


A STUDY OF THE ĀTMAN/ANĀTMAN DEBATE IN THE
ŚLOKAVĀRTIKA OF KUMĀRILABHAṬṬA AND THE
TATTVASANGRAHA OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA

by

Leon Hannotte

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Department of Religion
University of Manitoba

April, 1980



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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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MASTER OF ARTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER	
I BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS ON THE AUTHORS.....	10
II KUMĀRILA'S THEORY OF THE ĀTMAN.....	19
III THE BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF THE MĪMAMSA THEORY OF THE ĀTMAN.....	38
IV EXAMINATION OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF IMPERMANENCE.....	74
V CONCLUSION.....	138
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION.....	8
NOTES TO CHAPTER I.....	16
NOTES TO CHAPTER II, III, and IV.....	119
NOTES TO CHAPTER V.....	167
GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT TERMS.....	172
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	175

INTRODUCTION

The defining characteristic of a perennial philosophical question is that it be so complex that words and thematised thought never finish with it, yet so simple that it troubles almost everyone who thinks. "What am I?" is such a question. What this self is that acts, whether it in fact exists now let alone beyond death, whether actions affect its future; these are all perennial philosophical questions.

One of the best methods of seeking answers to questions like those above is to talk to those who are supposed to know about such things: the wise, the enlightened, the learned. In the case of teachers a thousand years dead we can only learn their ideas through books. Thus this essay consists of an analysis of an aspect of the medieval Hindu-Buddhist debate concerning the ātman (self)¹ based on one Hindu and one Buddhist text. The Hindu text is the Ślokovārtika (SV.) of Kumārilabhaṭṭa.² Kumāriḷa represents one of the two main branches of the Mīmāṃsā school of Hinduism. The Buddhist text is Śāntaraksita's Tattvasaṅgraha (TS.).³

Kumāriḷa's SV. is a commentary on the Tarkapāda of the Śabarabhāṣya of Śabara. The Śabarabhāṣya is a

commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini. This latter work is regarded as having been the first systematic formulation of the Mīmāṃsā school. The dates of these three writers are uncertain. Jaimini's dates have been given as circa 200 B.C.,⁴ Śābara's as sometime before 400 A.D.⁵ and Kumārila as a senior contemporary of Śāṅkara (788 A.D.).⁶ This essay will concentrate mainly on one section of the SV.: the Ātmavāda section.

The TS. is a Mahāyāna Buddhist text written sometime after the SV.⁷ Kamalāśīla, who is said to have been the pupil of Śāntarakṣita, wrote a full commentary on the TS. which he called Pañjikā (TSP.). The dates of these two Buddhists are uncertain but are almost always placed somewhere in the 8th c. A.D.⁸ In the TS. and TSP. an attempt is made to refute, using logical argument, the views of all important schools opposing Buddhism. This essay concentrates mainly on two sections of the TS. and TSP.: Ch. 7(b) treating of the Mīmāṃsā conception of the self and Ch. 8 treating of the permanence of things.

In the TS. and the TSP. the arguments are meant to show the untenability of any position which holds to any kind of permanence including the existence of an eternal self (ātman). In the SV. are found, among other things, arguments attempting to establish the existence of the self (ātman). Kumārila describes the ātman's activities, nature, connection with the body and liberation through

performance of dharma (duty). The Buddhists present arguments intending to show that the concept of an enduring entity like the ātman is illusory, that the ātman has no real nature or activity and is in fact the major stumbling block on the way to liberation.

The arguments concerning ātman/anātman (self/no-self) found in the two above-mentioned texts are the result of at least 1,000 years of development. This development started with the Upaniṣads wherein we find the self is held to be "Unborn, constant, eternal, primeval..."⁹ It was in opposition to this Upaniṣadic idea of the ātman that Buddhism took its stance. The Buddha is reported to have said "The body, monks, is soulless [anatta]...feeling is soulless [anatta]... perception is soulless [anatta] the aggregates are soulless [anatta] ...consciousness is soulless [anatta]." ¹⁰

We find that the authorities agree that the difference in attitude towards the ātman was and is the central issue in the Buddhist/non-Buddhist split. S. N. Dasgupta has written: "The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upaniṣads lies in the experiences of the self."¹¹ Nothing could present more of an affront to the spirit of the Upaniṣads than to deny the eternality of the ātman as did the Buddhists. J. Sinha has said: "The Buddhist doctrine of impermanence is the antithesis of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of eternality of Brahman or

Ātman."¹² The centrality of the ātman/anātman question in Indian philosophy is clear. E. Frauwallner points this out when he says that with the assertion of the Buddha that there is no ātman "...the preaching of the Buddha has assumed an entirely peculiar place in the development of Indian philosophy, giving rise to a whole series of difficult and interesting questions in connection with the doctrine."¹³ T. R. V. Murti states the problem unequivocally: "There are two main sources of Indian philosophy--one having its source in the ātma doctrine of the Upanisads and the other in the anātma doctrine of the Buddha. They conceive reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns."¹⁴

The Mīmāṃsā school, of which Kumārila is a member, entered the ātman/anātman debate rather late. In the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini one finds no indication that proving the existence of the ātman had any priority. Similarly in the Bhāṣya of Śabara there is only slight discussion of the ātman in connection with the defense of the main tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas (i.e. apūrva).¹⁵ It is only later, with Kumārila and Prabhākara, that we encounter elaborate arguments attempting to prove the existence of the ātman. Kumārila states that he must prove the existence of the ātman so as to validate the effectiveness of the performance of sacrifices as laid down in Vedic injunctions.¹⁶ He thus argues from the position of a

religious apologist. However this may be, his arguments are both convincing enough and Hindu enough to make him one of the main targets of attack in the TS.

The Buddhists and Kumārila, eventhough they oppose one another on the ātman question, have at least two main points of contact. Firstly, both schools are non-theistic; second, both schools oppose the non-believer or materialist (Cārvāka).

The importance of the TS. and the SV. in the history of Indian thought is large. This can be judged from the fact that scholars, both ancient and modern, make frequent reference to these works as primary sources. The popularity of the two texts is based on two things: both are compendia of theses of their schools, and both are valuable in that they display a command of sources.

It will not be out of place in this introduction to briefly say what the positions of the two sides of this debate are with respect to certain perennial philosophical and religious questions.¹⁷

First of all it should be made clear that in this debate liberation (moksa) or final release is the aim. Both sides have as their goal not the theoretical explanation of man and the universe, but the inner realisation of Truth which is sat (infinite Being), cit (infinite awareness) and ānanda (infinite bliss).

With regard to scripture Kumārila's school considers the Veda to be eternal and to have had no author. The whole

final chapter of the SV. is devoted to defending this view. The Vedas were from all time, God (Īśvara, Brahma) did not write them. The deity is of lesser importance than the Vedas. The deity is only a form to be thought of while making sacrifices.

The performance of sacrifices, according to the Mīmāṃsā school is to be done in strict accordance with Vedic injunction. This means that for this school the importance of the Vedas lies not in the philosophical parts but the parts where something is ordered to be done. Ritual is thus of the highest value, not knowledge. Only ritual correctly performed can get a person to heaven.

Heaven and hell are respectively a particular kind of pleasure and a particular kind of pain. Final deliverance is not the annihilation of all things but only the disconnection of the self (ātman) from the body and senses. The self in the state of final deliverance is omnipresent, blissful, eternal and conscious. Final deliverance is the negation of all pleasure and pain.

The world was not created by God, according to the Mīmāṃsā school. It is eternal and never completely annihilated. It does, however go through periods of partial dissolution.

The Buddhists of the TS. (as do most Buddhist schools) view scripture as means not end. What the Buddha found can be found by anyone earnest enough to fulfill the necessary

conditions. Knowledge of the Path is transmitted through scripture, but more importantly, through the living line of teachers. The scriptures are not considered eternal. The doctrine itself was given a finite life by the Buddha.

As for revelation, no God revealed the Buddhist teaching to the Buddha. The path to enlightenment is always there. From time to time Buddhas appear to teach it to men, but only after finding the path through their own efforts.

The Buddhist attitude to ritual varies widely from school to school and from time to time. Traditionally, the monks adherence to the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Noble Path, the Three Treasures and the practice of mindfulness or meditation is embraced. Certainly in the TS. one finds no indication that the mere performance of a ritual act ensures the performer of a favor. Seeing things as they are (bhūtatathatā) gives knowledge and release, not ritual.

Questions concerning whether or not the world was created, whether or not the world is eternal, etc., are seen as being impossible to resolve and not likely to aid the quest for mokṣa.

NOTES TO
INTRODUCTION

1. In the translations of the TS. and the SV. (see (Bibliography) 'ātman' is usually translated as 'soul'. 'Purūsa' is also sometimes translated as soul. In the translations quoted in this essay, 'soul' translates 'ātman' unless otherwise noted. See glossary under 'Ātman'.
2. See Bibliography for details on the SV.
3. See Bibliography for details on the TS.
4. A History of Indian Philosophy, S. N. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 370.
5. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in Its Sources, G. Jha, p. 13.
6. op. cit., loc. cit., Dasgupta.
7. See English introduction to the Gaekwad Oriental Series no. xxx, Sanskrit edition of the TS., p. xxiii.
8. See Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, K. Potter, vol. I, p. 125, where according to H. Nakamura 'Sāntaraksita's dates are 725-788 A.D., according to E. Frauwallner 680-740 A.D. Page 129 of the book by Potter says according to H. Nakamura, Kamalaśīla's dates are 700-750 A.D.; according to Frauwallner 740-795 A.D.
9. Katha Upanisad, transl. in A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore, p. 45.
10. Saṃyutta-nikāya, in ibid., p. 280.
11. Op. cit., S. N. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 110.
12. A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, J. Sinha, p. 41.
13. History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, E. Frauwallner, p. 172.

14. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, T. R. V. Murti, p. 110.
15. Sabarabhāṣya, transl. by G. Jha, in Gaekwad Oriental Series 66, p. 175ff.
16. SV. Ātma-vāda 1-6.
17. Here and there throughout this essay references are made to most of these philosophical and religious questions. They are here presented in capsule form whereas in the body of the thesis they are treated in detail as the occasion arises.

CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE AUTHORS

Kumārilabhatta (7th c. A.D.)

Kumārila is regarded as one of the greatest scholars that India has ever produced. At the time he flourished Hinduism was on the ascendancy and Buddhism, Hinduism's main antagonist in those days, was in the process of finding homes in countries like Tibet which bordered on India.¹ Buddhism's popularity was waning and therefore the time was ripe for Kumārila to "...take his cudgel against Buddhism and criticise its viewpoints...."²

Tāranātha (1574-1608), the Buddhist historian, says that Kumārila was a Brāhmin who enjoyed great power given him by the king "...he possessed excellent fields of śālu (śāli) rice, a large number of cows and buffaloes, five hundred each of male and female servants and a large number of hired persons."³

Umesha Mishra relates the following story about Kumārila:⁴ Dharmakīrti, the gifted Buddhist thinker, disguised himself, learned the secrets of Hinduism from Kumārila, then defeated Kumārila in a debate. Then Kumārila likewise disguised himself, learned all the secrets of Buddhism from the Buddhist monks and defeated the

Buddhists in debate. Kumārila then felt remorse for sinning against his teacher. As tapas he went to Prayāga where he burned himself to death. When Śankara heard what Kumārila intended to do he hurried to Prayāga to stop Kumārila. When Śankara arrived he found Kumārila half roasted but still alive. Śankara begged Kumārila to come back to the world of the living but Kumārila refused and so his life concluded.

Tāranātha records a debate between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, in which Kumārila was defeated whereupon he received ordination into the Buddhist order.⁵ Who defeated whom thus seems to depend on whether the story is told by a non-Buddhist as in the first case, or a Buddhist as in the second.

Some hold that Kumārila was a native of the south of India but the consensus is "...that he was a Brāhmin living in North Bihar-Mithilā in northern India and from there he went to the south also."⁶

Kumārila's works include his well known three-part commentary on the Bhāṣya of Śabara. This three-part commentary is made up of the SV., the Tantravārtika, and the Tuṭṭikā. The first two of these have been translated into English for the first time by Ganganatha Jha.⁷ Kumārila is also reputed to have written the Brhattikā and the Madhamatikā.⁸

Śāntarakṣita (8th c. A.D.)

There is conflict with regard to this great Buddhist Ācārya's birthplace. It seems most likely that he was born in the small village of Sabar in the Dacca district of Bengal (Bangladesh).⁹ Śāntarakṣita's importance lies mainly in his establishing Buddhism in Tibet. Buddhist spiritual lineage in Tibet is figured from the time of the coming of the "Teacher" (Śāntarakṣita).¹⁰

Bu-ston (1290-1364), the Tibetan Buddhist historian, tells us¹¹ that Śāntarakṣita met and taught the Tibetan monk Jñānendra, in Nepal. Jñānendra then went back to Tibet where he interested the king in Śāntarakṣita. The king was inclined to bring Śāntarakṣita to Tibet to establish the Good Dharma in his country. However, there was in Tibet at this time, a powerful minister of the government who was opposed to Buddhism. His name was Ma-sh'an t-ompa-kye. Gö, one of the King's ministers who was sympathetic to Buddhism, volunteered to examine possibilities for remedying the situation which, as it stood, guaranteed that Buddhism would never be successful in Tibet.

With the help of others, Gö came up with the following plan: "...they cast Ma-sh'an t'ompa-kye alive into a grave and covered the aperture with a stone."¹¹ The king then sent Jñānendra to invite Śāntarakṣita to Tibet.

Bu-ston tells us¹² that when Śāntarakṣita came to Tibet the local malignant spirits reacted with flooding and disease for the people of the country. At this time, Śāntarakṣita was sent back to Nepal by the king of Tibet. Five years later¹³ he was invited back and accepted the invitation on the condition that another monk subdue the malignant spirits. This accomplished, Śāntarakṣita returned to Tibet and established the first regular Buddhist monastery in Tibet. This monastery was called Sam-ye. The year was 749 A.D. He remained at this monastery for thirteen years until his death in 762. Bu-ston's information is that Śāntarakṣita died from injuries suffered from the kick of a pony.¹⁴

Śāntarakṣita's philosophy is variously described as being Vijñānavādin,¹⁵ Mādhyamika¹⁶ or Sautrāntika.¹⁷ There are a number of works attributed to Śāntarakṣita in the Tibetan Tan jur.¹⁸

Kamalaśīla (8th c. A.D.)

Kamalaśīla was a direct disciple of Śāntarakṣita. Kamalaśīla went to Tibet at the invitation of king Thron de-tsen after Śāntarakṣita's death. Before Śāntarakṣita died he left instructions in the form of a prophesy. Bu-ston relates this message to us thus: :

Thereafter the Ācārya Bodhisattva declared that no heretics would appear in Tibet, but that the church of the Buddha would itself be split into two sects, and that dispute and controversy would take place.

Therefore, said he, when that time will come, you must invite my pupil Kamalaśīla and, after controversy will have been held, all strife will be pacified and the true form of the Teaching established.¹⁹

According to Bu-ston, Jñānendra, who had originally arranged for Śāntarakṣita to come to Tibet, fled when Śāntarakṣita died. As a result a vacuum was created and the number of followers of the Buddhist heretic, the Chinese Hva-ṣaṅ increased. These latter people "...favoured nihilistic views and did not exert themselves in the practice of virtue..."²⁰ These monks believed that Nirvana could be obtained by perfect inactivity. However, when the king became distressed and ordered them to practically and theoretically follow the system as laid down by Śāntarakṣita, they managed to become quite active. They "...were enraged, armed themselves with sharp knives and threatened to kill all...the adherents of the Bodhisattva (Śāntarakṣita)."²¹

In the end the king got in touch with Jñānendra to ask what to do. Jñānendra reminded the king of Śāntarakṣita's instructions. The king thus recognized that a schism was taking place within the Buddhist church and that he must now send for Kamalaśīla. He did so and Kamalaśīla arrived. A debate was organised between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Hva-ṣaṅ. This debate lasted the final two years of the reign of the king (762-764). Kamalaśīla won. The loser was sent back to China, but

not without a parting shot. Bu-ston says: "Later on, four Chinese butchers, sent by Hva-ṣaṅ, killed the teacher Kamalaśīla by squeezing his kidneys."²²

So went the life of one of the best minds²³ of Buddhism. No one can yet say for certain where he was born.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

Kumārīlabhatta

1. S. Vidyabhusana, in A History of Indian Logic, p. 348, thinks that at the time of Śāntarakṣita, Buddhist logic was flourishing in India. He thinks that it was only at the time of Udayanācārya, at the close of the 10th c. A.D., that Hindu thinkers refuted the views of the Buddhists. The date of Buddhist decline in India is generally held by present day scholarship to have begun well before the time of Kumārila.
2. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā In Its Sources, G. Jha. See the Critical Bibliography of Mīmāṃsā (Mīmāṃsā Kusumāñjali) compiled by Umesh Mishra, p. 21. This compilation is in the back of Jha's book.
3. History of Buddhism in India, Tāranātha, transl. by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, p. 230, 231.
4. Mishra, op. cit., p. 21.
5. Tāranātha, op. cit., p. 231ff.
6. Mishra, op. cit., p. 21
7. This essay uses this transl. of the SV. It may be interesting to note that Sir G. Jha died Nov. 9, 1941 at Prayāga, the same place that Kumārila died. According to one source (The preface to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā In Its Sources, p. ixff.) Jha spent the entire last month of his life sitting up in yoga posture without a pause.
8. For complete information regarding the publishings of the three-part commentary of Kumārila on the Bhāṣya, see Umesh, op. cit., p. 22ff. Bibliographical details on all our authors also available in Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, K. H. Potter, with two supplements in Journal of Indian Philosophy, V. 2 & 4. Also Frauwallner, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 9ff. on Kumārila.

Sāntaraksita

9. According to G.O.S. Intro to TS.
10. History of Buddhism, Bu-ston, transl. by E. Obermiller, p. 210-211.
11. Ibid., p. 188.
12. Ibid., p. 188ff.
13. G.O.S. Intro to TS., p. xii.
14. Bu-ston, op. cit., p. 191
15. G.O.S. Intro to TS., ibid.
16. Tāranātha, op. cit., p. 277.
17. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, S. Mookerjee, p. 5.
18. These works are compiled in the supplementary notes of Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 415-416.
 Vajradhara-saṃgīta-bhagavat-stotra-tīkā.
 Asta-tathāgata-stotra.
 Hevajra-udbhava-kurukullā-pañca-mahā-upadeśa.
 Tattvasiddhi-nāma-prakarana.
 Sayadvaya-vibhanga-pañjikā.
 Mādhyamaka-alamkāra-kārikā.
 Mādhyamaka-alamkāra-vṛtti.
 Samvara-vimśaka-vṛtti.
 Vādanyāya-vṛtti-vipaṅcitārtha.
 Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā.
 Daṇḍa-hasta-lekha.
19. Bu-ston, op. cit., p. 191. Sarat Chandra Das, a late 19th c. Buddhologist believed Sāntaraksita was unable to defeat the heretic and Kamalāsīla was sent for. Kamalāsīla then defeated the heretic. Indian Pandits in the Land of the Snow, p. 49.
20. Bu-ston, op. cit., p. 191-192.
21. Idem.
22. Bu-ston, op. cit., p. 196.
23. So says E. Conze in Buddhist Wisdom Books, p. 18.

Ibid., p. 196. Here we give the works attributed to Kamalaśīla in the Tibetan Tanjur. These works are found listed in the supplementary notes of Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 421-422.

Arya-sapta-śatika-panjñā-pāramitā-tīkā.

Āya-vajra-chedikā-prajñā-pāramitā-tīkā.

Prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdaya-nāma-tīkā.

Mādhyamaka-ālamkāra-panjikā.

Mādhyamaka-ālokanāma.

Tattva-āloka-prakarana.

Sarva-dharma-abhāva-siddhi.

Bhāvanā-krama.

Bhānavā-yoga-avatāra.

Ārya-avikalpa-praveśa-dhāranī-tīkā.

Ārya-śāli-stambaka-tīkā.

Sramana-pañcāśatka-kārikā-pada-abhismarana.

Asta-dūkhā-viśesa-nirdeśa.

Sraddhā-utpāda-pradīpa.

Nyāya-bindu-pūrvapaksa-saṃkṣipti

Tattva-saṃgraha-panjikā.

Citta-sthāpanā-sāmānya-sūtra-saṃgraha.

Pranidhāna-paryanta-dvaya.

In addition to the above Potter records in his Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, the following two works as having been written by Kamalaśīla: Bodhicāryapradīpa and Bodhicittabhāvanā. p. 129, vol. I.

CHAPTER II

Kumārila's Theory of the Ātman (Self)

"We hold that the soul is something different from the body, the sense organs and ideas, and that it is eternal; while all the rest, the body, etc., are perishable."¹ So says Kumārila near the beginning of his discussion of the ātman in the SV. The TS. begins its treatment of the Mīmāṃsā conception of the ātman by stating that according to the Mīmāṃsaka the ātman is "...of the nature of caitanya [consciousness], sentient, exclusive and inclusive in character; this caitanya [having the characteristic of] buddhi (intelligence)."² Exclusion (vyāvṛttih) and inclusion (anugamah) as ways of describing the ātman are explained in the following Sāṃkhya example cited in the TS..

Just as, in the case of the serpent, the 'coiled' form disappears, and after that, appears the 'straightened' form; but the character of being 'serpent' continues through both states; in the same manner, in the case of the soul, there is no complete disappearance of the character of 'eternal sentience'; nor is there continuance of its whole character; there is disappearance of such of its states as 'pleasure', 'pain' and the like, and these appear again; but through all these 'sentience' continues.³

The question of change and permanence is a perennial philosophical problem. In Indian philosophy

it plays a central role. With regard to the question of the ātman the difficulties soon become apparent. There are two extreme positions: exclusion (vyāvrttiḥ) and inclusion (anugamah). The first is the Buddhist position. It results in there being no ātman. According to this theory there can be no continuity in the universe. The existence of an enduring entity is impossible on the grounds that only those things exist which produce effects and in the production of effects an eternal thing would lose its eternality. It would move or change in some way, shape or form and this would be enough to constitute the surrender of its eternal status. For the Buddhists, all things are made up of a series of moments (kṣana-krama). Each moment (kṣana) is exclusive, unique and absolutely independent. It appears with no hooks, ties or binds to other moments which appear before or after it. Each moment is destroyed immediately upon its coming into existence. All things thus have only momentary existence (kṣanikatvan). The idea that ordinary people have, that things endure beyond one moment, sometimes for years, arises from ignorance: the coarse nature of the senses and the absence of insight into the true nature of things leads them to mistake as continuing, that which is really only a series of moments.

The second view, inclusion (anugamah) is the view that Brahman and ātman are one. All change is

illusory. The true nature of all things is Brahman which is eternal. This is man's true nature. Changes of state like pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, are imaginary modifications of Brahman, the all-pervading eternal essence of things. In this view permanence is real, change illusory. In the former view change is real, permanence illusory.

The Buddhist view (vyāvṛttiḥ) that all is momentary entails the difficulty that the effectiveness of karmā is lost (kṛtanāśa--the destruction of what has been made/done; akṛtāgamah--the occurring of what has not been made/done). Thus what has been made/done by an individual has no effect on his future, for indeed there is no individual, no karmic residue and no future if nothing has continuous existence.

The second view (anugamah) is held by the Nāīyāyikas, the Vedāntins, the Sāṃkhya and others. It entails the difficulty that nothing a person does can effect his spiritual progress or regress because in being effected or tied to impermanence the ātman would become non-eternal. Good or bad actions cannot accrue to that which is not subject to modification. Thus in both extreme positions karmic effectiveness is lost. In both extremes no liberation (mokṣa) is possible.

Kumārila's solution to the above dilemma is to accept both assumptions: there is thus partial cessation

of those parts of the ātman that come in contact with the impermanent sense-organs, etc., and partial continuance of those parts of the ātman that are in the depth, quiet, calm and unaffected by life's vicissitudes.

Therefore an entire continuance or an entire cessation of all the traits of the Person (with change in condition) being both impossible, we must hold that there is both partial continuance (as of the permanent characters of intelligence, [consciousness] etc.), and partial cessation (as of the ephemeral states of pleasure or pain), like the serpent in the different positions of a circle, etc.⁴

Kumārila's is the precarious middle ground between the polar extremes that rests on soft logic and existential necessity. The Buddhists, as we shall see, are merciless in their hammering away at Kumārila's logical inconsistency. Kumārila, religious apologist that he is, nowhere admits his logical shortcomings. Adherence to logical extremes, for him, fails to fully explain experience. "Absolute difference, we do not accept in the case of any object..."⁵ Within the unity of a homogeneous entity simultaneously reside contradictory attributes: cessation and continuity. 'Non-eternality' and 'liable to modification' are not, for Kumārila, equivalent terms:

We do not deny the applicability of the epithet 'non-eternal' to the soul; if 'non-eternality' mean only 'liability to modification'; as such liability does not necessarily imply destruction.⁶

The ātman can undergo surface modifications and retain its eternality deep down in the same way as the surface fluctuations of the sea, even though identical

to the sea, do not disturb the deep.⁷ Thus surface modification need not signal total destruction of the whole. If a man who is happy has his whole self change into the character of 'happiness' and later the same man has his whole self change into the character of unhappiness he would have no self apart from these fluctuating states. There would be no ātman as a continuous, conscious substratum. This is what the Buddhist view supports. On the other hand, whereas it is impossible for the same man to experience the mutually exclusive states simultaneously, it is known from experience that opposites can occur successively in time. The fact that we are aware of such fluctuation, for Kumārila, proves the endurance of the ātman beyond one moment.

