

UN-Reliable: Explaining the Failure of the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon

by

Ran Ukashi

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

The University of Manitoba

in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

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Abstract

This thesis examines how and why the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping operation failed in its mandated aims of restoring Lebanon's sovereignty in the south, from both Israeli and non-state militia forces, restoring peace and security between both Israel and Lebanon, and the monitoring of Israeli troop withdrawals from the south of Lebanon since 1978. Drawing upon a large array of literature and expert analysis this thesis will explain how given various factors ranging from poor operation planning at the UN, Lebanese and Israeli intransigence, domestic political constraints, foreign intervention, and unrealistic expectations from UNIFIL, resulted in the failure of the operation in preventing the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah. This research is unique in that it focuses in depth on the reasons behind the failure of UNIFIL and what this could mean for other peacekeeping operations facing non-state force employing asymmetric warfare against state militaries.

Table of Contents

<u>Chapter I (Introduction): Creating the Context.....</u>	3 – 16.
<u>Chapter II: Peacekeeping Unraveled: The Origins, Development and Associated Problems of Peacekeeping.....</u>	17 – 45.
<u>Chapter III: Lebanon: A Divided Country.....</u>	46 – 58.
<u>Chapter IV: Relations Between Israel and Lebanon.....</u>	59 – 64.
<u>Chapter V: The Birth and Life of UNIFIL.....</u>	65 – 85.
<u>Chapter VI: The Hizballah Stronghold: Explaining the Rise and Success of the “Party of God”</u>	86 – 142.
<u>Chapter VII: UN-Realistic: Why UNIFIL Failed in its Mandate.....</u>	143 – 173.
<u>Works Cited.....</u>	174 – 184.

Chapter I (Introduction): Creating the Context

The 2006 Israel-Hizballah War was a highly significant event in recent history that has many repercussions for the Middle East and the world. The war had showcased many things. First, it proved that even after nearly thirty years of operation, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was unable to secure the south of Lebanon, allowing instead for a non-sovereign army to take de facto control of the south of the country and attack a neighboring country, Israel. This failure has called into question the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Second, Israel proved unable to effectively defend or prevent rocket fire from hitting Israeli towns and territory. No military means available to Israel were useful in restraining Hizballah. Third, the perceived victory of Hizballah, versus Israel's "defeat" has increased Hizballah's popularity in Lebanon and the wider Arab-Islamic World. This has made the possibility of eliminating Hizballah's military capabilities even more difficult than before.

This thesis will focus specifically on how the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War was allowed to happen in the first place. The contention that will be made here is that UNIFIL failed in executing its mandate ever since its creation in 1978, and that this cumulative failure inevitably led to the possibility of an outbreak of war, which came to fruition in the summer of 2006. This failure will be explained given the unique nature of UNIFIL's operation. UNIFIL is a unique example of the new challenges facing PKOs today as it is the only one that deals with a state military on one side (Israel), and highly sophisticated and self-reliant, highly organized and heavily armed non-state militia group on the other (Hizballah). Furthermore, six particular reasons will be given as contributing factors to UNIFIL's operational failure. First, Israeli and Lebanese intransigence have been decisive factors in UNIFIL's failure. The lack of commitment

on both sides has had a greatly negative impact on UNIFIL's operational effectiveness. Second, domestic-political factors, particularly in Lebanon, complicate the issue further, because the weak sectarian nature of the government leads to a constant state of internal conflict in Lebanon that is based on competing confessional groups vying for political power. These divisions of loyalty based on sect preclude any meaningful move on the part of the government to combat various militia groups in the country, especially with regard to Hizballah. Third, there is the historic Israeli mistrust of the United Nations, which leads Israel to quickly criticize the UN's actions and take matters into its own hands without necessarily considering the implications that its policies have on UNIFIL's operations. Fourth, the United Nations bureaucracy has been slow to adapt to new challenges to its peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and the tradition of secrecy among UN personnel—a remnant of Cold War suspicions of others within the organization—has made it difficult for states to get honest answers to questions about the conduct of UN PKOs, leading Israel and Lebanon to become dissatisfied with the UN on many occasions. Fifth the UN's poor management skills and lack of authoritative political muscle, has meant that even with the non-compliance of either Israel or Lebanon, there is nothing it can really do to remedy such behavior. Furthermore, the UN has overburdened UNIFIL with tasks that are beyond its capabilities. Finally, various regional and superpower interests have hindered UNIFIL's ability to effectively separate Israeli and Lebanese (both regular and militant) forces. Syria and Iran have actively encouraged Hizballah activities, thereby undermining Lebanese sovereignty, decreasing the level of Israeli security in the north of the country, limiting the chances for a comprehensive

peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, and last but not least, further miring UNIFIL's difficult position.

In order to address these problems, a wide variety of literature will be used. Historical information on peacekeeping will be drawn upon, in order to create a context of the international peacekeeping tradition that existed both prior to and immediately after the creation of the United Nations. Literature on the evolution of peacekeeping, as well as the persistent problem of a lack of an agreed upon definition of the term "peacekeeping" will be examined. Moreover, a discussion of the change from Cold War peacekeeping, to post-Cold War peacekeeping will showcase the UN's difficulty in dealing with intrastate wars and non-state actors in peacekeeping operations. Finally, the policies of Lebanon, Israel, and Hizballah, and other major actors in the Middle East region (primarily Iran and Syria), and their different perceptions regarding peacekeeping, will be discussed, in order to compare and contrast the differences that exist among the parties, regarding the phenomenon of peacekeeping, specifically within the UNIFIL context.

Available literature regarding asymmetric warfare will be consulted, especially with regard to Hizballah's tactics, because of the increasing importance this type of warfare has in the world today. Intrastate warfare has become more common than interstate warfare, and by extension, the means by which war is fought today are completely different than the traditional "army versus army" paradigm. Today, "rules of war" and codes of conduct, as stipulated by such agreements as the UN Charter, and the Geneva Convention are not respected or seen as relevant by those organizations that employ fourth generation warfare. This type of warfare involves a weaker party against a

much stronger opponent, whereby the rules by which states are bound could not possibly apply to these weaker adversaries, because otherwise—in the eyes of the “fourth-generation warrior”—the weaker party would be doomed to inevitable failure. Here as well, there will be a brief discussion of the laws of war, normative expectations of states in war, and how states deal with the dilemmas of what is “right and wrong” in the conduct of a war. The military strategies of Israel and Hizballah will be examined to show how each party dealt with the other in the past, and how they continue to do so to this day, as will UNIFIL’s reaction to fourth generation warfare, and how UNIFIL’s inability to politically or militarily deal with the situation has contributed to the worsening situation along the Israel-Lebanon border.

Theoretical literature regarding conflict management, prevention, and negotiation will be used to convey what alternatives there are to the current situation. For example, both Israel and Hizballah see no alternative to a military solution to each other’s problem. Hizballah, for its part, is utterly rejectionist of the State of Israel and sees no alternative solution to ending Israel’s occupation of the Bekaa Valley (and historic Palestine, including Jerusalem) than through physical force. Israel sees Hizballah as a persistent nuisance along its northern front that prevents it from achieving a comprehensive peace with Lebanon, and endangers some one million residents of Israel’s north. For Israel, destroying Hizballah’s in and out routes, bunkers, mobile weapon systems, and so forth, are the only means by which Israel can envision a peaceful situation. For both actors, the situation is a zero-sum game. However, recently, the Israeli perception toward peacekeeping has improved, and Israel has itself endorsed the reinforcement of UNIFIL as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. This change in policy

on the part of Israeli decision makers may improve the future of UNIFIL's success in Lebanon. UNIFIL has stood at the sidelines for most of the time it has been deployed. The conflict management literature will showcase how UNIFIL, along with the various actors can perhaps try to find some alternative arrangement that would prevent an outbreak of violence, such as that of the 2006 war, given the new mandate.

A historical analysis of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict will be presented, which is crucial to understanding where the Middle East stands today. Specific attention will be given to Lebanon's domestic-political makeup, based on a division of power among the three major religious sects of Lebanon, the Maronite Catholics, Sunni Muslims and the Shiites. Hizballah's rise to power cannot be explained without adequate historical context, and in order to understand why the conflict looks the way it does, this bit of history must be laid out to bare. Hizballah's birth and support from both Iran and Syria will be discussed, and the link between the three will show that although the war of 2006 physically took place between Hizballah and Israel, it was also a proxy war by Syria and Iran against Israel. Here too, information on the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War will be given in detail.

Finally, the history of UNIFIL itself, including information on its makeup, mandate, deployments and the way in which UNIFIL has dealt with the various hurdles that it has faced since its inception will be analyzed. Here, the United Nation's political culture will be critiqued, so that the symptoms that UNIFIL faced (and continues to suffer from) will be logically connected to the symptoms the UN—as an organization—faces in general. Everything from corruption, to the lack of political will, and other ailments that the UN suffers from will be clarified, so that a better understanding of why UNIFIL

failed in carrying out its mandate up until now can be generated. This will also lay the ground to explain why the new United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 finally came to replace UNIFIL's old mandate and what this means on the ground.

This research is of extreme importance and is highly relevant today. The war was a very good example of the threat asymmetric warfare poses to a well-trained, high-tech, and well-equipped military. The myth of rag-tag soldiers who lack discipline and cannot stand up to a well-oiled military machine such as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was shattered once and for all in the minds of the Israeli defense establishment.* Israel was aware of Hizballah's capabilities even as early as 2000, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon after being unable to justify losses from Hizballah attacks, but underestimated the determination of Hizballah fighters, as well as the precise amount of munitions that Hizballah has been stockpiling since 2000. However, even the IDF was confident that it could once and for all eliminate Hizballah from the picture using military force. We can observe from the war that Hizballah emerged seemingly "victorious," in so far as Israel's stated aims of destroying the organization were not realized, and also that Hizballah was able to sustain rocket fire against Israel, despite a month of incessant fighting and hard effort by Israel to extinguish Hizballah's firepower. Furthermore, a United Nation's sanctioned force, UNIFIL, in conjunction with the Lebanese Forces and Israel Defense Forces, was absolutely futile in reducing the threat to Israel, and increasing the sovereignty of Lebanon, by effectively dealing with Hizballah. The reasons for this are many, and not necessarily the fault of UNIFIL, but as will be explained below; sovereign

* It is useful to consider here the lessons learned in the involvement of the United States military in the Vietnam War. It was at this point that the United States, along with much of the world, understood how difficult it is for even the most sophisticated and militarily superior force to overcome lightly armed, determined guerilla warfare tactics. Although the Israelis have had experience in this field as well, it will become clear later on in this thesis as to how Israel had miscalculated Hizballah in the 2006 conflict.

entities, along with highly trained militaries are often at the mercy of low-tech guerilla warfare, and these challenges cannot be ignored.

The relevance of this research has another vitally important aspect; it will deal with the question of where peacekeeping is today. “Traditional peacekeeping,” despite the ongoing definitional debate, basically intended to use a multinational force (although not *necessarily* a multinational force) to separate two states from each other, under the agreement of both parties. The question now asked is whether or not peacekeeping can be enforced, and if so, when and how should it be done. It will be made evident that UNIFIL lacked the will, expertise, manpower, logistical, disciplinary, international support and military capabilities that would have allowed it to achieve its aims, and possibly have changed the political landscape of the region. Furthermore, UNIFIL has been seen as a force limited to operations between Israel and Lebanon only. Yet it is crucial to understand the interconnectedness of Syrian and Iranian interests in the equation. Iran has supplied ideological, financial and military support to Hizballah, while Syria has served in a more passive role of political support, providing training grounds and allowing logistical equipment flows through its territory from Iran to Hizballah, as well as some weapons transfers. This problem must be examined as well in order to adequately illustrate the various issues facing UNIFIL’s ability to carry out what will be considered here an unrealistic mandate. How UNIFIL looks now, and how its future role will evolve, given the new face of post-war politics between Israel and Hizballah, remains to be seen.

The remainder of the thesis will be organized in the following fashion: In the second chapter, a historical overview of peacekeeping since the post-World War II

(WWII) era will be discussed. The origins, evolution, and transformation of peacekeeping from the post-WWII to the post-Cold War eras will be illustrated, along with the various problems that peacekeeping faces in the changing global environment. Particular attention will be paid to the limitations of peacekeeping, the different types of peacekeeping that exist, along with the various bureaucratic and other hurdles that prevent peacekeeping operations from being effective in many cases. This chapter will also demonstrate how peacekeeping has failed to deal with situations of intrastate violence and has not been able to adapt to non-sovereign militia forces that challenge state sovereignty.

The third chapter will focus on Lebanon as a country. Its politics, ethnic makeup, political environment and colonial history will all be examined in order to illustrate the complex problems that Lebanon faces up to the present. Lebanon will be shown to be a country with a multitude of religious sects, each vying for a bigger share of political representation, often at the expense of others. Outside interference, both from within and outside of the Middle East region will show to have compounded Lebanon's problems even further. Competition between these various groups has led to a complex "power-sharing" arrangement which limits Lebanese politics to a system of managing conflicts between and among different religious sects. This chapter will give the reader a prelude to an understanding of how the 2006 Israel-Hizballah conflict is directly related to the disenfranchisement of certain groups—particularly the Shiite Muslims—within Lebanon, and why Lebanese domestic politics is inseparable from the equation regarding explaining the failure of UNIFIL in achieving its mandate.

The fourth chapter will discuss the relationship between Israel and Lebanon. The relationship between the two countries, which technically began in the late 19th century before both countries were independent states, will demonstrate how the perception of the other characterized the relationship to a deep extent. Israelis viewed Lebanon as a benign, Christian Arab country that could live peacefully with Israel. Lebanese viewed Israel as a country that created the Palestinian refugee problem, which now burdened Lebanon. This chapter will show that the relationship between the two countries has never *really* existed. Rather, Israel has been more preoccupied with various elements *within* Lebanon, be it the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or Hizballah. The different viewpoints Israel and Lebanon have of each other have directly affected the way they behave towards one another. This chapter will explain the history of this relationship, and how the Lebanese and the Israelis dealt with one another.

The fifth chapter will discuss the creation of UNIFIL in 1978 and its subsequent evolution over time. Attention will be drawn to the various problems UNIFIL has had in achieving the goals set out in its mandate, and its overall performance will be scrutinized. Several arguments will be made here: First, it will be shown that UNIFIL's mandate was unrealistic to begin with because it lacked the political will of contributing countries, the United Nation's sincere support in and of itself, as well as the personnel to carry out such a mission. Second, Israeli and Lebanese intransigence has complicated matters. Both countries have criticized UNIFIL's inability to succeed, but have simultaneously pursued policies that directly confound UNIFIL's ability to operate in a free enough manner to achieve its objectives. Finally, UNIFIL, is a PKO that operates under the same auspices as any other United Nation's operation throughout the world—the "traditional" model of

peacekeeping, where a UN sanctioned force separates two *states* engaged in war. As a result of this modeling of the UNIFIL operation, UNIFIL was doomed to failure and could not realistically hope to combat any of the many militia groups operating in Lebanon, especially not the most powerful one of them, Hizballah.

The sixth chapter will discuss the rise of Hizballah and explain what makes the organization such a formidable force in the Middle East. It will look at how the construction of the Lebanese domestic-political system following Lebanese independence, disenfranchised the Shiite community of Lebanon, leading to a long-held resentment toward the Christian and Sunni Muslim upper class. This sense of disillusionment with the political system, coupled with a centuries old feeling of alienation and persecution will explain why the Shiites became susceptible to radicalism. The Iranian revolution will, of course, demonstrate how a Shiite Islamic regime had given hope to the Shiites of Lebanon, that they too could establish an Islamic regime that would stand up for Shi'a Islam and strengthen the position of the Shiites in Lebanese politics. Hizballah, will be shown to be an extension and a creation of Iranian design, to extend Iranian influence outside of its borders, and to serve as a proxy for Iranian interests vis-à-vis Israel. Furthermore, Hizballah's non-military persona will be displayed, in order to understand why they have such mainstream support. Hizballah's strong social service networks, lack of corruption (especially compared to the political competition in Hizballah), lenient attitudes towards other religious groups in Lebanon, as well as its reputation as the only force in the Arab-Muslim World to effectively combat Israel have made the organization a force to be reckoned with, with increasing popularity within the Lebanese mainstream, and the entire Arab-Muslim World. The growth of the

Shiite community in Lebanon to the point where it has become the largest religious sect in the country further reinforces its potential for mass appeal. With such a huge showing of homegrown support, it has become more difficult for Lebanon, Israel, UNIFIL, or any other party to effectively “eliminate” Hizballah. Even if the military capabilities of Hizballah were put to rest through the use of force, it is unlikely that the Hizballah ideology could be put out as easily, and it would only be a matter of time before Hizballah would rearm itself, through the “generosity” of Iran. Finally, in this chapter, a comprehensive overview of the 2006 war, discussing vital details of the military confrontation between the IDF and Hizballah fighters, as well as mention of civilian displacements and death tolls on both sides, will show the extent to which UNIFIL had failed, in conjunction with the Lebanese government, to stop the creation and evolution of a non-sovereign army in the midst of Lebanese territory from 1982 up until today.

The final chapter of this thesis will discuss what, if anything, has really changed with the introduction of Security Council Resolution 1701. Much has been made about the mandate’s increased robustness, with a large surge of personnel and a stronger mandate to carry out operations along the “Blue Line” and separate Israel and Lebanon from one another. Yet many doubt whether this new mandate is not simply more paper gone to waste. The traditional concepts of peacekeeping, whereby both parties must agree to the existence of the PKO remain in place, and the use of lethal force against any of those particular forces would be unthinkable, especially by the UN, which by its very nature would seek to limit any form of confrontation and embarrassment that it possibly could. Embarrassment would surely follow should a UNIFIL soldier fire upon a member of either the IDF or Lebanese Forces. Furthermore, the will to strike at Hizballah is

simply an impossibility because of the amorphous nature of the organization itself. Hizballah has a network of fighters and supporters who do not wear uniforms to distinguish themselves from the rest of the population. Additionally, for UNIFIL to conceivably deal with Hizballah in military terms would be unthinkable because they would meet serious and insurmountable domestic opposition and de-legitimization by the Shiites and other Lebanese supporters. More importantly, if the IDF and the Lebanese Forces cannot deal with Hizballah militarily, then UNIFIL cannot realistically be expected to do anything as well. Security Council Resolution 1701 will be shown to be a step in the right direction, but a far cry from what is needed to truly offer protection to Israel's north, Lebanon's south, and Lebanese sovereignty.

These factors will produce a detailed and well-constructed argument that will explain the creation, development and failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Every aspect of UNIFIL's mandate will be shown to have not been fulfilled in nearly thirty years. The United Nations' bureaucratic culture, coupled with the inability of the United Nations', as well as individual states, to deal with asymmetric threats, have led to UNIFIL's failure as an effective "peacekeeping" unit. At the local level, however, Israel, Lebanese, non-state (Hizballah) and outside regional actors have obfuscated meaningful attempts, to varying degrees, by UNIFIL to perform what little it could in the face of such staggering obstacles. UNIFIL will not be examined as an entity, independent of the decision makers at the United Nations—rather, any and all actions taken by UNIFIL and their successes and failures, will be directly attributed to the UN, because UNIFIL cannot be separated from the United Nations as a unit of analysis. Rather, UNIFIL will be shown to have failed because of the bureaucratic and political

problems that exist at the UN, lack of cooperation from Israel and Lebanon, unrealistic mandates, and a host of problems which will become evident throughout the thesis.

Chapter II
Peacekeeping Unravelling: The Origins, Development and Associated Problems of
Peacekeeping

In order to have a serious discussion on the problems, limitations, benefits, and achievements of peacekeeping, a common definition would be an asset. Unfortunately, there is no agreed upon definition of the term “peacekeeping.” The term means different things to different people and different institutions. Peacekeeping itself has many “sub-definitions” or offshoots that encompass peacekeeping, but people and/or organizations differ on the details as to how it should look. Several definitions will be provided below to illustrate the problems associated with a lack of consensus on the definition of peacekeeping.

Former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his “Agenda for Peace” of 1992, laid out four “areas of action” with regard to peacekeeping. First, there was “preventive diplomacy,” intended to stop disputes from arising, prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts, and limit the intensity of a conflict once a dispute escalates. Second, there was “peacemaking,” which entailed bringing hostile parties to an agreement through peaceful means. Third, “peacekeeping,” meaning sending a group of UN troops, police and civilian staff to a conflict zone with the consent of the disputing parties in order to improve the chances of conflict prevention, and the establishment of peace. Finally, “post-conflict peace-building” comes into play, where structures that are conducive to creating peace are identified and supported.¹

For the American military, the definition of “peacekeeping” is quite different. Peacekeeping is defined as a “non-combat” military operation, except in circumstances of self-defence that is undertaken with the consent of the hostile parties in order to ensure a

¹ United Nations. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (1992); available from <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>; Internet; accessed 24 October 2007.

peace agreement is enforced and adhered to by both sides.² This is similar to the UN definition, but there are two subsets of “peacekeeping” that make the American military’s perspective on the matter different than that of the UN. First there is, “aggravated peacekeeping,” or a situation in which a UN non-combat peacekeeping mission, for any number of reasons, becomes a combat operation where force can be used beyond reasons of self-defense.³ This definition, does not officially appear in any UN document, but is rather based on observations by the American military during their operation in Somalia, where the UN employed force outside of self-defense provisions. Finally, there is “peace enforcement,” where UN military personnel use or threaten to use force in order to coerce one party or another into complying with a UN resolution or sanction.⁴

Jett offers the broadest definitions of the various types of “peace support operations,” for the purpose of this argument. He provides different types of operations with climbing levels of violence to show the different levels at which peace is pursued and the different tools required to achieve (or attempt to achieve) a sustainable peace. First, “peacemaking” can be employed through the use of mediation or non-violent diplomacy to get two belligerent parties to agree to a certain set of terms without violence. Second “peacekeeping” can be used, employing military staff to observe already existing cease-fire agreements, under strict “rules of engagement,” such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Third, “peace enforcement” can come into play where military might is used to force a particular state to cease any violence, as was the case in Iraq with the creation of “No Fly Zones,” following the 1991 Gulf War. Fourth, there is “peacebuilding,” or the reconstruction of institutions and

² Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 14.

³ Ibid, 14-15.

⁴ Ibid, 15.

physical infrastructure after a conflict has ended. This is intended to create a peaceful atmosphere in a post-conflict zone, and is another type of peace support operation that is not necessarily military in nature. Finally, there is “protective engagement,” where a military force is present in order to protect humanitarian work from being disrupted.⁵

With the UN’s, the US military’s and Jetts’ various definitions to work with, Jetts’ perspective on peacekeeping will be used for our purposes because it is generic enough to encompass the other definitions, and provides enough room to work with for the remaining argument. With this in mind, it is vital to realize that there exists a strong and logical reason for why there is no widespread agreement on a common definition of peacekeeping. Different parties/actors in a conflict, and outside of a conflict, have specific interests and expectations of peacekeeping, therefore no one definition satisfies all. Moreover, there is a functional purpose to the vague definition; it allows for operational flexibility in a changing combat environment. The more vague the definition, the easier it is for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to adapt to an ever changing combat context.⁶ States especially appreciate this vagueness:

Scholars try to use definitions and categories with precision, [but] states are under no such professional obligation...The term ‘peacekeeping’ has a very favourable resonance, so that states are glad to use it in their statements and rhetoric in circumstances where, at least superficially, it will look appropriate. It is a way of trying to engender positive feelings, and hence support, for their policies.⁷

Now that a working definition has been presented, a brief history of peacekeeping will be presented, through which we will be able to see how the flexibility of the definition has been employed throughout operational time and space.

⁵ Ibid, 15.

⁶ Ibid, 16.

⁷ Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1.

Contrary to the popular belief that the first peacekeeping mission was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) between Egypt and Israel in 1956, the first mission was actually the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Israel after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, followed by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir between India and Pakistan⁸ (although not referred to as “peacekeeping” at the time). This was the beginning of the “traditional/classical” peacekeeping period, because it was a time in which a UN force was deployed to separate two warring states, with state versus state warfare being the norm of the time.⁹ Over the next two decades, between the 1950s and 1960s, various other UN PKOs sprung up around the world, intervening at the behest of the state parties in conflict. It marked the first time since its establishment after World War II, that the UN temporarily controlled parts of territory of sovereign states. These operations took place in newly independent/post-colonial states where the capacity for full self-reliance had not yet been established. Civilian police were used outside of their national confines, UN PKO personnel were allowed to carry arms and the UN involved itself in civil wars for the first time during this period. The period of peacekeeping also became the first time that UN PKOs became large scale operations with a credible force to back up their mandates.¹⁰

The birth of traditional peacekeeping doctrine came about following UNEF I. This PKO was the UN’s first large scale operation, involving six thousand troops. It was during this operation that five key principles were established that have defined the criteria for peacekeeping up until this day. The first principle was that a PKO can only

⁸ Jett, 23.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid, 23-24.

take place if both state parties in the conflict agree to the presence of a peacekeeping force. Second, the use of force on the part of PKO personnel is only permitted in situations of self-defense. Third, neutral countries may volunteer troops for a mission, but the UN cannot order a country to do so. On this particular point, states are free to send troops, share the cost of operations, or not. However, as we will see below, the costs associated with PKOs have increased substantially, causing more and more reluctance on the part of states to donate troops for missions.¹¹ Fourth, the intervening force must remain impartial to the conflict. Finally, the United Nations Secretary General is the de facto commander-in-chief of all peacekeeping operations throughout the world.¹² The intended goal of peacekeeping was to facilitate trust and confidence-building measures between two antagonistic parties, in order to facilitate the management of a conflict, allowing for the two parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement.¹³

These principles have been violated by the UN. One case in particular that is quite illuminating, is the case of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The UN intervened without the consent of both parties, taking only the Congolese government into account. UN troops supported the Congolese government against mutineer members of the “Force Publique,” or the Congo’s national Army, and therefore violated the principle of impartiality in peacekeeping.¹⁴ Second, UN troops were given vague instructions to use “any and all force” necessary to restore order, violating the principle of the use of force only for self-defense. These factors led to the death of 126

¹¹ Linda Polman, *We Did Nothing: Why the Truth Doesn't Always Come Out When the UN Goes In* (London: Penguin, 2004), 16.

¹² Jett, 24.

¹³ Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen, “Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2000,” *Research Report*, no. 1 (Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2004), 33; available from http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/Wallensteen_pub/PKOs_050111.pdf; Internet. Accessed 18 June 2008.

¹⁴ Jett, 24.

UN troops, countless Congolese civilians, and even cost the life of then UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld. “Peacekeeping” became “enforcement” as a result of the abovementioned vagueness of the mandate, leading the UN intervention in the Congo to do more harm than good.¹⁵ By 1964, with France and the Soviet Union refusing to pay the \$411 million dollars required to keep the operation going, others followed suit, and the operation was terminated, leaving very little accomplished.¹⁶ The UN had overburdened itself with this operation. Due to the high casualty rate, the lack of financial support and political will among major players in the UN, the operation was doomed to failure. However, as we shall see, the UN did not learn from its mistakes—instead it continued to repeat the same errors of having unrealistic mandates and not abiding by its proposed principles in other missions around the world.¹⁷

There are three criteria that are necessary for successful peacekeeping. First, parties to a conflict must consent to the presence of a peacekeeping force.¹⁸ Second, the Great Powers (particularly the United States) must support these operations politically, financially, and militarily.¹⁹ This is of crucial importance because when powerful states give their support to an operation, it gives that operation a high level of prestige. The parties to a conflict can benefit from this by accepting international peacekeepers in order to enhance their prestige. If they do not comply and/or cooperate with the peacekeepers, it hurts their international standing. This was the case between Egypt and Israel in 1956. When UNEF set up its operation, Egypt allowed it to operate within Egypt, but Israel did

¹⁵ MacQueen, 18-19.

¹⁶ Jett, 24-25.

¹⁷ Jett, 25.

¹⁸ Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, “A Current Perspective of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (November 2004).” Available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&cat=34&menukey=_4_2; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

¹⁹ Jett, 25.

not allow UNEF to operate within Israel due to a longstanding tradition of hostility and mistrust towards the UN. This has hurt Israel's image worldwide up until this day.²⁰ Third, "winning" in the traditional paradigm of zero-sum, state versus state warfare must be done away with; the aim must be to "salvage" something that otherwise would or could not be salvaged—peace and compromise must be of greater importance than military victory.²¹

With this in mind, we will move on to what Jett calls the "dormant period" of peacekeeping, where no new peacekeeping operations took place. For most of the 1960s up until the early 1970s, superpower deadlock at the United Nations, coupled with primarily Cold War concerns of igniting a "hot war" between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) dominated the political agenda. Both sides did not want any UN intervention against any of their respective allies, therefore making it very difficult for PKOs to get off the ground.²² Furthermore, the conflicts that were occurring globally were not considered "severe" enough to merit any peacekeeping intervention, given the other seemingly more pressing concerns dominating the UN's agenda.²³

This period came to a quick end, giving birth to the "resurgent period" of peacekeeping following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.²⁴ Following the military confrontation between Israel, Syria and Egypt, UNEF II was established in the Egyptian Sinai desert, separating Israeli and Egyptian forces, while the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established in the Golan Heights between the Israelis and the Syrians. Both the US and the USSR supported the establishment of

²⁰ MacQueen, 16.

²¹ Jett, 25.

²² Nambiar, 3.

²³ Jett, 25-26.

²⁴ Jett, 26.

PKOs in the Middle East following the war, which was the only way in which a PKO could be established anywhere during the Cold War. The USSR, which was courting the Arab countries at the time, as a counter to American support of Israel, sought to establish some sort of peacekeeping force to alleviate the humiliation felt by the Arab countries resulting from Israel's victory in the 1967 (and to a lesser extent in the 1973) Arab-Israeli Wars. The American's sought to enhance Israel's security in order to prevent further military attacks against its ally in the region. These two operations were "traditional" in that they separated two state armies from each other, with the consent of both parties. UNEF II ended in 1979 with the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, while UNDOF continues to this day.²⁵ In 1978, UNIFIL was also established,²⁶ but will be discussed in much more detail below. For the next ten years, the "maintenance period" of peacekeeping would emerge. During this time, no new peacekeeping missions were implemented. Rather, existing PKOs were overseen and had their mandates renewed repeatedly, as needed. These PKOs were still taking place during the era of "traditional" peacekeeping between states.²⁷ The 1980s and 1990s, however, would turn the face of peacekeeping upside down.

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s the peacekeeping world radically changed. Following the collapse of the USSR, and the "defeat" of Communism, Russia ceased to be a global threat. The entire perception of global security and what posed a threat to the world changed dramatically. The Russians, alongside the US and the UN could now work together to deal with conflicts outside the Cold War framework. With the Cold War over, the UN could focus on intervening in conflicts without worrying

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, 26-27.

about a superpower rivalry. The first order of business was following the 1980 – 1988 Iran-Iraq War. The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) was established between the two countries to monitor the ceasefire agreement following the War. This gave birth to what Jett calls the “expansion period” of peacekeeping, where more and more PKOs proliferated around the world.²⁸

This new period posed more problems than traditional peacekeeping for the UN, as the UN was not prepared to deal with this new turn of events. According to Van Creveld, the new situation created quite a dilemma for PKO enforcement around the world. The traditional army versus army model of combat was almost entirely a thing of the past. Army versus guerilla/terrorist organization conflict was becoming more and more the norm, where armies had to fight a new kind of combatant that did not fit well with military doctrine, and laws of conduct.²⁹ Were these individuals, soldiers or civilians? How could they be distinguished from non-combatants? What types of combat are effective? The questions have been asked since then and have yet to be adequately answered. With intrastate warfare now being the most common type of warfare around the world, PKOs are posed with quite the conundrum:

Not only the number but the responsibilities of PKOs grew as intrastate conflicts increased. Whereas PKOs dispatched to deal with interstate wars engaged in classical peacekeeping, those that dealt with civil wars often had to involve themselves in the multidimensional aspects of nation building. Aside from the complexity and expense of nation building, these intrastate conflicts presented other challenges to the peacekeepers. Because they were often fought by rebel groups using guerilla tactics against poorly funded, third-world armies, light arms and landmines became the weapons of choice. These factors made the conflicts harder to control and more likely to place the peacekeepers at risk.³⁰

²⁸ Ibid, 27.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid, 28.

