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THE BASIS OF PRESENT DAY IDEALISM.

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INTRODUCTION.

Subjective and Objective Idealism:

(a) Creighton's Position.

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Under the common flag of "idealism" he sees two schools of thought, one which he terms "panpsychism" or "mentalism", and the other "speculative idealism". The speculative school he looks upon as being connected with "traditional idealism", the principles of which are that reality known in experience forms part of a permanent system of relations and values, and also that mind is not to be separated from nature. If it is the nature of mind to know, it is also the nature of nature to be known. The concept of the Absolute Mind is not an "a priori" starting point and is not an abstraction. It comes to fulfil the program and promises of the categories of ordinary experience. The speculative school views the mind and the objective system as complementary. Its logic and ideal of truth is that of the Concrete Universal. The panpsychical school, he claims, reduces objects to terms of mind and interprets minds and material things literally as identical modes of existences and further proceeds to postulate the Absolute Mind as a vast receptacle in which material things exist in forms of ideas. This denial of materiality, Creighton claims, is no solution to the problem of mind and matter. A material system is necessary to satisfy the needs of the mental life.

(b) Collins' Position.

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The first of these two schools, the panpsychical, she terms the "psychological", because it assumes a content of con-

sciousness in the form of mental states as the primary and immediate object of knowledge; the other, the speculative, "logical", because it is that of a concrete logic which finds truth as something objective in the real world. The former school, she says, with its subjectivism, virtually denies the reality of nature and law, reducing the world to a panpsychical society.

(c) The Bibliography.

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As representatives of the psychical school are cited Ward, Royce and Taylor, to which number may be added Bradley. Bosanquet is taken as the exponent of the logical or speculative school.

I. Psychological Idealism.

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This school of thought claims that the data of reality consist of sentient experience. However they do not wish to be accused of "subjectivism", and so go on to state that the whole physical order is not to be dismissed as a subjective illusion, but a belief in its existence is to be proved through a belief in the existence of our own bodies and the bodies of our fellows. This external world, through analogy with ourselves, is to be looked upon as "a plurality of conative individuals" or "a community of sentient experiencing beings". Inanimate nature does not exist. It is through the interaction of these centres of conation and volition that there is progress, development and evolution. The teleological principle Ward finds in the finite subjects themselves, while Royce and Taylor find its source in the Absolute. The plurality of the world exists in a unity. Ward again differs from the others by finding the unity to be the result of evolution, the unifying power being found in a

Supreme Unity, an individual which exists along with the other individuals "prima inter pares", thus making all natural law to be evolved. The others find the Unity in the Absolute, making the laws of nature to be found, not in the spontaneity of the individual, but rather in the expression of the nature of the Absolute in which it dwells. Ward, Royce and Taylor agree in finding what they look upon as the apparent uniformity of nature to be explained by the method of statistical averages. Ward is not troubled by having to explain the relationship of the individual to the Absolute, but the other three idealists state that the individual is no more lost in the Absolute than the notes in a melody. Progress and evolution belong to the individual but not to the Absolute. The same applies to pain and evil. In its true essence Reality is spiritual, and in this is to be found the solution of the dualism of mind and matter, two aspects of nature which cannot be separated.

II. Logical Idealism.

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Professor Bosanquet says that logic, or the spirit of Totality, is the clue to Reality, value and freedom. He assumes from the first that experience or reality is a unity, the unity being found in the Concrete Universal or Absolute. Logic, as the principle of the Concrete Universal, becomes the criterion of reality. This Concrete Universal is seen as a cosmos or as the individual in which all lesser individuals dwell and exist. It is in the light of the universe as a system or organism that he interprets natural law. In this system there can be no contrasing of "externality" and "inwardness". Experience always has an outer as well as an inner aspect. The Uniformity of Nature

he speaks of as Relevancy. This is the government of the parts by the whole, expressing itself most fully in the mental province. He condemns the theory of "statistical averages". Teleology is to be in nature only in so far as the parts express the purpose of the whole, that is, the logical principle of the Concrete Universal. This is to be found expressing itself not only in the finite consciousness but also throughout the whole of nature. Mechanism finds its place in Bosanquet's theory as being bound up with externality, there being no opposition between it and Teleology. Law is concrete and grounded in experience. It is the whole expressing itself through its parts. It is the tendency to self-transcendence appearing everywhere. Law has its abstract aspect in that the individual can be analyzed into abstract relations according to the nature of thought to generalize and form abstract ideas. The principle of law is to be found in the principle of the concrete unity, expressing itself in all experience, present everywhere. In so far as it expresses a purpose it is the purpose of the whole. The physical and the psychical are not to be dissociated. These two aspects of reality and totality are to be explained by "equivalence", by which is described the fact that the universal type of relation in individuals is one of qualitative wholes in quantitative counterparts. Taken in its widest sense, equivalence stands for the principle of determination by the whole, and in the light of the principle of equivalence there are to be found two complementary aspects, matter and mind, interrelated and interdependent. Consciousness cannot be introduced as a new principle, otherwise the continuity of the universe would be destroyed. The world comes first.

Mind is only something which can appear upon the scene after other conditions in nature have been prepared for it. Nature and mind are organic to each other. From the standpoint of the Concrete Universal the individual is a focus of meanings. The true and complete individual is only to be found in the perfection of the Absolute. Each finite individual is but an "element" in the Absolute. It is both finite and infinite and must pursue the logic of the self, but in this it is governed by the logical necessity of the whole whereby Freedom is not lost but won. Therefore the true criterion of value for the individual is in the Concrete Universal. Both pain and evil belong to the finite experience, the first being useful as an instrument for progress and for the development of the finite soul, the latter existing in finite experience as a contradiction of two goods, but neither being a part of the essence of the Absolute. Bosanquet is somewhat dubious as to the existence of the finite self after death, but no doubt as "soul" with him is synonymous with "finite mind", which is dependent upon materiality, there can be no place for it in his system. At the best, he says, it can be something beyond and different from our present self as it stands.

CONCLUSION.

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In spite of the sharp distinction made by Creighton and Collins between these two schools an examination shows that on the whole they are identical. It is the slight differences which have been over-emphasized by our critics and the intention of the parapsychists lost sight of. They differ in their interpretation of "experience". An enquiry into the nature of finite experience shows that there is a twofold aspect, the subject and the object. There is the

objective world which gives a plurality of sensations to the consciousness which unifies them into a world of ideas. In between the extreme view of Kant, who said that nothing was known but phenomena and that of Bosanquet who says that is is the thing-in-itself that is known there can be a middle position which states that the object, or external world, is partially known through the world of sentience. The physical is not only sufficiently known in its various relations for the guidance of the practical life but can only receive its interpretation through the sentience of the finite mind. This makes the knowledge of the external world not only dependent upon the world of sentience for its interpretation, but also makes the world of sentience dependent upon the external world for its data in experience. Also this partial knowledge and interpretation of nature is obtained according to the laws of nature since finite consciousness is a part of nature itself. This meets Creighton's demands that a rational life must have an apprehension of an objective order and that we must have commerce with this objective world on nature's own terms. There is then the one external world which finds its interpretation in as many internal and mental worlds as there are thinking finite minds. Herein lies the chief difference between the panpsychical and the logical schools of thought. Whereas Bosanquet holds "that we can know things as they really are", the panpsychists take the middle position by saying that things are only known through sense-perception and the world of ideas. Bosanquet says that the data of experience is the external world, whilst the panpsychists say that this data is sentience. But because they take up this position it cannot be said of them that they reduce nature to

to terms of subjects and their mental states thereby denying the existence of the physical world. Not only do they deny any charge of "subjectivism", but they assert their belief in externality. Marie Collins admits that the panpsychist does seek to destroy the appearance of externality but claims that he makes these objects nothing more than subjects like himself. In answer to this it can be said that he does not look upon himself merely as a subject but also as an object, not only of his own perception, but also of the perception of others; that is to say that he has a physical body, and from this it is assumed that others have physical bodies and that there is a physical world. This refutes her statement that the panpsychists resolve nature into a world of psychical subjects. Their intention is to assert the spiritual nature of the universe as against the materialism of mechanism, to show how the plurality of experience finds its unity in the Absolute, and also how this plurality in its varying degrees from uncommunicative nature up to the finite consciousness is the expression of Absolute according to its spiritual principle. The Absolute of the panpsychists is similar to that of Bosanquet, but their procedure is different. The panpsychists begin with the plurality of experience and find a unity for it in the Absolute, whereas Bosanquet starts with the unity of the Absolute and seeks to find within it a place for the plurality of experience. So alike are the two systems that Bosanquet can be accused of the charges brought against those to whom he has been placed in opposition. Both schools labour under the difficulties of viewing the world as an Absolute. To the panpsychists the Absolute is necessarily in the first place a mental concept, an interpretation of the external world as they believe it to be.

since the Absolute in itself cannot be experienced. Bosanquet begins with the statement that the Absolute is the one thing known in experience, but finally concludes by saying that finite mind cannot know it. Therefore he himself must consider it a mental idea. Another apparent difference between these two schools is to be seen in the use of the term "mind". With the panpsychists it is regarded as finite consciousness, whereas with Bosanquet it is the universalizing activity of the Concrete Universal, which corresponds to the panpsychists' "spirit" of the Absolute. This however is only a difference in the use of terms and does not go to prove the distinction made by J.E. Creighton and Marie Collins within the school of idealism.

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS.

- P.R. "Philosophical Review".
(where not otherwise stated this refers to vol. xxvi)
- Collins "Some Modern Conceptions of Natural Law".
Marie Collins.
- A. & R. "Appearance and Reality." F.H. Bradley.
- N. & A. "Naturalism and Agnosticism." J. Ward.
- R. of E. "Realm of Ends." J. Ward.
- W. & I. "The World and the Individual." J. Royce.
- E. of M. "Elements of Metaphysics." A.E. Taylor.
- Prin. "The Principle of Individuality and Value."
B. Bosanquet.
- Value & D. "The Value and Destiny of the Individual."
B. Bosanquet.

THE BASIS OF PRESENT DAY IDEALISM.

