

WATERFRONT REDEVELOPMENT AS A MEANS TO
BRING ABOUT INNER CITY RENEWAL

by

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A thesis submitted as partial
requirement for the degree of:

MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

Department of City Planning
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University of Manitoba

December 1987

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ISBN 0-315-44175-5

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ABSTRACT

The recession of the early 1980's forced local communities to carefully examine their options for economic development in the face of significant changes in the economy and in traditional industries. This resulted in a decrease in the importance of the traditional regulatory/growth control functions of city planning. Subsequently, these functions were replaced with policies that promoted economic development by creating a more positive, pro-business atmosphere within the inner-city. While social objectives have not been abandoned, the "selective revitalization" of only economically promising areas of the inner-city, such as urban waterfronts, is gaining acceptance.

In this thesis I examined existing examples of waterfront redevelopment in North America to produce an evaluative model for waterfront development. By using similarities found in these examples, an ideal set of development conditions was developed to serve as a baseline against which waterfront development proposals could be judged. The intent of this evaluative model is to identify proposals which present a viable physical environment under which economic development could take place.

While no single approach to waterfront redevelopment is universally applicable, sufficient similarities exist among cities contemplating waterfront renewal that an evaluative model, such as the one presented in this thesis, can operate with some degree of reliability. This point is amply demonstrated by the results of the case study which successfully pointed out the weaknesses in Windsor's concept plan for its riverfront.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people to whom I am indebted and without whom the completion of this thesis would not have been possible. These people primarily represent my 'academic' support. In particular I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Basil Rotoff, and the rest of my committee -- Professor Geoffery Bargh and Professor Ralph Harris. Support was also given by Mr. Larry Hodgson, Information Officer, Le Vieux Port-de-Quebec Corporation, Miss Kelly Gesner, Marketing Assistant, B.C. Place Development Corporation, Mr. L.S. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of Commerce and Development, New Brunswick, and Mr. P. Kennedy, Project Officer, Waterfront Development Corporation.

Finally I would like to thank Joanne Makulski, who served in an editorial capacity, Paul Makulski, who is responsible for the word processing of the text, and Rick Brundrige, who proved an invaluable liaison between the faculty in Winnipeg and myself in Windsor.

Greg Brouyette

December 1987

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INTRODUCTION

The early recession of the early 1980's forced local communities to carefully examine options for economic development in the face of significant changes in the economy and in traditional industries.¹

As a consequence of these changes, community strategies aimed at stemming inner-city decline are no longer necessarily focused on accommodating growth as they had been during the 1950's and 1960's. Maintenance of the inner-city, providing stability or even a strategy intended to facilitate a smooth transition to a smaller core are also becoming municipal concerns. The need to adapt to changing markets and to more competitive environments have forced some businesses to restructure their operations which often results in plant closures or the introduction of high-technology and job losses.²

Changing demands on municipal governments has resulted in new approaches to inner-city planning. Today, the economic strategies needed to contend with negative consequences of change require the integration of the principles of community development (maximize local resources), the principles of economic development (job creation and investment) and planning principles (the availability of land, services and facilities, the quality of life as well as orderly and efficient development).³ Further compounding the task of municipal government is the general dissatisfaction of the electorate with the programs proposed or implemented by the senior levels of government to remedy the inner-city's decline. This factor is magnified by widely supported, popular philosophies which

¹ Floyd Dykeman, "A Prescription for a Healthy Community", The Journal of Community Development, 1:2, 1987, p. 48.

² Dykeman, p. 48.

³ Dykeman, p. 51.

grew out of a 1960's holistic, ecological approach to community betterment, promoting self-initiative and self-help as a preferred approach to curing community and social ills.⁴ This has led to increasing political pressure on public authorities to make tangible progress in renewing the inner-city. Despite the magnitude of the task, a more active role by municipal officials in attacking the inner-city problems may be a step in the right direction.

Local government officials are in the best position to identify the inner-city's needs, limitations and priorities. They are traditionally in a position of leadership within the community. Municipal government also provides an essential local linkage to the senior levels of government and to the private sector. Without a combined effort by all these actors, lasting inner-city revitalization will never be realized. There is, however, a need for municipal officials to change their basic approach to inner-city renewal.

City governments need to become initiators in the revitalization process. They must change their orientation away from observation of the requirements of provincial planning legislation towards goal achievement. In addition to its traditional role of coordinator, city government should also adopt a more entrepreneurial approach to inner-city development, taking more risk, personal responsibility for results and fresh approaches to old problems.⁵

Communities that wish to deal successfully with development issues and successfully mobilize resources to support local development will have to be prepared: to seize the opportunity to provide leadership; to develop an action plan that examines all aspects of the community system...; to encourage partnership among communities, the surrounding countryside, governments, and the private sector; and to take or encourage initiatives to contribute to a better community.⁶

⁴ Dykeman, p. 50.

⁵ Dykeman, p. 52.

⁶ Dykeman, p. 54.

The community development approach should be present and future oriented and should, above all, be action oriented. There is a need for community development to address present short-term issues and goals, and by so doing provide early results which helps to demonstrate an action orientation. At the same time, community development should examine the longer term, with a clear indication of future directions for the community and of the required commitments to achieve the desired future.⁷

The purpose of this thesis is not to study economic development strategies for the inner-city per se, but to suggest planning initiatives capable of providing the physical environment necessary, in many instances, to attract economic development. Inner-city planning and economic development are interdependent. The availability of housing or the availability of adequate services and facilities are important planning decisions that influence the ability to realize economic goals.⁸ This thesis explores one particular type of physical development-- waterfront development -- which possesses special attributes which make it a promising approach to inner-city renewal, particularly when coupled with the implementation of a quasi-public development corporation. The intent of this thesis is to develop an evaluative checklist for waterfront development to determine the acceptability and quality of waterfront development proposals to bring about inner-city improvements and in doing so, serve as a basis for rational decision-making as it concerns the urban waterfront.

My interest in waterfront redevelopment stems largely from the controversy surrounding just such a project in my hometown of Windsor, Ontario. Despite being in an unpromising economic position for the future, the City is in favour of adopting the least controversial and most conservative approach to waterfront redevelopment -- converting it to public parkland. Given the abundance of examples of more ambitious and economically promising waterfront renewal

⁷ Dykeman, p. 52.

⁸ Dykeman, p. 50.

projects in North America, I find the City's redevelopment strategy shortsighted. Using the model, this thesis also demonstrates the folly of the City's strategy concerning its waterfront.

The methodology employed in this thesis is primarily research of the relevant literature. Because the redevelopment strategy of using waterfront renewal is relatively new, the available information is not as exhaustive as some of the other, more traditional renewal strategies. Since the literature on waterfront revitalization does not necessarily explore all the relevant aspects involved, this examination of waterfront revitalization does not explore the social impacts of waterfront redevelopment on pre-existing communities. Similarly, little literature exists on market research specifically geared to waterfront renewal. Although the available literature on waterfront redevelopment tends to be biased toward projects intended primarily as commercial revitalization, sufficient similarities exist with more traditional renewal strategies to draw valid conclusions in this respect.

Chapter one briefly examines some of the reasons behind the economic decline of the inner-city. For the purposes of this thesis, these problems are restricted to: the age of the majority of the inner-city's buildings and their increasing obsolescence in today's environment; the rate of technological change which is rendering buildings functionally obsolete before they can be renewed or replaced; the financial limitations of municipal governments which preclude them from any meaningful intervention; and the conflicting demands for saving the existing inner-city, producing tangible results of slowing the decline in the present, and planning for the inner-city of the future. The chapter also explores one current method which addresses some of these problems: selective revitalization of only economically promising areas of the inner-city.

Chapter two examines the advantages and special attributes which make waterfront revitalization an attractive development site within the inner-city. This chapter, too, addresses the suitability of selective revitalization, as it concerns urban waterfronts and their development as amenity enhanced areas to act as catalysts for further inner-city renewal. Lastly, chapter two explains that the development of the urban waterfront is only one of many possible development strategies and presents a normative model of waterfront development.

Chapter three reviews some of the more common building and development strategies. It is concluded in this chapter that three basic approaches to waterfront revitalization exist:

1. Selective revitalization to provide an inner-city improvement with a long term objective in mind, such as the development of an amenity infrastructure;
2. Urban redevelopment or growth accommodation; and
3. Single-purpose waterfront improvements which can but do not explicitly attempt to bring about further renewal.

Illustrative examples of North American waterfront projects which follow these approaches are also included in this chapter.

Chapter four examines the common traits found among waterfront projects despite their geographic, social and economic differences. Included in this analysis are common objectives of waterfront renewal projects, issues which need to be resolved prior to plan implementation, and common impediments to implementing such projects. Also included in this chapter is a discussion of the advantages of using development corporations to help fund and administer waterfront projects.

Chapter five combines the results of the previous chapters together with an analysis of Canadian and American approaches to waterfront development. These

findings serve as the basis for an evaluative checklist for inner-city renewal through waterfront development.

Chapter six applies the evaluative checklist to a case study of Windsor, Ontario's attempts to develop a particular section of its waterfront adjacent to the inner-city area. The Windsor case study was chosen because its plan for development is so unambitious. Ideally, the checklist will pinpoint the original plan's weaknesses and thereby indicate possible areas of improvement.

CHAPTER ONE: THE EVOLVING FUTURE

Introduction

The need for inner-city revitalization is not new or unprecedented in urban history. Accessibility of the Central Business District (CBD) to the metropolitan population has made competition for its available space fierce and as a consequence, change has always been a characteristic of the inner-city. Cities have always experienced cyclical periods of growth and decline with the attendant "transformation of urban space from one economic or social use to another".¹ In the years since World War II, however, various efforts to stem the continuous decline in importance of the inner-city have had little lasting effect. The age of many of the inner-city's buildings and the rapid changes in technology have caused the core to be unable to adapt quickly enough to keep pace with an evolving, post-industrial society.

What has become apparent, over the intervening years, is that there are no quick solutions to the inner-cities' problems. While some limited success has been achieved in reviving the inner-city, it has come about as a result of the cumulative effect of a series of short- to medium-term plans which improve certain aspects of the inner-city. These developments often use the accomplishments of its predecessor, such as the expansion of an office component which attracted new commercial ventures, which in turn increased residential building within the core to effect positive change. Today, because of increasing demands for municipally provided services despite a shrinking ability to collect tax

¹ L.S. Bourne, Designing the Future: A Perspective on Recent Trends and Emerging Issues in Ontario's Urban Environment, (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Research Paper #129, 1981), p. 22.

resources, together with the state of flux being created by the transition between eras, public officials have been forced to scale-down their plans for improvement even further. This change in development philosophy has increased interest in focussing renewal efforts exclusively on promising inner-city functions and areas through "selective revitalization" projects. As a result, urban waterfronts are becoming increasingly popular as a means of bringing about inner-city improvement. This chapter will briefly examine some of the main impediments which must be dealt with to bring about improvement within the inner-city and will outline some of the characteristics which make urban waterfronts an acceptable choice for bringing about positive change.

Coping with an evolving future

Since World War II, the inner-city of most industrial cities has experienced a steady decline in both economic and social importance. These changes stem largely from changes in technology which have favoured the less densely built up areas of the suburbs over the congested core. And while change has always been part of the city, the ineffectiveness of the public sector in recent times to stem the process of inner-city decline is largely the result of two interrelated factors:

1. The rapidity of technological and social change which renders buildings and functions obsolete at a rate faster than they can economically be renewed or modified; and
2. The age of the majority of the inner-city's buildings.²

The physical manifestations of the inner-city's age and the consequences of the rapidity of change is commonly referred to as blight. Blighted conditions often exist within the cores of older cities due either to the deterioration of

² George A. Nader, Cities of Canada, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1975), pp. 338-342.

buildings through the normal wear and tear of use or because changes in taste, fashion and design make some other building style or another location more desirable.³ This problem is compounded by the rate of technological change currently taking place which makes alternative sites or buildings more economically attractive to investors. As a result, obsolete buildings are created with little incentive for owners to modify or maintain their property. The existence and perpetuation of blighted areas is particularly damaging to government efforts to stem inner-city decline because the compactness of the inner-city focuses attention on these pockets. This in turn reinforces the negative image of the inner-city and undermines confidence in the future of the core, reducing their willingness to participate financially in the renewal process.

The reversal of the inner-city's fortunes is further inhibited by the inability of a municipal government to act on its own behalf. While it is in the best interests of the municipal government to encourage and participate in the renewal process, its ability to do so is limited financially. Reductions in transfer payments and lowered interest in urban problems by the senior levels of government, in addition to municipal expenditures rising faster than their ability to increase revenues, have diminished municipal government's leadership ability. Since they lack reliable prediction of future land use within the core by city officials, investors are wary of investing significant funds in the inner-city.

Further complicating the task of making the inner-city economically competitive with the suburbs is the transitional era in which the planning must take place. Older, industrial based cities are presently faced with the prospect of being left out of developments resulting from ongoing process of change from an industrial based economy to a service based economy, where some, such as

³ Nader, pp. 338-342.

Naisbitt, predict that the "creation, processing and distribution of information" will make human resources the strategic resource for North Americans in the future,⁴ not capital as has been the case.⁵ This change to an information based economy, where the provision of technical expertise will become our major contribution to the world economy, is forecasted to have as profound an impact on society as the move from an agricultural to industrial society had in the past.⁶ Unfortunately, it makes the task of improving the inner-city even larger since most cities are the products of the industrial era and are thereby geared to serving their diminishing needs. Also significant within this predicted change in society is the length of time it will take to complete the change to a post-industrial economy.

While it took almost 100 years to complete the change from an agricultural to industrial economy, the rapid technical advancements experienced with the advent of such developments as the widespread possession of televisions and elaborate satellite communications networks will greatly reduce the length of the transition period. As a result, the time orientation used to plan has also changed. During the agricultural period, planning was oriented to the past. Farmers learned, from past experience, how to plant, how to harvest and how to store their produce. In the industrial era, the time orientation is to the present, to get it done now.⁷ In an information era, because of the rapidity of change and dissemination of knowledge, the time orientation is to the future. Today, because we are in the midst of a transitional era, the correct orientation is not as clear cut as this:

⁴ John Naisbitt, Megatrends, (New York: Warner Books, 1982), p. 14.

⁵ Naisbitt, pp. 59-71.

⁶ Naisbitt, p. 18.

⁷ Naisbitt, p. 18.

We are living in the time of parenthesis, the time between eras. It is as though we have bracketed off the present from both the past and the future, for we are neither here nor there. We have not quite left behind the ... past -- centralized, industrialized and economically self contained. [But] those who are willing to handle the ambiguity of this in-between period and anticipate the new era will be a quantum leap ahead of those who hold on to the past.⁸

Thus one of the dilemmas of planning today is the need to be able to serve multiple masters. The investment represented by the older industrial-based cities precludes not addressing their needs. Political reality precludes not providing tangible project results in present for the public decision-makers whose political future is often dependent upon them. And the opportunity to improve the inner-city by anticipating the requirements of a post-industrial society to bring new life to city cannot be ignored.

Ideally, a development philosophy capable of addressing both the present needs of the inner-city and its residents, and anticipate the inner-city's future needs to stem further economic and social decline would be the development option of choice. While no such option is readily accepted as such a saviour or completely fulfills these requirements, one promising strategy currently employed is that of "selective revitalization". Selective revitalization, as its name implies, pursues revitalization selectively, concentrating limited financial resources only on those special areas within the inner-city which, for their desirable attributes,⁹ have a good chance for a profitable return on investment.¹⁰ Adoption of this strategy can, if carefully planned, facilitate the transition to a post-industrial society by focussing on providing facilities which serve both present

⁸ Naisbitt, p. 249.

⁹ Desirable attributes which add to an area's chances for successful economic renewal include: attractive housing costs; access to diverse educational or entertainment opportunities. For further elaboration see H. Briavel Halcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, Revitalizing Cities, (State College, Pennsylvania, Commercial Printing Inc., 1981), p. 25.

¹⁰ Halcomb and Beauregard, p. 25.

and future inner-city needs. More specifically, should today's predictions of the future come true, expansion of many of the inner-city's traditional functions will also be sympathetic to meeting the requirements of the future. In the short- to medium-term, one method for bridging the eras is expanding the inner-city's traditional service functions in entertainment and administration.

...cities which are now showing signs of revitalization recognized their changed functional roles and the ever present demand for invigorating social and cultural interaction. The revitalizing city has become a centre for leisure and entertainment underpinned by the service and financial industries ... Convention centres, resort hotels, market fairs, art shows, festivals, cultural facilities, restaurants, cafes, theatres, specialty shops ... represent hope for tomorrow.¹¹

By initially proceeding in this manner, present day inner-city needs for jobs and new investment are fulfilled and a more positive image of the core is presented to investors by the new or refurbished facilities. Fortunately, expansion of such facilities also meets many of the characteristics predicted to be influential in attracting the high-technology industries to a particular city, as will be more fully explained in chapter two. Such a development philosophy is also in tune with present day realities:

... the issue in most Canadian communities is now one of slow growth: how to control and affect change not growth.¹²

One type of selective revitalization project which is gaining popularity is waterfront development. Such developments represent a diverse group of approaches, ranging from modest improvements to the core all the way to being part of large-scale, long-term redevelopment plans. Depending on local circumstances and goals, these developments can act as potentially good methods of

¹¹ Lane L. Marshall, Action by Design: Facilitating Design Decisions into the 21st Century, (American Association of Landscape Architects, 1983), p. 62.

¹² Walter Jamieson, "Conservation as an approach to Urban Renewal", Planning Canada, (24:2, 1984), p. 53.

bridging the conflicting demands for present-day and future inner-city improvement.

Urban waterfronts, in particular, are being singled out as a means to revitalize the core of many older cities, due mainly to certain locational advantages they possess. As will be more fully explained in chapter two, the historical importance of waterfronts, combined with advancements in transportation technology, have resulted in development sites becoming available in sizes and locations well suited for the types of uses mentioned as possible means of improving the inner-city. Additionally, certain natural attributes of waterfronts, such as aesthetics and nature conservation, make these sites and their surroundings amenable to future development for high-tech industries and the new inner-city residents they forecasted to bring with them.

At present, no universally applicable approach to waterfront development has been produced although, as will be shown in chapters three and four, certain common elements and project objectives frequently appear in previous waterfront projects despite differences in local circumstances.

Summary

The age of the majority of the buildings found within the inner-city, coupled with the changing demands created by the rapidly evolving technologies have left most older cores at a decided disadvantage in the competition for new investment. The physical consequences of this inability to meet the changing requirements of business and industry, called blight, together with municipal governments' inability to financially participate in a renewal process, has seen the inner-city continue to decline in economic and social importance. This is not to say that publicly sponsored attempts to remedy this situation have not

been made, just that they have been ineffective, in part because the state of transition today's society is in tends to make planning difficult.

At present, planning improvements for the inner-city is complicated by conflicting demands. The established part of the inner-city, a product of the past designed to serve the needs of the industrial economy, represents a significant enough investment that it cannot justifiably be ignored or abandoned. Political reality is such that the electorate demands that public officials produce results within the inner-city with immediate impact on the inner-city of today. These results include producing jobs or improving the inner-city's image through new construction or through refurbishing in the hope of attracting new investment. Lastly, the transition to post-industrial economy demands that attention be given to meeting the projected needs of service-based, human intensive industries, if progress in renewing the inner-city is ever to be made.

As a result, these impediments and a trend toward urban consolidation rather than accommodation of growth, projects aimed at improving the inner-city have been greatly scaled down from the large-scale, bulldozer projects of the 1960's. Economic realities and the inability of public officials to collectively act to effect the change has seen a more incremental approach to development come into favour. Such projects are phased in over a number of years, in a series of linked steps to achieve an objective. Currently, one such popular approach is selective revitalization, which selectively targets only those areas or uses which have a reasonable chance for economic success for development. And one inner-city area which has seen a great deal of recent interest for this purpose is the urban waterfront.

For a number of reasons (as will be explained in chapter two), waterfront redevelopment is being used as a means to bring about inner-city improvement.

That is not to say all waterfront projects have such lofty ambitions. Experience has shown that waterfront development can vary widely in scale, make-up and intent. Some cities adopt a much more passive approach to waterfront development, such as in the case chosen for this thesis -- Windsor, Ontario -- where plans call for redevelopment for parks-purposes in the hope of creating a more desirable environment for development. Waterfront development as a possible means to bring about inner-city renewal is being stressed here because it will be shown, within the body of this thesis, how selective revitalization of the waterfront can act as a catalyst for further inner-city development in the present. It will also be shown that with some forethought concerning which uses to expand within the project, it can provide a foundation for attracting the new high technology producers and users to the core area in the future.

CHAPTER TWO: WATERFRONT REVITALIZATION TO BRING ABOUT LONG-TERM INNER-CITY IMPROVEMENT

Introduction

Having established that the major impediments to improving the inner-city are largely the result of the age and condition of the inner-city's building, together with conflicting demands for action, it is time to more fully elaborate why selective revitalization of waterfronts is a suitable development option to meet these challenges. Many interrelated factors make selective revitalization an acceptable choice to address the task of improving the inner-city, but for my purposes, this chapter will examine:

1. The historical developments which made waterfront available.
2. The locational advantages which many waterfronts possess which make them suitable as development sites.
3. The political efficacy of adopting waterfront development strategies.
4. The societal changes which favour inner-city locations.

The outcome of this chapter will establish the development of an amenities infrastructure as one of the more promising approaches to waterfront development to address the conflicting demands of the inner-city. This chapter will also serve as an introduction to certain concepts which will appear again in later chapters.

Background

A. Historical Significance

In a country with the world's longest coastline and largest supply of fresh water, the number of harbours available to Canada's early explorers was almost

limitless¹ but most ports which developed did so for specific reasons. Whether it was to provide the shortest return journey to Europe (Newfoundland and Nova Scotia) or to defend claims against competing nations (Halifax) or to combine access to the continent's interior with access to the sea (St. John, New Brunswick and Montreal, Quebec), most Canadian cities owe their existence to the earlier importance of water transportation. It follows therefore that, just as access to water routes was important to a city's location, so too was access to the water's edge in these ports:²

Just as it was natural that all of Canada's early settlements should stand near water, so also it was to be expected that within each community, the areas around the docks should be the first to be developed... With water-related activities as their major source of income, it was not surprising that communities saw banks, shops, churches, and housing soon vie for space alongside wharfs and warehouses; in the nineteenth century, if one found oneself on Main Street in a port city it was, as often as not, also known as Water Street.³

As a consequence of their earlier importance in the development of many of today's cities, certain locational advantages accrued to urban waterfronts which suggest their suitability as inner-city development sites.

B. Locational Advantages

The popularity of waterfront development sites can, in part, be attributed to two factors:

1. The applicability of urban waterfront redevelopment to most older industrial cities since, for historical reasons, most cities have access to water, be it a river, lake or ocean.
2. The availability of waterfront sites suitable for redevelopment in close proximity to the Central Business District (CBD) of most older cities because

¹ Harbourfront Corporation, "Harbour Revival", Canadian Heritage, 36, 1982, p. 28.

² Harbourfront Corporation, p. 28.

³ Harbourfront Corporation, pp. 28, 31.

- a) The earlier importance of water transportation saw most cities grow outward from the shoreline with time
- b) Technological changes caused many urban waterfronts to fall into disuse.

In this century, shifting demographics and technological advancement have combined to remake the face of our ports. As urban populations grew...cities fanned out like ripples caused by a stone dropped into water. In the meantime, such advances as the automobile, the train, and the airplane were soon offering transportation competition which further reduced the one time monopoly enjoyed by ships. With the passage of time, the commercial hearts of Canadian communities moved several blocks inland and the port areas, once the pulsebeat of the nation, settled in a long and slow decline...⁴

This process of waterfront decline was further accelerated during the 1950's when advancements in cargo handling technology revolutionized the industry and eliminated the need for many of the traditional railroad facilities. Traditional cargo handling, known as break-bulk, loaded individual packages in separate crates on and off ships. The advent of containerization revolutionized cargo handling. In containerization, cargo is loaded or unloaded in large, prepackaged metal containers, each the size of a small truck body. The reduction in the amount of handling greatly reduces the time necessary to service a ship. This technology is particularly significant to urban waterfronts because it requires a different kind of port, one not well suited to urban locations.

While the number of berths necessary for port operation is reduced through containerization because docking time is relatively short, the back-up space (averaging 35 acres per berth) becomes important. Hundreds of acres are required by large container-ship facilities, a parcel size not often available in most built-up portions of a modern city. The use of container facilities outside the inner-city became the norm and as consequence, many of the old finger-piers fell into disuse and disrepair. Compounding this loss was the widespread

⁴ Harbourfront Corporation, p. 31.

decentralization of industry to the suburbs. As a result, much of the waterfront's (and inner-city's) railroad trackage became unnecessary and later, abandoned.⁵

Many waterfronts virtually became ghost-areas, deserted, inaccessible, and depressing reminders of better days. With few exceptions, the communities adjacent to these no longer viable shipping and railroad facilities were adversely affected by the deterioration of their waterfront area.⁶

c) Man has a natural and subconscious attraction to water.

Research conducted into this area found nature -- especially scenes involving water -- to have a positive impact on the viewer's emotional state and a tendency to hold the attention and interest of the viewer more effectively than urban scenes.⁷

C. Political Acceptability

Recent interest in waterfront redevelopment is also the result of political acceptance of the approach. Media reports of economically successful waterfront development elsewhere has caused a flurry of similar developments across the continent. Part of the reason behind the popularity of this approach can be attributed to the efficacy of adopting a strategy which has widely known examples of success to show to the electorate to convince them of the approach's rightness. Similarly, waterfront redevelopment's political desirability is also partially due to the ease of gaining public support for the typically amenity-rich waterfront redevelopments since these projects create jobs during and after construction, and serve resident population needs while at the same time acting as "export industries by attracting money from other areas."⁸

⁵ Douglas Wren, "A View from Here: Urban Waterfronts", Environmental Comment, April 1981, p. 3.

⁶ Wren, p. 3.

⁷ Roger S. Ulrich, "Natural versus Urban Scenes: Some Psychophysiological Effects", Environment and Behaviour, 13:5, 1981, p. 523.

⁸ Rita J. Bamberg and David W. Parham, "Leveraging Amenity Infrastructure: Indianapolis' Economic Development Strategy", Urban Land, 43:11, 1984, p. 12.

Urban waterfront development is also a popular political strategy to bring about inner-city revitalization because of the financial assistance available from senior government agencies to facilitate such projects. In Canada, as will be discussed later, both Provincial and Federal government agencies have been actively involved in waterfront revitalization.