Peacekeeping is simply one dimension of the overall picture that PKOs now face. Humanitarian aid, national reconciliation efforts, disarmament and disbanding of paramilitary forces are now just as much of a requirement for a PKO as the simple separation of two opposing armies. This issue is compounded by the fact that many of the belligerents in today's conflicts lack the same regard as has been shown to peacekeepers in the past, making missions far more dangerous today than they have ever been.³¹

During this time the media began playing a larger role in the peacekeeping world. The end of the Cold War ended the black and white view of the world, where all nations were afraid of stepping on the superpowers' toes. Now, the media was free to be more critical and investigate situations of human rights violations around the world. The media transmitted images of conflict and suffering, making the citizens of various UN troop donor countries feel sympathy for whatever side the media portrayed as victim. As a result, many governments felt pressured to act on behalf of the calls of their respective citizens. Thus, many states simply sent troops to acquiesce their citizenries.³² This pattern can be broken down into stages, in order to explain how this phenomenon works. First, the citizens see suffering through the eyes of a camera lens and demand their country send troops to intervene in a particular conflict, on some group's behalf. Second, governments react by sending "peacekeeping" forces, as opposed to "military" forces, because the former term sounds more benign than the latter. Third, the troops mentioned in the second step are often sent half-heartedly, more out of domestic-political concerns,

³¹ Nambiar, 4.

³² Jett, 29.

rather than any altruistic or internationalist agenda.³³ States want to show that they are “trying their best” to end a conflict, but in reality are just doing so to buttress their reputation.³⁴ This is further exacerbated by the nature of the media itself. The media is a business like any other business, they are profit driven, and the hot image and/or conflict of the day can suddenly become yesterday’s news overnight. This compromises the accuracy of information provided:

[...] most media images are partial sources of information since they are transmitted without historical content. This inadequacy is a product of modern journalism and its need to function like any other business. Capturing the attention of viewers is necessary for ratings and competition with other networks.³⁵

The media, through its ability to influence and shape opinions can, to a large extent, determine when and where a country sends its troops. It is therefore not uncommon to see troops being sent to conflicts that are covered more heavily by the media, and not to places where they may be needed more which receive little to no attention.³⁶ The concept of national sovereignty protecting a state from foreign intervention, based on the Westphalian concept of the term, is no longer a valid excuse against outside condemnation. The “CNN Effect” has contributed to this phenomenon,³⁷ as the protection of individual human rights has become more of an international norm, challenging state sovereignty on issues of war.³⁸

³³ Ibid, 29.

³⁴ Ibid, 40.

³⁵ Tami Amanda Jacoby and Ran Ukashi, “The Challenges of Peace Support Operations in Israel/Palestine,” *Bison Defence and Security Report*, no. 4 (November 2007), 4.

³⁶ Jett, 29.

³⁷ Ibid, 30.

³⁸ Stanley Hoffmann, “The Debate about Intervention,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, et al. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 275.

The problem is that a reporter standing in the midst of a battlefield provides a worm's-eye view of events that is usually devoid of context, analysis, or opposing points of view. It is these images, however, that often determine how and when decisions are made. When that happens, there is the danger ... that "peacekeeping activities become merely a substitute for addressing the root cause of ethnic and communal violence and are not closely linked to an ongoing political process aimed at conflict resolution" in which case those activities "may prolong the war itself."³⁹

It is noteworthy to mention that the very same images that cause a public to implore their government to react can be used in order to diminish support for a PKO as well. Such was the case with the United States in Somalia in 1992, when the Americans pulled out after images of dead and mutilated U.S. Marines rapidly eroded popular support for the American presence there.⁴⁰ Therefore, the gruesome imagery or conversely, images of success, can make or break a states' case for involving itself in a conflict. However, this is detrimental to any meaningful public discussion on whether or not a state's presence in a conflict is actually in the national interest. The media influences emotional and reflexive responses that can prevent serious discussion from taking place.⁴¹

This "expansion period" saw the rise from 9,000 troops in 1988 to 80,000 by 1993. On top of the operations that had already existed, sixteen new operations emerged all over the world, from Asia (Cambodia) to the Middle East (Iran/Iraq, Iraq/Kuwait) to Central and South Asia (Afghanistan/Pakistan), Africa (Uganda/Rwanda, Western Sahara, Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, and Somalia), Europe (Yugoslavia and Georgia) and Central America (Haiti).⁴²

³⁹ Jett, 56.

⁴⁰ MacQueen, 7.

⁴¹ Jacoby and Ukashi, 4.

⁴² Jett, 30.

The final period Jett discusses is the “contraction period,” which began in 1993 and is continuing today. Due to the new challenges of non-state fighters and the media, coupled with the UN taking on more operations than it can handle, the future does not look good for the effectiveness of peacekeeping. The mandates of PKOs have become increasingly complex and grandiose,⁴³ and not backed up in reality by the forces on the ground. Too much is expected from peacekeepers, usually under unrealistic time constraints and limited resources. Furthermore, the ever-present media covers the failures of PKOs, rather than the successes, because the former sells papers while the latter bores an audience.⁴⁴ With the constant barrage of failures and scandals being emphasized in the popular media, more and more people begin to question the validity and wisdom of engaging in PKOs at all, which consequently influences the decision of states, over whether or not to contribute forces,⁴⁵ as Jett writes:

Where there had been 82,000 blue helmets around the world in 1993, there were 70,000 in 1994. By 1995, there were 60,000 military and civilian personnel serving in 17 PKOs, at a total annual cost of \$3.5 billion. By the end of 1996, although there were still 16 PKOs underway, only 26,000 peacekeepers were involved and the annual cost was down to \$1.6 billion.⁴⁶

In order to develop a deeper understanding of the institutional reason behind why peacekeeping fails, we need to look at how the decision making process leading up to a PKO takes place, and how these very steps often contributes to the problem. There are three primary ways by which the UN decides to take on a PKO. First, the UN will act

⁴³ “Challenges in Peacekeeping: Past, Present and Future,” Seminar Report (October 2002). Available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&cat=34&menukey=_4_2; Internet; accessed, 15 February 2008.

⁴⁴ Jett, 33-34.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 30.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 31.

under the direction of a Security Council initiative. This is the most likely to fail because it does not take into account the consent of the parties involved in a conflict. In this situation there is often no “peace to keep” as the conflict is still ongoing, resulting in a lack of will on the part of the warring parties to end a conflict.⁴⁷ Second, the UN will act at the request of the parties, as has been traditionally the case. Finally, the UN will assist a third party mediator to a conflict in implementing agreements negotiated between two warring parties.⁴⁸ Given the past ineffectiveness of PKOs in preventing conflict, coupled with the abovementioned “CNN Effect,” and the high cost of PKOs, there is a general lack of enthusiasm for establishing more and more PKOs. It is becoming harder and harder to get the financial, political, and military support required for such operations. Therefore, the UN has to be more selective as to when, where, and in what capacity it will involve itself in future conflicts.⁴⁹ Because of the serious budgetary constraints of the UN, coupled with media influence and the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN has faced the difficult task of having to choose which conflicts to involve itself in and which to effectively, ignore.⁵⁰

There were generally six factors taken into account before a PKO was to be established: First, a conflict had to be assessed and found to have the potential of endangering international peace and security. Second, there had to be the consideration as

⁴⁷ Ibid, 36.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 36-37.

⁵⁰ Johnstone makes the observation that the UN tends to operate where death tolls are the highest. However, the UN avoids entering conflicts where the state military is strong and tends to favor Europe over Africa and then Asia when deploying peacekeepers. The bias is evident when one considers the rapid reaction the UN takes to deal with European crises versus crises on the other two continents mentioned above. Johnstone also asserts that although human suffering is the primary motivation for UN peacekeeping operations, costs involved and risks associated with the mission are always important considerations. See Ian Johnstone, “Project on Transformations in Multilateral Security Institutions: Implications for the UN,” *Peace Operations Literature Review* (2005): 6; available from <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbpps/library/Peace%20operations%20final%20literature%20review.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2008.

to whether there are regional or sub-regional organizations willing to step in. Third, existing cease-fire agreements between parties, or a commitment to peaceful negotiation, would have to preclude any PKO involvement. Fourth, there would have to be a clear political goal that could be reflected within a PKO mandate, which ties into the fifth consideration, whereby an assessment of a conflict would have to lead to a clear and attainable mandate for a PKO. Finally, the safety of UN personnel had to be “reasonably assured,” basically implying that the UN can trust the hostile parties not to attack UN personnel.⁵¹ However, Heldt and Wallensteen argue that UN PKOs are established in places that are of direct interest to the permanent Security Council membership,⁵² as evidenced by the fact that the UN establishes more PKOs in Europe, the Middle East and South America, than it does in Asia and Africa, often where intervention is required the most.⁵³

Even if and when the UN decides to involve itself, the combat situation of today is far different than what the UN has designed itself for. The UN operates under the post-World War II assumption that the wars of the future would continue to be characterized by the state versus state paradigm.⁵⁴ Licklider points out the problems that UN PKOs face today, and the changing causes of war that have seemingly no resolvable end:

[...] not only have civil wars become more common and more violent since the end of the Cold War, but they are also less likely to be resolved by negotiation. In addition, when a negotiated settlement is arrived at, it is more likely to break down than a military one ... the long-term casualties of negotiated settlements are likely to be greater than those of military victories ... where the motivation for

⁵¹ Jett, 37.

⁵² Heldt and Wallensteen, 14.

⁵³ Ibid, 15.

⁵⁴ Jett, 28.

fighting is ethnic or religious, a military victory is more likely to result in genocide.⁵⁵

Aside from the changing face of war, the age old problem of complicated mandates and the lack of resources to back them up, come up time and time again. PKO personnel are more often than not given vague mandates with high expectations and limited resources. Too few people, too many limitations, and high levels of ambiguity contribute to the failure of PKOs around the world. These mandates are deliberately vague because they are products of negotiation due to Security Council member interests, or because of inadequate situational assessments that often underestimate the resources required to accomplish a specific task.⁵⁶

It is important to emphasize that not only because the UN cannot be everywhere, all the time, the UN only engages selectively in PKOs, but rather, the PKOs that the UN does engage itself in are always PKOs with superpower backing.⁵⁷ With this in mind, the permanent five members of the Security Council (USA, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) along with the fifteen rotating members will always use their position to meander around mandates that are too strong, preferring instead vague ones that can be interpreted loosely as required. What is more, the Secretary-General, as the one individual within the UN organization to identify “orphan conflicts” and bring them to the attention of the Security Council, will therefore, choose conflicts that he or she knows will serve some sort of interest of the Security Council membership. Should the Secretary-General select a conflict that has no particular interest to the Security Council Permanent membership, he or she understands that the suggestion itself is unlikely to

⁵⁵ Ibid, 38-39.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 39.

⁵⁷ Jett, 45.

result in a PKO. It is the Secretary-General that decides what is a “threat” to international peace and security, but this is always a decision based upon the realities and constraints placed upon him or her by the Security Council.⁵⁸

Now that we have a good understanding of how the decision making process regarding PKOs within the UN bureaucracy has its problems, we now have to look at the specifics—the people. The people who make up the PKOs (soldiers and civilian support personnel) may not always be the best for the job. It is alarming that much of the field personnel, as well as those at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York, receive little to no training before commencing their jobs.⁵⁹ Just as important, however, are the people who lead the PKOs, known as “Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG)”⁶⁰ who are often in this position for all the wrong reasons.

These SRSGs have four specific tasks: First, they must ensure that the parties in a conflict remain committed to peaceful dialogue and to the UN presence. Second, if necessary, the SRSG must revise the implementation process of the PKO to better suit the changing needs of the operations. Third, they must maintain international support for the mission they are leading, and make the personnel on the ground feel that this support, in fact, exists. Finally, they must ensure that the political, economic, and military elements of the operation remain organized, coherent and efficient.⁶¹ However, SRSGs are often people with “placement problems,” who either cannot be placed somewhere within the UN bureaucracy, or volunteer for PKO placements out of financial considerations and

⁵⁸ Ibid, 43.

⁵⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Peacekeeping Best Practices*, 62nd sess., 18 December 2007. Available from <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpps/Library/A62593.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 18 June 2008

⁶⁰ Jett, 46.

⁶¹ Ibid, 47.

lack the necessary motivation to effectively run the PKO. This attitude is part and parcel of a flaw in the bureaucratic culture of the UN:

There is a culture of secrecy in the UN and especially in the Secretariat in New York. Officials establish themselves and virtually cannot be removed. You would have to kill someone to get fired. The secrecy stems from self-interest and the Cold War fear that one's career could become a victim of a Super Power confrontation. Everything is inward looking and New York oriented. There is some contact with the field, but the outside world is far away. The majority of the staff are not there because of a commitment to the ideals of the UN. They got their job because they represent a geographic interest group and they keep their job because they are protected by their group or some other patron.⁶²

Furthermore, the bureaucratic system is suffers from corruption as evidenced by the method of promotion within the UN, therefore, hard work as a means for advancement has no real impact in the organization, it is more about who you know, rather than what you know and how well you perform:

Since virtually everyone gets excellent efficiency reports, under such a system getting promoted becomes more a question of whom you know rather than what you do and how well you do it. Given this and the inward-looking, headquarters-oriented mentality within the UN, it is not surprising that PKOs are not considered to be on the fast track to bureaucratic success.⁶³

Aside from the deficient work culture of the UN, there is the lack of staff that needs to be contended with. DPKO's staff amount to approximately two percent of UN peacekeepers on operation throughout the world, meaning that some six DPKO staff are providing support per operation at the New York headquarters.⁶⁴

It is not only the leadership of PKOs that contribute to their failure, but the soldiers serving in these operations as well. More and more developing countries are

⁶² Ibid, 48.

⁶³ Ibid, 49.

⁶⁴ "The Preparedness Gap: Making Peace Operations Work in the 21st Century," *United Nations Association of the United States of America* (2001), 15. Internet; available from <http://www.unausa.org/atf/cf/%7B49C555AC-20C8-4B43-8483-A2D4C1808E4E%7D/Preparedness.pdf>; accessed 18 June 2008

contributing troops to international PKOs. In today's PKO scenario, developing countries make up the majority of contributory troops:

Prior to 1990, 33 countries had participated in 3 or more of the 18 PKOs initiated. Of those, just over half were first-world countries. By 1994, the number of countries had doubled and in 1996 there were 70 contributing countries. Of these, only 22 had developed economies. In the past, a troop-contributing country was likely to be from the first world. During the Expansion Period, this was true less than one third of the time.⁶⁵

As of 2000, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Poland and the Philippines are nine out of the ten largest troop donor countries to UN PKOs. Australia is the only one of the top ten countries to be considered a developed country.⁶⁶ It is not altruism that drives these countries to take part in UN PKOs, it is something far more measurable. The UN pays approximately one thousand dollars per soldier per month on operation. For the militaries of highly developed countries (HDCs), this amount is not adequate to upkeep the needs of a soldier. Their technology is high-tech and their standards of efficiency are high as well. On the other hand, for lesser developed countries (LDCs), this is a fantastic opportunity. For example, the government of Zimbabwe takes one third of this pay from their soldiers, while India and Pakistan take the entire stipend from their troops. This practice depreciates the morale of the soldiers, which in turn, adversely affects their performance and that of the PKO. Poor troop morale means poor performance which can negatively affect troop performance and hinder aspects of the PKO. The UN not only has to deal with the poor morale of PKO troops, but must accept the wide gap of technological capabilities between the LDC

⁶⁵ Ibid, 50.

⁶⁶ Polman, xviii.

militaries and those of HDCs. The UN cannot afford to close this gap, and therefore must accept the fact that limitations will exist because of this incongruence.⁶⁷

Another issue of critical importance is discipline. When soldiers behave in an unbecoming manner, it is very difficult for the UN to dole out appropriate punishment. The UN does not want to politically embarrass a donor country. Soldiers of a specific country are rarely identified when they misbehave as to ensure that the UN does not have to come into confrontation with a country and deal with an embarrassing situation. By not responding to bad behavior on the part of soldiers, the UN undermines its credibility among the people with which it interacts in a given PKO, which only sabotages the PKO's mandate and effectiveness.⁶⁸ For example, in Somalia, Italian troops were found not to be wearing the UN blue helmet like other UN personnel.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Irish troops in Somalia would disobey orders from Indian commanders, seeing themselves as better trained and more capable than their Indian counterparts.⁷⁰ Such lack of cooperation (along with a host of other factors), deteriorated what little chance of success the UN had in keeping the peace in Somalia. This phenomenon is not unique to the Somalia theater, but is a sad fact of PKOs around the world. The UN continues to face difficulties dealing with peacekeeping personnel that emanate from different countries, with different work cultures and levels of training.⁷¹

Finally, the UN as an organization has an ideological predisposition towards believing itself capable of contributing to the *resolution* of conflicts, rather than the

⁶⁷ Jett, 50.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 50-51.

⁶⁹ Polman, 45-46.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 47.

⁷¹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. (New York: DPKO, 2008), 2; available from http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. Internet. Accessed 18 June 2008.

management of conflicts. If there is no peace to keep, then there can be no peacekeeping. For example, even if a PKO is established after a conflict round, but the one side still wants to continue the fighting, the UN can do very little to stop the actual violence. Furthermore, they cannot impose a peace because then no substantive issues are settled between the parties.⁷² Only if there is some sort of negotiated agreement that is acceptable to both parties, and a PKO serves as a force in that context, will there be a reasonable chance for success.⁷³ The UN does not have an aura of authority such as a superpower and is not effective at conducting negotiations due to its lack of leverage. The UN must realize this and understand that unless all sides to a conflict, be they interstate or intrastate, are committed to the ending of a conflict, a PKO will be of little use.⁷⁴ This problem is specifically potent in intrastate conflicts where state leaders will sign a brokered agreement, but not implement the terms because of fears of aggravating certain ethnic or splinter groups within society. At the same time, the UN, cannot impose costs on noncompliance even through a PKO.⁷⁵

The UN must look closely at the history of a conflict and understand the different points of view, culture, and values of the parties to a conflict. As we will see in our discussion on UNIFIL, there is a strong legacy of mistrust that prevents peace from emerging:

At various points in time, the parties (or hardline elements among them) will argue against continuing to go forward. The argument will be made that the other side cannot be trusted or that the UN has not adequately verified their compliance.

⁷² Jett, 51.

⁷³ Ibid, 52.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 53.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 58.

The motivation for putting the process on hold, nonetheless, will be unwillingness to either surrender power or to run the risk of losing it.⁷⁶

Betts adds the point that once blood has been spilled, the need emerges to justify previous deaths by continuing to fight:

When is compromise probable? When both sides believe that they have more to lose than to gain from fighting. Because leaders are often sensible, this usually happens before a war starts which is why most crises are resolved by diplomacy rather than combat. But peaceful compromise has to seem impossible to the opponents for a war to start, and once it begins, compromise becomes even harder. Emotions intensify, sunk costs grow, demands for recompense escalate. If compromise was not tolerable enough to avert war in the first place, it becomes even less attractive once large amounts of blood and treasure have been invested in the cause.⁷⁷

The most crucial hindrances of PKO effectiveness are the parties themselves. States will cite sovereignty to legitimize any action they take regarding their own security interests, despite the fact that they have agreed to allow the UN to operate as a PKO in their conflict. This is done selectively, and when the UN mandate is seen as being in a state's favor, the state will uphold its support for the mandate. A party in the conflict may criticize a PKO for failing to provide security or going through with its mandate. However, if that state wanted at some future time to engage in its own military operation, it will do so. States will ignore limitations placed on them by a PKO mandate as they see fit, but will berate the UN for failing in other areas.

The fundamental, and often missing, factor is a true interest by the parties in a lasting peace if it does not provide a means to attaining their goals. While the parties will always maintain they want peace, it will be a peace on their terms, with neither costs nor risks to their claim on power.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Ibid, 113.

⁷⁷ Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds., Chester A. Crocker, et al. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 286.

⁷⁸ Jett, 115.

The UN is very hard-pressed to react here. On the one hand, as an outside entity in the conflict, the UN cannot sustain the same amount of casualties as the local actors because the conflict to the local population has much more personal meaning. This in turn means that the UN cannot *force* an agreement to come about. The UN, unfortunately, tolerates this kind of behavior because there is little it can do otherwise. It can simply operate to the best of its ability given the circumstances. In fact, noncompliance by states and other actors may be a deliberate political maneuver designed to maintain a political status quo while making the UN foot the bill. UN PKOs between states have existed for years, many of which are still there presently. PKOs can become permanent features to a political landscape, wherein they situate themselves between two parties, limit the amount of physical violence between the two sides, and that is it. Often there is no further negotiation necessary, because the status quo can be maintained without having to concede anything for the sake of a genuine peace:

Arriving at a permanent solution would require one side or the other to surrender part, or all, of its territorial claims and accept a compromise. Given that this could entail considerable domestic political risk, for many governments the status quo is often preferable to a permanent solution. The absence of war is an acceptable alternative to the absence of real peace, especially since the UN is paying the bill for maintaining the peacekeepers.⁷⁹

The UN counters this accusation by claiming that the absence of war is still better than any state of war.⁸⁰ This may be the case, but because interstate wars in which this occurs are becoming less and less common, and intrastate wars have become the norm, it would be impossible to continue this kind of operation, especially as PKO demand is on the rise,⁸¹ but PKOs themselves are in decline.⁸² This model of peacekeeping cannot sustain

⁷⁹ Ibid, 150.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Johnstone, 15.

itself indefinitely and will cost the UN more and more money in the long run, causing it to spread itself thinner and thinner.

Media agents, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will continue to draw attention to various humanitarian disasters around the world, influencing state decision makers as well as the UN, to act in various conflicts. The UN's inability to adequately deal with interstate or intrastate warfare will not be the end of UN PKOs. However, if the UN does not change the way it engages in these conflicts, it will be doomed to repeat itself and fail over and over again. Internally, the UN needs to become more accountable. As we have seen above, hiring officials from countries simply because it is politically expedient is not enough of a reason to keep them on board, even after they have broken rules that should get them fired from the organization. Officials caught breaking rules must be dismissed, not "transferred" out of the way (sometimes to head PKOs as SRSGs).⁸³ However, although PKOs get media coverage, the UN bureaucracy escapes the public's eye much more easily, as Jett explains:

[T]he UN has no legislature closely monitoring its efforts, little close scrutiny from the press, and no outraged taxpayers demanding an end to waste when they observe it. An organization that serves everyone in reality answers to no one."⁸⁴

The three principles for successful peacekeeping are the consent of the parties involved to a PKO presence, the backing of the Great Powers (especially the "Permanent Five" on the Security Council), and the need for compromise by all parties involved.⁸⁵ These principles include the fact that an SRSG must be sincere in his or her desire to ensure a successful PKO. They must concern themselves with real-time issues such as

⁸² Jett, 169.

⁸³ Ibid, 180.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 179.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 181.

disarmament, de-mining, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, and so on, versus concentrating on long term goals such as creating local governance capacity. Situations must be calmed down and order brought about before long term societal change can take place.⁸⁶ Finally, regional players must be ignored if they seek to harm a peaceful situation in order to advance their own interests. If they can play a positive role, then they should be welcomed into the process at the behest of the parties involved, but if not, they must be pointed out by the UN. This can be in the case of direct interference, where a state assists one side of the conflict in defeating the other, or a passive one, for example, ignoring the fact that arms shipments cross one's territory, a problem that will come to light below with regard to UNIFIL. Achieving these goals, however, are easier said than done.

For the UN to realistically become a more accountable organization, it must become a more democratic institution, where the Security Council has less decision making power than it currently holds.

The five permanent members of the Security Council not only decide whatever peace missions are sent or not. They also determine what the goals of these missions should be, what they can cost, how long they can last, how many blue helmets are needed and what powers they require to achieve their objectives ... The mandate must be approved by the host country. Thus orders to blue helmets always sound something like: 'Do not fire except in self-defence and never on host country authorities.'"⁸⁷

The problem is that the vast majority of the states that make up the General Assembly are not democratic themselves. It may not be realistic to expect these undemocratic countries to adopt democratic practices even if the Security Council's powers were reduced. Additionally, no PKOs are operating in the developed world. It would be very difficult to

⁸⁶ Ibid, 186.

⁸⁷ Polman, 7.

convince contributor nations in the developed world, which fund some ninety seven percent of PKOs globally, to agree to a democratic system of governance that will make them foot the bill for all of the UN's endeavors, with much less say.⁸⁸ In fact, developed countries bemoan the fact that although they pay for these PKOs, they have no say in the actual operation, and point out that the developing world requests these operations, partially because they know they do not have to pay for them.⁸⁹ Finally, even if the financial and political support were there, the historically poor performance of the UN on the ground serves as a disincentive to invest in future PKOs.⁹⁰ Blunders in Rwanda and the Balkans have greatly diminished the enthusiasm for PKOs, as Luttwak explains:

UN contingents whose absolute priority is to avoid combat protect civilians caught up in the fighting or deliberately attacked. UN peacekeeping forces have been passive spectators of violence against civilians and even outright massacre, as in Rwanda and Bosnia. Sometimes their presence is worse than useless in protecting civilians; in the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995, the Dutch contingent not only failed to fight to protect the civilians in their care as military honor would have required, but also unwittingly assisted in subsequent massacre by helping the Bosnian Serbs to separate the men of military age—very broadly defined—from women and children. Almost all the men were promptly murdered.⁹¹

It is noteworthy to mention that the “contraction period” led to the neglect of conflict areas, creating situations where ad hoc solutions were employed to fill the gap of having no PKOs, which failed as well.

These failures, as well as the failures of PKOs in the past have been a result of external factors and internal factors outside the control of PKO personnel. In terms of the

⁸⁸ Jett, 191.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 192.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 193.

⁹¹ Edward N. Luttwak, “The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, et al. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 269.

former, the resources involved in a conflict area as well as the parties themselves can obviously not be chosen or determined by the UN. As mentioned above, the UN can merely mitigate a situation to the best of its ability given the facts on the ground.⁹² In terms of the latter, it is necessary to repeat that the parties themselves must desire peace. If they do not desire a genuine peace, the UN will fail no matter how much it does. Aside from this, the UN can do a better job in picking its personnel and ensuring neutrality in a conflict. The UN must ignore political appointments and choose the best people in terms of quality, not in terms of geography. Furthermore, the UN must be neutral, but not impartial—that is to say, it must intervene when tragedies, massacres, genocide, or the like is taking place, regardless of which side is responsible. Finally, when providing goods and services, such as humanitarian aid, the UN must do so in a responsible way, so as to not contribute to the continuation of a conflict.

Some problems may be beyond resolution regardless of how well the organization improves its peacekeeping ability. Thus while the causes of peacekeeping's failures can be identified and remedies prescribed, the challenge of implementing the changes required rarely gets sufficient attention. Implementation is a problem that frequently is not fully overcome, and until it is better understood, peacekeeping will continue to be less of an instrument of the international community than it otherwise could be. The dilemma of protective engagement is one example. How the international community copes with having to be ready to kill some people in order to save others will defy easy answers regardless of what reform takes place.⁹³

With the understanding of the United Nations, peacekeeping, and all of the associated baggage that comes along with it, this thesis will now turn our attention to Lebanon, the home of UNIFIL, and examine the various dynamics that make Lebanon the unique country that it is. It will look at the history, political evolution, and sectarian differences

⁹² Jett, 194.

⁹³ Ibid, 195.

that exist in that country to understand what UNIFIL must contend with and what this means for UNIFIL as a PKO.

Chapter III
Lebanon: A Divided Country

Lebanon is a state where identity through religion is particularly strong. There are some seventeen religious sects in Lebanon. These religious groups tend to concentrate in certain geographical areas, with very few areas containing mixed populations. This self-imposed clustering of populations is a direct result of the sectarian violence that has plagued Lebanon since the nineteenth century.⁹⁴ Lebanese society is divided by the different perceptions as to the “identity” of the Lebanese state. Some see it as an extension of Syria, others see it as a historical Christian nation, while others desire an independent Lebanon devoid of any specific religious affiliations.

During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon came into existence when the Empire established an “emirate,” or province of the Empire, in the area around Mount Lebanon. Powerful families and feudal landlords based on a system of alliances between influential families were the ones who were given power in Lebanon, responsible only to the Ottoman “Emir,” or governor. The two largest and most influential religious groups in Lebanon were the Maronite Christians and the Druze Arabs. In the 1820s, Maronite peasants revolted against paying taxes to the Empire and were backed by the Maronite Church. The peasants went against the rich elite and sought to establish an independent Christian Emirate in and around Mount Lebanon. The Druze feared that such a turn of events would damage their position in society and the elite mobilized the peasantry to fight the uprising Christians. The conflict came to its climax in 1858 when the Druze defeated the Christians, leaving some 11,000 Christians dead.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Marie-J  lle Zahar, “Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure,” in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, eds. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 220.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 221.

The Ottoman Empire quickly sought to manage the crisis and did whatever it could to revert back to the original arrangement prior to the tax revolts in the 1820s. The European powers, particularly the French and the British, exploited the situation in order to weaken the Ottoman Empire and strengthen their own imperial ambitions. The French backed the Maronites in their cause, drawing common cause with fellow Catholics, and the British sided with the Druze as a counterweight to French involvement. In the end, the French, British, Austrians, Russians, Prussians, and the Ottoman Empire made a deal to establish the first “power sharing arrangement” in Lebanon that would allot the six major religious communities—the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, and the Druze⁹⁶—two seats on a twelve member administrative council that would assist the Emir’s rule. Three of these officials would be nominated by the leaders of their respective religious communities. The province of Mount Lebanon was then divided into six districts based on the religious demographic majorities, and ruled by a local mayor that was chosen by members of that community.⁹⁷ This “confessional,” or “religion-based” system of government, and its different variations where different religious groups shared in the process would become the hallmark of Lebanese politics up until the present.

The Maronites were unhappy with this arrangement. They wanted representation based on their population and rejected the system of equal representation, especially with regard to equal consideration vis-à-vis the Shiites, who at that time made up less than six percent of Mount Lebanon’s population:

⁹⁶ Ibid, 220.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 223.