- Introduction -

It is currently held that modern Idealism is based, either upon sense-perception, or upon logic, in which case, it is, respectively either subjective or objective. J.E. Creighton brings forward this view very fully in an article entitled "Two Types of Idealism," which is to be found printed in "The Philosophical Review," Vol. xxvi, No.5, dated September, 1917.

The position that Creighton takes up is that

criticisms of idealism from other schools have served to unite under a common flag philosophical thinkers who are by no means at one either in their presuppositions and method, or in general character of their results. (P.R.514)

Here he sees two schools of philosophical thought, one which he terms mentalists and panpsychists, (P.R. 514)

whilst he speaks of those belonging to the second as the expounders of "speculative idealism." (P.R. 515.) However he states that the chief representative of this last school,

Professor Bosanquet, has repudiated that name (idealism) for himself and seems to suggest that the name should no longer be used to denote the speculative doctrine ----- but that to describe this the term 'speculative philosophy' should be employed. (P.R., 514.)

If this distinction is to be made within the ranks of idealism

Creighton feels that

the separation should be 'thoroughgoing and final, not something perfunctory and formal.-----Traditional idealism, if it is to maintain itself as genuinely 'speculative philosophy' must discard and disclaim the subjective categories assumed by the modern 'way of ideas.' Moreover, if this speculative idealism is to be defended and developed, it must rid itself of the ambiguities and restrictions that have resulted from its association with 'mentalism.' (P.R., 515.)

By so doing, he goes on to say that

2.
speculative idealism will give evidence, not of weakness or vacillation, but of its vitality and steadfastness in maintaining the continuity of its historical position. (P.R., 515.)

Creighton then goes on to place before his readers

the distinction which it is essential to make between the two types of philosophy which are confused under the name idealism. (P.R., 515 underlining mine)

Speculative philosophy he connects with "traditional idealism" and he says that

the characteristic mark of idealism, as it is found in the great systems, is its direct acceptance of things as having value or significance. The mind refuses, as it were, to allow anything to intervene between it and its object; to set up any bare existence, or isolated entity, as the 'cause' or 'element' in terms of which its own direct experience of a significant world is to be explained.----- it refuses to abstract from value,----- and it holds fast to the unity of existence and significance. Its primary insight which reflection has formulated as its principle, is that reality known in experience is not something that merely 'is' or possesses bare existence, but that, as existing concretely, forms part of a permanent system of relations and values. (P.R., 515-516, underlining mine)

Again he says

This historical speculative idealism, as occupying the standpoint of experience, has never separated the mind from the external order of nature.-----It assumes on the basis of experience that these realities (i.e. mind and nature) are not sundered and opposed, but are in very being and essence related and complementary. The relation, or rather system of relations, that constitute the bond between what we call mind, and that which is termed nature it takes not as external and accidental,----- but rather as internal, essential and constitutive,-----to be mind at all it is necessary to be in active commerce with a world which is more than an order of ideas.-----It is the nature of mind to know. (P.R., 522) The external order that we call nature is something that is at least knowable by mind.-----If it is the nature of mind to know it is also the nature of things to be known--- the order that we call nature is not complete apart from this relation. (P.R., 523)

The concept of the Absolute Mind finds a place in Speculative Philosophy, but it is not an 'a priori' starting point.

It cannot be accepted at the outset on the authority of formal arguments.----- if it is to have a meaning it

must grow out of the critical process of experience and be justified by this, ---- it is justified only when it is shown to be a necessary standpoint in order to enable reason to overcome actual difficulties that present themselves within human experience itself.--- If this conception of an Absolute Mind is to be anything more than an abstraction, it must come, not to destroy, but to fulfil the program and promises of the categories of ordinary experience. (P.R., 524)

Creighton feels that there is a certain amount of justification in the criticism of idealists that they bring in a ready made notion of an Absolute Mind, yet he is able to say this in favour of the speculative school of philosophy,

It is distinguished from these other attitudes towards experience only as emphasizing and making more explicit the common effort of experience to see things steadily and to see them whole. Speculation is not an effort to get beyond experience: its object is to see, to comprehend reality through the process of experience. (P.R., 525)

And so he sums up by saying Speculative Idealism

begins by viewing the mind and the objective system of nature as complementary and hence in agreeably related aspects of the conscious life which is experience. (P.R., 525)

He further adds that there is also another relation which is complementary - namely

that of the individual mind to the minds of other individuals. What we may speak of as a complementary social relation. (P.R., 525)

The ideal of truth and reality is to be found for this school of idealism in the nature of experience itself.

Its logic and ideal of truth must be that of the concrete universal. (P.R., 529.)

Its faith is that

the mind and things are what they show themselves to be in the whole course of experience, and that they are not once for all 'given' at the first moment, or any particular moment. (P.R., 529.)

The second type of thought to which the name "idealism" is applied in common usage Creighton has called "mentalism", but he

also states that it

might perhaps be denominated psychological or existential idealism. (P.R., 516.)

However he feels that the term "idealism" is wrongly used when applied to this school of philosophy. Its claims to the title 'idealism' he states,

comes from the fact that it asserts everything to be mental in character---of the content of mind, or of the substance of mind. But though idealistic in name, it fails to realize, wholly or in part, the speculative principle which distinguishes genuine idealism. Instead of accepting the intention of objective reality, and of seeking to penetrate into this through reflection, this type of thought proceeds dogmatically to transform experience into an order of existing ideas, to elaborate a theory of active substances and passive ideas as the machinery through which it is to be understood. In this process of transformation, both the mind and its objects become modes of existence, and the relation between them is conceived as external and mechanical. The external order of things as conceived by physical science is simply asserted to be a psychological order; but instead of thereby becoming "ideal" these things remain 'dead, inert, and passive' as before; --- existences, not meanings in a concrete world of meanings. (P.R.p.516-517)

Even the basal categories of experience, such as "significance" and the "ego" the psychological idealist, Creighton says, reduces to

a particular form of psychical existence, assuming that they can be validated and made secure only when they are based upon some psychological 'feeling of value' or feeling of 'ego'. (P.R., 517.)

Further on he says these idealists make the assertion that

material objects, at least so far as they can be known in experience, are real only as existent states of consciousness. The outer order is not accepted frankly for what it is, but is construed as the development or synthesis of some more primary inner order of facts, sensations or internal purposes. In order to be known, the objective order must be reduced to conscious states: 'What do we ever know but our ideas?' (P.R., 519-520.)

This the writer says is to reduce objects to terms of mind and to interpret minds and material things literally as identical modes of existences. Here he states that it is common for the adherents of this point of view to attempt to overcome the impossibility of reducing material things to states of consciousness in an individual

mind

by postulating an Absolute Mind as the vast receptacle, as it were, in which they exist in the form of ideas. (P. R., 519-520.)

This however, he is of the opinion, is no solution to the difficulty of panpsychic pluralism.

Things are not a whit more 'ideal' by thinking of them as states of consciousness of an Absolute mind. (P.R., 520) The fundamental postulate of this form of idealism----- is that the object must be reduced to terms of mind. The mind can know only that which is itself, or is within itself. As it is sometimes explained, reality must either be itself made up of minds, or exist as the state of some mind. (P.R., 520.)

In giving his judgment upon these two views as expressed by the two schools of idealists Creighton says

I fail to find any logical compulsion, in the supposed interest of monism to 'reduce' matter to terms of mind, or to interpret it with panpsychism as a bottom composed of mind stuff, or particular entities. (P.R., 534.)

On the other hand in referring to the speculative school his criticism is favourably stated as follows;

The conception of nature and mind as complementary in character satisfies, it appears to me, all the legitimate demands of monism. Moreover, I think that there are positive reasons for maintaining the contrast between the natural order of nature and the conscious order of mind. I cannot help feeling that this view of nature as a uniform and permanent system of natural laws is a necessary element in a rational experience. (P.R., 534.)

In the material system of things Creighton finds that which satisfies the needs of the mental life in the individual.

We need ---- an order to which we have to submit our intelligence and our will, an order that we are unable to bully or cajole, but which we can learn to control only by understanding and obedience. (P.R., 535.)

Here then he finds a great difference in the two schools of idealism which he severs apart in that the one, which he terms "speculative", satisfies the human outlook upon experience in its fulness; whereas the other, the "panpsychic", which he also calls "mental" or "existential" fails to do so. The external order of things and experience

are something more than a subjective psychological order comprised of unrelated psychical centres, but rather an objective, logical and concrete whole, or system, in which each part has its organic relationship.

This division of the school of idealism into two camps is further developed by Marie T. Collins in a treatise entitled "Some Modern Conceptions of Natural Law," which she published in the year 1920. For the purpose of criticising and examining the conception of "a law of nature" as interpreted by the modern idealist systems of philosophy she considers these interpretations

as broadly divisible into two types ---- the psychological and the logical. (Collins pref. iii.)

These two types correspond respectively to Creighton's divisions of "mentalist" and "speculative." As she sets herself the task

to set forth and compare the particular theories of natural law implied respectively in these two general views. (Collins, p. 2.)

it is natural that her two chief divisions to her work are entitled "Psychological Interpretation" and "Logical Interpretation." The one standpoint, she says,

is called psychological because it assumes a content of consciousness in the form of mental states as the primary and immediate object of knowledge. (Collins, p. 1.)

the other logical because

it is rather that of a concrete logic which finds truth as something objective in the real world and evidenced by the value and stability of concrete wholes. (Collins, p. 2.)

In her "Conclusion" there is an adverse criticism of the psychological theory in contrast to an appreciative one on behalf of the logical. She says of the former that its subjectivism, though claiming to have safeguarded what is most precious in experience, meaning and value, yet

in that championship of a supposed 'individuality and value', the reality of nature and law has been virtually denied. (Collins, p. 84.)

It

reduces nature to terms of subjects and then mental states and construes natural law as modes of behaviour. The very existence of nature is based on the proof of the existence of our fellows, and the essence of nature is found in its social character. Accordingly the relation between the ego and its fellows, or some form of social interaction, becomes the type of law. Natural law is a statement of the habits of intercourse of individuals in a panpsychical society. (Collins, pp. 84-85.)

For the purpose of this thesis it is not necessary at this point to dwell upon her various criticisms of this school, nor that her favourable comments upon the other be produced. In recognising two schools, each termed "idealism", she condemns the one as unsatisfactory, whilst of the other she says,

It is only a logical interpretation of experience which is able to represent the real as a teleological, systematic whole; that is, as genuine universal law. For it is only the logical view which comprehends experience as an organisation of relations and values. (Collins, p. 101.)

