POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND METAPHORICAL MOVEMENT

by

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A thesis
presented to the University of Manitoba
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Political Studies

Winnipeg, Manitoba

ISBN 0-315-71839-0

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

This study resulted from the intention of exploring the possibility of bridging the dichotomy between a theory of metaphor and the interdisciplinary use of metaphors. Essentially, this involved studying metaphor, not only in terms limited to the field of semantics, but as a concept that is properly an interdisciplinary phenomenon. The need for developing a theoretical framework that extended a theory of metaphor beyond semantics and into the phenomenal world required redefining metaphor as a sententional movement that brought together normally unassociated terms. This resulted in a theory of metaphor that shifted away from an interactive process emphasizing similarities between disparate things, and towards a theory of predicative movement that blended both identity and difference into a creative disclosure.

That metaphor is a configuration of normally unrelated words also meant that metaphor is a movement that evolves out of the same process that determines the literal meanings of words. The difference being, that metaphor is a predicative disclosure that arises out of ordinary

language by forcing a re-alignment of what is already held within the ordinary relationship between words. What constitutes the basis of this creative disclosure, though, is a sententional process that enables the imagination to appropriate ordinary meanings into a novel configuration. Through an integration between the imagination and the predicative function of the sentence, metaphor becomes a display of evolving images; a projection of images that evolves from the ordinary to the new.

Yet once we introduce the imagination as an intervening agent, then metaphor becomes a process that concerns the disclosure of that which bears 'relevance'. For through the sentence as a medium that links language to speech, the imagination represents the self's dialogical encounter with language as world. And what this encounter is, is the 'significance' that occurs for a being whose ontological condition is as one who is given over to discourse, to disclosedness, and the experience of participation. All of which become enhanced under conversation. For conversation effectively creates the conditions by which the self may undergo an experience with language that remains unhindered by the threat of tyranny or the arbitrary misuse of power.

Now his became evident, both in terms of defining what a metaphor is about, and in terms of defining the relationship between metaphors and the process and development of understanding and knowledge within political discourse. For not only is metaphor most appropriately made possible in conversation, but conversation as it related to political man, is also a metaphor that discloses the metaphorical nature of political man. By this I mean, that the 'conversation of political man' is a metaphorical accounting of the metaphorical exploration of being-in-the-world. And what this metaphorical accounting reveals is that the history of political man is the hidden history of the tyranny of conceptually disguised metaphors, of the totalization of a metaphorical order shaped by decree, and hence of ideas and concepts that appeared as self-contained truths. In the end, the metaphorical accounting of conversation reveals the plurality of political society, and as such, the dialogical encounter between self and world that is the unfolding of the possibilities of an ever evolving metaphorical disclosure.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the effort to complete this study on metaphor, several people contributed significantly to the final version. First and formost, I would like to give special thanks to my advisor, Prof. Ken Reshaur, whose direction, knowledge, and enthusiasm gave me the confidence and understanding necessary to complete this study. I would also like to thank both Prof. Robert Kroetsch, and Prof. George Knysh for their support on the committee, and their interest and insights concerning this study of metaphor.

In addition, there were many other individuals who contributed in both a scholarly and indirect way in my efforts to attain as comprehensive an analysis as was possible. Of those, I would specifically like to thank Prof. Len Kaminski, who offered insights and encouragement on a wide range of subject matter that was relevant to the particularities of this study. I would also like to thank Brent Olsen for his help and constructive comments on many difficult subjects.

In the end, though, it would not have been possible for me to complete this study on metaphor without the support and patience of my parents and family, who for years have

had to endure my haphazard and undisciplined approach to writing this thesis. Finally, I would like to thank the many friends (you know who you are), who have encouraged me in my efforts, and who have often suggested that I complete one thing in my life. Thanks to everyone.

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I

INTRODUCTION

If you were to scan any journal, article, or book that involved a study on some aspect of politics in general, you would be surprised to find that scholars and writers have extensively appealed to the use of metaphor when describing, prescribing, or analyzing socio-political cultures. One has only to look at any major study on politics and society to perceive the degree of reliance upon metaphor. References to contracts, organisms, systems, mechanisms, the marketplace, and solidarity repeatedly appear throughout the course of many of these studies; nor is this list exhaustive. In fact, metaphor essentially pervades throughout political discourse to the extent that it underlies the accepted framework for interpreting the socio-political world. Yet, such metaphors are quite often no longer recognized as metaphors but are simply reduced to conceptual frameworks that are promoted as the necessary methodology for interpreting the thoughts and actions of a particular group and nation, or perhaps of an entire age itself. For that reason, the study of metaphor as it applies to political discourse has largely been ignored, and those that have occured have

started from an analysis of a particular metaphorical concept; leaving aside the question of what defines a metaphor, and the relation that metaphorical meaning has to political discourse.

Similarly, studies on metaphor itself have traditionally focused on the theory of the inner workings of the metaphor, explaining what a metaphor is and how a metaphor develops. While many examples of metaphor are cited, very few of these studies have undertaken to explore the implications their theory of metaphor would have on the actual interpretations and roles of particular metaphors in other disciplines. Most, if not all, studies on metaphor tend to remain within the horizon of a semantic and linguistic framework of reference, so that like their counterparts in disciplines dealing with specific metaphors they tend to remain unmindful of the broader context and interrelatedness that language, and therefore, metaphor have. As a contribution to providing a linkage between the above disciplines, this study will both develop and explore a theory of metaphor, and apply that theory to the question of how metaphors become frameworks of knowledge, particularly in reference to political discourse. Essentially, this involves studying metaphor, not only in terms limited to the field of semantics, but as a concept that is properly an interdisciplinary phenomenon.

That there is a necessary connection between a theory of metaphor and the context of actual metaphors, points to the need for developing a theoretical framework that makes possible the link between semantics and the phenomenal world. Several of the more recent theories, particularly by Black, Davidson, Richards, and Ricoeur, offer substantial revisions to understanding the process of metaphor that may lead to the possibility of defining a theory of metaphor differently. But with the exception of Richards, the above thinkers still remain in one form or another under the spell of Aristotle's theory of metaphor and meaning, despite the significant move away from Aristotle's substitution theory of metaphor. If we are therefore to move towards a theory of metaphor that extends into the phenomenal world, we must begin by examining the theoretical basis for the continuation of Aristotle's influence.

Now, Aristotle's influence follows from the failure of Black, Davidson, and Ricoeur to challenge the fundamental Aristotlian principle that metaphor primarily concerns the question of likeness or identity. This oversight can be traced to the tacit assumption that Black, Davidson, and many writers on metaphor have on the concept of meaning. That being Aristotle's claim that the word is the fundamental unit of meaning, and that metaphor is, as a consequence of this interpretation, a non-proper word

that is to be regarded as redundant to the original meaning contained within the non-figurative word, (i.e the name of the thing). Hence many of the arguments put forward in contemporary theories of metaphor have not recognized the contradiction and ambiguity inherent in Aristotle's claim that metaphor is both an act of genius and an ornamental substitution.

This ambiguity within Aristotle's writings is what points to the need for a re-interpretation of what constitutes a metaphor. For Aristotle leaves open the door for a theory of metaphor that involves more than the question of identity. Together with Richards' interanimation theory, and Ricoeur's theory of sententional predication, the ambiguity in Aristotle's theory creates the possibility for a more far ranging interpretation of the process of metaphor. How we define a metaphor will therefore depend upon the new link between Aristotle and more recent thinkers on metaphor. A link that will not only touch upon the question of metaphor, but on the question of meaning as well. Therefore, in order fully to examine how metaphors develop and the way they affect our perceptions, I propose to begin my analysis by first critiquely reviewing the current accepted theories of metaphor. This is to be followed by a methodological re-interpretation of how a metaphor arises and the criterion by which we recognize a metaphor.

Now, the criterion of how we recognize a metaphor is important for developing an understanding of the process of metaphor, particularly in reference to how meaning arises. Yet, the question of meaning becomes also a question of sense and reference, so that to properly understand the meaning of metaphor requires a theory that examines the role of metaphor beyond the level of semantics. To move beyond semantics requires that we explore the grounds of what constitutes meaning outside of metaphor, because what has divided metaphor from literal forms of language reflects a theory that elevates the word over the sentence as the basis of meaning. And so long as the word retains its pivotal position, then theoretically, metaphor's extension into the phenomenal world remains undefined. Thus if we are to re-examine the structure of metaphor, we must also extend our analysis to include an exploration of how meaning arises.

Once we begin to explore the grounds by which metaphor and meaning become actualized, then it is essential that we acknowledge the phenomenal extension of metaphor, since by pointing to or saying something through metaphor one is, in fact, disclosing a context, situation, or sense. But to define metaphor as a semantic element that extends into the phenomenal world is to define metaphor as an aspect of language that involves disclosure, or the act of Saying. Saying,

however, should be understood as the means by which we disclose being-in-the-world, and since metaphor is an aspect of language through which Saying occurs, it becomes necessary that one undertake to explore metaphor's ontological significance. Now, the key to metaphor's ontological status is through its relationship to speech, because only through speech can language be continually recreated, extended, altered, and reshaped. Once it is understood that metaphor is the source of change and creativity in language, then speech becomes important as the mode through which metaphor is properly realized. Yet, speech is an activity whose appropriate setting is conversation, because only in a conversation is speech free to select and interpret what is being said without the threat of censorship or the imposition of rules and regulations by an authoritarian body. At a fundamental level, conversation is an open ended medium for disclosing oneself, and the world one lives in; and since metaphor is one of the means through which Saying occurs, then conversation becomes central to explicating a theory of metaphor.

But the explication of a theory of metaphor in terms of conversation also must be seen as two-sided, because while conversation is important as a medium through which metaphor arises, it is also important as a metaphor itself. Conversation is therefore not just

a medium by which language expresses itself, but also is to be perceived as a metaphor for participating in worlds. In other words, conversation is a metaphor of Saying, a meeting place for human intercourse, and a place where those who participate are able to disclose being-in-the-world. From an ontological point of view, it is the metaphor that makes present the actuality of Saying. Which means that not only is metaphor's ontological significance grounded in the medium of conversation, it is also revealed through conversation as a metaphor.

Now, if metaphorical meaning is understood as more than a problem of semantics, but of ontology as well, then metaphor is a question of what bears relevance, so that, instead of speaking of 'truth', one is referring to what is made true. Hence the importance of conversation, because if conversation is a process through which perception and understanding arise, then the question of metaphor's role for determining how knowledge arises becomes pivotal; particularly as it applies to political discourse. And by political discourse, I mean the mode of interpretation and understanding that political man undertakes in the course of explaining the political and social world. Once we accept that politics is about conversation, then metaphor becomes a central feature of how disclosure is presented; and is the subject of the final part of the study on metaphor. In other words,

because of metaphors's dual relationship to conversation, it will be proven that metaphor is not only a reflection of the nature of political man, but that metaphor constitutes the ground from which political man develops concepts that come to be defined as frameworks of knowledge concerning the socio-political world.

But before we arrive at an understanding of the relationship between metaphor and political man, the study of metaphor requires an approach that links the field of semantics, where metaphor was traditionally classified as one of several figurative tropes, and the social sciences, where various metaphors are found to be a part of the interpretive methodology. Hence the necessity of reviewing the current theories on metaphor. For these theories have evolved over time to a position where both their strengths and weaknesses require explication in order to provide the parameters for developing a theory of metaphor that begins with semantics, and passes through ontology on the way to knowledge. The following chapter is therefore a critical review of the prevailing theories offered by Max Black, (whose interaction theory is considered the definitive view); I.A. Richards, (whose theory initially provided the basis for Black's interaction theory); and Donald Davidson, (whose critique of Black's distinctions between the literal and the figurative form one of the main

arguments against Black's interpretation). At this stage, other than Aristotle, the contribution of other theories on metaphor will only be alluded to, since the arguments of these four writers form the starting point for a theory of metaphor that reaches beyond semantics.

II

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CURRENT THEORIES ON METAPHOR

When Aristotle referred to metaphor as a simile contracted into one word, he established not only the grounds from which a theory of metaphor would develop, but also indirectly designated the discipline under which a theory of metaphor was to be understood. Although Aristotle noted that the use of metaphor involved a change in a particular word's meaning, this change essentially came to be designated as an act of substitution. A definition of metaphor that was based on the perceptive capacity of identifying and naming 'the similar' between things that were 'dissimilar'.[1] Henceforth, metaphor was classified as one of several tropes, and was closely identified with the simile, since the parameters of both tropes were outlined in terms of the comparison of like things. In fact, the chief difference between the two was that simile was perceived as being an explicit comparison of the particular similarities between each thing, while metaphor implied the identity of the two objects compared.[2] As such, metaphor eventually evolved into a trope that was regarded as

redundant to the original meaning that is contained within the non-figurative word, (i.e. the name of the thing). For Aristotle, because metaphor is classified as a non-proper word, metaphor comes to be defined in terms of its relation to the noun.

Now, the importance of the noun to an understanding of metaphor can be traced to the importance and the direction that Aristotle gives to the analysis of lexis, roughly understood as language expression. According to Ricoeur, instead of analyzing lexis as a mode of speech, "which would link up notions such as command, prayer, simple statement, threat, question, answer, etc.," Aristotle passes over to an analysis of lexis in terms of the parts or constituents of diction, which includes not only the noun, but speech, (logos), as well.[3] It follows, that since the noun is common to both metaphor and the enumeration of parts of speech, metaphor comes to be understood in terms of a segment of discourse, and not at the level of discourse itself.

The emergence of the noun as the central figure of language, is apparent when we consider that, for Aristotle, the noun is the first semantic entity to be accorded status as a composite significant sound; a position which was defined in opposition to the invisible sound of the letter and the meaningless sound of the syllable, article, and conjunction. In addition, not only is the

noun a composite significant sound, but it is a composite unit that is meaningful by itself.[4] Meaning is therefore explicated at the level of the word, and since metaphor is defined as the change of the meaning of nouns it too becomes subject to the dominance of the word. Metaphor, in fact, comes to be defined in opposition to the meaning of the proper word for a thing. Metaphor is simply presented as a substitute to add flavor to what one says, but adds nothing to the meaning of what one is saying, because by resubstituting the proper word one can see that the meaning of what was said remains unaltered.

By analyzing lexis in terms of the component parts of speech, particularly the noun, Aristotle denys any role for the sentence in the determination of meaning. While Aristotle does acknowledge that the sentence is a compound composed of nouns and verbs from which meaning is conveyed, he does not go into the question of how a sententional process expresses meaning. As such, this decisive shift away from the level of discourse had profound implications for a theory of metaphor. Essentially, by opposing metaphor to the name of the thing in itself at the level of the word, Aristotle lays the groundwork for a theory of metaphor that involves substitution and not movement, thereby introducing the distinction between words proper, (literal words), and non-proper words, (figurative words). The classification

of metaphor into a non-proper word associated with terms that are ornamental, strange, invented, lengthened, and shortened, places metaphor on the other side of meaning. Whereas, words that Aristotle identifies in the Poetics as "regular words" are substantive words whose meaning is made clear through their use as a conventional expression in society.[5]

Once Aristotle defines metaphor as a transference at the level of the word, the study of metaphor takes place as an adjunct to the study of the meaning of words. In the ancient world such study was more often associated with philosophical inquiry, but in the age of specialization, Aristotle's theoretical classifications became properly the preserve of the field of semantics. Initially, this caused little change in the approach to a study of metaphor, since metaphor was viewed as peripheral to the meaning of words, and remained limited to those studies interested in linguistic ornamentation and style, or to a taxonomy of tropes. However, recent studies on language, particularly how we acquire new meaning, began to focus on metaphor as a possible source for how meaning arises, while simultaneously challenging the traditional Aristotelian theory of metaphor. As a result of metaphor's original link to the word through a theory of substitution, the most significant early criticism of Aristotle's theory developed through an analysis of metaphor in terms of its semantic role.

Of these studies, there emerged two significant contributions that effectively ended Aristotle's dominance. The earliest, and as we will see later, perhaps the more far-reaching, was I. A. Richards' Philosophy of Rhetoric, published in 1936 during the height of positivist influence. According to Richards, metaphor is not a simple transference of one term for another, but is a transaction between contexts, a borrowing between an intercourse of thoughts, that is supported by a single word, or a phrase, and whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.[6] Metaphor is therefore not a single word in opposition to the principal subject, (proper word), but is the co-presence of the vehicle and the tenor, or the principal subject and the subsidiary subject. Yet, the co-presence of the two words does not create a limited or static meaning, but tends to cause meaning to vary according to the extent of their interanimation.[7] Which is to say that meaning develops through a process of interanimation that brings forth the interpretive possibilities of the whole utterance. With the utterance, we no longer refer to a simple substitution between two words, but to a movement of words through the course of the sentence.[8] Thus, through the application of words to different sentences, meaning undergoes a constant change, and is subject to the variation of context that each word brings to the sentence.

By linking meaning to the co-operating of component words during the course of an utterance, Richards elevates meaning to the level of the sentence, and away from the dominance of the word. If the word can no longer be associated with the fundamental ground of meaning, then Aristotle's subordination of metaphor to isolated parts of discourse becomes problematical. Now, the importance that Richards' theory had for discourse will be dealt with later; however, it should be noted, that once meaning is explicated in terms of movement, then metaphor becomes a function of the sentence and not the word. In fact, if meaning is directly related to the interanimation of words at the level of the sentence, then the distinction that centered on the question of meaning and contributed to the dichotomy between figurative and literal words becomes questionable. As Richards states, "a word may be simultaneously both literal and metaphoric, and just as it may simultaneously support many different metaphors, it may serve to focus into one meaning many different meanings."[9]

Although Richards' theory on the nature and significance of metaphor was extensive, it had little impact at the time. Firstly, Richards was not a philosopher, nor did he have a highly visible reputation. Secondly, his arguments were viewed as a radical departure from the accepted wisdom of the time; a

predominantly positivist approach that continued to eschew any association with the figurative aspects of language. As things stood, it would require someone with a respected reputation, along with the decline of positivism, before any serious consideration for metaphor was to be given.

By 1962, with the publication of Models and Metaphors by the philosopher Max Black, circumstances had so changed that many scholars were open to the possibility for a renewal of the study on metaphor and meaning. Although Black's theory of metaphor was essentially drawn from Richards interanimation theory, it was to be Black's interaction version that was to become the definitive statement on metaphor. Now, according to Black, the interaction theory is committed to the the following seven claims:

> 1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects.....a "principal" subject and a "subsidiary" one.
>
> 2) These subjects are often best regarded as "systems of things," rather than "things."
>
> 3) The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of "associated implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject.
>
> 4) These implications usually consist of "commonplaces" about the subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer.
>
> 5) The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.

> 6) This involves shifts in meaning of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers. (The subordinate metaphors are, however, to be read less "emphatically").
>
> 7) There is, in general, no simple 'ground' for the necessary shifts of meaning...no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail.[10]

At an initial glance, Black's interaction theory appears to be a refinement and follow-up of Richards' earlier theory. On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that while Black's theory accepts some of Richards' tenets, he departs in ways both progressive and retrogressive from Richards' conclusions. Black does re-constitute Richards' interanimation theory in the sense that two thoughts are related through an interactive process. A process that incites the hearer to select some of the properties from the secondary subject, thereby creating a contextual framework to fit the primary subject, while also simultaneously altering elements of the secondary subject.[11] Similarly, Black notes that a powerful metaphor elicits a re-ordering of the intendant meaning by appropriating a "system of things" from a similar family of associated implications, on to the "system of things" of the principal subject. Thus like Richards, Black establishes the importance of context in the development of meaning. However, by introducing systems, Black goes beyond Richards explication of what is

implied by the interaction of context. For Black, context is not limited to the distinction between different things, between words whose meaning is defined in terms of a semantic ordering or an implied structure of thought. Instead, the interaction between two words involves a shift or transfer of backgrounds, or perhaps entire networks, from which meaning is drawn forth. In other words, meaning arises because what is brought to bear through the interaction of words is the interpenetration of a range of contextual relationships, whose appropriateness is determined by the speaker and hearer's ability to organize and project a shift in meaning from what they understand about words on a particular occasion.

While Black acknowledges that metaphor involves a transfer or displacement of meaning, he does not follow Richards' lead, that metaphor is a movement of meanings that arises in the course of an utterance, and therefore, at the level of the sentence. Instead, Black retains Aristotle's conception of the primacy of the word in semantic meaning, and with it, the traditional dichotomy between literal and figurative words. Now, it is important to understand, that for Black, the figurative word is not referred to as a metaphor, but contains a metaphorical sense, which acts as the frame upon the literal focus. Thus what metaphor involves

is the transference of meaning through the interaction of the figurative and the literal word. Yet, to speak of transference is to denote an attribute of movement. As Ricoeur points out, movement is defined in terms of what Aristotle refers to as the epiphora of the word, which is the transposition of all linguistic entites, and is the process that properly designates a change in meaning. In fact, the word phora itself, according to Ricoeur, "means a kind of change, a change with respect to location."[12] Ricoeur even goes so far as to say, that one cannot speak of metaphor without designating epiphora. Thus if one carries this argument to its logical conclusion, then metaphor should be classified as a process of displacement between one pole and the other; a displacement that is more likely to begin at the level of the sentence.

