

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

THE OPPOSITION OF THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY,
THE TRI-SERVICE IDENTITIES ORGANIZATION
AND SENIOR OFFICERS TO BILL C-243:
THE CANADIAN FORCES REORGANIZATION ACT

by

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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

By bringing forward Bill C-243, the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, in November 1966, the Liberal Government showed that it supported a radical approach to overcome problems related to the decision-making process, operational control and reduction of overhead and duplication within the Armed Forces. The Liberal solution, as put forward by the Minister of National Defence, the Hon. Paul Hellyer, was to unify the forces; namely, have a single unified force replace the three legal entities of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Within Cabinet, Paul Hellyer, the major proponent for unification, played the most influential role in the defence sphere. He offered a controversial solution in the form of Bill C-243 to perceived problems within the Armed Forces. The Defence Minister's particular approach to this solution exacerbated the antagonism which unification aroused.

The main opponents to unification were the Progressive Conservative Party, the Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO) and a largely unorganized group of senior military officers. Therefore, the thesis concentrates upon the main opposition found within three different parts of the Canadian political system: within a government department - the Department of National Defence; within Parliament; and within the extraparliamentary setting. In studying this opposition, the thesis largely

concentrates on the period between July 1966 and April 1967. An exception is made when the development of opposition within the ranks of the serving military officers is traced as far back as 1964. Also, an exception is made with respect to the examination of criticism within the Standing Committee on National Defence and its predecessor, the Special Committee on Defence, prior to the Standing Committee study of Bill C-243 in February and March 1967. A study of the main opponents' roles may be viewed as a study of their strategy and of the restraints the political system and leading personalities imposed upon this strategy.

In this study of the part played by the main opponents, attention is paid to several factors which contributed to the formulation of criticism. Factors such as those of minority government, of personality, of man-management problems in the Department of National Defence and of the premature retirement of senior officers in July 1966 along with the firing of the Commander of Maritime Command, Rear-Admiral Landymore, helped shape the criticism on Bill C-243. The premature retirement of several officers and the firing of Rear-Admiral Landymore especially had a catalytic affect upon the parliamentary and extraparliamentary critics. In combination with the controversial nature of Bill C-243, these factors assured that debate on Bill C-243 would be undertaken in a highly contentious manner.

It is in this study of the criticism that chapters

are devoted to TRIO, to the opposition in the Defence Department and to the role of the Progressive Conservatives in the Standing Committee and in the Commons. The formation of TRIO, of its efforts to attract allies and of this interest group's effectiveness are studied in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 concentrates upon Paul Hellyer's undertakings within the Defence Department and his disagreement with his senior military advisors at National Defence Headquarters. Special attention is given to the role of Rear-Admiral Landymore in voicing naval discontent. The opposition within the Standing Committee on National Defence and how this partisan forum favoured the Government is examined in Chapter 5. Opposition scrutiny, with emphasis upon the Conservatives' role, within the House of Commons is undertaken in Chapter 6. Mention is made in Chapters 5 and 6 that, at least on the unification issue, the parliamentary system was based on competition.

The unification debate showed how articulation of criticism in one part of the political system reinforced the voicing of criticism in another part. The interaction between the major opponents to Bill C-243 helped to explain the way in which the Bill was examined and why the Liberal Government, even if it were successful in having Bill C-243 passed, could not obtain a quick passage of the proposed legislation.

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Needless to say, in spite of the valuable advice and information received, the author is responsible for the interpretation and utilization of the material.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When the White Paper On Defence came out in March 1964, the various critics failed to recognize that its statement on the proposed organizational changes of the Armed Forces would result in unification. Less than two and one-half years later, several of these critics caused an intense and exhaustive examination of the Liberal Government's policy of proceeding to a single unified force. This policy was stated in Bill C-243, "an Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in Consequence thereof", the major intent of which was to replace the three services with a single force having a common uniform and a common rank structure. The Government's parliamentary and extraparliamentary critics strenuously opposed the Bill before it received third reading in April 1967. Indeed, there were indications that the Government's defence policy would be opposed before Bill C-243 was given first reading in November 1966.

It is the purpose of this thesis to study the main opposition, both within and outside Parliament, to Bill C-243. The Progressive Conservative Party, the Tri-Service Identities Organization and a largely unorganized group of senior military officers provided the major opposition to the Bill. Since members of these bodies generated most of the criticism, only secondary considera-

tion will be given to the opposition found within the ranks of the Liberal Party, the other political parties and other interest groups. The thesis concentrates on the period between July 1966 and April 1967. An exception is made when the development of opposition within the ranks of the serving military officers, mainly at Defence Headquarters, and the proceedings of the 1963 and 1964 Special Committee on Defence are considered. A study of the main opponents' roles may be viewed as a study of their strategy and of the restraints the political system and leading personalities imposed upon this strategy. Hence, an aspect of the Canadian political process is being considered with the emphasis being placed upon the major constituent elements of the opposition to a particular government policy.

This examination of a political party, an interest group and a group of public servants (in this instance, serving military personnel) gives recognition to the fact that an important element of the Canadian political process is made up of its adversary characteristics, analogous, in this respect, to the procedures of a common law court. The extent to which the adversary characteristics prevail, depends upon certain factors. A controversial issue may make the characteristics more noticeable and result in a greater degree of activity or articulation of demands by different parts of the political system. In turn, the prominence of the adversary aspect can account for the degree of interaction between the groups opposed to an issue

or to a government's position. Hence, the several oppositions can reinforce the adversary trait in different areas of the political process. Consequently, the respective roles and strategies may be affected, one result of which may be the oppositions supporting each other.

This thesis, in examining the degree of linkage between the main opponents to Bill C-243, suggests that the controversial aspect of unification in combination with the Government's particular approach emphasised the adversary aspects of the political process. Also, it is argued that certain circumstances need to be taken into account in the development of opposition. One such circumstance was the factor of minority government. Because the Liberal Government was a minority one, members of the Conservative Party thought that their chances of success with respect to getting a favourable response from the Government were increased. The existence of a minority government contributed to the Conservatives' determination to extract compromises with respect to the contents of Bill C-243. This determination partly accounted for a bitter, drawn-out debate.

Another important background factor was the premature retirement of several senior officers, along with the firing of Rear-Admiral William Landymore, in July 1966. This was most important for it accounted in large measure for the subsequent intensity of the Tory opposition and the high degree of attention the news media paid to unification.

One result was that Prime Minister Pearson, who appreciated a smoothly-working House of Commons, wavered in his support for his Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer. The premature retirements of these senior officers, and especially Rear-Admiral Landymore's firing, were an important catalyst in forming opposition to the Liberal Government. The actions which took place in the summer of 1966 largely explain the formation of the most active interest group, the Tri-Service Identities Organization. The early retirements also largely explain the resolve of certain Tory M.P.s, who had met with some of the retired officers, to commit the Conservative Party to an intense and critical examination of unification.

The unification debate directs attention to the fact that the personalities of the principal participants affected the nature and the degree of opposition. Such was the case when Paul Hellyer had to combat the efforts of some fellow Cabinet members who sought compromises with the parliamentary opposition. The Conservatives were exasperated at not being able to obtain what they considered to be adequate answers and reasonable compromises from the Defence Minister. This exasperation, coupled with the Conservatives' belief that Paul Hellyer had purposely misled the House of Commons with respect to his intentions to proceed from integration to unification, were factors contributing to the intensity and at times emotionalism of the Tories' criticism.

Of course, there were other factors accounting for the opposition the Liberal Government experienced. Mention, for example, can be made of at least one individual's assertion that the very attempt to undertake a massive reorganization within a government department was bound to stir criticism and the criticism was bound to become more widespread because the massive reorganization was the first experienced by a supposedly entrenched department in several years. Also, the nature of the reorganization, that is, unification, was in itself controversial. The approach to reorganization created managerial problems which gave rise to internal dissent amongst military personnel.¹ Before proceeding to unification, one of Paul Hellyer's assistants had apparently advised the Defence Minister that if he continued "all hell would break loose and his chances for the Liberal leadership would be ruined."² Instead of a gradual approach being taken to reform, one of the results of which would have been a more tempered criticism, the reform undertaken by the Minister of National Defence was done on a trial and error basis within a relatively short period of time. Thus, it was not unexpected that the integration/unification process led to criticism.

¹Interview with Liberal M.P., June 2, 1969.

²Interview with assistant to Paul Hellyer when he was Minister of National Defence, June 2, 1969.

Adding to the controversy over the nature and the timing of reorganization was the misunderstanding over the meanings of integration and unification. Confusion over the definition of the terms caused more than semantic problems because, prior to the summer of 1966, several critics failed to understand the Defence Minister's aims. Consequently their perceptions of what reorganization was all about were affected. Unnecessary confusion and bitterness were the results. There was bitterness because critics felt that a concept possibly containing several shortcomings had not been adequately examined. During the 1967 debate Paul Hellyer seemed to recognize this when he said:

Personally, I regret that we ever used the word 'unification'. It has been so widely misinterpreted that it has created a good deal of, I think, unnecessary concern. However, the purpose of the bill is to create a single service containing specialists in the fighting arms and the support forces necessary to back them up in carrying out the roles and missions assigned from time to time by the government of Canada. I do not like to see the purpose being confused, or diffused by some misunderstanding over the difference between 'intergration', 'unification' or 'amalgamation'.³

The Minister regarded integration and unification to be part of the same process or cycle:

If I may use a physical analogy, you could say that conception and childbirth were separate

³Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 25, Thursday, February 23, 1967, Friday, February 24, 1967, p. 1584. Hereafter referred to as S.C.N.D.

but they were all part of the same natural phenomenon. Once you start integration and proceed to the extent that we have and the extent we intend to proceed...you lead to unification.⁴

To the Defence Minister unification was the logical result of integration. His critics believed that unification, as defined by the Minister, was not part of the same process and if so, was the absurd conclusion of a concept carried to a logical extreme. Paul Hellyer defined unification in the following way:

When I refer to a unified force, I refer to a single integrated service encompassing the naval, land, air, and support units necessary to carry out its assigned roles and missions, and operating under unified management and control.⁵

The Minister could well agree with the definitions of his Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in 1967, Air Marshal Frederick Sharp, who stated:

Integration...is the process whereby the three Services were brought together under single control and management with logistics, supply, and training systems, operating within a functional command and organizational structure, but retaining their separate legal entities and the legal barriers between them. Unification is the creation of a Single Service in which all officers

⁴Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14795. Hereafter referred to as H. of C. Debates.

⁵S.C.N.D., No. 14, Tuesday, February 7, 1967, p. 440.

and men will be held in one entity rather than three.⁶

Simply, then, integration referred to the consolidation of parallel or overlapping functions under a single executive authority. For example, this meant one supply organization instead of three organizations operated on a service basis. Integration referred basically to the support and administrative functions or the 'soft end' of the services as distinct from the 'sharp end' or the fighting or operational part of the services. Unification, in the Minister's lexicon, was a single force replacing the three legal entities of the army, navy and air force. There would be a common rank structure and common uniform for the new force. Explicit in the definition was the functionalism on which the new force would be based.⁷ Also explicit was the centralization of decision-making and the attempt to eradicate individual service loyalties and tra-

⁶Air Marshal F. Sharp, cited in R. Barry Tackaberry, "The continuing search for a realistic Canadian Defence Policy", Independent Research, Vol. 2, No. 2 (February 28, 1972), pp. 4-5. Also see S.C.N.D., No. 14, p. 462ff.

⁷Functionalism refers to the organizational framework of the Armed Forces. With respect to the administrative side, this would mean that common tasks or functions would be brought together, for example, within the same branch. Therefore, there would not be a tri-service set-up. The same principle would apply to the field commands which would be organized on a role oriented or task oriented basis. This would replace the alternative structure based upon a geographical framework. Hence, the individual services would not necessarily control the functions.

ditions. Implicit was a degree of interchangeability between the different elements of the single force.

Yet, it appeared that several participants and observers were not aware of the Minister's definitions and of his intentions to proceed to unification within a relatively short period of time, that is, from the time of the White Paper in 1964 to the introduction of Bill C-243 in 1966. For example, this unawareness seemed to be the case with the Conservatives during the 1964 debate on Bill C-90. The major intent of the Bill was to have a Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff replace the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its Chairman. While the Defence Minister spoke of this as the first step towards a single unified force, at the same time he did not adequately outline what such a force entailed. In addition, terms were loosely used. The Minister spoke of unification of high command which would lead to complete integration of the Armed Services. In other words, Paul Hellyer, in contrast to his speeches in 1966, used integration to refer to the final stage of a single force. At times it appeared that he was using the terms as synonyms. Also, at times, the Conservatives used integration to refer to the single force concept. Thus, there was a degree of confusion with respect to how far the minister intended to proceed. In light of what occurred during 1966 and 1967 in relation to Bill C-243, the following words of Douglas Harkness, a leading Conservative defence critic, spoken during the

second reading debate on Bill C-90, were to assume an ironic hue:

...I am afraid...that most people in Canada have an idea that integration of the services means that all servicemen will be in one vast organization - that they will all wear the same uniform, that they will all be interchangeable and that the whole military organization as we have known it will disappear. The idea is, of course, a highly erroneous one. It is not practicable and it is not possible. Individual units in our armed services at the present time are highly specialized. If we are to have an effective military organization, they must remain so. This idea, as the minister I know recognizes, is not a practical one, and the sooner the general public can forget this impression of what integration may mean, the better.⁸

Douglas Harkness and other Conservatives later argued that Paul Hellyer did not clearly state in 1964 that what the Tories feared would occur.

The example of defence establishments in other countries and the manner in which integration and unification were defined in Canada and elsewhere prior to the Minister's particular use of the terms contributed to the apparent confusion. Not only did integration and unification seem to be used synonymously at times but also unification as interpreted in other countries implied unified or supreme command structures for combined operations rather than a single force as defined by Paul Hellyer. Besides, individuals in Canada did not have any other country to point to as an example of what Paul Hellyer in-

⁸H. of C. Debates, Vol. III, 1964, p. 3148.

tended. No country had a single service.

Other countries utilized the terms 'integration' and 'unification' in a different way than did the Minister of National Defence. What the Minister referred to in 1966 and 1967 as unification was defined as integration in countries such as England and New Zealand. To add to the confusion, integration in the United States also applied to the assimilation of non-whites into all-white units. New Zealand was an example of how the terms were employed differently and of the aversion to proceed to a single service. The New Zealand White Paper of 1966 in part stated:

The Government's general approach to the greater integration of the Services is that the three Services should retain their separate identities and the opportunities for closer unification lie in the support areas of supply, personnel administration, etc., rather than in the actual operational activities of the Services.⁹

The United Kingdom paralleled the New Zealand policy with the statement in the White Paper, "The Central Organization for Defence", that the

Services must preserve their separate identities. In action they are increasingly interdependent. This interdependence must be expected to increase. Nevertheless all experience shows that the fighting spirit of the individual man in battle derives largely from his loyalty to his ship, his unit, or his squadron. The traditions and battle honours of the individual Services are a vital factor in

⁹Cited in S.C.N.D., No. 17, Friday, February 10, 1967, p. 781. Also, "Integration of Defence Forces Unfavourable For New Zealand", Halifax Chronicle-Herald, June 11, 1966; cited in S.C.N.D., No. 18, Monday, February 13, 1967, p. 928.

morale and fighting efficiency. This must be preserved.¹⁰

Christopher Mayhew, the former Minister of State for Defence (Royal Navy), was of the opinion that single-service loyalty was a factor affecting recruiting, re-engagement and devotion to duty. Lord Mountbatten, in a letter of March 28, 1967 to Commodore Harold Groos of the Royal Canadian Navy (retired), stated:

In the British reorganization care has been taken to preserve esprit de corps and morale and those traditions which help to maintain this in the services and fighting units. It has been accepted that to achieve this the three services must retain their uniforms and ranks with an identifiable professional head of their service. The idea of a single uniform and rank structure was also rejected as undesirable and unnecessary.¹¹

Basically, then, the British view, though tending toward greater centralization and functionalism, differed from Paul Hellyer's unclearly-stated position of 1964. Service differentiation was important to the British. Distinctions between, and specialization in, the land, air

¹⁰United Kingdom, Minister of Defence, Central Organization for Defence, July 1963 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1964, Cmnd. 2097), pp. 1-2.

¹¹Cited in H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14711.

and sea were considered important and necessary.¹² The steps taken in British reorganization prior to, during and after the Canadian Government's reorganizational undertakings between 1964 and 1967 showed that British and Canadian thought with respect to deleting service identities for a single service were not parallel. Erosion of service autonomy in Britain was not carried to the Canadian extreme. Looking toward a greater degree of central control, British reformers in 1963 under the ministership of Peter Thorneycroft established a 'unified' Ministry of Defence which absorbed the three service ministries. The service ministers were subordinate to the new Secretary of State for Defence. Unlike the first steps of Paul Hellyer's programme, the Chiefs of Staff were not abolished and remained the professional heads of their respective service. Basically, the services were left intact even though the independence of the service ministries was eroded.

After Denis Healy became Secretary of State for Defence in 1964, the centralizing trend was carried further with each service minister being given a general area of concern or a 'tri-service interest'. For example, Lord

¹² However, the Ismay-Jacob Report of 1963 on the operations of the Ministry of Defence concluded with the recommendation of a single united Service or what Paul Hellyer referred to as unification. This recommendation was not carried out. See Michael Howard, The Central Organization For Defence (London: The Royal United Service Institution, April 1970), p. 16.

Shackelton, Minister for the Royal Air Force, bore a responsibility for the co-ordination of research, development and production of all three services and the defence budget as a whole.¹³ This situation which found the ministers having the ability to intervene without the power to decide was changed in 1967. The ministers were simply downgraded to the rank of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and relieved of their former widespread duties. Two functional ministers, the Minister of Defence for Administration and the Minister of Defence for Equipment, replaced them.

In general the British position seems to have been to bring about a workable structure which has service autonomy adjusting to central control. Along with the centralizing of the decision-making process with respect to support, research, development and operational functions there has remained a considerable degree of service autonomy.

Centralization of decision-making has also occurred within the United States defence structure but the Americans have not adopted the single service concept. Nonetheless, over the years, the service departments have had their authority reduced. It is in the sense of having a highly centralized defence establishment and unified com-

¹³ Ibid., p. 21. Also see Christopher Mayhew, Britain's Role Tomorrow (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1967), p. 158.

mands that the term 'unification' has been utilized.¹⁴ The National Security Act of 1947 created the post of Secretary of Defence to give general direction and control to the service departments which had their own secretaries. The amendments to the 1949 National Security Act which created a Department of Defence added further to the powers of the Secretary of Defence. Also, the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created. Still, the Secretary was specifically barred from encroaching upon the combatant functions of the individual services. In other words, the identities of the services were preserved. This was also the case with subsequent organizational changes.

Civilian control of the services was interpreted as centralizing authority in the Secretary of Defence. The 1953 reorganization plan allowed for the Defence Secretary to appoint Assistant Secretaries who had responsibilities in functional areas such as manpower and personnel. The creation of Assistant Secretaries was related to the decline of the service secretaries.

The Defence Secretary's authority was further increased as a result of the 1958 reforms. As one observer noted:

¹⁴For example, see Harry H. Ransom, "Department of Defence: Unity Or Confederation", in American Defence Policy, ed. by M. Smith III & C. Johns, Jr. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 363ff.

Under the [1958] Act the Secretary of Defence can exercise direct authority over unified commands, transfer weapons systems from one service to another and maintain centralized direction of all military research and development through the Director of Research and Engineering. The practical impact of these powers is to give the Secretary considerable influence over the roles and missions of the services....The concept of unified commands and the sweeping authority over weapons development now enable the Secretary to bring about de facto unification of the armed services even within the framework of a three-departmental system.¹⁵

What was meant by "de facto unification" was actually integration in the Canadian lexicon. For example, this referred to the establishment of an All-Service Defence Communications agency. This also referred to the practice of the Secretary of Defence from 1959 to 1961, Thomas Gates, and his successor, Robert McNamara, to sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of cutting down on duplication and imposing a decision on the Chiefs respecting issues on which the Chiefs could not agree. In other words, civilian centralization was being carried a step further.

Under Robert McNamara, the Office of the Secretary of Defence continued to grow. Through his administrative action several functions were centralized. Robert McNamara's predecessor's formation of a single Defence Intelligence Agency was an example of a centralizing trend which McNamara furthered along. To the detriment of the

¹⁵Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations", in Smith & Johns, op. cit., p. 396.

military Chiefs, emphasis was placed upon the civilian component of the Defence Department. So-called super-agencies assumed the functions previously handled by the independent services. Bureaus which cut into the power of the services were established, for example, the Defence Supply Agency and the Defence Contract Audit Agency. In other words, centralization meant cutting into the independence of the service departments by integrating various functions in agencies which cut across service lines.

Besides the way reorganization was handled in other countries, was the example of what had taken place in Canada before Paul Hellyer had become Defence Minister in 1963. The Canadian experience undoubtedly had not prepared many to foresee the Minister's sweeping reforms; or the Canadian experience had caused some to think that the Minister did not actually mean what he said. The approach taken to reorganization in the '40s and '50s was of a piecemeal nature which had not threatened the services' identities. Respecting the manner in which Paul Hellyer later defined integration and unification, little had been accomplished in the way of integration, let alone in the way of unification, before World War II.

After World War II, tentative steps were taken in the direction of integration under Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence from 1946 to 1954. External pressures pushed to the sidelines any contemplation of widespread integration. Pressures in relation to foreign

matters such as the Korean War, the building of NATO, and the Cold War exigencies were factors in preventing large-scale reorganization. Besides, there were the internal pressures of inter-service differences. A former lieutenant-commander wrote of the postwar Navy and its senior officers during the 1945-1955 decade in terms of the conservatism and anti-intellectualism evident in the Navy, the implication of course being that the Navy was not anxious for change.¹⁶ A witness, Mr. K. Patrick, before the Standing Committee in February 1967 testified that senior officers from the three services did not appreciate a plan he presented in 1945 for unification.¹⁷ There was, however, general agreement, as for example expressed in the views of all of the political parties, that, in order to obtain economy and efficiency, steps with respect to inte-

¹⁶J.D. Harbron, "The Royal Canadian Navy, 1945-1955", Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXXIII, No. 3 (Autumn 1966), pp. 329-330. However, Harbron did speak of the new admirals in the mid '50s who were genuinely interested in change. See, for example, his article, "Unification in Canada: Fait Accompli", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 93, No. 8 (August 1967), p. 84.

¹⁷Mr. Patrick had stated: "Before the end of the war in 1945 while I was still serving in the RCAF I prepared a paper which I delivered in the 'War Room'....in Ottawa, before a tri-service meeting of senior officers, advocating unification as an urgent postwar program...some of the 'brass' reacted against the idea, but almost half of the younger officers conceded that the proposition was logical." S.C.N.D., No. 21, Friday, February 17, 1967, p. 1280.

gration had to be undertaken.

Mackenzie King's distrust of the military, combined with his desire to bring about economy and efficiency, left Brooke Claxton with no doubt that the Defence Minister was to seek ways to cut the defence budget, if possible by integration. Claxton regarded his job as bringing together and making into a team "three mutually resistant and highly competitive services staffed by bands of aggressive young men who had little or no experience of peacetime responsibility but who had won the war."¹⁸ Viewing what he considered was unnecessary duplication, the Minister stated that he had the "original impulse to go far and fast in the direction of unification".¹⁹ In his testimony before the Defence Committee in 1967, General Foulkes testified that the Minister of National Defence had told him that the Minister, after having reformed the civilian side of defence administration, wanted to do the same for the services:

...he suggested to me that he would like to do the same thing with the services, and at that time we drew up a plan for one service.

...when I did talk to Brooke Claxton one day about how far he was going to go with it he told

¹⁸Quoted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, Vol. III (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 117.

¹⁹Ibid.

me that he would have to drop it....He said that he had enough troubles on his hands and that he was not going any farther with integration.

That started the set-up of a whole series of committees. That is when the committee fever started; in other words, integration by committee, and the start of committee hearings....That was in 1946 and 1947.²⁰

Indeed, Brooke Claxton had introduced Bill 19, which received third reading on February 17, 1947. The Bill had the affect of reforming the civilian side of the Defence Department by replacing the three deputy ministers of the three services by a single deputy minister and up to three associate deputy ministers whose duties were determined on a functional rather than on a service basis. During the debate on Bill 19, the Minister made clear his intent to integrate several branches of the Armed Forces:

...it is proposed to consolidate a great many of the auxiliary services of the armed services themselves. This includes the chaplain, medical, dental, hospital, welfare, education, legal and public relations services of the armed forces. The exact way in which that will be done is still being worked out. With regard to matters of supply, transportation and the like, there will be a good deal of consolidation; and with regard to operations, training and planning there will be close co-ordination under the direction of the three chiefs of staff who together form a committee.²¹

However, whether Brooke Claxton contemplated complete unification as inferred by General Foulkes was debatable since

²⁰S.C.N.D., No. 21, Thursday, February 16, 1967, pp. 1227-1228.

²¹H. of C. Debates, Vol. I, 1947, p. 412.

the Defence Minister informed the House of Commons on July 9, 1947:

I want to make it quite clear that when I referred to one set of armed forces, I had in mind the continuation of the three services....it would be quite wrong to suggest that we have in mind anything in the nature of a complete wiping out of the differences which result from the different functions and are useful in maintaining the traditions of the armed forces.²²

In any event, as Brooke Claxton found out, a 'complete wiping out of the differences' was difficult to achieve. In experimenting with the prime user principle, that the service which was the largest user of personnel or equipment would provide the function for the other two services, the Minister was unsuccessful when he assigned the Army the responsibility for vehicle repairs for all three services. The Combined Services Functions Committee which was established to examine the feasibility of co-ordinating different parts of the services was unsuccessful in resolving service opposition, mainly from the Navy, regarding the setting up of a single medical corps for all three services.

Nonetheless, certain steps had been taken in the direction of unification. The legal services had been integrated in the late '40s. A tri-service approach was taken with respect to the colleges. Royal Roads, which

²²Ibid., Vol. VI, 1947, p. 5275.

had previously catered only to naval cadets, by 1948 was receiving cadets from all three services. The last two years of the cadets' course work were completed at Royal Military College, which received its first post-war class in September 1948. Its French language equivalent, Le College Militaire Royal, had its first class in September 1952.

The National Defence College opened in January 1948. On April 1, 1947, the Defence Research Board, which served all three services, came into being. As a result of the overhauling of the Defence Act in 1950, the same rules of military law and justice were made applicable to all three services. However, it was not till January 1, 1959, under the Conservative Defence Minister, George Pearkes, that the integration of the medical services began. Also, the Minister was working toward the integration of the provost services. The chaplain services were not integrated until 1960. In passing, it is worth noting that integration did not automatically result in greater efficiency and lowering of costs. The integration of the medical and chaplain services were examples of this. Integration of the chaplain services only resulted in the headquarters appointment of two new brigadier chaplains. Integration of the medical services only caused a minor reduction of five medical officers while at the same time two additional lieutenant-colonels were appointed to headquarters.²³

²³Ibid., Vol. III, 1960, p. 3057.

With respect to headquarter changes, the post of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was created on February 1, 1951 and its first incumbent was General Charles Foulkes. The Chiefs of Staff still had individual access to the Minister. It is interesting to note that Brooke Claxton, unlike Paul Hellyer, viewed his meetings with the Chiefs of Staff as an important part of the policy process rather than as needless time-consuming interruptions.²⁴ Not having any executive authority over the Chiefs, the Chairman nonetheless was expected to co-ordinate their activities and be an independent source of advice to the Minister, besides representing the forces in top-level negotiations with other countries. The Defence Council consisted of the Minister, the Associate Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of Staff. Though the Council was not new, because of its membership it could be said to have had an affect upon the high-level co-ordination of policy, though differences in opinion existed regarding the degree to which the Council actually did co-ordinate.

From 1945 to 1964, when Paul Hellyer began what he called his first step in the integration/unification process by steering Bill C-90 through the House of Commons, these changes were the outward steps in integration. How-

²⁴Eayrs, op. cit., p. 116.

ever, these did not indicate the studies being conducted within the Defence Department. The political significance of these earlier steps lay in the following. Because the integrative process had been quite slow prior to Paul Hellyer's reign as Defence Minister, Paul Hellyer perceived the need for sweeping reforms. In contrast to the slow, piecemeal approach taken by his predecessors, Paul Hellyer's was one of radical endeavour which, in the process, alienated him from his military advisers, caused a storm in Parliament and alarmed several ex-servicemen.

Yet, several individuals recognized the need for further reorganization for the sake of greater economies and efficiency. But reforms were spoken of in the support and administrative areas and not in the operational areas. In other words, several quarters agreed with what Paul Hellyer was to call integration. Therefore, it is ironic to note that in comparison to the retrogressive picture the Liberals attempted to paint of the Conservatives in 1966, during the 1950s the Conservatives were pressing the Liberals to undertake several reorganizational measures. The Conservatives showed they were ready to accept reform, as long as the service identities were maintained. In 1947, George Pearkes approved of the policy of 'amalgamating' the three services under one minister. In 1956, Douglas Harkness spoke of the need of "having an overall chief of the defence forces" to help bring about a unified defence policy and that defence headquarters should be com-

pletely reorganized as the first step in reorganization for the purpose of achieving efficiency and economy.²⁵

With respect to the position of the serving senior officers, in spite of inter-service bickering, several had recognized the validity of exploring areas where consolidation of common ancillary functions and where the planning process were feasible. In his testimony before the Defence Committee in 1967, Lieutenant-General Simonds who was Chief of the General Staff from 1951 until 1956 stated that he had long been

an advocate of a sensible measure of integration of the three services, one reason being that I always felt that for the size of the forces we deployed, we had much too much overhead, and certainly increased efficiency could result from integration of most of the administrative services.²⁶

General Foulkes, during his tenure as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff from 1951 to 1959, was a strong supporter for integration and in principle agreed with what Paul Hellyer called a single unified force. However, General Foulkes also noted with respect to the Chiefs of Staff:

...I think I remarked that the attitude of the chiefs was: 'Yes; we believe in integration, but please do not do it while I am here. I do not want to be known as the chief of staff who ruined these services'....

²⁵H. of C. Debates, Vol. VI, 1956, pp. 6174-6175.

²⁶S.C.N.D., No. 34, Thursday, March 16, 1967, p. 2178.

When Mr. Pearkes became Minister this plan was put to him and it received favourable consideration, but again it was felt that it was a bit too revolutionary, and Mr. Pearkes decided to start at the bottom and see what he could do about getting common services.²⁷

To a degree, then, it could be predicted that Paul Hellyer would receive from his military advisers support for integration and condemnation for unification since the latter was thought to be either a faulty concept or a concept to be introduced over a carefully planned period of time. Furthermore, senior officers, while serving and recently retired, were wont at times to make public statements critical of government policy. Vice-Admiral Reid, Chief of Naval Staff from 1946 to 1947, in November 1946 made a speech widely reported in the newspapers critical of the Government's postwar naval plans. The vice-admiral was reprimanded by his political masters. In January 1955, Lieutenant-General Simonds made a speech to the Montreal Canadian Club in which he mentioned his advocacy for two years compulsory military training. Brooke Claxton and Ralph Campney were not pleased. A critical article the lieutenant-general after his retirement wrote in 1956 propelled the Tories to request an examination of his views.²⁸ In the process the Liberal Government was embarrassed.

²⁷Ibid., No. 21, p. 1228.

²⁸H. of C. Debates, Vol. V, 1956, pp. 5221, 5250ff.

Thus, service personnel, though not having widespread public support, had potential allies among parliamentary defence critics and in ex-servicemen organizations. In other words, events prior to the unification controversy showed that the services were not always 'silent' and that they played the important role of catalysts in arousing parliamentary scrutiny of government defence policy. Though this might raise questions of civilian control, many officers regarded the raising of questions on the military's challenge to civilian power as a red-herring. After he retired in 1956, Lieutenant-General Simonds made the statement that:

In Canada, on more than one occasion, when military views of what was necessary have come in conflict with political views of what was desirable, certain politicians and sections of the press have raised the bogey of military leaders, or a so-called 'military junta' attempting to usurp political powers. There never has been any foundation whatsoever for such fantasies. They represent one of the most outrageous hoaxes ever inflicted upon an unsuspecting public, and Canadian political twisting at its worst and most degrading.²⁹

There were thus signs raised prior to 1964 that reforms could be expected to take place within the Defence Department and that if the reforms were extreme the debate could be expected to raise parliamentary and extraparliamentary criticism.

²⁹ Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, "Where We've Gone Wrong on Defence", Maclean's, Vol. 69, No. 13, June 23, 1956, p. 62.

As has been mentioned, there were indications that the Liberals would undertake reforms more widespread in scope than to date had occurred if they were to beat the Tories at the polls in 1963. For example, in 1960 Lester Pearson spoke of the need to have one chief of staff and to integrate completely the administration of the three services. In January 1963, prior to the 1963 elections, Lester Pearson mentioned to the House of Commons that one of the points of the Liberal defence programme was:

The three Canadian defence services should be fully integrated with maximum efficiency and economy both in operation and administration and the necessary changes to that end should be made at the Department of National Defence.³⁰

The Liberals won the 1963 election. However, two points should be noted. The Liberal Party did not define the extent to which it would carry out integration. Also, since defence is not among the best of issues with which to wage an election campaign, none of the political parties raised defence reorganization in the 1962 election; nor was this issue raised in the 1963 campaign. So it was that a minority government contemplated and initiated the first steps in the major overhaul of the Defence Department.

If the Liberals needed any encouragement in this direction, they found it in the findings of the Glassco Commission or the Royal Commission on Government Organiza-

³⁰H. of C. Debates, Vol. III, 1962-63, p. 3124.

tion which completed its task in January 1963. The importance of the Glassco Commission's findings was they were an authoritative source on which the Government could justify its actions. Furthermore, the Commission recommended radical changes, but, of importance, it did not recommend complete unification. The Commission stopped short at the 'fourth service' concept, that is, integration of common functions under independent direction by a single authority, a Chairman of Canadian Defence Staffs.³¹

Paul Hellyer readily acquiesced to the Commission's rationale respecting the need for change, namely to cut overhead costs by combining common functions, but he offered his own solution, complete unification. As the Minister's first step in this direction, indications of which were given in the 1964 White Paper, he brought in Bill C-90 in April 1964. The Bill was given Royal Assent on July 16, 1964. As has been noted, its principal recommendation was the replacing of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs by a single Chief of Defence Staff who alone would have the right of access to the Minister. In 1964 the changes at the top were in contrast to previous changes which had occurred at the bottom or outside of Headquarters. In August 1964 Headquarters were organized on a functional basis. By June 1965 the Commands had been reduced from eleven to six and had been reorganized along functional

³¹The Royal Commission On Government Organization, IV, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1963), p. 71ff.

lines. What remained was the final stage, the abolition of the three services as distinct legal entities and replacing them by a single unified force.³² It was this last stage, to be implemented by Bill C-243, which raised the greatest controversy and which this thesis examines.

This 1964-1966 period was important in several ways with respect to the development of later criticism. Briefly, this part of the integration/unification debate showed that there was latent criticism ready to spring to the fore. Even in 1962 there were indications of this. A critical newspaper article reported that Paul Hellyer wanted to scrap the Navy:

...Hellyer said that...defence policies should be recast and that "Canada should phase out of her anti-sub role." The present destroyer escorts and frigates - the major components of the RCN - were a "waste" of defence dollars, he said.

Instead he advocated an integrated force built on airlift power, mobile army brigades, and... assault landing craft.

In short, scrap the navy....

...thousands of officers and men of the Canadian navy would have their careers ruined, their life-work cast callously aside.³³

³²For one of the best summaries of the reorganization of the Armed Forces, see M. Sherman, "A Single Service for Canada?", Adelphi Papers, No. 39, July 1967 (London: The Institute For Strategic Studies). For what might be termed the 'official view' of the first two stages in the integration/unification process, see Armed Forces Management, June 1965, pp. 42-47, 50-52, 55-56, 59.

³³"Scrap the Navy", Victoria Daily Colonist, May 13, 1962.

The R.C.A.F. Association's actions were an example of several ex-servicemen willing to question the wisdom of government policy. The questioning would be within the confines of existing associations or within the framework of new organizations, as was the case with TRIO. Implied, was that these organizations represented the views of dissatisfied serving military personnel. After the passage of Bill C-90, the following resolution was carried at the National Convention of the R.C.A.F. Association:

RESOLVED, that the separate identities of the three services be retained and that a deputy chief be appointed to be in charge of each service.³⁴

At the Association's fifteenth National Convention held in the fall of 1965, besides the reiteration of the above, the points were made that no further steps be taken by the Government until the steps regarding integration to date were assessed and that the Government give more weight to military advice respecting defence policy formulation. The Association at its Sixteenth National Convention in July 1966 carried the resolutions that the identities of the three services be maintained and that integration be confined to Headquarters and command formations. These were sent by telegramme to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of National Defence. The expression of opposition within

³⁴"Minutes: Fourteenth National Convention, October 1st-2nd-3rd, 1964, Charlottetown, P.E.I. - Royal Canadian Air Force Association", Appendix G, Resolution II.

sary and feasible. However, there was opposition to the Minister's time schedule and in instances to the concept of unification. Of importance was the senior officers refraining from making public comments prior to the summer of 1966. Additionally, because of his management techniques, in combination with faulty communications of information, Paul Hellyer aroused further criticism among several of his military advisers. One Liberal M.P. expressed the view that some of the serving officers not in favour of unification believed that the Liberals would not proceed to unification since they were a minority government and, furthermore, the officers thought they would be around longer than the Defence Minister because they thought, or hoped, the minority Liberal Government would be defeated.³⁵

It is on the basis of examining the role and strategy of the major opponents in the different parts of the political system that the plan of the thesis has been formulated. Hence, the Tri-Service Identities Organization, serving senior officers and the Progressive Conservative Party are viewed each in turn. Chapter 2 deals with the formation and the role of TRIO. In so doing, the Chapter explores the factors accounting for the formation of this interest group and the efforts of individuals concerned with forming an organizational framework through

³⁵ Interview with Liberal M.P., June 2, 1969. The author has not found any evidence either to support or to refute this contention.

how their roles suggest certain general traits of the Canadian political system.

CHAPTER 2

THE FORMATION AND THE ROLE OF TRIO

The Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO) was a child of the unification controversy which reached public attention in the summer of 1966. Although TRIO failed to halt the unification of the Armed Forces, it was not irrelevant in contributing to the debate. The role of TRIO was not inconsequential even if it did not realize its main purpose of bringing a halt to unification. This organization's role in the process which culminated in the passage of Bill C-243 was that of being a well-informed and stubborn critic of the Liberal Government's aims with respect to unification. Though not adopted, the proposals of TRIO were considered by the decision-makers; indeed, TRIO helped to slow down the Government's rush to unification. TRIO contributed to keeping the unification issue to the fore and gave other sectors of the opposition information which was used against those favouring unification. In sum, TRIO was an important element among the extraparliamentary forces opposed to unification.

A number of factors contributed to the formation of the Tri-Service Identities Organization in the summer of 1966. Potent reasons for the formation of this interest group in August 1966 could be found in the circumstances of the "Admirals Revolt" and other signs of officer discontent.

Statements of the Tri-Service Identities Organization hinted at this.

TRIO was organized in August, 1966, as a result of the widespread interest generated during the events of the summer in connection with the defence reorganization and as highlighted by the many releases of many senior officers of the armed forces under circumstances still unexplained but which indicated concern was justified respecting the reorganization of the Defence Department which had been carried forward since the White Paper of 1964.¹

Furthermore, Robert Hilborn, President of TRIO, in his evidence to the Standing Committee on National Defence, indicated that the time was ripe to focus on the problem of unification. To Robert Hilborn this was so because if one group organized, then others would spring up in other parts of the country.²

There was additional evidence which suggested that TRIO arose as a direct result of the concern over the events of July 1966. There were formal and informal ties linking future members of TRIO to individuals knowledgeable about

¹S.C.N.D., No. 17, Friday, February 10, 1967, p. 733.

²Ibid., p. 749. Robert Hilborn stated, "It really began in Toronto with a group of us who felt strongly that something like it should be provided by way of a focus on the problem....We had some indications from across the country that if something was started, some sort of pattern set, other areas would follow."

what was taking place at Defence Headquarters.³ An organization had not been formed prior to the summer of 1966 to protest against the Defence Minister's designs in spite of these ties. Yet information was received through face-to-face meetings such as took place at social gatherings and through correspondence. At least one future TRIO member received disconcerting information on matters of reorganization prior to the summer of 1966.⁴ It seemed that for a group like TRIO to be formed there needed to be more than disturbing reports; a public occurrence such as the large-scale premature retirements of senior officers was needed to activate latent discontent.

On the other hand, though this seems to contradict the above, members of the Tri-Service Identities Organization argued that they were unaware of the Defence Minister's designs and did not realize the full scope of his intents until the summer months of 1966. One of the higher ranking members of this organization stated that, in his view,

the White Paper [of 1964] itself was not a definite plan and indicated that there would be discussions

³"Formal" refers to certain individuals having military service backgrounds and recognized as being proficient in the field of defence. These individuals had links with active military personnel, civil servants and politicians. "Informal" refers to a relationship based on friendship.

⁴Interview with TRIO member, July 1969.

and nothing had been laid down firmly or, in the words of the Paper, the proposals were not 'immutable'....Against this background and without detailed knowledge of what might have been involved in a single service, it was only fair to let the Minister [Paul Hellyer] develop his programme....

You will also recall that the meaning of 'single service' was never defined until 1966 when the Reorganization Act was introduced, and Hellyer evaded questions on this in the Defence Committee Hearings of 1964....In other countries unification has indicated single command structures and allowing for the vagueness of the White Paper it was entirely possible that something would evolve with perhaps a greater degree of transferability between the services in certain areas where it might be advantageous.⁵

Supporting the above is the following evidence submitted to the Standing Committee on National Defence by George Penfold, Secretary-Treasurer of TRIO:

...when the White Paper was published, there were very few people who really had any idea about the specifics of it. These were very general and capable of many interpretations. As a lot of people did we expected that integration would be limited to the support forces, because this seemed logical at the time....It has not been spelled out.⁶

TRIO submitted further evidence to the Committee suggesting the difficulties in defining unification.

The difficulties in the defining and in the implementing of reorganization were given forceful attention in

⁵Letter from TRIO member to author, October 30, 1969.

⁶George Penfold, evidence to S.C.N.D., No. 17, Friday, February 10, 1967, p. 771.

