THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND NATO NUCLEAR FORCE
STRUCTURE
NATO Europe and the INF Treaty

by

J. David McLeod

A thesis
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NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE
NATO EUROPE AND THE INF TREATY

BY

J. DAVID MCLEOD

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
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ABSTRACT

<u>The</u> <u>Relationship</u> <u>Between</u> <u>Arms</u> <u>Control</u> <u>and</u> <u>Nuclear</u>
<u>Force</u> <u>Structure</u>: <u>NATO</u> <u>Europe</u> <u>and</u> <u>the</u> <u>INF</u> <u>Agreement</u>

This thesis will explore in detail the possibility that
the arms control process can provide a way for states to
overcome their security dilemmas.   It will seek to explain
the extent to which arms control represents an acceptable
form of cooperation among states to achieve greater degrees
of security.   This process of arms limitation has sometimes
been refered to as cooperative security.   It is cooperative
because it entails force structure arrangements which, con-
trasted with unilateral attempts to procure a desired degree
of protection, involve dialogue, negotiations and agreements
with an adversary.   While cooperative security through arms
control is often confused with,   or seen as similar to,
détente, it is in fact a different concept entirely.   Coop-
erative security is both a more limited and a more precise
notion than that of détente. Détente implies the establish-
ment of good relations and friendly contacts between oppos-
ing states, in a sense, an attempt at a political reconcili-
ation or at least understanding.   Cooperative security, on
the other hand, is concerned only with the military dimen-
sions of a rivalry.

The description and analysis of the relationship between
the process of arms control and NATO's nuclear force struc-
ture will be accomplished through five chapters and a con-
clusion.   The chapters will be structured as follows:

Chapter I   'Introduction: The Relationship Between Arms
               Control and NATO Nuclear Force Structure.'

Chapter II   'If Deterrence Fails: Security Through Force
               Structure.'

Chapter III   'An Inconclusive Record: Security Through the
               Arms Control Process.'

Chapter IV   'The Dual-Track Approach: The INF Example.'

Chapter V   'The Dual-Track Approach: The Outcome.'

Chapter One will be an introduction to the topic.   It
will lay out the rationale for the paper and present the
thesis around which the chapters are structured.

Chapter Two will be concerned with studying NATO's security paradox. It will be devoted to explaining why the Alliance adopted a policy of nuclear deterrence in its relations with the Soviet Union. It will then go on to review the utility of these nuclear forces in accomplishing this very task and will explain why NATO faced, in 1979, a defence dilemma which force posture improvements alone could not alleviate.

Chapter Three will concern itself with a consideration of the extent to which arms control and disarmament offered NATO a way to alleviate the strains of its nuclear dilemmas. The chapter will begin by exploring the theory of arms control in an effort to assess its applicability to the European security environment. It will then go on to review the historical record of arms control in achieving its stated goals and its contribution to the enhancement of a state's security. Finally, with particular attention to NATO, the chapter will detail the status of arms control as a means of achieving security in the nuclear age.

Chapter Four will devote itself to an analysis of the NATO decision to incorporate arms control into its force posture modernisations as a way to manage its security dilemmas. It will do so by examining the military and political rationales for the December 12 decision. It will look at the reasons NATO developed for both the modernisation programme and the need to engage the Soviet Union in an arms control dialogue.

Chapter Five will devote itself to an assessment of the intermediate nuclear arms control negotiations and agreement as a test case of the notion that arms control can provide a way for NATO to manage its security dilemmas. It will do so by examining the impact of the 'dual-track' decision on NATO's force structure and the credibility of its deterrent threat before, during, and after the negotiation process. A central theme of this chapter is an identification of the problems that arose because the Alliance itself did not fully understand the implications of linking the two concepts together.

The conclusion will assess the consequences of linking force modernisation with arms control as NATO enters new negotiations in the 1990s. It will draw upon the findings of the previous chapters to provide an insight into the ongoing security dilemmas the Alliance faces and the avenues available to deal with them. The political environment in Europe is changing at a pace unprecedented in recent history. While events are having a significant impact on the arms control process, an understanding of the relationship between arms control and NATO's nuclear force structure will remain pertinent. Regardless of the extent to which politi-

cal change generates alterations to NATO's nuclear posture,
NATO should enter into arms control with a clear understand-
ing of the degree to which such negotiations can contribute
to its security.

Glossary of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti Ballistic Missile
CEP	Circular Error Probability
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Talks
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
ERW	Enhanced Radiation Warhead
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GLCM	Ground Launched Cruise Missile
GNP	Gross National Product
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDD	Integrated Decision Document
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
KT	Kiloton
HLG	High Level Group
LRTNF	Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces
LTDP	Long-Term Defence Plan
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MLF	Multilateral Force
MMRBM	Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCG	Special Consultative Group
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SG	Special Group
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SPD	Social Democratic Party
SRTNF	Short-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces
SSBN	Nuclear Submarine
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TELs	Transporter/Erecter/Launchers
TNF	Theatre Nuclear Forces
TNW	Theatre Nuclear Weapon
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Warsaw Pact)

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION: ARMS CONTROL AND NATO NUCLEAR
FORCE STRUCTURE

Since Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival on the international scene in 1985, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been bombarded by a plethora of initiatives aimed at reducing force levels in the East and West and enhancing security. Military and strategic analysts look to each major speech by the Soviet Union's leader as an occasion for the announcement of newer and more comprehensive proposals on the East-West security relationship. This constitutes a radical departure from past practice.

Only a few years earlier Soviet policy in the entire spectrum of security matters was moribund to the point of non-negotiablity.[1] Arms control and disarmament policy during the latter period of Brezhnev's term in office and the transient years of Andropov and Chernenko were, by and large, unimaginatively predictable. NATO politicians viewed Moscow's arms control proposals with a great deal of circumspect.

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[1] John Barrett, "Soviet Arms Control and Disarmament Policy Under Gorbachev: Some Observations," in Perestroika, Glasnost and International Security, Occasional Paper #8, ed. Lisa Allbutt (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Programme in Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 81.

During the period before Gorbachev came to power, NATO struggled to provide a defensive capability for itself that would generate a real and perceived sense of security among its members. The new foreign policy being followed by the Soviet Union has afforded NATO an unexpected opportunity to exploit the environment of 'new thinking' in order to negotiate arms control agreements that may create a much sounder security force structure for the Alliance.

Previously, NATO attempted to address Soviet aggressive foreign policy and the fear of military blackmail by arming itself sufficiently to deter and defeat such attempts. The Alliance itself was formed in an attempt to achieve this goal. The Europeans alone did not have the ability to accomplish this task, consequently, North American support was procured making it the 'Atlantic Alliance'. This, it was hoped, would constitute sufficient strength to deter Soviet aggression.

In deterring Soviet aggression NATO has been successful[2] with the cornerstone of its deterrent strategy resting on the threat to use nuclear weapons. However, over time, NATO's threats have became increasingly incredible. Even a change of strategy, as occured in 1967, was unable to address concerns about the use of nuclear weapons for very

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[2] Bearing in mind, of course, that there is no clearly objective means by which to demonstrate the success of a deterrent policy. See Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" International Security, Vol. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-35.

long. The present atmosphere of change in the nature of the communist political system and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) offers an opportunity for NATO to increase its security and overcome its defence dilemmas through a process of arms control.

This thesis will explore in detail the possibility that the arms control process can provide a way for states to overcome their security dilemmas.[3] It will seek to explain the extent to which arms control represents an acceptable form of cooperation among states to achieve greater degrees of security.   International accords of this type have some- times been referred to as cooperative security. Cooperative security involves force structure arrangements which, con-

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[3] By security I intend to discuss the security of the state not the individual security of the peoples of the world or all mankind. Some would contend that the individual level is the basis upon which to assess security;

> I believe that the concept of arms control and disarmament takes its departure from this simple fact: man created arms, but those arms should not be used against their owner, that is, mankind. Arms control and disarmament should be designed, in other words, to protect man from the misuse of arms. Hence, the aim of arms control and disarma- ment is the enhancement of the security of the **peoples of the world.**

See Atsuhiko Yatobe, "A Review of Arms Control in the Post- war Period," in Arms Control II: A New Approach to Interna- tional Security, eds. John H. Barton and Ryukichi Imai (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981), pp. 23-42.

In contradiction to the above, this thesis adopts the approach that there is not necessarily a condition of harmo- ny between the security of the state and that of the indi- vidual; security takes on a meaning different for the state.

trasted with unilateral attempts to procure a desired degree
of protection, involve dialogue, negotiations and agreements
with an enemy. While it is similar to détente, it is both a
more limited and a more precise notion. Détente implies the
establishment of good relations and friendly contacts
between opposing states, in a sense, an attempt at a politi-
cal reconciliation or at least understanding. On the other
hand, cooperative security is only concerned with the mili-
tary realm of a rivalry.[4] States have usually sought to
structure their forces in relation to their enemy's capabil-
ities. In contemporary international relations, particular-
ly with respect to nuclear force postures, planning often
requires states to go beyond this stage; to involve their
enemy directly in the organisation of their own forces. In
essence, it is a matter of joint force planning between
adversaries.

Until recently, the fear of nuclear war created a common
interest between West and East. The risks of total destruc-
tion were so high that both sides had to work together to

For NATO, security may be obtained by military power, nucle-
ar deterrence, and the US commitment to European defence.
For peace activists, security is derived from the disengage-
ment of the superpower rivalry, establishment of a European
'nuclear weapons free zone' and the adoption of a less pro-
vocative defensive defence. The contradictions that arise
from these meanings are unavoidable. The two should be noted
and remembered, as this thesis goes on to examine security
at the higher level of the state. See Barry Buzan, People,
States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in Interna-
tional Relations (Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina
Press, 1983).

[4] Buzan, p. 10.

ensure that deterrence between them was stable and did not fail. This is not to suggest, however, that defence did not have a role. Rather, cooperative security and defence were (and probably still are), inseparable. There could be no security in the modern age without an adequate military capability. In addition, cooperative security has little to do with trust. If the two camps completely trusted each other their mutual interest in each other's force structures and military preparedness would have been unnecessary. Nevertheless, cooperative military planning could take place in the wider framework of détente and could in fact contribute to the easing of political tensions. This process will be explored by studying the relationship between arms control and force structure in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's security policy.

This thesis intends to describe and analyse the development, content and application of stable deterrence in the context of NATO security policy. The relevance of this topic rises not only from the historical basis of deterrence as an element of NATO strategy of flexible response, but also because of NATO's recent security dilemmas. It will conclude that, in the nuclear age, security can no longer be achieved exclusively through the acquisition of more, or increasingly sophisticated, arms.

The focus on NATO is pertinent because its theatre nuclear forces (TNF) recently underwent a significant transformation in an attempt to make alliance members 'safer'. The direct cause of these changes could be attributed to unilateral cuts by NATO, modernisation programmes, and the impact of arms control agreements.

In 1979, the NATO Heads of State arrived at a decision to modernise their long-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF) by replacing the aging and increasingly obsolete Pershing 1A ballistic missiles with Pershing IIs and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). At the same time, NATO chose to pursue an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting or potentially eliminating those same systems even before the deployments were completed. The 1979 'dual-track' decision, as this became known, is significant because it directly linked the force modernisation of NATO's nuclear systems to the largely political process of arms control for the first time. With the conclusion of the INF portion of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in 1987, the entire process can now be examined. Such a study will be useful in understanding the role that arms control can play in enhancing security in the nuclear age. In addition, it will provide an insight into the security dilemmas the Alliance continued to face after the treaty was signed and the avenues that were available to deal with them. This is of particular interest as the first round of

negotiations in the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks (CFE) have concluded. While CFE I excluded nuclear weapons, NATO has already agreed that its nuclear force posture and future short-range nuclear arms control policies will be largely influenced by progress in this realm.

NATO's political, and military, leadership must be cognizant of the problems inherent in achieving security in a nuclear world. This is the only way to ensure that its force structure and arms control objectives will be compatible and that both will contribute to the enhancement of security for the Alliance's members. At the time that the 'two-track' decision was adopted, there was no clear understanding among NATO allies as to how the two tracks of deployments and negotiations were to relate to one another.[5] By 1979, NATO had come to recognise that force structure changes alone would not necessarily enhance its security. Consequently, many NATO members sought to tie the new deployments of Pershing IIs and GLCMs to a process of arms control. However, the NATO allies did not have the entire concept worked out. They were not entirely sure what the relationship between arms control and their nuclear force posture should be. No one had set out guidelines or postulated the dynamics of interaction between ongoing negotiations and deployments. Given the terrible consequences of a

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[5] Jeffrey Record, <u>NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Programme: The Real Issues</u> (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981), p. 99.

nuclear war, it would have been prudent for NATO, and the Warsaw Pact for that matter, to have known how arms control would accentuate or detract from their security and the stability of their relationship with each other. Despite all the radical changes that have occured in East-West relations in the last few years, tremendous residual capabilities remain in place to wage conventional, chemical and nuclear war. As such, many of the lessons learned from the application of a dual-track approach to security enhancement will continue to be informative.

Chapter II

IF DETERRENCE FAILS: SECURITY THROUGH FORCE
STRUCTURE

> Like it or not, NATO must now come to grips with
> precisely why it has nuclear weapons in Europe,
> and begin to think about how those weapons might
> be employed if the eventuality we all fear the
> most came about.[1]

To provide its members with security going into the

1980s, NATO had to re-examine the role that nuclear weapons

played in its policy of deterrence and strategy of flexible

response. In 1949, NATO was formed on a defensive basis.[2]

NATO's members resolved to address the threat posed by the

Soviet Union by coming to each other's assistance in the

event of an invasion. By so doing, the Western states hoped

to create a coalition that would be large enough to keep the

Soviet Union from taking aggressive actions against Western

interests. The method of resolving insecurities by going to

war, as sometimes practised prior to World War One (WWI),

was never a seriously considered policy option. The Western

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[1] Gregory Treverton et al., "Theater Nuclear Force Modern-
ization," RUSI Journal, 125, No. 3 (September 1980), p. 4.

[2] For a detailed account of the immediate post-war period
and the creation of NATO see NATO, NATO Facts and Figures,
11th ed. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), pp.
3-11; Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance;
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Paul-
Henri Spaak, Why NATO? (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1959).

allies were much more interested in rebuilding their war-shattered economies. The method of appeasement employed during the inter-war period was also rejected. The attempts in the 1930s to avoid war and preserve the security of the state through rational negotiations designed to address the political aspirations of all parties was thoroughly discredited. Instead, the world witnessed the initiation of the 'Cold War'. The resulting policy was one of armed deterrence. Nevertheless, the Europeans still sought to have a political arrangement worked out that would alleviate East-West tensions.

The West sought to achieve security through deterrence in two ways; both being compatible with traditional means of attaining security. The first was to form alliances with others. An example of this case was the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The second was the accumulation of more and better armaments so as to increase their military strength, in essence a matter of self-reliance.[3] An example of this was the Lisbon force goals NATO adopted in 1952 to improve its defensive capabilities by calling for fifty divisions, 4,000 aircraft and strong naval forces by the end of the year.[4] Very often, states attempt

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[3] Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 12; and Hedely Bull, "Disarmament and the International System," in Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought, ed. John Garnett (Toronto: MacMillian, 1970), pp. 136-148.

[4] NATO, 11th ed., p. 41.

to employ both of these types of measures in order to enhance their security.

This latter method of enhancing security (acquiring more arms) is the focus of this chapter. Mandelbaum, in The Nuclear Revolution, re-stated the classic view held by Realists that the superpowers have maintained their security through the accumulation of military power.

> Each great nuclear power has increased its own stockpile of nuclear armaments. As in the past this has become a competitive exercise, with each accumulating weaponry with an eye on the acquisitions of the other. One of the most conspicuous effects of nuclear weapons on international politics has been the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.[5]

While this was representative of the relationship between East and West at one time, it is no longer completely applicable to the present situation. Mandelbaum's observation misses an important new aspect of the nuclear age and military security. Simply acquiring more and improved armaments does not, in and of itself, necessarily provide more security in the nuclear era. At one time this was indeed the case. Edward Luttwak cited aerial bombing as an example in this regard. "The ten-ton loadings of American bombers in 1945 were more useful than the two-ton loadings of 1940 German bombers over London, and hundred-ton or even thousand-ton loads could have been more useful still."[6] He noted,

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[5] Mandelbaum, p. 12.

[6] Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986), p. 60.

however, that eventually a culminating point of military utility could be overshot at which stage, paradoxically, larger bomb loads would bring progressively smaller benefits. The advantages gained would diminish as larger loadings were employed. Luttwak identified nuclear weapons as going well beyond the culminating point of utility in a military sense. Ironically, this very feature of nuclear weapons has enabled states to achieve the peace-inducing effects of war without needing the actual phenomenon of destruction that comes with their use.[7] Instead, the cost is that, "The war-preventing objective of deterrence is linked by a horrible logic to credible threats of apocalyptic destruction."[8] In 1979, NATO's nuclear weapons may also have achieved their culminating point of success in deterring aggression from the Warsaw Pact.

This chapter will focus on the theory of deterrence in order to establish a basis upon which to examine the relationship between arms control and NATO's nuclear force structure. Therefore, it will look at the use of force to deter, and at the theoretical implications of nuclear weapons for a policy of deterrence. It will then explain the development of NATO's policy of deterrence; how it emerged, matured, and became operational in different strategies and

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[7] ibid., p. 60.

[8] Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 159.

force structures. Finally, it will examine the defence
dilemmas that the Alliance faced in the 1970s arising from
the threat to use nuclear weapons to deter its foremost
potential aggressor.

Deterrence and the Nuclear Dilemma

Deterrence

Essentially, deterrence involves the efforts of one
political actor aimed at dissuading another from taking an
action of some kind against the former's interests. This is
done by convincing the opponent that the costs and risks of
taking a particular action will outweigh whatever possible
gains he may have anticipated receiving for his troubles.[9]
The deterring state can make the expected value of certain
actions unprofitable by two means. One is to prevent the
aggressive state from achieving its goals. This is deter-
rence by denial. The second is to threaten to extract ret-
ribution from the offender for his actions. This is deter-
rence by punishment. Under its most recent deterrent
policy, NATO's conventional defence was intended to defeat a
Warsaw Pact invasion. However, in the event that this
proved to be impossible, it was prepared to resort to the
use of nuclear weapons to meet this failure; deterrence by

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[9] Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, <u>Force and State-
craft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time</u> (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), p. 172.

denial.   Should such action still prove to be insufficient,
NATO threatened to escalate the magnitude of the conflict in
order to bring even greater degrees of nuclear devastation
to bear on the territory of Warsaw Pact states as required;
deterrence by punishment.[10]

Whether a state attempts to employ threats of denial or
punishment, the essence of deterrence is psychological, not
physical.   Particularly in terms of nuclear deterrence and
the issue of nuclear capabilities as discussed below.
Deterrence aims to prevent an action from occurring, not to
stop it from succeeding.[11] Nevertheless, the success of a
deterrent policy may require a state to demonstrate that it
can stop an action taken by an aggressor. Therefore, the
success of deterrence requires a degree of rationality on
the part of political actors. The party being deterred must
be expected to be able to calculate the different utilities
of proposed courses of action on the basis of available
information.   The aggressive state must weigh its interests

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[10] This is currently embodied in the NATO strategic concept
of flexible response.

[11] Phil Williams,   "Nuclear Deterrence," in Contemporary
Strategy I, 2nd ed., John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes
and Meier, 1987), p. 116.

[12] Threats can be either explicitly communicated, as in the
superpower threats to respond to nuclear attacks on
either one of their countries with a retaliatory nuclear
strike, or may be implicit, as in the threat that a minor
aggression against either's interests may trigger a
nuclear response because of the uncertain role of escala-
tory pressures.   Thus, the two superpowers have avoided

in light of the threats[12] the deterring actor has made.[13]
Therefore, in its most elemental sense, deterrence relies on
perceptions. It is imperative that actor's interpretations
do not significantly diverge from objective reality and from
the intentions of other actors. When misperceptions exist,
deterrence may fail.

Deterrent threats, be they to deny a military victory or
punish an aggressor for resorting to the use of force, hinge
on two elements. The first is the perceived cost of the
action to be deterred. The second is the perceived prob-
ability that the deterer will be willing or able to carry
out its threat.[14] If misperceptions occur regarding either
of these, then deterrence will likely fail. Such a situ-
ation is usually proceeded by what is referred to as a
'credibility gap'. If an aggressor does not think that the
defender has the wherewithal to make it too costly to use
force, then deterrence may not prevent an attack. Similar-
ly, if an aggressor thinks a defender lacks the political
fortitude necessary to carry out its threats, then deter-
rence may again be unsuccessful. Obviously, if a defender

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even minor direct conventional military confrontations
over the last forty-five years because of the threat that
such a clash **might** lead to nuclear strikes on each oth-
er's countries, not because either has threatened that it
will.

[13] Craig and George, p. 173.

[14] Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," in Interna-
tional Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in
World Politics, eds. Robert O. Matthews et al. (Scarbor-
ough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1984), p. 32.

questions his own ability to carry out the threats be has made then it is more likely that he may not feel secure, but, so long as an adversary believes the threat, deterrence will work. The requirement, then, is to clearly demonstrate that the deterer can make the costs of aggression outweigh the gains.[15] As will be discussed below, the problem of meeting this requirement finds particular salience in the question of self-deterrence.

Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear weapons have had an impact on the application and the utility of military power; and, therefore, a fundamental issue regarding the credibility of a state's deterrent capabilities lies in the use of nuclear weapons. Force, and the threat to employ it, have persistently played a role in international relations. However, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the international system has brought about many changes in international politics. Some have even gone so far as to call it a revolution, drawing comparisons between its effects and those changes that were characterised by Napoleonic warfare or the First World War.[16]

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[15] Williams, p. 116.

[16] For an analysis of this issue and an argument that nuclear weapons have not revolutionised international politics but only military affairs see Mandelbaum, pp. 1-21.

The use of force in international politics has been questioned since antiquity, as has the connected need to maintain a military capability and ensure its readiness. Since the world first realised the devastating potential of nuclear weapons the utility of force has come under ever more virulent attack and criticism. Both Soviet and American leaders have, from time to time, voiced their acceptance that there are few, if any, objectives that can be served through the actual employment of nuclear weapons. "The two sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. [...] They will not seek to achieve military superiority."[17]

The potential for untold destruction through the unleashing of nuclear power has been a very important cause for a renewed assault on the use of weapons as instruments of policy. However, nuclear weapons have not brought about a revolutionary change in this regard. Thermonuclear technology has not obviated the need that states have for military power. Force still remains the final guarantor of a state's sovereignty. "[N]uclear weapons have brought some significant changes to international political life, but transformation of the anarchic environment of state action is not

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[17] US President Reagan and USSR General Secretary Gorbachev, "Joint Statement," (November 21, 1985), reported in Department of State Bulletin, 86, No. 2106 (January 1986), pp. 7-9.

one of them."[18]

States, while needing military power to preserve their sovereignty, understand, as pointed out above, that the actual application of nuclear force in the form of a general nuclear exchange would not serve anyone's interests. Consequently, the utility of nuclear weapons arises from their potential use. It is in the threat that a state will resort to nuclear weapons that they serve a political purpose, not in their actual use. Therefore, since World War II, nuclear power has been used to deter an enemy with **threats** that such weapons will be used. Here, nuclear weapons have developed a special relationship with the concept of deterrence.

In achieving deterrence nuclear weapons have been extremly successful. Arguably, the Western world has enjoyed a period of relative security, devoid of major conflicts, since nuclear power was first used for military purposes in 1945. However, the security afforded the state through threats to employ nuclear weapons is not absolute. In preserving peace, one may be able to identify a point at which the usefulness of nuclear weapons over-reaches its own culminating point of success. A point may be achieved where, paradoxically, the acquisition of a greater nuclear capability may actually result in a deterioration of a state's

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[18] Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" in International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics, eds. Robert O. Matthews et al. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1984), p. 263; and Mandelbaum, pp. 4-8.

security. This may be the case because the destructive potential of nuclear force may call into question a state's resolve to use it in its own defence. If the threat is compromised by reluctance to use nuclear weapons then deterrence may not be maintained. When defence is inconsistent with security then a defence dilemma is created.

> The most serious defence dilemmas occur when military measures actually contradict security, in that military preparations in the name of defence themselves pose serious threats to the state.[...] More seriously, they can take the form of unacceptable damage, either self-inflicted, or risked as part of an explicit policy involving relations with other states.[19]

For example, the US tactical, theatre, and strategic nuclear deployments may not, in 1979, have been so numerous as to allow one to unequivocally argue that they detracted from Western security. However, the position can be advanced that nuclear deployments in greater numbers and modernised forms would have been security neutral. This is intended to mean that while they would not harm defence, they certainly would not have enhanced it. When this condition exists, a state faces a true paradox in achieving security. When defence is inconsistent with, or contradicts, national security one has a defence dilemma.[20] Nonetheless, the notion that nuclear weapons can provide an answer has continued to apply, in large measure, because states believed and acted as though they did. In reality,

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[19] Buzan, p. 159.

[20] ibid., p. 158.

there are qualifications which need to be made which compli-
cate matters.   Military force structure improvements, rela-
tive to one's rival, can, in the modern age, still lead to
increased security under certain circumstances.   Between
lesser powers, non-nuclear states, and in certain realms of
a great power relationship, unilateral adjustments can have
a positive influence on the arming state's degree of securi-
ty. In addition, the situation is still further clouded by
the fact that, in some instances, armed force improvements
may result in an improved security relationship with other
states or in other aspects of the same rivalry.

In the modern era of nuclear deterrence, the defence
dilemma has emerged as an important factor in security stud-
ies.   Procuring more nuclear arms will not necessarily
always lead to a stronger deterrent and improved security,
but, could instead lead to less security.   Consider the
'Doomsday Machine' hypothesised by Herman Kahn.   This would
be a multi-megaton nuclear device that, unlike standard
weapons, would not be fired on an enemy.   "It is triggered
in one's own country and in the course of several weeks it
takes the enemy's country out along with everything else.
It is the ultimate deterrent."[21] A nuclear explosion of such
a magnitude could prove to be an effective deterrent, but,
what should happen in the event that deterrence failed?   If
a doomsday machine were detonated, would one be able to

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[21] Herman Kahn,   On Thermonuclear War (Place: Publisher,
    Year), pp. 144-160.

argue that the security of the state had been advanced by its construction, maintenance and use? Surely not: deterrence is not enough when the result of failure is holocaust. In addition, one must also question whether such an action would in fact be seen as credible. If your enemy is unwilling to believe your threat to hurt him, because so doing would also entail great suffering on your part, it will not deter him. In such a situation of self-deterrence, the goal can no longer be deterrence but must be expanded to include the concept of stable deterrence.

The strategic arsenals of the superpowers at present can serve as a more contemporary example. Both states have the capacity to deliver a guaranteed retaliatory strike on the other's homeland. As a result, both are deterred from attempting to use strategic weapons to gain a political victory by war. If, however, deterrence is successful, it could create a situation in which war is again possible at lower levels of intensity. With the incumbent risk of escalation, this would serve to make nuclear war possible. Similarly, neither side can feel entirely secure knowing that its population is completely vulnerable to attack. Neither superpower can be certain that the other will behave in a thoroughly rational manner, particularly when an international crisis is at hand. This is somewhat unsettling because the success of deterrence is largely dependent upon an aggressor's actions and reactions. "As always with sua-

sion, it is the adversary alone who controls the process: it is **his** leaders who must believe in the threat and calculate its punishment as greater than what they hope to achieve. This makes security obtained by suasion inherently less reliable than defensive denial would be."[22] This is particularly significant in light of the fact that deterrence can be seen as preventing war while at the same time making it possible.

Historically, the solution to the problem of insecurity has been to acquire more arms so as to be able to deter an enemy with the prospects of either defeat or denial. In the nuclear age, however, building more intercontinental ballistic missiles may only exacerbate a state's security problems by adding more nuclear explosions into the calculus of damage and creating an incentive for an opponent to deploy more nuclear forces of his own. Present deterrence between the superpowers, as guided by mutually assured destruction, proposes to defend the state by a strategy which entails its destruction. As a result, a state's force structure can undermine the security it was intended to enhance. Recognition of this condition lead Leon Sigal to rephrase the superpower strategic relationship from 'strategic parity' to 'nuclear interdependence'. As such, "deterrence no longer means increasing the cost of war to the enemy but rather

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[22] Luttwak, p. 122. Luttwak used the term 'suasion' to describe both persuasion and dissuasion in all their forms.

manipulating the shared risk of a nuclear war neither side wants."[23] Richard Barnet went further when he argued that,

> There is no objective, including the survival of the United States as a political entity, that merits destroying millions or jeopardizing the future of man. The pretence that it is legitimate to threaten nuclear war for political ends creates an international climate of fear in which Americans will continue to have less security, not more.[24]

This position is somewhat one-sided, ignoring the degree to which nuclear weapons do deter. Even if nuclear armaments could be abolished, states in the present anarchical international system would probably not be any more secure. This fact is captured in the very term 'defence dilemma'. If nuclear weapons only detracted from security, without any positive correlation, it would not be a dilemma, the solution would be obvious. This, however, is not the case. Traditional rules of national security policy still apply today. The "para bellum" doctrine which states that, 'if you want peace, prepare for war' and the presumption that military superiority is the best route to security are important considerations in the nuclear age.[25] The problem is how to go about exploiting the benefits of nuclear deterrence. A security dilemma, as it related to Western European securi-

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[23] Leon V. Sigal, _Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects_ (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1984), p. 8.

[24] Richard Barnet, quoted in Buzan, p. 160.

[25] Karl J. Holsti, _International Politics: A Framework for Analysis_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 329.

ty, was particularly salient because of the special charac-
teristics of the strategic environment in Europe.

The marginal utility to be derived from nuclear deploy-
ments also found expression in NATO's force structure and
deterrent strategy of flexible response. This condition
arose from a security dilemma that was rooted in the very
threat to resort to nuclear weapons. A dilemma in achieving
security for NATO existed because the alliance depended on
nuclear weapons for its defence and for the deterrence of
Soviet aggression, but NATO was also aware of the undesira-
ble outcome of carrying out the threat.

> The terrifying consequences of such usage are so
> grave that doubts have continued to mount about
> whether the Europeans would ever want to use these
> weapons for their own defence, no matter how grave
> the threat. Similarly, fear of retaliation may
> make the United States reluctant to risk its own
> territory in defence of its allies.[26]

In other words, the fear of the failure of deterrence under-
mined deterrence. This dilemma raised considerable doubts
among Western analysts with respect to the credibility of
the NATO deterrent. This problem was further compounded by
the differing perceptions in Europe and the United States
about how best to maintain a credible deterrent force struc-
ture.

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[26] Terrence P. Hopmann and Frank Barnaby, eds., _Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 1.

Until 1979, NATO had been unable to overcome its security dilemmas with unilateral force posture improvements.[27] Quite simply, the reason was that more weapons would not make it any easier to use them. There were two key reasons for this. First, the Alliance strategy of flexible response relied upon the guarantee that the US strategic forces would be employed in NATO's defence. Second, flexible response required NATO to hold out the possibility of the first use of theatre nuclear weapons in order to initiate an escalation to the level of the US strategic forces.

NATO's Nuclear Dilemma

US Nuclear Umbrella

Since the end of the Second World War, Western Europe has relied upon the traditional means of enhancing its security through alliances and arms acquisitions. From the beginning, NATO relied fundamentally upon its armed forces and the nuclear guarantee of the United States to deter its potential opponents. Even before 1949, one could argue that the US nuclear umbrella had been extended to cover Europe. In 1952, the Alliance's first strategy, MC 14/1, leaned heavily upon the use of US nuclear bombs to deter by demon-

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[27] The radical changes presently underway in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Germany are transforming the nature of the threat that NATO has to address. As such, the usefulness of force posture changes, particularly changes to nuclear force structure, in alleviating NATO's defence dilemmas will be very different.

strating an ability to conduct an interdiction campaign against attacking forces.[28] With the enemy's supply lines cut, command in disarray, and logistical resources decimated, NATO's conventional forces would be able to deny victory and retake any territory ceded at the outset of hostilities. This nuclear deterrent was important because war weariness and the economic demands placed on budgets in the late 1940s and 1950s made it difficult for Western governments to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union without large defence expenditures.

As early as 1954, NATO members had failed to meet the force goals that they had set for themselves in Lisbon two years earlier.[29] Therefore Alliance members were receptive to any US ideas that might make it possible to deter Soviet aggression at a more manageable cost.[30] The route adopted was nuclear deterrence. The costs of nuclear weapons, while high, promised to be substantially lower than those of an effective conventional defence. The Korean War was an

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[28] Philip A. Karber, "NATO Doctrine and National Operational Priorities: The Central Front and the Flanks: Part I," in Power and Policy: Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control Part III, Adelphi Paper #207 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), p. 13.

[29] This provided much of the impetus to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the Alliance in 1955. See Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate Over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 11.

[30] Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 744.

important event in this regard because it highlighted all

the security difficulties the West faced and encouraged a

'New Look' which involved a more 'nuclear' force structure

in the West.[31]

Nuclear weapons provided a unique opportunity for the

United States to deter aggression with a minimum of effort

and to extend that deterrence to protect its allies.

Indeed, John Foster Dulles referred to budgetary constraints

eleven times in his speech on massive retaliation. He warned

that "the Soviet Union could draw the United States into

costly Korea-type wars ad libitum" and therefore, threaten

the West with "what Lenin called 'practical bankruptcy.'"[32]

In order to avoid this, the doctrine of Massive Retaliation

emerged in 1954 as a strategy of nuclear deterrence.[33] While

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[31] The belief that vailed threats to use nuclear weapons in Korea brought about progress at the armistice talks was influential in promoting the notion that nuclear superiority was a powerful diplomatic tool. ibid., pp. 739-740.

[32] Gerald Garvey, Strategy and the Defense Dilemma: Nuclear Policies and Alliance Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 14.

[33] Note that while massive retaliation became a declared policy of the United States government in 1954, it was not formally adopted by NATO until 1957 in the document MC 14/2. However, nuclear deterrence was applied prior to that point and exploited by NATO. The realities of the Cold War, and the 1948 Berlin Blockade, were fundamental in this regard. See John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); see also Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), pp. 21-23. Also note that "In 1952 the British government had already concluded that the best bet for the West in its confrontation

Dulles referred to nuclear weapons as 'political weapons', there were also military reasons why the US chose to make nuclear weapons a central component of its deterrent strategy. Essentially, they were effective military instruments. Nuclear weapons, if needed, offered to accomplish their assigned military mission with a great deal of success and at minimal cost to the user. A widespread view at the time was that the Korean War resulted from misperceptions. With the doctrinal implications of massive retaliation, nuclear weapons would be able to unambiguously demonstrate the United States resolve to defend its interests (this included the freedom of Western Europe).[34]

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In 1954, as part of the US ability to retaliate against an aggressor in a massive fashion, the Eisenhower Administration decided to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the European theatre. In December 1954, the North Atlantic Council endorsed this change in the Alliance's force structure and authorised NATO military commanders to plan to use nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact regardless of whether or not the WTO used them.[35] This move also made it easier

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with the East was to rely on nuclear deterrence." See Freedman, p. 740.

[34] Michael A. Guhin, <u>John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times</u> (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 224 and 232-234.

[35] <u>NATO Facts and Figures</u>, 7th ed. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971), p. 90; and David N. Schwartz, <u>NATO's</u>

for the United States to make it clear to Moscow that its
nuclear forces would be used in NATO Europe's defence. This
marked the point at which nuclear weapons became a dominant
military and also political issue for NATO. Up until that
time, the nuclear component of NATO defence rested on a uni-
lateral US guarantee.[36]

During this period the Soviet Union was developing its
own nuclear forces. As a result, the benefits that were to
be gained from NATO's use of nuclear weapons were not as
absolute as it at first appeared they would be.

> In short, tactical nuclear weapons seemed like a
> good idea for the West, if we should have them and
> the opposition did not. When the Soviet Union got
> them, the advantage for the West was cancelled
> out, and all the disadvantages of the early use of
> nuclear weapons remained.[37]

However, massive retaliation continued to provide security
to NATO Europe because the United States had an immense
superiority in nuclear forces. This advantage was not only
in numbers. Perhaps more important, was the US ability to
attack the Soviet Union while, by-and-large, remaining
immune to retaliatory nuclear reprisals against the conti-
nental United States.

Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1983), p. 32.

[36] Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in
NATO: 1965-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), p. 1.

[37] E.L.M. Burns, Defence in the Nuclear Age (Toronto:
Clarke, Irwin, 1976), p. 48.

The United States monopoly was gone because the USSR could retaliate. Still, the United States, and by extension NATO, possessed an immense advantage. The US bombers stationed in Allied countries around the USSR could indisputably threaten the Soviet homeland, but Moscow did not have a similar assured capability. Thus, the nuclear deterrent remained credible. If deterrence failed because of credibility deficiencies at the conventional level, then the United States, using the nuclear weapons at its disposal, was prepared to wage war and prevail.

In time, the Soviet Union was able to pose a more powerful threat to the United States. The implications of this eventuality were foreseen even before massive retaliation became a declaratory policy. As early as 1950, some voices raised concerns regarding extended deterrence using nuclear weapons. In NSC-68,[38] issued less than a year after the Soviets detonated their first bomb, United States officials pointed out that nuclear deterrence would be valid only as long as the Soviet Union did not possess sufficient nuclear forces to cancel out those of the United States. Deterrence, in this instance, it was argued, would have to rely more heavily upon conventional forces.[39]

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[38] A document of the United States National Security Council. NSC-68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1950).

[39] Williams, p. 128.

When the Soviet Union could retaliate against NATO Europe with nuclear forces and its aircraft could already inflict serious damage to the eastern US coast, the Alliance had to rethink its position.[40] To a certain extent, the US strategic guarantee had become questionable.[41]

NATO Nuclearisation

In March, 1957, NATO adopted a new doctrine for its defence. Known as the 'Overall Strategic Concept for the NATO Area', or NATO Document MC 14/2, it assumed that nuclear weapons would be used early on in a conflict with the East, particularly in the central region. More than ever, conventional forces would act as a 'tripwire' that would trigger a nuclear response to an aggression. Deterrence would be reinforced because battle-field nuclear weapons would enable NATO to respond effectively to an overwhelming conventional attack while, at the same time, presenting its opponent with the very real possibility that US strategic forces would become involved. "In short, the purpose of conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons was to deter the widest range of contingencies by ensuring that any aggression would be met with massive nuclear retaliation."[42]

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[40] Freedman, p. 741.

[41] By 1957, NATO had adopted plans and strategies (MC 14/2) to adjust the Lisbon force goals so as to require a lower level of conventional prepardness. See Schwartz, pp. 32-34; and Buteux, Nuclear Consultations, p. 1.

[42] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, p. 3.

This decision prompted the Heads of Governments of NATO countries to decide in December, 1957, to establish stockpiles of nuclear warheads in Europe and to acquire an intermediate-range ballistic missile capability[43] (the Jupiter and Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles [IRBMs]).[44]

Stockpiles of nuclear warheads for tactical use were established in Europe and held by units of the United States armed forces. With the decision of the US President, these munitions could be released to the NATO European allies with nuclear-capable weapons. At that point, command and control would flow to the planning and command structure of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).[45] With this doctrinal change and the arrival of the first 240mm. atomic cannon in Europe, a debate began about how these weapons would be used and what the consequences would be of their use.

By deploying Thor IRBMs in Britain, and Jupiter IRBMs in Italy and Turkey, NATO hoped to address doubts about the United States guarantee created by Soviet research into intercontinental ballistic missiles and improvements to both its long range air force and its air-defence capabilities.[46]

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[43] NATO, 7th ed., p. 91.

[44] These were replaced by the United Kingdom's V-bomber force and three US polaris submarines in 1963.

[45] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, p. 2.

[46] The launching of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 represented a concrete technological chal-

Estimates at the time (1955/56), predicted that the United States would not have an operational ICBM system in place before 1962. Sputnik required NATO to do something before this as it threatened to decouple the United States strategic bombers from NATO Europe's defence. The Alliance members also attempted to work out an arrangement for the stationing of mobile medium-range ballistic missiles (MMRBMs) in NATO Europe. These efforts, however, broke down as a result of American reluctance to participate and French demands that such deployments be linked to US support and assistance for France's independent nuclear programme.[47] The intermediate-range ballistic missile decision went ahead because the West possesed the technology prerequisites necessary to deploy such a force and because such weapons, with ranges of 1,500 miles, would, of necessity, be based in Europe. European basing would help address concerns about coupling that might develop as the Soviet Union's own nuclear capabilities grew.

The presence of Jupiter and Thor missiles made the basing states more susceptible to nuclear strikes from the Soviet Union: a capability better suited to the USSR's force structure than intercontinental attacks. As such, the IRBMs became an example of unequal risk sharing in NATO. Moscow played upon this by making explicit threats to Britain, Ita-

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lenge to the West promising significant repercussions for NATO security.

[47] Schwartz, pp. 62-81.

ly and Turkey.[48]

The IRBMs represented an attempt by NATO to resolve its security problems by altering its force structure independent of any other initiatives. The Thor-Jupiter initiative and the proposal for mobile missiles were examples of hardware solutions to NATO's nuclear dilemmas.[49] NATO deployed new weapons which would allow it to strike at Soviet territory itself in order to prevent the credibility of massive retaliation, and the NATO leg of it, from being undermined by questions about nuclear use being so destructive that it would be self deterring.

Sputnik marked the emergence of a new era in the superpower nuclear relationship that held consequences for NATO Europe's security. The development of ballistic missile technology by the Soviet Union resulted in its ability, by 1962, to hurt the United States regardless of time and space, which, until then, had been in Washington's advantage. This had the effect of fundamentally changing the deterrent relationship and led to an evolution in NATO's strategy resulting eventually in the adoption of flexible response.

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[48] ibid., pp. 76 and 81.

[49] ibid., p. 81.

Throughout the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union struggled to defend themselves from the possibilities of this new application of technologies. Slowly, during that decade, the Soviet Union, at great domestic cost, was catching up to the United States. The US was concerned about a war in Europe forcing it to use its strategic nuclear forces and resulting in untold damage to the United States when the Soviet Union retaliated. Thus, the United States began to alter its strategy unilaterally while trying to convince its allies to accept the new orthodoxy.[50]

In May 1962, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, was authorised to propose that NATO change its strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. As the condition of parity approached, NATO was compelled to re-examine its security policy of deterrence. NATO began to ask itself if the United States could extend its deterrence to Europe if the Soviet Union could threaten to retaliate in kind against the United States. US civilian and military observers began to ask if NATO's nuclear superiority could actually be exploited as usable military power. More importantly, they asked if even the smallest use of nuclear weapons could

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[50] Inter-alliance politics associated with McNamara's campaign to bury massive retaliation contributed to an impressive growth in theatre nuclear forces deployed in Europe; a turn of events that ran counter to the thinking of the new US strategic doctrine. This build-up was set in motion under the previous administration and McNamara thought it politically wise not to cancel it while trying to persuade Europeans to accept flexible response. See Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, p. 54.

threaten the very survival of the United States.[51] In answering these questions there emerged two different opinions about how NATO could best deter the Soviet Union.

In the United States, deterrence was deemed to be enhanced by an ability to use and control force at levels short of complete catastrophe. Emphasis in this regard was placed on escalation control.[52] The US wanted to avoid having to make an 'all-or-nothing' nuclear commitment to Europe. This, they believed, would not be credible. Throughout this period, the United States sought to distance itself from the risks of a war in Europe. McNamara was convinced that the threshold between conventional and nuclear war was far more important than the break between different intensities of nuclear war.[53] The new strategy of flexible response would mesh nicely with the demands of deterrence by minimising an aggressor's potential gains while inflicting some degree of costs on him. "Its supreme advantage, however, was that it made the potential costs for the deterer worth incurring and spared him the difficult choice between 'humiliation and holocaust'."[54] Following upon its experi-

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[51] McNamara, p. 24.

[52] Paul Buteux, The Political and Strategic Implications of the INF Treaty for NATO, Occasional Paper #3 (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1988), p. 3.

[53] Freedman, p. 770.

[54] Williams, p. 129. For a detailed theoretical analysis of this approach see Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1965).

ences in the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the United States had begun
to implement the concept of flexible response into its stra-
tegic force structure and defence planning.[55] The United
States also pressed the Alliance to adopt a more 'flexible'
doctrine; one that emphasised conventional options and low-
ered NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons.

In the European context, deterrence was deemed to be
enhanced in quite a different manner. The very basis of
deterrence lay in the US strategic nuclear guarantee: it had
to be closely coupled to the defence of Europe. Deterrence
resided in the prospect that, once war broke out, there
would be an unavoidable risk that uncontrolable escalation
would occur. In effect, Europeans stressed the utility of a
"threat that left something to chance".[56] An improved con-
ventional capability might succeed in denying the Soviets
the rewards of aggression, but, it might also reduce the
potential costs of attempting to secure its interests
through a resort to force. The approach of strategic pari-
ty, therefore, greatly concerned NATO Europe. In this
regard, the Germans had a particular concern for the effec-

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[55] Stromseth, pp. 39-41.

[56] John Barrett, "NATO's Flexible Response Strategy after
the INF Agreement," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 18, No. 3
(Winter 1988), p. 3. This notion that deterrence can be
best served when the ultimate decision to escalate a con-
flict is not completely within the power of an actor to
control is further explored in Thomas C. Shelling, The
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 1980); and Thomas C. Shelling, Arms and Influ-
ence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

tiveness and believability of forward defence. They con-
tended that forward defence could only be accomplished
through a deterrent threat to use nuclear weapons early in a
conflict.[57] Essentially, the NATO Europeans sought a strat-
egy of deterrence by punishment by presenting a potential
aggressor with an unacceptable risk of escalation, the Unit-
ed States sought a strategy of deterrence by denial by
establishing a war fighting capability.[58]

The Multilateral Force

While the inter-alliance debate raged on, massive retali-
ation remined the official concept behind deterrence and the
Europeans strongly opposed the United States initiative to
change it. For five years NATO members wrestled with and,
in many cases, virulently argued over the issue.[59] NATO
attempted to resolve these tensions, and deal with the prob-
lem of coupling, by making force posture changes. None of
these attempts succeeded for very long so that eventually,
NATO was compelled to adjust its strategy of deterrence.

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[57] Buteux, <u>Nuclear Consultation</u>, p. 91.

[58] <u>ibid</u>., p. 96.

[59] The events surrounding the Suez-Crisis of 1956 were
important in accentuating European concerns about the
reliability of the US nuclear guarantee. The crisis dem-
onstrated that American and European interests would not
always coincide. This was all the more important in
light of the United States' apparent apathy toward the
USSR's overt nuclear threats toward Britain and France.
See Schwartz, p. 60.

One such force structure adjustment was the concept of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) for NATO which took shape in 1963.[60] While it never became an operational system, it was propagated for over three years as a US response to NATO's doubts about the strategic guarantee. This would be a mixed-manned, multilaterally controlled seaborne fleet of MRBM-carrying vessels. The Europeans would be afforded a greater share of responsibility in the Alliance's nuclear force posture although the United States would have to authorise any attacks.

The MLF was to address the vulnerability of NATO's land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles and act as a counterforce weapon against Soviet medium- and intermediate-range theatre systems. The sea-based mode of deployment was seen as beneficial because it would be less vulnerable to preemptive attack and politically less visible. It was also seen as a safer arrangement than the dual-key options worked out between the United States and its NATO European allies for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.[61] The most important contribution of the multilateral force to enhanced deterrence was the aspect of co-ownership. It was feared that consultations alone would not suffice to send a clear

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[60] During the early 1960s, various proposals and discussions took place in the Alliance along these lines based on a concept of a collective alliance force made by US Secretary of State Christian Herter. See Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, pp. 17-22.

[61] Schwartz, p. 128.

message to Moscow that the United States would use nuclear
weapons to defend Western Europe because it might risk esca-
lation to a strategic exchange. Consultations would not
ensure that nuclear weapons would be used, but, co-ownership
would make it far more likely.[62]

The multilateral force plan became mired in quarrels
about how such a weapon system could/should be controlled.
Issues such as; launch vetos and the effect that this would
have on the credibility of the multilateral force as a
deterrent, the extent to which Germany would be involved and
the effect that this could be expected to have on East-West
and inter-alliance relations, the coordination of targeting
policy with the US strategic forces, and the problems asso-
ciated with a mixed-manned fleet, all had a bearing on the
project's operationalisation.[63] However, the real problem
was that the Europeans had doubts about whether the force
was worth the cost, the problems of its military effective-
ness, and its strategic relevance. It has been suggested
that the allies took part in the working groups set up to
resolve these technical difficulties only because they
believed that the United States saw the multilateral force
as important. The crux of the matter was that the NATO
European members of the Alliance did not wish to abandon, or
tamper with, the strategy of massive retaliation. Beginning

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[62] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, pp. 49-53.

[63] Schwartz, pp. 129-131.

in the early 1960s, the United States had been moving away from the strategy in its thinking. The NATO allies recognised that by adopting a plan such as the MLF, the Alliance would have been embracing a change in its deterrent policy. This the European allies were not prepared to do until forced to by unilateral US actions. Late in 1964, the United States lost interest in the idea of a multilateral force and decided to wait for a proposal from its allies that would have substantial European support. Although it was not finally interred until the Johnson-Erhard meeting of December 1965, the MLF effectively died.[64]

The United States had seen the multilateral force as a way of shoring up deterrence by making the threatened use of nuclear weapons in NATO's defence more credible. In time, Washington decided that it was not in its own security interests to have multiple, or several bilateral, controllers of nuclear forces. McNamara stressed the importance that the United States placed on the central control of a nuclear conflict.[65] Instead of co-ownership, the United States decided that a more extensive and effective consultative body within NATO would be a better route to take. This lead to the creation of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

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[64] Buteux, <u>Nuclear Consultation</u>, p. 30.

[65] It was also important in paving the way for the Non-Proliferation Treaty that the US was actively seeking with the USSR. <u>ibid</u>., pp. 83-84.

The multilateral force represented an attempt by the Atlantic Alliance to resolve its growing security dilemmas with a resort to unilateral force restructuring. Once again, it demonstrated the extent to which reliance on such initiatives was unable to positively affect NATO Europe's security. Both political and military reationales argued against its operationalisation.

An outcome of the inter-alliance discussions of the multilateral force proposal was to heighten attention to all aspects of NATO's theatre nuclear force structure. When the Nassau Communiqué, issued jointly by Britain and the United States in December 1962, called for an inter-allied nuclear force, NATO seized upon it as a means of replacing the already problematic Thor and Jupiter IRBMs. The outcome was the formal assignment of Britain's V-bomber force and three US Polaris SSBNs to SACEUR. These forces would still fall under their respective national command structures and the explicit right to employ these forces in accordance with a unilaterally determined national interest was affirmed.[66]

Flexible Response

NATO resolved to address the differences of opinion members held with respect to deterrence and to meet the Warsaw Pact challenge in two ways. The first was to alleviate the problems generated by differences of opinion by altering

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[66] ibid., p. 26.

NATO's force structure.   The other was to   pursue détente.
This approach was initiated with the adoption of the Harmel
Report.   The December, 1967, Report of the Council: Annex to
the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting described
the two main functions of the Alliance as such;

> Its first function is to maintain adequate mili-
> tary strength and political solidarity to deter
> aggression and other forms of pressure and to
> defend the territory of   member countries if
> aggression should occur. Since its inception, the
> Alliance has fulfilled this task.   But the possi-
> bility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as
> the central political issues in Europe [...]
> remain unsolved.   Moreover, the situation of
> instability and uncertainty still precludes a bal-
> anced reduction of military forces.   Under these
> conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary,
> a suitable military capablity to assure the bal-
> ance of forces, thereby creating a climate of sta-
> bility, security and confidence.[67]

The report went on to state that, within the environment
that would be created by the fulfilment of the first func-
tion, NATO could carry out its second, this being to solve
the underlying political issues in Europe.   Towards this
end, NATO asserted that defence and détente were not incom-
patible goals to seek at the same time.[68]

In effect, this was a call for the acquisition of capa-
bilities that would allow NATO to bolster deterrence,   a
stronger foundation to deterrence would contribute to stabl-

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[67] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,   The Future Tasks of
the Alliance, Report of the Council,   Annex to the Final
Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting (December 1967), in
NATO Facts and Figures, 7th ed., p. 365.

[68] ibid., p. 365.

ity in NATO's sense of the term. However, NATO did not invent détente. This condition emerged in the superpower relationship as a result of several factors, the Cuban Missile Crisis being one of the most pronounced. Instead, the Alliance sought to exploit the opportunities that might arise as East-West relations became more cordial. Therefore, the Harmel Report had an impact on the interpretation of the operational priorities of the new strategy NATO adopted. For the first time, NATO was beginning to realise that it had to do more than unilaterally restructure its forces. Détente was a consideration and would help by addressing underlying political contentions, but the military component of deterrence remained paramount to the attainment of security and had to come first. Furthermore, it was up to NATO's efforts alone to accomplish this task. So, along with the recognition of détente came the new NATO strategic concept of flexible response.

Flexible response ameliorated inter-alliance tensions, to an extent, simply because it was open to flexible interpretation. But, in being all things to all people, MC 14/3 was able to deal with the increasingly serious defence dilemmas only temporarily. The ambiguity of the new strategic concept, which was both required and beneficial in a political sense, was a serious liability in terms of NATO's military security.[69] NATO had formally recognised, by endorsing the

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[69] Stromseth, p. 194.

US strategic policies, the increased risk to the United States of extended nuclear deterrence to Europe that the Soviet Union's nuclear programme had brought about. The new strategy allowed the United States to stress the importance of a conventional response to a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive and this, the United States hoped, would raise the nuclear threshold. Flexible response committed NATO initially to respond to Warsaw Pact aggression at whatever level, conventional or nuclear, the attacker chose. If, in the event of a conventional attack, the direct defence proved insufficient, then flexible response emphasised the deliberate escalatory use of theatre nuclear weapons to restore the status quo. To defeat a Soviet led invasion or cause Moscow to reappraise the situation, NATO was prepared to escalate a conflict all the way to a general nuclear exchange.[70]

An immediate issue the Alliance had to grapple with after the adoption of flexible response was the role of theatre nuclear forces. While the conventional component of NATO's force structure was to be accentuated, conventional arms were not going to be able to substitute for theatre nuclear weapons. This would have been the case even if the Alliance had been able to improve its conventional capabilities. An Alliance debate ensued about the level of nuclear weapons that was required and about the manner in which they would be employed. The old problem remained; anything other than

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[70] ibid., p. 175.

the most restrained use of nuclear weapons on allied terri-
tory, quite apart from any enemy retaliation that might
occur, would involve collateral effects that would cast
serious doubts on the political feasibility, and therefore
the credibility, of any widescale use of nuclear weapons in
the Alliance's defence.[71] Flexible response calls for deter-
rence, defence, and deliberatly controlled escalation to
work together. NATO's force structure had to have both a
credible 'war-fighting' and punishment capability. Thus,
under the new strategic concept, a link still existed
between theatre and strategic nuclear forces. But, theatre
nuclear weapons would also have an accentuated, more autono-
mous, role.

NATO's theatre nuclear forces were intended to provide an
escalatory link to US strategic forces. This could occur
for at least two reasons. Some argued that the presence of
US ground forces stationed in Europe was enough of a link.
Indeed, these troops could be seen as 'hostages' held by
NATO Europe to ensure that the United States lived up to its
stated commitments. However, because the consequences for
the United States and the USSR of a strategic exchange were
so obvious, there was strong reason to fear that both might
be willing to do everything in their power to prevent a war
from escalating to that level. Theatre nuclear weapons and
NATO's deterrent doctrine were designed to ensure that the

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[71] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, p. 93.

United States and the Soviet Union would not be able to engage each other in a conventional war in Europe which would spare both of their home lands. To the Europeans, a conventional conflict was no more desirable than a nuclear one. The reluctance of NATO Europe to match Warsaw Pact conventional strength was partially intended to radically lower the 'fire-break' between the two levels.

As pointed out above, tactical weapons were initially deployed in order to shore-up deterrence. When the Soviet Union placed its own weapons in the field, NATO sought an advantage by adopting systems of longer range that would hold at risk the territory of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (thus having the same effect on the USSR as US strategic systems). At the same time, these weapons would be fired from Western Europe (the battlefield) and this, it was believed, would be a much more credible eventuality. The USSR would not be expected to draw a distinction between the strategic effect of weapons delivered from Europe or the United States. Despite the fact that successive American administrations sought to prevent the detonation of any nuclear weapon from inevitably leading to an exchange of strategic forces, doubts persisted as to whether or not flexible response was a strategy capable of avoiding this any longer.[72]

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[72] Jeffrey Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981), p. 17.

The paramount problem with theatre deployments was coupling. Intermediate nuclear forces may not have been needed when their targets were already covered by US strategic forces. Therefore, if NATO made major improvements to its intermediate nuclear force structure, it would likely signal an intent to develop the ability to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe which left the United States out. In other words, it would bring into question the United States' commitment to extend deterrence to Western Europe. In the event that NATO was able to strengthen its conventional and theatre nuclear force structures, the danger to the Soviet Union of nuclear escalation would be diminished. NATO would not have to automatically, or mechanically, escalate the conflict.

Even under MC 14/2 there were problems associated with the use of theatre nuclear weapons. The level of damage involved in their use was seen as approaching an unacceptable scale. More and more, the nuclear posture that was supposed to support the strategy of massive retaliation was seen to be as harmful to the defence as it was intended to be to the offence. When the enemy also had a theatre nuclear capability, as the Soviet Union did, then the problem was even worse.[73] Flexible response was supposed to make the threatened use of NATO's theatre nuclear forces more credible by stressing its ability to make limited and selective

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[73] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, pp. 217-220.

strikes. This capability was almost immediately called into question.

Doubts arose as to whether or not NATO's threatened use of theatre nuclear weapons would simply draw a preemptive strike from an attacker.[74] To compound earlier concerns, the new strategy's emphasis on 'limited' and 'selective' use of nuclear weapons would deny NATO a clear military advantage. To defeat an enemy, especially one who could use nuclear weapons as well, would involve levels approaching those envisioned in the bankrupt strategy of massive retaliation. Indeed, the force structure supporting flexible response was the same as the one that had supported massive retaliation. The political consequences of the collateral damage inherent in a nuclear defence would likely be unacceptable. These problems were accentuated by the nature of large-scale armoured battle expected in Central Europe where units of both sides would be dispersed over a wide area to survive in the nuclear environment.[75]

Threats, such as the ones embodied in flexible response, did not provide a greater degree of security for NATO for very long. Only initially did it enable the Western Europeans to strengthen the threat of escalation, but, NATO's nuclear dilemmas persisted. The strategic environment had

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[74] This was highlighted by concerns that NATO's TNFs were particularly vulnerable to a preemptive strike. _ibid_., p. 219.

[75] _ibid_., p. 220.

evolved considerably from when McNamara first proposed flexible response in 1962. By the early 1970s, rough parity existed between the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. As a result, strategic nuclear weapons lost a great deal of the military utility that was once attributed to them. Their sole purpose became deterrence of the other side's first use of its strategic forces.[76] In addition, the Alliance's failure to place the conventional forces in the field necessary to facilitate the proper functioning of its declaratory strategy meant that its nuclear forces would have to fulfil an incredible task. Tactical weapons, while serving to deter aggression, represented an ill-defined war-fighting capacity.[77]

Under strategic parity NATO could no longer tolerate imbalances below the strategic level. Strategic equality gave new weight to the Soviet Union's long-standing conventional superiority and growing predominance in theatre nuclear weapons. Given NATO's theatre nuclear force structure, parity struck at the heart of its credible deterrent.

> In a condition of nuclear parity the credibility
> of our deterrence calls for sufficient counter-
> weights to balance the whole spectrum of an
> aggressor's offensive capabilities. [...] To
> achieve this objective, improvements in the nucle-
> ar posture, [...] are indispensable.[78]

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[76] McNamara, p. 30.

[77] Stromseth, pp. 188-189.

[78] Franz-Joseph Schulze, "Rethinking Continental Defence," in Challenges to the Western Alliance: An International Symposium on the Changing Political, Economic and Mili-

This fear of decoupling was accentuated by the recognition of strategic parity. When flexible response was adopted as the Alliance's strategic concept, the United States had strategic superiority. McNamara's deterrent strategy had sought to exploit that advantage to NATO's benefit. However, with strategic parity, the basis upon which flexible response relied was seriously shaken. Parity between the superpowers prevented the United States from commiting its strategic forces against the Soviet Union except under conditions where its own survival was at stake.[79] As such, NATO's threat to expand a European conflict to involve the United States strategic forces was problematic. Strategic parity attacked the indirect deterrent effect of NATO's theatre nuclear forces which was to tie the United States to Europe. Strategic parity also placed greater emphasis on the direct deterrent effect of the Alliance's theatre nuclear forces -- that aspect which had, perhaps, been most maligned in the past.[80]

In addition, characteristics such as range, yield, and penetrablity, all indicated that NATO's theatre nuclear forces themselves could not perform a punishment role. The threat they posed to the USSR was not comparable to that posed by the US strategic forces. Therefore, the destruc-

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tary Setting, ed. Joseph Godson (London: Times Books, 1984), p. 51.

[79] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, p. 232.

[80] ibid., p. 233.

tive potential of NATO's nuclear posture could become as much of a hinderance as an asset: it may well have reached its culminating point of success. "Thus the conclusion can be drawn that the destructive power of theatre nuclear weapons can add nothing to direct **strategic** deterrence."[81] (my emphasis added). To overcome these problems, NATO did have some theatre nuclear capabilities that were intended to perform a punishment function in SACEUR's general strike plan. These were dual-capable aircraft, Pershing IAs, and perhaps, UK and US SLBMs (what the Soviet Union called 'Forward Based Systems').

If strategic parity prevented NATO from establishing an unambiguously credible threat to escalate a conflict using its nuclear forces, and such forces risked the prospect of decoupling, perhaps theatre nuclear weapons, in and of themselves, could constitute enough of a deterrent to a Warsaw Pact invasion or eliminate the danger of nuclear blackmail. This, unfortunately, was not the case. In the late 1970s, NATO's nuclear force structure was plagued with fundamental inconsistencies which cast doubt on its ability to fulfill its assigned mission. More significantly, additional nuclear deployments offered little hope of overcoming these problems in order to enhance NATO's security.

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[81] ibid., p. 228.

Theatre nuclear weapons were, at first, undoubtedly successful in fulfilling their assigned task. As we have seen, however, the benefits to be expected from their use, and the threat to use them, gradually diminished over time. The Soviet deployment of theatre nuclear weapons and the presence of strategic parity forced NATO in the 1970s to consider the prospects of a two-sided theatre nuclear exchange for the first time. The benefits of nuclear warfighting began to diminish dramatically and rapidly as the likelihood of the reciprocal use of theatre nuclear weapons became evident. The erosion of the United States superiority meant that the initiation of tactical nuclear war by the West would either hasten military defeat or lead to the destruction of Europe: perhaps even both.[82] The influences of this development were felt at both the tactical and wider theatre levels of nuclear deterrence.

The very nature of NATO, being an alliance of sixteen democratic states, ensured that a conflict in Europe would almost invariably have been fought on NATO soil. Consequently, there would likely have been strong pressure on NATO forces to make only the most judicious and economical use of their tactical nuclear weapons. The Warsaw Pact, on

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[82] Record, p. 14. Even in the early 1960s McNamara had concluded that a European theatre nuclear war would be a losing battle for both sides. "Millions of civilians would die, and the use of such weapons would not necessarily turn a European war to NATO's advantage." Fred Kaplan, "Enhanced Radiation Weapons" in Arms Control and the Arms Race, eds. Bruce Russet and Fred Chernoff (New York: W.H. Freedman and Co., 1985), p. 164.

the other hand, would not have been restricted by such con-
cerns. What the individual strikes of an attacker lacked in
effectiveness because of NATO countermeasures could easily
have been made up for by the number of strikes. If there
was an advantage in a tactical nuclear exchange on NATO soil
it was unlikely to lie with the West. The Atlantic Alliance
seemed bound, in fact, to suffer more.[83] For NATO, nuclear
(battlefield weapons) passed their culminating point of suc-
cess when the Soviet Union responded to the new deployments
by developing their own.[84] In fact, increasing the numbers
to deter, argues Luttwak, would have pushed well beyond the
culminating point of success by inhibiting their use,
because explosions would have occurred in West Germany.[85]

Recognising that the maximum utility in the Alliance's
dependence on nuclear weapons would arise from their early,
as opposed to later, use in a conflict opened another dimen-
sion to the tactical nuclear dilemma.[86] More numerous
deployments held little opportunity for NATO to overcome
this dilemma. Tactical nuclear weapons were intended to
support NATO's commitment to forward defence. At that

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[83] Otto Heilbrun, quoted in Record, p. 15.

[84] Record, p. 121.

[85] Luttwak, p. 123.

[86] Klaas G. de Vries, "Security Policy and Arms Control: A
European Perspective," in Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Mod-
ernization and Limitation, eds. Marsha McGraw Olive and
Jeffery D. Porro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
1983), p. 58.

point, however, the Warsaw Pact would not have presented
NATO with clear targets of opportunity. The forces of both
sides would have been in extremely close proximity to each
other, indeed they would likely have been intertwined. At
that point, NATO would be deterred from using its battle-
field nuclear forces for military reasons; the casualties it
inflicted upon itself would be immense.[87] In addition, the
very effectiveness of the weapons themselves were called
into jeopardy. There was a real danger that these forces
could fall into the hands of the enemy. In the early stages
of war in Central Europe, NATO might have been placed in the
unacceptable position of 'using or losing' its short-range
battlefield systems depending on how an Eastern offensive
had progressed.[88]

New or improved tactical nuclear forces would have added
little to NATO's ability to overcome these hurdles.
Improvements to battlefield systems would only have
increased NATO's ability to destroy Soviet forces, it would
not have made it any easier to use them. Deploying larger
numbers of weapons would only have raised the level of pos-
sible devastation to the territory of the allies. It might
even have diminished their security by presenting the Sovi-
ets with the need to use more of their own TNWs to target

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[87] Schwartz, p. 145.

[88] Senator Sam Nunn, quoted in John Cartwright (M.P.) and
Julian Critchley (M.P.), Cruise, Pershing and SS-20. The
Search for Consensus: Nuclear Weapons in Europe (London:
Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), p. 43.

and eliminate NATO's weapons.[89]

The fact that NATO's deterrent strategy held out the possibility of first use encouraged the Soviet Union to maintain a doctrine of preemption. This only exacerbated NATO nuclear planning. NATO did not have the credible capacity to strike time-urgent targets in the Soviet Union or survive a first strike.

Advances in technology could not be ruled out as a way of ameliorating NATO's security dilemma. However, such technologies as would provide increased accuracy and smaller yields would render them virtually negligible against Soviet dispersals, demanding more strikes. This would defeat both purposes for which the deployments would be made in the first place: one being a cheap defence, the other less collateral damage. To overcome the problems of associated damage inherent in their use in the densely populated region of Central Europe, these weapons would have to be so small as to lose their advantage over conventional munitions. Bear in mind that nuclear weapons still detered, the issue was that additions would have added little to their ability to do so at a lower level of risk to the overall security of the Alliance. This is not to suggest that one could have had a finite number of theatre nuclear forces regardless of what the Soviet Union had. The question was; what kind of nuclear force structure would increase European security?

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[89] Record, p. 15.

Still, aspects generally related to the presence of theatre nuclear forces in Europe contributed to coupling the strategic forces of the United States to the regional equation. Central Europe is an area of high political interest, where significant commitments have been made by superpowers who have often had a very acrimonious relationship. Therefore, it is not difficult to envision the hostile use of nuclear weapons in the theatre leading to a general nuclear war. To a certain extent, the danger that such an escalation could occur detered adventurous aggression. NATO could not be certain that a European nuclear war would become a superpower nuclear war, but, neither could the Warsaw Pact be certain that it would not.[90] This element of uncertainty allowed the United States to have its strategic forces linked to NATO Europe without having to make an unacceptable, and consequently unbelievable, explicit commitment to that effect.[91] Besides, it would not have been credible to threaten an immediate strategic response to an attack. Massive retaliation had been buried and in the 1970s, terms such as 'mutual assured destruction' and 'parity' ensured its decomposition. So, as problematic as it was, the threat to use theatre nuclear weapons was easier to contemplate than the use of strategic forces. Automatic escalation as a result of the defender's actions need not have occured.

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[90] This 'threat that leaves something to chance' has been stressed by the French as a most effective deterrent.

[91] Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, p. 230.

Instead, the onus was placed on the attacker to consider the risks of escalation to the strategic level. Therefore, theatre nuclear forces occupied an important place in the force structure toward providing a credible deterrent.[92]

NATO was to restructure its forces consistent with the new strategy of flexible response, but alliance members were unwilling to bolster their conventional forces. Therefore, their security was not appreciably altered by the new strategy. Throughout the 1970s, NATO's strategy came under increasing assault. The situation was considered to be increasingly unstable. In addition, the SALT process, MIRVing, deployment of more SSBNs and Soviet theatre nuclear force modernisation served as military catalysts to undermine the new NATO strategy throughout the decade. The problem continued to be one of credibility.

The Enhanced Radiation Warhead[93]

Once again, NATO turned to consider unilateral force posture changes in order to shore up the credibility of its deterrent. This time, it sought to exploit the technological features of the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW).[94] The

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[92] ibid., pp. 231-232.

[93] Popularly known as the neutron bomb.

[94] The exact design of each shell, bomb or missile warhead varies but an ERW is essentially a fission-fusion weapon that releases a greater proportion of fast moving neutrons, at the expense of explosive yield, than do standard thermo-nuclear devices. Thus, beyond a short range, ERWs produce many more neutrons, and kill more enemy com-

question of their deployment was first raised in the summer
of 1977 although interest in it had been growing since then
US Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, studied the
strengths and weaknesses of the European tactical nuclear
stockpile.

The advantage of enhanced radiation weapons lay in the
combination of accuracy and low-yield that would reduce
undesirable effects of their use such as the extent of col-
lateral damage associated with the use of 'normal' nuclear
weapons. In addition, these features would also militate
against escalatory pressures. NATO's policy of deterrence
calls for the use of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons to
support it, so a technology that made the Alliance's threat
to use nuclear weapons more credible would be attractive
because it would allow NATO to deter more effectively.
Enhanced radiation weapons would have increased the tactical
effectiveness of NATO's force structure, but, more impor-
tantly, they would have done so at a lower level of nuclear
war fighting than was the case in the late 1970s. At the
same time, there was no reason to believe that, in them-
selves, ERWs would encourage NATO to employ nuclear weapons
any sooner in a conflict than was already planned.

> "[...], given the strategic doctrine presently
> governing the Alliance's strategic posture, it is
> difficult to see why the introduction of new weap-
> ons better able to fulfil a role for which <u>nuclear</u>

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batants per kiloton of explosive, while minimising col-
lateral damage to objects of value. See Kaplan, pp.
164-165.

> weapons are already deployed should alter the
> nuclear threshold. [...] Rather [...] they may
> reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation in the
> event of nuclear weapons being used, and anyway
> will not increase the risks."[95]

With these advantages in mind, work began to deploy ERWs on Lance missiles and to replace many United States nuclear artillery shells.

However, the enhanced radiation warhead proposal was rejected on April 7, 1978, when the US government cancelled production.[96] Arguments against tactical nuclear modernisation focussed on the fact that any introduction of nuclear weapons, whether enhanced radiation weapons or not, would still result in enormous damage. For the most part, NATO Europe has never put much emphasis on the war fighting component of deterrence; nuclear or conventional. When the United States started talking about limited nuclear war, exchange ratios, and protracted nuclear conflict, the allies' fear of war was heightened. Recognising that United States strategic superiority was a thing of the past meant that tactical war fighting capabilities did not reassure Europeans about the outcome of a theatre nuclear campaign. Some Europeans did recognise the link between NATO's battlefield nuclear capabilities and the credibility of the link

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[95] Paul Buteux, Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance (Boulder: West View Press, 1983), p. 47.