Interest in waterfront development is also due in part to the realization that the present availability of waterfront properties within the inner-city may be the last opportunity for public officials to acquire sizeable parcels of urban land for recreational purposes. As the costs of travel and limits on free time increase, the importance of nearby recreational opportunities also increases. The attractiveness of this option is further enhanced by its adaptability and relatively low development cost, particularly if passive parkland is projected to be an initial phase. The flexibility of such an approach is desirable since, by beginning with passive parkland, municipal officials are able to satisfy resident recreational needs while at the same time increasing the desirability of adjacent properties for intensification or redevelopment.

Lastly, the popularity of waterfront redevelopment can be attributed to this area's positive image. Since the aim of inner-city redevelopment is to encourage and continue the rebuilding process begun by the project, it is necessary to project a positive economic image. Typically this objective is achieved by tangibly demonstrating growth and vitality through new construction or refurbishing. Examples of this type of development in conjunction with a waterfront site can be seen throughout the world: in Sydney, Australia's Opera House, in Detroit, Michigan's Renaissance Center and in Toronto, Ontario's CN Tower.

Urban waterfronts are often used as redevelopment sites in the hope that their positive image will be extended to include the buildings built upon them. Waterfronts are well suited to this task since research has shown that imaginability -- the ability of passersby to recall features -- is highest in urban environments at centers of activity (such as working waterfronts or lively pedestrian areas) and at both natural and artificial landmarks.⁹ Because urban waterfronts often possess both of these characteristics, their ability to project a positive image on the minds of potential investors and consumers provides a very necessary component if the inner-city is ever to rid itself of its negative image.

Recent Interest in Waterfront Redevelopment: Why is it Occurring?

As was briefly outlined in the previous chapter, one of the modern methods being used for inner-city renewal is selective revitalization. That is, concentrating available resources on those areas which, due to various positive characteristics, have the greatest chance for economic success. Presently, municipal officials and private developers alike are looking for trends which may indicate areas of future growth to base their redevelopment plans upon in the hope of increasing their chances of economic success.

While prediction of the future is guesswork at best, Bourne hypothesized two possible urban scenarios:

Those cities with a weak historical and commercial core, a concentration of heavy industry, pollution problems and a declining rate of growth will likely follow the path to further dispersal. Those cities with a commercially strong and attractive core, with a relative absence of environmental disamenities and an economy based on services will more likely move in the opposite direction.¹⁰

⁹ Ross Woodward, "Urban Symbolism", *Ekistics*, 50:301, 1983, p. 289.

¹⁰ L.S. Bourne, Designing the Future: A Perspective on Recent Trends and Emerging Issues in Ontario's Urban Environment, (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Research Paper #129, 1981), p. 22.

These scenarios are based on the extrapolation of current trends. The move to a post-industrial economy has seen a decline in the role of unskilled labour in the production process and its subsequent replacement with technology, not only in the factory, but also in the service industries and administration (see Appendix 1). Technology, rather than the factory, has become the dominant force in production. Also growing out of the importance of technology is a new class of professional, technical and administrative workers, who are forecasted to have a disproportionate influence on popular tastes. In general terms, this new class tends to be young professional households with two incomes and few (or no) children.¹¹ Of particular significance is this social group's pursuit of a lifestyle more hedonistic than were previous generations. Characteristically, their distinctive consumption patterns for services and housing require diverse entertainment/cultural opportunities and a high level of amenities.

More difficult over the next decade or so will be coping with the rapidity of changes flowing from a series of mini-booms and sharp declines in several age cohorts which are markedly different in size. These shifts...will alter the growth and composition of the labourforce, tax rates, pensions, housing demands, the need for public and private services, commercial facilities and recreational activities. They will also redefine the kinds of arrangements and locational choices made by households with respect to where they live and work. Some of these changes will be gradual, while others will be more sudden. When these shifts are overlaid with changes in attitudes -- to authority, to work, to leisure and lifestyle -- and on changes in the family as an economic unit...the potential impact on our cities is even more substantial. Whether these trends continue in the future is pure speculation, but the probability is high that they will.¹²

These forecasts are particularly important to declining industrial cities because they point out where future opportunities for redevelopment are likely to occur, the direction of change and the ingredients that will determine whether a city flourishes or continues to decline.

¹¹ Bourne, pp. 7,8.

¹² Bourne, p. 18.

Public policy decisions (or non-decisions) will heavily influence which alternative path a given city will follow. Over the next few years decisions on timing, scale and location of infrastructure, social services provision, new investments in transportation, land use regulations and local government financing will effectively lock-in certain options in urban development while excluding others.¹³

Due largely to the specialized economy of many Canadian cities, any large sectoral shifts in the national economy benefit certain areas at the expense of others. As the impact of the changes wrought with the coming of a post-industrial society increase, those cities responding first to the changes will likely capture a greater proportion of the economic benefits by monopolizing the finite markets these changes are creating.

In response to the infrastructure required by post-industrial employers and the preferences of their employees, governments are "moving away from promoting entrepreneurs to state intervention to promote social, ecological, and even aesthetic objectives, as well as economic objectives."¹⁴ Concern has been transferred from growth to "quality of life". Because the number of cities seeking to increase revenues and employment is steadily increasing, the competition is fierce. Some cities, responding to this competition, are exploring strategies which set them apart from the pack. And while tax abatements, loan guarantees, subsidies and land write-downs are still common inducements to attract this new infusion of capital, some cities are cultivating an "amenity infrastructure" as an alternative enticement. By employing such amenities as publicly supported theatres, art galleries or museums and/or entertainment complexes such as civic and convention centres, or sports facilities, government

¹³ Bourne, p. 22.

¹⁴ David Ley, "Liberal Ideology and the Post Industrial City", Annals of the Association of the American Geographers, 70:2, 1980, p. 243.

officials hope to appeal to and thereby attract new high-technology industries and workers to their environs.¹⁵

While it may not be as significant a factor as proximity to markets, availability of labour, water and sewer capacity, or the transportation system, cities are becoming increasingly aware that quality of life can help or hinder their economic development efforts.¹⁶

Amenity facilities are being used in some cities (such as Indianapolis, Dallas and Winston-Salem) as anchors for their redevelopment programs in the hope that the amenities will help re-establish their downtowns as activity centers. They hope to attract other, privately financed developments and influence the future pattern of inner-city development.¹⁷ The jury is still out as to whether an elaborate amenity infrastructure can improve a city's overall business climate but speculation is that positive benefits accrue regardless: "An active cultural environment may reduce the risks perceived for a central city location in that it suggests that community leaders care about their city and that active public/private cooperation exists."¹⁸

Waterfront development as part of the selective revitalization process can attempt to benefit the inner-city by developing an amenity infrastructure aimed at meeting the requirements of post-industrial society. Decision makers, cognizant of the evolving societal changes and their potential to regain the population lost to suburbanization and to revitalize the inner-city, can structure their redevelopment projects to accentuate desirable uses in favourable settings, such as urban waterfronts, in order to compete. Belief in this strategy's soundness is reinforced by the present intra-urban migration trends which, while

¹⁵ Rita J. Bamberg and David W. Parham, "Leveraging Amenity Infrastructure: Indianapolis' Economic Development Strategy", *Urban Land*, 43:11, 1984, pp. 12,13.

¹⁶ Bamberg and Parham, p. 12.

¹⁷ Bamberg and Parham, p. 13.

¹⁸ Bamberg and Parham, p. 13.

small in comparison to overall numbers, show an inflow of the much sought-after young, urban professional households to the inner-city and the forecast that "with smaller households the one-parent families, the demand for housing will most likely change, emphasizing proximity to employment, shopping and recreation."¹⁹ This trend, if it continues, favours the types and concentration of uses traditionally found in the inner-city.

Support for the use of waterfronts and the inclusion of amenities for inner-city development also has foundation based in the present. One of the responses to the increasing levels of technology in today's society is to "develop a highly personal value system to compensate".²⁰ As Naisbitt has concluded in his study of the future: "We must learn to balance the material wonders of technology with the spiritual demands of our human nature".²¹ One such example of this compensation and balance is the current of popular support for nature conservation. The level of concern for nature and the importance attached to it is reflected in modern man's preference for the suburbs as homesteads.

Concern for nature and the wisdom of peacefully co-existing with nature in modern times is best exemplified by the works of Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner and other ecological thinkers who initiated the environmental movement of the 1960's and 1970's. The success these ecologists had in reaching the masses is partially explained by the almost daily reminders of environmental abuses created by new and expanding technologies. "While only some had been

¹⁹ David E. Dowall, Households, Jobs and the Built Environment: Prospects and Policies for the 1980's, (Berkeley: Institute of Urban and Regional Development, 1984), p. 9.

²⁰ Naisbitt, p. 40.

²¹ Naisbitt, p. 40.

adversely affected by discrimination [or] war, nearly everyone had experienced undesirable environmental change."²²

Along similar lines of thought, the backlash against technology has resulted in a greater appreciation of our past:

... we have not embraced the future either. We have done the human thing: We are clinging to the known past in the fear of an unknown future.²³

Waterfront lands benefit from the sentimental attachment many people feel toward them and a widely held, idealized image of the past in general. The preservation of heritage has taken on an increased importance in today's society. Waterfront developments, with their often unique architectural styles and special ambience, offer urban dwellers a break from the often sterile, formula architectural styles of modern commercial projects. Waterfronts are familiar places to many people which contributes to a city resident's "sense of place" or belonging.²⁴

...cities are rightly concerned about losing their identity by the ruthless destruction of their landmarks. Certainly we should increase our efforts for the preservation of buildings of historical or architectural value. However, it is important to realize that elements other than buildings may be equal or more important factors in the continuity of city form. The natural site is fairly permanent, and it should be articulated -- made more visible -- by human action.²⁵

Summary

The speed of technological advancements and the willingness of business and industry to utilize these technologies verifies that a transition to post-industrial society based on technology is well underway. Older cities, recogniz-

²² T.A. Haberlien, "The Land Ethic Realized: Some Psychological Explanations for Changing Environmental Attitudes", Journal of Social Issues, 24:8, p. 79.

²³ Naisbitt, p. 249.

²⁴ For further elaboration of the importance of 'sense of place' see Edwin H. Zube, "Nature and Cities", Urban Design International, 4:3, 1983 and Donald Appleyard, "The Environment as a Social Symbol", Journal of the American Planning Association, 145:2, 1979.

²⁵ Hans Blumenfeld, "Continuity and Change in Urban Form", Journal of Urban History, 1:2, 1975, p. 147.

ing that they face further decline if they cling to their industrially-based economics, are seeking a development strategy which will help them adapt their cores to the new requirements of high-tech industries and businesses. This chapter has shown that waterfront development as part of a selective revitalization process, is one possible approach to adapting their inner-cities to these changes. It was also shown that waterfront development in particular is suitable for this task because:

1. waterfront sites are often available in parcel sizes suitable for redevelopment projects geared toward revitalizing the CBD.
2. of the natural attraction of man to water and because nature conservation and heritage preservation are issues which have a wide base of popular support.
3. political support for waterfront redevelopment is prudent, given the availability of public financial assistance and the flexibility in meeting community needs for recreation as well as economic revitalization.
4. waterfront sites often possess a range of amenities which appeal to high technology employers and their employees and thereby project a positive image to potential investors.

It was further shown that waterfront revitalization is a suitable choice to help bridge this transitional era because it has the ability to serve both the immediate needs of many inner-cities by providing recreational opportunities and improving inner-city image, while also laying the necessary initial steps for attracting high-tech industries and their employers to the core in the future. One possible way of meeting these two time dimension requirements was outlined also: using urban waterfronts as sites for the creation or expansion of an elaborate amenities infrastructure. It should also be noted that such an approach represents a break from the traditional tack of approaching "problems

with an eye toward high-tech, short-term solutions"²⁶, since it can provide a long-term approach to inner-city renewal.

Further clarification of selective revitalization as it concerns waterfronts needs to be made at this point. Waterfront developments stressing the provision of amenities is not the total solution to the inner-city's problems. Waterfront revitalization, in this instance, represents only a preparatory step in accommodating high-tech industry and its employees within the inner-city. It should also be noted that this type of waterfront development is not the only approach to or objective of waterfront revitalization, as will be suggested in chapter three. For example, Table 1 is Donner's categorization of waterfronts. This chapter stresses an amenity infrastructure because of its significance with regard to the types of facilities found in previous waterfront developments and its applicability to the case study examined later in this thesis. The inclusion of an amenities component in waterfront development is also consistent with projections which see the inner-city becoming "more a symbolic focus ... with heavy public intervention in the marketplace in the image setting civic and cultural amenities and with private investments in hotels and office towers".²⁷ Additionally, such an approach is consistent with development today which involves public/private partnerships to finance and manage waterfront projects as will be discussed in chapter four.

²⁶ Naisbitt, p. 249.

²⁷ Land L. Marshall, Action by Design (American Society of Landscape Architects, 1983) p. 71.

Table 1: Common Waterfront Renewal Strategies

1. TRADITIONAL URBAN RENEWAL APPROACH: Obsolete land and buildings are acquired and razed to make way for new uses.

Typical Situation for Utilization: Where a waterfront is blighted and both functionally and economically obsolete.

Advantages of the Strategy: (A) Eliminates blighted areas; (B) Acts as an incentive to private development to build on adjacent land which would not have occurred if blight remained.

Disadvantages of the Strategy: (A) Tax revenue lost if area is to be used for public purposes, such as parkland; (B) Potential changes occurring after clearance is complete could change the character and identity of the waterfront; (C) Prohibitive expense involved in acquisition.

Examples of the Strategy: Baltimore's Inner Harbour Development; Detroit's Renaissance Center.

2. ADAPTIVE RE-USE/CONSERVATION STRATEGY: This involves the adaptive re-use or conservation of existing waterfront structures to transform obsolete or dysfunctional elements of waterfronts into viable enterprises.

Typical Situation for Utilization: Where waterfronts contain significant historical buildings or locations, or where one of the goals of redevelopment is to protect the waterfront's heritage.

Advantages of the Strategy: (A) Recycles and conserves the limited waterfront sites in their historic state as much as is possible; (B) Preserves and enhances the waterfront's identity.

Disadvantages of the Strategy: (A) Existing waterfront infrastructure is often inadequate for new uses; (B) May not be a cost-effective approach to spend resources on buildings beyond their normal lifespan.

Examples of the Strategy: Halifax, Nova Scotia's waterfront; certain aspects of Saint John, New Brunswick's Market Square development.

3. FILLING TO ARTIFICIALLY CREATE SPACE FOR REDEVELOPMENT: Expansion of waterfront land through some type of environmental modification.

Typical Situation for Utilization: Where the availability of waterfront land is limited and its acquisition for redevelopment purposes appears to be unfeasible.

Advantages of the Strategy: (A) The ability to create space for redevelopment, often at a

cost less than existing sites; (B) Benefits public and private building projects underway by providing temporary disposal areas for clean fill.

Disadvantages of the Strategy: (A) New lands will require extension of municipal services; (B) Stringent and costly environmental review process and regulations to fulfill; (C) May adversely affect the environment without proper planning.

Examples of the Strategy: Toronto's Harbourfront; Battery Park in New York City.

4. MULTIPURPOSE OF SHARED FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT: Where some development objective is met (e.g. providing recreational space) while some other development objective is also served.

Typical Situation for Utilization: Where redevelopment sites in close proximity to the water's edge are limited and/or are in great demand.

Advantages of the Strategy: (A) Efficiently utilizes limited space and resources; (B) Shared construction and operational costs.

Disadvantages of the Strategy: (A) The number of different authorities involved in the project; overlapping jurisdictions; (B) The question of liability for damages occurring to or caused by the project.

Examples of the Strategy: Greenway along the Merimac River in Lowell, Massachusetts, where a pathway is being developed as part of a water pollution control project; flood control levees in Hartford Connecticut, where land is used for recreational purposes as well.

5. COMMERCIAL/PARK REDEVELOPMENT: Provision of public access to the waterfront and public open space as part of a commercial development.

Typical Situation for Utilization: Where public access easements are required to gain approval for private development adjacent to, or on public land.

Advantages of the Strategy: (A) Keeps some of the redevelopment on the tax rolls; (B) Gives private developers an advantage over their competition because of unique location; (C) Minimizes public investment in the project; (D) Can with proper structuring allow the project to become self-sufficient eventually.

Disadvantages of the Strategy: (A) Limited number of appropriate uses for such developments; (B) Maintenance costs for publicly owned spaces; (C) The risk involved in undertaking such projects may force developers to tailor the developments almost entirely to up-scale clientele.

Examples of the Strategy: San Antonio's Riverwalk; Vancouver's B.C. Place/Expo'86 development; Toronto's Harbourfront.

6. PUBLIC PARK/RECREATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Primarily occurs when municipal governments are unable (or unwilling) to attract private investment in the waterfront.

Typical Situation for Utilization: Where public officials are merely seeking to attract new investment in the inner-city or on the waterfront itself.

Advantages of the Strategy: (A) Uninhibited public access until private investment can be realized and control over what locates here; (B) Increased urban recreational opportunities; (C) Public authorities may initiate the project without significant involvement from the private sector or other levels of government because of the low cost of the minimal facilities provided under this scenario; (D) May be used as a transitional phase prior to more intensive development.

Disadvantages of the Strategy: (A) Limited utilization because of climatic limitations; (B) Maintenance costs borne entirely by creator of the project; (C) Infrastructure expansion may be necessary.

Examples of the Strategy: Hartford Connecticut's Riverfront Recapture project.

CHAPTER THREE: WATERFRONT STRATEGIES TO EFFECT POSITIVE INNER-CITY CHANGE

Introduction

Media reports of successful waterfront redevelopment projects may give the impression that such projects are a relatively new phenomenon. Such is not the case. While the popularity of waterfront renewal is relatively recent and the body of knowledge gathered from previous experiences not as large as some of the other approaches to inner-city renewal, it is sufficient to draw conclusions regarding waterfront renewal with some degree of accuracy. The aim of this chapter is to examine the different types of building strategies which have been used within waterfront developments. Basically three types of building strategies were found during the literature review for this thesis:

1. Waterfront developments using both existing and future inner-city demands as guide to create their project. An example of this approach has already been outlined in the text: the use of selective revitalization coupled with the development of an amenities infrastructure.
2. Waterfront development geared to creating "a city within a city" not revitalization as in the first building strategy but accommodating growth.
3. Waterfront development intended merely to improve the inner-city, in a single-purpose manner. This strategy focuses itself on improvement of a particular aspect of the inner-city, with no overall or specific long-term objective in mind.

Also included in this chapter are illustrative examples of each type of building strategy and a description of certain physical elements commonly found in waterfront developments.

Waterfront Building Strategies

Before outlining the three basic building strategies, it may be prudent to examine the characteristics of two building approaches available to developers of the waterfront: conservation/rehabilitation of pre-existing structures and new construction. Neither approach appears to be dominant; sometimes both methods are utilized in the same project.

A. Conservation/Rehabilitation (Adaptive Re-Use)

The conservation/rehabilitation approach is one which acknowledges that constant incremental change within the city is inevitable and uses this change to effect positive results.¹ This approach's current popularity can be partially attributed to its consistency with the selective revitalization philosophy being adopted by many older cities, since it concentrates its conservation efforts on selected areas and decides what to retain in order to make the best use of the building or areas involved.

While slower in producing tangible evidence of positive change than new construction, the cumulative impact of the conservation/rehabilitation approach to renewal can have as dramatic an effect on an area as that of the earlier bulldozer-approach to urban renewal. The results of this approach take longer to realize because they are dependent on the market's response to the gradual changes being introduced to increase the area's desirability as a place to work or live.²

Because of tight municipal resources and acceptance and attractiveness of "urban consolidation" by municipal authorities, conservation/rehabilitation tends

¹ Walter Jamieson, "Conservation as an approach to Urban Renewal", Plan Canada, 24:2, 1984, p. 45.

² Jamieson, p. 50.

to be small in scale and privately funded. Growing out of the popular support given to the conservation, environmental and community organization movements of the '60's, the largely favourable response to conservation/rehabilitation of older commercial buildings, retail districts and neighbourhoods has encouraged many small developers and builders to undertake projects in formerly declining areas. Additional impetus for conservation/rehabilitation's popularity can be traced to the proximity of many older neighbourhoods to downtown shopping and business districts, the attraction of the aesthetics of the earlier architectural styles and their diversity, the attraction of socially heterogeneous populations and the services they support and the generally lower real estate costs in old sections of the city.³

There is no widespread agreement on the economic feasibility of conservation/rehabilitation projects. Most large private developers shy away from such projects because they feel it is cheaper to construct new structures than it is to adapt old structures to modern uses. While no definitive answer can be given, it is believed that factors such as the following, affect a conservation project's feasibility:

...whether the owner can create more usable space through development; market conditions, nature and condition of building stock; public attitudes; location of the building or area; building and fire code regulation; and the availability of financing...⁴

There also must be a demand for rehabilitated structures at prices sufficient to justify investment. In many cases the health of the local economy and whether it inspires enough investor confidence is the deciding factor.⁵

³ Jamieson, pp. 44,45,46.

⁴ Jamieson, p. 46.

⁵ Jamieson, p. 51.

Project assessment can also show that there is no demand for additional space and/or that much of the existing stock is vacant. In these instances, conservation-based renewal, such as by Heritage Canada in its Main Streets program, can be used to facilitate "economic restructuring" by attracting new businesses or re-directing the economic focus of the city.⁶ This is a role sometimes given to urban waterfront revitalization projects, such as in the case of Halifax.

B. New Construction

New construction for waterfront redevelopment can take any number of forms. Two of the more popular forms of new construction on the waterfront at present are mixed-use/megastructures projects and specialty retail centres or festival malls. These two components are generally included as the major attraction of the redevelopment project, with entertainment and cultural uses aimed at generating after-hours crowds frequently included as support facilities.

New construction typically seeks to artificially create an atmosphere in those waterfront locations where traditional waterfront uses and/or buildings are absent. This is accomplished by using modernized versions of buildings historically found on waterfronts or by giving the project a distinctive architectural treatment which takes advantage of the waterfront site.⁷

Large, mixed-use developments or megastructures, often covering entire city-blocks, have become one method used to revitalize urban waterfronts. Such "self-contained" developments offer a wide range of consumer goods and services, in an often imposing structure, deliberately designed to discourage certain

⁶ Jamieson, p. 51.

⁷ For further elaboration see H. Briavel Halcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, Revitalizing Cities, (State College: American Association of Geographers, 1984), pp. 61-63.

elements (the poor and the blue-collar worker) of the population from entering the complex. By limiting the exposure of its upper- and middle-income consumers and employees to the perceived dangers of the inner-city, it is hoped the development's appeal to "desirable" users will be raised.

Mixed-use developments typically contain revenue-producing uses (such as retailing, residential, hotel and/or recreational facilities) specifically chosen to be mutually supportive of one another so as to have a combined impact greater than its individual parts could generate when acting alone. Such mixed-use structures are typically physically integrated internally by uninterrupted (climate-controlled) pedestrian connections.⁸

As it concerns waterfront revitalization, the key component of a mixed-use development is its retail and/or recreational components, which attract users from outside the complex. The size of these components depends on the intentions of the renewal project. If the project's purpose is solely to attract new businesses to the area by offering a prestigious location, then the presence of the mixed-use development itself satisfies that goal. However, if the project's goals extend beyond increasing office space or increasing the number of residential units, then the retail component becomes more important and thereby occupies a larger proportion of the project.⁹

It must also be remembered that, while these are two building options, there is more to waterfront development than simply constructing a few buildings. Waterfront development projects are often only a component within an overall inner-city redevelopment strategy and seldom represent an initial phase in the process. As such, other types of uses are also commonly found in

⁸ G.P. Schwartz, "Mixed-Use Development" in Market Research for Shopping Centers, Rubin A. Roca, editor, (New York: International Council of Shopping Centers, 1980), pp. 152,153.

⁹ Schwartz, pp. 152-167.

waterfront projects in order to attract people to the area and provide the necessary customers to support the project. The following two subsections outline some of these support facilities.

C. Specialty Retailing

Research has shown the presence of a downtown shopping centre makes it easier to raise money for other inner-city projects.¹⁰ This, in part, may explain why the second form of new construction commonly found in waterfront renewal projects -- specialty retail centres or festival malls as they are called in the Rouse Company's Boston and Baltimore waterfront projects -- are so popular. Festival malls, which are a collection of restaurants, boutiques and fresh food and flower stalls, have a unique market appeal. Unlike the department store draw of the typical suburb, specialty retail centres do not rely on retailing to bring people to the development but rather the specialty centres use a restaurant/entertainment draw in which retail facilities are a secondary reason for attending.¹¹ Architectural style and natural settings create a distinctive ambience, which is the main attraction for visitors, while shopping facilities only add to the length of their stay. Waterfront specialty retail centres typically use a unique, unified architectural design and the appeal of the location to attract people to the area.¹²

The attraction of the site or facilities found in a waterfront specialty retail centre is also generally augmented by some form of entertainment or recreational components, the inclusion of a variety of restaurants or merchants offering

¹⁰ Betsey Hansell, "Retail scene looking up in other major cities", Detroit Freepress, Dec. 14, 1983, p. 1.

¹¹ Don M. Stewart, "Specialty Retail Centers", in Market Research for Shopping Centers, Rubin A. Roca, editor, (New York: International Council of Shopping Centers, 1980), pp. 110-119.

¹² Stewart, pp. 110-119.

unusual merchandise, often related to the overall project theme or design. Specialty retail centres strongly appeal to tourists as well as to local shoppers. Ideally, waterfront specialty centres should be located close to high density, high income residential areas and/or tourists areas, if they are to fully exploit their potential. In instances where specialty retail centres have achieved this combination, their revenues have exceeded those of regional malls. Also, specialty retail centres represent an attractive form of inner-city renewal since they seldom compete for customers directly with existing business.¹³

D. Activity Generation

As in any redevelopment project, the key to its success is the project's ability to attract sufficient users to support the facilities the project provides. While mixed-use and specialty retail centres can and do operate in isolation, supporting uses frequently appear in waterfront redevelopment proposals. Among the most popular of these supporting uses are: Hotel/Convention centres, entertainment facilities (concert halls, dinner theatres, downtown sports venues, etc.) and parks. All of these uses are aimed at attracting consumers from the suburbs and beyond, as well as after-hours and/or local consumers. The objective of providing these uses is to produce sufficient numbers of people to create a sense of liveliness and to foster a sense of safety through the amount of visible street activity. To these ends, hotels are particularly sought after because they tend to generate a 24-hour activity cycle with the comings and goings of their guest. Hotels on the waterfront also bring tourists to the area, add to tax revenues, provide unskilled jobs in large numbers (because it is a labour-intensive industry) and generate large spin-off benefits from the

¹³ Stewart, pp. 110-119.

expenditures of their guests -- particularly business travellers -- elsewhere in the community.¹⁴

Business travellers, however, are more interested in a waterfront hotel's central location rather than in the aesthetics of the location. These travellers tend not to work on weekends. To counteract this shortcoming and in order to increase the number of potential hotel users, waterfront hotels often are built as part of a mixed-use development, or more frequently in conjunction with convention facilities. Recently, there has been a growing trend towards including arts/entertainment facilities as part of mixed-use developments to offset the decline in business occurring during the weekends. Arts and entertainment facilities are also desirable because they improve the city's image and increase the potential for future development.¹⁵

Waterfront recreational facilities and open space easements are often included in waterfront projects for their aesthetics and ability to promote diverse social interaction. The size of these components depends on the importance attached to these objectives, the size of the redevelopment site and on who is providing these spaces. Five categories of recreational activities sponsors exist: the Federal government, Provincial governments, municipal governments, quasi-public organizations and the private sector. Federally-run waterfront parks tend to offer a limited variety of recreational opportunities. Often, such facilities are geared to demonstrating a unique feature of the environment or habitat (eg. a bird sanctuary). Provincial waterfront parks do not necessarily concentrate on providing built recreational facilities. Typically, Provincial parks stress passive types of recreation (eg. fishing, picnicking) that

¹⁴ Bronwyn Krog, "The Development Scene: Inn Action", City Planning, 1:3, 1984, pp. 20-23.

