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**Epistemological Borders:
The Discursive Production of Social Psychological Knowledge**

Bradley Martin Stroud

**A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of**

MASTER OF ARTS

**Department of Psychology
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba**

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Epistemological Borders:
The Discursive Production of Social Psychological Knowledge

by

Bradley Martin Stroud

A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree
of
Master of Arts

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It is safest to grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place.

Fredric Jameson, 1991

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Abstract

This document represents an attempt to critically examine current social psychological research practices by placing them in historical context. My main objective in the first three chapters is to persuade the reader of the fundamentally social character of knowledge production. Chapter one focuses on criticisms of academic psychology at the institutional, methodological and rhetorical levels. Chapter two reviews psychology's early methodological development, focusing on the gradual institutionalization of the multiple groups experimental research design. The establishment of a *psychological* social psychology during the same period is examined within this context. Chapter three examines the "crisis" in social psychology during the 1960s and 1970s. The focus is on the self-criticisms of psychologists and social psychologists regarding experimental approaches to social research. My main objective in the final two chapters is to account for the maintenance of an experimental approach to knowledge production through an examination of educational practices. Chapter four highlights the social character of educational and research practices. Students participate in many of these social practices as part of their academic training. Admission requirements, forms of student evaluation, required courses and research projects, assigned texts and readings, and the research requirements of thesis advisors, for example, are all key educational practices that regulate the research activities of students. Chapter five focuses on aspects of both past and current educational practices of the Department of Psychology at the University of Manitoba from an institutional ethnographic perspective. This methodology follows from the work of Dorothy Smith (1990). Smith argues that the social organization of academic knowledge

is best understood in terms of everyday activities as characterized from a particular standpoint. The standpoint I have taken in my analysis is that of students as they receive a training in psychological inquiry. I have examined archival materials related to the curricula (e.g, undergraduate and graduate calendars, required courses, assigned texts), interviewed students and reflected on my own experiences to construct a critical and interpretive account of how training regulates the production of social psychological knowledge.

Introduction

Epistemological Borders: The Discursive Production of Social Psychological Knowledge

In the main, research practices in psychological social psychology¹ involve a particular social arrangement whereby introductory psychology students enter a “laboratory” and have their behaviour quantified in a manner amenable to statistical analysis. The “behaviour” quantified is often marks on pieces of paper (e.g., circles around numbers, checks beside a list of words, written words, sentences, sometimes whole paragraphs) implicitly or explicitly requested subsequent to exposure to stimulus materials. The materials are frequently in the form of segments of text but also sometimes include verbal and non-verbal communication via videotape. The basic assumption governing experimental inquiry is this: Fundamental and enduring aspects of social phenomena can be measured and documented by studying human beings independently of an actual everyday social context and focusing instead on discovering transcendent social principles.² My general purpose is to critically examine this methodological approach to the study of human social relations in terms of its historical development and educational institutionalization within the context of academic psychology. In other words, I will be treating the dissemination and use of current research practices in psychology as a social and historical problem in need of an explanation.

I will begin by distinguishing three kinds of observation to help clarify for the reader my approach to the problem: (a) social psychological observation, (b) educational observation and (c) socio-historical observation. Social psychological observation is characterized by precise measurement and experimental control. Observation entails the operational definition of one or more “dependent” variables with each assumed to vary as

a function of the experimental manipulation of an “independent” variable. Each observation, so obtained, represents one element of “data” and generally such data is organized in terms of groups or aggregates. Practically speaking, the behaviour observed in experimental research is aggregate behaviour: Individual behaviours are of use to the extent that they contribute to the aggregate. The experimenters’ observations are objective in principle, to the extent that extraneous variables have been controlled for and the experiment was conducted properly. The research goal of a given study is to test the validity of a hypothesized relationship among variables. To assist in this goal, a statistical analysis of the variability of “behaviours” within and between groups is conducted. If the differences in variability surpass a conventionally designated level, the researcher can tentatively conclude that a relationship exists among the variables. With statistical significance established (and providing that the research is timely and “well done”), the researcher has the disciplinary capital to publicly report the experimental observation of an empirical regularity.

Educational observation is characterized by a collection of practices that function to regulate student activities and evaluate student performance based on various criteria such as test scores, GRE scores, general program requirements as well as more qualitative evaluations of written products and research activities. Educational observation operates from two vantage points: (a) from the point of view of administration and (b) from the point of view of the student. The administrative apparatuses of a psychology department categorize and divide students in terms of particular educational and research values (i.e., grades, research projects, funding etc.). One function of this categorizing and dividing is

to determine who will be sanctioned to produce social psychological knowledge in the future and who will not. The student, as a participant in these educational practices, is to a greater or lesser degree aware of the categorizing and dividing function of her or his training. Consequently, the student also “observes” her or his academic performance in terms of how it measures up to those same values. In this way, educational observation works both externally through administrative practices and internally through student reflection, to regulate the production of knowledge. It is linked to social psychological observation in terms of how the rewards and punishments entailed by educational observation guide the form and content of students’ research activities.

Socio-historical observation is characterized by a focus on institutional practices and activities as they pertain to the development and dissemination of both educational observation and social psychological observation. Cultural and economic practices viewed historically, for example, can be understood as having influenced the formation and institutionalization of particular research practices. The goal of examining current research practices in social psychology consequently requires developing an account that begins with the socio-historical and moves by way of the educational to the social psychological. What is required, in other words, is a reflexive research strategy directed at situating current social psychological research practices within a particular social and historical context. To understand how the systematic observation and quantification of aggregates of people could come to constitute a social-psychology-of-the-individual, it is necessary to first examine social psychology’s past.

Before providing an overview of my methodological strategy for “problematizing”

psychological research practices, it may be helpful to the reader to understand how I came to conceive such as an object of inquiry. The core ideas of my analysis developed out of comments by Ian Parker (1994) in his article, “Reflexive Research and the Grounding of Analysis: Social Psychology and the Psy-complex.”³ It introduced me to the notion of a “psy-complex,” described as a “sprawling speculative and regulative network of theories and practices that constitute psychology,” (p. 246). “Psy-complex,” is meant to denote a broad collection of institutions and practices having the individual as their basic focus. Rose (1979) elaborates on the psy-complex in his analysis of the early history and relationship(s) of mental measurement and social administration. During the period from 1875 to 1925 there was a rapid development of institutions and departments including and related to the field of psychology:

one can observe the establishment of a whole technical apparatus — professional associations to form a specifically psychological community with its own rules and traditions for designating who is competent to speak, what objects can be spoken of, and in what way, also a network of professional journals to disseminate the results of psychological research — and so forth. And one can also begin to see the beginnings of an involvement of theories elaborated within this field, and of professional psychologists recognized in it, in a whole series of other areas — the practices of social administration and of social work, of the schools and the clinics, of the army and, somewhat later, the prisons. In other words one sees at this time, not simply the establishment of a *discipline* of psychology

but also of what we might term a psychological *complex* — a heterogeneous but regulated domain of agents, of practices, of discourses and apparatuses which has definite conditions of existence and specifiable effects. (p. 6)

Parker focused on aspects of the “psy-complex” most immediate to researchers in social psychology. He asked questions pertaining to the organization of social psychology both as an area of research and as a sub-discipline of psychology. How are its researchers and research participants socially organized within the research context? How are the methodological practices that ground social psychological research themselves grounded within broader social practices? One of his concluding remarks helped articulate for me a general topic area that I was interested in learning more about. He stated, “the documents and practices of the psy-complex limit and structure how social psychologists think about objective research, and how they may think about issues of subjectivity. The wider context in the discipline may offer spaces for critiques of science and for action research, but more often the language of psychology inhibits innovation,” (p. 250). This article (and Rose’s) helped me establish a basic analytic framework for exploring the question of educational practices in psychology.⁴ If I intended to critically examine aspects of the educational practices I myself had been exposed to, I realized it was necessary to view social psychology as a sub-discipline embedded within the institutional practices of psychology. In turn, it was necessary to view psychology as a discipline embedded within the broad collection of institutional practices that constitute the social, economic and political relations of North American society. These articles suggested to me that my social

psychological training - how I was taught to think about and conceptually organize human social interactions and the techniques I was taught to use to make sense of those observations - was connected with a “complex” of practices both internal and external to the educational practices of academic psychology. Consequently, my research interests came to take the form, *not* of an experimental examination of variable relations but rather of a critical, interpretive and empirical examination of how various social practices structure the research activities of students *toward* an experimental understanding of human social relations *in terms of* variable relations.

Overview

I have organized the thesis as follows:

First, I discuss some criticisms of academic psychology. These critiques range from an analysis of psychology’s embeddedness and ideological alignment with the prevalent epistemic and non-epistemic values of our culture, to an analysis of the required form and style for the public communication of research. I highlight particular arguments within a number of articles and I elaborate on some of the points made by discussing other contributions. The aim is to show the reader two things: (a) that the practices constitutive of psychology operate at different levels, and (b) that the practices themselves are not neutral procedures but are “active” in terms of how they regulate the research activities and research products of students. Foucault (1982) provides a useful definition of regulation in terms of relations of power:

In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent which implicitly is renewable. It is a total structure of actions brought to bear

upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions. (p. 789)

The various practices that constitute psychological inquiry entail power relations, less in the form of prohibitions and denials and more in the form of productive “actions” or “structures” (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984). The psychology curriculum, for example, is constituted by a series of learning activities productive of an objectivist understanding and approach to social problems. The curriculum, as a “total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions,” produces specific modes of inquiry and of understanding and in this sense psychological educational practices are productive. In the case of research training, the key to understanding power-relations is to focus specifically on what is produced and how its production is realized. What kind of knowledge does a psychological training promote? What forms of knowing are made easier or more difficult? How does a training in psychology incite, induce, seduce, constrain or even forbid particular ways of knowing? One specific manifestation of power relations is student-professor relations. Professors maintain a dominant position in the relation in terms of authority, status, experience and evaluative capacity. The student’s own views, opinions and interests, however, make it a power *relation* irrespective of the power differential. A professor may “insist” with demands, “induce” with persistent suggestions or “seduce” with research money. A professor may outright “forbid” a student

from carrying out a particular form of research or insist on another form. All of these possible actions by a professor can be viewed as being “brought to bear” on the possible actions of students who may have their own ideas about what they would like to do. The student is capable of embracing or resisting the actions of professors although it would certainly be more difficult and time consuming to resist. Either way, the research products of the student can be understood as coming about through a complex regulatory process otherwise known as a psychological training. Chapter one, therefore, is intended to direct the readers attention to how social and educational practices can be construed as regulating the knowledge products of students.

Chapter two, provides a critical-historical analysis of psychology’s development into a major institution. The general purpose is to situate the development and growth of psychology within a socio-historical, economic and political framework. The specific purpose is to provide the reader with a sense for how economic and political relationships influenced the methodological and institutional development of psychology and social psychology. This analysis does not involve any strict causal claims, nor am I claiming to have detailed the “true” history of psychology. The aim is to provide the reader with a reasonable and coherent account of the gradual consolidation and institutionalization of a particular experimental model of research practice within the discipline of psychology in North America.

In chapter three, I discuss the so-called “crisis” in social psychology in some detail. My goal is to link earlier observations and criticisms to the development of the crisis. In chapter four, I elaborate on a theoretical conception of educational practices that situates

them firmly within a socio-historical context. Finally, in chapter five, I examine selected educational practices and documents in the psychology department at the University of Manitoba with the express intent of empirically documenting a specific and concrete case study of the processes of epistemological regulation as they have been characterized in the body of the thesis.

A Critical Overview

Academic Psychology and Research Practices

My purpose in this chapter is to direct the readers attention toward criticisms of psychological inquiry at the institutional, methodological and rhetorical levels. First, I discuss Prilleltensky's (1989) assessment that psychological practices are ideological and function to maintain the status quo. I then discuss Habermas' (1978) distinction among three kinds of knowledge-interests held to inform social inquiry. Psychology promotes only one of the three leaving the other two largely unexplored. I then briefly discuss ideology in terms of set procedures and methods of reasoning. Second, I discuss Danziger's (1985) critique of methodological practices in psychology in terms of how they systematically bias observations so as to favour particular theoretical assumptions. Tseelon (1991) provides a concrete example of how methods bias observations. Finally, I discuss Madigan, Johnson and Linton's (1995) analysis of how APA style embodies psychology's objectivist rhetoric. I then briefly discuss the important role language and discourse play in regulating how students understand and approach social problems.

Psychology and the Status Quo

Prilleltensky's (1989) inquiry focuses on psychology's ideological functions in our technological society.⁵ He organizes the critique around societal context, ideology, socialization and the uses of a "value neutral" psychology. Prilleltensky suggests that social, economic and political institutions "predispose" psychology to adopt particular "epistemic (i.e., "values employed by scientists to choose among competing theoretical explanations" [Howard, 1985, p 257]) and nonepistemic values (i.e., sociocultural and political beliefs)" (Prilleltensky, p. 795). Psychology is, of course, part of the institutional

fabric of our culture: It both influences and is influenced by current institutional practices and regulations as well as the prevalent cultural beliefs. As a full participant within these practices and relations, psychology can play one of two roles: (a) it can reinforce existing practices and ratify the status quo, or (b) it can criticize existing practices and foster institutional change. Prilleltensky (1989) suggests that psychology's institutional activities tend toward reinforcing existing practices. This alignment with the values of the status quo is linked to the values psychology both shares with, and contributes to, various social institutions and apparatuses.

Prilleltensky defines ideology as, "the weltanschauung and social beliefs of a community, developed with the purpose of justifying and promoting their economic and sociopolitical interests," (p. 796). Lewontin (1991), however, provides a more detailed definition as it relates to scientific inquiry:

Science is molded by society because it is a human productive activity that takes time and money, and so is guided by and directed by those forces in the world that have control over money and time. Science uses commodities and is part of the process of commodity production. Science uses money. People earn their living by science, and as a consequence the dominant social and economic forces in society determine to a large extent what science does and how it does it. More than that, those forces have the power to appropriate from science ideas that are particularly suited to the maintenance and continued prosperity of the social structures of which they are a part. So other social institutions have an input into science both in

what is done and how it is thought about, and they take from science concepts and ideas that then support their institutions and make them seem legitimate and natural. It is this dual process — on the one hand, of the social influence and control of what scientists do and say, and, on the other hand, the use of what scientists do and say to further support the institutions of society — that is meant when we speak of science as ideology. (p. 4)

This definition helps clarify some of Prilleltensky's points about psychology's relationship to society. He argues psychology is valued by current economic and socio-political interests for two reasons. First, structurally, psychology's understanding and examination of problems tend to adhere to a conceptual dichotomy between individual and society. The ideological benefit to current social structures is that the individual is studied as an asocial and ahistorical being with few substantive connections made between this individual and the wider socio-political context. In addition, he claims that psychology benefits current social structures by rationalizing social policies that are themselves political, as well as by promoting societies' prevalent values such as individualism, male supremacy, and political conformity.

For Prilleltensky, the key to understanding how psychology's ideological leanings are reproduced, requires examining educational practices and the socialization of students into psychological research practices. Sarason (1981) describes this socialization process:

We may call the process education or training: a long series of rites that make them eligible for certain roles in certain places. It is a process in

which self, others, and the nature of society get defined. . . . *To be socialized means that one has absorbed and accommodated to predetermined conceptions of the way things are and ought to be. One may resist and resent the process but if one wants to occupy a certain place and role in society (e.g., lawyer, physician, psychologist) one has to traverse successfully the rites of passage. The socialization may be partial but its effects are never absent. For most people the process is far more than partial; it is so successful that for all practical purposes there is no questioning, no self-consciousness, about the forces that shaped them and their conception of society. (quoted in Prilleltensky, 1989, p. 796, italics added)*

When psychology is viewed as an institutional apparatus whose conceptual practices function to leave the socio-political realm relatively unexplored, while at the same time producing knowledge directed at the regulation of individual behaviour, it becomes possible to understand how concepts such as “value-neutrality” and the “individual” as distinct from “society” entail more than a collection of statements about methodological procedure. As Prilleltensky states, value-neutrality allows psychology to portray its knowledge as depoliticized. This allows psychology to claim that its “prescriptive biases” are in fact “descriptive assertions about human behaviour” (p. 797). In addition, the value neutral stance legitimizes psychology’s work in the eyes of the public.

There are two aspects of this critique that I will explore further: the belief that

instrumental methods are “value-neutral” and the notion of ideology.

Knowledge-interests. My aim is to provide the reader with a distinction among three forms of inquiry, each with a “specific connection between logical-methodological rules and knowledge-constitutive interests,” (Habermas, 1978). The three forms of knowledge-constitutive interest are (a) an empirical-analytical interest in technical knowledge (b) an historical-hermeneutic interest in practical knowledge and (c) a critical-emancipatory interest in transformative knowledge. The following summary of these three knowledge constitutive interests represents a hybrid based on the viewpoints expressed in the following books and articles: Ewert, (1991, p.348-358), Habermas (1978, p.301-317) and Morrow (1994, p. 147-149). In the empirical-analytic knowledge-interest,

Theories comprise hypothetico-deductive connections of propositions, which permit the deduction of lawlike hypotheses with empirical content.

The latter can be interpreted as statements about the covariance of observable events; given a set of initial conditions, that make predictions possible. Empirical-analytic knowledge is thus possible predictive knowledge. However, the *meaning* of such predictions, that is their technical exploitability, is established only by the rules according to which we apply theories to reality. (Habermas, 1978, p. 308)

The important point to note regarding instrumental knowledge in the context of research on humans, is that the “facts” it produces derive from a specific organization of the research conditions. Facts are produced within a particular social arrangement and it is this arrangement that establishes the utility of the knowledge in terms of technical control over

human behaviour. Generally, such knowledge is knowledge produced by people in positions of power (i.e., “experts”) and focuses on people without such power (i.e., those whose “problems” an expert has been hired to solve). Experts define the situation, define the problem, design the materials, collect the data and then draw conclusions based on the data, all largely independent of the self-understandings and opinions of those whom were studied. The knowledge produced in such a social arrangement is knowledge by experts for experts. The implication then, is that the empirical-analytic approach is necessarily tied to technical-interests such as the social organization, classification and regulation of human populations by various administrative apparatuses.

The historical-hermeneutic knowledge-interest focuses on the communication and establishment of inter-subjective meaning. The aim is to achieve consensus among individuals and groups of individuals. Social meaning is emphasized, not empirical observation. This form of inquiry entails processes of interpretation grounded in the norms, expectations and values - in short, the meanings - that concrete social activities have for the people engaged in those activities. The success or “rightness” of an interpretation stems from how authentic it is for the individuals involved. The knowledge-interest is one of practicality: Inquiry is intended to increase mutual understanding and communicability among the participants. For social research, this would involve some form of phenomenological inquiry guided by an attempt to articulate a vocabulary that is meaningful to all those involved. A limitation of this method of producing knowledge involves an over-reliance on the subjective self-understandings of people. This is based on the assumption that self-understandings often result from distorted social and personal

knowledge. Much of human understanding is mediated. One consequence of this is that individual self-understandings may not adequately reflect a person's actual social conditions. In addition, an interpretive approach may lead to the viewing of actual social conflicts solely in terms of a "problem-of-communication"; whereas, in reality the social conflicts may be materially based and therefore not entirely resolvable through communication.

The critical-emancipatory knowledge-interest stems from the human interest in self-knowledge through reflection. It is related to practical-interests but its focus on meanings is intended to move beyond mere articulation to the level of critique. Meanings are to be critically examined and an attempt is made to transform them. The examination of meanings stems from the assumption that norms and values (i.e., meanings) are intimately connected to specific social functions directed at the maintenance of particular social relations (i.e., social and cultural reproduction). This interest also utilizes the empirical and so attempts to unite both empirical and normative theoretical approaches. The empirical aspect focuses on social practices and structures especially in terms of the particular meanings that such practices and structures reproduce. The normative aspect attempts to conceive of a communicative context that would decrease the knowledge-distorting potential of particular social practices and structures so as to increase the possibility of self-reflection (the critical-emancipatory interest). One underlying assumption of this viewpoint, consequently, is that establishing the conditions for reflexive activity will lead to a transformation away from knowledge-distorting and potentially oppressive social practices toward emancipatory social practices.

To place knowledge-constitutive interests within the context of psychological practice, it might be useful to conceive of psychology's research history in terms of the pursuit of empirical-analytic knowledge with the aim of regulating the behaviour of human populations. The dominant techniques for conducting psychological research have traditionally involved an instrumental framework with the human being conceptualized in terms of both stable internal qualities and modifiable internal qualities. Either technique for organizing humans expresses a relationship of determination between individual variables and environmental variables. The dominant knowledge-interest of psychology has involved documenting the techniques and procedures effective in controlling human behaviour, usually within the context of a laboratory environment. One problem with a near exclusive reliance on an instrumental approach to social inquiry, however, is that governing cultural values tend to get unreflectively reproduced. Psychology's history, for example, shows that sexist and patriarchal values were confirmed and reproduced study after study in the name of objective scientific inquiry, because those who had received public sanction to conduct such research did not recognize that they had organized the research context to "objectively" confirm their social assumptions (e.g., Sherif, 1979; Shields, 1975). The Humanistic movement within psychology might be viewed as a reaction to the empirical-analytic knowledge-interest in favour of a historical-hermeneutic approach where understanding what things *mean* for the person being studied is deemed essential to providing a meaningful social account. This approach, as stated, has also shown itself to be partial in as much as people's self-understandings of the social context within which they live is often dependent on the dominant discourses, educational practices and

economic conditions under which they exist (Parker, 1989). As for the third knowledge-interest, in my experience, there has been little attempt to inform psychology students of the techniques and approaches useful for critically examining the socio-historical context within which social psychologists have conducted social psychological research. Rather, a largely positivist epistemology and ontology is offered as the guiding framework for the examination and elaboration of social psychological problems. A critical-emancipatory knowledge-interest, however, directed at providing psychology students with a critical perspective on the historical constitution and present practical consequences of current research practices, can presumably be of “emancipatory” value by virtue of how it challenges the unreflectively accepted norms, values and meanings of the discipline.

Ideology as practices. The standard definition of ideology treats it as a biasing element to be controlled so objective knowledge can be obtained. In the instrumental approach, “value-neutral” is intended to convey a collection of research practices designed to establish matter-of-fact relationships among observations independent of any ideological or otherwise biasing factors. Under this definition, ideology includes “interested” theoretical viewpoints such as a Marxist, a liberal or a feminist viewpoint where a particular phenomenon is examined from a specific point-of-view. In contrast to this view of ideology is Marx’s (according to D. Smith, 1990) definition as “definite procedures or methods of thinking and reasoning about social relations and processes” (p. 35). Here ideology is a practice of thinking about society in a distinctive and describable way. Ideas and concepts are not themselves ideological; rather, it is their distinctive use with specific methods of reasoning and interpreting that makes them ideological. At this

point, I merely want to draw to the readers attention, the distinction between ideology as ideas and ideology as specific practices. As I examine research and educational practices in psychology it will be important to keep in mind a conceptualization of ideology that focuses on how a collection of practices and procedures can function to regulate how social relations are to be reasoned about and explained.

The Methodological Imperative in Psychology

While Prilleltensky (1989) focuses on psychological practices within a larger cultural matrix, Danziger (1985) focuses specifically on methodological practice itself. He argues that methodological practices must be critically examined because they produce the observations that *count* as scientific while being, at the same time, “the repository of explicit and implicit theoretical assumptions. The relationship between observation and theory is mediated in practice by methodological prescriptions” (p. 1). He presents the reader with a conditional statement: “If theoretical preconceptions are an unavoidable component of methodological rules, and if such rules mean that only certain kinds of observation will ever be made then a certain predetermination of observation by theory must follow” (p. 1). His concern is that methodological practices in psychology may take the form of a methodological circle where the methods, grounded by particular theoretical assumptions, structure observations in ways consistent with these assumptions. The problem, if such were the case, is that theoretical change would be limited to changes consistent with the methodological rules for making observations. A theoretical change beyond this would require a change in methodology.

Danziger moves from a general development of the problem to a more specific

analysis of methodological practices in psychology. He asks us to consider the relationship of method and theory on the level of a whole research area rather than that of an individual research study. There are two possibilities: “The variability of methods in use might happen to be such that different types of theory have an equal chance of being confirmed, other things being equal; or the methods in use are systematically biased to favour one type of theory over another” (p. 3). For Danziger, only the second possibility operates in psychology. In practice, “*massive institutional pressures*” in psychology favour a particular research methodology: a methodology “based on the use of certain statistical techniques, the requirements of which govern the design of experiments” (p. 3, *italics added*). The statistical techniques, however, also are not theory neutral and produce results biased to favour theoretical interpretations of a certain type. The implication is that the methodological techniques and practices of psychology direct the research process in a specific direction. Danziger then moves to the question of the nature of such theoretical biases. Following is a succinct summary of one of the biases he examines.

Danziger argues that psychology is uniquely dominated by the use of inferential statistics to investigate theoretically postulated relationships. This is in contrast to the use of inferential statistics for seeking recommendations for courses of action in practical affairs - its historical origin within psychology (Danziger, 1990). These techniques dominate experimental design and structure data gathering techniques because the data must be amenable to the appropriate statistical analysis. That is to say, statistical techniques require that a numerical system be imposed on data. The use of a numerical system, however, is not a mere labeling of empirical items. Rather, “the structure of the

numerical system is taken to represent the structure of the empirical system” (p. 4).

Knowledge of the empirical system comes through the numerical system. The valid use of a numerical system to represent an empirical domain, alternatively, requires that the numerical system contain certain properties such as equivalence and transitivity. The consequence of this is that the numerical system representing the empirical, “involves a very definite theoretical structuring of the world one is interested in” (p. 5). What this means practically, at the level of research practice, is that to the extent that a particular methodology governs psychological research, there will be, “pressures for the structure of all theories to accommodate to the theoretical structure embedded in the methodology” (p. 5). By using inferential statistics almost exclusively in the investigation of theoretically postulated relationships, psychological research is structured such that the logical and mathematical criteria of a numerical system govern the development of psycho-logical theory.

Methodology as ideology. Tseelon (1991) provides a concrete example of the structuring influence of methodological design by focusing on social psychological research from the perspective of cultural studies. She argues that method is but another system of representation (i.e., signifying practice or coding practice) and the important component to consider when examining ideology is the *form* of a practice, as opposed to its content. When signifying practices are viewed in terms of how methodological form structures observation, it becomes possible to understand methods themselves as inherently ideological practices that, “define the terms through which we experience and explain the world” (p. 299). One of Tseelon’s objectives is to reverse the traditional

viewpoint that method is derivative of epistemology and ontology by demonstrating how different methods function to construct particular epistemologies and ontologies.

She accomplishes this objective by way of contrasting two methods used to produce knowledge about the concept of self-presentation. Her aim is to, “illustrate the working of method as ideology by analysis of the ontology and epistemology which are constructed by the use of the self-monitoring scale” (p. 306). The method of coding used to constitute the self-monitoring scale is contrasted with the coding for responses to open-ended questions. Tseelon makes the following observations about the structure of the self-monitoring scale:

The scale is meant to differentiate two types of people (pragmatic vs. principled actors) whom, while both possessing a true private self, differ in terms of how they present this self in public. Those who change their self presentation in public are labeled high self-monitors. Those who do not change their self presentation in public are labeled low self-monitors. The questionnaire and associated measurement scale imposes particular, “assumptions about motivation” on respondents and then leaves them no choice but to respond to the questions and answers as provided. Their responses will consequently be organized into predetermined social categories. The questionnaire allows only true or false answers, “excludes any qualifiers and is contextually insensitive” (p. 307). In addition, she states that the method of scoring the scale, works to iron out contradictions and idiosyncracies and groups the results according to the two essential categories above. In contrast, the open-ended questionnaire provides considerably fewer constraints on how the participant will respond to questions about self-presentation. Participants can respond

as they wish within a limited writing space based on what they take the question to be asking. So even here there are constraints. The participant, for example, cannot seek clarification of the meaning of the question until after providing an answer. Consequently, both methods of generating data structure observation in one way or another and in this sense, Tseelon argues, we cannot assume that either actually provides an account of 'the way things are'. The more specific question is not whether the methods produced true observations; rather, how did the two methods each structure the 'data' the researcher will use to make conclusions about how people present themselves?

The results of this contrast suggest that the highly structured coding practices of the self-presentation scale produce a somewhat singular conceptualization of individuals as fitting into clearly defined presentational styles while the open-ended questions suggest an individual who is much more complex, inconsistent and contextually defined (Tseelon, 1991). Methods as signifying practices, consequently, are not something the researcher can take for granted as being mere tools. In choosing a method, the researcher is committing to a particular view of humans: The choice of a method is already itself a question of values.

Both Danziger (1985) and Tseelon argue that methods in psychology structure how we understand phenomena. They are not merely neutral tools mediating between reality and our theories about reality. Our coding practices, especially our ways of coding the behaviour of human beings, are signifying practices. These signifying practices already suggest and, in fact, produce a particular ontology. The ontology so produced is then examined with the aim of confirming or disconfirming ontological assumptions about the

phenomena under investigation. I will raise one question at this point. If methods are theoretically embedded and consequently reproduce particular epistemological and ontological assumptions, and if the variety of such research designs/approaches used within social psychology are limited, how is this likely to influence its theoretical and substantive content?

The Language of Psychology: APA Style as Epistemology

I will now shift the focus from general methodological practices in psychology to the specific mechanics of constructing a scientific account as exemplified in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (PMAA). Madigan, Johnson and Linton (1995) discuss the virtues of the 1994 APA publication manual. This article appears to celebrate the same processes of epistemological regulation that I am criticizing. Further, it does so in a clear and straightforward manner by showing us how the APA manual functions to reinforce psychology's methodological perspective and promotes a particular brand of empirical inquiry. Its relevance to this inquiry, consequently, is in terms of how APA style functions as an *educational* practice.

The authors point out that the psychology curriculum generally requires competence in APA style in class papers, theses and dissertations and that APA style is not just a collection of arbitrary stylistic conventions. They claim that APA style, "encapsulates the core values and epistemology of the discipline," and is "a model for thinking about psychological phenomena and serves as an important socialization experience for psychologists," (p. 428). The authors make clear that APA style is not just about guidelines for presenting information. Rather, the APA manual involves a collection

of “unarticulated practices” that reflect the attitudes and values of psychologists, such as a commitment to the empirical method and to a cumulative, collaborative research practice (p. 428). My question: By what various textual practices does APA style manage to structure, not only the basic form of a research report but also the epistemological and ontological content? I will examine two report writing practices discussed.

First, the authors provide an example of how APA guidelines have changed to reflect psychology’s changing conception of the person. Participants, as we now refer to the subject/object of psychological research, “are anonymous, interchangeable, and distinct from experimenters”(p. 430). Whereas “participants” were once explicitly named individuals who may have also authored the report, they are now described in terms of major demographic characteristics as well as some particular group affiliation (i.e., female and male introductory psychology students). The authors state that changes in the social structure of the psychology experiment, “had far reaching effects, ultimately impacting the types of data collected and the methods used to analyze them,” (p. 430). APA style contributed to this impact by institutionalizing these changes:

By mastering APA style and reading APA style reports, a student learns how a participant is to be conceptualized in contemporary psychology and other details about the way her or his discipline constructs knowledge about the world. As APA writing conventions are internalized, the student is presented with the larger world view implicit in them and is encouraged over time to think in ways characteristic of the discipline. (p. 430)

Thus, APA’s conceptualization of the participant as an interchangeable data-

producing-unit complements the basic factorial research design within which the dictates of a numerical system require all the data be treated identically. APA style “acts on the actions” of students by regulating how students conceptualize human beings for the purposes of empirical research. Research designs complement this conceptualization by requiring that the “behaviour” of human beings be converted to numbers so quantifiable relationships among the behaviours can be produced.

Second, the authors state that APA style writing is guided by a, “utilitarian view of language in which words are implicitly assumed to function as simple transmitters of information from the writer to the reader” (p. 433). They contrast this view with that of the humanities where the meaning of a work requires a careful analysis of the rhetoric used to construct it. Language in APA style, “takes on the function of a somewhat unimportant container for information about phenomena, data, and theories,” and APA style language is not supposed to draw attention to itself. The authors refer to this style as the “rhetoric of objectivity, ” a style of writing that creates the impression of neutrality or impersonal detachment. They suggest that as students begin to practice this rhetoric, “they also begin to implicitly adopt an empiricist approach to knowledge construction,” (p. 433). They conclude that psychology’s view of the role of language, “leads away from a self-conscious examination of rhetoric ... toward practices that make language appear as a transparent medium for conveying objective information about a fixed external reality,” (p. 434). In other words, the rhetoric of APA writing style does not reflect on itself as a rhetoric despite it being a veritable micro-technology for the “do’s and don’ts” of the most minute aspects of experimental report writing.

To illustrate, I will briefly discuss some structural aspects of the *Publication Manual, Fourth Edition* (1994):

The manual has seven chapters, three appendices and is a total of 368 pages long. Chapter one, the “Content and Organization of a Manuscript” is 21 pages long, and contains four subsections (total pages are in brackets): (a) quality of content, [2]; (b) characteristics of authorship and articles, [3]; (c) parts of a manuscript, [15], including the following subsections: title page, abstract, introduction, method, results, discussion, multiple experiments, references, appendix, and author note; (d) and finally, quality of presentation [1]. Chapter two, the “Expression of Ideas,” is 37 pages long and includes three subsections: writing, grammar and guidelines to reduce bias in language. Chapter three, “APA Editorial Style,” however, is 174 pages long. This chapter includes the following subsections: punctuation [8], spelling [5], capitalization [5], italics [1], abbreviations [10], headings and series [5], quotations [4], numbers [6], metrication [6], statistical and mathematical copy [9], tables [21], figures [22], footnotes and notes [3], appendices [2], reference citations in text [7], reference list [15], appendix 3-a [34], appendix 3-b [11].

The *Publication Manual* makes explicit suggestions about how to structure an experimental report including what kinds of phrasing is to be preferred, when quotes should or should not be used, how publications should be cited in the text, how participants are to be described, how the research procedure is to be described, the reporting of results, the length and content of the discussion section and so on. Mastering APA consequently entails mastering a very specific and regimented mode of expression.

To sum up in the words of the Madigan, Johnson and Linton (1995):

We suggest that the process of mastering APA style directly contributes to students' enculturation into psychology. In developing writing skills, students learn to reason empirically about human behavior. The empirical report provides an explicit model for the way that psychological knowledge *should* be constructed. Empiricist values are thoroughly supported and encouraged by a variety of writing conventions. . . . A successful student comes not only to write like a psychologist but to think like one as well. (p. 434, italics added)

Discourse. Madigan, Johnson and Linton's (1995) article highlights the important role language and discourse play in the construction and dissemination of concepts and methods of analysis. First, it acknowledges that conceptions of the person have changed during the history of psychology. Second, it acknowledges that the social structure of the psychology experiment has changed historically and that this influenced: (a) the kinds of data collected, (b) the methods used to collect the data, and (c) how the data was interpreted. Third, the authors tie these changes to the processes of institutionalization, such as those of educational practices. In terms of educational practices, the main vehicles for institutionalization are the specific discourses psychology employs to communicate the research process to students. An experimental discourse, in the main, functions to constitute a particular epistemological process for the production of knowledge within the educational activities of students. From the observational viewpoint of educational practices, APA style and the associated methodological dictates of the curriculum work

together to “induce” the student to conceive of human social behaviour in terms of an experimental paradigm built upon concepts, such as independent variables, dependent variables, control, manipulation, effect size, significance, multivariate analysis, replication etcetera.

Viewed this way, discourses, especially when associated with evaluation practices, function to structure and regulate a student’s approaches to and understandings of, social relations so they tend towards an objectivist epistemology. This means that the discourse itself plays an important role in constructing how individuals, through their research activities, conceptualize human problems.

Historical Antecedents

A Critical-Historical Analysis of Psychology's Institutional Development

In order to explore the complexities of the institutional development of psychology and social psychology, I will review specific aspects of their respective development in separate but chronologically overlapping sub-sections. I will first discuss various factors, values and conditions that contributed to the development of particular forms of research practices in psychology over the first half of the 20th century. In particular, I will focus on the development of a hybrid neo-Galtonian model of experimental research. By the 1950s, this model was quickly coming to define the meaning of “experimental method” in psychology. Second, I will examine the development of social psychology as a sub-discipline of academic psychology. Its early development demonstrates a tension between its potential subject matter and modes of inquiry and the philosophical and methodological commitments of its “parent” discipline. I will also discuss some developments and perspectives within social psychology in the 1930s and then conclude this chapter with a discussion of the importance of World War II to social psychology's institutional legitimation.

Psychological Research Practices in Socio-Historical Context

In this section, I will discuss a period running from 1879 and Wundt's experimental model of psychological research to about 1950. During this period, one witnesses a relative diversity in psychology's object of inquiry as well as a relative diversity of methodological approaches. According to Danziger (1990), by the 1950s, psychology's research practices, “had settled into a rather rigid mold that allowed for relatively little variation” (p. 16). Consequently, understanding current research practices

requires understanding how this crystallization of research practices in the 1950s came about. The historical perspectives I will be drawing from are informed largely by the historical books of Danziger (1990) and Leahey (1991) and are supplemented by various historical articles and books.

Two historical conditions are important to contextualizing this period. The first focuses on economics and more specifically, psychology's need to make links with external markets for its knowledge products. The second focuses on the ascending scientism any new discipline needed to align itself with if it hoped to gain both scientific respectability and public legitimacy. Throughout this period, and of course during our own period in history, it has been to a discipline's economic advantage to be capable of providing knowledge products of value to established institutions. Established institutions, however, already have ways of achieving their particular goals, whether it be, for example, the goals of education or the goals of industry. Linking knowledge products to dominant institutional interests was especially important in America where the university system favored disciplinary specialization. In the American context, the control over university appointments and professional opportunities was largely invested in businessmen and their appointees, in politicians, as well as in people generally involved in practical professional activities (Danziger, 1990). When psychology entered the scene, it had to operate within this economic/political environment. In this respect, psychology proved itself to be quite adept at responding to the needs of the market in terms of developing and disseminating techniques and tools for accomplishing the then dominant technical knowledge-interests. In addition, however, in order for psychology to maintain any public recognition that

accrued from its applied work, it was also necessary that it establish its scientific credentials through links with the reigning conceptions of science. The key to this aspect of psychology's development involved producing an acceptable public perception that its work was scientific. At the time, this meant "doing science" the way the philosophers of science were specifying science must be done. So, psychology entered a scene where marketability and scientific legitimacy were necessary elements to disciplinary success. Psychology's disciplinary development, from its inception, was a practical affair constituted by establishing viable political and economic links to the reigning ideological interests and philosophical assumptions of the time.

Research practices in psychology. The founding of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1892 occurred just as America was about to undergo substantial social, structural and economic changes. The country had been largely a collection of isolated communities but with technological developments and an influx of immigrants, America was rapidly developing into an interconnected nation-state. During these early years, the "buzz words" of the time were reform, efficiency and progress. Dewey as president of the APA in 1899 wrote of how psychology could make contributions to social practices and in particular, he focused on the educational institution as a site for the development of common community values and social growth. Social control of the masses was viewed as a positive and necessary objective of this period and Cattell anticipated psychology's increasing participation in this social goal in the areas of education, medicine, political economy etcetera, as it developed more sophisticated quantitative techniques. This was also a period where administrative apparatuses like

government bureaucracy began to grow substantially. With the rapidly increasing population, an expanding economic base and the values of efficiency and progress, an administrative apparatus became necessary for the organization and administration of populations (Rose, 1979).

During the early twentieth century, psychology had two different models of psychological research. These models were the Wundtian model and the Galtonian model. I will discuss both because in the early years they functioned to satisfy psychology's dual interests in providing a practical and socially useful (read: marketable) research methodology as well as a rigorous (if somewhat limited) experimental methodology. The Wundtian model was experimental, with the object of inquiry being universal mind, or consciousness. All humans were assumed to represent individual instances of universal mind and so the focus of research was on the causal processes of the individual, with the experimental observation of a second individual constituting a replication. Access to the object of inquiry required individuals to report on the contents of their consciousness as various stimulus conditions were systematically varied. What the "subject" reported was interpreted as an indicator of an underlying "psychic causality," and so the reports were of value to the extent that they demonstrated the operations of mind. In order to conduct such research, it was necessary to establish a division of labour in the form of "experimenters" and "subjects", each with designated roles in the experimental situation. Thus, the psychological experiment, from its origins, constituted a special kind of *social* system where the participants were to take on particular roles in the production of knowledge. In this particular social system, the experimenter was able to control the

manipulation of stimulus conditions while the subject was required to respond to those conditions via introspection. In this early model of experimentation, however, the roles of experimenter or subject were interchangeable and everyone involved in such research was generally knowledgeable about the work and had acted as both experimenter or subject at some point. In this model of experimentation, statistics were exemplified by a Fechnerian psychophysics. Since psychic causality implied a strict determinism, it was assumed that any phenomenon under investigation had a true quantitative value. Consequently, when repeated measurements varied, the variations were treated as “errors” around this true value. Thus, in the Wundtian model, error implied a calculus of error based on the system of measurement. The importance of the Wundtian model lay in its systematic experimental procedures, its establishment of a particular social arrangement for the production of knowledge and its assumption of a lawful psychic causality.

The Galtonian model had an entirely different object of inquiry entailing an entirely different social system for generating knowledge products. The object of inquiry in the Galtonian model was a set of individual “performances” usually treated as individual “abilities” that could be statistically compared to the abilities of other individuals who had performed according to an identical research procedure. Such abilities were assumed to be internal and stable inheritable characteristics of individuals. The value of this approach, therefore, lay in its supposed ability to objectively measure inherent individual differences in human abilities. The particular social system constituted by this knowledge-interest, was one where there was a largely limited and superficial interaction between “experimenter” and “subject”. The relationship between experimenter and subject was now asymmetrical

with the experimenter taking the role of “expert” based on her or his unique possession of the techniques necessary for assessing individual abilities. The knowledge produced by the Galtonian method was knowledge about the characteristics of populations as opposed to knowledge about the processes of universal mind. One important difference between the experimenter role in these two models was that in the Galtonian model, the experimenter had no control over experimental manipulations as s/he did in the Wundtian model. This form of research practice was useful for generating regular associations among observations but it was not capable of generating evidence for underlying causal processes. However, the temptation to make causal attributions was not always fully overcome. Also, in this model of research, statistical analysis was integral, whereas in Wundt’s model, it was subsidiary and only of relevance for particular kinds of experimental research such as that of measuring minute sensory differences. Error in the context of the Galtonian model implied a calculation of exploration. Error (that is, individual differences) was the material necessary for making judgments and forming categories. Contrary to the Wundtian goal of establishing causal relationships, the goal of Galtonian research was no more and no less than the “establishment of statistical correlations among the attributes of natural populations,” (Danziger, 1987, p. 4).

I will now discuss the social context within which these two models differentially developed and eventually merged into a hybrid consisting of elements of both. First, I will discuss the different social, economic and political developments that were occurring in the first decades of the twentieth century before the advent of behavioralism⁶ and its gradual domination of the field, in terms of what constitutes the proper object of

psychological research. It is important to recognize that psychology was already more than merely an academic discipline, having established important links for its knowledge products in the outside world. The discipline had established a link with education largely by working with teachers and using the Galtonian approach as a kind of census-taking of the qualities and abilities of students. As this relationship developed, and as America began its shift toward an integrated nation-state, the emphasis in education shifted towards a more administrative stance necessitated by social, structural and economic changes. Educational administrators began thinking along the lines of scientific management, as it related to research in industry, with an emphasis on technological control and a rationalized educational system. Consequently, one of psychology's first, and certainly one of its largest external markets for its technological innovations, involved providing education with administrative knowledge. What were the concerns of educational administrators? They were seeking knowledge of assistance in addressing managerial problems. This involved producing quantitative data amenable to statistical analysis with large populations of individuals. The institutional demand for systematic and rationalized knowledge entailed the need for two kinds of knowledge products: (a) those obtained via psychometrics concerning individual differences in abilities and (b) those produced by comparing the relative efficiency of different educational practices and procedures. Education's technical requirements led psychology to develop an intimate tie with education and its practical pursuit of administratively expedient methods for categorizing individuals and assessing educational procedures. The consequences of psychology's early relationship with education are important. From it, psychology gained a market for its

knowledge products, gained employment for psychologists and gained social recognition. Perhaps more importantly, the relationship had a major influence on both its subject matter and its methodology that, according to Danziger (1990), reduced it to a largely instrumental enterprise of providing technical knowledge for the solving of social problems.

Roughly contiguous with psychology's gains in status and social value as a practical and socially relevant discipline, was the beginning of a change in its substantive focus as an experimental discipline. During this period, the 1920s and 1930s, there were two important developments relevant to psychology, one external and one internal, although it is likely that these two developments were fundamentally related. The internal development was always to some extent present but took on increasing urgency during this time: an increasing concern and focus on the development of a proper scientific method for psychology. With its increasing successes in the applied field, psychologists were aware of the critical importance of establishing the scientific credentials necessary to maintain the status established through the utility of their applied work. Leahey (1991) claims that psychologists had always been insecure about their scientific status and were always seeking, "to find some methodological recipe to follow by which they could infallibly make psychology a science," (p. 202). When logical positivism entered the scene, with its claim that the power of science could be explicated and formalized into a scientific method that all disciplines could then employ, psychologists embraced the formula because it appeared to provide the necessary techniques for establishing psychology on the bedrock of a scientific methodology. Psychology, thanks to the philosophy of logical

positivism, claimed that it had acquired the necessary procedures for producing objective scientific knowledge.

Without claiming a causal relationship, at this time psychology made the shift from mind to behaviour as the main focus of its empirical researchers. A concern with consciousness was replaced with a, “concern with the explanation, prediction and control of behavior,” (Leahey, p. 185). Eventually, over the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, psychology’s published research came to increasingly consist of research that focused on quantifiable relationships among operationally defined behavioural elements. For my purposes, I wish to emphasize the shift towards a focus on behaviour in general throughout the various sub-disciplines of psychology. Methodological behaviourism represented but one stream of the shift in focus to behaviour, albeit the stream that could best claim to epitomize the logic and structure of logical positivism with its tight link between theoretical and observational terms.

By the 1920s, psychology, thanks to the particular technical knowledge-interests of educational administration, had generated an institutional base built on the utility of its knowledge in the applied realm. This knowledge included research of a basic classificatory nature and research designed to assess the utility and efficiency of various forms of educational practice. In addition, on the laboratory/experimental side, positivism and behaviourism were beginning to push the Wundtian model of experimentation into the history pages. Behaviourism gradually came to replace the Wundtian model as the domain of an experimental science having, as its focus, the individual organism with the decided shift in focus from mind to behaviour. Also during this decade psychology released its first

style sheet in 1929 in the *Psychological Bulletin* titled, “Instructions in Regard to Preparation of Manuscript,” (Bazerman, 1987). This precursor to the *Publication Manual* of the American Psychological Association, was at that point, only six pages long and provided suggestions for the subdivision and articulation of subjects, the use of headings and for the amount of detail to include so others could criticize and compare it to other procedures and results. Fisher also did his first statistical work using analysis of variance but it would not be until the mid-thirties that psychology’s methodological practices had changed sufficiently such that Fisher, and Neyman and Pearson’s work became of value (Gigerenzer, 1987).

Thus, we reach a point where psychology had made the shift to behaviour as its object of inquiry, where it had a practical and marketable research tool in the form of the Galtonian model and where the more limited but also more strictly “scientific” experimental procedure of the Wundtian model was on the decline. As stated, educational administrators required a technique for assessing individual differences (Galtonian psychometrics). In addition, however, there was a demand for methods of measurement that could be used for comparing the results of different kinds of educational programs in terms of their effect on increasing overall group performance. This led to the development of, “the method of equivalent groups” (Danziger, 1990, p. 112). The institutional structure of the educational system (i.e., the division of students into classes) was well suited to this form of research and consequently, what developed was a form of experimental research (the manipulation of antecedent conditions within the control of an experimenter) that based its results, *not* on an individual psychophysical system, but rather on the result of a

group of individuals. Consequently, out of the administrative interests of educationalists, there developed an applied method of experimentation involving an experimental manipulation intended to answer research questions about the average response of groups. According to Danziger (1990), however, this “method of equivalent groups” only remained popular in the educational setting during the “efficiency” phase and subsequently its applied use faded.

