A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations: Past Failures and Future Possibilities.

by

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Abstract:

The post-Cold War era saw the extraordinary expansion of UN activity in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such a rapid expansion led to organizational over-stretch and failure and many in the international community began searching for ways to improve UN peace operations by reducing deployment time. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments released proposals for a UN rapid reaction capability. Unfortunately, of the three proposals only the Danish proposed SHIRBRIG was implemented. The lack of movement toward UN rapid reaction is due to a number of factors, namely the loss of post-Cold War idealism, a disconnection with the political reality of the time and cost concerns. More fundamentally, rapid reaction posed a threat to state primacy.

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Introduction

The 1990s was a troublesome decade for the UN. Both the number and scope of UN missions increased with alarming speed and the UN struggled to respond to emerging threats and crises in a timely fashion. It was in response to the UN's inability to confront and contain crises like the genocide in Rwanda that prompted discussion of a rapid reaction capability for the UN.

In the wake of the tumultuous events of the early 1990s, an international dialogue emerged which examined the feasibility of UN rapid reaction. A UN rapid deployment capability would, it was believed, enable the organization to meet the challenges it faced in the realm of peace operations. To that end, three proposals for UN rapid reaction were developed by the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments respectively. However, little of what was envisioned in the three proposals actually came to fruition. Of all the innovative and grandiose ideas only the conservative Danish proposal was implemented.

Unfortunately, the Dutch and Canadian proposals were grossly out of touch with the political reality of time. Rather than seeking an expanded, increasingly powerful UN, most member states were seeking means to limit and contain UN activities and decrease the costs associated with UN operations. Member states were simply unwilling to substantially increase the UN's power, specifically military power.

The UN's inability to deploy in a timely manner and member states unwillingness to provide the organization with the means to do so has led to an international debate on the role of regional organizations and private security companies

in the maintenance of global peace and security. Although regional organizations and private security companies have accepted larger roles, it remains to be seen whether such organizations can be employed by the UN as a means of rapid deployment.

Chapter 1
A New Role: The UN in the Post-Cold War World

The 1990s was a decade of tremendous change. It witnessed the end of the bipolar world and the emergence of a brief 'new world order' characterized by collective security and UN preeminence. Unfortunately, the 'new world order', and all the optimism and excitement it entailed, was short lived. In the absence of the stability imposed by the superpowers, many states degenerated into widespread intra-state conflict and the rampant expansion of these conflicts quickly emerged as a serious threat to global peace and security: a threat the UN was tasked with responding to.

The early to mid 1990s thrust the UN into a new, dramatically expanded realm of operations, namely intra-state intervention, for which it lacked both the necessary experience and resources to deal with its new role effectively. The UN's expanded repertoire pushed the organization to its breaking point and it quickly became over-extended and incapable of responding to crises in a timely and appropriate manner. The result was a number of widely publicized failures and disappointments; the most alarming of which was the UN's inability to stop the genocide in Rwanda.

In response to the UN's gross inadequacies, the international community, led by former Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, initiated a debate on ways to improve UN peace operations. One of the first and most significant documents to come out of this debate was Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*. *Agenda for Peace* was both visionary and aggressive. It advocated for a proactive, no-nonsense UN capable of enforcing its decisions around the globe and set the tone of the international debate. *Agenda for Peace* became the cornerstone of the drive to increase UN capabilities.

The UN and Post-Cold War Conflict

The end of the Cold War was met by a wave of idealism and optimism reminiscent of the post-WWII years. The UN, freed from the restraints of bipolar rivalry in the Security Council, was finally able to function as intended in the Charter and assume a leading role in the maintenance of global peace and security (Fleitz, 2002: 99; Otunnu, 1993: 67). The end of East-West hostilities breathed new life into the UN and many UN supporters saw it as "a once-in-a-century opportunity to build an idyllic world based on international law and collective security" (Fleitz, 2002: 16). The possibilities for collective action under the auspices of the UN seemed endless. A new world order, characterized by collective security and UN leadership, had begun and the entire world seemed hopeful and eager to participate.

The Cold War dictated the military, political, cultural and economic environments around the globe and had a profound effect on virtually every player in the international system. The security environment during the Cold War was drastically different than that which emerged after the Cold War ended. During the Cold War regional conflicts were prevented or controlled by heavy superpower involvement in almost every region of the world. Because many regional governments were dependent upon a superpower for financial and/or military aid, the superpowers were able to dictate, or at the very least direct, much of the recipients activities.

Superpower involvement controlled and moderated regional conflict by propping up unstable governments to avoid descent into civil war or by supplying one belligerent with aid to defeat or suppress the other. As such, the catalysts for many regional

conflicts were present during the Cold War but were dampened by the overarching bipolar rivalry that kept both the USSR and the United States heavily involved in their respective spheres of influence with the intent of maintaining relative calm and bolstering any potential ally (Kanet, 1998: 1-2). East-West hostilities, the fear of nuclear annihilation and massive superpower intervention overshadowed and muzzled the political, economic and cultural demands of regional governments (Coulon, 1998: 6). As a result, each superpower blamed the other for instigating regional conflicts. The practice of pointing fingers led to a misunderstanding and underestimation of the real sources of regional violence. Thus, the world was caught by surprise when the Cold War ended and nationalist, religious and territorial disputes exploded (Eban, 1995: 50).

In addition to dampening regional conflict and masking its causes, the Cold War had an adverse affect on the UN, and specifically on the Security Council. As members of the permanent five of the Security Council, the USSR and the United States held veto power on any Security Council resolution. As the UN's enforcement mechanism, the Security Council is intended to identify and punish aggressive states to maintain collective security. However, the ideological rivalry between the USSR and US often resulted in the inability of the Council to reach a consensus on which state was the aggressor; this led to Council deadlock and inaction (Roper, 1993: 3). The end of the Cold War, as Otunnu notes, freed the Security Council from the gridlock that paralyzed action and for the first time, placed it in a position to fulfill the role envisaged for it under the Charter (Otunnu, 1993: 67). The end of the Cold War replaced an adversarial relationship with a more cooperative one. For the first time, the international community

was divided, not on what to do or how to do it, but on how to pay for what needed to be done (Mandelbaum, 1995: 17).

The demise of the Cold War and the idealism and enthusiasm for UN activity that accompanied it led to profound changes in the international organization. Virtually overnight the UN went from being handcuffed by East-West rivalry and being a token, almost insignificant, player on the international scene to a central player. The international community, particularly the United States, became more willing to delegate increased authority to the UN as a means of sharing the security burden (Daalder, 1996: 40; Diehl, 1996: 148).

With the end of the Cold War, the UN became a central player in the resolution and prevention of regional conflicts as spheres of influence were no longer a hindrance and the superpowers became more supportive of UN activity (Diehl, 1996: 148-155; Ratner, 1995: 14-15; Kolodziej & Zartman, 1996: 5). In addition to an increased role in regional conflicts, the UN became involved in the new activity of humanitarian intervention. The enthusiasm for the UN following the Cold War pressured the UN to expand its role and become involved in a variety of new activities. As Louise Frechette, the Deputy Secretary General of the UN, noted in a 1998 speech to the Academic Council on the UN System: “when global opinion called for the world to “do something” about a crisis, we became the “doers,” whether or not we were given the tools” (Frechette, 1998: 2) or whether or not there was a precedent for such activity.

The idealism and optimism that followed the demise of the Cold War and the global sigh of relief that resulted from the cooling off of hostilities between two nuclear armed states resulted in grand ideas of collective security and a new, larger role for the

UN. These grand ideas were seen to be the way of the new world order and, for a short time, they proved successful. The winding down and end of the Cold War paved the way for a number of successful UN backed peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, most notably Namibia and the Gulf War. Each successful mission was seen as proof of a new world order and each mission raised the expectations of what collective security, and more precisely what the UN, could achieve (Flietz, 2002: 10-11; Durch, 1996: 12; Maynes, 1993: 3).

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was deployed to Namibia in 1989 to oversee the transfer of power from South Africa to the Namibian people and monitor the election of the Namibian government. The mission was significant because it was one of the first steps toward what would later become known as 'second generation' peacekeeping. In addition to its traditional military role of cease-fire monitoring, UNTAG included a police and electoral component to maintain law and order and oversee the election, a public information campaign to inform Namibians about the upcoming election, and a component dedicated to the repatriation of refugees (Ratner, 1995: 117-119). UNTAG moved out of the traditional, solely military realm into the political and humanitarian spheres. The UN mission in Namibia supported the post-Cold War presumption that the UN, with an expanded role, could intervene successfully in regional conflicts.

The Gulf War, like UNTAG, also contributed to an increased faith in the UN's ability to deal with regional conflicts. The swift action taken by the international community following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was testament to the UN's new ability for action. The Security Council, freed from the restraints of the Cold War,

was finally able to assume the enforcement role intended in the Charter and authorize a US led Chapter VII campaign. As Russett and Sutterlin note, "the Security Council showed itself capable of taking decisive action…[it] has shown that it has the capacity to initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance of peace in a new world order" (Russett & Sutterlin, 1991: 82). The dazzling success in the Gulf seemed to illustrate what the new world order had in store; a new, central role for the UN in the resolution of regional conflicts and an enthusiastic embrace of all things UN.

UN involvement in Namibia and the Gulf set the gold standard for UN activity. The international community came to believe that the UN was capable of solving even the most complex and protracted regional conflicts and were quick to increase the responsibilities and role of the UN. Suddenly peacekeeping became a magic bullet for the resolution of conflict (Durch, 1996: 12). Results similar to those seen in Namibia and the Gulf were expected elsewhere with greater ease and less expense. However, as Mandelbaum notes, "the Gulf war was a false dawn – less a harbinger of the future than the last gasp of a morally and politically clearer age" (Mandelbaum, 1994: 3). The new world order envisioned by post-Cold War idealists was fast coming to an end as was the great expectations for UN success in the resolution of regional conflicts. The Namibian and Gulf operations would become the exception rather than the rule of UN intervention; the exception because both operations were deemed successful and both conflicts were *between*, rather than *within*, states.

The post-Cold War world was marked by a dramatic increase in internal state conflict. As the Cold War wound down, the superpowers began withdrawing much of the financial and military aid used to secure the loyalty of developing nations in the

ideological battleground that was the Cold War. Often foreign aid was used to prop up weak regimes and suppress civic unrest and as the aid dried up so too did the artificial stability bought by superpower dollars and rubles. Many newly independent countries were plunged into civil wars of secession and independence as the nationalist, religious and territorial disputes that had been suppressed by the Cold War resurfaced with force (Clad, 1995: 117; Mandelbaum, 1994: 6; Helman & Ratner, 1992/193: 4; Jett, 1999: 9; Eban, 1995: 50; Diehl, 1996:157). Most of these civil conflicts were rooted in the period of decolonization following the Second World War.

In 1960, the UN passed Resolution 1514 which created the framework in which former colonies could achieve independence. Within fifteen years most colonies received independence. Although 1514 created a framework for independence it only applied to colonial cases. Calls for independence based on irredentist or secessionist movements were ignored as the resolution would not entertain claims which threatened the national or territorial integrity of a country (von Hippel, 1995: 103-105). This remained the international norm until the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia into a number of newly independent states. The breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia changed, as Weiss notes, "the ground rules governing world politics" – "no longer are internationally agreed borders sacrosanct, nor is secession unthinkable" (Weiss, 1995: 128). Given that, as Kanet notes:

> The historical national, ethnic and religious factors at work in the drive for independence did not stop at the artificial territorial boundaries of the old empires, it should have been expected that many of the newly established states would face new demands for self-determination or for territorial changes from among their ethnically diverse populations (Kanet, 1998: 2).

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia opened Pandora's Box. Nationalist, ethnic, religious and territorial claims for independence re-emerged around the globe and manifested into civil war. Nationalism and civil strife replaced nuclear war as the greatest threat to global peace and security (Kanet, 1998: 2; von Hippel, 1995: 101; Sadowski, 1998: 12; Maynes, 1993: 5; Kennedy & Russett, 1995: 67).

The type of conflict that emerged post-Cold War was different than the type of conflict the international community was accustomed to. The nature of conflict had been fundamentally altered from predominantly inter-state war to predominantly intra-state war. War was no longer driven by geopolitics or political ideals but by social organization and affiliation: clan, tribe, nation, religion and culture (Mendez, 1995: 21; Mandelbaum, 1994: 3; Kolodziej & Kanet, 1996: 4). The distinction between the two is important because they are fought and resolved quite differently. Typically inter-state conflicts consist of two combatants that are easily identified and can be separated along borders or cease-fire lines. Intra-state conflict, on the other hand, typically consists of numerous combatants and lacks established borders and/or frontlines because combatants which include militias are intermingled in the same cities and towns and are often difficult to identify and distinguish from non-combatants. What is most important to note about intra-state conflict is that it results in the paralysis and collapse of government and law and order, the flight and murder of government officials, and the displacement of massive numbers of persons and refugees.[1] (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 8-9; Weiss, 1995: 128; Diehl, 1996: 155; Sadowski, 1998: 22).

[1] While all war, regardless of type, results in displaced persons and refugees, intra-state conflict is unique in that displaced persons are often not able to return to their homes.

The difficulty of identifying and separating intra-state combatants coupled with the unique effects of such conflict on the basic functioning of the state makes resolution exceedingly difficult and complex. Because combatants live intermingled a territorial separation is often not workable. Also, due to the number of warring factions and lack of clear chain of command, negotiated settlements are very difficult to achieve and it is even more difficult to ensure compliance (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 8-9; Weiss, 1995: 128; Sadowski, 1998: 22). As Sadowski notes, resolving intra-state conflict is exceedingly difficult for political, not military, reasons because it requires the creation of new political institutions that enable power sharing and peaceable co-existence (Sadowski, 1998: 22). The resolution of intra-state conflict necessarily requires some form of state-building which will be a time consuming, expensive and precarious endeavor.

Just as the altered security environment following the demise of the Cold War saw the emergence of civil rather than inter-state war as the predominant type of global conflict, a number of other changes were ushered in by the end of bi-polar rivalry. Three are of particular importance: the emergence of a global community of values, increased media influence, and a new approach to state sovereignty. With the Cold War ended and the global ideological divide finally conquered, a global community of values emerged concerned with the maintenance and protection of human rights and the exportation of democratic ideals and principles. The new community of values saw the loss of human rights and democracy as an international security concern and the protection of such ideals created the common desire required for intervention through collective action. The days of purely strategic interventions were apparently over. Nations were becoming

increasingly willing to intervene solely on these humanitarian grounds (Otunnu, 1993: 68; Mandelbaum, 1994: 16; Kanet, 1998: 3).

The media played a significant role in the increased willingness to intervene on a humanitarian basis. As former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in *Agenda for Peace* "the revolution in communications united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 3). The technological revolution that coincided with the end of the Cold War changed the way the world communicated. For the first time, the media was able to broadcast events in real time and television viewers were bombarded with disturbing images of war zones and disaster areas (Weiss, 1995: 137; Durch, 1996: 1-2). Citizens were made immediately aware of peoples and nations in need of assistance and, as Jett notes, "the public response to such scenes made it harder for policy-makers to ignore these problems, even if their root causes and solutions were little understood" (Jett, 1999: 10). The CNN effect was born.

The emergence of a global community of values coupled with increased public awareness due to the technological revolution created an environment amenable to intervention. Such an environment led to a re-examination of the nature of sovereignty. Sovereignty, as understood during the Cold War years, was the near absolute and exclusive right to any action within ones' own borders. The only exception, designed to avoid superpower confrontation, was intervention in ones' sphere of influence as the superpowers regularly intervened in the developing world (Mandelbaum, 1994: 13-14). Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War, this norm has waned as the protection of human rights became a global, or at the very least a Western, priority and the idea that

the rights of the state are limited became more widespread. The idea that all individuals have certain inalienable rights that must be protected took hold in the post Cold War years and helped to redefine sovereignty and drive intervention. Sovereignty became understood to include a number of responsibilities including the protection of human rights and the maintenance of democratic ideals. Failure to live up to such responsibilities invited intervention (Belchman, 1995: 148; Mandelbaum, 1994: 14).

Together the emergence of a global community of values, the technological-communication revolution and a re-examination of the concept of sovereignty led, as previously noted, to an increased willingness to intervene in crisis situations around the globe. The problem was that the nature and number of conflicts had also changed. The international community was not accustomed to, nor were there many precedents for, using peace operations to resolve on going intra-state conflicts.[2] The result was a hurried and massive expansion in the number and size of UN peace operations as well as an equally massive expansion in the mandates of such operations.

Expanding Mandates and 2nd Generation Peace Operations

UN peace operations in the Cold War years were largely limited to traditional peacekeeping operations which Steven Ratner defines as "the stationing of UN military personnel, with the consent of the warring states, to monitor cease-fires and dissuade violations through interposition between competing armies" (Ratner, 1995: 10). Traditional peacekeeping operations, also referred to as first generation peace

[2] The exception being the 1960 – 1964 UN Mission to the Congo (ONUC). ONUC was similar to many UN operations of the mid-1990s but it seems the UN forgot the lessons learned in the Congo. For further information see: Ana Maia (January 1997) *Prospects for UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Congo Experience*, University of Manitoba M.A. Thesis (unpublished).

operations, possess the following characteristics: consent of combatants; impartial, lightly armed military units authorized to use force only in self defense; military operations; a mandate to observe and report; and the goal to prevent a resumption of hostilities (Goulding, 1993: 92-93; Ruggie, 1993: 28; Maynes, 1993: 8). Most importantly, the conditions required for their success, namely a cease-fire and consent, must exist prior to deployment. Traditional peacekeeping forces differ from regular combat units in that they do not possess the mandate, nor the capabilities required to impose the conditions needed for success (Ruggie, 1993: 28; Ratner, 1995: 10). As such, traditional peacekeeping operations are essentially peace observer missions; they maintain the status quo as long as the warring factions wish to maintain it themselves (Maynes, 1993: 8; Ratner, 1995: 10).