However, for Black, the question of transference is defined in relation to the idea of borrowing. The focal term is defined in terms of a connection made with an alien, or normally unassociated word. Each term is related by means of an application of one words' context onto the other, and not through the process of movement between words in a sentence. Interestingly, at one point, Black does speak of the metaphorical sentence, but he drifts off into questions on the relation between meaning and associated commonplaces.[13]

Black's failure to recognize the sententional source of metaphor, and his subsequent subordination of the sentence to the word, results from his appeal to accepted language conventions, and, as such, to what qualify's as a literal word. In order to be able to recognize a metaphor, it is necessary, according to Black, to have recourse to a set of syntactical and semantical rules, as well as, a common standard of beliefs. The ability to appeal to rules and convention is what sets metaphor apart. Yet, as Michael Polanyi points out, it is not rules and conventions alone that distinguish metaphor from other grammatical forms of language. It is the capacity of metaphor to infuse what is significant within the words themselves as they bear upon each other and as they are thought to relate to some of the inchoate experiences within our own lives. And how this occurs does not depend on rules and conventions, for they are tacitly assumed when words are given in a grammatical expression. Instead, the difference must rest with the imaginative performance that takes place when non-associated words are brought together.[14] It follows, that as long as Black continues to accept the traditional separation of metaphor from what is grammatically appropriate, then metaphor cannot be said to achieve a true interaction, but must remain grounded within a theory of comparisons; not in the sense of the traditional theory, but in relation to a question of paradox, or a violation of

rules. For in Black's words, a metaphorical statement essentially involves "an act of violence, which produces nonsense or self-contradiction."[15]

Now, it is important to note, that the problem of paradox or contradiction does not develop out of the relationship of two or more equally weighted terms, but is achieved as a result of the significance given to the principal propositional word. For that reason, when metaphor is defined as a paradox, it is because it is perceived only from the standpoint of the principal literal word in the sentence. For example, in Black's statement, "Man is a wolf", a paradox is denoted, thereby implying the presence of a metaphor, since the interaction of the words wolf and man violates commonly understood beliefs about what literally constitutes a man as opposed to a wolf.[16] Although the meaning of each word is not confined to a strict lexical reference, the attributes of what constitutes the meaning of each word is governed by the word's contextual constellation of accepted relations. Meaning is therefore determined by the specific referential ideas by which each word is commonly understood. Which is to say that meaning primarily is a result of what constitutes the words pivotal function in the sentence. For Black, like Aristotle, the word is the central unit of meaning because it embodies the semantic identity. In the course of a statement, or an

utterance, it is the principal word about which meaning is referred to, so that any change in meaning must both depend on and appeal to what is accepted as the principal word's normally understood meaning. So long as the primary locus of meaning is associated with the word, then metaphor is more an interactive application, than a transpositional movement. In other words, if the word's position is the semantic kernel about which meaning revolves, then metaphor must be identified as a correlative process in which the subsidiary word(s) is directly related to the principal word in the sentence. A process that must be seen to occur at the level of the word, and not at the level of the sentence.

Black's inability to appreciate the role of the sentence in the determination of meaning, leaves unanswered the question of what makes a figurative word figurative. While Black retains Aristotle's opposition between the literal and the figurative, he notes that all words in the sentence bring their literal meaning into contact. However, if the interaction of the two primary words is to involve displacement for a metaphor to arise, then what feature is available that enables a word to be accorded an additional metaphorical sense? It is just this question that Donald Davidson attempts to answer in a radical paper that is essentially a criticism of the tension theory that Black and many other semanticists have

advocated concerning the possibility of metaphorical meaning. A criticism that is directed against the notion that through a particular tension that is forced between particular words, one or more of these words comes to reveal a normally hidden metaphorical sense.

According to Davidson, the distinction between the figurative and the literal cannot be ascertained from the meaning of the words themselves, because in metaphor the words used mean nothing more than what they are understood in their most literal interpretation to mean.[17] Instead, the explanation of how a metaphor works must turn on the distinction between what a metaphor means and what they are used for. From Davidson's point of view, how a metaphor develops depends on the use made of the employment of words and sentences. And for Davidson, how we use words in a metaphor depends on the imaginative application of the literal meaning that each word carries; an application that is delimited by the context that the words are being used in. In fact, Davidson goes on to suggest that, the preoccupation with establishing a metaphorical meaning alongside a word's literal meaning stems from the natural inclination to assume that if ordinary acts denoting similarity elicit ordinary meanings then it is likely that unusual similarities invoked by metaphor posit unusual or metaphorical meanings. Once it is assumed that metaphor follows the same semantic rules as ordinary

language, then certain words are assumed to take on a new or extended meaning in relation to the accepted class of meanings associated with the ordinary word.[18]

This distinction between the ordinary meaning of the word and the figurative rests on the assumption that what metaphor is involved with is a kind of ambiguity, an uncertainty as to the actual meanings of the words used. But as Davidson notes, metaphor cannot simply be a result of ambiguity, because quite often we immediately recognize that a metaphor is being employed, nor is there any uncertainty as to the meaning of the metaphorical passage. If there is ambiguity it is due to the different use employed of words, and not to an ambiguity that would allow for the possibility of either an ordinary or metaphorical meaning to arise. On the whole, Davidson tends to dismiss the role of ambiguity, because he essentially portrays the recognition of a metaphor as a simultaneous recognition that each word in the metaphorical passage has been decisively interpreted as to their ordinary meanings.[19]

But is it safe to assume that ambiguity of meaning has been resolved? Israel Scheffler, for one, has noted the different ways that words may be said to be ambiguous. For instance, a word may be said to carry two or more interpretations in the same passage, the resolution of either remaining indecisive, given that

each interpretation is considered valid. This argument is clearly in evidence in the statement, 'Maria bore Michael and Lisa,' where the word 'bore' lends itself to the possibility that the passage is about birth, being carried, or being sustained. Nor can we unequivically say that the names Michael and Lisa are referring to children, adults, or perhaps even animals.[20] But then again, it is clear that Davidson is not concerned to express a theory of metaphorical meaning, and so does not explore the relationship between the polysemic nature of meaning in ordinary language and the possibility of metaphor. For it must be remembered, that in Davidson's interpretation, metaphor is a question of imaginative use, and in that sense, hinges on what he refers to as the dichotomy between, "learning a new use for an old word with using a word already understood," the former of which concerns metaphor.[21]

Davidson attempts to justify his claim by appealing to a consideration of dead metaphors. He suggests that it doesn't matter that a word can be ambiguously interpreted, but that what does matter is that when the word was applied metaphorically, it made the hearer notice some type of similarity. In contrast, once a word is understood in its present setting one is no longer asked to take notice of what is being pointed to. Words that were once used metaphorically are now understood as dead

metaphors because they posit nothing more than what they refer to. For example, according to Davidson, the metaphorical statement "He was burned up" was once a live metaphor that incited the hearer to picture an image about what the words were about, but currently it "suggests nothing more than that he was very angry."[22] Here the distinction suggests that with a metaphor we are asked to look beyond the meaning of the words, to take notice of a referential image that is revealed through the use that words can have in a given context. In other words, what Davidson seems to be implying is that metaphor is not a problem of semantics, but is directly related to the individual's psychological capacity to employ words in the service of the imagination. While with dead metaphors it is not a question of using one's imagination to perceive similarities, of looking beyond the words, but simply to decide which meaning is suitable to each word in the course of an utterance. A difference between the active use of the mind and the somewhat passive acceptance of what appears to be a limited range of ordinary meanings. It follows, therefore, that the difference between a live and a dead metaphor centers around what a metaphor is understood to be doing. And in this sense, metaphor is not about a change in the meaning of the words used, but concerns the context in which the words have been imaginatively used.

However, as Stephen Davies has pointed out, this portion of Davidson's argument is rather weak. As Davies states, it is difficult to understand why the original intimations of the live metaphor come to be lost. Moreover, if the literal meaning from the statement "He was burned up" did not derive from the lost intimations, then how does the dead metaphor come to acquire this newly posited meaning.[23] Although Davidson's explanation of the difference between what a dead metaphor means and how a live metaphor works remains problematical, he does extend his analysis into a consideration that includes a comparison of metaphor and simile. According to Davidson, when we invoke a simile we are declaring nothing more than the similarity itself; "the simile states there is a likeness, but leaves it to us to pick out some common feature or features."[24] Similarly, to employ a metaphor is not to explicitly affirm a likeness, but to notice that something common between things is to be sought. Now, when we employ a simile, we are not maintaining that the words used refer to some second or alternative meaning. The words simply convey the meaning that something is to be compared, but the point or intentionality of that comparison remains outside the scope of the meaning of the words used. To understand the point of what one is saying through a simile requires that one understand the context of use.

For that reason, "what words do with their literal meaning in a simile must be possible for them to do in metaphor."[25] The words used in a metaphor call attention to some form of similarity, although not the same similarities as a simile, and like a simile do not depend on the meaning of the words for disclosing the subtle parallels or analogies evoked by the metaphor. Although Davidson does attempt to understand metaphor by understanding a simile, he does not suggest as Nelson Goodman does, that the difference between metaphor and simile is negligible, because they essentially concern the same thing, (i.e. the likening of one thing to another).[26] Davidson's position is somewhat more complex. To begin with, it is important to remember that Davidson's argument is concerned with how we use words as opposed to the question of meaning implied by a comparison of the words 'like' and 'is'. The latter of which remains bound to a theory that continues to explain metaphor in terms of the problem of semantic ambiguity. It is because simile and metaphor are to be understood as an activity of linguistic use that Davidson is able to interpret metaphor in terms of simile. The result thereof, is not that metaphor has been reduced to the level of a simile, but that simile has been raised beyond a question of semantics to a level that is concerned with the explication of words as they are used.

Although Davidson's elevation of simile is important for understanding the question of context and the development of a theory of metaphor that reaches beyond semantics, it also contributes to a theory of metaphor that if accepted has no recourse but to be reduced to a theory of comparisons. If metaphor is a process through which one is nudged towards noticing the common elements between things then metaphor must still require that comparison take place, for how is one to notice what is common without some form of comparison occuring. In fact, if we examine this part of Davidson's theory more closely, it becomes apparent that much of what he states leads one to conclude that metaphor is essentially a process that reveals already constituted relations of likeness. In that way, Davidson seems to follow the view held by Eugene Miller, that metaphor is a linguistic act that involves the discovery and revelation of the similarities between things. But that once metaphor has revealed what is intrinsic between things, it can be discarded as unessential to further understanding the nature of what has now been discovered.[27] What we are therefore left with is a theory of metaphor that has been accorded the status of an instrument designed to aid in the interpretation and understanding of things, but does not itself contribute to the creation of alternative perceptions.

The underlying view that metaphor is more functional than creative stems from a theory that emphasizes the context of use as the criterion by which metaphor is to be understood; and which also causes Davidson to make the error of attempting to separate metaphor from semantics. A possibility that is likely to arise once it is accepted that metaphor relies on nothing more than a literal meaning, and that such meaning is a result of the predominance given to the word as the focus of how meaning develops. For Davidson, like Black, associates the development of meaning with the word's pivotal function in the sentence, precluding thereby the possibility of a transpositional movement which would enable the words in a sentence to form a meaning that is altogether distinct from the constellation of ordinary meaning associated with each words' occurrence. A problem, however, that Black is able to sidestep, because metaphor is linked to a shift or movement between the figurative and the literal word. An option that is not available for Davidson since he has already negated the possibility of explicating a theory of meaning that centers on the distinction between the literal and figurative.

Without a procedure for generating a change in meaning, no mechanism exists from which a semantic theory of metaphorical meaning may arise. On the other hand, if there exists no way of determining how a change in

meaning occurs, then how a word acquires its literal meaning becomes problematical as well; a question that we will leave aside for the moment. It follows, that if the words in a metaphor imply no semantic alteration of meaning then a metaphor can only be interpreted as a linguistic activity through which one is required to relate apparently distinct entities by comparing those aspects they have in common. A proposition that inevitably leads to a denial of both the interaction and interanimation theory, since there exists no framework through which either interaction or movement could take place.

Once it is accepted that the words used in a metaphorical expression mean nothing more than what they literally say, then the sentences in which metaphors occur can be interpreted as either true or false. For Davidson, to recognize a sentence as metaphorical is to understand that the meaning of the words used is literally false.[28] In fact, Davidson claims that one of the chief differences between metaphor and simile is that while the words used in a metaphor are literally false, in a simile they are literally true. It is because we perceive an absurdity as to the meaning of the words used that we recognize a metaphor, thereby requiring that we search out the intended hidden implications of what the metaphor points to.[29] Yet, as Black states, if in a simile

all things are true, then why is it necessary to use metaphor to nudge us into recognizing something common, when a simile would do just as well. What Black suggests, is that if we are to accept Davidson's distinction between a simile and a metaphor, then metaphor should be assimilated to hyperbole, which is an exaggerated or elliptical simile.[30] But Black has somewhat dismissed the importance that Davidson gives to the role played by the literal meaning of words in a metaphor. Accordingly, metaphor cannot simply be equated with an elliptical simile since the original meaning of the words upon which the metaphor depends could not be considered a literal equivalent to the words in the simile itself.[31] In this case, we would have to say that Davidson's defense is grounded in the inability of metaphor to be paraphrased. This is not to deny that paraphrase may have a role in determining the interpretation of a metaphor--a question--to be considered later.

Now, according to Davidson, one consequence of his theory of metaphor is that metaphor should be understood as similar to speech acts, such as telling a lie, asserting, hinting, promising, or criticizing, all of which concern the use of words and not what they mean.[32] Yet, Davidson's example of telling a lie is not the same as saying a metaphor. To say that "Lattimore is a Communist " may involve telling a lie, but it cannot be

mistaken for a metaphor. For a lie to be successful it requires that the words used make sense according to their ordinary meanings tacitly understood. Hence with a lie, it is important that the speaker choose words that remain persuasive, but that do not force the hearer to think through to what the words are revealing. The chances are, however, that by using words normally unassociated one is likely to find it difficult to convey a lie, because what the words appear to be saying points to the need for interpretation and not simply agreement. In a certain sense, therefore, telling a lie is fundamentally a problem of intentionality, since how the words are used specifically determines the success or failure of the lie. On the other hand, with the metaphor "from hands no tears flow" we have a configuration of words that appear to be remotely connected, so that the meaning of what they disclose is not found within a community's ordinary usage. It is a configuration that initially is interpreted as an absurdity, insofar as it is perceived that the chosen words are not normally associated, and therefore seem to be held in a state of tension with one another. And absurdity is not a question of falseness, but is more a problem of the relationship between words.

Thus, if we accept that metaphor denotes an absurdity, or what Ricoeur refers to as an impertinence, then it also

becomes evident that the recognition of this incompatibility exists at the level of semantics. For how do we explain that an absurdity arises, if not through how the words interact at the level of a sententional utterance. Context plays a significant role but more along the lines of Black's interaction of associated and unassociated commonplaces. Consequently, while Davidson is correct in his assertion that the words used in a metaphor mean nothing other than what they are ordinarily interpreted as, his theory leaves unsolved the problem of how the literal meaning of certain words are to be interpreted as a metaphorical application; particularly since Davidson has not established any criterion for concluding that metaphor should be classified as a speech act as opposed to a semantic process.

Essentially, for Davidson, the source of the problem is much the same as Black's, although with different consequences. For neither Davidson nor Black have followed up on Richards' interpretation of meaning and metaphor in terms of the movement and interaction of words at the level of the sentence. The result has been that both theories have tried to explain a theory of metaphor that focusses primarily on either semantics or context, but that is unable to bridge the two, or at the very least, extend its theory to a proper consideration of the other. As such, only by returning to Richards' approach

concerning how words interanimate, and how metaphor results from this interanimation, will it be possible to establish the grounds for a reconsideration of both Black's and Davidson's approach, as well as providing the initial framework from which a reconstituted theory of metaphor will develop.

III

A RE-INTERPRETATION OF MEANING: FROM WORD TO SENTENCE

3.1 THE NOMINALIST CRITIQUE

It is evident through our examination of the recent controversy between Black and Davidson, that the difficulties regarding the interpretation of metaphor began with Aristotle's subordination of metaphor to the word. This initial error resulted from a theory of meaning that focussed on the act of naming, or the application of a word to a particular thing. Now, the correlation between word and thing does not develop in a vacuum, but is rather the relationship between certain words that are understood to belong properly to certain kinds of things. The meaning of these terms therefore comes to be referred to as proper meaning, whereas, metaphor and other figurative tropes that do not signify a name are defined as borrowed or alien words; a term that is interpreted as a type of absence or lack in relation to the actual name of the thing. For that reason, metaphor and other figurative tropes came to be simply

classified as non-proper words in opposition to the proper name of the thing itself.[1] Once metaphor was identified as a borrowed term in relation to the primary proper word in a sentence, it signaled the development of a theory of metaphor that was limited to simple substitution or some form of comparison.

Yet, the dichotomy between proper and non-proper meaning rests on the premise that to name something is equivalent to knowing about the thing itself. An idea based on the assumption that naming is the creation of a linguistic sign that delineates a parallel resemblance to the thing so named.[2] As Plato has argued, however, words are not accurate representations of the thing itself, whether by sound or signification, but are labelled as appropriate or correct according to custom and convention. To name something is to give signification to an object or phenomenon in a manner consistent with the prevailing conception of the time. In this way, the criterion for determining the meaning of a word has nothing to do with resemblance, since a word may be made up of letters unrelated by sound or form to the thing disclosed.[3] If Plato is correct in saying that the relationship between the name and the thing has no referential basis, then a theory that grounds meaning in the word's capacity to represent the being of the thing itself becomes problematical, and with it a theory of metaphor that

develops in opposition to the noun's position as the primary source of meaning. However, if metaphor is to be detached from a theory that centers on the word as the primary source of meaning it is necessary to follow up on Plato's argument against the nominalist theory of what constitutes proper meaning.

Now if we agree that because words are a composition of letters and sounds without reference, then the relatedness of the word to the thing becomes a question of not only like but of unlike, as well. A distinction for Plato that is analogous to the distinction between truth and falsehood. According to Plato, therefore, any sign can be demonstrated to be either true or false in relation to the thing itself, because all designations of a thing are somewhat arbitrary, limited only by the conventions that prevail within a language community at any one time.[4] However, as Gadamer points out, the appeal to custom or convention does not by itself establish the problem of falsity as the ground through which the sign conceals the thing while simultaneously asserting itself. For the very "intelligibility of the sign lies precisely in the fact that it points away from itself and does not assert itself as an independent reality but merely serves its function."[5] What makes Plato's argument valid, though, is that despite the fact that the sign points beyond itself, it nevertheless depends on convention for

its meaning, because it is only through convention that a sign comes to acquire the meaning that it has. As such, it opens up the possibility of the sign revealing something that does not represent the thing meant. Thus for Plato the arbitrary nature of convention provided for the possiblity of ambiguity within the meaning of the sign.

Although Plato acknowledges that ambiguity in the sign has its origin in the community and not in relation to the thing itself, he still leaves unanswered the question of how ambiguity arises in the sign; and therefore how meaning develops through the actuality of the sign. Now, the answer to this question can be found in the study of semiology, a term defined by de Saussure, "as a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life."[6] However, as Ricoeur notes, for de Saussure "the sign is par excellence a word,"[7] and semiology primarily is the study by which the sign as word is made to represent ideas, both as a written mark as well as a verbal utterance. Now, according to de Saussure, the sign is not a link between a thing and a name, a point in agreement with Plato, but between a concept and its abstract articulation, or what he calls the signification and the signal.[8] Which is to say that the sign is composed of a link between a general notion or idea and the hearer's psychological impression of a sound. From this link de

Saussure deduces a fundamental characteristic which governs the nature of the sign. He expresses this as follows, "the link between signal and signification is arbitrary. But since we are treating a sign as the combination in which a signal is associated with a signification, we can express this more simply as: the linguistic sign is arbitrary."[9]

What de Saussure contends, is that there is no ground that would justify the existence of a necessary connection between an idea and a sequence of sounds; a fact that can be demonstrated by the differences between languages, or at the very least, by the existence of different languages. Instead, what determines how a signal becomes identified with a signification rests upon the collective habit or convention of a particular society, and not upon some natural connection in reality. For that reason, according to de Saussure, the connection between signal and signification is to be seen as unmotivated, because "the individual has no power to alter a sign once it has been established in a linguistic community."[10] Which means that the arbitrary relation between signal and signification is not based on an open-ended freedom to choose, but is limited to the influence of a language that responds to the constant participation of the members of a given linguistic community.

Once it is accepted that the arbitrary nature of the sign leaves a residual ambiguity as to the possible meaning of the word then a theory of meaning must begin with an understanding of the polysemic nature of the word and not from the basis of a semic analysis; where words are said to convey meaning by themselves. However, if the question of meaning is defined in terms of polysemy then both Black's and Davidson's theory of metaphor requires a re-interpretation as to what defines the literal meaning of a word, and with it, the possibility of metaphorical meaning. To begin with, both Black and Davidson define the literal meaning of a word in terms of a system of associated commonplaces. In this case, the literal meaning of a word is understood to result from an accepted standard of beliefs that are the common possession of members of a particular speech community. For both Black and Davidson the common view shapes the shared language, so that sentences are deemed to hold true insofar as what they say depends on the capacity for successful communication. On the other hand, it should be noted, that while Black is more concerned to limit meaning to beliefs, Davidson wants to link the notion of a common view to a corresponding reality. For Davidson, this may be summed up as follows;

> "The basic claim is that much community of belief is needed to provide a basis for communication or understanding; the extended claim should then be that objective error can occur only in a setting of largely true belief. Agreement does not make for truth, but much of what is agreed

must be true if some of what is agreed is false."[11]

Now, Davidson's position is intended to link the notion of agreement to the capacity to communicate, since it follows, that for there to be successful communication the possiblity for a massive error in interpretation must be precluded. As such, Davidson attempts to define a theory of truth through the explication of how the meaning of a sentence comes to be determined as either true or false. Accordingly, for a sentence to hold true the meaning of the words must correspond to some recognized belief about reality; a condition that arises through how the composition of a sentence occurs.[12] To say "that a cloud is passing before the sun " is to understand that there is a sun, that clouds are made of water vapor, and that clouds are capable of atmospheric movement, and so on.[13] The meaning that the sentence predicates is therefore directly a result of the role the word has as a referential unit whose meaning extends beyond the boundaries of context.

