

Konrad Adenauer and Gustav Stresemann: A Comparative Study  
in the Development of German Foreign Policy.

by

CHRISTOPHER PAUL GILLEN

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

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CHRISTOPHER PAUL GILLEN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of  
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
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## CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS . . . . .	14
III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GUSTAV STRESEMANN . . . . .	38
Weimar Foreign Policy 1919-1923 . . . . .	41
The Stresemann Years 1923-29 . . . . .	44
Stresemann's Ostpolitik . . . . .	58
Rapallo 1922. . . . .	65
Conclusions. . . . .	75
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY . . . . .	79
Religious/Philosophical Background . . . . .	80
The Roots of the Confessional Political Parties in Germany before 1945. . . . .	92
Development of the Christian Democratic Union. . . . .	96
Europe as a Geistig-politische Begriff . . . . .	107
Adenauer's Christian Democratic Background. . . . .	117
V. ADENAUER'S WESTPOLITIK . . . . .	126
Allied Occupation 1945-49. . . . .	130
The Beginning of an Independent Foreign Policy. . . . .	137
Conclusions. . . . .	158
VI. ADENAUER'S OSTPOLITIK . . . . .	162
Ostpolitik 1949-63 . . . . .	173
Ostpolitik Conclusions . . . . .	209
VII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	218

This thesis is dedicated to my parents for all their support.

## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

The Europe which evolved in the post-war period was dramatically different than the one which went to war in 1939. One of the most important results of the war was that the European states had been drastically reduced in power. Probably the most difficult realization these states had to accept ,and it was a slow acceptance, was that 'World Politics' (before, traditionally understood within an ethocentric European context) was in fact no longer centered around Europe. To a certain extent, Europe became the 'object' rather than the 'subject' of international politics<sup>1</sup> with the centres of power shifting geographically from London, Paris, and Berlin, to Moscow in the East and the United States across the Atlantic. Even more important, this geographical division was matched by a deep ideological separation between a 'free-enterprise' Capitalistic West under the political leadership of the United States and a Superpower whose values reflected the political and philosophical thought of Marx and Lenin.

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<sup>1</sup> Bracher., Karl Dietrich. The German Dilemma Praeger Publishers Ltd., New York. 1975 p.136

Accompanying the physical destruction of Europe went the deterioration of the traditional socio/economic class structures upon which many political movements and parties had been previously based.<sup>2</sup> As a result, the political parties of Germany, which are the indirect subject of this study, had to adapt and become more pragmatic and less ideologically motivated. Unlike the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in fact failed to fully grasp these new pragmatic requirements and therefore for much of the 1950's and early 1960's remained in the political wilderness. It was not until 1959 at the Bad Godesberg Parteitag (party conference) when the SPD finally was able to 'cast off its tired Marxist rhetoric' in favor of adopting a political platform with a broader appeal.

The Second World War resulted in the division of Germany into two different zones each lying within the geographical and political sphere of influence of one of the two Superpowers. This division served two separate functions simultaneously. Primarily it ensured a clear delineation of the existing political and military spheres of interest and influence of the two blocs in central Europe, and secondly it dampened the traditional European fear of a united Germany pursuing a destabilizing foreign policy within the heart of Europe.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.138

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 178 One could note here that the French were especially concerned with the future role of Germany in Europe. See for example a collection of reports put

The integration of western Europe, which included the Federal Republic, and which was advocated by many Allied and West German decision makers, accelerated West Germany's recovery process and offered a new set of values and supra-national principles into the post-Hitler political and psychological vacuum that was Germany. Germany's division also offered a systemic security guarantee to her neighbors, notably France and the Benelux countries in the West, and Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East, although one could argue that the price paid by Eastern Europe for this guarantee, that of subjugation to the Soviet Union, was not worth the benefits.

It seems that the only factual statement that scholars can make concerning the territorial character of the German state is that it has always been in flux. The various German states, united under the Prussian Banner, found themselves reduced geographically by the victors of the First World War. Yet again after accepting Hitler's promise of a 'Thousand Year Reich', in 1945 the German people were subjected once more to a partition. The USSR was directly involved in this partition to divide Germany both geographically and ideologically. Many Germans realized that while territorially the 'German Reich' no longer exists (at least not in its late 19th century form) , culturally and socially the

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together by Swiss diplomats assigned to the Allied High Commission in the formative years of the Federal Republic, in: Anfangsjahre der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Berichte der Schweizer Gesandtschaft in Bonn 1946-55 55 Oldenbourg Verlag, Munchen. 1987

bonds between generations speaking the same language and acknowledging the same historical experience are more difficult to sever.

Even prior to Bismarck's unification of the various German states under the Prussian banner in 1871, the territories encompassed by Prussia, the Rhineland, Saxony, Baden, Württemberg, Hesse, and Bavaria have always occupied a strategic location at the center of Europe. Although the united Germany of 1871 was much stronger economically, politically, and militarily the FRG still maintained some of the basic geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics which greatly influenced the formation of her foreign policy.

According to Peter Merkl, in his book German Foreign Policies: East and West, German foreign policy has always been founded, on the one hand, upon Germany's geographical placement at the center of Europe (thereby imposing upon Germany a direct interest in the events to both its east and west) and, on the other hand, upon the historical and social discontinuities in German development.<sup>4</sup>

Germany's open frontiers both in the east and in the west have continued to place her in a hazardous position, in terms of maintaining her political and economic sovereignty surrounded, as she is, on all sides by rivals and potential enemies. In this sense, Germany's location in central Europe

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<sup>4</sup> Peter Merkl. German Foreign Policies: East and West  
American Bibliographical Center, San Barbara. Calif. 1974  
p.48

has always made it open to amputation and dismemberment<sup>5</sup> and it suggests, too, a fundamental weakness with which all German foreign policy decision makers have had to deal. These unavoidable facts of geography, in part clarify why Germany foreign policy has been characterized as having both an east and a west orientation . Any attempt to secure Germany's borders, which ,to a greater or lesser extent, all foreign policy decision makers have had as a goal, has had to be realized through the development of one or both of these two orientations.<sup>6</sup> Therefore because of Germany's position, she has always been forced to pursue an active foreign policy in terms of securing (or indeed expanding these borders) and which has been perceived, often with justification, as being aggressive.

The relationship between Germany's geographical location and Germany's political/historical development becomes obvious when one remembers that the effects of the pre-1870 system of 'Fuerstentumer' (principalities) still linger today within the Federal Republic manifesting itself in strong regional forces which affect the national government. Regional or 'localistic' influences and forces, in and of themselves, often operated in direct contrast to the direction of Prussia's overall foreign policy. In the pre-1870

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<sup>5</sup> Ferenc Vali. The Quest For a United Germany John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. Maryland. 1967 p.8

<sup>6</sup> Werner Feld. Reunification and West German Soviet Relations Marinus Nijhoff Ltd. , The Hague. Netherlands. 1963 pp.67-68



era, the various 'Fuerstentumer' even aligned themselves with Russia and France in coalitions against each other. There has, in other words, always been an ambiguity of identification with the whole nation and its common interests.<sup>7</sup> Germany's geographical position at the center of Europe has meant that she has shared fully in the various European conflicts which have taken place from the 30 Years War up to the Second World War and even today there exists no doubt where, in the case of war in Western Europe, that war would be fought.

The scholarly commentary concerning the foreign policy implications of Germany's geography has established two basic motivating factors of all German foreign policy as being: (1) first of all an attempt to reduce the traditional strategic vulnerability which Germany's geographical position imposes upon her and (2) the search for avenues which will enhance Germany's economic development.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Merkl. p.49 Even into the 1980's, the debate has continued in both East and West Germany concerning the existence, or lack thereof, of the German nation. The debate in the DDR is particularly interesting with the recent rehabilitation within certain historical circles of Bismarck and Martin Luther. For a state which in 1949 proclaimed its break with the past, these recent developments are important for they reflect a certain discomfort which the government feels in terms of its own legitimacy and some of the historical prescriptions currently offered as a partial solution to the problem. Among the current literature on the subject is Davis Daycock's "The Political Uses of History: The Case of the German Democratic Republic." Programme in Strategic Studies: Occasional Paper Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba. 1987

<sup>8</sup> See for example a convincing exposition of these points in Werner Feld's Reunification and West German Soviet Rela-

Concerning the first of these motivating factors; strategic vulnerability has, in the past with the smaller 'Fürstentümer', been safeguarded or guaranteed through alignment with the West, alignment with the East, or finally through an independant position between both east and west. Unlike Gustav Stresemann (Weimar Foreign Minister and one time Chancellor 1923-29), West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer faced much more limited options. Alignment with the East, for Adenauer, became virtually impossible as the impact of the 'Cold War' changed the international political environment; likewise an independant 'see-saw' or Schaukelpolitik was equally not a realistic possibility for CDU decision makers, although the bridge<sup>9</sup>theory as represented by Berlin CDU leader Jakob Kaiser and Ernst Lemmer, was a early point of contention.

The question of an independant or neutral Germany was much discussed and debated officially and unofficially during the war and in the early post-war period. One extreme version of a neutralized Germany was the Morgenthau Plan (1944) which envisioned the complete 'pastorialization' of Germany. This scheme had adherents in all four of the Allied capitals, particularly in Paris and Moscow. Similarly the opposition SPD's leader, Kurt Schumacher, advocated reunification independant of both Superpowers (the SPD's

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tions Op Cit. p.71

<sup>9</sup> This term will be examined more fully in the 6th chapter dealing with Adenauer's Ostpolitik.

'Deutschland Plan'). The 'Deutschland Plan' survived as SPD policy until it was discarded at their 1959 Bad Godesberg Party Conference. Proponents of this view, which appealed to some sort of romantic notion of Germany's historic calling to be united and a leading political actor in central Europe, overestimated Germany's influence with the Allied powers. The SPD failed, or chose to ignore, the tragic consequences that this 'Weltanschauung' (although in a more extreme form) had had on recent European history. It must be pointed out here that the 4 Allied powers, especially the French and the Soviets, had themselves not ignored or forgotten what they had suffered through and were therefore quite apprehensive of any Germans who argued any line which involved German re-unification.

By way of application to the Europe of today, some observers have argued that the French are still apprehensive concerning the depth of the commitment of some elements of West German society to their integration into the Western community of nations. The recent talks and draft treaty signed between the SED (East German Socialist Party) and the SPD on the banning of all chemical weapons in Europe and the cancellation of all SDI contracts (reflecting the SPD's parallel foreign policy initiatives) have, in part, contributed to these fears.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For an analysis of current trends in SPD foreign policy proposals see Ronald Asmus: "The SPD's Second Ostpolitik With Perspectives from the USA." in Aussen Politik Vol. 38. No. 1. 1987.

The bipolar international system that was characterized in Europe through the de-facto division of Germany also ruled out the possibility of an alignment with the East. Although the historical precedents existed in the form of 1922's Rapallo, the 1926 Treaty of Berlin, and the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, not only the Allies, but more importantly the man who was to lead West Germany for the next 14 years, Konrad Adenauer, were completely opposed to this option. Indeed, I will argue that even had Adenauer not fully supported the Federal Republic's integration into the West (which he did), the possibility of an alignment with the East was negligible.

One can conclude from the previous discussion that the traditional range of goals and options in the repertoire of German foreign policy decision makers had been drastically reduced for West German leaders so that the possibility of a choice between these previously mentioned orientations did not exist.<sup>11</sup>

A second major factor which has motivated German foreign policy decision makers was that of attempting to pursue the establishment of an environment in which Germany's economic potential could be<sup>12</sup> manifest. The relationship therefore between security and economic factors becomes quite apparent. The strength of the economic miracle, the so-called

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<sup>11</sup> Feld. pp. 72-73

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. pp. 75-77

'Wirtschaftswunder' of the 1950's and 1960's and the development of the EEC contributed directly to the reduction of Germany's strategic vulnerability and enhanced her position within the NATO alliance. By contrast, the German historical record is also saturated with the other side of this argument. A weakening of the German economy has led, in the past, to political instability, as clearly the experience of the Weimar Republic, in particular, demonstrates.

The interrelationship of these two motivating factors in German foreign policy will be illustrated at every turn in the development of West German foreign policy during the Adenauer years. While partnership in the Western community of nations enhanced West Germany's strategic security, it also complemented her economic interests, for membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Community generally provided a forum or framework in which Finance Minister Erhard's "Wirtschaftswunder" could be realized.

Given Germany's past historical record of wars of aggression and territorial conquest, one can easily understand the anxiety felt by West Germany's neighbors when Adenauer called for the reunification of the two parts of Germany divided by the war. The term 'reunification' itself, has always been characterized by a disturbing lack of clarity. When one talks of reunification, the initial question most posed by the politician, scholar is: reunification according to what boundaries?; 1914, 1937, 1938 (i.e. the 'Gross-

deutsch' solution including the 'Anschluss' of Austria) or 1943 or 1944? ; did it include the Sudetenland or the areas up to and including the Oder-Neisse river? This is not a question unique to Adenauer's foreign policy for Hitler, Stresemann, Bismarck, as well as the Liberals who assembled at Frankfurt in 1848, have all had to ask themselves the question of what actually constituted the German 'Reich'. German nationalists, of various political stripes, have each developed in their own mind what exactly constitutes the German state ('Grossdeutsch or Kleindeutsch' for example). Given the pre-World War One size of the German State at its zenith, one could argue that Adenauer chose, or was content with, an even smaller version of the old 'Kleindeutsch' configuration. The solutions to the previously mentioned general foreign policy dilemmas have likewise been enunciated through the perspectives of different social and religious classes. As Merkl points out:

German Foreign policy attitudes have long tended to reflect social classes, class ideologies, and the deep antagonisms among the classes of German society.<sup>13</sup>

Adenauer's desire to see the realization of a quasi 'Catholic' configuration of Germany, France and the Low countries certainly illustrates Merkl's point well.

To sum up then, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the development and orientation of West German foreign policy during the period encompassing the Federal Chancellorship

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<sup>13</sup> Merkl p. 57

of Konrad Adenauer. It is not meant to be an exhaustive study of all foreign policy decisions taken during this period (1949-63), but rather an analytical attempt to indicate areas of continuity and change through a comparative exercise using, as a comparative touchstone, German foreign policy as conducted by Gustav Stresemann during the Weimar years (1923-29). By highlighting the basic goals of the Weimar foreign minister, with the domestic and international influences impacting upon the development of these policies, I intend to appraise Adenauer's contribution to (West) German foreign policy by indicating areas in which its goals and the policies created to attain them displayed similarities to and differences from those of Stresemann.

Although the scholarly writing on German foreign policy is voluminous, my research indicates that the amount of scholarly work, in English, directly comparing these two important periods in German political history is limited. In fact very few studies have been directed at a specific comparison of Stresemann and Adenauer's foreign policies. Nevertheless, the voluminous amount of research generally done on German history is merely symbolic of the importance of the role that Germany has played, and continues to play in the overall development of the European continent.

I believe that to understand the foreign policy of the present day Federal Republic, one must possess a knowledge of the circumstances through which West Germany came to

occupy its important position in the Western European Alliance. To accomplish this requires study of the forces, both internal and external, which effected the early 'western oriented' political and military development of the Federal Republic in the post-45 period. It is one of the purposes to demonstrate that it was, in part, a coalition of forces which was vastly different from those which Stresemann faced, which accounts for the realization of a highly successful 'Westpolitik' during the Adenauer years. This success though, must be juxtaposed against Adenauer's 'Ostpolitik' whose bankruptcy could no longer be concealed by the time Adenauer left office in 1963.

Through identifying the forces of change, the thesis will be able better to discuss the areas in which Adenauer's foreign policy could be said to exemplify 'traditional' German interests (articulated in a specific historical and cultural/religious manner) and conversely, where it can be said to be only superficially concerned with, or indeed antipathetic towards these highlighted interests and goals.



## Chapter II

### PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the major points of orientation around which the main arguments of the thesis are organized. Rather than launching an exhaustive discussion of all the relevant literature, I will simply review a number of articles by leading scholars in the field of international relations theory in order to introduce the combination of perspectives to be used in the study

Any scientific examination of the foreign policy behavior of a state from the perspective of political science, would prove to be inadequate if it simply collected together a string of dates and facts. A thorough discussion of decisions made by an administration is difficult if it is not preceded by an outline or 'model' in which these dates and facts may be structured and interpreted. The purpose then of this short chapter is to outline broadly four major methods of foreign policy analysis which have been used in the past by scholars in their examination of state behavior. While these four perspectives will be outlined, the reader must be made aware that I do not give each a 'balanced' examination, but rather I discuss the material and attempt to highlight where one perspective, or a combination of perspectives, can

give the reader a better understanding of the period under investigation.

James Rosenau, in his book Comparing Foreign Policies points out that although a strong case can, and indeed has been made for a number of the perspectives to be outlined in this chapter, a consensus on which is the most promising has yet to emerge.<sup>14</sup> From one perspective, the scientific study of foreign policy has much in common with research in the biological sciences for it too can be viewed as the study of an 'organism' (the 'organism' of the nation-state) and its adaptation to its environment. Foreign policy is necessarily calculated and goal oriented because, as Rosenau makes clear, a state seeks to preserve the desirable aspects of the environment and change or restructure those undesirable elements, although this calculation is by no means made with 100% knowledge of that environment, or for that matter, always made on a rational basis.<sup>15</sup>

The four perspectives of foreign policy analysis are: (1) so called 'National Attributes' of the state, (2) the personality dimension of its leaders, (3) the International Environment and finally (4) 'political regimes'. As the reader will discover, the thesis combines a number of these perspectives in pursuit of a broad interpretation of the

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<sup>14</sup> James Rosenau (editor) Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods Sage Publications. New York. 1974 p.3

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. pps.5-6

events being discussed.

One school of foreign policy analysis has for many years considered the so-called national attributes of a state and has given them much weight when examining a specific foreign policy decision. Maurice East develops a sufficient overview of this perspective in his article "National Attributes and Foreign Policy".<sup>16</sup> When examining national attributes, one must make mention of a state's population, geographical situation, military capabilities, and level of technological and economic development. East creates the term 'capacity to act' as the integrating construct relating the raw data (national attributes) to the foreign policy decision making process. The 'capacity to act' refers to the amount of resources a state possesses and its ability to utilize such towards a specific foreign policy goal.<sup>17</sup> His basic thesis is that differences in states' national attributes, as reflected in their 'capacity to act' can explain differences in their foreign policy behavior.

Before examining how national attributes specifically effect a state's foreign policy, one must define the term more clearly. National attributes refer to the characteristics of a state examined holistically, and therefore the characteristics of what are called 'sub units' will not be

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<sup>16</sup> Maurice East, "National Attribute and Foreign Policy" reprinted in Comparing Foreign Policies p. 123

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p.123

taken into account here.<sup>18</sup> Secondly, national attributes refer to characteristics that can be conceptualized and measured without references to entities outside of the state. Here one must draw the distinction between national attributes and 'external variables'.<sup>19</sup> Finally the characteristics of national attributes are assumed to be fairly stable over time, although I recognize that conflict and peace treaties can abruptly change both the political and social configuration of the state.<sup>20</sup>

According to East, national attributes can effect the foreign policy of a state in three ways. Initially it effects the amount of resources which can be used in the execution of national actions. These include variables such as the amount of territory, size of the armed forces, and population distribution. The assumption here is that resources themselves are necessary for any type of national action. Secondly national attributes can effect the state's ability to utilize its resources in the pursuit of national goals (this includes economic infrastructure and technological development). In other words one must be able to convert resources into forms appropriate for foreign policy

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<sup>18</sup> I believe that the characteristics of sub units are very important to the study of foreign policy but feels that they belong under the 'political regimes' category and will therefore be discussed in that section.

<sup>19</sup> This distinction will be highlighted during the discussion of the international system perspective.

<sup>20</sup> East. pps. 124-125

tasks.<sup>21</sup> Finally national attributes act as norm shaping factors which effect the predispositions of the state's leadership who determine where and how a state's resources are to be used. For example, a particularly large ethnic distribution in a state can effect a leaders perceptions of the national interest.

The foreign policy leaders of a nation with a large ethnic population might well have a predisposition towards close relations with other nations having similar ethnic populations.<sup>22</sup>

The distinction to be made here is that this third group of national attributes are more closely effected by the leader's empathisis on them whereas the others are seen as basically 'givens'.

National attributes can be seen to measure (a) the general power potential or power base of the state and (b) aspects of a state's general level of socio-economic development - resources here being both human and non- human. The 'capacity to act' then is used to describe the outcome of the two above measurements.<sup>23</sup>

East refers to the two components of the 'capacity to act' as the 'size variables'. The power potential includes the total population, total GNP, total land area, total military manpower etc. James Rosenau also discusses the size of the state or of the population from the way in which it

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 126

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 126

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p. 132

effects the peoples' perception of their role as a state in the world system. Size should not always be perceived as an asset for it can also be a liability. Change in this variable, as he points out, can be slow to occur.<sup>24</sup> The geography of a state is important for it can limit the extent to which a people can be self sufficient. It does not necessarily dictate behavior but any foreign policy analysis which does not take into account the geo-political environment of the state may have difficulty finding a satisfactory explanation for a specific policy. Again, changes in these variables occur quite slowly and one can look upon them as quasi 'permanent' imputs into foreign policy decision making. In this sense, when one observes a certain continuity in a state's foreign policy, its geographical situation may be a good starting point towards accounting for that continuity.<sup>25</sup>

The second of the 'size variables' is that of the level of socio-economic organization of the society, in other words the degree to which the state can control and convert resources towards foreign policy goals.<sup>26</sup> This category is further broken down by East into (a) the level of moderniza-

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<sup>24</sup> James Rosenau. World Politics: The Study of Foreign Policy. Collier MacMillan Publishers, London. 1976 p. 19

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p. 20 It should be pointed out here though that technology must be cited as having the effect of lessening the traditional role or permanent role that geography plays in foreign policy decision making. It has certainly shrunk the time needed for travel and communications between states.

<sup>26</sup> East p. 134

tion of the society and (b) the level of stress experienced during and after this modernization. The term modernization refers to the infrastructure available to the leaders to allocate and redistribute resources to national goals - this is related positively to the 'capacity to act'.<sup>27</sup> Technology can certainly be characterized as a quickly changing element which can drastically alter the state's military and economic capabilities which in turn allows them to undertake courses of foreign policy which otherwise would not have been possible.<sup>28</sup> The extent to which a state has moved or advanced from an agricultural to an industrial society will also effect the options and opportunities open to it in terms of its foreign policy. It is a simple fact that industrial societies have different needs than non-industrial ones.<sup>29</sup> In addition, one has seen a correlation between the degree to which a society is industrialized and the extent to which it has experienced a division of labor with the resulting emergence of organized factions with specific economic (and therefore political) interests which they advocate and which may be addressed by the foreign policy apparatus.<sup>30</sup> Rosenau also argues that the more a state is industrially developed, the greater the percentage of its GNP can be devoted to external purposes ( ie: various political, military and eco-

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 135

<sup>28</sup> Rosenau p.24

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p.20

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p.20

conomic commitments). This leads furthermore to an increased complexity of its foreign policy relations. In addition, a state which is further developed economically will be better placed to take advantage of technological breakthroughs.<sup>31</sup>

East relates 'levels of stress' within a society negatively to a state's 'capacity to act'. Included under this heading would be inflation, unemployment, and political fragmentation. Situations such as these would force the government to divert resources away from foreign policy tasks to domestic policy; the concrete example of the Weimar period will be used to underline the validity of East's arguments.<sup>32</sup>

From the above discussion one can observe that while a state may possess a high power/potential rating, a low socio-economic organizational level will result in a low 'capacity to act'. In this case East argues that the analyst will notice a tendency of states with a low 'capacity to act' (as is the case with both periods under discussion in this thesis) to seek out other states and engage them in foreign policy behavior in order to increase their own 'capacity to act'.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p.21

<sup>32</sup> East. p.135

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p.136



Before beginning a short discussion of a number of East's assumptions concerning the national attributes' perspective on foreign policy decision making, I should note that I am of the opinion that a certain amount of time should be devoted to the role of history and political culture as a variable included under this category. Rosenau argues that a society's collective memory and values can work to both unite and divide it and that the effects therefore of societal unity can promote foreign policy goals or in fact hinder the attempts by decision makers to carry out a foreign policy without mass popular support.<sup>34</sup>

it is reasonable to hypothesize that the more a people are unified by common culture and historical experience, the clearer and more resolute they will be about their collective goals and thus more effective they will be in their foreign policy behavior.<sup>35</sup>

Rosenau goes on to explain that the international system can have an effect on the state's perception of its historical and future role within that system. When a state has only been united for a short period of time, there can be differences of opinion as to what exactly constitutes the 'national' interest and the conflict between these factions will most certainly affect the development of its foreign policy. For example, a separate regional historical experience by one segment of the population can play a disruptive role in the creation of a clear and coherent national for-

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<sup>34</sup> Rosenau p. 21

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 21

eign policy. Cultural homogeneity or likewise heterogeneity may effect foreign policy decision making due to the extent to which such separate experiences can lead to internal dissension by sub groups within the state.<sup>36</sup> Rosenau concludes that the legacy of a specific foreign policy orientation of a state and the form in which this orientation was realized (be it militarily, economically, or culturally) can also play a role on the future implementation of foreign policy. Cultural factors seem to change only slowly, and even then can only change as a society re-examines its history and puts into practice the consequences of that examination.<sup>37</sup>

The 'capacity to act' then effects the amount of scope a state has in the implementation of its foreign policy. Even though 'national attributes' have had a prominent place in the study of foreign policy for a long time, it is certainly not the only perspective from which one can examine a state's foreign policy. National attributes can be altered and effected by the individual leader's perceptions of them and by the particular characteristics of a political regime.

In other words, to the extent that national attributes do effect a Nation's goals and objectives, the effects will be channelled through purposive human actors who are, in turn, political leaders, members of the bureaucracy or component members of the nation's political regime.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p.22

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 22

<sup>38</sup> East p. 134

The second perspective from which the subject matter will be organized and analysed will be that of 'political regimes'. This term refers to the internal political structure of the state - both its structure and its environment - and is considered by some to be a major determinant of foreign policy.<sup>39</sup> Barbara and Steven Salmore in their article "Political Regimes and Foreign Policy" are of the opinion that once Graham Allison's Rational Actor Model<sup>40</sup> is adopted, then the primary goal of the regime is to maximize its political support and thereby its power. Regimes are limited in their attempts to maximize their power by the internal structure of the decision making process and by the influence (or lack thereof) of domestic politics.<sup>41</sup>

There are three sets of variables which, according to this perspective, can effect foreign policy behavior including: (a) the amount of political resources available to the decision making elite, (b) limits on political resources imposed by political constraints, and (c) the regime's disposition to use those resources. The amount of political resources available to decision makers would include the extent to which the regime enjoyed widespread societal sup-

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<sup>39</sup> Steven and Barbara Salmore. "Political Regimes and Foreign Policy" Why Nations Act Sage Publishing. London 1974. p.103

<sup>40</sup> For a discussion of the development and consequences of the Rational Actor Model see: Allison's The Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Boston: Little, Brown. 1971

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p.104

port as measured by the moods of public opinion and their acceptance of the government's legitimacy.<sup>42</sup> The public's attitude towards specific issues or other states can also have an impact on decision making although Rosenau, in his book World Politics, argues that public opinion usually follows rather than guides foreign policy decision making. It should be noted though that certain well represented interest groups can impact quite heavily on specific foreign policy issues. Rosenau goes on to suggest that public moods tend to be unstructured thus allowing decision makers much latitude to shape and frame their policies, although again this would be done in such a way as generally to conform to the leader's perception of that same public mood.<sup>43</sup>

The second set of variables, that being the limits on those political resources imposed by political constraints, refers to the political unity or fragmentation of a regime. Regimes differ in the degrees of accountability to wider publics and the extent to which a society is ideologically divided. The analyst is forced therefore to identify differing publics in order to test their impact on the foreign policy decision making process.

In a society that is highly fragmented, the nature of the support base among such publics may be crucial in determining a regime's freedom to act<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p.104

<sup>43</sup> Rosenau World Politics p.25

<sup>44</sup> Salmore op cit. p.105

Prejudices towards certain groups in society can lead to societal strife which itself effects foreign policy. Moreover, the extent to which officials are made accountable to the public can effect the form and timing of foreign policy behavior. For example, in more open societies a leader must be more sensitive towards public opinion whereas in a closed system, a change in foreign policy direction can be more easily managed because the structure of the system allows leaders largely to ignore the views of the public.<sup>45</sup> Although changes in accountability can be sudden (ie: through coup d'etats, revolutions etc), these are variables which are generally slow to change. The structure of the government itself can almost be considered a political constraint for in more open societies, the access of interest groups into the foreign policy decision making forums is much greater than in closed societies. In open democratic regimes, because there is a much greater flow of critical information, foreign policy decision making may be more cumbersome but the leader's psychological environment and the operational (actual) environment are often closely identified which can mean that a political goal may be more easily attained.<sup>46</sup>

This set of variables is important for it leads into a third major perception or model used in judging the foreign policy behavior of a state. This refers to a regime's dispo-

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<sup>45</sup> Rosenau World Politics

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 26

sition to use its resources. One has here the introduction of the whole question of leadership orientation with its specific ideological predispositions and historical experiences. If one assumes that there is a large degree of executive dominance in foreign policy decision making, then to examine the political constraints/structure of a regime would not provide a broad enough data base for an explanation of inter-state behavior. One should therefore integrate another 'model' or perspective in order to allow for a more comprehensive examination.

The third perspective from which the material will be examined is that of the personal characteristics of the leadership. The reader will discover that these last two perspectives (those being personal characteristics and the international system) are the most heavily emphasised within the thesis because I feel that a concentration on these two can provide the broadest interpretation of the foreign policy behavior of the state in question.

The personal characteristics of the leader who decides foreign policy should only be analysed in relation to other variables because ,as stated previously, the structure of the government, of the society, its history, and culture, as well as the international environment itself together serve to dampen the effects of a leader's individual characteristics.<sup>47</sup> In her article "Effects of Personality Characteris-

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.23

tics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy", Margret Hermann says that:

Personal characteristics refer to an individual's biographical statistics, training, work experience, personality traits, beliefs and attitudes, and values.<sup>48</sup>

As she rightly points out, this question as to the specific role played by the individual decision maker has occupied scholars for centuries. The old 'zeitgeist' vs. 'great man' debate (as to whether the times create the great leader or visa versa) seems to have been debated forever. In her essay she points out three different manners in which a leader's personality effects the foreign policy behavior of a state.

The first of these concerns the leader's initial interest in foreign policy, thereby making the assumption that an interest in foreign policy will be a motivating factor. She equates increased interest with an increase in attention paid to foreign policy matters

Moreover the reasons behind a head of state's interest in foreign affairs may pre-determine the course of action he will implement.<sup>49</sup>

The second way a leader's characteristics may effect foreign policy is that of his training within the realm of foreign policy analysis. She feels that a lack of training or experience can result in an inability on behalf of the lead-

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<sup>48</sup> Margret Hermann. "Effects Of Personality Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy" Why Nations Act p.64

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. pps. 56-57

er to suggest alternative solutions to specific foreign policy dilemmas. I am of the opinion that direct experience can be overcome or accounted for if the decision maker has had some previous political/economic experience within the state.

The third manner in which a leader can effect foreign policy is the degree to which he is sensitive to his environment. This concerns the extent to which the leader is responsive to information. The less sensitive the leader is, the less likely he is to recognize and react to changes in his environment and therefore the less likely he is to pursue changes in his foreign policy course.<sup>50</sup>

In a sense, the less sensitive policy maker adjusts incoming stimuli to fit a certain set or viewpoint while the more sensitive policy maker attempts to deal with his environment, changing his views if incoming stimuli warrant such adjustment.<sup>51</sup>

Interest, training and sensitivity then act as filters on the relationships between the leader's characteristics and the state's foreign policy.

In her article Margret Hermann proceeds to outline another way in which a leader's characteristics may be separated and examined. These include the leader's beliefs, his motives (such as his need for power), his decision style, and his interpersonal style. It is also true that a leader's beliefs (both philosophical and religious) can provide much

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 57

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p.59



help in explaining his general 'Weltanschauung', the reader will notice that a large section of the present work is organized around such an investigation. The leader's 'Weltanschauung' is important for from such a discussion one can extrapolate his sensitivity towards his environment and as Oli Holsti notes:

a decision maker acts upon his image of the situation rather than upon objective reality.<sup>52</sup>

A leader's decision style can be extrapolated from a study of (a) his confidence as a leader, (b) his openness to new information, (c) his preference or certain levels of risk and the size of the stakes, (d) his capacity for postponing decisions without anxiety and, (e) his rules for adjusting to uncertainty.<sup>53</sup>

The so-called 'interpersonal style' refers to a decision maker's relations with other decision makers including the means he uses to persuade others and the degree of suspicion and paranoia he exhibits. The assumption being made here is that a leader's personal style will effect or carry over into his political behavior.<sup>54</sup>

it seems appropriate to propose that beliefs and motives form a basis for a political leader's views of the world that, in turn, effects his choice of strategy.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Holsti, as cited in M.Hermann. p.59

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. p.60

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p.60

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p.62

Hermann proposes, at the end of her discussion, that given the fact that personal characteristics effect foreign policy, the less training a leader possesses in foreign affairs, the more likely he is to rely on his predispositions and beliefs of reality and therefore he will be less open to information which does not support those beliefs.

The less sensitive head of state tends not to differentiate between types of situations and substantive problems but tends to group stimuli and react in a basically similar manner to a wide variety of stimuli.<sup>56</sup>

The final perspective for analysis to be used in this research project will be that of the international system approach to foreign policy behavior. To outline the basic tenets of this approach the author is relying on basically two authors (Maurice East and James Rosenau) who together provide a fairly comprehensive sketch of how the analyst would use this 'model' as a guide to research. The reader will notice, that I rely heavily on this approach when attempting to explain continuity and change in the foreign policy behavior of Germany in the periods under discussion.

When the analyst examines the foreign policy behavior of a state from the international system perspective, he focuses attention on the macro-level of analysis by discussing how changes within the international system (as a whole effect) the foreign policy of one particular member of that

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid p.68 The reader will note a specific example of the above when the author turns to evaluate Adenauer's foreign policy.

system. East borrows Young's (1968) definition of the international system; it is:

a group of objects or elements standing in some characteristic structural relationship to one another and interacting on the basis of certain characteristic processes.<sup>57</sup>

For purposes of this thesis the patterns of relationships are considered to be between states, although they are by no means the only actors in the modern-day international state system. East considers this perspective 'holistic' by referring to the international system as a single unit, although smaller sub-systems do exist and can effect the larger unit.<sup>58</sup> He takes a 'diachronic approach' by referring to changes within the international system over a period of time. This thesis will also take such an approach with references to changes within the international system over time and how these effect the policies of Germany.

East uses Rosenau's distinction between what he calls external variables (ie: variables which require reference to some external entity to give meaning, such as the number of alliance partners, or the number of air miles from the USSR etc,) and what he calls systemic variables ( such as the power distribution or amount of conflict within the system.)<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Maurice East "International System and Foreign Policy" Why Nations Act p.144

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p.145

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p.145

The international system effects the behavior of states, according to East, in two different ways : (a) changes in the system leading to similar changes in the foreign policy behavior of states within the system and, (b) changes in the system producing different changes in the foreign policy behavior of states. These differential changes may be the result of a combination of the three pervious perspectives on foreign policy analysis (ie: national attributes, regime constraints, and personality of the leaders) or they can be the result of differing perceptions of the state's role within the system; roles such as the balancer, bloc leader, or ally.<sup>60</sup>

East refers to Morton Kaplan (1957) who argues that the foreign policy behavior of states will be affected by the type of international system to which they are a part. For example, in a stable balance of power system leaders can devote relatively equal attention to both domestic and foreign policies whereas in a tight bi-polar structure (such as existed during the 'Cold War') leaders must devote more attention to foreign policy matters. Rosenau picks up on Kaplan's analysis and argues that during the 1945-59 period a tight bi-polar system was the norm and that fact heavily reduced the amount of foreign policy 'Spielraum' experienced by the smaller actors within the system. Bi-polarity therefore sharply constrained any attempts at major foreign policy re-orientations taken by the smaller powers. In contrast,

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid. pps. 151-152

in a loose bi-polar, or in a multi-polar system without states of a superpower status, the amount of 'Spielraum' among the lesser powers is significantly greater.<sup>61</sup>

East goes on further to outline five dimensions of the international system which he feels are salient for explaining foreign policy behavior of states. The first of these dimensions refers to the complexity and variety of components in the international system, assuming thereby that the more complex nature which characterizes the system will make it more difficult for the individual state to control and manipulate the effects of the system upon itself.<sup>62</sup> The system is made more complex by an increase in the number and type of actors within the system referring both to increased communication difficulties between states and the degree to which states can adapt to different types of actors (ie" the proliferation of international organisations) within the system. Similarly, an increase in the number and type of issues can make the system more complex. Finally the structure of state interaction changes as the system itself changes; for example, there is a different type of interaction required by the state as a tight bi-polar system gives way to a multi-polar entity.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Rosenau World Politics pps.22-23

<sup>62</sup> Maurice East. "The International System and Foreign Policy." p. 153

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. pps. 153-154

The last two dimensions refer to changes in the distribution of resources within the system; an example of such changes being the proliferation of nuclear weapons over the last twenty years. In this sense foreign policy leaders of states must learn to adapt to new realities. The final dimension refers to the amount of organisation which characterizes the system, ie: the manner in which the system is arranged to facilitate the processing of international system issues. Included here would be the number and type of intergovernmental organizations.<sup>64</sup>

Before ending this discussion with a review of the assumptions made by the international system perspective on foreign policy analysis, this author would like to discuss more concretely an example of how a particular characteristic of the international system (ie: its alliance structure) effects the foreign policy of its members. Rosenau argues that alliances are a derivative of the prevailing 'great power constellation' (the current hegemons within the system) and that they serve as important inputs into the foreign policy calculations of a state. Alliances can be enduring or can change quickly depending, among other variables, on the strength of the hegemons within the system. They are usually created to address issues which their member states feel will endure and are not easily shattered by the daily upheavals of world politics.<sup>65</sup> Alliance membership itself

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid. p.155

<sup>65</sup> Rosenau. World Politics p.23

imposes certain inputs, often in the form of restrictions on certain foreign policy actions/decisions by its member states. Even non-membership in an alliance effects the way in which foreign policy is calculated for in attempting to maintain foreign policy independence between strong alliances, a state can be influenced by the very existence of such alliances.