July 1966. With the firing of Rear-Admiral William Landymore and the early retirements of Rear-Admirals G. Burchell, Robert Welland, M.G. Stirling, Vice-Admiral Kenneth Dyer and other senior officers such as Lieutenant-General Frank Fleury and Lieutenant-General Robert Moncel in July 1966, and the intensive news coverage given to this, the critics viewed the months of July and August as being very disturbing for the well-being of the Armed Forces.⁷ The press across the land were giving front-page coverage to the debate on unification. Dramatic headlines like "Revolt of the Admirals Only the Beginning?" were fairly common.⁸ Without going into detail on the role of the news media, the assertion can be made that the media added tension and excitement to a situation already made tense by the firing and retiring of senior officers. In short, attention was being focused on the Government's policy. This focusing was both a cause and a result of murmurings of discontent in various quarters, amongst which were the Defence Headquarters, the chains of command, and the retired service personnel. Non-political groups were becoming

⁷For example, see "Military firings, retirements precede integration of forces", Sherbrooke Record, July 16, 1966. In August 1966, at least one newspaper had reported that Rear-Admiral Burchell withdrew his request for retirement which had been deferred until July 1967 ("Admiral Has 2nd Thought On Retiring", Brandon Sun, August 17, 1966).

⁸Halifax Chronicle-Herald, July 16, 1966.

politicized, that is, becoming interest groups and a new interest group, TRIO was on the verge of being formed.

Whether or not the argument is accepted that the organizers of TRIO were aware of Paul Hellyer's designs prior to the summer of 1966, it can be appreciated that the nature of the events during July and August 1966 was favourable to an organized articulation of discontent with respect to unification. The dismissal and retirement of senior officers, the attention paid directly to this, and indirectly to the Government's defence policy, by the newspaper media acted as catalysts to the formation of an interest group. If nothing else, the events of the summer of 1966 dramatized the issue of integration/unification and created a domino effect with the actions of one critic influencing the actions of others. More concretely, the actions of Rear-Admiral Landymore and others caused quiescent critics such as retired officers to become more vocal. These latter critics thought they could exploit to their advantage the attention being paid to the Defence Department by formally organizing and becoming politicized.

It could be argued, as the critics did, that Parliament and the communications media had given only superficial attention to unification. The many difficulties of the Defence Minister's programme had not been scrutinized. These critics asserted that they had a legitimate role to play in the policy-making process by at least revealing what they considered to be the many shortcomings of the uni-

fication programme. Thus, certain groups and individuals indicated concern after the press publicized the dismissal and firing of the officers previously mentioned.

Many groups had become alarmed by the rumours circulating and especially after the "Admirals Revolt". Though their activities were not fully co-ordinated, these groups were all uneasy as a result of the information received from serving military personnel. In a letter to R. Wilson, President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada, the opinion was forwarded that:

In recent months I have personally felt that I was a helpless witness to the death and dissolution of the Service....

Officers returning from the east and west coasts are discouraged and disheartened by what they found there.⁹

In July 1966, the Royal Canadian Air Force Association at Edmonton passed the following resolutions which were sent to Prime Minister Pearson and Paul Hellyer:

1. That the identity of the three services in the Fighting Forces in the field should be maintained.
2. That the integration process be confined to National Defence Headquarters and command formations in Canada.

A number of individuals and organizations had reached simi-

⁹Letter from individual with interest in naval matters to R. Wilson, July 4, 1966. TRIO files.

lar conclusions by independent means.

Nevertheless, a large amount of co-ordination was observeable in the sense that several individuals from different organizations were personal friends or could approach one another. Thus, on July 12, 1966, a meeting was held in Toronto. Among those in attendance were Robert Bundy, President of the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada, J. Koyl, Vice-President of the Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada, Herbert Maynard, President, Royal Canadian Naval Association, R. Wilson, President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada, W. Hodge, Assistant National Secretary, Navy League of Canada and Robert Hendy, Chairman of the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces.¹⁰ Robert Hendy was to become one of the Vice-Presidents of TRIO. In passing it should be noted that the Maritime Component Committee, composed of the NOAC, the RCNA and the Navy League, was formed in June 1966. This was for the purpose of the three naval organizations taking a more co-ordinated approach to naval matters. The Charters of all three organizations stated objectives relating to the support of the Navy and to a maintaining of public interest in naval and maritime affairs. In this instance, the three organizations wished to co-ordinate their activities with respect to unification.

¹⁰TRIO files.

Contacts were established in the summer of 1966 with influential people in various sectors who were willing to form an organization which could effectively combat the aims of the Minister of National Defence. As far back as June 30, 1966, a future member of TRIO was informed that Rear-Admiral Pullen had met with Lester Pearson in Montreal. The Prime Minister had "suggested he would be glad to see the Admiral on his next visit to Ottawa."¹¹ Several individuals were concerned about the events. This was the case with the Maritime Component Committee and the various naval associations. Approaches were being made in all directions: to M.P.s, to newspaper editors and to ex-service personnel. On the other hand, disconcerting information was being received from some serving officers and from some officers who had recently been retired or fired. A future executive member of TRIO wrote Rear-Admiral Landymore on July 21, 1966:

...In our small way we will continue to press for the position which we feel is justified and hope that from the strong position you have given us we will eventually be successful.¹²

¹¹Nothing of consequence developed from this meeting. This was indicated in Rear-Admiral Pullen's letter of July 25, 1966, to a future TRIO member: "Pearson knows just what I think of the whole affair and I have tried to see him on several occasions." TRIO files.

¹²Rear-Admiral Landymore had replied on July 22, 1966:

"The whole plan which Hellyer had fixed is now beginning to unfold and it is that he has no intention of allowing anyone to decide whether he'll join the 'new force'. If he did, I'm sure as far as the navy is concerned he would

The retiring of several officers had undoubtedly politicized others with an interest in defence matters.

The information and the contacts were plentiful. Yet the impression was given that the critics were groping for some common course of action and as long as they did not speak with one voice the Government could afford to ignore them. Besides, the Government was not dormant, for under the guidance of Bill Lee, Paul Hellyer's executive assistant, the Defence Department's public relations machine was working smoothly and efficiently.

As I see the position today, we must work ever harder for the Minister (under Lee's PR guidance) has achieved a public position that the "revolt" has been crushed, everyone else is all for his program, there will be no further resistance. This may achieve his desired objective of creating a "what's the use" attitude within and without the services.

He [Hellyer] has also skillfully taken the emotional heat out of the news by just threatening action against Landymore and then putting on a saintly cap and giving the Admiral full rights, pension, etc....at least, that's how the public sees it.

He has been able to do this because Lee has achieved over the past few years a position of journalist manipulation and news "management" far superior to anything that President Kennedy's press secretary was able to attain.

find very few people who would stay, and those only because they were 'trapped' so to speak.

"If by some miracle we can cause a choice to be required I don't think the Legislation will ever reach the house....

"I think by pressing for free choice the damage...will be so obvious he [Hellyer] will have to stop. I'm going to press along these lines using your legal argument (con-scription) as long as I can...." TRIO files.

For example, Warner Troyer's recent article that appeared on the editorial page of the Montreal Star was a paraphrasing of Lee's statements made in the last few days.¹³

Such manipulation was understandable, given the Defence Department's desire to paint a picture of well-being.

The public relations' skills of the Minister's executive assistant meant the critics had to work harder to form a potent organization, the efforts of which would receive favourable notice from influential individuals such as cabinet ministers. This was the rationale behind attempts to publicize the Government's policy and was recognized by some who wished to form an effective interest group. For example, a future member of TRIO suggested an organization to be established in different cities:

TORONTO

Central committee directed by R.I. Hendy and composed of an executive (not too cumbersome) well balanced by former army, airforce and navy.

A PR [Public Relations] sub-committee headed by someone like Young...and supported by Terence Robertson and one or two other seasoned pros....The leading figure on the PR sub-committee must also be on the executive committee....

¹³Letter of July 20, 1966 from lieutenant-commander (ret'd.) to future executive member of TRIO. TRIO files. It is difficult to determine to what extent journalists such as Warner Troyer were paraphrasing the releases of Bill Lee. However, several individuals who were interviewed believed that Lee was very skillful in manipulating the news media, at least initially, to take a sympathetic view of Hellyer's position.

VANCOUVER, WINNIPEG AND MONTREAL

Similarly constituted committees each containing professional PR people....

The Central Committee and Regional Committees should establish a good inter-communication so that programming will be carried out in a manner designed to obtain maximum effect and publicity.¹⁴

These suggestions were an indication of what was to be done after groups were organized.

July 1966 was a period of increasing but uncoordinated activity. Individuals with military backgrounds were responsible for holding meetings and for furthering contacts. A wider public was not aroused. Various concerned ex-servicemen still had not come to grips with the forming of an organizational structure through which their discontent could be articulated. However, these individuals were working toward this end. Efforts to organize were being increased. On July 25th a letter was sent to a number of people to meet at the Toronto Club on July 28th or 29th. Among those invited were Major-General A. Mathews of Excelsior Life Insurance Company, General Howard Graham, Brigadiers Clarence McKee, Ian Johnston and Gordon Wortherspoon, Colonels Alan Burton, Sydney Frost, Jr., Bishop Frederick Wilkinson, Air Marshal W. Curtis and Commodore Hendy.¹⁵ These names are mentioned to indicate

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ It is not known how many of these attended the meeting.

that concern was observeable in individuals with a military background other than naval. The press was wrong to concentrate upon the issue as one being fomented by the Navy.

Most of the efforts to organize seemed to take place in Eastern Canada, more specifically, in Toronto. Individuals in the East appeared to be more active. It was due to their prodding that other organizations were established in other parts of Canada. For example, a retired naval commander in Vancouver received a letter from a correspondent in Toronto. The correspondent stated the need to form an organization in places like this Western Canadian city:

I feel that we must get a group of respected and intelligent people who can spread the word in their community and ensure that this whole matter is drawn to the attention of the public who must be fully informed.¹⁶

The need to organize in various regional centres, though recognized, was not met until the activists in Toronto had themselves organized.

Steps were taken to organize in late July 1966. Toronto activists who were to be involved in the Tri-Service Identities Organization formed the Canadian Defence Advisory Committee, otherwise known as CANDECO. The brief existence of CANDECO lasted until August 16, 1966, when TRIO formally came into being. CANDECO was essentially a Toronto-based

¹⁶Letter from correspondent in Toronto to retired naval commander in Vancouver, August 2, 1966. TRIO files.

transitory group which was the forerunner of TRIO:

As you will probably be aware..., a group called TRIO, formally CANDECO, is now being organized....¹⁷

CANDECO was a preliminary step leading to the formation of a more viable organization. Briefly, CANDECO was a committee without an elected executive or subcommittees, in short, without a strong organizational structure. Its formation led to the next formal step of holding a meeting at the Military Institute in Toronto on August 11, 1966. This in turn brought about the next formal step of the formation of TRIO on August 16th.

The metamorphosis of CANDECO into TRIO was one of name and organizational framework. The objectives, though more clearly articulated by TRIO, remained essentially the same. CANDECO spelt out the objectives pursued by TRIO. This committee represented the determination of a group of people in Toronto to search for an organizational form with which to combat the proposed reorganization of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the name change to TRIO more clearly indicated that the opponents were of a tri-service background. The critics realized that no gains against the Government could be made without an effective organization.

The tactics and objectives of CANDECO are pertinent to note because they forecast those to be pursued by TRIO.

¹⁷Letter from TRIO to Robert Hendy, August 18, 1966. TRIO files.

Also, the determination of the Toronto critics and their alienation from the Defence Minister were indicated. Setting for themselves the task of defeating unification, those attending the July meeting felt that action should be oriented toward impeding the implementation of the unification programme.¹⁸ Of course, the undertaking of such action was related to strategy. At the July meeting, it was suggested that approaches be made to the Liberal Party:

Formulate plan to influence individual members of the Liberal caucus to find five or six defectors from the party line if unification is indeed accepted as official policy. Commodore _____ feels that it may be possible to find these, particularly among those whose election was very close and with strong suggestions from former service personnel in these areas, these members might swing the caucus to defer introduction of enabling legislation.¹⁹

The finding of a way by which Cabinet members could be influenced to withdraw support from Paul Hellyer was related to the approaches to be made to members of the Liberal caucus.

It is interesting to note the sensitivity of individuals associated with CANDECO with respect to their poli-

¹⁸"Notes Re Meeting On Integration-Unification" (sic), July 1966. TRIO files. There were at least two meetings. Among others, Robert Hendy, George Penfold, a former National President of the Royal Canadian Air Force Association, Terence Robinson, a journalist, Charles McNair, a former lieutenant-commander, and Doug Harvey, a former wing commander, attended. The meetings were held to set out the aims, objectives and strategy of CANDECO.

¹⁹Ibid. The name of the commodore has been intentionally omitted.

tical activities. Their concern respecting being associated with an interest group prompted them to assert that CANDECO was non-political. This was observable in the following statement on the role of CANDECO:

The Canadian Defence Advisory Committee is a completely non-political association of Canadian citizens dedicated to the maintenance of adequate and efficient Armed Forces for the defence of our country. While agreeing with the combining of the functions of support forces, The Canadian Defence Advisory Committee particularly advocates the preservation of the operational identities of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force.²⁰

"Non-political" should be interpreted as "non-partisan".

The strategy and tactics of CANDECO were political.

The political nature of the strategy was more clearly revealed in the subsequent step leading to TRIO. This was the meeting held at the Military Institute in Toronto on August 11th. The meeting was for the purpose of exploring means to organize a tri-service group which would act to preserve the operational identities of the three services. The strategy of approaching high-ranking

²⁰Quotation is extracted from a page entitled "Canadian Defence Advisory Committee" attached to an undated memorandum. TRIO files. This inner sensitivity of CANDECO to being labelled an "interest group" is noticeable in other interest groups. In 1963, Helen Dawson referred to the Consumers' Association of Canada being "hamstrung by its own rather ostrich-like attitude put forward in the constantly reiterated maxim that the CAC must not be allowed to become a 'pressure group'." Helen Dawson, "The Consumers Association Of Canada", Canadian Public Administration, Vol. VI, No. 1 (March 1963), p. 116.

Liberals was made more explicit. It was clearly recognized that attempts should be made to contact Cabinet members and to alienate them from Paul Hellyer. The Cabinet had to be influenced to reject unification as official Government policy. The obvious means was to find sympathetic individuals who were acquaintances of the Cabinet members. This was further detailed by referring to the possibility of contacting veteran groups in Cabinet members' ridings and having these groups write to the Cabinet members. The following suggestions were related to this:

4. Write letters-to-the editor to newspapers in the home ridings of the Cabinet members opposing unification now.
5. Get as many communications as possible from home ridings individuals sent to Cabinet asking for halt....
6. Prepare pamphlets and distribute to interested individuals in home ridings of Cabinet members.²¹

By contemplating these tactics, those at the meeting recognized they had to influence the centre of power within the governmental structure, that is the Cabinet, in order to achieve results favourable to their interests. This strategy is characteristic of many interest groups.

CANDECO and TRIO indicated other features which are characteristic of interest groups. In responding to

²¹Material was taken from a copy of an undated draft memorandum (under title "Method") which is in the TRIO files.

Government activities, individuals were seeking to organize in order to politically promote their interests. Their search for an organization was the search for a political weapon to combat a political issue. CANDECO and TRIO, desirous of altering Government policy, were looking at political means to accomplish their ends. This involved the contacting of political parties; the searching of means by which to influence the decision-makers; the attempt to mould areas such as the communications media. Without this understanding of tactics and aims, one would be at a loss to understand the need for a formal organization to contest the validity of integration leading to unification.

TRIO was the formal organization which arose from the events of the summer of 1966. CANDECO indicated the exploration of ways to halt the proposed reorganization. TRIO was the formalization of the behind-the-scenes efforts to organize for the purpose of opposing the Government on the unification issue. In its first press release of August 17th, TRIO stated the objectives which it pursued throughout the integration/unification debate.²² That is,

²² There was a meeting held at the Military Institute in Toronto on August 16, 1966. Among others in attendance were Air Marshal (ret'd.) W. Curtis, Robert Bundy, President of the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada, R. Wilson, President of the Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada, Frank Manchee, President of the Toronto Branch of the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada, and Robert Hilborn, a retired lieutenant-colonel. Robert Hendy who became one of the vice-presidents was not present because he was holidaying in Bermuda. In fact, he was selected as vice-president in absentia.

TRIO wanted the combat efficiencies of the three services preserved; an immediate halt toward a single military service; and a public enquiry or Royal Commission to examine the issue. Also, TRIO was willing to co-operate with any group or citizen opposed to the loss of the identities of the three services.²³ These were the themes to be constantly reiterated in one form or another. They were to prove effective in bringing together several critics who otherwise would have remained dormant or ineffectual.

Press reaction to the birth of TRIO was mixed. TRIO still had to convince members of the news media that its corporate pursuit of questioning the wisdom of the Government was a legitimate role to be exercised by ex-servicemen. Statements such as the following showed that TRIO would have much work to do if it were to play an influential role in deterring the Government from its policy of unification.

As watchdogs for Canada's armed forces, the newly-formed Tri-Service Identities Organization ...doesn't inspire much confidence. This officer-led opposition to...Hellyer's integration

²³"Veterans start campaign to prevent forces unification", London Evening Free Press, August 17, 1966. Also, TRIO files. Some discussion as to the timing of the press release took place between the individuals present at the meeting of August 16th (see Footnote 22):

"The question of a press release was thoroughly discussed and at first it was decided to defer release of our official formation until the following day, but when someone recalled that the Beatle story would occupy much newspaper space on Thursday, it was finally decided to move at once." Minutes of Meeting Held At The Military Institute, Tuesday, August 16, 1966. TRIO files.

program seems interested only in turning the clock back.²⁴

or

There is something amazingly, and amusingly, incongruous about the efforts of retired military officers to organize a unified protest against unification of the armed forces. They are disproving their own point....

There is, however, a more basic argument against the move headed by Air Marshal W.A. Curtis.... This is that officers of the past should not be allowed to dictate policies of the present.

They are, as all other citizens, entitled to their opinions and to the right to express them. They should have the privilege of appearing before a parliamentary committee to state their case. But this is something different from trying to whip up a pressure group among war veterans.²⁵

Whether this was a general criticism of interest group activity or of ex-servicemen interest group activity, it seemed that the press's initial reaction was negative with respect to the political endeavours of TRIO.

Other newspapers questioned why TRIO was not formed earlier and whether at this period it would serve any useful function.

Where...was TRIO when the question of integration was before the House of Commons? Why did the opponents of integration not join ranks until integration's implementation began? This kind of rear-guard action can only increase bitterness.

²⁴"Sleeping Watchdogs", Windsor Star, August 18, 1966.

²⁵"Former officers unite against unification", ibid.

It will not, thankfully, stop Mr. Hellyer.²⁶

Comments such as those quoted were more common than editorials favouring the formation of TRIO.²⁷ This meant that future tactics would involve the cultivation of contacts with newspapers. Aside from a few sympathetic journalists such as Scott Young of the Globe and Mail, other reporters and editors were not aware of many of the implications of unification. Though recognizing the political role of TRIO, they did not recognize the validity of such a role. This was so because it initially appeared to several editors and reporters that individuals with service backgrounds were emotionally inspired to oppose a civilian government. The reporters and editors did not fully appreciate the distinction between integration and unification. Until they became better informed, they remained sympathetic to Paul Hellyer's position, uncritically accepting his statements and the Defence Department's press releases. This made the task of TRIO all the harder. The members of TRIO of course recognized that sympathetic and informed responses from the communications media were important if the interest group were to realize its goals.

²⁶"All the Angry Admirals", Brandon Sun, August 20, 1966.

²⁷The author had the advantage of looking at several articles from various newspapers. These articles were obtained from the Canadian Press Clipping Service, a division of Maclean-Hunter. See bibliography for the titles of these newspapers.

Though a new organization, TRIO started from the advantageous position of having on its executive and amongst its rank and file respected, prestigious individuals.²⁸ These individuals, because of their background and contacts, could influence others with respect to the integration/unification issue. Several of the TRIO members were aware that the degree of the organization's influence was at least in part determined by the personal prestige of the membership. Part of the strategy of TRIO was to recruit individuals because of their prestige. These individuals could act as spokesmen whose viewpoints, being respected, could embarrass the Liberal Government.

The difficulties of defining and of assessing the influence of interest groups have been widely acknowledged, for instance, with respect to distinguishing, recognizing and observing influence.²⁹ Influence can be simply defined as the modification of the behaviour of an individual or decision-maker; the modification of the behaviour or activity results in an action, viewpoint or policy more favourable to the interests of the individual or group causing the behaviour modification. This definition is used without attempting to overcome the problems of identi-

²⁸Also see Chapter 3 with respect to this point.

²⁹For example, see James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (N.J.: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 11.

fying and measuring a group's influence.

This also brings attention to the interrelationships between an organization such as TRIO and individuals possessing expertise in the relevant issue area. In some instances, what may be referred to as the 'personal prestige' of the individual is so highly held that the individual's views will be regarded or solicited regardless of the fact that the individual may or may not belong to an organization. And, as an organization may enhance the opportunities of the individual to gain access to the communications channels, so may the highly respected individual raise the prestige of an organization by joining it. Hence, in turn, the organization's opportunities to submit opinions are enhanced. It may be noted in passing that the scope of an organization's access is determined in part by the status conferred upon it by organs such as the news media and by individuals such as Members of Parliament. Thus, TRIO became a more significant factor in the unification controversy because its contributions to the debate were reported by the press and referred to by Members of Parliament.

So, as TRIO provided an outlet for the views of several critics, the critics in turn were asked to join because they would enhance the organization's position in the unification controversy. It should be added that the view was expressed that the larger the membership, the more

powerful would be the voice of TRIO.³⁰ However, the strength of an organization should not be measured in terms of membership for of course the size of the membership is only one of several factors contributing to an organization's access to the policy-making process.

TRIO firstly had to construct a viable organization if it were to become the effective critic it desired to be. The Executive recognized this at the outset in the latter part of August 1966. The function of the Toronto TRIO was clarified at a meeting of the Toronto TRIO Executive held August 28, 1966:

FUNCTION OF TORONTO TRIO

1. Assist by co-ordinating all TRIO BRANCH activities including:
 - a) Recruiting of key personnel in each centre.
 - b) Providing outline of suggested organization and procedures.
 - c) Providing information kit including:
 - i) Clearly defined aims and objectives;
 - ii) Editorial and news material;
 - iii) Membership application form.
 - d) Maintain master registry of all TRIO members.
 - e) Co-ordinate Public Relations programme including:
 - i) Press releases and statements;
 - ii) Public speakers available for TV, Radio and public platforms such as Service Clubs, etc.;
 - iii) Drafts of suggested letters to opinion leaders at the Parliamentary level;
 - iv) "Letters to Editor" campaign;
 - v) Direct mail campaign to veterans associations seeking support and urging that they write and wire to their Members of Parliament;

³⁰ TRIO releases of November 17, 28, 1966, to TRIO members.

- vi) Constant liaison on all PR matters.
- 2. Organize Toronto TRIO Branch.
- 3. Stimulate general recruiting of members.
- 4. Arrange financing of 1, 2 and 3 above.
- 5. Organize Ottawa liaison and a campaign of private presentation to all members of Parliament with particular emphasis on Cabinet Ministers; Leaders and influential members of opposition parties; influential members of all parties; members of Commons Defence Committee.
- 6. Design and co-ordinate a Public Relations programme as (e) above.
- 7. Stimulate interest and participation of all Veterans' organizations.
- 8. Inform and liaise with the Reserve Forces of the three services.
- 9. Prepare and present TRIO Brief to the appropriate Committee or Commission.³¹

The above demonstrated the plan to take a 'shotgun' approach to the issue. The attack would be made on all fronts at the same time. This approach suggested that TRIO hoped that the application of pressure in one area would result in pressure in another. Whatever tactics were to be applied would be applied more effectively only after organizational cohesiveness was attained. With reference to TRIO, organizational cohesiveness should not be defined in terms of a monolithic structure through which opinions were submitted. If anything, TRIO was a series of self-sustaining, autonomous entities bound together by common aims.

³¹TRIO files. Also mentioned was the role to be played by TRIO in the public relations area, that is, the need was recognized to create news media support, to influence public opinion in general, and to influence opinion leaders at the parliamentary level.

So far, reference to TRIO has meant the activities of the Toronto branch. The executive membership in Toronto were the catalyst bringing into being other branches. The Toronto branch was the most active of branches in existence. Toronto TRIO was, for all intents and purposes, the head branch. However, in response to an enquiry whether one of the weaknesses of TRIO was the fact that the organization never became viable except in a few centres, a leading member of TRIO replied:

Regarding your comment about the organization of TRIO, our policy was not to develop a tightly-knit organization and the purpose of the Toronto group, which did most of the work, was merely to send material to various branches and individuals who were interested and asked them to take necessary steps in their own community to generate an interest in the issues. On this point of view your comment that there was not an organizational cohesiveness is correct but we considered our strength was the type of person we were contacting and the influence they in turn would have on people in their community, and particularly M.P.'s....All in all I think, with the resources we had, we did make a considerable impact and I have since been told there was very grave concern with respect to TRIO's activities and its criticisms of the ill-founded unification process.³²

Toronto TRIO viewed organizational cohesiveness to mean something beyond formal organization. The Toronto leadership, if it used the term at all, included in the term variables such as membership being based on genuine commitment and the ability to mobilize this membership and sympathetic nonmembers. It can be noted in passing that

³²Letter from executive member of TRIO to author, June 1, 1970.

it is not the power base of an interest group so much as the power distribution within the governmental framework which determines the approach taken by the group. This is the case because the group wishes to influence the parts which will produce the desired consequences. Recognizing this, the Toronto leadership wanted the independent branches to channel the criticism.

The failure of several branches to generate activity at the local level did not necessarily mean that TRIO as a whole was doomed to impotence. The zealousness of the Toronto branch made up, though not wholly, for the failures of some of the other branches. Accepting disproportionate expenses in the sense of energy expended, Toronto activists tried to overcome the difficulties experienced by branches in other cities. Within this context, it was the Toronto leadership which in large measure drew up the brief presented to the Defence Committee. It was largely members from the Toronto area who followed up in having a meeting with the Defence Minister in October 1966. The Toronto branch generated sufficient energy to be regarded as significant by various groups in the policy-making process without being broken by the weight of the shortcomings of the other TRIO branches.³³

The Branch Organization and Liaison Committee, the

³³Paul Hellyer stated in an interview with the author on June 4, 1969, that TRIO represented the main opposition outside of Parliament.

duty of which was to encourage the establishment of TRIO branches across Canada, was one of the committees the Toronto organization established.³⁴ Hence, the Toronto branch acted in a co-ordinating capacity, even if it were not set up with the purpose of being a central organization. Actually, the role extended beyond that of co-ordination. Toronto TRIO attempted to strengthen the other branches by suggesting various strategies to be followed and by trying to mobilize the critics of the Government into becoming more vocal:

It is certain that many people holding views similar to those put forward by TRIO are not being reached by us. It would be tragic to miss out on complete success simply because we failed to mobilize all who think the way TRIO does about the defence debacle. From our experience to date, we are convinced that the government would agree to a thorough enquiry into the defence situation before proceeding with legislation only if convinced that large numbers of Canadians feel that this is the only sensible way to proceed. Thus, TRIO's immediate task is to ensure that all Canadians who are concerned or confused by the existing defence situation register as TRIO members.

We are asking you, as a member of TRIO, to assist in this membership drive. Enclosed are three TRIO membership cards. Would you undertake to put these into the hands of persons who support TRIO objectives but have not yet enrolled as TRIO

³⁴ The other committees established or considered were:

- Toronto Branch
- Membership General
- Financial and Budget
- Ottawa Liaison
- Public Relations
- Veterans
- Reserve Forces Liaison
- Brief

members. Our aim is to greatly increase the TRIO membership over the next month and, to achieve this, the active participation of all TRIO members is required....³⁵

It was difficult to determine the size of the membership as no central registry was kept, despite the Toronto branch's initial intention to maintain a master registry. Obviously, different branches experienced various degrees of success.

By the end of September 1966, TRIO could boast of some thirty-five branches across Canada. The branches varied considerably in their effectiveness and some never really got off the ground. The thirty-five centres in which the branches were located were:

Victoria	Sault Ste. Marie	Toronto
Vancouver	North Bay	Windsor
Calgary	Sudbury	Sarnia
Edmonton	Ottawa	Orillia
Regina	Kitchener	Montreal
Saskatoon	Brantford	Quebec

³⁵Form letter of November 28, 1966, from Robert Hilborn, President of TRIO, to TRIO members. TRIO files. Yet, the President stated before the Standing Committee: "It was felt that the organization existed, that people of interest and concern were involved in it and that it might be influential in talking to other people who were interested in this legislation. It did not set out to obtain a large number of card-carrying members...." S.C.N.D., No. 17, Friday, February 10, 1967, p. 750.

Winnipeg	Woodstock	Aylmer
Oakville	London	Sherbrooke
Hamilton	Kingston	St. John
St. Catherines	Trenton	Charlottetown
Galt	Peterborough	Halifax
Lakehead	Oshawa	

By far the overwhelming majority were located in Ontario. Both in terms of actual membership and of active support, few garnered the support needed for mounting a strong public campaign against unification. In fact, the Ottawa branch, located right in the capital, was weak, despite the fact that Ottawa's strategic importance was recognized before the Tri-Service Identities Organization was formed.³⁶

The Winnipeg experience is an example of the difficulties encountered by the different branches. Commander (retired) Pat Benson, head of the Winnipeg branch, could not gain the active support of the Canadian Legion in Winnipeg; nor could he get those individuals, who because of their former military career might have brought others to support TRIO, to come out openly, or even behind the

³⁶At the meeting in July 1966 (see Footnote 18), it was "agreed that eventually there must be strong representation in Ottawa, because that is where governmental news originates, and where most hope for getting things out via the wire services, national T.V., etc. is capable of exploitation." TRIO files.

scenes, to give assistance.

_____, President of _____ won't participate actively - perhaps because Government announced subsidies to smaller airlines.

...Even the organizations that should be doing their outmost to slow this thing down have proven rather apathetic...._____ and I had to literally force the Naval Officers' Association (Winnipeg) to take a stand.

I do regret that my time is limited, and I cannot do as much as I would like....For your information, most of the R.C.N. types in town have been thoroughly convinced that this mad rush is a good thing....Ed Schreyer...told me that he is now convinced that things are not all that they should be, but that he does not understand the situation well enough to make any speeches.³⁷

On September 26, 1966, the Edmonton Journal reported the formation in Edmonton of a TRIO branch.

The role of the organization here would be to inform the public on defence operations and get them to look at them objectively and see how much value the forces are to Canada....³⁸

Regardless of the stated objectivity of the branch, some of the individuals whose names were originally connected with the branch requested that they not be associated

³⁷Letter from Pat Benson to executive member of TRIO, October 24, 1966. TRIO files. The blanks refer to people's names or to a company with which the person was associated.

³⁸"City Group To Be Formed To Protest Forces Merger", Edmonton Journal, September 26, 1966.

with the Edmonton TRIO.

You have possibly received a letter from _____ backing out of TRIO. He called me and behind his reasons for withdrawing his support would appear to be pressure from the other reserve defence advisers not to become involved plus the simple economics that _____ do considerable Department of National Defence work....

Interest at best is only lukewarm.

I will need considerable help in getting an Edmonton branch off the ground and such help is slow in coming.³⁹

In Quebec, support was difficult to come by because the person attempting to form a TRIO branch observed that no one wanted to attack a defence structure which had as its Chief of Defence Staff, a French speaking individual, that is, General Allard. Even in March 1967, someone wrote to the Toronto branch:

I tried to get a few contributions toward your expense but it seems that there are few people who wish to invest in the SECURITY OF THEIR COUNTRY.⁴⁰

The impression should not be left that every branch was weak. Vancouver, Victoria and, of course, Toronto, were very active as were other branches. And to reiterate, even if each branch were not thriving and even if support

³⁹ Letter from Edmonton TRIO member to executive member of TRIO, October 5, 1966. TRIO files.

⁴⁰ Letter from TRIO supporter to executive member of TRIO, March 4, 1967. TRIO files.

and funds were lacking, the zealousness of the leadership overcame several of these shortcomings. The zealousness was insufficient by itself. However, in combination with the ability to approach and be supported by individuals able to submit opinions, newspaper publishers, elected politicians and the like, the channels for submitting views to the decision-makers were made more accessible to the TRIO members.

It would be remiss to overly stress the internal weaknesses of TRIO because Paul Hellyer's position had become less flexible by the summer of 1966. It is unlikely that the Government's position would have been altered in any drastic manner even if the organizational structure had been firmer. As it was, the actions of TRIO tended to harden the Defence Minister's position. Besides, the Government did not consider TRIO to be technically competent, by which is meant that the Government did not consider TRIO to possess pertinent information. The Government did not need this group's expertise and information to formulate policy; nor was the support of TRIO considered necessary for the implementation of unification. Nonetheless, Government forces responded to the nuisance role of TRIO.

TRIO became one of the focal points for the critics. It acted as an organizer of dissent giving access to the appropriate communications channels. TRIO was an outlet for several individuals opposed to unification. It

attracted the attention of the news media and, in turn, engendered debate. If TRIO did not stir the 'general' public, it at least enlivened the smaller attentive public concerned with defence matters.

It was important for TRIO to attract to it people who would enhance the organization's position. Equally as important, TRIO had to cause individuals critical of the unification scheme and who had access to the communications channels to make use of them in order to further weaken the Government's position. Conversely, TRIO had to get critics recognized by those who had control over the communications channels, for instance, Government members, the Parliamentary opposition and newspaper editors, so that these critics could gain a hearing. In short, TRIO had to stimulate debate in order to have the Government reverse its course. For these reasons TRIO attempted to have service organizations and recognized defence critics enter the debate; however, in this it did not fully succeed.

CHAPTER 3

TRIO AND ITS ALLIES

As suggested in the previous chapter, Toronto TRIO was the guiding force of the Tri-Service Identities Organization. The executive members of the Toronto branch acted both as a co-ordinating body and as a strategy-planning centre for the other branches. The autonomy of the branches in activities such as electing their own officers and deciding their own role did not prevent the branches from recognizing the prominent position of Toronto TRIO. The branches welcomed any suggestions offered by the Toronto leadership. However, the membership's acceptance of such suggestions did not mean that in several instances members did not arrive at similar tactics through independent means. Members in different cities recognized as well as their Toronto counterparts that attempts should be made to get sympathetic news coverage and that support should be sought in every quarter.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the efforts undertaken by the Tri-Service Identities Organization to gain allies for its cause. These efforts of TRIO highlight certain points. Members of Toronto in comparison to those of the other branches played a leadership role. The leadership role revealed that Toronto TRIO, besides offering strategy suggestions to other TRIO

branches and playing the major role in writing the brief submitted to the Standing Committee on National Defence, attempted to have different parts of the external setting contribute to the unification debate. The Toronto leadership's attempts involved, for example, measures designed to influence the communications media and initiatives undertaken to arouse other service groups to oppose unification. More than the other branches, the Toronto executive sought to have the recently retired senior officers become TRIO members, act as advisers to TRIO, publicly air their views or have the officers take the initiative by requesting that they be called as witnesses before the Defence Committee. Toronto TRIO was the most active of the branches in establishing communications with the different political parties and, indeed, suggested to the different branches that they contact their Members of Parliament. In November 1966, Toronto TRIO sent TRIO members a form letter. Part of the letter stated that the day to day activities of Toronto TRIO members

include contacts with influential politicians of all parties; constant liaison with TRIO Branches, press, radio and TV; discussions and meetings with interested individuals including former and present senior officers of the three Services, etc.¹

Toronto TRIO was essentially the TRIO nerve-centre.

¹Form letter to TRIO members signed by TRIO President, Robert Hilborn, November 17, 1966. TRIO files.

TRIO aspired to make its position recognized by both the proponents and opponents of unification by attracting individuals regarded as experts on defence matters. TRIO also wanted these 'experts' to take a stand themselves and help in eliciting the support of other organizations. Since the debate was one on defence, it was to be expected that the majority of participants had service backgrounds.

TRIO attracted dissidents from all services.

Mr. Andras: Is it [TRIO] primarily ex-officers of the three services?

Mr. Hilborn: Yes....It is pretty obvious that those are the people who are going to be most interested, because they have been thinking, reading and talking about this problem....I would guess about 20 to 25 per cent [in Toronto] approximately are other than commissioned ranks. This includes people who, as far as we know, have no service history.²

The Honorary Chairman of TRIO was Air Marshal W. Curtis who retired as Chief of Air Staff in 1953. Robert Hilborn, the President of TRIO, was a retired lieutenant-colonel. Robert Hendy, one of the Vice-Presidents, was a commodore (ret'd.) in the Naval Reserve and served as the first non-Army chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations. Another Vice-President, Lawrence Wray, was a retired air vice-marshal. The Honorary Secretary, Gordon Ford, was a lieutenant-commander. George Penfold, the Secretary-Treasurer, had an Air Force background. He became

²S.C.N.D., No. 17, Friday, February 10, 1967, p. 750.

National President in 1964 of the Air Force Association.

The active membership of TRIO cut across service lines and was not, as Government supporters later claimed, a front for "disgruntled admirals". There were several individuals with Army and Air Force backgrounds who helped TRIO. The President of the Vancouver branch was a colonel and the Vice-Presidents were a naval captain, a lieutenant-colonel and an air vice-marshal. The President of the Montreal branch was a lieutenant-colonel. A lieutenant-colonel was predominant in the Halifax branch and Kitchener and Hamilton could boast of brigadiers, as could Galt and Peterborough.

Several of the members were prominent in the professions and business community. The executive of the Toronto branch was composed of five Q.C.s. These leading members were also of different political affiliations. An executive member of Toronto TRIO, F. Arthur Huycke, was Mitchell Sharp's campaign manager. Indeed, several of the individuals lending strong support to the activities of TRIO in Vancouver were of Liberal persuasion.

The Vancouver branch of TRIO which have a preponderance of Liberal supporters in its membership strongly supports submission made by Robert Hendy. The question of unification of armed forces should not be a matter of political partisanship but rather a question of determining objectively what is the best in the national CDN [Canadian] interest.³

³Ibid., No. 18, Monday, February 13, 1967, p. 811.

TRIO was in fact extremely conscious about the image it projected and stressed constantly its non-partisan role.

...we have the feeling that the TRIO group is being written off as a bunch of Conservatives. This, of course, is an image which must be dispelled....⁴

TRIO did attempt to dispel this notion in face of Liberal tactics accusing TRIO of being connected with the Conservatives and of arguing from a tradition-ridden, emotional base. TRIO, in preparing the brief to the Standing Committee, was aware that such charges might be laid.

3. The Brief should clearly state that TRIO is not against "Change" and that we heartily endorse Integration with the Services for the purpose of efficiency and economy.
4. The Brief should not take up cudgels for any of the dismissed or retired Senior Officers. However, it could recommend that some of these appear before the Committee to give their views....
8. The Brief should be as practical as possible and nothing in it should indicate that TRIO's suggestions are based on emotion.⁵

Members recognized that the role of TRIO as "objective" critic would lack credibility if it became a front

⁴Letter from Vancouver TRIO supporter to Toronto TRIO supporter, September 13, 1966. TRIO files.

⁵Letter from individual in Montreal to Toronto TRIO member, September 27, 1966. TRIO files. There were eight points in the letter, from which the above three as numbered have been quoted.

for dismissed officers, if it attacked emotionally the Government's stance or Paul Hellyer personally or if TRIO stated its case only in terms of the services' traditions. The private position however did not at times correspond to the public posture of TRIO. TRIO did take up the cudgels for the dismissed officers because the general position of TRIO corresponded to that of those officers who were asked or themselves requested to be prematurely retired. A community of interests was in being.

This community of interests in part accounted for the interconnection between dissatisfied service and ex-service personnel and those combating the unification issue in a more open manner. Some officers were willing to contribute their knowledge and TRIO was ready to receive or to solicit it. Herein lay the importance of the backgrounds of those individuals devoting their energies to realizing the aims of TRIO. Channels, which otherwise might have been shut, were open to them. The service and professional ties and, in instances, the political affiliations of the active members of TRIO paved the way to contact with others of like interests. The ear of Mitchell Sharp would have been all the more difficult to capture if Arthur Huycke had not been an executive member of Toronto TRIO.⁶

⁶Although this might have been true, one informant has suggested that Arthur Huycke's influence should not be overly emphasised because Sharp, though listening sympathetically to his friends, was not necessarily swayed by their advice. This informant has suggested that Huycke probably exaggerated Sharp's opposition to unification. (In-

Political connections will be left aside for the moment in order to concentrate upon the service contacts. For purposes of simplification, the relationships between ex-service and service personnel acting in an individual capacity and between the various service organizations can be distinguished.

TRIO attempted to bring together the individual critics who were scattered in their opposition to unification. The background of the TRIO members allowed for a myriad of channels of contact to develop. Generally, the TRIO leadership recognized recently retired high-ranking officers as being important to the TRIO strategy because these officers might convince others to mount an attack against the Liberal Government. These officers themselves could reinforce the tactics of TRIO, for example, by writing to M.P.s and the press. Also, the officers could advise TRIO on what approach to take, as was done, for example, in the writing of the brief presented to the Standing Committee. The status of the officers enabled them to make public statements and to testify before the Standing Committee. The serving personnel could give current information on what was happening within the defence structure and could help to gauge the feelings of other serving

interview with a former assistant of Mitchell Sharp, November 28, 1971). However, this viewpoint does not take into account that ministers might have been personally opposed to Paul Hellyer. (Interview with Liberal M.P., May 1969).

personnel, in particular, to what extent reorganization was being enthusiastically embraced. For example:

As a serving officer, I am restricted, at least officially, in what I can say. This in itself is hampering the airing of the true situation in the forces. However, what I have seen has convinced me that the problem of integration/unification is being approached incorrectly and in fact is being pushed through to the final conclusion desired by Hellyer for reasons of personal political ambitions....

...many aspects of integration are not working. CFHQ is a good example where, in the operational area, success has been limited or non-existent. We are faced with continual re-organizations in each Branch and Division....

For the overall size of our forces, CFHQ is grossly overstaffed and in spite of statements that staffs are to be cut and that the role of the HQ is one of policy only, no such necessary major cuts have been made. Yet integration has been in effect for two years or so!⁷

Such views, regardless of their lack of objectivity, did reveal that serving personnel, when objecting to a decision made by the political head of the department, were willing to leak information to outside critics. They did so without being solicited as in cases such as the above. However, these instances should not necessarily be interpreted as meaning that a cohesive or organized body of dissidents existed within the Armed Forces. Any dissidents usually acted on an individual basis. Nor should the view be taken that Government policy was being

⁷Letter from serving officer to Toronto TRIO member, October 18, 1966. TRIO files.