¹⁵ R. Davenport, "The Recreational Use of Waterfronts for Public and Private Recreation" in Urban Waterfront Lands, Committee on Urban Waterfronts, (Washington: National Academy of Science, 1980), p. 209.

are compatible with the waterfront location. Municipally operated waterfront parks are not as easily categorized. They generally offer a combination of active (eg. jogging trails, bicycle paths, athletic fields) and passive recreational opportunities and vary widely in size from a regional size park to narrow easements. Quasi-public providers of waterfront recreation include yacht clubs, which are generally geared to a single-purpose and restrict public access and membership to like-minded individuals. Lastly, the private sector is an active provider of water-based recreational opportunities for profit, such as marinas or paddle-boat rental operations.¹⁶

Waterfront Revitalization Strategies

Urban waterfront revitalization is typically a strategy aimed at rejuvenating the inner-city, often emphasizing the CBD. While other inner-city redevelopment strategies, such as main street revitalization and pedestrian malls, have been successful in creating a more functional built-form over the last twenty years, such projects often failed to make the core a vital part of the community. Waterfront revitalization attempts to avoid this mistake by giving greater attention to improving the quality of life within the inner-city by carefully choosing attractions geared specifically to this task.

The desire for a waterfront of new uses is part of a whole plan for "saving the city". To re-attract a middle class, even to lure new businesses, the urban atmosphere must be made more pleasant and more welcoming. Clean air, amenities, and good looking physical appearances are necessary. Park settings for buildings, parks themselves, and recreation facilities all provide the niceties that create the impetus for re-entry of people and investment into the urban orbit. Without these features the cities cannot be saved.¹⁷

¹⁶ Davenport, p. 209.

¹⁷ H. Briavel Halcomb and Robert A. Beauregard, Revitalizing Cities, (State College: American Association of Geographers, 1984), p. 3.

Redevelopment of the waterfront is set apart from other renewal strategies by the physical appeal of its location. The presence of open spaces and nature appeal to the desires of the emerging elite-class of technological and administrative workers and exploits the growing importance of leisure-time activities close to home.

Glowing media reports of waterfront redevelopment successes in Boston and Baltimore has led to a spate of imitators starting similar waterfront projects elsewhere. There is evidence, however, which suggests that these approaches are not the panacea that the media portrays:

There are limits to the potential of the boutique and scented candle shop formula for commercial success, as evidenced in the briefly reborn sections of Atlanta, Chicago and St. Louis.¹⁸

Each city has a unique set of local circumstances. Decision makers must be cognizant of these differences and tailor their projects to fit their own constraints if they hope to be successful.

While no universal approach to waterfront redevelopment has yet been discovered, analysis of successful waterfront projects reveal several characteristics which are common to most. Although opinions concerning which is the best method of waterfront renewal vary widely, the projects chosen for this chapter typify the current trends in this type of development.

Illustrative Examples of Waterfront Revitalization in North America

A. Selective Revitalization/Amenity Infrastructure

This strategy uses improvement to the inner-city's cultural, entertainment and recreational facilities to serve a present-day need for jobs and to improve inner-city image, while at the same time putting into place the types of facilities

¹⁸ Committee on Waterfronts, Urban Waterfront Lands, (Washington: National Academy of Science, 1980), p. 15.

(an amenities infrastructure) forecasted to be influential in attracting high-tech businesses and their employees to a given area. Like all examples presented in this section, this strategy has the ability to use adaptive re-use, new construction or a combination of both to implement their plans. The following are examples of selective revitalization/amenity infrastructure approach to waterfront development.

1. Selective revitalization of waterfronts for amenities improvement using new construction: Baltimore, Maryland, Inner Harbour Development

Growing out of a 1958 downtown renewal plan, inner-city redevelopment began in Baltimore in 1959 with the construction of Charles Center, a 33 acre mixed-use development in the centre of the downtown business district. The success of the Charles Center development generated interest in the inner-city area which eventually led to the interest in the 250 acre Inner Harbour area. First indications of serious consideration of the Inner Harbour areas for redevelopment appeared in the 1964 Master Plan for Baltimore which indicated four basic objectives related to the development of the inner Harbour area:

- a) The reconstruction of the municipal centre, including a 150 foot wide mall from the proposed centre to the Inner Harbour.
- b) Extension of Charles Center's office component southward toward the harbour.
- c) High and lowrise apartment blocks to be constructed, bracketing the harbour to the east and west.
- d) Creating a recreational playground comprised of recreational, cultural and entertainment facilities centering on the piers and around the shoreline.

Ten years later the plan was still not realized. Instead of a new municipal centre, the existing one was restored. Office construction did prosper, with 23 major office buildings built within or adjacent to the redevelopment area. The residential component never materialized in the proportions originally envisioned, although some restoration of existing residences did take place.¹⁹ The last objective of the original Master Plan, concerning recreation/entertainment, has materialized recently.

The resurgence of the Inner Harbour did not occur overnight but was the result of a lengthy building process. The first step in the revitalization of the harbour area involved the recapturing of the water's edge for public use. This was accomplished by purchasing all the property around the shoreline and creating a permanent circle of parkland. Then came the mooring of the frigate "Constellation" in the harbour to provide a focal point for later harbour development. Since these initial efforts, twenty-five additional attractions have been added to the Inner Harbour. They include: The Maryland Science Centre (1976), a marina, the opening of existing piers to visitors and tourist uses such as harbour tours by boat and boat rentals, a maritime museum and a variety of pre-planned activities including ethnic festivals. In addition to these developments, four other major components were put into place to make the Inner Harbour the success it is today. These components are: The Baltimore Convention Centre (1979), Harbourplace, a festival mall (1980), The National Aquarium (1981), and the Hyatt Regency Hotel (1981).²⁰ Key among these components was the retail component, Harbourplace. (see Figures 1 and 2).

¹⁹ D. Steller, "A MXD Takes Off: Baltimore's Inner Harbour", Urban Land, 41:3, 1982, p. 11.

²⁰ Steller, pp. 11,12,14,16.





Figure 1: Baltimore's Inner Harbour
Source: Urban Land, 41:3, 1982, p. 18

Figure 2: Artist's Conception of Baltimore's Inner Harbour
Source: Urban Design International, 2:1, 1980, p.11



Harbour place, a festival mall, is a collection of restaurants and small merchants (two-thirds of which are food-oriented) brought together to create a marketplace with the atmosphere of a festival or theatre. The two pavilions of Harbourplace employ modern architecture to create the project's ambience. The tenant mix and merchandising found in Harbourplace has several distinct sections. These include: Colonnade Market, which is a collection of fresh meat, poultry and seafood market stalls, the Trading Hall, where vendors of wine, gourmet food, pastries and candies are located, the Food Hall, which specializes in on-premises eating establishment and a number of small specialty shops, comprised of ever-changing, short-term vendors, offering unusual merchandise which contributes to the project's atmosphere of change and liveliness.²¹

Harbourplace was built with the intention of making it the hub of downtown activity while permitting public access to the water. In both respects it has been successful. The location of Harbourplace, within Baltimore's inner-city, benefits from the presence of 362,000 downtown workers, and access to 3.6 million people within 45 minutes driving time. These factors, combined with the synergy created by the project's other attractions, virtually assured the project's success.

Public investment in the Inner Harbour development of 55 million dollars²² (or 40% of the total investment after twenty years)²³ has already generated more than one billion dollars in private and institutional funds, a new image for the city and a major expansion of tourist and convention

²¹ Steller, p. 14.

²² Ann Breen and Richard Rigby, "Waterfronts in the 1980's: An Overview", *Journal of Housing*, 41:3, 1981, p. 78.

²³ Martin Millsbaugh, "Project Delivery Systems and Funding in the 80's" in *Urban Waterfronts '83*, (Washington: The Waterfront Press, 1984), p. 14.

business in Baltimore. Inner Harbour's developer, James Rouse, rents the Harbourplace site for one hundred thousand dollars per year and pays taxes on the land. This arrangement has given Baltimore more than three million dollars in taxes and rent after 3 years and will eventually net the City 25% of the festival mall's profits once it begins to make a profit.²⁴

2. Selective revitalization of a waterfront concentrating on amenities provision using adaptive re-use: Halifax, Nova Scotia

While not as explicitly focused on the provision of amenity facilities as the Baltimore example, Halifax's project uses the historical patina and waterfront ambience to tie the project together and to attract new visitors to the inner-city. Halifax's development uses less cultural facilities than does Baltimore's, using instead the beauty of waterfront vistas and the sentimental attachment to familiar waterfront architectural styles to attract new businesses. The project, though not entirely made up of refurbished buildings, uses the historical waterfront theme extensively to implement this long-term plan.

Modern downtown revitalization in Halifax began in 1967 with the start of the 65 million dollar Scotia Square, a mixed-use complex. Completed in the early 1970's, Scotia Square presently generates approximately 28% (3700) of the total jobs in the CBD and is a primary destination for many who come downtown. By 1977, the Maritime Mall, another retail and office project, located opposite Scotia Square on Barrington Street, created an additional 2000 jobs.²⁵

²⁴ Hansell, p. 18.

²⁵ Ann G. Haggart, "Halifax: Sympathetic Change", Contact, 13:2/3, 1981, p. 406.

Despite its historical significance to Halifax, the waterfront had largely degenerated into a parking lot by the 1970's. In response, a number of waterfront plans were put forward during the early 1970's. Significant among these was the 1971 Halifax Waterfront Development Study, which "advocated greater public access and use, the preservation of human scale, and the retention of historic buildings."²⁶ These objectives have, to varying degrees, been incorporated into subsequent plans.²⁷

The first manifestation of renewed interest in the waterfront area was the Law Courts Building and the renovation of a group of warehouses which became known as "Historic Properties".²⁸ This was in response to public outcries against the proposed destruction of the area known as Privateers Wharf to make way for a proposed expressway. To provide the capital necessary to restore the seven historic buildings involved, Historic Properties Limited was formed. This public corporation includes the City of Halifax, Canada Mortgage and Housing as well as the Historic Sites Division of the Federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Completed in 1975, the two phase project successfully rehabilitated the structures for commercial uses, as well as funding the construction of three new buildings in a compatible architectural style.²⁹

The next and most recent phase of waterfront redevelopment began with the establishment of the Waterfront Development Corporation Limited (WDCL), a Provincial corporation with financial assistance from the Federal Department of Regional Industrial Expansion and the Provincial Department

²⁶ Haggart, p. 400.

²⁷ Haggart, p. 400.

²⁸ Haggart, p. 400.

²⁹ Redstone, L. New Downtowns. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1976, pp. 315-316.

of Development. Charged with implementing the Metropolitan Halifax and Dartmouth Area Subsidiary Agreement, the WDCL manages and coordinates the revitalization of parts of the Halifax and Dartmouth waterfronts for recreational and commercial extensions of their respective downtowns.³⁰

The redevelopment area covered by WDCL extends out below the Citadel and the Clock Tower to the Harbour and is the governmental, business and tourist centre...It accommodates a mix of land-uses, which, in conjunction with the development of major retail complexes elsewhere in the city, has resulted in the development of an increasingly specialized retail component including the opening of a wide range of restaurants and food outlets.³¹

The subsidiary agreement provides 31 million dollars in shared costs and the Provincial government provided an additional 4 million dollars for planning, land acquisition, site preparation and infrastructure improvements in the redevelopment area.³² A further 3.4 million dollars was provided for a new ferry system between Halifax and Dartmouth -- a system projected to carry some 2 million passengers annually to Halifax's waterfront.³³ In addition to the new ferry terminal complex (Chebucto Landing in Halifax), the 1978 development plan calls for the provision of the following:

- a) a new park on Halifax's waterfront
- b) the construction of a new Maritime Museum, with funds provided by the Province and the Devonian Foundation, in a restored hardware store
- c) rebuilt wharfs where historic vessels will be moored³⁴

More recent redevelopment projects have continued the practice of rehabilitating historic buildings where practical. Most of these projects have oriented themselves with the water and have concentrated on

³⁰ C.E. Clark, 1984 Corpus Almanac and Canadian Sourcebook, Volume 2. (Don Mills: Southam Communications, 1984), pp. 19-233.

³¹ Haggart, p. 397.

³² Clark, pp. 19-233.

³³ Clark, pp. 19-233.

³⁴ Haggart, pp. 403-405.

commercial conversions. As a consequence of these individual actions, a series of rehabilitated structures now forms a link between Scotia Square and the waterfront.

Halifax's waterfront project also appears to be successful in attracting new investment to the core area, as evidenced by such new or proposed developments as:

- a) Keith's Brewery, a mixed-use development (opened in 1984)
- b) Founder's Square, a mixed-use development (to open in 1986)
- c) The Sheraton Hotel complex (opened in 1985)
- d) The Central Trust Tower and the Purdy's Wharf Office Building(s) (both to be opened in 1985) (see Figure 3)³⁵

Halifax's project is significant in that access via a boardwalk is not continuous as in most other waterfront projects. Instead, there are two separate boardwalks, one located in the Historic Properties/Sheraton Hotel area and another in an area where good views of the working Harbour can be seen. While continuous public access to the water's edge is almost universally held in high regard, the Halifax development has shown that despite this omission the project has been successful in attracting development far beyond the development area's borders.

3. Selective revitalization of waterfronts for amenities improvement using a combination of new construction and adaptive re-use: Quebec City, Le-Vieux-Port-de-Quebec

This development option, since it employs a combination of building approaches is the most common formula used for waterfront development. In Quebec City's case, the approach uses the aesthetic appeal of the old

³⁵ Patrick Kennedy, Project Officer, Waterfront Development Corporation Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, April 3, 1985.


port area of the city and the existing inner-city strength as a departure point for further amenities improvement and new development. The older port section concentrates on providing new retailing in the form of a festival mall, together with entertainment facilities to enhance an already architecturally attractive area. Quebec City's plan also makes provisions for anticipated growth, resulting from the appeal of the old port area, in an adjacent area developed around a new boating basin.

Growing out of a 1979 master plan, Le-Vieux-port-de-Quebec (Old Port) was incorporated as a development corporation in 1981 by the Canada Lands Company (a subsidiary of Public Works Canada). Like Toronto's, the Old Port's board of directors is made up of representatives of the local business community, community organizations and professionals, as well as the three levels of government. As conceived, the Old Port of Quebec seeks to preserve the history of the region and the waterfront's original character while improving living conditions on adjacent properties and encouraging economic development. In a manner similar to most Canadian waterfront redevelopment projects, the Old Port will use a combination of conservation/rehabilitation and new construction to realize these ambitions.³⁶ (see Figure 4)

Benefiting from a captive downtown market of an estimated 50,000 persons, Le Vieux-port-de-Quebec calls for a phased development process which will include the following:

- a) Les Terraces de la Pointe-a-Carcy, which is a festival mall-type development made up of three separate buildings:
 - i) Le Hangar des Boutiques, which is a renovated warehouse building containing 75,000 square feet of commercial space on two floors.

³⁶ Larry Hodgson, Information Officer, Le Vieux Port-de-Quebec, Quebec City, Quebec, April 23, 1985.



Plans call for 50 boutiques, 9 high quality fast food outlets, a European style cafe and a 5,400 square foot restaurant.

- ii) Le Havre, a newly constructed, triangular shaped building. It will have 33,000 square feet of specialized restaurants and exclusive businesses.
- iii) Le Hangar Du Grand Marche, also a renovated warehouse. Its 46,000 square feet of commercial space on two levels will be devoted to fresh food stalls and take-out food outlets. These three buildings will be connected to one another via climate controlled pedestrian bridges and will share a 1200-car parking facility. (see Figure 5)
- b) The "Agora", an amphitheatre capable of holding 10,000 persons (5,500 seated/4,500 standing) and a smaller 550 seat enclosed amphitheatre. (see Figure 6)
- c) A 4 storey observation tower which will allow panoramic views of the area, as well as of the adjacent working harbour.
- d) Docking facilities for cruise ships.
- e) The Bassin Louise Development. This portion of the project includes:
 - i) a 10 million dollar, 345-berth marina, with new locks to control water levels within the basin.
 - ii) a promenade around the basin with links extending to the festival mall development and amphitheatre areas.
 - iii) a 10 million dollar, interpretive centre run by Parks Canada. This centre will demonstrate historically accurate methods of naval construction and lumbering.
 - iv) a 59 million dollar, privately funded, residential development which is expected to provide 700 new units along the shores of the basin. (see Figure 7)
- f) Renovation of the nearby John Muir Building, which will provide 32,000 square feet of office space.
- g) A mixed-use complex, expected to be completed in 1987, which will include:
 - i) a 125-room hotel
 - ii) 540,000 square feet of office space
 - iii) a 300-car parking structure




FIGURE 5 : ARTIST'S CONCEPTION OF QUEBEC CITY'S WATERFRONT
SOURCE: LE VIEUX PORT-DE-QUEBEC CORPORATION, 1985




Figure 6 :Quebec City's Waterfront Redevelopment
Source: Le Vieux Port-De-Quebec Corporation, 1985




Figure 7 :Bassin Louise Residential Area
Source: Le Vieux Port-De-QuebecCorporation, 1985

- h) A renovated Customs Building, which is second in size within the city to the Quebec Parliament Buildings.

All of these attractions are located in the heart of the city within walking distance of Place Royale, an inter-modal transportation station, the new Musee de la Civilisation and a courthouse complex. The project is anticipated to provide 400 permanent and 100 seasonal jobs.³⁷

Expected to be completed in a relatively short 6 years, Le Vieux-Port-de-Quebec's original cost projections were as follows:

Le Vieux-Port-de-Quebec funding	91 million dollars
Ports Canada	10 million dollars
Public Works Canada	5 million dollars
Parks Canada	<u>4 million dollars</u>
Total public (Federal) investment	<u>110 million dollars</u>

These cost projections, however, proved to be slightly inaccurate since a total of 114,220,000 dollars (excluding a 3.5 million dollar contribution by the Province) has been spent up to December 1984. The public investment in the project is hoped to attract some 80 million dollars in private investment.³⁸

B. Urban Redevelopment -- City within a City

This strategy for renewing the inner-city through waterfront revitalization attempts to achieve its objective by clearing the site of its former uses and subsequently replacing them with new uses. This approach is similar to the "bulldozer approach" to inner-city renewal employed during the 1950's and 1960's. The rebuilding process is more an accommodation of growth within the inner-city than a plan to renew the inner-city, since these projects tend to focus attention and development on the new site with little consideration given to supporting

³⁷ Information concerning project facilities supplied by Larry Hodgson, Information Officer, Le Vieux Port-de-Quebec.

³⁸ Larry Hodgson, Information Officer, Le Vieux Port-de-Quebec, Quebec City, Quebec, April 23, 1985.


existing nearby uses. These urban waterfront redevelopment projects tend to be long-term strategies aimed at adapting the inner-city to accommodating growth, not necessarily change. Since it has been an assumption of this thesis that "consolidation and intensification" of the existing inner-city will be the primary concern for most cities, the assumption of continuing growth over a number of years, which is the basis of the urban redevelopment approach, could be risky. Of the examples chosen for this subsection, Toronto and Vancouver seem the most reliant on continued growth to propel their projects, while Boston is less concerned with creating a new area than it is with creating a separate identity for the waterfront area.

1. Urban redevelopment using new construction: Toronto, Ontario, Harbourfront

A federally sponsored and administered waterfront project intended to turn 91 acres of the lakeshore into a large mixed-use area. Begun in 1980, the Federal government approved a 7 year plan for Harbourfront which would see a 27.5 million dollar Federal contribution used to get the project started, with the hope of attracting some 300 million dollars in private investment in the project. The Federal monies will be used to improve the development site's infrastructure and to fund the corporation's early years of operation.

Located in downtown Toronto, on the shore of Lake Ontario, the Harbourfront site extends two and one half miles along the shoreline from York Street West to Stadium Street. As envisioned, half the site will remain open space and parkland --including a water's edge promenade -- as well as 3600 low- and medium-rise apartment units and 1 million square feet of commercial space. (see Figure 8) If the plan works according to

FIGURE 8 : HARBOURFRONT, TORONTO, ONTARIO
 SOURCE: THE HARBOURFRONT CORPORATION, NEWSLETTER AUGUST, 1982



schedule, Harbourfront will be self-supporting, through revenues received from the 60 year leases on the lake front lands used for private development, by the year 1987.³⁹

Development in Harbourfront is divided into five parcels of land or Quays which are separated by former berthing slips. The following is a brief description of the five quays.

a) York Quay

York Quay, located at the eastern edge of the development (see Figure 8) is the main entry area for visitors to Harbourfront. To its immediate east is Harbour Square (a mixed-use development) which, despite its design flaws, contributes to Harbourfront's summer crowds from the ferry docks at the base of the complex. York Quay schedules some 3000 events annually, from film festivals to antique shows. York Quay Centre, a converted truck terminal, contains arts and crafts exhibits, theatrical space and a restaurant. Nearby is a bandstand as well as a canoeing pond which doubles as an ice-skating rink in winter.

The main attraction on York Quay, since its construction in 1983, however is the 60 million dollar Queens Quay development. This conversion of a warehouse to a mixed-use complex provides the following:

- i) 100,000 square feet of retail space
- ii) 72 condominiums
- iii) 400,000 square feet of office space
- iv) a 450 seat dance theatre

³⁹ Harbourfront Corporation, Newsletter, (Toronto: August 1982), p. 1.

Also planned for York Quay is a 1200-car parking structure, which is to be built flush against the nearby Gardiner Expressway ramp, a mixed-use building (possibly a hotel) which will screen the parking structure and the renovation of some minor buildings for art and theatre uses.⁴⁰

b) John Quay

Moving west, the densities in Harbourfront become lower and take on an increasingly residential character. John Quay is a noted dining spot, which, along with several nautical stores, is located in a renovated post office building adjacent to a 100-berth marina.⁴¹ Existing plans for John Quay call for building a 156-room hotel there in combination with a 62-unit residential building and a three storey parking structure. Also, a new marine police facility will be constructed on its present basin's site. Further inland, on the north side of Queens Quay West, Harbourpoint, a highrise residential development consisting of three 400-unit apartment towers on a shared podium is to be constructed.

Also, in a departure from Harbourfront's original plans for John Quay, 135 publicly-assisted residential units will be transferred to Bathurst Quay.⁴²

c) Spadina Quay

Spadina Quay is said to be the most picturesque section of Harbourfront because of its long water frontage. Construction on Spadina Quay began in 1983 with the King's Landing development, a

⁴⁰ Ian Allaby, "The Harbourfront Lands: Revitalizing Toronto's Waterfront", *Habitat*, 27:2, 1984, p. 6.

⁴¹ Allaby, p. 6.

⁴² Mary Nueman, "Update on John Quay", *City Planning*, 1:4, 1984, p. 14.

100 million dollar mixed-use project which, when completed, will be comprised of three residential towers and one officer tower, arranged in a U-shaped configuration around a waterfront park. Completed, the King's Landing development will consist of the following:

- i) a 394-unit luxury condominium
 - ii) 108,000 square feet of retail space
 - iii) 70,000 square feet of office space
 - iv) 50,000 square feet for as yet undetermined auditoriums, museum or gallery space
 - v) a 7 acre lake front park
 - vi) a 200-berth public marina
 - vii) a renovated produce warehouse⁴³
- d) Bathurst Quay

Located at the western edge of the Harbourfront site, Bathurst Quay borders on the recreational complex formed by Ontario Place and the Canadian National Exhibition grounds. This Quay will be largely residential and geared to serving the needs of families and those persons requiring assisted-housing. Sub-area plans call for 500 units to be situated on 6.5 acres in the northwest portion of the quay, next to a 5 acre park. Three of the quay's five development sites will be devoted to cooperative housing, including one specially designed for the physically disabled. The greatest proportion of these cooperatives will be provided by Cityhome, Toronto's own non-profit housing corporation, in the form of medium-rise slab towers on the northern border of the quay. These towers will act as a sound barrier for the stacked townhouses slated to be built immediately to their south.

⁴³ Harbourfront Corporation, p. 3.

While Bathurst Quay is located near Island Airport, the noise effects of its small aircraft are expected to be negligible. Initially, the quay will be remote from schools, shopping and have only limited access to public transit.⁴⁴

e) Maple Leaf Quay

Located in the centre of the Harbourfront lands, Maple Leaf Quay has only sketchy plans for future development. Original plans call for the area to be mainly residential.⁴⁵

2. Urban redevelopment using new construction: Vancouver, British Columbia, The False Creek and B.C. Place Developments

Recent waterfront redevelopment in Vancouver has centred primarily on the False Creek area, a former industrial area located on both sides of the tidal inlet, near the downtown core. (see Figure 9) The resulting redevelopment has occurred in three project areas: Granville Island which, through adaptive re-use and new construction, recycled an industrial area for commercial, recreational and institutional uses, the south shore of False Creek, where primarily residential development has taken place, and the north shore of False Creek, where the B.C. Place development is underway.

The first component in the False Creek redevelopment was the residential development along the south shore. Begun in 1975 and substantially complete in 1984, this project was intended to demonstrate "inner-city living at its best."⁴⁶ A phased project, the south shore development

⁴⁴ Allaby, p. 7.

⁴⁵ Allaby, p. 6.

⁴⁶ David Ley, "Liberal Ideology and the Post Industrial City", Annals of the Association of the American Geographers, 70:2, 1980, p. 253.