At the end of his article East makes mention of four assumptions of the international system approach to foreign policy analysis which should be mentioned. The international system is comprised of all nation states of the world (ie: it has a global nature). It is assumed to be able to be conceptualized in terms of relatively stable patterns. Leaders are concerned about the international system when setting foreign policy goals, and finally that those same leaders perceive changes in the international system accurately, although this last point is debateable.<sup>66</sup>

Although international system variables may be some what remote in the hierarchy of reasons given for a specific foreign policy decision, they nonetheless cannot be ignored. I agree with Maurice East that this perspective should not constitute the analyst's sole model for examining the foreign policy behavior of states but rather be linked to other perspectives, such as those mentioned previously.

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<sup>66</sup> East. "International System and Foreign Policy." Why Nations Act p.156

These four perspectives then, will make up my approach within which my subject matter will be discussed. The reader may judge that one or more of these perspectives may be more relevant than others, but nonetheless all four will be present in the study and it will be assumed that a linkage between them can provide the most comprehensive explanation for the foreign policy behavior of Germany during the two periods under investigation.



### Chapter III

#### THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GUSTAV STRESEMANN

The purpose of this third chapter is briefly to highlight the course steered in foreign policy by Gustav Stresemann and to make clear the principle aims of his foreign policy.

Without doubt the most successful of the various Weimar foreign ministers was Gustav Stresemann of the German Peoples Party (DVP formerly the National Liberals), which he had founded in 1918. Born in Berlin in 1878, he has been described as a 'child of Berlin', tainted and influenced with the glories of Prussia.<sup>67</sup> He was a annexationist during the First World War, and an early opponent of the Weimar Constitution, paradoxically he developed into one of the periods's most successful politicians. He was a supporter of heavy industry and a strong Monarchist. Despite these sentiments, they did not prevent him from becoming a supporter of the newly created republic. (Vernunftrepublikaner)<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski. "Stresemann and Poland Before Locarno." Journal of Central European Affairs Vol.18, No.1 April 1958. p. 26

<sup>68</sup> Hirsch, Felix. Gustav Stresemann 1878-1978 Inter-Nationes, Bonn. 1978. pp. 11-21

The basic thrust of his foreign policy centered around a number of issue areas, which, according to Werner Feld's analysis in his book (Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations) could be categorized around one of three possible foreign policy orientations (previously mentioned in the introductory chapter). He believed in the 'greatness' of Germany and supported Germany's war aims during the great war for in it he saw Germany's attempt to achieve a place for herself among the great powers of the day, ('Griff nach der Weltmacht') and consequently during his 100 days as Chancellor in 1923 and as Foreign Minister (under Chancellors Marx, Luther of the Center party and Müller of the SDP) in the 1923-29 period he strove to re-gain the position which, through her defeat, Germany lost.

Stresemann's immediate goal was to acquire a greater measure of sovereignty in Germany's political, economic, social and strategic/security policy areas. According to Hans Adolf Jacobsen, in his book Locarno Diplomacy, some of these goals included a reduction (and further elimination) of the reparation demands of the Allies, and an end to the Ruhr and Rhineland occupations.<sup>69</sup> It is widely felt that he also sought to realize the retraction of the War Guilt clause (#231) from the Treaty of Versailles and an end to the International Military Control Commission (IMCC). Over the long term, he strove to acquire the return of the Eupen-

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<sup>69</sup> Jacobsen, Hans Adolf. Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-29 Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1972. pp.376

Malmedy region (from Belgium) and the Saar region (from France) as he felt this was in Germany's best interests, and also wanted to leave open the possibility of the Anschluss with Austria.<sup>70</sup> Stresemann not only sought to realize improved treatment of German minorities in Central Europe, but also the revision those same Eastern Territories, particularly in Poland. Finally, the restoration of Germany's pre-war colonies in Africa was also a long-term aim, although certainly not at the top of his priorities. To achieve the most important of these goals, (the increased measure of political and economic sovereignty within the European system), Stresemann felt that his foreign policy would initially have to create a rapprochement with the Western Powers, the victors and authors of the Versailles 'Diktat'.

Stresemann's foreign policy has been described as being characterized by a three-tier structure which included a solution to the reparations question, a guarantee of the Rhineland frontier, and a revision of the Eastern territories. Eventually he agreed to economic concessions in order to see the withdrawal of French troops from the Ruhr, which France occupied in 1923.<sup>71</sup> Before examining Stresemann's foreign policy it is necessary to first offer a short back-

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<sup>70</sup> Robert Grathwol. "Gustav Stressemann: Reflections on his foreign policy." Journal of Modern History No.1 March 1973 p.55

<sup>71</sup> Halperin, S. W. Germany Tried Democracy Archon Books, Hamden Conn. 1963 pp.262-63.

ground in order to outline the situation with which Stresemann was faced as Chancellor.

### 3.1 WEIMAR FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1923

In 1918 Prince Max von Baden had been appointed interim leader of a provisional German government after the Armistice and defeat had forced out Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg. The so-called 'Versailles Diktat' had forced the Germans to abrogate the 'harsh' Treaty of Brest-Litvosk signed earlier in the spring of 1918 with Russia. Although many Germans found it difficult to accept defeat, as German troops were still 'im Ausland' (the 'military's propaganda' making them believe that the war was almost won), in truth the war was lost by the early autumn of 1918. During the Weimar period certain nationalist political groups and elements in the military began to propagate the myth of the Dolchstoß (or 'Stab in the Back'), although the reality of the situation was that Germany could no longer fight on either the military or economic level.<sup>72</sup> The imposition of the British blockade simply made further fighting useless. This myth found 'fertile ground' within Germany, for in fact none of the fighting had taken place on German soil and at the time of the Armistice German troops were as far East as the Ukraine and the Caucasus mountains and as far north as Finland and the Baltic, while positions in France and Belgi-

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<sup>72</sup> John Hiden. Germany and Europe: 1919-1939 Longman Publishers. London & New York. 1977 pp. 3-4

um were still partly intact<sup>7 3</sup>

According to the Versailles Treaty the German Army was reduced to 100,000 troops and the Navy reduced to 15,000 sailors with a complete ban being placed on the manufacture of planes, tanks, and submarines. This initially created a sense of frustration and anger domestically and thus there developed a movement, propagated by certain Weimar military and political leaders, to bypass these restrictions on armaments. The armament clauses of the Versailles Treaty created the need in Germany to rearm secretly, which was carried out largely by General Hans von Seeckt and the Reichswehr in the 1920-26 period<sup>7 4</sup>

Through the Versailles Treaty the territorial status quo was changed dramatically further nurturing popular resentment of the Treaty and strengthening a desire for its revision. The Germans lost the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to the French, who also had expropriated the Saar mines. The Allies occupied the left bank of the Rhine from Cologne to Frankfurt, as well as demilitarizing it for some fifty miles on the eastern side and finally through plebiscite the area of North Schleswig joined Denmark. Although these losses were substantial, it was in the East where the Germans lost the most territory for Upper Silesia was partitioned in 1921 ( with the Poles acquiring most of the major industrial

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<sup>7 3</sup> Holborn, Hajo. Germany and Europe Doubleday and Co. Ltd., Garden City, New York. 1970. p.215

<sup>7 4</sup> Hiden. op cit, p.16 see also The Reichswehr in Politics

resources) while West Prussia was lost when the Polish Corridor was created. Finally the city of Danzig was made a 'Free City' supervised by the League of Nations.<sup>75</sup>

When Stresemann became Chancellor of the 'Grand Coalition', including Social Democrats (SPD), the Center Party (Zentrum), the German Nationalal Peoples Party (DNVP), and his own German Peoples Party (DVP), the so-called Erfüllungspolitik pursued by his predecessors Wirth and Wilhelm Cuno had failed to produce any substantial results.<sup>76</sup> Berlin could not get a reduction (or elimination) of the reparation requirements, which were set at 132 billion Reichmarks by the London Ultimatum of 1921. Cuno, in addition to repeating Wirth's calls for a moratorium on reparations, also sought to conclude a Rhineland security pact with the Allies. With little success in these appeals and no control over the domestic economic situation, which by August 1923 had seen the Mark drop to two million per American Dollar, Cuno decided to resign.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid. pp. 16-17

<sup>76</sup> This question as to the success of the 'Erfüllungspolitik' is still debated for it has also been argued that the moderate fulfillment foreign policy strategy was indeed successful during the 1919-1922 period in 'holding its own' against the hard line political right's criticism of the Versailles Treaty and all that it represented. For more information see Berghahn, V.R. Modern Germany Cambridge University Press. London, 1982.

<sup>77</sup> Carol Fink. "German Revisionspolitik 1919-1933" As quoted from a paper delivered on June 7th, 1986 at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association in Winnipeg. p.14

By 1923 the Germans had defaulted on timber and coal quotas and through French pressure the Allies (France and Belgium) occupied the Ruhr, after the reparations committee had voted for sanctions.<sup>78</sup>

### 3.2 THE STRESEMANN YEARS 1923-29

Upon Stresemann's ascension to the Chancellorship in 1923, he immediately put an end to the previous futile policy of 'passive resistance' to the Allied occupation, a move which did not endear him to the more right-wing elements both within his own Peoples' Party and more generally within the German political scene. He was able quickly to realize a number of successes including the stabilization of the currency through the creation of the 'Rentenmark' (which was theoretically based upon the mortgage of all German industrial production). He stopped the printing presses,<sup>79</sup> which, in part, led to a reduction in the run-away inflation effecting the Republic at the time.

When one examines more closely the Westpolitik of Gustav Stresemann, one is immediately struck by the relative success of what he was able to accomplish before his death. He was forced to pursue a strong Westpolitik for the basic reason that it was the Western Allies (France and Great Britain) who had, through the Treaty of Versailles, imposed upon

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<sup>78</sup> Halperin. p.248

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. p.280

Germany certain restrictions and reparation requirements which Stresemann wanted to see reduced or eliminated altogether. As previously mentioned, Stresemann called off the 'passive resistance' policies of Chancellor Wirth opting instead for a more accomodating policy vis-avis the Allies. Resistance had failed and therefore Stresemann felt that only compliance remained.<sup>80</sup>

One of the major issues confronting all Weimar leaders was that of the huge amount of reparations crippling the economic situation of the Republic. American Charles Dawes, head of the reparations committee bearing his name, brought down his reparations repayment schedule (hereafter refered to as the 'Dawes Plan') in April of 1924.<sup>81</sup> The British, especially British Ambassador to Germany Lord D'Abernon, were influential at getting the French to agree to send the reparations question to this independent panel.<sup>82</sup> The Dawes plan was based on a sliding scale of reparations directly related to Germany's ability to pay and based upon her economic recovery. In this sense it has been argued that the plan basically linked the interests of the creditor to that of the debtor.<sup>83</sup> Stresemann argued domestically that acceptance of this plan was necessary and represented Germany's

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<sup>80</sup> Grathwol. p.52

<sup>81</sup> Albrecht-Carrié, René. A Diplomatic History of Europe Harper & Brothers. New York. 1958 p.398

<sup>82</sup> Craig. Gordon, A. Germany 1866-1945 Oxford History of Europe. Oxford University Press, 1978 p.514

<sup>83</sup> Grathwol. p.61



only option because he said that the continued occupation of the Ruhr threatened completely to destroy the German economy.<sup>84</sup> The French, who had just defeated the ardent Germanophile Poincaré in favor of the more moderate Socialist Herriot, were in desperate financial straits owing to their major rebuilding campaign following the war which they based upon the expectation of German reparation payments. They were becoming politically isolated because of Allied disapproval of their occupation of the Ruhr, and were therefore in a position to be pressured by the British into sending the whole reparations question to this panel. Herriot himself, though, put diplomatic pressure on the Germans by stating that the Ruhr could not be evacuated until the Dawes plan was accepted, which Stresemann promptly got the Reichstag to pass.<sup>85</sup>

The Dawes Plan was no solution to the reparations question, as later events were to reveal. But thereafter it was impossible for the French to use the reparations issue as a means to achieve political and military aims which the peace settlement of Paris had denied her.<sup>86</sup>

Stresemann realized that he had won a considerable victory by impressing upon the British the difficulty Germany was having in meeting the previous payment schedule. Although the idea of an International Banking organization to control Germany's finances was discussed, it would not have been

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<sup>84</sup> Jacobsen. p.375

<sup>85</sup> Halperin. p.288

<sup>86</sup> Holborn. p.207

accepted by most German Nationalists, nevertheless, the Dawes Plan did lay the groundwork for the mid-20's economic recovery that Germany experienced. In fact, not to deter from Ludwig Erhard's accomplishments, the term 'German Economic miracle' was first coined during the middle to late 1920's.<sup>87</sup> The success was partly due to the fact that after the plan's ratification large numbers of American loans were made available (some 800 million Marks worth) to German industry. Here was the primary example of the Americans and the British being able to temper excessive French economic and security demands (as the Ruhr was evacuated by July 1925) while at the same time making obvious to the German people their approval of Stresemann's approach. His achievement was remarkable.

Thanks to French hesitancy, Anglo-American determination, and his own tough shrewdness, Stresemann in less than a year in office had made Germany a partner in its own rehabilitation.<sup>88</sup>

The Dawes Plan became the issue of the 1924 elections. The Nationalists, (Deutsche NationalVölkspartei DNVP) who gained some 33 seats in the Reichstag at the expense of the Social Democrats, interpreted their vote as a resounding rejection of the plan, although Stresemann was eventually able to see it ratified by the Reichstag. The SPD were forced into opposition while Wilhelm Marx formed another cabinet through the creation of a bourgeois coalition which

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<sup>87</sup> Arthur Marwick. War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century Macmillan Press Ltd. London. 1974 p.47

<sup>88</sup> Carol Fink. p. 16

formed the core of the government until the SPD's return under Chancellor Müller in 1928.<sup>89</sup> Once the Dawes Plan was accepted by the Reichstag, French and Belgium troops left the Dortmund Zone and the customs barrier between France and the Rhineland was abolished. By July 1925 the Ruhr had been completely evacuated and Stresemann had created the conditions necessary, (that of accepting Germany as an equal partner), for his masterwork - Locarno.

When the IMCC announced the postponement of the evacuation of the Cologne Zone (as stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles) due to German transgressions over the Treaty's disarmament clauses, Stresemann revived Chancellor Cuno's calls for a Rhineland Security Pact. Chancellor Cuno had proposed such a pact twice in 1923 but the proposal was rejected both times by the French.<sup>90</sup> In France, Herriot had been replaced by Aristide Briand and in Britain, the final negotiator, Austin Chamberlain had replaced the Socialist Ramsey MacDonald.<sup>91</sup> Stresemann feared a stronger Franco-British Alliance given the pro-French attitude displayed by the British Prime Minister, which made his calls for a security agreement all the more urgent.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Halperin. pp. 290-292

<sup>90</sup> Craig. p.515

<sup>91</sup> Carrie. p.418

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. p.516

For Stresemann, who saw 'the sovereignty of Germany on German soil' as the most important objective of his foreign policy, felt that the proposed Rhineland Pact would best serve German interests. By signing an agreement which included a British guarantee of the inviolability of the frontiers between Germany, France and Belgium, Germany could facilitate the evacuation of the Cologne Zone. Stresemann felt that the treaty would serve to guarantee the maintenance of the 'status quo' in the West, although domestic anger over his acquiescence in the loss of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine (which was inherent within the Locarno Treaty) was very strong.<sup>93</sup>

French ratification of the Treaty was dependent on Germany's entry into the League of Nations, which they finally did on September 8th, 1926. The French insisted that unless the Germans agreed to become a member of this international body and accept all the restrictions and obligations which accompanied it, they would refuse to sign the agreement.<sup>94</sup> The Germans argued vigorously that the Cologne Zone would have to be evacuated before the Locarno Agreements would be ratified, but the French succeeded in maintaining the legal provisions of the Versailles Treaty pertaining to German disarmament clauses.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Halperin. p. 324

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. p.329

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. p.330

Stresemann was able to persuade Briand to promise to evacuate the Cologne Zone as early as possible, which (after the treaties were ratified by the Reichstag in 1925) began in November 1925 and was finally completed by January 1926<sup>96</sup>

Some analysts have interpreted the Locarno Treaty as a victory for the French. This interpretation is possible because Germany was made to recognize the post-war settlement on the Western front (the east was left conspicuously open), and to renounce the use of force. By the time the treaties of arbitration between France and Poland, and Czechoslovakia were signed, France gained a much stronger position.<sup>97</sup> On the other hand, German revisionist tendencies towards the east were not drastically constrained by the agreements between France and her Eastern allies and in fact, this was one of the selling points Stresemann used when obtaining support for the treaty from the so-called "Easterners" ('Ostlers') in the Reichstag and in the Foreign Office. Stresemann actually indicated that the maintenance of the precarious and unsettled nature of the 'status quo' in the East was the prerequisite for any Western security guarantee.<sup>98</sup> Most Frenchmen saw Locarno as a rather 'weak' substitute for a stronger Anglo-French alliance which the British were not willing to participate in at the time.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 333

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. p.331

<sup>98</sup> Grathwol. p.60

<sup>99</sup> Hiden. p. 57

For Stresemann, Locarno was the pivot of his foreign policy in the West. Through the creation of the Rhineland pact he was able to realize his promise of the complete evacuation of the Ruhr and the Cologne zones of occupation, and the complete restoration of Germany as an independent and equal nation in the community of Europe through its membership in the League of Nations. In this way it was both a tactical and strategic success for not only did it assume the above specific goals but from a strategic point of view, it separated western security from eastern security concerns.<sup>100</sup> Stresemann once said:

A revision of the Versailles Treaty will not be achieved by the force of arms, but by the forces of the world economic community of interests of the nations.<sup>101</sup>

From the above we can conclude that for Stresemann, reacceptance into the European community, which came about as a result of Locarno, and the resulting participation in the world economy was inseparable from German interests. He therefore realized the continuation of foreign loans (especially American) to aid in the economic recovery of Germany in return for having to recognize the appropriation of Western territories which had been lost already through the Treaty of Versailles.<sup>102</sup> The difficulty with American loans

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<sup>100</sup> Marshall Lee German Foreign Policy 1917-1933 St. Martin's Press. New York. 1987 p.96

<sup>101</sup> Berghahn. p.99

<sup>102</sup> V.R. Berghahn, in his book Modern Germany takes up the argument that because of the large number of loans guaranteed by the Americans, the Weimar economy became a 'penetrated' one and therefore even more vulnerable to

were that they artificially made the German economy strong again and indeed furthered the dependance of the German economy on the west.

Locarno has been interpreted not simply for its importance to Germany's territorial revision. It also stands as an impressive attempt to define Germany's great power status in a more realistic fashion<sup>103</sup>

Before the treaties could be ratified a compromise had to be worked out concerning Article 16 of the League of Nations Charter (the so-called Annex 'F' clause), for Germany did not want the collective security aspect of the Charter to damage relations with the other 'pariah' state of Europe, the Soviet Union. Stresemann was able to get the clause

to an extent compatible with the military situation and geographical position of the members

inserted<sup>104</sup> thereby allowing Germany the potential to opt out of possible collective actions taken against the Soviets by the Allies.<sup>105</sup> The fact that this was an important issue of contention underlines the dual nature of the forces impacting upon the foreign minister in the development and execution of Weimar's foreign policy.

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changes in the United States economy (i.e. the 1929 Stock Market crash). See Berghahn p.332

<sup>103</sup> Hiden. p.60

<sup>104</sup> Carrie. p. 420

<sup>105</sup> Craig. p.517

The Locarno treaty ushered in the so-called 'Spirit of Locarno' in which Stresemann and the Germans were able to participate as an equal member and sovereign state in both the League of Nations and the later reparations negotiations which would culminate in the Young Plan of 1928.

Germany's prestige was enhanced by being treated formally, at least, as an equal, and the wind was taken out of the sails of those who were working for a bilateral Franco-British alliance.<sup>106</sup>

Locarno represented a compromise between the security conscious French and the equality conscious Germans, which was made possible through the conciliatory attitudes taken by the negotiators, a major change from the coercive and aggressive attitude adopted by the Former French Prime Minister Poincaré.<sup>107</sup> Germany was admitted to the League ensuring that her 'moral probation' period had ended only seven years after her defeat on the battlefield, although the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty remained in effect.<sup>108</sup> This 'spirit' of cooperation and conciliation was rightly said to have been one of the major reasons why the whole Locarno process was so successful. Although a number of Nationalist ministers (from the DNVP) in the 'Bourgeois' coalition resigned, Stresemann was able to get the treaty passed by the Reichstag with the help of the SPD and the Zentrum party.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Arnold Wolfers. France and Britain Between the Wars W.W.Norton and Co. Inc. New York. p.261

<sup>107</sup> Carrie. p.421

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 421



Stresemann was satisfied with the Locarno agreements for some of the above reasons, but, and perhaps more importantly, he felt that by joining the League of Nations the proper psychological environment could be created whereby the Germans could better press for revisions on her eastern frontiers.<sup>110</sup> He was able to exploit this 'spirit of Locarno' to press for some of his demands and force the Allies, especially the French, into the difficult position of not wanting to appear unreasonable in the face of, what many in the West felt were legitimate German claims. Although attacked by the right-wing radicals at home, Stresemann had effectively 'taken the teeth' out of the Franco-Polish alliance by refusing all attempts at an Ostlocarno.<sup>111</sup>

At this time the British seemed to be pursuing two not completely compatible positions. While Chamberlain was seeking closer cooperation with France (which included a defence commitment) his government also realized the importance of a strong Germany for European economic recovery<sup>112</sup> and as a bulkhead against communism.

As long as Germany's strength was still well below the danger line, Britain's conciliatory policy towards her was backed almost unanimously by all political parties in Parliament.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Hirsch. p.65

<sup>110</sup> Craig. p.518

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. p.519

<sup>112</sup> Wolfers. p.244

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. p.249

In March 1925 in the House of Commons British Foreign Minister Chamberlain actually stated that the Poles could do Europe a great service by voluntarily entering into negotiations with the Germans on the question of territorial revisions.<sup>114</sup> British Ambassador to Germany Lord D'Abernon stated:

Desiring the maintenance of the Anglo-French Entente, I am compelled to desire the existence of a strong Germany.<sup>115</sup>

In a private memo to Foreign Minister Chamberlain, D'Abernon outlined his greatest fear which was that of a strong Anglo-French alliance forcing the Germans into the arms of the waiting Soviets, thereby granting legitimacy to the latter and threatening British and French allies in Eastern Europe.<sup>116</sup> Chamberlain saw the Rhineland Pact as the most workable solution because it served many of the functions of the proposed Anglo-French security alliance while at the same time reducing anxiety in Berlin concerning France's German policy.<sup>117</sup> The British felt they had to do something constructive after rejecting the French sponsored Geneva protocols of 1925 because of those protocol clauses regard-

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<sup>114</sup> Grathwol. p. 54

<sup>115</sup> Holborn. p. 213 (For a more detailed discussion of the role of the British Ambassador and the Locarno pact see: F.G. Stambrook. "Das Kind: Lord D'Abernon and the origins of the Locarno Pact" Journal of Central European History Vol 1. No. 3 1968.

<sup>116</sup> Jacobsen. p. 21 (In fact it was always an important Soviet aim throughout this period to seek an understanding with Germany.)

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. p. 22

ing compulsory arbitration.<sup>118</sup> It is also important to make clear that Britain's attitude towards securing the Polish frontiers was somewhat ambivilant thus making Stresemann's arguments more convincing.<sup>119</sup>

Just after the Locarno treaty had been signed, Stresemann and Briand met at Thiory in France to discuss outstanding Franco- German problems. While the discussions went well (both leaders still 'basking in the post-Locarno spotlight') the domestic political situation for the French leader changed so that by December 1926 he began to move away considerably from the concessions he had discussed.<sup>120</sup> Such movement was not good for Stresemann, who hoped that the evacuation of the Rhineland and the return of the Saar region without a plebiscite (as called for under the Treaty of Versailles) could help shore him up against the attacks he was absorbing from those who wanted a more 'Eastern' oriented foreign policy. Poincaré was later re-elected and proceeded to alleviate France's currency crisis without making concessions to the Germans thereby strengthening the French position vis-a-vis Stresemann.

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<sup>118</sup> Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis Harper and Row Ltd. 1946. p. 95

<sup>119</sup> Grathwol. op cit, p. 61 In fact it has been argued that the British themselves recognized to a certain extent the legitimacy of German claims in Poland.

<sup>120</sup> Carrie. p. 442

By 1927 the IMCC had been withdrawn (after a disarmament settlement had been reached), and Germany participated as an equal partner in the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, along with the USSR. The Pact outlawed the use of force in international relations. Stresemann attempted to raise the Rhineland occupation issue once again, but Poincaré refused to be persuaded by the Foreign Minister's pleas.<sup>121</sup> The Rhineland occupation, he felt, was the best guarantee which the French possessed for prompt German payment of reparations. Also in 1928, Stresemann was able to participate in the negotiations which would lead to the Young Plan which firmly set reparations at 34.9 billion Marks.<sup>122</sup> In 1928 newly elected SPD Chancellor Hermann Müller accepted the Young Plan much to the disappointment of Alfred Hugenberg and the DNVP as well as certain members of Stresemann's own German Peoples Party.

By the time he died in October 1929, the Rhineland had been evacuated completely (June 1930), a full five years earlier than stated in the Treaty of Versailles, and Stresemann could finally say: "We are again masters in our own house."

Viewed from outside, and from Paris, Stresemann's Western policy was one of successive demands built one upon another and leading logically to a more powerful Germany than France could ever have been

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p. 442

<sup>122</sup> Reinhardt, Kurt F. Germany 2000 Years: Vol II The Second Empire and the Weimar Republic Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. New York. 1964 p.667

happy with.<sup>123</sup>

### 3.3

#### STRESEMANN'S OSTPOLITIK

I never thought more about the East than during the time I was looking for an understanding with the West.<sup>124</sup>

The purpose of this section of the chapter is briefly to examine and highlight the goals and aims of Stresemann's Eastern policy (Ostpolitik) during the period of his position as Weimar Foreign Minister. Before examining the effects of such western foreign policy successes as Locarno on Germany's policy towards the east, I will turn briefly to the state of Germany's Ostpolitik in the years before Stresemann became Chancellor in 1923. Such factors as the Treaty of Rapallo and the secret Soviet-German military and industrial agreements must be mentioned if one is to understand the environment and forces which worked upon Stresemann as he was developing his 'eastern' policy.

As previously mentioned, Stresemann's foreign policy aims included that of revising the frontiers imposed through the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty had deprived Germany of approximately one-twelfth of its pre-1914 territory. While realizing that the re-acquisition of the Saar mines and the Eupen-Maledy regions was not a realistic possibility in the

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<sup>123</sup> Hiden. p. 59

<sup>124</sup> Stresemann, as cited from: Fred Warner Neal. War and Peace in Germany WW Norton & Co. Ltd. N.Y. 1962 p.87

short term, Stresemann (and Chancellors such as Wirth and Cuno before him), felt that a revision of the eastern territories of Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Silesia certainly were. Some authors, such as Zygmunt Gasiorowski, have argued that revision of the Polish frontier was Stresemann's main priority and that the prerequisite to improvement of relations with Poland was a renunciation by them of their interests in Silesia and the Corridor<sup>125</sup> The impetus though for revision in the East did not begin with Stresemann, but rather was a strong political force even before the Treaty of Versailles had been signed in 1919.<sup>126</sup>

Germany has always possessed an interest in the East both economically and politically and has tried to use her economic strength to overcome the historical animosity that Eastern Europeans have traditionally held for the Germans ever since the days of Frederick the Great and the Partitions of Poland. Stresemann himself sought to pressure Poland economically but with Pulsudski's coup d'etat and successful manipulation of Poland's economic crisis in the mid-20's, this proved to be an unsuccessful venture over the long term.<sup>127</sup> In this sense, although the Weimar period is well known for the major divisions and factions which attempted to pull Germany's foreign policy either East or

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<sup>125</sup> Gasiorowski. p.27

<sup>126</sup> Reinhardt. p.653

<sup>127</sup> Henry Ashby Turner Jr. "Continuity in German foreign policy: the Case of Stresemann." International History Review Vol 1. No.4 Winter 1979 p.515

West, the idea of revising Germany's borders (as a political force to be dealt with by all Weimar leaders) came the closest to achieving a general consensus among the German population. While the need for revision (closely connected with the feeling of a 'loss of honor') was generally prevalent among Germans, it was in the tactics of realizing these revisionist aims where Weimar's policy divisions became most clear.

Many historians have maintained that Weimar's Ostpolitik was basically 'inactive' until the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, but an interpretation such as this serves to underestimate the importance of the trading relationship and agreements signed with the East, including the 1920 German-Czech trade agreement. Many large industrialists in Germany sought out markets and materials from the East to aide in German economic recovery.

There were also a number of powerful industrialists who had long been aware of the potentialities of the Russian market and who hoped to combat the economic crisis at home by obtaining export orders from the Bolshevik government.<sup>128</sup>

This avenue of trade, they hoped, would provide a counterweight to the huge amounts of industrial reparations to which the Ruhr district's producers were committed. It has been argued, though, that on this question of potential Soviet markets, many German industrialists had wrongly assumed that the Soviet Union would be able to absorb German industrial goods, yet, due to the chaos of the civil war and

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<sup>128</sup> Berghahn. p.98

the general backwardness of their distribution facilities and infrastructure, the Soviets simply could not have been such an important market.<sup>129</sup> Leaving this aside for the moment, the Eastern trade agreements were actually the precursor to the European race to engage Russia economically once the Bolsheviks had gained the upper hand in the civil war.<sup>130</sup> Germany's historic trading network with the east combined initially to give them a stronger position than others in opening up to the USSR after the civil war.

French policy towards the East reflected her security conscious attitude which 'colored' her foreign policy with her Allies as well as her former enemy. On the whole French policy was really much more clear and straight forward when it came to securing her border against Germany than was the ambiguous British position concerning Germany.<sup>131</sup> The March 1921 Franco-Polish Treaty and the 1924 Franco-Czech Treaty symbolized the French attempt to use, and indeed to strengthen Franco-East European ties to create a 'cordon sanitaire' directed against Germany.<sup>132</sup> While France wanted to keep the two outcasts of Versailles apart, her relations with Eastern Europe to some extent contradicted her main foreign policy goal. It has been argued that Allied policy

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<sup>129</sup> Berghahn. p.99

<sup>130</sup> Hiden. p. 112

<sup>131</sup> G.M. Gathorne-Hardy A Short History of International Affairs 1920-39 Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press. London 1960 p.28

<sup>132</sup> Hiden. p.111



only served to force a community of interests that was beginning to develop anyway between the Germans and the Soviets.<sup>133</sup>

There were a number of factors in the post Versailles political and economic environment which created a community of interests between Germany and the Soviet Union. The general Allied (French) attitude towards Germany served to strengthen the position of the Easterners<sup>134</sup> in the German Military and Foreign Ministries. Due to the mutual German-Soviet political position as outcasts of the international system, and their status as defeated states, they were allowed to forge a sense of 'togetherness' in light of their recent mutual historical experience. The West's attitude was manifest both through initially excluding these states from the League of Nations and, in the Soviet case, of aiding the 'White Russians' in their attempt to realize a counter revo-

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p.112 From an examination of Soviet foreign policy sources, one can conclude that Soviet initiatives towards Germany were directed mainly against France. France was in fact always central to the USSR's 'German' policy; being the leading military power on the continent, the Soviets sought to prevent a Franco-German rapprochement. This anti-French policy manifested itself for example in Soviet diplomatic support of Germany during the Ruhr occupation.

<sup>134</sup> This was the term used to describe those individuals who felt that Germany's destiny lay in an eastern orientation vis-a-vis her foreign policy. Included within this group were many members of the military (led by General Hans von Seeckt); members of the Foreign Office including German Ambassador to the Soviet Union Brockdorff Rantzau, and Baron Ago von Maltzan; a man of 'Mecklenburg Junker stock'. In fact some leading NAZI's also espoused this view, including Joseph Goebbels and Otto Strasser. For more information see Holborn. p.219

lution. The series of trade treaties between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Allies was perceived by both states (although not to the same degree) as being directed against them and thereby strengthened the idea that only together could these two states regain their position in the international community.

As Wirth's Erfüllungspolitik in the West began to break down and showed little concrete sign of success, the calls of the 'Easterners' ( including Prussian industrialists) for greater economic trading relations with the USSR became more pronounced. On May 6th, 1921 the day after the London Ultimatum, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the 'Provisional Agreement'<sup>135</sup> which helped to reconstruct the economic and political bridge that had been destroyed since the Treaty of Brest- Litosk.<sup>136</sup>

The Treaty of Versailles, allowing the Germans an army of only 100,000 also helped to consolidate the German- Soviet relationship. While most of the General Staff were ideologically opposed to Communism and the Comintern's call for proletarian revolution, they did not let this prejudice their exploitation of the Russian need for military training, which provided them with a way to bypass the Versailles restrictions on disarmament. The Reichswehr, led by General Hans von Seeckt, followed in the Bismarckian tradition of

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<sup>135</sup> Hiden. p.86

<sup>136</sup> Holborn. p. 219

viewing relations with Russia as the cornerstone of security, with France modelled in the role as arch enemy. Given the hostile attitude of the French, Seeckt felt that the Germans could not afford to antagonize the Soviets.<sup>137</sup> In a letter sent to Chancellor Wirth in 1922 Seeckt stated:

We are striving for two things (1) to strengthen Russia economically and politically, and thereby indirectly to strengthen ourselves by building up a potential ally; and (2) to strengthen ourselves directly, at first cautiously and with circumspection, by helping Russia build up an armament industry that could be useful to us in time of need.<sup>138</sup>

From this quotation one can easily observe Seeckt building up the Soviet 'option', which he had been doing for quite some time as part of his anti-Versailles policy.<sup>139</sup> Along with the economic relationship of commercial enterprises in industry and agriculture, secret military relations in terms of production, testing of new weapons and training served to strengthen this relationship which the Versailles Treaty, and stubborn Allied attitudes towards the Germans had initially made possible. The dovetailing of large German industrial interests with those of the Reichswehr served to re-enforce the "Easterners" as a political force in the development of Weimar foreign policy.

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p.217

<sup>138</sup> Feld, Werner. Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations The Hague, Netherlands. Marinus Nijhoff Ltd. 1963 p.5

<sup>139</sup> Berghahn. p.98

It was after the London Ultimatum, that Seeckt was able to persuade Wirth to give the 'green light' to these initiatives. The Allied decision (October 1921) to partition Silesia, through which the Poles received the better industrial areas, again served to weaken those, such as Walter Rathenau (Wirth's Foreign Minister until his assassination in 1922) who wanted a foreign policy focussing on the West. In response to the forces advocating the 'Ostorientierung', Wirth appointed such 'Easterners' as Baron Ago von Maltzan to the foreign ministry, at the expense of such influential people as Rosen, who felt that German policy should be more focussed on the West.<sup>140</sup> It should not be forgotten that the Russians did not help their situation by aiding the German Communist Party (KPD) in their uprisings in March 1923 which, along with the continued rhetoric of the aims and goals of International communism, brought home to many Germans the threat that the Soviets posed.<sup>141</sup>

### 3.3.1 Rapallo 1922.

The origins of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo lie in British Prime Minister Lloyd George's call for an international conference at Genoa to deal with the general state of the European economies. It became obvious to the European states that their individual efforts to reform their faltering economies were a failure. Lloyd George, whose own domestic

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<sup>140</sup> Hiden. pp. 88-89

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. pp. 88-89

political situation was hampered by Britain's economic woes, called for a united effort to seek a joint solution to European economic recovery to which the Germans and the Soviets were, for the first time, invited.

