

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY
AND NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

by

ROY ANTHONY REMPEL

A thesis
Presented to the University of Manitoba
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER of ARTS
In the Department of Political Studies

Winnipeg, Manitoba

(c) ROY ANTHONY REMPEL, 1987

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-37348-2

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

BY

ROY ANTHONY REMPEL

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

© 1987

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA to lend or sell copies of this thesis, to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

To my Aunt Agnes who has helped me immeasurably over the years.

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

I authorize the University of Manitoba to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

ROY ANTHONY REMPEL

I furthermore authorize the University of Manitoba to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

ROY ANTHONY REMPEL

Glossary of Terms

ACE	-	Allied Command Europe
AMF	-	Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
ASW	-	Anti Submarine Warfare
CAG	-	Canadian Air Group
CAST	-	Canadian Air-Sea Transportable brigade
CBG	-	Canadian Brigade Group
CDS	-	Chief of the Defence Staff
CIBG	-	Canadian Infantry Brigade Group
CIIA	-	Canadian Institute for International Affairs
CINC AFNORTH	-	Commander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe
CISS	-	Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies
CMBG	-	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CVN	-	Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier
DEA	-	Department of External Affairs
DND	-	Department of National Defence
FAC	-	Fast Attack Craft
FCMA	-	Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty
FOFA	-	Follow On Forces Attack
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GIUK	-	Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap
GNP	-	Gross National Product
IISS	-	International Institute for Strategic Studies
MBT	-	Main Battle Tank
MOU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
MR	-	Motorized Rifle
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORTH AG	-	Northern Army Group
PCO	-	Privy Council Office
PMO	-	Prime Minister's Office
RCAF	-	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	-	Royal Canadian Navy
RUSI	-	Royal United Services Institute
SACEUR	-	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	-	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SCEAND	-	Standing Committee on External Affairs & National Defence
SSF	-	Special Service Force
SSN	-	Nuclear powered attack submarine
UKMF	-	United Kingdom Mobile Force
UNEF	-	United Nations Emergency Force

Glossary of Terms

v

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
I. FACTORS INFLUENCING CANADA'S MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO NATO	6
- Slow-to-vary Variables as Sources of Canada's Alliance Posture	13
- Canada as a Small Power in Alliance	19
- The Origins of the Commitment to the Northern Flank	62
- Conclusion	78
II. CANADA'S CHANGING ALLIANCE POLICY AND THE CAST COMMITMENT	81
- The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy, 1967-1976: Full Circle	81
- The CAST Commitment as a Political Pacifier for the Alliance: 1969-1975	112
- Refining the CAST Commitment: 1975-1976	124
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN FLANK COMMITMENT: 1977-1987	134
- Attempts and Proposals to Improve the Commitment	134
- Continuing Political and Military Dilemmas	155
- The First Conservative Defence Review: 1984-1986	184
- Exercise 'Brave Lion', the 1987 White Paper and the Demise of the CAST Commitment	190

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
CONCLUSION: The CAST Commitment and Canada as a Small Power in Alliance	215
APPENDIX: THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN REGION: GEOSTRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS	232
- NATO's Northern Flank and the Growth of the Soviet Northern Fleet	232
- The Nature of the Soviet Military Threat to NATO's Northern Flank	251
- Nordic Force Postures and Likely Warsaw Pact Axes of Advance	259
- NATO Reinforcements for the Northern Cap: The Military Importance	273
- Geo-Political Interrelationships in the Nordic Region	279
- The Nordic Balance Concept	287
- NATO Reinforcement: Its Political Importance	296
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES	311

INTRODUCTION

The defence policy of any nation is part of a larger national security policy. The security policy adopted and maintained by a state over the long term, is influenced by certain slow-to-vary variables. These slowly changing factors are found in both the international environment and the nation's domestic political culture. The level of defence effort perceived as necessary; the decision as to whether a country opts for an alliance posture; the type of alliance framework it seeks to promote, these are all important security policy options and are determined, for the most part, by slow-to-vary variables. As opposed to more rapidly changing 'tactical' variables, slow-to-vary factors provide for historical continuity over a longer period of time. Both the nation's defence policy, and the force posture adopted as a result, are guided in part by these relatively constant variables. As a result, these slowly changing factors will be reflected to some degree in the force posture adopted. In particular, if a state opts for an alliance posture, the military commitments it makes must, to some extent, mirror the alliance objectives of the power making the commitment.

In 1967-1968 Canada made a relatively major military pledge to reinforce the Northern Flank of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO).¹ This commitment was maintained for about twenty years before being discarded and replaced with a new military commitment to the alliance. Despite the existence of this military commitment, most writers and analysts in Canada's defence community, when discussing Canada's alliance and defence policies, have focused on Canada's military commitments to NATO's Central Front. A lesser amount of discussion has centered on the commitments made by Canada to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Until about ten years ago the promise, made to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), to provide ground and tactical air reinforcements to the Northern Flank received almost no attention at all. This commitment was made twenty years after Canada had opted for an alliance posture. By this time most of the relatively permanent sources of Canada's security policy were firmly established. For instance, Canada seemed to have accepted the principle that a lower level defence effort was adequate to meet Canada's security and alliance objectives. Likewise, many of the other slow-to-vary factors guiding Canada's security and defence policies were well established by 1967-1968. The Northern Flank commitment made by Canada at that time probably reflected quite accurately Canada's post-war security objectives. Indeed, the Northern Flank commitment

¹NATO's 'Northern Flank' comprises the countries of Denmark and Norway as well as the northern Federal German state of Schleswig-Holstein. In wartime all NATO Forces in this region would come under the command of Allied Forces Northern Europe headquartered near Oslo.

can perhaps be said to have been more representative of Canada's security policy than the commitment made to NATO's Central Front in 1951. That commitment, the product of the cold-war atmosphere of the early 1950's, was made at a time when resources available to the Department of National Defence (DND) were much greater than they would be for most of the post-war period. Indeed, in that sense, the commitment to the Central Front, with its relatively high costs, may be somewhat of an aberration in the type of commitments Canada would normally seek to make to the alliance. The high profile of this commitment may also have contributed to a slight misunderstanding among many analysts of the exact nature of Canada's security and defence policies. However, once made, the commitment to the Central Front became impossible for Canada to abandon. Political considerations, well described in this thesis, made this inconceivable. However the commitment to the Northern Flank, as it was maintained over the next twenty years, continued to reflect certain of the constant principles of Canada's security and defence policies that had emerged in the post-war era. In fact the eventual demise of the commitment serves as an important case study of how and why Canada's defence commitments to the alliance rise and fall.

In spite of the usefulness of examining, in detail, the Northern Flank commitment, few Canadian writers and analysts have done so. The purposes of this thesis will thus be two-fold:

1. To describe and explain the evolution of the Canadian military commitment to NATO's Northern Flank; and,
2. To use the commitment as a case study in order to help determine some of the relatively permanent factors that guide and shape Canadian defence policy and commitments.

The thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter will present the analytical framework. Certain slow-to-vary variables that have helped guide Canada's post-war defence policy will be identified and analyzed. The chapter will also describe how these factors combined in the 1960's to help originate Canada's Northern Flank commitment. Chapters two through four will examine Canada's commitment to NATO's Northern Flank. The study of Canada's Northern Flank commitment will determine to what degree the sources of policy noted in chapter one continued to influence the commitment over the next twenty years.

Chapter two will examine the initial period of Canada's commitment to the Northern Flank, the period 1967-1976. The primary political importance of the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade commitment to the Northern Flank was emphasized throughout this period. However, the increasing Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank made NATO military reinforcements for the Northern Flank more important. This perception of increased threat made it necessary for Canada to consider ways of making the commitment more militarily credible. However the difficulties of doing so in the context of the restraints imposed on Canada by the nature of the particular geo-political and geo-

strategic interrelationships found in the Nordic region were a difficult and ultimately impossible obstacle to overcome (see Appendix). Chapter Three examines how Canada sought, in the period from 1976-1987, to overcome these obstacles and make the CAST commitment militarily viable.

The conclusion will constitute a final chapter. Drawing on the empirical evidence cited in the case study, the conclusion will determine to what degree the factors cited in chapter One help to explain the nature of Canada's defence policy and alliance commitments.

CHAPTER ONE

FACTORS INFLUENCING CANADA'S MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO NATO

The defence commitments or force posture of any nation evolve as a result of defence policy decisions. Laswell and Lerner have defined policy as a 'body of principle to guide action. The application of policy is calculated choice--a decision to pursue specific goals by doing specified things.'¹ Although the making of policy on first reading of this definition may appear to be a very rational process, involving the analysis of a given problem and then prescribing the logical solution, the making of policy is in fact subject to a multitude of pressures from the very beginning. In fact it has been noted that the 'process of choice for many states often involves choosing the least undesirable alternative.'²

The realm of defence policy making is, of course, no exception to this fact. For example, as a result of financial considerations the defence review initiated by the newly elected Pearson government in 1963 was constrained

¹Daniel Lerner, Harold Laswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 9.

²George Lincoln, Norman Padelford, The Dynamics of International Politics (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1962), p. 225.

from the very beginning from considering certain of the possibly more expensive solutions to Canada's defence problems. Priorities in government spending were made clear very early in the defence review process by the Prime Minister, and the defence policy decisions that emerged from the review therefore were in the context of reduced resources available to the Department of National Defence (DND). Thus, from the moment that consideration of the initial policy options begins, certain realities affect the nature and scope any decisions can take. As the policy process progresses, the dynamics of that very process, bureaucratic rivalries, and the inevitable attempt by political decision makers to satisfy as many interests as possible, combine to dilute much of the 'rationality' out of the process.³

Despite this fact, defence policy decisions are nevertheless guided by a certain measure of rationality. Decision-makers making decisions on the basis of the country's geostrategic environment and the nation's relative strength to that environment, frame defence policy so as to best protect the security and national interests of the nation. Naturally the nature of the defence policy adopted also has much to do with the 'lenses' through which these

³In the realm of Canadian defence procurement the case of the process leading to the procurement of the Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft provides a good example of the phenomenon. For an account see Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (McGraw-Hill, Ryerson Ltd., 1980), pp. 143-144.

decision makers view the world around them. The 'lenses' through which decision makers view the international environment are of course the product of their own particular socialization and more generally of their country's political culture. At this point it is important to distinguish between levels of policy decisions. Michael Brecher, for example, has differentiated between 'high policy' decisions and lower level implementation of 'high policy' decisions. The participants may well be entirely different in the two situations. In Brecher's study this was shown to be an important factor in changing the nature of decisions taken at the 'high policy' level.⁴ Samuel Huntington in The Common Defense also distinguishes between strategic decisions, the sources of which are found in the international environment, and structural decisions originating in the realm of domestic politics. Strategic decisions are further subdivided by Huntington into 'program decisions' and 'use decisions'. 'Program decisions' deal with the strength, composition and readiness of the armed forces while 'use decisions' focus on the commitment and employment of military force. Structural decisions, on the other hand, are concerned with such matters as procurement, allocation and organization.⁵ Huntington acknowledges that

⁴Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 373-408.

⁵Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense, (Columbia University Press, 1961).

in practice no sharp line exists between the two sources of policy, but his model is nevertheless useful in differentiating between policy decisions as such and actual commitment decisions.

P.A. Reynolds makes the distinction clearer when he differentiates between the policy and action and the goals that the policy and action are designed to achieve.⁶ If a defence policy decision is implemented almost immediately the chance that the goals of the policy and action will not be achieved is reduced. However if the implementation of the defence policy stretches out over a period of years it is much more likely to be the case that an evolving international environment and changing domestic circumstances will see the policy altered, perhaps to the extent that the original policy decision is hardly recognizable in the commitment assumed or in the procurement of equipment to fulfil that original policy directive. Thus the defence commitments that eventually result from these policy decisions may or may not have been originally intended when the policy decisions were taken, but they are a product of those policy decisions nevertheless. Take, for example, the role of Canada's ground force contingent in Germany in the period from 1969 through to the late 1970's. The 1969 decision reduced the brigade of some 6000 men to a 'combat group' of just over 3000 men. It was planned that this

⁶P. A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (Longman Group, Ltd., 1971), p. 36.

smaller force would serve in an air portable reserve role on NATO's Central Front. While planned reduction in strength was completed within about two years, despite considerable international and domestic opposition, the plan to re-equip this force over the longer term as an air portable reserve formation was abandoned in the face of sustained international and domestic pressure. Thus by the late 1970's what had evolved was a 'combat group' still equipped for a mechanized role, but at half strength due to a decision in 1969 that had been eroded over time and only partially carried out.

One can point perhaps to five pivotal periods in the history of Canada's post war defence policy in which policy decisions were taken emphasizing certain themes and which were especially influential in deciding the nature of future force commitments and of the type and scope of equipment procurement. The first period that must be considered pivotal is the period immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The expansion of the Canadian Forces, unprecedented in peacetime in Canadian history, also included the deployment of an Army brigade and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) air division on the European continent. Despite the intended temporary nature of these commitments, Canadian ground and tactical air forces have remained in Europe ever since.

The second period is that of 1962-1963, which saw the climax of the 'nuclear debate' in Canada. The 1963

general election was the first and only election in Canadian peacetime history, in which issues of national defence dominated the campaign. The new Liberal government, elected with a mandate to change the course of the country's defence policy, took decisions which, after being announced in the 1964 Defence White Paper, altered the course of Canada's post war defence policy and introduced themes still emphasized today. The Trudeau government's defence review of 1968-1969 (constituting the third pivotal period) attempted to resolve the questions left unanswered by Pearson-Hellyer review of the earlier part of the decade. Decisions taken emphasizing national rather than alliance themes are also reflected in some of the guiding principles of Canadian defence policy in the 1980's.

The fourth pivotal period of 1974-1975 witnessed the de facto rejection of many of the premises which had underlined the defence review of 1968-1969. The re-emphasis of the importance of the role played by NATO in Canada's foreign and defence policy returned some degree of consensus to the making of defence policy in Canada. The basic support given by both of Canada's major political parties to the scope of increases in defence spending and the relative continuity of spending emphasis in the third Trudeau, Clark, fourth Trudeau, Turner and Mulroney governments bears witness to this renewed consensus. The impact of the final pivotal period, that of the Mulroney-Beatty defence review of 1986-1987, has yet to be felt. However, the dramatic

adjustments to Canada's military commitments to the alliance and the apparent change in focus in equipment procurement, suggest that the impact of this pivotal period will be no less significant than that of the previous periods. The course of Canadian defence policy has been altered on numerous occasions in the post war period, but certain constant themes have been emphasized throughout. Similar to an object set in motion whose course may be altered from time to time, it still remains to a certain extent a product of the initial decision. For Canada's Northern Flank commitment, made in 1967-1968, the defence review of 1963-1964 and the defence policy decisions taken as a result were crucial.

Policy decisions and commitment decisions are of course not made in a vacuum. Canada's military commitments to NATO are the product of policy decisions made in the context of domestic and international realities coming together at a particular period in time to produce a particular policy decision. Some of these policy sources are what R. A. Sutherland called Slow-to-vary-Variables.⁷ While many sources of policy are rapidly changing and may impact on policy decisions at one time but then cease to be a factor at another time, Slow-to-change-Variables are a more constant source of policy. Variables identified by

⁷R. A. Sutherland, 'A Defence Strategist Examines the Realities' in J. L. Granatstein, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969), pp. 21-29.

Sutherland as slow-to-vary include such factors as geography, economic potential, and broad national interests. These provide a measure of historical continuity in a study such as this that spans some twenty years. Certain Slow-to-vary variables that impact on Canadian defence policy, combined with more rapidly changing factors, have been important sources of Canada's decision to opt for an alliance posture. Other Slow-to-vary variables have also helped to determine the nature or pattern of Canada's relations with its allies and the type of commitments that have been assumed to reinforce that pattern.

Slow-to-vary Variables as Sources
of Canada's Alliance Posture:

One relatively constant source of a country's alliance posture that may be often alluded to without necessarily being specifically mentioned involves the most basic values of similar peoples with common origins that are the product of similar sociological, cultural and political histories. Sutherland refers in this light to broad national interests leading to certain 'natural alliances'. An important aspect of Sutherland's analysis focuses on the common values of the countries of the NATO alliance. Indeed, Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty specifically emphasizes the importance of these common values in creating and maintaining the alliance. Harold von Riekhoff also emphasizes this ideological aspect that makes NATO in some ways unique when compared to other alliances in

history. Von Riekhoff notes that NATO's emphasis, particularly during the formative period has been on common institutions, common historical experiences, and on a common perception of threat to the alliance from a power that is the ideological antithesis to all countries in the alliance.⁸ The importance of these basic values have remained constant even at those times when certain NATO countries, notably Greece, Portugal and Turkey, have had something less than fully democratic governments. This is evidenced by NATO's strong discomfort with the governments of these countries in those periods. Indeed, this common tradition has been an important force in holding the alliance together. As George Liska has noted, the making and breaking of alliances depends on their cohesion and efficacy. If allies are to stay together the grounds of the alliance must be rationalized. This, Liska noted, is the function of ideology which defines the 'basis and limits of alliance solidarity'.⁹

The common historical tradition of the alliance (that is the most basic values evolved out of a similar sociological, cultural and political histories), will be distinguished from the more distinct concept of political culture. Unlike political culture, which includes the

⁸Harold von Riekhoff, NATO: Issues and Prospects (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1967), pp. 4-5.

⁹George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968), p. 61.

distinctive attitude of a people in a particular state towards politics, our definition of 'historical tradition' will be more transnational in nature and include many elements shared by most western nations as a whole.¹⁰ Although the perception of direct threat may have varied from time-to-time for different countries, the common perception of threat has been a constant holding the alliance together throughout the post-war period. Of course other political, military and economic imperatives have been instrumental, even decisive, in moving countries into the NATO alliance. For Canada, however, the perception in the minds of decision makers of a direct and immediate threat to common western values seems to have been one of the most important factors in moving Canada into an alliance posture.

In the pivotal period of the late 1940's and early 1950's, when Canada formally acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty and subsequently decided to make a series of major military commitments to the alliance, the common historical traditions shared by Canada with many other Western nations played a major part in influencing the policy and commitment decisions taken. Having only recently emerged from the Second World War in which Canada had stood shoulder-to-shoulder with other western democracies in a war widely perceived as a war against the foreign and aggressive ideology of fascism, it was unthinkable that Canada would

¹⁰For this definition of political culture see Michael Tucker, op. cit., p. 2.

stand by in what was shaping up, in that early cold war atmosphere, to be a confrontation between democracy and communism. The loss of some one hundred thousand Canadian dead in Two World Wars also made it difficult to see how Canada after such sacrifice would now suddenly abandon Europe to what was again perceived as an ideology foreign to all western values. The isolationist sympathies of some inter-war Canadian politicians aside, there was no real history in Canada of a policy of neutrality. Canada participated , mostly by providing volunteers in a number of Imperial conflicts from the attempted relief of the siege of Khartoum in 1885, through the South African War (1899-1902), to the massive sacrifice for Empire in the First World War (1914-1918). Furthermore, military, political and economic links to the United Kingdom remained strong; and the Depression of the 1930's and in particular the Second World War, had strengthened Canada's economic and military ties with the United States. These ties were reinforced by strong ethnic and cultural bonds not just to the United Kingdom and the United States, but also to France and most other countries of Europe. Despite the resistance of some neo-isolationists to this irresistible ideological pull, in a confrontation based on ideological differences, there was no doubt in which camp Canada would stand.¹¹

¹¹For a good account of perceptions in Canadian decision making circles in the late 1940's see Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (McClelland and Steward, 1977), and John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979). For a good synopsis see R. A.

This basic ideological orientation has remained virtually constant from the end of the Second World War to the present day. Indeed until the shift of the platform of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in the late 1960's, all the major Canadian political parties supported Canada's membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, it would seem that the leadership of the NDP has often been uncomfortable with the official party position on NATO as they attempt to sell the position to an electorate that is overwhelmingly pro-NATO.¹²

A second constant factor of the Canadian experience that has oriented Canadian defence policy firmly toward alliance is the reality of Canadian geography. As noted by numerous writers, Canada's geographic position between the super powers, especially after the emergence of the long range bomber threat which was then followed by the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat, made secure neutrality or non-alignment, even if desired, an impossi-

Spencer, 'Triangle into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO' International Journal, Canadian Institute of International Affairs Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-85.

¹²For example the Gallup Poll of June 19, 1976, showed 23% of the electorate supportive of the concept of neutrality for Canada with 57% opposed. The Gallup for May 26, 1986, indicated only a slight change with 26% supportive of neutrality and 56% opposed. As with all polls it would seem that the response has a great deal to do with who is asking and what is asked. For example when the question was asked in a more positive fashion toward NATO: 'Do you approve or disapprove of participation in NATO?', of those who had heard of NATO 72.3% approved while a mere 4.0% disapproved. See Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 34.

bility.¹³ Unlike countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and even Finland, which for different reasons opted for postures of neutrality, Canada had no hope of remaining outside a future general war. Indeed as Prime Minister St. Laurent stated, 'Canada could not stay out of a third world war even if 11,999,999 of her 12,000,000 citizens wanted to remain neutral.'¹⁴ Canada's geography has always been, in the post-war era, a vital part of the security interests of the United States, especially in terms of early warning for the American nuclear deterrent. As Annette Fox demonstrates in her study of neutrality during the Second World War, to be successful such a policy if followed by a 'small' state must be of advantage to all the Great Powers.¹⁵ In the case of Canada and the United States in the post-war period, this is clearly not the case.

The reality of geography also makes it essential for Canada, in order to properly guarantee the security and defence of its vast territory, to opt for an alliance

¹³See for example, R. Sutherland, op. cit.; Colin Grey, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Clark Irwin and Company, 1972), pp. 14-29; Jon McIn's good synopsis of the formative period in post-war Canadian defence policy, Canada's Changing Defense Policy: 1957-1963 (Baltimore: John Hopkin's Press, 1967), pp. 9-34; or Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch (New York: Harper Brothers, 1962).

¹⁴Cited in Melvin Conant, op. cit., p. 73; for an example of the argument for Canadian neutrality see John Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (New Press, 1970).

¹⁵Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 180.

relationship. Thus, geography not only compels Canada to join an alliance because of the security and defence interests of its neighbour to the south, but also mandates it due to Canada's own need for assistance to defend and deter against possible military aggression. While an alliance with Canada's large republican neighbour is essential, Canada has sought from the very beginning to ensure that the overpowering presence of the United States is counter-balanced in the multilateral framework of the Atlantic Alliance. First using the United Kingdom and then NATO Europe as a whole as a counterweight to the United States, Canada has endeavored to ensure that American political and military influence over Canada did not become all-encompassing.

Indeed Canada's diplomatic effort played an important part in linking North America to the nations of the Brussels Treaty in a North Atlantic wide military and political alliance.¹⁶ By maintaining this principle of multilateralism as a cornerstone of Canada's alliance policy, Canada has in many ways corresponded to the pattern identified as desirable for small powers in an alliance with Great Powers.

Canada as a Small Power in Alliance

One should note that it is somewhat unconventional to refer to Canada as a small power. Most often Canada has

¹⁶See R. A. Spencer, op. cit., pp. 79-85.

been described as a middle power in terms of its ranking in the international system. Indeed at times Canada has been described as a principal power. David Dewitt and John Kirton have described Canada's position as ascending toward the status of a principal power ever since about 1968 when American hegemony began to decline and the international environment became increasingly multi-polar. Dewitt and Kirton argued that states could be considered principal powers in three senses. First, they were states in the international hierarchy that stood at the top of the international status ranking, possessing decisive capabilities and differentiated from lower-ranking powers by both objective and subjective criteria. Second, they acted as principals, rather than as agents for other states. And third, they had a role in establishing, specifying and enforcing international order.¹⁷ The two authors in a series of case studies sought to demonstrate that, in all three categories, Canada increasingly acted as a principal power on the world stage. Indeed in terms of its economic power, as a member of the group of seven leading industrialized countries, and in terms of its status in diplomatic circles, particularly at the United Nations, Canada's status as a principal power was widely recognized.

Yet although in many settings it may be more appropriate to refer to Canada as a middle or principal

¹⁷D. Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1983), p. 38.

power, in the realm of Canada's strategic position it is probably more appropriate to identify Canada as a small power. The practice of referring to a state as say, a small power in one setting but a principal power in another setting is not without precedent. Indeed the noted Norwegian alliance theorist Johan Holst acknowledged that while, for example, the Netherlands usually referred to its own status as that of a middle power, its own alliance policy corresponded closely to the pattern associated with small powers in alliance.¹⁸ To make another analogy, one can no more refer to Israel, for instance, as a principal economic power because of the fact that it is a major military power, than one can refer to Canada as a principal military power because it is an important economic power. Smallness, it must be recognized, is relative. Canada, situated between the two most powerful nations on earth, is a small power in comparison. In relation to its geo-strategic environment, Canada can only exercise a limited amount of control. Other nations in other areas of the world, even though they may only possess one-tenth of Canada's economic power and population, may exercise considerably greater control over their strategic environment. Unfortunately, Canada is a prisoner of its geographic position. In a number of aspects of its alliance relations Canada seems to conform to the pattern characteristic of

¹⁸J. J. Holst, Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in a Great Power Alliance (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, March 1983), p. 16.

small powers in alliance. Robert Rothstein demonstrates quite convincingly that small powers are not merely 'great powers writ small' but that certain dynamics can be identified as operating for small powers that make their alliance policy unique in the international system.¹⁹

One such dynamic identified by various writers is the principle of multilateralism. Rothstein, in his comprehensive study concludes that the multilateral mixed alliance is the preferred type of alliance for small powers, while the least preferable is the unequal bilateral alliance.²⁰ The wariness on the part of smaller powers to encroachments on their sovereignty by their Great Power allies can be seen throughout history. Machiavelli, writing in the sixteenth century, warned against any alliances by small powers with great powers unless absolutely necessary.²¹ Even so, the advantages for small powers in aligning with great powers are perceived to outweigh the disadvantages often enough to see numerous examples throughout history. More recently, in 1961, Harold von Riekhoff identified the principle of multilateralism operating in the Danish desire to see the new NATO command, Baltic Approaches, organized on a multi-

¹⁹Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 1-62.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 173-178.

²¹Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1514) (England: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 122-123.

lateral basis.²² Similar concerns have been expressed within the Alliance by other powers who perceive themselves to be small in relation to their neighbours.²³

Given the necessity of co-operating closely with the United States in the defence of the continent, Canada has continued a long standing tradition in Canadian policy, both domestic and external, of searching for, and employing, counterweights.²⁴ Major Canadian criticisms of the NORAD agreement, entered into by the Diefenbaker government in 1958, centered on the bilateral nature of the Pact and the lack of formal links to the NATO Alliance structure. It was felt that the agreement was contrary to many of the prin-

²²Harold von Riekhoff, op. cit., pp. 99-102. Traditionally wary of its powerful neighbour to the south, Denmark sought to avoid a situation where West Germany would dominate the defence structure set up for the Baltic Approaches, as this could have the effect of undermining Danish sovereignty through implementation of a West German made defence strategy for the Baltic Approaches. The situation was ultimately resolved to Denmark's satisfaction when it was decided that the Commander of the Baltic Approaches would always be a Danish Officer and that staff positions would be allocated on the basis of one-third Danish, one-third West German, and one-third other allies. Denmark sought security through multi-lateralism to avoid the domination of its own defence by a powerful, if friendly, neighbour.

²³Most recently Portugal has made known its opposition to any plan for the integration of Spain into NATO's integrated military structure that involves the creation of joint Iberian command under the domination of Spanish Officers.

²⁴For discussions of this characteristic of Canadian domestic and external policy, see Michael Tucker, op. cit., pp. 4-8, and Colin Gray, op. cit., pp. 126-169.

ciples of Canada's post-war alliance policy.²⁵ 'North America is not now formally a NATO sector or a NATO Command as Western Europe is. It should be', wrote Lester Pearson while leader of the opposition in 1959.²⁶

Small powers choose both their allies and the type of alliance they join carefully; the great French statesman Talleyrand urged small powers to have vague alliances with great powers. However, in modern democratic societies a vague alliance can often be counter productive, and often the small power will then find its domestic politics consumed by a 'virulent debate' over the nature of its commitment to the great power.²⁷ This certainly proved to be the case in Canada when the basing of American nuclear weapons on Canadian soil was at issue in the early 1960's. Indeed the government was eventually defeated on this question. While the 'great power might be almost the whole concern of the small state, the latter (is usually) . . . only a small part of the concern of the former'.²⁸ This certainly characterizes, for the most part, the nature of relations between Canada and the United States.

²⁵Of course hundreds of agreements on defence co-operation had been concluded between Canada and the United States prior to the signing of the NORAD agreement which set up an integrated air defence command.

²⁶Lester Pearson, 'NATO: Retrospect and Prospects', International Journal, CIIA Vol. 14, No. 2. (Spring, 1959), p. 82.

²⁷Robert Rothstein, op. cit., p. 119.

²⁸Annette Baker Fox, op. cit., p. 181.

Through multilateralism then, the small power has traditionally sought to enhance its national independence vis-a-vis its Great Power allies. The extra-territorial military commitments of the small power, more than the military commitments of the larger power, often therefore have been oriented toward political symbolism. By committing what may often appear on the surface to be militarily insignificant forces to vulnerable or threatened areas of the alliance, the overall strength, credibility and cohesiveness of the alliance is enhanced. This is because the political and diplomatic symbolism of such commitments are a tangible way of demonstrating the alliance's resolve to the adversarial power(s). Such commitments therefore become immensely important to the country or region of the alliance that is the recipient of such support.

In return the small power making a politically important commitment may receive valuable political support from those allies for its own concerns. Indeed small and medium sized powers in alliance may find a need to offer each other support, not only against the threat of an adversary, but also as a hedge against domination by the larger members of the alliance. Through the careful political use of military commitments, small powers may well enhance the multilateral characteristic of the alliance for which they all strive. Thus as emphasized by John Holmes, the force posture and commitments of the Canadian Forces are determined largely by 'political, diplomatic considerations

rather than simply for the protection of its (Canada's) territory'.²⁹ Indeed, if certain elements in the Trudeau government had any desire to withdraw from NATO's Integrated Military structure in the 1968-1969 period, the principle of multilateralism, and of employing NATO Europe as a counterweight to the United States, soon put such notions to rest. The existence of Canadian Forces in Europe represented the most tangible symbol of Canada's interest in the security of Europe. The rapid demise of the 'Trudeau Doctrine' (which had deemphasized the importance of Canada's military links to NATO) in the early-mid 1970's bears witness to the importance of the NATO Counterweight in Canadian defence policy and commitment decisions.³⁰

A second dynamic that has been identified as characteristic of a small power in alliance is what has been described as a 'normal tendency toward inequity' in the contribution of resources toward alliance security.³¹ In his work The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson discusses a theory of groups and organizations and notes that when a group is formed to provide a 'collective good'

²⁹John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p. 173.

³⁰See R. B. Byers, 'The Demise of the Trudeau Doctrine', International Journal, CIIA Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1978), pp. 312-338.

³¹See Mancur Olson and Richard Zechhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', in F. A. Beer, ed., Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World (Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), pp. 121-140.

to all members of the group, those who do not pay their 'fair share' for the collective good cannot be excluded from 'sharing in the consumption of the good'. This is because the benefit of the good comes to them automatically by virtue of their being members of the group.³² In addition,

The smaller member by definition gets a smaller fraction of the benefit of any amount of the collective good he provides than a larger member, and therefore has less incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good.³³

Indeed the Chief of Danish Defence recently commented that,

it is much easier to pay five percent of your income for insurance premises (sic) when you have a family with 10 persons and in (sic) income of say 50,000 pounds than it would be for one person to pay an insurance premium of five percent with an income of 5,000 pounds . . .³⁴

In those cases where a large member of the group provides a 'good' for himself and extends it automatically to other members of the group free of charge, the incentive for smaller members of the group to increase their contribution to the collective good is further reduced.³⁵ As the Chief of Danish Defence alluded, there is little incentive for small powers to endure the strain required in making a larger defence effort, if the benefit attained from the

³²Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 15.

³³Ibid., p. 35.

³⁴O. K. Lind, 'Denmark and the Baltic: Forward Defence for the United Kingdom', RUSI Journal, Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 130, No. 2, (June 1985), p. 11.

³⁵Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 33-35.

collective good will not be increased as a result.

Olson, and his fellow theorist Richard Zechhauser, have also correctly noted that small powers who benefit from the 'good' cannot be excluded from benefiting just because they do not contribute their 'fair share' to the collective good. Occasionally ideas have been floated within NATO to consider penalizing those countries who do not pay their 'fair share'. This has partly been suggested so as to encourage smaller powers to increase their defence expenditures, bringing them more into line with the NATO average. Canada has been singled out with other countries for possible punishment. Indeed two authors recently proposed a series of possible measures which could be enacted against Canada, including the suspension of many of its privileges of membership as well as certain other political and military sanctions by the alliance against Canada.³⁶ However to single out one country or a group of small countries for such actions might well shake the alliance to its very foundations. As John Halstead, a former Canadian Ambassador to NATO noted, 'the very suggestion of such a threat would be seen by other allies as setting a dangerous precedent and would have a totally counter-productive effect in Canada.' 'NATO, he concluded, does not work that way'.³⁷ As Liska notes in his study of alliance interrelationships, an

³⁶Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, Canada and Collective Security, The Washington Papers, No. 121., (1986), pp. 105-106.

³⁷Ibid. Forward by John Halstead, p. xi.

alliance is only total when the allies practice the precept of solidarity.³⁸ For larger powers to impose sanctions on smaller powers for the perceived inadequacy of their contribution would be to put the future of the alliance into jeopardy. As a result, Olson concludes that 'in small groups with common interests there is accordingly a surprising tendency for the exploitation of the great by the small'.³⁹

As a very general rule, Olson and Zechhauser's arguments seem to hold. This can be seen by examining the comparative defence efforts of NATO states made in three samplings from the period 1973-1984. By examining the proportions of the GNP/GDP, per capita income, and percentage of the national budget devoted to defence in NATO countries in 1973, 1978 and 1984, a fairly clear picture can be painted of the relative defence efforts of NATO countries. Certainly small powers, like larger powers, are not monolithic. The scales of defence efforts will vary from

³⁸George Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 75.

³⁹Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 33-35. Some Small Powers, sensitive to ongoing American criticism over the level of their defence expenditures have argued that one must take into account that none of the small countries have the global responsibilities of the United States. Likewise, by maintaining policies of conscription and by basing their forces on or close to their own territory, they are able to reduce their defence costs significantly. Furthermore, by hosting allied forces either on a permanent basis or through temporary deployments, they provide an immeasurable contribution to alliance security that must be taken into account in any evaluation of small power contributions. See J. J. Holst, Lilliputs and Gulliver, p. 8. Even so, the discrepancy between the contributions of most small powers and the larger powers is significant even when taking into account the above factors.

one country to another. Different strategic environments, threat perceptions, military histories and political cultures will produce different defence efforts. By dividing each of the three tables used for measuring relative defence efforts into three levels it can be seen that some countries that would normally be thought of as small powers make middle range defence efforts. Likewise some states that might be considered larger powers made middle range or even lower level defence efforts. Some larger powers, like for example Italy, can even through limited defence efforts maintain a force posture that relative to the strategic environment allows the exercise of considerable control of that environment.

Small powers making larger than 'normal' defence efforts might do so for a number of reasons. Portugal, in 1973 for instance, tops both GNP and percentage of national budget tables. The scope of this defence effort is certainly more than might be expected of a relatively small power. However Portugal, in 1973, was fighting three major colonial wars in Africa and required an enormous defence effort as a result. The defence effort of Greece, in all three of the samples from all the tables, is also substantial. Since Greece faced the possibility of a war with its nominal ally, Turkey, it clearly perceived the need to undertake a national defence effort as an insurance against a situation where allied support would be unavailable. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Greek defence spending

rose sharply, reflecting an even greater threat perception on the part of Greek leaders. Other countries, such as Norway, also spent higher than normal monies on defence. Due to its base ban policy and geographical 'detachment' from its NATO allies, and as only one of two NATO nations sharing a common boundary with the USSR, Norway obviously perceived a need for its greater defence effort. Many countries of Europe have also had rather unpleasant military histories. Many, as recently as 45 years ago, experienced the horrors of military occupation by a foreign power. Moreover, the political cultures and military histories of some small powers include a proud military tradition. The naval history of the Netherlands is a good example of this. Thus, small powers can perhaps be sub-divided into those nations, as cited above, that for certain reasons have perceived a need to make middle range defence contributions (along with larger powers perceiving lower level defence outlays as adequate), and those states that for a combination of reasons see little need to make larger defence efforts.

Of some of the small powers found in the above mentioned latter category, one can notice that Luxembourg, certainly a small power relative to its Benelux neighbours, spent consistently less on defence than any other member of the alliance except Iceland. Denmark, exposed as it was geographically to attack, (with for example Warsaw Pact aircraft only minutes away from Copenhagen), had succumbed

to a serious 'question as to the relevance' of a larger Danish defence effort. While all three tables need to be analyzed with care, taking into account, for example, the significantly lower per capita incomes of Southern Europe and the significantly higher social welfare spending (which consumed a large portion of the national budget) in some countries of northern Europe, they do support the general validity of the Olson and Zechhauser theory.

Interestingly, Canada has, for most of the post-war period, found itself in the category of a small power, making a lower level defence effort. While it is true that in the 1950's Canada invested large scale resources in collective defence, the relevance of a contribution by Canada at the time was greater. Olson and Zechhauser have noted that as membership in a group increases the relative worth of a small member's contribution to the general good declines. Thus, when membership in the group remains limited, the benefits to be garnered from contributing to the collective good is greater than when membership in the group increases. When membership in the group increases, the small member, by definition, gets a smaller fraction of the benefit and therefore has less incentive to provide additional contributions to the collective good.⁴⁰ In the 1950's western Europe experienced marked economic recovery from the devastation it has suffered in World War II.

⁴⁰Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 35; and Olson and Zechhauser in F. A. Beer, ed., p. 124.

Gradually, as European nations recovered, the amounts of resources they were able to devote to collective defence increased. They moved from the status of being non-contributing members of the alliance to the status of contributing members. This defacto increase in the membership of the alliance gradually decreased the relative value of Canada's large military contributions. The benefit to be gained from such large contributions by Canada began to be outweighed by the costs. As a result, the amounts of funds available to DND declined (See Table 1.1). Of course this 'normal tendency toward inequity' in small power defence efforts is alone insufficient to explain the pattern of defence spending in Canada. Other factors played a role as well.

The years of 1957 to 1963 were ones of turmoil and transition in Canadian defence policy. The new Liberal government, elected in 1963 on a platform focussing on Canada's need to fulfil its defence commitments to the alliance, faced the problem of how to do so within the context of an ever declining defence budget. The recovery of Western European countries had raised a real question as to the future military relevance of the Canadian contribution to collective defence. Canada's single brigade and air division of 8-12 squadrons were seen by many to be of dubious military utility to the alliance, especially in the context of their significant cost. Likewise the reequipment dilemmas facing all three arms of the Canadian Forces

Table 1.1 Percentage of GNP/GDP
Devoted to Defence among NATO Countries:

		1953			1958			1963
Upper Five:	U.S.A.	14.8	U.S.A.	11.1	U.S.A.	9.8		
	U.K.	11.3	France	8.1	U.K.	7.2		
	France	11.0	U.K.	7.2	Portugal	6.8		
	Canada	9.0	Canada	6.0	France	6.4		
	Netherlands	6.2	Greece	5.8	Germany(3)	6.1		
Middle Range:	Greece	6.1	Netherlands	5.0	Turkey	5.9		
	Norway	5.6	Portugal	4.5	Netherlands	4.9		
	Turkey	5.4	Turkey	4.5	Greece	4.7		
	Belgium	5.2	Italy	4.3	Canada	4.5		
			Norway	4.0	Italy	4.2		
Lower Five:	Italy	4.6	Belgium	3.9	Norway	4.1		
	Portugal	4.5	Germany(3)	3.4	Belgium	3.7		
	Denmark	3.7	Denmark	3.3	Denmark	3.5		
	Luxembourg	3.2	Luxembourg	2.1	Luxembourg	1.4		
	Iceland(2)	n.a.	Iceland(2)	n.a.	Iceland(2)	n.a.		
		1973			1978			1984
Upper Five:	Portugal	6.2	Greece	6.7	Greece	7.2		
	U.S.A.	6.1	Turkey	5.2	U.S.A.	6.4		
	U.K.	4.9	U.S.A.	5.1	U.K.	5.5		
	Greece	4.1	U.K.	4.6	Turkey	4.4		
	Turkey	4.1	German(3)	4.2	France	4.1		
Middle Range:	France	3.5	France	4.0	Germany(3)	3.3		
	Germany(3)	3.5	Portugal	3.5	Belgium	3.2		
	Netherlands	3.3	Belgium	3.3	Netherlands	3.2		
	Norway	3.2	Netherlands	3.3	Portugal	3.2		
	Italy	3.0	Norway	3.2	Norway	2.8		
					Spain(4)	2.8		
Lower Five:	Belgium	2.7	Italy	2.5	Italy	2.7		
	Denmark	2.1	Denmark	2.3	Denmark	2.3		
	Canada	2.0	Canada	2.0	Canada	2.1		
	Luxembourg	0.8	Luxembourg	0.8	Luxembourg	1.1		
	Iceland(2)	n.a.	Iceland(2)	n.a.	Iceland(2)	n.a.		

1. All figures except for 1984 are for Gross National Product. Figures for 1984 are for Gross Domestic Product.
2. Iceland maintains no armed forces.
3. Germany entered NATO in 1955. 1978 figures include aid to West Berlin, all other years do not.
4. Spain entered NATO in 1982.

Source: Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Years 1968-1987 inclusive.

presented the government with difficult choices as to how to continue to maintain a relevant defence effort. The cancellation of the CF-105 Arrow fighter project in 1959 had been a catalyst for the emergence of this 'question of relevance'. The decision to cancel this wholly Canadian designed and produced aircraft, taken for political, economic and military reasons, had significant and negative political and psychological fallout. With the cancellation of the project, many Canadians questioned their own country's military relevance. Indeed an editorial in Maclean's magazine asked the question: 'Is Canada itself obsolete as a military nation'? The question was answered with a definite 'Yes'.⁴¹ In the period from the late 1950's, the inevitable protection of the United States, the remoteness of the immediate threat in Europe and the emergence of a question of relevance as to the military value of any Canadian defence effort, tended to exert downward pressure on the level of Canada's level of military spending. In terms of domestic variables, the political culture of Canada has also probably been a force that for most of the post-war period has exerted a downward pull on Canada's defence effort.⁴²

Earlier in this chapter we dealt with the notion of

⁴¹See Jon Mclin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy: 1957-1963 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 80. See also Colin Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance. op. cit.

⁴²When referring to the political culture of Canada we are dealing more specifically with elite political culture over popular political culture.

Table 1.2 Spending on Defence
Per Capita in American Dollars

		1973		1978		1984
Upper Five:	U.S.A.	372	U.S.A.	491	U.S.A.	1001
	Germany(1)	215	Germany(1)	428	U.K.	416
	France	189	France	354	Norway	375
	Norway	169	Norway	322	France	370
	U.K.	161	Belgium	319	Germany(1)	328
Middle Range:						
	Netherlands	157	Netherlands	302	Canada	288
	Belgium	139	U.K.	262	Netherlands	276
	Denmark	125	Denmark	256	Belgium	248
	Canada	109	Greece	228	Denmark	245
	Portugal	80	Canada	174	Greece	237
					Italy	161
Lower Five:	Italy	75	Italy	110	Spain(3)	117
	Greece	74	Luxembourg	101	Luxembourg	106
	Luxembourg	49	Portugal	64	Portugal	62
	Turkey	23	Turkey	63	Turkey	45
	Iceland(2)	n.a.	Iceland(2)	n.a.	Iceland(2)	n.a.

1. 1978 figures include aid to West Berlin: other years do not.
2. Iceland maintains no armed forces.
3. Spain entered NATO in 1982.

Source: Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Years 1968-1987 inclusive.

'historical tradition', which is an important element linking western countries in a formal alliance. Political culture on the other hand has a definition much more narrow in scope. As defined earlier, it involves the distinctive attitudes of a people toward politics as shaped by historical traditions, demography, and geographical circumstances. In looking at Canadian political culture certain unique dynamics can be immediately identified. The absence of vigorous nationalism or cohesive internal identity; and the absence of an assertive purpose abroad with a focus upon law and diplomacy instead as a primary medium for external

Table 1.3 Defence Spending as a Percentage
of Total Government Spending:

	1973	1978(3)	1984
Upper Five: Portugal	34.2	Germany(1) 27.4	U.S.A. 27.8
U.S.A.	29.2	Greece 27.3	Germany(1) 22.3
Germany(1)	26.2	U.S.A. 23.7	Turkey 20.0
Greece	21.7	Turkey 20.2	Greece 19.4
Turkey	21.1	France 18.6	France 18.8
Middle Range: France	18.3	U.K. 11.6	U.K. 11.9
U.K.	12.9	Norway 9.4	Spain(4) 10.2
Canada	12.0	Canada 9.1	Portugal 9.4
Netherlands	11.9	Netherlands 8.7	Canada 9.3
Belgium	10.2		Belgium 7.8
			Netherlands 7.2
Lower Five: Italy	10.1	Belgium 8.6	Denmark 6.9
Norway	9.4	Italy 6.6	Norway 6.2
Denmark	7.6	Denmark 6.4	Italy 5.6
Luxembourg	3.5	Luxembourg 2.9	Luxembourg 3.5
Iceland(2)	n.a	Iceland(2) n.a.	Iceland(2) n.a

1. 1978 figures include aid to West Berlin. Other figures do not.
2. Iceland maintains no armed forces.
3. 1978 figures for Portugal are not available.
4. Spain entered NATO in 1982.

Source: Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Years 1968-1987 inclusive.

assertiveness.⁴³ The lack of cohesive internal identity has necessitated the adoption of an internal policy of compromise which according to some is reflected in Canada's international relationships. One can see aspects of this in both Pearsonian internationalism, which saw Canada play the famous 'helpful fixer' role, and in Trudeauvian internationalism which saw Canada set up as a kind of 'mentor' state whose example of internal compromise and fairness among its

⁴³Michael Tucker, op. cit., p. 3.

diverse ethnic groups, the rest of the world could follow.⁴⁴ Indeed some committed internationalists have asserted that Canada's very 'national identity is found in our internationalism'.⁴⁵

Whether or not this is true, there has always been this idealistic impulse in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, especially since after the experience of the First World War the idealism for the Empire was, to a large extent shattered. Indeed the Canadian delegate to the first Assembly of the League of Nations seemed to sum up the feelings of his country when he declared, "It was European Policy, European Statesmanship, and European ambition that drenched this world in blood".⁴⁶ Initial distaste for balance of power policies gave way in the post World War Two era to what Thomas Hockin described as the 'search for moral opportunity' and the 'voluntarist tradition' in Canadian foreign policy.⁴⁷ It helps to explain the strong commitment to the United Nations and the effort to play a bridging role between the developing and developed countries. In terms of relations with NATO allies and in terms of east-west

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 9-10, and Bruce Thordarson's summary of Pierre Trudeau's political philosophy as reflected in his foreign policy, op. cit., pp. 55-104.

⁴⁵John Holmes, Essays in Canadian Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 1.

⁴⁶Cited in James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 71.

⁴⁷Thomas Hockin, cited in Michael Tucker, op. cit., p. 4.

relations Canada has usually emphasized the importance of the so called 'Canadian Article' of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article Two. The Atlantist ideals of the Alliance have symbolized the existence of a security community of West European and North American states. In the St. Laurent and Pearson era of Canadian foreign policy it was hoped that the North Atlantic example would be one that other areas of the world might be able to follow. In terms of east-west relations, Canada has traditionally emphasized the importance of engaging the Soviet bloc in dialogue to expand political, cultural and economic links. Likewise, Canada has often cautioned against quick rejection of Warsaw Pact Arms Control proposals and has sought to contribute to the success of arms control schemes, particularly in the area of creating adequate verification measures. As George Liska has correctly noted, a nation's diplomatic style mirrors its political culture.⁴⁸

Idealism seems to be a distinctive feature of Canadian political culture which includes the more conservative elements in Canadian society. Indeed, as Dalton Camp bellowed out at the Progressive Conservative Party Conference in August of 1967:

⁴⁸George Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 67.

I would hope that ten years from now this nation would be without the encumbrance of any nuclear association; that our commitment to foreign aid would be maximum; and our obligation to military establishment would be minimal.⁴⁹

Thus Canada's political culture is not a militaristic one. The absence of an external threat to Canada for much of its recent history and the reliance on external powers to provide Canada with security has given Canada little need to develop a strong military tradition. This absence of a perception, on the part of Canadians, of the existence of external threat has also characterized most of the post-war period. Nevertheless despite the Canadian lack of a military tradition in Canadian political culture, the Canadian populace does not appear to be anti-military as such. Indeed one hundred thousand Canadians dead in two world wars and the large scale peacetime military expansion of the 1950's bear witness to this. Rather, Canadian idealism is more of the 'voluntarism for a cause' variety as described by Thomas Hockin. It allows for great self-sacrifice when this is deemed necessary. The basic economic strength of the country and its natural resources have in the past allowed for herculean efforts when required, most notably in World War II. If anything, the attitudes of the Canadian populace to the armed forces is not suspicious or hostile,

⁴⁹Cited in John Holmes, Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 177. Dalton Camp was president of the Conservative Party in 1967.

but rather ambiguous or aloof most of the time.⁵⁰

The 'aloofness' of the population to military and defence issues tends to extend into Foreign Affairs generally. Certainly, with some exceptions, Foreign Policy has never been a great issue area in domestic politics. Indeed this would seem to be the case in many societies, as noted by James Rosenau, simply because foreign policy is remote and distant from the everyday lives of most citizens.⁵¹ In Canada the country's decision makers have rarely dealt with foreign and defence policy in peacetime as a priority area. This may at times have precipitated foreign policy crises as inexperienced decision makers have taken decisions or failed to take necessary decisions because of their own unfamiliarity with the complexities of the issue under consideration.⁵² The defence department in particular seems to have often been headed by Ministers who have had to undergo 'on the job training'. In fact, of the 12 men who have held the position of Minister of National Defence since 1963, only

⁵⁰See for example Colin Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities, pp. 38-50; R. B. Byers and Colin Gray, eds., Canadian Military Professionalism (Toronto: CIIA, 1973); and H. J. Massey, ed., The Canadian Military (Copp Clark, 1972).

⁵¹James Rosenau, ed., 'Foreign Policy as an Issue Area' in Domestic Sources and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 26.

⁵²Indeed this seems to have been the case on several occasions, for example in the controversies over Canada's nuclear commitments to the alliance in 1962-1963; during the 1969 decision to cut Canadian Forces in Europe; and more recently in the 1979 promise by Prime Ministerial Candidate Joe Clark to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem.

three had some previous formal experience with the issues facing the Department.⁵³ This made them vulnerable both to bureaucratic pressures, and largely ineffective as a lobby for DND within Cabinet. At times the Department has also found itself under the guidance of an ambitious Minister, anxious to 'make his mark' regardless of the complexities standing in the way. In the realm of military equipment procurement plans, decisions involving the initiation of equipment programs can have a profound impact on future defence policy for years to come. Thus the making of such decisions certainly requires a great deal of understanding and forethought. At times this forethought and understanding may have been lacking in Canada, resulting in an ineffective use of resources and the appearance, both domestically and internationally, of a 'drifting' Canadian defence policy. The lack of a military tradition in Canadian political culture also contributes to the degree of effectiveness that DND has in lobbying for scarce resources. The emergence in the late 1950's and early 1960's, of planning for more comprehensive social welfare programs, including a national medicare system, limited the resources available to other government departments. The Defence

⁵³These three Ministers were Paul Hellyer (1963-1967) who had briefly been the Associate Minister of National Defence in 1957 and served as Liberal Defence Critic from 1957-1963; Leo Cadieux (1967-1970) who served as Associate Minister from 1965-1967; and Allan McKinnon (1979-1980) who had served as Conservative Defence Critic from 1972-1979. The absence of a position of Associate Minister within DND from 1967-1985 seems to have contributed to the relative inexperience of Ministers in that period.