The type of peace operation that emerged post-Cold War was drastically different than the previous first generation missions. Second generation peace operations possessed a hugely expanded mandate that went beyond simply peace observation to include the restoration of civil order by re-designing governmental and administrative functions and training local police forces. The new expanded mandates also included election monitoring, human rights guarantees, the demobilization and reintegration of combatants, refugee return, the distribution of humanitarian aid, and economic and social development, as well as de-mining and the repair of critical infrastructure (Boutros Ghali, 1995: 11; Ratner, 1995: 1). The pre-eminence of civil conflict following the Cold War coupled with these new tasks moved the UN beyond the observation and maintenance of peace and into the expensive, complicated and time-consuming realm of state building.

The breadth of peace operation mandates aside, some critical differences between first and second generation peace operations must be noted. The first, and arguably most important, is that peace operations rather than being seen as the maintenance of the status quo became viewed as the solution to the conflict. The expanded mandates of second generation peace operations are a testament to this new reality; peace operations are now intended to resolve disputes not simply freeze them in place (Roper, 1993: 4; Ratner, 1995: 1). A second critical difference between the two generations of peace operations is their size and formation. First generation missions were small, usually less than 2,000 individuals, and consisted primarily of military personnel. Second generation missions, on the other hand, became massive deployments, with some consisting of more than 20,000 personnel, such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II), and include both military and civilian personnel (Roper, 1993: 10).

The interventionist tendencies of UN peace operations following the end of the Cold War moved the UN into the operational grey area between Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates. The resulting Chapter VI and a half missions were intended to remain neutral and impartial like regular Chapter VI missions but were authorized to use force like Chapter VII missions. However, unlike regular Chapter VII mandates, force was to be used only to protect humanitarian objectives and not to impose a peace or stop an aggressor (Boutros Ghali, 1995: 10).

UN activity in the no-man's land between Chapter VI and VII mandates was problematic because it lacked a pre-existing operational doctrine to use as a guidepost

for appropriate operational planning. In the absence of such doctrine, the UN simply expanded traditional peace operations to respond to the new post-Cold War security environment despite the reality that traditional peace operations were not designed or equipped to respond to the new security challenges; the result was failure and disappointment. (Ruggie, 1993: 26; Ruggie, 1995: 214). As Louise Frechette notes:

> The evolution of UN peacekeeping from the traditional patrolling of buffer zones and cease-fire lines to the modern, more complex manifestations in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere was neither smooth nor preordained…Indeed the task of managing peacekeeping in those days, as it expanded rapidly in both size and complexity, has been likened to "changing a tire while driving the car at ninety miles per hour"" (Frechette, 1998: 2-3).

The UN was caught unaware by the immediate and drastic change in the globe's strategic environment and struggled to alter operational concepts and posture in response to a security environment which nobody predicted or expected (Schlesinger, 1991/1992: 21).

The UN's response to the post-Cold War security environment was, as noted earlier, to expand peace operations in number, size and mandate. Between 1988 and 1994, the number of UN peace operations increased from five to seventeen and the number of deployed personnel increased by 60,000. In the same few years, peacekeeping costs also increased dramatically going from 200 million to 3.6 billion (US) dollars annually (Denmark, 1996: 6). Not surprisingly, the UN was unable to sustain the massive expansion and soon began to show signs of strain and fatigue.

The mammoth task of initiating and sustaining a number of increasingly complex missions strained the UN to the breaking point and weaknesses in the UN system became blatantly obvious. The first was the ad hoc nature in which the UN approached peace operations. The UN did not possess an established doctrine for the

creation and maintenance of military operations. Instead, the Secretariat established new procedures and doctrines each time the Security Council mandated a new mission. The cumbersome process of reinventing the wheel with each new mission contributed to the time lag between mandate approval and mission deployment. Such time lags allowed crises and hostilities to worsen or resume and UN personnel found "themselves in situations which had escalated well beyond their ability to control and for which they were ill-equipped in terms of resources, planning and mandate" (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 37).

The UN's ad hoc approach to peace operations coupled with the massive expansion of such operations led to a second serious problem in the UN system: the unavailability of troops and equipment. After a mission was mandated by the Security Council, the Secretariat solicited troop contributions from various member states but without accurate information regarding the type and number of units that might be available, the process was unnecessarily long and often resembled a wild goose chase with the Secretariat running wildly from nation to nation pleading for troops. The already difficult process of troop solicitation was made worse by the dramatic increase in the number and size of peace operation in the early to mid-1990s. Contributing nations became overburdened by the proliferation of missions and were unable or unwilling to contribute personnel to new missions or offer reinforcements or replacements for existing operations. Similarly, those member states that were able to contribute personnel for new missions were often unable to provide those personnel with the appropriate equipment necessary for the mission. The unavailability of troops and equipment contributed to increased time lags between mission approval and deployment

and often led to missions that were undermanned and ill-equipped (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 37).

Compounding the problems of member state over-extension and fatigue was increased risk to UN personnel. The early to mid-1990s was marked by a number of enforcement missions specifically UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia which presented greater risk to UN personnel for a variety of reasons. In each case the UN deployed in response to humanitarian crises with the intention of assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid. To that end UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR were mandated under Chapter VII and authorized to use force to ensure the delivery of aid. Enforcement measures notwithstanding, UN personnel were equipped as traditional peacekeepers and therefore lacked the equipment necessary to carry out an enforcement mandate. Similarly, because the UN had deployed before a cessation in hostilities, UN delivery of humanitarian aid was seen by combatants as a partisan act in support of another party. The perceived loss of impartiality was doubly damaging to the UN because it had deployed without consent and was therefore without the broad support of the combatants. Perceived partiality coupled with an already cool reception undermined UN legitimacy and established the UN as a target if not another combatant. The perceived or real loss of UN impartiality led to increased violence against the organization and the death and hostage taking of many UN personnel (Diehl, 1998: 158-172; Fleitz, 2002: 130-133, 137-144). Not surprisingly, the deliberate targeting of UN personnel in both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia made the organization, or rather its member states, increasingly cautious and risk-adverse and quelled previous enthusiasm for intervention. Member states were no longer willing or

able to contribute to UN peace operations. Such inability and unwillingness, arguably, set the stage for the greatest UN blunder of all time: Rwanda.

Although the lack of personnel and equipment were highly problematic for UNOSOM and UNPROFOR, nowhere did these same problems lead to graver consequences than in Rwanda. On October 5, 1993, the Security Council mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in response to the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords two months prior. Although UNAMIR's mandate called for the deployment of 4,500 troops, only 2,600 were ever deployed and most arrived without any equipment. Compounding the problems of insufficient personnel and equipment was a continued disintegration of the situation on the ground (Boulden & Knight, 1996: 43-44). Ethnic conflict quickly turned to outright genocide and UNAMIR, "being under-funded, understaffed and under-supported in material and political terms…was unable to deal with the escalation of events and unable to implement its mandate successfully" (Boulden & Knight, 1996: 44). Regrettably, due to a lack of political will on behalf of member countries and a Security Council that was determined to operate UNAMIR at the lowest possible cost, the Rwanda mission was reduced from one of meaningful assistance to one of simply bearing witness to an unspeakable tragedy.[3]

The international community's failure to respond adequately to the Rwandan genocide sparked massive refugee flows and a terrible humanitarian crisis in neighbouring Zaire. Following the Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) victory over the governmental forces (RGF), the RGF and their supporters began flooding over the

[3] For a more comprehensive understanding of UNAMIR, see Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (2004).

border into neighboring Zaire by the hundreds of thousands. The mass movement of people was triggered by fears of RPF reprisal for the previous genocide. The resulting refugees found themselves in camps near Goma and the massive number of people coupled with a lack of infrastructure to accommodate them triggered a cholera epidemic which killed 40,000 individuals (Dallaire, 2004: 469, 479-482).

The crisis in Goma was a direct result of the UN's inability to prevent a return to civil war in Rwanda and its inability to control the escalation of violence once fighting resumed. Had the UN deployed a well-equipped contingent early on, the return to violence and the resulting genocide and refugee crisis may have been averted. As the force commander of UNAMIR, Romeo Dallaire, notes "could we have prevented the resumption of civil war and the genocide? The short answer is yes. If UNAMIR had received the modest increase of troops and capabilities we requested in the first week, could we have stopped the killing? Yes, absolutely" (Dallaire, 2004: 514).

Unfortunately, the problems that emerged in the UN system as a result of the added strain placed on the organization in the post-Cold War world were not limited to ad hocery or a lack of adequate personnel and equipment: financing peace operations became another large impediment to an acceptable and timely UN response. As Boulden and Knight note:

> It would be difficult to under emphasize the degree to which poor, inefficient and constraining financial procedures and practices contribute to the inability of the United Nations to react rapidly or even in a timely fashion. Financial procedures are matched only by the time taken to solicit troop contributions as a problem in launching effectively manned and equipped missions in a timely manner (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 39).

Once mandated by the Security Council, the Secretariat established a proposed budget and forwarded it to the General Assembly for approval. However, the General Assembly

developed a tendency for micro-managing the budget which resulted in approval delays of up to four months. Similarly, the budgetary process was also complicated by the inability or unwillingness of member nations to pay their assessed UN dues. Difficulties passing the budget in a timely manner and securing funds from member states only contributed to an already lengthy time lag between mission mandate and mission deployment (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 39-40).

Another problem which became identifiable in the post-Cold-War UN system was the multi-national composition of most peace operations. Although multi-nationality, in and of itself, is not a problem and is often desirable, it becomes a problem when personnel from around the globe only come together as a unified force in the theatre of operations. Meeting for the first time in a crisis or conflict zone was not conducive to force unification or the settlement of language and equipment disparities. The result was a force which was largely ineffective, at least in the short-term, while personnel became acquainted with one another's language and culture, training levels, procedural doctrines and equipment (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 38). In some cases, such as UNAMIR, the force was unable to overcome the barriers of multi-nationality and never achieved full integration which had an adverse impact on overall mission effectiveness.[4] The multi-national composition of peace operations is often cause for concern because, as Boulden and Knight note, "there is a limit to how quickly the United Nations can react and be effective when it is dealing with troops with no prior joint-training and no equipment interoperability" (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 39). It is both unwise and unfair to expect a multi-national force to operate as an integrated and

[4] For more information regarding the multi-national challenges faced by UNAMIR, specifically the language barrier and differing levels of training and commitment, see Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (2004).

effective force in the theatre without any previous joint training and/or operations. A lack of joint training contributes to a lag in mission effectiveness.

Agenda for Peace

The UN's newly expanded role stressed the organization to the breaking point and made it clear that the current state of peace operations was both inappropriate and unworkable. Unfortunately it took a number of widely publicized UN failures, specifically UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR and, most disturbingly, UNAMIR, before calls for strengthening UN peace operations finally began receiving their due attention. Two of the most notable and influential calls for strengthening peace operations were Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping* (1992) and *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (1995).

In response to the changed security environment and the increased demands placed on the UN following the Cold War, the Security Council asked Boutros-Ghali to author a report on ways to strengthen peacekeeping and make it more effective. The result was *An Agenda for Peace* (Coulon, 1998: 6). Although *Agenda for Peace* offered a host of relatively safe and predictable recommendations including preventative deployment, co-operation with regional organizations and new methods of financing, its recommendations on the use of military force and its interpretation of the Charter were new and innovative. *An Agenda for Peace* recommended making use of Article 43 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a means of making armed forces available to the UN. As the report states:

> Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as the guarantor of international security. This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 12-13).

In short, member nations, under Article 43, would maintain a number of personnel on stand-by for deployment with the UN in peace operations. Because the capabilities of such a force would be limited, Boutros-Ghali also recommended the establishment of separate peace-enforcement units which would be heavily armed and extensively trained (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 13).

Agenda for Peace moved beyond the traditional characterization of UN personnel as passive peacekeepers. Boutros-Ghali envisioned the Blue Helmets as "warriors for peace, heavily armed peacemaking units authorized to use force against recalcitrant factions and able to quickly enforce the decision of the UN anywhere in the world" (Coulon, 1998: 8). *An Agenda for Peace* also recommended a more proactive UN with forces permanently at its disposal as a means of strengthening peacekeeping and making it more effective.

Two and a half years after *An Agenda for Peace* Boutros-Ghali followed-up with *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. The follow-up was intended to coincide with the UN's fiftieth anniversary and "to serve as a contribution to the continuing campaign to strengthen a common capacity to deal with threats to peace and security" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 37). *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, although reiterating much of what was noted in the original *Agenda*, made specific reference to the lack of troops for UN

peace operations. Using Rwanda as a case in point, where the UN was unable to secure troop contributions to expand UNAMIR and stop the genocide, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* went beyond the stand-by arrangements recommended in the original *Agenda* to suggest the creation of a UN rapid reaction force. As Boutros-Ghali noted:

> I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. Such a force would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peace-keeping troops. It might compromise battalion-sized units from a number of countries. These units would be trained to the same standards, use the same operating procedures, be equipped with integrated communications equipment and take part in joint exercises at regular intervals. They would be stationed in their home countries but maintained at a high rate of readiness…This will be a complicated and expensive arrangement, but I believe that the time has come to undertake it (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 18).

Fortunately, Boutros-Ghali was not alone in this belief. The Security Council supported his recommendation stating:

> The Security Council shares the Secretary-General's concern regarding the availability of troops and equipment for peace-keeping operations…[and] reiterates the importance of improving the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment and reinforcement of operations…The Council invites all interested member states to present further reflections on United Nations peace-keeping operations, and in particular on ways and means to improve the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment (President of the Security Council, 1995).

The Security Council's response to Boutros-Ghali's bold suggestion was essentially a call for action and a number of member states, specifically the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark, produced detailed proposals for UN rapid reaction.

Chapter 2
Optimism and Idealism: Visions for Rapid Reaction

The very public failings of the UN coupled with the vision of a new Secretary-General initiated an international discussion on ways to increase the effectiveness of UN peace operations in general and in particular the need for a rapid reaction capability for the international organization. It was believed that rapid reaction could address some of the key problems that led to the failure of previous peace operations and that rapid reaction would be more efficient and cost-effective than traditional peace operations. The result of such discussion was the publication of three proposals for rapid reaction authored by the Government of the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark respectively. Each proposal stressed the need for a rapid reaction capability and recommended varying means of achieving said goal.

Each proposal, although quite unique, shared common themes and all based their recommendations on the premise that rapid reaction was a more efficient and effective means of intervention than the current peace operation process and that rapid reaction could address many of the problems associated with the disappointments and failures of previous peace operations. A rapid reaction capability would help ensure the availability of personnel, increase the quality of multi-national forces, avoid much of the ad hocery associated with the current peace operation process, contain crises much quicker than regular peace operations, and finally, would be more cost-effective than the current process.

A capacity for rapid reaction would help ensure personnel availability either by establishing a permanent UN brigade which would be under the command of the

Secretary General and Security Council (Netherlands, 1995: 23; Canada, 1995: 62) or by augmenting the Stand-by Arrangement Systems and placing national contingents at UN disposal (Canada, 1995: 48; Denmark, 1996: 8). Either way, personnel would be maintained at a high state of readiness and capable of deployment within days or weeks rather than months.

Similarly, a rapid reaction capability would improve the quality of the multi-national force deployed by providing common basing[5] and joint training and exercises. The provision of common basing would minimize the cultural and linguistic barriers inherent in multi-national forces, contribute to a sense of camaraderie, and provide common training thereby increasing the force's cohesion and effectiveness in the theatre of operations (Netherlands, 1995: 31; Canada, 1995: 60-62). Even without common basing, force cohesion and effectiveness could be augmented by providing standardized training and joint exercises on a regular basis (Denmark, 1996: 10, 22).

A rapid reaction capability would also limit the ad hoc nature of peace operations by providing the UN with a permanent planning unit that would develop contingency plans for potential missions and evaluate previous operations. Contingency planning would reduce deployment times and make peace operations more effective by providing a preexisting framework for operations including conceptual development and mandate creation, personnel and equipment recruitment, logistical planning and support, and training requirements. Similarly, a comprehensive evaluation of previous peace

[5] Common basing refers to multinational personnel being stationed at the same base. Common basing enables joint training and exercises, allows personnel to become familiar with one another, their language, culture, religion, etc. and helps build a sense of comaraderie. In addition, common basing strengthens force cohesion and leads to greater effectiveness in the field.

operations would allow the organization to learn from experience making it more efficient and effective (Denmark, 1996: 21-22; Canada, 1995: 50-51).

A rapid reaction capability, as implied, would provide the UN with the resources to respond in a timely manner. This capability is essential to contain crises and prevent any further escalation of violence. As *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* notes:

> As a crisis escalates in severity, it represents an exponential increase in the scope of the problem. It therefore requires a much larger and more vigorous response if it is to be effective…As the parties invest ever greater resources in the conflict, they become increasingly committed to and entrapped in the struggle to prevail. As an intervention is delayed, greater amounts of political influence and financial resources are needed to have a positive impact over the course of the conflict (Canada, 1995: 6).

Boulden and Knight support this conclusion stating:

> Once a crisis emerges, it initiates a chain reaction that becomes very difficult to control. For example, an initial conflict may spark a refugee problem. Depending on the environmental situation the combination of the conflict and the refugee problem may contribute to a famine (as in Somalia) or to a health crisis (as in Goma). These new problems feed back into the conflict, deepening the enmity and determination to fight. This new level of conflict then spawns or exacerbates other problems (Boulden & Knight, 1995: 42).