"sabotaged" from within. Orders were obeyed, perhaps reluctantly, but nonetheless obeyed. Such occurrences should be noted in the light that the military, though not organized into opposition groups, acted like any other group when it felt its interests to be threatened. Civilian control was really never at issue although the Defence Minister raised the spectre of a threat to civilian control. More will be said on this when dissent within the Armed Forces is discussed.

The resulting reinforcement of each critic's outlook resulting from TRIO members' contacts with other critics is a point not to be overlooked. Opinions and factual accounts about the state of affairs flowed back and forth between them - and outwards to the hesitating and to the Government's supporters. This information flow helped to heighten the crisis outlook of the critics, because the flow of communication caused the critics to view as all the more alarming the unfolding state of events. If this threw them into despondency, it at the same time strengthened the critics' resolve to do battle with Paul Hellyer. Doing battle with a political figure essentially meant doing battle in political terms.

It must not be forgotten that the critics did not set the scope of the debate even if they contributed to the controversy and helped to determine the trend the debate took. The critics were compelled to react to the

political moves of their more well-versed political opponents. The critics' tactics, for example, the launching of publicity campaigns and the making of statements to the press, were made within a game called by the Government, although the important factor of the Government's reaction to its critics must not be overlooked. To simplify matters, the situation was one of action-reaction, that is, political action followed by political reaction and so on until the issue was resolved or dissipated. Naturally, it was important for Government forces to anticipate the opposition's tactics or to nip them in the bud. Thus, in turn, the Government could not disregard their opponents' moves even if, in this instance, the opponents were ex-service personnel not highly regarded by the public at large.

However, not all of the ex-officers, especially those who had retired during the summer of 1966, were willing to play an active part in the debate. Air Marshal Miller, the Chief of Defence Staff prior to General Allard, was reluctant to make public statements about the controversy. Lieutenant-General Frank Fleury, another officer reluctant to comment, said before the Defence Committee:

...the Chairman and some others may know that I came here with apparent reluctance....my reluctance stems largely, if not exclusively, from the feeling that I have had for many a long year, that there was great danger in calling serving officers before any parliamentary committee....I honestly feel that the questioning of serving officers by this committee, while it

may be most helpful to the committee, is very unfair and embarrassing to the serving officers. Obviously he is like the ham in the sandwich. If he follows the party line he does not really add anything to your knowledge; if he does not follow the party line, he is bound to be in trouble when he gets back to his desk in headquarters.⁸

The sentiments contained in these and similar statements made to the Defence Committee were supported also by retired officers. There were several serving officers who held parallel viewpoints. Through their training and the Canadian military tradition, these officers learned to distinguish between what they would call a political and a professional role. The degree to which the officers did become political and the extent to which civilian control over the military became a real question will be discussed elsewhere. It can be noted at this juncture that both the Government and its critics at times compelled serving officers to play a political role, though at the same time some officers voluntarily assumed a political role to which they were generally unsuited because of their former training and experiences. Actually, as will be demonstrated, it was those critics who refused to play a part other than to appear before the Defence Committee who, because of their adverse testimony, strengthened the opposition and rankled the Government.

⁸S.C.N.D., No. 24, Wednesday, February 22, 1967, p. 1490.

It was the viewpoint of TRIO and of the parliamentary critics, especially those of the Conservative Party, that one of the most telling points against the unification legislation was that many individuals of senior ranks, long and recently retired, were opposed to Bill C-243. These officers' reasons were based on a number of arguments: that of undue haste; that the dust caused by integration should be allowed to settle and its effects closely examined before one proceeded to unification. The officers also believed that the Government should not contemplate changing its defence structure unless it were prepared to reformulate its defence roles since, in the officers' opinions, structure was related to role. Officers also held the view that the Government was casting out the tub with the water, that many worthwhile traditions were being discarded for something unknown, not any better and probably much worse. These, and several other arguments when voiced by officers of senior rank, helped the critics strengthen their case. In a telegramme to the Chairman of the Defence Committee, TRIO suggested several high-ranking former officers as possible witnesses before the Committee and concluded by stating:

If the foregoing [list of possible witnesses who had been high-ranking officers] is weighted heavily on the side of the senior ranks, who else is more "expert". Many of these [were] proclaimed top experts in Canada - December '64 (see U.P.I. story sent out by MND's office). If calibre of men in forces as good as proclaimed...then leaders must be

okay. One doesn't consult a medical or law student for a complex medical or legal opinion! But many middle and junior ranks not happy according to TRIO's knowledge.⁹

TRIO not only was attempting to have more people take a public position on the issue, but also recognized that more weight would be attached to these individuals' arguments if they were deemed to be experts. Needless to say, TRIO believed this status would be conferred on ex-high-ranking officers. However, TRIO did make efforts to attract lower-ranking individuals to its cause.

We must get further down the rank structure.... this must not be a movement fomented by retired admirals. Thus I am working to get the RCN Association to generate interest in their members. You have not a branch in Victoria but there is one in Vancouver. These people are in a good position to attest the feeling of what could be called the man on the street, and this is important. (sic).¹⁰

Nevertheless, TRIO did not concentrate its major efforts in attracting the lower ranks.

The background of the executive members of TRIO indicated that they would be more effective in attracting the

⁹Telegramme sent by Toronto TRIO in February 1967 to the Chairman of the Defence Committee. TRIO files. The reference of TRIO to the lesser ranks was a recognition of the Government's insinuations that the critics were mainly ex-officers who did not have the support of the other ranks.

¹⁰Letter from Toronto TRIO member to a retired rear-admiral, July 29, 1966. TRIO files.

support of individuals having a background similar to their own, that is, individuals who had achieved high rank while in the Armed Forces, rather than having direct appeal to the non-commissioned ex-serviceman. Such contact as did exist was usually indirect in the sense of having associations such as the Royal Canadian Naval Association mentioned above appeal to its membership or through having letters written to the non-commissioned ex-serviceman by individuals known to the TRIO executive. Not unnaturally, TRIO concentrated on individuals who had access to channels through which others could be influenced, namely the ex-high-ranking and still serving officers, Cabinet members, newspaper editors and writers, M.P.s of all persuasions and the executive of other associations.¹¹

An examination of the nature of these contacts showed the contacts to be ones of personal friendship. Even if channels were not opened or widened, the expressions of similar points of view were not a chance occurrence. The individuals between whom there were contacts

¹¹The files of the Toronto TRIO which the author has examined suggest this. Although membership was open and voluntary, the officer class were attracted more than other ranks, perhaps because of the nature of the debate and the issues it involved. It is suggested that the other ranks were cognizant of TRIO through the publicity TRIO received in the news media rather than through personal contact with this organization.

were a specific, narrow community of the larger Canadian community. These ex-officers had similar experiences and interests based on their service in the Armed Forces, upon which friendships were established. Often they frequented the same social gatherings. These ex-officers knew each other directly and indirectly and could be brought into contact through friendships with a third party. Though this point should not be overlaboured, it should not be understressed because it helps to explain features such as the birth of interest groups, the reinforcing of an interest group's position, the objectives pursued by interest groups, the channels of communication between interest groups and other bodies in the policy-making process and the strategy of an interest group.

The opposition's ability to refute the statements of the proponents of unification depended upon the information the opposition had about the state of affairs. Success could be governed by this. It then might be stated that members of TRIO were successful to the extent that they were able to elicit information from serving and non-serving personnel.

Although TRIO does not necessarily cast itself in the role of expert we have gathered information both from within and outside the services, which, together with the knowledge of associates, enables us to make a well-informed appreciation justifying our position....¹²

¹²S.C.N.D., No. 17, op. cit., p. 731.

or

Mr. Penfold: Because of my own background and experience my job was to pick out people of whom I had to inquire personally to find out the expert point of view....Through my associations I had access to these people.

Mr. Winch: Did you inquire only of retired or fired personnel?

Mr. Penfold: No, serving and retired....the people whose opinions we respect most strongly say that there should be a pause....¹³

In a sense, TRIO was an outlet for the serving personnel's discontent regarding Government policy. The serving personnel, through TRIO and other bodies, were able to challenge a political decision, namely the unification legislation. There were indications that TRIO desired serving personnel to make their views known, even if through anonymous letters, to the Minister with the hope that these letters would weaken the Minister's resolve to proceed with his unification aims:

Having set up an organization [TRIO], we of course would be most interested to hear directly from service people and to this extent even anonymous letters would be useful. In this regard the Minister counts very much on letters....;

You, as a serving officer, may rest assured that any confidence you place in me will not be breached but our job will be much easier if we can speak with assurance that we are reflecting

¹³Ibid., pp. 771, 772. Interestingly, the statement about contacting service personnel was not seriously questioned by Government supporters.

the views of those in the services.¹⁴

Paul Hellyer did receive several letters and not only from the serving personnel. The letters, several of which were apparently emotionally vituperative in nature, did not weaken the Defence Minister's resolve, although they might have given him a clearer understanding of the emotions being aroused.¹⁵

Obviously, the nature of the nation-wide contacts of the TRIO members were strongest with those who had similar service backgrounds. Of course, regardless of backgrounds, contacts were pursued whenever a benefit was thought to exist. It was not uncustomary for letters to be directed to the officers who were dubbed as being part of the "Admirals Revolt" of July 1966:

I would be pleased to have your comments on this [enclosed Maritime Component Committee Brief prepared for the Defence Committee] and also you might consider firstly whether you would go with us to the Prime Minister...or secondly when we go before the Defence Committee if you would join the group as an interested expert. This would be at least one way of ensuring your presence before the Defence Committee as I am sure that we will have an opportunity to appear and I see no reason why we should have our team vetoed beforehand. I would keep this latter suggestion under wraps

¹⁴Letter from Toronto TRIO member to serving officer, August 22, 1966. TRIO files.

¹⁵Interviews with Liberal M.P.s and supporters, June 1969.

until the last moment.¹⁶

If some of the above groups were readily forthcoming in their support:

I spoke to _____ when I was in Ottawa the other day and he is quite prepared to assist TRIO in any way with giving us background information on the situation up to the time he left.

others were not:

What is discouraging is to find people like _____ and others not standing up with their comrades or making any effort. It makes it pretty difficult for those of us on the outside.¹⁷

The reluctance to heed the call to arms was not received in an amiable way. Nor was it felt that some of those who were critical contributed quickly and substantively to the debate:

_____ was quite good yesterday [as a witness before the Standing Committee] but, as somebody said, why did he take so long to say anything. If he would have done this earlier it would have saved the day.¹⁸

¹⁶Letter from Toronto TRIO member to retired officer, October 21, 1966. TRIO files.

¹⁷Letter from Toronto TRIO member to retired admiral, October 21, 1966. Letter from Toronto TRIO member to retired rear-admiral, February 21, 1967. TRIO files.

¹⁸Letter, February 21, 1967, ibid.

It should be stressed that the political role of the military has not been noticeable in Canadian life and, especially, the Armed Forces have not been publicly vocal. The debate on unification was the exception rather than the rule as far as the voicing of public dissent was concerned. There might have been service leaks to defence critics in the past and there might have been murmurings within the defence structure, but with respect to defence issues, the role of the serviceman (and ex-serviceman) especially was not one of such open dissent until the unification issue. It was this debate, unlike the previous debates on defence, which raised the question of the political role of the military.

The refusal of serving military personnel to render assistance to outside groups such as TRIO should not be regarded as unusual. One can accept the norm that in Canada serving personnel dissent from a stated or intended Government policy is usually very low. Increased political activity on the part of the serving personnel would be a deviation from the norm. Thus, it was not surprising that TRIO did not succeed in changing the resolve of officers at Defence Headquarters. As one very high-ranking officer wrote:

Changes are always hard for some people to bear, regardless of the advantages accrued thereby. However, as an ex-military man, I am sure that you appreciate that our prime requirement is to serve our country, and that the policy is dictated by the incumbent Government. This is

our calling, like it or not.¹⁹

However, the issue was not as clear-cut as suggested in the above quote, that is, the Government made policy and the military personnel implemented policy. The degree to which the Minister ignored professional advice will be examined later. It might be noted, though, that this rejection compelled the Minister's military advisers to seek other channels in voicing their dissent with what they considered to be an unsound defence policy; one based on political rather than military considerations. This, in combination with factors such as the senior advisors believing that their best advice was disregarded, formed a strong basis for dissent. Also, some critics believed that several military personnel were compelled to acquiesce or readily acquiesced in the 'unsound' policy because of the personnel's concern over promotion. It should be recognized that some serving officers who supported Paul Hellyer, for example, General Allard, played a political role by making statements to the press. Therefore, criticism can be fired at both sides, if criticism is to be voiced about the political role of serving personnel. By and large, however, the military were reluctant to assume an open political position:

¹⁹Letter from serving officer to TRIO member, January 11, 1967. TRIO files.

Anyone who has been close to the military will realize that there is probably no military group that is less inclined to fight the politicians than is found in Canada. In fact the events of 1966 showed that they were too reticent.²⁰

TRIO was not very successful in its efforts to get other service organizations to actively oppose unification. This was most noticeable in the case of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and the Royal Canadian Legion. Brief mention might be made of the communications of TRIO with the service groups, though their roles will be stated only in relation to the attempts of TRIO to attract these groups as allies. TRIO members recognized that the Government would view the position of TRIO more seriously if TRIO were able to act in concert with other groups. This important feature of the TRIO leaders' strategy, namely to arouse other groups and preferably to have them work in unison with TRIO, was not entirely successful. The strategy was not entirely successful because of the high profile TRIO maintained and because several of the groups desired to maintain independence of action. This is not to say that some groups, for instance, the naval organizations, did not criticize the Government; rather, there was no overall strategy plotted by a central body.

Mention has been made in the last chapter of the Royal Canadian Air Force Association having passed anti-

²⁰ Letter from retired officer to author, June 18, 1970.

unification resolutions in July 1966. However, the Association maintained a discreet stance after this, at least as far as TRIO was concerned. In response to feelers put out by TRIO, George Ault, the Association's National President, responded in October 1966:

In Edmonton, last July, the convention approved three resolutions with respect to the program and submission to the Prime Minister in the form of a brief....

TRIO did not exist as an organization last July and consequently the Association has no official attitude towards it.²¹

Prior to this reply, TRIO received notice that members of one of the Air Force associations, to avoid possible misinterpretations, had decided not to participate in TRIO while serving within their own organization.²² Two points should be noted. The stance of the National Executive of the RCAF Association, though downplaying the Association's public role, did not prevent individual members of the Association from supporting TRIO. George Penfold, a former National President, was Secretary-Treasurer of TRIO. Also, individual branches of the RCAF Association supported TRIO, for example, the Ontario Group

²¹Letter from George Ault, National President of the RCAF Association, to TRIO executive member, October 20, 1966. TRIO files.

²²Letter from a member of an air force association to TRIO member, September 30, 1966. TRIO files.

of the RCAF Association. A member of the Air Force Officers' Association of Vancouver Island wrote to a TRIO member:

Your very commendable Progress Reports and related enclosures read with interest, and contents made familiar to our Air Force Officers' Association and the United Services Institute of Vancouver Island (Victoria H.Q.). I am a member of both these service clubs from which "anti-unification" resolutions were sent to all House of Commons representatives concerned, and to the Cabinet, some time ago....²³

Branch support would have been more effective if the RCAF Association's National Executive had been more active.

TRIO also encountered difficulties in winning the executive of the Royal Canadian Legion as active allies. As events proved, TRIO was unsuccessful in budging the Legion from its quiet, neutral position. Perhaps remembering the flag debate, the Legion did not wish to become involved in the partisan debate developing over unification. This was clearly shown in the position enunciated by a member of the Legion's national executive:

I wish to state that the "passive stand" - to use your terminology - adopted by the Legion and its national magazine...has been prompted by two considerations....:

1. As an organization we do not have the professional competence and experience necessary to assess and intelligently criticize the extremely complex defence problems....

²³Letter from retired Air Force officer to TRIO member, February 28, 1967. TRIO files.

2. As an organization we must not under any circumstances become embroiled in party politics.

With regard to the Legionary, our national magazine reflects the above policy editorially.... To avoid any possibility of being accused of partisan leanings the Legionary has not, and will not, publish feature articles about this contentious issue.²⁴

Whether the Dominion Command's assertion of lacking expertise was a rationalization for its neutrality or an indication of the difficulty of obtaining information, it was a position which TRIO found frustrating.

...in a matter such as defence, which should be non-partisan, there must be room for interested groups and individuals to comment objectively without being accused of partisanship; otherwise there could be no criticism.

....I do not think it is any excuse to plead that the issues are too complex as there is an abundance of talent in the Legion members who might be called upon to examine this situation through a special committee....²⁵

TRIO received support from Legion members on an individual basis and made efforts to attract the support of Legion branches by sending to these branches printed material stating the position of TRIO and indicating that the organ-

²⁴Letter from Canadian Legion national executive member to TRIO member (no date but written in late March or early April 1967). TRIO files.

²⁵Letter from TRIO member to national executive member of the Legion, April 14, 1967. TRIO files. The Conservatives were also perturbed by the Legion's position, the New Democrats found it 'responsible' and the Socreds and Créditistes did not criticize the position. See H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9574, Vol. XII, 1967, pp. 1601, 12423.

ization would be willing to send speakers. TRIO, however, was not given the support of the Legion's Dominion Command and thus was not given the weight which such support would have carried.

Nor did TRIO gain the support of the Conference of Defence Associations. This body is composed of various corps associations - Army terminology is used - primarily Army in orientation. TRIO members suspected the lack of support from the CDA executive resulted from the fact that the CDA chairman, Brigadier George Robertson, was a Liberal.²⁶ Besides, TRIO was against Robertson's position that, as defence planning was a political matter, the CDA should not become involved:

In my opinion the national interest is the basis for the concern that is being expressed over... reorganization....if the CDA takes the position that to consider defence policy in its broadest sense and the organization of the forces as being a political matter then they can never discharge the objectives on which the Conference was established....²⁷

TRIO was also opposed to the CDA chairman's view taken in the summer of 1966 that no steps be taken until Parliament studied the matter. Discouraged by the stance taken by the CDA executive, TRIO attempted to persuade the Presi-

²⁶ Interview with TRIO member, July 1969.

²⁷ Letter from TRIO member to Brigadier Robertson, August 24, 1966. TRIO files.

dents of the All Corps Associations of the CDA to undertake actions against the Government. For this reason a TRIO executive member wrote to the presidents in the hope of persuading them to take a 'positive' view of matters:

While this might be an extraordinary approach, I am addressing myself to you in the hope that the executive can be prevailed upon to take a more positive approach....Incidentally the Conference at its meeting three years ago declared itself as being against integration. I don't think this stand has ever been altered.

Therefore I suggest a special meeting of the Presidents of all corps associations, as well as past chairmen, to be held as soon as possible to consider the Conference's position.²⁸

The Chairman of the Divisional Group of the Naval Reserve Corps Group was asked by a TRIO member to hold a meeting of all Divisional Groups to discuss re-organization and that the views of the groups be communicated to the President of the Naval Reserve Corps Group and the naval member of the CDA executive. TRIO might have attained the support of some individual corps associations but during the unification debate the CDA executive distinguished itself by its silence.

TRIO was more successful in gaining the support of naval groups such as the Navy League of Canada, the Naval Officers' Associations of Canada (NOAC) and the Royal Can-

²⁸Letter from TRIO member to the Presidents, All Corps Associations, Conference of Defence Associations, August 22, 1966. TRIO files. It is unknown to the author whether a meeting was held.

adian Naval Association (RCNA), which, on June 20, 1966, formed the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Force. The general mutual support that was forthcoming can be explained by the community of interests existing between the groups. The similar views held respecting the possible shortcomings of unification, the personal relations between individuals of the different groups and the cross-membership brought about the community of interests. Regarding the cross-membership, Robert Hendy was also chairman of the Maritime Committee. Herbert Maynard, an executive member of TRIO, was president of the RCNA. Another executive member of TRIO, R.C.G. Wilson, was president of the Ontario Division and a member of the National Council of the Navy League of Canada. One result of this cross-membership was seen in the fact that Robert Hendy bore a major responsibility in drafting both the TRIO and the Maritime Committee briefs presented to the Standing Committee.²⁹

²⁹ Cross-membership produced some counter-productive results with respect to the Liberal Party's attitude. Some Liberal M.P.s tended (1) to regard the opposition as compact rather than as widespread and (2) to regard the high profile maintained by some members as indicating a personal animosity towards Paul Hellyer (Letter from TRIO member to author, October 30, 1969). When Robert Hendy appeared as a witness for the Maritime Committee before the Standing Committee, a Liberal M.P., P. Langlois, commented:

"Coming into the room this afternoon, I was astounded to see you here again today, because for 10 days in November and December the opposition in the House told us there was a very big file of people who were going to protest against this thing. It seems to be reduced to a very few people." S.C.N.D., No. 18, Monday, February 13, 1967, pp. 855-856.

This network meant that there was greater opportunity to plot similar strategies and to exchange information. In some instances, a TRIO executive member drafted letters which were signed by an executive member of a naval organization. This executive then sent the letters to the membership of the organization.³⁰ The president of the Sault Ste. Marie RCNA sent a telegramme indicating full approval of the TRIO position when TRIO presented its brief to the Standing Committee. The London branch of the NOAC made a financial contribution to TRIO.

However, the network at times did not seem to be a firm one. Similarly held views on unification did not necessarily mean similar views respecting tactics. The high public profile of TRIO and the unease of members of some of the groups becoming too deeply and publicly involved in a political controversy accounted for the divergence. The reservations of some NOAC representatives was one reason why the Maritime Committee brief was not more stringent in tone.³¹ Also, with regard to the briefs prepared, the Toronto branch of the NOAC presented a separate submission to the Standing Committee. A separate submission on the part of the Toronto NOAC suggested that the

³⁰TRIO files.

³¹Letter from TRIO member to ex-naval officer, September 28, 1966. TRIO files.

Toronto NOAC wished to distinguish itself and maintain an independence of action from the Maritime Committee. Hence, Frank Manchee, president of the Toronto branch of the NOAC

recommended an objective (particularly a non-political) Toronto Branch policy of obtaining and assessing facts and providing practical criticism and recommendations direct to the parliamentarians concerned, rather than seek publicity that would not produce an effective impact on the public when originating with such a small...unit as a NOAC branch.³²

A Winnipeg TRIO member reported in October 1966 that he had "to literally force the Naval Officers' Association (Winnipeg) to take a stand." Following a meeting of TRIO representatives with Paul Hellyer in October 1966, a TRIO executive member was informed

that TRIO had gone down the drain...by being so foolish as to accept Hellyer's invitation to go to Ottawa...whereas the NOAC had been clever enough to resist....Could be a dangerous division of our forces....³³

³²NOAC Toronto Branch Newsletter, March 1967. A TRIO member was of the opinion that the:

"NOAC felt that they should try to maintain some independence of voice with the result that the submission from the Toronto group...seriously decreased the effectiveness of the hearing when the Maritime Committee was heard by the Defence Committee. You will realize that this was all against the background that Hellyer said TRIO was politically inspired, and this kept many of the organizations out of the battle." Letter from TRIO member to author, October 30, 1969.

³³Letter from TRIO member to TRIO executive member, October 27, 1966. TRIO files.

These divisions should be viewed as differences over strategy and not as differences over unification. The NOAC like the other naval groups and TRIO did not wish to witness the disappearance of the Navy. In April 1967 the New Brunswick NOAC branch sent a telegramme to the Prime Minister objecting to unification. In May 1967 the Nova Scotia NOAC branch sent \$100 to TRIO. During the unification debate members of the national executive of the RCNA and of the Navy League urged individuals to contact their M.P.s and Government members. TRIO received general and fairly active support in several instances even if TRIO did not have a firm alliance with the naval groups.

The leaders of TRIO recognized that political battle meant a public relations campaign and the contacting of the top decision-makers. In a letter with enclosed TRIO releases sent to a TRIO member in Western Canada, the Eastern Canadian TRIO advocate stated:

Do not hesitate to use the information that is sent in any way you think it will do good.
This is a PR war....³⁴

These activities were part and parcel of developing the debate on the overall front. A public relations campaign entailed pressuring the Government by way of the news-

³⁴Letter from Toronto TRIO member to Winnipeg TRIO member, October 28, 1966. TRIO files.

papers.³⁵ This involved the developing of contacts in the newspaper world. TRIO had a few allies among the editors and journalists.

At this point a general comment on the attempt by TRIO to harness the press is in order. The extent to which the mass media play a part in the decision-making process is a study in itself. Comments may be made about the media acting as channels through which the views of several opinion-makers circulate, but such comments do not reveal to what degree these views influence the various publics and, more importantly, the decision-makers. Generalizations also can be made about the politician's thirst for extensive and sympathetic news coverage. This may help create a positive image, as did those newspapers which portrayed Paul Hellyer as a person determined to have the "benefits" of unification in the face of a military "revolt". However, image-building is one thing and information dissemination is another; it is important to consider, for example, the effect the news coverage has upon the politicians roaming the corridors of Parliament Hill:

You [the Press] may say to me, "We couldn't make a Prime Minister. You know that if we espoused a cause, we would not succeed in that cause." No, I am not talking about that aspect of the matter. But you do not realize the stir you create in political circles when you write a little bit of gossip, when you state as a con-

³⁵Letter from TRIO member to retired rear-admiral, November 14, 1966. TRIO files.

clusion that so-and-so is motivated thus or otherwise. You do not, I think, fully realize how that goes around the circles of the party, not only of the party in Parliament, but of the whole party outside Parliament, and how this affects the individual's relations with his colleagues.³⁶

It was this type of press influence which helped cause dissent within the Liberal Party's ranks. The influence of the press was complemented by the influence of others, for example, the officers through their testimony and critics through their friendships with Liberal Party members.

As exemplified by the following headlines, press coverage of the debate was generally of the sensational variety:

"'I was fired' by Hellyer, navy leader charges"
(London Evening Free Press, July 15, 1966)

"Revolt of Admirals Said to be Spreading" (Halifax Mail Star, July 16, 1966)

"Hellyer's Political Bonanza" (Edmonton Journal, July 23, 1966)

"Navy Crisis Told Despite Hush-Up" (Chatham News, August 12, 1966)

"Admiral Sees Drastic Cut In Fighting Ships"
(Red Deer Advocate, August 13, 1966)

Regardless of the several criticisms which can be made res-

³⁶Unidentified politician in "Order, Good Government, And The Press", in Order And Good Government: 33rd Couchiching Conference C.I.P.A., ed. by G. Hawkins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 129.

pecting this type of reporting, such a style helps to keep an issue alive and it is the 'keeping alive' aspect which interest groups and others concerned with developing a public debate on an issue consider essential. As a representative of the press has said at the Thirty-Third Couchiching Conference:

...people do not gobble up their newspaper column by column, and political news is something that they tend to scan. So all I can do is write, and write as brightly as I possibly can, and sometimes indulge in tricks that earn the scorn of the academics because they regard these as cheap 'journalese', but my object is simply to capture a reader and draw him into the story.³⁷

A prominent newspaper columnist who was of the opinion that the 'public' was indifferent to the unification issue and, besides, had little regard for the military reinforced this view. To keep this issue alive, the columnist felt compelled to attack the Defence Minister personally in his column.³⁸

TRIO wanted extensive coverage to be given to the views of several critics. At the same time, TRIO was concerned with presenting what it considered to be an unemotional factual account to the public. Unlike the newspapers, TRIO refrained from making personal public attacks

³⁷ Unidentified press representative, ibid., p. 128.

³⁸ Interview with newspaper columnist, November 1971.

upon Paul Hellyer. The Toronto branch, wishing to further debate on the issue and to raise a public clamour, formed a Public Relations Committee. In its form letters to other branches, Toronto TRIO stressed the need to keep "the unanswered questions on 'unification' before your M.P., the press and the public", being convinced that "the government would agree to a thorough enquiry into the defence situation before proceeding with legislation only if convinced that large numbers of Canadians feel that this is the only sensible way to proceed."³⁹

TRIO members were in an advantageous position compared with members of the general public who might desire to make their views known. This was the importance, not only of the membership's backgrounds with respect to their vocations and service affiliations, but also of their friendships. The widespread friendships across Canada put members of the Toronto branch into contact with others who had access to impersonal channels of communication. This meant that several newspaper publishers, editors or reporters readily espoused the cause of TRIO. The head of a TRIO branch in an Ontario community was also the publisher and editor of that community's newspaper. Others, not personal acquaintances, became sympathetic as the debate unfolded.

In a number of instances, the unification issue

³⁹TRIO form letter to TRIO members, November 17, 1966 and November 28, 1966. TRIO files.

tended to eradicate the traditional party affiliations of Canadian newspapers. This was most noticeable with regard to individuals in the newspaper industry having a service background. Brigadier R. Malone of the Winnipeg Free Press stated in a speech to the Empire Club of Toronto that he was not speaking from any political base or as a member of TRIO. Malone continued on in his speech to criticize the 'Chief of Staff' concept. This was done on the grounds that the best expert advice could not be offered because Canada did not have a properly constituted defence council, the members of which would speak with an equal voice and would have the right of access to the minister and Cabinet. These views on the headquarters set-up and criticisms of the common uniform and rank structure formed a ready basis of agreement with TRIO. One did not have to be a TRIO member to support this organization's objectives.⁴⁰

Sympathy with the objectives of TRIO entailed more than the publishing of articles critical of Government policy. In some cases senior members of the newspaper hierarchy attempted to convince their acquaintances of the shortcomings of the Defence Minister's posture. Being part of the economic and social elite, these individuals had ready access to others who could make contributions to

⁴⁰Speech, "Armed Forces Integration", by R.S. Malone to the Empire Club of Toronto, Royal York Hotel, October 6, 1966. TRIO files.

the policy-making process. For example, the individuals could attempt to get their Liberal Party acquaintances to oppose the unification scheme. In light of this, a newspaper publisher wrote to a Toronto TRIO member:

I have done everything possible behind the scenes-(without much effect seemingly).

Do keep up the good work with TRIO and maintain the pressure. It is all a first class mess at the moment. And it will only be cleaned up if there is sufficient uproar. I do hope there are some good opposition speakers when it [apparently the examination of the issue in the Standing Committee] comes back to the house [the House of Commons], and that they are well briefed. Rest assured I will exert any pressure I can from here.⁴¹

This access to individuals such as newspaper publishers and radio broadcasters assured an airing of views parallel to those of TRIO. Even so, there were indications that the 'general public' was more interested in the spectacle of unification rather than in its implications. Although a resident on the West Coast wrote on January 23, 1967, that a newspaper publisher from a town in British Columbia requested material and TRIO membership application forms, and that he was impressed with the response to date, at the same time adding:

It has however come from individuals with service experience, and in many cases from presently serv-

⁴¹Undated letter (probably written between January and March 1967) from newspaper publisher to TRIO member. TRIO files.

ing personnel of all 'ranks'. It is indeed difficult to obtain any measure of response from the public at large, or to arouse interest.

In other words, signs were apparent that the convinced were becoming further convinced, while the disinterested remained so except for the more sensational aspects of the debate. Paul Hellyer also had this problem with the electorate at large:

I made a speech in the House on December 7, which took a considerable period of time...and it was, regrettably, not very widely reported in the newspapers. Sometimes they have seemed more inclined to report the controversial aspects rather than the meat and the answers to the questions which would be of more benefit to the people who are interested.⁴²

Yet, the participants grasped at the coverage supporting their stance, even if the participants were not especially pleased with the in-depth reporting of the issue. Thus, the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Force selected clippings supporting its pre-

⁴²S.C.N.D., No. 25, Thursday, February 23, 1967, p. 1607. The Defence Minister could also state in personal correspondence of September 6, 1966, to an individual critical of unification respecting press coverage of the Standing Committee:

"It was not our fault that the public and the press did not pay more attention. That is always the case, however, when most of the evidence is positive and constructive. The press are more interested when there is controversy, and it was only when a personality arose as a focus for the controversy that they became interested again. Even then the reporting concentrated more on the personality than on the issues...." TRIO files.

sentation made to the Standing Committee. These clippings of course refuted the releases from the Defence Department. Often it seemed that the antagonists were more interested in having biased allies rather than 'objective neutrals' observing from a distance.

On November 17, 1966, the publisher of a larger Eastern newspaper wrote a TRIO member and concurred with the member that the newspaper should present a more balanced view. The TRIO member could expect to see in the near future articles on the defence controversy containing views similar to his own.⁴³ It seemed that at times TRIO was successful in carrying the debate to specific, important publics and in influencing these publics. However, TRIO was less successful and began to despair of its efforts to arouse or to change the attitude of the mass public. In November a supporter wrote:

...the public mood has only progressed to the point of questioning what has gone wrong with an idea that originally seemed to have merit. There is now a very urgent need to carry this question into specifics, and to convince them that the principle of unification is a blunder, that it offers neither economy nor efficiency; and that the management of the department at the policy-making level has been incompetent in doing its job, because it is costing more to do less.⁴⁴

⁴³Letter from Eastern newspaper publisher to TRIO member, November 17, 1966. TRIO files.

⁴⁴Letter from TRIO supporter to TRIO member, November 9, 1966. TRIO files.

The public mood, whatever it was, did not go beyond the point of questioning. A TRIO member wrote in January 1967:

My reading of the Ottawa scene is that there is quite an apathy, that the die is cast and nothing much can be done.⁴⁵

The signs were evident, at least from the perspective of TRIO, that there was lack of success in arousing the general public. TRIO had conducted its own limited survey on the attitude of the polled toward unification, the results of which were forwarded to members of the Standing Committee:

...The survey does not show the reasons why those polled approved or disapproved of unification nor the extent and depth of their knowledge on the subject. This point is raised because TRIO's sampling of that portion of the public who are well informed on national and international affairs shows that an overwhelming majority are opposed to unification because they feel that it will result in reduced effectiveness of our Forces and less defence for our defence dollar.⁴⁶

On February 18, 1967, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion released its findings to the press. The Institute had posed the following question:

Do you happen to have heard or read anything

⁴⁵Letter from one TRIO supporter to another, January 1967. TRIO files.

⁴⁶TRIO files. The author was not able to see the figures of this survey indicating the size and nature of the sample.

about the unification of the armed forces - that is merging the army, navy and air force under one command and with the same uniform for all forces?

The below-listed results were obtained:

		<u>Age Groups</u>			
		21-29	30-39	40-49	50 &
	Total	Years	Years	Years	Over
Yes	66%	60%	65%	68%	69%
No	34	40	35	32	31
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Those who had heard of or read about unification were asked if they approved or disapproved of unification.

		<u>Age Groups</u>			
		21-29	30-39	40-49	50 &
	Total	Years	Years	Years	Over
Approve	48%	46%	53%	46%	48%
Disapprove	33	39	31	33	30
Can't Say	19	15	16	21	22
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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The size, distribution and background of the individuals polled were not published. The results of the poll, even though they were not surprising, were undoubtedly a dis-

⁴⁷ Canadian Institute Of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll of Canada, Toronto. The poll was released on February 18, 1967.

appointment to both the Government and its critics. Despite its efforts, the minority Liberal Government did not have overwhelming support with respect to unification. In this light, it can be conjectured that the Government might have had less support if the poll had been conducted after critics started appearing as witnesses before the Standing Committee. Only a few witnesses had appeared at the time of the poll's release. On the other hand, TRIO was proved correct in its assessment that the mass public was unknowledgeable and apathetic.

TRIO never did have the financial base to mount an extensive public relations campaign. A TRIO member indicated concern in November 1966 that the Government might be successful because TRIO did not have sufficient funds to be more critical. In February 1967, the financial viability was still not existent. Financial contributions, as was membership in the organization and the labours of the membership and sympathizers, were on a voluntary basis. This constricted the public relations efforts of the organization. TRIO also had to contend with Bill Lee.

In Bill Lee, the Defence Minister had an able assistant who made effective use of the resources at his command. Rightly or wrongly, critics thought that Lee was skillfully manipulating journalists. This might have been partly due to the journalists, at least initially, uncritically accepting Lee's press releases:

I think many newspaper people have been accepting releases from Bill Lee without checking or enquiring further into the issues of the presentation made and are thereby not doing their job in the objective manner to which the public is entitled to have reporting done.⁴⁸

It should be noted that the relations between the press and an important politician can depend upon the views of the press with respect to the politician. As one commentator has stated:

The use of news by important politicians in order to get praise...is one of the most corrupting traps, and it is terribly difficult for a journalist to deal with the situation because he does not receive the news unless he praises the politicians....Those who do not praise do not get in on the exclusive.⁴⁹

At least one journalist was not favourably viewed because of his criticisms and, hence, his 'welcome' at the Defence Minister's office was not noticeable.

The newspapers were bombarded with departmental releases favourable to unification. The war was carried on both extensively and intensively. As reported in one paper:

...we wonder if it was really necessary for... Paul Hellyer to use his mail rights to send to the Globe and Mail a few days ago a free copy

⁴⁸Letter from TRIO member to newspaper publisher, August 2, 1966. TRIO files.

⁴⁹Unidentified politician in Hawkins, op. cit., p. 132.

of an editorial that had appeared in the Globe and Mail July 27.⁵⁰

Despite the Minister's efforts, the press became more critical as the debate progressed from the summer of 1966 to the following spring. As already noted, the Minister of Defence was of the view that the reporting of unification often lacked depth and that the press was unfair to him. TRIO, with its own paper bombardment, could take partial credit for getting the criticisms against unification aired.

TRIO, though not succeeding in stirring the mass public, could still exert pressure on the Cabinet. TRIO had channels to Cabinet members as a result of having several Liberal members within its ranks. The TRIO leadership recognized that to have any chance of success Cabinet members had to be swayed. Basically, there were three ways used in attempting to influence Cabinet members. The organization urged its membership to write to M.P.s. Secondly, non-members friendly with TRIO members themselves took the initiative. Finally, individual members without directions from the Toronto branch contacted M.P.s with whom they were acquainted. It was hoped that Liberal M.P.s would criticize the policy of unification. Direc-

⁵⁰S. Young, "One-liners, or more", Globe & Mail, August 17, 1966. As the debate progressed, there were signs that Lee's handouts were not taken seriously by news-men, for example, "We should have known it couldn't last", Globe & Mail, March 22, 1967.

tions such as the following to the various TRIO branches were not uncommon:

I...would ask that you do all in your power ...to have individuals, as well as organizations who would not necessarily be associated directly with TRIO, write - or preferably wire - members of Parliament and members of the Cabinet to whom they are known recommending that in view of the testimony that has been presented before the Defence Committee that Bill C-243 should not be proceeded with until much further and deeper study can be made of all the issues involved.⁵¹

So it was that M.P.s received releases counteracting Government claims that other countries were following Canada's example. TRIO also argued that the morale within the services was low and that there was an excessive loss of service personnel caused by premature retirements. The releases additionally mentioned that all the recently retired senior officers had expressed reservations about the proposed reorganization. In its releases to M.P.s, TRIO pointed out that expenditures on equipment for the previous five years (ending March 31, 1968) would not match the expenditures ending March 31, 1963. There was concern whether the present capability would ensure that Canada could meet its military commitments. The releases suggested that Bill C-243 would not entail further economies. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the military merit of the proposed reorganization had not been established,

⁵¹Form letter from Toronto TRIO entitled, "To All TRIO Branch Heads", March 15, 1967. TRIO files.

the Bill should be re-examined. A pause should be effected until deeper consideration could be given to the existing myriad of problems.⁵²

The degree to which the individual M.P. was influenced by such submissions is difficult to gauge. M.P.s would be unlikely to break party rank however sound the arguments of organizations such as TRIO. There is evidence to suggest that, at least from a parliamentary perspective, interest groups have a minimum effect on the formulation of defence policy.⁵³

Although this evidence might suggest that in the resolution of defence issues, interest groups play an insignificant role, it has not explained the exact nature of the influence which might be exercised. It was argued in the previous chapter that TRIO, being a part of the policy-making (or policy resolving) process, was one of the factors accounting for concern within the Government with respect to the policy of unification. Also, TRIO helped to reinforce the position of parliamentary critics from other parties. Because of representations made by groups like TRIO, the Conservatives were better able to assert that the

⁵²For example, these points were submitted on TRIO stationery under the heading, "To All Members of Parliament: The Defence Issue" (no date, but probably mailed in late 1966 or early 1967). TRIO files.

⁵³R. Byers, "Executive Leadership and Influence - Parliamentary Perceptions of Canadian Defence Policy", in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, ed. by T.A. Hockin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971), pp. 163-182.

informed critics were against reorganization:

Mr. Smith: At six o'clock Mr. Chairman, I was discussing the genuine concern that organizations such as TRIO and others...were showing concerning the combat effectiveness of the Canadian forces and particularly the effect of unification proceeding at its present rate. The people concerned say that now is the time to pause and consolidate the advances in integration which have been made....They say that we should take a backward look to assess our progress.⁵⁴

At least for the Conservatives, TRIO represented an important part of the informed public, and this political party was willing to act as one of the links between the 'public' and the legislature and via the legislature to the Government policy-makers. Indeed, this is one of the functions supposedly basic to the House of Commons.

TRIO perceived the Commons as another place where pressure could be exerted on the Liberal executive and this was reinforced by representations made through other channels. As has been stated, the attack of TRIO was on a broad front. The importance to TRIO of the parliamentary critics lay in the fact that the critics would be able to question the Government more effectively upon receipt of information from TRIO. Also, the parliamentary critics in turn informed TRIO about their own and Government strategies,

⁵⁴H. of C. Debates, November 8, 1966, Vol. IX, p. 9696.

thus strengthening the critical posture of TRIO. As the writer of one letter indicated before TRIO came into being:

Let the political fighting be done by the Opposition. Our groups should not be tarred with any political brush. Undercover contacts should, of course, be developed...but here we should exercise great care.⁵⁵

Members of TRIO made multiple contacts with members of the Progressive Conservative Party as the Conservative Party was close to the position of TRIO. This did not mean that TRIO was a tool of the Conservatives or vice versa. Simply, each saw an advantage in maintaining contact with the other. The other parties were wrong to regard TRIO as a Conservative front, though contacts on a more personal basis than the sending of material to M.P.s was established.⁵⁶ A prominent Conservative defence spokesman wrote to one of the more active members of TRIO even before TRIO was formed:

I think probably statements and letters to papers such as _____, which is accepting Hellyer's statement that this is essentially an attempt on the part of the military to dictate to civil authority, pointing out that this is completely incorrect, would be of value. I believe that the greater the extent to which this is done, and the issue kept alive, the better the chances are of bringing to an end the

⁵⁵Letter July 20, 1966. TRIO files.