According to my theory the Person (i.e., the Soul), while passing through the different conditions of pleasure, pain, etc., never, for once, relinquishes his character of an intelligent substantial entity.⁸

Again:

If modification (change of condition) were identical with total destruction, then, when a man in trouble would regain happiness, he would either lose all those (character of intelligence, etc.), or continue in a state of trouble (simultaneously with that of pleasure).⁹

Someone may object to the above idea by saying if the ātman can remain non-fluctuating and calm while the states (doer/enjoyer, happy/unhappy) fluctuate then these states do not belong to the ātman. This would be so

because the ātman (non-fluctuating) and the states (fluctuating) possess contradictory characteristics. Things which are mutually negatory can have no contact with one another, they can nowhere touch or have any business together. The murderer's hand kills, his self is unmoved, unaffected. Thus we have an excuse for being as bad or good as we wish in a moral sense, for the ātman is of a different ontological order than the states of good/bad etc. In order to preclude such a suggestion Kumārila writes:

...the character of the doer and that of the enjoyer do not belong to the conditions (of the Person's life), but to the Person who is the substrate of all the different states; hence it is always the doer that enjoys the result of the action.¹⁰

The states of the ātman are the ātman just as the waves of the sea are not different from the sea. But just as the surface of the sea is not the whole sea, the states of the ātman are not the whole ātman. In this way Kumārila insures the effectiveness of karma.

One may further enquire as to how the contradictory states can subsist in the substrate without the ātman as substrate giving up its unity? How can two states, which, as they stand, have nothing in common, somehow align themselves so that they touch this third thing, the ātman, which is their common substrate? And if the ātman can have something in common with two such different things how can the ātman be constant and homogeneous?

Kumārila replies:

...as a matter of fact, on the appearance of a new condition (of life), the former condition does not become totally destroyed; but being in keeping with the new condition, it merges into the common character of the Self (intelligence) [consciousness].

It is only the individual conditions that are contradictory to one another. Over all of them, however, equally pervades the common character of the soul (intelligence) [consciousness].¹¹

As for the means of proof whereby we would have the existence of the ātman proven and the theory of anātman disproven Kumārila writes:

...we would have a rejection of the theory of the non-existence of the soul, by means of the... recognitions (of the soul), experienced by all persons.¹²

The TS. has:

The spirit (or soul)...is proved by the presence of recognition; and the doctrine of 'no-soul' is disproved by this same (recognition).¹³

Although the content of our cognitions may vary (today I see a cow, tomorrow a horse), what gives proof that the ātman endures is the notion that 'it is the same I who saw the cow yesterday who now sees the cow'.¹⁴

Although the content of the surface fluctuation of consciousness may vary, depending on the sense-organ and sense-object, the constant factor is consciousness given in recognition which is the ātman. Recognition proves the existence of the ātman because no matter what one may come to know, nothing could be known if all perished the next moment. What is cognised and then

later re-cognised is the 'I' in 'I know'.¹⁵ If this is not the case then all knowledge would lack order and would be impossible to explain. For Kumārila, each of us can prove the existence of the ātman ourselves by direct experience.¹⁶ For him the ātman is caitanya/consciousness and this consciousness is nowhere as evident as in the phrase 'I know'. The notion 'I know' is present in every act of consciousness no matter how drastic the difference in time and place. Thus it is clear and unmistakably perceived by all that this knowing cannot be other than the ātman.

Phrases like 'I go',¹⁷ 'I am fat' etc., refer to the body and the body is not the ātman: but the phrase 'I know' is different. 'I know' cannot refer to the body for the body is not conscious.

Someone may object that if, in the phrase 'I go' the body and not the ātman is meant, this indicates difference between the body and the ātman. Karma's effectiveness would be lost in such a case. The body could steal and not the ātman. So it is not desirable,, for Kumārila, to have a difference between the ātman and the body. Conversely, if the ātman and the body are somehow connected so that when the body moves, so does the ātman, Kumārila will have difficulty explaining how an omnipresent¹⁸ entity can move. If something is everywhere it cannot move to a new place for it would already

be there. Thus whether the ātman is different or non-different from the body, absurdities result for Kumārila. He answers these objections as follows:

We do not hold 'motion' to be the only form of action, as held by the Vaiśeṣikas.

It is not always only such an action as inheres in (i.e., belongs to the body of) the performer himself, that can be performed by him. All that is expressed by a verbal root would be an action (and hence motion cannot be held to be the only form of action); and we find that the character of being the performer of an action belongs to a person, even when the action properly belongs to (is performed by) another person, (and therefore it cannot be held that an action must always inhere in the performer himself).¹⁹

The body is thus the performer of an action but the action still belongs to the ātman which supervises these actions. The fighting soldier moves the sword with his cutting motions, the commander by his command, the king by his mere presence. All three act but not all move in the physical sense of swinging the sword.²⁰ The doer is the body but the moral responsibility accrues to the ātman:

Since these--the body, sense-organs, etc., could have no action without their belonging to the Person, therefore even with regard to the motion (of hands, etc.), they cannot be said to be the doers, inasmuch as they are not independent (of the intelligence of the soul, even in this form of action).

Since it is only such body and sense-organs, etc., as are earned by the Person himself by means of previous deeds, that can perform the actions, the character of being the performer of the actions must belong to the person; just as the actions performed by the 'Rtwik' (sacrificial priest) and the 'axe' (have their real performers, in the first case, in the Person who engages the priest and pays him for it, and, in the second, in the person who uses the axe).²¹

Even though the wood is actually cut by the axe, the cutting is due to the person using the axe. Even though the body 'goes' the moving is due to something else for neither the axe nor the body have consciousness or purpose. To have teleological purpose implies intelligence. Someone may wonder why it is not possible to say that the body has intelligence. Kumāṛila rejects this notion and cites five Sāṃkhya reasons:²² 1) the body is impure,²³ 2) the body is a partite whole made up of unconscious elements like those of the earth which are separately without consciousness and thus cannot come together to give a property to the body which they do not possess separately,²⁴ 3) having a particular shape: even when the constituent elements (unconscious) like earth, etc., form themselves into the shape of the human body they are still found to have no consciousness,²⁵ 4) the body is material (prakṛti) and of a different ontological order than spirit (purusa) which alone is conscious,²⁶ 5) a dead body has all the constituent elements present but is devoid of consciousness: if consciousness were the body or the elements making up the body, all of these are present even in a dead body and no one says a dead body is conscious. In addition to these five Sāṃkhya reasons Kumāṛila adds:

If all (the material elements constituting the body) had intelligence, then all being equal (in importance) could not be related to one another.

And if only one of them had intelligence, then the fact of the other (elements) being its auxiliary would become incompatible.²⁷

Equals, according to Jaimini (VI-vi,13),²⁸ cannot be related. Subservient things are not related to each other but only to the higher thing which they serve. Thus the hand and the foot, being elements making up the body, cannot both be conscious or they would never co-operate as they so obviously do. Neither can the hand both remain an element of the body and be conscious, for if the hand is an element, ipso facto, it is not that which other elements serve: for the other elements are its equal. Conversely, if the hand gives up its 'elementhood' and becomes conscious, it can no longer cooperate with other elements in actions for it is the principle towards which the actions of the elements are directed.

Kumārila concludes that all such difficulties cease if all members of the body exist for the ātman which is distinct from, yet connected with, the body.²⁹ Thus it is possible for the ātman to act and never move in the gross physical sense. Also an omnipresent entity like the ātman cannot really move, but in the sense that it is individualised in a body it 'moves'. The ātman (in the sense of Puruṣa) is everywhere like space:³⁰ space can be both particular, like the space in the hole of a do-nut, or infinite like the sky. Movement presents

no problem for no matter where the particularised space is moved it never becomes disconnected from infinite space. Even though the individualised space is limited it is still of the same nature as infinite space. In the same way the ātman is limited to the cognitions and karma of the body it has earned yet its true nature is eternal and omnipresent.³¹

So it is proven, for Kumārila, that whereas 'I go' refers to the body, 'I know' refers to the ātman.³² Whatever is done by the body is guided by the ātman and thus the ātman is rewarded or suffers for the actions of its body.

In an earlier section of the SV, Kumārila discusses the Buddhist idea of recognition and remembrance being due to residual impressions (vāsanās).³³ The Buddhists claim that no ātman is necessary to explain recognition.³⁴ The cow of yesterday is perceived to be the same cow today because it is made up of a series of 'cow-moments'. Ignorant people reify this series (krama) into a real enduring entity. Kumārila refutes this view³⁵ by asking whether the 'series' is the same or different than the individual 'moments' (kṣanas) that comprise it? If the series is the same as the moments the moments lose their uniqueness, if the two are not the same there is no similarity and therefore no series. According to either alternative the Buddhists are landed in an absurd

position. Kumārila concludes that the only concept that properly explains recognition of 'I' in 'I know' is the ātman. The above provides a background to what Kumārila deals with at length in the following: What is the difficulty that the Buddhist theory cannot explain?

If the knower were only an idea, then your knower would be a momentary entity; and then there could be no recognition of any previous cogniser (being the same as the one at the present moment): as that 'I knew this before and I know it also now.'³⁶

How so?

Because of this (recognition), which 'idea-moment' would be the object? With regard to the previous event (cognition in the past) we would have the notion 'I knew'; and then the assertion 'I know it also at the present moment' could not be true (with reference to the same cogniser), because the 'moment-idea' (that cognised the previous idea) does not cognise the present idea (since the past idea must have disappeared instantly, and as such could not cognise any idea at the present time). And a cogniser at the present time is known from the assertion 'I know'; and in this case, the assertion 'I knew it' would not be true (with regard to the present cogniser). Because the present cognising idea could not (have been present at any past time, and as such could not) have cognised the object in the past [sic]. If both (the present and the past cognising ideas) were to be the objects of (recognition) then both would be false, inasmuch as both of them did not cognise it in the past; nor did they both cognise it at the present moment.

The 'series' (of ideas) cannot be said to be the object of recognition; because none of the two forms (past and present) can possibly belong to it. As the series did not cognise it in the past (as it did not exist at the time of the first cognition), nor does it cognise it at the present moment, because of its non-objective (unreal) character.³⁷

This line of reasoning of Kumārila can be clarified further by consulting a text in the TS.

(494-495) in which the Buddhists are discussing an objector's view. The objector³⁸ is wondering how the Buddhists explain recognition if, as they say, all things are in perpetual flux? The Buddhist may argue that in the case of hair and nails that have been cut and grown back anew, the new and the old may be mistaken for the same because of their similarity. The Buddhists could then apply the same thinking to account for the recognition of 'I' in 'I know'. The cognitions of 'I' on various occasions are mistaken as being identical with one another, but on closer consideration, are found to be non-identical. If the Buddhists so argue, the objector brings forth the following counter argument: a person eats a citron fruit one day, sees another citron fruit the next day, and desires the taste upon seeing it. If, as the Buddhists hypothesise, the two cognisers have nothing in common, how is it that there is longing for the taste in one who has only seen and never tasted? If the mistake of the new and old hair or nails can be accounted for by similarity, certainly the cognition of sight and taste of the citron fruit cannot be accounted for in the same way. For Kumāṛila, the only acceptable explanation for instances such as the above is that it is the same ātman who recognises what it previously cognised.³⁹

From all of this it follows that recognition may

be explained without the Ātman if the contents of two separate cognitions are the same and the cognisers are different, or the contents of cognition are similar enough to make a mistake possible, but never when the contents of cognition are as different as the sight and taste of a citron fruit. The above discussion from the TS. is only quoted to be refuted by the Buddhists in their book. This is not their view. There is no need to follow up the Buddhist refutation following TS. 494 as we will cover the same ground later on in the Buddhist refutation of Kumārila.

Another alternative explanation of recognition without the Ātman might be that yesterday's cognition of 'cow' and today's cognition of 'cow' contain the common-element (universal) 'cowness' which is re-cognised on both occasions.⁴⁰ The Buddhists could then say against Kumārila, that the cognising 'I' is not really enduring but but because it cognises 'cowness' on several occasions the impression is evolved that the cogniser remains the same. But the Buddhists do not allow universals (sāmānya) any real existence.

Another objection to Kumārila's insistence that the basis of the notion of 'I' in 'I know' is the Ātman would be that both the cognisers of yesterday and today have the common nature of being cognisers and this does not mean that they are the cognitions of an enduring

ātman. Thus the notion of 'I' in 'I know' could come about easily without the ātman.⁴¹ Kumārila answers:

If it be urged that both have the common character of being the cogniser, then, that would also belong to other persons, and, then, in the case of the cognition of all men, we would come to recognise the 'I'.⁴²

If all we need for the production of the idea of 'I' (ātman) is that two cognisers have consciousness in common, then all men should recognise the same 'I'. All should know the same self, which is ridiculous. Under this scheme no matter whom one referred to, because all have the common character of being cognisers, one would always refer to the same person.⁴³ So this objection, for Kumārila, is unsatisfactory, and devoid of reason.

A further objection showing that recognition can be fully explained without the ātman is as follows: there is no ātman only a 'man-series' perceiving a 'jar-series'. The recognition that 'this is the same jar that I cognised yesterday and I am the same now who saw the jar before' would take place easily: and there would still be no necessity of the ātman. Kumārila answers:

Even if both these (cognising ideas had the similarity of) appearing in the same 'series' (of ideas), then, too, all the recognition we could have would be in the form of 'that', just as we have with regard to⁴⁴ external objects like the jar, etc., (seen twice).

Something more than an external object seen twice is given in recognition: it is the distinct impression

that it is 'I' who had both cognitions. The theory of momentariness of the Buddhists could conceivably explain 'this jar is the same as that cognised yesterday', but never 'I who see the jar today am the same who saw the cow yesterday'. 'Me-ness' (soulness) is not present in diverse momentary cognitions appearing consecutively. But why could residual impressions (vāsanās) carried from moment to moment not achieve the same result?

'Impressions' [vāsanās] are able to bring about the recognition of the cogniser; but they cannot bring about, with regard to an object, the idea of something that it is not; for 'impressions' are not a cause of mistaken notions (and the notion with regard to an object as being something that it is not, cannot but be a mistaken one).⁴⁵

'Impressions' (vāsanās) can bring about the idea that past and present cognisers are the same, but this would only be possible if there were the ātman connecting the two cognitions. If all things are momentary as the Buddhists say, no 'impression' could have a career spanning two moments. Thus no recognition could result. Yet direct cognition reveals, Kumārila would have us believe, the distinct, clear and unmistakable notion of 'I' which persists through all our cognitions:

And the notion of 'I' is not a mistaken one; as it is not set aside by any subsequent cognition; and naturally, this notion of 'I' cannot refer to any other object than the cogniser, as we always find the cogniser to be known by the notion of 'I'.⁴⁶

Kumārila has established above (p. 16ff) that it is the ātman and not the body which is conscious. But what

if someone suggests that the notion of 'I' does not come from the ātman but from seeing the body as one's 'I'?

Kumārila answers:

Those alone, who have no knowledge of the difference (of the soul from the body), can have a notion of the 'I' with regard to the body. But even in this case (they have this notion with regard to the body, only because) they think the body to be the soul. Hence the notion of 'I' must always (be accepted to) refer to the soul.⁴⁷

Yet, someone may object that in the same way as we say 'my body', we also say 'my ātman'. This indicates difference between 'I' ('My') and the ātman. Thus the 'I' and the ātman are separate and one cannot be the basis of the other. Kumārila counters thus:

The idea of 'my soul' [mine-ness of soul] indicating difference (between the soul and the 'I') must be explained as being due to the difference (from the soul) of 'cognition', which is a state of the soul (and hence often spoken of as such).⁴⁸

Cognition, whether of 'mine-ness' or redness' is only surface fluctuation of the soul. Cognition does not subsume the ātman for the ātman, even when cognising remains calm in its depth. Thus 'my ātman' does not indicate difference between the 'I' and the ātman but rather that the ātman is having a cognition like any other cognition.

The following are examples which, for Kumārila, prove that the 'I' in 'I know' has the ātman as its basis and not an evanescent series of moments. If asked why it is that the soul must be a continuous entity of the nature

of consciousness, Kumārila answers:

...if this notion were absent in the Yogis, how could they have any ideas while instructing their disciples? And we do find them thus engaged (in instructing); therefore we must admit that they are cognisant of the 'soul'.

In the case where only half of a certain scripture, etc., has been learned, if one were not to have any idea that 'I have learnt this much', then (when upon taking up the study of the work after some time), he would have to learn from the beginning again.⁴⁹

How does one know that it is the same 'I' that continues through various states of time and place? Kumārila answers:

(1) The cogniser, known as the 'I' yesterday, is the same that continues today, because the cogniser of yesterday is known as the 'I', like the cogniser of the present time. (2) The present cogniser must have been the cogniser yesterday, because it is a cogniser, or because of the aforesaid reason (i.e., because it is known as the 'I'), like the cogniser of yesterday. (3) Or, we may have the arguments based upon the 'cognitions' themselves as the minor term: all cognitions of the 'I' happening today yesterday have the same object (soul), because they are all the cogniser's cognitions of the 'I' connected with one and the same 'series' (of ideas), like any ordinary single cognition of the 'I'.⁵⁰

The first two arguments of this summary quotation are familiar. In the third we find that the cognitions which the ātman has today come in a series. All are attached to the same 'I'. In each cognition the presence of the impression that these various cognitions form a series would not be present if these cognitions were entirely disconnected. The idea of 'I' would never arise unless there existed the ātman as its cause.

This ends our exposition of Kumārila's theory of the ātman. The Buddhists in the TS. have many arguments against Kumārila which attempt to refute him on this point. We can now turn to examining these Buddhist arguments.

Chapter III.

The Buddhist Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Ātman.

The ideas of 'one-ness', 'eternality' and the like are purely imaginary and not real. Hence your laughter at us on this point is indicative of a very high grade of learning (on your part)!-- Santaraksita (TS. 1200).

You who are versed in logical rules, why should you argue thus, with a view to deceive us, as it were?
-- Kumārila (SV. Nirālambana-Vāda 130).

The first point Santaraksita brings against Kumārila's theory of the ātman is "If intelligence (caitanya/consciousness) is held to be eternal and one, then, cognition (buddhi) also should have to be regarded as of the same character."⁵² Kamalaśīla's commentary adds: "If intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then cognition also, which has no other form than intelligence, should have to be regarded as eternal and one."⁵³ Further on in the same commentary Kamalaśīla says that the idea of cognition (buddhi) being eternal and one is not desirable for Kumārila for Jaimini and Śabara have contradicted the idea. In addition, says Kamalaśīla, Kumārila himself has stated elsewhere the opposite of this idea. Kumārila has said:

Not even for a moment does (the cognition) (buddhi; jñāna) continue to exist; nor is it ever produced as doubtful or incorrect; and as such it can never subsequently operate towards the apprehension of objects, like the senses, etc.⁵⁴

The Buddhists feel Kumārila plainly wants cognition to be non-eternal, not lasting beyond the moment of production.

All of this notwithstanding, Kumārila has said:

Idea [buddhi] too we hold to be one and eternal, because it partakes of the nature of the intelligence [caitanya/consciousness] of the person (which intelligence is one and eternal). And as for the notion of diversity (with regard to the idea) it is due to the (diversity of) objects (of the idea).⁵⁵

This statement is given in the TS. translation as follows:

Cognitions [buddhi], and the soul [purūṣa] also, are held to be eternal and one, on the ground of their being the nature of intelligence [caitanya/consciousness]; if there is diversity, it is due to the [sense] object.⁵⁶

In the above two quotes, (the last two are worded differently in the translations of the SV. and the TS. but translate the same passage, so we can say that there are two quotes here not three) there is an apparent contradiction on the part of Kumārila. In the first quote Kumārila says that cognition (jñāna, buddhi) never continues even for a moment. In the second he says that cognition (buddhi) is eternal. This is the point the Buddhists wish to make. In order to better judge the validity of the Buddhist point we need to do two things. First we must examine Kumārila's theory of the production of knowledge and the part that sense-perception (pratyakṣa) plays in this production; for it might well be that Kumārila accepts (the logical contradiction notwithstanding) that the senses (non-eternal) and the ātman (eternal), somehow operate together in the production of knowledge. Second,

we must put these quotes in context and try to come out with a clear idea of what Kumārila wishes to say.

For Kumārila, sense-perception has a dual aspect:

1) the initial non-reflective aspect (nirvikalpaka), which is mere apprehension (ālōcanājñānam) caused by mere object (śuddhāvastūjam), 2) the reflective aspect (savikalpa) which contains the specifications of particularity (viśeṣa) and generality (sāmānya).⁵⁸ At the time of cognition in the first aspect (nirvikalpaka) neither particularity nor generality is given, only the pure unqualified datum which is the basis of both of these. Even though particularity and generality are not perceived in the first aspect of sense-perception, they are implicitly present even in this non-reflective first phase.⁵⁹ The subsequent second aspect of sense-perception is when the object is qualified. It is cognised in the specific sense of excluding other objects. and that it possesses universals ('cowness', 'brownness', etc.).⁶⁰ Both of the above aspects are included under the rubric of sense-perception (pratyakṣa) according to Kumārila.⁶¹ This is so because both aspects are dependent on sense-perception.

The Buddhists hold that sense-perception is totally free from all conceptual content.⁶² Thus they do not allow the second aspect (savikalpa) to be included under sense-perception for this second aspect contains

conceptual content.⁶³ Conceptual content, for the Buddhists means "...idea associated with verbal expression..."⁶⁴ and it is impossible to have an absence of words in Kumārila's second aspect or the specific individuality would then forever remain unqualified.⁶⁵ Kumārila holds that the reason savikalpa is included in pratyākṣa is that specifications such as universals, etc., even though eternal, are capable of perception by the senses under savikalpa.⁶⁶ If this were not the case, no inference would be possible as sense-perception, on which inference is based, would always be accepted as undefined.⁶⁷ Kumārila insists that the sense-organ is unconscious "...the cognition is not actually located in it..."⁶⁸ and yet there is this quasi-intellectual activity of specification of universals, etc., which takes place within his definition of sense-perception. The senses are not conscious, the ātman alone is conscious: "...cognition [jñānam] is located in the soul..."⁶⁹ The senses are the means of cognition but have no consciousness themselves.

With this theory of sense-perception of Kumārila's in mind we examine the above quotes (f.ns. 54,55,56) in their contexts to see if we can come out with a clear reading.

The first quote, 'Not even for a moment...' comes from a context in the SV. in which Kumārila is trying to

point out that sense perceptions only last for one moment and that they are never produced as false or wrong. Sense-perception only apprehends what already exists.⁷⁰ Because it only apprehends what already exists, it cannot be the means of knowing one's duty (dharma) and getting to heaven. This is so because knowing one's duty implies knowledge of the future: "...duty...is yet to come."⁷¹ For the Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda is the sole means of knowing dharma (duty) and thus the only way of knowing what to do to get to heaven.⁷² Neither sense-perception nor any of the other five pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge) accepted by Kumārila and his school give knowledge of duty.⁷³ Kumārila wants it to be known that on one hand sense-perception is valid and gives real knowledge of a real external world as opposed to the Buddhist idealistic view. In the first case his theory provides that sense-perception is not the means of knowing dharma because it only apprehends the present. In the second case, his theory avoids absolute idealism by positing that the knowledge gained from sense-perception is real, valid and never mistaken. It is never mistaken because it is only produced to be perceived. Its purpose is not contained in something beyond its production as is the case with many other things.⁷⁴ Error in identifying silver as a piece of shell, for example, is not a perceptual error but a judgemental error.⁷⁵ Thus sense-perception is saved



from absolute idealism.

The second quote above (f.ns. 55,56, the same quote quoted first from the SV. and next from the TS.), comes from a context where Kumārila is showing that the words of the Veda are eternal and when heard are not produced or created but merely manifested. Thus the Veda is kept pure and free from the profanity of having had an author. It is thus the only way of knowing how to get to heaven. Kumārila states previous to the above quote, that what is cognised in a particular sighting of 'cow' is really the universal 'cowness' which universal is eternal. The same thing happens with a particular pronunciation of a word from the Veda. The pronouncing of the word does not detract from its eternality. Diversity is attributed to what is external to the eternal word just as in the case of the ātman, diversity is due to what is external to it.

Kumārila's ideas concerning the operation of the senses and the ātman are further clarified in the following:

The fire, though eternally endowed with the power to burn, only burns combustible objects when these happen to be presented before it, and not otherwise; and a mirror, or a clean piece of rock crystal, reflects only such reflectible objects as are presented before it (though they are eternally endowed with the power of reflection). In the same manner, the eternal intelligences, functioning in the bodies of men, comprehend such objects, colour, and the rest, as are presented before them by the various organs of sense...

Thus then (it must be admitted) the idea appears perishable, on account of the perishability of its

connection with the organs (of sense) presenting objects before it; just as the fire does not appear to have an eternal power of burning, on account of the non-proximity of any combustile object.

And it is only in the form of 'intelligence' (of cognition) that ideas are recognised to be identical. And the diversity of the ideas of the jar, the elephant, etc., is held, by all people, to be due to the diversity of these (objects).⁷⁶

Above⁷⁷ we noted that buddhi (intellect) is of the same nature as puruṣa (spirit, ātman) in Kumārila's system. Unlike the Sāṃkhya school which teaches that no matter how refined buddhi is it never approaches puruṣa,⁷⁸ Kumārila makes conceptual thought (buddhi) of the same nature as spirit for both are conscious. Somehow how sense-perception is separate, yet connected with the ātman which is spirit (puruṣa). Where, in the Sāṃkhya school, the thing that exceeds our comprehension is the relationship between puruṣa and prakṛti,⁷⁹ in Kumārila's school it is the relationship between the non-eternal senses and the eternal ātman. There is a difference between these two in that the Sāṃkhya school believes all theorising takes place within buddhi and that no amount of theorising will make the qualitative leap to puruṣa. Kumārila believes there must be this unity within diversity to retain the efficacy of karma, and thus the validity of Vedic injunction. Thus, for Kumārila, the ātman somehow remains an eternal unity within temporal diversity because it has this dual character of continuity and cessation. In our further enumeration of the Buddhist refutation of

Kumārila's theory we must keep this in mind, that, for whatever reason, Kumārila does not seem to be as bothered by the logical contradiction he so obviously involves himself in in his theory of the ātman. He never admits that he contradicts himself. In no way does Kumārila equate pratyakṣa with puruṣa (ātman, self), even though these two mutual excluders somehow get together to produce cognition.