Department had to compete for a share of a smaller pie in an atmosphere within the country that questioned the need for a large defence effort.

Canada's defence spending because of a combination of circumstances reflected the 'tendency toward inequity' identified by Olson and Zechhauser as characteristic of small powers in alliance. Canada's political culture and a serious 'question of relevance' that emerged in the late 1950's, tended to guarantee that Canada remained among those small powers that contributed much lower levels of resources to defence. Canada's military commitments to the alliance mirrored the level of Canada's military spending. As Robert Rothstein observed, a small power usually de-emphasizes the contribution it can make to the alliance.⁵⁴ Certainly in the 1964, 1971 and 1987 White Papers on Defence, these limitations on Canada's commitments to the alliance were noted. With a limited defence budget more expensive military commitments to the alliance were to be avoided. For example, as a result of the heavy expense involved in maintaining a sophisticated air force presence in Europe, the Canadian air division declined in the 1960's from a strength of 12 squadrons to only 3 squadrons, at which point its name was changed to that of an 'air group'. Although Canada has generally de-emphasized the military value of its defence contributions, it has never opted for the total

⁵⁴Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 58.

'free ride' option. Since the United States will out of necessity provide for its own defence, Canada will, because of its geographic position, automatically receive American protection. But, aside from the fact that Canada has consistently emphasized the importance of the European connection in Canada's alliance strategy, the overbearing American presence that would result from a total 'free ride' posture would undermine Canada's national independence. Certainly Machiavelli would have considered Canada extremely foolish to opt for such a posture. Thus even Defence in the 70's, the 1971 Defence White Paper, which came the closest to accepting the 'free ride' posture, allowed for sufficient defence effort to maintain Canada's peacetime independence and sovereignty.⁵⁵ Nils Orvik has written that adequate defence spending on the part of small powers can constitute a 'defence against help'.⁵⁶ By providing adequate defence resources, small powers can ease the security concerns of their larger power neighbours. This, Orvik argues, may well contribute to the maintenance of a small power's sovereignty in a crisis, and prevent a larger power from feeling a need to intervene to protect its own vital interests. This 'defence against help' strategy seems to have been more

⁵⁵In 1975 the Canadian government went so far as to insist on a redrawing of NORAD boundaries so that Canada would have control over air defence operations in Canadian air space.

⁵⁶Nils Orvik, 'Defence against help - A Strategy for Small States?' Survival Vol. 15, No. 5 (September-October 1973), pp. 228-231.

fully adopted by Canada in the 1987 White Paper. The need to provide greater resources to implement this strategy successfully, may gradually move Canada from the status of small power with a low defence effort toward the status of a small power with a more middle range defence effort.

Although as Rothstein noted, a small power deemphasizes the contributions that it can make to the alliance, it usually insists on its right to be consulted on matters perceived vital to its own national interest.⁵⁷ High level consultation on important questions is not necessarily a 'collective good' to which smaller powers are automatically entitled simply by virtue of their membership in the alliance. Thus, small powers can be, and often are, excluded from sharing in such 'non-collective goods', unless they earn their right to share in non-collective goods. This third characteristic has thus been identified for small powers in alliance. The importance of adequate provisions for political consultation have traditionally been vitally important in the domestic politics of any nation, and especially in the domestic politics of small powers. One need only cite the overwhelming public support to be found in France in 1966 for the expulsion of American and Canadian Forces from that country when an agreement for adequate consultation over the use of those forces was not reached to the satisfaction of the French. More recently domestic controversy erupted in Britain and other NATO countries over

⁵⁷Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 58.

the degree of consultation required before American nuclear weapons systems based in those countries could be used. Although 'small' relative to the United States, Britain and France maintain a fairly strong political position from which to deal with the United States. For even smaller powers, usually lacking the same degree of political leverage with its super power ally as held by Britain, France, or West Germany, adequate consultation provisions were even more essential. Small powers not only aspire to restrain the Great Power from acting in a manner detrimental to the small power's interests, but also to seek in some circumstances to initiate policy measures that have the support of the entire alliance. For example, one can see that Norway would have a vital interest in seeing NATO policy vis-a-vis the question of Svalbard and the sea boundary dispute with the Soviet Union develop in a manner supportive of Norway's own negotiating position.⁵⁸ Certainly NATO support, or lack thereof, has been important for the credibility of Norway's negotiating position with the Soviet Union.

Canada, as well, has at times been anxious to promote the principle of adequate alliance consultation. This has not been limited to traditional strategic questions vital to Canada's national interest, but has extended also into political questions and the promotion of detente and

⁵⁸For a discussion of these disputes between the U.S.S.R. and Norway, see Appendix.

arms reduction. Indeed Prime Minister Pearson hoped that consultations on all levels would 'reach into the field of policy making as well as policy clearing'.⁵⁹ Pearson's emphasis on the importance of effective political consultation within the alliance is evidenced by his strong hand in the formulation of the 'Three Wise Men's' Report in 1956. The committee which included the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy and Norway, recommended that member governments be required to inform the North Atlantic Council of any matter significantly affecting the Alliance so that effective political consultation could be held on the type of action to be taken. Traditionally this desire for an effective voice in important issues has been a significant concern of small powers. Small powers have consistently emphasized the importance of the adequate representation of their interests in the various institutional organs of the alliance. For example, one author, in discussing the advent of NATO's Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC) and of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) has noted the strong political interest most powers have in participating in the formulation of one of the most important aspects of the alliance's political and military posture, its nuclear strategy.⁶⁰ The original American proposal of a 'select' committee of perhaps four or five members was expanded to

⁵⁹Cited in George Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 73.

⁶⁰See Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 39-68; 186.

eventually comprise an NDAC consisting of 'all interested' NATO members. The pressure applied by the 'smaller' powers within the alliance, including the Netherlands and Canada, played no small part in this process. As Harold von Riekhoff noted, political consultation was the means whereby greater powers acknowledged their interdependence with smaller allies.⁶¹

Small powers obviously consider adequate consultation provisions to be an important goal in alliance relations. The importance of such provisions increases as the question discussed becomes more important to the small power. Accordingly, many decision-makers perceive a need to 'buy' consultation rights through effective military contributions to the alliance and through the commitment of greater resources to defence. Indeed according to one survey of officials from various countries assigned to NATO, slightly more than half of the officials 'contended often vigorously, that there is a close correlation between military input and political influence'.⁶² Given this perception on the part of many decision makers, a problem arises for the small power as to how to 'buy' satisfactory consultation rights with the limited resources at its disposal. Since the de facto increase in alliance membership in the 1950's and early 1960's, the notion of special-

⁶¹Harold Von Riekhoff, NATO: Issues and Prospects, p. 110.

⁶²Peyton Lyon, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument (The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970), p. 24.

izing defence commitments has gained increasing acceptance as a possible solution to the problem of increasing costs associated with the procurement of defence equipment. For small powers especially, the notion of 'emphasizing the assets' and concentrating defence resources has been a popular one. Yet it has proved easier to propose specialization as a theoretical notion than it has been to implement the idea practically. Some small powers have always, for all intents and purposes, specialized their defence efforts. For example, Denmark and Norway have focused their defence efforts totally (apart from small peacekeeping commitments) on the defence of their national homelands and even have no plans to defend their dependent territories, some of which are strategically important.⁶³ Nevertheless, even this carefully defined geographic specialization has not allowed military force specialization. Both countries are still compelled to maintain diversely capable land, sea and air forces. To cite another case, the Netherlands finds itself unable for various reasons to achieve either geographic or force specialization. Fairly large and heavily mechanized land forces, with tactical air support, are maintained to meet the Soviet bloc armoured threat in

⁶³For Norway this would include the neighbouring dependencies of Svalbard and Jan Mayen, both potential targets for Soviet amphibious or airborne assaults, and the absolutely indefensible Queen Maude Land in Antarctica. For Denmark, Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands would also have to rely on whatever allied protection might be available. Denmark deploys only such forces in these territories as are necessary for peacetime sovereignty protection and peacetime control of the offshore Economic Exclusion Zone.

Central Europe; a large naval and maritime air force is maintained to assist in anti-submarine efforts in the Atlantic; light land and naval forces as well as air defence forces are maintained to protect Holland itself; forces (marines and a tactical air force squadron) are committed to reinforce NATO's Northern Flank; and contingents are deployed to protect the Netherlands Antilles as well as for peacekeeping in the U.N. context.

For Canada, desires for specialization have also been confronted by obstacles. Yet Canada is one of the few countries to have turned theoretical reflection into actual policy objectives. Seeking to specialize both defence forces and commitments seemed to be the final very noticeable characteristic of a small power's defence and alliance policy. In the Canadian case, the policy was taken on with vigour in the early 1960's by then Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer. Hellyer had arrived at DND skeptical of many of the roles that Canada had taken on in the alliance in the 1950's. In particular the Canadian ground and air commitments in West Germany, assumed 'temporarily' by Canada in 1951, were considered by many to be a dubious role for Canada. In the 1950's when the Canadian defence budget had been quite large, these expensive roles might have been acceptable. But in the context of a declining defence budget they would be hard to fulfil. Indeed, Prime Minister Pearson remarked that in future Canada's contributions to the alliance would

be more realistic and effective for Canada than the present one . . . Our financial resources are limited. Therefore we should be careful that our defence dollars are spent sensibly and economically, avoiding commitments which require expensive equipment . . . and activities that are or soon will be meaningless.⁶⁴

The alliance had since the late 1950's discarded the old doctrine of massive retaliation in favour of a new doctrine centered on the concept of flexible response. At the NATO Ministerial Meetings in Lisbon in 1952, it had been estimated that a force of more than 90 allied divisions along with associated air forces would be required to defend Western Europe against an attack by Soviet Forces. It rapidly became clear that such a force would not be raised by the alliance. In place of a credible conventional defence posture, the alliance adopted a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation if faced by any Soviet aggression. However, it was soon apparent that the strategy of responding to any form of aggression by resorting to nuclear weapons was itself not credible. In place of the strategy of massive retaliation emerged the strategy of flexible response. Under the new strategy the alliance sought to deter all forms of aggression with a flexible range of forces ranging from limited military contingents to strategic nuclear weapons.

The new strategy, as its name suggested, would be highly flexible in order to meet a range of possible

⁶⁴Cited in Marilyn Eustace, Canada's European Force, 1964-1971: Canada's Commitment to Europe, Queen's National Security Series, No. 4 (Kingston: 1982), p. 19.

threats. Of particular concern was the fear that in some future crisis the USSR might be tempted to make some kind of 'grab at territory' in some strategic but vulnerable area. It was widely believed that the best deterrent against such possible action were highly capable but relatively small mobile forces. Such forces could be rapidly dispatched to threatened areas to deter and, if necessary, defend those regions. Indeed, in 1959, the SACEUR, General Norstad, presented his concept of a multinational Allied Mobile Force to NATO Ministers. The force which would be of about brigade size would be comprised of contingents from many allied nations. By rapidly deploying to any threatened area on NATO's vulnerable Flanks it was hoped that the force would be a symbol of allied unity and determination which would deter any contemplated aggression. The force concept was approved by NATO Ministers in 1960.⁶⁵

It was widely perceived within the alliance that such mobile forces were essential for demonstrating alliance unity and cohesion. If deterrence failed in one place, it failed everywhere. The flexible response strategy thus required forces to ensure that deterrence did not fail anywhere. George Liska noted that "New techniques of mobility may come to resolve many an alliance dilemma by tying together sub-areas of an alliance system . . ." In fact, Liska felt that the Canadian brigade in Europe

⁶⁵Calvin Creasy, 'A Perspective of the ACE Mobile Force' Military Review U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Vol. 55, No. 11 (November 1975), pp. 14-22.

constituted a possible model of strategic reserve force suited for such a task.⁶⁶

With the alliance seemingly requiring specialized mobile forces to implement its new strategy, Canada seemed ready in 1963-1964 to oblige. The new Minister seemed very keen on the idea of mobile force specialization. As early as July of 1960, Hellyer had expressed his regret at the acquisition of the Honest John Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) for the Canadian brigade in Europe. Hellyer expressed the view that the Little John system would have been better suited to Canadian needs as it was air transportable while Honest John was not.⁶⁷ Writing in 1961 Hellyer remarked that 'by building up tactical mobile forces we would be making our best military contribution to the maintenance of peace'.⁶⁸ In the defence policy review of 1963-1964 support for a concept of mobility was forthcoming from both Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, the former Chief of the General Staff and General Charles Foulkes, the former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.⁶⁹ Likewise the Special House of Commons Committee on National Defence in its interim

⁶⁶George Liska, Nations in Alliance, pp. 132, 133.

⁶⁷Jon Mcllin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, p. 113.

⁶⁸Paul Hellyer, 'The Liberal Party and National Defence' Canadian Commentator, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April 1961), p. 9.

⁶⁹See Peyton Lyon in Canadian Annual Review 1963 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 9 and Special House of Commons Committee on National Defence, October 22, 1963, pp. 493-507.

report to the House advised that

study should be given to the role of the two brigades in Canada (earmarked for Europe) . . . and to the transport and mobility of these forces as well as that of Canada's brigade in Europe.⁷⁰

Hellyer, with the support of the Army, was already considering a revised role for two of the three brigades which were based in Canada but committed to provide the balance-of-a-division for Europe in the event of hostilities. Since the brigades were just equipped to training standards and since it might take weeks to transport them to Europe, they were essentially of limited utility both to Canada and to NATO.⁷¹ Years later Hellyer would remark,

They were just a paper commitment because they only had training scales of equipment and there was no possibility of equipping them and moving them to Europe in time to be of any use. Speaking of them as though they were real was the kind of phoniness I could not tolerate.⁷²

Given that the brigades existed it made sense to try to give them more viable roles. In the context of Canada's declining defence budget, a more specialized and efficient use of resources was felt to be essential. It was felt that these mobile forces should be of use not only for NATO roles, but would be available also for defence of Canada tasks and for

⁷⁰Special Committee Interim Report, December 20 1963, p. 19.

⁷¹Officially it had been estimated that it would take thirty days plus shipping time to move the brigades to Europe. Special Committee, October 29, 1963, p. 593. General Charles Foulkes estimated unofficially the time needed to move the brigades as 'weeks, months or longer'. Special Committee, October 22, 1963, p. 498.

⁷²Correspondence with the Honourable Paul Hellyer.

tasks outside the NATO Area. In addition, as a fulfillment of Canada's responsibilities within the United Nations, the new mobile force would be very valuable. Thus the Force would, as a result of the acquisition of effective air and sea transport, have a global capability.

The 1964 Defence White Paper outlined the government's new defence strategy. Although many analysts interpreted the 1964 White Paper as placing peacekeeping as the most important priority of the Canadian Forces, in fact this was a misinterpretation of the policy of the government.⁷³ In the White Paper the government reaffirmed its commitment to collective defence within the NATO alliance as the most cost effective way of ensuring Canada's security.

'In the North Atlantic area' the Paper stated,

there will . . . remain a . . . need to maintain intact the military and political cohesion of NATO . . . The principle of flexible response places increased emphasis upon the provision of conventional forces.

These conventional forces would have to have maximum flexibility so as to enable them to deploy to any threatened area. Likewise, given the continued central role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy for deterring war in Europe, the White Paper noted 'that Communist countries can be expected

⁷³This misinterpretation continues to the present day and seems to rest on a superficial reading of the White Paper. Although contributing to collective security is listed first, when the Paper recounts the traditional foundations of Canadian defence policy since World War II, this goal it is noted has been pursued in parallel with the other goals of collective defence, defending North America and defending Canadian sovereignty. White Paper on Defence - 1964 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1964), p. 7.

to continue to promote expansionist aims by measures short of all-out-war'. The White Paper continued that Communist support for so called 'wars of liberation' in the Third World would increase the role of United Nations peace-keeping.⁷⁴

Canada would thus seek to maintain a flexible force to deal with the many types of conflict that might erupt. This would range from the most threatening, but least likely, nuclear or major war at the high end of the scale to the much more likely, but much less threatening, lesser conflicts in various other parts of the world.⁷⁵ In the field of peacekeeping it was felt that Canada was 'one of a small number of powers capable and eligible for United Nations service . . .'.⁷⁶ Canada it was felt could play a major role among Western countries in this sense. Emphasizing this asset would, it was hoped, continue to bring Canada political dividends in NATO. Likewise, the restructuring of Canada's force posture on a mobile footing would hopefully compensate for Canada's overall reduction in resources committed to defence and allow the country to contribute a unique, well equipped and professional force to meet unique NATO defence requirements. It was hoped that Canada would be better suited than many NATO countries to meet the need for mobile light forces and as a result would continue to

⁷⁴White Paper, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 15.

secure an important voice in alliance deliberations.

In order to save scarce funds to purchase equipment for the new mobile force it was decided to integrate the three armed services and eventually unify them into a single service. This, it was hoped, would enable a goal of spending 25% of the defence budget on capital equipment to be realized as organization was streamlined.⁷⁷ The Canadian Forces could then be reorganized into the new mobile force concept, casting aside many of their pre-integration and pre-unification strategic concepts. This view also fit into a general government policy of 'Canadianizing' various institutions like the armed services that did not, it was felt, truly reflect Canadian society.⁷⁸

Four principal equipment decisions were taken to implement this new Canadian strategic concept:

- a) The Army in Canada would be re-equipped as a mobile force;
- b) Adequate air and sea lift would be provided for its immediate deployment in an emergency;
- c) Tactical aircraft would be purchased to provide air support to the Army's mobile ground forces;
- d) The R.C.N. would retain its ASW emphasis.⁷⁹

Over the next several years the government sought to implement its Mobile Force Specialization Strategy in the

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁸The principal target of the armed services, was the all-to-British R.C.N., which it was felt in some Canadian quarters acted more like an arm of the Royal Navy than a Canadian service.

⁷⁹White Paper, p. 24.

context of a declining defence budget. In major equipment procurement decisions taken in December of 1963, December of 1964 and July of 1965, \$1.5 billion dollars worth of military equipment was purchased.⁸⁰ These procurement decisions coupled with the reorganization of the forces and the proclamation of a detailed military strategy by DND, it was hoped would allow Canada to continue to make a relevant contribution to alliance security. As External Affairs Secretary Paul Martin remarked, Canada was specially qualified for certain alliance tasks.⁸¹ With its specialization strategy, Canada hoped to demonstrate this to its NATO allies in a tangible way. In fact, as the new Canadian defence policy was implemented, it tended to take on larger and larger dimensions. The Minister in particular remarked in 1966 that the mobile force was to be able to deal with crises in 'trouble spots anywhere at any time of the year'.⁸² The phrases 'anywhere at any time' or 'anywhere in

⁸⁰Much of this equipment was acquired to reequip the Army in Canada as a mobile force. Equipment for this purpose included 1000 M-113 air portable armoured personnel carriers, five ton cargo trucks and Carl Gustav 84 mm anti tank weapons. The Air Force received Hercules and Buffalo transport aircraft to move the Mobile Force by air and 2 new Operational support ships were ordered for the Navy to provide additional sea lift. In one of the most controversial decisions, the RCAF ordered 125 CF-5 Freedom Fighters to provide tactical air support to the Army. It was widely reported that the RCAF had opposed the purchase of this aircraft. Peyton Lyon, Canadian Annual Review 1964, p. 218; Special Committee (March 24, 1965), p. 1045.

⁸¹ Cited by Marilyn Eustace, Canada's European Force 1964-1971, p. 33.

⁸²Standing House of Commons Committee on National Defence, May 12 1966, p. 15.

the world' were increasingly being used to describe the mission of Mobile Command. Mobile Command had been formed in 1965 to command and control the new mobile force, and its name symbolized the whole specialization concept. Indeed by 1966 DND had devised a global strategy that envisaged using Mobile Command for a wide variety of possible conflicts from aid to the civil power right through to total global war.⁸³ The mobile force was further enhanced by a plan to transform the two 'mobile' brigades in Canada into 'air mobile' formations.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the third brigade was retained in its heavy infantry configuration, despite a plan in the White Paper to convert it into a smaller and lighter Special Service Force. In addition, a separate Airborne parachute Regiment was formed with a strength of some 1200 men to act as the 'spearhead' of Mobile Command. The Regiment was described by Hellyer as an 'elite Marine Corps type of unit'.⁸⁵ Thus Mobile Command had an impressive range of combat capabilities for its many tasks.

The mobile force specialization concept seemed, in the mid 1960's, to have resolved Canada's defence dilemmas. Even though the defence budget was in decline, Canada, it

⁸³For a full description of the concept behind the new mobile force see Standing Committee on National Defence, June 21, 1966.

⁸⁴'Canada's New Defence Policy', Statements and Speeches (June 21 1966), Information Division, Department of External Affairs, (February 17 1966, No. 66/9), p. 3.

⁸⁵Paul Dubois, 'Special Parachute Force is Planned', The Gazette (Montreal, December 7, 1966), p. 1 and Peyton Lyon, Canadian Annual Review 1966, p. 238.

was felt, was still making a vital contribution to the alliance through its specialized force. This was contributing to alliance unity and strength and would continue to guarantee Canada access to NATO's non-collective goods. Moreover, it seemed that the question of relevance within Canada had been satisfactorily addressed. Through its integrated and soon to be unified Force, Canada was again making an important and unique defence contribution both to the alliance and for wider peace and security. Domestic reaction to Hellyer's White Paper was, initially, overwhelmingly positive. Maclean's magazine named Hellyer one of the great individuals of 1964, the only Canadian so honoured. Likewise press commentary following the introduction of the White Paper was very favourable. It was felt by many that Canada could play a military role that was a small scale imitation of its major allies. Indeed the Montreal Star commented that Canada could play 'a world military role without a big power budget'.⁸⁶ John Gellner who had in 1963 urged the government to adopt a realistic strategic concept and then implement a policy based on that philosophy was generally impressed with the 'strategic concept' and policy that had been adopted.⁸⁷

In the early 1960's, with Canada's defence budget in rapid decline, the question arose as to how Canada could

⁸⁶Peyton Lyon, Canadian Annual Review 1964, pp. 214-216.

⁸⁷John Gellner, 'New Defence Policy begins to make sense' Executive, Vol. 8, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 37-39.

continue to mount a relevant defence effort given its strategic environment. Simultaneously, the perceived need to continue to pursue Canada's consistent alliance objective of making a viable contribution to the alliance's strength and cohesion, necessitated the creation of a new strategic concept. The desire to have continued access to NATO's 'non-collective goods', such as effective political consultation rights, required Canada's limited military commitments to be of the greatest possible political and military value to the alliance. The Hellyer mobile force concept was the first attempt to focus Canada's limited defence resources to emphasize Canada's perceived assets. Certainly it was not the last proposal to specialize Canada's defence effort.⁸⁸ As with many specialization concepts, especially those that were made in the context of declining budget, problems soon emerged with the mobile force that required a further reorganization of Canada's defence resources and commitments.

⁸⁸For a series of specialization proposals for Canada see: General Charles Foulkes' testimony before the House Special Committee on National Defence, (October 22 1963), pp. 507-521; Jack Granatstein, 'All Things to All Men: Triservice Unification' in Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), pp. 140-143; Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972); Franklyn Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy (Toronto: CIIA, 1979); and Nils Orvik, ed., 'Doctrines and National Security: A Canadian Defence Doctrine?' in Canada and NATO (Queen's Center for International Relations National Security Series No. 3/82), pp. 96-135.

The Origins of the Commitment to the Northern Flank

The belief that the re-organization of the forces and the buildup of a mobile posture could be accomplished on a limited budget soon proved to be mistaken. The acquisition of additional expensive equipment for Mobile Command or for the movement of the mobile force had been increasingly difficult as integration and unification of the Forces were not achieving the savings in funds that had at first been envisaged. From 1963 to 1966 defence spending declined from \$1.634 billion to \$1.572 billion. As a proportion of GNP defence spending fell from 3.9% to 2.7%.⁸⁹ All the cuts came in the first year of the Liberal government's term, but thereafter increases in defence spending were limited to two percent per year, the overly optimistic forecast of the rate of inflation. The goal to eventually divert \$100 million a year to capital equipment was not close to being realized.⁹⁰ Hellyer and Leo Cadieux (the Associate Minister of National Defence) attempted to change the funding picture for DND and tried to convince the Cabinet to allow the defence budget to

⁸⁹Figures taken from John Gellner, Canada in Nato (Ryerson Press, 1970), p. 89.

⁹⁰In 1963 expenditure on equipment accounted for 13.3% of total expenditure. In the 1965-1966 fiscal year, after the integration of the Forces, expenditure on capital equipment actually fell to 12% of the total budget. Between the years 1963 and 1970 capital expenditure never exceeded 18% and averaged 16.8%. See David MacIntosh, 'The Evolution of a Mobile Force' Executive, Volume 39, No. 5, (May, 1966), p. 38. See also Vernon Kronenberg, op. cit., pp. 20, 110-13.

rise at the rate of inflation that existed in the military equipment sector, 6%. In this endeavor they were unsuccessful, and the Cabinet continued to restrict DND to a 2% annual increase in spending.⁹¹

The major equipment purchases that had been made in 1964 and 1965 were designed to orient the Canadian Forces onto their new mobile force posture. However the government had simultaneously decided to retain a Navy of one aircraft carrier, 24 destroyers and frigates, 3-4 conventional submarines and 3 support ships.⁹² Furthermore the government had decided to continue Canadian Forces in Europe in their heavy infantry and air strike roles. It was noted in the White Paper that the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from these expensive, but high profile political roles, 'could be misinterpreted by both our European allies and the Soviet bloc. The importance to the solidarity of the Alliance of a Canadian presence in the NATO defence forces is real'.⁹³

⁹¹Interview with Ambassador, the Honorable Leo Cadieux.

⁹²To keep the R.C.N. at this strength four additional helicopter destroyers were ordered in 1964, replacing the 8 general purpose frigates cancelled in the previous year. Even though the size of the surface fleet was being reduced from the 43 destroyers and frigates previously deployed, the new ships ordered for the Navy (and older ones which underwent comprehensive refits), constituted a significant burden in the context of a declining defence budget. Indeed, the Navy was even lobbying for more. The White Paper of 1964 announced that the serious consideration was being given to the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (White Paper, p. 23). Likewise new ASW hydrofoils were under development for deployment in the early 1970's to supplement the Fleet's ASW strength.

⁹³White Paper - 1964, p. 21.

Inspite of cuts made in other areas, these two roles constituted a significant additional burden for a limited defence budget.⁹⁴ The many diverse roles assumed by Mobile Command also led to professional criticism from former officers of the armed forces. In testimonys before the House of Commons Standing Committee former Officers, many of whom had resigned during the climax of the Unification debate, criticized the roles of Mobile Command.⁹⁵ Furthermore the opposition parties in parliament were increasingly critical of the mobile force. Some members of parliament, particularly in the NDP supported the peacekeeping roles of the mobile force but hoped to see the Force eventually relinquish any NATO assignments. The Conservatives, on the

⁹⁴The Manpower of the Canadian Forces was reduced from its 1963 total of 126,000 to 108,000 by 1967. The long term target was for about 100,000 regular personnel. Likewise the reserves, viewed as unnecessary in the context of future wars which were unlikely to be protracted, were cut from about 60,000 to 20,000. See Defence Canada 80 (Ottawa: 1981), p. 15. Combined with limitations on equipment purchases for non mobile force tasks, it had been hoped that these measures would be adequate to help fund the new force posture.

⁹⁵For example, Lieutenant-General Moncel, former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, agreed with the assertion of Standing Committee member Andrew Brewin that the comprehensive roles envisaged for Mobile Command could not be accomplished under the size of the 1967 defence budget. Moncel argued that the government in maintaining air defence forces for Canada, a brigade and an air division in Europe, and an anti-submarine Navy, was really attempting to do everything Canada had done prior to 1963, if on a reduced scale, and attempting to build up the Mobile Force at the same time. Eventually something would have to give. Moncel, when asked how many personnel and what expenditure level would be necessary to truly fulfil the roles envisaged by the government, replied it would require some 150,000 troops and the expenditure of some \$2.6 billion per year. Standing Committee, (February 20, 1967), pp. 1322-1323.

other hand, often charged Hellyer with attempting to create one large peacekeeping force at the expense of NATO commitments. The remarkable consensus that had surrounded the defence policy of the government in the early part of its mandate had disappeared.⁹⁶

Both the peacekeeping and especially the peace restoring roles of Mobile Command had come under increasing criticism. Peacekeeping was by 1967 falling on hard times. The dramatic failure of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to keep the peace between Egypt and Israel in 1967 was a graphic illustration of this fact. The Egyptian government had no difficulty in expelling the UNEF in May of 1967 when its presence was no longer desired. The dramatic failure of the peacekeeping concept here caused the Prime Minister to remark in the House of Commons that, 'this has been a great blow in one sense to our peacekeeping ideas and hopes.'⁹⁷ Indeed one former air force officer testifying before the Standing Committee argued that for the peacekeeping role an elaborate force like Mobile Command was unnecessary. In fact he stated that all one needed were 'some jeeps, some whistles, and your presence.'⁹⁸ The concept of 'Peace-restoring' according to Leo Cadieux, was essentially

⁹⁶Peyton Lyon, Canadian Annual Review, 1967, p. 262.

⁹⁷General E. L. M. Burns, 'The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping', International Journal, CIIA, Volume 23, No. 1 (1967-1968), pp. 1-17.

⁹⁸See Air Vice Marshal M. M. Hendrick before the Standing Committee (February 23, 1967), p. 1447.

an 'after thought role' largely created to help justify the existence of the mobile force.⁹⁹ The experience of the Congo which served as a model for the type of role envisaged was in many ways a unique event not likely to be repeated. Also, it was difficult to envisage many situations where Canadian politicians would be willing to commit Canadian Forces to combat in a counter-insurgency role. Indeed the uproar in the 1965 election campaign over the rather unlikely charge, made by some opposition Members of Parliament, that the government was considering committing the mobile force to combat in Vietnam was evidence of the potential problems faced by any government in committing the Canadian Forces to a far flung battlefield of limited direct interest to Canada.¹⁰⁰ As Leo Cadieux pointed out many years later, 'Peace-restoring' meant war, and all too many people failed to fully appreciate this when the role was conceived.¹⁰¹

In terms of the commitment of two brigades to reinforce NATO Europe, it was increasingly apparent that this was an unreal commitment. With only 12 ageing Yukon and 24 modern Hercules aircraft in the long range transport

⁹⁹Interview with Ambassador, the Honourable Leo Cadieux. The purchase of the CF-5 could partially be justified in terms of the contribution it would make to the 'peace-restoring' capability of the Forces.

¹⁰⁰For an account of these charges during the 1965 campaign, see Peyton Lyon, Canadian Annual Review 1965, pp. 268-269.

¹⁰¹Interview with the Ambassador, the Honourable Leo Cadieux.

force, airlift capacity needed expansion in order to give the newly created Air Transport Command the capacity to airlift the two new air mobile brigades and the Airborne Regiment.¹⁰² As a result the Department looked at both the C-141 Starlifter aircraft and the C-5 Galaxy. The giant C-5 Galaxy which could even lift Main Battle Tanks (MBT), was soon ruled out because of cost. Nevertheless in 1966 Air Transport Command requested permission to purchase 10 C-141 aircraft to replace the 12 vastly inferior Yukon aircraft. Given the financial situation of the Department, this proposal was, however, rejected. By the time some funds were available in 1967 the production line of the C-141 had closed and 4 of the less capable Boeing 707 aircraft were purchased instead.¹⁰³

The Air Transport situation in particular was making the whole mobile force concept incredible. In 1964 Canada had committed one battalion from its own mobile force to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force operating on NATO's Northern Flank. Canada successfully airlifted the battalion

¹⁰²An air-refueling tanker capable aircraft was also required for the new CF-5 fighter aircraft which could not deploy to far flung areas of the world without air-refueling support. See Standing Committee (June 21 1966), pp. 296-297.

¹⁰³The cost of 10 C-141 was estimated at \$87.2 million. See Special Senate Committee on National Defence (May 9, 1985), p. 8:6. The first three 707's were acquired after an American Corporation was unable to take delivery of the aircraft it had ordered. Coincidentally and very uncharacteristically some \$27-28 million was left unspent in the DND budget at the end of the financial year. After a proposal in 1967 to purchase some 3-4 C-141 fell through, and since the money would lapse back to the Treasury if left unspent, DND decided to buy the 3 available 707's instead.

to Norway in 1966, within the seven days allowed by NATO for countries to move their forces assigned to the ACE Mobile Force (AMF) into position. However, in July of 1966, Hellyer, while attending a NATO Minister's meeting in Europe, announced that Canada would be providing a second battalion group to the AMF for operations on NATO's Southern Flank. As Air Commodore Diamond, Commanding Officer of Air Transport Command, had noted in June of 1966, just before the assumption of the new commitment,

If we were to change the criteria as the force structure changes we might want to move two battalion groups in seven days. Then I am sure air transport command would come back and say 'sorry' cannot do it, we have got to have more airplanes.¹⁰⁴

To lift, as it was theoretically required to do, two entire brigades and the Airborne Regiment, Air Transport Command would require 'a lot' more aircraft, especially if working within a certain time restraint.¹⁰⁵

Nevertheless the commitment of Canada to the AMF force operating on the Northern Flank had emerged as one of the few success stories of the Mobile Force concept. This commitment, the White Paper had noted, could 'be done without difficulty by simply drawing on one of the Canadian-based battalions and the air transport that will be available for its deployment'.¹⁰⁶ The request for a battalion from Canada had been made by SACEUR and coincidentally

¹⁰⁴Standing Committee (June 9, 1966), p. 229.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶White Paper - 1964, p. 22.

fitted very nicely into the strategic concept of the government as outlined in the White Paper.¹⁰⁷

Canada participated in its first AMF exercise in 1965. In that year one battalion from 4 CIBG in Germany deployed to Norway for the AMF exercise. By all accounts the results of the exercise proved satisfactory, with Canadian Forces acquitting themselves well in the harsh climatic conditions. In fact Canada's Ambassador to NATO, George Ignatieff, who attended this first exercise, recommended that the government continue with the commitment as the 'kind of specialized role suited to Canadian training and equipment for the arctic'.¹⁰⁸ After 1965, duties with the AMF were taken over by one of the Canadian based battalions of Mobile Command. In February of 1966, Canada's 1st battalion, 'The Black Watch', deployed to northern Norway from Canada for the AMF exercise 'Winter Express'. Altogether some 1000 personnel, 197 vehicles and 100,000 pounds of stores were airlifted to Norway from Canada over a period of five days. In a demonstration of the political

¹⁰⁷The request for a battalion group from Canada for the AMF may have been made by the then SACEUR General L. L. Leinitzer during his July 1963 visit to Ottawa. As the first exercises of the AMF, in 1961 and 1962, had been held on the Southern Flank, Canada had not felt inclined to participate. Nor had Canada participated in the first exercise on the Northern Flank in 1963. However with the new government's acceptance of the Mobile Force concept, Canada made its pledge to the NATO force quite readily in 1963-1964. K. J. T. Hoile, 'ACE Mobile Forces' NATO's Fifteen Nations, December 1963-January 1964, Supplement to the issue.

¹⁰⁸Personal correspondence with Ambassador George Ignatieff.

value of the commitment in April 1966, it was announced that the next commander of the entire AMF would be Canadian Major-General Gilles Turcott. Given that the new Canadian commitment had already given Canada access to a senior NATO command, it was easier for Hellyer in July to commit a second Canadian battalion to the AMF Force operating on the Southern Flank.

As early as the 1964 White Paper, the deployment area for the mobile force in the NATO area had been envisaged as on 'the European Flanks', though nothing more had been specified.¹⁰⁹ General Foulkes in his testimony before the House of Commons Defence Committees, both in 1963 and 1967, had argued that the mobile brigades would be better suited for operations on the Northern Flank than in Central Europe, where a 'heavier' combat capability was required. In fact, Foulkes suggested, in 1963, that lighter parachute forces might be more suitable for regions such as northern Norway than slightly heavier infantry formations.¹¹⁰ In 1967, Foulkes argued that the vague NATO reinforcement role assigned to the mobile force be ended, and urged that the brigades be committed specifically to the defence of northern Norway. He suggested Canada build on its successful AMF commitment to the Northern Flank, and on the unique Canadian expertise for operating in cold climatic condi-

¹⁰⁹White Paper - 1964, p. 21.

¹¹⁰Special Committee, (October 22, 1963), p. 521.

tions.¹¹¹ With Canada planning to reduce its reinforcement commitment to NATO Europe from two brigades to one, it was essential that the new single brigade committed to reinforce NATO Europe be as high a profile symbol of Canada's political commitment to the alliance as possible. The conversion of Canada's reinforcements to provide support to the AMF on the Northern Flank seemed a logical move given the already proven value to Canada of the battalion group commitment to the AMF. Given the AMF's double military/strategic and political task, the enhancement of the Canadian commitment to the Force could be of political benefit to Canada.

Leo Cadieux (who had succeeded Paul Hellyer in September of 1967 as Defence Minister) shared this view on the suitability of an enhanced Northern Flank commitment. The commitment of a brigade to northern Norway would be more relevant militarily than the Canadian commitment in Central Europe. This would hopefully make the commitment more beneficial to Canada politically. The Norwegian ban on foreign bases situated on its own territory in peace time, of course, made it impossible to consider basing Canadian forces in Norway, but it is difficult to have imagined Canada deploying more forces to Europe in the late 1960's, even if this had been an option.¹¹² It is perhaps useful to

¹¹¹Standing Committee (February 16, 1967), pp. 1220, 1223.

¹¹²Indeed in 1967-1968, it was decided to recall some 500 men from the Canadian brigade in Germany in order to ease the manpower shortages in Canada and save some money.

view the decision to commit Canadian Forces to NATO's Northern Flank partly in terms of the linkage of the defence of northern Norway to NATO's ASW effort in the Atlantic, to which Canada was also committed. Indeed as early as 1963, Norwegian analyst Nils Orvik had alluded to Canada's natural interest in the security of Norway and urged the commitment of troops by Canada to reinforce northern Norway in a crisis.¹¹³ Writing in the International Journal in 1964, Orvik asked the question as to what control of the Norwegian coastline meant to Canada's security?¹¹⁴ Psychologically, similar questions seem to have been asked by Canadian defence decision makers as early as World War II. One defence historian noted the emphasis Canadian decision makers within External Affairs and DND have tended to place on the mid Atlantic in determining Canada's natural defence perimeter. It was apparently even admitted by one long time official within DND, long concerned with the formulation of policy, that this defence perimeter was always in the back of his mind when writing policy or commitment recommendations.¹¹⁵

As a result of all these considerations Cadieux, at

¹¹³Nils Orvik, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union, Occasional Papers in International Affairs (Harvard University Press, No. 6, 1963), pp. 48-56, 63.

¹¹⁴Nils Orvik, 'Soviet Approaches on NATO's Northern Flank', International Journal Volume 20, No. 3 (Winter, 1964), pp. 54-78.

¹¹⁵These thoughts and recollections were related to the author by Dr. W. A. B. Douglas, Director of History at the Department of National Defence.

the December 1967 NATO Ministers Meeting in Brussels, proposed certain changes to Canada's reinforcement commitment to NATO. He reaffirmed that for the duration of 1968 Canada would continue to provide two brigades to NATO, but thereafter the reinforcement commitment would be altered to provide one 'air transportable' brigade to NATO. It was still hoped that as additional air transport became available that this force, including men and equipment, could be transported to Europe 'in time to make an effective contribution'.¹¹⁶ It was already envisaged by the government at this time that the commitment would be made to the Northern Flank with northern Norway specifically in mind.¹¹⁷ The specifics of this commitment would be negotiated in the coming year.

The hope that the brigade would be made air transportable proved elusive. The inability to purchase the C-141 aircraft had limited Air Transport Command's long range transport assets. Thus, only some 30% of the strength of the brigade would be air transportable. Given the numerous tasks facing Air Transport Command in war time, it was noted by Major-General Michael Dare, Deputy Chief of Operations and Reserves, that in any circumstances where airlift would be required for both the defence of Canada and the fulfillment of NATO commitments, that the defence of Canada would

¹¹⁶Debates. House of Commons, December 18, 1967, p. 5519.

¹¹⁷Interview with the Ambassador, the Honourable Leo Cadieux.

have to receive the first priority. General Dare noted therefore, that commercial aircraft would probably be needed to assist in providing air transport for the brigade.¹¹⁸

Some 70% of the brigade would have to be transported by sea. Theoretically, an entire brigade could have been moved by the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure, the support ship HMCS Provider and the two new support ships scheduled to enter service in the early 1970's. Indeed Provider had already exercised in this role in the 1966 AMF exercise in northern Norway. However, the primary mission of the three support ships in wartime would be to provide support to the Fleet to enable Maritime Command to fulfil its ASW commitments to SACLANT. Furthermore, one of the three support ships was to be based on the Pacific Coast. It was conceivable that the carrier Bonaventure could have been used in a 'quick dash' commando role, perhaps even embarking Mobile Command helicopters to enable her to land troops in areas where port facilities were inadequate. Again, however, this would have meant taking the carrier away from its primary role as ASW flagship of the Fleet for which it embarked

¹¹⁸Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), House of Commons, February 4, 1969, pp. 853-854. Air Transport Command also had the responsibility to provide airlift:

- For the Airborne Regiment in its defence of Canada's role;
- For the AMF battalion committed to NATO's Southern Flank;
- To reinforce 4 CIBG in West Germany with casualty replacements;
- To provide continuous resupply to all Canadian Forces overseas. (pp. 844, 852).

fixed-wing ASW aircraft and ASW helicopters. Indeed, Admiral R. H. Falls, a former commander of the Bonaventure, commented that it would be difficult for him to envisage sailing a carrier into an area of high submarine threat with its ASW weapons systems removed and loaded up with troops instead.¹¹⁹ Maritime Command certainly preferred using its new vessels to maintain its own ASW commitments to SACLANT rather than to act as a sealift force for Mobile Command. As Rear-Admiral Landymore, commanding Maritime Command in 1966, commented after the trials of HMCS Provider in the sealift role, it 'would not make very much sense to pass the Provider through a submarine area containing 56 submarines until we had that threat under control'.¹²⁰ As a result of these considerations General Allard, who had become Chief of the Defence Staff in 1966 succeeding Air Chief Marshal Miller, recommended to the Cabinet Committee concerned with foreign affairs and defence matters in 1968-1969, that the sealift portion of the commitment be met by requisitioning appropriate shipping on the east coast. In particular roll on/roll off ferries, such as those operated by Canadian National, were considered for the role.¹²¹ It was also

¹¹⁹Personal interview with Admiral R. H. Falls.

¹²⁰See Standing Committee (No. 12, June 23, 1966), p. 347. The Soviet Northern Fleet maintained in 1969 some 170 submarines of which the vast majority were older conventionally powered boats. (The Military Balance 1968-1969).

¹²¹Correspondence with the Honourable Donald Macdonald.

decided that the brigade would be deployed as part of the AMF. Thus, the need to provide logistic support to the force would be eased somewhat. In December of 1968, Cadieux announced that Canada would, in 1969, be participating in its third AMF exercise by again providing a battalion group for an exercise in northern Norway. Although the brigade was formally committed to either Denmark or northern Norway, it was in the latter region that the force was envisaged as operating. Indeed, this was the only region in which Canadian AMF battalion group had operated since being committed to the force in 1964. This, in spite of additional commitments not only to the Baltic Approaches, but also to NATO's Southern Flank.

Thus, the commitment as presented to SCEAND in February of 1969, involved the commitment of one battalion group within seven days to the AMF on the Northern Flank to be joined if necessary by the balance of a brigade also to be deployed as part of the AMF. From this brigade, and not in addition to it, a further battalion group was committed to operate with the AMF force deployed on NATO's Southern Flank. Linking the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade to the AMF not only had logistical benefits, but also re-emphasized the deterrent nature of the commitment. It was hoped that sufficient warning signs would enable the force to be deployed before fighting actually had erupted, thus strengthening deterrence. SCEAND members themselves seemed to view the new CAST commitment as a positive step.

Even a long standing critic of the Liberal government's mobile specialization concepts, such as Douglas Harkness, the former Conservative Defence Minister, agreed that it would have been foolish to have continued with the balance-of-a-division commitment of his day. He stated: "It was far better to substitute something like the 'air transportable' brigade for it."¹²²

The new CAST commitment that emerged in 1967-1969 seemed only marginally more militarily valuable than the previous balance-of-a-division commitment. Its deployment time (estimated 30 days), although shorter than the previous balance-of-a-division commitment, was still too long for many people to take its military role seriously. Indeed its link to AMF, which had a primary deterrence rather than war fighting role, re-emphasized this. Likewise, just as had been the case with the balance-of-a-division, Canada based units of Mobile Command would have to pool their resources in order to commit a full brigade to NATO's Northern Flank.¹²³ This reinforced the impression of the commitment as primarily political, rather than military, in nature. This in fact was its principal purpose, whether this was officially admitted or not. Since forces already existed in

¹²²SCEAND (No. 23, February 4, 1969), p. 854.

¹²³In the 1968 re-organization of Mobile Command, the three brigades of 6000 men each were re-organized into 4 combat groups of 3500 men each. This move was necessitated by Manpower factors. The term 'Combat Group' was devised by Cadieux to refer to the new formations which, although larger and more powerful than traditional battalion groups, were smaller than standard brigades.

Canada, it made sense, as it had in the past, to give them a NATO role. This time, however, the forces were specifically committed to a NATO Theatre that needed allied reinforcements. Moreover, the CAST brigade's spearhead AMF battalion group could deploy to the region in some 5-7 days. The Arctic training of many Canadian troops also reinforced the commitment's political value. The CAST commitment, for virtually no cost, gave Canada the opportunity to maximize its political leverage in the NATO alliance at a time when resources devoted to defence were already low and still declining further. For this purpose the CAST commitment was 'milked' for every drop of political benefit possible in the years to come.

Conclusion

The CAST commitment that grew out of the mobile force specialization concept reflected many of the themes of that earlier strategic concept. The CAST commitment reflected the new Canadian defence policy which in turn was based, to a large extent, on the small power alliance themes described earlier in this chapter. Canada, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, found itself in an expanding alliance. Although the membership of the alliance itself did not expand, the numbers of contributing members did expand as Western Europe regained much of the strength that it had lost during World War II. Canada, as a result, settled quite naturally into the pattern characteristic of a small power in alliance. If a country's defence and

alliance policies are partly influenced by certain relatively constant variables, then the defence commitments assumed as a result of these policies must reflect these variables as well. With the level of Canada's defence effort declining it was increasingly desirable to have as much of Canada's military force posture oriented toward the fulfillment of NATO roles as was possible. Previously with the existence of a high profile Canadian ground and air force in Central Europe it had been unnecessary to have a highly visible reinforcement commitment. Indeed the political dividends garnered from these Canadian forces in Europe had been magnified because of the comparative weakness of many of the other members of the alliance. Now however even the previously irrelevant reinforcement commitment had to be made relevant. The CAST commitment was the attempt in the late 1960's to maintain a politically valuable reinforcement commitment by Canada for the alliance. In the following two chapters the Canadian commitment to NATO's Northern Flank will be examined from its beginnings to its eventual demise. It will be determined to what degree the Canadian commitment to NATO's Northern Flank reflected Canada's Small Power in alliance pattern. In particular it will be determined to what extent the following four characteristics of such a pattern are reflected in the CAST commitment. The four characteristics are:

1. Reinforcing the strength of alliance's multilateral framework; ie. reinforcing the strength of NATO-Europe vis a vis the United States;

2. A tendency toward inequity in defence spending, with small powers perceiving limited utility in making substantial resource commitments to collective defence;
3. The desire, simultaneously with the characteristics identified above, to maximize the political value of the commitments that are made to the alliance; and
4. The attractiveness, as a result of the above factors, of specializing the country's defence efforts by focussing on those commitments that are of the greatest possible political benefit to both the alliance and to Canada.

As a result of this examination, a better understanding will emerge about some of the relatively constant variables that have partly influenced Canada's defence and alliance policies, as well as its military commitment decisions.

CHAPTER TWO
CANADA'S CHANGING ALLIANCE POLICY
AND THE CAST COMMITMENT

The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy
1967-1976: Full Circle

In 1967-1968, the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence conducted full internal reviews of Canada's defence and alliance policy. The DND review concentrated on the need to restructure the force posture of the Canadian Forces in the face of new financial and manpower realities, while the External Affairs (DEA) review concentrated more specifically on the role and composition of Canada's European Force. In the Hellyer review of 1964 Canadian Forces in Europe had continued in their traditional heavy and expensive roles, despite the conversion of the Canada-based forces into 'mobile' formations with light tactical air support and 'sufficient' air transport. However in 1964, rationales for the decision to retain the European force had mostly centered on the negative political consequences of a withdrawal instead of on positive reasons for remaining in Europe. As a result, an increasing number of people were now calling for a re-deployment of Canada's European force back to North America, which had in fact been intended back in 1951 when the commitment had originally been made. The time seemed ripe for a review. Both 4 CMBG

(formerly 4 CIBG) and the air division were facing major re-equipment decisions in the near future.¹ Furthermore, with the manpower of the Canadian Forces steadily declining, it would be increasingly difficult to maintain Canadian Forces in Europe at their existing strength.² Decisions taken by some of Canada's allies also seemed to suggest that Canada would be justified in reducing its own forces in Europe. Both the Americans and the British had already undertaken such steps.³ In general, since the commencement of West Germany's new policy of 'Ostpolitik', especially as accelerated under the 'Grand Coalition' elected in 1966, and since the withdrawal of France from the Alliance's integrated military structure in 1966, the atmosphere in Europe was one of reduced tensions. Within many NATO countries the need for expensive force postures or close alliance solidarity were called into question.

Within DEA a three member committee was set up to look at the merits of redeploying Canada's forces in Europe

¹4 CMBG needed a new MBT to replace its aging Centurion MBT, while the air division soon needed a new combat aircraft to replace its Starfighters which, without life-extension programs, would soon reach the end of their 'normal' life span.

²In 1961 the strength of the 4 CIBG had been increased by 1350 men during the Berlin Crisis of that year. 4 CMBG was still at this augmented strength in 1967. In total, Canadian Forces in Europe had a strength of about 10,500 men, plus their dependents, in 1967.

³The British Army of the Rhine had already reduced from a peak strength of 77,000 men and was heading toward a target of 46,000 troops. The United States had also announced plans to redeploy 35,000 troops from Europe to the United States.

to Canada, replaced in Canada by a strengthened NATO oriented Mobile Force.⁴ However, after three months the committee concluded that Canada's strategic interests warranted a retention, at least for the next several years, of the force in Europe. Indeed, as Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs had again noted, Canada 'cannot fail to take into account the political consequences of a unilateral action to withdraw forces from Europe'.⁵ Thus, cuts made by DND to Canada's Force in Europe corresponded proportionally more closely with reductions already made by the Americans and British to their forces in Europe.⁶

In the Spring of 1968, Lester Pearson retired as Prime Minister and Pierre Trudeau was subsequently elected. The new Prime Minister had long favoured the notion of a full scale review of foreign and defence policies. The recent 'in house' reviews within DEA and DND, that had re-emphasized the importance of NATO to Canada had failed to satisfy the many critics of Canada's defence posture; the new Prime Minister was no exception.