The Germans, initially disappointed when Poincaré was elected French leader, were not that surprised when he refused to discuss the reparation question during the Genoa talks. Led by Rathenau, the Germans hoped to use the conference to prove the viability of their Erfüllungspolitik to get the Allies to realize that the whole repayment schedule was unrealistic.<sup>142</sup> This, combined with the London Ultimatum and the Allied decision to partition Upper Silesia created an atmosphere ripe for a German-Soviet deal. The Russians let it be known that, as under Article 16 of the Versailles Treaty, and against Lenin's statements of no reparations or indemnities, that the possibility existed of the Soviets collecting reparations from Germany. Rathenau and the other German leaders feared these developments. When the Soviet representative Chicherin called them from the neighboring resort town of Rapallo, the Germans, after having been ignored by the Allies who would not even return their calls, promptly met the Soviets and signed the Rapallo Treaty. It called for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of Ambassadors. The Treaty went on to grant each state 'most favored nation' status and in addition can-

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<sup>142</sup> See, for example, the discussion in George Kennan's Russia and the West Under Lennin and Stalin New York. 1962 p. 212

celled all mutual debts.<sup>143</sup>

The Treaty of Rapallo sent 'shockwaves' through Allied capitals as it now became obvious that their policy of attempting to keep the two 'outcasts' of Versailles apart, had failed miserably. In the short term this agreement served to destroy Lloyd George's strategy and strengthened Poincaré and the 'Germanophobes' in France which resulted in an even stricter insistence on the letter of the Versailles Treaty.

In Germany the Rapallo Treaty was adopted by the Reichstag with the SPD notably in opposition feeling that this had dealt a harsh blow to Germany's attempt to win the confidence of the Western Allies and show their desire to fulfill the clauses of the Versailles Treaty to the letter.<sup>144</sup> The popular opinion was that Rapallo represented a confident Germany making an independant gesture against Western intransigence and legalistic calls for strict German adherence to the Treaty.<sup>145</sup> It is interesting to note that General Seeckt was completely unaware of these developments, although his secret military agreements were the indirect forerunner to this type of relationship.

(Rapallo)...confirmed to a number of Germans the correctness of their thinking that Germany's destiny should be based on an Eastern orientation of

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<sup>143</sup> Holborn. p. 221

<sup>144</sup> Halperin. p.210

<sup>145</sup> Holborn. p.221

her foreign policy.<sup>146</sup>

In this way the 'Easterners', notably Maltzan, were able to use the intransigence of the Western Allies to convince Wirth and Rathenau to agree to exploit the 'Russian card'.

At the very least, Rapallo was proof of Germany's tendency after 1919 to exploit the 'Russian card' to bring additional pressure to bear on the Western powers to revise Versailles.<sup>147</sup>

The Rapallo Treaty has been interpreted as a belated peace treaty, which most surely made Wirth's policy of fulfillment very difficult to proceed with. It served German revisionist interests in that it provided a useful framework for German-Russian dialogue on pushing Poland back to her 'ethnic' borders.<sup>148</sup> These benefits were said to have been manifest when Soviet pressure on Poland and Czechoslovakia influenced them in deciding against active participation in a joint action against Germany with the 1923 French invasion of the Ruhr.

It was therefore into this political environment which Stresemann ascended in 1923 as Chancellor. During his stint as Chancellor, Stresemann was, as previously mentioned, able to end passive resistance, ordered the Ruhr workers back to work, created the Rentenmark, and took decisive action

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<sup>146</sup> Feld. p.10

<sup>147</sup> Hiden. p. 91

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 113

against Communist activity in Saxony and Thuringia. It was this later action which led to the withdrawal of SPD support and the defeat of his government. President Ebert appointed Marx Chancellor with Stresemann staying on as Foreign Minister.<sup>149</sup>

Stresemann was best known for his success at Locarno, but of relevance at this point in the discussion was the treaty signed just after his sojourn to Switzerland. The Treaty of Berlin was signed on April 24th, 1926 between the Soviets and the Germans and served to re-affirm Germany's stated position of neutrality in case of hostilities between the Allies and the Soviets. It has been interpreted by some analysts as a public affirmation of Stresemann's 'Schaukelpolitik' ('swing politic') between East and West through which he attempted to placate Soviet anxiety after the trip to Locarno.<sup>150</sup> Although this treaty did not offer the Soviets more than they got at Rapallo, it did serve to reaffirm Germany's ties with the USSR, while at the same time placating some of the calls from the 'Easterners' for action and improved Stresemann's bargaining position after the criticism he received from Locarno.<sup>151</sup>

Germany has no intention of allowing herself to be used as an auxiliary in any action against Russia.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Marshall Dill. Germany: A Modern History University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Mich. 1961 p.293

<sup>150</sup> Hirsch. p. 68

<sup>151</sup> Craig. p. 520



Unlike the Locarno Treaty, this agreement was passed by all parties in the Reichstag.

Stresemann was faced with a major difficulty, he could not politically afford to deal exclusively with the West, for the calls of the large industrialists, the military, and the right-wing political parties for an active Ostpolitik were very strong.

The events of 1923 demonstrated the benefits to Germany of ties with East and West, and those who were in favor of continuing contacts with Russia were too influential to ignore.<sup>153</sup>

In fact the Soviets strongly supported the Germans in diplomatic efforts during the events of 1923. The above statement is also supported by the fact that Stresemann, although certainly knowing about Seeckt's military relations with the Soviets, felt that he could not move against him during this period. He did not approve of Seeckt's dream of a joint German-Russian military solution to the revisionist claims on Poland, but the strength of the 'Easterners' was such that no concerted attempt could be made to oust them from their position of influence within both the Army and the foreign office. The problems between the two men centered around the fact that while Seeckt sought military solutions, Stresemann felt that Germany's improving economy must be used as the vehicle of change<sup>154</sup> Seeckt's position was clear:

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<sup>152</sup> Stresemann, as quoted from Gasiorowski Journal of Central European Studies p.39

<sup>153</sup> Hiden. p.94

<sup>154</sup> Lee. p.76

Poland's existence is intolerable, and incompatible with the vital needs of Germany. She must disappear, and disappear she will through her own inner weakness and through Russia's action with our help.<sup>155</sup>

Fortunately for Stresemann, Seeckt was forced to resign because of his calls for payment of confiscated assets of the former Höllezzollern Imperial family and the unauthorized visit of the former German Emperor's son to Reichswehr military exercises in 1926.<sup>156</sup>

Generally though, with Stresemann's appearance Soviet-German relations began to slow down. The Soviets were criticized privately for their support of the communist agitation in Saxony and Thuringia, and support for the attempted rapprochement between the KPD and the SPD as the first step in a worker's revolution against the German establishment.<sup>157</sup>

The Stresemann period was a difficult one for the Soviets for he sought to realize his revisionist claims not through an exclusive policy with the East but rather by strengthening the diplomatic position of Germany in the Western community of Nations.

Stresemann clung to the belief that the peaceful acquisition of Danzig and the territories ceded to Poland would become possible once Germany had strengthened her diplomatic position.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> General Hans von Seeckt, as cited from Gasiorowski Journal of Central European Studies p.27

<sup>156</sup> Craig. p. 521

<sup>157</sup> Hiden. p. 93

<sup>158</sup> Halperin. p.327

It has been argued that the Treaty of Berlin, signed in April 1926, was not a high-water mark in German-Soviet relations, but rather an empty symbol of a deteriorating relationship which had become steadily worse since the 1922 Rapallo Treaty. The constant reassurances given to the Soviets during the Locarno negotiations did not dispel Soviet fears of the West colluding against them, and indeed the Soviets saw Locarno as nothing but an alliance aimed against them.<sup>159</sup>

The clutch of trade treaties signed between Germany and Russia on the eve of Locarno were meant to reassure the Russians of Germany's continuing friendship without endangering the coming security pact, which Moscow wanted to frustrate.<sup>160</sup>

In this sense economic and military relations were also to serve as the vehicle through which some form of political link could be maintained. The Treaty of Berlin has also been interpreted in light of the German struggle, throughout late 1925/26 to get a permanent seat on the League of Nations council. They sought to reaffirm German-Soviet relations as a counterweight to the West and strengthen her 'hand', Germany, in fact, later received her permanent seat in September 1926 as part of the Locarno treaty.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> The Soviets in fact regarded Locarno, the Young Plan, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact all from the same perspective, as a direct threat to their understanding of Soviet-German relations

<sup>160</sup> Hiden. p.94

<sup>161</sup> Lee. p.88

At Locarno Stresemann's success at gaining for Germany an equal place in the European community (and a permanent seat in the League of Nations) gave rise to a political situation in which the USSR was deemed to be of lesser political importance. Locarno reduced the importance of the Rapallo and Berlin Treaties by making them simply other agreements in the network of post-Locarno treaties.<sup>162</sup> As Werner Feld sums it up:

Germany's strengthened position in the international arena made her less dependant on the Soviet Union...<sup>163</sup>

Stresemann was able to use the forum that the League of Nations provided to argue for the gradual revision of her borders with Poland. For example, through her improved economic position, Germany was able to make better trading relations with the states in Eastern Europe dependant on how well they treated their ethnic German minorities.<sup>164</sup> This was seen as being of great benefit for Germany's revisionist cause.

The leverage obtained for German policy in Eastern Europe in the mid 20's came not from its relationship with Russia alone, but from the progress made by Germany in striking a balance between its commitment and interests in east and west as a whole.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Feld. p.8

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>164</sup> Hiden. p.121

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. p.117

For Eastern Europe Locarno displayed that the French obviously placed their own security needs ahead of those of their Allies.

The Allies basically accepted Germany's special relationship with the Soviet Union as part of the price of Locarno, yet, at the same time, Stresemann's ambivalence towards the Soviets served to ease Allied fears. Therefore one could argue that as the Western political environment changed for the better vis-a-vis Germany, Stresemann was able to depend less on the Soviets and move more towards that balance between East and West for which he was noted. This was most evident through the subdued Allied reaction to the ratification of the Berlin Treaty in contrast to their strong negative reaction towards Rapallo.

Finally one can add that German- Soviet relations were cooled even further by the German participation in the Young Plan of 1928 and the final evacuation of the Rhineland in 1930.<sup>166</sup>

in direct contrast to the rise in economic and military collaboration between Russia and Germany 1928-32 political relations between the two former 'outcasts' of Versailles went downhill with a rapidity that was just barely concealed by the outwardly formal correct diplomatic ties.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Feld. p.9

<sup>167</sup> Hiden. p. 97

### 3.4 CONCLUSIONS.

Author Albrecht Carrié has stated:

(Stresemann)...was a patriotic German and a nationalist who understood that in her position of weakness, a policy of conciliation and fulfillment would be the most rewarding...<sup>168</sup>

Stresemann as Weimar Foreign Minister was really able to 'leave his mark' on that office. He was mainly concerned with regaining for Germany her status as a great power. While firmly opposed to the Versailles Treaty, he came to realize that the successful implementation of his policies could only come about through an active Westpolitik. Stresemann knew he had to placate French security fears and attempted to use the British to pressure the French into agreeing initially to the Dawes committee and secondly to accepting his offer of a Rhineland security guarantee.<sup>169</sup> Some would argue that the British, because of their role as 'balancer' in Europe, were the main Stresemann target, and given their influence over the French, one can see that there is weight to such a position<sup>170</sup>

Stresemann, like Adenauer much later, saw that co-operation (and not confrontation) with the west would best serve German interests. He also realized that the 'Wiederaufbau' of the German economy, and not re-armament, was the key to

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<sup>168</sup> Carrié. p.417

<sup>169</sup> Hiden. p.32

<sup>170</sup> Lee. p.77

re-gaining sovereignty.

Ich glaube die Benutzung weltwirtschaftlicher Zusammenhänge, um mit dem Einzigen, womit Wir noch Grossmächte sind, mit unsere Wirtschaftsmacht, Aussenpolitik zu machen, ist die Aufgabe, die Heute jeder Aussenminister zu lösen hätte.<sup>171</sup>

The Locarno era was ripe with successes and failures, but Stresemann's signature on the agreement was not meant to imply his legitimization of the Versailles Treaty.<sup>172</sup> Stresemann was quite successful in realizing a reduction of reparation payments (the Dawes and Young Plan) and regained for Germany a place in the European community of Nations by actually making Germany an equal partner in her own recovery. Having said this, though, I would argue that Stresemann was not a 'good European' (in terms of the way this label was later applied to Statesman such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman) but rather he was a nationalist who, although stressing peaceful methods, sought to revise the hated Treaty of Versailles.

To be a good European during the Locarno Era did not mean that one was willing to diminish the sovereignty of one's nation state; it meant that one did not take unilateral action.<sup>173</sup>

At the same time , Stresemann was particularly interested in 'revision' in the East and shared the traditional Prussian concern for ethnic Germans living outside the 'Reich'.

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<sup>171</sup> Stresemann, as cited from: Wiedenfeld. p.36

<sup>172</sup> Jacobsen. p.374

<sup>173</sup> Jacobsen, as cited in Henry Ashby Turner Jr.'s Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic p.511

Germany must be the champion of the German minorities in Europe...The aim of German foreign policy must, further, be an effort towards a revision of the Eastern Frontier...she must, finally, stand up for the national rights of self determination<sup>174</sup>

There exists some discrepancy in the literature as to the strength of Stresemann's commitment to the Eastern revisionists. Some scholars, such as Marshall Dill have said:

In fact, Stresemann was more interested in the West than in the East, but he had no desire to lose friends anywhere, and he sympathized with the army's insistence on maintaining the valuable ties with the Soviets.<sup>175</sup>

Historians such as Robert Grathwol and Henry Turner Jr. sum up Stresemann's legacy this way:

Stresemann's accomplishment was to convince France and Great Britain of the validity of that range of compatible interests. His accomplishment was based on neither deception nor a commitment to a nebulous idea of Europe, but on a solid commitment to Germany's best interests.<sup>176</sup>

The overriding point to be made here is that besides the question of whether or not Stresemann was profoundly interested in revision of the Polish frontier, the fact remained that the forces representing this 'eastern' orientation were simply too powerful to ignore. Germany had turned to the Soviets in the early 1920's in the face of the failure of Wirth and Rathenau's fulfillment policy and the lingering success of this shift was still present.

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<sup>174</sup> Stresemann, as cited in: Halperin. p.327

<sup>175</sup> Dill. p.313

<sup>176</sup> Gasiorowski. p. 70



It is now with this knowledge of the forces with which Stresemann had to take into account in shaping his foreign policy, that we now turn to an examination of Adenauer's foreign policy in order to highlight the different constellation of forces which influenced the Federal Republic's early foreign policy.

## Chapter IV

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

Before examining the Adenauer Era, it is necessary first to examine briefly the development of Christian Democracy in Western Europe in the post '45 period in order to reconstruct the prevailing political climate in which Adenauer operated.

The phenomenal ascendancy of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in West Germany in the immediate post-war period is a subject of much interest to scholars of European Studies. The appeal of a political movement loosely based on a Christian view of morality and political action, which contained elements of both the "left" and "right", was something not entirely new to Germany. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce Christian democratic ideology<sup>177</sup> and to examine how a number of its precepts were manifest in the formulation and execution of West German foreign policy in the years 1945-1963. This will assist in outlining the effect the movement had on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. To do this, it is necessary both to examine Christian democracy from a theoretical and philosophical point of

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<sup>177</sup> The term ideology is used here in a very tentative manner; the author wants to simply express the opinion of Christian democracy as having some basic themes and ideas which constitute a very general type of 'ideology'.

view, and also to a briefly discuss the roots of Catholic political action in the pre First World War and Weimar periods of German history. It is only after having examined the roots of Christian democracy in Germany, that one can make some preliminary conclusions as to why the CDU was so successful in the post War period, when the Social Democrats under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher seemed poised to grasp the mantel of power.

This chapter will be divided into five major subsections examining briefly the theory behind Christian Democratic philosophy, its roots in pre World War Two Germany, and the preliminary reasons for its success 1945. The final two sections will attempt to relate some Christian democratic ideas specifically to Adenauer's 'Weltanschauung', specifically the point of view from which he understood 'Europe' as a whole.

#### 4.1 RELIGIOUS/PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

Christian democracy, as an identifiable political entity, emerged as a political and social movement of the "center-right" rooting itself in the area of traditional conservative reform philosophy which emphasized the social gospel and teachings of the Catholic Church. Although having explicit roots in the Catholic parties ("Zentrum" in the German case) of the pre-war period, its current configuration is essentially a post-war phenomenon. In Germany espe-

cially, traditional conservative political parties had been discredited by their association with fascism, and it was into this vacuum of the political "right" which Christian Democracy found an arena in which to develop.<sup>178</sup>

Despite its democratic roots and its record of promoting progressive social and economic policies, it still draws on well-established conservative traditions. An examination of the term 'Christian Democracy' itself will reveal two of the three major pillars upon which this political movement is based. The first of these is the emphasis on the importance of re-introducing traditional Christian values into the political, economic, and social spheres of human existence. As stated previously, it bases these pronouncements on the social teachings of the Catholic Church and is intensely motivated to defend and protect such social institutions as the family, the Church, and the local community. It is also from this Christian perspective, that one can understand the explicitly anti-communist attitude expressed by many of its members. Christian democracy is strongly anti-materialistic and anti-atheistic and would distinguish itself from the political philosophy of socialism and communism particularly

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<sup>178</sup> Zig Layton-Henry. Conservative Politics in Western Europe St.Martin's Press.1982 p.6 In fact what one could point to in terms of a democratic tradition in Germany is best summed up in the pre-war Centre Party. Both the SPD and the Centre Party were the least tarnished during the Nazi period and both were later (in the form of the SPD and CDU) to reappear in the post-45 period. After Marxism, Catholicism was a prime target of both the Nazis and the Communists and this attitude precluded the possibility of large scale cooperation between the Centre Party and the Nazis.

with the latter's saturation with these aforementioned Marxist elements.<sup>179</sup> Christian democracy celebrates the rights of the individual and the dignity of man with the importance of political, social, and economic morality strongly stressed.

The second element implied by the term is that of democracy. Given the post war revelations as to the extent of the abuses of both political power and human rights, it is not surprising that Christian Democrats strongly defend the principle of the inviolability of parliamentary or representative democracy. With the integration of these two elements it becomes clear that, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the state in question, one often observes a large measure of consensus regarding the attractiveness and utility of some form of the social welfare state.

The final element consistently pervading practical European Christian democratic philosophy is the emphasis on Pan-Europeanism reflected in the strong movement since 1945 towards European integration. It is this accentuation on the

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid. p.16 The above statement should be qualified. While Christian Democracy takes a negative view of the ideology of socialism, a Christian Democrat's emphasis on a 'Christian sense of responsibility' towards one's fellow man, in fact creates the possibility of cooperation with the Social Democrats in some areas of social and economic policy. In fact both the Centre and the SPD, if one examines Weimar voting patterns, worked together in the Reichstag against the attacks by the undemocratic radicals on the left and the right. The 'Grand Coalition' of the CDU-SPD in 1966-69 again proves that while there are differences between the two parties, a community of interests can develop over certain issues leading to certain levels of political cooperation.

importance of integration which sharply distinguishes Christian democracy from traditional conservative philosophy which, again depending on the particular state in question, has historically been quite nationalistic. In Germany this traditional form of nationalistic conservatism was best embodied by the Protestant rulers of what was previously Prussia and which is, for the most part, today located in the German Democratic Republic and parts of Poland. The East Prussian 'Junker' class of large land owners were one of the most nationalistic of these aforementioned groups. It will become clear when this chapter examines the roots of Christian democracy in Germany as to how the predominantly Catholic composition of the pre-war Zentrum and the post war CDU could justify and promote the Pan-European movement.<sup>180</sup>

It has been argued that because Christian democracy incorporates concepts from such a wide political spectrum that in fact it cannot possess a distinct set of assumptions, inherently consistent, which could be said to comprise a self-contained ideology. Rather, critics argue that Christian democracy is often pragmatic and there exists a large body of evidence to support this point. One need only examine the wide discrepancy of policies between the various self-proclaimed Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe ranging, for example, from the decisive state inter-

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid. p.16 In fact it was the unintended irony of Hitler's defeat that with the destruction of Prussia and its authoritarian legacy, the chances for the development of democracy in West Germany were better.

ventionism of the French 'Mouvement Republicain Populaire' to the more market oriented economic policies of Erhard's 'soziale Marktwirtschaft'.

A French Christian democrat once stated that Christian democracy's essence is said to be constituted by the integration of the two concepts of "personalism" and "pluralism". Christian Democracy is a deliberate attempt to reconcile liberal democracy (with its emphasis on the political and economic rights of the individual) and Industrial society to Christian teachings. Christian democracy endeavors to find a middle road between 19th century liberalism and collectivism. It is seen as a reaction to the two major upheavals Europe experienced in the 18th and 19th centuries, the effects of which still reverberate today.

The French revolution with its emphasis on the individual as the central component in the political process and the resulting affirmation of individual rights as 'human being' was initially accepted by the Catholic Church because it held out the possibility of a movement towards a more humane society. The Papal Encyclical "Rerum Novarum" of 1891 was the document in which there was an acceptance of a movement towards greater human equality. Similarly, the Industrial revolution, with its creation of increased wealth in society and the promise of an improved standard of living was accepted and encouraged by the Catholic Church. Although, as the effects of these two massive upheavals began to become



evident as the diversity between rich and poor increased, significantly, the Church's attitude was reinterpreted. It seemed as if both revolutions while starting out with such promise for a better society actually resulted in an abatement of the importance of Christian values rather than the opposite.<sup>181</sup> Other more materialistic values began to replace the traditional emphasis on family and community. It was therefore from the aftermath of these two revolutions that one had the development of a Christian democratic movement which does not completely accept the major tenants of 19th century liberalism. Although liberalism was largely responsible for the creation of political democracy, Christian democrats would argue that the same democratic vision has not been developed in the economic and social spheres.<sup>182</sup>

It is at this point in the discussion where one should re-introduce the concept of 'personalism' as it relates to Christian democracy. Essentially, 'personalism' refers to an emphasis on the individual in the 'truest' tradition of Liberalism, yet qualified by a Christian interpretation which permeates the entire concept. In other words, while Christian democracy admired and applauded the focus on the individual, it does not accept the conceptualization of the

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<sup>181</sup> There was a definite tension in the Church during this period for, on the one hand, it recognized modernity and secularism yet, on the other, it lamented its consequences.

<sup>182</sup> R.E.M. Irving Conservative Parties in Western Europe Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. p.30



individual and his behavior according to the "survival of the fittest" mentality of Social Darwinism. For Christian democrats, the development of all dimensions of the individual's personality (social, economic, and spiritual) were of equal and prime importance. In this sense, Christian democracy differs from traditional liberalism in its emphasis on the spiritual development of man and it stresses that this development can only be accomplished through his integration in what they would call the "natural social structures" of family and community. It is from these developments whereby Christian Democracy can exercise a certain degree of state or government intervention as opposed to some of liberalism's 'laissez faire' characteristics.<sup>183</sup>

The origins of this application of Christian values to human rights are initially found in the aforementioned Papal Encycles of Rerum Novarum (1891) Quadragesimo Anno (1931), and Pacem In Terris. In the last of these aforementioned Encycles Pacem In Terris (1963). the right to life, to property, and to work were especially emphasized. Secondly there was a reaction to the absolute horror of NAZI atrocities and the complete disrespect for human dignity displayed by them. Finally the application of Christian values to human rights were present and had an influence through the pre-war Catholic parties in Europe. Again, in the last of these aforementioned Encycles (Pacem In Terris) the right to life, to property and to work were especially emphasized. In

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid. p.31

Germany this is most clearly manifest in the March 1946 CDU program which called for

a return to the fundamentals of the Christian culture of the West, the essence of which is a higher view of the dignity of the person and the value of each human being<sup>184</sup>

A further example of the concrete manifestation of the CDU's emphasis on the value of individualistic human rights is the "Grundgesetz" (or Basic law), the first 19 articles of which constitute the basic rights section of the law. It is somewhat ironical to note the focus on, what have been termed 'political rights' and the lack of any mention of economic and social rights. Similarly though, one can comprehend the reasons why the Germans stress the inviolability of political rights considering the infamous abuses of such during the NAZI period.<sup>185</sup>

Christian democratic thought, while not completely identifying itself with 19th century liberalism, would conversly not be comfortable with the attitude of placing the interests of the collective completely over those of the individual. It is from this perspective one begins to understand a Christian democrat's attitude towards Marxism and Communism. Leaving aside a Marxist's atheistic precepts, which certainly would not endear him to a Christian democrat, it is rather his dismissal of the individual in favor of specific economic classes as the lowest common denominator in the political

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<sup>184</sup> March 1946 CDU Party Program

<sup>185</sup> Irving. pp.36-37

process which contradicts the 'principles' of Christian democracy. Having said this it is important to point out that certain ideas, especially the concept of social justice, would appeal to some of the more "left leaning" elements who find a place for themselves under the rubric of Christian democracy.<sup>186</sup>

A Christian democrat places more emphasis on finding a middle course between liberalism and Marxism in which the important combination of freedom and justice can be accented and protected. It is important to strike a balance between these two concepts because an imbalance of justice over freedom can easily lead to tyranny while that of freedom over justice can end in anarchy. While 19th century liberals might define freedom in terms of the freedom of the individual to act as he pleases within the limits of society as defined by its laws, a Christian democrat on the other hand, would include the additions of economic and social freedoms from want, fear, and poverty.

Therefore, to conclude, one could argue that a Christian democrat believes that man as an individual is always more important than society as a whole yet the necessity can be envisioned in which the state may intervene to protect and maintain the aforementioned balance between freedom and justice.

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid. p.31

It should now be added that Christian democracy has been interpreted or classified as advocating the "horizontal" and "verticle" elements of pluralism. A Christian democrat would define the term 'horizontal pluralism' in the sense of various competing institutions of social and economic life (for example: the right of Christian and socialist trade unions to exist side by side in the same movement). Horizontal pluralism is also taken to mean the existence of competition between private and nationalized industries. Conversely, 'verticle pluralism' is understood to mean that decision making can take place at lower levels within a hierarchical political, economic, or social structure. One can see this manifest in CDU support for a "federalist" governmental structure.

A Christian democrat's support of pluralism can be interpreted as the by-product of his commitment to the rights of the individual. Although Christian democracy does not, as it has been shown, completely support 19th century liberal democracy, it does feel that after the abuses by authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, while not making liberal democracy the ideal form of organizing society, does feel that it should be supported as the best way to prevent the previously mentioned abuses from happening again.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid. pp.41-42

Christian democrats feel that industrial and liberal society must adapt to the needs of man rather than the opposite; economic liberalism cannot be allowed to trample the economic and social rights of the individual within society. Christian democracy is then an attempt to reconcile 19th century economic liberalism to Christian social justice and can be said to be similar to Social democracy and conservatism in its willingness to protect certain tenants of liberal democracy and social pluralism yet differs from the latter in its emphasis on the importance of 'natural' social structures.

At this point in the discussion we should focus our attention on some of the particular characteristics of Christian democracy in Germany and how these resulted in a modification of the type of Christian democracy since realized in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Primarily the CDU developed from the ruins of a regime which abused totally the individual rights of a great many members of society. This fact partly accounts for its strictly anti-fascist tone. It is somewhat ironic to note that although its declaratory policy is decidedly anti NAZI and anti-Communist, the votes and support of former NAZI's were quietly accepted.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Geoffrey Pridham Christian Democracy in Western Germany Redwood Burns Ltd. London, England 1977. p.24-25

A second important aspect of Christian democracy in Germany which distinguishes it, to some extent, from other Christian democratic parties in Europe is the emphasis placed (by certain CDU leaders such as Konrad Adenauer) on the establishment and maintenance of a "confessional bridge" between Protestants and Catholics. This aspect of the CDU challenges the traditional animosity between these two religious groups in Germany which dates back to the reformation and later to Bismarck's Kulturkampf of the 1870's. This need to bridge the "confessional ghetto" goes back to the threat posed to all Christian groups in Germany by the NAZI's. It was here where the reemergence, albeit briefly, of the pre war Catholic Zentrum party posed a threat to the development of the CDU. The problem with a revived Zentrum Party on the political scene was the feeling created among CDU leaders that the Protestant groups in central and northern Germany would be unwilling to join and work with what had essentially been a "Catholic" party. Rather CDU leaders wanted to get the support of prominent Protestant leaders who could then appeal on the CDU's behalf to their constituents for support.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid pp.26-28

#### 4.2 THE ROOTS OF THE CONFESSIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN GERMANY BEFORE 1945.

As previously mentioned, one cannot understand German Christian Democracy as it developed in the 20th Century under the CDU unless one takes into account its 19th century origins. The rise of Christian Democracy is essentially a result of the Catholic response to the Industrial and French revolutions. With the onslaught of secular influences and consequences resulting from these upheavals, there developed an attitude among conservative Catholics that the institutions and traditions that they deemed most important were under attack. With the move towards ending the power and privilege of the Church in the areas of family, community and education, some Catholics began to feel that only together in political action groups or parties could they exert the pressure required to resist these changes. In this sense Christian democracy then became the socio-economic response to militant secularism and an economic response to the Industrial revolution.<sup>190</sup>

During the reformation, a majority of Germans were "converted" to Protestantism creating a situation whereby only 33% of all Germans by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia were considered Catholic. Throughout the 18th century, German Catholics despite being in a minority position, attempted to distance themselves from Rome. It was Joseph II's independent stance (vis-a-vis Rome) which served as the role model for

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<sup>190</sup> Irving. p.1

the various Catholic princes in the Germany states. The zenith or climax of this independant position was reached in 1786 at Bad Ens when the German Bishops published a document calling for, what essentially amounted to, total independence from Papal control. Protestant Prussia, while looking favorably on these initiatives by German Catholics still sought to maintain hegemony over all Germans and realized this through a series of laws which strictly controlled Catholic power. An example of these restrictions was the 1784 'Preussische Landrecht' which saw the strict control of Church land by the state. By 1815 Catholics began to feel the pressure that Prussia was applying on them and consequently again turned to Rome. In 1832 the Catholic parliamentary group was established in the Prussian Diet in response to the growing amount of anti-Catholic measures taking place in Prussia.<sup>191</sup>

Unfortunately, for the Catholic Bishops and Princes in the various German states, Bismarck used this change of direction by Catholic groups to begin his infamous 'Kulturkampf'. The 1870 Papal declaration of infallibility only added to the growing anti-Catholic sentiment in Germany and Bismarck's Kulturkampf was perceived as the best solution for both reducing Catholic power and, more importantly, as a way of achieving a greater degree of internal cohesion within the newly established German state. Bismarck realized

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<sup>191</sup> Arnold J. Heidenheimer Adeanuer and the CDU Martinus Nijhoff. The Hauge, Netherlands. 1960 p.12



that not only was Germany's loose federal structure a hindrance to unification, but also recognized that the so-called "state within state mentality" of the Catholics would provide opposition to his plans. In this way the centuries' old policy of attempting to "protestantize" the Catholics was resurrected with the Jesuits, for example, being banned outright and all Church activity being made subject to control by the state.<sup>192</sup>

It was this situation which in 1870, gave rise to the German Catholic party along with the development of a significant Catholic press. The Zentrum was not a party totally committed to liberal democracy, but rather accepted its basic tenants as long as Catholic rights could be protected. The Zentrum, it has been argued, used the democratic system to uphold the interests of the Church without actually completely integrating itself philosophically into such a system. Many Catholics actually supported the monarchy and regretted its passing along with the quasi-authoritarian social and political system of pre 1914- Germany.<sup>193</sup>

The Kulturkampf was officially called off in the 1880's as Bismarck met with Pope Leo 13th and decided that it was socialism which actually presented a greater threat. All anti-Catholic legislation was repealed (except for the case of the Jesuits, who remained banned until 1917). Between

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<sup>192</sup> Irving. pp.12-14

<sup>193</sup> Ibid. p.10

1881-1914 all German governments were based on an alliance between the conservatives, National Liberals, and the Zentrum. In fact, in 1878 the Zentrum became the biggest 'fraction' in the Reichstag and over the years served very competently while developing along quite nationalistic lines.<sup>194</sup> For example, the Zentrum clearly supported Germany's ambition to become a World Power ('Griff nach der Weltmacht').

During the unstable Weimar period the Zentrum (under Chancellors Wirth, Cuno and Marx) became the fulcrum of the government and the largest party. It was, in part, their lack of experience and more generally a lack of a democratic tradition within Germany which became quite evident as one government after another collapsed. The Zentrum faced constant opposition externally from the Bayernische Volkspartei (Bavarian Peoples' Party) and internally from Catholics who disliked their coalitions with the Socialists (SPD). By 1928 the Zentrum had moved further to the political right with the support of right wing liberals and nationalists and, in fact, to a certain extent it was the weak leadership of former Zentrum member Von Papen which, through the Enabling Act of 1933, aided Hitler's ascension to power.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid. It is important to remember here though that the Reichstag played only a secondary role during the Wilhelmine era. The real political power rested with the Kaiser and his Chancellor. p.5

<sup>195</sup> pp.16-18

The end of the Second World War had not only left Europeans without the material and psychological elements of their previous existence but also created a political vacuum due to the discrediting of the traditional conservative political groups (this was especially true in Germany and Italy). Similarly, the war had created a renewed upsurge in support for the socialists and groups which were perceived as representing progressive ideas based on social justice.<sup>196</sup>

The CDU was founded in Germany under the assumption that it would eventually become a party of wide appeal and attempt to bridge the various social and economic classes in Germany's, soon to be re-developed, society. Therefore CDU leaders did not want to appeal only to the middle classes but also attempted to influence the working classes. The CDU they felt had to provide both an alternative to socialism and outright opposition to communism.<sup>197</sup>

#### 4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION.

In his book Conservative Politics in Western Europe Zig Layton-Henry describes seven reasons as to why the CDU was able to emerge as it did. He notes that in Italy and France, Christian Democrats were active in the resistance (and to a lesser extent also in Germany) and that enabled them to avoid accusations of collaboration with the NAZI's. Second-

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<sup>196</sup> Zig Layton-Henry. p.13

<sup>197</sup> Pridham. p.30

ly, the social teachings of the so-called "progressive popes" struck a positive cord and appealed to an electorate demanding social justice and peace. Into the predominantly left-wing political environment of 1945 Western Europe, Christian democrats were able to espouse and emphasize the "progressive" nature of their policies. This was most evidently manifest in the brief adoption by the German CDU of the Ahlen Program in 1947.

It was the Christian aspect of their movement and the 'democratic element' of the platform which enabled Christian democrats to distinguish themselves to the voters from the anti-Christian NAZI's. In Germany, this had the added benefit of appealing to the Allies whose attitude was more amiable to democratic parties. Their success was based on the wide spread appeal to the Catholic voting bloc; this was significant especially in Germany considering the rebirth of the Zentrum, which the CDU eventually managed to outmaneuver and digest.<sup>198</sup> It is important also to note the generally transformed attitude possessed by most Europeans in 1945 which resulted in a distrust for authoritarian regimes and an increased willingness to experiment with liberal democracy; this was most evident in Germany. It was this change that formed the essential distinction between pre and post war attitudes in Germany.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Ibid. p.14

<sup>199</sup> Gabriel Almond. "The Christian Parties of Western Europe" World Politics Vol.1, No.4.January 1949. p.34

The question must now be asked why the CDU was able to develop in the FRG in the post war period. What vision of Germany did it espouse which gave it appeal to the electorate in that war-torn, devastated country?

The first reason why the CDU was able to move into the vacuum existing on the political "right" within the German body politic, was the obvious weakness of the competition; Prussia had been brutally severed from the rest of the German political landscape. This dismemberment of Germany cut off the SPD from its traditional basis of support thus hampering their efforts at renewal. Moreover the total collapse of German society had in effect undermined the traditional socio-economic class structures upon which both the SPD and the KPD had relied upon for support.

To expand on a previous analogy, the CDU, while proclaiming a fresh start from Nazism, was better able than the old Zentrum party to cross, that "confessional bridge" discussed earlier recruiting large numbers of Protestants in their organization. Their brutal repression by the Nazi's had forced both sects to work together in a collaborative effort which, when faced with the communist threat as the 'Cold War' began to develop, continued and expanded.