As representatives of the school of psychological interpretation Marie Collins cites James Ward, Josiah Royce, and A.E. Taylor. (Collins, p. 2) To this group should be added the name of F.H. Bradley to whom the first three look back with a certain sense of obligation. Bradley published his "Appearance and Reality" in 1893. Of this work he himself says,

Neither in form nor extent does it carry out the idea of a system.....what I have done is incomplete. (A. & R. pref. xi.)

In the years of 1899 and 1900 Royce delivered his Gifford Lectures before the University of Aberdeen, and later published them in two volumes under the title, "The World and the Individual." In his preface to volume I, in referring to

the very deep and positive obligations

which he owes to Mr. Bradley's book, he says that it is

a book without which much of what appears in my Lectures themselves could never have received anything like present

form. (W. & I. vol. I, xii.)

Ward in the year 1896 - 1898 delivered a series of Gifford Lectures, publishing them under the title of "Naturalism and Agnosticism."

These were followed later by the lectures delivered in 1907-10 and given to the reading public under the name of "The realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism." These latter were intended to serve as a sequel to the former. In 1903 A.E. Taylor brought out his work entitled, "Elements of Metaphysics." In the preface to the first edition he acknowledged his indebtedness to the previous writings of Bradley, Royce and Ward, though claiming not to

represent the views of any one author or school.
(E. of M. pref. v.)

Bernard Bosanquet is taken as the advocate of the most systematic and fully developed statement of what is here termed the logical interpretation of natural law. The clearest outline of Bosanquet's views regarding the matter under discussion is to be found in his Gifford Lectures, given after those of Ward and Royce, and published as "The Principle of Individuality and Value," and "The Value and Destiny of the Individual." In order that the contention of J.E. Creighton and Marie Collins can be either justified or otherwise it will be necessary to outline the views of the various writers who have been noted, and from whose several works that have been mentioned in this introduction quotations will be taken.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION.

The primary question which the writers feel it their duty as metaphysicians to answer is, "What is the criterion of Reality?" The answer given by the panpsychical school can be summed up in the words of Bradley when he says,

Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real.....there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence. (A. & R. p. 144.)

Royce makes a similar statement to this effect,

The valid then, even the eternally valid, enters our human consciousness through the narrow portals of an instant's experience. (W. & I. vol. I. pp 256-257)

Taylor explicitly expresses the same opinion by saying,

Reflection should convince us that we can at least say as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter or fact, what is given in immediate feeling.....The real is experience, and nothing but experience, and experience consists of 'psychical matter of fact.' (E. of M. p. 23.)

Thus according to these views it is to be considered that perception is the ground of the knowledge of reality --- a conception, which observes that

an experience of facts which send you beyond themselves, and to further possible experience for their interpretation, is the only conscious basis for any assertion of a Being that is beyond the flying contents of this very instant. (W. & I. vol. I, p. 245.)

However it is not the desire of these writers that they should be accused of Berkleyan 'subjectivism,' even though, according to their

own idealistic view, all Nature is an expression of mind. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 158.)

Royce in dealing with this point remarks as follows;

Now our hypothesis agrees with Berkley's view in asserting that no substance, and especially no material substance, exists independently of all mind. But just as we ascribe some sort of Being beyond our own individual minds, to the minds of our fellow-men, so the hypothesis here in question ascribes an existence, beyond that of man's mind, to the finite mental life which we here suppose to be indicated to us by our experience of Nature. And we do not suppose with Berkley that Nature has existence solely in our human experience.....We suppose that there is a vast range of extra-human life, limited in its nature, like the life of man, and identical with the Absolute life only in the universal sense in which, according to our theory, every life, however minute or however vast, is real in precisely the sense in which our fellow-men are real. Only we, of course, maintain that our present experience gives us very imperfect hints as to what the inner life of Nature contains; just as, even in case of men, our social experience of the doings of people whose language is not ours, and whose customs are remote, leaves us long in ignorance of what they mean. (W. & I. vol. 2, pp 235-237.)

Thus in order to avoid "subjectivism" and to assert a belief in the reality of Nature, when Nature is taken to mean the realm of physical phenomena known to common sense and to science, Royce states that this belief

is inseparably bound up with our belief in the existence of our fellow-men. (W. & I. vol. 2, pp. 165-166.)

But the question is how to prove the existence of our fellows.

Bradley does it in the following words:

If I am asked to justify my belief that other selves, beside my own, are in the world, the answer must be this. I arrive at other souls by means of other bodies, and the argument starts from the ground of my own body. My own body is one of the groups which are formed in my experience. And it is connected, immediately and specially, with pleasure and pain, and again with sensations and volitions, as no other group can be. But since there are other groups like my body, these must also be qualified by similar attendants. With my feelings and my volitions these groups cannot correspond. For they are usually irrelevant and indifferent, and often even hostile, and they enter into collision with one another and with my body. Therefore these foreign bodies have, each of them, a foreign self of its own. (A. & R. p. 255.)

Taylor appears to take up the argument from here by stating that

the whole physical order cannot be dismissed as a subjective illusion, because there are some members

of it which undoubtedly have an existence independent of the fact of being perceived by my sense organs. Such members are my body and the bodies of my fellow-men. (E. of M. pp. 202-203.)

Again,

All practical life is a mere illusion, unless my fellow-men are, like myself, centres of purposive experience. By the existence independent of my own perception which I ascribe to them, I mean precisely existence as feeling purposive beings. Hence, unless all social life is an illusion, there is at least one part of the physical order, external to myself, of which the 'esse' is not mere 'percipi,' but 'percipere,' or rather 'sentire.' If my fellow-men are more than complexes of presentations or 'ideas in my head,' then the subjectivist reduction of all reality to states of my 'consciousness' breaks down, at least for this part of the physical order. (E. of M. p. 204.)

Taylor feeling that the inner experience of his fellows is indubitably real to the same extent as his own is prepared to take up the position that

We can no longer conclude, from the dependence of the physical order for its sensible properties upon presentation to ourselves, that it has no further existence of its own.....we can no longer assert of any part of the physical order, without special proof, that its 'esse' is merely 'percipi'.....Unperceived physical existence must be real if I am myself real, because my own inner life is unintelligible without reference to it. (E. of M. p. 207.)

Having proved satisfactorily to themselves the existence of other-selves the idealists proceed to describe the nature of their being. Working upon the analogy of self they proclaim that the otherself must be similar in that it is to be considered as a centre of sensation and perception. Bradley says that his own body is one of the groups which are formed in his own experience, and

it is connected immediately and specially with pleasure and pain, and again with sensations and volitions, as no other group can be, but since there are other groups like my body, these must also be qualified by similar attendants. (A. & R. p. 255.)

Ward states the same view when he says that on the pansychical view

Nature thus resolves into a plurality of conative individuals. (R. of E. p. 21.)

Taylor confirms these ideas in the following words;

What appears to us in sense-perception as physical nature must be a community of sentient experiencing beings. (E. of M. p. 209.)

It is to be observed that those feelings are also to be applied to what is commonly spoken of as "matter", "inorganic nature" or "inanimate nature." According to the theories at present under review there is no such thing as inanimate nature in the physical world.

We have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature, or of Nature whose mental processes go on at such different times rates from ours that we cannot adjust ourselves to a live appreciation of their inward fluency. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 226.)

or

the inanimate world.....appears to us lifeless and purposeless merely because the kind of life it possesses is too far removed from our own for us to recognise it. (E. of M. p. 127.)

In so far as these centres of conation and volition are not passive but active they interact upon each other and thereby progress and develop. With Ward it is not cognition which is regarded as fundamental to life and conation.

It is the blind impulse to live that leads on to knowledge. (R. of E. p. 198.)

Cognition is the consequence and result of the activity of conation.

It is a question of ^afinite many mutually striving for the best 'modus vivendi' which is the key to development. In the beginning of the world,

in which everything is inchoate, but not chaotic. (R. of E. p. 71.)

it is

the stimulus of pain, as a veritable goad,

which

leads to random efforts for relief. (R. of E. p. 68.)

It is the principles of self-conservation, subjective or hedonic

selection which furnish

natural selection with the $\lambda\theta\theta\tau\omega$ it seems to demand. (N. & A. p. 235.)

A repetition of a number of similar uncomfortable positions and a repetition of the required adjustment develops into

an immediate, habitual, and eventually even a mechanical response. (R. of E. p. 68.)

This causes development and evolution, and this factor Ward calls

teleological, simply, then, on the ground that it presupposes conscious, or at least sentient, activity directed to the satisfaction of needs, appetites or desires. (N. & A. p. 274.) The Realm of Nature turns out to be a Realm of Ends. (N. & A. p. 573)

Royce also sees progress to be teleological, and says that it

is due to the constant intercommunication of a vast number of relatively separate regions of this world of conscious life. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 229.)

but

every natural process, if rightly viewed from within, would be the pursuit of an ideal. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 231)

Here may be pointed out a difference between Ward and Royce. While both agree in resolving nature into a realm of finite subjects, Ward makes finite subjects themselves the source of evolution, whereas Royce would presumably refer the laws of evolutionary process to a source in the Absolute. Taylor appears to agree with Ward rather than with Royce as to the source of progress in finding it to exist in conation, although he takes a wider interpretation of 'feeling' as the spur to action, as, for instance, when he says

feeling is essentially teleological, as we may see even in the case of simple pleasure and pain. (E. of M. p. 55)

However he is in agreement with the former when he says that we have

to think of the 'laws' or 'uniformities' in physical nature as corresponding to the habitual modes or reaction of the sentient beings of whose inner life the physical order is phenomenal; these uniformities would thus be essentially teleological in their own nature, and would also stand in intimate inter-relation with the spontaneous initiation of fresh

responses to variations in the environment of the part of the same sentient beings. (E. of M. p. 238.)

Our present idealists all having arrived at a theory of the existence of a plurality of sentient beings deem it necessary to bring the multiplicity beneath the influence of an existent unity. On the whole they, with the exception of Ward, agree in their interpretation of the same. Ward asks

may not the Many account for their own unity instead of requiring a One, an individual of another order, to account for them? May not the unity of the world be analogous to that of a society? (R. of E. p.25-26.)