[96] Note that President Reagan reversed this decision to a point in August 1981, when he ordered the manufacture and stockpiling of neutron warheads. Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, pp. 50-51.

to US strategic forces. However, for many of them, ERW deployments would be provocative in nature and would detract more from NATO's security by harming détente than they could provide militarily.[97] This would be compounded by retaliatory or preemptive attacks from the Soviet Union without any guarantee that they would employ warheads with low explosive yields.[98] Thus, the neutron bomb was unable to ameliorate NATO European concerns about coupling. If anything, Europeans feared that enhanced radiation weapons would only allow NATO to fight a limited nuclear war on the continent. There was nothing in their technological features that promised to make a strategic exchange any more likely.

> In these circumstances, the proposal to deploy the 'neutron bomb' can be seen as an attempt to find a technological solution to the political problem of persuading the various allies of the continued credibility and political appropriateness of a strategic posture based on the doctrine of flexible response[99]

Conclusion

Somewhere in the late 1960s, more probably the early 1970s, the Soviet Union reached strategic parity[100] with the United States. A realisation that this condition was

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[97] Sigal, p. 67.

[98] Brezhnev's 'No First Use Speech' at the United Nations on June 12, 1982, not withstanding.

[99] Buteux, Strategy, p. 52.

[100] This meant that, while literal and exact equalities do not have to exist between the numbers of warheads available to the two superpowers, it does mean that there must exist a roughly equivalent capability to assure the destruction of each other. See Garvey, p. 43.

approaching, compelled Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defense 1961-1968, to embed the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) into US strategic planning. If both the United States and the Soviet Union were mutually assured of their ability to destroy each other, this would create strategic stability by removing an incentive to strike first in a crisis.[101] Submarine launched ballistic missiles and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty both contributed to shoring up this concept during the 1970s and were compatible with it. However, this very process of stabilising the US-Soviet strategic relationship further destabilised the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance and NATO's ability to deter Soviet aggression or withstand Soviet political pressure. In 1973 James Dougherty pointed out that

> Spreading through the minds of many well-informed
> West Europeans is the disturbing thought that,
> even though it will probably remain unthinkable
> for the Soviets to use their gross numerical
> superiority for the purpose of carrying out an
> actual military attack against Western Europe,
> nevertheless the Soviets might be able to project
> an image of military superiority in order to
> acquire greater political leverage over West Euro-
> pean governments.[102]

Nuclear weapons appeared to be increasingly less useful in providing NATO with the means to secure its frontiers and political interests. NATO had altered its strategy, yet, the Alliance's ability to deter remained at issue. West

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[101] ibid., p. 44.

[102] James E. Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1973), p. 191.

German Chancellor Schmidt gave voice to European concerns about extended deterrence during his now famous speech in 1977 to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States....In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons."[103]

The political problem for NATO was that the allies sought to provide for their security through deterrence rather than their ability to effectively fight a war in Central Europe. The dichotomy between credible deterrence and credible defence persistently plagued NATO force planning.[104] So, throughout the 1970s, the contradictions between the attainment of security for NATO and the threat to use nuclear weapons grew. In response, NATO agreed, in 1979, to modernise its long-range intermediate nuclear forces in order to once again address its defence dilemmas.

But the deployment of more nuclear weapons by NATO in the theatre did little in reality to rectify this problem. Franz-Joseph Schulze, former Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Central Europe, argued that,

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[103] Helmut Schmidt, quoted in Thomas L. McNaughter and Theodore M. Parker, Modernizing NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces: An Assessment, The Rand Paper Series (1980), p. 3.

[104] Buteux, Strategy, p. 51.

> Nuclear weapons are an indispensable element of
> deterrence. NATO's deterrence rests on the close
> linkage of its conventional and theatre nuclear
> forces in Europe and the strategic nuclear poten-
> tial of the United States. The tight and indisso-
> luble coupling of these three elements of the NATO
> triad confronts the Soviet Union with the incalcu-
> lable risk that any military conflict between the
> two alliances could escalate to an all-out nuclear
> war.[105]

This very same reason for the success of deterrence, how-

ever, has also contributed to its incredibility. The 'seam-

less web' idea raised fears that escalation was built into

NATO's force posture. Close linkage and the threat of first

use increased NATO's risks of miscalculation and early esca-

lation in a crisis.[106] The traditional route followed by

NATO had been to obtain security by being prepared to use

nuclear weapons in war and so deter attacks. But, in the

age of nuclear parity, a state can no longer view its secur-

ity as a competitive goal which can be obtained at the

expense of others. "Security must be viewed as a shared

value. The common enemy is war itself. Real security means

common security."[107] In essence, the utility of nuclear

weapons in the modern age was restricted because it was

impossible to think of the use of nuclear weapons by one

side that did not invoke a nuclear response from the other.

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[105] Schulze, p. 53.

[106] Stromseth, p. 198.

[107] Johan Jorgen Holst, "Strategy and Arms Control," in
Challenges to the Western Alliance: An International
Symposium on the Changing Political, Economic and Mili-
tary Setting, ed. Joseph Godson (London: Times Books
Ltd., 1984), p. 56.

There was never going to be a one-sided war between the superpowers.[108] In addition, continued reliance on hardware solutions to NATO's nuclear dilemmas would only make arms control more difficult to achieve. "States have to exercise mutual restraint in their quest for security. In the absence of such restraint they are likely to set off competitive actions which harbour the danger of exacerbating conflicts, introducing new sources of instability and resulting in ever higher levels of military forces."[109]

The nuclear age has produced a kind of insecurity that is unprecedented, at least for a large country such as the United States. While the Alliance could have a deterrent strategy, absolutely nothing could prevent it from being utterly destroyed in a nuclear attack.[110] To a large extent, survival, for NATO, became dependent upon the logical cognitive abilities of its potential opponent's leaders. If they became irrational enough to 'push the button', NATO could do little than to destroy the other in return. Building more nuclear weapons would only allow the Western allies to destroy their opponent all that more effectively, but would

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[108] McGeorge Bundy, "Some Thoughts About Unilateral Moderation," in Arms Control and International Security, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 19.

[109] Holst, p. 56.

[110] Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet View of the Strategic Situation," in Arms Control and International Security, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 89.

do nothing to make them more secure. At certain lower lev-
els, more nuclear forces could help shore up deterrence and
ensure that an aggressor did not perceive an opportunity to
exist for encroachment upon Western interests. But, in
NATO's case, too many nuclear warheads in Europe would have
just added to the Alliance's insecurities. Continued unilat-
eral efforts by NATO to make its deterrent more effective
may have succeeded in producing a more secure capacity to
retaliate against its opponent, but would not have removed
the risks basic to nuclear deterrence. In order to allevi-
ate the specific defence dilemmas posed by NATO's nuclear
force structure, the Alliance might have had to abandon uni-
lateral hardware solutions. "There are limits, however, to
how far this [security] can be achieved by unilateral
action. Certain kinds of measures useful for these purposes
require joint action or co-operation."[111] Arms control may
be what NATO needed to find a middle ground where East and
West were comfortable with the effectiveness of their deter-
rents.

When pursuing arms control with the Soviet Union, NATO
would have to ignore the rhetoric about eliminating nuclear
weapons. Nevertheless, NATO would also have to enter into
negotiations bearing in mind that nuclear weapons were not
all that useful in the modern age. Some scholars, in the
contemporary environment, have suggested that it might be

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[111] Robert R. Bowie, "Basic Requirements of Arms Control,"
Daedalus, 89, No. 4 (Fall 1960), p. 167.

more useful to reject the Clausewitzian assessment of war, arguing that security could no longer be assured by military means.[112] This assessment was almost right. Security could only come from military means as was discussed above. Nevertheless, in 1979, nuclear weapons were less useful than they were in 1949. NATO had to be willing to enter into negotiations with its foremost potential enemy. Security would not be obtained through relentless arms competition alone, as this could have even proved to be counter-productive. The mission, 'deter, or if deterrence fails, prevail', was no longer adequate in Central Europe. Under concepts of arms control and stability the mission became, 'deter safely, and if deterrence fails, defend successfully without extending the destruction to general war.'[113]

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[112] Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev," Foreign Affairs, 67, No. 1 (Fall, 1988), p. 22.

[113] Carl H. Amme, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defense (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 94.

Chapter III

NATO'S PANACEA? SECURITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL

> Disarmament is a continuation of strategy by a
> reduction of military means, and arms control is a
> continuation of strategy by a mutual restraint on
> military means.[1]

This derivation of Clausewitz' often cited aphorism cap-

tures the core aspiration that NATO holds for its strategy

of arms control. Having concluded that individual efforts

on the part of NATO to alter its force structure through

nuclear force modernisations, additions or redeployments

were not likely to better implement its strategy of flexible

response and so enhance its security by strengthening deter-

rence, the question immediately arose as to what would

indeed accomplish this task. At this point, then, this

paper will turn to consider the role that arms control, both

in the process of negotiating and in the achievement of for-

mal agreements, could play in this respect.

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[1] Ken Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control," in _Contemporary Strategy I_, 2nd ed., John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), p. 140.

Arms Control: A Definitional Exercise

Arms control first emerged as a concept, distinct from disarmament, in response to two factors. The first, was a combination of disarmament's failure to satisfactorily deal with the concerns of those persons skeptical of its purported advantages and disarmament's failure to actually deliver agreements that would enable it to institute its theoretical advantages. The second reason is related to, and exacerbated by, this first factor, it being the loss of the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons and the increasingly evident growth in Soviet military capabilities in the nuclear realm. The realisation that nuclear war would entail unspeakable devastation in both the Soviet Union and the United States was the primary incentive behind the abandonment of disarmament and the search for alternatives. In the forward of a special issue of Daedalus devoted to arms control in 1960, just when the concept was emerging, Jerome Wiesner wrote;

> One idea stands out very clearly in these papers;
> the general consensus that civilization is faced
> with an unprecedented crisis. There is a growing
> realization among knowledgeable people that if the
> arms race is allowed to continue its accelerating
> pace, our country will have less security, not
> more, with each passing year. As a result, there
> is an ever increasing likelihood of a war so dis-
> astrous that civilization, if not man himself,
> will be eradicated.[2]

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2 Jerome B. Wiesner, "Forward to the Issue 'Arms Control',"
  Daedalus, 89, No. 4 (Fall 1960), p. 678.

The notion that nuclear weapons had brought about the need for the superpowers to cooperate and jointly manage their military rivalry was endemic to thinking about arms control at that time.

There were certain features of arms control, as an approach to the military relations between states, that distinguished it from previous practices. To evince the character of arms control, this section will compare and contrast 'arms control' with both 'arms policy' and 'disarmament'.

Arms Policy

Arms control is similar to the concept of arms policy. Arms policy, of course, being simply the course that a particular government has chosen to follow with respect to its armed forces. An armaments policy deals with both the amount of, and kind of, weapons and forces in being. It also deals with the deployment, development and utilisation of such forces, whether in periods of relaxation, tensions or open hostilities.[3] An arms policy is itself part of a state's general foreign policy. Military resources and the structure of a defence establishment are altered as necessary, or possible, in order to attain national objectives. Therefore, to the extent that arms control enables a state to achieve its foreign policy goals, the process of weapons

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[3] Donald G. Brennan, "Setting the Goals of Arms Control," Daedalus, 89, No. 4 (Fall 1960), pp. 692-693.

limitation can be considered a component of a state's arms
policy.

> Both the military content of arms control measures
> and the self-control implicit in the concept of
> arms control are features that arms control shares
> with arms policy. And many of the possible spe-
> cific objectives of some arms control measures,
> such as avoidance of war by accident or miscalcu-
> lation, are basically military objectives as
> well.[4]

While arms control is part of arms policy, it is also a
broader concept than arms policy and may, in fact, be part
of other policies and serve other functions beyond the scope
of arms policy alone. An example, would be the use of arms
limitation to restrict military growth in a potentially des-
tabilising area of competition while at the same time fos-
tering a relaxation of tensions and the implementation of a
policy of détente.

Despite similarities, 'arms control' exists as a term in
the language alongside 'arms policy' because it is in fact
different. The most fundamental characteristic of arms con-
trol, that distinguishes it from arms policy, is the notion
of cooperation among adversaries. Whether arms control is
bilateral, multilateral or unilateral reciprocation-induc-
ing, it involves cooperation between antagonistic interna-
tional actors.

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[4] David V. Edwards, Arms Control in International Politics
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 4.

Cooperation is required in order to regulate the interaction between states involved in arms control. Force structures, and the strategies that states adopt for their utilisation, have always had an influence on the forces of other actors in the system. However, a degree of true cooperation is required before states can agree whether or not it would be in their interest to abide by the elements of an arms control agreement.

Obviously, states negotiating bilateral and multilateral agreements must be willing to cooperate to some extent if the measures are ever to be agreed upon and implemented. All parties are obliged to abide by the strictures of an agreement. This would be the case whether states agreed not to exceed certain limits, restrict forces to authorised geographical zones, reduce the total number of forces in any one or more categories, or forgo the development of a particular weapons system altogether.

Unilateral arms control also involves cooperation. If undertaken in the anticipation that the adversary will reciprocate, in essence creating a tacit arms control agreement, the state that initiated the action will require cooperation on the part of its adversary before the arms policy becomes arms control. Without the cooperation of a potential enemy, the action described would simply amount to a unilateral arms policy decision.

This cooperation emerges in the relations between states in competition with one another over interests for which open hostilities are a possibility. It is a central tenet of arms control that cooperation or joint actions can take place between adversaries. As Schelling and Halperin asserted, "The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of the reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments."[5]

It is very simple to see why states would be interested in mutually controlling their armaments. The negative aspects of the need for states to rely upon their own capabilities include the high cost of modern military equipment and personnel, multiplied by the degree to which the states concerned are engaged in an arms race. This is a particular concern because the costs of modern weapons systems have grown to the point where the creation and maintenance of a military capability has become a true economic burden.[6] This was very much the case with NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

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[5] Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, <u>Strategy and Arms Control</u> (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 2.

[6] So costly are high technology weapons that there is a growing awareness of 'structural disarmament'. As weapons become more expensive, states can afford to purchase fewer and so a degree of disarmament is imposed upon them.

Besides costs, the relationship between arms and international tensions is another factor. While arms do not constitute the sole, or even most fundamental, reason wars occur, they do contribute to the likelihood of their use when their access and perceived use is easier. While only political conflicts of interest create an atmosphere of hostility, the presence of military capabilities can become an essential factor in prolonging or intensifying a conflict. Weapons may even supplant political interests as the driving force behind inter-state friction.

Another problem is the devastation incumbent in waging an armed struggle in the nuclear age. By accepting the existence of military capabilities in an anarchic system, arms controllers recognise that it is possible for wars to occur from time to time. Large-scale nuclear war implies mutual destruction and this would not advance the political interests of either side in the conflict. Both would be better served, despite basic political hostility, by preventing the occurrence of massive destruction.[7] Therefore, arms control is advanced as a means of limiting the harm that could be inflicted in a war.

Although one can point to several objectives for which states may pursue arms control, such as creating and exploiting opportunities for cooperation and international stabilisation, punishing and rewarding allies, or for domes-

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[7] Bowie, p. 165.

tic political considerations, these are not of foremost
interest. The traditionally cited purpose for which states
pursue arms control agreements is to address the undesirable
consequences of surviving in a system where war is possible.
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency con-
firmed this thinking when it stated that;

> Arms Control includes all those actions, unilater-
> al as well as multilateral, by which we **regulate**
> the levels and kinds of armaments in order to
> reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts, their
> severity and violence if they should occur, and
> the economic burden of military programs.[8]

In order to achieve these ends, arms control involves the
conclusion, after a process of negotiation, of a formal
agreement. In other words, the cooperation between adver-
saries is institutionalised.[9] Essentially, cooperation can
be accomplished in one of two fashions: explicitly or tacit-
ly. Explicit agreements involve the detailing of arms con-
trol procedures in a treaty or some form of joint official
statement. Tacit understanding or informal cooperation is
facilitated by actions one party wishes to see both adopt,
which is initiated and responded to favourably through
reciprocal actions by another state.

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[8] US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, <u>Arms Control
Report 1976</u>, Partially reported in <u>Arms Control and Reace
Keeping: Feeling Safe in this World</u>, Ralph M. Goldman (New
York: Random House, 1982), p. 185.

[9] The process whereby policy is converted into practice.
see Edwards, p. 15.

Some analysts would contest that it would be better to reduce unilaterally and challenge a potential opponent to follow suit. They contend that it is of little use postponing until a treaty is negotiated because in the process so many promises are made to the military that, in fact, arms control treaties often amount to arms build-up.[10] Although the SALT II Treaty was never signed, both parties to it acknowledged their willingness to abide by its terms in a de facto approach.[11] This would still constitute cooperation even though appearing unilateral. One's opponent would be expected not to exploit the situation to its advantage, or conversely, misperceive it as an attempt by the initiating party to develop an advantage for itself through a ruse (For an example of this type of arms control arrangement see

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[10] Kenneth Waltz, "The Current Situation in Arms Control and International Security," Arms Control and International Security, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 28.

[11] There is another manner in which cooperation between states in arms control can be facilitated. This would be unilateral actions by a state or alliance and may be seen as a subset of this second tacit approach. This other method would involve individually initiated, self-imposed arms control measures which are considered beneficial even if the state's adversaries do not respond favourably. A state may decide that unilateral arms control is worthwhile on the basis that it will enhance its security regardless of what its adversary does in return. "Hardening of a nation's missiles is a self-contained unilateral initiative, for its primary purpose as an arms control measure is achieved without reciprocation; it protects a nation's missile force so that it can withstand attack and then respond if response is desired, thus increasing national control over military capabilities." Edwards, p. 75. Because this lacks cooperation this thesis will not recognise such actions as arms control, rather, this will be defined as simply an aspect of an armaments policy. Also see James E. Dougherty, How to

NATO's 1984 'Montebello Decision').

Although the international system of anarchic state interaction cannot be fundamentally affected, this does not give rise to despair within the arms control school. Through the intelligent, economical and judicious use of force, facilitated by a reasonable degree of cooperation, supporters of arms control maintain that the threats posed to states can be ameliorated. The means to wage hostilities are a required element for security, arms control is intended only to limit the undesirable collateral consequences that taint the utility of using force. "In the view of the arms controllers, it is possible to postpone Armageddon indefinitely **provided** that governments can be persuaded to pursue policies which are based on a realistic understanding of the actual political-military environment."[12] This notion, that arms are still useful in the international system, leads to a comparison of arms control and disarmament.

Disarmament

Until now, this chapter has not attempted to draw a rigorous distinction between arms control and disarmament. While the two are closely related, at the superficial level, and share certain overlapping characteristics, they are in

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Think About Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1973), p. 31; and Booth, p. 158.

[12] Dougherty, p. 30.

fact almost diametrically opposed regarding their underlying assumptions.

Although definitions vary, it is widely accepted that disarmament involves the quantitative reduction of the total stocks of armaments available to states at the present time. The most august design of the advocates of this approach is 'General and Complete Disarmament'. As such, the goal of disarmament is the virtual, if not absolute, elimination of all military forces. This can, and usually does, include the qualitative dimension of a state's military capabilities in addition to the quantitative side.[13]

Disarmament has taken several forms, the mentioning of which will further clarify the concept. A condition of disarmament obtains when states voluntarily demobilise their armed forces and reapportion their military expenditures. This phenomenon often can be observed once a military force has served its purpose following a conflict. Vanquished states may, as a result, have disarmament imposed upon them by force majeure. German disarmament in the aftermath of both world wars is the most obvious example of this practice. Disarmament may also be applied to the elimination of a military presence in a selective and specified geographical location. Here, the Antarctica Treaty, signed in 1959,

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[13] Dougherty, pp. 22-23; Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety and Arms Control (New York: Viking Press, 1961), pp. 5-6; and Booth, pp. 140-141.

can be identified as an instance of 'zonal' disarmament.[14]

Disarmament, as an approach to the problems of peace and security, has its roots in a philosophy of human nature and society that maintains an idealistic view of mankind. Science, education and socialisation can, it is believed, transform men and, consequently, the system in which they live. Disarmers traditionally espouse revolutionary ideas intent upon changing the international system and placing it upon its head. They seek protection from the threat of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, through their radical reduction. By definition, followers of this approach see the present system, in which war is a possibility, as perverted.[15]

Arms controllers, however, have a substantially different perception of the world in which we live. The most optimistic arms controllers are usually reluctant to embrace the vision of a totally disarmed world which characterises the radical disarmers.[16] Adherents to the process of arms control subscribe to a more conservative outlook. They place greater stock in available historical evidence and a realistic interpretation of international relations. Arms control is advanced as a programme by those who believe that it is not possible to disarm with the assurance that an adequate

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[14] Dougherty, p. 23.

[15] Booth, p. 141.

[16] Dougherty, p. 35.

system of safeguards will be established. In the present world environment, a state's need for armaments is just as pressing as the need to take seriously the possibility and the consequences of nuclear war.[17]

Reductions in total weapons numbers in any one or all categories of weapons may not be beneficial. The wrong kinds of reductions could increase, not lessen, instability.[18] An often cited example in this instance applies to multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. If states should agree to limit the number of delivery vehicles they possess, the strategic situation could be destabilised because the numerous warheads on a MIRVed missile would allow one side to threaten all the missiles on the other side. For example, if the two opposing superpower strategic arsenals were reduced to 100 MIRVed missiles each (a significant disarmament achievement), the temptation may develop for an aggressor to strike first. He could launch only a portion of his force and be assured of destroying enough of the targeted forces to limit the damage of a counter attack while still having the forces in reserve to threaten his opponents counter-value targets which may likely exempt him from the unacceptable consequences of a retaliatory

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[17] Brennan, p. 696.

[18] Harvard Nuclear Study Group, "The Realities of Arms Control," in International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics, eds. Robert O. Matthews et al. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1984), p. 485.

strike.[19]

Arms control calls for international restraints on state's armaments policies regarding the level of forces, their character, deployment or use. Thus, arms controllers seek security within the present system of international anarchy. Weapons cannot be radically reduced, therefore a far better goal is to control the military capabilities that states have at their disposal so as to negate, as best one can, the dangers of nuclear holocaust. Indeed, the aspiration of arms controllers is to reduce the hazards of existing practices of arms acquisitions by a factor greater than the amount of risk that would follow upon the acceptance of arms limitation itself.[20] In short, arms control is a case of a combined policy of armament and disarmament whose objective would be the control of military instruments to ensure that they serve political purposes.[21] By so doing, argue arms controllers, a state can hope to enjoy the best aspects of both approaches.[22]

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[19] This example leaves aside consideration of bomber forces and the more secure submarine forces the superpowers have but it serves to demonstrate the point being made. Bruce Russet and Fred Chernoff, introductions, Arms Control and the Arms Race (New York: W.H. Freedman and Company, 1985), pp. 87-88; and Harvard Nuclear Study Group, p. 485.

[20] Brennan, pp. 700-701.

[21] Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger, 1981), p. 650.

[22] Booth, p. 142.

Thus, there is a substantial difference between arms control and disarmament. This gulf was summarised by John Garnett when he suggested that, "trying to manage military power is a philosophy of despair for disarmers, but for arms controllers, it is all there is."[23] George Kennan, in 1981, arrived at a similar conclusion when he remarked, "We are confronted here with two courses. At the end of the one [arms control] lies hope -- faint hope if you will -- uncertain hope, hope surrounded with dangers if you insist. At the end of the other lies, so far as I am able to see, no hope at all. Can there be...any question as to which course we should adopt?"[24]

The remainder of this chapter will consider arms control as a means of contributing to NATO's security. It has been contrasted with disarmament only to facilitate a clearer understanding of the concept of arms limitation. Disarmament, in itself, is not of interest because NATO has not pursued a policy of disarmament. There are several reasons for this which will be outlined below.[25]

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[23] ibid., p. 142.

[24] George Kennan, quoted in, John T. Rourke, <u>Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in World Politics</u> (Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin, 1989), p. 249.

[25] For basic arguments for and against the routes of disarmament and arms control see Hadley, pp. 44-62; Booth, pp. 142-152 and 158-163; Dougherty, pp. 34-52; Harvard Nuclear Study Group, pp. 480-482.

The Promise of Arms Control

Disarmament to Arms Control

Arms control has not always been enthusiastically pursued
by many analysts and practitioners of Western foreign poli-
cy. Immediately following the Second World War, Westerners
placed much of their thought and efforts into disarming the
military postures of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.
During this period, however, no disarmament agreements could
be reached. The goal proved to be overly optimistic. The
antagonisms between East and West would not allow for the
trust and cooperation required to effect such moves. More
significantly, the United States monopoly of nuclear power
and the inferiority of the Soviet Union annulled any con-
structive movements by either party.[26]

The US monopoly was a factor because of the absolute
security afforded by nuclear weapons in the postwar period.
Simply put, there was little incentive to pursue arms con-
trol agreements with Moscow in the domain of grey, ambiguous
and less exacting arms control policy. NATO's security was
sound with the knowledge that the US had a nuclear monopoly,
and when that had dissipated, a huge nuclear superiority
with the ability to extend that superiority to Europe.[27]

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[26] Booth, p. 149.

[27] This is not intended to imply that NATO did not have any
difficulty in creating a credible deterrent, only that
self reliance provided enough security to make the
untried waters of arms control unattractive (see above,

Those who held a distaste for war, the threat of war and
military means, still held true to the disarmament banner.
The debate focussed on either one or the other, no one was
interested in watered-down compromise solutions; these, it
was believed, would only prove to be ineffectual half meas-
ures. The West either had the Baruch Plan or an effective
strategic deterrent: disarmament or armament.[28]

Throughout the 1950s, disarmament initiatives were put
forward, and discussions took place, but agreements were
never reached. "Thus from late 1946 to the end of 1954 the
United Nations was the scene of what one of the delegates
called a 'parallel monologue'. Both sides were intent upon
justifying their rigid positions before world opinion and
largely ignored each other."[29] Consequently, the disarmament
process became a branch of propaganda.

Meanwhile, NATO's insecurities began to increase as the
Soviet Union deployed its own nuclear forces. While this
took place the prospects for disarmament looked incremental-

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pp. 16-27).

[28] The Baruch Plan was the earliest United States disarma-
ment proposal after WWII and is usually interpreted as
epitomising disarmament thinking. Basically, this propo-
sal entailed the supervised abolition of atomic weapons
while at the same time creating an 'International Atomic
Development Authority' responsible for nuclear research
into military and civilian applications and control of
all sources of materials necessary. Dougherty, p. 47;
and Booth, p. 149.

[29] Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament? (Boston: Bea-
con Press, 1961), p. 22.

ly dimmer. In effect, nuclear proliferation in both the horizontal and vertical senses[30] was undermining the potential that any disarmament agreement could be reached, particularly with regard to verification.

Comprehensive nuclear disarmament became less and less attractive to NATO and its nuclear guarantor, the United States. As a result, discussion about disarmament policy moved from comprehensive to 'partial' measures.[31] Thus, arms control slowly began to emerge. However, between 1961 and 1964, 'sustained intellectual attention' produced some of the most sophisticated disarmament proposals ever fielded. But, agreement was never very close. Hedely Bull described the discussion of general and complete disarmament since 1965 as a 'perfunctory affair'.[32]

In 1961, Richard Barnet wrote, Who Wants Disarmament?, in which he stated;

> Is there a middle ground between an unrestrained competition of armaments on the one hand, and complete disarmament on the other? Is it possible to approach the problem of armament by taking a few modest steps towards disarmament? [...] Such solutions are usually termed measures of "partial disarmament," "limited disarmament," or "arms con-

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[30] Horizontal proliferation means the spread of nuclear weapons and their relevant technologies to other political actors. Vertical proliferation entails the spread of nuclear weapons by one political actor geographically, numerically, technologically or among the different services of its own armed forces and territory.

[31] Barnet, p. 149.

[32] Hedley Bull, quoted in Booth, p. 150.

trol".[33]

Thus, attention shifted to arms control and there was great anticipation that this would provide the means of addressing security problems.

Arms Control

Arms control would accomplish this task by maintaining the presence of arms while controlling them. Such control could be facilitated by any one or combination of the following measures. First, arms control may involve prescriptions being placed on military postures. This is indeed where the main focus of attention has been in arms control for some time. Restrictions on the military can affect qualitative aspects of the force structure. These would involve restrictions of missile ranges or the number of MIRVed warheads that may be placed on an intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missile. It often involves drawing distinctions between 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons or between first-strike, second-strike and other-strike forces.

Due to qualitative distinctions being so difficult to elicit, this type of arms control is difficult to achieve. More often, restrictions deal with quantitative aspects of a force posture which may be, held constant, held within specific ratios for increase, held below specified ceilings, or

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[33] Barnet, pp. 99-100.

held above specified floors. Forces may also be increased
to equality or increased to stability, balance, or some oth-
er provided objective, such as a 'safer' level. Similarly,
they may be decreased to equality or decreased to a 'safer'
or 'less destructive' level. Finally, elements of a force
structure may be abandoned, proscribed ('nonarmament' in
terms of a specific weapon or system or of a specific area
of environment), or transfered to other nations (allies,
neutrals) or to organisations (alliances, international
organisations).[34]

Second, arms control may involve the exchange of informa-
tion through any number of different media. Knowledge of an
adversary's national military establishment has long been a
significant indicator of its security policy.[35] The degree
of transparency of a potential enemy's forces has been con-
sidered central to reducing the risks of surprise attack and
preemptive strikes. The interest in confidence and security
building measures in Europe has led to arms control in this
realm with the latest round of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that opened in March 1989.
These talks just concluded with the signing of several docu-
ments on November 19-21, 1990. The NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) agreement placing limitations on their conventional

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[34] Edwards, p. 17.

[35] ibid., p. 16.

capabilities.[36] The members of the two alliances also issued the Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States announcing that their nations were no longer adversaries. The members of the CSCE adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe pledging their support for the process and adopting some new measures and institutional arrangements for achieving confidence and security building measures. Finally, the 34 CSCE states endorsed the Vienna document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

Third, the allocations of economic or material resources a state may make to its military efforts can be restricted. Measures that proscribe the peaceful use of fissionable material would fall under this category.[37] Similarly, a ceiling may be placed on the percentage of a state's budget or gross national product (GNP) that may be devoted to defence spending.

Fourth, control over military forces may be facilitated by the establishment of rules concerned with operations, such as the employment of weapons, or the threat to employ them. Controls on military assistance would also fall under this category. An example would be the prohibition on germ warfare. A state is allowed to invest research into, and acquire quantities of, biological agents, but may not be

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[36] The CFE discussions and agreement were not part of the CSCE process, but the treaty was signed at the same time.

[37] Edwards, p. 18.

allowed to use this military resource.[38]

The application of arms control measures such as these are intended to provide stability to the relationship between potentially hostile states and, therefore, to increase the security of those states. Stability could come in two forms; strategic stability would address concerns about surprise attacks, crisis stability would ease pressures to strike preemptively during periods of heightened tensions.[39]

Stability requires that neither alliance fears an imminent attack. "We are interested not only in assuring ourselves with our own eyes that he is not preparing an attack against us; we are interested as well in assuring _him_ through _his_ own eyes that _we are preparing no deliberate attack against him_."[40] There are, therefore, military capabilities that NATO might prefer not to deploy. Of course, it is even better if the other side did not have them either. So there may be advantages in thinking of the surprise-attack problem as one suitable for negotiation.[41]

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[38] _ibid._, p. 18.

[39] William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control Record," in _Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality_, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 9.

[40] Thomas C. Schelling, _The Strategy of Conflict_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 231.

[41] _ibid._, p. 231.

Negotiations

To ensure stability and the resolution of NATO's defence dilemma that gave rise to instability, meant one of three things; NATO had to expand and improve its forces, or the WTO had to voluntarily and unilaterally reduce its own forces, or both sides had to engage in negotiated, mutual limitations and restraints.[42]

The obstacles to NATO's accomplishing the first of these options has already been discussed at length in Chapter One. The second can easily be dealt with here. Prior to the present situation, in which the Soviet Union has actually initiated some unilateral military cuts of its own volition,[43] this could not be a seriously anticipated turn of events.[44] Essentially, there was no incentive for the Soviet

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[42] Marvin Leibstone, "NATO's Critical Options," Strategic Review, 16, No. 2 (Spring 1988), p. 44.

[43] The period up until it became apparent to Western analysts that Gorbachev was intent upon fundamentally restructuring the Soviet economy so dramatically as to necessitate a substantial retrenchment in the role of the Soviet military (1986/87 would be a reasonably conservative point).

[44] The 1960 'Khrushchev cuts' not withstanding. Khrushchev initiated a cut-back in armed forces personnel arguing that large armies, navies and bomber forces were obsolete. He stressed the upgrading of the USSR's nuclear rocket forces and proposed to find the resources at the expense of the other services in January, 1960. By the spring of 1961, this plan was already being reversed as the military establishment and international events convinced Khrushchev that the unified use of all means of armed struggle were necessary. David Lane, State and Politics in the USSR (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp.116-118.

Union to adopt such a policy. Today, however, those unilateral actions that the USSR has initiated, present problems for NATO. So long as those reductions are unilateral, NATO has little or no leverage over what in fact will and will not be reduced. This denies NATO the ability to have a hand in the restructuring process so as to understand more fully the security consequences of any particular Soviet decisions, or even to have a hand in the process so as to ensure that the effect will in fact be a stabilisation of military affairs.

The underlying impetuses behind these changes in the Soviet force structure threaten to run out of control and destabilise the European balance as the events in East European states, combined with domestic Soviet political considerations, come to bear on decision makers in Moscow. If any alterations were to occur only within the framework of East-West negotiations, then NATO would be afforded an opportunity to influence the pace of change in the military realm to its liking. Such a process would enable the West to entrench the sort of intrusive verification measures that it requires in order to build confidence in its relationship with the East.

Even more significant, is the fact that unilateral reductions in the East will create growing demands for reductions in the West that may be both difficult to resist and mili-

tarily compromising to Western security interests in their effects. NATO and WTO force structures did not mirror each other. Changes to the Soviet Union's theatre nuclear arsenal that had an acceptable influence on its ability to implement its strategies and, therefore, did not detract from its security, may, if duplicated by NATO have had a profound impact on the implementation of its strategy and the security that it was supposed to provide.

Finally, one must not forget the institutional contribution of negotiated arms control. There is no guarantee that any unilateral decisions taken by Moscow will continue to be in force at any time in the near or late future. Many analysts still express doubt and concern about the reversability of the present 'new thinking'. Consequently, "[...] the possibility of reversal makes it all the more urgent to seize this opportunity to reach favourable agreements in an approach that can be characterized as 'locking in gains'."[45] Unilateral reductions on the part of the Soviet Union would not allow NATO to institutionalise any gains.

By way of conclusion it could be stated that, while this opportunity -- unilateral cuts by NATO's adversary -- holds much promise and may provide many fortuitous results, it is by no means optimal. NATO has rarely been presented with such a situation before and in the future it may not have

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[45] Joseph S. Nye, "Arms Control After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, 68, No. 5 (Winter 1989/90), p. 51.

this opportunity again.

This short analysis would tend to imply that NATO's only recourse, one where it could hope to have an active influence on its security environment, as opposed to the passive nature of awaiting the fallout of unilateral initiatives from Moscow, is that of arms control. This was particularly so of the period when NATO adopted, and later implemented, the dual-track approach. At that time, any arms control measures unilaterally adopted by the Soviet Union would have raised suspicions in Western circles about the motives that conditioned them. The Soviet Union had long been known to treat arms control as simply another avenue to pursue its struggle with the West. Moscow did not view its own forces as potentially dangerous and one-sided arms control was a desirable goal for the Soviet Union provided that it was on the right side. Therefore, the problem for the Alliance in 1979 was to figure out how arms control could be married to its armaments policy so as to provide the most advantageous outcome.