For Kumārila, pratyakṣa is ephemeral in its connection with the ātman. This does not mean that all of the ātman is modified by pratyakṣa. The surface is modified, the depth is calm. When terms like 'pratyaya' (cognition), 'buddhi' (intelligence), 'jñāna' (knowledge), etc., are tied to the ātman, their eternal aspect is emphasised insofar as they operate with that which is eternal (ātman). When these same terms are tied to pratyakṣa, their non-eternal aspect is emphasised insofar as they operate with that which is non-eternal (sense-perception). Thus Kumārila says:

Those who have the difference of the objects (jar, etc.) in view, do not assert one idea to be the same as the other; and, conversely, until one has the difference of objects in view, he cannot but recognise one idea (to be identical with the other): (because apart from the objects all ideas are identical in being 'intelligence'): It is with this dual fact in mind that the Bhāṣya has asserted 'these [two] (ideas) are eternal?'⁸⁰

Because we have knowledge of diverse cognitions, the cognitions are similar in this knowledge. This shows

that there is an enduring conscious ātman. Conversely, unless there were diverse cognitions we could only have one cognition (i.e., of the soul itself), which would not be a cognition because it would contain no difference (modification). Therefore external objects are necessary to explain our everyday experience of the modulation of consciousness. Because there is only similar and not identity of cognitions, there is the ātman which links this non-identity. Because the ātman is, itself, eternal and calm, the modulations are not self-induced. They are caused by the external object.

With respect to the contradiction pointed out by the Buddhists above (above p, 38ff) that Kumārila wants cognition (buddhi) to be both eternal and non-eternal, we can see that that is exactly what he wants: for it must be so. If cognition is not allowed this dual aspect our experience, according to Kumārila, remains incompletely explained. We just have to leave this gaping logical hole in Kumārila's theory as we find it and wait to see if the same apparently necessary logical inconsistency is not later quietly accepted by the Buddhists (for example when they try to explain from their theory of momentariness, the experience of recognition or continuity of objects).

With all of this in mind, Śāntaraksita asks:

If such is the case, then, on the occasion where there appear cognitions imposing the concepts of 'elephant' and the rest in reference to spots where

these animals do not exist, to what is the diversity in such cognitions due?⁸¹

Kumārila has gone through great trouble to establish that any diversity in the ātman can be accounted for by the ātman's contact with the sense-organs. Here Śāntaraksita gives an example where in dream, swoon, or drunkenness, various external objects appear to be cognised even though the objects themselves are not present. It follows that the ātman (caitanya/consciousness) is many and not one. Therefore the ātman does not exist.

Kumārila counters with:

Even in dream-cognition the external substratum is not altogether absent. In all cases there is a real substratum, though (in dreams) appearing under diverse conditions of place and time.⁸²

This is a weak argument and Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla have little trouble destroying it. In TS. and TSP. 250-252 this is done. The main argument is that if dream-cognitions can occur and have for their causes "... (some real external object that has been perceived) either during the present life, or in some past life, or at any other time..."⁸³ then chaos would result. If the actual external object is given in sense-perception, it cannot be given again in dream-cognition. It could only do this if it had two forms and if it had two forms it would not be a thing identical with itself through consecutive moments. Kamalaśīla argues:

Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to

appear in the form of another thing; if it were, then this would lead to incongruities; and in this way all cognitions would come to have all things for their objects; and there would be⁸⁴ an end to all ordered useage regarding things.

For the Buddhists, the only real things in existence are caused things. If something has for its cause an eternal entity, all effects should be produced at once.⁸⁵ Now all the effects of the jar, for example, are not produced at once, for it has two 'times' (the appearance in wakefulness and the appearance in dreams). This alone for the Buddhists shows the jar to have no self-identity; it shows that the jar is really made up of unique moments, none of which are the 'jar' for there is no 'jar'. Kumārila's idea of there being a real background in wakefulness (let alone dreams) is thus wrong. To further suppose there is a real background in dreams, only appearing 'under diverse conditions of time and place' is even more mistaken according to the Buddhists.

For Kumārila, caitanya/consciousness is formless, form belonging to the external object.⁸⁶ Thus pratyākṣa (sense-perception) and caitanya/consciousness are not equivalent terms even though they somehow work together. The above Buddhist argument explodes the idea that caitanya/consciousness (ātman) is formless for form is present in the absence of pratyākṣa. So Kamalāsīla says:

From this it follows that these cognitions have no real basis, and they are, in reality, unmixed in character and mobile; that they are so is due to the

fact of their appearing only occasionally; and it also becomes established that the soul, which is of the nature of the said cognition, must also be evanescent and many.⁸⁷

It might be argued that cognition's diversity does not signal diversity in the ātman because cognition belongs to the ātman but does not constitute its exhaustive nature.⁸⁸ Kamalaśīla disallows this:

This cannot be right; 'pratyaya' (cognition), 'caitanya' (sentience) [consciousness], 'buddhi' (intelligence), 'jñāna' (knowledge) are all synonymous terms; nor does a mere difference in names make any difference in the nature of things. Further, even with a difference in their names, all these are actually accepted (by you) as being of the nature of sentience [consciousness] caitanya; and as this sentience is one and the same, there can be no distinction among the cognitions that are of the same nature. If it were not so, then, on account of the attribution of contrary properties to them, the two, (sentience and cognition) would become entirely different from one another.⁸⁹

Where does pratyakṣa (sense-perception) fit in here? It is missing in Kamalaśīla's list of synonyms. It is true that for Kumārila's pratyaya, etc., are synonymous. But it seems that pratyākṣa, which accounts for diversity in a superficial part of the ātman should be included in the above list. Again, because there is a non-eternal side to pratyākṣa, it should not be so included. Even the synonyms which Kamalaśīla lists have a non-eternal side to them insofar as they have some connection, in some mysterious way, with pratyakṣa. One thing should be clear: the non-eternal is only a superficial part of the ātman in Kumārila's theory. The question with

regard to the Buddhist refutation is whether, at any point they try to scuttle Kumāṛila's theory on the basis that if they can prove modification in pratyakṣa they will have proven total destruction of the ātman. In the above list of synonyms Kamalaśīla does not make pratyakṣa and the ātman equivalent yet on occasion the Buddhists leave the impression that their disproof will be successful if they can show that the senses only produce cognitions occasionally.⁹⁰ Kumāṛila admits that the senses only produce cognitions occasionally, but for him the ātman is more than consciousness as a result of sense-perception.

For Kumāṛila, there is consciousness even when nothing in particular is being cognised. The ātman is conscious continually and not only when the senses are operating. To this Kamalaśīla rightly points out that the senses and consciousness (sentience) must then be entirely different from one another as they have contradictory properties attributed to them. We will see that the Buddhists who now insist so strongly on logical purity run into similar difficulties when they try to explain continuity in our experience, from the basis of their theory of absolute momentariness.

Kamalaśīla makes another point in connection with the example of the 'dream-elephant'. The Buddhists attribute the construction of the whole world to the activity of the mind constructing 'continuous' objects

out of non-continuous series of moments. The appearance of an elephant in a dream proves that form belongs to the mind. The same thing happens in waking life to ordinary men. An elephant in waking life is not real for the only reals are those things which are causally efficient. The moments which make up the 'elephant-series' are alone efficient at producing cognitions. If, as ignorant people believe, the elephant endures beyond one moment, it would last forever, for there would be no reason for it not to go on indefinitely. If it went on indefinitely it would keep the same form over all moments and there would be no production of cognition of the elephant because in all production there is the coming about of something that did not previously exist. The production of something new in the effect (cognition of 'elephant') assumes change in the cause (elephant), and an eternal entity could never change and maintain its eternality at the same time. Thus if the elephant is perceptible its form is a product of the imagination. The senses perceive only unqualified moments appearing in a series. Out of this series is constructed the 'elephant'. 'Elephant' is, therefore imperceptible to the senses. Thus Kamalaśīla can say that any cognition that apprehends form is merely a mental construction (the mind's own):

"...it becomes established that the cognitions apprehending that form as their own are of themselves, because they are

self-luminous in their character."⁹¹

TS. 253 harks back to the Mīmāṃsā example⁹² of fire being the 'burner' of only those combustibile materials placed before it. This is compared to caitanya (consciousness) which, although eternally conscious and everywhere present, in its human embodiment, cognises only that which is placed before it by the senses. This TS. text reads:

If cognition [buddhi] remains forever in the form of the apprehension of all things, then how is it that the cognition of all things is not present at all times?⁹³

Kamalaśīla's comment on this is "If cognition which is of the nature of apprehension, exists forever, then all things should be cognised at all times."⁹⁴ This Buddhist argument attempts to show the logical contradiction in Kumārila's theory. It does not reach the heart of the matter. Kumārila can easily explain why all things are not cognised at all times: "...soul, though impartite, has the cognition in the body it occupies (and which it has acquired in accordance with its past deeds.)"⁹⁵ The real weakness in Kumārila's theory is not why all cognitions do not appear simultaneously but how the ātman can have anything to do with what is non-eternal.

Kumārila, as a Mīmāṃsaka, believes the Veda to be eternal. He believes the sounds of the words (śabda) of the Veda are eternal.⁹⁶ He also believes that the

relationship between the words of the Veda and their meanings is eternal.⁹⁷ The words of the Veda are, according to Kumārila, present everywhere, for all time. What a speaker does is manifest the omni-present words and when he stops speaking the words continue to exist in their unmanifested form.⁹⁸ In this way the hearing sense is made different for the Mīmāṃsaka so that he can secure the words of the Veda from imperfection and profanity which are connected with all produced things. For the Mīmāṃsā school as a whole, the Veda is the perfect thing, the all in all, and its words are not written by human authors.⁹⁹ With all of this in mind, Śāntarakṣita is setting up Kumārila for a dilemma.

TS. 254 says that the cognition of sound must be the same as that which cognises taste, colour, etc., because according to the Mīmāṃsaka cognition is ever-present. Thus, when one thing is cognised (sound), then all the rest (taste, colour, etc.) should be cognised at the same time:

The cognition on which sound has been imposed must be the same that apprehends taste, colour, and other things. If this is not admitted by you, then you have, by your own words, admitted that there is difference among cognitions.¹⁰⁰

The consequence, according to the Buddhists, is that if Kumārila does not accept the above formulation he "...would be admitting that there is diversity among cognitions."¹⁰¹ The Buddhists want to show that a

homogeneous, ever-present consciousness would not be capable of consecutive cognitions. Nor is homogeneity in the soul reconcilable with variety in the sense-organs. If caitanya is the ear and the eye, hearing-cognition should occur at the same time as seeing-cognition. This is obviously not the case so caitanya cannot be ever the cogniser. The Buddhist argument rests on their all-or-nothing logical preference. For Kumāṛila, eye-cognitions, etc., are superficial. They do not effect the depths of the ātman, yet they do somehow effect its future in a karmic sense. Cognition taken as a joint product of eternal (ātman/caitanya/consciousness) and non-eternal (sense-organs/pratyākṣa) can be viewed as eternal on non-eternal, depending on which aspect is stressed.

The Buddhists insist the above formulation is impossible. If the ātman is of the nature of consciousness, it must exist only when consciousness is there.¹⁰² If cognitions can occur the ātman is absent in the intervals. For the Buddhists, the content of consciousness is consciousness. Consciousness is not something over and above being conscious of something. For Kumāṛila, ātman is something over and above the superficial cognition of something. Beyond this surface fluctuation, according to Kumāṛila, lies the deep calm which is also the ātman.

Depending on how strictly logical one insists on being the Buddhist argument will or will not convince.

The dilemma fails if it is allowed Kumārila that the same temporary consciousness that acts as the intelligent factor in taste, smell, etc., also acts as the conscious factor in the ātman. This consciousness factor is thus present in both the eternal and the non-eternal. The difference is that the non-eternal does not exhaust it. The Buddhist dilemma stands if one insists that consciousness cannot be present unless there is consciousness of something: that a non-acting consciousness is no consciousness at all.

TS. 255 says that "even fire is not always a 'burner' of all combustible things; otherwise the whole (world) would be instantly reduced to ashes."¹⁰³ This analogy is meant to show that successive appearances of cognitions (consciousnesses) are not reconcilable with an omni-present eternal consciousness. It rests on the Buddhist insistence on logical purity which they, themselves later breach. Individual (subconscious?) metaphysical bias will determine for each how convincing the one side or the other is. Logic simply cannot decide. Kumārila is satisfied that he has shown why all things are known at once.¹⁰⁴ We recognise the logical contradiction in Kumārila's theory and the Buddhist indicating of the same.

Someone may object to the above Buddhist argument concerning 'fire' by saying that if fire is not always of the nature of a 'burner' how can it ever be a 'burner'?

The Buddhists answer that fire is only a 'burner' when a combustible object is placed before it. There is no such thing as a 'non-burner' fire in the same way as there is no consciousness unless there is cognising going on. Thus both fire and consciousness are non-eternal. Fire, like the ātman, cannot exist without producing its defining characteristic, and then suddenly decide to produce this defining characteristic: for the defining characteristic and the 'thing' (fire/ātman) are the burning and the cognising. Kumārila, on the other hand, separates the ātman from its activities while insisting that they still somehow have contact with each other.¹⁰⁵

The dubiousness of Kumārila's position becomes clear if we try to imagine fire without burning. In the same way the Buddhists want us to realise that if Kumārila wants to define ātman as caitanya/consciousness, then during dreamless sleep, etc., there is no ātman.

Śāntarakṣita displays a sense of fairplay in the example in TS. 257-258 involving the rock-crystal and the mirror.¹⁰⁶ He concludes that neither his theory nor Kumārila's can explain the appearance of the reflection in the mirror. He ascribes¹⁰⁷ the appearance of the reflection in the mirror to the peculiar potency of the mirror, which peculiar potency is the same as that of the fire to burn. Neither can be further defined and must be accepted as given.

We now examine the difficulty of explaining the reflection in the mirror according to the theory of permanence (ātman) of Kumārila. The mirror in contact with the thing (blue) must be either the same or different than the mirror not in contact with the blue. Because the mirror (ātman) in Kumārila's theory is eternal, so must be the 'two' mirrors (the one in contact with the blue and the one not in contact with the blue). If this is so, the blue should be visible in 'both' mirrors, the one actually reflecting the blue and the one not actually reflecting the blue. This is so because an eternal entity cannot abandon one form 'reflector' and take up a contradictory form 'non-reflector'. An eternal thing keeps the same form forever.

...if it could reflect the image without being momentary, then it would have to be admitted that the mirror in contact with the object is the same as that not in contact with it; so that, even in the absence of the blue and other reflected things, the reflection of these would be perceptible, as the reflector will not have abandoned its previous character (when in contact with the object); or, conversely, even when in contact with the object, it would be seen without the said reflections; as its form would not be different from its previous state (when not in contact with the object).¹⁰⁸

Because this quote so clearly shows the Buddhist use of dichotomy and dilemma in argument we can examine it in detail to thoroughly understand this way of arguing. If the mirror is non-momentary it is eternal. There is no middle.¹⁰⁹ If it is eternal it must always retain the

same form. Now which is the mirror's own form? Reflector or non-reflector? If both the mirror is non-eternal, for if the mirror is now blue and later non-blue, it must be a non-eternal mirror for blue and non-blue cannot be in the same mirror simultaneously. But someone may object that blue and non-blue can be in the same mirror at different times. The Buddhists would say 'What is meant by in?' Does being 'in' the mirror make blue and the mirror identical? Or are they somehow really separated even though blue is 'in' the mirror? If the mirror and the blue are identical, the presence or non-presence of the blue in front of the mirror should make no difference as the 'blue-mirror' is eternal and retains the same form regardless of what is in front of it. If the blue and the mirror are not absolutely identical they cannot have the slightest thing to do with one another. They can nowhere have contact. In this case the blue would not appear in the mirror even when the mirror was in the presence of blue reflecting material.

The Buddhists state things so as to emphasise their logical incompatibility. In this way they polarize argument. This is desirable for them for their target is to neutralise not defeat.

Next Śāntaraksita demonstrates why it is impossible to explain the reflected phenomena in the mirror from either the Buddhist theory of impermanence or from the

opposite theory of permanence:

As a matter of fact, the mirror surface can never contain the reflection (of anything), because it is lasting, because it is indivisible, and because several things with material shape cannot subsist together.¹¹⁰

Firstly, 'because it is lasting' means according to Kamalaśīla, that the reflection is perceived as being physically in the mirror in the same sense as water is physically in the well. Because the mirror surface contains no empty space like the well, the reflection, even though it appears to be inside the mirror, must be an illusion.¹¹¹

Secondly, 'because it is indivisible' may mean, according to Kamalaśīla, "...absence of difference between the previous and succeeding states..."¹¹² This argument only applies to the opponent of the Buddhist. It is similar to the argument in TS. 258. Only a lasting thing (permanence) shows absence of difference between preceding and succeeding states. If the mirror is permanent and real, its appearance in some inexplicable conjunction with something ephemeral (the reflection), shows the latter to be an illusion.

Finally, 'because several things with material shape cannot subsist together.' Two material entities with material extension cannot occupy the same point in space simultaneously and, at the same time, maintain their respective identities. Yet this is what happens, in some

mysterious way, with the mirror and its reflection. This shows that both the mirror and the reflection cannot be real.

Further proof that the mirror is not transformed into the reflection is given in TS. 260. In this text and its commentary it is noted that if a hibiscus flower is placed in front of a rock-crystal, a man standing in front of the rock crystal perceives the hibiscus flower as red, a man standing to the side, as white. If the rock crystal were really transformed into the reflection, it should be the same colour from every angle. This objection holds against both the Buddhist impermanence view and the opposing permanence view. In this way it is shown that the reflection is an illusion produced by the peculiar power of the rock-crystal or mirror.

Kumārila has said that the mirror is like the ātman.¹¹³ The sense-organs bring objects before the ātman and the ātman reflects (cognises) them. In the same way, the mirror reflects the objects brought before it. The mirror is eternally endowed with the power to reflect things, but only does so when something is placed in front of it. This analogy has been refuted by showing that whether the mirror and the reflection are the same or different, absurdities result. We note that neither side denies there is modification of consciousness. The parties only disagree on whether this modification supports

permanence or impermanence of the ātman.

To the assertion of Śāntaraksita that the reflection in the mirror must be attributed to the peculiar nature of the mirror, someone may make the following objection:

If that is so, then in the case of cognition also, the idea of its being transformed into the reflection of its object may be mere illusion; so that there is no transformation into the reflected form.¹¹⁴

In this way the eternality of the ātman is preserved. Śāntaraksita replies: "In the case of cognition, there cannot be even illusion; as there is absence of difference."¹¹⁵ The Mīmāṃsakas hold that cognition is never mistaken and that the same cognition is never given twice.¹¹⁶ Cognitions purpose is fulfilled in its being produced, and it is never produced as faulty. If there is an error, for example seeing silver in mother-of-pearl, the sense-organ is at fault. The ātman as caitanya is eternal and never makes a mistake if the sense-organ is operating normally.¹¹⁷

The sense of the hypothetical objection (f.n. 114)¹¹⁸ is to save the eternality of the ātman by saying the cognitions of the ātman, like the reflections in the mirror, are illusory. But the reply of Śāntaraksita is that this alternative is not open to Kumārila¹¹⁹ who holds that cognition is eternal. This being so, cognition could never be illusory. Also, in the case of the

reflection in the mirror, there is the hibiscus flower itself to compare with cognition which has no second. It is produced as authoritative. There is thus no possibility of having the authoritative cognition, and then later on, an illusory cognition of the same thing.

In TS. 263 we encounter the Buddhist reply to Kumārila's thesis that the eternality of the ātman is proven by re-cognition. (see above p. 25ff.). We have seen above that out of the given facts of experience Kumārila extracts proof that the ātman exists. Now we will see that out of the same facts of experience the Buddhists will show that no such ātman is proven to exist.

Kumārila has said¹²⁰ that the ātman is shown to exist through its possession of the characteristic of caitanya/consciousness which re-cognises itself to be identical through changes of place and time. The Buddhists put forward the following idea:

The character of being different from non-cognition is one that is common to all cognitions, and the said recognition could proceed on the basis of the imposition of that common character, even under the view of cognitions being many and diverse.¹²¹

Recognition could get its common character elsewhere than from the ātman. The Buddhists constantly avoid allowing anything a positive essence. They do not subscribe to the view that there are universals residing in things which separate them from other things which possess other universals.¹²² Neither do they subscribe

to the idea that words have a positive meaning, but rather the meanings of words come from 'the negation of other things' (apoha).¹²³ So in their characteristic way they do not allow consciousness any positive basis like the ātman. In its place they propose that what unites consciousness is that it is different from non-consciousness. There is thus no positive homogeneity (ātman) in consciousness but rather a bunch of conscious moments which possess no similarity other than the fact that they are not non-conscious. The common character which 'unites' all cognitions could be that they are all different from non-cognition. Re-cognition could operate just as before, but without the ātman. Kumārila goes too far when he reifies this mutual difference from non-cognition into an entity. There is no need to make this uneconomical assumption. We might ask Kumārila, who insists on reifying conscious moments into this entity, the ātman, must you not also reify non-consciousness into an actually existing entity too?

Thus when a horse is seen by a man one day and a cow the next, the statement 'I saw the horse yesterday and I see the cow today' need not mean the same ātman ('I') had both cognitions. The recognition of 'I' in this instance, is, according to the Buddhists, based not on a truly existing ātman, but on the fact that both cognitions are different from non-cognition. The arising of this

re-cognising awareness which occurs in vastly differing times and places need not prove anything more than this: all the periodic occurrences are different from non-cognition.

One cannot help but feel uneasy with this explanation of recognition offered by Śāntarakṣita. 'Being different from non-cognition' is a double negative: 'not non-cognition' is the same as saying 'cognition.' Whereas it may be true that there is no need to postulate the ātman there still must be a distinguishing characteristic in all conscious moments in order for them to be distinguished from non-conscious moments. It would seem that it must be the case that all conscious moments are marked off by a positive common characteristic. This establishes continuity and is undesirable for the Buddhists.

Normally the Buddhists avoid the 'permanent thing'¹²⁴ (sāsvatavāda) position by something more substantial than a negative assertion as is given in TS. 263. In fact, in another section of the TS.¹²⁵ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla give a full description of how all continuity, similarity, universals, god, the ātman, etc. can be accounted for without the necessity of positing any permanent thing in the universe. In the next part of this section we will look at this Buddhist account of a world in which nothing lasts beyond one moment and try to give a critical estimate in the conclusion of how successful the Buddhists are. For

now it will suffice to say that there is a positive and fully developed theory behind TS. 263 involving one of the three characteristics¹²⁶ of all things, and that especially important in the discussion of the Buddhist account of continuity within momentariness is the concept of vāsanās (perfuming impression,¹²⁷ habit-energy,¹²⁸ bhāvanā or universal force which propels life,¹²⁹ or kleśa¹³⁰). In the midst of a negative statement on the part of any Mahāyāna Buddhist is always the belief in the reality of an absolute (bhūtatathatā),¹³¹ and that men who follow the path of Buddhism to its end will see things as they truly are (yathābhūtam).¹³² These negative statements are meant to free the disciple from clinging to anything for support. They are not meant to be actual accounts of physical reality.

Kamalaśīla, perhaps sensing the weakness of a bare negative statement like TS. 263, immediately points out, and rightly so, that:

It is only when cognitions are many, and not when they are not many, that the said recognition can be explained as being brought about by the 'exclusion of all that is not homogeneous to it.'¹³³

An eternal consciousness could never have more than one cognition, so Kamalaśīla implies that even with the admission of there being two cognitions (which there must be for re-cognition to take place), Kumāṛila gives up the ātman as an eternal entity.

We can point out that this is another instance which brings to light the elementary lack of agreement in interpreting the facts of experience, between the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila. The Buddhists insist that if the ātman is of the nature of caitanya/consciousness, it must only exist periodically, when there is actual cognising going on. Kumārila equally insists that if such were the case all order, memory, re-cognition and continuity is totally inexplicable.¹³⁴

TS. 264-267 further set up Kumārila's theory for refutation. Kumārila has said that even when going through the various states of happiness, etc., the ātman never renounces his character of being a permanent, substantial entity.¹³⁵ He has said that on the appearance of a new state of 'happiness' the old state of 'unhappiness' does not become totally destroyed but is merged into the common character of the ātman as consciousness.¹³⁶ The states in their own forms are incompatible but all are compatible with the ātman.¹³⁷ To this the Buddhists address the following inquiry:

If the states are not entirely different from the soul, then there should be destruction and origination of the soul also, following upon the destruction and origination of the states.¹³⁸

If the states are the same as the ātman, the ātman is non-eternal; if different; no karma.