The unity has evolved from the plurality, as he expresses it thus;

a plurality of conative beings at first casually interacting in pursuance of their several particular and immediate impulses gradually become to have ends and continually widening ends in common. (R. of E. p. 148.)

The principle of continuity he thinks forces us to posit higher orders of intelligence than our own, and therefore

this 'grand law' then encourages the pluralist to assume, though lacking sufficient direct evidence, that there exist individuals of a higher order, or rather a hierarchy of such orders. (R. of E. p. 189.)

Therefore the unifying power in nature would be the highest individual in this order, but it is to be recognised that

such Supreme Unity.....could from the pluralistic standpoint be regarded only as supreme, only as 'prima inter pares,' not as absolute. (R. of E.p.191.)

The other writers, however, find this unity to exist in the all-embracing Absolute. Bradley emphatically says that

except in the Absolute in which Nature is merged, we have no right to assert that all Nature has a unity.

Royce says that

the world is a rationally connected social system of beings that embody purposes in deeds.....they are linked in teleological unity.....the true variety is that of various individual selves, who together constitute, in their unity, the Individual or Individuals, the Absolute. (W. & I. vol.2,p.102.)

It is in the

true world.... the world of socially interrelated selves. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 107.)

that the individual works out its destiny.

It is not until man views himself as a member of a universal society..... that man rationally appreciates the actual sense of the conscious ideas that express his longing for oneness with an absolute life. We are related to God through our consciousness of our fellows. And our fellows, in the end, prove to be far more various than mere men. It is one office of philosophy to cultivate the deeper sense of companionship with the world. (W. & I. vol. I, p. 418.)

Taylor in looking to the Absolute as the unifying principle defines it as

that structure of the world system which any and every internally consistent purpose must recognise as the condition of its fulfilment, (E. of W. p. 53) a systematic Reality in which the unity and the multiplicity of the system are alike real and equally real. (E. of W. p. 97.)

Having found, then, that Reality consists of a systematised world of socially related individuals in which the individual not only expresses himself, but also finds himself, the next question to be decided upon is the nature and origin of the laws which appear to exercise themselves in experience. Ward's interpretation is that there were no natural laws 'in force' at the beginning, but, on the contrary,

all natural laws were evolved. (R. of E. p. 78.)

They are the result of the impulsive activities of the primordial individuals for self-conservation, self-development or realisation. This development he compares to the manner in which

a great multitude of human beings, varying in tastes and endowments

would act. The result would be that

in place of an incoherent multitude seemingly acting at random, we should have a social and economic organisation, every member of which had his appropriate place and function, while the ever increasing co-incidence of private ends and public ends would tend continually to enhance the unity of the whole. (R. of E. pp. 55-56.)

Contingency he feels is too apparent in experience to presuppose a theory of the Absolute, and in fact

the contingency in the world in general seems to involve that the existence of mankind at all is itself but a special contingency. (R. of E. p. 89.)

Yet elsewhere he makes this remark;

Absolute chance is certainly nonsense. (R. of E. p. 454.)

On the other hand the constants and uniformities which are said to exist in nature are to be regarded as

simply statistical results, such as frequently hide the diversity and spontaneity of animated beings when they and their actions are taken 'en masse'. Thus diversity and spontaneity are held to be fundamental, and the orderliness and regularity we now observe to be the result of behaviour. (R. of E. p. 433.)

At this point Royce is not in agreement with Ward in that he states that the laws of nature are not to be found in the spontaneity of the individual, but rather as an expression of the nature of the Absolute in which it dwells. Causation he says

will find a place in our world, but as a mere result of the very significance of that world itself. (W. & I. vol. I. p. 445.)

Taylor in taking the same view as Royce can give no place to "contingency" in his plan. Chance he says

may mean 'pure' chance, the existence of something for which there is no organic interconnection with a wider system of real existence. Chance in this last sense is, of course, absolutely excluded by our conception of the systematic unity of the real as expressed in Ground and Consequence as an ultimate axiom of all consistent thought. (E. of M. p. 232) Transeunt Causality must in the end be appearance. In as much as all interconnection between things depends upon their inclusion in the single system of Reality, it may be said that, when you take the whole into account, all Causality is ultimately immanent. (E. of M. p. 189.)

He, like Ward, sees the uniformities of nature to be explained by the methods of statistical averages. (E. of M. p. 221.)

The exact relation of the individual to the Absolute is not of much concern to Ward in so far as from his point of view that

if there be a Supreme Being at all.....that Spirit is still genuinely a member of the realm of ends, albeit the highest and, so to say, the central member. (R. of E. p. 193.)

However, Bradley, Royce, and Taylor have to meet the question as to how the individual, or series of individual centres of sentience, are still able to retain their individuality, and, in the face of the controlling teleological influence of the Absolute, their independence and free-will. Bradley admits that an explanation is beyond him.

We do not know why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres, or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one. The relation of the many experiences to the single experience, and so to one another, is, in the end beyond us. (A. & R. p. 527.) We do not know, except in a vague outline, what the Unity is, or, at all, why it appears in our particular form of plurality. (A. & R. p. 541)

Taylor sees the freedom of the individual to consist in having a purpose to pursue even though that purpose be the purpose of the Absolute.

To be really free, he says

we must have purposes which are coherent and abiding. And it is no paradox to say that unfreedom in the end means, in the main, not having your own mind, while to be free is to know what you mean. (E. of M. p. 365.)

or again,

we are free.....just so far as our experience is the embodiment of coherent and permanent interest or purpose, and freedom is, like 'will' simply an abstract expression for teleological unity, which in varying degrees, is an essential feature of all experience. (E. of M. p. 367.)

Royce maintains that

while it is, indeed, true that for every one of us the Absolute Self is God, we still retain our individuality, and our distinction one from another. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 289.)

And with the retention of individuality goes the individual freedom even though it be the expression of the will of the Absolute. The relation of the individual and his actions to the Absolute is comparable to that of notes in a melody.

You do not lose the many in the unity any more than you lose the notes in the melody. (W. & I. vol. I, p. 426.)

This, your way of expressing God's will is not derived. It is yourself. And it is yours because God worketh in you. The Spirit of God in its wholeness compels you.....the individual, the self, the unique personality, in the sense that it compels you to be an individual, and to be free, or it compels your individual will only in so far as you consciously compel yourself. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 293.)

Elsewhere he even goes so far as to say

So that when the Self rebels, it can rebel only because the Spirit dwells in it. (W. & I. vol. 2, p.351.)

Progress and evolution belong to the individual, and not to the Absolute.

In the infinite whole there can be no development; it cannot progress, (E. of M. p. 273.) for evolution is thus an inseparable characteristic of the life of the finite individual, and of finite individuals only. (E. of M. p. 274.)

Or as Bradley states it;

The Absolute is timeless, but it progresses in time as an isolated aspect, an aspect which, in ceasing to be isolated, loses its special character. It is there, but blended to a whole which we cannot realise. (A. & R. p. 210.)

He further says

there is of course progress in the world, and there is also retrogression, but we cannot think that the Whole either moves on or backwards. The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number. (A. & R. p. 499.)

As regards pain Bradley thinks that it may be

neutralized by pleasure in such a way that the balance is exceedingly pleasant, and hence it is possible that in the universe as a whole we may have a balance of pleasure, and in the total result no residue of pain... I question our right even to suppose a state of pain in the Absolute. (A. & R. p. 157.)

It is also the opinion of these idealists that evil is also lost in the Infinite. Taylor remarks that

hence we can see that evil is at once a mere appearance, and an appearance which is inevitable to the finite experience conditioned by temporal form. The so-called 'problem' is thus in principle insoluble only so long as we falsely think of the time order itself as a characteristic of the Absolute whole in

its real individuality. (E. of M. p. 396.)

Royce is of the opinion that

every evil deed must somewhere and at some time be atoned for, by some other than the agent, if not by the agent himself.....the condition of a moral order that evil should be, in the end, over-ruled for good. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 368.)

but after all

no finite act is a total evil, for taken in its external context, as aspects of the whole, it ultimately impliesall other finite acts, and forms together with them the total life in which the Absolute Will is fulfilled. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 363)

Thus these metaphysicians claim to have solved the problem of

the dualism of mind and matter, and its consequence, the fruitless endeavour to reunite what has never been experienced asunder. (N. & A. p. 381.)

Bradley closes his work by insisting that

Reality is spiritual.....outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real. (A. & R. 552.)

Reality to Taylor becomes

a spiritual system of which the elements, constituents, or terms, are in their turn spiritual systems. (E. of M. p. 99.)

whilst Royce declares that

All Nature is an expression of mind. (W. & I. vol.2,p. 158)

THE LOGICAL INTERPRETATION.

Professor Bosanquet claims that

logic, or the spirit of totality, is the clue to Reality, value and freedom. (Prin. p. 23.)

Instead of working out from the subjective conscious states to a belief in other experiencing centres, and then finding a unifying power in the Absolute, as the previous idealists have done, he takes the external world of experience as granted and necessary. He assumes from the first that experience or reality is a unity, and that consciousness and the world are one. The unity he finds in what he terms the Concrete Universal.

By 'logic' he does not mean formal logic, which consists of a group of highly abstract statements of the principle of wholeness, but,

the supreme law or nature of experience, the impulse towards unity and coherence by which every fragment yearns towards the whole to which it belongs, and every self to its completion in the Absolute, and of which the Absolute itself is at once an incarnation and a satisfaction. (Prin. p. 340.)

The principles of logic are to be found in the very nature of thought itself. But thought is to be taken in the fulness of its meaning. In the first place it is not to be taken merely as mediate, for

all thought, no doubt, has a mediate side; but all concrete thought has become immediate no less than mediate. (Prin. p. 65.)

Again it is not a separate faculty of something known as intelligence.

It is this active form of totality, present in every experience of a rational being....perhaps in a degree, in every experience in the universe. (Prin. p. 59)

Therefore the nature of thinking is not exhausted in the abstract reflective judgment or course of inference of formal logic.

Its essence lies in the passage of a being or content

beyond itself, in a word, ideality, adjustment or the universal. (Prin. p. 60.)