With the total collapse of German society there came about a major religious revival in which the Christian democrats played an active role in expanding their electoral

base. The Christian principles of the CDU were also more palatable than the atheistic materialism of the Communists or the Social Democrats. The breakdown of Allied co-operation in Germany and the onset of the Cold War served to dampen down the earlier "new left" enthusiasm of the electorate.<sup>200</sup> The fact that the CDU was at the same time quite anti-communist and internationalist made it more palatable to the Allies than the SPD. Furthermore, due to the CDU's desire to maintain contact with the "established" order, many of the "discredited" segments of society quietly associated themselves with the CDU and were thus able to reacquaint and readmit themselves into German society.

The federal character of the government also helped the CDU initially gain success especially in the predominantly Catholic areas of Bavaria, and the Rhineland. At the same time, the Protestant element in the CDU was encouraged to maintain this 'confessional bridge' and by voting for the CDU in the länder of Hamburg, Bremen, and Schleswig-Holstein, the Protestants were guaranteed a major role in the party's decision making structure.<sup>201</sup>

The fourth section of this chapter will now briefly examine developments effecting the consolidation of power by the CDU in 1949. It will discuss the immediate post war years and follow with the CDU's founding in Goslar in 1950.

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<sup>200</sup> Mintzel p.132

<sup>201</sup> Heidenheimer p.2

The early CDU had a strong crusading quality about it as exemplified by this statement from the Frankfurt principles:

We want a new Germany. A completely different one....different from that which existed before 1933 or before 1914. We simply do not wish to continue from where our predecessors had to leave off,<sup>202</sup>

Nonetheless, this statement masks the internal conflict pulling the party politically from the left to the right. Early CDU leaders such as Konrad Adenauer knew that these struggles would have to resolve themselves before any concerted effort could be made to gain electoral victory.

Initially, the 'left and right' wings of the movement lined up respectively behind the conservative Adenauer and the left wing CDU founder in Berlin, Jacob Kaiser whose Christian trade unions maintained a substantial influence in the area. It was Kaiser's commitment to a "socialist faith" based on a Christian sense of responsibility which appealed to both workers and the religious elements of the Berlin body politic.<sup>203</sup> The first CDU conference was held in Bad Godesberg in December 1945 and the term "union" was adopted over that of "party" to identify this new movement owing to fears that the Germans, especially the middle class, would not again join a political "Party" because of that term's association with the Nazi's.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Pridham. p.22

<sup>203</sup> Richard Hiscocks Democracy in Germany London: Oxford University Press. 1957 p.75

<sup>204</sup> Pridham. pp.44-45

The development of this political struggle initially favored the "leftists" within the CDU as symbolized by the popularity of the 'Kölner Leitsätze' of 1945, and more effectively by the 1947 adoption of the Ahlen program in the British Occupation zone. Generally the reason for this might have been the mood of the electorate in terms of their support, in the immediate post war years, for politicians that spoke to social issues from the 'collectivist' point of view. The Ahlen principles represented the zenith of influence for Kaiser and his left wing faction within the CDU. The program criticized the 'Capitalist' system for its failure to provide a decent standard of living for those living within it.

The economic system of Capitalism has failed to satisfy the vital political, economic, and social catastrophe that has befallen us...a new social order must be established from top to bottom.<sup>205</sup>

Moreover it also called for the nationalization of both the coal and steel industries and the banking system.<sup>206</sup> It should not go without mentioning that there occurred in the British Zone a definite SPD bias on behalf of the British officials for the most part due to the election of a Labor government in London at the end of the war. The Ahlen principles basically represented a sharp criticism of 'laissez

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<sup>205</sup> As cited from the 1947 CDU Ahlen Plan; cited in Heinz Boscht Miracle of the Menace p.50

<sup>206</sup> In fact, the British Labor Party wanted to use the their Zone as a 'socialist experimentation' area wherein Labor Party policies could be applied in order to test there effectiveness. For a further discussion of this point see Richard Barnet's The Alliance Simon and Schuster Ltd. New York 1983. p. 52



faire' capitalism and sought to find a compromise between private capitalism and state socialism.<sup>207</sup>

After the enunciation of these principles one saw the development of a trend which brought the CDU back to the center-right of the political spectrum, which it has since never left. In 1947 Ludwig Erhard, a Protestant liberal economist ascended to the Directorship of the Economic section of the Economic Council (set up by the Allies to coordinate economic activities in their Zone). The establishment of this organization in 1947 in Bizonia<sup>208</sup> helped the CDU nationally and helped promote Erhard's economic policies internally within the CDU. Along with Germany's rapid economic recovery (which was partly brought about by Marshall Aid and the currency reform in 1948) Erhard managed to realize the adoption of the principles of the Social Market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) in the 1949 Dusseldorf Principles (Leitsätze).<sup>209</sup> The co-operation that developed between the CDU and the Frei Demokratische Partei (FDP) who maintained a conservative economic outlook also helped see the initial success of the CDU in the 1949 Federal elections.

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid. p.31

<sup>208</sup> This term is used to describe the March 1948 integration of the British and American Zones of Occupation; this later became known as 'trizonia' when the French were added in 1949.

<sup>209</sup> Hiscocks p.16

The Dusseldorf Program of 1949 rejected the 'leftist' proposals of the Ahlen Program of two years earlier and endorsed Erhard's Social Market Economy. This included restraining the excesses of private capitalism through the independent control of monopolies; it endorsed free competitive production although tempered by social justice and a large publically-owned manufacturing sector. Erhard claimed that this was a departure from the old style free economy in that while rewarding individual enterprise, it sought to protect economically the weaker elements in society. Its adoption at the party conference was a major victory for the conservative faction within the CDU.<sup>210</sup>

Adenauer, who was by this time Chairman of the CDU in the British Zone, further strengthened his own position through his election to the head of the Parliamentary Council in 1948 and proceeded to use this influence to help draft a somewhat "conservative" basic law (Grundgesetz).<sup>211</sup> He also

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<sup>210</sup> Pridham p.32

<sup>211</sup> In an attempt to learn from the problems of the Weimar period, Adenauer and the others who drafted the Basic Law sought to reduce the powers of the President and in turn enlarge those of the Federal Chancellor. According to Article 67 of the Basic Law, a non-confidence motion cannot take place unless a majority of the Bundestags' members can agree upon a successor. In this one can see a substantial change from the Weimar constitution which, in part, aided Adenauer in developing the political stability needed to push ahead with his foreign policy agenda. This, of course, was only one of the major differences between the 'Basic Law' and the Weimar constitution. Other significant changes included the imposition of the '5% clause' and other changes to the electoral laws with a view to strengthening the role of the chancellor and the cabinet system generally. See the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Arti-

used the position to further consolidate his power as national Chairman of the CDU.<sup>212</sup> By the time the CDU was officially founded in 1950, Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the FRG, his party having taken 139 seats in the Bundestag as compared to the SPD's 131.

As has been alluded to earlier, the impact of Allied policy varied from zone to zone. The British Labor government was fearful (as were the Allies in general) of a revival of nationalistic conservative parties and therefore favored the SPD, who in fact under Schumacher turned out to be more nationalistic than the Catholic parties. The CDU was hampered by the different Allied licencing policies, the poor state of communication facilities and the lack of a nationally constituted co-ordinating body, something which, although devastated by the Nazi's during the Second World War, was easily revived by the SPD in 1945 thus giving them an initial advantage.

While the CDU faced these problems when trying to organize both internally in terms of the "left" and the "right" and externally in terms of Allied policy, it faced an even greater threat to its election chances. The SPD was better organized, led by the popular Kurt Schumacher and posed a strong threat to Adenauer and the CDU in the years leading up to the 1949 Election. In turn, Adenauer saw the CDU not

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cle 67 "Vote of Non Confidence", Press and Information Office, Bonn, FRG.

<sup>212</sup> Mintzel p.36

as a union of the forces that resisted Hitler...Rather, he conceived of it as the best possible rallying point for the anti-socialists,...<sup>213</sup>

While the SPD would certainly be able to get the majority of the working class votes, the CDU, on the other hand, faced a real threat from the political right. The splintering of the various right wing groups hurt the CDU by syphoning off needed votes. The Zentrum quickly re-organized and threatened the CDU's pool of Catholic support. Adenauer fought hard against the solely Catholic image of the CDU feeling that a truly national party must be able to appeal to the Protestant voters in northern and central Germany as well as Catholics. As for the Zentrum, eventually they were absorbed into the CDU in Nord Rhine Westphalia and by 1948 no longer posed a serious threat to the CDU's political development.<sup>214</sup>

The CDU has been both the most successful and the most conservative Christian Democratic party in Europe, and indeed arguably the most successful party in German history. It has almost singlehandedly made the term "conservative" respectable again in the eyes of Western Europeans.<sup>215</sup> The CDU has been a party of a variety of interest groups, an ideological patchwork based on differing regional political tendencies. Therefore one could not say that their relig-

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid. p.36

<sup>214</sup> Pridham pp.34-36

<sup>215</sup> Mintzel p.142

ious ideology constitutes a coherent body of political philosophy comparable to the ideologies of the left.<sup>216</sup> This religious component is only of the most general kind , although, it should be noted that religion, whether or not voters actually practice it, has been and will continue to be an important element in the German political environment.

The CDU was also effected by its support of the federal political system because it was through the federal structure that the CDU was able to combine various Christian Democratic 'groups' throughout the state. In this way one would not be surprised to learn that the CDU's emphasis changes on certain issues depending on the area being considered. Arnold Heidenheimer feels that the CDU's success is based upon an ability to adapt pragmatically to a given situation unhampered by adherence to a strict ideological dogma. In fact, Adenauer himself felt that party programs were merely rhetoric and contained no "lasting value". It has even been argued, that the CDU has made pragmatism a central value.<sup>217</sup>

In the proceeding chapters, it will become clear to the reader that there are direct links between the Pan-Europeanist sentiments held by most European Christian Democrats and Adenauer's pursuit of both German sovereignty and integration into the EEC, EDC, and NATO. At the same time, Adenauer's refusal to enter into a dialogue with Eastern Europe

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<sup>216</sup> Pridham p.23

<sup>217</sup> Ibid. p.33

to some extent, found its roots in his attitudes both towards Prussian Protestantism and Communism.

#### 4.4 EUROPE AS A GEISTIG-POLITISCHE BEGRIFF

Denn Europa war für ihn kein bloss geographischer, sondern ein geistig-politische Begriff, der vielfältiger Wertaufladen fähig war.<sup>218</sup>

When Adenauer assumed the mantle of leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, he became the first West German leader to confront the inherent structural difficulties of Germany's 'Europapolitik'. The tension, some would argue contradiction, between a western-oriented European policy and the reunification problem is still much debated today in West German politics. One need only examine the subtle differences of opinion regarding future foreign policy directions offered by Social Democrat Oscar Lafontaine and the ruling Christian Democrats for evidence of this simmering dispute. As many critics have argue, and indeed as this thesis demonstrates, the Adenauer administration failed to bring this seemingly incompatible situation to a satisfactory conclusion. The 'integration' vs. 'nation' dichotomy was not solved. Nor does not look like it will be solved in the near future.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Werner Weidenfeld. Konrad Adenauer und Europa: Die Geistigen Grundlagen der Westeuropäische Integrationspolitik des Ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers. Institute für Europäische Politik. Band 7. Europa Union Verlag, Bonn. 1976. p.209.

<sup>219</sup> Weidenfeld. p.8

Werner Weidenfeld, in his book Konrad Adenauer und Europa outlines four basic aspects which, in his opinion, constituted Adenauer's notion of the term 'europa'. These elements have, at various times been employed by other authors when examining Adenauer's philosophy and social/political background. I am of the opinion therefore that Weidenfeld's analysis is consistent enough with a large range of expert opinion as to be representative and therefore useful in this discussion.

As the title of this section makes clear, the term 'Europe' does not simply refer to a geographical entity, but more importantly, to a spiritual/intellectual and political notion. As Weidenfeld points out, Adenauer's concept of Europe is created through a confrontation of alternatives for Germany with which Adenauer personally had to deal.

Die Vorstellungen Adenauers werden konfrontiert mit dem grössten Alternativkonzepten aus der verschiedenen Epochen, die sich personalisiert fixieren lassen mit Gustav Stresemann, Jakob Kaiser, und Kurt Schumacher.<sup>220</sup>

For Adenauer Europe was not simply a collection of states bound together by geographical accident, but rather a 'geistig-politische' term which was characterized by his recognition of four interrelated elements, those being: Western Culture, the political as well as the religious function of Christianity, his appreciation of the relationship between freedom and democracy, and finally the 'Spannungsfeld' (ten-

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid. p.10

sion) in which integration and the concept of Nation were related.<sup>221</sup>

Although Adenauer realized that Europe was composed of a number of different states, he nonetheless looked upon it as possessing basically the same culture; that being western culture. As far as he was concerned Europe must continue to fulfill its cultural role, and pick up in 1945 where it left off in 1933. In March 1952 he addressed the Union of European Federalists saying:

Ich möchte bei der Erörterung der Frage des Zusammenschlusses Europas erster Linie hinweisen auf den Universalen ethischen Wert, der eine solche Zusammenschluss haben wird...Es wurde ein Verlust seine sonder-gleichen für die ganzen Welt, wenn Europa die Rolle, die es in kultureller, in geistiger Beziehungen spielen muss, nicht spielen könnte.<sup>222</sup>

Adenauer recognized the twentieth century as one of great material progress although he felt this progress was not matched in the spiritual sense. For him 'das Abendland' (the West) was the sole inheritor of antiquity and Christianity and that European culture had developed out of the interplay and handling of these inheritances. The antiquity of the Greeks, their views as to the meaning of existence, of all spiritual, philosophical, intellectual and political activities must, and could only be preserved by West European culture.

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>222</sup> Adenauer, in his address to the Union of European Federalists. March 1952, cited in Weidenfeld. p.79.



Das heutige Abendland ist ohne das Erbe der Antike kaum unvorstellbar.<sup>223</sup>

Adenauer paid great homage to Europe's Greek roots when he said:

Die Akropolis in Athen und das Kapitol in Rom waren für uns geistige Sinnbilder für Einheit und Ordnung.<sup>224</sup>

The second inheritance of Europe for Adenauer was that of Christianity.

Unsere ganze abendländische Geisteshaltung berührt letzten Endes auf Christlichen Grundwahrheiten.... Die Menschenrechte.... sind aus der Christlichen humanistischen Weltanschauung entwickelt.<sup>225</sup>

In this way Adenauer interpreted the legacy of Christianity not only from his strong personal religious beliefs, but also associated it with the concept of 'Rechtsstaat', individualism and freedom. The relationship between Christian Democracy and freedom is, for Adenauer, a very important one. He clearly related freedom to politics, and this freedom he associated with Europe.<sup>226</sup> To Adenauer freedom was not only to be interpreted in terms of the individual before the state (the so-called 'Achtung vor dem Staat'), but also the freedom of the collective; meaning freedom as co-operation of individuals within a collective organization. West-

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<sup>223</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.84

<sup>224</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld p. 84

<sup>225</sup> Ibid. as cited in Weidenfeld. p.85

<sup>226</sup> The implications of this will be examined more closely when the author discusses Adenauer's policy of 'reunification in freedom'.

ern culture, in which this unique concept of freedom was developed, had to be protected for the sake of its tradition. Adenauer goes on to say that:

Es (Europa) ist das Herz der abendländisch-christlichen kultur. Es hat unendliches für die Entwicklung der Menschenheit geleistet. Seine geistigen, kulturellen, religiösen, wirtschaftlichen, und politischen Kräfte sind nicht erschöpft. Die Menschenheit würde empfindlich armer werden, wenn dieses alte Europa eines Tages dem Ansturm der asiatischen Barbarei erliegen wurde. Deshalb muss Europa sich einige und so sich davon retten, vom Ostblock in irgendeiner Form assimiliert zu werden.<sup>227</sup>

Adenauer felt that European culture, for some of the above reasons, must be saved from both the African and Asiatic elements which he perceived were poised to attack. It is interesting to note that Adenauer would include the USSR within the asiatic categorization for he believed that Russia was the 'spielfeld' (the playing ground) for a struggle between European and Asiatic forces, which, since 1917 had been dominated by the asiatic elements. The reader will probably notice that Adenauer's understanding of the roots of Communism seems to ignore its German philosophic contribution.

The second aspect concerning Adenauer's conception of the term Europe is that of the political function of Christianity. By this one means that in order to protect and secure the culture mentioned above, political action is necessary. Adenauer, as this thesis demonstrates, felt that only a

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<sup>227</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.91

united Europe could attain this goal and his foreign policy therefore was greatly influenced by that urgent need.

Unsere Aussenpolitik... dient der Sicherheit und der Frieden Deutschlands und den ganzen Westens und damit die Christlichen Welt. Es geht um nichts weniger als um unsere Existenz als Christen.<sup>228</sup>

According to Adenauer, Christianity plays a role in politics in two different ways. Firstly, in Christianity Adenauer saw the great motivation for individual interaction and secondly he felt that Christianity was the prerequisite for more humane politics. Christianity plays a role in disciplining states, because the individual Christian sense of discipline would, in theory, be reflected in the state's leadership. He felt that it would also help resist the temptations of materialism.

The term 'Europe' also has definite undertones of a certain understanding of democracy. Adenauer himself had witnessed the weakness displayed by the democracies in the face of the Hitler threat and sought, through his idea of a united Europe, to prevent the renewal of 'Staatsomnipotence'. He also felt that not only must a state have a strong government, but more importantly it must have a strong opposition. In the Rhöndorfer Conference of August 1949 Adenauer put it quite clearly:

Das deutsches Volk müsse daran gewohnt werden, dass die stärkste Partei die Führung übernehme und eine andere grössere Partei die Rolle der Opposition, aber eine verantwortliche Opposition, die mit dem Interesse des Staatsganzen vereinbar

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<sup>228</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.92

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The fourth aspect concerning Adenauer's concept of Europe is the crucial question of the nation state. His detractors consistently criticized him for his apparent lack of concrete success in the area of reunification, while supporters pointed out the success of integration into the western community of states.

It would be misleading if the role of Adenauer's personal experience were not injected into the chapter at this point, for before one can really understand what the term 'nation' meant for the West German leader, one must be reminded of Adenauer's own personal experience with radical German nationalism. His own personal experiences of the interpretations of nationalism by the Nazis with its emphasis on Race and 'Volk' had a huge impact on his own views concerning the nation-state. The idea of a specific people identifying themselves as different (and consequently superior) to other European peoples was, as a result of the Nazi period, viewed in negative terms not only by Adenauer, but by many leaders in the western world.<sup>230</sup>

Adenauer came out of his experiences believing that the time of the old concept of the European state was over and that in the face of threats to Western European culture, Europe itself would have to become more united to preserve

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<sup>229</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.106

<sup>230</sup> Weidenfeld p.115

freedom.

Die europäischen Nationalstaaten hatten meines Erachtens eine Vergangenheit, aber keine Zukunft. Das galt im politischen, wirtschaftlichen wie auch im sozialen Bereich. Kein einzelner europäischer Staat könnte aus eigener Kraft seine Bevölkerung eine sicher Zukunft garantieren.<sup>231</sup>

In this way one could argue that Adenauer himself saw Europe as the new 'Vaterland'.

Darum haben wir uns mit ganzen Kraft gewidmet dem Werk der europäischen Integration, weil es im weiteren Sinne des Wortes auch unser 'Vaterland' ist und weil wir nur auf diesem Wege unseren Kinder und Kinderskinder Aussicht schaffen konnten für ein Leben in Ruhe und Zufriedenheit.<sup>232</sup>

With statements such as the above, Adenauer opened himself up to much criticism from the so-called traditional German 'nationalists'. While his emphasis on european integration was certainly not appreciated by the remaining nationalists in Germany, its relationship to his concept of the importance of the traditional nation state is quite logical when one understands the role that freedom plays. In Weidenfeld's analysis, he states quite clearly that Adenauer's understanding of the concept of nation was directly related to political freedom and international solidarity and security.<sup>233</sup> Adenauer in fact placed the maintenance of political and economic freedom above the maintenance of the 'traditional' German state. In this way the author feels

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<sup>231</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.125

<sup>232</sup> Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.116

<sup>233</sup> Ibid. p.131

that the contradiction between reunification and integration can be resolved by focussing on his concept of freedom.<sup>234</sup> Adenauer also believed in the importance of will in the creation of the state; he said the deciding factor is Will, ie: the people will themselves to be together and therefore his foreign policy was directed at stimulating this will on the part of the West Germans to integrate themselves into the European Community.<sup>235</sup> He felt that traditional nationalism could be transformed into a supranational feeling of belonging to Europe. When one examines the relatively late development of the German state in the nineteenth century one can understand their somewhat frantic and confused feeling of nationalism and can therefore understand why Adenauer felt that his supranationalism then had a good opportunity to develop itself.

Adenauer's foreign policy was, in this sense, then directed at orienting Germany towards his goal of increased european co-operation and integration. He realized that history plays an important role in orienting a people in the present through the systematic examination of their past; he recognized also that foreign policy could not operate without this direct knowledge of the past.

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid. p.139

<sup>235</sup> Ibid. p.117

When one is discussing the question of western integration in the foreign policy of Konrad Adenauer, I am of the opinion that the opposite policy option must also be referred to. Many critics have focussed on Adenauer's ardent anti-communism as proof of his unwillingness to compromise with his Ostpolitik. While the details of his Ostpolitik will be discussed in chapter five, some reference to his attitudes towards communism should be mentioned for it was this threat of communism which served to consolidate and justify his calls for further european solidarity.

#### 4.5 ADENAUER'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BACKGROUND.

The first West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was a man of both intense intellectual, emotional, and spiritual convictions. He was also a man of tremendous political experience, gaining the mayoralty of the major urban center of Cologne in 1919 ( at the age of 42) and even being asked to run for the Chancellorship under the Zentrum banner during the Weimar period. Fortunately he declined the offer otherwise he may have ended up like so many of the leaders of the period, who although individually more than capable, were so constricted and confined by the instability and factionalism of the political and social environment as to be completely ineffectual. Although personally effected by the brutality of the period, he managed to escape the total spiritual and emotional malaise that gripped the German nation as it was confronted by the horrors it willingly had perpetuated. He emerged in 1945 as a man unscared by the tremendous sense of disillusionment that effected many Germans and found that his long held convictions were reaffirmed upon their confrontation with the horrors of radical nationalism and racism as symbolized by the Hitler regime.<sup>236</sup> He concluded that:

Die Zeit des Nationalstaats ist vorüber. Wir haben nur noch zwischen Untergangs und Einigungs zu wählen. Das ist meine feste Überzeugung.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> Konrad Kellon. "Adenauer at 90" Foreign Affairs Vol 44 No. 2. January 1966. p.282

<sup>237</sup> Adenauer, as cited in an article: "Einigung Deutschlands



As a self-proclaimed Christian Democrat, and indeed as a founding member of the CDU, Adenauer was, as has already been mentioned, firmly rooted in the Western system of values, both religious and political. He was a devout Catholic and, although authoritarian by nature, professed a deep admiration and dedication to the principles of democracy and freedom.

Adenauer had been placed in the most opportune of situations, in that he inherited a nation both spiritually and morally bankrupt, a malatable entity waiting to be shaped by his strong character and convictions, in this case Christian values based upon a democratic foundation. A German state finished politically, and morally was essentially a power vacuum into which most political parties of the "right", through their association with the Nazi's, had been compromised and therefore banned by the Allies.

Ever since the 1920's, when he sympathised with the creation of a separate Rhenish state, economically tied to France and Belgium and politically tied to the Reich, Adenauer was deeply interested in a unity of Western European states based upon their similar Christian and democratic

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- Einigung Europas." Bulletin Des Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. den 14 April 1955. Nr. 69, s. 569. Adenauer was also quoted as saying: "The age of the Nation state belongs to the past, a past full of jealousy and steeped in blood." [as cited from "Unsere beide Völker" in Die Zeit June 26th, 1952

traditions.<sup>238</sup> He was a firm believer in the Carolingian<sup>239</sup> or Catholic Europe based on closer cooperation between Catholic France, Italy, Austria and the Benelux countries with the Federal Republic. The center of his Catholic world was Cologne and his position there was described by Stresemann as being that of a "König der Gegenwart" ( a modern day king<sup>240</sup>).

Adenauer's involvement with the Rhineland separatist movement of the 1920's was in part due to this disaffection for Prussia and Prussian influence within the greater 'Reich'. He held them to be responsible for the disaster of 1918 and argued, hence the many confrontations with Stresemann, that their time and influence had passed. In February 1919 he was quoted as saying:

Nach den Erfahrungen, die Deutschland mit dem Hegemonialstaat Preussen gemacht hat, nachdem die Hegemonie Preussens nicht zufällig, sondern als notwendige Folge eines systems zum Zusammenbruch geführt hat, wird Preussens Hegemonie von den andern Bundestaaten nicht mehr geduldet werden...Ich glaube...die tiefüberzeugt Verehrer des alten Preussens sind, können die Augen nicht davon schliessen, dass sammentlich im Westen eine separatistische Strömung auflösung von Preussen besteht.<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>238</sup> Joffe. p.82

<sup>239</sup> This term is used to describe the idea of a united 'Catholic' Europe achieved by the Ruler Charleslemange/ Charles Vth.

<sup>240</sup> Baring Arnuff, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie R. Oldenbourg Verlag. München und Wien, 1969 s.50

<sup>241</sup> Weidenfeld. Konrad Adenauer und Europa p. 118

Prussia.<sup>242</sup> This was an aversion that he constantly maintained often referring to anything east of the Elbe river as 'Asiatic'. His focus was on the West, its culture and civilization.

Adenauer set out to realize the Carolingian vision of a Christain empire reaching from the Pyrenees to the Elbe. The steps towards overcoming nationalism, towards the political unification of Europe, and towards the rebirth of the Reich of Charles Vth were to be the coal and steel plan in the economic field and the EDC (European Defence Community) in the military field.<sup>243</sup>

Adenauer profoundly believed in the necessity of European Unity and constantly stated that it "remains an unalterable aim of German policy."<sup>244</sup> At the fourth Parteitag (Party Conference) of the CDU in Bonn in 1953 Adenauer reiterated his desire to make Germany a party to a united Western Europe.

We West Germans have in the past committed many foreign policy errors. But we would be committing the greatest error of all if we did not seek to tie ourselves to the leading power in the World (The United States) a power which derives freedom and justice for all including ourselves.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> He once referred to Berlin as that 'heathen city' and recalled the story he told of actually closing the blinds of the train as he crossed that 'Asiatic steppe' into Prussia. Baring Arnulf, in his book Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie goes so far as to call Adenauer's animosity historically grounded. (p.53)

<sup>243</sup> Claus Jacobi. "Germany's Great Old Man." Foreign Affairs Vol.33 No. 2 January 1955 p.241

<sup>244</sup> Konrad Adenauer. "Germany: The New Partner." Foreign Affairs Vol 33 No. 2 January 1955. p.180

<sup>245</sup> Proceedings of the Fourth Parteitag of the CDU, Bonn 1953 p.212.

It is important to point out that Adenauer not only believed that Western European Unity was desireable in itself,

C'est l'Europe elle-meme qui est essentiel. Une Europe Unie serait une necessité aussi urgent s'il n'existait aucun danger soviétique.<sup>246</sup>

but that it was also necessary defensive measure in the face of the massive Soviet threat. Although Adenauer has been criticized, probably with some justification, for his somewhat oversimplified view of the USSR and its people ,('a soulless people'), nobody could make the same claims concerning his perceptions of the existence and threat that this power in the East posed.<sup>247</sup>

We are living in a restless age full of tension. The athestic forces of communism, while pretending to create a paradise on earth, are set on robbing people of their dignity and freedom and degrading them into will-less elements of a termite state.<sup>248</sup>

From the same article and with typical 'cold war' rethoric, Adenauer enunciated not only the inherent evil perceptions he had of the communist system generally but also the concrete threats it posed to the Western political and economic system.

The Free World united in an Atlantic Alliance is threatened by the ruthless efforts of Soviet Communism to expand its power and its system. The Soviet Union is trying by every means to weaken the West and to drive it back. It changes the form, the intensity and the theatre of its

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<sup>246</sup> "Preludes a une Etat Européen" As cited in an interview with Adenauer in Bonn, March 5th, 1952

<sup>247</sup> Konrad Kellon. "Adenauer at 90." Foreign Affairs Vol 44 No. 2 January 1966.p.286

<sup>248</sup> Konrad Adenauer. "The German Problem: A World Problem." Foreign Affairs 1962-63 p.65

efforts, but never allows the free world to settle in peace.<sup>249</sup>

Again, earlier in 1955 he claimed that:

The Soviet aim continues to be to lessen the interests of the United States in European questions and to eliminate the Atlantic influence from European affairs.<sup>250</sup>

Adenauer felt that in the face of a possible 'pull-out' of American troops or perhaps, more realistically, a waning of United States' interest in European affairs brought on by American domestic considerations or by renewed Soviet aggressions and Cold War confrontations in the emerging Third World, that European unity was even more important if Western Europe was to survive as an independant and strong entity. He felt though, that this unity could not realistically proceed without a Franco-German reconciliation.

France and Germany will form a firm political dam against the advance of Soviet Communism which threatens the freedom of us all...Franco-German solidarity is also the foundation for the edifice of European unification.<sup>251</sup>

Although Adenauer maintained his commitment to European integration, he possessed a skeptical view of the British both because of their dismissal of him in 1945 as Mayor of Cologne (for his opposition to the cutting down of Cologne's

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid. p.62

<sup>250</sup> Adenauer. "Germany, The New Partner." Foreign Affairs p.183 Although the language is definitely 'soaked' with Cold War rhetoric, one is surprised when reading Adenauer's later speeches to realize how consistently he kept to this tone even as the Cold War receded.

<sup>251</sup> Adenauer. "The German Problem: A World Problem." Foreign Affairs pp. 59-60

'Green belt') and because he felt that they still had a 'maritime' and 'Empire' oriented mindset. To this skepticism was later added the apprehension of Britain's entry, both as industrial competition and as a Protestant country, into the EEC. He saw it as the opening of the 'door' to the Protestant and 'socialist' influences from the Scandinavian countries.

Partly as a result of the fact that Adenauer was somewhat unconvinced of the Germans' newly found enthusiasm for democracy,<sup>252</sup> he sought to integrate and firmly align the young Republic into the West, whose democratic influences, he felt, were bound to be absorbed by the German electorate.<sup>253</sup>

Wolfram Hanreider in his books ( German Foreign Policy 1945-63, The Stable Crisis, and The Foreign Policies of France, Great Britain, and West Germany.) has summed up German foreign policy as basically a search for three not 'completely compatible' goals; those being Sicherheit (security), Wiedervereinigung (reunification) and Wiederherstellung (recovery) in both the economic and political spheres.

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<sup>252</sup> It has been argued that Adenauer did not even trust his own people.

Tatsächlich traute Adenauer den Deutschen nicht:  
Er fürchtete ihre Unbeständigkeit, ihr Schwachen.

As cited in Zieburu. p. 452

<sup>253</sup> Neil Johnson. "The Adenauer Era and After". Parliamentary Affairs Vol 17. No.1 Winter 1963-64. p.48

West Germany's chances of achieving foreign policy goals...were actually directly effected (positively in the case of security and recovery, and negatively in the case of reunification) by the decision to join the Western Defence system.<sup>254</sup>

Hanreider believes that reunification is the linchpin that held together the entire foreign policy of Adenauer and played an important role in the overall containment strategy of the United States in the post 1945 period. His 'thesis' will be addressed in the next chapter. Hanreider advocates that the Cold War and the international system were largely responsible for providing the impetus for German rearmament and the resulting reestablishment of sovereignty that accompanied it.

In march 1946 Adenauer, in his first policy speech was quoted as saying:

Deutschland soll ein demokratischer Bundestaat mit weitgehender Dezentralisation werden; wir glauben, dass eine solche staatliche Gestaltung Deutschlands auch die beste ist für die Nachbarnländer. Ich hoffe dass, in nicht zu fern Zukunft die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, zu denen Deutschland gehören würde, geschaffen werden, und dass dann Europa, dieser so oft von Kriegen durch obte Erdteil, die Segnungen eines dauern Friedens geniessen wird.<sup>255</sup>

In his maiden speech to the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) he said:

For the German people there is no other way of attaining freedom and equality of rights than....in concert with the Allies. There is only

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<sup>254</sup> Adenauer, as cited in: Wolfram Hanreider. The Stable Crisis Harper and Row Publishers Ltd. New York. 1970. p.1

<sup>255</sup> Weidenfeld Konrad Adenauer und Europa p.46

one oath to freedom. It is the attempt to extend our liberties and prerogatives step by step in harmony with the Allied High Commission.<sup>256</sup>

In the next two chapters the foreign policy of Konrad Adenauer will be examined in more detail. I will do this by making reference to what I see as six major elements in the West German leader's foreign policy. These are: early efforts to win the trust of the allies, the attempt to overcome the Federal Republic's isolation in the Western Alliance, the attempt to gain equality and influence in this said alliance, the building up ('stetigkeit') of a reputation as a consistent and reliable ally, the anti-communist sentiments of the West German leader, and finally increased economic development and prosperity.

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<sup>256</sup> Konrad Adenauer, as quoted from the Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags (Proceedings of the Federal Parliament) September 20th, 1949. p.29



## Chapter V

### ADENAUER'S WESTPOLITIK

1945 saw the once mighty German nation prostrate before the world. A defeated state without control of her domestic or foreign policies. Germany was completely submissive to the dictates of Great Britain, the USSR, the United States, and France (the 4-Allied powers). Many observers felt that the occupation regime (established after General Jodl's signature of Unconditional Surrender in May 1945), and although decided upon during the Wartime conferences and later to be manifest in the 4-Power Allied High Commission, would last for at least twenty years. Even before the end of the war, the always precarious Allied relationship seemed to be deteriorating as increased tensions between East and West became manifest. As these developments between the Allies over the 'spoils' of victory became more pronounced so too did Western and Soviet decision makers begin to contemplate the future role of Germany in a reconstructed Europe.

The result of this movement towards what has been labelled the 'Cold War' is that Germany, divided earlier into 'temporary' zones of occupation awaiting the signing of a final peace treaty, once more returned to its pre-1871 status of a fragmented nation. Although the Occupation, was

expected to endure for at least 20-30 years, it came to a gradual end with the de-facto full restoration of sovereignty for the Western Allies' zone of Occupation (now called the Federal Republic of Germany or FRG) on May 5th, 1955.

This chapter purports to examine why the Federal Republic of Germany able to gain for itself complete sovereignty in such a short span of time. The chapter is prepared to deal with this question both in terms of the characteristics outlined in the second chapter, such as, for example, the international system and the constraints which it imposed on the choices possessed by the Allied decision makers and the new leaders of the Federal Republic. Secondly it will discuss how a compatability of interests and more importantly the increasing similarities in Weltanschauung<sup>257</sup> possessed by both Allied and West German leaders intersected to speed up this restoration process.

Before beginning this examination of German foreign policy, it is important to make clear that it is a united Germany which, paradoxically enough, is the anomaly in the historical span of the existence of German speaking peoples in Europe rather than a disunified Reich. (Germany was only relatively recently united through the 'Blood and Iron' foreign policy of Chancellor Bismarck. A Second Reich emerged

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<sup>257</sup> This is the German term for 'world view'. It has come to mean one's philosophical perceptions of the world; included within it is the ideological or value-laden basis or foundation upon which this perception of the world is formulated.

in 1871, after victories over the Austrians and the French.) It was then the Third Reich, who after the interlude of Weimar, inherited Bismarck's legacy, and squandered the unity of Germany during Second World War. It seems that Germany's weakness (when divided) and strength (when united) has consistently been a source of instability and tension in Europe. In 1871 Germany was perceived by the Allies as being dangerously strong, having defeated Denmark, Austria, and France in quick succession, whereas after 1918, and partly as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany proved too weak, this weakness being manifest both in the 1918-20 rebellions and the fledgling instability of succeeding Weimar administrations which eventually created the fertile ground from which the Nazi seed took root and grew. By 1939 a remilitarized Germany was again too powerful and their demands for territorial revision and self-proclaimed need for 'Lebensraum' in the East, in part lead to the Second World War and all the destruction that it brought. The situation in 1945 again, partly reflected that of 1918 which saw a defeated German state providing the focus of instability in Europe, and the substance over which Allied distrust could be manifest. Unlike 1918, in 1945 there were two strong ideologically incompatible powers vying for influence in Europe. In 1918-1919 the Soviet Union, devastated by the war and subsequent revolution and separated by the newly created state of Poland, was simply too weak to pose a major military threat to a defeated Germany. After the Second World War, the resulting East-West collapse of cooperation

over Germany and Eastern Europe's future was both a cause and a consequence of the bipolar power equation developing in post war Europe. As this bipolarity further entrenched itself it transformed the traditional German question into a 'zero-sum' game.<sup>258</sup> It was probably the Superpowers' desire to get around this 'all or nothing' situation with Germany that lead, in part, to the entrenchment of the east-west division in Germany.