Soon after the development of this hybrid model of experimental research - combining the experimental aspects of the Wundtian model with the statistical aspects of the Galtonian model - “basic” laboratory research came to adopt the research design. In the shift from the realm of applied research to the realm of basic research, however, the interpretation of the meaning of the results also changed. A method of research originally designed to assess the practical outcomes of different educational programs, when it was employed in the laboratory, came to be interpreted as providing evidence for universal processes of learning. Whereas previous experimental research focused on individual psycho-physical systems, this new hybrid focused on the statistically average response and treated individual deviations from this average as “error”. Over a number of decades, these “new” methods in basic research came to dominate psychological research practice. From the 1910s to the 1930s, one witnesses in experimental psychology a steady increase in: (a) the use of group data as opposed to the use of individual data and (b) the use of experimentally defined groups (those constituted by a particular experimental intervention); (Danziger, 1990). Experimental psychology was shifting from being a science of the individual to a science of the aggregate.

The introduction and growth of ANOVA. I will now discuss an associated technological development that transformed the hybrid experimental model into the most used research tool for the analysis of aggregates: analysis of variance (ANOVA). My purpose here is to (a) discuss the relationship of inferential statistics to experimental research, (b) highlight the eventual institutionalization of inferential statistics by first reviewing some of the controversies and disagreements out of which a particular anonymous disciplinary presentation of statistical analysis developed, and (c) review some empirical evidence indicating the growing popularity of ANOVA in psychological research.

Fisher's development of ANOVA, provides another example of how a research tool developed for use in an applied setting came to be adopted by those engaging in "basic" research and how a tool originally intended to inform practical decisions came to be interpreted as a mechanism for deciding among hypothetical propositions about human regularities. Fisher developed ANOVA in the practical context of agricultural research with crop yields but it was within psychological research practices (both applied and basic) that ANOVA gained popularity and widespread use (Gigerenzer, 1987). To understand this popularity, it is important to recognize that each shift in substantive focus - from individual mind to individual behaviour to aggregate behaviour - led to respective changes in the methods of inquiry. When experimental research on aggregates became popular in "basic" research, Fisher's ANOVA seemed to be perfectly suited to the new research design. In particular, Gigerenzer (1987) argues that ANOVA seemed to provide a mechanical process of inference from data to hypotheses, thereby maintaining a separation

between the experimenter and the knowledge the experimenter was producing. The new techniques of inference appeared to provide psychologists with a mechanism for maintaining scientific objectivity by virtue of how it removed the judgement of the experimenter with respect to the validity of hypotheses.

To underscore how social factors can help shape the content of educational practices, I will briefly review Gigerenzer's (1987) discussion of three factors that he argues contributed to maintaining the "illusion of a mechanized inference process," (p. 18). The three factors are: (a) neglect of extant controversies, (b) anonymous presentation of ideas and (c) institutionalization of a statistical hybrid.

In terms of the neglect of extant controversies, he states that the inferential statistics of psychology are a mixture of work by Fisher and work by Neyman and Pearson. The proponents of these two perspectives, however, disagreed on a number of points. Fisher did not think it necessary to specify alternatives to the null hypothesis. Neyman and Pearson, however, rejected a null hypothesis test, arguing hypotheses must test for both Type I and Type II errors. For interpreting the significance level, Neyman and Pearson lay an emphasis on applications where there was repetitive sampling and significance was linked to, "the proportion of Type I errors in a long series of similar tests," (p. 18). Fisher, on the other hand, tended toward decisions based on individual tests. While both initially hoped to develop a deterministic statistical induction, Neyman and Pearson, "gave up the pretense of creating a theory of inference in order to preserve the integrity of their theory," (p. 19). Consequently, their statistical theory was limited to direct probability statements regarding the probability of observations given some

hypothesis. This, Gigerenzer claims, was not what psychologists were looking for. They wanted a statistical inference procedure leading to a “decision” based on “weighing the costs of the two types of errors,” (p. 19). Fisher provided this by presenting his statistical theory, “as if it were *the* perfectly rigorous method of scientific inference,” (p. 19). According to Gigerenzer, the above controversies were completely ignored even though psychology came to adopt a hybrid of these two differing perspectives. In addition in experimental psychology, ignoring controversial issues was unusual. Gigerenzer explains this neglect in terms of psychology’s desire to maintain the objective ideal over a probabilistic understanding of human behaviour. It allowed the researcher to present her or his research as confirmations of valid scientific hypotheses about aspects of human nature. In addition to the neglect of controversy, the hybrid model of statistical inference was presented, “*anonymously as the* corpus of inferential statistics,” that “facilitated the illusion of the ‘correct’ mechanized inductive inference, apparently freeing the experimenter from his own subjectivity and responsibility,” (p. 21). Finally, in terms of institutionalization, the anonymous hybrid soon entered the textbooks, the curricula and by the 1960s the publishing policies of major journals. Regarding this institutionalization, Gigerenzer notes that the criteria for publishing research in experimental journals (a) implied there were no alternatives to significance testing of null hypotheses as the method of scientific inference, (b) implied there were no experimental researches without significance testing, and (c) demonstrated how “level of significance” had come to be an institutionalized measure for assessing the quality of research.

Danziger (1990) and Rucci and Tweney (1980) both provide summary statistics

focusing on the use of group data and the use of ANOVA, respectively, for the period of approximately 1925 to 1950. Danziger's analysis of five major journals demonstrates a clear trend from the 1920s to the 1950s toward an increase in the use of group data in experimental research, both of a pure and applied nature (see Tables 1 and 2 below).

If we compare this trend with the percentage of some 6,457 articles appearing in major American psychological journals from 1935 to 1952, we see the increase of the use of ANOVA at 0% in 1936 to near 20% by the year 1952 (Rucci and Tweney, 1980). In addition, the t-test for statistical comparisons of two groups starts at 0% in 1935 and rises to about 30% of all articles by 1952. Thus by 1952, nearly 50% of the articles in American psychological journals made statistical inferences by using either the t-test or ANOVA, with correlational research constituting another 25% of all research articles (see Figure 1 below). Thus, it seems clear that during a twenty-five year span, psychological research practices were well on their way to being used to examine psychological problems in terms of the statistical analysis of aggregates of individuals.

Table 1

Percentage of Empirical Studies Reporting Individual or Group Data: Three**Journals of Basic Research***

Type of data	American Journal of Psychology	Psychological Monographs	Journal of Experimental Psychology
1914-1916			
Individual data only	70	62	43
Individual and group data	5	11	19
Group data only	25	27	38
1924-1926			
Individual data only	60	31	41
Individual and group data	6	24	15
Group data only	35	45	44
1934-1936			
Individual data only	31	31	28
Individual and group data	14	16	11
Group data only	55	53	61
1949-1951			
Individual data only	17	3	15
Individual and group data	3	3	2
Group data only	80	94	83

*Reproduced from Danziger, 1990

Table 2

Percentage of Empirical Studies Reporting Individual or Group Data: Two
Journals of Applied Research*

Type of data	Journal of Applied Psychology	Journal of Educational Psychology
1914-1916		
Individual data only	15	11
Individual and group data	7	14
Group data only	77	75
1924-1926		
Individual data only	11	5
Individual and group data	6	4
Group data only	83	91
1934-1936		
Individual data only	5	3
Individual and group data	2	3
Group data only	93	94

*Reproduced from Danziger, 1990




Figure 1. Proportion of articles using selected statistical tests as a function of year (Reproduced from Rucci & Tweeney, 1980).

The Development of Social Psychology as a Sub-Discipline of Psychology

The purpose of this section is to discuss some of the approaches, both internal and external to psychology that had, “the social” as their focus during roughly the same period covered above.⁷ It is important to discuss this variety so as to situate psychology’s conception of social psychology, as well as to give a sense for how this conception has narrowed over the years.

One of the first conceptualizations of social psychology on record involved an understanding of it as a socio-historical research activity. Wundt held psychology to be both an experimental and an historical discipline (Graumann, 1986). He believed that an experimental/natural science of humans was of limited value and needed to be supplemented with a broader understanding of the cultural embeddedness of human activities as exemplified by cultural products such as language, custom and myth. His *Volkerpsychologie* is best translated as cultural psychology or cultural anthropology, although Wundt himself also accepted the translation “social psychology” (Hilgard, 1987). Psychology’s rejection of a Wundtian social psychology, however, meant the socio-cultural topics of the *Volkerpsychologie* were left to the anthropologists and sociologists to explore (e.g., Malinowski’s British social anthropology, G. H. Mead’s social behaviourism, Boas’s cultural anthropology and Durkheim’s sociological work); (Farr, 1996). Consequently, during the first two decades of the 20th century, psychology had yet to stake a disciplinary claim to social inquiry. However, McDougal’s often cited instinctually based “Social Psychology” (published in 1908) was received in America by an as yet undeveloped sub-discipline (Hilgard, 1987). Nonetheless, the rapid changes to the

American social landscape, fostered within psychology an interest in developing a social psychological approach along naturalistic lines. I will briefly discuss G. H. Mead's social psychology to provide the reader with a sense for a Wundtian perspective on the social, before turning to the behaviorist social psychology of F. H. Allport.

My discussion of Mead is based on Farr's (1996) analysis and is only intended to highlight one salient aspect of his work: language. Language was central to Mead's "social behaviourism," and was viewed as an inherently social phenomenon. While behaviourists in social psychology "were treating mind, the self and consciousness as metaphysical concepts," Mead was discussing the, "self-reflexive intelligence in the human species," (Farr, 1996, p. 55). Language was viewed as a form of dialogue necessarily involving taking the role of the other. When one speaks, they also speak to themselves, and all speech and thinking consequently is dialogical in form. Language and self-reflexivity were viewed as basic components distinguishing humans from other species: It was considered essential to the meaningful examination of human social relations. Mead did not publish his social psychology work. "Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist," was not published until 1934, three years after his death. At the time of his death he was teaching social psychology. His class was taken over by Blumer who, lending his own interpretation to the work of Mead, developed the sociological perspective referred to as symbolic interactionism.

F. H. Allport defined social psychology for both psychologists and sociologists with the publication of *Social Psychology* in 1924 (according to, e.g., Farr, 1996; Graumann, 1986; Hilgard, 1987). This textbook was the first to become part of the

standard curriculum of psychology departments in American universities. It was published one year prior to the title of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* being changed to the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (Hilgard, 1987). During this period, Watson had already published, "Psychology as a behaviorist views it" and behaviour - as the proper subject matter of psychology - was beginning to take hold (Farr, 1996). In 1919, F.H. Allport wrote, "true social psychology is a science of the future; its data are at present unrecorded," (p. 297). In analyzing the factors preventing the development of experiment in social psychology, Allport pointed to the "fallacy of the group", arguing that the group is not an elementary fact and "analysis must go beyond it to the behaviour of the individuals of whom it is composed," (p. 297) Further, "true causes must be sought by the scientific method, that is by the scrutiny of individual cases in which direct or indirect social stimulation has produced definite responses" (p. 298). Allport also ruled out the importance of "consciousness of the self", or reflection, arguing that in actual life it is generally "conspicuously absent" and "to determine what causal relation it bears to social behaviour is a problem for mystics. Self consists not in reflection but in adjustment of the organism to the inanimate and social sphere in which it moves," (p. 300).

Subsequent to the publishing of "Social Psychology" Allport (1927) attempted a more elaborate definition of *psychological* social psychology noting, "*social* psychologists seem at present to straddle the line between psychology and the social sciences, having an especially firm foothold in sociology and ethnology," (p. 372). This "disunity" is exacerbated, he holds:

by the fact that psychology and sociology do not belong by common

consent even to the same “family” of sciences; the former being considered a “natural” science, and the latter, through a distinction vital to some writers, designated as a “social” science. This difference leads to basic disagreements as to the nature of the elements or units of social psychology, the methods of measurement, the principles of explanation, and the laws eventually derived. (p. 372)

The “more strictly psychological” approach represented by the behaviouristic perspective of the social field, “regards the study of the individual as the data proper to social psychology” (p. 376). While the importance of social environment is acknowledged (tipping his hat toward the cultural sociologists and anthropologists), socialization and aculturation are reduced to the “universal acquisition of habits, that is, the habits common to the entire race or group” (p. 377).

Apfelbaum’s (1986) analysis of the emergence of social psychology in the 20th century is helpful in elaborating on Allports distinction between sociology and psychology. She claims that one of the major differences between the psychological and sociological perspectives to studying “the social” was “their degree of linkage to the political and scientific spheres,” (p. 3). Sociological inquiry maintained an explicit link between social psychological theories and the broader socio-political context of social problems. This entailed defining its subject matter in connection with actual political and cultural events. Psychology, on the other hand, accepted social psychology into the discipline with ambivalence. Apfelbaum refers to the books by McDougall (published in 1908), Allport (published in 1924) and Murphy and Murphy (published in 1931) as each taking a similar

position: both that, “there is a need for social psychology and that there is no specific object of social psychology,” (p. 8). She claims that there seemed, “to be a consensual *undermining* of the specific and distinct subject matter of social psychology; rather, what appears is a persistent claim that all social analyses and questions can be subsumed under a general psychology,” with the individual as the focal unit of analysis (p. 9). This subordinate status inhibited psychological social psychology from developing its own unique subject matter to the extent that this subject matter would require an extra-individualistic understanding of social relations. This meant that the “activist” aspects of social psychology requiring an analysis in terms of political, economic or historical understandings, were effectively neutralized by a conceptualization of the social consisting of stimulus relations among individuals. Psychology established its own brand of social psychology by providing for a purely individualistic conceptualization of “the social”. The first major move toward an increasingly limited and narrow approach to social relations is made in the 1920s, although it would not reach its zenith until decades later. Nonetheless, F. H. Allport’s experimental position led to social psychology’s unofficial recognition as a field of research in American psychology. As Farr (1996) states, Allport’s text was the most, “formative influence on the development of social psychology as a discipline,” and it helped to, “establish social psychology in America as an experimental and behavioral science” (p. 85).

Pre-Modern Social Psychology

The 1930s in social psychology could be described as a period of relative breadth in terms of the various subject matter characterized as social psychological. While it is

clear that an experimental approach has now come to dominate social psychological thinking, during this period one finds a relative diversity of perspectives and approaches. To place this decade in context, however, it is important to situate the many real world social events that had recently or were currently taking place: for example, the Great Depression, the New Deal, the emergence of dictatorships in Europe, the immigration into America of European scholars and the threat of war in Europe. At a level closer to the concerns of psychologists, was the concrete problem of unemployment due to America's economic collapse. Hilgard (1987) notes how, despite all these events, "it is somewhat surprising how little the social context had entered into social psychology," (p. 587). So within the context of significant social and political upheaval, I will discuss three diverse books claiming social psychology as their subject matter: a) Murphy and Murphy's (1931) *Experimental Social Psychology* (revised by Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, 1937), b) Murchison's (1935) *Handbook of Social Psychology* and c) J. F. Brown's (1936) *Psychology and the Social Order: An Introduction to the Dynamic Study of Social Fields*. I will also briefly discuss Kurt Lewin's action research of the 1930s and 1940s; an experimental alternative to behaviourist social psychology (albeit every bit as ahistorical). Finally, I will discuss the development of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) around 1936. The SPSSI was an organization dedicated to developing a more socially activist brand of psychological inquiry.

Some social psychological perspectives. According to Hilgard (1987), *Experimental Social Psychology* (1931, 1937), is a collection of quantitative studies intended to illustrate how social psychology had matured as an experimental field.

“Experimental” was broadly defined in this textbook and included findings outside of the laboratory by sociologists (see Appendix A for the table of contents of the 1937 edition). Based on the table of contents, it would appear that experimental social psychology at this time consisted largely of the examination of the social behaviour of children. It also included close to 300 pages of research on the measurement of the adult personality and on the measurement of social attitudes.

Murchison’s (1935) *Handbook of Social Psychology* was informed by a combination of comparative and experimental social psychology with four sections devoted to field work, one to correlational work and one to experimental work (see Appendix A for the table of contents of the Handbook). Farr (1996) provides a detailed discussion of this book. I will highlight a few points. Farr views this book as representing the highpoint of Wundt’s influence on social psychology in terms of how it is organized by the principle of comparative research. In the section on “Social Phenomena in Infrahuman Societies,” for example, the writers speak of the high degree of social organization reached by insects, the division of labour within such societies, the long periods (e.g., “65,000,000 years”) that some of these societies have been perfected, how birds do not show the same degree of social evolution as insects etcetera. Regarding the “Historical Sequences of Human Social Phenomena”, Farr states that the authors write as “social, rather than as biological, scientists,” (p. 93). The various authors point out, for example, that “race is a concept rather than an objective fact,” culture is conservative but never static, culture is more salient than biology in America in the 1920s and 1930s, and the “white man” due to recent exploration activity, “has been in recent centuries the greatest

creator of civilization and also the greatest destroyer of both human and natural resources,” (p. 94). Finally there is a section that examines correlative data including G.W. Allport’s work on attitudes as well as a section on “Experimental Constructions of Social Phenomena,” including the same research by Murphy and Murphy cited above in addition to research concerning, “Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Individual Human Adults” (p. 98). My main purpose for highlighting this Handbook is: (a) it was the first such Handbook of Social Psychology and (b) its very existence during the 30s suggests the experimental and behavioural social psychology of F. H. Allport had yet to dominate and exclude alternative approaches for examining “the social”.⁸

Brown’s, *Psychology and the Social Order: An Introduction to the Dynamic Study of Social Fields*, provides another contrasting approach to the study of social phenomenon (see Appendix A for the table of contents). My inclusion of this book is based on the fact that it was consistently praised by a number of notable social psychologists of the time when it first appeared (e.g., D. Katz, K. Lewin, and R. L. Schanck); (Minton, 1984). In addition, the book was widely used in social psychology during the years following its publication. I will quote Katz’ assessment of the text (in Minton, 1984):

Brown’s courageous book is the first American psychology to treat systematically the complexities of collective behavior. No other social psychologist has written as adequately about the state, the church, social classes, the family, and social theory. Nor has any writer of psychological

viewpoint kept his eye as steadily upon the multiplicity of relationships which affect social behavior. We deal in this book not with a laboratory fragment of man (sic) reacting to isolated stimuli, but with real men behaving in a social world. (p. 34)

Of course Brown, as progressive as he was, appears to have overlooked “real women” behaving in the social world. The point I want to make here is that during the 1930s, J. F. Brown attempted to develop a systematic model of social psychology framed within a socio-historical context. In terms of theoretical orientation, it involved a combination of Lewin’s field theory and Marxian theory, incorporating a concern for sociological, political and economic aspects as they related to social behaviour. In this work, he was critical of two trends he held to have shaped social psychology up to that point: a) the broad theoretical principles of 19th and early 20th century writers based on such “pseudoexplanatory concepts such as instinct, sympathy, imitation, and habit” and b) the behaviourist turn resulting in an, “atheoretical, atomistic, and mechanistic social psychology” (Minton, p.35). Finally, his work was concerned with the applicability of social psychology and he viewed academic social psychology as irresponsible for failing to address social issues and the implications social issues held for understanding humans in society.

Kurt Lewin was another prominent experimental social psychologist during this period. Lewin used the notion of a social field or “life space” to conceptualize the motivated actions of a person within a particular social context, including both the objective features of the environment and the actions of other people. Central to Lewin’s

methodological approach was the participation of the “subject”. In Lewin’s research, it was important to attend to the meaning that the situation had for the individual who was the focal point of the research (Patnoe, 1988). This entailed the participation of research “subjects” in discussions about the research with the aim of making a contribution to how the research team came to understand the social dynamics of the situation studied. Lewin viewed theory and practice as interdependent. As a consequence, research was necessarily tied to social action. The particular style of research he developed during the late 30s and used into the early 40s was called “action research.” Because the research was explicitly tied to a concrete “life space” - with the experiment being an attempt to recreate the essential dynamics of that “life space” - it was important that the researcher be deeply involved with those participating in the research. As a consequence of the various necessary requirements for successfully conducting such research, there was an “emphasis on field experiments, in actual settings rather than in a laboratory” (Hilgard, 1987, p. 587). The social action research approach of Kurt Lewin, however, was unable to survive for long after his death in 1947.

It appears that the 1930s were a period of growth as well as a period of methodological and theoretical diversity. During this period, the sub-discipline witnessed a wide “range and variety of points of view” about representative problems and there appeared to be considerable “differences of opinion as to the subject matter and the methodology of scientific social psychology,” (Smoke, 1935, p. 539). Social psychology was still a collection of diverse schools, although Smoke (1935) was optimistic that it was on the “eve of a period of specialized research and investigation,” (p. 540). In response to

various criticisms of social psychology as an “amorphous mass” or too vague and wordy, Smoke responds, “the fact remains however, that although social psychology may not be entirely clear as to where is it going, it is on its way and this is not so hopeless a situation as may appear to be the case at first sight,” (p. 541).

At this point I will briefly add that two years prior to this optimistic outlook on social psychology’s status and barely following in the footsteps of a “truly” experimental social psychology, a largely unreceived article by Rosenzweig (1933) argued, “analysis discloses that the experimental situation in psychology is itself a psychological problem. Because one is obliged to study psychological phenomena in an intact conscious organism that is part and parcel of a social environment, the isolation of factors is difficult from the standpoint of experimental procedure just as it is dangerous from the theoretical standpoint” (p. 337).

To conclude the above overview of some of the diverse conceptual strands constituting social psychological practice during the socially and politically turbulent years of the 1930s, I will turn to the founding of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). The SPSSI was formed in 1936 and was later affiliated with the American Psychological Association (APA). Its creation came out of the concrete realities and political problems that were associated with the Depression: most notably the problem of unemployed psychologists. From the viewpoint of social psychology, the formation of this organization provided social psychologists with their first grouping and it served to provide them with a sense of coherence up to then lacking (Apfelbaum, 1986). The SPSSI was attractive to many psychologists at the time, and within the first year of its formation,

one-sixth of the members of the APA were also members of the SPSSI (Finison, 1979). Finison (1976) claims that by 1937, important political changes had occurred in American psychology with two independent organizations, the Psychologists League and the SPSSI, having been “set up by socialist insurgents” (p. 753). As Finison states, “both organizations had their roots in the employment and unemployment problems of psychologists themselves and in support of the idea psychology and psychological research could be used to solve social problems,” (p. 753). Thus, for example, the first planned yearbook was entitled “Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation,” and was sympathetic to organized labor and consistent with the changes brought about by the New Deal (Hilgard, 1987). Another example of the kinds of topics of interest to the SPSSI and pertinent to this thesis, focused on the problem of power. Unger (1986) states that, Dorwin Cartwright as president of the SPSSI in 1953 expressed the opinion, “none of the major phenomena of social psychology could be analyzed without taking into account the concept of power” (p. 217). He felt that social psychologists had been “soft” on power and had evaded direct investigations of power by focusing on “safe” research objects like animals or by converting any problems of power into questions about attitudes, expectations, and perceptions. The SPSSI, however, was an organization constituted from the start by members with divergent opinions as to its dual role as political activist organization and research supporting organization, a tension always present within the organization.

American Social Psychology as a Consequence of World War II

Moving into the 1940s, Cartwright (1979) argued, “the most important single

influence on the development of social psychology" was World War II and the political upheaval in Europe that preceded it (p.84). Cartwright offers four reasons why these events were so important to social psychology's development: (a) they occurred at a critical stage in its development, (b) they were responsible for the spectacular increase in its rate of growth, (c) they influenced the demographics of the field and (d) they exerted a fundamental influence on the intellectual complexion of the field. I will expand briefly on some of these reasons. It was a critical stage because by the end of the 1930s, the sub-discipline was still "up for grabs" in terms of methodological commitments. There were diverse perspectives falling under the label "social psychology", despite the growing institutionalization of a behavioural experimental approach. There was disagreement about how to "do" social psychology (not to mention formal disciplinary boundaries each housing relatively distinct but still at this time overlapping social psychological perspectives) and as we noted above, no single methodological approach had yet stamped its imprint on the bulk of research practice. If we look at the changes in the intellectual complexion of the field, it would appear on the surface that American social psychology was ignited by social scientists from Germany, such as Lewin, Koffka, and Heider. The increase in its rate of growth was due to a combination of employing the formerly unemployed, as well as the increasing demand for social psychologists mostly in the service of providing technical expertise and know how to the American government and its war related research interests. Another aspect of this growth and influence took the form of the construction of major centres for graduate training in social psychology (Elms, 1975; House, 1977). During the war, social research was generally conducted in an

interdisciplinary manner and these new major centres reflected a desire to maintain an interdisciplinary approach. Two examples of this interdisciplinary thrust were the doctoral program in social psychology created at the University of Michigan in 1946 and the creation of the Department of Social Relations at Harvard also in 1946 (Hilgard, 1987). As House (1977) states, “World War II produced a coalescence and acceleration of certain trends in social psychology by involving a large number of social psychologists in truly interdisciplinary programs of research on military and civilian behaviour and morale utilizing a wide range of methods,” (p. 162-163)

In 1948, Cartwright published a paper focussing specifically on social psychology in America during World War II. This article highlights the research topics focused on, the methodological techniques employed as well as the significance of the changes to social psychology. The central change in emphasis from the pre-war period (1939) to the period during and immediately after the war, was a focus on concrete social and economic problems. Cartwright notes how the pre-1939 research, “appeared to have little immediate applicability to the solution of social problems,” (p. 333). He refers to Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb’s *Experimental Social Psychology* as an example of a book that provides an “excellent treatment of the field as it existed in 1939,” including a considerable interest in social problems, (p. 333). Such research, however, tended to focus on populations or groups from the university campus or from within public schools. In addition, “the relation of an investigation to large social problems lay simply in the fact that *attitudes toward* these problems were being studied,” (p. 334). In contrast, he notes, during the war, psychologists were engaged in practical problems of social technology with little time for

“pure” research and people were more interested in the practical implications of research (p. 334).

For Cartwright, the developments during the war were positive, not only because social psychological work was focusing on actual social problems but also because a series of new and improved research techniques were being developed for conducting more elaborate and objective research than in the past. Among the research topics explored during the war were: (a) building civilian morale, (b) combatting demoralization, (c) enemy morale and psychological warfare, (d) military administration, (e) international relations, (f) domestic attitudes, needs and information and (g) psychological problems of a wartime economy. Among the research methods and objects of research were: (a) intensive interviews with representative samples of workers, (b) case studies of individual industrial plants, (c) evaluation of “morale-building” devices like awards, movies, music, (d) action research, (e) the analysis of enemy letters and diaries, (f) the systematic study of enemy newspapers and of radio broadcasts to ascertain significant changes in patterning and emphasis in such material, (g) research on cultural differences, (h) new techniques for scaling attitudes, (i) use of testing instruments for determining potential leaders and for detecting army criminals, and (j) use of market research, opinion and attitude studies. In addition, Cartwright noted how the research conducted on behalf of the American government was interdisciplinary, and social psychologists were often working along side anthropologists, sociologists and economists. It appears that the event most social psychologists acknowledge ignited the field as a viable and well funded research enterprise, involved social psychologists engaging in the solution to the practical social

problems of managing a nation engaged in war.

Cartwright ends the paper with a few observations regarding developments as a consequence of the war. He noted: (a) a tendency for traditional boundaries to be broken and the development of interdisciplinary departments to house sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists, (b) increased work on the concrete problems of communities (in addition to traditional academic work) and (c) the increasing centrality of the SPSSI to the professional and organizational activities of social psychologists with its emphasis on the solution to actual social problems.

The Crisis of Confidence

The Institutionalization of Psychological Research Practices and the Ensuing Crisis

The aim of this chapter is to contextualize the period of the “crisis” in social psychology by detailing the debate around the value of an experimental approach to the study of social behaviour. Before focusing on the crisis period, however, I will provide an overview of some of the antecedent conditions leading to its development.

The necessity of employing research techniques with “cash value,” led to a gradual shift in research practices as reflected in the published literature of major psychology journals of the period. Wundt’s experimentalism was of limited value in this respect and its use gradually decreased while Galtonian psychometrics proved to be immensely useful for categorizing individuals and describing the characteristics of populations. The educationalists adopted the latter technique but also developed an experimental program based on comparisons between groups. Psychology’s successes with applied educational research led to the growth of experimental research on aggregates in “basic” experimental psychology as well. A new object of psychological inquiry was developing: the behaviour of the aggregate. Each change in the assumed object of psychology (i.e., from mind to individual behaviour to aggregate behaviour) entailed changes in research practices and techniques of interpretation. In “aggregate” psychology, the change entailed short term experimental work with clearly defined “experimenter” and “subject” roles in a laboratory context. Aggregate research was facilitated by ANOVA. Soon inferential statistics came to be interpreted and used as a mechanical technique for making inferences from hypotheses to data.

Prior to ANOVA’s use in psychological research and around the same time that

psychological social psychology was defining itself as an experimental science, aggregate psychology (with the use of a “critical ratio” technique to determine “significance”) was being used extensively. By the 1930s experimental research using group data had grown to about 55%, based on the analysis of select journals (Danziger, 1990). In the mid-thirties, ANOVA and t-tests were introduced to psychologists and used in less than 1% of research (Rucci & Tweney, 1980). Assuming Floyd Allport’s *Social Psychology* represents the first *psychological* social psychology, the sub-discipline is about 10 years old. Within the sub-discipline, one witnesses a relative diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches, although the approaches dominant in academia are experimental and adhere to an instrumental (i.e., empirical-analytic knowledge-interest) conception of knowledge. Also during this period, the activist SPSSI began to organize and focus its research activities on actual social problems and conditions.

During the war years, social psychologists participated in research utilizing a diversity of quantitative and qualitative methods. Their research focused on actual populations and actual social problems as defined from the perspective of administrative bodies. Apfelbaum (1992) states that World War II led to the establishment of social psychology’s scientific credentials and institutional legitimacy including, substantial military and civilian funding as well as disciplinary autonomy. In 1944 the *Psychological Bulletin* published a second stylesheet entitled, “The Preparation of Articles for Publication in the Journal of the American Psychological Association” (Bazerman, 1987). It had grown from 6 to 32 pages and included guidelines for references, tables, graphs and an explanation of editorial policies. As the 1940s came to a close, “basic” experimental

research on aggregates constituted about 80% of all such articles in the major journals examined (Table 1 above) and ANOVA and the t-tests were being reported in about 50% of research articles, with correlational work remaining steady throughout this period averaging about 25% (Figure 1 above). In social psychology, however, at the end of the 1940s based on an analysis of the *Journal of abnormal and social psychology*, only 30% of research involved an experimental intervention and F-tests or t-tests were used in only 30% of research articles (as cited in Higbee & Wells, 1972), (see Table 3 and Table 4 below).

Post-World War II

The two decades subsequent to World War II were a period of relative optimism within academia. Universities were expanding and American federal policy was based on the assumption that “hard” social scientific research was necessary for better understanding social problems (Sarason, 1981). Substantial government funding to the social sciences led to an increase in prestige among social scientists who now found their research activities valued by society. Sarason explains this academic optimism - during a period when there were many social problems such as racial conflicts and riots, an emerging civil rights movement, McCarthyism, a Korean War, urban decay and labour-management struggles - as stemming out of psychology’s hard science (i.e., asocial, apolitical, ahistorical) aspirations and its dependency on government funding for its research. The specific social conditions of psychology’s new found value and prosperity, “short-circuited any tendency to focus on the underlying, usually un verbalized, unreflectively assimilated assumptions, axioms and values of the social order,” (p. 4). The

optimism of psychologists apparently stemmed more from their everyday reality of being valued and funded than from the success of their programs of research in actually solving social problems.

Leahey (1991) claims by the 1950s, psychology had developed into an American science with bright prospects and a professional future. The aim of professionalizing psychology to achieve public respect, led to psychologists setting, “their own house in order, tighten[ing] requirements for training in psychology, persecut[ing] pseudo-psychologists, and establish[ing] certification and state licensing standards for professional psychologists” (p. 259). It was the age of the psychological person. Fillmore Sanford, the APA secretary of 1951, claimed, “. . . our society is tending more and more to think in terms of the concepts and methods spawned and nurtured by psychologists” (as cited in Leahey, p. 301). This period witnessed considerable growth in psychology, most notably within the applied divisions and within clinical psychology. Boards and committees were established within the APA focusing specifically on designing the psychological profession. Psychologists became “legit” with certification and licensing laws being passed for clinical and counselling psychologists defining them as legal and legitimate professionals. Also, World War II led to the establishment of a general headquarters for psychology in Washington - the Office of Psychological Personnel - a major event in the history of institutional psychology in America that has been the, “fount of funding and locus of lobbying” ever since (Leahey, 1991, p. 253). According to Apfelbaum (1992), massive government financial support played a determining role in the structure and orientation of psychology, “both as a content area and as a community of interacting

Table 3

Percentages of Studies Using Various Research Designs in Social
Psychological Research*

Design	1949	1959	1969
1. Classic experimental control	0	4	3
2. Single group-experimental intervention without a control group	10	3	3
3. Two or more experimental groups with a control group (one-way design)	3	5	9
4. Multiple experimental groups (factorial design)	17	71	72
5. Report on a single sample without experimental observation	33	2	5
6. Sample followed over time without experimental observation	10	5	0
7. Within-sample comparisons (survey-type research)	7	0	a
8. Comparisons of multiple samples	13	9	3
9. None (theoretical articles)	7	1	5
Total	100	100	100

a Category 7 was combined with Category 5 for the 1969 analysis

*Reproduced from Higbee & Wells, 1972

Table 4

Percentages of Studies Using Various StatisticalTechniques in Social Psychological Research(Reproduced from Higbee & Wells, 1972)

Technique	1949	1959	1969
Descriptive only	10	0	1
Parametric direction tests			
t test	27	52	40
F test	3	35	79
Subtotal	30	87	119
Nonparametric tests			
Chi-square	20	28	20
All others	0	28	24
Subtotal	20	56	44
Correlational (all types)	43	41	37
Post hoc comparisons	--	--	26
Total	93	184	226

*Reproduced from Higbee & Wells, 1972

individuals” (p. 532).

Ironically, this period also witnessed the first seeds of disquiet. During the 1950s, psychological inquiry was firmly embedded within the dominant American ideology of liberalism and its shared belief that science and social progress work hand in hand (Apfelbaum, 1992). The value of value-free science guided psychologists in their research, including the claim to be neutral with respect to the goals and interests of society, merely offering it tools for achieving its ends. Apfelbaum accounts for this research stance by suggesting that, as social psychology was gaining institutional legitimacy and receiving substantial research funding, “the threat of McCarthyism resolutely pushed social psychology towards a scientifically more neutral, behaviourist language and directed it away from any sort of potential for a progressive political commitment to an engaged social practice” (p. 531). One consequence of this political environment was that attempts to balance theory and practice, research and action (such as Kurt Lewin’s work), declined and soon disappeared from the social psychological literature, “when the increasingly scientific laboratory trend took precedence in the 1950s” (Apfelbaum, 1986, p. 11). Instead, the positivist perspective dominated and the “hard science” aspirations of exploring universal laws of social relations were viewed as liberating “social psychology from studying ‘local’, ‘problem-centred’ nationally or culturally bound questions, and elevat(ing) its research and theorizing to the higher plane of universal science” (Apfelbaum, 1992, p. 532).

By the late 1950s and culminating in the 1960s, social psychology began to lose the sense of coherency and purpose it held during and immediately after World War II

(Elms, 1975). It found itself drifting away from conducting research involving ‘real-life’ settings and problems and moving ever closer to ‘basic’ laboratory research generally involving university and college students (House, 1977). Higbee & Wells (1972) followed up Christie’s (1961) analysis of research designs and statistical techniques used in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* and found that 71% used multiple groups experimental designs in 1959 (as opposed to 17% in 1949) and 87% of all research studies use either the F-test or the t-test in 1959 (as opposed to 30% in 1949); (see Table 3 above). Hilgard (1987) noted that the content of a series of books of social psychological readings (years, 1952, 1958, and two from 1965) indicated the sub-discipline’s increasing laboratory based research. Hilgard (1987) also makes an observation about the consequences of this near exclusive laboratory approach.

As social psychology became increasingly devoted to laboratory studies, a peculiarity developed that is not unknown in other fields of investigation. A discovery is made, a method is found, a theory is proposed which together open up a promising field. The direction is pushed hard for a time, the theory does not turn out to be generalizable, or the results do not generate enough new ideas to keep the area interesting, so that the theory and the topic may no longer be inviting, and investigators turn to other fields. (p. 606)⁹

In 1961, Cartwright noted that the excitement in social psychology had died down. By the mid-sixties there was a general malaise developing in social psychology which was soon to be labelled a ‘crisis’ (in Hilgard, 1987).

The “Crisis” in Social Psychology

Many of the questions arose because of the drift toward an aping of general psychology as reflected by the choice of limited laboratory methods of investigation and the use of refined statistical models, such as analysis of variance, almost for their own sake. This attempt to parallel experimental psychology was shown in the title of the new journal, the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, which began publication in 1965. The opposed demand for relevance appeared to be called for by the *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, started in 1971. The very aspects that had caused problems for general psychology were compounded when the emphasis on laboratory studies led again to the social psychologists' taking college students as representative of all human beings -- something for which experimental psychology had long been criticized. A review of the primary journals of social psychology, the two just mentioned, and also the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* showed that for the year 1974, when criticisms were nearing their crest, college students were the typical students in the articles of the three mentioned journals: 87% and 74% of the papers in the two more general journals and 62% of those in the applied journal. (Hilgard, 1987, p. 609-610)

I will touch on the socio-political events of this decade as they have filtered into my mind in one way or another. This was obviously an important decade socially, politically, and economically. The events of this decade help to provide a meaningful

backdrop within which we find psychology and social psychology “turning around” to critically reflect on the discipline, its methods, its assumptions and its ethics. This was the decade of the Women’s Liberation Movement, of the Gay Rights Movement, of the Black Panthers and of student protests on the campuses of America, involving challenges to the authority of the state and concerning issues of human rights. This was the decade of Vietnam (with Kent State just around the corner). This was also the decade where the multiple groups laboratory experiment using introductory psychology students had become the mainstay for the production of social psychological knowledge. By 1969, 79% of studies in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* involved an experimental research design and 119% (accounting for multiple samples per article) used F-tests (79%) and/or t-tests (40%). In addition the increase in the use of “college students” as measured at 1949, 1959 (both based on the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*) and 1969 (based on the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*) were 20%, 40% and 76% respectively (see Table 5 below).

My examination of the “crisis” period will consist of discussing the following: (a) the various criticisms and reflections that psychologists and social psychologists were making about the institutional practices of academic psychology, (b) the “crisis” itself, focussing on methodological and theoretical issues including the various methodological alternatives suggested, (c) some of the “post-crisis” reflections on the meaning of the crisis, and (d) a brief discussion of social psychology’s substantive and methodological narrowing in terms of a shift in emphasis towards cognitive social psychology. I examine the critical literature of this period from the perspective that the crisis period, formally

speaking, was from 1967 to 1979. Consequently, it is subsequent to this period that any potential influence on educational practices regarding research may have occurred. I will use Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1980) definition of "crisis" to clarify how I am treating this period in the history of social psychological practice:

1a: the turning point for better or worse in an acute disease or fever b: a paroxysmal attack of pain, distress, or disordered function c: an emotionally significant event or radical change of status in a person's life 2: the decisive moment (as in a literary plot) 3a: an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs whose outcome will make a decisive difference for better or worse b: the period of strain following the culmination of a period of business prosperity when liquidation occurs.

My focus is on 2 and 3a from the perspective that this period was critical because it represented an opportunity to radically alter how social psychologists conceptualized and approached their subject matter along the lines of a *social* science as opposed to a *natural* science. After examining the crisis period, I will elaborate on the perspective I am taking with respect to educational practices. Finally, I will bring that perspective to bear on an interpretive analysis of aspects of the educational practices of the Department of Psychology at the University of Manitoba.

The Crisis

To organize in the readers mind the various problems that came under the heading "crisis," I will provide one retrospective account before discussing the crisis literature itself and the substantive and methodological issues being raised within psychology in

general. The crisis has been organized into three interrelated domains: (a) an artifact crisis, (b) an ethical crisis and (c) a relevance crisis (Rosnow, 1981). Each domain of criticism challenged the utility, validity and general value of examining social relations experimentally. Experimentalists initiated the “artifact crisis” claiming the traditional experimental context was too simplistic and did not control for various extraneous variables that challenged the validity of experimental results. Rosenthal (1967), for example, demonstrated how the personal expectations of the experimenter can influence results while Orne (1962) demonstrated how a research subject’s interpretation of the research context can influence behaviour in unpredictable ways. The artifact research made clear, through experimental means, that even in the socially impoverished and relatively acontextual environment of the laboratory, there was still considerable complexity to the social context of the psychology experiment. Rosnow (1981) claims the “ethical crisis” developed out of particular social events during the late 1960s and early 1970s that “intensified as a result of revelations about the hazards of biomedical research,” (p. 10). In addition, American psychologists became sensitized to invasion of privacy issues due to “stories of domestic wiretapping by the C.I.A. and F.B.I. and rumours of similar clandestine activities by other agencies” (Rosnow, 1981, p. 10). Soon ethical concerns in research on humans developed into a public issue both within and outside of psychology leading to severe criticisms of much social psychological research in particular and all research practices with humans in general. This led to the development of federal rules and regulations as well as APA ethical guidelines for the conduct and treatment of research subjects. During this period, deception research was prevalent and the new

regulations curtailed the kinds of experimental research social psychologists could conduct. The “relevance crisis” in social psychology also focused on experimental research. The criticisms in this case, however, implied the need for radical changes to social psychological research practices. Even if it was possible to control for all artifactual conditions, the experimental approach was of limited value because it could never adequately handle or represent the subject matter at hand. From the point-of-view of relevance, experimentation was, “oblivious of how social phenomena were conditioned by developmental, teleological, or historical circumstances” (Rosnow, 1981, p. 73).

I will elaborate on some of the issues being discussed during this period with particular reference to the question of relevance. My focus is on relevance for two reasons: First, the artifact evidence is important from the perspective of an empirical-analytic epistemology where scientific research practice entails the manipulation and measurement of operationally defined variables. From this perspective, an experimenter’s expectations during a study and a subject’s interpretation of the experimental situation are undesired extraneous variables that contaminate the results. The importance of the artifact research, however, can also be viewed to lie in how it demonstrates the social nature of a laboratory experiment, one that necessarily includes the thoughts, feelings and interpretations of both experimenter and subject. The artifact research, consequently, demonstrates the importance of subjectivity when examining social relations, implying the need for non-experimental methods of inquiry. Second, ethical concerns demonstrated how societal values can influence the form and content of research practices, thereby illustrating how social research practices and their interpretation are historically

embedded. In addition, the ethical crisis increased the public's awareness about questions of power in psychological research. In short, the ethical crisis revealed the normative basis of research on humans, suggesting the need to address the question of social behaviour beyond the confines of an objectivist epistemology.

Below, I attempt to treat the documents of the crisis period historically by portraying the viewpoints in social context. My aim is to help the reader to construct an understanding of the form and content of the criticisms directed at psychological methods of inquiry.

The crisis in social psychology received one of its first published expressions in 1967. Ring (1967) discussed three conceptions governing social psychology at the time: a) humanist, action oriented, b) experimental-scientifically oriented and c) a 'fun and games' orientation. The humanistic, action-oriented conception was viewed as Kurt Lewin's legacy. Its proponents, Ring claimed, no longer engaged in such research but were nonetheless proud of the tradition in a kind of "nostalgic" way (1967, p. 113). Its concern for domestic unrest and social issues, however, were no longer the "dominant brand of contemporary social psychology," and the values constituting the tradition no longer influenced professional activity (1967, p. 114). The scientifically-oriented conception was held to appeal to "tough minded investigators who, while not necessarily denying an interest in problems of human welfare," felt there is, "no reason why such problems must be an essential part of social psychology" (Ring, 1967, p.116). Ring argued, neither of the two above factions represented the dominant values of social psychology. What governed,

rather, was a lot of fun and games aimed more at thinking up clever experiments and zany manipulations than at producing meaningful empirical facts. His concern was that ‘fun and games’ research would undermine the development of the field into a rigorous and respectable scientific discipline. My interest in the article, however, centers on Ring’s concern for three areas of social psychology as a consequence of its research practices: a) the teaching of social psychology to undergraduates, b) graduate training in social psychology, and c) the development of the field. First I will discuss, MacLeod’s (1965) concerns about training in psychology.

MacLeod (1965) focused on undergraduate teaching in psychology from a liberal arts perspective. If psychology is part of a liberal arts education, shouldn’t it justify itself on that basis? “The question I am asking is in the last analysis an ethical question. Have we the moral right to ask our students to spend their time learning the stuff we teach as psychology” (p.345). Given the ubiquitous null hypothesis approach to human psychology, he pondered, wouldn’t students be better off devoting their time to other more relevant subjects? MacLeod characterized the curriculum of psychology as, “as culture-bound as any curriculum could be” (p. 346). He stated that psychology students accepted uncritically what they were taught “as though it had been handed down on a tablet from Mount Sinai” and that they had learned to be critical only in the sense that they were, “uncomfortable about a statement which lack[ed] a confidence level or an observation reported without a control group” (p. 346). The student of psychology, MacLeod argued, is lacking, “the critical spirit which leads back to the challenging of implicit assumptions” (p. 346). He found encouraging signs in the World War II effort, however, and noted the

beginnings of cross-cultural research and an increasing interest in understanding other peoples through an analysis of their “language, beliefs, artistic products, and social patterns” (p. 346).

MacLeod observed that - in the context of increasing concerns for human rights, poverty and delinquency - psychologists were finding their subject “embarrassingly irrelevant - embarrassing because so much of what we have been teaching in the past now seems so trivial” (p. 347). He lamented how it seemed to take a “major crisis to awaken the psychologist to the social relevance of his (sic) subject” (p. 347). Finally, he criticized psychology for the narrowness of its approach and its emphasis on producing professionals instead of providing students with the critical tools for examining and solving human problems. Teaching psychology should not be narrowly specialized:

a discipline which attempts to understand what is distinctively human about man (sic) must draw its insights not merely from the microscopic analysis of bits and pieces of human behaviour but from a knowledge of the physical, biological, and social world in which man is living and behaving and of the culture which man down through the centuries has created. (p. 348)

MacLeod, of course, has apparently forgot to critically examine *his* gendered language. Ring (1967), focussing on graduate training, however, viewed the principle dangers to the development of the discipline to be disenchantment and corruption. Disenchantment results as students realize that the sub-discipline is, “less relevant to his interests than ... originally thought,” or is too “trivial” or “too experimental” (p. 119).

Ring's main concern, however, was for students who did not abandon the field and became corrupted by 'fun and games' values. If the students':

Doubts concerning the value of what they are learning can be assuaged until a certain feeling of commitment to the field has been established, one would surely anticipate that they would come to share, rather than protest against, the values of their mentors. As graduate students in social psychology, they learn that rewards usually come to those who uphold the values of the group; and as the rewards increase in incidence and magnitude, it becomes more difficult to disavow those values, particularly when adherence to them is a prerequisite for continued success. (p.119)

Ring's comments, while directed at concern for the reproduction of a 'fun and games' approach to social inquiry, nonetheless allude to how power relations function to structure knowledge products. The values of the discipline are reflected in the kind of research activities disseminated educationally and rewarded financially. A student's commitment to a field is unlikely to take the form of challenging its research values. More likely, the values and attendant rewards will be embraced. Ring's comments also allude to the training conditions of graduate students who are always producing works under the supervision and guidance of academics. Academics, as one might expect, provide supervisory expertise in terms of the dominant values of the discipline. This underscores the position I am developing that the form and substance of graduate students' knowledge products are regulated by the epistemological values and reward structure of the discipline.

McGuire (1967) responded to Ring's article by agreeing that social inquiry may have shifted too far in the direction of "basic" research. Nonetheless, he anticipated, "a remelding of basic and applied research with increasing attention to the latter," including "theory-oriented research in natural settings" (p. 125). He spoke optimistically of methodological innovations: manipulative experiments in natural settings (but still using ANOVA), observational work in natural settings (via quasi experimental designs that allow measures of covariance), and the use of archival data. In addition, he suggested that natural environment research can be facilitated by advances in mathematical modeling and computer simulation. McGuire also discussed, however, opening up PhD *training programs* to alternative methodologies. He thought doctoral programs should prepare students for future advances in research. He believed that, unfortunately, psychology is backward looking and "current doctoral programs are training students for the most part exclusively to do manipulatory laboratory experimentation" (p. 133). Other methods are taught, "as a secondary approach for second-class citizens when the royal road to manipulatory laboratory experimentation is somehow blocked" (p. 133). Graduate programs, he claimed, should be augmented by including hypothesis testing in natural settings and by increasing the use of archival materials and new techniques "over and above" those used in laboratory experimentation. Regarding techniques "for testing hypotheses in natural settings," McGuire suggested the following: participant observation, the use of unobtrusive measures, augmenting experimental design and statistics by attention to techniques for teasing out causal directions among co-variants ("cross-leg panel analyses, quasi-experimental designs"), plus increased use of computer programs for

statistical analysis and computer simulation. Finally, McGuire pointed out that his suggestions for strengthening the sub-discipline required, “the reduction of currently existing walls between conventional departments, including psychology on the one hand and sociology, economics, and even anthropology on the other. I do not apologize for or hide the fact that I am suggesting lowering the conventional barriers which now provide familiar and reassuring guidelines as to what we or our students are expected to know” (p. 136).