⁴Cited by Marilyn Eustace, Canada's European Force 1964-1971. Queen's National Security Series No. 4 (Kingston, pp. 55-56. The three member committee was chaired by Norman Robertson and included members Geoffrey Murray and Geoffrey Pearson.

⁵Cited by Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 26.

⁶Some 500 men were recalled from 4 CMBG and it was confirmed that the air division would be reduced by some 20%.

Trudeau's disagreements with Pearson's foreign and defence policy had basic philosophical roots. Trudeau saw the nation-state as a beneficial actor for humanity if that nation-state was established on certain principles linked to maximizing human dignity and welfare and creating a quality of life that pursued the goal of establishing a more civilized humanity. (Trudeau's Canada was certainly molded in this direction.) Pearson, on the other hand, had tended to view the nation-state as a failed institution in the Twentieth Century and saw internationalism as the future saving-grace for mankind. Pearson's foreign policy was thus oriented to the promotion of greater co-operation within the United Nations and the provision by Canada of its 'good offices' for the strengthening of international co-operation at the expense of national sovereignty.⁷ Pearson viewed NATO very much in 'Atlanticist' terms. The creation of an Atlantic 'security community' of like minded nations was an important experiment in international co-operation. Trudeau, on the other hand, having no such views, viewed Canada's commitment to Europe as anachronistic. 'We have to realize that Europe has developed itself, it's strong. . . . ' Canada, in Trudeau's view, was a small power in comparison to other countries and as such Trudeau rejected the world 'helpful fixer' role encouraged by previous Canadian

⁷For a more complete description of the two Political Philosophies, See Lester Pearson, Mike (University of Toronto Press, Volume 3, 1975); Pierre Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (1968) (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1977), and Bruce Thordarson, op. cit., pp. 67-70.

governments. 'We should not be trying to run the world'. 'We should be trying to make our own country a good place'. More specifically Trudeau even questioned the need for NATO as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, a country he doubted had any aggressive intentions toward the West.⁸ Trudeau's views were shared by many in Cabinet who took the opportunity to voice their views in the policy review announced by Trudeau shortly after his election. In particular many shared the Prime Minister's discomfort with the nuclear roles undertaken by the Pearson government in 1963, and with the maintenance of a brigade and air division in Germany.⁹

Academic and Press criticism had also mounted in the later months of the Pearson government in support of a policy review. One noted scholar of the period, while downplaying the actual direct impact made on emerging policy decisions by the Press and the academic community, nevertheless noted the impression of 'general malaise' which emerged about the actual state of foreign and defence policy as a result of academic and press criticism.¹⁰ The majority of recommendations from academics, newspaper editorials and Opposition spokesmen centered on the reduction of Canada's NATO obligations and increasing alternatively its foreign aid contributions, its involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations, or its role in non-military

⁸See Bruce Thordarson, op. cit., pp. 67-70.

⁹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 113.

activities in the Third World generally. Most of the critics tended to regard Canada as having a truly constructive and moral role to play here.¹¹ Such views even came from Dalton Camp of the Progressive Conservative Party, although he was by no means reflecting majority opinion in the party.¹² Partly, the perceived need for greater domestic spending made a policy review to de-emphasize the importance of NATO highly desirable for many.

In looking at the external environment one can affirm that, for many individuals, the factors creating a question as to the relevance of any Canadian military contribution to the alliance had not been solved in the 1964 Defence White Paper. The failure of the Mobile Force concept within a limited defence budget represented for many a further failure of Canada's attempts to make a relevant contribution to the defence of Europe. The swing towards an environment of detente was even more evident in 1968-1969 than it had been in 1963-1964. The NATO 'Harmel Report' of 1967 had emphasized that the future tasks of the alliance lay in political measures to improve East-West relations. Indeed, in the future it seemed that European Security Conference Talks, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, would be entered into and would set the tone for better and smoother relations between East and West. Likewise, the United States was

¹¹Ibid., pp. 28-34, 40-45.

¹²See Marilyn Eustace, op. cit., p. 57.

increasingly perceived as a country with which Canada should not have closer ties but from whom Canada should try to distance itself, especially in the realm of American control of the Canadian economy. Since NATO was perceived by many in Canada to be an American dominated alliance, anti-American feelings also took on anti-NATO overtones.¹³

The review process has been described at length by numerous scholars.¹⁴ Suffice it to say that the results of the review announced in April of 1969 closely matched those views already held by the Prime Minister. The new Canadian defence policy was to have four defence priorities. These priorities were:

1. Surveillance of our territory and coastline; i.e. the protection of our sovereignty;
2. The defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces;
3. The fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and
4. The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.¹⁵

Both collective defence within NATO and collective security within the United Nations were downgraded in importance. Instead the Canadian Forces received the protection of Canadian sovereignty in peacetime as their

¹³Bruce Thordarson, op. cit., pp. 10-20.

¹⁴See for example Bruce Thordarson, op. cit.; Marilyn Eustace, op. cit., or Peyton Lyon, A Review of International Affairs (School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1970).

¹⁵Cited by Marilyn Eustace, op. cit., p. 94.

primary role. This new defence policy fit logically into the overall national policy of the Prime Minister which attempted to set one coherent policy and see all agencies of government move in one common direction. In his famous 'Calgary Speech' of April 12, 1969, Trudeau criticized past defence policy as highly reactive. He compared past defence policy, perceived as having guided foreign policy rather than the other way around, to an upside down pyramid.¹⁶

The views of many had been ignored in the review. To the consternation of critics on the left there was no hint in the review of increased involvement in the Third World, nor was there any suggestion that savings in defence spending would be channelled into foreign aid. Views on the right as well had been overridden. Both Mitchell Sharp (the new Secretary of State for External Affairs) and Defence Minister Cadieux had failed to prevent the announcement that the forces in Europe were to be reduced. The review bore witness to a new style of governing. The new Prime Minister disagreed with many of the basic elements of traditional Liberal post-war foreign policy. As a result he needed to be interventionist in fields in which he had limited interest, such as foreign and defence policy. This was necessary in order to re-orient policy in a direction in keeping with his overall national policy. The result in the early Trudeau years was heavy reliance by the Prime Minister

¹⁶See text of the speech, Press Releases and Speeches, Dinner of Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, April 12, 1969.

on his own staff. Thus a Prime Minister's Office/Privy Council Office Committee chaired by the Prime Minister's own foreign policy advisor, Ivan Head, prepared the paper recommending the compromise reduction of Canadian Forces in Europe. Apparently Cadieux and Sharp did not even know of the paper's existence until hours before its distribution to Cabinet on March 29, 1969.¹⁷

The new defence policy priorities and the decision to freeze the defence budget at the 1969 dollar level for three years necessitated another review of the Canadian Forces force posture. The new force posture would have to do with significantly less personnel than had been envisaged under the 1967-1968 review. Likewise, Mobile Command now had to be firmly oriented toward the overriding task of protecting Canadian sovereignty and the defence of North America. The reinforcement of NATO Europe and provision of contingents for peacekeeping became 3rd and 4th rate priorities: a complete reversal of the world wide roles envisaged for the Command in the Hellyer years.

The biggest problems for Cadieux were in how to restructure Canadian Forces in Europe. The reaction of NATO Ministers to the Canadian cuts announced at the May, 1969, Defence Ministers Meeting in Brussels can only be described

¹⁷The PMO/PCO Report was a compromise between the joint External Affairs/DND Report which had recommended against any European reductions and the views of left of centre members of the Cabinet, some of whom not only favoured withdrawing all forces from Europe but also favoured pulling out of the alliance completely.

as explosive. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet led Warsaw Pact Forces in 1968 the November 1968 NATO Ministers's meeting in Reykjavik had determined that no country would reduce its contributions to collective defence, and that such cut-backs would be made only as a result of balanced force reductions negotiated by NATO countries with the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, Canada had pledged to fulfil all its alliance obligations through 1969, and symbolically had deferred the 20% reduction planned in the air division.¹⁸

Cadieux's announcement to NATO Ministers that Canadian Forces were to be reduced by some two-thirds was therefore very badly received.¹⁹ The Europeans especially were afraid the precedent that the Canadian move would set for future American policy options, particularly in the realm of Congressionally mandated cuts. As a result of the

¹⁸See Marilyn Eustace, pp. 65-69, 110.

¹⁹The initial announcement of the intended cuts was made at Ross Campbell's (Canada's Ambassador to NATO) apartment in Brussels by Cadieux to representatives of NATO countries with forces on the Central Front. The reaction was extremely negative with one delegate (from Belgium) reportedly bursting into tears! Nevertheless, all the representatives agreed not to raise the issue at the subsequent Minister's meeting. Despite this pledge the question was raised by Denis Healey (The British Secretary of State for Defence), who accused Canada of 'passing the buck to the rest of us'. Cadieux, in defending Canada's decision, reminded Healey privately that Healey himself had been forced in the past, as a result of financial considerations, to cut British Forces in Germany and had appeared before NATO Ministers several times to justify such reductions. Canada, Cadieux rather angrily pointed out, had not criticized Britain at those times. Related by Ambassador, the Honourable Leo Cadieux and confirmed by Ambassador Ross Campbell.

degree of negative reaction, cuts in European based forces were reduced from a planned two-thirds cut to only a 50% reduction in strength.²⁰ The 4th CMBG was to be reduced to an air portable combat group of some 3000 men. This long-considered role, again recommended by General Foulkes before the House of External Affairs and National Defence Committee (SCEAND) in February of 1969, was now adopted out of necessity.

General Foulkes, in testifying before the Committee (the External Affairs and National Defence Committees had been merged into a joint Committee of the House after the 1968 election), recommended the land force in Europe serve as a force capable of deploying to either of the NATO Flanks in an emergency.²¹ Cadieux was apparently taking a similar concept into serious consideration. In June, 1969, he commented: "The plan I had in mind was the combat group stationed in Europe, with the ACE Mobile Force as a matter of fact."²² DND was apparently looking at the structure of the German Army's airborne brigades as a model for the new Canadian combat group.²³ However, in the end the necessity to equip this new formation with large scale helicopter support and to replace the CF-104's with a better close

²⁰See Bruce Thordarson, op. cit., p. 142.

²¹See Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (No. 26, February 12, 1969), pp. 934-935.

²²See House of Commons Debates, June 3, 1969, p. 9384.

²³Ibid., p. 9327.

support aircraft probably made this impossible. Likewise, in order to deploy to the flanks such a force would require the heavy air transport which Canada could not afford. Indeed one of the principal reasons for converting the brigade to the air portable role was to eliminate the need for expensive re-equipment with a new MBT. Likewise, the reduced Air Group with only 3 CF-104 squadrons could be run-on without the need to replace the aircraft for some time, by giving the remaining CF-104's a life-extension overhaul. In the end it was decided to group the land and air formations of Canada's force in Europe together for the first time and place them in a Central Front reserve role at Lahr on the Franco-German border. The move would reduce logistic costs and it was argued it would give Canadian Forces in Europe a 'distinctive identity'.²⁴ Certainly it was the case that Canadian ground forces in Europe would now be able to have similar equipment and training to that of Mobile Command in Canada. The only question was, how relevant would such a force be on the central front?

Despite these considerations, the first moves to implement the new defence force posture were announced in

²⁴It has been noted that the move of 4 CMBG away from 1st British Corps (BAOR) under whose operational control it had been since 1951, was partly due to the fact that it was deemed desirable to cut the British connection and give the Canadians a role more recognizable at home as being distinctively Canadian. Both Lieutenant General Henri Tellier, former Director General of Plans at DND, and Ambassador Ross Campbell confirmed this as an important rationale.

September of 1969.²⁵ A review of External Policy also began in earnest. It was envisaged that Canada's new foreign policy would set the pyramid, that Trudeau had previously referred to, back on its base. Despite the fact that the results of the defence review had been announced before the foreign policy review, the new defence policy would flow logically from the new foreign policy. The White Paper on foreign policy, Foreign Policy for Canadians, was released in June of 1970.

Foreign Policy for Canadians emphasized six themes of government policy that would serve as national goals in Canada's foreign policy:

- 1) to foster economic growth;
- 2) to safeguard sovereignty and independence;
- 3) to work for peace and security;
- 4) to promote social justice;
- 5) to enhance the quality of life; and
- 6) to ensure a harmonious natural environment.

In keeping with the Prime Minister's philosophy, Foreign Policy for Canadians firmly oriented Canada's new foreign

²⁵The Force's manpower was further reduced from about 98,000 to 82,000. As a result of these manpower cuts and because of the three year spending freeze, the four combat groups of Mobile Command were further reduced to three, and the commitment to provide a battalion to NATO's Southern Flank was cancelled. Maritime Command lost its heavy repair ship and its aircraft carrier, despite its expensive and comprehensive recent refit, while the modernization of some destroyers was also cancelled. Finally, Forces in Europe lost their nuclear roles with the retirement of the Honest John rockets and the conversion of the Starfighters solely into a conventional 'attack' role.

policy priorities to the 'extension abroad of national policies.'²⁶ The theme of fostering economic growth was given primary emphasis. However, while economic growth was the first priority, it would only be fostered in the context of the other foreign policy themes, most notably in the context of maintaining Canada as a fully sovereign and independent political entity. This national emphasis in foreign policy was of course an important departure from the internationalist emphasis of previous governments. So too was the inherent view of the United States as a threat to Canada's sovereignty and independence. The primary threat to Canada's independence and sovereignty (though this was rarely explicitly stated), was taken to be the growing American control of the Canadian economy and the strongly perceived threat to Canada's cultural sovereignty. As a result, Foreign Policy for Canadians re-emphasized the importance of seeking counterweights to American influence by strengthening Canada's economic links to other areas of the world, most especially Europe. All too often in the past, it was felt, Canada's links with western Europe had been framed in military and strategic terms. Given the now perceived limited threat of the outbreak of war in Europe, Canada's relations with Europe would be restructured toward improving economic and cultural links with the European

²⁶Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 9.

Continent.²⁷

The forthcoming White Paper on National Defence would be required to formalize Canada's defence policy in keeping with the themes outlined in Foreign Policy for Canadians. In September of 1970, Leo Cadieux was replaced as Minister of National Defence by Donald Macdonald.²⁸ The task ahead for Macdonald centered on supervising the drafting of the new Defence White Paper. As a supporter of the 1969 defence decisions, Macdonald seemed suited to this task. The emphasis of the August 1971 Defence White Paper, Defence in the 70's, was on the protection of Canada's sovereignty and independence. The defence priorities, as announced in April of 1969, remained intact.

The first defence policy priority, the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines (i.e. the protection of our sovereignty), was essentially a peacetime 'quasi military' task that only involved the requirement of a capability to conduct surveillance and control operations for the purpose of protecting Canadian territory in peace-

²⁷For discussion on Foreign Policy for Canadians, see for example J. L. Granatstein in Canadian Annual Review 1970, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), pp. 313-319; Peyton Lyon, 'The Trudeau Doctrine', International Review, Volume 26, No. 1 (Winter 1970-1971), pp. 18-43; Peter Dobell, Canada in World Affairs 1971-1973, CIIA, 1975, pp. 127-163.

²⁸Cadieux, a firm supporter of NATO, had become increasingly unhappy with the governments defence policy and eagerly accepted the offer of Prime Minister Trudeau to become Canada's Ambassador in Paris.

time.²⁹ While on the surface the second defence priority, the defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces, appeared to be an important military function for the Canadian Forces, Defence in the 70's made it clear that 'the only direct threat to Canada's national security today is that of a large scale nuclear attack on North America'.³⁰ The government's defence White Paper noted that, 'There is unfortunately, not much that Canada herself can do by way of effective direct defence that is of relevance against massive nuclear attack . . .'.³¹ The European NATO roles and the international peacekeeping roles of the Canadian Forces had, of course, already been downgraded in the 1969 defence review. These decisions were confirmed in Defence in the 70's, and as a result the Canadian Forces of 1971 were left with few truly significant military roles. Canada had clearly opted for a near 'free ride' approach, maintaining only those forces necessary for certain national tasks and limited forces symbolizing Canada's continuing political commitment to the alliance.

Defence in the 70's focussed on explaining the role of Canada's defence policy as part of, not only a larger foreign policy, but also as part of Canada's overall national policy. Particularly important in this regard were

²⁹Defence in the 70's, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1971, pp. 17-24.

³⁰Ibid., p. 25.

³¹Ibid., p. 6.

the roles assigned to the Forces to contribute to overall national development.³² The White Paper noted:

. . . the Armed Forces combine effective command and organization, high mobility, great flexibility and a range of skills and specialties broader than that of any other national organization. These provide Canada with a resource which may be used to carry out essentially non-military projects of high priority and importance to national development.³³

In addition to these non-military tasks the armed forces could, since their unification, be identified as a 'distinctively Canadian' institution that could better attract persons of all ethnic backgrounds to its ranks and contribute toward fostering national unity.³⁴ The non-military and quasi-military roles identified in Defence in the 70's would assist in ensuring that Canada remained a secure and independent political entity in the face, not of an overt military threat from the Warsaw Pact, but from an economic and cultural threat from the United States.³⁵

³²Ibid., pp. 12-16.

³³Ibid., p. 12.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 12, 46-47.

³⁵For discussion of some of these themes, see R. B. Byers in Canadian Annual Review, 1971, pp. 293-296; Stephen Clarkson, ed., 'An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada' op. cit.; John F. Sokol, Power and Independence: The Relevance of Nationalism and Sovereignty in the 1970's and Beyond, CIIA, 1970; John S. Dickey, 'Canada Independent' Foreign Affairs, Volume 50, No. 4 (July 1972), pp. 684-697; and Ivan Head, 'The Foreign Policy of the New Canada', Foreign Affairs, Volume 50, No. 2 (January 1972), pp. 237-252. In a sense the Trudeau defence policy of the early 1970's returned Canada to a traditional force posture that had dominated Canadian Defence Policy prior to World War II. From Confederation (and before) until 1939 the standing armed forces had been small and predominantly concerned with non-military and quasi-military garrison tasks.

While the many national roles assigned to the armed forces were outside the traditional military sphere, most of the equipment of the armed forces, acquired as a result of decisions taken earlier, was oriented to fulfilling traditional military tasks. For example, Maritime Command was oriented almost exclusively to the ASW role. The 4 new helicopter destroyers and 2 operational support ships that were under construction would be oriented to the ASW role and not to the role of the surveillance of Canada's coastline, for which much cheaper vessels would suffice. Likewise, Mobile Command's new CF-5's, originally purchased to provide tactical air support for the Command in NATO Europe or elsewhere in the world, were of limited utility for the quasi-military and non-military roles that now dominated the country's defence policy.³⁶ Thus, while in terms of declared defence policy, national non-military and quasi-military role dominated, much of the equipment of the forces continued to be oriented toward NATO. In a sense the non-military and quasi-military roles had always been an element of the activity of the Canadian Forces. Now in Defence in the 70's, these roles dominated declared policy as well. Even so it was still in the lower priority

³⁶The one exception to this policy vs. equipment dilemma seemed to be the ground forces of Mobile Command. Light, mobile ground forces were conducive to many national roles. After the F.L.Q. Crisis of 1970, the role of providing 'aid to the civil power' became increasingly prominent. A possible repeat of the October Crisis was feared, along with scenarios that envisaged a possible spill over into Canada of inner city unrest in American border cities such as Detroit.

military roles in NATO, where the 'action' was. Thus, bureaucratic pressure from within DND was always in the direction of focussing on Canada's role in NATO. The role played by the bureaucracy, both within DND and DEA in gradually orienting Canadian foreign and defence policy back onto a more solidly pro-NATO footing cannot be overlooked. After the so-called 'Nixon shocks' of August 1971, DEA gradually regained from the PMO much of its previous power in the area of foreign policy making.³⁷ The return of the primary responsibility for foreign policy making from the PMO back to DEA must rate as an important factor.

Donald McDonald left DND in January of 1972. He was succeeded in 1972 by two Ministers as well as two other temporary Acting Ministers. All these successors had limited experience in National Defence. This left them open to heavy bureaucratic pressure from the military and civilian personnel in DND. This pressure was certainly apparent in the process involving the proposed replacement of Canada's Centurion MBT's with a new light armoured vehicle better suited to carrying out tasks in Canada as well as in Europe. In Defence in the 70's the government had announced its intention to acquire 'a light, tracked,

³⁷Nixon's comprehensive and surprising economic measures announced in August of 1971 did not exempt Canada from their negative effects. To a certain extent these shocks helped to reemphasize the importance of other regions of the world, most especially western Europe, to Canada. Indeed soon thereafter DEA received the assignment to conduct a review which would present options for diversifying Canada's overseas relations. The product of this review was the famous 1972 'Third Option' paper.

direct fire-support vehicle' for units in Europe as well as in Canada.³⁸ However, by the end of 1972, Canada still had not acquired this vehicle, widely believed to be the British designed and built Scorpion light tank. This may be explained partially by the fact that in 1972 General Jacques Dextraze had been appointed Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). As an Army Officer, General Dextraze had been clear in his belief that a replacement MBT was essential for the European Force. Dextraze communicated the views of both SACEUR and of the Commander of NATO's Central Army Group (to which the Canadian combat group in Germany was assigned) to James Richardson (who had become Minister of Defence in November of 1972) that Canadian ground forces in Germany should not be equipped with a light armoured vehicle instead of an MBT.³⁹ As a result the Scorpion project died early in 1973. The decision proved to be a crucial turning point for Trudeau defence policy. As a result of sustained domestic and NATO military pressure, the government abandoned an important tenet of its defence policy. The abandonment of

³⁸Defence in the 70's, p. 35.

³⁹Cited in Larry Stewart, Canada's European Force, 1971-1980, Queen's National Security Series, No. 5/80, pp. 38-43. SACEUR had apparently informed Dextraze that since Canada had, in 1969 'volunteered' for the reserve role on the Central Front, Canada should now be prepared to bear the cost of the role and purchase the MBT required. Secret negotiations were initiated by the Cabinet in the Fall of 1972, that resulted in an offer by Germany to provide Canada with 160 Leopard I MBT at a total cost of \$55 million. The proposal was rejected by the Cabinet as too expensive. Cited in Gerald Porter, In Retreat, Deneau and Greenberg, 1979, p. 162.

the Scorpion was not important in and of itself, but rather for what it symbolized. By 1973, the government was already feeling steady pressure to reverse its declared defence policy. Since the launch of the 'Third Option' in 1972, Canada had sought to build alternatives to its economic relations with the United States by promoting better trade relations with other regions of the world, especially western Europe.⁴⁰ This had been alluded to already in Foreign Policy for Canadians, but at that time the government had rejected the notion of the linkage of improved economic relations between western Europe and Canada with the maintenance of a credible Canadian military commitment. By 1973, with the demise of the Scorpion project, this linkage was reluctantly acknowledged.

Early in 1973 Henry Kissinger, at the time the President's national security advisor, declared 1973 to be the 'Year of Europe' for American foreign policy. Kissinger, in describing his conception of a tripolar system existing in the west, viewed three power centers as predominant: the European Community, The United States and Japan. Implied in this conception was a Canada subordinate to the United States. With the American foreign policy initiatives toward Europe in 1973, there was a danger that the Canadian initiative for a contractual trade link would be lost if

⁴⁰For a good account of the Trudeau government's shift in policy, see R. B. Byers, 'Defence and Foreign Policy in the 1970's: The Demise of the Trudeau Doctrine', International Journal, Volume 33, 1977-1978, pp. 312-338.

Europe perceived Canada merely as an appendage of the United States. Canada's strained diplomatic relationship with NATO was not promoting its trade initiatives. Indeed, as one author noted, Canadian diplomats at NATO 'rather than influencing it (NATO) to any substantial degree found themselves running at full speed just to ensure that they were not overlooked.'⁴¹ As a result, certain measures were undertaken to attempt to improve Canada's position in the alliance. In 1973 for the first time since 1969, the freeze in defence spending was lifted. Even though the increase in defence spending was still 1.5% under the rate of inflation, the limited increases still went primarily to the purchase of equipment for NATO assigned forces. The purchase of both the Blowpipe surface-to-air missile in 1973 and the TOW anti-tank guided weapon early in 1974, could only have a role in the fulfillment of Canada's NATO duties.⁴² Canadian officials and diplomats also began a concerted attempt to reinforce in European minds the importance of Canada's role in Europe and NATO. External Affairs Secretary Sharp reportedly even tried the shock treatment by telling NATO Ministers at the December 1973 Ministerial Meeting that if

⁴¹Larry Stewart, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴²Of the 150 Blowpipe systems originally planned, budgetary considerations allowed the purchase of only 100. Of these, 70 were assigned to European based forces while 30 were held in Canada for training and assignment to the CAST brigade. All 150 TOW launchers were also assigned to the combat group in Europe, or held in Canada for training and available for the CAST brigade. See John Gellner, 'The Blowpipe', Canadian Aviation, August 1973, p. 12; Gerald Porter, op. cit., p. 150; and Larry Stewart, op. cit., p. 47.

Canada's views were continually ignored in alliance deliberations, Canada might withdraw from the alliance's integrated military structure.⁴³ By using Canada's military commitments as a bargaining chip, Sharp apparently sought to increase Canada's political and diplomatic leverage in alliance deliberations. Having used a hard line approach at the start of the Ministerial Meeting, Sharp re-emphasized Canada's continued perception of the alliance's value as the meeting concluded,

NATO is one of the few places where Canada is able to exercise an influence and to be in direct contact with our major partners, both in economic and political matters . . . We have come to the conclusion that there was no alternative to the Alliance--without it the world would be a very dangerous place.⁴⁴

At the NATO Council Meeting held in Ottawa in the Spring of 1974, Canada's efforts to improve its standing in the NATO alliance seemed to pay off. In a victory for Canada's attempts to have its role in the alliance recognized as distinct from that of the United States the final declaration of the Meeting declared that 'All the members of the Alliance agree that the continued presence of Canadian

⁴³Larry Stewart, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 49, 50. Perhaps one of the most dramatic but least publicized Canadian pronouncements about the value of NATO came from Pierre Trudeau himself. On the occasion of NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns first visit to Canada after assuming his post, Trudeau, at a luncheon for Luns, dramatically told Luns that he had been wrong to cut Canada's force in Europe in 1969. Trudeau in fact reportedly stated to Luns that 'I was wrong and Ross Campbell (Canada's Ambassador to NATO at the time of the cuts) was right'. Related by Ambassador Ross Campbell during a personal interview.

and substantial United States forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defence of North America as well as Europe' (emphasis added).⁴⁵

By 1974 there were compelling reasons to conduct another review of Canada's defence policy. Firstly, there was the perceived importance of improving Canada's position in NATO in order to facilitate other Canadian objectives in Europe, notably Canadian trade initiatives. Other NATO countries were in 1974 facing serious political and economic difficulties; the authoritarian governments in both Greece and Portugal were overthrown, sending those countries into political turmoil. In Portugal, the communists seemed poised to take over the government, while Greece had for all intents and purposes withdrawn from the alliance's military structure. In other countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, economic difficulties forced the governments in both countries to make defence cuts. Moreover, by 1974 the leadership of NATO, centered in the United States, had evaporated because of the 'Watergate' scandal. As a result, it seemed that an increased Canadian contribution to the alliance at this time would likely be especially welcome.

The review was made necessary not only because of international considerations, but also due to the miserable shape in which the Canadian Forces found themselves in by 1974. The absence of any major equipment purchases for about eight years put into serious question the ability of

⁴⁵Cited in Larry Stewart, op. cit., p. 58.

the Armed Forces to perform future tasks.⁴⁶ The 1973 plan to increase defence spending had envisaged increases in defence spending of 7% per year for five years. These increases had been wiped out by double digit inflation which had increased the costs of DND by 12-15% in 1974.⁴⁷ Even if one put aside differences over whether Canada should re-emphasize its commitments to NATO, as C. J. Marshall, the Director of the Defence Relations Division in the DEA, had noted,

It would clearly be contrary to the national interest and poor economy to let the Canadian Armed Forces run down to the point where they could no longer be an effective instrument of government policy.⁴⁸

In the fall of 1974, the Liberal government, having just been returned in the July elections with a majority mandate, undertook another major review of defence policy.⁴⁹ The 'Defence Structure Review' was chaired by Michael Pitfield, the Clerk of the Privy Council, and was carried out primarily within DND, though DEA and other departments

⁴⁶By 1974, the Manpower of the Armed Forces had fallen to a strength of 81,000 personnel. A further decline to below 79,000 would occur by 1978. New ships, aircraft, trucks and armoured vehicles would all be required in the years to come. If Canadian ground forces remained in Central Europe a new MBT would be required as well.

⁴⁷C. J. Marshall, 'Canada's Forces take stock in Defence Structure Review', International Perspectives, (January/February, 1976), p. 26.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 28.

⁴⁹From 1972-1974 the Liberal Minority government had been dependent on NDP support. Thus, to have undertaken a major defence review that re-emphasized the importance of NATO, might have had the effect of undermining NDP support of the government.

were also involved in the process.⁵⁰ Essentially the Review addressed five principal questions:

1. Should Canada continue to station forces in Europe in peacetime and, if so, what kind of forces?
2. What kind of combat capability should Canada have in the maritime field, either for national purposes or as a contribution to collective defence?
3. What are Canada's requirements in the field of air defence?
4. Apart from any forces it has stationed in Europe, what other forces should Canada maintain for domestic and international contingencies? and,
5. To what extent should Canada contribute to United Nations peacekeeping activities.⁵¹

Early in the review process the government's defence priorities, as outlined in Defence in the 70's were confirmed. However, the nature of the questions asked in the defence review emphasized the need to improve Canada's NATO forces. Indeed at the NATO Ministers Meeting in December of 1974, Richardson announced that the Canadian defence budget would increase by 11.2% in 1974, while the amount of money devoted to capital equipment would rise by 30%.⁵² These moves, and the location of the announcement, suggested that Canada would concentrate on improvements to its NATO assigned forces in the future. In fact, the government had

⁵⁰DEA provided an overview paper on the international situation, while a committee of senior officials from DEA, the Treasury Board, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and the Department of Supply and Services were involved in the process before the results of the Review were given to the Cabinet.

⁵¹C. J. Marshall, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

⁵²Larry Stewart, op. cit., p. 71.

for some time been searching for a more dramatic way to increase the value of Canada's military commitment to the alliance. Richardson had been actively considering further specializing the Canadian commitment to the alliance in order to make it more militarily, and thus politically, effective. At the December, 1973, NATO Ministerial Meeting, Richardson, in informal discussion with NATO officials, expressed his view that the small powers of the alliance could no longer afford the 'luxury' of performing all of the tasks requested of them within NATO. Instead, Richardson proposed that smaller powers specialize in certain fields where they could make a truly credible contribution to alliance security. More specifically, Richardson was inclined toward an all-air Canadian contribution to Central Europe. As a former RCAF pilot, Richardson looked favorably on the notion of taking many of Canada's CF-5's out of storage and adding them to the Canadian Air Group in Germany. The ground combat group would be recalled to Canada simultaneously in order to help pay for the increased air commitment.⁵³

However, any move to shift the Canadian contribution to NATO from a mixed ground and air force to an all air contribution had serious political pitfalls. As the number

⁵³Cited in Larry Stewart, op. cit., p. 47. Although long term savings might well result from the redeployment of Canada's ground forces from Europe to Canada (thus for example ending the need for an MBT replacement), the short term costs of such a move and of forming new CF-5 squadrons, could not be overlooked.

of Canadian personnel stationed in Europe would almost certainly decline, the move might well be seen by many to be a lessening of Canada's commitment. Indeed the Prime Minister on his return from Europe in the Spring of 1975 commented, 'it was impressed upon me by some of my NATO colleagues how disappointed they would be should any Canadian government at any time take any steps to lessen the effectiveness of the Canadian military contribution'.⁵⁴ A host of NATO Ministers and officials had made this preference abundantly clear to Canadian officials.⁵⁵ Domestically as well there were interests opposed to the Minister's specialization plans. Certainly the CDS, General Dextraze favoured continuing Canada's ground force commitment to Central Europe and he later publicly advocated a strengthened Canadian ground force in Central Europe.⁵⁶ Maurice Dupras, the Chairman of SCEAND, had also recommended an all land force of 5000 men in Central Europe equipped with a new MBT.⁵⁷ Such ground forces, it was felt, would be the most tangible demonstration of Canada's political commitment to Europe. At the same time, Canada's three CF-104 squadrons represented an important contribution to NATO's tactical air

⁵⁴House of Commons, Debates (June 5, 1975), p. 6337.

⁵⁵These officials included United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, West German Defence Minister Georg Leber, United States Defence Secretary James Schlesinger, United States Air Force Secretary John McLucas, SACEUR General Alexander Haig, NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns.

⁵⁶Larry Stewart, op. cit., pp. 101-102.

⁵⁷Debates (June 5, 1975), pp. 6475-6477.

power and their withdrawal too, could have negative political repercussions.⁵⁸

Thus, when the results of the Defence Structure Review were announced in November of 1975, Richardson confirmed that Canada would continue to maintain a mixed ground and air force in Europe and that a modern MBT would be provided to maintain the effectiveness of the ground force. A provision to increase the capital equipment portion of the defence budget was also announced. A 12% real increase annually for five years would be maintained until 20% of the total budget was devoted to capital equipment.⁵⁹ This would allow for the gradual modernization of the equipment of the armed forces. That the focus of this equipment modernization would be on that required by Canada's NATO assigned forces was apparent in the first two equipment procurement announcements. Both the new MBT and the long-awaited CP-140 Aurora long range patrol aircraft (a modified P-3C Orion aircraft) would be most useful in fulfilling NATO roles. This was especially true after the sovereignty protection equipment was dropped from the Aurora project when it was decided that this additional capability

⁵⁸Clearly Air Command would also strongly lobby for the continuation of an Air Force role in Central Europe, where extremely valuable contacts could be maintained with other NATO air forces.

⁵⁹Debates (November 27, 1975), p. 9503.

would make the aircraft too expensive.⁶⁰ Future fighter aircraft and ship replacement programs would also be oriented to better fulfilling NATO roles. The government thus embarked on a program to better fulfil all the NATO roles to which it was committed. By gradually modernizing equipment holdings it was hoped that this would be accomplished. To play around with existing commitments had been ruled out as potentially politically disastrous, given the likely negative reaction that would be incurred from many NATO members.

The correctness of the new government policy seemed apparent within the first several months of the government's Defence Review Announcement. At the December, 1975 NATO Ministers Meeting, Richardson was reportedly specifically congratulated by the Americans, the British, Secretary-General Luns and others.⁶¹ Furthermore, in July of 1976, only two months after the announcement that Canada would be purchasing the Leopard I MBT from West Germany, Canada signed its long sought after contractual link with the EEC. The purchase of the Leopard had been widely interpreted as an important gesture by Canada to West Germany, the most powerful member of the European Community. Indeed, the purchase may have been more important than a simple gesture, if Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's rumoured remarks to Prime

⁶⁰See Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), pp. 143-174.

⁶¹Cited by Larry Stewart, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

Minister Trudeau, during the latter's Spring 1975 visit to Europe, are true. Schmidt reportedly told Trudeau that Germany regarded a viable Canadian military contribution to Central Europe as such an important symbol politically that Canada could not expect a contractual link with the EEC without a re-equipment of its combat group with an effective MBT.⁶²

Between 1967 and 1976 Canadian alliance policy came around full circle. While from 1969-1971 the government had rejected the concept of linkage between Canada's military commitment and its desire to improve Canada's trade and economic ties with western Europe, after the release of Defence in the 70's, it was soon apparent that such linkage was taken very seriously by Canada's NATO allies. Throughout the various phases of the evolution of Canada's alliance policy from 1967-1976, Canada's military commitments to the alliance were used primarily as political tools. The CAST Commitment which emerged at the beginning of this period was no exception to this fact. Despite of the primary importance of Canadian Forces stationed in Europe, the CAST commitment proved politically beneficial to Canadian officials throughout the period.

⁶²In fact it is reported that Schmidt bluntly told Trudeau, 'No tanks, No trade.' cited by 'Taking Canada more seriously', RUSI Journal, Royal United Services Institute (December 1982), p. 44.

The CAST Commitment as a Political Pacifier
for the Alliance: 1969-1975

Given the angry reaction by NATO countries in 1969 to Canada's unilateral decision to cut its forces in Germany, it was natural that the Canadian government should try to allay the fears of NATO's European members. Indeed, as has been noted, the degree of negative reaction forced the government to reduce the planned two-thirds cut of Canadian Forces in Europe to a 50% reduction in strength. At the same time, the government also endeavoured to use the CAST commitment to its maximum political benefit. Defence Minister Cadieux and External Affairs Minister Sharp had both argued in Cabinet that cuts in the European Force should only be made in consultation with Canada's NATO allies. When the advice of Cadieux and Sharp was overridden by Trudeau and other members of the Cabinet, both Ministers initiated 'damage control missions' with Canada's allies. Cadieux attempted to use the relatively new CAST commitment as attempted justification of the reduction of Canadian Forces based in Europe, arguing forces recalled from Europe would be used to strengthen forces based in Canada but committed to NATO.⁶³ Canada's Ambassador to NATO, Ross Campbell, was instructed to formally present the Canadian commitment to NATO's Northern Flank to the NATO Council as a

⁶³Interview with Ambassador, The Honorable Leo Cadieux.

symbol of Canada's continuing commitment to the alliance.⁶⁴ While it was almost impossible to repair the damage caused by the announced cuts to Canada's force in Germany, the CAST announcement did yield some positive response. The Norwegians were the most happy with the new commitment for obvious reasons. They were quick to raise the option with Campbell for the repositioning of Canadian military equipment in Norway. The same proposal was made by Norwegian officials to Cadieux in his June, 1969, visit to Brussels for the NATO Ministerial Meetings. Given the strained nature of the defence budget it was difficult to see how Canada could have embarked on such a program at the time, especially in the context of a de-emphasis on NATO roles generally. Secretary for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp also visited Oslo during his trip to Europe for the Ministerial Meetings. Speaking at a dinner in Oslo given by the Norwegian government, Sharp pledged that Canada would maintain 'an effective military presence in Europe'. In response, Norwegian Prime Minister, Per Borten, expressed his gratitude that Canada would 'continue to play a constructive role' in the alliance. A Norwegian spokesman commented that Sharp had been informed that Norway feared the 'psychological and political effects' of Canadian actions at a time when efforts were being made to strengthen conventional forces.⁶⁵ To relieve Norwegian and allied

⁶⁴Interview with Ambassador Ross Campbell.

⁶⁵Globe and Mail, June 10, 1969, p. 3.

suspicion of possible further cuts by Canada of its commitments to the alliance, Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) laying down a program for the employment of the CAST Force. The MOU, signed by Cadieux in February, 1970, at a ceremony in Brussels involving SACEUR and other NATO officials, had been negotiated in the preceding months between Canadian Forces headquarters and the headquarters of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) in Oslo.⁶⁶

The common perception that emerged, as a result of this political and diplomatic use of Canada's military commitment to NATO's Northern Flank, was that the CAST commitment itself had originated as a result of the cuts made to Canadian Forces in Germany.⁶⁷ Indeed a number of persons interviewed by this author, who were actually involved in the decision making process on the CAST Brigade, expressed their view that the CAST commitment was initially made simultaneously with the cuts to Canadian Forces in Germany in 1969. In fact, of course, the actual commitment of a brigade sized force to the Northern Flank was made several months prior to the announcement of cuts to Canadian Forces in Europe. The use of the CAST commitment to help

⁶⁶Information provided by Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters. Interviews with Leo Cadieux and Ross Campbell.

⁶⁷A number of articles on the CAST commitment have contained this erroneous assumption. See for example Nils Orvik, 'Choices and Directions in Canadian Defence Policy', Canadian Defence Quarterly, Volume 9, No. 4, (Spring, 1980), p. 10; and Charles Belzile, 'Concentration and Deployment--The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group', NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special 1, 1985, p. 20.

alleviate the negative political fallout resulting from cuts to standing forces in Europe featured so prominently in the minds of so many people that many came to the erroneous belief that the CAST commitment itself was quickly dreamt up after the negative reaction to Canada's cuts to its European based forces.

The Trudeau Cabinet had no objection to the measures taken to strengthen the political value of Canada's commitment to NATO's Northern Flank. In fact, the CAST commitment was perceived as compatible with the objectives of Trudeau defence policy. Forces would be retained in Canada for national tasks but would be available for certain limited NATO and United Nations assignments. In fact in the new force posture for the Canadian Forces, outlined by Cadieux in September of 1969, the CAST Brigade was even strengthened by the elimination of its need to deploy one battalion group to NATO's Southern Flank.⁶⁸ However, with another decision taken in September of 1969, it was clear that the CAST Brigade's purpose was still primarily political. The retirement of the aircraft carrier Bonaventure eliminated the possibility of deploying part of the Brigade, possibly one battalion group, as a truly amphibious capable force. As noted British military historian Sir Basil Liddel Hart had noted in 1960,

On a superficial view airborne forces may appear to be a better counter, as being quicker to arrive. But their

⁶⁸'Canada Adopts a New Defence Policy', Statements and Speeches, DEA, No. 69/15 (September 19, 1969).

strategic movement, and effect on arrival are subject to many limitations . . . In tackling emergencies, two hands are better than one--and essential when one is unreliable. While it is desirable to have an airborne force, which enables quicker intervention where it is possible, it is essential to have a marine force, and better that this should be the bigger of the two.⁶⁹

If, as its retirement suggested, the Bonaventure was no longer essential for the ASW mission then retaining it for a Commando or amphibious role could have greatly strengthened the CAST force. The investment in a few light landing craft would also not have been prohibitively expensive. Certainly Canadian officers will have been familiar with prevailing military thought on airborne and amphibious warfare. However, there is no evidence that this was even considered as an option. The need to make cuts in Maritime Command in order to keep ASW destroyers in service seems to have been the primary consideration.⁷⁰ Indeed since the CAST force was scarcely ever thought of in military terms and instead focus was almost exclusively on its political role, the failure to consider options in order to enhance its military credibility is hardly surprising. Of course many military problems with the CAST commitment were to emerge over the years that were scarcely given a thought in 1969. In other areas, while measures were taken to strengthen the military credibility of the commitment, they

⁶⁹Cited in Joseph Porter, 'Budget pressures threaten British amphibious fleet', in John Moore, ed., Jane's Naval Review (Jane's Publishing, 1986), p. 63.

⁷⁰Interview with the Ambassador, the Honourable Leo Cadieux.

were often adopted for reasons other than specifically to benefit the CAST commitment. For example, in 1969 the CAST brigade was no longer required to provide one of its battalions for NATO's Southern Flank. However, this measure was taken almost exclusively for financial reasons. Likewise, through the process of attempting to rationalize equipment choices made in the Hellyer years with the new defence priorities of the Trudeau years, one such step was taken in the early 1970's which enhanced the credibility of the CAST commitment both politically and militarily.

The CF-5 Freedom Fighter had originally been purchased in 1965 to provide tactical air support to Mobile Command anywhere in the world, including the NATO Theatre. However with the demise of Mobile Command's world-wide roles in 1967-1968, and due to budgetary restrictions, only two of the originally intended four CF-5 combat squadrons were formed. Thus of some 125 aircraft ordered, some 74 were put into storage almost as soon as they were delivered. Following severe criticism in the press, the newly appointed Defence Minister Donald McDonald announced on October 1, 1970, in an interview with the Toronto Star that 'the planes will be taken out of storage and made operational. Operational roles will be found for them . . . though for some it will be a backup role.'⁷¹ The next day DND announced

⁷¹Cited by Jack Granatstein in Canadian Annual Review 1970, p. 368. In August of 1970, General F. R. Sharp, an air force officer who had become CDS in 1969, announced that production of the CF-5 would continue despite the fact that so many of the new aircraft were simply going

that the CF-5's would be deployed in a Northern Flank exercise 'for operational trials as a tactical fighter in the European Theatre'.⁷² Subsequently, in exercise 'Pygmy Chief', held from mid-January to mid-February, 1971, six CF-5's supported the Canadian AMF assigned battalion group in exercises in northern Norway. Although most CF-5's remained in storage, Defence in the 70's was able to announce that henceforth both of Canada's CF-5 combat squadrons would be committed to support the AMF battalion and the CAST brigade in northern Norway. The deployment of the CF-5 aircraft to Norway was supported by the Forces new 707 aircraft, two of which were configured for mid-air refueling. In order to ensure more operational 707's at any given time, a fifth 707 was purchased to add to the four purchased when Leo Cadieux was Minister.

The CF-5's thus continued in their intended role as a close support aircraft for Mobile command. Again, however, it was clear that the CF-5 was not the best aircraft available for operations in the NATO Theatre. The problem identified many years earlier still remained. While the CF-5's would have been a fairly capable close support aircraft in a relatively unsophisticated environment such as found in many areas of the third world, in the European theatre the

into storage. The quick announcement by Macdonald after assuming office in September of 1970, that he would attempt to make the CF-5's operational leads one to suspect possible lobbying by the CDS and the air force for a positive 'pro air force' decision.

⁷²Ibid., p. 368.

CF-5's would require support from friendly allied air forces to protect them from enemy fighter aircraft.⁷³ For operations in the European theatre a lesser number of multi-role F-4 Phantom aircraft could have been purchased for about the same cost as the larger number of CF-5's and still have filled the complement of two squadrons.⁷⁴ Nevertheless the CAST force was fortunate to have the capabilities of the CF-5 added to its order of battle since increased funds were only budgeted for two NATO tasks in Defence in the 70's⁷⁵

Just as the commitment of CF-5's to the Northern Flank was a cheap way of enhancing the value of the CAST commitment, other actions taken by the government also seemed to enhance the commitment's credibility. Although certain actions were taken primarily to fulfil Defence in the 70's protection of Canada's role, it was extremely cheap simply to claim that the action also contributed to enhancing Canada's Northern Flank commitment. For instance, in 1971, 6000 troops of Mobile Command were assembled in Gagetown, New Brunswick, for exercise 'Running Jump II'. The exercise was described as an exercise of Canada's

⁷³See testimony of Air Vice Marshal M. M. Hendrick before the House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, (February 21, 1967), p. 1453.

⁷⁴It is perhaps interesting to note that the F-5 was designed for export to smaller powers air forces. It was never purchased by the United States Air Force for its operational squadrons. Both the Netherlands and Norway have operated the F-5 on the Northern Flank.

⁷⁵Defence in the 70's, p. 41. The other NATO task receiving increased funding was Canada's contribution to the NATO Integrated Communications System.

Northern Flank commitment.⁷⁶ Financial considerations prohibited the actual deployment of the Brigade to the Northern Flank, but by remaining in Canada this, the largest exercise in Canada since 1949, could also demonstrate the ability of the Canadian Forces to assemble large numbers of troops to 'protection of Canada' tasks. After all, this had been their principal task since 1969. In the light of the 'October Crisis' of less than one year before, a large exercise like this can be more easily explained.

Similarly, in 1970, the Canadian Forces established the regional Arctic Command, Canadian Forces Northern Region.⁷⁷ The principal task of this headquarters in Yellowknife was to co-ordinate the activities of the Canadian Forces in the Arctic. One of these tasks was the training of Canadian military units in arctic warfare. In the 'Viking' series of exercises, troops from Mobile Command underwent training courses in the Arctic in rotation from southern Canada. The training courses of several weeks duration also occasionally involved CF-5 fighters exercising in their 'protection of Canada' role. The primary purposes of such exercises were political rather than military. Through the familiarization of Canadian troops with arctic warfare, and by maintaining a relatively constant Canadian

⁷⁶DND, Defence 1971, Information Canada, 1972, p. 32.

⁷⁷Since the voyage of the United States tanker Manhattan through arctic waters claimed by Canada, the Canadian government had taken a series of steps to enhance Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The establishment of Canadian Forces Northern Region was one of those steps.

presence in the north, Canada's sovereignty claims were enhanced. However, the arctic training of the Canadian Forces also allowed Canada to pronounce the CAST force as 'arctic warfare' trained, something which, for example, the United States troops assigned to Norway could not claim. This claim was made despite the differences in conditions in the Canadian Arctic and the Norwegian Arctic.⁷⁸

All these developments, the commitment of CF-5's to the Northern Flank, the holding of exercise 'Running Jump II', and the certification of the CAST force as 'arctic warfare trained', represented a relatively cheap way to enhance Canada's commitment to the Northern Flank without spending a great deal more money. CF-5's in their 'protection of Canada' role provided surveillance flights to demonstrate Canadian sovereignty but were also available for close support duties supporting Mobile Command formations. CF-5's performed similar close support duties in roughly similar climatic conditions on the Northern Flank. Likewise, the now-rare brigade size exercises held by Mobile Command could always be used to rehearse aspects of the CAST role, because such exercises necessitated the assembly of troops and equipment from various parts of the country. It also provided senior Canadian officers with the opportunity

⁷⁸One author has pointed out, for example, that the unsimilarity between Norwegian and Canadian winters made some winter clothing unsuitable for Norway. These differences were noticed as a result of the exercises of the Canadian AMF battalion. See Major M. G. McKeown, The reinforcement of NATO's Northern Flank: A Canadian Dilemma, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, April, 1980.

to rehearse commanding a brigade size force. Finally, exercises in the Canadian Arctic had obvious operational benefits for the CAST role. In all these areas, apparent linkage existed between some aspects of the first priority of the Defence White Paper and the Northern Flank role of the third defence priority. Yet it was clear that no strategic conception had been formulated within DEA or DND that formally linked the similarities of the defence requirements of the Canadian Arctic with that of northern Norway. This is perhaps due to the fact that the government did not consider there to be an active military threat to the Canadian Arctic in the early 1970's.⁷⁹

The threat was primarily non-military in that it took the form of the non-recognition by the United States of some Canadian sovereignty claims. Thus, when Leo Cadieux had been asked whether there had been discussions with other NATO northern allies on the establishment of a joint northern headquarters, he responded with a simple 'No'.⁸⁰ Likewise G. S. Murray, Chairman of the Policy Analysis Group at DEA, confirmed that no consideration had been given to the idea of closer 'polar co-operation' with Nordic countries. The general unwillingness on the part of the government to develop ties with Europe based on military

⁷⁹This perception was made clear by Leo Cadieux before SCEAND in March of 1970. Cited in Brian Cuthertson, 'Canadian Defence and the Northern Flank', in J. L. Moulton, ed., Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1973, (London: William Clowes, 1973), p. 182.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 182.

links may have played a part in the failure even to look at the possibility of strengthening co-operation with Nordic countries. The low profile at the CAST commitment in the early 1970's may also have had a major part in the failure to fully explore all options with regard to fully cultivating the commitment's political value. Indeed, during all the proceedings of SCEAND from 1969 until 1976 the commitment was not discussed in any detail even once in the committee's hearings. The failure on the part of the government to present any well articulated strategic and military rationales for the commitment contributed to the impression, among those few Canadians who bothered to notice, that the commitment was every bit as unreal as the previous balance-of-a-division commitment. Nevertheless despite this Canadian impression, the CAST commitment seems to have been more beneficial to Canada politically than the previous balance-of-a-division commitment. For instance, in spite of severe budgetary restrictions in the early 1970's, the Canadian Forces did manage to exercise on NATO's Northern Flank every year in the period from 1971-1976.⁸¹ Thus, in terms of comparison to the previous commitment, the CAST commitment allowed for a relatively constant Canadian

⁸¹These exercises included 'Pygmy Chief' (1971) involving the AMF battalion group supported by CF-5's in northern Norway; 'Strong Express' (1972) involving the AMF battalion group; a June 1973 exercise of CF-5's in northern Norway; 'Argus Express' (1974) involving a rehearsal of the airlift to northern Norway; 'Long Leap' (1975) deploying CF-5's to Denmark and; 'Atlas Express' (1976) exercising both the AMF battalion group and the CF-5's in northern Norway. See DND Annual Reviews, 1971-1976.