If there be presence of contradictory properties,

then there should be absolute difference; just as in the case of your souls which are absolutely different from each other, through the distinctive character belonging to each of them.¹³⁹

Kamalaśīla adds:

If it be held that destruction and origination pertain to the states only, not to the soul, so that the two (the states and the soul) have two contradictory properties of 'origination' and 'non-origination', then there must be difference between them; just as in the case of souls, which are many, each has its own character restricted to himself, and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference.¹⁴⁰

These are solid Buddhist arguments which clearly bring out the indefensibility of the Mīmāṃsā position. It is hard to see how Kumāṛila can get around such devastating logic. In fact, he never does. Kamalaśīla continues:

The argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them; e.g. among souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes, the states of happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes; hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they cannot be non-different).¹⁴¹

The next text refutes the idea of Kumāṛila that upon the appearance of 'happiness' the preceeding state of 'unhappiness' is not entirely destroyed:

If your 'states' become merged into the soul in their own form, then, on the appearance of happiness, unhappiness also should be felt.¹⁴²

Kamalaśīla adds¹⁴³ that the states of 'happiness' and 'unhappiness' can become merged in the common ātman either in their own form or in some other form. If the

former, 'happiness' should be felt at the same time as 'unhappiness' as neither have given up their own form and both have the common character of 'feeling'. If the states gave up this common character of 'feeling' we could never become aware of them separately or simultaneously. If the latter alternative is opted for Śāntarakṣita says:

...when there is transference of one form to something, there can be no transference of another form. So that if the states become transferred (merged into the soul) in their own form, then the soul also would be liable to origination.¹⁴⁴

'Thing' or 'state' implies a retention of same form through time. If the defining characteristic of a thing is given up, i.e. 'happiness' is no longer 'happy', then the thing cannot be said to continue without its defining characteristic. In the same way, the ātman as caitanya/consciousness cannot be said to continue even when there is no cognising going on.

TS. 272 deals with the assertion by Kumārīla that the ātman's character of 'doer' and 'enjoyer' belong to the ātman itself; that actions accrue to the ātman and not to the states. It follows that the characters of the ātman (doer, enjoyer) do not depend on the states of 'happiness' etc., for the characters of doer and enjoyer are like the ātman, constant and enduring. The Buddhists answer:

If the characters of doer and experiencer are not dependent upon the state, then the said characters cannot belong to the soul, as they can belong to only one who has that state.¹⁴⁵

Kamalaśīla formulates it thus :

One who has not abandoned his previous states of non-doer and non-experiencer can never do or experience ...and the soul never abandons its state of non-doer and non-experiencer; hence we find (in the assertion concerned) conditions contrary to the more extensive character.¹⁴⁷

Reference is made in the same commentary to Dignāga who is recorded by Kamalaśīla as having said:

...if the fact of the soul being modified on the appearance of cognition meant the non-eternity of that soul, then, there can be no cogniser in the shape of the soul not modified.¹⁴⁸

Kumārila would answer such a position, according to Kamalaśīla, with the statement that he does not object to the ātman being called non-eternal if non-eternal means only liability to modification but not complete destruction.¹⁴⁹ Śāntaraksita counters:

...we are not denying the fact of the soul being spoken of by the term 'eternal'; but on account of its form being subject to modification, there must be destruction of it.¹⁵⁰

Kamalaśīla explains:

...we are not denying the fact of the soul being spoken of as 'eternal', on the ground that sentience [consciousness], which is in a state of perpetual flux, continues undestroyed, along with its cause, as long as the world lasts. But its form, nature, being subject to modification, as there is always the abandoning of preceding and the appearance of the succeeding form, its liability to destruction is clearly indicated.¹⁵¹

TS. 274 deals with the example of the serpent who assumes 'coiled form' at one time and 'straight form' at another time, all the while maintaining the same eternal form of 'serpent'.¹⁵² Śāntaraksita answers with:

The serpent also is liable to become crooked [coiled] and so forth, because it is subject to perpetual flux; if it had a permanent form, then, like the soul, it could never come by another state.¹⁵⁵

Now it was argued by Kumārila¹⁵⁴ that the cognition of 'I' in 'I know' can have as its object none other than the ātman. Thus the existence of the ātman can be directly and definitely perceived in the assertion 'I know'. To this Śāntaraksita answers:

As a matter of fact, the 'notion of I' comes about without a real basis, through the force of the beginningless seed of the vision of being [satkāyadrsti]; and that also only in some places.¹⁵⁵

Kamalaśīla comments that the 'notion of I' is not caused by the ātman but by satkāyadrsti (the vision of the existing body) and that the 'seed' (bijā) of this vision is the potency of dispositions [vāsanāśahti] and that this seed is beginningless. All of this, the arising of the illusory notion of 'I' comes about "...only in the internal economy of the sextuple body [adhyāturaniyata iva sadāyatane]."¹⁵⁶

Someone may inquire as to why the notion of 'I' does not appear everywhere? To this the Buddhists reply:

It is only some (not all) impressions [samskāras] that secure the requisite potency for bringing about the said notion apprehending that particular form; hence it does not appear everywhere.

If this were not so, the objection in question could be urged with equal force against your 'soul' also; but all difficulties are removed by the fact that there is diversity in its potencies.¹⁵⁷

Kamalaśīla explains:

...even when the 'I-notion' is held to have the

soul for its basis, the objection in question would apply with equal force: Why does the said notion not appear in connection with another soul also? It might be answered that 'it is not so because of the restrictions imposed by the potency of things', then, for us also the same answer would be available, that the notion appears only in regard to some internal objects, and not in regard¹⁵⁸ to all. So that all difficulties would be removed.

So the difficulty of explaining why the notion of 'I' does not appear everywhere or the reason why all 'ātmans' do not cognise the same 'I' is the same explanation: the restrictions imposed by the potency of things. But this does not prove the Buddhist point that the 'I' notion does not have the ātman as its cause. The proof of this is in the following:

If the said notion (of 'I') had an eternal thing for its basis, then all 'I-notions' would come about all at once, as their efficient cause would be always present. If it had a non-eternal basis, then all these notions would be equally clearly manifest. Hence (it follows) that the other parties needlessly raise questions regarding the existence of the basis of the said 'I-notion'.¹⁵⁹

The 'I-notion' has a cause that must be either eternal or non-eternal. If it was eternal all 'I-notions' should appear simultaneously as their efficient cause is always present. We can prove from experience that the notion of 'I' comes and goes and is thus proven to have succession and not simultaneity as its characteristic.

Kumārila has argued¹⁶⁰ that 'impressions' (in TS. 280-281 'disposition': both words translate 'vāsanās') could bring about recognition of things without the ātman

but that the idea of 'I' present in diverse cognitions could never arise unless the diverse cognising moments were identical in that they all have as their basis the same ātman. This cognition of 'I' would never arise, according to Kumārila, unless it had a substantial referent as its object of cognition. If there were absolute distinction between the present and past cognisers, as the Buddhists say, there would be no possibility of the notion of 'I' arising. This cognition of being the same cogniser through time is not illusion, according to Kumārila, for cognitions bring knowledge of a thing as it is, and not as it is not: "...for 'impressions' [vāsanās] are not a cause of mistaken notions..."¹⁶¹ To this the Buddhists answer:

How is it that, entirely from dispositions [vāsanās] such diverse illusions come about as those that devotees have in regard to God and other beings as being the cause of things and so forth?¹⁶²

The concept of 'vāsanā'¹⁶³ is closely tied in with the Buddhist view of all produced things being subject to conditioning (karma). Many devotees of non-Buddhist sects have imperfect ideas concerning this or that aspect of cognition which arises from the karmic process. Because of their lack of the full understanding of things they arrive at various wrong ideas solely on the basis of 'dispositions'.¹⁶⁴ When things are fully understood these mistaken notions about reality no longer are held.

In his commentary to the above text, Kamalaśīla

notes that it is entirely from the 'dispositions' that the idea of God arises and Kumārila, like the Buddhists, denies the existence of God. The implication is left by Kamalaśīla that if Kumārila denies the existence of God, how can he hold that the ātman has a real substantial background?

Thus Śantarakṣita finishes his treatment of the Mīmāṃsā theory of the ātman by saying:

...the baselessness of 'I-consciousness having been established, there can be no cogniser who could be apprehended by the said 'notion of I'. Hence among all valid forms of cognition, there is not one which is found able to supply a fit example; and the reasons also that have been adduced in due course are found to be 'unproven' regarding their substratum.¹⁶⁵

Kamalaśīla adds "Hence the existence of the 'soul' is not proved."¹⁶⁶

Chapter IV

Examination of the Buddhist Theory of Impermanence.

So far we have seen that according to Kumārila the ātman is a continuous intelligent entity of the nature of caitanya (sentience). The Buddhists have pointed out some serious difficulties in this idea of the ātman. Their arguments are incisive. The heart of the difficulty with Kumārila's theory is that it wants to attribute contradictory characteristics to a homogeneous unity.

The difficulties the Buddhists point out are serious enough to make Kumārila's position indefensible on this important topic of the ātman.

After casting doubt on the existence of the ātman the onus is now on the Buddhists to make our experience intelligible. Logically, it would seem that the continuous parts of our experience (i.e. memory, recognition) require the ātman. But the same logic, used so well by the Buddhists, militates against the acceptance of contradictory attributes (non-eternality of the functioning of sense-cognition) in the unchanging, eternal ātman.

Now the Buddhists must try to explain our experience without any recourse to ideas of a continuous substantial entity like the ātman. This they forfeit. Our assessment of their

degree of success or failure at this task we leave to our conclusion.

We now examine the Buddhist theory of momentariness as it is explained in the TS.

We have noted¹⁶⁷ that anitya (impermanence) is one of the three marks (lāksanā) of all things (duḥkham—pain, ill, suffering; and anātman—not-self are usually derived from the first mark).¹⁶⁸ The centrality of the idea of impermanence is reiterated by Kamalaśīla near the beginning of the section on impermanence in the TS. when he says "...in reality, the whole purpose of our philosophy reaches its culminating point in this examination of the 'permanent character' of things."¹⁶⁹ It will be shown that there are no things which have this 'permanent character'.

In this examination of the Buddhists, all entities that other schools posit as enduring beyond one moment, such as God, Prakṛti (primordial matter), ātman, Words of the Veda (which words Kumāṛila holds to be eternal¹⁷⁰); etc.; all of these will "...become discarded at a single stroke..."¹⁷¹

The Buddhists speak of their dharma (teaching) as mobile¹⁷² (cala) or impermanent.¹⁷³ The Buddhists hold the view of vyāvṛttiḥ (exclusion) as opposed to the view of anugamaḥ (inclusion).¹⁷⁴ No-thing has a permanent own-form or permanent internal nature. All things are momentary

(kṣanika). TS. 352 brings in two ideas that oppose this Buddhist premise:

Some people hold that there are two classes of things--created and uncreated; others have held that the two classes of things are momentary and non-momentary.¹⁷⁵

Both of these theses are not acceptable to the Buddhists for whom there is only one class of things: momentary. The commentary to the above text tells us that the Nyāya and others regard the atom, for example, as uncreated and the jar and such things made from atoms as created. Others, like the Vātsīputrīyas, believe that such things as the earth and space (ākāśa) are eternal whereas cognition, sound, light-rays, etc., are momentary. TS. 353-355 set out why 'created' things are in perpetual flux:

Among these, all those things that are 'created' are in 'perpetual flux', because, as regards their destruction, all of them are entirely independent.

When a certain thing does not need any other cause for the bringing about of a certain condition, that condition should be regarded as attaching to it permanently, because, out of its own causes, that thing appears in that condition; just as the causal conditions are independently, by themselves, capable of producing their effect; and all the things that are produced are independent of all else in the matter of their destruction.¹⁷⁶

All things must be permanently attached to their own destruction (nāśa--extinction, termination, disintegration). No outside forces acting on the thing destroys it for this outside thing would have its own separate, momentary internal nature and as such it could in no way contact or

effect the thing it is supposed to destroy. If things are permanently attached to their own destruction their destruction must follow immediately upon their being created from their causes. Therefore 'created' things are momentary. 'Out of its own causes' the thing appears and 'out of its own causes' it disappears. If the thing does not bring itself into existence on its own and take itself out of existence on its own nothing else could: for nothing else could be the cause and at the same time be non-homogeneous with the thing. If it is homogeneous with the thing it is the thing: the two are identical.

Someone may object:

The reason put forward is inconclusive: Even though things are independent regarding their destruction, yet is it quite possible that the destruction of a thing may come about at some other time and at some other place; so that it cannot prove the immediate destruction of the thing, which is desired by the upholder of the 'Perpetual Elux', the doctrine of all things being 'momentary'.¹⁷⁷

Śāntarakṣita responds:

Eventhough independent, if the destruction were to come at another place and time, the, on account of its being dependent on those, the thing could not be regarded as 'independent'.¹⁷⁸

The objection is raised that for example, the jar awaits its destruction at the stroke of the bludgeon.¹⁷⁹ This shows that the jar is not the cause of its own destruction and that the jar depends on other conditions for its destruction. In addition, the jar cannot be momentary because until the bludgeon destroys it, it endures.

Also such things as words and cognitions are known to be independent with regard to their own destruction (they pass away of their own accord, unlike the jar which endures until it is struck by the bludgeon), yet even words and cognitions depend on time and place for their appearance. This shows them not to be entirely independent for if they were so they would appear regardless of whether certain other conditions were right. (Seeing-cognition needs the eye, enough light, the object, etc.). Śāntarakṣita responds:

All produced things are always and everywhere independent in regard to their destruction; as in this matter, all causes of destruction are entirely inefficacious.

For instance, the 'destructive cause' cannot be rightly regarded as the bringer about of a 'destruction' which is not-different from the thing itself; as the positive thing is produced from its own cause.

When a certain thing that comes out of its cause is without parts, the 'Destruction' that would be imposed upon it by other causes must be of the same nature.¹⁸⁰

When there is destruction of something this destruction can either be an entity or a non-entity.¹⁸¹

TS. 358-362 deal with the first alternative; TS. 363-366 with the second.

First, if destruction is thought of as being an entity it must have a cause as all entities are caused, according to the Buddhists.¹⁸² So if 'destruction' is an entity it must have a cause which can be labelled the 'cause of destruction' or the 'destructive cause'. If this is accepted then it follows that the 'cause of destruction'

must be either the same or different than the entity 'destruction' which it causes. All positive entities come out of causes which are not-different from themselves.¹⁸³ 'Destruction' comes out of its own causes just as the 'Thing' which it is to destroy comes out of its own causes, for both are equally entities. So it cannot be right to suppose that the 'cause of destruction' brings about an entity 'destruction' which is the same as the 'thing' which it is to destroy (see second text in the above quote). Now when a positive entity is produced out of its causes "...it must be produced in its entire form..."¹⁸⁴ It appears full-blown, complete and as a finished whole with nothing left to be completed. This is so because the positive thing produced from its causes cannot have two natures: complete and incomplete.¹⁸⁵ Now if 'Destruction' and 'Thing' both are produced full-blown and complete from their own causes how can 'Destruction' which is a complete finished entity have one more thing to do, i.e., destroy 'Thing'?

Plainly then, if 'Destruction' is held, by the opponent of the Buddhist, to be an entity which comes out of a 'cause of destruction' which is the same as itself, 'Destruction' could never destroy 'Thing'. What if 'Destruction' is thought of as an entity that comes from a 'cause of destruction' that is different from the 'thing'? Santaraksīta shows that this alternative is also impossible.¹⁸⁶

If the destruction that is brought about is something different from the thing, then there is nothing produced in the thing itself by those other causes (of the said destruction); so that the effects, like the apprehension of the thing and other phenomena, should continue as before. And as the thing continues to remain in the same condition, it is not possible¹⁸⁷ that there should be any 'concealment' etc., of it.

The Buddhists allow two types of relationship between things: identity (tādātmyam) and 'being produced out of it' (tadatpattiḥ).¹⁸⁸ Ex hypothesi the relationship cannot be one of identity. Neither can the relationship between 'destruction' and 'thing' be that of 'being produced out of it', for each are produced out of their own causes.¹⁸⁹ There are no other real relationships between things according to the Buddhists.¹⁹⁰

The reference to 'concealment' in the above quote is in answer to the objection that:

...when the thing becomes concealed, or obstructed by the destruction, which is something different from it, it ceases to produce such effects as its own apprehension and the like.¹⁹¹

Kamalaśīla explains Śāntarakṣita's answer as follows:

Nothing is possible as a 'concealer' or 'obstructor' of a thing unless it removes its properties or does not produce them; if it were it would lead to absurdities. Hence it follows that, on account of its previous nature being unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, there can be no 'concealment' or 'obstruction' of the thing.¹⁹²

Above¹⁹³ we spoke of two alternatives for destruction: that it must either be an entity or a non-entity. We have seen that if destruction is viewed

as a separate entity from the thing that it is supposed to destroy it could never destroy the thing for two reasons: 1) if the cause of 'destruction' as an entity is the same as the cause of the thing it is to destroy, 'destruction' and 'thing' would become identical which is what the Buddhists desire. 2) if the cause of the entity 'destruction' is different than the cause of the 'thing' it is to destroy, both 'destruction' and 'thing' would be full-blown, complete entities and 'destruction' could not possess contradictory characteristics (complete and incomplete) and be an entity which has attained its entire form. Now we deal with the second of the above alternatives, that destruction be considered as a non-entity.

If it be held that 'The destruction (nāśa) brought about is of the nature of the 'negation of entity', otherwise called 'disruption' (pradhvamsa), there can be no reasonable cause for that also. If negation were an effect then it would be an entity, like the sprout and other effects; because while there is possibility of its being regarded as something 'not produced', it is found to come about through the potency of a cause.¹⁹⁴

What is an effect is always an entity not a non-entity. If destruction is thought of as 'disruption' (pradhvamsa), it must either be an entity or a non-entity. If the former, is it different or the same as that which it is to destroy? In both cases no destruction. If it is, on the other hand, said to be a non-entity there would be no power in it to produce results, no efficiency in

producing effects. Therefore, no destruction of 'thing' would occur in this case also.

Another explanation of destruction that opposes the Buddhist theory is that negation is brought about by affirmation in the form of 'preclusion' (paryudāśa--exception). Kamalaśīla explains:

...through the speaker's choice sometimes even an entity is spoken of as a different form (negation) of some other entity.¹⁹⁵

This objection is open to the same difficulties as the others with regard to the difference or non-difference of 'destruction' from the thing which is destroyed. If the cause of destruction brings about a 'destruction' which is negation in the form of 'preclusion', 'destruction' must be of the same nature as the thing negated, and if this is so the Buddhist position is adopted by the opponent.

It may be further argued that "...what is brought about by the causes of 'destruction' is negation, not in the form of 'preclusion' but in the form of the absolute negation."¹⁹⁶ If this is so Śāntaraksita answers:

If it be held that 'what is meant by 'destruction' is the negation of effective action and this does not bring about a positive entity', even so, it becomes established that what brings about the destruction cannot be its 'cause' because it is devoid of the character of 'cause'.¹⁹⁷

The defining characteristic of a cause is that it acts. 'Negation' as the nature of 'destruction' would mean that the cause of destruction produces something which

is not a positive entity. This leads Kamalaśīla to question: "...how can a thing devoid of action be a 'cause'?"¹⁹⁸

Now objections are brought against Buddhists by Aviddhakarna¹⁹⁹ and Uddyotakara.²⁰⁰ The Buddhists say destruction has no cause because destruction, apart from the thing itself does not exist. The thing self-disintegrates. Disintegration arrives with the thing. Destruction is not something extraneous. Just as the thing needs nothing but itself to flash into existence, it needs nothing to terminate it save its own nature. If the thing required some other cause in any way, in even the slightest degree it would not be unique. If each moment is not itself efficient at producing its effect how can it maintain its own internal self nature (non-efficient) for awhile and then when a helper comes along, trade in its 'non-efficient' internal self-nature for the contrary 'efficient'? This is impossible for a thing to do and yet maintain its own homogeneous identity. The inner nature of a non-efficient moment can have no connection with the inner nature of an efficient moment. Between these opposites there is no trace of a hook, tie or bind. The Buddhists say that destruction has no cause for these above reasons.

Aviddhakarna says destruction must have a cause because it arises at a particular time: "If it were

independent (of all causes), then this occasional character would be impossible..."²⁰¹

Aviddhakarna believes that destruction can only come immediately after the thing has come into existence. Destruction could not be present before the thing or the thing would never come into existence. Nor can destruction be present at the time the thing comes into existence for then again, the thing would never come into existence. Nor can the destruction come very long after the thing has come into existence for if this was so the thing would endure and be eternal. He therefore concludes that destruction must come immediately after the thing has come into existence. Destruction thus has a particularised time which requires that it have a separate cause.

If the Buddhists have shown that the thing and its destruction must occur together or there would never be destruction, Aviddhakarna hopes to show that if the thing and destruction are not separated, the thing could never appear.

Kamalaśīla renders Uddyotakara's objection to the Buddhist theory as follows:

One who declares that 'there is no cause for destruction' should be questioned as follows: Does this mean that there being no cause for destruction, destruction does not exist (come into existence) at all, like the 'sky-lotus'? or that having no cause, it is eternal (everlasting), like ākāśa and other things? According to your view what is causeless is found to be of two kinds, eternal and non-existent, there is no other alternative to these two--existence

and non-existence: Now, if being without a cause, destruction is non-existent, then all things must be eternal; as there is no destruction at all. And the idea that 'all properties become destroyed' becomes, in this case, baseless; because when there is no movement, the idea of anything 'moving' is impossible. If, on the other hand, having no cause, destruction is eternal, then it becomes possible for it to co-exist with the thing (destroyed), as the destruction would always be there. And this would be highly improper, as the presence and absence of a thing are mutually negatory. If then the said co-existence is not admitted, then there can be no producing of any effect, as its contrary, the destruction of the effect would be there always; and when a thing is not produced at all, there can be no destruction of it; for instance, such unproduced things as the 'hare's horns' are not known among people to be destroyed; hence any such assertion as that 'there is destruction of what has not been produced' cannot be in keeping with reason. 202

Śāntaraksita responds to these above objections by saying:

What sort of 'destruction' is it (the causelessness of) which the other people object to? (a) Is it the 'momentary existence' of things, as explained by us? Or the 'cessation of the form of the entity', called 'disruption' (dhvamsa, annihilation)? If it is the former there is no quarrel. 203

It is not right to say the Buddhists hold destruction to be causeless because the cause of destruction and the cause of the thing are identical. Neither is it right to say of the Buddhist theory that it holds destruction to have a cause separate from the thing for the thing (entity) and the 'destruction' are the same: they arise together. Thus the Buddhist position is not that destruction is uncaused but that destruction is 'disintegration'. Destruction as disintegration does not leave any room for an outside cause of destruction. Of the two types of

destruction mentioned in the above quote, (a) is held by the Buddhists and (b) is not held by the Buddhists.

Śāntarakṣita says in the above quote that the Buddhists fully acknowledge that destruction (disintegration) '(a)' is caused but that the 'cause of destruction' is the thing's own nature. Thus there can be no substance to the opponents charge that the Buddhists hold destruction to have no cause.²⁰⁴

As for the second type of destruction, this the Buddhists "...regard as being without cause, on the ground of there being nothing else (which could be its cause)."²⁰⁵ If the jar and such things were not continually disintegrating nothing outside of the jar could destroy it, for the outside cause must be either the same or not the same as the thing destroyed and in either case there is no destruction.

With specific reference to the objection of Aviddhakarna that destruction can only come at one specific time and that is immediately after the thing has come into existence Śāntarakṣita replies:

The character of 'coming immediately after the thing' does not subsist in the destruction as described; because destruction in the form of the mobile (momentary) thing appears along with the thing itself.²⁰⁶

Unless destruction forms "...the very nature of the thing..."²⁰⁷ it could never destroy it.

Śāntarakṣita has shown that destruction as

annihilation (dhvamsa) can have no cause and is thus not an entity. If, on the other hand it is a caused entity it still cannot destroy the 'thing' for its essence would not be identical to the 'thing'. If the essences of the 'destruction' and the 'thing' are the same then the Buddhist position is adopted by the objector. All entities are caused and momentary. There is no room in the Buddhist system for an uncaused eternal thing. Only momentary things are efficient at producing effects and in order for things to have this momentary character they must be independent with regard to their disintegration. So Sāntarakṣita writes:

Thus then, the destruction being there, things cannot be eternal; and the notion that 'things are destructible' cannot be baseless.²⁰⁸

What has no existence cannot come into existence at any time let alone immediately after the 'thing' as aviddhakarna thinks is the case with 'destruction'. In addition:

When it is said that 'there is annihilation of the thing', what is meant is that 'the thing is not here'. And it is not meant to convey the affirmation (prediction) of anything.²⁰⁹

If 'annihilation' were the same as 'momentary thing' it would all be as the Buddhists say. If 'annihilation' were different from 'momentary thing' it would have a non-momentary nature. Now if 'annihilation' were affirmed with regard to 'momentary thing', how is it the

'momentary thing' ceases to exist seeing how 'annihilation' is a permanent entity? Thus it is plain that when the Buddhists speak of 'annihilation' they must be understood as positing no-thing beyond the momentary thing.²¹⁰

In addition, Śāntarakṣita stresses that the opponents of the Buddhists should not be overly concerned about the words the Buddhists use to express their thoughts about momentariness for the existence and non-existence of things is not affected by the mere use of words.²¹¹

Śāntarakṣita says:

The mere naming of a person as a donkey does not lead to the attribution of the whole character of the ass to that person.²¹²

Uddyotakara has argued, according to TS. 371 that all things would be eternal if destruction were absent.