⁵⁶This was sometimes expressed during interviews with the author.

measures presently being taken.⁵⁷

This common posture helped in the plotting of strategy. TRIO was assured of receiving a sympathetic hearing from Conservative members when the organization forwarded names of possible witnesses to the Standing Committee and advocated that there be no restrictions on the scope of the Committee's enquiry.

As TRIO submitted information to its parliamentary sympathizers, so did, as a result of informal contacts, members of the Conservative Party suggest points of strategy to TRIO members. It should be pointed out, however, that although a community of interest existed, TRIO was not restricted in its ability to approach other parties. Also, the community of interest did not mean that the Conservatives and members of TRIO held meetings to plot a 'common' strategy, that the Conservatives would be the voice of TRIO in the Commons or that TRIO would be the Party's spokesman outside of the Commons. What it did mean was each found a willing ally in the other, but each would plot its own course of action according to its own perceptions. Besides, each was operating within a different framework of the policy-making process; the Conservatives were a disciplined party working within the Commons and Defence Committee, whereas TRIO was working as a

⁵⁷ Letter from Conservative M.P. to future TRIO executive member, July 19, 1966. TRIO files.

part of the non-governmental sector of the Canadian system.

TRIO sought also to form lines of communication with the Liberal Party. As has been pointed out, TRIO recognized that it had to influence Liberal Party members and, in particular, Cabinet ministers in order to achieve success. It might be wondered whether the communications flow established was a result of the organizational character of TRIO, or a result of the fact that within TRIO there were those who were well acquainted with prominent Liberals. Regardless, individual members of TRIO were able to assert more forcefully their opposition and, in turn, be viewed by some Liberals as a non-partisan group concerned with the well-being of the Canadian defence establishment. One Cabinet minister wrote to a TRIO member:

...I think it was wrong of Paul [Hellyer] to attach a political complexion to the representations made by you and your associates.⁵⁸

There were also prominent Liberals outside the Commons who were not enamoured with unification. Apparently, Gerald Regan, Leader of the Liberal opposition in Nova Scotia at the time, was against unification.⁵⁹

Initially, the legitimacy of the role played by an interest group such as TRIO in the policy process was re-

⁵⁸ Letter from Cabinet minister to TRIO member, March 31, 1967. TRIO files.

⁵⁹ H. of C. Debates, Vol. XII, 1967, p. 12567.

cognized by the Liberals. As reported by TRIO representatives when they appeared as witnesses before the Defence Committee:

A gratifying response to the establishment of TRIO was made by the Department of National Defence in a release to the press by the Executive Assistant to the Minister who was reported as follows: "The formation of TRIO is by all means a good thing....the Defence Department welcomes such organizations."⁶⁰

This might have been a tactic rather than an actual representation of the Liberal Party attitude. Still, the fact that members of TRIO were asked to appear as witnesses indicated that at least the Government was willing to allow interest groups a role in this aspect of defence policy-making. In fact, Paul Hellyer felt compelled when appearing as a witness before the Standing Committee to attack some of the arguments of TRIO:

The TRIO organization goes on to contend that a single service in Canada will not be able to work properly in co-operation with the United States. It is suggested that NORAD requires a separate capability for the Air Force....

As far as NORAD is concerned, this simply is not true. Aero-space defence of this continent is NOT simply a function performed by one of the environmental services.⁶¹

Actually, the Defence Minister did more than ack-

⁶⁰S.C.N.D., No. 17, op. cit., p. 733.

⁶¹Ibid., No. 25, p. 1574.

knowledge the existence of TRIO. Through an intermediary, a meeting was arranged between Paul Hellyer and other representatives of the Defence Department and representatives of TRIO. The meeting took place in Ottawa on October 18, 1966 and both sides thought that they could change the other's position through a face-to-face encounter. Whether the personal friendship between the Defence Minister and a leading member of TRIO - which became one of bitterness as the debate dragged on - helped to bring the two antagonists momentarily together, the meeting was just, in the words of one of the attendants, an "exercise in semantics".⁶² This apparently was an attempt by the Minister of National Defence to placate some of his most effective critics before they became too vociferous. Possibly, the Minister was slightly uneasy about the role of TRIO. One of the TRIO members who was present at the meeting wrote in a letter to a Western Canadian publisher:

Five of us...went to Ottawa last week and entertained the Minister and the entire defence staff. While we did not achieve anything concrete, and the TRIO people are just as determined as ever to proceed, we thought it quite a coup that such a group would assemble if they did not feel we had some significant position.⁶³

This meeting caused misunderstandings with other

⁶²Interview with TRIO member, July 1969.

⁶³Letter from TRIO member to TRIO supporter, October 24, 1966. TRIO files.

groups opposing the Defence Minister's position, although the meeting might have enhanced the prestige of TRIO. This meeting was the first and last time that the two antagonists met and because the meeting was non-productive to either side, it led to a hardening of attitudes. It was after October 18th that the Minister and his office, although welcoming initially the formation TRIO, thought of TRIO as being 'political' in the perjorative sense of the term. This had some effect in hindering the attempt by the TRIO membership to arouse others to take up the cudgel against unification. A member of TRIO put forward the following view in a letter to the author:

You must remember that the Minister particularly attacked TRIO as being politically motivated and thereby took the debate out of the realm of discussion on his programme as related to the military needs of the country. Thus any opposition to plan was deemed to be political. (sic).⁶⁴

If results were not obtained by this meeting (in fact, counter-productive results were produced since the meeting caused the antagonists to take a more negative attitude to one another), TRIO hoped for more positive results from contacts with other ministers. The working toward these contacts was easier because several members of TRIO were prominent Liberals. Arthur Huycke, Mitchell Sharp's campaign manager, has already been mentioned as be-

⁶⁴Letter from TRIO member to author June 1, 1970.

ing an active executive member of the Toronto branch. A member reported shortly after the formation of the Toronto branch:

I have just had a phone call from Arthur Huycke....He reports that he has been on the phone to Mitchell Sharp and [Michael] McCabe his Executive Assistant. Sharp is very impressed with the people that are behind TRIO and has asked Huycke to come to Ottawa to brief him completely. He says that this whole matter has really come sort of out of the blue to him and has never been brought up by Hellyer at Cabinet. He further says that he can see nothing unreasonable in our approach.⁶⁵

In September a Toronto TRIO member reported that he had talked to the Solicitor General and Finance Minister and that they had taken a serious view of the matter. During the same month, a Vancouver TRIO supporter stated:

...I have had the full opportunity of putting my views before Arthur Laing and Jack Davis; the latter is quite receptive to our ideas....⁶⁶

In January 1967, Vancouver TRIO had received intimations that

one cabinet minister has expressed his concern regarding the soundness of the Government plan for Unification.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Memorandum to members of TRIO executive, August 26, 1966.

⁶⁶Letter from Vancouver TRIO supporter to Toronto TRIO member, September 13, 1966. TRIO files.

⁶⁷"Progress Report - Vancouver TRIO", January 23, 1967. TRIO files.

This indicated that there was behind-the-scenes dissension within the Cabinet respecting Paul Hellyer's policy and that this dissension was at least partly caused by representations made by groups like TRIO. The fuller implications of this discontent will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The importance of friendship could be seen once again in TRIO members' attempts to have Prime Minister Pearson re-examine the Government's position vis-a-vis unification. A leading TRIO member and John Matheson, Lester Pearson's Parliamentary Secretary, were friends of long standing. Matheson of course was requested to approach the Prime Minister on behalf of TRIO and other groups such as the Maritime Component Committee. Also, letters were addressed directly to the Prime Minister. Both tactics bore little fruit. The Prime Minister refused to meet with TRIO and in fact supported his Defence Minister, even though the support might not have been enthusiastic.

This is not the place to discuss the waverings within the Liberal ranks but it should be noted that as the debate dragged out, uneasiness developed within the Liberal Party. TRIO could take partial credit for sowing these seeds of discord. Herein lay the influence and role of TRIO. By helping to present the critics' views on unification, TRIO was one of the factors contributing to the Government's re-examination of its position. TRIO, in fact, helped to prolong the debate.

The Tri-Service Identities Organization did not

prolong the debate in isolation but did so in concert with other groups and individuals. As part of the opposition, the Tri-Service Identities Organization was one of many elements opposed to the Government's unification policy. It was perhaps the most active of the extraparliamentary groups. The activity of TRIO dealt with articulating its discontent so as to halt the Government's advance towards unification. The voicing of criticism entailed TRIO to seek allies in several quarters which ranged from the news media to Members of Parliament. TRIO wished to bring to the public's attention what it considered to be the shortcomings of Bill C-243. To educate the public in this regard also meant to attempt to arouse the public against the Government. TRIO therefore welcomed support from any quarter.

Thus, the wrong question is posed when asking what determined the suitability of the allies of this interest group. One might suggest that TRIO would have allied itself with any group or individual which could have advanced its cause. Also, the term "ally" should not be misinterpreted. It should not necessarily suggest a concrete alliance, a central planning body, active membership in TRIO or even meetings between TRIO members and other critics of the Government's position. Any critic was a potential ally because a community of interests existed. Of course, TRIO members recognized that the Government would view their position more seriously if other groups worked in

unison with TRIO. Yet it can be suggested that TRIO wanted support for its position but it did not necessarily want direct support. It has been noted in this chapter that a newspaper publisher who supported the views of TRIO did not openly align himself with this organization. What was desired was to have several influential bodies speak out together or separately against the Government. Obviously, TRIO could not expect a Cabinet minister to become a member; but could hope that the minister would be persuaded by the arguments of the TRIO membership.

Overtures to Cabinet ministers focuses upon the point that TRIO, although welcoming support from any quarter, concentrated its efforts upon specific publics of the general public. TRIO wanted influential individuals whose views would be respected by the decision-makers and who had access to the channels of communication to become involved. Within the context of the unification debate, this meant ex-officers considered as experts, ex-servicemen organizations, editors, journalists and M.P.s. It is easier to assert that TRIO was influential than to measure the extent of this organization's influence. This problem can be seen, for example, with respect to members of the press and M.P.s. The question can be posed whether these individuals became more critical as a result of, or in spite of, the efforts of the TRIO leadership. However, it can be inferred that the endeavours of TRIO members contributed to the critical posture of several participants without needing to

measure the extent of the contribution. The press which was initially critical to the formation of TRIO became more sympathetic as the debate progressed. George Bain, a noted columnist, in September 1966 stated that "people such as those associated with TRIO should have something useful to say".⁶⁸ Furthermore, TRIO helped to crystallize and to channel the criticism.

As has been noted in this chapter, TRIO was not entirely successful in attracting allies among service organizations such as the Conference of Defence Associations and the Dominion Command or national executive of the Royal Canadian Legion. A TRIO supporter wrote in August 1966 with respect to what he considered to be the laxness of a service group's efforts:

No wonder Lee [Paul Hellyer's assistant], some time ago, remarked that dealing with service and civilian associations opposed to the Minister was "like shooting fish in a barrel" because they never joined forces and coordinated their attack.⁶⁹

The failures of the approaches made by TRIO can be attributed to the belief that ex-servicemen should not become actively involved in a controversial political matter, that

⁶⁸George Bain, "Wild ideas revisted", Globe and Mail, September 23, 1966.

⁶⁹Letter from TRIO member to member of naval association, August 27, 1966. TRIO files.

TRIO was acting in too open a manner and was politically motivated. Also, groups such as the Legion believed they did not have the expertise to comment upon a complex defence matter. In some instances, there was a conflict between an individual's personal life and the public role expected of him in the defence debate. Still, TRIO provided an outlet for critics who wished to become actively involved.

The zealousness of the TRIO leadership and its access to channels of communication contributed to the influence of TRIO. The approach TRIO took towards unification and the position its strategies compelled others to take suggested that the success of TRIO be defined in terms other than the ultimate one of having Bill C-243 scrapped. TRIO raised several obstacles to unification's coming into being though it did not halt unification. By adding pressure to an issue causing stress in other parts of the Canadian system, for example, the House of Commons, TRIO revealed itself as a force which Government supporters were compelled to notice.

CHAPTER 4

THE MILITARY OPPOSITION

In discussing the military opposition, this chapter concentrates mainly upon the roles of senior officers at National Defence Headquarters between 1964 and 1966. It would be wrong to interpret the acts of dissenting serving officers as emanating from a well-organized, plotting military clique. Despite this, generalizations can be drawn from the activities of senior military advisers who were part of the charged atmosphere of Defence Headquarters and who were closely involved in the implementation of reorganization. Such generalizations suggest that there was dissent. Personnel problems, the Defence Minister's particular use of the decision-making process, the rapid pace of change and the resultant disagreement between Paul Hellyer and several of his senior officers were causes of the dissent. It is easier to assert that there was disenchantment on the part of serving senior officers than to assert that their activities, at least initially, were political. Whether senior officers were only exercising the legitimate function of offering to their political head advice based on professional expertise or whether senior officers went beyond this role by refusing to implement a political decision, that is, the decision to proceed to unification, are questions difficult to answer. When does the non-political role of offering advice to a minister

become political? Regardless, between 1964 and 1966 senior officers generally did not perform an open political role by making critical public statements and by establishing contacts with interest groups and opposition political parties for purposes of challenging government policy. Until the events of July 1966, dissent among senior officers remained within the confines of the Defence Department. The questioning of the various stages of integration/unification remained an internal matter.

It is not surprising that members of the Armed Forces have rarely assumed an open political role. This is broadly defined as engaging in activities challenging the right of a government or its representatives to determine policy. The training of serving personnel and what may be termed the Canadian military tradition have assured both a submission to government authority and an unpreparedness and unwillingness to engage in political activities. Samuel Huntington has referred to one pattern of civil-military relations which is generally applicable to Canada; a pattern characterised by an antimilitary ideology, low military political power and high military professionalism.¹

¹Samuel Huntington, The Soldier And The State: The Theory And Politics Of Civil-Military Relations (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 97. The four other types of civil-military relations (or societies) are 1) antimilitary ideology, high military political power and low military professionalism; 2) antimilitary ideology, low military political power and low military professionalism; 3) promilitary ideology, high military political power and high military professionalism; 4) promilitary ideology, low military political power and high military professionalism.

Though there may be variations on this type, it suggests that an increase of political activity on the part of members of the Armed Forces is a deviation from the norm of political quiescence or neutrality.

The Canadian military tradition generally has not been a major force in Canadian history. The nation building influences of military exploits such as the War of 1812 and Canada's magnificent contribution in World War I, besides less spectacular permeable military influences upon the Canadian economy and social scene, can be noted. Nevertheless, alongside military achievements which symbolized Canada's emergence as a nation came an indifference and neglect for military matters. The general neglect for the militia in the nineteenth century was paralleled by the twentieth century struggle of the Armed Forces to maintain an existence in the inter-war years. The Canadian governments bestirring of themselves at times of crises were followed by low emphasis being placed upon military affairs during periods of peace.² Thus, public disregard has formed part of the Canadian military tradition.

Within the context of the unification debate,

²For the points discussed in this paragraph, see R.H. Roy, "The Canadian Military Tradition" and Richard Preston, "Military Influence on the Development of Canada", in The Canadian Military: A Profile, ed. by H.J. Massey (Canada: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972). Also see Richard Preston, "Canadian Defence Policy And The Development Of The Canadian Nation 1867-1917", The Canadian Historical Association, Booklet No. 25, Ottawa 1970.

public disregard meant the debate was intense but localized. The serving personnel could not count upon and arouse widespread public support. It seemed that the sensational aspects of the debate mainly attracted the attention of the general public. It was not uncommon, initially, to caricature members of the Armed Forces in the news media. Lack of widespread support meant that officers, especially as a group, did not have, and usually did not, seek alliances with outside groups in the political system. Contacts of course existed with M.P.s and with ex-servicemen groups. But the contacts were of a low profile. This was the case until the summer of 1966. Even afterwards, with the heightening and extending of the contacts, widespread disagreement by officers and men did not result in the building of several political alliances which might have threatened the Government's position. If anything, the reaction of dissenters within the Armed Forces took the form of premature resignations and lowering of morale. At best, these were covert acts of dissent as compared to the alternative of an overt political action.

Besides, the characteristics of the political structures did not favour participation by serving personnel. Members of the Armed Forces were at a disadvantage in articulating their discontent through the existing political structures. They had to rely on go-betweens, for example, the Conservative Party, in order to be heard in the House of Commons. It might be argued that the politicizing of

the unification issue worked against the interests of serving personnel disagreeing with Government policy as the issue then came to be a deeply partisan one. Serving military personnel who appeared as witnesses before the Standing Committee were expected to support the Defence Minister; else they ran the risk of being severely reprimanded. Additionally, the Queen's Regulations and Orders forbade serving personnel from publicly commenting upon questions of policy.

The professionalism of the Armed Forces suggest several points. Other than suggesting the already-noted reluctance to indulge in political activities, professionalism did not prevent serving personnel from providing information to nonserving critics. Information leakages after the summer of 1966 were the result of individual actions rather than the product of a well-organized military opposition. This, however, did not mean that the policy of the Minister of National Defence was enthusiastically supported. Support was not readily forthcoming but orders were obeyed. The reluctance partly stemmed from the services' inner keeps of loyalty and tradition.

In fact, the professionalism of serving personnel accounted for the process of alienation which occurred at Headquarters. Agreement with the concept of civilian control did not automatically connote agreement with the concept of civilian direction. Simply, civilian control is the right of civilian authorities to have the final say in

policy decisions, whereas the related concept of civilian direction constitutes civilian involvement in the internal functioning of the Defence Department.³ This may include civilian participation on essentially military committees and civilian decisions on technical matters best left to the expertise of military professionals. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, former Chief of the General Staff, has said one of the conflicts between military leaders and their political masters has been:

when political leaders intervene in what should be the strictly military field of domestic organization and administration affecting the essential qualities of service discipline and morale. No military attributes are less understood by the civilian.⁴

Presumably Lieutenant-General Simonds was referring to unification.

Thus, tension can result if the professionals' role is undercut, ignored, overruled or by-passed. Of course, since there is a relationship between civilian control and civilian direction, a criticism of the way in which direction was exercised could be construed as a criticism of

³Also see R. Byers, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither Civilian Control?", Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the C.P.S.A., Winnipeg, June 4, 1970, p. 5ff. (Also printed in H.J. Massey, ed., The Canadian Military: A Profile, op. cit.).

⁴Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, "Commentary and Observations", in H.J. Massey, op. cit., p. 269.

control. A passive minister who did not fully participate in internal matters but only discussed defence questions within the limits of the alternatives forwarded by senior military advisers would have general control. This would be firmer if the direction were extensive; at the same time inappropriate extensive direction could hamper the professionalism of officers and in the process estrange them from their minister. Such appeared to be the case with Paul Hellyer and senior advisers at Defence Headquarters. In some ways, the Minister had pre-empted the role of his Chief of Defence Staff. Besides, the Minister's perceptions of re-organization with respect to the ultimate goal of unification and to the timing of its implementation differed from those of several of his senior advisers.

The estrangement process which resulted from extensive civilian direction, man-management problems and different perceptions on the nature of reorganization were apparent at the very beginning, even before the White Paper of 1964 was written. Of significance, Paul Hellyer undertook the initiative to change the defence structure and, in so doing, did not rely mainly upon his senior military advisers. This could be interpreted as an undermining of the position of the senior officers as advisers; this in turn led to a less amiable relationship between themselves and the Minister.

Paul Hellyer when he became Defence Minister in 1963 established ministerial study groups to examine the

various aspects of Canadian defence, keeping in mind that Cabinet had informed him to expect no more than \$1.53 billion. The Minister was displeased by what he referred to as the problems of three services having individual access to the Minister, with plans and projects being made in an unco-ordinated fashion. In addition, he believed that the extensive use of a framework of committees was inadequate for setting priorities. With this in mind and noting the need for new equipment to be somehow obtained within a fixed budget ceiling, Paul Hellyer concluded that modern management methods were needed. The first step was to be a single Chief of Defence Staff and the last step was to be a unified defence force.

The Minister, in reaching his conclusions, seems not to have utilized extensively his military advisers. In 1963 Paul Hellyer commenced what his Chiefs were later to regard as an undercutting of their position and a solidifying of his own.⁵ The steps the Minister of National Defence took in formulating his policy lent some credence to this belief. His ministerial study groups, though composed of both civilians and officers, placed greatest emphasis on the civilian component. In May 1963, the Defence Minister in beginning his appraisal of defence policy had assembled an inter-service committee chaired by his scientific adviser, the late Dr. R.J. Sutherland. The

⁵Interview with retired officer who served at National Defence Headquarters, March 4, 1970.

ensuing Sutherland Report proved to be a disappointment to the Minister. This top secret report did not envisage a large and active role for Canada on the international scene and, equally, was less than enthusiastic about the unification concept. One individual had written:

Even within the Canadian Defence Department in the summer of 1964, it was very difficult to establish who had produced the bulk of the material included in Mr. Hellyer's White PaperDr. R.J. Sutherland...was known to have voiced some objection to the proposed extension of integration to unification. Naturally, once the decision had been taken by the Minister, Dr. Sutherland felt that he had no alternative but to provide the required supporting detail.⁶

Despite not having received full encouragement, by August 1963, Paul Hellyer had made the political decision in favour of unification.

The Defence Minister made the political decision apparently without having utilized extensively the expertise of his Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, the latter appeared to be unaware of several studies undertaken by the Deputy Minister's office.⁷ It can be inferred that, if this were the case, Paul Hellyer was indicating a degree of lack of confidence in the senior military advisers. In turn, this was a factor in his worsening relations with them and a

⁶R. Barry Tackaberry, "Unification of The Canadian Armed Forces - The Single Service Concept", January 2, 1970, 31 pp., unpublished draft, p. 7.

⁷Interview with retired officer who served at National Defence Headquarters, March 4, 1970.

subsequent lack of understanding on the advisers' part respecting the full scope of the Minister's intentions. For example, Vice-Admiral Rayner had testified to the Defence Committee that in the fall of 1963 the Chiefs of Staff, with the Minister, made a comprehensive review of the role and task of the Armed Forces but they were unaware of his intentions with respect to integration and unification.⁸

One senior officer was of the opinion that

by November 1963, Hellyer began to undercut the Chiefs and through people like Bill Lee and Warner Troyer, solidified his position. Denegation of the Chiefs began to flow from the Minister's office.⁹

Within these circumstances it was not surprising that Paul Hellyer did not formally consult the Chiefs respecting the contents of the White Paper. Without relying upon his advisers, the Minister wrote the first draft of the White Paper over an eighteen day period in early December 1963.¹⁰ One can conjecture that he indulged in this exercise to make sure that his views were clearly stated and understood in Cabinet before they could be dis-

⁸S.C.N.D., No. 31, Monday, March 13, 1967, p. 2001.

⁹Interview with retired officer who served at National Defence Headquarters, March 4, 1970.

¹⁰William Lee, "A Defence Plan For The Future", Speech to the Kingston Kiwanis Club, June 29, 1964, 18pp., p. 5.

puted by his military advisers. It showed that the Minister was further relegating his Chiefs to an inferior position. Paul Hellyer was clearly taking the initiative.

Before the Chiefs could make known their views to the Cabinet Defence Committee, on December 27, 1963, the Defence Minister had submitted to the Prime Minister a letter containing the first draft of the White Paper.¹¹ Paul Hellyer, in discussing the proposed white paper, suggested a plan of action for the next ten years, including the following points. The proposed organizational changes would strengthen civilian control. Re-organization would reduce the problems of waste, extravagance and duplication to manageable and negligible proportions. Integration of the Armed Forces was fully provided for. Mention was made of the fact that the Forces would be more Canadian. The new Canadian Force would attract world-wide attention because it would be the leader in innovation caused by integration. Interestingly, "integration" was used instead of "unification"; presumably integration was used as a synonym for unification. Amongst others, these were the points made on December 27th. These points conformed to the broad policy principles which the Defence Minister had discussed with the Prime Minister on September 25th; these in turn reflected the consensus of the Cabinet Defence Committee's informal meeting in early September. The Defence

¹¹Government source. The author is not at liberty to identify or to quote from this source.

Minister had solicited and received his leader's approval for relatively broad terms of reference without having detailed what integration/unification implied.

Only after Paul Hellyer had taken these important preliminary steps did he ask his Chiefs to make any significant contribution with respect to the question of integration/unification prior to the White Paper being approved. In early February 1964, the Minister held a meeting with the Chiefs of Staff. He informed them of the necessity to integrate the forces. The Chiefs were taken by surprise by reference to unification in the first draft of the White Paper. Vice-Admiral Rayner, who retired as Chief of Naval Staff in July 1964, stated in an article he wrote for the Ottawa Citizen:

...there had been no discussion of unification. It was a far-off spectre which would have to be considered seriously when the many pressing concerns of the moment had been settled. I doubt very much if any of the chiefs would have advocated unification in 1964.

....I urged strongly that all reference to a single unified defence force be deleted. If this had been done, I doubt if the hasty attempt to force through unification against professional advice would be going on today.¹²

The arguments of Vice-Admiral Rayner and the other Chiefs resulted in only a brief reference to a 'single unified force' in the White Paper, but Paul Hellyer did not delete

¹²Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner, "Unification: public enquiry needed", The Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday, November 9, 1966.

the term altogether.

Subsequently, the Cabinet Defence Committee met. Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, who was Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in 1964 and who later became Chief of the Defence Staff, was to state before the Standing Committee that the Cabinet Committee had met on February 12, and March 24, 1964. In contradiction to Paul Hellyer's assertion, the Air Chief Marshal stated that he had not discussed unification, although the question of integration arose. There seems to be some conflict regarding how many meetings of the Cabinet Defence Committee were held. According to one Chief of Staff there were at least three meetings during the February-March interval. Of more importance, the Chiefs were not present at the first meeting and only Miller was present at the second meeting. It was at the second meeting that the various departments represented reached general agreement.¹³

Paul Hellyer's intent had become a fait accompli, despite the Chiefs being present at the Cabinet meeting in March when the final draft of the White Paper was considered. The pleas of individuals such as Vice-Admiral Rayner were impassioned. They were based on the assertions that there had been little preparation for integration and that the Navy would suffer. The attempts at having any reference in the White Paper to a single unified force

¹³ Interview with ex-officer, March 1970.

deleted were unsuccessful. The Chiefs were unsuccessful because of Paul Hellyer's resolve and of his particular use of the decision-making process prior to the March meeting. On March 25, 1964, the Cabinet approved the White Paper for tabling in Parliament.

At this stage it is relevant to note the conflicting opinions regarding the extent to which the Chiefs of Staff were able to make their views known to Cabinet. On the one hand, Paul Hellyer had stated:

The question of Cabinet Defence Committee consideration of the unification issue is not a matter of viewpoint but a matter of fact. The Cabinet Defence Committee considered the issue thoroughly before taking a decision and sending their recommendation forward to Cabinet for approval. At that time the Chiefs of Staff were given an opportunity and were encouraged to speak to the issue.

The Cabinet Committee having heard these arguments took a decision to proceed with unification and recommended the policy to Cabinet for final approval. Once the Cabinet decision was taken the Minister was given discretion in implementing the policy which is the customary procedure.¹⁴

Before the Standing Committee, the Defence Minister testified that he had

always taken my senior military and civil staff advisers to Cabinet Defence Committee meetings ...and when their views differ from the departmental recommendations I have always insisted that they state their views to the Committee

¹⁴Letter to author, July 14, 1970.

before it made its decision.¹⁵

In spite of these contentions, members of the Chiefs of Staff later were to state that they did not have the opportunity to make their views known to the Cabinet Defence Committee.

Leaving aside the companion question of the extent to which Paul Hellyer utilized the Cabinet Defence Committee and informed his Cabinet colleagues about his plans for unification, it appeared that there was a degree of truth in the contentions of both sides. Namely, the Committee had heard the views of the Chiefs of Staff in March 1964 but only after the Defence Minister had sought approval from the Prime Minister for the contents of the White Paper. The Committee was not fully aware of the myriad of problems besetting the Defence Department. The senior military advisers did not have the right to appear before the Committee on their own initiative; they appeared according to the inclinations of their minister. Also, the Cabinet Committee had approved a general aim but were unaware of the many details. It was common procedure for a minister to be given discretion in policy implementation.

With the tabling of the White Paper in March 1964, one might say that the first stage in the integration/unification debate regarding the Defence Minister's rela-

¹⁵S.C.N.D., No. 25, Thursday, February 23, 1967, Friday, February 24, 1967, p. 1573.

tions with his advisers had come to an end. Some important features which bore upon the later stages were discernible at this point with respect to the military opposition. Briefly viewed, the role of the Chiefs of Staff had been undermined. For example, the Chiefs of Staff contended they had not been asked to formulate any plans on unification prior to the White Paper and had been surprised at Paul Hellyer's mention of a single unified force in the early months of 1964. At the same time, the Chiefs had voiced opposition to the concept of unification and this was a hint of future discontent. Paul Hellyer had made only slight reference to unification in the White Paper because of the arguments raised by members of the Chiefs of Staff. Nonetheless, he had not dropped the goal of proceeding to a single unified force within three or four years. Herein lay a difficulty which was to affect the discontent to come. Apparently, there was a misunderstanding between the Minister and the military advisers respecting the target date of unification. Vice-Admiral Rayner testified before the Standing Committee that he had no doubt

of what a single unified service meant; I had always assumed it would be one service with one uniform and a loss of identity to the three services....I must admit that at the time I thought it was years away, and I think everyone else did too.¹⁶

This misunderstanding was based on the fact that

¹⁶S.C.N.D., No. 31, Monday, March 13, 1967, pp. 2011-2012.

the Chiefs of Staff, unlike Paul Hellyer, believed that unification did not necessarily follow integration. Their attitude seemed to be 'integration yes, but not necessarily unification.' Also, the Chiefs thought they had the Minister's assurance that the multiple problems related to integration would be overcome before one even started to contemplate unification. Despite these views, a letter bearing the signatures of the Minister and the Associate Minister was sent to Armed Forces personnel. It stated in part that after the first two steps had been taken, namely the reorganization of Defence Headquarters and the reorganization of the command structure, the third and final step would be

the unification of the Three Services. This will not be initiated until the various staffs...have been established and are working effectively. It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

The process outlined above is not immutable. As the lessons of the reorganization are learned, changes in the plan or in the timing may result. However, the end objective of a single Service is firm.¹⁷

In passing, it should be noted that reference to the

¹⁷Official letter dated April 2, 1964, signed by the Minister of National Defence and the Associate Minister and entitled "To All Members Of The Armed Forces And Employees Of The Department Of National Defence." Quotes from this letter can be found in the minutes of proceedings and evidence of the S.C.N.D., 1967.

process not being immutable added to the confusion. Military critics were later to charge that this appeared to them as an indication that unification was a far-off, uncertain goal. In fact, the critics believed that this was also the intent of the White Paper which concluded by stating that there was no attempt to be inflexible.¹⁸ Yet, Paul Hellyer was determined to proceed to a single unified service and believed his military advisers were aware of this. The policy was flexible only insofar as the details were concerned, for example, with respect to timing, and not with respect to the final goal of unification.

The Minister's and Associate Minister's letter with covering messages by the respective Chiefs was duly sent to the services in early April. The Chiefs seemed not to have indicated a large degree of enthusiasm in their divergent messages. The Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Rayner, in his covering statement, pointed out that the first step of integration would result in greater efficiency and that the Navy was in an excellent position to fit into the new organization because it was already organized on

¹⁸Canada, Department of National Defence. White Paper On Defence. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, March 1964, p. 30. The White Paper mentioned that "no attempt has been made to set down hard and fast rules for future policy and development. Flexibility, not rigidity has been the keynote. The paper is a charter, a guide, not a detailed and final blueprint. The key outline in it is not immutable. It can be altered or adapted to meet the requirements of changing circumstances, national and international."

functional lines.¹⁹ Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap, Chief of the Air Staff, said in his message that ultimate unification was sound in principle and that the Royal Canadian Air Force was well prepared for the process as it had "considerable experience in operating in integrated organizations under unified command" and was already organized on a functional basis. Though he would regret the day the Air Force ceased to exist as a separate service, the Air Marshal was sure that the

personnel of the RCAF will display the necessary fortitude, vigour and flexibility not only to adjust to the new circumstances but to participate positively in their fulfilment.²⁰

Unlike his RCAF counterpart, the statement of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General G. Walsh, mentioned such benefits of integration as greater flexibility, the reduction of overhead and duplication and the possibility of providing a better manpower/equipment ratio and better career prospects. In mentioning these benefits, the Chief of the General Staff did not refer to the passing away of the Army as a distinct entity, except in the vague sense of stating that the implementation of the revolu-

¹⁹"Statement by Vice-Admiral H.S. Rayner Chief Of The Naval Staff To Naval Personnel" April 13, 1964. Also see S.C.N.D., No. 31, Monday March 13, 1967, p. 2027.

²⁰"Statement By The Chief Of The Air Staff To All RCAF Personnel" (No date but probably written in first or second week of April 1964).

tionary concept would be by evolutionary means.²¹

Yet, when he appeared before the Standing Committee on March 13, 1967, Vice-Admiral Rayner asserted that, according to his understanding of the April 2, 1964 letter, guarantees had been given and unification was not to be for several years hence. Besides, the vice-admiral regarded the Minister's mentioning of unification and of a 3-4 year timetable "as purely a selling job" and that the Minister's reference to a single unified force was neither Government policy nor a plan.²² There was the urge or strongly held hope among the Chiefs of Staff and perhaps with all of them to regard unification as something far-off. This affected the nature of future discontent of the senior officers because this affected their understanding and the flow of information between themselves and the Defence Minister and between themselves and field commanders.

In spite of the letter of April 2, 1964, the military heads at Defence Headquarters did not reinforce the idea of proceeding to a single unified force to the commanders in the field. The latter, as in the case of Rear-Admiral Landymore, was generally unaware of what was to follow integration. As a result, the discontent later

²¹"Statement By The Chief Of The General Staff To All Army Personnel" (No date but probably written in first or second week of April 1964).

²²S.C.N.D., No. 31, op. cit., pp. 2026-2028, 2031-2035.

voiced took on a character that the Minister was to consider as challenging civilian control. In the light of Rear-Admiral Landymore's later stance, it was slightly ironic that the Victoria Colonist in March 1964 reported the rear-admiral as saying that he did not believe there would be any rapid changes and that the services would not lose their traditions.²³ Rear-Admiral Dillon, the Deputy Comptroller-General, stated in an address to the Naval Association on October 3, 1964:

The formation of a single force Headquarters under single Chief of Defence Staff is slated to be the first step towards a single unified defence force for Canada. Does this mean that in the course of the next ten years individual services will lose their identity? I do not believe that it does....²⁴

Whether or not it was their fault, senior officers did not foresee that the inner keeps of the services' loyalties and traditions would be challenged and overcome.

Part of the lack of foresight was related to the fact that there was no detailed plan outlining the reorganizational changes. Although the Chiefs were aware of the intent of the White Paper, the problems related to a con-

²³D. Gain, "Service Chiefs Agree: Merger 'Good Thing'", Victoria Colonist, March 27, 1964.

²⁴Rear-Admiral C.J. Dillon, "Address To The Royal Canadian Naval Association Annual Meeting, Oshawa, Ontario, Saturday, October 3, 1964", 6 pp., pp. 4-5. Yet, on June 29, 1964, Bill Lee, Paul Hellyer's Special Assistant, in a speech to the Kingston Kiwanis Club said, "Hellyer has given himself a 3 to 4 year goal for the integration-to-unification process but refuses to be pinned to this or any other schedule".

cept stated in the briefest of ways were several. Of interest was the Chiefs' difficulty in communicating their views at a meeting in June 1964 because there was no method of communication standard to all the services. Air Marshal Clare Annis, former Vice-Chief of the Air Staff who became Chief of Technical Services in August 1964, in a speech of June 26, 1964, recognized the difficulties of the lack of planning and how the resultant problems might be used to indicate that senior officers were to blame for the snarls:

...The great problem is how much time is to be allowed the officers...to accomplish the results desired by the planners. Actually, I feel that there has been too little study of the details involved...so that unanticipated snarls are bound to delay its [White Paper] execution. Whether the department...is willing to take responsibilities for this lack of foresight or will take the easy route of blaming the military for unenthusiastic compliance when the snarls occur remains to be seen.²⁵

Paul Hellyer was of the opinion that had he attempted to document in advance all of the problems, they would have been pointed to as reasons for not going ahead:

If one tries to work out the implementation plan in detail in advance of taking the basic decision the emotions will cloud the issue and the chance of the basic decision ever being taken becomes practically nil.²⁶

²⁵Royal Canadian Air Force Association, "Notes On A Speech By A/V/M C.L. Annis", June 26, 1966. Private source. Air Marshal Annis was an air vice-marshal at the time.

²⁶Letter from Paul Hellyer to private citizen, August 24, 1966. TRIO files.

This interesting view meant that integration/unification was to proceed on an experimental step-by-step basis towards a not-too-distant target date rather than on the basis of an overall, detailed plan. This was bound to create difficulties between the Minister and senior officers.

The details were to be worked out as the different stages of reorganization were implemented. With this approach, Bill C-90, which provided for the functional reorganization of Defence Headquarters, came into force in August 1964. It is interesting to observe that before the Chiefs attended the meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee in March 1964, on February 27, 1964, the Cabinet had approved Paul Hellyer's recommendation to draft a bill, that is, Bill C-90, to abolish the Chiefs of Staff Committee which was to be replaced by a Chief of the Defence Staff. Before noting the effects this first step had upon the position of the military staff, it is worth noting the fact that Rear-Admiral Jeffrey Brock was fired.

According to his testimony to the Standing Committee, the rear-admiral said that in a meeting of August 5, 1964, the Defence Minister stated that Brock was being prematurely retired (or fired) so as to help cut down on personnel costs in order to make additional monies available for capital investment.²⁷ At the time, Rear-Admiral

²⁷S.C.N.D., No. 19, Tuesday, February 14, 1967, p. 951. Also see pp. 958, 959, 963, 973, 977, 1008.

Brock, the second most senior naval officer, was Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast, Maritime Commander and the commander of the Canadian sub-area for SACLANT. On the basis of his testimony, it appeared the main reason for Brock's premature dismissal was his disagreement with Paul Hellyer's plans. Brock not only was against the concept of unification but also was against the abolition of the professional heads of the services which would occur as a result of Bill C-90. The Defence Minister was made aware of these differences and that Brock was expressing his lack of sympathy within the confines of the service.²⁸ In addition, when the Special Committee on Defence had visited Halifax in July 1964, the rear-admiral, though he said he had the permission of the Associate Minister to do so, had voiced his criticisms. This included a criticism of the Government's decision to cancel the \$450 million general purpose frigates programme.

G. Laniel, a Liberal member of the Standing Committee, raised the point that there was a relationship between Rear-Admiral Brock's strong position and the issue of civilian control and, of course, Brock's retirement. The rear-admiral was against a system of training and management which denoted some form of interchangeability of personnel. However, he was in favour of greater efficiency in the sense of combining certain common functions and in

²⁸ Interview with retired senior officer who served at National Defence Headquarters, March 3, 1970.

favour of unified commands.²⁹ It appeared Rear-Admiral Brock and the Defence Minister could not agree on integration (unification, to Brock, in 1964 remained undefined).

The former Maritime commander believed that his treatment by Paul Hellyer had the following effects. Morale in the Navy was affected as no clear reason was given for Brock's dismissal. Secondly, Brock believed that his dismissal inhibited the willingness of officers to give advice contrary to what they thought the Minister wished to hear.³⁰ If subsequent events were not to fully bear this out, Paul Hellyer nonetheless demonstrated that he would not be adverse to acting contrary to the strong representations made by his military advisers, even if it meant in some instances relieving them of their duties. On the other hand, Rear-Admiral Brock showed that military advisers like himself would not remain quiescent in the face of ministerial statements of intent. Brock's dismissal created some publicity but he did not make any public statements at the time. Interestingly, in contrast to the actions of Rear-Admiral Landymore, Brock felt it was improper to enter into any controversy while on retirement leave. The dismissal did not have any noticeable adverse effects upon the Minister's position. Whether or not Rear-Admiral Brock was the first victim of the developing

²⁹S.C.N.D., No. 19, Tuesday, February 14, 1967, pp. 952-953.

³⁰Ibid., p. 982.

unification controversy, he was one of the more noticeable ones in its early stages.

Brock's dismissal in August 1964 was almost coincidental with the implementation of the first step envisioned by Bill C-90. This was the reorganization of Defence Headquarters on a functional basis with a single Chief of Defence Staff replacing the old Chiefs of Staff and their Chairman. The position of the three services was an anomalous one under the new structure. They remained distinct entities without a head and without direct representation of their views at the highest levels of government. The importance of the change and of the subsequent announcement by the Government in June 1965, that the eleven command structures would be reduced to six organized on functional lines, was additionally to remove the raison d'être for three distinct services.³¹

The effect of these steps upon internal military dissatisfaction or opposition, and here one must refer mainly to events at Defence Headquarters, was hard to discern. There was a desire on the part of senior officers to make integration a reality. However, the atmosphere was one of confusion which resulted, in some instances, in faulty management, with the offshoot that relations worsened between Paul Hellyer and some of his military personnel. The Defence Minister was not receiving the necessary

³¹For a summary of this see Michael Sherman, "A Single Service for Canada?" Adelphi Papers, No. 39 (July 1967), p. 6 ff.

encouragement from his top advisers and he believed that some were dragging their heels. This worsening of relations had the effect of reinforcing the Minister's determination to proceed to the final stage of unification and, in turn, his drive towards this goal affected the openness of the military advice given to him. It should be noted that officers who supported the policy of unification were not discouraged from making public statements which backed up Hellyer's policy aims.

One of the ironies of the debate related to the use made of the Headquarters setup. The changes at Headquarters were made for the purpose of rationalizing the decision-making process and of extending civilian control and direction. Yet there was a malfunctioning of the new setup because of the various practices employed to obtain information and reach decisions. For example, a minister who argued for the need of a single Chief of Defence Staff to co-ordinate the information flow by-passed the incumbent, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, to elicit information from several quarters. Brigadier Malone had written:

...where the commander-in-chief principle has been attempted, either the minister representing the government or the commander-in-chief has dominated. One or the other, or sometimes both, must be destroyed or become mere ciphers.³²

³²R.S. Malone, "Defence Forces Integration: Progressive Step Could Be Destroyed by Two Cardinal Errors.", Winnipeg Free Press Pamphlet No. 83, August 1966, p. 5. Also see Michael Sherman, op. cit., p. 9 and Air Vice

During reorganization, Paul Hellyer dominated.