The concept of the nation state ('Staatsnation') united and sovereign, developed quite late in Germany (as compared to its 13th century manifestation in Britain and France) and Germany,<sup>259</sup> it must be remembered, underwent massive transformations in the twentieth century from the collapse of the Reich of Wilhelm II, to the political and economic instability of Weimar, to the Third Reich and finally its collapse and the creation of the present day Federal Republic,<sup>260</sup> all in the space of some fifty years. The pace of this metamor-

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<sup>258</sup> Joffe. p.82

<sup>259</sup> During the period in which the other European states were undergoing the process of achieving the expression of their ethnic identity in the development of sovereign separate states, the German speaking territories were experiencing a directly opposite metamorphosis of further political fragmentation. It has in fact been argued that the fragmented experience of the German speaking peoples was deliberately built into the system of the Holy Roman Empire as its ruler relied upon the sovereign rule of the various 'princeloms' to maintain overall control, although at the cost of granting each Prince a larger amount of freedom than the Emperor would have liked. For further explanation see: Ferenc Vali's book The Quest for a United Germany in chapter one.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid. pp.72-73

phosis has naturally left the German speaking people with a tremendous sense of bewilderment and uncertainty as to their exact role both as a people and as a nation-state within Europe.

#### 5.1 ALLIED OCCUPATION 1945-49.

Initially it must be made clear that this was the period of occupation of Germany and subsequently Germany had no foreign policy per-se because overall policy was determined by the 4 Allied Powers through the High Commission. The Western Allies imposed, and thereby set the tone and influenced, the creation of the basic domestic political structures through the processes of de-nazification, re-education, the imposition of both political federalism, (de-centralization) and the free enterprise economic system.<sup>261</sup>

In 1945 the Allies seemed to be in agreement that the Germans must never again be allowed to develop their industrial capacity to the extent that they could once more pose a threat to the stability of Europe.

By identifying Nazism with the German people, many wished to make the German nation as a whole responsible for NAZI atrocities. Others wishing to simply render post-war Germany incapable of any future aggression, proposed political military, and economic measures stern enough to achieve the desired result.<sup>262</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Terrence Prittie Adenauer p. 28

<sup>262</sup> Vali. p.10

Initial Allied strategy was basically negative in that Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Order 1067 called for a general policy of non-fraternization with the local population, which was practically unrealistic. Allied strategy has been characterized by the four "d's", including de-nazification, de-militarization, de-centralization, and de-industrialization.<sup>263</sup> Initial Allied economic strategy for Germany was embodied in the Morgenthau Plan of transforming Germany into an agrarian society. In March of 1946 German industrial production was set by the 4 Allied Powers at 50% of their 1936 level according to the JCS 1067. As Cold War tensions began to mount, this level was increased by the Western Allies to 70-75% of the 1936 level adhering to the new JSC order 1779. These developments were significant for they reflected a change in American policy towards Germany and the support the United States was beginning to show for a change in their overall strategy in Europe. Many realized that:

a fragmented Germany would hardly have been a bulkhead and an Ally against the threat of the East.<sup>264</sup>

This transformation of American attitudes was symbolized by the American Secretary of State James Burns' speech of September 6th, 1946 in Stuttgart wherein he called for a changed Allied attitude towards Germany.

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<sup>263</sup> Michael Freund. From Cold War to Ostpolitik Oswald Wolf Publishers. Ltd. , London 1972. p.16

<sup>264</sup> Vali. p.11

if complete unification (of Germany's economy) cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum possible unification.<sup>265</sup>

Here again it was Superpower animosity and disagreement which had had a major effect on the transformation on Allied policy.

Soviet policies have been decisive in shaping post-war German history. The failure to establish a unified occupation rule owing to Soviet intransigence and the breakdown of negotiations for an all-out German peace treaty led to the creation of an independant German state.<sup>266</sup>

After the Soviets refused to take part in the Marshall Aid program<sup>267</sup> (criticizing it as simply an attempt to create a post-war Europe hostile towards the Soviet Union) and with the severe economic crisis that followed the long, cold winter 1946-47 the United States and Britain decided to combine their Zones of occupation into 'Bizonia' in March of 1948. In June of that same year, the Western Allies instituted a currency reform to help boost the local economy making the old Reichmarks illegal, replacing them with Deutsch-

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<sup>265</sup> This marked the beginning of the move towards what eventually became 'bizonia'. This excerpt was taken from the speech by James Burns in Stuttgart on September 6th, 1946; (as cited in Beate von Ruhm Documents on Germany: 1945-54, p.155)

<sup>266</sup> Gerald Freund, Germany between Two Worlds Harcourt Brace and Co. Ltd. New York. 1961 p. 189

<sup>267</sup> The Marshall Aid Plan for Europe (as named for its creator American Secretary of State George Marshall) was created to help re-develop the economies of Europe through the influx of some \$13 billion (US) of capital resources and investment. For a more detailed analysis of the Plan's consequences see Lincoln Gorgen's "The Marshall Plan Legacy." in NATO Review June 1987. No. 3. NATO Information Services, Brussels, Belgium.

marks. This, in turn, set off the Soviet economic blockade of Berlin which was answered by the West through the Berlin Airlift and lasted eleven months until the Soviets backed down.<sup>268</sup>

In 1949 German industrial production had outstripped that of 1936 owing, in large part, to the Western Allies both reducing the amount of reparations they were extracting from their zone and the 10% of Total Marshall Aid which the FRG came to receive. Adenauer himself, to a great degree, was responsible for some of these reductions in that he was able to so quickly gain the confidence and trust of the Allied High Commission. By way of contrast, the USSR continued to dismantle entire factories and ship them back to the Soviet Union thus hampering the future economic viability of their eastern zone well into the late 1950's. The Allies themselves though were not totally immune from disagreements over Germany. For example, the French, who had suffered invasions in three successive generations, were still apprehensive at allowing the Germans to re-establish themselves so quickly after their enormous defeat.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Baker p.110

<sup>269</sup> Hanreider German Foreign Policy 1945-63 Stanford University Press, Stanford California. 1967 pp.20-21 In fact one of the constant sore points in Adenauer's relationship with DeGualle was the French leader's earlier support of the Morgenthau Plan which Adenauer looked upon with much disdain.



Adenauer's ability quickly to gain the confidence and trust of the Allied High Commissioners is rightly said to be one of the most remarkable of his achievements. Under the Occupation Statute Germany had very little control over her foreign policy, yet on November 20th, 1949 the FRG and the Allies signed the Petersberg Agreements which restored German sovereignty, and which included the right to maintain consular relations with other states.<sup>270</sup> Germany then proceeded to join the Council of Europe, the International Ruhr Authority and was able to realize an end to industrial dismantling as well as the Federal Republic's direct participation in the Organization for European Economic Development. (OEEC)<sup>271</sup> Amazingly enough, this took place only two months after Adenauer had been elected West Germany's first Chancellor. The Petersberg Agreements called for

The incorporation of the FRG as a peaceful member of the European community, and to this end German association with the countries of Western Europe in all fields should be diligently pursued.<sup>272</sup>

The signatories agreed to:

promote the participation of Germany in all those international organizations through which German experience can contribute to the general welfare.<sup>273</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> Burdick p.130

<sup>271</sup> Gatzke. p.182

<sup>272</sup> Beate Ruhm von Oppen. "Protocol of the Agreements Reached between the Allied High Commissioners and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic at Petersberg: November 22nd, 1949." Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press, London. 1955. p.440

<sup>273</sup> Ibid. p.440

Also of significant importance in these agreements was the German pledge to complete disarmament:

The Federal Government further declares its earnest determination to maintain the demilitarization of Federal territory and to ensure by all means in its power to prevent the recreation of armed forces of any kind<sup>274</sup>

Peter Merkl says of the Petersburg Agreements that they represented:

a landmark of this process of widening German freedom in proportion to demonstrated German loyalty to the West.<sup>275</sup>

It is important to note here that no sooner had the Federal Republic signed this agreement than Adenauer launched his trial balloon concerning West German rearmament. The August 1950 memorandum concerning a possible German contribution to Western defence was not initially accepted at the September 1950 Foreign Ministers Conference, although they did make a pledge to further liberalize the Occupation Statute.<sup>276</sup> The dramatic impact of both the 1948 Czech crisis and the 1949 Berlin Blockade were being felt at this point in time by the Allied and West German leadership, thus transforming the international environment into one of increased east-west tension. In addition to these developments, the Allies made good on their promise to promote German membership in various international organizations so that by 1952 Germany was a full member of the United Nations' World Health Organiza-

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<sup>274</sup> Beate Ruhm von Oppen Documents on Germany p.440

<sup>275</sup> Peter Merkl. German Foreign Policies: East and West p.83

<sup>276</sup> Gatzke. p.183

tion, the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agricultural Administration, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.<sup>277</sup> For a state striving to exert its claim to sole representation of the German people, these developments were highly significant.<sup>278</sup> The Federal Republic also accepted full membership in the Council of Europe in May 1951, but so to did the Saar Region, much to Adenauer's disappointment.

In connection with the Allied pledge following the Petersbeg Agreements, the joint foreign ministers' communiqué of September 19th, 1950 was significant and considered a victory for Adenauer as they pledged themselves to Germany's sole representation policy.

Die Aussenminister und ihre Regierung teilen den Wunsch des Westdeutschen Volks nach einer Vereinigung Deutschlands auf einer Basis, die die Grundrechte respektiert...Bis zur Vereinigung Deutschlands betrachten die drei Regierungen die Regierung der Bundesrepublik als die einzige frei und gesetzlich konstituierte deutsche Regierung, die infolgedessen befugt ist, in internationalen Angelegenheiten als Vertreter des deutschen Volkes für Deutschland zu sprechen.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>277</sup> Merkl. West Germany did not become full member of the United Nation's General Assembly until 1973 when both German states, after signing the 1972 Basic Treaty, applied for and were endorsed as full members.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid. pp.64-66

<sup>279</sup> Foreign Ministers' Communiqué. September 19th, 1950. as cited in Andreas Hillgruber Deutsche Geschichte 1945-82. Kohlhammar Urban-Taschenbuecher, Band 360, Stuttgart, 1983. p.49

In 1951 the Petersberg Agreements were revised so that the West Germans were able to deal in foreign currencies and accepted the former debts of both the Prussian and Third Reichs which amounted to a total of 13.5 billion Marks. In March of that same year they were granted considerable foreign policy powers through the creation of a Foreign Ministry with Adenauer at its helm.<sup>280</sup> In May the Federal Republic was subsequently made a full member of the Council of Europe, another result of the second revision of the Petersberg agreements.<sup>281</sup>

## 5.2 THE BEGINNING OF AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY.

With every Allied concession the Chancellor personally assumed greater responsibility for the exercise of German sovereignty, it was to him that Germany's Allied Guardians looked for reassurance that the new freedoms could not be abused.<sup>282</sup>

This next section will focus on some of the initial steps made by the Allies to promote increased European unity. The first of these steps was the creation, by the Allies, of the Ruhr Authority, to which the Federal Republic applied for membership in accordance with the Petersberg Agreements. This applicatoion greatly eased French fears of a renewed industrial Germany on her border. Adenauer, although resenting the imposition of an international body to control the

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<sup>280</sup> Burdick pp.130-133

<sup>281</sup> Majonica p.11

<sup>282</sup> Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds Harcourt Brace Co. Ltd, New York, 1961 p.54

industrial Ruhrgebiet as did a large number of Germans, agreed to its creation but showed his displeasure by stalling in announcing a representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). He used the creation of the Ruhr Authority to pressure the Allies into putting an end to the dismantling of factories.

The newly created European Coal and Steel Community marked an important step towards increased Western control of the German industrial sector and closer European unity (which paradoxically resulted in the freeing up of more German industrial capacity). Adenauer hoped that this would serve as a 'prototype' and eventually lead to the inclusion of the basic industrial sectors of other West European states. Here is an example of what has been labelled Adenauer's *Vorausleistungspolitik*<sup>283</sup> in which he consented to Allied requests and proposals in order to gain their trust which he later would use to increase political autonomy in both the domestic as well as foreign policy domains.<sup>284</sup>

As the implications of the Korean War became obvious to a divided Germany and reverberated throughout Europe thereby 'heating up' the cold war, the Allies came to realize that the rearmament of the FRG, forbidden under the Petersberg

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<sup>283</sup> Literally this term means a policy of 'achievement in advance'; in context it describes Adenauer's policy of 'giving into' Allied decision makers so as to achieve his goals in the longer term.

<sup>284</sup> Michael Balfour. West Germany Fredrick A. K. Preager Publisher .N.Y. 1968 p.205

Agreements, was becoming more of a necessity. The question for Allied decision makers became a tactical one of exactly in what framework this rearmament should be allowed to take place, and in what manner so as to allay persistent French fears of a re-militarized Germany.<sup>285</sup> The fact that it was Adenauer himself in 1949 who first mentioned the new proposal for a rearmed Germany did nothing to calm these fears.<sup>286</sup>

In May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the creation of the aforementioned ECSC in which the Ruhr Authority was to be eliminated along with the advantages of the Customs Union between France and the Saar in favor of a joint Franco-German organization to combine their coal and steel industries. This was later approved by the Bundestag in January 1952. The French government's attitude was that Germany's growing economic and political influence in Western Europe could be best controlled by an international organization such as the ECSC.<sup>287</sup>

For Adenauer the advantages of Schuman's proposal were two-fold. Most importantly, the ECSC eliminated the dreaded Ruhr Authority and created a community in which Germany was to be a full and equal member. Secondly it granted Germany

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<sup>285</sup> Hanrieder German Foreign Policy 1949-63 p.59

<sup>286</sup> Kendall L. Baker, Russel J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt. Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1981 p.112

<sup>287</sup> Balfour p.205

increased economic autonomy by eliminating industrial production limits which were a major hinderance to West German economic reconstruction. Adenauer's support of this plan again represents an example of his agreeing to Allied designs in order to regain sovereignty in the long run.<sup>288</sup>

Although this was a gigantic step towards increased European cooperation and unity in the economic realm, Adenauer (who personally had little actual interest in economic policy and subsequently left that arena to Ludwig Erhard) viewed the ECSC basically from the political perspective. At the same time, the French too had a political motive for they hoped that the ECSC's creation might ease the tension over the difficult Saar issue which was then poisoning Franco-German reconciliation. As Adenauer perceived it, the ECSC was a renewed boost for European unity. He had promised gains to the German people on the 'de-jure' level of political recovery and this represented a step in that direction as well as a movement towards his most important goal, that being a Franco-German rapprochement. It has been noted that sovereignty was not interpreted to mean:

unfettered freedom of action and political mobility, but rather in gaining an equal status in the integrative international structure to which the Federal Republic was bound to both contractually and politically.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> Hanrieder German Foreign Policy 1949-63 p.60

<sup>289</sup> Ibid. p.61

The military rejoinder to the ECSC was enunciated under the Pleven Plan (named after the French Defence Minister) in May 1950. It called for a 'complete fusion of all human and material elements' of the proposed European Defence Forces placed under the command of a unified Atlantic community.<sup>290</sup> There were harsh disagreements, among French decision makers, some of whom wanted to maintain a limited German army and others such as Schuman who urged the French National Assembly to accept a modified Pleven Plan giving the Germans both a larger army and a greater say in the decision making structure. This was not enthusiastically received in Germany as it failed to stress the equality of the participants.<sup>291</sup> Adenauer, in turn, stated that he would agree to this plan so long as German troop contributions were equal to that of other member states.<sup>292</sup>

In March 1951, a full eighteen months after it was signed, the Allies revised the Occupation Statute. It was the Bonn Conventions of May 26th, 1952 in which the above developments were enshrined. The Allies abolished the High Commission and replaced it with individual embassies and agreed to support the Federal Republic's claim to sole representation ('alleinvertretung'). These revisions were of substantial significance because they reaffirmed the Western Allies' support of the original 4-Power position in which

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<sup>290</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>291</sup> Majonica p.16

<sup>292</sup> Balfour pp.209-210



the final borders of Germany would have to wait until a peace treaty was signed between the parties involved.<sup>293</sup> The Allies also retained their right (as part of the 4-Power administration over Berlin) to continue stationing troops there, and together to decide the final status of Berlin in a reunified Germany. These conventions were also significant for they clearly showed the priority placed upon western integration over that of reunification, even though they publically proclaimed their support of Adenauer's sole representation theory.<sup>294</sup>

The Bonn Conventions cannot be properly understood without placing them within the framework of the agreements signed by all the Western Allies (including West Germany) for the creation of the aforementioned European Defence Community. This latter agreement amounted to the political complement to German rearmament. Adenauer, remarking from the political perspective through which he consistently viewed events, said of the EDC Treaty that it meant that Germany was no longer alone.

Wir sind nicht mehr allein. Wir sind nicht mehr ein objekt der Aussenpolitik fremder Mächte.<sup>295</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Ibid. p.211

<sup>294</sup> Hillgruber Deutsche Geschichte. p. 53

<sup>295</sup> Adenauer, as cited in "Eine geschichtliche Wende" Bulletin Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Vol.6 s. 68

Further, Adenauer saw this treaty as another step towards his ultimate goal of increased European cooperation.

Unsere Politische Arbeit, die mit dem Schumanplan eine Etappe durchschnitt und der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft einer weiteren - ich glaube den entscheidenden - abschnitt erreichte, hat die Hinwendung zu einer Gemeinschaft der europäischen Völker zum teil.<sup>296</sup>

This quotation highlights for Adenauer the real connection between German rearmament and the restoration of complete political and economic sovereignty. Adenauer was able to trade off rearmament (and closer cooperation and integration in the military field) for the above Conventions which basically gave 'de jure' recognition to the 'de facto' reality of the restoration of West Germany into the Western community of nations.<sup>297</sup>

furthermore, the Western powers' insistence on West German rearmament presented Bonn with a chance to trade German support of the West for Allied political and economic concessions.<sup>298</sup>

Although Adenauer had floated a 'trial balloon' concerning rearmament as early as 1949, which was quietly dismissed, it was American Secretary of State Dean Acheson who, in September 1950, made it clear that the American governments' willingness to remain in Western Europe would become contingent upon some form of German rearmament. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea served to underline the fact that there were only 4 Allied divisions stationed to defend West-

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<sup>296</sup> Ibid. p. 68

<sup>297</sup> Hanreider. German Foreign Policy 1949-63 p.82

<sup>298</sup> Hanreider. The Stable Crisis p.23

ern Europe against some 175 Soviet and East European divisions. This fact only added urgency and strength to Acheson's statements.

The West's inferior strength in available military manpower along the European Iron Curtain had become glaringly manifest (in light of Korea) to Western leaders, especially the United States. German military power would have to be rebuilt for the sake of restoring the military and political Balance of Power at the center of Europe.<sup>299</sup>

In this sense he outlined to Europeans the price they would have to pay to see the Americans maintain their commitment to European defence. This was greeted with considerable apprehension in Europe, especially in Germany whose recent history had made their people somewhat apprehensive about the military in general. The phrase 'ohne mich' (which was employed by the opposition Social Democratic Party) came to characterize and reflect a certain apprehensive attitude prevailing among Germans at the time concerning the rearmament negotiations.<sup>300</sup>

The creation of the EDC has been interpreted as simply the French reply to these American demands established within a framework with sufficient international control over the German army as to allay French anxieties.<sup>301</sup> As part of this control, the French demanded American and British security guarantees against the possibility of a German uni-

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<sup>299</sup> Vali p.25

<sup>300</sup> Balfour p.208

<sup>301</sup> Heinrich Bechtoldt. "German-French Friendship." Aussen Politik Vol 24. 1973 p. 54

lateral withdrawal from the defence community.

Plagued by problems manifest with the start of the Algerian conflict, and torn apart by the major defeats in French Indo-China, French Premier Mendes-France realized that there was absolutely no chance of the EDC treaty passing the French Assembly and tried to delay its ratification. Eventually it could be delayed no longer and when it was finally introduced in the National Assembly, the proposal was postponed indefinitely thereby killing the whole project.<sup>302</sup> Some critics have maintained that the EDC's major problem was that it simply entailed a degree of cooperation and supranationalization which Europe was not yet prepared to accept.

This supranational treaty in the most sensitive sector of sovereignty had sought to move too far in the direction of integration. Despite the Cold War, the forces of the past were still too strong.<sup>303</sup>

For Adenauer this was the worst foreign policy failure he had experienced since being elected Chancellor five years earlier. Typically he interpreted this rejection in light of the left/right ideological battleground that was Europe.

The failure of the EDC was bound to convince World Communism that it had won the Cold War in Europe.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Prittie. Adenauer 1876-1976 p.34

<sup>303</sup> Carl A. Ehrhardt. "Europe between National Sovereignty and Integration." Aussen Politik Vol 38. No.2. ,1987 . p.109

<sup>304</sup> Adenauer. "Germany: the New Partner" Foreign Affairs Vol 33 No. 2 January 1955 p.178

In the wake of this defeat, the French had actually precipitated a situation in which they had to rely on the Germans themselves not to initiate independent rearmament. The French also partly laid the blame for the defeat of the Defence Community on the British because of their refusal to join the community or give it binding security guarantees. These developments, Mendes said, helped swing the mood of the Assembly against the proposal.<sup>305</sup>

It was at this point, when British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden came up with his plan to use the Western European Union (WEU) as the vehicle in which German rearmament could proceed and thereby Germany could enter NATO as its 15th member.

The WEU, as an organization of sovereign states rather than a supranational group, was revived as an extension of the Brussels Treaty Organization which originally created NATO. Eden proposed to alter article 7 of the treaty:

1.....to take such measures necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression.<sup>306</sup>

into a statement which replaced this 'anti-German' clause by one of increased European Unity. The new clause read:

to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> Balfour p.215

<sup>306</sup> As cited in Article 7, BTO Treaty of October 1949.

<sup>307</sup> As cited in the Paris Protocols Amending the Brussels Treaty and Establishing the WEU, October 23rd, 1954. in Documents on Germany p.155

Article one of the Paris Protocols, which passed the Bundestag by a majority vote of two-to-one, in effect made way for the inclusion of both the FRG and the Italian Republic into NATO and thereby facilitated the rearmament of both states within this aforementioned framework.

While the Federal Republic and Adenauer finally realized their goal of German rearmament, there came with it an important restriction agreed to by the West Germans:

The Federal Chancellor declares that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture on its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons, or biological weapons.....<sup>308</sup>

While Adenauer was now able to raise the equivalent of a 500,000 man standing army, he also received a reaffirmation by the Allies of support for a reunited Germany based upon the principles of self determination and a free democratic constitution.<sup>309</sup> The Allies supported the Federal Republic's claim to sole representation of all Germans through statements declaring the Federal Republic as 'freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs'. In October 1954 the FRG was invited to join NATO:

the government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the parties communicate to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany

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<sup>308</sup> As cited in Protocol No.3 on the Control of Armaments, Annex I as part of the Paris Protocols, October 23rd, 1954. in Documents on Germany p.164

<sup>309</sup> Fritz Erler. "The Alliance and the Future of Germany." Foreign Affairs Vol 43 No.3, April 1965, p.347

an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>310</sup>

And by May 5th 1955, only ten years after 'jahre null' and after having been ratified by all the various governments including the Bundestag this became law and Germany's sovereignty was juridically restored.

Although Adenauer was certainly pleased to see rearmament take place within the NATO framework in which Germany played a role as an equal partner, it should be pointed out that in these organizations he also saw potential for further Atlantic and European integration. He saw neither the WEU nor NATO as simply military organizations. NATO's

1....military organization, therefore, is not an end in itself. It is based on a close unity of the states on both sides of the Atlantic who share the views on the meaning of life and the mission of men throughout the world. This strong link must be intensified in all fields.<sup>311</sup>

Adenauer again viewed the WEU as more than simply a defensive organization saying:

I would like to stress that the WEU, in the view of all its member states, is not by any means a primarily military alliance. It is an instrument of European Integration in all fields.<sup>312</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> As cited from Article 1 of the Protocol of the North Atlantic Treaty on the Ascension of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23rd, 1954. in Documents on Germany pp.173-174

<sup>311</sup> Adenauer speaking on NATO; as cited in Richard Hiscocks. Germany Revisited p.42

<sup>312</sup> Adenauer. "Germany: The New Partner." Foreign Affairs p 179.

The Western concessions to complete German sovereignty were not as risky as one might imagine simply because of the way through which this sovereignty was granted. The ascension of the Federal Republic was one of equality within a number of defensive organizations which, as has been shown by Adenauer's attitude, were perceived by the Federal Republic as being more than what their charter might stipulate. The manner of the restoration of sovereignty was obviously of the utmost importance for France and the Eden Plan seemed to offer the best and quickest solution to the problem created by the defeat of the EDC.<sup>313</sup>

The Paris Protocols therefore officially granted German entry into Western Europe and thus constituted, what has been termed, the Western 'Peace Treaty' with Germany. At the same time, Germany's desire to see the West formally agree to work for reunification on Adenauer's terms was realized.<sup>314</sup>

The resolution of the intensely emotional issue of the Saar became for Adenauer both a test and a symbol for the success of his 'Vorausleistungspolitik' and the movement towards Franco-German rapprochement. The re-acquisition of the Saar, because of its importance as an industrial and

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<sup>313</sup> Hanrieder. the Stable Crisis p.48

<sup>314</sup> Charles R. Planack The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy 1955-66 Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Studies. John Hopkins Press. Baltimore, Maryland. 1967 pp.3-6



resource-rich area, was to be an important victory if Germany were to regain her pre-war economic position. It contained the second largest coal deposits in Europe and was only returned to Germany after World War One by the League of Nations.

In 1945 the French, who were not present at either Potsdam or Yalta, appropriated the Saar which was located within their zone of occupation. The reintegration of the Saar region became an issue of utmost importance to West Germany for various economic and political reasons. Because the final borders of Germany were supposed to await the outcome of a peace treaty, Adenauer had real difficulty in coaxing Allied support for his policy. At the London conference in 1945 this support was not forthcoming and in June 1946 the French unilaterally seized the Saar's coal mines. This was strongly condemned by the Soviets who, at the time, were bent on the realization of Morgenthau's pastoralization policies.<sup>315</sup>

On December 2nd, 1946 the French began to police the borders between the Saar and the surrounding German Länder and administer trade and 'right of passage' policies. In June 1947 they proceeded to create a customs union between France and the Saar region and in that same year, the population of the area voted overwhelmingly (87%) for economic union with France. Furthermore, the Reichsmark (which had given way to

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<sup>315</sup> Hanreider. German Foreign Policy 1949-63 pp.23-24

the Saarmark) was finally replaced by the Franc, and by March of 1950 the Saar population was persuaded to sign a 50-year agreement leasing the coal mines to the French.<sup>316</sup>

The West Germans, including Adenauer, resented these developments deeply and constantly criticized the French government for these actions and repeated the argument that Germany's final borders could not be changed until the final peace treaty was signed. The French, on the other hand, wanted quickly to settle the issue of its de-facto expropriation of the area, while conversely Adenauer's policy was aimed at keeping the issue in a state of flux and therefore undecided. The creation of the ECSC seemed to foreshadow the difficulty of the Saar's resolution in that the French wanted the Allies to recognize the 'Europeanization' of the Saar by admitting it as a separate entity to the ECSC.<sup>317</sup>

One of the major problems of the 1952 agreements was that the unresolved Saar issue was tied to it at the insistence of the French who, some critics have argued, tried to blackmail the Germans into accepting the European (which really meant 'French') status of the Saar region as a pre-requisite for French ratification of those same agreements.<sup>318</sup>

By 1954 the Allies (whose attitude towards the Saar question had reversed itself from its original acquiescence) had come up with a compromise solution that was included as part

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<sup>316</sup> Ibid. pp.24-26

<sup>317</sup> Hanreider The Foreign Policies of France, Britain, and West Germany p.64

<sup>318</sup> Prittie p.65

of the Paris protocols. The parties involved agreed to: (1.) place the Saar under a European Statute within the framework of the Western European Union, and (2.) set up a European Commission which would represent the Saar in foreign and defence policy. This has been interpreted as basically a diplomatic victory for Bonn although the feeling persisted that the Saar would constitute the price for French acceptance of German membership in NATO.<sup>319</sup>

Das europäische Saarstatut war der Preis, der es der Nationalversammlung in Paris möglich machen sollte, diese Lösung der Frage deutschen militärischer Beitrags sowie den rividierten Deutschland Vertrag - jetzt ohne die unstrittene Binde Klausel - zu billigen.<sup>320</sup>

In October of 1955 the 'Europeanization Statute' was submitted to the population of the Saar for ratification and was rejected by 67% of the electorate. This was followed by the defeat of the Saar's pro-French local government in December 1955 and by October 1956 negotiations began which were to culminate in the return of the Saar to Germany as the 15th province on January 1st, 1957. In part the rapid economic revival of Germany served to increase the desire on the part of the population living in the Saarland to return to the Federal Republic.

Nevertheless, the 're-launching' of European integration was a big help in the final solution of the Saar question. When the French agreed, simultaneously with EEC negotiators, to allow the Saar leaders to rejoin West Germany with safeguards for

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<sup>319</sup> Hanrieder. The Stable Crisis p.62

<sup>320</sup> Hillgruber p.59

French interests.<sup>321</sup>

The Saar settlement served as the early cornerstone of Adenauer's policy on Franco-German relations. The West German Chancellor correctly realized how badly it had poisoned the ECSC and the EDC negotiations and in fact, as Adenauer notes in the following statement, this problem has a long and difficult history.

Seit dem 17 Jahrhundert hat immer wieder die Saarfrage eine störende, eine vergiftende Rolle gespielt<sup>322</sup>

Adenauer was adamant that real rapprochement could not take place until this issue was finally settled.<sup>323</sup> This provides us with yet another example of how Adenauer's policy of early concessions to the Allies actually helped precipitate the desired result culminating, in this case, with the return of the Saar to the Federal Republic.

The goal of this chapter has been to highlight the two-sided Westpolitik of Chancellor Adenauer. While seeking to gain the emancipation of the Federal Republic from the strictures of Allied control, he never missed an opportunity to push the realization of his ultimate goal of a United Western Europe. The cornerstone, as Adenauer took great pains to stress, was a Franco-German rapprochement that was

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<sup>321</sup> Merkl. German Foreign Policies: East and West., p.102

<sup>322</sup> Adenauer, as cited in "Die Rückkehr der Saar." Ansprache am 1 Januar 1957. Bulletin Des Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. 20 April 1967. Nr.41, s.346

<sup>323</sup> Hanrieder. German Foreign Policy 1945-63 p.62

strong enough to overcome centuries of animosity and distrust.

One of the principle political aims of the free world is to reconcile France and Germany and bring them together in a common effort for the welfare of their people...The cooperation of Germany and France is an absolutely essential element for the maintainance of peace in Europe. It is also a guarantee that Europe can affirm her intellectual position in the world and that her creative powers are not exhausted.<sup>3 2 4</sup>

Although Churchill's 'United States of Europe' concept was something with which Adenauer would approve, a united Europe centered on Britain was not. Britain was too concerned with a disintegrating Empire and the implementation of its newly elected Labor government's social welfare program, to to play this role. Adenauer, whose animosity towards the British stems from the days of his dismissal at the hands of the British occupation authorities, beleived that European unity could not be realized without making a real peace with France. Britain itself did not really possess the Pan-European sentiments of Adenauer until MacMillan's time and by then it was too late because in 1963 General DeGualle had vetoed Britain's application for membership. Adenauer viewed British entry into the EEC as the wedge which could open the door to 'socialist' and protestant influences from the Scandinavian countries, and was therefore himself quite apprehensive about the British application. He was most likely greatly relieved when DeG-

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<sup>3 2 4</sup> Konrad Adenauer. "Germany: The New Partner." in Foreign Affairs p.181

ualler took his action against them.<sup>325</sup> British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's independant arms control initiatives, Adenauer felt, were harmful to Western European solidarity and for this reason he did not warmly welcome these steps.<sup>326</sup> He felt that a united Europe was the way not only the best way to temper the nationalism that had done so much damage in Europe in the previous century but also was the only visible method to opposing the Soviet monolith poised at the Elbe.<sup>327</sup>

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship in June 1963 between the Federal Republic and France, as Adenauer constantly reiterated, was the zenith and crowning glory of his Westpolitik.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> This attitude on the part of Adenauer towards the British is interesting when one compares it to a quite different perception of England's role in Europe which he expressed on a number of occasions during the mid 1940's. On April 8th, 1946 Adenauer, in discussion with historian Ulrich Novak, was quoted as saying:

Ich halte es nicht für richtig, das Sie lediglich Frankreich als die führende Macht Europas bezeichnen. Frankreich ist biologisch und Wirtschaftlich nicht stark genug für diese Rolle. Ich bin der Auffassung, das Europa von England und Frankreich geführt werden muss...Wir haben ebenso wie die Engländer selbst, dass grösse Interesse daran, dass England sich als europäische Macht fühlt. Wenn aber Frankreich als die alleinige führende Macht Europas bezeichnet, schaltet man England aus.

As this quotation demonstrates, Adenauer felt that with the uncertain role the US would play in Europe (if any), that German and English interests coincided in the creation of a strong european movement. The later American re-examination

He interpreted this treaty as the ultimate symbol of Franco-German reconciliation and stressed its significance not only within the narrow context of Franco-German relations, but also within a European and typically enough, a world perspective.

Ohne eine dauernde Aussöhnung zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland, meine Damen und Herrn, ist Europa nicht zu schaffen. Ohne diese Aussöhnung und Freundschaft wird es keinen Frieden in Europa und damit in der Welt geben. Der Abschluss dieses Vertrages ist ein Grundpfeiler des Friedens in Europa und der Welt...Ich bin zutiefst davon überzeugt, dass der Abschluss dieses Vertrages ein Historisches Ereignis ersten Ranges ist für unser Land und für Europa und damit für die ganzen freie Welt<sup>330</sup>

Although some criticism<sup>331</sup> raised by certain people who felt that the 'bilateral' nature of the treaty contradicted the spirit of the EEC's multilateral scope, Adenauer, nonetheless, still felt that this treaty would go down as his greatest legacy.<sup>332</sup>

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of their foreign policy priorities effected Adenauer's predisposition to a reconciliation with France. These events, in part, led the West German Chancellor into DeGaulle's orbit. It made for a very strange relationship and somewhat puzzled Adenauer's supporters who remembered quite clearly that DeGaulle had come to power again in 1958 expressing a negative attitude towards Adenauer's 'special' relationship with the Americans. (See Weidenfeld - p.55 , and Willis - p.172.)

<sup>326</sup> Bolling p. 229

<sup>327</sup> Pridham p. 309

<sup>328</sup> It is interesting to note that Adenauer, during this period, acknowledged earlier attempts at Franco-German reconciliation taken by Stresemann and Briande.

The Franco-German Co-operation Treaty, concluded in January 1963 by DeGualle and Adenauer also played its part in ensuring that the infant community (EEC) did not breakup in dissatisfaction with DeGualle's veto.<sup>333</sup>

It is important to note that the very strength in the success of the manipulation of his Westpolitik had profound implications on the development of a clear, coherent Ostpolitik. Before examining this Ostpolitik more closely, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn regarding this aforementioned Westpolitik.

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Aus unsere Jungsten Geschichte erinnere ich an die Versuche während der Weimarer Republic, die gemacht worden und gekennzeichnet sind durch die Namen Stresemann und Briand. Diesem Versuchen waren schon Jahrzehnte lang vorher Bemühungen Bebels<sup>329</sup>

<sup>329</sup> Adenauer, as cited from "Ein Grundpfeiler des Friedens." Bulletin Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. den 26 April, 1963. Nr.74, s.649

<sup>330</sup> Ibid. s. 650

<sup>331</sup> In Germany especially the rejection of Britain's application for membership in the EEC and the signing of the German-French agreement were taken by some to be anglophobic gestures.

In diesem Zusammenhang erscheinen deutschen Politikern aller Parteien der Deutsche-Französische Vertrag als eine anti-amerikanische Geste, ein Hinnehmen der französischen Vorherrschaft in einem kleineuropa der Sechs und ein Verzicht auf die künftige Möglichkeit der politische integration.

Furthermore Adenauer's support of DeGaulle against that of



### 5.3 CONCLUSIONS.

One of the main reasons why Adenauer was so successful in his manoeuvring to regain full FRG sovereignty was the compatibilities created between German and Allied interests as the international environment transformed itself into an orgy of East-West rivalry. The role of the North Korean attack in further precipitating the rearmament of West Germany is but one concrete example of this transformation.