By 1864, tension between the Maronites and the Ottoman governor required substantial modifications to the arrangement. Once again, the foreign brokers stepped in, and over time they redesigned the administrative council to consist of four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodoxes, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni Muslim, and one Shia Muslim. Proportional communal representation thus became the norm [...].⁹⁸

This arrangement lasted until 1920, when the Allies dismantled the Ottoman Empire because of its support of Austria and Germany during World War I (WWI). On September 1, 1920, the French Mandate established its own power sharing scheme for Lebanon. The French High Commissioner, General Henri Gouraud pronounced the creation of “Greater Lebanon,” which kept Mount Lebanon, but included Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, the Bekaa, Baalbek regions and the district of Rashayya and Hasbayya. This territorial expansion greatly increased the religious diversity of Lebanon. The Maronites fell from being eighty percent of the population to fifty one percent. Furthermore, Sunni Islam replaced the Druze as the largest Islamic sect in the country.⁹⁹

The French High Commissioner established the “Lebanese Representative Council” (LRC) in 1922 in order to have a true political representation of Lebanon’s new demographic reality.¹⁰⁰ It was believed that if the Council gave representation based on demographic weight, then the strife between the various groups could be alleviated. The Commissioner maintained veto power over any decision made in the LRC as a safeguard, and could adjourn or dissolve the Council if and when he saw fit.¹⁰¹ Besides alleviating sectarian tensions, the ultimate goal of the LRC was to serve as a forerunner to a true democratic system of “one citizen, one vote.” Hence, the LRC was meant to be a

⁹⁸ Ibid, 223-224.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 224.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 224.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 226.

temporary solution to quell any dissatisfaction felt by any one particular group.

However, the enshrining of the LRC in 1926 in the constitution of the “Republic of Lebanon” only made matters worse. Notables from the various communities exploited the LRC to pursue their own interests, increase their wealth, and strengthen their social and political positions, with little regard for the communities they were charged to represent. Anyone who spoke out in favor of true democracy, a more equitable and a pluralistic society was immediately forced out of the system.¹⁰²

The divisions in Lebanon ran very deep and the French found themselves more and more embroiled in the situation. The French had to contend with the Sunnis who did not recognize the legitimacy of Lebanon as a separate state from Syria. The French had to play a balancing act by satisfying the non-Christian communities, while also trying to maintain Maronite Christian dominance of Lebanon, in the face of growing demographic shifts. The French began tempering Maronite dominance to an extent in order to calm down opposition. French favoritism fostered radicalized leaders to portray themselves as warriors for their communities fighting against the Maronites and their French protectors. Syria became emboldened by these developments and exploited the factional differences within Lebanon to motivate people to turn against the French.¹⁰³

French authority was weakened by these events; the final blow was the German invasion of France in 1941 by Nazi Germany in World War II (WWII).¹⁰⁴ With the understanding by all in Lebanon that France would no longer be a player in Lebanon (especially by the Maronites), a compromise was reached among all the groups in

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 227.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Lebanon, culminating in the “National Pact of 1943.” The Maronites gave up their desire for French tutelage, the Sunnis relinquished their claim to being part of Syria, and the Lebanese nationalist perspective prevailed. The pact, however, was never written down, but was more of an understanding where communities would be represented by their demographic proportions, and made the affairs of religion, education, and culture specific to each particular religious community. One very important facet of this pact was that Lebanon would be neutral in its foreign policy, which referred to the Maronites and Sunnis in particular. The Maronites were not to gravitate Lebanese policy towards the West, and the Sunnis were not to advance a pro-Syrian agenda.¹⁰⁵ Thereby, although we see that all sides “relinquished” their biases, there was no genuine sense of trust among any groups in Lebanon.

An amended version of power-sharing now emerged. Maronites were guaranteed the presidency of the country, which had ultimate control of the Army, and allowed the President the right to veto any legislation passed in parliament. Also, the President had “informal” say in the choice of the Premier—which was always to be a Sunni Muslim. Cabinet posts were held by the largest religious communities in direct relation to their size. For example, the Ministry of Finance was shared almost equally between Sunnis and Maronites. The Deputy-Premier was a Greek Orthodox Christian, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was either a Maronite or Greek Catholic. The Minister of the Interior was to be a Sunni Muslim, the Minister of Defense was a Druze, and the Agriculture and Post and Telegraph Ministries were held by either Shiites or Druze. Furthermore, the National Pact permanently fixed the ratio between Christians and Muslims by law, at a

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 228.

six to five ratio, giving Christians a permanent majority by law (despite changes in demography that would tip the balance to the Muslim community's favor).¹⁰⁶

Once again, this power sharing arrangement failed to impress many Lebanese. First of all, people were often unhappy with the leaders representing their community's "interests," as they were often corrupt and self-interested. Second, economic changes and migration turned the entire system upside down, and made a continuation of the status quo very difficult to maintain. In the mid-1950s, Lebanon's economy began shifting significantly from the agricultural sector to the service sector. The Shiites were most heavily involved in agriculture and began losing their livelihoods. Naturally, the Shiites began migrating to the suburbs of Beirut, en masse, to seek better employment opportunities. This changed the demographic set up of the district-based religious clustering that made the previous power-sharing arrangements easier to swallow. The Maronites in particular were becoming richer and lived alongside with mostly Sunni Muslims in Beirut and the surrounding area. The Shiites were getting poorer and were moving out of their traditional pockets to seek a better life. There was no foreign power such as the Ottomans or the French to provide a solution, so the promise not to involve foreign powers quickly broke down, as the different groups sought the influence of various external power brokers to maintain the status quo.¹⁰⁷

One February 1, 1958, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) urged the pan-Arabist Lebanese National Movement, to overthrow the Lebanese government, appealing particularly to Sunni Muslims, who at that time were heavily influenced by pan-Arabist

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 229.

(Nasserist) ideology. The charismatic Nasser called upon all Lebanese to overthrow the government, particularly because of the signing of the Baghdad Pact by President Camille Sham'un. Because of the influence Nasser had on mobilizing the masses, the Muslim leadership in parliament had to harden their positions in order to secure the votes of their co-religionists. This only polarized the different sects even further, enhancing anger and suspicion, leading to a short civil war in 1958, which was quickly ended by US intervention.¹⁰⁸

Another hot issue for the Lebanese was the presence of the PLO. The Maronites were particularly weary of the PLO because they blamed their cross-border attacks against Israel for subsequent Israeli reprisals. This enmity eventually erupted into a military confrontation between the PLO and the Lebanese Army in 1969.¹⁰⁹ The only solution to this problem was, yet again, another form of power sharing. In order to end the conflict, the Lebanese and the PLO signed the "Cairo Agreement" on November 3, 1969, giving the PLO large levels of autonomy within their camps. The Maronites regarded this agreement as a crushing blow to Lebanese sovereignty and felt that this compromise was in effect a surrender to "Muslim dominance." The Muslims in Lebanon, particularly the Sunni, also found the PLO to be somewhat of a nuisance, but sympathized with their cause against Israel and saw them as a buffer against "Christian dominance." Everyone viewed themselves as the victim. The Syrians saw an opportunity to destabilize Lebanon, and thereby, serve as a "foreign protector" in Lebanon by financing several Palestinian militia groups and instigating PLO clashes with

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 230.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

the Lebanese Army. These clashes took place between 1969 and 1973,¹¹⁰ effectively making the “Cairo Agreement” obsolete, deteriorating the security situation in Lebanon.

The situation in Lebanon pitted various sides against each other and tested loyalties. The Christians wanted to maintain the status quo, securing their traditional political and economic privileges in Lebanon. The Muslims, and particularly among them, the Shiites, wanted more advantages and greater access to state resources. The situation continued to deteriorate until a civil war broke out yet again on April 13, 1975.¹¹¹ The Arab League established a “peacekeeping force,” which was virtually entirely Syrian, to intervene in the conflict. It would be safe to say that the Syrians ignored all of the rules regarding peacekeeping, and that the term “peacekeeping” should be used loosely.¹¹² The civil war raged on between Christians, Muslims, Druze, and various combinations of alliances of convenience throughout the conflict. The war finally ended in 1991, following the implementation of the Ta’if Accord of 1989, brokered in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. The answer provided at Ta’if—power sharing. Another “new and improved system” was established to “save Lebanon.” The Accord kept the system intact, but curtailed the Maronite presidency’s powers. A mixed religious Council of Ministers would instead have most of the executive powers, greatly increasing Sunni influence. The Shiites were given more clout in state affairs, serving as house speaker of the parliament. The 6 to 5 ratio between Christians and Muslims was done away with. Instead, equal representation between Christians and Muslims was established, and the

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 231.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² MacQueen, 121.

number of parliamentary seats increased to one hundred and twenty eight.¹¹³ These new arrangements would fail as the other ones failed because they did not take into account the fact that groups wanted to safeguard their privileges, at the expense of others, and no amount of power sharing would suffice. Finally, the Accord allowed for the Syrian army to “assist” the Lebanese Army to extend its state authority in Lebanon.¹¹⁴ As will be shown, the Syrians have assisted Lebanon for a much longer period than intended.

The intention of the Accord was to once again establish a “temporary” power-sharing system in lieu of a democratic system to be created in the future. Yet once again, with newfound power, the different communities wanted to retain as much power as they could. As Zahar explains, “[f]ar from working to eradicate confessionalism, Lebanese leaders used customary practices to challenge the provisions of the new constitution and each attempted to enhance its own power at the expense of the others.”¹¹⁵ The Syrian Army was the only stabilizing force in Lebanon; serving as a foreign protector as the Ottomans and French had in the past. This inevitably drew the Syrians deeper and deeper into Lebanese domestic politics.¹¹⁶

Syria supported pro-Syrian elements within Lebanon (especially, but not exclusively Lebanese Muslims), safeguarding their interests and thereby securing various policy initiatives that would otherwise have not been supported by the other religious groups. For example, Syria was able to drum up support for a continued military presence in the country even after its deadline for withdrawal, following the first post-war

¹¹³ Zahar, 232.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 233.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

elections.* The Lebanese parliament, under Syrian pressure amended the constitution, allowing for the pro-Syrian Maronite President, Emile Lahoud, to rule for another three years, supporting Syrian interests in Lebanon.¹¹⁷ Such actions drew much opposition, especially from General ‘Awn and other Christians in Lebanon. ‘Awn and likeminded people rejected the Ta’if Accord from the outset, specifically because the Accord made no mention of a *specific* timeline for Syrian withdrawal. The Syrians were able to justify remaining in the country after the first post-civil war election, and were entrenching themselves deeper and deeper into political permanency in Lebanon. ‘Awn forced other Christian leaders to either side with him or with Syria, leading to an internal confrontation within the Christian community in Lebanon, weakening them and making them vulnerable to outside pressures. Syria took advantage of this weakness, defeated ‘Awn’s army, and acted in accordance with its own strategic interests in Lebanon, interpreting and reinterpreting the Accord as it saw fit.¹¹⁸ The only positive outcome and tangible effect the Ta’if Accord produced was the marked reduction in inter-communal violence, which owed a large part to the heavy handed Syrian military presence,¹¹⁹ which ended along with the Syrian occupation in 2005.¹²⁰

The reason non-confessional democracy has failed to come about in Lebanon is due to foreign power intervention. Foreign powers avoided issues that were hard to solve, such as the identity of Lebanon (for example, should it be a “Christian” country,

* For example, Syria has been seen as the only modern-day “foreign guarantor” of security in Lebanon, once provided by the French. Up until 2005, many at various times, including both the United States and even Israel, considered Syria to be the only military force capable of maintaining a semblance of order in Lebanon. See Eyal Zisser, “Whither Syria?,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (March 2007); available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue1/Zisser.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 234.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 235.

¹²⁰ Ibid, Zisser, 20.

part of Greater Syria, an independent state with no official religion, or some other arrangement). Instead, agreements were established just to stop physical violence without resolving underlying causes for recurring conflict. Second, the very presence of a foreign power ensured the guarantee of security. Negotiations on core issues could be indefinitely postponed because the status quo provided by an intervening power satisfied everyone enough to avoid making any types of concessions. There was simply no motivation by any religious group to deal with the other in any meaningful way.¹²¹ Third, whenever a foreign power left, the privileged group would always seek to regain any lost privileges. For instance, when Syria entered the scene, the Sunni Muslims benefited greatly (as did other Muslim groups), but the Christians were often ignored, including in parliament where Syria often sidestepped parliamentary procedures, allowing Muslim Cabinet members, under Syrian protection, to pass laws that the Christians were opposed to. Fourth, leaders would hold on to their positions fiercely. Any challenge to an elite of a particular sect would be interpreted as an attack on the *community*. They could cry foul and accuse someone of trying to break the power-sharing arrangement if they challenged their positions.¹²² Fifth, the presence of a protector actually heightened, as opposed to diminishing suspicions of the other religious groups. Any mention of a non-confessional democracy would make the other groups nervous and fear discrimination; therefore, cementing the power-sharing paradigm even further.¹²³

¹²¹ Zahar, 238.

¹²² Ibid, 239.

¹²³ Ibid, 239-240.

With the understanding provided regarding Lebanon's complex and conflict-ridden history, this thesis will now take a look at the relationship that Lebanon has had with Israel. This is necessary in order to create the historical context of Israel-Lebanon relations, and explain the corresponding conflicts and sectarian viewpoints that have emerged since the 19th century, which have all culminated into the situation that exists today between the two countries today.

Chapter IV
Relations Between Israel and Lebanon

Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 (and even the State of Lebanon in 1943), many Zionist Jewish organizations, most prominent among them the Jewish Agency for Palestine, maintained cordial relations with some members of the Maronite Catholic community of Lebanon. The Jews and the Maronites both had particular problems with the Muslim population of Mandatory Palestine and Lebanon, respectively, and it was a common misperception on the part of the Jews that the two could work together against a common threat. The Zionist thinkers failed to understand and give proper attention to the broader segment of Lebanese society which was hostile to the Zionist dream of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Across all sects in Lebanon, including the majority of Christians, there was growing sympathy toward the Arab population of Palestine, and diminishing support, even among Maronites, for the Jewish national cause.¹²⁴

When Israel declared its independence in May 1948, the new state was attacked by its neighbors, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, along with contingents from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and elsewhere, including the small state of Lebanon. However, the Lebanese Army was small and relatively ineffectual. It was comprised of 3,500 soldiers and only engaged in small hit-and-run operations.¹²⁵ This limited engagement on behalf of Lebanon perpetuated the Zionist myth of a benign Lebanon. Once again, it was the Maronite population that was particularly supportive of Israel. This group saw Israel as a partner that could help them deal with Palestinian activity in the south of Lebanon as well as curb Muslim aggression against Maronite populations. However, Israel once again underestimated the political situation in Lebanon immediately following the 1948 Arab-

¹²⁴ Eisenberg, 19.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 19-20.

Israeli War. Israel did not pay enough attention to the fact that the majority of Lebanese blamed Israel for creating the Palestinian refugee problem, introducing thousands of refugees into Lebanon. However, despite this hostility, for approximately twenty years the border between Lebanon and Israel was relatively free of any cross-border incursions except for the odd errant shepherd or stray cattle.¹²⁶

Issues became more serious in the ten year period preceding Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon. The PLO, which was established in 1964,¹²⁷ moved its headquarters to Beirut following the "Black September" massacre in 1970. King Hussein of Jordan saw the PLO forces within Jordan—which stood somewhere between 30,000 to 50,000—demand more and more autonomy from the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy. King Hussein, fearing the growing political power of the PLO as a challenge to his rule, ordered Jordanian troops to dismantle the organization, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Palestinians, forcing many to escape to Lebanon as refugees.¹²⁸ The Palestinian population in Lebanon, coupled with those Palestinians that had ended up in Lebanon following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, made up approximately twenty percent of the country's population.¹²⁹ In Lebanon the PLO set up shop once again, and continued its fight against Israel.

Lebanon became the PLO's training and recruitment ground, as well as an arms depot and a staging ground for attacks against Israel. The PLO had established such a

¹²⁶ Ibid, 20.

¹²⁷ Marie-Jöelle Zahar, "Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure," in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, eds. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 230.

¹²⁸ Roy R. Andersen, et al., *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2001), 121.

¹²⁹ MacQueen, 120.

strong presence in the south of Lebanon, that the Lebanese government was powerless to stop it. The PLO (and much of the Palestinian population in Lebanon) was not loyal to the state. In fact their relationship was quite tense, with most Palestinians owing allegiance to the PLO and viewing Lebanon with disdain for its failure to participate in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars.¹³⁰ Making matters worse, the attacks that were planned and staged from Lebanon invited strong Israeli reprisal attacks throughout the 1970s,¹³¹ prompting the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and leading to the 1982 Israeli re-invasion of Lebanon. At this time, Israel viewed Lebanon as a country dominated by the PLO, Syrian forces (which supported any and all anti-Israel factions), and a rising grassroots Muslim support base that supported these operations. Israel sought to alleviate some of this pressure by allying itself with the pro-Israel Maronite community which also sought to use Israeli military supremacy against Muslim factions. Aside from the Maronites, most Lebanese viewed Israel as an affront to the Nasserist vision of a pan-Arab society. However, the Maronites in the south, as well as the Shiite community were willing to support Israel (or any other party) that would be able to bring some form of stability in the south, by ending Israeli-Palestinian clashes in the area.¹³²

Unfortunately, things escalated in March 1978 when PLO guerillas entered Israel via Lebanon and killed 37 Israeli civilians in a bus attack near Tel Aviv. Israel responded with “Operation Litani” in June 1978, designed to push the PLO off of Israel’s northern border and create a security zone within southern Lebanon. This zone was to remain

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Eisenberg, 20.

¹³² Ibid, 21.

occupied by Israeli troops to ensure the PLO would not return southward.¹³³ Three months later, in accordance with UN Resolution 425 (and U.S. pressure), Israel withdrew to the international border, and allowed UNIFIL to take its place in the south of Lebanon. Although Israel had withdrawn its military from Lebanon, Israel left behind IDF advisors to assist SLA members in preventing PLO attacks against Israel in exchange for weapons, funds and training. This was a product of Israel's mistrust of the UN, seeing UN Security Council Resolution 425 as an anti-Israeli resolution that failed to mention the retaliatory nature of Israel's invasion. Additionally, Israel did not trust UNIFIL's commitment to protecting its northern border and had more faith in the SLA which had proven its commitment in battle.¹³⁴ Israel's mistrust had much to do with UNIFIL's poor performance with regard to the PLO. The PLO refused to withdraw from positions within UNIFIL's area of operations, about which UNIFIL could do nothing. UNIFIL was bound by this reality which hindered troop movements throughout the south. If UNIFIL could not move freely, it could not operate freely; if it could not operate freely, it could not carry out its mandate. Moreover, the Israelis simply shook their heads at this, taking more solace in their security arrangements with the SLA versus placing their faith in a visibly ineffectual UN force.¹³⁵

UNIFIL was unable to stop the PLO or any other hostile force in south Lebanon, which led Israel to launch Operation Peace for Galilee in June of 1982. This operation was designed to completely destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon once and for all,

¹³³ Noah Pollak, "Video Made the Terrorist Star: Hezbollah has a Chillingly Effective Media Strategy," *National Review*; available from <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ODg3MGZkODIIMThmM2ZhMmE4NWEzMmJhZTc3MTFiNGI=>; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008.

¹³⁴ Eisenberg, 21.

¹³⁵ MacQueen, 123.

as well as to end, or at least greatly limit, Syrian influence in Lebanon and establish a pro-Israel regime under the Christian militia leader Bashir Gemayel, with the ultimate goal of securing a peace treaty with Lebanon.¹³⁶ Israel was successful in ending the PLO presence in Lebanon and securing the election (although narrowly) of Gemayel to the presidency, but was unsuccessful in diminishing Syrian influence or securing a peace treaty with Lebanon. A brief accord was reached between the two states when in May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement formally recognizing the 1923 “Blue Line” as the international border. However, the agreement also stipulated that Israel could establish a “security region” in southern Lebanon as a buffer against anti-Israeli forces. Syria, which had a tremendous amount of influence on Lebanon’s domestic politics, rejected the agreement, leading to the dissolution of the agreement in 1984. However, Israel did leave behind troops in the south running the distance of the border with Lebanon, and approximately nine miles north of the border, establishing the “security zone.”¹³⁷ Now that the PLO was gone, a new contender came to the fore. Hizballah was born during the 1982 invasion, and we will see later on what exactly Israel, Lebanon, and UNIFIL are now dealing with.

However, before discussing Hizballah, it is important to look at the creation and development of UNIFIL as an operation since 1978. Now that a context has been created through which to frame the situation in Lebanon and the various problems that country faces, this thesis will analyze UNIFIL’s creation, development, and level of success in achieving its mandated aims.

¹³⁶ Eisenberg, 21.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 22.

Chapter V
The Birth and Life of UNIFIL

In the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was operating against Israeli civilian and military targets from southern Lebanon.¹³⁸ Although present in the south, where the PLO was operating, the Syrian army feared taking on PLO forces as this could have invited an Israeli attack on Syrian troops, resulting from Israel's fear of the Syrian army encroaching on its northern border. However, this lack of intervention contributed to an intensification of fighting along the Israel-Lebanon border.¹³⁹ The back and forth fighting between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the PLO continued in a tit-for-tat manner, until March 14, 1978, when Israel invaded southern Lebanon in an attempt to flush out the PLO once and for all, occupying the majority of southern Lebanon within a matter of days.¹⁴⁰ The day following the invasion, Lebanon protested the invasion to the UN claiming the Government of Lebanon had nothing to do with the PLO operations against Israel. Under a U.S. initiative,¹⁴¹ the UN issued Security Council resolution 425 calling upon Israel to cease military operations and withdraw forces from all Lebanese territory, and 426, creating UNIFIL with the first troops arriving on Lebanese soil on March 23, 1978.¹⁴²

Canadian, Norwegian, Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Irish, and French troops contributed troops to the new peacekeeping force. However, given France's political involvement in Lebanon prior to Lebanon's independence, its neutrality was questioned. Lebanese Muslims viewed the French as pro-Christian. Furthermore, the French had no

¹³⁸ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*; Internet; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html>; accessed 18 June 2008.

¹³⁹ MacQueen, 121.

¹⁴⁰ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

¹⁴¹ MacQueen, 121.

¹⁴² DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

experience in peacekeeping, but were rather adept at colonial pacification and were either not willing or able to make the transition from one role to the other. By the 1980s, following a Hizballah attack on French forces in Lebanon, France withdrew from the operation.¹⁴³

UNIFIL was established in the middle of an extremely complex web of territory. Although on a map UNIFIL's area of operations was straightforward, the territory in which UNIFIL found itself was made up of pockets of Palestinian and Christian forces and their respective sympathizers.¹⁴⁴ To make matters worse, UNIFIL had (and continues to this day) to buffer between Israel, a state with a monopoly of force, and Lebanon, a state which was plagued with different militia groups operating freely.¹⁴⁵ This reality made UNIFIL's job a monumental undertaking. UNIFIL was tasked with three major objectives. First, UNIFIL was to confirm the withdrawal of the IDF to the internationally recognized border. Second, UNIFIL was to restore international peace and security (assumed to mean between Israel and Lebanon), and finally; to assist the Lebanese government in regaining its authority in the south of the country.¹⁴⁶ It is clear to see how malleable and vague UNIFIL's mandate was, given the circumstances. It will be made clear that the first and third portions of the mandate have been somewhat attainable, and that UNIFIL had in fact achieved some measure of success in these areas. However, it is the second part of the mandate that has remained entirely elusive.

¹⁴³ MacQueen, 122.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 122-123.

¹⁴⁵ Eitan Barak, "Peacekeeping Forces and the Emergence of a Limited Security Regime in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Lessons from Israel's Experience with Syria and Lebanon, 1974-2006," in *Stabilizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Considerations for a Multinational Peace Support Operation*, eds. Kobi Michael & David Kellen (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007), 77.

¹⁴⁶ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

After the Israeli withdrawal in 1978, there was relative peace and quiet between Israel and Lebanon up until 1982. The PLO and IDF had had cross-border exchanges for some time between 1978 and 1982, but after intense fire from the PLO against Israel, and the fact that the PLO's operational headquarters was in Beirut, Israel decided to invade Lebanon once again, with a 60,000 strong force,¹⁴⁷ this time reaching and surrounding the Lebanese capital, Beirut. UNIFIL, modeled as an observer mission with weak military force and limited resources, could do virtually nothing to stop the violence. UNIFIL could do little more than watch the events happen. In fact, another "peacekeeping" force was established in West Beirut, aside from UNIFIL, known as the Multinational Force (MNF). The MNF was a non-UN peacekeeping force initiated by the Americans that included French and Italian troops as well, intended to ensure that the removal of the PLO from Beirut was accomplished without a clash between Israeli and Syrian forces in the city. The 2,000 strong force was supposed to augment the Lebanese Army, which was outgunned by virtually every rebel faction in the country. However, the Western composition of the army, coupled with America's support for Israeli objectives in Lebanon united various Muslim Lebanese factions and the PLO to fight as hard as they could against the MNF. Despite the final success of the MNF and Israel to rid Beirut of the PLO, the force itself came to an end after American and French troops were attacked by suicide bombers—one of the first attacks carried out by the newly emergent group, Hizballah.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ MacQueen, 124.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 125.

Until 1985, when Israel partially withdrew from Lebanon, UNIFIL operated within the Israeli domain of southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population within its area of operations. However, the IDF and its ally, the Lebanese Maronite Christian militia (along with Shiite Muslim members),¹⁴⁹ known as the South Lebanon Army (SLA), really had effective control of Lebanon's south,¹⁵⁰ and pursued its security interests any way it wished, without UNIFIL interference.¹⁵¹ From this period until the full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, UNIFIL was prevented from fulfilling its mandate because the Israelis and the Lebanese would not cooperate, and also because the PKO had no real way of enforcing its mandate without the cooperation of the two sides. UNIFIL was limited to providing relief and offering limited protection to Lebanese civilians, and did what it could, given its constraints, to salvage some form of relevance in this state of affairs.

UNIFIL was deployed between a rock and a hard place. UNIFIL could not realistically intervene in any conflict because dealing with the various militia groups while being seen as effective by Israel or Lebanon, was a sheer impossibility. This very inability to intimidate militias to comply with UN regulations simply reinforced the perception of UNIFIL's weakness. In order to have been truly effective, "peacekeeping" was not the answer, but rather, a peace "enforcement" mission under Chapter VII of the

¹⁴⁹ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, "Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?: Israel and Lebanon after the Withdrawal," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4, no. 3 (September 2000); available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue3/jv4n3a2.html>; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008.

¹⁵⁰ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

¹⁵¹ MacQueen, 126.

UN charter permitting the use of force¹⁵² to fight against militia groups was needed.¹⁵³ If the UN were able to fight against these militia groups, Israel would have no motivation to rely on the SLA for the defense of its northern border and southern Lebanon could be stabilized enough to allow for the Lebanese Army to take control of the territory. Hindsight being 20/20, this example showcases the lack of operational planning before deployment—evidenced by the fact that the deployment of UNIFIL was done in such a rapid manner which did not allow for all options to be considered.

On April 17, 2000 the Government of Israel, under Prime Minister Ehud Barak, acting on behalf of an election promise he made to evacuate the IDF from Lebanon, issued a notice to the Secretary-General of Israel's intentions.¹⁵⁴ The withdrawal took place on May 24,¹⁵⁵ under less than ideal conditions. The IDF and the SLA began the withdrawal under fire from Hizballah and other militant and independent fighters. Crowds of Lebanese, accompanied by armed elements of various factions, began flooding into vacated villages and near-vacated villages, confronting the IDF and the SLA. Large numbers of SLA members crossed into Israel, while others remained and surrendered to Lebanese authorities. On May 25, 2000, Israel notified the UN that it had complied with Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 after twenty-two years.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Ibid, 123.

¹⁵³ "Charter of the United Nations," *Chapter VII*; available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008.

¹⁵⁴ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

¹⁵⁵ Eisenberg, 17.

¹⁵⁶ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

The UN confirmed the Israeli withdrawal to the satisfaction of both Israel and Lebanon.¹⁵⁷ In the words of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

From 24 May to 7 June, the Special Envoy traveled to Israel, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic ... The United Nations cartographer and his team, assisted by UNIFIL, worked on the ground to identify a line to be adopted for the practical purposes of confirming the Israeli withdrawal. While this was not a formal border demarcation, the aim was to identify a line on the ground conforming to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, based on the best available cartographic and other documentary evidence.¹⁵⁸

However, this was not the end to the conflict, as border violations on both sides continued unhindered. For its part, Israel has built a technical fence to demarcate the Israeli-Lebanese border in areas that cross over the “Blue Line” (the line demarcating the border between Israel and Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal) into Lebanon. The IDF has also used patrol tracks within Lebanese territory. Lebanon, at this point, had not yet sent its troops to the border, and stated that only once Israel withdrew from these areas would they send Lebanese troops to the south. The only move the Lebanese made was to send 1,000 soldiers and police near the border, leaving the area where security was *actually* needed to be inhabited only by UNIFIL troops and Hizballah.¹⁵⁹ What will be made clear is that for strategic reasons, Lebanon changed its rationale for not sending troops to the south. Lebanon stated that until there is a comprehensive treaty with Israel, Lebanese troops will not enter the south.¹⁶⁰ However, it will be made clear that the true reasons behind Lebanon’s refusal was due to its fear of confronting Hizballah.

¹⁵⁷ Lebanon quickly changed its mind, claiming the Shebaa Farms as part of its territory. More on this will be brought to light in the third chapter of this thesis when discussing the rise of Hizballah.

¹⁵⁸ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

¹⁵⁹ Eisenberg, 17.

¹⁶⁰ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

By July 2000, Israel ceased its violations of the Blue Line, allowing for UNIFIL personnel, along with the Lebanese army, gendarmie and police to enter the south, establish checkpoints and maintain “law and order.” The army collected weapons left by the IDF and SLA, and UNIFIL and the Lebanese army performed joint patrols in the area and provided humanitarian assistance such as water, medicine and food distribution, as well as reintegrating SLA members who had escaped to, and then returned from Israel to live in Lebanon.¹⁶¹

Despite some minor back and forth violations, either by Israeli patrols and aerial incursions, and some shepherd crossings from Lebanon into Israel, the situation on the border remained fairly calm. On May 22, 2000, the UN augmented UNIFIL, by totaling the troop strength from 4,513 to 5,600 personnel. The augmentation was an effort to help UNIFIL fill the vacuum left by the IDF withdrawal. More troops were needed to patrol a larger area of land. The end goal was to have 7,935 UNIFIL peacekeepers as part of the operation.¹⁶² This goal was not achieved in its entirety. Two units from Ukraine and Sweden were deployed to UNIFIL to assist in mine-sweeping, and Finnish, Ghanan, Irish, Nepalese, Fijian and Indian units were reinforced. However, UNIFIL was still short two infantry battalions which limited UNIFIL’s self-sufficiency to a high degree. UNIFIL was left to work with what it had, and received little commitment from UN PKO donor countries.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Ibid 4-5.

¹⁶² Ibid, 6.

¹⁶³ Ibid, 7.

Through historical perspective, UNIFIL has been relatively unsuccessful in stopping the two sides from fighting. Israel sends out patrols, deploys unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, and carries out aerial sorties as it sees fit. The Lebanese government has refused to take on remaining non-sovereign forces in the south (particularly Hizballah), and UNIFIL is left with no choice but to simply operate to the best of its ability. Once again, the second component of UNIFIL's mandate, to assist in restoring sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon to the Lebanese government alone, has remained elusive.