Conclusion

Arms control has been enthusiastically pursued by governments and, although its history is much shorter than that of disarmament, it has been far more successful in terms of achieving formal agreements (see appendix A). Despite this apparent success, the early 1980s marked a turning point at

which the acceptability of arms control had waned. By this point the critics of disarmament were more numerous than its proponents. The theory and practice of arms control appeared to be in complete disarray. Arms control came under fire because it had gone from being a complement of an armaments policy to a competitor as it moved from a theoretical exercise to an institutionalised activity. As a result, so the argument went, arms control developed the mindless momentum associated with other bureaucratic efforts that have prolonged their usefulness. Arms control became an end unto itself. The goal of attaining an agreement had supplanted more broadly defined security objectives.[46] Just when the critics of arms control where making their presence felt and the process appeared to be most compromised, NATO demonstrated an interest in the process again with its 'dual-track' decision of 1979. But, before going on, this chapter will take a look at those criticisms of the arms control process in order to assess their relevance for NATO. There are two areas of criticism. The first is that arms control could do little to affect NATO's security in the strictly military dimension of the question. The second is that the political impedimenta that came with arms control would have a potentially harmful influence on NATO security.

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[46] Richard Burt, "The Relevance of Arms Control in the 1980s," Daedalus, 110, No. 1 (Winter 1981), p. 169.

Arms Control and Effective Deterrence I

Militarily, NATO had little reason to expect, in 1979, that arms control could adjust its security in any meaningfully positive manner. For this, there were three basic reasons. First, NATO forces were inferior in numbers to those of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in almost all areas. The consequence being that it was almost impossible to expect that NATO would be able to negotiate a deal that could, in any way, contribute to the fulfillment of its security interests. Secondly, it was very difficult to know what was 'good' and what was 'bad' militarily as negotiations were underway. Therefore, in the present age of rapid technological change, arms control could easily have been more harmful than beneficial. Finally, arms control and the negotiation process interfered with effective defence planning.

Negotiating From Strength

States approach arms control in order to improve their security, not to diminish it. Therefore, arms control agreements are not incompatible with enhancing one state's relative advantage in the military sphere and diminishing its losses in conducting a war. Even if all this meant was the postponement of war until a time of a particular state's own choosing. Because arms control is intended to augment security, there is little opportunity for a militarily weak-

er state to negotiate an arms control agreement that would involve limitations being placed on the superior state's force structure. Until the INF and CFE agreements, asymmetrical reductions were almost unheard of. Therefore, a great paradox of NATO's security posture was that without military strength, it had little leverage to secure real arms reductions.[47] US experience in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that limitations could not be placed on the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons unless Moscow had an incentive to negotiate seriously. Therefore, the West needed to arm in order to parley. Regarding the Central European balance, Lawrence Martin noted that, "The erosion of NATO's erstwhile superiority in tactical nuclear weapons having trumped one of the West's few bargaining cards, it becomes difficult to see why the Soviet Union should **grant** NATO the security and equality it will not purchase by its own efforts."[48]

This brings about a consideration of the 'bargaining chip' theory, which is an important part of the relationship between arms control and force structure. New arms could provide the leverage necessary to achieve an arms control agreement. Arms talks make bargaining chips out of existing programmes and sometimes freeze the status quo for fear of upsetting ongoing negotiations or harming a bargaining posi-

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[47] Casper W. Weinberger, "Arms Reductions and Deterrence," Foreign Affairs, 66, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 702.

[48] Lawrence Martin, The Two-Edged Sword: Armed Force in the Modern World (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1982), p. 70.

tion. "For example, the United States delayed its withdrawal of obsolete tactical nuclear missiles from Europe for several years in the 1970s for fear of affecting the NATO position in MBFR."[49] (See also the role of the Titan II ICBMs in the SALT negotiations).

If successful, arms control could result in modifying the requirements for a modernisation programme in the first place.[50] But, if there is no concise purpose for which a particular weapon is to be used it will not provide much power in bargaining. However, if the system under discussion has an important role, this would bring into question the desirability of arms control that would limit or restrict the weapons use in some way.[51] Thus, when assessing the utility of arms control, one must bear in mind that arms control and force structure have not been equals regarding their impact on national security policy in the past. Arms control has been criticised for simply codifying existing balances rather than creating new ones. Many scholars have been correct in asserting that unilateral planning decisions, however determined, have had a greater impact on

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[49] Joseph J. Kruzel, "Arms Control and American Defense Policy: New Alternatives and Old Realities," Daedalus, 110, No. 1 (Winter 1981), p. 155.

[50] Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," Foreign Affairs, 66, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 723.

[51] Buteux, Strategy, Doctrine and the Politics of Alliance: Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation in NATO (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 126. See also Weinberger, pp. 700-719 for a defence of the Reagan Administration's insistance of negotiating from strength.

states' security than has been the case with negotiated con-
straints.   Often, those agreements that appear to have been
influential are compromised in   reality.   For example,   the
1963 Test-Ban Treaty simply   resulted from the superpowers
agreeing not to do what they no longer had an interest in
doing.[52]

This past practice has led to the conclusion that the
relationship between arms control and force structure is not
necessarily the key to security policy. "Phrased different-
ly,   one could argue that the sum of the contributions of
arms and arms control does not equal either the totality of
security policy or, more obviously, the totality of diploma-
cy."[53] This observation is informative, as the interest, if
not the extent, to which NATO has attempted to use arms con-
trol as an accessory to force structure has grown immensely
over the previous decades (1970s and 1980s). The reason for
this was the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union
and its nuclear force modernisations, and new deployments.[54]
The difficulty this presented was compounded by the numerous
and significant conflicting aspects of the national goals of

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[52] Richard Haass, "Arms Control and the Indian Ocean," in
    Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s, ed. Rich-
    ard Burt (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p.   145; and
    Aron, p. 653.

[53] Haass, p. 145; see also Cleave, p. 9.

[54] Henning Wegener, "The Management of Change: NATO's Anni-
    versary Summit," NATO Review, 37, No. 3 (June 1989), p.
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the two alliances.[55] Arms control and disarmament agreements
are negotiated for direct gains; to serve the national
interest, not the international interest.[56] In this way, the
nature of arms control itself creates a difficulty for
adversarial alliances to come to an agreement. The arma-
ments and security nexus is such a sensitive one that gov-
ernments have not been predisposed to embrace radical chang-
es.[57] Indeed, the fact that arms control involves
cooperation between states with poor diplomatic relations
can incapacitate the process. As Joseph Kruzel pointed out;

> Negotiated restraint is therefore only useful when
> nations are sufficiently wary of each other to see
> the need for an agreement, but not so suspicious
> that talks will either fail, or produce an accord
> likely to collapse at the first hint of crisis.
> This is the paradox of arms control: the easier it
> is for nations to conclude an agreement, the less
> need they will have for it.[58]

Parity

A second military problem lies in the difficulty in
determining what is actually a desirable adjustment of
national and allied military capabilities oriented toward
improving security. This arises because there is a lack of
consensus as to what **actually** is desirable. The concepts of
security and stability are very nebulous, as are the inten-

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[55] Barry M. Blechman, "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a
Future?" Foreign Affairs, 59, No. 1 (Fall 1980), p. 699.

[56] Booth, p. 176.

[57] ibid., p. 158.

[58] Kruzel, pp. 153-154.

tions of each party in negotiating.[59] A state must have an understanding of its security requirements before it can define the contribution that arms control can make to it. This presents a problem because the concept of security is plagued by uncertainties as much as is arms control. For NATO, this is exacerbated by two factors, one being the constantly evolving technological and political circumstances,[60] the other being the nature of a sixteen nation alliance.

A serious arms control problem is the lack of an understanding of what, in fact, would constitute a stable military configuration. Military competition will not be eliminated unless all the states in a particular arrangement or régime can feel secure. It is most often proposed that this situation may be achieved by establishing military parity amongst states. Concepts such as eveness, balance, equality and equivalence, benefit from an apparent logic, fairness and conceptual clarity. "Eveness of some description appears to have an overwhelmingly strong case in moral, political and rational grounds as the solution to the problems of insecurity which arise from the endless cycle of the weapons dynamic."[61] However, this concept does not provide

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[59] Blechman, p. 693.

[60] Cristoph Bertram, "Rethinking Arms Control," Foreign Affairs, 59, No. 2 (Winter 1980), p. 357.

[61] Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Caralina Press, 1983), p. 203.

the stability necessary to prevent a return, by states, to the dangers of free competition for military security. Barry Buzan identified two reasons why the principle of parity will fail to provide stability to a potentially conflictual relationship between states. First, the necessary conditions of parity are uncalculable. Second, because parity does not lead to stability in military affairs, the very premise of the principle of parity is compromised.

Attempts to accurately assess a military balance in peace time are inevitably liable to fail. While comparisons of weapons and manpower levels can be informative they can also be misleading. There are multitudes of qualitative factors that have a bearing on the actual prepardness of a state's military instrument. Such factors as the quality of leadership, morale, reliability of machinery, effectiveness of command, control, communications and intelligence, geo-strategic position, fortune, surprise, choice of tactics, the prepardness of the opposition, mobilisation rates, the effectiveness of supply logistics, and the nature of opposing forces all have an influence.[62] "From recent history -- the German breakthrough in 1940, Israel's campaigns, the American defeat in Vietnam -- we know that the number and even quality of men and weapons are far from decisive when what the Russians call operational factors are added in."[63]

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[62] ibid., pp. 203-204. See also Fred C. Iklé, "The Fog of Military Estimates," Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 17-37.

Buzan attacked the concept of parity from two approaches. To begin with, a balance will not create a basis for stabilising security relations because, even if such a condition could be reached, the nature of military action would undermine it. The logic of strategy rewards those who strike first as so doing provides them with the choice of time, place and conditions that will favour their attack. As such, a condition of parity would provide the initiator with an advantage. This is accentuated when the military environment, as it has been since the Second World War, is dominated by offensive forces. When force calculations are under-developed, uncertainty serves to restrain incentives to strike first. If the balance is common knowledge, as it presumably would be if arms control created parity, the calculation of the effectiveness of a first strike can be made more accurately.[64]

The second flaw in parity, noted by Buzan, is that it provides an incentive to arms race or tip the balance. When parity exists, a small increase in military strength could have the effect of quickly creating a 'superior-inferior' relationship. Even if neither side in a balanced relationship had any intention of gaining an advantage, the constant angst that the other was seeking to do just that, makes the relationship unstable. Mutually assured destruction appears

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[63] Martin, pp. 70-71.

[64] Buzan, p. 205.

to have created a condition of equivalence that obviates the problems of superiority and inferiority. However, the continuation of this relationship is continually threatened by technological developments that may restore one state's first strike capability before the other can respond.[65] This concern is further compounded by an historically substantiated Soviet inclination to abide (if even that) to the strictest letter of an agreement as opposed to its spirit.[66] As of 1979, and NATO's dual-track decision, there was little evidence that the Soviets had adopted the United States belief in the stability of MAD. This, among other reasons, had led to Washington's disenchantment with mutually assured destruction as well.

These criticisms of parity detract from the utility of arms control for NATO as the process focusses so intently upon attaining such a condition. Colin Gray attacked negotiated limits when he stated that, "Arms control agreements have the effect of focussing attention on the strategically irrelevant question of whether a tolerably even balance of forces has been negotiated."[67] This leads to the identifica-

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[65] ibid., p. 206. See also Cristoph Bertram, Adelphi Paper No. 146, Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of a New Approach (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 2.

[66] Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Balance and Arms Control," in Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 29.

[67] ibid., p. 24.

tion of a specific problem for NATO, this being that parity was not completely compatible with the requirements of extended deterrence. The strategic concept of flexible response necessitated the maintenance of some useful nuclear advantage for escalation pre-eminence and control.[68] The United States, without whose acquiescence NATO would not be able to employ its nuclear option, has shunned the notion of 'the threat that leaves something to chance' and has consistently stressed the need for escalatory options. The SALT I agreements of May 1972, explicitly recognised a condition of parity between the two superpower's strategic nuclear forces. With this arms control 'achievement' the United States commitment to Europe was seriously damaged and this had correspondingly grave repercussions for the security of NATO Europe. Strategic Parity undermined the original assumptions behind the Alliance's strategy and, for some, called into question the validity of flexible response and for others the value of theatre nuclear weapons.[69]

These problems of parity, identified by Buzan, are further complicated when arms control involves reductions as opposed to limitations. Therefore, the NATO allies had to realise, in 1979, that just as there was a requirement for an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, there

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[68] ibid., p. 36.

[69] Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO: 1965-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 232.

was also a need for an adequate mix of arms control and
force modernisations; that there were minimum levels of both
nuclear and conventional forces, relative to Warsaw Pact
forces, below which deterrence would be impaired.[70]

Defence Planning

Another major problem that arms control creates is for
defence strategy. The assumption that a state's arms con-
trol position should follow naturally from the dictates of
its strategic policy requirements and the reality of its
force structure appears aphoristic. However, this has not
always proven to be the case. A strong argument can be made
that SALT influenced United States strategic planning far
more than those objectives conditioned the outcome of the
SALT process.[71]

> Although it has become conventional wisdom that
> arms control considerations should be taken into
> account in shaping defence policy and programs, it
> is interesting that so little thought is given to
> how existing negotiations should be adopted to
> changing military realities.[72]

The NATO allies had to realise that arms control efforts
are only useful to the extent that they are directly rele-
vant to defence efforts. Military plans had to be devel-
oped, therefore, in the full knowledge of the Alliance's

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[70] Wegener, p. 4.

[71] Cleave, p. 9.

[72] Burt, "Arms Control," p. 175.

objectives in its arms control negotiations.[73] While NATO was quite aware that the goal of arms control was to enhance, or at least maintain, security at lower levels of armaments, and indeed had explicitly stated this goal on numerous occasions, it was important to remember that this was not an end in itself. Arms control measures that promise to enhance détente and lower the danger of nuclear war must be balanced against the fundamental requirements of deterrence and defence, and the realities of alliance politics.[74] As this indicates, there are limits to what arms control can accomplish. If too much is expected of arms control in bringing about collateral side effects, such as improved détente, then it will be in danger of failing to accomplish any of its tasks effectively. In 1981, Cristoph Bertram wrote that, "Unless there is a durable concept for medium-range delivery systems in NATO's doctrine, any bargain will be struck without a clear idea of the consequences."[75] Six years later, with the conclusion of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, NATO was engaged in doing just that -- assessing the consequences.

In order to facilitate arms control, states have been compelled to compartmentalise military reality. Artificial boundaries have been drawn between forces based on such fac-

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[73] Wegener, p. 4.

[74] Carl H. Amme, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defense (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 85.

[75] Bertram, "Arms Control," p. 359.

tors as modes of employment and geographical locations under discussion. Such distinctions are inherently arbitrary in the end and, therefore, may have dangerous consequences for a state's force structure and its security. This becomes particularly evident when considering NATO's security and weapons systems that were relevant to both intercontinental and regional warfare.

Each alliance had its own distinct mix of armaments and men. This would have been the case even if their force structures were intended to fulfil similar duties. Consequently, any agreement that placed restrictions on a particular weapon or system would have a different impact on the security of each side. Nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles accentuate this problem because assessments of their effects on offence and defence (as discussed above) varied widely. The dynamic of weapons technology in each alliance created a condition where, at any one time, one side was ahead of another in developing capabilities within specific fields.[76]

Future military options of significant utility may be sacrificed in negotiations. So, states engaged in arms control talks need a clear sense of their defence strategy and also their negotiating strategy. Actors need to know what they want, how they plan to get it, and what they are prepared to sacrifice in order to achieve the desired results.

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[76] Bowie, p. 714.

While no negotiations can be planned completely from the start, the degree of flexibility necessary to keep negotiations going forward must be closely monitored to ensure that such efforts do not bring about unconscious accommodation.[77]

> Entering into over-simplified agreements about particular aspects of a complex strategic environment, where politics and technology interact in ever-changing patterns, entails the danger of losing the flexibility with which to adopt to change.[78]

NATO's deterrent strategy relied heavily upon the notion that a seamless web of military forces and doctrine existed. Such concepts and slogans as, 'the indivisibility of NATO' and 'the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons' relied upon this contention of seamlessness. Any negotiation that isolated one type of weapons system or geographical region would impose strains on military strategies. SALT for example, involving a focus on the homeland-to-homeland nuclear balance between the superpowers, was arguably damaging to NATO Europe militarily and the West as a whole politically. Thus, any one agreement, for example the SALT II agreement, did not, and probably could not, resolve NATO's security dilemmas. Thus, when approaching negotiations, NATO had to be careful to ensure that its security was not compromised

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[77] Kruzel, p. 154.

[78] Martin, p. 65. The notion that states should have the 'freedom to mix' together different systems within their force structures below negotiated ceilings has been generated by this concern. Martin pointed out that the stultified MBFR and the success of CSBMs also indicate a move in this direction.

between agreements as it sought to improve its overall position vis-à-vis its adversary.[79] Military planning is based on a combined arms approach to force structure and war plans while arms control is frequently based on a clear separation of the nuclear from conventional force requirements.[80] Arms control outcomes that limit weapons of one type were unattractive because they foreclosed options for upgrading other defences that might have strengthened NATO.[81] Such problems could not be overcome with trans-Atlantic reassurances and numerous consultations alone, because the military reality existed, and (as pointed out in Chapter Two) the success of deterrence depends to a great extent on Soviet perceptions. Consequently, the conclusion that, "Some distortions of military reality may be acceptable in the higher interest of securing a useful agreement, but they should not be ignored",[82] appears perfectly valid.

Arms Control and Effective Deterrence II

Arms Control and Political Solidarity

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[79] See NATO, The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept (May 1989).

[80] Johan Jorgen Holst, "Strategy and Arms Control," in Challenges to the Western Alliance: An International Symposium on the Changing Political, Economic and Military Setting, ed. Joseph Godson (London: Times Books, 1984), p. 58.

[81] Burt, p. 168.

[82] Kruzel, p. 155.

The second major criticism of arms control, is that it is often approached without an adequate appreciation for its relationship to politics. It has all too often been neglected that arms control **is** a political process at heart. There are three reasons why NATO should have expected political considerations to militate against the utility of arms control in improving its security. The first, was the influence of one's own domestic public interest combined with that of one's adversary. The second, concerned the problem of obtaining comprehensive agreements that improve security and avoid the difficulty of inevitably redirected conflict. Third, NATO Europe's nuclear force structure is owned by one partner, the United States. Negotiations dealing with these forces have been, and likely will remain, bilateral thus restricting the role that NATO can play in the restructuring of its forces.

Arms Control as Politics

A serious problem regarding arms control is its relation-
ship to the political state of affairs between negotiating
parties. Many scholars in the field envision a spectrum in
which politics occupies one pole and force the other.
Because arms control deals with force it should not be too
closely associated with politics. Indeed, many would like
to see it completely divorced from political considerations.
"There was an attempt in 1958 to begin serious negotiations
on ways and means of achieving limitations, but it broke
down on what in retrospect seem ridiculous grounds: the
United States insisted that the talks be purely technical,
the Soviet Union wanted them purely political."[83] Arms con-
trol, divorced from a careful assessment of the political
climate could be potentially destabilising and sow within
itself the seeds of its own undoing.

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[83] William R. Frye, "Characteristics of Recent Arms-Control
Proposals and Agreements," Daedalus, 84, No. 4 (Fall
1960), p. 732. This quote was not used in an effort to
suggest that the Soviets have a better or worse concep-
tion of the nature of arms control, only to indicate the
presence of thinking that would exclude politics from a
consideration of arms control and attempt to pursue some
sort of a technical/mechanical fix. At the same time, it
is interesting to note that the Soviets, in their writ-
ings on military strategy and affairs, stress the primacy
of politics much more than the Americans have been known
to do.

Domestic and Foreign Interference

Arms control should, perhaps, be seen as the active link between force and politics. It would be insightful to picture it as the subordination of the military means to political will during times of peace. Therefore, the expression, 'arms control is simply the continuation of politics by military means during periods of peace'; might be one way of adapting Clausewitz to the contemporary environment.

However, a substantial segment of the population of Western states appear to be under the illusion that arms control promotes détente and has other useful purposes. It certainly is often believed that there will be no harm resulting from attempts to utilise arms control to achieve these other objectives. The danger in so thinking lies in the potential for arms control to prevent improved relations and even cause them to deteriorate. "In fact, a failure in arms control can jeopardize many other elements of a diplomatic relationship. If negotiations generate more acrimony than accord, the result might well be a general deterioration in bilateral affairs."[84] This is all the more possible when arms control is pursued for nefarious reasons and/or without the proper political preconditions. Such problems are further complicated by the importance, particularly in the present era, of the military balance. The consequences of cheating could further complicate this potential. Added to

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[84] Kruzel, p. 156.

this, is the nature of political discourse in Western democracies that provides a propensity for an over reaction of 'doom and gloom' to emerge upon the failure of arms negotiations.

The notion exists that, so long as states are engaged in arms control discussions, the likelihood of war is substantially, if not completely eliminated. In accordance with this perspective is the belief that negotiation itself can embroil an adversary in obligations not to disrupt the process, or can be so gratifying, that an adversary will refrain from undertaking the use of force that might otherwise have been used. Negotiating can become an alternative activity in itself, one that distracts the opponent from offensive or otherwise undesirable actions.[85]

In the early 1970s, détente depended heavily on arms control. Without SALT any of the perceived benefits of reduced tensions, such as enhanced political, economic and cultural ties, would not be attainable. Détente started with arms control in the late 1960s in the form of the Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. During the 1970s, Détente revolved around SALT I and II. The MBFR Talks and CSCE added other complicating dimensions to the arms control approach to détente. "As the difficult process of relaxing political tensions between East and West came to hinge on

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[85] Fred Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 45.

specific arms-control negotiations, most notably SALT, arms control became a high-priority issue on the agenda for the West."[86]

The opportunity for negotiations to substitute for violent action depends on two factors. First, the party that is to be restrained must deem it likely that the opponent would break off negotiations if it took action. Secondly, the party must value continued negotiations over the utility of other possible actions.[87] However, there is no guarantee that these conditions will prevail. Consequently, arms control could reduce public support in Western states to address serious force imbalances while, at the same time, fail to prevent open hostilities in the future. To an extent, the muted public reaction in the United States to the tremendous expansion of Soviet strategic forces in the early 1970s was a function of the ongoing SALT negotiations.[88]

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[86] David N. Schwartz, <u>NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas</u> (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1983), p. 201; see also Jim Fergusson, "The Role of Arms Control in the End of the Cold War and Future Directions of East-West Security," in <u>The End of the Cold War? Prospects for East-West Security in the 1990s</u>, Occasional Paper #12, ed. J. David McLeod (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Programme in Strategic Studies, 1990), p. 142.

[87] Iklé, <u>Nations Negotiate</u>, p. 47.

[88] Kruzel, p. 156.

There has been a tendency for Western leaders to accept new arms control objectives even when their prospects are perceived to be hopeless. This pleases constituents with actions that are seen as harmless. However, the larding of the arms control agenda with too many initiatives demeans those items which are significant, wasting time and influence, and casting a naive pall over the entire policy, regardless of the intrinsic merits of specific items.[89] Useless arms control negotiations compete with worthwhile efforts for attention, funding, and promotion while challenging the credibility of the entire process. In any event, arms control is intended to address military matters. This differentiates arms control from political control measures and is useful to bear in mind when considering the utility of arms control in facilitating further understanding between states and promoting policies such as détente.

Military Balance

While arms control started as a separate process from that of politics in American thinking, the Soviet Union has never bought into that idea. Vladimir S. Semyonov, at the first SALT session in 1969, stated that, "The government of the U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the negotiations on curbing the strategic arms race. Their positive results should undoubtably contribute both to improvement in Soviet-American relations and in the consolidation of universal

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[89] Blechman, p. 119.

peace."[90] In the early 1970s, arms control was a way for Moscow to manage the transition from inferiority to strategic parity more safely and less provocatively than might have been the case otherwise. Arms control dampened US strategic competitiveness and gained formal recognition of the Soviet Union's co-equal superpower status.[91] This linkage can damage arms control and arguably did bring an end to the SALT process in the United States.

In theoretical terms, arms control made no claims to solve political conflicts. However, in practice, the West has closely linked movement in arms control to broader political accommodation with the Soviet Union. Successive US administrations have required that movement in arms talks be dependent upon the Soviet Union's modification of its international behavior so as not to pose a threat to Western interests. The very nature of the democratic political system in the United States has created this sensitivity displayed by US policy-makers.[92]

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[90] ibid., p. 106.

[91] Arnold L. Horelick and Edward L. Warner III, U.S-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control: The Next Phase (Santa Monica: RAND/UCLA Centre for the Study of International Behavior ,1985), p. 13.

[92] Barry Blechman argued that, policies, in particular those that were even marginally innovative and diverged from traditional ways of doing business, could not be sustained without considerablly sizable domestic political constituencies. Arms control, just happens to be such a policy as the history of armaments policies, even since WWII, more than fully indicates. Paul C. Warnke, former Director of the US ACDA, characterised arms control as "an unnatural act". (see above pp. 9-13). This led

It is possible for arms control to blunt pressures for unilateral force reductions and for arms control to rally public support for new defence expenditures. The White House used the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks to head off Senate pressures to reduce US troop levels in Europe. In this manner, arms control protected existing force structure.[93] Associated with this is the necessity of ensuring that public support for defence expenditures is sustained over the long term. The security of the Alliance was a function not just of military strength, but also of the deep political strength that came from acting together, with the support and understanding of the peoples of the member countries.[94]

Forces needed for effective and credible security could be placed on hold while arms control negotiations were underway, thereby, detracting from NATO security. The notion exists that weapons that threaten arms control negotiations (for example see the role of the cruise missile in SALT) also threaten military stability. This is not a given condition. The cruise missile presented huge problems for negotiating an effective arms control agreement while pos-

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Blechman to conclude that SALT II's demise had more to do with the rising uneasiness of the US population about Soviet military power and assertiveness than in did with any deficiencies in the agreement itself. Blechman, pp. 108-109.

[93] Kruzel, p. 155.

[94] George Younger, "INF and Beyond," RUSI Journal, 133, No. 1 (Spring 1988), p. 4.

sibly being a great enhancer of credible deterrence. Sometimes, new weapons are destabilising and unsettle the political/military status quo. If arms control is not a substitute for unilateral military initiatives, the effect on negotiations of deploying new systems must be measured against the military benefits that will be derived from their deployment.[95]

Attempts to use force structure to influence progress in arms control had a history in the SALT process. Kissinger sought to increase funding for the development of cruise missile technology in order to create a bargaining chip that could be exchanged for tangible reductions in the Soviet Union's strategic forces. However, this effort was undermined when the United States defence community appreciated the potential technological advantages of the missile programme, and fought for its production and deployment. "They viewed the cruise missile not as a **bargaining chip** but as a **defense bargain,** and resisted the notion of trading the cruise missile option for any Soviet concessions.[96]

Domestic political pressures that reflect an honest desire to seize an 'historic opportunity' and rid Europe (and the world) of nuclear weapons characterises large segments of Western public opinion. It makes the rejection of Soviet proposals very difficult regardless of their security

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[95] Burt, "Arms Control," p. 167.

[96] Schwartz, p. 203.

implications.[97] This danger, or potential disadvantage, leaves aside the opportunity that an adversarial state may use arms control negotiations as a means of deceiving a state which is honestly interested in a negotiated accord. An example in this regard can be found in the events of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 when the Hungarian and Soviet governments engaged in talks to remove Soviet troops from the former's territory. Through these negotiations, the Soviet Union gained the necessary time to prepare its attack to crush the revolution and set up the Kadar puppet government.[98]

The propensity for this to occur in negotiations between NATO and the WTO have been relatively high because of inter-alliance politics. It has not been uncommon for NATO to consider placing force restructuring on hold for varying lengths of time while arms limitation discussions were underway. Such actions are often motivated by a desire not to jeopardise the successful attainment of a negotiated settlement on favourable terms.

The Federal Republic of Germany opposed any attempt by the United States to initiate the modernisation of NATO's short-range Lance nuclear weapons. An agreement was eventu-

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[97] B.A. Goetze, "Deterrence and Dialogue: NATO Strategy for Perestroika," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 17, Special No. 1 (1988), p. 49.

[98] Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 51.

ally reached in NATO whereby a decision about Lance modernisation was put off until 1992 while the CFE negotiations were underway.[99] The fact that the NATO states were characterised as being open political systems, whereas, the Soviet Union was not, gave a certain advantage to the latter in negotiations. The Soviet Union had many ways to influence public opinion in the NATO states, thereby placing their democratic governments under more pressure. Closed systems, like the Soviet Union had, were immune to such tactics.[100] Thus, the West was particularly vulnerable to this ploy and could not exploit such tactics itself.

"It would be entirely possible for a carelessly drawn or carelessly inspected arms-control measure to present them [the adversary] with opportunities they might be tempted to exploit -- whether they had originally intended to at the time of signing the agreement or not."[101] Along the lines of this argument, Richard Perle blamed SALT for the very existence of the SS-20 and therefore, the need to counter it. Many US officials argued that the Soviet Union developed the SS-20 in a conscious effort to take advantage of the loopholes in SALT.[102]

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[99] "U.S., Bonn work out face-saving missile compromise", Winnipeg Free Press, Saturday, (May 20, 1989), p. 44.

[100] Werner Kaltefleiter, "Structural Problems in Negotiations: A View From Europe," in Arms Control, ed, Richard F. Staar (Stanfield: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 69.

[101] Brennan, p. 699.

The close correlation of politics, therefore, makes it essential that negotiating states have, as a prerequisite, already achieved some degree of political accommodation. Historically, arms control has been a poor diplomatic ice breaker. In an atmosphere of acute political suspicion, arms control has virtually no chance of success.[103] Most analysts agree that arms control can make a useful contribution to the easing of tensions and the improvement of relations, but not as a sole measure, and certainly not as the only approach attempted to seek these goals. Thus, international armaments agreements just redirect competition elsewhere; even where it may be more harmful.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a central element in the quest for cooperation in the Soviet-American relationship. By recognising that both would suffer unprecedented destruction in a major nuclear exchange, they were also recognising the necessity for a certain degree of cooperation. This does not mean that they were prepared to resolve their political differences or eliminate their rivalry. Still, they established a formally recognised mutual need to stop the competition from getting out of hand and to avoid confrontations that could lead to nuclear war.[104]

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[102] Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate In Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 44.

[103] Kruzel, p. 153.

Bilateral Negotiations

Another political problem is the focus, on the part of
arms controllers and defence analysts, on first obtaining
strategic limitations (not directly in the realm of NATO's
nuclear forces) and then working their way down to limita-
tions and agreements on arms at lower levels of theatre
nuclear forces and conventional deployments. This has been
a hinderance to NATO involvement in arms control because
strategic arms control has been very difficult to reach and
so theatre issues have not made it onto the agenda very
often. Related to this problem, and accentuating it, is the
fact that almost all negotiations on nuclear forces in
Europe have been bilateral. For example, the intermediate
nuclear force discussions were conducted between the United
States and the Soviet Union only. Nevertheless, during the
1980s, the interests that the United States negotiated on
behalf of in Geneva dealt with nuclear forces deployed on
the soil of the West European allies ostensibly to address
the security problems of the theatre and the insecurities of
NATO Europe.[105] It is true that a consultative process was
set up to alleviate problems that might arise in this
regard. However, the Europeans still did not have a seat,
and, therefore, a direct voice at the table when nuclear

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[104] Blechman, p. 109.

[105] Gregory Treverton, "Managing the Alliance Politics of
Multilateral Arms Control," in Arms Control, the Multi-
lateral Alternative, ed. Edward Luck (New York: New York
University, 1983), p. 75.

arms control negotiations took place.

The very definition of strategic forces[106] itself conditions the two superpowers to focus on this dimension of their military relationship at the expense of the forces deployed in the European theatre. Such negotiations may conclude treaties at NATO's expense because Western European interests were being ignored or because Europeans had little or no participation in its conclusion. Here, the Non-Proliferation Treaty can be pointed to as an example. In the early to mid-1960s, the Alliance believed that co-ownership of NATO's theatre nuclear assets would give the European allies the control over the nuclear force structure necessary to make the threat to cross the threshold to nuclear war credible. However, for reasons related to its own security interests, the United States sought to conclude a non-proliferation treaty with Moscow. It was very important

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[106] Although the definition generally includes all those systems capable of reaching the territory of an adversary (including forward-based systems such as dual capable aircraft on carriers or based in neighbouring territory such as Europe or Cuba) it usually focuses on intercontinental offensive weapons (ICBMs, SLBMs and long range bombers). See Russet and Chernoff, p. 11. The SALT II Treaty defined ICBMs as having a range greater than 5,500 kilometres. SLBMs were any ballistic missiles launched from any submarine regardless of its type. Long-range bombers were of the B-52, B-1, Bear or Bison types and any future bombers capable of carrying out the missions these aircraft filled. Any aircraft capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres and equipped for cruise missiles or air-to-surface ballistic missiles were also defined as heavy bombers. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), (Vienna, June 18, 1979), Article II.

to the Soviet Union that a US veto on NATO's use of nuclear weapons not be watered-down. Thus, while a plan for joint control of NATO theatre nuclear forces was under discussion in the Alliance, the Soviet Union refused to conclude the Non-Proliferation Treaty with the United States. The conclusion of the NPT was crucial to the United States aim of establishing a détente in the superpower relationship. As a result, the US interest in the co-ownership plans evaporated and the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. This had implications for NATO security.

> What was of concern to allied capitals was the fact that a United States-Soviet agreement effectively imposed restrictions on the scope of inter-allied solutions to the political problems of alliance nuclear policy, in effect giving the Soviet Union a claim to exercise a veto on certain kinds of policy alternative and providing a basis on which it could subsequently seek to establish a precedent for intervening politically in Western European policy debates.[107]

Even those agreements that were undertaken in a multilateral forum and addressed issues that were not particularly 'strategic' excluded many of NATO Europe's concerns and were dominated by the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

> Except for the Tlatelolcol Treaty, these agreements are, for all practical purposes, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union alone. It is true that the Partial nuclear Test Ban treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty were discussed in the [Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee] ENDC and in the U.N. General Assembly, [...] but the fact remains that they are basically agreements between the Americans and the

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[107] Buteux, <u>Nuclear Consultations</u>, p. 84.

Soviets.[108]

The two superpowers have been inclined to devote their attention towards strategic forces because of a belief that this was the most important level. The destructive consequences for their two states of a hostile encounter at this level precluded agreements at other levels until this one was addressed.

This led James Dougherty to correctly assert that,

> Potentially the most important of all the US-Soviet negotiations, of course, have been the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)...It resulted from several years of American insistence, dating from January 1964, that the arms race could not be reversed until after it had been brought to a halt through a verified freeze on offensive and defensive **strategic** delivery vehicles.[109] (my emphasis added)

While these negotiations, and agreements, have dealt ostensibly with strategic forces this does not mean they have not had an impact on NATO's nuclear force structure and, consequently, its security.

The strategic agreements that have been concluded (SALT I and SALT II, not ratified but negotiated), and are currently under negotiation (START), have had an influence on NATO Europe's security. NATO has been excluded from these discussions because the subject matter deals with forces locat-

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[108] Atsuhiko Yatobe, "A Review of Arms Control in the Post-war Period," in Arms control II: A new Approach to International Security, eds. John H. Barton and Ryukichi Imai (Cambridge, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981), p. 40.

[109] Dougherty, p. 62.

ed outside Europe and not owned or shared by any NATO states.[110] Nevertheless, these discussions have had an impact on NATO Europe because of the reliance, in the end, of NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response upon the United States strategic nuclear reserves. NATO must be interested in whatever changes occur to the United States' ICBM, SLBM and bomber forces as this will have a bearing on the credibility of extended deterrence and, ultimately, the credibility of NATO Europe's ability to threaten escalation in a possible conflict. With respect to NATO European anxieties, Richard Perle blamed strategic arms control for what he saw as NATO's misguided response to the SS-20. The Carter Administration agreed to the 1979 deployments mostly to allay West European anxieties that SALT had sold their security short. "The whole sorry story," remarked Perle, "is a classic example of how so-called arms control, far from controlling arms, has had the effect of driving the deployment of new weapons."[111]

Conclusion

A few observations can be made at this point about the role that arms control could play in alleviating NATO's nuclear dilemmas and thereby contribute to improving the security of its members. First, it is important to note that, while an armaments policy entailing unilateral force

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[110] Although the United States has consulted with its allies about its negotiating positions.