Figure 9: False Creek Development Areas
Source: Canadian Architect, 25:8, 1980, p.19





Figure 11: South Shore Residential Areas of False Creek Source: Canadian Architect, 25:7, p.21



arranged two neighbourhoods around a six hectare park and an additional 6.5 hectare residential phase west of the first two neighbourhoods. Determined to exploit these sites to their fullest, Vancouver's administration set social, as well as aesthetic goals for the phase one development. Made up of eight enclaves accommodating 850 dwelling units each, plans for the project called for a mix of lifestyles, incomes and tenure-types within each enclave to encourage classless social interaction. Despite good intentions, high expectations and a 55 million dollar investment, phase one was not entirely successful in achieving its lofty goals.⁴⁷ (see Figure 9)

Based on resident responses, the enclave concept does not significantly influence neighbouring or socialization patterns. Additionally, the phase one development unintentionally fueled inner-city housing demand at a time when Provincial and Federal officials were attempting to limit Vancouver's inner-city housing supply and may have, by removing the undesirable industrial firms previously located there, fostered elitism by contributing to the replacement of the former low- and middle-class housing of the nearby Fairview Slopes area with expensive townhouses.⁴⁸

The second major redevelopment in the False Creek area was the Granville Island redevelopment on the Federally owned portions of the island. Begun in 1977 with the support of the Federal government, the Granville Island project sought to change the mix of uses found on the island. While attempting to preserve the industrial waterfront atmosphere, the project sought to recycle some of the industrial buildings for commercial, recreational and institutional uses through adaptive re-use. The

⁴⁷ Jacqueline Visher, "Community and Privacy: Planners Intentions and Resident Reaction", Plan Canada, 23:4, 1984, pp. 112-114.

⁴⁸ Ley, p. 255.

resulting changes in Granville Island saw it transformed into a complementary complex to the residential areas to the south. (see Figure 10)⁴⁹

The redevelopment of the north shore of False Creek, the B.C. Place redevelopment project, was undertaken in the mid-eighties by the B.C. Place Development Corporation, a Provincial crown corporation. Beginning with the B.C. Place Stadium development, this phased project will attempt to integrate commercial facilities being built for Expo '86 with residential development (see Figure 11). Like many large-scale redevelopment projects, B.C. Place is a long-term project, with projected completion dates of twenty years for the residential components and twenty-five to thirty years for the commercial components.


Situated on a 220 acre parcel, the present plans call for 72 acres of open space -- including continuous waterfront access via a boardwalk-- and 91 acres of developable parcels. Projections for the developable portions call for the project to provide 10,000 to 13,000 housing units, 5.4 million square feet of office and commercial space and approximately 980,000 square feet of hotel space.⁵⁰ (see Figure 12)

Total public investment is projected to be 460 million dollars, with an expected private contribution of between 2 and 2.5 billion dollars upon completion. At present, the 125 million dollar B.C. Place Stadium is complete, while a 130 unit intermediate care facility, a renovated round-house and the B.C. Pavilion complex are under construction. In addition, approval has been given for the Granville Slopes redevelopment, located in phase A of the western neighbourhood. This will include a 400 room hotel,

⁴⁹ Ley, p. 255.

⁵⁰ Kelly Gesner, Marketing Assistant, B.C. Place Development Corporation, Vancouver, British Columbia, March 5, 1985.

FIGURE:12 B.C/ place development, VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA
 SOURCE: LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE, 73:6, 1983,p.6



City Development Concept (Acreage by Sub-Area)

SUB-AREA	HOUSING	COMMERCIAL	PARKS	PUBLIC FACILITIES	ROADS	TOTAL
A. Western Neighborhood	19	1	10	X	8	38
B. Roundhouse Neighborhood	27	3	20	X	16	66
C. Stadium/Commercial Area	3	16	5	31	11	66
D. Eastern Neighborhood	23	1	15	X	12	51
Total	72	21	50	31	47	221

two 21 storey apartment towers and a marina/retail complex, which will increase the funds available to the Development Corporation through the lease payments for these facilities.⁵¹

3. Urban redevelopment using adaptive re-use: Boston, Massachusetts, Faneuil Hall Development area

Boston's waterfront redevelopment does not replace old buildings with new ones. Instead, it combines old uses with new uses of old buildings. Unlike the previous two examples of urban redevelopment, the Faneuil Hall development and its surroundings renewed the functional ability of a particular portion of the inner-city, instead of replacing the existing neighbourhoods. Boston's project also differs in that its objective is to improve a loosely defined area to create an identity for the waterfront separate from the remainder of the inner-city. In this way, the waterfront remains integrated in terms of transportation and avoids a clearly identifiable break with the surrounding area while enjoying the potential benefits of a separate, positive image within the core.

Boston's was among the first of the waterfront redevelopment projects to receive rave reviews and widespread media coverage. Undertaken in the 1960's as part of a city-wide redevelopment plan, during the height of the bulldozer era of urban renewal, Boston's waterfront first came under the authority of the Downtown Waterfront Corporation. Utilizing 28 million dollars in Federal funds and locally collected contributions (50%), the Downtown Waterfront Corporation's redevelopment plans called for 104 acres to be cleared of existing structures to allow the construction of new

⁵¹ Gesner.

highrise buildings and a limited open space component. Like many of the redevelopment projects of the era, the waterfront proposal became the subject of heated debate since the plan, to a large extent, ignored its impact on or the needs of adjacent neighbourhoods. This omission resulted in the Downtown Waterfront Corporation becoming involved in a court battle with the nearby Italian community over the content of the proposal. The presiding judge agreed with the objections raised by the local residents concerning the inclusion of components geared to their desires and needs and ordered changes in the concept. Revised plans reflecting these changes ultimately saw a scaling down of the original concept's density, height restrictions on the highrise units, the inclusion of a fair proportion of low income and elderly housing units so as to allow existing area residents access to the new buildings and a roadway realignment to permit the construction of a four and one half acre park.

Out of this controversy emerged a gradual reclamation of Boston's waterfront for recreational, residential and commercial uses. The revised plans placed a stronger emphasis on retail elements and encouraged conversion and rehabilitation of existing wharf buildings, reversing the original plan of clearing the redevelopment site prior to construction. On Long Wharf, adaptive re-use produced a new restaurant, 312 apartment units and new office space. Elsewhere in the waterfront area, similar rehabilitation took place, including:

- a) Lewis Wharf and the Pilot House, where 95 new condominiums as well as new office space was created.
- b) Commercial Wharf and Commercial Wharf West where new apartment units and additional office space was created through adaptive re-use.

Not all components of the redevelopment project -- which eventually came under the control of the Boston Redevelopment Authority -- were rehabilitation or conversion; some, such as the New England Aquarium on Central Wharf, Harbour Towers on India Wharf, and the Galleria on Sargents' Wharf, were constructed for the project.⁵² (see Figure 13 for a diagram of the Boston redevelopment as proposed in 1975)

Also included in Boston's waterfront redevelopment project is the most acclaimed component, the Faneuil Hall Market Restoration Project. Faneuil Hall and its 3 block long market annexes (see Figure 13). Quincy, North and South markets acknowledge but do not attempt to re-enact the history of their construction period.⁵³ Opened in 1976 by the James Rouse Company, the Faneuil Hall complex adapted the historic building to contemporary uses and exploited the area's former role as crossroads for pedestrian traffic in downtown Boston to bring about project success. The project's intent was to enliven the area while retaining the familiarity of the market area to Boston's citizenry.⁵⁴

Faneuil Market is the major link in the walk-to-the-sea that is included in the Boston Redevelopment Authority's renewal plan. It provides a pedestrian connector between Government Centre and the waterfront at a pivotal point between these areas, the North End and the Financial District.⁵⁵


The Faneuil Hall development consciously integrates itself with Boston's overall circulation patterns and to other inner-city amenities, commercial districts, cultural and recreational facilities. Faneuil Hall is

⁵² For further elaboration on Boston's waterfront redevelopment see C. Donaher, "Boston's Waterfront: Issues for Today and Tomorrow" in Urban Waterfront Lands, Committee on Urban Waterfronts, (Washington: National Academy of Science, 1980), pp. 21-51 and "Boston: Maintaining the Historical Patina", Progressive Architecture, 75:6, 1975, pp. 44,45.

⁵³ L. Redstone, p. 302.

⁵⁴ Jane McCThompson, "Boston's Faneuil Hall", Urban Design International, 1:1, 1979, pp. 13-15.

⁵⁵ Redstone, p. 304.



- Legend**
- 1 Harbor Towers (India Wharf)
 - 2 Parking Garage
 - 3 New England Aquarium
 - 4 Charthouse (Long Wharf)
 - 5 Customs House Block
 - 6 Commercial Wharf
 - 7 Lewis Wharf
 - 8 The Galleria (Sargeants Wharf)
 - 9 Commercial Wharf West
 - 10 Mercantile Wharf
 - 11 Faneuil Hall and Quincy Market
 - 12 Rehabilitation
 - 13 Union Wharf
 - 14 Proposed Office Building
 - 15 Existing Building
 - 16 Proposed Motel
 - 17 Proposed New Housing
 - 18 Waterfront Park
 - 19 Atlantic Ave.
 - 20 Proposed Elderly Housing

44 Progressive Architecture 6:75

Figure:13 Boston's Waterfront as Proposed in 1975
 SOURCE: PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, 6:75, p. 44

also the first example of the Rouse Company's popular "festival mall" concept which uses a collection of unique shops, food markets and restaurants to create a distinctive ambience for an area. Jane McCThompson, one of the designers of the Faneuil Hall Restoration, attributes the development's success to a number of interrelated factors:

- a) The variety of uses found within the complex creates a multi-sensory experience which keeps the visitor's faculties alert and responsive.
- b) The complex's inclusion of direct contact with nature and the elements.
- c) The circulation within the project allows individuals to choose the type and intensity of contact with other people.⁵⁶

The City of Boston, which owns Faneuil Hall's buildings and its lands, receives no rent or taxes from its developer, James Rouse. The city does, however, benefit from the project through the 25% share of the project's revenues it receives (which were estimated to be 2 million dollars in 1983) and the 3000 jobs the complex provides.⁵⁷

The festival mall concept for waterfront redevelopment has application elsewhere but, as Jane McCThompson cautions, not as a carbon copy:

...Faneuil Hall Marketplace is not per se a formula or universal blueprint. It is a solution arising from the specific context of Boston's conditions and responding to those as well as human problems. It can be likened to a salad...a composition of ingredients that varies widely according to what is available on a given day. The task is to select, balance, mix and arrange the ingredients. The end product, rather than a haphazard mixture should be a concept of complimentary flavours, textures, colours, and tastes.⁵⁸

C. Waterfront-Based Improvements for the Inner-City

⁵⁶ McCThompson, pp. 13,14.

⁵⁷ Betsey Hansell, "Retail scene looking up in other major cities", Detroit Freepress, Dec. 14, 1983, p. 18.

⁵⁸ McCThompson, p. 29.

The last type of waterfront revitalization project included in this analysis is one where the waterfront project represents the addition of a single element or elements which are judged to be missing from an existing core. As such, these projects are intended to improve the existing situation within the inner-city in the present. It can rightfully be asserted that these projects also serve a long-term objective of attracting new investment and/or uses to the core but more is left to chance and the vagaries of the private market as opposed to the more specific plans of the two previous development strategies.

1. Detroit, Michigan, Renaissance Center and Hart Plaza

Inner-city renewal in Detroit began in the early 1950's with a 100 acre civic centre development which included the Veteran's Memorial Building, Cobo Hall (convention centre), the City-County Building and Ford Auditorium, most of which are located on the waterfront (see Figure 14). By the late 1960's , a number of other private, public and semi-public highrise office buildings located in the downtown area.⁵⁹ This new infusion of jobs, however, did not stem the population loss to the suburbs and because of this, the downtown area continued to decline.

By 1970, Detroit Renaissance Inc. had been formed to encourage new investment in the core area. Out of this organization grew the proposal for Renaissance Center, a large mixed-use development located on thirty-three and one half acres of riverfront property, at an estimated cost of 500 million dollars. Because it had the resources and the backing of its major corporate employers in the automobile industry, Detroit chose to finance the project privately. Consequently, Renaissance Center was financed

⁵⁹ Redstone, p. 130.




Figure 14 Early Redevelopment Along Detroit's Riverfront
 Source: L. Redstone, New Downtowns, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976),
 P.137

through a limited partnership between a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company and fifty other locally-based corporations.⁶⁰

The result was to be the physical symbol of Detroit's rebirth: Renaissance Center, a 337 million dollar megastructure consisting of 5 cylindrical towers (a 73 storey hotel and four 39 storey office towers) on a common base platform (which contains 350,000 square feet of retail space and parking facilities).⁶¹ (see Figure 15) The project also included plans for the 20 million dollar Hart Plaza Development which includes 8 acres of open space area with an amphitheatre. Hart Plaza was intended to act as a recreational activities centre for various outdoor festivals.⁶² (see Figure 16)

The resulting development has shown little positive spin-off, with the Center itself defaulting on its mortgage in 1982. The Renaissance Center is a classic example of what not to do when planning a waterfront project. First, the project is not part of any comprehensive downtown plan (as Boston and Baltimore were) since no such plan existed then or at present. This oversight has resulted in a project which has no relationship to its surroundings -- giant earth berms block the landward entrances, and a 10-lane road separates the Center from the remainder of the downtown area which is some 4 to 10 blocks away.⁶³ The development makes no effort whatsoever to integrate itself with the downtown's pedestrian flow. As Redstone concludes, "no one project, however important, can itself restore the City to full vitality. By the same token, not even several projects, if

⁶⁰ Redstone, p. 131.

⁶¹ Andrea O. Dean, "Linking a Civic Symbol to its City", *AIA Journal*, 60:8, 1978, p. 41.

⁶² Redstone, pp. 133,134.

⁶³ Dean, p. 41.

LEGEND

1. Hotel Tower
2. Office Towers
3. Office towers (originally envisioned as apartments)





FIGURE 15: Original Renaissance Center Plan
Source: L. Redstone, New Downtowns, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), P134



Civic Center Plaza and Fountain. ABOVE: Upper-level plan. White granite paving with 4'-wide random lengths intermixed with 8" X 8" granite pavers. BELOW: Lower-level plan. Includes service and mechanical areas, dressing rooms for amphitheater, space for shops and boutiques, and underground street tunnel

Figure:16 Hart Plaza

Source: L. Redstone, New Downtowns, (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1976), p.135

they are isolated from one another will accomplish the desired results".⁶⁴
Such appears to be the case in Detroit.

Despite 750 million dollars being invested in scattered downtown projects over the last seven years, Detroit shows little signs of renewal.⁶⁵

Though it encouraged development along the river, the 350 million dollar RenCen stopped the momentum of development on the western edge of downtown, where 200 million dollars of new office space had been built in the early 1970's...Plans for a 60 acre housing and commercial development were cancelled...after RenCen was announced. The proposed site is now a parking lot.⁶⁶

The Renaissance Center complex has acted more like a magnet than a catalyst. It has drawn more attention, life and people to the downtown area during specific times but to date it has generated little new investment. Since the Renaissance Center's construction the following developments have been built in the downtown area: Joe Louis Arena, the Millender Center (a mixed-use building located directly north of RenCen), a 134 million dollar people-mover transportation system is under construction and two large office complexes have been proposed up river from the CBD, but lack of concentration has achieved little economic impact.⁶⁷

In Detroit, while some downtown stores say they are doing well and a few new shops are succeeding, many stores are just holding their own...35% of first and second floor space is unoccupied...Hudson's [department store], which had accounted for about a third of downtown sales closed in January [1983]. In the RenCen World of Shops, 30% of the retail space is vacant.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Redstone, p. 134.

⁶⁵ Rick Ratcliff and Betsey Hansell, "Detroit's Downtown Dilemma", Detroit Freepress, Dec. 11, 1983, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Betsey Hansell and Rick Ratcliff, "Detroit lacks a master plan for city core", Detroit Freepress, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 13.

⁶⁷ Ratcliff and Hansell, p. 15.

⁶⁸ Hansell, p. 18.

2. Saint John, New Brunswick, Market Square

Like most waterfront projects, the Market Square development took many years to realize. That project grew out of a 1946 planning study that expressed interest in improving the inner-city by redeveloping the Market Square/waterfront area. The interest continued through the 1960's era of urban renewal and Market Square, after some 36 years, finally materialized in 1983.⁶⁹ Like many waterfront redevelopment projects, the Saint John example was not the initiating project in core area renewal. The most significant step in this initial phase of modern redevelopment in Saint John was the Brunswick Square development, which was a large, mixed-use complex, featuring a retail component, a hotel and a 33-storey office building.⁷⁰

Market Square is also similar to other waterfront projects in its purpose of acting as a catalyst to bring about further inner-city improvements. The project, however, differs in its approach to achieving this end. While most waterfront plans call for a series of phased steps to achieve their objective, Market Square adopted a more aggressive approach which built the complex in essentially a single phase of construction.

Market Square is a low-profile, people-oriented, mixed-use development atop a specially-built pier on the harbourfront. The site contains a hotel, convention centre, housing (senior citizens, low-income, and waterfront condominiums), retail outlets, offices, a regional library and an underground parking facility of more than 500 spaces.⁷¹


In addition, Market Square (see Figure 17) was not built in isolation from the remainder of the inner-city, as occurred in the Detroit example.

⁶⁹ George Schuyler and Michael Ircha, "Market Square: Downtown Economic Revival", Plan Canada, 27:1, 1987, p. 17.

⁷⁰ Edward Lindgren, "Mixed-Use: Rebuilding a Waterfront", Canadian Architect, 29:6, pp. 25-29.

⁷¹ Schuyler and Ircha, p. 16.

FIGURE 17 - MARKET SQUARE, SAINT JOHN'S, NEW BRUNSWICK
SOURCE: EDWARD LINDGREN, CANADIAN ARCHITECT, 29:6, 1986, P. 22, 23



The development promotes pedestrian movement through the complex via a series of climate controlled walkways which provide links to nearby facilities, the Aquatic Centre, City Hall, Brunswick Square and the City Market. Also enhancing the chances for the project's economic success were municipal-sponsored landscaping infrastructure improvements along nearby King Street.⁷²

With respect to its financing, Market Square more closely resembles that found in the American examples -- a large private participation-- than other Canadian experiences with waterfront renewal. At its completion in 1983, Market Square cost 103.7 million dollars to build. Of that total the following list gives the breakdown of the participants' contributions:⁷³

Federal Government	13.5 million dollars (13%)
Provincial Government	23.0 million dollars (22%)
City of Saint John	15.0 million dollars (14%)
Rocca Group (private developer)	52.2 million dollars (51%)

While the public participants have fared well with the results of Market Square, the Rocca Group, the largest contributor unfortunately did not. Changes in the design of the project (such as a reduction in the amount of commercial space permissible in the complex) enforced by Rocca's public partners along with rising interest rates combined to cause the developer to lose millions of dollars as well as their share of Market Square.⁷⁴

Overall the project has to be considered an economic success. Both the Federal and Provincial governments have been successful in recovering

⁷² Schuyler and Ircha, p. 17.

⁷³ Figures are taken from Schuyler and Ircha, pp. 19,20.

⁷⁴ Schuyler and Ircha, pp. 19,20.

their investments through the increases in various tax receipts the project has produced. The City has fared almost as well as the senior levels of government. For its direct investment of 15 million dollars in the project and an additional 19 million dollars toward related improvements to the area around the project, Saint John received facilities occupying 70 per cent of Market Square. On the negative side the City, as a result of this ownership, is also responsible for 70 per cent of the operating expenses which, in 1984, resulted in an 11.8 per cent increase in the municipal tax rate to cover the deficit. Conversely, Market Square has also benefited the City by improving retail sales in the area, attracting new business to the area, improving tourism⁷⁵ and creating 600 full-time (and 700 part-time) jobs.⁷⁶

It is not clear that the Market Square development utilizes the site to its fullest potential. More specifically, it is debatable whether the project really needed the waterfront location to be successful or whether it could just as easily have been built elsewhere in the core. While the retention of the North Market Wharf group of historic buildings within the project is admirable, in a city noted for its abundance of historic buildings and long maritime history, the project hardly seems to have taken advantage of its unique surroundings.

Additionally, it remains to be seen what effect the failure of the private investors to retain their holdings and their failure to recoup their investment will have on future private investment in waterfront projects.

⁷⁵ Schuyler and Ircha, p. 20.

⁷⁶ L.S. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of Commerce and Development, Fredericton, New Brunswick, May 3, 1985.

Summary

This chapter began by briefly outlining the two building strategies available to waterfront development projects: new construction and adaptive re-use of existing structures. It was concluded that, under new construction building approaches, mixed-use development (MXD), megastructures and specialty retailing were commonly used in waterfront development. Both of these approaches seek to artificially create or enhance a special waterfront ambience and focus their developments to the tastes and desires of the middle- and upper-classes. The second building strategy, using adaptive re-use, was a slower, longer-term approach to waterfront development. It was concluded that success for this option is dependent on a number of factors, including market conditions, nature and condition of building stock, building code enforcement and the availability of financing. Because development of revitalized areas does not often occur in a single development, the smaller-scale projects do not require large investments, thereby offering a greater opportunity to involve a number of private developers. However, this fragmented approach negatively affects the ability to produce tangible results and the ability of the public sector to coordinate the project.

Examples of the three categories of waterfront development -- selective revitalization coupled with developing an amenities infrastructure, urban redevelopment, and waterfront development to encourage inner-city improvement-- were used to show how building strategies and development options have been combined. Essentially it was concluded that: the selective revitalization/amenities infrastructure option is a short-term strategy producing results in the present which have the potential to be important in the future in adapting the inner-city to a changing society; the urban redevelopment option closely resembles traditional, 1960's era renewal and that it is generally a long-term, large-scale

project which is part of an overall city plan although there are exceptions such as in the Boston example; the waterfront improvement option is a short-term strategy geared to filling an existing inner-city need although it too can be a prelude to further longer-term development. However the waterfront improvement option leaves much more to chance concerning future development than does the amenities option.

While outlining the various examples shown, it became apparent that few waterfront projects fit precisely into their assigned categories. There are, however, a number of commonalities (see Table 2) which exist among all waterfront projects in terms of objectives and administration. These commonalities will be examined in the next chapter.

TABLE 2 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES: PROJECT FACILITIES

Project location	Category			City Plan		Land Uses Recreational	Residential	Commercial	Culture/Entertainment	Water Dependent	Funding Private	public	Development Corporation	Integrate w/ inner-city	Pedestrian routes
	A	B	C	Yes	No										
						open space/parks swimming boating sports activity planned activities botanical garden	apartment townhouse condominium multiple-family (low-rise) publicly-assisted units	retail specialty retail services (non-pro fit, bakery) services (prof. ei. lawyer)	theatre museum conservatory art gallery sports facility amphitheatre aquarium	working harbour cruise ship docking marina					
BALTIMORE	x			x		x x x		x x x	x		x			yes	yes
HALIFAX	x			x		x x		x x x	x			x	yes	yes	yes
QUEBEC CITY	x		x		x	x x x	x x x	x x x	x			x	yes		
TORONTO		x			x	x x x	x x x x x	x x x x	x				yes		
VANCOUVER		x			x	x xx	x x x x	x x x			x			yes	yes
BOSTON		x	x		x	x	x x x x	x x x x			x		yes		
DETROIT			x		x	x x xx	x	x x x				x	yes	yes	yes
SAINT JOHN			x		x	x x	x	x x x							

NOTE: Negative response to whether a city plan exists does not mean a downtown plan does not.
 Legend: Category A-selective revitalization with a long-term goal, Category B-growth accomodation, C-inner-city improvement without a specific long-term goal.

CHAPTER FOUR: PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

This chapter will use the common traits of waterfront projects discovered during the literature search conducted for this thesis and analysis of the illustrative examples chosen to serve as a basis for an evaluative checklist aimed at determining both the quality and/or feasibility of a given waterfront proposal. More specifically, common objectives of waterfront developments will be examined by dividing them into economic and non-economic objectives. Issues affecting waterfront plan acceptance and success in achieving objectives will be reviewed, and common impediments to waterfront plan implementation will be analysed. In the second portion of this chapter, public/partnerships in the form of development corporations will be examined to explain the popularity of this form of organization for financing and administering waterfront projects, particularly as it concerns the Canadian experience with waterfront development.

Objectives of Waterfront Redevelopment

Many of the planning considerations involved in the decision making process are related to taking advantage of the economic and social changes arising from the transition to a service-based economy. While the objectives of urban waterfront redevelopment vary according to local circumstances, certain common elements exist in most instances. Objectives for waterfront renewal can be grouped into two categories, depending on whether their aim is to economically revitalize the inner-city or to meet resident desires for leisure time activities.

A. Economic Objectives

Economic objectives are those that are aimed at renewing the inner-city by adapting the core area to a post-industrial economy by building on the inner-city's existing strengths. In the case of waterfront redevelopment, this primarily takes the form of exploiting and building upon the inner-city's traditional concentration of cultural and social amenities.

1. To promote the inner-city as a desirable location for high technology industry and a desirable location in which their employees may live and shop as well as work.

Encouraged by the small intra-urban migration of middle- and upper-income groups to the inner-city, many cities are tailoring their redevelopment projects to meet the particular tastes and desires of these economic groups. This, together with high-technology industrial firms and their employees' affinity for cultural and entertainment amenities, has seen many waterfront projects being geared to expanding the inner-city's traditional concentration of these functions.

The physical and social characteristics of metropolitan regions are now influenced as much by the leisure lifestyles of the American culture as by any other social force...Even within the oldest cities of North American continent...the loss of industrial capacity is offset somewhat by the role that these central cities play as entertainment zones and centers for the production of popular culture.¹

Since waterfront development seldom represents an initial phase in the overall renewal of the inner-city, the initial interest in waterfronts grew out of an earlier phase of inner-city redevelopment which saw many large scale office towers and apartment/condominium complexes built in the core. Municipal officials hoping to maintaining and possibly expand these initial

¹ David Ley, A Social Geography of the City, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1983), pp. 58,59.

developments are doing so by providing high quality retail and entertainment facilities within (safe) walking distance of the existing core area residential and office complexes. Because space is often limited within the core, waterfronts are frequently the only suitable sites in close enough proximity to these exclusive areas.

Beyond the potential revitalizing effect the construction of such facilities may have, municipal officials also find this objective desirable because of the additional revenues generated by increases in property taxes and land leases.

2. To strengthen investor confidence in the inner-city.

New construction and the high public appeal of waterfronts are often used in tandem to instill a lasting 'positive' image of the inner-city. While the methods used and the balance of natural versus built environment varies from location to location, the intent is the same: to tangibly demonstrate, to potential investors and residents, that the inner-city is still a vital area within the city. By using new construction, infill and intensification of existing land uses and historic preservation, it is hoped that the generally positive public response to waterfront redevelopment will once again allow the inner-city to be viewed by investors as a desirable area in which to invest.