Furthermore, the expression of civilian direction within the framework of the Defence Council added to the difficulties between the Defence Minister and his senior military advisers. The Defence Council is the major policy group or 'cabinet' of the Department of National Defence. The Minister is the Chairman and the Associate Minister is the Vice-Chairman. Other members include the Deputy Minister, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, the Chief and the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff. It is clear the civilian component dominates. During reorganization, Paul Hellyer instituted the practice of giving branch heads associate member status. Also, expert staffs at the working level briefed the Defence Council. Thus, the Minister did not cut himself off from expert advice. The point, however, was that the way in which advice was solicited indicated that the Minister did not rely solely upon his senior advisers. This can be interpreted that there was disagreement, that the Minister felt he could not fully rely upon his senior advisers who disagreed with the unification timetable and that the Minister sought and found support from officers of lesser rank.

Therefore, the Minister's workings of the decision-making framework had a negative affect upon his relations with senior advisers. This was partly due to personality

Marshal R.A. Cameron, "Canadian Armed Forces Merger Runs Into Trouble, Called Mistake", Navy Magazine, May 1970, p. 23.

and a circumstance, both of which exacerbated the situation. The circumstance was the fact that the Chief of Defence Staff was close to retirement. Air Chief Marshal Miller, originally prepared to leave in July 1963, was requested by Paul Hellyer to become CDS. The Air Chief Marshal wished to serve only one more year but was again requested to remain because within the circumstances Paul Hellyer believed him to be the best man available.³³ The Air Chief Marshal did not retire until the summer of 1966. Normally this should have given the CDS additional influence. However, there was no close rapport between the two. Paul Hellyer began to bypass his CDS and the latter did not believe in confrontation. Hence, the most senior officer did not have any overwhelming influence upon events. Other senior officers believed that the Air Chief Marshal was no longer in the Minister's confidence and that the Minister was not keeping him fully informed of events. This was compounded by some at Headquarters who believed that because Miller was close to retirement, not as much weight should be given to his views as otherwise might have been the case.³⁴

The way the Defence Council operated further undermined the CDS's position. Whether this was the result of

³³ Interview with retired senior officer, March 2, 1970 and with Liberal M.P., June 4, 1969.

³⁴ Interview with retired senior officer, March 5, 1970.

the Minister having a frustrated ambition to become CDS, as some officers believed, the setup put the CDS's subordinates in what one officer termed an 'invidious' position:

In meetings of the Defence Staff on many occasions - perhaps most - there is rather sharp differences of view among the officers giving advice to the Chief of Defence Staff. Nevertheless, when the Chief has made a decision that binds all. When we reappear in Defence Council, the lid is lifted off again. An officer who has failed in his advice to the Chief of Defence Staff is invited literally to give his views independently of what the Chief's views are. This puts the Chief in an extremely difficult position and certainly complicates his relations with his senior officers....I do not know what a Minister would think if the Prime Minister had a meeting on a subject and had, along with the Minister, his two other principals, and by-passed the Minister and put all of them on equal status in giving opinions when the final decision was made. It is analogous to that sort of situation. You can judge the embarrassment in which it places a Chief of Defence Staff and his principal officers.³⁵

The Minister's military critics believed that this practice worked against a management framework in which the many problems of integration could be resolved with a low level of recrimination.

Paul Hellyer did not shrink from avoiding the normal channels of chains of command with respect to eliciting information. Senior officers were by-passed in the search of expert advice and an 'invidious' situation was created par-

³⁵Testimony by Air Marshal Clare Annis, who retired from his post of Chief of Technical Services on May 28, 1966, to the S.C.N.D., No. 23, Tuesday, February 21, 1967, p. 1377.

allel to the one with respect to the Defence Council. For instance, Paul Hellyer, either within the Defence Council or in private conversations, solicited the views of officers subordinate to the Chiefs of the functional branches. This was an indication of the Minister's estrangement from senior advisers and of his search for support in less senior officers.

Though Paul Hellyer said he did not consult with junior officers either in front of their seniors or without their seniors' knowledge, he was of the following opinion:

I get information from any source that I can, as long as, in doing so, I am not breaking any particular rules of the game.³⁶

The Minister considered that as part of the 'rules of the game' he had the responsibility to seek expert advice which at times involved briefings by junior officers to the Defence Council. Paul Hellyer felt that the critics who argued against this practice and yet were against the "Supremo" concept were contradicting themselves.

I do not think you can take the point of view that with the single service you have a single chief and, therefore, must rely on one man's advice...and at the same time complain about the normal processes by which corporate decisions are made in our modern world, of having a council and having appear before that council briefers and witnesses who make their knowledge and their expertise available to all mem-

³⁶S.C.N.D., No. 25, Thursday, February 23, 1967, Friday, February 24, 1967, p. 1635.

bers of council, so that you can then have discussion and come to an intelligent conclusion.³⁷

The divergent views caused a clash and created personnel problems.

The activities of the Minister's office compounded the personnel problems. One officer stated:

All during this period, Hellyer had 'whiz kids' attached to his own office and others in staff headquarters who were sold on Hellyer's plan. This caused unfortunate incidents, for example, the CDS tried to put things in perspective; then one of Hellyer's assistants would infer that such and such a statement made by General so and so was not in conformity with the Minister's policy.³⁸

The result was that senior officers who thought they were acting in good faith had their credibility shaken because of statements implying that they were acting contrary to the Minister's policy. Also, statements were made to the press that changes were being welcomed except by officers who were 'over the hill'. Lieutenant-General Moncel had testified that Paul Hellyer lacked respect for those who

³⁷Ibid., p. 1643. It should be noted that critics like Lieutenant-General Moncel were not against the concept of a Defence Council; rather, as this former Vice-Chief of Defence Staff suggested, besides eliminating the practice of summoning subordinates to be pumped by the Minister in front of their superiors, the Defence Council should be reformed to include environmental experts and to make the Council formally responsible to the Cabinet Defence Committee.

³⁸Interview with retired senior officer, March 5, 1970.

held views contrary to his own.³⁹ Rear-Admiral Landymore related an incident for which Bill Lee was responsible. Lee had apparently made comments which were reported in the Globe and Mail to the effect that naval officers maintained an 'above-deck' mentality with respect to personnel who were 'below-deck'. Rear-Admiral Landymore believed the entire naval officer corps had been unjustly criticized and could have had serious implications respecting morale.⁴⁰

The previous discussion on the way in which decisions were arrived at and carried out could be management problems which could apply to issues other than unification. Their relevance to the generating of military opposition to the Minister's plans were that they were seen as lowering morale. Because of the way the decision-making framework was utilized, senior military advisers believed that the best professional advice they gave was often ignored. Prescribed channels of communication were circumvented. The management problems caused intentional information leakages and, in the latter part of 1965 onwards, helped to explain at least in part the development of cliques favouring and opposing Paul Hellyer's push to unification.

³⁹S.C.N.D., No. 22, Monday, February 20, 1967, pp. 1305-1306.

⁴⁰S.C.N.D., No. 20, Wednesday, February 15, 1967, Thursday, February 16, 1967, p. 1161.

One officer who was at Headquarters was of the following opinion:

You must appreciate that the massive reorganization of the Defence Department in Ottawa bred a new kind of military man. What disturbed me most was the research undertaken by certain senior gentlemen to determine what...Hellyer wanted to hear before they offered any military opinion. Honest military advice was at a premium when I elected to leave the military service in 1967.⁴¹

Lieutenant-General Frank Fleury who was Comptroller-General until he elected to retire voluntarily in July 1966 spoke of instances of disloyalty and of junior officers knowing more than their superiors respecting the Minister's plans:

The whole headquarters reminded me of a giant sieve. I saw evidence of disloyalty, and of near disloyalty, in some people to the point literally that on one, two or three occasions a week, I would sit at my desk and feel like vomiting. I decided that after all these years that this was an atmosphere, that these were conditions under which I could no longer conscientiously serve, and I asked for my retirement.

.....
...loyalties had become divided...factions were starting to grow up in the headquarters. One heard comments around the place such as "Whose

⁴¹Letter from retired officer to author, January 23, 1970. This extreme view was supported by interviews the author had with senior officers who were at Defence Headquarters. One senior officer believed that honest advice was at a premium and that advice was sometimes offered by individuals who thought in terms of personal advancement (Interview, March 5, 1970). He added that the Defence Minister did not want only 'yes-men' but it was the existing situation which created these types of individuals.

side are you on?"⁴²

The Defence Minister later charged that officers who were against him elected to remain in the Armed Forces in order to oppose internally, rather than choosing to retire because of their differences. It might be mentioned in passing that the above-stated information leakages were translated at times into the submitting of information by officers on an individual basis to outside critics.

The dissemination and gathering of information and the way in which the channels of communication were utilized not only was a problem at Headquarters but also was a problem between Headquarters and the Commands such as Maritime Command. Paul Hellyer himself spoke of the misinterpretations of Government policy which were the result:

One of the problems that existed was communications, in getting...the policy of the government, as interpreted and laid down by the minister, communicated to all ranks through normal channels.⁴³

The problem went beyond one of misinterpretation to one of

⁴²S.C.N.D., No. 24, Wednesday, February 22, 1967, Thursday, February 23, 1967, pp. 1491, 1541. Also, in an interview with a now retired senior officer who served at Defence Headquarters at the time, the officer spoke of divided loyalties. He gave the example of two ambitious senior officers who courted Paul Hellyer's favour and became the Minister's spies, though the officer did not state whether they so acted as a result of their own initiative or as a result of the Minister's prodding (Interview, March 4, 1970).

⁴³S.C.N.D., No. 25, Thursday February 23, 1967, Friday, February 24, 1967, p. 1635.

field commanders not being aware of what was occurring at Headquarters with respect to the day-to-day problems as they arose. Faulty communication of orders caused the inadequacies. For example, the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Moncel, stated that he was partly responsible for this. Also, statements emanating from the Minister's office added to the difficulties; namely, statements made by 'defence spokesmen' to the press undercut the communications by officers to field commanders. The offshoot was a series of contradictions arose.

We were then put in the position that you would speak to a commander one day and tell something with the best possible intention and you would be denied in print the next. After a few months of this we became gun-shy. The result was that you did not speak to the commanders; you did not dare tell them anything because you did not know. When Landymore, as somebody told me, said that communications broke down and he thought the Defence Staff had lost their heads, I do not blame him.⁴⁴

The internal problems deepened the problems related to the interpretation and carrying out of the Minister's policy. Rear-Admiral Landymore's reaction was a telling example.

Because of the faulty communications between Headquarters and the Commands which affected the perceptions of

⁴⁴ Lieutenant-General Moncel's testimony to the S.C.N.D., No. 22, Monday, February 20, 1967, p. 1316; also see p. 1340. Lieutenant-General Fleury testified in the same vein (S.C.N.D., No. 24, Wednesday, February 22, 1967, Thursday, February 23, 1967, pp. 1540-1541). A retired officer in an interview of March 4, 1970, with the author opined that Rear-Admiral Landymore's 'rebellion' could be explained in terms of faulty communication.

the commanders respecting the nature of reorganization, Rear-Admiral Landymore was not fully aware of the Minister's policy. This shaped the way in which the rear-admiral expressed his concern. As a result of the Minister's briefing of service personnel in Maritime Command (Pacific) on April 11, 1964, Rear-Admiral Landymore was left with the impression that unification would not be forced upon the services. Yet, seven months later this perception was to be altered. Shortly after he took over from Brock as Maritime Commander (Atlantic), Landymore, who was to become the first commander of the unified Maritime Command in January 1966, attended a Commanders Conference in Ottawa in November 1964. At this conference the Minister informed the commanders that they should resign if they could not support integration/unification. Landymore stated that he could not support the unification policy unless details were provided. Also, the rear-admiral felt unification would prove disastrous for the Navy. As he had firmly presented his views, Landymore did not feel that he had to resign unless requested to do so. Paul Hellyer did not make the request.⁴⁵ Still, the conference seemed to indicate a lack of rapport between the Minister and the field

⁴⁵Rear-Admiral W.M. Landymore, "Address For The Parliamentary Committee On Defence (1966)", Appendix E of the S.C.N.D., No. 20, Wednesday, February 15, 1967, Thursday, February 16, 1967, p. 1157.

commanders.

This lack of rapport was given additional expression at a meeting in Ottawa in June 1965. In his opening remarks to the senior officers present, Paul Hellyer announced that by July 1967 there would be a common walking out dress and a common rank structure.⁴⁶ Alarmed and surprised by this announcement, Rear-Admiral Landymore approached the Chief of Personnel for more details. The latter was unaware of any plan involving dress and rank structure. This was disconcerting to Landymore and probably to several other officers.

The Minister's June 1965 announcement was also disconcerting to the personnel in Landymore's Command. The morale of the officers and men were seriously affected. Because of this Landymore initiated a series of moves which he thought were conducted according to the use of proper channels. In order to report back to Ottawa the affects of the announcement, Landymore had an informal poll conducted in his Command, the results of which the rear-admiral conveyed by letter on June 21, 1965, to the CDS. Interestingly, Landymore received no reply to his letter which stated that the poll revealed little desire for change. In order to halt what he viewed as deterioration in morale amongst his officers, Landymore called to a meeting in July 1965 all officers of his Command of the rank of

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 1157-1158.

commodore, captain and commander. In February 1967, Hellyer had in mind this meeting and the events which followed when he charged Landymore with being disloyal. Of the fifty officers present, all but one agreed with Landymore's position and the one officer who did not agree did so because he thought Landymore was wrong to ask officers to state their personal views under non-private circumstances.⁴⁷

Demoralization should not be allowed to set in as unification had not yet been defined was amongst the points Rear-Admiral Landymore made at the meeting of July 1965. There was no merit in the Navy losing its identity. Landymore expected that Parliament would not amend the National Defence Act as he hoped good sense to prevail. The forty-nine officers then signified their agreement that Landymore would represent them and that he was correct in encouraging them to speak frankly on unification in the service and outside until the law was changed. The officers also agreed with the point that they should not consider a loss of identity as inevitable. Furthermore, they agreed that they would not ask to be retired but that Landymore alone would take this action if their views were ignored. For information of the people not at the meeting, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss morale.

Landymore conducted other meetings within his Com-

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 1158ff.

mand. He held two further meetings in August 1965. By August 17th, Landymore had spoken to 230 officers, the overwhelming majority of whom supported his position. Eventually the rear-admiral had met with 367 officers. Meanwhile, he had notified Headquarters of his activities, for example writing a letter on August 23rd to the Chief of Personnel. However, Landymore neither was admonished nor visited in his Command by the Minister, Associate Minister or by the CDS. In January 1966, after having heard of meetings between Paul Hellyer and the Defence Staff at which unification was mentioned, the rear-admiral sent his own appreciation on unification to the Chief of Personnel. Possibly this was because the Chief of Personnel, Rear-Admiral Dyer, was a naval officer. Though the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Moncel, was advised that the brief had been forwarded, it seemed a bit unusual that the brief was not forwarded directly to him or to the CDS.

Generally, Landymore stressed the specialist aspect and the factor of identity for his service and that unification should be confined to the top, that is, at Defence Headquarters. Landymore also mentioned in his appreciation:

It must be clear that it would be disastrous to pursue the concept of a single force with a single identity as far as the Navy is concerned. Moreover, since a large portion of the Naval force will feel they have been betrayed by their commanders, I doubt that I, or any other of the

present day Admirals will be able to exercise effective leadership if the Navy's identity is altered.⁴⁸

Landymore felt that he was using properly the channels of communications available to him, having conscientiously reported his actions and the morale in his Command. It is important to recognize that during this period Landymore believed that unification was not Government policy and had not been concretely defined and had not been studied by the Defence Staff.

Also noteworthy was the fact that Landymore did not include the Air Force officers of his Command in his above-mentioned meetings. He, however, asserted that as Maritime Command was not officially designated as an integrated command until January 1966, he had only operational control of the Air Force officers in 1965 and only had the right to call meetings of these officers with respect to operations. Hellyer charged that Landymore excluded the Air Force component of his integrated Command from being part of the 'team'. Evidence does suggest that Landymore and his deputy commander, Air Commodore Carpenter, were incompatible. The importance of this was it heightened Hellyer's suspicion of naval opposition and there were indications that the Defence Minister had met with the deputy commanders of Mari-

⁴⁸Rear-Admiral Landymore, "The Navy's Place In Unification February 1966", Appendix G of the S.C.N.D., No. 20, op. cit., pp. 1211-1212.

time Command (Air Commodores Carpenter and Gordon) to discuss problems of that Command.⁴⁹

On June 23, 1966, Landymore presented a classified and an unclassified brief to the Standing Committee. The changes, or in the terminology of Landymore and his supporters, the censoring, of the unclassified brief was to be the cause of much acrimony in the House of Commons. The Minister's office made these changes in the brief without Landymore's consent prior to its presentation to the Standing Committee. Landymore believed the changes were made in order to understress the problems in naval matters to members of the Standing Committee so the Government would less likely be criticized.⁵⁰ The changes to which Landymore most objected were with respect to the ones made to cover up the manpower shortage. The rear-admiral also objected to the changes respecting the ship replacement programmes and replacement of the Argus aircraft and the need for sea blockade during peacekeeping operations such as the Cyprus one. Landymore's dissatisfaction with the changes made to his brief was another step in separating him from the Minister's position.

On June 24, 1966, Rear-Admiral Landymore had a

⁴⁹S.C.N.D., No. 25, op. cit., pp. 1632-1634, No. 26, op. cit., pp. 1719-1721, 1751-1753.

⁵⁰See Landymore's statement, "An Account Of Circumstances Of Altered Testimony For The Standing Committee On National Defence In June 1966", Appendix F of the S.C.N.D., No. 20, op. cit.

private meeting with the Defence Minister, at which Landymore stated that the Minister's views on unification would lead to disaster and would not be accepted by the Navy.⁵¹ The meeting was inconclusive. The next meeting between Landymore and Hellyer was not held until June 12, 1966. At this Ottawa meeting, Landymore refused Hellyer's request to resign because Landymore thought he should not have to resign over what he termed to be a difference of opinion on undefined policy. Also, Landymore would have to accept a pension reduction if he resigned. Hellyer then informed Landymore that he would be retired. Landymore, in what appeared to be a challenge to the Minister's decision or at least to the Minister's policy, through the offices of David Groos (Liberal - Victoria) saw Pearson on July 13th. However, the Prime Minister did not take any specific action as a result of the meeting, though the meeting might have proved a factor in the future wavering of Pearson's support for Hellyer.⁵² Only after he found out on July 14th that his retirement had been announced to the press did Rear-Admiral Landymore give a press interview during which he stated he had been fired, that he was opposed to the eradication of the Navy as a distinct entity and that there had been no collusion be-

⁵¹Landymore, "Address For The Parliamentary Committee On Defence (1966)", op. cit., pp. 1162-1163.

⁵²Ibid., p. 1163.

tween officers who had retired.

The press referred to the retirement of several senior naval officers in July 1966 as indications of a naval revolt. These retirements were the outer signs of inner discontent within the Navy. Lieutenant-General Allard, who became the new CDS, referred to the admirals as having "put navy before country" and the admirals

have never been able to accept integration.
They were only in favour of it as long as
it didn't touch them.⁵³

Besides the firing of Landymore, several senior naval officers asked to be prematurely retired. These were Vice-Admiral Dyer, Chief of Personnel, Rear-Admiral Welland, Deputy Chief of Operations, Rear-Admiral Stirling, Maritime Commander Pacific and Rear-Admiral Burchell, Deputy Chief of Technical Services for Logistics.

Headquarters and some of the Commands were not only hard-hit by naval retirements. Lieutenant-General Moncel, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, and Lieutenant-General Fleury, Comptroller-General, asked to be prematurely retired. All of these retirements occurred in July 1966.

⁵³"Allard, Reyno Speak Out", Halifax Chronicle-Herald, July 16, 1966. In a letter of July 25, 1966, a retired naval officer wrote to another retired officer, "Allard has dammed himself as far as the RCN is concerned. His remark about Landymore putting the navy before his country was not worthy of any soldier." TRIO files. It should be noted that Allard, a proponent of unification, and Landymore were personal friends (see G. Stevens, "Hear views of servicemen before unification: Hellyer", Globe & Mail, July 21, 1966).

There was a further reduction of senior officers as a result of the retirement in May 1966 of Air Marshal Annis, Chief of Technical Services. He had reached compulsory retirement age as had the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Miller, who left his post in July 1966. This did not take into account the number of officers who had left under less spectacular circumstances. For example, between January 1, 1965 and August 30, 1966, 79 officers of the ranks of commodore, brigadier and air commodore and above had left the services (these included the above-mentioned). Of the forty-one who had not normally retired, it might be presumed that at least some had left because of their discontent with governmental policy.⁵⁴ However, the main point was the large number of experienced officers who had left the services and especially those of senior rank who had left because of unification. Besides, the departure of the latter accounted for the Minister's raising of the issue of civilian control, especially with respect to Rear-Admiral Landymore.

The contention by Paul Hellyer that military critics threatened civilian control was one that rankled these critics, as well as those within the Conservative Party and, to a lesser degree, within the New Democratic Party. Also, one of the Liberals believed the very nature of a

⁵⁴See H. of C. Debates, Vol IX, 1966, pp. 8559-8561, 9589-9592.

massive reorganization imposed upon a tradition-bound department was responsible for opposition developing. According to this view, the military establishment was supposedly entrenched and felt itself threatened. Serving personnel were not used to a minister who extensively exercised civilian direction which apparently was not the case before Paul Hellyer became Defence Minister.⁵⁵ Another Liberal stated:

The main purpose of unification was a more efficient military organization. The question of civilian control, though important, was a secondary or side issue. When the senior military officers began to use their power to prevent the implementation of unification however, the issue of civilian control became a matter of first importance in that context.⁵⁶

On July 15, 1966, while in Edmonton, Paul Hellyer was reported to have said:

I am going to insist that government policy is carried out and I'm not going to let anyone, including an admiral, dictate policy to the government....⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Interview with Liberal M.P., June 2, 1969.

⁵⁶ Letter from Liberal M.P. to author, July 14, 1970.

⁵⁷ "Hellyer stakes his job against ousted admiral", Toronto Daily Star, July 16, 1966. Landymore's reaction to Hellyer's statement was 'tommy-rot' because Landymore was of the opinion "No one I know wants control of government policies in any way, shape or form. We all wish to carry out government policies....the whole purpose of my speaking out is to indicate that the policy of unification is demoralizing the armed forces." ("Power Grab 'Tommy-Rot'", Victoria Colonist, July 17, 1966).

The Minister also said that Government policy was made clear at several commanders' conferences and that his officers were given the option of retiring if they could not support the policy but instead

they chose to remain and take part in a campaign of tacit resistance. This is reprehensible conduct and I will not tolerate it.⁵⁸

This charge of tacit resistance obviously was denied by senior officers.

The Defence Minister's opponents claimed he was exploiting the civilian control issue for his own political benefit and that this was the great non-issue of the debate.

One person wrote:

Anyone who has been close to the military will realize that there is probably no military group that is less inclined to fight the politicians than is found in Canada. In fact the events of 1966 showed that they were too reticent. A comment has been attributed to Mr. Pearson that if he had had one more officer of the senior status of Landymore react the way Landymore did he would have stopped unification.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Ibid.; also, for example, "Hellyer Lays Job On Line", Edmonton Journal, July 16, 1966; "Won't Let Admirals Run Forces: Hellyer", Woodstock-Ingersoll Sentinel-Review, July 16, 1966; "Hellyer threatens to quit if cabinet support wavers", Niagara Falls Review, July 16, 1966.

⁵⁹Letter from TRIO member to author, June 18, 1970.

Another view was that the issue was greatly exaggerated:

Having witnessed over the years how 'down trodden' were the senior Canadian military in Ottawa compared to their counterparts in Washington and London, I was quite convinced that the whole emphasis on the threatened 'military take-over' was truly a 'red herring'. (sic).⁶⁰

The critics and the Minister had different views on the matter of civilian control. There was no opposition on the part of military personnel with respect to the need for civilian control. In fact, the Minister's opponents who also were against the concept of a single Chief of Defence Staff pointed out the dangers to civilian control inherent in the CDS position. Another example might be Landymore's mentioning the dangers of Mobile Command to Canadian democracy.⁶¹ However, the critics interpreted

⁶⁰Letter from retired officer who had served at Defence Headquarters until 1967 to author, June 29, 1970. Interestingly, in the same letter, this officer suggested that if the military could be described as having increased their influence, this was due in part to the incompetence of the civilian side of the Defence Department; at least in the initial stages of integration:

"...the Defence Department in Ottawa in 1964 was loaded in the civil side with people who personified the 'Peter Principle'....Both 'percussive sublimation' and the 'lateral arabesque' were being practiced with vengeance for years within the Offices of the Deputy Minister of National Defence."

For explanations of the 'Peter Principle', 'percussive sublimation' and the 'lateral arabesque' see L.J. Peter and R. Hull, The Peter Principle (U.S.: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 8, 19-22.

⁶¹In his brief to the Standing Committee, Landymore stated:

"Mobile Command...is dangerous to our democracy. If ever a Commander of that Command decided to set himself up to control this country of ours, he has a ready made

civilian control in its extreme sense of the civilian authority having the final say in decisions to be taken but tended to be critical of the Minister's practice of civilian direction.

Any charge of tacit resistance against senior officers seemed to be weakened by the extraordinary premature retirements of several senior officers. One would think that they would have remained within the Department to practice their resistance. On the other hand, the Defence Minister interpreted Landymore's actions as disloyal acts, despite the rear-admiral's reasons for his actions and the way he conveyed them to Headquarters. Although Lieutenant-General Moncel told the Standing Committee that he had wanted to resign prior to July 1966, but was persuaded by the CDS to remain, Moncel also mentioned that one of the reasons he remained was

in the mistaken belief that possibly I could have some influence and attempt to slow it [the objective to proceed to unification] down so that I could begin to compete with it.⁶²

As noted, Lieutenant-General Fleury had spoken of the creation of an organization to achieve it. If a Minister of National Defence and a Commander Mobile Command got together, we could have a dictatorship overnight." S.C.N.D., No. 20, *op. cit.*, p. 1060. The rear-admiral seemed to be raising a straw man in order to discredit the Minister.

⁶²S.C.N.D., No. 22, Monday, February 20, 1967, p. 1341. However, Moncel and several other officers declared there was no tacit resistance.

tion of factions at Headquarters.

Important features of the so-called resistance up to and including the retirements and firing of senior officers in July 1966 were related to the different perceptions of the Defence Minister and of his senior military advisers. Management problems tended to heighten the irritation between the Minister and his senior officers.

What at times was sloppy staffwork made Paul Hellyer suspicious that he was being deliberately opposed, for example, with respect to personnel policy. Senior officers believed that the Minister was increasingly downgrading their legitimate role as advisor and that he believed they were resisting if the officers in their advisory capacity criticized proposals for change. This explained the Minister's seeking of support from less senior officers.

The Defence Minister had less cause to be suspicious as a result of the filling of the vacancies at Headquarters in July 1966 with individuals who, although competent, fully supported his policy. In fact, the Minister had taken the unusual step of having the new Comptroller-General, Vice-Admiral Hennessy, promoted two ranks from commodore. However, the Minister's policy and the effect of the 'Admirals Revolt' strengthened the antagonism between himself and the Navy, which in subsequent stages of the debate accounted for several leaks from serving person-

nel to the outside opposition.⁶³ For the period up to July 1966, criticism was largely confined within the services and not expressed to non-serving personnel except perhaps to friends at social functions who did not take any additional steps. As one person wrote:

Up to [July 1966] there was nothing in the press or in the public realm indicating the terrific resistance and opposition of the senior military staffs to reorganization and the public were being led to believe that everything was going along well. What better evidence of the loyalty of the military officers to their civilian masters could you have than this?⁶⁴

The more obvious features and results were related to the activation of latent interest groups and the creation of new interest groups, besides giving ammunition to the parliamentary critics which assured a long debate and a closer scrutiny of the policy of unification.

As the purpose of this chapter has been to assess the nature of the opposition of the serving officers as distinct from ex-servicemen, the events following July 1966 need only be briefly viewed. Serving personnel played the role of forwarding on their own initiative, or because they

⁶³Immediately before his departure, as reported in the Victoria Times, Rear-Admiral Stirling, in the final review of his Command, suggested that his officers and men indicate their opposition ("Insufficiently Silent Service", Victoria Times, August 1, 1966).

⁶⁴Letter from military critic to author, June 18, 1970. This quotation, however, seems to indicate opposition to civilian direction.

were approached, information to the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary critics. Interestingly, although frowned upon by the Government, both sides seemed to view this role as one within the 'rules' of the political game. The following exchange occurred between Paul Hellyer and the Conservative defence critic, Marcel Lambert, in reference to the Minister seeking the advice of junior officers behind the backs of their superiors:

Mr. Hellyer:...I know some instances where members of the opposition have been in direct communication with junior officers. Would you deny that?

Mr. Lambert: This may be; this may be.

Mr. Hellyer: So, within our society, it is... very difficult to keep people from expressing opinions if they feel them very strongly.⁶⁵

It has already been noted that serving personnel were in contact with the interest groups. This contact also occurred with the political parties. It occurred either by face-to-face meetings or by letter. Douglas Harkness, the former Conservative Defence Minister, said in the House on April 7, 1967:

I have been careful since I ceased to be minister of defence not to ask serving officers to express their views on any matter. However, a number of them feel so strongly on this issue that they have volunteered information, and there are to my personal knowledge a considerable number of serving officers who

⁶⁵S.C.N.D., No. 25, op. cit., p. 1635.

disagree completely with the idea of unification....⁶⁶

Such contacts were not discouraged. Yet the criticism was voiced that the Minister allowed his senior officers to make public statements in support of unification and that these officers were used by the Minister in a political role in order to sell his policy and to enhance his image.

Paul Hellyer seemed to take the attitude that serving officers could speak out on policy questions as long as they were not critical of the policy. Thus, officers such as General Allard and Vice-Admiral Hennessy were attacked by the Conservatives for making public statements on a controversial issue and in the process, according to the Conservatives, imputing improper motives to the Minister's critics.⁶⁷ Within this context, it is important to note that the critics did not voice any objection, for example, when Rear-Admiral Landymore spoke out on July 15, 1966. Landymore was still a serving officer at the time. The following exchange occurred between Landymore and a Liberal member of the Standing Committee:

Mr. Stafford:...You were still a serving officer at the time you spoke to the press, and, thus, you violated the Queen's regulations and orders under section 118 of the National

⁶⁶H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14661.

⁶⁷For example, see ibid., pp. 14414, 14440, 14727, 14988; also see H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, pp. 8053-8056.

Defence Act.

Rear-Admiral Landymore: I am still a serving officer and I spoke to the press yesterday.

Mr. Stafford: Yes; you never quite answer the question, Admiral, but I think that is sufficient.⁶⁸

Several critics believed that because of the dire situation existing within the Defence Department, the state of affairs, if not properly viewed by the civil head, had to be brought to the public's attention.

Mention has been made at the beginning of the chapter to the officers' reluctance to become politically active and of their not forming a well-organized opposition. Although for the first time in several years the phenomenon of the military assuming a high public profile had occurred, this was more a result of the coverage given to the retirements of serving officers and of the subsequent activities of their allies than a result of serving personnel indulging in public acts of dissent. Even behind-the-scenes activities such as leakages to political parties were done on an individual basis, though the individual actions were widespread and perhaps reinforced by personal contact with one another. The officers who retired in the summer of 1966 reached their decision to do so on an indi-

⁶⁸S.C.N.D., No. 20, op. cit., p. 1095. Landymore also was criticized by a senior officer who had been at Defence Headquarters prior to Landymore's dismissal. This officer felt that Landymore went a 'bit beyond the role of an officer' (Interview with retired senior officer, March 3, 1970).

vidual basis. There was no concerted action although the retirements had such an appearance. With only a very few but important exceptions, such as Rear-Admiral Landymore, these officers declined from making any public statements. Later, when the Defence Committee convened, some officers were reluctant to appear as witnesses and most did not take the initiative in asking to appear. Also, several officers refused to participate actively in the affairs of any of the interest groups.

A retired rear-admiral had written:

...the happy relationship and trust that existed between the Government and the Military can never again be the same. It is a sickness of the soul whose symptom is self interest and whose carriers are opportunists.⁶⁹

This was symptomatic of the pessimistic view held by the military critics during the unification controversy. The steps taken by the Defence Minister to improve relationships with his advisers did not stem the criticism made with respect to the Minister's approach to his goal of unification, for example, the criticism respecting his prior ignoring of expert advice and promotions being based on one's enthusiasm for unification. However, ex-servicemen and parliamentary critics in large measure voiced the criticism. Serving personnel, except on an individual basis, had refused to make their criticisms known to these outside critics.

⁶⁹Letter from retired rear-admiral to TRIO member, March 30, 1967. TRIO files.

Even when several prematurely retired, they elected to keep their counsel to themselves. Within the ranks of the senior officers there was neither the inclination nor the skill to get into a political fight with the Minister of National Defence.

CHAPTER 5
THE OPPOSITION
IN THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

The testimony of ex-serving officers contributed to the highly charged atmosphere in which examination of Bill C-243 was undertaken in the Standing Committee on National Defence of the House of Commons. The Standing Committee did not perform its function of scrutinizing the proposed legislation in a manner which facilitated co-operation between the committee members of the different political parties. Lack of co-operation was to be expected because of the controversial nature of Bill C-243. Also, the events which occurred between the Committee's sitting in June 1966 and the Committee's next meeting in February 1967 deepened the cleavage between the proponents and opponents of unification; events such as the alleged tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence and the way in which the debate developed in the Commons assured considerable opposition to the Bill in the Defence Committee. Representatives of the Conservative Party were the main critics.

The emphasis in this chapter is upon the role of the Standing Committee in examining Bill C-243 and upon the events shaping the debate in the Standing Committee. Therefore, it is important to note the unfolding of events as far back as 1963, though the major emphasis will be upon

the period following the summer of 1966. The chronological listing may be summarized as follows. The proceedings of the 1963 Special Committee on Defence occurred between June 18 and December 18, 1963. This Committee was charged with the general examination of defence matters. The White Paper on Defence was tabled in the Commons on March 26, 1964. Shortly after Bill C-90, the first step in the integration/unification process, was given first reading on April 13, 1964; second reading was given on May 12, 1964 and Bill C-90 was referred to the Special Committee on Defence. The Special Committee examined the Bill between May 26 and June 9, 1964. Bill C-90 received third reading on July 7, 1964 and Royal Assent on July 16, 1964.

The Standing Committee on National Defence first met on March 1, 1966 and sat until June 29, 1966. It then reconvened on February 7, 1967 to consider Bill C-243 after the Bill had received second reading on February 2, 1967. The Standing Committee met until March 21, 1967.

The workings of the Standing Committee should be viewed within the following context. That is, it did not sit until the first two stages of reorganization had commenced, namely, the reorganization of Defence Headquarters and the reorganization of the Commands on a functional basis. Also, between March 1 and June 29, 1966, the Standing Committee examined the estimates of the De-

fence Department. As a result, it did not concentrate specifically upon integration and unification. However, during the Standing Committee's proceedings in June 1966, the evidence of one witness, Rear-Admiral Landymore, was allegedly tampered with by the Minister's office before being submitted to the Standing Committee. Subsequently, on July 12, 1966, the Defence Minister fired the rear-admiral.

This alleged tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence, along with other events of the summer of 1966, influenced the nature of the debate in the Commons in the following fall and winter. The unsuccessful Conservative motion in September 1966 to have an emergency debate was followed by the Conservative charge in October 1966 that Paul Hellyer had tampered with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence. This set the tone of the interim supply debate which occurred between October 31 and November 15, 1966. During this debate, the Conservatives unsuccessfully attempted to have the Standing Committee reconvened. Also, during interim supply, Bill C-243 received first reading on November 4, 1966. The Standing Committee did not convene until February 7, 1967, after Bill C-243 received second reading. Because of the nature of events and the way in which the debate developed, the proceedings of the Standing Committee were contentious.

In contrast to the highly partisan discussion of the Standing Committee, the 1963 and 1964 Special Commit-

tees on Defence were relatively impartial with respect to the broad policy areas they examined. However, for purposes of this chapter it is more important to note the role of the Special Committees in the integration/unification debate. Within this context, it is worthwhile to mention briefly some of the points raised in Chapters 1 and 4. As noted in Chapter 4, the Minister of National Defence undertook various measures during the summer, fall and winter of 1963 with respect to initiating studies on re-organization. The Defence Minister concluded that a single unified force would be a desirable goal. This goal was briefly stated in the 1964 White Paper, which in turn pointed towards the Minister's first step in this process; Bill C-90. With Bill C-90, Paul Hellyer intended to re-organize Defence Headquarters on a functional basis and have the Chiefs of Staff Committee and its Chairman replaced by a Chief of Defence Staff. After a fairly quick second reading debate which occurred on May 8, 11 and 12, 1964, Bill C-90 was referred to the Special Committee on Defence.

It is relevant to note the role of the 1963 Special Committee before considering the study of Bill C-90 by the 1964 Special Committee. In asking what role the 1963 Special Committee played in articulating the integration/unification issue, it may be noted that the Special Committee was not in a strong position to forward its views on this subject. The appointment of the 1963

Special Committee, which resulted from a 1963 Liberal campaign promise, was never meant to undercut the Government's role of legislative initiative and control. Prime Minister Pearson, when moving the appointment of the Special Committee in May 1963, stated:

It is the purpose in setting up committees of this house to assist the government of the day in discharging its activities; to convey information to the government and to give the government advice; to make recommendations to the government if thought fit. But in the last analysis, under our parliamentary system of responsible government the government remains responsible for any decisions taken.¹

The Defence Minister maintained a similar attitude, one which was extended to not taking committee members fully into his confidence with respect to reorganization. At best, Paul Hellyer only made vague references to integra-

¹H. of C. Debates, Vol. I, 1963, p. 455. In response to a question of a New Democrat committee member, Harold Winch, respecting whether the Special Committee would be just a 'questioning committee' presented with Government faits accomplis, the Defence Minister, Paul Hellyer, responded:

"...in this country we operate under the system of responsible government. Under this system it is the responsibility of the minister of each department to make recommendations to the government which, if they are adopted, become the policy of the government for presentation to parliament...."

"In respect of the particular projects that you are referring to, some of them will have to be taken before the committee concludes its deliberations, unless it concludes them more quickly than I would suspect." Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 5, Thursday, July 11, 1963, p. 157. Hereafter referred to as Sp. C.D.

tion.² As a result, the issue was largely ignored and the appropriate questions were not asked.

However, the deliberations of the 1963 Special Committee must be viewed from the perspective that at the time of its sittings - June 18 to December 18, 1963 - Paul Hellyer was still having departmental study groups examine the reorganization alternatives. Also, the Defence Minister had not yet written his White Paper, the first draft of which was not completed until late December 1963. Still, two witnesses, Lieutenant-General Simonds and General Foulkes, both retired, spoke positively of integration; but their testimony was not related to what the Minister intended to do because he did not reveal his intentions except in the sense of stating that the recommendations of the Glassco Commission were being studied.

Nonetheless, the Chiefs of Staff who appeared as witnesses made fleeting references to integration. Their general comments were not followed up. Committee members questioned more the roles than the organization of the forces and did not adequately relate roles to the organizational framework. Therefore, committee members did not attach any especial importance to the brief critical comments made by the Chiefs of Staff. For instance, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Dunlap, indicated his reservations by stating:

²Sp. C.D., No. 1, Thursday, June 27, 1963, p. 20; No. 19, Tuesday, November 5, 1963, p. 667.

I would hope that our efforts in this direction would be made with very careful study, and without rushing into integration for integration's sake.³

The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Walsh, observed that integration of the services would be difficult and would not be advised as long as the services maintained different tasks.⁴ The Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Rayner, testified that the Navy had not made any detailed studies respecting an integrated role; furthermore, an integrated role would detract from the Navy's antisubmarine capabilities.⁵

These general comments were the extent to which the 1963 Special Committee examined integration/unification. This examination raises the points that integration was not defined in a precise fashion and that the Special Committee did not, and was not encouraged to, complement the efforts being undertaken by the Minister and his study groups. However, even though the Special Committee was given scant information on reorganization and did not itself initiate deep probes, in its Third Report to the Commons, the Committee indicated that further time was required to study matters such as integration, civilian control, the organi-

³Sp. C.D., No. 18, Thursday, October 31, 1963, p. 658.

⁴Sp. C.D., No. 17, October 29, 1963, p. 614.

⁵Sp. C.D., No. 11, Tuesday, October 8, 1963, pp. 318-319.

zation of the chief of staff structure and the centralization of defence matters under the authority of only one minister.⁶ Also, the Report mentioned that the Committee should examine future defence policy and that it be reconstituted as early as possible to consider several important matters. In other words, as far as integration was concerned, the Special Committee felt that it should give more study to this area and especially before the Government formulated a policy in this area.

Such was not to be the case because the Special Committee was not reconvened till May 19, 1964. This was after the White Paper had come out in March 1964 and after Bill C-90 had received second reading on May 12, 1964. The Defence Minister's moving forward in reorganization undercut the role of the Special Committee and angered committee members from the different opposition parties. For example, during the second reading debate on Bill C-90, the Social Credit member for Fraser Valley, Al Patterson, stated:

The main item which is before us today is Bill C-90, which has to do with the unification of command. In...its report the committee made mention of this particular matter....

This shows the committee felt sufficient study had not been given to this particular matter of unification and integration, and it suggested that when the committee was reconstituted it would be able to give its time and attention to

⁶Sp. C.D., No. 22, Tuesday, December 17, 1963, Wednesday, December 18, 1963, pp. 797, 809-810.

a more thorough study and analysis of this particular problem. But now we find the minister moving forward...thus showing neglect and a repudiation of the position of the committee relative to such a study.⁷

A New Democratic member, Harold Winch, complained that the Special Committee should have been reappointed earlier in order to deal with matters such as integration which should have received deeper examination before Bill C-90 was introduced. The Conservative member for Simcoe North, Heber Smith, voiced similar sentiments as did the Conservative ex-Defence Minister, Douglas Harkness, who stated that integration of the Armed Forces was being debated in a vacuum because of the lack of information.⁸

The uncertainty voiced during second reading of Bill C-90 as to the extent the Defence Minister intended to proceed was not eradicated during the 1964 Special Committee's consideration of Bill C-90. This was the case despite the fact that the Minister stated during second reading "that unification of command...is...intended to be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada."⁹ Yet, the Minister did not enlighten committee members as to his final purpose during the Committee's examination of Bill C-90. Of importance, the 1964 Special

⁷H. of C. Debates, Vol. III, 1964, p. 3080.

⁸Ibid., pp. 3125, 3072, 3147.

⁹Ibid., p. 3188.

Committee did not have the opportunity to question serving officers. The Defence Minister, the Associate Minister, Lucien Cardin, the Deputy Minister, Elgin Armstrong and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), Dr. Jack Hodgson, were the government witnesses; all these were civilians who did not speak of future defence changes. Only three retired officers, Brigadier Malone, Air Marshal Curtis, and Major-General Macklin, who were not up-to-date on what was occurring in the Defence Department, appeared. In other words, committee members were not in a position to know what future changes were to take place and to distinguish between integration and unification.

Interestingly, it was a Liberal member, David Groos, who asked the very few and most penetrating questions on what the future changes were to be. The Defence Minister's replies appeared to be evasive. For example, on May 28, 1964, the following was part of the exchange which took place between Paul Hellyer and David Groos:

Mr. Groos: ...I wonder if the Minister is in a position to tell us how far this unification is going to go....

Mr. Hellyer: ...As to what further steps are taken, these will have to be worked out by the defence staff....¹⁰

¹⁰Sp. C.D., No. 2, Thursday, May 28, 1964, p. 39; also Sp. C.D., No. 6, Tuesday, June 9, 1964, p. 217, when David Groos again indicated his concern about the possible extent of unification. When another Liberal, Grant Deachman, asked about joint recruiting and basic training, Paul Hellyer did not welcome this query: "I think you are getting into an area of questioning which we agreed not to

In response to a query from Douglas Harkness, Paul Hellyer stated that the three services would exist as legal entities for a considerable period of time. In passing it is important to note that Paul Hellyer by his responses also seemed to reveal that he had no overall plan for reorganization. It is also important to note in passing that Air Marshal Curtis in his testimony indicated that several serving personnel were concerned.¹¹

On June 10, 1964, the Special Committee reported Bill C-90 back to the Commons without amendment. During the Committee of the Whole stage, Conservative M.P.s voiced concern about the way the Special Committee was utilized. Gordon Churchill stated that the Special Committee did not adequately study Bill C-90. Marcel Lambert said that the Minister had withheld too much information. Of equal importance to the fact that the Conservatives were opposed to Bill C-90, largely because of the 'supremo' concept inherent in the Chief of Defence Staff position, was the concern of the Conservatives over the Minister's indiscriminate use of the terms "integration" and "unification". Also, the Conservatives indicated that they were opposed to the single force concept.¹²

take up because it relates to decisions yet to be taken as a consequence of reorganization." Sp. C.D., No. 3, Tuesday, June 2, 1964, p. 73.

¹¹Sp. C.D., No. 6, Tuesday, June 9, 1964, p. 166.

¹²For example, see H. of C. Debates, Vol. IV, 1964, pp. 4849-4851, 4853-4856, 5077-5081, 5089-5090, 5102-5106.

Unsurprisingly, Bill C-90 in its original form received third reading on July 7, 1964. Neither the proceedings of the Special Committee nor the debate in the Commons adequately prepared M.P.s and specifically the committee members for the stages following Bill C-90. Hence, criticism did not fully emerge during the 1964 debate, though signs were given of the future criticism.

The sittings of the Standing Committee on National Defence between March and June 1966 were as ineffective as the sittings of the Special Committees in uncovering the full extent of the contemplated changes in the Defence Department.¹³ In relation to the investigatory role of the Standing Committee between March and June 1966 several points should be observed. Briefly summarized, these points are as follows. Changes had taken place within the Defence Department before the Standing Committee convened in March 1966, but the difficulties related to the changes were not fully brought to the attention of committee mem-

¹³The Sixth Report of the 1963 Special Committee on Defence and the Fifth Report of the 1964 Special Committee on Defence contained recommendations that a Standing Committee on National Defence be established. It was not until June 1965 that a Standing Committee on National Defence was created, however, and it did not commence its sittings until March 1966. The establishment of a Standing Committee was probably less an acknowledgement of the useful role played by the Special Committees in defence matters than more of a recognition that the pressures on parliamentary time dictated a role for standing committees in expediting the business of the Commons. Hence, as a result of the recommendation of the 1964 Special Committee on Procedure and Organization, 21 standing committees were established in June 1965 for the purpose of examining estimates.

bers. The Standing Committee was charged with examining the estimates of the Department of National Defence; although this examination allowed for a broad discussion of defence matters, there was not a specific concentration on the process that was to lead to unification. Only Government witnesses appeared before the Standing Committee, that is, political heads of the Defence Department, civilian public servants and serving military personnel. These witnesses did not wish to criticize or were not in a position to criticize Government policy. In one specific instance, the testimony of one witness, Rear-Admiral Landymore, was apparently revised before the testimony was presented because his political superiors believed that it was too critical. The total impact was that committee members were less than astute in asking the appropriate questions.

The proceedings of the Special Committees on Defence and the debate on Bill C-90 in the Commons had not revealed to members the full scope of the Defence Minister's policy. Several members were confused as to the Minister's definition of integration and unification and did not think that Paul Hellyer wanted to do away with the separate identities of the three services.¹⁴ With this background, the twenty-four member Standing Committee began to sit after Paul Hellyer had moved forward to what he considered was

¹⁴See Chapter I for a discussion on the definitions of integration and unification.

the second stage of the integration/unification process. This was the establishment of six functional command centres. During the debate on Bill C-90, the Defence Minister had stated:

I think it follows logically that once the high command has been unified and once the armed forces...are organized on a functional basis rather than along traditional service lines the complete integration of the armed services will follow as a natural evolution from this change in organization.¹⁵

In other words, at the time the Standing Committee was examining the estimates, at least for the Minister the stage had been reached where the final steps toward a single unified force were contemplated. Committee members were neither sufficiently knowledgeable nor astute to question this contemplated last stage. It should be remembered that an indecisive federal election occurred in November 1965 in which defence was not raised as an issue. Although various M.P.s voiced concern about the state of morale within the Armed Forces, they did not sufficiently relate such problems to the steps the Minister contemplated beyond integration.¹⁶ By and large, committee members

¹⁵H. of C. Debates, Vol. III, 1964, p. 3188.

¹⁶In February 1966, A New Democrat Member of Parliament, Harold Winch, said in the Commons:

"It is my own personal opinion that the minister in the preparation and delivery of his statement [in which Paul Hellyer said morale problems did not result from integration] must have followed the advice of his political strategists and public relations officers to continue his policy of camouflaging the true state of affairs in

were unaware of the many difficulties within the Defence Department.

This lack of awareness meant that effective investigation did not take place because the correct questions were not asked and, if they were, the questions were not followed up. The response of committee members to briefings from the different commanders of the new functional commands, for example, was generally to ask questions relating to NATO, the pay conditions and the present state of integration; there was scarcely any attempt to relate the existing conditions to any additional changes which might be contemplated or to ferret out information pertaining to the last stage the Minister had in mind. Yet, when questions on unification were raised, it is difficult to explain fully why some committee members did not follow up their questions on unification except to assume that members did not believe that unification was contemplated or that it was not to be implemented for a long time.

It should be noted that Paul Hellyer, in his testimony before the Committee on May 12, 1966, stated that the last stage had been reached but no final decision had been taken.¹⁷ Committee members at the time did not raise any questions about unification. This was also the case when the Comptroller-General, Lieutenant-General Fleury, testi-

the Department of National Defence with a cloak of generalities." H. of C. Debates, Vol. II, 1966, pp. 1451-1452.

¹⁷S.C.N.D., No. 2, Thursday, May 12, 1966, p. 21.

fied on June 9, 1966, that unification was still far off, telling a Conservative committee member, Jack Maclean, that unification was the final stage. Maclean did not ask what unification entailed.¹⁸ On June 10, 1966, a New Democrat member, Andrew Brewin, elicited from the Minister that it had not yet been decided to proceed with legislation to bring about unification. Nonetheless, the Minister stated that unification was the objective and agreed with Brewin's comment that a single unified force entailed:

a single walking out uniform and the same rank designation....the differences between the three forces...would eventually be wiped out
19

Andrew Brewin did not continue with this line of questioning and other members did not pursue it.

The most critical witness was Rear-Admiral William Landymore, Commander of Maritime Command. One reason why his remarks of June 23rd before the Committee were not followed up was because the Minister's office altered his unclassified brief - the rear-admiral had also presented a classified brief. On June 22nd, the Minister's office made some alterations, the most important of which were

¹⁸S.C.N.D., No. 7, Thursday, June 9, 1966, pp. 157, 159-160.

¹⁹S.C.N.D., No. 8, Friday, June 10, 1966, p. 185.

with respect to the personnel problems in Maritime Command. The Minister wanted a 'positive' approach to be taken in the brief.²⁰ The result was that alarming information was not fully brought to the attention of committee members. Some Conservatives were aware that something was apparently not right:

As to my knowledge that Landymore's brief had been altered, all that I can indicate is that the Admiral's temperament at the time of delivering his "In Camera" brief to the Standing Committee was such as to make it clear to myself that indeed something had happened. It was not however until several days later that I learned from the Admiral the cause of his deep concern.²¹

In spite of the alterations to his brief, Rear-Admiral Landymore indicated his concern to the Standing Committee. A Liberal member, Jack Matheson, elicited from him the response that the Navy had misgivings over unification. Opposition members were slow to follow up. In reply to a question from the Conservative member, Marcel Lambert, Rear-Admiral Landymore stated that the need to clarify the definition of unification and the need to reassure the Navy about its future identity were causing a great deal of

²⁰S.C.N.D., No. 20, Wednesday, February 15, 1967, Thursday, February 16, 1967, pp. 1162, 1171-1178.

²¹Letter from Conservative Member of Parliament to interested individual, January 22, 1970. The author was given a copy of this letter.

unrest. There were no follow-up questions to these answers.²²

Therefore, when the Standing Committee ended its deliberations on June 29, 1966, committee members were hardly more knowledgeable about the last stage of integration/unification. This lack of knowledge was also related to the fact that the Standing Committee dissolved before the 'admirals' revolt' of July 1966 and the premature retirement of senior officers became public knowledge. Also, the alleged tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence was not revealed until the summer recess. In combination with the Conservatives' concern over the state of morale in the Armed Forces, these circumstances foretold that there would be a strong partisan split once the Standing Committee reconvened.²³

Between the last meeting of the Standing Committee in June 1966 and its reconstitution in February 1967 a great deal of ill feeling was engendered by the twists and turns taken by the debate during this period. This ill feeling caused the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the N.D.P. members, to attempt in the Commons to have the Standing Committee reconvened. These attempts occurred mainly in October, November 1966 and during second reading of

²²S.C.N.D., No. 12, Thursday, June 23, 1966, pp. 334, 350ff.

²³See Chapter 6.

Bill C-243 in January 1967. Related to these endeavours was the Conservative charge in October 1966 that Paul Hellyer had tampered with Rear-Admiral Landymore's brief.

The Conservatives and New Democrats believed that the Defence Minister was moving forward to unification without adequate examination having been made of this last stage. They believed that the Standing Committee should be provided the opportunity to study unification before Bill C-243 was accepted in principle. It was the principle of Bill C-243 which was being contested and if the Bill were given second reading, then the opposition would be faced with a fait accompli.²⁴

The Tory and New Democrat arguments for the reconvening of the Standing Committee can be summarized in the following terms. The full implications of integration/unification were subjects best discussed in the Standing Committee so the Commons could get on with its business. Committee members could clarify and expertly examine the Bill; besides the Government had not presented an urgent case for the intended change. The Standing Committee should study the release of several senior officers and the problem of morale. The example of other countries did not speak well for unification. There had not been sufficient examination of how the roles of the services would be affected. Future defence policy as related to foreign

²⁴ Interview with New Democrat M.P., May 31, 1969.

policy had not been spelt out.

The Government, generally supported by the Créditistes and Socreds, responded that Bill C-243 should be examined in the normal parliamentary manner, namely, the Standing Committee should be convened only after second reading. Also, as the Government argued, ample opportunity had been given to discuss unification in previous sittings of the Special and Standing Committees, the Government's aims having been made clear since the 1964 White Paper. Of not small importance in refusing to accede to the wishes of the Tories and New Democrats was Paul Hellyer's belief that all this was mainly a Tory trick to have Bill C-243 killed in the Standing Committee before the Bill saw the light of day.²⁵ Naturally, these different viewpoints led to conflict.

The conflict was one with respect to both the Defence Minister's approach in implementing unification and to the contents of Bill C-243. The opposition was generally of the view that Paul Hellyer could be held responsible for tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence and thus had abused the Standing Committee. Of importance was the fact that the Conservatives took the initiative in bringing this matter before the Commons. The tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence revealed in addition

²⁵Interview with Liberal M.P., June 4, 1969.

the Defence Minister's attitude to the role of serving officers as committee witnesses. In general, this tampering charge partly explains not only the course the unification debate was to take but also the attitudes to the use of committees in the legislative process. To a lesser extent also, the charge partly explains the effective use the opposition made of the discontented military officers.

Paul Hellyer seemed evasive when he said in the Commons after it had convened in late August 1966 that he would prefer to deal with the question of censorship within the Standing Committee. The Defence Minister's statement was in reply to a question by the New Democrat member, Harold Winch, as to whether officers' briefs were censored before being presented to the Standing Committee.²⁶ The Conservative member, Michael Forrestall, was unsuccessful on September 7th when he tried to move the adjournment of the Commons in order to have an emergency debate on unification. Part of Forrestall's motion dealt with the contention that Paul Hellyer "interfered with the deliberations of the Committee by tampering with the evidence which Admiral Landymore intended to present to the Committee, thus being in contempt of Parliament."²⁷ The debate on this motion resulted in taunts and charges being hurled

²⁶H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, p. 7796.

²⁷Ibid., p. 8125.

across the floor.

Michael Forrestall's motion foreshadowed the well-laid tampering charge made by his party colleague, Terence Nugent. On October 12, 1966, Nugent rose in the Commons on a question of privilege and moved the adjournment of the Commons to discuss a matter of urgent public importance, namely, Paul Hellyer's tampering with a committee witness, Rear-Admiral Landymore. The seriousness of the motion was all the more noticeable because it was unusual for a minister to be charged as such. Gilles Gregoire, a Cr ditiste member, stated that it was the first time in the five years he had been a M.P. that a cabinet member had been formally accused of tampering with evidence of a committee witness. Prime Minister Pearson was concerned because this reflected upon the honesty and honour of a minister and consequently upon the integrity of the Government.²⁸ If upheld, the motion of course would slow down the Defence Minister's drive to unification. However, the Speaker ruled against Nugent's motion, partly because only fifteen minutes remained for a debate.²⁹

The alarm with which the opposition viewed the alleged tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence

²⁸H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, p. 8578.

²⁹For the Speaker's other reasons see H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, pp. 8583-8584.

was aptly summarized in the remarks of the Conservative member, Gerald Baldwin:

...to what extent in the future are we entitled to accept statements made by those who are under the control or influence of ministers of the Crown? To what extent are we entitled to accept the statements which they give in evidence and to what extent, when reports are made, based on evidence given by such people, are we entitled to accept at face value those statements?³⁰

In contrast, Paul Hellyer took the attitude that these 'slandorous insinuations' were made for the purpose of frustrating the business of the Commons. Besides, the Minister did not believe that the changing of a serving officer's or civil servant's evidence constituted improper tampering because a minister was responsible for material presented by his department to Parliament.

With respect to this charge of tampering, it is relevant to note the role played by the Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence, David Groos. As came out during the interim supply debate on November 3, 1966, Groos was aware that Landymore's evidence had been changed, having been informed of this by the rear-admiral on July 12, 1966. Groos attached no particular weight to this remark made during a private conversation lasting several hours. Besides, Groos was of the following opinion:

³⁰H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, p. 8571.

I think that if the minister is to protect witnesses, he must be able to change the evidence which he is requiring those witnesses to giveas a committee chairman I do not think I can be expected to act on all matters brought up in private conversation. I believe that written advice would always be acted upon and brought to the attention of the steering committee. But on this occasion, I regarded what was said as part of a private conversation. It was only one of the subjects which was brought up at the time, and for these reasons and because the committee was not sitting, I did not bring it to the attention of the steering committee.³¹

It should be remembered that the Commons did not recess until July 14, 1966. David Groos's position, therefore, deprived the Commons the knowledge of what had happened with respect to Rear-Admiral Landymore.

Having taken the initiative in bringing to the attention of the House of Commons the charge of tampering with Landymore's evidence, the Conservatives again took the initiative during interim supply to have the Defence Committee reconvened. The Tories played a large part in making the interim supply debate, according to Prime Minister Pearson, the longest ever for one month's supply (October 31-November 15, 1966). The Conservative strategy was re-

³¹H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9521. Rear-Admiral Landymore stated that David Groos and Grant Deachman (Liberal, Vancouver-Quadra) were aware of his early retirement and that of the other admirals involved. Deachman, denying this, was supported in his contention by Admiral Welland from whom Deachman was supposed to have received the information. For a discussion of this, see S.C.N.D., No. 20, pp. 1089-1091, 1163, 1178; No. 21, p. 1264; No. 23, p. 1442.

latively simple: frustrate the Government and have the Defence Committee reconvened:

We are engaged at the moment, on interim supply, in trying to force the Government to call the Defence Committee together, or alternatively set up a Royal Commission to investigate the whole matter, and I hope that we will be able to hold up supply for a sufficient length of time so that the Government will take this action.³²

This approach set the tone and the nature of the debate on interim supply.

As this opposition will be examined further in the next chapter, at this point it is important only to note the bitterness and frustration experienced by the Tories. The prolongation of the debate for the purpose of having the Standing Committee reconvened increased partisan feeling. A Conservative M.P., Robert Coates, noted:

As this debate goes on and on and on it becomes more and more obvious that the government has placed parliament on a collision course. (sic).³³

In their attempt to have the Standing Committee reconvened, the Conservatives were generally supported by the New Democrats. The Cr ditistes, however, accused the Conservatives of "filibustering", while the Socreds generally re-

³²Letter from Conservative M.P. to an opponent of the programme, November 1, 1966. TRIO files.

³³H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9773.

frained from comment.

Though the Conservatives did not succeed during interim supply in having the Defence Committee recalled, a point important to the future workings of the Committee emerged. Briefly noted, this was that the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister committed the Government to the position that it would not resist efforts by the Committee to call outside witnesses.³⁴ One might suspect that this was done in the hope that the opponents would become less adamant in pushing for the reconvening of the Defence Committee before second reading. As was to be the case, outside witnesses were called. This was a departure from the previous meetings of the Defence Committee between March and June 1966, when only the Minister, Departmental officials and serving officers appeared. Such witnesses were not expected to, and could not, be critical of a government's policy. The calling of outside witnesses ensured that a critical examination of the Liberal Government's policy would take place.

Lester Pearson's and Paul Hellyer's assurances of a comprehensive examination of unification within the confines

³⁴Prime Minister Pearson said once the Bill passed second reading, it could "then go to committee where the committee will hear witnesses...and there will be an opportunity for everyone to discuss this matter." H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9826; also see p. 9719 for Paul Hellyer's statement.

of the Defence Committee did not prevent the frustrated Conservatives from appealing yet again during the second reading debate for the recall of the Defence Committee. So, second reading, the purpose of which was to debate and vote upon Bill C-243's principle, occurred in the normal parliamentary fashion before the Committee convened to give further consideration to the Bill's contents. A cursory examination of Parliament's formal proceedings suggests that second reading of a bill indicates approval of a bill's general aim or principle. Furthermore, this examination reveals that second reading is only one stage of a bill's progression. As consideration or reconsideration of a bill can be given during the committee, report and third reading stages, the process is not finalized until the bill has been approved. The realities of parliamentary life, however, show that once a contentious bill has received second reading, the parties' positions have hardened.³⁵ Hence, during second reading of Bill C-243, the Government did not retreat and, with the support of the small parties, moved successfully on February 2, 1967, the second reading of Bill C-243.

The manner in which the debate had developed with

³⁵ During second reading of Bill C-243, the Liberal member, David Groos, stated: "...to be realistic...it can hardly be argued there is much hope now of changing anyone's...view on this matter." H. of C. Debates, Vol. XII, 1967, p. 12467.

respect to the referral of Bill C-243 to the Standing Committee assured a high level of partisanship within the Committee. There was a spillover of partisan feeling from the Commons to the Committee. A Liberal Committee member said that because members were tied down in a fixed position, the Committee might have made better progress if all meetings had been held in camera.³⁶ A Conservative Committee member referred to the Committee as a partisan "House in embryo."³⁷ A New Democrat Committee member stated the partisanship was obvious.³⁸ Committee members from the different parties all experienced a degree of frustration with the workings of the Committee. As stated by Andrew Brewin, a New Democrat, during the Committee of the Whole debate:

Positions were solidified. Every representative on that committee showed a complete inflexibility of view.

It would be less than frank for me to say what I was looking for as the evidence was given to the committee were matters that would justify the stand we have seen fit to take...on second reading. I would say of the government members on the committee that not a single question or intervention they made seemed to have any purpose but wholesale support of the bill....At the same time the official opposition made their views very clear, and instead of having a calm, objective examination of the merits of the bill

³⁶ Interview with Liberal M.P., May 29, 1969.

³⁷ Interview with Conservative M.P., October 21, 1969.

³⁸ Interview with New Democrat M.P., May 21, 1969.

we had a continuation in the defence committee of a political wrangle and a strengthening of political opinions.³⁹

The deliberations of the Standing Committee not only were a continuation of a political struggle but also contributed to the course of the political struggle which occurred in the Commons following the Committee's deliberations.

The Standing Committee on National Defence convened on February 7, 1967 and met till March 21, 1967. Between these two dates the Committee held fifty-five meetings, with the not surprising end result being that Bill C-243 was reported with unsubstantial amendments back to the Commons. No professional staff were attached to the Committee to assist members except a clerk who performed administrative chores such as seeing to the printing of the evidence. The twenty-four member Committee had an average attendance of just over twenty-one members. A quorum of nine members was never lacking. There was a Liberal Chairman, David Groos, who because of ill-health resigned from the Committee on February 24th. Another Liberal, Grant Deachman, became Chairman. Marcel Lambert, a Conservative, was Vice-Chairman.

The Chairman and Vice-Chairman sat by right on the Steering Committee or, more formally, the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure. Empowered to name five members to

³⁹H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14446.

the Steering Committee, the Chairman only chose four. The Steering Committee was almost evenly balanced, being made up of three Liberals consisting of the Chairman and Messrs. Andras and McNulty; two Conservatives, namely, Messrs. Churchill and Lambert; and one New Democrat, Harold Winch.

The Standing Committee could call nongovernment witnesses besides the Minister, Defence Department officials and serving Armed Forces personnel. Additionally, the Committee was empowered to pay for the living and travelling expenses of out-of-town witnesses. M.P.s who were not members were allowed to pose questions.

Fifty-five substitutions were made during the course of the Committee's meetings; eleven were made before the Committee convened. Thirty-six substitutions were made by the Liberals, fourteen by the Conservatives and one each by the New Democrats and Cr ditistes. There was no Social Credit representation on the Committee. Membership of a committee being based on the voting strength of the parties in the Commons of course meant that the Liberals had the largest number of members. There were thirteen Liberals, eight Conservatives, two New Democrats and one Cr ditiste. Four Liberals had service backgrounds, two having been officers. Six Conservatives had service backgrounds, four having been officers. Neither the Cr ditiste nor the New Democrat members had service experience. Of the substitutes made after the Committee convened, three of the Liberal

substitutes had service backgrounds while eight of the Conservatives had service backgrounds. In some instances, substitutes were individuals who were replaced and then had returned to the Committee. Two of the Conservative members, Messrs. Churchill and Harkness, were former defence ministers. Andrew Brewin and Harold Winch, the two major N.D.P. defence critics, were Committee members. Several leading Conservative defence critics were on the Committee, for example, Messrs. Forrestall, Lambert and Nugent.

The membership indicated that the opposition was determined to conduct a close scrutiny of the unification issue. With the top defence critics on the Committee, the Liberals were assured of a closely-contested debate. In light of this, the other statistics take on added meaning. These were the holding of fifty-five meetings within approximately six weeks and the large-scale substitutions on the part of the Liberals. One might well ask whether the holding of so many meetings in such a short period - an average of over nine a week - were attempts to wear out the opposition. If so, the substitutions by the Liberals might be interpreted as their bringing in of new "troops" every so often to oppose more successfully a relentless opposition.

This substitution strategy was related to the Government's timetable which, in turn, was related to the Liberals' desire to quicken the pace of the Committee's deliberations. The Conservatives gave a literal interpre-

tation to Paul Hellyer's and Lester Pearson's previously noted assurances about the Committee making an exhaustive examination.⁴⁰ In their attempt to get as much information as possible, the Conservatives tried to call an unlimited number of witnesses. One suspected this was also done in order to delay the outcome as long as possible. Such endeavours conflicted with the Liberals' wish to follow a timetable which would enable Bill C-243 to be reported back to the Commons before the proposed Easter break in March 1967.

Indeed, the Government's intended timetable was revealed prior to the reconvening of the Committee.⁴¹ Being aware of the time restriction, Government members did not call as many pro unification witnesses as they might otherwise have called. In the latter stages of the Committee's sittings, they attempted to curtail the number of witnesses requested by opposition committee members. In effect, this meant that most of the witnesses were against Bill

⁴⁰During a Committee meeting, the Chairman, Grant Deachman, said: "We are not bound within the Committee by the promises of ministers - if this promise ever was made - and we act upon our own cognizance in bringing witnesses forward." S.C.N.D., No. 28, Thursday, March 2, 1967, p. 1890. Also see Footnote 34.

⁴¹In his speech to the Commons on January 25, 1967, Prime Minister Pearson stated his desire that Bill C-243 and a host of other bills be dealt with by April 3, 1967, at the latest. This was the date of the intended summer adjournment. See H. of C. Debates, Vol. XII, 1967, p. 1221.

C-243. The opposition had a 'good inning' while the Government was embarrassed by the proceedings. For this reason, a Liberal member felt that the Government made an error in not wishing the Committee to spend more time on Bill C-243. He thought that "had there been more time, the Liberals would have been able to produce witnesses in favour of unification and whose arguments would have been devastating."⁴²

It was within this context that the Chairman had to steer the Committee's deliberations. Though his partisanship became noticeable during the examination of the highly contentious Bill C-243, the Chairman tried to play a guiding and conciliatory role rather than an inquisitorial and adversary role. This role could not be extended to a logical extreme because of the Chairman's political affiliations. Nonetheless, for instance, during the second reading debate the Committee Chairman, David Groos, perhaps foreseeing the conciliatory role he would have to play, appealed to the goodwill of all members and refrained from entering the debate. Groos's replacement, Grant Deachman, interpreted the chairman's role in the following terms:

The best that I think any chairman can do in proceeding before a committee is to attempt to proceed on the basis of interpreting what is the intention of the committee, what can be

⁴² Interview with Liberal M.P., May 29, 1969.

done to preserve the good will of members and to move forward the business of the Committee. That is what I have tried to do in chairing this particular committee.⁴³

Deachman and Groos also recognized that an important role for a chairman was to have a bill returned quickly to the Commons.

Sincere as the successive Chairmen might be in wishing to be conciliatory and fair, they could not totally extricate themselves from the Committee's contentious proceedings. They might have attempted to remain fairly aloof from the partisan battle by not engaging in the questioning of witnesses; however, in a sense, the Chairmen operated at two levels. They were fair in ensuring that all members were given the opportunity to ask questions and the time in which to do so was evenly allotted, but on the other hand, the Chairmen could not ignore the Government's expectations. Contrary to the wishes of the opposition, the Chairmen tried to have Bill C-243 quickly examined.

This was seen at the first meeting of the reconvened Standing Committee. Opposition members protested the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee meet three times a day. Tory members contended that such a course of

⁴³S.C.N.D., No. 29, Friday, March 3, 1967, p. 1946. A Conservative spokesman, Gordon Churchill, stated: "A Chairman's duty...is to get the general sense of a committee and effect a compromise between opposing points of view and we are entitled to opposing points of view...." S.C.N.D., No. 28, p. 1895.

action would impose a strain on Committee members, on the Committee Branch and on the time the members would have to devote to their other duties. The Chairman stated:

As for the three meetings, the subcommittee felt that inasmuch as there is a timetable we are trying to meet, if possible, in getting this bill through the Committee by the end of this month [February] or thereabout, we would have to press on as fast as we could, and it was left to the Chairman to see how quickly we would get started.⁴⁴

On February 7th, Gordon Churchill questioned David Groos's authority to call three meetings a day. The Chairman answered that he was not setting any new precedent. On February 9th, Douglas Harkness protested against the 'impossible situation' resulting from meeting three times a day. The Chairman responded that he hoped the meetings could be cut down to two each day. At the conclusion of the questioning of TRIO members on the morning of February 10th, Gordon Churchill objected to the 'dictatorial' running of the Committee respecting the tight scheduling of the afternoon sitting following so quickly upon the close of the morning sitting. On this particular occasion a compromise was struck. The Committee adjourned till 1:30 P.M. Another Conservative, Jack McIntosh, on February 16th complained of having so many meetings close together. On February 20th, Marcel Lambert stated that it was "non-

⁴⁴S.C.N.D., Tuesday, No. 14, February 7, 1967, p. 438.

sense to try to say that you are going to work from Monday afternoon right through Friday afternoon attempting to ram ...witnesses through."⁴⁵

Not counting weekends of course, the Committee sat each day between February 7 and March 3, 1967, with the meetings held after March 3rd closely scheduled. As events turned out, the Committee met twice a day nine times and thrice a day nine times. It was with some reason that opposition members argued that the Government was intentionally attempting to wear down their resistance by having long and wearying meetings. David Groos's resignation as Chairman for health reasons was referred to by one member as possibly "the first serious result of an almost continuous session which this Committee has been holding...."⁴⁶

The Chairman's problems in scheduling meetings exemplified the differences between the parties. As a result, the Chairman encountered difficulties in reaching compromises. An example of this friction was the appeal to the Speaker by Gordon Churchill on March 3, 1967. Churchill's appeal was on a question of privilege respecting

⁴⁵S.C.N.D., No. 22, Monday, February 20, 1967, p. 1299.

⁴⁶S.C.N.D., No. 26, Monday, February 27, 1967, Tuesday, February 28, 1967, p. 1655. It was not without some realism that when Marcel Lambert was nominated by one of his Tory comrades as Chairman after Groos's resignation, Lambert wished his name to be withdrawn. "...under the circumstances, it is not the appropriate time for that ecumenical spirit to apply and that it would not in any event. There is no point in delaying our proceedings by an exercise in futility." S.C.N.D., Monday, February 26, 1967, Tuesday,

the 'autocratic' conduct of the Committee's Chairman.

This pertained to Grant Deachman's scheduling of a Committee meeting without any notice being given or any motion being put before the Committee or any opportunity to discuss the decision within the Committee.⁴⁷ The Conservatives were unsuccessful in their appeal because the Speaker ruled that committee grievances should be settled in the committee. These actions had the effect of making the Committee's progress all the more difficult.

Also, because he was a member of the Steering Committee, the Chairman could not avoid being part of the partisan struggle. The Steering Committee was a forum which plotted the Standing Committee's course, for example, by determining the number of witnesses to be called. A member of the Defence Committee likened some of the meetings of the Steering Committee to a labour-management dispute. At times, the meetings lasted more than an hour without anything being accomplished. The Chairman sometimes solicited members on an individual basis with the

February 27, 1967, p. 1656.

⁴⁷See S.C.N.D., No. 29, Friday, March 3, 1967, p. 1960 and H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIII, 1967, pp. 13697-13704. On April 10, 1967, in the Commons, a Conservative, Donald MacInnis, referred to Deachman as not having led the Committee with honour. H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14717. Though this charge was largely unfounded, it revealed the degree of acrimony between the Liberals and Conservatives.

hope of getting an agenda together. Long meetings sometimes were held on the assumption that members in such circumstances would be more willing to reach a consensus.⁴⁸

It was not surprising that the Steering Committee meetings were long and conflicting since the Conservatives wanted to schedule several witnesses. A Tory Committee member wrote to a member of TRIO:

...I can assure you that both _____ and myself who are members of the Steering Committee on behalf of the opposition have been pressing to have a long list of witnesses both of senior and middle rank appear before the committee. However, we are running into increasing resistance from the government representatives and the N.D.P. representatives and the Steering Committee who keep insisting on an early target date for clause by clause study soon. I anticipate a move to close down the public hearings in order to get the bill back to the House to meet an early prorogation date.⁴⁹

Discussion within the Defence Committee of the Steering Committee's recommendations held up the work of the Defence Committee.

The Steering Committee's eighth report of February 6, 1967 was approved on division. It allowed for eight days to hear witnesses, beginning with the Minister of National Defence. The Conservatives disagreed that the first witness should be the Defence Minister and objected

⁴⁸Interview with Liberal M.P., June 2, 1969.

⁴⁹Letter from Conservative M.P. to member of an ex-serviceman organization, March 2, 1967. TRIO files.

to the time schedule. The Steering Committee's ninth report of February 17, 1967, besides recommending that various individuals be invited as witnesses, noted a general agreement that clause-by-clause examination of Bill C-243 commence on February 27th. However, a Steering Committee member, Harold Winch, stated this was an impossible goal. Another member, Marcel Lambert, said that it was ridiculous to consider such an aspiration.⁵⁰ In fact clause-by-clause examination did not commence on February 27th and this was partly caused by the impasse resulting from Paul Hellyer's contention that Rear-Admiral Landymore had been disloyal. As a result, the Steering Committee's tenth report of February 27th dealt mainly with getting the matter of Landymore's alleged disloyalty cleared away.

In passing it is worth noting that, within the context of the operation of the Standing Committee, the Minister's allegation of disloyalty on the part of Rear-Admiral Landymore was a disruptive factor. Paul Hellyer's charge before the Committee on February 23rd that "Admiral Landymore was fired for 18 months consistent disloyalty to the policies of the people he was paid to serve" impeded the progress of the Committee and widened the split between

⁵⁰S.C.N.D., No. 22, Monday, February 20, 1967, p. 1297.

the Conservatives and the Liberals.⁵¹ On February 27th and February 28th, the Minister and Rear-Admiral Landymore were invited to appear before the Committee. In spite of the Chairman's plea that

We are a parliamentary committee. We are not a court; we are not a military enquiry....We are attempting to resolve a dispute which arose between a minister...and a public servant,⁵²

the questioning of the witnesses was done in a courtroom-like manner. While it was mainly Conservative members who questioned the Minister, Liberal members attempted to 'trip up' Rear-Admiral Landymore. On February 28th, the Defence Minister unreservedly withdrew his allegation of disloyalty.

The Steering Committee's report of March 2, 1967 again indicated differences on the question of inviting further witnesses. A major point of the report was that clause-by-clause consideration should be begun on March 6, 1967. This caused a heated exchange within the plenary Committee. The report was not adopted. In fact the Standing Committee did not convene again till March 9th because of the death of Governor-General Vanier.

⁵¹S.C.N.D., No. 25, Thursday, February 23, 1967, Friday, February 24, 1967, p. 1623.

⁵²S.C.N.D., No. 26, Monday, February 27, 1967, Tuesday, February 28, 1967, p. 1726.

This meeting of March 9th was spent on wranglings over the calling of further witnesses and winding up the Standing Committee's business. Unsurprisingly, the Steering Committee's twelfth report of March 9th showed that no agreement could be obtained respecting the calling of further witnesses. The motion by the Liberal member, Robert Andras, that the report not be concurred in and that the calling of additional witnesses be finished by March 14th and the Bill be reported to the Commons by March 17th, caused dissension. The extent of the differences was shown when Harold Winch stated he had been 'double-crossed'. Winch had met with Deachman and Andras before the Steering Committee met on March 9th to see if a compromise could be struck on the basis of hearing from General Simonds, Air Vice Marshal Curtis and Air Chief Marshal Miller by the evening of March 14th. If this were accepted, then Winch would agree that clause-by-clause study commence. What irked the N.D.P. member was his belief, though this was disputed by Andras, that Andras had changed his position from the one maintained in the Steering Committee.⁵³ The Conservatives regarded the motion as a form of closure. The Committee was again at an impasse. Andras's motion was withdrawn on March 20th.

The last witness, Air Chief Marshal Miller, appeared on March 20-21, 1967 as a result of a compromise that the

⁵³S.C.N.D., No. 30, Thursday, March 9, 1967, p. 1986ff.

Standing Committee would wind up by the evening of March 21st. The Liberals were compelled to compromise in order to get on with the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-243. The Liberals wanted to wind up the Committee proceedings and, as a result of the partisan consideration of Bill C-243, were unlikely to be swayed by the testimony of witnesses who appeared as a result of a compromise intended to wind up the Committee hearings. The testimony of witnesses such as Air Chief Marshal Miller did not have any effect upon the position of Liberal members of the Committee respecting approval of Bill C-243.

The question of how many should appear as witnesses was related to who should appear and in what manner the witnesses should be questioned. These features further split the Standing Committee. Also, interest groups such as TRIO took a hand in urging the Committee to request the appearance of knowledgeable individuals. Invariably the 'knowledgeable' individuals promoted were distinguished retired officers.

A Liberal, Pierre Langlois, said that it was because of the opposition's request that retired officers opposed to unification appeared before the Committee.⁵⁴ Langlois's inference, presumably, was that these officers were biased and should be regarded as such. One might be surprised if it had been the Liberal members who had taken

⁵⁴H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14676.

the initiative in calling retired officers.

The obvious part of the Conservative strategy was to expose relentlessly, through adverse testimony, the shortcomings of Bill C-243. Generally, the scheme was to have expert critics testify:

We asked for all the evidence from all the witnesses, all the senior officers who were now free to speak and who had been in the armed forces since the inception of the integration program. We wanted to hear them all, so that we could get a consensus of what went on. We were balked at every turn by members on the Liberal side. We asked for many more witnesses than we were able to get. To get any of them was like pulling teeth.⁵⁵

Specifically, the opposition questioned several of the witnesses with the view to exposing the failings of both unification and the process leading to unification. This was part of the Tory strategy to attack the credibility of the Defence Minister, for if Paul Hellyer's credibility were successfully attacked, then it would be easier to denigrate his scheme.⁵⁶ However, there was a genuine concern that the Minister of National Defence had ignored or had not fully weighed the best military advice available.

The opposition's attempts to obtain critical appraisals of unification necessarily meant obtaining the

⁵⁵ Terence Nugent in H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14743.

⁵⁶ Interview with Conservative M.P., May 30, 1969.

views of retired officers as, owing to their position, serving officers could be expected to refrain from making statements critical of government policy. This was quite bluntly stated by General Allard, the Chief of Defence Staff, when he appeared before the Standing Committee.⁵⁷ The opposition might deny that they only wanted military experts to appear who were critical of unification and that the testimony of several witnesses could be forecast because of their activities or the circumstances in which they found themselves prior to the convening of the Standing Committee. Such was the case with TRIO, the N.O.A.C., the Maritime Component Committee, the Navy League and the officers dismissed or retired in the summer of 1966. Nonetheless, as attempted by some Liberals, this did not mean that the testimony should be ill-considered.⁵⁸ Besides, the Standing Committee was a valid forum - one of the very few - where non-governmental persons could voice concerns about governmental legislation and contribute to the legislative process.

⁵⁷Allard said: "...there are called before you officers...like myself who...can speak only within the bounds of...the policies set forth by the Government....I would like to make it clear...that in making my presentation...I do so as the man responsible for carrying out the policy of the Government...." S.C.N.D., No. 27, Tuesday, February 28, 1967, Wednesday, March 1, 1967, p. 1769.

⁵⁸In the Commons, Paul Hellyer quoted from the philosopher, Piet Hein: "Experts have their expert fun/ Excathedra telling one/Just how nothing can be done." H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14536.

The differences over who should appear as witnesses led to antagonisms respecting the way in which witnesses were examined. Each party attempted to elicit information in support of its case, besides trying to enlighten itself on unification. Such questioning, however, increased the tension in the Standing Committee. It was not uncommon for members of each side to attack verbally individuals whom they considered to be a spokesman for the other side. A Conservative member apologized to members of TRIO for the way they were treated by the Liberals. Later on, a presumed spokesman for the Liberals, Mr. Patrick, was attacked by the Conservatives. The verbal thrusts of either side led one witness, Frank Manchee, President of the Toronto branch of the N.O.A.C., to comment:

As a civilian coming up here on my time...I am astounded at some of the questions, the retorts, the information and the discourse that I have been a witness to today by a group of gentlemen who are the defence specialists in this country.⁵⁹

One of the TRIO witnesses later wrote a Liberal committee member that the member was biased against him. Furthermore, the TRIO witness believed that the Liberal member was being directed by the Minister's office.

⁵⁹S.C.N.D., No. 18, Monday, February 13, 1967, p. 862.

The Tories believed that the Minister's office was feeding information to Liberal committee members; the Standing Committee's work was accordingly affected. The partisan practice of secret and special briefings for Government members held several implications. This showed the control the Minister tried to exercise over Liberal members. This was an attempt to give Liberal members an advantage by forwarding current information to them not easily available to opposition members. Also, this was an obvious example of the partisan nature of the Standing Committee's proceedings. Still, Liberal members denied that they were being directed by the Minister's staff and were being given appropriate questions to ask witnesses.⁶⁰

However, one can only note that departmental officials were present at several of the Committee's meetings and were in conversation with Liberal members. For example, on February 16, 1967, Gordon Churchill complained about the Associate Minister being in conversation with Liberal members. On February 21st, the same member stated

⁶⁰ In an interview of June 4, 1969, with a Liberal M.P., the M.P. stated this was common practice. A Conservative, D. MacInnis, said in the Commons that "Liberal members...were...feeding to the different witnesses whatever questions the officials of the department wished fed to them....with the exception of a few members,...the Liberal members were depending on the officials who sat behind them during the committee hearings to feed them questions to which answers were desired." H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14455.

that the Liberals were receiving information from departmental officials. No denial was made. On February 22nd, Marcel Lambert said that the ministerial staff were making notes of the testimony "not only to assist the Minister in his replies but to inspire questioning by government members."⁶¹ During the same day, after being accused by Douglas Harkness, Robert Andras admitted receiving information from the Defence Department. Andras added that any committee member could obtain similar information. On March 21st, a Liberal committee member, Jack Macaluso, vehemently denied MacInnis's charge that Macaluso was given information by the Minister's staff. If nothing else, all of these examples indicated a cleavage between the Liberals and the Conservatives. The New Democrat members refrained from making similar accusations.

These accusations caused the Tories to believe that the Liberals were not flexible in their approach to witnesses critical of unification. It is not the author's purpose to assess the charges and countercharges or the witnesses' arguments. Suffice to say that the adverse testimony of several witnesses accounted for the long and tiring sittings. The nature of the testimony explained the Government's desire to report back to the Commons as quickly as possible. Of all the parties, the Conservatives

⁶¹S.C.N.D., No. 24, Wednesday, February 22, 1967, Thursday, February 23, 1967, p. 1486.

and the Liberals seemed to have been the least flexible. The Cr ditiste position was hard to discern. Perhaps this was so because the Cr ditiste member, Messr. Latulippe, attended only two meetings. On each occasion he distinguished himself by not participating whatsoever in the discussion. Though critical of the Liberal posture, the New Democrats appeared to be more flexible than the Conservatives. The positions of the parties will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. It need only be said at this point that the flexibility of the New Democrats resulted from their being opposed to the Government's approach rather than to the Government's aims. On this, the New Democrat members differed from the Conservatives who were opposed both to the approach and end objective of unification. For example, on February 8th, Harold Winch indicated his anger with the Minister's approach but at the same time agreed with the basic principle of Bill C-243.⁶² In general, the New Democrats hoped that a single unified force would be a mobile one concentrating more upon the peace-keeping role.

Expectedly, the Conservatives voted against the Bill while the Liberals with New Democrat support defeated amendments proposed by the Conservatives. Terence Nugent expressed the Conservative attitude when he said:

⁶²S.C.N.D., No. 15, Tuesday, February 7, 1967, Wednesday, February 8, 1967, p. 539.

...realizing that there is another chance in the House, I will choke back the natural tendency...to start reviewing the evidence...to prove why this bill should not go through and content myself with voting against each clause which has anything to do with unification.⁶³

Both the Conservatives and the New Democrats were resentful of the fact that only one and one-half days were to be spent on a clause-by-clause examination.

Also, both parties were opposed to the Liberal attitude to the contents of the Standing Committee's report. The Conservative and New Democrat members thought that the report should contain recommendations regarding the Bill's acceptance. Both parties also desired that the report contain a summary of the evidence. On March 22, 1967 the Standing Committee met in camera to consider the contents of its report to the Commons. As a result of this in camera session the Fifth Report of March 22nd and the Sixth Report of April 3rd were prepared.⁶⁴ Expectedly, the reports contained no recommendations or summary of evidence. There was no minority report. The reports consisted of the names of the witnesses, the amendments, largely ones of

⁶³S.C.N.D., No. 36, Tuesday, March 21, 1967, p. 2346.

⁶⁴The Sixth Report only listed the amendments to Bill C-243. This was not included in the Fifth Report because time was needed to set forth the amendments. See S.C.N.D., No. 37, Tuesday, March 21, 1967, pp. 2385-2391.

wording and renumbering of clauses, and the number of meetings. Also, the reports stated that the Committee's minutes would be tabled. Only in the nebulous fashion of stating that Bill C-243 was recommended by majority vote did the Fifth Report reveal the differences within the Committee or the attitudes of any party toward Bill C-243. These attitudes were left to be revealed in the following stages of the debate.

The Special Committees on Defence and the Standing Committee on National Defence can be considered as vehicles for the opposition, and it may be briefly noted that the opposition could not manipulate the functions of education, policymaking and surveillance for the purpose of putting a straitjacket on the Government's initiatives. Besides, these committees did not have the professional assistance which could have aided the members in performing their functions. For instance, the proceedings of the 1963 and 1964 Special Committees, although educating members in a general manner, did not prepare the members for such specific aspects of defence as were entailed by unification.

The functioning of the committees respecting the making and amending of legislation should be viewed within the context of the Government control of the Special and Standing Committees. Respecting the role of Government members, David Groos stated that "the Government would not

be grateful were we to embarrass it too much."⁶⁵ Also, the function of policymaking should be seen within the overall picture; that is, the Standing Committee's examination of Bill C-243 came toward the end of the legislative process after the attitudes had been shaped and fixed in the earlier stages of the process. It was very doubtful that the Defence Minister wanted the Standing Committee to offer any substantive refinements. Therefore, opposition members expected great difficulty in substantively amending Bill C-243 within the Standing Committee. Opposition members believed that the Government had stated its position and could not retreat from it.⁶⁶

As a means of exercising surveillance, opposition members could not expect to use the committees for the purpose of receiving critical testimony from 'government' witnesses. Nonetheless, the Standing Committee was successfully utilized to bring out many features related to unification. This was related to the fact that several witnesses had formerly served at Defence Headquarters and were in a position to comment critically upon the state of affairs within the Defence Department and to forward their expert views with respect to the feasibility and timing of unification. The result was bad publicity for the Liberal

⁶⁵Keith Spicer, "Why didn't Canada's defence watchdog bark?", Globe & Mail, August 4, 1966.

⁶⁶Interviews with Conservative and New Democrat M.P.s, May and June, 1969.

Government. Thus, the opposition succeeded in using the Standing Committee as a platform to embarrass the Government. However, because of the way in which the function of surveillance was performed, that is, because of the manner in which information with respect to a contentious bill was ferreted out, a partisan split developed. The partisanship prevented the Conservatives from using the Standing Committee as a means of altering the Government's position. A fine but important distinction must be drawn. Although the opposition's arguments were based upon the testimony of the witnesses, the Government, if it did attach any validity to the arguments, did so primarily because of the testimony of certain witnesses such as Air Chief Marshal Miller and secondarily because of the arguments of the opposition.⁶⁷

Such success as the opposition achieved may be summarized in the following terms. The news media became more sympathetic to the opposition as a result of the adverse testimony of several witnesses. Also, the opposition succeeded in extending the sittings of the Standing Committee and having more witnesses appear than desired by the Liberals. The opposition used the testimony of several witnesses to reinforce their arguments in the subsequent Commons debate. This had the further effect of lengthening the Committee of the Whole stage. Government forces defensively reacted to the opposition arguments. In this

⁶⁷See Chapter 6 on this point.

sense the Standing Committee was successfully used and foretold aspects of the debate in the Commons.

CHAPTER 6
OPPOSITION
IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS

As in the Standing Committee on National Defence, the Progressive Conservative Party was the Liberal Government's major critic in the House of Commons. By being opposed to both the Government's approach to, and aim of, unification, the Conservatives differed from the New Democratic Party, the Social Credit Party and the Ralliement Cr ditiste Party. Besides, the Conservative Party was fulfilling one of its roles as Official Opposition by being anxious to detect the Government's weaknesses. This alarm over the Government's policy of unification in combination with the role of Her Majesty's 'loyal sappers and miners' made Conservatives the stubbornest of critics.¹

Opposition to Bill C-243 in the House of Commons amounts mainly to the opposition of the Progressive Conservative Party. For this reason, this chapter will concentrate more upon the Conservatives than upon the roles of the other parties. Strictly speaking, examination of criticism in the Commons with regard to Bill C-243 would focus only upon the procedural stages through which the

¹W.G. Moncrieff, Party and Government by Party (1871), pp. 58-59. Cited in R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government Of Canada (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 446.

Bill progressed. However, this chapter pays attention to the development of the debate in the Commons prior to the first reading of Bill C-243. It is suggested that the way the debate developed prior to first reading determined the nature of the later stages. Attention is therefore given to the formation of the reaction of the Conservative Party and other opposition parties to the Government position as far back as July 1966.

The chronology of events may be briefly stated. The Commons recessed on July 14, 1966; this was before the full impact of the premature retirements of senior officers was brought to the attention of Members of Parliament. Conservative activists used the summer recess, which lasted till late August 1966, to formulate a strategy. The strategy of probing the Government's position was revealed in the fall of 1966. As indicated in Chapter 5, the Conservatives took the initiative in bringing the alleged tampering with Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence to the attention of the Commons in October 1966. Another instance of the developing criticism shown in October 1966 was the Tory attempt to raise a question of privilege against a journalist, Marcel Pepin, and have Pepin brought before the Committee on Privileges and Elections. The attempt failed.

Procedural manipulation such as that of rising on questions of privilege was a warm up for the interim supply debate which occurred between October 31 and November 15, 1966. It is relevant that an interim supply debate took

place before the second reading debate on Bill C-243 for this provided the Conservatives with an additional opportunity to present their arguments. As shown in Chapter 5, interim supply was mainly utilized for the purpose of arguing for the reconvening of the Standing Committee.

It was within this contentious atmosphere created by a persistent opposition that the Government moved first reading of Bill C-243 on November 4, 1966. Second reading commenced on December 7, 1966 and continued from January 25 to February 2, 1967. Second reading provided the opportunity to focus directly upon the Bill's principle. The Committee of the Whole stage began on April 3, 1967. Mainly because of Tory persistence, this stage was a drawn-out affair in which the arguments raised in the Standing Committee were tediously reiterated. The Liberals felt compelled to limit the debate by moving standing order 15A on April 20, 1967. Bill C-243 was given third reading on April 25 and Royal Assent on May 8, 1967.

This chronological summary shows the stages of the debate. There is an obvious overlap between the features in the stages of the debate mentioned in Chapter 5, leading to the reconvening of the Standing Committee in February 1967, and the features sketched in this chapter. Therefore, several of the aspects already mentioned will not be re-emphasized. Also, rather than describing a chronological unfolding of events, for reasons of greater clarity this chapter's material is organized along the following

lines. That is, the position of the Conservative Party is considered first. This is followed by a discussion of the role of the other opposition parties. In turn, the criticism Paul Hellyer encountered within the Liberal Party is examined along with Paul Hellyer's own position. Particular attention is given to the Defence Minister's speech moving second reading of Bill C-243. The last section pays attention to the extent that Bill C-243 was substantively amended. The conclusion in large measure concentrates upon the role of the Conservative Party.

Several of the functions normally ascribed to the House of Commons attest to the opposition being meant to examine a government's proposals. The very fact that there exists a Loyal Opposition is self-explanatory in this regard. The way in which the examination of a government's position or programme is carried out determines the degree to which an adversary relationship between government and opposition is noticeable. Implicit in the examination is the performance of various functions. In this respect, reference may be made to the educative, legitimization and surveillance functions.

The performance of these functions was characterized by the stubborn determination of the opposition to Bill C-243. For the Conservatives, to scrutinize meant constant time-consuming enquiries of a tight-lipped government. To educate meant the eliciting or receiving of information to be used in argument in the ensuing debate. To deny legi-

timacy meant to oppose to the very last the approval of Bill C-243 by making full use of the tactical advantages offered by the rules and procedures. If the Liberal Government had the initiative in proposing policy, the Tories, by responding to this initiative, made the Government defend its actions. Along with the Government's role of proposing legislation went the obligation to defend it. The Government, by not carrying the attack in the subsequent debate, allowed the initiative to slip to the Conservatives. The Government wished an expeditious passage of Bill C-243; yet it had the task of reconciling this wish and a desire to avoid political embarrassment with the one of giving the appearance of not ignoring Parliament's right to question.² Besides, the Government wanted to deal with other legislation. However, the Conservatives' discontentment with the Government's position assured that the passage of Bill C-243 was a lengthy process.

In fact, the concern of the Tory members was revealed in the measures they took during the summer of 1966 recess, and foretold that an exhaustive scrutiny of Bill C-243 would occur. Of all the opposition parties, the Conserva-

²This point is discussed in general terms by T. Hockin, "The Prime Minister and Political Leadership: An Introduction to Some Restraints and Imperatives", in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, ed. by T. Hockin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971), p. 10.

tives were undoubtedly the ones most active in this period with respect to preparing themselves for the debate on unification in the fall session. Aroused by the firing of Rear-Admiral Landymore and the retirement of several senior officers in July, Conservative members began to educate themselves on what was happening. Besides this, the Tories had to help keep the controversy alive during the summer recess so it would not be 'cold' or pushed to the sidelines before there was a full airing. More important for purposes of this chapter, the Party leaders had to be convinced that this was an issue worth fighting in the Commons. The devising of a strategy to be used in the Commons naturally evolved from this step. There had been no opportunity to discuss the 'admirals' revolt' in the Commons before it recessed on July 14, 1966. Thus, the Conservatives were left with a summer adjournment to plot and brood over their future strategy.

Since there was no chance to discuss events in the Commons before it recessed, the Tory strategists decided to leak their knowledge of the events which they had received from 'friends' in military circles to the general public by way of the press. Gordon Churchill was reported as having demanded the Defence Minister's resignation as a first step to halt the 'rot' in the Armed Forces. Douglas Harkness, another prominent Conservative defence critic, was reported as stating the need to establish a royal commission to investigate the defence situation. As reported in the

Winnipeg Free Press on July 21, 1966, Harkness repeated the necessity of having an independent enquiry to study integration and the state of the Armed Forces' efficiency.³ On the same day, the former Conservative Defence Minister indicated that there would be a full parliamentary debate on unification.

Before a full scale parliamentary debate could be mounted, the leader of the Conservative Party, John Diefenbaker, had to be convinced by Conservative M.P.s of the suitability of such a move. The former Prime Minister was reluctant to do this on the grounds that the Conservative Party could gain no mileage by fighting unification. He thought that if there should be a fight, it should be one done in the style of 'quiet diplomacy' or behind-the-scene efforts rather than in the style of public bar-rages.⁴ Besides, John Diefenbaker felt a reluctance to mount a full scale attack on what he considered to be proposals of a vague nature which could cause the attack to stumble into many pitfalls. One of the Conservative M.P.s anxious to have a debate, found it difficult to overcome his leader's reluctance during the three or four meetings held in the summer of 1966. To add weight to his arguments, the M.P. arranged that several retired military

³V. Mackie, "Predicts More To Quit", Winnipeg Free Press, July 21, 1966.

⁴At least this was the opinion expressed by a Conservative Member of Parliament in an interview conducted March 2, 1970.

leaders, amongst whom was Rear-Admiral Landymore, should confer with the Progressive Conservative Party leader to impress upon him that unification would result in grave consequences. Although Landymore denied that he had allied himself with the Conservative Party, on numerous occasions he answered questions of Messrs. Forrestall and McCleave. In September 1966, the rear-admiral was asked to go to Ottawa by Michael Forrestall and answered questions from such Conservatives as Diefenbaker, Churchill and Lambert.⁵ These persistent advances finally brought results. By late August 1966, John Diefenbaker gave the green light to oppose the Government's plans.

Of course, Diefenbaker had other problems on his mind, namely, the split developing in the Conservative Party. 1966 was the year in which the anti-Diefenbaker faction became quite active. Diefenbaker's absence from caucus meetings dealing with the unification issue suggests that he played a minor role in the formulation of opposition strategy; however, at least on unification the Party was superficially united. The deep concern over unification, intensified by Paul Hellyer's position in the Commons, overrode internal differences. Thus, for nonparallel rea-

⁵Rear-Admiral W. Landymore, "Address For The Parliamentary Committee On Defence (1966", in S.C.N.D., No. 20, Wednesday, February 15, 1967, Thursday, February 16, 1967, p. 1163. Rear-Admiral Landymore also answered questions for Gerald Regan, leader of the Nova Scotia Liberal Party and for Professor Aitchison who was affiliated with the New Democratic Party.

sons, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Official Opposition played a secondary role in a major debate. So it was that the Tory Caucus Committee on Defence, headed by Marcel Lambert, with Michael Forrestall as Secretary, found itself playing a major role in co-ordinating the Tory attack. Other members of the Caucus Committee included Messrs. Churchill, Fulton, Harkness, McLean and Smith.⁶

Of the three opposition parties, the Progressive Conservatives formulated the main attack and indicated the most concern. This was explainable in terms of the Conservatives being the main Opposition party and of their service backgrounds. In contrast to the other parties, 37% of the Conservatives had service backgrounds. As Conservative members scrutinized the Government's position most vigorously, in large measure they set the nature and tone of the debate. The minority Government was fortunate that there was not a co-ordinated opposition attack. None of the parties made or solicited any 'backroom' deals. For the Conservatives this meant that there was less chance for informal agreement. As Gordon Churchill stated:

...I have seen innumerable agreements arrived at, when difficulties were amicably settled in the lobby behind the curtains. These things are not recorded....This is how legislation goes through, unless we run into legislation that is controversial, such as the unification bill.

⁶Interviews with Conservative M.P.s, October 1969, March 1970.

On many of our items...there is an exchange of information, party to party, as to how many people are going to speak and how long they want. This is never publicly pronounced, but when you get a controversial bill you run into trouble....the government should assess the opinion of the house, and should not press on with such a bill....⁷

Since the Government did not seek to bargain, the Conservatives carried on a lengthy debate even if the other opposition parties refrained from seeking the Government's downfall.

What are we to do - just collapse because we know that the smaller parties...are going to vote with the government and that therefore we cannot defeat the bill?....This is not the purpose to be served by an opposition. If we have strong convictions...we must present them.⁸

The Conservatives presented their views in a time-consuming debate. The harder they opposed, the more determined Paul Hellyer became and the more determined he became, the stronger the Conservatives reacted. Thus, they were the main protagonists in a major clash. The rules and procedures of the House of Commons contributed to the nature of the clash.

In contrast to the other parties, members of the Official Opposition attempted to use the procedures to halt

⁷H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 15158.

⁸Gordon Churchill in H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 15159.

the drive to unification. The Tories were at a disadvantage when rising on questions of privilege or points of order but were more successful during the interim supply debate. The Speaker's strict interpretation of the rules contributed to the difficulties the Tories encountered in attempting to manipulate the rules to their tactical advantage. Nevertheless, even though several motions were unsuccessful, they were time-consuming and brought the issue to the public's attention. Michael Forrestall on September 7, 1966, unsuccessfully moved the adjournment of the Commons to discuss a matter of urgent public importance. Namely, the Defence Minister was illegally accelerating the unification of the Armed Forces. Terence Nugent's tampering charge respecting Rear-Admiral Landymore's evidence was ruled against. Yet, it caused much publicity and brought added pressure to bear on the Government. This was seen in the fact that Paul Hellyer felt compelled to table Rear-Admiral Landymore's 'uncensored' brief on October 28, 1966.

On October 24, 1966, the Speaker accepted the validity of Terence Nugent's motion requesting the bringing of a journalist of a scurrilous article, Marcel Pepin, before the Committee on Privileges and Elections. Briefly, Pepin had written that Rear-Admiral Brock from the public galleries had directed Nugent's attack against Hellyer for tampering with Landymore's brief. Pepin also mentioned in his article that the Conservatives were attacking the Chief of

Defence Staff, General Allard, because he was French Canadian, the Conservatives, in concert with the naval officers, wishing to keep the Navy 'British' and 'Protestant'. Not surprisingly the motion was defeated (103-147).⁹ This specific instance of procedural manipulation had the effect of worsening relations between the Conservatives and the other opposition parties. For example, it should be noted that the Cr ditistes believed that Pepin was being attacked because he was French Canadian.¹⁰ This accordingly affected the Cr ditiste position. Nugent's motion was one example of his party's tactics of procedural manipulation which worked counter to whatever slim possibility existed for an overall opposition strategy on unification.

Conservative tactics of enquiry, delay and publicity were utilized in the stages to follow - interim supply, second reading and Committee of the Whole. As events prior to the interim supply debate set its tone, so would the partisan course of the debate affect the stages to follow. The Tories set the pace and the mood of the supply debate, making it one of the longest ever for one month's supply (October 31-November 15, 1966). Their strategy was

⁹For reference to Marcel Pepin, see H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, pp. 8125-8126; Vol. IX, 1966, pp. 8889-8891, 8999-9015.

¹⁰For example, see the statement of the Cr ditiste leader, Real Caouette, who said he was in contact with individuals who believed that Terence Nugent was bringing charges against Marcel Pepin because this journalist was French Canadian. H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9000.

to withhold interim supply until the Government made concessions, for example, with respect to reconvening the Defence Committee before the Bill's principle was approved at second reading.

In setting the debate's tone, the Tories were carrying the momentum of attack. Still, they were addressing themselves to a minister who refused to budge and to a government which shrank from moving him. Nonetheless, the Tories were squeezing and the Government had to respond, while looking for alternatives to meet interim supply. Besides, the news media were supporting the Conservatives in their attempt to have the Standing Committee reconvened.¹¹ The withholding of supply helped to create a crisis atmosphere. It should be noted that Claude Edwards, President of the Public Service Alliance, in a telegramme stated his concern that public servants would suffer if supply were withheld. The public servants could not afford "the luxury of manipulative politics."¹² So the Tories manipulated the procedures to drag out interim

¹¹This appeared to be the case at least at the beginning of the interim supply debate. After Bill C-243 was given first reading, press commentaries suggested that the Standing Committee on National Defence be convened so the Commons could get on with the nation's other business. However, as the debate dragged on, the press began to accuse the Conservatives of holding up the civil servants' paychecks. For example, see H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, pp. 9606, 9810.

¹²H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9810.

supply and in the process embarrassed the Government. The Conservatives gave notice of their stubbornness in later stages of the debate.

The debate on second reading which occurred on December 7, 1966 and from January 25 to February 2, 1967, was another bitter experience. The most noticeable procedural tactic used by the Conservatives was the eleventh hour amendment on February 2nd. The amendment, to have further consideration of Bill C-243 deferred until it was examined by joint meetings of the Defence and External Affairs Committees, was defeated by 88-75. On the same day, immediately after the defeat of the amendment Bill C-243 received second reading. The Tories were the only party opposed to this. Second reading debate only widened the gulf between themselves and the Government. Matters were not helped any when, during the course of the debate, Tory spokesmen accused the Defence Minister of arrogance, of employing 'propaganda' techniques and of deliberately confusing the terms integration and unification.

Expectedly, Conservative members took advantage of procedures to cause a lengthy debate in the committee stage. However, they were unsuccessful with respect to utilizing the rules to their full advantage. This was due both to the Speaker's interpretations and to the support the Government received from other opposition parties. With respect to the Speaker's role, when the debate in the Commons commenced again on April 3rd, the Conservatives raised the

point that the Standing Committee evidence was not available.¹³ For this reason, it was requested that Bill C-243 be deferred. Related to this was the Tory contention that the report of the Committee with the amendments was not official as it had not been printed in Votes and Proceedings. Besides, it would be a laborious process to have the original bill and amended bill lying side by side to show what changes the Committee had made. Also, the evidence was being made available at the last moment, which made it difficult for members to study. The machinery of the Commons seemed not to be well-oiled in this instance; however, the Speaker ruled against the Conservatives' contention on the basis that there was no standing order referring to the convenience of members which needed to be satisfied.

The protracted debate carried out by Conservative members forced a government to utilize rules to cut short the debate. The Tories were wrong in believing this would embarrass the Government for the Government had the support of the other parties. Also, the debate had become so extended that no public outcry was heard. Nonetheless, the Conservatives correctly assessed the reluctance of the Government to impose standing order 15A, the 'guillotine', for the first time. George McIlraith moved this procedure on April 20th. Supported by all except the Tories, the

¹³Ibid., Vol. XIV, 1967, pp. 14423-14428.

motion was approved by 124-162. Having manoeuvred the Government into using this diluted form of closure, Conservative members by their tactics caused the Government to be concerned with its ability to manage the nation's business. Mainly as a result of the Conservative tactics, the Government had a backlog of twenty-one items on its legislative agenda.

The Conservatives might have been more successful in manipulating the procedures for the purpose of halting the passage of Bill C-243 if they had attracted the support of the other opposition parties. This was not the case. Generally, of the minor parties, the New Democrats showed the most interest in defence matters. The Socreds and Cr ditistes largely refrained from scrutinizing the Government's proposals and contented themselves with supporting the legislation in a generally uncritical manner. All three parties disagreed in some ways with the Government's approach but supported the Government's position on unification. Support for the Government also meant criticism of the way in which the Conservatives practiced their opposition.

Part of the explanation for the Conservative failure to obtain the support of the other parties may be in the lack of military backgrounds of opposition M.P.s from other parties. A lack of knowledge and personal interest, in combination with a lack of opportunity, can cause apathy or uncritical acceptance of government statements and pro-

posals. So it seemed to be with the Cr ditistes. Only one of the nine Cr ditiste members had a service background and this might account for their lack of knowledge and lack of interest in defence matters. As in the Defence Committee, no Cr ditiste member participated in the second reading debate. The Cr ditistes supported the Liberals. Support for the Liberals meant that the Cr ditistes opposed both the Conservatives' pronouncements on unification and several of the Conservatives' tactical ploys.

Although not directly related to the unification issue, the Cr ditiste belief that the Conservatives were the upholders of Anglo-Saxon tradition and were anti-French accordingly affected the Cr ditiste position with respect to the Conservative Party. The Cr ditistes in fact tended to regard French Canadian members of the Conservative Party as Quebec 'traitors'.¹⁴ With a French Canadian, General Allard, as Chief of Defence Staff, the Cr ditistes had further reason to support the Government. Conservative attacks upon the political role Conservatives thought Allard was playing did not help to bring about co-operation. Cr ditistes thought such attacks were motivated by the fact

¹⁴H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9009. J. Ricard, a Conservative M.P., in response to Cr ditiste attacks, stated:

"As Quebec Conservatives, we have year after year suffered from prejudices stirred up against all Conservatives...." H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9002.

that the general was a French Canadian.¹⁵

There were also differences between the Cr ditistes and the Conservatives over the Canadian military tradition and Canada's defence roles. The Cr ditistes regarded the concern over the walking-out uniform as inconsequential and could well agree with the 'Canadianization' of the Armed Forces. With respect to defence roles, an isolationist stance was perceivable. Briefly stated, the Cr ditistes emphasized that the primary role should be the direct protection of Canada; this was related to the belief that Canada should withdraw from her alliances.

The Cr ditistes uncritically accepted Government statements, for example, that unification would reduce costs. Unification, it was thought, would improve the administration of the Armed Forces. Additionally, it was thought unification would provide the opportunity to re-define Canada's defence roles. Bill C-243 would "unify the Canadian armed forces so as to promote a better understanding and a greater unity within the Canadian army."¹⁶ Such was the Cr ditiste position.

¹⁵During Committee of the Whole stage, a Cr ditiste member, Gilles Gregoire, stated: "...I want to protest strongly against the earlier outburst of the hon. members for Calgary North and of Winnipeg South Centre (Messrs. Harkness and Churchill) against General Allard. I wonder why those two former ministers of national defence hound the Chief of Staff, if not precisely because he is a French Canadian." H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14498.

¹⁶H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14799; also see pp. 14451, 14797-14798.

The Cr ditiste pronouncements upon unification were not noticeable until the Committee of the Whole stage. Earlier, however, the Cr ditistes had given indications that they would not support the Conservative Party. Real Caouette, the Cr ditiste leader, did not support the already-noted Conservative motion of September 7, 1966. Real Caouette accused the Tories of playing 'partisan politics'.¹⁷

The stance of the Cr ditistes in the early part of the debate foretold their future irritation with the Conservative position. So it was not unexpected that the Cr ditistes did not support them during interim supply with respect to requesting the reconvening of the Standing Committee. The Cr ditistes largely refrained from discussing defence matters at all, except within the context of attacking the Conservative position. Cr ditiste spokesmen sided with the Liberals in maintaining that Bill C-243 should receive second reading before being sent to the Standing Committee. As the interim supply debate dragged on, the Cr ditistes accused the Conservatives of filibustering and of siding with retired officers who were attempting to dictate to Parliament.¹⁸

During the Committee of the Whole stage, the Cr ditistes referred to unjust Tory attacks against General

¹⁷H. of C. Debates, Vol. VIII, 1966, p. 8129ff.

¹⁸H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, pp. 9620, 9652, 9810-9812.

Allard. They also felt that the Conservatives were preventing Parliament from exercising its right to reach a decision. Thinking that the debate had become repetitious and that the Conservatives were holding up the business of the House of Commons, Cr ditiste members stated they would agree with closure to muzzle 'irresponsible' members.¹⁹

A general lack of knowledge of defence matters and a greater interest in domestic matters led the Cr ditistes to a general acceptance of the Liberal position. This was the major importance of the Cr ditiste participation in the debate.

Like the Ralliement Cr ditiste Party, the major role of the Social Credit Party in the unification debate was to agree generally with the Government. The Socreds otherwise played a minor role. They largely refrained from making any speeches and from demanding a clarification of the Government's position. This was not unexpected. The Socreds consisted of five members of whom only the leader, Robert Thompson, had a service background and he did not make any speeches on unification. One member made one speech during second reading and another made a speech during the Committee of the Whole. Although Socred members were not as antagonistic as Cr ditiste members toward the Conservatives, the Socreds did not support the main opposition party.

¹⁹H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 15101-15102.

Before the unification debate, the Social Credit Party in its few policy statements on defence had not clearly articulated whether a three service force or a single force would best suit the defence roles of the Canadian Armed Forces. Nonetheless, the Socreds had long advocated the need for adjustments within the Armed Forces. Suggestions such as those pertaining to a re-designing of the forces to eliminate useless expenditure and to the establishment of mobile forces could not help but be viewed as sympathetic to the policy proposed by Paul Hellyer. Hence, in November 1966 Robert Thompson asserted that unification provided the answer to Canada's defence needs. During the Committee of the Whole stage, a Socred member stated that though he had difficulties in interpreting the differences between integration and unification, he felt a unified force would be more effective than three forces. This would be especially so with respect to Canada's peace-keeping role.

Support for Bill C-243 also meant that the Socreds did not desire to lengthen the debate. Only Al Patterson spoke during interim supply and his remarks were directed to ending the impasse. Implied was Socred agreement with the Government position that Bill C-243 not be sent to the Defence Committee until after second reading. However, Mr. Patterson during second reading reluctantly admitted the feasibility of departing from usual procedure and having the Defence Committee convened. At the same time, he

stated that the Bill was a move in the right direction.

At the very beginning of the committee stage, the Socreds indicated they would support the Government in allocating time to end the debate. Mr. Olson felt that nothing useful was left to be said in a repetitious debate. As the committee stage progressed, Socred spokesmen accused the Conservatives of filibustering. Along with the Government, Mr. Olson argued that it was time to take a decision.²⁰

Next to the Conservative Party, the New Democratic Party undertook the greatest effort in attempting to scrutinize the Government's programme in other than a pro forma manner. Of the twenty-one N.D.P. members, eight had service backgrounds. The party's concern with Canada's defence roles led to criticism of the Government's position; but this did not prevent the New Democrats from voting in favour of Bill C-243. The N.D.P. believed that the Government was putting more emphasis upon the peacekeeping role.²¹ The party thought unification was a step in the right direction because it suggested a unified, mobile force available for peacekeeping. Where the N.D.P. differed with the Government was with respect to the Govern-

²⁰H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 15005ff.

²¹Interviews with New Democrat, Liberal and Conservative M.P.s, May, June 1969.

ment's view that Canada's traditional roles should be maintained.

The N.D.P. also disagreed with the timing of unification. It was felt that the Minister of National Defence was proceeding with unification at an unnecessarily quick pace. Instead, an evaluation was required at each step of the reorganization process. For example, Ed Schreyer stated:

There can be only one overwhelming argument in favour of unification and the passage of this bill now....any argument in favour...would have to be very powerful, such as one suggesting that the government had decided on a foreign policy-defence policy combination to the effect that we should re-evaluate and renegotiate our existing military role and commitments. In that case it could be said that it was urgent to proceed with changing the organic structure of our defence forces.²²

Nonetheless, other spokesmen such as Andrew Brewin thought that reorganization pointed the way to future changes in Canada's defence roles. It was upon this basis that New Democrat support was given.

Support, however, did not mean complete acceptance of the Government's approach. Criticism of the way the Government was proceeding with Bill C-243 caused the N.D.P. to agree with the Conservatives on several points. This agreement was most noticeable during interim supply and second reading. One point both parties agreed upon was

²²H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14682.

the desirability of sending the Bill to the Defence Committee before second reading. During interim supply, the party's attitudes were typified by Andrew Brewin and the party's leader, Tommy Douglas. On October 31, at the commencement of the interim supply debate, Brewin protested against Paul Hellyer's 'continued and obstinate' refusal to allow the Defence Committee to study adequately unification before approval was given to the principle of Bill C-243. It was important to hear the doubts of the military experts before voting intelligently on the Bill's principle. Although Brewin inclined to agree that unification might be an important step, he felt that the Defence Minister's position had not been adequately explained. Tommy Douglas also supported the Conservative argument that the Defence Committee should examine the Bill before second reading.²³

N.D.P. spokesmen maintained similar arguments during the second reading debate. Their discontent with the Government caused them to support the Conservative amendment on February 2, 1967, that is, that further consideration of Bill C-243 should be deferred until it was studied by joint meetings of the Defence and External Affairs Committees. N.D.P. support of the Conservatives, however, did not mean support of the Conservative policy. Although spokesmen from both parties agreed that the Government had not adequately defined the future roles of the forces and although

²³H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, pp. 8354-8357, 9914-9915.

both parties believed that the proposed legislation might cause a shift in foreign policy in the direction of peacekeeping, the Conservatives and New Democrats disagreed whether the supposed change in roles was correct for Canada.

The Conservative Party resented what it considered to be a downplaying of Canada's other defence roles in favour of peacekeeping. Indeed, the largest opposition party argued that unification made sense only if the peacekeeping role were emphasized. Yet the New Democrats favoured what they thought to be a shift away from roles such as the NATO one. What the N.D.P. criticized, as brought out during second reading and the committee stage, was the Government's statement that unification made sense for all of Canada's roles.²⁴ So the New Democrats could agree in general terms with the Conservatives to oppose the Government, but still disagree with the Conservatives.

Because the N.D.P. and Tory positions were only broadly the same, the N.D.P. refrained from supporting several of the tactics employed by the Conservatives to drag out the debate. During the latter stages of interim supply, the N.D.P. showed that it placed higher priority upon social legislation such as old age pensions and medicare than upon consideration of unification. Also, it was felt that the drawn-out debate was damaging the image of Parliament. As a result, Tommy Douglas stated that the

²⁴See, for example, H. of C. Debates, Vol. XII, 1967, p. 12546; also see Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14732ff.

Government's refusal to have Bill C-243 sent to the Defence Committee before second reading did not warrant a continuance of the interim supply debate. The New Democrats did not wish to see Parliament stalemated over unification.²⁵

Therefore, indication was given in the early stages that the New Democrats would not wage a filibuster. Even though support was given to the already-noted Conservative amendment of February 2nd, the N.D.P. immediately after voted with the Government to have the Bill approved in principle. Because the New Democrats thought that unification might put greater emphasis upon peacekeeping, reluctant support was given to the Liberals. The New Democrats decided not to press the matter of sending Bill C-243 to the Defence Committee before second reading. Party members refrained from lengthening the second reading debate and reluctantly voted in favour of the Bill on the understanding that it would be referred in its entirety to the Defence Committee where the Bill could be examined in detail.²⁶

Therefore, the New Democrats were willing to compromise with respect to taking up the time of the Commons, regardless of their dissatisfaction with the Government's answers and approach to the legislation. During the com-

²⁵H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, p. 9915ff.

²⁶H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, pp. 14570-14571.

mittee stage, Andrew Brewin indicated that his party would not be intervening too often when the individual clauses were examined. As the Committee of the Whole debate progressed, the N.D.P., through Stanley Knowles, recognized that a time limit would be set. Knowles suggested that this be done through agreement. The N.D.P. were prepared to vote for the provisional standing order 15A which would limit the debate in Committee of the Whole and during third reading. Believing that Bill C-243 had been adequately discussed, the N.D.P. argued that Parliament must come to a decision.²⁷ In fact, during the April 20th debate on the proposal for time allocation, Tommy Douglas rejected Gordon Churchill's overtures that the substantive clauses be postponed till October 1967. The New Democrat leader felt that nothing would be gained by this Conservative proposal. Enough time had been spent on the Bill to the detriment of the other business of the Commons. It was clear that the N.D.P. desired that the Commons come to a decision and that New Democrat members would vote in favour of Bill C-243.

The Defence Minister not only encountered difficulties with the opposition parties but also experienced some problems within his own party with respect to getting full support for his position on Bill C-243. This could be explained in part by the fact that the Liberals formed a

²⁷H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, pp. 15138, 15170.

minority government. During the 1966 First Session of the Twenty-Seventh Parliament, the seating of the House of Commons consisted of 132 Liberals, 97 Progressive Conservatives, 21 New Democrats, 9 Ralliement Cr ditistes, 5 Social Credit members, and 2 Independents.²⁸ The Conservatives hoped that a minority government, if hardpressed, might be compelled to compromise. The fact that Bill C-243 was controversial heightened the Conservatives' desire to attack the Government.²⁹

Coinciding with the factor of minority government, and to a degree shaped by it, was the factor related to personality. The personality factor, for want of a better term, obviously suggests that a political actor's personal traits affect his actions. This is axiomatic. Personal needs or ambitions, which may not necessarily be synonymous with his party's needs, may cause a politician's perspective to differ from that of his fellow party members. Consequently, intraparty differences may arise both with respect to the party's objectives and to the approach the party should take to reach its goals. The factor of personality explains in part the intraparty opposition to the Defence Minister's policy on unification.

²⁸In January 1967, this was revised to 130 Liberals, 96 Progressive Conservatives, 21 New Democrats, 8 Ralliement Cr ditistes, 5 Social Credit members, 3 Independents and 2 seats vacant.

²⁹This was confirmed by interviews with Conservative and Liberal M.P.s.

Very few of the Liberal members were opposed to unification although some, such as David Groos, might have had initial doubts. On October 20, 1966, David Groos wrote a letter, part of which stated:

Complete unification is of course not practical, nor is it contemplated. The degree of unification the government proposes will very largely influence my own position.³⁰

The minority of Liberal M.P.s who doubted the practicality of unification maintained party unity. Besides, very few Liberal members were disenchanted with Bill C-243. If personal background can be an indication of interest and expertise, then it is worth noting that only 18% of the Liberals had service backgrounds. Lacking the necessary expertise and interest, several Liberals did not question the Defence Minister's wisdom. Also, they were not encouraged to do so within the party's caucus. As suggested by the above quotation, the issue seems not to have been very much discussed in caucus.

The discontent seemed to be in the upper echelons of the party. It was here that the factor of personality in part explained Paul Hellyer's difficulties. The Defence Minister encountered opposition from certain Cabinet members, including the Prime Minister, because of their perceptions regarding their own needs. They were not

³⁰Letter quoted in H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14709. It is unknown to whom David Groos addressed this letter of October 20, 1966.

directly opposed to unification; rather, it was an opposition based upon the desire of certain Cabinet ministers to downplay Paul Hellyer's strong position within the Cabinet and to enhance their own positions. It appeared that certain ministers were looking to the day when Lester Pearson would step down as leader.³¹ The public posture of party unity, however, hid the discontent and conflict in the upper echelons of the Liberal Party.

Lester Pearson's approach to leadership of his party was also relevant to the factor of personality. This in turn was related to the Prime Minister's view of the constraints imposed on him by the House of Commons. It was surprising that someone who did not like political stress should ignore the strong possibility that a loosely-run cabinet, unlike a tightly-run one, might encounter several difficulties with opposition parties. A loosely-run cabinet might suggest a lack of an overall strategy to counter any opposition attacks; also this might suggest that the cabinet was not fully cognizant of a minister's actions which might have critical consequences. The Prime Minister tried not to interfere with a minister's handling of his department; yet the Liberal Party leader voiced a strong dislike for parliamentary rows. It might be presumed that Lester Pearson was disturbed by the lengthy uni-

³¹ Interview with Liberal M.P., June 4, 1970. Also see Chapter 3 where mention is made of the contacts between TRIO and Cabinet members.

fication debate.

The importance to the unification debate of the Prime Minister's attitudes was his willingness to seek a compromise. However, an exploration of compromise possibilities suggested a slackening of the Prime Minister's support for Paul Hellyer. As stated by Judy LaMarsh, this created difficulties for Paul Hellyer within Cabinet:

I know...that on least one occasion, when Pearson's feet chilled suddenly and the Prime Minister had actually made up his mind to drop or revamp integration, in the face of loud Naval opposition, Hellyer convinced Pearson that there could be no compromise or that he would unquestionably resign at once and not quietly. Half of a vigorous minister's time was spent...in holding [the Prime Minister] to the sticking-point when the going in Opposition became heavy....³²

The Defence Minister did not resign because he kept the Prime Minister from retreating. Paul Hellyer recognized that he could not retreat without discredit. As it would be abnormal to withdraw a bill from the legislative process, the Defence Minister could not pull back without weakening his position.

Paul Hellyer remained inflexible in the face of suggested compromises. One such instance occurred when the Prime Minister sought to have his Defence Minister make

³²Judy LaMarsh, Judy LaMarsh: Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage (Canada: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1969), p. 315. Several of the points raised by this quotation were confirmed by interviews.

concessions during the latter stages of the debate. This was in March 1967 at the time of the death of Governor-General Vanier. The Governor-General died on March 5, 1967 and the Commons was adjourned from March 6th to March 9th. An adjournment of course meant an additional delay in the legislative work schedule. Seeing his timetable in the process of collapsing, Lester Pearson attempted to get Paul Hellyer to compromise. The Prime Minister's attempt was made on the way to Governor-General Vanier's funeral. The Defence Minister took a strong stand and threatened to resign. The Prime Minister did not press his point.³³

However, Paul Hellyer was not home free with his Cabinet colleagues and there was to be further pressure against his position. Lester Pearson was to waver again after Air Chief Marshal Miller had testified to the Standing Committee on March 20-21. The Prime Minister found the air marshal's testimony

"very interesting....I wish it could be reported in depth. It was very comprehensive." Asked whether this evidence could lead to changes in the unification plan, he said he could say nothing about that until he had had a chance to discuss all the evidence...with ...Hellyer.

The Prime Minister was particularly impressed by...Miller's suggestion that the timing of unification was all-important and that there

³³ Interview with Liberal M.P., June 4, 1969.

should be no rush to implement the plan....³⁴

Yet, Pearson was compelled to support Hellyer's viewpoint as Hellyer refused to support his. Later on, the Defence Minister successfully opposed attempts by the Prime Minister and Cabinet members such as the Minister of Public Works, George McIlraith, to end the session without Bill C-243 being approved. Because of this, the Government was forced to apply the politically dangerous 'guillotine' to shorten the debate and have Bill C-243 passed.

The Cabinet difficulties which the Defence Minister experienced were related to the fact that the Liberals were slow in recognizing the political repercussions resulting from Paul Hellyer's approach. Their slowness in recognizing such repercussions extended to the period before Bill C-243 received first reading on November 4, 1966. With respect to the Bill, a Liberal M.P. has said:

A government member doesn't get to see a bill until it is brought to the House. [Otherwise] changes might have been made.³⁵

Liberal M.P.s, at least those who were not Cabinet members, were apparently left in the dark prior to the Bill's first reading. It might be presumed that the Liberal caucus

³⁴Anthony Westall, "Unification bill will get high priority after recess", Globe & Mail, March 29, 1969.

³⁵Interview with Liberal M.P., May 29, 1969.

was not given adequate information until the debate became fully developed in the Commons. If this was the case, the caucus did not and could not play a substantial role in plotting political strategy to assure the expeditious passage of the Bill.

Even when the debate was well under way, the Prime Minister seemed to indicate some confusion over certain aspects of unification, for example, the rank structure. It seemed that the Liberal leader was not quite sure to what degree his Defence Minister desired to proceed, despite Hellyer's claims that the issue had been fully aired in Cabinet. Though the Cabinet Defence Committee and the Cabinet might have been informed, the Minister still had discretion to develop his policy without undue Cabinet direction.

...I have spoken to members of the government at the time and my understanding is that when defence matters were being considered the Minister merely said everything would be alright and leave it to him notwithstanding the pressure that was being brought by his colleagues to find out what was going on.³⁶

Also, the military personnel critical of the policy believed the Government was not adequately informed of Paul Hellyer's intentions. When Rear-Admiral Landymore saw the Prime Minister on July 13, 1966, Lester Pearson seemed to be unaware of the extremes to which the Defence Minister

³⁶Letter from TRIO member to author, January 29, 1970. This view is supported by Judy LaMarsh in her

wished to carry unification.

The factor of personality, as it applied to Lester Pearson and his Cabinet, had many implications. Because a minister was given free rein, apparently the Cabinet was not kept adequately informed of developments within the Defence Department. Not fully appreciating the difference between integration and unification, the Government was unprepared for the events which occurred after July 1966. As a result, the Government's defences against strong opposition attacks were weak. It meant that Liberal M.P.s had to put greater reliance upon Paul Hellyer's assertions in order to counter opposition criticisms. In effect, the Defence Minister and his aides were the principal advocates for the Liberals. Ministers and backbenchers refrained to quite an extent from entering the debate in the Commons. However, it should be noted that it was part of the Liberal strategy not to enter the debate so as to give the opposition less 'ammunition' and to save the time of the Commons.

Because Prime Minister Pearson did not exercise strong leadership over unification, Paul Hellyer occupied the central position. This meant that criticism in the Commons focused both upon his programme and himself. The Defence Minister's uncompromising approach, besides influencing the Government to give top priority to Bill

C-243, caused personal attacks upon himself. Whether or not these attacks were justified, they deepened the partisan atmosphere of the Commons. According to the Conservatives and, to a lesser extent, to the New Democrats, the arrogance of the Defence Minister militated against a 'fruitful' compromise. Paul Hellyer felt nothing would be gained by trying to meet all opposition arguments. His silence was interpreted as contempt for the House of Commons. For example, during the interim supply debate in November 1966, the Conservative M.P., Robert Coates, accused the Defence Minister of being silent and arrogant and having a complete disregard for Parliament. During the second reading debate, Harold Winch stated that Paul Hellyer, who was too dogmatic and dictatorial, was unnecessarily antagonistic. The New Democrat member mentioned during the committee stage that because of the Minister's inflexibility, a controversial bill had returned basically unchanged from the Standing Committee:

The minister has failed to accept even a compromise position or even to give a reasonable and factual explanation why he would not accept a compromise. Because of that failure we today, and for days ahead, will again have to repeat all the arguments.³⁷

The debate contained the ingredients of a personality clash which could only create further splits in the

³⁷H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 14571.

Commons.

However, it should be noted that disparagement of individuals was not entirely unexpected. It was part of the Conservative strategy to raise emotional points, regardless of their peripheral relevance to the contents of Bill C-243, in order to 'rattle' the Government. It was hoped this would cause the Government to make a blunder and to have the media and thus the public give more attention to the issue. Part of the Conservative strategy at the beginning of the debate and throughout was to say that the approach to unification was wrong because of the Defence Minister's leadership. This entailed personal attacks upon Paul Hellyer.³⁸

The Defence Minister's major speech of December 7, 1966 moving second reading did not dispel these personal attacks. It appeared that the speech did not dissipate the charges that the Minister was too 'silent'. In actuality, Paul Hellyer was answering the criticism that there had been no updating of the 1964 White Paper and as a consequence, it was unknown what the future shape of the forces would be. To all intents, his speech could be viewed as an updating of the White Paper or as a second 'White Paper'.³⁹ Regardless, the critics argued that the

³⁸ Interview with Conservative M.P., March 2, 1970.

³⁹ Interview with Liberal M.P., June 4, 1969. For Paul Hellyer's speech moving second reading, see H. of C. Debates, Vol. X, 1966, pp. 10816-10841.

major portion of the speech concentrated on past events and on integration rather than clearly spelling out the several areas of unification. Unsurprisingly, the Conservatives were the main critics of the Defence Minister's speech of December 7th.

Paul Hellyer's remarks suggested that the defence roles stated in the 1964 White Paper were still valid in 1966. The critics believed that these roles could not be carried out with a unified defence force or that they would have to be reformulated to fit the unification concept. The Defence Minister thought that the roles would not be affected even though his rationale for initiating changes was based on what he considered the need to deal with poor management techniques and with rising costs which affected the monies available for capital expenditures. The opposition believed that Paul Hellyer did not adequately relate the cost factor to personnel.

Though he stated that integration/unification was one process, it was curious that the Defence Minister argued for unification on psychological grounds:

It is...important that a sense of purpose and a sense of belonging to one single service... be developed....One Force, with one name, a common uniform, and common rank designations will nurture this total family loyalty....

With the establishment of a common identity, sailors, soldiers and airmen, although loyal to their ships, regiments and squadrons, will have an overriding loyalty to the whole force

and its total objectives on behalf of Canada.⁴⁰

To Paul Hellyer this was the first of the four fundamental reasons for the desirability of a single unified force. The other three reasons referred to more rewarding career opportunities, flexibility in the unified force to changing circumstances and swifter decision-making and reaction time to the demands of modern warfare. Although the Defence Minister thought it was logical to proceed from integration to unification in order to curtail personnel and morale problems, the single service was really advanced for psychological reasons, for the 'intangibles'.⁴¹

Because these psychological reasons could easily evoke an emotion response, Paul Hellyer further antagonized his opponents. This point of overall loyalty was constantly criticized in the Commons and in the Defence Committee. The Conservatives raised the question whether an individual was any less loyal to Canada in a tri-service organization. Could a greater loyalty than the one felt by military personnel be created with respect to Canada? It was poor tactics on the part of the Government to base its rationale for unification on this point since it could be attacked easily. It introduced much bitterness to the debate, hav-

⁴⁰Paul Hellyer in H. of C. Debates, Vol. X, 1966, p. 10820.

⁴¹Interview with Liberal M.P., June 4, 1969.

ing a spillover effect on the other arguments put forward by the Government.

Conservative spokesmen also attacked other features of the proposed new entity. Paul Hellyer argued that the demands of modern warfare necessitated the need for a more co-ordinated response. Conservatives denied that modern warfare had changed to the extent of requiring a unified force. The Bill, in essence, would be enabling legislation, the details to be worked out in the course of several months following its approval by Parliament. In the meantime, present personnel would not be required to perform any duties inconsistent with the requirements made of them when they joined their service. So, there would be no special provisions on retirement benefits. Because of this, critics argued that those who elected not to remain within the single service would suffer a pension penalty. The Defence Minister further argued that the combat units would retain their identities; soldiers would not be requested to undertake the duties of sailors or fly airplanes; servicemen would not be required to become a 'jack-of-all-trades'. However, the barriers to personnel movement would be removed. This seemed to be a contradiction to the critics. In fact, some Liberals later argued that it would be sound, if the need arose, to transfer a radar specialist from the land element, that is, the Army, to the sea element, that is, the Navy, or to retrain a fighter pilot to fly planes off the deck of an aircraft

carrier.

Curiously, although Paul Hellyer stated that the units and elements of the three forces would become those of the Canadian Armed Forces, he almost in the same breath said:

Certainly, we will continue to have infantry regiments as well as the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. Others will change as they are amalgamated with similar groups in other services and new grouping will unquestionably be needed and desired for the new force.⁴²

The opposition thought they had cause to believe that unification would affect the structures of the units and elements. Paul Hellyer further pointed out that although there would be a common rank structure, use of former rank titles would be authorized. This seemed to be a partial recognition of the Conservatives' argument of the absurdity of giving army ranks to naval personnel. So a ship's captain would not be a colonel except officially for documentation and pay purposes. The new service dress would be introduced over a period of several years, although occupational clothing would remain the same. Although the Armed Forces would be a single service, the reserves for the time being would remain organized in the same manner as in the past. Also, no present changes

⁴²H. of C. Debates, Vol. X, 1966, p. 10834.

were contemplated for the cadet organizations. Although the Defence Minister denied the Conservatives' charge that the new force would be only good for a peacekeeping role, Paul Hellyer indicated that the force would be better equipped to deal with peacekeeping assignments.

Paul Hellyer maintained the same arguments during Committee of the Whole stage as he had when he made his speech moving second reading. With the perhaps reluctant support of Cabinet and the smaller parties, the Minister of National Defence did not perceive the necessity of making any major revisions to Bill C-243. For all their efforts, Conservative spokesmen could not attain any substantive concessions; else the Bill would have lost its raison d'être. The only noteworthy change, which did not affect the substance of the Bill, was the amendment the Defence Minister felt compelled to move respecting Clause 6. Clause 6, to the Tories the 'conscription' clause, stated that members of the tri-services automatically became members of the new force. On April 24, 1967, Gordon Churchill moved an amendment that there not be any automatic enrollment without reattestation. Impressed by the argument of the main opposition party, Paul Hellyer had the Minister of Transport, Jack Pickersgill, move a counter amendment. Namely, an officer or man immediately prior to the day the act was proclaimed and within two months after that day, except in an emergency, could be released within six months. However, there would be an actuarial adjust-

ment to the pension of any person who withdrew.

Churchill's amendment was defeated (74-25) and Hellyer's approved (66-28).⁴³ This was the extent of the Liberal compromise.

On April 25, 1967, Bill C-243 was given third reading and approved by 127-73. On the same day the Senate gave the Bill first reading; second reading hastily followed on April 26th. As noted by the Conservative Senator O'Leary, nothing the Senate said would change the Bill. Liberal leader, Senator Connolly, brought out the fact that because he was a Cabinet minister he had to maintain Cabinet solidarity; his personal feeling was that unification was necessary.⁴⁴ On April 28th, the Senate approved on division second reading. Immediately after, Bill C-243 received third reading and was passed on division. Royal Assent was given on May 8, 1967 and the Bill was proclaimed in early 1968. In effect, the debate on unification had ended on April 25th. Debate on this defence issue had contributed to making the First Session of the Twenty-Seventh Parliament one of the longest ever. The long and difficult birth of Bill C-243 left Parliament and its combatants bruised.

⁴³H. of C. Debates, Vol. XIV, 1967, p. 15237ff.

⁴⁴Canada, Senate, Debates, Vol. II, 1966-67, pp. 1872, 1895.

In conclusion it is worth noting that the Conservatives in formulating their strategy in the Commons welcomed the assistance of sympathetic serving and ex-serving personnel. Such help at times caused counter-productive results. One specific instance worthy of attention was the role of the retired Rear-Admiral Brock. The discovery by the Liberals of the rear-admiral's role of defence adviser to the Conservative Party proved an embarrassment to the Conservatives.⁴⁵ This was so because the Conservatives had adopted the posture of concern with developments in Canada's defence policy rather than that of speaking on behalf of disgruntled military personnel. Of course, it often seemed to the Conservatives that military personnel were correctly disgruntled because of defence policy developments. There was nothing wrong with an admiral retired since 1964 acting in an advisory capacity. However, Rear-Admiral Brock's position gave the appearance that the

⁴⁵For example, on November 2, 1966, the Liberal M.P., Grant Deachman, made reference to a defence paper the rear-admiral had prepared for the Conservative Party. This was embarrassing to the Conservatives who originally denied this and then had to admit to the paper's existence because the Liberals had copies. The caricature Grant Deachman drew of Rear-Admiral Brock esconcing himself on Parliament Hill, working behind the scenes and from the Commons' public gallery, while Tory M.P.s did battle on the floor of the Commons, did not help the Conservative cause. This episode took some of the sting from the Tory charges that Paul Hellyer's assistant, Bill Lee, was directing the Liberal attack from the galleries. The galleries seemed to be a place for intense political activity. See H. of C. Debates, Vol. IX, 1966, pp. 8889-8891, 9351-9353, 9454-9460, 9520-9521, 9554.

Tories were the voice of the military, serving and retired, who wished to see the Government defeated.

It is again worth noting the communications between the Conservatives and serving officers. Though perhaps selective, the disturbing information passed on to the Tories reinforced the Party's position. At times these leakages took on the appearance of incidents worthy of a pulp spy story. One Conservative member stated that he had met with serving officers in an hotel room where the officers brought various documents. To maintain the fiction that they had not relayed any information, the officers left the papers in one part of the room, talking amongst themselves while the M.P. perused the information. At least one Conservative M.P. did not discuss defence matters with his military contacts over the telephone in his parliamentary office. He believed his phone was tapped by the Government which was trying to determine what serving officers were advancing information.⁴⁶

The Conservatives' communications with serving and ex-serving personnel, useful as such contacts were, did not prevent the passage of Bill C-243. Manipulation of rules and procedures resulted in a long, critical debate. In the process, reorganization of the Armed Forces was extensively examined. The legislative stages through

⁴⁶The contents of this paragraph are based on an interview of March 2, 1970, with a Conservative M.P.

which Bill C-243 had to pass might have been drawn-out but the Bill received approval. Each step of the enquiry into unification ensured that the matter would be strongly contested during subsequent stages. Terence Nugent's charge of alleged tampering with evidence against the Defence Minister in October 1966 forecast that the interim supply debate in November 1966 would be contentious. There was a spillover from this debate into second reading which in turn had an effect upon the stages to follow.

One writer has said:

For a long time 'parliamentary control', realistically conceived, has meant not the threat of overthrowing the Government in the House but the process of informing the electorate; influencing the Government by inquiry, debate, and scrutinizing the administration....⁴⁷

Yet, with respect to parliamentary control, the unification debate raised at least one important 'if'. The Prime Minister and some Cabinet members were willing to compromise. If there had been a more conciliatory Defence Minister, Bill C-243 would not have passed in the form it did. It is interesting to note that while the Conservative position contributed to the Prime Minister's desire to seek a compromise, several of the Conservative tactics separated the Conservative Party from the other opposi-

⁴⁷ B. Crick, "Parliament And The Matters Of Britain" in Essays On Reform, 1967: A Tribute, ed. by B. Crick (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 208.

tion parties which leaned toward supporting the Government. So, having the voting support of the smaller opposition parties, the Defence Minister was assured that his Bill would be approved.

It is important to note that on the unification issue Prime Minister Pearson neither occupied the central position nor wielded the most influence. Paul Hellyer was the main figure. In fact, the Cabinet as a collegial body did not exercise great influence. The Prime Minister's role was practically negligible. Lester Pearson only intervened during interim supply to attempt to end the impasse. He did not participate at all during second reading and only spoke during the Committee of the Whole stage to advocate the necessity of time allocation. In other words, the Prime Minister was not a noticeable proponent of unification during the Commons debate. Of importance, Lester Pearson and some Cabinet colleagues were ineffective in getting Paul Hellyer to compromise. As a result, the Minister of National Defence was the most influential figure on defence matters and the opponents responded to his position.

Because the Conservatives were the major opponents and had exercised to the extreme their right to examine, a great deal of the time of the House of Commons was consumed. Still, all parties shared responsibility and not just the Conservative Party which the Government attempted

to present as filibustering. Deficiencies of parliamentary procedure accented the lack of compromise and contributed to the form of the debate. The unification struggle resulted from the lack of co-operation and lack of planning to obtain the needed co-operation. Leadership should have been expressed before the unfolding of an acrimonious debate which locked the protagonists into uncompromising positions.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Progressive Conservative Party, the dissatisfied serving senior military personnel and the Tri-Service Identities Organization did not succeed in having Bill C-243 killed or in extracting any major compromises from the Liberal Government. In this sense, the major opposition to unification was unsuccessful. Success was obtained in terms of placing stress upon the political process, causing the Liberal Government to falter in its support of the Defence Minister and hindering Paul Hellyer's desire to have a speedy passage of Bill C-243. Regardless of the outcome, the debate was unique because it focused attention upon a defence matter which within the Canadian context had previously received scarcely any public consideration.

Besides the reasons advanced in the previous chapters, this attention may be explained in terms of the sensational features of unification. A defence issue which had previously been given deep attention also had sensational features. This was the 1963 campaign issue concerning Canada's acquirement of nuclear warheads for her Bomarc missiles. Sensational defence issues, considered 'newsworthy', are brought to the public's attention and may cause protracted debates on defence matters. Regardless, the point may be raised that these matters affect and

arouse the interest of only a small segment of the Canadian population. Still, defence debates, besides raising questions and educating the participants, hold wider implications. Such debates bring into focus various aspects of the Canadian political system.

It is apparent that defence issues, like other issues, are often settled on a partisan basis. The difference lies in the rhetoric used. The partisanship observable in the unification debate indicates that the Canadian political system is sufficiently flexible to allow for the articulation of parliamentary and extraparliamentary criticism. However, to state this perhaps obvious feature does not adequately explain the nature of the criticism or the degree to which the criticism may be successful. On a general level, why criticism is voiced may be mentioned in terms of groups of a particular bias, such as ex-servicemen groups and disorganized serving senior officers, becoming politicized because of their reaction to government initiatives. Also, on this level, the degree to which the critics of unification were successful may be stated in terms of their having put the Liberal Government on the defensive as a result of the critics' protracted and stubborn enquiries.

What these predictable generalizations point to are the following. The same general processes which account for the expression of opposition on domestic issues can

explain the formation of criticism on defence issues.¹

Indeed, this is the case because the formulation of defence policy is made within the context of the influences of the internal and external environments. As a result, the domestic scene with its conflicting interests between individuals, political parties and interest groups have an effect upon the policy-making process by which decisions on defence matters are reached. Especially is this the case if the aspect of defence under consideration is structural rather than strategic, that is, for example, having to do with organizational matters. The activities of TRIO were not different in kind from those of an interest group opposed to a domestic issue. The tactics employed by the Conservatives with respect to Bill C-243 have parallels to Tory tactics used in combatting government legislation in domestic areas. Public servants have

¹Defence policy is formulated on the basis of reaction to pressures from the domestic or internal and the foreign or external environments. It is relevant to note Samuel Huntington's observations, namely:

"Military policy cuts clearly across the usual distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy. Domestic policy consists of those activities of a government which affect significantly the allocation of values among groups in society, while foreign policy consists of those activities of a government which affect significantly the allocation of values between it and other governments. The categories are not mutually exclusive....With military policy...it is almost impossible to say which is the primary focus and which the constraint. It is neither primarily foreign nor primarily domestic. Instead it consists of those elements of both foreign and domestic policy which directly affect the armed forces." Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 1-2.

leaked information on many matters.

Yet, it is important to note that the vigour with which the different opposition groups pursued their objectives respecting unification can be accounted in part by the fact that the debate pertained also to the strategic aspects of defence, namely, to the strength and the role of the Armed Forces. The criticism of the opponents was intensified because they viewed reorganization within the context of whether a single unified force could carry out the varied defence roles and tasks, in other words, within the sensitive context of Canada's security and relations with her allies. Therefore, the criticism went beyond questioning only one aspect of the Government's defence programme, that is, reorganization, to a questioning of the possible adverse effect of unification upon Canada's defence policy and defence establishment in general. As a result, there was less room for compromise.

Not only was there a lack of compromise but also the manner in which events developed indicated that a sharp clash would occur. The particular way in which the Defence Minister arrived at decisions caused man-management problems within the Department of National Defence. These problems added to those related to the timing of reorganization and the decision to proceed from integration to unification while the problems of integration had not been resolved. The role of the senior advisers was undermined, the Defence Minister, on occasion, bypassing

the prescribed channels to elicit advice from junior officers sympathetic to the Minister's viewpoint. At the same time, communications between Headquarters and the field commands were faulty. As in the case of Rear-Admiral Landymore, this created problems. This critical situation could not be kept within the Defence Department forever, especially when sensitive areas such as the identity and traditions of the three forces were threatened. With the premature retirement of several senior officers in July 1966, the Defence Department's inner turmoil came to the public's attention. This had a catalytic effect upon the forming of parliamentary and extraparliamentary criticism which was heightened by the critics' perceptions of Paul Hellyer's role. The failure to establish a conciliatory rapport in the early stages of the debate meant that the latter stages would be resolved in a highly contentious manner.

An extensive debate occurred during which the Government defensively reacted to the oppositions' initiatives. Predictably, the individuals recognized as defence experts played the largest role in the debate. For example, the major speakers of the Conservative and New Democrat parties were members of the Standing Committee on National Defence. These included former defence ministers. In fact, adamant parliamentary criticism might not have developed if ex-senior officers, recognized as experts by politicians and ex-servicement groups, did

not speak out. The recognized experts had to make a contribution to the faulty knowledge of the parliamentary critics and interest groups in order to assure a hard assessment of Government policy by these critics.

Unlike material on domestic issues, material on specifics of defence issues may be harder to acquire because of the greater concentration of up to date information within parts of the Canadian political system generally inaccessible to the outsider, that is, within the executive and within the Defence Department. It was not accidental that the criticism on unification became widespread only after Rear-Admiral Landymore's firing and the resignation of several senior officers in July 1966. This tentatively suggests that in comparison with domestic issues, nonmilitary critics of defence policy must put greater reliance upon the opinions of the recognized experts such as senior officers. It is the reaction to the stimuli of the views of recognized experts which may assure a controversy over defence policy.

The reaction of the Conservative Party and of TRIO to the views of the military dissidents brings attention to the communication between the different opposition groups and their interconnection or linkage with one another. The implications of this linkage with respect to unification suggest a different conclusion to that held by some observers. These individuals have asserted that on defence issues actors from the extraparliamentary scene such

as interest groups and retired officers have a minimal impact upon policy formulation. For example, Roddick Byers has argued that the political process is 'closed', though he has also stated that the extent to which the process is closed may depend upon the issue being examined.² Byers supports this by a table he has devised on the basis of his interviews with thirty-four parliamentarians in the spring of 1968. Interest groups were at the bottom, with the legislative bodies following, in a hierarchial listing of influence in formulation of defence policy. Hence, "the overall perceptions of the parliamentarians supported the view that the executive is at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the legislature, with nongovernmental structures at the bottom."³

However, Byers has recognized that one must take into account specific instances, like unification, in order to show that in these instances individuals and factors which otherwise may not be in play open up the 'closed-circuit' pattern. In his interview with a member of the

²R. Byers, "Executive Leadership and Influence: Parliamentary Perceptions of Canadian Defence Policy", in Apex Of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, ed. by Thomas A. Hockin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971), pp. 165, 175. Also, Franklyn Griffiths has used a closed-circuit model. Franklyn Griffiths, "Opening Up The Policy Process", in An Independent Foreign Policy For Canada?, ed. by Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Ltd., 1968), pp. 110-118.

³Byers, op. cit., pp. 167, 168. The categories in the table are the Minister of National Defence, the Prime Minister, the Minister of External Affairs, Chief of

Pearson Cabinet on unification, Byers elicited the following response:

...the reorganization of the Armed Forces was not discussed in detail. As long as it was receiving good press and people seemed to be satisfied with the way things were going there did not seem to be any need to discuss it at length. But as soon as the press and some of the military turned against the minister then everyone gets all upset and wants to know what went wrong and the pressures start to build up on the minister - in this case Paul Hellyer. Pearson also got after Hellyer.⁴

This quotation gives additional support to what has been asserted in this thesis. It shows that unification was not fully discussed in Cabinet and that the Prime Minister did not exercise leadership and the strongest influence in the defence sphere. The quotation also supports the contention that the closed-circuit pattern of influence was 'opened' on the unification issue.

Therefore, nongovernmental parts of the Canadian political system played a pervasive role with respect to the debate on Bill C-243. As has been mentioned in Chapter 3, for example, Paul Hellyer and his senior military advisors met with TRIO representatives in October 1966. The pervasive role raises a seemingly contradictory

Defence Staff, Deputy Minister of National Defence, Parliamentary Defence Committee, Government Caucus and Interest Groups.

⁴Ibid., pp. 178-179.

feature. On the one hand, a government may stubbornly ignore the contributions made by various critics. On the other hand, because it must justify its policies, the government gives attention to the critics' views.

One individual, though referring specifically to the politician's relations to the mass media, has recognized this contradictory feature. Senator Maurice Lamontagne has stated that most politicians share his view that though the mass media has little impact upon the public, most politicians are newsworms:

It is in the restricted context that a minister cannot ignore the mass media with impunity. If he enjoys a good press, he will be envied and respected or feared by his colleagues. If he has no press, he has no future. And if he has a bad press, he is in serious trouble, because he will be viewed even by his own associates as a political liability, in spite of the qualities he may have.⁵

If TRIO, other ex-servicemen interest groups, individual retired senior officers, the Conservative Party were substituted for 'mass media' in the above quotation, the arguments would generally still hold true. Besides, government forces and their opponents did pay attention to the news media. Both sides attempted to manipulate the press.

⁵Maurice Lamontagne, "The Influence Of The Politician", Canadian Public Administration, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Fall 1968), reprinted in The Canadian Political Process, ed. by O. Kruhlak, et. al. (Canada: Holt, Rinehart & Winston of Canada, Ltd., 1970), p. 485.

There were official handouts from the Defence Minister's office, Paul Hellyer's assistant was active in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, and letters-to-the-editor formed part of the strategy of TRIO. Newspaper articles were quoted in the Commons and Standing Committee and were used by M.P.s to support their views or to detract from their opponents' views. One example has been given in Chapter 6 with respect to the Conservative member for Edmonton-Strathcona, Terence Nugent, rising on a question of privilege regarding an article written by Marcel Pepin.

The unification controversy did not arouse the 'general public'. Although the Liberal Government was a minority one, it had the support of the New Democrats, the Socreds and the Cr ditistes. All parties were not particularly anxious to have another election so soon after the 1965 election. Several M.P.s recognized that defence was not the best of issues with which to wage a campaign. In spite of these factors, the Government defensively reacted to a determined opposition. Mention has already been made in Chapter 6 of Paul Hellyer's need to convince his Cabinet colleagues not to attempt any compromises on Bill C-243. The role of the opposition to unification suggests that statements referring to the minimal influence of the legislative bodies and the extraparliamentary part of the political system upon the formulation of defence policy must be reformulated to account for (a) the influence of the nongovernmental parts upon specific

defence issues and (b) a definition of influence which should not be defined mainly in terms of the end results of a government's legislative initiatives.

This reformulation suggests that nongovernmental groups will be more successful, or at least more adamant, in pursuing their objectives when allying themselves with or receiving information pertinent to the pursuit of their objectives from policy-formulating bodies such as the Defence Department or Cabinet. Also, this shows that nongovernmental groups will have better opportunities for realizing their objectives if they have direct access to decision-making bodies such as Cabinet to which views can be directly submitted. However, access alone does not assure success because the opportunity to submit opinions does not necessarily mean that influence is submitted with the opinions.

Examples of these points were given during the debate on unification. TRIO was a more effective body as a result of the information it received from ex-serving officers and serving officers aware of the state of affairs within the Defence Department. As shown in Chapter 4, the access of TRIO to certain ministers, although enhancing the interest group's chances of realizing its objectives, did not result in TRIO and other opponents having Bill C-243 substantively amended or withdrawn. However, this access quite likely was a factor contributing to the difficulties which Paul Hellyer encountered within Cabi-

net. Conservative M.P.s elicited or voluntarily were given information from serving military personnel. This information, in combination with information obtained from other quarters which reinforced the Conservative members' own perspectives on defence policy, helped make the Conservative Party the one most opposed to unification. In passing, it should be noted that the formation of criticism in one part of the political system can activate criticism and can account for the degree of criticism within another part. This will assure opposition to a government's legislative programme.

This brings attention to the interaction between the different oppositions and the affect this has upon the attitudes, strategies and success of the different oppositions.⁶ Though suggesting communications between different oppositions, interaction does not necessarily indicate formal alliances between the oppositions. Interestingly, exchanges between groups having similar perspectives may be indirect because of reasons relating to perceived interests and strategy by which a group can achieve its aims.

Brief reference may be made to certain features of the unification debate to indicate aspects of the interaction which occurred. As concerned the various opposi-

⁶For a general article on interaction, see Robert Presthus, "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy, and Influence", Canadian Journal Of Political Science, Vol. IV, No. 4 (December 1971), pp.444-460.

tions, in some ways it was a case of the convinced preaching to the convinced. That is, the different oppositions upon which this thesis has concentrated, influenced each other's perceptions of unification by reinforcing the perceptions rather than changing them from support to non-support of unification. Interaction between several of the officers who retired at the time of the unification controversy and the parliamentary and extraparliamentary dissidents was usually on a formal basis. Many of these officers did not encourage the basis to become less formal, that is, a face to face or personal friendship basis. For example, they did not become members of TRIO, did not meet with members of the Conservative Party and did not take the initiative in requesting to be invited to appear as witnesses before the Standing Committee.

The relations of TRIO with Parliament can be viewed on two levels, that is, the group's contacts with the executive and the group's forwarding of material to all parties. The point that a high degree of interaction does not necessarily imply a high level of influence is supported by the results of the contacts of TRIO with the Government. TRIO recognized that if its strategy were to be successful it had to influence the Cabinet. TRIO was not successful and was viewed by Liberal M.P.s as being biased. For example, a Liberal M.P. inferred that the brief TRIO submitted to the Standing Committee was

'political'.⁷ It may be inferred that TRIO was invited to appear before the Standing Committee on the basis of the efforts of Conservative members of the Committee's steering committee, though this should not lead to the conclusion that TRIO was a Tory organization. However, this does suggest support for an explanation of group interaction in terms of mutual profit for the actors involved, in this instance between Conservative M.P.s and TRIO members.

Also, this shows that political parties which espouse views similar to the ones held by an extraparliamentary group can legitimize the group's function within the political process. The political party makes sympathetic reference to the group's views within Parliament and opens the legislative process to the group, for example, by playing a role in having the group appear as a witness before a standing committee. Like TRIO, the Conservative Party received several anonymous letters from serving military personnel dissatisfied with intergration/unification. In some instances, Conservative M.P.s met with serving personnel. However, the serving personnel preferred to remain anonymous.

Interaction did not result in concrete alliances

⁷S.C.N.D., No. 17, Friday, February 10, 1967, p. 749. This was confirmed in interviews with Liberal M.P.s. Also, a New Democrat M.P. in an interview of May 31, 1969, stated that TRIO was a group 'fighting the last war' and that TRIO raised no valid points against unification.

or in a united front. One explanation was a concern with image in all of the groups, namely, TRIO, the Conservative Party and the military dissidents. A relationship was made between a projection of the 'right' image and the degree of influence upon the Government. For this reason, TRIO was careful not to align itself with any one party. Also, for this reason, various ex-servicemen groups refused to support TRIO. And the Toronto branch of the Naval Officers' Associations submitted a brief to the Standing Committee independent of the one submitted by the Maritime Committee. This would at least tentatively suggest that similarly held views do not automatically assure cohesion among different groups.

Because reference to serving military opposition is related to the question of civilian control, brief mention may be made of civilian control of the military which was a secondary issue of the unification debate. To Paul Hellyer this was a valid issue, though to the opposition groups civilian control was a 'red herring'. It is not necessary to reiterate the views held by the opposition groups respecting civilian control. However, it is important to note that the question of civilian control in relation to unification poses other questions. To what degree was civilian control threatened during unification? Can civilian control be taken for granted in Canada? Is a questioning of the way in which civilian control is exercised necessarily a challenge to the principle of civilian

control? Within the larger context of executive (ministerial) - public servant relations, can the serving military opposition, ineffective as it was, be viewed as an example of the influence of public servants upon ministers and the large role played by such public servants in policy formulation?

Civilian control was used as one of the reasons to explain the need for reorganization within the Defence Department. The Glassco Report stated:

The Minister may rely primarily on the Chiefs of Staff Committee for advice and on questions of military effectiveness it is natural that he do so; but the military character of this group raises doubts as to the reality of civilian control if the minister places excessive reliance upon it.⁸

The Report's views were incorporated into the White Paper of 1964 and during the debate on Bill C-90, Paul Hellyer mentioned that the proposed changes would permit a more effective exercise of both civilian control and civilian direction. Having referred to the need to have a greater exercise of civilian control and direction, the Defence Minister, during the unification controversy, stated that civilian control had been threatened, especially by Rear-Admiral Landymore's actions.

The degree to which civilian control was threatened

⁸Canada, The Royal Commission On Government Organization, Vol. IV, Special Areas Of Administration (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963), p. 76.

or could be threatened not only was dependent upon the institutional framework in which the control was exercised, but also was in part dependent upon the resolve of the participants to pursue courses threatening civilian control. The military critics supported the principle of civilian control, but added that a minister had a responsibility to receive and weigh expert advice before making a decision. During the unification debate, the question was therefore one of both control and direction. However, Paul Hellyer had strengthened the institutional framework and this in combination with his particular use of the framework and his strong personality seemed to suggest that there was no need to fear military erosion of civilian control. With an integrated defence staff, with the Chief of Defence Staff only having the right of access to the Minister, Paul Hellyer had strengthened his position. He revitalized the Defence Council and assured that it was heavily weighed on the civilian side.⁹ Also, there was the Cabinet Defence Committee and the Cabinet itself. The civil-

⁹The Defence Council was the senior policy committee of the Defence Department. The Minister was Chairman. The Associate Minister was Vice-Chairman. Other members included the Chief of Defence Staff, the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, and the Deputy Minister. Paul Hellyer initiated the practice of having the military heads of the functional branches at Headquarters and some assistant deputy ministers attend on a fairly regular basis. Also, a senior officer of External Affairs attended regularly.

ian side of the Defence Department had been strengthened.

The institutional arrangements and Paul Hellyer's interpretation of his office indicated that civilian control and direction were increased during the process leading from integration to unification. The way in which the Minister exercised control, however, led to civilian-military tensions. Evidence suggests that Paul Hellyer bypassed his senior military advisers to elicit information from junior officers. The way in which the Defence Council was utilized caused dissatisfaction among the senior military advisers. Furthermore, several officers felt that by not making representations to Cabinet on their behalf on an issue about which they felt strongly, the Minister had added to the tension between himself and the military.¹⁰ The outstanding example of tension was that between the Minister and Rear-Admiral Landymore.

Civilian-military tensions and a questioning about the way in which civilian control is exercised do not necessarily imply a threat to civilian control. Besides, these tensions do not adequately reflect the role played by the civilian side of the Defence Department. In 1956, Lieutenant-General Simonds referred to the negative influ-

¹⁰R. Byers, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither Civilian Control?" in The Canadian Military: A Profile, ed. by H.J. Massey (Canada: The Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1972), p. 222.

ence of senior civil servants and the desultory effect this had upon policy decisions. Simonds mentioned how the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee was 'packed' so the government would not consider the military case on its merits. This was caused by the senior civil servants of the Committee:

It is difficult enough to get agreement among the...Chiefs of Staff when they are each competing for a share of the same financial allocation and pool of manpower. This leaves ample scope for the deputy minister, the chairman, Chiefs of Staff and the chairman of the Defence Research Board to ride their own hobby-horses....As long as they act as a buffer between their political master and unpalatable advice, they can shift onto the executive head of one or more of the three services the responsibility for shortcomings....¹¹

Lieutenant-General Simonds views show that questions on civilian control should be expanded to include those related to the extent of control an elected individual, a minister, exercises or can exercise with respect to both the civilian and military components of his department.

Whether Simonds' concern was an expression of the

¹¹Lieutenant-General G. Simonds, "Where We've Gone Wrong On Defence", Maclean's, Vol. 69, No. 13, June 23, 1956, p. 67. In his evidence before the Standing Committee on National Defence in March 1967, Lieutenant-General Simonds said in response to a question by a Liberal member whether unification would help in promoting the overall needs of the services: "They were always looked at as a whole between the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence." S.C.N.D., No. 34, Thursday, March 16, 1967, p. 2196.

military expert's disdain for the layman, his concerns were paralleled by those held by several senior military personnel during the 1964-66 period. Lieutenant-General Moncel, who had prematurely resigned as Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in July 1966, testified before the Standing Committee in February 1967 that the duties of the Comptroller-General duplicated those of the Deputy Minister's office. This showed the existence of an unsatisfactory arrangement and perhaps indicated discontent on the part of the military respecting excessive control by public servants.

Lieutenant-General Fleury, who had prematurely retired in July 1966 from the post of Comptroller-General, stated before the Standing Committee in February 1967 that the military were not adequately represented in the Defence Council, one of the results of which was the politicization of the Defence Council's military members:

....one of the effects...is that there is a tendency more and more for military officers to skate pretty close to the political line which...is a very bad thing indeed. It is just as bad as politicians or civil servants who insist on acting as if they were military officers.¹²

Military officers were expressing a concern with respect to both the amount of expert military advice weighed by

¹²S.C.N.D., No. 24, Wednesday, February 22, 1967, Thursday, February 23, 1967, p. 1492.

the Defence Minister and the quality of the advice which the Minister received.

The fact that several senior officers had prematurely resigned in one way showed their respect for civilian control and their concern about the basis upon which Paul Hellyer was building his policy. It has already been stated that several officers had refused to play an active political role and that those who became dissatisfied did so in part because of the way in which decisions were made at Defence Headquarters. Managerial problems exacerbated discontent over unification. On the other hand, Paul Hellyer did not discourage the senior officers who supported him, for example, General Allard, from making public statements on what had become a political problem and thus from playing a political role as a result.

The unification debate, if it were a test of civilian control, was one which showed that civilian supremacy had been strengthened by Paul Hellyer. It can be suggested that if there are future tests, these may question the nature of the control rather than the principle of control itself. It may also be suggested that because of the nature of structures such as the Defence Council, crises may build up again within the Defence Department and, depending on the type of Defence Minister, these crises may not come to the attention of the Cabinet or Parliament until the crises have become acute.

The fact that the question of civilian control was

raised was an indication that the unification debate was one containing features characteristic of the politics of extremity. The spectacle was raised of senior officers prematurely resigning, of the Defence Minister charging an officer, Rear-Admiral Landymore, with being disloyal and of an interest group forming for the express purpose of halting the drive to unification. These were acts uncommon to a Canadian defence debate. Acts of political extremity were also revealed within the parliamentary institutional framework. In the confines of Cabinet, the Defence Minister threatened to resign if his policy were not supported. The Conservatives carried out a lengthy debate in the Commons. Inflexible positions were taken. Consequently, the parliamentary institutional framework did not result in a satisfactory resolving of conflict. Instead of behind-the-scenes agreement, the Government imposed the 'guillotine' in the latter stages of the debate to curtail an opposition accused of 'filibustering'. The Government members' primary concern within the Standing Committee was to have a speedy passage of Bill C-243 back to the Commons rather than to elicit information for any possible refinement of the Bill. On the other hand, the Committee's Conservative members tried to impede the Bill's passage by attempting to call as many witnesses as possible. The politics of extremity created uncompromising positions which could only result in Bill C-243 being debated in a highly charged atmosphere.

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Tilbury Times
Timmins Press
Tisdale Recorder

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Toronto Globe & Mail
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E. Unpublished Material

1) Government

Letter of April 2, 1964, from the Minister of National Defence and the Associate Minister of National Defence, concerning the reorganization of the Armed Forces. The letter is entitled, "To All Members Of The Armed Forces And Employees Of The Department Of National Defence."

Dunlap, Air Marshal C. Statement By The Chief Of The Air Staff To All RCAF Personnel (n.d. but written in April 1964). This concerned the reorganization of the Armed Forces.

Rayner, Vice-Admiral H. Statement By Vice Admiral H. S. Rayner Chief Of The Naval Staff To Naval Personnel, April 3, 1964. This concerned the reorganization of the Armed Forces.

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2) Personal

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3) Ex-servicemen Organizations

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Minutes: Fourteenth National Convention October 1st-2nd-3rd, 1964, Charlottetown, P.E.I. - Royal Canadian Air Force Association.

Minutes Of The Annual Meeting Of The National Executive Council, RCAF Association Held At The Chateau Laurier Hotel [Ottawa] Friday And Saturday January 22-23, 1965.

Minutes Of The Annual Meeting Of The National Executive Council, RCAF Association Held At The Chateau Laurier Hotel [Ottawa] Monday And Tuesday February 7th And 8th, 1966.

Minutes Sixteenth National Convention July 14th-15th-16th-1966 Edmonton, Alberta - Royal Canadian Air Force Association.

Files Of The Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO).

Between June and August 1969, the author was in Toronto re-searching the TRIO files. A major portion of the material covered the period from July 1966 to the summer of 1967.

Though the files were largely unorganized, their contents can be classified as follows:

1. Personal correspondence to and from serving and ex-serving officers; M.P.s; newspaper editors and journalists; members of the different TRIO branches.
2. Releases to M.P.s and Senators; TRIO branches; newspapers; ex-servicemen's organizations; different Navy Leagues.
3. Press clippings and copies of magazine articles.
4. Copies of speeches made by TRIO members; ex-serving officers; the Minister of National Defence; the Minister's Special Assistant.
5. Minutes of meetings leading to the formation TRIO; of the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces.
6. Progress reports of TRIO;
7. Briefs presented on behalf of TRIO, of the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces, of Air Marshal W. A. Curtis, of Rear-Admiral W. Landymore to the Standing Committee on National Defence.
8. Naval Officers Associations of Canada, Toronto Branch, newsletters and briefs.
9. Reports of the Naval Officers Associations of Canada and of the Navy League of Canada.

The files proved most helpful, especially with respect to Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.

F. Interviews

Most of the interviews were conducted in Ottawa; others took place in Winnipeg and Toronto. The interviews were conducted between May and August 1969, in March 1970, in October 1970 and in October and November 1971. The interviews were of an informal, frank nature. Open-ended questions were asked. The length of the interviews varied from twenty minutes to three hours. Some individuals were interviewed more than once. In a few instances, interviews were followed up by personal correspondence.

Of the M.P.s interviewed, the author concentrated upon individuals who were the leading defence spokesmen of their parties and who were members of the Standing Committee on National Defence. The breakdown was as follows: Progressive Conservatives, 4; Liberals, 4; New Democrats, 1. These individuals included four former ministers. Two former assistants to ministers were also interviewed.

One serving very high-ranking officer and four retired high-ranking officers who had served at National Defence Headquarters were interviewed.

Two executive members of Toronto TRIO and one executive member of the Winnipeg branch were interviewed. One of the executive members was also a member of the RCAF Association. Also, conversations were held with a Director of the National Council of the Navy League of Canada and with an executive member of the Naval Officers Associations of Canada.

One newspaper publisher, one journalist and one magazine editor were interviewed.