Śāntarakṣita replies:

...the existence of any 'destruction of things' of the nature of 'annihilation' is not admitted; because the 'destruction of a thing' consists in the dissociation of a particular form, and not in the negation of its existence.²¹³

The Buddhists stop at what is observed.²¹⁴ In a dispute involving not objective scientific knowledge but soteriological methodology the Buddhists (and the majority of Indian schools) rely on what is observed during meditation and not on the scatter-brained assertions of the 'experience' of ordinary people.²¹⁵ Ultimately, when even sweet reason fails, the final arbitrator is, for the Buddhists, the word of Buddha.²¹⁶ 'Destruction' as a

separate entity is never observed: all that is observed is the arising, the momentary enduring and the passing away of things, perceptions, etc. and all of this during meditation. The ordinary way of seeing things is suppressed.²¹⁷ Questions which a scientific mind feels must be answered such as where these dharmas²¹⁸ (cognitions, feelings, sensation) come from and where they go, etc., are the types of questions which seem unimportant to a Buddhist who meditates and observes these things for himself.²¹⁹

The Buddhist theories of momentariness and dependent co-production (pratītyasamutpāda), to take two major trusses from the Buddhist bridge, are accepted by the Buddhists themselves as a methodology out of which to move towards liberation. If they fail to make satisfactory philosophical theory it may be because they were never intended as such. If they fail to answer questions that seem to beg for answers on a logical level it may be because if someone is a Buddhist in a monastery practicing the prescribed methods of self-annihilation logical questions are put aside and replaced by faith in the Three Treasures.²²⁰ All of this may be disappointing to a certain type of person who demands that everything be rationally explicable and logically capable of proof. Such a person would never find himself in a Buddhist monastery where people strive for release not explanations. This is not to say Buddhism is not reasonable. It just

means that Buddhism like all other structures (including the hard sciences²²¹) have a point of departure which is not capable of further explanation or reduction and that if a sceptic chooses he can doubt this too. Categorical skeptics, like fanatical believers, share a common dislike for moderation. In their rush to finalize things they lose the ability to listen.

Destruction as disintegration is a thing that really happens, according to the Buddhists. Yet they see no reason for the tendency of the opponent to reify this disintegration into an entity. Śāntarakṣita says:

When it is asserted that 'destruction is of the nature of cessation', it does not mean the affirmation of its positive character; it only denies the continuity of the particular form of the thing beyond one moment. Thus no lasting form is affirmed in regard to the 'annihilation', and there is no room for the alternative that it is eternal.²²²

Uddyotakara has argued,²²³ according to the Buddhists, that "...what is causeless is found to be of two kinds-- eternal and non-existent..."²²⁴ This, says Uddyotakara, is the Buddhist view. Kamalaśīla says this is not the Buddhist view and this shows that Uddyotakara is ignorant of the true Buddhist view:

As a matter of fact, for Buddhists who are fully conversant with logic,²²⁵ what is without cause must be non-existent...

The Buddhists do not allow a caused, eternal thing. The only things which exist are caused things and if a thing is caused it is momentary.

In the same commentary Kamalaśīla deals with the

further question: .

When a thing is produced from its cause, is it produced sometimes as evanescent by its very nature, and sometimes as not evanescent (eternal)?²²⁶

With regard to the first alternative that the thing is produced from its own cause as evanescent (momentary) a separate external cause to effect the destruction of the thing would be inefficacious:

For instance, like the things that are bright or fluid or solid and the like, when produced, are produced along with these properties, and they do not depend on another cause for the bringing about of these properties.²²⁷

To this the following objection is raised:

In the case of the seed and such things, it is found that though the seed has the nature of producing the sprout, yet by itself it cannot produce it, it needs the help of other causes in the shape of water and such things, and in the same way, though the thing may have the evanescent nature, yet for its destruction it would require other causes.²²⁸

Kamalaśīla replies:

This cannot be right; because what is regarded as the 'cause' of a thing is what brings it about in its final complete form; nothing else is regarded as its 'cause'. So when a thing has a certain nature, it must produce it by itself, and it does not need another cause. If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it is because such productivity does not constitute its 'nature': it may be called 'the cause of the Cause' (of the sprout), not the direct cause: so that this does not vitiate our position.²²⁹

On the other hand, if the view is taken that the thing is produced as non-evanescent (eternal) it becomes even clearer that a cause of destruction would be inefficacious. Kamalaśīla writes:

If the alternative view be accepted, that when the thing is produced in the non-evanescent (permanent) form, then, for that also, any cause for its destruction would be entirely inefficacious; because any change in the nature of such a thing would be impossible. Because if the nature of a thing were not destroyed immediately after its production, then, later on also, as the same character of permanent standing would be there, what is there that would be done by the 'cause of destruction', by virtue of which the thing could be destroyed.²³⁰

To this the objection may be raised:

In the case of copper and other things it is found that, though they are solid, yet, on contact of fire, their condition becomes changed; similarly though the thing may be naturally indestructible, the cause of its destruction may change its condition; and by reason of this, it may become destroyed on its coming into contact with the Cause of Destruction.²³¹

Kamalaśīla answers:

This cannot be right; as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes changed; because 'change' consists in the production of another nature or character; now this 'change' that you speak of-- is it something different from the thing itself? or is it the thing itself? It cannot be the thing itself; as that has already been produced by its own cause (and hence could not be produced again by the cause of that change). If it is something different from the thing, then the thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence; so that it has not changed. As regards the example of copper and other things, that is not admissible. Because what happens in their case (according to us) is that the preceding 'solid-moment' of the copper being inherently perishable (destructible) becomes destroyed by itself, then under the influence of such auxiliary causes as fire and the like, there is produced, out of its own constituents and other circumstances, a different character in the shape of fluidity; again this character of fluidity, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of solidity. So that there is no change of one and the same thing.

Thus the 'Cause of Destruction' is in every way infructuous; and our reason is not 'unproven'.

Nor is our reason 'contradictory'; as what is put forward does actually happen according to our view.

Nor is the reason 'inconclusive'; as it has been already established before.²³²

In our conclusion we will criticise this view of the Buddhists on the ground that causation is not satisfactorily explicable in this above manner. For now we will just move on.

Śāntarakṣita next says something on the category of 'uncreated things' (see above p. 73-74).

The ākāśa and other things which have been held to be 'uncreated' are really non-existent, in the form of 'entities'; as they are devoid of all potentiality; hence there can be no room for attributing to them any such alternative characters as that of 'momentariness' or 'non-momentariness'; whereby they could be regarded even as an 'entity', be it either momentary or otherwise.²³³

In response to the question "Why cannot the question of momentariness or non-momentariness arise in regard to a non-entity?"²³⁴ Śāntarakṣita responds:

That thing is said to be 'momentary' whose form persists for a moment; while that thing is said to be 'non-momentary' which is endowed with a lasting (permanent) form.²³⁵

The commentary to TS. 387 introduces an argument which hinges on a point of grammar. Kamalaśīla attributes this objection to Uddyotakara:

The term 'ksanika' ('momentary') contains the possessive affix ('thañ'²³⁶ by Panjikā 5-2-115); how does this affix come in?

Uddyotakara, according to Kamalaśīla, goes on to point out that ksana cannot be ksanika (that which has

destruction) because of the difference in time:

...that is, at the time there is destruction, the thing to which it belongs is not there (having ceased to exist); and the possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times.²³⁷

Uddyotakara is convinced language about reality and reality itself are equivalent. For him, a linguistic problem means there is a corresponding problem in reality and visa versa. He seems to not suspect language. He continues, according to Kamalaśīla:

If (with a view to escaping from that difficulty) it be held that the positive entity itself, as qualified by its impending destruction, is what is spoken of as 'ksanika', ('momentary'), even so, it is not possible for the thing qualified by the destruction to be spoken of as possessing that destruction; and thus also the use of the possessive affix would be unjustifiable. If what is meant by things being 'ksanika' 'momentary', is that the time of their existence is only one moment; and that having posited the 'ksana', 'moment', as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things 'momentary' which continue to exist only during that point of time; then this also cannot be right; because the Buddhist admits of time only as a mere name (a hypothetical entity, without reality); and it is not right for what is a mere name to be regarded as the qualification of an entity.²³⁸

These objections are answered in the following texts of Śāntarakṣita:

That form of the thing which does not persist after its production is what is called 'ksana', 'moment'; and that which has this form is held to be 'ksanika', 'momentary'.

Even when there is no difference between two things, there is nothing to prevent the notion of 'this belonging to that'; as every expressive word is applied in accordance with an arbitrary whim.

What is meant to be spoken of (by the term 'ksanika', 'momentary') is the thing that does not continue to exist

after its coming into existence; and that term may be used either with the affix or without the affix (to which Uddyotakara has taken objection).²³⁹

Saying the momentary thing possesses its own' destruction does not prove that these two are separate.. Verbal expressions are not necessarily used in accordance with the true state of things. Someone may use the expression 'one's own nature' which seems to indicate difference between the self and its nature when they are really one and the same.²⁴⁰

Thus Śāntarakṣita has proven that if ākāśa, etc., are held to be uncreated they must be non-existent. Now he will show that if these things exist they must be momentary.

...whatever things are existent are all in a state of perpetual flux, just as all created things have been shown to be; these things, ākāśa [vyōma-ether], time [kāla], God [Īśvara], and the rest are held by you to be existent; these could never have an existence if they were devoid of momentariness; because permanent things cannot have any fruitful activity, either successively or simultaneously, therefore they are held to be non-existent.²⁴¹

A thing is found to produce its effect either simultaneously or successively: there is no middle. Why cannot the permanent thing have successive fruitful activity? This is answered by Śāntarakṣita:

Effects are delayed on account of the non-proximity of the cause. If the efficient cause were there, to what would the delay be due?²⁴²

Kamalaśīla explains:

It is not by their own wish that the effects come

into existence or not come into existence; in fact, their being and not being depend upon the presence or absence of the cause. Under the circumstances, if the thing in its permanent form were always there, as the cause of all things, then how is it that all effects are not produced at once, being dependent as they are on the mere presence of the said cause? and why should they appear successively, one after the other?²⁴³

This is a strong Buddhist argument. If a permanent thing can produce effects, these effects should come all at once for the cause is always completely present. The objector may answer the question concerning the delay in the production of effects by asserting that there is non-proximity of auxiliary causes.²⁴⁴

The Buddhists answer the above objection by asking whether the auxiliaries become auxiliaries by virtue of their causing the causal efficiency of the permanent thing or by virtue of their serving the same purpose.²⁴⁵ With regard to the first alternative, the difficulty follows that:

The effects would in that case be produced only when the said 'condition' is there, and they would not be produced when the 'condition' is not there; and thus it would be this 'condition' that would have to be regarded as their cause.²⁴⁶

The opponent might further argue:

On account of its (the condition's) relation to the thing, the causal character does belong to that (thing) also.²⁴⁷

The relationship between the permanent thing and the auxiliaries would be such that although the effects are produced only in the presence of the auxiliaries, it is

still the permanent thing which is the cause of the effects. But what kind of relationship would this be? Śāntarakṣita says:

...it cannot be identity; as the two are recognised as distinct. Nor can the relation be held to consist in the fact that it is produced from it; as in that case, there would be simultaneity; and then the appearance of the effects also would be simultaneous.²⁴⁸

The permanent thing and the 'condition' (auxiliary) cannot be identical for they have been admitted to be different. Neither can the relationship be that of being produced out of it because "...the effects are produced out of the auxiliaries themselves."²⁴⁹ If the opponent means the conditions are produced out of the permanent thing then these conditions (auxiliaries) must be produced simultaneously for their cause (permanent thing) is ever present.

If the second alternative is opted for, that the auxiliaries and the permanent thing serve the same purpose "...as colour, etc., become auxiliaries to the eye in producing the visual perception of colour..."²⁵⁰ the permanent thing would be subject to production and change in its eternality would disappear.²⁵¹

The relationship between the auxiliary and the permanent thing cannot be identity nor that of 'being produced out of it' (one causing the other or visa versa). Neither can there be a third auxiliary posited to link the two for that would lead to infinite regress.²⁵² The

opponent may further propose that the relationship between the two is 'inherence' (samavāya) which means one subsisting in the other.²⁵³ Śāntaraksita answers that if this be the case then the following must be considered:

Is the 'inherent' thing so regarded because it is helpful? Or not so? If the former alternative is accepted, then it come to be the same as the relationship of 'being produced from it', and this has just been rejected.²⁵⁴

Alternatively:

In the case the 'inherent' be not something helpful to that wherein it inheres, than all things would be equally inherent, as there could be nothing to differentiate one from the other.²⁵⁵

In this way the two alternatives of the auxiliaries being different and non-different from the permanent thing become discarded. Also the conjunction and disjunction of these two alternatives become discarded.²⁵⁶

Someone may further argue:

Even though the permanent thing may not actually need the auxiliary agencies, yet, apart from these latter, it cannot produce its effect, like the final cause; its own nature is such that it becomes an efficient cause only when in close proximity to the auxiliaries; hence it is that even though the permanent thing is always present its effect does not come about always.²⁵⁷

The problem with the above is that if the permanent thing with the auxiliaries (complete form) is held to be the same as the permanent thing with the auxiliaries (incomplete form) then the auxiliaries themselves must be permanent (eternal).²⁵⁸ This is not what is desired by the opponent. If, on the other hand, the complete and

incomplete forms of the permanent thing are different the unity of the permanent thing is lost: "Thus the successive appearance of effects is not possible, even when the cause is not dependent (upon auxiliaries)." ²⁵⁹

As for simultaneous production of effects, this is contrary to both the Buddhists thinking and to the thinking of the opponents of the Buddhists. The theory of simultaneity goes against perceived facts which always appear successively, such as the following:

(a) Pleasure, pain, and the rest of the soul;
 (b) Sound--of ākāśa [ether]; (c) the successive cognitions--of the mind; (d) the gross substances, from the diad onwards, of the atoms; (e) all products--of time, space, God and so forth. And in the case of all these effects it is clearly perceived that they appear in succession. ²⁶⁰

The above are all held by opposing schools to be the effects of the permanent thing and these effects are known from experience to appear successively and not simultaneously.

The theory of simultaneity is also contrary to inference as the thing which produces all its effects simultaneously must either produce them and disappear or keep on producing them over and over again. The first alternative establishes Buddhist momentariness, the second, succession of effects. Both of these are contrary to the theory of simultaneity. ²⁶¹

For the Buddhists capacity for fruitful action is the defining characteristic of an entity. ²⁶² If this

criterion is not accepted and some things are held to exist even though we can have no knowledge of them from their effects on our senses, then all things become confounded. Someone may object to this saying "...being related to existence (Being)..."²⁶³ is the defining characteristic of entities. This is refuted by Śāntarakṣita by saying that this is the same as the relation of inherence which has already been refuted. Furthermore, 'existence' or 'being':

...can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; if there²⁶⁴ were such a relation, it would lead to an absurdity.

Someone may enquire of the Buddhists how the existence of something which has no capacity for fruitful action can be disproven.²⁶⁵ Śāntarakṣita answers that there is no use in proving or disproving the existence of such a thing.²⁶⁶ The Buddhist theory of momentariness is established by the Buddhists to be useful to some people at some time.²⁶⁷ Kamalaśīla attributes a question such as the one above to someone who is demented: "...addicted to the habit of considering things..."²⁶⁸ In order to stress this view further Kamalaśīla asks: "What need has the young woman of discussing whether the man wanting in fertility is handsome or ugly?"²⁶⁹

A further objection might be that the sky-lotus and other fictitious things are non-existent and yet

become the basis of fruitful activity, thus disproving the Buddhist universal premise.²⁷⁰ The Buddhists disallow this as, if the sky-lotus has a non-entity for a cause, it cannot need a concentrated locus to cause it. Its cause being everywhere there is not an entity, it should be produced constantly: "...because its cause would be always present in its perfect form."²⁷¹

Now we come to the objections of a Buddhist writer, Bhadānta Yogasena:

Even if things are momentary, how can there be any effective action? The initial auxiliaries could not be productive of peculiarities in one another; because if they have come into existence, they must be there already in their complete form; if they have not come into existence, as the entities would not be there, as this absence would be without differentiation, wherefore could not the effect itself be produced therefrom (for the bringing about of which the auxiliaries are posited)? Specially as they could not be differentiated from anything else, being equally open to question. Thus too there would be an infinite regress of auxiliaries for you. Then again, as they could not have an effective action either successively or simultaneously, it is useless to regard them as 'momentary'; specially when no peculiarity can be brought about by any auxiliaries, the entire series is rightly held to be wholly undifferentiated (uniform). If then the destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning; and if there be no possibility of it at the beginning, how could it come at the end also? If again, no cause is admitted except the cause of the entities themselves, then why should there be any incongruity in their destruction coming about in certain cases only (not always)?²⁷²

Kamalaśīla explains:

Yogasena has argued as follows: 'Even if things were momentary, any activity of their, either successive or simultaneous, would be incompatible. Because, by themselves, they could be either capable or incapable of such action. If they are capable, then they cannot

need auxiliaries; as what is itself capable cannot need anything else. If the things are themselves incapable, then any need for auxiliaries is all the more baseless. For instance, the things that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire any peculiarities from one another; because things that are produced and not produced being existent and non-existent, cannot stand in the relation of helper and helped. Hence at the initial stage, they being all undifferentiated, they could not produce any particular 'moment'; for, if such a 'moment' could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial 'series'; as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the 'series' themselves. If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinite regress. Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated 'series' of causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated cause, then all things would be produced from all things.

Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in effective action, coming either successively or simultaneously, things do have effective activity, and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things are momentary.

Thus the reason put forward (by the Buddhist) 'because things exist (therefore they must be momentary)' is found to be inconclusive.

Nor can it be said that 'the production of the effect is due to the 'series' in a particular condition, and not always'; because in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by the auxiliaries, the series would remain always undifferentiated. Nor can it be right to assent that 'the series itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause'; as this would be contrary to a perceived fact. For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearance (respectively) of the auxiliaries. If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to the thing independent of auxiliaries.

Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated,

such particular products as the potsherd and the rest could not be produced out of the jar.

Then again, if the destruction of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the series of its homogeneous moments were without cause, then, as independent of all else, it should come about at the very outset; and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before. If then, for the destruction of things, no such cause is admitted as another 'series' distinct from the cause of the things themselves, then why should fire be the destroyer of cold? because what is ineffective cannot be a destroyer, simply because it is incapable of doing anything; and even so if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term 'non-apprehension' and the 'destroying of life' as being due to opposition (or destruction).²⁷³

How are differentiation and variety in our experience explicable under the Buddhist theory of momentariness? After all, we do not live in a world that is bland, distinctionless and lukewarm, but a reality of varying degrees of contrast. Some contrast is easily noticable and some not so obvious. Some contrasts, such as fire and cold, seem to directly oppose one another.

Philosophers who subscribe to some sort of permanence, such as Kumāṛila, can explain the opposition of fire to cold as being due to the abiding internal essences of the things. This is the theory of universals (jāti).²⁷⁴ The Buddhists deny the existence of universals.²⁷⁵ 'Water' is made up of a series of moments that are not really 'wet' for no enduring internal essence 'wetness' exists in 'water'. 'Wetness' is an imaginary

mental construction based on a series of momentary flashes. None of these moments have a definable peculiarity 'wetness' or any other definable characteristic.²⁷⁶ If there is no enduring internal nature in 'water', how is the consistent appearance together of 'water' and 'wetness' to be explained? This is the sense of a part of Yogasena's objection. We are able to state Yogasena's case in the following manner:

If the momentary thing is capable of being the basis of differentiation, then each momentary thing is not unique.

If the momentary thing is incapable of being the basis of differentiation, then the variety in our world is inexplicable.

The momentary thing, ex hypothesi, cannot need auxiliaries. If it did, no self-capability, no uniqueness.

But if the momentary thing does not have auxiliaries, no variety, no particular effects, as the momentary thing is always produced full blown and complete, with nothing left to do to complete itself.

This hopefully helps clarify the interplay (or lack of interplay) between auxiliaries and moments.

If the initial moments are to avoid producing bland, luke-warm effects that are indistinguishable from one another they must acquire peculiarities from somewhere. The moments cannot acquire these peculiarities from auxiliaries or they would be incapable (not self-sufficient, not unique). Neither can they acquire these peculiarities from one another because each moment is produced full-blown

and complete and as such is unable to effect or be effected by anything outside itself. According to Yogasena there is change 'things do have effective activity' (see above quote second paragraph), and to insist that this effective activity must be momentary is needless. Things could have effective activity and be permanent. Whether one subscribes to the view that things have momentary causes or a permanent cause the production of effects is impossible to explain: nevertheless there is such production.²⁷⁷

Yogasena also enquires how it is that if destruction is not the result of a separate cause but is the result of the same cause as the thing itself, how is it that destruction is delayed until the end of the production of the effective moment even though it is present also at the beginning?²⁷⁸ The series of moments would still be as undifferentiated as before. If the series is supposed to be made up of moments which have no other cause than themselves how is it that 'cold-series' is seen to consistently disappear on the appearance of 'fire-series'? This shows that 'cold-series' is affected by outside causes. If all is as the Buddhists say all moments are entirely undifferentiated and as such everything should destroy everything else, for all moments would be equal in their mutual lack of particular potential for action. If 'fire-series' has no particular internal nature which enables it to destroy 'cold-series', it should also be possible for

'ice-series' to destroy 'cold-series'. This is not provable from experience.

Śāntarakṣita responds to Yogasena as follows:

There can be no mutual help in the case of things appearing at the 'initial stage'; they become auxiliaries only by virtue of having the same effective action. Even when there is no help rendered to one another, these are not entirely undifferentiated; because when they are themselves produced out of their own constituent cause, they become productive of their own several distinct 'series'.

Thenceforward the particular entities that come into existence are brought about by that; on account of the fact that those that help towards them are of that nature.

Every moment, entities go on coming into existence with definite undefinable potentialities, and no objection can be taken to them, just as to the fire's capacity to burn.²⁷⁹

In the commentary to the first paragraph in the above quote Kamalaśīla quotes an unnamed source in support of Śāntarakṣita and himself as follows: "Nothing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of the attendant circumstances."²⁸⁰ This does not mean, however, that the momentary thing is not independent from all else in its initial production. With regard to its initial production, the momentary thing is produced from its own causes, just as other momentary things are produced from theirs. There is no relationship between the moments at this point. At the second stage when each momentary thing has produced its effects there is interplay between these effects, which in turn become co-efficient in the production of the third stage of the causal series. The effect that

comes out of the causal ideas that have appeared in the second stage arises independent of all other moments. This third moment that comes out of the effects of the second stage proceeds in the same manner. The process extends to infinity in both the future and the past.²⁸¹

As for Yogasena's argument that restriction of effects (differentiation) would be impossible under such a theory, Śāntarakṣita says (paragraph 3, f.n. 279) the particular abilities of things just have to be accepted.²⁸² This whole answer of Śāntarakṣita to the objection of Yogasena will be criticised in the conclusion.

Yogasena also has objected to the Buddhist idea that destruction and the thing destroyed come from the same cause and yet the destruction does not come about at the beginning but only at the end. To this Śāntarakṣita answers:

It is 'destruction' in the shape of the 'breaking up of the series' which is without cause; and this does not come about even at the end; what is denied is its coming into existence in that form. As for the coming into existence of such dissimilar things (series) as the potsherd and the like, this certainly has a cause; but this also is not produced at the beginning, because at that time its cause is not there.²⁸³

The argument based on whether destruction should come at the beginning or the end of the momentary thing's existence is irrelevant to the Buddhists because it rests on the assumption that destruction comes into existence as something dissimilar to the thing. This is

not the Buddhist theory. Destruction, according to the Buddhists, is simply the thing passively disintegrating and is not any positive independent entity. As such it does not require a separate cause. As for the coming into existence of a dissimilar series of moments such as the potsherd from the jar, this has a cause (bludgeon) but this effect does not come about at the beginning because the cause is not there. The two types of destruction are not the same.

Kamalaśīla tells us that there are two types of destruction (vināśa):²⁸⁶ in the form of the 'breaking up of the series' (sāntānocchedarupa) 2) in the form of the coming into existence of a 'dissimilar series' (visadrsasan tānotvāda). The first kind does not have a separate cause for the moments self-disintegrate. The second kind is allowed a separate cause. The smashing of the jar is caused by the bludgeon. No one, however, says that the bludgeon causes a new positive entity in the sense of creating the potsherd.²⁸⁷ Such creation is only possible for the moments of the series which make up the 'jar'. If the first type of destruction were not a fact, the second type could not be accomplished for all things would be eternal.

Finally, Yogasena has objected to the absence of 'opposition' amongst the undifferentiated 'series of moments'. (He feels the 'series of moments' must be

undifferentiated if they are unique and unable to effect peculiarities in one another). Yogasena thinks that it is impossible to explain the consistent observable decadence of cold in the presence of fire from within the framework of the Buddhist theory of momentariness. This consistent behaviour seems to require some persistent nature that endures in the internal nature of 'cold' and 'fire'. The Buddhists deny all enduring essences. Śāntarakṣita says the decadence of 'cold' in the presence of 'fire' is explicable from the Buddhist standpoint as follows:

There are two kinds of 'momentary things'-- some are the causes of decadence, e.g. fire is the cause of the decadence (diminution) of cold; and others are not so. People not perceiving the truth, think that there is antagonism of various kinds among things, even when the relation of cause and effect is there. As a matter of fact however there is no real 'antagonism' among things, in the shape of the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed. in this sense that the expression 'notice of antagonism' has been used.²⁸⁸

Kamalaśīla comments:

There are certain things which become causes of the 'decadence' of certain other things, the 'decadence' consisting in the production of 'moments' of gradually decreasing degrees of intensity; for instance fire is the cause of such a 'decadence' of cold; while there are other things which are not so, i.e. not causes of the decadence of things; e.g. fire is not the cause of the 'decadence' of smoke. Among the former, i.e. among the causes of decadence, even though there is the relation of cause and effect, yet, people, having their powers of vision bedimmed by ignorance, think that there is 'antagonism' (between the said cause and the thing whose decadence has been brought about) ...In reality, however, there is no such antagonism among things as that between the destroyer and the destroyed; because when an entity comes into existence,

it does so in its complete form, and it is impossible to bring about any change in the nature of a thing; there can be no cause for any such change, whether it to different or non-different from the thing.²⁸⁹

This idea of the proximity of fire producing gradually less intense moments of cold is the same as that expressed in TS. 435-436. It is based on the theory of the three moments as discussed above (p. 104, 105).