[111] Talbott, p. 44.

alterations was in itself insufficient to resolve NATO's problems, so too was arms control insufficient to accomplish this task alone.

> Military strategy is designed to deter an enemy from deliberate attack upon us or our allies and to defend us successfully if war should occur. Arms control bases its measures on seeking stability and on minimizing the devastation that will accompany our efforts to prevail. Yet this is not a clear-cut separation.[112]

Arms control is only one aspect of a general policy of armament and should be put in the total context of the strategic environment to be judged objectively.[113]

Secondly, force modernisations were not inherently contradictory to force reductions when discussing NATO nuclear forces. Indeed, modernisations (the natural outgrowth of technological progress) may have facilitated an actual lowering of total weapons numbers as features such as accuracy or penetrating capability were improved.[114] Modernisations are equivalent to the strengthening of 'muscle', reductions; the 'trimming of fat'. This was arguably the premise behind force multiplication, light infantry divisions, rapid deployment forces, airland battle tactics and follow-on-forces attacks.[115] However, such reductions do not, in themselves, constitute arms control. Even if older systems are

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[112] Amme, p. 83.

[113] Aron, p. 656.

[114] Younger, p. 5.

[115] Leibstone, p. 45.

removed as new ones are deployed, the result may be an expansion of the arms competition between international actors. It may still present a challenge to the security of other states which, in addressing their perceived deficiencies may deploy new forces of their own which only exacerbate the security concerns of the state that originally deployed new forces. The next chapter will examine how NATO came to decide on a mixture of nuclear force modernisations and arms control as a means of strengthening its deterrent strategy.

Chapter IV

THE DUAL-TRACK APPROACH: THE INF EXAMPLE

We do not have to choose between détente and
defense. We must have both and -- with political
will -- we can.

                                Zbigniew Brzezinski

Having explored both force structure and arms control in

the NATO European context, the thesis will now turn to an

analysis of their application, side-by-side, in an intended

complementary manner, to the resolution of NATO's security

dilemmas. Towards this end, the INF agreement will function

as a test-case analysis of the relationship between arms

control and NATO's nuclear forces.   The point to be made in

this half of the thesis will be the degree to which the arms

control process was able to ameliorate the defence dilemmas

plaguing NATO.   It will assess the extent to which NATO was

able to formulate an arms control strategy compatible with

its security and defence requirements and review the negoti-

ating process to understand how arms control impacted upon

NATO European security.

As the 1970s came to an end, NATO chose to link both

deployment and arms control together in order to overcome

its security dilemmas.   NATO's Foreign and Defense Minis-

ters, formally adopted a programme of intermediate nuclear force modernisation and arms control in Brussels, on December 12, 1979. The implications of this decision are significant because it represented a clear joining of the two concepts when NATO formulated a military and political answer to the defence problem which resulted from the Soviet military build-up in Eastern Europe.[1]

By 1979 NATO had come to accept that arms control, as part of détente, was essential to complement the security of member states by military means. In 1979, NATO conducted its annual Defence Review. The outcome was a commitment -- arrived at at a December 11-12 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee -- to improve the deterrent and defensive capabilities of the Alliance. The essential underpinning of NATO's force plan for 1980-1984 was a demand that all members achieve a real annual growth rate in their national defence expenditures of approximately three per cent. However, the Defence Planning Committee concluded that it would support attempts at arms control that would promote détente and ensure stability at lower levels of armaments.[2]

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[1] Christian Hacke, "After NATO's Dual Track Decision of 1979: Where Do We Go From Here?" Journal of Strategic Studies, 9, No. 4 (December 1986), p. 84.

[2] NATO, Communiqué of the Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, (December 12, 1979).

On December 12 of that same year, a special meeting of
Foreign and Defence Ministers was held. At this meeting
NATO adopted the plan to deploy new intermediate nuclear
forces to bolster deterrence. The NATO allies also agreed
to seek an arms control dialogue leading to limitations in
these weapons. Given the overall security environment that
existed at the time, and in light of the findings discussed
in the previous chapters of this thesis, NATO Foreign and
Defence Ministers believed this to be the best route to
achieve security.

> The Ministers have decided to pursue these two
> parallel and complementary approaches in order to
> avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet
> TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's
> strategy of deterrence and defence and thus main-
> tain the security of its member states.[3]

This clear linkage had not been practically tried before.
An examination of the degree to which NATO was successful in
accomplishing this task is the goal of the next two chap-
ters. However, achievement of this goal will be impeded for
two reasons. First, seven years elapsed between the time
the decision was made to adopt the dual-track approach and
the time an agreement to limit these forces was reached.
The strategic/political environment did not remain static
during this period and many events (deployments, withdraw-
als, technological innovations, public reactions and, lead-
ership changes), had significant bearings on the outcome.
Second, the consultative process within NATO and the manner

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[3] NATO, _Communiqué of the Special Meeting of Foreign and
Defence Ministers_, (December 12, 1979).

in which the High Level Group (HLG), the Special Group (SG), the Special Consultative Group (SCG),[4] the Defence Committee, the Foreign and Defence Ministers, and the US negotiating team interacted have not been fully disclosed. Official documents which could point out the successes and failures of the process are presently unavailable.

At the Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers the guidelines were agreed upon that should condition the US approach to arms control negotiations with the USSR.

> A. Any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.
>
> B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.
>
> C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.
>
> D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.
>
> E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.[5]

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[4] The SCG was the follow-on to the Special Group after the INF modernisation decision was taken and the work of the Special Group had formally concluded.

[5] NATO, Special Meeting.

These strictures were elaborated through intensive consultations within the Alliance.[6] However, the linkage was never really thought out and, therefore, immediately after laying out these guidelines the Communiqué went on to announce the constitution of a special consultative body at a high level. Designed to support the United States negotiating efforts, this committee was intended to monitor negotiations and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers so that they could be kept abreast of the negotiating process and ensure that the arms control results would in fact contribute to NATO security.

So NATO had to attempt to exploit the advantages of both approaches (force modernisation and arms control). This was to prove to be a difficult task because any improvement in obtaining a balanced military relationship with the East came at the expense of improved political relations with the Warsaw Pact. NATO was being very ambitious in attempting to reconcile the classical dilemma between the conflicting demands of defence and détente, between 'insurance' and 'reassurance'. Many have contended that this was not possible for international and domestic political reasons. Moreover, détente does not always bring about less defence while defence almost always leads to less détente.[7] Finally, NATO

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[6] ibid., p. 122.

[7] Martin Leitenberg, "NATO and WTO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces," Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects, ed. Karl E. Birnbaum (Laxenberg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1980), pp. 48-49.

was seeking force structure improvements which would be able to contribute to NATO's security in 'real' terms.

In order to avoid some of the negative impacts of force structure improvements, NATO had to give the impression (reflective of the actual state of affairs or not), that the Alliance was not attempting to obtain an advantage over the Soviet Union: that it was not attempting to augment its security at the expense of its potential opponent.   So as not to provoke an escalatory response from the Warsaw Pact it was necessary for NATO to parallel the modernisation decision with a willingness to establish a mutually acceptable balance of theatre nuclear forces through arms control negotiations.   In this respect NATO officials stressed that intermediate nuclear force modernisation did not seek parity with the Soviet Union and that it was only an offseting force.

The arms control approach, if successful, promised to alleviate the problems that arose from the various perspectives on extended deterrence and how best to maintain the credibility of the strategic concept of flexible response. However, at the time that the dual-track approach was adopted it is difficult to believe that NATO members actually believed that an arms control accord could be reached between Moscow and Washington that could establish a balanced and more stable military relationship in Central

Europe.   The history of arms control, as discussed in the
preceding chapter, should not have warranted optimism on the
part of western statesmen.   Consequently, the argument that
the dual-track approach was adopted primarily to placate the
concerns of domestic western public opinion had some founda-
tion.   In order to gain public and, therefore, parliamentary
support for the new deployments in several European states,
particularly those where the new systems would be based, an
arms control component was essential.

The demise of the enhanced radiation warhead proposal
provided solid grounds for concern.   The intermediate nucle-
ar force deployments were of a different nature from the
'neutron bomb' plans, but, substantial negative public reac-
tions had to be expected.   This was particularly the case in
the Federal Republic of Germany where the left wing of the
Social Democratic Party could be expected to vigorously
oppose new deployments.   Opposition would be widespread in
The Netherlands. In Belgium, opinion had proven itself to be
highly unpredictable.   Because of Germany's demand for non-
singularity and a unanimous endorsement of the NATO plan, it
was important to overcome the traditional 'no nuclear' poli-
cies of Norway and Denmark.   In addition, Belgium, Denmark,
and The Netherlands had relatively unstable coalition gov-
ernments that could be vulnerable to an issue such as the
deployment of nuclear missiles.[8]

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[8] US Congress, House, <u>The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range
    Theater Nuclear Forces</u>, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-

A Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the US House of Representatives delivered in November of 1988 entitled <u>NATO Security Policy in the Post-INF Treaty Era</u> stated that

> An important discussion which is taking place in a number of European capitals is the question of how arms control can be integrated into NATO's ongoing security planning in order to ensure a viable, integrated NATO security policy in the future. Numerous European security specialists believe that inadequate attention is currently being paid to formulating arms control proposals which will be consistent with current or future NATO security policy. These observers and government officials believe that a top NATO priority should be the construction of a long term NATO security policy which would include in its formulation progress in the arms control area.[9]

It is interesting that such a question should be formulated after NATO had just completed a process, extending over seven years, that linked modernisation with arms control. This chapter will examine the process that lead to the dual-track approach in order to understand its contribution to NATO strategy and security.

The Special Consultative Group played a major role in the success of deployments. This gave European countries the ability to participate in the formulation of the United States negotiating position. This forum allowed European

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committee on Europe and the Middle East, United States House of Representatives, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 38.

[9] US Congress, House, <u>NATO Security Policy in the Post-INF Treaty Era</u>, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p.2.

thinking to significantly influence the Reagan Administration's decision to develop the zero-zero proposal, the interim agreement proposal and both the September and November 1983 initiatives.[10]

The Special Consultative Group was widely seen as a beneficial way to improve the process of linking the objectives of arms control and force structure together. However, the fact that NATO's force structure was undergoing a change at the time (INF deployments), may have had a bearing on the success of the Special Consultative Group. The SCG process may become a model for future NATO consultations, but without the intensity of the deployment debate it is a standard that may be difficult to meet.[11]

The Road to the Dual-Track Decision

With Helmut Schmidt's speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 1977, the Alliance began to grapple with, and devote increasing attention towards, the resolution of its security problem. NATO almost always had to deal with disparities between its conventional force levels and those of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. However, throughout the 1970s a most troublesome disparity was

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[10] US Congress, Senate, Post-Deployment Nuclear Arms Control in Europe, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Hans Binnendijk et al., (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 3.

[11] ibid., p. 3.

emerging in the realm of theatre nuclear weapons.

Added to the implications of 'strategic parity', the Atlantic Alliance was, in the mid-1970s, having to come to grips with a significant expansion of Soviet theatre nuclear capabilities. Part of the catalyst behind Schmidt's observations was the concern that the US strategic nuclear forces would not be able to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. He was suggesting that international developments were leading to a situation where the European balance could be considered separately from the overall superpower equation. The speech was widely interpreted as a call for the West to address existing theatre disparities.[12] Alliance officials identified three separate but related developments as warranting the Alliance's attention: strategic parity, existing NATO long-range intermediate nuclear force obsolescence, and the Soviet Union's long-range theatre nuclear modernisations.

As long as the United States possessed a clear degree of superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear power the US had a surplus of fire power which it could invest in

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[12] There is some question as to whether or not Schmidt only intended this speech to voice concerns about the apparent lack of political sensitivity in Washington for NATO European security, and the lack of a coherent political direction from President Carter as leader of the Alliance. Schmidt voiced the concerns of many European leaders that US foreign policy, and in particular its arms control policy, did not give sufficient attention to the question of the European balance. Alliance. See David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 216.

the defense of its allies.[13] The SALT II process was very important in depleting the United States capital available to buy European reassurance. The Carter Administration's handling of the enhanced radiation warhead affair, effectively requiring West Germany to **ask** the United States to deploy the new weapons on its territory, had already created deep doubts about the US government's judgement and reliability. SALT II had an effect in two ways; what it did not do, and what it did do.

French and German concerns grew as SALT II placed greater emphasis on creating equality between the superpower strategic arsenals. In addition, SALT II did not address those weapons systems of concern to Europeans. It was feared that SALT II would not remove the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. SALT II banned mobile ICBMs, but, the SS-20 had an effective range just short of the 5,500 kilometres set by the treaty as defining strategic weapons. The SS-20, therefore, was deemed an intermediate-range delivery vehicle, and thus exempted from the treaty provisions.[14] Missiles were not the only area of concern in the SALT II treaty. Extensive discussions in the United States attempted to determine whether or not the Backfire bomber constituted a strategic threat to the United

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[13] Strobe Talbott, <u>Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control</u> (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1984), p. 27.

[14] <u>ibid</u>., p. 30.

States. The Soviet Union's negotiators contended that it was designed to fulfil theatre missions only. In exchange for Moscow's assurances that the Backfire would not be redeployed or upgraded in such a way as to make an intercontinental role possible, the United States agreed not to include it under SALT II ceilings. In the process, the debate highlighted the Backfire's considerable potential against Europe, a potential that created European political unease.[15]

In addition to failing to address European concerns vis-à-vis extended deterrence and Soviet theatre capabilities, the SALT II negotiations threatened to impose restrictions on NATO's ability to deal with such problems. The high visibility of restrictions in the context of SALT II drew increasing European attention to the alleged merits of cruise missiles deployed in Europe and to the potential dangers of a SALT II agreement made over the heads of the Europeans that restricted such deployments.[16] Beginning in 1977 there was evidence emanating from Geneva and Washington that cruise missiles would be restricted to meet Soviet demands and extract concessions in other areas. "As it turned out, SALT II limited the number of air-launched cruise missiles that could be deployed on bombers, while the protocol banned altogether the deployment of long-range sea- and ground-

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[15] Schwartz, p. 206.

[16] ibid., pp. 205 and 210-212.

launched cruise missiles, thus establishing a precedent that some Europeans (and some Americans, too), found disturbing."[17]

With SALT doing nothing to constrain Soviet improvements and NATO efforts to do something about it restricted, the West may not have been able to respond to aggression at any level in the continuum of deterrence any longer. The credibility of the United States doctrine for the defence of Europe would be undercut and the guarantees that the US would not sit out a European conflict would evaporate. Europeans indicated that the old fear of decoupling finally appeared to have arrived.[18]

NATO's intermediate forces were insufficient to reassure Europeans of the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy.[19] In 1977, the long-range nuclear systems committed to NATO included British and US nuclear-capable aircraft. A small British SLBM force, and some US Poseidon SLBM warheads were stationed in the theatre and assigned to SACEUR for targeting purposes. NATO's theatre nuclear force structure had not been planned to meet the requirements of flexible response. By-and-large, the forces were the same as those that were deployed under a previous strategy. In

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[17] Talbott, p. 32.

[18] ibid., pp. 28 and 30.

[19] A direct comparison of NATO and WTO forces assigned to theatre roles is very difficult and entails making assumptions about a variety of systems.

"the present arsenal, deployment and posture of theatre nuclear weapons are not the best designed to achieve theatre nuclear deterrence since they are largely the product of haphazard growth stemming from the outdated strategic assumptions of the fifties."[20] While the doctrine for the use of these weapons had evolved over the decade of the 1970s, no degree of tampering by the Nuclear Planning Group with the concept and guidelines related to theatre planning could change the basic fact of the inadequacy of NATO's nuclear forces.

Both British Vulcan Bombers (48) and US F-111s (156) based in the UK were aging systems whose penetrating capabilities were being put in doubt because of ongoing improvements to the Soviet Union's air defences. They were also extremly vulnerable to a first strike.[21]

The four British Polaris submarines (64 missiles) and the 40 Poseidon missiles (400 warheads) of the United States central systems devoted to NATO missions suffered as well. The British forces were subject to being withheld if the 'supreme national interest' so dictated. Although they are

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[20] Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO: 1965-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 236.

[21] US Congress, Senate, Second Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 24; and US Congress, House, Modernization, p. 38.

highly survivable their numbers were small. The United States submarine-launched ballistic missiles were of questionable utility because their use may not have been readily forthcoming. Because they are part of the United States central strategic systems, there was widespread belief that their use would be restricted for fear of their being mistaken for a strategic attack on the Soviet Union. The use of such weapons has not been sufficiently identified with, or connected to, the defence of NATO Europe.[22] Because they had ten warheads per missile, the selective targeting required to make flexible response work may have been impossible to achieve.[23]

Undoubtably the greatest problem with the use of the SLBMs assigned to NATO was the fact that they were not intermediate nuclear forces. They were clearly defined as strategic weapons and their warheads were integrated into the United States targeting plans as layed out in the Single Integrated Operational Plan. As such, they were also affected by arms control in strategic negotiations.

French medium bombers, Submarine-launched, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles were not (and are still not) committed to NATO. Moreover, if they were, they would also

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[22] US Congress, Senate, Second Interim Report, pp. 14 and 15-17.

[23] Note that while this is a description of NATO's theatre nuclear posture in 1979, most of the features described still characterise the SLBM force in 1991.

be subject to being withheld for 'national interests'.[24]

There developed concerns amongst Western Europeans that this force structure would generate escalatory pressures in a conflict that would be difficult to control and, therefore, the United States would be deterred from responding to Soviet aggression with these forces. Similarly, it was also feared that Moscow might believe that it could conduct a nuclear war, confined to the European theatre, in which the territory of the Soviet Union was a de facto sanctuary.[25] This deficiency of NATO force structure struck at the heart of flexible response. Soon, if NATO did not attempt to restore deterrence, the Alliance would face the prospect of either surrender or theatre nuclear war.[26]

Compounding the problems associated with the obsolescence of existing NATO INFs was the modernisation programme Moscow was undertaking of the Soviet Union's intermediate nuclear forces. For about thirty years the Soviet Union had been able to threaten NATO Europe with medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. These were the SS-4s and SS-5s. However, in the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to deploy new aircraft and missiles which NATO officials saw as giving the Warsaw Pact a far greater ability to threaten

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[24] Thomas L. McNaughter and Theodore M. Parker, Modernizing NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces: An Assessment, The Rand Paper Series (October 1980), p. 5.

[25] ibid., p. 6.

[26] Buteux, p. 241.

NATO forces and interests.

The SS-4s and Ss-5s had large warheads and were highly
inaccurate. The addition of the SS-20 to the USSR's arsenal
significantly enhanced Moscow's capabilities. A number of
observers in the mid to late 1970s argued that the SS-20
posed a qualitatively different threat to European military
targets precisely because of its improved accuracy (reported
as 440 feet over a 2,500-mile range), and smaller yields.[27]
The SS-20 also had a longer range (over 4,000 kilometres)
than either the SS-4 or SS-5 because these later missiles
were in fact medium-range weapons. Range, along with its
MIRVed (3 warhead) configuration and reload capability,
arguably added significantly to the Soviet Union's theatre
nuclear warfighting capability.[28] A reduction in collateral
damage associated with the use of nuclear weapons in Europe
might have led Moscow to believe that it could selectively
strike at NATO military assets without initiating a more
general nuclear conflict.

The significance of the SS-20 also stemmed from its
mobility. The Soviet Union's earlier intermediate-range
ballistic missiles were easily targeted by NATO's nuclear
and conventional military forces because of their fixed mode
of deployment. The SS-20 could be dispersed when necessary
and thus escape attacks on its home bases. The numbers of

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[27] US Senate, Second Interim Report, p. 12.

[28] ibid., p. 12.

SS-20s deployed by the time NATO made its dual-track deci-
sion, and those projected to be in place in short order gave
the Soviet Union more than enough of a capability to destroy
virtually all of NATO's land based nuclear forces and many
other key military facilities in Europe with a nuclear
attack. Moreover, it was feared that such an attack, while
causing several million civilian collateral casualties,
would not destroy Western Europe so as to make it a hollow
victory.[29] The Soviet Union insisted that the deployment of
the SS-20 represented a normal stage in the modernisation of
its nuclear forces, and that the SS-20 was intended to carry
out the same tasks as the medium-range missiles of older
types which it was replacing.[30]

These assessments were not unanimously endorsed by all
analysts. Others have argued that the SS-20 did not alter
the military balance in any appreciable manner. Although
the warhead was smaller than those on the earlier IRBMs, its
150 KT yield, no matter how accurately targeted, would

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[29] McNaughter, p. 4; and US Senate, ibid., p. 15.

[30] US Senate, Second Interim Report, p. 12. Other observers
have argued that the SS-20 was the last two stages of a
three-stage ICBM being developed for intercontinental
use. Due to ongoing difficulties in the development of
the third stage the missile was adopted as an IRBM.
"This history provides some suggestion that the original
intention of the Soviet weapon acquisition process in
this case was not directed at providing a 'threat' to
European targets, but was rather to find some use for an
ICBM whose development had not quite succeeded after a
lengthy and costly development process." See Leitenberg,
p. 18; and Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Sovi-
et Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1987), pp. 249-257.

result in damage great enough to initiate a general nuclear
exchange between the strategic forces of the two superpow-
ers. Under these conditions, it was difficult to understand
how this new capability would give the Soviet Union a use-
able weapon, either in a military or political sense.[31]

Soviet theatre nuclear capabilities were also enhanced
during the 1970s by the introduction of new, relatively
sophisticated, aircraft. These included the TU-26 (or Back-
fire) medium-range bomber, the Fencer, and the Flogger D
tactical strike aircraft. These aircraft all had improved
range and payload capabilities compared to older genera-
tions.[32] While these forces helped push NATO towards new
deployments of its own, doubts were voiced about NATO's need
to respond. Washington pointed out early on that the NATO
European allies had faced the threat of over 400 medium-
range bombers, and intercontinental forces that could be
used in the theatre, for many years. As a result, there
was no **pressing** need to respond with new deployments.[33]

Less publicised, but likely no less noticed by NATO
observers, was the substantial modernisation of the Soviet
Union's shorter range theatre nuclear forces. These includ-
ed missile launchers deployed with Soviet combat troops in

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[31] US Senate, <u>Second Interim Report</u>, p. 15; and Schwartz, p.
222.

[32] McNaughter, p. 4; and Leitenberg, p. 22.

[33] Schwartz, p. 222.

Eastern Europe and nuclear-capable artillery.[34] These improvements in the Soviet Union's tactical and long-range nuclear systems seriously challenged any claim that NATO had a superior theatre nuclear capability. As a result, there was considerable concern that the Soviet Union going to be able to neutralise NATO's theatre nuclear options within the framework of flexible response.[35]

The dual-track decision employing arms control would increase confidence in the United States nuclear guarantee. This was fundamentally important as the question of the American strategic forces umbrella over Europe lay at the root of NATO's effective deterrent posture. Ever since the Soviet Union began to deploy a nuclear capability of its own, NATO struggled to prove that the US would be both willing and able to use its nuclear power to defend Europe. One way of doing this was to make clear the potential for escalation.

Improvements in the Soviet Union's theatre nuclear posture stole escalation dominance from the United States, a concept upon which it had relied in order to make its deterrent posture appear credible. Indeed, this is what Schmidt's speech in 1977 was all about. He made a strong

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[34] Andrew J. Pierre, "Long-Range-Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe: The Primacy of Politics," in <u>Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Modernization and Limitation</u>, eds. Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 39.

[35] Buteux, p. 234.

comment on US vagueness regarding a credible extended deter-
rence posture for the United States.[36]

Intermediate nuclear forces were seen as an important
link between the defence of Europe and the United States'
strategic forces. The Europeans voiced the most concern in
this matter. They were afraid that, along the lines of
flexible response, a conventional war could escalate to the
tactical level and continue to be fought there without any
damage occurring to either of the two superpowers' home-
lands. The Europeans had long held a fear of a superpower
conflict being fought on their territory.

The High Level Group

It was increasingly argued, during the 1970s, that these
new Soviet improvements created a dangerous gap in NATO
strategy. If in the event that NATO chose to resort to the
use of battlefield nuclear weapons after conventional set-
backs, Moscow could then escalate to the use of its SS-20s.
By so doing it could destroy NATO nuclear-capable aircraft
intended to strike at Soviet territory. This would leave
the United States to decide whether to use its central stra-
tegic systems or agree to terminate the conflict on the
Warsaw Pact's terms should aggression take place.[37]

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[36] Hacke, p. 86.

[37] Talbott, p. 26.

At one time, resort to US strategic forces would have been an option. As strategic parity approached and the credibility of extended deterrence eroded, more emphasis was placed on the need to closely tie the United States ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers to Europe.[38] The terminology 'coupling' and 'decoupling' became increasingly important at that time. In 1979, West Germany, one of the states most vocally concerned about Soviet IRBM capabilities, stated that "The nuclear mid-range arsenal of the Warsaw Pact comprises some 600 Soviet IRBM/MRBM which can be offset by NATO only by taking recourse to the overall spectrum of deterrence."[39] However, the United States strategic forces could not credibly do this after strategic parity was recognised.

As a result, NATO came to consider the deployment of new and modernised theatre nuclear weapons as a necessity to fill the gap in NATO's force structure and so shore up the strategy of flexible response. What was occurring here, however, was less the recognition that there was a strictly military necessity for new deployments, as it was an acknowledgment that NATO had to act to shore up confidence in the United States pledge to assist its allies: it was a matter of confidence, atmosphere, and psychology.[40]

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[38] ibid., p. 27.

[39] Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry of Defence, Security and Defense Policy of the Federal Government (Bonn: 1977), p. 13.

[40] Talbott, p. 32.

While United States administrations were initially reluc-
tant to address the theatre nuclear problem in Europe,[41]
increasing allied pressure eventually got Washington to
agree that the issue deserved special attention.   At the
May, 1977, summit of NATO leaders, US President Carter ini-
tiated an action programme that involved increased allied
efforts across a wide spectrum of defence areas.   Included
in the Long Term Defence Plan (LTDP) that resulted from the
Summit was the identification of remedial measures required
in the theatre nuclear field.   Task Force 10, as this was
labelled, was assigned to the Nuclear Planning Group. Thus,
at its October, 1977, meeting in Bari, Italy, the NPG creat-
ed a special body to perform this function of analysing the
theatre nuclear situation.[42] "The [High Level Group's] HLG's
mandate was to examine the need for NATO TNF modernization,
and the technical, military and political implications of

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[41] While hearings were underway regarding the SALT II Treaty
in the United States in October, 1977, Secretary of State
Vance confirmed that the Atlantic Alliance was examining
its theatre nuclear posture.   Nevertheless, he argued
that Polaris and the existing forward-based systems con-
tinued to make additional long-range ground- or sea-
launched systems unnecessary.   US, House, Modernization,
p. 19.

[42] A major impetus behind the creation of a separate commit-
tee to address this issue was the US belief that the NPG
did not function well enough to deal with the politically
sensitive aspects of LRTNF modernisation.   In support of
this, Washington pointed to the ERW fiasco.   See Simon
Lunn, "Policy Preparation and Consultation Within NATO:
Decision Making for SALT and LRTNF," Decision-making for
Arms Limitation: Assessments and Prospects, eds. Hans
Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke (Cambridge: Balling-
er, 1983), p. 267.

alternative NATO TNF postures."[43]

The High Level Group's Study

The HLG first laid out several important guidelines intended to condition its findings. First, the new systems were chosen to enhance deterrence by providing NATO with the capability to respond to a nuclear attack short of a general strategic exchange, and by replacing the aging systems -- F-111s and Vulcans -- which currently fulfilled those requirements.

Second, the long-range intermediate nuclear forces decision should reflect an "evolutionary" rather than radical change in NATO's defence posture. Thus, it would not entail any increase in importance in the role of nuclear weapons in allied defence or any change in the strategy of flexible response; nor would it produce any change in the overall total of nuclear weapons in the European theatre. At the same time, the number had to be large enough to constitute a political response by NATO. This was intended to encourage the Soviet Union to enter seriously into arms control negotiations. The number of new deployments would have to be large enough to provide a margin for reductions through arms control negotiations. However, the number could not be too large, or it would appear to constitute a separate theatre nuclear capability.

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[43] US, House, <u>Modernization</u>, p. 19.

Another guideline stated that a direct matching capability to the SS-20 was not considered necessary, but merely an offseting capability to provide a credible response would suffice. This requirement determined that the systems chosen should have sufficient range to strike targets in the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The size of the Soviet modernisation programme also implied the need for a high number of NATO intermediate nuclear forces, However, it was emphatically stressed that whatever number was agreed upon would not be considered as countering the SS-20 weapon for weapon.

To satisfy public perceptions concerning the credibility of NATO's ability to respond, the fourth guideline held that the systems should have as much visibility as possible. Hence a preference for land-based systems. There had to be a wide geographical spread of the systems, that is, the systems had to be deployed from north to south throughout the countries of the Alliance to complicate Soviet military planning. An equally important consideration was the concept of sharing the nuclear risk among Alliance members.

Fifth, to meet the requirements for deterrence and for flexible response, there had to be a sufficient number of systems capable of surviving a possible preemptive attack, particularly in view of improving Soviet capabilities. For the same reason, the number had to be large enough to penetrate Soviet air defences and be highly accurate.

Finally, it was assumed that a mix of systems would provide an optimal synergistic effect. While it was recognised that visibility inevitably compromises survivability, the need to enhance the credibility of response was considered sufficiently important for this aspect to be given priority. Concerning the mix of the two systems, their characteristics offered flexibility to NATO and maximised the difficulties for Soviet planners. It was a political-military decision that the Pershing II would be as similar as possible to Pershing IAs and would only be installed where Pershing IAs were currently deployed. Pershing II was thus considered a replacement and modernisation. At the time, the Soviet Union did not yet have an effective defence against the cruise missile and, while Moscow could feasibly have built an adequate air defence against them in the future, American officials estimated that it would cost in the range of $50 billion (US).[44]

The High Level Group then turned to study which force structure could best fulfil NATO requirements. The modernisations and/or additions to the existing force of aircraft were considered. By mid 1978, the High Level Group had reached the consensus that theatre nuclear modernisations should involve the deployment of additional and improved long-range nuclear systems (an evolutionary upward adjustment), in the theatre that would allow NATO to strike tar-

[44] US Senate, <u>Second Interim Report</u>, pp. 17-18; and US House, <u>Modernization</u>, p. 20.

gets in the USSR.[45] It then turned to examine four long-range intermediate nuclear weapons types as presented in military option papers prepared by United States military officials.[46]

The Pershing II was originally planned as a replacement for the Pershing IAs that were deployed with United States and West German forces. 108 Pershing IAs were deployed with American Army units in the Federal Republic of Germany and 72 launchers with the Air Force of the Federal Republic. Initially, the Pershing modernisation was intended to achieve greater accuracy and lower yield in order to reduce collateral damage and provide a more credible theatre nuclear interdiction capability.[47] In 1977, these requirements were expanded to include a substantial increase in the range of the missile (1000 miles as opposed to 400 for the Pershing IAs). However, the Pershing II was not going to be deployed so close to the inter-German border that it could hit Moscow or any of the command-and-control centres east of there. This limitation in range was seen by NATO officials as being less provocative and, therefore, in actuality a

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[45] Schwartz, pp. 218-219.

[46] Strobe Talbott and David Schwartz identified the FB-111H bomber, which had a longer range and larger payload then the FB-111A which was already in service as a fifth possible choice. See Talbott, p. 33. However, this platform does not appear to have been given much consideration by the HLG.

[47] Note that these assets were similar to the benefits of the ERW that proved to be so controversial.

positive feature.[48]

The Pershing IIs differed from the earlier missiles in NATO to accommodate these improvements. The Supreme Allied Commander recommended that the Pershing II resemble the Pershing IA as closely as possible. With this in mind the replacement system was designed to use a modified version of the existing erecter/launcher and other ground support equipment.

Unlike the Pershing IAs which followed a ballistic trajectory from RV separation to target, the Pershing II warheads were terminally guided by an onboard radar and memory stored maps. This gave it a circular error probability (CEP) of about 20 or 40 metres compared with 400 metres CEP for the IAs. This improved accuracy was reflected in the weapon's reduced yield for a given mission.

The Pershing II was organised into platoons of three erecter launchers each with one missile per launcher. The Pershing II was to be deployed in casernes and dispersed to firing positions when conditions warranted. The reaction time of the newer system was supposed to be better than the earlier model.

Working from the belief that the evolution of cruise missile technology could be of tremendous benefit in improving NATO's defence capabilities, the High Level Group decided

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[48] Talbott, p. 35.

that the ground-launched version of the missile would be best for the Alliance.

This system would be fired from an air transportable, ground mobile platform. The interesting feature of the GLCM was its use of terrain contour matching to fly below 100 metres thus having a greatly improved capability of evading detection by the Soviet Union's air defences and so making it to its target. The missile was relatively slow compared to other nuclear systems -- travelling at .8 mach or 965 kilometres per hour -- but had a range of approximately 2,500 kilometres and had a circular error probability under 80 metres. The slow speed was in fact seen by Western analysts as a benefit because it meant that the cruise would not easily be seen a first-use weapon. It would not pose a significant threat to the Soviet Union of NATO aggression. Being retaliatory, the ground-launched cruise missile would augment what stability there was in the theatre and strategic balances.[49] The ground-launched cruise missile differed from the Pershing IIs in that it was deployed four to a launcher. Four launchers constituted a flight as they were operated by the same two control centres.

Normally, the ground-launched cruise missile was to be based in hardened shelters, however, with warning time they could move from their main operating bases to field locations. It was recognised that this afforded the cruise mis-

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[49] _ibid_., p. 34.

sile a considerable degree of survivability.[50]

. The High Level Group promoted the ground-launched cruise missile even though the sea-launched cruise missile had a number of advantageous characteristics which included both survivability and deployment flexibility. For example, the US Poseidon SLBMs were favoured in the early 1970s over land-based quick reaction alert aircraft on the basis that the former were absolutely secure and 'stabilising'. Placing NATO nuclear assets at sea reduced USSR nuclear targeting of NATO territory and this would alleviate some of the dilemmas built into NATO's force structure and strategy.[51]

There was reason to believe that the sea-launched cruise missile would be a more expensive system to deploy because of the problem in procuring dedicated platforms. In the United States, opposition arose to this proposal because it would have resulted in a net reduction in conventional torpedo tubes available to the US Navy. A major reason for the High Level Group's preference for the ground launched version was the SLCM's lack of political visibility which was considered an essential requirement of the Alliance's theatre nuclear force modernisation. Perhaps the greatest impediment to support for this plan was its similarity to

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[50] For a more detailed discussion of the utility of cruise missile technology see Rose E. Gottemoeller, Land-Attack Cruise Missiles, Adelphi Paper #226 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1987/1988), pp. 13-30.

[51] Leitenberg, p. 21.

the earlier NATO scheme for a multilateral force.[52]

The US Air Force put forward a detailed plan for an intermediate-range ballistic missile system in the spring of 1979 known as Longbow. Criticism of the duplication of theatre nuclear programmes within the United States killed the IRBM before it received much development funding.[53] It also faced opposition because it would be perceived, and criticised, as representing an escalation in the arms race. Finally, the Longbow would take too long to perfect; there would be little hope of deploying it by the mid-1980s.[54]

High Level Group Recommendations

When the Nuclear Planning Group meet in Florida in the Spring of 1979, its members had agreed that 200 to 600 warheads needed to be deployed in the European theatre in the early 1980s. Before the final decision was to be taken in December, 1979, the specifics regarding the types of systems to be used and numbers needed were worked out. The final High Level Group recommendation called for the deployment of a total of 572 nuclear missiles in five European states.

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[52] Schwartz, pp. 226-227. and Talbott, p. 34. For a discussion of the similarities between the MLF plan and the INF deployments see Josef Joffe, "Allies, Angst, and Arms Control: New Troubles for an Old Partnership," <u>Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Modernization and Limitation</u>, eds. Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffery D. Porro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983).

[53] US House, <u>Modernization</u>, pp. 21-23.