If a rapid reaction capability can prevent an escalation of violence, such a capacity may also be more cost-effective than previous peace operations. *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* notes "the principle of cost-effectiveness is based on the presumption that it is often better to act early when a situation remains relatively fluid and is more susceptible to outside influence – when the costs of intervention are fairly low" (Canada, 1995: iv). By preventing escalation and containing a crisis, the scope of the problem is limited and, therefore, requires less resources than a widespread crisis. The UN's inability to effectively deal with the crises

in Rwanda and the resulting Goma refugee problem is a telling example of how rapid reaction may, in the long-term, be a more cost effective means of intervention.

Although UNAMIR's total operating budget was only $200 million (US), the UN was unable to acquire the necessary funds for the Rwandan mission. As a result, UNAMIR was largely ineffective and its inability to control the crisis led directly to the Goma refugee disaster.[6]

> The lack of funding and material support for UNAMIR stands in sharp contrast to the money spent by the international community in aid and human resource support once the [Goma] crisis attracted the attention of the international media. The United States alone provided US$350 million in aid in the first six weeks of the Goma catastrophe (Canada, 1995: 6).

UNAMIR's force commander also noted this disconnect, stating:

> The original US assessment for UNAMIR I, which the Americans committed to pay but never did, would have been no more than $30 million. The cost of UNAMIR II would have been only slightly more. By deciding to support the refugee camps in Goma, the US paid ten times that amount (Dallaire, 2004: 498).

The awful irony is that, had the international community came through with the necessary funding for UNAMIR – an amount much less than that spent on the refuges in Goma – the genocide and the resulting Goma catastrophe may have been avoided. A rapid reaction capacity, by providing the UN with the ability to contain crises before they escalate, may, in the long-term, reduce the costs associated with intervention.

Each proposal maintained that rapid reaction would ensure the availability of personnel, increase the quality of the intervening force, avoid ad hocery, contain crises and be cheaper than the current UN intervention process. However, each envisioned the actual constitution of a UN rapid reaction capability quite differently.

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[6] Due to a lack of funding, UNAMIR was plagued by a number of equipment shortages including fuel, reconnaissance and transport vehicles and even rations. Such shortages severely restricted the mission's ability to carry out its mandate.

The Netherlands – *A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade*

In April 1995, the Netherlands' proposal, entitled *A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study*, recommended the creation of a permanent UN brigade consisting of 2,000 to 5,000 personnel. It would be structured as an infantry brigade but would include some motorized capabilities, specifically armored personnel carriers, and other elements not typical of traditional combat units including civil engineering, medical supplies, and broadcasting capabilities for public information campaigns. Such capabilities would lend themselves to increased flexibility and adaptability which is essential given the varying tasks assigned to the brigade (Netherlands, 1995: 23).

The UN rapid deployment brigade would be deployed for three primary tasks: preventative measures, humanitarian assistance or as an interim arrangement between Security Council decisions and deployment of regular peace operations. Each task is relatively distinct and requires varying capabilities, force levels and degrees of consent. Preventative deployment may be authorized as a confidence builder, where the brigade would interpose itself between adversaries prior to the outbreak of armed conflict with the intention of arresting conflict before it begins. Such activity is usually consensual and therefore requires a lighter show of force than non-consensual activities (Netherlands, 1995: 9-10).

The second brigade task is to assist in humanitarian emergencies. Brigade assistance can range from the relatively passive, consensual activity of escorting and protecting humanitarian aid agencies and relief convoys to the aggressive prevention of crimes against humanity (Netherlands, 1995: 11-12). When the brigade enters the realm

of aggressive, non-consensual activity it requires "a capability for armed action to defend itself…[and] for deterrent and locally decisive action" (Netherlands, 1995: 11). Although consent is not required for deployment, the UN rapid deployment brigade would only deploy without consent in extraordinary circumstances when inaction is not an option (Netherlands, 1995: 29).

The rapid deployment brigade would also deploy in the interim between Security Council decisions authorizing peace operations and the actual arrival of regular peacekeepers in the theatre. The brigade's presence may prevent the conflict from escalating and/or prevent the disintegration of a cease-fire. Similarly, the brigade could assist in the deployment of regular peacekeepers by performing reconnaissance duties, establishing basic infrastructure such as housing and water treatment and undertaking a public information campaign informing citizens of the UN's mandate (The Netherlands, 1995: 10).

The premise behind the proposed creation of the rapid deployment brigade was to ensure an always available, rapidly deployable brigade. To that end, specific safeguards were established to prevent becoming bogged down in a specific environment or crisis. The brigade would operate on a first in, first out basis and its deployment duration would be limited to three months. Given the brief duration of its mission, deployment of the brigade would coincide with plans and preparations for its replacement by a regular peacekeeping force or national contingent (The Netherlands, 1995: 9, 38).

The rapid deployment brigade, as noted earlier, would consist of 2,000 to 5,000 personnel. Brigade personnel would be voluntary recruits from member nations and

would be employees of the UN. Recruitment for brigade personnel would follow the same procedure of recruitment of UN civilian staff where the member nation acts as an intermediary between the international organization and candidate. However, the member nation would not be involved in the contractual agreement between the UN and employee. Candidates would be judged on their qualifications and geographical representation would be taken into account. Due consideration would also be given to double manning the brigade to maintain a permanent high degree of readiness and limit the costs and infrastructure needed for housing. Double manning would require the recruitment of personnel for two brigades while only procuring the equipment and materials needed for one. Personnel would be rotated to negate the need for family housing and ensure that fresh personnel were always ready for deployment. Another means of ensuring rapid deployability at all times would be the establishment of independent sub-groups within the brigade. Semi-autonomous sub-groups of battalion size could be deployed in situations, which did not warrant the deployment of the whole brigade allowing for the possibility of simultaneous deployment in different theatres (Netherlands, 1995: 26-28).

Given that brigade personnel would come from all parts of the globe and possess different languages, cultures and religions, due consideration would have to be given to brigade cohesion. One means of circumventing the inevitable religious, linguistic and cultural barriers is the creation of platoon sized homogenous sub-groups with a common language for the officer corps. Another means of ensuring brigade cohesion is basing. If the brigade were based in only one location joint training and exercises would be easy to organize and shared quarters would increase camaraderie. Single location basing is also

desirable because it is cost effective. However, regional basing must be considered as an option because it lends itself more easily to rapid deployment by decreasing the time personnel and equipment would spend in transit (Netherlands, 1995: 28-32).

Regardless of single or multiple basing, a suitable basing location would require adequate access to the infrastructure needed for air and sea lift, acceptance by the local population, support of the host government, access to specific climates and terrain necessary for training and a pre-existing military facility. The ability to retrofit a pre-existing, unused military facility would greatly reduce the costs incurred by the brigade and enable it to establish itself much quicker. Given these requirements for basing, the Mediterranean was identified as an optimal location (Netherlands, 1995: 32-33).

The Dutch estimated that the UN rapid deployment brigade would cost $300 million (US) annually with initial procurement costs of $500-550 million (US). Such costs would be included in the UN peace operations budget and would be paid for by member nations through the scale of assessments for peace operations (Netherlands, 1995: 14-15). Adoption by a regional organization or member nation was identified as another possible means of cutting the costs incurred by the UN. An adoptive arrangement would consist of a regional organization such as NATO or a member state volunteering to cover some of the brigade's overhead costs such as education, training exercises, logistics and equipment (Netherlands, 1995: 18-20). The existence of a benefactor, although desirable, would not be essential to the operation of the brigade; what was essential was support from member nations in the realms of air and sea lift, reinforcement, replacement and evacuation. The brigade would not possess the capabilities required for air and sea lift and evacuation, nor would it possess the

personnel required for reinforcement and replacement. For all these tasks, the brigade would rely on the abilities of member states (Netherlands, 1995: 36-38).

Canada – *Toward a Rapid Reaction Capability for the UN*

In September 1995, the Government of Canada released its own recommendations for decreasing deployment times and increasing the effectiveness of UN peace operations in a report entitled *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*. The Canadian report focused primarily on reforms that could be achieved within the short to medium term and for minimal expense. The ability to implement reforms on the cheap or for no additional cost was essential given the UN's financial constraints and the Canadian government's adherence to a policy of zero growth for the UN system. The Canadian report attempted to work within the UN's existing resource base by suggesting reallocation and better management of existing funds rather than the procurement of new monies as a means of financing reforms (Canada, 1995: 11, 67).

Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations divided the UN system into four levels – political, strategic, operational and tactical – and suggested a number of incremental changes at each level to improve effectiveness and decrease time lags. The political level was characterized by the interaction of member states in the General Assembly and the Security Council and the creation of organizational goals and policy objectives. The political level represented the decision-making bodies of the UN (Canada, 1995: 12). Suggested reforms at this level were geared toward improving the

efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making process by increasing consultation and broadening political support.

As a means of improving the decision-making process at the political level, the Canadian report recommended the creation of Troop Contributor Committees to assist the Security Council and Secretary-General in the establishment of mission mandates and objectives. Such Committees would consist of potential troop contributors and would help ensure the availability of troops by ensuring that the mission and its mandate enjoyed the broad political support of contributing nations. Similarly, allowing informal "groups of friends"[7] to play a larger role in the decision-making process would help ensure the political support of those nations most affected (Canada, 1995: 37-39).

In addition to recommending better consultation with contributing nations and broader political support, the Canadian report also recommended streamlining fiscal decision-making by establishing a unified peace operations budget, granting the Secretary-General broader spending authority in the preliminary stages of mission planning, and doubling the peacekeeping reserve fund from $150 to $300 million. Because the financing and procurement needs of a peace operation are so complex, the report also recommended the establishment of a sub-committee of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to offer financial expertise regarding the financing of peace operations. Similarly, a decentralization of spending authority from headquarters to field operations was deemed necessary in order to decrease procurement times and decrease the burden on over-stretched UN headquarters (Canada, 1995: 40-42). Such changes would lend themselves to decreased response time

[7] Groups of Friends refers to a group of nations discussing an issue or crisis informally outside the UN. Member of the group are usually nations affected by the crises and who are likely to play a central role in its resolution (Canada, 1995: 39).

and increased effectiveness, both of which are essential to a rapid reaction capacity for the UN.

The strategic level of the UN system is comprised of the Secretary-General and the UN secretariat and is tasked with translating political goals into strategic objectives (Canada, 1995: 12). To speed up the translation process, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* suggested greater contingency planning, including the identification of available personnel and equipment for future missions. More specifically, the report recommended better procedures for the sharing of information between the UN and member states and the establishment of an early-warning alert system to bring potential crises to the attention of the organization. Access to timely information through the early-warning system would kick start the planning process thereby lending itself to an enhanced ability for rapid reaction (Canada, 1995: 43-44).

Similarly, the report suggested strengthening the Office of the Military Advisor and creating a roster of potential force commanders as a means of making the planning process more efficient and effective. A more robust Office of the Military Advisor and a roster of potential force commanders would provide invaluable military expertise and advise and assist in contingency planning (Canada, 1995: 44-46). The final and arguably most important recommendations made at the strategic level were intended to ensure the availability of personnel and equipment for future missions. To this end, the report recommended strengthening the stand-by arrangement system[8] and the creation of generic equipment packages through leasing or purchasing. Clearly, a capacity for rapid reaction rests on the availability of personnel and equipment (Canada, 1995: 46-48).

[8] The Stand-by Arrangement System was established in 1993 as a means of decreasing UN response time in crises. Member states agree to make personnel and equipment available to the UN for peace operations

The operational level of the UN system is represented by the force commander and customizes the broad objectives of the strategic level to fit the situation on the ground in the operational theatre (Canada, 1995: 12-13). Typically this process is time consuming, overly complicated and always on an ad hoc basis. To avoid such problems, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* recommended creating a permanent headquarters unit which would be tasked with specific mission planning as well as generic contingency planning. Such headquarters would be staffed by thirty to fifty people, be capable of commanding 5,000 personnel and be rapidly deployable (Canada, 1995: 49-51).

Similarly, the report recommended the creation of a vanguard concept in which "member states would link their national units to the operation-level headquarters by way of the standby arrangements system" (Canada, 1995: 51). National contingents would remain under national command and at their home base until requested by the UN and deployment would be subject to national approval. By linking the headquarters unit with tactical elements, the UN would establish a vanguard group capable of rapid deployment (Canada, 1995: 51-52). The vanguard group would consist of 5,000 personnel and would be deployed for a wide range of military objectives including containment, de-escalation, cease-fire monitoring, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The vanguard group would not be deployed into combat situations and would not be authorized to use force against an aggressor (Canada, 1995: 24, 52). Given the vanguard groups wide range of activities, units would be organized according to function and training into 'capability components.' Such a division of capability would

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and such contributions remain in their home base until requested for deployment by the Secretary-General. However, the choice of whether to respond to the Secretary-General's request remains with the member state (Denmark, 1996: 8).

lend itself to increased efficiency and effectiveness (Canada, 1995: 52). The vanguard group would help circumvent a key obstacle to rapid reaction, namely the unavailability of personnel.

The tactical level of the UN system refers to the personnel and financial and material resources applied to a mission (Canada, 1995: 13). At this level, lack of standardized training is often a problem. As a remedy, the Canadian report recommended the creation of a generic and mission specific training manual for all contributing nations. Such a manual is doubly important given the fact that the duties and tasks associated with peace operations are often very different than those associated with traditional combat roles and therefore national military training may not have adequately prepared personnel for participation in peace operations (Canada, 1995: 53-54).

Although the purpose of *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* was to "identify practical proposals to enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability in the short to medium term, given the current and foreseeable political and financial conditions of the UN system," (Canada, 1995: 55) long-term goals were not forgotten. To increase the UN's effectiveness and decrease deployment times, the Canadian report made a handful of long-term recommendations including the employment of advanced technology, regionally based headquarters, more stable means of financing and even the establishment of a permanent UN force. Making better use of advanced technology, specifically surveillance and communications technology, would enable early warning of potential crises, facilitate advanced planning, and assist in logistical support. Similarly, the augmentation of the operational-level headquarters into

numerous regionally based headquarters would reduce deployment times and enable much more specific contingency planning by narrowing the potential theatre of operation (Canada, 1995: 56-60).

Reliable funding is also essential to the UN's ability to respond quickly and effectively. The Canadian report notes that, "as long as the UN remains wholly dependant for its financing on member states, some of whom have huge arrears in payments, the UN will never have the resources essential to doing its job" (Canada, 1995: 63). As a remedy, the report recommended the continued study of independent source of financing such as a tax on currency transfers or a surcharge on international airfares (Canada, 1995: 63).

Finally, the Canadian proposal, like the Dutch proposal, suggested the creation of a permanent UN force. The Canadian report recognized the problems inherent in seeking troop contributions from member states and noted, "a UN rapid reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on member states of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations. If the UN is to build a rapid reaction capability which is fully reliable, the challenge in years ahead will be to develop its own personnel, independent of state authority" (Canada, 1995: 60).

To achieve such a goal, the report suggested an evolutionary approach beginning with the establishment of a rapid reaction base staffed by national contributions. Because national contributions would remain under national command and require national consent before deployment, the national government would assume the financial burden of its contribution. Although a rapid reaction base would contribute to UN effectiveness by providing common training and developing a cohesive international

force, it would not address the fundamental problem of reliability. Following the establishment of common basing, steps could be taken towards the creation of a UN Standing Emergency Group. The Emergency Group would be staffed by international volunteers and commanded only by the Secretary-General and the Security Council (Canada, 1995: 60-62). *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* maintains that "UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid-reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response time significantly" (Canada, 1995: 62).

Denmark - *United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade*

Following the Dutch and Canadian proposals, the Government of Denmark issued its own proposal for UN rapid deployment in March of 1996. It was the result of a Danish led multinational military working group consisting of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Sweden (Denmark, 1996: letter). The working group's proposal entitled *Report by the Working Group on a Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade*, recommended the creation of a rapid reaction brigade within the existing framework of the Stand-by Arrangement System. As the report notes, "a number of member states can, by forming an affiliation between appropriate contributions to the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System, make a pre-established Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade" (Denmark, 1996: 9). Such an affiliation would ensure equitable training, standardized operational

procedures, compatible equipment, and lend itself to decreased response times and greater efficiency in the field (Denmark, 1996: 10).

The Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) would undertake various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and would be tasked with cease-fire monitoring; negotiating with and mediating between combatants; establishing infrastructure including housing, electricity, sanitation, water supply and road repair; the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; disposing of surrendered weapons; conducting public information campaigns; providing humanitarian assistance; and maintaining brigade security and ensuring the safety of its personnel (Denmark, 1996: 16). Given the wide range of tasks assigned to the brigade it would require a well balanced, flexible force consisting of "mobile headquarters and communications facilities, three or more protected infantry battalions, one or more light reconnaissance units of company size, as well as units for engineer and logistical support, including transportation, supply, maintenance, health services and military police" (Denmark, 1996: 17). The brigade would also require a permanent Planning Element to assist in brigade maintenance, ensure continuity, plan future operations and evaluate and assess previous operations (Denmark, 1966: 21-22).

SHIRBRIG is intended to provide the UN with a rapid reaction capability while still respecting national decision-making procedures and national sovereignty. As such, brigade deployment would be subject to national approval and member states could withhold their contribution if the mission was deemed to be outside the scope of national interest or if the mission lacked public and/or parliamentary support (Denmark, 1996: 8-9). However, in order to ensure that the brigade is not reduced to inaction by a member

state withholding their contribution, a brigade pool would be established. The brigade pool would consist of military units beyond the force requirements of the brigade which could step-in if and when particular units where withdrawn as a result of national concerns. The brigade pool would also ensure that every brigade unit had at least one duplicate. As the report notes, the

> duplication of units assigned to the Brigade by different participating nations will help to ensure a satisfactory ability to field the Brigade when needed, provide participating nations with the necessary freedom of action, and prevent the situation from arising where one or a limited number of participants, by deciding to abstain from participation, renders use of the Brigade impossible (Denmark, 1996: 19).

In addition to safe guarding the capacity for rapid deployment while still respecting national decision-making and sovereignty, the brigade pool would provide a strategic reserve capable of reinforcing the brigade if and when necessary (Denmark, 1996: 19).