Rosnow (1981), claimed that this debate impacted on social psychologists, leading to an increase in natural environment field studies and toward the Lewinian ideal of focusing on problems of human significance. Soon social psychologists were speaking of the “age of relevance in social psychology,” (p. 78). Entering the 1970s, however, Silverman (1971) criticized the notion of relevant social psychology because “relevant” was being determined externally by “granting agencies who have one after another given the message that proposals related directly to current social problems have the inside track” (p. 583). Silverman’s critique focused on methods. Social psychologists have not been able to provide data relevant to social ills not because they focus on the wrong topics [e.g., “aggression, attitudes and attitude changes, communication, competition, conformity, decision making, group dynamics, impression formation, intergroup relations, leadership, negotiation, persuasion, prejudice, social power, socialization” (p. 583)] but rather due to an, “inadequacy of methodology rather than direction,” (p. 583). The problem lay with the unquestioned acceptance that methods appropriate to the natural sciences were also appropriate to a human science. The result, he claimed, was a “slavish

obsession to fit the study of behaviour into existent models of other experimental sciences,” instead of focussing on the generalizability of such work (p. 583). He concluded with a positive note concerning the movement within social psychology (as opposed to that without in the form of the knowledge-interests of granting agencies):

The core concept of the movement is that the model of psychological subject as object that has pervaded our research since postintrospectionist times is painfully flawed, and the data we acquire may relate very much to the motives and feelings and thoughts of subjects about their role in the experiment and very little to their lives outside of it. This movement deals also with the issue of “relevance,” but in the broader, scientifically credible sense of the *relevance of data to the construct to which they pertain*. (p. 584)

The “crisis” finds its earliest published expressions largely in terms of the value and relevance of experimental research practices for the meaningful examination of human social relations. Before providing a summary review of the issues being raised during this period, I will discuss Proshansky’s (1972) article, “For what are we training our graduate students?”. In it he raises the basic questions and sets the critical tone for an examination of university educational practices. His main focus is on graduate training and he claims these issues were no less true in 1947 than in 1972. The difference is that back in 1947, such concerns were buried deep, “in the excitement and optimism of psychology as an expanding field of inquiry” (p.206). Are the issues still true today? The basic problem he sees is this:

Over a 20-25 year period, there has been little if any basic change in the *underlying assumptions* of these programs in terms of how and, perhaps more importantly, for what purposes we train future PhDs in the field.

Notwithstanding the growth of new courses, more sophisticated research techniques and methodologies, new areas of specialization, and our credence as a scientific field of inquiry, the academic model for training PhD students in psychology has remained pretty much the same. (p. 206, italics added)

Proshansky's view that PhD programs in psychology were inadequate, arose due to changes in his everyday work practices. Over the years, he shifted from teacher/researcher, to administrator of a PhD program in psychology with 10 specializations, to administrator of 26 doctoral programs: "For the first time ... I was on the 'outside' looking 'in.' I was truly able to stand back and take a far more sustained and objective look at doctoral training in psychology and not just at my own university but at many others" (p. 207). A basic problem in psychology, he held, was the notion of a root model or a core regarded as, "fundamental to the training of all psychologists, regardless of the student's area of interest, and most importantly, regardless of his (sic) particular talents or proclivities. The model is simple enough to identify: the *experimental research-scientist*. It is this model that determines curriculum, establishes the relative importance of various degree requirements, is used as a basis for evaluation and reward, and so on" (p. 207).

Further:

It is very easy to demonstrate this fact for every area of specialization in psychology. The clinician, the industrial psychologist, as well as the cognitive specialist, social psychologist, and educational psychologist must be trained in the role of experimental research-scientist, not just during his (sic) first year but at many points in the course of his training. It is reflected in the “required courses” of his curriculum, the relative weight given to certain questions or parts in his preliminary and comprehensive examinations, and, of course, in the *sine qua non* of the student’s experimental research-scientist role, namely, the ‘almighty research dissertation.’ He must not only do a research dissertation; but it must be an empirical research dissertation that in one form or another must involve the experimental paradigm as the basis for data collection. (p. 207)

Proshansky, in 1972, however, had not yet seen the light with respect to his gendered pronouns.

He is puzzled why a dissertation must be empirical and based on the experimental paradigm, and why it must be this way in all areas of specialization. He is not arguing, however, against training and experience in the experimental research paradigm, just in its being a “core” that culminates, “in the almost ‘self-righteous’ requirements for what makes an acceptable thesis investigation” (p. 208). With respect to this regulation of the research products of graduate students he states that the real tragedy:

lies in my conviction that students come into psychology with a variety of

interests, abilities, and talents, and what we do is to impose on them a ready-made professional self-identity. We rule out in effect what for many of them undoubtedly represents basic interests and critical talents.

Ostensibly, the concept of individual differences, which psychologists probably know most about, is relevant to any number of other problems, but not to how we train our doctoral students. (p. 208)

He makes it clear he is not against training highly skilled researchers. Rather he is opposed to a “*single*-model view of the psychologist as the experimental research-scientist. The PhD degree should be given for scholarly achievement, and for me scholarship means research defined in very broad rather than very narrow terms” (p. 208). From this viewpoint, a thesis may involve, “*research* which can take one of many forms, for example, critique of existing literature; development of a conceptual scheme; an administrative and substantive program for a large-scale research project; an analysis of a major social problem in the community; and so on” (p. 208).

Proshansky also discusses how the experimental research-scientist model starts at the undergraduate level:

It can be said unequivocally that the experimental research-scientist model does not begin in graduate school; it ends there. Our graduate students come to us already indoctrinated with the special virtues of the model. And indeed they better accept it at the undergraduate level in the form of required courses in experimental psychology, learning, statistics, and research methodology if they expect to get into a graduate school. The

strands of their interests, talents and desires by the time their undergraduate training is over have already been rewoven to match the curricular fabric of the experimental research-scientist model. (p. 209)

Finally, Proshansky makes some recommendations while acknowledging the substantial difficulties of such an enterprise. First, in terms of specialized areas of inquiry such as social psychology, psychology should forego disciplinary “purity” and pursue a more interdisciplinary approach in terms of drawing from the relevant contributions of other fields to a particular problem, even as the “parent” discipline provides the basic perspective. Second, psychology should be less “purist” in another way in terms of opening up research programs to the community so that both students and professors develop a knowledge base more real than conceptual. Third, if the first two are to be accomplished there must be a, “major shift in the structure of professional rewards or in what we commonly call the prestige hierarchy,” so that the relevant changes in research practices also touch on the practicalities of recognizing the value of such work.

Critical perspectives about psychological research. The critical tone of the crisis period was directed at psychological practice in general with social psychology being particularly open to the criticisms because of its purported subject matter. When viewed as a whole, the criticisms suggest a widespread reflexivity among psychologists as they attempted to remedy methodological problems and reinvigorate the discipline. With the intent of indicating the diversity of perspectives being put forth during this period, I will highlight in chronological order some of the problems and concerns being raised during the 1970s:

1. Weisstein (1971) informs the psychologist that, “psychology has nothing to say about what women are really like, what they need and what they want, essentially because psychology does not know” (p. 70). The problem is that for so long (i.e., psychology’s entire history) human attributes and qualities have been assigned predominately on some variation of a biologically determined model with little attention being paid to the social context. Further it has almost exclusively been white men of European decent who were providing the academic public with their insights on the “true natures of women” (p. 68).

2. Kelman (1972) focuses on the rights of the subject in social research including issues of ethics, power, legitimacy and the status quo. In terms of power, Kelman highlights the power relationship between “subject” and “experimenter” but also that between the sponsor/user who has a particular knowledge-interest and the subject who provides the data for that interest. In such research contexts, the subject rarely has a say in determining the questions or even of evaluating how the experimenter interpreted their behaviour and why. Also related to the topic of power: Who is doing the research? and who is providing the sources of data? The answer to the second question: generally people in various dependent institutional contexts such as schools, hospitals, prisons, the army and the university. Very few, however, are watching the watchers so to speak largely because they are, “better able to resist intrusions from the outside and thus to avoid being studied themselves” (p. 991).

3. Gergen’s (1973) article is now regarded as the “clarion call” that challenged social psychology to question the validity of its experimental research practices by arguing that social psychology is primarily an historical and value-laden research process

necessitating a radical change in methodology. Inquiry would necessarily have to include historical context and societal values into the equation not to mention the viewpoints of the subjects themselves.

4. McGuire (1973) iterates the problems of experimentalism (artifacts, ethics, relevance) and argues, “in our graduate programs in social psychology, we try to train people who are good enough stage managers so that they can create in the laboratory simulations of realities in which the obvious correctness of our hypothesis can be demonstrated” (p. 449). McGuire again suggests that increasing technological sophistication will improve experimental approaches but he also suggests the pursuit of a methodological and theoretical pluralism. In addition, he advocates restructuring graduate programs, “to keep the novice's eye on the real rather than distracting and obscuring his (sic) view behind a wall of data” (p. 453).

5. Caplan and Nelson (1973) raise the important point that psychological research tends to produce a “person-centered bias in psychology with regard to social problems” (p. 203). Solutions to social problems are looked for in the adjustment of individual behaviours and cognitions. This serves a number of social functions: (a) it inhibits examining the contributions of government and cultural institutions to social problems, (b) it legitimates person-change rather than system-change interventions, (c) it supports the training and employment of personnel in terms of a person-adjustment conceptual framework and (d) it reinforces cultural attitudes of personal autonomy at the expense of institutional reform.

6. Schlenker (1974) upholds the naturalistic conception of science by criticizing

Gergen's claims and arguing that psychological laws must be abstract, universal, and transhistorical. Schlenker states, "the overwhelming majority of philosophers of science," have concluded, "there is really nothing fundamentally different about the social sciences as compared to the natural sciences which would preclude the attachment of the 'honorific' label 'science' to both branches of knowledge equally" (p. 1).

7. Further criticisms stem out of historical work. Samelson (1974), for example, discusses the reluctance of social psychologists to critically examine the history of the field, instead relying on and accepting a mythical origin that serves to validate and legitimate, "present views by showing that a great thinker 'discovered' these, our truths, a hundred years ago, that our questions are 'perennial' ones" (p. 223). In particular, Samelson focuses on Gordon Allports, history of social psychology where Comte is assigned the position of "father" of modern social psychology by highlighting only those aspects of Comte's philosophy that were pertinent to modern day positivist epistemology.

8. In 1975, Elms published a discussion focusing explicitly on "the crisis in confidence in social psychology," discussing among other things various problems associated with the laboratory experiment such as demand characteristics, subject bias and experimenter effects as well as federal and corporate pressures for social relevance. He iterates the need for methodological changes and repeats the largely empiricist-analytic techniques McGuire suggests. He also mentions making changes to educational practice and suggests that social psychologists, "may still be able to benefit from lessons in the philosophy and history of science," referring to Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (p. 973). Again, in terms of education, Elms suggests, in addition to course

changes in graduate school and self-education, there should be an increase of historical articles published in journals to provide knowledge of social psychology's history. He also notes that social psychologists are paying, "greater attention than in the past decades to the concerns of minorities and women" (p. 975).

9. Three articles from 1975, all published by *American Psychologist*, illustrate the reflexivity of psychologists: (a) Functionalism, Darwinism, and the Psychology of Women: A Study in Social Myth, (b) Through the One-way Mirror: The Limits of Experimental Self-Reflection, and (c) The Emerging Field of the Sociology of Psychological Knowledge.

Shield's (1975) examination of the early history of sex differences research shows how "science played handmaiden to social values," through various attempts to scientifically substantiate what most men already knew: women were inferior (p. 752). These attempts at scientific confirmation were all premised on one or another variation of a biological determinism that did not take into account social context. As Shields states, such biases arise when they are socially and politically useful, such as that of suppressing, "women's aspirations to positions of power" and in the case of psychology, they served the role of perpetuating a social myth about the psychology of women that justified current social arrangements of male dominance (p. 752).

Gadlin and Ingle (1975) discuss the problem of framing the problem(s) of experimentation in terms of experimentation (i.e., artifacts) because this tact tacitly legitimates what one is ostensibly attempting to question. This contradiction arises because the logic of experimentation requires a separation of method and subject matter

and the problems being characterized as artifact problems violate this logic. So from *within* the experimental paradigm, “artifacts” are necessarily conceived of as variables to be controlled for to maintain objectivity but from *without*, the problem is conceived more in terms of the inadequacy or limited utility of organizing social phenomena within laboratory contexts because method and subject are not independent. The authors suggest that inquiry initially focus on phenomena, not methodology, so we do not select phenomena to fit our methods, but rather allow our methods to develop out of substantive pursuits. Second, they suggest that human research involves entering into human relationships and current experimental practices turn this relationship into an impersonal one where subjects are treated as objects (i.e., so many variables): this obviates the crucial relational aspects of human relations. Thus, “considering and treating our subjects as informants ... rather than uniformed objects,” would be one additional factor in better understanding social relations (p. 1008). Finally they note that reflexivity involves, “acknowledging that the study of human behaviour necessarily includes the behaviour of psychologists,” including, I would like to add, the research behaviour of social psychology students as they reproduce an experimental understanding of social relations (p. 1008).

Buss (1975) argues for a sociology of psychological knowledge having as its goal, “to begin understanding the role of politics, ideologies, values, economic systems ... in the birth, development, and death of some of the classical psychological theories, perspectives, paradigms, models, or approaches that have and continue to exert considerable influence” (p. 991). With particular reference to experimental social psychology, Buss suggests its positivist underpinings, “precludes an adequate appreciation of the social basis of social

psychological theory” (p. 996). This is because the positivist ideology, in the form of experimental research practices, attempts to “control” for values and ideology so that the knowledge produced is that of unmitigated fact. The consequence of the “value neutral” approach to social relations, “is that traditional experimental social psychology inadvertently adopted an ideology that precluded the study of ideology in social theory. In this move, social psychology thereby forfeited the possibility of being the leaders in studying the social basis of psychological theories and knowledge” (p. 997).

The diversity of critical perspectives continue. Levine (1976) argues social psychology's emphasis on a naturalistic metaphysics prevents an understanding of social change. What is needed, in addition, is an historical metaphysics focusing on historical conditions, human-made laws and descriptive explanation. Pepitone (1976) argues, the crisis in social psychology is due to, “the misplaced theoretical unit of analysis” (p. 641). Most social behaviour is normative and related closely to socio-cultural factors. Social psychologists, however, attempt to understand these socio-cultural aspects of behaviour in terms of concepts and processes located within the individual. House (1977) argues the crisis in social psychology reflects a division of the field into three increasingly isolated domains: a) psychological social psychology, b) symbolic interactionism and c) psychological sociology. He argues the distinct substantive and methodological concerns of each reflect the intellectual and institutional contexts within which they developed. In psychological social psychology this has led to an increasingly narrow focus on “individual psychological processes in relation to social stimuli using laboratory experiments” (House, 1977, p. 161). R. J. Smith (1978) questions a number of, “assumptions basic to

mainstream American social psychology” (p.173). The assumptions questioned are: a) American social psychology *is* social psychology, b) objective, value-free research will reveal cross-historical findings and c) current “training in social psychology is ‘the way to do it’” (Smith, 1978, p. 173). Smith questions social psychology’s “steady diet of empiricism” suggesting it has led to the endless piling up of minutiae and to the repression of the important “issue of the context of social psychology” (p.174). Regarding training, Smith suggests that American training of social psychologists has narrowed rather than broadened since the 1950s. Sampson (1978) argues the naturalist conception of science arose in a particular “cultural context and value matrix: Puritan Protestantism, individualism, male dominance, selective equality, private property, and capitalism” (p. 1332). This cultural context and value matrix both reflects and reaffirms values serving the interests of the status quo. Sampson argues that until this conception of social science is replaced with a socio-historical analysis of social relations, social psychology will remain in a crisis.

To conclude my overview of the critical literature of the period (but see also, for example, Argyris, 1975; Aron, 1979; Buss, 1974; Farr, 1976, Gergen, 1976, 1978; Moscovici, 1972; Sherif, 1979; Silverman, 1977), Cartwright (1979) examines social psychology in historical perspective, providing a number of important insights regarding its institutional aspects. He notes it is a “social system whose primary objective is the production of a particular kind of empirical knowledge, and its history is more than a history of ideas and intellectual accomplishments” (p.82). Cartwright, in discussing the intellectual and professional activities of social psychologists observes:

How much they have been influenced by such things as the policies of funding agencies, the editorial practices of journals and publishing houses, the monetary and symbolic reward system of university departments, the nature of doctoral programs, and the demographic composition of the profession (p.82)

He is not suggesting all these influences are detrimental. He states:

But I do feel it would be a mistake to underestimate the magnitude of their effects upon the problems that have been chosen for investigation, how they have been approached, the methods employed, the way research facilities have been organized, and the amount of time social psychologists have devoted to that old-fashioned activity known as scholarship.

In addition, Cartwright claims, while it is true the substantive content of the knowledge attained within a discipline is intrinsic to the nature of the phenomena under discussion, it is also true, “the knowledge attained is the product of a social system and, as such, is basically influenced by the properties of that system and by its cultural, social and political environment” (p.82).

The power structure in social psychology. I will now highlight two articles from this period focusing on the power structure of social psychology before highlighting additional institutional/educational comments of the period. Lubek (1976) provides a reflexive analysis through his examination of the “power structure” of a discussion of the “power structure” of social psychology among social psychologists. Lubek uses power in terms of the ability of X to control Y’s outcomes. He provides some examples of such

power relationships: “journal editor-article writer, professor-student, PhD committee member-candidate, grantor-grantee, paper presenter (communicator)-audience, and experimenter-subject,” (p. 318). He suggests, “one could ask how all the above power relationships in social psychology affect the final output of the discipline — the findings that get reported in journals, summarized in texts, and committed to memory by thousands of undergraduates (some of whom then go on to become the next generation of social psychologists)” (p. 318). Lubek, first analyzed the discussion in quantitative terms to determine who was making the greater contributions to the conversation - the established social psychologists or those “lower down” in the hierarchy. In terms of number of speeches and length of speeches, he noted the established spoke more often and longer. After he interrupted the discussion (roughly in the middle) to point this out, the established still spoke more often and longer but the total percentage decreased. Lubek then discusses what he refers to as a social psychology of social psychology, suggesting three sources of influence where unequal power relationships can have sway: (a) pressures to preserve the paradigm, (b) pressures in the publication relation and (c) apprenticeship education. I will elaborate on Lubek’s discussion of education.

He states the authority-based publication system reflects the educational system that trains new researchers. In this respect, the apprentice system resembles the authority-centered education system where producing knowledge (i.e., research or scholarship) is the expert’s job, teachers transmit this knowledge and students learn it. In this educational model, authorities identify both the problems and the problem-solving approaches on behalf of the students. Lubek then provides the reader with two “hypothetical” meetings

between an advisor and a new graduate student, inviting the reader to compare it to the graduate education relation in one's own department:

Supervisor A:

Here are reprints of all my (important) papers, and the outline of the grant I'm currently working on. Familiarize yourself with them. You'll be running the next three studies on this list, to give you practice with the equipment and procedure. One of my other students, working on his dissertation, is in charge of the lab — he'll show you the ropes. For these three studies, you'll be third author if the results are significant. For your thesis, you can choose any of the studies on this list, and add to it one variable of your own choosing. You'll get senior authorship on the first paper coming out of your thesis data. I'll write up all the others, and you'll be second author. (p. 328)

Supervisor B:

Find a topic that interests you, and we'll sit down frequently to discuss and develop your ideas. We can jointly explore the literature together, develop a new methodology if appropriate, and apply for a grant together if needed. We'll try to expand the existing theory and test out some of the implications from it. We'll critically analyze ideas, brainstorm, and if necessary, cross interdisciplinary lines to develop the intellectual tools to tackle your chosen problem. As we'll be working together on this problem area for a number of years, pick a topic of sufficient importance to you to

maintain your curiosity and to allow you sufficient enthusiasm to motivate mine. (p. 328)

Lubek concludes this hypothetical meeting with, “suffice it to say that initiation into the power structure of social psychology can be traced back to most graduate learning environments” (p. 328).

Morawski (1979) provides an examination of the power structure by way of an introductory paper focusing on the importance of developing a research program that examines how social and historical conditions have influenced the growth of social psychological knowledge. Morawski employs a typology of influences on scientific development that has intellectual and social influences interacting with sources internal to and external to the institution of science. Each type provides a possible framework for conducting a sociological analysis of the production of knowledge. In reference to social psychology she suggests three possible avenues for future “critical socio-historical examinations”: (1) an examination of internal-intellectual debates such as what occurred over the nature of conflict research and whether or not it was based on particular dominant economic relations and political ideologies, (2) an examination of power and prestige and its distribution including how this may influence the dissemination of knowledge, and (3) questions concerning the history of social psychology and the various biases inherent in particular historical methods such as those of presentism and inductive history. I will briefly discuss Morawski’s examination of power and prestige.

In order to examine a power hierarchy within social psychology it is necessary to identify what constitutes a power structure or hierarchy and to specify how this can

influence social psychological knowledge; then, so she argues, an empirical examination can be carried out. By way of illustration, Morawski determined what percentage of members of a “prestigious social psychological society,” where membership could only be obtained by peer nomination, were also editors or part of the editorial staff of two major social psychological journals, JESP and JPSP. For the period covered, 61% of the combined editorial board members were members of the society. Thus it appears editorial decisions for two of social psychology’s mainstream journals, based on this small but suggestive analysis, were (at the time) in the hands of a select few people of privilege.

Methodological alternatives and institutional change. As is clear, the crisis literature and the period in general led to challenges to the methodological orthodoxy including theoretical, methodological, and ethical critiques, critiques of relevance and even at least a couple of attempts to criticize the power structure of social psychology. As stated, early criticisms stemmed out of experimental critiques of the psychology experiment: This led to the development of procedures for controlling extraneous variables constituted by the social context of the experiment. Around the same time there were also ethical concerns: This led to ethical regulations on research with humans or animals. In addition to these two important criticisms of experimental research, however, there were criticisms that aimed not so much to “fine tune” the experimental method as to replace it. Gergen’s (1973) critique was an intentional call to a radical change in the methods social psychologists employed to conduct their research. It was based on the position that a truly *social* psychology cannot be meaningfully or usefully developed within the confines of predominantly experimental understandings. The actual

methodological changes suggested, however, varied considerably. The suggestions can be divided roughly into two basic groups: (a) proposals for historical, dialectical and sociological approaches to social psychological phenomenon (e.g., Baumgardner, 1976, 1977; Buss, 1975; Buck-Morss, 1977; Cvetkovick, 1977; Gergen, 1977; Kytte, 1977; Levine, 1976; Morawski, 1979; Smith, 1977), and (b) proposals for more rigorous multivariate and mathematical approaches (e.g., Guttentag, 1976; Harris, 1974, 1976; Helmreich, 1975; McGuire, 1973). In addition to these two basic groups, however, there was also the ethogenic approach (Harre & Secord, 1972; Shotter, 1974). Many of the proposed changes were published in the *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* (PSPB) in 1976 and 1977. During this period the PSPB highlighted various concerns with social psychological research practices. In particular, there were three major concerns focused on: (a) the methodological prospects of applied social psychology consisting of responses to Helmreich's (1975) call for a new multivariate social psychology, (b) a symposium on social psychology as history with Gergen (1976) and Schlenker (1976) squaring off again and others providing their assessments and (c) a symposium on a dialectical social psychology as an alternative to a positivist methodology.

Within some of the articles of this period, usually only briefly mentioned, were comments about the institutional problems that might inhibit methodological changes. I will highlight some of these comments before elaborating on the critical perspective I will be using to frame my analysis of educational practices in (social) psychology. My aim here is merely to highlight relevant institutional comments that were made in the context of discussing the problems of social inquiry.

Gergen (1973) mentions how promotion and tenure are dependent on contributions to basic research with applied research being denigrated. McGuire (1973) claims methods courses spend too much time focusing on the hypothesis testing stage (the “critical”) and not enough on the hypothesis formation stage (the “creative”), especially since hypothesis formation (i.e., thinking about social phenomena and how they “work”) is the more important. He also believes the methodology curriculum should be revised to cope with “dirty data” (i.e., real world “data”) where all the rules of procedure for maintaining internal validity in the laboratory are of considerably less value. Elms (1975) notes how external institutional pressures had led to demands for relevant research and demands for both a psychology of women and a psychology of minorities, and how funding influenced research practices as did the “publish or perish pressures and shrinking job market within the academic world” (p. 972). Elms also criticizes research practices for focusing on the development of procedures likely to generate statistical significance (and publications) at the expense of explaining important aspects of human social interaction. Lowe (1976) notes how, “criterion for entry into the academic marketplace in social psychology seems to be one’s publication record” (p. 116). Lowe ties this to the decreasing academic job market and suggests such publication pressures will only increase. In addition such pressures will lead to “low-budget, small-scale, limited-variable studies using the readily available and inexpensively measured college sophomore” (p. 116). Thorngate (1976) thinks the really useful data are generally concealed by “vested interests.” Such people and institutions are unlikely to reveal relevant data for the good of science. Ryckman (1976) provides one of the more sustained examinations of institutional

matters focusing on the communication barrier between the social psychologist and the public, given the former's separation from the community. The social psychologist's more expedient links are to the incentive system of the university, leaving more explicitly "social" research behind. The consequence: much research is "directed at securing the rewards available for appropriate behavior in the system and gaining recognition and approval from our colleagues and students" (p. 127). "Our journals are the vehicle for communicating with these individuals, and it is no wonder that they are read primarily by them and not the citizenry" (p. 127). The incentive system places high value on experimental research and thus students (and professors) are not adequately trained in the intricacies of applied research methods. He notes how the methodological materials taught tend to direct the student, "away from an understanding of the problems of poor people and others," instead emphasizing a technical language and research strategies that, in fact, create distance between research and lay people (p. 127). Finally, he suggests the need for graduate programs rooted in the community as well as the lab. He notes, however, that this would require, "radical restructuring of the current reward system," and would necessitate academic rewards for students who pursue such work (p. 128). Hendrick (1976) suggests that social psychologists are surprised by the idea the sub-discipline requires an historical approach and that the experimental approach is limited, "only because of the uniform indoctrination most social psychologists have had in the optimistic belief that the experimental method can accomplish almost anything" (p. 402). M. Sherif (1977) claims that making serious and fundamental changes to the sub-discipline would involve raising "unthinkable" questions about its foundations and it would require

“intellectual stamina, commitment and sustained effort to get out of the usual ruts. Such questions are not exactly welcomed by the mainstream, and especially not by the influentials therein” (p. 375). To conclude these illustrative comments, Gergen (1977) notes how, whether a perspective is deemed to have merit, depends on the professional leverage of those in favor of the perspective. In reference to the possibility of a new methodological perspective gaining sway, Gergen emphasizes the importance of its adherents being prepared to “confront the realities of an inimical institutional structure” (p. 718). He states:

Virtually all of the major editorial positions within social psychology are occupied by individuals who have been trained in the traditional positivist manner. Much the same is true of the review committees of the major granting agencies, and the editorial advisors for major publishing companies. Most graduate programs in social psychology are deeply concerned that their products excel as scholarship with the traditional positivist paradigm. Entrance into such programs, success within them, and subsequent professional placement are typically dependent on one's capacity to generate ‘basic knowledge,’ through experimentation. Thus, one's entire career trajectory is vitally dependent on comportment vis a vis the traditional positivist paradigm. Anyone concerned with the exigencies of continued employment would be wise to avoid the dialectical perspective or to seek ways of altering the existing structure. (p. 718)

Did any of this talk have an impact on mainstream social psychological research

practices? Higbee, Millard and Folkman (1982) followed up previous work on methodological practices extending the analysis to additional journals. The journals analyzed were, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *Journal of Social Psychology* and *Social Psychology Quarterly* (formerly *Sociometry*). The research trends from 1949, 1959 and 1969 were “sustained during the 1970s,” (see Table 5 below); (p. 182). The authors also note that the use of college students as “subjects” increased from an average of 61% in 1969 (across journals examined) to 70% in 1979. By the close of the 70s, social psychology is still dominated by the use of experimental procedures in the production of knowledge.

So much for the “crisis” literature then. As we move into the 80s, explicit reference to a “crisis” basically disappears (but see Parker, 1989; Parker & Shotter, 1990), although there were now methodological alternatives being suggested within the published literature ranging from discourse analysis to affirmations of social psychology’s experimental basis to contextualist approaches to Marxist approaches (e.g., Georgoudi & Rosnow 1985; Gergen, 1985; Gergen & Morawski, 1980; Morawski, 1982; Shaeffer, Francis & Ruback, 1981; Unger, 1981; Wexler, 1981). There are, however, at least two articles that “reflect” on the crisis and its impact on the mainstream of social psychology. Both of these articles help to situate the relevance of the crisis from the perspective of mainstream positivist social psychology.

Two “reflections” on the crisis. My purpose in discussing these “post-crisis” examinations is to situate the radical elements of the crisis within the current mainstream of social psychology; or more specifically to situate these elements *without* the

Table 5

Summary: Total Percent of Research Designs Using Experimental Manipulation*

Journal	1949	1959	1969	1979
Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology	30	83	--	--
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology	--	--	87	77
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology	--	--	93	94
Social Psychology Quarterly	--	--	41	61
Journal of Social Psychology	--	--	46	66

*Based on information from Higbee, Millard and Folkman (1982)

mainstream. The questions of interest to be followed up later are: Did any of the methodological approaches advocated during the “crisis” come to be reflected in the curriculum of psychology? Did social psychology come to acquire a more diverse methodological repertoire outside of the positivist ideology? And if methodological innovation did not obtain, is it possible to understand this failing in terms of the institutional and educational practices psychologists and social psychologists employed?

Blank (1987) examines how Gergen’s (1973) “Social Psychology as History,” has come to be situated within social psychology. At the extremes he notes Jones’ dismissal of the importance of Gergen’s perspective (in an article in the 1985 *Handbook of Social Psychology*). Jones’ refers to Gergen’s article as, “an intellectually irresponsible invitation to despair,” based on misunderstanding progress in the field and situated the whole issue as, “a minor perturbation in the long history of social psychology” (as cited in Blank, p. 653). At the other extreme were the proponents of this new perspective who viewed the call to radical change, “as the first widely noticed positive volley in the battle for control of social psychology,” and who proceeded to expand the call by focusing on issues of historicism, constructionism and contextualism (p. 654). The more moderate mainstream response to Gergen’s critique, however, was to acknowledge the importance of the less radical elements of Gergen’s thesis in terms of an, “impetus to changes *within* the positivist-empiricist approach that have made in stronger in the intervening years” (p. 654). Blank argues that Gergen’s call for radical methodological change was interpreted as reflecting a particular historical period in social psychology’s history where there were, “inadequate methods to account for process and change,” that have since been corrected

for by new and improved methodological solutions such as meta-analysis and improvements in quasi-experimental and experimental design techniques as well as more sophisticated tools for statistical analysis. Thus, the “crisis” is placed in historical context and interpreted as making, “things right within the dominant paradigm, thereby reinstantiating the empiricist position” (p. 654). Blank claims commentators on the discipline and the role of Gergen’s article in the discipline, held, “that contextualism or some similar relativistic view of social psychological knowledge is not necessary as an alternative to empiricist social psychology,” but they took this very position themselves, “by providing a contextualist interpretation of Gergen’s original statements and the attention, especially positive, paid to them” (p. 659).

From an historical perspective, however, Blank argues we can understand Gergen’s article and the response to it at three levels of ideological history in the 1970s and 1980s. First, the article and its reception are embedded within social psychology’s history as a discipline. This was a period of extreme dissatisfaction with the narrowness of the social psychological approach to social phenomenon. Second, this history is itself embedded within a larger context of ideological conflict within the social sciences in general, concerning issues of traditional epistemology versus “various forms of social constructivism and contextualism in philosophy, sociology, and methodology of science” (p. 658). At this level, the conflict involves power relations with those challenging the mainstream in terms of the value of particular “assumptions, ideas, policies and organizational structures,” (p. 658). Third, these conflicts can be viewed as reflecting a conservative-liberal tension within American society at this time. But, Blank reasons, if

this radical perspective can be situated within a particular socio-historical context, then why not also the mainstream response to it and, in fact, the actual impact (or lack thereof) of this “radical” perspective on the educational activities of psychology departments. Blank concludes that it was not this new perspective that was gained (leaving aside the real extra-institutional growth and development of non-positivist social psychological methodological practices) but rather the old perspective was regained. The “consensus view in the field continues to favor a fairly narrowly defined, empiricist approach built on mechanistic models and employing experimental designs and quantitative measurement tools” (p. 660). Finally, he suggests that understanding how the old perspective was regained requires an understanding of the socio-historical conditions that supported it and consequently, Gergen’s original thesis has proven itself as a valuable impetus to generating non-positivist approaches to understanding social behavior and social change within social psychology.

Adair’s (1991) “Social Cognition, Artifact and the Passing of the so-called Crisis in Social Psychology,” is also relevant because in it he discusses methodological problems with the most recent focal topic of mainstream social psychological research: social cognition. Adair’s perspective is that the central problem motivating the crisis involved problems with the laboratory experiment, such as demand characteristics, subject bias and experimenter effects. Concurrent with the crisis, however, was the emergence of a new direction for research in terms of a cognitive model. In this new model, the methods of positivism were maintained but the object of inquiry shifted toward attributions and other cognitions. Adair notes that the emergence of cognitivism coincided with a “rapid

dissipation” in crisis talk and offers a conceptual exploration of four possible relationships between the two. First, the artifact research weakened the behavioral model and led to the adoption of the cognitive model at a time when it was gaining sway within psychology in general (i.e. the so-called cognitive revolution). Second, institutional pressures both inside and outside of psychology in terms of ethical concerns, led to increasing constraints on the kinds of research that could be conducted. In this respect, studying cognitions based on the manipulation of wording appeared to sidestep such ethical concerns. Third, because the artifact research highlighted the subjects thoughts and perceptions, this led to research that made such thoughts and perceptions its focus. Finally, Adair suggests the possibility, “that a cognitive paradigm is methodologically better suited to answer the artifact challenges of the 1960s and 1970s,” (p. 446). If subjects’ cognitions about an experiment undermine the experiment, then focusing on those cognitions might silence critics. Adair, however, sees problems with this rationale, arguing “because methodological behaviorism or the positivist experiment continues as the preferred method, the flaws of the laboratory identified by artifact research apply with equal force to the cognitive experiment” (p. 446). The basic problem with studying social cognitions in experimental contexts is a problem of *communication* that may lead to, “misunderstandings, misinterpretations and misportrayals of subjects cognitions and cognitive abilities” (p. 446). He discusses three problems. First, subtle variations in the phrasing of instructions can lead to different interpretations of the meaning of the task and consequently of how the “subject” acts. Second, one must interpret a subjects’ cognitions based on what they say to you (i.e., verbal reports). The problem in psychology, however, is that there is an anti-phenomenological bias and a

general suspicion that what people say can't be relied on. Third, what Adair describes as the greatest problem, is the lack of attention paid to how a task is represented by the subject. He notes how the attribution literature is filled with research devoted to corrections of problems of interpretation. In sum, Adair provides a mainstream interpretation of the crisis in terms of the possible influences that artifact research may have had on the development of social cognition as the latest "paradigm" for conducting experimental research in social psychology. But because this research still employs the basic positivist methods of old, and because studying cognitions is intimately tied up with individual contextual elements in the form of language and meaning, such research is as susceptible to artifacts as the previous behavioral models.

It appears that the "crisis" in social psychology had little effect on the mainstream of the discipline. Once again, social psychology came to reflect the basic intellectual climate of its parent discipline. When psychology became behavioral in the 1920s, so too did social psychology. When aggregate research and ANOVA came to dominate general psychology, the same research techniques soon came to dominate social psychology. Finally, when the mainstream of general psychology adopted a cognitive model, social psychology, despite the voices of dissent calling for radical methodological changes, soon followed suit. Mainstream social psychology developed in the 1970s and 1980s into a cognitive social psychology focusing on perception, thought and information processing. Its methodology was fundamentally positivist and quantitative, premised on a positivist epistemology and on an ontology of relations among empirical facts. As Hilgard (1987) notes, "the release from the restraints of behaviorism, coupled with the wide acceptance of

cognition in developmental psychology, personality, and social psychology was a tonic, but in itself it did not resolve the problems” (p. 611). In the next two chapters, I will explore the role that educational practices have played in the maintenance of social psychology’s commitment to an empirical-analytic knowledge-interest.

Educational Practices: A Standpoint Methodological Approach

Educational Practices

There is no such thing as a *neutral* educational process. Education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, *or* it becomes “the practice of freedom,” the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. (Shaul, 1997, p. 16)

Social psychology students are trained, to employ experimental methods to conduct research. This is not, however, the same as saying that students are *forced* to conduct experimental research. While it is undoubtedly the case that particular professors will not countenance non-experimental research from their students, others may in fact encourage such research. What makes training problematic, rather, centers on understanding how the student of psychology, immersed as s/he is in a collection of experimental research practices and student-professor relations, could possibly come to conduct research *other than* in experimental terms. This is one facet of the problem and it concerns how training functions to regulate the conceptual understandings and research activities of students. Another facet of the problem, concerns how the institutional reward structure functions to promote experimental research. This facet is expressed by the following question: What kinds of research must an aspiring social psychologist conduct, if she or he hopes to be accepted or even compete for, a position as professor at a North American university? These two ways of viewing epistemological regulation constitute a

kind of “push me, pull me” institutional dynamic having as its focus, the research behavior and research products of the student.

I raise these questions, to direct the reader to the reflexive nature of social inquiry. Consider this: The student participates in a collection of *educational* practices that function to provide them with particular *conceptual* and *methodological* practices for studying human *social* practices. The methodological practices disseminated, however, are themselves socio-historical products. The methods are informed by particular underlying assumptions and knowledge-interests. As a consequence, “social observations” come to take on a particular form consistent with these assumptions and interests. In other words, being trained to study social behavior is itself constituted by a collection of social practices that function to regulate the research activities - the concepts, methods and rhetoric - of students. Thus, from the point of view of social inquiry, how the student of social psychology is trained to study “the social,” is itself a social question. Asking this kind of question, however, necessarily requires the researcher to move beyond the parameters of an experimental methodology so as to avoid getting caught in a “bootstrap” problem like the artifact researchers found themselves in, as they attempted to address the problems of experimentation through the method of experimentation (e.g., Gadlin & Ingle, 1975). My central purpose, up to this point, has been to construct a critical account of the development and debate over the experimental mode of inquiry. My aim, from this point on, is to account for the maintenance of this mode of inquiry, at the level of educational practice. Instead of conducting experiments on social behavior, my analysis aims to account for the social behavior of students, as they conduct experiments on social

behavior. My aim is not prediction but descriptive explanation and interpretation. Up to this point, I have built the case through interpretive inferences based largely on a history of various forms of documentation ranging from books and articles focusing on social and historical practices, to actual historical books and articles, to present day critical assessments of psychological practice. From this point on, however, I will first discuss the educational apparatus before documenting and describing a range of actual educational activities that students are required to participate in as they work toward becoming researchers, earning a degree and building a career. I will approach this object of inquiry - the educational and research activities of the (social) psychology student - by way of a critical ethnography. I expand on this below in the next section. In this section, I elaborate on and attempt to connect, various theoretical perspectives as they apply to an analysis of the role of educational practices in the production of knowledge. To set the tone, I will paraphrase and quote from a section of Danziger's (1990) discussion of the political economy of knowledge production.

Research practices entail a work process generative of valued symbolic products in the form of scientific knowledge claims. Through a network of social relationships, particular rules and procedures are established for rendering knowledge claims into knowledge. The transformation of knowledge claims into knowledge is fundamentally social. It entails an, "acceptance process that involves a number of individuals - such as reviewers, readers, textbook writers - who share certain norms and interests. The *anticipation* of this acceptance process affects the production of knowledge from the beginning" (Danziger, 1990, p. 180, my italics).

Scientific knowledge production, like many human activities is goal directed. This is reflected in an, “implicit commitment to the search for a certain type of knowledge” (p. 180). The knowledge, for example, may have to be quantitative and require that the world be organized in terms of variables. Advanced prescriptions can be quite specific requiring only linear and additive relations among variables. Danziger notes, “the kind of knowledge product desired,” has “a decisive influence on the choice of investigative procedures” (p. 180).

He then notes:

Prescriptions pertaining to the form of knowledge products are themselves social products. They are characteristic of particular groups of knowledge producers and unite their members in common methodological commitments. More fundamentally, they tend to be products of the interface between the group of knowledge producers and centers of social power that are able to determine the success or failure of an enterprise. Thus, the investigators gathered in the seventeenth-century Royal Society decided to pursue a form of knowledge that promised technical utility and to exclude forms of knowledge that were tied up with questions of social reform and revolution. The end result was the modern conception of the “value neutrality” of scientific knowledge. But the decision to limit the forms of admissible knowledge was made because the producers of knowledge lived and worked in a social context where certain types of knowledge were perceived as useful and others as threatening to powerful

social interests. (p. 181)

The production of knowledge, entails social rules of admissibility and desirability generated in an, “historical process of negotiation that involves the coming to terms of knowledge producers with the realities of social power and influence in the world they inhabit” (p. 180). Understanding knowledge production as a social process constituted by a web of practices and power relations, helps one to understand the important role of educational practices in the social regulation of knowledge production. To briefly iterate:

Prilleltensky (1989) argued psychology’s knowledge producers fostered a tight relationship with the centers of social power. Psychological knowledge became of value, through its development of techniques and tools for adjusting individual behavior, while leaving largely unexamined, existing social arrangements and practices. Training perpetuated this research strategy, by directing the students scholarly gaze toward the individual and away from the socio-historical context within which the individual existed. This person-centered focus, however, has rendered psychological-knowledge, knowledge as understood from the inside: It is knowledge about human behavior when the world of social, historical, economic and political practices are taken for granted. By espousing “value neutrality” and by treating changing social and historical practices as the static and unproblematic “given”, psychology legitimized itself in the public eye by presenting its techniques of socio-cultural maintenance as objective and non-ideological facts about human behavior. Danziger (1985) showed education’s importance when he penetrated to the heart of psychological knowing, focusing on how theoretically embedded methodological commitments are institutionally maintained. Madigan, Johnson and Linton

(1995) examined the educational apparatus in psychology, highlighting the important role “micro practices” play in regulating psychological research activities so as to ensure a consistent structure, form and rhetoric, irrespective of subject matter. The APA manual reveals itself as an essential tool for enculturating an empirical-analytic framework for the constitution and examination of social problems.

Psychological inquiry then is fundamentally ideological. “Ideology” is a term used in many different ways (Tseelon, 1991). I intend to use ideology as Dorothy Smith (1990) articulates it. Her use of ideology, helps clarify how the documents and practices of social psychology can be construed as constraining and limiting the research process (see Parker, 1994). The methods disseminated within psychology, are ideological in terms of how they prescribe, “definite procedures or methods of thinking and reasoning about social relations and processes,” (D. Smith, 1990, p. 35). In Smith’s conception of ideology, concepts and ideas themselves are not ideological. Rather it is how concepts and ideas are used in distinctive and describable ways: in the process constituting a “kind of practice in thinking about society,” that makes them ideological (p. 35). The distinctive use of particular concepts and ideas, with specific methods of reasoning and of interpreting society, are ideological because they inhibit thinking about social relations and processes in ways outside the definite procedures or methods. The student of psychology is not unfamiliar with first, being provided with a range of quantitative methods and second, being asked to write up a research proposal. The student has an implicit understanding regarding how s/he should methodologically organize her or his inquiry before s/he has even found a topic of interest to examine. The ideological nature of this programmatic approach,

however, lies outside the “grasp” of the experimental stance, in part because the rhetoric of experimentalism insists that its methods of inquiry are merely neutral tools - the objective techniques for making observations about the social world. Presumably, disseminating specific methodological practices early on in a students training is helpful in regulating the form of student research products. The unfortunate downside of this particular ideological stance, however, is it - to use a familiar word in an unfamiliar way - does *violence* to actual concrete social practices because it inhibits the researcher from studying what cannot be made to fit the, “definite procedures or methods of thinking and reasoning about social relations and processes” (D. Smith, 1990, p. 35).

Understanding the Educational Apparatus: Constructing a Point-of-View

In this section, I will move from a general conceptual understanding of the educational apparatus, to a more specific understanding at the level of everyday educational practice. I will begin with a general overview of the socio-political nature of scientific inquiry in psychology, shift to a focus on the distinction between mainstream and critical perspectives on education, and complete the section by characterizing educational practices in terms of textually mediated social organization, power and the pastoral model of student induction.

Dumont and Lecomte (1985) focus on the, “political and cognitive structures underlying scientific inquiry in the university,” with particular reference to educational psychology (p. 23). They note the disenchantment of some psychologists with the field and observe how, “much research gives the impression of meticulous planning and execution but conceals a poverty of meaning and conceptual rigour” (p. 24). Further, they

“suspect” the weaknesses and problems are connected with its underlying research ethic. The problem, “is not that insufficient research is being done ... it is that the wrong kind of research is being done” (p. 24). The authors focus on educational psychology but raise interesting points about psychological scientific practice in general. They acknowledge, for example, what I assume must be an inescapable fact to all academics, namely, that “scientific research is a highly politicized endeavor” (p. 29). Scientific inquiry involves a community of peers who decide the value of academic scholarship. One concrete example of how a community of peers can arbitrate scholarly output, involves the Holy Grail¹⁰ of academia: the research grant. The social and political reality enveloping psychological research behavior is this: Choices for research problems are strongly associated with, if not determined by, sources of funding. In addition, particular publication strategies are necessary to gaining research funding. As the authors state, “colleagues are not disposed to act favorably on scholarship that questions the conventional wisdom of their field,” and governmental agencies tend to, “resist underwriting hypotheses that challenge, even implicitly, the convictions and values of their constituencies,” (p. 31).¹¹ They discuss, how the socio-political world influences scientific productivity including, how changes in the managerial style of the National Institute of Education influenced scientific research activity, and how researchers conceal their ideas from peer reviewers who may avail themselves of the opportunity to improve on a proposal for the same funding. They discuss the increasing, “entrepreneurial responsibilities,” of the academic to bring in funding and they note how reward structures and constraints have led many researchers to, “spend their lives chipping away at tiny problems which have meaning only within the

dominant paradigms of their disciplines” (p. 32).

In the numerous domains that constitute psychology there are few paradigms that find general acceptance. Much of the problem-solving, therefore, is of an *ad hoc* and even whimsical nature, unrelated in a coherent fashion with any paradigm that can give it meaning as science.

There may be nothing intrinsically wrong with any one of these studies.

The problem develops when a field is top-heavy with such studies and their authors are not asking the broader questions that give meaning to them all.

(p. 32)

Further, the conditions for promotion and tenure, “have impelled legions of professor-researchers to publish several articles a year (each of which may be hardly distinguishable from the others) without regard to their alleged intrinsic importance,” leading, “to the proliferation of tens of thousands of snippets of research which are non-programmatic or otherwise uncoordinated in character” (p. 33). Psychology consequently, with its commitment to producing technical knowledge of value to those with the ability to fund such research, when viewed as an educational apparatus, can be understood as operating to reproduce the intellectual labour-power from which this relationship to the founts of funding can be maintained. By understanding educational practices in psychology as geared toward developing, within the research activities of students, the competencies necessary for achieving career success under the above detailed socio-political context, we can begin to understand the function of structuring the educational apparatus in terms of an experimental ideology.