3. To secure active and permanent uses for underutilized or abandoned waterfronts.

This objective also seeks to improve the inner-city's image but it is also concerned with the opportunity waterfront renewal represents in creating jobs, increasing tax revenues and increasing the desirability of the inner-city as a place of residence. While attracting permanent uses is

relatively simple if residential and commercial development is allowed, providing the waterfront with a lively preferably a 24-hour activity cycle-- is more difficult. Generally, hotels which have guests arriving and leaving at all hours are the only developments consistently able to provide the necessary level of street activity. The level of street activity is important because it is generally felt that a high level of street activity discourages robberies. Perceived levels of safety are important; research conducted in the United States has shown that the degree of safety and absence of crime in an area is a significant factor in the decision of potential middle- and upper-income persons to return to the inner-city to live.²

4. To create inner-city employment opportunities.

This objective is related to an overall inner-city objective of capitalizing on favourable economic changes resulting from the move to a post-industrial society. Without the lure of nearby employment opportunities it is doubtful the in-migration of middle- and upper-income persons to the inner-city will continue. Additionally, creation of jobs is sometimes a requirement for government financial assistance for waterfront redevelopment. Provincial participation (at least in Ontario) in redevelopment projects is dependent on the ability of the project to create new jobs. The particular mix of skilled and unskilled jobs created is dependent on the type and size of the development elements anticipated as well as local employment circumstances.

5. To invigorate the commercial component of the inner-city.

² Gary S. Tobin and Dennis R. Judd, "Moving the Suburbs to the City: Neighbourhood Revitalization and the 'Amenities Bundle'", *Social Science Quarterly*, 63:4, 1982, pp. 771-779.

This objective is not as universal as the preceding objectives. In some instances of waterfront redevelopment, social and recreational objective are pursued exclusively. However, when increased retail sales is an objective, it is often aimed at creating new commercial ventures which would complement, but not necessarily compete with, existing inner-city businesses. By adopting this approach, it is hoped the attractiveness of the waterfront setting will gain the inner-city merchants a competitive advantage over the formula architectural styles of their suburban competition. Recently, this approach has seen waterfront redevelopment fall victim to the same standardization as the suburban mall in the form of specialty/retail centres or "festival malls", which have been extensively imitated.

6. To ensure project (financial) self-sufficiency.

Since waterfront renewal is often undertaken to increase the economic attractiveness of the inner-city, it is logical that the project pay for its own upkeep and not require long-term public assistance once construction is complete. Generally, this objective is fulfilled with the provision of public revenue producing facilities such as commercial or residential developments in sufficient numbers or sizes to offset the maintenance costs of the non-revenue producing portions of the project.

B. Non-Economic Objectives

The non-economic objectives of waterfront redevelopment are geared more towards existing inner-city residents than the economic objectives. Typically, these objectives address the provision of public spaces and access and the mitigation of the project's impact on adjacent land uses and neighbourhoods.

1. To ensure public access to the water's edge.

Prevailing opinion by public officials and agencies suggests that physical access to the water should not be impeded by (private) development. Typically, proponents of this objective argue that it is the public's right to have unrestricted access, since the waterways are publicly owned and managed. It is also argued that public access is necessary to fully realize the recreational potential of urban waterfronts.³

2. To ensure visual access to the waterfront.

Waterways are special visual amenities with the potential to greatly enhance the appearance of urban environments. It is in the public interest to ensure that views from the shoreline are not blocked by buildings located adjacent to, or on, the waterfront. Such a requirement is logical when one considers that simply viewing the water is, to a large extent, the most significant attraction of the waterfront to the average resident or visitor.

3. To consult citizens and businesses prior to development.

Efforts should be undertaken in the planning stages to ensure that the concerns of local residents and businesses are taken into consideration.

This, however, is not as easy as it might sound:

Since urban waterways are public resources capable of supporting a variety of activities and uses, waterfront development proposals draw the attention of a diverse collection of special interest groups and citizen organizations...fishing interests, conservation groups and recreational boating organizations, in addition to groups such as neighbourhood associations and preservation societies.⁴

Ideally this consultation process would result in the development of uses not in direct competition with existing businesses, apartments, or be sufficiently small in scale so as to have a limited impact. It should be

³ Douglas Wren, "Urban Waterfronts: Awash with Controversy", *Urban Land*, 41:11, 1982, pp.19,20.

⁴ Wren, p. 21.

noted that this objective is in direct opposition to the selective revitalization process which promotes one segment of the community at the expense of the other segments.

4. To protect or conserve the natural features and/or settings of the waterfront, as much as is economically feasible.

This objective is dependent on the overall development strategy: that is, the importance attached to the conservation of nature. The level of concern for nature is dependent on:

- a) the availability and suitability of waterfront sites found elsewhere in the city.
 - b) the amenity factor or quality of the site.
 - c) the importance attached to the provision of easily accessible recreational opportunities within the region.
5. To include provisions for residential development within the waterfront plan.

The purpose of this objective is to ensure certain redevelopment goals are not achieved at the expense of existing inner-city residents and land uses. Care must be taken that the city-wide stock of low-cost housing is maintained after waterfront redevelopment, in sufficient numbers to support pre-development levels of users. Similarly, a balance must be struck between the existing low-income residents' need for housing and capitalizing on the attractiveness of waterfront sites for middle- and upper-income housing. This latter point is especially important to revitalizing the inner-city given the forecasts that predict smaller housing requirements in the future and the growing importance of proximity to work and leisure time activities in deciding upon residential location.

Issues to be Resolved

Once project objectives have been defined, consideration must be given to certain common issues arising from the method of implementing waterfront renewal. Whether the redevelopment of the waterfront is to be parkland, a commercial development or a combination of the two, consideration of the project's impact must be included in the decision making process. The following are some of the most frequent issues which need resolution.

1. The type of development which is suitable for the proposed revitalization.

Among the first issues to be resolved in this grouping involves deciding upon the permitted types of development and whether more than one type of use will be permitted within the project. Early waterfront redevelopment projects were often limited to providing promenades in park-like settings. More recently however, researchers have found that such single purpose developments, by themselves, are incapable of attracting significant numbers of people to the waterfront. The research has instead concluded that, while concentrating efforts on pedestrian traffic itself is not a bad idea, it should be done in a manner which incorporates existing inner-city pedestrian patterns and offers new attractions specifically aimed at pedestrian users. While uses such as parks are popular forms of waterfront development, the modern trend is away from single use areas:

Recreational usage of this limited land and water space must not only compete with other potential uses (eg. residential, commercial, institutional) but with historical uses as well (eg. transportation, industrial)...The competition for space has led many cities to conclude that single-use developments are no longer feasible.⁵

⁵ Richard S. Lehman, "The Principals of Waterfront Renewal: The Summary of the Experiences in Fifty American Cities", Landscape Architecture, 56:4, 1966, pp. 286-291.

Modern trends in waterfront revitalization are therefore more inclined to provide a "creative mix of uses" emphasizing "public access amid a variety of private enterprises."⁶ This does not mean these redevelopments are moving entirely toward commercialization. The truly successful waterfront renewal projects have instead included commercial components within an overall concept that includes, "a mix of uses such as marinas or aquariums, housing and industry."⁷ The precise mix chosen for individual projects would depend on the objectives of the project and the amount of financing available.

2. The intensity of land use proposed in the redevelopment.

This issue is generally confined to commercial or residential uses. Typically, water-dependent industry, regardless of its intensity, and recreational uses such as parks or promenades are accepted. Commercial and residential uses require closer scrutiny in order to prevent continuous, view-obstructing, developments of large buildings along the water's edge. Consideration of the impact the intensity of the development will have on the capacity of the waterfront's infrastructure and the expense of extension or expansion must also be incorporated into the plan.

3. Public access to the waterfront project.

Public access issues take place on three levels: Physical access; Visual access; Transportation integration. The importance of any one of these issues is dependent on the objectives of the project, but generally those issues are addressed in all waterfront projects.

⁶ Ann Breen and Richard Rigby, "Waterfronts in the 1980's: An Overview", Journal of Housing, 41:3, 1981, p. 79.

⁷ Breen and Rigby, p. 79.

a) Physical Access

The first issue to be resolved with respect to physical access is whether the redevelopment will require physical access to the water's edge on a continuous basis or whether ground level public/commercial spaces will be considered acceptable. Arguments in favour of continuous access include:

Many water-related recreational opportunities can be realized simply by allowing public access to the shoreline. It is unfortunate that in some jurisdictions public waterfront areas are burdened with over-crowding because access is restricted to a few locations.⁸

Alternatively, arguments in favour of a more selective access include:

Attention should also be given to the quality of public access... Depending on the circumstances, it may be better for a city to have a limited number of shoreline access points that are nicely landscaped and complete with boat docks, parking areas and observation decks than to have continuous access to the shoreline in the form of a pathway that lacks other basic amenities.⁹

Ground level public space within private developments also has positive and negative qualities. Public space within private developments may prove to be psychological barriers to movement within the project. Alternatively, the movements of pedestrians through mixed-use or commercial developments may enhance the chances for economic success. Resolution of the issues will be related to the primary motivation behind the project: that is, upon the importance attached to commercial revitalization and the quality of the public spaces provided. Also requiring resolution is a related issue: that of deciding whether public access is to be continuous or confined to a limited number of specific sites along the waterfront.

⁸ Wren, p. 20.

⁹ Wren, p. 21.

The final outcome of decisions concerning continuous or limited access will depend, to a large degree, upon the size of the proposed development: specifically, whether or not the project is confined to an area sufficiently small so as to be served entirely by pedestrian routes alone. Additionally, the size of the proposed promenade or easement needs consideration. The mix of uses being proposed for the development also needs to be reviewed. Attention to human scale should be included in the design guidelines, whenever possible, in order to increase the project's aesthetic appeal.¹⁰

Finally:

Another concern...is the maintenance and management of public access areas within a waterfront development project. For shoreline projects that combine various uses within public and private areas, formal written agreements should clearly define which party will be responsible for management and maintenance of each portion of the project, and who will pay which costs on what basis.¹¹

Consideration should also be given to the quality of standards for maintenance and to the ability of the consignees to fulfill their commitments.¹²

b) Visual Access

Visual access to the waterfront and to the water itself needs consideration because:

Visual access to the water's edge is just as important as physical access. Waterways are special visual amenities with the potential to greatly enhance the appearance of urban environments. It is in the public interest to make sure that views to and from the shoreline are not blocked by unbroken masses of large structures.¹³

¹⁰ For further information concerning human scale see Sale Kirkpatrick, Human Scale, (New York: Perigee Books, 1982).

¹¹ Wren, p. 20.

¹² Wren, p. 20.

¹³ Wren, p. 20.

Caution should be exercised in enforcing this objective, placing uniform building regulations on new facilities locating along the shoreline. By enforcing setback requirements or height limitations, building envelopes may be significantly restricted. Faced with this limitation, developers often try to recoup the loss of revenue-producing space by building a product which can be sold at a higher price or by increasing the intensity of building use.¹⁴ Government efforts to ensure public access to urban shorelines through land use regulations often indirectly encourage private developers to be more exclusive and focus their developments on the high end of the market for each proposed use.¹⁵

c) Transportation System Integration

Access to the waterfront site via public transportation systems also needs consideration. The suitability of the city's existing road network and the level of service the public transportation system will provide to the waterfront will need to be reviewed. In terms of pedestrian access, attention should be given to the distance between attractions, as well as to the CBD. Efforts should also be made to minimize the physical impediments to movement surrounding and on the waterfront site, such as major roadways and railway tracks, as well as the psychological barriers these routes can represent.

4. The role of the private sector in the development process.

The issue to be resolved is the extent and type of participation, if any, by public bodies such as municipal governments. This involves deter-

¹⁴ Wren, p. 20.

¹⁵ Wren, p. 20.

mining whether the public sector's role will include any one (or more) of the following which have been issues in other redevelopment projects.

- a) Site assembly and/or site preparation.
- b) Upgrading or expanding infrastructure.
- c) Becoming an actual building partner within the project by building a civic building, such as a concert hall or museum, on site.
- d) Entering into a public/private financial partnership to realize the project.

These roles must also be delegated according to which level(s) of government are involved in the project and their respective areas of jurisdiction.¹⁶ In Canada, participatory arrangements between the various levels involved and between government agencies and private developers is the norm for waterfront revitalization projects. Typically, waterfront renewal in Canada has seen the Federal Government take the leading role, with smaller roles played by the other levels in most (but not all) instances.

- e) Citizen participation in the decision making process.

Waterfront redevelopment plans must also address the varying demands of special interest groups, as well as the citizenry-at-large. While most public bodies routinely make provisions for public input into the planning process, a decision must be made as to which concerns expressed by the public are going to be addressed in the project and to what extent.

¹⁶ Mary Nueman, "Public/Private Partnerships - The Key to the Rebirth of Downtown Retailing", Urban Land, 43:6, 1984, p. 26.

- f) Where waterfront revitalization plans fit the overall plans for the city as a whole.

In order to avoid waste and needless delays, consideration should be given to the integration of the waterfront plan's objectives and proposals with existing municipal plans. Coordination with the plans of municipal departments, such as Public Works and Transportation departments, helps avoid cross-purposes.

- g) Realistic expectations for the project.

Public bodies and project investors should plan for an achievable first phase of redevelopment, in order to instill confidence and to tangibly demonstrate the project's potential. To achieve this, the first phase of development should:

- i) reflect the amount of financial resources available to the project.
- ii) require no major institutional changes.
- iii) not assume that the project participants will act in an untypical manner for the project's good, such as developers foregoing acceptable profit margins.¹⁷

- h) The importance of resident versus non-resident users of the waterfront.

Experience with waterfront developments elsewhere has shown that the potential for conflict between resident and non-resident users of the waterfront is high:

...local residents usually become concerned when the visiting population threatens to overwhelm the physical capacities of local facilities or ignore cherished local customs or procedures. This has

¹⁷ Al Benkendorf, "Planning for Successful Waterfront Renewal", Environmental Comment, April 1981, p. 16.

been a source of irritation between visitors and natives in all regional or national resort places throughout the country.¹⁸

This sentiment is echoed by Jane McCThompson, one of the designers of Boston's Faneuil Hall festival market development. She cautions that waterfront undertakings should concentrate on providing uses geared toward the desires of the regional market since this is where repeat users of the facilities will come from. McCThompson suggests that discretion must be applied when deciding on the number and type of uses aimed at the tourist market to be included in the development since tourists' tastes for merchandise tends to differ from that of the local market. This is particularly important in the case of waterfront developments because they tend to draw people from a much larger area than other types of development.¹⁹

The spending pattern of tourists and sightseers is unlike that of local customers. To the extent that they follow impulse buying habits...The transient usually has fewer real dollars to spend, and less interest in solid, heavy carry-home goods, instead seeking trinkets, souvenirs, and small superficial items, if at all.²⁰

The ease of selling tourist-oriented merchandise, if unchecked "can undermine a merchant's willingness to work at selling more expensive, quality goods,"²¹ which are geared to supporting the local market. Also, should the waterfront become a popular tourist attraction, swelling seasonal crowds can be obstacles to comfortable shopping by local customers and result in their shopping elsewhere.

¹⁸ Leo Molinaro, "Address to Urban Waterfronts '83 Conference" in Urban Waterfronts '83, (Washington: The Waterfront Press, 1984), p. 7.

¹⁹ Jane McCThompson, "Boston's Faneuil Hall", Urban Design International, 1:1, 1979. p. 31.

²⁰ McCThompson, p. 31.

²¹ McCThompson, p. 31.

i) Inclusion of marinas as part of the development.

Urban marinas are costly to construct and generally are marginal financial operations. For example, Baltimore's Inner Harbour development has a city-operated marina which cost 2 million dollars to construct, but only returns 50,000 dollars annually in income.²² Similarly, in Quebec City it is doubtful whether economic justification exists for spending 10 million dollars for a 345 berth marina in their development.²³ However:

A marina adds something to a project that goes beyond simply its economics. We think the ambience of a waterfront project is as important in its strictly technical and economic terms. We are including a marina (as part of a riverfront apartment complex)...as much for the attractiveness of the setting and state of mind it creates as for its recreational value.²⁴

While economically unfeasible in many instances, marinas have been effectively used when they are built in conjunction with other uses in order to reduce their riskiness. Experience in the United States has shown residential uses to be a good counterbalance to marinas.²⁵

Obstacles to Project Implementation

While the success stories of urban waterfront revitalization in other cities generates widespread acceptance and interest in this form of inner-city renewal, a number of formidable obstacles must be overcome if implementation is ever to occur. Chief among these stumbling blocks are:

²² Martin Millsbaugh, "Project Delivery Systems and Funding in the 80's" in Urban Waterfronts '83, (Washington: The Waterfront Press, 1984), pp. 16,17.

²³ Larry Hodgson, Information Officer, Le Vieux Port-de-Quebec, Quebec City, Quebec, April 23, 1985.

²⁴ Sal Samperi, "Project Delivery Systems and Funding in the 80's" in Urban Waterfronts '83, (Washington: The Waterfront Press, 1984), p. 17.

²⁵ Samperi, p. 16.

1. Arranging project financing.
2. Overlapping government jurisdictions.
3. Accommodating the changes (when necessary) in the public transportation network to ensure adequate access to the project.
4. Settling property disputes, particularly if private ownership of waterfront lands is involved.

The following discussions elaborate these problems.

1. Financing

Urban waterfront renewal typically involves spatially large redevelopment areas. Because of this, private developers are reluctant to become involved individually, so that private investors in waterfront projects generally do not undertake these projects without significant financial involvement and/or support from the public sector. While the benefits to the communities where they are located are undeniable, the ability of the public sector, especially the municipal governments, to participate financially is limited by large debts and demands for their resources elsewhere. In light of these limitations, partnerships between private and public agencies are increasingly being used to underwrite development projects as a "means of pooling risks and limiting liability of the individual participants."²⁶

Collaboration may be essential to the revitalization of downtown commercial centres. Small, uncoordinated, and fragmented investments are rarely sufficient to reverse the cumulative effects of economic decline. Acting independently, neither the public sector nor the private sector has the financial resources or the expertise and authority to meet the needs for redevelopment of central business districts. But together, they can provide infrastructure, recreational and cultural facilities, services, and general public amenities linked to private investment in office space, retail activities, and hotel and residential facilities.²⁷

²⁶ Committee for Economic Development, Public/Private Partnerships: An Opportunity for Urban Communities, (Pearl Paul Ltd., 1982), p. 36.

²⁷ Committee for Economic Development, p. 40.

Public/private partnerships involve two phases of negotiations. The first phase is concerned with securing a consensus on project objectives, as well as gaining formal commitments on what their respective roles in the project will entail and their desire to see the project to completion. The second phase of the partnership process details how the objectives will be pursued, as set forth in formal understandings, mutually adopted plans or legally binding development agreements.²⁸

Such joint ventures, while benefitting the community-at-large, must also satisfy the organizational interests of the individual partners: for private developers, "the economic bottom line" or acceptable profit margins for the project. For the public sector, the project must be politically justifiable and/or produce tangible results within a reasonable time in order to placate constituents demanding results.

Public/private partnerships can involve a number of different organizations. Typically, these partnerships involve a level of government and one of a business, a non-profit organization, neighbourhood organizations or another level of government. Generally these partnerships are entered into voluntarily; however, they are seldom harmonious all of the time and have drawbacks for both sides. For the private sector, these drawbacks can mean any one of the following: additional expense to hire staff to deal with the public sector, sharing project information that they consider confidential or operating on the city's schedule²⁹ "which typically is different from the optimum schedule of developers."³⁰ For the public

²⁸ Committee for Economic Development, pp. 2,3.

²⁹ Mary Nueman, "Public/Private Partnerships - The Key to the Rebirth of Downtown Retailing", Urban Land, 43:60, 1984, p. 26.

³⁰ Nueman, p. 26.

sector, the main drawback is having to share the economic risk of investing in the project in order to participate and/or attract private investment in the redevelopment project.

Under ideal conditions, the public/private partnership would evolve in a "positive civic culture", where business and citizen input is actively sought after and incorporated into the project's plans. In this way, consensus on the plan is assured. This aspect is especially important when the redevelopment project is anticipated to require any one of the following:

- a) Large investments.
- b) Innovative institutional arrangements.
- c) Disruption of normal community activities.
- d) Long periods of time for implementation.³¹

Unfortunately, these considerations are often not in place or not fully utilized in all cities.

2. Overlapping Jurisdictions of Government

...in Canada the largest single obstacle is the multiplicity of jurisdictions in the public sector. Many of the most suitable areas for redevelopment in Canadian port cities are under public ownership, but there are frequently so many levels of government involved and such a bewildering array of departments connected in some way with the harbour, that renovation is virtually impossible under present (1974) conditions. The Waterfront Plan for Metropolitan Toronto listed 50 public bodies involved with the waterfront.³²

All three levels of government exercise varying degrees of control over urban waterfronts. Most directly involved in administering urban waterfronts is the Federal Government. Ottawa exercises its influence through the Minister of Transport, who administers the four types of Federal employees and appointees (National Harbour Board, Harbour Commis-

³¹ Committee for Economic Development, pp. 2,3.

³² Brian Slack, Harbour Redevelopment in Canada, (Ottawa: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1974), p. 33.

sioners, Harbour-masters and Wharfingers), through Public Works Canada, "which has some responsibility for the maintenance and construction of facilities and the management of land and real property"³³ through the Finance and Justice Ministries and the RCMP, as well as Environment Canada. The Federal government also retains jurisdiction over all lands below ordinary low water marks on navigable watercourses.³⁴

The Provincial governments control all lands above ordinary high-level marks on navigable watercourses. This level of government also exercises influence through its jurisdiction over municipalities and its power to amend or revoke municipal legislation. An example of this latter power was demonstrated in the 70's in Victoria, British Columbia, when that city was informed that the redevelopment it had begun on the "Inner Harbour" was henceforth the responsibility of the Provincial government.³⁵

Municipal governments have a variety of departments which are involved with waterfronts. Municipal governments exert their influence primarily through land use controls and regulations, as well as through their control of local roads, affecting access.³⁶

More recently, these jurisdictional obstacles are being partially overcome by setting up quasi-public waterfront development corporations which include members of the various ministries and departments in the waterfront renovation process. Such redevelopment corporations provide a forum for negotiation and compromise which was absent in earlier water-

³³ Slack, p. 33.

³⁴ Slack, p. 33.

³⁵ Slack, p. 33.

³⁶ Slack, p. 33.

front redevelopment projects thereby allowing a more harmonious working atmosphere than in the past.

3. Transportation

Among the biggest obstacles to overcome in waterfront redevelopment concerns the balancing of city-wide transportation needs against the need to provide easy access to the water's edge. Because the land adjacent to the water's edge is typically flat and in close proximity to the CBD, there is substantial competition for this space, particularly for use as roadbeds for expressways or major arterial roads. While the inclusion of such roadways along the waterfront does not preclude redevelopment, they do represent physical and psychological barriers to waterfront access. Negotiation of transportation guidelines for the waterfront area among the various agencies involved in the project is therefore desirable prior to specific proposals being tendered.

Railroad trackage and marshalling yards also have a history of locating of land adjacent to waterfronts. While changes in technology and manufacturing plant locations have diminished the railways' importance to the core area, many rail lines traverse the inner-city. Many cities would prefer these obsolete rail lines be removed and thereby increase access to the waterfront and the core area in general. However, the astronomical costs involved preclude them from doing so without government financial assistance. Given the diminished Federal interest in railway relocation and the subsequent reduction in Federal financial aid to bring this about, the inconveniences caused by the urban trackage are almost impossible to eliminate.

Parking facilities also present obstacles to waterfront projects since experience has shown that successful parking structures require sites within reasonable walking distance of the attraction. This sometimes results in using scarce waterfront property for this purpose. Also, because of their inner-city location, waterfronts can find themselves in the predicament of having no suitable parking sites vacant and/or available.

4. Private Ownership of Waterfront Property

Private ownership of waterfront property can disrupt land assembly or fragment the project's land holdings. While this problem is not insurmountable if the municipality exercises its powers of expropriation, it can increase land costs beyond what is acceptable to developers and thereby undermines the project's feasibility. In some isolated instances, property owners can have the right-of-first-refusal clauses in their deeds for waterfront property once it is released from its previous use (eg. railroad lands).

Administrative Structure: Development Corporations

While both the public and the private sectors contribute to the development of the local economy, there are limits to what each sector can accomplish when they act separately. Efforts to overcome these limitations have increasingly been directed at combining the resources and skills of the public and private sectors in the form of public/private partnerships. This is particularly true for waterfront redevelopment projects where, because of the sophisticated financing necessary to realize such projects, public/private partnerships are becoming the norm. While major redevelopment efforts can be undertaken primarily through private financing, such as in the case of Detroit's Renaissance Center, the

project's success is still dependent upon facilitating actions and endorsement by public bodies.³⁷

Typically public actions aimed at assisting and/or participating in development partnerships include:

1. Planning and land assembly. This may include city involvement in project feasibility studies.
2. Political protection. This may include protection against political pressure to scrap the project (particularly during the planning stages when no tangible product exists), as well as protection against pressure to spread city assistance to a number of projects.
3. City support for nearby municipal projects -- such as parking facilities or parks -- that may be important to the success of the retail component.
4. Land improvements.
5. Design, construction, and/or management of various project components such as parking structures, interior spaces, pedestrian ways, etc.
6. Financial assistance, which may include utilizing government funding sources and programs and their use for leveraging in securing further private funding.³⁸
7. Reorganizing the city bureaucracy to facilitate a less stringent development process. Currently the popular method for achieving this is by forming quasi-public development corporations.³⁹

Public development corporations have become the favoured approach for waterfront renewal because they offer the following advantages over the

³⁷ Committee for Economic Development, Public/Private Partnerships: An Opportunity for Urban Communities, (Pearl Paul Ltd., 1982), pp. 35-40.

³⁸ Mary Nueman, "Public/Private Partnerships - The Key to the Rebirth of Downtown Retailing", Urban Land, 43:60, 1984, p. 26.

³⁹ Nueman, p. 26.

traditional adversarial roles adopted by the public and private sectors in negotiations for major redevelopment projects:

1. Structural independence from local government: that is, the release from political allegiances and partial release from political accountability.
2. Privacy of negotiations. Negotiations for the sale or lease of public property can occur without constant public scrutiny or bidding procedures.
3. Coordination of public resources -- both capital and expertise -- to meet specific development needs.
4. Financial independence from city budgets.
5. Employment of professional expertise. The corporations employ professionals with development expertise in industrial development, marketing specialists, real estate agents, financial experts and lawyers independent of civil service restrictions.
6. Continuous access to public and private decision makers. The staff has direct contact with public and private leaders via a board of directors whose members are generally selected because of their ability to influence the allocation of resources for urban development.⁴⁰

Waterfront Development Corporations: The Canadian Experience

The popularity of employing public development corporations to oversee waterfront renewal projects (especially the early stages of development) is well established in Canada. Toronto, Halifax and Quebec City have Federally sponsored development corporations administering their waterfront projects. However, while waterfront development corporations to manage and finance such

⁴⁰ Committee for Economic Development, p. 44.

projects are fast becoming the norm for such undertakings, the parties involved in these partnerships sometimes differ.