Unlike Adenauer's Ostpolitik, his foreign policy in the West was well executed and followed a clear and simple pattern. His 'Vorausleistungspolitik' paid off dividends in the 1952 and 1954 treaties restoring German sovereignty. Integration into the West was a low cost, high payoff policy

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his own cabinet minister Ludwig Erhard during the 1962 Agricultural negotiations also caused a stir in Germany and was used as evidence of DeGaulle's influence over the West German chancellor. See Willis. Deutschland, Frankreich und Europa pp.173-174

<sup>332</sup> Robert G. Neumann. The Government of the German Federal Republic Harper's comparative government series. Harper and Row Publishers Ltd. 1966 p.56.

<sup>333</sup> Ehrhardt. p.113 One must remember here though, that Franco-German reconciliation was not entirely built on sentiment (although this probably played a major role in Adenauer's attitude) but rather was based on a clear determination of each state's interests. DeGaulle needed Adenauer's support in the Algerian campaign, but more importantly he wanted Germany on his side in the attempt to keep out British (and American) influences within the EEC. In return Adenauer received his long sought after rapprochement with France. For further details see Gerald Freund's Germany Between Two Worlds.

because it sacrificed non-existent potential rights (for Germans to live in a 'United' Reich) for de-facto political sovereignty. Paradoxically the Federal Republic was, through its policy of aligning and integrating itself with the West, able to speed up the seemingly contradictory policy of sovereignty restoration.<sup>334</sup> It should be pointed out though that Adenauer did not understand sovereignty as antipathetic to closer Western cooperation. The traditional German (Prussian) view of sovereignty was not his view and therefore he did not see, or chose to ignore, the contradiction which the opposition saw in his foreign policy agenda.

It is important to keep in mind that although Adenauer was fundamentally inclined to lead Germany in the conduct of foreign policy, he also played a major role in the birth of her domestic policy.<sup>335</sup> He believed correctly that before Germany could conduct an unhampered domestic policy, she would have to be allowed to enter the Western community of nations on a basis of equality, which, in his view, necessitated primary attention to be paid to foreign matters.

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<sup>334</sup> Joffe p.79

<sup>335</sup> Adenauer once said that:

Eine gute Aussenpolitik können wir nur machen wenn wir Innern gefestigt sind. Aussen und Innenpolitik sind voneinander gar nicht zu trennen.

(Adenauer, as cited in Weidenfeld. p.193

Any conclusions one could draw concerning Adenauer's tremendous success, in terms of his Westpolitik, would be incomplete without mentioning or making brief reference to his electoral successes. These victories gave him the freedom, much public support, and control over both his own party and over the Bundestag (especially in the pre-1955 period) allowing him to take the 'great' decisions which this chapter has attempted to highlight. In this sense, Adenauer did not operate under the handicap of political factionalization as did Stresemann during the Weimar years.<sup>336</sup> The success he achieved electorally also served to silence his critics within the CDU, men such as Jakob Kaiser and Ernst Lemmen, who, being from the former eastern territories and Berlin, were naturally more concerned about an active Ostpolitik<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> The CDU under Adenauer West Germany governed from 1949-63. During that time Adenauer was victorious in the four general elections held during this period receiving 45.2% of the popular vote in 1953, 50.2% in 1957 (the largest percentage in West German political history; as well as gaining the only majority in the Bundestag the Federal Republic has ever seen) and 45.3% in 1961. The massive percentage of voter turnout for these elections added further legitimacy to the declared mandate in his continuing policy towards the West. See Merkl, German Foreign Policies: East and West p.244

<sup>337</sup> Vali p.63 Adenauer appointed men to the cabinet such as Kaiser and Lemmer partly in recognition of the early political weight which the refugee groups were able to use and hoped therefore that these positions would serve to placate the concerns of these said groups.

<sup>338</sup> Adenauer, while a democrat by political conviction, certainly was not a democrat by nature. He, as well as, many Germans would probably find wisdom in Goethe's

Adenauer's authoritarian style<sup>338</sup> was somewhat 'puzzling' when one considers that he oversaw the establishment of democratic institutions within the new Republic. His habit of not providing the Bundestag with sufficient information led to accusations that rather than setting up a parliamentary federal political system, his actions precipitated the creation of a 'Chancellor Democracy'. His foreign policy could definitely not be characterized as being 'bi-partisan'. His antipathy towards the SPD's 'neutralistic' policies was well known and documented. Adenauer's actions in 1961 in the so-called 'Presidential crisis' seem ample empirical evidence for some of these above criticisms.<sup>339</sup>

It is now with the success of Adenauer's Westpolitik that the discussion turns to a detailed examination of his Ostpolitik.

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famous dictums: "better one injustice than disorder".  
see Heinz Boescht Menace of the Miracle Collets Holding  
Ltd., London 1962

<sup>339</sup> Gerald Freud. "Adenauer and the Future of Germany."  
International Journal Vol.18 No.4 Autumn 1962-63.

## Chapter VI

### ADENAUER'S OSTPOLITIK

They (the German people) have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self determination the unity and freedom of Germany.<sup>340</sup>

The above statements, found in the preamble to the 'Basic Law' of the Federal Republic of Germany, display clearly that the Basic Law of the FRG applies to all Germans, including those living in parts of Eastern Europe, in the territories encompassed by the 1937 boundaries, and that the reunification of these peoples remains an important goal of the Federal Republic. Although one might have difficulty arguing that this goal occupies the premiere place on the West German list of priorities, it remains an important issue still much discussed today<sup>341</sup> In the early years of

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<sup>340</sup> As cited from the Preamble of the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic of Germany. Press and Information Office Of the Federal Government. Bonn. May 23rd, 1949. The reader will notice that the Federal Republic does not possess a 'constitution' per say, but rather a 'basic law' which is simply a temporary arrangement. This is done specifically to symbolize the fact that the Germans do not recognize the 'permanence' (legality) of the european status quo, and that only a united Germany can have a constitution. (Verfassung)

<sup>341</sup> A 1984 poll put at 79,6% the number of Germans who say that they would like to see the reunification of the two Germanies. Cited in the Information Zur Politische Bildung. Nr. 203, "Die Deutsche Frage" 1984, p.2 Even more important though, the whole question of reunification is being once again debated in light of Gorbachov's

the Federal Republic's existence this question (the so-called "German question") was much more pertinent to the everyday discussion of politics in West Germany.

It has been noted that the present cannot be understood without a precise knowledge of the past and in the case of the FRG, this is particularly appropriate. This struggle to understand the past has been labeled the 'Bewältigung der Vergangenheit'.<sup>342</sup> which, loosely translated means an attempt to overcome the past. An examination of the Ostpolitik of the FRG could appear effectively incomprehensible without an intimate understanding of where the Federal Republic stood in terms of its own position in the international community in the period under investigation. As after World War One, the amputation of the Eastern territories and the resulting 8.3 million refugees ('Heimatlosen') who together formed the 'Bund der Heimatsentrechteten' burdened

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arms control initiatives and his own plans of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' and the effects they are having in Europe. Not only are alternative defence strategies such as nuclear-free weapons zones and the dissolution of the two-bloc system being debated, but also the concept of 'Mitteleuropa' is being resurrected and discussed in central Europe. This 'new thinking' has effected the traditional Adenauer interpretation of 'reunification through strength'. For further discussion see Marion Gräfin Dönhoff's article: "Von der Geschichte längst überholt." in Die Zeit 27. Januar 1989.

<sup>342</sup> This term has been defined as a 'struggle to overcome the problems and experiences of the past'. In practical terms this can be interpreted as meaning an historical and psychological self-examination by the Germans of their recent history. It is a struggle to put into perspective the role of militarism and Nazi ideology, and to realistically assess Germany's role in recent European history.

the Federal Republic with a major interest in reunification. Germany's history had imposed on it a legacy of suspicion and fear, especially in France which suffered invasions in three successive generations.<sup>343</sup>

The ratification of the Paris Agreements in the Bundestag on May 5th, 1955 recognized the restoration of German sovereignty and, in turn, opened up the possibility of new vistas of potential German foreign policy initiatives focusing on the East. The question to be examined in this chapter is why did Adenauer not conduct a more vigorous Ostpolitik after sovereignty over foreign policy matters had been restored. This question will be resolved both in light of Adenauer's Westpolitik and his own beliefs.

When Adenauer became Chancellor of the new Federal Republic in 1949 he realized that the foreign policies pursued by such German leaders as Bismarck and Gustav Stresemann were no longer practical. The classical Bismarckian foreign policy tradition in central Europe was not feasible for the simple reason that the centers of power within post-war Europe had shifted to the East (Moscow) and to the Western capitals of Paris, London, and most importantly Washington. Bismarck's MittelEuropa<sup>344</sup> was physically and practically

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<sup>343</sup> Josef Joffe. p.79

<sup>344</sup> Basically this term refers to the establishment of a powerful Germany ruling over Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Belgium and large portions of the rest of Europe which was born of the 19th Century concept of power politics and the Balance of Power. For a more descriptive account see William Griffith. The Ostpolitik of the

impossible given both Adenauer's fundamental belief in the desirability of the establishment of a Carolingian (or Catholic) Europe and, more importantly, due to the fact that Europe contained no recognizable central power base, but rather only two increasingly antagonistic bipolar entities.<sup>345</sup>

Similarly the so called 'see-saw' (Schaukelpolitik).<sup>346</sup> policy undertaken by Stresemann in the Weimar Years was equally undesirable. Adenauer realized quite correctly that after integrating the newly formed Federal Republic firmly in the Western camp through the Paris and Bonn agreements<sup>347</sup> any attempt towards a rapprochement with the East could have had dangerous repercussions on Allied perceptions as to the amount of scope West German foreign policy should

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Federal Republic of Germany MIT press, Cambridge, Mass. 1978 p.4 and pp. 24-25.

<sup>345</sup> J.K.Sowden. The German Question 1945-73 Bradford University Press. 3 Upper St.James Street, London. 1975 p.164

<sup>346</sup> This term refers to that period of Weimar foreign policy characterized by playing off mutual apprehensions of both East and West against each other for the betterment of German interests. The Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 was an attempt to secure German security interests and recover Germany's pre-1914 role as a independant power in Europe by aligning with the Soviet Union . It signalled Berlin's rejection of a concert of Europe. Stresseman partially relied upon Western fears of an alliance with Russia to get them to sign the 1925 Locarno Treaties restoring German sovereignty thus symbolizing this foreign policy position of balancing the two sides' fears and insecurities off against each other. Griffith pp. 10-11. See the second chapter for a more detailed analysis.

<sup>347</sup> See previous chapter for an expanded analysis



be given. It becomes clear that it was not only Adenauer's belief system which made him more accommodating to the West, but also, and perhaps more importantly, those restraints imposed on the Federal Republic's range of options by the prevailing power equation in post-war Europe.

Although Heinrich Brüning advocated a return to the "Schaukelpolitik" of the 1920's, Adenauer passionately denounced all possibility of this as a guide to German foreign policy saying:

I considered neutrality between the two power blocs as an unrealistic position for our nation. Sooner or later, one side or the other would attempt to incorporate Germany's potential on its side...We had to join one or the other side, if we wanted to prevent being crushed by both.<sup>348</sup>

Werner Weidenfeld argues that the idea of neutrality between the two superpowers was simply not possible due to the prevailing international power constellation.

Insofern boten die weltpolitischen Entwicklungen, die gesellschaftspolitischen Veränderungen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und die 'nationale Erschöpfung der Deutschen' für ein Konzept der Neutralität ein relativ schlechtes Ausgangspotential in der Grundstruktur kollektiver Intentionalität der westdeutschen Politik.<sup>349</sup>

Although this was the case, the record reveals that Adenauer, as previously mentioned, had much bitter confrontation with the major CDU representative of the concept of 'Blockfreiheit' (Jakob Kaiser). While Kaiser's ideas contin-

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<sup>348</sup> Konrad Adenauer Memoirs Vol No.1. Henry Regency Co. Chicago, Ill. 1966 p.96

<sup>349</sup> Weidenfeld p.69

ued to provoke debate, it is generally assumed that by 1949 his ideas were not in the mind-set of the majority of West German and Allied decision makers. The question as to how much the West actually feared the spectre of a new 'Rapallo' was probably a moot point in part due to the above circumstances and of the prevailing state of Superpower relations. The division of Europe into East and West and the Federal Republic's 'de facto' integration into the West made even the discussion of a more active Ostpolitik pointless.

Owing to the length of service in the politics of both Cologne and indirectly in Weimar Adenauer witnessed both the rebirth and more pointedly the death of German democracy and was therefore fully aware of its less than 'solid' history. It is therefore not surprising to learn of his real apprehension concerning his own people when it came to adhering to a somewhat 'untenable' democratic tradition. True, the 'rump of Prussia' with its authoritarian heritage, had been amputated by the Soviets but his fear of a revival of nationalism still persisted. As far as Adenauer was concerned, Bonn, because of Germany's recent history, could only develop a realistic Ostpolitik from a European, rather than from a German perspective.<sup>350</sup> He has, therefore, been appropriately criticized as being a 'good' European (thus in contrast, implying that he was a 'bad' German) and to a certain extent this case could be argued. As previously mentioned, Adenauer favored a rejection of traditional German

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<sup>350</sup> Griffith. p.47

nationalism in favor of European Unity and rapprochement.<sup>351</sup> Some academics have argued that Adenauer was actually able to substitute Pan-Europeanism and anti-communism for traditional German nationalism.<sup>352</sup> Others have argued that anti-communism actually worked to bridge opposition concerns;

Anti-communism began to provide a powerful glue which bridged the divide between the 'Christian Occidentalists' advocates of a West German Integration into the Western Allinace and the non-neutalist Nationalists.<sup>353</sup>

Another great fear that concerned the West German Chancellor was that of a 'return to Potsdam' mentality on the part of the Western Allies, although, through the development of his Westpolitik and the resulting restoration of full FRG sovereignty, this fear was largely negated. The 'Return to Potsdam' mentality has been used to describe the fear that the Allies would alone come to some sort of mutual understanding and settle the German question without any substantive input from the Federal Republic. Adenauer, in an interview with the Journalist Ernst Friedlander on June 11th, 1953 summed it up this way:

Bismarck spoke of his nightmare of coalitions against her. I have my own nightmare; it's called Potsdam. The danger of a collusive great power policy at Germany's peril has existed since 1945, and it has continued to exist after the Federal Republic was established, the foreign policy of the Federal government has always been aimed at escaping from this danger zone. For Germany must

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid. p. 44

<sup>352</sup> Karl Dietrich Bracher. The German Dilemma Preager Publishers Ltd. N.Y. 1975 p. 151

<sup>353</sup> Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds p.212.

not fall between the grindstones. If it does it will be lost.<sup>354</sup>

Although after 1945 these fears seemed increasingly ill-founded, the evidence suggests that Adenauer himself actually continued to fear, and therefore to work against, the manifestation of this situation.<sup>355</sup>

Adenauer's animosity towards the Soviet Union and Communism has been well documented,<sup>356</sup> yet this attitude, although a direct result of Adenauer's philosophical and religious perceptions of the East, did not serve to stifle all political activity. Rather it served as an impetus for strengthening the political and economic integration of the FRG with the West. In this manner East-West tensions (as described by the use of the term 'Cold War') served as an

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<sup>354</sup> Konrad Adenauer in an interview with Ernst Friedlander: June 11th, 1953. As cited in Josef Joffe, p.84

<sup>355</sup> Griffith. p.47

<sup>356</sup> Adenauer was an ardent anti-communist as evidenced by the following statements:

The free world united in an Atlantic Alliance is threatened by the ruthless efforts of Soviet Communism to expand its power base and its system. The Soviet Union is trying by every means to weaken the West and drive it back.

Konrad Adenauer, from an article entitled: "The German Problem: A World Problem" Foreign Affairs Vol.33 1962-63 p.62

From the same article he goes on to say:

We are living in a restless age full of tension. The atheistic forces of communism, while pretending to create a paradise on earth, are set on robbing people of their dignity and freedom and degrading them into will-less elements of a termite state.

important pre-requisite for the development of Adenauer's Ostpolitik. It was only through continued East-West tensions that his Westpolitik and his 'policy of strength'<sup>357</sup> in terms of its application to the German question, could have become justified both domestically and with the Allied powers.

Adenauer appreciated the fact that it was the Superpowers who had divided Europe and that if German reunification was ever to be realized, it could only be accomplished through the interplay of these two actors. His Ostpolitik was therefore said to have been based on two major assumptions, the first (as outlined above) being essentially correct and the second assuming a decreased representation of reality as the 1950's came to an end. Firstly, Adenauer assumed that it was Washington and Moscow who held the key to the German ques-

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Only sufficient strength of the West will create a real basis for negotiations. Their objective is to liberate peacefully not only the Soviet Zone but also all of enslaved Europe east of the Iron curtain.

Konrad Adenauer, in an article in the West German Bulletin (Published by the West German Information office) No.27. March 16th, 1952. p.262. As cited from Joffe. Adenauer reinforces this policy perspective in an article in Foreign Affairs 1962-63, on page 63, when he states:

If we maintain our unity and strength, and remain patient, we will lay the foundations for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union based on respect for the vital interests and freedom of peoples.

tion, and secondly that over time the balance of power in Europe would shift decisively towards the West, yet at the same time the Federal Republic would retain the sovereignty required to participate realistically in the final demarcation of european borders from a basis of strength. He held that German reunification could only be realized through cooperation with the West and that it was his duty to prevent the West from trading off reunification for a settlement in the Cold War.<sup>358</sup> As it turned out, this cold war animosity, which provided such fertile ground for the stubborn, legalistic Ostpolitik which Adenauer pursued, later gave way to the more relaxed detente atmosphere in the 1960's and thus undermined the raison d'etre of Adenauer's Ostpolitik.<sup>359</sup>

Adenauer was once asked to explain his attitude towards the Soviet Union and in his response revealed the reasoning behind what has been called his 'demagogic' conservative Ostpolitik.

The Federal government observes the tensions and uncertainty which prevails in all parts of the world as a result of the expansionist urge of the Communist system....So long as the Soviet Union insists on the division of Germany and aims at the

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<sup>358</sup> Wolfram Hanrieder. The Foreign Policies of Great Britain, France, and West Germany Prentice Hall Inc. N.J. 1980 p.51

<sup>359</sup> Adenauer's Westpolitik has actually been interpreted in Hegelian terms as being the 'antithesis' of Bismarck's 'Mitteleuropa' and Stresemann's 'Schaukelpolitik'. One could take this analogy further by examining Gerhard Schröder's 'Politik der Bewegung' (policy of movement) as the resulting 'synthesis'; a type of modified Western 'Mitteleuropa'. Sowden. p.169

subjugation of West Berlin and the neutralization of the Federal Republic, most of the initiatives which we are called upon to make would serve no purpose.<sup>360</sup>

Before beginning the discussion with Adenauer's Ostpolitik since the restoration of sovereignty in May 1955, it is important to examine the initial perception of success of his 'policy of strength'. In March and April of 1952 in his famous notes, Stalin called for a united Germany free of ties to either Superpower. These came just as the Allies were negotiating the EDC Treaty and seemed designed to prevent this from being ratified and to prevent German rearmament.

These notes came at a critical time for the Chancellor because, although being ultimately rejected, they seemed to underline the validity of his view that only through strength and integration into the West could the USSR be forced to the negotiating table.<sup>361</sup> From the Soviet point of view, these must be seen in their overall context of the disarmament proposals which they were advocating following their failure in Korea.<sup>362</sup> Whether these proposals actually represented an actual Soviet position at the time is diffi-

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<sup>360</sup> Konrad Adenauer. As cited from Richard Hiscocks The Adenauer Era

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unsere Politik mus es sein, dabei zu helfen, den Westen so stark zu machen, dass die Russen zu einem Kompromiss gebracht werden.

<sup>362</sup> Bracher p.185

cult to prove, but nonetheless, they certainly served the interests of the Federal Chancellor<sup>363</sup> A debate still simmers in the FRG as to whether Adenauer abandoned Germany's only hope of reunification when he so quickly dismissed the Stalin Notes. The author, when confronted with this question would have to agree with Ferenc Vali, author of The Quest For A United Germany when he says

The Soviet Notes, while suggesting an uncommitted all-German government, were never ready to allow free elections as a first step towards setting up a central German government, again and again they insisted on a fusion of the East and West German regimes on a parity basis<sup>364</sup>

One might also add here that the population certainly did not rise in protest when they heard of the Chancellor's rejection of the proposals. The government was very popular among the greater part of the population and therefore their passive reaction was taken by the CDU as tacit support.<sup>365</sup>

#### 6.1 OSTPOLITIK 1949-63

An Adenauer proponent, Hans Peter Schwarz, in the course of numerous books and articles has developed five 'theories' which he maintains influenced and guided Adenauer during the latter's conduct of the Ostpolitik. These are: the theory of global detente; the disarmament theory; the crisis theory; the frustration theory; and the China theory.

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<sup>363</sup> Michael Balfour. West Germany Fredrick A. Preager Publisher Ltd. N.Y. 1968 p.213

<sup>364</sup> Vali p.33

<sup>365</sup> Hillgruber. p.53



Schwarz describes the Adenauer theory of global detente as referring to Adenauer's perception that the Soviet leadership could not remain stable forever and that they simply could not resist change. He felt that as detente replaced the 'cold war'; the resulting Soviet view of the reduced threat posed by the West would result in a general 'loosening up' of their attitudes towards their satellites. In this sense Adenauer saw general detente as the natural precursor to reunification. Although I will deal more specifically with Adenauer's view of detente in the conclusions, it should be pointed out here that Adenauer drew a distinction between global detente and the insulated US-USSR detente relationship.

The second of Schwarz's theories concerns disarmament. According to this Adenauer felt that, because the Soviets could not keep up financially in the arms race, that disarmament policies would eventually be pursued by the USSR and that questions of the territorial status quo could be linked to any agreements in the field of disarmament. This can be seen as a manifest projection of Adenauer's attempt at linkage-politics. The disarmament proposals could be used as a lever in the reunification debate. The applicability of this theory can be seen in the efforts by the West German leader to prevent the 'de-coupling' of the German question from the disarmament proposals of the late 1950's and early 1960's<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> Schwarz Rhöndorfer Gespräche p. 20

The third of these theories is the so-called crisis theory. According to this theory, as the Soviet economy worsened, the West could push the reunification issue in return for economic and technological assistance. The obvious flaw in this theory was the gross underestimation of the strength of the Soviet economy.

The fourth of these theories is that of frustration, and it owes much to Adenauer's pronounced 'Politik der Stark'. He felt that if the West remained strong this would lead the Soviets to recognize that their policies of world domination were simply not effective in Europe. He hoped they would reassess their ideas about Eastern Europe, including the DDR.<sup>367</sup>

The final theory concerning attitudes towards realizing the pronounced goal of reunification is that referred to as the 'China' theory. According to this Schwarz says that Adenauer believed the Soviets would become more accommodating towards the West in proportion to increased tensions with China in the struggle for the leadership of the communist bloc.

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<sup>367</sup> I see a slight contradiction in Schwarz's theories here in that Adenauer could not have been propelled by both a detente and a disarmament theory, (in which the perception of a lessened threat from the West would lead the Soviets to re-evaluate their ideas towards Eastern Europe) and at the same time believe that the frustration theory would prove successful. The 'Politik der Stark' appears to be a policy born out of the 'cold war' period and was not applicable in the detente environment.

In the early summer of 1955 expectations rose concerning reunification because of both the Austrian State Treaty and the 1955 Summit meeting. The importance of the 4-Power Summit at Geneva in July of 1955 underlines the dual nature of the reunification problem. Although Adenauer had regained full German sovereignty in all policy areas (including foreign policy) by May 1955, this did not ultimately mean that Germany was free to solve the reunification problem unilaterally. The 4-Power responsibility (as agreed to by the Allies at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences) was still valid and their jurisdiction manifested itself periodically through these conferences designed to address the major divisive issues of the day, the most important of which was Germany.

This conference was preceded by both sides outlining their respective positions. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden outlined his position on the upcoming talks in a statement made at Geneva on July 18th, 1955. In it he signalled reason for optimism saying:

We have only to stretch out our hands and the human race can enter a period of prosperity such as has never been known.<sup>368</sup>

On July 7th, 1955 Eden had categorically stated that there would be no discussion or negotiation on the dissolution of NATO or any form of split with the United States and any

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<sup>368</sup> As cited in a statement at Geneva by Prime Minister Eden, on European Security, German Reunification, and a demilitarized area, July 18th, 1955. Documents on Germany Committee on Foreign Relations: United States Senate. Greenwood Press, Publishers. New York. 1968 p.178

solution to the German question other than reunification. In this manner Eden echoed the Allied position agreed to by the United States, Britain, and the USSR at Potsdam that the question of the boundaries of Germany could only be solved through a final peace treaty.

The key to the whole problem of European Security, said Eden was the German question and the latter could not be solved as long as Germany remained divided.<sup>369</sup>

The 'Eden Plan' went on to outline two concrete proposals including the development of a mutual security pact with a reunified Germany,

We would be prepared to be parties to a security pact of which those round this table and a united Germany might be members.<sup>370</sup>

and following from that a de-militarized area:

We should be ready to examine the possibility of a de-militarized area between East and West.<sup>371</sup>

This plan was significant in that it discussed the twin problems of German reunification and European security and implied that the former would have to be resolved in order to realize the latter.

Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin's reply to the above proposal came on July 20th, 1955 and served essentially to reverse the order of resolution of these twin problems.

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<sup>369</sup> Sowden. p.168

<sup>370</sup> Cited in the same statement by Prime Minister Eden. Documents on Germany p.180

<sup>371</sup> Cited in the document by Prime Minister Eden. Documents on Germany p.180

Having in view that the establishment of a system of Collective Security in Europe would facilitate the earliest possible settlement of the German problem through the unification of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis.<sup>372</sup>

Here the Soviets basically restated their 'two-state' theory<sup>373</sup> arguing that it was the two German states which should participate and sign the final Treaty on Mutual Security.<sup>374</sup>

Given the incompatibility of the Eastern and Western positions, it comes as no surprise to learn that the conference ended without accomplishing anything of substance. The Soviet Union was unwilling to see a 'mechanical union' (which they interpreted as meaning a supervised free vote) of both the GDR and the FRG and, through their actions, made it clear that they were unwilling to withdraw their troops without the proper 'safeguards' in place to see the continuation of the Soviet apparatus in the GDR. The Soviet position, coming just two months after the FRG's entry into NATO has been interpreted as an attempt to reverse this decision. Bulganin's proposals were completely unacceptable as far as Adenauer and the Allies were concerned because, first of all, they violated the Allied pledge (made at the 1954 Paris Agreements) to support and promote German reunification, and

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<sup>372</sup> As cited in the preamble to the Soviet Draft Treaty on Collective Security in Europe July 20th, 1955. Documents on Germany p.181

<sup>373</sup> This refers to the Soviet (and GDR) position that the former German Reich had given way to two separate German states developing along different social, economic, and political lines.

<sup>374</sup> Sowden. p.170

secondly they challenged NATO security arrangements in Europe.<sup>375</sup>

The directive emanating from the Summit has been seen as a partial victory for the Allies because they were able to get the Soviets to reaffirm

their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany. The settlement of the German question and reunification by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German People and the interests of European Security.<sup>376</sup>

This directive instructed the Foreign Ministers to meet again in October to discuss the twin issues of German reunification and European disarmament. The summit though marked the end of the 4-Power maneuvering vis-a-vis German reunification and, after this the Soviets vigorously returned to their 'two-state' theory in the hopes of securing widespread diplomatic recognition for the GDR.

There can be no doubt that since 1955, and especially after 1956, the Soviet Union has made every effort to incorporate East Germany in the communist orbit while at the same time flatly rejecting Western terms for unity...<sup>377</sup>

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<sup>375</sup> Charles R. Planack The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy 1955-66 Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Studies J.H. Press, Baltimore Maryland. 1967 pp.14-15

<sup>376</sup> As cited in the Geneva Directive of the Heads of Government of the 4-Powers to the Foreign Ministers, July 23rd, 1955. Documents on Germany p.184

<sup>377</sup> Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds p.210

This position was reaffirmed when Khrushchev echoed the same idea in a speech he gave at the Lustgarten in East Berlin on his return to Moscow on July 21st, 1955.<sup>378</sup> Not only had the Soviets made it clear that their 'two-state' theory was to be their future position, but their emphasis on the importance of 'peaceful co-existence' gave official recognition of a trend which was to expose Adenauer's Ostpolitik to much criticism.

Die sowjetische Seite rückte die 'Entspannung' in den Vordergrund, da eine 'mechanische Verschmelzung' beide deutschen Staaten infolge der 'sozialistischen Errungenschaften, in der DDR nicht möglich sei.<sup>379</sup>

This conference proved important to Adenauer because it highlighted his fear of the West beginning to place their need for arms control ahead of their commitment towards German reunification. Adenauer felt, therefore, that Moscow had won a complete victory and interpreted the outcome as evidence that the West was developing a trend towards arms control initiatives without first securing reunification.<sup>380</sup> Indeed the 1955 Geneva Summit made more explicit the tacit agreement between the Superpowers to downgrade the German question so as to avoid another major crisis<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> Sowden. p.171

<sup>379</sup> Hillgruber p.63

<sup>380</sup> Griffith. pp. 70-71. In fact Adenauer saw the mechanics of arms control negotiations as creating an insulated bilateralism which he viewed as threatening to West German interests. This may account for his acceptance of the Soviet invitation of June 1955.

<sup>381</sup> Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds p.217

On June 7th, 1955 Adenauer received an invitation to visit Moscow which he accepted on June 30th. The visit was set up for September. Against the advice of Heinrich von Brentano, Walter Halstein, and Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer opted to attend the conference in which diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in exchange for the release of approximately 10,000 German POW's held by the USSR. Khrushchev seemed to be motivated by a desire to display to the West that the USSR was genuinely interested in detente, but more importantly, he was seeking to drive a 'wedge' between the Allies (who were already pre-disposed to easing East-West tensions) and the FRG. The Soviets were in a 'no-lose' situation and felt that if the visit failed it would only highlight Adenauer's stubbornness and impress upon the West the potential for Adenauer to be a major obstacle in the development of detente. They also felt that the establishment of diplomatic relations would serve to further entrench the status quo and give a solid justification to their two-state theory.<sup>382</sup>

The question directly relevant to our study concerns the motivation on behalf of the Federal Chancellor. In his book Konrad Adenauer 1876-1976 British journalist Terrence Prittie suggests that evidence exists that the 10,000 POW's would have been eventually released through the Red Cross.<sup>383</sup> He goes on to imply that Adenauer may have felt

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<sup>382</sup> Sowden. p.166

<sup>383</sup> One should not downplay the domestic political benefits



that his persuasive powers were greater than they actually were and that the cause of reunification could only be positively advanced by the establishment of diplomatic relations with the last remaining state who possessed partial responsibility for the whole of Germany, namely the Soviet Union.<sup>384</sup>

In part Adenauer's decision to sit down with men he considered to be brutal,atheistic, uncultured and untrustworthy reflected his own new sense of confidence.<sup>385</sup>

On the other hand, it has also been purported that Adenauer had no choice about attending since he had to 'keep alive' the myth of four-power control because it was only through its continued existence that Adenauer's calls for reunification by negotiation appeared justified. In this sense he could not realistically advocate reunification if there was no official diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. Adenauer had to avoid inaction and not create the impression of 'standing still' which could result in political isolation.<sup>386</sup>

Diplomatic relations were established between the two states. An agreement was reached...for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the setting up this end of embassies respectively in Bonn and in Moscow, and to the exchange of diplomatic representatives of

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reaped by the Chancellor through the release of these prisoners.

<sup>384</sup> Sowden. p.173

<sup>385</sup> Barnet. p.171

<sup>386</sup> Elenor Lansing Dulles One Germany or Two: The Struggle for the Heart of Europe Hoover Institute Press. Stanford University, California. 1970 p. 107

the rank of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors.<sup>387</sup>

In a letter from Chancellor Adenauer to Prime Minister Bulganin on September 13th, 1955, Adenauer qualified the above statement by insisting that:

1. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Soviet Union does not constitute a recognition of the present territorial status quo on both sides. The final delimitation of the German borders remains reserved to the peace treaty.

and

2. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Government of the Soviet Union does not mean a revision of the legal point of view of the Federal Government regarding its powers to represent the German nation in international affairs and with respect to the political conditions in the German territories which are at present outside of its effective sovereignty<sup>388</sup>

Indeed Adenauer left no doubt where he stood on the continuing division of Germany. With typical hyperbole he said in Moscow in 1955:

The division of Germany is abnormal. It is against human and divine Law and against nature.<sup>389</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> As cited in a Communiqué on Negotiations Between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, September 13th, 1955. Documents on Germany p.186

<sup>388</sup> As cited in the Letter from Chancellor Adenauer to Premier Bulganin, stating reservations at the time of establishing Diplomatic relations, September 13th, 1955. Documents on Germany p.187

<sup>389</sup> Hartmann p.135

In a statement for the Bulletin Adenauer reaffirmed the German and Allied position that real progress on peaceful co-existence and the bettering of relations between East and West was dependant on a solution to the German question.

Ein solches Sicherheitssystem ist auf der Basis der Teilung Deutschlands unmöglich. Solange Deutschland geteilt ist, bleibt ein Spannungsfeld erster Ordnung bestehen...<sup>390</sup>

It is also of significance the lengths to which Adenauer went to point out West Germany's commitment to the West.

From the same declaration Adenauer went on to state:

Ich darf in aller Form für mich, für die Bundesregierung, für das ganze Deutsche Volk in West und Ost erklären: Deutschland ist ein Teil des Westens, seiner geistigen und sozialen Struktur, seiner geschichtlichen Tradition und dem Willen seiner Bevölkerung nach. Die Bundesregierung wird in Zukunft in ihren Bemühungen um die europäische Integration und die Verteidigung der Freiheit nicht nachlassen, sie wird vielmehr verstärken...<sup>391</sup>

It is generally assumed that Adenauer went out of his way to offset any misperceptions on the part of the Allies in light of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>390</sup> Adenauer, as cited from "Regierungserklärung zu den Moskauer Vereinbarungen." Bulletin Presse und Informationssamt der Bundesregierung. 23 September, 1955. Nr.179 s. 1494

<sup>391</sup> Ibid. s. 1494

<sup>392</sup> In his memoirs Adenauer talks about what he felt was the 'Rapallo type' proposal made by the Soviet leader in light of their continuing problems with China since the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting struggle for leadership in the communist world. With typical rethoric Adenauer explains his response this way:

Es wäre eine Untreue gegen Europa und gegen Amerika gewesen, und den Russen in diesem Stadium und ohne fest Bindung mit der ubrigen freien Welt zu helfen, hiesse den Kopf in den Rachen des Löwen zu

Although Adenauer wrote this letter making it clear that the Federal Republic did, in no way, recognize the post-war status quo, he has nonetheless been criticized for actually precipitating the 'de-facto' recognition of the territorial status quo some twenty years before Helsinki. For the above reason, many scholars have looked upon Adenauer's trip to Moscow as being premature and ill advised and in fact, some such as Ferenc Vali even refer to it as a Soviet victory.

Thus, although neither of the two opposing legal and political positions (Adenauer's Vs The Soviet's) was violated, the Soviet government achieved its objective.<sup>393</sup>

A week after the signing of this agreement, the Soviets , in a shrewd political move designed to underline the existence of the two German states, signed a Treaty of 'Soviet-GDR Relations' dissolving the Soviet High Commission in East Berlin and replacing it with an Embassy thereby attempting to stress GDR sovereignty and equality within the Warsaw Pact Alliance.<sup>394</sup> Following these developments the USSR insisted that reunification would be an internal matter between the two German states. In light of this, SED leader

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Adenauer, as cited in Hillgruber. p.64 (It is from Adenauer's statements concerning the 'Rapallo-offer' that Schwarz gets the evidence for his 'China-theory' discussed earlier.)

<sup>393</sup> Vali p.41

<sup>394</sup> Sowden p.176

Walter Ulbricht increasingly called for an all-German confederation which he saw this as a means to gaining diplomatic recognition for the DDR. Needless to say, this was rejected by the West Germans.<sup>395</sup>

Adenauer's actions vis-a-vis Moscow have been interpreted as a calculated attempt to prove to the Allies that he too could pursue a more active Ostpolitik and operate within an environment characterised by less tension: the problem here being that he was unwilling to go any further. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow provided the opportunity for Adenauer to pursue a more adventurous Ostpolitik, although the opposite occurred. This marked the beginning of an essentially 'defensive' attitude on the part of the FRG towards the East and shortly was followed by the enunciation of the 'Halstein Doctrine'. Before the implications of the Halstein Doctrine are examined, the events of October 1955 and the 4-Power Foreign Ministers' conference should be briefly discussed.

In October of 1955 once again the 4-Powers convened a meeting to discuss reunification and European security. The Western proposal was developed in a treaty of Assurances containing nine clauses<sup>396</sup> and called for reunification with

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<sup>395</sup> See Bracher pp. 202-203

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the Treaty called for a 1: renunciation of the Use of Force 2: withdrawing support from aggressors 3: limitations on force and armaments 4: inspection and control 5: special warning system 6: consultation 7: Individual and Collective Self Defence 8: Obligation to react

free elections. The proposal reiterated the Western position that without German reunification there could be no realistic security system.