'presence' on the Northern Flank that must have enhanced the 'reality' of the commitment to the NATO allies, most especially the Norwegians. Yet doubts as to the military viability of the commitment simultaneously exercised a negative pull on this political benefit. Even Defence Minister Donald Macdonald, an initial supporter of the concept of having forces based in Canada tasked to NATO, noted that he gradually came to the conclusion that the CAST commitment was not the best commitment for the Canadian Forces to have taken on.⁸²

In the context of Defence in the 70's, de-emphasis of the importance of NATO, the CAST commitment, as it stood in the early 1970's, was adequate simply as a political pacifier to the alliance. However, in the context of the 1974-1975 Defence Structure Review's re-emphasis of the importance of NATO to Canada, it was clear that a more refined and militarily viable commitment to the Northern Flank would be more politically beneficial. Thus, the fourth question of the Defence Structure Review addressed itself in part to the problem of how to improve the CAST commitment's credibility.

Refining the CAST Commitment: 1975-1976

By 1975 many problems, both political and military, had emerged with the CAST Commitment. Although Canada's

⁸²This view Macdonald noted, was reinforced after his visit to Canadian Forces exercising in Norway in 1971. Personal correspondence with the Honourable Donald Macdonald.

political decision makers had viewed the commitment primarily in terms of the benefits that would accrue to Canada in the alliance as a result of it, the Canadian military had been charged with drawing up the plans for the brigade's actual deployment. Paper exercises of the CAST deployment had been conducted by DND in conjunction with the annual and biannual 'Ocean Safari' and 'Express' exercises held by NATO to test maritime and Northern Flank defences. These paper exercises had demonstrated serious shortcomings in the plans to deploy the CAST formation. General Dextraze in particular was bothered about the viability of the whole commitment, given the difficulties involved.⁸³ While significant problems were to be found in a number of areas (such as with sea and air transport) the Defence Structure Review had not allowed for additional funds to solve such problems. Instead, improvements in the commitment would have to be limited to solving problems that could be solved without the commitment of additional resources. Since the government was now seriously trying to improve Canada's standing in the alliance, the cancellation of the commitment was ruled out, especially since various NATO officials had called on Canada to increase the viability of its Northern Flank commitment.⁸⁴ Thus, in November 1975, Defence Minister Richardson

⁸³Interview with the Honourable Allan McKinnon and Admiral R. H. Falls.

⁸⁴In particular, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General Colin Humphrey had urged Canada in 1976 to improve its ability to move troops from Canada to Europe. See Gerald Porter, op. cit., p. 125.

presented a memo to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence which outlined several problems with the CAST commitment.

One problem that had emerged was that the CAST force was committed to reinforce either northern Norway or the Danish Straits region. The threat to the Jutland/Schleswig-Holstein region (the land portion of the Danish Straits), as an extension of the North German Plain, primarily emanated from Warsaw Pact armoured formations. The CAST formation was at the time not equipped with the MBT that would be essential in meeting such an armoured threat. As Defence Minister Richardson noted in the memo to the Cabinet, the Cast Group,

would therefore be highly dependent upon armoured support from adjacent allied forces, which in fact have insufficient armour to meet adequately their own requirements and thus no surplus to provide the necessary support to make the Canadian formation viable in combat. . .⁸⁵

To equip both the CAST group and the combat group in Germany with new MBT would entail doubling of the cost of the MBT replacement program.

On the other hand, in the environment of northern Norway, an MBT capability was not essential. Of particular use however, was a good helicopter transport capability to shuttle infantry to help defend the narrow mountain passes leading into northern Norway (See Chapter Three). The Canadian Forces, already equipped with UH-1 utility trans-

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 126.

port helicopters and Kiowa reconnaissance/communications helicopters, were further having their capability improved with the acquisition of the giant Chinook heavy-lift transport helicopter. Thus, northern Norway looked like a more suitable location, militarily, for the deployment of the CAST Group.

A second problem with the deployment of the CAST formation centered on the sealift portion of its deployment. As Richardson informed the Cabinet in his memo that 'The Military practicality of the entire CAST concept is open to question because of problems associated with the sealift aspect'.⁸⁶ Problems existed with nearly every aspect of this element. Shipping would have to first be assembled to load the equipment for the CAST Group. Apart from questions over whether such shipping would be available, the seaborne deployment would have to be protected against submarines, surface and air attack. In all probability, Canada would have to provide such protection itself. This additional commitment for Maritime Command (with only 12 operational destroyers on the east coast) would be almost impossible to meet. If the equipment were lost at sea, Canadian troops would be in an unenviable position.

Thirdly, Canada's AMF battalion group would deploy first to either Denmark or to northern Norway. The rest of the CAST Group would then deploy as an understrength formation as it would be missing one of its three battalion

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 127.

groups. If the AMF Force was deployed to Denmark and the CAST Force was deployed to northern Norway, Canada would be faced with a situation of having to support three broadly dispersed Canadian formations (in southern Germany, in Denmark and in northern Norway).

Finally, the CAST formation would have to be assembled from across Canada from the three Combat Groups of Mobile Command. This move, as 'Running Jump II' had shown, would take time. Likewise the CAST Brigade, once assembled, would not be a cohesive unit that had trained together in the past; instead, it would be an amalgamation of troops from across the country. Furthermore, the structure of Mobile Command, with Combat Groups of less than brigade size, did not allow for regular brigade sized exercises. When the CAST Brigade was formed, its size was almost twice the size of formations senior Canadian Officers had usually commanded over the past seven or eight years.

These Canadian military concerns as to the military viability of the commitment were expressed to Richardson through General Dextraze. As part of the Defence Structure Review, three options were generated as partial solutions to some of the military problems faced by the CAST Brigade:

- 1) To confine the CAST commitment solely to Norway;
- 2) Reduce the Brigade sized force to an entirely air portable force of some 1500 men; and

3) To cancel the commitment.⁸⁷

None of these options involved the spending of a great deal of money with the possible exception of the last option, which might, as Richardson warned the Cabinet, 'require that Canada offer an increase in its NATO contribution elsewhere'.⁸⁸ For both political and financial reasons the second and third options were therefore rapidly ruled out. The first option was adopted instead. The fact that Norway had offered to provide the shipping for the CAST Brigade by requisitioning it from its large merchant marine made the decision that much easier. Furthermore, it had been agreed that in a situation where Canada's AMF battalion group was deployed to Denmark, the battalion would be redeployed to join the CAST Brigade when the latter arrived in north Norway.⁸⁹

Further decisions were taken in 1976 to improve upon the organization of Mobile Command. These decisions benefited the CAST commitment. The three Combat groups of Mobile Command were amalgamated into two brigades (one headquartered in Quebec and one headquartered in the West) and a rapidly deployable and centrally located 'Special Service Force' (SSF). The 5th Brigade headquartered at Valcartier Quebec, received the CAST assignment. Thus, one brigade

⁸⁷Joseph Jockel, 'Canada's other Commitment: The Defence of Norway', International Perspectives, (January/February, 1980), p. 22.

⁸⁸Gerald Porter, op. cit., p. 127.

⁸⁹Joseph Jockel, op. cit., p. 22.

would now have the CAST assignment, solving many of the problems associated with the formation of an 'ad hoc' brigade formation from across the country. The Brigade's helicopter squadron, No. 430 squadron which held 14 UH-1 and 10 Kiowa helicopters, together with 4 Chinook helicopters, would be available to support the brigade's operations in northern Norway, a region decidedly suited for helicopter operations.⁹⁰ Likewise, as a result of the decisions announced by Defence Minister Richardson in November of 1975, the Canadian Forces would be gradually re-equipped to enable them to properly fulfil their existing NATO roles. Some of this equipment would naturally benefit the CAST Brigade. For instance, since 1974 the Army had been searching for new light armoured vehicles to replace its then obsolete light vehicles. The armoured regiment assigned to the 5th Brigade, 12^e Regiment Blinde du Canada (12 RBCO), had been of concern to General Dextraze who remarked as a result of questioning before SCEAND,

Let us be honest. The armoured regiments we have in this country are not armoured regiments in the same way as old soldiers knew them to be. They do not have the equipment to do the job of armoured regiments; . . . they do not have the capabilities.⁹¹

While Dextraze had probably hoped for a larger Leopard order to equip 5 CBG in addition to 4 CMBG, financial considerations prevented this. A process begun in 1974 to acquire

⁹⁰DND, Briefing on Exercise 'Brave Lion', July 15, 1985, Slide #5, p. 15.

⁹¹SCEAND, (March 23, 1976) p. 33:27.

new light armoured vehicles for the Army was finally completed with the February, 1977 announcement that some 350 new light armoured vehicles would be purchased. These were only half of the 710 vehicles that had been requested, but nevertheless would represent an improvement in the CAST Brigade's capability, once delivered.⁹² Although the new light armoured vehicles were air transportable, too many sorties would be required to airlift the brigade's entire light armoured regiment. The new light vehicles, as was the case with most of the rest of brigade equipment, would have to move by sea.

This problem was illustrative of many of the difficulties associated with the CAST commitment. While some problems (basically those that did not require money to solve or those that were addressed as a result of previously planned organizational or re-equipment plans) were resolved, many other problems remained. These included continuing equipment dilemmas and the enormous problems concerning the air and sealift aspects of the commitment⁹³ (see Chapter

⁹²See Gerald Porter, op. cit., pp. 110-112. While Dextraze had hoped the first order for 350 light armoured vehicles would only be the first installment in a plan to acquire all 710 vehicles, these hopes were dashed by financial realities.

⁹³The slow re-equipment of the Forces and the financial limitations on the size of the re-equipment orders were both causing problems. For instance, the CAST Brigade was short of both Blowpipe and TOW weapons systems. Likewise the limitation of the new light armoured vehicle order to 350 which probably meant that some of the brigade's 135 vehicles would have to be 'borrowed' from other Mobile Command formations or militia units. See July 15, 1985, Briefing, Slide #5, p. 15.

Three). Military problems were also compounded by political problems centered on the possible effects of a decision by Canada either to deploy or not to deploy its CAST formation in a crisis. Moreover, the commitment was still conceived of primarily in terms of its usefulness as a political demonstration of Canada's commitment to the alliance. In the coming years it continued to be described primarily in terms of its contribution to NATO's strategy of deterrence rather than in terms of its potential contribution to the defence of the Northern Flank. However, in the context of a rapidly growing Soviet military buildup on the Northern Flank, pressure on Canada to make its political commitment militarily viable would inevitably increase. In particular, the build up of the Soviet Navy reinforced the need to make the commitment militarily credible if it was to retain its political credibility. Yet the continuing limitations on Canadian defence spending, combined with the restraints exercised on Canadian options by the complexities of the geo-strategic and geo-political relationships in the Nordic region, would prove to be powerful obstacles to making the Canadian commitment truly viable. In particular, the refusal of Norway to allow the permanent basing of foreign forces on its territory in peacetime would prove to be the greatest obstacle. As Nils Orvik commented,

It is not known whether this dogmatic inflexibility was fully realized by the Canadian authorities who made the initial commitment in 1969-1970. (sic) Whatever was

assumed at the time, Canada now finds itself tied to a commitment which has become increasingly difficult to fulfil.⁹⁴

Indeed, it seems that Canada did plunge into a region in 1967-1969, the complexities of which Canadians knew little. Decisions taken at that time assumed that by making a relatively cheap military commitment to the alliance, greater political dividends could be garnered. Now with the increased Soviet military threat to the Northern Flank, the government would be facing pressure both from its own military and from its NATO allies to move beyond the political nature of the commitment and begin to attempt to make the commitment more viable militarily, with all the expenses that such a move potentially entailed.⁹⁵

⁹⁴Nils Orvik, 'Doctrines and National Security. A Canadian Defence Doctrine?' in Nils Orvik, ed., Canada and NATO, Queen's National Security Series No. 3/82, p. 126.

⁹⁵For a more complete discussion of the geostrategic and geopolitical interrelationships in the Nordic region, as well as of the increasing Soviet threat to the region, see the Appendix.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN FLANK COMMITMENT: 1977-1987

Attempts and Proposals to Improve the Commitment

In November of 1976 Minister of National Defence Richardson resigned from the government due to policy differences unrelated to National Defence. Richardson was replaced by Barney Danson, the former Minister for Urban Affairs. It was quickly apparent that Danson shared Richardson's view that NATO and collective defence were the most important cornerstones of Canadian Defence Policy. In his introductory remarks for the DND annual report for 1976, Danson stated his belief that in order

to achieve deterrence, the members (of the alliance) must each contribute a fair share of the total defence resources required. It is not easy to judge how much is enough, but the consequences of doing too little in defence could well be far more serious than those of doing somewhat too much.¹

Danson was determined to continue with the re-equipment program of the Canadian Forces so as to allow for the adequate fulfillment of NATO commitments. As a result, the Minister rapidly approved the purchase of some 350 new light armoured vehicles for Mobile Command in February of 1977. Danson was further determined to ensure that Canada's

¹DND, Defence 1976 (Ottawa: DND, 1977), p. 3.

commitments were of the greatest possible value to the alliance. Only in that way could it be ensured 'that allied policies (would include) provision for Canada's security interests'.²

In order to make the commitments to the alliance politically effective, Danson felt that these commitments had to be militarily effective. The military difficulties with the CAST commitment were made apparent to Danson by his military advisors almost immediately on his arrival at DND. The Defence Structure Review had introduced a number of changes to the CAST commitment, but these adjustments had been insufficient to satisfy the Army, most particularly the CDS, General Dextraze. Danson expressed these concerns publicly in November of 1976, less than one month after becoming Minister. Danson hinted that Canada might be better suited committing the CAST force to Germany in order to reinforce 4 CMBG.³ In making these statements just prior to the December 1976 NATO Minister's Meeting in Brussels, Danson aroused the concerns of the Norwegians. The Norwegians, having just signed an MOU with Canada committing the CAST Brigade exclusively to Norway, were anxious to see the Canadian commitment sustained, both militarily, but especially for political reasons (See Appendix). In meetings with both Danson and External Affairs Secretary Don

²Ibid., p. 18.

³Cited by Larry Stewart, Canada's European Force 1971-1980, Queen's National Security Series No. 5/80, p. 115.

Jamieson in Brussels, Norwegian officials were able to receive guarantees of a continuation of the Canadian commitment. Indeed, Jamieson, anxious to reassure Norwegian and NATO officials, reported at a subsequent News Conference that 'the issue has been resolved', and that the Norwegians had been 'reassured about Canada's intentions'.⁴

Yet Danson's concerns about the viability of the CAST commitment continued. His concerns were shared by the Conservative Party's spokesman on defence, Allan McKinnon. In noting Danson's concerns, McKinnon commented:

The Minister of National Defence has finally discovered this situation and realizes now that it is unlikely Canada would be able to land a force there and supply a force with any expectation of overcoming any opposition whatsoever.⁵

However, during his subsequent visit to Norway in Fall of 1977, Danson came to share Jamieson's view about the political necessity of maintaining the CAST commitment. As Danson noted after his conversion,

. . . this area in northern Norway and the Finnmark region faces the Kola peninsula where we are seeing one of the great military buildups in the world today. If we show determination, capability and political will, we can be an effective deterrent . . . So I am much more satisfied now that that is a viable role, that some of those things, in my mind at least, which were not as well defined as they might have been are being well defined.⁶

⁴Ibid., p. 109.

⁵House of Commons, Debates (October 26, 1977), p. 293.

⁶House of Common's Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense (SCEAND) (April 18, 1978), pp. 13:15-16.

Danson's 'education' as to the realities of growing Soviet power in Northern Europe made him appreciate the political importance of the commitment both to the alliance and Canada. Given the Minister's earlier emphasis on the need to fulfil Canada's obligations to the alliance, any moves to cancel the CAST commitment would have been counterproductive in Canada's efforts to improve its alliance relations.

Having perceived the political need to sustain the CAST commitment, Danson now began to look for ways to make it more viable militarily. The restructure of the organization of Mobile Command in 1976-1977 had resulted in transfer of the Airborne Regiment from Edmonton to Camp Petawawa, Ontario. The move, undertaken primarily for reasons of economy, also strengthened the newly created Special Service Force.⁷ Having symbolically relinquished its role for the protection of Canadian sovereignty in the

⁷The move was widely criticized, especially by MP's from the Western Provinces. The transfer of the Airborne Regiment from Edmonton to Petawawa ended the independent role the Regiment had enjoyed within Mobile Command. In addition to rationales of economy, it was reported that General Dextraze favoured the Airborne Regiment as an elite core of the SSF rather than in its independent role. It has also been suggested to this author that the move may also have been related to Danson's unhappiness with the involvement of members of the Regiment in all too realistic 'training' and 'observation' exercises overseas. Indeed, the subsequent dismissal of the Regiment's commanding officer, Colonel Jacques Painchaud, may have had as much to do with disagreements between the Minister and Colonel Painchaud as to what constituted proper 'activities' for the Regiment overseas, than with public criticism of the Minister by the Colonel, as reported in the press at the time. See Robert Lewis, "The Unhappy Warrior" Maclean's, Vol. 91 (July 24, 1978), p. 17. Interview with Admiral R. H. Falls and private conversations with some former officers of the Airborne Regiment.

Arctic, the Regiment and the SSF now had the role, as a rapidly deployable formation, of reinforcing either of Canada's two domestically based brigades as required. This primarily domestic security role had already come under some criticism due to the proximity of Petawawa to the Quebec border and the recent election in that province of a separatist government. As a result of the fact that the infantry battalion assigned to the SSF already had the AMF role, it was decided to give the entire CAST role to SSF. The CAST assignment would give the formation a 'less threatening' NATO profile and, it was hoped, increase viability of the Northern Flank commitment in the eyes of the Norwegians and NATO by assigning this rapidly deployable formation to the role.

The Norwegians wanted to see a more viable CAST commitment. Speaking to a conference at Queen's University in April, 1977, the Norwegian strategist, Anders Sjaastad (and future Norwegian Defence Minister) pointed out that

a major handicap with the CAST commitment assigned at present is that most of it would have to be transported across the Atlantic by ship, and this takes time and increases the risk. The only way to get around this problem is to make the unit totally air transportable.⁸

As a result of these considerations, Danson announced on October 31, 1978, that from 1980 the SSF would take over the CAST assignment. The Norwegian Defence

⁸Anders Sjaastad, "Nato's Northern Flank and Norwegian Security," NUPI notat Revised and enlarged version of an oral presentation at the conference 'Canada and the Northern Rim' at Queen's University, March 31-April 2 1977), p. 14.

Minister, Rolf Hanson, on a visit to Canada, accompanied Danson to Petawawa for the announcement. As Danson emphasized, the move was designed 'to reduce the lift requirement and deployment time' and at the same time 'give the men of the SSF a demanding challenge to use their expert capability, including the Airborne Regiment, in a most important NATO theatre'.⁹ Danson further expressed his hope 'that the improvement in this Canadian capability will again show our Norwegian allies our determination to support the allied cause in the defence of western Europe'.¹⁰ The political importance of making the Northern Flank Commitment more credible militarily was now apparent to the government.

By the late 1970's and early 1980's various individuals and groups had also come to see the political importance of the commitment. Indeed, the New Democratic Party and its defence spokesman had, since the early 1970's, alluded to the desirability of closer cooperation between Canada and the Nordic region. In 1970, for instance, NDP member Douglas Rowland suggested to an official from DEA appearing before SCEAND that Canada might best be served by initiating closer ties with NATO's Nordic states as part of its efforts to improve economic and cultural ties with Europe. Likewise the Party seemed to view Canada's own political culture and foreign policy principles as consistent with those found in the Nordic region. The NDP urged

⁹DND, News Release (October 31, 1978), pp. 1-2.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 2.

the government to adopt a stand in common with those taken by Norway and Denmark and condemn the authoritarian regimes in the NATO countries of Greece and Portugal.¹¹ Since the regimes in these countries were viewed as inconsistent with the principles of the North Atlantic Alliance, as expounded in Article Two, this was only proper, in the view of the NDP. Andrew Brewin, the Party's longtime defence spokesman, had urged the government to strengthen Mobile Command's ability to deploy Mobile Forces to the Northern Flank. This should be done, Brewin argued, at the expense of Canada's commitments to the Central Front.¹² Despite these leanings, no clear policy was ever developed by the NDP, partly because of the Party's formal rejection of NATO.

Other commentators did, however, develop ideas involving the formulations of what has been termed a 'northern foreign and defence policy' for Canada. Proposals emerged from various sources to expand Canada's defence relations with NATO's Nordic states. Canada's former Ambassador to NATO, George Ignatieff, proposed that Canada orient its defence policy toward the north because it was, he termed it,

¹¹See for example the statements of Tommy Douglas and Andrew Brewin on the subject of the NATO Ministerial Meetings of 1970 and 1971. House of Commons Debates, December 9, 1970, p. 1382; and December 13, 1971, p. 10386.

¹²House of Commons Debates, June 2, 1975, p. 6350; and June 5, 1975, p. 6474.

unnatural to belong to a peacetime defence arrangement which requires Canada to keep expensive military forces in Europe, while our own Arctic regions are left largely unprotected from foreign encroachments.¹³

Ignatieff hoped that as Canada became more involved in the defence of the European north, NATO nations there could be persuaded to provide token contingents for exercises in the Canadian Arctic, and to support a Canadian effort to create a new NATO Arctic Command. Such a Command, Ignatieff felt, would be preferable to the NORAD agreement between Canada and the United States.¹⁴ However questions over Ignatieff's superficially attractive proposals remained unanswered. To what degree would Europeans be willing to participate in the defence of North America? Furthermore, would the Americans be anxious to see greater European involvement in the defence of North America?

Similar proposals for the strengthening of Canada's Northern Flank commitments in Central Europe came from Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky. The Central Front role, they argued, did 'not allow Canada to best exploit its strategic assets to the benefit of the alliance'.¹⁵

¹³George Ignatieff, "Canadian Foreign Policy in an Interdependent World," Spectrum, Vol. 1, No. 4 (September 1979), p. 5.

¹⁴Ignatieff felt that the bilateral defence relationship between Canada and the United States in North America opened Canada to the domination of its defence policy by the United States. Personal Correspondence with Ambassador George Ignatieff.

¹⁵Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Emphasizing the assets: A proposal for the restructuring of Canada's military contribution to NATO." Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1979), p. 17.

Instead, the two authors suggested that Canada significantly augment its contributions to NATO's maritime defence and improve the deployability of the CAST Brigade force. A Canadian brigade deployed in time to northern Norway would serve as an important deterrent role in and of itself, something Canadian Forces in Germany could never do.

'Although small in numbers when compared to NATO's overall forces, these units (the AMF and CAST forces) become a particular strategic asset in the Norwegian context . . .'¹⁶ These proposals, however, had a significant political pitfall. The withdrawal of Canadian forces from Germany, as the most tangible symbol of Canada's commitment to the NATO alliance, would likely be extremely costly politically no matter how much Canada were to increase its naval strength or improve its ability to reinforce the Northern Flank. The negative impact on certain elements in the American Congress favouring similar moves by the U.S., might well be significant. Any Canadian government indirectly contributing toward a 'decoupling' of America from its European commitments would be a foolish government indeed.

The proposals of Franklyn Griffiths constituted a more detailed advocacy of the 'Northern Foreign and Defence Policy' option.¹⁷ Griffiths argued for a 'mini alliance' between NATO's four Northern Allies (Canada, Iceland, Norway

¹⁶Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁷Franklyn Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy (Toronto: Wellesley Papers CIIA, No. 7/1979).

and Denmark). The 'mini alliance' would through numerous cooperative measures seek to strengthen deterrence in polar regions as well as counter the overbearing influence and presence of the United States, thus strengthening the security and independence of all four Northern states. Such a policy, Griffiths argued, would meet Canada's consistent post-war diplomatic objective of building counterweights to the United States, while strengthening national unity as well. The North, Griffiths remarked, had a nation building potential. All Canadians could identify with and support increased Canadian activities in the Arctic as a means of enhancing Canadian sovereignty and independence.¹⁸

The difficulties with many of these proposals seemed to center on misinterpretation of Norwegian interests. As one analyst noted, Norway would have no interest in any 'mini alliance' perceived as anti-American. While Norway has sought to limit the influence of the United States, it at the same time has recognized that it is on American support that Norwegian security has ultimately depended. Thus the anti-American undertone of proposals such as those

¹⁸Griffiths suggested that diplomatic measures could be initiated in which the four mini allies could support each other's sovereignty claims. For instance, Norway could support Canadian claims in the North West Passage, in return for Canadian support of Norway's position on Svalbard. Likewise Griffiths suggested regular exercises for the CAST brigade in northern Norway and the creation of a joint Norwegian-Canadian Air Transport Command to support military deployments in the Arctic and to support such common activities as United Nations peacekeeping assignments. For a full account see Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy, pp. 52-81.

advanced by Griffiths would repel the Norwegians.¹⁹

Perhaps the most detailed and wide-ranging proposals came from the former Norwegian, now naturalized Canadian, analyst Nils Orvik. Orvik argued that the defence of northern Norway, the ASW efforts of NATO in the Atlantic, and the defence of the Canadian Arctic were all strategically linked. Given that Canada had traditionally sought to meet military threats to itself as far from Canadian territory as possible, a Canadian commitment to northern Norway and a northern oriented defence posture generally, constituted a strategically logical posture. At the same time, such a posture could be demonstrated to Canadians to be a posture that was 'distinctively Canadian' and of importance both for the enhancement of Canadian sovereignty and as a relevant contribution to collective defence in the alliance.²⁰ Unlike some of the other proposals for a northern foreign and defence policy, Orvik argued for a retention of Canadian forces in Germany as politically essential. However he advocated that 4 CMBG and 1 CAG be moved to the German state of Schleswig-Holstein where they

¹⁹See Nils Orvik, Canada's Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension (Ottawa: DND, OARE Paper No. 21, June 1982), pp. 45-51.

²⁰For an outline of Orvik's arguments, see Nils Orvik, 'Choices and Directions in Canadian Defence Policy' Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 4 and Vol. 10, No. 1 Spring and Summer 1980; Idem., 'Doctrines and National Security: A Canadian Defence Doctrine?' in Nils Orvik, ed., pp. 95-135; and Idem, 'Canadian Security and Defence Against Help' International Perspectives, (May/June, 1983), pp. 3-7.

could have contributed to the defence of NATO's Northern Flank, while retaining their all-important political role.²¹

As with the other proposals, these proposals too raised questions. For instance, could Canada ever have been expected to raise its defence spending to the 4% of GNP that Orvik estimated might be required to implement these proposals? Would Canadians ever perceive the necessity or utility of spending that amount of money on defence? Likewise, even some seemingly simple suggestions as moving 4 CMBG from Lahr to Schleswig-Holstein would cost a great deal of money, not just in making the move, but in building new infrastructure facilities in northern Germany. By the late 1970's the Canadian Forces had invested considerable sums in the Lahr base and more money would follow in the 1980's. Thus, as with the other proposals, problems in achieving a 'Northern orientation' were significant.

A more specific suggestion to increase the credibility of the CAST commitment had also been made by several individuals in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The suggestion was to establish a Northern base in either Canada or Europe from which Canadian Forces could be rapidly flown or (if based in Europe) perhaps moved by sea to northern Norway. While Nicholas Tracey advocated the construction of a base in the Canadian North, two other authors suggested

²¹Idem., 'A Defence Doctrine for Canada', (Philadelphia: Orbis, Vol. 27, Spring 1983), pp. 185-206.

such a base be located in Europe.²² John Halstead, the former Canadian Ambassador to NATO and West Germany, advocated co-locating the CAST force with 4 CMBG at Lahr in West Germany. From there, Halstead argued, the CAST formation could be more rapidly flown to northern Norway.²³ Yet, besides the difficulty of finding room for thousands of extra troops at Lahr, the concept of flying troops from southern Germany to northern Norway was not practical. Canadian equipment would still have to be prepositioned in northern Norway and transport aircraft would have the difficulty of flying from bases in Canada to pick up troops in southern Germany and fly them to Norway.

The final proposal, made by Nils Orvik, involved the construction of a base in Scotland or in Schleswig-Holstein. The former base would have the advantage of being closer to northern Norway and both equipment and men could be rapidly moved to Norway in a crisis. Likewise its northern location

²²Tracey proposed a base in the Canadian Arctic where Canadian troops could train for the CAST role and, in an emergency, be rapidly be flown to Norway to link up with prepositioned equipment in Norway. However, beyond the problem of driving 5000-6000 Canadian troops crazy with boredom in the Canadian Arctic, there was some question why a Northern base in the Canadian Arctic was needed for the CAST Brigade which could be flown to Norway just as rapidly from a base in southern Canada. Likewise climatic and topographical conditions in the Canadian Arctic were significantly different from those in northern Norway. See Nicolas Tracy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Objectives and Canadian Security Arrangements in the North (Ottawa: OARE Paper No. 8, DND, February 1980).

²³John Halstead, 'Canada's Security in the 1980's: Options and Pitfalls', Behind the Headlines (Toronto: CIIA, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1983), p. 16.

was conducive to Orvik's conception of a future Arctic Command covering both Northern Europe and Northern North America. The disadvantages of the latter location would center on the proximity of such a base to Warsaw Pact Forces in East Germany. On the other hand, such a base would provide the opportunity to base Canada's two European assigned brigades together, thereby reducing logistic costs. A base in Scotland would have required Canada to incur additional costs associated with supporting two widely separated bases in Europe.²⁴

Despite their grandiose nature, some aspects of these proposals clearly had merit, both in official Canadian and official Norwegian eyes. For instance, demonstrating the validity of Ignatieff's proposal for greater symbolic European involvement in the defence of North America, in 1979 an infantry company from the Norwegian Army served a short tour of duty in Canada while an company from Mobile Command served a similar tour in Norway. In 1980, probably as a result of a Norwegian initiative, an MOU was signed between Norway and Canada providing for annual platoon level exchanges between the Norwegian Army's Brigade North and Mobile Command.²⁵ This bilateral agreement was a small way to strengthen the military relations

²⁴For a good discussion of these numerous proposals, see William Robertson, Canada's Commitment to NATO's Northern Flank: The Northern Base Option (Ottawa: OARE Paper No. 27, DND, December, 1983).

²⁵DND, Defence: 1979 in Review Ottawa: p. 46; and Defence 1984, pp. 22-23.

between Norway and Canada, gradually building a wider network of such arrangements.

The Norwegian political interest in some degree of closer polar cooperation between the two countries was clear. Nevertheless, both countries still did not seem ready to embrace more comprehensive cooperation such as those found in the proposals mentioned above. The primary restraining factor, particularly in making the Canadian military commitment to Norway credible militarily, proved to be the limited defence budgets of both powers. Defending the Northern Flank of NATO was a big budget requirement; this was becoming increasingly clear. Neither Canada nor Norway had the money to invest in the substantial air transport and prepositioning required to make the commitment militarily more credible. Although Anders Sjaastad had claimed in 1977 that Norway might be willing to pay for the prepositioning of some equipment, there was to be little evidence of this in the years to come.²⁶ Canada too, was going to be unable to come up with the money under the Defence budget of the late 1970's. For instance, in 1978 Canada had pledged with other NATO nations, at the annual NATO Ministers Meeting, to attempt to increase its defence spending by three percent in real terms every year for the next several years. Yet for the financial year 1978-1979, Danson acknowledged that increases in the defence Budget

²⁶Anders Sjaastad, "NATO's Northern Flank and Norwegian Security," p. 18.

would only come to 2.2% in real terms, while for 1979-1980 increases would be 'somewhat lower'.²⁷ Even if Canada had met the 3% real increase pledge, the massive re-equipment required by the Canadian Forces would have precluded any measures to enhance the military viability of the Northern Flank commitment. Certainly excluded was any thought of a super-expensive proposal such as a 'Northern base option'.

Despite the obvious difficulties involved in fulfilling Canada's obligations to the Northern Flank, cancelling the CAST commitment was always ruled out on political grounds. This was true of governments of both Liberal and Conservative stripes. Allan McKinnon, who became Minister of National Defence in the short lived Clark government of 1979-1980, had long been sceptical of the CAST commitment. He declared his intention early upon assuming office, to carry out a full review of defence policy and produce a White Paper on Defence by the fall of 1980.²⁸ The White Paper would orient declared Canadian Defence Policy firmly toward the meeting of Canada's obligations to the NATO alliance. Prime Minister Clark, in a letter to the NATO Ministerial Meeting held in the Hague at the end of May, 1979, stated his view that 'NATO (was) not only . . . Canada's first line of defence but . . . a diplomatic infrastructure for consultation and cooperation within the

²⁷House of Commons, Debates (December 14, 1978), p. 2112.

²⁸R. B. Byers, Canadian Annual Review 1979 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 262.

Western alliance'.²⁹ Given that in 1979 the defence budget was at a very low base, it was clear that any readjustment of Canada's military commitments could have been perceived as a lessening of Canada's commitment to the alliance.³⁰ With a limited budget, the first priority of the new Conservative government, as with Liberal governments of the past and future, had to be the reequipping of the Canadian Forces with new equipment. Originally McKinnon had hoped to go ahead with the new fighter aircraft and frigate programs simultaneously, but this had proved to be unacceptable to the Cabinet. Likewise, McKinnon had toyed with ideas of purchasing two new fighter aircraft instead of one, but again financial considerations intervened.³¹

Under these financial and political constraints, major adjustments to the CAST commitment (either cancellation or comprehensive repositioning of equipment) were out of the question. Thus in October of 1979, McKinnon announced his intention to move only gradually towards the repositioning of military equipment for the CAST force in northern Norway. As a former career Army Officer, McKinnon had long been sceptical of the Northern Flank commitment. In particular, the whole seaborne deployment aspect was most

²⁹Larry Stewart, Canadian's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 135.

³⁰In 1979-1980 the Defence Budget was \$4,375 billion, which constituted 8.6% of the Federal budget and about 1.8% of the GNP. See Defence Canada 80, p. 136.

³¹Interview with the Honourable Allan McKinnon.

bothersome to the new Minister. Prior to his appointment as Minister, McKinnon had obtained a copy of a paper exercise of the CAST commitment code named 'Spring Window'. The 'exercise' held within DND in conjunction with the annual NATO 'Ocean Safari' exercise, revealed serious shortcomings with seaborne deployment of the CAST force. This information, coupled with McKinnon's previous doubts of the viability of the whole commitment, led him to pursue the prepositioning option.³²

With a very limited budget it would only be possible to consider prepositioning such equipment as soft-skinned trucks, jeeps and oversnow vehicles. The positioning of such vehicles would not involve the expense of purchasing duplicate sets of more sophisticated armoured vehicles, artillery and helicopters.³³ Initial bilateral discussions were undertaken between McKinnon and the Norwegian Defence Minister, together with their officials, at the December 1979 NATO Ministerial Meetings in Brussels. Meeting on December 10 1979, the discussants focussed on the type of equipment to be prepositioned and on the question of Norwegian control of the prepositioned equipment. The Norwegians expressed their desire very early on to exercise formal control over any prepositioned equipment sites. Such an arrangement was desired in order to ensure that the base

³²Interview with the Honourable Allan McKinnon and Admiral R. H. Falls.

³³Interview with Admiral R. H. Falls.

ban policy was adhered to both in the letter as well as in spirit.³⁴ Unfortunately, these discussions could be taken no further by the Conservatives, as the government fell on December 13, 1979. When the Liberals returned to office in the February 1980 elections, these discussions were resumed. In the Spring of 1980, the new Liberal Defence Minister, Gilles Lamontagne, visited in Norway and pledged that Canada would fulfil all its NATO obligations.

By the early 1980's, NATO was facing severe strains and pressures. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the preoccupation of the United States with the hostage crisis in Iran, the strains created in NATO as a result of the 'two-track decision' taken by NATO in December of 1979, and the emerging crisis in Poland, all called for alliance cohesion and unity. The times still seemed to call for a steady Canadian political commitment to the alliance coupled with steady increases in defence spending, in keeping with the decision of the 1978 NATO Ministerial Meeting. A major defence policy review in Canada, while perhaps making military sense, would 'rock the boat' at a time when the level of the Canadian contribution to NATO and the size of the Canadian defence budget already were perceived as far too low.

With regard to the Northern Flank commitment, the Norwegians had made it quite clear to Lamontagne during his

³⁴Interview with the Honourable Allan McKinnon and Admiral R. H. Falls.

visit to Norway that they regarded the Canadian commitment as vitally important. The agreement with the United States in 1980 for the prepositioning of equipment for the U.S. Marine Brigade, made the Norwegians anxious to diversify their alliance reinforcement options. Similarly, by the early 1980's, the expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet was reaching alarming proportions. Norway, which was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the U.S.S.R. over bilateral disputes, regarded the political importance of Canadian commitment very highly (see Appendix). Now that Norway was gradually slipping behind the outer Soviet defence perimeter, these allied commitments were all the more important. The expanding Soviet military threat was of increasing concern to authorities in NATO as well. SACEUR, General Bernard Rogers, related his view to Canadian Officials that 'Canada's assignment of the CAST Brigade Group to the defence of Norway is the most important potential (Canadian) NATO contribution . . .'³⁵ Rogers, and most other U.S. analysts, reportedly regarded the CAST commitment and Canada's maritime forces as the country's most significant strategic commitments to the alliance.³⁶

In spite of Norwegian and NATO pressures on Canada

³⁵Cited in George Carver, ed., The View from the South: A Perspective on Key Bilateral Issues Affecting U.S.-Canadian Relations (Washington: Georgetown University, 1985), p. 35.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 34-35. Canadian Forces stationed in Europe were considered by the same analysts as much less significant militarily, though their political value was incalculable.

to maintain and improve its Northern Flank commitments, movement toward a Canadian-Norwegian prepositioning agreement, similar to the one that had been concluded between the U.S. and Norway moved slowly. Problems centered in particular on the level of Norwegian participation in any funding scheme for the construction and maintenance of prestocking depots. The issue of Norwegian control of the prestocking depots appears to have been resolved favourably. In the agreement between Norway and the United States, Norway retained responsibility for the maintenance of the equipment and control of the sites. 'From time to time, some special maintenance tasks (would be) . . . carried out with assistance of American technical personnel, in the case of highly sophisticated material for which the necessary technical expertise (was) lacking in Norway'.³⁷ Since any prepositioned Canadian equipment would be of a relatively unsophisticated nature (as Canada could not afford to acquire duplicate sets of expensive, sophisticated equipment), such problems were unlikely to arise.

The delays in the achievement of a prepositioning agreement with Norway began to irritate many observers, including SCEAND member, Stan Darling. Darling commented that the negotiations appeared to be 'endless' and asked if this 'paper commitment' might have to eventually be aban-

³⁷Royal Ministry of Defence, Norway, Main Guidelines for the Defence Establishment During the Period 1984-1988, Oslo: p. 23.

doned.³⁸ Lamontagne responded that he saw no difficulty with the CAST commitment as it now stood. The CDS General Withers, also surprisingly, saw no difficulties with the commitment and, indeed, he noted that 'new arrangements' with Norway had improved the seaborne deployment aspect of the commitment, shortening the overall deployment time.³⁹

However these 'adjustments' to the CAST commitment, including the subsequent 1982 agreement to gradually preposition limited heavy equipment for the lead AMF battalion of the CAST Brigade in northern Norway, did little to dampen growing criticism of the Canadian pledge to Norway. While the 'adjustments' Canada had made to the CAST commitment since 1975 had cost little money, they had also yielded little. Fundamental political, conceptual and especially military problems with the CAST reinforcement plan remained.

Continuing Political and Military Dilemmas

By 1982 few of the problems that had existed in 1976-1977 with the CAST commitment had been resolved. A series of political problems with the CAST deployment had always existed for the CAST Brigade. These political problems had not even been addressed by the 1976 changes in the CAST plan.

Chief of these political problems centered on the

³⁸SCEAND, May 19, 1981, p. 43:16.

³⁹Ibid.

timing of the actual decision to request the deployment of the CAST Brigade. The problem was partly reflected by a NATO-wide dilemma as to when to order mobilization and request reinforcements for Europe, but for Norway set in its Nordic environment, the problem was that much more acute. During the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, former Minister of National Defence, Barney Danson, had argued that the CAST force be put on full alert and that 4 CMBG in Germany be brought to full strength.⁴⁰ Commenting on this suggestion, Allan McKinnon noted many years later that

the truth of the matter is that it took us all of ten seconds to determine that that would be the most destabilizing action that Canada could possibly take in any situation such as that. The rest of the world looks to Canada for sober and intelligent judgments, not to destabilizing situations.⁴¹

In fact, no request had been made, either from SACEUR or Norway, to consider putting the brigade on alert. In fact such a move would have been regarded as most unwelcome by the Norwegians. However, if a request from Norway in some future crisis had actually been forthcoming, what would have been the likely Canadian response?

The problem partly centered on the timing of a Norwegian request. If Norway, anxious not to provoke the Soviet Union by requesting NATO reinforcements, delayed its request for reinforcements, then Canada might well have been

⁴⁰Larry Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 141.

⁴¹Debates, October 3, 1986, p. 61.

faced with a deployment situation which gave it only a short deployment time before hostilities erupted. Would the Canadian government then have deployed the CAST Brigade and faced a possible repeat of the Hong Kong debacle; a Canadian force arriving just in time to be captured or destroyed? Canada and NATO faced possible disaster both as a result of decisions that deployed reinforcements to Norway and as a result of decisions that delayed deployment. If Norway requested deployment of reinforcements and NATO deployed, the deployment may well have provoked a Soviet attack where none may have originally been intended. On the other hand, the vital military importance of northern Norway to the Soviets may well impel the Soviets to try to take that strategic territory before NATO reinforcements arrive. Likewise, if NATO did not deploy, the Norwegians might well decide to come to terms with some limited Soviet demands and opt for 'Finlandized' neutrality rather than fight the U.S.S.R. alone, unaided by NATO.

Although the near annual Canadian and other NATO participation in exercises in Norway in the late 1970's and early 1980's had made the presence of NATO Forces in that country quite routine for the U.S.S.R., the impact of unscheduled deployment of those forces in a crisis is essentially an unknown quantity.⁴² A more definite alert

⁴²Allied Exercises in Norway are basically of three types:

1. The 'Team Work' series of exercises held every fourth year under the command of SACLANT. These

schedule might have addressed some of the political problems associated with deployment. For instance, Franklyn Griffiths suggested that the CAST force go on alert whenever Soviet Forces staged exercises near Norway, and that a 'spearhead' battalion group be immediately deployed to Norway. Furthermore, he argued that the whole CAST Force could regularly exercise in Norway (perhaps once every four years), making the deployment of the Force more routine and predictable.⁴³ Problems in implementing such a plan were numerous, however. Firstly, it would make Canada somewhat of a hostage to Soviet actions. Whenever the Soviet Union staged major exercises, Canadian Forces would have been required to respond in a certain fashion without flexibility. If the Soviets staged three or four major exercises in one year, the Canadian Forces would be faced with a very expensive task involving three or four deployments to Norway. Moreover regular deployments of the CAST Force to

exercises rehearse the reception and support of allied forces in Norway;

2. The 'Express' series of exercises held every other year. They involve the AMF and some elements of other allied forces tasked to Norway; and
3. National Norwegian exercises or ad hoc NATO exercises. These exercises are scheduled well in advance and exercises such as the 'Cold Winter' series are annual events.

Canadian Forces participated in nearly all of these exercises in some capacity. Royal Ministry of Defence, Norway, Exercises in Norway with Allied Participation, Oslo, February 1984, pp. 138-140.

⁴³Franklyn Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy, p. 53.

Norway would have proved an additional drain on the defence budget. One could easily envisage the CAST commitment coming under greater criticism and ridicule. Secondly, a plan, as advocated by Griffiths, might well have strained relations between Canada and the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. might have interpreted the Canadian actions as provocative.

Finally, in order to make the NATO reinforcement of Norway truly credible politically, Canada could not have been expected to embark on such a plan alone; allied cooperation would have been necessary. Thus when the Soviet Union staged exercises near Norway, all allied reinforcements committed to Norway would be required to go on alert and dispatch lead elements to Norway. It is doubtful whether NATO would be willing to adopt such a posture. Moreover the Norwegians might have regarded it as incompatible with their policy of reassurance. Thus major political and financial obstacles barred an easy solution to the political difficulties associated with the CAST commitment. These political difficulties were, of course, compounded by numerous military difficulties.

The greatest of these difficulties centered on the seaborne portion of the CAST brigade's deployment. At the time of the original description of the CAST assignment to SCEAND in February of 1969 by General Michael Dare, it was estimated that 70% of the strength of the brigade formation would have to be transported by sea. This was estimated at the time to require a duration of 30 days. The deployment

time in the early 1980's had not been appreciably reduced. As a result of improved plans for deployment refined in real and paper exercises over the preceding fifteen years; as a result of the improvements in arrangements for shipping made with Norway and; as a result of the concentration of the CAST assignment in one Mobile Command formation in eastern Canada; the deployment time was now under good conditions estimated at closer to 21 days.⁴⁴

The transfer of the CAST assignment from 5 CBG to the SSF seems to have had little impact in reducing the deployment time of the CAST force. Even though the SSF had some 1500-2000 fewer men than 5 CBG (4000 in the SSF vs. 5500-6000 in the authorized strength of 5 CBG), most of the equipment such as vehicles, helicopters and other supplies still had to move by sea. As a result, the CAST assignment was transferred back to 5 CBG, effective November 1984. The brigade's artillery regiment, 5 Regiment d'artillerie Legere du Canada (5 RALC) being reequipped with M-109 155 mm SP guns, was able to provide much better fire support than the 105 mm towed guns held by the SSF's artillery regiment. Moreover, the Brigade had 35-50% more troops than the SSF. All in all it was a much more credible combat formation.⁴⁵

⁴⁴See Proceedings, Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, Ottawa: February 10, 1981, p. 7:10; and May 19, 1981, p 16-27.

⁴⁵Brigadier-General Terry Liston, a former Commander of the CAST force, remarked that the SSF in the CAST role actually constituted the 'worst of both worlds'. The SSF did not have the fire power of 5 CBG but neither was its deployment time any shorter. In fact, the SSF, head-

The transfer of the CAST assignment back from the SSF to 5 CBG had addressed many of the military problems involving actively fighting in Norway. 5 CBG was in many respects as well equipped or better equipped than most Norwegian brigades. Moreover it still had a good transport helicopter force and its troops were all professional volunteers. Yet the crucial problem of actually getting the brigade to Norway remained. Vice Admiral J. Allan, Deputy CDS in 1980, made it quite clear that the deployment of the portion of the CAST group that is transportable by sea must occur before hostilities'.⁴⁶ When asked by a member of the Senate Sub-committee on National Defence what would happen if the Soviets did not give the CAST formation the chance to deploy before hostilities erupted, the Admiral replied, 'Then we will not go'.⁴⁷ This then raised the question as to what Canada would do if the CAST deployment had been requested and 5 CBG assembled, but the outbreak of hostilities appeared imminent? The political imperatives to show NATO unity would then become intermingled with the military imperatives against deployment and the political

quartered at Petawawa, Ontario, was some distance from the east coast ports where it had to load its equipment for transport by sea. 5 CBG had its units stationed no more than 15 minutes to one hour from its ports of embarkation. Interview with Brigadier-General Terry Liston. See also Lieutenant-General Charles Belzile, "Concentration and Deployment," NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special 1/1985, pp. 20-23.

⁴⁶Senate Sub-committee, November 25, 1980, p. 3:33.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 3:33.

pitfall of possibly provoking a Soviet attack.

The whole question of the viability of the CAST commitment seemed to centre around the problem of the vulnerability of sea transport and the length of time it would take. The Falkland's War of 1982 had accentuated the concern over the sea deployment portion of the commitment. In that war, Argentina's force of four conventional submarines constituted a significant threat to the Royal Navy task force.⁴⁸ ASW had failed to sink any submerged Argentine submarine, while one Argentine submarine reportedly may have scored a hit on one of the British carriers, HMS Invincible, with a torpedo that failed to explode.⁴⁹ With 117-130 attack and cruise missile submarines in the Soviet Northern Fleet in the early 1980's, a majority of which were nuclear powered, the undersea threat to the equipment of the CAST force, slowly making its way across the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, would be very great. The submarine threat to the CAST force's seaborne deployment had been multiplied by the existence of an additional and growing naval surface and naval air threat as outlined in Chapter

⁴⁸Two of Argentina's four submarines (old ex-U.S. Guppy class boats) were immobilized early in the war. One, the Santa Fe was caught on the surface by the British in their attack on South Georgia in late April, and immobilized. The other had reportedly been cannibalized to provide parts for the Santa Fe. Thus, with only two German-built submarines, the Argentines were still able to mount a fairly major threat to the Royal Navy for the remaining six weeks of the conflict.

⁴⁹For an account see Charles Koburger, Sea Power in the Falklands (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 38.

Three.

To counter this threat, Maritime Command deployed only 12 destroyers, 2 operational support ships and 3 conventional submarines on the East Coast, supported by 14 shore based long range ASW aircraft. It would be nearly impossible for this force to fulfil Canada's obligations to SACLANT and protect the deployment of the CAST Force to Norway as well. Moreover, although this Fleet was oriented to ASW warfare (with all the destroyers and both support ships embarking large ASW helicopters), two-thirds of the destroyers were 20 years of age or older in the early 1980's. Likewise, only the four newest destroyers were equipped with air defence missiles and even these would be of only limited utility against Soviet anti-ship missiles.⁵⁰ Combat with Soviet surface ships, equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, would be out of the question as none of the ships of Maritime Command were equipped with their own surface-to-surface missiles. Clearly, allied naval protection would have had to be provided.

The possibility that the CAST Force might either lose some of its equipment on the way to Norway, or arrive in Norway just in time to be destroyed or captured had been a possibility often alluded. The disasters of Hong Kong and

⁵⁰The Container ships embarking the CAST Brigade's equipment would be extremely vulnerable to such stand off missiles. In the Falklands War, the Container ship Atlantic Conveyor was hit by an air-launched anti-ship missile. As a result the British task force lost some badly needed equipment, including some heavy-lift Chinook helicopters.

Dieppe in World War II both occurred when Canadian Forces were committed to operations planned and directed by non-national Commanders. In both cases in World War II it was felt that too little regard had been given to Canadian lives and that the disasters occurred when the Canadian government all-to-readily agreed to provide Forces for dubious undertakings. The CAST Brigade would have been allocated to AF North (under British command) and its subordinate command, Command North Norway (under Norwegian command). The commander of the Norwegian Forces would have had the authority to deploy the CAST formation as he saw fit. As General Jacques Chouinard noted, of the four main defensive positions in northern Norway,

three of those defensive positions have a good tank approach into the position. I am positive that you know the organization of the Russian Forces. You know their, strength in tanks and artillery particularly . . . If we look at our CAST Combat Brigade, they have no tanks.⁵¹

The CAST Brigade would have been dependent on armoured support from either Norwegian or American units (since neither the AMF nor the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force were equipped with MBT). In 1974 former CDS General Jacques Dextraze had charged that if the Canadian Combat Group in Germany did not have its own tanks it would not be able to expect an American or German commander to provide tank support to the Canadians while leaving his own troops un-

⁵¹Senate Sub-committee, May 19, 1981, p. 16:15.

protected.⁵² The same could be said to apply to the Canadian Brigade in Norway. Likewise the traditional Canadian concerns of the fate of Canadian Forces under foreign command was especially apparent in the Norwegian theatre. With the lead battalion of the CAST Brigade arriving much earlier than the rest of the brigade, it was expected that the Norwegians might want to move that lone battalion to the front immediately. The breakup of Canadian units had been something resisted by both Canadian politicians and military leaders since the First World War. In Norway this old concern seemed in many ways to have come to the fore once again.⁵³ Indeed the whole commitment raised deep-seated fears in the minds of many. In the words of one Senator,

Are we not exposing troops to risks similar to the situation in Hong Kong? . . . If these troops are going into a fight they should at least be able to look after themselves as well as possible . . . I am wondering about the duty we have to the troops involved not to play political games and thus expose them to a situation where they become nothing more than sacrificial lambs.⁵⁴

⁵²Larry Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 67.