Next to be considered are the arguments against the doctrine of perpetual flux from the position of the followers of Jaimini. This means the Mīmāṃsā school and in the context of the TS. Kumārila in particular.

The first objection centers around Kumārila's contention that re-cognition disproves the theory of perpetual flux of all things.²⁹⁰ Śāntaraksita presents this view of Kumārila as follows:

As a matter of fact, there is always the recognition of a thing in the form 'this is that same', when the sense-organ concerned is rightly functioning; and this recognition is quite firm and undeniable. This therefore is an irrepressible fact of perception, which annuls all the reasons that have been adduced for proving the 'perpetual flux' of things.²⁹¹

In his refutation of this view Śāntaraksita follows the theory of perception of Dignāga.²⁹² Briefly, this theory teaches that there are two sources of knowledge: sense-perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). The particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (samanyalakṣaṇa) are, in that order, the objects of these two means of cognition (pramāṇa). The particular is efficient at

producing effects on the sense-organs. It contains nothing determinate, no information, no differentiation, no knowledge, no conceptual construction (kalpanāpodha). It contains all reality (for only efficient things are real). The universal contains no reality. It is amenable to verbal expression, it contains all information, differentiation and knowledge. The internal essence (svabhava) of the particular can never be known for all knowledge is thematised and the thing-in-itself causes thematised thought. What is known is the universal that the particular causes us to produce in ourselves. The particular is never known except indirectly through its effects (universals). There is a radical schism between the particular and the universal. Cognition cognises itself upon being stimulated by the particular.²⁹³ The way we know things is to form a definite thematised concept. As soon as this is done all reality vanishes. This is why the ultimate particular is ineffable, unknowable.

With the above in mind Śāntarakṣita answers the objection of the Mīmāṃsaka:

...recognition can never be of the nature of direct sense-perception; because the form of the thing itself is inexpressible, and the recognition is expressed in words. Recognition must be wrong, and sense-perception is entirely different from it. That recognition is wrong is clear from the fact that it appears in the form of the notion of 'non-difference' where, in reality, there is difference.²⁹⁴

The Mīmāṃsakas are realists who believe the

external world exists as it is perceived.²⁹⁵ As has been explained before, the Buddhists do not admit that what is really there (the particular) is ever known directly as the particular is not nameable. Sense-perception contains no judging, comparing or considering. Recognition obviously belongs to the universal and as such it cannot act as proof or disproof of what actually exists. For the Buddhists what is namable is false in the sense that it does not exist.

Sāntaraksita continues:

If the recognition did apprehend the form of the thing as previously cognised, then it would have appeared at that same time, as its object would be the same, like the previous cognition.²⁹⁶

Kamalaśīla comments:

If the recognition had the same object that has been cognised before, then it would have appeared at that same time, because as having the same object, its cause would be there in its perfect form; like the previous cognition...²⁹⁷

Each cognition is produced at its own time and if the recognition of something appears to be the same as a previous cognition this must be a mistake. When the cause is there the cognition will appear. The reason there are two different cognitions is because there are two different causes of two different things. A thing cannot have the same cause on two different occasions for this would mean the cause is eternal and an eternal cause is impossible.

The cognition of a diamond on two separate occasions is no different, according to the Buddhists, than seeing now a cow and later a horse. The reason for the difference in cognitions in both cases is the same: the objects are dissimilar because their causes are dissimilar. All cognitions do not appear at once because all causes of cognition are not fully present simultaneously. If the diamond were caused by a permanent cause (which is absurd) the diamond could never undergo change (such as cutting). It is possible to see the diamond twice because the 'diamond-series' presents its cognitions successively and this is so because the 'diamond-moments' mature successively, not simultaneously. So Śāntaraksita says:

...then the recognition has not been regarded as apprehending the same object; because it is produced at its own time, like the cognition of another thing; and inasmuch as it apprehends as non-different what is really different it must be mistaken...²⁹⁸

Remembrance (smṛti) is a pramāṇa (valid means of cognition) for neither the Buddhists nor the Mīmāṃsā.²⁹⁹ Śāntaraksita says recognition and remembrance are the same for the Mīmāṃsā insofar as both operate towards an object whose purpose has already been accomplished. Both operate towards something which has been apprehended in a previous cognition.³⁰⁰ Because of this similarity between remembrance and recognition, the force of the 'recognition argument' against the doctrine of perpetual flux is lost.

Kumārila insists that remembrance and recognition are not the same. Śāntarakṣita paraphrases Kumārila's view³⁰¹ as follows:

As a matter of fact, the existence of the thing at the present time (of recognition) has not been included under the previous cognition; this is a peculiar feature in recognition which is not present in remembrance. Remembrance is in the form of 'that' and appertains only to that which has already been cognised before; recognition however is in the form 'this is the same', which is something totally different (from the previous cognition).³⁰²

Recognition has this additional feature that the remembered object is the same as the one now being cognised. Remembrance only takes in the memory part.

The paraphrasing of Kumārila continues:

Inasmuch as there is no doubt or mistake in regard to what is cognised (by recognition), recognition acquires the character of the 'means of right cognition' after having set aside both.³⁰³

Someone³⁰⁴ may object to Kumārila's certainty on this point using an example such as this: we see a dark-complexioned woman and assume that the child with which she is pregnant will likewise be dark-complexioned. Subsequently we see the child is fair-complexioned. Thus a conclusion arrived at by one means of right cognition (inference-anumāna) is later contradicted by another valid means of right cognition (pratyakṣa--sense-perception). In the same way it may be the case that Kumārila proves the permanence of things by recognition but that this proof is later contradicted by inference which establishes

the impermanence of all things.

Kumārila is paraphrased as answering:

A thing, though cognised by other means of cognition, could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by sense-perception; when however a thing is already taken up by sense-perception, there can be no appearance of any other means of cognition (to the contrary).

When a thing has been duly apprehended through the firmly established highest means of cognition, how could one ever have a cognition to the contrary? ³⁰⁵

Śāntarakṣita begins to answer the above objections as follows:

If existence at the present time is held by you to be distinct from the previous existence, then difference between them becomes proved by yourself.

If the present existence is not-different (from the previous existence), then how is it that it is 'not included in the previous cognition'? In fact, if it were not included therein, then it would come to this, ³⁰⁰ that the thing itself was not apprehended at all.

If previous and present existence are not the same thing then the thing loses its unity, its completeness, its efficiency as a perfect, mature, whole, fully blown cause. If previous and present existence are the same thing, why do they appear successively? The thing cannot have its complete internal essence present and not be its complete self; past, present and future. Such a simultaneous appearance of the three forms of the thing is never observed. Therefore the 'thing' as a permanent cause of existence is a fiction. Things occur successively, thus there is no enduring entity causing them.

Śāntarakṣita continues:

If what has been cognised through inference and the other means of cognition were annulled by sense-perception, then inference and the rest could not be regarded as means of right cognition, because they are annulled, like cognitions through defective vision.

The character of 'being in accordance with the real state of things' being equally present in all valid forms of cognition, why should there be a prejudice at all? In case the said character be not present in inference and the rest, then these later would not be valid means of right cognition at all.³⁰⁷

For Kumārila the Veda is the all in all. The sum total of his philosophising has the protection of the Veda at heart. As a Mīmāṃsaka the injunctive passages of the Veda tell men what to do (dharma=duty for the Mīmāṃsakas, and one's duty is laid down in Vedic injunction³⁰⁸). If a man follows Vedic injunction, the Mīmāṃsakas say he will get to heaven. This is, according to these people, the only way to get to heaven. Buddhist idealism threatens the Veda. If words are universals as the Buddhists say, they are false in the sense that the things to which they refer are not existent. This jeopardises the words of the Veda. In the same way, the Veda would no longer be true if one were to assume that sense-perception were false.³⁰⁹

For Kumārila, sense-perception perceives the universal in the particular: a horse is seen to be a horse because of the perception of the universal 'horse-ness'.³¹⁰ Universals are eternal and real. In this way Kumārila hopes to defend the Veda against the Buddhists. Kumārila can not allow sense-perception to be undefined

(as the Buddhists say) for then people would doubt their ears when hearing the words of the Veda etc.

Above (f.n. 305) the Buddhists say that, according to Kumārila, sense-perception is the highest pramāṇa (means of valid cognition). This is wrong. All Kumārila wants to say is that if sense-perception were always undefined (as the Buddhists say) inference, and the rest would be impossible.³¹¹ Also above (f.n. 307) Śāntarakṣita says that 'being in accordance with the real state of things' should be equally present in all the pramāṇas. However, the Buddhists themselves allow two pramāṇas. Does this mean that there are two real states of things? If this is not the case, that there is a 'real state of things' for each pramāṇa, then one of the pramāṇas of the Buddhists must be false. If the Buddhists allow that their two pramāṇas cooperate in the production of knowledge about one reality, the Mīmāṃsakas can have the same explanation for their six pramāṇas.

Finally, we come to some objections against the doctrine of permanent flux from the point of view of Bhāvivikta and again, Uddyotakara.

The central point of these objections is that the same 'moon' for example, must be seen by men at diverse times and places for all of these men use the same term to express what they see.³¹² If all things are momentary, ask the objectors, how this coincidence?

To this Śāntarakṣita answers that the corroborative instance (moon) is devoid of the probandum (permanence). The moon too, is included under the probans (momentary things): for in order to cause a cognition it must precede its effect. Thus the 'moon' does not exist while the men see it as "...it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things."³¹³

With regard to various men using the same expression to designate 'moon'; the same thing happens with respect to 'lamp' or 'flame'. No one says the flame is the same for it is now high, now low, etc. and yet always termed the same. Thus 'moon' too, could be used to express the cognitions had by several men at different times and this does not prove that the 'moon' endures.³¹⁴

Śāntarakṣita concludes:

All these reasons are free from doubt and denial; as no proofs have been adduced in annulment of these.³¹⁵

NOTES TO CHAPTER II, III, IV.

Kumārila's Theory of the Ātman (Self)

1. SV. Ātma-vāda (AV.) 7. All improvements to the transl. are in square brackets. All needless capitalisation in the transl. is reduced to the small letter. The English spelling of Sanskrit terms in the transl. is up-dated. Most dashes in Jha's transl. have been omitted. The references in the English translation of the SV. are used in this essay. When compared with the Sanskrit edition of the SV. they are one number out: i.e. SV. AV. 7 in English tr. = SV. AV. 6.
2. TS. 222.
3. TS. 223-225.
4. SV. AV. 28.
5. SV. Śūnyavāda 105.
6. AV. 22. A modern writer on Kumārila, G. P. Bhatt, in his Epistemology of the Bhaṭṭa School of Purva Mīmāṃsā, writes (p. 396) that moral considerations led Kumārila to assert his idea of the self (soul) as being both permanent and changeable. According to Bhatt, where Sankara conceives of an absolute static, eternal self the Buddhists conceive of a universe without anything enduring. Both fail to account for aspects of the self which Kumārila's view includes:
"They [Sankara and the Buddhists] unduly emphasise the cognitive aspects to the neglect of the other aspects. Kumārila lays an equal emphasis on all three aspects. The self is not only a knowing agent but also a feeling and doing one. When Kumārila says that the self is never divested of caitanya what he means by the term 'caitanya' is intelligence and not merely consciousness. Intelligence implies a conscious pursuit of certain ends. Moral considerations lead him to conceive the self as eternal and at the same time changeable." (p. 396)
From the Buddhist point of view, all morally bad

things can only take root when the mistaken conception of the self is held. (TS. 3496-3497). For the Buddhists, this positing of the self for moral reasons is mistaking the medicine for the poison.

7. Translator's notes to SV. AV. 22.
8. SV. AV. 26.
9. Ibid., 27.
10. Ibid., 29.
11. Ibid., 30-31.
12. Ibid., 136.
13. TS. 228
14. See SV. AV. 108-109 where Kumārila says 'impressions' may explain remembrance and recognition "...yet the recognition of the cognising self (by itself as being the same today as it was yesterday) is hard to be got at (by 'impression',&)."
 15. SV. AV. 131
 16. Ibid., 107 and translators note to same.
 17. Ibid., 108.
 18. Ibid., 73.
 19. Ibid., 74-75.
 20. Ibid., 85-86.
 21. Ibid., 78-79.
 22. Ibid., 111-112, and translator's notes to same.
 23. made of the three gunas: sattva, tamas and rajas.
 24. What this point says in essence is that what does not belong to the part cannot belong to the whole. This question which seems to have been settled for Kumārila continues to bamboozle philosophers and scientists to the present. See Emergent Properties of Complex Systems, by Sir Allan Cottrell, in Encyclopaedia of Ignorance, by Ronald Duncan and Miranda Weston-Smith, pp. 129-135.

25. See translator's note to SV. AV. 111-112. Also note that the ātman as caitanya/consciousness in Kumārila's theory, is without form. The ātman is the common character in all the mutually contradictory states. As such, that which has form, i.e., the body, is ipso facto unconscious, cf. SV. AV. 30.
26. This is similar to the first reason.
27. SV. AV. 113.
28. Reference originated from translator's note to SV. AV. 113.
29. Cf. SV. AV. 114.
30. Cf. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 402ff. Also SV. AV. 73.
31. Cf. Jha's introduction to his transl. of the SV. p. xliii.
32. Cf. SV. AV. 76.
33. SV. Nīrālambana-vāda, 178ff. On vāsanās see Buddhist Logic, by T. Stcherbatsky, vol. II, p. 367, n. 3 where it says in part: "It [vāsanās] performs in the Buddhist system of Idealistic Monism the function of explaining the origin of phenomenal plurality out of transcendental unity and is in many respects similar to the karmacetana of the early Buddhists, the māyā of the Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins, the vāsanā of the Sāṅkhyas, the bhāvanā of the Mīmāṃsakas, the adrsta, apūrva, abhyāsa and samskāra of all schools." Also L'Abhidharmakosa, trad. Louis de La Vallée Poissin, T. 5, p. 142, for other references in this same work see the index (T. 6, p. 81). Also see La Somme Du Grand Vehicule, E. Lamotte, T. 2, pt. 1, p. 33. Also see The Central Conception of Buddhism, T. Stcherbatsky, pp. 19, 32,
34. Cf. TS. 263.
35. SV. Nīrālambana-vāda, 179-193.
36. SV. AV. 115-116.
37. SV. AV. 117-120.
38. There is no direct statement in the TS. that the objector is Kumārila; if we take TS. 493 as belonging

to the same objector, this argument (TS. 493) is identical to Kumārila's argument in SV. AV. 136.

39. SV. AV. 121-122.
40. Ibid., cf. TSP. 350-351, TS. 708ff.
41. SV. AV. 122-123, cf. TS. and TSP. 263.
42. SV. AV. 122-123.
43. Cf. translator's notes to SV. AV. 122-123.
44. SV. AV. 123-124.
45. Ibid.,
46. SV. AV. 125-126.
47. SV. AV. 132.
48. SV. AV. 130.
49. SV. AV. 134-135.
50. SV. AV. 137-139.

The Buddhist Refutation of
the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Ātman.

51. In the refutation by the Buddhists, of the Mīmāṃsā theory of soul, Prabhākara is not mentioned. We can say that in the TS. 'Mīmāṃsā' refers to Kumārila, for his theories are the only Mīmāṃsā theories dealt with in the TS. apart from the occasional mention of Śābara and Jaimini.
52. TS. 241.
53. TSP. 241.
54. SV. Sense-perc. 55.
55. SV. Eternality of Words (EW.) 405. In TS. 242 Jha gives this reference as SV. EW. 405.
56. TS. 242, This quote from the TS. and the above quote from the SV. are not worded identically in the English

translations of these two texts. This is the fault of the translator. My advisor advises me that in the Sanskrit original the Buddhists in the TS. quote Kumāṛila correctly. Whereas it may be possible, if one examines only the English translation, to say the Buddhists purposely distort Kumāṛila's meaning (in their quoting of him) this is not so in the Sanskrit.

A third translation is supplied by my advisor as follows:

"For us all cognitions of the soul (puruṣa) possess permanence, unity (and) movement because of the nature of consciousness. (Cognitions of) difference rests on (difference of) objects.

None of this effects our thesis as we do not build our case on the faulty translation but on the point that Kumāṛila finds it necessary to accept logical contradiction in order to explain cognition.

57. The two quotes referred to are per above nn. 54, 55.
58. SV. Sense-perc. 112, 113, 120.
59. SV. Sense-perc. 118.
60. SV. Sense-perc. 118-120. Cf. History of Indian Epistemology, J. Prasad, pp. 266-267.
61. SV. Sense-perc. 124.
62. TS. 1214.
63. TS. and TSP. 1293-1294.
64. TS. 1214.
65. TS. and TSP. 1293-1294.
66. SV. Sense-perc. 247-248.
67. Ibid., 248-249.
68. Ibid., 121.
69. Ibid., 122.
70. Śabarabhāṣya. I:4.
71. SV. Sense-perc. 33.
72. SV. EW. 4.

73. The six pramāṇas accepted by Kumārila are: pratyakṣa (sense-perception), anumāna (inference), upāmana (comparison or analogy), śabda (verbal knowledge or testimony), arthapātti (presumption or postulation) and abhāva (absence, negation or non-existence). The first four of these are accepted by the Nyāya and other systems of Hindu philosophy. The last two are Mīmāṃsā additions. The Buddhists accept only the first two and explain that the others all reduce to anumāna. Cf. Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, Radhakrishnan and Moore, pp. 356, 486. Dignaga, On Perception, M. Hattori, p. 76.
74. SV. Sense-perc. 56.
75. Ibid., 246, 247.
76. SV. EW. 406-410.
77. p. 27. Cf. SV. EW. 405.
78. Sāṃkhya-Kārikā III. Cf. Eliade, Le Yoga, p. 37ff.
79. Ibid.
80. SV. EW. 411-412.
81. TS. 249.
82. SV. Nirālambana-vāda, 107-109.
83. Ibid.
84. TSP. 251.
85. TS. 278-279, 415-416.
86. SV. EW. 405ff.
87. TSP. 252.
88. SV. AV. 130, 22.
89. TSP. 252.
90. see TS. 253.
91. TSP. 252.
92. SV. EW. 406-408.

93. TS. 253.
94. Ibid.
95. SV. EW. 73-74.
96. Ibid., 1-7.
97. Ibid., 138-139.
98. Ibid., 172-175.
99. SV. Aphorism xxvii (on the Veda having no author)
100. TS. 254.
101. TSP. 254.
102. TSP. 272.
103. TS. 255.
104. SV. EW. 409.
105. Ibid., 400-412.
106. Cf. Ibid., 406-408.
107. TS. 262 (first line).
108. TSP. 257-258.
109. The law of the excluded middle.
110. TS. 259.
111. TSP. 259.
112. Ibid.
113. SV. EW. 406-408.
114. TSP. 262 (first line)
115. TS. 262 (second line).
116. SV. Sense-perc. 53-54.
117. Ibid., 38-39.
118. If this quote is supposed to represent a view of

- Kumārila in the SV. then I have been unable to find it.
119. We presume the objector is Kumārila. In the commentary to this text there is reference made to 'the Mīmāṃsaka'.
 120. SV. AV. 107ff.
 121. TS. 263.
 122. TS. 708ff.
 123. Cf. TS. 1003-1004.
 124. Śāśvatavāda (eternalism, 'permanent thing') and ucchedavāda (nihilism) are the two extremes the Buddhists 'middle way' avoids. There is no contradiction with n. 109 above because Buddhist arguments are directed to the reasoning level from whence reasoned objections come. 'Tathatā' (suchness) is the realisation of the truth beyond duality and thematised thought. Cf. Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, D. T. Suzuki, p. 404-405 (glossary).
 125. TS. 350ff.
 126. The three marks (lakṣaṇa) of all things are anitya (impermanence), duḥkha (suffering) and anātman (not-self).
 127. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 33ff.
 128. Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, D. T. Suzuki, p. 438.
 129. Buddhist Logic, vol. II, p. 366, n. 3. He refers to Abhidharmakośa IX.
 130. La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., see reference to 'vāsanā' in the index, T.6, p. 81.
 131. Radhakrishnan and Moore, op. cit., 273.
 132. Suzuki, op. cit., (Studies), p. 433 and numerous references.
 133. TSP. 263.
 134. SV. AV. 117ff.

135. above p. 20-21 and SV. AV. 26.
136. above p. 23 and SV. AV. 30.
137. Ibid. and SV. AV. 31.
138. TS. 268.
139. TS. 269.
140. TSP. 269.
141. Ibid.
142. TS. 270.
143. TSP. 270.
144. TS. 271.
145. above p. 22 and SV. AV. 14.
146. TS. 272.
147. TSP. 272.
148. Ibid.
149. above p. 20-21 and SV. AV. 22.
150. TS. 273.
151. TSP. 273.
152. above p. 17 and SV. AV. 28.
153. TS. 274.
154. above p. 23 and SV. AV. 110.
155. TS. 255. Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi comes from 'sat' (being), 'kāya' (body), "dr̥ṣṭi" (vision or view). For the Buddhists, all things contain the three marks (see n. 126 above). All things which contain the three marks are: rūpa (form, matter), vedanā (feeling, volition), samjñā (ideas), saṃskāra (volitions and other functions) and vijñāna (pure sensations or general consciousness). See L'Abhidharmakosa, T. 1, p. 14ff. The 'self', too, is made up of the five skandhas. When the 'self' is analysed in terms of

being made up of the five skandhas the insight into the third of the three marks of all things, anātman (no-self) is attained. One of the methods for driving home the idea of not self is to show in detail the many ways in which the idea of self arises. 'Satkāyadrsti' ('false view of individuality') is a formulation wherein the origin of self is shown to be 1) that of mistaking one of the five skandhas for the self: 'I am rūpa', etc. 2) the mistake of thinking that the self possesses the five skandhas. 3) the mistake of thinking the skandhas are in the self like the scent is in the flower. 4) the mistake of thinking the skandhas are in the self like a gem is in a casket. (see Buddhist Thought in India, Conze, p. 38ff.) Thus the notion of 'I' in 'I know' is not the soul, as Kumārila tries to prove, but it is 'satkāyadrsti'.

- 156. TSP. 275.
- 157. TS. 276-277.
- 158. TSP. 277
- 159. TS. 278-279.
- 160. above p. 32-33 and SV. AV. 124-125.
- 161. SV. AV. 124-125.
- 162. TS. 282.
- 163. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 33ff.
- 164. TS. 282.
- 165. TS. 283-284.
- 166. TSP. 282-284.

Examination of the Buddhist Theory of Impermanence

- 167. Cf. above n. 126.
- 168. Cf. Buddhist Thought in India, Conze, p. 275, I, 3, 2. Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Kalupahana, p. 69.
- 169. TSP. 350-351.

170. SV. EW. 445 and above p. 50ff.
171. TSP. 350-351.
172. see the introduction to TS. 350-351.
173. Ibid. Both 'mobile' and 'impermanent' translate 'calam'.
174. TSP. 223-225.
175. TS. 352.
176. TS. 353-355.
177. TSP. 354-355.
178. TS. 356.
179. TSP. 356.
180. TS. 357-359.
181. TSP. 358. See note 20.
182. Efficiency at producing (causing) effects is the Buddhist criteria for distinguishing what exists from what does not exist. Cf. TS. 415-416.
183. Cf. TSP. 358.
184. TSP. 359.
185. Ibid.
186. Schematically the Buddhist refutation that begins on p. 75 above looks like the following:
- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| <p>"Destruction" as a
separate entity
(Refuted in <u>TS.</u> 358-
362)</p> | | <p>"Destruction" as a
separate non-entity
(Refuted in <u>TS.</u> 363-
366)</p> |
| <p>"Destruction" same as
"Cause of Destruction"
(refuted in <u>TS.</u> 358, 359)</p> | | <p>"Destruction" different
from "Cause of Destruction"
(refuted in <u>TS.</u> 360, 361)</p> |
187. TS. 360-361.
188. TSP. 401-402.

189. TS. 360-361.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid.
193. p. 75.
194. TS. 363-364.
195. TSP. 365.
196. Ibid.
197. TS. 366.
198. TSP. 366.
199. TS. 369-372. According to Mookerjee in The Buddhist Philosophy Universal Flux, p. 3, Aviddhakarna is "...an old Naiyayika, whose opinions are frequently quoted in the Tattvasangraha, but who has been entirely forgotten by the later Brahmanical writers..."
200. A Naiyayika writer (550-625 A.D.).
201. TS. 367-368.
202. TS. 370-372.
203. TS. 373-374.
204. Both Aviddhakarna and Uddyotakara make this charge. Cf. TS. 367-372.
205. TS. 375.
206. TS. 376.
207. TSP. 376.
208. TS. 377.
209. TS. 379.
210. TS. 379-381.
211. TSP. 380.