On October 7, 2000, some 500 Palestinian demonstrators approached the Lebanese-Israeli border fence near the Lebanese village of Marwahin. The demonstrators attempted to cross the fence and Israeli troops opened fire, killing three Palestinians and injuring twenty others. That same day, Hizballah crossed the fence and kidnapped three Israeli soldiers. On October 20th, three more Palestinians tried to cross into Israel and were met with Israeli gunfire, which killed one of the three.¹⁶⁴ All of this happened despite the presence of UNIFIL, and the presence of a 1,000 strong "Joint Security Force" established by the Lebanese government, intended to patrol key villages in the south, such as Marjayoun and Bint Jubayl. The Lebanese army operated in primarily Christian villages where it was safer, as opposed to operating in more dangerous territory, where Hizballah operated. By the United Nation's own admission, the Lebanese government had left *de facto* control of southern Lebanon to Hizballah:

[...] near the Blue Line the [Lebanese] authorities have, in effect, left control to Hizballah. Its members worked in civilian attire and were normally unarmed. They monitored the Blue Line, maintained public order and, in some villages,

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 3.

provided social, medical and educational services. The Government of Lebanon took the position that, so long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel, the army would not act as a border guard for Israel and would not be deployed to the border.¹⁶⁵

Two primary problems are evident here. First of all, a non-sovereign parallel-government runs the south of Lebanon. They are the ones patrolling the Blue Line, not the Lebanese army, which means that an utterly rejectionist, anti-Israel, privately funded militia group is in charge of the Lebanese-Israeli border, while the Lebanese government effectively relinquishes control of the south. Furthermore, the above mentioned logic of Lebanon as to why it refused to send soldiers to the south, was due to Israel's continued occupation of southern Lebanon. Given the fact that both Israel and Lebanon, through a UN brokered agreement, recognized Israel as having withdrawn to the internationally recognized Lebanese border—the new claim that Lebanon will not send troops to the south because of a lack of “comprehensive” peace with Israel, is also not convincing. The Lebanese government is highly reluctant to enter the south because it is terrified—and rightly so—of Hizballah, and this fear has serious consequences for Lebanon, Israel, and UNIFIL. In fact, Lebanon has never been able to reign in any militant group, especially not Hizballah, which is of course, extremely problematic for UNIFIL, as MacQueen explains,

An immediate problem lay in the fact that the central government had not exercised anything like ‘effective authority’ in the [southern] area for a considerable period before the Israeli invasion. Furthermore, to restore peace and security would require the force to confront both Palestinian and Phalangist [SLA] forces who, with or without an Israeli presence, were intent on destroying each other. Another problem for the UN was that, in the case of UNIFIL, Israel had reverted to its default posture of instinctive hostility to peacekeeping...Washington's sponsoring of the UN force was not well received by its Israeli allies.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 8.

¹⁶⁶ MacQueen, 122.

Despite efforts on the part of UNIFIL to persuade Lebanon to assume full responsibilities in the south and along the Blue Line, Lebanon had not budged on the issue. UNIFIL, therefore, failed in the third component of its mandate, to assist in the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty throughout Lebanon, directly because of Lebanon's refusal to cooperate. It is impossible to "assist" an unwilling partner. UNIFIL relegated itself to clearing leftover mines and unexploded ordnance and humanitarian assistance, as usual.¹⁶⁷ Ironically, after this period of increasingly hostile activity, UNIFIL's strength was reduced. According to the Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, UNIFIL had completed two out of three parts of its mandate. It had confirmed Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and assisted with transferring authority to the Lebanese government, as much as possible. Even though the Lebanese army did not patrol the Blue Line, UNIFIL remained to do so, but its numbers were reduced, as the belief that progress was being made was being accepted by the UN.¹⁶⁸ On the issue of "restoring international peace and security," UNIFIL could only patrol and monitor the Blue Line from observation posts and report on various violations from both sides of the border.¹⁶⁹ This was the extent of UNIFIL's ability to "restore" peace and security for Israelis and Lebanese alike.

Security Council Resolution 1337 of 2001, called for the reduction of UNIFIL troops to 4,500 by the end of July,¹⁷⁰ reducing UNIFIL personnel by 1,200. UNIFIL wanted to transfer some of its authority to 51 UNTSO observers to relieve some of the

¹⁶⁷ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 10.

burden of their operation. At this time, most of UNIFIL was operating near the Blue Line, save for a small contingent which protects UNIFIL's headquarters in Naqoura, Lebanon. The original intent of UNIFIL was to gradually reduce its troops to 2,000, by July 2002.¹⁷¹ Whether or not UNIFIL was to reduce its troops seemed to have little influence on the antagonistic actors on both sides of the border. For both the IDF and Hizballah, it was business as usual.

Israel and Hizballah continued to engage each other in the Shebaa Farms, a small patch of disputed land claimed by Israel and Lebanon, where UNIFIL operates (see below). Israel continued to violate the Blue Line by building its technical fence on the Lebanese side in some areas while also carrying out aerial incursions into Lebanon. Lebanese vehicles, shepherds and fighters also crossed into Israel, and had various firefight skirmishes, with UNIFIL unable to stop or do anything about it.¹⁷² Israel had even destroyed a Syrian radar station in the Bekaa Valley, with UNIFIL unable to act. Israel continued to act in its own security interests as it saw fit, and Hizballah was able to carry out its attacks against military and civilian targets whenever the opportunities presented themselves.¹⁷³ UNIFIL continued its regular tasks of helping the local population of the south with medical care, social services, schools, orphanages and mine clearing. The situation UNIFIL faced (and continues to face) is quite the quandary, in that Hizballah has both mobile and fixed positions along the Blue Line and monitors the line, as opposed to the Lebanese army, which has refused to deploy to the south unless

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 11.

¹⁷² UNIFIL has been unable to stop stone throwing into Israel, let alone Hizballah attacks. See Barak, 81.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 11.

there is a “comprehensive peace agreement” between Israel and Lebanon.¹⁷⁴

Furthermore, Hizballah has provided social, medical and educational services to the people of the south, primarily to (but not exclusively) the Shiite majority, and have even restricted UNIFIL movement in the area.¹⁷⁵ The UN, in the words of the Secretary General Kofi Anan, has relayed time and time again, their dissatisfaction with Lebanon’s inability to cooperate:

The Lebanese Government should take more steps to ensure the return of effective Lebanese authority throughout the south, including the deployment of its army. A more energetic and concerted effort to restore basic services to the population, and the full return of the local administration, should be integral to the process.¹⁷⁶

Despite the apparent successes of UNIFIL in handing out aid and de-mining very large amounts of land, the real point of the mission was failing miserably. In 2002, there were two separate incidents between the IDF and Hizballah within a matter of weeks. On October 3, 2002, Hizballah fired eighteen missiles and thirty three mortars at two IDF positions near Kafr Shuba. Israel responded with heavy artillery and mortar fire. A few weeks later, Hizballah launched ten missiles and sixty one mortars at five IDF positions, leading Israel to respond again with artillery and mortar fire, and two air-to-ground missiles. UNIFIL took this opportunity to once again condemn both sides for not complying with their respective agreements regarding UNIFIL, and condemned Israeli air violations, saying they were completely unjustified. UNIFIL particularly berated Israel for its policy of low altitude flights which break the sound barrier – causing sonic booms which disrupt the life of the local population. UNIFIL warned Israel that these actions

¹⁷⁴ Barak, 81.

¹⁷⁵ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*, 11.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 12.

only enhanced the hostility felt by ordinary Lebanese towards Israel.¹⁷⁷ Yet no amount of stern warning would make Hizballah, Lebanon, or Israel compromise their own security interests. UNIFIL's hands were tied.

The IDF and Hizballah (along with some Palestinian militant groups as well) continued to operate back and forth with no intervention on the part of UNIFIL. The Lebanese army had still not deployed to the south, and made its position abundantly clear that it had no immediate and/or foreseeable intentions of doing so. The situation culminated on April 4, 2002, when 15 Hizballah militants forced a UNIFIL patrol to stop at gunpoint and assaulted them with the butts of their rifles. Three of the patrol members were injured, one seriously. Even with such serious events unfolding and despite the increased tension, UNIFIL reduced its numbers, with 135 Ukrainian troops and the entire Fijian contingent slated to leave by August of that year.¹⁷⁸

While ignoring the growing problem of Israeli air incursions and Hizballah attacks on IDF positions and Israeli villages, UNIFIL boasted its successes in its progress during the 2003-2004 period. UNIFIL had cleared half-a-million square meters of land in addition to the destruction of twenty thousand mines. Almost 500 square kilometers of Lebanese land were now cleared of mines.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the southern Lebanese infrastructure, health system, welfare services, postal services and communications were increasingly being integrated with the rest of the country, due in part to the efforts of

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 13.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 15.

¹⁷⁹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *UN Peace Operations: Year in Review 2003*; available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review03/Middle-East_peace_operations.htm; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008.

UNIFIL personnel.¹⁸⁰ However, in terms of returning Lebanese sovereignty to the south, UNIFIL was still not successful, and in restoring international peace and security, UNIFIL had much work to do.

UNIFIL is greatly hindered in its operations not only by Hizballah, but by the Lebanese government which has refused outright, to cooperate with UNIFIL in any meaningful way. Also, the Israelis, understandably, seek to react to Hizballah provocations, but this inevitably hinders UNIFIL's operations because it cannot convince the local populace to support any calls for the disarming of Hizballah in favor of the Lebanese army, especially when Israel is perceived as an aggressor. The Lebanese government fears Hizballah's strength and popularity, and does not have enough power or political support to challenge Hizballah. Israel cannot afford not to retaliate against Hizballah attacks against both IDF positions and civilian targets, because the public demands Israel guarantee its citizens' security. Given that the UN cannot afford to be embarrassed, or be seen as a failure, in order to enhance and maintain its level of prestige, it must invent successes to motivate both the troops on the ground, as well as potential donors to the mission and the international community at large. UNIFIL is faced huge serious of problems.

Aside from Lebanon's inability and unwillingness to enter the south, Hizballah had made proclamations regarding its view on surrendering power. Hizballah had made

¹⁸⁰ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*, 18-19. It is noteworthy to mention here, however, that even the UN has realized that it is not helpful to over-exaggerate successes in the field, because it hides what needs to be improved to truly see results take place on the ground. See DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 89.

it clear that it would continue to fight “Israeli occupation” of Lebanese territory by force—referring to the Shebaa Farms. Should the Lebanese army try and stop Hizballah, they would be met with stiff (and insurmountable) opposition. The Shebaa Farms are nothing short of a political conundrum for any Israel-Lebanese peace agreement, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. According to the UN:

The continually asserted position of the Government of Lebanon that the Blue Line was not valid in the [Shebaa] farms area was not compatible with Security Council resolutions. The Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of confirming Israel’s withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978).¹⁸¹

However, Hizballah has used Israeli control of the Shebaa Farms to justify its continued attacks against Israel. Hizballah has become a formidable force in Lebanon, and has challenged the monopoly of force of the Lebanese government to a substantial extent. They are definitely the most technologically advanced “militant” group in the world, having deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) into Israel on November 7, 2004.¹⁸²

Following the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, UNIFIL had even less cooperation from the Lebanese army. The army had to show that it could handle civil strife throughout the country, and therefore made its presence known in major urban areas, but again, in the south, UNIFIL had to shoulder the burden until the crisis passed. This led to the passing of Security Council Resolution 1614 (2005) calling on Lebanon to exercise “sole and effective” authority in the south, and deploy as many troops as needed to ensure that Lebanon had a monopoly on force in all of Lebanon.¹⁸³ Furthermore, although condemning both Israel and Hizballah for the continued violence,

¹⁸¹ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*, 20.

¹⁸² “Hizballah Rockets”; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizballah-rockets.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008.

¹⁸³ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*, 22.

the UN requested that Lebanon hold perpetrators of attacks against Israel responsible for their actions. The Lebanese government reacted by co-locating its army liaison office in Naqoura to be closer to UNIFIL headquarters. The Lebanese army proposed the establishment of a “joint security force,” involving 1,000 troops, alongside UNIFIL to carry out joint patrols in the south. Although this new found enthusiasm was appreciated and encouraged by UNIFIL, they wanted Lebanon to do more than just observe, but also to do whatever was required to regain control of the south.¹⁸⁴

Any talk of action was now too little, too late. UNIFIL’s inability in doing what it was created to do (namely, what was called for in UNIFIL’s mandate of 1978) had now led to the eruption of the largest conflict between Israel and Hizballah in years. On July 12 2006, Hizballah militants launched rockets at the Israeli coastal town of Zarit, crossed the Blue Line and captured two soldiers, wounded two others, and killed three Israeli soldiers.¹⁸⁵ All across the Blue Line, but especially near the Bint Jubayl and Shebaa Farms area, the IDF and Hizballah exchanged heavy fire. Hizballah continued to rocket both military and civilian targets, and Israel conducted a heavy air, land, and sea attack, targeting roads, bridges and various infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon, both within and outside of UNIFIL’s area of operations.¹⁸⁶ UNIFIL was very restricted during the conflict and could not even carry out re-supply operations to its various positions, or perform search and rescue operations.¹⁸⁷ UNIFIL simply stood back militarily and carried out whatever humanitarian missions it could. Unfortunately, four UN observers

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 23-24.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 24.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 25.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

were killed during the conflict by an Israeli attack. The UN deemed it to be deliberate,¹⁸⁸ but Israel vociferously denied the allegations.

Three days before the end of the fighting, on August 11, 2006, the Security Council issued Resolution 1701 which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hizballah, the creation of a buffer zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River that was free of any and all armed elements save for UNIFIL and the Lebanese army, and for Israel and Lebanon to support the ceasefire and work on a comprehensive solution to the crisis.¹⁸⁹ The mandate reads as follows:

According to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006, UNIFIL, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426, shall:

- Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon;
- Coordinate its activities referred to in the preceding paragraph (above) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an [area] free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area;
- Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel.

¹⁸⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Report – Israel/Lebanon* (August 2006); available from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gKWLeMTIsG/b.1985951/k.1BD7/August_2006BRIsraelLebanon.htm; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008. See also "Secretary-General Shocked By Coordinated Israeli Attack on United Nations Observer Post in Lebanon, Which Killed Two Peacekeepers," *United Nations - Department of Public Information – New York Division*; available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10577.doc.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

¹⁸⁹ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*, 22.

By this resolution, the Council also authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council; and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹⁹⁰

With this resolution in place, UNIFIL's troop numbers were to rapidly increase.

UNIFIL's troop strength called for an increase from its meager 2,000 troops to a force of 15,000. The Lebanese army agreed to deploy its troops southward yet again, and UNIFIL promised to monitor the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, offer any assistance to the Lebanese army, continue helping out in a humanitarian capacity and assist displaced civilians to return to their homes, in addition to their existing duties. Also, realizing the extent to which outside arms had helped Hizballah, at the expense of the sovereignty of the Government of Lebanon, the Secretary General reiterated UN Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) forbidding any state from supplying or selling arms to any entity in Lebanon except for the government.¹⁹¹ The conflict officially ended on August 14, 2006, with only a few minor violations by both sides;¹⁹² basically, returning the situation to "normal."

On the Lebanese side, according to a United Nations estimate, 1,187 people died and 4,092 were injured. Approximately one million people were displaced, 735,000 within the country and 230,000 outside of Lebanon. However, within days following the conflict, some ninety percent (or 900,000 people) returned to, or nearby their homes.

¹⁹⁰ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Mandate*; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/mandate.html>; Internet; accessed 18 June 2008.

¹⁹¹ DPKO, *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Background*, 27.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 28.

100,000 to 150,000 Lebanese remained displaced by the end of August 2006. Lebanon suffered approximately \$3.6 billion dollars in damages with eighty bridges, six hundred kilometers of road, nine hundred factories, markets, farms, and commercial buildings, thirty one airports, water and sewage treatment plants, dams and electrical plants, and 25 fuel stations destroyed. Additionally, fifteen thousand homes were destroyed and unemployment shot up to seventy five percent in some areas of the country.¹⁹³

On the Israeli side, forty three civilians died and one hundred and seventeen soldiers were killed. Fifty three Israelis were seriously wounded and sixty eight were moderately injured. Large amounts of people were treated for shock and anxiety problems, 300,000 Israelis were displaced and over 1,000,000 were living in underground shelters. 3,970 rockets landed in Israel, with 901 hitting urban areas.¹⁹⁴

Given the better understanding of how peacekeeping operates today versus the Cold War period, it is important to realize just how much has changed in modern warfare. Dealing with non-state actors (Hizballah) greatly obfuscates the situation. Issuing condemnations to states for actions that non-state actors commit within their territories gets very little, in terms of progress, done. It is amidst this unstable and chaotic political situation, sectarian violence and economic and political segregation from which the greatest threat to Lebanese sovereignty has emerged. Hizballah, an organization of Shiite Muslims has developed out of this situation. Hizballah has become a formidable force in Lebanon, challenging the Lebanese Army, the Lebanese state, and even the IDF. It was with Hizballah, not the Lebanese Army that the IDF fought against in the summer of

¹⁹³ Ibid, 29.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

2006, and it is Hizballah that proves to be an even greater challenge to both Lebanon and UNIFIL. Before discussing the details of the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War, the origins and development of Hizballah must be examined to understand exactly who UNIFIL, Israel, and Lebanon are dealing with.

Chapter VI

The Hizballah Stronghold: Explaining the Rise and Success of the “Party of God”

Lebanese Shiites have had a particularly unfair position in Lebanon's social, political, and economic life. Numerically inferior to the dominant Maronite and Sunni population in Lebanon, many Shiites became disillusioned when Lebanon's independence was declared on November 22, 1943, due to their lack of political clout.¹⁹⁵ With the Maronites claiming the presidency and the Sunnis, the premiership, the weak position of "parliamentary speaker" was all that was left for the Shiites,¹⁹⁶ in a political system where power was based on the size of one's community. This problem has become progressively more severe as the Shiite population has grown at a faster rate than any other community in Lebanon, without any commensurate increase in their political representation.¹⁹⁷ With the Ta'if Accord of 1989, Shiite representation was supposed to be equal to that of the Maronites and the Sunnis; but to many Shiites, this promise has never been translated into reality.¹⁹⁸ The embitterment of the Shiites goes beyond the relatively new state of Lebanon. The Mamluks and the Ottomans persecuted Shiites in Lebanon and elsewhere throughout their respective empires, viewing them as a heretical sect of Islam. The Shiites' longstanding history of persecution, as well as their poor social status in Lebanon has created a potential for crisis. According to Hamzeh, the Shiite pressure cooker culminated over the years and finally boiled over following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982:

When identity crisis and structural imbalance are reinforced by military defeat, a society's militancy potential increases markedly. Military defeat followed by foreign occupation opens the way for militant movements fostering political organization or employing guerilla warfare and enjoying widespread grassroots

¹⁹⁵ Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizballah* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 11-12.

¹⁹⁶ Gary C. Gambill, "Islamist Groups in Lebanon," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 4 (December 2007); available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue4/pdf/3.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 January 2008.

¹⁹⁷ Hamzeh, 12.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 13.

support. In Lebanon, the Israeli invasion of 1978 and its occupation in 1982 served as a crisis catalyst, triggering the emergence of Hizballah and its guerilla organization.¹⁹⁹

The Shiite mindset must be understood to realize how Hizballah was able to emerge and evolve into the formidable force that it is today. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978, Israeli decision makers intended to end PLO attacks against Israel by destroying the PLO headquarters in Beirut. Israel occupied an area up to the Litani River, creating a "security zone" to serve as a buffer against these attacks. At first, Shiites welcomed the Israeli presence. The Shiites had their own problems with the PLO, and resented PLO attacks being orchestrated from primarily Shiite neighborhoods. However, the Israeli "Operation Litani" did not succeed in ending Palestinian attacks against Israel. Hundreds of homes were destroyed in the fighting, some 1,000 civilians—mostly Shiites—died in the conflict, and some 250,000 others were internally displaced within Lebanon, seeking refuge in the sordid suburbs of southern Beirut. The Shiites felt that they were being victimized by Israeli countermeasures and became increasingly hostile. Following UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 in 1978 calling on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and establishing UNIFIL, respectively, the PLO ceased its attacks and Israel partially withdrew while transferring over its former area of operations to its ally, the SLA.²⁰⁰ The Shiites were now becoming radicalized against Israel, but it was not until the 1982 invasion that Hizballah emerged to "protect Shiite interests" and pose a real problem for Israel, Lebanon and UNIFIL.

Israel launched "Operation Peace for the Galilee" in 1982 with a renewed and

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 15.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 16.

more vigorous effort to root out and destroy the PLO's presence in Lebanon. Another goal of Israel's invasion was to weaken the Syrians as well, in order to undermine the great influence Syria had in Lebanon since the late 1970s (including, but not limited to supporting all anti-Israel elements within Lebanon). In fact, Israel destroyed 102 Syrian aircraft, 61 pilots and all of Syria's surface-to-air missiles within three days of the 1982 conflict. Israel was successful in removing the PLO from Lebanon this time, with the PLO's leader Yasser Arafat and members of his organization escaping to Tunis, Tunisia, establishing the PLO's base of operations there.²⁰¹ In Israel's strategic thinking, a Lebanon free of PLO and Syrian influence would become the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty, following Egypt (and later Jordan in 1994). Furthermore, Israel hoped to establish a pro-Israel, Christian regime in order to ensure this reality. Israel helped Bashir Gemayel, the Maronite leader of the SLA to become president. After only one month in office he was assassinated in a bombing, leading to his brother, Amin Gemayel's succession. Amin exacted revenge for his brother's death by orchestrating the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres,²⁰² killing hundreds of Palestinians.²⁰³

These two months of conflict in 1982 galvanized the Shiite community in Lebanon. First, the 1982 Israeli invasion actually resulted in more destruction than the 1978 one. Second, the US-brokered, Lebanese-Israeli Accord, established by Amin Gemayel left south Lebanon—a predominantly Shiite district—under the control of the SLA, which was largely Christian and markedly pro-Israel. Third, the longstanding

²⁰¹ Roy R. Andersen, et al., *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2001), 307.

²⁰² Hamzeh, 16-17.

²⁰³ Andersen, 96.

presence of Israeli troops in south Lebanon since 1978, created resentment by the Shiite population toward foreign occupation. Finally, the Shiites felt that the PLO did not perform to the best of its ability against Israel. Despite having a severe dislike for the PLO, Shiites now saw them as the lesser of two evils, and felt they could outperform the PLO in the fight against Israel. In fact, the "Palestinian cause" was now being taken up by Lebanon's Shiites, merging very easily with their preoccupation with ending the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.²⁰⁴

It is impossible, however, to ignore the political events in the region that gave inspiration to the Shiite community in Lebanon. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran gave some Shiites in Lebanon the ideological impetus for the establishment of what was to become Hizballah. This ideology coupled with Israel's invasion of 1982 (as well as continued Israeli presence since 1978) provided a strong foundation for more radicalized politics within the Shiite community. The final ingredient in the establishment of Hizballah was the death of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a revered Lebanese Shiite cleric, who was outspoken in his condemnations of Shiite oppression, and formed the Shiite political party, Amal. Al-Sadr was believed to be killed in Libya, allegedly by the Libyan government.²⁰⁵ Al-Sadr was a charismatic leader, without which the members of Amal became internally divided. Al-Sadr promoted the enhancement of Shiite status in Lebanon through peaceful means, hoping to garner social, economic and political changes, while staying true to Shiite religious principles.²⁰⁶ Those loyal to Nabih Berri,

²⁰⁴ Hamzeh, 17.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 21-22.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, Gary C. Gambill, "Islamist Groups in Lebanon."

the current leader of Amal, had a more secular approach in their outlook,²⁰⁷ were against Islamic militancy and sought only to gain better economic, political, and social representation in Lebanon, but were very much along the same vein as Al-Sadr. Others, however, became increasingly influenced by the call for an Islamic revolution emanating from Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran. Amal, which had come to dominate Shiite politics was now challenged by the breakaway group, "Islamic Amal" lead by Sayid Husayn al-Musawi, which formed in June 1982. It was the Islamic Amal that eventually transformed itself into Hizballah—"the Party of God."²⁰⁸ The members of this group were inspired by Iranian revolutionary Islamic philosophies which they learned in Iraqi Shiite seminaries.²⁰⁹

These militant Shiites took up residence in the Bekaa Valley border area between Lebanon and Syria, and pledged their loyalty to Khomeini, who they viewed as the vanguard of the Shiite Muslims. Iran sent 1,500 Revolutionary Guard troops to train these fighters. Khomeini himself coined the term Hizballah, because he believed it was a term that could unify all Islamists, and was derived from a Quranic verse stating that those who accept God and his Prophet Muhammad are the "party of God" and will be "victorious." This arrangement between the Lebanese Shiites and Iran was mutually beneficial. For the Lebanese Shiites; they could now fight on behalf of Shiites, while establishing a struggle against Israel, the United States, and their Lebanese supporters. Iran now had a military proxy force which could carry out direct attacks against Israel,

²⁰⁷ Gary C. Gambill and Ziad Abdelnour, "Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 4, no. 2 (February 2002); available from http://www.meib.org/articles/0202_11.htm; Internet; accessed 27 June 2008.

²⁰⁸ Rodger Shanahan, "Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9, no. 1 (March 2005); available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/shanahan.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, Gary C. Gambill, "Islamist Groups in Lebanon."

under Iranian command, and serve as a conduit for Iranian foreign policy without involving the Iranian army directly in any conflict.²¹⁰ Iran also had a military tool to export its revolutionary ideals outside its own borders. Hizballah strongly identifies with Khomeinist ideology and the spreading of an Islamic order around the world—to both Muslim and non-Muslim peoples, starting with Lebanon.²¹¹

Although Hizballah has employed violence in its operations against Israel, the United States and other opponents, it is not invariably a violent organization. In fact, the exportation of its ideal "Islamic order" is, according to Hizballah's grand scheme of things, to be a non-violent transformation. Hizballah hopes that it can convince the majority of Shiites, the largest religious sect in Lebanon,²¹² to accept this Islamic order and strive for its establishment in Lebanon. Hizballah has even been seen by many as a force for democracy in Lebanon. In fact, Hizballah is very open to a democratic system instead of the "confessional" system currently in place in Lebanon for one very obvious reason. Hizballah, an organization made up of members of the largest religious sect in Lebanon, would be well advised to fight for a democratic system where the majority would have the most influential say in national policy. By extension, the Shiites would be accorded the appropriate political representation given their demographic size, which could result in a consolidation of power by Hizballah—and its particular Islamic worldview. This would be Hizballah's preferred "peaceful" transition to an Islamic-oriented Lebanon. However, despite the disclaimer that Hizballah is not necessarily a violent organization, it has made its goal of establishing an Islamic regime in Lebanon

²¹⁰ Hamzeh, 25.

²¹¹ Ibid, 28.

²¹² Ibid.

and a global Islamic order in the future by any means necessary, including violence, explicitly clear.²¹³ As Hamzeh explains, "[w]hatever its operational choice...[Hizballah's] ultimate goal is the same: to seize political power and establish an Islamic order."²¹⁴

Following the 1975 Civil War in Lebanon, the government was as divided as could be, with Syria exercising de facto control over parts of Lebanon. Israel successfully forced out most Syrian forces in the 1982 invasion, but could do little against Hizballah. Iran and Syria, the former a country that had recently undergone a religious revolution, and of a predominantly Shiite Muslim character, and the latter a secular Arab country ruled by a heterodoxical Muslim sect, saw eye to eye when it came to their views on Israel. The two states cooperated due to different anti-Israeli motives. The Syrians wanted to put pressure on Israel to return the Golan Heights, and Iran sought Israel's destruction as a Jewish state in the Muslim Middle East. Both Syria and Iran encouraged and supported Hizballah activities against Israel. This support only grew as Hizballah proved its effectiveness in combating Israeli troops in the south of Lebanon.²¹⁵

It would be useful here to include a brief history of the Iran-Syria relationship in order to understand why a religious regime is working so closely with a secular Arab country such as Syria. The relationship began in the 1970s when Syria supported Iran during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, because of Syria and Iraq's diverging views on Arab

²¹³ Ibid, 80.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 4.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 81.

nationalism.²¹⁶ Syria, under Hafez al-Asad, even provided Iran with military equipment, such as artillery and anti-aircraft technology, as well as allowing Iranian aircraft to refuel in Syrian territory.²¹⁷ One year prior to the war, the Alawite-led Government of Syria shared an affinity for Iran, because Alawite Islam was an offshoot of Shi'a Islam, leading Syria to support the Iranian Revolution of 1979 with the hopes of Iran becoming a strong player in the region—and remembering Syria's support in the future.²¹⁸ Syria even offered Ayatollah Khomeini asylum in Syria when he was being expelled from Iraq in 1978, but Khomeini chose France instead.²¹⁹ Iran most certainly did remember and appreciate Syria's friendship leading to a strengthening of relations between the two countries. Syria went so far as to close the border with Iraq in 1982, shutting down an Iraqi oil pipeline, opting instead to import heavily subsidized Iranian oil.²²⁰ With Hafez al-Asad's death in 2000, his son Bashar took the helm of Syrian leadership and increased the economic ties between his country and Iran. For example, an agreement was reached regarding the construction of an oil pipeline through Iraq, reaching Syria.²²¹

The relationship between the two countries has increased greatly following the end of Syria's occupation of Lebanon in 2005, as well as the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq. Both states feel under siege by the United States and feel they are next on the "hitlist," choosing to unify themselves as a counterweight to any US ventures in

²¹⁶ Sami Moubayed, "Syria's One True Friend – Iran," *Asia Times*, 12 July 2006; available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG12Ak01.html; Internet; accessed 20 June 2008.

²¹⁷ Abbas William Samii, "Syria and Iran: An Enduring Axis," *Mideast Monitor* 1, no. 2 (April/May 2006); available from http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0604/0604_4.htm; Internet; accessed 20 June 2008.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid, Moubayed.

²²⁰ Ibid, Samii.

²²¹ Ibid.

the region.²²² Therefore, Syria understands that Iran is the more powerful state in their “marriage,” but can use Iran to gain some political leverage, yet the relationship between the two is symbiotic. Iran enjoys the fact that it can use Hizballah, with Syrian patronage, to export its revolutionary ideals outside of Iran, while also using Hizballah as a proxy force against Israel, and as a tool to deflect criticism of its own domestic policies. For example, it has been suggested, although with no certainty, that Iran gave the “green light” for Hizballah to kidnap Israeli soldiers (unintentionally igniting the 2006 conflict) in order to take the pressure off of criticism of its nuclear program. For Syria, Hizballah serves as a destabilizing force in Lebanon, allowing it to slowly but surely reassert Syrian influence in Lebanon.²²³ The two states share common goals despite their differences, which leads to their “marriage of convenience,” as Moubayed writes,

Syria and Iran have much in common. They have a mutual friend and ally in Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon. They have a common enemy in the United States. They are both committed to the Palestinian cause. At a grassroots level in the Arab and Muslim world, the masses are pleased at Iran’s success story and support for Damascus. Why should Syria oppose Iran, or not cement its relations with Tehran, if the Iranians are being good and supportive of Syria?²²⁴

An understanding of the Iran-Syrian relationship, and how it includes Hizballah is vital to the discussion regarding Hizballah’s aims, operational tactics and broadening level of support discussed below.

Hizballah uses any techniques possible to achieve its aims. Hizballah’s method of warfare falls under the category of “asymmetric conflict.” According to Ruiters,

²²² Esther Pan, “Backgrounder: Syria, Iran, and the Mideast Conflict,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, 18 July 2006; available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11122/>; Internet; accessed 20 June 2008.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid, Moubayed.