⁵³As Brigadier-General Terry Liston noted, Canadian Forces are under the operational 'control' of allied commanders, not operational 'command'. It has been agreed that Canadian units will not be broken up, but that they will always go into action as one unit. In Norway various unique situations (such as the arrival of units and their equipment at different times) made this policy questionable. For instance, what might happen if the equipment of some particular units were lost in transit? Would the remaining units to be sent to the front in any case? Interview with General Liston.

⁵⁴Senate Sub-Committee, May 19, 1981.

Only three options presented themselves as a means of overcoming the seaborne transport difficulty.

The first two of these options were ruled out virtually from the beginning because of cost. One option was to increase air transport capacity by purchasing additional air transport aircraft. From the late 1960's the size of Canada's air transport force had remained at a stable level. The long range element of the force comprised some 23-26 Hercules and 5 707 aircraft. In order to transport the heaviest equipment of 5 CBG (such as the M-109 guns and the Chinook helicopters) a small force of C5 Galaxy aircraft would be required. Further augmentation of the air transport force could have been made by adding C-141 Star-lifters, additional 707's or additional Hercules aircraft. Even so, numerous transport sorties would still have been required to lift an entire brigade, its equipment and munitions. Would there be enough time for such a massive airlift that might take at least ten days? There was also the question as to whether Canada could afford to concentrate all its air transport resources on one formation. Even if these problems had not existed, the reequipment planned for the Forces in the 1980's and 1990's did not have room for an increase in air transport resources.

The second option, suggested by analyst Nils Orvik and others, involving the forward deployment of the CAST Force to Europe also entailed significant financial costs. The initial costs of establishing a new base in Europe, or

expanding the base at Lahr, to accommodate 5 CBG and additional dependents would be very great. Furthermore, even the U.K./Netherlands Amphibious Force, with naval amphibious vessels under its immediate control, would require some 10 days before being fully set up in northern Norway. As has been noted by naval theorists and strategists, such a force had the flexibility lacked by an airborne force, even if that Airborne force had its equipment prepositioned in its intended area of destination. A decision to deploy an amphibious force is a less irrevocable step than a decision to deploy an airborne force. In the political context of the Northern Cap, this type of force might be ideal. However, in order to match that capability, a Canadian force deploying from Schleswig-Holstein or Scotland would require its own specialized amphibious vessels. This type of expenditure would have been very difficult to justify.

The third alternative for improving the CAST commitment, that of prepositioning military equipment in Norway was the option actually pursued by the government, though not with the commitment of substantial resources. As a result, since the signature of the 1982 MOU, progress on prepositioning some heavy vehicles for the lead AMF battalion of the CAST brigade, had been very slow. Indeed, more than one year later, in June of 1983, only 57 soft-skinned trucks and jeeps had been prepositioned in Troms county in northern Norway. These vehicles were only sufficient to carry munitions and stores for two of the AMF

battalion's four rifle companies. The vehicles represented only about 1/36th of the more than 1800 vehicles held by the entire brigade.⁵⁵ Jean Jacques Blais, who succeeded Giles Lamontange as Minister of National Defence in 1983, sought to move the prepositioning process along by attempting to obtain NATO Infrastructure funding for the construction of proper equipment sites in Norway. During his visit to Norway in March of 1984, Blais enlisted Norwegian support in pursuing a request for such NATO funding. Norwegian Defence Minister Anders Sjaastad (who years earlier had remarked that Norway might be willing to provide some funding for such a project--see Appendix) and Foreign Minister Svend Stray readily agreed to support such a Canadian request. Blais noted that he hoped such funding would be forthcoming after the May 1984 Ministerial Meetings in Brussels. 'All indications are that the decision will be made in our favour', Blais reported.⁵⁶ Such funding Blais noted would allow Canada to fully preposition equipment for the lead battalion of the CAST Brigade, the AMF battalion group. Canada, as Blais subsequently remarked after the NATO Ministerial Meetings, was the largest proportional contributor to NATO infrastructure costs.

Therefore we were very adamant that the amounts that should be made available under the infrastructure ceiling should be sufficient for us to obtain the

⁵⁵SCEAND, May 19 1983, p. 96:25, and June 9 1983, Appendix 99A:6 and DND Canadian Air/Sea Transportable Brigade Group, Ottawa:1986, p. 1.

⁵⁶SCEAND, March 27 1984, p. 5:6.

funding for the North Flank infrastructure, which is required for the CAST Brigade prepositioning.⁵⁷

However no consensus was reached at the NATO meeting to increase the amount of funding available in the 1985-1990 period for Slice 36; that being the money for infrastructure on the Northern Flank.⁵⁸ Inevitably this would have entailed taking money away from other areas to pay for the Canadian-Norwegian project. NATO countries which would have lost funding programs or had those programs delayed naturally opposed the Canadian-Norwegian proposal. Even if additional funding had been made available from NATO coffers for the project, the basic problem with the CAST commitment, the requirement to transport most of the equipment to Norway by sea, would have remained.

A second major area of military concern involving the CAST commitment centered on the air transport portion of the deployment. In its report on Canada's Military Air Transport, the Senate Special Committee on National Defence noted the following duties assigned to Air Command's Air Transport Group in a crisis:

. . . provide airlift support for the defence of North America; airlift the Allied Command Europe, ACE, mobile force . . . contingents to the NATO North Flank; provide logistic resupply and personnel reinforcement for the ACE Mobile Forces; airlift augmentation forces to Canadian Forces in Europe; withdraw and redeploy Canadian Forces peacekeeping forces; deploy forces for internal security and post-strike operations; evacuate Canadian nationals, non combatants and casualties from overseas areas; provide for and support search and

⁵⁷SCEAND, May 22 1984, p. 12:8.

⁵⁸Ibid.

rescue, humanitarian and medical evacuation operations; and provide secure airlift to senior government and military personnel.⁵⁹

While some of these requirements could either be downgraded, discarded or accomplished on return flights to Canada from Europe, certainly it can be seen that Air Transport Group faced a serious problem in fulfilling all of its roles. All these roles had to be accomplished with only some 30 long range 707 and C-130 aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Scott, Section Head of Air Operations and Training, noted that the airlift of the AMF battalion group to the Northern Flank alone 'required the use of the entire C-130 force, generating over 3000 flying hours.⁶⁰ Clearly assistance would be required from requisitioned civil air transport to accomplish all of Air Transport Group's duties. Indeed, in past AMF exercises, Air Canada had provided freight charters for the flights from Canada to Bardufoss in Norway.⁶¹ An agreement signed in 1981 between DND and Air Canada (which acted as an agent for Canada's other commercial air carriers), called for commercial air carriers to provide airlift assistance to the Canadian Forces when required in peacetime to assist in deployments.⁶² However the agreement

⁵⁹Special Senate Committee on National Defence, Military Air Transport, Ottawa: February 1986, p. 6.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 23.

⁶¹Proceedings, Special Senate Committee on National Defence, September 26, 1985, p. 10:7.

⁶²Agreement reprinted in Military Air Transport, Appendix 2, pp. 63-71.

did not include a war contingency. Even though Captain Normand Foster, President of the Canadian Airline Pilots Association, stated his belief that enough pilots would volunteer for possible dangerous wartime assignments that included flying into war zones such as northern Norway, there was some concern over DND's ability to get enough trained civilian air crew to do the job. At the same time it was noted by Major General L. A. Ashley, Chief of Air Doctrine and Operations, that the Canadian commercial aircraft fleet had limited cargo capacity. Thus, while the fleet could assist in deploying personnel to Europe and in evacuating some of the 12,000 non-combatant dependents from Europe, its ability to assist in moving vehicles and munitions was limited.⁶³ Air Transport Group also had the assignment to provide air-air refueling support for the deployment of CF-5 fighters to Europe. As indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel D. A. Noble of the Directorate of Military Plans Co-ordination, the movement of these squadrons to the Northern Flank would be one of the first priorities. However as of 1985, only two of Air Transport Group's 707's and none of the C-130's were equipped for mid air refueling. As a result, only eight of the CF-5's could be escorted over at one time. A number of sorties in the first several days would therefore be required to move both squadrons to Europe. In addition, supporting equipment and

⁶³For instance, only one civil Hercules was in operation in Canada in 1985. Special Senate Committee May 9, 1985, pp. 8:12-13.

ground crews would have to be moved over by C-130 aircraft. The need to provide mid-air refueling for North American air defence in the early days of a crisis would be a serious problem. It is not surprising that Colonel J. D. O'Brien, Director of Air Requirements, regarded additional 707 and C-130 tanker equipped aircraft as a top priority for Air Transport Group.⁶⁴

In the mid 1980's the scenario for Air Transport Group shaped up about as follows: In the first 7-10 days after a decision to mobilize, Air Transport Group and requisitioned civil aircraft would be required to move augmentation personnel to Europe; move the AMF battalion group to either Norway or Denmark; assist in the deployment of the two CF-5 squadrons and their ground crews to the Northern Flank; assist in North American defence operations; and evacuate as many dependents from Europe as possible on return flights. Likewise, if resources could have been spared, a redeployment of Canadian Forces serving in Cyprus and the Mid East would have been undertaken. The second 10 day period was to see the deployment by air of CAST personnel to Northern Norway. This task had been made more difficult by the 1985 decision to provide the AMF battalion group for the Northern Flank separately from the CAST brigade. While solving the problem of the need to possibly

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 8, 18, 20. The decision to reequip the two CF-5 squadrons with the CF-18 Hornet in the late 1980's would not reduce the air-refueling problems involved in deploying to Norway.

redeploy the AMF battalion group to rejoin the CAST brigade, Air Transport Group now had to lift an additional battalion group, its vehicles and stores, with no increase in air transport resources.⁶⁵ At the same time resources would have to be provided for operations in North America. Thus, while the deployment of the CAST Brigade's equipment would take three weeks moving by sea, it was difficult to see how, even if that equipment had been prepositioned, Canadian troops could have been transported over to Norway in much less time than the 2 weeks to 20 days envisaged without an increase in air transport resources.

Similar problems had arisen with respect to the air transport of Brigade personnel and equipment when actually in Norway. 430 Squadron, 5 CBG's helicopter squadron, was required after 1986 to provide some of its Twin Huey helicopters for the Canadian helicopter force stationed with the multinational Peacekeeping Force in the Sinai peninsula. Either these helicopters would be redeployed from Sinai to Norway in a crisis (which required modification of the Twin Huey to fit into a C-130 as well as up to nine C-130 sorties to lift all nine aircraft from the Sinai to Norway) or the other helicopter squadrons of Mobile Command would have to provide additional helicopters to 430 Squadron. Failing

⁶⁵The simultaneous decision to add 1200 troops to Canadian Forces Europe would decrease the number of augmentation personnel that would have been transported to Europe in a crisis. However, augmentation personnel did not require the vehicles and munitions that would have to be transported over with the additional battalion group now committed to the AMF.

this, 430 Squadron would deploy to Norway with only 3-4 Twin Huey helicopters, and thus have a much reduced battlefield airlift capacity.⁶⁶

The problems of Air Transport Group did not end with the deployment of the CAST Brigade to Norway. 4 CMBG, 5 CBG, the AMF battalion group, and their supporting air squadrons all had to be sustained in combat conditions after operations began. As Lieutenant General F. J. Richard, Deputy CDS in 1985, noted:

As long as we are dealing with a 'seven day war' there is no need to sustain indefinitely the forces deployed. With the likelihood of a protracted war, there is a requirement, in order to be able to sustain conventional operations, to have sufficient stocks and logistics support in place in Europe. What we have talked about are the requirements for the first 30 days of operations. No one has dictated that the war would end after 30 days; hence other requirements have to be added to those that we have described thus far.⁶⁷

Logistic support in Norway presented the Canadian Forces with a unique series of problems. Facilities for the repair of sophisticated equipment such as helicopters, was lacking in Norway. The incompatibility of many Canadian weapon systems with Norwegian or other allied equipment meant Canada would be responsible for providing such support on its own. In Germany Canadian Forces had the benefit of 'plugging into' an extensive U.S. supply line that fed the

⁶⁶Military Air Transport, pp. 49-54. If one considers that some helicopters are likely to be non-operable, especially in the possibly harsh climate of northern Norway, the need for adequate numbers of helicopters is especially apparent.

⁶⁷Special Senate Committee, May 9, 1985, p. 8:13.

needs of the U.S. 7th Army in southern Germany. In Norway no such supply line existed. Since no war stocks were held for 5 CBG in Norway, all such supplies would have to be transported from Canada. These logistic hurdles created immense problems for Canadian military planners.⁶⁸ Air Transport resources would thus have to be used to fly in munitions, replacement personnel and replacement equipment (if available) and fly out casualties. This airlift would have to be divided between the Northern Flank and the Central Front.

The third military problem with the CAST commitment concerned the unclear perception as to its exact military role. Originally the CAST commitment had been perceived primarily as 'political' commitment to the alliance. Little thought had been given by political decision-makers as to its military role. As late as the 1980's it was still perceived as a commitment designed to deter war, rather than as a commitment to also fight the war, if it occurred. As

⁶⁸Norway promised to provide some of this logistic support, but many facilities necessary for such support were lacking or inadequate. For instance, sophisticated systems such as the CF-18's coming on line in the late 1980's would have had to have been supported from Canada itself. Likewise, General Terry Liston noted that the Canadian public would never have tolerated the treatment of Canadian casualties in 'unsophisticated' Norwegian Field Hospital conditions. Clearly even where Canadians had reluctantly 'surrendered' logistic support to the Norwegians for practical reasons, they would have preferred to provide such support themselves. It is interesting to note in this regard that logistic support for the projected Canadian division in Germany will be provided by a Canadian reserve group, rather than by German Territorial Troops. Interview with General T. A. Liston.

Deputy CDS Admiral J. Allan noted in 1980, 'The CAST is a deterrent force more than anything else'.⁶⁹ When its military role was discussed, it always seemed to be envisaged in terms of assisting in the defence against initial Soviet attacks against northern Norway. Given the length of time envisaged for its deployment to Norway, this always seemed an unrealistic scenario. The U.S. Marine Brigade, which by 1986 could deploy to Norway in 8-10 days by air, had its equipment prepositioned some 800 kilometers south of the main defensive area of Troms county. The primary reason for choosing this location was of course to ease Soviet concerns about the possible offensive role of the U.S. Marine Brigade. If its equipment had been prepositioned further north, this may have raised tensions in the region. In spite of this, the Trondelag area was in many ways more conducive to meeting possible 2nd and 3rd echelon Soviet attacks through Swedish Lapland into northern Norway south of Troms. If the brigade's equipment had been prepositioned further north it would be less able to counter such a possibility.

The CAST Brigade only being able to deploy to Norway in 21 days, on the other hand had prepositioned its small amount of equipment in Troms county. Although the CAST Brigade would be more flexible in being able to land further south to meet 'unexpected' contingencies (such as a Soviet advance through Swedish Lapland), psychologically the

⁶⁹Senate Sub-committee, November 25, 1980, p. 3:26.

prepositioning of the Brigade's equipment in Troms suggested the need to deploy in time to meet Soviet first echelon attacks in the Troms/ Narvik area. With a deployment time of 21 days this was never realistic. Firstly, to land equipment in northern Norway, given heavy Soviet naval and naval air force activity, would be much more difficult. Secondly, to fly transport aircraft into this region, given likely heavy Soviet air force interdiction, was also a dubious proposition. Deployment to central Norway both by sea and air was more realistic. However it should be noted that no other allied country was committed to deploy troops and equipment by sea into Norway at such a late time after initial mobilization (M + 21). The U.S. Marines while possibly committed to deploy into Denmark between M + 30 and M + 40 would deploy with a true amphibious capability. Canada, on the other hand, would have been restricted to land its equipment in areas where port facilities were still in operation. Furthermore, an even later deployment (such as that of the U.S. marines which might deploy to Denmark), after allied naval and air forces had reduced the threat from Soviet naval and air forces, might have been more realistic than a shortened deployment time of 21 days, which committed Canadian Forces to arriving at the time when enemy naval and air activity might well be at its peak. Yet, while a later deployment of the CAST formation might have made more military sense in a long war scenario, such a formation would have had little political utility for

Canada. Since the commitment had been primarily political in the first place, and had proved useful as such, the government had no desire to consider changing the primary reason for the commitment's very existence. (For a more complete discussion, see Appendix).

A fourth military problem centered on the overtasked situation the Canadian Forces found themselves in since manpower had been reduced from some 100,000, first to 82,000 and then down to 78,000. Although manpower was by the early 1980's slowly being restored to a level of 83,000+, the multitude of commitments assigned to the Canadian Forces had led to a significant commitment-credibility gap. Mobile Command in particular was faced with serious dilemmas. Of the nine regular infantry battalions maintained by Mobile Command, one was usually deployed in Cyprus, two were deployed in Germany and the remaining six were based in Canada. To bring 4 CMBG in Germany to full strength and deploy the AMF/CAST force to the Northern Flank, four of those six battalions would have to be deployed to Europe. After the 1985 decision to constitute the AMF and CAST forces separately, five of the six Canadian based battalions were assigned overseas in wartime. While theoretically this left one infantry battalion and the Airborne Regiment to guard the whole of Canada, in fact since Mobile Command's infantry battalions were only maintained at about 75% strength, additional infantrymen would have to have been borrowed from the remaining Canadian based regular infantry

battalion, from a redeployed Cyprus based battalion (if there was time to redeploy) and from the militia.⁷⁰

Even if by some miracle, all Canadian Forces were able to deploy as planned, there would have been almost no reserve personnel left in Canada to sustain forces committed to combat overseas. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Air transport resources would have to be provided to sustain two brigades several thousand kilometers apart. General Jacques Chouinard, a former commander of 4 CMBG, estimated that the German based brigade would suffer 35% casualties in the first five or six days, once committed to combat. By the tenth or eleventh day he estimated casualties would be about 70%.⁷¹ Under these circumstances it was probable that 5 CBG would divert from its original Norwegian destination and, if it would deploy to Europe at all, would reinforce 4 CMBG. Seaborne deployment south of the GIUK Cap to Central Europe would be much less hazardous, and port landings in France much more feasible than landings in northern or central Norway. Although without MBT, the brigade did in fact possess many of the armoured assets necessary for fighting in Central Europe. Thus in the chaos of a general war, and given the feelings within the Canadian Forces that once

⁷⁰M. G. McKeown, The Reinforcement of NATO's Northern Flank: A Canadian Dilemma, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, April 1980. It was estimated by one noted analyst that the Militia maintained an effective strength of no more than 1000 qualified infantrymen, Senate Sub-committee, February 10, 1981, p. 7:10.

⁷¹Senate Sub-committee, May 19 1981, p. 16:18.

fighting had erupted a deployment to the Northern Flank was impossible, it was questionable whether the CAST Brigade would ever reach its intended wartime destination.

Increasingly the multitude of political and military problems led more and more individuals and groups to call for a cancellation of the CAST commitment. One of the first and most notable of these recommendations came from the first report of the Senate subcommittee on Defence, published in January of 1982.⁷² The Report, concerned with Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces, concluded that the CAST commitment was the most questionable aspect of the commitment-credibility gap. Although the subcommittee recommended that Canada's regular manpower be increased to about 92,000 personnel, it still concluded that even with these increases, the CAST commitment was an unacceptable drain on manpower and resources.⁷³ The subcommittee therefore recommended that the commitment be reviewed.⁷⁴ Committee members had on several occasions expressed their view that other NATO allies, notably Britain and the United States, were better suited to carrying out the CAST assignment. Canada, it was felt, would be better off reinforcing its commitment in Central Europe and having the capacity to sustain 4 CMBG in combat. Nevertheless, Committee members

⁷²Senate Sub-committee on National Defence, Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces, Ottawa: January, 1982.

⁷³Ibid., p. 41.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 19-20.

were conscious of the inevitable negative political consequences of such a decision and noted that

the Canadian government would probably encounter strong objections from Norway and Denmark . . . and, unless Norwegian and Danish concerns could be met and new NATO tasks worked out for the CAST force which significantly strengthened allied defenses, they would almost certainly object to any changes.⁷⁵

The Senate sub-committee recommendations certainly found favour with much of the Canadian military and many independent analysts. Within DND a series of classified studies had pointed out all of the political and military difficulties of the CAST commitment.⁷⁶ It was scarcely a secret that most officers, and especially Army Officers, believed that if sufficient funds could not be found to preposition equipment in Norway and increase air transport resources, then the CAST Commitment should be discontinued. A growing number of independent analysts had come to the same conclusion. For example, R. B. Byers concluded that because of the military difficulties and because of the need to focus Canada's limited defence resources, the CAST commitment should be cut and used to strengthen 4 CMBG while

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁶These studies included: The Effectiveness of the Cast combat group in its NATO role, ORAE Report No. R 47, Directorate of Land Operational Research, July 1974 (Classified 'NATO Secret'); The Warsaw Pact Threat to the Northern Flank of NATO NDHQ Director-General Intelligence and Security, March 21, 1978 (Classified 'Secret'); Directorate of International Plans, Coordination Presentation to DSACEUR on Canadian Forces Commitments to ACE April 30 1979, (Classified 'NATO Secret'); and more recently 5e Group-Brigade du Canada the CAST brigade mission: Estimate of the Situation, March 22 1985 (Classified 'Secret Canadian Eyes Only').

the 1 CAG should be recalled to Canada to strengthen the air defence of North America.⁷⁷ John Halstead, as has been noted, also favoured the consolidation of both the CAST Brigade and 4 CMBG at Lahr, while a group of four analysts joined Byers in calling for an end to the CAST commitment in a monograph published by Atlantic Council of Canada.⁷⁸ These analysts were pitted against the other group of individuals who saw the CAST commitment as a desirable commitment as it was expressive of Canada's interests as a 'northern country'.⁷⁹

The actual response of the government to calls from one side for cancellation and from the other side for an enhancement of the commitment, had the effect of satisfying neither lobby group. In responding to Senate committee recommendations, the government noted that the CAST commitment had been fully reviewed in 1978 and had been confirmed 'as an important and viable contribution to collective deterrence'. In reaffirming the primary war prevention rather than war fighting nature of the commitment, the

⁷⁷R. B. Byers 'Defence 81: The Strategic Environment for Canada' in Brian McDonald, ed., Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination? (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1982), p. 25.

⁷⁸R. B. Byers and others, Canada and Western Security Atlantic Council of Canada, 1982, pp. 36-37.

⁷⁹For a good synopsis of the divergence of opinion as to how to bridge the commitment-credibility gap, see Martin Shadwick, 'Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for Rationalization' Canadian Defence Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 1 Summer 1985), pp. 22-27.

government noted that

The CAST Brigade Group . . . is the only external force dedicated to the reinforcement of North Norway. It is highly important to the deterrence of aggression on this exposed flank of NATO.⁸⁰ (emphasis added)

In noting its own limited Maritime resources, the government statement emphasized the importance of allied assistance in deploying and protecting the CAST Brigade's equipment during its deployment to Norway. It went on to acknowledge that

in the present circumstances, it is the Canadian view that completion of the deployment before the outbreak of hostilities is imperative if this force is to achieve its objectives.⁸¹ (emphasis added)

The statement, while emphasizing the importance of maintaining the CAST commitment for political reasons, also alluded to the government's concern as to its continued military viability. Nevertheless, it was still felt that the political importance of the commitment overshadowed any military problems. In fact, Defence Minister Blais rejected all suggestions that the commitment could not be made viable within Canada's limited Defence budget.

I take exception as well to his (Conservative Harvey Andre) suggestion that somehow the CAST obligation to NATO will not be met should we proceed with the anticipated increases of 3% on an annual basis in our budgetary expenditures. Quite to the contrary, we feel quite confident that the CAST obligation is able to be met and will continue to be able to be met.⁸²

⁸⁰Special Senate Committee, April 17 1984, Appendix 8A:5.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 8A:5-6.

⁸²SCEAND, October 1 1985, p. 12:15.

More than one year later when the same Conservative member who had criticized the CAST commitment in the past was Associate Minister of National Defence, the government still viewed the CAST commitment as politically essential. As Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy, John Anderson noted, 'So the situation is far from ideal, but I guess from an alliance and a Norwegian point of view it is better than nothing'.⁸³ Thus the government, constrained by a limited defence budget and by political considerations, felt it could neither significantly strengthen nor abandon the CAST commitment.

The First Conservative Defence Review: 1984-1986

Prior to the September 1984 General Elections the Conservatives had pledged to increase the level of funding for Defence within Canada. In February of 1984 Brian Mulroney, leader of the Opposition, stated,

General Bernard Rogers, the present Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, stated in the summer of 1982, that major improvements in NATO's conventional forces were feasible at a modest price . . . General Rogers estimated the cost to be approximately 1 percent greater than the 3 percent annual real increase which NATO agreed to in 1978 . . . We stand ready, Mr. Speaker, to accept this policy.⁸⁴

This pledge, repeated in the election campaign, was only modestly greater than Prime Minister Turner's pledge to

⁸³SCEAND, October 1 1985, p. 30:25.

⁸⁴House of Commons, Debates, February 9 1984, p. 1219.

continue increases at a level of 3% per year.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, barely five weeks after the new government had been sworn in, Finance Minister Michael Wilson announced in his first budget that \$154 million would be cut from the previous Liberal governments estimates for defence. The government argued it would need to concentrate on a reduction of a deficit problem that was larger than anticipated. The new Minister of National Defence, Robert Coates, thus emerged as an early loser in the budget battle within the Cabinet. Coates, and his successor in February of 1985, Erik Nielson, nevertheless were mandated to reviewing Canada's defence policy with the aim of producing a White Paper that enhanced Canada's commitments to the Alliance.⁸⁶

However under a defence budget that was to be limited to a 2.75% real increase in 1985-1986 and 2% per year thereafter until 1991, DND would be lucky to continue with all the programs begun under the Liberal government.⁸⁷ Simultaneously the government seemed to rule out cuts to any

⁸⁵Gillian MacKay, 'Promises Without Specificity' MacLeans August 13 1984, p. 16. Defence Minister Jean-Jacques Blais had urged his Liberal Cabinet colleagues to adopt the 'Rogers Plan', and commit themselves to a 4% real increase but during the televised election debates Turner described the 3% increase pledge as 'adequate'. Debates, May 24 1984, p. 4007.

⁸⁶Robert Coates was forced to resign in February of 1985 after the disclosure of his visit to a West German strip club in December of 1984.

⁸⁷Cited in R. B. Byers, Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Challenges (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 214, Winter 1985), p. 43.

of Canada's major commitments. As Nielson declared,

The government believes that Canada must make every effort to meet its agreed commitments and carry its share of the burden in upholding the principle of collective defence.⁸⁸

Under these circumstances a new Defence White Paper seemed somewhat pointless to Nielson, since such a White Paper would say very little that was new. Nielson and his Associate Minister Harvey Andre did however endeavor to make the existing commitments more credible.⁸⁹ First, and most notably, it was announced in March of 1985 that an additional 1200 personnel would be provided to Canadian Forces in Europe by the summer of 1986.⁹⁰ The move would incur short term costs of deployment of additional personnel to Europe and additional costs associated with basing 1200 more personnel and their dependents in Europe. The replacement of personnel in Canada would be undertaken gradually by 'backfilling' positions by recruiting additional personnel. Although the government had pledged to add 8000 personnel to the regular armed forces over three years, these increases now were restricted basically to the previous Liberal levels

⁸⁸Erik Nielson, 'A Defence Perspective' Defence 84 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), p. 2.

⁸⁹Erik Nielson, who also held the position of Deputy Prime Minister, received assistance in his duties from the long time Conservative defence critic, Harvey Andre. In returning to the two Minister system of the 1960's, the Conservatives may also have sought to split the many duties involved in preparing a policy White Paper and in running the day-to-day affairs of DND, between two Ministers.

⁹⁰This proposal was first requested publicly by the former CDS General Jacques Dextraze in 1976. Cited in Larry Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, pp. 101-102.

of between 400-600 extra personnel per year.⁹¹

Secondly, the government continued to move ahead with equipment replacement programs planned under the previous Liberal government. These measures included, most notably, the Tribal class destroyer modernization (authorized in May of 1986), the Low-Level Air Defence Project (authorized in June of 1986), the conventional submarine replacement program (launched in July of 1986) and the shipborne aircraft replacement program (launched in August of 1986).

Thirdly, in measures specifically connected with the CAST commitment, the government sought to strengthen its military viability. Firstly, in March of 1985, the AMF and CAST commitments were separated. The Canadian Forces had long been concerned about the possible need in a future crisis to redeploy the AMF battalion to rejoin the CAST Brigade. The move to constitute these two formations separately seemingly made both forces more militarily credible once actually deployed on the Northern Flank. Yet in solving one problem, another was immediately accentuated. As described above, Mobile Command was already stretched very thin. It was doubtful whether it could realistically expect to deploy all of its combat strength overseas without the reserve capacity to sustain those formations in combat.

In a second move to increase the credibility of the

⁹¹SCEAND, April 6, 1985, p. 13:20. Nielson noted that 683 additional personnel would be added to the strength of the Forces in 1985.

CAST commitment, the government confirmed its intention to deploy the entire CAST Brigade on its first exercise in Norway in the fall of 1986. The measure, first announced by former Liberal Defence Minister Jean-Jacques Blais in May of 1984, had been under consideration since 1981. At that time, the CINCAF NORTH raised the possibility with Canadian CDS General R. M. Withers. The option was finally taken-up by the government in May of 1984.⁹² The exercise, which would cost some \$20 million, involved a relatively substantial commitment of resources. It was hoped that this demonstration would yield both political and military dividends. Politically, it was hoped that the exercise, code named 'Brave Lion' would demonstrate Canada's resolve to fulfil its military commitments to the Alliance, while militarily it was believed that numerous lessons could be learned and applied, eventually making the CAST commitment more credible. Lt. Colonel Garry Hunt, the Chief Planner of the exercise, noted that 'somebody else is not going to get something this year because we are doing this exercise'.⁹³ General Paul Manson, who had become CDS in 1986, hoped that this obvious Canadian effort to meet its CAST obligation, would benefit the country politically. He noted that an important objective of the exercise was to remind other members of the Alliance that Canada was doing its best

⁹²DND, Briefing on Exercise 'Brave Lion' to the NATO Media, July 15 1985, p. 2.

⁹³Jim Robb, The Citizen Ottawa, August 9, 1986.

within a restricted budget, to carry its part of the load.⁹⁴

The measures adopted by the Conservatives in defence, up until the end of 1986, constituted a de facto continuation of Canadian defence policy objectives as they had been first announced at the conclusion of the defence structure review in November of 1975. The primary aim was to ensure that the country did not suffer the adverse political effects that might result from a perception within NATO of Canada reducing the level of its commitment to the alliance. For the Conservatives, elected on a promise to fulfil Canada's commitments to NATO, this was especially important. Even a long time sceptic of the CAST commitment, Associate Minister Harvey Andre acknowledged, in October of 1985, that he had 'found it easier to criticize when I was on the outside rather than now that I am on the inside.'⁹⁵ After Erik Nielson's retirement in the summer of 1986, Harvey Andre seemed the natural choice to become Minister of National Defence. However, Prime Minister Mulroney had promised the electorate a full defence review and a new White Paper. He was now determined to find a Minister who was willing to conduct such a review. His choice fell on Perrin Beatty who, although he had next to no experience in

⁹⁴Winnipeg Free Press, August 13 1986, p. 17.

⁹⁵Special Senate Committee, October 24 1985, p. 12:10.

matters of defence, had proved to be an energetic and innovative Minister in his previous assignments.⁹⁶

Exercise 'Brave Lion',
the 1987 White Paper and
The Demise of the CAST Commitment

Exercise 'Brave Lion' officially began on August 12, 1986 with the issuance of an alert order to 5 CBG and other units associated with the CAST commitment. By September 2, 1986, 5 CBG, all its equipment, a supporting Chinook helicopter squadron and elements of two supporting CF-5 squadrons were deployed in Norway. After a period of work-up and training, Exercise 'Bar Frost' was held from September 19-25 with the CAST brigade exercising under the command of the Norwegian 6th Division. After the completion of the exercise all Canadian Forces personnel and almost all the equipment redeployed back to Canada. All units had returned to Canada by October 10.⁹⁷

While the movement of troops to Norway had been accomplished in a seemingly smooth fashion and within the 21 days allowed for the movement, the deployment concealed some two and one half years of planning. Planning for this first exercise of the entire CAST force had begun in the December

⁹⁶Beatty's previous portfolios were as Minister of Revenue from 1984-1986 and as a Minister of State in the Finance Department in 1979-1980.

⁹⁷For a detailed account see Malcolm Dunlop, 'Exercise Brave Lion to test Canadian Mobility' Chronicle Herald Halifax: August 6, 1986 and G. D. Hunt, 'Reinforcing the NATO North Flank: The Canadian Experience' Canadian Defence Quarterly (Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1987), pp. 31-38.

1984 meeting between Canadian and Norwegian officials in Oslo. In this and subsequent meetings, the concept, objectives and support requirements of the exercise were agreed upon. Emphasizing the seemingly close military ties that had evolved between Canada and Norway, the exercise was to be a bi-national affair held in conjunction with annual NATO wide autumn exercises. The bi-national nature of the exercise seemed to reflect the importance the Norwegians placed on the Canadian commitment.

The political symbolism attached to 'Brave Lion' is reflected in the declared initial objective of the exercise: 'to raise public consciousness about the commitment in Canada and NATO, and to observe the reaction of the Soviet Union'. This objective, it was declared, had been met, 'although not perhaps to the extent that had been hoped for'.⁹⁸ The declared initial objective was certainly promoted by Canadian officials within NATO prior to and during the exercise.

The second objective involved 'testing the plans and procedures for moving the force . . .'.⁹⁹ The exercise confirmed all that had been suspected about the sea deployment. The deployment of the Brigade's equipment, on 4

⁹⁸C. D. Hunt, 'Reinforcing the NATO North Flank', p. 36.

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 36-37.

chartered container ships, took 14 days.¹⁰⁰ Ominously, Soviet merchant ships and intelligence gathering vessels (AGI) shadowed the ships carrying the Canadian equipment through their entire deployment. Although mock protection for the deployment was provided by numerous NATO surface ships, including indirect support from a U.S. Navy Carrier task force, the probable dangers to the seaborne deployment were reinforced in the eyes of many.¹⁰¹

In terms of the air transport, it was necessary to utilize nearly all of ATG's C-130 and 707 aircraft to transport forces to northern Norway and to provide air refueling support to the CF-5's. In addition 5 747 and 4 DC-8 aircraft were hired from Air Canada and Nation Air to assist in the air deployment. This enabled the lifting of about 5000 men to Norway over a period principally concentrated on the four days from August 30 to September 2.

The personnel of the CAST force deployed into Bardufoss while the equipment landed in Sorresia, both centers being located in Troms county. The Canadian military needed no reminders as to the probable difficulty of deploying directly into this region if fighting had already erupted. Certainly Norwegians themselves had raised the difficulty of landing equipment from merchant ships,

¹⁰⁰In an actual war situation, Norway was committed to provide the sea transport. In order to avoid severe disruptions to the peacetime functions of these vessels 4 Container Ships (from Panama, Honduras and Britain) were chartered for the exercise.

¹⁰¹Winnipeg Free Press, August 19, 1986.

especially in a situation where port facilities had been damaged.¹⁰² Furthermore, if after the CAST landing the Soviets launched a successful flanking attack through Swedish Lapland, the CAST Brigade and other allied forces would be endangered of being cut off and surrounded. The Canadian assessment of the results of the exercise alluded to possible differences between Norwegian and Canadian officers when it was noted that 'Differences in doctrine, operating procedures, command and intercommunication appeared, pointing to the requirements to improve interoperability . . . in order to ensure effective cooperation in war.'¹⁰³

The third and fourth objectives of the exercise were to conduct 'realistic field training' and to 'test the support concept'.¹⁰⁴ Both objectives were affected by peacetime constraints, but nevertheless significant military lessons were learned.¹⁰⁵ Even such seemingly simple matters such as having the correct size of nozzle available in Canadian vehicles for attachment to Norwegian jerricans were

¹⁰²Joint session between SCEAND and Norwegian Parliamentary Defence Committee, Ottawa: February 25, 1985.

¹⁰³C. D. Hunt, 'Reinforcing the NATO North Flank', p. 37.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵It was not possible for Norway to provide the logistic support it was committed to provide under the terms of the 1976 MOU. The requisition of vehicles to provide such support would have constituted a significant disruption of the civilian economy. Thus such support had to be provided by other means, inevitably increasing the cost of the exercise.

obstacles that had to be overcome.¹⁰⁶ One problem already apparent before the exercise was the great cost of conducting such an exercise. The Canadian Forces were strained conducting just one such major exercise. If exercises were conducted on a more regular basis, costs would be great. Yet it was only through such exercises that the political and military reality of the Canadian commitment was emphasized to allies and adversaries alike.

Finally, the exercise focused attention on the seriousness of the commitment credibility gap. A significant pooling of equipment from other units, notably of helicopters, had to be made to make the CAST formation effectively operational. The difficulties of sustaining this force in combat, both with men and equipment, had been made more apparent.

Exercise 'Brave Lion' had the effect, for the new Minister, of demonstrating and focusing all of the military problems involved in the CAST commitment. As Beatty himself noted, the exercise offered an important opportunity to test a major part of Canada's NATO commitment at a time when defence policy was under review. This review of Canadian defence policy was to be comprehensive. 'Nothing is dismissed, nothing is confirmed, everything is on the table for us to look at other than the commitment that we made to

¹⁰⁶Briefing for the NATO Media, July 15, 1985, p. 4.

NATO'.¹⁰⁷ Beatty, as a self-admitted novice in the area of national defence, was alarmed by the stark gap that he found between the commitments of the Canadian Forces and their ability to actually meet those commitments. As the 1987 Defence White Paper, Challenge And Commitment, would note, 'After decades of neglect there is indeed a significant commitment-credibility gap'.¹⁰⁸ Beatty found such gaps in five principal areas.

The first area was in the capability of the forces in the Canadian Arctic. Although the Forces had exercised in the arctic throughout the 1970's and 1980's in order to enhance Canadian sovereignty claims, there was little in the way of a military capability to defend against what was perceived as a growing Soviet military threat to Canada. In Defence in the 70's it had been noted that 'a catastrophic war between the super powers constitutes the only major military threat to Canada'.¹⁰⁹ However, by the late 1980's both the bomber/cruise missile threat and the undersea Soviet submarine threat were perceived to have grown considerably.¹¹⁰ The Canadian capability to counter both

¹⁰⁷'Defence policy review to exclude NATO commitment, Beatty says', Winnipeg Free Press, September 25, 1986, p. 58.

¹⁰⁸DND, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987, p. 43.

¹⁰⁹Defence in the 70's, p. 6.

¹¹⁰In the context of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative, it was felt that the threat from Soviet air-breathing cruise missiles might well increase in the future.

those threats was seen as insufficient. In the context of the 1985 voyage of the USCG Icebreaker Polar Sea through the North West passage, many individuals in government felt that Canada had to exercise a greater 'presence' of her own in the north, rather than working out a closer naval defence arrangement with the U.S. for the Arctic. The conflict between U.S. and Canadian claims in the Arctic proved a major impetus in moving the government to accept the need for a greater Canadian military presence in the Arctic.¹¹¹ Despite the launch of the conventional submarine replacement program in August of 1986 and the apparent rejection of the nuclear submarine alternative, Beatty convinced by his naval advisors, revived the idea of purchasing SSN's. Indeed, Rear-Admiral Charles Thomas, Chief of Maritime Doctrine and Operations, even suggested double-crewing Canadian submarines so as to achieve maximum operational flexibility.¹¹²

The North Warning agreement, signed with the U.S. in September of 1985; the moves to construct five forward operating locations in the Arctic for use by Canadian CF-18 fighters; and the consideration given to possible space based surveillance satellites for the 1990's all were measures designed to meet the air breathing threat. In order to reduce American domination of air defence in Canada, the government also moved to increase the numbers of Canadian personnel in certain NORAD positions and as crew members of U.S. AWACS aircraft. Challenge and Commitment, pp. 55-59.

¹¹¹For a good view of the progression of government thinking on Arctic Defence, see 'The New Race for the Arctic', Macleans August 19, 1985, pp. 16-23; 'A Secret Plan for Free Trade and Sovereignty' Macleans, November 11, 1985, pp. 14-21; and 'The Battle Over Defence', Macleans, March 24, 1986, pp. 20-23.

¹¹²Proceedings, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, January 28, 1987, p. 3:31.

Clearly the navy was lobbying for a fleet with maximum capability. SSN's, unlike conventional submarines, would put the Canadian Navy in the 'big league' of maritime powers.¹¹³ With the government already under serious attack from Canadian nationalists for its 'Free Trade' Initiatives, an increased maritime, air and ground force military capability in the Canadian Arctic, coupled with other civil, diplomatic and legal measures, would serve to shore up the government's credibility as a defender of Canadian sovereignty and independence.¹¹⁴

The reconstruction of the capability of the Canadian Navy was a second area of focus for the new Defence Minister. Modernization of the Navy in the 1990's had already been planned by the previous Liberal government. However, under Beatty's revised plan, the Canadian Navy would be reconfigured as a truly three-ocean force. Challenge and Commitment announced that, while the number of destroyers and frigates in the navy would decline slightly in the 1990's (probably from 20 to 16), the submarine component

¹¹³Nuclear-powered attack submarines were only held by the United States, Soviet, French, Royal and Chinese Navies in 1987.

¹¹⁴The government announced in the 1987 White Paper that a major Canadian air, naval and ground force 'training center' was planned for construction in the Arctic. The most notable civil and legal measures to enhance Canadian sovereignty were announced shortly after the Polar Sea voyage. The government decided to draw straight base lines around Canada's territorial claims and take any future violations of Canadian sovereignty to the International Court of Justice. It was also decided to build a huge Polar 8 class icebreaker for use in the Arctic by the Canadian Coast Guard.

would increase significantly after the turn of the century. Likewise new mine counter measures ships and light patrol boats would be acquired to give the fleet a more balanced capability. By cancelling the conventional submarine replacement program and the third batch of new frigates, the government hoped it could pay for this reconfiguration of the Navy.¹¹⁵

This reconfiguration would have major impact on Beatty's Third priority for enhanced capability, the Pacific theatre. As Beatty remarked,

Canada is a Pacific nation . . . Yet today the capabilities that we have on our West coast are quite meager . . . The Soviet presence in the Pacific is continuing to grow. The Soviet navy has assigned a very high priority to this whole question of its role in the Pacific.¹¹⁶

As a result, in January of 1987, Beatty announced the transfer of a Tribal class helicopter destroyer to the west coast as well as the provision of Sea King ASW helicopters for the support ship HMCS Provider, which she had here-to-for not embarked. For the first time, the west coast received an ASW helicopter capability.¹¹⁷ However in the context of a reduction of the size of the Canadian surface fleet it was difficult to see how the government would enhance its maritime capability on the west coast. If it

¹¹⁵Challenge and Commitment, pp. 49-55.

¹¹⁶Standing National Defence Committee, December 11, 1986, p. 2:12.

¹¹⁷'West Coast naval forces to receive helicopters', Winnipeg Free Press, January 22, 1987, p. 18.

sought to maintain the same number of surface ships on the east coast in the 1990's as in 1987 (12 destroyers and frigates), then this would leave only 4 major surface ships on the west coast in the 1990's (as opposed to 8 destroyers and frigates in 1987). Thus, Challenge and Commitment, lamenting the existence of only 4 Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft on the west coast, announced that six additional LRPA's would be purchased to help remedy the situation on the west coast until new SSN's entered service in significant numbers in the 2000's.¹¹⁸

A fourth priority area, the sustainability of the Canadian Forces in combat and the general inefficient use that had been made of reserve forces in Canada, had been singled out in the defence review as in need of improvement. In the context of a limited defence budget, Beatty noted that, 'there are jobs reserves can do much more cost-effectively than the regular forces can'.¹¹⁹ This had long been apparent and in a speech in January of 1987, Beatty announced that the low priority the reserves had received since the 1964 Defence White Paper would be ended. Under Challenge and Commitment's priorities, the contribution to Conventional Defence by Canada was second only to the first priority of maintaining the viability of stable strategic

¹¹⁸Challenge and Commitment, p. 57.

¹¹⁹Standing Committee on National Defence, March 5, 1987, p. 5:39.

deterrence.¹²⁰ In this light, revitalized ground, air and naval reserves were vital for contributing to and sustaining conventional combat operations.

The need to sustain credible conventional operations in the long term was the primary consideration in reviewing Canada's CAST commitment. At the time of exercise 'Brave Lion', no hint had been given of Canada's intention to review this commitment. In fact, Defence Minister Beatty, while visiting Canadian Forces during the exercise, remarked that the exercise demonstrated that 'Canada's obligations towards NATO and Europe will be fulfilled'. As part of the demonstration of its continued commitment, Canada left sufficient vehicles behind to virtually complete the prepositioning plan agreed to between Canada and Norway in 1982.¹²¹ However, in light of the Minister's demonstrated desire to have 'real' military capability in those areas where a significant commitment-credibility gap existed, it is not surprising, given all the problems of the CAST commitment, that a full-scale review was launched.

Firstly a major option to enhance the CAST commit-

¹²⁰Challenge and Commitment announced that in future Canadian defence policy would seek to contribute to:

- the maintenance of strategic deterrence,
- credible conventional defence
- the protection of Canadian sovereignty
- the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and
- effective arms control (p. 49).

¹²¹'Canada leaves arms', Winnipeg Free Press, September 23, 1986, p. 25.

ment was considered. This option was to fully preposition equipment for 5 CBG in Norway. A similar plan had already been adopted for the U.S. Marine brigade committed to reinforce northern Norway. Furthermore, Canadian Forces in Germany had long had equipment prepositioned so that augmentation personnel flown to Germany from Canada could link up with such equipment. Likewise war stocks to replace equipment lost in combat were also held in Germany. However, prepositioning in Norway presented several unique problems. Firstly, all new equipment would have to be virtually purchased in duplicate. In order to conduct brigade sized, or even battalion group sized exercises in Canada the brigade based in Canada would have had to be fully equipped. Moreover, once 5 CBG deployed to Norway, the brigade's equipment in Canada would still have had to be sealifted through the treacherous waters north of the GIUK Gap. Without such replacement equipment, the brigade would be unable to replace its war losses. Likewise, the limited Canadian transport force, as described previously, would still have to sustain forces both in Germany and in Norway. As Brigadier-General Liston noted, the difficulties of supporting sophisticated equipment in Norway were numerous. Certain types of support for equipment such as the CF-18 Hornet would have been unavailable at any Norwegian base.¹²²

¹²²Interview with Brigadier-General Terry Liston. Certain types of support costs might have been shared with the U.S. Marine Corps F-18 squadrons assigned to Norway. However Canada would certainly have had to pay a significant share of the costs of constructing support facilities and

In conjunction with studies to preposition equipment, the possibility of basing 5 CBG forward in Europe was also considered. In particular, the Scottish base option was apparently considered by DND.¹²³ In return for the boost such an influx of 5000-6000 Canadian troops to Scotland might have given to the local economy, joint sea and air transport arrangements might have been made with the British. However, the incompatibility of Canadian and British equipment would have made any joint logistic support plans very difficult, perhaps impossible, to implement. Moreover British Amphibious and Air Transport capability was already stretched to the limit without adding a requirement to lift an additional 5000-6000 Canadian troops. Likewise the deployment of predominantly French-speaking brigade to Scotland might have a difficult adjustment for French-speaking troops to make.¹²⁴ As Challenge and Commitment ultimately concluded, the implementation of a comprehensive prepositioning plan (perhaps including the forward deployment of 5 CBG to Europe) 'could only be done at great cost'.¹²⁵ Since the Conservative government had already

stocking spares.

¹²³"Scotland puts out welcome mat for rumoured Canadian invasion," Winnipeg Free Press, February 20, 1987, p. 12.

¹²⁴Although Canadian troops deployed in Germany faced similar problems, a greater percentage of Germans probably speak English than do Scots speak French. Likewise the Canadian base at Lahr is only minutes away from France. This is of benefit to French-speaking troops stationed there.

¹²⁵Challenge and Commitment, p. 61.

restricted DND to a 2% real annual increase in defence spending, the option to provide massive amounts of additional resources for the Department was rejected. Indeed, given the likely need to provide enhanced funding for the four other defence priority areas, the additional funds required to make the CAST commitment credible could not be found. The government therefore had only one militarily credible alternative, the cancellation of the commitment.

In both the 1974-1975 and 1976-1978 Defence Reviews, this option had been rejected for political reasons. Indeed, since 1978 any review of Canada's existing military commitments had been ruled out. All the pressure from NATO in the late 1970's and 1980's had been in the direction of Canada enhancing the military viability of its pledges to the alliance. This was certainly true in the case of the CAST commitment. Yet the limited size of the Canadian defence budget had precluded any truly significant programs to enhance the viability of the reinforcement plan. As exercise 'Brave Lion' had demonstrated, significant obstacles remained in the path of making the CAST concept militarily credible. As a result of its military weaknesses the political value of the CAST commitment was being undermined also. Indeed the White Paper noted, that the military dubiousness of the commitment 'would be as obvious to our opponents as it is to us and, consequently, these commitments would contribute little to deterrence'.¹²⁶ This

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 61.

perception contributed to the general feeling that the commitment had to be abandoned and replaced by a new reinforcement plan that was both more militarily and politically credible. Indeed, the Canadian position in the alliance in 1986-1987 seemed more conducive to support for such an alteration in Canada's commitments.

Firstly in 1976-1978 Canada was still attempting to demonstrate its renewed strong political commitment to the alliance in the face of the earlier deemphasis of NATO in Defence in the 70's. Ultimately, it had been felt at home that a cancellation of the CAST commitment would have been politically counterproductive. In 1986-1987, however, Canada's position in the alliance was quite different. In absolute terms the Canadian Defence budget was some 26% higher than it had been in 1977-1978. Most of these increases had gone into providing new equipment for Canada's NATO commitments. Moreover, Canada had been remarkably consistent in meeting NATO's three percent real increase goal, whereas other NATO nations has fallen short.

Secondly, unlike in the period 1976-1978, Canada could realistically offer to provide a more credible military reinforcement plan elsewhere in the NATO Theater. 5 CBG had recently, as noted previously, reequipped its artillery regiment with self-propelled howitzers in place of its previously held lighter and towed artillery. The infantry battalions of 5 CBG were mechanized, making them suitable for deployment in Central Europe. Likewise the

helicopters of the brigade would provide a future Canadian division in Germany with the air transport and additional reconisance capability usually held by such a force. While the 5 CBG held no MBT, a reequipment of 4 CMBG with new tanks was planned for the 1990's. By reequipping both brigades with new tanks at that time, 5 CBG could be transformed into a truly heavy brigade capable of operations in Central Europe. Moreover the consolidation of two Canadian brigades in southern Germany had numerous logistical benefits. Equipment now held as war stocks for 4 CMBG could be designated as prepositioned equipment, ready for use by the troops of 5 CBG after they had been flown over from Canada. The equipment held by 5 CBG in Canada could then be shipped by sea to Central Europe and made available to both 4 CMBG and 5 CBG to replace war losses. Shipping equipment south of the GIUK Gap would certainly be less hazardous than the previous plan of shipping equipment to Norway.¹²⁷ If this plan for a comprehensive reequipment of both Canadian brigades, complete with prepositioned equipment, went ahead as planned it was felt that to provision such a 'divisional sized' strategic reserve on the Central

¹²⁷Interview with Brigadier-General T. A. Liston. The consolidation of two brigades and 5 CF-18 squadrons in southern Germany also reduced the support problems previously involved in supporting two brigades thousands of kilometers apart. The existence of major Canadian base facilities in southern Germany ended many of the previous problems associated with the commitment of sophisticated equipment to northern Europe. Even so, Canada would now have to provide its own shipping for the brigade's equipment. Previously, of course, Norway had been committed to provide this transport.