212. TS. 380. Also see TSP p. 18 where Kamalaśīla says "...the Blessed Teacher, closing his eyes in the manner of the elephant, to the true character of things, sought to express the true idea, through a sort of illusion; and this simply because there is no other way of doing it." The Buddha's teaching is not really contained in words. The words only point to the truth.
213. TS. 382.
214. Cf. Buddhist Meditation, E. Conze, p. 79. Here in a section on the Repudiation of the Sensory World, it is said "...he stops at what is actually seen." Cf. also Buddhist Thought in India, by Conze, p. 65 ff.
215. Cf. TSP. 3338 (p. 1474) where it is said that the deep realisation of the soulessness of things is achieved not by the mere pondering of what has been "heard (learnt)" and also 'no-soul' is not cognised through mere inference. Cf. also TSP. 3338 (p. 1474) where Kamalaśīla says Omniscience is achieved upon the removal of "Hindrances of Afflictions" which is accomplished "...by the direct perception of the fact of there being no-soul..." and by the removal of the "Hindrances of cognisable things" which "...is removed by the faithful and intense and long-continued meditation upon the said soulessness."
216. See Buddhist Thought in India, Conze p. 30: "In all disputes the ultimate appeal is, however, not to the 'experience' of Tom, Dick and Harry, but to that of the fully enlightened Buddha..."
217. Cf. Buddhist Meditation, Conze, p. 78ff. deals with the Repudiation of the Sensory World. Cf. also Le Yoga, M. Eliade, p. 358 where it is said a rebirth into the higher mode of being is only possible for a yogin who has in a very real sense, died, even though not physically: "C'est en vue de cette renaissance à un autre mode d'être que le yogin fait le sacrifice de tout ce qui, au niveau de l'existence profane, semble important. Sacrifice de sa 'vie' mais aussi de sa 'personnalité'."
218. For a discussion of the Buddhist use of the words 'dharma' or 'dharma's' see Buddhist Thought in India, Conze, p. 92ff. and the Central Conception of Buddhism And the Meaning of the Word Dharma, T. Stcherbatsky. In our conclusion we will briefly

explain this word.

219. The essence of a religious path like Buddhism is that certain things be done and then see what happens. Cf. Conze, op. cit., p. 18.
220. The Three Treasures (or Refuges) of Buddhism are Buddha, Dharma and Sangha (Buddhist Order of monks). About these see Buddhist Meditation, Conze, p. 45ff.
221. Cf. The Open Society and Its Enemies, Karl Popper, vol. II, p. 17: "Since Aristotle, it has become widely known that one cannot prove all statements, and that an attempt to do so would break down because it would only lead to an infinite regression of proofs. But neither he nor apparently, a great many modern writers seem to realise that the analogous attempt to define the meaning of all our terms must, in the same way, lead to an infinite regression of definitions." See also Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 29: "Every test of a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification, must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept." (underlining is my own).
222. TS. 383-384.
223. TS. 371.
224. Ibid.
225. TSP. 383-384.
226. Ibid.
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid.
229. Ibid.
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid.
232. Ibid.
233. TS. 385-386.
234. TSP. 385-386.

235. TS. 387.
236. TSP. 387.
237. Ibid.
238. Ibid.
239. TS. 388-390.
240. TSP. 389.
241. TS. 392-394.
242. TS. 395.
243. TSP. 395.
244. TS. 396.
245. TS. 397-399.
246. TS. 400.
247. TS. 401-402.
248. Ibid.
249. TSP. 404-405.
250. TSP. 397-399.
251. TS. 397-399.
252. TS. 403.
253. TSP. 404-405.
254. TS. 404-405.
255. TS. 406.
256. TS. 407-408.
257. TS. 409-410.
258. Cf. TS. 411.
259. TS. 412-413.

- 260. TSP. 413.
- 261. Cf. TS. 414-416.
- 262. Cf. TS. 415-416.
- 263. TS. 418.
- 264. TSP. 418.
- 265. Cf. ibid.
- 266. TS. 419-421.
- 267. Ibid.
- 268. TSP. 419-421. The Buddhists are not philosophers. They wish that others not be misled by extreme views and so engage in philosophy in order to neutralise, not establish views. Cf. Murti's Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 131: "The Mādhyamika disproves the opponents thesis and does not prove any thesis of his own." We will show that by the time of Sāntarakṣita and Kamalasīla this could no longer be said of the Sautrāntika Buddhists like our two above mentioned authors. We will show this in the conclusion.
- 269. TSP. 422-424.
- 270. TS. 425. The Buddhist universal premise is that only existent things can cause effects.
- 271. TSP. 427.
- 272. TS. 428-434.
- 273. TSP. 428-434.
- 274. Cf. SV. EW. 412-413.
- 275. Cf. TS. 708ff.
- 276. Cf. Dignāga, On Perception, transl. by M. Hattori, p. 80. According to Dignāga, the momentary flash has no perceptible characteristics. All such characteristics are later additions by the imagination. This is a more epistemological explanation. In a more ontological mood, Sāntarakṣita says the wetness or hotness of water and fire, respectively, simply

have to be taken as given: Cf. TS. 438. This is, as we shall see in the conclusion, no explanation at all and simply avoids the objection of how the disconnected moments can have any relation with one another.

277. More on this in the conclusion
278. This argument bears some resemblance to that of Aviddhakarna under TS. 367-368.
279. TS. 435-438.
280. TSP. 435-436.
281. Ibid.
282. The question of how the moment can be 'empty of peculiarities' and yet have the ability to produce particular effects will be discussed in the conclusion. Sāntaraksita seems to contradict the teaching of Dignāga on this point with what he says in TS. 438.
283. TS. 439-440.
284. TSP. 439-440.
285. TS. 434.
286. TSP. 439-440. In Sanskrit the preposition 'vi' gives the sense of 'apart' or 'separation' to the verb to which it is added. In the case of destruction (nāśa) we get the distinctively passive sense of vināśa 'coming undone destruction' or 'falling apart destruction' or more briefly 'dis-integration'. We can see that no outside agent is implied.
287. Ibid.
288. TS. 441-443.
289. TSP. 441-443.
290. Cf. SV. AV. 136, TS. 228. This argument that recognition proves duration is also found in the Jain work by Malliṣeṇa, Syād-Vāda Mañjarī, p. 121, F.W. Thomas' transl. Stcherbatsky, in Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p. 88ff. deals with this argument from the Buddhist viewpoint that recognition does not prove duration.

291. TS. 444-445.
292. Cf. Dignāga, On Perception, transl Hattori, p. 76ff. and Stcherbatsky, op. cit., vol. I, p. 146ff.
293. Hattori, op. cit., p. 76 and see "Dignāga expounds the theory that each cognition has a twofold appearance: the appearance of an object (arthābhasa) and that of itself as subject (svābhāsa). As such, cognition cognises itself while cognising an object." p. 95.
294. TS. 446-447.
295. Cf. SV. Nīrālambana-vāda 32ff.
296. TS. 448.
297. TSP. 448.
298. TS. 449-450.
299. TSP. 451.
300. Cf. TS. 451.
301. Cf. SV. Sense-perception, 230ff.
302. TS. 452-453.
303. TS. 454.
304. TSP. 454.
305. TS. 455-456.
306. TS. 457-458.
307. TS. 459-460.
308. Cf. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā In Its Sources, G. Jha, p. 30.
309. Ibid., p. 59: "The Mīmāṃsaka lays stress upon the reality of the external world, because, if cognition had no real basis in the external world, all that has been declared in the Veda in regard to the worldly and supernatural results following from actions would be meaningless."
310. Cf. "Thus it is proved that the character of

sensuousness (perceptibility by sense-organs) belongs to class (i.e., the different factors of inference in general) as also the relation...; and hence it is only when preceded by sense-perception, that inference, etc., can be rightly accomplished.

If sense-perception were always accepted to be undefined (abstract), then we could not have inference, etc..." SV., Sense-perception, 247-249.

311. Cf. ibid. The sense of Kumārila's assertion is that if sense-perception were only individual and separate it could never be known as such by the sense-organs alone. If inference were empty of sense-perception it would have no particulars with which its knowledge could operate. This interpretation is not directly stated by Kumārila but is supported by his explanation of the diversity and identity of cognitions in SV. EW 410-412. This interpretation also finds support in Jha's Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā In Its Sources, p. 75. Jha writes: "Though the universal is one, it is regarded as many when viewed in relation to the individuals, and though the individuals are many, they are regarded as one, when viewed in relation to the universal."
312. Cf. TS. 462-467.
313. TSP. 468.
314. TS. 470-474.
315. TS. 475.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

In this conclusion we hope to accomplish three things:

1) Briefly sketch the background to two central concepts in Buddhism (pratītyasamutpāda--dependent origination and dharma) in order to strengthen our criticism of the Buddhist theory of momentariness.

2) Criticise the Buddhist theory of momentariness on the grounds that it does not explain continuity or causality.

3) Summarise our findings.

1. Background to Pratītyasamutpāda and Dharma.

According to Kalupahana¹ causality (pratītyasamutpāda) is the central philosophy of Buddhism. But the theory of causality is different in early and later Buddhism and this difference is caused by the acceptance, in later Buddhism of the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda). He writes:

Hardly any evidence can be gathered from the Pali Nikāyas or the Chinese Āgamas to support the view that things were considered to be momentary (kṣaṇika, ch'a na). We do not come across any statement such

as, 'All forces are momentary.'* The theory of momentariness is not only foreign to early Buddhism but it is contradicted by some statements in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. For example, two suttas in the Samyukta called Assutvā described how a man should give up attachment to the physical body made up of the four primary existents because the body grows and decays, comes into being and perishes. Comparing the vacillation of the mind with the change taking place in the physical body, it continues: 'This physical body made up of the four primary existents exists for one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred or more years. That which is called the mind, thought, or consciousness arises as one thing and ceases as another whether by night or by day.'**That description of mind and body is not inspired by a theory of momentariness.²

Kalupahana later makes the following unequivocal statement: "...a theory of momentariness appears nowhere in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas..."³ Thus Kamalaśīla's attributing of the theory of momentariness to the Buddha⁴ is not supported in the earliest Buddhist scriptures, in Kalupahana's opinion.⁵ Kalupahana is convinced that:

According to early Buddhism, things are impermanent, not because they are momentary, but because they are characterized by birth (uppāda, ts'ung chi), decay or transformation (thitassa aññathatta, ch'ien p'ien), and destruction (vaya, mieh chin).⁶

To say that things are impermanent because they are born, decay and are finally destroyed is empirically verifiable.⁷ It is an observation anyone can make and within the context of early Buddhism it had a decidedly soteriological purpose: to create de-attachment. After a prolonged period of observation the monk is induced to state the universal: 'All things are impermanent' not as an hypothesis in a philosophical structure but as a

simple summary of his experience. The experience precedes the statement and the statement is understood best by those who have done the same exercises. An inductive process like this presumes immediate experience and the universal statement 'All things are impermanent' presented no philosophical difficulties within the community of monks (sangha) because all shared the same exercises.

Now compare the above process with the one in which we find the statement 'All things are momentary'. This latter statement is not empirically verifiable in all cases. Lightning may be perceived as enduring for only a moment but stones and trees are not perceived as lasting only one moment. A deductive process of reasoning is implemented to establish that if things eventually decay and die, they must be changing every moment. Such a process is not conducive to soteriological ends. It leads to more wrangling and any end to deduction in this way is purely arbitrary. The emergence of the theory of momentariness seems to point either to internal squabbling or external pressure. This is so because the theory of momentariness is transcendental and requires logical deduction for support. Just as legalism indicates a breakdown of trust, the necessity of logical argument in a religion indicates doubt, separation and lack of faith.

By the time of Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla (over 1,000 years after the time of the Buddha), impermanence

had become equated with momentariness. The first requires only experience for support, the second massive deduction (the TS. is over 1500 pages in translation). If it is a truism that some people refuse to believe what experience teaches, it must also be noted that fewer people are likely to believe a conclusion arrived at via a long process of deduction. None of this proves 'impermanence' is true and 'momentariness' is false; it only wants to point out that impermanence is less likely to lead to wrangling than is momentariness. Indeed we will see that the theory of momentariness is the product of an extensive process of analysis and classification. As such it can be seen to be an undue pushing of 'impermanence' toward one of the poles in logical argument- in this case towards the pole of 'non-continuity'.

From the above we are led to believe that the theory of momentariness is a later development in Buddhism. In order to see how and why it came about it is necessary to examine the Buddhist formulation of the law of causality and also the nature of the things caused (dharmas).

The Buddhist formulation of the law of conditioned co-production (pratītya-samutpāda) is:

When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases.

Kalupahana writes that the early Buddhist texts consider the causal nexus to have four main characteristics:

...1) 'objectivity' (tathatā, ju fa êrh), 2) 'necessity' (avitatathatā, fa pu li ju), 3) 'invariability' (anannathatā, fa pu i ju), and 4) 'conditionality' (idappaccayatā, sui shun yuan ch'i).⁹

Kalupahana then follows, to a large degree Buddhaghosa's exposition of these four terms (except in the case of the first term). For our purposes we note that in the discussion of the first term it is emphatically brought out that at a time when other schools viewed the causal nexus as a mere thought construction, Buddhism stressed the objective validity of the causal law.¹⁰ In early Buddhism causation is something more than mere statistical constant conjunction and association.¹¹ This statistical type of conjunction is stressed in the first part of the formula 'when this is present, that comes to be'. But this is immediately followed with 'from the arising of this, that arises' which, if we agree with Kalupahana combines "...the principle of lawfulness or constant conjunction with that of productivity."¹² We believe that such real production must be assumed in works like the TS. which accept the theory of moments; for if the theory of moments is accepted causation is necessarily only constant succession with no productivity.¹³ It was the first formulation of the law of causality as pratītyasamutpāda (dependent-origination) that allowed early

Buddhism to avoid the two extreme formulations: self-causation (satkāryavāda) implying the pre-existence of the effect in the cause; and external causation (asat-kāryavāda) implying the non-identity of the cause and the effect.¹⁴ The first leads to a belief in permanence the second to a belief in annihilation.¹⁵

The discussion of dharmas is relevant to the discussion of causality because dharmas are the things which are caused.¹⁶

Kalupahana is of the opinion that early Buddhism considered dharmas to be, among other things, non-substantial because impermanent.¹⁷ Later on, with the advent of the Abhidharmists such as the Sarvāstivādins, a dharma theory was developed which came very close to the substance theory (satkāryavāda) of the Sāmkhya school.¹⁸

Kalupahana writes:

The origin of the Abhidharma school has been traced to an attempt to preserve the fundamental teachings of the Buddha after his demise. The method adopted to achieve this end was to pick out the central teachings and analyze and classify them. Once the central tenets were determined, the next step was to classify and group them into various categories, sometimes in numerical order...Such analyses and classifications had to be complemented by a system of definition, and in defining these categories the Abhidharmikas seem to have followed their own ideas rather than those found in the early texts...Such definitions led to a clear demarcation between mental and physical events comparable to the division of reality into mind and matter. Thus the philosophy of the Abhidharma assumed the form of a naive realism or pluralism, which was very different from the philosophical outlook of early Buddhism.

The Abhidharma tradition in India then became

exposed to various external, non-Buddhist influences. Philosophical speculation continued in the wake of the emergence of pluralistic and realistic schools as the Vaisesika, and the Abhidharmikas also succumbed to speculation, engaging in an endless analysis of dharmas into their minutest form. This process of analysis reached its logical conclusion when the Abhidharmikas accepted the view that a dharma is a point in space-time. Thus, the Buddhist schools in India came to accept the theory of atoms (paramanuvāda) and a theory of moments (ksanavāda). As Stcherbatsky himself points out 'such computations as the size of the atom and the duration of the moment are evidently mere attempts to seize the infinitesimal.'¹⁹

In the Abhidharma tradition there are usually 75 dharmas.²⁰ Conze is quick to point out that:

They are not 'ultimates' in the sense that abstract analysis would necessarily lead to them. They are 'ultimates' to the analysis bent on salvation by the Buddhist method of meditation, and respecting, in faith, the conventions of that method.²¹

In spite of what Conze believes, or Stcherbatsky for that matter,²² Kalupahana is convinced that the Sarvāstivāda theory that all dharmas exist in all three times (past, present, and future) leads to a belief in permanence. He writes: "There is no doubt that the Sarvāstivāda theory leads to a belief in permanence..."²³

The scenario we are left with is that impermanence was, in early Buddhism, something empirically verifiable which was not a thought construction but which had objective reality regardless of whether Buddhas arise or not.²⁴ The extrapolation of impermanence to its logical extreme, momentariness, came later when the Abhidharmists had become addicted to analysing, classifying and philosophising.

These same Abhidharmists (Sarvāstivādins) were also influenced by non-Buddhist ideas such as those of the Vaiśeṣikas. In their attempt to 'seize the infinitesimal' they arrived at the theory of momentariness which was foreign to early Buddhism.

Now upon the acceptance of a doctrine as extreme as momentariness, there arose a difficulty we find full-blown in the TS.: continuity becomes inexplicable. The causal relationship is reduced in this way to Humean²⁵ constant succession. Any possibility of real interdependence is gone and thus, among other things, the law of karma need no longer be considered effective under this theory.

In order to solve the problem of continuity the Sarvāstivādins accepted four moments of a compound thing (samskrta).²⁶ Of these four moments the third was considered static (sthiti).²⁷ This static moment becomes the basis for causal contiguity.

The Sautrāntikas (like Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla) denied the static moment,²⁸ for all forces are momentary to this school.²⁹ Yet they too employ the theory of contiguous cause to explain causal continuity. In the Sarvāstivādin school the static moment was defined according to its causal efficiency:

The production of a result (phalāksepa) by a dharma endowed with the potency gained as a result of coming into [present] existence and the harmony

of (external and internal) conditions, is said to be the causal efficiency [karitra].³⁰

Kalupahana says further with respect to the above:

"To maintain causal continuity among such momentary dharmas, they [the Sarvāstivādins] formulated the theory of immediately contiguous cause (samanantarapratyaya, têng we chien yuan)."³¹ We will show that no matter how the theory of conditional co-production is twisted it can never fit into the Buddhist theory of moments which tracelessly destruct every moment.

An additional problem faced by upholders of the doctrine of momentariness was the birth, decay and destruction of the 'series of moments' (kṣaṇakrama). This was explained³² by the production of moments of gradually increasing or decreasing intensities. The final end of the series is when these moments are no longer produced. In order to explain the origin of the series the Sautrāntikas had recourse to the theory known as 'abhūtvā bhāva utpāda' which taught that "...the first moment of the series being non-existent (abhūtvā, pên wu) comes into existence (utpāda, sheng)."³³

'Abhūtvā bhāva utpāda' became the basis, in the opinion of Kalupahana, of the non-identity theory of causation (asatkāryavāda).³⁴ He thinks that the Sarvāstivādins held a theory of causation that was similar to the Śāmkhya theory of self-causation or

identity theory (satkāryavāda) in which there is a continuously present substratum in both cause and effect. In the same way the Sautrantikas abhūtvā bhāva utpāda is similar to the Vaiśeṣikas non-identity theory (asatkāryavāda) in which no continuous substance connects the cause and the effect.³⁵ With this in mind Kalupahana says:

Just as the identity theory (satkāryavāda) leads to a belief in impermanence, so does the non-identity theory (asatkāryavāda) lead to a belief in annihilation or the absence of continuity. The Buddha faced this identical situation, which is evident from the Kaccaya-nagotta-sutta. There he rejects both atthita and natthita because they would lead to belief in permanence (sassata) and annihilation (uccheda), respectively.³⁶

Above (p. 144) we make mention of a difficulty the Sautrāntikas encountered in explaining, from within the confines of the theory of momentariness, the birth, decay and destruction of the series, especially as the series is made up of distinct moments. This question is covered, in the TS. by Yogasena's objection.³⁷ The question in the TS. is how 'fire-series' can destroy 'cold-series' consistently if neither series has any substance that has any enduring characteristic. This is so because according to the Buddhists all moments are unique and separate, occurring only once. In a similar vein, Mookerjee³⁸ and Kalupahana³⁹ bring out the point from the TS. 438 (not tracable in Jha's translation) that when the Sautrāntika is asked why it is that the sesame seed should produce oil

and not some other substance as both are equally missing in the cause, the Sautrāntika answers⁴⁰ that the peculiar potentialities of things must be accepted and cannot be further questioned.

The Sautrāntika cannot admit the continuity of anything substantial because their theory of moments precludes this. Yet they posit causal relationship between moments which are by definition unable to have relationship.

We note that Kumārila, in his criticism of the Buddhist denial of the reality of the external world, has pointed out the impossibility of there being any relationship between unique moments. Here he is speaking against the Buddhist idea of 'vāsanās'⁴¹ which the Buddhists use to explain recognition:⁴²

(1) Ideas being momentary (transient), and (2) their destruction being total (lit. without leaving behind its least trace), and (3) there being no association of the impressed and the impresser (i.e., since the two do not in any case appear together), there can be no vāsanā.

And again, the next moment having not yet appeared, cannot be impressed by the foregoing moment; and the following moment having been destroyed (as soon as it appears), there can be no impression, thereby, of the foregoing; and even if the two moments appeared together, they could have no relation (between them); and hence there can be no 'vāsanā' or impression.

Both (the preceding and the following moments) being momentary, they cannot operate upon one another: how can that which is in the course of destruction be impressed by another which too is undergoing destruction? It is only permanent entities (i.e., those that last for some moments) that can be impressed by other entities, which are also permanent.⁴³

Kalupahana quotes Śāṅkara as making the same point

from the ontological view:

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment enters into being, the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission, it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,⁴⁴ cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.

Kalupahana says that explaining the causal relationship is not difficult for the Buddhist theory of causality found in the early Buddhist texts.⁴⁵ The above type of criticism (and the criticism of Yogasena) do not affect the teachings of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas:

...where there is a recognition of empirical things, impermanent but still existing for some time..., not necessarily momentary. Causes, therefore, are observable facts existing for some time, and they can act successively or simultaneously because they are not momentary.⁴⁶

In the opinion of J. Sinha, the Buddhists, because of their acceptance of the theory of momentariness, are unable to explain duration and simultaneity in our experience: as a consequence they "explain it away"⁴⁷ rather than explain it, they "surreptitiously"⁴⁸ bring in the concept of 'vasanas' as providing the missing link, or they "...invented the hypothesis of residua (vāsanāsam-skrama)..."⁴⁹ to explain continuity.

Similarly, Kalupahana says the Buddhists must assume the very thing (causality) which an objector like Yogasena questions:

...the Sautrāntikas, while denying substance, merely assumed the causal efficiency of the momentary existence. But this very assumption was being questioned.⁵⁰

S. K. Maitra agrees:

The difficulty in the Buddhist theory arises from a total and absolute denial of constants of any kind whatsoever. If there is nothing but momentary reals, then even the law of causation becomes meaningless as nothing really repeats itself.⁵¹

Mookerjee, after stating that his examination of the Sautrāntika theory of causation (based largely on the TS.) leads him to the conviction that the Buddhist theory fails to explain causation says:

...the Sautrāntika...seems to hold with the hare and run with the hound by his insistent demand to regard the momentary units of existence as absolutely real, although he denies in the same breath the reality of all relations.⁵²

Kalupahana adds:

The theory of moments, which is a product of psychological or even logical analysis of the theory of impermanence, presents a problem, as Sankara and Yogasena have pointed out, with regard to the conception of causality. If a thing exists for one moment only, a moment being reckoned as the smallest particle of time imaginable, how can the causal efficiency of that moment be made intelligible?⁵³

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla seem to think it is possible to maintain the theory of moments and make the causal efficiency of the moments intelligible. All of the above evidence against the Buddhist theory notwithstanding, we now, as promised, direct our criticisms against the theory of moments.

In the interest of a smoothly flowing argument

we risk some repetition of quotation.

2. Criticism of the Buddhist Theory.

Above (p. 101) the objection of Yogasena is quoted in full as it appears in the translation of the TS. Also Kamalaśīla's explanation of this objection of Yogasena is quoted in full. We have boiled down one of Yogasena's objections into four statements (p. 104). The reply to Śāntarakṣita gives to the first part of Yogasena's objection is given on p. 106. In that place TS. 435-438 are quoted in succession. We now give Kamalaśīla's commentary to TS. 435-436:

The effect is produced only from a cause that is efficient: and yet auxiliaries are not entirely useless. Because the auxiliary is of two kinds 1) that which serves the same purpose, and 2) that which renders mutual help; in the case of the effect appearing immediately, the auxiliary can be of the former kind only, not of the later kind; because at one and the same moment one could not produce any peculiarity in the other, as it remains impartite (undifferentiated); in the case of the remoter effect, however, the auxiliary is of that kind where there is mutual help; as the qualified succeeding moment is produced mutually out of both, and the remote effect is produced by mutual help in reference to its own 'series'. Thus then, as regards those that appeared at the initial stage, there can be no differentiation from one another; and yet there can be nothing incongruous in their rendering mutual help; inasmuch as they serve the same purpose. But they are not undifferentiated in regard to the producing of the immediately following particular 'moment'; as the entire series of the succeeding effects is produced out of its own preceding 'causal ideas', and each member in this series is equally efficient in producing the said effects. These 'causal ideas' are produced from their own 'causal ideas', these again from other 'causal ideas' of their own: and thus there is an endless series of causes.

Even if there is infinite regress, that is nothing undesirable. Even though each member of the series is efficient, yet the others are not useless; as they also have been produced as so efficient, through the potency of their own causes. Nor is it possible for them to have a separate existence, as there is no cause for it. Nor can it come later on, as all things are momentary.

'They become productive of their own several distinct series'; that is, they are capable of producing the set appearing at the second moment. The term 'of their own constituent cause' should be understood to have been added for the purpose of precluding the usefulness of an auxiliary that appears at the initial stage. And it is not possible for any effect to be produced entirely from its own constituent cause, as everything becomes possible with the help of attending circumstances. This has been thus declared 'Nothing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of the attending circumstances.'⁵⁴

In commenting on TS. 437 Kamalaśīla writes:

Towards the effect that comes into existence at the third moment, the particulars that have appeared during the second moment are helpful, as its cause; and those that are so helpful have the character of having a nature which is capable of producing the effects producible by the particulars brought about by the auxiliaries; so that the particulars appearing at the third moment are all brought about by these.⁵⁵

In commenting on TS. 438 (which tries to answer the question of how things come to have the particular qualities they have) Kamalaśīla writes:

The nature of things cannot be criticised (or objected to); because all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of 'ideas' bringing the things into existence; like the 'burning capacity' of fire; as a matter of fact, they come into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other. Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity, yet, in reality, their nature is entirely different.