Asymmetric warfare is a form of war (or fighting) that employs asymmetric means. Asymmetric threats or techniques describe weapons and tactics that opponents could and do use to foil or circumvent the technological superiority of Western nations. These techniques can include the use of surprise combined with weapons or tactics in ways that are unplanned or unexpected.²²⁵

An example of such techniques are "Martyrdom operations" or "suicide bombings," which are particularly infamous. Hizballah's first operation was in November 1982 when the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre was bombed, killing 90 Israeli soldiers and some Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners held in the complex.²²⁶ Hizballah's subsidiary organizations which are either linked to, or directly controlled by Hizballah have also carried out such attacks, such as the group "Islamic Jihad's" attack on the United States embassy in Ras-Beirut in April 1983, killing 80 people, and the massive attack on the United States Marine compound in October of that year killing 241 soldiers. The French air force barracks were also attacked, resulting in the deaths of 80 soldiers in the same month.²²⁷ The attacks proved to be quite successful, as both American and French troops left Lebanon in February of 1984. Furthermore, such attacks led the Israelis to retreat further and further southward into the "security zone" until Israel completely withdrew in May of 2000.²²⁸ Suicide bombing is the most powerful of all of Hizballah's tactics. The impact on the enemy is not primarily physical but psychological. Hizballah and organizations that employ suicide bombing want to convey to their enemies that its fighters do not fear death; on the contrary, they embrace and even desire it. If the threat of force is useless in deterring an enemy from attacking, what hope is

²²⁵ Major R.H.J. Ruiters, "As Old as Warfare Itself: An Examination of Asymmetric Warfare," *Doctrine and Training* 6, no. 2 (Summer 2003), 37.

²²⁶ Hamzeh, 81-82.

²²⁷ Ibid, 82.

²²⁸ Ibid.

there of victory? That is the message suicide bombing is intended to send to the enemy, and it has been particularly successful in obfuscating military operations and morale, as evidenced by the withdrawal of American, French and Israeli soldiers.²²⁹ Hizballah aimed to defeat Israel through attrition and demoralization, rather than military strength, in which it would lose decisively against the IDF.²³⁰

Another tactic used by Hizballah is the taking of hostages. This type of terrorism emphasizes a state's inability to protect all of its citizens, all of the time. It reinforces the powerlessness of the state in the face of pinpoint kidnappings, which also has a psychological effect on both the state decision makers and the citizens. Such attacks make people question the security their states provide them, and can immobilize thousands of troops from performing to the best of their abilities, as well as disrupt government functions by increasing security concerns and anti-kidnapping measures.²³¹

Hizballah has achieved its reputation as a premier fighting force through guerilla warfare. Hizballah has generally been very strategic in its employment of guerilla warfare taking into consideration the domestic-political situation in Lebanon. Hizballah has learned not to push its luck and to act patiently, as Hamzeh explains:

It has been proposed by writers that where a solid basis for revolutionary organization already exists, "terror" is unnecessary, even unproductive. In addition, terror alone cannot sustain a mass constituency and its support in the long run due to local, regional, and international complications that militancy creates. As such, Hizbullah's techniques of armed struggle have become more focused, guerilla-type warfare, particularly after the party secured areas of

²²⁹ Ibid, 85.

²³⁰ Ibid, 84.

²³¹ Ibid, 85.

control.²³²

Like many other Middle Eastern "militant" organizations, Hizballah has a geographic base and a centralized hierarchy of command. It also has a decentralized military capacity, allowing teams to operate independently in a similar fashion to small "special forces" units in state militaries, giving it mobility while maintaining a structured chain of command. Finally, it employs the same tactics as other "militant" organizations do, such as ambushes, hit and run military engagements, booby traps, and so forth.

There are, however, two important differences that differentiate Hizballah from other organizations: its recruitment practices and its level of discipline. In both cases, Hizballah is more selective than other organizations. With regard to the first point, Hizballah seeks fighters that want to fight for Shiite Islam and God, and who are willing to submit to the interpretation of Hizballah's "jurisconsult," or clerical leadership, on what constitutes good Islamic practice in all areas of life, including combat. On the same note, the recruit must be fully aware of the chance that they will be "martyred" and embrace this with a genuine fervor. That is to say, the fighter may not seek to die if it is not necessary, but should be willing to do so with pride and without hesitation for the sake of Islam. On the second point, Hizballah fighters possess strict codes of conduct and discipline in war. For example, in areas under Hizballah control, fighters are forbidden to plunder or steal among the population because it is forbidden by Islam.²³³ This code of conduct in particular has improved its image even among the non-Shiite population of Lebanon as will be discussed below. Hizballah's "purity of arms" make it different than other militant organizations, as Gambill explains

²³² Ibid, 8.

²³³ Ibid, 87-88.

For all of its relentless violence against the West and Israel, Hizballah rarely engaged in the kind of indiscriminate bloodletting characteristic of other wartime militias (a “purity of arms” that remains integral to its public image in Lebanon today). Shi’a suicide bombings against Western peacekeepers and diplomats, while abhorrent, “achieved pinpoint precision—an unusual technique for Beirut, where exploding cars usually killed indiscriminately,”... Similarly, Hizballah’s kidnapping of dozens of Western nationals contrasted sharply with the thousands of indiscriminate abductions and summary executions perpetrated by other militias during the war. At any rate, Hizballah gradually phased out such methods as it built its conventional military strength and developed a formal leadership structure.²³⁴

Hizballah receives most of its financial, ideological, and logistical (military) aid from Iran, by way of Syria. Hizballah has set up its headquarters in the Lebanese region of Baalbek-Hirmil, a part of southern Lebanon that was not occupied by Israel, and neighbored Syria. There were several reasons why Hizballah chose to set up its base in that area. First, the proximity to Syria makes it very easy for Hizballah to get the weapons and equipment it needs from Iran through Syria without fear of Israeli (or UNIFIL) intervention. If it were not for Syrian participation and political influence in Lebanon, Hizballah would not be able to operate as freely and as effectively as it does today.²³⁵ More importantly, Syria is the only land area through which weapons can flow from Iran into Lebanon—Syria’s cooperation is invaluable to Hizballah.²³⁶ Second, the area is predominantly Shiite and organized along kinship links. The loyalty of these Shiites and the fact that the vast majority of Hizballah leaders have come from this region, have provided easy recruitment, intelligence gathering and safe-havens, making it

²³⁴ Ibid, Gary C. Gambill, “Islamist Groups in Lebanon.”

²³⁵ Ely Karmon, *Fight on All Fronts’: Hizballah, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq*. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003; Internet; available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PF46.pdf>; accessed 27 May 2007.

²³⁶ Yaakov Amidror. “The Hizballah-Syria-Iran Triangle.” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (March 2007). Available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue1/Amidror.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

an ideal location to set up its operation.²³⁷ In fact, the use of safe-havens among a sympathetic population is a hallmark of Hizballah's guerilla warfare strategy. Hizballah fighters often look and dress like civilians and can easily assimilate themselves into a civilian population. Israeli soldiers are very easily identifiable and can easily be targeted.²³⁸ From this region Hizballah, toward the late 1980s onward, began to attack Israel, along with other militia groups that were affiliated with Hizballah.

Between 1988 and 2004, Hizballah and its subsidiary organizations carried out 6,074 attacks against Israel. One hundred occurred between 1985-1989, 1,030 between 1990-1995, 4,928 between 1996-2000, and 16 between 2001-2004.²³⁹ Throughout this time, Israel was unable to effectively stop the near incessant rocket attacks against its northern border. Israel's inability to eliminate the Hizballah threat made Hizballah seem to be the most effective fighting force in the Arab-Muslim world against Israel. It also demonstrated to the Arab-Muslim world that Hizballah's morale was higher than that of Israel's, and by exploiting Israeli doubt in its government's operations, one can garner much success.²⁴⁰ In the period between 1999-2000, Hizballah carried out 1,528 attacks. When compared to the many other Lebanese organizations that have attacked Israel within that same one year span, it is noteworthy to mention that there was a marked difference between Hizballah's performance and the others. Amal carried out 711 attacks, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, 167, the Syrian Social National Party, 3, the Lebanese National Resistance, 18, the Harakat al-Jihad Islami, 6 and 8 attacks were carried out by unknown elements. On average, Hizballah carried out 63 percent of the

²³⁷ Hamzeh, 88-89.

²³⁸ Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 132.

²³⁹ Hamzeh, 89.

²⁴⁰ Harik, 132.

attacks against Israel emanating from across the Lebanese border.²⁴¹ Hizballah was so effective in its operations that even against a vastly superior military force such as the IDF (including its SLA proxy militia), between Hizballah's creation in 1982 up until 1999, the overall casualty rate between both Hizballah and the IDF was almost one to one (with a slight favor going to Israel).²⁴² Once again, it is vital to reiterate that Israel could do very little in the face of such attacks and grew increasingly frustrated:

There is no question that Israel and its ally the SLA tried all destructive powers at their disposal to stop Hizbullah's guerilla warfare operations. The Grapes of Wrath campaign carried out by Israel in early 1996 ... did not prevent Hizbullah's guerrillas from carrying out their attacks. Although the April 1996 Grapes of Wrath understanding between Lebanon, Syria, and Israel succeeded somehow in the early stages in confining Hizbullah and Israeli operatives to the security zone and restricting them from attacking civilians on both sides of the border, the agreement failed to curb Hizbullah's operations. On the contrary, Hizbullah, tacitly party to the written agreement, found by it an instrument to triple its guerrilla operations, particularly after 1996, a move that Israel strived to prevent completely. Both sides accused each other of violating the agreement...The commission (consisting of the United States, France, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon) established by the April understanding and based at Naqoura, the site for the UNIFIL headquarters in South Lebanon, received hundreds of complaints. The highest number of these was in 1999 during which Hizbullah filed 125 complaints and [Israel] filed 85 complaints.²⁴³

These frustrations, along with Israeli domestic-political considerations, eventually led to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000. Although this was heralded by Israel as not only an act of compliance with UN resolutions, but also a benefit to Israel in terms of security, this latter point could not have been further from the truth. Israel had left Lebanon in haste, with no security agreement with Lebanon—the withdrawal was completely unilateral, and made Hizballah seem like a victor in a twenty

²⁴¹ Hamzeh, 90-91.

²⁴² Ibid, 93-94.

²⁴³ Ibid, 93.

year conflict with Israel.²⁴⁴ Neither Hizballah, Lebanon, or Syria had provided any concession or agreement with Israel, playing up the conception that Israel was vulnerable to guerilla warfare, and that this tactic would inevitably result in victory without giving any concessions to Israel. The withdrawal allowed Hizballah to boast the fact that it was the only force that has been able to make Israel flee, giving it massive support in the Arab-Muslim world.²⁴⁵ The SLA quickly collapsed without Israeli support, leaving fighters stranded or running to escape into Israel.²⁴⁶

The withdrawal left a bitter taste in the mouths of many SLA members who were loyal to Israel and wanted the same loyalty in return, burning a future bridge between Lebanon's Christians and Israel. These victories have greatly buttressed Hizballah's legitimacy and bargaining power in the Middle East, giving it greater independence and emboldening those who seek no negotiation with Israel to continue on their preferred path of diplomacy (particularly Syria and Iran).²⁴⁷

Hizballah quickly filled the vacuum left by the IDF and the SLA, but did so in a very tactical manner. Hizballah ensured not to take revenge on any people or communities that sided with Israel during the occupation. They were especially concerned with alleviating Christian fears that they would be massacred as revenge for their collaboration with Israel. On the contrary, Hizballah did not exact mass revenge on these communities. In fact, Hizballah provided security, even in Christian neighborhoods, due to the fears of many that people other than Hizballah may enter to

²⁴⁴ Tami Amanda Jacoby, *Conflict in Lebanon: On the Perpetual Threshold* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), 11.

²⁴⁵ Karmon, 15.

²⁴⁶ Jacoby, 11.

²⁴⁷ Karmon, 17.

take revenge.²⁴⁸ Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizballah, deliberately issued Islamic statements that espoused peace and reconciliation with Christian people. He also exonerated the Christians in the south of any wrongdoing, and differentiated between the majority of Christians who were "held hostage" by the Israelis, and those that actively sided with Israel.²⁴⁹ Hizballah wanted to make people believe that it was fighting first and foremost on behalf of all Lebanese, regardless of their religious affiliations.²⁵⁰ They did, however, organize mass arrests and interrogations. Aside from some 1,250 SLA fighters and their families that escaped into Israel during the pullout from Lebanon, the ones who remained were turned over to Lebanese state authorities to be sentenced after Hizballah was finished with its interrogations.²⁵¹ However, Hizballah's "leniency" should be interpreted in a more relative fashion. Compared to what people expected Hizballah to do—that is, exact revenge—Hizballah was more restrained. However, Hizballah sought to encourage defections, which would psychologically undermine SLA loyalists and send a message to the Israelis that their allies in Lebanon were becoming few and far between. While Hizballah did not take revenge on Christian communities so as not to ignite a sectarian war (and lose votes),²⁵² they did promise "hell" to those who were caught not surrendering once given the chance.²⁵³ More striking, the Lebanese government did not even try to challenge Hizballah's threats, but allowed them to freely operate in this fashion. The Lebanese government simply promised fair trials for those who surrendered, while Hizballah

²⁴⁸ Harik, 128.

²⁴⁹ Harik, 136.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid, 94-95.

²⁵² Ibid, 127.

²⁵³ Ibid, 129.

threatened those who did not and were later discovered.²⁵⁴ Hizballah was quick to establish its control over the south; Hizballah built twenty observation posts along the Lebanese border from Mount Hermon, near the Syrian border to the Lebanese coastal town of Naqoura (home of the UNIFIL headquarters). Hizballah fighters, operating in small teams and wearing civilian clothing, patrolled gates of entry and observation posts on motorcycles,²⁵⁵ both along the Blue Line, and ignoring it where the Shebaa Farms were concerned. The totality of Hizballah's control is unmistakable:

Shipping containers had been moved into place to serve as observation posts and checkpoints near the old passages between Lebanon and Israel and were dotted around and between the posts manned by UN observers on duty in the area. From these stations, Hezbollah presently controls all movement on area roads and checks the identity of any person approaching the gates, which were closed after Israel's evacuation. Hezbollah also maintains offices in two beach resorts previously exploited by SLA militiamen at the coastal town of Naqoura, where the headquarters of the UN force is also located. Since the only means of passage between Israel and Lebanon is located there under UN supervision, Hezbollah is able to monitor the return of SLA members and their families who sought refuge in Israel and also stop SLA partisans from escaping to Israel.²⁵⁶

For the Israelis, the withdrawal proved to be a costly move that was regretted by many Israeli military officials. Without the buffer zone and with Hizballah filling in the space left by the IDF and the SLA, Israel's north was at the mercy of Hizballah, which has had massive implications for Israel.

The fact that the whole northern population of Israel - some one million people - was indeed under Hizballah's guns after May 2000 and that there also remained areas occupied by Israel that could still be resisted by Hizballah (the Shebaa Farms), constituted an important strategic setback for Israel and an important victory for

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, 95-96.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, 155.

Hizballah and its sponsors, Syria and Iran. Hizballah shelling of Israel's north has had a strong psychological impact on the civilian population there. In fact, in a 1999 survey carried out by the municipality of Kiryat Shmona, a village whose location had placed it within range of attacks from Lebanon, it was found that one out of every four residents indicated willingness to relocate in order to distance themselves from these perils.²⁵⁷

Despite the fact that the UN had confirmed Israel's full withdrawal from Lebanon following the 2000 pullout, Hizballah considered continued Israeli presence in the Shebaa Farms as a continuation of Israeli occupation. According to the UN, the call for Israel's withdrawal, expressed in UN Security Council resolution 425 did not apply to the Farms, because it belonged to Syria, and falls under UN Security Council Resolution 242 from 1967 calling on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory. However, Syria complicated the issue when it conceded the Shebaa Farms to Lebanon, and confirmed this with Treje Rod Larson, the Middle East Assistant to then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Syria wanted to maintain domestic support for its policies in Lebanon, especially Hizballah's support, and therefore saw it to be within its interest to put Israel on the defensive once again.²⁵⁸ Furthermore, Lebanon itself, aside from Hizballah, complained about Israel's continued control of this area, arguing that it was always Lebanon's to begin with.²⁵⁹

Since Lebanon's independence, the Shebaa Farms were included within its borders, but during the 1960s, the Syrians deployed their forces to that area in order to prevent cross-border smuggling along the Syrian-Lebanese border. During the 1967

²⁵⁷ Ibid, 145.

²⁵⁸ Hamzeh, 96.

²⁵⁹ Harik, 139.

Arab-Israeli War, Israel captured the Farms while Syrian forces were still deployed there. The UN ruled that because the land was under UN jurisdiction at the time due to an agreement between the UN, Israel and Syria in 1973, a UN Disengagement Observation Force (UNDORF) was established and began operating in the area in 1974 under UN Security Council Resolution 350.²⁶⁰ Following the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, UNIFIL was established to operate in the other part of Lebanon that now had an Israeli force. The Shebaa Farms were not included in the UNIFIL mandate because the UN did not want an overlap of authority between UNDORF and UNIFIL.²⁶¹ The "Blue Line," which was the southern most point at which UNIFIL could operate in Lebanon, or the line at which Israel withdrew behind, did not include the Shebaa Farms. Therefore, when the disengagement agreement was signed by Israel and Syria, the UN considered the return of the Shebaa Farms to be a matter that concerned Israel and Syria, regardless of the Lebanese land claim. Thus, two problems emerged for Lebanon and Syria. Syria has relinquished its claim to the Shebaa Farms and given the title to Lebanon and Lebanon has always considered the Farms part of its territory. However, because of the Israeli control of the Farms, neither Syrian nor Lebanese topographical investigations can be carried out to provide sufficient evidence to the Security Council to eliminate any doubt of ownership.²⁶² Israel, on the other hand, is quite content with the current situation, because the Farms provide Israel with one final buffer zone, albeit a small one, against Hizballah infiltration into Israel.²⁶³ Israel and Syria have been deadlocked on negotiations over returning the Israeli occupied Golan Heights, as well as the Shebaa

²⁶⁰ Ibid, 139.

²⁶¹ Ibid, 139-140.

²⁶² Ibid, 140.

²⁶³ Ibid, 141.

Farms. However, by having the UN confirm full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel enjoys the right to defend itself against Hizballah attacks emanating from the Shebaa Farms. These attacks allow Israel to strike against Hizballah without the UN condemning the acts, or at least, finding it harder to legitimize a condemnation.²⁶⁴ One final consideration for Israeli motivations to retain the Shebaa Farms, is that the farms are rich in water—a resource that is very scarce in Israel, but plentiful in Lebanon.²⁶⁵ Israel would be hard pressed to relinquish this territory without some guarantee in the form of a peace treaty that it would be able to share in the water flow coming down from Lebanon and Syria.

Using the Shebaa Farms as a pretext and justification for continued violence, since December 2001, Hizballah has continually attacked Israel. Israel holds all of Lebanon and Syria responsible for not reigning in Hizballah and allowing it to attack at will.²⁶⁶ For example, following Operation "Grapes of Wrath" in 1993 where Israel used airpower to attack highways, bridges, power stations, Hizballah hideouts and other infrastructure in Lebanon, Israel gave the Lebanese government stern warning.

[...] Israel warned the Lebanese government of even wider destruction if Hezbollah fighters were not brought to heel ... Uri Lubrani, coordinator of Israeli activities in Lebanon, warned that the Lebanese government's 'adoption of Hezbollah' would lead to the destruction of the country's economic and security accomplishments and that the damage that Hezbollah's shelling caused in Israel would be answered in kind anywhere in Lebanon.²⁶⁷

Israel uses these attacks to justify its own retaliations by conducting frequent fighter jet

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, 144.

²⁶⁶ Joshua L. Gleis, "A Disproportionate Response? The Case of Israel and Hizballah," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, no. 549 (December 2006); available from <http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=1456>; accessed 24 June 2008.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, 117.

fly-over raids over Hizballah and Syrian positions.²⁶⁸ Israel, at this time, faced a serious catch-22. On the one hand, if Israel continued to respond to Hizballah's provocations, Hizballah would retaliate with rockets, fired from mobile rocket launchers all along the Lebanese border, potentially using Iranian-made "Fajr-3" Katyusha rockets with a 45 kilometer range, enough to hit major Israeli cities. Hizballah was believed to have some 10,000 of these rockets which posed a serious security threat for Israel's Galilee region. On the other hand, there is no more buffer zone in Lebanon, and Hizballah enjoys full Iranian and Syrian support while not recognizing international borders. Furthermore, Hizballah does not recognize Israel itself as a legitimate state, but rather a hostile entity within "historic Palestine," which needs to be liberated, in addition to all Israeli-occupied territory. Israel realizes that whether it responds or not, guerilla warfare will continue unabated, and it must also consider domestic Israeli public opinion, calling for the government to provide security for Israel's north.²⁶⁹

For Lebanon as well, the problem of reigning in Hizballah to stop attacks against Israel was simply impossible. Hizballah operated on its own initiative and did not inform the Lebanese government when it was going to attack. In fact, this very problem led to a major political embarrassment for the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. While in France, with most of his cabinet, meeting with foreign investors and members of the international community, seeking foreign investment and financial aid to help Lebanon's ailing economy and reconstruction projects, Hariri tried to calm the fears of these investors and instill confidence in Lebanon's stability. When asked about Lebanon's shortcomings in effectively ruling its south, leaving it to Hizballah, and the threat of Israeli retaliations

²⁶⁸ Hazmeh, 98.

²⁶⁹ Ibid, 99.

which would target newly built infrastructure, Hariri reassured investors that Lebanon and Syria wanted to do whatever they could to not provoke an Israeli attack. A day after Hariri made this statement, Hizballah had fired an anti-tank missile at an Israeli patrol in the Shebaa Farms, killing one soldier and injuring two others.²⁷⁰ Israel responded with artillery fire against the outskirts of villages near the Shebaa Farms.²⁷¹ Hariri attempted to pass off the attack as a legitimate reprisal against Israeli occupation of Lebanese land, but was embarrassed further when he was discovered trying all measures at his disposal to prevent further Israeli reprisals against Lebanon in spite of his “endorsement” of Hizballah’s actions.²⁷² Additionally, Israel itself, with much more advanced and a better equipped military than Lebanon has been unsuccessful in eliminating Hizballah's mobile rocket systems. In response to Israel's abovementioned threat, Lebanon's leaders asked themselves, if Israel cannot do anything, what can they expect from Lebanon?²⁷³ Furthermore, acquiescing to an Israeli demand would be political suicide for any Lebanese official—despite any personal misgivings about Hizballah's actions. Hizballah has been very successful in exploiting this governmental silence, by translating it into tacit support on behalf of the nation to continue its attacks against Israel.²⁷⁴

Thus it is possible to see that although Israel bears most of the brunt in terms of physical attacks, Lebanon and UNIFIL are also constrained by Hizballah. Hizballah has driven out state authorities and local political rivals in areas under its control. For example, in 1983, the General of the Lebanese Forces, Amin Gemayel, ordered the army

²⁷⁰ Harik, 152.

²⁷¹ Ibid, 153.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid, 118

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 119.

to route out Hizballah from the eastern region between Baalbek and Bitl, where Hizballah was particularly strong, but Hizballah was able to defeat the Lebanese army and force them to retreat. A similar attempt was made in 1989, with the Lebanese army shelling Beirut's Shiite-dominated southern suburbs, but again the army failed, and even surrendered their weapons to Hizballah. However, the failure of the army was due in part to the fact that the army was not motivated to fight. The rank and file of the Lebanese army is 60 percent Shiite,²⁷⁵ half of which sympathize with Hizballah.²⁷⁶ Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal and direct competitor with Hizballah for the leadership of the community, was united with Hizballah when it came to urging Shiite soldiers to resign from the army. The calls were heard, and the Lebanese army (and Lebanon's political apparatus) faced an almost total collapse

[...] Hizbullah strengthened its positions in the southern suburbs and occupied the Lebanese army barracks in the city of Ba'albek. Reportedly, Hizbullah's fighters surrounded the barracks and requested that the army's commander capitulate. As the army was overpowered by Hizbullah fighters, the soldiers surrendered to Hizbullah, who confiscated their arms and ammunition. By turning the barracks into a military base, the whole region of Ba'albek-Hirmil was seized by Hizbullah from the Lebanese state.²⁷⁷

Hizballah did not challenged Lebanon's state authority, but also Amal's and UNIFIL's. In fact, Hizballah did not recognize the legitimacy of either, viewing Amal as treacherous in its cooperation with UNIFIL and accepting a tacit non-aggressive status-quo situation with Israel in comparison to Hizballah. As for UNIFIL, Hizballah saw it simply as a foreign protector of Israel.

[...] Amal's policy after Israel retreated into the security zone turned increasingly

²⁷⁵ Hamzeh, 100.

²⁷⁶ Paul A. Jureidini, et al., "The Future of Lebanon: Panel Discussion," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 3, Article 2/8 (September 2007); available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue3/2.pdf>; Internet; accessed 25 October 2007.

²⁷⁷ Hamzeh, 100-101.

toward a pragmatic *modus vivendi* with Israel, in return for a tacit acceptance of the status quo. Amal's southern fiefdom of control was not to be used as a springboard for attacks on Israel. Hizbullah, on the other hand, pressed for jihad against Israel under the unequivocal banner of Islam and Iran. Also, differences between the two with regard to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were clear. While Amal opted for a cooperative working relationship with UNIFIL, Hizbullah considered it to be a means to protect Israel and a counter to the Islamic Resistance operations.²⁷⁸

Hizbullah is very serious about the Islamic component of its political program. In areas under its control, alcohol, pork and pornography are not allowed. The mixing of the sexes is carefully controlled and women are required to veil their heads and cover their bodies. These laws are not Lebanese state laws, but rather the laws of Lebanon are done away with as Hizbullah sees fit.²⁷⁹ Where Hizbullah has control, Hizbullah makes its own laws. Hizbullah rejects the idea of democracy except as a tool to establish a non-democratic, Islamic regime, Hizbullah-style. For Hizbullah, the concept of "shura" or following the decrees of recognized Islamic leaders, is Hizbullah's ideal form of governance. Hizbullah are members of the Lebanese parliament, but participate simply to ensure its "resistance" in the south can be maintained, while also giving them a voice in parliament calling for the end of the "confessional" system that currently exists.²⁸⁰ In particular, Hizbullah (and Amal) seek to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 years of age, allowing the largely young Shiite population of Lebanon to cast their votes in greater numbers.²⁸¹ Hizbullah hopes that by influencing the popular vote of the Shiites in Lebanon, being the largest religious sect in the country, they can take control of the country "peacefully," in order to avoid a violent takeover.²⁸² Remarkably, despite

²⁷⁸ Ibid, 101.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, 102.

²⁸⁰ Hamzeh, 112.

²⁸¹ Ibid, Shanahan.

²⁸² Hamzeh, 112.

Hizballah's authoritarian control and obvious animosity toward the confessional system and the very concept of democracy, Hizballah's popularity has greatly increased over time. In fact, for all of the "Lebanese nationalistic" discourse that Hizballah uses to appeal to non-Shiite Lebanese citizens, it is still noteworthy to mention that Hizballah's flag proclaims "the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon."²⁸³

In the 1992 elections, 8 out of the 27 seats designated for Shiite parliamentarians were taken by Hizballah, out of a total of 128 seats divided equally between Christians and various Muslim sects, as stipulated by the Ta'if Accord.²⁸⁴ Although Amal and some other smaller Shiite family-based associations were ahead of Hizballah, Hizballah's rising popularity was hard to ignore. There are several reasons that can explain Hizballah's success in Lebanese politics. First, Hizballah has been very successful in organizing its public relations campaign, and has won over large numbers of people in southern Lebanon, creating a large and very enthusiastic constituency of support. Hizballah's organization and strong political campaigning got its message across in a way that other parties failed to do. Other parties relied more on family loyalties and old voting patterns to secure their votes. Second, Hizballah has a large and very effective network of charities, social welfare services, and education programs that rival that of the state. For example, since 1988, five years before the Lebanese Sanitation Department began functioning again following Lebanon's war with Amal, Hizballah provided garbage removal services in areas under its control. Even though today the department is functional, Hizballah still trucks out 300 tons of garbage a day, in addition to what the

²⁸³ Ibid, Gary C. Gambill, "Islamist Groups in Lebanon."

²⁸⁴ Ibid, 112-113.

Sanitation Department does.²⁸⁵ Hizballah also runs its own hospitals and employs a large staff. In fact, Hizballah is the second largest employer in Lebanon following the Lebanese government, with an estimated 35,000 people on its payroll.²⁸⁶ These people depend on Hizballah-run hospitals to make a living and are therefore very keen on having Hizballah maintain its political success. Hizballah also has its own primary and secondary schools that teach the national curriculum as well as its own religious curricula. There are also Hizballah religious training schools that create clergymen to carry on the Hizballah creed.²⁸⁷ Hizballah is also the main provider of drinking water for the residents of the southern Beirut suburbs. It is important to realize that Iran finances Hizballah's operations, and the state of Lebanon has performed very poorly in managing the situation in the southern Beirut districts.* Many point out that the non-Shiite areas of Beirut do have clean drinking water, but that if it were not for Hizballah, the Shiites would not have such amenities, and social disorder would have been much more likely to arise should Hizballah have been absent from the scene to provide what the state is unwilling or unable to. This failure by the state has solidified Hizballah's support base even further.²⁸⁸

So long as the government remains incapable of fulfilling its basic responsibilities toward its citizens, Hezbollah will no doubt continue to expand its social and public assistance work and to reap the rewards that spin off from these endeavours. These rewards are more solid anchoring in the social fabric of the Shiite community and increased legitimacy with which to continue to spearhead the struggle against Israel from Lebanon.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁵ Harik, 83.

²⁸⁶ Ibid, Paul A. Jureidini, et al.

²⁸⁷ Harik, 84.

* However, it is important to note that since the late 1990s donations from the Shiite Diaspora all over the world, as well as involvement in illicit enterprises such as the West Africa 'blood diamond' trade, along with cigarette smuggling, and movie bootlegging have made Hizballah largely financially self-sufficient. See Gary C. Gambill, "Islamist Groups in Lebanon."

²⁸⁸ Ibid, 85.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, 93.

Furthermore, Hizballah has been sensitive to non-Shiite religious groups, primarily southern Lebanese Christians, who have also sought out its services, leading many Shiites and even some Christians to vote for Hizballah. Third, Hizballah was viewed as the only sincere, dedicated, and truly motivated force that was willing to go the distance in the fight against Israel. Lebanon's Palestinian and Amal militias were seen as weak and ineffective in comparison. Finally, the Christian boycott of the 1992 elections reduced Christian participation in the elections, allowing for the Hizballah vote to take a stronger toll.²⁹⁰ Hizballah's work to improve the lives of its constituents has enhanced its legitimacy and made it difficult for its rivals to challenge.²⁹¹

Hizballah's popularity soared after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.²⁹² In the elections of that year, Hizballah won 9 seats in parliament, surpassing Amal for the first time by 3 seats,²⁹³ owing to its continued high quality and reliable social welfare programs, and largely to the widespread perception in Lebanon that Hizballah was the only Arab force ever to defeat Israel.²⁹⁴ Hizballah was viewed as an organization that put its money where its mouth is. Hizballah had spilled blood for Lebanon and was perceived as willing to pay the ultimate price for the well-being of the Lebanese people—all of this manipulated masterfully by Hizballah's public relations expertise. Now, more than ever, rival political groups, and other sects once opposed to Hizballah found it harder and harder to de-legitimize Hizballah. Hizballah also enjoyed less restraint from

²⁹⁰ Hamzeh, 113-114.