SHIRBRIG is intended to function as a rapid reaction force and is not intended to act as, or replace regular peace operation forces. In this regard, the deployment duration of the brigade is limited to six months. If the mission is to continue beyond the specified six months, the brigade must be replaced by other forces. To ensure that replacement forces are ready for deployment within six months, planning for their deployment must begin as soon as the brigade is deployed. Similarly, planning for the brigade's deployment should begin in parallel with UN and national decision-making to ensure that once a decision is reached the brigade is able to deploy within 15 – 30 days (Denmark, 1996: 14-15, 26).

Given the brief duration of the brigade's deployment, it is recommended that the brigade be self-sufficient for its entire deployment because the establishment of a UN logistical support network is unlikely in the first three to six months of deployment.

Instead the brigade would rely on the logistical support of contributing nations (Denmark, 1996: 23). In addition to logistical support, the report notes that "participating nations will retain full financial responsibility for their individual troop contributions, and the individual participant will meet all expenses in relation to assigning troop contributions to the brigade" (Denmark, 1996: 15). Such expenses include training, housing and if necessary evacuation from the deployment area. Although participating nations are fiscally responsible for their contributions, some costs such as personnel and equipment are expected to be reimbursed by the UN and the report recommends UN reimbursement for costs arising out of "pre-deployment structures and activities," including training, housing and the establishment and maintenance of the Planning Element (Denmark, 1996: 22, 25-26).

In order to help ease the fiscal burden of contributing nations and ensure the brigade is capable of deployment when necessary, specific safeguards are identified to prevent the frivolous use of the brigade's resources and unique capabilities. Simply put, the brigade should only be deployed in crises where time is of the essence and when no other forces are available. Similarly, the brigade will only be deployed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and requires six months of reconstitution following deployment. Such safe guards will help ensure that the brigade is deployed only for those tasks specific to its creation (Denmark, 1996: 10-11, 15).

When the pre-conditions for deployment are met and "if appropriate for the operation in question, due considerations should be given to appoint the Brigade Commander as Force Commander, at least for the initial period, when the Brigade, due to its rapid reaction capability, must be expected to be the only force or the majority of

the forces deployed" (Denmark, 1996: 13). Regardless of whether or not the Brigade Commander is also chosen as Force Commander, the Brigade, when deployed, remains under the direction of the Secretary-General and "is subject to the standard command and control arrangements for United Nations operations." Standard command and control arrangements dictate that personnel remain under national command (Denmark, 1996: 20).

In the end, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish proposals premised their recommendations on the belief that rapid reaction was a more effective and efficient means of intervention. The Dutch proposal, being the first published, advocated the most revolutionary reform: the immediate creation of an independent UN rapid deployment brigade. The Canadian report was more conservative than the Dutch and advocated a series of short to medium-term reforms leading up to the creation of an independent UN rapid deployment brigade in the long-term. The Danish report was the last published and was the most conservative of all. It abandoned an independent UN brigade and instead recommended reform within the existing UN framework. Put simply, each consecutive proposal became less revolutionary and more in keeping with the status quo.

Despite the degree of reform advocated, the rapid reaction debate revitalized the optimism present at the end of the Cold War and illustrated that the UN need not be written off as an ineffective and irrelevant international institution nor relegated to the sidelines of international affairs. It demonstrated that, given the right tools, the UN might be capable of responding efficiently and effectively to crises around the globe.

The Dutch, Canadian and Danish proposals were attempts to provide the UN with the capabilities necessary for effective intervention.

Chapter 3
Maintaining the Status Quo: Modest Achievements and Recent Developments

The rapid reaction debate of the mid-1990s was filled with hope and cautious optimism. The Dutch, Canadians and Danes through their respective proposals suggested means for UN rapid deployment in an effort to make the organization more effective and to prevent future atrocities. Unfortunately, it seems that such hope and optimism was misplaced. Ten years after the fact, very little of what was envisioned in the rapid reaction debate has actually been achieved. In fact, the only two notable accomplishments in the realm of UN rapid deployment have been the modest expansion of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) and the creation of the Danish proposed Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Of these two accomplishments, only SHIRBRIG developed directly out of a rapid reaction proposal. UNSAS was already in existence and it became the cornerstone of the SHIRBRIG proposal. Its expansion and evolution was guided by the *Brahimi Report* rather than a rapid deployment proposal.

The *Brahimi Report*[9] was intended to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peace operations and it made four major recommendations relating to rapid deployment. First, it defined "rapid and effective deployment" as 30 days for traditional peace operations and 90 days for complex operations. Second, it suggested the creation of an "on-call list" of military personnel for the establishment of new mission headquarters. Such personnel would be rapidly deployable and would form the basis of

[9] The *Brahimi Report*, formally known as the *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects*, was released in August of 2000. Many of its recommendations were regarding administrative and budgetary processes.

new headquarters. Third, the *Report* recommended the creation of partnerships to form brigade sized contingents that could be rapidly deployed. Finally, the *Brahimi Report* recommended giving the Secretary-General the ability to examine the level of preparedness of national contingents slated for deployment with the UN in a peace operation. If the contingent was not properly prepared it would not be deployed. While these recommendations were made within the context of the UNSAS, they were intended to reduce UN deployment time and make a real contribution to rapid deployment (Brahimi, A/55/305, 2000).

The evolution of UNSAS and the creation of SHIRBRIG are significant achievements but it is important to note that these developments were spawned by the lackluster *Brahimi Report* and the most cautious and pragmatic rapid deployment proposal respectively. Sadly, the revolutionary changes sought by the Dutch and Canadians were never attempted or even considered. The modest expansion of UNSAS and the less risky, less expensive and arguably less effective SHIRBRIG came to fruition while the ambitious recommendations of the Dutch and Canadians faded into obscurity.

UNSAS

UNSAS pre-dates the Dutch, Canadian and Danish reports and forms the basis of the Danish proposed SHIRBRIG.[10] UNSAS came into existence in 1993, following the establishment of the United Nations Stand-by Forces Planning Team. The Planning

[10] SHIRBRIG was created within the UNSAS framework. Its members make specific contingents available to UNSAS and then form affiliations between such contingents to create a cohesive multinational force. Essentially, SHIRBRIG uses UNSAS as a database for available contingents and SHIRBRIG deployments are derived from contingents pledged to UNSAS.

Team was tasked with "developing a system of stand-by forces, able to be deployed …anywhere in the world at the Secretary-General's request…for United Nations duties, as mandated by the Security Council" (Mentzen, 1998). After establishing UNSAS, the Planning Team was replaced in 1994 by the Stand-by Arrangement Management Unit which developed readiness standards, negotiated participation with member states, and created a resource database (Langille, 2002: 43; Mentzen, 1998).

> The United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System is a system of arrangements negotiated between the United Nations and individual member states. The resources agreed upon remain on 'stand-by' in their home country, where necessary preparations, including training, is conducted to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. When necessary, the resources are requested by the Secretary-General, and, if approved by the member states, are rapidly deployed (Langille, 2002: 43).

In short, member states are to pledge specific resources and/or personnel to UNSAS for deployment with a UN peace operation. Such pledges are conditional. National authorities dictate the terms and conditions of deployment and always have the final say on whether national resources or personnel are deployed (UNSAS Military Handbook, 2003: 4).

UNSAS is intended to decrease UN response time by providing a database of available resources and personnel and facilitating mission planning. UNSAS provides the UN with a "precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a member state will have available, at a given state of readiness, should it agree to contribute to the peacekeeping operation… [and] …the bilateral exchange of detailed information [will] facilitate planning and preparation" (Security Council, S/2000/194). Timely preparation and planning is essential to any rapid deployment initiative and by maintaining a comprehensive database of resources and personnel:

> the United Nations Secretariat is in a better position to determine the resources available to meet peacekeeping mission requirements. It also enables the departmental planners to tailor realistic tasks for resources provided by the governments according to their capabilities, as well as identify what services and materials will need to be procured or contracted if deficiencies exist. The database also provide generic information that helps logistics planners to know in advance what transportation provisions are required in terms of force units movement into the mission area (Mentzen, 1998).

UNSAS's resource database contains all national pledges of resources and/or personnel, their state of readiness and conditions of deployment. As such, the planning of peace operations is streamlined and deployment time reduced.

Although member states pledge resources and personnel to the UNSAS, all contributions remain in their home country until national authorities agree to deploy such resources for UN duty. As such, national authorities retain full financial responsibility for pledged contingents while at home. Similarly, national authorities also retain responsibility for training these contingents, although training guidelines are distributed by the UN Secretariat to help ensure standardization. The UN assumes command and financial responsibility of national contingents while deployed on UN duty and retains responsibility for support of deployed contingents. Although the UN is tasked with support and logistics, all contingents are required to be self-sustaining for the first 90 days of deployment while a UN support network is established (UNSAS Military Handbook, 2003: 5-6, 9-10).

UNSAS is organized according to levels of commitment and the nature and extent of a member state's participation is determined by the commitment level chosen. There are four levels of commitment. The first level consists of the provision of a list of national capabilities that may be made available to UNSAS. Such a list may include a description of the equipment available, the size and strength of contingents, and an

estimated response time. It is important to note that providing UNSAS with a list of national capabilities is by no means an assurance of participation in a peace operation; national authorities always retain the right to withhold participation (UNSAS Military Handbook, 2003: 7).

The second commitment level builds and expands upon the first by providing UNSAS with a more detailed list of national capabilities through the completion of a Planning Data Sheet. The Planning Data Sheet includes an extensive and specific inventory of equipment, unit organization, self-sustainment levels, and personnel data. The third commitment level goes one step beyond the second to include the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). MOU's contain much of the same data found in the Planning Data Sheet but also include response time and, most importantly, conditions for employment. MOU's are an important element of UNSAS because they offer the UN Secretariat a detailed outline of the capabilities available as well as the conditions required for deployment (UNSAS Military Handbook, 2003: 7).

The fourth level was established in July 2002 and came about as a result of poor deployment times with the first three commitment levels. Although UNSAS is intended to lend itself to UN rapid deployment, the target deployment time for level one, two and three is 120 days. Because four months cannot be considered rapid, the fourth commitment level adheres to the deployment standards recommended in the *Brahimi Report* of 30 days for traditional peace operations and 90 days for complex peace operations (Brahimi Report, S/2000/809).

The fourth commitment level, aptly known as the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) (www.un.org, UNSAS 2002 Annual Update), consists of extensive pre-

deployment preparation and planning. Such pre-deployment planning greatly decreases deployment time by

> converting the agreed equipment lists into load lists, and…by determining the proposed contingents' sustainment capabilities and requirements…[Similarly, member states ensure] that a specific unit, consisting of an agreed suite of equipment and personnel, is capable of fulfilling certain tasks, in total or as part of the resource required, and is available for deployment within a certain time (www.un.org, UNSAS Rapid Deployment Level).

RDL participants are not required to provide all the sustainment capabilities necessary as national contributions may be augmented by resources and equipment from the UN's Strategic Deployment Stocks.[11] Nor is it required that all the essential resources for a peace operation be fielded from the RDL. Contingents from RDL may deploy first to establish a UN presence and be augmented later by contingents from any of the other commitment levels. The only restriction to participation in the RDL is deployment time. Member states must ensure that all contingents are deployable within 90 days.

In addition to the creation of the RDL, a number of recent initiatives, namely the development of an "on-call list," the promotion of partnerships and sub-regional arrangements and the development of the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), have sought to make UNSAS more efficient and effective and decrease deployment time. Like the RDL, the "on-call list," came out of the *Brahimi Report*.

> A further step to improving the current situation would be to give the Secretary-General a capability for assembling, on short notice, military planners, staff officers and other military technical experts…to liaise with mission planners at Headquarters and then deploy to the field…to help establish a mission's military headquarters… Using the current Standby Arrangement System, an "on-call list" of such personnel…could be formed for this purpose (Brahimi Report, S/2000/809: 18).

[11] The Strategic Deployment Stocks are a stock-pile of UN owned equipment for use in peace operations.

Similar to that envisioned in the *Brahimi Report*, the "on-call list" consists of approximately 100 military personnel who provide the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with additional expertise and assistance in mission planning and start-up and are rapidly deployed to form the nucleus of new mission headquarters (Langille, 2002: 45; UNSAS Military Handbook, 2003: 7).

The on-call list is structured according to deployment time and consists of three groups or pools of individuals. Personnel pledged to Group One are deployable within seven days and are tasked with forming the Core Planning Team. The team consists of nine individuals who deploy to UN headquarters in New York to augment and assist the planning element already underway in the DPKO before deploying to the theatre of operations to establish and maintain mission headquarters.

Following the deployment of the Core Planning Team, individuals pledged to Group Two deploy from their country of origin directly to the mission area to staff the mission headquarters and prepare for the arrival of contingents. Group Two personnel augment the Core Planning Team in the field, must be deployable within fourteen days and "complete the formation of the new mission headquarters" (UNSAS Military Handbook, 2003: 8; On-Call List).

While Group One and Two individuals are deployed for the sole task of creating new mission headquarters, Group Three personnel are deployed as replacements and to fill vacancies in ongoing missions. As a result, Group Three individuals are not subject to the same strict deployment times of Group One and Two. Rather they are deployed according to the response time agreed upon between the UN and member state. Regardless of specific deployment time, the "on-call list" provides the UN with a list of

readily available, qualified individuals who reduce the time required for mission planning and start-up and therefore reduce overall deployment time.

The promotion of partnerships and sub-regional arrangements within UNSAS is also aimed at reducing UNSAS's deployment time and increasing effectiveness by ensuring standardized training and force cohesion. Both the *Brahimi Report* and the *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Stand-by Arrangements for Peacekeeping* encouraged the formation of such partnerships and sub-regional/multinational brigade sized units. As the *Brahimi Report* notes:

> If the United Nations military planners assess that a brigade is what is required to effectively deter or deal with violent challenges…then the military component of that operation ought to deploy as a brigade formation, not as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another's doctrine, leadership and operational practices (Brahimi, S/2000/809: 19).

Multinational brigade size units may contribute to force cohesion by ensuring all contingents receive common training and language standardization prior to deployment. Similarly, as the *Progress Report* notes, if brigade units assume responsibility for a specific geographic area near their embarkation point, deployment times may be reduced (Security Council, S/2000/194). The formation of the Danish SHIRBRIG is an example of such an initiative.

The final initiative directed at improving the effectiveness of UNSAS was the creation of the UN's SDS in 2002. The SDS is intended to address the ongoing problem of poorly and ill equipped peace operations by procuring and stockpiling UN owned equipment for use in peace operations. In 2002, the UN General Assembly allocated $140 million towards this endeavor with the object of procuring enough equipment to equip fully one traditional and one complex peace operation per year (UNSAS Annual

Update, 2002; General Assembly, A/58/707, 2004; General Assembly, A/56/863, 2002). In so doing, SDS seeks to increase the effectiveness of UNSAS and decrease deployment time by providing much of the necessary equipment for peace operations and, therefore, limiting the amount of time spent seeking contributions from weary member states.

Despite the previous initiatives and all their good intentions, UNSAS has yet to become an effective and true means of rapid deployment. UNSAS lacks universal membership and has yet to receive the full support of the major powers. Of the one hundred and ninety-one UN members, only eighty are members of UNSAS and only two nations, Jordan and Uruguay, have committed themselves to the RDL. Similarly, China and the United States have been less than enthusiastic in their support for UNSAS by only committing themselves to Level One. Other Level One supporters include Estonia, Myanmar, Senegal and Uzbekistan (www.un.org, UNASAS Current Status, January 2005).

Similarly, despite UNSAS's encouragement of sub-regional arrangements and the strengthening of the SDS, force coherency and equipment availability remain problems. In the absence of pre-deployment joint training and exercises, force coherency remains a challenge because forces meet for the first time in theatre. Likewise, equipment availability remains a challenge because nations continue to contribute personnel who are ill equipped or not equipped at all and the SDS is still unable to provide all necessary provisions. Finally, regardless of UNSAS, the availability of equipment and personnel remains an issue because member states retain the right to deny deployment of national resources. UNSAS is a conditional, non-

binding arrangement. It is unable to ensure that personnel and equipment will be available when needed. Contributions to UNSAS are still made on a case-by-case basis and all deployments are subject to the political will of member states (Langille, 2002: 45-49).

SHIRBRIG

Despite the continued evolution and expansion of UNSAS, the most significant development arising out of the rapid reaction debate of the mid-1990s was the creation of the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Following the release of the Danish-led Working Group's paper in March of 1996, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden signed a Letter of Intent and MOU establishing SHIRBRIG in December 1996 and March 1997 respectively (Vance, 2004: 5; MOU/SHIRBRIG, 1997: para 1.1). The actual formation, structure and duties of SHIRBRIG are essentially the same as those envisioned by the Working Group that authored the proposal and as a result the brigade itself deviates very little from its original concept.

The SHIRBRIG concept is comprised of three core elements: rapid deployment, sovereignty and UN authorization (Crabbe, 2005). The first, as the *2003 Work Plan for the SHIRBRIG Presidency* notes, "is the raison d'etre of the organization" (Work Plan, 2003). SHIRBRIG came out of the rapid reaction debate of the mid-1990s and was developed in response to the deplorable deployment times of UN peace operations. SHIRBRIG was developed as a means of addressing a specific challenge, poor deployment times, and it is not surprising that the widely accepted solution to this

challenge, namely a rapid response, became such a fundamental element of the organization's identity. Given that a rapid response capability is a core element of SHIRBRIG, the *MOU Concerning Operation, Funding, Administration and Status* recommended deployment times of 21-30 days from point of embarkation following national deployment authorization. Because rapid deployment often places personnel on the ground before an adequate logistics support network can be established, SHIRBRIG contingents adhere to a 60 day self-sufficiency rule (MOU/SHIRBRIG, 1997: para, 3.3, 6.8) and are "designed to operate at considerable distance from home-base support structures and in an environment where infrastructure is poor or non-existent" (Work Plan, 2003).