That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything. Hence there is no force in the objection urged.⁵⁶

The Buddhists, who elsewhere⁵⁷ are adamant on the tracelessness of destruction of each moment prior to the arising of the following moment here soften their position. Kamalaśīla writes: "The effect is produced only from a cause that is efficient; and yet auxiliaries are not entirely useless." (above p. 151) This is so because at the second stage there is the possibility of 'helping'. Even considering the possible shortcomings in the translation we feel confident that the following case, presented in the form of questions can carry conviction:

Q: Does this not constitute continuity and thus threaten the tracelessness of destruction which the Buddhists posit? Kamalaśīla continues:

Because the auxiliary [sahakaritvam--auxiliariness] is of two kinds 1) that which serves the same purpose, and 2) that which renders mutual help; in the case of the effect appearing immediately, the auxiliary can be of the former kind only, not of the latter kind; because at one and the same moment one could not produce any peculiarity in the other, as it remains impartite (undifferentiated); in the case of the remoter effect, however, the auxiliary is of the kind where there is mutual help; as the qualified succeeding moment is produced out of both, and the remote effect is produced by mutual help in reference to its own 'series'. [above p. 151]

Q: Does the 'moment' then have two natures? Does it have one nature at the initial stage and a different nature at the second stage? Such must be the case if, with regard to the initial stage it is impartite and unable to

accept peculiarities from other moments or produce peculiarities in other moments and then at the second stage is able to do this. If this is so how can the moment be in existence for the shortest span of time? Why is the same moment still considered to be one and not two if it has two natures?

Q: Is it the same moment which extends over the initial and second stages? If so, there is the attribution of contradictory properties to it (impartite at the initial stage and partite at the second stage). If the same moment does not extend over the initial and secondary stages it may be that there is a lingering effect of the moment from the initial stage that remains in the second stage. But this is not desirable for the Buddhists for then the further question arises as to whether the effect remaining at the second stage is the same or different than the moment that appeared at the initial stage. If the two are the same momentariness is given up for the moment extends beyond the shortest span of time and the lingering effect is not destroyed completely upon its arising. If the two are different then causality (the effecting of peculiarities in the series) remains unexplained.

Q: If the qualified third moment acquires its qualities from the previous series of causal ideas is the moment the same or different from these ideas (the series or

chain) which qualify it? If the same, permanence becomes established, if different, causality is still unexplained.

Kamalaśīla continues:

Thus then as regards those that appeared at the initial stage, there can be no differentiation from one another; yet, there can be nothing incongruous in their rendering mutual help; inasmuch as they serve the same purpose. [above p. 149]

Q: If the thing has the character of 'non-helper' at the initial stage it must retain the same nature through its momentary existence or give up its unity. How can you Buddhists say that at the second moment the thing abandons the character of 'non-helper' at the initial stage and assumes the contradictory character of 'helper' at the second stage, and still call this the same moment which exists for the shortest span of time possible?

Kamalaśīla continues:

But they are not undifferentiated in regard to the production of the immediately following particular 'moment'; as the entire series of the succeeding effects is produced out of its own preceding 'causal ideas', and each member of this series is equally efficient in producing the said effects. [above p. 149]

Q: Is the series of 'causal ideas' the same as the momentary thing or different? If the same momentariness is given up, if different causality is still unexplained. (In TSP. 1807-1809 Kamalaśīla says the chain is incapable of being spoken of as the same or different from the moments. Why do the Buddhists not allow Kumārila the same resort to inexplicability with regard to the *ātman*'s

nature?)

Kamalaśīla continues:

These 'causal ideas' are produced from their own 'causal ideas', these again from other 'causal ideas' of their own; and thus there is an endless series of causes. Even if there is an infinite regress that is nothing undesirable. [above p. 151]

Q: Of the two relationships which you Buddhists allow between things (identity and 'being produced out of it') which relationship holds between the 'series' and the 'moments'? It cannot be identity for then nothing new is ever produced and the differentiation in the world remains unexplained. It cannot be that of 'being produced out of it' (cause-effect) because there is traceless destruction. Indeed the Buddhists can be seen to assume causality and when this assumption is questioned it is (cf. TS. 438, TSP, 1807-1809) passed off as being inexplicable. The truth of the matter is that if one accepts certain premises and presuppositions certain aspects of our experience do become inexplicable. This is so not because it is in the order of reals to be so but because of the presuppositions. Early Buddhism was at least not encumbered by the theory of moments and could therefore account for aspects of experience which, by the time later Buddhism came along with its theory of moments, had become 'inexplicable'.

Kamalaśīla continues:

Even though each member of the series is efficient [co-efficient--samārthyam], yet the others are not useless; as they also have been produced as so

efficient [co-efficient] through the potency of their own causes. [above p. 152]

Q: How can the same momentary real initially be independent and subsequently dependent (co-efficient)? Either the moment is non-homogeneous or it contains an enduring substance that undergoes only surface change. Both of these alternatives are undesirable to the Buddhists. To put it another way: for the Buddhists, 'efficiency' ex hypothesi means at the initial stages others are entirely useless (not able to aid in the production of the effect). Yet at the second stage (how can the shortest span of time endure into a second stage?) 'co-efficiency' is operative (there is mutual aid rendered in the production of the next moments). Thus causation remains unintelligible under the Buddhist theory.

Kamalaśīla continues:

Nor is it possible for them to have a separate existence [prthavyabhāva], as there is no cause for it. [above p. 152]

Q: In what does separate existence consist? The momentary real must initially have separate existence in order to avoid eternalism. Yet if this separateness is given it, the relationship between the 'series' and the 'moment' becomes impossible.

Kamalaśīla continues:

Nor can it come later on, as all things are

momentary. [above p. 152]

Q: If all things are momentary how is it that the effect actually does come later on at the second stage? Is anything substantial left of the initial moment at the second stage? If there is then the moment endures beyond the shortest span of time; yet if nothing is left and there truly is traceless destruction causality is unintelligible.

Kamalaśīla continues:

They become productive of their own several distinct 'series'; that is they are capable of producing the set appearing at the second moment. [above p. 152]

Q: If there is traceless destruction how can there be production of subsequent effects? If there is traceless destruction how can there be a series, for there would be no commonality?

Kamalaśīla continues:

And it is not possible for any effect to be produced entirely from its own constituent cause, as everything becomes possible with the help of attending circumstances. This has been thus declared 'Nothing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of attendant circumstances'. [above p. 152]

Q: If 'all is possible out of attending circumstances' which is real, the 'moment' or the 'attending circumstances'? If the 'moment' then traceless destruction, then no series, then no 'attending circumstances'. If the 'attending circumstances' are real then the 'moments' are not efficient, then continuity, thus eternalism is

arrived at. Both of these alternatives are undesirable for the Buddhists.

Śāntaraksita says:

Thenceforward, the particular entities that come into existence are brought about by that; on account of the fact that those that help towards them are of that nature.⁵⁸

Kamalaśīla comments:

Towards the effect that comes into existence at the third moment, the particulars that have appeared during the second moment are helpful, as its cause; and those that are so helpful have the character of having a nature which is capable of producing the effects producible by the particulars brought about by the auxiliaries; so that the particulars appearing at the third moment are all brought about by these. [above p. 152]

Q; Is not the tracelessness of destruction given up by saying that certain moments are helpful in the production of particular characteristics, and certain moments are not? The particulars that appear at the third moment are admitted to acquire peculiarities from the moments that have appeared at the second moment. What is the relationship between the particular moment and its characteristic? If the characteristic is real then real things endure and the eternalistic view is adopted. If the characteristic is not real commonality in the series is still unexplained.

Śāntaraksita writes:

Every moment, entities go on coming into existence, with definite undefinable potentialities, and no objection can be taken to them, just as the fire's capacity to burn.⁵⁹

Kamalaśīla comments:

The nature of things cannot be criticised (or objected to); because all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of 'ideas' bringing the things into existence like the 'burning capacity' of fire; as a matter of fact, they come into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other. [above p. 152]

Q: It is not the fact that there is diversity in phenomena that is being objected to but the Buddhist inability to explain this diversity because of their acceptance of the theory of moments. To simply say that this is the way things are is to admit the total failure of the Buddhist theory of moments.⁶⁰ If there is traceless destruction (a clean cut between moments) there can be no relationship and as such no acquiring of peculiarities from one another.

Kamalaśīla continues:

Hence even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity, yet, in reality, their nature is entirely different. [above p. 152]

Q: Is the 'presence of some similarity' real or unreal?

If real no momentariness, if unreal diversity remains unexplained.

Q: How much is some similarity? Enough to make non-momentariness or even eternal things?

Q: How little similarity must there be for things to be considered separate (momentary)?

Kamalaśīla continues:

That is the reason why only one entity becomes

the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything. [above p. 153]

Q: If only one entity causes only one other entity what becomes of your previous position that 'Nothing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of attendant circumstances'?⁶¹

Q: Which is the real cause of the particular that comes about at the third moment? Is it the single entity or the 'attendant circumstances'? It cannot be both for then the momentary real contains contradictory characteristics: 'unaided' (at the first stage) and 'aided' (at the second).

We now proceed with our second area of Buddhist criticism based on a point of Yogāśena. In Kamalaśīla's commentary on the TS rendering of this objection⁶² Yogāśena's point is clarified:

... If... for the destruction of things, no such cause is admitted as another 'series' distinct from the cause of the things themselves, then why should fire be the destroyer of cold? Because what is ineffective cannot a destroyer...⁶³

In TS. 441-443 Śāntaraksita answers this objection.⁶⁴

We will criticise only Kamalaśīla's commentary. Kamalaśīla writes:

There are certain things which become causes of the 'decadence' of certain other things, the 'decadence' consisting in the production of 'moments' of gradually decreasing degrees of intensity; for instance fire is the cause of such a 'decadence' of cold; while there are other things which are not so. i.e. not causes of the decadence of things; e.g. fire is not the cause of the 'decadence' of smoke. Among the former i.e. among the causes of decadence, even though there is the relation of cause and effect, yet people, having their power of vision bedimmed by ignorance, think that there is 'antagonism' (between the said cause and the thing whose decadence has been brought about)... [above p. 1108-1110]

Q: The point is how can 'fire-series' cause the diminishing of 'cold-series' if the moments which make up these two series are all equally unique (undifferentiated)? If they are not unique then no momentariness.

Q: You Buddhists say that the decadence of 'cold-series' is caused by the presence of 'fire-series' in that there is the production of moments of 'cold' of gradually decreasing intensity. Yet you still have not explained the real issue: how can there be contact between two moments in a series, as one is gone before the other arises? You simply assume such contact because without such contact your theory makes no sense and yet because you must assume the thing which the premise of your theory denies your theory is all the more unintelligible.

Q: What causes 'the production of moments of gradually decreasing intensity'? If the moments themselves, then as all moments are unique, you would still have to explain the recurrence of the reaction of certain 'series' to other 'series'. If the 'series' and not the 'moments' cause the diminution then the 'series' and not the 'moments' are efficient and momentariness is given up.

Q: When you say 'even though there is the relation of cause and effect' what does this mean? Is there a material connection between the moments? If not, nothing is produced. If there is a material connection, no traceless destruction, therefore continuity, therefore

eternalism.

Kamalaśīla continues:

In reality, however, there is no such antagonism among things as that between the destroyer and the destroyed; because when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its form, and it is impossible to bring about any change in the nature of the thing; there can be no cause for any such change, whether it be different or non-different from the thing. As regards the non-entity, nothing can be done to it, simply because it is non-existent. So that in both ways, the 'antagonist' can do nothing. It is for this reason that the Teacher has declared that 'When your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as antagonism; i.e. there is no real antagonism.'⁶⁵

Q: Then in the same way as 'antagonism' is only a notion, so must causality be only a notion and not real. If this is so why act so as to do good and avoid evil (law of karma)?

Q: You Buddhists say that a thing comes into existence full-blown and it is complete. It is impossible, you say, to bring about any change in the nature of this thing. You also contend that the thing is initially undifferentiated and then at the second stage it becomes differentiated.⁶⁶ Is this not a contradiction?

Perhaps the best way to conclude our criticism of the Buddhist theory of moments is to quote from the SV. where Kumāṛila is summarizing his findings concerning the Buddhist concept of 'vāsanās'. This verse is also relevant to our findings as just as the theory of 'vāsanās' assumes continuity or residua in cognition, so does the

Buddhist theory of momentariness assume causality between moments. Both assumptions are made for the same reason: they are necessitated by the initial acceptance of an extreme view which later is found inadequate unless such assumptions are allowed. Kumārila writes:

As a matter of fact, this denial (of the reality of external) objects, following upon the assumption of such an 'impression-theory' (theory of *vāsanās*), which is incorrect and devoid of reason, was declared by the Buddha, with the sole object of alienating the affections (of men from such worldly objects); and somehow or other, some people (the so-called followers of the Buddha) fell into a mistake (and accepted it to its utmost extent, as the denial of all external substratum of cognitions).⁶⁷

3. Summary

We have completed a study of two theories and found both unsatisfactory. If the purpose of study is to find a writer or philosophical or theological theory that one likes and can subscribe to then we have not been successful. But at the risk of sounding naïve we ask: Is the truth a theory? Does someone lack seriousness and conviction because he does not become convinced of a formulation?

Formulations or theories (theological and philosophical discourses) are formulated in words. Words are in the space-time-causation continuum. Words are by definition limiting and must be so to have meaning to a rational mind that thinks using the three laws of logic. Because words limit they must necessarily eventually involve their user in contradiction (provided he tries to think about high things). If words are confined to everyday use they work fine and there is no contradiction. However, if a man is required to keep only

to this 'everyday level' he becomes restless for meaning, tries to think about high matters and, if he is capable of honest assessment, eventually will become restless with logic and formulation. He will see that nothing human thought can bring forward will satisfy him: all theories for others to examine must be expressed in words which are incapable of final satisfactory formulation of Truth. And yet there is Truth to be found in words for words have another side which is non-logical and this is where they transmit meaning. To a properly prepared hearer the true intention and meaning of words (of scripture or an honest speaker) can result in an inner deepening of insight. This truth in words realised within oneself is not for others to examine. It is its own evidence requiring no further proof to convince its attainer. What others may eventually examine is the description of Truth by an attainer of Truth.

The part of the above which is important to this essay is that when a dispute arises concerning the truth of the vision of a seer (Buddha) or a scripture (Veda) the Truth disappears and the perennial philosophical questions arise. We have dealt with one such perennial philosophical question in this essay. The point is (and this is our conclusion) no conclusion has or will ever be reached to a perennial question in public (i.e. in this essay). To understand a perennial philosophical question in all of its facets is to see it cannot be resolved. To see a perennial philosophical

question in only a few of its aspects will result in a 'conclusion' or a 'resolution'.

The true seer is thus one for whom philosophical discourses on religion are over yet they continually end. 'I'm finished but I keep on finishing' he might say. As such he never leaves a balanced and even stand, yet this balance is stationary only because he constantly moves from place to place.⁶⁸

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

I

1. Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,
D. J. Kalupahana, p. 185.
2. Ibid., p. 82-83.
- 2.* Kalupahana notes this quote as coming from TS.1:11. Jha translates this as (see p. 16 of Jha's translation): "All embellishments are momentary." However this may be there can be no doubt that the authors of the TS. equated impermanence with momentariness. We can see this by examining the context of the above statement. In the same paragraph in the TS. the question is asked: "The above-described Intervolved Wheel of Causation [pratītyasamutpāda] that the Lord taught, is it something permanent, lasting?" to which Kamalaśīla replies: "Not so; it is mobile, impermanent, i.e. momentary; what is meant is that anything not momentary cannot be 'mobile'. On this point there is the following declaration by the Blessed Lord: 'All embellishments are momentary; how can there be any action by things that are impermanent? Mere being is said to be their sole function as well as cause'." (p. 16-17 of Jha's transl. of the TS.) Kalupahana translates this same passage as: "All forces are instantaneous. But how can a thing that has no duration nevertheless have the time to produce something?...That is because what we call 'existence' is nothing but efficiency (*kriyā*), and this very efficiency is called a creative cause." (Kalupahana, *op. cit.*, p. 81). The difference of translation notwithstanding, it is plain that impermanence is, for Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, necessarily momentary. By the time of these two authors, the theory of momentariness had become accepted, in Buddhism, to the point where if momentariness were not a fact, impermanence would not be a fact.
- 2.**Kalupahana notes this as coming from Samyutta Nikaya 2.94-97: Taisho Shinsu Daizokya 2.81c 82a (Tsa a-han ching 12.7).

3. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 153.
4. TS. p. 16.
5. Cf. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 81ff.
6. Ibid., p. 84.
7. Ibid., p. 83.
8. Ibid., p. 90. Kalupahana gives this translation after considering the originals in Pali, Buddhist Sanskrit and two Chinese versions.
9. Ibid., p. 91.
10. Ibid., p. 92.
11. Kalupahana says this is clearly implied though not stated directly in the early texts. See p. 95.
12. Ibid., p. 96
13. Ibid., p. 96.
14. Ibid., p. 95-96.
15. Ibid., p. 154. Later Buddhism favoured the latter extreme.
16. Cf. ibid., p. 68.
17. Cf. ibid., p. 69ff.
18. Cf. ibid., p. 151.
19. Ibid., p. 71.
20. Cf. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma, T. Stcherbatsky, p. 5; on p. 67 Stcherbatsky gives the attitudes of various schools towards the Sarvāstivādin list of 75 dharmas.
21. Buddhist Thought in India, E. Conze, p. 96 (note).
22. Cf. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 79.
23. Ibid., p. 79.
24. Cf. ibid., pp. 75, 89, 102, 107.

25. Ibid., p. 96ff.
26. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., pp. 77, 88 and Kalupahana, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
27. Kalupahana, op. cit., ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 81.
29. TS. p. 16.
30. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 81.
31. Ibid.
32. TS. 441-443, Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 81.
33. Kalupahana, op. cit., pp. 81, 151.
34. Ibid., p. 151.
35. Ibid., pp. 151, 152.
36. Ibid., pp. 82, 151.
37. TS. 428-434.
38. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, S. Mookerjee, p. 54.
39. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 152.
40. TS. 438.
41. See glossary.
42. The theory of vāsanās does, in Buddhist epistemology, what causality does in Buddhist ontology; both are attempts to make relations intelligible.
43. SV. Nirālamabana-Vāda, 181-185.
44. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 72. We note that the 13th c. Jain work Syādvāda-Manjarī (Thomas's transl.), p. 104ff. uses this identical argument to disprove the possibility of causality in momentariness.
45. Kalupahana, op. cit., pp. 72, 153.
46. Ibid., p. 153.

47. Indian Psychology, V. I, J. Sinha, p. 158.
48. Ibid., p. 157.
49. Ibid., pp. 157-158.
50. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 82.
51. Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic, S. K. Maitra, p. 12.
52. Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 56-57.
53. Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 72.

II

54. TSP. 435-436.
55. TSP. 437.
56. TSP. 438.
57. TSP. 387-388. Cf. Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p. 95ff.
58. TS. 437.
59. TS. 438.
60. Cf. Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 58. "To say that such is the nature of things, which has to be presumed on the evidence of the result produced, is certainly no answer. It totally fails to carry conviction."
61. TSP. 435-436.
62. See TS. 428-434.
63. TSP. 428-434.
64. Cf. also above p. 107.
65. TSP. 441-443.
66. TS. and TSP. 435-436.
67. SV. Nīrālambana-vāda, 202. Kumārila here seems to think that the Buddha himself taught the theory of

moments (the concept of 'vāsanās' is unintelligible without a previous breaking up of experience into moments). We are led to believe, by Kalupahana's work and our own examination of the problem, that such is not the case. The theory of moments was a later addition.

68. See K. Sivaraman's comment in Saivism in Philosophical Perspective, p-620 where he speaks of Kierkegaard's idea of 'persistent striving' and 'systematic finality' "...the ideal of a persistent striving is the only view of life that does not carry with it an inevitable disillusionment." In addition Sivaraman cites Augustine in a similar vein "...that finding should not end that seeking by which love is testified, but with the increase of love the seeking of the found also should increase."

Phrases like these, like so much of scripture East and West, are vulnerable to the logicians' scalpel, unless read with compassion granting, that no matter what is said, the sayer cannot satisfactorily say what he means. We all choose to 'harden' ourselves into logicians where we please and 'soften' ourselves into sympathetic hearers when we please. This 'hardening' and 'softening' have their proper place. It is a personal decision where and to what degree each is employed. 'Hardening' results in polemics (i.e. the TS. and the SV. are polemical in nature). In a rough and tumble world it is good to know how polemics operate. On the other hand (and this agrees with our above-stated conclusion) if someone subscribes to a 'solution' to a perennial philosophical question he will likely never again be able to 'hear' sympathetically another 'solution' of equal value. In the area of perennial philosophical questions the price of 'conclusion' is eventual disillusion.

GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT TERMS

abhūtvā bhāva utpāda: the theory by which the Sautrantika Buddhists explain the origin of a series of moments. "The first moment of the series being non-existent comes into existence." p. 146.

ākāśa: ether. For the Buddhists of the TS. an illusory mental construction in the same way as Īśvāra, ātman, the universal, etc., are all illusory constructions. For the Mīmāṃsakas ākāśa is one of ten or eleven substances which comprise all corporeal and incorporeal things. The other substances are earth, water, light, air, time, space, soul or self, mind, Eternal Sound, and darkness. p. 75, 93.

akṛtagāma(h): the occurrence of what has not been made/done: The alternative view is kṛtanāśa; the destruction of what has been made/done. p. 19.

anitya: impermanent. One of the three marks (lakṣaṇa) of all things according to Buddhism. In the Buddhism of the TS. is equivalent to momentariness of things. p. 75.

anugama(h): inclusion. The view that all things have one eternal all-pervading essence and that change and separateness are illusory. Partially accepted by Kumārila and totally rejected by the Buddhists of the TS. The Buddhists of the TS. accept the opposite view vyāvṛtti(h). In this theory all things are momentary and any continuity in the universe is a mind-construction. p. 18.

anumāna: inference. One of the two pramāṇas (valid means of knowledge) accepted by the Buddhists. One of six pramāṇas accepted by Kumārila. See note 73.

ātman: self. Rejected by the Buddhists. Belief in ātman is considered by the Buddhists to be the major stumbling block to enlightenment. Accepted by Kumārila as being of the nature of caitanya (sentience). For Kumārila, the ātman is something different from the body. There are many selves, one for each human being and all are eternal and indestructible. The self is all-pervading but is energised only in the body. Buddhi is only a property of the self and

does not constitute its exhaustive nature for the Mīmāṃsakas who follow Kumāṛila. Occurs frequently.

asatkāryavāda: external causation. Implies the non-identity of the cause and the effect. The other view in this respect is sarkāryavāda which implies the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. p. 143.

bhāvana: the universal force which propels life. p. 65.

bhūta tathatā: suchness as it really is. The Buddhist absolute. p. 65.

buddhi: knowledge, intelligence or cognition. For Kumāṛila, one of the ātman's traits. For the Buddhists a term synonymous with pratyaya (cognition), caitanya (sentience), jñāna (knowledge). pp. 18, 38, 49.

caitanya: sentience. A word Kumāṛila uses to describe the nature of the ātman according to his theory. pp. 18, 38, 49.

calam: mobile or impermanent. Used to describe the Buddhist teaching of the TS. p. 75.

dharma: For Kumāṛila 'duty', the knowledge of which comes from Vedic injunction alone. For the Buddhists the name for the Buddhist teaching as a whole; or in another sense one of 75 (according to the Sarvastivādins) 'ultimate facts of experience'. See Chapter V (1).

dūḥkham: misery, sorrow, ill, pain. One of the three marks of all things according to Buddhist tradition. p. 75.

kāla: time

kleśā: in Buddhism, morally impure mental elements. p. 65.

kṣana: moment. The shortest span of time imaginable. In the Buddhism of the TS. this is the length of time all things exist before they self-destruct.

kṣaṇakrama: series of moments. In the Buddhist theory of momentariness 'series of moments' account for the apparent endurance of things beyond one moment. p. 21.

mokṣa: liberation or release. In Buddhism the attainment

of Nirvāna or the insight into things 'yathabhutam', as they really are. For Kumārila the attainment of heaven for the performance of dharma. p. 22.

pratītyasamutpāda: the Buddhist law of conditioned co-production. See Chapter V(1).

pratyakṣa: sense-perception. Accepted by both Kumārila and the Buddhists as a pramāṇa. Their understandings of its operation and what it includes differ. p. 39.

puruṣa: spirit or person. A word used by Kumārila, for 'self' or ātman. Is eternal and of the nature of caitanya. For the Buddhists, an illusory mind-construct. pp. 22, 39.

sahakaritva: auxiliary condition effected between moments, in the Buddhist theory of momentariness. It modifies the series of moments to give the series its particular characteristic. p. 152.

saṃskaras: impressions, volitional dispositions. One of the five aggregates (skandhas) in Buddhism. The other aggregates are rūpa (form), samjñā (perception), vedāna (feeling), and vijñāna (intelligence). p. 70.

samskrta: a compound thing made up of a combination of the five aggregates (skandhas), in Buddhism. p. 145.

śāśvativāda: the eternalist theory as opposed to ucchedavāda, the annihilationist theory. p. 64.

satkāyadrsti: false view of individuality, in Buddhism. See note 155.

tādātmyam: identity. One of the two relationships allowed to exist between things according to the Buddhism of the TS. The other relationship allowed is tādupartih, 'being produced out of it'. p. 80.

vāsanās: residua, impression. In the Buddhist account of the operation of the memory or recognition the vāsanās provide for linking in the absence of ātman. pp. 30, 149, 163.

vināśa: passive disintegration. The Buddhist account of destruction without an outside cause centers around this term. See note 120.

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