In Atlantic Canada, at Halifax and Saint John, Provincial crown corporations were formed to administer their projects. The funding arrangements for the two projects differ sharply. In Halifax, the project depends financially on the contributions of the Federal government through its Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, more than does Saint John, where private investment exceeds that of the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion.⁴¹ The Saint John example (at least for the phase already constructed) more closely resembles the American approach utilizing more private sector investment than in other Canadian approaches used to date. In Quebec and Ontario, redevelopment of Quebec City's and Toronto's waterfronts were funded entirely by Federal bodies. In Toronto, a board of directors, appointed by the Federal Minister of Public Works Canada, oversees the project,⁴² while in Quebec City a specially created Federal crown corporation, Le Vieux-Port-de-Quebec, is indirectly administered by Public Works Canada through its Canada Land Company branch.⁴³ In British Columbia, Vancouver's B.C. Place development is administered and funded by a Provincial crown corporation. Federal participation in Vancouver's waterfront revitalization exists in the form of the Federal government's contribution to Expo '86, Canada Place, which is administered through a specially created crown corporation, Canada Harbour Place Corporation.⁴⁴

These Canadian approaches to waterfront development represent a sharp break from the way in which waterfront renewal is typically being funded in the

⁴¹ C.E. Clark, 1984 Corpus Almanac and Canadian Sourcebook, Volume 2, (Don Mills: Southam Communications, 1984), pp. 19-233.

⁴² Ian Allaby, "The Harbourfront Lands: Revitalizing Toronto's Waterfront", Urban Land, 43:9, 1984, p. 72.

⁴³ Clark, pp. 18-121.

⁴⁴ Clark, pp. 18-120.

United States. There, public/private partnerships between municipal governments and private investors are the norm. In Detroit (the Renaissance Center⁴⁵), Toledo (Seagate/Promenade Park⁴⁶) and Indianapolis (the White River Recreational Area⁴⁷), private corporate investors provided the bulk of the financial resources for these projects. This is not to say private investment is absent in Canadian waterfront projects (eg. Saint John, Toronto and Vancouver), but rather that project start-up is less dependent of private funding than in the United States.

Summary

In this chapter common objectives, planning issues, and impediments to waterfront development have been discussed. More specifically, it has been shown that the objectives of waterfront renewal typically fall into two categories: economic objectives aimed at stimulating the inner-city's economy by exploiting projected social and economic trends of the near future, and non-economic objectives, which centre on addressing public access issues and the incorporation of resident desires in the plan. Similarly, the section on waterfront planning issues indicated that they too are loosely based upon the distinctions established in the objectives. It should be noted that these economic and noneconomic issues often do not lend themselves easily to working in tandem and that solutions to these issues are not likely to have universal popular support. Negotiation and compromise between political objectives and economic goals is a necessary part of a successful waterfront plan. Additionally, the section on impediments to waterfront development has shown their formidability and the

⁴⁵ L. Redstone, New Downtowns, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), p. 131.

⁴⁶ Committee for Economic Development, p. 35.

⁴⁷ Ann Breen and Richard Rigby, "On the Waterfront", Planning, 45:11, 1979, p. 13.

need for political flexibility and adaptability in approaching these issues. This chapter suggested the development corporation as one approach to overcoming the shortcomings of the traditional adversarial approach to development common between the public and private sectors. As was briefly outlined, the suitability of waterfront development corporations in overcoming these issues, particularly in Canada, has seen their widespread incorporation into waterfront projects.

The findings of this chapter, together with concepts developed in the preceding chapter will serve in chapter six as a basis for an evaluative checklist for waterfront proposals.

CHAPTER FIVE: AN EVALUATIVE FORMAT FOR ANALYSING WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS

Introduction

In this chapter the differing approaches found in the illustrative examples of waterfront development will be analysed. Examination will first be divided by country of origin; that is, whether the project took place in Canada or in the United States. Second, the two groups will be examined for common and for unique traits. From this analysis, some insight will be gained into which strategies are utilized to achieve particular objectives in the two countries. The results of this analysis will have some influence on the makeup of the evaluative checklist and will indicate options to decision-makers considering specific proposals. From these results and the findings of the preceding chapters, an evaluative checklist for waterfront development will be produced. This evaluative checklist will later serve as the basis against which the Windsor case study will be judged.

Analysis of the Examples

Scrutinizing the various examples of waterfront renewal cited reveals that many of the goals and pitfalls detailed in the previous chapters are indeed typical of the waterfront redevelopment process. Certain elements are common to both countries studied. Analysis of these examples shows that waterfront revitalization projects almost universally are part of a downtown development plan and, typically, are not initial components in the renewal process. These examples have also shown that some sort of formal agreement or partnership is

involved in the funding of these projects. Although the participants in these agreements vary widely in their make-up and degree of financial participation, particularly in government involvement in waterfront projects between the United States and Canada. Public access to the water is also universally sought after as a desirable component in waterfront redevelopment, although the methods used and the degree of commitment to including this feature varies, depending on the particular mix of uses being considered for the project. The inclusion of commercial uses within waterfront projects is also widely accepted, but again the importance of this use to the project depends on the importance attached to economic renewal (particularly retailing) in the project's objectives. Lastly, what becomes apparent from the examples cited is that no single approach to waterfront renewal has universal application to all waterfront cities.

Certain differences also exist between Canadian and American responses to the problems presented in waterfront revitalization projects. American waterfront renewal projects generally exhibit some of the following characteristics:

1. They support mixed-use projects which stress commercial uses such as retailing facilities and office uses.
2. Their projects tend to take established travel patterns into consideration more than do Canadian efforts to date with respect to the project's location within the downtown area.
3. Greater emphasis is placed on attracting captive daytime markets, inner-city employee markets and on including provisions for all income levels, at least in their initial proposals. Typically these projects address all groups, including the inner-city's poor, by providing civic attractions such as aquariums and museums or by programming recreational activities which interest everyone.

4. Private investment plays a much greater role in realizing waterfront redevelopment projects than in Canada.
5. Federal funding of waterfront redevelopment projects is used primarily as leverage to secure further private loans.
6. Greater voice is given to civic leadership in formulating the overall project than is typical in the Canadian examples.
7. The approaches being adopted by American cities contemplating waterfront revitalization are less divergent than in Canada. This is particularly true of including festival mall-type development in waterfront projects. This is amply demonstrated given that Boston, Baltimore, Toledo, New York City and Norfolk all include or are planning to include festival malls in their waterfront projects despite the wide differences in these cities' make-up.
8. Less importance is attached to amount of recreational space allotted in these inner-city projects.
9. Changing widely-held negative perceptions (eg. Detroit and New York) through waterfront renewal is stressed, while Canadian cities tend to undertake such projects to enhance an already positive image (eg. Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Quebec City).

The Canadian experience with waterfront redevelopment, which does not have as long a history as does the United States in undertaking such projects, demonstrates the following characteristics:

1. The Federal Government's role in financing, to a large extent, many of the waterfront renewal projects initiated in Canada to date.
2. A shorter development time-frame than the American examples, at least for the projects with extensive funding by the Federal government. In the United States, waterfront projects generally take 20 to 30 years to realize

substantial results, while Canadian projects forecast development periods of generally less than 10 years. They also tend to stress self-sufficiency rather than profits.

3. Canadian projects tend more often to be part of a municipally undertaken downtown redevelopment plan, as quick fixes to pressing inner-city problems (eg. False Creek's south shore residential development during a severe housing shortage).
4. Waterfront renewal projects also tend to be mixed-use developments, but they place greater emphasis on residential and non-economic uses (eg. open space) than in the United States.

From these differences in technique and from common objectives and pitfalls, a model will now be formulated using this information to produce a checklist against which waterfront redevelopment proposals may be evaluated.

The Evaluative Checklist

This section will produce a checklist to evaluate waterfront proposals for their feasibility and effectiveness, using a subjective approach based on the findings previously presented. This approach is utilized because no single approach is universally applicable; therefore, no quantifiable benchmarks can be established suitable for comparison purposes. There are, however, sufficient similarities between waterfront projects to allow analysis measuring the existing situations against an optimal set of circumstances which have proved to be influential in bringing about successful waterfront revitalization elsewhere.

Under ideal circumstances, the redevelopment of a waterfront would proceed only after a legally-binding downtown plan has been formally adopted. This overall development plan for the inner-city would clearly identify the objectives

of the plan and what actions -- both public and private -- will be necessary to realize these objectives within a defined time-frame. Additionally, the Downtown Plan would also show how the waterfront area fits into the overall development concept and have the support of business, industry, residents and politicians. By proceeding in this fashion, the City's commitment to waterfront renewal is clearly demonstrated, opportunities for private development are identified, and a baseline guide is established against which both public and private officials may evaluate their proposals.

The evaluative checklist will use the findings of the previous four chapters and will incorporate these to form a baseline used to evaluate proposals. The checklist will address the four basic problems identified within the inner-city-- the age of the majority of the inner-city's buildings, the speed of technological change, municipal financial limitations, and conflicting demands -- and will incorporate the common objectives identified to arrive at an ideal set of waterfront development conditions based on the illustrative examples. The following is a brief outline of the issues involved in each problem.

1. Building Age

Basically the problem here is that the built form was designed for an industrial economy which is increasingly becoming obsolete. As a consequence of this incongruence the inner-city, in some instances, is losing even some of its traditional functions to the suburbs. For example, in some large cities suburban office park developments are becoming increasingly popular. To combat this problem, a long-term strategy utilizing a combination of adaptive re-use (to use existing buildings) and new construction (to demonstrate vitality) should be formulated.

2. Speed of Technological Change

Because technology, in many areas, is expanding at a rate quicker than buildings can economically be replaced or renewed, there needs to be both a change in basic planning philosophy emphasizing the long-term consequences in place of the more traditional short-term, quick-fix approach, and a switch to including future impacts as well as immediate results when formulating a plan. Should this change to considering future needs be adopted then waterfront development proposals should attempt to create an inner-city environment sympathetic to the needs and desires of high-tech industries and their employees. One such approach is improving the amenities found in the core.

3. Financial Limitations

Since municipal bodies seldom have the financial resources to act on their own behalf or participate extensively in large-scale projects, waterfront proposals should include privately initiated land uses in order to increase tax receipts. Municipal governments can also partially overcome their financial limitations either in sharing the financial risks involved by becoming part of a public/private partnership to realize portions of the project or in constructing shared facilities. Through careful phasing and shared funding, waterfront projects can achieve an important objective -- to be self-sufficient instead of a further drain on municipal resources.

4. Conflicting Inner-City Demands

This inner-city problem is related to conflicting planning orientations. That is, the need to address pre-existing, present-day and future inner-city demands.

While many solutions or combinations of solutions exist to address these conflicts, one strategy which could be adopted is:

- a) Existing (past) facilities -- Utilize adaptive re-use to modify existing buildings to present and future user demands.
- b) Present-day needs -- Utilize new construction to present a positive image of the inner city to:
 - (i) Potential investors: to change the generally negative perception of the inner-city by showing growth and thereby indicating continuing vitality.
 - (ii) Resident attitudes: to improve suburban residents' perceptions of the inner-city as an acceptable residential location and to reap the political gains new developments can offer if new jobs, skilled or unskilled, are also created.
- c) Future -- Improving the functional capability of the inner-city through waterfront projects planned to anticipate the needs and desires of high-tech industry, information creation and distribution industries and/or research and development firms. Waterfronts, because of their natural beauty and attraction, lend themselves well to amenity-enriching projects which are anticipated to be influential in locational decisions in the future.

The cumulative impact of these conflicting demands may, in part, explain the mixing of building and development strategies in the illustrative examples previously examined. Bearing in mind these assumptions, the evaluative checklist will be divided into five sections based on the following categories.

A. Development Atmosphere

This section will help decision-makers examine the feasibility of the proposal given the development conditions within the core. It is this section's purpose to: determine whether the City has the ability to raise the funding necessary to start the waterfront project and whether the municipal government has the ability to participate financially and/or to continue the renewal process beyond the waterfront; to indicate the degree of public/private cooperation within the community which will be an indication of the possibility of a public/private partnership to jointly undertake the project; and to indicate if there appears to be sufficient community and political commitment to the project to support the long-term duration of many waterfront projects.

B. Image Enhancement

Because a widely-held negative perception of the inner-city often exists, it is paramount that development act to positively change this attitude, particularly as it concerns potential investors and city residents. This can be done by employing a variety of building and development strategies but this section of the checklist will emphasize:

1. whether steps specifically aimed at improving the inner-city's image are included in the project
2. whether this improvement is a single- or multi-purpose improvement
3. whether a clearly identifiable attraction or focal point is produced to offer tangible examples of inner-city vitality
4. the time orientation of these improvements.

C. Land Use Proposals

The purpose of this section is to examine the waterfront project's potential to facilitate the transition of the inner-city to a post-industrial society and if

the uses chosen have the ability to at least partially overcome the financial limitations of the municipal government. Ideally the project would become at least financially self-sufficient through new tax revenues gained by including a commercial/park segment, by sharing facilities or by artificially expanding the developable portions of the waterfront site through filling. The land uses chosen must also address the varying time orientations of the inner-city planning.

D. Addressing Target Markets

As the section title indicates, this section examines whether the project is addressing specific market segment needs and desires as well as identifying those segments which are being overlooked.

E. The Site

This section analyses whether the waterfront site is being developed in a manner which fully utilizes its special qualities or whether an alternative site might do just as well for the project's purposes.

The importance of particular aspects of the waterfront project is dependent on the weight attached to them in achieving overall inner-city objectives and the time orientation of the project's facilities. The sensitivity of the checklist could be enhanced by assigning a weighting system to the questions which awards higher points for achieving the objectives important to the city considering the project. Such a weighting scheme will be applied to the case study and alternative proposal presented in the next chapter.

When constructed the checklist would look like Table 2 at the end of the chapter.

Summary

This chapter began by analysing the similarities and differences in development philosophies between Canada and the United States, as deduced from the illustrative examples chosen for this study of waterfront development. It was found that in the developments studied, universally accepted characteristics studied were:

1. Public access to the water be guaranteed although the extent and importance attached to this characteristic varies according to project objectives and local circumstances.
2. The inclusion of commercial uses within the development although again this characteristic varies according to the project's objectives and the country of origin.
3. That no single, universally applicable development strategy yet exists.

Similarly, it was found that in the United States and Canada, waterfront projects have demonstrated the following characteristics:

1. United States
 - a) Mixed used developments predominate with particular importance attached to retailing.
 - b) Greater importance is assigned to existing inner-city populations and their inner-city travel routes when locating the project.
 - c) That private initiative, both in terms of planning and financing, takes place in American waterfront projects.
2. Canada
 - a) Shorter development completion dates are projected for Canadian projects than in the American examples. This may be indicative of a more quick-fix approach to waterfront development, directed more at present-day conditions than future considerations.
 - b) The federal government plays a much greater role in financing and administering waterfront development.
 - c) Greater importance is attached to meeting noneconomic objectives, particularly in non-revenue producing components.

Lastly, an evaluative checklist, based on information from existing developments, was developed. This checklist suggests an ideal set of criteria under which waterfront development may take place. These criteria form a baseline against which proposals may be judged. In the following chapter, this checklist will be tested on the Windsor case study and will be used as a guide to produce an alternative development option.

Table 3: Evaluative Checklist for Inner-City Improvement through Waterfront Revitalization

- Biased weighting of double points for achieving primary project objectives indicated by showing scores in bold.

Section A: Development Atmosphere

Question	Yes/No	Weight (-1 to +1)	Comments
1. Is there a downtown plan in effect?	Yes	+1	
2. Are downtown development goals identified? If yes, are specific methods to achieve these goals identified.	Yes Yes	+1 +1	
3. Is the waterfront's role in the CBD identified in the downtown plan?	Yes	+1	
4. Does an established communications network exist between civic and business leaders, and the City?	Yes	+1	
5. Is public opinion concerning development actively sought and incorporated into the plans?	Yes	+1	
6. Has the City been successful in attracting desirable development in the past?	Yes	+1	
7. Are jurisdictional problems anticipated?	No	+1	
8. Have financial partnerships between public and private sectors occurred in the City in the past?	Yes	+1	
9. Does the City have the ability to participate financially? If yes, is there a firm commitment for long-term support both financially and politically?	Yes Yes	+1 +1	
10. Do the corporate members of the community support the waterfront project? If yes, does this commitment extend to their financial participation?	Yes Yes	+1 +1	

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
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11. Is the project single-purpose?

No +1

Section B: Image Enhancement

1. Does the plan improve the quality of inner-city facilities?
If yes, do these improvements follow a course of action which:

Yes +1

- a) promotes the inner-city in the future?
- b) promotes the inner-city in the present?
- c) reinforce existing development?

Yes +1
Yes +1
Yes +1

2. Does the project include a regional attraction?

Yes +1

3. Does the project have a clearly identifiable focal point to use as proof of renewal to

- a) private investors?
- b) city residents?
- c) tourists?

Yes +1
Yes +1
Yes +1

4. Is the project anticipated to give a positive image to

- a) the city-at-large?
- b) the inner-city?
- c) a particular segment of the inner-city?
- d) the waterfront?

Yes +1
Yes +1
Yes + 1/2

5. Are similar attractions or activities found elsewhere in the local region either

- a) on the waterfront?
- b) elsewhere in the host city?

Yes +1
No +1

Section C: Land Use Proposals

1. Are new facilities planned?
If yes, do they include any of the following:

Yes 0

- a) Entertainment/Cultural Facilities

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
i) theatre	Yes	+1	
ii) art gallery	Yes	+1	
iii) museum (art or historical)	Yes	+1	heritage preservation
iv) resort-type hotel	Yes	+1	year-round use
v) conservatory	Yes	+1	
vi) zoo	Yes	+1	
vii) aquarium	Yes	+1	
b) Recreational Activities			
i) parkland - active	Yes	+1	
- passive	Yes	+1	
ii) boating	Yes	+1	accommodation of water-dependent use
iii) swimming	Yes	+1	
iv) botanical garden	Yes	+1	nature conservation
c) Residential Uses			
i) high-rise apartments?	Yes	+1	
ii) multi-family low-rise?	Yes	+1	potentially a replacement for displaced residents
iii) townhouses?	Yes	+1	
iv) condominiums?	Yes	+1	
v) low income units?	Yes	+1	for displaced low-income persons
Are these new residential units located in close proximity to entertainment, cultural and recreational developments?	Yes	+1	projected to be beneficial to attracting middle- and upper-income residents
d) Commercial Uses			
i) office/administration	Yes	+1	present and future jobs
ii) research and development facilities	Yes	+1	present and future jobs
iii) services	Yes	+1	present and future jobs
iv) retailing	Yes	+1	present and future jobs
v) specialty retailing	Yes	+1	present and future jobs and amenity factor

Question		Yes/No	Weight	Comments
vi)	hotel and convention centres	Yes	+1	24-hour activity -- safety
Are these commercial uses anticipated to compete with existing uses?		No	+1	
2.	Will any of the components of the waterfront project increase municipal tax revenues? If yes, through	Yes	+1	
a)	taxes	Yes	+1	improves chances for self sufficiency
b)	leases	Yes	+1	improves chances for self sufficiency
c)	rent	Yes	+1	improves chances for self sufficiency
3.	Is it anticipated that the project will ever be financially self-sufficient? If yes, do plans for this self-sufficiency involve:	Yes	+1	
a)	taxes, land leases, land rents or profit-sharing?	Yes	+1	
b)	combining uses such as			
i)	commercial development?	Yes	+1	jobs
ii)	sharing facilities with another public body or private developer?	Yes	+1	political acceptability of costs
iii)	increasing the amount of developable land through filling?	Yes	+1	
Section D: Addressing Target Markets				
1.	Will the development appeal to			
a)	residents?	Yes	+1	present and future resident support
b)	tourists?	Yes	+1	
c)	businesses?	Yes	+1	present and future jobs
d)	youths?	Yes	+1	
e)	the elderly?	Yes	+1	
f)	middle- and upper-income groups	Yes	+1	desirable residents and consumers

Section E: The Site				
Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments	
1. Does the project require a waterfront site?	Yes	+1		
2. Does the project benefit from a waterfront site?	Yes	+1		
3. Will the adjacent neighbourhoods and businesses benefit from the waterfront project?	Yes	+1		
4. Does the development take advantage of existing topography?	Yes	+1		
5. Is public access to water ensured? If yes, is it	Yes	+1		
a) inhibited, or	Yes	+1		
b) part of private spaces?	No	+1		
6. Is visual access to water ensured? If yes, is it unhindered?	Yes Yes	+1 +1		
7. Is green/park space part of the development?	Yes	+1	nature conservation	
8. Is the emphasis on				
a) quality of public spaces? or	Yes	+1		
b) quantity?	No	+1		
9. Are there provisions to accommodate water-dependent uses?	Yes	+1		

CHAPTER SIX: TESTING THE EVALUATIVE CHECKLIST USING THE WINDSOR CASE STUDY

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to apply the concepts developed in the previous chapters to test their applicability to a real waterfront development situation presently occurring in Windsor, Ontario. This will be accomplished by using the evaluative checklist produced in chapter five as a baseline against which Windsor's proposal can be judged for quality and project feasibility. Because the checklist represents ideal waterfront development circumstances, the degree of congruence with these ideal circumstances will vary according to the proposals meeting these conditions. As presented, the evaluative checklist will use development atmosphere, the ability of the project to improve the inner-city's image, proposed land uses, the ability of the project facilities to serve specific market segments of the population, and utilization of the site to arrive at a conclusion concerning the acceptability and/or feasibility of the project. This chapter will also present alternative recommendations concerning Windsor's riverfront development, based on any shortcomings identified in the analysis of the original concept plan.

Case Study Background

Due to its location and history, Windsor has come to cherish its lengthy waterfront as a public amenity. Recently an opportunity has arisen whereby the city may be able to recapture a parcel of riverfront land immediately east of the CBD. At present, the Canadian National Railway (CNR) and the Northwestern

Railway (NW) jointly utilize the area in question as a marshalling yard for a boxcar ferrying operation which transports railway freight cars to and from Detroit, Michigan via the Detroit River. These railway companies -- as well as the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) which has its freight car ferrying operation further upstream -- are forced into using this inefficient and outmoded method because the only alternative, a railway tunnel beneath the riverbed, is exclusively used by ConRail (through its Canadian subsidiary, Canada Southern Railway). ConRail, however, has been seeking to divest itself of its Canada Southern holdings, including the railway tunnel beneath the river, its trackage from Windsor to Niagara Falls and a rail bridge to Buffalo, New York. The prospect of finally having access to the railway tunnel, as well as the shortest rail route between Detroit and New York City, was sufficient to encourage CN/CP to jointly make an offer to purchase the Canada Southern Railway and its holdings.

After a lengthy debate and a Canadian Transport Commission hearing into the takeover's ramifications to CN/CP competitors, the CN/CP bid was approved. In order to present a strong case for their acquisition of Canada Southern before the Canadian Transport Commission, CN/CP enlisted the support of the City of Windsor by offering to abandon CNR's riverfront marshalling yards and ferrying operation and make the property available to the City. While CN/CP continue to make plans for the eventual replacement of CNR's riverfront yards, negotiations between the CNR and the City for the property are hesitantly proceeding.

The Site

The CNR's riverfront lands are located between the foot of Windsor's main street, Ouellette Avenue, and Hiram Walker's Distillery complex (see Figure 18).




FIGURE :18 Windsor's CN Riverfront Lands Boundaries
 Source: City of Windsor, CN Riverfront Lands Concept Plan, 1983

The Railway site covers approximately 34 acres, in a 1.2 mile long strip of land varying in width from 70 to 330 feet.¹

The most prominent feature of the site is its drop in elevation between the level of Riverside Drive, which forms the site's southern boundary, and track level. The greatest differential in height occurs on the western edge of the property, gradually diminishing as one proceeds eastward. Road access is restricted to entrances at Marentette Avenue and Aylmer Avenue, while pedestrian accesses to track level are located at Aylmer Avenue and Goyeau Avenue (see Map 1)². At present, access to the water's edge is prohibited by the CNR. Vegetation on the site is minimal, with the majority provided by City plantings along the slopes adjacent to Riverside Drive and in Great Western Park (which is a public park located on land leased to the city by the CNR). Shoreline protection varies greatly within the site, ranging from no protection to wood pilings with plank support. Municipal services to the site are restricted to CN's freight offices and sheds. Any planned redevelopment would utilize an existing interceptor sewer running parallel to Riverside Drive at a depth lower than that of the riverbed.³


Also included in the study area are the neighbourhoods and land uses located on the south side of Riverside Drive which, in all probability, will be the area of greatest interest to private developers. This area offers a diverse mixture of land uses, building conditions and redevelopment opportunities.

Warehousing mixed with commercial uses characterizes the area bordered by Ouellette Avenue on the west, Glengarry Avenue on the east, and Chatham Avenue on the south. With the exception of those commercial uses fronting on

¹ The City of Windsor, CN Riverfront Lands Study, (Windsor: City Administration Office, 1983), p. 9.

² The City of Windsor, p. 10.

³ The City of Windsor, pp. 9,10.



Ouellette Avenue, poor building conditions and underutilization typify this area. Notable among the buildings found in this section is a department store which has been closed for 8 years despite the need for such a facility in the CBD. Of the entire study area, this section has the greatest commercial development potential.⁴

Similarly, underutilization also typifies the blocks immediately fronting on Riverside Drive, eastward to Parent Avenue. There is a high incidence of empty and/or abandoned commercial and residential buildings.

This strip of land is also the location of a number of vacant lots which are presently used as temporary parking lots. Residential development, apart from the newer highrise buildings, includes a large number of subdivided houses in poor condition.⁵

Newer development within the area, such as the four highrise apartment buildings built in the area between 1967 and 1981, have been constructed in accordance with site plan controls, as are all multiple-family buildings built in the area between Chatham Street and Riverside Drive. Building heights for these newer apartments range from 10 to 20 storeys, providing the city with some 700 units, including 300 senior citizen units.⁶ These conditions in the neighbourhoods adjacent to the railroad's property have led the city's planning staff to conclude that:

In light of the declining condition of many of the structures in this area and the availability of vacant lots...expect to see more pressures for similar redevelopment in the future...⁷

⁴ The City of Windsor, pp. 11-13,27-28.