²⁹¹ Harik, 81.

²⁹² Ibid, Shanahan.

²⁹³ Hamzeh, 113.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, Shanahan.

Syria, owing to the death of Hafiz al-Assad, who was much more politically adept at manipulating politics than his son Bashar al-Assad. Bashar al-Assad was also more concerned with domestic Syrian power struggles, was too focused with deadlocked negotiations with Israel, and lacked the political clout of his father to gain the same level of respect from Hizballah that his late father enjoyed.²⁹⁵

Hizballah's position in government has allowed it to maintain and garner a rapidly growing support base. Hizballah prefers to stay outside of the cabinet decision making process because Lebanese political decisions may run contrary to Hizballah's ideological commitments. For example, Lebanese reluctance at establishing an Islamic order is something that is non-negotiable for Hizballah, as is any potential peace deal with Israel. Instead, Hizballah prefers sticking to the role of opposition,²⁹⁶ because criticizing the Lebanese political system and instilling popular doubt in Lebanon's capacity to govern can only enhance its chances of victory; more so than giving the system legitimacy by participating productively in any long-term political planning. Hizballah has also been very clear in its threats to parliament, ensuring a "hefty response" should any attempts be made by any actor to destroy Hizballah. This is a threat that everyone in Lebanon takes very seriously, given Hizballah's past performance in fighting Israel and attacking the American, French and even Lebanese soldiers. Aside from appearing strong and united in government, Hizballah also lacks a history of corruption, something which Amal and other parties cannot claim as easily. The embezzlement and squandering of public monies dedicated to agriculture by Amal, as well as the dismissal of 6 Amal party

²⁹⁵ Hamzeh, 115-116.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, 120.

members (including 2 ministers and one member of parliament), by Nabih Berri, in order to quell internal opposition to his leadership, has damaged public confidence in the unity of the party—something Hizballah has been able to avoid more skillfully.²⁹⁷ Supporters of Amal and the late Rafik Hariri have been linked to corruption in one way or another, but Hizballah appears to have held on to the moral high ground compared to its rivals.²⁹⁸ Amal in particular, has lost much support from the Shiites in Lebanon, not so much because the message of an Islamic order is so attractive, but because Hizballah provides great social welfare services. Amal has not provided any of these programs, nor any municipal work in municipalities under its control—all things which Hizballah is renowned for.²⁹⁹ This led to Hizballah's exponential success in the 2004 municipal elections compared to Amal, where it won every municipality in which it competed against Amal. Out of 6 districts of competition, Hizballah won all of them, with 4 out of 6 of the municipalities issuing no seats to Amal, whatsoever. Hizballah won 98 seats in total, with Amal securing a mere 10.³⁰⁰ Amal is rapidly losing members to Hizballah, and Hizballah is tactically gathering the votes of Shiite communities neglected by Amal. However, despite all the good Hizballah has done, it has come with a major caveat which is true to its ideology; all areas under the party's control have come under Islamic law, as interpreted by Hizballah, disregarding Lebanese law.³⁰¹ Hizballah is creating a state within a state, piece by piece.

Hizballah's growing success was a product of its "more of the same" political

²⁹⁷ Ibid, Shanahan.

²⁹⁸ Hamzeh, 121.

²⁹⁹ Ibid, 123.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, 132.

³⁰¹ Ibid, 144.

approach. The party realized that its political, economic and social formula were working and simply headed on course to secure more widespread support. Hizballah outdid both Amal and the Lebanese government in providing social services to Shiites and non-Shiites alike. It was credited with liberating southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation, as well as continuing the fight in the Bekaa Valley and securing the release of prisoners from Israeli jails. Hizballah maintained a popular image of "clean politics," avoiding corruption and internal party rivalry, unlike Amal which was internally divided and poorly organized. Hizballah also had a large and growing number of legal, medical, engineering and business professionals within the party, and used these tools to continue and enhance its pragmatic approach to tackling economic, developmental and social issues within its areas of control. For all of the above reasons, Hizballah has been seen as committed to the well-being of Lebanon and doing more than any other party to achieve that end. Hizballah has achieved great political success, but it is essential to remember that Hizballah has not, and will not, abandon a militant option should these advances fail to produce its end goal of an Islamic state. It has taken a bottom-up approach to politics, trying to create grassroots support for the party. However, Hizballah's peaceful mode of operation is one avenue through which the party would pursue its aims of seizing political power and establishing an Islamic regime, based on Hizballah's interpretation of Islam as the end goal, and this goal must, in the party's eyes, continue at any cost.³⁰² Today, Christian, Druze, Sunni, and even the majority of Shiites would oppose a Hizballah-run state.³⁰³ However, demography may prove to be the biggest challenge to those opposed

³⁰² Ibid, 141.

³⁰³ Lee Smith, "The Rising Popularity and Current Status of Hizballah Leader Nasrallah After the Lebanon War: Does it Matter?," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* 6, no. 11 (September 2006); available from <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-11.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 June 2008.

to this "impending" reality. Hizballah's power will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. Shiites have the lowest emigration rate compared to any other sect in Lebanon, coupled with the fact that even if Shiites do emigrate, they are the most likely to return. Additionally, Shiites have the highest birthrate in Lebanon, and their population is expected to double from the 2004 population by 2009. Given this reality, Shiites will cease to be the largest religious sect in Lebanon and become the largest population in Lebanon, period. Assuming Hizballah can maintain its sweeping levels of support, this will give Hizballah a greater chance of convincing Shiites that a Shiite Islamic government is in their interest.³⁰⁴

Given the fact that Hizballah's original reason for fighting was to remove Israel from Lebanon, it has reinforced its continued role as a resistor to Israel, even if Israel were to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms. However, most of its energy will revolve around domestic political issues within Lebanon.

[...] Hizbullah has somehow redefined its role. The party will continue supporting the resistance of the Palestinians and remain a role model for them, but its main task is to defend Lebanon's national sovereignty by striking a balance of terror through its proven guerrilla warfare and substantial armory. Given this goal, it will continue its resistance more as a defensive force along the border with Israel than as an offensive force marching to "liberate Jerusalem."³⁰⁵

Hizballah's future will continue to be determined by its ideological, financial, and logistical overseer, Iran.³⁰⁶ Syria, which is rife with internal political fragmentation, negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights, and its contention with growing anti-Syrian elements, particularly from Syrian Christians, is too distracted to allow Bashar al-

³⁰⁴ Ibid, 145.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 149.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 146.

Assad to adequately concentrate on Lebanese politics and Hizballah.³⁰⁷ Syria will continue, however, to serve as a go-between, between Iran and Lebanon for logistical transfers, and the free movement of fighters.³⁰⁸ Hizballah has increased its popularity even outside of Lebanon, where it has served as role model for Islamist and militant groups around the Arab-Muslim world. Seen as the only effective fighting force against Israel, even Sunnis, who do not look highly upon Shiite Islam, have taken Hizballah's fighting approach to their respective battles around the world. Hizballah has been very involved in aiding Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—two Sunni-Muslim militant organizations that seek to establish an Islamic order, of their own kind, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (as well as modern day Israel), by providing training, social welfare services, and logistical support. Hizballah has even been known to recruit Israeli Arabs to gather intelligence and carry out terrorist attacks.³⁰⁹ However, all financial and weapons transfers to these other organizations are dealt with directly through Iran, not Hizballah.³¹⁰ Other Islamic militant organizations have sought guidance from Hizballah, hoping to emulate their effective strategies to achieve greater success in their respective battles, giving Hizballah a superstar status that is difficult to contend with.³¹¹

The Lebanese state cannot dismantle Hizballah. The Shiites which make up the bulk of the Lebanese army are reluctant to attack fellow Shiites. Hizballah is very

³⁰⁷ Ibid, 146-147.

³⁰⁸ Yaakov Amidror, "The Hizballah-Syria-Iran Triangle," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (March 2007); available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue1/Amidror.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

³⁰⁹ Karmon, 16-17.

³¹⁰ Hamzeh, 147.

³¹¹ Ibid, 148.

effective at defending itself, and has defeated the Lebanese army in the past. Hizballah enjoys widespread support from the fastest growing demographic in Lebanon, and provides better services and economic prosperity for people through its welfare programs than the state. Unless Lebanon can adequately challenge Hizballah by providing a better quality of life to all Lebanese without any regard for social or religious affiliation,³¹² it cannot hope to defeat Hizballah at the polls, or through military means. Moreover, Lebanon must conform to some aspects of Hizballah's programme, while simultaneously maintaining a diametrically different course. For instance, because both Hizballah and Lebanon oppose Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory, both agree that Israel must withdraw. This puts Lebanon in an awkward position because it realizes that the only successful actor that has ever produced such a result has been Hizballah. So, while Lebanon tries to regain its sovereignty in the south of Lebanon, by ending Israeli occupation, it must also beware of allowing Hizballah to run a state within a state in the south.³¹³ The state wants to regain national sovereignty in the south, but also to end any provocative attacks which could lead to Israeli reprisals. Hizballah, however, shares Lebanon's desire to see Israel leave Lebanon, but has also dedicated itself to fighting Israel even after withdrawal. Lebanon has yet to learn how to manage this state of affairs effectively. Hizballah is also strategizing in this sense. Hizballah realizes that Israeli reprisals are inevitable and the party does not want to damage its support by inviting massive Israeli retaliation.³¹⁴ It will become clear how these problems manifested themselves in the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War. Given the understanding provided regarding Hizballah's development and modus operandi, it is necessary to examine how

³¹² Ibid, 151.

³¹³ Harik, 113.

³¹⁴ Ibid, 114.

Hizballah broadcasts its message to the world—by which it has accumulated much popularity throughout the Middle East and beyond.

Hizballah's Media Empire

As has been mentioned previously, the media can make or break a case for war, and make the public sympathize with or detest a particular cause. This reality is not lost on “militant” organizations, especially Hizballah. The desire to get a good story on the part of the journalist gels perfectly with the desire of the “militant” to get its message across in a particular way. The emphasis on sound and video clips versus thorough and in-depth analysis, in a media world where news is transmitted in mere seconds or minutes, is particularly conducive in transmitting pinpoint imagery used by organizations such as Hizballah, as Hoffman explains:

We live today in an age of soundbites and ‘spin’. In which arresting footage or pithy phrases are valued above considered analysis and detailed exegesis – and are frequently mistaken for good journalism. One of the enduring axioms of terrorism is that it is designed to generate publicity and attract attention to the terrorists and their cause. It is, accordingly, an activity custom-tailored to mass media communication at the end of the twentieth century. Terrorist acts are only too easily transformed into major, international media events – precisely because they are often staged specifically with this goal in mind. Their dramatic characteristics of sudden acts of violence exploding across the screen or printed page, rapidly unfolding into crises, pitting enigmatic adversaries against the forces of law and order make these episodes as ideal for television as they are irresistible for broadsheet and tabloid journalist alike.³¹⁵

Hoffman makes it very clear that the media is quite happy to report on these types of events specifically because they make news and attract readers. Suicide bombings, for example, make good stories, attract readers, and sell papers, magazines, and so forth. However, Hizballah has taken this understanding to a whole new level. It is the only

³¹⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 154.

“militant” organization in the world, with its very own television and satellite broadcast “news” agency. Hizballah now no longer relies on foreign media to get its message across; it can do it by itself, whenever and however it pleases.

Hizballah’s television station is called Al-Manar, or “the Beacon.” The television station is completely funded by Iran and began its operation in June of 1991. Al-Manar, unlike other news organizations, makes its politics explicitly clear and admits a bias toward the Hizballah view point. Al-Manar openly encourages violent “resistance” against Israel, the West, and the United States in its programming.³¹⁶ The station is owned and operated by members of Hizballah and takes orders directly from the Secretary General of Hizballah himself, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah.³¹⁷ Al-Manar is located in the southern suburbs of Beirut,³¹⁸ but maintains a second station at a secret location should the main station become compromised.³¹⁹

Al-Manar originated as a small radio station during the 1975 Lebanese Civil War in which it was used to spread messages, news, and propaganda to Shiites during the conflict, a practice that all the various sects and militias participated in. The Lebanese government had no effective way to regulate these stations, and the war was so encompassing that it simply was not a priority, especially given the fact that the politicians’ loyalties, which depended on their sectarian biases, went out to the respective messages of these stations. It was only in the mid-1990s, once the civil war was over,

³¹⁶ Avi Jorisch, “Al-Manar: Hizballah TV, 24/7,” *Middle East Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2004); available from <http://www.meforum.org/article/583>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2008.

³¹⁷ Ibid, Jorisch.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

that the Lebanese government took greater efforts to regulate radio and television broadcasts in order to extend the state's authority to the whole of Lebanon once again. In 1994, the government passed a law that forced all broadcasting stations to be licensed. By 1996, the majority of stations were denied licenses, and only five remained operational. The denial of licenses was an attempt to end partisan politics which became all too common in Lebanon during the Civil War. However, this closing of stations only made people assume that they were being closed on sectarian considerations.³²⁰ Some stations that were forced to close down tried to appeal the decision, including Al-Manar.³²¹ Hizballah appealed to then president of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, urging him to put pressure on the Lebanese cabinet to revoke the decision to ban Al-Manar from broadcasting. Soon after Hizballah's visit to Damascus, the decision was repealed and Al-Manar was permitted to broadcast once again³²² (although they had continued broadcasting the entire time, in spite of the ban).³²³ Al-Manar is also the only station that is not censored by Lebanese (or Syrian) authorities, giving Al-Manar full mobility and freedom to report how it wants, what it wants, and when it wants.³²⁴

As mentioned above, Iran provides the funding for the station. However, according to Lebanese law, it is illegal for a foreign government to provide any funding whatsoever. Al-Manar has found an ingenious method to counter this problem. Al-Manar's \$15 million dollar budget (which is roughly half of Al-Jazeera's annual budget) comes from Hizballah accounts, which then go to fund Al-Manar projects. In this way,

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

Iran can transfer monies to Hizballah, which can then use the money as it sees fit—in this case, funding Al-Manar. Hizballah can now operate a station which is Lebanon’s leader in “in-house” programming, vis-à-vis a technicality in Lebanese law, purchasing for itself state of the art equipment and operating bureaus around the Middle East, including Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Dubai.³²⁵ In addition to Iranian funding, overseas donors from Europe, the United States, Canada, among others transfer money to various Lebanese banks and Hizballah-run charities, all of which is funneled to various Hizballah operations, including Al-Manar.³²⁶ Finally, Hizballah’s own domestic-Lebanese business ventures fund part of its projects, including the renting of media equipment to foreign stations covering stories in Lebanon.³²⁷

Al-Manar has even enjoyed corporate advertising from huge American and European firms. “Media-Publi Management,” Al-Manar’s own advertising agency has worked with the likes of advertising giants Saatchi and Saatchi, demonstrating the considerable interest various firms have in doing business with Al-Manar. However, the political ramifications of such a partnership was not lost on these firms. These firms wanted to limit the exposure of their business partnership from their domestic viewers back home, specifically American companies, and as of 2003, commercials for these companies were aired in Lebanon only, and not on Al-Manar’s satellite stations.³²⁸ It is important to illustrate exactly what kind of companies have worked with Al-Manar to show how strong Hizballah’s media influence is, as Jorisch writes,

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid.

Al-Manar officials reported that as of July 2002, their biggest American commercial advertisers included Pepsi, Coke, Proctor and Gamble, and Western Union. Other corporate sponsors include the German chocolate Milka, the American washing powder Ariel, Nestle's Nido Milk, German Maggie Cubs, Finnish Smeds cheese and butter, French Picon cheese, Austrian Red Bull, the French cigarette company Gauloises, and the German Henkel's Der general detergent. Following an op-ed that appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*, Pepsi, Coke, Proctor and Gamble, and Western Union ceased advertising on al-Manar, but the other European companies continue to do so.³²⁹

Al-Manar became particularly popular when it began broadcasting live attacks against Israel. Al-Manar would bring its journalists to locations prior to an attack and start filming right before they engaged Israeli forces, or other targets. These live shots were transmitted to audiences via satellite. It is obvious that in order to get this kind of footage, a great deal of collaboration between Hizballah fighters and Hizballah journalists take place. Attacks are pre-planned at a specific time and place in order to ensure the best type of footage, without the fear of failure. Most Al-Manar reporters are former Hizballah fighters who later make the change to "journalists."³³⁰ Hizballah "journalists" have even gone so far as to "literally parade bodies before the media."³³¹ Foreign journalists, much to Israel's chagrin, have actively eaten up this type of content because of its "newsworthiness," giving Hizballah a great deal of media leverage vis-à-vis other militant groups, and elements opposed to Hizballah, both within and outside of Lebanon.

Al-Manar gradually increased its broadcasting capacity during the mid-1990s, broadcasting as frequently as possible, and as many hours a day as possible. With more and more antennae and satellite technology, by 2001, Al-Manar became a 24 hour a day,

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Gleis, 3.

365 days a year station, which is currently the third most popular station in Lebanon. However, whenever there is a conflict with Israel, or in the Palestinian Territories, Al-Manar becomes the *most* popular station in Lebanon for news. Al-Manar's satellite capacity comes from the company "Arabsat," which initiated Hizballah's satellite debut on May 24, 2000, deliberately to coincide with the Israeli evacuation of southern Lebanon. With this new found transmission capability, Al-Manar has become one of the most popular "news" agencies in the Arab world, even winning two gold and two silver awards at the Eighth Cairo Television and Radio Festival in 2001.³³²

Al-Manar's aim is twofold: First, it seeks to undermine Israel through psychological warfare, in order to chip away at the morale of the soldiers and the Israeli public. Al-Manar hopes to achieve this by broadcasting footage of Hizballah victories against Israeli troops and showing Israeli casualties.³³³ Hizballah's Al-Manar is the first Arab news network to reach Israeli audiences directly in their native language.³³⁴ For example, in order to reach Israeli audiences, Hebrew language broadcasting began in 1996. The Hebrew speaking personnel at Al-Manar are either Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, or Hizballah fighters that spent time in Israeli or SLA jails.³³⁵ However, the impact on Israelis has been marginal, if not completely ineffective. Israeli satellite carriers do not broadcast Al-Manar, and the only ones that have direct access to Al-Manar would have to subscribe to Arabsat, or be close enough to the Lebanese border to

³³² Ibid, Jorisch.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Harik, 161.

³³⁵ Ibid, Jorisch.

receive Al-Manar signals from a Lebanese antenna.³³⁶ Second, Hizballah hopes to empower Shiites to rise up in Lebanon and become politically active, with the future goal of making Lebanon a Shiite-Muslim state—but this message is not broadcasted on Al-Manar’s satellite programming, only on Lebanese domestic television, in order not to invite hostility from the majority Sunni Arab-Muslim world.³³⁷

Al-Manar’s tactics are directly aimed at Israel, but although it has been ineffectual, over time the instilling of doubt into Israel’s public is potentially an effective strategy due to the importance of public support for war. As was discussed in the second chapter, popular opinion can make or break a case for war. This fact coupled with the media’s preoccupation with getting a good story, means that Al-Manar can rely on journalists framing a story that sells, rather than a story that informs. The more the media criticizes a government’s actions against a “militant” organization, the more media pressure is kept on that government, which relieves the pressure on the “militant” group. Furthermore, by undermining moral clarity through broadcasts of IDF casualties as well as the negative effects of Israel’s assault on Lebanon, Hizballah (as well as other groups) hopes to use the media to achieve an aim that they cannot achieve militarily—breaking the will of the enemy to continue the fight.³³⁸ Although this has not been successful with regard to the Israel-Hizballah War of 2006, it may nevertheless be an effective long-term strategy, causing divisions within a given society, such as Israel, over war.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Noah Pollak, “Video Made the Terrorist Star: Hezbollah Has a Chillingly Effective Media Strategy,” *National Review Online*, 3 August 2006; available from <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ODg3MGZkODIIMThmM2ZhMmE4NWEzZmJhZTc3MTFiNGI=>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007.

Using its own media outlet, Hizballah has given a very high level of exposure to its "martyrs." Hizballah, like other religious "militant" organizations, glorifies the deaths of its fighters, selling them as brave, selfless and courageous fighters for the Islamic cause. This exposure is buttressed with sermons, speeches, posters and so forth which can be found all over Hizballah-controlled areas of Lebanon, creating a romanticized view of death in the name of a "holy struggle." As Harik explains,

This approach also meant that the extent to which Hezbollah partisans were committed to God and country on the southern battlefield was constantly reinforced for public consumption at home and across the border. All of these activities strengthened Arab and Muslim support for the Party of God's militant activities and fortified the image Hezbollah was trying to convey to the Israelis, the SLA and the world - that of righteous fury backed up by unassailable national rights.³³⁹

Furthermore, out of the millions of viewers who tune into Al-Manar, a considerable amount of them are poorly educated, illiterate, and therefore cannot turn to print media for news, but rather rely on television for their connection to the outside world. The images conveyed via satellite are designed to encourage emulation by the viewer. When this particular viewpoint on "martyrdom" is repeated over and over again, all day every day, it is very influential and can have a devastating impact on the psychology of many people.

A significant part of the Arab television audience is illiterate and therefore depends on television as the main source of news. When figures like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden are presented as heroes it is only natural for viewers to want to emulate them, as they too desire the fame and attention. Moreover, dedicating airtime for those who take their own lives entices uninformed viewers to do the same.³⁴⁰

³³⁹ Harik, 134.

³⁴⁰ Avi Jorisch and Salameh Nematt, "Inside Hizballah's al-Manar Television," *Policy Watch*, no. 917 (November 2004). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2188>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2008.

Following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, after Hizballah showcased its “might” and its great “victory” against Israel, a new struggle was relayed to audiences in order to keep Al-Manar’s popularity high—the Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) of 2000.³⁴¹ However, this support of Palestinian resistance is unique. On the one hand, Al-Manar plays out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in an extremely pro-Palestinian fashion, calling for the destruction of Israel at any and all costs, and so forth. On the other hand, Al-Manar places little attention on the Fatah (or PLO) component of the conflict—which is the traditional, yet *secular* component of Palestinian resistance. The “resistance” towards which Al-Manar is predisposed is the “Islamic” variety. This enables Hizballah to focus on its two primary goals at the same time; promoting the destruction of Israel, while simultaneously promoting the promulgation of Islam through violent revolution. Al-Manar has interviewed leaders of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but has rarely interviewed leaders of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hizballah has a clear bias towards “Islamic resistance” versus regular political resistance.³⁴² The Islamic cause of Palestine and the Islamic cause of Hizballah are really extensions of the same desire to establish God’s reign on earth. Thus, Al-Manar hopes to use Islam as the common bridge between Sunni and Shiite Muslim Arabs, creating an idea that the fates of both are intertwined:

Not only does it seek to achieve this for all Arabs and Muslims. It seeks to achieve this for the Shi’ites themselves. Shi’ites were marginal to the grand narrative of Arab awakening and nationalism for most of the twentieth century. Al-Manar is part of the attempt of Shi’ites to enter the narrative and to redefine it. Al-Manar’s preoccupation with the Palestinian cause is an act of appropriation: it is an attempt to make the preeminent Arab and Muslim case identical with the cause of Hizballah.³⁴³

³⁴¹ Ibid, Jorisch.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid.

Al-Manar's influence is second only to Al-Jazeera's in the Middle East,³⁴⁴ but serves Hizballah's purpose of mobilizing public support across the region and more importantly, across religious and sectarian divides. Al-Manar has been very successful in uniting popular opinion against Israel and the West (building upon strong preexisting tensions) to allow itself to enjoy enough backing for a war with Israel. Although a war such as the one that broke out in 2006 was not what Hizballah had planned, Al-Manar did serve Hizballah as a well-oiled propaganda conduit, by which to portray the enemy in a particular light, of Hizballah's own design.

Not only is there strong domestic and international support for Hizballah, which obfuscates any Lebanese state interference in its operations, or any UNIFIL operation, but also a high level of autonomy that Hizballah has, allowing it to not only fight when and where and against whoever it seeks, but also to broadcast its own messages to mass audiences independently. With the understanding of how formidable Hizballah truly is as an organization, this thesis will examine the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War to now gauge Hizballah's performance in combat, and what this means for Israel, Lebanon, and especially UNIFIL.

The Anatomy of the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War

The kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of three others ignited the month-long Israel-Hizballah War on July 12, 2006. Hizballah operatives crossed the Blue Line and used anti-tank missiles to attack an Israeli patrol, allowing them the opportunity to kidnap two soldiers. Hizballah even had the operational foresight to

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

landmine its attack route, which resulted in the destruction of an Israeli tank which attempted to rescue the captured soldiers.³⁴⁵ Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was concerned that the kidnapping would elicit an Israeli counterattack, but Hizballah assured him that Israel would not retaliate in a heavy-handed way.³⁴⁶

Hizballah could not have been more wrong in this regard. The IDF pummeled both southern Lebanon, but also areas further north, including the airports (although sparing the newly built terminal, targeting only the runways,³⁴⁷ various power stations and civilian infrastructure, and all roads leading out of Lebanon. Israel assaulted Lebanon through air attacks only up until July 17, when a ground invasion was ordered in order to root out Hizballah fighters in the south. The fighting in the south was far more ferocious than the IDF had expected.³⁴⁸ Hizballah regulars, along with Lebanese laymen all fought against the IDF making the distinction between who was and was not a legitimate target harder and harder for the IDF to discern.³⁴⁹ In fact, members of Hizballah's political rivals, Amal, even participated in fighting alongside Hizballah. Although Hizballah has around 1,000 "regulars," the exact amount of fighters involved in the 2006 conflict cannot be accurately estimated because of the participation of "irregulars," or fighters not "formally" associated with Hizballah.³⁵⁰ Israel could not use tanks due to the narrowness of the streets in the southern villages, increasing Israeli casualties. Hizballah went from house to house in small teams and fired anti-tank

³⁴⁵ Andrew Exum, "Hizballah At War: A Military Assessment," *Policy Focus*, no. 63 (December 2006); available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus63.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 January 2008. Page 8.

³⁴⁶ Ibid, 9.

³⁴⁷ Nahum Barnea, "Israel vs. Hezbollah," *Foreign Policy*, no. 157 (November/December 2007), 24.

³⁴⁸ Exum, 9.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, 10-11.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, 5.

missiles at Israeli soldiers taking shelter in these houses—even firing through walls of houses to reach Israeli targets.³⁵¹ Hizballah made good use of the rugged terrain of southern Lebanon, which they understood would prevent Israel's preferred method of attack using mechanized (tanks and armored carriers) warfare. The villages served as camouflage, shelter and protection against Israeli attacks, especially given their hilltop positions, giving Hizballah an advantage in infantry-based warfare due to its command of higher positions.³⁵² For Israel this was a wake up call. Israel realized that it was fighting a highly motivated and disciplined force. Hizballah had good training and knew what they were doing, even understanding Israeli tactics and anticipating combat scenarios. The IDF understood that even if there was a clear Israeli victory, the civilians who took up arms could easily melt away into the surrounding population, avoiding Israeli arrests.³⁵³

However, what most surprised the Israelis and many other onlookers was Hizballah's sustained and well-orchestrated rocket attack campaign against Israel. Since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hizballah immediately began preparing itself for a future confrontation with Israel. They began entrenching their positions and building underground positions for their rockets in order to avoid Israeli air reconnaissance and bombardments. Hizballah was also very adept and skilled at using mobile Katyusha rockets to fire on Israeli towns. They were able to operate in small autonomous teams, to fire rockets, and then quickly escape elsewhere before Israel could strike.³⁵⁴ Hizballah

³⁵¹ Ibid, 10.

³⁵² Ibid, 3.

³⁵³ Ibid, 11.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, 12.

maintained its own closed cell phone system, using two way radio and cell phone communication to coordinate the various autonomous teams through their chain of command.³⁵⁵ Hizballah made expert use of anti-tank missiles, firing them at every possible Israeli position, tank, shelter, vehicle, it had the opportunity to target, including an Israeli naval ship off of Lebanon's coast.³⁵⁶ Hizballah had spent the 6 years since Israel's withdrawal building a system of defense in southern Lebanon that would stop or at least delay an IDF invasion.³⁵⁷ Hizballah had established some 500 arms caches throughout southern Lebanon, and used civilian homes, infrastructure and mosques as storage facilities for rockets, small arms, munitions and supplies, sometimes with or sometimes without the knowledge of the civilians, in an attempt to dissuade Israeli attacks.³⁵⁸ This tactic forced the Israeli military to do a form of cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not it should strike at Hizballah targets embedded in civilian infrastructure. This is a deliberate tactic used by non-state actors given their unaccountability to international law, to which militaries are bound:

Especially in asymmetric conflicts, where one side is a state and the other a non-state combatant, the principle of proportionality is often manipulated. The non-state actor, sometimes a terrorist organization, sometimes a rebel force, uses civilian populations as a shield to protect its fighters. The latter intentionally take cover within areas of civilian residence *in order* to prevent the enemy from attacking. This method of war is of course a war crime, and one of the worst ones, at that ... non-state actors actually use civilians more in battle, instead of using them less.³⁵⁹

Hizballah is well aware that it is not limited to the same extent as a military is, in what it can get away with. In fact, to this date, Hizballah's actions have only been criticized by

³⁵⁵ Ibid, 5.

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 7.

³⁵⁷ Ibid, 3.

³⁵⁸ Ibid, 4.

³⁵⁹ Amichai Cohen, "Proportionality in the Modern Law of War: An Unenforceable Norm, or the Answer to our Dilemma?," *Perspectives Paper*, no. 20 (August 2006); available from <http://www.besacenter.org/perspectives20.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 January 2007.

NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, but have not been analyzed from a legal perspective by any recognized body.³⁶⁰ Furthermore, Hizballah is well aware that media scrutiny tends to go toward a state power versus a militia group, allowing Hizballah more flexibility in its tactics than a state such as Israel could enjoy.* Hizballah's tactics are designed specifically to make the enemy collapse upon itself, eroding its will to fight versus dominating the enemy through military force:

A non-state player such as Hizballah seeks to attack its militarily and technologically stronger opponent's weak points. On a tactical level it engages in guerilla-type warfare against small units of the enemy army, while on a grand-strategic level it uses various forms of terror against the enemy population and economy. In the recent war, Hizballah fighters used their defensive capabilities (advanced but easy to operate weapons, effective evasion tactics, a network of bunkers, and familiarity with the territory and population) to engage small Israeli combat teams in battle under advantageous conditions. By firing Katyusha rockets, they also managed to paralyze social and economic life in northern Israel, bring about mass desertion of populated areas, cause casualties and damage property. Israel's failure to send in large ground forces with massive firepower and maneuverability at an earlier state, with the mission of occupying areas from which the Katyushas were being fired, harmed its ability to achieve the war objectives [...].³⁶¹

The Israeli objectives were to destroy Hizballah's arsenal and infrastructure in southern Lebanon and secure the return of the kidnapped soldiers. These objectives were unrealistic and could not be achieved through military means alone, which meant that Israel's objectives were doomed to failure from the very outset.³⁶² Both of these objectives were not successful, and with the ensuing war, Israel failed in achieving these objectives.

³⁶⁰ Jacoby, 12.