Moving into the realm of educational practice, Fitzclarence and Giroux (1984) discuss the “problematic” relationship of knowledge to control and power in education, by comparing mainstream theory to critical theory. The mainstream approach, focuses on efficient ways to transmit and evaluate “legitimate” knowledge. Knowledge and the techniques for obtaining knowledge are viewed as something one masters, as opposed to something one must continually contest and deliberate over in a critical and reflexive manner. The link between knowledge and control is seen as necessary from this perspective but largely in terms of how the relationship can be used to structure and define the educational experience of students. Not explored from this perspective, however, is the link between knowledge and power and its connection to political interests. Mainstream viewpoints ignore how, “power functions in the interests of specific values and knowledge forms so as to sustain the political, economic, and social interests of some groups at the expense of others” (p. 462). The critical approach, alternatively, focuses on how knowing and knowledge production are important political issues in need of investigation. From the critical point of view, the mainstream educational approach neither reflects on nor discusses the concrete social reality, that actual human beings in positions of power and with specific institutional interests, are the ones deciding - on behalf of the students - what they ought to know and how they ought to go about knowing it. The educational apparatus is not viewed as a simple mechanism for knowledge transmission. Rather it is seen as a site functioning to legitimate particular dominant versions of knowledge. In this way, knowledge is linked to power. The focus is on how particular forms of knowing, come to be socially and culturally reproduced. Finally, Giroux (1985)

helps clarify the critical approach to education and training in his discussion of the need for critical educators. “Critical educator” is intended to emphasize a pedagogical approach, where educational sites are interrogated, “as ideological and material embodiments of a complex web of relations of culture and power, on the one hand, and as socially constructed sites of contestation on the other” (p. 23). Education and training entail a “politics of experience,” where knowledge, discourse and power function to produce particular social practices and understandings.

Combining the above two analyses and applying it to psychology, one can understand the “push me, pull me” nature of graduate training, especially as it pertains to students with academic aspirations. On one side, the social and political climate regulates the form and content of fundable knowledge products. On the other, educational conditions prepare students for participation in that climate. A mainstream educational approach, where questions of power and political interests are marginalized, in favour of politically and socially “neutral” understandings of social behavior, dovetails with a network of social power interested in funding technical know-how for use in solving problems as understood from within current social and economic structures: Social psychology as the science of social maintenance as opposed to the science of social transformation.¹² A critical approach by contrast, necessarily involves challenging and questioning current power structures. This, as might be expected, will be less likely to lead to gainful employment in the field of social psychology (in its present incarnation). None-the-less, from this perspective it is possible to approach and analyze educational practices in psychology, with the aim of accounting for its experimental preoccupations.

Textually mediated social organization, power and the pastoral model. A

psychological research training, directs students toward experimental understandings through their immersion in a collection of textual practices. The key to understanding the importance of textual practices in the training of students, involves recognizing the role that text plays in the constitution of social relations (D. Smith, 1984). Textual practices in the form of the curriculum, for example, organize social relations in at least two ways. First, the curriculum organizes student social relations in accordance with a specific structure of required and optional courses. The student is required to engage and demonstrate competency in a series of programmatic learning activities. Particular learning activities are provided and performance is evaluated, leading to a division among the students in terms of their eligibility for further training at subsequent levels. Second, the curriculum organizes social relations in terms of how the actual learning activities themselves (i.e., the actual research practices learned) influence how students approach social problems. (Namely, as an academic elite who, as societies' experts, attempt to solve social problems largely independent of the people and the conditions, that constitute the problems in the first place.) My main purpose in emphasizing the textual basis of student research activities, stems from the position that textual practices represent a concrete and specifiable collection of practices that students actually participate in as part of the educational process. Both through and by means of text, students develop research abilities and communicate research "findings". The important question for me, regarding text, is one of documenting the kinds of textual practices students have been and are required to participate in, because this will provide a concrete marker of the

epistemological goals of their training. In addition to the curriculum and the various textual practices constitutive of a (social) psychological training, however, is a less identifiable training condition of critical importance to understanding the regulation of knowledge. This is the student-professor relation and in particular the student-advisor relation. The problem is to understand how these two complex and inter-connected domains of educational practices “act on the actions” of students to regulate their research activities. Consequently, it is necessary to elaborate on the notion of power I have discussed at various points above.

Power. Cherryholmes (1988) provides a good start by stating power precedes speech. Our utterances, phrases, ways of speaking, “are located within existing social institutions whose rules, power configurations, norms, commitments, and interests determine what can and cannot be said and what utterances count as” (p. 59). The student enters an already existing and historically constituted “psychological-complex,” a complex with its own particular ways of going about the process of introducing new students to the techniques and practices of knowledge production. This already existing power configuration is, in effect, an assumed background the student becomes increasingly aware of as their participation within it increases. They come to learn the rules, the norms and the interests of the discipline and their individual research activities reflect a response ranging from acceptance to challenge, regarding what can and cannot be said and done in the name of social inquiry. To understand power, as it operates at the level of the curriculum and student-professor relations, it is useful to view the student as a “subject” in a double sense as that which is acted on and that which acts. Marshall elaborates on the

ambiguity of the concept “subject” by stating it, “means both being tied to someone else by control and dependence, and being tied to one’s own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (1990, p. 14). Another way of describing the subject is as, “an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows” (Marshall, 1990, p. 14). When situating the student within already existing configurations of power (otherwise known as a psychological training), it is important to view the student neither as strictly determined nor as entirely free, in her or his actions. The embeddedness of the subject within configurations of power, entails processes of regulation not determination. Miller (1987) describes power, “as a multiplicity of practices for the promotion and regulation of subjectivity, (as cited in Tierney & Rhoads, 1993, p. 321). To understand human behaviour, it is necessary to understand how power plays a role in structuring subjectivity. But one must also recognize the subject’s ability to act for her or his own purposes, even if those actions must occur within configurations of power organized prior to the subjects entering the scene. As Burbules (1986) states, “power is a relation that is not simply chosen (or avoided) but made more or less necessary by the circumstances under which persons come together,” (as cited in Tierney & Rhoads, 1993, p. 321). Foucault’s (1982) description of power as, “a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions,” also highlights the fundamental duality entailed in the notion of a subject as both the actor and the acted on (p. 789). The subject - in our case the student - enters an historically constituted psychological discipline both as an independent knower and as an object of knowledge. The dual conception of the subject, makes it possible to understand how educational practices (i.e., institutional actions) can be either embraced or resisted by

the actions of students. It is not a question of educational practices determining the research subjectivity of students. Rather, it is a question of the subject acting to produce knowledge within the context of an already existing and historically constituted network of regulatory practices, procedures and inter-personal relationships.

Pastoral power. Howley and Hartnett (1992) analyze the contemporary university in terms of how it is constituted by the interplay of knowledge and power.¹³ The authors focus on two paradigms for understanding power relations within major institutions: (a) disciplines and (b) the pastorate. In the university, pastoral power is more applicable than disciplinary power (the power predominant in institutions like prisons, mental hospitals and public schools). The author's characterize pastor power:

Unlike physical domination, which restricts all action, pastoral power establishes a technology whereby certain actions structure the field of other possible actions. Through its exercise, pastoral power enables and precludes certain actions, thereby exerting a normative influence over the lives of individuals. Conceived in this way, the power of the state neither dominates individuals nor connects them to a unitary political entity.

Instead it distinguishes them as individuals, counsels and guides them, and through this process, 'ensures, sustains, and improves' their lives. (p. 272)

Pastoral power is meant to highlight a normative based power within which voluntary compliance to the prevailing values and conditions is sought. The educational process, for example, functions to exert a, "normative influence over the lives of individuals," effectively regulating the actions of student by depending on the students to

choose what is “good” for them. This reminds me of Ring’s (1967) discussion (above) of getting students to share rather than protest against the values of their mentors. Power relations in such a context is described as, “a complicated interplay of coercion and freedom” (p. 272). Freedom (what I discuss above as the subjects ability to act) is a crucial aspect of power relations because the student’s commitment to a specific academic path, requires them to chose on their own, to share and not to protest against the dominant values of the discipline.

The authors describe the role of the state in academia:

In spite of its presumed autonomy and its evident stature ... the contemporary university is completely, if imperceptibly, bound to the state.

The public university — and even the private university to some degree — relies on the state for its sustenance and, to some extent, for its credibility.

The university, in turn, serves the state in important ways: it supports ‘state rationality’ by cultivating individuals whose lives ‘foster the strength of the state,’ and it promotes the state’s truth-seeking by elaborating a variety of useful discursive practices, such as the language and rituals of medicine or psychology. (p. 274)

To understand how the university supports and fosters a close relationship with the dominant knowledge-interests of the state, the authors claim, “one must analyze the mechanisms of capillary power - power localized in particular physical and temporal settings” (p. 274). Analysis must be at the level of concrete and specifiable practices in actual settings.

One particular “technology of power” they discuss, focuses on the induction of the novice scholar into the academy. I have been focusing on a similar object characterizing it in terms of the regulation of student research activities. In both cases, from the point of view of the university, the induction of students into the logic of the discipline is crucial to the maintenance of the power-structure. The authors focus in particular on the distinction between bachelor, master and doctor. The levels are held to play two roles: (a) to provide a hierarchy of increasing selectivity in the reproduction of the disciplinary perspectives and (b) to differentiate the induction of social technologists from social scientists (p. 278).

“Whereas doctoral programs replenish the supply of social scientists within the university, baccalaureate and master’s degree programs supply the social institutions of control (such as public schools, hospitals, mental hospitals, and prisons) with technologists skilled in the exercise of disciplinary power” (p. 278). Viewed this way, the masters students’ training is intended to equip her or him with technical skills suitable for placement within various dominant institutional apparatuses. The training aims at producing technicians capable of reproducing and exercising the disciplinary forms of power necessary for maintaining current social institutions.

In discussing the baccalaureate and master’s curriculum, the authors discuss how such programs, “institutionalize social control through the power of knowledge” (p. 278). In line with the dual notion of the subject, the “power of knowledge” with respect to students, works in two ways: (a) there is the power of practices of evaluation, classification and division (i.e., the subject as an object of knowledge) and (b) there is the power of employing the practices and techniques of social control as a university trained

technician (i.e., the subject who acts). To the extent students are objects of knowledge, their performance can be assessed and evaluated by a collection of educational practices aimed at encouraging them to approach problems in specifiable ways. The rites and rituals to academic advancement and the consequences of disregarding these rites and rituals, can effectively wean out the students whose epistemological products do not conform to disciplinary standards.¹⁴ The students who are not weaned out, accomplish this feat through adherence to disciplinary standards. They have accomplished the goals set out by the discipline and presumably this will equip them to participate within the institutional framework in a way that says they belong. At the doctoral level, this power increasingly takes the form of pastoral relations (although they are also present at the masters level). The aim is to bring the aspiring student into the fold, which is to say to reward the student for accepting and reproducing the accepted practices and values of the discipline. One of the ways of ensuring the student chooses what is “good” for her or him is to have them defend a presentation of new knowledge under, “the scrutiny of a committee of professors, experienced in the discursive practice to which the student seeks access” (p. 280). But while one might expect success in this defense to release the new academic from the rites and rituals of knowledge production, the larger institutional forces that link the university to the state ensure that the academic continues to choose what is “good” for her or him (and for the state) for years to come.

In closing, the authors discuss how students who do not comply to or otherwise reject the normative parameters of the discipline, will be viewed:

If as the discussion thus far suggests, universities use various technologies

of power to try to dominate students and professors on behalf of the state, resistance will appear as the insubordinate actions of those who are not wholly dominated. These persons, through their resistance to the technologies of power, can take for themselves and open to others access to strategies of power that will ultimately alter the nature of both knowledge and power. (p. 282)

In other words, students who act in resistance to the regulating force of educational power relations, put them themselves in the position - through their own non-normative research products - of suggesting to other students, the power structure and its techniques of knowing are open to criticism.

Methodology and Rationale

One purpose of this thesis, has been to show that social psychological research activities have been and are, inextricably tied up with a history of social, economic, political and institutional practices. The account I have developed, was intended to direct the reader to consider how factors outside of the “logic of research design” have played a significant role in determining the form that logic has taken, in the methodological training of psychology students. Another purpose, involving the analysis of the “crisis” in social psychology, was intended to show there was (and still is) dissatisfaction with a near exclusive emphasis on experimental social psychology, including its general disregard for the value of non-positivist methodological strategies and approaches. I have also attempted to show that the history of social psychological inquiry has been a history of decreasing scope and applicability, both methodologically and substantively. Finally,

related to this decreasing scope, I have alluded to how social psychology's theoretical and methodological approaches to social research, have consistently reflected the biases of experimental psychology in general. The historical shifts have been from Floyd Allport's inauguration of a behaviorist social psychology to the increasing trend, over decades, of a predominately laboratory based social psychology of the college student, to the present day focus on the social cognitions of college students.

As should be clear, there are many socio-historical and institutional factors necessary for providing a comprehensive examination and explanation of social psychology's adherence to experimentalism. Cartwright (1979) probably as well as anyone, identifies some of the many practices that function to regulate epistemological form. For example, policies of funding agencies, editorial practices of journals and publishing houses, the monetary and symbolic reward systems of university departments, the nature of graduate programs, and the particular perspectives of those who constitute the sub-discipline. It is important to note that all of these factors are important and necessary for understanding the methodological form social psychological research has maintained over the last five decades. I will now narrow my focus, however, to those practices that pertain to the education and training of psychology students within institutions of higher education. More specifically - and this is the essence of the methodological strategy I have been employing throughout - in what follows I *extend* the present analysis by further narrowing the focus, in this case to a selected assortment of educational practices constitutive of the conceptual and practical training in methods of research at the University of Manitoba.

The rationale for conducting a case study of the University of Manitoba stems out of three factors: 1) It is within this department that I received my training and consequently I have certain critical experiences and familiarities with the program requirements and basic educational procedures and content which can be of benefit in developing the account, 2) psychology departments presumably differ and providing detailed information on the educational practices of one department may prove useful for future comparisons with other psychology departments and 3) a department provides a relatively contained system of practices that can be understood to function collectively to reproduce, through the educational activities and research products of graduate students, the basic epistemological and ontological assumptions and practices constitutive of that department. In other words I have chosen to narrow the focus to the educational practices of one department because such a focus allows for the concrete examination of actual everyday practices as they impact on the training of social psychology students.

To clarify my methodology, I will elaborate on the critical ethnographic approach I will be employing as it is articulated in the work of D. Smith (e.g., 1984, 1987, 1990). The main quality of this method of inquiry is what is referred to as “standpoint,” and it is based on the assumption that knowledge production always occurs from a particular point of view. Consequently, the key to employing a critical ethnographic perspective is to be clear as to the particular perspective or standpoint one is taking, to analyze and interpret the data of interest. My standpoint, as may be evident by now, is that of a graduate student currently immersed within the educational practices I am examining. I am also a white male who has read the writings of a number of dead white men over the years and this has

undoubtedly influenced the sources of information I have chosen to use to develop my account as well as the basic tenor, tone and emphasis of the critique itself. Shiner (1982), discusses Foucault's notion of the specific intellectual which may be helpful in clarifying the notion of standpoint. Shiner speaks of, "the 'specific' intellectual who speaks out on regional issues which relate to his or her field of knowledge and practice," (p. 383). In contrast to the "universal intellectual," who might be said to speak for everyone in the name of universal truths, the specific intellectual focuses her or his critical tools on that aspect of life they are practically involved in. The key to standpoint methodology is that inquiry is to be organized, from the beginning, at the level of actual everyday practices. The aim is to approach inquiry by explicating, "the actual social processes and practices organizing people's everyday experience from a standpoint in the everyday world" (p. 151). Inquiry at this level, aims at preserving the presence of people in the analysis, of expressing the, "actual activities of actual individuals" and of exploring how those activities are organized as social relations. This particular methodological stance is intended to produce a kind of knowledge different from acontextual knowledge, where actual everyday practices are invisible. Not only does it reject the notion of disinterested inquiry but it insists interested inquiry is valid and that it is valid to begin inquiry from a particular site or point-of-view (D. Smith, 1990). In other words, standpoint methodology is committed to a form of inquiry that violates the standard conditions of psychological objectivity. One of the goals of such a methodological approach (I refer to it above in terms of an emancipatory knowledge-interest) is to provide a means for the subject to grasp, "the social relations organizing the worlds of their experience" (p. 153). When

connecting this approach to my research aims, the goal is to focus on the concrete and everyday practices of psychology with the intent of showing students and other interested readers, how a psychological training functions to constrain and inhibit how social psychology students approach and understand social problems.

In reference to institutional ethnography, D. Smith (1987) emphasizes how such research aims at explicating how institutional relations determine everyday worlds. The aim of a critical ethnographic approach, however, is far from merely a subjective enterprise, although clearly human subjectivity is a critical component to any standpoint methodological approach. Rather ethnography is meant to convey a commitment to an investigation and explanation of how actual everyday practices and relations really work (p. 160). The question of validity necessarily refers back to the actual practices and processes themselves: Do things actually work the way it has been claimed? “Its methods, whether of observation, interviewing, recollection of work experience, use of archives, textual analysis, or other, are constrained by the practicalities of investigation of social relations as actual practices” (p. 160). The question the reader must ask as they consider my description and analysis of educational practices is this: Do the practices and relations documented and discussed, actually work in the ways it is claimed they work? But in addition to the question of validity, the evaluation of the analysis I have developed needs to be assessed in terms of plausibility, credibility, relevance and importance.¹⁵ To evaluate the analysis is this way, however, first requires recognizing that the goal of the inquiry has not been to establish another acontextual and apolitical “truth” about human social behaviour but rather to persuasively argue for and support a different way of thinking

about and approaching social psychological inquiry than traditionally offered as part of the curriculum. Further, my intention has been to accomplish this goal, in part, by virtue of my use of a non-positivist (i.e., critical and interpretive) approach that demonstrates its own value by virtue of how it succeeds (or fails) in presenting the reader with a plausible, coherent and reasonable analysis.

Finally, it is important to address the question of the larger relevance of such a specific analysis. Often, such in-depth qualitative work is criticized on the grounds that it does not touch on matters outside of its limited realm of application. Part of the reason for the extensive historical analysis, as well as the critiques with which I began the paper, was to make clear to the reader that an examination of specific mechanisms at the level of a psychology department, can clearly be linked to much broader socio-historical trends within the discipline. The everyday activities of psychological training - here and now - can be seen as the concrete expression and consequence of larger socio-historical practices. Thus, treating the everyday world as problematic (to coin D. Smiths phrase), “does not confine us to particular descriptions of local settings without possibility of generalization,” (D. Smith, 1987, p. 157). Rather, the examination of the local and the specific is a “point of entry ... into a larger social and economic process” (p. 157).

Materials to be Examined

Chapter five consists of both a description and an analysis of selected elements of the educational practices of the Psychology Department at the University of Manitoba across the last number of decades. My aim was to document key aspects of the educational practices in psychology from the undergraduate up to the Ph.D. level and to

provide an interpretive analysis of how this training regulates the production of knowledge. The form of the analysis largely involves: (a) the presentation and analysis of various historical documents such as texts and aspects of the curriculum but also includes, (b) data from interviews with students. In addition my own experiences and familiarity with the department - that is to say my subjectivity as a (white male) graduate student - are included as an important and necessary factor in the construction of the account.

The following list consists of the various sources of data I have used to construct a description and interpretive analysis of educational practices at the University of Manitoba. I explain the process more thoroughly in chapter five. Here I merely present the sources of information and materials examined:

1. University general calendars and departmental brochures across the decades.
2. Required undergraduate courses and textbooks across the decades.
3. Required graduate courses and textbooks across the decades.
4. Interviews with undergraduate and graduate students regarding their reflections, experiences and opinions about particular aspects of training.
4. Graduate theses and dissertations in social psychology.
5. Prefaces of selected methods texts and social psychology texts across the decades.
6. The content of the 1998/99 fourth year Honours Research Seminar.
7. The content of a 1992 graduate course on theory in social psychology.
8. Email correspondence with various academics within the department concerning textual materials that could not be obtained through archival documents.

I chose these materials because they constitute a considerable proportion of the core educational practices that honours and graduate students are required to participate in as part of her or his training, irrespective of sub-disciplinary speciality (save for the explicit references to social psychology courses).

Educational Practices at the University of Manitoba

An Interpretive Analysis of Educational Practices at the University of Manitoba

My aim in this chapter is to describe and examine various documents that constitute some of the central textual practices that psychology students are required to participate in as part of their training. Throughout, I describe aspects of the textual practices and then I attempt to show how these practices function to structure the research understandings and activities of students in the direction of experimental inquiry. In addition, I analyze aspects of six student interviews that focused on training in psychology. The aim of the interview analysis is to highlight the various perspectives of the students and how those perspectives reflect (or contradict) the basic points I have raised above about the educational process. In addition, I provide a more general interpretation of the training process by distinguishing how an undergraduate training is governed predominately by disciplinary power while the transition to graduate work involves a shift in the role of normative or pastoral power in regulating student research. The specific structure of the analysis is as follows.

First, I discuss aspects of the undergraduate honours program. I provide data on the structure of the curriculum across the decades, focusing on required courses as well as social psychology courses. I then examine the prefaces to both required texts and social psychology texts (with the chapter titles of these texts located in an appendix) to highlight how research practices and the psychological discipline were (are) being characterized. The above materials are intended to provide the reader with a sense for the educational emphasis within psychology as represented by required courses. I then examine some of the materials relevant to the fourth year honours seminar course. This seminar course is

required of all honours and pre-masters students and is basically a mini-tour of the practices and procedures required of graduate students as they develop a thesis or dissertation. My aim is to look a little deeper into the specific practices constituting this course and to elaborate on the ways in which student research behaviour is socially organized. This is followed by an analysis of aspects of interviews with two undergraduate students who had participated in the fourth year honours course, in terms of their experiences with and perceptions of the training provided in the course. As indicated above, each section will involve both a description of some textual materials (e.g., the content of the texts based on chapter titles, the themes or topics emphasized in the prefaces of texts, the educational thrust of the honours course) and an analysis of how the research activities of students are socially organized with respect to such materials. Finally I will close out the section by characterizing the undergraduate program in terms of disciplinary power.

Second, I discuss aspects of the graduate program. I provide data on the structure of the curriculum focusing on required courses. I then document the chapter titles for required texts across the decades to provide the reader with a sense for the methodological emphasis of the program. I then provide a description of the content of one graduate course in social psychology, based on my notes for this course, so as to provide the reader with a sense for what social theory *means* in social psychology. Following this, I provide some basic quantitative data regarding the research design, techniques of analysis and samples used, in M.A. theses and Ph.D. dissertations produced by social psychology students across the decades. I then highlight and discuss selections

from interviews with four graduate students about the graduate program in social psychology. I then reflect on my own graduate training experiences. Finally I close the section on graduate training by characterizing it in terms of a shift toward normative power as the key regulatory force governing the production of graduate work.

In addition to the specific purposes of the analyses of the undergraduate and graduate programs, however, there are two more general purposes. The first general purpose is to generate an historical record of research practices disseminated at the University of Manitoba (U of M). Given the social and historical analysis I have constructed regarding the experimental preoccupations of academic psychology, how consistent have been (and are) the U of M's research practices with the general historical pattern within the discipline? To what extent, in other words, were (are) the experimental preoccupations of the discipline in general, reflected in the training practices at the U of M? The second purpose is to develop an interpretive analysis that situates the training activities and conceptual and methodological development of the student within this history of research practices. Given the structure of the curriculum, the required courses and the practical considerations of producing a thesis/dissertation document, is it plausible to understand student research activities and research products in terms of textually mediated social organization and relations of power? In addition, do the practices and relationships that constitute a training in psychology at the U of M help account for social psychology's experimental preoccupations throughout its entire history?

Undergraduate Honours Psychology

As stated, I used a number of different sources of information to construct an

account that situates the student within an already existing collection of educational practices. The general calendars were used to provide information about: (a) the structure of the curriculum, (b) the textbooks for the second year required courses, (c) required social psychology texts, and (d) additional information such as course descriptions.¹⁶ The information I obtained through the general calendars or through other means has been organized into two tables. Table 6 (below), details the required courses and in some cases the assigned textbooks for selected years (based on the availability of such information) for the honours program at five year intervals beginning in 1945. Table 7 (below) provides details regarding social psychology courses and texts over the same period.¹⁷

By way of introduction, it is perhaps informative to learn that in the 1945/46 academic year, psychology was part of the “Department of Philosophy and Psychology.” It is not until the 1946/47 academic year that psychology became a separate department. This was also about the same time that psychology was “professionalizing” and social psychology was coming of age with numerous social psychology departments springing up across America. During the 1945/46 academic year, there were a total of six courses offered in the program: Introductory, Experimental, Social, Industrial and Applied, Personality and Contemporary Theory (with five distinct content options).

Looking at Table 6, the first thing to note is that social psychology is a required course in the 1950/51 and 1955/56 academic years. In the 1945/46, 1960/61 and 1965/66 academic years, social psychology is not required but it is one of two options that must be taken in the second year of the honours program (the other option is, industrial and applied in 1945/46 and developmental in 1960/61 and 1965/66). After this point, a course

in social psychology is chosen entirely at the discretion of the student. The second thing to note is that the required courses are predominately methodology courses. In year two of the honours program, beginning in 1955 and running up to 1995 every honours student has been required to take an "Advanced General Psychology," course. As can be seen from the textbook titles, the methodological emphasis appears to be predominately that of experimental methodology and statistical analysis. In year three of the program the content of the required courses does not appear to focus specifically on research methodology and includes required courses in personality from 1945 to 1960, among other courses. Note, however, that learning theory - meaning experimental research in the behaviorist tradition - is a third year required course from 1960 to 1990. Finally, in year four note a general emphasis on research methodology although there are some years where the student can choose among a set of options and consequently need not necessarily take a course in experimental research methods. As for the fourth year "Honours Research Seminar," the description in the general calendar from 1980 to 1995 is identical: "In first term there will be an examination of important experimental issues, and several experimental assignments. In addition, each student will propose a research project of greater scope to be conducted under the supervision of a Psychology staff member. In second term, students will carry out their projects and report their findings," (e.g, General Calendar, 1995). Thus from the perspective of the would be social psychology graduate student, social psychology is a required course in only two of the academic years examined and it would appear that, in terms of methodological outlook, they are being trained to conceptualize and conduct social research within the context of experimental procedures. Further, it would appear

Table 6

University of Manitoba, Honours Program: Required Courses & Some Methods Texts

	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4
1945	EXPERIMENTAL - "Introduction to Psychology" (Boring, Langfelt and Weld)	PERSONALITY	Options
1950	EXPERIMENTAL - "Foundations of Psychology" (Boring, Langfelt and Weld). SOCIAL	PERSONALITY MENTAL TESTING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE	RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY - "Methods of Psychology" (Andrews) THEORIES OF LEARNING
1955	ADVANCED GENERAL - "Experimental Design in Psychological Research" (Edwards). "Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology" (Osgood) PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, a ZOOLOGY course	PERSONALITY SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND THINKING	RESEARCH METHODS - "Methods of Psychology" (Andrews). "Introduction to Experimental Method" (Townsend) MENTAL TESTING PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT COMPARATIVE APPLIED
1960	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY - "Methods in Psychology" (Andrews)	THEORY OF PERSONALITY THEORIES OF LEARNING	Options
1965	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY	THEORIES OF LEARNING ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY II	Options
1970	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY	LEARNING	RESEARCH METHODS
1976	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY - "Foundations of Psychological Research" (Plutchik). "Quantitative Topics: Introductory Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences" (Welkowitz, Ewen and Cohen)	LEARNING	Options
1980	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY	LEARNING	HONOURS RESEARCH SEMINAR
1988	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY - "Experimental Methodology - 4 th ed" (Christensen). "Statistics - 2 nd ed" (Witte)	LEARNING	HONOURS RESEARCH SEMINAR
1990	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY	LEARNING	HONOURS RESEARCH SEMINAR
1993	ADVANCED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY - "Methods: Toward a Science of Behavior and Experience - 4th ed" (Ray). "Introduction to Statistics for the Social and Behavioral Sciences - 2th ed" (Christensen and Stoup)	3 Options	HONOURS RESEARCH SEMINAR

* 1976, 1988 and 1993 were used because I had information about the assigned texts for these years.

Table 7

University of Manitoba: Undergraduate Social Psychology Texts

General Calendar	Social Psychology	Other Optional Social Psychology Courses
1945	SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Katz & Shanck)	Recent Contributions to Social Psychology: 1) EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Murphy, Murphy & Newcomb), 2) DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY (Lewin), 3) PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (Brown), 4) SOCIAL NORMS (Sherif)
1950	THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Kretch & Crutchfield), ref book: READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Newcomb & Hartley)	none
1955	THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Kretch & Crutchfield), ref book: READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Newcomb & Hartley)	none
1960	THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Kretch & Crutchfield), ref book: READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Newcomb & Hartley)	none
1965	SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Roger Brown)	none
1970		none
1976*	SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SEVENTIES (Wrightman), THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (Aronson)**	none
1980		none
1985		none
1990		SELECTED TOPICS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
1993	SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (4th. Edition) (David Myers)	SELECTED TOPICS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL COGNITION

* 1976 and 1993 were used because I had information about assigned texts for this year.

** Also in this section: The Science Game, Humanistic Behaviorism and Social Psychology, An Introduction to Attribution Processes, Doing Onto Others: Joining, Molding, Conforming, Helping, Loving

that an experimental approach to research has constituted the core curriculum of the undergraduate psychology honours program at the University of Manitoba from its inception.

Second Year Required Courses: Prefaces and Tables of Content

To help place psychological inquiry in historical context, I will begin by discussing Boring, Langfeld & Weld's, 1935 textbook, *Psychology: A Factual Textbook*. I could not locate the required text by the same authors for the 1945/46 academic year. In the preface, the authors describe the field of experimental psychology as having, "reached the stage of maturity. There is a vast amount of well-substantiated fact which forms the foundation of the science, and we have felt that these facts should be presented to the young student of psychology in terms free from the bias of metaphysical presuppositions or of psychological systems" (p. vii). Implicit in this description is the positivist assumption that experimentally derived facts are somehow produced independently of metaphysical presuppositions and of psychological systems (i.e., stand outside of an actual social and historical context). They discuss their aim of presenting a "factual text as one should expect from a science," and note that theoretical discussions and controversial points have largely been omitted. See Appendix B for the chapter titles of textbooks discussed in this section.

In 1948, the same three authors publish a new text, *Foundation of Psychology*, that is required reading at the U of M in 1950. They mention the importance of World War II in leading to, "new and valuable knowledge" including a, "clearly distinguishable change in point of view" (p. vii). "In 1948 the important thing about the organism is not

that it is conscious, but that it reacts to stimulation” (p. vii). The authors appear to be emphasizing the importance of a behavioral analysis of human behavior. The text has been reworked. It now begins with, “response — its nature, its mechanics, its maturation, its dependence on motive,” and preparing the student to “study learning as a change in the organism’s response repertoire,” then to “perception as a form of the organism’s adjustment to its physical environment,” leading to research on individual differences, personal adjustment and social relations (p. viii). The empirical road to understanding social relations requires working from a behaviorist model of learning.

For the 1955 academic year, there are two textbooks assigned for the newly named “Advanced General” course: a research methods textbook and a textbook on statistical technique. I managed to find Edwards (1960), *Experimental Design in Psychological Research* (note the only version I could find was subsequent to the 1955 academic year). The preface provides little information. The table of contents, however, clearly shows the general methodological pattern familiar to presumably all undergraduate students from that period to the present. As can be seen in Appendix B, there are chapters on probabilities, t-tests, analysis of variance, factorial analysis, and analysis of covariance among others. Experimental design appears to mean designing research amenable to statistical analysis.

I also obtained one of the two research methods texts for fourth year honours for the same academic year: Townsend’s (1953) *Introduction to Experimental Method: For Psychology and the Social Sciences*. Townsend notes the text will appeal to three overlapping categories of individuals: (a) undergraduates undergoing, “exposure to the

rigors of the experimental method in psychology,” (b) students with an inadequate background in the experimental method and “faced with the necessity of ‘doing a piece of research’ to satisfy thesis requirements,” and (c) social science workers finding a demand for research projects as part of their work (p. vii). These three categories suggest that experimental methods were a basic component in the training and research practices of psychology students of the period. It also suggests, however, that such skills were of demand outside of training and academia, perhaps in the business community. Townsend also notes that there, “is a need to develop in students an early appreciation of the theory of scientific method and statistics,” and that past training was based on a “cookbook” method with students given complete directions for performing a certain experiment. The problem with this approach, however, was that it did not call on students to design their own experiments and become good experimenters. This book consequently places an emphasis on training students to, “think along lines of the development of sound research designs,” rather than executing standardized traditional experiments. In the process the student will be exposed to elements of theory and method necessary, “for the understanding of the performance of experiments” (p. vii). Explicit throughout the preface is the primacy of experimentalism. Being a good researcher in psychology entails being able to design ones own experiments and to think in terms of sound research designs. In short, in psychology research *means* experimental research.

In 1976, Plutchik’s (1974), *Foundations of Experimental Research*, is assigned. The two prefaces (for first and second editions) are short and both discuss the importance of experimentalism and how it involves a decision making process. “The decisions concern

such issues as: definitions of key concepts, sampling of subjects as well as conditions, measurement, scaling, instrumentation, design and statistics” (p. xiv). The second preface notes the addition of a chapter on analysis of variance and refers to recent criticisms of the concept of significance level considered independently of effect sizes. Consequently effect sizes are discussed. Welkowitz, Ewen and Cohen’s (1971), *Introductory Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*, is the assigned statistics text. They note a broader approach to hypothesis testing including a full chapter on statistical power and the probability of a Type II error.

For the 1980s, I used my own “Advanced General Psychology” texts. I took the course in the 1988/89 academic year. Christensen’s (1988), *Experimental Methodology - 4th edition*, was assigned. The short preface basically amounts to a discussion of how the text has been made more accessible to students through various pedagogical aids. The emphasis appears to have shifted from justifying textbooks on the ground of sound experimental practice to demonstrating the value of the text for student learning. Perhaps by this point in psychology’s history, emphasizing its commitment to an experimental approach would be to state the obvious. Witte’s (1985), *Statistics* was the assigned statistics text. Again the preface consists largely of reassuring the reader about studying statistics and includes a listing of pedagogical features intended to facilitate learning the material.

Finally, the content of Ray’s (1997) text, *Methods: Towards a Science of Behavior and Experience - 4th edition*,” suggests that the history of the second year honours course represents a consistent emphasis on an experimental methodological approach to research.

Christensen and Stoup's (1991) *Introduction to Statistics for the Social and Behavioral Sciences - 2nd edition*, is the required stats text for the 1997 academic year. Appendix B highlights the similarity of the chapter contents across the years of the "advanced" program. In the early years (i.e., 1945, 1950), the emphasis appeared to be on reading about the results of experimental research in general. After this period, however, the emphasis was on experimental methods of inquiry and statistical techniques of analysis.

It appears then that throughout the entire history of the psychology department at the University of Manitoba, the methodological emphasis for second year honours students has been (and is) on the use of an experimental methodology with the attendant techniques of statistical analysis. Research is objective in a very specific way. It is objective in the sense that it entails formulating hypotheses, defining variables, controlling for confounds, assuring internal validity and employing experimental or quasi-experimental research designs. Psychological research, in other words, is oriented towards an empirical-analytic knowledge-interest in technical knowledge. The goal of the research process is the prediction and control of human behavior. Sound research practice is equated with establishing quantitatively specifiable relationships among variables. Statistical techniques are employed to the extent that they can assist the researcher in ascertaining if hypothesized relationships among variables are (probably) true or false. An honours students initial foray into the world of psychological inquiry entails understanding the research process as a quantitatively rigorous enterprise within which the basic goal of any research project is to establish the cause and effect nature (but correlation will do) of the relationships among operationally defined variables. Implicit in this research orientation is

a division between the researcher and the researched. Already, at this early stage, the student is being oriented to take the position of an expert or an authority with respect to the process of psychological knowledge production. But equally as important as the positive or productive aspects of a training in research methodology, are the omissions. What the student is not encouraged to do, for example, is to reflect critically on her or his own experiences and to ask if those experiences connect meaningfully with the kinds of objective systems of research they are being asked to participate in. The second year student enters the third year of the honours program equipped with the skills and practices for conducting experimental research. In all likelihood, what psychological research *means* for the student is that it involves the manipulation and quantitative measurement of independent and dependent variables in a controlled laboratory environment.

In third year, a course in Learning is required from 1960 to 1990. While I did not examine actual “Learning” texts over this period, it is probably safe to assume that honours students were required to familiarize themselves with the specific experimental techniques common to behaviorist research. When I took the course in the 1989/90 academic year, the assigned textbook was Schwartz’s (1989) *The Psychology of Learning and Behavior - 3rd Edition*. It included chapters on Pavlovian conditioning, operant conditioning and schedules of reinforcement.

Looking at the fourth year of the honours program, after the 1955 year where five courses are required, there are some years where the student has options that need not necessarily require taking a methods course. By 1980 and up to 1995 (and in fact, up to the present), however, a new required course is put in place: the honours research

seminar. Although I do not have information on the specific content of this course over the years, below I focus in detail on the content of the 1998/99 honours seminar course.

Before examining the honours seminar course, I will examine the prefaces to a number of social psychology texts across this historical period with the aim of highlighting both how the discipline of social psychology was characterized and what themes or viewpoints were emphasized. As can be seen from Table 7 (above), I have obtained five textbooks covering the period of 1945 to 1995. I could not find a specific reference to a text for the 1980s but I personally used the second edition of Myers's "Social Psychology" in 1989 and will examine the preface of the fourth edition as it is still the standard text assigned in most social psychology classes at the U of M.

Social Psychology Texts: Prefaces and Chapter Titles

Please see Appendix C for a listing of the chapter titles of the books discussed below.

Katz and Schanck's (1938) text was assigned in 1945. The authors note that, "man is a creature not only capable of inspiring poetry and drama, but one whose social living may be scrutinized with the same scientific objectivity that is applied to non-human things" (p. vii). In discussing social psychology's youth and the "uneven rate of progress in its experimental findings," the authors state that, "time has not yet permitted a thorough assimilation of facts and concepts in this broad province to a generally accepted systematic framework" (p. vii). The authors also address the question of studying the "vital" problems of everyday life and contrast sociological texts with social psychology texts in terms of experimental rigour.. While sociological texts focus on, "the problems of

everyday adjustment,” such texts are problematic in as much as their value is, “in proportion with the brilliance of the writer and leaves the scientific student with the feeling that these are splendid descriptions of problems rather than conclusive findings about them” (viii).

Paragraph five of the preface appears to encapsulate an extreme optimism regarding what an experimental social psychology is capable of accomplishing.

We believe, however, that it is possible to meet the requirements of scientific validity and conceptual adequacy within the bounds of the experimental tradition. The development of experimental work in social psychology has progressed to a stage wherein a fairly complete treatment of the entire subject matter can now be given in the light of experimentally derived knowledge. In other words, where actual experiments remain yet to be performed, the problems can even now be envisaged in terms of experimentally established facts. (p. viii)

Interestingly, the structure of the book is intended to introduce problems from different points of view such as, “the man on the street,” or through the “eyes of the clinician or psychiatrist,” or from the perspective of the social engineer or planner. While the authors clearly intend to emphasize social psychology’s scientific credentials, the text itself is described as focusing on social psychological problems from diverse perspectives. The authors summarize the four parts of the book as follows: “Part I is thus descriptive and sociological, Part II is analytical and experimental, Part III is genetic and developmental, Part IV historical and dialectical” (p. ix).

Nonetheless, the authors make clear that they have attempted to, “develop a rigorous emphasis upon the perceptual data which underlie social psychology, and to keep our feet as close to the grounds of observable fact as seems possible, hence our emphasis on the psychology of the individual” (p. x).

Finally, in closing and discussing the value of the text they state:

the course in social psychology should become a useful ground work for courses in political science, economics, and sociology. The emphasis upon the experimental tends to accentuate an attitude basic to psychology, and we believe orients social psychology toward the general line of courses in psychology which may follow,” (p. x).

Krech and Crutchfield’s (1948) text was assigned for the years, 1950, 1955 and 1960. The authors state that the book is designed for those, “primarily interested in the *science* of psychology as a systematic, interpretive account of human behavior and who are interested in *applying the science* of psychology to current social issues” (vii). They discuss how, “the basic guiding principle has been that a theoretically sound social psychology is also a practically valid and immediately useful social psychology” (p. vii). In addition they suggest that neither scientist nor layperson can, “neglect public opinion survey data or experiments on perceptual organization without running the risk of making his theory truncated and narrow or his program of action superficial and ineffective” (p. vii).

They emphasize a distinction between basic principles and theory and practical

applications. While basic and fundamental research focuses on “timeless questions,” more practical work focuses on, “public opinion survey methods, sampling problems, and action programs designed to minimize industrial conflict, racial prejudice, and international tensions” (p. vii). They state, “a large section of this book is devoted to such basic principles, but if the student is to be in a position to evaluate the theoretical soundness of basic principles he must take the time to “spell out” the operation of these basic processes in the behavior of the leader of a labor union, the politician, the father of a family, and the disciple of a “hate” organization. After all, these basic principles presumably apply to human behavior” (p. vii/viii). Social psychology at this juncture, as reflected in the preface of this particular but popular text (according to Stringer, 1990),¹⁸ appears to retain a sense of immediacy with actual social problems.

In discussing the structure of the book, the authors emphasize the, “fundamental role that perceptual processes play in man’s beliefs, attitudes, thinking and action,” and how the theoretical structure leans on concepts and experimental findings from perception research. They also note a new field of inquiry, group dynamics, that is given a “prominent place in this book”. In addition, they note that the, “war work of psychologists, psychiatrists and sociologists has demonstrated the necessity of integrating clinical and sociological data with psychological phenomena” (p. viii). To this end, the authors employ clinical concepts and sociological descriptions and data, “in sketching the backgrounds for our psychological analysis of behavior” (p. viii).

Brown’s (1965) text was the assigned text for 1965. It precedes the crisis period although by this point social psychologists had been made aware of the potential problems

of psychological experiments by Orne (1962) among others. Even so, the preface seems to present a less optimistic characterization of social psychology in terms of its being a distinct and unified area of inquiry. Brown highlights social psychology's somewhat loose boundaries. It is not a system of psychology like reinforcement or psychoanalytic theory. Nor is it, "a simple 'extrapolation to the social level' of principles developed in general experimental psychology" (p. xix). It uses sociological data but is not a synthesis of psychological and sociological knowledge. Rather, "social psychology in 1964 is a set of topics that have exceeded the grasp of a non-social psychology but which are being effectively investigated by a psychology that draws upon the social sciences" (p. xx). Brown then highlights an, "authoritative list of the topics that constitute social psychology in 1964," based on chapter headings of a recent edition of *Readings in Social Psychology*. Reflecting on this list of topics and asking if one can abstract from it a logical class of topics considered to be "the domain of social psychology," Brown concludes that he cannot so abstract a domain that would, "distinguish the topics of social psychology from topics that remain within general experimental psychology or sociology or anthropology or linguistics" (xx).

In terms of structure, Brown points out that the various areas of research inquiry are relatively independent of each other in terms of methods and concepts and that most theories are miniature theories for a certain problem or class of problems. Consequently the structure of the book is in the form of a series of independent chapters and while a theoretically integrated book would be better, "since the discipline itself has not achieved integration the author of the textbook would have to achieve it. That was more than I

could do” (p. xxi).

Wrightman’s (1972) textbook is published prior to Gergen’s “Social Psychology as History” but subsequent to the many developments of the 1960s both internal and external to social psychology. The preface reflects an acute awareness of these developments. He opens the first paragraph with, “times change. It now appears that the 1970s are destined to be as different from the 1960s as that decade was from the 1950s” (p. xvii). He notes this observation means, “compilations of knowledge must reflect these changes,” and, “social psychology should be most sensitive to changes in the times” (p. xvii). Hence a need for continually new social psychology textbooks that reflect, “on always-changing contemporary social phenomena” (p. xvii). He notes how, “social psychology has been reluctant to do this; contemporary issues such as drug usage, violence in the streets, sexual freedom, and invasion of privacy often do not get the attention they deserve” (xvii). He stresses that a textbook for the 1970s, “must interrelate theory-derived knowledge with real-world applications in a mix that enhances both” (xvii).

Wrightman makes clear his aim is to provide a comprehensive text that covers diverse topics and extends the field. With this aim in mind the author states the text includes coverage of traditional topics but also topics, “about which solid theory-based knowledge is less but interest is great,” (p. xviii). This includes topics, “usually slighted or ignored in other texts,” namely “sections on love, student activism, and utopias and communes, as well as entire chapters on sexual behavior, racial differences, moral development, drug usage, social change, and community problems” (p. xviii). The author acknowledges the difficulties of, “defining, measuring, or understanding,” such

phenomenon but thinks such topics cannot be overlooked. Having said this, the author then makes clear that, “this book reflects a belief that theories are the foundation of our field.” The author states, “our goal has been to show how different theoretical orientations explain the same social behavior” (p. xviii). Emphasis is placed on how, “theories serve as a way of organizing information and seeing how facts and findings do or do not hang together.” He also places an emphasis on the limitations of current theories and how this reflects, “the present state of theory development in social psychology” (p. xviii). Wrightman also notes that by including a look to the future as well as a review of the past he hopes to, “produce a book that reflects the utilization of knowledge, rather than the mere accumulation of it” (p. xviii).

Myers’ (1993) preface reflects a new modesty, perhaps the result of decades of experimental research and of the failure to achieve the status and solve the social problems social psychology once believed was within its grasp. He opens by noting that, “human social behavior has been scientifically studied” only during this century and that considering this, “the results are gratifying” (p. xvii). He notes how, “we have amassed significant insights into belief and illusion, love and hate, conformity and independence,” providing “partial answers to many intriguing questions” (xvii). Where once social psychologists spoke of how a, “fairly complete treatment of the entire subject matter can now be given in the light of experimentally derived knowledge,” they now spoke of “partial answers to many intriguing questions”.

Myers reflects on how he first envisioned the text: “at once solidly scientific and warmly human, factually rigorous and intellectually provocative” (p. xvii). He saw it as

revealing social psychology in terms of, “providing an up-to-date summary of important social phenomena,” and how scientists uncover such phenomena. Also, it would be “reasonably comprehensive” and “stimulate students’ thinking — their readiness to inquire, to analyze, to relate principles to everyday happenings” (p. xvii). He discusses the selection of material so as to be “reasonably inclusive” (p. xvii). The author choose to “present theories and findings” not too esoteric or better suited to other courses. In addition he has chosen material that puts, “social psychology in the tradition of the liberal arts,” noting how such, “seeks to expand our thinking and awareness and to liberate us from the confines of the present” (xvii). He notes how most undergraduate students in psychology enter other professions. Thus he aims to focus on “humanly significant issues,” in a way that, “preprofessional psychology students” will find stimulating and useful.

There are four points to note in terms of a comparison and contrast of the tenor of the different prefaces. First, the prefaces appear to reflect the historical context within which the textbook was produced. In 1938, when social psychology was just beginning to establish itself as a sub-discipline, Katz and Schanck (1938) aimed to emphasize how it is distinct from sociology by being more experimentally rigorous. Social psychology’s parent discipline had, of course, long ago staked its claim on being a natural science and social psychology also aspired to this status. Krech and Crutchfield’s (1948) text, a post World War II product published shortly after Kurt Lewin’s death, emphasized the importance of both scientific principles and of practical application to the behavior of real people and organizations. Brown’s (1965) text, just at the onset of the crisis and years after the decline in enthusiasm in social psychology during the 1950s, emphasized the

fragmented nature of the discipline into various research areas that were relatively independent of each other. Wrightman's (1972) textbook, published in the early years of the crisis and following the events of the 1960s emphasized the need to be open to the social context in social inquiry. Finally Myers (1993) textbook appeared to reflect a modesty in the accomplishments of social psychology. Second, the prefaces appear to place less emphasis on its experimental credentials across time. This is connected to the historical changes, of course. After social psychology had committed itself to being an experimental discipline and after having spent decades building up an experimentally produced knowledge base, it was no longer necessary to persuade potential readers that it was a rigorous experimental discipline. This was now simply taken for granted. Third, the prefaces suggest a consistent retreat from bold claims to more modest claims about the achievements of an experimental social psychology. This probably reflects the early optimism of the discipline. As the experimental research continued to build and as the problems once believed solvable receded or consistently produced new problems for a new generation of researchers to build their careers on, bold claims about the achievements of an experimental social psychology could no longer be sustained. Fourth, the early prefaces characterized social psychology in a much more inter-disciplinary way than the later prefaces.