Although Davidson acknowledges the role that a community has in shaping the meaning of words, his explanation of how a word is to acquire that meaning amounts to simply defining the method of interpretation as a quantification of probabilities in reference to a particular set of beliefs held by a given community.

In this case, we may say that a word's meaning results from the interpretive application of an accepted range of beliefs that are to be understood as an accurate guage of reality. What Davidson does not explain, however, is that since words change meaning over the course of time, it requires that some mechanism be available for change to occur. Thus while Davidson is concerned with the explanation of the possible truth-conditions within the predicative function of the sentence, he fails to note how predication is the means by which we disclose a context, situation, or sense. Now, the disclosure of a context, situation, or sense is fundamentally the way in which language is projected into the phenomenal world. And if the predicative function of the sentence is the means by which semantics is linked to the phenomenal world, then the act of predicating something becomes the source for how meaning arises.[14] Without acknowledging the importance of the predicative function of the sentence, Davidson leaves us with the problem of trying to explain how we measure reality in a manner that would enable a word to be identified as meaningfully isolated from another word when the community of belief that is to convey such concreteness is itself a configuration of individuals in a web of relationships.

As such, if there exists no mechanism for explaining how a word acquires or changes meaning, then Davidson's

theory on meaning remains problematical, because by defining metaphor without considering the problem of how meaning develops, we are left with no grounds for appealing to some accepted criterion of what defines a literal word. Moreover, if the meaning of the word depends upon the interpretive possibilities open to a community then ambiguity must be assumed to be intrinsic to a words meaning. And so long as a word's meaning remains ambiguous, then Davidson's attempt to explicate a theory of metaphor outside the parameters of a theory of meaning is placed in doubt, since at the level of the word nothing precludes the possibility of a word denoting some type of metaphorical sense.

On the other hand, if Davidson's position remains unsupported, this does not mean that we have no alternative but to fall back to a position advocated by Black. For if you remember, it was previously noted that Black's interaction theory is hardly a true interaction, given the central role that the principal word carries in the explication of a sentence's meaning. In fact, what Black refers to as an interaction is more in the line of a 'revolving correspondence' between the principal word and all other subsidiary words within the sentence. To use an analogy, it is simply the case that the principal word is to the subsidiary words what the sun is to the planets. And as the sun determines the physical condition that each

planet has, so too does the principal word provide the guiding basis of how each other word is to be understood. Therefore, as long as meaning hinges on a theory that relativizes the role and importance of words within a sentence, then Black's deference to a system of commonplaces as a source of how meaning arises must be considered underdeveloped. In other words, if some words are perceived only in light of a principal subject, then these words are not able to bring into play what Goodman has referred to as a word's home realm. And without appealing to each word's background, the full impact of the contextual nature of the predicative function of the sentence is not realized; thereby precluding an explanation of how the word comes to be associated with a particular meaning.

In addition to the above problems inherent in Black's theory, there still remains the criticism that Davidson levelled against Black regarding how we are to define what a word means when used in a metaphorical utterance. Now, as was pointed out, with Davidson, there is no doubt as to how we are to interpret the meaning of the words used. For they convey nothing other than their literal sense. However, because Davidson tacitly accepts this explanation without further inquiring into the nature of how meaning arises, his theory is essentially vague and unsupported. Yet not without grounds. Where we

are to find these grounds, though, will take us away from a narrow consideration of speech acts only, and back to what has been implicit within Richards' interanimation theory. That being, the predicative element associated with the sentence, and how the act of predication becomes the initial starting point for a theory of metaphor that is to bridge semantics to the phenomenal world. But to understand the full importance of Richards' theory will require that we once again return to de Saussure, because to understand how words acquire the meanings that they have, we will have to explore the nature of the relatedness that words have.

3.2 THE SENTENTIONAL SOURCE OF MEANING

If a particular linguistic community contributes to the actuality of a sign's identified range of meanings, then comunication is not about the thing itself, but reflects the interrelatedness of members of a community who are given over to participating in a plural range of possible relationships. de Saussure makes it clear, that it is because of the arbitrary nature of the sign that we are able to understand more easily why it needs social

activity to create a linguistic system. A fact that is plainly evident when we come to explain the basis for distinguishing between the value of one sign and another. For de Saussure, though, in order for a sign to assume a certain value, it is necessary that there be some form of general agreement and usage through which they come to be understood. Yet, to say that agreement forms the basis of how words are compared, is to overlook what Wittgenstein has noted is the point of agreement. For when we refer to agreement as a basis of how the language-game is conceived we are not establishing a ground through which values and meaning arise, we are simply outlining the rules of the game.[15] And how rules arise must be seen in the light of experience, where the 'use' of words leads us to where values and meaning occur.[16] A consideration that rules out the impact an individual acting alone is likely to have, because no one person is capable of establishing a value that requires others to both understand and accept.[17]

Where de Saussure is correct, however, is in how words are used. No word stands outside of the actuality of its saying, so that when we invoke a 'word' we are, in fact, presupposing the possibility of other words. For it stands to reason, that to be able to say that a word carries a certain value is to acknowledge the relatedness that words have. Hence the value of any one element must depend on the simultaneous coexistence of all other values,

since no word has a value that can be identified independently of other values within the vicinity: the logic of the concept requires this.[18] A consequence which inevitably leads to the assumption that language is to be defined as a system where each word is to be understood in the setting in which it occurs, where the actuality of each word comes to influence the value and, therefore, the meaning by which each word is perceived. It follows, that if words depend upon the participation of a linguistic community for their meaning, then meaning is not a correlation between word and thing, but is about what is made appropriate or significant by the interaction of members of a particular linguistic group.[19]

On the other hand, to speak of what is appropriate or significant is to introduce the question of relevance to those who participate in a particular linguistic community. In this way, it may be said that as discourse occurs so then does meaning arise, because what concerns a linguistic community is the meaning that is posited in the actuality of linguistic participation. To put it another way, where discourse occurs meaning must follow, because such is the condition of a being who, in being with others, is already prepared to both listen and understand only to what is said-in-the-talk.[20] If, then, the actuality of discourse forms the basis for what meaning

is about, it still remains obscure as to how discourse links the semantic notion of meaning with what is significant in the course of participating in a linguistic community. Once again we must return to what de Saussure offers us.

If we accept de Saussure's argument concerning the arbitrary nature of the sign, it becomes apparent that meaning cannot be located at the level of the word, because the word assumes its meaning only in relation to other words within the same linguistic community.[21] However, if the meaning of words is a result of association, it still remains unanswered as to how each word comes to acquire its meaning. de Saussure attempted to resolve this problem by extending his analysis to include a study on the linear character of the sign. Accordingly, he states, "Words are used in discourse, strung together one after another, enter into relations based on the linear character of languages. Linearity precludes the possibility of uttering two words simultaneously. They must be arranged consecutively in spoken sequence. Combinations based on sequentiality may be called syntagmas."[22] A syntagma therefore comprises two or more consecutive units, so that the meaning of a word is determined in opposition to either what precedes or follows it, or both. At the very minimum, a syntagma is a two unit word, (i.e. re-read), but also applies to

groups of words, and complex combinations such as compound words, derivative forms, and above all, the sentence.[23]

Now, according to de Saussure, the syntagmatic nature of the word is important for determining a particular linguistic value, and with it, the significance and meaning of the word itself. de Saussure states that in the course of an utterance a word carries not only an identifiable meaning but a whole series of implied relationships; one that is based upon not only the relation between part and part, but between part and whole, as well.[24] For de Saussure, the syntagmatic relation of the word governs the very process through which we express the meaning of what is disclosed by the words used. Which is to say that meaning can arise only through a process that enables both association and particularity to co-exist. At a fundamental level, when words interact in a particular setting they bring forth a disclosure of meaning that is both simultaneously limited by the linear structure of interaction and open to the infinite possibilities intrinsic to the sign's capacity for association. Thus even though a word is understood in terms of its linear configuration, the word itself is not limited by what precedes or follows it. For what transpires through a syntagmatic ordering is a bringing forth into actuality of the possibilities that language is. A consequence that establishes the significance of discourse itself,

because without a medium for relating words, there is no question of possible association. Hence it is only when words are brought together in the form of an utterance, that the whole range of associations becomes possible; associations that range from simple derivatives to more complex associative qualities such as similarity, proximity, difference, and distance, as well as, descriptive and temporal qualifiers.

For that reason, the meaning of a word depends upon the variety of associations that each word brings with it as it is uttered in a syntagma. Given that the syntagmatic ordering of a word's meaning develops through the course of a sequential movement, then the associations that are possible for each word must necessarily collide with the possible associations of the words that both preceded and followed it. How then are we to get a handle on what the meaning of each particular configuration conveys? It is certainly evident that meaning remains ambiguous if we restrict our definition to the semantics of a syntagmatic relation. This becomes clear if we are referring to sentences where irony is involved, because irony is often "a pattern of words that turns away from the direct statement or its own obvious meaning."[25] Nor should we exclude the lie, which could not be expressed if only the relationship between words in a syntagma were the source of meaning. For how would one

use a statement to convey a lie if there was no reference by which others could be influenced to believe the statement as true. And to appeal to external references implies that meaning is a result of phenomenal considerations. Now we have already noted that meaning arises as a result of the participation of members in a particular linguistic community. But how the linguistic community actualizes this meaning, though, is through the discursive mode that syntagmatically relates words, while simultaneously pointing beyond itself. That mode is the sentence.

With the sentence we now come to a point of transition in our argument. For the sentence is not to be defined in terms of the semantics of language, but is rather under the perogative of speech.[26] This is clearly the case when we understand that the primary role of the sentence is characterized by the act of predicating. And what predicating is about is the assertion or affirmation of, in Wittgenstein's words, a particular " state of affairs."[27] Now by asserting or affirming a particular "state of affairs" one introduces the sentence in the role of discourse. For with discourse we reach the level where words are understood according to the roles that they have. A role whose parameters are disclosed by reference to a context; where context is defined as the phenomenal world towards which language reaches as it extends itself beyond

the internal relationship of signs. In this way, as meaning develops it is revealed through discourse, because the interpretation and disclosure of what a word means primarily is a reflection of the context implied in the course of an utterance.[28]

Once context becomes the measure of how a word's meaning is to be interpreted then meaning cannot be seen as a function of the word, because the meaning that is given to a word is itself dependent on the means by which words are related. And at the very minimum, that means is the sentence. As such, because the sentence both integrates the semantics of the word, and the context about which speech is about, the sentence must be defined as the fundamental unit from which meaning has its starting point. As Ricoeur clearly indicates, however, the Saussurean postulates do not in themselves lead one to the assumption that the meaning of the word is to be found in the predicative function of the sentence. For although de Saussure notes that the role of the sentence is defined in terms of speech, and not language, he does not continue that line of reasoning to indicate that sententional meaning is a function that links the arbitrary nature of the sign with a medium that points beyond language.[29] A consequence that leaves aside the question of how the participants of a linguistic community are able to convey the contextual boundaries from which the value of a sign is to be recognized.

This failure to connect the sign to what the sign is about is attributed by Ricoeur to a theory that focusses on the internal difference between the signifier and the signified.[30] By defining the sign according to a non-referential system of characteristics de Saussure separates language from discourse, and therefore, from the ground through which a theory of meaning must develop. Once de Saussure defined meaning according to a system of internal relationships between signs, he underscored the point of what a sign is about. Which is to say that if the sign is not about a context, but refers only to another sign within its vicinity, then the sign essentially discloses nothing but the fact that it is distinct from other signs. This opposition between signs logically follows from a theory that establishes the notion of difference as the a priori relationship from which meaning evolves. Though meaning evolves out of the relationship between signal and signification, each component itself is defined as a series of isolated differences. In other words, each component is purely negative, a series of parallel differences that comprise the linguistic base of language.[31]

Now, according to de Saussure, such structural difference is what constitutes the distinction between signs, because what distinguishes a sign is the characteristics of negativity that merge with the unit to

determine the opposition between each sign. Why the sign does not carry the full negativity of its components de Saussure leaves unclear. de Saussure does argue that the combination between signal and signification is of a positive nature, and that it partly shapes the relatedness between signs, but how this positive occurrence develops out of a system that posits only differences remains obscure.[32] As such, the dichotomy forced between a system of signs and the external notion of context, leads one to assume that de Saussure's postulates imply only the potentiality for language. For language assumes the possibilty of meaning. And meaning develops only as a result of a process that contextually directs the relationship of differences. That process being the sentence. Thus without a process that links the sign to a context language essentially is left unarticulated and meaning remains something that is only potentially there.

More importantly, however, is that by turning the sign away from the question of reference, the dichotomy that de Saussure establishes between the meaning and value of a word becomes doubtful. For how does a word acquire a particular meaning through the value that it carries if the value is something that only a linguistic community can give? de Saussure himself does not address this problem, so that the distinction he makes

between the meaning and value of a sign remains vague. Yet, the distinction that de Saussure draws between the meaning and the value of a sign is quite valid, although it requires that we re-introduce the question of reference as it occurs in the linguistic act of predicating or saying something. In this way, we can trace de Saussure's uncertainty to his failure to appreciate what Frege noted as the dual nature of the sign; a duality that incorporates de Saussure's notion of sense with a somewhat broader definition of reference.

However, Frege tended to focus his attention on what he referred to as the sense and reference of proper names. Accordingly, "a proper name expresses its sense but refers to or designates its reference. We use a sign to express its sense and to designate its reference."[33] For Frege it is the word or incomplete expression, (such as the subordinate clause) that elicit both a sense and a reference, whereas the sentence primarily intends a sense about an assertion of thought. Frege makes this clear when he compares the sentences "the morning star is a body lighted by the sun" and "the evening star is a body lighted by the sun". Each sentence is a different thought and therefore corresponds to a different sense. If one did not know that the evening star and the morning star refer to the same reference, one would therefore assume that one sentence is true and the other false. It

follows, according to Frege, that the thought cannot be the reference of the sentence, so that the sentence must be the sense of the assertion.[34] Despite this claim, though, Frege does emphasize the referential basis of subordinate clauses, (partly because he argues that we presuppose in discourse a sententional reference), but his theory only indirectly argues that grammatically expressive forms such as the sentence contain both a sense and a reference.[35]

Instead, we must once again turn to Wittgenstein's concept of a "state of affairs," but this time more precisely in terms of the question of reference. Now as Wittgenstein states, a "state of affairs" is essentially representing through description a totality of facts. Although it must be understood, that by facts, Wittgenstein is not referring to some form of objective reality, since it quite often happens that as we assert a proposition we may in fact simply be referring to another proposition. Nor should it be mistaken that reality is defined as the relationship between propositions, because all this points to is the communicative element of the proposition; wherein what we assert is how we explain ourselves in a particular context.[36] When Wittgenstein therefore speaks of a "state of affairs" he essentially is alluding to the 'surroundings that we are about', to our encounter with the 'world'

from the perspective of the necessity of being-in-the-world. A proposition that is very similar to Heidegger's notion of Dasein's, (man's being), correspondence with the sign as the means by which we assert the present-at-hand.[37]

If the particularity of a "state of affairs" is inherent to the way in which being-in-the-world is disclosed, then context becomes decisive for determining the meaning of a word. However, what context reveals is not the meaning of the word per se, but the value that a word comes to acquire. When de Saussure distinguished between the meaning and the value of the word he acknowledged the difficulty of such a separation because quite often we take for granted that the value of a word is equivalent to its meaning. This is a problem that de Saussure failed to overcome, because he remained wedded to the notion that meaning is properly a synchronic affair. Once context is re-introduced, though, it becomes clear that the value a word carries is very much dependent upon the input members of a linguistic community are able to give. For that reason, a value is to be understood as an arbitrary measure that is tacitly made known when any member of a particular linguistic community engages in discourse. For the value of a word primarily is a question of significance; and significance can only be realized through the actuality of how the word is used. A point of

view that Wittgenstein considers as analogous to the value that money engenders when it is utilized according to the situation at hand, (i.e., to purchase objects, a space in a theater, a title, or one's life).[38]

Now, the conclusions drawn above should not be taken as implying that the meaning and value of a word are entirely distinct, leading one to thereby assume the possiblity of stating the existence of one without the other. Indeed, such a hypothesis is far removed from the case. For when one refers to the significance of a word, one is implying in that understanding a genesis of what the word reveals; of the meaning that the word comes to acquire. As such, when de Saussure attempted to define the meaning of a word by the value that a word has relative to other words, he misjudged the importance that changes in the meaning of a word have. This is clearly evident by his efforts to separate the synchronic structure of language from the diachronic process that language is.[39] To put it bluntly, de Saussure's claim is unsupportable on the grounds that when we are making use of language we are simultaneously denoting the act of saying something with what is being talked about. Thus, what transpires essentially is a reflection of the interrelatedness that language has with those whose ontological condition is properly discursive.[40] For that reason, when we speak of significance we are referring to

nothing less than the contextual parameters under which a linguistic community comes to influence the possible range of interpretations a word may have in a particular semantic configuration.

If the value of a word is determined by a particular "state of affairs," then the meaning that we attach to a word can only develop in the course of saying something, because only when one is in the act of discourse does one convey a sense about what one is referring to. Hence to understand how a word acquires a particular meaning is to understand that meaning is a result of a linkage between what we disclose and the relatedness that words have in any linguistic system. It only stands to reason, therefore, that meaning is not something that arises as a question of identity, but is something that is always evolving in the interplay between system and world.[41] Moreover, once meaning becomes a question of the discursive interaction between language and being-in-the-world, then at the very minimum, meaning is something that must arise at the level of the sentence and not at the level of the word. And if meaning occurs at the level of the sentence, then from a semantic point of view, meaning is evidently something that can only result from a complex interaction that determines the relationship of each word as it is uttered and the value that each word carries in response to the context of that utterance.

Now, if meaning is a result of a process between words at the level of the sentence, then meaning must develop as a result of a movement between words. For how else can we explain how the actuality of discourse brings forth meaning, if not by how each word is brought forth in the course of an utterance. Indeed, such a process would likely involve more than a strict interaction between subject and predicate, as Black has noted, but a movement that enables all words in a sentence to influence and be influenced as they occur. For that reason, the distinction that Black draws between the figurative and the literal must now be seen as unsupported. For as it is apparent that a word's meaning develops in the course of a sententional utterance, the question of what the words are to be interpreted as primarily is taken to develop out of the ambiguity that is inherent to how words are both related and used.

It also points to why Davidson was correct when he claimed that the words in a metaphorical expression mean nothing more than what they are literally interpreted as. Although as it is now becoming clear, not for the reasons that Davidson cites. For when Davidson criticized Black he brought forth an argument that touched on the fundamental importance of interpretation. And while Davidson's own definition takes him away from an exploration of the sentence as it occurs in discourse,

his approach is nonetheless concerned with exposing as myth the notion that a word can carry a possible meaning that is altogether hidden from the meaning that is normally identified with a word's particular use. Hidden in the sense that it remains as something to be discovered, and whose uncovering occurs through the use of apparently abnormal or deviant turns of phrase, such as metaphor. For what would initiate the disclosure of this hidden meaning? And more importantly, how would we come to read the hidden meaning in the words used? Would it not be that we must draw from precedent, and say that each word is lexically given over to a certain range of meanings, so that a word cannot be understood without deference to such precedent. A consideration that points to the distinction between how meaning occurs, and how words are identified. The former is about predication and saying at the level of the sentence, the latter concerns the role and value that words have come to acquire through a particular use.

Once it becomes apparent that meaning develops out of the movement between words at the level of the sentence, then one can no longer claim for the word both a literal and a figurative meaning. Regardless of how each word comes to be individually interpreted, the meaning of those words remains governed by a sententional process that links the sign to a linguistic community, and gives to

the word its intrinsic polysemy. In that way, by denoting the discursive origin from which meaning occurs, one precludes the possibility that a word could acquire a meaning from outside the community's lexical field. When Davidson points out that each word in a metaphorical statement is to be literally understood, he indirectly acknowledges the intersubjective origin of a word's meaning. That words in a metaphorical statement are non-metaphorical in themselves, is evident when we come to realize that to understand an assertion or saying at all, it is necessary that the words used in any sentence be open to an interpretation that is associated with what members of a community initially are able to identify with. Thus, to say that all words in a metaphorical statement are literal, is to simultaneously deny to the word the possibility of a hidden metaphorical meaning. However, this is not to say that there exists no such thing as metaphorical meaning, but only that metaphorical meaning must begin with the same sententional process that determines literal language.

With a theory of meaning that finds its origin in the way words interact at the level of the sentence, we come to acknowledge that what meaning concerns is the interplay between language as tradition and the open-ended participation through which language evolves.[42]

In that way, once we define meaning exclusively from an intra-linguistic perspective, then what we define metaphorical meaning as, cannot be a question of abnormality in relation to what is literally held as true. Instead, to say what metaphor is and how it arises is to begin with the understanding that metaphor evolves out of the same sententional movement that gives to words their so called literal meaning. To therefore claim that metaphor is literal nonsense is to overlook the way that language posits the possibility for meaning to arise. For as Wittgenstein has noted, language is something that is circumscribed by grammar, and with grammar we are essentially talking about "a description of language, which consists in giving the rules for a combination of symbols, i.e. which combinations make sense and which don't, which are allowed and which are not."[43] Meaning cannot then be something that is outside and abnormal to what determines and legitimizes the role and use of words, because if something is to have a particular meaning it must be grammatically possible for that meaning to develop.[44] Hence it does not matter whether one is referring to the process of metaphor or just simply to the polysemic variations that normally constitute the acceptable range of interpretations available for the literal meanings of a word. What metaphor involves, is such, that if we are to attribute to it a meaning at all, it must be that metaphor is not

something defined as abnormal and in opposition to literal language, but a meaning that develops out of a particular application of literally understood words in the course of any given metaphorical statement.