Without German Unity, any system of European security would be an illusion.<sup>397</sup>

The Soviet counter proposal repeated their interest in establishing a collective security system before reunification could take place. The end result of these three weeks of deliberations was that although both sides had agreed to reunification as an eventuality, it was the mechanics of realizing this through an All-German Council (the Soviet proposal of November 2nd, 1955) or through free elections (Western proposal) and its relationship to a general security system which provided the major obstacles to progress.

As part of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, Adenauer felt that it would be necessary to counterbalance this by attempting to prevent the recognition of the DDR using the FRG's growing economic and political strength. The Halstein Doctrine<sup>398</sup> was enunciated in December 1955 and was aimed primarily at the emerging Third

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against aggressors and 9: Entry into force by steps. As cited from the Western Proposal for German Reunification and European Security, October 27th, 1955. Documents on Germany pp. 194-95

<sup>397</sup> As cited in the Western Proposal on German Reunification and European Security, October 27th, 1955. in Documents on Germany p.193

<sup>398</sup> This was named after the Federal Republic's Secretary of State Walter Halstein, although it was drawn up by Wilhelm Grewe.

World. It tried to make clear to these states the peculiar and distinct aspects of the German problem. It was drawn up by Adenauer's influential advisor and US Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, and as enunciated in a note to then Yugoslavian Ambassador in 1957 it stated:

The Federal Republic has never left any doubt that it would have to regard as an unfriendly act, directed against the vital interests of the German people, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the government in Central Germany which lacks all democratic legitimacy - by governments with which the Federal government itself maintains diplomatic relations. Nor has the Federal government left any doubt that such a step would render inevitable reconsideration of mutual relations on the part of the Federal government.<sup>399</sup>

In the Bundestag on September 22nd, 1955 Adenauer outlined more directly the essentials of what would become known as the Hallstein Doctrine.

In our relations with the Third World we also uphold the viewpoint adopted hitherto in respect to the so-called 'DDR'. I must state unequivocally that in future the Federal government will also regard the establishment of diplomatic relations with the 'DDR' by third states maintaining official relations with the Federal Republic as an unfriendly act designed to deepen the division of Germany.<sup>400</sup>

The last part of this statement was interpreted to mean that the Federal Republic would immediately break off relations with any state officially recognizing the DDR. Its purpose,

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<sup>399</sup> The Hallstein Doctrine: Note to the Yugoslavian Ambassador 1957. (as quoted from:) James K. Pollock, John C. Lane (editors) Source Materials on the Government and Politics of Germany Wahrs Publishers Ltd. Ann Arbor, Mich. 1964. p. 282

<sup>400</sup> Statement by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the Bundestag on September 22nd, 1955.

as Richard Lowenthal points' out in an article entitled "Germany's Role in East-West Relations" was to try to convince the Soviets that East Germany had indeed become a liability for them in terms of getting Soviet Second World War gains recognized in the West.<sup>401</sup> The Halstein Doctrine was first used in the spring of 1958 when Tito recognized East Germany and the FRG (whose relations with Yugoslavia were first established in 1951) promptly severed all ties. This policy appeared to achieve some success for a brief period but, as Phillip Windsor points out in his book entitled German Reunification, the Halstein Doctrine ultimately amounted not to a statement of progressive policy but rather a statement consistent with Adenauer's policy of non-recognition of East Germany. Adenauer explained away the apparent contradiction of having diplomatic relations with the USSR (the dominant power in Eastern Europe) as being qualitatively different from official relations with other east European state owing to the fact that the USSR is also one of the 4-Powers responsible for Germany.<sup>402</sup>

The Halstein Doctrine demonstrates clearly that Adenauer adopted a very rigid, legalistic interpretation of the Potsdam Agreements and consistently adhered to a position that

no permanent revision of Germany's border could take place before a final peace treaty could be

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<sup>401</sup> Richard Lowenthal. "Germany's Role in East-West Relations." World Today Vol. 23, June 1967. p.242

<sup>402</sup> Phillip Windsor German Reunification International Relations Series. Elek Books Ltd. London 1969. p.36



signed.<sup>403</sup>

The Halstein Doctrine seemed to develop from the FRG's 'alleinvertretung' or sole representation position and its relationship to the aforementioned events of 1955.

The events of 1956 in Hungary and Poland and the Western inaction (in part due to their involvement in Suez) on the reunification issue led Adenauer to fear that a mutual Soviet-United States desire to avoid a major conflagration might lead them to settle differences in Germany without specifically addressing West German interests regarding reunification. Adenauer saw in the Soviet invasion of Hungary a Superpower who was certainly still willing to use force to achieve its own political and ideological goals and that talk of a "thaw" during the post-Stalin period under Khrushchev was merely that, talk.<sup>404</sup> The United States' denunciation of the Anglo-French escapade in Suez upset the West German leader in that he perceived a sense of weakened Western solidarity which might, in the future, set a precedent of American non-support of her Allies in a crisis situation.<sup>405</sup>

In addition, after the 1955 enunciation of the Halstein Doctrine, relations between Von Brentano and Adenauer became strained as Von Brentano argued that Bonn should concentrate

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<sup>403</sup> Wolfram Hanrieder The Foreign Policies of France, Britain, and West Germany p.52

<sup>404</sup> Merkl p.101

<sup>405</sup> Griffith p.77

its attention on Eastern Europe (specifically on Poland). Adenauer, on the other hand, maintained that change could only come about through dialogue with Moscow. In this way he overestimated the willingness of Moscow to make concessions on reunification while Brentano's policy actually foreshadowed his successor, Gerhard Schröder's 'Politik der Bewegung'.<sup>406</sup> Von Brentano wanted to take advantage of the 1956 post-Gomulka's German policy but the Chancellor refused repeating his attitude that Moscow must be the focus.<sup>407</sup>

The Polish example is important because it serves to reinforce the interpretation of Adenauer's Ostpolitik as being stubborn and 'legalistic'. In the more 'relaxed' atmosphere that was Poland in 1956, wherein Warsaw was leaning towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, opposition to Adenauer's policies was gaining greater strength. The Polish initiatives presented the West German leader with the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with Warsaw at a time when the only Germans represented there were from the Pankow Regime.<sup>408</sup>

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<sup>406</sup> Literally, the 'policy of movement'. This refers to the Ostpolitik pursued by Gerhard Schröder during the last two years of Adenauer's administration and during the Erhard Administration in which small steps were taken to initiate a dialogue with Eastern Europe, specifically Poland.

<sup>407</sup> Griffith pp.78-79

<sup>408</sup> Bracher p.207

There were calls from within the CDU (Büromeister Sievek-ing for example) for a normalization of Polish-German relations, but the continued East-West conflict concerning the final placement of the GDR-Polish border and the persisting influence of the Refugee groups (BHE) served to harden Adenauer's position into one of nonaction. This episode reinforced the 'unconstructive' image of his Ostpolitik to opponents both within his own party and among opposition members of the Bundestag.<sup>409</sup>

The United States, through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Radford, decided in 1956 to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, although the actual warheads would have remained under American control. Adenauer immediately agreed to this for he wanted a stronger voice for West Germany in the nuclear as well as the political decision making arenas.<sup>410</sup> Adenauer felt that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would serve four useful purposes; they would provide an additional bonding element between American and European defence<sup>411</sup> they would strengthen the 'hostage function' of American troops in Germany; a Germany

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<sup>409</sup> Ibid. p.148

<sup>410</sup> Griffith p.79

<sup>411</sup> One must understand Adenauer's anxiety at this time for he perceived a definite weakening of NATO in light of the New York Times' 'leaking' the story of the Radford Plan which would have consisted of the pullout of some 800,000 American troops, the shift of French troops to Algeria, and the reduction by the Belgium government of the length of their military service. See Gerald Freund Germany between Two Worlds p.148

without nuclear weapons might encourage neutralist sentiments within the Federal Republic, and finally they would be a crucial symbol of political status, as with the French and British when they developed their independant nuclear deterrent.<sup>412</sup>

It was into this environment that Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki announced in October 1957 a proposal for a nuclear free zone in central Europe. This was just the first of many disengagement proposals made during the 1956-58 period; others included those by British MP Hugh Gaitskell, George Kennan and the SPD's 'Deutschlandplan'. There exists some discrepancy as to whether this actually represented a sovereign Polish initiative or was rather a Soviet inspired attempt to prevent the arming of the Bundeswehr with Nuclear weapons. In his address Rapacki goes on to state:

In the interest of Poland's security and of a relaxation of tensions in Europe, the Government of the People's Republic of Poland declares that if the two German states should consent to enforce the prohibition and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on their respective territories, the Peoples' Republic of Poland is prepared simultaneously to institute the same prohibition on its territory.<sup>413</sup>

Adenauer reacted to this by going a step further and proposing general global disarmament.

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<sup>412</sup> Joffe p.90

<sup>413</sup> As cited in the Address by the Polish Foreign Minister on Disarmament, October 2nd, 1957. in Documents on Germany p.247

In the period between the Rapacki Plan and Khrushchev's initiation of the second Berlin crisis in 1958; Adenauer made some initial moves towards the east. Although feeling more secure in the post-Suez re-establishment of Western solidarity, Adenauer still felt that he had to do something to prevent from becoming politically isolated. He reversed his position that reunification must come before arms control and began to advocate policies of general global disarmament. Many critics assailed Adenauer for the apparent contradiction then being expressed through these general disarmament proposals because of Adenauer's consistent support for German rearmament. In March 1958 Adenauer secretly proposed to Soviet ambassador Smirnov that the Austria solution (of neutrality) should be used as the technique to reunify the two Germanies. This was rejected by the Soviets.<sup>414</sup> These moves were short lived for Soviet decision makers decided to try once again to force the West out of Berlin, thus precipitating the second Berlin crisis.

On November 10th, 1958 Nikita Khrushchev, at a joint Soviet-Polish Conference on Germany and Berlin initiated what has been called the Second Berlin crisis. In his address he stated:

The time has obviously arrived for the signatories of the Potsdam agreement to renounce the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin and thereby

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<sup>414</sup> Griffith pp. 84-85. The Soviets had by this time decided to fully support the two-state theory. They had decided to develop the DDR into one of their most important Allies in the east; this was reflected in their efforts to gain full diplomatic recognition for East Germany.

make it possible to create a normal situation in the capital of the DDR the functions in Berlin that are still exercised by Soviet agencies.<sup>415</sup>

This quotation, and the rest of the speech essentially amounted to a demand for the West to remove itself from West Berlin and for the Allies to agree to the creation there of a so-called 'free city'. The Soviets demanded an end to the 4-power control over Germany and for the 'de-jure' recognition of the DDR, and threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with them if this was not carried out. The consequences of these actions would force the West to directly negotiate with the DDR over such issues as transit rights. The West's reply stated that the 4 power status simply could not be declared null and void by any one member, and thus set the stage for further East-West confrontation.<sup>416</sup> This crisis could not have come at a better time for Adenauer, for given the growing strength of the opposition to his inflexibility during the Polish episode, this aggressive Soviet stance served to reduce the threat of increasing FRG isolation within the Alliance.

During the crisis the Foreign Ministers met at Geneva in May 1959 wherein the American representative proposed the 'Herter Plan'.<sup>417</sup> This conference was preceded by the draft

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<sup>415</sup> As cited from an Address by Khrushchev at a Soviet-Polish meeting on Germany and Berlin, November 10th, 1958. in Documents on Germany p.342

<sup>416</sup> Hanrieder. The Foreign Policies of France, Britain, and West Germany p.56

<sup>417</sup> Named after United States Secretary of State Charles A. Herter.

of a Soviet peace plan for Germany on June 10th, 1959 which basically amounted to a call for the recognition of the status quo (the existence of two separate German states) and was therefore immediately rejected by the FRG.<sup>418</sup>

Specifically the 'Herter Plan' called for reunification by steps that would involve a preparatory period during which a 'mixed committee for the whole of Germany could be set up'<sup>419</sup> to compose an electoral law under which, after a set period of time, free elections would take place. Actually this plan had more relevance to Berlin's security than reunification, although the two were linked. The newly appointed Soviet representative Andre Gromyko then, in turn, presented a counter proposal with the final result much like the rest of the meetings; complete lack of agreement. There were significant consequences though; the process of the negotiations themselves, lead to apprehension in Bonn that the two Superpowers might sign an agreement "over the heads" of the FRG and thereby settling differences without FRG participation. This anxiety was expressed in a letter sent by then Foreign Minister Von Brentano to Scherpenberg.

I have the impression that more and more the foreign policy initiative and freedom of actions escapes us, or more accurately, is taken away from us and we are sinking back into a situation in which we are only the object of the policies of others.<sup>420</sup>

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<sup>418</sup> Sowden p.191

<sup>419</sup> As cited in a statement made by Charles A. Herter, Presenting the Western Peace plan, May 14th, 1959. in Documents on Germany p.459

The above quotation is important for it underlines the fact that the Central European states had in fact become merely the 'objects' of the Superpowers and were no longer to enjoy their traditional role as a powerful 'subject' in Europe.

By the late 1950's a serious divergence of opinion developed between Washington and Bonn which was compounded by the death of American Secretary of State, and Adenauer's close personal friend, John Foster Dulles in 1959. Both men were truly 'Politicians of the Cold war' and probably understood each other even better than Adenauer and DeGaulle. Adenauer, even though upset with Dulles' Agent Theory (in which the DDR would act as agents in guaranteeing Western access routes to West Berlin) he nevertheless respected and supported Dulles' more general Weltanschauung.<sup>421</sup> It has been argued that Dulles' death upset Adenauer to such an extent that it moved him closer politically to DeGaulle.<sup>422</sup> Adenauer's domestic political situation during this period had become substantially more difficult as a result of the presidential scandal following the resignation of FRG President Theodore Heuss and Adenauer's attempt to succeed him, which was followed shortly by the reversal of that same deci-

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<sup>420</sup> Von Brentano, as cited from Griffiths. p.87

<sup>421</sup> The timing of Dulles' statements about the DDR were quite disturbing coming so soon after Khrushchev's Berlin Ultimatum. As cited from: Hillgruber. p. 64

<sup>422</sup> Charles Burdick. Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture Westview Press. Boulder, Col. 1984 p. 183



sion.<sup>423</sup>

In November of 1960, partly as a genuine offer and partly to show the Western Allies that he could breath new life into his Ostpolitik, Adenauer put forward the Globke Plan.<sup>424</sup> It called for reunification to occur if, ten years after, majorities in both states voted for it in United Nations' supervised elections. Berlin would become a 'free city' under United Nation supervision, and with no interzonal trade restrictions. In accordance with their emphasis on the existence of two German states, Khrushchev rejected this proposal.<sup>425</sup>

A significant side point to Bonn's Ostpolitik were the actions taken by West German Ambassador Kroll in 1962 when he proposed his 'little solution' to the Soviet Union without the proper authorization from Adenauer. This plan called for assurances by the Soviets of their peaceful intensions towards Berlin, improvements in the GDR human rights record, removal of the Wall, and recognition of the rights of all East Germans to self determination ('Selbstbestimmungsrecht') in return for 'de-facto' FRG recognition

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<sup>423</sup> Griffiths pp.88-89

<sup>424</sup> Named for FRG's State Secretary Hans Globke, a more influential foreign policy advisor than was the first Foreign Minister von Brentano.

<sup>425</sup> In fact, in June 1962 a second Globke plan was proposed (again rejected by the Soviets) which called for a ten-year moratorium on the German question and the liberalization of East Germany. It was promptly rejected by Smirnov who repeated his call for a peace treaty between the two states. Griffith p 86 & p. 94

of the the GDR.<sup>426</sup> After this episode an angry Adenauer had Kroll recalled to Bonn.<sup>427</sup>

The drift that had characterized Adenauer's Ostpolitik from 1955 to the beginning of the 1960's became more pronounced as it confronted a new American administration and a new international environment characterised by a decrease in 'Cold War' tensions.<sup>428</sup> As the Soviets developed their ICBM capability following the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the nuclear balance of terror became the prevailing reality, a trend towards arms control developed. Adenauer was apprehensive of arms control for he felt that the process of negotiations might provide a vehicle through which the GDR would acquire diplomatic recognition.<sup>429</sup> The effectiveness of Adenauer's uncompromising Ostpolitik of the early 1950's was based upon the American nuclear monopoly and these same cold

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<sup>426</sup> Merkl. p.115

<sup>427</sup> Dulles pp.113-114

<sup>428</sup> Hillgruber comments on this changed foreign policy outlook on the part of the Americans when he says:

Der Seit 1947 die Weltpolitik beherrschende 'Kalten Krieg' wurde von den USA für beendet erklärt. 'Entspannung und Friendedspolitik' waren die neue Leitbegriffe der Amerikanische Aussenpolitik. As cited from Hillgruber. p.80

Hillgruber goes on to state that Adenauer's Ostpolitik could not be as effective under such a fundamental change in American perceptions, and therefore discontinued to play its central role.

<sup>429</sup> Windsor p.97

war tensions; as the situation transformed itself, so too did the effectiveness of Adenauer's Ostpolitik.

Before Kennedy's arrival, the Bonn-Washington Axis had been quite fruitful; Dulles and Eisenhower accepted and admired Adenauer and felt that he really symbolized the new Germany. Likewise on Adenauer's part ( who knew very little about America) Dulles was seen as an individual whose anti-communist sentiments actually rivalled his own. With the arrival of a new American Administration, this situation changed dramatically. Newly elected Democratic President John F. Kennedy was perceived as being both a brash young man<sup>430</sup> and one who was more accommodating towards the USSR.

Konrad Adenauer was at least as apprehensive as DeGaulle about Kennedy's ascension to the presidency. The new American leader appeared to him to be a 'cross between a junior naval person and a Roman Catholic boy scout' a man, as the chancellor insisted to DeGaulle, with a weakness for surrounding himself with prima donnas.<sup>431</sup>

Indeed Kennedy became more accommodating towards arms control as the Cuban Missile crisis demonstrated to the Superpowers just how close to the precipice of nuclear conflagration they had come).

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<sup>430</sup> Indeed in 1957 the young senator was quoted as saying:

Adenauer's time is now over. The main question... must now be the name of Adenauer's successor.  
(Gatzke p.188)

a statement which certainly did not endear him to the German leader.

<sup>431</sup> Barnet. p.223

Adenauer was personally opposed to Kennedy's reexamination of American nuclear strategy as later manifest in the 'flexible response'. The (Kennedy) goal was, at minimum, to prevent miscalculation leading to war in the continuing Cold War struggle; at maximum, to reach agreements beginning in the military realm to go beyond hostile co-existence to peaceful co-operation.<sup>432</sup>

Adenauer supported the strategic concept of 'massive retaliation' because he felt that it bound the United States firmly to European and German defence<sup>433</sup> and felt that 'flexible response' only sacrificed effective deterrence for the better protection of American cities.<sup>434</sup> It has been argued that Adenauer never really understood the concept of flexible response and this view may have been justified. The West German leader felt that in abandoning 'forward defence' for 'defence in depth' the whole of the Federal Republic could become a battleground in another war.<sup>435</sup>

Besides some of these apprehensions Adenauer displayed concerning Kennedy's 'flexible response' proposals, the heart of the problem was manifest in the incompatibility of the 'Weltanschauungen' of both leaders. Adenauer transferred his anti-intellectualism he held for German academics (Erhard among them) to Kennedy and his advisors. Adenauer's

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<sup>432</sup> Planack p.33

<sup>433</sup> Hanreider pp.5-6

<sup>434</sup> Griffith pp.90-91

<sup>435</sup> Balfour p.239 (These sentiments expressed by the West German Chancellor have almost a prophetic quality about them in light of the raging debate going on today within Germany over alternative defence proposals, some of which have roots back to the 1950's)

'dogmatic cold war' rhetoric and inflexible attitudes contrasted sharply with the cool precise approach of Schröder and Erhard, and this, combined with his complete ignorance of America made for a very difficult relationship. Although this may seem like an issue more applicable to a discussion of FRG's Westpolitik, it is important here because the divergence of attitudes later helped to widen the already increasing gap between the two leaders in terms of their attitude towards relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>436</sup>

Adenauer's ineffective and slow response to the combined Soviet/East German solution to their refugee problem (the Berlin Wall of 1961) had a deep effect on German perceptions of his leadership and policies. Growing disillusion was partly reflected in the decrease in the number of seats and the decrease in popular vote obtained by the CDU in the 1961 federal election. After the completion of the wall, the West waited to see if Adenauer would continue to pursue his 'hard line' policies towards the East, which would demonstrate his complete refusal to recognize the Wall's significance.<sup>437</sup> The CDU leadership's notion of reunification preceding detente rang somewhat hollow during this period although 'peaceful co-existence' served to highlight the potential danger of West Germany becoming politically isolated.

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<sup>436</sup> Heinrich Bolling. Republic in Suspense Praeger Contemporary World World Series No. 10 , N.Y. 1964. pp. 220-222

<sup>437</sup> Sowden. p.352.

After the events of August 1961, Adenauer tried to shift the focus of his troubles from Washington-Bonn relations to deepening Franco-German rapprochement, which was ultimately realized through the historic Franco-German Friendship Treaty in 1963; without doubt one of the major highlights of his Westpolitik. In fact even here Adenauer's foreign policy advisors were so worried about the perception of him shifting towards DeGaulle in light of his difficulties with Kennedy, that Foreign Minister Schröder actually added a 'pro-American' preamble to the 1963 Treaty of Friendship.<sup>438</sup>

In 1962 Kennedy further expanded the developing schism and estrangement with the West German leader through his premature call for an international access authority for Berlin. Adenauer, once again displaying just how far Germany had come since 1949 in terms of exercising autonomy, basically vetoed the idea by prematurely 'leaking' the details of the proposal to the press. The absence of any mention of

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<sup>438</sup> Peter Merkl. Germany Yesterday and Today. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1965 p.261 The fact that the preamble was added to the document can be taken as proof of the deep party rift developing between the Atlantic vs. the European groups within the CDU. Adenauer, then enjoying the warm political spotlight because of the Friendship treaty with France, was the strongest proponent of the 'european' group, while his Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard represented the 'atlantic' group. Schröder wanted to guide German foreign policy out of the 'dead-end' Ostpolitik which Adenauer had created. This author is of the opinion that one could designate the 1961-63 period when the 'atlantisists' gained the upper hand as the beginning of the development of a generally bi-partisan outlook on the major goals of West German Ostpolitik which were to culminate in the creation of the Grand Coalition in 1967.

the reunification problem in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty served to further illustrate for Adenauer that the West was pursuing detente and arms control ahead of the interests of the Federal Republic. Due to the United States' desire for detente, the amount of common ground between two states was constantly decreasing with the FRG actually threatening to become a liability for the United States.<sup>439</sup>

Kennedy's access route statement made to the editor of *IZvestia* in November 1961, highlights some of the difficulties between the two states. Bonn's leadership seemed to lack an understanding of the requirements of a Superpower and Adenauer felt that Kennedy saw the Germans as basically a disturbing element in East-West relations. Adenauer has been criticized for taking a very 'provincial' view of international relations, which given the limited extent of his travels can certainly be justified. More importantly though, it was Bonn's aforementioned fear of secret American-Soviet collusion (which could potentially resolve the 'German question' without Bonn's participation) which colored the West German leader's relations with their most important Western Ally.<sup>440</sup>

Some of the blame for this deteriorating situation must be accepted by the American President because for some eighteen months American strategy was certainly ambivalent

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<sup>439</sup> Windsor. German Reunification p.44

<sup>440</sup> Ibid. pp. 217-219

as Kennedy's decision makers struggled to strike a balance between a move to strengthen NATO in light of DeGaulle's challenge, and of other factions who were more concerned with arms Control.<sup>441</sup>

Those who now point to Bonn's commitment to maintaining good relations with the GDR and the Soviet bloc as proof of a West German drift to the East should be reminded that it was American policy under Kennedy and Charles DeGaulle's own policy of 'Detente, Entente, et Cooperation' that shattered the foundations of Adenauer's policy of strength and forced a painful process of re-thinking West German foreign policy goals in the 1960's.<sup>442</sup>

More importantly though, it was the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 which served as the watershed in West German foreign policy. Its construction basically forced the FRG to accept the 'de-facto' status quo in Germany and the complete failure of Adenauer's Ostpolitik as characterized by reunification through strength.<sup>443</sup>

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<sup>441</sup> Roger Morgan. "The United States and the Federal Republic." p.184

<sup>442</sup> Asmus, Ronald D. pp.41-42

<sup>443</sup> Andreas Hillgruber sums up the significance of the Wall's construction this way:

Sehr schnell stand fest, dass an 13 August 1961 in der Deutschland-Frage eine irreversible Entscheidung gefallen war, dass die totale Abschnürung der beiden deutschen Staaten voneinander von die Westalliierten und der Bundesrepublik hingenommen wurde, dass die weitere Geschichte der Deutschen Nation sich nicht nur - wir viele bisher gehoft habe - vorübergehend sondern für sehr lange Zeit in zwei Staaten mit diametrisal entgegengesetzten Gesellschaftsordnung vollziehen würde. (Hillgruber p. 76.)



Once the end of this road was reached, decision makers paradoxically harkened back to a comment in 1956 made by the Social Democrat Fritz Erler which seemed to symbolize a call for a more forward-looking Ostpolitik.

The more traffic there is, the more communist violence and monopoly of opinion lose their effectiveness among the people of the Soviet Zone and the more they come to know what a real society looks like. Increased trade relations can also help to raise the living standards in the Soviet Zone, while cultural exchanges keep alive the feeling of 'belonging together', of being members of the same community of European culture.<sup>444</sup>

By 1961 the politicians calling for a more pragmatic approach to the East were becoming more and more difficult to silence. These included Ambassador Duckwitz who pleaded with Adenauer for a more active Ostpolitik, and Gerhard Schröder, who, after Adenauer had been weakened by the 1961 presidential fiasco, pushed ahead with increasing acceptance within the CDU of his policy of movement, which eventually was embraced by Ludwig Erhard.<sup>445</sup> The opposition SPD found that some of their calls for a renewed active Ostpolitik with Eastern Europe were also being expressed within the governing coalition.

In the Summer of 1961 noted German academic and philosopher Karl Jaspers compared calls for reunification of the two Germanies (by the CDU and various refugee groups, most notably the BHE) to the Bismarckian revival of the concept

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<sup>444</sup> Fritz Erler. "The Struggle for German Reunification." Foreign Affairs Vol. 34 No.3 April 1956.

<sup>445</sup> Bolling. p.234

of the state which, he said, the FRG has rejected. He went on to say the reunification issue was really a refusal by the German people to accept their defeat and its resulting consequences as reflected in Germany's partition, and for him the Ostpolitik of the FRG should be geared towards increasing the freedom for the Germans living in the GDR and reunification per say.<sup>446</sup>

In Jaspers' view Germany had forfeited her right to national unity because of Hitler. What she retained was a right to freedom only, as well as the right of demanding freedom for the population of East Germany.<sup>447</sup>

Although there exists a firm basis for a criticism of Adenauer's Ostpolitik, Adenauer himself either refused to admit the obvious or indeed intensely believed that integration into the western community of nations was the natural pre-requisite for reunification.

dass die europäische Föderation auch ein grösser Schritt auf dem Wege zu Wiedervereinigung ist<sup>448</sup>

Weidenfeld states that:

Die vielfach als antinomisch verstandene Grundstruktur von Integration und Nation löste Adenauer in seiner spezifischen Sicht auf, indem er beide Aktionsfelder an eine identische Westorientierung.<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>446</sup> Ibid. p.263

<sup>447</sup> Vali. p.113

<sup>448</sup> Adenauer, as cited in: Weidenfeld. p.111

<sup>449</sup> Ibid. p.210

To Adenauer, european integration and his consistent anti-communism were the ways in which he could prevent West German political isolation. He viewed integration as helping to destroy questionable German traditions of nationalism and anti-western sentiments. It should also not be forgotten that this european solution has played a major role in the German struggle to overcome their past, the so-called 'Bewältigung der Vergangenheit'.

Even though Adenauer's general attitude towards european unity remained the same, there does exist a number of unanswered questions and the perplexing actions by the German leader only serve to confuse the record. For example; it seems that ever since the signing of the 1957 Rome Treaty, Adenauer moved away from general european integration in favor of closer Franco-German co-operation. The question remains as to how these actions can be justified. Was the Franco-German reconciliation and the NATO community compatible? Why did Adenauer allow himself to come under the influence of DeGaulle. Did his concept of Europe change? Was he afraid of the effects that British entry into the EEC would have on Germany's then number 'two' position? This author believes that the last explanation is the reason, along with his distrust of the northern 'Protestant' states. More importantly though, he saw DeGaulle as an ally who would support his efforts to prevent the de-coupling of German interests from the arms control discussions the Superpowers were then engaging in.

## 6.2 OSTPOLITIK CONCLUSIONS

It is better, and in any case politically preferable, to do what is possible, instead of dreaming about what is at present impossible...<sup>450</sup>

The above quotation has been chosen from the article 'Our Two Peoples' by Adenauer to demonstrate the extent to which he felt that the Federal Republic was faced with a very clear policy choice between which of their foreign policy orientations (Westpolitik or Ostpolitik) to stress. Not only was Adenauer, as a 'Carolingian' predisposed to a Western European Union loosely based on Christian values and therefore fundamentally uninterested in the East, but public opinion polls seemed to confirm that reunification was not really that important as an immediate foreign policy priority. Most Germans were for reunification (as one is against 'Sin') but the degrees to which this support was manifest were highly questionable and fluxuated substantially.<sup>451</sup>

It would be misleading even to imply that had Adenauer possessed a stronger interest in pursuing an aggressive-diplomatic Ostpolitik, that he was free to do so, for the Superpower nuclear equation and their general state of relations would probably have proved too great an obstacle for the successful implementation of any engaging Ostpolitik. Any independant aggressive move towards the east so soon

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<sup>450</sup> Konrad Adenauer. "Our Two Peoples" in Foreign Affairs June 26th, 1952

<sup>451</sup> Richard Hiscocks. Germany Revisited Garden City Press. Ltd. London 1966 p.234

after the war could have lead to a serious misunderstanding with the West at a very vulnerable point in West German political development.<sup>452</sup> In this sense the international system imposed upon Adenauer certain constraints on his scope for initiative in the foreign policy realm

The apparent need to make a choice between security and recovery on the one hand and reunification on the other hand was largely imposed by the power and interest configuration of the Cold War international system; and Germany's weakness and dependence on the Western powers did not leave the Adenauer government much room for maneuver, and even if Bonn had been prepared to accommodate the Soviet Union and thus run the risks of its security and recovery policy as well as its reunification policy<sup>453</sup>

In his book The Stable Crisis Wolfram Hanreider suggests that bipolarities of interest, tension, and power were not really conducive to a policy of reunification.<sup>454</sup> Adenauer's anti-communism and his desire for a militarily strong West posed a serious limitation to the pursuit of his reunifica-

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<sup>452</sup> Dulles. p.8

<sup>453</sup> Hanreider. The Stable Crisis Harper and Row Publishers Ltd. N.Y. 1970 pp. 130-131

<sup>454</sup>

Beide gegnerischen Lager des Kalten Krieges hielten es für opportun, Deutschlands Bestrebungen nach Weidervereinigung zumindest verbal zu unterstützen, doch wollten weder die Vereinigten Staaten noch die Sowjetunion ein widervereinigtes Deutschland, das zur wirklich freien Gestalltung seiner Auswärtiges Beziehungen in der Lage gewesen wäre und damit das Kräfte gleichgewicht in Europa fundamental hätte verändern können. (Hanreider. 'Die westdeutsche Aussenpolitik von 1949-79: Möglichkeiten und Notwendigkeiten') Im Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik: 30 Jahren Deutschen Aussenpolitik. Aktuell, Verlag Bonn. 1981 p.39

tion goals.<sup>455</sup> It has been suggested by a number of analysts that Adenauer's Ostpolitik simply cannot be understood without stressing his preference for security, freedom, and unity - in that order. He saw the whole reunification question as a freedom issue and could only be achieved as a fully democratic state.

Doch die Analyse der einzelnen Entscheidungsfälle wie auch der Grundanlage seiner Politik zeigt ganz zweifelsfrei, dass er Freiheit und Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik sowie den Freiheit in Europa über das Ziel einer Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands gestellt hat.<sup>456</sup>

Adenauer realized that he had to tread quite carefully when attempting to pursue a more energetic Ostpolitik.

Adenauer realized that going it alone in the field of Ostpolitik would not merely place a burden on the FRG, but that it would threaten the very existence and survival of the newly formed state.<sup>457</sup>

He therefore decided to pursue his Western foreign policy in the hopes that it would lead to a gradual release by the USSR of their hold over Eastern Europe, especially over the GDR. He hoped that change in the overall political equation would break the German logjam'.

As Adenauer purported to see things, only a Western policy of strength predicated upon the FRG's complete integration into the West, could open up vistas to the East, in the first instance by bringing about Germany's reunification in freedom 'through the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the concomitant elimination of the 'puppet' East Ger-

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<sup>455</sup> Hiscocks. Germany Revisited p.221

<sup>456</sup> Schwarz. Rhöndorfer Gespräche p.15

<sup>457</sup> Kunz. p.54

man regime.<sup>458</sup>

In this sense, Adenauer's foreign policy between 1953-58 was governed by propagandistic, psychological and juridical arguments which seemed to lag far behind the prevailing reality. While his rigid position seemed to complement and even shape public opinion in the 1949-53 period, as previously mentioned, Adenauer's Ostpolitik seemed 'out of step' in the subsequent period.<sup>459</sup> Given these criticisms, one must make mention of Adenauer's tremendous ability to communicate to the German people, particularly earlier in his chancellorship his conviction that reunification would follow as a result of strengthened Western European integration was widely accepted.

Thus German public opinion was conditioned to believe that alignment with the West and German contribution to the Western military preparedness would force the hand of the Soviets and bring about the long expected Soviet concession of genuine free elections and, as a result, the unity of Germany<sup>460</sup>

The Allies themselves, for reasons such as the containment of communism and the development of an economically self sufficient West, fully supported Adenauer's reunification through strength policy, especially in the early 1950's.

Since NATO's 'raison d'etre' was the defence of the free world, and Germany was to become part of the free world, reunification seemed a natural consequence for the Alliance.<sup>461</sup>

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<sup>458</sup> Merkl. p.38

<sup>459</sup> Windsor p.104

<sup>460</sup> Vali. p.38

With the dawning of the 1960's, the United States and the USSR developed (spurred on by such crises as Berlin in 1958 and Cuba in 1962) a bipartisan interest in preventing a dispute from resulting in nuclear war. These developments resulted in the undermining of the second of the two tenants upon which Adenauer's Ostpolitik rested. Adenauer's reunification policy only served to raise hopes in East Germany which could not possibly be fulfilled. The West's policy of liberation of the East became impossible after the Soviets developed their own retaliatory nuclear capability.<sup>462</sup> These factors, along with Khrushchev's initial 'feelers' towards 'peaceful co-existence', seemed to go a long way towards removing the threatening aspect of Soviet intentions upon which Adenauer's policy of non-engagement with the East had been built. He found that within a detente environment, the Federal Republic simply could not exercise the same amount of influence within the Western community and that this would ultimately stifle the movement towards increased Western integration. Actually it was not a question of reduced influence, but rather a matter of finding the proper policy orientation in which this influence could be exerted. Hence the need for a fundamental re-evaluation of the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik, which began in the 1961-63 period under Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder. Adenauer, as previously stated, feared either a 'return to Potsdam' mentali-

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<sup>461</sup> Ibid. p. 245

<sup>462</sup> Hanrieder. The Foreign Policies of France, Britain, and West Germany p.93



ty on behalf of the Superpowers or, worse still, a drift by the United States into globalism as the focus of Superpower confrontation shifted from Germany to arms control and developments in the emerging Third World.<sup>463</sup>

The direct results of the 1953 revolt in East Germany and the Berlin wall were such that the German electorate and the West in general realized the bankruptcy of Adenauer's policy of bringing about reunification through strengthened Western European integration. Paradoxically the Wall had served not only to strengthen the Pankow regime economically and politically (in part, by decreasing the number of skilled workers escaping to the West) but also served to damper the East-West tension that had existed there. It re-affirmed the entrenchment of the status quo with all the inherent stabilizing effects it has had on Superpower confrontation in Germany.