What, in fact, connects the various textbooks, however, is an experimental approach to the study of social phenomena. Even as Wrightman (1972) argued for the need to broaden the kinds of topics social psychologists will study, it is still within the context of an experimental approach to these new topics. New current topics are not

opportunities for more qualitative and interpretive approaches to examining social problems. Rather the new topics present problems of “defining, measuring or understanding.” The fundamental approach to problems is not altered except in the direction of an more extensive quantitative approach in the form of an increase in the use of multi-variate statistical approaches.

Fourth Year Honours Seminar

As noted above, the “Honours Research Seminar” is characterized as a course where important experimental issues are examined. My aim is to provide the reader with a sense for how this course functions to “regulate” or guide student research activities. My purpose in focusing on this course is not to show or to suggest that the training provided is in any way inadequate. In fact, the basic structure and content of the course and the attendant activities, appear to provide aspiring graduate students with a well grounded and rigorous introduction to the kinds of research tools they will need to be successful in graduate school. My purpose, rather, is to focus on the actual educational conditions that undergraduate honours students find themselves embedded in, as they prepare for graduate school. This in turn will lead to an analysis of how the educational conditions of graduate study are designed to prepare students for participation in psychology’s scholarly community. My examination of this course, in other words, is meant to be social psychological in nature if the reader will permit “social psychological” to denote a less narrow approach to inquiry than its history has up to now permitted. My aim is to examine the basic structure, content and flow of the course from the viewpoint that it can be meaningfully understood as constituted by a series of practices and relationships that

socially organize the epistemological form of student knowledge products in ways that prepares students to participate in graduate programs in psychology.

According to the course syllabus for the 1998-99 academic year, there were four required texts. I will list the book titles and then quote the syllabus characterization regarding the value of the book for the course:

1. Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association - "This is your Bible for the preparation of your proposal and thesis. It is the style guide for the majority of scientific journals in psychology, so its mastery will be important in the course."

2. Mastering APA Style: Students' Workbook and Training Guide (4th ed.) - "This is a helpful workbook and training manual. It is quite possible to learn APA style from the Publication Manual alone, so the text is optional."

3. Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists - "You will need to be familiar with ethical guidelines for the conduct of research, and this manual provides one of several frameworks for ethical conduct."

4. The Psychologist's Companion: A Guide to Scientific Writing for Students and Researchers (3rd ed.) - "This book is a style guide geared specifically to the writing of papers in psychology."

While I'm sure the use of the term "Bible" to describe the APA Publication Manual was meant tongue in cheek, it is nonetheless clear that students are expected to become proficient in the multitude of micro-writing-practices prescribed therein. Besides the text on ethics, the other three suggested texts all focus on mastering the rhetoric of scientific (read: objective in the positivist sense) report writing.

In addition, the course syllabus lists seven student objectives. The first is “to design, run, analyze, and report an original piece of empirical research under the supervision of a faculty member and the course instructor.” Two through seven focus on various developmental skills such as maturing, “from a student orientation to psychology to a professional orientation by working closely with a faculty supervisor, meeting deadlines, composing a curriculum vitae,” to developing “the ability to critically evaluate,” ones own and others research, to improving and acquiring scientific writing skills, becoming more proficient in public speaking and becoming familiar with the use of electronic mail, word processing packages, “bibliographic searching, data analysis, and graphical presentation.” The course appears well organized and includes a number of specific learning objectives for the students. The course evaluation breakdown, however, appears to focus predominantly on those objectives pertaining to public speaking and scientific research writing. Seventy-two percent of the final grade is based on the evaluation of oral presentations and research writing.

I will attempt to expand on some of the seven criteria of this course based on my experiences with the program. The first objective covers a lot of territory in terms of the practical activities that the student is expected to participate in: Design, run, analyze and report. Given the honours students training up to this point and based on my personal knowledge of the kinds of research products that fourth year honours students actually construct, “design” is meant to denote a research design amenable to statistical analysis. This is not necessarily the case for all research projects because some will produce behavioral research products that will not require statistical analysis. “Run” is a term

which generally refers to the process of conducting research on a sample of introductory psychology students. It is a code for the process of recruiting subjects, presenting them with stimulus materials, and measuring the responses. “Analyze”, will almost always mean the statistical analysis of quantitative data (save for behavioral research). And “report”, of course, refers to an empirical research paper in the form of an introduction, review, statement of the problem, listing of hypotheses, specifying the sample, procedure and materials, analyzing the results and discussing the meaning of the results. This basic educational procedure of “design, run, analyze, and report,” is reinforced through the student’s development of her or his thesis with a member of the faculty. The general procedure for working with an academic on ones honours thesis - and this can easily be discerned by examining the relationship of student theses to the research interests of the thesis advisor - is for the student to find an advisor and work with them in developing an empirical research project in the domain of expertise of their chosen advisor. If the student happens to be interested in social psychology and wishes to work with a social psychology professor at the U of M, this will likely (but not necessarily) involve conducting an empirical (i.e., experimental, quasi-experimental or correlational) study on one of the following topics: Body image, metaperceptions, attributional retraining in students, authoritarianism, or artifacts in psychological research. In each case the research will entail employing some of the methodological skills acquired in second year. This relationship will involve the professor reading the students work and making suggestions on how to improve all facets of the study, from research design to report writing. At least in the ideal the professor will do so. Each professor participates in the production of the students

research project to varying degrees. In some cases the involvement will be very nearly nil (my experience in fourth year). In other cases, the involvement of the professor will be total, including every facet of the project. At any rate the student will, with the help of an academic, go through an approximately eight month process of proposing, conducting, writing up and reporting an empirical research project.

As stated, one of the things students learn or in fact already seem to know by the time they enter the fourth year of the program, is that they will be expected to conduct experimental (quasi-experimental, correlational) research in the area of expertise of her or his advisor. Often enough, the reason given for why things are done this way is that the advisor cannot advise if the topic is outside their little empirical domain. The implicit model provided to the student is that of an apprentice who is to learn the proper way to conduct research by emulating the research practices of a professional. The standard methods of inquiry have already been laid out rather clearly by this point. It is now the students role to work with a professor and attempt to produce a knowledge product that conforms to these methodological standards. This, however, is not a specific requirement nor is it a demand. It is communicated less through explicit documentation than it is through the departmental culture (students talking to students who know students or professors who have worked with particular professors and so on). And while no student need necessarily adhere to this apprenticeship model of student induction, it is undoubtedly easier to do so in terms of time and resources spent working on the thesis project. After all, these are the research techniques and procedures the student has been trained to use over the last four years. In this way, the student equips her- or himself with

the requisite skills necessary for further study and research at the graduate level.

The “ability to critically evaluate,” is also mentioned in the syllabus as a goal of the course. In my experience, this means learning to critically examine experimental research in terms of potential methodological problems such as demand characteristics, other extraneous variables, construct validity, history effects, procedural problems, and representative samples etcetera. Critically evaluate, however, does *not* mean considering the partiality of an objectivist approach to the study of psychological phenomena. It does *not* mean questioning the value, utility or relevance of asocial and apolitical understandings of human behavior. It does *not* mean examining whose knowledge-interests researchers serve when they produce technical knowledge about people with little to no input from the people themselves.

In addition, the course is described as helping the student to acquire scientific writing skills and to present research in a public forum. I’ll turn to these two research activities by focusing specifically on the criteria used in the course, to assess public presentations and scientific writing. The purpose is to illustrate how a series of “micro-practices” function to regulate the final form of a research product (See Appendix D for the details of the evaluation criteria for the final thesis oral and manuscript). In my opinion, it is useful to recognize that each and every evaluation criteria is also simultaneously a guide or directive to assist the student in producing a knowledge product that fits a particular epistemological form.

Looking at the “Final Oral Presentation Score Sheet,” the “characteristics to be scored,” are broken down into six sections. The sections (and number of characteristics

scored, in parentheses) are as follows: Introduction (1), Style (5), Visual Aids (2), Content (15), General Preparation (2) and Peer and Audience Questions Handled Appropriately (1). All the various characteristics are to be assigned a value from 0-3, 0-4 or 0-5 depending on the characteristic. The 26 characteristics total to a mark out of 100. Some examples of characteristics from the content section are: “scientific/applied relevance of topic described,” “design addresses hypotheses,” “control variables cited and rationalized,” “data analysis clearly described,” and “interpretation of results in context of hypotheses.” For the “Feedback on Final Thesis Manuscript,” the evaluation is first broken down into two major sections (percent in parentheses): Style (30) and Content (70). Each major section is divided into subsections with some subsections further divided into specific characteristics. Style (with number of characteristics in parentheses) is divided into: APA style and Mechanics of writing (3). Content is divided into: Informative abstract and title (1), introduction to set stage for study (4), method for addressing problem/hypothesis (3), clear exposition of results (4), clear discussion (4). Again each characteristic is scored ranging from 0-4 up to 0-13 in the case of APA style totaling to 100.

As stated above, in both of these cases, the evaluation criteria should not be construed as simply a technique for grading student performance. It is not simply a tool of administration. Evaluation criteria are also directives that - whether intentionally or not - guide students in terms of the kinds of things they should be including in their research projects. If the student is gunning for an A-plus (and the more A-pluses the better when one applies to graduate school) each evaluative criteria is equivalent to a gentle nudge

directing the student to construct her or his research project in conformity with a pre-determined methodological form. Conformity to this evaluation criteria, after all, will both strengthen the students ability to write using the required scientific rhetoric and at the same time it will help the student achieve a high grade. This can only bode well in the competition for a place in a graduate program.

One additional document provided to students of 17.452 was entitled, “17.452 — Preparing the Final Thesis Manuscript.” I will discuss the section whose purpose is to assist the student with reporting the results of her or his thesis. This section implicitly illustrates what “results” *mean* from the perspective of psychological inquiry. First, less cumbersome ways to report p levels, is discussed. Discussed next is how and where to report the discarding of subject’s data. Paragraph four begins, “the text of the Results must include the outcome of your statistical tests.” It then explains how to communicate significant effects so as to highlight both descriptive and inferential statistics in a way that fully describes the relevant effects. In addition, “all statistics computed to test a hypothesis (t, F, Chi-square) should be accompanied by the corresponding index of variability, such as the standard error of the mean, the mean square error (MSe) for F ratios.” It is a background assumption of the training in this course that whatever kind of research the student wishes to pursue, the data will be amenable to statistical analysis. Results *mean* statistical results. I am not, however, suggesting that there are not exceptions. Rather I am emphasizing how the textual organization and explication of psychological research practices simply asserts the primacy of statistical analysis and by implication the primacy of experimental (quasi-experimental, correlational) research designs with operationally

defined independent and dependent variables. When the student enters this course s/he enters into a collection of assumed methods and techniques for organizing, studying and interpreting human behavior. This is what D. Smith (1990) was referring to when she spoke of methods as ideological to the extent that they prescribe, “definite procedures or methods of thinking and reasoning about social relations and processes,” (p. 35). The advantage to the student in adhering to this ideology, however, is that s/he will find her- or himself more or less prepared for the kinds of educational practices s/he will participate in at the graduate level.

Interviews: The Perspectives of Two Fourth Year Honours Students

I conducted two open ended interviews with students who had just completed the Honours Seminar course with the aim of discussing the course and their experiences with the course. I have included transcripts of the interviews in Appendix E. Here I will discuss two aspects of the interviews: student-professor relations and opinions regarding the purpose and value of the course. Please read the first two paragraphs of Appendix E before proceeding. They clarify the interview process as well as the editing practices that follow.

Student one initially provided a succinct summary of both topics after which we discussed both in a little more detail:

B: Could you just sort of explain the fourth year course .. how it was organized. the general picture of it?

A: It is sort of funny on the first day they asked for expectations and people gave a few positive expectations and they allowed us to state negative expectations and so I said 70% APA style, 20% ethics and 10% filler and .. well I guess I got the proportions wrong. It's more 40% APA and twenty filler. But besides APA style and the filler, what they gear you towards is preparing a piece of research .. now it says in there a piece of original research. I don't know what the procedure is really supposed to be. I don't

know how much the typical honours student consults with their advisor and to what extent it is sort of doing something the advisor is interested in.

B: Right.

A: I really couldn't tell you. For my part, I got the idea from doing reading. I was sort of gearing myself to work with a member of the faculty and I actually had some problems with [her/his] research and felt there were certain things that the research didn't look at and so the conclusions were drawn from .. a sort of a narrow perspective. There were things outside of it that should have been looked at that might have led to a different conclusion. So I mean I went on my happy little way developing theories and I had a bunch of models on how society works which didn't make it into the final draft although they might be good for a book someday and obviously, doing, breaking new theoretical ground takes a bit of time and the press story, you know the story that goes to the press is that this member of the faculty just didn't have the time to do that sort of work and wasn't interested in seeing how it progressed. I think possibly our theoretical differences might have been a far more pertinent factor. At any case there I was all left in the lurch in October and I whined to a member of [another department] who I know from my political involvement and he was, after a little bit of whining quite amenable to working with me.

The student had initially met with the first prospective advisor in the April prior to the academic year. They had agreed to work together on her/his honours thesis. During this period s/he had handed in several drafts. When I followed up on this I asked:

B: So then, what you were saying before was .. what, that you had different ideas, how do you want to put it?

A: Umm I guess I disagreed with [her/his] entire research (laughs).

B: Ok, so you were doing something in [her/his] area generally speaking.

A: Yeah, I wanted to do something in [her/his] area using some of [her/his] instruments in fact that was going to, if not contradict then at least limit the, seriously limit the generalizability of [her/his] findings. So that was the problem.

By this point the student went to speak to the course professor as [s/he] was concerned that [s/he] may have to find a new advisor. "There had been developments that had suggested to me [s/he] really didn't want to work with me and I was a little worried." She was advised not to look outside the department just yet (for a new advisor) but, "the next day (laughs) there was a large red thing in my mailbox saying I was officially ditched.

And so off I went.” The student then found a different advisor outside of the department to work with as [s/he] pursued the same topic. In response to my question about finding a new advisor [s/he] commented:

A: ... I think partly because [s/he] was in a different department [s/he] was a little on the hands off side. [S/he] was very helpful in discussing certain aspects of theory, especially political theory making sure that I didn't .. [s/he] was railing against liberal pluralism biases which of course psychology is riddled with and I was just attempting to make sure I didn't fall into those, in my attempt to avoid my own prejudices which are not liberal-pluralist but, we'll leave that aside. And [s/he] was also very helpful in ... crafting items for the new scale. Like I would bring in a list of items and we would hash through them but .. often [s/he] read about things about the same time as [prof] was marking them so it wasn't .. really a hand in glove type thing ..

This student clearly rubbed up against student-professor power relations. The students individual tenacity, however, appeared to mitigate the potential problems of being dropped after months of working with a specific advisor. The student continued on with the same research project with an advisor outside the department. [Her/his] opinion that [s/he] was dropped as a consequence of how [her/his] proposed study would challenge the conclusions of [her/his] advisor seems to suggest that a professor is capable of inhibiting (but in this case clearly not preventing) the form of a students knowledge products. Interestingly, the problems the student encountered were not of a methodological nature as [s/he] employed questionnaires and analyzed the results statistically.

In contrast to the dramatic and overt power relations experienced by student one, student two found [her/his] student-professor experiences both collegial and helpful:

B: ... could you like explain not so much the relationship and if it was good although you can include that but just the process. like ok you are taking this course ... you took stuff like APA format and stuff like that right and you had these presentations but what was the process with respect to [her/him]. like how often did you and [her/him] work together to help you with your project? Do you know what I mean? Like do you have meetings, and what happened?

C: ... we met I guess more in first term than in second term. ... I had my data before

Christmas already ... we started meeting I guess last May and then a few times over the summer and then we met once a week last semester ... and we just had meetings basically on how to ... conduct the experiment and ethical things like that. ethical issues ... what kind of scales I would use ... [s/he] helped a lot with the writing. like the style. grammar. [s/he] was good for ... revisions and stuff. [S/he] was very helpful with that. ... I don't know. as far as the course itself. ... what we were taught in the course about ethics and APA format I guess [s/he] was really involved ...

B: That was just part of the course?

C: Just part of the course right. But [s/he] was. [s/he] helped with ... the assignments in the second term about. like with data analysis and that sort of thing ... [s/he] knew we were given assignments and we'd go over them. ... made sure that I put down what exactly the hypotheses were and what kind of tests I was going to use so that I could double check it. And I guess [s/he] worked ... quite closely the whole year compared to other people I heard hardly like. really didn't meet their advisors at all in second term. or maybe just talked to them once on the phone. ... [s/he] told me [s/he] ... liked to work closely with [her/his] ... students which is good. And [s/he] helped me with the presentation for the final ... like for presenting the thesis. Yeah. I presented in front of [her/him] first. like just for practice. [S/he] was quite involved I think.

B: So [s/he] gave you a lot of time. a lot of [her/his] time?

C: Oh yeah. like I called [her/him] on the phone for ... hours almost every night towards the end. So that was really good. [S/he] gave up [her/his] late weekends and stuff to help. [S/he] was very helpful.

When the focus was on the course itself, two things were clear to the students.

One, the course was intended to prepare students for graduate school and two, the actual time spent in lectures was not very helpful. When asked what the thrust of the course was, student one replied, "They want you to get practice in conducting a piece of empirical research and basically get, they want to prepare you for grad school," while student two replied:

C: ... I guess how to prepare for grad school. because in the first semester they taught. (prof) taught a lot about ... how to. like GRE's and how to prepare or apply for graduate school and how. ... how hard it was to get in and all that kind of stuff so I guess basically it was to prepare us for applying and for the types of skills we could use once we got there.

In addition both students conducted experimental research (i.e., variable analysis.

Both we're correlational in nature.). I asked student two if [s/he] was happy doing an

experiment. [S/he] replied that doing research is not where [her/his] interests lie but [s/he] decided to take the fourth year honours course anyway. [S/he] discussed how in graduate school we probably do more, “practical things like I know in social work we actually get placements and that sort of thing, you focus more on counselling or dealing with people, cause I think that’s .. like a lot of people might want to deal with that more in psychology than research .. that would have been a neat idea but .. couldn’t do that so.” I then asked, “When you say you couldn’t do that .. what do you mean?”

C: We’ll it’s not .. the course doesn’t .. there is no place to do that in the course as far as I know.

B: Yeah.

C: Basically, the honours course is for research and that’s .. and I guess that and preparing us for grad school in that sense but .. I don’t know.

B: No, I’m just curious ... maybe ... you had something you wanted to do and ... you couldn’t do it. But it sounds like you already accepted that when you went into the course, that it would involve doing a certain kind of research.

C: I basically knew going in that we couldn’t, that that is what it would involve.

Interpretive Analysis: Undergraduate Program

The aim in this section is to provide the reader with an interpretive analysis of how the honours training program socially organizes the learning activities of students through textual and extra-textual means and in the process regulates the production of knowledge. In particular, an undergraduate training is governed by disciplinary power. Howley and Hartnett (1992) state that discipline refers to general, institutionalized mechanisms of control. For the purposes of my analysis this description of disciplinary power is sufficient. The key to understanding disciplinary power requires that one direct her or his attention to how educational practices regulate student research activities. As I see it, there are three

important conditions to recognize from the point of view of the student and especially those in the honours program who aspire to enter graduate school. The first condition pertains to the curriculum itself. What are the kinds of activities the honours student is expected to demonstrate competency in? How are these required activities likely to impact on the kinds of research products the student produces through the years of the program? The second condition pertains to important student-academic relationships. What is the nature of the student-professor relationship at the honours level? How is the student tacitly expected to “fit into” this relationship? How important is this relationship to the future success of the student’s career aspirations? The third condition pertains to admission into graduate school. What grades and GRE scores must the student have to successfully compete? How important is it to have excellent letters of recommendation from professors familiar with the students academic performance and research abilities? What else can help in getting admitted into a graduate program?

An important starting point is to recognize that when the student enters the honours program in psychology, they enter an already existing and historically changing, collection of research practices and procedures. What I want to suggest is that this collection of practices and procedures can be meaningfully understood in terms of disciplinary power relations in the sense of a structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions. This “structure of actions” might be less dramatically understood in terms of the social organization of the research activities of students. Either way, the crucial point to understand is that while students are capable of acting on their own and of making their own choices and decisions, they nonetheless must do so within the parameters of an

already existing collection of institutional practices. The student, of course, is already somewhat familiar with the schooling process in terms of taking courses, studying materials, and being evaluated. It is not like the student is entering an unknown world. And in fact this familiarity with disciplinary power at the secondary educational level is an important training background for undergraduate work. When the student begins study at the university, s/he is already quite familiar with disciplinary power in the sense of being familiar with the process of taking required courses and of being evaluated and assigned a grade.

What is important to note about an undergraduate training is that any choices or decisions a student makes with respect to their own learning goals and research interests must occur within the confines of already existing relations of power. When a student chooses to enter the honours program, this choice is immediately regulated by a partially set curriculum that requires the student to participate in predominately experimental approaches to research. Once in the program, any research interests the student wishes to pursue are once again regulated by the research interests and methodological biases of available professors. The student, of course, is not forced to use such methods in any explicit way. The specific social organization of the research process as the student writes research proposals, reads psychological journals and interacts with professors, however, influences the form of the knowledge products in directions reflective of their training. At every stage in the training process, students of psychology are directed to conceptualize and examine problems in terms of experimental procedures even when the actual research conducted is not, strictly speaking, experimental. In other words, the actual activities of

students, what they actually *do*, is largely structured through the regulatory processes of the curriculum in conjunction with the epistemological biases of the faculty.

An important factor supporting the regulation of student research activities is what might be referred to as the economy of student research behavior. One of the concrete realities evident to the honours student is that there is a limited amount of time to get the work done. If this is what is being taught, if these are the grades necessary for being admitted to graduate school and if working on a professors research interests is helpful in gaining a positive letter of recommendation, it is much easier to work “with” the program than against it. In this way, the total structure of social/training (disciplinary) activities that constitute the program become the dominating conditions within which the student is free to act. It is within this kind of social environment that the student must successfully compete and consequently the force of the educational practices is to favour the production of knowledge products which conform to the basic epistemological orientation of the discipline. At a minimum then, the honours student aspiring to be admitted to graduate school may find it within her or his own personal interest to pursue a line of research that reflects the values of the discipline as opposed to critically examining or challenging those values. Having succeeded in presenting themselves as competent, experimentally trained psychological researchers, however, the students are now in a much more competitive position to extend their training at the graduate level.

The Graduate Program

I was able to obtain information regarding the graduate curriculum, for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Please see Table 8 (below) for a listing of required courses and research

activities for the Pre-Masters, Masters and PhD programs. In particular, compare the specific requirements for pre-masters student's in the 1970s, with the more open curriculum of the M.A. student. The pre-masters student must take "Learning" as well as three courses focusing on research methods in psychology to prepare for the masters year. The masters student, however, having been admitted via the honours program, need not necessarily take any of these courses. The 1971/72 departmental brochure explains this difference (the 1976/77 and 1979/80 brochures specify basically the same thing). It notes that the "major area" for both M.A. and Ph.D. programs:

is fairly loosely defined and the student's advisory committee has primary responsibility for guiding the student in selection of courses and to ensure that the student has adequate preparation for the material covered by the candidacy examinations. This allows individual committees to use their own discretion in naming courses like History, Systems and Advanced Psychological Statistics as part of the major. (p. 5)

The 1971/72 brochure also explains what the "Problems in Psychological Research," course entails: "in every case the course will involve an empirical study which includes: (a) the collection, and (b) the analysis of data together with (c), a final written and (d) oral presentation of the study" (p.3). In addition, for 1976 and 1979, a few changes were made to the Ph.D. program. Students were now required to take one of History of Psychology or Systems of Psychology but not both as in 1971. In addition (and note the timing is in line with those contributors to the crisis literature who were arguing for a multi-variate approach to research):

Table 8

Required Courses for the Various Graduate Streams

Year	Pre-Masters Year (required courses - if not already taken - for students admitted from General Program)	Masters Year (students admitted from Honours Program)	PhD
1971	Learning (17.342); Problems in Psychological Research (17.770); Advanced Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.777)	Thesis	All core courses of M.A. Program except 17.770: History of Psychology; Systems of Psychology; Doctoral Dissertation; Candidacy Examinations
1976	Learning (17.342); Problems in Psychological Research (17.770); Advanced Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.777)	Thesis	Basic course requirements for M.A.: Three half-courses in research design or quantitative methods over and above the basic statistics requirement; Doctoral Dissertation; Candidacy Examinations
1979	Learning (17.342); Problems in Psychological Research (17.770); Advanced Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.777)	Thesis	Two half courses equivalent to Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.777); Three half-courses in research design or quantitative methods are required over and above the basic statistics requirement in the M.A. program; Doctoral Dissertation; Candidacy Examinations
1984	Learning (17.342); Honour Seminar (17.452)	Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.777); Thesis	Two half courses equivalent to Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.777); Three half-courses in research design or quantitative methods are required over and above the basic statistics requirement in the M.A. program; Doctoral Dissertation; Candidacy Examinations
1991	Learning (17.342); Honours Research Seminar (17.452)	Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.842); Thesis	One half course in research design or quantitative methods; Doctoral Dissertation. Candidacy Examinations.
1995	Honours Research Seminar (17.452)	Psychological Statistics (17.776, 17.842). Thesis	One half course in research design or quantitative methods; Doctoral Dissertation. Candidacy Examinations.

Three half-courses in research design or quantitative methods are required over and above the basic statistics requirement in the M.A. program. Two of these courses must be in a clearly quantitative area as defined by the Departmental Quantitative Committee. The other course may be a course in area specific

research design as defined by the Quantitative Committee and may also be applied to the major or ancillary course requirements. (1979, p. 6, as underlined in brochure)

The Ph.D. curriculum remains like this until at least the 1984/85 academic year. By 1991, students must take only one half-course in research design or quantitative methods. For the pre-masters and masters programs, however, by at least 1984/85, the programs have changed. Pre-masters students are no longer required to take graduate level methods and statistics courses. Instead they must take the fourth year “Honours Seminar” (in addition to Learning which by at least 1995, is dropped as a requirement). In terms of required course descriptions, the 1991/92 general calendar provides a description for one of the statistics courses. “Quantitative Methods in Psychology” (17.842), is described thus: “The use of analysis of variance, multiple comparison procedures, linear regression and contingency table analysis is discussed as it relates to data gathered in behavioral science research” (General Calendar, 1991, p. 192). In considering the structure of graduate training as described above, the “looseness” of the M.A. and Ph.D. programs in the 1970s suggests that it was at least possible for a student to negotiate with her or his advisor regarding methodology courses relevant to her or his own interests. In addition,

however, this looseness is explained in terms of how an advisory committee will “guide” the student so as to ensure they are prepared for candidacy examinations. Given psychology’s history, it is likely that guiding the student means directing her or his attention to important methodological problems in the field of experimental inquiry. Also, while I have highlighted this flexibility in the structure of the curriculum, it is important to keep in mind that course selection is also “regulated” by course availability. I do not, however, have records with respect to all the various kinds of methodology courses available other than the specified required courses. It is therefore possible that interpretive and qualitative methods of inquiry were available to students. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the room for negotiating course choice had been curtailed. M.A. students were now required to take two courses in psychological statistics (i.e., problems in psychological research, 17.776 & 17.777 later changed to 17.842). Ph.D. students, however, throughout the period discussed do not have specific course requirements only course content guidelines (i.e., the courses taken must focus on quantitative methods). Exactly which quantitative courses a student chose was presumably determined through student-professor negotiation.

Some Required Graduate Texts

I could not find specific references to assigned texts in the graduate program. Consequently, I communicated with various professors and students at the U of M. Through these communications, I was able to obtain the names of some of the required texts for the various courses referred to as “Problems in Psychological Research.” Table 9 (below) provides a listing of the names of all the texts I was able to obtain in the above

mentioned way. In Appendix F, I have provided the chapter titles for some of the texts listed in Table 9, covering the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s so as to provide the reader with a sense for the kinds of research methods being disseminated in the graduate program. A look at the table (and the chapter titles in Appendix F), indicates that the predominant course requirement for graduate students entailed studying things like probability theory, sampling distributions, hypothesis testing, analysis of variance, chi-square and linear regression.

It would appear that undergraduates admitted to the graduate program are not in for any surprises, methodologically speaking. While actual program requirements have changed across the decades, it appears clear that graduate work entails further study of quantitative methods of analysis in the form of ANOVA, and linear regression. When specific methods courses are not required, the student is nonetheless required to take courses in quantitative methods or research design. When courses are required, they focus on psychological statistics. In addition, all graduate students are required to do a thesis at the M.A. level and a dissertation and candidacy examinations at the Ph.D. level. Below I provide information on the epistemological form of theses and dissertations produced by social psychology students at the U of M over the decades. Before discussing that, however, I will highlight the content of a graduate social psychology course that focused on social psychological theory. The purpose of examining this course is to document for the reader what social theory appears to *mean* as viewed from inside the sub-discipline of social psychology.

Table 9

Some Assigned Texts Across the Decades for the Required Courses in the Graduate Program

	17.770 (full course)	17.776 (half course)	17.842 (half course)
1966/67	Statistics (Hays)*	No such course til 1970s	No such course til 1970s
1968/69	Fundamentals of Experimental Design (Myers); Tactics of Experimental Research (Sidman)*	No such course til 1970s	No such course til 1970s
1970s		Statistics for Psychologists (Hays)**	
1986/87	No longer a required course	Statistics - 3 rd ed. (Hays)*	A First Course in Linear Regression - 2 nd ed. (Younger)*
1988/89		Statistical Methods for the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Marascuilo & Serlin)	A First Course in Linear Regression - 2 nd ed. (Younger)*
1989/90			Applied Regression Analysis: A Research Tool
1991/92			Classical Modern Regression with Applications (Myers)
1992/93		Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (Hinkle, Wiersma & Jurs)*	A First Course in Linear Regression - 2 nd ed. (Younger)*
1993-1995		Statistics for Psychology (Aaron & Aaron)	Classical Modern Regression with Applications (Myers)
1996-Present		Statistical Methods in Education and Psychology (Glass & Hopkins)*	An Introduction to Computational Statistics. Regression Analysis. (Jennrich)

*The chapter titles for these assigned texts can be found in Appendix E

** My only information regarding this text is that it was used in the 1970s. It was also used in 1966 and 1986. I can only speculate that it was probably used for a number of years during the 1970s.

17.764 Social Psychology II

Social Psychology II, was team taught by six professors. Four were social psychology faculty at the University of Manitoba, one was social psychology faculty at the University of Winnipeg and one was faculty of the Department of Education who had earned her Ph.D. in social psychology at the University of Manitoba. I took this course in the 1993/94 academic year. Within the context of this thesis it is important to get a sense for the kinds of social psychological theory being presented to graduate students. Is social behavior examined and conceptualized as occurring within a changing socio-historical, political and economic context? To what extent are the theories socially based as opposed to individually or cognitively based? I will highlight the basic focus of each lecture as detailed in my notes and other records of the seminar. I should note that I will not be examining the methodological techniques and practices used by the various theorists to “test” their theories, although such information would certainly be relevant to the present thesis. My assumption is that most of the theories discussed were assessed by the use of experimental methods on aggregates of university students but I have not obtained the relevant information to substantiate this assumption. My discussion of this course aims merely to highlight the kinds of theoretical perspectives that were presented to social psychology graduate students (and other interested students) as *social* theories. In a sense the course content I present is intended to highlight what is *missing* more so than what is present.

In addition, however, this course has a personal significance for me in as much as it was through this course that I met the professor who would come to be my current thesis

advisor. Further, it was the alternative perspective on social inquiry discussed by her during two class periods that immediately captured my imagination and opened up an entirely unique approach to social inquiry than I had up to that point encountered in psychology. See Table 10 for a listing of the schedule of topics of this seminar course.

Theory in social psychology. This lecture focused on discussing three articles aimed at placing social psychological inquiry in context. I recall enjoying this lecture and the readings because it encouraged a critical assessment and examination of the discipline, something I do not recall encountering in a psychology course up to that point. We were assigned three articles to read. Farr (1978) argued in his “On the Varieties of Social Psychology: An Essay on the Relationship between Psychology and other Social Sciences,” that there are three types of social psychology, two sociological and one psychological in orientation. The sociological orientations were derived from Wundt’s non-experimental social psychology and are described as truly social versus social psychology’s individualistic approach. Farr discusses how Meads’ symbolic interactionist approach along with the French schools’ social representations approach would be helpful correctives to social psychology’s more static conceptual notions (such as opinion and attitude research).¹⁹ Gergen’s (1973) “Social Psychology as History,” and its largely conceptual critique of social psychology’s adherence to a positivist and ahistorical approach to social inquiry was also assigned. Finally McGuire’s (1980) “The Development of Theory in Social Psychology,” provides a sixteen cell matrix to locate “guiding idea theories” held to be, “partial views of human nature that lie behind social psychological research in the 20th century”. I sincerely do not know where I would locate this social

Table 10

Schedule of Topics for, 17.764 Social Psychology IIduring the 1993/94 academic year

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 17.764
Theory in Social Psychology (one week)
Research Methods and Ethics (one week)
Social Judgment Theory (two weeks)
Learning Theory (one week)
Social Learning Theory (one week)
Cognitive Consistency Theories (one week)
Cognitive Dissonance Theory (one week)
Attribution Theory (two weeks)
Relationships (two weeks)

psychological thesis within the 16 cell matrix. The constructs to organize the matrix characterize human behavior in terms of four dichotomous categories: (a) stabilizing versus growth, (b) active versus reactive, (c) cognitive versus affective and (d) internal versus external. Included in the readings were two handouts: (a) an outline for describing and comparing theories and (b) guidelines for a demand characteristics analysis of an empirical study.

My class notes indicate that we discussed artifacts in research including demand characteristics. In addition we discussed the problem of theories developed in North America, being exported to different countries where the theories are not applicable. These two classes were the only two in my training where I was encouraged to consider the possibility that the experimental practices which constitute social psychological inquiry may have problems outside of the standard methodological concerns in terms of artifacts etcetera.

Research methods and ethics. This class focused on ethical guidelines and included reading a number of articles about ethical regulations and ethical principles regarding the conduct of research with human participants. The class time was spent deliberating over particular ethical cases based on the three codes of ethics we had been assigned to read.

My notes for the second class indicate we discussed Orne's research on demand characteristics in psychological research. I also noted how in every experiment: (a) there is the investigators experiment as designed, constructed and interpreted etc., and (b) the subjects experiment which could be completely different and hence is arguably more important. The problem of multiple interpretations of an experiment is mentioned as well.

The emphasis was on solving methodological problems relevant to experimental inquiry on human subjects. We moved from this to a discussion on ethics (little notes on that).

Social judgment theory. These two classes entailed reading chapters of Hovland and Sherif's (1935) text "Social Judgment" with its focus on attitudes and attitude change in terms of internalized reference scales and anchors. Our assignment was to find two articles and interpret the results/conceptualization in terms of social judgment theory. The lectures focused on the importance of internal anchors to the judgement process and highlighted some of the problems with scaling techniques that fail to account for individual differences with respect to the attitude one is interested in measuring. My notes also indicate that we discussed how individual latitudes of acceptance and rejection will effect the possibility of producing attitude change.

Learning theories. We were asked to look at an undergraduate social psychology text and pick a "learning" theory. Our assignment was to: (a) briefly outline the principle features of the theory, (b) discuss what it is trying to explain and (c) discuss what we like and dislike about it. This assignment would then be evaluated and we were each to take the role of the theorist we had read about and try to account for or explain the theory in class. The theories suggested were all from the 60s and early 70s. I read Daryl Bem's (1972) "Self Perception Theory". It focuses on how inferences regarding external cues play a role in our self-perceptions.

My notes indicate we also discussed (a) Thibaut and Kelley and some kind of rational cost/benefit approach to decision making (sketchy notes), (b) Berscheid and Walster's equity theory of interpersonal attraction, and (c) Berkowitz' early frustration-

aggression theory of aggression and his later cognitive neo-associationist theory of aggression.

Social learning theory. Our assignment was to read parts of Albert Bandura's "Social Learning Theory" and discuss, in a short paper, its main points and provide a short critique. In my paper, I enthusiastically applaud the positing of a "continuous reciprocal interaction between cognitive, behavioral and environmental determinants." I state this approach, "is enough in itself to elicit screams of joy (were it not for the fact that it seems to be rather obvious and long overdue)". My notes indicate we discussed how drive theories lack specificity and that it is important to understand histories of reinforcement. Motivation is now understood in terms of internal expectancies and not internal drives.

Cognitive consistency theories and cognitive dissonance. The assigned readings were: (a) Heider's (1958) "The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations," an early and influential theory of causal attributions, (b) Festinger's (1957) "A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance," with its notion of an internal state of tension produced by dissonant cognitions and (c) Aronson's (1978) "The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective". My notes highlight how years of experimental research have detailed a chain of conditions necessary for producing dissonance arousal, namely: (a) counter-attitudinal behavior, (b) insufficient justification, (c) aversive consequences, (d) commitment, (e) choice, and (f) foreseen consequences. If all these conditions are present the product is cognitive dissonance.

Attribution theories. The aims of these two classes are specified as follows: (a) to develop your knowledge of attribution theories and research and (b) to have you evaluate

the attribution literature from a post-structuralist perspective using methods of discourse analysis. The assigned readings were Hewstone's chapter, "Attribution Theory and Common-Sense Explanations: An Introductory Overview," and a chapter in Parker's (1992) "Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology." The assignments were (a) present a post-structuralist critical analysis of traditional attribution theory and (b) based on the presentations and the ensuing discussion prepare a 3 to 4 page summary of my reflections. My notes state that I was to focus on attribution theory from a broad perspective and to, (a) situate it in a community of discourse (i.e., a social, historical or political context), (b) take one aspect and really probe it deeply (i.e., importance of control or why causal inference making?), (c) get creative, imaginative. For the written assignment ("Attribution Theory: A Post-Modern Perspective") I made up a dialogue between "Zarathustra" and "Immanuel" where after a discussion about universal truths versus historically specific (i.e., conventional) truths I attempt to situate attribution theory within a scientific culture where "human being as naive scientist" is popular now but may one day be out of step with the times.

Relationships. These classes focused on research on love. The assigned readings were "Love and Romance", a chapter on the history and changing conceptions of love and an article entitled "Heartbreak in Cyberspace". A number of scales were developed by the researcher to measure love styles. My notes indicate a fairly extensive discussion of two research studies that focused on love styles. One conclusion of one study was that it was viable because each concept of love can be clearly measured and the six love scales appear to be content valid as well as technically sound.

The rough details of the content of this course, help underscore how the basic objectivist methodological approach constitutive of a psychological training is, in the case of social psychology, complemented by a range of social theoretical perspectives that theorize social behavior in ahistorical and apolitical terms. Social psychological social theory is very much an insiders social theory by social psychologists and for social psychologists. The student is introduced to the works of social psychologists but for almost all the lectures they are not introduced to the broader debates and controversies that constitute social theory in general be it in the form of critical theory, post-structuralism or feminism, for example. The one exception to this involved a professor outside of the department. It is true that Gergen's 1973 article is discussed but surely one could find more cogent and more recent critiques of the problems with an experimental approach to understanding social relations even if this required stepping outside the sub-discipline itself to consider some of the perspectives produced say in cultural studies and women's studies, for example. As stated, I have included the content of this course because I think it is valuable to document at least one course example of what "social theory" *means* to social psychologists because it may prove of value for making future comparisons with respect to the broader area of social theory of which academic social psychology is presumably a part.

Theses and Dissertations: Basic Methodological Form

Quantification is not without its rhetorical force, especially when one aims to persuade an audience whose biases are in favour of quantitative analysis. Consequently, I thought it would be of value to examine and provide basic quantitative data regarding the

epistemological form of the knowledge products of graduate students who had received their research training at the U of M. I obtained from the psychology graduate office, the names of social psychology graduates of the M.A. and Ph.D. programs. My goal was to examine each students thesis and dissertation with the aim of determining, (a) the research design used, (b) the techniques of analysis used and (c) the sample used. The lists provided to me were divided into three categories: (a) social, (b) social/personality and (c) personality. I omitted the personality list and for the social/personality list, two criteria were used to determine if a particular thesis or dissertation was not social psychological in content. Both criteria had to be met in order to omit the thesis from the analysis. First, if the thesis had an advisor from personality and second, if the content of the thesis was clearly not social the thesis was omitted. One criterion was not sufficient because in some cases, although the thesis had an advisor from the personality area, the content of the thesis was clearly social.²⁰

A total of 44 theses and dissertations were examined. The following decisions had to be made for each thesis/dissertation examined. The first decision focused on the research design. Was it experimental, quasi-experimental, correlational or other? The second decision focused on the kinds of techniques of analysis employed in the inquiry, with particular reference, in the case of statistics, to the actual tests of significance. Thus things like measures of association, tests of reliability and measures of effect size were not included. Because the basic purpose of the analysis was to determine to what extent statistical procedures were used to analyze data as opposed to qualitative forms of analysis, it was not considered of vital importance to determine to what extent good

statistical practice had been employed by the student. In addition, it was sufficient that any particular statistical test had been used once to be included in the count. Thus, for example, numerous uses of ANOVA in the same research, only counted for one for that particular thesis or dissertation even when there were multiple studies. Consequently, the totals for each of the different techniques of analysis, can be compared to the total number of theses/dissertations

examined to get a sense for what proportion of the research projects employed that statistical test at least once. Finally, the third decision focused on determining if the sample was from an introductory psychology class or not. University students who were not from a introductory psychology class were classified as “other” along with non-university samples.

In terms of validating the content analysis of the theses and dissertations, two procedures were used. First, for half of the research studies examined, “consensual validation” was used. This simply means that two people (myself and a colleague) made the above three decisions regarding the theses/dissertations independently and then we compared. Any differences (this usually involved missing one of the statistical tests used) were resolved by re-checking the thesis/dissertation until there was agreement. Second, for the other half of the research studies examined, I simply examined them twice at two separate times. I would then compare the decisions I had arrived at on the two occasions and would resolve any differences by re-checking the thesis/dissertation.²¹

The raw results of the analysis are listed in Table 11. I divided the analysis into three decades (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). Within each decade I further divided the M.A.

theses from the Ph.D. dissertations. I placed the total number of theses/dissertations for each division in brackets beside "M.A." or "Ph.D.". There is an increase in the proportion of studies across the decades that are correlational in nature. In addition, the ratio of different kinds of tests used per thesis or dissertation increased across the decades. For masters theses, the ratio increased from 2-1, to 2.57-1 to 3.2-1. For dissertations, the increase in ratio was less pronounced (3.75-1, to 3.8-1, to 4-1). Reading through the research, it was clear that the complexity of the studies in terms of number of measures and number of statistical tests conducted also increased during this period. The increase in the use of correlational research designs may reflect a move toward more contextually complex analyzes that would not be possible in an experimental context. At any rate, the analysis of data was almost always based on one or another form of statistical analysis. While a more detailed analysis of the kinds and number of statistical tests used in proportion to the number of studies, might be of general interest, it is not of relevance to the focus of this inquiry. What is of interest rather, is the sheer fact that almost all graduate research is of an experimental, quasi-experimental or correlational nature, involving the production or use of quantitative data amenable to various forms of statistical analysis. There were a few exceptions, however. One study was strictly theoretical and one study was based entirely on the qualitative analysis of discourse. In addition, one study used in-depth interviews in the pilot stage and quantitative data in the formal study stage while two study's from the 1970s used some interview data but the main research design and analysis were quantitative in nature.

It would appear then, that the general epistemological orientation of students'

Table 11

**Content Analysis of Social Psychology Theses and Dissertations at the University of
Manitoba: Basic Methodological Data**

		1970s		1980s		1990s	
		M.A.	Ph.D.	M.A.	Ph.D.	M.A.	Ph.D.
		(7)	(4)	(7)	(5)	(15)	(6)
Research Design	Experimental or Quasi-Experimental	6	3	3	3	8	2
	Correlational	1	1	3	1	6	4
	Other (theoretical etc.)	-	-	1	1	1	-
Techniques of Analysis	t-Tests	4	2	3	2	7	5
	ANOVA	5	4	4	4	10	3
	MANOVA	-	-	4	3	3	2
	Regression	1	1	1	2	3	4
	Correlation	2	1	3	3	10	4
	Chi-Square (and other non-parametrics)	1	2	2	1	8	2
	Other Quantitative	1	3	1	4	6	3
	Qualitative	-	2	-	-	1	1
Sample	Introductory Psychology Students	4	3	5	3	9	3
	Other	3	1	2	2	6	3

social psychological research products, across the decades, has been in the direction of an experimental approach to inquiry be it in the form of a true experiment, a quasi-experiment or a correlational study. The knowledge products of students, therefore, are largely in conformity with the particular research methods and forms of statistical analysis that constitute the required courses of the curriculum.

Interviews: Graduate Students

I interviewed four graduate students in psychology. There were a number of general themes that I was interested in and that tended to come up in the process of the interview. In particular I was interested in student reflections on the following: (a) student-advisor relations, (b) the graduate training process, and (c) psychological research practices in the context of social research. Other themes also came up depending on the interviewee. See Appendix E for the full transcripts.

Student One. After a bit of discussion about research interests, the student touched on [her/his] entering the graduate program including [her/his] views of the graduate process:

A: ... when I applied to grad school. "A". I was applying here only. "B". I decided I wanted to go into experimental, and "C": I wanted to work with [prof 2]. I thought that it was a natural progression. I looked at other social psychology interests of the profs and they didn't really match mine at all other than maybe [prof 3] I suppose. So, and I sort of realized that .. an advisor should have .. the interests should mesh somewhat. of course, because they can only advise you on knowledge they have. You know, it is very difficult for an advisor to advise on something you're way off on. they have no clue what you're talking about. And so, well I can see myself being interested in that type of research. realizing, of course, that when you're going through a graduate school, what you do is not necessarily what you're going to be doing out of graduate school. So it is just a part of the process. you approach the prof. you work with him or her and go your separate way. ...

The student had found an advisor with whom [her/his] interests "meshed" and the students' personal plan was to work with the advisor for the first year to gain familiarity

with the advisor's research and specific research interests. In other words the student appeared to fully accept the standard student-professor relationship (in psychology) in the sense that the knowledge product the student would come to produce would largely take the form of the research work of the professor. " ... just getting to know what [s/he's] doing ... and starting reading some of the material around [her/his] research so that I can identify something within that structure, within those parameters that both of us can be comfortable with ...". The student thought some of this research had, "potential in terms of further research, potential in terms of being recognized by the intellectual community and potential in terms of publications, of course". Thus what appeared to be important to the student was that [her/his] research project conform to the epistemological standards of the discipline. Shortly after this I reflected on the student's understanding of the student-advisor relation asking the student to correct me: " ... well first of all you had a sense for what your role was with respect to your advisor and even the program? And you ... accepted that? Is that right?"

A: The role being, whenever I get in the presence of people who I think, know a lot of things, I tend to hand over control, I tend to shut-up and listen, I tend to learn from those individuals. So in that sense I do give up control to, to [the prof].

B: Right. Understanding what you said though. That [s/he] is a person with experience and knowledge .. skills that you can only benefit from like listening like you said.

A: Oh, definitely, listening, observing, .. heeding advice. I basically, again realizing that graduate school is for learning all this stuff and then once you get out of there, out of graduate school, you are the expert. You know, Ph.D. stream, you are actually becoming an expert in some sort of field. And master's is just a second step where you learn a little bit about how to be an expert. ...

Here the student basically indicates [her/his] adherence to an apprenticeship model of student induction. This approach fit perfectly with the student's personal goals (see below) of becoming a professor. Recognizing the institutional requirements for further success in

the discipline, the student appeared prepared and willing to emulate the kinds of methodological practices used by [her/his] advisor to the extent that [s/he] thought them advantageous to [her/his] career aspirations. After the student had further discussed [her/his] student-advisor relations, noting how their meetings were sometimes quite stimulating and at other times frustrating, I asked the student if [s/he] had wanted to approach research in a certain way but was discouraged in one way or another or if this sort of thing never came up. The student did not feel restricted to explore ideas. When [s/he] asked questions the advisor would provide reasons why such was a good or a bad idea and so the relationship appeared to be quite collegial.

Interestingly for me, the student had never considered doing a non-experimental social psychology study and noted how such work is very rare at the U of M. "I think there is one other thesis that was like that in the past ten years or something like that". This led to a brief discussion about the program. When asked to reflect on what the master's program was trying to train us for, the student noted there was "multi-faceted goals of the program," but in particular writing and data analysis. "But .. towards the end, I sort of realized that well, what they're doing here .. is they're preparing me, like I said, "one" to be somewhat of an expert in a certain area and "two" being able to take those skills and apply them to whatever I want to do". The student's reflections on the goals of the program suggests that [s/he] was aware that [s/he] needed to focus on some highly specialized empirical domain and that the program functioned to help [her/him] to specialize. In addition, however, the student also suggested that [her/his] graduate training is intended to equip [her/him] with research skills that can be applied to any kind of

inquiry.

The student then mentioned [her/his] academic goals with this eventually leading back to the question of experimental research practices. What is clear as one reads this students comments is that [s/he] views training in terms of a necessary process for the achievement of particular career goals. In this sense the educational process was a means to an end. The student was aware of how the discipline expected the aspiring student to build a career and [s/he] was prepared to do exactly what was required:

A: ... I had one goal going into graduate school. I'd come out and I'd be a professor.

B: Right. That is actually a good question.

A: So I was looking at the way [prof] behaved and what [s/he] was doing, in terms of that goal. So I did have one goal going in at least.

B: Ok one goal going in, becoming a professor. Reflecting on that what did you, whether it is in retrospect or what have you ... what do you have to do to get there?

A: Oh definitely the emphasis is on research. No ifs, ands, or buts, about it. And publication.

B: Experimental research. Is that what you meant by research?

A: Yes. Experimental research. ... Because when you take a look at the people they hired here.

B: Just recently? Yeah, I followed them but I was in the middle of my proposal.

A: Yeah. They have their ideas, they have their research .. thrust you know, their area of expertise and their line of reasoning. ... That is what I see myself doing, is creating that. And that is the main thing that I think hiring committees in universities in Canada and the States look for is somebody that has a distinguished record of research. And everything else is subservient to that I think.

B: Yeah, that is probably true. That is probably the bottom line. I wouldn't go so far as to just say number of publishings but publishings and where they were published and maybe partly relationships.

A: And everything makes sense! If it doesn't make sense. "What are you talking about?" "I don't know." ... Just basically the one goal, become a professor. How can I do it, how can I make myself marketable.

B: Right. What do you gotta do. And that's sort of, that comes to understanding. See to

criticize myself ... these things were never self evident to me. I was interested in what I wanted to do. But then I, now I reach a point where I can actually understand, someone like yourself .. you saw the structure, for what it was. I guess you could say. You knew what things had to be done .. to get to the position of professor.

A: Then you can do whatever you want. Well it sort of goes back to .. University reading. I came across this really interesting article on famous people and what their graduate school theses were you know and .. totally not-identifiable with what they're famous for, you know. Freud is neurobiology and the slug, you know, stuff like that. And yet he is one of the most influential people of all time. Something like that, seeing that article and you sort of go, well ok, it is a process. You can't, you can't assert yourself, there's a key thing.

B: You can't assert yourself? Is that what you said?

A: You can't assert, .. your interests until you learn, until you get freedom to do so.

In response to the comment about asserting yourself, I briefly discussed the notion of knowledge products and then asked, "I guess ... the more direct way of putting it is do you think it is difficult for students to do anything other than experimental research .. here?" This lead to a short discussion focusing on the scholarly climate at the University of Manitoba.

A: Here? Yeah.

B: Yeah, like I don't know about other universities.

A: In Regina you'd fit right in.

B: Is that right? Heh, heh.

A: That's what I hear anyway. Cause there that's .. this is sort of almost privileged information here .. it's commonly known through ... all the professors here that the University of Regina about 10 years ago, had no experimental research whatsoever, more theoretical, just you know, out there, you know those type of theses and stuff like that .. and actually the reaction around here was, that's bad, that was just terrible, the place was in shambles almost to, you know, if it was a business it'd be bankrupt. So you know, there's no production ..

B: Right.

A: .. of experimental research and that is just abhorrent. There is this one [prof]. [s/he] became the head went in there and straightened things out and got them at least do some research and I don't know. There is a stigma definitely.

The student appears acutely aware of the experimental biases of the department and [her/his] contrast with another department suggests that the scholarly climate at the U of M may not generalize to all psychology departments.

I asked the student, “Do you think a department like social psychology .. should .. explore things from different perspectives, be more diverse, on how it is going to study slash research slash inquire?”. The student discussed psychology’s ongoing goal of legitimizing itself as a science as well as the problems associated with its particular approach to inquiry.

A: Well out of all the sub-disciplines of psychology, social psychology should, yeah, it should have the ability to distinguish itself from other areas. The way I understand psychology right now is it’s trying to establish itself as a science, and the only way it can establish itself as a science is through controlled procedural research. And that is what I see is happening. And I don’t like it .. you know, think about two variables at once, at all times and that’s it, you know, don’t look at the larger picture. .. That’s what you’re learning in graduate school, keep your narrow focus. Keep your focus narrow. And you know I’m, I think of weird things all the time and the problem is that, in graduate school, I think what you’re learning in graduate school is your ability to operationalize these weird and wacky things. So ok come down to an experiment and try and test whether the truth or falseness of it, this is what you’ve gotta do.

The student reflections (above) raise a number of interesting points. First the student agrees that social psychology should distinguish itself from other areas presumably because there is something about the subject matter in need of a distinct approach. [S/he] then seems to explain why this distinction has not occurred in social psychology by invoking what I hold to be psychology’s fundamental social, economic and political objective since its inception: to be recognized not as a social science but as a natural science. Third the student comments on this state of affairs by criticizing the disciplines preoccupation with variable analysis to the exclusion of broader conceptual/theoretical approaches. Fourth, the student connects the natural scientific aspirations of the discipline

to training in graduate school by stating we are encouraged to keep the focus of our research interests narrow and at the level of variable analysis. Finally the student seems to back off from the criticisms by justify the training in terms of how the discipline wants to train us to test the truth or falseness of an idea via experimentation.

I then returned to the question of research freedom by asking the student if [s/he] thinks [s/he] will be as free as suggested earlier given, for example, tenure. "Is not the tenure track going to be .. something that inhibits or keeps these ideas basically on your computer for a while?". This suggestion lead the student to restate [her/his] opinion regarding how free [s/he] will be to pursue [her/his] own interests once accepted for an academic position.

A: Unfortunately yes. I do see that.

B: So you are still looking at it as a bigger picture than that? There is tenure and then there is ...

A: Well, there's, it's, the thing I learned about [prof]. [s/he] is very busy. Doing research is [his/her] main thrust, teaching is subservient to that .. among others .. and it seems like they're caught up in doing that, producing, getting grants, grants depend on the research, you know it's .. very constraining and I can see that. And that is where I say I don't see any real freedom in becoming a professor or, or in getting tenure. You get tenure you go, well promotions, raises, all that stuff is determined by research again. ... So .. you know, I guess .. I guess the whole process is squashing somewhat my intellect and .. ability to think abstractly and free think. It is somewhat squashing.

B: Yeah, I know what you mean.

A: So yeah, I see that and it is pretty unfortunate. .. When .. the analogy is well, you become an adult and you're not a kid anymore and kids have these vast imaginations and can think of so many things and play with them and with their imaginations they go really out there and as adults we go what the hell are you talking about? We don't have it anymore.

B: Good point, yeah.

A: So it seems .. its unfortunate that aspect but I am fighting it all the time. But, it is just the way I think this society is. Everybody is busy, everybody is producing ...

The student's focus had shifted from suggesting that if one plays by the rules

initially then one can do what they want later, to providing a more qualified response that acknowledged that various institutional practices and procedures will regulate [her/his] research activities for many years to come. The student mentions many of the key social practices that will govern [her/his] future research behavior such as the need to produce publications, the importance of getting grants, how grants depend on the research proposed, the tenure process, and subsequent academic perks such as salary.

In wrapping up I asked the student if [s/he] had any questions or points.[S/he] touched on constraints and on the benefits to professors of having students do research in her or his area of expertise.

A: .. In terms of the process of graduate school .. well, in sort of conclusion, students are somewhat constrained by their advisors. Earlier I said, they usually like you to do .. research that's closer to home. And I can see that because if I'm a professor and somebody comes to me well that is one of my stipulations on that. .. If I can't understand what you're doing I can't really help you.

B: Yeah, that makes sense to me too. .. but .. and if I can add something, I mean .. I think part of it is a time thing. If I we're a professor I would love to learn to explore what some students, I would love to try to learn what some student wants to teach me .. but that involves time right? Whereas if you get some student learning what you know then you can just help them along you know.

A: Time .. and the fact is too as well, if you do research along parallel to theirs that sort of stimulates their own goals that might be of interest to them too, so that as soon as you leave when all that data is left behind they can zoom right in and take over .. so it's a benefit, it is beneficial for them too. .. But .. yeah if you let them do whatever they want, it costs them time and it doesn't benefit. Possibly, possibly benefit them...

Student 2. After the initial discussion concerning the students educational background [s/he] explained [her/his] interest in social psychology.

C: Social psychology seemed to be the most broad area of psychology and I truly, I enjoyed a lot of the principles we learned in undergrad but I thought that if I wasn't going into clinical I could probably study pretty much anything I wanted from a social psychological perspective because it doesn't matter if you look at it in terms of attributions or aggression or whatever it is, we can all fit just about everything into some kind of social psychological explanation, and that was the pull.

The student was specifically interested in an experimental approach to social inquiry. After discussing [her/his] thorough process for selecting an advisor also interested in an experimental approach to [her/his] area of interest, I asked [her/him] to discuss [her/his] experiences with the program. Those experiences we're largely positive although [s/he] thought perhaps the amount of course options left a little to be desired. Referring to a couple of social psychology courses in particular, the student stated, "I probably learned more from [prof 2] in the two courses that I took from [her/him] just in terms of research and writing and everything else than I have learned in my entire graduate career".

C: So the course content themselves. I found it interesting. I loved the courses. I don't know that they were truly social psychological but I gained a lot. And well the other .. we have the ancillary course we have to take and I was able to negotiate a readings course in [course name] which I had wanted to do so I mean it all worked out.

B: What about the methods courses?

C: ... I took one with [prof 3] and it focused on meta-analysis, path analysis and I taught myself a lot in that course. In that sense I learned a lot. Did I learn a lot from [her/him]. No. It was good that I took the course cause I got a good textbook and I gained a lot of useful knowledge but I mean I could not have attended class ever and still done the same.

I then asked the student to focus on courses and methods courses and explain to me her philosophy or outlook regarding social psychology. First I provided a contrast by briefly discussing my interests. The student's response focused largely at the level of actual training practices such as the kinds of alternative courses that would be of value.

B: ... Like I've been talking myself .. I've been arguing that .. I wrote a paper that talks about how psychology constrains research and I've been arguing that it basically directs people into doing experimental research. Now you may think that's good or bad. I was kind of interested in what your opinion is on that and if you agree with that general statement as well.

C: Well I mean we are training to be psychologists so I think we should be encouraged to do research period. I don't care if it is social psychological research, rat research or whatever kind of research. If you can argue that it's from a social standpoint it should be awarded some sort of merit. I think that, if they wanted to strengthen the program they

should incorporate some sort of .. practical course where you are given course credit for the design and conduction of an experiment. And I mean obviously we do that with theses and dissertations. Something smaller than that prior to the dissertation. Or if done at the master's level, just to give you sort of a running head start on thinking about issues of design and analysis. I mean even if it is just designing a proposal which we do get to some level, but I do think there needs to be more of a focus on doing research. I mean, we are supposed to do that with our advisors but I don't think all of us get the same sort of training. But if they wanted us to have an overall level there could be this practical course that is required where we do an experiment, write it up and hopefully submit it for publication.

B: Right, sort of like, something you're doing during the course before you're getting too involved in a thesis. Is that what you're saying?

C: Yeah, yeah so you work out a lot of the kinks and bugs and hopefully have sort of a more pleasant thesis or dissertation.

As the student's comments indicate, [her/his] concerns with respect to training in social psychology focused on providing the students with more practical courses aimed at developing their experimental research skills. For [her/him] program changes should be in the direction of providing students with more experience in conducting experimental research so that the thesis/dissertation process itself becomes more routine. [S/he] emphasized improving the students familiarity with questions of research design and data analysis. [S/he] also touched on the student-professor relationship noting how it is not consistent in as much as each student is somewhat at the mercy of the advisor they have in terms of the kinds and quality of advice and guidance they receive as they develop their experimental research skills. Finally [s/he] reflected on what seems to be the point of the whole educational process when [s/he] spoke of conducting an experiment, writing it up and submitting it for publication.

I then asked a more direct question, "Do you think there should be other methods besides experimental methods in social psychology?".

C: For example?

B: Well ways of doing research, interpretive, qualitative, like ... Qualitative is very general but I mean things that include in depth interviews and maybe that is all that your research project is.

C: Well, that would be good or even at the masters level if you were required a half course in quantitative and a half course in qualitative research. Yeah. That would be useful. I have taken a course at the master's level in [location] that looked at both. And I mean I think that is a well-rounded way to do it. I'm not necessarily all that fond of qualitative research but now it looks like I may be using it in my dissertation so, good thing I have that course. ... But I mean it would strengthen us, on the other hand, there will be some people who never do qualitative analysis, have no interest in doing it and it would probably be a waste of their time to take a course in it.

One change the student is open to is the addition of a methods course that focusses on qualitative methods of inquiry, noting how [s/he] will be using such in her dissertation and making note of how [s/he] had received some training in qualitative methods at a different university.

I followed this up with a question about the program overall, offering [her/him] my perspective about the discipline directing students into experimental research and asking if this fit with [her/his] experience. [S/he] stated it was "tough for me to say," because [s/he] was more prepared coming into the Ph.D. program.

C: ... I was looking for somebody experimental so I specifically looked for an advisor who took that perspective. I assume that if I was interested in qualitative research I also could have found an advisor who would have worked with that or done something with that. If not I would have gone to another university. I mean, my assumption is that it is primarily experimental. I was ok with that, that was what I was looking for, therefore I'm here.

The implicit message I took from this comment was that it is really up to the student to be organized and to find a professor who can advise them in the direction they want to go. If you want to do qualitative research then find a professor who can help you.

I then asked, "Did you feel free to pursue your own interests?" with the aim of moving the discussion into the realm of student-professor relations. [S/he] felt free to

some extent but commented [s/he] thought [s/he] was, “a little limited in sort of the type of research I can do and also the .. I think I’m restricted in that I can only research a certain area within that ..”. The reason for this limitation was the advisor did not want to go too far outside [her/his] area of expertise because [s/he] could no longer help the student as much. “But, I still think it is a restriction, I mean if I’m interested, however, in something, I think at some point [s/he] would say no”. The student did acknowledge, however, that there was room for negotiation about such matters. I reflected to the student, “So you kind of, you had to feel, you felt you kind of .. I don’t know what the word would be .. curtail it or at least ..”. [Her/his] initial response highlights the students ability to resist and/or negotiate the development and form of a knowledge product while also indicating the power of the academic advisor to contribute to the final form of that product.

C: ... I think it is more of a collaborative project. Even though it is my dissertation I think that there is two of us working on it. and it has to .. I mean I am not going to cave completely. it is my project and there are certain things I want to do but maybe the way in which I go about doing it is a little different. Maybe I had intended to do it strictly intro university student. standard paper and pencil but maybe [s/he] feels qualitative with [sample] coming in from somewhere else is more up the alley .. I mean I trust [her/his] judgement because that is what [s/he] is here for but I don’t feel 100% free to say. I want to do this.

I asked [her/him] what she thought of the advisors requirement that the project be limited to something within the advisors realm of expertise.

C: Umm ... I mean its reasonable to an extent. I don’t expect [her/him] to have to review an entire body of literature to deal with my dissertation cause I am not [her/his] only student and [s/he] does have a work load and everything else. however. I think there needs to be bending on both sides

The student then explained how [s/he] had opportunities to use non-university populations. This led to a discussion of getting through the training process with as little

hassle as possible. The more the student follows the standard patterns for producing a research document (i.e., recruit introductory students, conduct paper and pencil tests, perform statistical analysis on quantitative data etc.) the easier the process is likely to be. [S/he] also touched on how the interests of the advisor can take precedence over the interests of the student unless the student is prepared to put in more time and effort to conduct [her/his] own work. Referring to the use of an off-campus sample:

B: Yeah. That seems that that would be an opportunity for you.

C: [S/he] had said, you know, it is outside of my area. And ..

B: The sample was outside of [her/his] area?

C: The sample was outside the area and would probably result in research that did not go in the same direction as. I mean it is tough to do basic [topic] research with a [specific sample]. I mean they are [characteristic of sample], so that would result in a whole new study. But I was really not impressed when we first had the conversation but I mean I can sort of understand it.

B: Right

C: And also [s/he] wants this to be sort of as painless-a procedure as possible and [s/he] wants me to get through in a reasonable amount of time and if there is going to be major delays cause [s/he] has to do all this extra work ... I mean I was more miffed about it than I am now .. it seems a little more reasonable. ...

B: Yeah. It seemed like it was an opportunity for you to like start building something on your own.

C: And [s/he] is not saying that I couldn't do the research. [S/he] is saying I can't do it for a dissertation. So if I wanted to go and do the work then that would be on my own.

B: Yeah ok, yeah.

C: It brings up an interesting little point though because if I, when I start doing outside research, I get criticized for not doing research because it is not [her/his].

In terms of the question of power touched on above, I asked more specifically, "...did you have, call it power problems with respect to, how did you see the relationship between you and the professor?". The student did not think there were any real power

issues. Largely, [s/he] saw [her/his] advisors contributions as directed at helping [her/him] to get through the program as quickly as possible. In response to my mentioning how another student had spoke of deferring to [her/his] advisor [s/he] responded:

C: I think deferring to your advisor is part of the. is part of the. I don't know. is part of the game? or if it is part of the experience itself because regardless of whether you are at the M.A. or PhD level you are still a student. And I mean, I can do all the reading I want and run all the research, as much research as I want and it still won't be more than [her/him]. So [s/he] has certain expertise and I assume that if I come up with an idea and [s/he] is very open to any of my ideas and we talk about them but if [s/he] can give me a reasonable explanation why it's a half-fast idea or if it can be done in a different way that would probably be more useful, then I am all for hearing that cause I think that is the role of the advisor.

The students comments highlight a number of points. [S/he] discusses the student-professor relationship by emphasizing the research experience and expertise of the professor in the context of suggesting that part of the educational process entails that the student view the professor as an expert from which they can learn about the procedure and practices of sound research. The professor is there to both be open to your ideas but also to explain why some of those ideas are not workable. What is considered a workable idea, of course, is dependent on the professors personal biases as to what constitutes good research in the first place. In other words, the students comments above sound perfectly reasonable as long as we assume both student and professor are sharing in some taken-for-granted epistemological assumptions about the processes of knowledge production.

Close to wrapping up, I again brought up the question of training students in experimental procedures and asked [her/him] if she thought, "that is where social psychology should go?". [S/he] did not go so far as to agree that this was the way social psychology should go but [s/he] was clear that if a department is to adopt a particular perspective it should be announced. [S/he] also stated, "But I would suggest that anybody

who is not interested in an experimental approach maybe look elsewhere.” Clearly [s/he] understood that it would be difficult for a student to try and produce a piece of research outside of the experimental paradigm. In defense of an experimental orientation, [s/he] stressed that a department need not offer, “every different slant for every different area,” and with a shrinking staff such an approach would be unwieldy.

I then brought up explicitly in terms of speculation, the possibility that social psychology’s methodological approach had, “functioned to limit its’ realm of application over the years and that there are all these other areas that study the quote unquote social, that social psychology has sort of cut itself off from because it wouldn’t .. use the kinds of methods that were necessary ...”. While [s/he] did not think the discipline itself was shrinking, noting areas within the field that are “booming” [s/he] did think “we do restrict ourselves in some ways and there would be a lot more things we could study if we did more qualitative stuff or if we did things a little differently but, I mean, part of it is you have to have people sort of willing to do it as well”. This last point is an important one as it highlights how the research proclivities of the faculty can function to regulate the kinds of research students produce. If professors are not willing to work with a student on some topic and with methods outside their empirical domain, the students alternatives are to reject the program or conform to the epistemological requirements of her or his advisor. [S/he] then followed up on this train of thought by focusing on the undergraduate curriculum and in particular the kinds of research practices we are trained to use to conduct research:

B: Yeah, you got to have the ..

C: But I think we are trained from day one. I mean take it back to an undergraduate level. 225, 226. How much qualitative exposure are you getting at that stage?

B: Exactly.

C: None. And that's where we learn the basics. I didn't do an honours degree. I came out of the advanced program. So I mean. I took 225 and 226 and I did an independent research project with somebody that was experimental in nature and that was my introduction to research in psychology. So I mean it wasn't until sort of the master's level where I thought about, yeah I guess I could ask the people instead of getting them to fill in all these computer bubbles.

B: That's right. that's right.

C: So.

B: Yeah, you sort of take it for granted. There's a .. it's like there is an implicit process. Especially when you are first learning. You're in school, you are an undergraduate and you haven't really reached the level where you're starting to like question ..

C: Exactly. How many of us are going to raise our hand and say well maybe, isn't there a better way to do this? I .. take 225, 226 with [prof 2] and see how many questions you ask. Ain't going to happen.

Student 3. After discussing [her/his] academic background, the student provided a detailed description of [her/his] initial experiences with research training in graduate school. [Her/his] training appeared to be systematic and rigorous, requiring hard work and input with respect to on-going research activities. In addition, [s/he] thought the intensity and rigour of student research training depend to some extent on the advisor a student happened to have. The student then described [her/his] training environment:

D: So [s/he] ran a lab that had a hierarchical structure .. but it was also a cooperative environment where .. I got my name on [association names] presentations where what I was doing was running sessions and participating ... in group meetings and just bouncing ideas around. And so that was my initial exposure to graduate study at the U of M. There are these labs that get together where Ph.D. students and professors, down to undergrads sit down and just bounce off ideas and the naive perspectives of undergrads was welcome just because it created a greater sense of validity to what was being done But it was also very structured. ... There were things that had to be done, you did them or suffered the consequences. ... It was very rigorous .. and I assumed that's sort of how things were. But, you know, going through years of the program I sort of saw that not all labs are like that. I talked to other students about, you know, what their research group is doing and they wouldn't even know who others, what other students were under the same advisor.

Regarding [her/his] role with respect to the advisor, the student responded largely in terms of [her/his] role within the research program. [S/he] noted how [s/he] was expected to produce and “to have valuable input into what the research program was doing” as well as gain from senior students. [S/he] was seen as a peer, “but to maintain that level I had to show that I was willing to produce, willing to listen to criticism, and alter my thinking to make ... my ideas work”. I then asked if [s/he] had a sense that [s/he] could not “go” with her own ideas and whether that mattered or was important to her.

D: That didn't, that really didn't matter to me. ... I picked my advisor based on sort of, on first come, first serve. At that point was, well what ever research they we're doing .. could be interesting and it just so happened I could make it personally relevant. As for my specific topic in there, it was sort of bounded, bounded by [prof 2's] research area ... but within that there was questions that I wanted to ask, that I was free to ask and again if I could justify or develop, an argument for that, I was free to run with it.

The student's response suggests the apprentice/expert model to the extent that the student was permitted to find her or his own topic of interests as long as it conformed to the research area and methodological form of the advisors work.

I then asked a question about research practices. This developed into a discussion of the student's interest in applied research as well as [her/his] interest in social psychology from the perspective of universal laws.

B: For your masters ... did you want to do any non-experimental research? Was that ever something? Did you ever think about that?

D: What do you mean?

B: Was the idea of doing qualitative research, the idea of doing non-experimental, something that didn't involve experiments, something that didn't involve necessarily questionnaires or checklists or what have you?

D: Umm ..

B: I'm just trying to get a sense for ... how students look at it. You know, what was their experience was it like .. no I understood it was experimental and that was cool with me.

that is what I wanted to do. That sort of thing.

D: I didn't think about it when I was, at the beginning of my masters, however, when I thought I was going to be continuing on with [prof 2] I definitely had a bent, or thought that I wanted to make it more applied .. so, it would still involve questionnaires but I wanted to, to take the whole process and see how it would work in the real world a little more. ... So, it would still be experimental, you would have control and an experimental group but it would be real people in an applied setting [S/he] [prof 2] did some work ... in introductory psychology, but I wanted to know more than just about intro psych and I don't know how that would have been taken.

B: Umm, right.

D: ... as I was talking for my current dissertation it is going to be, it is going to be applied. It is going to be a little more non-experimental. I am going to, for the final part, go into organizations and look into their performance appraisal process and I'm not going to have a control group. I'm going to use their actual performance appraisal process. I don't want to go and set up two groups.

This student's comments highlight a theme that runs through three of the four graduate interviews. Three of the four wanted to do more applied social research albeit informed by an experimental perspective. Given that all the students basically accepted the experimental model of social research, constraint appeared to mean being inhibited from pursuing applied research. This student was still a proponent of experimental procedures, [s/he] just wanted to take it out of the lab and work with actual populations in actual social circumstances.

Following shortly in the interview, I raised the question of alternative approaches to social inquiry and how our training focuses on experimental approaches. I then asked the student if [s/he] was concerned about such issues:

B: ... But .. reflecting on the program, the actual educational program. Being trained to do work, being trained to analyze your research

D: Now there's an assumption, that we're being trained!

B: Heh, heh. I see there being, building a case like I told you for there being an experimental bias or the whole point of the training, don't call it a bias, say the training, is training to be an experimental researcher. You can take that as a criticism or a compliment, it doesn't matter right, you know it depends on your point of view but .. does that make sense to you?

D: .. I think the thing that I've just to answer that .. the alternative being?

B: Non-experimental ..

D: What does that mean to you though?

B: To me it means a qualitative research, research that focuses on .. in-depth interviews on some topic and you may not be coming to any predictive conclusions at all. it may be rich description. it may be, you know, stuff along the lines of anthropological or what you might think of more in terms of sociological social-psychology, that kind of work. .. Work that wouldn't necessarily .. wouldn't take the stance of objective, scientific neutral research where you manipulate variables and predictions. You may not even have variables at all, right, in that sense. You may be trying to understand social behavior in terms of .. practices and social structures and how those structures and practices are political, ok and how they have relationships to .. society in general and how that's influencing behaviour so you're introducing .. political ideas into it so that you're not just trying to predict behavior .. without the political context or even, in a sense without a social context. ... And so, when you thought of social psychology, I guess to ask the question differently, did you think these things were important too?

D: .. They weren't that important to me.

B: Well they don't have to be important to you but, go ahead tell me, but do you think that social psychology should be hardcore experimental or whatever?

D: .. Yeah, I would have to say yeah.

B: Ok, good.

D: My background, I come from a science background, .. analytical. I believe there are universal laws we just don't know what they are, we can't articulate them very well. .. And that, sort of .. I think you are looking at the context being more important than the universal law would be?

B: Yeah, my focus is on .. on context, yeah heavy on context.

D: Yeah, and I .. I don't deny the existence of context but it's not of what's of interest to me and you mentioned its more ... sociological social-psychology and yeah there is sort of a grey area that can be blurred there. ... I sort of believe in laws and there is context that influences things but I will rely on that law first and, but there is for me on a personal basis, outside of research, yeah there is context and I take that into consideration. I don't just look at laws. ... if there is anything that I think is contextual that should be included, it is more of an applied setting that I think is really missing from social psychology. That may get to the context area of research. ... you've done the experiment, now how will it work. That's where I'm heading, the actual usage of it but not just, not necessarily in-depth interviews that can give you information or that can garner, I find my perception of that is that it is very subject specific or it is specific to that situation and that is not what I'm looking for in research and so I don't. I'm not in social psychology because of that I think, it is because it will get me some universal laws that I base myself on.

This student clearly wished to study social phenomena from a positivist perspective whether it be in a laboratory or in an applied setting. As [s/he] stated, context cannot be denied in everyday life but when it comes to the work of inquiry, context is not so important. Applied experimental research, for this student, appears to be sufficient for getting at the context. And perhaps this reflects the students empirical-analytic perspective about what the research process is all about. For [her/him] the emphasis was on the importance of universal laws that stand outside of specific situations and contexts.

Finally, in discussing student-advisor relations in the context of power and how that may have influenced the students work, the student provided a interesting contrast with respect to [her/his] graduate experiences. The basis for this contrast appeared to be the fact that [s/he] had worked with two advisors who were at opposite ends of their career. This difference in status and experience was seen by the student as allowing [her/him] to explore more applied work in the one case that would not have been available in the other. Consequently, the student-professor relationship was a potentially important factor with respect to the form of the students research project.

B: ... So your relationship with [prof 2] how. the question I want to ask is one on power. power-relationships, power. where did you see your position. how much influence did you see in the construction of your work. ...

D: [Prof 2] had the power. I didn't have the power. .. But [s/he] .. was .. careful in wielding it? .. When it comes to .. to what I wanted to do or maybe, who knows, maybe I was convinced that that was what I wanted to do. [S/he] was .. I guess in my research area [s/he] was open to what I wanted to do .. and I think eventually, I got to do what I wanted to do .. not til after it had gone through scrutiny in the group process .. I don't think it ever at any point. [s/he] ever really told me what I should be doing with my research, however, you knew in [her/his] research group that ultimately [s/he] made the decisions and they were final .. and maybe I just didn't come up against that power. I was going with the power and so I didn't see it. Academically, I didn't see it being used in an adverse way against me. ...

B: ... I guess I was just trying to get at the idea or ask about the idea to what extent

training involves. involves this regulation I brought up. To what extent do you think the graduate program training .. it could be another. I'm not saying it is unique to psychology. I'm talking about the idea of training being this way of directing the way you observe. of directing the way you do research and stuff like that.

D: That issue may be more relevant with my Ph.D. Again. I could have been young and naive for my pre-masters and masters research. that's what I want to do. that's what [prof 2] wants to do. With my Ph.D. I've decided I know what I want to do. And so I'm working with a new advisor now [prof 4] [s/he's] a younger professor ... I'm [his/her] first Ph.D. student and so now there is more of a power struggle before us, because I don't think [s/he] is not quite sure how to interact with me. ... And so I'm the first Ph.D. student after. not a lot of graduate supervising experience. I came into the program knowing sort of pretty much what I wanted to do. ... There is a bit more of a power struggle there. [S/he's]. I think maybe doing [her/his] job and ensuring that [s/he] questions me in what I'm doing to ensure I've thought it through so that I can defend any arguments that I make. Though there's. I think a definite feel that [s/he] is wondering why I am doing it and why aren't you doing a little bit more in my area. and why do you want to do it in this context and oh you want to do it in an organizational setting and do it in an applied kind of way. why do you want to do that? That's not social psychology .. so there is a bit of that. that power struggle there ... And I came through a system where I worked with [prof 2] where [s/he's] senior and almost sees [her/him] self above the university. [s/he] has [her/his] own little office and lab happening and so I came out of that thinking this is my relative reference group and now I'm dealing with [prof 4] and the reference group that I'm switching over to. the transition of a new professor and someone just starting their Ph.D. who wasn't that. that far apart and so I feel that I can say no to [him/her] or feel that I could. I probably have .. to some extent. Though on other issues I have completely jelly-fished. backed down ...

B: So there has been more negotiation?

D: Yeah.

The student's discussion of power above, highlights how student-professor relations play a crucial role in regulating the form of student knowledge products. In this particular case, the students reflections suggest the extent to which the final form of a student's research project will depend on the questions of power and authority between student and professor. Having said this, however, it is important to again remind the reader that the kinds of negotiation the student highlights are all operating from within the experimental approach. The background assumption that experimental methods of inquiry are how one goes about studying "the social" is not being questioned by student or by

professor. Rather, the questions of power the student is focusing on are questions about the kinds of research projects [s/he] can do *within* the experimental paradigm.

A bit later in the interview:

B: ... as you look back do you think .. you know, going with [prof 4] is going to be more beneficial in terms of you being able to do what you want to do than if you had worked with [prof 2]?

D: .. I would actually .. beneficial I would probably place them about equal though in different ways. With [prof 2] I sort of knew what I would want to do in a Ph.D. setting. It would have been the same area but again I would have been perfectly happy doing that. Again it would have been a little more applied. With [prof 4] I have more liberty to, to not do what [s/he's] doing. My Ph.D. work is still largely based on what I did for my masters, perceived control, attribution theory. And so now it is beneficial that I can take what I've learnt and apply it in a different setting which I wouldn't, with [prof 2] it would have to be education and I thought that I would be happy with that. With [prof 4] I can take it and pretty much apply it to any area I wanted. ... Sort of beneficial that I have a few more liberties here. However, it would have been a little more structured. The training I would have received with [prof 2] definitely would have been more intense, more rigorous however I had more liberties, working with [prof 4].

Student 4. Student four stated that [s/he] didn't have a definite career plan but when [s/he] took social psychology [s/he] found it really interesting, "especially the classic ones where [the prof] would sit and ask people what do you think happened and whatever, and most people didn't .. couldn't guess the results ... and once they were explained, it made sense". When I asked how [s/he] found the graduate program here [s/he] noted how [s/he] knew what [s/he] was getting into when [s/he] took advanced general psychology. "Which I did not know was research methods, had no idea ... so when it, when it came to graduate training I looked into what it was that I was going to do. ... And I knew there would be a research focus .. I was shocked into that sort of second year." For this student, it was not a question of disagreeing or of trying to find avenues to pursue a non-experimental approach to social inquiry. Rather, after the honours second year methods course, the student while surprised by the emphasis on experimental

methods, nonetheless prepared [her/himself] for conducting this kind of research at the graduate level. [Her/his] master's experience, "fell into place as far as .. what I wanted to do and how to go about doing it and that sort of thing." After a brief discussion within which [s/he] described how [her/his] research came together fairly easily, I asked questions about [her/his] student-advisor relations and power.

B: In working with your thesis, can you talk about or explain ... the student/professor relationship .. and what that role played in your thesis....?

E: ... For my master's thesis ... that one seemed to fall into place. I was very highly motivated. I got a plan very early on .. it seemed to make sense what to do .. I had access, easy access to all of the literature. You know, it took a long time to run. But that's how it goes, we don't have a lot of assistance here or undergraduates helping graduates students it doesn't seem like. ...

B: ... Well the other thing that I've asked everyone else is just reflecting on ... one of the things I am interested in is power ok, power differential, or if you even perceived it or if you have any reflections on it, reflections on how that relationship may have influenced your research, or if that was a problem or wasn't a problem for you, like it was fine, it was ok, that sort of thing ...

E: Well for my master's .. I was pretty .. I was pretty motivated but I was pretty willing to go along with, the thing is for my master's thesis sort of everything fell into place and I was comfortable with it. So I didn't feel any sort of .. and I was willing to take advice and guidance because I wanted that. I wasn't sure what I was doing, I wanted to get it done and I wanted to get it done properly, and it went very well, and I was happy with it so ... you know there wasn't anything that I can remember that was .. that stands out in my mind.

B: Nothing stands out ..

E: No not really. It was a collaboration and it was quite smooth and if there were any little things .. I felt like I got what I needed with that .. Does that make sense?

B: Yes.

E: And I ... wanted the guidance so I didn't want to say or I couldn't at that time say, you know .. I want to do this or I am doing this or whatever because I just ... didn't or couldn't.

B: Did you think .. well at that point was that not even a question?

E: I was always told that ... if I wanted to work with an advisor that my topic area and my questions and my method would have to fall somewhere in the general .. parameters of what that professor knows about and is willing to do .. and it was .. sort of explained as being a benefit to both people because as a student, if you pick a topic that, or

methodology that's outside of the advisor's area. you're not going to get help because they can't provide it to you. Do you know what I mean?

B: Well yeah I've heard that.

E: So that's. .. But I never .. I didn't really want to do that anyways so I didn't feel it was a problem. there was no .. you know what I mean?

B: You were happy ..

E: Yeah

As the students comments indicate [her/his] M.A. went smoothly. This student accepted the experimental discourse constituting the training program and simply went about the process of constructing an experimental research project. Within this context she sought out the advice and guidance of [her/his] advisor and things went quite smoothly.

When I asked if [s/he] thought a student's research should always be within the area of the professors [s/he] initially responded, "Well, I guess it depends on what the student is willing to accept as far as help goes. Like any agreeable relationship seems fine to me." She suggested advisors and committee members can probably help more than they think they can even when it is out of their area of expertise. For [her/him] the important thing was "agreement on both parts," and "congruence between expectations." [Her/his] advice:

E: ... try to get things worked out in advance then at least you know what you are in for and if an advisor, or professor, or whomever they are, has a particular plan or anything for you. just as long as you know in advance, you can deal with it. You can either reject it or modify it or find someone else or whatever. Just as long as you .. You know? It's not that easy usually because graduate school is so competitive and you get in when you can and all of that kind of stuff and it's a compromise..

I then changed the focus to educational practices and the program in general.

B: Reflecting on educational practice at a broader level ... what is the objective of the program? Think of the objective to be trained as a social psychologist.

E: The social psychology program?

B: Does that make sense to you? What are they trying to do .. or what do they want ..

E: I think what they are trying to do is they are trying to produce in .. university .. academics as far as research. I think the focus is on research .. obviously. And they are trying to develop research skills such that a person from .. graduating from here should be able to go out and compete with people graduating from all the other academic programs ... I think the objective of the program is to get .. people trained as academics.

B: Academics.

E: Yeah..

B: When you say research ..

E: There's no .. as far as I know there's not a lot of applied focus ... but I think to be competitive on the whole. ... it's not just being competitive at this university but being competitive across the board. You know which journals you want to have on your c.v. and that sort of thing and you know what kind of research to get in those journals and so that's to compete with everyone else too it's not just ..

B: ... actually I like the way you put it. Let's see if I can reflect and you can correct it. Ok so the program is aimed at .. well, not any specific students but what we want our students to come out of here with, so that they can compete so that they can become academics and then you would say research ..

E: I guess the objective if you asked any person would be not just to train people to get a job but to do good research too. to .. I am taking the point of view of you know what the program may be about .. but .. to do research that is new and novel and expands on .. you know what I mean?

B The research that is out there.

E: Yeah, yeah, that sort of thing. In experimental.

B: In experimental.

E: Yeah, to have students who are good researchers, have good research skills .. preferably to be able to communicate those as well to other colleagues and students if that is in the form of teaching or whatever but .. I guess I am saying skills good enough to match everywhere else .. and that means producing good research, moving forward or whatever.

While up to this point one might construe the students perspective as largely in accordance with a mainstream understanding of the training process [s/he] none-the-less highlights a number of real practical considerations for the aspiring academic, such as developing sound experimental research skills so as to make oneself competitive in the

academic job market. There was a certain straight-forward honesty to [her/his] responses such that when [s/he] responded in a way that could be construed as critical, I couldn't help but think that [s/he] was really simply stating a matter of fact more so than a criticism. At this point I asked specifically about constraint.

B: ... do you look at the program as constraining students? Or .. ok it is an experimental emphasis. How do you understand that in terms of .. well student that may not want to do experimental research. Do you see the program as .. constraining research, the student's research practices or behaviour?

E: Well .. I haven't really .. tried to do anything else so I haven't had this experience myself. So .. I would think obviously it would because ... there is no .. support that way in terms of courses or research groups or anything like that within social psychology. So there is sort of nothing within the program itself .. I don't know what else there would be .. I guess courses. And then beyond that it would have to be people who would be either doing that or willing to do something other than .. because everyone is pretty experimental right .. or whatever. Pretty close to that so yeah. I guess, yeah. It is one of those questions that I, I haven't really .. any sort of difficulties that I've had, that I've created for myself or whatever has not be a result. I don't think of constraints of the program but my research has always be in completely. So I haven't had that experience.

Shortly after:

B: I think .. my reflecting on myself, this whole idea of constraint and power relations is all that evident to me because I've chosen to bang my head against a wall.

E: Well that's the thing and like I said .. the part, parts of social ... those are the sorts of things that grab my attention and they were experimental studies. They were things that had volunteer subjects come in. some of them were questionnaires, some of them were a little bit more interesting than that. ... But those, all those really interesting things were all the experimental things that I was interested in. I was not exposed to a lot more. And it is partly a matter of choice because to be exposed to a lot of things, you have to do a lot of things but there is not a lot of exposure within the area of social psychology, for example.

B: Exposure?

E: Well, I don't know, to alternative methods to different .. I think for example, given what I know about sociology .. they're a little bit more broad, they always, in sociological social psychology, they'll keep track of what the psychological social psychologists are doing. And they may not do the same thing or whatever but they'll keep track of it, do you know what I mean? Even though their methods, some of their methods are exactly the same and they have their own research methods courses and I bet their students would complain about them if you asked them.

B: Heh, yeah, yeah, no doubt.

E: But you know what I mean? But it seems they'll keep track of different things and they'll talk about it and they'll be interested in doing some sort of comparison or whatever and they maybe still go on about their own business. Whereas, there is not. I don't think there is as much in psychological social psychology from what I know. ...

I then followed the focus on constraints in psychology with a question about experimental inquiry.

B: ... Do you think, experimental research is the way to go quote unquote in social psychology or do you think other methods .. what do you think about that? ...

E: Well I guess .. I see room for both and I think that the people who want to be doing each should be doing each to the best of their ability and getting the most out of it whether it is applied or expanding theory or whatever the case may be. And they should be able to co-exist perhaps .. ideally, you know what I mean. If you are doing an experimental study, I don't see any reason .. its hard to come across non-experimental studies, almost, right but there is no reason why they can't ..

B: Within the discipline anyway ..

E: Right. Why they shouldn't be able to .. come together in terms of not necessarily one person doing both unless they want to. It depends, people, whoever is doing whatever they're doing, they have to be well trained. Like I don't know, you're doing some sort of discourse analysis? Or you have?

B: Yeah, yeah.

E: Like I could not do that because I don't know how so I shouldn't be doing it right? But if a person can do that and do experiments fine. If one person is doing you know, something in a particular way and then it's out there for other people to take information from. I don't think one should. I think people favour, obviously.

B: You mean students?

E: No. Everyone in the discipline.

B: Ok.

E: I mean obviously everyone has their preferred methodology that they use and that sort of thing but I don't .. there is an obvious .. there is such an obvious separation or demarcation or whatever and they don't come together. Am I right?

B: You're talking what?

E: Research, like let's say someone is producing a lot of research using different kinds of methods and someone's producing a lot of experimental research on similar topics .. they don't seem to .. you know what I mean?

B: No. I don't think so not in the literature.

E: No. not that I've found anyway. There is not a lot of them referencing one another

and that sort of thing. And I don't know, given what I know, I don't know why the findings in one kind of study and the other can't be brought together and, you know what I mean?

Following this line of discussion about research products in social psychology and how there is very little non-experimental research, I suggested to the student that perhaps publication practices are "policed".

B: Do you think that might have something to do with .. this is the only word I can think of, policing. How .. what gets published and who is deciding what gets published and who is deciding .. what to write before you even get to the point of trying to publish?

E: Well .. I think that .. I don't know about that. I don't know that it is an active effort but it is obviously happening. I mean the .. the big name journals and stuff like that are very serious complicated five experiment studies you know that .. and that sort of thing. I think the thing is the competition. ... I think it's the way the discipline has just sort of evolved. Are you saying that there is someone going around stamping out ..

B: .. well .. sure. I guess in a way I am saying that. I'm saying .. just from things I've read like you know .. there are .. committees that accept work and that is based on conventions about what is good scholarship and what is poor scholarship and that comes out of a history like you just said. So .. I just wondered if you had any reflection on the institution and what you have to do .. to make it.

E: So you are talking more about right here at the university. I was talking about more or less overall.

B: Yeah. I was talking about overall.

E: Yeah ok cause to be honest, I don't have that many, or I don't have enough knowledge about meta-discipline stuff to feel like I could really comment, do you know what I mean? Like how editors of journals get picked and why .. certain ones have gone in the direction they have and that sort of thing, do you know what I mean?

B: Sure.

E: Because I really don't know. I don't know a lot about the politics, which is why .. you know not that anxious (laughs) to get involved in it all. Because I think you have to be aware of what is going on and that way you can form a better opinion you know what I mean and I have sort of not done that.

B: So ...

E: And I don't see it going on in our program .. and I knew that from the start.

B: You don't see what going on?

E: Any sort .. well any .. its pretty fixed about what everybody is doing, you know what I

mean. And it is somewhat similar and it's experimental and there is not a lot of other ...

B: Ok. Well do you have any questions?

E: I think though that the competition for everything, for entering grad school, for getting scholarships and fellowships and all that stuff. Getting published is quite difficult as far as I understand. Do you know what I mean?

B: Well yeah.

E: And those are the things you need. It depends what you wanna, you know if you want to go out and get a good academic job, you need those things. You need all of those things.

B: Yeah, ok.

E: And so, you know I think though that a lot of people that enter social psychology .. like experimental and want to do that. Do you know what I mean?

B: Yeah, that is probably true.

E: That is .. a lot of the elements of that will quite easily, if you know, work hard and do all of that kind of stuff will easily lead you to success right? In getting those things and if you want to go get an academic position you'll have all this stuff on your c.v. that is what people want to see.

Later the student discussed the need for more applied work in social psychology.

This lead back to the practical considerations for building an academic career:

E: I would like it, if anything it were more applied. And I think there is room for it but I think, you know, also economic conditions, you know lots of people would probably love to have social psychologists around doing all kinds of different things but everyone has limited money and you have to hire people to get the main bulk of the work done.

B: Sure. I was just wondering .. you talked about the importance .. if you want to make it as an academic, there are certain important things. Your c.v. and publishings blah, blah .. was there some point where this was the way you were thinking? I mean I was asking if you wanted to become an academic, were you like well aware? Cause like I wasn't. I never have been.

E: You were not aware of what you had to do ..

B: No. Well I never even thought of it that way. I thought about studying what I wanted to do, study ok. But when I talk to other people, you know, you sort of become aware of how people, how like some are very focused.

E: Yes.

B: This is an academic career. This is what I have to do to get it.

E: Yes. These are the seven steps or whatever yeah. No. I was a little bit more naive. But I was willing to .. I mean I don't regret any of my academic studies and I was willing all along to say. I like this I think it is interesting. I think a lot of it is important and that's fine. And then I go out and get a job in something that is not that related that's ok with me. So I was willing to say that all along. But I did know. but not until later .. not til .. probably after Master's.

B: Yeah that sounds about right. That's where you start becoming aware.

E: Yeah. they come about slowly. And I certainly wasn't aware of all the .. you know .. sort of the politics within the discipline and department and all of that stuff. But that comes with time and exposure sort of thing. But you are right I think some people are more well aware of that to begin with. They're not just out there kind of doing their work and seeing what they can learn and .. you know being interested in it and that sort of thing. I mean I think those people are as well but they are also doing all those other things that it is going to take. And I think if you are really motivated to work in a university or whatever. you do have to work pretty hard. You know what I mean? There is no question about that. And the faster you get through. the better you know. I don't know. Does that answer your question?

Later the student asked about what the other interviewees thought (as the interview was winding down). I gave a brief reply and noted how no one was, "railing against the experimental method like the way I am," although I hadn't really expected that anyway. She replied:

E: Yeah. Well I think like I said to know .. your not. I guess the thing is you're not that exposed to anything in the program. So to know about it you have to find out about a lot of things .. elsewhere.

B: Yeah.

E: I mean you kind of get a brief introduction to it but all this stuff you really read about. is experimental so then you. you know that is what you know and that is what you ..

My Graduate Experience

In this section my aim is to provide the reader with a narrative account of my experiences and interactions with the members of a previous thesis committee as I attempted to complete my master's thesis and move on to Ph.D. study. My account will focus in particular on the decisions and requirements of committee members with respect to the development of my thesis document. I do not believe my personal case to represent

the normal state of affairs with respect to knowledge production at the U of M largely because most students tend to produce knowledge by means of experimental procedures. My case, in contrast to the graduate interviews, provides a sense for the potential hazards to a student who attempts to “know” in a way that does not reflect either the practices and procedures of the curriculum or of the research interests and aptitudes of the faculty. The main point of this narrative is to illustrate how epistemological values and normative power - as they are instantiated in the actual requests and requirements of academics - can be understood to play an important role in the production of social psychological knowledge.

I was admitted into the M. A. program seven years ago with what I assume was at best an average GPA and average GRE scores. By this time I had already been doing some research work with one of the social psychology professors who would come to be my first thesis advisor. My first thesis proposal, I think it is safe to say, was not embraced as the model of experimental soundness. The enduring memory I have is of me sitting by my computer at home when my advisor called to express how concerned and distressed he was because he felt my proposal was, in fact, so bad he did not know where to begin to help me improve it. And, in fact, he never actually tried to help me improve it although I should add that it was not a question of refusing to help or of the advisor being hostile or negative. He just didn't “work that way” so to speak. This was not exactly what I was hoping for nor was it what I needed as a student trying to develop my research and writing skills. I continued on with the program finishing up course work all the while feeling discouraged about my thesis work due to my advisor's assessment and lack of

participation. After a number of months had passed I realized I needed to work with an advisor who would participate with me in my academic development.

The social psychology course I discussed above (taken in year two of my M.A. program) turned out to be important to my academic development because through this course I was exposed to an entirely different approach to social inquiry (by one professor for two classes) than I had been exposed to throughout any of the psychology program undergraduate or graduate. Somehow a book I read by a social philosopher (Richard Rorty) always looms large when I think back to what triggered an intense interest in what I would now refer to as social theory. In this book, Rorty (1989) opens with a chapter that discusses the debate within the social sciences between the traditional defenders of a universal ahistorical reality knowable through traditional objective methods and a socially constructed, historical and particular reality where language, meaning and context all play crucial roles in what is treated as true or real. I mention this book because I think my extra-curricular reading helped me to be open to the post-structuralist point-of-view my future thesis advisor was presenting to the social psychology seminar class. Within a few months of this course and realizing I must find a new thesis advisor, I sought out this professor (who was faculty in the Department of Education) and after a couple of meetings she agreed to become my new advisor.

I remember one experience at our first formal “student-advisor” meeting. She asked me something to the effect about what is that thing inside me I have to know about. I recall stating (after getting over the shock of such an unusual question!) that I was interested in human subjectivity or that which is subjective in humans or something along

those lines. Equipped basically with the freedom to pursue this interest, I searched for published work by social psychologists who might have focused on similar interests. I recall finding articles by Rom Harre, John Shotter and Kenneth Gergen and soon I was studying “positioning” and how language and discourse situate or position students in terms of particular points-of-view such that taking up a particular discourse entails positioning oneself with respect to other discourses (and people). At some point around this time I recall my advisor suggesting I tie in this interest with the area of education and this is in fact what I came to focus on in one way or another ever since. As I reflect on the development of my first thesis proposal it was very much driven by my interest in subjectivity but it was also connected to my advisors interest in higher education. While my writing was perhaps only slightly better than with my first advisor, this time I was required to rewrite, revise and to have regular meetings with my advisor over a period of months. Finally, I produced a short research proposal. My proposed research entailed interviewing a number of students who had recently completed a graduate seminar in psychology that focused on discussing and critically examining different epistemological perspectives. My research goal was to develop my ability to analyze text, in this case interviews, by examining how each interviewee constructed a particular epistemological discourse (or perhaps invoked more than one discourse within the context of the interview) based on their own personal commitments to one of the views discussed in the course.

My thesis advisor approved the final draft proposal and I was prepared to move ahead to the research phase where I would interview students and analyze the content of

the interviews. This was back in 1995, just prior to year four of my M.A. program. While my advisor was ok with the document, one of the committee members provided four pages of text and about two hours of questions about the proposal during the oral proposal (the external could not attend and deferred judgment to the remaining committee members). The objections ranged from my not stating what the study intend to achieve, to my not stating the context of the research, to my instructions to subjects being both too precise and too loose such that it would render the data suspect, to my having methods of analysis that are unclear largely because unstated, to my using methods that have not previously been used (presumably in social psychology). While I had successfully passed the oral proposal, I was required to submit revisions of the written document before I could proceed with the research. In other words, I had to address all of the above objections in my research proposal before I could proceed to the research phase.

As I reflect on this particular aspect of my graduate training, a number of things come to mind. First, my intention was to conduct a non-experimental (i.e., non-positivist) research project and this is why I sought out a specific thesis advisor who I knew would be able to help me to develop such conceptual and research skills. Second, attempting to produce a knowledge product contrary to my training meant I had to largely start from scratch since my training provided basically nothing of value to assist me with this form of inquiry. Third, despite the expertise of my advisor in the area of inquiry I was pursuing, my proposal was held up by objections from a committee member whose expertise lay in the field of positivism. Consequently, my ability to carry on with my proposed research had shifted from the approval of a committee to the approval of one committee member. I

raise these points, to emphasize that despite the fact I had specifically sought an advisor who was open to helping me develop my ability to do work from a post-modern perspective, I found myself confronted with having to revise my thesis for a committee member who was not familiar with post-modern forms of inquiry. Of course, I was barely familiar with post-modern inquiry myself and to this extent I was prepared - like the students in the interviews above - to defer to the judgment of my thesis advisor as to what constituted an acceptable document. Thus looking at this period of my training in retrospect, it would appear that my personal knowledge-interests were at odds with the institutional knowledge-interests of the psychology department. Having taken my first stab at this alternative approach, however, I then found my ability to continue inhibited by what I assume were the underlying or unreflected experimental values of a member of the social psychology faculty. None of my interactions with this committee member, of course, were in any way hostile or negative. The spirit of the required revisions to my thesis were provided more in line of the kinds of things that simply had to be included to make the document sound: not disciplinary power so much as normative power.

At this stage in the proposal, there was also another development that was undoubtedly crucial to the eventual progress of my proposal revision. My thesis advisor left the province for a better academic opportunity elsewhere. The student-advisor relationship would subsequently come to take on the form of countless communications through email. In addition, and related to this, I recall the committee member making it clear to me how since he was only a committee member he did not want to have to do any additional work with respect to my thesis as that should be done with my thesis advisor.

Rather, he was only interested in reading the revised document and he expected it to be more or less in final form. Consequently, as I worked on the revised proposal I never went to consult this committee member as he had made clear the limits of his involvement with respect to my research document. In retrospect, I find this puzzling in the sense that it was this committee member who sought many substantial changes to the thesis and yet it was expected that the thesis advisor would assure that the requirements of the committee member be satisfied. Wouldn't it have been more helpful to offer to talk and discuss the kinds of changes that he thought were necessary? At any rate, at this stage in my exploration of the topic (and, in fact, even up to this moment) I continued to read and to seek out new and interesting articles and books such that my revised proposal basically turned into a new proposal having little in common with the first. The changes required by the committee member basically demanded a complete revision and some of my new readings made me very enthusiastic about how I could further clarify and refine my understanding of what I would now call "post-structuralist" inquiry. The new proposal came to take the form of an examination of the problem of educational practices and academic subjectivity. My new proposal focused more on the training in psychology in terms of how it functioned to produce a particular form of research subjectivity. Reading the abstract to this "revised" proposal, it would appear that I was emphasizing how mainstream social psychological practices produced an individualistic conception of the person and an experimentalist as an inquiring subject (this being how I expressed these ideas at the time). My proposed research entailed focusing on four case studies (i.e, four students) and having each provide me with verbal and written materials that were either

derived from courses the student had taken or were based on student reflections about aspects of their training. The goal was to construct the academic subjectivity of each case, based on an analysis of the various texts provided by each student.

I completed the proposal five months subsequent to the oral proposal and then sent it to my thesis advisor. My thesis advisor was very supportive of the new proposal. She commented that I understood post-structuralist conceptions of teaching/learning more than any student she had supervised to that point. In addition, however, she requested that I make some revisions to the methods section. I made the requested changes (the approach described above was the revised version) and then I submitted the “revised” proposal to the social psychology committee member. At this point, in retrospect, I made an error in that I only sent the “revised” copy to this committee member and not to the external. As stated, the external was not able to make it to the oral proposal and he stated he was willing to abide by the decision of the other committee members. Consequently, at this point I had come to accept the position that if I could get the approval of the social psychology committee member, all would be fine with the external. Unfortunately, the social psychology committee member did not return my research proposal to me for six months. I submitted it to him in April and I received it back in October of 1996. In addition, after having taken so long to return my document, the professor was not prepared to allow me to move on to the research phase of the study as he did not believe the document was ready. Needless to say, “relations of power” was quickly becoming something I understood at a very concrete and specific level.

The committee member was so dissatisfied with the proposal, he sent an email to

the committee and myself (he informed me of this prior to actually sending it) expressing his dissatisfaction with the revisions to the thesis. The formal notice was unambiguous on a number of points. First, he objected to having to do what he stated he would not do. This was to make further revisions to a document he did not think was ready. Second, he wondered why he was the only one making such suggested revisions. This was in part my fault as I stated above. I had not sent it to the other committee member wanting to wait until I had received comments and criticisms from the social psychology committee member first. My thesis advisor, of course, had already read it about six to seven months prior. Third, he requested a formal meeting of the committee and myself to assess my progress. This would be an opportunity for me to explain what work I had done and to clarify to the committee about aspects of the thesis where they felt clarification was necessary. Fourth, this would be an opportunity to bring the thesis to a conclusion by either deciding the proposal is satisfactory and the project can proceed or by deciding it is not satisfactory and should be rejected.

My attempt to develop my skills at a different form of social inquiry had apparently lead me to a point where there was the possibility that my proposal would flat out be rejected. Looking back I cannot imagine that making further revisions under such conditions could have, in any way, encouraged me to further explore a novel approach to social inquiry. Such conditions were guaranteed to favour my adhering to standard and accepted ways of organizing and communicating about social problems. The beneficial side of this discouraging experience, however, was that it helped to expand my understanding of how educational practices function to regulate the production of

knowledge. My personal experiences with contradictory and conflicting opinions as to the basic soundness of the research project I proposed to conduct, provided me with a much more concrete understanding of how discourses, training and institutional power can function to constrain the research products of students. I was beginning to understand more clearly, the critical importance that social relations (in addition to textual practices in the form of the curriculum) play in the construction of student research products.

Without going too deep into it, having my thesis work hanging over a precipice, so to speak, I was somewhat unenthusiastic and relatively unproductive with the whole project for approximately eighteen months. The only thing I began to work on during this period focused on trying to understand social psychology's obsession with an experimental approach by examining the "crisis" literature (thank goodness I was given Gergen's article in my social psychology seminar course!). During this eighteen month period, I was reluctant to make personnel changes to my committee but at the same time I had simply lost confidence that this particular member would not once again find my methods neither specific, nor precise, nor exact enough. And rejection this time was to have a finality about it as his letter to the committee made clear. So, as stated, I took a break, continued to read and regrouped for one last attempt to say what I wanted to say and conduct the kind of research I wanted to conduct (all the while receiving the supportive advice of my thesis advisor in terms of email and suggested further readings in line with my research interests). Finally, I came to accept that the kind of research project I wanted to carry out would require that I assemble a new committee open to a broader conception of scholarly inquiry. Consequently, I discussed with my thesis advisor the idea

of seeking out a new committee who would be better equipped to provide me with the kinds of advice and expertise that would assist me in further developing the approach to scholarship and inquiry that I had originally intended to develop some five years previously. Of course, as might be expected after five years had passed, my understanding and ability to communicate about the kinds of things I was only just learning about earlier, had improved dramatically. This version you read here thus ends up the fruits of an extremely laborious process that both hindered my academic progress while it also inadvertently helped me to concretely understand, how training and student-professor relations play a fundamental role in the production of knowledge.

Interpretive Analysis: Graduate Program

In this section, I want to fill in the gaps concerning graduate training by focusing on those aspects of graduate work where the textual traces, so to speak, are not so readily identifiable in the form of the curriculum and student research products. My purpose is to provide the reader with an interpretation of how, at the graduate level, disciplinary power comes to be overshadowed by normative or pastoral power. Normative power is power when it takes the form of institutional inducements to accept the norms and values of the discipline. One can discern its operation, for example, through the concrete practices and social relationships that support a students “choice” to espouse disciplinary values. My interpretation basically involves elaborating on Howley and Hartnett’s (1992) analysis of Michel Foucault’s “model” of power as I discussed in chapter four.

The transition from admitted graduate student to budding professional, entails a

transition from producing knowledge within the context of disciplinary power to producing knowledge within the context of normative or pastoral power. At the undergraduate level and in the early years of graduate school, disciplinary power in the form of how the curriculum organizes the students learning activities is the essential tool for regulating the production of knowledge. The curriculum structures the research activities of students and develops their aptitudes and abilities along the lines of experimental approaches. At the end of the undergraduate program, students are introduced to the student-professor relationship as a sort of warm-up for what to expect and what to do when they do it “for real” as a graduate student. At this point, the educational practices and the student-professor relations are still “pushing” the student in the sense that the students educational products come about through the educational organization of their learning activities. In short and put simply, they produce what they are required to produce in order to get A pluses. Doing what is required and doing it well is what makes admission into a graduate school possible. Again, at this stage, the focus is disciplinary in the sense of instilling within the research activities of students a healthy appreciation of, familiarity with and acceptance of the concepts and methods of inquiry of the experimental tradition as well as a familiarity, appreciation and acceptance of how the student-professor relationship “works”.

Once the student is doing graduate work, however, the relations of power *shift* from a “push” to a “pull”. No longer is discipline (through a core program of experimental practices) the central organizing force that helps to assure that the knowledge products of students conform to an experimental ideology. At the masters level it is clear that

discipline is still present, however, its importance has decreased. The master's student, for example, must still participate in programmatic learning activities in the form of studying about inferential statistical techniques for the analysis of quantitatively organized data. But another power is beginning to take precedence. As the master's student begins to reflect more concretely and specifically on their career aspirations and as they begin to understand what social practices it is necessary for them to successfully participate in (e.g., publication practices, student-profession relations, grant writing practices) a normative power begins to take precedence. The aspiring graduate student is now being "pulled" into a collection of discursive practices that can only benefit her or his career aspirations to the extent that the student embraces and emulates these practices. Where at the undergraduate level, training is largely about developing within the student, the proper aptitudes and abilities for conducting experiments, at the graduate level, training focuses on encouraging the student to recognize that her or his individual career success is linked to the reigning publication practices and other disciplinary values. The professor/advisor, consequently, takes on the status of an expert who can help guide the student through the necessary channels for building an academic career.

At the masters level, the student-advisor relationship becomes the central relationship from within which the student is expected to produce a research document. As the interviews and as my own experiences suggest, the kind of knowledge produced by the student will be related to the kinds of knowledge her or his advisor produces. This much seems relatively easy to understand. One chooses an advisor who can actually advise the student with respect to her or his research interests. In my case, I wanted to explore

non-positivist methods of inquiry and consequently I chose an advisor who could assist me in terms of suggested readings and advice about writing and methods of inquiry. The important point to note in terms of the role of normative power in regulating knowledge production, however, is this: The research product I happened to produce was only possible (and even then only because I persisted) because my thesis advisor was open to non-experimental approaches to inquiry. If she had not been available, there would not have been anyone else in the department willing to or capable of assisting me in developing this approach. In the case of all of the graduate students I interviewed, they conducted experimental (positivist) research within the area of expertise of her or his advisor. Further each stated that they wanted to conduct experimental research. But what might have happened had they been trained in feminist research in addition to experimental? What might have happened had the social psychology faculty included feminist researchers? The question of choice, it seems to me, comes down to a question of the educational context. A student can choose to do non-experimental research but only if s/he can find an advisor prepared to help with such work. And even then, as my case illustrates, the student will have to seek out a committee willing and able to assist her or him in developing such a project and this requires that those participating have some familiarity with the perspective the student wishes to develop. In this sense normative power, in terms of the epistemic values of the faculty and of how those values are imbued to students, plays a crucial role in regulating the production of knowledge.

If one looks to the Ph.D. program, it would appear that the role of disciplinary power has decreased further. No longer are specific courses required. Discipline has been

limited to the requirement that one quantitative course be taken. It would appear that in many ways, the Ph.D. student is much freer to pursue her or his own interests using whatever methods of inquiry they deem fit. Or are they? While the role of disciplinary power has receded into the background in terms of its regulatory force on the research activities of students, normative power has increased in terms of how academic success entails reproducing disciplinary values. The regulating forces are less in the form of training practices and perhaps less in the form of student-advisor relations although I suspect this still plays an important role. Instead, the Ph.D. student is already very much aware of the necessary extra-educational practices within which s/he must demonstrate proficiency if s/he hopes to achieve academic success. This means producing knowledge in terms of the kind of work that would be likely to be acceptable for publication in a “good” psychological journal. In addition, the Ph.D. student is aware that getting hired on as faculty in a psychology department will be strongly linked to the body of research the post-graduate has amassed. Thus what increasingly comes to govern the research practices of students as they advance through the program is less actual training conditions and more extra-institutional conditions in the sense of the social/research practices that the post-graduate will be expected to produce in the name of psychological inquiry. By this point in the students training s/he is already very familiar with experimental approaches to inquiry. It is no longer a question of whether the student believes experimental methods are the way to go. The questions become more like, which are the best journals to publish in?, what are the current research fashions in my field?, what kind of research is most likely to receive funding?, what area is up and coming in terms of advancing my career?

Thus the student is no longer producing knowledge products from within the constraints of disciplinary power where the basic epistemological approach is set out in the form of textual practices and evaluation techniques. Instead, the student - already assuming the techniques that constituted her or his methodological training in psychology - is focusing more on the standard and accepted practices and procedures useful for making oneself competitive in the academic job market.

Discussion

My purpose in this section is to make explicit some links between the broader socio-historical analysis of psychology's institutionalization of experimental methods of inquiry, the criticisms of this institutionalization and the actual educational practices historically employed at the University of Manitoba as they have impacted on the research products of social psychology students.

To understand how social psychological research practices constrain how social psychologists conceptualize and study social phenomena, it is first necessary to recognize that social psychology's research history is largely a history of embeddedness with the naturalistic assumptions of psychology in general. In my opinion, one understand's how and why social psychological inquiry has limited itself to an empirical-analytic, technical knowledge-interest at the point where one also understand's that social psychological inquiry has been inhibited by the institutionalization of a core program of experimental research methods across sub-disciplines. In essence, social psychologists (be they professors or students) have been subjected to and embedded within a collection of discursive practices that function to produce almost exclusively, experimental knowledge

products. Despite the period of critical reflection among some social psychologists during the 1970s, the positivist assumptions underlying these methods of inquiry have largely remained the same. How was this methodological monolith maintained during and subsequent to the period of criticism and critique? I cannot begin to provide the complicated answer required of such a broad question. What I can do, however, is point to the focus of this inquiry and suggest that if we consider the concrete research practices of one major North American psychology department, it would seem clear that to the extent that a psychological training regulates the epistemological activities of its students, so to the discipline succeeds in maintaining its ideological commitments to an experimental approach to social inquiry.

I opened this paper by discussing Prilleltensky's (1989) critical assessment that psychology has adopted particular epistemic and non-epistemic values that have affected the kinds of knowledge it produces. The epistemic values center around an objectivist stance in the form of a predominately experimental approach to the study of all phenomena that fit under the umbrella of psychology. Be it developmental, cognitive, or social psychology each sub-discipline has been constituted primarily by adopting a natural scientific approach to the study of its own particular subject matter. The non-epistemic values have entailed a largely unreflective acceptance and legitimation of the North American political and economic order. The two values, however, work hand in hand. The value of the empirical-analytic knowledge-interest to current institutions lies precisely in how this objectivist stance produces knowledge that focuses on the solution of problems as they are understood and defined by the reigning political and economic apparatuses. In

other words, it treats as unexamined background what a more critical approach treats as an object of examination. I then discussed Danziger's (1985) claims regarding how psychology has institutionalized a particular research methodology based on particular statistical techniques whose requirements govern the design of experiments. Danziger's claim is that psychology's objectivist stance has taken a particular methodological form that biases the kinds of knowledge that it is possible for researchers in the field to produce. This kind of constraint on knowledge production can be meaningfully understood as ideological. Since psychological research practices favour the production of empirical-analytic knowledge and inhibit the production of interpretive and critical forms of knowledge, for example, psychological knowledge production favours technical knowledge over practical knowledge or emancipatory knowledge. The result is that social phenomena are conceptualized, examined and understood in technical terms rather than in practical or emancipatory terms. What I mean by this is that social psychologists aim to produce knowledge within which an expert can engineer or specify a relationship of determination among variables. What it does not do and what it cannot do from within the confines of the experimental ideology, however, is focus on what things mean for the people being studied. Meanings become something to be controlled such that they do not confound experimental results. What things mean to people is not to be trusted. Only when you can specify a relationship of determination can you be said to have produced knowledge. In addition, mainstream social psychological knowledge does not focus on generating a critical assessment of institutional structures and practices such that people can develop their own personal skills for questioning things like educational apparatuses.

One is tacitly directed to treat her or his training in psychology, for example, as providing her or him with the neutral tools for objectively studying problems. They are not, however, provided with the critical viewpoint that her or his training fits into a larger socio-economic picture wherein educational apparatuses are sites for the organization of student research behavior such that the successful student is equipped with the requisite tools to contribute to the maintenance of dominant institutional apparatuses like businesses, government and indeed the university itself.

Social psychological inquiry, however, has a subject matter that is fundamentally tied up with things political, economic and historical. Social psychological inquiry simply cannot *not* incorporate questions of values and of knowledge-interests into its forms of analysis without excluding the very conditions that are necessary for understanding what is actually underlying, supporting, regulating and producing particular forms of human behavior. This thesis amounts to my attempt to substantiate this viewpoint about social psychology, by showing how student research behavior is regulated by mainstream educational practices that have been institutionalized for decades. One understands the research behavior of psychology and social psychology students to the extent that one contextualizes that behavior by situating it within a particular social, historical, political and economic context. Students do the kinds of research they do largely due to the structuring and regulating force of educational practices both in the form of the curriculum as well as in the form of social relationships and career aspirations, given an already existing research producing industry that values particular forms of knowledge over and against other forms. Blank (1987) suggested, the “crisis” in social psychology could be

understood as reflecting the general dissatisfaction internal and external to the discipline concerning a more general conflict in the social sciences about traditional epistemological approaches versus forms of social constructivism and contextualism. The end result of this crisis, however, was that social psychology maintained its commitment to an empirical-analytic knowledge-interest and, in fact, stepped up the methodological rigour in the form of an increase in the use of multivariate statistical analysis and the like. The crisis did not seem to have a very significant impact on the discipline. My analysis of the educational practices at the U of M was intended to try and give sense to why social psychology has been inhibited and constrained from studying social phenomena outside of the objectivist stance of psychology in general. And my answer to this question, based both on the descriptive and interpretive aspects of my analysis of the educational practices at the U of M is that social psychology students have been constrained by an educational apparatus that renders all psychological subject matter into an objectivist form through a years long process of training that orients the student toward social subject matter in terms of quantification, experimental design and operationally defined variables.

Particular social psychologist's during the crisis period touched on the kinds of institutional practices that would inhibit methodological change within the field (e.g., Elms, 1975, Gergen, 1973, 1976 Ryckman, 1976). Promotion and tenure practices, publish or perish pressures, the structure of incentive systems within the university, the structure of graduate programs, and a inimical institutional structure in general, were all discussed as problems that would have to be overcome if substantive methodological change was to occur. None of these practices or incentive systems appear to be any

different now than in the 1970s. The institutional structure did not change. The methods of inquiry remained the same. Social psychology continued to adhere to the assumptions of a natural science. The end result has been that social psychology has rather successfully reproduced its narrow objectivist approach to the study of social phenomena. The student truly interested in understanding and participating in the debates and controversy's that constitute the social sciences and social theory in general, consequently, must look beyond what is offered in academic social psychology.

Conclusion

In 1994, Ian Parker stated, "the documents and practices of the psy-complex limit and structure how social psychologists think about objective research, and how they may think about issues of subjectivity. The wider context in the discipline may offer spaces for critiques of science and for action research, but more often the language of psychology inhibits innovation" (p. 250). The above master's thesis - and I will treat it historically even now having only just completed it - represented my attempt to substantiate Parker's claim, from within the limits of my current understandings and abilities. In order to substantiate this claim, I believed it was essential that I direct the readers attention to social psychological inquiry at the level of an historically changing body of documents and practices. I was interested in providing a critical analysis that would encourage the reader to think of psychological research practices in terms of specifiable historical products whose particular development and institutional maintenance have been and are, governed by numerous extra-scientific considerations. The particular extra-scientific aspect I choose to focus on was the educational apparatus. My particular educational experiences in and

understandings of the psychology curriculum and the various student-professor relationships I participated in - as I stubbornly persisted in developing a research strategy that satisfied my own intellectual beliefs about what social psychological inquiry should entail - provided an actual social context from which I could meaningfully develop my analysis. My purpose was to provide the interested reader with a point-of-view different than that they are probably used to if they were trained to conduct social research in a psychology department. My hope is that the reader has been encouraged, not necessarily to abandon the field of social psychology, but rather to work toward transforming it into a discipline capable of exploring fully, its actual subject matter.

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Appendix A

Table of Contents for Three Social Psychology Texts of the 1930s

PART I: INTRODUCTION	
I.	The Field and Methods of Social Psychology
PART II: INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCESS OF SOCIALIZATION	
II.	Nature and Nurture in Relation to Social Differences
III.	The Biology of Motives
IV.	The Learning Process in Social Situations
PART III: GENETIC STUDY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR	
V.	Methods of Studying the Social Behavior of Children
VI.	Development of Social Behavior in a Social Context: Age Levels, Traits, and the Social Situation
VII.	Characteristic Social Behavior of Children in Our Culture: Aggression and Competition
VIII.	Characteristic Social Behavior of Children in Our Culture: Cooperation, Friendship, and Group Activity
IX.	The Development of Social Behavior in Early Childhood
X.	Social Behavior in Later Childhood and Adolescence
XI.	Some Adult Behavior Patterns in Our Own Society
PART IV: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ADULT SOCIAL BEHAVIOR	
XII.	Measurement of Adult Personality
XIII.	Social Attitudes and Their Measurement

Figure A1. Chapter titles of Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb's (1937)
*Experimental Social Psychology: An Interpretation of Research upon the
 Socialization of the Individual*

PART I. SOCIAL PHENOMENA IN SELECTED POPULATIONS

1. Population Behavior of Bacteria
2. Social Origins and Processes among Plants
3. Human Populations

PART II. SOCIAL PHENOMENA IN INFRAHUMAN SOCIETIES

4. Insect Societies
5. Bird Societies
6. The Behavior of Mammalian Herds and Packs

PART III. HISTORICAL SEQUENCES OF HUMAN SOCIAL PHENOMENA

7. Social History of the Negro
8. Social History of the Red Man
9. Social History of the White Man
10. Social History of the Yellow Man

PART IV. ANALYSES OF RECURRING PATTERNS IN SOCIAL PHENOMENA

11. Language
12. Magic and Cognate Phenomena: An Hypothesis
13. Material Culture

PART V. ANALYSES OF SOME CORRELATES OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

14. The Physical Environment
15. Age in Human Society
16. Sex in Social Psychology
17. Attitudes
18. Social Maladjustments: Adaptive Regression

PART VI. EXPERIMENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

19. Relatively Simple Animal Aggregations
20. Social Behavior of Birds
21. Social Behavior in Infrahuman Primates
22. The Influence of Social Situations upon the Behavior of Children
23. Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Individual Human Adults

Figure A2. Chapter titles of the Murchison (1935) *Handbook of Social Psychology*

PART I: METHODOLOGICAL SECTION

- I. Introductory Material
- II. Two Philosophies of Biology
- III. Some Basic Concepts in the Logic of Dynamics
- IV. Social Groups as Fields
- V. Some Persistent Problems of Social Psychology.

PART II: SOCIOLOGICAL SECTION

- VI. Concerning Classification
- VII. The Effect of National Membership-Character
- VIII. The Effect of Church Membership-Character
- IX. The Effect of Social Class Membership-Character
- X. The Effect of Minor-Group Membership-Character
- XI. Historical Relationships Between Groups as Organized Wholes
- XII. The Effect of Family and Primary Group Membership-Character

PART III: PSYCHOLOGICAL SECTION

- XIII. Personality and Personality Traits
- XIV. The Original Nature of Man
- XV. The Field Theory of Personality Genesis
- XVI. The Freudian Theory of Personality Genesis
- XVII. Leadership

PART IV: POLITICAL SCIENCE SECTION

- XVIII. The State
- XIX. Types of State: The Liberal Democracy
- XX. Types of State: The Fascist Dictatorship
- XXI. Types of State: The Communist Dictatorship
- XXII. Theories Concerning the Outcome of the Present World Crisis
- XXIII. Resume of the Argument

Figure A3. Chapter titles of Brown's (1936) *Psychology and the Social Order: An Introduction to the Dynamic Study of Social Fields*.

Appendix B

Chapter Titles: Selected Research Methods and Statistics Texts Assigned as Part of the Undergraduate Honours Program at the University of Manitoba

1. The Nature of Psychology
2. The Response Mechanism
3. Psychological Measurement
4. Vision
5. Audition
6. Taste and Smell
7. Somesthesia
8. Intensity
9. The Perception of Spatial Relations
10. Temporal Perception
11. The Perception of Movement
12. Perceiving
13. Learning
14. Imagery
15. Pleasantness and Unpleasantness
16. Emotion
17. Action
18. Thought
19. Personality

Figure B1. Chapter titles of Boring, Langfeld and Weld's (1935) *Psychology: A Factual Textbook*. This text was not assigned at the University of Manitoba. See Figure B2 for a similar text that was so assigned.

1. The Nature of Psychology
2. The Response Mechanism
3. Response
4. Growth and Development
5. Feeling and Emotion
6. Motivation
7. Learning
8. Retention and Transfer of Learning
9. Recollecting, Imagining and Thinking
10. Perception
11. Sensation and Psychological Measurement
12. Color
13. Visual Space Perception
14. Hearing
15. Taste and Smell
16. Somesthesia
17. Topographical Orientation
18. Individual Differences
19. Heredity and Environment
20. Efficiency
21. Personality
22. Personal Adjustment
23. Vocational Selection
24. Attitudes and Opinions
25. Social Relations of the Individual

Figure B2. Chapter titles of Boring, Langfeld and Weld's (1948) *Foundations of Psychology*. This text was required in year two of the 1950 academic year.

1. The Nature of Research
2. Principles of Experimental Design
3. Binomial Populations in Research
4. Approximation of the Probabilities Associated with Sampling from a Binomial Population
5. Tests of Significance the χ^2 Distribution
6. Significance Tests for the Correlation Coefficient
7. The t Test for Means
8. Heterogeneity of Variance and the t Test
9. Introduction to the Analysis of Variance
10. Multiple Comparisons in the Analysis of Variance
11. The Randomized Blocks Design
12. The 2×2 Factorial Experiment
13. Factorial Elements: Further Considerations
14. Trend Analysis
15. Latin Square Designs
16. The Analysis of Covariance for a Randomized Groups Design
17. Analysis of Variance Models and Expectations of Mean Squares.

Figure B3. Chapter titles for Edwards' (1960) *Experimental Design in Psychological Research*. An earlier edition was required in year two of the 1955 academic year.

Part A. Theory of Experimentation
1. Psychology and Science
2. Causal sequences and the Meaning of Explanation
3. Armchair experimentation
4. Locating and Simplifying Problems
Part B. Design and Conduct of Experiments
5. Formation of Hypotheses
6. Independent and Dependent Variables
7. Control of the Experiment
8. Procedure for Experimentation
9. Methods of Inference
10. Apparatus
11. Conducting the Experiment
Part C. Interpretations and Conclusions
12. Central Tendency and Variability
13. Reliability of Measures
14. Computing Significance of Differences
15. Testing for the Significance of Relationships
16. The Construction of Graphs
Part D. Application of the Experimental Method
17. Report of Two Well-written Experiments

Figure B4. Chapter titles of Townsend's (1953) *Introduction to Experimental Method: For Psychology and the Social Sciences*. This was one of the required texts for the fourth year methods course in the 1955 academic year.

1. The Role of Observation and Description
2. Experimentation as a Decision-Making Process
3. Decisions Concerning Definitions of Concepts
4. Types of Experiments
5. Sampling in Experimental Research
6. Basic Statistical Concepts
7. Analysis of Variance: Basic Concepts and Applications
8. The Treatment of Functional Data
9. Concepts of Causality in Experimentation
10. Sources of Error and the Nature of Controls
11. Experimental Design Methods
12. An Introduction to Psychophysics
13. The Nature of Measurement
14. The Role of Instruments in Research

Figure B5. Chapter titles of Plutchik's (1974) *Foundations of Experimental Research*. This methods text was required in year two of the 1976 academic year.

Part I. INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
Part II. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
2. Frequency distributions and graphs
3. Transformed scores I: Percentiles
4. Measures of central tendency
5. Measures of variability
6. Transformed scores II: Z and T scores
Part III. INFERENCE STATISTICS
7. The general strategy of inferential statistics
8. The normal curve model
9. Inferences about the mean of a single population
10. Testing hypotheses about the difference between the means of two populations
11. Linear correlation and prediction
12. Other correlational techniques
13. Introduction to power analysis
14. One-way analysis of variance
15. Introduction to factorial design: Two-way analysis of variance
16. Chi square

Figure B6. Chapter titles for Welkowitz, Ewen and Cohen's (1971) *Introductory Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*. This text was required in year two of the 1976 academic year.

1. What is Science?
2. Descriptive Research Approaches
3. Experimental Research Approach
4. Problem Identification and Hypothesis Formation
5. Variables Used in Experimentation
6. Control in Experimentation
7. Techniques for Achieving Constancy
8. Experimental Research Design
9. Quasi-Experimental Design
10. Single-Subject Research Designs
11. Ethics
12. Data Collection and Hypothesis Testing
13. External Validity

Figure B7. Chapter titles for Christensen's (1988) *Experimental Methodology*. This text was required in year two of the 1988 academic year.

1. Introduction

Part I: Descriptive Statistics: Organizing and Summarizing Data

2. Organizing and Summarizing Data with Tables
3. Describing Data with Graphs
4. Describing Data with Averages
5. Describing Variability
6. Normal Distributions and Standard Scores
7. Measures of Relationship: Correlation
8. Prediction

Part II: Inferential Statistics: Generalizing Beyond Data

9. Populations, Samples, and Probabilities
10. Sampling Distributions
11. Introduction to Hypothesis Testing: The z Test
12. More about Hypothesis Testing
13. t Test for One Sample
14. t Test for Two Independent Samples
15. t Test for Two Dependent Samples
16. Estimation
17. Analysis of Variance (One Factor)
18. Analysis of Variance (Two Factors)
19. Chi-Square (χ^2) Test for Qualitative Data
20. Tests for Ranked Data

Figure B8. Chapter titles for Witte's (1985) *Statistics*. This text was required in year two of the 1988 academic year.

1. What is Science?
2. Introduction to the Methods of Science
3. Developing the Hypothesis
4. Description of Behavior Through Numerical Representation
5. Inferential Statistics: Making Statistical Decisions
6. Testing the Hypothesis: A Conceptual Introduction
7. Control: The Keystone of the Experimental Method
8. Applying the Logic of Experimentation: Between-Subjects Designs
9. Extending the Logic of Experimentation: Within-Subjects and Matched-Subjects Approaches
10. The Ecology of the Experiment: The Scientist and Research Participants in Relation to Their Environments
11. Quasi-Experimental, Correlation, and Naturalistic Observational Designs
12. Single-Subject Designs
13. Questionnaires, Survey Research and Sampling
14. Ethics
15. Sharing the Results
16. Beyond Method

Figure B9. Chapter title of Ray's (1997) *Methods: Toward a Science of Behavior and Experience*. This text was required in year two of the 1997 academic year.


- 
1. Basic Concepts
 2. Frequency Distribution and Percentiles
 3. Measures of Central Tendency
 4. Measures of Variability and Their Relationship to the Normal Curve
 5. Linear Correlation
 6. Regression and Prediction
 7. Probability Theory
 8. Sampling
 9. Hypothesis Testing
 10. Testing Differences Between Means
 11. One-Way Analysis of Variance
 12. Two-Way Analysis of Variance
 13. One-Way Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance
 14. Nonparametric or Distribution-Free Statistics

Figure B10. Chapter titles of Christensen and Stoup's (1991) *Introduction to Statistics for the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. This text was required in year two of the 1995 academic year.

Appendix C

Tables of Content for Social Psychology Texts
Assigned for the Undergraduate Course at the University of Manitoba

Part I: The Social World of the Man on the Street

1. Social Psychology and Everyday Experience
2. A Description of Uniform Ways and Their Psychology: Cocnotropes, Folkways, Mores, Institutional Ways, Fad and Fashion
3. The Measurement of Institutional Ways and the J-Curve Hypothesis
4. Special Forms of Uniform Behavior: Taboo, Ritual, and Verbal Stereotype
5. Atypical Ways: Non-conformity, Normal Variations, and Unique Ways
6. Social Interaction: Competition, Cooperation, Conflict, and Accomodation
7. Social Institutions

Part II: The Scientific Basis of Social Processes

8. The Physiological and Psychological Foundations of Social Behavior
9. The Motivation of Behavior
10. The Mechanisms of Social Interaction
11. Social Stimulus-Patterns and the Development of Language

Part III: The Social World of the Clinician: Personality

12. The Nature of Personality and Methods of its Study
13. Personality Characteristics and the Structure of Personality
14. The Development and Integration of Personality
15. The Relation of Culture to Personality

Part IV: The World of the Social Engineer: Social Context and Social Change

16. Society and Culture
17. The Epoch of the Rural Community
18. The Era of Publics
19. The Era of Social Classes
20. The Individual in the Modern World

Figure C1. Chapter titles to Katz and Schanck's (1938) *Social Psychology*. This was the required text for the 1945 academic year.

Part I: Basic Principles
1. The Field and Problems of Social Psychology
2. The Dynamics of Behavior
3. Perceiving the World
4. Reorganizing our Perceptions
Part II: Social Processes
5. Beliefs and Attitudes of Men
6. Development and Change of Beliefs and Attitudes
7. The Measurement of Beliefs and Attitudes
8. Public Opinion Research
9. Persuasion Through Propaganda
10. The Structure and Function of Social Groups
11. Group Morale and Leadership
Part III: Applications
12. Racial Prejudice in the United States
13. Controlling Racial Prejudice
14. Industrial Conflict
15. International Tensions

Figure C2. Chapter titles of Kretch and Crutchfield's (1948) *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*. This text was required in the 1950, 1955 and 1960 academic years (and presumably those in between).

Part I: A Comparative Baseline
1. The Social Behavior of Animals
Part II: Problems of Psychology and Social Structure
2. The Basic Dimensions of Interpersonal Relationship
3. Stratification
4. Roles and Stereotypes
Part III: The Socialization of the Child
5. The Development of Intelligence
6. Language: The System and Its Acquisition. Part I. Phonology and Grammar
7. Language: The System and Its Acquisition. Part II. The Semantic System: Language, Thought and Society
8. The Acquisitions of Morality
Part IV: Personality and Society
9. The Achievement Motive
10. The Authoritarian Personality and the Organization of Attitudes
Part V: Social Psychological Processes
11. The Principle of Consistency in Attitude Change
12. Impressions of Personality, Including One's Own
13. Group Dynamics
14. Collective Behavior and the Psychology of the Crowd

Figure C3 . Chapter titles of Brown's (1965) *Social Psychology*. This text was required in the 1965 academic year.

Part I: Theories, Methods and Orientation
1. Theories in Social Psychology
2. Methods of Studying Human Behavior
3. Our Assumptions about the Nature of Man
Part II: Social Factors in the Development of Personality, Motives and Abilities
4. Moral Development and the Development of Motives
5. Cooperation and Competition
6. Aggression, Violence, and War
7. Racial and Social-Class Differences in Abilities, Motivation, and Personality
8. Social-Class and Ethnic Differences in Language Development
Part III: Social Attitudes and Attitude Change
9. Attitudes: Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism
10. Theories of Attitude Change
11. Attitude Change Through Intergroup Contact
12. The Nature of Social Change
13. Authoritarianism, Obedience, and Political Repression
Part IV: Interpersonal and Group Processes
14. Affiliation, Anxiety, Attraction, and Love
15. Social Perception
16. Conformity and Social Influence
17. The Social Psychology of Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness
Part V: Applications of Social Psychology to Contemporary Problems
18. Drug effects and Drug Use
19. The Social Psychology of Sexual Behavior
20. Community Applications of Social Psychology

Figure C4. Chapter titles of Wrightman's (1972) *Social Psychology in the Seventies*. This text was required during the 1976 academic year.

1. Introducing Social Psychology

Part I: Social Thinking

2. Social Beliefs

3. Explaining Behavior

4. Behavior and Attitudes

5. Social Cognition and Human Well-Being

Part II: Social Influence

6. Cultural Influences

7. Conformity

8. Persuasion

9. Group Influence

10. Social Psychology in Court

Part III: Social Relations

11. Prejudice: Disliking Others

12. Aggression: Hurting Others

13. Attraction: Liking and Loving Others

14. Altruism: Helping Others

15. Conflict and Peacemaking

Figure C5. Chapter titles of Myers' (1993) *Social Psychology*. This text in its various editions has been required reading for the last number of years.

Appendix D

**Criteria for Evaluating the Final Thesis Manuscript and
Final Thesis Oral in the Fourth Year Honours Research Seminar**

Feedback on Final Thesis Manuscript

Style (30%)

1. APA Style (0-13)
2. Mechanics of writing
 - a. Spelling and grammar (0-5)
 - b. Clarity, organization, and transitions (0-6)
 - c. Overall impression (0-6)

Content (70%)

3. Informative abstract and title (0-4)
4. Introduction to set stage for study
 - a. Scientific and/or applied relevance of topic (0-4)
 - b. Organization and completeness of cited literature (0-4)
 - c. Predictor, outcome, & control constructs introduced (0-4)
 - d. Clearly stated purpose or hypothesis (0-4)
5. Method for addressing problem/hypothesis
 - a. Participants/recruitment appropriately described (0-4)
 - b. Apparatus/materials/questionnaires described (e.g., reliability, validity) (0-4)
 - c. Procedure understandable, relevant (0-4)
6. Clear exposition of the results
 - a. Data described (e.g., means and standard deviations) (0-4)
 - b. Rationale for data reduction or exclusion (0-4)
 - c. Appropriate use and description of analytic tests and procedures (0-4)
 - d. Appropriate use and construction of graphs and tables (0-4)
7. Clear discussion:
 - a. Interpretation of results in context of initial purpose (0-7)
 - b. Integration of findings with other literature (0-5)
 - c. Consideration of methodological shortcomings that affect interpretation (0-5)
 - d. Practical or theoretical implications, conclusions (0-5)

Point Total (out of 100) _____

Figure D1. Evaluation sheet for final thesis manuscript, 14.452 honours research seminar, 1998/99

Final Oral Presentation Score Sheet - 17.452 - Honours Research Seminar

Characteristics to be scored	Points
Introduction captures audience interest	(0-3)
Style	
Speaks audibly & communicates self-confidence	(0-3)
Avoids verbal mannerisms (e.g., ah, uh, ok, umm)	(0-3)
Shows variation in intonation, speed, volume	(0-3)
Uses appropriate gestures, avoids mannerisms	(0-3)
Makes frequent eye contact with all of audience	(0-3)
Visual Aids	
Appropriate, readable aids selected for setting	(0-3)
Audience attention maintained, controlled	(0-3)
Content	
Scientific/applied relevance of topic described	(0-4)
Literature review organized and sequential	(0-4)
Key variables/constructs introduced	(0-4)
Hypotheses flow readily from background	(0-4)
Design addresses hypotheses	(0-4)
Data reduction, exclusion described, justified	(0-4)
Expected outcomes clearly stated	(0-4)
Participants, materials described clearly	(0-4)
Procedural details adequate to understand study	(0-4)
Control variables cited and rationalized	(0-4)
Data analysis described clearly	(0-5)
Clear, understandable tables or graphs	(0-5)
Interpretation of results in context of hypotheses	(0-5)
Integration of findings with other literature	(0-5)
Practical or theoretical implications, conclusions	(0-5)
General Preparation	
Time proportioned appropriately	(0-3)
Well-rehearsed; infrequent use of notes	(0-3)
Peer and audience questions handled appropriately	(0-5)

Total Score (out of 100) _____

Figure D2. Evaluation sheet for final oral presentation sheet, 14.452 honours research seminar, 1998/99

Appendix E

Transcripts of Interviews with Two Undergraduate Students and
Four Graduate Students at the University of Manitoba.

Interview process: The interviewees agreed to a meeting via email or telephone. During the meeting I explained my research project. I informed the interviewees that I would edit the transcripts to reduce the likelihood of identification. After the transcripts were completed and partially edited, I gave them to the interviewees to read over and make further editorial suggestions as they deemed appropriate. Each interviewee had distinct criteria for what they wanted paraphrased. In some cases the interviewee did not request any editing. After the transcripts were returned I made a final decision regarding any additional editing I thought necessary for preventing the unnecessary identification or characterization of people discussed, while still allowing the main points made by the interviewee to be expressed.

Editorial practices: I will explain the various editorial practices I used to edit the transcripts. First, all references to professors were eliminated and replaced with brackets. For example, [prof] refers to a professors name in the transcripts. The same practice was used for pronouns referring to gender. For example, [her/his] and [s/he] were used in place of a specific gendered pronoun. In addition, brackets were used to paraphrase segments of text that would too obviously identify the interviewee. As stated, however, each interview was edited differently in part due to the wishes of the interviewee. In addition two dots (..) signifies a pause by the speaker. Three dots (...) however signifies that a portion of the text has been omitted. The omitting of text occurs only when I am highlighting aspects of the interviews in chapter five. The full transcripts do not contain actual omissions. Finally, I follow the same bracketing procedure throughout the interview section in chapter five (even when the gender reference is not part of the actual interview transcript) so as not to identify the gender of the interviewee.

Undergraduate Interviews

Student 1.

B: Could you just sort of explain the fourth year course .. how it was organized, the general picture of it?

A: It is sort of funny on the first day they asked for expectations and people gave a few positive expectations and they allowed us to state negative expectations and so I said 70% APA style, 20% ethics and 10% filler and .. well I guess I got the proportions wrong. It's more 40% APA and twenty filler. But besides APA style and the filler, what they gear you towards is preparing a piece of research .. now it says in there a piece of original research. I don't know what the procedure is really supposed to be. I don't know how much the typical honours student consults with their advisor and to what extent it is sort of doing something the advisor is interested in.

B: Right.

A: I really couldn't tell you. For my part, I got the idea from doing reading. I was sort of gearing myself to work with a member of the faculty and I actually had some problems with [her/his] research and felt there were certain things that the research didn't look at and so the conclusions were drawn from .. a sort of a narrow perspective. There were things outside of it that should have been looked at that might have led to a different conclusion. So I mean I went on my happy little way developing theories and I had a bunch of models on how society works which didn't make it into the final draft although they might be good for a book someday and obviously, doing, breaking new theoretical ground takes a bit of time and the press story, you know the story that goes to the press is that this member of the faculty just didn't have the time to do that sort of work and wasn't interested in seeing how it progressed. I think possibly our theoretical differences might have been a far more pertinent factor. At any case there I was all left in the lurch in October and I whined to a member of [another] department who I know from my political involvement and he was, after a little bit of whining quite amenable to working with me.

B: So, so first of all just to like follow the procedure ...

A: Sorry.

B: No, no, what you said was good .. but .. so you choose an advisor. Did you pick on your own. Like how are the students, the students are asked to go find an advisor?

A: Yeah, they do go find although the advisor has the opportunity to consent or not consent. Especially, some advisors are very sought after.

B: Sought after. And so then you chose who you chose and then, what you had a meeting with [her/him]?

A: I had several meetings with [her/him]. Actually, I approached [her/him] in April and [s/he] consented in April and May and during the summer it was sort of a bit of phone tag and bit of communication. There was, we had several meetings together and I handed in several drafts.

B: Did you consider yourself, like that you would be working with him?

A: Yes indeed.

B: That was the agreement between the two of you?

A: Yes, that was (laughs), that was the stated agreement.

B: So then, what you were saying before was .. what, that you had different ideas, how do you want to put it?

A: .. I guess I disagreed with [her/his] entire research (laughs).

B: Ok, so you were doing something in [her/his] area generally speaking.

A: Yeah, I wanted to do something in [her/his] area using some of [her/his] instruments in fact that was going to, if not contradict then at least limit the, seriously limit the generalizability of [her/his] findings. So that was the problem.

B: So then you went to [another department] and found an advisor there and then you worked with that advisor.

A: .. But .. I think partly because [s/he] was in a different department [s/he] was a little on the hands off

side. [S/he] was very helpful in discussing certain aspects of theory, especially political theory making sure that I didn't .. [s/he] was railing against liberal pluralism biases which of course psychology is riddled with and I was just attempting to make sure I didn't fall into those in my attempt to avoid my own prejudices which are not liberal-pluralist but, we'll leave that aside. And [s/he] was also very helpful in .. assisting .. Let me start this again, in crafting items for the new scale. Like I would bring in a list of items and we would hash through them but .. often [s/he] read about things about the same time as [seminar prof] was marking them so it wasn't .. really a hand in glove type thing ..