Thought is more than perception and conation. It is also more than mere cognition, for

it is to be observed.....that not all thought is cognition, though all cognition is thought, (Prin.p.66.)

and

exhibits that self-transcendental character of thought which constitutes its freedom and initiative.(Prin.p.67)

In so far as thought is the form of all experience its characteristic embodiments within life are to be found in

knowledge, (including sense-perception) love, and works or activity. (Prin. p. 61.) The rhythm that completes a poem, the sounds that with other ends satisfies the educated ear, the colour that is demanded by a colour scheme, are, I take it, as necessary and as rational as the conclusion of a syllogism. (Prin. p. 62.)

Logic, then, is the criterion of reality, because it is both the essence of thought and experience and, at the same time, a principle of the Concrete Universal.

The key to all sound philosophy,
says Bosanquet,

lies in taking the concrete universal, that is, the individual, as the true type of universality. (Prin.p.40.)

It is to be found in experience, qua experience, and not in the abstractions of formal logic and science.

Then the true embodiment of the logical universal takes the shape of a world whose members are worlds. (Prin. p. 37.)

The concrete universal is then seen as a cosmos, or as the individual in which all lesser individuals dwell and exist. It is

a whole, self-directing and self-experiencing.(Prin.p.xxv.)

It is a macrocosm, constituted by microcosms, and can be otherwise expressed in the following terms; "a whole of parts," "an organism" or "a system." We are to think of the ultimate universal as the spirit

of a single system, constituted by differences which have for their function to develop and manifest the contents of its nature.

The nexus of these differences, in the system which is universal, is a system of laws, each of which is general by holding together the diverse expression of the one life and spirit. (Prin. p. 105.)

It is in the light of the universe as a system, or organism, that Bosanquet interprets natural law, the inter-relation of the parts or other "worlds," which make it up, and solves the problem of the duality of mind and matter.

He does not contrast externality to inwardness. He would have inwardness taken as

a type of experience superior to externality and including it. (Prin. p. 74.)

No progress in clarity of thought can be made by setting the one against the other, or else in abolishing either. Neither one can subsist without the other.

A world cannot consist.....of spatial centres without circumferences, nor can they, as inward centres in the popular sense, for circumferences for each other. (Prin. pp. 75-76.)

And again;

Externality can subsist only as subordinated to inwardness; but inwardness can subsist only in conquest of externality. (Prin. p. 76.)

To reduce the world to pure subjectivity is to reduce it to formlessness. Experience always has an outer as well as an inner aspect, and each aspect gains significance through the other.

Bosanquet admits the Uniformity of Nature into his theory of the universe, but in using this term he explains that he does not mean that the future will always resemble the past. The Uniformity of Nature he also speaks of as Relevancy. It is the government of the parts by the whole. It means that

every variation is a member in an intelligent system. It excludes spontaneity only in the sense of behaviour

responsive to nothing. Variation is a means of adjustment or response, and to establish its existence in a high degree is not inconsistent with, but evidence of, the Uniformity of Nature in the true sense. The proof of genuine spontaneity is not mere variation, but progressive and adapted variation. Individuality therefore, meaning not empty eccentricity, but the character of a system as self-contained and coherent, is fully in harmony with the Uniformity of Nature. (Prin. p. 119.)

With this view there is no need to relax uniformity to make room for mind in Nature, as it is in the mental province that true Uniformity in Nature exhibits itself in the fullest and completest sense. It is here taken as a

logical postulate, equivalent to the Law of Identity as interpreted in the Law of Sufficient Reason. (Prin. p. 138)

The argument that seeks to show that it may be a mere fiction of the scientific method Bosanquet replies to by pointing out a fundamental difference between physical and social averages, rendering the whole analogy, upon which the argument has been based, fallacious. Social statistics are based on true constant averages; physical statistics are not.

Even the roughest methods, properly used, can give no such analogy as is asserted by the argument we are discussing. And the more we perfect the measurements, the less the analogy holds. (Prin. p. 91.) Social statistics are marked by an extraordinary sensitiveness and progressiveness to which nothing in the material world shows any parallel. To discount the contrast between matter and mind is a mistake. (Prin. p. xxi.)

Teleology is accepted by Bosanquet in a sense different from its general usage and meaning,

If it is to retain its meaning, it must abandon the whole analogy of finite contrivance and selection, and must fall back on the characteristics of value which, apart from sequence in time and from selected purposes, attach to the nature of a totality which is perfection. (Prin. p. 126.)

"Meaning" in the preceding sentence is not referring to the "means" and "ends" of the purposes of finite minds but purpose as seen in the plan

of the Universal Concrete and expressed in the lesser wholes of which it is the combining and influencing system.

In extending the idea of teleology to the Universe as a whole we are turning from the question whether this fact or that has the appearance of being contrived for a purpose, to the question whether the totalitycontrivance or no contrivance, and without any suggestion of dividing it into part which is "means" and part which is "ends".....can be apprehended or conceived as satisfactory, i.e. as a supreme value. (Prin. p. 126.)

Bosanquet thinks that it is intolerable that Nature, through which alone spirit attains incarnation, should be treated as a directionless material, or that art, thought, society, history, in which mind begins to transcend its finiteness should be ascribed to the direct abilities of units in a plurality, precisely apart from the world content and the underlying solidarity of spirits, the medium in which all things are done. Teleology is not to be found in the apparent inter-reaction of the parts, but only in so far as the parts express the purpose of the whole.

Things that are not teleological because they are purposed, but are purposed because they are teleological. (Prin. p. 137.)

With this subjective selection is ruled out of court, unless it becomes more than subjective selection. Objective selection, that is selection of values which will stand criticism and be brought into harmony with the Concrete Universal, is

the test of true 'teleology' or purposiveness. (Prin. 138.)

In a foot-note on page 136 of "The Principle" Bosanquet defines "teleological" as implying

something valuable and desirable, in harmony with the universe as most perfectly experienced.

He therefore would not apply it to the idea which merely indicates that some finite mind or consciousness is urged by some pleasurable impulse or by some unfulfilled idea. Teleology then is to be found

in the Concrete Universal alone, revealing itself in the uniformity of Nature, and expressing itself through the finite or lesser worlds of which it is the system. The "Plan" is to be found in the working of the whole, and not only in the purposive action of finite mind.

The motions of the solar system, the curve of the wave, the curve of a cataract, the abruptness of a precipice, are appearances deeply rooted in the simplest material data, and yet for all that we can see, as well meriting a presumption of teleological value as any object of consciousness except consciousness itself. (Prin. p. 147.)

Bosanquet says that we are to avoid saying that

'purpose is operative' in the flower or the wave, if that is to mean that we ascribe them to an end or idea, somewhat superinduced upon the course of their elements by a power comparable to finite consciousness, operating as it were 'ab extra', and out of a detached spontaneity of its own. (Prin. pp. 148-149.)

The purpose must be found in the Concrete Universal.

The idea of mechanism is accepted as

one which neither reduces the universe to modifications of homogeneous quantity, nor yet impeaches the 'Uniformity of Nature'. (Prin. p. 140.)

for the true spiritual view of the universe regards Nature as mechanically intelligible. Mechanism, in the sense of system appears as a fundamental aspect of all experience. It is bound up with externality which must be frankly accepted as a factor, actual but not ultimate, in the universe. Also there is to be no opposition between mechanism and teleology.

The contrast between them is rooted in the very nature of totality, which regards it from two complementary points of view, as an individual whole, and as constituted of inter-reacting members. Of the two points of view it is impossible for either to be entirely absent. (Prin. p. 155.)

Man, with his purposive actions, operating upon nature, Bosanquet says

is essentially no more than a co-operative mechanical force. He may be a predominant partner, from dealing

with a completer whole, but in principle he is just as dependent on the reactions which he can elicit from the other members of the partnership as he is on his own.....After all man with his hands does not bring with him a new principle or create out of nothing a new totality. He reacts, so to speak, to a much more concrete whole than his material partners, but he can do nothing with them beyond what it is in them to do. Teleology, if we know what we mean by it, is a good name for the principle of his action; but it only means that he is able to take account of more complete totalities than those with which material objects in random grouping (i.e. grouping not especially interesting to man) are likely to be in relation. (Prin. pp. 164-165.)

Mechanism thus taken as a true aspect of experience and of the universe as a whole is seen as a logical relevancy which is at the same time teleological and in line with the idea of the Uniformity of Nature, for

teleological wholes are inevitably constituted by what may fairly be called mechanical relations, that is to say, a determinate relativity of part to part in the light of the Whole. (Prin. p. 161.)

Law, then, is concrete and grounded in experience, whilst the expression of the nexus between the parts of reality takes the form of organic systems or individuals. To be understood, the principle of law must be read off from the whole of reality. It must be comprehended as the tendency to self-transcendence appearing everywhere, the inmost nature of the real expressed in the effort of thought to universalize experience. Wherever knowledge grasps reality, there is law. But although law is to be spoken of as concrete, yet it at the same time has an abstract aspect. The Concrete Universal dissolves the contradictions which appear to exist between the concrete and the abstract, in so far as the relation between abstract law and concrete law is implied in the fundamental assumption of law, namely, that the individual can ideally be analyzed into abstract relations. The very nature of the concrete law or individual implies that it is a system capable of having its organization expressed as abstract truth. It

is the nature of thought to generalize and form abstract laws---- the analyzing of given experience. But there is the reciprocal return of thought to the concrete, and in this reunion is found an enriched and new-centred world. Science in resolving the world into common qualities and abstract laws at the same time sees it as a system and concrete. Abstraction and concretion are to be viewed as complementary opposites, everywhere unveiled in experience, for

the true embodiment of the logical universal takes
the shape of a world whose members are worlds, (Prin.p. 37)

expressing concrete laws of relationship between its various parts and capable of being abstracted and idealized by thought into abstract generalities.

The principle of law is to be found in the principle of concrete unity and universality everywhere appearing in experience. Law is not to be limited to certain particular fields of fact, but in all and every one. The higher the level of organization, the more easily are such universal laws discernible, as in selves, works of art, or institutions of state and society. Law is present in every thing. It is the principle that reality is an intelligible system, and reveals itself as such throughout the world in the form of organized wholes or individuals. And in so far as law expresses a purpose it is to be understood that

the endis the whole. (Prin. p. 181.)

What is the relation of mind to matter---the psychical to the physical? As has already been shown, Bosanquet finds "inwardness" and "externality" to be complementary and finding their unity in totality. So in the same way, though he is prepared to

maintain the 'prima facie' difference between material
and psychical existence, (Prin. 95.)

he finds that

we cannot dissociate physical from psychical states,
and that interrelation is most naturally assumed to

hold between condition each of which has both a psychical and physical side. (Prin. p. 174.)

The relationship between these two aspects of reality or totality cannot be explained by the theories of interaction, parallelism or epiphenomenalism. These three theories treat experience as a duality without a unity. They make a gulf between the psychical and the physical which cannot be bridged.

Thus when we maintain that consciousness actually works in and through the systematic adaptation of a certain type of matter, we are not really adopting any one of the three dualistic doctrines, parallelism, interaction, epiphenomenalism. -----In all these theories consciousness is conceded on intentionally dualistic lines, as a repetition or duplication of neurosis in a different medium, or within a different attribute. (Value & D. p. 2.)

It is "equivalence" that Bosanquet looks upon as the most adequate explanation of consciousness to the psychical order.

Any such view allows us to remain within the general analogy of qualitative wholes conditioned by more homogeneously quantitative counterparts.---- The psychical would be regarded as an inherent character within the physical process, coming to light under conditions of relative perfection. (Prin. pp. 174-174.)

Equivalence is the term by which he describes the fact that the universal type of relation in individuals is one of qualitative wholes in quantitative counterparts.

It accepts as the apparent custom of the universe and as a corollary of the interdependence of content and system, that qualities have quantitative connections and that a high degree of spiritual or emotional expressiveness accompanies a high degree of complexity and intelligible determinateness. (Prin. p. 140.)

Speaking elsewhere of various psychical experiences he says

such counterparts are normally of a material nature, as in familiar cases of the physical bases of sound and colour, and the simplest assumption to which analogy leads us would result in treating the relation of the psychical and physical on some such plan as that which does duty in these well known instances.-- The suggestion before us is not to 'explain' consciousness on the analogy of the relation of sound to mechanical motion of an extended medium (which relation itself is a relation of objects of consciousness) but to extend

to consciousness in general the conception of 'de facto' equivalence which is illustrated by that particular case. We should thus get a certain orderly arrangement and continuity in the objects of experience.----No character necessary to consciousness appears to be interfered with by retaining the conception of equivalence. For, even if we drop equivalence, we must, in the interest of system, retain finite totality, which would then present itself as a quantitative limit, no less determinate than equivalence but without the systematic rational which equivalence affords it. (Prin. p. 175.)

Taken in its widest sense, equivalence stands for the principle of determination of the whole, and the experience of this determination in two mutually responsive systems; mechanism or the physical regarding the world as a logical system, and teleology taking it as a world of consciousness and scheme of values.

In the light of the principle of Equivalence then there are to be found two complementary aspects---matter and mind---interrelated and interdependent.

Matter is externality, a side of your experience which seems essential to the whole of things but not capable of independent reality. Under certain conditions, which are uniform in experience, a certain type of this externality, also in the main uniform, persists and develops as the vehicle of life and mind. Its responsiveness, which all matter 'ex hypothesi' possesses, takes on a new form, ceases to be spatial appearance and becomes a centre of responses, to which its own antecedent conditions persist as external environment. (Prin. p. 194.)

Continuity would be destroyed if consciousness were introduced as a new principle, and as the nature of equivalence implies that consciousness is the qualitative aspect of that which is the same quantitative and mechanical, Bosanquet finds the only possible avenue open is

to accept conscious process as the essence of a certain kind of physical process, and as covered by its physical cost in the body's balance sheet. (Prin. p. 197.)

It would be a futile dualism, he thinks, to argue that the unity of experience has come from an immaterial being. The world comes first;

it works towards finding a centre, and in the working the types of our thinking and experience arise.

Finite consciousness and the finite self come late, on the top of immense stores of unconscious mechanism and adaptation, which are to all appearances its precondition. -----Mind, so far as it can be in space, is nervous system, ---is the interpreter of nervous system, ----is the meaning of externality, which under certain conditions concentrates in a new focus of meaning, which is a finite mind. (Prin. pp. 219-220.)

If, however, there should be objections to the view that a physical system like the brain is able to represent a "meaning" or an "end", Bosanquet states that answers to the objection are to be found in any complex reaction in which the nature of a physical whole responds to a simple stimulus; e.g..

the reaction of a carnivorous plant, or of a penny-in-the-slot machine, and in the action of the brain as a whole. (Prin. p. xxvi.)

The difference of the brain process and the conscious is that one is spatial and the other not. If there should be difficulty in thinking that the two systems must be similar, a cell for a thought, a spatial coincidence for identity, and the like, it can be overcome by realizing that all that is necessary is that

their systematic action should be capable of responding, and this in general we can understand. There is no reason for demanding point to point similarity between them. (Prin. p. 199.)

The peculiarity of mind, for us, is to be a world of experience working itself out to a harmony and completeness, but it

is not so much a something, a unit, exercising guidance upon matter, as the fact of selfguidance of that world which appears as matter, when that reaches a certain level of organization. (Prin. pp. 193-194.)

Mind is only something which can appear upon the scene after other conditions in Nature have been prepared for it.

Life and mind respectively are the appearance at different stages of the omnipotential principle, which elicits its whole definite content and development from its surroundings. (Prin. p. 368.)

Consciousness.....neither creates a higher organism nor works it. It is rather the indispensable means of reaping the final and supreme result of the organism's complex adaptations.(Prin. p. 196.) The work for which finite mind is necessary and valuable may surely be summed up as guidance, including will, and appreciation, including emotion. Below the limits of adjustable conduct and behaviour, in the lower organic world, as in most of the actual working of human and animal bodies, there is no need---- of finite mind for will or guidance. (Prin. pp. 363-364.)

Therefore Nature and mind are to be spoken of as organic to each other.

Nature-----exists only through finite mind. But finite mind again exists only through nature.(Prin.p.371) It is all but impossible to distinguish Nature from mind. To separate them is impossible. If you ask what in Nature is not mind, you can only answer, the fragmentary or disconnected 'qua' fragmentary or disconnected. If you ask what in mind is not Nature, you can only answer, the Spirit of Totality, the attitude which makes everything alive in its bearing on the whole. (Prin. 367.)

What is the relation of individuality to the whole of Totality, and in the face of the teleology of the Universe or Absolute is the individual granted freedom? What is the solution of the problem of good and evil, both physical and moral? Wherein does value exist? Is there any hope of continued existence after death for the individual within the Absolute? These are questions which Bosanquet seeks to answer from the standpoint of the Concrete Universal. By the Individual is meant a focus of meanings, expressed in a

system of laws, each of which is general by holding together the diverse expression of the one life and spirit. (Prin. 105.)

The individual cannot be defined by conation. This is a negative conception.

If we are to define the individual by his conation, it should be his conation as relative to some special type of function; the content in which the individuality is based, no less than the completeness which its nature demands, characterizes and determines the individuality. What we call individuality is not a fixed essence, but a living world of content, representing a certain range of externality, which in it strives after unity and true individuality or completeness because it has in it the

active spirit of noncontradiction, the form of the whole. (Prin. ch. vii.)

The true and the complete individual is only to be found in the perfection of the Absolute. Each finite individual is but an "element" in the Absolute. The nature of the finite individual is both finite and infinite.

It is both a concentration of externality and a fragment of the Absolute, (Value & D. p. 4.)

and it is its nature to attempt to transcend itself and thereby approach to a closer union with the Universal.

It must pursue the logic of the self; it must work out its nias to the whole; it must struggle in some form towards self-consistency and self-realisation. (Value & D. p. 6.)

In this it is governed by the logical necessity of the Whole. Here there is no need for the denial of Freedom of the finite individual. Bosanquet says that individuality, as its essence is to be a world in itself, implies a special kind of self-determination. His contention is that no other conception of the universe offers any loophole whatever by which Freedom can be saved, or a creative, constructive, and initiative character vindicated for itself.

All particular given selves bear the identical feature of self-consciousness, which is a conation towards the unity of the harmonious cosmos, or towards the completed system of an eternal self. The striving towards unity and coherence is the striving of the self as a living system of content; and the fact that this content has its origin in 'without' is only a corollary of the central truth that every self is a special 'within', and deals with some group of elements of that world life in which all experience is one. No ideal of freedom lies in the direction of isolating the self from the world. Freedom lies in the direction towards unity and coherence; and all that becomes one with the self is capable of contributing to this satisfaction of the inherent logical tendency. (Prin. ch. ix.)

This would distinguish between the determinism of fatalism and the determinateness of logic, the mainspring of the latter being love.

The crucial point, then, which separates determinateness from determinism is the distinction between logical and fatality. By logic, we understand, the

supreme law or nature of experience,--- the impulse towards unity and coherence---by which every fragment yearns towards the whole to which it belongs, and every self to its completion in the Absolute, and of which the Absolute itself is at once an incarnation and a satisfaction. (Prin. p. 340.)

Values, also, are to be found in the logical system of the Totality. They are not to be found in the urge of conative impulses.

It is surely plain that the power of an idea to interest or satisfy us is not merely a brute fact, but a matter for logical estimation. (Prin. p. 296.)

True value consists

in the complete individuality of the Universe as a conscious being, which is the ultimate value and standard of value, (Prin. p. 309.)

and apart from the universe it is impossible to value finite individuals. Elsewhere he remarks to the same effect that

the supreme principle of value and reality

is

wholeness, completeness, individuality. (Prin. p. xxv.)

Pain is not denied existence by Bosanquet, but he speaks of it as an instrument for progress and for the development of the finite soul.

Pain, with accident and death, belongs essentially to the hazards and hardships which are involved in the double nature of the finite-infinite being.----- What is necessary to see is that the incidents of our finiteness are more than finite incidents. They belong to the tension of our double being, in which it affirms its unity with the Absolute.---Our pain has the same root as our value, that is to say, both lie in the tribute of our finite self which we bring, not rejected, but transformed through reconciled contradiction to the Absolute. (Value & D. pp. 190-191.)

Again, both evil and good are characteristics of the finite experience.

The contrast of good and evil-----depends upon its finite-infinite nature. (Value & D. p. 210.) The essence of the evil attitude is the self-maintenance of some factor in a self as both as good and also as against the good system. It is---good in the wrong place, and therefore wrenches the soul out of gear. (Value & D. p. 215.)

Evil, then, amounts to two goods being in contradiction, or else one good out of harmony with the perfection of the Absolute. But evil is also of the finite within the Absolute, yet it cannot be said to be of the essence of the Absolute.

There is evil, then, within the Absolute, but the Absolute is not characterized by evil. (Value & D. p. 217.)

In discussing the question of the immortality of the soul and the perpetuation of the life of the finite individual after death Bosanquet recognises the desire in the human breast for continuance of existence, but he thinks that the demand for a better state than the present is the least that can be wished for. However this raises the problem of a conflict between our personal identity and transformation towards perfection. It is rather a personality than our personality (what is called our proper name) that is essential, and there is no repugnance against something more than, but only against something less than, personality. What matters, it seems, is the survival of what we really care for; which, as we know even from common sense, may be something beyond and different from our present self as it stands.

It is not in principle the bare continuance of what we now seem to ourselves to be, which our heart is set upon. It is not the unbrokenness of the link of personal recollection. It is the security, the certainty, of the realisation of what we care for most, in the Absolute; and this does not mean in a remote and supernatural world, but in the fullest experience and throughout the universe of its appearances. Whether "we" are aware of it.....is really a question of degree, of the importance of present self within the whole in which it is an element. The fundamental truth is that it is an element, and instinctively regards the eternal whole as its reality and its satisfaction. (Value & D. pp. 288-289.)

In summing up the logical interpretation of Reality it is to be observed that Bosanquet makes Reality to be a Concrete Universal or Totality, which reveals a double aspect of logic and value which are reciprocal and relative. It is both an individual whole and also a system of interacting members (or elements). It manifests its two-fold nature according to the principle of wholeness, by which there

exists reciprocal adaptation between the parts and the whole. Its law is at the same time an expression of logical mechanism and of a world-plan immanent in the whole. To understand this is to see how mechanism and teleology are not contrary to each other but resolve themselves into complementary aspects of the whole in the light of the wider conception of logic and value. For mechanism regards the world as logical system; while teleology takes it as fundamentally a scheme of values. Nature and mind are likewise complementary revelations of the one ultimate principle. This ultimate law of the whole reveals itself as a perfect individual system organised as an equivalence of relation and values, in which lesser individuals or worlds exist, and from which they obtain their value and meaning.

CONCLUSION.

Having outlined the teaching of the two schools of thought, which have been termed "psychological" and "logical" there is now laid upon us the duty of seeing whether the distinction drawn by J.E. Creighton and Marie Collins is justifiable or not. It is the intention of the present writer to take up the position that the answer is in the negative; that, in spite of the differences that are to be found not only between Bosanquet and those termed psychological, but also between these last mentioned writers themselves, yet that on the whole and in the main there is an agreement in the interpretation of the world and natural law. Marie Collins' position is that the psychological school have

a view of the world which is based upon the postulate that mental states are the primary objects of knowledge and which deduces the external world from these states, (Collins p. 2.)

and that this view gives a different interpretation to natural than does the view of the logical

which finds truth something objective in the real world and evidenced by the value and stability of the concrete wholes. (Collins, p. 2.)

But an examination of their writings will show that they are in agreement concerning the nature of Reality as to the four following points; (1) Reality is one; (2) Reality is a harmonious system made up of lesser systems in which the law of the parts is the law of the whole; (3) Reality is experience; (4) Reality is one experience, individual and perfect. However there is one difference which must be noted, as this is possibly the clue to the solution of the problem set by the writings of Marie Collins. They differ in their interpretation of 'experience' as the ground of knowing the universe, and

the solution of this is to be found in the twofold nature of finite experience; i.e. that it has both a subjective and an objective aspect. There is the mind that perceives and also the object that is perceived.

Bradley, Ward, Royce, and Taylor hold that what is known in experience is 'sentience', and that it is through the systematizing of this that what knowledge one has of the universe is to be received. Bosanquet on the other hand, says that what is known in experience is nature itself. With the first it is 'immediate sentience' which is the key to Reality. With Bosanquet, on the contrary, the immediate offers no hint of its nature. For him

the true axiom of knowledge was "that we can know things as they really are." (P.R. Nov. 1923, p. 567.)

With this he takes up Bergson's phrase, "Tout est donné."

In experience consciousness receives sensations from without, and accordingly, with perception there comes a consciousness of particular objects and events. Then through its inherent power to systematize the finite mind weaves these perceptions into a systematic whole or the conception of a unity of experience. Thus reflection leads us to recognise three main levels of conscious experience---sense experience, perceptual experience, and conceptual experience. For the sake of convenience these distinctions can be made, but it is to be remembered that they are forms of experience unified in human consciousness. In all experience, then, there is in the first place the recognition of a mixed plurality, and also running through this plurality a unity.

Here a question may be raised. In the perception of the manifold received in sentience does the percipient know the physical world, the external cause of his sensations, or is he cognizant of only what he himself has unified? Kant took up the position that the knower knew only his own world of thought,---the world of phenomena. Bosanquet

takes up the position of the other extreme; that the thing-in-itself is known. It is the great reality of experience. J.H. Creighton holds the same opinion, as he says

It seems, then, permissible to say that 'knowability' is a genuine characteristic of things, not an accident external to them. If it is the nature of mind to know, it is also the nature of things to be known, and we accordingly seem entitled to assert that the order that we call nature is not fully complete apart from this relation. (P.R. Sept. 1917, p. 523.)

On the same page he makes the following statement;

The external order that we call nature is something that is at least knowable by mind. That seems to be the very least that experience can assume and still remain experience. The only alternative assumption is that of 'things-in-themselves' which have only an external relation to each other and to mind.

But in between these two "alternatives" can there not be a middle position, i.e. that the external object, and therefore the universe itself, is not fully known nor yet unknown? This appears to me to be the position of the psychological school. The only world of experience is the world based upon sentience, but it is the key to the partial knowledge of the concrete universe. Enough is known of the relationships between the external objects and their interactions for the guidance of the practical life, and also through the medium of sentience and the knowing mind they take on even a beauty and meaning that they do not otherwise possess. In so far then as this view does not make sentience merely subjective, but also dependent upon, and at the same time governed by, the external object, it satisfies Creighton's demand that there could not be

a rational life without an apprehension of an objective order, unmoved by our clamour, indifferent to our moods, with which we can hold commerce only on nature's own terms. (P.R. p. 534.)

There is the one external reality, but this must be interpreted by each individual centre of knowing sentience according to his own peculiarities of sense-perception, when there are such, (e.g. of an

extreme case; colour-blindness,) and herein lies the truth that there are as many worlds as there are apprehending minds. In this view finite mind and nature are not opposed but are considered as complementary, the one to the other. Taking up Creighton's phrase, we hold commerce with the objective order "on nature's own terms," because the limitations of the finite mind, together with its powers of transcending the given sentience, is a part of nature and according to the law of the relative knowability of externality. The unity of the manifold in consciousness, and also the categories of thought, are not merely impressed upon the 'mind stuff' by the synthesizing unity of the knowing mind, as Kant would have it, but are there because they are also existing in ^{the mind's} ~~the minds~~ complementary nature. It is here that the two schools differ. To Bradley, Ward, Royce, and Taylor the interpretation of the world is to be found in experience, as the sentience experience of the individual systematized according to the laws of finite thought and nature, and more fully in Experience, as the systematized experience of all sentient finite minds. Bosanquet on the other hand claims that experience is the Totality of things as they are in themselves.

Therefore it cannot be said that whilst Bosanquet admits the existence of the physical world, the others on the other hand deny it, or make it merely to be "a society of spiritual beings" or reduce "nature to terms of subjects and their mental states" to the denial of the physical world. The last thing that they do wish to be accused of is the subjectivism of Berkley. Even though their appeal to the analogy of their bodies, and through the bodies of their fellow men, may not be valid and probably leaves them in a solipsism, still it is an acknowledgement of the physical world which is the external cause of sensations, and is the same world as Bosanquet's Concrete Universal. The following quotations from each of the four prove their insisting upon this point. Even Bradley, who is somewhat ambiguous in his use

of the word 'appearance' and who so strongly emphasizes the sentience of experience to the point of saying that

sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real,

elsewhere says

the physical world exists, of course, independent of me, and does not depend on the accident of my sensations. A mountain is, whether I happen to perceive it or not. (A. & R. p. 275.)

Ward says

we know nothing of minds without a living body and without external environment, (N. & A. p. 12.)

whilst Royce states the same faith as follows;

our assurance that outer nature exists apart from any man's private experience is thus inseparably bound up with our social consciousness. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 198.)

Taylor expresses himself upon the matter in these words;

The whole physical world cannot be dismissed as a mere subjective illusion, (E. of M. pp. 202-203.)

and

unperceived physical existence must be real if I myself am real, because my own inner life is unintelligible without reference to it. (E. of M. p. 207.)

It is through the knowledge of the abstract world of consciousness that there is a knowledge of the concrete, and the abstract world can only be real, and not an illusion, in so far as it reveals the nature, if only the partial nature, of the physical world to finite consciousness and mind.

Marie Collins recognizes that

panpsychism does not seek to destroy the appearance of externality,

but she says that

this protest of the panpsychist amounts to the admission that he wishes to recognize experience as involving the relation to an object, even while at the same time he knows the object is in reality a subject like himself. (Collins p. 90.)

However he does not look upon "himself" merely as a being with a per-

ceiving mind, but also as a being possessing a body which is the medium of sensations and through which he is also able to react upon external objects as well as communicate with his fellows. M. Collins' retort to this is that he merely

persuades himself that he reduces the object to terms of subject without destroying the form of experience as a subject-object relation. (Collins, p. 90.)

In answer to this, can it not be replied that the panpsychist's attitude is this; that just as he can think of himself as the subject perceiving his sensations and also as the object of another man's sensations, so he can think of his fellow man as being at the same time the subject of his own sensations, and that therefore as he is able to think of his fellow man as both an object and also as a perceiving subject, so it is possible for him to think of all objects as centres of sentience and mind?

Marie Collins' next criticism is, that supposing the panpsychists have satisfactorily proved the existence of our fellows; then, according to their views,

nature resolves into a world of psychical subjects.
(Collins, p. 21.)

But, as shown above, it is not the intention of these writers that the physical aspect of nature should be denied. Their chief argument is to offset mechanism and the idea that nature is composed of dead, inert atoms which are the foundation of mind and spirit. They wish to emphasize the spiritual aspect of nature, and to solve the problem of the duality of mind and matter by stating that the duality does not exist and never has, as matter and mind are one and the same thing. Collins recognizes that

Ward and Taylor admit degrees of individuality and a corresponding scale of values in nature,

and further says

Royce does not acknowledge this. He holds that we have no right to consider humanity as a kind of final term

in an evolution of nature from 'lower' to 'higher'. In his own words, 'we certainly do not know that the nature-experience whose inner sense is not now communicative to us is in the least lower or less meaning'. The uncommunicativeness of nature would seem to be due simply to 'arbitrary' differences of time span and sense organs. (Collins, pp. 21-22, note 54.)

She quotes Ward as saying "Nature thus resolves into a plurality of conative individuals." But we have seen that Ward does not deny the physical aspect of nature, and his 'conative individuals' are monads of the double nature of mind and matter, and when he applies the term 'mind' to these primordial beings, from which nature has developed, it is not 'mind' as applied to consciousness of a human finite individual. Consciousness of the higher order is of a late appearance and the result of the conative activities of these monads through a long series of evolution.

The whole world is made up of individuals, each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour; but of course it does not find its real individuals in the rough and ready way of popular impersonation; it would not regard a mountain or a river as a person. (R. of E. p. 5.)

Elsewhere he says that

Nature and Man are one in being rational, but it has been a slow development for both from the inchoate state to the cosmos and unity. Royce, Bradley, and Taylor differ from Ward in that they find their unity in the being of an Absolute, whilst the unity of Ward's world is a result of the interaction of the conative individuals. Taylor does speak of "uncommunicative nature," but as for him

there can -----be only one perfect and complete individual, the whole of Reality itself, and that the subordinate individuals can never be wholly and entirely individuals in themselves," (E. of M. p. 113.)

all nature becomes nothing more than expressions of the unity and mind of the Absolute. Reality has degrees, and the human mind expresses the fundamental character of the whole system more fully and adequately than physical nature as it exists for our apprehension. (E. of M. p. 108.)

Here, then, the individual is lost, and also the individual mind as we know it. All nature, together with the finite mind, becomes nothing more than degrees of expressions of the Absolute mind. The same is true of Royce, for, though he distinguishes between conscious nature and inorganic nature, he rejects

every form of doctrine that regards nature as in any sense a realm of the genuinely unconscious, or supposes the Absolute to come to self-consciousness first in man ---- All life, everywhere, in so far as it is life, has conscious meaning, and accomplishes a rational end.---Where we see inorganic nature seemingly dead, there is, in fact, conscious life, just as surely as there is any Being present in nature at all.----What we find, in organic Nature, are processes whose time rate is slower or faster than those which our consciousness is adapted to read or to appreciate.-----For the psychical life which we refer to the lower animals is---merely a fragment and a hint of a larger rationality which gets its fuller individual expression in the evolution of a species or genus or order, or other relative whole of animal existence. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 240-241.)

Here, again, mind as revealed in inorganic, and even in organic matter, is not to be compared to mind as revealed in human consciousness. With Royce also we find that the finite mind loses its real significance, as the following words suggest;

Your distinction from the rest of the universe, your contrast with other selves, your uniqueness, your freedom, your individuality, all depend upon one essential principle. This world, in which we live, is, in its wholeness, the expression of one determinate purpose, the fulfilment of the divine will. (W. & I. vol. 2, p. 292.)

The whole of nature including the human consciousness becomes nothing more than an expression of the mind of the Absolute. Bradley implies the same idea, as when he writes,

Every attitude of experience, every sphere or level of the world, is a necessary factor in the Absolute.----- The Absolute is immanent alike through every region of appearances. There are degrees and ranks, but, one and all, they are alike indispensable. We can find no province of the world so low but the Absolute inhabits it. (A. & R. p. 487.)

Thus we have been led by the panpsychists to view a world of the Absolute in which all the parts are unified and become, in varying

this he proceeds to explain and analyze his Universal, and here is to be seen that he lets down the ladder again for our inspection. Bosanquet, Bradley, Royce and Taylor all agree in saying that the mind of the Absolute is the governing principle acting throughout all plurality. The apparent teleology of finite experience is the expression of the teleology of the whole. The various "degrees of reality" of Bradley, which also we saw to be expressed in different terms by Royce and Taylor, as finding their ground in the permeation of the physical world by the mind of the Absolute, find their likeness in the system of Bosanquet when he speaks of mind and matter being complementary and inseparable, neither one being able to exist apart from the other. He is making the material world, in its various phases of existence from the lower to the higher, the falling stone, the wave, the cataract, the flower, the brain of man to be centres of thought expression. Also in so far as he makes all finite progress from the lower to the higher to depend upon conation, as when he says,

yet in the purposiveness which is perfect and inclusive satisfaction, something must remain which represents the facts of conation,

or as he puts it in the following sentence still more strikingly,

the contradiction of a conation co-existing with fruition must be realized,

is he not making matter to be centres of sentience and mind? Matter he says,

is externality---not capable of independent reality. Under certain conditions, which are uniform in our experience, a certain type of this externality, also in the main uniform, persists and develops as the vehicle of life and mind. (Prin. 194. underlining mine.)

Because Bosanquet makes human consciousness, as also all other expressions of the universe, to be the results of material processes he has been accused of being a materialist in disguise. Even if this is not justifiable, it, on the other hand, appears possible to rank him amongst the panpsychists whom Marie Collins condemns. Also it might

be said that the two systems, the psychical and the logical, are finally so much alike that the former can come under the same condemnation that has been meted out to Bosanquet;

What emerges very clearly out of the discussion is that Bosanquet had no place, in his philosophical scheme, for an individual mental life, as it is studied by the psychologist. There are percepts, but no acts of perceiving, thought, but no acts of thinking, desires, but no acts of desiring. Thought, it is repeatedly insisted, is not an act of mind (indeed the mind cannot be rightly said to exercise any act at all); thought is rather the control of that 'complex of psychical matter which may be called mind' by the object, the self-assertion of reality according to its characteristic laws, the self maintenance of universals, every universal being a growing creature, tending to expand, to ramify, to specify, to differentiate, to adapt. (Hibbert Journal, Oct. 1923, 190.)

In all experience we are conscious of a plurality and a unity. They are the two aspects of finite experience, and as they are there we must postulate that the two also exist in the universe itself. Unless this is so we should be at the mercy of subjective vagaries, and there would be an absence of coherence in experience itself. The panpsychists, with the exception of Ward, started with the experience of the plurality and finally lose sight of the plurality in the unity of the Absolute. Bosanquet, on the other hand, begins with the experience of the unity of the Absolute and fails to find in his system a place for the plurality. Ward, as a pluralist, retains the plurality from which he starts, but fails to arrive at an idea of unity which satisfies all the demands of the universe as experienced.

W.G. Gamertsfelder in an article, "Thought, Existence and Reality, as viewed by F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet," (reviewed in Phil.R. Mar. 1921.) in viewing what he believes to be the main difference in the two systems of thought, viz, their views of the 'immediate' and its relation to thought, says that the difference concerning the significance of the immediate is closely connected with a difference in the two writers' views in regard to the nature of thought. Mr. Bradley is inclined to regard thought as essentially discursive and abstract, akin

to Kant's 'verstand', whilst Dr. Bosanquet finds in thought the fundamental principle of concreteness present in all forms of experience, in feeling, sensation, and will, as well as in cognition proper. With Bradley, as with the other panpsychists, mind is finite consciousness, the expression of what they term the 'spiritual' in the world. With Bosanquet it is

a universalizing activity, the power of forming wholes,
 ----different from the psychological, individual minds,
 which panpsychism makes the source of laws. (Collins, pp. 91-92)

Mind, then, as defined by the logical view merely corresponds with the others' 'spirit'. And as the panpsychists have found the solution of the reality in the Absolute and thereby ended in denying finite individuality and its adjectives, so Bosanquet starting from the conception of the Absolute can find no place for finite consciousness or mind in the sense of psychology. In a review of M. Collins' work Professor R.C. Lodge takes exception to her criticism of the panpsychist use of the term "mind" in the following words;

Mind can be understood in two senses, the one more subjective and psychological, the other more objective and logical. To contrast these two senses, to exhibit clearly the differences which arise as one follows one path rather than the other in metaphysical construction, is a task which is legitimate, important and timely. (P.R. 1921, pp. 533-534.)

In this last task he is of the opinion that Marie Collins has largely succeeded, but at the same time there appear certain deficiencies in the method followed. The general criticism of the differentiation made within the idealistic school of metaphysics can be summed up in Professor Lodge's words.

But is not this result reached by arbitrary selection of certain elements in their writings, and by arbitrary neglect of the more 'logical' elements which they all share with Bosanquet? And in the second place, is not the main contrast between 'subjective' and 'objective', between psychology and logic, somewhat over-emphasized? Surely we are, each one of us, individuals, finite centres of consciousness, and 'subjective elements', matters of sensation, feeling and impulse, do play a major part in our lives. At the same time, in spite of this, we do feel

some of the force of a logically harmonious system, and, under the sting of certain problems which cannot be solved at the sensory level, we do try to develop a philosophy in which 'objective' and logical methods are at least prominent. Is not this true even of the panpsychists? To the present reviewer it seems that the writer (Marie Collins) who accepts the main position of Bosanquet should recognize that all groups of idealists, facing the same facts of experience, are constructing a theory in which the elements shared in common far outnumber the differences, and that the metaphysical hypotheses as to the ultimate nature of the universe offered by panpsychists and by 'speculative philosophers' are not necessarily opposed in such a sense that the one must be true and the other must be false. (P.R. 1921, p. 534)