Just as rapid deployment forms an essential element of the SHIRBRIG concept, so does respect for national sovereignty and UN authorization. Although member nations may make specific resources available for use through SHIRBRIG, national participation in any SHIRBRIG deployment is decided on a "case-by-case basis"; national authorities have the final say in whether national resources and/or personnel are deployed on a specific operation (Work Plan, 2003; MOU/SHIRBRIG, 1997: para 3.1). The protection of, and respect for national sovereignty within SHIRBRIG is both necessary and pragmatic. It allows member nations to contribute if and when they are able and when such an operation falls within the scope of national interest. Similarly, it ensures the ability to deny deployment when such an operation is deemed outside the realm of national importance. In addition to national authorization, SHIRBRIG requires a UN Security Council resolution prior to deployment. Although SHIRBRIG was originally intended for deployment only under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, as of 2003

"members have agreed to consider more robust operations on a case-by-case basis" (SHIRBRIG brochure, 2003) given that many new UN operations are mandated under Chapter VII. Notable examples include the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

SHIRBRIG consists of three main components: the Steering Committee, the Planning Element and the Brigade Pool. The Steering Committee is the executive body of SHIRBRIG and is responsible for policy creation relating to exercises and training, interoperability and troop contributions, employment guidelines including rules of engagement and the use of force, and logistics support and transportation requirements and capacities. The Steering Committee is also tasked with directing and supervising the operation of the Planning Element (MOU/SC, March 9, 1997: para 6.1 – 6.2). To carry out its numerous functions, the Steering Committee is comprised of military and civilian personnel from each of SHIRBRIG's fully participating members[12] (Work Plan, 2003; Crabbe, 2003)

Despite its wide range of activities, "the primary role of the Steering Committee is one of force generation" (Work Plan, 2003). Essentially, the Steering Committee acts as a liaison between the DPKO and SHIRBRIG members. It maintains contact with DPKO and receives requests from the UN for SHIRBRIG contributions to UN operations. The Steering Committee remains abreast of UN operational developments

[12] "Fully participating members" refers to those SHIRBRIG nations that have signed *all* the SHIRBRIG documents. There are currently ten fully participating members: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. However, there are five additional SHIRBRIG members - Finland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Ireland and Portugal – that are not "fully participating members" because they have yet to sign all the SHIRBRIG documents. In addition to the 15 SHIRBRIG members, there are six SHIRBRIG observers: Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan, and Senegal. Argentina was a member but suspended its membership due to economic crisis (Crabbe, August 2003; www.shirbrig.dk).

and relays any developments and/or requests for contributions to SHIRBRIG members. Most importantly, the Steering Committee develops an Operational Plan for SHIRBRIG deployment once a request is received (Crabbe, July 2003).

The second structural component of SHIRBRIG is the Planning Element. The Planning Element is the permanent component of the SHIRBRIG headquarters and is tasked with all pre-deployment activities including the development of Standard Operating Procedures; establishing options for strategic movement; planning and overseeing operational and logistical training exercises; supporting UN headquarters through contingency planning and participation in fact finding missions; and the collection and evaluation of lessons learned (MOU/PLANELM, September 1997: para 4.1). Put very simply, the Planning Element conducts all pre-deployment planning and deploys as the nucleus of mission headquarters (Work Plan, 2003).

The Planning Element is comprised of 15 officers including a Brigade Commander, who are assigned to the Planning Element for a two or three year term. "All military planning functions are represented" (Crabee, August 2003) in the Planning Element and staff are representative of all the full participating members. Because each fully participating nation is represented, each nation is responsible for the costs associated with its assigned staff member(s) including salary and living allowances. Similarly, all other costs related to the operation of the Planning Element are shared equally amongst the full participating nations, although such costs are negligible as the total 2003 operating budget for the Planning Element was a mere $450,000 (US). Once divided equally and assessed to each participant, each nation owed only $44,000 for the

2003 fiscal year (MOU/PLANELM, September 1997: para 7.2, 8.3, 8.6-8.7; Crabbe, August 2003).

The Planning Element is the most important element of SHIRBRIG for a number of reasons. First, the existence of a permanent staff enables the development of an intimate knowledge of the policies and procedures related to peace operations and an in-depth understanding of the UN system. Such awareness and understanding lends itself to more detailed and specific contingency plans which in turn leads to quicker deployment times. Similarly, a permanent staff lends itself to the formation of effective working relationships despite the many different languages, cultures, religions and nationalities within the Planning Element.

Additionally, the existence of a permanent staff is advantageous because permanent staffers are not subject to "call-up" to national duties. Therefore, permanent staffers, as the nucleus of a mission headquarters, can deploy more readily and be in theatre creating a framework for an expanded headquarters, establishing a logistic support network for yet to be deployed contingents, gathering intelligence and establishing liaisons with warring factions, locals and regional governments. A rapidly deployable headquarters, even if just a skeletal headquarters formed by 15 Planning Element Officers, is an essential component of any rapidly deployed mission.

Finally, the Planning Element has become exceptionally adept at formulating in-depth nation studies and producing detailed concept papers which identify potential operations and outline how such operations could and should be conducted. Such practices are essential to rapid deployment as in-depth contingency planning, prior to an UN mandate, significantly reduces deployment time. As Lieutenant General Crabbe,

former Chair of the Steering Committee, explained, deployment time is contingent upon the amount of planning and preparation that goes into a mission prior to a UN mandate. If the majority of the planning is complete, contingents can deploy almost immediately. On the other hand, if very little or no contingency planning has been undertaken prior to a mandate, deployment will be delayed by such planning (Crabbe, 2005)

The third structural element of SHIRBRIG is the Brigade Pool. As the *MOU Concerning Operation, Funding, Administration and Status* notes, "the SHIRBRIG Brigade Pool is an administrative tool, which enables the Planning Element to identify the type of contributions, which might be available for SHIRBRIG missions" (MOU/SHIRBRIG, 1997: para 4.2). Essentially, the Brigade Pool is a number of duplicate units in excess of force requirements, which help ensure that the Brigade is not reduced to inaction if a number of members withhold their contributions (Denmark, 1996: 19). The Brigade Pool contains communication facilities, infantry battalions, medical companies, engineering and logistics support, reconnaissance units, a helicopter squadron and a headquarters company (Work Plan, 2003; MOU/SHIRBRIG, 1997: para 3.1; Langille, 2002: 50).

Given that the Brigade Pool helps maintain SHIRBRIG's viability, it is not surprising that the *2005 Work Plan for the SHIRBRIG Presidency* made specific reference to the Pool stating, "the demand for expanding the SHIRBRIG membership and creating additional redundancies or other specialized assets for the Brigade Pool is a priority issue…[Membership expansion] is an ongoing process essential for ensuring the necessary capabilities for the force generation of SHIRBRIG" (Work Plan, 2005). The importance of maintaining and expanding the Brigade Pool is difficult to understate

given force over-stretch and the declining defence budgets faced by many SHIRBRIG nations. A healthy and robust Brigade Pool is essential if SHIRBRIG is to retain its ability for rapid deployment.

Despite the need for membership expansion, there are strict requirements for SHIRBRIG membership. First of all, membership is reserved for small to middle powers who may be unable to field a large force for employment in a peace operation and who possess similar capabilities. Second, SHIRBRIG members must have previous peacekeeping experience and be participants, or willing to become participants, in UNSAS. Third, members must be capable of providing contingents that are fully equipped, well trained and at specific levels of readiness. Finally, all members must be able to pay for their membership (Crabbe, August 2003; Crabbe, 2005).

Although such criterion is exclusionary, particularly for poorer developing nations who are unable to provide fully equipped, well trained contingents and/or pay for their membership, it is absolutely necessary to maintain the integrity of the Brigade. SHIRBRIG is based on the concept of rapid deployment and in order to ensure a rapid response all contingents must be fully equipped and well trained and member nations must be able to financially support their contributions. Put simply, “deployed forces must have the credibility and the capacity to carry out roles assigned in support of UN operations” (Work Plan, 2003).

Due to the above criteria, SHIRBRIG members are typically wealthy, northern nations. However, it is important to reiterate that such criteria, although exclusionary, are in place to maintain Brigade integrity and *not* to maintain an “old boys club” of sorts. Although all SHIRBRIG members are from Europe and North America,

SHIRBRIG is aware of the need to expand membership to help ensure global representation within the Brigade (Crabbe, 2005)

Just as strict membership criteria are needed to maintain Brigade integrity, strict deployment criteria are also needed to maintain Brigade availability. To prevent the frivolous use of the Brigade's capabilities, SHIRBRIG will be deployed only on peace or humanitarian operations that are mandated by the Security Council and require a rapid response. In order to ensure SHIRBRIG's capacity for rapid deployment and to prevent it from becoming bogged down in any one operation, deployment is limited to six months and the Brigade will not be subject to regular force rotation in connection with on going operations (MOU/SC**,** March 9, 1997: para 2.1; MOU/SHIRBRIG, 1997: para 3.1, 6.1-6.5).

Although specific deployment conditions may give SHIRBRIG the impression of being immovable and inflexible, SHIRBRIG has matured and evolved over the years to reflect changes in UN requirements. One such evolution was SHIRBRIG's agreement in 2003 to expand its operational repertoire to include both Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates. This was done to reflect more adequately the increasingly robust nature of new peace operations. Similarly, SHIRBRIG has moved away from its original ideal of "deploying the complete brigade as an entity and operating it as such" to more flexible deployments (Work Plan, 2003). Flexible deployment includes the deployment of only specific elements of the Brigade, most notably the Planning Element and SHIRBRIG headquarters, to assist in the creation of new mission or form the basis of new UN operations (Crabbe, August 2003). SHIRBRIG's deployment of its headquarters to Liberia as part of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and its recent

deployment of the Planning Element to Sudan as part of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) are recent examples of flexible deployment in action (Crabbe, 2005; www.shirbrig.dk).

Rapid Reaction Considered

After being declared ready for deployment in January of 2000, SHIRBRIG deployed on its first mission to Eritrea as part of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in January 2001. UNMEE was established in June of 2000, following the signing of a peace accord between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and began as a very limited operation consisting of up to one hundred military observers. Such a limited deployment was established in preparation of a larger, follow-up peace operation and was intended to establish liaisons with local parties and assist in planning the follow-up operation (Background, www.un.org).

In anticipation of a larger peace operation, the UN and SHIRBRIG conducted a technical assessment mission in July of 2000 and SHIRBRIG was approached as a potential troop contributor (www.forces.gc.ca, November 21, 2000). In response to the UN's request, the Netherlands agreed to consider deployment "on the condition that a reliable and experienced peacekeeping partner would also participate in a significant way" (www.forces.gc.ca, November 21, 2000). Canada turned out to be such a "reliable and experience partner" and on October 6, 2000 the Netherlands formally agreed to contribute forces through SHIRBRIG to the newly expanded UNMEE. Canada followed suit on October 17, 2000.[13] (www.forces.gc.ca, November 21, 2000).

[13] In September 2000, the Security Council through Resolution 1320 authorized the expansion of UNMEE to include 4,300 personnel (background, www.un.org).

The Dutch and Canadian SHIRBRIG contingents deployed to the region in early December "to complete mission specific training, administration and acclimatization prior to operations" but were not fully deployed or even operational until January of 2001 (www.forces.gc.ca, November 21, 2000; www.forces.gc.ca, June 6, 2001). In addition to the Dutch and Canadian SHIRBRIG battalion, SHIRBRIG also provided UNMEE with headquarters support. In total, SHIRBRIG contributed an approximate 1,700 personnel to UNMEE (UNMEE/PR/58, June 11, 2001). SHIRBRIG's first deployment with UNMEE was hailed a success despite less than desirable deployment time. Four months passed from the date of the UN resolution expanding UNMEE in September to the arrival of operational SHIRBRIG contingents in the theatre in January. For a previously untested concept/Brigade, SHIRBRIG performed adequately and proved itself to be a valuable UN resource. However, it does not at present constitute rapid reaction as defined by the *Brahimi Report*. The *Brahimi Report* set the rapid reaction standard for deployment in a complex peace operation at 90 days or less, yet it took SHIRBRIG 120 days to deploy. Until SHIRBRIG can meet the standards set out in *Brahimi*, it cannot be considered rapid deployment.

Although SHIRBRIG was established with the intention of providing the UN with peacekeeping personnel who are readily available, fully equipped and well trained, the SHIRBRIG mandate has evolved and expanded to include capacity building. Capacity building refers to the further development of national and/or regional peacekeeping capabilities through SHIRBRIG assistance. SHIRBRIG identifies and participates in three areas of capacity building: modeling, secondment and training, and planning assistance.

First, SHIRBRIG is viewed as an example on which other Brigades can be modeled. Regional organizations and/or like-minded nations may replicate the structure and mandate of SHIRBRIG to establish a similar Brigade for rapid reaction (Crabbe, August 2003; Capacity Building, 2003). The existence of other SHIRBRIG type arrangements would enable geographic specialization and may decrease deployment time as personnel would be acclimatized to regional conditions, familiar with regional cultures and languages, properly inoculated, and possess specific training and equipment for regional terrain (Crabbe, 2005).

Second, non-SHIRBRIG officers have been seconded to the Planning Element for three to six months for on-the-job training in multinational headquarters and to gain experience with peacekeeping policies. Additionally, SHIRBRIG allows non-SHIRBRIG officers to participate in SHIRBRIG field training exercises as a means of exposing "participants to UN procedures and enhancing their knowledge and understanding of the UN and of rapid deployment" (Crabbe, August 2003). Secondment and SHIRBRIG training is intended to provide non-SHIRBRIG officers with the knowledge required to develop peacekeeping policy and procedures in their own nations and/or regional organizations.

Finally, SHIRBRIG, through the Planning Element and headquarters, provides planning assistance to nations and/or regional organizations attempting to establish a new peace operation (Crabbe, August 2003; Capacity Building, 2003). As noted, earlier the Planning Element is particularly adept at formulating national studies and concept papers and is an invaluable resource and wealth of information to nations and/or regional organizations with little peacekeeping experience. Planning assistance through

SHIRBRIG may decrease deployment time and mission effectiveness by ensuring the operation is properly mandated and participants are knowledgeable of conditions in the theatre.

Interestingly though not surprising, the bulk of SHIRBRIG's capacity building efforts have focused on Africa. In fact, all SHIRBRIG deployments and assistance missions have been to Africa: Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. SHIRBRIG's preoccupation with Africa is difficult to understate. Both the 2003 and 2005 *Work Plan for the SHIRBRIG Presidency* make explicit reference to the need for capacity building in Africa. The *2005 Work Plan* lists "reinforcing SHIRBRIG's role in helping build a similar capacity for peacekeeping in Africa" as a main priority and goes on to state, "the growing demand of crisis management on the African Continent will ask SHIRBRIG to further adapt in order to be ready to deploy to Africa and to assist African organizations in creating their own assets for peacekeeping" (Work Plan, 2005).

Unfortunately, the extent to which such efforts will be successful is questionable. Africa is a continent awash in conflict and poverty and it is highly unlikely that African nations, regardless of SHIRBRIG assistance, possess the necessary resources and expertise to develop and maintain a capability similar to SHIRBRIG. That being said, an African SHIRBRIG may be an important step towards lasting peace on the troubled continent. Previous experiences in Somalia and Rwanda[14] have made the western world increasingly weary of providing personnel for African peace operations and it is questionable whether or not the western world will ever take a leading role in an African

[14] Both Somalia and Rwanda saw the deliberate targeting of UN personnel and both missions drew heavy UN casualties – the most notable of which were the death of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers and the death of eighteen American Rangers in Mogadishu and the death of eleven Belgian peacekeepers in Kigali. Both missions were clear examples of the dangers faced by UN personnel and as a result many nations, western/northern in particular, are reluctant to put their personnel in such situations.

peace operation again. It seems the Africans have been left to their own devices and the development of an African SHIRBRIG type brigade, although unlikely, may be the continent's only hope.

Although SHIRBRIG has been quite successful, it is not without limitations. First of all, SHIRBRIG's respect and protection of national sovereignty leaves deployment decisions in the hands of national authorities and such decisions are most often dependant upon political will. Unfortunately, political will is notoriously unreliable and often absent regardless of the merit and/or necessity of a peace operation. As the *2003 Work Plan for the SHIRBRIG Presidency* notes, the political will of member nations to deploy is critical to the overriding requirement of SHIRBRIG – rapid deployment (Work Plan, 2003). Too often, "there is a philosophical lack of political will for countries to follow through on their promises. Some countries…are afflicted by the "body-bag" syndrome and, fearing any casualties, will only commit to slow, deliberate, "antiseptic warfare"" (www.wfm.org). Political will is an inherently problematic and too often absent prerequisite for deployment; it simply cannot be relied upon.

Similarly, if political will is not an obstacle to deployment, force availability may be. Critics of SHIRBRIG express concern over the potential lack of available contingents noting that "a larger pool of resources is needed to allow for last minute reductions in resource commitments by individual member states…If [the Brigade] is not to be constrained at the last minute, the pool will have to be larger" (Langille, 2002: 55). However, as noted previously, SHIRBRIG is aware of the need to expand the Brigade Pool but is often constrained by strict membership criteria. Simply approaching existing SHIRBRIG members for additional contributions will have limited success due

to force over-stretch and declining defence budgets. That being said, if SHIRBRIG seeks to remain viable and readily available, the Brigade Pool must be expanded while still maintaining Brigade quality and standards. Despite its limitations, SHIRBRIG remains a valuable UN resource in that it provides a fully equipped and well-trained Brigade. However, it does not constitute rapid reaction. This warrants repeating: SHIRBRIG is not at present rapidly deployable.