Although it appears that metaphor is dependent upon the same sententional movement that governs the polysemic variations of a words' meaning, what distinguishes metaphor from literal meaning is the very nature and extent of that movement. A movement, in fact, that concerns the ground upon which language as creation and language as tradition confront each other. And insofar as metaphor differs from conventional forms of linguistic meaning, it does so from its ability to create new meaning with words that have become accepted by a tradition that limits the range of possible interpretations. Now two questions immediately come to mind that need to be answered. Firstly, if we are to establish that metaphor is a means by which language evolves, how then does metaphor create this new meaning? Secondly, if metaphor is a process similar to the process that gives to language its literal meaning, what occurs within the movement of words that determines the difference between literal and metaphorical utterances?

To answer properly both questions requires an approach that deals with both the problem of what a metaphor specifically concerns, and the significance that metaphor

carries as a process through which change occurs. However, the question of significance is more a question of ontology, and marks the point of departure for a theory of metaphor that reaches beyond semantics. Before we reach the stage in which metaphor bridges the gulf between semantics and speech, it still remains necessary to explore the nature of the movement between words that contributes to how a metaphor is achieved, because within the process of metaphor there occurs a development that leads from semantics towards ontology. What the following subsection will therefore be concerned with, is a problem that has traditionally been tacitly overlooked as a problem; and that is the problem of resemblance or identity. For if we are to realize what a metaphor involves, it will come as no surprise when we find out that metaphor is not a question of recognizing similarities, (a relation that can easily be invoked with the use of a simile) but of bringing together what is not normally associated. A connection therefore that points not just to <u>identity</u> but to the question of <u>difference</u>, as well.

IV

MOVEMENT AND MEANING

4.1 IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

If we examine the history of metaphor quite closely, it will become apparent that since the time of Aristotle, theories on metaphor have tended to focus on the assumption that metaphor is simply a more condensed version of the simile. This assumption finds its source in the notion that both figures of speech are concerned with revealing the resemblance that things have with each other. The only difference being that while a simile expresses what is like between things, metaphor suggests a likeness in the form of an explicit identification of each related thing. On the other hand, if we accept that a theory of metaphor involves a movement between words that begins at the level of the sentence, then metaphor must derive its explanation from more than what is similar between things. For the movement between words does not imply an isolated act of substitution, but an interplay between all words within the sentence. As words are brought together they reveal a meaning that discloses a composite

whole; where each word comes to be related to each other not only in terms of their likenesses, but of their differences, as well. In that way, if we are to refer to metaphorical meaning at all, it must not only be about what is similar, but also what is different.

If the problem concerning the significance of identity has not been taken to be a problem, where then are we to begin an analysis of metaphor that elevates the question of difference while simultaneously redefining the role of identity? In what follows, it will become plain that the problem of difference has cropped up in one or more forms since the time of Aristotle. And though the problem of difference has tended to be submerged in favor of the question of identity, it is evident that it has not entirely been forgotten.[1] Now, in the position that I am about to advocate, I will make significant use of the writings of Paul Ricoeur, who in my estimation has set the contemporary tone for a theory of metaphor that underlies the way language creatively evolves. But the views held by Ricoeur are not in full agreement with my own. In fact, where they differ will be made clear through a return to the writings of I. A. Richards who long before Ricoeur set the stage that has yet to be reached concerning the dynamic nature of metaphor. However, before touching upon what Ricoeur and Richards have to offer regarding the question of identity and

difference, it is necessary once again to take as our starting point Aristotle's perspective.

It seems strange to begin with Aristotle whose theory forms the basis of the now discredited substitution theory. But it must be pointed out that Aristotle's theory is not as tidy as many writers have assumed. Indeed, it is the case that the question of difference is not without precedent, and that such precedent is to be found within Aristotle's writings. But why begin with Aristotle when contemporary writers offer a more comprehensive understanding. To this I respond by noting that much of what contemporary theory is about can be traced to the ambiguous quality of Aristotle's position concerning metaphor. This is not to say that Aristotle's ambiguity forshadows the theories of Richards or Ricoeur, to name a few. It is simply to point out that with Aristotle we have a genesis of what until now has been overlooked but that has been tacitly implied within more recent theories. That being how to define a theory of identity within a field of differences. To that end, if we are to reshape the question we must begin with a re-interpretation that includes the source from whence these problems first occurred.

Thus, despite what Aristotle explicitly states concerning a theory of metaphor, there is within the body of his writings an implicit interpretation that reaches beyond the traditional view that metaphor is essentially only about

identity. What leads one to assume that Aristotle means more than what is implied in a question of identity can be traced to a series of unconnected but relevant statements about metaphor. To begin with, when Aristotle states that to be good at creating a metaphor one must possess high native gifts, he points out something that involves the question of what is brought forth when things are related. Although, according to Aristotle what is revealed primarily is a perception involving identity, he also notes that metaphor produces an effect of distinction. Which is a sense altogether different from what is normally conveyed, so that the meaning of what is uttered remains somewhat enigmatic and elusive. That Aristotle emphasizes essentially distinctive traits can be found in his attempt to reveal what a metaphor is partly about by referring to what takes place when we say a riddle.[2]

The fact that Aristotle interpets metaphor in terms of a riddle is not to say that Aristotle considers the two as equivalent. In Aristotle's definition, it is only when the entire composition is made up of metaphors can it be said, that to say a metaphor is to speak a riddle. Given, though, that Aristotle was determined to explain a theory of metaphor in terms of the word as the focal point for a theory of meaning, he tended to overlook the implications that underlie any link between metaphor and

the concept of a riddle. On the other hand, once we understand that metaphor is a process that only begins at the level of the sentence, then what metaphor involves is very similar to what concerns a riddle. Consider, for example, Aristotle's brief definition of a riddle:

> "For the very essence of a riddle is, while talking about real things, to make impossible combinations of them, such as "I saw one man glue bronze upon another with fire," and the like."[3]

What Aristotle is saying, is that as a riddle refers to reality, it does so by adding a twist to the conventional. With a riddle one takes from what is accepted and alters the form so as to say something different. A process that is very similar to how a metaphor arises when words are brought together at the level of the sentence. For does not a metaphor arise out of words that are understood from what they are conventionally accepted as, (i.e. the literal meaning of each word).

If a metaphorical composition involves a process similar to what transpires when we use a riddle, can we then say that Aristotle is correct to point out that under this definition a metaphor is indeed a riddle? While it is true that both a metaphor and a riddle reorganize our perceptions of things, there remains the difference as to what is implied in the use of each. With a riddle, one is more concerned to convey a puzzle, to test the ingenuity of the listener with a statement or question about a

particular state of affairs. A metaphor, on the other hand, is not a test or a puzzle to be solved, though it may have a puzzling or enigmatic quality. Instead, as Ricoeur clearly points out, because of the predicative function within metaphor, what occurs essentially is the transposition of an entire realm.[4] Hence because metaphor constitutes a change of sets, in reference to how ordinary words are related, then metaphor is more about saying something distinct and/or novel; whereas a riddle is concerned about revealing, in an indirect way, what is conventionally understood and accepted. The distinction resting on what Ricoeur claims is the function of metaphor, which is to redescribe reality "by shattering the previous structures of our language, and of what we call reality."[5] A function that Ricoeur contends is essentially heuristic in nature.[6]

Although metaphor differs from a riddle in its fundamental purpose, it is important to note that when Aristotle attributes to metaphor the characteristics of a riddle, it is because metaphor doesn't just suggest, but like the riddle, takes on a different posture from the conventional. One that points to what Davies notes is the <u>experience</u> that a metaphor creates out of a particular configuration of words.[7] An experience that becomes possible, because what we define as a linguistic community's lexical field, is nothing more than a

vague and indeterminate semantic boundary where the meaning of a word remains fuzzy and cumulative.[8] And the accumulation of meaning is where metaphor enters. As such, when Ricoeur refers to the change that metaphor brings forth, he gives to metaphor the decisive role for how language evolves. A connection that Aristotle does not explicitly deny, given that his explanation vacillated between metaphor as a transparent figure and something that was novel, and somewhat far-fetched.

If we therefore agree with Aristotle that metaphor points out something that is distinctive and novel, it still remains unclear as to what criterion is available for giving metaphor this essentially creative capacity. Now, Aristotle adds one further note that conveys the possibility for a theory of metaphor that does not solely rest on the question of resemblance. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle speaks about the effectiveness of metaphor, where "the more unlike and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the metaphor."[9] Essentially, what can be deduced from Aristotle's statement, is that metaphor is most effective when the terms involved are remotely connected. Which is to say that a metaphor becomes effective because it brings together what is normally not associated. In this way, what Aristotle leaves us with, is the potentiality for a theory of metaphor that points to what is different when normally unassociated words are brought together.

Now, if metaphor is a process at the level of the sentence that primarily concerns the aspect of 'difference', then how we recognize a metaphor is dependent upon what happens when normally unassociated words occur together. Now, although each word carries an open capacity for change, its interpretation fundamentally depends on the initial ordinary meaning associated with each word. Even poetry does not begin as a dichotomy between the ordinary and the new. As if it were possible to say something without deference to the language already in use. Yet, what we acknowledge as the ordinary meaning of the word is itself a range of tacitly acceptable uses, of the tradition established by a linguistic community's participation. To a certain extent, it is what governs the polysemy of the word, the range of what a word is normally understood to mean. By the same token, however, because a word is not strictly limited in its meaning, it becomes the condition that makes it possible for meaning to evolve.[10] For it must be remembered that there exists no strict boundary between ordinary and figurative meaning. It is simply the case that what we define as a word's meaning is something that is always somewhat fuzzy and indeterminate.[11] Thus, what we refer to as the ordinary meaning of the word is only the partial limitations imposed on the word's use and association by the continual participation of a linguistic community. And it is partial, because participation never occurs in a

uniform manner, but is given over in varying degrees, and in varying forms. In fact, fundamentally, we cannot say that a word carries only certain meanings; this despite a given context or a particular form of linguistic participation. We can only say that meaning is something we participate in.

To understand my point, consider what transpires when a statement is uttered. Each word in the sentence has a range of possible meanings that are brought to bear on each word in the sentence. These possible meanings remain recognizable by the particular context and association that conventional use has made of each word. Which is to say that what determines their range of ordinary meaning is the oft-repeated association made between words. And if association is simply a question of putting together a particular semantic configuration, then there is nothing to preclude uttering words that are rarely, if not at all, associated. For does not a given association develop out of the actuality of participation, which is itself of a varying nature. What then distinguishes ordinary from metaphorical statements begins with the way words are associated. While deference must be given to the ordinary meaning of the word, there also must be the recognition of the nature of the relationship between the words uttered. For if ever an alternative meaning is to arise, it will do so

through how words in ordinary language are differently related. In other words, if traditional values, and therefore meanings, are to change they will do so only as they come to be alternatively expressed.

Now, if change is to occur it will require that the literal meanings of particular words be brought into a state of tension; where the possible range of each word's meaning is no longer capable of producing a tacitly accepted meaning within the semantic configuration of the sententional utterance. This initial stage of bringing together normally unassociated words is what constitutes the first phase of producing a metaphor. For with a metaphor we have a semantic situation that is, in Ricoeur's words, "predicatively incompossible" as long as the words are forced to hold to the possible range of meanings normally associated with each word.[12] In this we can only agree with Ricoeur, because by creating a tension between words one destroys the consistency that normally holds for the literal meaning of an utterance. Yet what creates this semantic impertinence is not what traditionally is viewed as the identity between objects. Instead, as Miller points out, the question of identity revolves around its capacity to bring together terms that seem somewhat remote; but it does not itself express this identity.[13]

If metaphor doesn't explicitly express this identity, then does identity comport to our understanding of what metaphor reveals? According to E. R. MacCormac, the problem of identity is related to our perception of what a metaphor is disclosing. A metaphor does not refer to a restricted range of meanings determined by resemblance only, but ranges between either expressing a similarity, or emphasizing differences. A distinction that is, in fact, drawn from the distinction that Philip Wheelwright makes between the epiphor and diaphor of the word.[14] Now, as Ricoeur notes, Wheelwright's notion of the epiphor is very similar to what Aristotle called epiphora, a concept that was previously defined as a transposition, or transference between words or ideas alien to each other. It is a concept that implies a stroke of genius, because it designates an apperceptive insight, where to use a metaphor is to be perceived as having an eye for seeing similarities. However, it is not yet the metaphor per se, since in Ricoeur's words, "there is no epiphor without diaphor, no intuition without construction."[15] In other words, what is intuitively brought together is that which is fundamentally disparate, so that although a metaphor carries with it a sense of what is similar, it also makes present an anomaly through what remains incompatible between the words.

By disclosing an anomaly within the metaphorical statement, Ricoeur points to what primarily distinguishes a metaphor from literal language, and from other figurative forms that focus on the similarities between ideas and contexts. The actuality of an anomaly immediately implies that with a metaphor the characteristic of difference is brought to the forefront. The metaphor reveals not just a resemblance, but a relationship that is predominantly remote, and therefore different. Although it is clear that metaphor involves bringing together ideas that are normally unassociated, the problem of difference is, in Ricoeur's opinion, to be resolved within the framework of a theory that remains under the spell of identity. For despite the definite clash between unlike terms, for Ricoeur, the resolution of this clash in terms of a fusion of differences into identity is what reveals a metaphor.[16]

The assumption that metaphor is a fusion of differences into identity, assumes that the intent of the metaphor is to resolve the enigmatic quality that remains between things that are different, into a meaning that essentially announces a sameness. On the other hand, once it is apparent that the primary feature of metaphor is difference, then how metaphor eliminates these differences while expressing an explicit likeness has not been answered. For what process at the

level of semantics calls for the retention of identity over difference? In fact, what particular similarities is the metaphor calling forth that enables differences to be brought together without the emphasis of such differences? The failure to answer these questions, can be traced to Ricoeur's intent of explaining a theory of metaphor that attempts to bridge previously established frontiers by the capacity to perceive similarities between the known and the unknown; to make the similar visible within the heart of what is different.[17]

Where we find the source of Ricoeur's error is in his attempt to explain how difference is fused into identity through the relationship that is assumed to occur between two networks of significance.[18] Now, according to Ricoeur, this relationship, while being predicative at the level of the sentence, is also attributive in the strict sense that one thing is made to bear significance upon another thing. A point that seems to closely resemble Black's thesis concerning the interactive relationship between the metaphorical word and the principal word in the sentence. Indeed, Ricoeur still holds to the idea of a metaphorical word, although clearly from the perspective of its capacity to reveal only in the actuality of predication.[19] As for the apparent similarity between Ricoeur and Black, this is not without grounds. That there is a similarity stems from the same source.

That being that neither thinker has fully appreciated the importance of what Richards offered regarding the interanimation of words. It is a failure that essentially marks the difference between a theory of metaphorical interaction and a theory of metaphorical movement.

When Richards stated that the meaning of a sentence results from the interplay of words, he was emphasizing what transpires in the course of a sententional utterance. For how meaning arises is only through the actuality of discourse, where each word is brought into play through its particular utterance. An event that is dynamic, inasmuch as it refers to a movement through each uttered word. In Richards' words, meaning is the co-operating of the whole utterance, the interplay between interpretive possibilities.[20] Each principal word is therefore constantly changing its meaning in relation to the sentence they go into and the context they derive from.[21] Even metaphor requires the full play of the sentence. And though Richards acknowledges the importance associated with the principal and subsidiary word, he defines their relationship in terms of the interanimation of all the words in a sentence.[22] In that way, metaphor is not an interaction, because it is not stated in the form of an interaction. By this I mean, that unlike a simile, metaphor is not a question of simply expressing a

direct correspondence between two significant words. Thus although interaction is implied in movement, that interaction is not limited to the two principal words, but is an occurrence between all words in the sentence. In fact, we may say that interaction is implied only because movement occurs. It follows, that because metaphor is fundamentally an occurrence of meaning, it must also be an occurrence of semantic movement.

With Richards, therefore, we are introduced to the dynamics of metaphorical movement. A process that reflects the participation of each word as it contributes to the meaning of the utterance. Moreover, because each word is accorded an effective role, then unless a sentence explicitly denotes a given relationship, there is no reason to assume that a metaphor is given over to revealing an identity. In other words, once metaphor is perceived to be a movement that predicates a meaning from what transpires in the course of the sententional assertion, then the basis of that meaning cannot primarily be identity, because the metaphor does not explicitly assert that identity. Instead, what the metaphor asserts amounts to a saying that relies on a blending of identity and difference. For example, in the Rebel, one has only to examine the following metaphor by Camus, in which he states that, "The City of God will coincide with the city of humanity; and universal history, sitting in judgement

on the world, will pass its sentence by which good and evil will be justified."[23]

If we accept that metaphor is about what the words assert, then Camus' metaphor is not simply expressing a particular likeness, but is expressing an idea that carries within it the notion of that which is both similar and different. For clearly, Camus' metaphor means what the words are given over to mean. Given over, in the sense that each word carries a potentiality for interpretation that depends on their utterance. What we previously understood of the use and association of a word is carried into the metaphor. At the same time, however, it becomes apparent that the traditional roles and identities of certain words are no longer sufficient for producing a meaning. This results in what Ricoeur calls "an impertinence," which is a tension of association engendered by the remoteness of certain words from each other. That there is tension, is itself significant for a theory of metaphor. For such tension is a question of distance and the initial incompatibility of certain words. Why we recognize Camus' statement as a metaphor is that ordinarily we do not associate history and judgement in reference to the question of good and evil; particularly when humanity is portrayed as God. Now, although humanity is spoken of in terms of God, this is not the same as comparing and identifying one with the other. For the

question of coincidence is to occupy a similar position but with reference to what or who the new occupant initially is understood as. Humanity initially is still humanity despite its elevation to the throne of God. As is the throne of God. And it is this 'difference' that gives the metaphor its flavor. If we wanted to identify one with the other we then would invoke a simile or comparison regarding why they should be identified with each other.

A metaphor is therefore a movement that begins at the level of the sentence and it is as much about difference as it is about identity. In fact, it may be said that the essential meaning of the metaphor is more dependent upon what is different within the framework that is to be interpreted. This is evident through the presence of a tension within the utterance. Not that it points out what is different, only that it acknowledges the presence of 'difference'. Why the aspect of 'difference' becomes prominent follows from the nature of the relationship within the metaphor. As Goodman points out, with a metaphor we are forcing a collision between different realms. The natural orientation of the primary words is away from the metaphor, and is directed instead, in deference to a precedent or habit, within the orbit of the words use.[24] What we therefore understand of humanity, of God, of history, and of judgement initially is in relation to their natural orbit, (the region of linguistic association).

This becomes clear, because each word is already associated with a range of roles and values that we earlier defined as a polysemy of accepted meaning within a linguistic community. When words such as humanity, God, or history are brought together in a metaphor, what constitutes our understanding of their potential roles and values is already determined by the roles and values that they have assumed in the linguistic community. For example, if we accept that the words in the statement, 'humanity has known only a history of wars', are tacitly accepted to be ordinarily associated with each other within a given linguistic community, then the role and value that each word has in that sentence, and others they ordinarily are a associated with, will determine the initial characteristics that each word would bring into a novel relationship. All words have a tacit background if they were already part of the linguistic community, and it is this background that influences how far each word's role and value is to be altered. Thus although the metaphor may be a new relationship for each significant word, it is not a denial of its original habitat, but simply an interplay between each word's tacit background. As such, what tends to transpire is a movement between distant realms at the level of the sentence. And as each realm interanimates with each other realm, the traditional roles played by each word become altered, thereby producing a metaphorical meaning. For remember, meaning

is not equivalent to the word, but results from the interplay of words and context beginning at the level of the sentence. Metaphor is simply the interplay of disparate terms.

For that reason, if we are to define what a theory of metaphor properly involves, it must go beyond the question of likeness, and include the side of movement that carries tradition into conflict. For only through a conflict with tradition can language creatively evolve. Thus, the importance of difference within a metaphor is in how the aspect of difference enables metaphor to be a creative process. Now, although Ricoeur claims that metaphor is a resolution that vacillates between the epiphoric and the diaphoric, there remains a crucial distinction that establishes the primacy of difference as the major contributor to what the metaphor discloses as a creative process. As MacCormac emphasizes, to define metaphor as strictly a creative process is clearly to interpret metaphor as a diaphoric construction. A conclusion that becomes quite tenable when you consider that the epiphoric side of metaphorical meaning tends towards the polysemic range of ordinary language.[25] In that way, it is only when references, and therefore realms, are emphatically juxtaposed as different does it produce a metaphor that reconstructs our perception of the relationship, by creating a novel meaning from words whose remoteness remains irreducible.

Yet, this is not to say that all metaphors are creative, nor does it deny to identity a role in determining the meaning of the metaphor. A qualification that rests on the assumption that metaphor can be merely suggestive, simply emphasizing an interpretation that remained either underdeveloped or not clearly expressed. What I have in mind, are metaphors that have become well-worn, but have not yet been incorporated into the ordinary use of language. Simple metaphors tend to be classic examples. For example, the political concept of the 'body politic' still seems suggestive enough to recognize it as a metaphor. For the attributes of what it claims are not contemporarily taken for granted as in ordinary language. In fact, perhaps this is an example of a rejuvenated metaphor, given that as it was once associated with the notion of the state as a kind of living organism it no longer appeals to contemporary western political thinking.[26] The upshot of this argument, is that suggestive metaphors are very much a product of their times and place, so that what was once a metaphor may not be now; nor can we say that they will not be again. Then again, it could also be argued, that such metaphors are not true metaphors, but that they are a part of the polysemic range of ordinary meaning. On this point, though, the boundary between ordinary language and suggestive metaphor depends upon the extent and area of linguistic participation. For certainly, what is to some

members a metaphor, may be to others a part of ordinary language. This is generally not the case, however, for creative metaphors, given their remoteness.