The fundamental dilemma of Bonn's reunification policy was that without an abating of East-West tensions, neither side could allow reunification to occur to the advantage of the other and that, with detente, events led to a temporary settlement of the German question through the legitimization of the territorial status quo.<sup>464</sup> Because Bonn refused to

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<sup>463</sup> Griffith pp.66-67

<sup>464</sup> It is interesting that both the DDR authorities and Adenauer were apprehensive concerning the bettering of Superpower relations although for different reasons. DDR leaders worried about what effects detente would have on government stability and legitimacy whereas Adenauer was concerned that detente might limit the Federal Republic's

abandon its rigid Ostpolitik, the result simply was that, initially it made very convenient Moscow's rational of maintaining its hold on Eastern Europe and subsequently resulted in a strengthening of those same regimes.<sup>465</sup>

After 1955 West Germany did not really pursue a policy of reunification but rather attempted to prevent the legitimization of the status quo in Central Europe.<sup>466</sup>

The increasing effects of 'peaceful co-existence' poses a problem of analysis. The contradictory opinions regarding whether or not Adenauer was in favor of Detente can be summed up this way: on the one hand, Adenauer, according to some of Schwarz's theories, saw the development of detente as the pre-requisite for the settlement of the German question.<sup>467</sup> To a certain extent Adenauer, in his opposition to detente between the two superpowers actually, in the words of Schwarz tried to create a veto for himself on east-west relations.

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area for movement in foreign policy.

<sup>465</sup> Windsor. German Reunification p.45

<sup>466</sup> Hanrieder. The Foreign Policies of France, Britain, and West Germany p.57

<sup>467</sup> See Schwarz Im Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik for a expanded analysis of his 'Ostpolitik theories'. Yet, on the other hand, his so-called 'Potsdam complex' led him to perceive the bettering of superpower relations with some apprehension. Schwarz goes on to point out that all steps in detente seemed to alarm the Chancellor including the Ostpolitik of Mendes-France (June 1954), the Geneva Summit (1955), the London Disarmament discussions (1956-57), MacMillan's Moscow trip (1959), and DeGaulle's cautious approaches to the Soviet Union. (1965)<sup>468</sup>

<sup>468</sup> Ibid p.213

Sein ständiges Plädoyer für eine Multilateralisierung der Entspannungspolitik hatte natürlich vor allem den Zweck, ihn selbst eine Art Veto-position zu schaffen.<sup>469</sup>

It has also been argued that Adenauer actually tried to prevent the political momentum of history towards detente by clinging to his old position. He therefore became a liability for the United States and tried to block East-West detente by making reunification its pre-condition. His foreign policy was essentially a product of Cold War circumstances and his policy of non-recognition of the east was most effective in the pre-1955 period when tensions were at their highest. Some analysts have argued that in integrating the Federal Republic into the West he actually decided to give-up (for the time being) any real hope of reunification. This author believes such hope was completely unrealistic after the Soviets stepped in to reestablish their authority following the revolt of June 1953.

Although the government in Bonn never ceased to pay lip service to the goal of German reunification, it appeared to be giving preference to European integration over the fundamental German question.<sup>470</sup>

Finally it seemed that Adenauer's main goal of a closely cooperative Western Europe was progressing along swiftly and his stagnating Ostpolitik was only of secondary importance.<sup>471</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> Ibid. p.214

<sup>470</sup> Vali. p.57

<sup>471</sup> Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the Federal Republik's Ostpolitik was Adenauer's Ostpolitik. West

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Germany's post 1963 Ostpolitik was not characterized by a strong ideological component, which serves to underline the influence and guiding role Adenauer played. Adenauer was quite successful in keeping the form of his Ostpolitik intact almost until the end (1961) of his administration in 1963. This author would suggest that his Ostpolitik reflected even more Adenauer's own personal characteristics than his Westpolitik, which had numerous proponents throughout the Alliance. Adenauer, unlike Stresemann before him, was able to prevent the penetration of differing opinions from significantly altering the form and course of his policy towards the east. (For more information see Schwarz Im Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik pp. 227-231.)

## Chapter VII

### CONCLUSIONS

Has the division of Europe into two mutually antagonistic camps with the subsequent establishment of differing economic and political systems permanently provided an answer to the German question? Has Germany's division, and the reluctant acceptance of this division both inside and outside of Germany forever settled the reunification issue? David Calleo, in his book The German Problem Reconsidered poses some of these same questions adding that the West Germans themselves were not completely innocent in the perpetuation of Germany's division.

Indeed, although partition was clearly imposed upon them, the Germans themselves were not altogether unwilling collaborators, even at the outset."<sup>472</sup>

Questions such as these are presently difficult to answer with any degree of certainty although today it seems unlikely that the two halves of Germany would be allowed to reunite once more at the center of Europe. One of the most apparent reasons for this judgement is the importance that each nation continues to play within the economic and political alliance system of which it is a part. While the above opinions do not seem 'outrageous' today, they certainly were by no means as settled in the immediate post-war period.

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<sup>472</sup> Calleo. p.162

West Germany's first chancellor Konrad Adenauer consistently spoke of the eventual reunification of Germany yet pursued a seemingly contradictory policy of strengthened West European integration. Analysts today could easily question his commitment to the aim of reunification in contrast to other foreign policy goals which he sought to realize. The purpose behind this thesis has been to examine the development of Adenauer's foreign policy compared to that pursued by Gustav Stresemann.

Both leaders, at different times and by various authors have been simultaneously labelled as 'good Europeans' and as 'traditional' German nationalists. These positions certainly do not seem to be completely compatible and by directly comparing these two leaders, I will now highlight some preliminary conclusions regarding their basic foreign policy orientations. This comparison will take into account the political environments in which they operated, the political forces influencing the course of their foreign policies, and their personal beliefs and experiences.

The discussion is organised around the four perspectives of foreign policy analysis which were outlined in the second chapter. (1.) the political environment in each post-war period which necessitated that Germany operate in a specific fashion and the impact upon German foreign policy of change within this environment; (2.) the belief system (the particular historical and social/philosophical experience) of

each leader and how that impacted upon their view of Europe and Germany's role within it; (3.) the constellation of forces within Germany during both periods and the influence these had on the foreign policy course already pursued; (4.) each leader's commitment to revision of the eastern territories. Through a comparison of these two periods the author can make some conclusions as to the extent to which Adenauer was a 'good European' or 'traditional German nationalist' and how this effected both West Germany's Ostpolitik and her role within the Alliance.

Before exploring the specifics of the two periods outlined in the previous chapters, it is of primary importance to expose the drastically different international political environments in which the defeated German nation was to operate during the two periods. In this way the reader can observe the dominant role played by the 'international system' perspective on foreign policy evaluation. The author has, in the course of the research continually stressed that any examination of West Germany (or German) foreign policy cannot be totally comprehensive if the role of the international environment is ignored.

The most glaring distinction between the Weimar and post--'45 periods was that of the legal or 'de facto' existence of the state itself. While strong objections were raised right across the political spectrum in Germany regarding the 'harshness' of the Versailles Treaty, the important fact

remains that the political sovereignty of pre-war Germany remained partly intact. Germany remained a sovereign political unit. According to the treaty the Germans experienced a large expropriation of territory, and complete autonomy over economic capacity was hampered by the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, and complete expropriation of the Saar mines. This direct control by the Allies of Germany's economic potential did not translate though into a complete loss of political sovereignty. The contrast with the Germany of the 1945 period is stark and direct in that Germany, in its traditional-historical configuration ceased to exist as a state and was entirely occupied by the victorious allied powers. It has been argued that this situation was one of the major reasons why Adenauer's accomplishments in gaining sovereignty for the West German state in such a short period of time seemed so impressive; for he began in what the Germans refer to as 'Jahr Null' (year zero).

As the international political environment changed in the post-war world, the West German state, while operating with increasingly more sovereignty, had, at the same time to conform to the politics of an alliance system. While the German state in both post-war periods was looked upon with mistrust and apprehension by those with whom it was conducting relations, a distinction must be emphasised between a West German state which had to manoeuvre within a closely knit military and economic alliances and a German state which tried



to steer clear of too close a relationship with any state. Another influential factor must be indicated. There was no closely coordinated Allied policy after 1918. By contrast in the post Second World War environment there was strong American leadership which expressed itself from the outset through Marshall Aid and its alliance building efforts. It was also true that because of Soviet weakness due in part to the problems experienced in the 1918-1921 period, the Soviet Union was not perceived as a threat to the same extent as they were in 1945.

Significantly, Europe itself had changed dramatically in the post-45 period for the centers of power had shifted to Moscow and Washington. While Great Britain and France were still 'great' powers in 1919, their proportion of power both economically and militarily could not compare to the Super-power status of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1945. While Stresemann, as Chancellor and Foreign Minister, governed a sovereign state whose foreign policy, within certain boundaries, he could create and pursue, the 'western stump' of a state which Adenauer inherited as Chancellor in 1949 ultimately relied on the protection of its political and economic sovereignty by the Western Allies led by the United States.

With the post-45 breakdown of Allied co-operation, and the decision by the Western Powers to rebuild the Western half of Germany with Marshall Aid, some critics would argue

that the decision of West Germany to join the West European Alliance had already been made and Adenauer's role was simply that of legitimizing and justifying this decision to a 'shell-shocked' population. While there certainly is some truth to this, one must not underemphasize Adenauer's guiding role in creating the form in which this integration into the West would take place.

Before moving to the next section one should also highlight some of the similarities internationally between these two post-war periods. Due to Germany's status as a defeated nation, leaders in both periods were necessarily operating within a domestic environment which to different degrees, was periodically punctuated by the influence of the victorious powers. It was then necessary for each leader to construct a foreign policy which reflected Germany's status as a defeated state and which, through her defeat, had imposed upon her certain restrictions of movement, which each leader sought to relieve himself of.<sup>473</sup> In this sense both were defeated states seeking to regain a certain measure of sovereignty over their domestic as well as foreign policy agendas. While one could argue about the degree to which each leader was interested in regaining complete sovereignty for

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<sup>473</sup> In a sense then, both states' had a low 'capacity to act'; Weimar partially because of the high levels of stress due to political fragmentation and economic instability, and the Federal Republic because most of the economic infrastructure had been destroyed in the war. Therefore both states' foreign policies sought out other more stable states who could help Germany increase her own 'capacity to act'.

the Germany they inherited, one can definitely say that this attitude was present and did influence both leaders as they created and manipulated their relations with other states. From this perspective, both leaders were 'nationalists', in that they wanted to see their 'German' state comparatively free to make its own decisions. The important distinction though, is that Stresemann was a German (read Prussian) nationalist who wanted to realize, although through peaceful means, the re-establishment of the Germany, which he had grown up in and understood in its pre-1914 form. Adenauer, on the other hand, was interested in the development of a German state free of Prussian hegemonic influences,<sup>474</sup> and which would (as a sovereign state) make the decisions, that Adenauer indeed did make, to join the Western community of nations. Both leaders were therefore similarly committed to revise the Peace Treaty/Occupation Statute which had been imposed upon Germany by her defeat. The following could be equally applied to Adenauer.

Like his predecessors, Stresemann intended to revise the peace treaty, but unlike them he foresaw confrontation and defiance<sup>475</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> In fact Adenauer's involvement with various Rhineland separatist movements in the 1920's was the direct result of his desire to reduce Prussian influence within the German Reich. For an expanded analysis of Adenauer's role during this phase of Weimar history see "Stresemann und Adenauer: Zwei Wege deutsche Politik." in Karl Erdman's Vom Sinn der Geschichte Seewald Verlag, München. 1976.

<sup>475</sup> Kimmich. p.196

Another factor which was applicable during both periods, and indeed has not changed today, is that of the persistent importance of the role that Germany plays in Europe. In the post-45 period the strategic and economic importance of each German state (due in part to its geographical characteristics) in the alliance system of the two Superpowers has, in part, prevented the eventual reunification that was initially agreed to by the Allies during the war time and post-war conferences. Due to the fact that Germany, situated at the heart of Europe, could not expand (as Britain was able to do through her Empire or the Superpowers in their continental hinterlands) any 'vitality' therefore in her foreign policy has always been interpreted by her neighbors as being potentially dangerous.<sup>476</sup> One of the functions that the western alliance structure has played has been that of providing a comprehensive framework complete with safeguards wherein this traditional 'vitality' could be safely exercised. In the post-war period this 'vitality' has been directed, for the most part, into the economic field. The contrast with the Stresemann period is stark in that Locarno failed to contain German foreign policy 'vitality' vis-a-vis the East.

As one will have noticed (from the preceding chapters) the international political environment is not a 'static' factor, but rather it is subject to change as proportions of

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<sup>476</sup> Calleo. p.206 In this sense then the major national attribute of geography continues to be responsible for restricting what the German state can do in a given political environment.

power and influence shift between the major hegemons dominating the system. Just as Adenauer's rigid Ostpolitik became more unmanageable as American interests placed 'Détente' ahead of reunification, so too did many of the successes Stresemann was able to achieve at Locarno disappear as the League of Nations lost its prestige as a forum to resolve conflict, and the rapidly deteriorating economic situation further fractured his unstable domestic political consensus.

One of the major reasons why Adenauer was so successful in his period as Chancellor is that he realized that the post-45 world was characterized by competition between the two Superpowers each representing a drastically different social and economic order. He subsequently managed to steer a foreign policy course very compatible with the interests of one of the two Superpowers.

When one is directly comparing two periods in foreign policy, a comprehensive picture is impossible without a side by side examination of the key figures creating and conducting the foreign policies under consideration. The thesis has, to this point, already examined each of the separate historical and philosophical experiences of the two leaders. While it is essentially impossible for the analyst to ever completely understand and know the exact belief system of an individual, this author is of the opinion that an individual's actions in combination with one's direct historical and

socializational experience can indicate a fairly comprehensive outline of what an individual feels is politically and socially important. In other words, the author will now use the last of the four perspectives from the second chapter (the 'personality-approach') to do a side by side comparison.

In the third chapter (dealing with Stresemann's foreign policy) mention was made of his attitudes towards Germany and the role it should play in the post-war world. Some of these conclusions bear repeating here for they serve to reinforce some of the basic philosophical differences between the two leaders, differences which impacted directly on the shape and form of their foreign policy.

Stresemann, being a Prussian and a member of the upper middle class, supported the 'vision' of Germany as seen through the eyes of a Prussian nationalist. In his early days he was labelled 'Ludendorff's boy' reflecting his support both of Germany's military and political aims ('Griff nach der Weltmacht') and for the monarchy as an institution. When the Kaiser fled Germany, Stresemann became a supporter of the Republic, although there is some doubt as to whether he inherently supported the creation of a proper liberal democratic state. It has been argued that he sought to work within the system to achieve his goals which he felt were important if Germany was ever to regain her pre-1914 status as a great power. Indeed both he and General Hans von Seeckt turned their backs on the monarchy.

What both believed in and labored for was the future greatness and might of Germany, an aim which transcended all lesser causes and minor loyalties.<sup>477</sup>

As an exponent of the National Liberal theory of 'Mitteleuropa', Stresemann supported the revision of the Eastern territories

Stresemann's revisionist policy, the most distinctive policy of the Republic, was rooted in the past. Stresemann had been a National Liberal, a member of the patriotic, moderately liberal party of the educated and propertied bourgeois of Imperial Germany.<sup>478</sup>

In his book Germany and the League of Nations Christopher Kimmich points out that Stresemann's Prussian heritage aligned him with another great Prussian statesman, Otto von Bismarck.

His (Stresemann's) concern for German minorities in Eastern Europe, his defence of their cultural autonomy and their right to domicile, motivated no doubt by genuine patriotic sentiment, was founded also in national tradition and prompted by political consideration.<sup>479</sup>

This quotation is important for it highlights one of the similarities already mentioned between the two leaders when discussing the revisionist issue, that being the forces influencing both Adenauer and Stresemann which required that 'reunification' actually be an issue of domestic political consideration.

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<sup>477</sup> Wheeler Bennett. p.106

<sup>478</sup> Kimmich. p. 204

<sup>479</sup> Ibid. p.205

To extrapolate from the two chapters devoted specifically to the Adenauer era, one is immediately struck by some major distinctions between both men. Adenauer, as a Catholic Rhinelander was immensely suspicious of Protestant Prussia and held that their efforts had led Germany into the greatest disasters of the Twentieth Century. This suspicion has been well documented.<sup>480</sup> Adenauer, during his Weimar days, even went so far as to advocate a Rhenish state separated from Prussia, while constantly pleading for better Franco-German understanding.

Wenn es Deutschland nicht gelingt, in angemessener Zeit zu das Verhältnis zu Frankreich in Ordnung zu bringen, wird das Reich auseinanderbrechen, jedenfalls aber das besetzte Gebiet Rhineland nicht beim Deutschen Reich verblieben. Darum muss Deutschland, wenn auch um hohen Preis, sich mit Frankreich verständigen suchen. Die Schaffung eines Westdeutschen Bundesstaates wird erträglich gemacht, wenn gleichzeitig eine Bereinigung der Verhältnisse zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich entritt.<sup>481</sup>

The statement is enlightening in that it re-affirms Adenauer's attitude towards the importance itself of realizing an Aussöhnung (reconciliation) with France, in contrast to Stresemann's desire to make peace with France, simply in order to shift diplomatic pressure on the Poles. Adenauer's aim was to see a joint Franco-German defence of 'Catholic' Europe against the threat of communism and 'protestant

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<sup>480</sup> see chapter four for a more detailed description by this author.

<sup>481</sup> Adenauer, cited in a statement he made to Stresemann on January 9th, 1924. (taken from: Leonard Froese. "Reform der Deutschland und Ostpolitik." Was Soll aus Deutschland sein: Neue Aspekte zur Deutschlandpolitik. Wilhelm Goldman Verlag, München. 1968 p.199



socialist' influences from England and Scandinavia.

One of the areas in which the direct comparison of the foreign policies pursued by both German leaders is most rewarding is that of the different forces which helped shape their foreign policy orientations. Probably the most outstanding difference (which could be characterized as a national attribute) in itself is a force which must be highlighted. The Germany Adenauer led was substantially free of 'Prussian' influence because of the division Germany was subject to in 1945. Indeed Prussia, as a legal entity, had been abolished by the Allies. This loss of protestant Prussian influence also included that of the Prussian 'Junker' and industrialists who constantly sought to exploit the territories to the east. In the Weimar period it has since been seen how the 'Easterners' in the Foreign Office including Hugo von Maltzan and Brockdorf Rantzau supported the Rapallo and Berlin treaties reflecting their interest in creating an 'Ostorientierung'.

As an important element of the political regime, one could mention that the religious dichotomy between Protestants and Catholics has always played a role in German political culture since the reformation; one need only examine Bismarck's 'Kulturkampf' of the late 19th century (examined briefly in chapter four) to see evidence of this. Stresemann himself was apprehensive regarding the 'Anschluss' with Austria (encouraged by many Bavarian leaders)

because he feared that such a development would undermine Prussian influence within the Reich. Similarly Adenauer, due to the division of Germany, was left with a fiercely Catholic Bavaria (ruled by the CDU's sister party CSU) and a Catholic Rhineland; this distinction greatly effected the foreign policy course steered by him

Another factor, again grouped under the perspective of political regimes, which greatly effected the conduct of each leader's foreign policy was that of the strength of the opposition within and towards the state. With the loss of Prussia went a whole segment of German political society which has traditionally viewed relations with the east as being the most important priority in the creation of German foreign policy. This, combined with the leadership of a sick, although heroic, Kurt Schumacher made Adenauer's decisions easier to implement. The SPD enjoyed an initial surge in strength and support,<sup>482</sup> as did the left in Europe generally. As the Cold War developed, the SPD's Marxist rhetoric was viewed suspiciously by the United States who felt that Schumacher's calls for a neutralized, sovereign Germany at the heart of Europe was both foolish and dangerous to the overall stability of Europe.<sup>483</sup> The SPD seemed to give voice

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<sup>482</sup> The British, as Richard Barnet argues in The Alliance in fact wanted to use their zone as a kind of 'socialist experimentation' zone in which policies such as 'Mitbestimmung' could be tested as to whether they should be adopted by the Labor Party for use in Britain. See Barnet p. 52

<sup>483</sup> Alfred Grosser. p.107 (see chapter six for a more detailed analysis.)

to the traditional German 'nationalism' which was symbolized by, among others, the DNVP and the DVP during the Weimar period.<sup>484</sup> The fact that it was the latter who opposed the Locarno agreements and Germany's entry into the League of Nations did not reflect well on the SPD, who for similar reasons, also opposed Germany's membership in the ECSC, the EEC, and NATO. The Allies felt more comfortable with a man like Adenauer who shared their view of the communist threat and the importance of strengthened Western European integration. Likewise Barnet argues that:

from a British viewpoint Adenauer's vision of a decentralized small Germany was infinitely preferable to a united Germany acting alone.<sup>485</sup>

Both leaders, in the pursuit of political and economic sovereignty, were faced with a 'european' and 'atlantic' range of options. In the previous chapter this author mentioned this rift which bitterly divided the CDU at the end of Adenauer's administration. As priorities of interest began to change in the United States, one saw a noticeable shift in Adenauer's emphasis towards DeGaulle, whose own attitudes towards further European political integration were 'luke warm' at best.

Stresemann too was faced with this dilemma, although it did not play as important a role in the inter-war period as it did in the late 1950's. After the Dawes Plan, Stresemann

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<sup>484</sup> Calleo. p.169

<sup>485</sup> Barnet. p. 52

courted the Americans because Germany needed direct U.S. investment to help offset their reparations debts and stimulate the economy. As has been shown, this aid did not play as important a role because firstly, the Americans were not a superpower (as understood in today's use of the term), but rather a western power whose isolationist tendencies eventually were to remove them again from the European scene, and secondly, the political power of the British and the French had not yet begun noticeably to wane. In this sense, although keeping in mind the extent to which there were differences in the success of their quest, both leaders looked to the Americans for economic aid and support.<sup>486</sup>

Another area of direct contrast was that of the role of the military during both periods. For Adenauer the question became one of attempting to use the Cold War atmosphere to influence the Allies to agree to the rearmament of Germany. There seems to have been little possibility of the army pursuing an independent foreign policy in the immediate post-war period for the simple reason that it had been officially disbanded and a new army was not to be created until the ratification of the Paris Agreements in 1954 and the ascension of the Bundeswehr into the controlled NATO command structure. The apprehension of Germany's former enemies was of direct consequence in the banning to the Bundeswehr of the so called 'ABC' (atomic, biological, and chemical) weapons. This is still in effect today.

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<sup>486</sup> Gatzke p.88

The situation was dramatically different during the 1920's as General Hans von Seeckt commanded the loyalty of the Reichswehr. It has been argued that Stresemann knew about the secret Soviet military agreements with the Reichswehr but due to his precarious political situation, never felt strong enough to move against them. A reduced German army used the mutual political, economic, and military isolation of themselves and the Soviets to exploit a community of interests whereby the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty could be circumvented. Some critics have argued that Seeckt occupied the position of the leader of a 'state within a state' and his loyalty to the republican experiment was always subject to suspicion.

Never fundamentally converted to belief or confidence in the Republican Germany, von Seeckt was prepared, unlike many of his caste, to use the Republic for his own needs; and to co-operate with it as the existing constituted authority to restore the strength and power of those two institutions to which his devotion and loyalty were deep and unswerving, the German Reich and the German army.<sup>487</sup>

The influence of the army, while certainly not pro-Soviet, was such that it strengthened the 'Easterners' position in arguing for a foreign policy reflecting more of an 'Ostorientierung'.

The previous section outlining the changed external political environment was only a part of the overall changed environment because the Germany that Adenauer governed was more stable economically and politically. The onslaught of

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<sup>487</sup> Wheeler-Bennett. p.86

anti-democratic forces (which West Germany expected) did not materialize and Adenauer was therefore left within a political structure wherein the powers of the president had been heavily reduced in favor of those of the Chancellor.<sup>488</sup> Adenauer's so-called 'Chancellor Democracy', in which he played the overwhelming role resulted in a situation whereby he was able to impose his influence to maintain general party support for his foreign policy direction. This situation is in pointed contrast to the difficult position Stresemann was faced with. Not only was the 1923 Ruhr crisis economically debilitating but the political factionalism that the Weimar years are so noted for made necessary the creation of large coalition governments. These governments included a number of parties of radically different political philosophies thus complicating even further the course Stresemann was attempting to steer. During the Weimar years Stresemann had to satisfy those who called for both a 'east' and a 'west' orientation. His 'Schaukelpolitik' attempted to accomplish this.

An argument can likewise be made that a contrast in the relationships between the various leaders greatly effected the ultimate realization of their foreign policy goals. The negative relationship between Stresemann's predecessors (Wirth and Cuno) and French Leader Poincaré greatly hampered efforts to conclude an effective security system. The failure of their Erfüllungspolitik (as compared with the success

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<sup>488</sup> Merkl. pp. 262-273

of Adenauer's Vorausleistungspolitik) made a policy solely concentrated in the West difficult to realize and promote. On the other hand, Stresemann's amiable relationship with Briand was one of the major reasons for their success at Locarno. Unfortunately for Stresemann, the fluctuating attitudes of France between security from and accommodation with Germany resulted in a French position which shifted dramatically with the election, and subsequent defeat, of General Poincaré.

During the Adenauer period the initial relationship between General McCloy (who was related through marriage to the German leader) and Adenauer was very positive as were those relationships with John Dulles and General DeGaulle. Unlike the Weimar period, the Allies' attitudes did not suffer as much from these aforementioned shifts between security concerns and accommodation with Germany because the United States made it consistently clear their commitment of protection and support of their Allies.

In terms of differing political tactics, Adenauer, as outlined in the previous chapter, attempted to link ('die Politik des Junktims')<sup>489</sup> East-West rapprochement ('detente') to improvements on the German question. In this way he tried to operationalize the Western pledge towards German reunifi-

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<sup>489</sup> Indeed this policy, as previously mentioned, was developed to prevent the dangerous decoupling of West German interests in reunification from detente and arms control which he saw beginning to occur within the western alliance in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Weidenfeld Konrad Adenauer und Europa p.175

cation. Unfortunately for Adenauer, these two goals were not completely compatible and with a new American administration led by President Kennedy the 'gaps' between these approaches became more pronounced.<sup>490</sup> What Adenauer failed to do was to modify and re-examine the role of West Germany in the overall European Balance of Power. He perceived all specific arms control and disarmament proposals as being useless and dangerous unless tied to the German question. In reality though these proposals only became possible because of the stabilizing effect the division of Germany had brought about within Europe.<sup>491</sup>

Adenauer's rigid Ostpolitik, while not only suffering due to its incompatibility with Western interests in the 1960's, was plagued by the national and international approaches in which it was presented. His policy fluctuated between the Hallstein Doctrine (representing the stubborn nationalistic approach) while Adenauer's attempts at linkage politics formed the international approach.<sup>492</sup>

We cannot under any circumstances accept the unilateral separation of those territories (east of the Oder-Neisse) by the Soviet Union and Poland.....<sup>493</sup>

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<sup>490</sup> Planak. p.12

<sup>491</sup> Jacobsen. "Zur Kontinuität der Aussenpolitik 1919-1975." p.162

<sup>492</sup> Windsor. p.101

<sup>493</sup> Konrad Adenauer...from Foreign Relations of the United States Eastern Europe; Soviet Union U.S. Government Publication Office. Washington, D.C. 1972 p.103



The above statement is interesting for it theoretically could have been attributed to either of the two leaders subject in this study. The quotation though, points to a very difficult aspect of comparison/contrast which must be mentioned if a examination such as this is to prove meaningful. The discussion therefore turns to the extent of each leader's commitment to a revision (in Adenauer's case reunification) of the eastern territories and how this was actually reflected in their foreign policy initiatives.

Before specifically examining their commitment to eastern revision, one must briefly look at each leaders attitudes as displayed through their major foreign policy initiatives towards the West. As has been previously mentioned, Stresemann was pleased with what the Germans were able to achieve at Locarno, not only for the re-acquisition of status and equality which membership in the League of Nations offered, but that the negotiations did not require a similar 'Ostlo-carno' of security guarantees towards the eastern territories. The fact that Stresemann was interested in getting a special exemption from Article 16 (the collective security clause) of the League Charter demonstrated his recognition of the importance of maintaining good relations with the USSR. The League provided Stresemann with a forum in which he could argue for the proper treatment of ethnic minorities (read ethnic Germans) in eastern and central Europe along the 'Wilsonian' lines of self determination then being enunciated. Stresemann, this author feels, saw Locarno as the

armistice with the West that constituted the prerequisite before any real revision in the East could be contemplated. He was criticized for placing relations with the West ahead of those with the East, but I believe that had not Stresemann died prematurely and the economic situation crippled his reparation successes, then one might have seen a full fledged diplomatic effort to regain, through peaceful means, those territories lost in 1918. The fact remains that Stresemann certainly was, as a Prussian and a nationalist, much more committed (as was Bismarck) to those Germans living outside the 'Greater Reich' than was Adenauer, as a Catholic Rhinelander. As Adenauer saw membership in the western Alliance as a vehicle to regain sovereignty, so too did Stresemann who also saw Locarno as the vehicle in which Germany could regain a greater measure of economic and political sovereignty.

In terms of Adenauer's commitment to reunification, some critics, such as Werner Feld, even go so far as to state that reunification was of secondary importance not only for Adenauer but also for a number of groups across the West German political and economic spectrum.

The inquiry into the West German foreign policy decision making process has produced evidence which suggests that a substantial majority of the elites in groups most influential in this process (foreign policy decision making) as well as a large segment of public opinion probably ranked the values of increasing West Germany's security through alignment with the Western Powers and, in some instances of strengthening West Germany's

economic posture, above that of reunification.<sup>494</sup> Reunification may have in fact been, and possibly still remains today, the ultimate goal of West Germany foreign policy, but the diversity and complexity of pressures impacting upon the creation of Adenauer's foreign policy relegated it a lesser political value.<sup>495</sup>

Although Adenauer may not have had as much choice in the matter, he realized (like Stresemann before him) the importance of placing Germany in a position in which her western borders could be secured. He supported NATO, ECSC, and the EEC not only because his political and philosophical predispositions inclined him towards co-operation with the West, but also because, like Stresemann at Locarno, membership in these organizations gave a defeated Germany a sense of equality and rehabilitation into the Western community of nations. The distinction between the two leaders is that, besides a changed political environment, Adenauer was able to achieve a greater degree of political, economic, and military sovereignty within the Western Alliance structure. Paradoxically Adenauer's Vorausleistungspolitik paid off dividends quickly in the restoration of greater and greater levels of political autonomy. Unlike Stresemann, who saw Locarno as the stepping stone or a settling of accounts in the West so as to concentrate his efforts in the east, Adenauer saw his foreign policy successes as self fulfilling

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<sup>494</sup> Feld. p.177

<sup>495</sup> Ibid. p.176

and comprehensive. By the end of his rule he had arguably achieved almost everything within the Western Alliance that he could have wanted . His opposition to all the SPD's 'disengagement' plans of the 1950's and 1960's is further proof of his lack of commitment to reunification by any other method than the complete surrender of the DDR to the Federal Republic which was, and still is, unthinkable<sup>496</sup>

To sum up then, the major distinction between the two periods was that unlike after World War One wherein Germany herself was the issue and the danger to be dealt with by the West, after the Second World War a divided Germany only symbolized the much larger danger and potential conflict, that of the growing bipolarization and division of Europe into two separate, antagonistic camps.

While Stresemann's commitment to revisionism was as much a product of the traditional Prussian contempt for the Poles and was manifest in his desire to keep Poland economically unstable, he, like Adenauer, failed to realize, over the long term this revision which so interested him.

For all its integrity of conception and adroitness of execution....the question still remains whether at the time of Stresemann's death Germany was nearer to attaining the paramount objectives of his policy in the regaining of those old territories than she had been before he assumed office.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>496</sup> Kaplan. p.624

<sup>497</sup> Gasorowski. p.317

A similar statement to the above could also be made concerning Adenauer's legacy, although for Adenauer this might not have been necessarily construed in negative terms.

Therefore while both leaders came to office after Germany had been defeated in a major war, and both were quite interested in regaining for Germany a position of equality in the World community of nations, it is in the ultimate success of their Westpolitik and commitment to a 'revisionist' policy wherein the differences begin to become apparent.

By 1963, incompatibility between Adenauer's policy of increased western integration and his policy of reunification was quite obvious and calls for a more realistic 'Ostpolitik' were heard right across the political spectrum. While one cannot ultimately know whether or not Adenauer really believed in his policy of reunification through strength, the fact remains that by the end of his rule reunification was in fact further from reality than when he took office in 1949. Some academics, such as Karl Dietrich Bracher, have argued that Adenauer used his anti-communist rhetoric as a substitute for traditional German nationalism and that talk of reunification was really only a smokescreen.

All concrete material interests, however, weighed in the opposite direction, as time went on it became increasingly clear that the alleged primacy of reunification was no more than an ideological postulate used to justify the stabilization of the West German state and it was this stabilization which best served the material interests and

security requirements of West Germany.<sup>498</sup>

Just as Bismarck limited himself to the 'Kleindeutsch Reich' (excluding Austria), one could argue that so too did Adenauer, although in an even smaller version<sup>499</sup> It is interesting to note that some of the same reasoning effected both Bismarck and Adenauer; Bismarck too was apprehensive of the effects of including a strongly Catholic Austria into his largely 'Protestant' state of Prussia. In this way, Bismarck, Stresemann, and Adenauer were all moved by religious/political considerations when leading their 'Germany'.

While Stresemann and Adenauer had both come to office after Germany had been defeated in a major war, and both were quite successful in regaining an increased level of autonomy for the German state which they led, one could not criticize either for their failure to realize their revisionist aims for, as this author argues, they were simply not equally committed to them. Both were 'realpolitikers' who sought the best for their 'Germany' but both advocated different approaches which in part, reflected the changed political environment, their own philosophical and historical experiences and their aims for Germany. This author does feel though, that both leaders probably expected too much from their policies ; Adenauer with his policy of reunification through strength and Stresemann with the potential of the League as a forum in which German interests could be

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<sup>498</sup> Bracher. p.151

<sup>499</sup> Calleo. p.162

secured.

Robert Grathwol argues that Stresemann's 'Schaukelpolitik' amounted to an attempt to avoid great decisions which would forever bind Germany to other states.<sup>500</sup> Stresemann was possibly attempting to maintain for Germany its position as a completely sovereign state independantly taking initiatives at the heart of Europe. He sought to 'chip away' at the Versaille Treaty in the hopes of realizing for Germany a proportionate position reflecting her pre-1914 status..

While Adenauer was also interested in regaining a certain measure of autonomy, he realized that he would have to, and indeed probably wanted to, make the 'great' decision which Stresemann sought to avoid. To a certain extent that decision in 1949 had already been made. Adenauer, on assuming the Chancellorship did not work against the implementation of this decision, but rather attempted to strengthen and justify it to the German people.

The conclusion that in Adenauer's scale of values entry into the Western political and military system and Franco-German reconciliation preceded the goal of reunification appears correct.<sup>501</sup>

What does the understanding of Nation in this context mean? Perhaps in the end our judgements concerning Adenauer and Stresemann's foreign policies rest on their assumptions about the role or meaning of the German nation in Europe.

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<sup>500</sup> Grathwol. p.57

<sup>501</sup> Vali op cit,

Adenauer was both aware of and used the uncertainty of what actually constituted the German nation for his own political purposes. The label 'German nationalist' is not normally applied to Adenauer, although I feel that he was indeed a nationalist (in his understanding of the Germany he wanted to create). A contrast with the Weimar period can be drawn here because unlike in 1945, the German nation in 1919 (although defeated) was still understood in its 1914 terms which meant that Stresemann did not have to worry about this identification problem and that therefore all his actions could conceivably be 'sold' to the German people as those of a nationalist.

So while Adenauer could be labelled a 'Nationalist' who took the 'great' decision to strengthen the Federal Republic's commitment to the West, it was not taken with the same vision of a Stresemann; Adenauer's Germany was much different politically, socially, and economically than was Stresemann's. Adenauer's Germany was so different in fact that the decision to join the western alliance was Adenauer's only real option as the possibility of an alliance with the east did not really exist.

Since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, its foreign policy posture has been shaped by two deep seated fears in West German society. The first is the fear of communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular; the second is the fear that German soil could again be the theatre of a world war. The popularity of Konrad Adenauer's policy of Western integration reflected West German desires to be part of the Western political and economic community as well as a deep fear of Soviet expansionism. At times anti-commu-



nism served to function as a surrogate form of West German nationalism. Adenauer's skill in tapping these sentiments paid off handsomely in two decades of CDU rule.<sup>502</sup>

Finally this author would have to agree with Karl Bracher who concludes that while Stresemann saw the eastern option as a possible avenue to get around the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, there was no getting around the clear Superpower division of Europe in 1945 and Adenauer's role seems to have been that of governing over a major transitory period in which he could accustom Germans to their 2nd attempt this century at liberal democracy.<sup>503</sup>

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<sup>502</sup> Ronald D. Asmus. "The SPD's Second Ostpolitik with Perspectives from the USA." Aussen Politik Vol 38 No.1. , 1987. pp.46-47

<sup>503</sup> Bracher. p.153

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