While the continued expansion and evolution of UNSAS and the creation of SHIRBRIG have been positive developments which, undoubtedly, have led to a more responsive UN, neither provides the UN with a true rapid reaction capability. Although UNSAS provides the UN with a database of resources, such resources are too often lacking in equipment, personnel and training, are deployed elsewhere or are unavailable for political reasons. SHIRBRIG is similarly unable to fulfill the requirement for rapid deployment as its member states are notoriously overstretched militarily and/or constrained politically. Even when political will and available forces coincided, SHIRBRIG's deployment time remains less than desirable at four months, if the Eritrean-Ethiopian operation is indicative of deployment time.

Although the recent expansion of UNSAS and the creation of SHIRBIRG are steps in the right direction, each is inherently conservative and it is somewhat disheartening to realize that the more ambitious rapid reaction proposals were not even attempted nor given a second look. Indeed, the extent to which member states actually want a UN rapid reaction capability is questionable for two reasons. First, the number and scope of UN peace operations dropped dramatically following the publication of the three proposals and regional organizations, specifically NATO, began taking on

numerous large-scale, high-profile missions on behalf of the UN[15]. Member states seemed content to contain UN activity and allow regional organizations to take the lead in demanding peace operations. Second, the fact that two of three rapid deployment proposals where dropped even before the ink was dry and only very modest advancements toward rapid deployment have been achieved or even attempted in the past decade is indicative of member state opinion toward UN rapid deployment.

[15] NATO has taken on a number of high-profile large scale operations in the past including Operation Joint Endeavour (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia which consisted of 60,000 personnel and Kosovo Force (KFOR) which consisted of 46,000 personnel. For more information see www.nato.org.

Chapter 4
Fear and Loathing: Explaining the Failure of Rapid Reaction

The post-Cold War era was a time of tremendous optimism and change for the UN and the three rapid reaction proposals that appeared were innovative and visionary. Each proposal, by challenging the status quo to one degree or another, faced extraordinary challenges and, unfortunately, only the most pragmatic proposal garnered serious consideration and eventual implementation. While the Danish proposed SHIRBRIG achieved moderate success, both the Dutch and Canadian proposals were shelved with little to no consideration.

The lack of movement toward rapid reaction, although unfortunate, is not surprising. The rapid deployment proposals were politically unfeasible because they failed to take shifting member state opinion into account. Each proposal assumed that member states would remain supportive of increased UN capabilities in spite of the loss of post-Cold War idealism and the influential American led movement to contain the organizations activities. More fundamentally, rapid reaction, as envisioned by the Dutch and Canadians in particular, posed a serious challenge to the global order and threatened state primacy. Both the Security Council and member states sought to limit UN power, specifically military power, as a means of maintaining control over the organization and containing its costs.

Generally speaking, the rapid reaction proposals of the mid 1990s were grossly out of step with the political reality of the time. The idealism that followed the Cold War was over and the myth of the ‘new world order’ had quickly been exposed. The UN was suffering from severe over-stretched and fatigue and operational failures led to member

state cynicism and distain. Unfortunately, rapid reaction was premised on the assumption that UN member states were fully supportive of such a capability and would be willing to increase their contribution to the organization to make rapid deployment a reality. However, rather than forming closer ties with the UN or increasing their contributions, many member states sought to distance themselves from the troubled organization and contain its activities. This reversal of member state opinion was a significant contributor to the lack of movement toward rapid deployment.

Political Reality

The loss of post-Cold War idealism and the shift in member state opinion toward the UN began around 1993, *before* the release of the three proposals, and was heavily influenced by changing American foreign policy and the souring of US/UN relations. The United States was a central supporter of the 'new' UN following the Cold War and it was with American support and direction that the international organization began playing a much larger role in the maintenance of global peace and security. In fact, the popular post-Cold War phrase that invoked so much hope, optimism and enthusiasm about what the UN could achieve – the 'new world order' - was coined by President Bush. Given the United States leadership role in the UN, it is not surprising that as the US/UN relationship soured and became more adversarial other member states would follow the American example and reconsider their previously held notions about the role of the UN and their involvement in it. American disillusionment with the UN began with President Clinton's new foreign policy and its tragic failure in Somalia.

The drastically altered security environment that followed the end of the Cold War enabled the newly elected Clinton Administration to approach American foreign policy from an entirely new angle. The costly unilateral action that characterized the Cold War was no longer required and the American administration was finally free to pursue a foreign policy based on multilateralism. The new American policy, which quickly became known as assertive multilateralism, relied heavily on multilateral organizations, specifically the UN, to share the costs associated with the maintenance of international peace and security and the pursuit of American interests. Essentially assertive multilateralism was a means of burden sharing. It would allow the United States to advance American interests abroad, but did not require it to shoulder all the costs because the UN had become a payment partner (Sterling-Folker, 1998: 278-280; Delaney, 2004: 33; Daalder, 1996: 40).

In an effort to draft a new foreign policy predicated on assertive multilateralism, Clinton commissioned an all encompassing review of peace operations to address such questions as when to engage, who should engage, how to improve US support for UN operations, and finally, how to strengthen UN operations. Given the administration's enthusiasm for assertive multilateralism, it was not surprising that the final draft of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) "was a forceful endorsement of multilateral peace operations" (Daalder, 1996: 42, 45). As Daalder notes:

> The draft expressed support for the "rapid expansion" of UN operations, noted the greatly expanded US role in peacekeeping and committed the US to support these operations "politically, militarily and financially"…It [also] maintained that "wherever appropriate" the US would employ multilateral peacekeeping as a "key element" of its national security strategy (Daalder, 1996: 45).

Although the draft PDD embodied assertive multilateralism and seemed to signify the beginning of revolutionary change in the course of American foreign policy, it simply reflected changes that had already taken place.

On March 26, 1993, three months prior to the completion of the draft PDD, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 814 establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) which would relieve the American led United Task Force (UNITAF) already operating in Somalia. Resolution 814 was extraordinary for two reasons. First, it tasked UNOSOM II with the daunting chore of disarming combatants and rebuilding the Somali state. Second, it proved the Clinton administration's commitment to assertive multilateralism (Delaney, 2004: 33; MacKinnon, 2001: 20). As MacKinnon, author of *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton*, noted:

> The new ambitious mission given to UNOSOM II was a significant development in that it was fully endorsed by Clinton, thus representing his decision to venture much further than his predecessor into new and uncharted waters. While Bush had pledged to the Somali people only four months earlier that the United States had no intention of influencing the political outcome of the civil war, Clinton signaled his intent to do just that. With strong US support, the UN was instructed…to 'seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from states and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia'. (MacKinnon, 2001: 20-21).

The United States' pursuit of nation building through the UN was evidence of Clinton's fervent, but experimental commitment to assertive multilateralism.

The Clinton Administration's enthusiastic pursuit of assertive multilateralism in the spring of 1993 is difficult to overstate. Not only was the United States a supporter of UNOSOM II's expanded mandate but it was also a chief architect of all UN resolutions pertaining to said mission. As Clarke, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Somalia, noted "all the major Security Council resolutions on Somalia…were written by US

officials…and handed to the United Nations as faits accomplis" (Clarke & Herbst, 1996: 73). Indeed, the most extraordinary Security Council Resolutions for Somalia, 814 and 837, were authored primarily by the United States. Resolution 837 was overtly aggressive and authorized the UN to 'take all necessary measures against all those responsible' for the June 5th ambush and death of Pakistani peacekeepers.[16] However, as Delaney notes, Resolution 837 was "not simply a mandate to bring the perpetrators to justice, [it] was a license to teach Aideed a lesson. And it originated not in New York, but in Washington" (Delaney, 2004: 35).

Despite Clinton's apparent zeal for assertive multilateralism, as the Somali mission became more difficult and demanding due to its nation-building mandate and the mission's shift away from impartial by-stander to combatant, the United States remained unwilling to support UNOSOM II in a multilateral fashion. In fact, as UNOSOM II's mandate became more aggressive and resistance mounted, the United States began moving toward more unilateral activity with the deployment of American Rangers under American command[17] (MacKinnon, 2001: 21). Delaney notes the irony of this situation: "despite the policy of assertive multilateralism, the more assertive the United States became, the less multilateral was the operation" (Delaney, 2004: 36).

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[16] While enroute to inspect a weapons storage site, the Pakistani contingent was ambushed and 24 peacekeepers were killed and 57 wounded. Responsibility for the attack was placed on General Aideed (one of the warlords vying for power in Somalia) and a manhunt to bring him to justice ensued (Delaney, 2004: 35).

[17] In August 1993, 400 Army Rangers and Delta Force personnel were deployed to assist in the capture of General Aideed; these personnel were under US command and operated separately from UN personnel in Somalia. Although the deployment of the Rangers garnered the most media attention, there was already a large contingent of American personnel operating under US, rather than UN, command in the region - this was the 1,300 personnel Quick Reaction Force which had been left behind after the withdraw of the American lead UNITAF to assist UNOSOM II troops in case of emergency. Additionally, approximately 4,000 American logistical personnel operated as part of UNOSOM II and were under UN command. For more information see: Michael MacKinnon (2000) *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend* London: Frank Cass and Doug Delaney (Winter 2004) "Cutting, Running or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia" in *Small Wars and Insurgencies* vol. 15, no. 1.

UNOSOM II tested the Clinton administration's commitment to assertive multilateralism and, rhetoric aside, the United States proved reluctant and unwilling to fully support a multilateral mission which it created and directed.

The United States' lack of commitment to UNOSOM II was due to a realization that the central assumption of assertive multilateralism – burden sharing – was flawed[18]. Assertive multilateralism was based on the premise that increasing involvement in multilateral organizations would decrease the American burden of maintaining international peace and security while still maintaining American interests. However, it failed to recognize the extent to which multilateral organizations, specifically the UN, depended upon American support and leadership in order to function effectively. As Delaney notes:

> If the multilateral United Nations was going to be more assertive in regulating international as well as intra-national disputes, it needed the military, economic and diplomatic weight only the United States could muster. But, in deference to American economic security, neither the Clinton Administration nor the Congress were anxious for the United States to bear a disproportionate share of that burden…Resolution 837 (drafted as it was by the Americans), and the aggressive actions in support of it, reflected the Clinton administration's desire to make UNOSOM II work – without paying too much. Assertive multilateralism depended on it (Delaney, 2004: 40).

The idea that multilateral organizations could operate effectively in complex, demanding missions without American support was sadly misguided. Unfortunately, the UN was/is virtually incapable of forceful action without American support and the problems that plagued the Somali mission were evidence of this. America's policy of

[18] For an in-depth examination of the fundamental assumptions of assertive multilateralism and where such assumptions went wrong, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker (1998) "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Assertive Multilateralism and Post-Cold War US Foreign Policy Making" in J. Scott (ed.), *After the End*, London: Duke University Press.

assertive multilateralism and the draft PDD failed to take such realities into account (Sterling-Folker, 1998: 284).

Although the Clinton administration begun backing away from assertive multilateralism in response to the changing situation in Somalia and increasing public and Congressional opposition at home[19], assertive multilateralism remained the dominant American foreign policy until the fall of 1993. On October 3, 1993, while hunting for Muhammad Farrah Aideed, seventeen American Rangers were killed and seventy-eight wounded in a widely publicized gunfight in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Four days later, President Clinton announced the United States withdrawal from Somalia (Daalder, 1996: 56). This response marked the limit of what the Clinton administration would risk and/or sacrifice in the name of assertive multilateralism. The pictures of a dead, mutilated US Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu solidified American opposition to assertive multilateralism and, as MacKinnon notes, "marked the complete reversal of US policy in Somalia" (MacKinnon, 2000: 24). The assertive multilateralism experiment had failed and the impact of the Clinton administration's response to that failure would be felt around the globe.

The American response to the tragic events in Somalia was to redraft PDD 25 and tone down its support for multilateralism and UN peace operations. As Daalder notes,

> gone was the bold rhetoric of earlier versions supporting the "rapid expansion" of UN peacekeeping and committing the US to support such operations…Instead of emphasizing the centrality of multilateral peacekeeping in US security policy,

[19] The American public was willing to commit resources to a short-term, morally justified humanitarian operation – feeding starving Somalis – but were less willing to risk resources and lives to end a civil war and rebuild a failed state in which the US had no strategic interest. Additionally, many Americans and members of Congress in particular, saw the United Nations as a bloated, ineffective bureaucracy and sought to decrease the United States' financial commitment to the organization.

> the completely rewritten introduction of the PDD began by describing the limited role peacekeeping played in US national security and defence policy…The goal of US policy was neither to expand the number of UN operations nor to enhance US involvement in such operations; rather the US would aim to ensure that peacekeeping would be "more selective and more effective" in the future (Daalder, 1996: 58).

In an effort to make UN operations "more selective and effective" and limit American involvement, the revised PDD 25 included an extensive list of criteria to ensure that all UN missions reflect American interests, regardless of whether or not the United States would be contributing personnel.

Concerns of the Community of States

October 3, 1993 marked a turning point in American foreign policy and UN history. Beginning in 1993, the pendulum of member state opinion started to swing back from one which was supportive and enthusiastic about UN operations to one which was more guarded, cautious and realist. Faith in the 'new world order' and the idealism that followed the Cold War was fading and member states began to reevaluate the role of the UN and question their involvement in the organization. The catalyst for member states' doubt and questions was the American response to the events of October 3 and their near complete withdrawal from UN involvement. In fact, the new American foreign policy embodied in the final version of PDD 25 had an enormous impact on the UN and its member states because the United States was less willing to become involved in UN operations. This is especially true since

> PDD 25 does little in practice to reassure the international community that the United States is willing to provide the necessary leadership in times of need, or worse, can perhaps even cause efforts by others to answer a call for help to be blocked. At a time when the UN's capacity for responding to more frequent and complicated calls for help need steady support, PDD 25's subservience to

> domestic politics leaves it as anything but certain that the support needed will be forthcoming (MacKinnon, 2000: 114).

Put very simply, American support of UN operations is virtually a requirement and PDD 25 made that support unlikely.

Of course the United States could not and should not shoulder all the blame for undermining UN support; peacekeeping operations were becoming increasingly dangerous and member states were beginning to question whether such risks were worth taking. However, what the Americans did do was begin the process of abandoning the UN. By using the UN as a scapegoat for its own mistakes in Somalia[20] and pulling a complete policy reversal the United States shook member states' confidence in the UN and its ability to maintain global peace and security.

The American withdrawal from UN operations had a profound effect on the international organization. Not only did it sow seeds of doubt within the membership regarding the organization's expanded role, it also had an immediate adverse effect on the organization's ability to carry out operations. Given American military pre-eminence, member states were reluctant to commit to UN operations that lacked American involvement or support. The unfortunate fact is that the United States, and often only the United States, possesses specific capabilities needed for operational success. One such capability is the immediate evacuation of personnel from the operational theatre if and when the situation warrants. For example, in 1994, Canadian forces were unable to exit Srebrenica and required American assistance to evacuate the

[20] Contrary to public belief, the tragic events were the result of US decisions and US command and control. The UN was not responsible for the tragedy yet the Clinton administration deflected much of the blame and used the UN as a scapegoat to save itself from the outrage of US citizens. For more information about the US role in undermining confidence in the UN see: Michael Hirsh (November/December 1999) "Fall Guy: Washington's Self-Defeating Assault on the UN" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 6 and Douglas Delaney (Winter 2004) "Cutting, Running or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia" in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 15, no. 3.

theatre. Of course American assistance did not come without a price: in exchange for evacuation assistance, the Canadian government agreed not to oppose NATO air strikes in the Srebrenica region.[21] Similarly, in 1995, a full year after the complete withdrawal of American forces from Somalia, Clinton redeployed American troops to the region, as Schraeder notes, to "protect the withdrawal of remaining UN military forces" (Schraeder, 1998: 349). The situation in Somalia had deteriorated to such an extent that only the United States could facilitate a safe withdrawal. Additionally, according to a confidential source, Canadian forces negotiated a classified evacuation agreement with American forces prior to their deployment to Afghanistan in 2001. Without such an agreement, it is highly unlikely that Canadian forces would have been deployed to a dangerous and remote area of the globe without means of withdrawal; the associated risks would have been too great.

Even if specialized American capabilities are not required, member states still question their involvement in peace operations if lacking an American contribution. As MacKinnon notes, "for many states, the lack of US support, be it financial, logistical or military signifies greater chances of failure and much higher costs than would otherwise be the case in such complex and risky operations" (MacKinnon, 2000: 109). The preponderance of American military might is undeniable and member states prefer to operate along side such might rather than without it.

While American involvement is often preferred and occasionally required, the American withdrawal from the UN was not the sole catalyst causing member states to re-evaluate the role of the UN and their participation in it. Unfortunately member states

[21] For more information on the Canadian-American evacuation agreement see: Alex Moens (Spring 2003) "Lessons for Peacekeepers: Srebrenica and the NIOD Report" in *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 10, no. 3.

used American non-intervention as a scapegoat to justify their own lack of action. Rather than admitting that a specific intervention was not in their national interest and would not be undertaken for that reason, member states preferred to cite American non-involvement as the primary reason for their own lack of action. Citing American non-participation was a convenient means of deflecting blame and criticism for non-intervention. It enabled member states to feign concern and outrage while still acting within the parameters of their own national self-interest.

The American withdrawal from UN activity added fuel to the fire of burgeoning member state discontent and the lack of development toward a UN rapid reaction capability is owed, in part, to this gradual shift in member state opinion. As member states were reevaluating their participation in UN operations and limiting their involvement, the UN, supported by the Secretary-General and 'Friends of Rapid Reaction'[22], was seeking a capability that required both a substantial increase in meaningful member state involvement and a significant increase in UN powers. However, increased member state involvement and expanded organizational power was well beyond the realm of member state's national and strategic interests.