It is therefore obvious, that what contributes to forming a metaphor is a blending of both identity and difference, where identity primarily brings forth what is remote, and where differences qualify and extend the interanimation of the literal to say something either suggestive or novel. Neither aspect is ever able to shut out completely the other side in the actuality of the meaning. For without some form of identity it is not possible to refer to what inevitably remains beyond relatedness. At the same time, without some form of difference within the actual meaning of the sentence, we would not be able to distinguish metaphor from simile, or for that matter, literal language itself.

Now, the question of what distinguishes metaphor from the literal interpretation of a sentence depends upon the remoteness between the words used. To bring forth a semantic impertinence is to both extend and even reshape what language is about. However, does it mean that metaphor is essentially irreducible to ordinary language? In other words, is it possible to take a metaphor and translate its meaning into a literal expression, without at the same time losing that original meaning. Or does the aspect of difference elevate metaphor to a creative

level, thereby precluding any parallel appeal to ordinary language? The importance of these questions cannot be overlooked for a theory of metaphorical movement. For if we claim that the aspect of difference within metaphor is the ground of creation in language, we must resolve the problem of 'paraphrase' as it applies to the interpretation and understanding of metaphor. Which is to say that by emphasizing the aspect of difference we are attempting to elevate metaphor away from merely expressive forms of language. We are saying that metaphor is a process that reveals and discloses, and is something distinctive from what ordinary language conveys. Thus, the following subsection will attempt to reconcile metaphor with ordinary language through the role that paraphrase has in understanding a metaphor.

4.2 INTERPRETATION OVER TRANSLATION: THE QUESTION OF PARAPHRASE

One of the ongoing arguments about the meaning and content of metaphor has centered around the contention that metaphor either contains no cognitive content that could not be stated in a literal paraphrase, or that metaphor is part of the creative side of language and is

therefore beyond paraphrasing. Both arguments are in effect diametrically opposed to each other. However, this is not to say that there is no room for movement between the two. That the argument has tended to fall between polarized camps of interpretation only adds to the misunderstanding regarding what metaphor is about. Yet, if we are to follow the line of argument that has until now been pursued, it will require that we mark the final break of metaphor from traditional accounts of meaning by re-interpreting its relationship to the literal paraphrase.

Having outlined a theory of metaphor that begins from its position within a theory of meaning, there can be no doubt that metaphor essentially is a creative process. And as a creative process, metaphor must be considered to carry a cognitive insight within its meaning that separates it from literal language. The question remains, however, as to whether that aspect of novelty is truly untranslatable into ordinary language. In other words, does a theory of metaphor that is grounded in a blending of identity and difference elevate metaphor beyond the possibility of stating its equivalent meaning in a literal paraphrase? For although metaphor is a particular relationship between words that presupposes the polysemic extent of their ordinary possible meanings, does it mean that metaphor precludes a parallel restatement of its meaning?

According to those who support the pragmatic approach, this is not held to be the case, for they claim that what the metaphor intends is different from what the speaker means. And though metaphor conveys a cognitive insight, this insight is not to be misconstrued with the meaning carried. Instead, the insight disclosed by the metaphor rests with the author's intention to use the metaphor to call attention to an experience that the metaphor offers.[27] It is the point that the metaphor is about, so that a la Davidson, metaphor comes to be understood as a speech act similar to the telling of a joke. And as Davidson has noted, a joke does not enable us to appreciate some fact by standing for that fact, but calls upon us to notice what is evoked.[28]

Now, although Davidson has denied the need for paraphrasing a metaphor, pragmatists such as Searle have claimed that to understand the words in a metaphor requires a parallel statement in the form of a literal paraphrase to get at what the speaker intended their meaning to be. According to Searle, to understand the following, it is necessary to set forth the metaphor's truth-conditions in its literal equivalent. Thus;

"(Met) Sally is a block of ice.
(Par) Sally is an extremely unemotional and unresponsive person.

(Met) I have climbed to the top of the greasy pole. (Disraeli)
(Par) I have after great difficulty become prime minister

(Met) Richard is a gorilla.

(Par) Richard is fierce, nasty, and prone to violence."[29]

For Searle, the above examples are intended to suggest that it is not the words in the metaphor that determine the speaker's meaning, but the truth-conditions contained within the literal paraphrase. And what determines those truth-conditions is a set of shared assumptions that are a part of the general background for members of a particular linguistic community. Given that metaphor is said to violate what is commonly held to be the case of what a linguistic community's beliefs and values are understood to be, then metaphor is defined without recourse to that background. It follows, therefore, that the above paraphrases are possible, and in fact necessary, because only in literal expressions are the speaker's meaning and the speaker's utterance identical.[30] When Disraeli uttered the metaphor of the climb to the top of the greasy pole, he was not, according to Searle, conveying such a set of truth-conditions, (because they are not held to be true), but only wanted to point out an experience relevant to what he really means. If you wanted to know the actual meaning of the metaphor it would be necessary to translate it into the truth-conditions contained within the paraphrase.

However, if the pragmatic approach is to separate the speaker's meaning from the speaker's utterance then essentially metaphor becomes simply what Davies

describes as an aim, a directional marker without assertive qualities.[31] In other words, metaphor is defined in terms of its expressive capacity, which focusses on an experience as opposed to an assertion. Thus, if we are to understand Searle'e metaphor, "that Sally is a block of ice," we must understand that we are acknowledging the expression of an experience, one that is about an assertion held within our thoughts. If we want to get at the assertive thought that the metaphor points to, we would have to construct a literal paraphrase of the actual meaning, (i.e. that Sally is unemotional and unresponsive). A paraphrase that is, in effect, a translation from the non-assertive to the assertive truth-conditions contained within the paraphrase.[32]

The problem, though, with the pragmatic approach to a theory of metaphor is that it places too much emphasis on the speakers intention without due regard for the role language has in conveying such intentions. To put it another way, Searle, Davies, and Davidson begin their analysis from what MacCormac calls the illocutionary effect of metaphor.[33] An approach that stresses the performative action that metaphor has on the hearer. In this case, where we would normally take a literal statement to be asserting something, with metaphor we are directed to an experience that is suggestive in nature. And it is deemed suggestive, because in Searle's words,

"the utterance is obviously defective if taken literally."[34] Thus, by a process of elimination, metaphor comes to be defined in terms of its role. For it stands to reason, that if you accept that metaphor is a deviant form of expression, then what meaning it might offer cannot be taken too seriously. And once meaning is reduced to a level of irrelevance, then the semantics of metaphor becomes secondary to the performative expression for defining a metaphor. Moreover, because the concept of expression primarily interprets speech as deed, then metaphor as an expressive marker becomes defined solely in reference to a theory of speech-acts.

Yet, the dichotomy that Searle and Davies stress between a speaker's meaning and a speaker's utterance in a metaphor remains unsupported. As MacCormac notes, although it appears that with a metaphor we are moving along a literal to figurative track, or from assertion to suggestion, we should not be misled into delineating a formal division. In fact, according to MacCormac, even the act of suggestion requires a semantic foundation. A foundation that constitutes the range between the diaphoric as suggestion and the epiphoric as assertion.[35] In other words, one cannot offer a suggestion without appealing to the semantics of meaning. For how else would you begin to understand that a suggestion is being made, if not by the fact that a declaration is

being made. And any question of declaration depends on the meaning contained within the proposition. An argument that follows from what Wittgenstein emphasizes is essential to playing the language-game. Now, what Wittgenstein states, is that to properly play the language-game it is necessary to distinguish between an individual's "inner state" and the communicative nature of meaning. One does not therefore intend a suggestion in the course of an utterance by appealing to an inner state, to an experience outside of language. Instead, one must understand that what intention is about is made possible by the fact that we tacitly presuppose that we can speak the language. Intention is situated in language, so that its meaning is simply a composition of words. In that way, what part of intention that is embedded in suggesting is made clear by the meaning carried within the actuality of the sentence.[36]

Once we defer to language as the ground that makes possible speech as communication, then the act of suggesting is dependent upon the actuality of language through speech. Where we locate the intention of a suggestion is therefore not in some amorphous undisclosed thought, but through the intent revealed in the sentence's pronouncement. Moreover, if intention as suggestion is disclosed in the proposition, then suggestion falls under

the rubric of predication, which is in part a process that asserts. That suggestion and assertion seem closer than Searle has indicated is acknowledged by MacCormac, who notes how both suggestion and assertion overlap each other, so that it is not always clear that a statement is either asserting or suggesting something. And without a method that effectively divides a statement of assertion from the act of suggesting it becomes unclear as to why metaphor should be interpreted without regard for what the proposition states. If we are, therefore, to get a handle on the meaning of a metaphor, we cannot appeal to a paraphrase of its contents; at least in terms of a translation into literal truth-conditions. For the metaphor already carries a set of truth-conditions that have their origin in the same process that gives meaning to the literal paraphrase.

Which brings us full circle to our original position regarding the creative aspect of metaphor and the role that paraphrase may have in understanding the meaning of the metaphor. Once we accept that metaphor is a process of meaning, then paraphrasing it cannot be an act of translation, because the meaning offered by the metaphor is peculiar to the relationship between words in the metaphor. However, does that mean that we are left advocating a position that essentially denies the reductionist claim, while proclaiming the severance of

metaphor from the literal restatement? Certainly, if the only position we are left with is the non-reductionist, non-translation school of thinking. But such polarized views miss the point about what a paraphrase infers, as well as the extent of its application. As Dabney Townsend makes clear, as a possibility of restatement, paraphrasing is not unique to figurative forms of language. Any sentence in a natural language, whether taken literally or figuratively, is subject to restatement.[37] Hence, contrary to the prevailing view, paraphrase is not unique to metaphor or other forms of figurative language, but is quite often applied to clarify ordinary forms of discourse. Paraphrase is therefore not an instrument of ordinary meaning designed to capture the meaning intended by abnormal forms of discourse. And in the case of metaphor such a role would not have been possible, because metaphor begins in a theory of meaning that cannot be separated from the literal.

Now, to integrate the literal within the process of metaphor precludes a dichotomy that elevates the literal to a level that presumes its status as the primary form of meaning.[38] What constitutes the ground for determining the sense and reference of the literal is very much a part of what constitutes the meaning of metaphor. What distinguishes the two depends on the nature of the relationship that is engendered between ordinary words

as they are brought together in a metaphor. For that reason, we may say that the inability to separate metaphor from ordinary language is a result of a process that entails the possibility of metaphor only through the unusual relatedness forced between each word's ordinary range of meaning. As such, paraphrasing a metaphor is not about revealing a set of truth-conditions within the metaphor, for the metaphor pronounces those truth-conditions in the course of its saying. Instead, if we are to understand what paraphrasing a metaphor is about we must liken it to what Townsend describes as an "archaeological enterprise."[39]

The appropriateness of the metaphor of archaeology cannot be overlooked. For although the following fails to capture the breadth of its meaning, it nonetheless discloses an interpretation about interpretation. In other words, one aspect of archaeology is to uncover, to reveal parts from a larger whole. And in regards to the archaeology of meaning, that one aspect is <u>interpretation</u>. When we offer a paraphrase of a metaphor we are essentially giving an interpretation as to what it means. That a paraphrase should be about interpretation follows from what Carl Hausman notes is a fundamental aspect of the creative metaphor. That is, by designating referents in a particular and unfamiliar setting, the metaphor creates a condition that

essentially is unprecedented or unique.[40] This uniqueness points away from ordinary language, because how would the discovery of the unique be already assumed within the bounds of the ordinary.[41] Which explains the difficulty that paraphrase has in capturing the full content of the metaphor. For how would a paraphrase accurately represent the meaning of a metaphor that was itself previously unknown.

Yet, although a metaphor can be said to be unique, it does not necessarily follow that it cannot be paraphrased. But instead of being an expression of the metaphor's meaning, paraphrasing a metaphor must be seen as a second order process. It is a restatement of the metaphor in the form of what Frye calls a secondary or outward meaning.[42] As a secondary explanation paraphrase becomes more a statement of interpretation, an assertion about certain features within the metaphor. It does not capture the whole metaphor, because as a restatement it imposes limitations on what the metaphor is about.[43] In fact, according to Townsend, as a selection of alternatives, the paraphrase must presume a prior knowledge of the metaphor.[44] However, despite what Townsend claims regarding the a priori condition of the metaphor, he nonetheless holds to the view that once a particular aspect has achieved a substantive status on its own, then what initially

was a conditional limitation becomes the measure by which to understand and define the metaphor. Although couched in different terms, Townsend's argument leads to an understanding that is very similar to the pragmatic position. By emphasizing the importance of what the paraphrase calls our attention to, Townsend essentially gives to the paraphrase the decisive role for understanding the metaphor.

Thus by vacillating between a theory of metaphor that emphasizes the creative and a priori status of metaphor to paraphrase, and one where metaphor is measured and defined by the paraphrase, Townsend leaves us with a position that fails to reconcile the original creative content of metaphor with the limiting function of the paraphrase. Why speak of the creative import of metaphor when the insight it claims is made a function of the interpretation of the paraphrase? Are we to therefore say that before we arrive at a proper understanding of the metaphor that it requires an almost analytical application of a literal paraphrase to root out the actual meaning of the metaphor. What then is the metaphor in relation to language and meaning when its words are redefined without proper reference to the actuality of their saying?

The apparent contradiction within Townsend's conception stems from his failure to appreciate how metaphor builds its uniqueness on the ashes of the ordinary. Once

we acknowledge that metaphor is a sententional process that links remote terms, then metaphor must be seen as traditionally 'underdetermined'. By this I mean that metaphor only occurs through a semantic process that enables the integration of the imagination with the predicative function that allows for the interplay of normally unassociated words. In that way, within the process of metaphor, the movement of meaning evolves as a projection from the ordinary to the new. Similar to how a poem projects a moving body of imagery, metaphor forces an interplay between different realms that forms a display of evolving images. And as Ricoeur states, because metaphor is an intuitive process at the level of the sentence then metaphor is a form of predication that displays a flow of images that are interrelated in a way that fundamentally redescribes reality.[45]

When we therefore say that a paraphrase fails to capture the full content of the metaphor, we are referring to what Polanyi notes is the inability to equate the imaginative performance of a metaphor with the disconnected subsidiaries of its vision.[46] Metaphor determines what is to be viewed as relevant, but only through the manifestation of a multiple series of iconic images. Hence to gather the meaning of the metaphor, it is necessary that each image be given its relative weight. A condition that can only occur through the actuality

of the ordinary differences projected by the metaphor itself. Which leads us to conclude that the meaning of the metaphor can only be understood in terms of the relatedness between images that is brought forth in the whole of its movement through different realms.

Yet, why paraphrasing remains relevant is, in fact, due to the multiple nature of a metaphor's projection from the ordinary to the new which essentially allows for the possibility of an interpretive role. Returning to the idea of an archaeology of meaning, we note how paraphrase is designed to emphasize certain features of the metaphor. In a way, by selecting certain aspects of the metaphor, it is the paraphrase and not the metaphor that is the proposition that is framed to call attention to what is offered by the metaphor. But this calling attention to is not in reference to the whole but to its parts. What paraphrase presumes is the possibility of a variety of aspects, or a plurality of senses. At a fundamental level, therefore, paraphrasing is diametrically opposite to a metaphor, because while a metaphor is an evolving movement in a field of differences, paraphrase is about one condition or feature that is distinctive. A dichotomy that revolves around the question of what is intended by each proposition. With metaphor what is intended is primarily a cognitive meaning that is novel and unusual, a perception that is definitely on the

creative side. While with a paraphrase it is not about creating but about discovering conditions or senses within the metaphor.

By uncovering what is related within the metaphor, a paraphrase primarily is intended to be a gathering of elements of the ordinary within the metaphor itself. It is an attempt to bridge ordinary language with the uniqueness of the metaphor's meaning. Thus from a display of images that initially are grounded in the ordinary orbit of a word's meaning does it become possible to extract a sense of the metaphor. But a gathering of the ordinary is not the same as a movement that actualizes a relationship of the different. So that although the following metaphor, "socialists in Canada have never watered down their doctrines,"[47] could be interpreted as a refusal to dilute the content of socialist theories, it does not exhaust the meaning of the metaphor. It could just as easily be said that the metaphor contains aspects that can lead to the following paraphrases:

1. socialists in Canada have never simplified their doctrines.
2. socialists in Canada refuse to competitively level off their doctrines.

That each of these paraphrases is as valid as the other is apparent when we come to realize that a paraphrase is simply a heuristic device by which one may enter into the

metaphor. The above examples point to aspects, give several senses of the metaphor depending on the relevance and weight that each of these aspects is considered to have. Together, however, each above paraphrase, and any others that may come to mind, do not add up to the metaphor's meaning, because the metaphor itself is not precisely about any one of the above aspects. With each paraphrase we therefore enter into the initial condition that directs us to the metaphor's meaning. It does not achieve that meaning, because as an intuitive process metaphor requires a leap out of the ordinary. For that reason, to paraphrase a metaphor is to reveal a sense of the metaphor from the standpoint of the ordinary. Given that within metaphor the ordinary is a plural configuration of imagistic possibilities, then the meaning of the metaphor must be said to distinguish several senses. And if we follow Henle's argument, that because metaphor conveys not one sense, but many senses, then paraphrase must be seen in terms of <u>interpretation</u>.[48]

That paraphrase is to be referred to as a second order process that enters into metaphor through its interpretive role becomes clear once we understand metaphor as a discursive movement that links semantics to the imagination. Metaphor is a simultaneous play between the sentence and cognition, between movement and seeing. When we force a movement between remote terms we are not simply presenting

a semantic configuration, but are invoking a perceptive insight as to the necessity of creating a relationship between differences. That this process is extraordinary is why paraphrasing a metaphor comes down to interpretation, because any use of the ordinary to build an understanding of a perceptive insight into the movement between differences can only be an explanation or rendering of the ordinary possibilities within the metaphor itself.[49]

Now, if metaphor is to be defined in terms of a sententional process of movement and the intuitive input of the imagination then metaphor must be considered a process that reaches beyond the level of semantics and into the phenomenal world. For what the sentence and intuition imply is a predicative function that asserts a relationship given over to description and depiction. To assert something is to reveal or bring forth through discourse a context, situation, or sense. Hence the question of discourse fundamentally is a question of the actuality of speech, where speech becomes the activity by which language is continuously recreated, extended, altered, and reshaped. It follows, therefore, that if metaphor is a creative process within language, then metaphor is a predicative function whose movement is most effectively realized in the actuality of speaking. For with speech we acknowledge the

participation of members of a linguistic community who are given over to the act of Saying or disclosing being-in-the-world. Which is to say that if metaphor is most effective in the activity of speech, then metaphor contains an ontological dimension. However, because metaphor is both a question of the semantics of the sentence and the intuitive input of the imagination, then metaphor's ontological status must be explored in terms of the interplay between the self as imagination and language as world. The following chapter will therefore begin with an analysis of metaphor as a process that links self and world in the actuality of discourse.

V

METAPHOR'S ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE: ONTOLOGY, CONVERSATION, AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE

5.1 SELF AND WORLD: AN INTERPLAY BETWEEN INSIGHT AND LANGUAGE

By identifying the role of the imagination in the creative process of metaphor, we have added the last link in a theory of metaphor that begins with semantics and reaches into the phenomenal world. Yet we should not misconstrue the intuitive function within metaphor as the primary means by which metaphor enters into reality. As Wittgenstein notes, imagination is not outside and prior to speech, thus the question of intuition and image presupposes that we can speak the language.[1] In fact, Wittgenstein makes it clear that it is not always necessary that imagination accompany a proposition for its meaning to be understood.[2] Although what Wittgenstein is referring to are those propositions that are part of the ordinary use of language. The same cannot be said of metaphor. That metaphor is a creative process within language requires that there be some form of intervention through which to bring together

normally unassociated words. Hence the importance of the imagination, because only through the imagination's active interplay with language at the creative level is it possible for metaphor to develop out of ordinary meaning. However, to say of the imagination that it actively participates in language is to recognize within metaphor a simultaneous occurrence between productive innovation and traditional forms of meaning. For metaphor is a result of an interplay between insight as self and language as world; a conjunction that fundamentally reflects the ontological condition of a being, who is a being in-the-world.[3]

However, despite acknowledging the participation of the self with language as world, the bridge to the phenomenal world is not a result of each aspect separately, but of their simultaneous interplay. An interplay that can only begin at the level of the sentence, because as a movement between words the sentence is the minimum predicative medium through which insight and a linguistic community are united. At a fundamental level, it is the sententional merging of the self and language that enables metaphor to reach beyond semantics. Therefore, as a medium that points beyond itself the sentence brings together the ordinary values held by a linguistic community and the individual's novel appropriation of those values and forges them into an assertion about

reality. To a certain degree, this link between self and language at the level of the sentence can be traced to three conditions that Ricoeur claims are essential to a theory of metaphor. Firstly, the initial act of predication which is intended as an insight that effects a rapproachment between disparate terms. Secondly, the flow of images that discourse displays as it initiates this change in logical distance. Thirdly, the "suspension" of ordinary descriptive reference.[4]

What Ricoeur claims, is that if we are to complete a semantic theory of metaphor it will be necessary that we appeal to a psychology of the imagination. Ricoeur argues that, through the ability to both think and see, the imagination is able to effect both a restructuring of semantic fields and a grasping of the possible relationships between disparate terms; a productive characteristic of the insight that Ricoeur refers to as predicative assimilation.[5] Now, Ricoeur's notion of the productive imagination is drawn from Kant's idea of the role of the productive imagination in the schematization of the pure understanding. The emphasis here is on the relationship between images created by the imagination and the concept itself. Thus, according to Kant, it is through the imagination's production of schemata (figuration) "as a representation of a method of representing an image in conformity with a

conception," that provides the ground from which to attain an understanding of the concept.[6] In a similar vein, Ricoeur points to how the production of images is channeled through a schematization of predicative assimilation and towards an iconic presentation of what appears.[7] What Kant refers to as the relational quality of the schema is therefore preserved in Ricoeur's movement from image to icon. Unlike Kant, however, Ricoeur does not elevate the imagination beyond language, but places it under the control of a figurative disclosure that is a predicative depiction that begins at the level of semantics.