⁵ The City of Windsor, pp. 11-13,27-28.

⁶ The City of Windsor, p. 12.

⁷ The City of Windsor, p. 12.

The remaining portion of the neighbourhood located on the south side of Riverside Drive east of Pierre Avenue is generally stable and well maintained.

The Situation

Windsor, like most other older cities, has experienced a decline in CBD importance due to suburbanization. This is compounded by the fact that the present metropolitan area was originally made up of 5 distinct town-sites. As a result of this fragmentation, no dominant commercial centre emerged in the downtown area; rather 5 town-centres emerged, with strip development linking them. In addition, when the city amalgamated 5 suburban townships in the early sixties, the city inherited a large area with inferior municipal services, particularly sewers. Because earlier councils delayed construction to avoid politically controversial property tax increases, more recent councils have been forced to borrow large sums of money to initiate these long-overdue sanitation projects. This, because of large outstanding loans, has in turn reduced the city's ability to raise money and thereby reduces its ability to participate financially in any large-scale projects. Windsor's core also suffers from being in the urban shadow of Detroit, Michigan. Because the two cities share a common economic base in the automobile industry and Detroit is clearly the corporate headquarters for many of the industrial plants located in Windsor, the CBD contains a much smaller proportion of office uses than it should for a city with a population of 200,000.

Windsor also suffers from a cyclical economy of successive booms and busts, varying directly with the fortunes of the automobile industry. The recent economic recession hit Windsor particularly hard, so much so that Windsor was one of only two major Canadian cities to report a decline in population in the

1981 census.⁸ Forecasts of Windsor's prospects for growth in the future (as it concerns Ontario) is not bright since the city is outside the 100 kilometre ring surrounding Toronto where the major portion of growth is forecasted to take place.⁹

Windsor has not been idle in its efforts to stem the downtown area's decline. The early 1980's saw the construction of a semi-pedestrian mall along Ouellette Avenue, the core's main retailing street. The widening of the sidewalks and landscaping proved to be successful during the warmer months of the year when the sidewalk cafes are filled to overflowing. This successful redevelopment has encouraged more entertainment facilities and restaurants to locate within the core despite the seasonal aspect of the business climate.

The city was also successful in attracting a first-class hotel to the downtown area, adjacent to Windsor's convention facility, on city-assembled land with a commanding view of the river and Detroit's skyline beyond. The Hilton Hotel and the other downtown hotels are reliant, to some extent, on overflow business from Detroit-based conventions since Windsor's convention venue, the Cleary Auditorium, is too small to handle large-scale gatherings. Despite this handicap, another hotel has recently been completed, approximately one quarter of a mile east of the Hilton Hotel. In addition to convention business, the inner-city greatly benefits from the two-week long Windsor/Detroit International Freedom Festival during the summer. Crowds in excess of 500,000 persons are attracted to the waterfront area during this period.

With the increased use of off-shore imports of automobile parts and automated assembly lines, Windsor is faced with the prospect of a steadily

⁸ L.S. Bourne, Designing the Future: A Perspective on Recent Trends and Emerging Issues in Ontario's Urban Environment, (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Research Paper #129, 1981), p. 6.

⁹ Bourne, p. 6.

declining labour force in the future if an alternative is not found to replace the automobile industry's role in the city's economy. With its major source of employment diminishing, Windsor, like many other industrial cities, wants to diversify its economic base in order to stem further decline. Since Windsor has the largest volume of U.S. based traffic entering Ontario through its two border crossing points,¹⁰ tourism has been singled out as a possible alternative to the auto industry.

Efforts to tap into the available tourist market, beyond the improvements previously mentioned, are largely the result of a 1948 municipal policy of acquiring all available waterfront properties on the north side of Riverside Drive for park purposes. While the resulting linear parks system is heavily used during the warmer months of the year by local residents, it is, for the most part, an insufficient incentive to cause American travellers on their way to the bright lights of Toronto to pause in Windsor, let alone spend any money there.

Plans for the development of Windsor's waterfront began with the conveyance of the Government Dock Property by the Federal government in 1963. In light of this gift, the City initiated a "Plan for Windsor's Waterfront" in 1964, which set the tone for all subsequent waterfront redevelopment plans in Windsor. Focusing on the area between the Peabody Bridge and the Ambassador Bridge (see Figure 19), the plan sought to acquire all privately owned land on the north side of Riverside Drive and to turn this property into parkland for the citizens of Windsor. The plan did allow for some commercial development of the riverfront, including a hotel development. This later aspect met with mixed results and set a negative precedent which has lasted almost two decades.¹¹

¹⁰ The City of Windsor, pp. A2,A3.

¹¹ The City of Windsor, pp. A3-A5.

While a new hotel, a Holiday Inn, was constructed along the riverfront just west of the core, it resulted in a bad experience for the city with private developers. The developer chosen to construct the hotel failed to deliver the grandiose highrise development originally approved by council and in its place built a rather modest lowrise complex which did not realistically deserve the prestigious site it occupies. The hard feelings caused by the Holiday Inn episode later resulted in a 1974 court battle between the City and Valhalla Inns, which wanted to build a highrise hotel at the foot of Ouellette Avenue. With the physical reminder of past mistakes nearby and strong public opposition to the project, the proposal was eventually killed. Today the Valhalla site is occupied by a rather unimpressive fountain.

In 1975, a Downtown Plan/Overview Study was initiated. It addressed the future of the downtown area primarily but also included references to riverfront development. Although no consensus on the plan's recommendations was reached and the plan was never formally adopted by Council, its policies have been used as guidelines against which development proposals are judged. With respect to the riverfront, the plan continued the recreational-use-only policy of earlier times and expanded the policy to recommend that a public marina be constructed in the area and that developments operating on a year-round basis be considered as acceptable forms of land uses on the riverfront.¹² These sketchy guidelines have served as the only directives concerning the waterfront to date, as can be seen in the 1983 CN Lands Concept Plan.

¹² The City of Windsor, pp. 14-30.

CN Riverfront Lands Concept Plan

The 1983 CN Riverfront Lands Concept Plan was adopted in principle by Council in the same year it was presented. It does not represent a major break from previous waterfront plans for Windsor in that the concept focuses primarily on redevelopment without regard for adjacent land uses or inner-city needs.


The accepted proposal (see Map 2) which was the more intensively developed of the two alternatives presented to Council, would see three activity groupings located along the riverfront. The first grouping, located nearest to the CBD, would include:

1. a hard surfaced festival plaza
2. a transient marina
3. a passenger ferry dock
4. a tug boat restaurant (existing)
5. a bi-level parking structure with some limited commercial uses
6. the western terminus of a trolley car system which would serve the length of the project.

The second grouping, the cultural grouping, is aimed primarily at tourists. Included in this grouping, which is to be located between McDougall Avenue and Marentette Avenue, are:

1. a theme park/botanical garden
2. an amphitheatre
3. a second bi-level parking structure with a roof deck
4. a large reflecting pool (which will be used for ice skating in the winter) with a fountain
5. a historical museum
6. a historical vessel berthed near the museum
7. another floating restaurant
8. a conservatory

The third and most easterly section is devoted to family oriented recrea-



HISTORIC VESSEL

CONSERVATORY

FOUNTAIN

MUSEUM

BILEVEL PARKING GARAGE

POND

GARDENS

AMPHITHEATRE


WASHROOMS

PLAYGROUND

FITNESS TRAIL

TROLLEY TRAIL

LEGEND



parkland/open space

R RESIDENTIAL

C COMMERCIAL

N



SCALE: 1 INCH = 200 FEET

ham St

AND

HISTORIC VESSEL

FOUNTAIN

MUSEUM

BILEVEL PARKING GARAGE


CONSERVATORY

WASHROOMS


PLAYGROUND

FITNESS TRAIL

TROLLEY TRACK



LEGEND



parkland/open space

R RESIDENTIAL

C COMMERCIAL

N



SCALE: 1 INCH = 200 FEET

tion. This section most closely resembles the type of waterfront parkland found elsewhere in the city. Included in this portion of the project are:

1. a commons
2. a tot lot (playground)
3. washroom facilities
4. an exercise trail

Despite the last use listed above, the purpose of this section is to permit passive recreational pursuits such as picnicking and fishing.

The concept plan also recommended that the anticipated redevelopment of properties located on the south side of Riverside Drive be devoted primarily to residential development although not exclusively so. (see Map 1) Under the city's proposal, the area bounded by McDougall Avenue on the west, Pierre Avenue on the east and University Avenue on the south, would concentrate mixed use development in this area so that the new development maximizes the view of Detroit from these locations and harmonizes with existing land uses in the district. The plan further recommends that:

1. The parcels be assembled into sites as large as possible.
2. The tallest structures be located closest to University Avenue so that views can be maximized.
3. That densities of existing residential uses located nearby be considered when planning for new residential construction.¹³

Analysis of the CN Lands Concept

Comparing the City's development concept for the riverfront to the evaluative checklist (see Table 4) first points out a moderate development atmosphere. At present, Windsor lacks a reliable downtown plan. As a result, public decision makers lack direction for development within the inner-city. This

¹³ The City of Windsor, pp. 14-30.




Figure :19 Windsor's Other Riverfront Parks
 Source: City of Windsor, CN Riverfront Lands Concept Plan, 1983.

may explain in part their unambitious waterfront proposal which beyond the property immediately adjacent to the riverfront, makes no commitment to including specific proposals for the surrounding area. Instead, they choose to leave the remainder of the inner-city's development largely to private market's discretion. The checklist also reveals that the City seems intent on undertaking the riverfront project without any participation from the private sector. Given the large sums of money necessary to realize waterfront plans and the amount of competition for the public resources available for these projects, the wisdom of such an attitude appears questionable.

The ability of the CN Lands proposal to improve the inner-city is minimal at best, largely because similar park improvements already exist elsewhere in the city (see Figure 19) and because, while the proposal will improve the attraction of the inner-city for visitors, the types of uses and activities will have little monetary impact on the inner-city. In the proposal's defense the recreational and entertainment activities could be a starting point in developing a more elaborate amenities infrastructure and thereby represent an important addition to attracting inner-city development in the future.

In terms of the land use chosen to make up the project, the City's proposal is very successful in meeting recreational and entertainment objectives but the remaining development options available suffer as a consequence. While the provision of residential development is mentioned as being a desirable use, no firm plans are made since this portion of the riverfront project is only a suggestion, not a target. Particularly damaging is the lack of commercial development which effectively precludes any significant increases in inner-city employment and lessens the possibility of the project's financial self-sufficiency since no taxes, leases or rents will be collected by the City to help offset

operating and maintenance costs. As a result of these omissions, the riverfront project will have minimal monetary impact on the inner-city. Similarly, in terms of addressing target market segments of the population the proposal, by not including commercial uses, fails to address these groups' desires as fully as waterfront projects elsewhere.

Finally, the proposal does score very well in utilizing the waterfront location effectively, particularly in terms of nature and heritage preservation. There remains, however, the nagging question of whether comparable results could have been achieved if the **quality** of the project attractions had been emphasized more than the **quantity**.

Further Developments Concerning Windsor's Waterfront

Since the City first proposed its parkland development plan for Windsor's waterfront in 1983, a new actor has arrived on the scene of the riverfront development controversy: CN Real Estate's Development branch has approached the City with its own development proposal for CN's rail yards. In May of 1985, CN Real Estate submitted a development proposal to Council for a riverfront project which would have CN constructing five highrise towers on the north side of Riverside Drive, on two separate sites totalling 6.1 acres. Under this proposal, the City would receive the remainder of the rail site, almost 26 acres, at no cost to the public, in return for the City agreeing to the proposal. Private negotiations since that time (until June of 1986), between the City and CN Real Estate, has resulted in Council flatly rejecting CN Real Estate's offer, preferring instead to adhere to the city policy of no commercial development on the north side of Riverside Drive.

On June 18, 1986, CN Real Estate, in the hope of gaining public support for its proposal, which had yet to be released to the public, released their plan to the media. Under CN Real Estate's proposal CN would construct three residential towers and two office towers on 6.1 acres of CN property located near the downtown core. The three residential towers, most likely condominiums, would be constructed between Glengarry and McDougall Avenues. As proposed, these residential towers would range in height from 140 feet to 300 feet, set in large landscaped sites. The two commercial towers would be located at the foot of Goyeau Avenue and would be approximately 200 feet in height. While the plans for the commercial component of the plan remain sketchy, the proposal calls for half of the 590,000 square feet to be used for office and commercial purposes, while uses for the remainder of the space have not yet been decided upon by CN Real Estate. CN Real Estate also has expressed an interest in operating a transient marina,¹⁴ which is in keeping with city plans.

Apart from giving the City 83 percent of the total site to develop its park along the riverfront, CN Real Estate's proposal does not preclude the City's original plans for the riverfront from taking place, largely as originally proposed. In addition to this benefit, the City would also benefit in the following ways:

1. 100 million dollars in new construction for the city
2. increased municipal tax revenue by approximately 2.5 million dollars yearly
3. 600 new housing units in the downtown area
4. construction employment for 1000 persons for one year.¹⁵

Despite meeting many of the common objectives for waterfront revitalization, Council still flatly rejects any proposal involving commercial development

¹⁴ Paul McKeaque, "CN plan was for 5 highrises: City would get 83% of land", Windsor Star, June 18, 1986, p. A6.

¹⁵ Paul McKeaque, p. A6.

on the north side of Riverside Drive. Reaffirmation of its parks-only policy for riverfront lands at a July 4, 1986 Council meeting has left the City three development options:

1. Purchase the railway property from CN for a price estimated to be between 3 and 10 million dollars.
2. Complete a land-swap with CN Real Estate which would see CN exchange the 34.5 acres of riverfront land for 600 acres of flood prone, publicly owned land in the City's extreme east end. At present, the City owns approximately one-third of this parcel, while the remaining two-thirds is owned by the Ontario Land Corporation, a Provincial crown corporation. Recent developments seem to make this option the most likely to be adopted by the City.¹⁶
3. Accept the CN Real Estate development proposal.

As was established in the analysis of the City's redevelopment proposal, the development atmosphere in Windsor is poor due to the lack of guidance by Council in the form of a downtown plan and a basic distrust of developers. While CN officials are somewhat guilty of reinforcing Council's suspicions concerning private developers, given their changing position on the City's rights to develop the rail yards,¹⁷ it is ironic that a Council not aggressive enough to actively pursue a developer of its own choice would turn down an unsolicited offer to develop the waterfront.

If CN's proposal were accepted by Council, the overall proposal would loosely fall into a more traditional approach to waterfront redevelopment: commercial/park development. However, because the components proposed by CN are not extensive, the CN proposal represents more of an initial step than a complete project. CN's highrise buildings would be successful in building up the

¹⁶ Paul McKeague, p. A1.

¹⁷ That is, reversing CN's earlier commitment to make the rail land available to the city in return for supporting their bid at the CTC hearings, just as Holiday Inn reneged on its grandiose hotel development on the riverfront.

inner-city's daytime population by creating new jobs and by expanding consumer markets through the addition of the residential units. This, in turn, could provide a necessary starting point for a more extensive redevelopment of the riverfront. While not a complete solution to the inner-city's problems, CN's towers would offer the city increased tax revenues which could offset the maintenance costs for the still extensive linear park.

CN's project is an improvement over the City's proposals in two important respects. First, CN's buildings would improve the inner-city's image by demonstrating investor confidence in Windsor and by creating a more distinctive and therefore memorable skyline, especially to visitors. Second, the office/commercial component being proposed could be an important first step in changing the character of the CBD if new businesses could be attracted to the core. While not a high impact project, CN's proposal does represent a more progressive waterfront redevelopment than the City's feeble attempt and is a step in the right direction.

The unfortunate part of the whole waterfront controversy in Windsor is that both parties interested in developing the waterfront, the City and CN Real Estate, have failed to realize that the real stumbling block to settling the issue is not the type or size of the development being proposed but the location. Council has repeatedly gone on record as preferring that commercial development locate on the south side of Riverside Drive, yet according to CN Real Estate officials, the available sites just inland from CN's preferred location have never been brought into the negotiations as an alternative.¹⁸

¹⁸ Paul McKeague, p. A6.

An Alternative Approach to Windsor's Riverfront Redevelopment

In the absence of an accepted (or current) downtown plan to use as a guide, the City's concept plan has been forced to use past plans as a guide. Consequently, the apartment development which has occurred along the riverfront where the zoning has permitted it in the past is carried forward by the concept plan's inclusion of apartment uses inland from the rail site. Similarly, all riverfront property north of Riverside Drive would become parkland as it has in the past. Perhaps a more enlightened approach would be to utilize the type of development either presently under construction or proposed by private developers. This is more logical since the ability of the City to participate financially is limited and the Federal government's commitment to expensive waterfront renewal is questionable, given the discontinuing of Federal funding for Montreal's Old Port and Chicoutimi's waterfront projects.¹⁹

While CN Real Estate is committed to disposing of their marshalling yards, the estimated price tag of between 3 and 10 million dollars appears to be prohibitive, given the City's financial situation. Even if the Federal government became involved in the project, it is doubtful that the funds would approach those invested by the Federal government elsewhere. Estimates for Windsor's waterfront have placed a tentative figure of 10 million dollars just to construct a permanent seawall along the shoreline of the rail site.²⁰

Using developer construction and interest as a guide, the riverfront plan should consider the following elements:

1. a downtown shopping mall
2. expanded convention facilities
3. hotel development

¹⁹ Gord Henderson, "Cuts may doom plans for Windsor's Waterfront", Windsor Star, Nov. 9, 1984.

²⁰ Rob Van Nie, "New Riverfront Still Far Away", Windsor Star, April 11, 1985.

4. apartments/condominiums
5. office buildings
6. parking structures
7. a dinner theatre/mixed use entertainment area

These opportunities are, for the most part, ignored by the city's proposal.

Essentially the land use question on Windsor's riverfront boils down to this: how can significant redevelopment on a limited site be encouraged while maximizing public access within the site? If any significant development is to occur, it may be necessary to sacrifice some of the cherished riverfront land, despite the certainty of unpopular public reaction. **Quality** of the public access and spaces, not **quantity** needs to be emphasised. In a city with little to offer potential investors beyond a waterfront view, and in a time when many other industrial cities are seeking to diversify their economies, this compromise of ideals seems a realistic approach to adopt.

While the City's concept is not without merit, even if only for its inexpensive approach, the unique opportunities for inner-city revitalization the riverfront project has the potential to provide are too important to be ignored. Recognizing the limitations of municipal involvement is merited but shortsighted. The example of waterfront renewal in Saint John, where a public/private partnership in the form of a development corporation produced encouraging results, would indicate that such agreements (with some modification) are viable in Canada. Given Windsor's situation and given that a large American (regional) population is readily available, it is not unreasonable for the City to break with the traditional Canadian approach requiring almost total reliance on Federally supplied funds. As an alternative to the City's concept, it is suggested that more private investment in the riverfront project be actively sought by the City.

It is further recommended that, as in the case of most other waterfront renewal projects, the riverfront development site be extended further inland than originally proposed, particularly in the CBD. It is in the CBD that most of the development interest exists and where the greatest impact of the riverfront project will be felt. Consequently, the redevelopment site's boundaries should be changed from the City's proposal, in order to reflect the change in development philosophy which would have the CBD and the riverfront development integrated as opposed to the isolation that would result under the original proposal. It is recommended that the project boundaries be changed as to conform to the suggested boundaries in Map 3.


A Blueprint for Action

On the basis of the above analysis and given the present situation of Windsor, a new scenario should be envisaged if a measure of success is to be achieved in Windsor's waterfront redevelopment. Although there may be some possible variants, in broad terms the following public and private actions should be considered.

A. Private Actions


1. Encourage CN Real Estate to build a mixed use megastructure complex (combining their 5 buildings into a single complex), complete with a seasonal commercial (specialty retailing) component and a transient marina. This would give the project an impressive initial phase and provide the project with a focal point, as a tangible example of what is possible and which may attract other investors.

EXISTING BUILDINGS, LANDSCAPE, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT AND LAND USES



Map 2
ORIGINAL CONCEPT PLAN

Source: The Urban League of Detroit, 1990. City of Detroit, 1990.



map 3
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT PLAN

SOURCE: AUTHOR

SCALE: 1 inch = 200 feet

0 200

2. Build a shopping mall in the downtown area using vacant and/or under-utilized sites to tie the waterfront to the CBD in order to promote pedestrian flow between the areas.
3. Build a resort-type hotel (a hotel including such recreational facilities as indoor running tracks, tennis courts, swimming pools, etc.) in conjunction with a dinner theatre to give visitors to the city a (year-round) reason to stay longer.
4. In partnership with the municipal government (or some other level of government), jointly undertake the expansion of Windsor's convention/-theatre facilities. This could be in the form of a large, mixed use complex, complete with its own convention hotel.

B. Public Actions

Apart from the public participation with private investors outlined above, the following actions should be considered:

1. Construction of parking structures, in acceptable locations and in acceptable sizes, to service the increased demand created by the new construction in the waterfront area.
2. Rehabilitate the City Market Building and expand the types of services found there, giving particular attention to the tastes and desires of:
 - a) the new apartment dwellers nearby
 - b) persons visiting the inner-city either in search of entertainment or tourist attractions.
3. Undertake the recreational plan outlined in the City's original proposal, modifying it so that the most active uses and those with appeal to tourists (such as the amphitheatre, museum, botanical gardens) are concentrated as

much as is possible near the core in order to intensify activity and to keep distances from parking structures to activities to a minimum. In this way, fun seekers and visitors would be separated from (local) individuals seeking to enjoy the solitude of the passive park sections.

If these recommendations were implemented, the resulting development could look something like that shown on Map 3. This alternative plan uses a combination of improvements, an expansion of service sector activities within the core, and expansion of recreational and cultural activities to attract the tourist. By choosing a two-pronged strategy, results are achieved in the present by improving job opportunities and by encouraging marginal increases in tourism. Both these improvements also have long-term benefits. By improving the core through the addition of office and service sector jobs and by completing recreational/cultural facilities within the parks component, both the amenities enticement and job opportunities in service and information-processing businesses are at least partially in place. The cumulative impact of these improvements should, if forecasts of factors influencing the locational decisions of businesses in future come true, be influential in attracting further inner-city development. The alternative recommendations did not include the full endorsement of the development of an elaborate amenities infrastructure because the present-day population would not, in all probability, support such facilities to an extent that would make them financially self-sufficient. There is, however, sufficient amenities-type development included to provide a base should further demand for these activities ever materialize.

The recommendations made in the alternative plan are by no means a total solution to Windsor's deficiencies. Windsor still would not have a regional attraction facility. A number of possibilities in this regard exist, with two

options more feasible than others. The first is to construct a new multi-use arena in the downtown area (presently a feasibility study is underway in the city) capable of presenting a variety of entertainment activities and thereby increase the after-hours inner-city population. The second option lies in eliciting senior government assistance in constructing an enticement to encourage tourists to stop over in Windsor. This enticement could take the form of a duty-free shop or a government-run facility promoting Canada or Ontario on a more comprehensive basis than a tourist information bureau.

The alternative plan is not out-of-line with the types of facilities constructed in other successful waterfront projects. By increasing the private sector's role, the attraction of the riverfront for tourists and consumers is enhanced, while at the same time providing additional municipal revenues to help offset the maintenance costs of the remainder of the project. With proper phasing and careful attention to impact of the project on existing land uses, the citizens of Windsor could have both a revitalized inner-city and additional public parkland.

Project Phasing

As in most projects proposing such extensive redevelopment, the changes would occur over a period of years. Realistically, such sweeping changes would take a number of years to materialize. Under optimal conditions, the riverfront project might proceed as follows²¹:

Short-Term Development (1 to 5 years)

- 1) Construction of CN Real Estate's megastructure complex

²¹ The items listed in each section are done so in the order of their priority.

- 2) Acquisition and minimal landscaping of the rail yard
- 3) Sea wall construction up to and including CN's Project site

Medium-Term Development (6 to 10 years)

- 1) Construction of a public promenade along the shoreline where possible
- 2) Construction of a festival plaza, recreation centre, amphitheatre, museum, and conservatory
- 3) Installation of fountains and botanical garden
- 4) Construction/expansion of Windsor's convention/theatre facilities in a single, mixed use complex.
- 5) Construction of parking structure A.

Long-Term Development (10 to 15 years)

- 1) Construction of a resort hotel/dinner theatre complex
- 2) Construction of parking structure B
- 3) Assuming the demand for such facilities exists, pursue the residential development east of the CN complex as originally envisioned in the City's concept -- possibility of office park development in provincial building area.
- 4) Completion of the City's parks component.

Analysis of the Alternative Proposal

This section should begin by explaining that the alternative development proposal presented does not really represent an alternative to the original concept but rather an improvement of the City's existing plan. This is not to say the alternative would not require a change in the City's development philosophy. Adoption of the alternative proposal would require the acceptance of:

1. The financial participation of the private sector in the development both in privately funded development and in public/private partnerships.
2. The inclusion of commercial development within the riverfront project.

3. A change in the development area's boundaries to include more land on the south side of Riverside Drive and the inclusion of buildings on the north side of Riverside Drive. (see Table 4 and Maps 2 and 3)

Proceeding in such a manner would share the financial risks of the project with the private sector, improve the inner-city's development atmosphere, increase the chances of the project eventually becoming self-sufficient, increase the amount of developable land within the development and, perhaps most importantly, increase inner-city employment opportunities in the fastest growing service sectors of distributive services and producer service (see Appendix 1).

If the alternative proposal were implemented it would present an improved image to potential investors and residents. The amount of new construction, the number of new businesses and the generally increased levels of street activity within the core would project a more lively image. The process begun by the riverfront project could have a beneficial effect on the remainder of the existing core by encouraging property owners to improve or rehabilitate their buildings since the project would now include uses similar to those already present in the inner-city and thereby stimulate demand for additional space.

In terms of the alternative proposal's land uses and addressing target market segments, as already mentioned there would be significant improvements in the variety of commercial and business uses and in the number of jobs produced over the original concept. Of particular significance is the improved attraction of the development for middle- and upper-income users especially if an objective of the project is to attract these persons to pave the way for future high-tech and information-based industry.

On the negative side, the alternative might be considered more biased toward middle- and upper-income tastes and therefore negligent in addressing the needs of the low-income persons found in the core, particularly those adversely

affected by the project. More specific direction within the plan is needed in this respect. One would hope that, unlike the Harbourfront example, low-income or publicly assisted housing would not be assigned to least attractive portions of the development exclusively.