Member states were leery about giving the UN too much power and this is yet another contributing factor to the lack of development in the rapid deployment arena. An independent UN rapid deployment capability would require a significant expansion of the organization's capabilities, most specifically its intelligence gathering and military

[22] The 'Friends of Rapid Reaction' is an informal group of countries that support UN rapid deployment. It was formed in 1995 by the Dutch and Canadians and quickly expanded to include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Senegal, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and Zambia. However, 'Friends' has been dormant since 1998. For more information see: Peter Langille (2000) *Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability*, policy option paper prepared for the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Available on-line: www.worldfederalistscanada.org.

capabilities. Although access to complete, reliable intelligence is a prerequisite of rapid deployment, the UN possesses very little independent intelligence gathering capabilities[23]. Instead the organization is reliant on member states and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) for the majority of its intelligence requirements. On the face of it such an arrangement seems satisfactory; it enables the UN to access intelligence without expending the organizations precious resources. However, the provision of such intelligence is inherently unreliable.

Intelligence provision is at the sole discretion of the state or organization and relevant intelligence is routinely withheld from the UN due to security concerns and political interests. Member states often withhold intelligence on the basis that revealing such information could compromise both the source of the information and the method used to gather it while NGO's may withhold information on the basis that their organization rejects all things military or they simply seek to reduce the chances of a local/conflicting party viewing them as biased (Dorn, 1999: 432, 435; Eriksson, 1997: 5, 10, 14; Koch, 1999: 230).

As the UN is rarely in possession of complete, reliable and relevant intelligence, its ability to develop contingency plans for arising crises and impending operations is severely restricted. Unfortunately, deployment time is directly related to the degree of anticipatory planning and preparation undertaken prior to a UN mandate to deploy; without adequate contingency plans rapid reaction is virtually impossible. The relationship between intelligence, contingency planning and rapid deployment is

[23] The UN limits itself to passive, benign means of intelligence gathering such as fact-finding missions, Observation Posts/Checkpoints and Military Observers. Each method requires consent of the host state and/or conflicting parties and as a result each are easily interfered with and unreliable. Conflicting parties routinely deny the UN access to incriminatory sites, severely limit the freedom of movement of MO's and restrict the locations of Checkpoints/OP's.

paramount; rapid deployment *requires* contingency planning and contingency planning *requires* intelligence.

Of course, the obvious solution to the UN's intelligence woes is to provide it with its own independent means of intelligence collection and both the Dutch and Canadian proposals mention the need for strengthening the organization's intelligence capabilities (Government of the Netherlands, 1995: 7; Government of Canada, 1995: 56). However, as the Canadian report notes, an independent UN intelligence system is highly unlikely.

> A number of member states are bound to be weary of systems and equipment designed for advanced surveillance, intrusion detection, early-warning and enhanced analytical skills…these systems might be considered too intrusive for use by an inter-governmental organization…[Additionally] the costs of some systems are well beyond the foreseeable capacity of the UN (Government of Canada, 1995: 57).

Eriksson notes similar misgivings stating:

> It seems unlikely that the UN would acquire its own satellites or sophisticated radar systems within the foreseeable future. It is, first of all, a political problem – many states are reluctant to give the UN large independent surveillance resources…It is, however, also an economic problem: Satellites and JSTARS are immensely expensive (Eriksson, 1997: 10).

Unfortunately, the economic concerns associated with UN intelligence gathering are, arguably, more easily overcome than the political concerns. Member states simply do not want to endow the UN with a capability that would allow it to act without the consent or support of its member states. Such a capability would have the simultaneous effect of reducing the UN's reliance on its member states while restricting member states ability to manipulate and constrain the organization. Put simply, an independent intelligence gathering capability for the UN would significantly increase the organization's autonomy and member states were unwilling to support it.

If an intelligence gathering capability would decrease the UN's reliance on member states, an independent military capability for the purpose of rapid deployment would make the organization virtually autonomous. Although the Danish rapid reaction proposal steered clear of suggesting that the UN have access to its own military personnel, both the Dutch and Canadian proposals recommended such a capability stating "a permanent, totally equipped, self-contained and self supporting stand-by unit, employed directly by the UN itself…needs to be considered" (Government of the Netherlands, 1995: 4):

> a UN rapid reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on member states of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations. If the UN is to build a rapid reaction capability which is fully reliable, the challenge in years ahead will be to develop its own personnel, independent of state authority (Government of Canada, 1995: 60).

An independent military capability for the UN would endow the international organization with some of the capabilities and characteristics of a state and significantly reduce its reliance on member states. No longer would member states be able to contain UN activity by denying it access to personnel and equipment. This warrants repetition, member states do not want to grant the UN a degree of autonomy that would allow it to operate independently of member state constraint.

Ironically, because a UN military capability would be under the control of the Security Council, member states which are not represented on the Council are also likely to oppose any such development. Indeed, many member states already harbour concerns about the powers of the Security Council and its dominance by the permanent five (P5) as well as the Security Council's lack of geographic, ethnic and economic diversity.

In addition to all the above mentioned impediments, rapid deployment had the added disadvantage of requiring increased funding. The early to mid-1990s was a period of extraordinary growth in peace operations and as mandates and numbers of personnel expanded so to did the cost. From 1991 to 1993 UN peacekeeping costs increased nine fold from $400 million (US) to $3.6 billion (US) (www.un.org). As member state opinion gradually shifted and member states began questioning the UN's expanded role and their involvement in UN operations, peacekeeping expenses came increasingly under fire and by 1998-1999[24] the peacekeeping budget had been reduced to $1 billion (US) (www.un.org).

It was in this environment of cost reduction that the Dutch, Canadian and Danish rapid reaction proposals were released. While the Canadian and Danish proposals largely by-passed the issue of cost, the Dutch proposal estimated that a 5,000 personnel UN rapid reaction capability would cost approximately $300 million (US) per year with initial procurement costs of $500-550 million (US). With the UN's regular budget subject to a zero growth policy, such costs would be incorporated into the peacekeeping budget and any additional costs would be borne by member states through the regular assessment process (Government of the Netherlands, 1995: 17-20). However, given member state's concern about the UN's expanded role and organizational failure, member states were leery about embarking on a path that would increase their UN dues. Indeed, there seemed to be an overarching global consensus that the immediate priority was cost reduction and, as a result, member states were bound to reject any plan that

[24] Prior to July 1996, the peacekeeping budget was based on the calendar year (December 1 through January 31). Following July 1996, the budget cycle ran from July 1 to June 30 (*United Nations Peacekeeping Costs and Regular Budget*, available on-line: www.un.org. Retrieved June 2, 2005).

went contrary to said goal. Member states were simply not interested in any initiative that would cost more money.

Given the tenor of the times, member states' unwillingness to fund a UN rapid deployment capability is not surprising, particularly given the concern that a 5,000 personnel brigade would be insufficient numerically to maintain operational readiness. If the UN's rapid reaction capability was to be able to respond to numerous crises at any given time, two to three times the suggested number of personnel would be required (Christie, 1995: 112). 10,000 to 15,000 personnel would allow a dual response and ensure that the rapid reaction capability was not reduced to inaction by the time required for reconstitution following deployment. However, as the number of personnel increases so to does the associated budget. Given member states' reluctance to fund a 5,000 personnel brigade, it is highly unlikely they would agree to fund a capability two to three times that size requiring two to three times the funds.

Additionally, the Security Council was opposed to rapid reaction because it required increased UN military capabilities. Rapid deployment, as envisioned by the Dutch, Canadians and Danes, used Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* as a cornerstone of their recommendations. This was problematic because Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council had quite different visions for the UN. The Security Council hoped the Secretary-General would use *Agenda for Peace* as a platform to promote increased cooperation with regional organizations and an expanded role for regional organizations in the realm of peace and security. More specifically, the Security Council hoped the UN would limit its activity to Chapter VI missions and leave Chapter VII/enforcement operations to the more experienced regional organizations.

As it turned out, Boutros-Ghali used *Agenda for Peace* to advocate a drastically expanded military role for the UN and sought to create UN contingents specifically suited to peace enforcement. Not surprisingly, the Security Council chose not respond to Boutros-Ghali's recommendation of an expanded military capability (Fergusson & Levesque, 1997: 121-124; Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 13; Coulon, 1998: 8). Because the Dutch, Canadian and Danish proposals premised their recommendations on *Agenda for Peace*, obtaining Security Council endorsement of their recommendations would be exceedingly difficult. The Security Council simply did not agree with the proposals fundamental assumption: an expanded military capability for the UN.

More fundamentally, rapid reaction challenges the global order. Endowing the UN with an independent military capability would require, as Fergusson and Levesque note, a fundamental "reconsideration of the underlying values and principles which shape the UN" (Fergusson and Levesque, 1997: 125). Essentially, Charter reform would be mandatory. The UN is an organization of independent states and its Charter is a multilateral, nationalist document deferential to national sovereignty and premised on nationalist considerations. If the UN were to possess its own independent military capability the nature of the Charter and the entire organization would have to evolve to one premised on supranationalism and collectivism (Fergusson and Levesque, 1997: 118-125). Indeed such revolutionary change was/is highly unlikely.

The implications of an independent UN rapid reaction capability are profound. Such a capability would challenge the status quo and require the fundamental transformation of the global system. Independent states are the primary actors in the international system. To transform the UN into a supranational organization would also

mean transforming the entire international system. States may become obsolete and supranationalism may supercede nationalism but such a transformation cannot and will not be achieved easily or quickly and this was and remains perhaps the biggest impediment to a true, independent UN rapid reaction capability. It challenges the fundamental assumption of the global order: state primacy.

Pragmatism and Caution: A Recipe for Moderate Success

Given the many challenges and seemingly insurmountable hurdles facing UN rapid deployment, it is not surprising that so little was achieved toward that end. While both the Dutch and Canadian proposals were quickly shelved, the Danish/SHIRBRIG proposal achieved moderate success. First, unlike the Dutch and Canadian reports which proposed a rapid reaction capability that operated within the UN framework and was subject to UN authority, the Danes proposed a capability that was independent of UN authority and operated outside the troubled organization. This was an important distinction as member states were becoming increasingly cynical about the UN's ability to undertake peace operations and were also becoming increasingly leery about endowing the UN with more powers, specifically military powers. The Danes innovative proposal enabled member states to move toward rapid deployment while still constraining UN activities and power. Rampant cynicism toward the UN may also have been a contributing factor to the premature death of the Dutch and Canadian proposals as member states were not prepared to endow the UN with increased military power and discretion, particularly since the organization seemed incapable of adequately handling the powers it already possessed.

Second, in terms of initial investment and annual maintenance costs, the Danish proposed SHIRBRIG was much more desirable than the Dutch and Canadian proposals which would have cost many times that of SHIRBRIG. As noted previously, member states were becoming increasingly preoccupied with peacekeeping costs and were actively seeking means of reducing such costs. The result was a membership vehemently opposed to any suggestion requiring additional funds. Also, because SHIRBRIG operates outside the UN and membership in the Brigade is voluntary, any costs associated with the Brigade, outside of deployment, would be born solely by SHIRBRIG members. Conversely, both the Dutch and Canadian proposals, by advocating a rapid deployment capability within the UN framework and under UN authority, placed the financial burden of such a capability on the shoulders of the UN membership as a whole. The advantage of SHIRBRIG was that those states that wanted to become involved and could afford to be involved were involved while those states uninterested in contributing to such a capacity or financially unable to contribute would not be involved. Put simply, the Danish proposal gave UN members a choice about contributing while the Dutch and Canadian proposals, by default, forced all UN members to support, if only financially, its rapid reaction capability.

Third, the Danish rapid deployment proposal had two added advantages: it guaranteed multinational support and was the last in a series of proposals. Unlike the unilateral Dutch and Canadian proposals, the Danish led SHIRBRIG proposal was authored by a thirteen nation working group[25] which guaranteed multinational support. From inception, SHIRBRIG possessed the multinational support necessary for

[25] The working group consisted of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Sweden.

implementation and that support never wavered or disappeared. Unfortunately, the Dutch and Canadian proposals were not so fortunate. Indeed there is little evidence that the Netherlands or Canada actually promoted and supported their own independent proposals at all; instead both nations actively participated in drafting the SHIRBRIG proposal and doggedly supported the SHIRBRIG model. Most likely the Dutch and Canadians recognized the advantages of working within a coalition of like-minded nations and chose to abandon their previous recommendations in favour of a multinational approach.

Similarly, because SHIRBRIG was the last in a series of rapid deployment proposals, it was able to 'borrow' desirable elements of the previous Dutch and Canadian reports. Such elements include the suggestion of regionally based headquarters borrowed from the Netherlands and the suggestion of linking national contingents to the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System which was borrowed from Canada. Of course, borrowed elements were more likely due to Dutch and Canadian participation in the working group rather than intellectual thievery but the SHIRBRIG proposal certainly benefited from its predecessors experience.

The final unique characteristic of the Danish proposal is SHIRBRIG's Planning Element. While the Planning Element does not and cannot offer total compensation for the UN's lack of intelligence gathering capabilities, it does gather some intelligence independently and produce contingency plans to help speed the deployment of any impending SHIRBRIG operation. Also, it is likely that information sharing within SHIRBRIG is both easier and more likely than within the UN given that SHIRBRIG members are like-minded and share similar military ethos. The Planning Element is

SHIRBRIG's most important tool and without it SHIRBRIG may be subjected to the same fate as the UN: a lack of intelligence leading to a lack of anticipatory planning and slow deployment times.

The winds of change that ushered in the 'new world order' following the Cold War were, unfortunately, short lived. The UN's inability to cope with its newly expanded repertoire turned enthusiasm into cynicism and member states began questioning the UN's central role in the maintenance of peace and security as well as their participation in UN operations. This shift in public opinion coupled with member states' reluctance to increase UN military capabilities, a preoccupation with costs reduction and rapid reactions profound impact on the international system all contributed to a lack of movement toward and achievement of a true rapid deployment capability for the United Nations: the exception, of course, being SHIRBRIG. SHIRBRIG was successful because it was more conservative than the Dutch and Canadian proposals and it remained well within the realm of the acceptable status quo.

Chapter 5
The Way Ahead…

UN rapid deployment as envisioned in the three proposals is either relatively ineffective like SHIRBRIG's inability to meet the *Brahimi* standards or virtually impossible to achieve like the Dutch and Canadian visions. The challenges facing an independent and effective UN rapid reaction capability are staggering and it is highly unlikely any such capability will be developed in the near future. Unfortunately, the need for rapid deployment never went away nor is it likely to go away soon.

The lack of a viable option within the UN has forced the international community to look toward other institutions, namely regional organizations and private security companies, as a means of supplementing the UN's meagre capabilities. Devolving responsibility for some traditional UN tasks such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement to regional organizations and/or private security companies is intended to provide the UN with capabilities currently beyond its reach. This type of devolution may be the simplest means of improving the UN's capacity for rapid intervention. While it is doubtful that regional organizations and/or private security companies will become a long-term answer to the UN's gross lack of capabilities, they are a potential UN resource.

Regional Organizations

On the face of it, delegating traditional UN responsibility for peacekeeping and peace enforcement to regional organizations is a sound idea. Indeed, regional organizations may be better suited to address some of the fundamental difficulties facing

UN initiatives, namely lack of political will and deployment time. There is little debate that regional organizations/states are more likely to be adversely affected by regional conflict and are therefore more likely to possess the political will necessary to intervene in a crisis before it escalates out of control. Fears of economic disruption and massive refugee flows are often enough to nudge regional states into action. Certainly fears of refugees prompted the Australian intervention in East Timor (Hirsch, 2000: 5-6; Wilson, 2003: 94) and the American intervention in Haiti (Smith & Weiss, 1997: 613). Given the potential for regional disruption, regional organizations/states are most likely to possess the political will needed to pursue the containment and resolution of regional conflicts – it is simply in their national and strategic interest to do so.

Regional organizations are also more likely to deploy faster than non-regional actors. Timely deployment is often essential to the containment of conflict and, given their geographic proximity, regional organizations are often best suited to deploy quickly (Wilson, 2003: 97). This is especially true if non-regional intervention requires the procurement of heavy sea and air lift and is completely reliant on sea and air capabilities for deployment. Regional organizations, on the other hand, may be able to deploy a significant portion of its intervening force by land or regional lift. Additionally, regional organizations may be capable of faster deploy due to a pre-existing familiarity with regional terrain and climate. Non-regional actors may require specialized training to acquaint themselves with the region's unique terrain and may require a lengthy period of acclimatization in the region prior to operational deployment.

Although regional organizations seem capable of addressing problems of lack of political will and lengthy deployment time, they are not a simple solution. Despite

widespread support for the devolution of UN responsibility, reliance on regional intervention is cause for serious concern. First of all, regional organizations do not possess permanent, institutionalized military capabilities. As a result, any military intervention undertaken by a regional organization is done so on an ad hoc basis (Wilson, 2003: 96). Unfortunately, ad hoc arrangements are notoriously unreliable and slow and are often plagued by poor training and a lack of adequate resources. Indeed, it is questionable whether replacing ad hoc UN arrangements with equally ad hoc regional arrangements will produce any positive change in the maintenance of global peace and security.

Regional intervention is also disconcerting given the potential for regional power/hegemonic interference and domination. Regional states are weary of an interventionist regional power and any intervention by a regional power, even in concert with other regional states and sanctioned by the UN, may be perceived as a thinly veiled attempt to direct and control another state's internal activities. Indeed, such suspicion is well founded and the historical record is ripe with examples of regional hegemons employing regional organizations as a "legitimate" means of meddling in other states internal affairs and exploiting discontent and crises to produce an outcome favourable to the hegemon (Smith & Weiss, 1997: 603, 613). Some of the most blatant examples of hegemonic exploitation include the Russian domination of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Nigerian domination of the Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) and the Syrian domination of the Arab League.[26] Under such circumstances, regional organizations are "less intermediary structures of the UN's collective security system than local agents of the regional hegemon in question" (Bellamy and Williams, 2004: 194). UN authorization notwithstanding, hegemonic domination poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of interventions undertaken by regional organizations.