Front would be probably more politically valuable than the previous CAST commitment had been.

By the late fall of 1986 this planned alteration to Canada's commitments began to take shape. As Beatty noted in November, only some two months after exercise 'Brave Lion',

I am concerned about our double commitment to supply both Norway and Central Europe in time of war. The commitment raises two questions. Are we making the most effective contribution possible? Are we spreading our troops so thinly that we put them in jeopardy?¹²⁸

Canadian military officers who had long expressed their concerns in private began to do so publicly. Likewise, in a move that seemed to herald Canada's withdrawal from Northern Europe, it was made known that DEA planned to close Canada's small embassy in Finland.¹²⁹ Finally the CDS General Paul Manson, addressing the conference of Defence Associations in Ottawa in January of 1987, omitted any reference to the CAST commitment when remarking on the political importance of Canada's forces stationed in West Germany.¹³⁰

These signals set off alarm bells in Norway. The signals indicated to the Norwegians that the Canadian defence policy review had taken an ominous turn. Barely four months earlier, during exercise 'Brave Lion', it had

¹²⁸'Beatty's Mandate', The Financial Post, December 1, 1986, p. 51.

¹²⁹'Bungling over Embassies', Winnipeg Free Press, December 17, 1986, p. 6.

¹³⁰'Canada to Maintain West German Forces', Winnipeg Free Press, January 16, 1987, p. 24.

seemed that Canada's commitment to Norwegian defence had been secure. Now the Canadian defence policy review had taken a surprising turn for the worse.

As a result in February of 1987 the Norwegians despatched a delegation of senior officials, headed by Defence Minister Johan Holst, to Canada. Holst met with Beatty in Ottawa and evidently made a strong political pitch for Canada to remain committed to Norwegian security. Holst apparently emphasized the natural interest Canada had in cooperating with Norway as a fellow northern country. He also noted that Norway preferred Canadian reinforcements to the provision of additional American forces for Norway. In the Norwegian view the U.S. role (particularly in the realm of naval power) on the Northern Flank was already too overshadowing for Norway's liking. Canadian forces, Holst argued, were more compatible with Norway's policy of reassurance. Additional American forces committed to Norway were not only perceived as weakening Norway's independence of action, but might also have the effect of increasing the level of military engagement in Northern Europe.¹³¹

However these arguments failed to sway Beatty or his military advisors. In an appearance before the House of

¹³¹Related by Captain (N) John Toogood of the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security. Holst repeated the same arguments to a group of academics of Carleton University during his visit. Holst had served as a guest professor at Carleton several years previously. Evidently Holst's argument was a strong one. Captain Toogood, who was himself very sceptical of the CAST commitment, noted that all who listened to Holst acknowledged that he had made a strong case for retaining the commitment.

Commons Defence Committee, Beatty acknowledged Holst's visit but did not elaborate on any of the matters discussed. He merely reaffirmed the importance of Canada's commitment to the AMF (land) and offered no assurances about Canada's CAST commitment to Norway.¹³² Canadian officials seemed to have concluded by this time that the negative political reaction to the cancellation of the CAST commitment would be manageable.

Firstly, Canada would be increasing its military and air contribution to the defence of West Germany. As one of the most important NATO countries, the need to satisfy West Germany was crucial. Both of the NATO Ministerial Meetings of December 1986 and May 1987 had strongly urged both Canada and the United States not to reduce their in place forces in Western Europe.¹³³ The Canadian plan to reinforce Central Europe after withdrawing from the Northern Flank actually envisaged increasing slightly Canadian forces in Germany in order to establish some new units including a divisional headquarters. In the light of European concerns over the results of October Reykjavik summit between Soviet leader Gorbachev and president Reagan, Germany and the other nations of Central Europe should have been pleased with the

¹³²Standing Committee on National Defence, March 5, 1987, p. 5:8.

¹³³See Winnipeg Free Press, December 4, 1986, p. 37 and Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 7, 1987, p. 6.

Canadian decision.¹³⁴

Secondly, among the other concerned European nations, Britain would likely oppose the Canadian decision. As a British General directed the defence of the Northern Flank, the withdrawal of Canadian troops from this command area would not likely find support from the British government. Moreover, if replacements for Canadian troops on the Northern Flank were provided, it was likely that either the United States or Britain would have to provide them. Given Norwegian desires to limit the American presence on the Northern Flank, the responsibility for replacing the Canadian formation might well fall on Britain.¹³⁵ Even so the concerns of CINCAF NORTH, while no doubt expressed by the British government, might well have been somewhat muted. With the Canadian plan to purchase some 10-12 SSN the British government will certainly have been anxious to see

¹³⁴The so-called 'near deal' at Reykjavik included a plan to withdraw American medium range missiles from Europe. The extent to which a future American-Soviet deal would decouple America from the defence of Western Europe concerned the West Europeans. Under these circumstances all signals from North America (including Canada) indicating continued North American interest in the defence of Europe, would be welcome.

¹³⁵Britain would be hard pressed to find a formation to take on the Norwegian role. Transferring the area of responsibility for the UKMF from Denmark to that of Norway might be the most logical solution. This principally light air portable force would probably be more suited to northern Norway where the U.K. could consolidate its logistics support requirements for supplying both the UKMF and the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force. However it seems likely that the Danes might strongly object to the withdrawal of the UKMF from its responsibility of reinforcing the Baltic Approaches.

this massive contract awarded to the British nuclear submarine builders, Vickers. Leaks from DND to the effect that Vickers were the apparent forerunners for the SSN contract, may have had an effect on the criticism made by British diplomats and officials of Canada's planned CAST decision.¹³⁶ The fact that the British Defence Ministry had taken a keen interest in Canada's submarine plans is certain. In May of 1987, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defence confirmed that Britain was actively seeking the contract.¹³⁷ Indeed a future decision by the British government to assume the responsibilities of Canada's CAST force on the Northern Flank might be even more crucial in helping to decide which company gets Canada's SSN contract.

The most difficult country to satisfy was, of course, Norway. Indeed in April of 1987 the Norwegian Chief of Defence, General Frederick Bull-Hansen, speaking at the RUSI in London, reportedly remarked informally that the consequence of a Canadian decision to withdraw from its commitment to Norway would be 'absolutely disastrous', for Norway and for NATO in political terms. Later in a visit to Canada at the end of May, 1987, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg warned of possibly a serious rift in Norwegian-Canadian relations resulting from the

¹³⁶ Britain was also anxious to provide Canada's new shipborne helicopters and offered a variety of shipboard components and equipment suited for Canada's planned surface ship programs.

¹³⁷ 'Sub purchase plans hinted', Winnipeg Free Press, May 14, 1987, p. 26.

Canadian decision.¹³⁸ Norwegian concerns may have thus led the government to attempt to ease the withdrawal pains. In announcing its decision in the June White Paper, the government pledged to remain formally committed to Norway for one-two more years so as to allow NATO to find a replacement for the CAST force. Likewise Canada decided to retain its AMF (land) battalion group commitment to the Northern Flank. Equipment prepositioned in Norway for this battalion would considerably ease the problems of deployment. In the future Canada was apparently seeking to end the obligation to deploy this battalion to Denmark.¹³⁹ Canada's AMF battalion group would then be committed solely to Norway, with much of its heavy equipment already prepositioned.

As a result of these various moves, Canada's formal proposals to end the CAST commitment were accepted (with Norwegian reservations) by the NATO Defence and Military Committees in May of 1987.¹⁴⁰ Yet, despite the Prime Minister's own assurances that 'There is nothing (for Norway) to worry about', it seemed clear that serious political questions had arisen as a result of the Canadian

¹³⁸Norway warns of diplomatic rift with Canada over troop pullout', Winnipeg Free Press, May 30, 1987, p. 56.

¹³⁹Interview with General Terry Liston. Since the German AMF battalion assigned to Norway had never in fact exercised there because of Norwegian restrictions, a deal might in future be worked out whereby the Germans would handle AMF responsibilities in Denmark while Canada would provide forces for the AMF in Norway.

¹⁴⁰Interview with General Liston.

decision.¹⁴¹

Firstly, although Canada had taken direct steps to fully consult its NATO allies about the proposed changes, some questions about Canadian credibility must nevertheless have been raised. Canada was clearly abandoning a commitment it had made to Norway and to NATO. It had signed numerous MOU's with NATO and Norway designed to emphasize the secure nature of this commitment. Moreover Canada had a previous history of backing out of major commitments when it had unilaterally reduced its forces in Germany in the early 1970's. The new Canadian commitment in Central Europe to provide a division there in a crisis, depended on the willingness of future Canadian governments to go ahead with expensive reequipment and repositioning programs. Since such heavy equipment would only be of use to Canada in Central Europe, one might expect some degree of European scepticism about the future of this new Canadian commitment to the alliance.

Secondly, of direct political importance to the alliance as a whole, and to Norway most immediately, was the question of the possible signal the Canadian move unintentionally sent to the Soviet Union about NATO's political determination and cohesiveness. Canada was abandoning its commitment to Norway because it had become too expensive to make it militarily viable. The expansion of the Soviet

¹⁴¹'P.M. offers Norway defence assurances', Winnipeg Free Press, May 25, 1987, p. 1.

threat to NATO's Northern Flank had made the CAST commitment more and more flawed militarily. Given that these were the reasons for Canada abandoning its pledge to NATO's Northern Flank, what were the political implications of the Canadian decision in possibly encouraging future Soviet attempts to decouple North America from Europe? What signals did the Canadian move send to Norway and other similarly vulnerable and difficult-to-defend NATO nations about the likelihood of other NATO nations coming to their aid in a crisis? Had alliance unity been undermined by the Canadian move?

Finally, it was clear that for several years to come Canada's reinforcement commitment to NATO would mean little. Until both 4 CMBG and 5 CBG were reequipped with new MBT (including sufficient prepositioned tanks and other heavy equipment for 5 CBG in Europe) Canada's reserve 'division' in Germany would be a division on paper only. Likewise, despite Canada's intention to remain formally committed to the Northern Flank for one-two years, this commitment was now completely dead. Should a crisis arise between 1987 and 1989 there is almost no chance that Canada would even consider deploying this brigade to Norway. This is known by allies and adversaries alike.

These were questions that the White Paper did not seriously address. Despite the fact that Canada had limited the political damage of its decision, these questions would remain. In the end they might well not only damage Canadian

credibility in the alliance, but might also serve to act as a negative force on NATO's future unity and cohesiveness.

CONCLUSION

The CAST Commitment and Canada as a Small Power in Alliance

The CAST commitment serves as a good case study of Canada's defence policy. As a commitment to the alliance maintained by Canada for twenty years, it reflects many of the themes and doctrines that guided Canadian defence policy over those twenty years. Indeed defence policy decisions taken in the four most recent pivotal periods were instrumental in impacting on and shaping Canada's CAST commitment. The study undertaken in this thesis demonstrates that the CAST commitment was maintained almost exclusively for political reasons. Despite the fact that a Canadian brigade on the Northern Flank was much more relevant militarily than Canada's brigade in Germany, there was little chance of successfully deploying the CAST brigade to Norway. This made the commitment, for the most part, militarily irrelevant. Yet the commitment was sustained for two decades, a testimony to its perceived political importance. As with many other Canadian military commitments to the alliance, such as the permanent stationing of Canadian Forces in Europe, the CAST commitment evolved quite unintentionally.

The CAST commitment emerged (as noted in Chapter One) out of Canadian attempts to specialize in building a

mobile force that in its NATO roles could rapidly deploy to the NATO Flanks. This strategy was partly grounded in conceptions of the late 1950's and 1960's that emphasized the need to maintain the territorial integrity of all members of the alliance through NATO's new strategy of flexible response. By contributing to this NATO strategy through its mobile force, Canada hoped to provide a small, but highly professional and efficient mobile force for an essential task within the alliance for which Canada seemed well suited. The need to support the vulnerable and exposed members of the alliance was essential in order to maintain alliance unity, cohesiveness and credibility.

The responsibility to provide rapidly deployable 'fire brigades' was taken on by Canada with enthusiasm. It was hoped that Canada would gain political mileage within the alliance for its mobile force contribution. It also seemed that Canada, by helping to strengthen the unity, cohesiveness and credibility of the European members of NATO, also contributed to the enhancement of the principle of multilateralism. A stronger NATO Europe vis-a-vis the United States was of direct interest to Canada. Although the globally capable mobile force concept died relatively quickly after it was introduced, the concept of rapidly deployable mobile force for NATO tasks lingered on for years. At the time that the CAST commitment was made to the Northern Flank in 1967-1968, it was hoped that this single 'rapidly deployable' brigade would continue to constitute a

unique Canadian contribution to the deterrence of aggression on NATO's Northern Flank. The CAST brigade was to have been a tangible political symbol of Canada's commitment to NATO's unity and strength in a vulnerable theatre. Robert Rothstein has noted that small powers 'choose their allies carefully'.¹ A codicil might be added to this phrase noting that they also carefully choose the commitment that they decide to make to their allies. While it is certainly true that the CAST commitment itself was made in a highly reactive fashion, the mobile force concept that underlined it was a concept that had been given much thought and support. Indeed such a noted alliance theorist as George Liska thought of the role as ideally suited for a power such as Canada. Thus the Hellyer mobile force concept, in so far as it pertained to NATO, was a concept very much in keeping with prevailing thought in the alliance and in keeping with the alliance's developing flexible response strategy. The CAST commitment that finally emerged in 1967-1968 seemed to fit nicely into Canada's broad alliance objectives.

The principal problem with the CAST commitment, and indeed with the whole notion of small powers specializing in flexible mobile forces, was that the commitment required a fairly large outlay of resources in order to be militarily credible. This fact would emerge only in the ensuing years as the need arose to move beyond the political symbolism and

¹Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 62.

make the commitment a truly viable one for collective defence. The two measures needed to make the commitment truly effective, the prepositioning of equipment and the provision of improved air transport, seemed beyond available financial resources. The limited size of the Norwegian defence budget also precluded the possibility that Norway would assist Canada financially with prepositioning. If Norway had made an exception in Canada's case and paid for a share of the cost of prepositioning, similar demands for Norwegian assistance would almost certainly have been forthcoming from the other NATO states committed to reinforcing northern Norway. Norway would then have had to come either to similar financial arrangements with its other allies, or been faced with a possibility that those allies would have cancelled their reinforcement plans. Over the long term, Norway's defence position might have been less secure as allied reinforcement of Norway would have been increasingly tied to the provision by Norway of adequate financial assistance for such reinforcements. While larger powers such as Britain and the United States could maintain fairly credible reinforcement commitments to Norway on their own, for Canada such a commitment, if made credible, would eat up a much higher proportion of the country's limited defence budget.

The belief, if it existed in Norway, that Canada would, despite obvious difficulties, remain committed to Norway indefinitely proved mistaken. There was a seeming

inability on the part of Norwegians to fully understand the problems created for Canada in making a commitment to a country that did not allow the permanent basing of foreign forces on its territory in peacetime. Indeed, in some quarters in Canada the feeling that Canada was being used to its own disadvantage by the Norwegians seemed to predominate. The historic sensitivity of Canadians to any suggestion that Canadian troops were going to be nothing more than live pawns in a deadly political game undoubtedly contributed to the commitment's eventual demise.

If there was a Norwegian insensitivity of the Canadian position, the same can be said of the understanding of many Canadians for Norway's own position in its Nordic environment and its desire, as a small power, to limit the influence of its larger power allies over its security and defence policies. The lack of appreciation of the reasons for Norway's base ban policy was often apparent in the statements of both members of SCEAND and the Senate Committees. The writings of some Canadian academics also reflected this lack of understanding. The fact that the commitment was maintained for so long may be a partial testimony to the 'voluntarism for a cause' phenomena identified by Thomas Hockin as characteristic of Canadian foreign policy. However the willingness to remain committed to vulnerable and exposed Norway was eventually tempered by the often widespread misunderstanding of Norway's base ban policy. The unfamiliarity of Canadian politicians with

foreign relations generally and with geostrategic and geopolitical interrelationships in the Nordic Region specifically, may have contributed to the eventual decision to cancel the commitment. The inability of both small powers to fully understand that similar factors had created similar budgetary problems in both Norway and Canada, served as a sadly ironic contribution to the eventual demise of the CAST commitment. (see Appendix).

Despite the inability of Canada to find the money to make the CAST commitment militarily credible, there was evidence that Canada's small power status was in a state of transition. Dewitt and Kirton, for example, presented Canada's status as evolving toward that of a principal power in most sectors outside the military sphere. Within the military sphere the last ten years have seen a fairly consistent increase in the real level of Canadian military spending. With a defence budget in 1987 of about 7.4 billion American dollars, Canada's defence expenditure in absolute terms is fairly high, and approaches that of Italy. Likewise as shown in Table 1.2, the level of per capita spending in Canada has risen fairly significantly in the last decade. All indications are that this trend will continue in the years to come. Thus, while from the late 1950's until the mid 1970's there was fairly strong downward pressure on the Canadian defence budget, the last ten years have witnessed pressure in the opposite direction. The need to shore up Canada's political position in NATO and rebuild

the capability of the Canadian Forces after years of neglect played the major part in exerting upward pressure on the defence budget in the late 1970's and early 1980's. However an increasing perception of a growing 'threat' to Canada itself, also influenced the perceived need to sustain these increases through the late 1980's and into the 1990's. The expansion of Soviet naval capability in particular seemed to have brought about a consensus among all three of Canada's federal political parties for the need to rebuild the Canadian Navy.² It is also scarcely a coincidence that four of the five priority areas found in Challenge and Commitment for rebuilding the capabilities of the Canadian Forces focussed either primarily or partially on 'defence of Canada' tasks rather than on alliance tasks. The perception of a need to provide a 'Canadian' presence in the Arctic rather than relying on allied (i.e. American) assistance that might threaten Canadian sovereignty seemed to predominate in the thinking of Canadian decision makers. Indeed Prime Minister Mulroney, in his preamble to Challenge and Commitment stated that,

Only we as a nation should decide what must be done to protect our shores, our waters and our airspace. The White Paper, therefore, takes as its first priority the

²While the general consensus existed on the need to rebuild the navy, the Conservatives were alone in favoring the deployment of Canadian SSN's. The Liberals and NDP favoured concentrating resources on additional surface ships and conventional submarines.

protection and furtherance of Canada's sovereignty as a nation.³

Defence Minister Beatty also had asserted that, 'our defence policy will be written in Canada to serve Canadian needs, and it won't be written in Washington'.⁴ To a certain extent the Canadian government seemed to have perceived the need to devote increased resources to meet a national contingency (the protection of national sovereignty), for which allied support could not be relied upon. This certainly seems to have been the perception of Canadian policy in the U.S. where officials openly wondered if Canada was more interested in protecting its narrow sovereignty interests than in improving the West's military posture.⁵

While Canada's strategic environment still makes it a relatively small power in the alliance, the country's alliance status seems to be in a state of change. Canada can be cautiously described as a small military power moving from the status of a country perceiving little need to provide resources for collective defence toward the status of a small power perceiving an increased need to provide greater resources for both collective defence and especially to meet its own national objectives. Certainly it would be

³Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987), p. ii.

⁴"Beatty shrugs off concerns." Winnipeg Free Press, May 5 1987, p. 14.

⁵"Nuclear subs puzzle to U.S." Winnipeg Free Press, May 5 1987, p. 14.

easier for Canadian decision-makers to justify the proposed increases in defence spending domestically, by claiming that primarily national rather than primarily alliance tasks were being funded.⁶ While the peacetime military buildup of the Canadian Forces in the 1950's provided a precedent for the acceptance by the Canadian population of significant increases in military spending when required, it is questionable whether the political will exists in Canada to sustain the increases in defence spending planned for the next fifteen years. Indeed Harold von Riekhoff noted that any power will find it increasingly difficult over a protracted time period to sustain major military efforts if there is no more direct way to measure success other than in the deterrence of an undesired, but in no way certain, eventuality.⁷ As with Defence in the 70's, the 1987 Defence White Paper sought to resolve the question as to the relevance of any Canadian defence effort by partly orienting that effort to national tasks. But, unlike the 1971 White Paper, Challenge and Commitment's significant military roles for the Canadian Forces would require the commitment of significantly greater resources than had been required for the 1971 White Paper's quasi-military and non-military

⁶Challenge and Commitment set increases at 2% in real terms every year for 15 years. Programs in any one of the 3 five-year periods that exceeded these levels of planned increases would receive additional funding.

⁷Harold von Riekhoff, NATO: Issues and Prospects (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1967), p. 4.

roles.

By rejecting the option of providing significantly greater resources to make the CAST commitment militarily credible, the government continued to emphasize that Canada's pledges to NATO would remain limited primarily to those commitments that were most valuable to Canada politically. If Canada had chosen to devote significantly greater resources to the CAST concept, it was clear that in the strategic context of the Northern Cap (as described in Appendix), even Canada's single brigade and two supporting fighter squadrons would have constituted a fairly major military contribution. However, Challenge and Commitment clearly rejected the provision of the significantly greater resources for the CAST force which would have been required to make it viable. The additional monies that would be available to DND in the 1990's (if the political will could be sustained) would be mostly concentrated on priorities much 'closer to home'. It should likewise be noted that even if all the increases projected in defence spending were implemented, Canada would still be contributing less than 3% of its GNP to defence. This would still be equal or less than the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and other small powers in the alliance. It is interesting to note that the Special Senate Committee on National Defence (dominated by Liberals) came out with a recommendation for the government to set a

goal of spending between 2.5%-3% of the GNP.⁸ With a similar focus on activities 'closer to home', the Senate Committee reports revealed a remarkable degree of consensus between Liberals and Conservatives on the type of military spending appropriate for a power such as Canada.

Throughout the period under study, spending on the CAST commitment was kept limited. Only on two occasions were 'significant' funds committed specifically to enhance the political value of the commitment. The first occasion was with the conclusion of the 1982 agreement between Canada and Norway for the prepositioning of military equipment for the lead battalion of the CAST brigade. Even though the agreement called on Canada only to preposition unsophisticated support vehicles for one battalion of the brigade, the program remained uncompleted until more than four years later. The second occasion occurred when Canada held its first full exercise of the CAST brigade in September of 1986. If one looks at the statements of Canadian officials and officers at the time, a principal objective of the exercise was to demonstrate Canada's commitment to the alliance. Indeed, the declared initial objective of the exercise, 'to raise the public consciousness in Canada and NATO' (emphasis added) about the CAST commitment, underlined

⁸See Special Senate Committee on National Defence, Military Air Transport (Ottawa: February 1986), Appendix 3, Parts A and B.

its political purpose.⁹

The importance of the CAST commitment to Canada politically, and the access that the commitment might give Canada to NATO's 'non-collective' goods, was the primary purpose of the CAST commitment's very existence throughout the period of study. In 1967-1968 when the commitment was made initially, the primary purpose in committing a brigade to a vulnerable area of NATO was political. Indeed, the initial link of the CAST force to the AMF (in itself a primarily political force) emphasized this fact. After the 1969 decision to reduce Canadian Forces stationed in West Germany the CAST commitment was used to help justify these reductions to NATO. Throughout the early 1970's the CAST commitment was employed as a symbol of Canada's continued commitment to the alliance, with elements of the CAST brigade force exercising on NATO's Northern Flank almost every year. Through the making of the CAST commitment in 1967-1968, forces based in Canada, which during the previous balance-of-a-division pledge had had no political utility for Canada in NATO, then acquired such utility.

After the Defence Structure Review of 1974-1975, the CAST commitment's political role, continued to assist Canada in demonstrating its renewed appreciation of the alliance. However in the late 1970's and early 1980's the increasing Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank not only increased

⁹C. D. Hunt, "Reinforcing the NATO North Flank: The Canadian Experience", Canadian Defence Quarterly (Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1987), p. 36.

the importance of making Canada's commitment militarily viable, it also increased the potential costs of the commitment. Thus the requirement of a small power to sustain viable political commitments to its allies ran straight into the dilemma of the small powers's limited defence budget. After a decade of 'dabbling' with the commitment but refusing to commit the necessary resources, the government came to the conclusion that since the commitment could not be made militarily credible for limited cost, neither could it any longer be said to be politically credible. This primary political role of deterrence was again reemphasized by the CDS General Manson in May of 1987. In fact, Manson declared the CAST brigade's 'whole purpose' was to demonstrate international solidarity. Manson noted that even if the brigade arrived in northern Norway successfully, if it arrived after the war had already begun it would already have failed in its mission.¹⁰

When John Holmes remarked that Canada's military commitments to the alliance were largely determined by political and diplomatic considerations he was probably correct. Indeed this also seems evident in Canada's new military commitment to the alliance. Given the emphasis within NATO in the 1980's of the importance of strengthening conventional forces, an enhanced Canadian role in the Central Region was deemed to be the most effective way of

¹⁰Special Senate Committee on National Defence, Ottawa, May 5 1987, p. 1:33.

demonstrating Canada's political interest in NATO. Certainly the description of the two-brigade force, which Canada would eventually seek to deploy in West Germany in a crisis, as a 'division' seemed to be evidence of this. Likewise the description of the five CF-18 squadrons, that are to be tasked to Central Europe, as an 'air division' also suggested the desire on the part of the government to enhance the political value of Canadian military contributions in the alliance.

Canada's new commitment which centered on providing one consolidated reserve force for NATO's Central Army Group, mirrored other specialization plans that had been proposed or adopted as policy solutions to Canada's defence dilemmas. Certainly, as noted above, CAST itself was a product of the strategic and specialization concepts that predominated in NATO in the 1960's. Regardless of the fact that the mobile force specialization role proposed for small powers soon proved to be beyond their limited financial capacities, the small power mobile force notion continued to hang on. The CAST commitment was in fact retained under this concept for twenty years. Indeed the continued existence of a 'Mobile Command' in Canada to describe the country's Army bears witness to the resilience of the idea.

The problem with many of the specialization proposals was that they always accompanied cuts to existing commitments. This proved to be the case in 1964 when resources were reduced but 'focused' on a smaller more

efficient mobile force. It also was the case when the two brigades committed to reinforcing NATO from Canada were reduced to one brigade specializing in reinforcing the Northern Flank. Likewise the Richardson proposals floated in 1974 for specializing in an all-air Canadian contribution to NATO were to be at the expense of Canada's ground forces in West Germany. Finally, the present plan which seeks to focus Canada's military commitment to the alliance on West Germany, also involves the abandonment of Canada's pledge to reinforce Norway. Thus, allied reactions to announcements by small powers that they would seek to 'emphasize their assets' by practicing a specialization of their defence efforts, was often greeted with justifiable scepticism.

The CAST commitment, reflective as it is of the factors guiding the formation of Canadian Defence Policy, demonstrates that certain characteristics attributed to the pattern of small powers in alliance are also characteristic of many of the aspects of Canada's alliance policy. In Chapter One it was postulated that four principles characteristic of the pattern of a small power in alliance were characteristic of Canada's alliance policy as well. These four principles were:

1. Reinforcing the strength of the alliance's multi-lateral framework; i.e. reinforcing the strength of NATO-Europe vis a vis the United States'
2. A tendency toward inequity in defence spending, with small powers perceiving limited utility in making substantial resource commitments to collective defence;
3. The desire, simultaneously with the characteristic

identified above, to maximize the political value of the commitments that it does make to the alliance, and;

4. The attractiveness, as a result of the above factors, of specializing the country's defence efforts by focussing on those commitments that are of the greatest possible political benefit to both the alliance and to Canada.

All four of these principles were reflected in aspects of the CAST commitment. Despite the fact that Canada's status as a small military power, as noted above, does seem to be in a state of transition, it continues to be appropriate to refer to Canada as a 'small power in alliance'. Given Canada's strategic environment, this is unlikely to change. Indeed many analysts, both Canadian and foreign, seem to have placed Canada in the small power category. As Henry Kissinger noted, the Canadian contribution to collective defence would be 'marginal compared with that of the major European powers and the United States. Canada's ties (to the alliance), therefore, had above all a strong symbolic character'¹¹ (emphasis added). This has certainly corresponded to the reality of Canada's contributions to the alliance over the past 30 years. As Rothstein noted, the small power traditionally insists on its right to be consulted but deemphasizes the contribution it can make.¹² The CAST commitment represented part of the Canadian attempt to limit the cost of its contribution to

¹¹Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979), p. 383.

¹²Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 58.

the alliance while at the same time maximizing its access to NATO's non-collective political goods, through methods that were largely symbolic.

The CAST commitment indicates that Canada in many ways corresponds to the pattern of a small power in alliance. Canada is perhaps in the unique position of being sometimes referred to as a principal power, at other times as a middle power and still at other times as a small power. Certainly there were aspects of all three patterns to be found in different Canadian foreign policy relationships. However the study of Canada as a small power in the international system, especially in terms of its alliance relationships, seems to have been an under-studied area. Yet it is not only in the military sphere that Canada seems to fit into the small power pattern. Vis-a-vis the United States, the country which dominates the focus of Canada's foreign policy bureaucracy, Canada by comparison seems to be a small power in most sectors. If, as Rothstein asserts, the small power is not merely a 'Great Power writ small' but that certain unique dynamics can be identified as guiding the policy of small powers, then the study of Canada as small power in the international system deserves to receive greater attention.

APPENDIX
THE NORTH EUROPEAN REGION:
GEOSTRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL
INTERRELATIONSHIPS

NATO's Northern Flank and the Growth of the
Soviet Northern Fleet

Northern Europe has at times been described as the 'quiet corner of Europe'. The ability of Nordic states to remain outside most European conflicts from 1815 until 1939 earned the region this fortunate label.¹ During World War Two all Nordic states sought to maintain their good fortunes and sought refuge from the coming conflict in Europe through policies of neutrality. However, a combination of circumstances had made the territories of four out of the five Nordic countries strategically important to the belligerent powers in 1939-1940. All the countries, except Sweden, found themselves dragged into the war as a result. Unfortunately for the Nordic states, the end of World War II did not return the Nordic states to the 'quietness' they had enjoyed prior to the War. The strategic value of what was

¹The Nordic region for the purposes of this paper includes the countries of Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Norwegian dependencies of Jan Mayen and Svalbard and the Danish dependency of the Faeroe Islands are also considered part of the Nordic region. Both the Faeroe Islands and the Finnish Aland Islands are specifically represented in the Nordic Council as part of the Danish and Finnish delegations. It should be noted that the term Scandinavia includes only the countries of Norway, Denmark and Sweden.


to become NATO's Northern Flank in many ways made the region much more important than it had been in the Second World War.²

In the Second World War Northern Europe was only a peripheral flank in the initial struggle between the Anglo-French alliance and Germany. Northern Europe only became involved in the war many months after the initial outbreak. In the post-war strategic balance however, Northern Europe found itself directly between two antagonistic power blocs. It became increasingly apparent (especially in the 1970's and 1980's) that despite its geographic 'Flank' description, the Northern Flank of NATO could expect to be involved in any conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact from the outset.

Two areas of the Northern Flank in particular came under increasing focus in the 1970's and 1980's. These two areas were the 'Northern Cap' and the Danish Straits.³ (See Map A.1) The Northern Cap area gained increasing importance for two principle reasons.

²By NATO's Northern Flank we mean the countries of Denmark and Norway as well as the northern Federal German state of Schleswig-Holstein. This territory would come under the wartime command of Allied Forces Northern Europe headquartered near Oslo.

³The term the Northern Cap should not be confused with the term NATO's Northern Flank. The former area refers to those parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and the U.S.S.R. north of 66 degrees north latitude. It also includes the Arctic waters extending to the north pole from the Norwegian Sea in the west to the White Sea in the east.



Map A.1 Taken
from Royal
Norwegian
Ministry of
Defence facts on
Norwegian defence.

Firstly, in the 1950's (when the term Northern Cap came into common usage), the advent of first the Intercontinental bomber and then the I.C.B.M. put the area directly on the shortest air route between the United States and the Soviet Union. The importance of Early Warning Stations for both sides in the Northern Cap area was immediately apparent.⁴ It also became an important intelligence gathering area for both sides. NATO installations in Norway proved an important monitoring area for Soviet activities in the region.

⁴See B. C. Cuthbertson, 'The Strategic Significance of the Northern Cap' RUSI Journal (Volume 117, June, 1972), p. 45.

Secondly, and much more importantly, the expansion of the Soviet Navy in the 1970's and 1980's, most particularly the Northern Fleet based in Murmansk, increased the attention both sides paid to the region. Traditionally the Russian/Soviet Navy has been restricted in its access to the open sea. The Black Sea Fleet must pass through the Turkish controlled Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits in order to reach the Mediterranean Sea, and even in peacetime the Montreux Convention of 1936 forbids the passage of warships such as aircraft carriers and submarines through the Turkish straits.⁵ The Baltic Fleet as well is restricted in its access to the open sea by the NATO controlled Danish Straits. Thus the Northern Fleet is the only one of the three Fleets in the European Theatre to have relatively unimpeded access to the open sea. (In wartime, of course the GIUK Gap would be a major impediment to Soviet access to the open Atlantic). Whether a crisis were to erupt in Central Europe, southern Europe, or outside the European Theatre (as in the Middle East Crisis of 1973), the Northern Fleet has proved to be a key instrument for the Soviet

⁵This could result in an interesting diplomatic and legal battle in and around 1990 when the first of the Soviet's nuclear powered aircraft carriers (CVN) being built at the Nikolaev yard on the Black Sea attempts to pass the Turkish Straits. The Kiev class, ships widely regarded in the West as aircraft carriers, were classed by the Soviet Navy as aircraft carrying cruisers, and have thereby been allowed to pass through the straits by the Turks. Undoubtedly the Soviets will attempt to do the same with their new CVN's, using the Kiev class passage as a precedent.

government.⁶ In the event of general war the Northern Fleet would assume the key offensive role of interdicting maritime traffic between North America and Western Europe. Defensively, the Fleet is charged with protecting the vital Soviet installations on and off the Kola peninsula. Control of the Northern Cap would be vital to accomplishing both the Fleet's offensive and defensive tasks. Control of Norwegian airfields would move Soviet interdictor combat aircraft some 500 kilometers closer to Scotland, southern Norway, and American installations in Iceland. It would also give Soviet ships and submarines the ability to use the Norwegian fiords as bases for an attempted breakout through the GIUK Gap. Soviet installations on the Kola peninsula would at the same time be made secure against NATO attack. Thus, the buildup of the Northern Fleet was oriented to accomplishing the many peacetime and wartime tasks it was assigned. As the most important of the Soviet Union's four Fleets it was selected to receive the best and most modern equipment being procured for the Soviet Navy.

The control of the Danish Straits can be seen to have become equally strategically important. Over 50% of Soviet ship repair facilities are located on the Baltic Coast making the opening of the Straits important to the

⁶The Northern Fleet provides submarines for the Soviet Mediterranean squadron as well as ships and submarines for the task forces deploying further afield in the Western Hemisphere.

Soviet Navy in any protracted struggle.⁷ Control of Denmark would also enable Soviet tactical aircraft to strike at the United Kingdom Air Defence Region, southern Norway and at Central Front rear areas with much greater ease. The seizure of Denmark by Warsaw Pact Forces could therefore threaten the NATO position in Norway and the vital Central Front region simultaneously.⁸ Even if NATO were able to hold the Central Front, a Soviet breakthrough in either or both of the two Northern Flank strategic areas could imperil air and sea reinforcements from North America.

The importance of these two Northern Flank strategic chokepoints (and others worldwide) was not lost on the Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov noted this fact in his brilliant work The Sea Power of the State,

. . . our navy . . . is forced to cover enormous distances and force narrows and straits controlled by the fleets of the imperialist states or permanently under surveillance by their allies in aggressive military blocs.⁹

The importance of seizing such chokepoints was therefore emphasized by Gorshkov in his later discussion of the

⁷See 'Report on the Activities of the Joint Subcommittee on the Northern Region' North Atlantic Assembly, (October, 1979), p. 17.

⁸See Christopher Donnelly and Phillip A. Petersen 'Soviet Strategists Target Denmark' International Defense Review (Volume 19, No. 8, 1986), 1049-1051.

⁹S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 183. Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov served as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 until 1985. He personally guided the Soviet Navy in its expansion from a coastal force to the status of a global power.

importance played by amphibious operations in the success of overall strategy.¹⁰ The importance of the offensive and the importance of integrating and co-ordinating the actions of all the Soviet combat arms in any general offensive has been consistently emphasized by Soviet Military writing.¹¹

Achieving control of strategic points would be not only very advantageous in an attempt to smash NATO Forces in a short decisive war but would become vital in a war that became protracted. According to the noted Soviet Military scholar Peter Vigor, planning against the possibility of a long war scenario has been an important facet of Soviet military

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 213-219.

¹¹The following six points have been outlined as 'Basic principles of Operational Art and Tactics' in Soviet Military Doctrine:

1. Mobility, high tempos of combat operations and combat activeness. This principle of constant forward movement is reportedly well discussed in a work appropriately entitled The Offensive, published in 1970.
2. 'Concentration of main efforts and creation of forces and means over the enemy at the decisive location and decisive time'.
3. 'Surprise', 'May be tactical, operational or strategic'.
4. 'Preservation of the combat effectiveness of Friendly Troops'.
5. 'Conformity of Goals to actual conditions'.
6. 'Co-ordination'.

See Joseph Douglass, Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (Pergamon Press Limited, 1980), pp. 26, 43-54; for an excellent description of Soviet Doctrine, see Harriet and William Scott, The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. (Westview Press, 1981, 2nd edition).

writing.¹² Indeed the emerging trends in Soviet military thought emphasizing the likelihood of any future war being a highly destructive and protracted conventional struggle would seem to underline the continuing importance of traditional Soviet Military Doctrine with its emphasis on seizing immediate control of strategically vital areas.¹³ The conclusion of the Swedish Submarine Defence Commission, (set up to investigate the numerous incursions by foreign, certainly Soviet, submarines into Swedish territorial waters), that these Soviet submarine incursions against Sweden must 'represent the preparatory phases of military operational planning' appears to be supported by the strategic importance of the Nordic region as viewed from Moscow, and by Soviet doctrine which emphasizes the imperative need to seize such strategic areas. Indeed, all factors add up to the conclusion that NATO can in the event of war expect an immediate Soviet attack on both the Northern Cap and the Danish Straits. This conclusion is reinforced by the growth of the Soviet Northern Fleet in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's.

The development of the seaborne element of the


¹²See Peter Vigor, 'Strategic Perspectives: An Eastern View' in The Northern Flank in a Central European War (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defense Research Institute, 1982), pp. 83-91.

¹³For a good synopsis of this likely development in Soviet thinking as expounded by the former Soviet Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, see John Hemsley, 'The Influence of Technology upon Soviet Operational Doctrine', RUSI Journal (Volume 131, No. 2, June, 1986), pp. 21-28.

Soviet strategic nuclear deterrent force and the basing of roughly half of the SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) carrying force with the Northern Fleet (and about 50% to two-thirds of all Soviet SLBM's), was an important factor raising the importance of the Northern Fleet. As Soviet SLBM's have increased their range and accuracy, the area from which Soviet submarines can strike at targets both in North America and Western Europe has moved ever further into the Arctic polar region. Increasingly in the 1970's and 1980's Soviet ballistic missile submarines no longer had to transit through the GIUK Gap. According to many, the Arctic Ocean and Barents Sea region in the Northern Cap area have thus become de facto SSBN (Strategic Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine) 'bastions'. Here Soviet SSBN enjoy the protection of Soviet surface ships, submarines, and shore based aircraft, or if deploying further north, the protection of the Arctic ice cover.¹⁴ The protection of the sea based element of the Soviet nuclear deterrent must be a key defensive imperative for the U.S.S.R. when formulating its

¹⁴For a discussion of this concept see Harriet Critchley, 'Polar Deployment of Soviet Submarines', International Journal (Volume 34, Autumn, 1984), pp. 828-865. For a critique of the Bastion concept see Jan Breemer, 'The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference and Alternative Scenarios' RUSI Journal (March, 1985, Volume 130, No. 1), pp. 18-26. Breemer points out that the huge size of some of the latest Soviet SSBN classes call into question the SSBN Theory because such huge submarines would not be required if relatively short range deployment was the only requirement.

Map A.2 Taken from Finn Sollie
Soviet Sea Power and Relations in
Northern Waters - Trends and Goals
in Russian Maritime Strategy



Northern Cap strategy.¹⁵

The necessity of controlling the Northern Cap area gradually became more achievable for the Soviet Union as the

¹⁵In late 1986, 37 of the Soviet Navy's 63 SSBN were deployed with Northern Fleet (or about 60%). This included all 4 of the Typhoon class (some 24,000 tons submerged displacement) and both of the Delta IV class (some 13,000 tons), the two latest Soviet SSBN types. These 37 SSBN (plus one SSB) carried about 564 (55%) of all Soviet's SLBM's. In 1968 the Northern Fleet deployed only 6-7 SSBN and together with about 15 SSB these vessels carried only 58-61 SLBM. See Military Balance 1986-1987, pp. 36, 41. (Note: Military Balance lists 38 SSBN in 1986, but one Yankee class was accidentally lost in October, 1986).

Soviet Northern Fleet expanded over the years from the late 1960's to the 1980's. This expansion can be noted by examining the nature of major Northern Fleet exercises from 1968 to 1985 (See Map A.2). After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the expansion of the Soviet Navy was apparently given a new and higher priority. Beginning in 1963, the Soviet Navy began to conduct exercises in the Norwegian Sea culminating in the major combined land and sea exercise SEVER 68 in the Northern Cap area in 1968.¹⁶ In 1970 exercise OKEAN 70 was part of a worldwide, centrally controlled exercise by the Soviet Navy. Both exercises established a Soviet naval defence line just south of the main Norwegian defence concentration area of Troms County.¹⁷ After 1975 Soviet naval exercises have been held regularly in the vicinity of the GIUK Gap, culminating most recently in the comprehensive air and sea exercises of 1985, which involved several Soviet task groups in North Atlantic waters.¹⁸

The expansion of the Soviet Navy has been most closely associated with its Commander in Chief for almost thirty years, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. He supervised the

¹⁶See L. L. Lemnitzer, 'The Strategic Problems of NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks' Orbis (Volume 13, No. 1, 1969-1970), pp. 106-107.

¹⁷For a description of Soviet naval exercises from 1970-1976, see Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr. 'NATO Strategy and the New Dimension at Sea' NATO Review (Volume 24, No. 6, 1976), pp. 6-12.

¹⁸See 'If you happen to be Norway, start worrying' Economist (July 27, 1985), pp. 41-42.

expansion of the Soviet Navy from a mere coastal force to the global power that it is today. 'The need to have a potent navy in keeping with the geographical position of our country and its political significance as a great world power has for long been clear', notes Gorshkov. The need to maintain a great navy for global presence and intervention played a key part in its creation.¹⁹ However, an equally important factor was the impact of the Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs on integrating the previously coastal navy into a new Soviet Military Doctrine recognizing the importance of all arms of the Soviet armed forces in achieving strategic objectives.²⁰

The development of the Soviet submarine Fleet was the key element in the Soviet Navy's new and wider offensive capability of the 1970's and 1980's. The lessons of the Second World War were interpreted by the Soviets as demonstrating the potential power of the submarine. With minimal commitment of resources the German navy was able to inflict significant losses on Allied Shipping. The allies were able to defeat this submarine enemy only by deploying 25 warships and 100 ASW aircraft for every German Submarine. As Gorshkov notes:

¹⁹Sergei Gorshkov, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

²⁰Ibid. See here in particular Gorshkov's discussion of the development of the Soviet Fleet, pp. 178-189, and his discussion in Chapter four on the Problems of Naval Art, pp. 213-277.

. . . the question of the ratio of anti-submarine forces is of great interest even under present-day conditions since if ASW forces, which were so numerous and technically up to date (for that time) possessing a vast superiority turned out to be capable of only partially limiting the operations of diesel submarines, then what must this superiority be today in order to counter nuclear powered submarines, whose combat capabilities cannot be compared with the capabilities of World War II - era submarines.²¹

The development of the Northern Fleet's submarine arm (the largest submarine force in any of the Soviet navy's four fleets), has concentrated on deploying submarines capable of forcing their way through the GIUK Gap to attack and destroy convoys carrying reinforcements from North America to NATO Europe. The importance of neutralizing NATO monitoring systems centered in northern Norway, and then using Norwegian fiords as forward bases for operations against the GIUK Gap and beyond, is instrumental in Soviet offensive strategy. The development of the submarine arm of the Soviet Northern Fleet has therefore centered on deploying increasing numbers of nuclear attack submarines (some carrying cruise missiles) and replacing older conventional boats with newer and quieter conventional replacements (See Table A.1). Although overall numbers of Soviet attack submarines in the Northern Fleet have declined over the last twenty years, the new vessels are much larger and infinitely

²¹Gorshkov cites figures in this article of a German navy budget of 12.1% of the total sum allocated to the armed forces in 1942 and 5.6% in 1944 to support his argument. See Sergei Gorshkov 'Analysis of Navies in the Second World War' in Red Star Rising at Sea (United States Naval Institute, 1974), p. 101.

Table A.1 Northern Fleet Attack Submarines: 1968-1986

	SSK*	SSN*	SSG*	SSGN*	TOTAL
1968	105	10	3	18	146
1975	55	26	16	28	123
1982	52	39	10	29	130
1986	40	45	6	26	117

* SSK - conventionally powered attack submarine

* SSN - nuclear powered attack submarine

* SSG - conventionally powered cruise missile submarine

* SSGN - nuclear powered cruise missile submarine

Sources: Erling Bjol Nordic Security op. cit., p. 23.

Military Balance, 1986-1987, pp. 41-45.

1986 figures are approximates.

Table A.2 New Soviet Submarines

<u>Type</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>Lead Unit Completed</u>	<u>Displacement (tons)</u>
SSBN	Delta IV	1985	13,550
SSBN	Typhoon	1983	25,000
SSGN*	Oscar	1981	14,500
SSN*	Mike	1985	9,700
SSN*	Akula	1985	8,300+
SSN*	Sierra	1984	7,550
SSK*	Kilo	1982	3,000

* SSGN denotes a nuclear powered submarine armed with Cruise missiles;

SSN denotes nuclear powered attack submarine;

SSK denotes conventionally powered attack submarine.

Source: Norman Polmar, 'The Submarine Enigmas', United States Naval Institute Proceedings (January, 1986), p. 128.

more capable.²² Likewise, the production of some five different types of attack submarines and two types of new SSBN in the 1980's indicate a continuing emphasis on the Navy's submarine force (See Table A.2). Indeed the new Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, (former Commander of the Northern Fleet) has, in particular, emphasized in his writings in the Soviet Military Press the importance of submarines within the Northern Fleet.²³

While the submarine fleet has continued to be the cornerstone of the Soviet Navy, the most dramatic Soviet naval development of the past twenty years has been the expansion of the surface fleet. Criticism by Soviet naval theorists of the German strategy of the Second World War has often centered on the failure by the Germans to support their own submarine effort with an effective surface fleet. Thus the gradual expansion of the Northern Fleet's major surface units appears to have been oriented toward building up a force capable of exercising control of the Norwegian Sea region. Together with the shore based naval aviation and Soviet submarines, the Soviet surface fleet would seek to defend against American aircraft carrier task forces and

²²Many of the new Soviet designs are said to be superior to western designs. See Roy Corlett, 'Soviet Submarine propulsion: Signs of a Great Leap Forward?' in John Moor (ed.), Jane's Naval Review, (Jane's Publishing, 1986), pp. 28-35.

²³See Yossef Bodansky, 'Soviet Navy: The King is Dead . . .' Jane's Naval Review. op. cit., p. 42.

Table A.3 Soviet Northern Fleet: Approximate Totals of Major Fleet Units: 1956-1986.

	Aircraft Carrying Cruiser	Rocket Cruiser	Large ASW Ship	Large Rocket Ship	Cruiser	Destroyer	Patrol Ship (Missile Frigate)	Total
1956					5	28		33
1962					2	26		26
1967		2			2	16		20
1973		6	8		2	13	1	30
1980	1	3	16		2	8	8	38
1986	2	3	20	3	1	3	9	41

The Soviet Navy abandoned traditional western warship classifications in 1963-1964. Aircraft carrying cruisers combine a heavy missile and rocket armament with vertical take off fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. "Rocket" denotes a ship armed with surface to surface missiles as primary armament. Major Soviet ships range in displacement from 3,800 tons (Krivak class patrol ship) to some 38,000 tons (Kiev class aircraft carrying cruiser).

Sources: See A. F. Nicholas, 'The Fifty Year Development of the Soviet Northern Seas Fleet', Armed Forces (RUSI Publication, Volume 5, No. 4, April 1986), pp. 182-185 and: John Jordan, Modern Soviet Navy (New York: Acro Publishing, 1982).

NATO submarine forces. Offensively, the surface fleet could be expected to support Soviet amphibious operations and attempt to assert Soviet control over the GIUK Gap if possible. While overall numbers of major Fleet units have increased only moderately, the diversification of the Fleet to include larger high quality surface combat ships must be noted (See Table A.3). Despite the continuing emphasis on submarines it is anticipated that the future will see the deployment of either the first or second of the new Soviet CVN (some 65,000-75,000 tons displacement) with the Northern Fleet along with more nuclear powered Rocket Cruisers of the Kirov class (some 23,000 tons). This surface Fleet of about 45 major surface combatants; some 40 ocean-going light frigate/corvette type escorts (some 1000-2000 tons), and; some 110 Minor surface combatants (which include mine counter measures ships, Fast Attack Craft and patrol ships under 1000 tons), together with various types of support ships and auxiliaries, represents a formidable offensive force indeed.²⁴

The Soviet Naval Air Force has also expanded also and improved its capabilities in the 1970's and 1980's, becoming, as described by Gorshkov, 'one of the most salient indicators of the strike power of our modern navy. Naval aviation has, in fact, become oceanic . . . a most important

²⁴See Military Balance, 1986-1987, p. 42; see also A. F. Nicholas, 'The Fifty-Year Development of the Soviet Northern Fleet' Armed Forces (Volume 5, no. 4, April, 1986), pp. 182-185.

means of armed struggle at sea'.²⁵ The deployment of fixed wing aircraft and ASW helicopters at sea has significantly improved the ability of the Northern Fleet to attempt to assert control over the Norwegian Sea. At the same time the deployment of an improved shore based Naval Air Force including Tu-22M/Tu-26 Backfire bombers and air refueling tanker aircraft has given the Soviet Navy the option of calling on shore based air strikes for both offensive and defensive tasks.

A final area of expansion for the Northern Fleet that should be noted is in amphibious capability. In 1961 Admiral Gorshkov reformed the Soviet Naval Infantry (which had been disbanded in 1947); this force which would be an instrumental element in attempting to gain control of northern Norway, has recently expanded from one regiment to a force of two regiments assigned to the Northern Fleet. (Each regiment having a strength of about 2500-4000 men). In addition it is believed that a specialized unit of Spetsnaz (special forces) Naval Infantry of approximately 1300 men is maintained by the Northern Fleet. A force of specialized amphibious ships, craft and hovercraft has been built up by Northern Fleet to transport this force which approaches divisional size.²⁶

²⁵See Sergei Gorshkov, op. cit., p. 202.