* Hizballah understands that Israel is constrained in its actions because it is accountable for its actions, unlike Hizballah which is seen as a militia group *outside* of a legitimate framework such as a state. For this reason, Hizballah knows the propaganda value of dead civilians, and how this can garner much international criticism against Israel, while working in the favor of Hizballah. See Noah Pollak, "Hope Over Hate: A Lebanon Diary," *Azure*, no. 28 (Spring 2007), 26-27.

³⁶¹ Avi Kober, "The Second Lebanon War," *Perspectives Paper*, no. 22 (September 2006); available from <http://www.besacenter.org/perspectives22.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 January 2007. Page 2.

³⁶² *Ibid*, 5.

It is estimated that throughout the entire conflict, Hizballah had lobbed nearly 4,000 rockets into Israel,³⁶³ mostly Syrian made, as there was barely any debris found of Iranian “long-range” rockets which Israel anticipated would have been used to strike at targets deeper within Israel.³⁶⁴ This may have been the result of an early Israeli air assault on a known Iranian missile cache.³⁶⁵ Aside from Hizballah’s mobile attacks, Hizballah had developed anywhere between 40 to 150 fixed underground rocket launchers, encased in bunkers with hydraulic lifts to fire rockets without being detected.³⁶⁶ Such technology showcased the sophisticated weaponry in the hands of Hizballah. With these well hidden bunkers, Hizballah was able to carry out 475 attacks throughout the month long conflict, averaging 15 to 16 attacks per day. Hizballah had so many rocket launchers that it is believed that each Hizballah launcher was fired once per day;³⁶⁷ 907 of these rockets hit built up areas, including homes, industrial facilities, civilian infrastructure (where the majority of attacks were aimed),³⁶⁸ hospitals, and public utility stations. Forest fires resulting from errant missile attacks ignited throughout Israel’s northern forests;³⁶⁹ but the majority of rockets missed key targets and landed in open areas.³⁷⁰ Hizballah fired their rockets from Tyre, the Bekaa Valley, north of the Litani River, and south of the Litani River, giving them access to attack 44 Israeli cities and towns. The northern Israeli towns of Kiryat Shmona, Naharia, Maalot, Tarshiha and

³⁶³ Uzi Rubin, “The Rocket Campaign Against Israel During the 2006 Lebanon War ,” *Mideast Security and Policy Studies*, no. 71 (June 2007); available from <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS71.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007. Page 10.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 5.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 9.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid*.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 12.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 14.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 11.

Safed accounted for 74 percent of Hizballah's attacks.³⁷¹ Israel's attempts to stifle Hizballah rockets through artillery fire, in which Israel launched over 100,000 rounds into southern Lebanon, failed miserably,³⁷² evidenced not only by Hizballah's incessant rocket attacks throughout the conflict, but also by the fact that the heaviest day of rocket attacks was on the last day of the conflict, revealing Hizballah's control of fire and surviving stockpiles of weaponry.³⁷³

A further concern regarding Hizballah's weapons arsenal was its launching of a UAV into Israel. Hizballah launched four Ababil-T (Iranian made) UAVs into Israel. These UAVs carried a 30 kilogram charge and were likely set on course to attack Tel-Aviv, in order to fulfill Nasrallah's vow of attacking the center of Israel.³⁷⁴ The UAVs either never went off, disappeared off radar without their whereabouts known, crashed in an uninhabited area of the Galilee region or were intercepted by Israeli aircraft.³⁷⁵ Despite this bold attack, Hizballah had flown previous *reconnaissance* UAVs in the past without any Israeli detection or interception in 2004, but this was the first time *attack* UAVs were launched against Israel. Nevertheless, the fact that a non-state fighting force has access to such advanced technology is truly disconcerting for both Israel and Lebanon.

Hizballah made use of its diverse and well camouflaged rocket launchers and weapons caches to avoid Israeli efforts to destroy its stockpiles. Hizballah's intelligence

³⁷¹ Ibid, 12.

³⁷² Ibid, 19.

³⁷³ Ibid, 13-14.

³⁷⁴ Ibid, 21.

³⁷⁵ Ibid, 22.

capacity and strategic planning allowed them to anticipate Israeli actions throughout the conflict, including Israel's attempts to destroy their rocket power.³⁷⁶ Hizballah's understanding of Israeli warfare tactics and preferences, as well as their high morale, professionalism, discipline and organization, allowed for Hizballah to emerge beaten and bruised, but still operational following Israel's military campaign to destroy Hizballah's arsenal in Lebanon. Hizballah's attack showed why asymmetric warfare is difficult for even the most advanced and well trained army to deal with, as Rubin explains:

The rocket campaign of the Second Lebanon War was a textbook example of an asymmetric confrontation between the heavily equipped modern army of an industrial state on one side and a lightly equipped but well entrenched and dedicated militia on the other. Stealth, cunning, and simple technology clashed against massive firepower and the best and latest of high technology, and to the surprise of many experts, the militia prevailed, maintaining its power to launch rockets at an undiminished rate until [the] very end of the fighting.³⁷⁷

Despite Hizballah's strong showing in the war, it is important to note that Hizballah was still seriously weakened by Israel's massive reprisal, and had made some serious mistakes. Israeli air strikes alone did manage to destroy between 70 to 80 percent of Hizballah's medium and long range missiles, and killed hundreds of its fighters. More importantly, however, the Lebanese public, although supportive of Hizballah in general, resented Hizballah's kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers and blamed them for the resulting Israeli onslaught. Therefore, Israel, although failing to weaken Hizballah beyond repair, did manage to weaken Hizballah's offensive capabilities to a considerable extent.³⁷⁸ The majority of those displaced in Lebanon were Shiites, emanating from Hizballah's constituency, and along with this, much of their economy in the south was in ruins.

³⁷⁶ Ibid, 26.

³⁷⁷ Ibid, 22.

³⁷⁸ Barnea, 22.

Although Hizballah's popularity was on the rise in the Arab-Muslim world, Hizballah's popularity diminished during and immediately following the war *inside* of Lebanon, where it matters the most. Hizballah has now been blamed for setting back years of reconstruction efforts following the Lebanese Civil War by single handedly provoking the Israelis. Hizballah has tried to reverse these trends by leading the reconstruction efforts through the millions of dollars being funneled in by Iran—but this only aroused the suspicions of many Lebanese (and Arabs across the region), of Hizballah being merely a tool of Iranian³⁷⁹ (and Syrian) foreign policy.³⁸⁰ Hizballah has been seen by many in Lebanon (and correctly so) as being more loyal to Shiites rather than Lebanon as a country for all its citizens.³⁸¹ Despite Hizballah's claims of victory, it is doubtful that they will launch a similar attack in the near future. They underestimated how Israel would respond, and realized that Israel would levy a great price in the future, if need be.³⁸² Hizballah simply cannot risk another wave of destruction while simultaneously coordinating massive reconstruction efforts,³⁸³ which—to the added frustration of many Lebanese—it can barely keep up with.³⁸⁴ Therefore, despite retaining enough support to remain a formidable force in Lebanon, by remaining the most palatable platform for the social change desired by Lebanese Shiites,³⁸⁵ Hizballah has to tread carefully in terms of its future military confrontations with Israel.

³⁷⁹ Ibid, 23.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, Jureidini, et al. Page 10.

³⁸¹ Ibid, 9.

³⁸² Kober, 6.

³⁸³ Edward N. Luttwak, "Misreading the Lebanon War," *Jerusalem Post*, 20 August 2006; available from <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1154525911992&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007.

³⁸⁴ Ibid, Jureidini, et al.. Page 10.

³⁸⁵ Ibid, 15.

Israel had made its own grand mistakes and quickly realized that a military offensive against a disciplined and dedicated “militant” organization was a hopeless pursuit. If Israel had considered the 2006 conflict to be a repetition of the successful ouster of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, it grossly underestimated Hizballah as a fighting force. Israel’s reliance on air power to destroy Hizballah’s rocket capacity made little sense, especially given the fact that much of Hizballah’s rocket systems were mobile and were never at the same place at the same time. Although Hizballah’s rocket capacity was greatly diminished, they still had more than enough to inflict serious damage on Israel’s north.³⁸⁶ However, the Government of Israel sought to avoid a ground invasion as much as possible. When an invasion was finally ordered, the Israeli reserves, with poorer training and equipment than the regular army was called in, making it difficult to successfully fight well-trained and well-armed Hizballah fighters.³⁸⁷ Israel also relied too much on its “high-tech” capabilities, allowing information technology to replace traditional human intelligence collection in the field. Israel’s strong reliance on this technology, coupled with the assumption that it had information dominance in the field allowed it to come face to face with many surprises once the IDF began fighting Hizballah. Israel was surprised to find the simple but sophisticated weapons stockpiles of Hizballah, and Israeli soldiers were constantly harassed by Hizballah ambushes.³⁸⁸ In all, Israeli objectives were far too grandiose. Israel learned that there is a great difference between using the military to destroy an enemy’s capacity to harm the country, and using

³⁸⁶ Kober, 2.

³⁸⁷ Max Boot, “The Second Lebanon War: It Probably Won’t Be the Last,” *The Weekly Standard* 11, no. 47 (September 2006); available from <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/621hdtho.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007.

³⁸⁸ Kober, 2-3.

a military to change a political situation in a country.³⁸⁹ Israel also came to the realization that if such a rocket campaign were launched again, and Israelis either had to go into shelters or relocate, this would devastate the country economically and socially—a weakness that has not been lost on Hizballah.³⁹⁰

Despite, poor decision-making and execution by the Israeli military, public opinion in Israel—as is the case in many democratic countries—began turning against the war upon seeing broadcasts of dead Israeli soldiers. Initially, Israelis were highly supportive of the war effort and were willing to do whatever was necessary to eliminate the Hizballah threat once and for all from Israel's northern border;³⁹¹ but with the media as an important and inseparable feature of the combat zone today, Israelis can only tolerate short and successful operations with minimal casualties.³⁹² The media was heavily preoccupied with long and drawn out coverage of funerals and personal profiles of fallen soldiers, using heart wrenching language and imagery, that it is no surprise that many Israelis lost their nerve.³⁹³ Low casualty rates, as a rule, has become part and parcel of Israeli military doctrine,³⁹⁴ much to the chagrin of many military combat veterans that remember a time when Israel was not so casualty averse. This makes it difficult to fight against an organization that openly and actively endorses the pursuit of death for the “greater good.” Aside from casualty aversion for Israeli soldiers, Israelis, like other democratic countries, are critical of heavy enemy casualties as well, leading

³⁸⁹ Efraim Inbar, “How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War,” *Mideast Security and Policy Studies*, no. 23 (August 2007); available from <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS73.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007. Page 2.

³⁹⁰ Kober, 3.

³⁹¹ Inbar, 3.

³⁹² Barnea, 28.

³⁹³ Boot, 3.

³⁹⁴ Inbar, 3.

many to feel uneasy about Lebanese suffering across the border.³⁹⁵

The war resulted in an astonishing amount of damage, loss of life, and an extensive disruption in the economic and day to day life of many Lebanese and Israeli civilians. According to Israeli military and police sources, the war left 116 Israeli soldiers and 43 civilians dead with almost 3,000 injured. According to Lebanese government sources, 1,109 civilians were killed.³⁹⁶ Forty-eight Lebanese soldiers were killed and anywhere between 250 to 500 Hizballah fighters (identifiable ones) were killed.³⁹⁷ Approximately 2,700 Israelis and 3,700 Lebanese were injured, and some 500,000 Israelis were internally displaced, with nearly 916,000 Lebanese also internally displaced. Some 300 Israeli homes and facilities were damaged or destroyed by Hizballah rockets. On the Lebanese side close to 16,000 homes, industrial and power plants, bridges, air and seaports were damaged or destroyed, including approximately 630 kilometers of roads. Hizballah had launched close to 4,000 rockets into Israel, and Israel had launched 7,000 air strikes against Lebanon, aside from artillery and infantry attacks,³⁹⁸ the vast majority hitting Hizballah targets—including civilian infrastructure used by Hizballah to fire from.³⁹⁹ In total, the financial damage to Israel in terms of

³⁹⁵ Boot, 3.

³⁹⁶ "Middle East Crisis: Facts and Figures," *British Broadcast Corporation*, 31 August 2006; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5257128.stm; Internet; accessed 15 October 2007. It is important to note, however, that government statistics coming out of Lebanon may not be particularly reliable, given the fact that Hizballah sits on parliament. See Max Boot, 3.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid*, *British Broadcasting Corporation*. According to Nahum Barnea, the majority of those killed in the fighting were Hizballah fighters. As was written earlier in this paper, many Hizballah fighters did not don uniforms and were indistinguishable from the regular Hizballah fighters. However, sources and facts and figures conflict with each other and because of this ambiguity it is difficult to verify the exact numbers of civilian casualties in Lebanon. See Barnea, 24.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid*, *British Broadcasting Corporation*.

³⁹⁹ Although, Barnea claims there were 9,300 air strikes, of which 5,000 hit inside of Lebanon, the majority of which targeted Hizballah locations in the southern suburbs of Beirut and elsewhere. He argues that the

reconstruction, lost revenue due to business closures, military spending and so forth totaled around six and a half billion dollars. Lebanon's reconstruction and financial loss has amounted to around the same amount.⁴⁰⁰

Following the end of hostilities on August 14, 2006, it was plain to see that the amount of damage levied throughout the 33 days of war was considerable. However, putting comparative statistics aside, an important question must be asked, as to how Hizballah, despite UNIFIL's presence in the south of Lebanon, managed to build up such a massive and sophisticated arsenal of weaponry without any impediments. The very fact that a non-sovereign militia could build up such a capability without any obfuscation illustrates just how monumentally UNIFIL has failed in implementing the second part of its mandate—to aid in the return of full sovereignty to the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese government alone, throughout *all* of Lebanon. It is important to now look a little bit deeper at UNIFIL to understand specifically why it failed its mandate, allowing for the situation between Israel and Lebanon to get to where it is today.

bridges and roads that Israel targeted were being used to transport munitions from outside of Lebanon into Hizballah strongholds. *Ibid*, 24.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid*, *British Broadcasting Corporation*.

Chapter VII
UN-Realistic: Why UNIFIL Failed in its Mandate

The previous chapters have dealt with the various facets relating to the failure of UNIFIL in its mandate. Attention has been drawn to the various factors involved, such as Israeli and Lebanese intransigence, the presence of strong militia forces (primarily Hizballah), outside intervention (such as Iran and Syria), bureaucratic and staffing issues vis-à-vis the UN, as well as the people on the ground, participating in the operation, and unrealistic mandate expectations. All of these factors have been dealt with, giving the reader a vital insight into understanding how and why UNIFIL has failed in achieving its mandated goals. However, in order to explain this failure, “success” must be defined. Whether or not UNIFIL has been a success depends on one’s own perspective—leaving the definition to be interpreted individually. According to the UN, UNIFIL has been a monumental success—with room for improvement. This attitude is evident from the aforementioned report where UNIFIL was congratulated on its achievements, despite its failings. If one were to ask the Israelis, they would question UNIFIL’s utility altogether. Lebanon may have a more positive view as it has requested time and time again for UNIFIL to renew its mandate every 6 months since 1978;⁴⁰¹ while Hizballah views UNIFIL as a foreign protector of Israel. Partisan politics aside, a common definition of success which would be agreeable to many, is simply an absence of war, brought about by and/or during the presence of a peacekeeping force.⁴⁰² With this definition being a simple “common denominator” among the various other avenues and alleyways one

⁴⁰¹ Eitan Barak, “Peacekeeping Forces and the Emergence of a Limited Security Regime in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Lessons from Israel’s Experience with Syria and Lebanon, 1974-2006,” in *Stabilizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Considerations for a Multinational Peace Support Operations*, eds. Kobi Michael and David Kellen (Jerusalem: The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, 2007), 80.

⁴⁰² Birger Heldt, *Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions* (Stockholm: National Defence College of Sweden, 2001): 2; available from http://www.pcr.uu.se/conferenses/Euroconference/heldt_paper.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 October 2007.

could use to measure success, we see that even at the most fundamental point of peacekeeping, UNIFIL has failed.

The underlying assumption with any peacekeeping mission is that the presence of a force to separate two warring parties will allow for meaningful peaceful dialogue to take place, with the threat of force on behalf of the UN preventing an eruption of violence.⁴⁰³ PKOs also serve as a confidence building measure, whereby a state can negotiate the terms of an agreement with a rival state without fearing the other state will negate on their promise and resort to force. Thus, PKOs monitor agreements made by these states through “observer” missions. PKOs can therefore be seen as a tool by which to increase trust between parties while also increasing the costs associated with defecting from an agreement.⁴⁰⁴ The PKO monitors agreements and reports on any violations, while also serving as an interposing force to guarantee security and alleviate mutual suspicions.⁴⁰⁵

However, this is merely a theoretical approach and is not based in fact. PKOs are deployed even in situations where the parties are not ready to lay down their arms. PKOs which are launched in situations where there is no peace to keep, are futile. If there is no political support from the parties involved, if the mandate is unrealistic, if the leadership and personnel are not up to the job, and if the parties to the conflict do not cooperate fully with the PKO, then what the PKO can realistically accomplish is relatively limited.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ Walter Dorn, “Canadian Peacekeeping: No Myth—But Not What it Once Was,” *Sitrep* 67, no. 2 (March/April 2007): 5; available from <http://www.rcmi.org/archives/200703%20Sitrep.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

⁴⁰⁴ Heldt 5.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid, 18.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

Moreover, if a PKO is present while a state of war reemerges, then the validity of the PKO becomes questionable, losing much needed credibility.⁴⁰⁷

It is necessary to now discuss how these factors relate specifically to the experience with UNIFIL. UNIFIL is not operating simply as an interposing force between two states. Realistically speaking, there is no military conflict between the Government of Israel and the Government of Lebanon. The original antagonistic relationship which led to UNIFIL's deployment, as mentioned earlier, was the relationship, or lack thereof, between Israel and the PLO. Today, the antagonist is Hizballah. That is to say, UNIFIL is operating between Israel, a state with a monopoly of force and a non-sovereign militia force operating within Lebanon, outside of formal Lebanese state control. Peacekeeping operations were not designed to deal with this type of situation. Therefore, UNIFIL failed in disarming militias in Lebanon up until the present.

Additionally, Lebanon has never had full sovereignty since Israel's invasion of 1978. Although Israel withdrew in 1978, the SLA was for all intents and purposes the Israeli army's proxy force, taking orders from Israel up until 2000. Even when Israel invaded in 1982, there was little UNIFIL could do against the Israeli army and simply operated to the best of its ability within Israeli controlled territory, providing the usual humanitarian assistance it has traditionally been engaged in.⁴⁰⁸ Israel, the PLO, Hizballah, and the various Lebanese militia groups that exist throughout the country have at one point or another, or at the same time, operating in direct defiance to Lebanon's sovereignty, attacking when and where they chose and dealing with their affairs in an

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid, 30.

⁴⁰⁸ Barak, 80.

autonomous fashion, flagrantly defying Lebanese laws. UNIFIL was also powerless to stop any of these factions from pursuing their aims. As for the continued cross-border violence, the previous chapters make clear that the restoration of international peace and security has yet to be achieved in any shape, way, or form. Therefore, UNIFIL has failed in achieving any of its mandated goals since its inception in 1978.

However, UNIFIL itself is not to blame for this failure. UNIFIL is simply the creation of the UN, and was inserted into a conflict in which it was not equipped to deal with. The necessary conditions for peace have not been established for a PKO to work along the Israel-Lebanon border. If the conflict was merely between the governments of Israel and Lebanon, it is likely that a PKO could serve as a positive force for negotiation, but this is not the case. The problem is really between Israel and Hizballah, and there is little UNIFIL, Lebanon, or even Israel can do to stop Hizballah, militarily.

The Lebanese military has no strategic capability, such as nuclear, chemical, or biological weaponry,⁴⁰⁹ while Israel has two (although not officially) nuclear reactors and is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁴¹⁰ Israel has approximately 629,150 land, air, sea, reserve, and paramilitary forces,⁴¹¹ compared to Lebanon's 74,400 combined military strength.⁴¹² This is important for two reasons. First, if a were to break out, UNIFIL's forces would be hard pressed to prevent any military operation either by Israel or Lebanon. Second, with regard to Lebanon's troop strength, the numbers mentioned are that of the *state* military apparatus. If one were to include the various

⁴⁰⁹ "Lebanon's Strategic Balance," *Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2006); available from <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Lebanon.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

⁴¹⁰ "Israel's Strategic Balance," *Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2006); available from <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Israel.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid*, 11.

⁴¹² "Lebanon's Strategic Balance," 5.

military groups active in Lebanon, the total troop strength would include an additional 10,000 over half of which would be Hizballah fighters.⁴¹³ Yet despite the superior troop strength of both states, it has become clear that asymmetric fighting tactics are difficult for even the most trained armies to fight against.

Lebanon can outgun Hizballah, as can Israel, but problematically, UNIFIL cannot. UNIFIL, operating as a PKO can only carry light weapons for personal security without any offensive capacity. Thus, preventing either an Israeli or Hizballah attack would result in heavy casualties for UNIFIL troops should they invite any retaliation. The Israeli army is a modern army equipped with highly sophisticated technology. It is important to focus on here is Hizballah's arsenal.

Hizballah's mobile rocket capacity was emphasized previously. This was because the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War was primarily a rocket war on the part of Hizballah. However, Hizballah also has armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, mortars, rockets, UAVs, anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a whole slew of light personal armaments, all of which are provided either by Iran or Syria.⁴¹⁴ Hizballah has a high level of offensive capability which makes UNIFIL's task of disarming Hizballah nothing short of impossible. With all of UNIFIL's shortcomings, and given all that we know about the outbreak of violence in 2006 and the failed history of the UN operation since the very beginning, it is important to go to the source of UNIFIL's birth, and look at how UNIFIL was designed and implemented.

UNIFIL was created and has survived as a stop-gap political measure, not as an operational tool for the execution of its mandate on the ground...The operation was never structured to succeed in traditional military terms. In fact, its consistent military ineffectiveness is well known and perhaps even purposeful.

⁴¹³ Ibid, 10.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

Since the day of its inception up to its most recent operations, UNIFIL's military effectiveness has always been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. It is a mission that was hastily created to serve the needs other than the tactical situation in southern Lebanon and this remains the case. Moreover, the UN is an institution that is expert in the use of passive and inert military forces employed as a confidence building measure rather than as active military units applying coercive force to influence and adversary.⁴¹⁵

Mere days after Lebanon requested the Security Council deal with Israel's invasion on March 17, 1978, the US called for the rapid creation and deployment of UNIFIL. The timing of this decision was not coincidental, in that, on March 21, 1978, Egypt and Israel were attending the Camp David conference to discuss a peace treaty, and should the US have ignored the situation in Lebanon, it could have simultaneously damaged peace prospects between the Egyptians and the Israelis.⁴¹⁶ It becomes immediately obvious that the PKO was launched with great haste and was not thought through. Various important facts were either ignored or simply overlooked. Lebanon was suffering from a civil war during the invasion. The PLO was operating freely in the country, outside of Lebanese law, establishing a semi-parallel state within a state, and Israel was sponsoring the Christian militias in the country. Another factor was the terrain of southern Lebanon, which is full of hills and valleys making it very difficult for a peacekeeping force to fight guerillas regardless of their sectarian affiliation.⁴¹⁷

This political and military reality did not mesh well with the underlying principles of PKOs, namely strict impartiality of the UN, the use of force only in self defense, and of course, the assumption that the parties to the conflict will cooperate with the PKO in

⁴¹⁵ John Hillen, "The Role of UNIFIL After an Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon," in *The Last Arab-Israeli Battlefield?: Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon*, eds. Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 47; available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/44bfc75dae14.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 September 2007.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, 48.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

achieving its mandate. The three main tasks associated with UNIFIL's original mandate will now be broke down into stages: the confirmation of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the restoration of international peace and security, and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, and the difficulties UNIFIL has had in implementing these tasks will be discussed, before examining Security Council Resolution 1701 and the new UNIFIL mandate.

As mentioned above, UNIFIL has not been able to "confirm" any Israeli withdrawal up until 2000, because either the IDF or SLA had been operating within the UNIFIL area of operations (AO) from the very beginning. UNIFIL performed whatever tasks it could simply to relieve human suffering, by providing humanitarian aid and personal security as has been shown. However, the concept of "self-defense" had created some unforeseen complications for UNIFIL. The various national contingents that made up UNIFIL defined "self-defense" in different ways, stemming from the ambiguity surrounding the term. For example, some interpreted self-defense to mean defending one's self from immediate physical harm, while others took it to mean defending one's self as well as the mandate, when required. Therefore, some contingents would engage in limited attacks on Israeli positions to deter incursions into Lebanese territory. Others did not engage unless they were directly threatened, while others opted for passive resistance such as establishing roadblocks intended to stop Israeli armored vehicle movements. There was no clear-cut definition of self defense given, leaving the rules of engagement to be determined by personnel at their own discretion. This diversity in interpretation weakened the cohesion of UNIFIL, and made for poor command and control of the operation. Furthermore, UNIFIL had no idea what to do when there was no cooperation

from any of the actors. It had no orchestrated response, which led to a great deal of confusion and ambiguity with regard to how it should react to non-compliance by either side.⁴¹⁸ This state of affairs has been the case up until the 2006 conflict, as both Israel and Hizballah have engaged each other at will, with little to no response from UNIFIL. UNIFIL has not been equipped with, nor can it realistically do anything against the military might of both Israel and Hizballah.

When looking at the state of “peace and security” between Israel and Lebanon, it is particularly difficult to see where the prospects for either of these goals lay. UNIFIL is charged with preventing fighting, establishing peace within its AO and controlling the movement in and out of that same area. It has to patrol the area and make use of observation posts and road checkpoints to ensure this peace is maintained.⁴¹⁹ It is also charged with finding and eliminating any armed elements within the area and preventing the free movement of these parties. Although the original intent was to separate the IDF and SLA from the PLO, today’s situation is different, but the goal is the same.⁴²⁰ However, UNIFIL’s AO has never been firmly established under UNIFIL’s sole control. For example, Israel had expanded its “security zone” while UNIFIL was simultaneously trying to demarcate the exact limits of its AO.⁴²¹ Israel, along with the various militia movements in the area caused the separation and isolation of various UNIFIL contingents, resulting in poor coordination of UNIFIL troops and damaging the operation’s capabilities and the security of personnel.

Each of these isolated detachments—including UNIFIL’s headquarters—was subject to constant harassment, frequent attacks, and virtual states of siege by the

⁴¹⁸ Ibid, 50.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, 52.

⁴²⁰ Ibid, 53.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

belligerents in southern Lebanon, being without mutual support from other UNIFIL elements. For instance, the French detachment in the Tyre area fought a running gun battle against PLO elements in May 1978, resulting in the loss of three French soldiers and the wounding of fourteen more, including the battalion commander. The Norwegian and Nepalese battalions were similarly isolated and harassed. Indeed, the disjointed deployment of UNIFIL not only prevented it from fully achieving its tasks, but also greatly endangered the units that were isolated from the main body.⁴²²

It is quite a lot to expect from just UNIFIL, but the Lebanese government basically left UNIFIL to fend for itself, allowing Hizballah to take virtual control of the south, along with leaving the IDF and the SLA to their own devices. Lebanon refused to serve as a “border guard” for Israel, despite the fact that this was Lebanese soil that Israel was being attacked from, and Israel refused to leave Lebanon while guerilla groups attacked its citizens from within Lebanese territory, including the UNIFIL AO. The UN itself recognized its own limitations and reduced the number of positions it had throughout the AO.

The UN was forced to accept this reality and to concede that Israel did not consider UNIFIL capable of ensuring peace and security in southern Lebanon. Recognizing this, throughout the mid-1980s, UNIFIL, reduced the number of its positions throughout the area, especially those isolated in the security zone. In the 1990s, it streamlined its operations even further. This was a tacit admission of failure in maintaining an authoritative presence in pursuance of the missions set out in Resolution 425.⁴²³

UNIFIL has not only failed in providing security or ensuring Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, but has admitted its own failings to itself. Such failures have only increased Israeli suspicions that UNIFIL has a bias against it, with Israel considering UNIFIL’s inaction as a result of apathy to Israel’s suffering. The situation had come to a boil when

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Ibid, 54.

Israel accused UNIFIL of actively collaborating with Hizballah on occasion.⁴²⁴ For instance, 3 IDF soldiers were kidnapped and murdered by Hizballah militants dressed as UNIFIL soldiers. In 2001, it came to light that there existed video footage of the kidnapping which UNIFIL had not informed the Israelis about. Initially, UNIFIL denied that it possessed any footage whatsoever.⁴²⁵ Upon learning of the videos, Israel demanded access to them, but UNIFIL refused. Following much negotiation, Israel was granted permission to view the tapes but the faces of the members involved in the kidnapping were intentionally blurred. Israel accused UNIFIL of accepting a bribe from Hizballah, through which UNIFIL troops provided Hizballah with uniforms, especially given the fact that the abductions took place near a UNIFIL observation post.⁴²⁶ More concerning, Hizballah demanded that the tapes be turned over to them,⁴²⁷ and UNIFIL obliged. According to a former UN official, evidence from the vehicles which were later found with the bloodstains of the Israeli soldiers was destroyed.⁴²⁸ This incident has blemished PKOs in the eyes of Israel to a great extent.*

Such political crises, along with the inability to operate given the immense constraints, lack of cooperation, and vague mandate, leads to a third and particularly

⁴²⁴ Barak, 81.

⁴²⁵ Asaf Romirowsky, "Who and What Does the UN Represent?," *Middle East Forum*, 21 September 2006; available from <http://www.meforum.org/article/1024>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

⁴²⁶ Barak, 82.

⁴²⁷ Ibid, Romirowsky.

⁴²⁸ Saul Singer, "Why Israel Rejects "Observers,"" *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, no. 459 (August 2001); available from <http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=1127>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

* Another incident causing many in Israel to raise a few eyebrows at the UN, was a visit to Hizballah by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan in June of 2000, one month after Israel's withdrawal. Many saw this as official recognition of Hizballah as a legitimate entity by the UN. See David Bukay, "Israel's War Against Hizballah: The First Stage of the Free World's War Against the Muslim Evil Axis," *Nativ Online* 9, (September 2006); available from <http://www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/09-issue/bukay-2-9.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 June 2008.

problematic failure—the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, free from foreign as well as militia influence.

The previous chapters have outlined the various reasons why UNIFIL has been unable to root out Lebanese militia groups, with particular emphasis on Hizballah. Yet since 1978, UNIFIL has remained in place. It has proven unable to perform its stated tasks, yet its mandate has been renewed time and time again since its creation—making the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, nothing *interim* at all. The reason for this is that the Lebanese government has become dependent on UNIFIL to the point where it relies on UNIFIL to be the *de facto* administrative body in the south, rivaling only Hizballah. The original UNIFIL mandate has been sidelined in favor of UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian aid to Lebanon's southern citizens.⁴²⁹ UNIFIL provides for the south what the Lebanese government is either unwilling or unable to provide.

Unfortunately, this entrenches UNIFIL as an inseparable part of the political landscape of Lebanon, making it part of the solution as well as part of the problem.⁴³⁰ UNIFIL's current role as a distributor of humanitarian aid leaves its original three tasks to be sidelined to the point where UNIFIL's original purpose becomes completely null and void. Up until the 2006 conflict, UNIFIL resigned itself to simply recording the various violations of both the Israelis and the militia groups, while offering whatever protection it could to civilian populations within its AO.⁴³¹

In the aftermath of the 2006 conflict, "UNIFIL II" was born. The Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006, calling upon both Israel and Hizballah to immediately cease all fighting. The ceasefire

⁴²⁹ Hillen, 55.