Not only does hegemonic domination threaten the impartiality of an intervention and risk making the regional organization a party to the conflict, it may also lead to the blatant disregard of UN norms and undermine the UN's primacy in the maintenance of global peace and security. As Wilson notes, "there is a danger that regional actors will conduct operations in a manner which conflicts with the collective objectives established by the Security Council, thereby undermining its authority as the body conferred with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Wilson, 2003: 100-101).

Yet another area of concern related to reliance on regional organizations for regional intervention is the regionalization of global peace and security (Bellamy & Williams, 2004: 194, Morris & McCoubrey, 1999: 133). Because regional organizations are disproportionately reliant on regional powers for the capabilities and resources

[26] Russia seeks to maintain its primacy in Eurasia by managing regional conflicts through CIS, most notably the civil war in Georgia. As MacFarlane notes, "as the former imperial power and autocratic ruler of the 'near-abroad', the legitimacy of Russia's role is immediately suspect as reflecting a self-interested accumulation of power." For more information see: Smith & Wiess, 1997: 599; Morris & McCoubrey, 1999: 140. Nigeria used ECOWAS as a means of intervening in Liberia in 1990. Once deployed the large Nigerian contingent became involved in the Liberian civil war by providing weapons and ammunition to rebel groups opposing Charles Taylor. Taylor had a close relationship with the Cote d'Ivoire and the Nigerian government preferred a Liberian government with close ties to anglophone Africa (ie: Nigeria) rather than Francophone Africa. For more information see: Christopher Tuck (2000) "Every Car or Moving Object Gone: the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia" in *African Studies Quarterly*, available on-line: www.africa.ufl.edu. Syria used the Arab League to intervene in Lebanon in 1976 which led to a 28 year Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

necessary for intervention, any increased reliance on regional organizations requires an increased reliance on regional powers. Such dependency encourages regional powers to become increasingly interventionist and significantly elevates their already preponderant position within the region. As a result, the devolution of UN responsibility to the regional level may be interpreted by regional hegemons as a carte blanche to intervene in regional affairs on their own terms. Given the already shady record of regional hegemonic intervention the adage 'regional solutions to regional problems' seems particularly unwise.

Additionally, reliance on regional organizations for military intervention is disconcerting given the fact that the capabilities of regional organizations differ dramatically from region to region and many regions lack an organization capable of or willing to undertake peace operations on behalf of the UN. For example, African organizations are often willing to intervene in regional crisis but lack the resources necessary to do so while European and North American organizations possess a wealth of military capabilities yet lack the political will to intervene.

For example, the Balkan crises of the mid-1990s demonstrated the European Union's (EU) lack of military capabilities, even when operating in its own back yard, and illustrated the extent to which Europe was dependent upon the United States for force projection. Europe's inability to play any significant role in the Balkan interventions underpinned the necessity that the EU possess its own military force capable of projecting European influence abroad. A credible EU military capability would allow it to counter American global preponderance and, more importantly, would

bolster its status as a significant international actor (Olsen, 2002: 88-90; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2002: 25; Rasmussen, 2002: 44-47; Gordon, 2000: 12-14).

With this in mind, the EU announced its decision to create a European rapid reaction force of 60,000 personnel. The European force would be capable of full deployment within 60 days and would be capable of maintaining full deployment for a year. Although the force would not be deployed to fight large-scale wars, it would be employed to perform the full range of Petersburg tasks including peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue operations, crisis management and peace enforcement operations.[27] In 2001, two years after its announced creation, the European rapid reaction force was declared operational with 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships at its disposal (Olsen, 2002: 89; Lindborg, 2001: 2; Rasmussen, 2002: 41-42, 57).

Despite this declaration, the European rapid reaction force lacks essential capabilities and is only capable of very limited deployments. First of all, the EU lacks a force pool necessary for lengthy deployments. Continued deployment requires a force pool of approximately 3 times the size of the actual deployed force to allow for personnel replacement and force reconstitution and reinforcement. In the case of the EU, this means a force pool of approximately 180,000 - a sum well above current capabilities (Lindborg, 2001: 3; Rasmussen, 2002: 42).

Additionally, the EU lacks a number of military capabilities required for current peace operations. As Gordon notes, “most European forces lack the means to conduct truly demanding, modern military operations: airlift, sealift, satellite intelligence,

[27] The Petersburg tasks originated in the Western European Unions Petersburg declaration of 1992, they were subsequently adopted by the EU. For more information see: Western European Union Council of Ministers: Petersburg Declaration, June 19, 1992. Available on-line: www.weu.int

precision-guided-munitions and all-weather and night-strike capabilities" (Gordon, 2000: 15). Strike capabilities aside, adequate air and sea lift are essential if the EU rapid reaction force is going to be capable of a rapid response or capable of undertaking even the least demanding operations. Clearly, such capabilities are required if the force is to function at all.

The EU faces a serious challenge in creating a fully capable, effective rapid reaction force: procuring the required military capabilities. The procurement of military capabilities is a difficult task and will require a mammoth increase in European defence spending. However, any increase is highly unlikely given the current political atmosphere and the past decade's ruthless slashing of military expenditures. Although European governments finally understand their critical lack of military capabilities, the bad news, as Gordon notes, "is that neither their publics nor their leaders seem prepared to make the financial sacrifices necessary to procure such capabilities any time soon" (Gordon, 2000: 16). Unfortunately, the European rapid reaction force will remain a hollow capability until the EU backs its bold initiative with something more substantial than rhetoric and meaningless pronouncements.

Like the EU, NATO is also in the process of creating a rapid reaction force: the NATO Response Force. The NATO Response Force is a fully integrated and interoperable sea, land and air rapid reaction capability comprised of national contingents. Such contingents are made available to the Response Force on a rotating stand-by basis and undergo extensive training as a cohesive force. NATO's Response Force was established in 2002 and was declared fully operational in October 2004 with

17,000 personnel. However, the force will not reach its maximum capacity of 21,000 personnel until late 2006 (www.nato.int, The NATO Response Force).

The Response Force is tasked with a wide range of missions including peacekeeping, evacuation and rescue operations, humanitarian crisis response and counter-terrorism. To undertake such missions, the Response Force possesses a comprehensive range of capabilities including "fighter aircraft, ships, army vehicles, combat service support, logistics, communications, intelligence and whatever is required to make it a highly ready, credible force" (www.nato.int, The NATO Response Force). NATO's Response Force is, without a doubt, one of the best equipped and most capable multinational forces on the globe – American military preponderance and its leading role in NATO ensures this. Indeed, as Gordon notes, many of NATO's military capabilities "are not NATO assets at all but American ones" (Gordon, 2000: 16).

If NATO's Response Force is one of the most capable multinational forces on the globe, African multinational forces are among the least capable. Put simply, organizations like the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) lack the resources necessary for the creation and maintenance of a capable multinational force. Many African nations are desperately poor and as a result their multinational forces are plagued by obsolete or absent military capabilities and a serious lack of logistical support. For example, most African countries lack even the most basic transport capabilities, to say nothing of the more sophisticated and expensive air and sea lift capabilities, and some are even incapable of providing their personnel with such basic requirements as helmets, flak jackets and tents (Neethling, 2003: 95-96).

Additionally, many African nations are preoccupied with internal affairs and are so consumed by their own crises whether it be famine, poverty, unemployment, civil unrest, political opposition, or the AIDS epidemic to contribute to a regional assistance force. Given the sheer number of African crises and the continent's desperate economic and political conditions, it is not surprising that Africa's regional organizations are incapable of effective intervention and rapid deployment.

The capability gap between regional organizations in Europe and North America and those in Africa is striking and these organizations represent each end of the capability spectrum. Nonetheless, North American/European organizations are atypical and do not reflect the universal norm. Indeed, African organizations are a more accurate reflection of the general capabilities of regional organizations across the globe. Given most regional organizations lack of capabilities, it is unwise to become increasingly reliant upon them as a means of rapid deployment or for the maintenance of regional security, particularly since regional organizations, as Singer notes, "are often weakest in areas of the world where they are needed the most" (Singer, 2003: 60). Regional organizations are simply incapable of shouldering the security burden and cannot be relied upon to provide rapid reaction.

Private Security Companies

The UN's lack of progress toward rapid deployment coupled with the inability of regional organizations to provide such a capability has prompted an international debate over the role of the private sector in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such debate hinges on whether the UN, in response to a shortage of national contributions or

in the face of a rapidly escalating crisis, should employ private security companies to intervene on its behalf. Advocates of such employment maintain that private security companies are both fast and effective and would be a positive addition to the UN resource base. Opponents maintain that the UN should avoid any association with such companies due to their questionable legal status and lack of accountability.

Although private security companies provoke much heated debate, there is little doubt that private security companies can provide the UN with a rapid means of intervention. Private security companies seem to be a faster alternative to traditional UN intervention because such companies are not subject to the same political wrangling that entangles national governments and multinational organizations. In fact, Executive Outcomes, a South African based private security company, claims it can have personnel on the ground any where in the world within 72 hours: an impressive standard that the UN, at present, cannot even come close to (Spearin, 2005: 242; Shearer, 1998: 55).

In addition to rapid deployment capabilities, private security companies have proven themselves to be an effective intervention force. Private security companies have deployed to numerous conflict areas around the globe, most notably Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone, and played an essential role in the resolution of such conflicts. In Liberia, International Charters Inc. provided ECOWAS with assault and transport helicopters allowing the regional organization to intervene successfully in Liberia's civil war. In Angola, Executive Outcomes helped bring an end to the civil war by providing government forces with military support and advice to defeat the rebels. After a series of military setbacks, the rebels were forced to broker a peace deal. Similarly, in Sierra

Leone, Executive Outcomes entered into direct combat with rebel forces and defeated them within a matter of weeks. Once defeated, the rebels entered into negotiations with the government making elections possible (Shearer, 1998: 46-53; Singer, 2003: 62-63). Private security companies' success record speaks for itself and there is good reason to believe that such companies would be equally effective in the service of the UN.

In addition to being fast and effective, there is evidence to suggest that private security companies may be more cost effective than traditional UN operations. For example, Executive Outcomes was paid $35 million for its 21 month contract in Sierra Leone which brought an end to the civil war in 1996. By contrast, the UN Observer Force that was to oversee the peace accord was expected to cost $47 million for 8 months (Shearer, 1998: 51). However, once the contract with Executive Outcomes expired fighting resumed and the Observation Force was never deployed. Instead, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone in 1999 that "despite having a budget and personnel size 20 times that of the private firm, the UN force took several years of operations, and a rescue by the British military, to come close to the same results" (Singer, 2003: 63).

Similarly, Executive Outcomes claims that for $150 million it could have deployed 1,500 personnel to Rwanda for six months to create safe havens for victims of genocide. Clearly such an intervention would have been preferable to the ineffectual and massively expensive UN operation. While the Executive Outcomes proposal would have cost $600,000 per day and saved thousands of lives, the UN relief effort to feed refugees following the genocide cost $3 million per day (Singer, 2003: 65).

Despite their advantages, private security companies are not a magic bullet. In fact, many in the international community shy away from their employment due to legal and accountability concerns. Private security companies reside in a sort of legal grey area. They are not members of national armed forces and are therefore not subject to military law, nor are they subject to the laws of their country of origin because they operate outside of its jurisdiction. Similarly, although private security companies are subject to the laws of the country in which they are operating, enforcement is a serious problem. First, any private security company personnel wishing to avoid prosecution will simply leave the country. Second, most of the countries in which private security companies operate are experiencing the near or total break down of law and order[28] (Singer, 2003: 66-67).

Private security companies' lack of a clear legal status raises the question of accountability: who or what is responsible for crimes or infractions committed by the company or company personnel and how can accountability be enforced. Presently, private security companies are only accountable to the market: companies tend to abide by the conditions of their contracts, refrain from illegal activity and respect international norms on the premise that any unseemly behaviour would adversely impact their future business. However, it is both unwise and potentially dangerous to allow the industry to regulate itself. Clearly some kind of international regulatory regime is required but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper (Spearin, 2005: 246).

In addition to serious legal and accountability concerns, private security companies lack the resources and capabilities necessary to undertake large scale operations such as UNTAC in Cambodia, UNOSOM II in Somalia, and UNPROFOR in

[28] For more information regarding the fuzzy legal status of PSC's see: Shrearer, 1998: 16-21

the former Yugoslavia. While most private security companies employ between 1,500 and 5,000 personnel, only a portion of such personnel are actually deployed on operations at any one time. A reserve force is usually withheld to enable force reconstitution and/or reinforcement. Private security companies simply lack the capabilities necessary to undertake large-scale operations without the assistance of another firm or regular UN forces.

Private security companies' limited operational scale necessitates cooperation and large-scale operations would see private security company personnel operating alongside UN forces. This is problematic for two reasons. First, it raises questions of command and control. Private security companies are accustomed to operating autonomously and commanding their own personnel and it is unlikely they would subject themselves to UN operational command. Similarly, it is equally unlikely that UN member states would allow their personnel to be commanded by a private security company. Second, it adversely impacts force cohesion. It is no secret that private security personnel are often very well-paid nor is it a secret that UN forces, specifically those from under-developed states,[29] are often grossly underpaid. Wage disparity may breed resentment between personnel and adversely effect force cohesion (Singer, 2003: 68-69). An example of this is the increasing tension between American forces and private security personnel in Iraq.

More fundamentally, private security companies challenge the state's monopoly on legitimate force. As Spearin notes:

[29] The UN pays member states a flat per capita rate for personnel contributed to UN operations. As a result, many under-developed/developing states use UN personnel contributions as a means of raising much needed funds. Often only a small percentage of the per capita rate paid by the UN makes it to personnel, the vast majority of it ends up in government coffers.

> States are expected to have a monopoly of violence, and the appeals of nationalism and patriotism continue to inform the rationale for, and application of, organized violence under the direction of the state. Hence, the reliance of states on 'mercenary' forces is, for many, a contradiction and an anathema that brings into question the resolve of the state and the merits of the mission (Spearin, 2005: 243).

Condoning the use of private security companies blurs the line between legitimate and illegitimate force and surrenders one of the most absolute aspect of state sovereignty – the monopoly on violence.

Despite the above noted concerns, private security companies may be an effective means of supplementing inadequate military capabilities and the UN may be well advised to take advantage of such services. Whether one likes it or not, private security companies are not a passing phenomenon. The privatization of military capabilities is widely accepted and the industry is worth approximately $100 billion dollars. In fact, the United States is one of the industries primary clients and there is upwards of 20,000 private security company personnel currently operating in Iraq on behalf of the American government (Shearer, 1998: 65; Spearin, 2005: 247; O'Hanlon & Singer, 2004: 91; Singer, 2003: 60-62). It seems logical that if the most capable military on the globe can benefit from the employment of private security companies, the UN should be able to garner similar benefits.

The UN is notoriously ill-equipped and overextended and private security companies may be a simple, effective means of bolstering UN capabilities, specifically in the realm of rapid deployment. Private security companies are capable of providing virtually any military capability that may be required from military advice and training to logistical support to combat personnel. Such capabilities could be contracted by the UN on approval of the Security Council to provide it with a well trained, fully equipped,

rapidly deployable vanguard force. Rather than expending precious time negotiating with national governments for contributions and delaying intervention when such contributions are not forthcoming, the UN could employ private security companies to provide the initial intervention. The private force would contain the crisis and separate combatants and be supplemented and/or replaced by UN personnel once available. Although, some UN activities, like post-conflict reconstruction, election monitoring and mediating peace accords, are beyond the scope of private security companies, security companies can provide the UN with the environment necessary for undertaking these activities. Put simply, private security companies may provide the UN with the military capabilities necessary for rapid deployment and successful intervention it clearly needs but currently lacks.

Of course private security companies, even if employed by the UN, still face problems of legality and accountability. However, these may be circumvented with relative ease if companies sign contracts with the UN subjecting themselves to UN regulation and oversight. In return for regulation and oversight, such companies would be guaranteed access to the massive UN market and the lucrative business it entails. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the UN can afford to wait until an international regulatory regime emerges before taking advantage of the services offered by private companies; instead the UN may simply ensure that the companies it chooses to employ conform to international norms and UN regulation. By taking a leadership role in security company regulation, the UN may set a practical example and move the international community toward a universal regulatory regime.

The UN's chronic lack of military capabilities coupled with the ad hoc nature of UN operations has made rapid intervention almost impossible. In response to the failure of numerous proposals intended to provide the UN with its own independent rapid reaction capability, many in the international community began looking to organizations outside the UN, namely regional organizations and private security companies, as a means of providing intervention assistance. Regional assistance is premised on the devolution of UN tasks to organizations at the regional level but this is problematic due ad hoc military capabilities, concerns about regional hegemony and regional organizations serious lack of resources. Unfortunately, regional organizations are even less capable than the UN of conducting military interventions, particularly those requiring rapid deployment.

Private security companies, on the other hand, possess the military capabilities necessary for intervention but face serious legal and accountability concerns. Although private security companies are not an ideal solution to the UN's intervention challenges; they are, at present, the best possible option. Private security companies may be able to supplement UN military capabilities and provide it with a much needed rapid deployment capability. This warrants repetition, private security companies may supplement, but not replace UN capabilities.

Whether one likes it or not, the creation of an independent UN rapid deployment capability is possible only with the furthest stretch of imagination. The rapid reaction proposals of the mid-1990s and everything they sought to achieve have been largely forgotten and it is doubtful if such a debate will re-emerge in the near future. Until member states are willing set aside their fears of a militarily powerful supranational

organization and are willing to carry the expense, rapid reaction as envisioned by the Dutch and Canadians will never happen. A more likely outcome is UN employment of private security companies and capable regional organizations as a vanguard rapid deployment capability. Indeed, this trend has already started…

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