²⁶See Robert Boyd, 'Spetsnaz: Soviet Innovation in Special Forces' Air University Review (November-December, 1986, Volume 38, No. 1), pp. 63-69; Canadian Defence Quarterly (Autumn, 1986, Volume 16), p. 68 and Military Balance, 1986-1987, p. 41. Conscripts of the Naval Infantry

The Soviet naval buildup, and in particular the ability of the Northern Fleet to operate in the area of the GIUK Gap, threatened to isolate northern Norway from its vital NATO connections. Simultaneously, the growing perception within NATO Naval circles (particularly in the U.S. Navy), that an offensive American, and NATO, naval strategy was required to defeat this expanding Soviet Navy, increased the strategic importance for NATO of northern Norway. It was widely perceived that if northern Norway fell into Soviet hands, an offensive U.S. Navy strategy would be made impossible. If the initiative at sea shifted to the Soviet Navy, NATO's maritime communications between North America and Europe would be in serious danger of being severed. These developing strategic trends of the late 1970's and early 1980's made credible NATO reinforcements vital for the defence of northern Norway. Most specifically the need to avoid the movement of reinforcements by sea through the Norwegian Sea became more apparent. The Soviet submarine threat to seaborne reinforcements in this area had been apparent since the 1960's, but by the late 1970's and early 1980's the scope of this threat had been infinitely multiplied.

appear to be better trained than conscripts in the Soviet Army. The former are required to do three years military service while troops in the army only do two years of military service.

The Nature of the Soviet Military Threat
to NATO's Northern Flank

The Soviet military threat to both of the key strategic areas on NATO's Northern Flank involves a combination of amphibious and mechanized forces. Facing northern Norway, in addition to their divisional sized amphibious force of Naval Infantry, the Soviets maintain an impressive force of 9-10 Motorized Rifle (MR), one Airborne and one Artillery divisions, plus an air assault brigade and other Army and Corps level units.²⁷ However, as impressive as these forces appear none, except the Airborne division and the Naval Infantry, maintain a high level of readiness for operations.²⁸ Thus, the Soviet 6th Army headquarters at Petrozavodsk, which would command any offensive against northern Norway, would require some time to mobilize its forces or to be reinforced from outside the Leningrad Military District, before being ready to begin an offensive. It is believed that of five-six MR divisions commanded by the 6th Army, only two are at a Category Two level of readiness, while the remaining three-four are at a Category


²⁷Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 42; John Berg, 'Soviet front-level threat to Northern Norway' Jane's Defence Weekly (Feb. 2, 1985), pp. 178-179; and Norwegian version of the Military Balance 1984-85 Norwegian Atlantic Committee, pp. 5-6.

²⁸Soviet divisions maintain three readiness levels: Category One: full strength ready on 24 hours notice; Category Two: 50-75% strength fully manned in three days, but up to 30 days before fully operational; Category Three: 20% strength with older equipment, up to 8-9 weeks before fully operational.

Three level of preparedness. The two Category Two divisions are the 45th MR division based on the Norwegian border at Pechenga and the 54th MR division headquartered at Kandalaksha with most of its regiments based in the Alakustti/Kandalaksha region. Of the remaining Category Three divisions assigned to the 6th Army only one, the 21st MR division at Murmansk, is based in the northern part of the Leningrad Military District. The remaining MR divisions are based in the southern part of the District. (See Map A.3)²⁹ It is almost certain that in any offensive against northern Norway, Soviet forces would attempt to transit through northern Finnish Lapland. As a result it is believed that the Soviet 30th Corps, headquartered at Vyborg on the Finnish border, commanding 3 MR divisions (one Category Two and two Category Three) would be used to threaten the populated areas of southern Finland in order to guarantee the safe passage of the 6th Army formations through northern Finland. Finally the elite 76th Guards Airborne division (some 7000 men) headquartered at Pskov and maintained at Category One strength could, together with the air assault brigade and Army Special Forces (Spetsnaz), pose a significant rear area threat in northern Norway, especially if combined with an amphibious landing by Naval

²⁹Norwegian version of the Military Balance op. cit. and John Berg, op. cit. Soviet MR divisions in this region have a wartime strength of about 12,500 men equipped with 220 MBT.

Map A.3 - Taken from
John Berg, 'Soviet Frontlevel
Threat to Norway'




Infantry. (See Map A.3).³⁰

Some 500 tactical aircraft of the Soviet Air Force and the Soviet Air Defence Force are also deployed in the region. Soviet airfields on the Kola peninsula are well located to support an offensive against northern Norway. It is estimated that air bases on the peninsula could receive some 500 additional tactical aircraft in a matter of hours. Likewise some 500 attack and transport helicopters are held

³⁰For a good description of the 76th Airborne division see Mark Urban '76th Guards Red Banner Chernigov Airborne Division' Armed Forces, December 1982, pp. 413-417. It is believed that the Soviet Army's 27th Corps at Arkhangelsk, commanding two Category Three MR divisions, would likely assist Ministry of the Interior Troops and KGB units in maintaining rear area security in the Leningrad Military District.

Map A.4 Taken from
Norwegian Version of the
Military Balance, 1984-1985



by Army and Air Force units in the District. (See Map A.4).³¹

Unlike in the NATO command structure, the Northern Cap and the Baltic Approaches are the responsibility of different Soviet Commanders. The duty of securing control of the former area would fall to the Northern (sometimes referred to as the North-Western) Theatre Commander, while the latter would be the responsibility of the Western Theatre Commander. In keeping with Soviet Military Doctrine which emphasizes the importance of coordinating an all-arms offensive, offensives against both the Northern Cap and the Danish Straits would involve the coordination of amphibious,

³¹John Berg, op. cit., p. 179. Soviet tactical aircraft on Kola include some of the latest Soviet Mig 31 Foxhound fighters as well as Mig 23's, 25's and 27's. Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 42.

mechanized, airborne, naval and tactical air support forces. The responsibility of coordinating such offensives would be a primary function of the Commander in Chief of Western Strategic Direction. A successful effort against both of these regions could well be decisive for the Warsaw Pact.³² Given the importance of both of the key regions on the Northern Flank, it was natural that the Soviet capacity to attack the Danish Straits also expanded in the 1970's and 80's. In terms of amphibious forces the Soviet Baltic Fleet deploys some 20 major amphibious ships in addition to 12 East German and 23 Polish Tank Landing Ships (LST). This compares with only 14 major Amphibious ships held by the Northern Fleet.³³ In addition, the 1970's witnessed the deployment of large numbers of assault hovercraft with the Baltic Fleet. Operating from East Germany, such craft would have the capacity to transport large numbers of troops and supplies over to Denmark, without regard to defensive minefields in a matter of hours. (See Map A.5).³⁴ This large amphibious capability was needed to transport the large number of Warsaw Pact amphibious troops in the Baltic region. These comprised:

³²Western Strategic Direction would command all offensive actions against NATO Europe as directed by the Soviet High Command (Stavka) and the General Staff. In 1986 it was widely believed that Marshal Ogarkov was the Commander-in-Chief of Western Strategic Direction. John Hemsley, op. cit., p. 23.

³³Military Balance 1986-1987, pp. 42-43, 51, 53.

³⁴Roy McLeavy, 'AIST Amphibious Assault Hovercraft' Armed Forces, Vol. 5, No. 9 (September 1986).

Map A.5 Taken from
R.D.M. Furlong,
'The Threat to Northern Europe'



- The Soviet Baltic Fleet's Guards Naval Infantry Regiment;
- The East German Army's 'Ernst Moritz' amphibious trained MR regiment; and
- The Polish Army's 7th Sea Assault division.³⁵

Also to be noticed in the late 70's and early 1980's was the buildup of Pact amphibious Special Forces units in the Baltic.³⁶ It is likely no coincidence that the buildup of

³⁵Mark Urban, 'The Red Banner Baltic Fleet Guards Naval Infantry Regiment' Armed Forces, Vol. 3, No. 6 (June 1984), p. 226.

³⁶These included two Soviet regimental sized units (one of Naval Infantry and one Army regiment in East Germany), one Soviet battalion (in Poland), two Polish and

Warsaw Pact amphibious Special Forces in the Baltic coincided with the increase of submarine incursions into the territorial waters of Sweden and other Nordic countries. In fact the Swedish Submarine Defence Commission concluded that the operational training of Soviet Special Forces was a useful by product of the Soviet Union's submarine operations against Sweden.³⁷ Completing the amphibious capability of the Warsaw Pact in the Baltic were the vessels of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and the Polish and East German navies, which were oriented toward protecting the offensive amphibious forces from mines and NATO and other Nordic Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and submarines.³⁸ The naval and amphibious forces of the three Warsaw Pact Baltic powers frequently train together and are reported to have achieved a considerable degree of integration. In September 1981, the 70's buildup of the Baltic Fleet's amphibious capability

two East German battalions as well as other land oriented Special Forces and airborne units possibly available if needed. It was reported that these forces specialized in particular in the languages of NATO countries and in the impersonation of NATO troops. R.S.M. Furlong, 'The Threat to Northern Europe' International Defense Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 and No. 6, 1979, p. 525.

³⁷Cited by Stig Lofgren, 'Soviet Submarines Against Sweden' Strategic Review, Vol. 17, No. 6 (Winter 1984), p. 40. The apparent focus of such operations on Sweden can be perhaps partially explained by the fact that 'practising' against Sweden is much less dangerous than the potential dangers associated with 'practising' (and possibly getting caught) in NATO Nordic countries.

³⁸For a description of Warsaw Pact navies in the Baltic, see: A. F. Nicholas, 'The Fifty Year Development of the Soviet Baltic Fleet' Armed Forces Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 1986), pp. 120-124 and Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 42-43, 51, 53.

culminated in the largest amphibious exercise in Soviet post-war naval history. Ominously entitled 'Zapad (West) 81', the exercise involved some 80 ships from all three Soviet Fleets in the western hemisphere. The exercise was commanded by Admiral Chernavin, the Northern Fleet commander, suggesting a probable Soviet perception of close strategic links between the two key areas on the Northern Flank.³⁹

The seaborne threat to the Baltic Approaches is multiplied by the fact that Warsaw Pact armoured and mechanized forces have the capacity to attack the Jutland peninsula from the south. Some elements of the 2nd Soviet Guards Tank Army and the 5th East German Army (a total of about 7 divisions plus other Army level units), would likely be assigned to advance into Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland.⁴⁰ Second echelon Soviet and Polish divisions could be assigned to follow up any failed first attack with a second offensive. Tactical air support for both amphibious and land operations would come from Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft based in northern East Germany and Poland.

³⁹The exercise was probably primarily preparing primarily for the future role of the Soviet Navy in distant waters beyond Europe. This was evidently the reason for the integration of some 80 warships from three Soviet Fleets for a single exercise. The Polish Crisis may also have played a part and spurred the Soviet leadership into showing 'naval muscle' to the Polish leadership. Yossef Bodansky, *op. cit.*, p. 44 and Mark Urban, 'The Red Banner Baltic Fleet Guards Naval Infantry Regiment', *op. cit.*, p. 226.

⁴⁰Mark Urban, 'Red Flag over Germany - 2' and 'Red Flag Over Germany - 3' *Armed Forces*, Vol. 4, Nos. 3 and 4 (March and April 1985), pp. 111, 149-155.

The Soviet military threat to NATO's Northern Flank was by the mid 1980's a very serious and multi-dimensional threat. However the nature of the threat to the Baltic Approaches differed considerably from the threat to northern Norway. NATO Reinforcements would be of less utility in halting an offensive in Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland. Since Warsaw Pact Forces in this region were heavily armoured, and all were at Category One strength, the maintenance of strong and full strength NATO 'in theatre' forces in northern Germany were probably more important than reinforcements arriving by sea and air. In northern Norway, however, the limited readiness level of Soviet forces in the Leningrad Military District and the mountainous nature of the terrain seemed to contribute to the military value of NATO air and sea reinforcements. Here as well however, the expansion of Soviet sea and air power was by the late 70's and early 80's calling the credibility of such reinforcement plans into serious question. In both Denmark and northern Norway indigenous forces would thus be vitally important in halting at least the initial part of a Warsaw Pact offensive.

Nordic Force Postures and Likely Warsaw Pact Axes' of Advance

The defence of the Baltic Approaches is of crucial strategic significance as has been noted above. Given the readiness level of Warsaw Pact Forces facing the Baltic Approaches, the keys to a successful NATO defence of this

region are twofold. Firstly, forces based in the command area must be of sufficient strength to hold an initial Warsaw Pact attack and second, counter attacks to forestall the attacks of Warsaw Pact second and third echelon formations must be carried out from the NATO Northern Army Group area, which is immediately to the south of the Baltic Approaches region. Reinforcements arriving by sea and air into the Baltic Approaches would seem to be highly vulnerable to air interdiction and may well arrive too late and with insufficient armour.⁴¹ It seems likely therefore that a successful defence of this region largely depends on the strength of German and Danish forces in the command area, on the success of NATO's Follow-On-Forces-Attack (FOFA) Strategy, and on counter attacks from NATO's Northern Army

⁴¹Three NATO ground formations are dedicated to reinforce the Baltic Approaches. The AMF (land) which has a dual obligation to northern Norway; the U.K. Mobile Force (UKMF); and the U.S. 4th Marine Brigade which has other obligations to NATO's Southern Flank and possibly outside the NATO area. The AMF has no MBT and would take up to 7 days to arrive. The UKMF (with 15,000 men including logistic support troops) could deploy in less than one week though its heavy equipment including only one Chieftain tank squadron with about 15-20 MBT, would take up to a full week to arrive. The 4th U.S. Marine Brigade would take up to 30 days to arrive by sea and could be followed by the rest of the 2nd Marine division (if not tasked elsewhere) in 40 days. However, the entire division has no more than 150 older M-60 type MBT. Further on in the NATO alert process Norway has also tasked some forces to reinforce the Baltic Approaches. R.D.M. Furlong, 'The Threat to Northern Europe' op. cit., p. 908; Rear Admiral H. Schuur, 'Twenty-five Years Command', Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1987), pp. 233-239; John Morris 'UKMF's Role in the Baltic Approaches' Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 27-29. Information also provided by Brigadier-General Terry Liston during an interview.

Group (NORTH AG) sector.⁴²

Both Danish and German forces in the area are capable of rapid mobilization. In the Danish case a 78,000 man Army plus a 50,000 man (and 8000 women in support roles) Army Home Guard can be mobilized within seventy-two hours 'covered' by a standing force of 13,000 combat troops.⁴³

In fact a Royal decree made in the memory of the swift Danish capitulation in World War II declares,

. . . in the event of an attack being launched against Danish territory or Danish military units outside Danish territory the forces under attack will without delay engage the enemy without awaiting or trying to obtain orders . . . orders to cease resistance or to stop mobilization are to be disobeyed until it has been duly established that such orders have in fact been issued by authorities competent to do so.⁴⁴

Danish forces are organized to break up any attempted amphibious assault against the main Danish islands, while the Army's mechanized Jutland division would assist German

⁴²For a discussion of the NATO FOFA Strategy and on the impact of the new technologies see the March/April 1984 issue of Survival 'New Directions in Conventional Defence'? Vol. 26, No. 2 and the December 1984 issue of NATO Review, Vol. 32, No. 8. For a good synopsis of the strengths of NATO Forces in the Central Region see James Meacham, 'NATO's Central Front', Economist (August 30, 1986), Survey, pp. 3-22. In contributing to NATO's FOFA strategy the U.S. Marine Corp's 2nd Air Wing, with about 120-150 tactical aircraft, would be a valuable reinforcing formation for the Baltic Approaches. However as is the case with the rest of the 2nd Marine Amphibious Force, it could be tasked elsewhere if circumstances demand it.

⁴³For a further more detailed description of the organization of Danish ground forces, see, George Forty, 'The Danish Army', Armed Forces Vol. 4, No. 4 (April 1985), pp. 133-136.

⁴⁴Niels Haagerup, A Brief Introduction to Danish Foreign Policy and Defence, Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defence, 1980, pp. 31-32.

forces in defending against a Warsaw Pact armoured offensive in Schleswig-Holstein. German forces, as well, are capable of operations very quickly, and reserves can be fully mobilized in 3 days.⁴⁵ The main responsibility for the initial defence of Schleswig-Holstein rests with the German Army's powerful 6th Panzergrenadier division. With four brigades instead of the usual three brigades, its 22,500 men and 330 MBT comprise a formation with as many tanks as a Soviet Bloc Tank division and twice as many as men.⁴⁶ German naval forces and the Naval Air Force would combine the Royal Danish Navy in attempting to destroy Warsaw Pact Amphibious Forces before they could complete a successful landing.⁴⁷

These Danish and German forces seem to have a reasonable chance of holding initial Warsaw Pact assaults against the Baltic Approaches. Initial Soviet amphibious assaults might well be very risky as long as credible German

⁴⁵These reservists would man one Home Defence brigade with 5000 men and 40 MBT in the Hamburg area, as well as two light Home Defence regiments and other rear area security forces. Neil Munro, 'The West German Territorial Army' Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 4. (April 1987), p. 167.

⁴⁶Soviet Bloc Tank divisions have a strength of about 10,500 - 11000 men with about 324 MBT. Military Balance 1986-87, p. 8.

⁴⁷Combined, the Federal German and Royal Danish Navies maintain some 15 frigate escorts, 50 missile armed FAC, 29 attack submarines, and various types of mine warfare ships. In addition the German Naval Air Force maintains some 100 shore based Tornado strike aircraft equipped with stand off anti-ship missiles. Further, the Luftwaffe and the Royal Danish Airforce also deploy about 120 jet combat aircraft in the region which could be immediately bolstered by two RAF squadrons tasked to the Baltic Approaches.

and Danish naval and air forces still exist. Likewise, of the 7 divisions in the 2nd Soviet Guards Tank Army and the 5th East German Army, some would likely have to be detached to assist other Warsaw Pact formations in the northern part of the NORTH AG sector. Immediately to the south of Schleswig-Holstein are the main deployment areas of the 1st Netherlands and 1st German Corps, and the threat that these formations would represent to the flanks of any Soviet assault against the Baltic Approaches would have to be addressed. (See Map A.5).

In the Northern Cap the strategic situation is somewhat different from that found in the Baltic Approaches. First, it seems likely that the warning time in this area would be somewhat longer than would be the case in the Baltic Approaches. In fact, the Norwegians themselves have described Soviet forces in the Leningrad Military District as 'not immediately threatening'.⁴⁸ Given that only three Soviet MR divisions in the district are at Category Two strength, it is anticipated that it would take some time to bring these divisions into an operational footing. It would also be necessary to move divisions from their peacetime bases to 'jump off' positions. Moreover since the majority of the Soviet Navy is in, or close to its home ports in peacetime, any large scale fleet movements would immediately cause alarm bells to start ringing. As the main Norwegian

⁴⁸Royal Ministry of Defence, Norway, Main Guidelines for the Defence Establishment During the Period 1984-1988, pp. 46-47.

defense position in Troms county is some 400-500 kilometers from the Soviet boundary it might be some time before the main Soviet forces reach Norwegian lines. This allows Norway further preparation time. Secondly, two neutral countries are situated in the Northern Cap region. The responses of Finland and Sweden could have a crucial impact on the course of events in such a crisis. Finally, the terrain of the region, being quite mountainous in Troms County, is not very conducive to rapid armoured warfare. This may give lighter allied forces somewhat of an advantage.

As is the case in the Baltic Approaches the initial defence of the region is entrusted to local forces. Norwegian forces in the county of Finnmark are very limited in number, and it is likely these forces would seek only to delay a Soviet advance.⁴⁹ The forces in this region are not saddled with the forward defence strategy predominant in Central Europe. The main Norwegian defence would be conducted in Troms county, some 400-500 kilometers from the Soviet Border. (See Map A.3) There are five principle reasons for selecting Troms county as the area to establish the Norwegian defence line:

1. The area is quite mountainous and the front here is quite narrow (some 200 kilometers across, bounded by

⁴⁹Norwegian forces in Finnmark consist only of two battalion formations at Kirkenes and Portsangen. In addition one Army brigade and Home Guard units can be mobilized in the county. Military Technology 'Close up Norway', Supplement Vol. 8, Issue 11 (1984), p. 20.

Sweden on the East and the Norwegian Sea on the west);

2. Forces making a stand in Finnmark would be vulnerable to being out-flanked by Soviet Forces advancing through Finland;
3. Soviet supply lines would be stretched over 400-500 kilometers (or 900 kilometers if tied to the Norwegian road through Finnmark) and would be vulnerable to air and partisan interdiction;
4. The most strategically and militarily valuable territory for both the NATO and the USSR (airfields and fjords that could act as safe havens for ships and submarines) are found in and to the south of Troms county; and
5. Keeping Norwegian forces in Finnmark to a minimum is an important element of Norway's consistent post-war policy of attempting to reassure the Soviet Union of Norway's purely defensive concerns.

In Troms county Norway deploys its one peacetime standing brigade, Brigade North. Within the space of a few days forces here could be increased to 5 brigades plus other light units of the Army and the Home Guard (a total of between 30,000 and 35,000 combat troops). This has been achieved by prepositioning heavy equipment in Troms county and rapidly flying in mobilized reservists from southern

Norway to the relatively sparsely populated north.⁵⁰ Most units of the Norwegian Navy and Air Force also have roles in northern Norway to provide air defence and prevent rear area amphibious and airborne landings.⁵¹

Soviet forces, once mobilized, would likely advance in the following order of battle. The 45th MR division would likely advance across the frontier from Pechenga, sweeping aside light Norwegian forces, and attempt to secure control of Finnmark. The 54th MR division would in turn advance through Finland and into Finnmark, preparing for an assault on the Troms region. At this point it is important to note that the attacking force could be bolstered by additional Soviet Forces. John Erikson, for example, has noted that the Soviet road and rail transport in the Leningrad Military District can accommodate some 10-12

⁵⁰Norway's Brigade North has a strength of over 6000 men with 45 MBT. By 1988 two of the remaining brigades available in Troms in a crisis will have an authorized strength of 6000 men with about 15 MBT each, extra artillery and better anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The remaining two brigades have a strength of 4500 men without any MBT. Additional light Army and Army Home Guard units would also be available. 'Close up Norway', Ibid., pp. 29-30.

⁵¹The Royal Norwegian Navy has a total of 5 missile frigates, 37 missile FAC, 12-14 attack submarines and various types of mine warfare ships. In order to prevent a rear area amphibious landing, some 15 Navy coast defence fortresses protect the entrances to the Ofot and Lyngen fjords. Military Balance 1986-87, op. cit., p. 74 and Erling Bjøl, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper No. 181, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (Spring 1983), p. 24. The Royal Norwegian Air Force deploys both F-5 and F-16 aircraft, and from 1987-89 will deploy six Batteries of Improved Hawk Surface to Air missiles in northern Norway, in addition to modernizing Air Force Home Guard anti-aircraft guns.

divisions simultaneously. The Finnish road and rail network in Lapland is similarly capable.⁵² Thus additional divisions could be assigned to bolster the 6th Army's initial attacking force. The Category Two division from the Soviet 30th Corps at Vyborg could join the 54th division in moving through Finnish Lapland. Likewise the one or two Category One strength divisions from the Soviet Central Strategic Reserve could also be assigned 6th Army first echelon forces. In fact, even more divisions, Category One and Two, from the Western Military Districts of the USSR and the Strategic Reserve could be added to the attacking force. It is anticipated that Category Three divisions of the 6th Army would follow Category Two divisions as a second echelon. The assignment of additional divisions to the 6th Army might give the Soviets the option of avoiding the heavily defended Troms defence line and instead, striking through Swedish Lapland, attempt to surround and cut off NATO forces in Troms county.

The Norwegians, NATO and the two Nordic neutrals must therefore prepare for a variety of possible contingencies. One of the first questions that must be asked by both the Norwegians and the Soviets is, given the likelihood of a Soviet advance through Finnish Lapland, will the Finns resist?; and what impact would such resistance have in the Soviet advance? In 1981 the report of the Third Parliament-

⁵²See John Erikson, 'The Northern Theatre: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts', RUSI Journal, Vol. 121, No. 2 (June 1976), pp. 16-19.

ary Defence Committee in Finland attempted to make clear the official position of the Finnish government.

The Republic of Finland is a whole and the entire population as well as all her parts must be defended . . . The increasing strategic importance of Northern Europe is reflected in Finland primarily in Lapland where in a conflict . . . the areas's air space and relatively well developed road network might serve as invasion routes to the opponent's territory. It serves the security interests of nations of Northern Europe that Finnish Lapland remains inviolate . . . (The Finnish armed forces must be prepared to) prevent transit through the country and the use of the military facilities (of Finland) against a third party.⁵³

There have been some suggestions that in a crisis Finland might give up defacto control of Lapland to the Soviet Union, thereby safeguarding the security of populated southern Finland.⁵⁴ Indeed in a statement by the Finnish Defence Ministry, outlining the country's likely policy in a war situation, this possibility seems to be alluded to.

If the country should become a target of military operations the task of its (Finland's) security policy is to safeguard the lives of its citizens and to create conditions for restoring peace with the least possible damage while preserving the country's independence (emphasis added).⁵⁵

⁵³Report on the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee, Helsinki, 1981, pp. 20, 36.

⁵⁴It has been noted in this regard that the fact that some four-fifths of Finnish imports from the Soviet Union are in the form of oil and petroleum products, Finland is particularly vulnerable to a cut off of such supplies. (Emergency stock piles of such supplies are maintained.) Likewise in 1981 it was estimated that some 120,000-130,000 jobs in Finland were dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc. V.J. Punasalo, The Reality of Finlandization, Institute for the Study of Conflict, No. 93 (March 1978), p. 7 and Erling Bjøl, op. cit., p. 16.

⁵⁵General Headquarters, Finnish Armed Forces, Finnish National Defence, 1983, p. 14.

In an effort to end speculation as to Finnish intentions, Finland began in 1965 to shore up its military presence in Lapland. In that year a battalion group was stationed at Sondankla in northern Lapland. This was later increased to a force of brigade size. Today three of Finland's eight standing brigades are deployed in Lapland, and reservists on refresher training deploy into the region regularly. Likewise the Finnish Air Force deploys 30 jet fighters at Rovaniemi in Lapland. This represents half of Finland's first line combat aircraft, as the 1947 Peace Treaty between the allies and Finland limits the Finnish Air Force to no more than 60 combat aircraft.⁵⁶ Indeed the tenacity of Finnish resistance in World War II is an example often cited when referring to Finland's likely actions if its territory were to be violated. A statement from the Finnish Foreign Ministry asks the rhetorical question, 'Is it possible that Finnish people have resigned themselves to giving away what they were willing to die for during the last war?'⁵⁷

⁵⁶Tomas Ries, 'Finland's Armed Forces' International Defense Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1984), pp. 263-270. Finnish brigades in Lapland are mostly light infantry formations of 2000-3000 men and without any MBT.

⁵⁷'Substance and Appearance: Finland' Finnish Features, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Helsinki (February 1981), p. 2. It should likewise be noted that during the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Finnish forces went on a heightened state of alert for a short period as an apparent signal to the Soviets. Likewise although Communists have been admitted to various institutions of government, they are apparently excluded from the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces and from the Foreign Service. Cited by George Maude, The Finnish Dilemma: Neutrality in

If we assume that Finland would resist a Soviet attempt to transit through its territory, what impact would such resistance have on the likely outcome of a struggle for control of the Northern Cap? Certainly Finland would likely be unable to stop a Soviet invasion of Lapland, but Finnish military doctrine puts primary emphasis on prolonged partisan style resistance.

The invader would commit himself to prolonged fighting requiring plenty of troops and a quick solution favourable to the enemy would not be attainable.⁵⁸

Finland claims the capacity to mobilize some 700,000 troops, though a figure of 250,000-350,000 seems more reasonable.⁵⁹ Thus Finnish resistance would center on attacks on Soviet supply-lines for forces advancing into Norway. This might have the effect of tying down certain Soviet units in Finnish Lapland to protect these supply lines. The more effective the Finnish resistance, the more Soviet units that would likely have to remain in northern Finland instead of moving into Norway. The Soviets would likely also have to commit some divisions under the command of the 30th Corps at Vyborg, to southeastern Finland in an attempt to draw off

the Shadow of Power, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 43, 26.

⁵⁸Finnish National Defence, p. 24.

⁵⁹Military Balance 1986-87, p. 83. The Finnish Army has a wartime posture based on some 20 brigades and about 100 independent battalions. Most of these units would likely be deployed in the forests and lake regions of southern Finland. Likewise the Finnish Navy maintains extensive coastal defence fortifications effectively turning southern Finland into a natural fortress.

Finnish forces to defend the populated south of the country. All in all Finnish resistance could have considerable impact on fighting between NATO and the USSR for the control of northern Norway.

For the initial attacks against the main Norwegian defensive position in Troms, the Soviets would likely deploy between 2 and 5 MR or Tank divisions (or anywhere between 25,000 and 62,500 combat troops). Given the likelihood of both Finnish and Norwegian partisan resistance in Lapland and Finnmark, it is unlikely that the maximum figure of 5 divisions would be available. The mountainous nature of the terrain, and the limited road facilities make the terrain here of great advantage to the defender.⁶⁰ Likewise neither rear area amphibious nor airborne landings will be easy. Since good landing areas in Troms coastal areas are mostly well protected by the Norwegian Navy and coastal fortresses, an amphibious assault could be a difficult and costly undertaking for the Soviets. Moreover, given NATO air force reinforcements and the distance of Soviet airbases from Troms, Soviet air superiority is certainly not assured. It has been noted that over 200 sorties by large transport aircraft are required to lift just one of the 76th Guards

⁶⁰Moreover since the Norwegians would be defending their own territory their morale could be expected to be reasonably high. Soviet reservists, on the other hand, having just crossed some 400-500 kilometers of hostile terrain in likely difficult conditions might well have somewhat lower morale.

Airborne divisions's three regiments.⁶¹ Given the likely widespread demands on Soviet Military Transport in a future war, such an airlift could prove difficult. All in all, initial Soviet attempts to seize this area could encounter extreme difficulties.

The Soviets might therefore decide, for these military reasons, to strike through the northern portion of Swedish Lapland in order to outflank the main Norwegian defence line and cut off and surround Norwegian and NATO forces. Although the road and rail network in this area of Sweden is not as extensive as that found in Finnish Lapland, there are transport routes that the Soviets could utilize. For example in September 1984 a road from Kiruna in Sweden to Narvik in Norway was officially opened. The road was criticized by defence planners as a military and strategic mistake.⁶² Such developments may have the effect of increasing the value of northern Sweden to the USSR. There are certainly other military factors that might well make the USSR unwilling to add Sweden to its list of adversaries in Northern Europe, but the possibility of a Soviet outflanking action through Sweden must nevertheless be con-

⁶¹See Mark Urban, '76th Guards Red Banner Chernigov Airborne Division', op. cit., p. 415.

⁶²The road was opened to transport iron ore from the mining center of Kiruna to the port of Narvik. Cited in Keesings (January 1986), p. 34114.

sidered by NATO planners.⁶³ Forces would have to be available to meet such a possible threat.

It was clear in examining the developing strategic situation in Northern Europe in the late 1970's and early 1980's that credible NATO reinforcements would be crucial to the military defence of the Northern Cap. Despite their highly skilled and fairly numerous defence forces, the Nordic countries could not hope to resist a Soviet attack alone. Reinforcements from outside would be crucial.

NATO Reinforcements for the Northern Cap:
The Military Importance

As of 1986 four NATO ground formations were committed to reinforce northern Norway. These forces were:

- The AMF (land), a light infantry formation of brigade size, with contingents from a number of countries, was available within 7 days by air;

⁶³The Swedish armed forces with a mobilizable strength of some 700,000 troops would be a formidable adversary. Even so, the relatively weak forces deployed in Swedish Lapland (centered on 4 Noorland Arctic warfare trained brigades) make this region a potentially tempting target. However the Soviets might well prefer to avoid a situation where a Soviet attack on northern Sweden provokes Swedish intervention on the side of NATO in the struggle for the Baltic Approaches. With some 370 combat aircraft, 30 missile FAC and 12 attack submarines, Swedish intervention would certainly not be meaningless. Likewise, even if the Soviets deployed five divisions in their first echelon of attack these might be insufficient to force their way through Swedish Lapland and to resist Swedish counter-attacks. Adding yet more forces to the strength of the 6th Army from the Central Strategic Reserve or the Western Military Districts of the USSR would likely be something that the Soviet High Command and the General Staff would seek to avoid in a general war, given the need to provide effective second and third echelon formations for Central Europe.

- The 2nd U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Brigade comprising some 12,000-16,000 men (including its own logistic support troops) and deployable in 8-10 days by air, linking up with prepositioned heavy equipment;
- The U.K./Netherlands Amphibious Force with British and Dutch Royal Marines which could deploy by sea within 10 days, had a total strength of about 6,000-7,000 men; and
- The CAST Brigade available by sea and air within 21 days, comprised some 5,000-6,000 men.

Of these formations only the CAST Brigade was committed to Norway alone. The other formations could possibly be deployed elsewhere if circumstances so dictated. Even so the most likely area of deployment for all four formations was northern Norway.⁶⁴ The roles of these formations would be to combine with mobilized Norwegian forces

⁶⁴The AMF for instance could be deployed to either Denmark or Norway, though it seemed that its more likely deployment area was northern Norway simply because there would be more time to get the force into position. Since the German battalion assigned to the AMF has never exercised in Norway for political reasons, it is possible that the German battalion assigned to the AMF would deploy to Denmark instead. This might avoid giving the Soviet Union a pretext for some aggressive action in a crisis. The U.S. Marine brigade since prepositioning its equipment in Norway (a process to be completed by 1989 with the construction of secure storage sites) was also more likely to deploy to Norway rather than elsewhere with the rest of the 2nd Marine Amphibious Force. Likewise given the extensive arctic warfare training of the British and Dutch marines, they too would most likely be deployed to northern Norway. See Gerhard Schepe, Mountain Warfare in Europe, Queen's National Security Press, No. 2/83, pp. 45-46.

and contain a Soviet offensive against Troms county, and to resist any Soviet offensives coming through Swedish Lapland. In the strategic context of the Northern Cap, even these limited allied formations with a combined strength of between 27,000 and 33,000 men could make a major contribution to the defence of northern Norway. Perhaps more important were the allied air force squadrons that were also committed to reinforce the Northern Cap. These comprised in 1986:

- The AMF (Air) with 4 tactical fighter squadrons usually assigned (one each American, Canadian, British and Dutch);
- One Canadian Forces tactical fighter squadron;
- One Royal Air Force close support squadron; and
- One U.S. Marine Corps Air Group with 4-6 tactical fighter squadrons..

All told these squadrons had some 152-182 tactical fighters.⁶⁵ Again it should be noted that the AMF (Air) squadrons have an additional commitment to the Baltic Approaches if CINCAFORTH determines this area to be of higher priority. The rapid deployment time of these squadrons and the fact that Soviet aircraft, although more numerous, would be operating near the maximum extent of

⁶⁵See North Atlantic Assembly Report, Security in the Northern Region (1979), p. 29 and; for descriptions of Northern Flank NATO exercises see for example: Carl Larsen-Burnett, 'Avalanche Express 84' Armed Forces Vol. 3, No. 7 (July 1984), pp. 265-271 and Robin Adshed, 'Exercise Anchor Express', Armed Forces, Vol. 5, No. 7 (July 1986), pp. 297-298.

their combat radii, from bases on Kola, increase the value of these NATO air reinforcements.

Equipment provided by the reinforcing allied formations that was of particular value were the transport helicopters held by the various allied formations. One author (a colonel in the German Army's Mountain Infantry Division) has noted that the helicopter is a 'revolutionary' piece of equipment in mountain warfare. Karl von Clausewitz believed that the advantage in mountain warfare was with the attacker simply because a defender could not usually hope to adequately defend all the mountain passes which the attacker might use in an offensive. However the helicopter, Gerhard Schepe has noted, gives the defender the capability to rapidly move troops from one threatened area to another.⁶⁶ The Military Balance reports that the Norwegian Air Force deploys only 28 UH-1 and 10 Sea King helicopters, with latter committed to search and rescue. The Army deploys no helicopters.⁶⁷ In such circumstances reinforcing allied helicopter assets could prove crucial to a successful NATO defence of northern Norway. As Soviet second and third echelon formations are committed to the offensive (if the first attacks are contained by NATO), NATO is going to have to be able to move its forces around northern Norway efficiently. The large Chinook helicopters held by Canada (until its withdrawal from the Northern Flank commitment)

⁶⁶Gerhard Schepe, op. cit., pp. 11-21, 61-73.

⁶⁷Military Balance 1985-86, p. 156.

Britain and the United States would be of particular value.⁶⁸

In addition to the essential role played by reinforcing NATO air power (for both combat and transport), NATO ground formations would be of particular value in counter-attacking Soviet offensives, especially in the event of a Soviet offensive through Swedish Lapland. If such a move is undertaken by the Soviets, NATO would be forced to defend a much wider front. (See Map A.3). Later arriving reinforcements such as the U.S. Marines and the CAST brigade would be essential for this purpose. The U.S. brigade, with its equipment prepositioned some 800 kilometers to the south of the main defensive area, would be well suited to respond (together with some of the eight Norwegian brigades deployed in central Norway and southern Norway) to such a threat. Since the CAST brigade would also have been a 'late' arriving force it might also have been suited to such a role. However the formation only rarely was thought of in such a war fighting role. Unlike other NATO formations committed to Norway, its role was primarily one of deterrence. (See Chapter Three). The fact that by 1987 Canada had still not been able to discard the late sea deployment concept was evidence of this. The U.K./Netherlands Am-

⁶⁸Among the transport helicopters available from the reinforcing NATO formations would have been some 25 UH-1 helicopters from Canada (until Canada's withdrawal from the CAST commitment) and Germany; 4 Puma helicopters and over 20 Sea King helicopters from the U.K.; Numerous Chinook, UH-1 and CH-53 helicopters from the U.S. Marines, as well as some others.

phibious Force, while also deploying by sea would have been able to arrive within 10 days. Given the low readiness level of Soviet divisions in the Leningrad Military District, this might be a sufficiently short enough deployment time. However the CAST brigade's equipment arriving by sea in 21 days would have been extremely vulnerable to being destroyed enroute. Indeed as early as 1973 the Defence Committee of the Norwegian Parliament had noted that, 'It is clear that the transfer to Norway of reinforcements will in many ways become more difficult . . .'⁶⁹ By the 1980's all other allied reinforcing formations had abandoned any pretext of being able to deploy into Norway by sea at such a late time after the initial mobilization.

Nevertheless, the military need for NATO reinforcements for northern Norway was clear. Throughout the late 1970's and 1980's NATO officials and organizations concerned with the Northern Flank made clear the need to make military commitments to reinforce northern Norway militarily credible. For example as the North Atlantic Assembly's sub-committee on the Northern Region had concluded in 1979,

The changed circumstances in the North dictate a broad range of western responses . . . A number of remedial actions in the military field (are) needed to reserve the credibility of NATO deterrence in the region. In particular, air defence and reinforcement capabilities must be improved.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Cited in Joseph Jockel, 'Canada's other commitment: the defence of Norway', International Perspectives (January/February 1980), p. 21.

⁷⁰Security in the Northern Region, op. cit., p. 62.

All NATO commanders of the Northern Region in the 1970's and 1980's also repeated the message that commitments to the Northern Flank had to be made militarily credible in the face of an expanding Soviet land, and especially maritime, threat.⁷¹ The Canadian decision to focus its CAST commitment exclusively on Norway (rather than on either Denmark or Norway), was part of an effort to make the CAST commitment more 'real' militarily. But with the expansion of the Soviet threat to Norway, it was clear that further measures were needed. The Canadian government attempted to respond with solutions of various kinds, but the one measure that would probably have made the CAST commitment militarily credible, the prepositioning of military equipment, proved to be a very expensive undertaking for a power with a limited defence budget like Canada. These difficulties should have been best understood by the Norwegians themselves. As a small power with a limited defence budget Norway had on many occasions delayed or cancelled expensive equipment programs because of financial difficulties. Given that military reinforcements are essential for Norwegian security, and given that Norway's base ban policy has created severe difficulties for fellow small powers like Canada to reinforce Norway, why has Norway at no time

⁷¹See for example General Sir Walter Walker, 'The Defence of the Northern Flank', RUSI Journal, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Sept. 1973), pp. 21-30; General Sir Peter Whiteley, 'The Northern Flank of NATO', RUSI Journal (Vol. 125 No. 1 March 1980), pp. 9-13 and General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 'Dynamic Defence: The Northern Flank' RUSI Journal, Vol. 128, No. 4 (December 1983), pp. 5-11.

seriously considered a review of this policy? The answer can partially be found in examining the pattern of political and strategic interrelations between Northern European states, and their relationship to the external Great Powers.

Geo-Political Interrelationships
in the Nordic Region

In some senses the countries of the Nordic region sought to remain the 'quiet corner of Europe' even after their territories had become strategically important during and after World War II. The ability to have remained outside most European conflicts since 1815, and even before, reinforced this desire to remain the quiet corner of Europe. The ability to develop in relative peace and security, to a certain extent isolated from European-power politics, also helped to reinforce a certain common regional identity. This 'Nordic' identity has its roots in some 700 years of common cultural, social and political development. Thus, Nordic states not only share a geographic proximity, but also similar cultural, religious and political semblances. Common psychological bonds and affinities have been reinforced in the post war period by Nordic integration at the 'micro' level.⁷² The Nordic Council created in 1952 unites

⁷²See Erik Solem, The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration (Praeger Publishers, 1977). 'Micro' level integration involves the integration of activities between the various Nordic countries at lower profile levels rather than at higher policy levels: For example, since 1952 measures have been introduced to set up a common Nordic labour market; enable all Nordic citizens to enjoy free hospital care in each other's countries; co-ordinate and implement common public and private law, road and traffic

all five Nordic States in a common supranational organization to promote consultation and between the five national parliaments and governments. These integration measures, accelerated by the post war period, actually began in the late 19th Century. Social, cultural, religious and political semblances have also manifested themselves in similar Nordic social policies and common perceptions on many international issues often reflecting a certain degree of Lutheran religious idealism.⁷³ It has been said that the high degree of affinity the Nordic peoples share with each other creates an important psychological bond between all Nordic peoples. The overall result has been a certain degree of allegiance to the region as well as to the country by Nordic citizens and the creation of a sub-'security community' within Europe that in most ways goes beyond any other security community in terms of psychological bonds and regional affinities among its peoples.⁷⁴ It was only natural that common perceptions and attitudes would find their way into the security policies of Nordic states.

safety standards, regional planning programs, education standards, and the like. In terms of 19th Century effort at integration, 1839 saw the Scandinavian countries begin the process with the establishment of unity in patent legislation. By 1875 the Scandinavian countries had established a Monetary Union, which lasted until 1924.

⁷³See N. Elder, A. H. Thomas and D. Arter, The Consensual Democracies? The Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), and S. Berglund Ulf Lindstrom, The Scandinavian Party System: A Comparative Study (Student Literature, 1978).

⁷⁴See Erik Solem, op. cit., pp. 11, 29.

During World War II, all Nordic States sought to maintain policies of neutrality. However, a combination of circumstances had made the territories of four out of five countries strategically important to the belligerent powers in 1939-1940. Denmark and Norway found themselves occupied by Germany, while Iceland was occupied by Great Britain and later by the United States. Finland (in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and later as a co-belligerent with Germany from 1941-1944) fought savagely to preserve her territorial integrity from Soviet designs. Of all the Nordic countries only Sweden was able to maintain a successful policy of neutrality throughout World War II.

If we were looking at the relative successes and failures of the pre-war neutrality policies of the Nordic countries from a behaviorist, psychological, point of view as expounded by B. F. Skinner, we might logically expect a continuation of Swedish policy and a change in the policies of the four other Nordic countries in the post war period.⁷⁵

The successful Swedish policy of armed neutrality during the war could be expected to be maintained. On the other hand, the unsuccessful policies of neutrality in Iceland, Denmark and Norway, punished by occupation, could be expected to be altered. A change could also be anticipated in the Finnish policy of confrontational armed

⁷⁵See Haken Wiberg, 'Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as a Process: The Nordic Case' in Kari Mottola (ed.) Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 15.

neutrality, which had been punished by long and costly wars ultimately leading to territorial losses. Thus, after World War II the evolving perception of a Soviet threat to Western Europe as a whole led to Iceland, Denmark and Norway (after a brief flirtation by the latter two powers with the idea of a common Scandinavian alliance as proposed by Sweden) to opt for membership in a common western defensive alliance. The governments of all three countries recognized the strategic importance of their territories and the inability as a result to remain outside any future war. Likewise the experience of harsh foreign occupation in Denmark and especially in Norway made a decision to cast aside failed pre-war policies of military unpreparedness and neutrality that much easier.⁷⁶

In the case of Finland the necessity of coming to terms with Soviet hegemonic power was apparent by the Finnish armistice with the USSR in 1944. The Peace Treaty between the victorious allied powers (principally the USSR), and Finland in 1947 confirmed Soviet territorial gains and placed serious restrictions on the future size and composition of the Finnish armed forces. One year later Finland signed an Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual

⁷⁶All three countries as well maintained important psychological and trade ties to the other nations of the West. Norway with its large merchant marine had long had close trading relations with both Britain and America while Denmark had close economic ties with both Britain and Germany. Likewise close bonds had developed in World War II with the Anglo-American allies, especially in the case of Norway which maintained a government in exile in London from 1940-1945.

Assistance with the Soviet Union (The FCMA Treaty). In that agreement Finland pledged to resist any attack on the Soviet Union carried out by Germany, or its allies, through Finnish territory. If required the Soviet Union would provide Finland with the necessary assistance to repel the attack. The treaty subsequently became the basis of Finland's post war security policy.⁷⁷

From the initial formulation of the Nordic countries post war security policies a certain 'geostrategic unity' seems to have manifested itself. The Soviet demand that Finland accede to the FCMA Treaty served as a catalyst in moving the countries of Norway, Denmark and Iceland into the NATO alliance. It was feared that the FCMA treaty was a first step in the eventual incorporation of Finland into the Soviet bloc. In fact, Finnish success in limiting the provisions of the FCMA treaty has widely been interpreted as due, in a large part to the Soviet fear that a more inclusive pact between the USSR and Finland would have driven even Sweden into the Anglo-American camp.⁷⁸ The Norwegians,

⁷⁷See Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Finland, February 10, 1947; and Agreement of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 6, 1948. The Treaty, initially signed for a period of ten years, has been renewed several times and is now extended until at least 2003.

⁷⁸As early as the Napoleonic wars the 'geostrategic unity' of the Nordic region manifested itself as the 1807 British naval bombardment of Copenhagen set in motion events that led to the Russian occupation of Finland in 1808. See Erling Bjøl, Nordic Security (Adelphi Paper No. 181, IISS, Spring, 1983), p. 1.

concerned over possible Soviet moves against Finland, in retaliation for the Norwegian decision to join the NATO alliance pledged, in January 1949, not to allow the basing of any foreign forces on Norwegian territory 'as long as Norway was not attacked or exposed to threats of attack.⁷⁹ Denmark adopted a similar policy, in particular with respect to the island of Bornholm located some 150 kilometers east of the main Danish islands in the Baltic Sea.

Decisions taken early in the post war era by Norway and Denmark mushroomed into a series of policies all designed to maintain what was perceived as a delicate equilibrium in the Nordic area. This 'equilibrium' in the Nordic area has been termed the 'Nordic Balance'. In a sense the 'Nordic Balance' can be said to represent the attempt by the Nordic countries to remain the quiet corner of Europe. By limiting the presence of allied forces in NATO Nordic states and continuing to maintain the credibility of Swedish neutrality and Finnish independence, the Nordic region enhances its collective independence from the two power blocs in Europe. This perception has deep

⁷⁹See Robert K. German, 'Norway and the Bear' International Security Volume 7, No. 2 (Fall, 1982), pp. 59-60. German points out that three other factors also played an important part in the Norwegian base decision.

- 1) The desire to reassure the USSR as to the defensive nature of the alliance Norway was entering;
- 2) The sensitivity of Norwegian public opinion to the question of foreign forces on Norwegian territory only four years after the end of the German occupation, and;
- 3) The fact NATO countries were not seeking bases on Norwegian territory in 1949.

psychological roots and is reinforced by historical, social and cultural factors unique to the region. J. J. Holst, long a defender of Nordic security policies (and a former Deputy Minister, and from 1986 Minister of Defence in Norway), has stated that Norwegian allies 'should be within reach but at arm's length'.⁸⁰ In this respect Norway follows the pattern advised by Machiavelli more than 450 years ago for small powers entering alliances with larger powers. The simultaneous requirement of not antagonizing the great power neighbours unnecessarily is exemplified in Finnish security policy. A Finnish Foreign Ministry statement notes, 'Imagine what a Cuban Crisis in reverse would be created if Finland were to ignore Machiavelli's wise advice'.⁸¹ Finns are quick to point out that Nordic security policies of reassurance have in general enhanced Finnish independence, and been beneficial to the country.⁸²

⁸⁰J. J. Holst, The Nordic Balance and the Northern Flank: A Norwegian Perspective (Norsk Utenriskspolitsk Institutt, November 1983), p. 9.

⁸¹'Substance and Appearance: Finland' Finnish Features, (Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981), p. 7.

⁸²For example, the war reparations that Finland was required to pay to the Soviet Union (some \$300 million American dollars) were reduced by some 25% by the USSR as a reward for Finnish post-war co-operation. Likewise in 1955 the Soviet Navy returned the port of Porkkala (which had been granted to the USSR under terms of the 1947 peace treaty) to Finnish sovereignty. In 1962 conditions of the Peace Treaty were further eased to allow the Finnish armed forces to acquire guided missiles. By way of contrast the Austrian armed forces had, as of 1986, not received Soviet consent for similar acquisitions, barred them under the 1955 Austrian State Treaty.

Likewise the border areas of the Nordic region and its Soviet neighbour remain an area of limited engagement when compared with the highly militarized Central Front region. The same can be said for northern waters, although given increasing Soviet submarine penetrations of Nordic countries this is less the case than it was, particularly in the Baltic Sea. Nordic countries have sought to reinforce this pattern of security relationships with policies of reassurance and restraint. A brief summary in Table Four outlines the basic elements of each country's security policy.

The Nordic Balance Concept:

The Finnish note crisis of 1961 is often said to have confirmed the reality of the Nordic Balance and reaffirmed the delicate nature of relations in the region. On October 30, 1961, the Soviet Union sent the Finnish government a note suggesting consultations between the two governments under the terms of the FCMA Treaty. Such consultations were provided for in the Treaty to establish if the threat of armed attack was present.⁸³

Possible reasons for the Soviet request are numerous, but after President Kekkonen of Finland met Soviet Premier Khrushchev in the Soviet city of Novosibirsk, it was decided by the Soviets to withdraw the request for formal

⁸³Article Two, FCMA Treaty, op. cit.