[54] Talbott, p. 34.

108 of these would be Pershing IIs to be located in the Federal Republic of Germany. The remaining 464 would be ground launched cruise missiles based as follows: 24 GLCM launchers (96 missiles), in the FRG; 40 GLCM launchers (160 missiles) in the UK; 28 GLCM launchers (112 missiles) in Italy; 12 GLCM launchers (48 missiles) in Belgium; and 12 GLCM launchers (48 missiles) in The Netherlands.[55] The number of warheads and delivery vehicles that NATO decided to acquire was based on several factors.

Soviet force levels were generally founded upon long-standing targeting requirements including such things as hard-targets, transportation networks and command and control centres. However, NATO weapons were not needed to satisfy specific targeting requirements. By and large, all critical targets were already covered by existing NATO forces and those of the US strategic reserves.[56] In fact NATO had decided in 1979 to disavow any need to match the Soviet Union's intermediate nuclear force deployments on a one-to-one basis.[57] Nevertheless, this did not mean that the number of new deployments was 'pulled out of the air' as some observers have claimed.

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[55] US House, Modernization, p. 23.

[56] Leon V. Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1984), pp. 112-115.

[57] ibid., pp. 112-115.

NATO officials explained the choice of a mixture of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles as resulting from the fact that each system possessed distinctive features that would complement each other.

> Pershing II offers a very high assurance of penetrating Soviet air defenses, the capability of striking time-urgent targets, and particularly important, the opportunity to take advantage of the existing Pershing 1-A infrastructure. GLCM will have lower life-cycle costs and longer range, providing the capability of attacking a wider range of targets from several different bases thereby increasing the opportunity for participation among member countries through deployment on their soil. In addition, it was pointed out that the deployment of a mixed ballistic/cruise missile force hedges against the failure of one type of system, provides the flexibility to select the best weapon for a given mission while complicating enemy planning.[58]

This would allow NATO to meet its selective employment plans for theatre nuclear forces. NATO would not necessarily wish to take a great escalatory step from the start of a conflict. The new forces would have the accuracy and the lower yields deemed necessary to fulfil demonstrative roles. Their unique signature and telltale pattern of trajectory would prevent them from being confused with United States strategic forces as it was feared may occur with the use of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.[59] These features would enable NATO to fill a gap in the continuum of deterrence. Moreover, these features matched those of the Soviet Union's SS-20s allowing NATO to respond proportionatly to

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[58] US, House, <u>Modernization</u>, p. 23.

[59] Sigal, pp. 38-39.

any level of attack or threat. However, these forces did
not necessarily have to equal Soviet intermediate nuclear
forces in terms of numbers. A capability in this category
was considered sufficient. In addition to such considera-
tions as system availability, in-flight reliability, pene-
tration capability, risks on the ground,[60] and cost,[61] more
purely political considerations had a bearing.

The military rationale for the INF deployments were well
understood and, as will be discussed below, were of secon-
dary importance. Next to consider were the political rea-
sons for the choice of a mixture of 572 Pershing II and
cruise missiles, particularly as these reflected upon the
arms control dimension of the dual-track decision. The High
Level Group proposal and the Foreign and Defence Minister's
decision were impacted by several political issues. The
first political concern was for the nature of deterrence.
NATO intermediate nuclear force levels had a great deal to
do with Soviet perceptions of deterrence and the unity of
the Alliance. The deployment figures had to be high enough
to leave doubts in the minds of Soviet planners about the
possible success of a preemptive strike. At the same time,

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[60] Leon Sigal argued that their less than total invulner-
ability may have been viewed as a beneficial feature. If
NATO LRTNFs were largely invulnerable to anything other
than a nuclear attack, military planners in the Soviet
Union would have to consider striking US strategic forces
as well. This would place US strategic forces at risk
alongside its theatre forces and so reinforce coupling.
ibid., p. 47.

[61] US, House, Modernization, p. 23.

INF levels had to be low enough that they would not decouple the US strategic guarantee from the defence of Europe. Too many would have the reversed effect by decoupling the US strategic forces all that more convincingly by making it look as though the United States was trying to buy its way out of its commitment to use its central, strategic nuclear weapons in defence of Europe.[62]

The second political issue was the condition of East-West relations. All the European states were enjoying the détente relationship of the 1970s and none wished to see it totally discarded in an effort to improve their security. Schmidt and the Social Democrates, in particular, had their own brand of détente, 'Ostpolitik', to preserve. In Washington, Carter was a believer in the benefits of détente and was anxious to conclude the SALT II Treaty. As a consequence, the numbers and types of deployments were planned so as not to disturb East-West relations.

Third, the mechanics of alliance cohesion was a purely political consideration.[63] The systems NATO chose to adopt had to have a basing configuration that made it possible for all five participating countries to have weapons deployed on their soil (the need for risk sharing, ie. the non-singularity of the Federal Republic of Germany, was very important

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[62] Talbott, p. 35.

[63] US, House, <u>Modernization</u>, p. 24. and Sigal, pp. 12-15.

to the success of the deployments).[64] Following the neutron-
bomb débâcle, the Carter Administration promoted political
considerations over military pros and cons in deciding to
augment its European nuclear force posture. Towards this
end, the US ability to even table a plan to enhance NATO
security, and then stick to it, became very important.[65]

The fourth political factor was the European attitudes to
nuclear weapons. The numbers of new forces had to be low
enough to appear to meet the popular issue of reduced levels
of nuclear forces on both sides. Matching Pershing IIs to
IAs was thought to be politically palatable -- appearing as
a modernisation only, not a contributor to the so called
'arms race'. In light of the previous point, the numbers of
ground-launched cruise missile deployments in each country
had to be large enough to allow each state to 'share' in the
reductions that may have emerged as part of an arms control
agreement.

The Special Group

The arms control portion of the two-track decision had
its beginnings sometime after the High Level Group was cre-

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[64] Talbott, p. 36. The FRG had made it clear that its sup-
port for basing on its territory would be conditional
upon other NATO European states also accepting deploy-
ments and an unanimous endorsement of the modernisation
plans by all NATO members whether they were potential
basing countries or not.

[65] Schwartz, pp. 223-224, and Talbott, p. 33.

ated to examine the intermediate nuclear force question.[66]
The recognition and desire that NATO should not pursue a
modernisation programme without some consideration being
given to arms control grew as the HLG's work progressed.
There were three fundamental reasons for this. First, pub-
lic, and therefore parliamentary, approval or even accep-
tance of the modernisation programme would have been diffi-
cult to achieve without a demonstrated willingness on the
part of the Alliance to 'close the gap' with a negotiated
arms control convention.[67] Second, many Alliance members
were convinced that it was in their interest to do every-
thing possible to maintain the integrity of the Harmel
Report and the Alliance's commitment to pursue the twin pil-
lars of its security; defence and détente.[68] NATO European
states feared that intermediate nuclear force modernisation
might be the catalyst for a return to the pre SALT I era of
tension[69] Third, NATO officials were increasingly aware that
any decision to deploy new forces would be a difficult one
and were anxious not to have their efforts undermined by
reactionary Soviet force structure improvements. Therefore,
NATO personnel sought to eliminate the potential for an

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[66] Strobe Talbott tells that the idea for the structure of
the Special Committee was first put forward by French
President Giscard at an informal summit meeting with the
US, FRG, and UK. Talbott, pp. 36-37.

[67] See Schwartz, p. 229 and Lunn, p. 270.

[68] Talbott, p. 37.

[69] Schwartz, p. 229.

unrestrained arms race in theatre nuclear forces might develop with the Soviet Union.[70]

Thus it was that in April, 1979, NATO created a group just for the special purpose of examining the arms control implications of the intermediate nuclear force decision. This body of arms control experts from all alliance countries save France, was known as the Special Group (SG) on Arms Control and Related Matters.[71] This body was intended to serve as a bureaucratic counterweight to the High Level Group. Alliance members were interested enough in arms control to create the Special Group to offset the military bias of the HLG with an organisation biased, if anything, in favour of negotiations.[72]

The creation of the Special Group came at the same time that the Nuclear Planning Group had already decided in principle that deployments were necessary. In fact, the Special Group was instructed to take the work of the HLG as its starting point, to develop arms control strategies in parallel with the modernisation plans, and to ensure that the Alliance's arms control efforts would not derail the intermediate nuclear deployments.[73] Therefore, the Special Group

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[70] US, House, Modernizations, pp. 29-30.

[71] NATO, Communiqué of the NPG (24-25 April, 1979), pp. 106-107.

[72] Talbott, p. 38.

[73] US, House, Modernization, p. 30.

drew up guidelines to assist US negotiators. The Special
Group suggested that arms control negotiations should be
complementary to and not a substitute for intermediate
nuclear force modernisation. The High Level Group had iden-
tified the need for an evolutionary upward adjustment in
NATO's nuclear force structure and this modernisation
requirement existed independently from arms control. Arms
control negotiations would be neither realistic nor possible
without an agreed modernisation plan and a decision to
implement it.

The Special Group concluded that a decision in principal
on modernisation but suspending implementation temporarily,
pending progress in arms control, would not be in NATO's
interest. Postponement of the decision was proposed in a
number of the small countries, particularly by certain sec-
tions of the social democratic parties. It was countered,
however, by the argument that a postponement on these terms
would mean that NATO defence planning was dependent on the
willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate -- an unaccep-
table position for NATO.

Arms control negotiations could lead to a downward
adjustment in NATO's intermediate nuclear force require-
ments, but as negotiations were unlikely to eliminate the
Soviet INF threat, NATO nuclear modernisations would be nec-
essary. If and when arms control results were achieved, the

alliance could decide whether to modify the scale of its intermediate nuclear deployments. This guideline acknowledged the position of those who sought the so-called zero option or at least wished to minimise the deployments. However, it made it clear that such an outcome was not likely.

The Special Group proposed that INF arms control negotiations should be conducted within a SALT III framework and that these negotiations should involve close and regular consultation within the alliance in an appropriate manner; perhaps by extending the life of the Special Group itself.

Finally, the Special Group wanted INF negotiations and MBFR to be consistent and mutually supportive. In addition, intermediate nuclear negotiations should ensure <u>de jure</u> equality in ceilings and in rights. It was particularly important for the Alliance to maintain the principle of equality with the East even if it chose not to exercise this right. It was important to the Special Group that INF reductions or limitations be verifiable.

These guidelines made it clear that NATO intended to go ahead with deployment of the two new systems. The only purpose of arms control was to reduce the numbers of USSR SS-20s, not to eliminate them.[74] The Special Group also laid out some suggestions about the immediate objectives for any intermediate nuclear force negotiations.

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[74] Leitenberg, p. 24.

As such, the negotiations should be a step-by-step process focussing on narrow and selective areas, rather than attempting a comprehensive approach which would multiply the difficulties and complexities involved and minimise the chance of progress. The first step of this approach should be to focus on limiting and reducing the most serious and immediate threat to NATO: the Soviet land-based missile force, particularly the SS-20. Furthermore, the aim should be to achieve a reduction in the overall threat of the land-based missile force by limiting SS-20 deployment, and insuring the retirement of the SS-4s and SS-5s.

The effective unit of limitation should be the numbers of warheads on launchers. Thus an SS-20 launcher would count as three because its missile carried three warheads, and a ground-launched cruise missile launcher would count as four because each launcher had four missiles with one warhead each. The Special Group wanted limitations to apply to worldwide land-based INF deployments, but with regional subceilings on systems located within striking range of NATO. But, to avoid complex and prolonged negotiations, long-range aircraft should not initially be included, although serious consideration should be given to addressing this problem in future negotiations. Backfire, however, did pose a particularly serious problem and careful consideration should be given to ways in which Backfire could be constrained in the SALT III context, without jeopardizing the possibility of

obtaining limits on the long-range missile threat.[75]

In the fall of 1979, the US National Security Council and the State Department combined the proposals of the two NATO study groups. The result was the Integrated Decision Document (IDD).[76] Because of the nature of the political rationales for the intermediate nuclear deployments and the emphasis that was placed on the SS-20 in the military need for Pershing II and cruise missiles, the arms control side of the two-track decision was necessary. Without arms control it was clear that the decision to modernise would not proceed smoothly, if at all. This lead the NATO Foreign Ministers to marry an arms control programme to their approval of the High Level Group's recommendations to improve NATO's force posture.

The Dual-Track Decision

As it became apparent that a decision to adopt a modernisation programme was nearing, the intensity of political activity increased. In The Netherlands, opposition to the INF deployments developed within the governing coalition, raising doubts about whether or not it would support the NATO proposal. In Belgium, a government already besieged

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[75] US, House, <u>Modernization</u>, pp. 29-30.

[76] Talbott, p. 38.

with serious economic and constitutional/linguistic issues was unprepared to act on such a sensitive issue as the placing of nuclear weapons on its territory. In Norway and Denmark, both 'nuclear free' states, strong public reactions threatened to compel their governments to abstain or vote against intermediate nuclear force modernisation. The reservations made by these smaller NATO members threatened to undermine the modernisation plans.

Such an outcome may have emerged because the Federal Republic of Germany was the lynch pin for the success of the deployments. A sizable proportion of the cruise missiles were intended for Germany as were all the Pershing IIs. The German government also had to contend with domestic opposition, but, it was prepared to push ahead provided that it could show that all NATO members were in agreement and committed to the INF programme.[77] In this respect the arms control component of the double decision played a vital role. Without the December 12 decision being a 'dual-track' decision, the modernisation of NATO's INFs would not have proceeded.

On December 12, 1979, NATO's Foreign and Defence Ministers met to give final consideration of the High Level Group's recommendations. They arrived at their decision in light of the submissions of the Special Group. The outcome was the now famous 'Dual-Track Decision'. The communiqué of

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[77] US, House, Modernization, pp. 37-38.

the December 12 meeting (see appendix B for the entire text), began by drawing attention to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's military build-up. NATO Foreign Ministers noted the qualitative and quantitative improvements in Soviet strategic forces resulting in parity and the expansion of their short-range theatre nuclear forces and conventional armies. In particular, attention was drawn towards the SS-20 and the Backfire Bomber as necessitating a NATO INF response. However, the Alliance was not prepared to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and defence through its decision to counter Soviet military improvements with the new intermediate nuclear deployments alone. "In this connection, ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible."[78] Moreover, because the new nuclear forces were to be accommodated within that reduced level, this would involve a shift in NATO's force structure away from warheads of other systems and shorter ranges.

In addition, NATO committed itself to consider the application of arms control to deal with the intermediate nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. "This is being reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980's."[79]

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[78] NATO, Special Meeting,

The Special Consultative Group

After laying out some guidelines for arms control negotiations NATO further demonstrated its desire to see such efforts succeed and its expectations that arms control may be achieved. If arms control was indeed a real possibility it would be important for NATO to coordinate the allies' approaches to nuclear arms control with NATO's military strategy and force posture.[80] The Foreign Ministers did so by announcing the creation of a special consultative body to liase between the US negotiating team and the Foreign and Defence ministers of NATO. This was to ensure that the outcome of an arms control accord would, in the end, be in NATO's security interests.[81] When negotiations got underway, the Special Consultative Group became the main forum for Alliance consultation on matters concerning the INF talks until they were successfully concluded in December 1987.[82]

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[79] ibid.,

[80] For an historical review of the role of consultations in NATO and an argument for their importance see Buteux, pp. 233-234; and Stanley R. Sloan, "Arms Control Consultations in NATO," Decision-making for Arms Limitation: Assessments and Prospects, eds. Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 219-236.

[81] ibid.

[82] NATO, NATO Facts and Figures, 11th ed. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), pp. 101-102.

There were many interesting facets to this dual-track decision. The communiqué concluded by stating that

> Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet buildup can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.[83]

NATO, as a whole, did appear to intend to see arms control through to a successful conclusion. Arms control was given a fairly detailed action plan and did constitute an important degree of attention in and amongst NATO officials. But, arms control was not in fact the predominant approach to enhance NATO security. Despite the tone of the communiqué "the 1979 decision clearly subordinated the principle of arms control to the principle of modernization. NATO took the need to deploy the new systems as the starting point for its arms control approach."[84] If arms control were really expected to have had a reasonable chance of acting as a parallel and effective approach it should have been given as detailed and well thought out a plan of implementation as that of deployments. This has been argued particularly in light of an understanding that the dynamics of a defence system production decision would have greater momentum than

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[83] NATO, Special Meeting.

[84] Klaas G. de Vries, "Security Policy and Arms Control: A European Perspective," Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Modernization and Limitation, eds. Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 61.

a decision to enter negotiations.[85]

Nowhere in the December 12 communiqué is the impression given that NATO saw arms control as serving Moscow's interests as well. The tone of the communiqué is self serving. While "The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe [...]"[86] NATO appears to see arms control as working to improve its security without any consideration of the stable relationship it might have sought with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. There was nothing in the dual-track decision to invite Moscow to sit down with NATO to negotiate a balance of forces in Europe that would also serve the interests of the Soviet Union. There had been substantial evidence arising from the Helsinki round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to indicate that the Eastern European states would have been receptive of such a proposal. Some observers have argued that when Western spokesmen used the terms 'balance' and 'stability' their implied meaning was 'status quo'. In particular, that NATO sought to maintain an earlier status quo that provided the Alliance with an advantage in nuclear systems.[87] NATO appears to have seen arms control as a means of achieving greater security, perhaps even at the expense of the WTO's

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[85] ibid., p. 63.

[86] NATO, Special Meeting.

[87] Leitenberg, p. 47.

security -- more along the lines of the traditional outcome of arms acquisitions. After the December 12 meeting, several voices pointed out that NATO was suspected of having adopted the dual-track approach only to ensure that domestic western opposition would not undermine the intermediate nuclear force deployment programme.

The communiqué stated that **all** ministers had agreed to the modernisation plan; however, no mention could be made at the time about the reservations submitted by Belgium and The Netherlands. The Netherlands, while endorsing the rationale for intermediate nuclear force structure improvements, wished to reserve its acceptance of basing on its territory. The Netherlands government wanted to wait two years. Its decision at that time would be taken in the light of progress made in arms control negotiations on medium range systems.[88] The Belgium Government also chose to wait. However, it was prepared to make a commitment after six months of arms control negotiations.[89] The hesitation of the two lowland states was compounded by an offer by Brezhnev just prior to December 12 to negotiate the theatre nuclear balance.

To make the deployments palatable to Western European allies experiencing difficulty, the Alliance added a provision to remove 1,000 US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (a move proposed earlier in the Mutual and Balanced Force

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[88] US, House, <u>Modernization</u>, p. 38.

[89] <u>ibid</u>., p. 38.

Reduction Talks and acceptable because they were antiquated and indiscriminatly 'dirty' weapons).[90] While this helped Schmidt overcome resistance in West Germany it did not decisively sway The Netherlands or Belgian opposition. Although the modernisation and arms control tracks were intended to be complementary, two allies found it immediately impossible to proceed with both.[91]

Having now reviewed the rationales for the NATO dual-track decision and the process by which it was reached, the next chapter will examine the negotiating/deployment process to explore the workings of this relationship between arms control and force structure. The next chapter will highlight the implications of the connection made by NATO for the achievement and enhancement of its security: to determine whether or not a combination of limitations and modernisations could solve NATO's nuclear dilemmas.

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[90] Schwartz, p. 238.

[91] Lunn, p. 271.

Chapter V

THE DUAL-TRACK APPROACH: THE OUTCOME

At a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in June, 1980,
Defence Ministers appealed to Moscow to respond positively
to US offers to negotiate verifiable limits on United States
and Soviet long-range land-based INFs. In July, Chancellor
Schmidt went to Moscow and reached an agreement to discuss
intermediate-range nuclear forces. As the two sides met in
the Autumn of 1980, it was immediately apparent that little
headway could be made. The Soviet Union was of the opinion
that a theatre balance already existed in nuclear forces.
They contended that the deployment of the SS-20 was simply
the outgrowth of natural weapons upgrading. Because SS-4s
and SS-5s were supposedly being removed as the new missiles
were activated, Moscow contended that this latest generation
of weapons did not constitute a new or different threat to
Western Europe. General Chervov, Chief of the Soviet Staff,
stated that

> Obsolete types of missiles have come to the end of
> their serviceable life and are being replaced by
> SS-20 missiles, which are designed to carry out
> the same tasks. Of course, it would be strange if
> the new missiles were worse than the old ones, but
> their tasks and combat potential have remained
> basically the same.[1]

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[1] General Chervov, July 21, 1980, interview with "Rude Pra-

While the NATO dual-track decision was still pending, in October, 1979, Soviet President Brezhnev made an offer to negotiate on long-range INFs, but only under the condition that NATO did not adopt its modernisation programme.[2] Moscow's argument that a balance already existed led Soviet officials to state that the December 12 decision had cancelled the basis for negotiations.[3] In a sense Moscow had its own 'two-track' approach: the offer to freeze and possibly reduce its own forces if NATO did not modernise, along with the resolve to terminate arms control and escalate the arms race in Europe if NATO approved the Integrated Decision Document (IDD).[4]

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vo" (Prague), as reported by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union Daily Report, July 24, 1980, found in US Congress, House, The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 42.

[2] This offer was made one day after NATO's planned deployments were leaked to the press in the US. "The timing of Brezhnev's offer was undoubtably and clearly an attempt to undo the NATO decisions, but it was at the same time a far different matter than the propaganda campaign of the previous year launched to block NATO procurement of enhanced-radiation warheads." Milton Leitenberg, "NATO and WTO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces," Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects, ed. Karl E. Birnbaum (Laxenberg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1980), p. 28.

[3] USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, said "...if such a NATO modernization decision is taken and our proposal for the beginning of negotiations is rejected, the position of the Western powers will destroy the basis for negotiation. There will be no negotiating basis." Quoted in ibid., p.

The NATO governments, in some cases with a great deal of proding from the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States, did not defer their decision to modernise until arms control had been given an opportunity to work.[5] By so doing, NATO was able to avoid the pitfalls of having its force structure held hostage to Soviet delays at the negotiating table. The Soviet reaction to the NATO decision, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shelving of the SALT II Treaty by the US Senate (in addition to the stark disagreements between the superpowers regarding the NATO deployments), prevented any real progress in arms control. As a result, it took only the start of the US elections to terminate the introductory round of talks.[6]

Round One

The new US administration formed under President Reagan created uncertainty amongst its European allies concerning its attitude toward the utility of arms control negotiations. In May, 1981, the NATO Council reaffirmed its commitment to the dual-track decision and insisted on persistence in the search for a less provocative resolution to the Alliance's nuclear dilemmas. At the same time, US Secretary

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[4] Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 40.

[5] Leitenberg, pp. 31-32.

[6] Talbott, pp. 41-42.

of State Haig announced that the United States would com-
mence long-range theatre nuclear force talks with the Soviet
Union before the end of the year. When this announcement
was combined with a US endorsement of the Conference on
European Disarmament as part of the CSCE process, NATO
Europe's anxiety regarding the United States' commitment to
intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations was somewhat
allayed.[7]

Western European concerns were by no means fully allayed
by US pronouncements regading arms control. Other state-
ments and actions frightened and antagonised the NATO
allies. Reagan's first term in office was marked by an
immediate and massive defence build-up. Reagan promised to
bring a formal end to the period of détente. In the US the
SALT II agreement, while being informally adhered to, came
to represent all that was wrong in East-West relations.
Influential members of the new US administration were con-
vinced that the arms control process was politically incom-
patible with the primary goal of rearmament. As such, they
sought to have arms control stricken from the agenda of
East-West relations, perhaps indefinitely.[8]

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[7] US Congress, Senate, Second Interim Report on Nuclear
Weapons in Europe Prepared by the North Atlantic Assem-
bly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1983), pp.
23-24.

[8] Arnold L. Horelick and Edward L. Warner III, U.S.-Soviet
Nuclear Arms Control: The Next Phase (Santa Monica:
RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International
Behavior, 1985), p. 5.

As leader of the NATO Alliance, these hardened US attitudes toward the Soviet Union were bound to effect European security matters. As such, the buildup of theater nuclear forces in Europe was seen as a natural concomitant to the expansion of the United States defence structure.[9]

While formally expressing a desire for negotiated limitations, the United States was increasingly seen as wanting to use the process only as a means of achieving new deployments in the face of European wavering. The predominant necessity at that time was to ensure that the deployments went ahead. Despite the arguments by Fred Iklé and Richard Perle that the dual-track decision was a mistake militarily and financially, the administration held to the December decision because the consequences of reversing course would have been far worse than those of going forward.[10] If negotiations were to be of any use in promoting security, they would only have a chance of success after the intermediate nuclear force deployments had begun in 1983.[11] "The object of making a proposal and undertaking negotiations was damage limitation, public relations, and getting the new NATO missiles deployed with a minimum of anguish and recrimination inside the alliance."[12]

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[9] Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 159.

[10] Talbott, p. 44.

[11] Kaplan, p. 159.

[12] Talbott, p. 62.

European unease increased because the allies did not share all of Washington's sentiments regarding relations with the East and the role of arms control. With respect to the US disillusionment with arms control, one German official stated:

> This development has not taken place in Europe because in Europe we have never regarded arms control as an alternative to deterrence. Our less Quixotic view of arms control has enabled us to maintain continuity in that view. It is in our interest to continue arms control as a realistic and practical process.[13]

Europeans were anxious about United States policy and reluctant to support actions which in their view seriously undermined what stability existed in the East-West relationship. Contrary to what might have been expected, Soviet actions in Afghanistan did not diminish the opposition in Europe to new United States nuclear deployments in the theatre, nor did they produce any lessening in the belief that arms control remained an indispensable element of Western security.[14] Casper Weinberger sought to link the arms control process to other diplomatic business between the superpowers. Weinberger wanted negotiations on TNFs to be cancelled should Moscow intervene in Poland's Solidarity trade union problem. This the allies reluctantly agreed to; but, it further heightened their concerns about the status of détente and the hopes for arms control.[15] As it turned out,

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[13] US Senate, <u>Interim Report</u>, p. 24.

[14] US House, <u>Modernization</u>, p. 40.

the United States did not find it necessary or beneficial to suspend arms talks over the Solidarity issue.

As such, the pace of the arms control dialogue was bound to have an effect on the modernisation programme. For several NATO European allies, support for the Pershing II and cruise missiles was predicated on an explicit commitment to arms control and made in anticipation of the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. The arms control discussions on the European TNF balance were supposed to take place in the framework of SALT III. With SALT II unratified and withdrawn, it appeared as though half of the dual-track approach had been cut off. Reviewing this period, the North Atlantic Assembly noted that, "American interest and willingness to negotiate arms control is considered essential to Alliance security and specifically to the implementation of the NATO LRTNF decision."[16] (Later known as the INF decision).

The Reagan administration, according to Robert Osgood, put forward the zero option almost solely to quell anti-nuclear sentiments. He explained that Reagan 'inherited' the dual-track approach and what the Administration initially saw as the unfortunate need to engage in negotiations.

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[15] Talbott, p. 47. Later, Weinberger stated in a press statement that the NPG had linked the resumption of talks to the easing of USSR pressure on Poland. However, the NPG had not done so and was not about to do so. Therefore, doubts about American leadership were intensified and the Alliance's cohesion suffered as well.

[16] US Senate, Interim Report, p. 24.

> Inevitably, this approach to the INF issue put the
> Reagan administration in the position of champion-
> ing arms control. Moreover, in the course of
> championing it, as part of the effort to disarm
> the rising antideployment forces, the administra-
> tion proved to be a worthy contender for the high-
> est moral ground by means of the most radical pro-
> posal. In the famous "zero" option, it proposed
> what was, in effect, a radical disarmament treaty
> for the elimination of all medium-range missiles
> in Europe and throughout the world, although it
> did so with full and well placed confidence that
> the Soviets (who, alone, had deployed such mis-
> siles) would reject the proposal.[17]

Past experience in arms control with the Soviet Union had demonstrated that a proposal such as the zero option was not negotiable. The zero option was, therefore, viewed widely as a 'tactic' only. The most likely prospect was that it would embarrass Moscow and strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as basically uninterested in arms control except to achieve military advantages.[18]

It should be noted that this assessment of Reagan's incentive for pursuing arms control is not shared by all observers. Robert Grey defended the US administration's zero option arguing that "In short, the Reagan administration is committed to going well beyond what has been achieved so far in the field of arms control -- well beyond the mere codification of both sides' military posture

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[17] Robert E. Osgood, The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 68.

[18] Michael R. Lucas, The Western Alliance After INF: Redefining U.S. Policy Toward Europe and the Soviet Union (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 10.

plans."[19] Compatible with the the views of Richard Perle and Fred Iklé, Grey contended that Reagan's appreciation for the utility of arms control is what lead him to endorse so radical a proposal as the zero option; this would be the only way to achieve real stability at much lower levels of armaments.

Too much was easily made of the new US administration's apparent belief in the efficacy of military superiority as an end in itself in the nuclear age. Nevertheless, comments from United States officials, such as Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger, acknowledging the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe (although insisting that the objective was to prevent it) did not instil a great deal of confidence.[20] Instead, such comments went a long way towards alienating Western European public support for the NATO modernisations and thus significantly complicated the political environment for Alliance leaders.

If NATO did not appear to be serious or interested in actively searching for an arms control accord with the Warsaw Pact then European public opinion would view the modernisation programme with increasing hostility. This turn of

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[19] Robert Grey, "Arms Control Policy in the Reagan Administration," Arms Control and International Security ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), p. 41.

[20] Leon V. Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1984), p. 60.

events began with the demise of the SALT II agreement. When
a treaty that had evolved under the direction of four United
States administrations was suddenly dismissed as being
fatally flawed and contrary to the interests of NATO, the
Europeans could not understand why.

Because the United States did not appear to be interested
in seeking real limitations to the intermediate nuclear
forces in Europe, the modernisation programme became seri-
ously threatened. If it had not been tied so closely to the
arms control agenda then this danger may never have arisen.

The Soviet Union made every effort to exploit this intra-
Alliance problem. It was not lost upon Moscow that Western
public opinion could be used to prevent the Pershing IIs and
ground-launched cruise missiles from ever reaching Europe.
Indeed, this issue could perhaps have been turned against
NATO and have caused its fragmentation. The Soviet Union's
thinking in this respect is perhaps confirmed by Moscow's
actions at the October 1980 talks. The Soviet Union had not
reconciled itself to the eventuality of the NATO deploy-
ments, it still sought to have the decision reversed. Con-
sequently, USSR representatives engaged in arms control
almost solely for the purposes of swaying public opinion.
Had they actually intended to engage in serious negotiations
they would not have been willing to overlook other nuclear
systems in the theatre. Soviet spokesmen confirmed that,

during the preparatory talks on INF negotiations, the Soviet Union was not interested in French and British nuclear forces.[21] With the advantage of hindsight we know that when talks did become more serious these independent nuclear arsenals became one of the most bitter and intractable points of contention.

In attempting to stop NATO's nuclear modernisations the Soviet Union did two things. One, it fully supported arms control dialogue to win over Western public sentiments. Two, it threatened, and later began, to implement reprisals and counter measures against NATO's new deployments.

Soviet Support for Arms Control

The Soviet Union had good reason to enter arms control negotiations in an attempt to halt NATO deployments. Should an actual agreement emerge, Moscow had to expect it would favour its security. With few exceptions, arms control has only succeeded in preventing the deployment of new forces, not in reducing the quantity or capabilities of existing systems.[22] NATO forces were not yet deployed while those of the Soviet Union were. "For the Soviet Union, an appropriate arms control policy was one primarily intended to weaken

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[21] US House, <u>Modernization</u>, pp. 41-42.

[22] Elliot L. Richardson and Henri Simonet, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives in Negotiations," <u>Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Modernization and Limitation</u>, eds. Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 10-11.

the Western basis of support for the Reagan Administration's security policies without reducing accumulated Soviet military advantages or constraining future prospects."[23]

So the Soviet Union proposed a moratorium involving a quantitative and qualitative freeze on intermediate nuclear systems of both sides in Europe including US forward-based systems.[24] A proposal to cease the 'arms race' that NATO initiated with its new deployments and create an environment in which to then negotiate the theatre nuclear balance appealed to anti-nuclear peace groups in Western Europe. More importantly, soft support or acceptance of the NATO intermediate nuclear forces wavered when NATO rejected the Soviet proposal. NATO explained that,

> The latest Soviet proposal for a moratorium on Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces is wholly unacceptable to these Allies. It would freeze them into inferiority by blocking the NATO modernisation programme altogether. Moreover, the proposal would permit the Soviets to increase the threat to NATO by failing to limit systems capable of striking Allied territory from East of the Urals.[25]

The rejection of Soviet 'overtures' and NATO's effective imposition of a time limit on negotiations alienated Western support for deployments. NATO officials consistently argued that the Soviet Union would begin to engage in serious talks only when the Alliance's resolve to deploy the new forces,

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[23] Horelick, p. 6.

[24] NATO, NATO Facts and Figures 11th ed. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), p. 113.

[25] ibid., p. 113.

stated as December of 1983, was demonstrated.   The pressure
that the December 12 decision placed on the arms control
process -- in effect demanding that the Soviet Union acqui-
esce or NATO would deploy its new forces -- was not viewed
by many in Western states as being constructive.   Moreover,
the call for the USSR to reduce missiles in return for zero
NATO missiles made the Western position intolerable to the
Soviet leadership.[26]

> NATO's approach was therefore scarcely one that
> was calculated to do successful business with the
> Soviet Union.   One can only conclude that either
> the major NATO governments were never really seri-
> ous about finding a feasible agreement on INF lim-
> itations, or they did not ask for or receive good
> advice on how to approach arms control talks with
> the Russians. Or both.[27]

Regardless, the appearance, especially with the orches-
tration of the Soviet Union,[28] was that NATO was uninterest-
ed in arms control and bent upon acquiring new nuclear forc-
es.   Thus, by linking its force structure to arms control so
directly, NATO almost allowed the entire programme to be

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[26] Gregory F. Treverton, "Intermediate-Nuclear-Force Negoti-
ations: Issues and Alternatives," Nuclear Weapons in
Europe: Modernization and Limitation, eds. Marsha McGraw
Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1983), pp. 86-87.

[27] Ken Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control," Contemporary
Strategy I, 2nd ed., John Baylis et al. (London: Holmes
and Meier, 1987), p. 171.

[28] By orchestration I mean only that US arms control policy
appeared in certain light due to its own actions as cir-
cumscribed by the USSR's negotiating position in Geneva.
There is little evidence to suggest that Moscow enjoyed
much success in directly manipulating Western public
opinion although they certainly attempted to do so.   See
Sigal, pp. 64-65.

de-railed because it was compelled to be the party rejecting arms control efforts. The mood of public opinion in Europe shifted from what had appeared to be disinterest in 1977 to virulent opposition in 1981. Note that when ninety nuclear capable F-111s were deployed at United States bases in Britain in 1977 there was no public outcry. The reaction to the proposal to deploy enhanced radiation warheads was significant, but had little to do with the cancellation of the programme. In the end, all other public protests appeared mild compared to what was to follow. In 1980, 20,000 attended a rally in London and, in 1981 perhaps ten times that number turned out again. Demonstrations like these took place across Europe and culminated in 1981 with 350,000 marching in Amsterdam alone.[29]

The intra-alliance politics revolving around the dual-track issue struck at the heart of NATO cohesion. West German Chancellor Schmidt, during an election campaign, reiterated the notion of a freeze on future deployments by both sides.[30] This provided the pretext for his Moscow visit

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[29] ibid., pp. 60-61. Barbara Tuchman expressed the impression held by Western populations that the US and Soviet Union did not really intend to achieve an arms control agreement at Geneva. "Perhaps it is indicated on our side by the appointment, as chief delegate to the Geneva talks, of the high priest of the hard line, Paul Nitze. A rough equivalent would be putting Pope John Paul II in charge of abortion rights. Governments that distrust each other do not seriously intend to reduce their arsenals." Barbara W. Tuchman, "The Alternative to Arms Control," Arms Control and International Security, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 137.

which accentuated the dissension and mutual suspicions over NATO policies that already existed between Alliance members. Tension over this issue reached a peak when President Carter sent a letter to Chancellor Schmidt cautioning him against taking actions that might undermine the December decision.[31]

> As one of the architects of the December decision and as someone who had been preoccupied with this aspect of Western security for many years, the Chancellor reportedly was antagonized by this incident. It was viewed by some as a decidedly low point in relations between the Carter administration and the Bonn Government.[32]

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[30] Schmidt stated that "The Soviet Union says it is prepared to negotiate, but only if the West will rescind its decision. In the meantime, it wants to continue building a missile every week and two-and-a-half planes a month. That will not do. A first possible step for solving this crisis could be for both states simultaneously to renounce for a certain number of years the production of new additional or more modern medium-range missiles, so that this interim period of years can be used for negotiations on bilateral limitation -- limitation to a balance on a lower level." Schmidt, "Chancellor Defines Stance on International Problems", in FBIS, Daily Report: WEU April 18, 1980, p. J8, reprinted in ibid., p. 79. In the US capitol this statement was largely interpreted to be an acceptance of the Soviet Union's call for a moratorium. However, Bonn insisted that it simply represented a call for a unilateral moratorium on Soviet deployments because NATO's new systems would not be operational for three-and-a-half years.