Summary

The evaluative checklist successfully analysed both development options, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. The checklist, with the assistance of a weighted quantitative factoring, achieved a measure of success in the high values the City's plan achieved in its intended improvement areas of recreation and entertainment. Additionally, the evaluative checklist was successful in pointing out the original concept's weaknesses in such areas as project financing, job creation, image enhancement for the inner-city and diversity of uses provided by the proposed development. In doing so, it pointed out the areas which needed addressing in the alternative plan. The alternative plan represents improvements in: the ability of the project to be self-sufficient, the diversity of land uses found within the inner-city, job creation and, perhaps most importantly, integration of the waterfront development with the remainder of the existing inner-city by expanding the project's boundaries. Sacrifices in the **quantity** of public riverfront land available were made in the alternative plan, but the overall **quality** of the development was improved. The alternative is also important because it adopts a more realistic, aggressive approach to riverfront development and it paves the way for a better overall inner-city development climate.

Because the evaluative model is based on meeting the four impediments to inner-city development outlined, it does not represent a total solution to inner-

city problems. Many more inner-city problems exist and their importance varies with local circumstances. The checklist is also limited by its reliance on past examples of waterfront development as a baseline against which other future developments will be judged. Reliance on future projection, although based on projection of present-day trends, is also risky. Sensitivity of the checklist might be enhanced by incorporating a more complex weighting system, giving greater significance to identified project objectives while downplaying other checklist sections. Increasing sensitivity in this manner would have, in the Windsor case study, reduced the checklist's ability to point out missed development options.

While decision makers using this model will be searching for a final answer for their developments, they must be aware that inner-city change is an ongoing process. Therefore, no definitive answers for their questions concerning waterfront development exist. The checklist can, however, refine their development proposals to maximize the site's potential and project impact. Whether or not the axioms presented in the checklist hold true over time remains to be seen.

Table 4: Evaluative Checklist for Inner-City Improvement through Waterfront Revitalization
CN Riverfront Lands Concept Plan

- Since recreational and entertainment objectives have been stressed in original concept, double scores will be awarded to those segments of the checklist satisfying these objectives.

Section A: Development Atmosphere

Question	Yes/No	Weight (-1 to +1)	Comments
1. Is there a downtown plan in effect?	No	-1	not legally binding and produced in 1975 -- out-of-date
2. Are downtown development goals identified? If yes, are specific methods to achieve these goals identified.	Yes No	+ 1/2 -1	plan out-of-date
3. Is the waterfront's role in the CBD identified in the downtown plan?	Yes	0	Vaguely
4. Does an established communications network exist between civic and business leaders, and the City?	No	-1	
5. Is public opinion concerning development actively sought and incorporated into the plans?	Yes	+ 1/2	Sufficient to satisfy legal requirement only
6. Has the City been successful in attracting desirable development in the past?	Yes	+ 1/2	But lengthy periods of negotiation prior to actual construction
7. Are jurisdictional problems anticipated?	No	+1	
8. Have financial partnerships between public and private sectors occurred in the City in the past?	No	-1	
9. Does the City have the ability to participate financially? If yes, is there a firm commitment for long-term support both financially and politically?	Yes Yes	0 + 1/2	Marginally Somewhat

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
10. Do the corporate members of the community support the waterfront project? If yes, does this commitment extend to their financial participation?	n/a	0	No opinions being expressed
11. Is the project single-purpose?	No	$\frac{+1}{+1\frac{1}{2}}$	
<u>Section B: Image Enhancement</u>			
1. Does the plan improve the quality of inner-city facilities? If yes, do these improvements follow a course of action which:	Yes	+1	
a) promotes the inner-city in the future?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	Partially
b) promotes the inner-city in the present?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	Partially
c) reinforce existing development?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	Only to the extent possibly increasing seasonal crowds in the core
2. Does the project include a regional attraction?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	If amphitheatre attractions are carefully planned, but must avoid direct competition with larger Detroit venues
3. Does the project have a clearly identifiable focal point to use as proof of renewal to			
a) private investors?	No	-1	
b) city residents?	Yes	+1	Parkland strongly supported by residents
c) tourists?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	But numbers unlikely to be significant - monetary impact minimal
4. Is the project anticipated to give a positive image to			
a) the city-at-large?	Yes	0	But similar park development almost plentiful
b) the inner-city?	No	$-\frac{1}{2}$	Does not improve run-down conditions, but does improve development potential
c) a particular segment of the inner-city?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	Through addition of parkland--monetary impact minimal

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
d) the waterfront?			
5. Are similar attractions or activities found elsewhere in the local region either			
a) on the waterfront?	Yes	-1	
b) elsewhere in the host city?	Yes	-1	
		0	
<u>Section C: Land Use Proposals</u>			
1. Are new facilities planned?	Yes	1	
If yes, do they include any of the following:			
a) Entertainment/Cultural Facilities			
i) theatre	No	-1/2	existing demand low
ii) art gallery	No	0	existing one nearby
iii) museum (art or historical)	Yes	+2	
iv) resort-type hotel	No	-1	
v) conservatory	Yes	+2	
vi) zoo	No	0	limited space precludes
vii) aquarium	No	-1	
		+1 1/2	
b) Recreational Activities			
i) parkland - active	Yes	+1	minimal
- passive	Yes	+2	
ii) boating	Yes	+2	
iii) swimming	No	0	water quality and strong current preclude
iv) botanical garden	Yes	+2	
		7	
c) Residential Uses			
i) high-rise apartments?	Yes	+ 1/2	Not aggressively promoted

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
ii) multi-family low-rise?	Yes	+ 1/2	Not aggressively promoted
iii) townhouses?	No	0	Not necessarily a handicap
iv) condominiums?	Yes	+1	Project under construction 1987
v) low income units?	No	-1	
Are these new residential units located in close proximity to entertainment, cultural and recreational developments?	Yes	$\frac{+1}{2}$	
d) Commercial Uses			
i) office/administration	No	-1	
ii) research and development facilities	No	-1	
iii) services	No	-1	
iv) retailing	Yes	0	Minimal
v) specialty retailing	No	-1	
vi) hotel and convention centres	No	-1	
Are these commercial uses anticipated to compete with existing uses?	No	$\frac{+1}{-4}$	
2. Will any of the components of the waterfront project increase municipal tax revenues?	No	-1	
3. Is it anticipated that the project will ever be financially self-sufficient?	No	-1	No provision for this objective
<u>Section D: Addressing Target Markets</u>			
1. Will the development appeal to			
a) residents?	Yes	+1	
b) tourists?	Yes	0	Modest improvement over existing
c) businesses?	Yes	+ 1/2	Possibly
d) youths?	Yes	+ 1/2	
e) the elderly?	Yes	+1	

Question		Yes/No	Weight	Comments
f)	middle- and upper-income groups	Yes	+ ½ + 3½	Not as fully possible
<u>Section E: The Site</u>				
1.	Does the project require a waterfront site?	Yes	+ 1	
2.	Does the project benefit from a waterfront site?	Yes	+ 1	
3.	Will the adjacent neighbourhoods and businesses benefit from the waterfront project?	Yes	+ 1	Removal of trackage should increase property value
4.	Does the development take advantage of existing topography?	Yes	+ ½	
5.	Is public access to water ensured? If yes, is it	Yes	+ 1	
	a) inhibited, or	Yes	+ 1	
	b) part of private spaces?	n/a		
6.	Is visual access to water ensured? If yes, is it unhindered?	Yes Yes	+ 1 + 1	
7.	Is green/park space part of the development?	Yes	+ 1	
8.	Is the emphasis on			
	a) quality of public spaces? or	No	-½	
	b) quantity?	Yes	-1	
9.	Are there provisions to accommodate water-dependent uses?	Yes	+1 8	

Table 5: Evaluative Checklist for Inner-City Improvement through Waterfront Revitalization
The Alternative Concept

- No additional scores given to achieving prime objectives since the checklist is already biased toward commercial development.

Section A: Development Atmosphere

Would be the same as the original concept (see Table 3).

To improve the development atmosphere it is recommended that the following steps be taken:

- Establish communications between the city and business leaders at a minimum.
- Actively pursue and encourage private sector development, both in terms of solely private funded ventures as well as public/private joint ventures.
- Expand the study area to include sites on the south side of Riverside Drive.

By implementing these suggestions, the following benefits would accrue:

- Make more specific where and what type of development is acceptable (compatible with existing and projected uses).
- Integrate the project better with the existing core facilities.
- Take into consideration existing inner-city pedestrian travel patterns.

Section B: Image Enhancement

Question	Yes/No	Weight (-1 to +1)	Comments
1. Does the plan improve the quality of inner-city facilities? If yes, do these improvements follow a course of action which:			
a) promotes the inner-city in the future?	Yes	+1	- but only marginally better than the original.
b) promotes the inner-city in the present?	Yes	0	- jobs, new construction to demonstrate vitality.
c) reinforce existing development?	Yes	+1	- new businesses, larger daytime inner-city population.

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
2. Does the project include a regional attraction?	Yes	+ ½	- Seasonal specialty retailing.
3. Does the project have a clearly identifiable focal point to use as proof of renewal to:			
a) private investors?	Yes	+ 1	- CN Complex
b) city residents?	Yes	+ 1	- Cherished parkland preserved and view of Detroit skyline intact for the most part.
c) tourists?	Yes	+ ½	- Only marginally more than the original concept.
4. Is the project anticipated to give a positive image to:			
a) the city-at-large?	Yes	0	- But only if new high-profile employers attracted.
b) the inner-city?	Yes	+ 1	- Through new construction and increased activity.
c) a particular segment of the inner-city?	Yes	+ ½	- Waterfront's image improved marginally over original concept.
d) the waterfront?			
5. Are similar attractions or activities found elsewhere in the local region either:			
a) on the waterfront?	Yes	- 1	- Toledo, Ohio
b) elsewhere in the host city?	No	$\frac{+ 1}{+ 7\frac{1}{2}}$	

Section C: Land Use Proposals

1. Are new facilities planned?
If yes, do they include any of the following:
 - a) Entertainment/Cultural Facilities
 - i) theatre

Yes	+ 1	Dinner theatre
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Question		Yes/No	Weight	Comments
b) Recreational Activities	ii) art gallery	No	-1	
	iii) museum (art or historical)	Yes	+1	Historical
	iv) resort-type hotel	Yes	+1	
	v) conservatory	Yes	+1	
	vi) zoo	No	0	limited space precludes
	vii) aquarium	No	-1	
			+3	
c) Residential Uses	i) parkland - active	Yes	+ 1/2	- Nothing beyond original concept.
	- passive	Yes	+1	- Nothing beyond original concept.
	ii) boating	Yes	+1	- Nothing beyond original concept.
	iii) swimming	No	0	- Water quality and strong current preclude
	iv) botanical garden	Yes	+1 +3 1/2	
d) Commercial Uses	i) high-rise apartments?	Yes	+1	
	ii) multi-family low-rise?	No	-1	
	iii) townhouses?	No	0	
	iv) condominiums?	Yes	+1	
	v) low income units?	No	-1	
Are these new residential units located in close proximity to entertainment, cultural and recreational developments?		Yes	+1 +1	
e) Office/Commercial Uses	i) office/administration	Yes	+1	
	ii) research and development facilities	Yes	0	- Possibly, if they could be attracted.
	iii) services	Yes	+1	
	iv) retailing	Yes	+1	
	v) specialty retailing	Yes	+ 1/2	- Seasonally

Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments
vi) hotel and convention centres	Yes	+1	
Are these commercial uses anticipated to compete with existing uses?	No	$\frac{+1}{+5\frac{1}{2}}$	
2. Will any of the components of the waterfront project increase municipal tax revenues? If yes, through:	Yes	+1	
a) taxes	Yes	+1	
b) leases	Yes	+1	
c) rent	Yes	+1	- CN Complex
3. Is it anticipated that the project will ever be financially self-sufficient? If yes, does this result from:	Yes	+1	
a) commercial development?	Yes	+1	
b) sharing facilities with another public body or private developer?	Yes	+1	
c) increasing the amount of developable land through filling?	Yes	+1	
<u>Section D: Addressing Target Markets</u>			
1. Will the development appeal to:			
a) residents?	Yes	$+\frac{1}{2}$	- More jobs, more variety in retailing.
b) tourists?	Yes	+1	
c) businesses?	Yes	0	- Depending on unknown make-up of new businesses.
d) youths?	Yes	+1	- Slightly more than original.
e) the elderly?	Yes	+1	- Slightly more than original.
f) middle- and upper-income groups	Yes	$\frac{+1}{+4\frac{1}{2}}$	- More diversified job market and retailing.

Section E: The Site				
Question	Yes/No	Weight	Comments	
1. Does the project require a waterfront site?	Yes	+ 1/2	- Not entirely.	
2. Does the project benefit from a waterfront site?	Yes	+ 1/2	- Improves amenity quality.	
3. Will the adjacent neighbourhoods and businesses benefit from the waterfront project?	Yes	+ 1/2	- Increase numbers of potential consumers.	
4. Does the development take advantage of existing topography?	Yes	+ 1/2	- It could at CN Complex and specialty retailing.	
5. Is public access to water ensured? If yes, is it:	Yes	+ 1		
a) inhibited, or	Yes	+ 1/2	- For the most part.	
b) part of private spaces?	No	+ 1		
6. Is visual access to water ensured? If yes, is it unhindered?	Yes	+ 1		
	No	-1/2	- CN Complex blocks some of the vista.	
7. Is green/park space part of the development?	Yes	+ 1		
8. Is the emphasis on				
a) quality of public spaces? or	Yes	+ 1		
b) quantity?	No	0		
9. Are there provisions to accommodate water-dependent uses?	Yes	+1 8		

CONCLUSION

This thesis began by assuming that four basic problems are responsible for the inner-city's continuing economic decline: the age of the majority of the inner-city's building make them irrelevant to today's businesses; the rate at which change is taking places does not allow existing structures to economically be renewed or reconstructed; the financial limitations of municipal government constrain their ability to intervene; and that it is difficult to reconcile conflicting demands for addressing pre-existing, present-day and future inner-city needs. It was at this point that the idea that a change in the basic planning approach to inner-city renewal was necessary to address these problems. Such a change requires a more aggressive approach to achieving specific goals for the inner-city rather than merely enforcing provincial planning legislation, as has been the case. It was then that the idea of selective revitalization of economically promising sites, such as waterfronts, was presented.

Since the intention of this thesis was not necessarily to explore specific economic revitalization strategies but rather to examine promising physical environments under which economic renewal could take place, a further analysis of urban waterfronts' suitability for this purpose was then undertaken. It was concluded that urban waterfronts do indeed possess potentially important physical attributes such as: the natural beauty of the site and man's natural attraction to water; a location within the inner-city which is readily adaptable to addressing some of the identified inner-city needs; and applicability of the approach to many older cities since, for historical reasons, most cities have access to some body of water. Also in favour of the choice of urban waterfronts were the

political acceptance of the approach and existing examples of economically successful waterfront projects in North America.

Subsequently it was shown that through the careful planning and implementation of building strategies, project uses, and development strategies, waterfronts had the potential to satisfy two recurring themes: (1) the need for a coordinated effort by government and private businesses to achieve inner-city revitalization and (2) the necessity to plan renewal projects that produce results today but with an eye to the future (long-term) needs of the inner-city. As an example of how this was possible, selective revitalization of the waterfront to improve or construct an amenities infrastructure in combination with the use of a development corporation was offered as a possible, but not the only solution.

Illustrative examples of waterfront development projects in North America were then used to demonstrate three basic approaches to inner-city renewal: selective revitalization with specific long-term objectives; redevelopment to accommodate projected inner-city growth; and single-purpose, short-term improvements with no specific long-term objectives. From these examples and other research, it was also concluded that despite geographic, social and economic differences, many common objectives, issues and impediments to waterfront development exist between cities. From these findings and other criteria established through the research conducted in the preceding chapters, an evaluative checklist of inner-city renewal through waterfront development was produced.

The evaluative checklist used analysis of:

1. the proposals
2. development atmosphere
3. image enhancing ability
4. proposed land uses

5. particular market segments of the population's desires and utilization of site.

These are used to determine a project's ability to positively change the inner-city's physical environment. To test the validity of the checklist, it was applied to a case study of Windsor, Ontario. Despite some biases and design flaws the evaluative checklist was successful in pointing out the weaknesses in Windsor's riverfront development proposal and thereby pointed out the opportunities for plan improvement, which were subsequently incorporated into an alternative proposal. While the evaluative checklist is not sensitive enough to fairly judge all the possible development approaches available for waterfront development, it does provide a sound basis for further development of an expanded and thereby more complete model.

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APPENDIX 1: The Changing Mix of Industrial Employment

Leaves 157 to 160:

THE CHANGING INDUSTRIAL MIX
OF EMPLOYMENT, 1951-1985

This article has been adapted from the
report "Canada's Industries: Growth
in Jobs over Three Decades". Statistics
Canada, Catalogue 89-507, February,
1986, by W. Garnett Picot, Social
and Economic Studies Division.

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THE CHANGING INDUSTRIAL MIX OF EMPLOYMENT, 1951-1985

157

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Changes in the Industrial Mix, 1951-1981

The post-war period has been characterized by dramatic growth in the share of the labour force¹ accounted for by service sector workers, and by a concomitant decline in the proportion of the labour force made up of goods-producing sector workers. In 1951, less than half (47%) of all labour force participants were involved in service industries; by 1981, however, two out of three (66%) Canadians in the labour force were service sector workers. In contrast, the proportion of the labour force made up of goods-producing industry workers declined from 53% in 1951 to 33% in 1981.

The tremendous increase in the service sector's share of the labour force has resulted from far greater growth in the size of the labour force in this sector than in the goods-producing industries. Between 1951 and 1981, the service sector labour force grew by 220%, while that of the goods-producing sector increased by only 45%. As a result, in 1981, the service sector labour force of 7.9 million persons was almost twice the size of the goods-producing labour force of 4.1 million persons. This is in stark contrast to 1951, when the goods-producing labour force was actually larger than that of the service sector – 2.8 million persons to 2.5 million persons.

The rate at which the service sector increased its share of the

labour force was slower during the 1971-1981 period than in the previous two decades. Of the overall 19 percentage point increase in the service sector's share of the labour force between 1951 and 1981, only four points occurred in the 1971-1981 period. Almost half the increase – nine percentage points – took place between 1951 and 1961, while the remaining six points occurred in the 1961-1971 period.

Recent Patterns in the Industrial Mix

The proportion of the labour force in the service sector continued to increase in the 1980s. The change in this period occurred largely because of major declines in the goods-producing sector during the recession of 1981-1982. The goods-producing labour force declined by

4% between 1981 and 1983, and in spite of some growth (1%) in 1984 – there was no change in 1985 – it was still 3% smaller in 1985 than it had been in 1981. In contrast, the labour force in the service sector grew by 10% in 1981-1985 period. As a result of these changes, according to Labour Force Survey data, the proportion of the total labour force in the service sector increased from 67% in 1981 to 70% in 1985.

¹ The data comparing the years 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981 are from the Census. For these years, the term labour force refers to the experienced labour force which includes the employed and the unemployed who worked during the previous 18 months. Data describing labour force and employment trends in the 1980s are from the Labour Force Survey and are not directly comparable with Census data. In the Labour Force Survey, the labour force includes the employed plus the unemployed looking for work.

Definitions

For the purpose of this review, the economy¹ is divided into two main components, the goods-producing and service sectors. The service sector is subdivided into commercial and non-commercial (largely public) services. Commercial services, the largest sector of the economy, is further subdivided into three parts: distributive, producer, and consumer services. Following is a list of the industries included in each sector:

Goods-producing Sector

Agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and oil and gas wells, utilities, and forestry and fishing.

Service Sector

Commercial Services:

distributive services: transportation and storage, communication, and wholesale and retail trade; **consumer services:** accommodation and food services, personal services, amusement and recreational services, and other miscellaneous services; and **producer services:** services to business management (for example, accounting, engineering, and legal and management consulting), finance, insurance and real estate.

Non-commercial Services:

education, health and welfare services, religious organizations, and public administration (government).



The dramatic difference in the effect of the 1981-1982 recession on the goods-producing, as compared to that on the service sector, is even more pronounced when just employment figures are examined (the labour force data above include both the employed and the officially unemployed). Total employment in the goods-producing sector fell by 372,000, or 10%, between 1981 and 1983. While employment in this sector recovered somewhat in 1984 and 1985, total goods-producing employment was still 7% lower in 1985 than it had been in 1981. Service sector employment did decline slightly (0.6%) in 1982. Overall, however, employment in this sector grew by 7% between 1981 and 1985.

The Service Sector

Growth in the service sector labour force was very consistent across the three decades in the 1951-1981 period. The labour force in this sector increased 46% between 1951 and 1961, and 48% in both the 1960s and 1970s. There was considerable variation in the growth rates of the various sectors within the overall service economy over this period. The non-commercial (public) sector accounted for much of the growth in the service sector during the 1950s and 1960s; however, it was the strength of the commercial services that was responsible for the service sector's rising share of the labour force during the 1971-1981 period.

The proportion of the labour force in the non-commercial services rose almost 10 percentage points in the 1951-1971 period, from 12% to 22%. In the same period, the share of the total labour force in the commercial services increased by 5 percentage points, from 35% to 40%. Between 1971 and 1981, however, the share of the labour force in the commercial sector continued to increase, to 44%, while the proportion of workers in the non-commercial services remained at 22%.

Some sectors of the non-commercial services, notably the health sector, and provincial and local public administration, did continue to grow faster than the labour force as whole during the 1970s. Growth in both education



and federal public administration (including defence), however, was very slow in this period. As a result, the proportion of the labour force in the education sector declined from 7.0% to 6.6% between 1971 and 1981, while the percentage in federal public administration fell from 4% to 3%. In fact, federal public administration was among the ten slowest-growing industries during the 1971-1981 decade.

Among the commercial ser-

vices, the producer services – consisting largely of professional services (legal, accounting, engineering and management consulting, finance, insurance and real estate organizations) – have consistently been the fastest growing. The labour force involved in the producer services increased at average annual rates of 5.5%, 6.0% and 6.2% during the 1951-1961, 1961-1971 and 1971-1981 decades. As a result, the share of the total

labour force in this sector increased from 4% in 1951 to 10% in 1981.

The increasing importance of the producer service industries is related to the rise of the "information economy". For these industries, the processing, analysis and dissemination of information form the basis of much of the service they provide. These industries clearly do not encompass the entire "information economy". Parts of the non-commercial service sector, for example, are also very information-dependent. However, the producer services are the most information-dependent of the commercial services, and perhaps of the entire economy.



Consumer service industries also increased their share of the labour force – from 7% in 1951 to 11% in 1981. The distributive services share of the total labour force remained constant at approximately 24% during all three decades.

The Goods-producing Sector

The labour force in the goods-producing sector also grew during the 1951-1981 period, but growth in this sector was considerably slower than the growth of the service sector labour force. The 1971-1981 decade was characterized by a slightly larger increase in the goods-producing labour force than in the preceding decade, and by much greater growth than occurred in the 1950s. The non-agricultural, goods-producing labour force increased by 29% between 1971 and 1981, compared with 25% in the 1960s and 12% in the 1950s. As a result, the goods-producing sector contributed 23% of the total net increase in the labour force in the 1970s, up from 19% in the 1960s and 5% in the 1950s.

The difference in the growth rate of the non-agricultural, goods-producing labour force in the 1960s and 1970s, however, may be somewhat misleading. In the latter decade, a greater share of the growth in the labour force in this sector was accounted for by increases in unemployment. As a result, growth in total employment in this sector was likely smaller in the 1970s than in the previous decade.

Within the goods-producing



sector, agriculture and manufacturing were characterized by particularly large decreases in their share of the total labour force. In 1981, for example, just 4% of the experienced labour force was involved in agriculture, down from 16% in 1951. In this period, the agricultural labour force fell 40%, from 824,000 to 493,000.

Manufacturing's share of the total labour force also declined, from 25% in 1951 to 19% in 1981,

although the actual manufacturing labour force continued to grow in this period. The growth in this sector in the 1970s (25%), though, was slightly lower than in the previous decade (29%).

The manufacturing labour force, however, declined precipitously during the recession in the early 1980s. The manufacturing labour force fell 6% between 1981 and 1983; and in 1985 was still 4% below its 1981 level. The effect of



the recession on manufacturing was even greater when just employment is considered. Total manufacturing employment fell by 11% between 1981 and 1983, and was still 7% lower in 1985 than it had been in 1981.

The remaining portions of the goods-producing sector, par-

ticularly construction, and the mining, oil and gas industries, also experienced considerable labour force growth during the 1971-1981 period, followed by declines in the 1980s. The mining labour force increased by 43% between 1971 and 1981, while that of construction was up 34%. Between 1981

and 1983, the mining labour force fell 12%, and in 1985, was still 6% below its 1981 level. The construction labour force was down only 0.3% in the 1981-1983 period; however, it fell a further 1.5% between 1983 and 1985.

As with the decline in manufacturing in the 1980s, employment figures for mining and construction paint an even darker picture of the effect of the recession on these industries than do just labour force totals. Employment in mining and the petroleum industries fell by 19% between 1981 and 1983, and was still 9% lower in 1985 than it had been in 1981. Employment in construction was down 13% in the 1981-1983 period, and 10% between 1981 and 1985.

The effect of the recession on the goods-producing sector is further reflected in the fact that the industries from this sector which were among the 10 fastest-growing industries during the 1976-1981 period (mining, oil and gas, machinery, and metal fabricating industries) were included among the ten slowest-growing industries in the early 1980s.

Labour Force by Sector, 1951-1981

	Labour Force				Percentage Distribution			
	1951	1961	1971	1981	1951	1961	1971	1981
	000s				%			
Service Sector								
Distributive services	1,233.7	1,568.7	2,026.4	2,861.3	23.3	24.2	23.5	23.8
Producer services	202.8	346.7	621.5	1,134.7	3.8	5.4	7.2	9.5
Consumer services	387.8	556.8	793.6	1,291.3	7.3	8.6	9.2	10.8
Total commercial services	1,824.4	2,472.2	3,441.6	5,287.3	34.5	38.2	39.9	44.0
Non-commercial services	656.0	1,138.4	1,909.1	2,654.9	12.4	17.6	22.1	22.1
Total services	2,480.4	3,610.6	5,350.6	7,942.2	46.9	55.8	62.0	66.2
Goods-producing Sector								
Agriculture	823.8	637.9	501.0	493.0	15.6	9.9	5.8	4.1
Manufacturing	1,307.1	1,429.9	1,840.0	2,298.0	24.7	22.1	21.3	19.1
Construction	325.4	448.3	580.3	777.3	6.2	6.9	6.7	6.5
Other goods-producing	349.8	345.1	355.0	494.7	6.6	5.3	4.1	4.1
Total goods-producing	2,806.0	2,861.2	3,276.3	4,063.1	53.1	44.2	38.0	33.8
Total Labour Force	5,286.4	6,471.8	8,626.9	12,005.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada.