Form Matters:
An Ontology of Music

by

Harley Dyck

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
of the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg

Abstract

In this thesis, I develop a hylomorphic view of musical works and argue that it proves more explanatorily successful than rival metaphysical accounts. I begin by presenting general concepts of hylomorphism, before tackling the question of specifically musical hylomorphism. Some candidates for the matter and form of musical works are rejected; I propose that the matter of musical works is note-types, and that the form is "semblance," a specific notion developed by Susanne Langer. I end by presenting the benefits of this view, namely its avoidance of difficulties faced by competing metaphysical accounts, and its corresponding elegance in explaining various facts about musical works, such as their repeatability, creatability, and expression.

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to a host of people, without whom I would not be who, what, and where I am. Not all of them can be listed here, but I single out a few. Adam and Carl, my advisors, and Simone, my committee external. I have learned much from you, in and out of class. Others in the Department of Philosophy, Chris, Rob, Dimitrios, Rhonda, Steven, and Laurie, who have been invaluable help and formative influence. Hendrik van der Breggen, my first philosophy professor. This thesis would not exist without your influence. My parents, Walter and Marilyn, for too many things to list. Justin, Jordan, Luke, Riley, Joshua, for discussions on all topics at all hours.

I am grateful as well for the generous funding given to me by the University of Manitoba, the Faculty of Arts, and the Department of Philosophy.

This thesis is dedicated to Hendrik van der Breggen, and to my parents.

Contents

List of Figures

Chapter 1
Hylomorphism

Introduction

The ontology of musical works—and the philosophy of music more generally—has experienced a marked rise in popularity the last few decades. Questions of what musical works are, what category they belong to, and their relationship to their composers and audiences have been much discussed by philosophers in recent years. In this essay, I endeavour to contribute to this discussion. I present an Aristotelian hylomorphic account of musical works, on which sound structures and 20^{th}-century philosopher Susanne K. Langer's "semblance" are the matter and form of musical works, respectively. This account well fits the data we already intuitively possess about musical works, particularly their repeatability, creatability, and expressivity. Moreover, it is uniquely explanatory in the way it accommodates the aforementioned data without falling victim to the objections other analyses face.

I will present all these components of my hylomorphic account in due time, but in order to properly set the stage, I begin with an exposition of hylomorphism generally, as predicated of ordinary objects and of artifacts. After laying out how the general hylomorphic framework is supposed to operate, I then (re)introduce the specifically musical question.

1.1 Hylomorphism

Hylomorphism[1] is the doctrine that (at least some) objects are composed of matter and form.[2,3] It is most associated with Aristotle, though in its commitment to form, it necessarily

[1]The word is also spelled "hylemorphism." I will use the former here, as it is the more common usage in English philosophy, even though the latter more closely mirrors the original Greek *hyle* (ὕλη); I will leave quotes from other authors unchanged.

[2]Indeed, the name comes from the Greek for "matter" (ὕλη, *hyle*) and form (μορφή, *morphē*).

[3]I do not have space to properly argue for the general theory of hylomorphism here. Those interested in such a defense should see first Aristotle's *Physics*, Book I. For an overview, see Thomas Ainsworth, "Form

involves something of Plato (as does much of Aristotle's thought).[4] However, there has been a resurgence of neo-Aristotelian thought in recent years, including the signature hylomorphic analysis of objects.[5]

1.1.1 General concepts

Of course, the question that immediately arises is something like, "What does this amount to—that is, what *are* form and matter on this account?" On a hylomorphic analysis, matter is actualized by form, and form is manifested by matter. A paradigmatic example is a bronze statute—its matter is just the bronze of the statue. Its matter is *what it is made of*, in a fundamental and intuitive sense. The form is *what makes it what it is*, its "statue-ness." Of course, there is more to say. I will take matter first, and then go on to form.[6]

1.1.1.1 Matter

The hylomorphist use of "matter," it should be stressed, is often different than our regular sense of "matter," i.e., physical stuff made of (or reducible to) particles. Some contemporary hylomorphists do take this approach,[7] it is true, but not all. Hylomorphism has been used to analyze immaterial or partially immaterial things;[8] it thus clearly can have a broader range

vs. Matter," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016). For a modern defence of a strong hylomorphism, see David S. Oderberg, *Real Essentialism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), especially §4.1, and Edward Feser, *Scholastic metaphysics: A contemporary introduction* (Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014), especially §3.1 (pp. 160-188).

[4]Aristotle is perhaps best thought of not as a counter to Plato, but rather the paradigmatic Platonist, developing and refining Plato's ideas. This view is something like what Lloyd Gerson calls "Ur-Platonism" (see Lloyd P. Gerson, "Plato, platonism, and the history of philosophy," in *What Makes a Philosopher Great? Thirteen Arguments for Twelve Philosophers*, ed. Stephen Hetherington (London: Routledge, 2017), 12–29).

[5]For some comments on this (near) revival and some philosophers who play a part in it, see Andrew Bailey and Shane Maxwell Wilkins, "Contemporary Hylomorphism," in *Oxford Bibliographies* (Oxford University Press, 2018), `https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0363.xml`, Matthew O'Brien, "Who's Afraid of Metaphysics?," *The Public Discourse*, June 2011, `https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/06/3356/`, and Edward Feser, "Introduction: An Aristotelian Revival?," chap. 1 in *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics*, ed. Edward Feser (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013). For some recent edited volumes on the subject, see Tuomas E. Tahko, ed., *Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), John Greco and Ruth Groff, eds., *Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism* (Routledge, 2012), Lukáš Novák et al., eds., *Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic* (Ontos Verlag, 2012), Daniel D. Novotný and Lukáš Novák, eds., *Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics* (Routledge, 2013), Edward Feser, ed., *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013), and Rafael Hüntelmann and Johannes Hattler, eds., *New Scholasticism Meets Analytic Philosophy* (editiones scholasticae, 2014).

[6]Hylomorphism is deployed most often in the modern context in the field of mereology. While I am here concerned primarily with ontology, some mereological discussion will be unavoidable.

[7]For instance, Kathrin Koslicki and Kit Fine, about whom more later.

[8]Such objects include political bodies (as in Aristotle, mentioned in Ainsworth, "Form vs. Matter"), mathematical entities (see David S. Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," in *Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in*

of meaning than just physical stuff. It might be thought that the use of "hylomorphic" to describe immaterial or abstract entities is mere metaphor, but this is not the case. These are to be understood as *analogical*, where this is meant not in the colloquial sense of comparison, but rather in the classical sense of an intermediate mode of predication, between univocal and equivocal predication. This is a more metaphysically substantive approach, and one that is arguably more in line with Aristotle's original conception. At the very least, if one is to countenance the aforementioned (partially) immaterial objects, "matter" must be allowed to refer to physical stuff *and other things*.

Probably the most intuitive way of understanding the role of hylomorphic matter on a more substantive, Aristotelian notion is via change. All change involves three things—the beginning object, the final result, and something which underlies the change, that is, which undergoes it. Inessential or "accidental" changes, such as location, weight, or colour,[9] are changes *by substances* (which concept I will expound shortly), such as the individual person, tree, or whatever undergoes the change of location, weight, or colour. However, *substantial* change involves the changing of an object itself—such as, paradigmatically, its going out of existence. This process, since it is an instance of change, also requires something to underlie it—something to *undergo* the change. But it cannot be the object itself this time, since no object can underlie its own destruction. What is the substrate in these cases? Prime matter, according to Aristotle.[10]

On this stronger (i.e., more metaphysically committing) view, that which is actualized by form is *prime matter*. This is just matter unactualized by any form. On this interpretation, form is the "principle of specificity of a thing," i.e., "that by which it is what it is,"[11] and since prime matter just is matter without any form, it follows that prime matter is *not any thing*. If this seems impossible, that is because it is. It is the two together that make a thing; either, without the other, are mere abstractions. Both are needed for an object to *be* an object.[12]

Metaphysics, ed. Daniel D. Novotny and Lukáš Novák (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 167), and propositions (Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, and Eileen Nutting, "Hylomorphic Propositions," in *The Routledge Handbook of Propositions*, ed. Chris Tillman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020)).

[9]These are called "accidental" changes, as opposed to "substantial" changes.

[10]As David Oderberg helpfully summarizes: "Prime matter is the underlying substrate, itself wholly undifferentiated, which form actualizes to produce a material substance" (Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," 164).

[11]Oderberg, *Real Essentialism*, 65.

[12]Technically, form *can* exist *sans* prime matter in one place—a mind; this is a central part of Aristotelian epistemology. More on this later.

1.1.1.2 Form

The idea of form is rather intuitive, though exactly what it *is* is disputed. There have been numerous approaches to the question of form; a standard definition according to Aristotle runs something like: "Form is that by which a thing is what it is." Return to the paradigmatic example of the bronze statue: it is obvious that any random lump of bronze is not a statue, even if it is precisely the weight—or even the same molecules—as a statue made out of it. The lump may, over time, not be a statue (e.g., when it is first refined), then become a statue (if it is sculpted), and then cease to be a statue (if it is melted). The form is what makes the difference—i.e., what supplies the *statue-ness* of the statue.

Well and good. But exactly what *this* amounts to is contested. There are a number of ways to understand the cashing out of this definition; what kind of thing is a form, metaphysically speaking? This is one reason why some clarificatory work is necessary at this juncture.

If one considers the case of the bronze statue, it seems that its form is simply its shape, but one must be careful of generalizations; form is not *identical* to shape. Thomas Ainsworth preemptively rules out this excessively simplistic interpretation of Aristotle: "The word 'form' may misleadingly suggest that what is acquired in a case of substantial generation is simply a shape, and this impression is reinforced by some of the examples that Aristotle uses, especially when focusing on artefacts: plausibly the form of a bronze statue just is its shape. When we consider organisms, however, it becomes apparent that having the right shape is not sufficient to possess the form."[13] The fact that both simple things like statues and more complex things like organisms have form means that form must not be something so simple as shape. I will survey a number of contemporary interpretations of form shortly.

1.1.1.3 Substance and artifact

One of the fundamental ideas in Aristotelian metaphysics is that of substance. A substance, Aristotle said, is something of which we predicate things, but which is not predicated of anything else: "A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse."[14] On the Aristotelian view, there are of course other kinds of being than substance, the most obvious being the converse of the definition given above—those

[13] Ainsworth, "Form vs. Matter," §1, ¶4. This quote touches on the difference in (neo-)Aristotelian metaphysics between substances and artifacts, which I will discuss next.

[14] Aristotle, *Categories*, 2a11-13, as translated by Corkum in Phil Corkum, "Substance and Independence in Aristotle," in *Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence*, ed. B. Schnieder, A. Steinberg, and M. Hoeltje (Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, Philosophia Verlag, 2013), 43.

things which *are* said of or are in a subject. However, I do not have space to go into all the nuances here; instead, I focus on one that is particularly relevant: artifacts.

Artifacts, roughly, are made things. They have forms, since without them, they would not be objects, and no common-sense Aristotelian would deny them objecthood.[15] The difference is that their forms are *accidental* forms, rather than *substantial* ones. These are forms of made things, "added on," as it were, to substances (or groups thereof).

An entertaining example from Edward Feser will hopefully help to clarify what is meant by substantial and accidental form.[16] He refers to liana vines, i.e., the jungle vines on which Tarzan famously swings, and imagines a hammock or bed made by Tarzan out of such vines. As noted above, no one denies that the hammock is in fact a *thing*. However, Feser notes, the fact that the vines form a hammock has nothing to do with the vines themselves; it is a consequence of Tarzan's action. He gives the accidental form of a hammock to the vines, which all along retain their substantial forms.

On a stronger (neo-)Aristotelianism, form is also understood as the source of teleology—what a thing *is* determines what it *does*,[17] and more, what it *should* do. Accordingly, this means that (on a strong neo-Aristotelianism) artifacts have no *intrinsic* teleology, only *extrinsic*, mirroring their type of form.

To expand the example given above: consider that the liana vines do not naturally grow into a hammock; rather, Tarzan must keep trimming or retying them in order to keep his aerial sofa safe and functional. This is because liana vines have no intrinsic tendency to grow into a hammock; this particular form is *accidental*; it has been imposed on them extrinsically by Tarzan.[18] Accidental form thus has a teleological component, but not so strong or fundamental a one as substantial form.

The distinction between substantial and accidental form and the correlate distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology is not universal among neo-Aristotelians.[19] One of the reasons for the disagreement is likely because Aristotle himself makes little mention of this difference, at least at first. Worse, he blurs it by his choice of examples when he discusses form and substance.[20] Nevertheless, it ought to be kept in mind.

[15]"Aristotle is catholic in his acceptance of what is. Qualities, quantities[,] relations[,] and so on are all things that are" (Corkum, "Substance and Independence in Aristotle," 4.)

[16]The following example is taken from Edward Feser, *Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science* (Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2019), 36.

[17]The scholastics codified this in the maxim *agere sequitur esse*, "action follows being."

[18]This does not mean that there is a tendency to grow *away* from being an artifact; this can be explained statistically: there are many more directions and patterns of vine growth that are *not* amenable to hammock-status than ones that are. Thus, if the vines grow randomly, odds are that they will grow away from or out of hammock-status.

[19]For instance, Kathrin Koslicki's account, about which more later, makes no mention of a fundamental ontological difference between people and trees on one hand and beds and watches on the other.

[20]"Aristotle often uses the example of artefacts like houses, even though he does not regard them as

1.1.2 Contemporary Hylomorphism

As I have already mentioned,[21] there is something of a revival of Aristotelianism in contemporary philosophy, and this of course includes hylomorphism. But first explaining some of these developments, it only makes sense to lay out the background against which they have been made—neo-Aristotelian mereology has by no means been dominant over the last century. I will discuss in turn the inherited view and a few of the attempts that have recently been made to return to and elaborate upon Aristotle's insights.

1.1.2.1 Classical extensional mereology

A prominent mereological view among contemporary philosophers is *classical extensional mereology* (CEM).[22] CEM is a powerful theory, as even its critics admit,[23] possessing elegance, simplicity, and a wide explanatory reach. It consists of a number of axioms and definitions, all of which I will not discuss here. The majority of these are intuitive and uncontroversial, such as transitivity (a part of a part of an object is also a part of the object), anti-symmetry (if x is a part of y, y cannot be a part of x), or uniqueness of composition (two identical objects cannot have two different mereological sums). But CEM also features more controversial axioms, such as unrestricted composition, which says that any collection of objects compose a mereological sum. On CEM, mereological sums are just what objects are supposed to be, so this axiom says that for any selection of objects you like, there exists a further object composed of them. Thus, the collection of my limbs, torso, and head composes an object—namely, my body; the collection of some boulders, rock, snow, dirt, and ice composes a mountain, and so on.

One of the reasons for this postulate has to do with vagueness. In short, the idea is that if *restricted* composition holds, i.e., if some collections are objects and some are not, then there must be cut-off points which define some collection(s) and exclude others. But, says the proponent of CEM, there are cases where there are purported objects, but where such a distinction is inescapably vague. Thus, composition is sometimes vague. This would in turn imply that existence itself is sometimes vague (does the vaguely composed object

substances properly-speaking (Metaphysics vii 17, 1041b28–30), because their matter is more straightforward to identify" (Ainsworth, "Form vs. Matter," §1, ¶3). To be fair to Aristotle, it should be noted that the distinction between substance and artifact is "downstream," as it were, from the fundamental questions of form, matter, and substance. Thus, using these more easily understandable examples is a valid pedagogical strategy; it only possesses the caveat that one will have to carefully disambiguate later.

[21] In footnote 5 above.

[22] Indeed, it is sometimes even called "standard mereology."

[23] See, for instance, Kathrin Koslicki, "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology," *dialectica* 61, no. 1 (2007): 130, `https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56f5c75c2eeb813966086409/t/574c8751b654f95fce4b0a29/1464633169682/NeoAristotelianMereology.pdf`.

exist?); but surely existence, of all things, is not vague. Thus, restricted composition leads to an absurdity, and is false. Unrestricted composition then holds, and all collections—that is, sums—are objects.[24]

There have been a number of critiques leveled at CEM. Probably the most common is that it has some drastically counterintuitive implications. On CEM, as noted, any sum of objects is itself an object. This means not only that there are a tremendously greater amount of objects in the universe than commonsense supposes, but also that many (or even the majority) of these objects are ones that commonsense would not even recognize—for instance, Lewis' infamous "trout-turkey," consisting of the upper half of a trout and the lower half of a turkey.[25] If such an object does not exist, then some sums do not compose an object, and unrestricted composition is false.

Kit Fine has raised further objections to CEM, namely the "aggregative objection" and the "monster objection."[26] These are similar to the proliferation objection in that they underscore the counterintuitiveness of CEM's implications, though they are more technical. First, the "aggregative objection": on CEM, Fine points out, a sum exists whenever any of its members exist. But this means that whenever any the components of a sum—say, a ham sandwich—exist, then the ham sandwich itself exists—even when the bread slices are in two different stores, and the ham has only just been processed at a third location. But this, Fine points out, is absurd; the ham sandwich only exists during *part* of the existence of its components.

The "monster objection" blocks a possible move the standard mereologist might make to avoid the aggregative objection. The standard mereologist might propose that the ham sandwich is not a sum *simpliciter*, but the temporal restriction of that sum to the time the ham sandwich exists. This blocks the aggregative objection. But, Fine notes, this seems an odd sense of "part"; worse, the move seems ad hoc. But even if it is allowed, this reply is committed to the objection's eponymous "monsters." Fine writes:

> Consider the sum of the ham and Cleopatra or, more dramatically, the sum of the ham and all objects that existed only before or after the sandwich existed.

[24]This argument was proposed in David K. Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986); a more recent and arguably stronger version can be found in Theodore Sider, *Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[25]See David K. Lewis, *Parts of Classes* (Blackwell, 1990). This grotesque chimera is made slightly less disquieting when one recalls that the two halves are still part of a whole trout and a whole turkey, i.e., they are not physically fused together, though this may merely relocate the disgust from the visceral to the rational realm.

[26]Kit Fine is a contemporary philosopher who has done much to promote hylomorphism (and Aristotelian generally) as an answer to metaphysical, and especially mereological, questions; he presents these objections in Kit Fine, "Things and their parts," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23, no. 1 (1999): 62-3, doi:10.1111/1475-4975.00004.

> Then the restriction of this sum to the time the sandwich exists is the same as the restriction of just the ham and hence must also be a part of the sandwich. But it is ludicrous to suppose that this monstrous object—of which Cleopatra and all merely past and future galaxies are parts—is itself a part of the ham sandwich.[27]

The problem here is that there are infinitely many restrictions of infinitely many sums that overlap, and are thus identical to each other, making every object composed of an infinite array of bizarrely counterintuitive parts.

Together, Fine's arguments demonstrate that mere sums are not real mereological wholes. The aggregative argument shows that parts must be taken *together* in a real sense in order to compose an object. But the monster objection shows that simply assigning a (temporal) restriction clause to the sum does not capture what it is to be an object, either.[28]

The ultimate point Fine makes is that the *arrangement* of the parts of a whole seems to matter, not just the parts themselves. And not just proximity or physical contact—the *way* the parts are arranged matters. A motorcycle taken entirely apart, strewn across the floor of the garage, is no motorcycle at all, even if all the parts are piled on top of one another or packed as close together as possible. What Fine then does is propose a way of understanding the relationship between parts and their arrangement into a whole.

1.1.2.2 Fine

Fine begins by distinguishing between *timeless* and *temporal* parts. Timeless parts, according to Fine, are those for which "it is not appropriate to ask when, or for how long, it is a part; it just is a part."[29] One intuitively clear example Fine gives is how "various time-slices, if there are such things, are parts of a persisting individual."[30] It is obviously nonsensical to ask *how long* a time-slice is a part of an object; it just is a part. Fine predicates this type of part of numerous physical objects as well, such as the bread and ham of ham sandwiches, the jacket and pants of suits, and atoms composing molecules.[31]

Temporal parts, then, are parts for which it *is* appropriate to ask when or for how long they are a part of their whole; they are parts whose parthood is "relative to a time." As examples, Fine offers the carburetor of a car, or the quantity of water in a river.[32] A

[27]Fine, "Things and their parts," 63.

[28]Kathrin Koslicki suggests that any more substantive addition to CEM that would capture the true character of objects would be so divergent from the basic framework that it would no longer count as an extension of CEM at all; see Kathrin Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 75.

[29]Fine, "Things and their parts," 61.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid. Fine allows that his particular examples may be debated as to whether they do indeed timeless parts; the ham sandwich in particular is debatable, he says, though he contends that molecules are still good examples.

[32]Ibid. "The water in the river" is here understood in the sense of a variable rather than a given quantity,

carburetor can be replaced, at which point it is no longer a part of the car; the water in a river is continually leaving it and becoming part of its endpoint (an ocean, lake, sea, or other river). When inquiring about these kinds of parts, one has to specify a certain timeframe within which they are parts (or not).

Fine then postulates a relation of *embodiment* as primitive. There are two types of embodiments: *rigid* and *variable*. These are apparently kinds of wholes, on Fine's view. The former covers those things which have their parts timelessly; the latter applies to objects which have temporal parts.[33] Rigid embodiments consist of parts bound in a relation. This embodiment relation is Fine's version of form.[34]

Variable embodiments are more complex. Using the example of the water in the river, Fine proposes that "there is a function, or 'principle,' that determines which quantity of water constitutes the variable water at any given time," and that "there is new kind of whole corresponding to this principle." Fine clarifies this admittedly odd idea by comparing the variable embodiment to a container, except in this case, it is an abstract rather than concrete object, and it actually plays a role in determining its contents.[35]

In the case of the car,[36] Fine proposes that "at each time at which a particular car exists, it is constituted by a certain rigid embodiment."[37] The idea is that a variable embodiment is a "container" of sorts for a series of rigid embodiments. Thus some variable embodiment can consist of many rigid embodiments, yielding a nested mereological structure.[38]

While it might seem an odd interpretation at first, there are a number of strikingly similar aspects between Fine's relations and the general understanding of form. First, parts are determined by a "function or principle";[39] this talk of a "principle" recalls the Aristotelian definition of form given in 1.1.1.2 above. Second, Fine says that "these principles [i.e., relations]...are intensional or conceptual in nature."[40] This echoes (though it perhaps does not perfectly mirror) the abstract nature of form, as well as the deep relationship between form and intellect.[41] Finally, the principle of variable embodiment "plays an active role, as

---

i.e., the water in the river *now*, rather than the sum total. This is the sense in which the water is said to be rising.

[33]See Fine, "Things and their parts," 61.

[34]"[T]he 'form' R is embodied in the fixed 'matter' *a, b, c,...*" (ibid., 65).

[35]Ibid., 68-9.

[36]And presumably other artifacts, though Fine does not suggest any criteria by which to identify them, though obviously it will be whichever of them have their parts temporally, like the car.

[37]Fine, "Things and their parts," 69.

[38]There is of course more to Fine's view. For instance, he gives a number of postulates for both rigid and variable embodiments designed to formally specify the part/whole relations he posits. I will not discuss these in detail here; I refer the interested reader to Fine's work.

[39]"The relation R will then be called the *principle of rigid embodiment*" (Fine, "Things and their parts," 65-6).

[40]Ibid., 73.

[41]On Aristotle's view, it is via form that an object is intelligible; it is not for nothing that form is said to

it were, in determining what its content is to be over time."[42] This reflects the Aristotelian idea of formal cause, though it is not clear that Fine intends it in this way.

A third distinctly Aristotelian part of Fine's account is its "mereological hylomorphism,"[43] i.e., the idea that its relation is an actual *part* of an object. Indeed, Fine himself seems to take his account to roughly be an Aristotelian account with more precise distinctions (i.e., between variable and rigid embodiment).[44]

Fine's account is significant; nevertheless, it has been criticized not only by traditional advocates of classical extensional mereology (which is to be expected), but by other Aristotelians as well. Some of the most significant friendly fire is due to Kathrin Koslicki.[45,46] She criticizes Fine's account for "lead[ing] to a proliferation of primitive, *sui generis* relations of parthood and composition."[47] Koslicki worries that since Fine's account focuses on the domain of "ordinary material objects," the same (relatively minor) amount of postulation of primitives would need to be reiterated for other domains, resulting in an explosion of primitive relations and making Fine's ontology dramatically and counterintuitively expansive.

Similarly, Koslicki argues that rather than neatly explaining our common-sense mereology, Fine's account also forces one to accept a superabundance of objects. This problem stems from the fact that there are multiple relations which overlap—some (arguably) necessarily so. For instance, in Fine's example of a ham sandwich, the relation he postulates is "betweenness," where the ham is between the slices of bread. But we could postulate the relation of "having ham and a slice of bread on top (in that order)." This will also describe a ham sandwich, but since there is a different relation, and since relations are literal parts of objects, this is a separate object from the "betweenness" ham sandwich. Yet every ham sandwich will instantiate *both* relations, and so both objects will be present.

In other words, wherever there is one object, there will in fact be multitudinous objects occupying the same space and constituted of the same matter (albeit with a different relational component). Fine recognizes this; however, he does not seem to be dismayed by it.[48] This is somewhat odd, since one of the main reasons to search for an alternative to CEM is its commitment to a radical proliferation of counterintuitive objects. Fine's ontology may be

"inform" its object. See also footnote 12 above.

[42]Fine, "Things and their parts," 70.

[43]As Koslicki calls it (Koslicki, "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology," 145).

[44]See Fine, "Things and their parts," 70.

[45]The adjective "friendly" is most appropriate here; Koslicki expresses much appreciation for Fine's work in mereology.

[46]Koslicki discusses Fine's view in Koslicki, "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology," which she later developed into Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*. Fine responded to the former in Kit Fine, "Response to Kathrin Koslicki," *Dialectica* 61, no. 1 (2007): 161–166, `https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970943`.

[47]See Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*, 82-3.

[48]See Fine, "Things and their parts," 73.

populated by somewhat less counterintuitive objects, but the proliferation problem persists.

1.1.2.3 Koslicki

Koslicki astutely notes that "Fine's general strategy seems to be to presuppose standard mereology and to impose on it further, more stringent conditions."[49] Since such a strategy has proven problematic, it seems advisable to advance a more novel solution. And this is precisely what Koslicki has done herself.

She puts forward a neo-Aristotelian mereology on which form and matter are to be understood in terms of structure and content, respectively.[50]

"Content" seems relatively clear. Since Koslicki is setting forth a mereology of ordinary material objects, "content" is just material parts, components, etc.What is meant by "structure"? Koslicki somewhat metaphorically speaks of form/structure as a "recipe" specifying "a range of selection requirements which must be satisfied by an object's material components."[51] She gives the example of a seating plan at a dinner party, where the guests are to be seated alternating between men and women.[52] Thus, structures, on Koslicki's view, "are precisely the sorts of entities which *make available positions* or places for other objects to occupy, provided that these occupants satisfy the type *restrictions imposed by* the structure on the positions in question; as a result of occupying these positions, the objects in question will exhibit a particular configuration or arrangement *imposed* on them by the structure."[53] Koslicki's structure specifies or designates places for things to fill, and which (type of) things may fill them. In this regard, it has the same sort of control over the (potential) object as Fine's embodiment relations do—and is quite different than the undifferentiating mereological sum of CEM. Also like Fine, Koslicki endorses the notion that the formal aspect of an object is a literal *part* of it, alongside the material parts.[54]

So what differentiates Koslicki's analysis from Fine's? What is the difference between her conception of structure and Fine's relations *qua* "container"? More generally, *what*, ontologically speaking, is structure, on Koslicki's view? To what ontological category does it belong? Her answer is intriguing but unfortunately unclear: she says that structures are at least sometimes objects rather than properties or relations, but abstains from a full ontological analysis for the reason that such is unnecessary for her limited project.[55]

[49]Koslicki, "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology," 149.

[50]This view is laid out in the already-mentioned Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*.

[51]Ibid., 198.

[52]Koslicki credits the example to Verity Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

[53]Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*, 235-6, emphasis added.

[54]Ibid., 168.

[55]Of course, similarly to Fine's, there is much more to Koslicki's account that I do not here have space to

There are a number of benefits to Koslicki's account. Like Fine's, it avoids his criticisms of CEM.In addition, as Tuomas Tahko notes, this "concept of a recipe is intuitively appealing."[56] Another advantage of Koslicki's account is that it is simpler than Fine's. It is true that Koslicki needs a number of postulates to formally describe her view, but at its core, it is less complex than Fine's system of rigid and variable embodiments.

1.1.2.4 Oderberg

However, Koslicki's account has come under friendly fire of its own. David Oderberg finds much to agree with, save for one rather significant caveat—form is not structure.[57] Or, to be more exact, form is not *always* structure. Structure is a purely *quantitative* notion, but form is not—it may be quantitative or *qualitative*.[58] It will be purely quantitative in just those instances where the essence of its object is itself purely quantitative. As examples, Oderberg proposes "mathematical, musical, linguistic, and logical compounds."[59] Other entities, however—such as living things—have more substantive or qualitative forms.[60] In short, Oderberg classifies the structure/content distinction as an *instance of* the form/matter distinction.[61]

Oderberg also objects to the content side of Koslicki's analysis. "The problem...is that this picture of how content is differentiated from structure does not work so well for material substances, the core of Aristotelian ontology...In a word, the problem is this: How is the content of a material substance to be fixed? If it cannot then neither can the structure."[62] The root of the problem is that the content is underdetermined. Oderberg takes up one of Koslicki's own examples—that of a water molecule. He points out that Koslicki takes the content to be the atoms (two hydrogen, one oxygen), but that she could just as easily take the content to be the quarks and electrons which constitute the atoms. Since this is a different content, it in turn implies a different structure/form.[63] So we are forced back to

discuss. She too defines parthood relations via postulates, as well as addresses implications and objections. For more on these, I direct the reader to her work.

[56]Tuomas E. Tahko, "Kathrin Koslicki, The Structure of Objects," *Humana Mente* 19 (2011): 201.

[57]"[Koslicki's] approach, however, is problematic precisely because she converts the form/matter distinction into the structure/content distinction" (Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," 165)—a fundamental disagreement indeed!

[58]Ibid., 170.

[59]Ibid., 169. Oderberg usefully and carefully explicates the difference between form, essence, and definition (see pp. 167-8).

[60]Oderberg does not discuss this in much depth in "Is Form Structure?", saying he will leave it to a later essay. Though it actually predates the paper in question, I suggest Oderberg, *Real Essentialism* for the interested reader.

[61]Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," 169.

[62]Ibid., 170. Oderberg points out that the majority of examples Koslicki settles on are actually not examples of material objects, which are what she ostensibly set out to analyze.

[63]"Different contents yield different structures" (ibid., 171.

the original question: what is the structure/form of the water molecule? Oderberg frames the problem as a dilemma:

> [M]ultiple structures require the double counting of content, which is unacceptable if the contents are supposed to be as real as the structures. But if it is only a matter of choosing to 'carve up' the molecule in one way rather than another, the structures are not real components of substance but somehow relative to perspective or choice. This avenue is no more palatable than the first.[64]

In short, for structural hylomorphism to be true, the structural hylomorphist must be able to (non-arbitrarily) determine what the content is (and thus how it is structured). But he cannot do so. Thus, the theory is false.[65]

As the reader will already have intuited from the previous section, Oderberg's is a much more thorough-going hylomorphism than Fine's or Koslicki's. *All* substances, he claims, are compounds of form and matter. What is more, even non-substances are very frequently also analyzed in terms of form and matter. That being said, material substances are examples of hylomorphic compounds *par excellence*, with a "literal application" of the form/matter distinction, while other objects often display "secondary" or "derivative" instances of the distinction.

This is where we can begin to see Oderberg's view distinguishing itself from Koslicki's. As mentioned above, while he allows that *sometimes* form is just structure, he holds that that is not *always* the case. He cites the instance of bodily motion;[66] whereas on Koslicki's view, there is no literal structuring of the motion (i.e., by intention) and thus no form and no hylomorphic compound, on Oderberg's view, form may still be predicated of the motion *analogically*.[67] This is a disadvantage of Koslicki's view, since it is less explanatorily powerful. Thus, a more substantive hylomorphism proves a stronger theory as well.

Fine and Koslicki (and other neo-Aristotelian philosophers) share a general idea of (re)interpreting Aristotle's hylomorphism into distinctly modern terms, such as relation or structure. In so doing, they leave out some objects (as in the above example of bodily motion) which could otherwise be explained by a hylomorphic account. But there remains the possibility of retaining Aristotle's insights more or less wholesale, and indeed some have done and still do so, including, of course, Oderberg. Thus, he says, "form *in general* is

[64]Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," 172.

[65]Oderberg also outlines a number of smaller criticisms for the structural hylomorphist view. However, I leave off the discussion here, directing the reader to Oderberg's essay for more detailed discussion.

[66]"The case of action shows how the distinctions might come apart" (Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," 165).

[67]Oderberg here means the classical sense of analogical predication, not the colloquial sense of a mere linguistic comparison.

no more than the principle of specificity of any thing, that by which it is what it is."[68] Accordingly, it will vary depending on what the object under consideration is—i.e., it may be purely quantitative (structure), or qualitative.

Oderberg also embraces all the "controversial metaphysical machinery"[69] of Aristotle, including the teleological aspects of form and the act/potency distinction. Thus his mereology, and his Aristotelianism more generally, is indeed more substantive than that of Fine or Koslicki.

A final note: the relationship between form and matter is, if anything, tighter on this sort of strong Aristotelianism. While it is true to say, on this view, that form and matter are "parts" of an object, it is important to keep in mind that they are both essential to the object. If a statue were to lose either its bronze or its shape, in both cases it just ceases to be a statue. Form and matter together constitute *one* object; they are not to be broken apart (other than by analysis, in the mind). In fact, both form and prime matter are *abstractions*, in the literal sense—they do not exist apart from each other. Forms, on a strong Aristotelianism, are *immanent*, not transcendent. They do not exist in isolation, as Plato's Forms do, but only in the actual objects they are forms of.

1.2 The Question

We have seen how a general hylomorphic ontology of objects is supposed to go, as well as a few more specific contemporary outworkings of the general ideas. But, we might wonder, which objects are included within the hylomorphist's analysis? *All* objects?

Is it possible that *musical works* are also hylomorphic objects? They do not seem to be material objects like people, dogs, trees, and motorcycles; for one thing, they can occur (be performed) more than once. For this reason, musical works are commonly understood as abstract entities (though this analysis comes with its own set of problems, as will be discussed later). But hylomorphism has been used to understand immaterial or abstract objects before;[70] why not musical works?

If musical works *are* hylomorphic, then what would this mean? How would we spell this out? The most foundational questions, obviously, are what could serve as the matter and form of musical works? Finding suitable candidates for these roles is key to a hylomorphic analysis. And of course, why would we want a hylomorphic account of musical works in the first place? Well, it would obviously integrate our metaphysics of musical works with our metaphysics of objects more generally; such simplicity would be a theoretic virtue. But

[68] Oderberg, *Real Essentialism*, 65, italics mine.
[69] As Koslicki calls it (Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*, 170).
[70] See footnote 8 above.

would there be any more specific benefits? Would a hylomorphic account of musical works tell us something about how they come into being, perhaps, or how they operate? And even if it can answer these questions, can a hylomorphic account answer *better* than competing theories?

These are good questions, and deserve equally good answers. They will all be addressed—in the next chapters.

Chapter 2
Hylomorphic Musical Works

2.0.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will address the question raised at the end of chapter 1—namely, what would a hylomorphic account of musical works specifically look like? I approach this question from the ground up, as it were, by asking what the matter and form of musical works might be. In each case, I propose a "naïve" response, i.e., the candidate that seems intuitively most obvious, before arguing that this answer is insufficient. I then suggest an alternative that avoids the problems of the naïve candidate. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to explicating the proposed candidate for the role of form, namely Susanne Langer's notion of *semblance*. Finally, I consider the relationship between semblance and hylomorphism more generally.

Throughout the chapter, I will refer back to a single musical work—Beethoven's Fifth Symphony—as a working example and case study. In fact, at first I will refer not to the whole work, or even the first movement, but only to the legendary introductory theme itself:

Figure 1: Theme from Beethoven's 5th Symphony



This has been called the "fate" theme, and has often been interpreted as representing the "knocking of fate," especially in relation to Beethoven's increasing deafness. Its associations are thus ominous, implacable, foreboding, fearful. Obviously, a theme does not a work make. I use this (overly) simplified example to facilitate the explanation of the general theory—what applies to the theme should apply, *mutatis mutandi*, to the work.

2.1 Form and Matter: Filling in the View

2.1.1 What is the matter of musical works?

What is the *matter* of a musical work? The first and most intuitive candidate is *sounds*—actual, physical notes, pitches, timbres, etc. On this view, the matter of the opening theme of Beethoven's Fifth is just the three octaves of Gs, E♭s, Fs, and Ds, i.e., the sounds made by the instruments. But this answer runs into problems quickly. As a hylomorphic object, a musical work needs both matter and form to exist. If the matter of a musical work is actual sounds, i.e., of a performance, then that implies that the work's existence is tied to its performances. Just as a statue smashed to bits ceases to exist, a musical work would go out of existence when its sounds do. But obviously, the composer finishes the work before its performance; if the work does not exist then, what did he conceive and compose? Similarly, we can think of, remember, discuss, and evaluate musical works independently of their performances, and while we are not listening to any performance of it. How to account for this, if physical sounds are the matter of musical works?

Actual notes, pitches, timbres, etc. seem to be better candidates for the matter of *performances*, rather than of works proper. On this understanding, the existence conditions track our intuitions perfectly. We say a performance is "over," and we mean that it has ceased, that it no longer exists. How do we demarcate this? Precisely when the notes stop. Thus, the three octaves of Gs, E♭s, Fs, and Ds of the fate theme heard in the concert hall are (part of) the matter of the performance, which is over when its notes cease.

What then is the matter of musical works? I propose we go up a metaphysical level and nominate note-*types* (as well as the appropriate types for rhythms, timbres, etc.). Of course, these are abstract, and thus an unusual candidate for the *matter* role, given that the most common examples given of hylomorphic compounds are material objects such as humans, tables, dogs, and trees. But there are two reasons this move should be accepted. For one, hylomorphism has already been predicated of some abstract objects, as we saw in the previous chapter,[71] and the matter in such cases must also be abstract. So there is precedent. Second, the traditional concept of hylomorphic matter goes beyond our modern idea of matter as the subject of study of particle physics, as also discussed in the previous chapter. We should thus be open to other uses of "matter" than just physical stuff, atoms, etc.

[71] See again footnote 8 in chapter 1.

2.1.2 What is the form of musical works?

But note-types themselves are not enough to make a musical work—there needs to be an *order* or *arrangement* to them.[72] Just as the parts of a motorcycle strewn across a garage are not a motorcycle, so mere unordered note-types are not a musical work. To see this, consider again the introductory theme of Beethoven's Fifth—or even just the first half of the theme. It consists of four notes, three of which are the same pitch, the fourth being a major third lower, in a particular (very familiar) rhythm. If any of these elements are changed, the result just is not the iconic theme anymore. So the order of the notes appears essential to the theme, and not just the notes themselves. This abstract ordering is what is meant by talk of "sound structure." And if this is true of something so simple as a four-note theme, then it applies to more complex musical entities as well, such as melodies and entire works.

These sound structures are the first and most obvious candidate for the form of musical works. Call this view *structural musical hylomorphism* (SMH). Many philosophers have taken this position—including, notably, David Oderberg.[73] This fact is particularly significant because Oderberg's is an example of a strong Aristotelianism, as discussed in the previous chapter. This would seem to suggest that on an (any?) hylomorphic analysis, the sound structure is the best candidate for the form of musical works. That is, if even a non-reductionistic Aristotelian holds sound structures to be the forms of musical works, this option should be taken seriously.

2.1.2.1 Creatability

But sound structures will not do. One reason is that musical works are composed, and sound structures are not. More precisely, the process of musical composition appears to involve bringing the musical work into existence. But the sound structure, as an abstract object, is arguably eternal and thus neither goes into nor out of existence. Since the same applies to note-types, both the matter and form exist eternally, and so it seems that the musical work they compose should also exist eternally, contra our initial supposition.[74,75]

But, the sound structuralist could reply, this does not necessarily follow—musical works may be created even though their *parts* are eternal. How? Consider a table, which is of

[72] We may include timbre in "note" here, and rhythm in "order."

[73] Oderberg says that structure is "plausibly" the form of musical works, along with other abstracta such as mathematical and logical entities. See again Oderberg, "Is Form Structure?," 169.

[74] Musical creation is a contentious issue in the philosophy of music; I discuss it more in the next chapter. Until then, I beg the reader's indulgence.

[75] Oderberg's conception of structure is more Aristotelian than Platonic, however; he differs in this from Koslicki, as well as most contemporary philosophers of music. On this picture, structures are immanent, existing only in objects, and are not eternally existing objects of their own. If one takes this metaphysical approach, the objection I have raised will have little bite.

course made of legs and a top. The table is assembled at some point. Thus, the parts (legs and top) preexist the table proper. But now consider some object with abstract parts. The parts, since they are abstracta, exist eternally. But, analogously to the case of the table and its parts, this does not mean that the object itself exists eternally. The parts may preexist it, like the table legs and top, only eternally. Apply this to musical works: the sound structure and note-types may preexist the work itself, but it is nevertheless brought into existence by some sort of assembling of the two into a hylomorphic compound.

I confess to some dissatisfaction with this reply, though I cannot decisively say why. There is some ambiguity, I think, regarding what exactly the composer's creative act consists in; that is, *how* it binds eternal abstract types into parts of a new whole. There is an analogy to the table, to be sure. But can there be any deeper metaphysical analysis? For instance, is the thing that binds the parts together—presumably an intentional act of some sort—itself a part of the work? If not, what else could it be? Or is there any change in the sound structure or note-types themselves? Presumably not—but then in virtue of what can we say there is a new object?

Again, this alone is no refutation. But there is another reason why SMH is false. It has to do with *musical expression*.

2.1.2.2 Musical expression

It is a commonplace that musical works "express."[76] This seems to be a—if not *the*—main purpose behind their creation. The introductory theme from the Fifth Symphony, as I wrote above, expresses fate, dread, foreboding, and impending doom; Pärt's *Cantus in Memoriam Benjamin Britten* expresses loss and grief as well as any music I have ever heard. But what kind of expression is actually at play here? I first distinguish between two senses of "express," and argue that musical works do not quite fit either sense.

Many philosophers of music argue that musical works do not technically *express*, but rather *are expressive of* emotions. Trivedi succinctly distinguishes the two notions: "To express a mental state is to display outwardly an actual occurrent state in one's psychology, whereas being expressive of a mental state involves merely displaying outwardly features typically associated with that state, without necessarily having or feeling that state."[77] Since musical works have no minds, they cannot *express* in this sense, only *be expressive of* some mental state.

But it seems that expressiveness does not quite fit the bill either. First, it is too weak—it

[76]I address what and how shortly; the point here is just that works do in fact express.

[77]Saam Trivedi, "Resemblance Theories," chap. 21 in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, ed. Andrew Kania and Theodore Gracyk (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 223.

cannot capture the sense of directness and intention we experience when listening to music. We think about and interact with musical works in a drastically and qualitatively different way than, say, the "sad" face of a St. Bernard. For instance, the sadness expressed by the dog's face often prompts us to laughter, but a sad work properly understood never does so. We appreciate, pay for, seek out, and revere works in ways we would never do for a St. Bernard's moping face. This sort of general expressiveness is a far cry from the immediacy of musical works and their expression. If this is all that musical works do, then they do not seem all that different from many other things in the world—and yet we do treat them differently.

Second, saying music "is expressive" rather than "expresses" does not explain how it can seem that a work is *communicating* with or to us, as when we say, "that piece really spoke to me," or "I finally understand that piece." The very use of this kind of language implies some kind of intellectual element to musical "expression," and that is difficult to explain in terms of mere expressivity.

To reiterate: musical works clearly express, even if what this expression is is still at this stage unclear. I will return to this and propose an answer later in this chapter. For now, I will simply use "expression" to denote this still somewhat fuzzy notion.

How does this apply to SMH? If musical works are made of note-type matter and sound structure form, then their expression becomes something of a mystery. The argument goes like this: if SMH is true, then musical expression must be extrinsic. But musical expression is not extrinsic, but intrinsic. Therefore, SMH is false.

Before I defend the argument, a clarification is in order—namely, what is intrinsicality? Though there is no little debate over this question, it is most often taken to describe properties that an object has " in virtue of the way it is in itself," not in relation to other objects. Extrinsic properties, then, are those that objects have "in virtue of their relations or lack of relations to other things," not in themselves.[78]

But this formulation will not work. Consider again a table. It has a certain mass, say, 25 kg. This mass is in virtue of the decisions of the carpenter—for instance, if he had carved decorative grooves in it, it would have had slightly less mass. Therefore, if we adopt the definition given above, the table's mass must be extrinsic. But mass is a paradigmatically *intrinsic* property. So, defining intrinsicality/extrinsicality by properties held "in virtue of" is inadequate. What then? I will use another of David Lewis' characterizations—"intrinsic properties are just those properties that never differ between duplicates."[79] But what are

[78]This definition is from David Lewis (see Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 61).

[79]David K. Lewis, "New work for a theory of universals," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61, no. 4 (1983): 355, doi:10.1080/00048408312341131.

duplicates? Lewis defines duplicates as objects sharing the same basic or "natural" properties.[80] By way of illustration, he starts with the intuitive notion of duplication, as in the case of a photocopier, and then extends this to imagine *perfect* duplication. The two duplicate objects will still have some ineradicable differences—e.g., location and origin. But what will the two objects necessarily have in common, in virtue of being duplicates? Structure, composition, size, density, etc.—precisely these are the intrinsic properties.[81]

What are the natural properties of musical works?[82] Presumably, the relations of pitches (internal structure), for one. Expression, I contend, is another. That is, duplicate musical works would necessarily express the same emotion. It is true that the expression is in virtue of the composer's intentions and acts just as the mass of the table is in virtue of the carpenter's decisions and acts, but since it is shared by all duplicates, it is nevertheless intrinsic. In the next chapter, I will note how musical hylomorphism specifically provides grounds for this claim.

Now, back to the argument. The reasoning for the first premise is that sound structures and note-types, as abstract objects, are often taken to exist eternally (or sempiternally). If expression were intrinsic, then they would express eternally. But that is absurd. Intuitively, expression essentially requires humans, or at least minds. But expression can only be intrinsic or extrinsic—these two options exhaust the metaphysical space, as it were. Therefore, on SMH, expression must be extrinsic. But, as I said, musical expression is indeed intrinsic, and SMH is therefore false.

At this juncture, I again beg the reader's indulgence; I will return to this issue in the depth it deserves in the next chapter. For now, the takeaway point is that *if* musical expression is intrinsic, then sound structures cannot be the forms of musical works.

2.1.2.3 Conclusion

What, then, is the form of musical works, if it is not sound structure? As I said, form as a metaphysical concept generally has a structural aspect to it, but what other type of structure it could be? I offer a more radical proposal: that it is something called *semblance*. "What is that?" one might ask. "Semblance of what?" My use of "semblance" here is technical—it refers to a specific concept developed by 20$^{\text{th}}$-century philosopher Susanne K. Langer. And it is to explicating this concept that I now turn.

[80] Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 61-2.

[81] Lewis, "New work for a theory of universals," 355.

[82] Lewis has in mind those properties included in a physical Theory of Everything, but I will need some others for abstract objects like musical works.

2.2 Susanne Langer's view explained

Unfortunately, Langer's notion can be somewhat obscure. I will explicate it as accurately and concisely as I can, but I do not claim that what I present is the only interpretation. Rather, I will only advance one way of reading Langer, one which is consistent and possesses explanatory benefits relevant to my project of a hylomorphic account of musical works.[83] That being said, what I am about to exposit is *not* my view. While Langer has some insights and concepts I hold to be crucial for a proper understanding of musical works, her general theory is, I maintain, incorrect. I present her view here so that the concept of semblance I will adopt can be properly understood.

2.2.1 Musical works as symbols of feeling

The first thing to note about Langer's view is that for her, musical works (and artworks generally) are *symbols*. This conception immediately raises three questions. For one, if a musical work is a symbol, what is it a symbol of? And second, what *is* it? Just saying "a symbol" is not a very metaphysically substantive answer. Third, how does a symbol work, on Langer's view?

Langer's answer to the first question is straightforward: musical works are symbols of "feeling." However, it is important to understand that, on Langer's usage, this notion is exceedingly broad. By "feeling," she means "*everything that can be felt*, from physical sensation and pain, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions and intellectual tensions. Thus, feeling may be thought of as the subjective aspect of our experience."[84] For Langer, an artwork "*means* a feeling, or makes a feeling known, articulates it in an objective form, or meaning-bearing matter."[85] Musical works are symbols of what is sometimes called our "inner life," just as words are symbols of the outer world around us.

2.2.2 Semblance

The second question—what *is* the symbol, ontologically speaking—is less easily answered than the first, since Langer focuses much more on the functions and epistemology of symbols than on their metaphysics. By a "symbol," Langer means something which "articulat[es]

[83]To be clear: in this exposition of Langer's view, I will use "form" according to her usage, *not* the Aristotelian/hylomorphic definition (if the two occur in conjunction, I will be careful to differentiate them).

[84]Sam Reese, "Forms of Feeling: The Aesthetic Theory of Susanne K. Langer," *Music Educators Journal* 63, no. 8 (1977): 45, doi:10.2307/3395285, italics in original. Innis observes that "Langer uses 'sentience' and 'feeling' as comprehensive terms: they cover the total range of 'movements' and 'states' that mark human subjectivity and its organic embodiment" (Robert E. Innis, *Susanne Langer in Focus: The Symbolic Mind* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009), 99).

[85]Ibid., 97, emphasis in original.

and present[s]" one or more concepts.[86] Langer calls this process "expression"[87]—symbols "express" their meanings.[88]

Musical works, on Langer's view, are a special kind of symbol—what she calls a "semblance" or "virtual object."[89,90] I give Langer's own explanation:

> "What is 'created' in a work of art?...More than a delightful combination of sensory elements; far more than any reflection or 'interpretation' of objects, people, events...It is an image, created for the first time out of things that are not imaginal, but quite realistic—canvas or paper, and paints or carbon or ink...[A work of art] becomes an image when it presents itself purely to our vision, i.e. as a sheer visual form instead of a locally and practically related object. If we receive it as a completely visual thing, we abstract its appearance from its material existence. What we see in this way becomes simply a thing of vision—a form, an image...Something arises from the process of arranging colors on a surface, something that is created, not just gathered and set in a new order: that is the image. It emerges suddenly from the disposition of the pigments, and with its advent the very existence of the canvas and of the paint 'arranged' on it seems to be abrogated; those actual objects become difficult to perceive in their own right. A new appearance has superseded their natural aspect."[91]

An image or semblance (Langer uses these interchangeably) is a "virtual object,"[92] a sort of "virtual reality."[93] It is "something that exists only for perception, abstracted from the physical and causal order."

We can understand this notion of semblance as a type of emergent entity. Consider again Langer's own description: "Something arises from the process of arranging colors on a surface...[i]t *emerges* suddenly from the disposition of the pigments."[94] In this summary, it sounds like an artwork is something that just arises whenever colours are arranged in a certain way, and which supervenes on them.

---

[86]Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (London: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1953), 26.

[87]I am not here talking about musical expression. I will call this "Langerian expression" or "logical expression" when the distinction is not clear.

[88]Thus, Langer sometimes speaks of "expressive" form, on account of this relation. Since symbols have meaning by (Langerian) expression, this just means that symbolic form and expressive form are essentially synonymous.

[89]This idea applies generally to all artworks, of whatever medium. Much more on this concept can be found in the chapter of the same name in *Feeling and Form*.

[90]Langer also uses "apparition" and "image" as general terms for the semblance (the latter term still refers to all art media, not just the visual ones).

[91]Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 46-8.

[92]"An image is, indeed, a purely virtual 'object'...its visible character is its entire being" (ibid., 48).

[93]David Clowney uses this phrase in a PowerPoint presentation, and it seems useful as a more easily understandable gloss for the modern reader (see David Clowney, *Reading Guide for Langer, "Feeling and Form"*, PowerPoint presentation, Online, accessed June 25, 2021, `http://users.rowan.edu/~clowney/Aesthetics/ReadingGuides/Langer.ppt`).

[94]Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 48, emphasis added.

But that is not the whole story. Langer is also clear that semblances are products of minds.[95] What is more, she implies that they are also dependent on minds for their beginning and for their later perception. The description of the process above is referring not just to the painter's work, but to ours as well. We "abstract" the image—the artwork—from raw material components arranged for us for this purpose by the artist.

But emergent objects are not necessarily mind-dependent nor created. Semblance may well be emergent, but Langer must argue for these additional features. Recall that Langer holds the semblances of artworks to be *symbols*[96]—this is the key. Emergent objects are not necessarily mind-dependent, but symbols are. Consider an ant crawling on the sand leaving a line that looks like Winston Churchill. Neither the ant nor the line thereby *depicts* Churchill; there seems to be something else that is required for representation.[97] The most plausible candidate for such a "something else" is a mind.

This exactly parallels Langerian semblance. Lines on a canvas do not automatically have meaning any more than the ant's lines on the sand absent some sort of intention—they do not simply emerge. They must be *meant*. It seems, then, that semblance is a certain *subtype* of emergent object—a symbol. It emerges from the raw materials of an artwork—paint and canvas, note-types, clay, etc.—by the action of a mind.

Let's take an example. Consider the case of film.[98] Many smaller animals do not perceive film footage in the same way we do; rather than a continuous flow of video, they presumably see the individual frames or stills.[99] The difference is clearly not in the raw components; we see the same individual frames as a rat or bird. Yet we see something more—we see movement, people, spaces and environments that move and change.[100] The film *qua* artwork can be understood as that which we see but which these animals do not—the semblance.

What of musical works specifically? They too are semblances; rather than virtual *space*, they are virtual *time*. A musical work contains a whole new temporal world, as it were, bound only by its own rules of theme and development, harmony and musical form (sonata, rondo, etc.), conflict and resolution, narrative, etc. This is why time can seem to vanish while we listen to music, why a twenty-minute piece can pass in the blink of an eye. Our

[95] Cf. "An image in this sense...is the artist's creation" (Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 47).

[96] The Langerian image is "an abstraction, a symbol, the bearer of an idea" (ibid.).

[97] This example is from Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 1.

[98] Langer does not use this example herself, but I believe she would endorse it.

[99] See Kevin Healy et al., "Metabolic rate and body size are linked with perception of temporal information," *Animal Behaviour* 86, no. 4 (2013): 685–696, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.06.018, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0003347213003060.

[100] For Langer, each art medium has a specific type of virtual object (the latter half of *Feeling and Form* surveys a number of media and their types of virtual objects). For instance, films, as well as sculptures and paintings, create virtual spaces and volumes.

internal perception of time, usually synced to the world around us, is temporarily annexed by the internal, virtual time of the musical work.

All this is to provide some basic explication of the entity Langer proposes to analyze artworks. Now we will see how it fits into her general aesthetic theory.

2.2.3 The semblance as the symbol

Putting together what we have surveyed, this means that musical works are semblances or virtual objects which symbolize human feeling.[101] But *how* musical works do this? How does an abstracted virtual object "mean" feelings?

Langer's answer is that the symbol and the symbolized—a musical work, and a feeling—share the same general form or abstract structure. That is, the structure and flow of the musical work maps on to that of the feeling. In her own words:

> "The tonal structures we call 'music' bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling—forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses—not joy and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both—the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. *Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.*"[102]

In short, "music sounds the way feelings feel."[103]

Obviously, this sounds drastically different than how we understand other symbols, such as stop signs. There are two different types of symbolic expression on Langer's view. One is *discursive* symbolism, best exemplified by language. It is characterized by its linear and sequential nature, as, for instance, a sentence always consists of words one after another, rather than all at once.[104] *Presentational* symbolism, however, is all-at-once, as in a painting, which is seen "at a glance." This is not to deny that our eyes do in fact wander across a painting, noticing and focusing various details and excluding others. But the effect of the painting is something seen all at once. Anyone who has ever been "struck" by a painting can attest to this fact. For one thing, the speed of comprehension is too fast to be plausibly said to be "read" from the individual elements of the painting. In addition, upon close

[101] Langer also calls the semblance an "expressive form," since the abstracted form expresses ideas of human feeling.

[102] Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 27, emphasis added.

[103] Reese, "Forms of Feeling," 46.

[104] This says nothing about word *order*, which is dictated by the grammar of the particular language. The point is only that words must come sequentially. When a number of people all speak at the same time, they do not say something new taken together, nor do they make an artwork, but instead lose whatever intelligibility they might have had.

examination one often finds details one hadn't noticed before—this despite the fact that one has already "understood" the painting as a whole. The use of a painting as an illustration of presentational symbolism is not incidental. For Langer, presentational symbolism is *the* mode of artistic expression.

It is important to understand that, for Langer, both of these types of symbolism are fundamentally *rational* (thus she speaks of discursive and presentational *reason* as well as symbolism). While discursive symbolism is generally what we first think of when we consider rationality, Langer is adamant that presentational symbolism is equally, though irreducibly, a part of the rational mind. This allows her to hold that artworks communicate, and communicate *truth*, while simultaneously acknowledging the fundamental disconnect between artworks' "communication" and more mundane (i.e., linguistic) instances. It also deftly explains why we can have a strong sense that an artwork "says" something, and yet be unable to explain or recount it in words. The two modes are incommensurable.

Since Langer holds that expression of some feeling is the purpose and essential function of a musical work, that expression—and the way it may be accomplished—is of key importance to the creation and development of the work itself. In this way, Langer also calls the semblance the "Idea" of a work, which is present at its inception and informs the creative decisions along the way by providing the goal at which they aim. Not just any combination of notes will do; just as a feeling is articulated, or has an internal structure, so must the musical work expressing it have the same articulation. Changing even one note in such a case as the Fate theme of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony results in a drastically different affect. Thus, the semblance is *normative* with respect to the raw material of the musical work (i.e., the notes and rhythms).[105]

Langer's solution has a certain intuitive appeal. After all, we do in fact seem to be able to differentiate a painting from the canvas and brushstrokes, a bust from the bronze, and a musical work from the mere arrangement of notes.[106] But beyond this, the position is difficult. It may still be somewhat unclear exactly what semblances *are*. Langer uses a variety of terms for it, and they do not conduce to a single interpretation.

2.3 Langerian semblance and hylomorphism

Thus far, I have examined hylomorphism, and made some moves towards a hylomorphism of musical works in particular. I have also surveyed Langer's general theory, and in particular

[105]It is in this sense that Langer speaks of "commanding form", i.e., the semblance considered as a guiding light.

[106]For instance, it seems plausible that a dog sees the exact same colours as we do when looking at a certain painting (different ocular physiology set aside), yet does not see the painting itself *as a painting*.

the notion of semblance. It now remains to discuss the relationship between Langer's view and hylomorphism, and how they fit together. More specifically, I will expand upon my earlier statement that Langer's theory, while insightful in some ways, is incorrect.

2.3.1 Semblance as Aristotelian form

The observant reader will have noticed that Langer herself does not appear to have had a hylomorphic view of musical works.[107] More specifically, whereas Langer identifies semblance with the musical work, I have proposed to identify the semblance with the form of the musical work only, rather than the work entire. But why take this approach? Why appropriate Langer's insights in service of a metaphysical view not her own? Simply this: that Langer's view has one particularly adverse, counterintuitive consequence, namely that it does not count the raw materials as actual parts of a musical work. To illustrate this, consider a painting. On Langer's view, it is some sort of emergent object brought about from the paint and canvas via the mental action of the painter. This implies that the paint and canvas are not actually parts of the painting. But, intuitively, they are.[108] The emergence relationship might be necessary, and the material essential to the work—as indeed it seems—but on this view, it cannot be said that it is *part* of the work itself.

To sharpen the point, we can ask *why* the underlying material seems essential to the semblance, and why the relationship between the material and the semblance seems to be necessary. To this, Langer offers no real answer. Consider the musical case. Here, the material is the note-types. Again, to say that the semblance alone is the musical work is just to deny that note-types are parts of the work—when they are so obviously a part that some hold they just *are* the work!

The hylomorphic view I have proposed avoids this problem. The paint and canvas and the semblance are just one object, a hylomorphic compound. This is why we intuitively hold the material to be a part of the work, why the material is essential, and why the relationship necessarily holds. Thus, it is my contention that semblance is best fitted for the role of the *form* of musical works, rather than the musical work itself. This conclusion is strengthened by a number of things Langer says about it—semblance, even on Langer's own view, seems to be very similar to Aristotelian form.

For one thing, Langer says we "abstract" the semblance from the raw material of an artwork. But this is virtually identical to the Aristotelian view of how we "abstract" "forms" from the things we see, and thereby understand the world around us. This process is de-

[107] Though see Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 52, where Langer discusses artistic "form" and "content." At the least, Langer did not display as thorough-going an Aristotelianism as I suggest here.

[108] Indeed, it is even called a "*paint*ing," not an "abstracting" or "conceptualizing."

pendent on the material; without the material body of a dog, we cannot access the form (and thus cannot understand the thing)—without the matter, we see no dog.[109] Similarly, without the paint and canvas, we cannot abstract the semblance and thereby understand the symbol of feeling. This dependence is just because the two—form and matter—compose one thing: a hylomorphic compound.

Second, Langer attributes normativity to the semblance—this is the idea of "commanding form," or the "Poetic Idea," which shapes the artwork and directs the artist's creative decisions. But this sort of normative governing is exactly what a form does. The form directs what and where the parts can be.

On a strong Aristotelianism, the same phenomenon occurs even before the hylomorphic object properly exists. This is just Aristotle's notion of final cause. So, for instance, the form of a house is in the mind of the architect before it exists in the house itself.[110] This, again, is exactly what Langer describes. That such a particular, unusual feature is present in both accounts underlines how similar they are.

Thus, from these similarities, we can see that semblance as Langer understands it indeed seems like an Aristotelian form.

2.3.2 Which hylomorphism?

Now that we have a rough sketch of the matter and form of musical works, we can address the question of their relationship. Recall from chapter 1 that there are a number of ways to understand form and its relation to the matter it informs.[111] The approaches of Fine and Koslicki were discussed; the former interpreting form as a relation, and the latter as structure. Oderberg's more substantially Aristotelian hylomorphism was also mentioned. But which of these approaches (if any) accurately describes the musical work as hylomorphic object? That is, on which model should we understand musical hylomorphism?

I contend that Oderberg's is the most natural fit for a musical hylomorphism. This choice turns on two factors in particular: the abstract and qualitative nature of musical works, and the normativity of Langerian semblance.

[109] Technically, we can hold in our minds a form without seeing one manifested in the world—e.g., when we think of a dog—but we can only do this with forms we have previously abstracted from the material world. "Nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu," said Thomas Aquinas, "nothing is in the intellect which is not first in the senses" (*Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* Q.2, Art.3, Arg.19).

[110] Aristotle lays out his final causality doctrine in *Physics* II.3 and defends it in *Physics* II.8. The house-building example also appears in Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1937), 639b12-20.

[111] Of course, the three interpretations I mentioned are not, and are not intended to be, comprehensive.

2.3.2.1 Fine

The hylomorphic ontology of musical works I have proposed does not sit very comfortably with a Finean interpretation of hylomorphism. Fine's analysis is explicitly meant for *material* objects.[112] Musical works, as we have seen, are best understood as abstracta, so Fine's analysis seems to miss the mark. One might attempt some kind of translation or extension of Fine's framework, whereon it applies to abstract or immaterial objects as well. Fine's original proposal understandably enough takes physical matter to be the matter side of hylomorphism; it would have to be expanded to allow for "immaterial matter."

In addition, it is difficult to see how Fine's form-as-relation could be squared with Langer's notion of semblance. The former seems too ontologically bare to carry the meaning a symbol does. It is true that semblance is something like a structure that makes known an idea, and to the extent that the form is a quantitative structure, it seems roughly analogous to a relation (or a set of relations). But there is also something intrinsically qualitative about a symbol; there is a meaning to a symbol, and if Langer is correct, then the meaning of a musical symbol is a feeling, and thus quite qualitative indeed.

Besides these incongruities, there are the other, more general problems with Fine's view, as I argued in the previous chapter, which should also deter us from taking this approach.

2.3.2.2 Koslicki

Koslicki's structural hylomorphism at first seems a better fit for musical works.[113] Recall her relatively strong notion of structure, on which it not only makes "slots" for content, but even dictates (to some extent) what can go in those slots. These traits of Koslickian structure reflect well the normative aspect of Langer's semblance.

However, Koslicki's view shares the same crucial problem as Fine's—viz., that it is designed for ordinary material objects, not abstracta. The structural hylomorphist might argue for a kind of adaptation or expansion to allow it to account for abstracta, but as Oderberg notes with his illustration of bodily movement, Koslicki's seems a rather binary view between literal and metaphorical—either something is structured and has a (material) content, or it is not. This leaves out analogical applications of structure and content (and hylomorphism generally), including the case of musical works.

Besides all this, there is the suspicion that such an adaptation of structural hylomorphism for abstracta would simply end up turning into an even stronger hylomorphism like

[112]"I wish to sketch a theory of the general nature of material things" (Fine, "Things and their parts," 61.

[113]Koslicki actually discusses musical works, but she does so in order to explicate the notion of musical structure, rather than to develop a structural hylomorphic analysis of musical works themselves (see Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*, 246-8). Koslicki does not appear interested in a metaphysics of musical works per se.

that of Oderberg (this concern is relevant to an expansion of Finean hylomorphism as well). Regardless, I will leave this hypothetical expansion of structural hylomorphism to its proponents.

2.3.2.3 Oderberg

Oderberg's hylomorphism is an interesting case. It is the strongest Aristotelian mereology of the three, as I have argued, and it provides the best ground for the musical hylomorphism I have been developing. These two facts are not purely coincidental. By allowing form to be (sometimes) qualitative, rather than purely quantitative, Oderberg's hylomorphism is much more easily applicable to musical works—considered as abstract symbols—than are Fine's or Koslicki's versions of hylomorphism. In addition, Oderberg's notion of analogical matter is precisely what is needed for a hylomorphism of musical works. Whereas the first two interpretations are geared towards material objects, Oderberg explicitly allows for a hylomorphism of abstract objects. Again, this more thorough-going hylomorphism proves to be the best way of generating a specifically musical hylomorphism.

Oderberg's hylomorphism also easily accommodates the normative aspect of Langerian semblance. While the others make some basic allowance for normativity, they tend to shy away from anything more than the bare minimum. Oderberg, on the other hand, fully accepts the strong Aristotelian version of form and formal and final cause.

Accordingly, while others may be adapted to the case of musical works, Oderberg's hylomorphism is, I argue, the most natural fit for a musical hylomorphism. Moreover, the very adaptations which would be required of Finean and Koslickian hylomorphism themselves seem to be generally in the direction of Oderberg's version.

The interesting part is that Oderberg himself apparently disagrees with the musical hylomorphism I have set forth. Not literally, of course—Oderberg nowhere considers Langerian semblance. What I mean is that Oderberg appears content to take sound structure to be the form of musical works.[114] Nevertheless, for the reasons I have given above, I maintain that sound structure alone is not enough to be the form of musical works. Thus, while Oderberg's hylomorphic framework seems the best way to understand musical hylomorphism, his actual *views* about musical ontology are, I contend, lacking.

[114]Oderberg implicitly takes this position in "Is Form Structure?", but does not argue for it specifically, since musical works (and their forms) are merely examples in that paper.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has been dedicated to getting a grasp on what a hylomorphic account of musical works might look like. I undertook this by considering the fundamental questions of what the matter and form of musical works are. For the former, I answered note-types. For the latter, I proposed the notion of "semblance," from the work of Susanne Langer. In order to properly explain what this proposal amounts to, I then set out an explanation of Langer's idea.

After thus laying out the basic elements of a musical hylomorphism, I examined the relationship between musical form and matter. I compared it to the three types of hylomorphism discussed in chapter one, and argued that David Oderberg's strong hylomorphism seems the best fit, though Oderberg himself apparently holds to a more minimal sound structural hylomorphist account of musical works.

But a question remains. At the end of chapter 1, I had asked what the value of a hylomorphic account of musical works was? What could it do, especially in a field already replete with competing theories? It is my contention that this hylomorphic account is a powerful and holistic theory of musical works, and that it answers many of the questions we have about them, such as what they are, and how they do what they do. Such large claims need to be justified, and it is precisely that endeavour with which the next chapter is occupied.

Chapter 3
Defending the View

In this third and final chapter, I defend the hylomorphic view I have been developing. I intend to do this by describing a number of areas where any metaphysical view of musical works should have something substantive and explanatory to say (the "data"), and then demonstrating how an hylomorphic analysis is indeed such a view. Moreover, I contend, it succeeds where other theories have faltered.

3.1 The Data

There are many things we know about musical works. Any metaphysical or ontological account of musical works should have something to say about them. Ideally, it will explain each of them substantively, rather than simply denying them, and will do so in a simple, parsimonious way. The hylomorphic account I have developed is well suited to provide just such a holistic, powerful, parsimonious explanation.

In order to show this, I now turn to a discussion of some of the questions or aspects that the hylomorphic account should address.[115] First, I survey some of the general metaphysical points that we seem to know about musical works. Then, I turn to a specifically *aesthetic* question, more about what musical works *do* than about what they *are*.

3.1.1 General metaphysical features

3.1.1.1 Repeatability

One of the most basic things that we know about musical works is that they are *repeatable*. That is, they can exist more than once, and even in multiple locations at the same time. This

[115]I do not claim that these are all of the relevant or interesting questions a metaphysical account of musical works should address—far from it! But I have selected a number to be representative, to show the strength of the hylomorphic account in various areas, and to underscore the way the hylomorphic account accommodates the insights of other theories even as it goes beyond them.

is just what happens every time a work is performed—every performance of Beethoven's Fifth is a performance of *the same work*—and is in a sense the whole point of musical works.[116] Repeatability may seem a commonplace, but precisely because it seems such a basic element of musical works, it should be a basic element of any metaphysics of musical works. Any theory that somehow failed to account for this piece of data about musical works would immediately be at a tremendous disadvantage compared to literally any other view.

But what implications could such a basic piece of data have? What constraints could it lay on a metaphysics of musical works? Most have considered the repeatability of musical works (and other artworks such as poems and dances) to be an indicator that they are abstracta of some sort, since abstract objects like types are precisely the sort of thing that can exist at multiple times and places, while concrete objects like trees seem like the sort of thing that exists singly. This general categorization has been cashed out in a number of ways, which I will discuss in more depth shortly.

There are a handful of philosophers who have disagreed with this conclusion, instead analyzing musical works as concrete objects.[117] Of course, the concretists must immediately deal with the question of repeatability. It is not at all clear how a concrete object can occur more than once; singularity seems a paradigmatic property of concrete objects. This problem has been tackled in a variety of ways, including analyzing musical works as sets or classes, mereological sums, and multiply located performances.

Musical works have been said to be sets, generally of all the (correct) performances.[118] But this solution will not work. Infamously, it implies that there are no bad performances of a work—even slightly incorrect performances are just not instantiations of the work *at all*.[119] This consequence goes against both intuition and standard practice.

[116]This raises questions about works that in principle could not be repeated. First, would such works thus not count as music? Would they be some special kind of musical work, or some other type of art entirely—perhaps performance art? Second, how would such particularity be possible? One way would be for a piece to involve irreparable and nonrepeatable action on an irreplaceable object—for instance, the burning of the Shroud of Turin, or the shattering of Rodin's *Thinker*. Whether such directives could actually be incorporated into a musical work and retain any legitimacy (e.g., are they instead works of conceptual art?) is a fair question, and one which I will not attempt to solve here.

To my knowledge, no such pieces exist, or have been performed, though Scriabin's *Mysterium* may be close (it was unfinished at the time of its composer's death).

[117]See, for instance, Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson, "Defending Musical Perdurantism," *British Journal of Aesthetics* (Oxford) 46, no. 1 (2006): 59–69, doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayj004, Chris Tillman, "Musical materialism," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 51, no. 1 (2011): 13–29, doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayq028. For a brief summary of the positions of these philosophers and others in the concretist camp, see Guy Rohrbaugh, *Ontology of Art*, Oxford, 2016, doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0319, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0319.xml.

[118]See Goodman, *Languages of Art*.

[119]This is because of the rigidity of sets—no set could contain different members than the ones it does; if it did, it would just be a different set.

Some have analyzed musical works as sums or fusions, generally of all performances.[120] On this view, each of the performances/instances is a temporal part of the whole work. This solves the rigidity problem of sets, but in turn has its own issues. The main problem with this approach is that it implies that most of our talk about musical works is incorrect. For instance, if a work is properly understood as the sum of all its performances, then whenever one hears only one performance of it, one has not actually heard the work itself.[121] Any one performance is only a part of the work proper, and so one never really hears "Beethoven's Fifth."[122]

There have been, of course, replies to this objection. Matheson and Caplan suggest a few, ranging from simply biting the bullet and accepting that we never truly hear all of a musical work, to arguing that we do in fact hear the work via its performance, through "deferred perception." These counter-objections suffer from counterintuitive complication of our engagement with musical works. If a more elegant solution can be found, I contend, it should be preferred.

There is also the question of what exactly binds all the components of the fusion together—in virtue of what are the performances all parts of one work, rather than two or five works, or indeed as many as there are performances? The Aristotelian hylomorphist has a ready answer: a form. But this answer is not available to the concretist.

Another concretist proposal is that musical works are entirely material objects.[123] On this account, repeatability is explained by claiming that the work is multiply located, occurring at each performance. But the idea of multiply located objects can be hard to grasp. What binds the different instances together? In virtue of what are A and B two locations of the same thing, rather than two separate things? One cannot simply *say* that an object has multiple locations and leave it at that. The most obvious answer is some kind of abstract object such as a type (or a form); this solves the issue, but simultaneously negates the eponymous materialism of the view.

Besides this, the Aristotelian hylomorphist simply denies that there *are* any purely material objects—real objects have both matter and form. Of course, merely to assert this as an objection to musical materialism is question-begging, or at best only convincing to

[120]See Caplan and Matheson, "Defending Musical Perdurantism" and Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson, "Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism'," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48, no. 1 (2008): 80–85, doi:10.1093/aesthj/aym037, https://academic.oup.com/bjaesthetics/article-abstract/48/1/80/130436.

[121]This is presuming the work has had at least one performance one has not heard, which is obviously true for the classic works (though rather less than certain for most contemporary classical works).

[122]Platonic type analyses of musical works face a version of this problem as well—abstract objects are generally considered causally inaccessible, which implies that they cannot be (for instance) heard. So, when listening to a performance, it would seem that one only hears the *performance*, and not the work.

[123]See Tillman, "Musical materialism" and Chris Tillman and Joshua Spencer, "Musical materialism and the inheritance problem," *Analysis* 72, no. 2 (2012): 252–259, doi:10.1093/analys/ans042.

fellow hylomorphists. However, hylomorphists have given arguments for this conclusion. If these arguments are sound, then musical materialism may be in trouble. If there are no purely material objects, then musical works cannot be such.[124]

Presumably, since explanations of musical works as abstracta easily capture this basic feature of musical works, and are simpler than concretist analyses, the proponents of the latter have rejected them for other benefits gained by their various accounts, or else because they believe these explanations are hopeless. It is my contention that this is not so, and that the hylomorphic account offers benefits aplenty, so that it is to be preferred to concretist ontologies.

3.1.1.2 Creatability

Another piece of data about musical works is that they seem to be *created*, or using less loaded language, to *come into being*. When a musical work is composed, it seems that the composer has made a new thing, has added something to the universe, to the collection of what is.

Jerrold Levinson was one of the first to concretely argue that this is true of musical works. He called it "one of the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs concerning art."[125] Ironically, the very fact that this is hotly debated (as we will see) demonstrates that it is perhaps not quite so firm as Levinson believes. Nevertheless, the intuition is definitely present in some, and should be accounted for by a metaphysical theory of music.[126]

What does the creatability of musical artworks imply for their ontology? If musical works do in fact come into existence, then obviously they must be a type of objects that *can* do so. This seemingly innocuous observation has in actuality caused a great rift among philosophers of music. To keep the story short, abstract objects are generally considered eternal (or sometimes sempiternal). But this means they do not come into existence. Thus, there is a deep tension between the *prima facie* implications of the repeatability and creatability of musical works, and philosophers of music are divided over how to resolve it. Platonic-type theorists easily solve the repeatability, but are forced to deny or redefine creatability.

[124]Obviously, the history of arguments for hylomorphism is far too extensive to be discussed properly here, so I can merely point the reader to some of the relevant work. One should of course begin with the original arguments in Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 189b30-191b34 and Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 1041a5-1041b34. For extensions of these arguments (particularly against atomism) and defences against criticisms, see also Oderberg, *Real Essentialism*, ch. 4, Feser, *Scholastic metaphysics: A contemporary introduction*, 160-189, Feser, *Aristotle's Revenge*, 20-31.

[125]Jerrold Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is," 77, no. 1 (1980): 8, `http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025596`.

[126]But see Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson, "Can a musical work be created?," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44, no. 2 (2004): 113–134, doi:`10.1093/bjaesthetics/44.2.113`.

Concretists more easily explain creatability, but are less deft at handling repeatability. Levinson's approach is an attempt to keep both the abstract nature of musical works and their creatability. He does this by proposing that musical works are a modified sort of abstract object, which he calls an "initiated (or indicated) type."[127] On this view, a musical work is a "S/PM [sound/performance means structure] indicated-by-X-at-t, where X is a particular person—the composer—and t is the time of composition."[128] "Indicated types," then, are types that are somehow *chosen* or selected.

Levinson's proposal has been contentious. Some have objected that indicated types are metaphysically obscure;[129] others have pointed out that indication is still not creation, and so Levinson does not achieve his own explanatory goal;[130] still others argue that Levinson's method is too ontologically committing,[131] or that the contextual type approach generally fails to capture the modal flexibility of musical works[132]

Given the issues facing the indicated type analysis, some retain the purely abstract nature of musical works, and deny or reinterpret the creatability intuition. Generally, this means glossing creation as *discovery*. On this view, musical works are not created, but discovered, and this is what we mean by all our talk of musical creation.[133] But, as I said above, many do have the intuition that musical works are created, and to the extent that this intuition is simply denied, this is a weakness of an account.

[127]See the now-legendary Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is" and Jerrold Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again," chap. 10 in *Music, Art, and Metaphysics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); see also Robert Howell, "Types, Indicated and Initiated," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42, no. 2 (April 2002): 105–127.

[128]Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is," 20.

[129]Currie calls them "metaphysically obscure" (Gregory Currie, *An Ontology of Art* (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 58).

[130]See Julian Dodd, "Musical Works as Eternal Types," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 40, no. 4 (2000): 424–440, Stefano Predelli, "Musical ontology and the argument from creation," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 41, no. 3 (2001): 279–290, Peter Alward, "The Spoken Work," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62, no. 4 (2004): 331–337, doi:10.1111/j.1540-594x.2004.00166.x.

[131]Currie fears that if Levinson's analysis is accepted, we will have to hold that initiated types come into being *whenever* an abstract type is chosen or indicated, resulting in a massive proliferation of objects. See Currie, *An Ontology of Art*, 58.

[132]Guy Rohrbaugh, "Artworks as historical individuals," *European Journal of Philosophy* 11, no. 2 (2003): 177–205.

[133]This is the approach of Kivy, among others; see Peter Kivy, "Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defense," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 19, no. 1 (1983): 109–129, Peter Kivy, "Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defense," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (1987): 245–252, doi:10.1163/18756735-90000194, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014199, Peter Kivy, "Orchestrating Platonism," chap. 4 in *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 75–94, Dodd, "Musical Works as Eternal Types," and Julian Dodd, "Defending Musical Platonism," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42, no. 4 (2002): 380–402. For some criticisms, see Stefano Predelli, "Against Musical Platonism," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 35, no. 4 (1995): 338–350, doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/35.4.338, Predelli, "Musical ontology and the argument from creation," Stefano Predelli, "Platonism in Music: a Kind of Refutation," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 60, no. 238 (2006): 401–414.

All this tends towards mere intuition-pumping and "philosophy by spreadsheet,"[134] however, and the simple fact of the debate itself implies that our intuitions are not so settled as either side may suppose.[135] Nevertheless, I contend that a theory which allows for the coming into existence of musical works is at least somewhat preferable (all else being equal) to one that denies it.

3.1.1.2.1 Musical destruction

If musical works come into being, it *prima facie* seems that they can go *out* of existence as well. Interestingly, this has been much less discussed in the literature than the issue of creation.[136] It is possible that intuitions on this question are more lacking or confused than on creatability, but this would seem an odd circumstance. Matheson and Caplan point out that the temporal beginning has the advantage of being connected to the issue of creation, and so naturally draws more interest.[137]

One might at first assume that the destruction or cessation of musical works mirrors their creation, i.e., whatever mechanism allows for their coming into existence is involved (or its lack is involved) in their going out of existence. Interestingly, this approach implies either that the mechanism which creates a musical work somehow *sustains* it in existence, as a sort of metaphysical precondition, or that there is another (presumably similar) event which actively *ends* the existence of a musical work.

I have little more to say about the destruction of musical works here, except that any theory that incorporates it is to that extent more interesting as well as more explanatorily powerful (especially if it explains it by the same method as creation)—and that a hylomorphic ontology does in fact provide for musical cessation. Obviously, musical Platonism has a ready answer—musical works *never* cease to exist. Levinson's view is necessarily more complicated;

[134]I owe this acerbic summary to Carl Matheson.

[135]I suspect, though do not claim to be able to show, that one of the confounding factors in this debate (and likely others, both in musical metaphysics and other subfields) is that the intuitions in discussion come from philosophers who have spent much time pondering these and related questions, and in so doing have stifled the pre-theoretic intuitions to which they so often advert.

[136]Carl Matheson and Ben Caplan, "Ontology," chap. 4 in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 1st ed., ed. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (London: Routledge, 2011), 40-1, https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Companion-to-Philosophy-and-Music-1st-Edition/Gracyk-Kania/p/book/9780415486033. Saam Trivedi has written on musical cessation (Saam Trivedi, "Music and metaphysics," *Metaphilosophy* 39, no. 1 (2008): 124–143, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00524.x), as has Rossberg (Marcus Rossberg, "Destroying Artworks," in *Art and Abstract Objects*, ed. Christy Mag Uidhir (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 62–83, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691494.001.0001), and Levinson has outlined a range of possible prerequisites for musical destruction from "nothing" to "general neglect," though he does not take a definite stance (see Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again," 261-2). But this is orders of magnitude less than the mass of work on the question of creation.

[137]Matheson and Caplan, "Ontology," 41.

it is not clear what role the indication has in sustaining the work.[138] Concretists presumably can fold the question into the more general question of material destruction.

3.1.2 An aesthetic feature: Expression

There are also some specifically aesthetic features of musical works that they obviously have; ideally, an ontology of musical works will account for these, or at the least provide a foundation on which to understand them. I here discuss one—musical *expression*.

3.1.2.1 Characteristics of expression

In this section, I will summarize and expand on material from the previous chapter: as discussed there, it is a commonplace that musical works "express." But this idea turns out to be notoriously difficult to pin down. Follow-up questions immediately arise. What do musical works express? How do they express? The naïve answer to the first question is "emotions." But this solution runs into immediate trouble when we note that expressing emotion is characteristic of agents, and this, musical works are not. Humans express emotions because we feel them, but musical works do not and cannot. The lack of mental states to express is generally considered a fairly decisive objection against what we might call "simple expression";[139] philosophers of music have often adverted to saying that musical works are "expressive of," rather than "express," emotions. Nevertheless, there is a strong sense that it is the *artwork* which is speaking to us; there is a directness and immediacy to musical expressing that is not comparable to mere expressiveness. Expressiveness—"displaying outwardly features typically associated with that state"[140]—can be found everywhere, from the faces of some breeds of dogs to the drooping boughs of a tree to the craggy outlines of a cliff. But musical expression is not like that—it is much more particular, intense, and unique than mere expressiveness. So expressiveness does not quite capture what is happening when we listen to musical works either.

What is more, the fact that we use "speaking" of artworks implies more than mere emotion (and thus mere expressivity). Grunts and screams are expressive without constituting speech; that musical works are sometimes said to speak implies that they (can) express something beyond mere emotional release. There is, therefore, some kind of cognitive aspect

[138]Levinson presents a list of possible answers in Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again," 261-2.

[139]However, at least one philosopher preferred to bite the bullet and say that emotions can be at least expressed, if not felt, by non-sentient objects. Otto Baensch argued for what he called "objective feelings," which are feelings somehow inhering in inanimate things like landscapes and sunsets (see Otto Baensch, "Art and Feeling," chap. 2 in *Reflections on Art*, ed. Susanne K. Langer (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1958), 10–36).

[140]Trivedi, "Resemblance Theories," 223.

to the expression of musical works. This is a whole new category of communication, and neither simple expression nor expressiveness can explain it.

These arguments seem to lead nowhere. Each view proposed has problems, or only seems to cover part of the phenomenon of musical expression. A theory of musical works should have something to say about this conundrum. Particularly, it should have an answer to *whether* musical works express or are only expressive, *what* they express/are expressive of, and *how*. While a full treatment may be somewhat outside the bounds of a strictly metaphysical account, such an account should still at least provide grounds on which the more aesthetic debate can take place. Whatever a musical work is according to a metaphysical theory, it should be the kind of thing that can express.

Philosophers of music have tackled this problem in a number of ways.[141] Jenefer Robinson has discussed them particularly well.[142] One common account is the "resemblance theory," which Robinson labels (perhaps somewhat pejoratively) the "doggy theory," due to its proponents' use of dogs' faces as examples.[143] On this view, just as a St. Bernard's or a basset hound's face appears sad to us because it resembles the drooping features of a sad human, so (the theory has it) musical works are expressive of emotions by resembling in their sounds and melodic/harmonic movement the actions, gestures, posture, or utterances of a person feeling those emotions. Robinson criticizes this account on three grounds; for one, it fails to account for cognitively complex emotions that either may not have distinctive physical manifestations, or may share manifestations with simpler emotions (as despair may physically look similar to simple sadness). Second, the doggy theory cannot adequately account for emotional progression in musical works, being able only to present one after another, without implying any interaction (as, for instance, of triumphing over difficulty and sadness, like Beethoven's 9th Symphony). Finally, Robinson says the doggy theory does not explain our emotional reactions to music. Why should our emotions be aroused by music

[141]The reader will notice that these theories are not the same as the metaphysical theories already discussed. The aesthetic question of musical expression usually treated separately from more ontological considerations; it is a strength of the hylomorphic view I propose that both subfields can be grounded in one view. I will consider the implications for musical expression of the metaphysical theories shortly.

[142]See Jenefer Robinson, "Music and Emotions," *Journal of Literary Theory* 1, no. 2 (2007): 395–419, doi:10.1515/JLT.2007.024, much of which recurs in Jenefer Robinson, "Expression Theories," chap. 19 in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 1st ed., ed. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (London: Routledge, 2011), 201–211, https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Companion-to-Philosophy-and-Music-1st-Edition/Gracyk-Kania/p/book/9780415486033.

[143]In Robinson, "Music and Emotions," 400. This view has been held most notably by Peter Kivy (see Peter Kivy, *Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical Representation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Peter Kivy, *Sound Sentiment: An Essay on the Musical Emotions* (Temple University Press, 1989)) and Stephen Davies (see Stephen Davies, *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Cornell University Press, 1994)), though the former has moved away from it in recent years (see Peter Kivy, *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music* (Clarendon Press, 2002)).

more than a basset hound's "sad" face?[144]

Another prominent theory (briefly mentioned in chapter 2) is the "persona theory," whereon musical works are expressive of emotions possessed by an imaginary persona "in" the music.[145] This view allows that musical works can actually express, rather than being merely expressive, since there is a mind (of sorts) which can be the ground for real expression. It is thus closer to the data we have about musical expression. Robinson criticizes the persona view via counterexample—she says there are pieces which express an emotion, but in which we are not inclined to imagine a persona.[146] In addition, she takes issue with the characterization of expression as something fundamentally on the listener's side. For Robinson, "expression is primarily something achieved by expressers, not something noticed or experienced by spectators or audiences."[147]

That last point is important—and it is here, as promised in chapter 2, that I finally return to the intrinsicality of musical expression, and mount a defence of the assertion I made there. Recall that intrinsic properties were there defined as those that never differ between perfect duplicates.

As Robinson states, expression is not a thing imposed on the music by listeners, but done by expressers. That is, it is not extrinsic to the work, but *intrinsic* to it. We can understand things via expression—paradigmatically, someone's mood or mental state—but it is the person who is doing the expressing, not us as viewers.[148] So, who- or whatever is expressing in a musical work, it is not the audience.[149] Is the composer the expresser, as the sad person is in the case of the downturned face? No; more often than not, the composer is not involved in the performance of the work, frequently being long deceased, and yet the work expresses still. Paradigmatic instances of expression such as gestures can not do this.

It is the musical work itself that is the expresser. But how? Consider a red octagon with the text "STOP" on it. It expresses something: namely, the imperative to *stop*. It is

[144]Robinson, "Music and Emotions," 400-2.

[145]This view has been advanced by Levinson (see Jerrold Levinson, "Musical Expressiveness," in *The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 90–125) and others (for instance, Bruce Vermazen, "Expression and expression," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (1986): 196–224 and John Sloboda, "Brain Waves to the Heart," *The BBC Music Magazine*, November 1998,). For a similar "make-believe" view, except where the focus is not a persona, but the music itself, see Saam Trivedi, "Expressiveness as a Property of the Music Itself," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59, no. 4 (2001): 411–420, doi:10.1111/0021-8529.00042.

[146]This seems plausible, but unfortunately, she gives no examples.

[147]Robinson, "Music and Emotions," 405.

[148]Ibid.

[149]As Robinson notes, Levinson at first seems to agree with the intrinsicality of musical expression by holding that there is a persona that expresses, but then undermines it by saying that the persona is imagined—that is, imposed on the music, or, in a word, extrinsic. She says that some musical expression "require[s] the persona but not merely as something imagined or postulated by listeners, but as a genuine (dramatic) protagonist genuinely expressing his or her emotions" (ibid.).

not the viewer who does the expressing, nor is it the factory worker who made the sign—it is the sign itself, expressing *symbolically*. In the same way, a musical work expresses some emotion. *It* is the "expresser," from which we understand the expression.

In addition, holding musical expression to be extrinsic denies the centrality of expression to musical works. It makes them out to be on the same level as the faces of basset hounds or clouds, that is, things with no intrinsic expression, to which we happen to attribute expressive qualities. However, this is not borne out by experience—if expressive qualities were merely extrinsic to musical works, arising from our own attributions, we would expect them to be considered roughly as socially, emotionally, and culturally important as St. Bernards' faces, weeping willows, or a cheerfully babbling brook—pleasant, certainly, but hardly worth special remark. But this is decidedly not the case—rather, musical works are sought out, highly valued, obsessed over, made centrepieces of cultural events and identities, religious services, and relationships. The most probable explanation is that musical works are something of a different kind than these natural phenomena I have mentioned, and they express or are expressive by nature—that is, intrinsically.

To sharpen the point: there is the fact that we make musical works, often going to great amounts of effort to do so.[150] Correspondingly, audiences spend huge amounts of time and money on musical works every year. This makes sense, if musical works are a unique sort of thing that intrinsically can express. Why should we bother with the effort of making them, if we can just ascribe expression to musical works—or to innumerable other objects all around us? It might be because the musical work is particularly suited to expressing. But why should this be the case? The answer would have to be something along the lines of nature—it is just because of the kind of thing the work is that it is particularly well suited to receiving our attribution of expression. But this answer is treading close to intrinsicality; if it is not already the same, it is the shortest of steps to simply admitting that expression is intrinsic. In any case, just being particularly conducive to extrinsic properties still is not sufficient to explain the drastically different way we engage with musical works as compared to (say) the faces of St. Bernards.

3.1.2.2 Rival theories

The reader will have noticed that these theories of musical expression are not identical to nor obviously related to the metaphysical theories I have discussed. But this indifference is not a strength of either set of theories—as I stated earlier, a metaphysical theory should at least provide a grounding for further aesthetic considerations, and an aesthetic theory should

[150] I use "making" here as a generic activity word, avoiding "creation" for now. Even the type theorists admit that we do *something* in the process of making musical works, even if it is only discovery or indication.

be based in a solid metaphysics. After all, what a thing does will depend on what it is.[151] The more direct the integration between our account of expression and its metaphysical grounding, the better.

I now turn to examining the rival metaphysical theories I have previously mentioned—Platonic or pure type theory, Levinsonian indicated type theory, and concrete analyses—and examine how expression may be accounted for on each. In particular, as we shall see, each view has trouble with intrinsic expression.

First, the Platonic-type theory. These types are eternal; if expression is intrinsic, then the types—that is, musical works—express eternally. But this is absurd. Beethoven's Fifth did not express fate or doom or the dread thereof or anything else at the first moment of the universe, when there were no minds, and at its heat death, when all of us are long gone, the Fifth will not be expressing. Therefore, on musical Platonism, expression must be extrinsic. But it is not, as we have argued, and so musical Platonism is false.

Besides this, musical Platonism has a "contact problem": if the work is an abstract type, and we are not abstract, then we cannot access the work itself, but only its tokens. This means that, strictly speaking, we never actually hear musical works, and they never arouse our emotions. But obviously we do, and they do, so either we can somehow interact with abstract objects, or musical Platonism is false.

How does Levinson's indicated type view deal with expression? Here, as in the Platonic case, the type cannot be doing the expressing, on pain of eternal expression. Therefore, if the indicated type is to express, it must be due to the indication, rather than the type. However, it is not clear how to cash this out. How could a composer's indicating a certain sound structure also be the ground of expression? Perhaps the Levinsonian could reply that expression is the *purpose* for the indication; the sound structure could be indicated *for the purpose of* expressing some emotion. But this is still extrinsic expression. The purpose of a work of music, or of the act of indication is not a part of the work, at least not on Levinson's view. Thus, we see that indicated types also suffer from an inability to properly account for musical expression as intrinsic.

How is expression explained on concrete analyses? Here again there is a problem with accounting for intrinsicality. Sets or sums are not the kinds of things that express emotions intrinsically. But musical works do; therefore, musical works are not sets or sums.

Some concrete analyses also face a contact problem. Taking works as sets or sums or fusions of performances allows the expression to lie in the performances, but that only pushes the question down a level, as it is no longer the work itself that expresses, but its members or parts. Worse, this tactic falls into the same issue as musical Platonism, i.e., it denies the

[151] See footnote 17.

centrality of expression to musical works.

Expression, as we have seen, is a fraught issue in the philosophy of music. Simple expression does not seem to capture what is going on, but expressiveness (the other standard option) does not either. On top of that, there is an element of cognition in musical expression. Finally, it is best understood as intrinsic to the works. How to account for all this? There are a number of different approaches to explaining it, but each has difficulties of its own.

3.1.3 The questions summarized

A thorough ontological analysis of musical works has quite a list of features to account for. I have listed a number in this chapter; I reiterate them by way of conclusion. Musical works are *repeatable*; they can happen more than once. Musical works are also *creatable*—composers actually add to what is by their compositional activity. Musical works also *express*, to some degree and in some manner—this is one of the main reasons we are so interested in them. Not only do they express emotion in some sense, but they seem to have a cognitive element as well.

This is a only a brief list, and the task of accounting for all these features is daunting indeed. Nevertheless, it is my contention that the hylomorphic analysis I have been developing is able to accomplish it. More—that it is able to account for all these features, and to do so better than other metaphysical theories of musical works.

3.2 The Hylomorphic Account

As in the previous section laying out the "data," I here address the metaphysical questions first, before showing what the hylomorphic account has to say about the specifically aesthetic feature of expression.

3.2.1 General metaphysical features

3.2.1.1 Repeatability

On Aristotelian hylomorphism, forms are immanent—they do not exist outside of their manifestations in some sort of eternal or sempiternal "third realm," as Platonic forms do. They are abstracta in the literal sense—they are abstracted (by our minds) from the objects in which the inhere. For an object to repeat, then, it must have the same form and matter. The same form alone is not enough; two dogs share the same form, but they are separate objects. Objects are differentiated by their matter. That is another reason why the matter of musical works is itself abstract note-types. If it was actual sounds, rhythms, etc., then

there would be a different musical work for each performance.

This has the consequence that no two musical works can share the same form. Since the form is the "what it is" of a work, for two to have the same "what it is" would just mean they *are* identical—that "they is the same," to bend grammar a little. Could two works have the same *matter*? That is, could two different semblances be combined with the same sound structure? In theory, yes, if (say) conventions had drastically changed, so that what used to symbolize sadness now symbolized happiness. It's not clear that the first work would survive this alteration, however (more on the persistence of musical works below).

It is by the musical work's abstract nature that it is able to be instantiated many times in different places, and even in multiple times and places at once. In this regard, the hylomorphic account is like other analyses of musical works as abstract objects, differing only in the fact that it denies the independent existence of those abstracta.

It should be admitted that the hylomorphic account does not particularly distinguish itself in regards to this question. Its special explanatory power will come into focus as we examine the other questions.

3.2.1.2 Creatability

It is my contention that the hylomorphic account of musical works captures and explains our creatability intuitions as well as or better than any other theory.

Since, on this view, forms are immanent, the objection to musical Platonism—namely, that identifying works as abstracta implies their eternality (and thus non-creation)—is avoided entirely. Thus, the hylomorphic account has a significant advantage over pure-type analyses.

This account also has an advantage over Levinson's indicated type analysis, though it is somewhat smaller, since Levinson at least allows that musical works are created (unlike the musical Platonists).[152] The advantage here is primarily methodological—the hylomorphic account is more parsimonious, in that it does not postulate some new type of mixed entity like an "indicated type." Rather, it assimilates musical works to well-understood broader categories such as artifact.

A possible objection to the hylomorphic account is that it implies that musical works do not exist until (or after) they're performed. If, as the Aristotelian claims, forms do not exist outside of their manifestations, then the form of the musical work does not exist outside of the note-types, which in turn do not exist except when they are manifested in actual sounds, i.e., in a performance. This has some counterintuitive consequences, such as that

[152]That the advantage is slight is not surprising, since Levinson himself says his view might equally be called "qualified Platonist" or "qualified Aristotelian" (Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again," 216).

the composer does not actually create the work until it is performed (at which point it seems more plausible to attribute the creation to the *performers* rather than the composer).

This objection is right as far as it goes, but it leaves out one critical fact—that forms can also exist in minds that contemplate them. Aristotle himself discusses this phenomenon, using the example of an architect: he says the form of the house exists in the mind of the architect before it is built. It is in this way that the architect knows *what it is* he is to build.[153] Similarly, the composer has the form (the semblance) of the work in his mind as he composes it, and it is the semblance itself that directs his composing work—selecting notes, rhythms, instrumentation, etc. In addition, the form is held in the mind of anyone who listens to the work—this is the process of abstraction referred to above. Similarly, one can contemplate the work after hearing it by calling up one's memory of it, whereupon the form again occurs in the mind. So, a musical work does not exist except when it is being performed, and whenever it is being listened to or contemplated by a mind.

The existence of forms in minds that contemplate them also resolves the difficulty raised at the beginning of chapter 2. There it was discussed that taking actual sounds as the matter of musical works made understanding compositional activity opaque at best. But on this more detailed picture, it is clear that the composer conceives the form—the semblance—and then selects the note-types that are necessitated by the form to express it. The work may only be manifested in performances, but non-performance activity such as composition, remembrance, and rehearsal now make perfect sense.

This directing of the compositional process by the contemplated form is an instance of Aristotelian final causality. The work exists in the mind of the composer before it exists in the world, and serves as a guide for how to bring about that worldly occurrence. This is a standard part of Aristotelian metaphysics, and so on this hylomorphic analysis musical creation is neatly understood in the same way as many other such processes.[154]

This view is not peculiar to the hylomorphist; Langer herself advocated something similar. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, initial creation and subsequent development is just her notion of commanding form. Indeed, for Langer, the development of the musical work continues even into its performance, which is the final culmination of its original idea, its "full realization": "Performance is the completion of a musical work, a logical continuation of the composition, carrying the creation through from thought to physical expression."[155] This is another way in which Langer's semblance and hylomorphism is particularly compatible,

[153]See footnote 110 in chapter 2.

[154]Interestingly, this analysis allows us to acknowledge some truth in both Levinson's creationist account of musical composition and Kivy's discovery account. Musical works are created, but there is a process of discovering how to manifest the idea—or, might I say, the Idea.

[155]Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 138.

in that they independently imply the same sort of creation process.

How does the hylomorphic account deal with the contact problem? Recall that on both Platonic type and fusion analyses (though for different reasons), there is a worry that we only really hear performances, and not the work itself. This difficulty dissolves on an Aristotelian view. Forms are immanent, and thus wholly present in each of their instantiations. We hear the work, and the form is present as an inseparable part of it; we literally do hear the form. For the Aristotelian, the abstract form is hearable after all, because it is embodied in the matter of the note-types, themselves embodied in the actual sounds of the performance.[156,157]

Here we see how once again the Aristotelian view manages to capture what is best about the other metaphysical analyses and bring these insights together into one cohesive whole. More than that, it even includes the aesthetic insights of Langer's view (more on this shortly).

3.2.1.2.1 Musical destruction

The hylomorphic analysis also allows for musical destruction. As hinted at above when the question was introduced, it does so by a sort of mirroring of the creation question. Since the form ("that by which it is what it is") of a musical work is a semblance, a symbol, it is fundamentally a human construction. Thus, its existence conditions are tied to its makers. As it possesses an accidental form, the object *qua* hylomorphic compound ceases to exist once that form is no longer imposed. The question of when a musical work goes out of existence is then relatively easy to answer: it goes out of existence when there are no humans sustaining it—that is performing or contemplating it. This is analogous to substantial change, such as human death (though I hasten to reiterate that musical works are *not* substances). Just as humans revert to a corpse—an assortment of parts no longer essentially bound together[158]—upon death, so a musical work reverts to meaningless parts.[159]

I now move on to the aesthetic feature of expression and how the hylomorphic account deals with it.

[156]Note that the form-matter relationship manifests again at this level as well. As I noted before, for the Aristotelian, *everything* is hylomorphic.

[157]Again, the form alone is an abstraction, not an object that can exist on its own in the world.

[158]"Essentially" here is literal, referring to the essence of the human. The colloquial usage of "essentially" as merely "very important" would imply that the parts of a body (alive or dead) somehow *belong* together in and of themselves.

[159]Likewise, "meaningless" here is literal; having lost the symbol by losing those who could have understood it, the work loses what makes it *mean* anything; its meaning depended on it being ascribed to it, which in turn depended on there being ascribers.

3.2.2 Musical expression

I now turn to the aesthetic feature discussed above, namely, musical expression. As argued in section 3.1.2.1 above, musical works express in some form which appears not to be simple expression nor mere expressiveness, to carry some sort of cognitive content, and to be intrinsic. The question was raised: how to account for all these characteristics in one theory? This is where Langer's notion of semblance comes to the fore. As I have mentioned, most general metaphysical analyses do not have much to say about the more narrowly aesthetic aspects of the art they analyze. At most, they provide the ground on which such aesthetic phenomena may be explained. But on the hylomorphic account I have proposed, the explanation is woven into the very fabric of the musical work itself. This accords well with the fact that expression seems to be a (if not *the*) key purpose of musical works and motive of their composition.

Recall that, for Langer, musical works are symbols—particularly of "feeling," that is, of the inner life. Thus, we have an account of expression (namely, symbolic expression) baked into our theory right off the bat. Musical works express emotions by symbolically representing them, which they do by sharing a "logical form" or abstract structure with them. I have discussed the nature and method of this expression in the previous chapter. Here, I will examine it in relation to the difficulties faced by other attempts at explaining expression.

Taking musical works to be symbols resolves the tension between expression and expressiveness by positing a third option. As discussed above, the former requires a mind to express, which the music does not have; however, the latter seems too weak to capture the intensity and directness musical works have, putting the works on the same expressive level as basset hound faces. Symbolic expression provides a particular mode that is more direct than mere expressiveness, and yet does not require us to say that the music literally has a mind (as expression does). It is the result of intentional action by an agent, and thus has the directness of human interaction, without needing to be agential itself.

There is another explanatory benefit to this solution. Symbols are fundamentally products of rational minds. They carry cognitive, rational meanings meant for other intellects, and the making and understanding of them are equally rational. Indeed, symbols are paradigmatic examples and test cases of rationality. Thus, musical works, on this view, are objects understood and made by and for rational consideration by intellectual beings. Yet they are also fundamentally about (expressive of) *emotions*.[160] This reconciles the fact that musical

[160] As I noted in chapter 2, for Langer, musical works communicate in a very different way than language. Both modes are rational and symbolic, in her view, but musical works are *presentational*, while language is *discursive*. I refer the reader to Langer's own work (particularly Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a*

works express emotion, in some sense, with the fact that musical works seem to not only express but also "communicate," to "speak"—a paradigmatically rational/mental (i.e., not purely emotional) activity. Musical works often seem to be "getting at" something, and people will often say that a musical work "spoke" to them, though they may not be able to describe precisely what was "said." This phenomenon is easily explained on this account. Langer says that musical works *symbolically* express emotions—or, more precisely, "*ideas* of feeling"—each musical work is an individual, conceptual communication of a particular emotion.[161,162]

How does musical hylomorphism account for the intrinsicality of musical expression? This is where the hylomorphic and Langerian elements come together. The semblance expresses—that is just what it is, *qua* symbol. Taking the semblance to be the form of the musical work means that a symbol is *that by which the work is what it is*. Expression, then, is central to *what it is to be* a musical work at all—in a word, it is intrinsic.

This is also why expression is the same between duplicates. For two works to be the same, they must have the same form. That is, they must have the same semblance, which is just to say the same *symbol*. Same symbols express (mean) the same thing, and so that expression must be the same between duplicates—again, in a word, it is intrinsic.

Return to the table analogy from the previous chapter: just as a carpenter has intentions and makes decisions, and a table is created with a certain intrinsic mass, so a composer has intentions and makes decisions, and a musical work comes into existence with a certain intrinsic symbolic expression.

To summarize: on Langer's account, the semblance of a musical work is a symbol, designed to express emotions. This provides grounds for the apparently cognitive communication we attribute to artworks, as well as the emotional aspect. In addition, taking the semblance as the form of the work ensures that this expression is intrinsic to it. Now I turn to comparing symbolic expression to the other contemporary accounts on offer.

Symbolic expression has some similarity to the resemblance theory. However, instead of resembling the demeanour, actions, facial expressions, etc. of a person feeling some emotion, the work (specifically, the semblance) resembles the emotion itself—its contours and internal structure, as phenomenologically felt. This is a deeper, more cognitive kind of similarity,

New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), 79-102) for in-depth explorations of these types of symbolic expression.

[161]This is somewhat similar to the "Romantic" view discussed by Robinson, especially as formulated by R.G. Collingwood (Robinson, "Music and Emotions," 405-7).

[162]Which emotion? Well, just the one the work expresses. That work is the best way to express that emotion; any other method just will not work as well. Recall Langer's distinction between discursive and presentational symbolism. The two are incommensurable; translation is never perfect. As Louis Armstrong (or a number of other musicians) is reputed to have said, "If I could say it, I wouldn't have to play it."

and one that is not shared with the faces of St. Bernards.

Symbolic expression easily avoids the criticisms Robinson levels at resemblance theory, namely that it cannot account for cognitively complex emotions or emotional progression in musical works. Symbolic expression, on the other hand, is uniquely suited for expressing cognitively complex emotions, since it is specifically representative of internal states. Out of this capacity comes the ability to express emotional progression—since our internal lives feature emotional progression, so do symbols of it.

The persona theory is particularly metaphysics-agnostic, i.e., it is compatible with virtually any metaphysical account of musical works. This is because it is primarily centred on the what the listener does rather than what the composer (or musicians) do. And this very fact, the reader may recall, is one of Robinson's critiques of persona theory—expression, she says, is intrinsic—it has to do with "expressers," not audiences ("expressees," if you will). But symbolic expression does not rely on imagining a persona "in" the music, and thus does not fall to the difficulties Robinson poses. What is more, it too accounts for expression via "expressers," though it uses a different sense of "expression." Symbols are meant by their makers, and are custom-made for precisely that purpose.

3.3 Conclusion

I began this chapter by detailing a number of features of musical works of which any philosophical explanation must give an account. The first was repeatability—how musical works can exist more than once, i.e., in different performances. The second was creatability—musical works are intuitively understood to be *created* by their composers, brought into existence. The final feature is an aesthetic one, namely expression. Musical works are universally understood to express—but what? and how do they do so? As I discussed each of these features, I surveyed contemporary attempts at explaining them, and noted flaws in each one.

In the second half of this chapter, I turned to the hylomorphic account I spent the previous two chapters developing, and argued that it can account for the features I listed above, and do so in a concise yet wide-ranging manner. By taking Langerian semblance to be the *form* of musical works, the aesthetic explanations just given are merged with the broader metaphysical view. The result is an exceptionally powerful account which at a stroke explains a wide variety of facts about musical works, both metaphysical and aesthetic, in a parsimonious package. This is a strength of the hylomorphic project over the other metaphysical theories, which are to a large degree agnostic regarding aesthetic questions like expression.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have presented, explicated, and defended a hylomorphic analysis of musical works. I began by developing a case for hylomorphism generally, in particular that strong brand of hylomorphism close to Aristotle's own, advocated by the likes of David Oderberg (chapter 1). I then turned to the question of musical hylomorphism specifically. After considering some candidates for the matter and form of musical works, namely physical sounds (i.e., of performances) and sound structures, respectively, I rejected these in favour of note-types and "semblance," a concept from the work of Susanne Langer. The rest of chapter 2 was spent explicating this latter idea. Chapter 3 presented data to be accounted for by any metaphysical theory of musical works, namely repeatability and creatability, as well as the specifically aesthetic feature of musical expression. I explicated the phenomena and argued that contemporary theories fail to properly account for them. I then examined how the same data could be easily accounted for on the hylomorphic view I have developed.

It is my contention that, due to the wide range of phenomena explained by the hylomorphic account, and that in a particularly concise, parsimonious way, that view is a superior metaphysics of music. If we are in fact stuck doing "philosophy by spreadsheet" in the ontology of music, the hylomorphic theory I have advanced comes out ahead where it counts—on the bottom line.

S. D. G.

Bibliography

Ainsworth, Thomas. "Form vs. Matter." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2016, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016.

Alward, Peter. "The Spoken Work." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62, no. 4 (2004): 331–337. doi:10.1111/j.1540-594x.2004.00166.x.

Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.

———. *Parts of Animals*. Translated by A. L. Peck. Cambridge, MA: Loeb, 1937.

———. *Physics*. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950.

Baensch, Otto. "Art and Feeling." Chap. 2 in *Reflections on Art*, edited by Susanne K. Langer, 10–36. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1958.

Bailey, Andrew, and Shane Maxwell Wilkins. "Contemporary Hylomorphism." In *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford University Press, 2018. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0363.xml.

Caplan, Ben, and Carl Matheson. "Can a musical work be created?" *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44, no. 2 (2004): 113–134. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/44.2.113.

———. "Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism'." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48, no. 1 (2008): 80–85. doi:10.1093/aesthj/aym037. https://academic.oup.com/bjaesthetics/article-abstract/48/1/80/130436.

———. "Defending Musical Perdurantism." *British Journal of Aesthetics* (Oxford) 46, no. 1 (2006): 59–69. doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayj004.

Caplan, Ben, Chris Tillman, and Eileen Nutting. "Hylomorphic Propositions." In *The Routledge Handbook of Propositions*, edited by Chris Tillman. Abingdon: Routledge, 2020.

Clowney, David. *Reading Guide for Langer, "Feeling and Form"*. PowerPoint presentation. Online, accessed June 25, 2021. http://users.rowan.edu/~clowney/Aesthetics/ReadingGuides/Langer.ppt.

Corkum, Phil. "Substance and Independence in Aristotle." In *Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence*, edited by B. Schnieder, A. Steinberg, and M. Hoeltje, 36–67. Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, Philosophia Verlag, 2013.

Currie, Gregory. *An Ontology of Art*. New York: Macmillan, 1989.

Davies, Stephen. *Musical Meaning and Expression*. Cornell University Press, 1994.

Dodd, Julian. "Defending Musical Platonism." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42, no. 4 (2002): 380–402.

———. "Musical Works as Eternal Types." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 40, no. 4 (2000): 424–440.

Feser, Edward, ed. *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics*. London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013.

———. *Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science*. Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2019.

———. "Introduction: An Aristotelian Revival?" Chap. 1 in *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics*, edited by Edward Feser. London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013.

———. *Scholastic metaphysics: A contemporary introduction*. Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014.

Fine, Kit. "Response to Kathrin Koslicki." *Dialectica* 61, no. 1 (2007): 161–166. `https://www.jstor.org/stable/42970943`.

———. "Things and their parts." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23, no. 1 (1999): 61–74. doi:`10.1111/1475-4975.00004`.

Gerson, Lloyd P. "Plato, platonism, and the history of philosophy." In *What Makes a Philosopher Great? Thirteen Arguments for Twelve Philosophers*, edited by Stephen Hetherington, 12–29. London: Routledge, 2017.

Goodman, Nelson. *Languages of Art*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.

Greco, John, and Ruth Groff, eds. *Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism*. Routledge, 2012.

Harte, Verity. *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.

Healy, Kevin, Luke McNally, Graeme D. Ruxton, Natalie Cooper, and Andrew L. Jackson. "Metabolic rate and body size are linked with perception of temporal information." *Animal Behaviour* 86, no. 4 (2013): 685–696. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.06.018. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0003347213003060.

Howell, Robert. "Types, Indicated and Initiated." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42, no. 2 (April 2002): 105–127.

Hüntelmann, Rafael, and Johannes Hattler, eds. *New Scholasticism Meets Analytic Philosophy*. editiones scholasticae, 2014.

Innis, Robert E. *Susanne Langer in Focus: The Symbolic Mind*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Kivy, Peter. *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music*. Clarendon Press, 2002.

———. "Orchestrating Platonism." Chap. 4 in *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music*, 75–94. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———. "Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defense." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 19, no. 1 (1983): 109–129.

———. "Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defense." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (1987): 245–252. doi:10.1163/18756735-90000194. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014199.

———. *Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical Representation*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

———. *Sound Sentiment: An Essay on the Musical Emotions*. Temple University Press, 1989.

Koslicki, Kathrin. *The Structure of Objects*. Oxford University Press, 2008.

———. "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology." *dialectica* 61, no. 1 (2007): 127–159. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56f5c75c2eeb813966086409/t/574c8751b654f95fce4b0a29/1464633169682/NeoAristotelianMereology.pdf.

Langer, Susanne K. *Feeling and Form*. London: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1953.

———. *Philosophy in a New Key*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943.

Levinson, Jerrold. "Musical Expressiveness." In *The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays*, 90–125. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Levinson, Jerrold. "What a Musical Work Is." 77, no. 1 (1980): 5–28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025596.

———. "What a Musical Work Is, Again." Chap. 10 in *Music, Art, and Metaphysics*, 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Lewis, David K. "New work for a theory of universals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61, no. 4 (1983): 343–377. doi:10.1080/00048408312341131.

———. *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986.

———. *Parts of Classes*. Blackwell, 1990.

Matheson, Carl, and Ben Caplan. "Ontology." Chap. 4 in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 1st ed., edited by Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania, 37–43. London: Routledge, 2011. https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Companion-to-Philosophy-and-Music-1st-Edition/Gracyk-Kania/p/book/9780415486033.

Novák, Lukáš, Daniel D. Novotný, Prokop Sousedik, and David Svoboda, eds. *Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic*. Ontos Verlag, 2012.

Novotný, Daniel D., and Lukáš Novák, eds. *Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics*. Routledge, 2013.

O'Brien, Matthew. "Who's Afraid of Metaphysics?" *The Public Discourse*, June 2011. https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/06/3356/.

Oderberg, David S. "Is Form Structure?" In *Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics*, edited by Daniel D. Novotny and Lukáš Novák, 164–180. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014.

———. *Real Essentialism*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Predelli, Stefano. "Against Musical Platonism." *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 35, no. 4 (1995): 338–350. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/35.4.338.

———. "Musical ontology and the argument from creation." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 41, no. 3 (2001): 279–290.

———. "Platonism in Music: a Kind of Refutation." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 60, no. 238 (2006): 401–414.

Putnam, Hilary. *Reason, Truth and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Reese, Sam. "Forms of Feeling: The Aesthetic Theory of Susanne K. Langer." *Music Educators Journal* 63, no. 8 (1977): 45–49. doi:10.2307/3395285.

Robinson, Jenefer. "Expression Theories." Chap. 19 in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, 1st ed., edited by Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania, 201–211. London: Routledge, 2011. https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Companion-to-Philosophy-and-Music-1st-Edition/Gracyk-Kania/p/book/9780415486033.

———. "Music and Emotions." *Journal of Literary Theory* 1, no. 2 (2007): 395–419. doi:10.1515/JLT.2007.024.

Rohrbaugh, Guy. "Artworks as historical individuals." *European Journal of Philosophy* 11, no. 2 (2003): 177–205.

———. *Ontology of Art*. Oxford, 2016. doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0319. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0319.xml.

Rossberg, Marcus. "Destroying Artworks." In *Art and Abstract Objects*, edited by Christy Mag Uidhir, 62–83. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691494.001.0001.

Sider, Theodore. *Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Sloboda, John. "Brain Waves to the Heart." *The BBC Music Magazine*, November 1998.

Tahko, Tuomas E., ed. *Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

———. "Kathrin Koslicki, The Structure of Objects." *Humana Mente* 19 (2011): 197–204.

Tillman, Chris. "Musical materialism." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 51, no. 1 (2011): 13–29. doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayq028.

Tillman, Chris, and Joshua Spencer. "Musical materialism and the inheritance problem." *Analysis* 72, no. 2 (2012): 252–259. doi:10.1093/analys/ans042.

Trivedi, Saam. "Expressiveness as a Property of the Music Itself." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59, no. 4 (2001): 411–420. doi:10.1111/0021-8529.00042.

———. "Music and metaphysics." *Metaphilosophy* 39, no. 1 (2008): 124–143. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00524.x.

———. "Resemblance Theories." Chap. 21 in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, edited by Andrew Kania and Theodore Gracyk, 223–232. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.

Vermazen, Bruce. "Expression and expression." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (1986): 196–224.