That language becomes the controlling medium of metaphorical imagery follows from what Marcus B. Hester cites is the commonality of language.[8] Without language providing a limitation to the spontaneous creation of images, then the imagination would tend towards a lawless freedom that, according to Kant, produces nothing but nonsense.[9] Perhaps we might agree with Hester when he refers to such anarchical images as most appropriate to dream-like states, where the question of communication is apparently irrelevant. But once we accept that metaphorical imagery is intended as a communicative device, then the images that are part of a schema that develops towards an iconic presentation must necessarily be associated with language from the beginning. As Hester

states, "images are not free, because we share a common language, a common sound and sense of our language and the non-verbal associations of that language," so that if the image is to make sense it can do so only in the context of the ability to communicate.[10]

But though the flow of images that results from the actuality of discourse is limited to discourse as communication, it does not mean a limitation on the possibility of imagistic association. Hence Ricoeur's appeal to the Kantian schema. For in a schematic form images are displayed as associated and related. What the productive imagination does is engender this relationship, but only through the actuality of discourse, because what constitutes this relatedness is parallel to the relatedness between words at the level of the sentence. In fact, what is given as a figurative display is brought forth by the sententional movement of words, to the extent that the imaginative performance is subject to the nature of the sententional configuration. Thus, like de Saussure's reference to the sign's infinite capacity of association, images have no limit as to the possibilty of association. But like the sign, images are related and given form by the particular sententional configuration of an utterance. Which is to say that although the imagination is an active performer in the creation of a metaphor, it is subject to the rules of

a language that initiates communication through the movement between words.

It follows, that if the imagination is linked to language through a schematization of images that arise in conjunction with a configuration of words at the level of the sentence, then the nature of the imagination's active role is to transform or reshape the values and relations traditionally held within language.[11] Which is why the role of identity remains important to understanding the process of metaphor. For what identity is about is the bringing together of that which is not traditionally associated. Thus it is the imagination that perceives the possibility of the relatedness between distant terms, so that it is the imagination that is closely identified with the concept of metaphorical sameness. Which explains the traditional view that a theory of metaphor concerns similars. For the history of metaphor is truly a history of the ocular side of the metaphorical equation; of the imaginative performance that perceives a likeness. In that way, up until the twentieth century, what the study of metaphor unconsciously focussed on was the imaginative impact of the self. Where the self participated, and how it participated were never explored, so that the study of metaphor never reached beyond the initial stage of relating distant terms.

It further explains the contradictions present in Ricoeur's thesis when he alludes to both the imaginative performance that is controlled by the semantics of the sentence, and the assimilation or rapprochment made between distant terms. On the one hand, Ricoeur goes farther than any previous writer to explicitly ground a semantic theory of metaphor in the predicative function of the sentence. Moreover, he does not delimit this approach by appealing to a psychology of the imagination. In fact, he clearly establishes the primary role of discourse in both managing and displaying a flow of images. Where he contradicts himself, however, is in the claim that identity is the primary orientation of the metaphorical statement. An argument that follows from Ricoeur's emphasis on the imagination's capacity to perceive likenesses. For that reason, despite the sententional orientation of his theory on metaphor, Ricoeur never really reaches beyond Aristotle's view that metaphor is about an insight into similarities. As such, when Ricoeur refers to the metaphorical depiction it is not seen as an evolving creation that develops from the interplay of self and world, but as a suspension between two worlds, (what Ricoeur refers to as a split-reference).[12]

Now, the suspension between two worlds essentially is a result of a theory that retains the difference between

literal and figurative forms of language. A difference that we have shown to be unfounded. At the level of ontology it is an assumption that rests with the ocular side of the metaphorical process. Specifically, the idea that metaphor is about seeing two worlds or views simultaneously. "That is to say, the perspective prior to and subsequent to the transformation of the metaphor's principle and subsidiary subjects must be conjointly maintained."[13] Yet this dual vision is a misinterpretation of the imagination's insight. As we have noted, if the imagination is confined by the sententional movement of words, then what constitutes that insight is displayed by discourse. While the words and images must initially be understood from the context of their traditional orbit, together they do not present both an ordinary and a novel depiction. The fact that each word and image was not previously associated means together they never constituted an ordinary depiction. That there is a tension or impertinence is a result of the degree of difference between each term. Such tension is therefore a question of the relatedness between each word and image, and not between ordinary and novel depictions. For the latter would require two statements opposed to each other, and not what transpires in a metaphor.

But this is not to say that a suspension does not occur within metaphor. Such a suspension, however, would be in

the form of a stepping back, or what Hester refers to as "a bracketing of our naturalistic presuppositions and our reality presuppositions."[14] This bracketing takes place between the self and world at the level of discourse, because by allowing for what Hester claims is the original right of all data within the metaphor, ordinary values held within language and individual references that contribute to insight are held in abeyance. What constitutes the ordinary differences between terms and the possible identity perceived in normally unrelated terms becomes secondary once the imagination and language are brought together in a metaphor. For that reason, what had previously been referred to as a blending together of identity and difference resulted from the 'unity' and simultaneous 'suspension' that takes place between the self and world in the course of a metaphorical utterance.

Once we accept that metaphor is a process that results from the interplay between self and world, then metaphor is not a discovery of something already held within language and therefore the 'world-at-large', or a reflection of the subjective condition of the self. Instead, metaphor is a radical departure from the limitations of both convention and relativism. As an interplay between self and world, metaphor becomes a means of disclosure, or of creating and recreating language and therefore a world. Yet,

metaphor does not create in a vacuum, but must begin with what Goodman notes is "a world already on hand."[15] For the creation of a world results, according to Goodman, from the compositional or decompositional remaking that takes place from within a world or between worlds.[16] But what constitutes the means through which a world is made is not simply from what Goodman notes are competing or conflicting versions of reality, or between multiple actual worlds.[17] For the making of a world begins when the ordinary values of a particular linguistic community collide with an individual's unique relationship to that world. This is not a question of simultaneous multiple worlds in competition with each other, but simply the creation of an alternate world. To create or remake a world, one must presume the incompleteness of a particular world. Metaphor is therefore the disclosure of this interplay between the inadequacy of a particular world and the self's novel insight on that world.[18]

Now, as an act of disclosure, metaphor is also an act of Saying, which should be understood as the means by which we disclose being-in-the-world. But as Heidegger points out, Saying, as a question of creating or making manifest, fundamentally refers to that which bears 'relevance'.[19] Where the question of relevance must be seen from the vantage point of speech and participation, because if metaphor is about the interplay between

self and world, then what is held as relevant must result from a contextual actuality that enables self and world to encounter each other. Therefore, in the following subsection, we will extend our analysis into an exploration of metaphor's creative status in language through its relationship to speech, particularly in terms of speech as conversation.

5.2 FROM SAYING TO CONVERSATION: METAPHOR AS THE EXPERIENCE OF SIGNIFICANCE

By pointing to metaphor as an interplay between self and world, we have grounded that relationship in the predicative structure of the sentence. In that way, like Ricoeur, we have given to discourse the primary role as the means through which metaphor arises. A role that is made possible because as a predicative configuration of words, discourse both extends into the phenomenal world, and determines the nature of that extension as a relationship between self and language. Yet, once we establish the discursive ground of metaphor, then metaphor becomes a function of what Heidegger claims is the communication of the possibilities of disclosing existence. That is to say, as a discursive movement, metaphor is

a way of creatively articulating the "intelligibility of being-in-the-world."[20] And how we articulate being-in-the-world is not through what Taylor has claimed is the expressive nature of language, but through what Heidegger defines as Saying, which means to show, to let appear, to let be seen and heard.[21] A distinction that rests on the question of what language is about.

Now, in Taylor's view, language is about the "capacity to speak the reflective awareness implicit in using words to say something."[22] Language is about a being who is capable of using words for describing and recognizing and therefore of manifesting the world he dwells in. And though language presumes the background of the world, the focus for Taylor is the expressive awareness of the self as it brings language into being. Thus language is simply the vehicle that enables the self and its interpretation of the world to become actualized.[23] Which is why what meaning and understanding are about is nothing more than the realization of what conditionally is a case of the self's reflective orientation to the world. In other words, for Taylor, language primarily reflects the self's pivotal role as the agent of disclosure. For that reason, because Taylor continues to appeal to an expressive theory of language, his thoughts still remain within the narrow bounds of an emotive theory that had its origins in the thinking of Herder and the Romantic school of thought.

Yet, although we have appealed to Heidegger's idea of disclosure as Saying, Heidegger's explanation of articulation as Saying is carried away from the actuality of discourse as the interplay of self and world. In Heidegger's words, Saying as Showing;

> "brings all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind...that which brings them there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing we call Appropriation...Appropriation assembles the design of Saying and unfolds it into the structure of manifold Showing."[24]

For Heidegger, Saying is not about what is revealed in discourse by man qua man and world, but concerns the release of Dasein (man's being) to the word, and therefore to the being that we are. Dasein dwells in language insofar that language holds Dasein in view. For language as Saying appropriates Dasein to itself, and allows Dasein to come into his own, as one who is given over to speech, and therefore to encountering and answering Saying.[25]

However, according to Heidegger, Dasein only experiences this encounter with language when he is unable to find the right word for what concerns him. In that way, the experience with language that brings Dasein to encounter language does not occur in everyday talk, but in the absence of what concerns us.[26] From Heidegger's point of view it essentially depends on whether language gives or withholds the appropriate word. Now, for Heidegger, like Ricoeur, it is the poet who comes closest to

uncovering that which is unspoken.[27] The poet serves to reveal, to unconceal the world that Dasein as a being-in-the-world is directed towards, and that lays claim to him.[28] But to reveal is only to acknowledge what science has long claimed; that truth is grounded in the 'there' that is eventually disclosed by man's encounter. That observation controlled by logic, empirical fact, and phenomenal data discloses "the laws of nature, which tell us what is always and everywhere the case."[29] Thus if truth is what awaits man's archaeological dig, then the poet becomes more like the scientist, using his 'experience with language' in the form of an heuristic device for uncovering what is already held for Dasein's world. An approach, in fact, that is followed by many in the social sciences, who have often defined the political and social world as an unobservable reality that awaits the appropriate method of discovery. It is also the position that Miller supports when he argues that metaphor serves to disclose an underlying political reality by positing a likeness between different things; between the familiar experience of the everyday and the unobservable but intelligible structure of political things.[30]

But if Dasein only experiences language in its absence, then such an experience is not about uncovering the hidden, but concerns the interplay that Dasein as self has with language as world, and to the role that metaphor has as a

process that gives significance to this experience. For the absence that is apparent when the poet first confronts language, results from the poet's retreat from ordinary discourse, or what Heidegger refers to as the "they".[31] By withdrawing from ordinary discourse, the poet draws away from the actuality of language and into the horizon of the possible. As the possible, language is, in Gadamer's words, more than "an elaborate conventionalism, or the burden of pre-schematisation with which it loads us...it becomes simply the freedom of speaking oneself and of allowing oneself to be spoken."[32] Therefore, what the poet comes to experience with language is a gap or distance between self and the "they" as ordinary language. And how the poet closes that gap is not through what is already found within language, but only in what creatively transpires when ordinary language confronts the active participation of the self. For that reason, because metaphor is the creative process that results from the interplay of self and language, metaphor is what occupies the space opened up by the poet's experience.

Once we accept that the experience that Dasein has with language is only revealed in the self's withdrawl from ordinary language, then 'Saying' is about what is disclosed in the interplay between self and language. Saying shows, but what it shows reflects the condition of a being that actively participates, and

who has a role to play in the evolution of language and therefore world. It follows, that if Saying is about the active freedom that the self has in participating in the creation of language, then it is possible to say that what Heidegger refers to as Appropriation is nothing more than the influence that is exerted by the "they" as it attempts to bring Dasein into its world.[33] For Appropriation concerns what is already held within language, so that what is given over to Dasein are the ideals and values that Tradition carries to all members of a linguistic community. As such, what the self encounters is not something primarily his own, but what is already given as the ordinary world that he is a part of. Which is to say that what holds Dasein in view is the ordinary world, of the traditions that are elevated by History, and that in turn shape History as the movement that appropriates.

Now, on the surface, it would appear that such a view imply's that Heidegger's notion of Appropriation carries with it the overtones of a Hegelian teleology that once defined man as the conditional means through which the World Spirit realized itself. There is no doubt that Heidegger's History of Being primarily focusses on the ontological dimension of Sein, (Being) and only on Dasein as it relates to Sein. And this is particularly the case in his later writings when Heidegger begins to move away

from the influence of the metaphysical ground of Being and towards a conception of Sein that is at once a criticism of western metaphysics from the time of Plato, (reaching its zenith under Hegel), and a return to the thinking of the early Greeks. The latter being "the destiny of the disclosure of the duality...that both conceals and is thought as something said...and that yields what is present to the everyday perception of mortals."[34] Yet, though Heidegger would define language as Appropriation as the master of men, he at times remains uncertain as to the role Dasein has with language.[35] For though Appropriation brings Dasein to language, it does not mean that Dasein cannot bring language to language. And even Heidegger acknowledges that there comes a time when the poet "is compelled...to put into language the experience he undergoes with language."[36]

That the poet participates in the giving of language points to Saying as the disclosure of that which bears relevance. Saying refers to what is relevant because it reveals that which transpires as the closing of the gap between the poet and language. Given, though, that metaphor is what results from the poet's movement towards language, then Saying is about the disclosure of metaphor as the 'significance' that bears directly upon 'being'. By significance I mean the relevance that occurs for a 'being' whose ontological condition is as one

who understands and interprets, and therefore as one who in discourse is given over to its disclosedness, to the world, to being-in, and to the self.[37] Metaphor reveals what is directly relevant in the self's encounter with language, because through discourse metaphor creates a reality that is neither of self or world, but that reflects the actuality of the ongoing dialogue between the unique condition of the one and the common values held within a linguistic community.

On the other hand, if metaphor is what arises out of the dialogue between man qua man and world then what we define as 'significance' is the action that is humanly disclosed by the Word. As Arendt notes;

> "action is the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, and therefore corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world."[38]

Yet, on its own, without speech, action represents a brute physical reality that remains indifferent to the question of the relationship between self and world. Hence the close relationship between speech and action, because only through the Word is it possible for deeds to be captured and held as something unique and relevant. For the Word represents man's capacity to reveal the "who" that we are and the world that we come into.[39] The Word, or more precisely, speech, because speech is what reveals, is the means through which the self comes to

encounter an already existing web of relations. Together they form a unique lifestory of both the self and world, so that together they establish a 'significance' that reflects the manifestation of a reality that both acknowledges and identifies the actor and the stage that forms his background.[40]

At the same time, because significance is about man's place in the world, it is also about man's attempt to assert the necessity of his being in a world where uncertainty and anxiety are the norm. For the significance that is attained out of the congruence between speech and action is a density and definiteness that excludes the indifference of space and time by establishing a resistance against the trend towards conditions of higher probabilty, such as diffusion, and the erosion of entropy.[41] Significance becomes the self-assertion of a reality that wards off uncertainty by giving the self a place and a role within the world. As Blumenberg notes, significance results from man's effort to distance himself from the anxiety that Heidegger defines as his basic state-of-mind.[42] Significance is the response to the reality that man encounters as a being that is both in-the-world, and oriented towards the world, and is therefore "the quality of the world as it would not originally have been for men " had not man sought to nullify the "authenticity" of his relationship to an impartial reality.[43]

Now, according to Blumenberg, the significance that man gives to his encounter with the world is a metaphorical disclosure that is delineated in the form of myth. For in Blumenberg's words, metaphors are linguistic incarnations of nature and humanity and represent a process in which "man is forever caught in the act of becoming incarnate as man."[44] Citing a passage from Jean Paul's Horn of Oberon, Blumenberg gives a metaphorical accounting of the metaphorical 'significance' that is attained in myth when the self encounters language. Thus,

> "When man looks down, as theology did in the old days, from the supernal world to the earthly world, then the latter seems to drag along, small and futile; and when he measures the small world, as humor does, against the infinite world and sees them together, a kind of laughter results which contains pain and greatness."[45]

Myths give man a place in the world, because they enable the self to become reconciled to the world. However, unlike the metaphors that result from the poet's encounter with language, the significance found in myths represent a metaphorical story that follows from man's attempt to become reconciled to the world. A difference that rests on the distinction between the experience the poet seeks and the reconciliation with language as world that inspires the storyteller.

Thus although the poet forever dwells in the experience of the encounter between self and world, and as such,

bears witness to the role he has in shaping language and world, the storyteller through the elevation of metaphors to myth, wants only to come back into a world. The storyteller is not interested in revealing the experience he has undergone with language, but only in closing the gap that has opened up between the ordered world that is shaped by certain myths and the incompleteness of his relationship to these world myths. The storyteller seeks the ascendancy of man's place in the ordinary world by restoring an order that gives to man a familiarity and nearness that is similar to "making oneself at home."[46]

But while the storyteller attempts a reconciliation with the world, in his haste he has overlooked what the poet has long understood; that being the intersubjective communicability that the self has with the world.[47] We have already noted with Wittgenstein that communication depends on the ability to speak a language, so that communication is an act grounded in speech. Speech, though, according to Arendt, corresponds to both the self's distinctness and the actuality of the self's participation in a linguistic community. Thus speech is "the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is of living as a distinct and unique being among equals."[48] Through speech, both self and world are brought together, because speech serves to put things out in the open, to reveal or make visible. In Taylor's words, speech is the actuality of

language as it creates a space about which both self and world revolve. In that way, speech is what holds the significance that man finds in his encounter with the world.[49] Which is why Arendt is correct to point to the Polis as the true space in which significance is held. For the Polis is the organization that arises when people both act and speak together.[50]

But if the polis is the framework in which man discloses his encounter with the world, then ultimately the polis is the space of dialogue, participation, and disclosure. All of which reflect man's open capacity to engage in the exchange of words and deeds. For the polis is the space in which men are both equal and free, and thereby constitutes the forum wherein each individual's experience is gathered and held as part of the ongoing evolution of the dialogue between self and world. As such, as the space of the encounter, the polis is the place where dialogue is given over to the experience of the possible. An experience the participants undergo that is neither of convention or prejudice, but of the possibilities that arise when dialogue simultaneously concerns the unique condition of each participant and the commonality of their linguistic heritage.

Yet, if the polis is the framework that offers a meeting place for a dialogue between self and world, and hence of the disclosure of the 'significance' as the conditional

possibility that comes in the actuality of this encounter, then the polis fundamentally is the 'institution' of conversation. For what conversation is about is the disclosure of the self's participation with the world. In Michael Oakshott's words, "conversation is the meeting place of human intercourse, a place where the participants are not engaged in an enquiry or debate, there is no 'Truth' to be discovered, no proposition to be proved, and no conclusion sought."[51] Conversation actualizes the human condition of participation, so that what is relevant is already contained within the conversation itself. What conversation reveals is the experience of the 'dialectic of participation'. And by that I don't mean what Gadamer refers to as the Platonic process of question and answer that has traditionally defined conversation.[52] Instead, the 'dialectic of participation' must be seen as a movement of infinite engagement and unfolding, where the actuality of conversation presupposes an experience that is of neither participants but of what is constantly being created and recreated in the course of the dialogical encounter between self and world.

For that reason, because metaphor is the 'significance' that arises out of the encounter between self and language as world, conversation is what enables metaphor to arise. As a meeting place for participation that has no limitations as to what may enter into the

conversation, conversation effectively creates the conditions by which the self may retreat from ordinary discourse and undergo an experience with language. For at a fundamental level, conversation is about the experience that man has with the world. An experience that is revealed through metaphor.

But if metaphor is about the experience that takes place between self and world, then what we hold up as 'Truth' is, in fact, only metaphors that redescribe reality in the course of the dialogue between the individual as self and language as a pluralistic linguistic community. What bears relevance precludes the establishment of an archimedian point, because as conversation opens up the possibility of an encounter between self and language, metaphor comes to represent an experience that is neither relative or objective, but a condition of one who dwells in participation. For that reason, the problematic of significance must call into question whether an objective truth for the social sciences is possible and/or necessary. In politics, history, and even philosophy, one is unable to reach the ground on which all of mankinds institutions and concepts are founded, because the reality of each is determined by the necessity of dialogue and participation.[53] We thereby remained immersed in a society that manifests a reality for which we are partly responsible, but which at the same time we come

upon. This is no longer a question of 'Truth' but in Wittgenstein's words, "of a seeing as", of an understanding that is realized through interpretation, and participation.[54] In such altered conditions, one no longer speaks of truth, but what is made true, through what bears relevance.

Conversation is therefore about the actuality of the encounter and dialogue between the self and language as world, and not their reconciliation. Which is why it is the poet, and not the storyteller, that is at home in conversation, because the poet has forever been open to the possibility of an ongoing experience with language. A consequence that cannot be overlooked for a theory of metaphor. For once we accept that metaphor is grounded in conversation as the 'significance' that is attained when the poet experiences language, we must conclude that metaphors are an infinity of possibilities. A conclusion that becomes quite tenable when we consider that conversation is, according to Oakshott, an open ended medium where "facts appear only to be resolved into the possibilities from which they were made, 'certainties' are shown to be combustible...by being kindled by the presence of ideas of another order."[55] In conversation metaphor attains its zenith because it is the medium that reveals the creative quality of the dialogical interplay between self and world. Yet, it is also evident

that in conversation metaphors are a 'significance' that remains subject to the actuality of the conversation itself. A prescription that reveals the other side of conversation's relationship to metaphor as one in which conversation becomes the disclosure, as well as, the ground of metaphor. In that way, to complete our study on metaphor it requires that we explore conversation from the standpoint of a metaphorical accounting of conversation. In this case, from the standpoint of the 'conversation that political man dwells in'.