[31] Talbott, pp. 40-41.

[32] US House, Modernization, p. 40.

The Special Group at Work

In light of NATO's political difficulties, the work of the Special Group grew in importance. While the first round of meetings were taking place in October of 1980, United States spokesmen stressed their intention to pursue arms control with as close an involvement of their NATO European Allies as possible. However, this was to be substantially less involvement than had taken place in the process leading up to the dual-track decision. A senior American official told the Special Group that

> "These negotiations intimately affect you and we need to hear your views ... we will not enter into negotiations without hearing what you think." However, the SC [sic] was reminded that in the final analysis LRTNF negotiations were a bilateral affair between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, there may arise European points of view that the US could not accept. It was nevertheless added "my instructions are to take them [European views] into account."[33]

Arguably this hard line was a reflection of the Reagan Administration's decision to reimpose American leadership over NATO nuclear policy. The Europeans would be informed, but policy would be made in Washington.[34] As anticipated, differences of opinion did arise. The most significant being in 1981 over the objectives of arms control and the 'zero option'.

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[33] US Senate, <u>Interim Report</u>, p. 25.

[34] Simon Lunn, "Policy Preparation and Consultation within NATO: Decision Making for SALT and LRTNF," <u>Decision-making for Arms Limitation: Assessments and Prospects</u>, eds. Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1983), p. 261.

The United States was not keen to pursue the arms control track of the December 1979 decision. The allies let it be known that they could not maintain the deployment schedule -- locating and preparing sites for the new missiles and building an infrastructure to support them prior to the deployment date in 1983 -- without, at least, a date for the resumption of negotiations. There was considerable debate within the Reagan Administration about returning to arms control.[35] In the end, it appears as though Reagan decided, after a personal appeal by Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, who represented the views of Western European states such as West Germany and Italy, that the United States had to appear accommodating to the Europeans.[36]

Thus, on May 5, 1981, NATO was able to announce that the United States intented to begin talks with the Soviet Union on European theatre nuclear forces by the end of the year. Schmidt pushed for the acceleration of the time table for negotiations, but this was more than Washington was prepared to do. In fact, the United States got the Allies to endorse an undertaking that would provide an updated alliance threat assessment and a study of functional requirements for NATO theatre nuclear forces. The US incentive behind this review was to modify the Integrated Decision Document and alter the relationship between NATO force structure and arms con-

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[35] These divisions are well recorded in Talbott, Chapter Two, "The New Regime," pp. 43-55.

[36] ibid., pp. 47 and 49.

trol.[37]

The zero option (first put forward by Schmidt and the SPD) would require the Soviet Union to eliminate its long-range intermediate nuclear forces in exchange for the cancellation of NATO's modernization plans. In November, 1982, a year after the 'zero option' was announced, the North Atlantic Assembly defined the proposal in these terms; "the 'zero option' refers to the theoretical, but admittedly **highly unlikely** possibility, that the Soviet Union would reduce all its long-range land-based missile forces."[38] (my emphasis added).

Round Two

Thus, the first major United States proposal on intermediate nuclear force arms control was announced on November 18, 1981, shortly after the two sides had resummed talks in Geneva.[39] In addition to exchanging future NATO intermediate nuclear forces for the dismantling of Soviet SS-20s, including those in East Asia, shorter-range missiles (SS-12s/22s

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[37] ibid., pp. 49-50.

[38] US Senate, Interim Report, p. 25.

[39] The INF negotiations were just one component of an entire series of initiatives worked out in discussions with the Soviet Union. NATO endorsed a four point agenda conveyed by President Reagan to the Soviet leader dealing with; 1) the elimination of INF; 2) reductions in strategic nuclear arms; 3) limitations in the area of conventional weapons and; 4) proposals for building confidence and reducing the risk of surprise attack or war arising from miscalculation. see NATO, Facts and Figures, pp. 115-116.

and SS-23s) would be frozen at current levels. Other nuclear systems would be dealt with in future negotiations. The Soviet Union, for its part, rejected the US position. Moscow argued that the meetings could not be restricted to land-based nuclear weapons alone. They sought to include all those systems capable of striking Soviet territory including NATO's dual-capable aircraft, SLBMs assigned to NATO and the nuclear forces commanded by the United Kingdom and France.[40]

The zero option presented a prickly problem for the NATO alliance. Initially, the political purpose of the dual-track approach was to lead to some deployment and some arms control. Total cancellation of NATO deployments in return for total removal of the SS-20 was definitely not envisioned in 1979.[41] If a zero option agreement could be reached, NATO would not need to modernise and the European allies would be spared the political rigors of basing in their territory. However, this ran counter to the rationale that NATO needed to modernise irrespective of Soviet developments.

In 1979, the predominant thinking was that, even in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union's SS-20s no longer posed a threat to NATO Europe, one way or another, the Western European confidence in the US strategic guarantee would still demand that there be more US nuclear forces deployed

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[40] Booth, p. 171.

[41] Talbott, p. 39.

in the theatre capable of hitting the Soviet Union. The
deployment of the SS-20 was the publicised rationale for the
NATO intermediate nuclear force modernisations; however,
eliminating the Soviet missiles would not reduce uncertain-
ties about extended deterrence.[42] For this reason, some
alliance members considered the zero option a non-starter.
However, should Moscow agree to this unlikely scenario, then
NATO would be in a different position. In that event, NATO
could accept the zero option for political reasons, but not
for strategic doctrine.[43] The zero option aptly illustrated
two problems in linking arms control to modernisation:
Firstly, it was damaging to make NATO deployments dependent
upon Soviet actions; Secondly, the notion of the zero option
likely compounded public expectations that arms control
could work and eliminate the need for modernisations.[44]

When the zero option was adopted in November 1981, the
numbers and deployments of the intended NATO intermediate
nuclear forces had already been decided upon and the arms
control strategy the alliance adopted had to recognise this.
The procurement choice had to affect the ceiling levels and
unit of account that the United States proposed. Because
the Alliance had decided to integrate two systems (Pershing
IIs and GLCMs) into its force structure, it was almost

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[42] ibid., p. 39.

[43] US Senate, Interim Report, p. 25.

[44] ibid., p. 25.

obliged to seek zero levels of intermediate nuclear forces. If arms control had resulted in a low ceiling on INFs NATO might have been forced to abandon one of its systems as the production and operating costs of two different systems in small numbers would have been prohibitive.[45] Although NATO did not really seem to anticipate reductions to a zero level, but did hope to achieve parity as low as the Soviet Union would allow, one must question whether or not they thought about the need to abandon either the Pershing II missile or the ground-launched cruise missile.[46] The Soviet Union, because it supposedly intended to retire its SS-4s and 5s would have been left with SS-20s only and, therefore, would not have had to face such a financial consideration.

The US proposal was to count warheads-on-launchers as the unit of account. They sought to do so to negate the reload capabilities of the SS-20. In NATO's proposed force structure, such an agreement at levels higher than zero would probably favour the Pershing II over cruise missiles as the former would have greater survivability because its configuration had fewer transporter/erecter/launchers (TELs) per warhead than did the GLCM. Similarly, if launchers were counted, ground launched cruise missiles would be a more

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[45] Sigal, pp. 113-114.

[46] This argument does not leave aside the fact that there were some in the United States who were prepared to sacrifice the Pershing II to negotiations. See US Congress, Senate, Post Deployment Nuclear Arms Control in Europe, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 3.

advantageous asset having four missiles per TEL as opposed
to one Pershing per launcher. If missiles were the unit of
account, then Pershings would be better because they could
be MIRVed.[47]

Each one or these different counting procedures also car-
ried with it implications for the success of arms control.
Counting warheads would depart from the politically signifi-
cant, although nonetheless disdained, history of SALT where
launchers were the basic unit of account. Moreover, the
Soviet Union's negotiating advantage and leverage would pre-
sumably be greater when counting warheads rather than
launchers because the SS-20 had multiple warheads. In late
1981, this counting procedure made the Soviet lead in land-
based long-range intermediate nuclear forces jump from 250
units to zero, to 750 units to zero.[48]

The arms control agenda enunciated by the United States
for the intermediate nuclear force negotiations followed the
basic framework outlined by the Special Group. Thus, it
advocated a step-by-step approach focusing at first upon the
most threatening and destabilising system -- the land-based
INFs. However, where the outcome of the Special Group's
meetings was to reach global limitations with European sub-
ceilings, the United States proposed a global ceiling --

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[47] ibid., p. 115.

[48] Treverton, pp. 89-90. These numbers do not include
eighteen French IRBMS.

theatre subceilings were discarded. Where the Special Group
wanted to count warheads on launchers, the United States
proposal was to count warheads on missiles. The Special
Group sought to address aircraft at a later stage, the US
proposal sought to include shorter-range missiles so that a
potential agreement could not be undermined by fresh deploy-
ments outside the scope of an intermediate nuclear force
treaty.[49]

The inclusion of aircraft and shorter-range missiles
proved to be another prickly problem. NATO officials were
concerned that attempts to include as many of the Soviet
Union's theatre nuclear assets in negotiations would provide
Moscow with the opportunity to place limitations and
restrictions on NATO systems of like-design. In terms of
aircraft, Western analysts saw the possibility of control-
ling the numbers of the Soviet Union's Fencers, Floggers,
and most importantly, Backfire bombers, as very appealing.
However, military officials were not keen to see their bet-
ter aircraft, like the F-111s, traded off in "simple-minded
numbers games"[50] against poorer Eastern systems. Moreover,
while inclusion of aircraft would have provided NATO with
the ability to influence Warsaw Pact force structure in this
area it might have seriously militated against any agreement
at all. Difficulties could have arisen in discerning capa-

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[49] US Senate, <u>Interim Report</u>, p. 26.

[50] Talbott, p. 67.

bilities and exactly what portion of the other side's force of a particular plane was dual capable. For these reasons, including many types of aircraft in the talks would have been like opening a Pandora's box of negotiating difficulties.[51] In terms of shorter-range missiles, NATO's concerns must surely have been that their inclusion would result in Soviet Union demands on the Pershing 1A and Lance of which there were only 180 with little depth for cuts. Set against these reservations were desires to prevent SS-12s, 22s, and 23s from substituting for the eliminated SS-4s, 5s, and 20s.[52]

Given NATO's deterrent/defensive strategy of flexible response, any serious reductions in US theatre nuclear systems would only compound Western Europe's reassurance crisis and this would certainly not be in the Alliance's security interests. At this stage of the arms control process not only was it possible to question the manner in which linking arms control to force structure was to benefit NATO security, but it was doubtful if arms control itself had any security positive features. This was a particularly salient concern as Moscow was not prepared to allow NATO to meet its objectives through arms control. Consequently, the Soviet Union rejected the United States negotiating position and countered with proposals of its own.

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[51] Treverton, p. 91.

[52] Talbott, p. 75.

The Soviet position was consistent with its view that a European theatre balance in intermediate nuclear forces already existed. Thus, for the talks to be workable, the Soviet negotiators sought to include all medium range carriers in the discussions, the unit of account should be launchers, and both sides should have the freedom to mix. In addition, the Soviet Union was particular about confining any arms control negotiations to the European portion of the USSR.

The Soviet Union's draft treaty proposed to eliminate only those missiles in European Russia assigned to NATO targeting. The number of missiles that could be deployed east of the Urals would remain unlimited. The Soviet negotiators called for the inclusion of British and French nuclear systems in the calculation of the two sides aggregate ceilings for missiles and aircraft. NATO represented, in Moscow's eyes, a triple threat. The United States was a force to be reckoned with in its own right, as its strategic forces were devoted to a European conflict. In addition, there were US theatre nuclear forces stationed in a region separate from the strategic resources. Finally, Britain and France, while protected by the US strategic guarantee, had nuclear systems of their own capable of striking Soviet territory.[53] Considering these proposals one can see that the superpowers were working at cross purposes. The United States wanted a nar-

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[53] ibid., p. 85.

row approach on systems and a broad approach on geographic scope, while the Soviet Union sought to have the geographic scope restricted to the European theatre, but demanded a broad approach on the systems to be included.[54]

With both parties this far apart progress was unlikely. They could not even begin to discuss what data should be used as the basis for negotiations. The United States presented the following numbers in November 1981 to support its claim that the Soviet Union enjoyed a six to one advantage.

US Figures

NATO		USSR	
IRBMs	0	IRBMs:	
Aircraft:		SS-20	250
In Europe:		SS-4/5	350
F-111	164	SS-12/22	100
F-4	265	SSN-5	30
A6/7	68	Aircraft:	
		Backfire	45
sub total	497	Badger/Blinder	350
In the US:		Fencer, Flogger,	
FB-111	63	Fitter	2,700
	====		=====
Total	560	Total	3,825

The Soviet Union saw the equation differently and consequently came up with different numbers that supported its claim that a balance already existed.

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[54] US Senate, <u>Interim Report</u>, p. 28.

USSR Figures

United States and NATO		USSR	
IRBMs:		IRBMs:	
French IRBM	18	SS-20	243
French SLBM	80	SS-4/5	253
United Kingdom Polaris	64	SSN-5	18
Aircraft:		Aircraft:	
United States:		Backfire, Badger,	
FB-111	65	Blinder	461
F-111	172		====
F-4	246	Total	975
Carriers A6/7	240		
French Mirage IV	46		
United Kingdom Vulcan	55		
	====		
Total	986		

Talks Break Down

As a result of these differences the two sides were far
apart. Any optimism about the conclusion of an agreement at
the Geneva talks was unfounded.   This created a new basic
problem for NATO.   Public concerns about nuclear deployments
and what many interest groups perceived as an unending and
pointless escalation of nuclear weapons and the arms race,
led to a great deal of interest and attention being focused
on the Geneva talks.[55] Therefore, Alliance officials regard-
ed the likelihood of the modernisations proceeding unevent-
fully and on schedule a difficult proposition. Without real
arms control progress the political climate would militate
against new US intermediate nuclear forces.   However, NATO
and US leaders were largely committed to the belief that

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[55] ibid., p. 32.

meaningful negotiations would commence only after Moscow got the clear message that NATO was determined to go ahead with its December 12 decision. Without initial deployments of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles, arms control would not provide substantive results. Thus NATO was faced with a dilemma: progress in negotiations would depend on deployment, but deployment would depend on progress in negotiations.[56]

Moreover, US negotiating flexibility was substantially constrained. Had the Alliance begun to consider variations to the zero option that provided an acceptable outcome, it would have signalled a lack of resolve on NATO's part to implement its modernisation plans. The discussion of a fall-back position would also result in the granting of concessions to the Soviet Union for which there would be little likelihood of their responding reciprocally. Had the Alliance put forward a fall-back position at that point in the negotiations, it would, in fact, have amounted to the abandonment of the zero solution.[57]

It would have been very difficult for the United States to introduce greater flexibility into its negotiating position. The INF discussions were bilateral, meaning that there were no chairs at the table for British and French officials. These two states were not prepared to see any

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[56] ibid., p. 32.

[57] ibid., p. 32.

constraints placed on their nuclear systems by the two superpowers.[58] Furthermore, the two NATO European nuclear states had consistently maintained that their forces should not be included in calculating NATO force levels because they constituted strategic, not theatre, systems for the ultimate defence of their home territories.

The US was reluctant to make concessions regarding the Pershing IIs because so doing might have strengthened the hand of West German opposition to these deployments on the grounds that they were unnecessary.[59] As pointed out above, a German decision not to deploy would totally unravel the December 12 decision.

Finally, arms control was unlikely to proceed at this point because of Soviet disinterest in constructive bargaining. Soviet attention revolved around attempts to ensure that United States intermediate nuclear force deployments in Europe would be cancelled. They would only accept an arms control agreement that provided them with such an outcome. Consequently, the Soviet Union's arms control position was characterised by intransigence. "None of their negotiating positions would have allowed for any U.S. deployments and they showed flexibility only on issues unrelated to this point."[60] Moscow was unprepared to compromise in Geneva

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[58] US Senate, Nuclear Arms Control, p. 1.

[59] ibid., p. 1.

[60] ibid., p. 1; and Talbott, p. 114.

because it had calculated that the goal of zero US moderni-
sations could also be achieved by fragmenting the NATO alli-
ance with a deep seated internal crisis. The Soviet Union
recognised that the failure of the arms control discussions
would likely provide them with just such an opportunity.
Arms control provided the Soviet Union with a tool to use to
play the NATO members off against one another, create domes-
tic difficulties in Western Europe by exploiting the hopes
and fears of the peace movement, and meddling in trans-At-
lantic relations with the aim of exacerbating tensions. By
doing so skillfully, they stood to win in two ways: a halt
to the threatening American military programme, and the
birth of a new political discord within NATO.[61] The Soviet
Union was still committed to seeking security at the expense
of the NATO alliance. As Paul Nitze put it to the Soviet
delegation at the Geneva talks: "what you're demanding is
nuclear forces equal or superior to the aggregate of nuclear
forces of all other countries. That amounts to a demand for
absolute security for yourselves, which means absolute inse-
curity for everyone else."[62]

Inflexibility on the part of both superpowers militated
against an arms control deal. In July of 1982, Paul Nitze
and Yuli Kvitsinsky, as heads of their respective delega-

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[61] Talbott, p. 39.

[62] ibid., p. 112. Moscow never talked of absolute security.
The pillar of its arms control position was always stated
as 'equal security', taking into account, of course, geo-
graphical and other considerations.

tions, reached an understanding that established an interim ceiling on INFs. Known as the 'Walk in the Woods' agreement, this deal was essentially reached through private channels and provided for a limitation of 75 launchers for each side in the European theatre. There would have been a freeze on SS-20s in East Asia as well as freezes on SS-21/22s and SS-23s in Europe. In exchange, the United States would not deploy the Pershing IIs.[63] This agreement was rejected by both governments.

It does not strike one as unusual that this first agreement was rejected, what is impressive is that the two sides were not that interested in pursuing this framework in an attempt to reach a deal. Both sides were effectively compelled to stress public diplomacy over private negotiations. Consequently, negotiating positions appear to have been structured more to impress European public opinion rather than to reach a settlement. Private channels, while promising, did not lead to more formal discussions; leaks to the press hampered private initiatives and; particularly during the last weeks before negotiations were suspended, the Soviet Union sought to exploit private channels by publically misrepresenting US proposals. "Severe damage may thus have been done to the ability of the chief negotiators to explore new avenues to agreement through private channels."[64]

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[63] Booth, p. 172.

[64] US Senate, Nuclear Arms Control, p. 4.

The zero option continued to be advanced as the official US position until March 1983. At that point, the US proposed an interim ceiling again along the lines of the 'walk in the woods' formula. This was fleshed out in the form of final offers from both teams in the fall of 1983. It was clear by then that the zero option had become an untenable approach.[65]

The final Soviet position would have limited both the Soviet Union and NATO to 420 intermediate nuclear warheads targeted at Europe. This would have involved the destruction of approximately 100 SS-20s. It would also have seen the destruction of the older SS-4s, a freezing of Soviet INF deployments in Asia, and equal limits on Soviet and NATO nuclear capable aircraft with a medium radius of action. The US counter offer, made in November, called for a global ceiling of 420 warheads with the freedom to mix systems within that limit. The United States made the concession of addressing the independent British and French nuclear weapons by agreeing not to match global Soviet intermediate nuclear forces with US deployments in Europe, although the United States reserved the right to match total Soviet deployments with intermediate nuclear forces outside the European theatre.[66]

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[65] Booth, p. 172.

[66] US Senate, <u>Nuclear Arms Control</u>, p. 2.

These final offers were interesting because they indicat-
ed that, while there had been very little movement on either
side, the most flexibility was demonstrated by the West.
However, this was antithetical to the purpose of the dual-
track decision. The deployment decision was supposed to
spark Moscow's interest and the approaching deployment date
was supposed to compel them to amend their intransigence and
inject flexibility into their arms control position. This
did not turn out to be the case as the Soviet Union stuck
rigidly to its 'no US INF' demand through to the end.[67] In
fact, it was the United States that showed the most signifi-
cant movement, particularly when it abandoned the zero
option in the end for a stance that accepted some deploy-
ments on both sides under mutual limitations.[68]

This posed a problem with respect to NATO security and
had implications for the utility of the arms control-force
structure link. There is no evidence that the Special Group
and US negotiators examined what number below the planned
572 missiles would be militarily acceptable, practical or
cost effective. Back in 1981, the Pentagon had worked out

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[67] Some observers interpreted the Soviet Union's negotiating
position as being highly flexible. They argue that, in
the period leading up to the collapse of talks in Novem-
ber, 1982, Moscow made one concession after another. See
for example Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Disman-
tling the East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 130-135. However, at no point
did Andropov's 'flexibility' go so far as to allow any US
INF deployments.

[68] Booth, p. 173.

the implications of various permutations and combinations of SS-20, GLCM, and Pershing II numbers. These efforts concluded that there were 250 to 300 important potential military targets in Western Europe. Thus, even with only 100 SS-20s, MIRVed as they were with three warheads, the Soviet Union would have been able to cover all the vital NATO targets. To some interested parties the interim ceiling would not be an acceptable outcome because it would provide Moscow with more than enough warheads to conduct a comprehensive strike against NATO. With the Pentagon's studies in hand in 1981, Richard Perle stated "Only as you approach zero, [...] do you reduce the Soviet threat to those targets."[69] The Western military assessment that the SS-20 had a 'refire' capability also figured prominently in this issue.[70] When the proposal was made for an interim ceiling, the NATO allies had not discussed the manner in which responsibility for the new force structure could or would be shared among allies.

The development of the interim ceiling proposal was carried out after discussion within the Alliance. At the Paris Ministerial meeting in June, NATO agreed to support the new negotiating position. It was also at this meeting that the NATO allies began to examine their long-range intermediate nuclear force requirements and to make appropriate adjust-

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[69] Richard Perle, quoted in Talbott, p. 60.

[70] Talbott, pp. 60 and 70.

ments in the levels of deployments needed once concrete results had been achieved.[71] Note that the decision to alter the arms control strategy was made before assessments of the force structure requirements. If force structure considerations were thought of as overly predominant in 1979, perhaps by 1983, arms control had become the 'track' of focus.

These positions, as discussed above, were final positions, because the Soviet Union discontinued the Geneva Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces talks on November 28, 1983. The USSR had threatened to do so since talks first began as their reaction to the actual deployments of missiles in West Germany, Great Britain and Italy.[72] On December 8, the United States-Soviet Union Strategic Arms Reduction Talks were suspended indefinitely when the Soviet Union refused to set a date for the next meeting. On December 15, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations on conventional armaments also ended as a result of Moscow's protests.[73]

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[71] NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 125.

[72] These deployments began on November 23, 1983 when the first GLCM components arrived in the UK and FRG. ibid., p. 130.

[73] ibid., p. 130.

Deployment

Thus, NATO had reached a decisive point in the dual-track decision -- implementation.   Consistent with their decision in 1979, the NATO allies pushed ahead with modernisation as scheduled when negotiations failed to make such deployments unnecessary. The impact of public opinion on Alliance policies had been making itself felt by ever increasing degrees throughout the INF process since 1979. The public debate on intermediate nuclear force deployments between 1980 and 1983 were on a scale which had not been seen for a long time. In this period, the nuclear disarmament campaign grew, and the protests and demonstrations carried out against NATO's plans attracted a great deal of media coverage and attracted international public attention. The new European nuclear forces were not seen by some sectors of public opinion as defensive or deterrent in effect.   The states most directly affected were those where basing was scheduled and began to take place -- Belgium, West Germany, The Netherlands, Britain, and to a lesser extent, Italy.[74] Note, however, that the United States was not totally spared the consequences of public sentiment.   For example, in the fall of 1983, the US Congress conditioned its funding support for a number of defence programmes on alterations to the country's arms control position that would make it negotiable.[75]

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[74] ibid., pp. 126-127.

[75] Horelick, p. 15.

In the final analysis public opinion was not so opposed to intermediate nuclear force modernisation as to prevent it from going forward. NATO had made a concerted effort to explain how theatre nuclear weapons constituted an essential and integral part of a deterrent strategy designed to make both conventional and nuclear war less likely. In December, 1982, NATO's Defence ministers called upon each other's governments to ensure that the debate was carried out in full recognition of the **facts.** They emphasised that fundamental to any such discussion must be a recognition of both the defensive nature of the Alliance and, equally, of the need for strong, modern and effective forces, if peace was to be maintained.[76] In essence, NATO recognised that it had to counteract the opportunities that the disarmament campaign had provided the Soviet Union to undermine the December 12 decision. Arms control, which in 1979 had appeared to be appended to the modernisation decision in order to help ensure that NATO's force structure would develop as intended by the High Level Group, could have destroyed the basis of security that the new military posture was intended to provide.

In the end, public opinion did not prove to be a decisive barrier to the 'evolutionary' alteration of NATO's nuclear force posture. The vocal opposition remained a minority. The majority of NATO European publics accepted the Atlantic

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[76] NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 127.

Alliance's thinking as demonstrated by their voting behavior.[77] In fact, the public protest was less severe than NATO officials had expected. In essence, the Soviet Union had miscalculated when it thought that it could prevent US intermediate nuclear forces from reaching the European theatre by exploiting Western nuclear anxieties.[78] Soviet intransigence at the bargaining table, designed to prevent arms control movement and so heighten the dichotomy between NATO's modernisations and arms control initiatives (as encapsulated in the dual-track decision) in fact served to strengthen NATO's hand and solidify soft support for US INFs in Europe. All of NATO's efforts to place the burden of responsibility for the failed negotiations on the Soviet Union -- changing the term TNF to INF,[79] the zero option, considerable arms control flexibility, the proposal for START involving deep reductions not just legitimised ceilings, and the unilateral 1,000 theatre nuclear forces withdrawn in 1979 and 1,400 removed in 1983 -- were as effective as Moscow's own heavy-handed attempts to intimidate NATO European alliance members in keeping the organisation together and giving it the strength to begin deployments on

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[77] ibid., p. 126.

[78] US Senate, Nuclear Arms Control, p. 1.

[79] The term 'Theatre Nuclear Forces' was seen as disassociating the the European nuclear issue from the United States. It was replaced by the term 'INF' as the new systems neared deployment in an attempt to use semantics to bolster their deterrent role and the credibility of flexible response. Kaplan, p. 162; and Talbott, p. 78.

schedule.   The Western European leadership believed the

Soviet Union attempted to stop INF modernisation by suspend-

ing arms control.   But, it failed to materialise as the

threat to NATO cohesion as had been feared.   Instead, the

result was a test of Alliance solidarity in which Soviet

intimidation united rather than divided NATO.[80]

Jeffrey Record foresaw this turn of events when, writing

in 1981 he stated that the arms control process, even if

failing, would strengthen the case for actual deployments

because NATO would have demonstrated good faith.[81] However,

the potential for disastrous consequences emanating from the

dual-track approach were heightened because the political

stakes were so high and the criteria for success was so

obvious.[82] Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's decision to walk

out of the arms talks was a major political error.

While the initiation of deployments in 1983 and 1984

marked a decisive point in the dual-track approach to INF

modernisation it was by no means the terminal point.   The

greatest, and perhaps only, success that NATO could claim at

that point was that the Alliance remained united.[83]   The

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[80] Kaplan, p. 161.

[81] Jeffrey Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Moderniza-
tion Program: The Real Issues (Cambridge: Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981), p. 96.

[82] David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 241.

[83] And perhaps it was still only united because Belgium and
The Netherlands had been continually allowed to avoid

utility of the nuclear weapons coming into place remained a
contentious issue among strategic analysts. While on the
one hand, Soviet actions and rhetoric at the Geneva talks
made unilateral force improvements an acceptable route, the-
atre nuclear forces, and the strategy they were intended to
support, continued to be plagued by credibility questions.
Now that NATO was left to the hardware solution to its
security dilemma because arms control had apparently run its
course, increased attention would focus on whether these
specific weapons would perform the missions for which they
were intended.[84] It was contended that the advantages of the
new systems were outweighed by a number of disadvantages.
Militarily, the mobility of the cruise and Pershing II would
enhance pre-launch survivability, but, some questioned the
extent to which they were mobile and survivable enough.
There were concerns that they would simply draw enemy fire
and that this would not be in NATO Europe's security inter-
ests.[85] The proximity, speed, and accuracy of the Pershing
II would lead to fears in the Soviet Union that its preemp-
tive capabilities might destabilise the East-West relation-
ship enough to negate any contributions to NATO European
security that the Pershing IIs might provide by enhancing
deterrence.

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having to make a deployment decision.

[84] Schwartz, p. 241.

[85] Talbott, p. 44.

The question of coupling is, in essence, a question of political commitment. The strategic dilemmas that lay at the root of Washington's ability to reassure NATO Europe were not likely to go away with the addition or removal of US nuclear forces from the theatre by what was a negligible amount. This criticism is particularly salient when one remembers that deterrence is based upon perception. The extent of controversy that had surrounded the United States intermediate nuclear force deployments from the start would ensure that they would never address the concerns of Western Europeans. Deeply rooted perceptions are not likely to be changed by marginal military adjustments. The answer lies in political factors which, if anything, had deteriorated as a result of the trans-Atlantic tensions arising from the deployment decision and the arms control process.[86]

This consideration led to criticism on more strictly political grounds. Concerns in the European public about the costs of nuclear war had created dangerous inter-alliance rifts. While the Alliance survived, the disputes and suspicions might last and they would hamper future NATO cooperation. The trauma of the process might make alliance members squeamish about going forward with necessary force structure improvements again. It would not be long before questions about the willingness of the United States to use these weapons in Europe's defence resurfaced. Certainly the

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[86] Sigal, pp. 47-48.

Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles were in Europe, but without control sharing or the integration of the new INFs into the command structure of the deployment countries, doubts undermining US reassurances would reemerge.

Towards a New Arms Control Agenda

In addition, the Soviet Union was making counter deployments of its own ostensibly to offset the imbalances created by the new US INFs. "As with every other technological initiative in the East-West nuclear weapons competition, the advantage for the West -- if there is any at all -- is likely to be extremely limited in time, a few trivial years in comparison to the decades that the weapons systems and their successors will be deployed."[87] It is difficult to assess the degree to which the NATO alliance recognised that the United States INF deployments were threatening to the Warsaw Pact. NATO did not appear to believe that Moscow might have legitimately feared that NATO modernisation might be destabilising and that the aim of arms control should have been to reach a mutual agreement regarding stable deterrents on both sides.

Arms control, too, remained an area of unresolved work and potential. The dual-track decision committed the Alliance to pursue both modernisation and arms control, but how

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[87] Leitenberg, p. 25.

long was NATO to wait for what it considered an acceptable
Eastern position, and how long after the deployments would
the arms control track continue? The initiation of deploy-
ments created a new problem in NATO's attempts to obtain a
negotiated limit to the superpower intermediate nuclear
force structures. This problem involved verification for
two reasons.

First, verification of cruise missile numbers was likely
to prove to be far more difficult than it had been for bal-
listic missiles and fixed silos. The Soviet Union could
have been expected to seek substantial Western concessions
to compensate them for this difficulty. If the Soviet Union
had deployed its own cruise missiles before an agreement was
reached (as NATO expected they might) then Western concerns
about past Soviet compliance and Moscow's historical reluc-
tance to permit intrusive verification would likely have
prevented the two sides from coming to an agreement.

Second, as early as 1980, there had already been sugges-
tions for "a NATO conventional cruise missile force of tac-
tical range deployed in Western Europe in significant num-
bers..."[88] Under such conditions arms control would be
virtually impossible, in fact, the conditions may have been
created for a true arms race.[89]

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[88] General Johannes Steinhoff, "The Nuclear Dilemma," NATO's
Fifteen Nations (December, 1979), p. 110.

[89] Leitenberg, pp. 25-26.

NATO's response to Moscow's boycott of negotiations came in the Declaration by the Foreign Ministers at the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Brussels in December 1983. At this meeting NATO expressed its desire to see both alliances respect each others security interests. Towards the creation of a more secure future the Alliance stated

> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as co-operation based on mutual advantage.[90]

This statement can be contrasted with the 1979 December dual-track decision for the tone here is much more one that envisions arms control as providing a means of cooperating to achieve mutual security. It certainly leans in this direction far more than in 1979 where arms control was presented more as an attempt to obtain greater security for NATO no matter what the result was for Moscow's defence sensibilities.

A staff report prepared for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations early in 1984 noted that the Soviet Union had understandable cause to fear the alleged strategic decapitation capabilities of the Pershing IIs. Therefore, it suggested that "after their counter-deployments have been made, the Soviets may be more amenable to a formula which

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[90] NATO, <u>Declaration by the Foreign Ministers at the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Brussels</u> (December 9, 1983).

would replace the deployed Pershing IIs with cruise mis-siles."[91]

The arms control agenda was not tabled right away, The December 1983 NATO statement hints at changing NATO atti-tudes regarding its force structure and arms control but the Soviet Union appears to have still been following Brezhnev's thinking that force can provide the state with the security it requires in the nuclear age. The Soviet Union was under-going leadership changes at the time thus preventing any opportunity to reappraise this thinking.

Equally important was the weariness of European leaders to rekindle the intensly emotional INF debate.

> They feel a need for a break from politics domi-nated almost exclusively by discussion of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles. An improvement in the overall Soviet-American relationship is seen as being of greater importance for the moment than declaratory shifts in previous arms control nego-tiating positions or imaginative proposals for new negotiating fora.[92]

As a result, arms control entered what Ken Booth described as hibernation.[93] Force structure improvements continued apace. The Pershing and GLCM deployments were taking place in NATO Europe. After the break down in arms control talks, the Soviet Union was also making deployments of its own. In addition to restoring the European 'balance' in theatre

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[91] US Senate, <u>Nuclear Arms Control</u>, p. 4.

[92] <u>ibid</u>., pp. 6-7.

[93] Booth, p. 173.

nuclear forces, Moscow also sought to place weapons in the field that would make the United States face similar risks as the USSR believed it now faced with respect to the short flight time of the Pershing II.

In the European theatre, the Soviet Union lifted its unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployments.[94] The failure of arms control negotiations seemed likely to greatly exacerbate NATO's security problems "Absent an INF accord, the SS-20 inventory may well exceed 600 missiles, with over 1,800 warheads, substantially larger than that projected at the time of the December 1979 INF decision."[95] Estimates circulating at the time gave the Soviet Union a three to one superiority in deployed INF warheads by the end of the decade.[96] It is interesting to note that the 'walk in the woods' formula that had been rejected would have established a 1.7 to one INF advantage for the Soviet Union globally. In the European theatre there would have been a 1.3 to one NATO advantage in deployed INF warheads.[97]

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[94] As far as NATO was concerned this 'moratorium' had never actually been in effect. However, this declaration was considered an indication that the Soviet Union would begin to accelerate the pace of its SS-20 production and deployments.

[95] US Senate, Nuclear Arms Control, p. 11.

[96] These projections were based on the full implementation of NATO's 572-missile deployment plan.

[97] US Senate, Nuclear Arms Control, p. 11.

Given the highly emotional nature of the NATO INF moder-
nisation programme, it was very unlikely that the Alliance
could have further expanded its efforts to match the Soviet
Union militarily. Neither was there any hint from NATO or
US officials that a reconsideration of the Montebello deci-
sion should have been made in light of the USSR's counter
measures.[98] Thus, the Soviet Union's changing theatre nucle-
ar force structure was probably only going to provoke fur-
ther NATO European interest in arms control as a means of
addressing its security concerns.