TABLE A.4 THE NORDIC BALANCE

Iceland -	NATO Membership; no national defence; United States base.
Norway -	NATO Membership; no foreign bases in peacetime; no nuclear weapons in peacetime; no allied exercises east of 24 degrees latitude.
Denmark -	NATO Membership; European Economic Community Membership; no foreign bases in peacetime; no nuclear weapons in peacetime; no allied exercises on the island of Bornhom.
Sweden -	Neutrality; strong national defence; extensive stockpiling of strategically vital materials.
Finland -	Neutrality; FCMA Treaty with the USSR; total security policy of confidence building measures designed to lower force levels and ease tensions in the Nordic region; national defence based on partisan style resistance.

consultations.⁸⁴ Earlier, Norway had publicly warned that further pressure on Finland could lead Norway to change its

⁸⁴Four possible Soviet motives have most often been advanced for the consultation proposal:

1. That the USSR was upset by the candidacy of Olavi Honka for the presidency of Finland. Honka was backed by some conservative elements hostile to the FCMA Treaty;
2. Khrushchev's own internal problems with party hardliners forced him to show 'toughness';
3. The formation of the NATO Baltic Approaches command involving Federal Germany closely in the defence of Denmark and the Baltic Approaches, and;
4. Escalating East-West tensions in the Berlin crisis of 1961.

For an account of the crisis see Robert German, op. cit., pp. 67-68; Arne Bruntland, The Nordic Balance (norsk utenriks politisk institutt, 1981, pp. 4-8, and; George Maude, The Finnish Dilemma: Neutrality in the Shadow of Power (Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 60-61.

policy on banning foreign bases and on the storage of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, in the Soviet-Finnish communique at the Novosibirsk summit, Kekkonen stated that the start of consultations could provoke war preparations in 'Norway and Denmark who are members of NATO'. As Arne Bruntland points out, 'one seldom comes closer to finding proof of a theory in contemporary international relations'.⁸⁵

The note crisis reaffirmed and strengthened the concept of the Nordic Balance in all Nordic countries. Officially neither Finland nor the Soviet Union accept the concept of Nordic Balance. For Finland formal acceptance of the concept would involve undermining Finnish neutrality by suggesting collusion with NATO countries. It could also be seen to undermine Finnish independence by making Finland hostage to the actions of other powers. The Soviet Union, for its part, by rejecting the concept rejects the assertion that the USSR harbours any aggressive intentions toward Finland or the Nordic region as a whole.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, both President Kekkonen's statement at the Novosibirsk summit and Finnish actions and statements on other occasions in the post war period suggest a strong Finnish stake and reliance on the concept as part of Finnish security policy. For example since 1963 the AMF has conducted regular exercises in Norway (a subject of constant Soviet protest).

⁸⁵Arne Bruntland, op. cit., p. 8.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 9-10.

However, only in 1974 did Federal German units begin to participate in these exercises. The intention appeared to be to gradually integrate German support units (communications personnel, a medical unit, and a helicopter unit), before allowing the German infantry battalion assigned to the AMF to participate in the exercises. However, in January 1978, the Norwegian Defence Minister Rolf Hansen announced that German participation in the exercises had reached an 'appropriate level'. It was later learned that President Kekkonen had informed the Norwegians that full German integration into the AMF could pose possible problems for Finland.⁸⁷ The USSR by its constant efforts in the post war era to play on the basic principles of the concept for its own strategic benefit (often using crude forms of military suasion) acknowledges its defacto recognition of the concept.⁸⁸ The geostrategic unity of the Nordic Balance would seem to be most closely identified with Norway, Sweden and Finland. This reflects certain geostrategic differences between the three northern Nordic countries and the more detached countries of Denmark and Iceland. Denmark, while it is part of the Nordic region and within NATO, is considered part of Northern Europe, and is really part of both Central Europe and Northern Europe simultaneously. This is true whether one looks at cultural links, geostrategic

⁸⁷See Robert German, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

⁸⁸Perhaps the most notable evidence of attempted suasion in recent years are the submarine incursions into Nordic countries, most particularly Sweden.

considerations, or trade patterns. One should note for example that Denmark, unlike Norway, is a member of the European Economic Community.⁸⁹ Psychologically, Danes for the most part can be said, more than any other Nordic peoples, to consider themselves both Nordic citizens as well as citizens of a wider European Community.⁹⁰ Iceland is geostrategically more closely tied to the maritime balance of power between east and west. Unlike its two NATO Nordic partners it maintains an American base on its own territory. Although geographically it is part of Europe and culturally it is closely linked to the other four Nordic states, it is nevertheless somewhat detached from both by sheer distance. Norway, on the other hand, is more geographically discernable as a northern European state. Separated from the rest of Europe by the Baltic Sea Norway, Sweden and Finland would seem to form a 'core entity'. Norway appears over the years to have been the most 'orthodox' of the Nordic NATO countries in its adherence to the Nordic Balance concept.

⁸⁹By a narrow margin Danish voters approved entry into the EEC in 1972, while Norwegian voters rejected the EEC by a similar narrow margin in the same year. For a discussion of Nordic differences see D. Arter, op. cit.

⁹⁰Strategically the defence of Denmark is closely connected with the defence of NATO's Central Region. Unlike Norway, Denmark is not assisted by geographic barriers in her defence in the event of a Warsaw Pact armoured breakthrough on the Central Front. Likewise Soviet bloc airfields are only minutes away from Danish population centers. The emergence in Denmark of a question as to the relevance of any Danish defence effort and the consistent unwillingness to meet the 3% real increase in defence spending target has led to the coining of the phrase 'Denmarkization'; that is the acceptance of NATO protection without the willingness to pay for it. See Erling Bjøl, op. cit., pp. 33-38.

The effort to reassure the Soviet Union about the peaceful intentions of NATO in northern Europe has been a key element of the security policies of NATO Nordic countries. Norway (as noted in Table A.4) does not permit allied ground exercises in the county of Finnmark nor is allied air or naval activity normally permitted east of 24 degrees latitude. It also maintains a practice of notifying the Soviet Union thirty days prior to any allied exercise involving more than 10,000 troops and invites Soviet observers to attend all major allied exercises in the country.⁹¹ Furthermore prepositioned equipment for the United States brigade assigned to reinforce Norway in a crisis is located in Trondelag, some 800 kilometers to the south of its intended deployment area. This is principally due to the Norwegian desire to re-emphasize the defensive nature of the United States Marine commitment.⁹²

Since its armistice with the USSR in 1944, Finland has regarded such policies of reassurance as vital to its own national security. Finland's own security policy seeks

⁹¹Under the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) formula agreed to in 1975, countries were required to notify other countries of maneuvers involving more than 25,000 men twenty-one days prior to the start of the exercises. Thus, Norway exceeded CSCE standards. (A new more stringent CSCE formula was agreed to by member countries in 1986).

⁹²It should be noted that equipment stored in Trondelag is much less vulnerable to destruction by air interdiction than is equipment stored in the main defensive area of Narvik. For a description of Norwegian policies of reassurance, see J. J. Holst, Norway and NATO in the 1980's (Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1984), pp. 6-8.

to maintain northern Europe as a region of limited military engagement and above all to prevent the 'Mediterraneanization' of northern European waters and the militarization of the neighbouring Nordic land mass.⁹³ In the Finnish case this effort to reassure the Soviet Union has taken many different forms.⁹⁴ Although Finland has sought in general terms to maintain balanced relations between East and West, Finnish relations with the West in practice have been maintained on a very careful basis. Early in the post war period Finland did not join the Nordic Council until some four years after its formation, when it was assured that questions of defence and foreign policy would not be a subject of discussion in the Council. Likewise although Finland joined the European Free Trade Agreement in 1961, and signed a limited trade agreement with the European Economic Community in 1974, it also signed trade agreements with the Comecon countries of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1974 and 1975. About 20% of Finland's total trade is with the U.S.S.R., which is Finland's largest trading partner.⁹⁵ Finland thus applies

⁹³The term 'Mediterraneanization' has been coined to refer to a region (like the Mediterranean) that is an area of potential military confrontation and whose waters are subject to regular naval patrols by regional navies as well as by the navies of both Superpowers.

⁹⁴For a description see George Maude, op. cit., pp. 77-128.

⁹⁵See Ake Wihtol, 'Some views on the present and future Economic relations between Finland and the Soviet Union,' Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1984 (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs), pp. 31-35.

the principle of diversification in its political and economic relations very carefully.

In the realm of domestic politics Finland has attempted to ensure that a consensus is maintained on the importance of friendly relations with the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of the total Finnish security policy. This has involved a policy of self censorship. For example, the works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn have never been published in Finland and the Finnish media are careful not to carry materials that might be termed anti-Soviet agitation.⁹⁶ Generally it is the role of the hardline elements in the Finnish Communist Party to act as a kind of Soviet watch dog, thereby limiting the occasions under which the Soviet embassy itself will begin to make unfriendly noises.⁹⁷

In the area of diplomatic policy Finland has generally sought to remain neutral in issues of tension

This level of trade was maintained despite the often levelled accusation that high technology goods (such as a nuclear power station purchased in the 1960's) were generally of inferior quality to goods available in the west. It is also often argued that the barter system of Finnish-Soviet trade is of disadvantage to Finland. For an example of the contrasting arguments see: Ibid., Ake Wihtol, and V.I. Punsalo, The Reality of Finlandization (Institute for the Study of Conflict, No. 93, March 1978), pp. 5-7.

⁹⁶See Erling Bjøl, op. cit., pp. 7-13. While Solzenitsyn's works have not been published in Finland, they have been available in Finland from a publisher in Sweden.

⁹⁷While the Finnish Communist Party polled some 25% of the vote in the immediate post war period, this declined to an average of some 20% in the 1960's and 1970's, and declined further to only 14% by the 1983 general elections. See S. Berglund and Ulf Linstrom, op. cit., pp. 46, 79-80; see also Britannica Book of the Year 1984, 'Political Parties', p. 450.

between East and West.⁹⁸ Finland's diplomatic policy has sought instead to promote dialogue between east and west. In one sense, Finnish activity on the international scene provides Finland with international recognition of its independence in the face of the overpowering post war presence of its superpower neighbour. The final accords of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki in 1975, symbolized the culmination of Finland's post war security goals. The 1975 accords were widely interpreted in Finland as symbolizing an end to the speculation about Soviet intentions toward Finland. Finns widely regarded the conference, which guaranteed European boundaries, as an assurance of the country's independence and sovereignty.⁹⁹

Finland has also sought to reduce tensions and force levels in the Nordic region specifically. One proposal designed to achieve this goal has been the Finnish proposal (first made in 1963), to make the Nordic area a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Likewise in 1965 Finland proposed

⁹⁸To cite one example, prior to 1972 Finland did not maintain full diplomatic relations with either of the two German states. Since Finland would have had to choose between recognizing western Germany (a country with which Finland was anxious to expand its trading relations) or Eastern Germany, Finland chose to recognize neither country. After the Inter German Treaty of 1972, Finland established full diplomatic relations with both German states.

⁹⁹Britannica Book of the Year, 1976 'Finland' (University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 344-345. See also Jaako Blomberg, 'Finland's policy of Neutrality in times of detente and tension' in Year Book of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1984, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

to Norway that the Finnish and Norwegian frontier be formally demilitarized.¹⁰⁰ Finnish policies of restraint have inevitably resulted in charges from the West that Finland has from time to time played the role of a 'trojan horse' for the U.S.S.R. Overall, Finland's security policy of passive acceptance of Soviet regional hegemony has been termed 'Finlandization'. Some authors have in fact gone as far as to argue that Finland has over the years become a de facto satellite of the U.S.S.R.¹⁰¹ While this view may be exaggerated and based on generally crude analysis, the degree to which Finland gradually has been made a Soviet tool as a result of its comprehensive post war policy of recognizing and bowing to Soviet hegemony has long been a subject for concern in the West.

NATO Reinforcement:
Its Political Importance

The Soviet relationship with Finland has often been described to be a model of how the Soviets would like to construct their relations with the rest of the Nordic

¹⁰⁰The proposal to demilitarize the Norwegian-Finnish frontier was rejected by Norway as an impediment to its ability to deter or defend against a Soviet threat to the county of Finnmark. The Soviet-Finnish NWFZ proposal is rejected by the governments of Norway, Denmark and for all intents and purposes Sweden for similar reasons of deterrence and defence and due to the fact that Soviet territory would be excluded from the NWFZ.

¹⁰¹See V. I. Punasalo, op. cit.

region.¹⁰² At the very least the U.S.S.R. has sought to ensure that NATO Nordic states, in particular Norway, maintain their policies of reassurance. At best the Soviets would like to see such policies expanded, eventually achieving a defacto detachment of Norway, Denmark and Iceland from the NATO alliance. Soviet propaganda initiatives have consistently supported the proposals of left and centre parties in the Nordic countries to reduce defence preparedness or to sever their NATO connections. In Iceland, the Communist People's Alliance Party has perhaps received the strongest support from the electorate of any left wing movement in the Nordic region.¹⁰³ Its policy which has advocated the expulsion of all U.S. forces from the island and a withdrawal from NATO has, as a result, received strong Soviet support for this platform.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰²Soviet aims or objectives with regard to Finland have been described as basically three-fold. First, to use Finnish-Soviet trade relations and the lack of anti-Soviet agitation in the Finnish press as a model of friendly Soviet relations with a neighbouring non-socialist state; second, to utilize the country as a hostage against the actions and policies of NATO Nordic states and to ensure as well that Sweden maintains a neutral posture, and; thirdly, to enable Finland, as a western nation generally and a Nordic country more specifically, to act as a 'trojan horse' for Soviet diplomatic initiatives. Erling Bjøl, op. cit., pp. 7-16.

¹⁰³In the 1983 general elections the People's Alliance and another party of the extreme left (The Social Democratic Alliance) received some 24.6% of the popular vote. Britannica Book of the Year 1987 'Political Parties', University of Chicago Press, p. 419.

¹⁰⁴In 1971 a coalition government including the People's Alliance was elected. This government sought to achieve the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iceland by the end of its electoral term. Negotiations toward this end began in 1974, but the government fell in spring of that

Similar such initiatives have been proposed by left-of-centre parties in every Nordic country with varying degrees of success.¹⁰⁵ The success of left-of-centre parties in limiting the defence preparedness of Nordic states has its precedence in the policies of socialist dominated governments in Denmark and Norway prior to 1939. In fact, Danish opposition parties recently proposed a new Danish defence policy based entirely on a defensive posture, involving the virtual elimination of the combat capability of the Royal Danish Navy and the elimination of any offensive capabilities in both the Jutland division and the Royal Danish Air Force.¹⁰⁶ Soviet propagandists evidently view the Nordic region as potentially 'fertile ground' for Soviet 'peace offensives' to achieve eventual success.

year due to a split in the coalition over economic issues. The Soviet Union made very effort to show its support for the Icelandic government during this period. In fact, during the 'Cod War' between Iceland and the United Kingdom in the early 1970's, the Soviet Navy deployed a task force of some ten surface ships and ten submarines into Icelandic waters during one of the high points of the crisis. Bjorn Bjorns, 'Iceland's Security Policy' in Kenneth Myers (ed.), North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank? (Georgetown: Washington Papers, 1979), pp. 111-113 and Robert Weinland, 'The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic', in Kenneth Myers (ed.), op. cit., pp. 69-71.

¹⁰⁵Parties encouraging a detachment from NATO have, for example, found a constituency in the Faeroe Islands as well. Opposition to NATO radar installations has mounted there in recent years, and although foreign and defence policy for the islands is decided in Copenhagen at the present, the future of the installations in an independent Faeroe state cannot be assured.

¹⁰⁶Hilary Barnes, 'Danish Opposition Backs Controversial Defence Policy' Financial Times (Friday, September 5, 1986), p. 2.

The means the Soviets have employed to achieve their objectives in the Nordic region have often taken on crude and overt forms. In 1960, for example, during the U-2 and RB-47 incidents, the Soviets threatened to destroy the Norwegian air bases which the Soviets charged had been used by the American aircraft on their missions.¹⁰⁷ In June of 1968, Soviet tanks moved up to the Norwegian border with their guns pointed at Norway. A clumsy piece of military suasion, the move was designed apparently both to protest Norwegian hosting of allied exercises and also persuade Norway to review its NATO membership on the occasion of NATO's twentieth anniversary in 1969.¹⁰⁸ More recently, the 1970's and particularly 1980's have seen a noted increase in definite, probable and possible incursions of Soviet submarines into the territorial waters of Nordic countries, most especially Sweden. It has been noted that in 1981, the year a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground in a restricted area near the Swedish naval base of Karlskrona, there were ten reported intrusions into Swedish territory by

¹⁰⁷See Robert German, op. cit., pp. 64-66; Anastas Mikoyan, then a Soviet Vice-Premier made this specific threat during a visit to Norway several weeks after the incidents. The Norwegians have always been careful to limit the types of allied aircraft that use Norwegian air bases. Most recently United States Air Force nuclear capable F-111 aircraft were not allowed to use Norwegian air bases during allied exercises in northern Norway in the fall of 1986.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 70-71. The Soviet move may also have been a warning to the west of the Soviet ability to escalate any conflict should NATO countries have had any thought of interfering in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August.

submarines. In 1982 and 1983 there were more than 40 such intrusions each year.¹⁰⁹ The Submarine Defence Commission established in Sweden to investigate the intrusions expressed no doubt that the violators of Swedish sovereignty were Soviet.¹¹⁰ Given that the number of submarine incursions actually increased in 1982 and 1983, after the embarrassing 'Whiskey on the Rocks' incident in 1981, it was ominously concluded by the Commission that the main motive must 'represent the preparatory phases of military operational planning.'¹¹¹ Other probable motives involve standard intelligence gathering (mentioned by the Commission as a secondary motive in any such operation), the operational training of Soviet Spetsnaz (special forces) troops, and the probable Soviet desire to intimidate Sweden to 'adjust' to Soviet hegemony in the region. But, given massive Soviet propaganda 'peace offensives' specifically directed at the Nordic region, why would the Soviet Union risk strengthening the pro NATO elements in NATO Nordic states and risk pushing Sweden into closer collaboration with NATO?

The alarming conclusion that has been drawn in many circles is that the Soviets now perceive the balance of

¹⁰⁹Cited in Tomas Ries, 'Soviet Submarines in Sweden', International Defense Review, Vol. 17, No. 6 (1984), p. 694.

¹¹⁰Stig Lofgren, 'Soviet Submarines Against Sweden', Strategic Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1984), pp. 39-40.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 40. The scope and sophistication of Soviet incursions and the probable involvement of highly trained teams of Soviet Spetsnaz (special forces) led the commission to its conclusion.

forces in the Nordic region to be so overwhelmingly in their favour that the possible reactions of Nordic states are of no concern to them.¹¹² This conclusion is supported by an increase in the number of reported incidents in Norway and Finland indicating a probable Soviet effort against the Nordic region as a whole, rather than targeted against Sweden alone.¹¹³ The continuing validity of the Nordic Balance concept given this Soviet perception has been called into question. In order for the Nordic balance concept to remain valid, the credibility of Norwegian and Danish threats to review their base ban policies if 'exposed to threats of attack' must remain solid.¹¹⁴ Likewise continuing Swedish neutrality must be perceived by the Soviets to be preferable to co-operation with NATO, and the possibility that, if pushed far enough, Sweden will review its neutrality posture must be real.

Essentially the problem that has arisen is that by linking Soviet behavior toward Finland in past crises with the continued practices on the part of NATO Nordic states of policies of restraint, NATO Nordic states have helped to create a double edged sword that can be used against them by

¹¹²See Thomas Ries, op. cit., pp. 695-696.

¹¹³See Carl Bildt, 'Sweden and the Soviet Submarines', Survival (Volume 25, No. 4, July/August, 1983), p. 168. The rare Finnish disclosure of a submarine incursion in 1982, in which a Finnish warship dropped warning charges' near the intruding vessel, must reflect increasing Finnish concern as well.

¹¹⁴See for example Robert German, op. cit., pp. 76-79.

the Soviets with equal effectiveness. Today Nordic states can be expected to review their base policies only in the case of an imminently perceived attack by the Soviet Union on the Nordic region or in the case of a direct Soviet threat to Finnish independence and neutrality. In the case of Sweden, a review of its policy of neutrality can be expected only in similar circumstances. This reality must be apparent to the Soviet Union. In the case of threats of a 'lesser' nature, such as those described above, 'milder' counter measures must be considered. For example, after the publication of the Submarine Defence Commission's findings in 1983, Sweden recalled its ambassador from Moscow and sent a note to the Soviet government requesting that the Soviet government 'give instructions to the Soviet Navy that violations of Swedish territory must cease.¹¹⁵ Funding for ASW in the Swedish Navy was increased in a crash program and the Swedish Navy received orders to attack any intruder without warning. In effect, the Swedish Navy was almost given the authority to fight a limited war of attrition against Soviet submarines. Given the realities of the region, it is difficult to envisage a much firmer Swedish response.¹¹⁶ The Soviet Union, fully cognizant of these

¹¹⁵See Britannica Book of the Year, 1984, 'Sweden'.

¹¹⁶Subsequently in 1984 the scope of the confrontation escalated further with the intrusion of a Soviet fighter plane into Swedish air space for five minutes (in 1982 unauthorized aircraft resulted in 293 Swedish Air Force alerts) and reported attack by Swedish coastal defence troops on 'frogmen' attempting to come ashore. To date however, Swedish ASW efforts have been unable to sink a

regional realities, has evidently decided that it is imperative for it to continue with its submarine operations regardless of the consequences in terms of the likely failure of its simultaneous 'peace offensives'. Indeed despite apparently hostile Soviet objectives and recent developments involving more aggressive Soviet military suasion it seems Nordic countries will remain committed to the Nordic Balance concept.

The buildup of Soviet Forces in Northern Europe, and increasing Soviet boldness as a result of a correlation of forces seen to be increasingly to the Soviet advantage, pose the greatest threat to traditional Nordic patterns of security. Ultimately, the degree of Nordic independence is highly dependent on the strength of the link to the NATO alliance. The buildup in particular of the Northern Fleet in the 1970's and 1980's, has threatened to isolate the Nordic region (more specifically the 'core' countries of Norway, Sweden and Finland), from its vital NATO connections. It has been noted that by examining the pattern of Soviet naval exercises, the impact of Soviet naval expansion can be seen. (See Map A.2). As the area for Soviet naval deployment has moved toward the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, Norway has found itself ever further

Soviet submarine or force one to the surface. The difficult conditions of the Baltic and limited investment and training in ASW in the past has been blamed for the Swedish failure. See Britannica Book of the Year, 1985 'Sweden', pp. 541-542. See also This Happens in the Swedish Air Force (Information Department, Swedish Air Staff, June, 1983), p. 3.

behind the outer Soviet defence perimeter. If NATO Reinforcements are unable to deploy to Norway in a crisis in some credible fashion, the isolation of the Nordic region from the NATO alliance will have become a reality. As General Sir Walter Walker, a former commander of NATO forces in the Northern Region, stated, the Soviets 'with their superior forces . . . intend to gain their political objectives without the use of weapons.'¹¹⁷

This not only undermines, for example, Norway's security position in a crisis situation, but also impacts on Norway's ability to resist Soviet peacetime suasion on issues ranging from the interpretation of Norway's base ban policy to the credibility of Norway's negotiating position with the Soviet Union in bilateral disputes. For example, the Soviet-Norwegian sea boundary dispute has been a source of tension between the two countries in recent years. The Norwegians have proposed a boundary based on the widely accepted Median line concept (based on principles of equidistance between land reference points). The Soviets on the other hand have based their claim on the relatively new sector principle (simply drawing a rough straight line from the Soviet land mass to the North Pole and incorporating everything on the Soviet side of the line).¹¹⁸ In January

¹¹⁷Walter Walker, 'Defence of the Northern Flank', op. cit., p. 25.

¹¹⁸See for example, Willy Ostreng, 'Soviet-Norwegian relations in the Arctic', International Journal, Volume 39, No. 4 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 867-887, and Frank Brenchley, Norway and her Soviet Neighbour: NATO's Arctic Frontier

of 1978, Norway and the Soviet Union concluded the so called 'Grey Zone Agreement'. The Agreement must be renewed every year and covers a small portion of the area disputed between the two countries. (See Map A.6). Although neither country's long term claims were compromised by the Agreement, critics charge that the Agreement favors the U.S.S.R.¹¹⁹


Another area of dispute between the two countries concerns the Svalbard archipelago. The archipelago, although formally under the sovereignty of Norway, is governed under the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. Several countries are guaranteed equal access to the resources of the archipelago under the Treaty. The Soviets are the only signatory to the Treaty besides Norway to have exercised this option. Soviet coal mining communities maintained on the islands have pushed their rights to the limit, even to the point of raising Norwegian and NATO concerns over the possible military applications of some of their activities on the strategically important but demilitarized archipelago.¹²⁰ In 1977 the establishment by Norway of a 300

(The Institute for the Study of Conflict, no. 131, 1982).

¹¹⁹See Frank Brenchley, *Ibid*, p. 7. Under the Agreement, Norway retains jurisdiction over its own fishing vessels and those of third countries it chooses to licence. The Soviets retain the same right. The Agreement thus reduces the possibility of confrontation over fishing rights. However, while Norway has limited rights to fish inside the traditional Soviet waters, the Soviets have substantial access to traditional Norwegian waters. Supporters of the Agreement reject this as inconsequential.

¹²⁰See Willy Ostreng, op. cit., pp. 875-822.

Map A.6 Taken from Willy Ostreng,
'Soviet-Norwegian Relations in the Arctic'.



kilometer fishing zone around the archipelago widened the dispute.¹²¹

Norwegian, and collectively Nordic security and independence, and the credibility of individual countries negotiating positions depend on how firm and credible the

¹²¹The U.S.S.R. disputes the Norwegian claim of exclusive rights to economic resources around the archipelago arguing that the waters come under the terms of the 1920 Treaty. Norway, on the other hand, argues the terms of the Treaty apply only to the islands and their immediate territorial waters. Norway's NATO allies have reserved their final positions on the dispute.

NATO counterbalancing influence is to constant Soviet suasion. For example, Norway increasingly became anxious in the late 1970's and 1980's, to ensure that NATO reinforcing formations became more credible militarily. Anders Sjaastad, Norway's Defence Minister from 1983-1986, noted that Norway had been 'prompted' as a result 'to try to reach independent arrangements with allied countries on a bilateral basis'.¹²² Through the signing of various Memorandums of Understanding with its allies, and in particular through agreements which resulted in the prepositioning of military equipment on Norwegian territory and the construction of secure prepositioning sites, Norway attempted to ensure that its allies remained committed to Norway's security in a tangible way. It seemed particularly important for the Norwegians that other 'small' powers similar to themselves be committed to reinforce Norway. As Sjaastad remarked, neither the U.S.S.R. nor Finland would be as likely to feel threatened by the prepositioning of Canadian military equipment in Norway whereas such concerns were raised when a plan was drawn up to preposition U.S. Marine equipment in Norway.¹²³ The United States was already pursuing defence strategies in NATO's northern waters that made the Norwegians and their Nordic neighbours ill at ease.

¹²²Anders C. Sjaastad, 'NATO's Northern Flank and Norwegian Security', NUPI notat, Revised and enlarged version of an oral presentation at the conference, 'Canada and the Northern Rim' at Queen's University (March 31-April 2, 1977), p. 13.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p. 13.

The most worrisome aspect of American strategy for the Norwegians has been U.S. naval strategy in wartime. Increasingly, it was felt in U.S. Navy circles in the late 1970's that in order to deal with the expanding Soviet Northern Fleet, the U.S. Navy would have to take the war at sea to the enemy, rather than waiting for the naval initiative to be taken by the Soviet Navy. Attempting to protect convoys with large numbers of surface ships and ASW aircraft and helicopters alone, was rejected in favour of the classic 'command of the sea' strategy long favoured by the U.S. Navy.¹²⁴ This meant sailing with several large U.S. Carrier groups into the Norwegian and Barents Sea, and attacking and bottling up the Soviet Northern Fleet in its home ports.¹²⁵ As John Lehman, Secretary of the U.S. Navy from 1981-1987, put it,

¹²⁴For a description of U.S. Navy strategy, see for example 'The Battle for the Norwegian Sea' Frontline, Transcript for the PBS Television program broadcast on January 1, 1985; Hugh O'Donnel Jr., 'Northern Flank Maritime Offensive', United States Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1985), pp. 47-57; Phillip A. Karber and John Hellenberg, 'The State and Future of United States Naval Forces in the North Atlantic' in Kenneth Myers, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 30-54; and George Lindsey, 'The Future of Anti-Submarine Warfare and Its Impact on Naval Activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic Regions' in Kenneth Myers (ed.), op. cit., pp. 139-159. For a comparison between strategic and tactical Anti Submarine operations see, International Peace Research Institute, Tactical and Strategic Anti-submarine Warfare (Stockholm: , 1980).

¹²⁵U.S. Carrier battle groups would be accompanied by numerous U.S. and NATO anti-air and anti-submarine escorts, as well as by American and British nuclear attack submarines. Five U.S. strike carriers could carry a total of about 300 tactical fighters plus additional support and ASW aircraft.

We have no alternative to a forward strategy. That means we must move quickly to put the Soviet Navy on the defensive to . . . prevent them from moving out into the Atlantic to prey on our shipping . . . It would be incomprehensible for NATO to adopt a strategy that as they attack NATO we would not attack their forces in Kola. Kola is a very vulnerable area; their ships, their support facilities and their offensive capability against NATO and obviously the options would be there for the Theatre Commander to attack Kola.¹²⁶

Whatever the merits or demerits of the U.S. Naval strategy, the Norwegians and others have been concerned particularly about the prospects such a strategy would have in hastening escalation to a nuclear level of conflict. In particular, the threat such a U.S. Navy strategy would pose to the Soviet SSBN force has been criticized.¹²⁷

U.S. reinforcements remain vitally important to Norway both politically and militarily. Nevertheless the Norwegians have been anxious to diversify their reinforcement sources. In this way Norway's defence will not be overly dominated by its Superpower ally. The paradox that has emerged, however, is this. While Norway has been anxious to ensure that small alliance powers, like Canada, remain committed to its defence, the costs associated with making such military formations credible, have made it difficult for countries like Canada to remain committed to reinforcing Norway. Indeed the question as to how the Norwegians would react in reverse, if they had to provide

¹²⁶Frontline, op. cit., p. 10.

¹²⁷See for example Barry R. Posen, 'Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank', International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall, 1982), pp. 28-54.

reinforcements to Canada but Canada refused to allow Norwegian forces to be based on Canadian territory, was put to Norwegian Parliamentarians by Canadian Parliamentarians during a visit by the former to Canada in 1985.¹²⁸

The expansion of the Soviet naval and military threat in the late 1970's and early 1980's made the successful movement of NATO reinforcements to Norway in a crisis more imperative. Thus, Norwegian and NATO pressure to make allied military reinforcements more credible increased. Ironically, the very expansion of the Soviet threat made the successful movement of NATO reinforcements more dangerous and difficult, increasing the costs of any reinforcement commitment. The ironic danger that emerged for Norway was that the unique circumstances of its Nordic environment, that created the base ban policy might now not only keep, as J. J. Holst had stated, Norway's allies 'at arms length', but for all intents and purposes, out of reach.

¹²⁸Text of Joint Sitting of SCEAND and Norwegian Parliamentary Defence Committee, Ottawa (February 25, 1985).

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES

1. Official Sources:

A. Canada:

Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians. Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1970.

Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches. 1963-1986.

Department of National Defence, Annual Reports. 1971-1985.

Department of National Defence, Briefing on Exercise 'Brave Lion' for the NATO Media. July 15 1985.

Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987.

Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70's. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971.

Department of National Defence, 5^e Group Brigade Du Canada (Information packet on 5^e Brigade and its units) Ottawa: June 1986.

Department of National Defence, News Release. October 31 1978.

Department of National Defence, News Release. 'Exercise Brave Lion', Ottawa: June 2, 1986.

Department of National Defence, News Release. 'Exercise Brave Lion Deployment', Ottawa: July 21, 1986.

Department of National Defence, News Release. 'Government Moves to Strengthen NATO Contribution', Ottawa: March 11, 1985.

Department of National Defence, Norway. (Information Monograph on Norway and the NATO defence thereof), Ottawa: June 1986.

Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence - 1964. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964.

Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence - 1959. Ottawa: 1959.

House of Commons, Debates. 1963-1986.

House of Commons, Transcript of a joint sitting of Standing Committee of External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) and Norwegian Parliamentary Defence Committee. Ottawa: February 25 1985.

Press Releases and Speeches, Dinner of Alberta Liberal Association. Calgary: April 12 1969.

Special House of Common's Committee on National Defence, Proceedings. 1963-1965.

Special House of Common's Committee on National Defence, Interim Report. December 20, 1963.

Special Senate Committee on National Defence, Canada's Territorial Air Defence. January 1975.

Special Senate Committee on National Defence, Military Air Transport. February 1986.

Special Senate Committee on National Defence, Proceedings. 1983-1987.

Standing House of Common's Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Proceedings. 1968-1985.

Standing House of Common's Committee on National Defence, Proceedings. 1965-1968.

Standing House of Common's Committee on National Defence, Proceedings. 1986-1987.

Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada's Maritime Defence. May 1983.

Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces. January 1982.

Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proceedings. 1980-1983.

B. Finland:

Agreement of Friendship Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 6 1948.

Finnish Parliament, Report of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee. Helsinki: 1981.

General Headquarters Finnish Armed Forces, Finnish National Defence. Helsinki: 1983.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finnish National Defence. Helsinki: September 1981.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Substance and Appearance: Finland. Helsinki: February 1981.

Treaty of Peace Between the Allies and Finland. February 10, 1947.

C. NATO:

North Atlantic Assembly, Report of the Joint Sub Committee on the Northern Region. North Atlantic Assembly Papers, 1979.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures. Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Ministerial Communiques. 1975-1985. Brussels: NATO Information Service.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Hand Book. Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1983.

D. Norway:

Royal Ministry of Defence, Defence Budget for 1986.

Royal Ministry of Defence, Exercises in Norway With Allied Participation. Oslo: February 1984.

Royal Ministry of Defence, Main Guidelines for the Defence Establishment During the Period 1984-1988.

Royal Ministry of Defence, Prestocking of Allied Military Equipment in Norway. Oslo: December 1983.

E. Sweden:

Information Department Swedish Air Staff. This Happens in the Swedish Air Force. Stockholm: June 1983.

Security Policy of Northern Europe, Address by Anders Thursborg, Swedish Minister of Defence at the University of Toronto, April 15 1985.

Swedish Information Service, Nordic Co-Operation. Stockholm: Facts Sheets on Sweden, September 1984.

Swedish Information Service, The Swedish Defence System. Stockholm: Fact Sheets on Sweden, September 1985.

The Total Defence Information Committee, The Swedish Total Defence. Stockholm: 1984.

2. Secondary Sources:

A. Books and Monographs.

Beer, F. A., Ed. Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World. Holt Rhinehart and Winston, 1970.

Berglund, S., and Lindstrom, Ulf. The Scandinavian Party System: A Comparative Study. Student Literature, 1978.

Bjol, Erling. Nordic Security. Adelphi Paper, No. 181, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Spring, 1983.

Brecher, Michael. The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Processes. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Brenchley, Frank. Norway and her Soviet Neighbour: NATO's Arctic Frontier. The Institute for the study of conflict, No. 131, 1982.

Brewin, Andrew. Stand on Guard, The Search for Canadian Defence Policy. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965.

Bruntland, Arne. The Nordic Balance. Norsk Utenriks Poltisk Institutt, 1981.

Britannica Books of the Year 1971-1987. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Byers, R. B., et. al. Canada and Western Security: The Search for New Options. Atlantic Council of Canada, 1982.
- Byers, R. B., and Gray, Colin, Eds. Canadian Military Professionalism. Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1973.
- Byers, R. B. Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Challenges. London: IISS Adelphi Paper No. 214, Winter 1985.
- Buteux, Paul. The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1975-1980. Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Canadian Annual Review for the Years 1963-1986. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Carver, George, Jr., Ed. The View from the South: A Perspective on Key Bilateral Issues Affecting the United States-Canadian Relations. Georgetown: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985.
- Clarkson, Stephen, Ed. An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada. McClelland and Stewart, 1968.
- Conant, Melvin. The Long Polar Watch. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.
- Dawson, McGregor. Democratic Government in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.
- Dewitt, David and Kirton, John. Canada as a Principle Power. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1983.
- Dobell, Peter. Canada in World Affairs, 1971-1973 . CIIA, 1985.
- _____. Canada's Search for New Roles. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Douglass, Joseph. Soviet Military Strategy in Europe. Pergamon Press Ltd., 1980.
- Eayrs, James. The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
- Elder, N., et. al. The Concensual Democracies? The Government and Policies of the Scandinavian States. Martin Robertson, 1982.

- Eustace, Marilyn. Canada's European Force 1964-1971. Queen's National Security Series, No. 4/82.
- Fox, Annette Baker, The Power of Small States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Gellner, John. Canada in NATO. Ryerson Press, 1970.
- Gorshkov, Sergei. Red Star Rising at Sea. United States Naval Institute, 1974.
- _____. The Sea Power of the State. Naval Institute Press, 1979.
- Granatstein, J. L., Ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969.
- Gray, Colin. Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance. Clark Irwin and Company, 1972.
- Griffiths, Franklyn. A Northern Foreign Policy. Toronto: CIIA, 1979.
- Haggerup, Niels. A Brief Introduction to Danish Foreign Policy and Defence. Information Services of the Danish Defence, 1980.
- Holmes, John. The Shaping of Peace. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.
- Holst, J. J. Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in a Great Power Alliance. Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt, March 1983.
- _____. Norway and NATO in the 1980's. Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1984.
- _____. The Nordic Balance and the Northern Flank: A Norwegian Perspective. Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt, November 1983.
- Huntington, Samuel. The Common Defense. Columbia University Press, 1961.
- Jockel, Joseph; and Sokolsky, Joel. Canada and Collective Security. Washington: The Washington Papers No. 121, 1986.
- Jordan, John. Modern Soviet Navy. New York: Acro Publishing, 1982.
- Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979.

- Koburger, Charles. Sea Power in the Falklands. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.
- Kronenberg, Vernon. All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972. Wellesley Paper, CIIA, 1973.
- Lerner, Daniel and Laswell, Harold. The Policy Sciences. Stanford University Press, 1951.
- Lincoln, George and Padelford. The Dynamics of International Politics. New York: Macmillan Company, 1962.
- Liska, George. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Independence. John's Hopkins, 1968.
- Lyon, Peyton. A Review of the Review. School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1970.
- Macdonald, Brian, Ed. Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination? Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring, 1982.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince (1514). Penguin Books, 1982.
- Massey, H. J., Ed. The Canadian Military. Copp Clark, 1972.
- Matheson, W. A. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Methuen Publications, 1976.
- Maude, George. The Finnish Dilemma: Neutrality in the Shadow of Power. Oxford University Press, 1976.
- McKeowan, Major M. G., The Reinforcement of NATO's Northern Flank: A Canadian Dilemma. Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, April 1980.
- McLlin, Jon. B. Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963. John's Hopkins, 1967.
- Military Balance, Years 1968-1987, Inclusive. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Moore, John, Ed. Jane's Naval Review. Jane's Publishing Company, 1986.
- Mottola, Kari, Ed. Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1983.
- Moulton, J. L. Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1973. London: William Clowes, 1973.

- Myers, Kenneth, Ed. North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank? Georgetown: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983.
- Norwegian Version of the Military Balance 1984-1985. Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1984.
- Ollivant, Simon. The Strategic and Economic Importance of the Arctic. Institute for the Study of Conflict Paper, No. 172, 1985.
- Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Orvik, Nils, Ed. Canada and NATO. Queen's National Security Series, No. 3/82.
- _____. Canada's Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension. ORAE Paper, No. 21, DND, 1982.
- _____. Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union. Harvard University Press, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 6, 1963.
- Pearson, Lester B. Mike. Volume 3., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.
- Porter, Gerald. In Retreat. Deneau and Greenberg, 1979.
- Punsalo, V. I. The Reality of Finlandization. Institute for the Study of Conflict, No. 93, March 1978.
- Reid, Escott. Time of Fear and Hope. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.
- Reynolds, P. A. An Introduction to International Relations. Longman Group, Ltd.
- Robertson, W. S. Canada's Commitment to NATO's Northern Flank: The Northern Base Option. ORAE Paper, No. 27, DND, December 1983.
- Rothstein, Robert. Alliances and Small Powers. Columbia University Press, 1968.
- Rosenau, James, Ed. Domestic Sources and Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Schepe, Gerhard. Mountain Warfare in Europe. Queen's National Security Series, No. 2, 1983.

- Scott, Harriette and William. The Armed Forces of the USSR. Westview Press, 1981.
- Sjaastad, Anders. 'NATO's Northern Flank and Norwegian Security' NUPI Notat Revised and enlarged version of an oral presentation at the conference, 'Canada and the Northern Rim' at Queen's University, March 31-April 2 1977.
- Sokal, John. Power and Independence: The Relevance of Nationalism and Sovereignty in the 1970's and Beyond. CIIA, 1970.
- Solem, Erik. The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration. Praeger Publishers, 1977.
- Stewart, Larry. Canada's European Force, 1971-1980. Queen's National Security Series, No. 5/1980.
- Tactical and Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare. Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute, 1980.
- 'The Battle for the Norwegian Sea'. Frontline. PBS Television Transcript, January 1, 1985.
- The Northern Flank in a Central European War. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence Research Institute, 1982.
- Thordarson, Bruce. Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Tracy, Nicholas. Canada's Foreign Policy Objectives and Canadian Security Arrangements in the North. OARE Paper, No. 8, February 1980.
- Tucker, Michael. Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes. McGraw Hill; Ryerson, Ltd., 1980.
- Trudeau, Pierre. Federalism and the French Canadians (1968). Toronto: MacMillan Company, 1977.
- von Riekhoff, Harold. NATO: Issues and Prospects. Toronto: CIIA, 1967.
- Warnock, John. Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada. New Press, 1970.
- Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1984. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

B. Journal Articles:

- Adshed, Robin. 'Exercise Anchor Express', Armed Forces, Vol. 15 No. 7 July 1986.
- Belzile, Charles. 'Concentration and Deployment: The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group,' NATO's Sixteen Nations. Special 1/1985.
- Berg, John. 'Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern Norway', Jane's Defence Weekly, February 2, 1985.
- Bilt, Carl. 'Sweden and the Soviet Submarines', Survival, Volume 25, No. 4, July/August, 1983.
- Bjol, Erlins. 'Denmark: Between Scandinavia and Europe', International Affairs. Vol. 62, No. 4, Autumn, 1986.
- Boyd, Robert. 'Spetznaz: Soviet Innovation in Special Forces', Air University Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, November/December, 1986.
- Breemer, Jan. 'The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference and Alternative Scenarios', RUSI Journal, Vol. 130, No. 1, March 1985.
- Burns, E. L. M. 'The Withdrawal of the UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping' International Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1967-1968.
- Byers, R. B., 'Canada's Defence Review' Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, Spring 1985.
- _____. 'The Demise of the Trudeau Doctrine', International Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, Spring, 1978.
- Cadieux, Marcel. 'Framework Agreement is the Key to Closer Relations', International Perspectives, November/December, 1976.
- 'Close Up Norway', Military Technology Supplement, Vol. 8, No. II, 1984.
- Creasy, Calvin. 'A Perspective of the ACE Mobile Force', Military Review, Vol. 55, No. 11, November, 1975.
- Critchley, Harriet, 'Polar Deployment of Soviet Submarines', International Journal, Vol. 34, Autumn, 1984.
- Cuthbertson, B. C. 'The Strategic Significance of the Northern Cap', RUSI Journal, London: Vol. 117, June 1972.

- Dickey, John. 'Canada Independent', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4, July 1972.
- Donnelly, Christopher, and Peterson, Phillip. 'Soviet Strategists Target Denmark', International Defense Review, Vol. 19, No. 8, 1986.
- Erickson, John. 'The Northern Theatre: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts', RUSI Journal, Vol. 121, No. 2, June 1976.
- Farrar-Hockley, Sir Anthony. 'Dynamic Defence: The Northern Flank', RUSI Journal, Vol. 128, No. 4, December 1983.
- Forty, George. 'The Danish Army', Armed Forces, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1985.
- Furlong, R. S. M. 'The Threat to Northern Europe', International Defense Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 and No. 6, 1979.
- Gellner, John. 'The Blowpipe', Canadian Aviation, August 1973.
- German, Robert. 'Norway and the Bear', International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall, 1982.
- Halstead, John. 'Canada's Security in the 1980's: Options and Pitfalls', Behind the Headlines. Toronto: CIIA, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1983.
- Head, Ivan. 'The Foreign Policy of the New Canada', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2, January 1972.
- Hellyer, Paul. 'The Liberal Party and National Defence', Canadian Commentator, Vol. 5, No. 4, April, 1961.
- Hemsley, John. 'The Influence of Technology upon Soviet Operational Doctrine', RUSI Journal, Vol. 131, No. 2, June 1986.
- Hoile, K. J. T. 'ACE Mobile Forces', NATO's Fifteen Nations, December 1963 - January 1964.
- Humphreys, David. 'Canada's Link with Europe Still Not Widely Understood', International Perspectives, March/April 1976.
- Hunt, G. D. 'Reinforcing the NATO North Flank: The Canadian Experience', Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1987.

- Ignatieff, George. 'Canadian Foreign Policy in an Inter-dependent World', Spectrum, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 1979.
- Jockel, Joseph. 'Canada's Other Commitment: The Defence of Norway', International Perspectives, January/February 1980.
- Jockel, Joseph, and Sokolsky, Joel. Emphasizing the Assets: A Proposal for the Restructuring of Canada's Military Contribution to NATO', Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn, 1979.
- Kemp, Ian. 'The Danish Defence Agreement, 1985-1987', Armed Forces, Vol. 4, No. 8, August 1985.
- Kidd, Jr., Isaac. 'NATO Strategy and the New Dimension at Sea', NATO Review, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1976.
- Langley, James. 'Canada's Dialogue with the European Economic Community: Problems of Making it Effective', International Perspectives, January/February 1974.
- Lemelin, Claude. 'Objectives Viewed as Too Vague in Ottawa's Approach to Europe', International Perspectives, January/February 1974.
- Larsen-Burnett, Carl. 'Avalanche Express '84', Armed Forces, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1984.
- Lemnitzer, L. L. 'The Strategic Problems of NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks', Philadelphia: Orbis, Vol. 13, 1969-1970.
- Lind, O. K. 'Denmark and the Baltic: Forward Defence of the United Kingdom', RUSI Journal, Vol. 130, No. 2, June 1985.
- Lofgren, Stig. 'Soviet Submarines Against Sweden', Strategic Review, Vol. 17, No. 6, Winter, 1984.
- Lyon, Peyton. 'The Guest for Counterweight: Canada, Britain and the European Economic Community', International Perspectives, January/February 1976.
- MacLaren, Alasdair. 'Canada Needs to Reconcile Foreign and Defence Policies', International Perspectives, March/April 1977.
- Marshall, C. J. 'Canada's Forces Take Stock in Defence Structure Review', International Perspectives, January/February 1976.

- McIntosh, David. 'The Evolution of a Mobile Force', Executive, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1966.
- McLeavy, Roy. 'AIST Amphibious Assault Hovercraft', Armed Forces, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 1986.
- _____. 'Soviet Logistic Support ACV's', Armed Forces, Vol. 5, No. 9, September 1986.
- Morris, John. 'UKMF's role in the Baltic Approaches', Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1987.
- Munro, Neil. 'The West German Territorial Army', Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1987.
- NATO Review, December 1984 Issue, Vol. 32, No. 8.
- Nicholas, A. F. 'The Fifty Year Development of the Soviet Baltic Fleet', Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1986.
- _____. 'The Fifty Year Development of the Soviet Northern Fleet', Armed Forces, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1986.
- O'Donnel, Jr. Hugh. 'Northern Flank Maritime Offensive', United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1985.
- Orvik, Nils. 'A Defence Doctrine for Canada', Orbis, Philadelphia: Vol. 27, Spring 1983.
- _____. 'Canadian Security and Defence Against Help', International Perspectives, May/June 1983.
- _____. 'Canadian Security and Defence Against Help', Survival, Vol. 15, No. 5, September/October 1973.
- _____. 'Choices and Directions in Canadian Defence Policy', Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 and Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring and Summer, 1980.
- _____. 'Soviet Approaches on NATO's Northern Flank', International Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1964.
- _____. 'Defence in the 70's: Comments on the White Paper', Behind the Headlines, Vol. 30, No. 7-8, October 1970.
- Ostreng, Willy. 'Soviet-Norwegian Relations in the Arctic', International Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn, 1984.

- Painchaud, Paul. 'Growth in Bilateral Relations Between Canada and Denmark', International Perspectives, May/June 1978.
- Pearson, Lester. 'NATO: Retrospect and Prospects', International Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1959.
- Polmar, Norman. 'The Submarine Enigmas', United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1986.
- Posen, Barry. 'Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank', International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1982.
- Ries, Thomas. 'Soviet Submarines in Sweden', International Defense Review, Vol. 17, No. 6, 1984.
- _____. 'Finland's Armed Forces', International Defense Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1984.
- Ritchie, R. S. 'Problems of a Defence Policy for Canada', International Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1959.
- Russell, W. N. 'The Management of Canada's Defence Resources', Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4, Spring 1984.
- Schuur, Rear-Admiral H. 'Twenty-five Years Command', Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1987.
- Shadwick, Martin. 'Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for Rationalization', Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1985.
- Spencer, R. A. 'Triange into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO', International Journal, Toronto: CIIA Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1959.
- Survival, March/April 1984 issue, 'New Directions in Conventional Defence?', Vol. 26, No. 2.
- Urban, Mark. 'Red Flag Over Germany-2'. Armed Forces, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 1985.
- _____. 'Red Flag Over Germany-3', Armed Forces, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1985.
- _____. 'The Red Banner Baltic Fleet Guards Naval Infantry', Armed Forces, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1984.

_____. '76th Guards Red Banner Chernigov Airborne Division', Armed Forces, Vol. 1, No. 11, December 1982.

Walker, General Sir Walter. 'The Defence of the Northern Flank', RUSI Journal, Vol. 118, No. 3, Sept. 1973.

Whiteley, Sir Peter, 'The Northern Flank of NATO', RUSI Journal, Vol. 125, No. 1, March 1980.

C. Newspapers, Magazines and Other Sources:

The Citizen (Ottawa).

The Chronicle Herald (Halifax).

The Economist (London).

The Financial Times (London).

The Gazette (Montreal).

The Globe and Mail (Toronto).

Keesings Contemporary Archives.

Maclean's Magazine (Toronto).

The Manchester Guardian Weekly.

The Winnipeg Free Press.

3. Interviews:

A. Personal:

October 20, 1986 -	Ambassador, The Honourable Leo Cadieux
-	Former Associate Minister of National Defence and Minister of National Defence.
October 21, 1986 -	Dr. W. A. B. Douglas
-	Director of History, Department of National Defence.
October 21, 1986 -	The Honourable Allan McKinnon
-	Former Minister of National Defence

- October 22, 1986 - Lieutenant General Henri Tellier
 - Former Director General Plans, National Defence Headquarters; former Canadian Military Representative to NATO
- October 23, 1986 - Admiral R. H. Falls
 - Former Deputy Chief, Vice-Chief and Chief of the Defence Staff; former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.
- April 29, 1987 - Ambassador Ross Campbell
 - Former Canadian Ambassador to NATO

B. By Telephone:

- June 11, 1987 - Brigadier General Terry Liston
 - Director-General NDHQ Information; former Commander, CAST Brigade Group.

C. By Correspondence:

- The Honourable Paul Hellyer
 - Former Minister of National Defence
- The Honourable Gilles Lamontagne
 - Former Minister of National Defence
- The Honourable Donald Macdonald
 - Former Minister of National Defence.
- Ambassador George Ignatieff
 - Former Canadian Ambassador to NATO
- Ambassador Gordon Smith
 - Canadian Ambassador to NATO; former special policy advisor to the Minister of National Defence
- Mr. Elgin Armstrong

- Former Deputy Minister of National Defence
- Colonel Robert Raymont
- Former Executive Staff Officer to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and to the Chief of the Defence Staff.