⁴³⁰ Ibid, 56.

⁴³¹ Ibid, 57.

took effect on August 14th, with Israeli troops withdrawing from southern Lebanon and Hizballah relocating north of the Litani River, creating a 30 kilometer buffer zone from the Israeli border.⁴³² Resolution 1701 authorized an increase in personnel for the mission along with including various other tasks: UNIFIL II was to continue its observations, ensuring Israel and Hizballah did not revert to hostilities. Second, UNIFIL was to continue providing humanitarian aid and assisting displaced persons to return to their homes. Third, it was to continue assisting the Lebanese army in establishing a monopoly of force in the south of Lebanon. A “weapons free zone” is to be established in the south of the country, with the exception that only UNIFIL and Lebanese troops may carry arms.⁴³³ However, two differences in the mandate came about. First, Lebanon for the first time since 1978 agreed to engage its military in operations in the south in a complete and comprehensive way, performing joint tasks with UNIFIL. The Lebanese army was to be the major vacuum-filling agent following the Israeli withdrawal, not UNIFIL. UNIFIL was to serve in a supportive role rather than leading the way as had previously been the case. It is noteworthy to mention that the Lebanese army has four brigades currently deployed to the south and is cooperating with UNIFIL in patrolling the area and destroying militia bunkers and arms caches. Finally, UNIFIL and the Lebanese government are charged with preventing the entry of weapons from foreign sources to any actor other than the Lebanese government.⁴³⁴ Much of these tasks are simply reiterations of what was already expected of UNIFIL from day one.

⁴³² Nicoletta Pirozzi, “UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Europe’s Contribution,” International Security Information Service – *European Security Review*, no. 30 (September 2006), 2; available from http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/esr_32.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 October 2007.

⁴³³ Efrat Elron, “Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: New and Renewed Partnerships and Implications for Mission Effectiveness,” (2006): 4; available from http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/op_23.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 June 2008.

⁴³⁴ Pirozzi, 2.

The most significant change in UNIFIL's mandate would be in the new rules of engagement (ROE). UNIFIL II was authorized to take "all actions necessary"⁴³⁵ to prevent hostilities in its AO, as well as fight against any force that hinders its operations, protect UN personnel and facilities, and ensure the freedom of movement and protection of the civilian population.⁴³⁶ UNIFIL is now permitted to use force *beyond* the parameters of self defense. Finally, UNIFIL became more independent of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with the hope that by eliminating the bureaucratic hurdles presented by the overburdened DPKO, the operation could run more smoothly. To achieve this goal a "strategic cell" has been established at the UN headquarters in New York:

[The strategic cell's] mandate is to supervise UNIFIL II operations, a role hitherto entrusted to the UN peacekeeping department (DPKO). The commander on the ground will respond directly to this strategic cell, which itself will be answerable to the Secretary General. The aim of this innovation is to streamline the bureaucratic procedures that often hampered the effective and rapid actions of previous UN peacekeeping missions.⁴³⁷

Resolution 1701 calls for 15,000 troops, the majority of which will be from Europe. Italy, France, Spain, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Germany, Holland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Cyprus are all contributing to UNIFIL II, along with non-European support from Turkey, Qatar,⁴³⁸ Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the United States.⁴³⁹ In addition to these troops, 15,000 Lebanese soldiers will be deployed to the south of Lebanon. As of April 30, 2008, UNIFIL has 13,254 military and support staff on the

⁴³⁵ Ibid, 2.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Ibid, 3.

⁴³⁸ Elron, 8.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

ground.⁴⁴⁰ The mandate is open to future enhancement, and has been left open-ended specifically so that the mandate can change more easily and commensurately with the situation on the ground.⁴⁴¹

Today UNIFIL II looks like a much more formidable force. In addition to the light infantry and combat engineers, artillery pieces, tanks, armored vehicles, radar equipment and intelligence gathering technology have been integrated into the operation. UNIFIL II conducts 400 daily patrols and has a maritime force consisting of 1,600 sailors off the Lebanese coast, patrolling Lebanese waters, made up of German, Danish, Turkish, Greek, Dutch, Norwegian, and Swedish personnel. This naval contingent also happens to be the largest in UN history.⁴⁴² It would seem that the 2006 conflict was a potential wake up call, forcing the UN to reevaluate what PKOs need to look like in order to achieve real “peace and security.” Although UNIFIL II is a very young operation, and given the realization it may still take time and effort to achieve the requisite “peace and security,” an examination of the positive and negative aspects of UNIFIL II is necessary, given its new mandate.

An important aspect of UNIFIL II is that it is made up of mostly professional armies from Europe. Thus, the problems associated with the severe imbalance of military hardware and performance has been alleviated to some degree. In addition to the strong European presence, four Muslim countries—Turkey, Qatar, Indonesia and Malaysia—are participating in the operation, giving UNIFIL II more credibility in the eyes of the

⁴⁴⁰ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Lebanon-UNIFIL-Facts and Figures: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/facts.html>; Internet; accessed 28 June 2007.

⁴⁴¹ Elron, 5.

⁴⁴² Ibid, 4.

Muslim Middle East.⁴⁴³ Europe is eager to continually improve the image of the European Union (EU) as much as possible. Turkey, on the other hand, seeks to bolster its image in order to accelerate its candidacy for EU membership. Italy seeks greater prominence in European affairs, and so forth. These desires are indoctrinated into the military staff leant to UNIFIL II, ingraining a national sense of pride and purpose into the donor troops, which translates into better motivation and performance in the field.⁴⁴⁴ What now exists in UNIFIL II is a more sophisticated, motivated, and highly trained force with greater capabilities to carry out the mandate.

Another important improvement, arguably the most important, is the aforementioned creation of the “strategic cell,” which is unique to UNIFIL II. The cell is comprised of an officer from each contributing country, allowing for real time communication between the different national contingents, creating a more coherent and coordinated decision-making body. The cell engages in meetings between Israeli and Lebanese military officers as well as bilateral discussions between UNIFIL’s force commander and the officers of both the IDF and the Lebanese army. UNIFIL has now streamlined the communication process making communication between either Israel and/or Lebanon much faster. UNIFIL commanders have also made themselves more accessible to both Israeli and Lebanese officers in emergency situations.⁴⁴⁵ There has been greater cooperation in intelligence sharing, and clearer rules of engagement in order to prevent tensions leading from vague regulations. One final area of improvement is the

⁴⁴³ Ibid, 8.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid, 8-9.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, 11.

increased use of the media to convey positive information about UNIFIL to both Israeli and Lebanese citizens.⁴⁴⁶

UNIFIL II has ensured Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, which has been completed with only minor incidents resulting in no casualties between Israel and Hizballah. The ceasefire agreement has been maintained up until this point. Most significantly however, is the true separation of Hizballah from Israel. Hizballah positions are no longer situated along the Israel-Lebanon border, nor are they operating right next to UN observation posts, as has been the case in the past. Rather, Hizballah has had to vacate various positions as a result of UNIFIL patrols⁴⁴⁷ and joint UNIFIL-Lebanese army operations. In one incident, Hizballah personnel wearing uniforms and carrying weapons threatened UNIFIL troops, at which point they were arrested by the Lebanese army—proof that tangible efforts at combating Hizballah are being made in the south.⁴⁴⁸ As Uri Lubrani, the adviser to the Israeli Minister of Defense points out regarding the achievements made by UNIFIL II,

Today's Lebanon is not the same Lebanon that we faced on the eve of the war. Hizballah in Lebanon suffered a serious blow and will now think twice about what steps to take, despite Iranian backing. Hizballah now has a very serious partner in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese Army—which represents the UN and legitimacy with which it must coordinate ... this automatically blocks Hizballah from attacking Israeli directly. So to claim that nothing has happened is wrong. Something has indeed happened; certainly not enough, and less than we had hoped for, but it has definitely changed Lebanon.⁴⁴⁹

Negotiations regarding land issues, such as the Shebaa Farms are actually taking place with partial implementation and UNIFIL II has successfully continued with its de-mining

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid, 12.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid, 13.

⁴⁴⁸ Efrat Elron, "Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: UNIFIL II Might be a Model for a PSO in the Israel-Palestine Arena," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 13, no. 4 (2007), 3.

⁴⁴⁹ Uri Lubrani, "The War's Fall-Out in Lebanon," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (March 2007), 17; available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue1/Lubrani.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

operations.⁴⁵⁰ Overall, both the Israeli and the Lebanese governments have spoken positively about UNIFIL II's results and aside from minor violations (specifically Israeli flights into Lebanon), there is relative satisfaction with the current situation for both the Government of Lebanon and that of Israel.⁴⁵¹

Both Israel and Lebanon were heavily involved in the shaping of UNIFIL II and in garnering international support for the mission. Israel's traditional mistrust of the UN seems to have improved.* Israel tried to convince European nations to contribute troops to the operation and even called for the involvement of Muslim countries.⁴⁵² Lebanon (along with Israel) was particularly appreciative of the involvement of democratic European states with shared values and professional armies that give the mandate more legitimacy and a greater chance of success, along with the insertion of Muslim country contingents, giving the region a sigh of relief.⁴⁵³

There is, however, more to the story here. Lebanon's internal politics remain a strong obstacle to UNIFIL II's continued success. Pro-Syrian elements within the Lebanese parliament, particularly among the Shiites, provide strong and outspoken

⁴⁵⁰ Elron, "Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: New and Renewed Partnerships and Implications for Mission Effectiveness," 13.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid, 14. See Amos Harel, "Olmert: Lebanese Army, UNIFIL are Keeping Hezbollah in Check," *Haaretz*, 21 February 2007; available from <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/828765.html>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

* It is important to mention, however, that Israel is actually taking a risk here. Israel is concerned with the stationing of a large PKO, along with the Lebanese military, because such a presence may prevent Israel from retaliating against any future Hizballah attacks, while the same inter-positional forces would do little to combat Hizballah attacks against Israel—limiting Israeli options. Israel is hoping that Hizballah will be restrained by the large force now present in the south, and that its domestic-political concerns, such as reconstruction efforts, and the need to alleviate concerns over the possibility of another devastating war will keep Hizballah from attacking Israel. Therefore, Israel's change in attitude towards PKOs is seen as a necessary gamble to help increase Israel's northern security. See David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, "Lessons and Implications off the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment," *Policy Focus*, no. 60 (October 2006), 19; available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus60.pdf>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007.

⁴⁵² Elron, "Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: UNIFIL II Might be a Model for a PSO in the Israel-Palestine Arena," 3.

⁴⁵³ Ibid, 5.

support for Hizballah. Fighting has erupted among various militia factions within UNIFIL II's AO, leading to confrontations between the Lebanese army and an Islamist Palestinian organization, Fatah al-Islam. Such instability and violence could prove to be too much of a challenge for UNIFIL II, but only time will tell.⁴⁵⁴ Also, despite the alleviation of massive military technological and training imbalances between countries, such problems still exist and continue to plague the operation.⁴⁵⁵

Within UNIFIL II itself, despite the force's composition of more professional armies, the contingents stemming from the developing world still hamper the mission. Disagreements regarding all aspects of the mission arise creating a very tense environment in many situations, as Exum and Pozez explain,

At the root of the problem is UNIFIL's greatest strength—the fact that it compromises soldiers from so many different countries. This mix of contributing nations—from both the European Union and the developing world—is a nightmare in terms of the challenges it poses to a unified command structure. The different contingents do not just vary in training and equipment, but also in the way they conduct themselves within their own sectors. A collective UNIFIL decision to assume risk and redouble presence patrols would be nearly impossible to enforce.⁴⁵⁶

However, even more important than the problem of disunity within the operation, there is one particular deficiency with UNIFIL II's new mandate that threatens to invalidate the entire operation. Although UNIFIL II and the Lebanese army are supposed to ensure that no weapons or militia fighters enter Lebanon, UNIFIL II's mandate does not include the monitoring of the Lebanese-Syrian border—the very place from which the vast majority of Iranian/Syrian weapons, along with foreign fighters enter the country. Surprisingly,

⁴⁵⁴ Elron, "Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: New and Renewed Partnerships and Implications for Mission Effectiveness," 15.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid, 14.

⁴⁵⁶ Andrew Exum and Gerri Pozez, "United Nations Peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon: One Year After the War." *Policy Watch 1272* (August 2007); available from <http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2648>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

UNIFIL II could intercept arms shipments from Syria, but only at the Lebanese government's request,⁴⁵⁷ which is unlikely given the existence of parliamentary as well as strong popular support for Hizballah and its continued holding of arms, as well as Syria's warning that any deployment of along its border would be interpreted as a hostile act.⁴⁵⁸

[...] Resolution 1701 just calls on Lebanon to secure its borders; UNIFIL may assist the Lebanese government if requested. The resolution also only calls on states to refrain from selling weaponry to Hizballah, but does not authorize any state to enforce an arms embargo.⁴⁵⁹

UNIFIL II has also resigned itself to supporting the Lebanese army in disarming militia groups, including Hizballah, but not in actively disarming such groups. UNIFIL II will train Lebanese troops and provide other forms of assistance instead,⁴⁶⁰ with the hope that they will be the ones who will proactively disarm Hizballah—something which does not appear to be very likely.

Additionally, Resolution 1701 makes it clear that only the Government of Lebanon may operate militarily in the south of Lebanon, south of the Litani River. Now that Hizballah has relocated north of the Litani River, the renewed mandate does not specifically require them to disarm. Although this may be seen as a technicality in the language, it may very well provide Hizballah with the excuse it needs to retain its arms, especially its long range missile capabilities which can still target Israel. Also, Hizballah's source of funding, which comes in the form of charities and legitimate business enterprises has not been contended with and will continue to allow Hizballah to

⁴⁵⁷ Elron, "Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: UNIFIL II Might be a Model for a PSO in the Israel-Palestine Arena," 3.

⁴⁵⁸ Makovsky and White, 28.

⁴⁵⁹ Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Shimon Shapira, "Countdown to Conflict: Hizballah's Military Buildup and the Need for Effective Disarmament," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* 6, no. 8 (August 2006); available from <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-8.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

⁴⁶⁰ Elron, 3.

financially, and therefore, militarily sustain itself.⁴⁶¹ Additionally, Hizballah has been constructing defensive lines north of the Litani River and has continued to train sympathizers in the UNIFIL AO.⁴⁶² What will be done about this issue remains to be seen, but Hizballah has threatened to prevent any attempts, by UNIFIL or the Government of Lebanon, to disarm it.⁴⁶³ In fact, Hizballah may have already carried out its threat. For example, following a bomb attack on a UNIFIL reconnaissance patrol in June 2006, killing 6 peacekeepers, and infrared trigger and military grade explosives were found at the scene. Hizballah did not claim responsibility for the attack, denying any involvement whatsoever, but the sophistication of the weapons involved made Hizballah the prime suspect.⁴⁶⁴

Overall, since the August 14 ceasefire, Israel has been very happy with the deployment of Lebanese troops, along with UNIFIL personnel to the south of Lebanon. Israel enjoys the buffer created by these actors in removing Hizballah from being directly on Israel's northern border. However, Israel reserves doubt over whether or not the Lebanese government along with UNIFIL can continue to exert enough pressure on Hizballah to ensure the border is safe.⁴⁶⁵ Hizballah has been replenishing its strength since the ceasefire, despite the clear prohibition against doing so and the responsibility of UNIFIL II and the Lebanese army from preventing such an occurrence. This has resulted

⁴⁶¹ Barak Ben-Zur and Christopher Hamilton, "Containing Hizballah's Terrorist Wing," *Policy Watch 1145* (September 2006); available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2512>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

⁴⁶² Exum, Andrew, "Hizballah's 'Big Surprise' and the Litani Line," *Policy Watch 1276* (September 2007); available from <http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2652>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

⁴⁶³ Schenker, David, "Hezbollah's New Mission," *Daily Standard*, 29 September 2006; available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=984>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

⁴⁶⁴ Andrew Exum and Gerri Pozez, "United Nations Peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon: One Year After the War."

⁴⁶⁵ Jonathan Spyer, "Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 12, no.1 (March 2008), 8; available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2008/issue1/pdf/1.pdf>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2008.

largely from the transfer of arms from the un-patrolled border with Syria. Hizballah has been replacing its medium and long-range missile capabilities, and has even established an anti-aircraft unit, and managed to smuggle in land-to-sea missiles.⁴⁶⁶ One of the most flagrant examples of Hizballah's continued presence was a 3 day military exercise conducted by Hizballah fighters within UNIFIL's AO. Both Israel and UNIFIL observed the exercise but neither UNIFIL nor Lebanon did anything to intervene.⁴⁶⁷ Therefore, aside from a physical separation between Hizballah and Israel resulting from the increased UNIFIL II force and the deployment of the Lebanese army, Hizballah still has much freedom in Lebanon and widespread political and popular support. Hizballah continues to have the military capabilities to attack Israel, serving as a standing military force other than the legitimate state-sanctioned Lebanese military. What is required on behalf of UNIFIL II is a credible show of force, whereby it can prove its ability to counter any militia force, at any cost. As Elron explains,

To be a credible peace operation, not only does it need to engage in state building, but its forces must be armed and organized according to the situation it is embedded in, and to be perceived as being willing and capable in overmatching whatever opposition they might encounter. Forces are better [able] to fulfill their mission through the combination of means of negotiation, consent promotion techniques, deterrence, and the will to use limited force if necessary to protect the population and the mandate. In parallel, high levels of adaptability, creativity and flexibility displayed in UNIFIL's deployment and operations are also necessary.⁴⁶⁸

These suggestions are nothing new, but it is very difficult to engage militia forces with the aim of destroying them. The militia force is only an extension of an ideology, and ideology is much more difficult to extinguish. For example, despite Hizballah's

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, 9.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Elron, "Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community: New and Renewed Partnerships and Implications for Mission Effectiveness,"16.

relocation northward, Hizballah flags are being placed directly on the Israel-Lebanon border, much to the frustration of the Israelis.⁴⁶⁹ It is doubtful that UNIFIL II or even the Lebanese government can do much to eliminate support for Hizballah's ideology, unless they were to compete more heavily with Hizballah in terms of the social, educational, and reconstruction services that Hizballah has become known for. If this is the case, it is important to ponder whether in fact UNIFIL II is doing more harm than good.

Since UNIFIL's inception, nothing has really been achieved in ending cross-border attacks either by Israel or by any Lebanese militia group. The new mandate, although using much stronger language, and giving UNIFIL more soldiers and freedom of action, does not in reality have the "backbone" required to make a tangible difference in the situation. UNIFIL II will not engage Hizballah in a direct battle—and wisely so, because it can learn from Lebanon's perspective; if Israel failed, Lebanon and UNIFIL II, surely will. Second, UNIFIL II is not permitted to patrol the Lebanese-Syrian border, the very place from which the majority of arms transfers to Hizballah emanate from. Hizballah is getting its weapons from somewhere, most definitely from the long unprotected border with Syria making rearmament easy.⁴⁷⁰ Therefore, while UNIFIL stands guard between Hizballah fighters and the IDF, it is more accurately a larger force which is performing the same task it has for three decades. Furthermore, although Lebanon's army is present in the area, it does not engage Hizballah fighters, nor does it collect and/or share intelligence on Hizballah activities. Lebanon enjoys UNIFIL II's presence because it takes the burden off of the state to make the difficult decision to

⁴⁶⁹ Andrew Exum and Gerri Pozez, "United Nations Peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon: One Year After the War."

⁴⁷⁰ Pollak, "UNIFIL Unfulfilled: The U.N. Organization is Ineffective and Unaccountable."

physically disarm Hizballah using force.⁴⁷¹ If these steps are not taken, then it does not matter how many more resolutions are drafted by the Security Council because the situation on the ground will not change. Unless Lebanon disarms Hizballah, Israel will feel compelled to do so, inviting condemnation by UNIFIL II for violating Lebanese sovereignty, but acting in its own national security interest. Simultaneously, Lebanese sovereignty is already challenged by the existence of a strong non-sovereign force such as Hizballah, which is rearming without any impediments from either the Lebanese army or UNIFIL II. Just as the initial UNIFIL operation was established in haste, so too was UNIFIL II. The mandate has simply been reinforced, using stronger language to demand the same thing that the original mandate did.

UNIFIL was never equipped with the right mandate for assisting Lebanon to “restore sovereignty” to its south. UNIFIL did not have the manpower or the firepower to challenge Hizballah, or any other militia group within Lebanon. UNIFIL’s entire mandate, including the “new and improved” Security Council Resolution 1701 may be seen as a step in the right direction, but in reality is simply a document that reiterates the old mandate of 1978. Without active and meaningful participation from the Lebanese government, UNIFIL cannot stand to fight on behalf of Lebanon, when the Lebanese military itself is not capable and/or willing to rival a paramilitary force such as Hizballah. To make matters worse, Hizballah has political legitimacy within the Lebanese parliament, and has massive support throughout Lebanon and the Arab-Muslim world. The Government of Lebanon, which operates on a delicate and tense balance of sectarian interests, cannot afford to alienate the Shiite community—the largest confessional group in Lebanon, and the only one with its own military force, thereby limiting its options in

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

dealing with Hizballah militarily. Lebanon is also too weak to challenge Syria and Iran at any level whatsoever and prevent arms from entering Lebanon through the porous and unmonitored Syrian-Lebanese border. Here too, pro-Syrian elements within the Lebanese political system would prevent such a reality from coming about. The tightrope of political maneuvering in Lebanon makes dealing with this issue a precarious affair—and in a country where political assassinations, a legacy of civil war, and sectarian divisions are a frightening reality, few are willing or able to challenge a powerful organization such as Hizballah.

As for UNIFIL, although its efforts in the humanitarian and de-mining field are admirable and should be continued, the PKO must distance itself from state-building activities that showcase the deficiencies of the Lebanese state. Lebanon has to contend with Hizballah as a direct competitor for the allegiance of Lebanese citizens, by providing superior education, social and medical services, and employment opportunities. UNIFIL must stop engaging in these activities and transfer all responsibility in these areas to the Government of Lebanon, forcing Lebanon's political decision makers to surpass sectarian divisions to pursue a common good—serving Lebanon's citizens despite their respective religious affiliations. UNIFIL has allowed itself, by accepting Lebanon's renewal requests since 1978, to serve a governing role in Lebanon's south on the UN's bill. UNIFIL must allow Lebanon to truly assert its independence and take back at least a modicum of sovereignty by providing the needed humanitarian aid, and other services that UNIFIL (and Hizballah) currently provides. In the end, it is the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon to disarm Hizballah and prevent any cross-

border violence and other challenges to Lebanese sovereignty,⁴⁷² but this will be quite problematic given the majority Shiite composition of the Lebanese army. It will be very difficult to convince Shiite servicemen to disarm a group to which they may very well have sympathy for, or at the very least, view as their coreligionists to whom they have a sectarian bias. Finally, without outside pressure on Hizballah to disarm, it would be folly to expect Lebanon to perform this task alone.⁴⁷³ It has hitherto been unable to carry out any disarmament, and with Hizballah's widespread popularity and Syrian and Iranian sponsorship, coupled with massive arms shipments from the Syrian-Lebanese border that go unchallenged—it is impossible for the Government of Lebanon to act alone. Lebanon is truly between a rock and a hard place on this issue.

Additionally, despite the increased permission to use force against any and all impediments to UNIFIL's mandate in Lebanon, it is unrealistic to imagine that UNIFIL would engage in attacks, however justified, against either Israel or Hizballah. Regardless of the more professional military makeup of "UNIFIL II" both Israel and Hizballah would be able to deliver massive reprisals to any UNIFIL II attacks. UNIFIL also has to ensure that it does not appear to favor one side over the other. However, by doing so, UNIFIL is tacitly legitimizing Hizballah's continued holding of weapons, even though it is charged with disarming non-sovereign forces. Thus far, as we have seen, more and more weapons have entered Hizballah strongholds without UNIFIL intervention. UNIFIL is simply not equipped with the right mandate to do the job, and could not possibly disarm Hizballah without Lebanese military assistance. Furthermore, any attack

⁴⁷² Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon and Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, "An International Force in Lebanon: Advantages and Disadvantages," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* 6, no. 4 (July 2006); available from <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-4.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 June 2008.

⁴⁷³ Makovsky and White, 30.

on Hizballah would enrage large segments of the Lebanese public—and as the Government of Lebanon aptly stated—if Israel could not contend with Hizballah’s asymmetric warfare tactics, UNIFIL would have little hope as well.

Finally, although Israel has supported Resolution 1701, there is no reason to think that Israel would not respond to a provocation from the border with Lebanon, should UNIFIL II fail to prevent such an occurrence. Hizballah does not want to be blamed for the massive destruction brought about through Israel’s reprisal attacks yet again, and is currently swamped with concerns over reconstruction efforts, public relations damage control, and domestic power struggles to launch another attack against Israel. Hizballah does not want to become a pariah within Lebanon and is currently treading very carefully. However, history has shown Hizballah to be a very patient organization, as it waited from 2000 up until the conflict in 2006, building up a massive and complex system of weapons, rockets, bunkers, and safe-havens, from which to attack Israel—all under the watchful eye of UNIFIL.

It is difficult to imagine or present a viable solution to the current situation. UNIFIL cannot deal with Syria and Iran, so weapons transfers can only be stopped once inside Lebanon—often much too late. UNIFIL cannot change the domestic-political realities of Lebanon, and can only deal with the situation and accept it for what it is. UNIFIL cannot use overwhelming force to disarm a well-armed militia group with sectarian and familial loyalties that does not wear a uniform or operate on the same guidelines as a state military. UNIFIL cannot stop Israeli aerial flights or UAV deployments, basically resulting in UNIFIL’s overall mission failure. Thus, UNIFIL has failed not only because of the lack of participation by Lebanon, Israel, and Hizballah, but

also because the UN mandate is too much to expect from the situation. If Hizballah were to be disarmed, all other groups, however small, would have to be disarmed within Lebanon to quell any sectarian-based conspiracy theories that could lead to civil war or at the very least a limited outbreak of violence. This is especially concerning for Hizballah, as they are opposed to disarming while other groups have weapons, as well as out of the fear of losing political influence and diminished personal security for Shiites.⁴⁷⁴

Hizballah also enjoys pointing out the futility of the Lebanese army in fighting Israel, making Hizballah seem as the only viable military force able to confront Israel.⁴⁷⁵ There is no way for UNIFIL to guarantee complete security for both Lebanon and Israel without some form of peace agreement between the two, which is impossible with a Syrian-Iranian-sponsored militia group that is opposed to any such reconciliation. Thus, the plethora of problems in Lebanon are layered and interconnected in such a way that one issue leans on another and so forth. UNIFIL was established in an environment where there was no chance for success, the mandate did not reflect reality, the mission historically was a politically expedient maneuver to make the UN seem like it was taking action, while also increasing the prestige of the United States' peace-brokering efforts between Egypt and Israel. The historical perspective of Lebanon's domestic politics, Israeli attitudes towards the UN and its national security, Hizballah's perception of Shiite marginalization and the righteousness of the Islamic cause, coupled with external power interests that have plagued Lebanon since the Ottoman Empire, have all culminated to a point where we can see how, why and where UNIFIL has failed.

⁴⁷⁴ Nicholas Blanford and David Schenker, "Hizballah: Learning to Live with Resolution 1559," *Policy Watch 1119* (July 2006); available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2484>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2008.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, Bukay.

In order to truly succeed UNIFIL II would have to do the following things: First, UNIFIL II would have to engage in offensive operations against Hizballah. Only through directly confronting Hizballah and inflicting heavy casualties, including the destruction of arms caches, safe-havens, observation posts, and so forth can Hizballah be stopped militarily. This would also include the monitoring of the border with Syria. Despite Syrian threats to attack any military force along its border, UNIFIL II must actively seal off the entry points of weapons and foreign fighters which come almost exclusively from the long and undefended Syria-Lebanon border. If UNIFIL II could achieve this, than it would not only increase Lebanon's domestic security, but also increase Israel's security which would conversely translate into no fly-over operations into Lebanon by the Israeli air force. Second, UNIFIL II must cease humanitarian aid and social assistance in the south of Lebanon. Lebanon must be forced to compete with Hizballah in providing goods and services to Lebanese citizens. With UNIFIL II providing the only counterweight to Hizballah control in the south, incentives need to be created for Lebanon to enter the south and regain control over the whole of its territory. By taking control of the south and providing the services that are required in the south, Lebanon can counteract the popularity of Hizballah by providing the economic opportunities that many of Lebanon's southern citizens desperately require. Third, the Lebanese military must become more representative of the different religious communities that make up Lebanon. By having a standing army that is comprised of mainly Shiite Muslims, Lebanon is compromising the effectiveness of its force by increasing the chances of mutiny within the rank and file should a confrontation with Hizballah come about. The military must become reflect Lebanese society as a whole in order to avoid the creation

of two Shiite-led military forces within Lebanon. Fourth, Lebanon must move from sectarian power sharing agreements to a more open, democratic regime based on land-based nationality versus confessionalist nationalities. A common Lebanese nationalism which places national identity ahead of religious affiliation must be encouraged and inculcated into national education in order to avoid the repeated sectarian-based political tug-of-wars that plague Lebanese politics and prevent meaningful change from taking place. Finally, Hizballah's monies and assets must be seized in order to ensure they cannot finance their military operations or broadcast media messages intended to incite violence against any and all groups. In addition to this, Syrian and Iranian involvement in Hizballah activities must be condemned by the UN and other international bodies in order to make it clear that these types of activities are unacceptable and will be met with consequences. Hizballah cannot be divorced from its ideological, financial, and military providers and the three entities must be condemned together.

However, what should be done and what can be done are two different things. Iran and Syria can both claim "plausible deniability" in any involvement, claiming they have no knowledge, or have no relationship with Hizballah. Furthermore, the reformation of the Lebanese military would be very difficult because you cannot force individuals to serve in the military as a career if they do not choose to do so. As for fighting Hizballah, UNIFIL II, despite its increased military capacity would be hard-pressed to fight Hizballah even with rules of engagement allowing for the use of force other than self defense. Hizballah does not fight by the same rules, and it is doubtful that UNIFIL II could sustain a high level of casualties that such an endeavor would

necessitate before donor countries would either pull out their troops or refuse to send more.

UNIFIL II would also have difficulty monitoring the border with Syria as there are many points at which smuggling can take place, and UNIFIL II could not monitor the border without sophisticated equipment which would increase the cost of the operation. As for the need to reeducate the public and form a national sense of identity that transcends religion—this is much more difficult than it sounds. Civil war (and even pre-civil war) grudges remain among all groups. Furthermore, with the Hizballah ideology already firmly rooted in many Shiite minds, it is doubtful whether compromise can come soon enough to be attributed to UNIFIL II. The young generation of Lebanese Shiites have already been educated in Hizballah schools and employed by Hizballah businesses, creating a stronger sense of identity with Hizballah than with Lebanon among many young Shiites. Therefore, the political discourse in Lebanon is unlikely to take on a purely “Lebanese nationalist” perspective in the near future.

Overall, it is clear that UNIFIL II has not been able to contend with the situation on the ground for the reasons made evident in this thesis. The challenge presented to UNIFIL II is a lesson to PKOs elsewhere. A viable solution to the situation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is safe to say that the existing UNIFIL mandate is not enough to solve one of the most complex situations, in one of the most complex regions of the world.

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