5.3 THE METAPHORICAL NATURE OF POLITICAL MAN: CONVERSATION AS THE DISCLOSURE OF WORLDS

Conversation and metaphor; a relationship that primarily concerns the question of disclosure. But a relationship that offers two forms of disclosure. The first, as we noted, was the culmination of an exploration that defined metaphor as a creative process that extends into the phenomenal world through its disclosure of the encounter between self and world; one that is made possible in conversation. The second, only alluded to at the end of the previous section, concerns the question of conversation as the disclosure of worlds. The importance of

which should not be overlooked, because by disclosing the metaphorical significance of the relationship between self and language, conversation simultaneously reveals the unlimited metaphoricalness of man's participation in worlds. In other words, 'although conversation establishes the possibilities for a dialogical experience of the self's encounter with language' it is also a metaphorical accounting of the metaphorical exploration of being-in-the-world. And this metaphorical accounting of metaphor is most appropriately the metaphor of the 'conversation that political man dwells in'.

Now, to say that political man dwells in a conversation, is to reveal a metaphor that makes present a story. When one tells a story one is speaking of an experience, not from the place separate from what is spoken, but from the presence of the experience itself. To tell a story is to refer to a gathering that holds open the possibilities of the past and strengthens the expectations of the future. It is a story that reflects the dialogical horizon of a being who finds himself in circumstances not of his making, following actions intended as an imperative for authenticating the present through the expectations of tomorrow. As Ricoeur observed with Marx, it is an experience often expressed as "making history" or "doing history", a process that is equivalent to humanity

narrating its own story.[56] But contrary to Ricoeur, it is not a step backward from the future towards the past, of a narrowing of the temporal distance between the past and the future. For the experience that is given through conversation is a gathering that suspends time. In conversation the space of experience does not differentiate between past and future, because conversation denotes only the actuality of the dialogical relationship between man qua man and world. In other words, what is defined as the given of history, or the indeterminancy of tomorrow is leveled off in a dialogue with man: here history often remains open to re-interpretation, and constantly offers the promise of a variety of possibilities, while the future is given a weight that reduces its contingency and provides man with goals by which to direct action towards.

Thus as a process that levels off, conversation essentially is creating a space of equality, where the weight of tradition or the uncertainty of the future are transformed into one of several dialogical participants with competing views. For conversation acknowledges that all participants with their competing interests have a value and a role to play in the conversation of mankind. And if each participant has a say, then the metaphorical accounting of conversation expresses a story that acknowledges the role that the individual plays

within the plurality that is inherent in the 'world-at-large', and conversely, the influential role that the linguistic community has with the individual. Given then that conversation is about the plurality of interests that enter into a dialogue, then political man becomes the dialogical centerpiece of conversation's metaphorical disclosure, because political man must balance the significance that evolves as a creative metaphor with the traditions, values, and history of the everyday linguistic community that he is a part of.

As to why it is political man who has the pivotal role and not the poet will become clear when we understand that conversation not only reveals man's experience with language, but also how it relates back to the values and traditions already held within a linguistic community. Thus, while it is true to say that the poet is at home in conversation, the poet is nonetheless concerned only with the experience within conversation that enables him to constantly encounter language. The poet is one who ever dwells on the horizon of language, and conversation is what enables him to remain there, because it continually allows him to enter into a dialogue with the ordinary world from a distance. The fact that the poet must encounter and listen to the ordinary world is not a prerequisite for returning to the world. It only

signals that the poet must speak with the ordinary world as a necessary condition for retaining a remoteness from the mundane. Political man, on the other hand, finds himself at the center of a dialogue between the stability offered by the traditions and values of the everyday, and the development and change that is required if society is to effectively progess. For politics is the conversation between tradition and change, order and revolution, and self and world, and it is the job of political man to recognize the plurality within the totality of this dialogical unfolding.[57] Hence the importance of political man to the unfolding of conversation, because it is political man who must strike a balance between different worlds.

While this clearly distinguishes political man from the poet, it also separates him from the storyteller. As the disclosure of the plurality of worlds, the conversation that political man dwells in displays the dialogical actuality of the different possibilities that are attained in the 'significance' of the encounter. They are the 'possibility of worlds' and signify what Oakshott states is the "pursuit of intimations" that are initiated when men participate.[58] It is a difference between the storytellers singleminded pursuit of a totality that shapes a limited but ordered world, and political man's understanding that everything is

temporary, and nothing arbitrary in a dialogue of possible worlds.

But if conversation is the mode through which we participate in worlds, then political discourse must reflect man's plurality. For the failure of political man to promote and maintain an ongoing and open dialogue can only lead to what Marcuse refers to as the "functionalization of language"; where language expresses a technological behavior or "habits of thought" as it organizes the socio-political world towards a single dimension.[59] Without the contingency generated by conversation, language becomes governed by cliche intended as intimidation and glorification, and according to Marcuse, opens the door towards authoritarian and totalitarian forms of communication such as decision, dictum, and command.[60] This is evident in societies where the possibilities for open discourse are limited or non-existent, for what is disclosed is distorted from the potential that is central to being-in-the-world. Conversation remains, but has been forced underground, while language is subject to a manipulation designed to control, select, organize, and redistribute ideas and interpretations. When conversation is closed off, discourse becomes, according to Foucault, a struggle for power, "discourse does not simply translate struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing by which there is

a struggle, discourse is the power to be seized."[61] In the end, only when conversation is maintained can political discourse avoid the violence of a totality that seeks to unify discourse under an ideal of truth.

Thus, at a glance it would appear that conversation is more prevalent in societies where participation is encouraged. That societies where a democratic tradition has long been accepted are the natural political settings from which to engage in a conversation. And while this is true to the extent that democratic institutions presume the possibility of participation, they nevertheless can constitute a restriction and closing off of conversation through the systematic tryanny of public opinion. Under the guise of a tradition that has extolled the virtues of public space, participation has been channelled by the mass media towards intellectual trends, linguistic stereotyping, and the pursuit of immediate desires. As Fred Dallmayr argues, "the 'general will' shades over into a sum of private wills, or at least into the will of the most vocal and preponderant segment of society...desires...become a socially generated and fashioned impulse." It is not direct political constraint, but simply the indirect control and manipulation of the public sphere.[62] Thus when we speak of the 'conversation of political man' we are referring to a metaphor that reaches further than what democractic institutions intend,

as it reveals a changing and open dialogue, where concepts and ideas are constantly being replaced and redefined. Conversation opens up mankind's worlds, so that what bears upon humanity is disclosed in the course of the conversation. In other words, for political man, conversation is the politics of discourse; and discourse is the articulation of the significance of a being who encounters the world. Which is to say that conversation is the metaphorical disclosure of the significance that is metaphor. Conversation is therefore not just the ground upon which metaphor arises, it is also a metaphorical accounting that discloses the metaphorical possibilities inherent in the discourse of political man's plural polity.

Now it is precisely the threat of tyranny, or of arbitrary authority, that points to the unique and fundamental position of the metaphor of political conversation. For as conversation, politics becomes a metaphor that portrays and discloses the metaphors that underly the perception and legitimacy of political man's socio-political world. And what conversation reveals is that the history of political thought is a history of the tyranny of metaphor; of priviledge, without extraction from their native soil.[63] For that reason, despite pointing to the necessary metaphorical relationship between political man and conversation, the history of political man has often been indistinguishable from the

storyteller. Like the storyteller who sought to reconcile man to the world, political man in his zeal for a harmony of interests placed order and stability above the uncertainty inherent in a dialogue of worlds. Within the established polity of the times this translated into the preservation and justification of the status quo. But which became possible because of a tradition that integrated a selected group of properties into a conceptual totality that identified society with the totality that shaped it.

Hence the tyranny of metaphor; a history of political thought that sought to define reality through political man's appropriation of metaphorical identities. Where identity becomes the original cause for the totalization of political thought. And where the dominance of the word over discourse becomes the foundation for the history of the world. In other words, because the word held sway for so long, the transpositional identity between things was given a central role in the development of thought. Totality became possible, because the attributes of sameness provided the conditions for transference. It also meant that once transferred metaphor would no longer be perceived as a metaphor. Instead, metaphor would be reduced to a conceptual framework that resembled the characteristics of the word, at that time identified as the fundamental unit of meaning, and hence as the vessel of 'Truth'. Which is to say that by focussing only on

identity, political man selected a limited number of attributes that were made to assume world-wide scope by encompassing an entire age's thoughts and actions; while at the same time, leveling off all other metaphors, concepts, and ideas that did not fit the accepted parameters.[64]

Yet, in the words of Paul deMan, "properties, it seems, do not properly totalize, or rather, they totalize in a haphazard and unreliable way. It is indeed not a question of ontology, or things as they are, but of authority, of things as they are decreed to be."[65] It is language as power on the part of the noble, powerful, and high-stationed who, according to Nietzsche, "seized the right to create values and to coin names for values."[66] It is authority in the guise of Truth:

> "a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified...and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding."[67]

In other words, metaphors that have become worn out or effaced, so that the ideas and concepts that remain take on the appearance of self-contained truths.[68] Abstractions without context or origin that, according to Blumenberg, were raised to a metaphorical totality by proclaiming their authority from a teleological intention of legitimizing the political order as against the threat of chaos.[69] It is a self-assertion that

displaces myth as the original order of the world with an order that repeats the original act of creation. Politics therefore became myth and political man replaced the storyteller. In the end, it was order by decree.

Indeed, one need only examine the history of political thought to realize the extent and tyranny of conceptually disguised metaphors. For example, in English jurisprudence one of the more prominent references involved the metaphorical concept of the King's Two Bodies:

> "For the King has in him Two Bodies viz., a body natural, and a body politic. His body natural is a body mortal, subject to all infirmities that come by Nature or accident, to the imbecility of infancy or old age...But his body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government, and constituted for the Direction of the people, and the management of the public weal."[70] Thus;
>
> "The King has two capacities, for he has Two Bodies, the one whereof is a body natural, consisting of natural members as every other man has, and in this he is subject to passions and death as other men are; the other is a body politic, and the members thereof are his subjects, and he and his subjects together compose the corporation, and he is incorporated with them, and they with him, and he is the head, and they are the members, and he has the sole Government of them."[71]

Now, according to Kantorowicz, the idea of the King's Two Bodies brings to the forefront the mystical quality of the corporate entity similar to the corpus mysticism identified with Christ as the head of the Church. The metaphor of the body politic is elevated to a

mystical level that implies the immutability and superiority of such a body, so that it is perceived as an individual with a larger and more perfect capacity.[72] In that way, once the body politic is defined as a transcendent organic whole, it becomes possible for the immortal Kingship to migrate from one incarnation to another, thereby preserving the validity of the polity for all time.

But though anthropocentric consciousness eventually began to decline in favour of a conception that perceived the world as a machine constructed on behalf of man, the tyranny of metaphor remained undiminished. The metaphorical totalization of reality simply shifted from an organic self-perpetuation to a mechanistic "perfection of clockwork, which admitted only springs and wheels, and seem to exclude any thought of criticism or altering reality."[73] Indeed, in a passage that Blumenberg cites from Schlegel, the once dominant organic concept came to be justified as the freedom of an unfinished world that had become threatened by the ascendancy of this mechanistic totality:

> "The reason why we speak against freedom is that it breaks up the unity of the world. For if the world is thought of as a mechanism and man as absolute causality, then the world is split, and so is reason. The split that thus comes into being is even now irreparable, and no practical postulate can bridge it...It is entirely different in our theory, where the world is an organism, a nature. We do not want our action to succeed; we want something to emerge from it; we do not want everything to be already foreclosed; but the mechanistic system prevents this."[74]

Although the tyranny of metaphor is evident in the use of the above political metaphors, such is not the case with conversation as a political metaphor. The unique status of conversation is that it carries its metaphorical traits over into the actuality of its disclosure. Conversation discloses the plurality of political society, of the possibilities of an ever evolving 'significance', and thus of the dialogical unfolding of metaphors that result from the encounter between self and world. In that way, conversation as politics must be seen as a metaphor of tolerance, because conversation does not exclude the possibility of other metaphors but, in fact, accounts for both their actuality and their necessity. It follows, that conversation is not a political metaphor without remainder. Nor is it to be identified as the political metaphor second to none. For conversation in its self-disclosure as a metaphor presumes the condition of its relationship to other metaphorical disclosures. As a metaphor that reveals the disclosure of the encounter between self and language as world, conversation must presume a commonality, and therefore a background of intersubjective beliefs that individuals are able to bring forth or encounter in the course of the conversation.[75] For conversation is an actuality of community and contact, of identity as well as difference, so that when we refer to the conversation that political man dwells in, we are

simultaneously elevating other metaphorical accounts of the politics of humanity.

One metaphor that comes to mind, is 'the solidarity of civil society'. For one of the conditions that makes conversation possible is a "solidarity that is expressed by actors in their capacity to make common cause while maintaining their equality and distinctness. It is a transient, fluid form of association expressive of the voluntary assumption of committments."[76] Here solidarity is interpreted in the larger sense of community, or for that matter, as the commonality of humanity, so that as opposed to the limited solidarity of special interest groups, or historically defined groups, where conflict is often the order between them, an enlarged solidarity is a realization of social and political causes that a community or humanity share. And it is this recognition that enables conversation to occur, because conversation only begins when we acknowledge the unity of a polity itself. For that reason, conversation must be considered the antithesis to political tyranny, because conversation is not about itself, but about the disclosure and relationship of the metaphors that political man dwells in.

In the end, we are reminded of Hegel's account of the world spirit unfolding towards a self-conscious realization of its own freedom. For does not Hegel

define this teleology of freedom in terms of a historical devolution of tyranny, where humanity's socio-political world reflected an evolution from the authority of the one who was free to the authority of the many who were all free.[77] But instead of the metaphysics of a teleological Being, the devolution of tryanny is the dialectical movement away from the authority of the word and towards a conversation of metaphorical discourse that represents the plurality of political freedom. How else to describe the history of political man, but as a dialogical unfolding from the discourse of the one as Word to the conversation of the many as Metaphor.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

From the beginning, our intention was to examine a theory of metaphor as an interdisciplinary phenomenon. We had noted how many studies of metaphor had either focussed on the semantic structure of metaphor, or on the chracteristics of a particular metaphor. But while many of these studies offered insights on the nature and use of metaphor, they remained largely unconcerned with the broader implications of their conclusions. This resulted in theories on metaphor that were not able to account for the phenomenal application of metaphors, the apparent cognitive content of metaphor, and the relationship between metaphor and knowledge; to name just a few. This study was therefore largely an attempt to respond to some of these unanswered questions.

Thus, evolving out of a critique of the most prevalent theories on metaphor, and the re-evaluation of those theories that followed, we have arrived at a theory of metaphor that begins as a sententional predication between disparate terms, and that extends into the phenomenal world as an encounter between self and language as world.

At the level of semantics, metaphor is a movement between remote terms that are brought together in a sentence, blending both their differences and similarities into a novel meaning. But as a sentential process, metaphor is also a creative disclosure that reaches beyond language and into the phenomenal world. What constitutes the basis of this creative extension is a sentential process that enables the imagination to appropriate ordinary meanings into a novel configuration. Metaphor is the process that represents the imaginations's intervention in the world, because metaphor concerns the disclosure of that which bears 'relevance'. Which is to say that metaphor is about the 'significance' that results from the encounter between the self as an active participator and language as world. Hence it is an encounter between creation and tradition, and reflects the ontological condition of a dialogical being who is a being in-the-world.

But once we refer to either a movement between normally unassociated words at the level of the sentence, or the imagination's intervention upon the values held by a linguistic community, we are referring to a sentential process that simultaneously operates on several levels. On the one hand, metaphor is a creative disclosure that arises out of ordinary language by forcing a re-alignment of what is held within the

ordinary relationship between words; i.e. those meanings that are tacitly accepted as part of the polysemic range of a word's literal meaning. On the other hand, metaphor is an integration of the imagination and the predicative function of the sentence, so that it forms a display of evolving images. In that way, together with the movement of words, metaphor is a projection of images that evolves from the ordinary to the new. Yet once we refer to metaphor as a relationship between imagination and predication, then metaphor also takes on an ontological dimension. For the question of predication directly depends upon the role of the sentence as the medium that links language to speech.

Now, this sententional extension into speech is what enables metaphor to arise, because speech is about both the self's distinctness, and the contextual actuality of the self's participation with a linguistic community. For that reason, metaphor is more than a semantic insight, or a psychological perception. It is a dialogical encounter between the imagination as self, and the ordinary values of a linguistic community, and represents the 'significance' of a being whose ontological condition is as one who is given over to disclosedness, and the experience of participation. All of which become enhanced under conditions in which conversation prevails. For conversation effectively

creates the conditions by which the self may undergo an experience with language that remains unhindered by the threat of tyranny or the arbitrary misuse of power. Thus, as a predicative movement between distant terms metaphor is a creative disclosure between self and language that fundamentally must be grounded in the possibility of conversation.

This became evident, both in terms of defining what a metaphor is about, and in terms of defining the relationship between metaphors and the process and development of knowledge and understanding within political discourse. For not only is metaphor most appropriately made possible by conversation, but conversation as it is related to political man, is also a metaphor that discloses the metaphorical nature of political man. Which is to say that the 'conversation of political man' is a metaphorical accounting of the metaphorical exploration of being-in-the-world. Conversation points to the metaphorical encounter between self and world, and of the dialogical actualities that are made possible by the 'significance' of that encounter. For the latter are the possibilty of worlds, and result from a plurality of possible relationships between individuals and a linguistic community.

Hence the danger of tyranny, because when conversation is reduced or pushed underground, (though it is never completely shut out), the plurality of the metaphorical encounter between self and world is reduced to a conceptual priviledge by which all other concepts and truths are measured. This has clearly been the case in the history of political man, who has more often than not resembled the storyteller or mythmaker when attempting to establish the totality of a political order; as opposed to recognizing the plurality inherent in a dialogue of possible worlds. For the history of political man is a hidden history of the tyranny of conceptually disguised metaphors, of the totalization of a metaphorical order shaped by decree, and of 'Truths' that take on a self-contained appearance.

Which explains the importance of the metaphorical accounting of conversation, because conversation reveals the plurality of political society, and as such, the dialogical encounter between self and world that is the unfolding of the possibilities of an ever evolving metaphorical disclosure. In the end, metaphor is a interdisciplinary process that is both grounded and revealed in the ontological condition of conversation, because metaphor results from the actuality of beings who are given over to discourse, understanding, and participating within the plurality of the 'world-at-large'.

But although we have explored the basis for an interdisciplinary theory of metaphor, much still remains unanswered. We have noted that metaphor must begin as a sententional process, but what of larger more cohesive written works, such as a poem, a novel, or even a philosophical treatise. Each of these develop creative forms of meaning that result from a predicative movement that relates remote terms. But the 'meaning' and 'significance' of their composition is more often a consequence of their total movement. In other words, what we define as metaphor would be measured by the whole poem, novel, or treatise.

In a different vein, there remains the metaphorical possibilities of the visual arts, such as painting, photography, and sculpturing, to name a few. In this case, metaphor must be defined as a relationship between images and language, as it is when the imagination works strictly through language, such as in a poem, or political metaphor. Yet, the question remains as to what extent works, such as by Van Gogh, Picasso, or Michael Angelo, can be placed under the rubric of language. For if we are to link the purer arts to a theory of metaphor, we must first account for their relationship to language. One possibility that comes to mind, may lie in the fact that these forms of disclosure must presume a tradition of values and perceptions by which the self can first

encounter, in order then to display a 'significance' that is metaphor.

At a different level, the relationship between metaphor and conversation must be seen to have significant implications for the conceptual process by which the social sciences arrives at its 'Truths'. For though we have explored that relationship in terms of the study of political man, metaphors are not limited to poetry or politics, but encompass a variety of theoretical explanations within other areas of the social sciences. Hence the need for a comprehensive exploration of the impact of an interdisciplinary theory of metaphor on concept building within the social sciences itself. On the other hand, studies on metaphor should not be limited to the social sciences, because it is clear that the natural sciences quite often make use of analogies, or metaphorical insights to grasp a sense and understanding of the data that is encountered. What are called paradigms are simply different models of observational data that is presented as an account of reality. To what extent these paradigms are dependent on the metaphorical encounter between the self and world needs to be studied. Nonetheless, it does beg the question as to whether the social sciences should be searching for a methodological framework for arriving at a concept of truth that is prevalent in the natural sciences, or

whether the natural sciences should perhaps be cognizant of the metaphoricity that is apparent in both the natural and social sciences.

To conclude, this thesis is intended as a contribution to the literature, but clearly much still remains unanswered. For though I have explored a theory of metaphor that is an interdisciplinary phenomenon, the nature of this study has precluded a more extensive analyis of a multi-level theory of metaphor. At this stage, what is offered is simply the beginning for a theory of metaphor that originates out of the totality of the human condition.