The NATO reluctance to reopen the Montebello decision,
withdrawing 1,400 shorter-range nuclear weapons from Europe,
was interesting in light of the USSR's other counter meas-
ures. The Soviet Union had been replacing its SS-12 (Scale-
board) missiles in the Western regions of the USSR with the
newer SS-22. However, after the new year the SS-22s were
also being deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Demo-
cratic Republic consistent with Moscow's earlier threats.
In terms of NATO security, vis-à-vis force structure alone,
these Soviet re-deployments were not militarily significant
because NATO expected the USSR to move these SS-22 brigades
forward during a crisis anyway. In fact, these movements
eased pressures on flexible response slightly by providing
NATO's same force structure greater opportunities to credi-
bly threaten Moscow's nuclear assets and enabled NATO to do

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[98] <u>ibid.</u>, p. 12.

so without calling for nuclear strikes on the territory of
the Soviet Union with all the incumbent escalatory baggage
that that would have been expected to include.[99]

In terms of arms control and NATO aims to see its securi-
ty advanced through the negotiating process, the redeploy-
ment of SS-22s had a two sided effect.   On the one hand the
Soviet Union,   in deliberately presenting the SS-22 as a
direct threat to NATO Europe, lost support for its position
in the INF debate among certain Western peace groups.   In
addition, because these forces were moved to 're-establish'
the nuclear balance, NATO may have been able to get the
Soviet Union back to the Geneva negotiating table without
dealing with Moscow's precondition that all deployed Persh-
ing IIs and GLCMs be removed.   On the other hand, when nego-
tiations resumed the Soviet Union would have more assets on
the table than it had before.   The USSR presented the rede-
ployments as 'corresponding' to the new US intermediate
nuclear forces and so would have had to be expected to seek
a price just for moving them back again.[100]

Finally, in terms of counter measures, the Soviet Union
increased patrols of its SLBM submarines off the US coasts.
It did so by re-deploying its advanced Delta Class SSBNs to
replace the older Yankee Class vessels already there.   The
Soviet Union also let it be known that they would begin

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[99] ibid., p. 12.

[100] ibid., pp. 12 and 13.

deployments of a new submarine launched cruise missile off
these same US coast lines. Militarily, these force changes
did not alter the strategic relationship a great deal. Mov-
ing submarine-launched ballistic missile platforms closer to
the continental US did not significantly change the flight
times of their weapons. Instead, it removed the more mod-
ern and prized Soviet SSBNs from their 'sanctuary-like'
positions off the Soviet coast in the Barents Sea thus mak-
ing them more vulnerable to US detection and destruction.
The SLCM deployments, the outcome of a research programme
begun before NATO's December decision, did not possess the
range to strike US ICBMs or the speed to threaten the US
strategic bomber force. With regard to strategic decapita-
tion, the Reagan administration had been placing considera-
ble resources into efforts to protect its command and con-
trol facilities since 1981. The uncertainty that such an
attack could succeed and the consequences that would accrue
from a failed decapitation attack greatly diminished the
SLCM threat.[101]

So immediate reprisals from the Soviet Union and its War-
saw Pact allies were not particularly threatening to NATO
security interests. However, the long-term consequences
would prevent NATO from enjoying improved security. The val-
ue that the Western Alliance derived from its cruise mis-
siles once the USSR deployed its own would also diminish.

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[101] ibid., pp. 13-14.

"They [Soviet Leaders] are likely to do so eventually, if for no better reason than that NATO will have deployed them, to 'match' the West, visibly. [...] What will be NATO's judgment then as to the value of cruise missiles?"[102]

Round Three

There was no movement in the arms control field during 1984 other than signals from Moscow that talks may soon be renewable. For the Soviet Union, 'hibernation' had given it an opportunity to re-evaluate the strategic situation. and its arms control positions. Thus, it was not until January 7 and 8, 1985, that the two superpowers met to announce the Nuclear and Space Talks. These talks would cover strategic nuclear arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces and, defence and space issues. The talks restarted because the ongoing deployments of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe represented a clear defeat for the Soviet Union.[103]

When talks resumed on March 12, 1985, expectations were a little higher because the environment appeared more propitious. One day earlier, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Under his leadership the tenor and pace of the intermediate nuclear force negotiations were to change significantly. With the US deployments going ahead, the political grand

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[102] Leitenberg, p. 25.

[103] Horelick, p. 18.

standing tactics and uncertainty that had characterised the earlier rounds was gone.[104] However, when the two sides met, the negotiating teams reiterated their previous INF proposals and positions.   The Soviet Union suggested a freeze on both sides and announced a unilateral moratorium until November, 1985, on all new deployments.   The United States called for equal global limits and stated that it was not particular about the levels at which these limits were set.[105]

Ken Booth explained the absence of new initiatives in the resumed forum as resulting from a continued belief that unilateral efforts at force structure improvements provided the optimal way to achieve greater security. "[O]stensibly, the aim of the new talks was to reduce intermediate and intercontinental missiles and to reach agreement about defensive weapons. For the parties, however, the main objective is to enhance national security by whatever means are believed likely to be most telling; this may or may not involve an arms control agreement."[106] Arms control could provide security benefits as well, but the process was difficult and the outcomes far more uncertain.

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[104] <u>ibid</u>., p. 20.

[105] NATO, <u>Facts and Figures</u>, pp. 139-140.

[106] Booth, p. 174.

Increasingly, Gorbachev was making his presence felt as he began to turn Soviet foreign policy, including its arms control strategy, in a new direction. In October, 1985, the Soviet Union called again for a bilateral freeze on deployments with the deepest possible reductions to follow thereafter. The new Soviet leader stated that the older SS-4s were being phased out and that some SS-20s were being removed from combat status. The Soviet Union relaxed its demands that British and French nuclear forces be included to the extent that the USSR did not demand that the US count them. Gorbachev instead suggested a dialogue with the two NATO European nuclear allies on medium-range systems in light of the overall theatre balance.[107]

The US delegation countered by proposing interim levels for launchers, similar to NATO's planned deployments, with sublimitations being placed on warheads. Proportional reductions on Asian based Soviet SS-20s and constraints on short-range intermediate nuclear forces were also incorporated.[108] While both sides were still advancing conditions that the other considered unacceptable they issued a joint statement on November 21, 1985, agreeing to early progress in Geneva and their intentions to focus on areas where common ground existed.[109]

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[107] NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 141.

[108] ibid., p. 141.

[109] ibid., p. 141.

Little evident headway was made in arms control while the NATO modernisation continued until the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit Meeting between US President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. This meeting was important because the deadlock on strategic, defensive, and space systems issues was offset by radical progress on European INFs along the lines of the United States' earlier zero option. While the United States had basically sidelined the zero option as a working proposal, it was now the Soviet Union that took up this approach and pushed for its adoption. The United States was no doubt caught off guard by the new position put forward by Moscow, but nonetheless agreed to the earlier NATO arms control plan.

In essence the two sides agreed to equal global ceilings of 100 LRINF warheads each. There would be no deployments in Europe. Weapons could be deployed in Soviet East Asia or on US territory provided they did not exceed 100 warheads. Substantial agreement was also reached in respect to verification. The only area that remained largely unresolved was short-range INFs. This deal, reached at the highest levels, was scuttled when Gorbachev sought to link the INF agreement to constraints on the US strategic defence initiative programme.[110]

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[110] Limitations already applied in the 1972 ABM Treaty but the USSR was looking for something that went beyond those restrictions. ibid., p. 149.

On his way to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze, Ambassador Nitze, senior arms control advisor to
President Reagan, briefed the North Atlantic Council on Sep-
tember 10, 1987, about the developing Nuclear and Space
Talks. At NATO headquarters the US negotiators received the
Alliance's support for their arms control position. Having
acquired this, Nitze went to Moscow to determine whether or
not an INF treaty was really possible.

In Moscow Nitze was well received and the will to resolve
final details and procedures standing in the way of an
agreement was well demonstrated. In Geneva, on September
14, the United States tabled an 'Inspection Protocol' as
part of a draft treaty. This stringent verification régime
would involve extensive on-site inspections upon short
notice and a thorough exchange of information on the loca-
tions of each side's facilities.[111]

By this potential treaty provision, NATO stood to add
measurably to its degree of security. A verification régime
as intrusive as the one that the US proposed was unprece-
dented in the history of arms control with the Soviet Union.
Its provisions would provide the Alliance with information
that would normally be very difficult to collect by national
technical means of treaty verification. In addition to
alleviating anxieties about activities going on behind the
'Iron Curtain' vis-à-vis the Soviet Union's INF structure

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[111] ibid., p. 163.

thus allowing NATO members to feel safer, such an inspection arrangement would allow planners to utilise NATO's remaining force posture to its greatest potential.

Four days later, at the conclusion of the talks between the superpower foreign ministers, the announcement was made that agreement on the conclusion of an INF treaty had been reached.[112] On December 8, 1987, President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty so beginning a process and timetable for the global elimination of all US and USSR intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles in the 500-5,500 kilometre range. Close to 670 deployed Soviet missiles, including 405 SS-20s, were to be destroyed. With this agreement the NATO deployments ceased and approximately 440 deployed missiles were to be withdrawn and disman-tled.[113] The inspection régime involved four means of ensur-ing compliance. A baseline data exchange inspection took place within 30-90 days of the treaty's entry into force. Short notice challenge inspections were allowed during the period when the missiles were still deployed. Close-out inspections were to occur when all the missiles had been eliminated. Finally, short-notice challenge inspections are to continue for 10 years after the end of the three year period during which the missiles were eliminated.[114] In

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[112] ibid., p. 163.

[113] ibid., p. 165.

[114] ibid., p. 165. see also Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1987, the INF Treaty was signed incorporating the zero-zero option. As a result, many of the above mentioned goals were achieved. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that many of these were unintended. There was in 1979, no clear appreciation for the effect an INF agreement would have on NATO's force posture. This is most evident in an examination of the plethora of material produced since ratification of the deal that explores the implications of the agreement.

Conclusion

Now the point had been reached where a more accurate assessment could be made of the roles that arms control and force structure had played in improving NATO security. From 1979 until the treaty was signed in 1987, the predominance of one aspect or the other of the dual-track decision waffled back and forth. With the conclusion of the INF Treaty, arms control had a radical direct effect upon NATO's force structure. The modernisations were scrapped in favour of the arms control portion of the December 12 decision. However, a force posture still remained. In this instance it was now a force posture without a land-based INF component. The question that immediately arose at that point was whether or not the INF Treaty contributed to improving NATO's security.

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on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (December, 1987).

Some analysts pointed to flaws in the agreement in voicing concerns about its implementation. Often such criticisms were not identifying flaws with the agreement itself as much as with the treaty as it related to the remaining NATO nuclear and conventional force structure. As pointed out earlier, the USSR and NATO had sought to develop and deploy their intermediate nuclear forces for different reasons. Therefore, the removal of a component of the superpowers' theatre nuclear assets would not have equal consequences for the security of each side. As long as the superpowers' force planning and acquisition programmes were not in synchronisation, then negotiating agreements for the relatively near term would present a problem. Bearing in mind that some assymetries, such as geography, are not subject to human control, some voices called for the US and USSR to begin a separate but parallel set of negotiations concerning future force structuring. "With an eye to the twenty-first century, we can begin planning for new, stable forces, which can vastly reduce the risk of nuclear war."[115] Along these lines NATO was criticised after the INF Treaty was signed for not having undertaken a net assessment of its security situation.[116]

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[115] Ralph Earle II, "Prepared Statement of Hon. Ralph Earle II, Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control and Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and its Implications for U.S. Arms Control Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Congress, House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 11-12.

The NATO INF deployments were intended to shore up deterrence by reassuring the allies that the invocation of the US strategic guarantee on their behalf was credible. The need to do so existed because of strategic parity and was only exacerbated by the SS-20. It follows then that the removal of the Soviet Union's INFs would not fully restore European confidence in nuclear deterrence. NATO Europe itself has consistently demonstrated its belief that nuclear weapons provide a degree of confidence in the Alliance's deterrent strategy that conventional forces alone cannot. That element of NATO's force structure, the INF missiles, intended to 're-link' the US strategic guarantee to the defence of Europe was eliminated.

The US still had long-range nuclear systems: the F-111s and the Poseidon SLBMs assigned to SACEUR, but, the analyses that criticised the effectiveness of these forces and that led to the 1979 deployment decision still stood after the intermediate nuclear forces had been removed. As such, the INF Treaty represents a failure for NATO to strengthen the

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[116] "Despite the fact that there are all kinds of intelligence committees at NATO and there is a lot of information available, they have never systematically done this kind of analysis in which the strengths and the weaknesses of the two sides are put up against one another." Michael Moodie, "Statement of Michael Moodie, Chief of Staff of the Resources Strategy Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies," The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and its Implications for U.S. Arms Control Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress, House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 17.

Atlantic link. From a political perspective, the arms con-
trol agreement made it difficult for the Alliance to place
new forces in the theatre that would not be perceived, by
the Soviet Union and the United States allies alike, as an
attempt to circumvent the treaty. In the light, and the
climate, of mutual cooperation that certainly appeared to
have been promoted by the arms control process and the con-
clusion of the INF Treaty, it would be difficult to achieve
a politically acceptable adjustment to NATO's force struc-
ture. "[...] the whole question of introducing any new
nuclear systems into the alliance after the political trauma
caused over the past decade by efforts to modernize the
alliance's theatre nuclear arsenal, makes nearly all Europe-
an governments very unwilling to contemplate another long
drawn out battle over the issue."[117]

All this has become theoretical because the threat per-
ceptions that NATO Europe held about the Soviet Union's
intentions have been drastically altered in the wake of Gor-
bachev's diplomatic overtures and his country's retrenchment
to deal with numerous domestic crises. The result was that
NATO chose not to modernise its Lance short-range nuclear
weapons. This forestalled, for an indefinite period, this
alternative to shore up flexible response.[118]

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[117] Schwartz, p. 9.

[118] See NATO, Communiqué of the Nuclear Planning Group (May
9-10, 1990).

The political conditions that made flexible response so difficult to change could have made matters worse for NATO. The process of arriving at flexible response was so difficult that the events leading up to the 1979 deployment decision can easily be seen as an effort to maintain flexible response at all costs despite a changing strategic environment that called the doctrine into question. But, MC 14/3 was a carefully worded yet ambiguous compromise. It often proved to be an asset that it was open to creative interpretation. "Little wonder, then, that NATO is reluctant to tamper with sacred text. To do so would be to reopen old debates that have no better prospects for easy resolution today than they had in the past. Given the choice between doctrinal revision and force-posture revision, NATO will choose the second, and reconcile it with the first."[119] The conclusion of the INF Treaty did not make the prospects for a review of flexible response any easier. "[...] it is far from clear that at present [1988] the political conditions exist that would enable the alliance to undertake a formal revision of MC 14/3."[120] NATO has been spared the rigors of this problem because the radical changes that have taken place in Europe since the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty have preempted the debate.

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[119] Schwartz, p. 248.

[120] Paul Buteux, The Political and Strategic Implications of the INF Treaty for NATO, Occasional Paper #2 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Programme in Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 16.

From a hardware perspective two factors deserve notice. Quite clearly the prospects for modernising NATO's tactical nuclear forces offered little possibility of fulfilling the purposes for which the Pershing IIs and GLCMs were intended. In terms of short-range systems, NATO would have faired no better. This requires some explanation. With reference to the two escalatory nuances that have been applied to flexible response, short-range nuclear forces were insufficient to operationalise the strategy. If the alliance wanted to demonstrate escalation control, modernised short-range forces would have allowed it to do so only at very low levels of use. This would remove the prospects of NATO obtaining dominance and placing the burden of escalation on Moscow's shoulders. If it was 'the threat that leaves something to chance' that one wished to accentuate, then the removal of land-based INFs capable of striking the USSR from Western Europe would have undercut a substantial degree of the 'automaticity' required to make the claim credible.[121]

Similarly, a more fundamental problem existed. NATO's force structure still did not allow the West to convince the Warsaw Pact that it intended to carry out its nuclear threat. The logic of deterrence dictates that NATO have done so.

> There are, in fact, no feasible solutions to this
> problem. Nuclear escalation cannot be made 'safe'
> -- either through development of so overwhelming a
> nuclear force that a disarming first strike

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[121] ibid., pp. 9-10.

> becomes possible or through construction of a vir-
> tually leak-proof nuclear defense. For that rea-
> son, substantial doubts will always remain about
> the willingness of NATO to actually use nuclear
> weapons.[122]

More than just the long-range portion of NATO's nuclear

force structure was affected by the treaty.   The Pershing

IAs, deployed in the late 1960s, no longer existed as an

element of NATO's force posture.   This resulted in a net

reduction of systems designed to cover deeper targets such

as Warsaw Pact airbases, railroad trans-shipment points, and

key bridges over the Vistula River.   These missiles were

deployed before strategic parity and the SS-20 to fulfil a

NATO requirement.

Had an arms control agreement been reached before NATO

INF deployments began in 1983,   then the Pershing IAs may

still have been in place. However, because the Pershing IIs

were designed to exploit the existing IA's infrastructure,

the earlier model was withdrawn as the new ones were

deployed.   This did not mean that the Pershing IAs were no

longer required,   only that the Pershing IIs could fulfil

their own role plus that of the IAs.   With the arms control

agreement coming after NATO's modernisations, the Pershing

IA was effectively removed by the treaty but its rationale

still remained.   "Right now [1988] there is a vacuum that's

got to be filled by something.   We are not going to fill it

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[122] Charles Daniel, Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls of
    First Use (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
    1987), p. 161.

with air. Therefore, that is a significant change."[123]

While NATO was advancing the zero option and the US was actively negotiating to achieve such an agreement, the Alliance was undertaking an air modernisation that caused the INF Treaty to have questionable implications for NATO Europe's security. As part of air modernisation many of NATO's dual-capable aircraft were withdrawn and replaced by more 'mission-specific' aircraft (A-10s and F-15s) which were not nuclear capable. With the INF missiles eliminated, NATO had less aircraft to rely upon to perform nuclear duties. Moreover, US analysts have noted that while the INF negotiations were in progress the USSR was expanding the percentage of its air force that could fill a nuclear role.[124] Given these changes, the INF Treaty can be criticised for returning NATO to the position it was in in December 1979.

More generally, the return to reliance on aircraft to provide NATO with a long-range nuclear delivery capability had other direct military implications that INF deployments were intended to overcome. By removing these forces that

[123] Phillip Karber, "Statement of Phillip Karber, Vice President, BDM Corp., and Former Director, Strategic Concept Development Center, National Defense University," <u>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and its Implications for U.S. Arms Control Policy</u>, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress, House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 26 and 35-37.

[124] <u>ibid</u>., p. 26.

had been needed in 1979, NATO was, in effect, undermining its own security. If longer-range targets in Eastern Europe had to be covered by aircraft, such resources would have been taken away from their conventional interdiction role. They would have to be held in reserve for potential nuclear missions. Consequently, many of those aircraft could not have been committed as decisively or significantly during the conventional phase of battle.[125]

Compounding these concerns about the INF Treaty was another factor. The treaty did not result in a reduction in the number of Soviet warheads targeted against Western Europe. According to Ambassador Nitze, the Soviet Union could retarget either aircraft or ICBMs on former INF targets with their excess strategic and theatre forces.[126]

Despite these flaws and negative consequences for the implementation of flexible response, the INF Treaty was ratified by the US government and supported by most NATO European members of the Alliance.

> Having reviewed progress in the negotiations
> between the United States and the Soviet Union on
> an INF agreement, the Allies concerned call on the
> Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a por-
> tion of its SS-20 capability and reiterate their

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[125] ibid., p. 24.

[126] Paul Nitze, "Statement of Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Spe-
cial Assistant to the President and Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters," The Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces [INF] Treaty and its Implications for U.S. Arms
Control Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United
States Congress, House of Representatives (Washington:
US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 82.

wish to see all long-range land-based missiles eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective.

They support the global and effectively verifiable elimination of all United States and Soviet land-based SRINF missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km as an integral part of an INF agreement.[127]

The reasons the European alliance members supported the INF agreement lie primarily in its political significance as opposed to its military importance. Militarily many, arguably most, believed that the INF Treaty would not result in any diminution of NATO's flexible response capability. "It is generally agreed that the nuclear arsenal that will remain in place in Europe (some 4,000 theatre nuclear warheads, including 88 LANCE surface-to-surface missiles) will permit NATO to continue implementing NATO strategy."[128] But, the Alliance's deterrent strategy had not changed between 1979 and 1987. In 1987, the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed its belief that there was no substitute for deterrence and that an adequate and effective mix of nuclear and conventional forces (including the strategic and nuclear commitment of the United States) was indispensable to achieve deterrence.[129] Because the original rational for the

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[127] NATO, <u>Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik</u> (11-12 June 1987).

[128] US Congress, House, <u>NATO Security Policy in the Post-INF Treaty Era</u>, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress, House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p.1.

[129] <u>ibid</u>., p. 1.

INF deployments still applied in 1987, NATO Europe's confidence that it had the resources (SNF modernisation still pending in 1988) to create a credible deterrent appears to have been based on a changed threat perception and interest in promoting the INF Treaty. The potential security enhancing features of the INF Treaty that appealed to NATO Europeans and the United States were two-fold.

The first was the establishment of a precedent for Soviet acceptance of asymmetrical reductions.[130] The INF Treaty did call for the Soviet Union to remove far more weapons than the United States. By codifying such arrangements in the Treaty, Western states planned to create a precedent for future arms control agreements in the conventional and strategic nuclear areas. In other areas, an accord involving asymmetrical reductions could be very beneficial to NATO and result in a far greater degree of 'military' security.

The second politically important security aspect of the INF Treaty was also encompassed in its provisions. The INF Treaty called for the entire elimination of a whole class of weapons.[131] This was a dramatic achievement in the history of arms control verging on a from of disarmament. Alliance members no doubt felt that it would be important enough to have despite lingering security problems left in the Trea-

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[130] NATO, The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept (May 1989), p. 3; and US, House, NATO Security Policy, p. 1.

[131] ibid.

ty's wake. By promoting the entire cause of arms control, that had been viciously maligned in the late 1970s and early 1980s from several quarters, the INF Treaty may well have had a security positive impact on NATO European security by keeping arms control open as an alternative route to unilateral force restructuring. In addition, the arms control contribution to national security was further strengthened by the stringent on-site inspections called for in the Treaty to verify compliance. Assuming that the Treaty conclusively improved NATO European security, Western states would not have felt any securer if they did not believe that the Soviet Union was in fact abiding by the treaty provisions.[132]

Other observers have noted that this may have been a significant gain but only in terms of future arms control agreements. For the INF Treaty it was of negligible benefit because it involved total elimination of long-range land-based systems. Any undetected SS-20s would not be militarily significant because the closure of production plants, prohibition of flight testing, and absence of training would make their utility increasingly questionable over time. Ambassador Kampleman estimated that after three years a small number of hidden SS-20s would not constitute a militarily significant threat to Western Europe.[133]

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[132] ibid.

[133] Max Kampleman, "Statement of Ambassador Max Kampleman, Head of Delegation, Negotiations on Nuclear and Space

The INF treaty did not solve NATO's nuclear dilemmas itself, but it was seen as a way to further strengthen the role that arms control could play in helping NATO avoid relying on its own arms policy alone. If the deal had been rejected, particularly at a time when the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev appeared to be going so far to alter the established thinking on Soviet security matters, arms control may well have ended as a means to achieve improved security. Consistent with this thinking, NATO called for the creation of a comprehensive strategy that would incorporate arms control efforts into an effective means of improving Alliance security. If the INF Treaty had gone unratified or unsupported in NATO, then the Alliance would be left to its own devices and talk of mutual and cooperative security would be dead. This would, of course, also mean that potential opportunities for NATO to solve its nuclear dilemmas may have been lost.

Arms," The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and its Implications for U.S. Arms Control Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress, House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 83 and 84-85.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION: ARMS CONTROL AND NATO NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

NATO was confronted with a security paradox for some time. This paradox stemed from the policy of nuclear deterrence the Alliance adopted in its relations with the Soviet Union. The utility of nuclear forces in accomplishing the task of detering aggression remained high throughout the post World War II period. However, for NATO Europe, nuclear weapons became an ever increasing threat to the states they were intended to defend. Thus, while there was no alternative to the security of nuclear deterrence, NATO officials were increasingly aware that the very characteristics of the Alliance's force structure that made it successful also undermined its security.

In theory, arms control offered NATO a means to enjoy the security of nuclear weapons while ensuring that their negative features (namely the massive destruction that would come with their use) would not be realised. However, arms control proposed to do this by imposing the results of a political process onto the Alliance's force structure. This

raised several concerns about the use of arms control to improve NATO security.

In 1979, NATO sought to use arms control, not to improve its security but, to manage its potentially harmful effects on the credibility of the Alliance's nuclear force posture by tying both negotiations and modernisations together. Thus, in addition to the rationale for new Pershing IIs and ground launched cruise missiles, NATO also established the need to obtain an arms control forum that could adjust the number and types of systems eventually deployed. While the nuclear weapons destined for the European theatre were being perfected and built, East and West would engage in negotiations about the systems in this particular class.

This plan did not proceed very smoothly for the Alliance. Certain elements of the dual-track decision had not been fully thought out beforehand (and it is questionable whether they could have been). When the problems of coordinating arms control and modernisations were compounded by the politics of a sixteen nation alliance, NATO was faced with a seriously divisive situation. At each step along the dual-track path the implications of the implementation of the approach were different. In the end, NATO got an agreement worked out between the United States and the Soviet Union that eliminated the deployment track and accentuated the negotiation approach. Still, doubts and concerns about the Alliance's nuclear dilemmas persisted.

The INF arms control process acted as a test case of the use of both arms policy and arms control to advance Alliance security and interests. Just as the dual-track approach involved mixing the two concepts together, so the aftermath entails a mixture of responses. It appears as though the arms control agreement failed to achieve its militarily significant objectives for NATO. Instead, it obtained important political goals. But, in Chapter III it was repeatedly asserted that arms control is, at heart, a political exercise.

This does not mean that the use of arms control to promote security is a misdirected policy or inherently prone to failure. Clausewitz' contribution to present day strategic analysis rests on the notion that force is to serve political ends. This had particular bearing for NATO because its nuclear strategy of deterrence involved a great deal of political contingencies to appear credible and to be accepted as believable. Similarly, in Chapter II it was stressed that nuclear weapons serve a useful purpose only to the extent that they prevent the use of force (particularly the use of other nuclear forces). There are serious doubts about the utility of the military use of nuclear weapons. They are seen as political instruments and have been used primarily for such purposes. Therefore, the fact that the largely political exercise of arms control affected NATO's force structure is not a 'bad' thing. If anything, arms

control could well be interpreted as an instrument designed for the expressed purpose of making armed force serve political goals.

The issue in this case is how a state, or alliance, best goes about accomplishing this goal of having an arms control strategy that contributes to a force structure that served political ends. NATO chose to ensure that the two were compatible by marrying them together in the Integrated Decision Document. Unfortunately, the verdict on the INF dual-track approach is mixed. The variety of opinions about whether or not the marriage was a good one resulted from its being the first time that the two approaches were practically tied together. It was not until 1988, after the two-track decision, the negotiations, and the treaty, that a US House of Representatives study was able to state

> An important discussion which is now taking place in a number of European capitals is the question of how arms control can be integrated into NATO's ongoing security planning in order to ensure a viable, integrated NATO security policy in the future. Numerous European security specialists believe that inadequate attention is currently being paid to formulating arms control proposals which will be consistent with current or future NATO security policy. These observers and government officials believe that a top NATO priority should be the construction of a long term NATO security policy which would include in its formulation progress in the arms control area.[1]

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[1] US Congress, House, <u>NATO Security Policy in the Post-INF Treaty Era</u>, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress, House of Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 2.

The process of negotiating the INF Treaty does not represent a good example of the application of a dual-track approach for NATO to draw upon in the future. This assessment is not based on an analysis of the outcome of the process, but rather an observation of what occurred during the period the talks were taking place. In large measure the INF Treaty was not compatible with the original intent of the Atlantic Alliance in 1979. At that time, NATO members envisioned the possibility of an arms limitation agreement that would make the planned deployments a more effective guarantee of the US commitment to NATO Europe's defence. Arms control was supposed to work alongside force structure modernisation to provide better security to member states. At the conclusion of the communiqué announcing the Alliance's intention to pursue a parallel approach in 1979, NATO stated that arms control could modify the scale of NATO's theatre nuclear requirements. While this did not preclude eliminating the need for new forces, it did not suggest it either. NATO intended modernisation and arms control to work together to enhance the stability of the European nuclear balance.

Force structure and negotiations did not work together in the manner the Alliance had initially intended. The reason being that the US adopted, and the Alliance endorsed, the zero option. The December 12 decision united the two concepts, but the zero proposal split them apart. By requiring

the Soviet Union to accept either total deployment or none
at all, the dual-track approach was undermined; the two con-
cepts were effectively separated. One either had deploy-
ments or arms control, but not both. This was encouraged by
Washington in an attempt to eliminate the harmful effects of
arms control for effective defensive preparations. In Europe
it was endorsed in an attempt to see arms control play an
important role. These different notions of how arms control
and force structure improvements were to relate to one
another created much of the internal stress that seriously
threatened Alliance cohesion.

In the Alliance's statement on arms control and disarma-
ment made in spring 1989, recognition was made of the need
to understand how defensive measures were to work alongside
negotiations.

> It is essential that defence and arms control
> objectives remain in harmony in order to ensure
> their complementary contribution to the goal of
> maintaining security at the lowest balanced level
> of forces consistent with the requirements of the
> Alliance strategy of war prevention, acknowledging
> that changes in the threat, new technologies, and
> new political opportunities affect options in both
> fields. Decisions on arms control matters must
> fully reflect the requirements of the Allies'
> strategy of deterrence. Equally, progress in arms
> control is relevant to military plans, which will
> have to be developed in the full knowledge of the
> objectives pursued in arms control negotiations
> and to reflect, as necessary, the results achieved
> therein.[2]

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[2] NATO, A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarma-
ment (May 1989), p. 14.

As such, it is difficult to determine whether or not a marriage of force structure and arms control efforts can help NATO overcome its nuclear dilemmas. The INF Treaty has certainly failed to do this. If the Alliance members feel any more secure today than they did in 1979 it is more likely attributable to a less intense threat perception. Today, when thought is given to defending Europe from Soviet military aggression, the response is that it is too unlikely a scenario to be concerned about. A USSR attack just is not on. But, assuming that it was, NATO would face the same security inconsistencies flowing from its nuclear deterrent posture as it faced before. This is where the lessons of the INF Treaty take effect. NATO's failure to improve its security with a parallel approach of arms control and modernisations has been forestalled and overtaken by changes in the international political climate. Thus, as NATO, or other states for that matter, attempt to secure their vital interests in the anarchical international system, they will not be able to look to NATO's 1979 dual-track decision as a model. More thought will have to be given in the future to a consideration of the dynamics of interaction between ongoing negotiations and modernisations along the lines of the Alliance's comprehensive concept. Given the obviously unacceptable consequences of a nuclear exchange in Europe or between the superpowers, it will be essential for East and West to work out ways to continue to exploit the benefits of

nuclear deterrence without incurring the costs of profound
nuclear dilemmas that undermine that same security.

NATO is now entering a new era where it has been present-
ed with an unexpected opportunity to address its nuclear
dilemmas at their source. The Warsaw Pact has dissolved as
a viable military alliance and many of its members have for-
mally quit the coalition so that its total collapse is immi-
nent.[3] The budgetary problems in the United States and the
political convulsions within the Soviet Union are also
transforming the European security situation. Moreover, the
unification of the two Germanies has prompted an entire new
agenda for the discussion of European security.

As such, forward defence in Central Europe is a virtually
dead issue and those aspects of the European military bal-
ance that necessitated the strategic concept of flexible
response no longer exist. These changes have compelled NATO
to radically reassess its military arrangements. Alliance
officials must entirely rework NATO defences. The Alli-
ance's political leaders essentially called for a total

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[3] The final document adopted by the Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on June 7,
1990, stated that the pact would change from a military to
a political alliance. The Soviet command structure would
be abandoned and the Joint Supreme Command would be dis-
solved. The member states would regain control over their
national forces. Finally, the Pact's multilateral insti-
tutions, so long as they remained in existence, would have
their positions filled by the member states on a rotating
basis. Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification:
Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power," Problems of
Communism, 39, No. 4 (July-August, 1990), p. 15.

reappraisal at the London Summit in July, 1990. The Allies called for a new strategy and "concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range." and stated that "NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe."[4]

The new strategic environment in Europe means that real cooperative security may become an operationalised concept. NATO endorsed this notion last year stating that "our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent."[5] Such attempts will certainly involve a further development of the arms control and force structure linkages explored in this thesis.

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[4] NATO, NATO Summit Declaration on a Transformed Alliance (July 5-6, 1990).

[5] ibid.

Appendix A

Major Arms Control Agreements

Date Signed	Agreement	Provisions
1959	Antarctic Treaty	Prohibits all military activity in Antarctic area.
1963	Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and under water.
1963	'Hot Line' Agreement	Establishes direct radio and telegraph communications between US and USSR.
1967	Outer Space Treaty	Prohibits all military activity in outer space.
1967	Tlatelolcol Treaty	Prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America.
1968	Nonproliferation Treaty	Prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states.
1971	Sea Bed Treaty	Prohibits nuclear deployments on the ocean floor.
1971	'Hot Line' Modernisation Agreement	Previous agreement upgraded for satellite communications.
1971	Nuclear Accidents Agreement	Measures to reduce likelihood of accidental nuclear war.
1972	High Seas Agreement	Measures to prevent dangerous military incidents at sea.
1972	SALT I ABM Treaty	Limits ABM deployments.
1972	SALT I Interim Offensive Arms Agreement	Five year freeze on the aggregate number of fixed land-based ICBMs and SLBMs. Extended to 1980.
1972	Biological Weapons Convention	Prohibits deployment, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and calls for the

destruction of existing weapons.

1973	Nuclear War Prevention Agreement	Measures to reduce likelihood of war during crises.
1974	Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Prohibits underground tests of nuclear weapons with yields greater than 150 kilotons.
1976	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty	Prohibits nuclear explosions greater than 150 kilotons for peaceful purposes.
1977	Environmental Modification Convention	Prohibits hostile use of environmental modification techniques.
1979	SALT II Offensive Arms Agreement	Limits numbers and types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (unratified).
1986	CSCE Confidence and Security Building Measures	Measures to reduce dangers of surprise attack by creating rules about size, timing and notification of manoeuvres.
1987	INF Treaty	Completely eliminate all ground launched land-based LRTNFs.

Appendix B

Communiqué Issued at a Special Meeting of the
NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels
on 12th December, 1979

1.   At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers
in Brussels on December 12, 1979:

2.   Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where govern-
ments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges
to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the
Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3.   The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large
and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly
threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance
for the Alliance in Europe.   This situation has been espe-
cially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet deci-
sions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their
long-range nuclear capability substantially.   In particular,
they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers signifi-
cant improvements over previous systems in providing greater
accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as hav-
ing multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a
much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed
hitherto in a theater role.   During this period, while the
Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long-
Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and
qualitatively,   Western LRTNF capabilities have remained
static.   Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vul-
nerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater
nuclear missile systems.

4.   At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a
modernization and expansion of their shorter range TNF and
greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional
forces.   These developments took place against the back-
ground of increasing Soviet intercontinental capabilities
and achievement of parity in intercontinental capability
with the United States.

5.   These trends have prompted serious concern within the
Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superi-
ority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stabil-
ity achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on

the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing I-A, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons.

In this connection, ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG ministers in the autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and and West and in advancing the process of détente This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980's. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes toward achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain United States and Soviet Long-range theater nuclear systems.

This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and U.S. systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the U.S.S.R. to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the U.S. negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defense ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semiannual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF buildup, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet buildup can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

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