VII

NOTES

7.1 NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. Aristotle, " The Poetics. " (U.S.A.: The University of Michigan Press) 1967, p.57

2. Aristotle, " The Rhetoric." (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.) 1953, p.151-152

3. Ricoeur P., " The Rule of Metaphor." (Toronto: University of Toronto Press;) 1975, p.13

4. Aristotle, " The Poetics." p.54-55

5. Ibid., p.60-61

6. Richards I.A., " The Philosophy of Rhetoric." (New York: Oxford University Press) 1936, p.93-94

7. Richards I.A., Philosophy of Rhetoric." In M. Johnson (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press) 1981, p.55

8. I.A. Richards, " The Philosophy of Rhetoric." p.47-48

9. Ibid., p.118

10. Black M., " Models and Metaphors." (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press) 1962, p.44-45

11. M. Black "More About Metaphors." In A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1979, p.29

12. P. Ricoeur, p.17

13. M. Black, " Models and Metaphors." p.39-40

14. Polanyi M. & Prosch H., " Meaning." (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1975, p.76-79

15. M. Black., p.40

16. Ibid., p.40-41

17. Davidson D., " What Metaphors Mean." in S. Sacks (ed.), On Metaphor. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1979, p.29-30

18. Ibid., p.32

19. Ibid., p.33

20. Scheffler I., " Beyond the Letter: A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in Language. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1979, p. 15-16, 33-36

21. D. Davidson, p.35

22. Ibid., p.36

23. Davies S. " Truth-Values and Metaphor." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Vol.17, No.3, Spring 1984 p.300

24. D. Davidson, p.38

25. Ibid., p.38

26. Goodman N. " Language of Art." In M. Johnson (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 1981, p.128-129

27. Miller E. " Metaphor and Political Knowledge." American Political Science Review. Vol.73, 1979, p.165-168

28. D. Davidson, p.39

29. Ibid., p.40

30. Black M. " Critical Response II, How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald Davidson." Critical Inquiry. Autumn 1979 p.139

31. D. Davidson, p.37

32. Ibid., p.41

7.2 NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. P. Ricoeur., p.45-46

2. Plato. " The Cratylus." in E. Hamilton & H. Cairns, (ed's), The Collected Dialogues. (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1961, p.467-468

3. Ibid., p.469-470

4. Gadamer H. " Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato." (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1980, p.106-107

5. Ibid., p.107-108

6. de Saussure F. " Course in General Linguistics." (La Salle, Illinois: open Court) 1972, p. 15

7. P. Ricuoer, p. 103

8. F. de Saussure, p.66

9. Ibid., p.67

10. Ibid., p.68-69

11. Davidson D. " The Method of Truth in Metaphysics." In K. Baynes, etc. (ed's), After Philosophy. (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press) 1987, p.167-168

12. Ibid., p.169

13. Ibid., p.167

14. Davidson's failure to recognize how the predicative function of the sentence asserts meaning, stems from his earlier assumption that conditions of truth are to be found in the word's correspondence with identifiable beliefs. For Davidson, meaning becomes identified with the functional capacity that the word has in relation to its composition; a composition that should be considered largely true because of the corresponding role that each word has both in the sentence and in reality. Davidson, therefore, remains pre-occupied with the problem of finding a method for both limiting and defining what constitutes a truth-condition within a sentence, despite

what he acknowledges is the recurring ontological problems that the sentence implys in the act of predicating something. Ibid., p.168-178

15. Wittgenstein L. " Philosophical Investigations." (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.) 1958, p.86 & p.226-227

16. Ibid., p.227

17. That values are the property of the community and not the individual becomes apparent when we note with Hobbes that though an individual may assume a pre-eminent position of power within a given society, the value or worth that such an individual would have is itself dependent upon the judgement that others convey. Only through exposure to a public realm can there be any question of determining what a value may be. As Thomas Hobbes argues, what shapes a value is the "price" that is garnered in an open marketplace, and according to Hobbes that "price" is determined by the buyer and not the seller. For the value of any one individual is given over by how others understand and accept his role. Thus, "an able conductor of soldiers is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent, but in peace not so." Hobbes T. "Leviathan." (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd.) 1982 p.152

18. F. de Saussure., p.113-114

19. According to Quine, the appropriateness of a word's meaning results from the objective pull of our intersubjective process of socialization. Appropriateness reflects the " uniformity of resultant patterns that underly a chaotic subjective diversity of connections between words and experience." And this in turn is conditioned by what socially matters, which for Quine is the " intersubjective conspicuous circumstances of utterance." Quine W.V.O. " Word & Object." (Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press) 1960, p.8

20. Heidegger M. " Being and Time." (New York: Harper & Row) 1962, p.212

21. F. de Saussure., p.128-129

22. Ibid., p.121

23. Ibid., p.121-122

24. Ibid., p.126

25. Frye N. " Anatomy of Criticism." (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1957 p.40

26. F. de Saussure, p.122

27. Wittgenstein L. " Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.) 1922, p.45

28. P. Ricoeur., p. 129

29. Ibid., p.123-124

30. Ibid., p.124

31. F. de Saussure, p.118-119

32. Ibid., p.118-119

33. Thiel C. "Sense and Reference in Frege's Logic." (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.) 1968, p.89

34. Ibid., p.90

35. Ibid., p.90

36. L. Wittgenstein, " Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." p.69

37. M. Heidegger., p.110

38. Wittgenstein L. " Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932- 1935." A. Ambrose (ed.), (Chicago: University Chicago Press) 1979, p.30

39. It should be noted, that although de Saussure primarily is concerned with changes in the sound and physical structure of signs, he does acknowledge that change in the meaning of words is also historical, and therefore to be interpreted as a diachronic process. What de Saussure does not do, however, is explore the nature of that change. It is this oversight that enables de Saussure to establish a dichotomy between the systematic relations of the word, (synchrony), and the historical changes to the word, (diachrony). If de Saussure had extended his analysis to include changes in the meaning of the sign, he might have found the need to incorporate the sentence as a means through which the linguistic community effects changes in the value of the word. A consideration that would also have softened the strict seperation that de Saussure maintained between the synchronic and diachronic aspects of language. For de Saussure's distinction between synchronic and diachronic aspects of language see F. de Saussure, p.79-187

40. M. Heidegger., p.47

41. P. Ricoeur., p.74

42. To say that language and tradition are interchangeable is not to say that language simply represents historical life-situations, but is instead to understand that it is through language that tradition remains significant. Gadamer has pointed out that, the importance of a linguistic tradition is not just that something has been left over as a remnant of the past, but that a particular tradition has been preserved in myth, legend, or written text from which it has been either directly repeated, or conveyed in the meaning and interpretation of signs. In that way, language becomes a representation of the past in the context of the present, particularly through the written word. And once tradition comes to co-exist in the present, then such a tradition is no longer a fragment of the past, but has already become a part of our world. Gadamer H. " Truth and Method." (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company) 1975, p.351-352

43. Wittgenstein L. " Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932." D.Lee (ed.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1980, p.46-47

44. Ibid., p.48-49

7.3 NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Certainly in the case of Black, the question and role of "difference" in the meaning conveyed by a metaphor did not go completely unrecognized. Black acknowledges that a metaphor occurs by applying to a principal subject a system of associated implications characteristic of the subsidiary subject. And Black does allow for the full range of the subsidairy subject's features to initially apply to the principal subject. But the features of the subsidiary subject are eventually restricted in their application to the principal subject by what Black refers to as their appropriateness. For Black, what determines the relationship of each term is the extent that certain features of the subsidiary domain overlap the domain

of the principal subject. In other words, particular relations are considered to be relevant between the two subjects. Now, Black is not concerned with questioning whether the relevant features are similar between the two realms. Instead, what defines the appropriateness of the metaphor for Black is, on how each term is able to make similar use of the corresponding features of the other term. Hence for Black, though a subsidairy subject is understood to contain non-relevant features, they are suppressed out of a process that claims to select and organize features according to the proximity of their contextual roles. In the end, identity prevails, because the emphasis is not on the full interaction of each system's implications, but solely on the familiarity of roles that certain features have within each system of tacitly associated commonplaces. M. Black, " Models and Metaphors." p.38-46

2. Aristotle., " The Poetics." p.59

3. Ibid., p.59

4. P. Ricoeur., p.236

5. Ricoeur P. " Creativity in Language." In C.E. Reagan & D. Stewart, (ed's), The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work. (Boston: Beacon Press) 1978, p. 132

6. Ibid., p.133

7. S. Davies, p.294

8. P. Ricoeur, " The Rule of Metaphor." p.116

9. Aristotle, " The Rhetoric." p.151

10. P. Ricoeur, " The Rule of Metaphor." p.122-123

11. Ibid., p.113-114

12. Ricoeur P. " On Interpretation." In K. Baynes, etc., (ed's), After Philosophy. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) 1987, p.365

13. Miller G.A. " Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors." In A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1979, p.220

14. MacCormac E.R. " A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor." (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) 1985, p.38

15. P. Ricoeur., " The Rule Of Metaphor." p.195

16. Ibid., p.198

17. Ibid., p.198

18. Ibid., p.194

19. Ibid., p.156

20. I.A. Richards, " The Philosophy of Rhetoric." p.55

21. Ibid., p.72

22. Ibid., p.48

23. Camus A. " The Rebel." (New York: Vintage Books) 1956, p.142

24. N. Goodman., p.125

25. E.R. MacCormac., p.39

26. Mill J.S. " Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government." (London: Everyman's Library) 1972, p.189

27. Turetzky P. " Metaphor and Paraphrase." Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 21, No.3, 1988, p.213-214

28. D. Davidson, " The Meaning of Metaphor." p.44

29. Searle J. " Metaphor." In A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1979, p.97

30. Ibid., p.98

31. S. Davies, p.294

32. Ibid., p.298

33. According to MacCormac, the illocutionary effect of language is taken from what Austin distinguished as three aspects of language: 1) locutionary--the declarative force of language or the conveyance of information; 2) illocutionary--the force of what language does, its performative action; and 3) perlocutionary--the effect of language on the hearer. But for MacCormac, metaphor does not conform to this dichotomy, as it often stresses both the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of language. MacCormac claims that metaphors are both suggestive and assertive, that they possess a semantic component that ranges between asserting analogies and suggesting new possible meanings. What links both components together is the commonality of their declarative or statement-like characteristics. In fact, MacCormac argues that only by perceiving that an assertion

has produced a semantic anomaly can it be possible to recognize that a suggestion is also being made. For MacCormac, assertion and suggestion are two sides of the same coin. E. MacCormac, p.159-171

34. J. Searle, p.120

35. E. MacCormac p.171

36. L. Wittgenstein, " Philosophical Investigations." p.108, 179, & 181

37. Townsend D. " The Problem of Paraphrase." Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, Vol.3, No.1, 1988, p.38

38. Ibid., p. 44

39. Ibid., p. 50

40. C.R. Hausman. " Metaphors, Referents, and Indivduality." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.17 No.2, Winter 1983, p.188

41. P. Turetzky, p.210-211

42. N. Frye, p.77

43. Henle P. "Metaphor." In M. Johnson (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 1981 p. 102

44. D. Townsend, p.50

45. Ricoeur P. " The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling." In S. Sacks (ed.), On Metaphor. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1979 p.148-152

46. M. Polanyi, p.82

47. Trudeau P. E. " Federalism and the French Canadians." (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada) 1968, p.127

48. P. Henle, p.102

49. Although it is clear that metaphor reveals a cognitive insight that is not reducible to the meaning rendered by the paraphrase, metaphor is in some ways similar to a paraphrase, because metaphor may also serve as an heuristic device for understanding other metaphors, or even aspects of reality. Where metaphor differs, is through its creative capacity to reveal something novel and distinct. Thus when metaphor serves as paraphrase it is not simply offering an explanation of ordinary features

contained within the metaphor it paraphrases or an aspect of reality that remains obscure, but is instead disclosing an altogether different aspect that may aid in understanding a metaphor or an aspect of reality. Like a paraphrase, it is a device for entering into the metaphor's meaning or an obscure perception of reality, but unlike a paraphrase, it stands on its own as offering something novel and different.

7.4 NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1. L. Wittgenstein, " Philosophical Investigations." p.110

2. Ibid., p.131-133

3. M. Heidegger, " Being and Time." p.78-90

4. P. Ricoeur, " The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling." p.145-150

5. Ibid., p.146

6. Kant I. " Critique of Pure Reason." (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.) 1988, p.119

7. P. Ricoeur, " The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling." p.148

8. Hester M.B. " The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor." (The Hague: Mouton & Co.) 1967, p.132

9. Kant I. " Critique of Judgement." (New York: Hafner Press) 1951, p.163

10. M. Hester, p.142

11. P. Ricoeur, " The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling." p. 145-147

12. Ibid., p.151

13. Ibid., p.152

14. M. Hester, p.168

15. Goodman N. " Ways of Worldmaking." (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company) 1978, p.6

16. Ibid. p.7

17. Ibid. p.110

18. It is necessary to distinguish between the actuality of several worlds intersecting with one another, and the metaphorical disclosure of the self's relationship to a world. When the self encounters a world, the self brings forth a background that partly shapes it, and that it partly shapes. The self is not necessarily limited to participating in one world, so that what it brings forth is often reflected by the self's capacity as a participator in multiple worlds. But what governs the actuality of intersecting worlds is dependent upon the self's relationship to each world. The self never expresses itself between linguistic community's (i.e. between different language groups, or between regional and/or colloquial linguistic nuances). Rather, the self must always participate in one or the other, where one linguistic group remains dominant at the moment of participation. In that way, the self always remains the focal point in the relationship between each world. For that reason, if alternate worlds are to intersect, it first requires that the self step back from the world by which it has found itself. But this does not mean that the self has retreated to another world. The self only introduces something of that alternate world through its insight on a possible relationship between things of another world and its current linguistic group. What constitutes the basis of this insight is the self's distance and interplay with a given linguistic world. Metaphor is the actuality of this movement, because it reflects the distance and insightful appropriation by the self upon a particular linguistic community. In essence, to speak of composition or decomposition between worlds, or even within a world, is not to speak of a collision of actual worlds, but the creation and recreation of an alternate world when the self encounters a language as world.

19. To understand how for Heidegger, Saying is that which bears relevance, it is necessary to understand Heidegger's concept of Saying as poetry. According to Heidegger, poetry represents the arena of the conflict between world and earth, between what is near and what remains remote. Here a people's historical world arises, while the earth remains foreign and closed. This is not Hegel's

theme of historical transcendence, but a happening, where " the concepts of an historical people's nature, and of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, and before it." And happening is for man how " beings disclose themselves to him each time as beings." Thus poetry is essentially the "setting-into-work of truth," which in Being and Time, Heidegger refers to as the disclosedness of Dasein as one who " discloses and uncovers as something disclosed so that to this extent it is essentially "true"." To dwell in truth is to disclose that which bears relevance. And since Saying is a speaking that brings to light, a showing of something we entrust to others, Saying is that which bears relevance. Heidegger M. " Poetry, Language, and Thought." (New York: Harper & Row) 1971 p.74 & M. Heidegger, " Being and Time." p.263

20. M. Heidegger, " Being and Time." p.205

21. Heidegger M. " On the Way to Language." (New York: Harper & Row) 1971, p.122

22. Taylor C. " Human Agency and Language: Philosphical Papers 1." (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1985, p.230

23. Ibid., p.228-229

24. M. Heidegger, " On the Way to Language." p.127-128

25. Ibid., p.129-135

26. Ibid., p.59

27. Although both Ricoeur and Heidegger define the poet as the one who comes closest to participating and disclosing language and reality, there remains a difference in their interpretation as to the nature and extent of the poets role. According to Ricoeur, the poets disclosure results from a primordial relationship between mortals who are born in this world and who dwell in this world for a short time. For Ricoeur, the poet's place within the world decisively contributes to the reality that is to be disclosed. In contrast, Heidegger views the poet's role as a receiver to the destiny or Being that lays claim to him. For Heidegger the poet attains to a happening that answers to the coming world era, or whose saying comes out of the future and into the present. Citing the poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, Heidegger maintains that the poet is simply the one who both listens for and reveals the "song that sings essentially". P. Ricoeur, " The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling." p.150-151 & M. Heidegger, " Poetry, Language, and Thought." p.140-142

28. M. Heidegger, " Poetry, Language, and Thought." p.138-142

29. Scheffler I. " Science and Subjectivity." (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company) 1982, p.8

30. E. Miller, p.165-167

31. What Heidegger refers to as the 'they' is Dasein's encounter with 'Others', in the sense of a being who is a being-with-others. But this being-with-one-another is not an equal relationship, but reflects the inconspicuous domination of others over Dasein. However, the 'Other' is not represented by anyone in particular, but is simply the totality of those who Dasein dwells with in the world. Dasein both belongs to the 'Other' and dwells alongside the 'Other'. As Heidegger states, the Other is the neutral 'they', in which Dasein often dissolves himself into, so that what was distinguishable and explicit, vanishes further and further into the ordinary and indistinguishable. For Heidegger, " the 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness." M. Heidegger, " Being and Time." p.163-164

32. H. Gadamer, " Truth and Method." p.498

33. M. Heidegger, " Being and Time." p.167

34. Heidegger M. " Early Greek Thinking." (New York: Harper & Row) 1984, p.100

35. M. Heidegger, " Poetry, Language, and Thought." p.146

36. M. Heidegger, " On the Way to Language." p.59

37. M. Heidegger, " Being and Time." p.121

38. Arendt H. " The Human Condition." (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1958, p.7

39. Ibid., p.179-184

40. Ibid., p.184

41. Blumenberg H. " Work on Myth." (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press) 1985, p.109

42. Ibid., p.110

43. Ibid., p.110

44. Blumenberg H. " The Legitimacy of the Modern Age." (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press) 1983, p.108

45. Ibid., p.108

46. According to Gadamer, it is not unusual for humanity to make oneself at home in a flood of impressions. The initial order that the individual comes into is the linguistically interpreted experience of one's mother tongue. The mother tongue represents the familiarity of an articulated world that we first make our way in. Familiarity is represented not simply by the growing constancy of words and phrases, but also in what is said in these words. Through language, the world is brought nearer so that it comes to acquire a certain stability as it guides our understanding and opens up the possibility of a world that is shared. For to make oneself at home is to experience language as the means by which humanity gains access to to a world in which certain special forms of human experience arise. Gadamer H. " The Relevance of The Beautiful and other Essays." (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1986, p.114-115

47. The position that Blumenberg argues remains somewhat contradictory. Blumenberg is quite right to link the question of the acceptance of myth with the objectivity of an intersubjective communicability. But Blumenberg delimits the significance that Cassirer emphasizes on the subjectivity, or affective state of the person to whom the world exhibits itself. Thus in the case of the storyteller, while he seeks a reconciliation with the world, this reconciliation is intended on his terms. What defines the storytellers position is not an ongoing dialogue with the world, but a quest to reduce the anxiety that follows from the perception of an unmanageable world. From the vantage point of the storyteller, it is not a question of partaking in communication with the world, but of ending the distinction between self and world, and hence of the dialogue between the two. H. Blumenberg, " Work on Myth." p.167-168

48. H. Arendt, p.178

49. C. Taylor, p.264

50. H. Arendt, p.198

51. Oakshott M. " Rationalism in Politics." (London: Metheun & Co. Ltd.) 1962, p.198

52. H. Gadamer, " Truth and Method." p.326-341

53. Rorty R. " Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature." (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1979, p.389-394

54. L. Wittgenstein, " Philosophical Investigations." p.193-208

55. M. Oakshott, p.198

56. Ricoeur P. " Time and Narrative Vol.3." (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1988, p.216

57. For a full account of the constancy and struggle between tradition and change in politics, and between order and revolution in politics, see Arendt's essay " Tradition and the Modern Age," in Arendt H. " Between Past and Future." ((New York: Penguin Books) 1977 & Arendt H. "On Revolution." (New York: Penguin Books) 1977

58. M. Oakshott, p.125

59. Marcuse M. " One Dimensional Man." (Boston: Beacon Press) 1968, p.85-86

60. Ibid., p.91-101

61. Foucault M. " The Order of Discourse." In M. Shapiro (ed.) Language and Politics. (New York: New York University Press) 1984, p.110

62. Dallmayr F. " Polis and Praxis." (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press) 1984, p.219

63. Derrida J. " Margins of Philosophy." (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1982, p.215

64. Pepper S.C. " The Root Metaphor Theory of Metaphysics." In W. Shibles (ed.), Essays on Metaphor. (Whitewater: The Language Press) 1972, p.19-20

65. de Man P. " The Epistemology of Metaphor." In S. Sacks (ed.), On Metaphor. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1979, p.17

66. Nietzsche F. " The Genealogy of Morals." In W. Kaufman (ed.), The Basic Writings of Nietzsche. (New York: The Modern Library) 1968, p.462

67. Nietzsche F. " On Truth and Falsity in their Extramoral Sense." In W. Shibles (ed.), Essays on Metaphor. (Whitewater: The Language Press) 1972, p.5

68. The notion that a metaphor is quite often worn away and effaced, like a coin, is explicitly drawn from Nietzsche as a foundation from which Derrida begins his

discussion of metaphor as white mythology. According to Derrida, metaphor is a provisional loss of meaning, a diachronic process involving the exchange of properties. The primitive meaning of the metaphor is no longer recognizable, because through the power of displacement the metaphor's meaning participates as a signification of conceptual definitions. At each possible rhetorical turn, one has the possibility of metaphor, of an uninterrupted exhaustion of the metaphor's original meaning. In other words, metaphor appears as a regular semantic loss, a depletion of value, and a hidden history, where truth is an illusion that we have forgotten is an illusion. J. Derrida, p.215-230

69. H. Blumenberg, " The Legitimacy of the Modern Age." p.218-219

70. Kantorowicz E.H. " The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Midieval Political Theology." (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1957, p.7

71. Ibid., p.13

72. Ibid., p.16

73. H. Blumenberg, " The Legitimacy of the Modern Age." p.217

74. Ibid., p.216

75. H. Gadamer, " Truth and Method." p.341-350

76. Reshaur K. " Solidarity." (Paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting) June, 1986, p.24

77. Hegel G.W.F. " The Philosophy of History." (New York: Dover Publications) 1956, p.17-20

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