B: About going to get an advisor? Did you have to go speak to [prof]?

A: I did go speak to [prof]. I spoke to [her/him] actually before, my original advisor formally told me [s/he] didn't want to work with me. There had been some developments that had suggested to me [s/he] really didn't want to work with me and I was a little worried that I would be left in the lurch and [seminar prof] said well you know, see what you can do, don't go out of the department yet and the next day (laughs) there was a large red thing in my mailbox saying I'd been officially ditched. And so off I went.

B: Ok, so you got some kind of document .. that basically said what you just said.

A: Yes.

B: What did you do? Can we talk about that?

A: What I did for my research?

B: Yeah, what did you do for your research?

A: [student discusses research project]

B: Uhhmm

A: So, I'm not sure why I thought I would find [category of people] but I wouldn't. I didn't think [another category of people] was contextual. Probably just my own prejudices based on my own experiences. I haven't been in any right wing groups. In any case, the outcome which supposedly, its .. validity is rather marred by the fact that I did have a low sample size but .. if you just look at the numbers and the probability values are very strong. Basically as predicted, [category of people] is more prevalent on the right but [different category of people] is equal. I found the same thing with [topic]. Yes there is a cluster of characteristics that can predict political violence. But .. you know, these people who are identified are no more likely to whine about the authority in their own groups than anybody else is.

B: And how did you .. how did you conduct the research?

A: I emailed the survey to a bunch of political list-serves and lists, some politicians, mostly non-politicians. Just basically whatever I could get on the web, because I didn't have any money. I wouldn't be able to pay the people.

B: So you got a sample through the web and so they answered questionnaires, and the questionnaires were a bunch of scales .. How many divisions on the scales, just curious?

A: .. well there was the [category of people] scale which I had to modify just a little bit to abridge the instructions just a little for email and one for a politically sophisticated left-wing sample. There was about 20 questions that I thought would correlate with left-wing [category of people] and they did, most of them did, there was a twelve item, what would you do scale about political violence, given, you know, which of

these situations is the worst and what would you do about them and, then there was a twenty item scale which had to do with attitudes toward [topic] and rebellion in political organizations. And then I just had a question about ideology between the left, right and center continuum with the names of different ideologies which I thought, you know, doubling it up would probably making it a little easier for people to place themselves. And I just divided left-wingers, right-wingers and liberals based on that. The left-wingers I was able to sub-divide.

B: and then you analyzed, how did you analyze the data?

A: For the [category of people] scale, well first of all there was a whole bunch of reliability analyses, for the [category of people] questions. I did t-tests between left-wingers and right-wingers. On [category of people] then [different category of people] and then the really dirty part of it which is contextual hostility toward rebellion. So three little t-tests. And I did some correlations with [category of people] and the other measures within different ideological groups which, basically supported my hypothesis. For the other thing, what did I do, I think I followed what [prof 2] does which I think is with [category of people]. I took the top and bottom quartiles on Iagoism, that was my name for [category of people]. We can get into it some other time, at any case, took the top and bottom quartiles and did t-tests for that in terms of the different contextual measures.

B: Ok, did you want to do this, in terms of methods did you want to .. use these methods? Were you happy with using the methods you used? Did you want to try other things or was it just obvious to you that you were going to do it this way and so that question is not really relevant and you never even thought about it.

A: Well I had a lot of soul searching about which statistical analyses to use and I actually changed the formulation of my hypotheses between the proposal and the data coming in. That is because I didn't think to follow properly .. but in terms of what I settled on, yeah I think that is what I wanted to use. Originally I would have liked to do more idiographic work as well but I thought for laying the foundations, it was better to deal with a broad sample.

B: A broad sample and see what happens .. Ok, so that is a lot of details on the actual thesis. How often did you interact, we'll move to the advisor you had because it sounds like your one in house, was short, it didn't last long.

A: Yeah.

B: So you didn't interact with [her/him] much so you largely worked on your own?

A: Yes I had, I only had .. a couple of big meetings with [her/him] really that, there is one I remember we spent a few hours to work on the scales and previously I ran into [her/him] in the library and got into an argument and then wrote [her/him] an apology note later about being so damned defensive.

B: (laugh)

A: And, other than that I basically would write to [her/him] after something was already finished. In the beginning there was a bit of, a few emails back and forth, correspondence about theoretical aspects but afterwards it was basically just writing to [her/him] and answering [her/his] questions, just clarifying things. Often [s/he] would find out about things at about the same time as everyone else did.

B: So that went smoothly then?

A: Oh yeah, sure.

B: Ok, what else about the course? Well just the basic mechanics of the course. As you said, at the beginning about the question, it was 40% or 70% APA. .. like did you have classes?

A: We did for the first term, and they were, and with all due respect to [prof] because I am sure [s/he] is very interesting and enlightening when [s/he] is talking about something that is actually necessary .. some of the most useless classes I ever attended. [Comments about class participation].

B: (Laugh.) See when I took it it seemed to me, I don't know .. well they talked about ethics right?

A: A bit, yes.

B: They talked a bit, well they got you to do these problems where you had to find the independent variables and dependent variables? Is that the kind of stuff you did?

A: I don't remember doing a lot of that. The only .. let's think. They had us, you had to get an email account, they had you sleuth for an advisor, it was very geared towards getting into grad school. They had us do some quizzes on APA style I remember that and there was some marks for attending colloquia and for attending seminars which I did in body if not in spirit. And the assignments we had to do were basically preparation for a statistical analysis of our data. There was one we had to discuss what our independent and dependent variables were and what tests we were going to do. They wanted us to analyze fake data too but I thought that was a waste of time so I just analyzed whatever I had put in so far.

B: Real data then.

A: Yeah. Incomplete but real.

B: So, so that was the course then basically? A bit of stuff on stats.

A: Yeah.

B: And then, I suspect, if I remember correctly then you went to then you had orals or something, what was that process? You know like you had a different bunch of oral proposals and presentations?

A: Yeah, well the first oral we had to do was presenting someone else's article, something that was related to our research and discuss how it was related to our research. So that was just a very brief thing just to get our feet wet. Then when the thesis proposal went in, there was an oral proposal of about twenty minutes that basically discussed what we we're going to do. And then the final oral presentation was probably reasonably the way it goes in grad school except that the committee doesn't ask you questions, just comments from the floor. I got a lot of them, actually there was a sort of a, a bit of a, it was sort of anti-climactic because everyone expected my former advisor to come in seeing as [discussion of a continued conflict with former advisor after they had parted ways]. We expected to see [her/him] there but no.

B: Yeah plus the other difference is you actually have a lot of people at your talks unlike your average graduate. There is usually like three people well including your committee.

A: Well we got, one thing I thought was actually good, we got a couple of marks for attending seminar sessions. So we had to attend four of seven to get full marks and that ensured you had a decent audience. It was kind of nice, I got a bunch of people, of course my Mum and my partner came and he brought his best friend and another, a couple of my friends came and so it was sort of nice to have a cheering section.

B: Ok, overall, what was the thrust of the course?

A: What was the, pardon?

B: Thrust of the course what would you say, what was the .. what did they want, what we're they trying to get across to you?

A: They want you to get practice in conducting a piece of empirical research and basically get, they want to prepare you for grad school. I think probably I would have paid more attention to [profs] initial lectures if I had anticipated going into psych grad school. This sort of .. this thing about [prestigious graduate school] is just a, a very new thing. I didn't expect that. I didn't expect to be doing psych if I was going to [prestigious graduate school]. And, I didn't expect that they would send me there at all. I assumed I would be going to law school and you know, empirical research isn't that great of a preparation for law .. although the [conflict with former advisor] certainly was.

B: Yeah preparation, is there anything else?

A: I think that was probably the .. thrust of the course.

B: Did you enjoy the course?

A: I enjoyed .. some of the course. I enjoyed doing my own research. I liked the fact that my advisor was able to provide insight where I didn't have it but wasn't sort of directing it from above. It basically, like basically it didn't matter to him, whatever I did ..

B: He just worked with you?

A: Yeah, a little bit at the beginning and then just sort of you know, do it yourself. I liked being able to have freedom in terms of what my hypotheses were and what my statistics were and being able to develop my own theories. I guess I sort of sacrificed method .. well not exactly methodological soundness. I don't know what I could have done better with an email sample or any sample of non-psychology students. But I think there are methodological problems with a small sample, that is the biggie but I liked the fact that I was able to go off in my own theoretical direction.

B: Yeah cool ... ok thanks.

Student 2.

B: Ok, [student]. Ok basically to start off, to get things going .. kind of describe what the course was about. The fourth year honours seminar course. What was it about, what did you have to do. Just give a general overview and then we can go into it in more detail.

C: Well, I guess the goal of the course was to prepare us for graduate school, to teach us research skills and writing skills and presentations skills. I don't know what, what ..

B: Ok, well just take it step by step .. what did you have to take .. think of the syllabus, what was, one thing, what were the required course, what were the requirements of the course, like what were the things you actually had to do?

C: Ok .. some of the requirements were, I guess, the first semester was assignments that, I guess were to help us with the course like, teaching us email which is pretty straight forward .. having us write a page, a report on what our goals were for the next five years and things like that

B: Oh yeah, ok.

C: I can't remember what the third one was but it was something that was .. and those we're worth 1% each I think. And then we had to do a report or oral presentation on a research article related to our thesis topic and that, I have no idea how much that was worth. I think 4% and that was 10 minutes long I think.

B: Well, approximately ...

C: Yeah and there was no questions after that it was basically go up and do it. And .. there was two markers for that one, one on style and one on content. Then we had to do our oral proposal and our oral written and those were, the proposal, I think would be 8%, the oral, and I have no idea what the written was .. and then after Christmas there was the .. a few other small assignments related to or trying to prepare us for our data analysis.

B: Ok.

C: So we had to .. I guess put down our hypotheses and .. what kind of tests we thought we were going to use, our dependent and independent variables and those were spread over three assignments .. and we would do, I guess enter some fake data, we didn't have our own data yet .. and then .. they were worth, I think, 3% each, .. and then finally, that was all basically for assignments. In second semester, we didn't have class after January and then there was just our presentation of our thesis and our written thesis.

B: Ok, so that, so what would you say the course was about? Like in a general sense, what did they want you, what did they want from you in this course?

C: What did they want from us?

B: I'm not trying to be abstract, I mean, what was that course focusing on, like what was the main thrust of it, what did they want you to come out with?

C: I guess .. some knowledge about .. I guess how to prepare for grad school, because in the first semester they taught, [prof] taught a lot about .. how to, like GRE's and how to prepare or apply for graduate school and how, like what .. they looked for and how hard it was to get in and all that kind of stuff so I guess basically it was to prepare us for applying and for the types of skills we could use once we got there.

B: Plus the research too?

C: Yeah .. I guess the research was a large part of the course. I guess that was one of the major focuses of the course. About writing and then on publication of research on different things like that .. yeah.

B: What was your study about? Could you describe it in a little bit of detail, talk about it?

C: I looked at how .. the effect of .. [research topic] and so .. basically [prof 2] was my advisor and [s/he] was really good. [S/he] let me do like kind of whatever I wanted. When I went to meet [her/him] [s/he] asked me what I was interested in, [s/he] told me what [s/he] was interested in and then we kind of put something together. So it wasn't like [her/him] saying this is what you will do your research on

B: Right.

C: So that was really good, I liked that. And so basically .. I was able to start last summer .. to do a lit review and some stuff done on that and my proposal was basically done pretty early .. so that was good. And so basically I just did like a correlational study and so that was basically all. There was fourteen .. the

scale [s/he] used for [topic]. I used 14 scales on that and so I correlated that with [category of people] scores from [prof 3]] ..

B: [type of] scale?

C: No. [different] scale.

B: Oh yeah. ok.

C: So yeah. And I had three hypotheses. the first was that [discussion of three hypotheses]. And only the first one turned out. So. I guess that's good. like ..

B: Did you get lots of students?

C: I had a hundred. well I tested a hundred. I had a hundred and four that I actually used because I dropped about ten because they didn't fill in all their data for gender .. and I kinda needed that .. it was roughly equal numbers of males and females but I .. should have used more. I guess more of an age range would have been better for [aspect of topic] because .. university students don't really attend church as often as .. I'm guessing older people. not older people but .. people in the workforce and families and that sort of thing .. so I only have like .. 28 people who said they attended church .. it was kind of ..

B: It was hard to find them.

C: Yeah.

B: How about your relationship. like you already mentioned. with [prof 2] but could you like explain not so much the relationship and if it was good although you can include that but just the process. like ok you are taking this course and you got you know. you took stuff like APA format and stuff like that right and you had these presentations but what was the process with respect to him. like how often did you and him work together to help you with your project? Do you know what I mean? Like do you have meetings. and what happened?

C: Yeah. ..we had basically .. meetings. like we met I guess more in first term than in second term. Like I had my data before Christmas already .. so just entering it and once I entered it and .. we started meeting I guess last may and then I few times over the summer and then we met once a week last semester .. and we just had meetings basically on how to. like how to conduct the experiment and ethical things like that. ethical issues .. what kind of scales I would use .. [s/he] helped a lot with the writing. like the style. grammar. [s/he] was good for ... I guess. for revisions and stuff. [S/he] was very helpful with that. .. I don't know. as far as the course itself. .. what we were taught in the course about ethics and APA format I guess [s/he] was really involved ..

B: That was just part of the course?

C: Just part of the course right. But [s/he] was. [s/he] helped with the .. the assignments in the second term about. like with data analysis and that sort of thing .. [s/he] knew we were given assignments and we'd go over them. Like what. basically what. made sure that I put down what exactly the hypotheses were and what kind of tests I was going to use so that I could double check it. And I guess [s/he] worked. I think we worked quite closely the whole year compared to other people I heard hardly like really didn't meet their advisors at all in second term. or maybe just talked to them once on the phone. So I think we worked. [s/he] told me [s/he]. like when I first went to see [her/him] that [s/he] liked to work closely with [her/his] .. students which is good. And [s/he] helped me with the presentation for the final .. like for presenting the thesis. Yeah. I presented in front of [her/him] first. like just for practice. [S/he] was quite

involved I think.

B: So [s/he] gave you a lot of time, a lot of his time?

C: Oh yeah, like I called [her/him] on the phone for like hours almost every night towards the end. So that was really good. [S/he] gave up his late weekends and stuff to help. [S/he] was very helpful.

B: Were you happy with the methods you used? Of course that goes deeper but first of all were you happy, were you happy doing an experiment, did you want to do an experiment?

C: .. I think .. I don't know. I didn't, see I don't particularly like research, its not .. where my interest is and I was thinking of not being in honours cause I didn't like doing research. .. But, I guess, the reason I did it was I thought well if I do it I might learn something and maybe I will like it but I don't so. So, I think it might of .. like I guess you go more into this in grad school but where you do more practical things like I know in social work we actually get placements and that sort of thing, you focus more on counselling or dealing with people, cause I think that's .. like a lot of people might want to deal with that more in psychology than research .. that would have been a neat idea but .. couldn't do that so.

B: When you say you couldn't do that .. what do you mean?

C: We'll it's not .. the course doesn't .. there is no place to do that in the course as far as I know.

B: Yeah.

C: Basically, the honours course is for research and that's .. and I guess that and preparing us for grad school in that sense but .. I don't know.

B: No, I'm just curious, like I just wondered if you on your own, like maybe based on other courses, and that, you had something you wanted to do and .. you found that .. you couldn't do it. But it sounds like you already accepted that when you went into the course, that it would involve doing a certain kind of research.

C: I basically knew going in that we couldn't, that that is what it would involve.

B: Well that's a good way, well once you know it is easier, you can just ...

C: I think as far as the class time in the first semester, I mean I know a lot of people who said, it was a waste of time. Like you were there from 8:30 to 11:30 so like three hours and .. it was basically sit around, check your email while [s/he] was up there talking about writing style but it was a waste of time. So I think ...

B: Stuff you could have done on our own your mean?

C: Yeah, read the books or .. like, I don't know, you don't really take notes when you are talking about writing style and I don't know .. I don't know, I just think there just could have been .. more guidance on how to write our thesis and stuff like [s/he] didn't really go over that, like the different sections. It was just ..

B: Did [s/he] leave that to your individual professors? Or that would be looked at when you handed in an assignment and then they'd correct it and say ...

C: Yeah, like I guess we would use our APA manuals for that. Our advisors .. like I know, not every

advisor looked over someone's thesis or proposal before they handed it in but .. I think that basically just .. when we did our proposals, got marked on that, APA style. I guess we went over it some but .. I don't know, it was kind of. Oh yeah in the second semester, one of the assignments was I think .. or the first semester, I'm not sure but we did quizzes on APA style and that was good. But you could cheat and stuff.

B: Quizzes on APA.

C: Yeah we actually did it over like, the course site and you could have your manual and you got like 1% for that but ..

B: Just for doing it I guess ..

C: Well there was 10 questions on each. I think there was four quizzes but I mean you were doing it at home so I guess you could look in your book. I know don't. I just thought .. for three hours a week, we could have learnt a lot more stuff than what we did in those hours. And I don't even know what I would have wanted to learn about but it was really a waste of time .. if you didn't go you wouldn't miss anything that would help you with your work but you had to be there because of attendance.

B: Ok.

C: So, people were just putting in time.

B: (Chuckle) They got you. Now they can show they have full attendance.

C: Yeah.

B: Was there anyone that didn't do an experimental study? Even though it sounds like the answer would be no. I just wondered like, you saw them all or most of them.

C: I saw most of them. I think everyone did experimental.

B: No. I think that is true too. I mean I have the manual or .. whatever. I was just curious that maybe .. you can't always tell by the titles. You can usually tell by the titles.

C: As far as I know I think they were all experimental.

B: Anything else?

C: ..umm

B: How was the course?

C: How was the course?

B: Does the course encapsulate what it means to do, to be a psychologist?

C: I don't know. I don't think so but I think .. from what I've heard you get more of that once you get into grad school and right now it is just basically preparing you for that. So, I guess I didn't expect it to be everything you, that there is about psychology. It is the part of it I don't like so

B: Yeah

C: and I was just kind of doing it for ..

B: We're you interested in clinical?

C: I don't know. I was but I'm kind of leaning toward social work now.

B: Yeah. ok. yeah. well yeah. .. good thank you.

C: Ok.

Graduate Interviews

Student 1.

B: I'll just kind of explain what I have been doing, the sort of the perspective and then you can ask questions.

A: Aha. Ok. Is this for your masters?

B: Yeah. Still chipping away on it. It is going to get done this summer. But what I ended up focusing on, what this final thesis has been about focusing on how we're trained basically. I've gone to focusing on how we're trained as students and in particular as social psychology students. So I've been focusing on educational practices ok. and ... I've been looking at them from a critical point of view, from the point of view of how the curriculum and student-advisor relationships, these things, how they work together to .. direct us, guide us towards doing a certain kind of research and at the same time, preventing doing other kinds of research. In particular experimental research. So like, that's the thing I've been interested in. Now I've asked for this interview is not so that people confirm what I am saying but at the same time I don't want to hide, that is what I am interested in but now what I want to talk to you about is just your own experiences with the program and what you think the program is about sort of thing, what you think the purpose of it was, you know, what were they trying to train you for. I'll ask these more specifically. I'm just being general now and .. and then even your own experiences. I should point out that I'd prefer that you were completely honest and told me what you thought and then like, there's nothing, anything I want to use I'm going to like show you first so you can say no. I don't feel comfortable with having this in, or I feel like, even though I'm not going to use your names or anything, I feel this ... would identify me because there is not enough students. You know what I mean?

A: Right.

B: So like, in other words I'd far rather like everyone of my interviews gave me something interesting because it touched on really what happened, as you see it, and not be able to use any of it, you know what I mean, then, then to have you .. worry about how I was going to use it.

A: Well generally in my life I don't worry about the things I do. "A", I don't care. Maybe I should but I don't. "B" ... well that's about it I guess.

B: That's a good way to be. I'll ask you to just speak a little louder cause it might not pick up. Ok I'm going to start with maybe some kind of corny questions but just to get us going into it ok? .. Why social psychology. Ok, first of all I want to focus with you, I know you've gone into [area in psychology] is that true? You've gone into [area in psychology]?

A: Yes

B: Ok so I'm going to ask you largely to reflect on your experiences with your social psychology, your masters, the whole thing as you recall it. So why did you go into social psychology in the first place?

A: Oh God! ... Well before I applied to graduate school, I guess that would be the start of it. I mean even in the fourth year I was still sort of ... confused or I had the dilemma of do I go into [area in psychology], not [area in psychology] but do I go into clinical or experimental psychology? I still believe that. I tell students, you're still not going to decide until fourth year or maybe after that. But ... I can't recall the specific reason why I wanted to go into social psychology ...

B: Well that's ok actually ... so you ...

A: Well there is probably a reason.

B: But it was so long ago now eh? How did you go about picking your advisor? Maybe it will come to you.

A: ... Actually, oh yeah ok. In my fourth year in my honours year I approached [prof] and I wanted to do some work around free will or ... perceptions or something like that, two of my main topics. And [her/his] area was self-deception and so I wanted to switch and so we had a couple discussions and we talked about possible research and possibly being an honours student of [her/his] and so we got some sort of agreement, yeah ok, and [s/he] got me reading on some material ... what was that ... I can't remember the material. But [s/he] got me reading on some material and I didn't realize that [prof 2] was here.

B: Ok

A: ... Once I did realize and I understood what [her/his] research was about, it seemed to fit. I seemed to be really interested in that. It seemed to fit better with what I wanted to do than [prof's] research. So I approached [her/him] and said well I want to do my honours thesis with you. And so we got to talking a little bit and [s/he] realized I had this verbal arrangement with [prof] and [s/he] said well I'm not too comfortable about taking you on, away from [prof] and all that. Well, I said ok, if you're not comfortable well, it's unfortunate ... so I let [her/him] know I wanted to work with [her/him]. I went through my honours year with [prof] and when I applied to grad school, "A", I was applying here only, "B", I decided I wanted to go into experimental, and "C": I wanted to work with [prof 2]. I thought that it was a natural progression, I looked at other social psychology interests of the profs and they didn't really match mine at all other than maybe [prof 3] I suppose. So, and I sort of realized that ... an advisor should have ... the interests should mesh somewhat, of course, because they can only advise you on knowledge they have. You know, it is very difficult for an advisor to advise on something you're way off on, they have no clue what you're talking about. And so, well I can see myself being interested in that type of research, realizing, of course, that when you're going through a graduate school, what you do is not necessarily what you're going to be doing out of graduate school. So it is just a part of the process, you approach the prof, you work with him or her and go your separate way. So I applied under [prof]. Yeah, it is all starting to come back.

B: Yeah, so that is an interesting point you just raised. So you saw it as a process where ... well did you think that you kind of had to ... forgo exactly what you were interested in to get in with some professors?

A: No, no, I knew what my general interests seemed to fit generally with what I might be interested in. You know we're all guessing at the time about what the hell we are interested about. And [s/he] seemed to be the best fit and [s/he] was. I liked the fact [s/he] was new. I liked the fact that [s/he] [characteristics of prof] and sort of, I mentioned this is that ... my approach to grad school again, is that I'm just learning. I have no idea what I am doing, so I basically hand over quite a bit of control and ... influence over to my advisor and [s/he] seemed to know what [s/he] was talking about so I was looking forward to learning under [her/him].

B: How did you go about choosing a topic? What was the process with your advisor?

A: .. Well the first, we sort of in our weekly meetings, at the beginning, .. sort of fleshed out well I'm not quite sure what I want to conduct my research on, my masters thesis on. And I said to [her/him], well, I real, like I said to you I realize that your interests and my research mesh somewhat so I'm going to take courses for the first year, I'm going to actually work for [her/him] in the first year doing some research, just getting to know what [s/he's] doing ..

B: Ok.

A: and start reading some of the material around [her/his] research so that I can identify something within that structure, within those parameters that both of us can be comfortable with, with the topic. So that's how I went that way for first year, didn't even think about, you know what's [s/he] learning what [s/he's] doing and sort of getting a mesh that way.

B: And then, out of that, a topic came up?

A: .. [s/he] had a couple of different areas of research and one of them was on [topic] and, it seemed to be quite a cool concept .. something that is applicable to a lot of different areas and it seemed to me that .. personally .. it seems like it has the potential as a research topic, research area ... potential in terms of further research, potential in terms of being recognized by the intellectual community and potential in terms of publications, of course.

B: Heh, heh, yeah.

A: So that was one of the reasons I identified my topic and, [s/he] was, [s/he] had some research ongoing with this, .. I didn't know quite what I was going to do with [topic] or where the area would be so I said I was interested in this but, you know, I'm not quite sure how it could applied to different areas, I don't know so we talked and [s/he] said well you should maybe .. that is too strong a word, [S/he] suggested, well take a look at what I am doing in this area and maybe start thinking about taking on some of my research here or going off in a little direction on your own ... in these research topics that I'm doing on [topic]. And so I started reading [her/his] material and I got interested in .. [topic]. So it was, it was kind of like a narrowing down process, I guess you could identify stages or whatever .. but I ... my own interests, I got a lot of different interests. The thing is, like I said, I just put them on the back burner and learn .. how to do research.

B: Yeah ok. Umm, trying to reflect back on what you said and so you can correct me. It's like you sort of, well first of all you had a sense for what your role was with respect to your advisor and even the program? and you .. you .. you accepted that? Is that right?

A: The role being, whenever I get in the presence of people who I think, know a lot of things, I tend to hand over control, I tend to shut-up and listen, I tend to learn from those individuals. So in that sense I do give up control to, to [the prof].

B: Right. Understanding what you said though, That [s/he] is a person with experience and knowledge .. skills that you can only benefit from like listening like you said.

A: Oh, definitely, listening, observing, .. heeding advice, I basically, again realizing that graduate school is for learning all this stuff and then once you get out of there, out of graduate school, you are the expert. You know, Ph.D. stream, you are actually becoming an expert in some sort of field. And master's is just a second step where you learn a little bit about how to be an expert. Just a little bit, not quite a lot. It was so fast.

B: So fast for you yeah. Heh. heh. Ok .. this might be like .. repeating. How did you view your role with respect to the advisor. That is not a very specific question but I guess I mean did it work well. did you find it collegial and helpful? Or there. was things you wanted to do say that you had problems with or that sort of stuff. I guess you can only really answer. Was it like smooth. was there problems and things you would have preferred had gone in different ways?

A: Ok. at times I felt subservient and that. of course this is my own personality. You know. I view an advisor as someone a little bit higher than I am who knows. sort of. what they're doing. I could be wrong but in terms of getting along mentally. our meetings were. sometimes we would be really on the same level and going along and having a great in depth discussion. intellectual discussion and having a lot of progress and that was cool .. [?] so we did mesh on those aspects. .. But I sort of sensed there was a .. I sensed. sensed a frustration on [her/his] part and I couldn't quite narrow it down where that was coming from. But .. I was frustrated too. [Her/his] way of talking .. is sort of like [s/he] would begin a sentence and stop abruptly and say. no well it's like this. I. I had a really hard time. like following. like what [s/he] was saying at times. But. and [qualities of prof].

B: Yeah. I guess [response about qualities of prof].

A: But [s/he] was very up front about that. When I applied and got accepted and all that. [discussion of the personal dynamics of the student-advisor relation]. So we weren't really worried about process.

B: Along the lines of your research .. and it doesn't sound like there was but I'm going to ask anyway. Was there. was there things you wanted to do that you weren't allowed to do. told not to do. did you want to approach it in a certain way and either like discouraged in one way or another. Or did you actually. was the situation already one where. like you said you knew what your position was and you were working with [her/him] and so those kind of things never came up anyway?

A: .. No it was in discussions of the thesis and particulars of it. for example in terms of measures and .. procedures. I wasn't. I didn't feel restricted to entertain ideas. which I did. For example. .. I sort of said well why don't we just ask them a yes or no question for example instead of using a sort of deceptive social psychological measure to .. gain that information. And .. [s/he] threw me a paper and said this is why. And .. but you know. I wasn't afraid to say things .. and. but in order to learn the reasons why you don't do them .. and [s/he] gave me pretty good reasons why I'm not supposed to do certain things and that is all part of the process of ... but that's the thing. if I did entertain something that was .. naive and [s/he] said no. you can't do that and s/he gave a reason for it and I learned something. then that's fine. But if it didn't. if there was no reason. just no. but there wasn't very much of that though. Only if it came down to when I was working for [her/him]. I had no say whatsoever course when I working ..

B: So in other words .. there was more. more negotiation when it was your own project

A: Yeah I noticed there was that difference.

B: Which is fair enough which is what you kind of want at least to some extent

A: Yeah .. and quite a bit of leeway in the design ..

B: .. We're you happy with experimental .. research? Was that ever a question to you? Doing a non-experimental social psychology study?

A: ... Pardon? What? Experimental?

B: Was. was. well. yeah did. I mean. did you ever .. was it ever a question to you like of doing some kind

of social research that didn't involve an experiment basically?

A: Oh. No.

B: I kind of assumed that but I just wanted to ask you so.

A: That is why it confused me.

B: Yeah. see well one of the reasons that I raise that question is because for me personally I have not wanted. I have not wanted to do an experimental study and I'm actually not doing an experimental study ok. It's interpretative and its qualitative.

A: Ummm. Very rare.

B: I personally had the .. the difficulties .. it wasn't really with my advisor so much. once I switched to a second advisor so much as finding a committee where. finding a committee of three that would all go for it that was the challenge. So that is why ..

A: I think there is one other thesis that was like that in the past 10 years or something like that.

B: Yeah. it's rare and I guess that brings us to the last section sort of prefer to focus on your own experiences but what about reflections about the program. You know. kind of touching on what I just brought up .. do you see that as like .. Ok. first of all a question. what is the program trying to train us to do? Even if it sounds like an obvious question.

A: I saw the program as .. oh there was multi-faceted goals of the program. the masters program. I can identify things I learned and .. and looking back say that those were the goals but going into it I didn't really know what the goals were you know .. I'd say wow I'm going through this process .. and for some reason. I'm going to do what they are telling me to and then figure it out from there. But in hindsight you know. writing and re-writes and this and that and oh that's one. [s/he's] a great writer.

B: So writing. writing scientifically?

A: Scientifically. Oh yes. I learnt so much there. .. data analysis. I never realized how horrid I was at data analysis because .. basically [prof] was almost appalled by my lack of knowledge of simple things like terms like factor. well what's a factor. You know. it was .. and procedures and design. [S/he] was somewhat dismayed but that's a problem of a student like myself going through the University of Manitoba. instead of somewhere else.

B: Yeah. I guess so.

A: More than anything else but. so I had a like .. sort of like on a truck and jumping off onto the road way going at 80 miles and hour I had to like. get going. .. so statistical analysis. I learnt a tremendous amount. .. Experimental control. You know. things about an experiment like that .. experimentation through my work with her. .. But .. towards the end. I sort of realized that well. what they're doing here .. is they're preparing me. like I said "one" to be somewhat of an expert in a certain area and "two". being able to take those skills and apply them to whatever I want to do.

B: Uhum ..

A: .. Which is sort of what happened as I was becoming quite frustrated with social psychology about social psychological measures and how. still. even though they're trying to eliminate social desirability on

all those measures. I don't think they accurately reflect a person's true attitudes or dispositions or anything else.

B: Right ..

A: There is still a lot of error in the measures so... That is why I am going into [area of psychology]. So I'm sort of hashing it out as I go. Which .. (prof 4) another up and coming researcher, good writer. That is what I have to look forward to in my Ph.D. working with [her/him]. [Discusses common characteristics of the two professors].

B: Sure, what I've heard about [prof 4] is that [s/he] is good, smart, very enthusiastic. Umm ..

A: I sort of, like with the goal, I had one goal going into graduate school. I'd come out and I'd be a professor.

B: Right. That is actually a good question.

A: So I was looking at the way [prof] behaved and what s/he was doing, in terms of that goal. So I did have one goal going in at least.

B: Ok one goal going in, becoming a professor. Reflecting on that what did you, whether it is in retrospect or what have you, what did you, what do you have to do to get there?

A: Oh definitely the emphasis is on research. No ifs, ands, or buts, about it. And publication.

B: Experimental research. Is that what you meant by research?

A: Yes. Experimental research. .. because when you take a look at the people they hired here.

B: Just recently? Yeah. I followed them but I was in the middle of my proposal.

A: Yeah. They have their ideas, they have their research .. thrust you know, their area of expertise and their line of reasoning. .. that is what I see myself doing, is creating that. And that is the main thing that I think hiring committees in universities in Canada and the States look for is somebody that has a distinguished record of research. And everything else is subservient to that I think.

B: Yeah, that is probably true. That is probably the bottom line. I wouldn't go so far as to just say number of publishings but publishings and where they were published and maybe partly relationships.

A: And everything makes sense! If it doesn't make sense, "What are you talking about?" "I don't know." .. Just basically the one goal, become a professor. How can I do it, how can I make myself marketable.

B: Right. What do you gotta do. And that's sort of, that comes to understanding. See to criticize myself .. I hadn't reach the point, see these things were never self evident to me. I was interested in what I wanted to do. But then I, now I reach a point where I can actually understand, someone like yourself .. you saw the structure, for what it was. I guess you could say. You knew what things had to be done .. to get to the position of professor.

A: Then you can do whatever you want. Well it sort of goes back to .. University reading. I came across this really interesting article on famous people and what their graduate school theses were you know and .. totally not-identifiable with what they're famous for, you know. Freud is neurobiology and the slug, you know, stuff like that. And yet he is one of the most influential people of all time. Something like that.

seeing that article and you sort of go, well ok, it is a process. You can't, you can't assert yourself, there's a key thing.

B: You can't assert yourself? Is that what you said?

A: You can't assert, ... your interests until you learn, until you get freedom to do so.

B: Right. And would you say .. this one is harder, ... to connect it to your personal experience but reflecting on your training and professor-student relationships ... the work that professors do ... how do you think that effects the average students, how do think it influences the kind of work that students do. Think of it from this point of view. Let me give you a sense. One of the things I talk about lots is knowledge products and I just mean whenever we do research, I'm calling it a product and I'm treating it like something ... like you said, there is this process, and by the end of it there is a product, you might use a factory analogy or what ever and so ... I guess, you know, the more direct way of putting it is do you think it is difficult for students to do anything other than experimental research ... here?

A: Here? Yeah.

B: Yeah, like I don't know about other universities.

A: In Regina you'd fit right in.

B: Is that right? Heh, heh.

A: That's what I hear anyway. Cause there that's ... this is sort of almost privileged information here ... it's commonly known through this, all the professors here that the University of Regina about 10 years ago, had no experimental research whatsoever, more theoretical, just you know, out there, you know those type of theses and stuff like that ... and actually the reaction around here was, that's bad, that was just terrible, the place was in shambles almost to, you know, if it was a business it'd be bankrupt. So you know, there's no production ...

B: Right.

A: of experimental research and that is just abhorrent. There is this one [prof], [s/he] became the head went in there and straightened things out and got them at least do some research and I don't know. There is a stigma definitely.

B: A stigma. Would you ... do you think ...

A: I was interested in sociology as well.

B: You are? So you can see where I'm coming from.

A: Yes. Definitely.

B: Would you. To be crude, would you see this as good or bad? Do you think a department like social psychology ... should ... explore things from different perspectives, be more diverse, on how it is going to study slash research slash inquire?

A: Well out of all the sub-disciplines of psychology social psychology should, yeah, it should have the ability to distinguish itself from other areas. The way I understand psychology right now is it's trying to establish itself as a science, and the only way it can establish itself as a science is through controlled

procedural research. And that is what I see is happening. And I don't like it .. you know think about two variables at once. at all times-and that's it. you know. don't look at the larger picture. .. That's what you're learning in graduate school. keep your narrow focus. Keep your focus narrow. And you know I'm. I think of weird things all the time and the problem is that. in graduate school. I think what you're learning in graduate school is your ability to operationalize these weird and wacky things. So ok come down to an experiment and try and test whether the truth or falseness of it. this is what you've gotta do. But .. there is .. so I have all these weird and wacky things on my computer waiting. just waiting and waiting. I take a look at them from time to time and go ohh delete.

B: Yeah. I know what you mean by that. I thought it was good.

A: Yeah. coming out of a acid high somewhere and say ...

B: Do you think .. do you think you will be as free as you suggested when you are a professional or do you think your are still going to find a lot of .. I mean the next thing for you as a professional is tenure right? Is not the tenure track going to be .. something that inhibits or keeps these ideas basically on your computer for a while?

A: Unfortunately yes. I do see that.

B: So you are still looking at it as a bigger picture than that? There is tenure and then there is ...

A: Well. there's. it's. the thing I learned about [prof]. [s/he] is very busy. Doing research is [his/her] main thrust. teaching is subservient to that .. among others .. and it seems like they're caught up in doing that. producing. getting grants. grants depend on the research. you know it's .. very constraining and I can see that. And that is where I say I don't see any real freedom in becoming a professor or. or in getting tenure. You get tenure you go. well promotions. raises. all that stuff is determined by research again. Otherwise. data. I saw those professors salaries that were just printed out. And I go well. what distinguishes who from who? And you sort of. I haven't really done this analysis but almost like maybe the publications of research might be coinciding with the money their getting. the production. never mind administrative duties. Which I'm also interested in. Administrative duties. So .. you know. I guess .. I guess the whole process is squashing somewhat my intellect and .. ability to think abstractly and free think. It is somewhat squashing.

B: Yeah. I know what you mean.

A: So yeah. I see that and it is pretty unfortunate. .. When .. the analogy is well. you become an adult and you're not a kid anymore and kids have these vast imaginations and can think of so many things and play with them and with their imaginations they go really out there and as adults we go what the hell are you talking about? We don't have it anymore.

B: Good point. yeah.

A: So it seems .. its unfortunate that aspect but I am fighting it all the time. But. it is just the way I think this society is. Everybody is busy. everybody is producing .. it doesn't look good.

B: Well good. Well I don't really have any questions. Do you have any? Anymore questions that is. Do you have any questions? Or was there some points or something we sort of .. walked by?

A: .. In terms of the process of graduate school .. well. in sort of conclusion. students are somewhat constrained by their advisors. Earlier I said. they usually like you to do .. research that's closer to home. And I can see that because if I'm a professor and somebody comes to me well that is one of my

stipulations on that. ... if I can't understand what you're doing I can't really help you.

B: Yeah, that makes sense to me too. ... but ... and if I can add something, I mean ... I think part of it is a time thing. If I were a professor I would love to learn to explore what some students. I would love to try to learn what some student wants to teach me ... but that involves time right? Whereas if you get some student learning what you know then you can just help them along you know.

A: Time ... and the fact is too as well. if you do research along parallel to theirs that sort of stimulates their own goals that might be of interest to them too, so that as soon as you leave when all that data is left behind they can zoom right in and take over ... so it's a benefit, it is beneficial for them too. ... But ... yeah if you let them do whatever they want, it costs them time and it doesn't benefit. Possibly, possibly benefit them...

B: So did you switch over. ... to paraphrase or repeat did you, do you have a problem, putting things more bluntly, with social psychology ... like you don't think that really, like these experimental measures aren't really getting at stuff?

A: ... I do have a problem but ... not in the direction you are thinking, it's the reverse direction. I don't think they're ... controlling enough experimentally, I don't think they, really measure what they intend to measure.

B: Construct validity.

A: Yeah ... Whereas a lot ... of what I really liked in that social, social psychology interview was that ... name escapes me right now, but she used cognitive methodology in her research and I consider like social cognition because she used implicit tasks like that. That's the real key I think because that sort of gets away from ... it is sort of like, my analogy is it being hooked up to a lie detector you know. Ok you might say well no I'm not prejudice and ceeppp (buzzer sound) no. Just by the length of the word prejudice, like you said it, you said it a little bit too fast. You're wrong, you actually are. You know, that's weird. That is futuristic. But that's where I see, it's de-individualizing as well, you know to the participants by saying no you are lying. You know, "What do you mean?" "What are you talking about?" But the thing is people do that, they'd have to get underneath that to get to the real aspect of the person without all the ... and that way you can actually predict a little bit more accurately their behaviour because, these scales you read of, the prejudice scale, all these ... so you can actually lie on them..

B: Yeah, yeah, I guess you are right, I would look at it the other way and therefore conclude that what we need is more ... well just of looking at the social not in more experimental ways but in more contextual ways I guess. Understanding prejudice not necessarily by the way an individual responds to a questionnaire but in terms of factors like sociological factors that play a role in prejudice too.

A: Uhum, that sort of brings everything into perspective, I appreciated this actually.

B: Yeah well actually it was a good.
END.

Student 2.

B: Ok [student's name] ... just to get things going I guess ... what should we talk about. Just to get things going first of all you just told me that your M.A.'s and your Ph.D. [context of student's training].

C: That's right.

B: And was your M.A. in social psychology?

C: My M.A. was in applied social psychology which is not exactly what it sounds like. I went there under the assumption that it would be social psychology under an applied setting and it actually ended up being more [topic area]. Very much [topic area] psych within an applied setting. One of the problems we had was that my views differ from theirs in terms of what is a suitable applied setting. So I had wanted to take social psychological principles into [applied area of interest], they would prefer, would have preferred that I was in something like [alternate area of interest], something very business oriented.

B: Ok umm .. more general question than that I guess, what, how did you get interested in social psychology? What led you to the field, that sort of thing. What led you here?

C: Social psychology. I did my undergrad degree here so I mean it did have some pull for me in that way. Social psychology seemed to be the most broad area of psychology and I truly, I enjoyed a lot of the principles we learned in undergrad but I thought that I wasn't going into clinical I could probably study pretty much anything I wanted from a social psychological perspective because it doesn't matter if you look at it in terms of attributions or aggression or whatever it is, we can all fit just about everything into some kind of social psychological explanation, and that was the pull. Specifically I was interested in [topic]. So that is what I went to [location] for. I was actually going to look at [topic of interest] but that changed. I was interested in [topic] so I did that at the masters level and then I came to the U of M because [prof] was working specifically in that area.

B: So you found a researcher with your research interests?

C: Yes

B: That kind of answers the question, how did you go about choosing your advisor?

C: I actually went through .. I was going to apply to several different universities so I went through the books because I was looking for matches of interest because I got screwed at the master's level. I went there under the assumption I would be working with one advisor who left five weeks after I got there. So I was forced to select another advisor and it was whoever was available and willing to take me. So I didn't have a lot of choice there and so I didn't want to make that mistake again. And I came here and I .. I was a lot more confident about what I was doing and I thought well, I probably could get in to several universities so I wanted to make sure I got in with the people I wanted to work with. So I came here before the applications were due, sat down and talked with [her/him], talked about sabbaticals, talked about, you know, making sure [s/he] was going to be here and tried to get a handle on [her/his] approach and [her/his] perspectives. I think I even talked to one of [her/his] graduate students. So I really think I was a lot more informed.

B: Cool. So, so then you found, you clicked in other words. Umm or you at least found at the start that [s/he] was .. that you we're going to be able to work with [her/him].

C: I thought it would be a good working relationship and a good working environment.

B: Ok. Let's focus on here, here first. Your experiences with the, with the program .. I don't know if I want to talk about it in a general way at first. I guess sort of like, what is the program teaching us or what you think it is designed to teach us and did you find it satisfactory, those sort of questions. Did you like the program and the required courses and were there different courses you would far rather taken that sort of thing.

C: .. The courses at the U of M are very interesting because there are so few available. They can call them

elective courses all they want but if they are only offering one social psychology course a year and you have course requirements to fill, you are forced to take them. So I'm not .. I have a hard time saying that we have any electives to take or that we have any choices about courses because I think the requirement is that we take three social psych courses over, however, long were here. And I mean I took the first three that came along with the expectation that you do your course work in the first two years. I wanted it done earlier than that so I take whatever courses come along. Were they ok and were they useful I mean. I took a team taught social psych one at it gave an overview of social psych. It was useful in the sense that I hadn't really taken a social psych theory course that I found useful yet, so I mean it was a good refresher and a good overview of what I was getting myself back into. The other two courses I took, it would be tough to argue that they were truly social psych. They were taught by [prof 2], and he is social psych faculty one of them was perceived control and one of them was health psychology which essentially was perceived control in a health setting. I mean they called them social psych courses, they filled the gap. I probably learned more from [prof 2] in the two courses that I took from him just in terms of research and writing and everything else than I have learned in my entire graduate career.

B: Really.

C: So the course content themselves. I found it interesting. I loved the courses. I don't know that they were truly social psychological but I gained a lot. And well the other .. we have the ancillary course we have to take and I was able to negotiate a readings course in [course name] which I had wanted to do so I mean it all worked out.

B: What about the methods courses?

C: I wasn't required to take any. I had a quantitative requirement to fill because at the masters level you take three social psych, you take your history or systems which was not a pleasant experience. I took systems, and I had to take a quantitative course so I took one with [prof 3] and it focused on meta-analysis, path analysis and I taught myself a lot in that course. In that sense I learned a lot. Did I learn a lot for [her/him]. No. It was good that I took the course cause I got a good textbook and I gained a lot of useful knowledge but I mean I could not have attended class ever and still done the same.

B: Focusing on courses and methods courses and that, what do you, do you. What is your viewpoint, your philosophy or outlook with respect to social psychology. Maybe it would help if I give you some contrast. Like I've been talking myself .. I've been arguing that .. I wrote a paper that talks about how psychology constrains research and I've been arguing that it basically directs people into doing experimental research. Now you may think that's good or bad. I was kind of interested in what your opinion is on that and if you agree with that general statement as well.

C: Well I mean we are training to be psychologists so I think we should be encouraged to do research period. I don't care if it is social psychological research, rat research or whatever kind of research. If you can argue that it's from a social standpoint it should be awarded some sort of merit. I think that, if they wanted to strengthen the program they should incorporate some sort of .. practical course where you are given course credit for the design and conduction of an experiment. And I mean obviously we do that with theses and dissertations. Something smaller than that prior to the dissertation. Or if done at the master's level, just to give you sort of a running head start on thinking about issues of design and analysis. I mean even if it is just designing a proposal which we do get to some level, but I do think there needs to be more of a focus on doing research. I mean, we are supposed to do that with our advisors but I don't think all of us get the same sort of training. But if they wanted us to have an overall level there could be this practical course that is required where we do an experiment, write it up and hopefully submit it for publication.

B: Right, sort of like, something you're doing during the course before you're getting too involved in a thesis. Is that what you're saying?

C: Yeah, yeah so you work out a lot of the kinks and bugs and hopefully have sort of a more pleasant thesis or dissertation.

B: I guess a more direct question. Do you think there should be other methods besides experimental methods in social psychology?

C: For example?

B: Well ways of doing research, interpretive, qualitative, like ... Qualitative is very general but I mean things that include in depth interviews and maybe that is all that your research project is.

C: Well, that would be good or even at the masters level if you were required a half course in quantitative and a half course in qualitative research. Yeah. That would be useful. I have taken a course at the master's level in [location] that looked at both. And I mean I think that is a well-rounded way to do it. I'm not necessarily all that fond of qualitative research but now it looks like I may be using it in my dissertation so, good thing I have that course. Again, I mean a lot of the courses for us is just warehousing textbooks and acquiring a good sort of reference base. So if I've got all this stuff in a box somewhere that I can pull out and refer to rather than having to go do a lit search or talking to people about their books or qualitative analysis. But I mean it would strengthen us, on the other hand, there will be some people who never do qualitative analysis, have no interest in doing it and it would probably be a waste of there time to take a course in it.

B: Do you think .. just looking at the program over all and I know you didn't take the M.A. program and perhaps you can reflect on it a bit with some of your experiences here as well as with the PhD program .. how do you view it? Like my bias is that I view it as directing students into experimental research. Some may be completely happy with that and so they don't see it as directed. Others may not be happy with it and so it is much more evident that they are being directed. Is that your .. does that make sense to you or does that sort of fit with your experience say with professors and what kind of research they are willing to work with with respect to their students?

C: It is sort of tough for me to say because I think I came in here a lot more, had I started at the masters level there would have been a lot of things I didn't know, there would have been a lot of questions I didn't ask. So, I think I was a lot more knowledgeable coming in at the Ph.D. level. I was looking for somebody experimental so I specifically looked for an advisor who took that perspective. I assume that if I was interested in qualitative research I also could have also found an advisor who would have worked with that or done something with that. If not I would have gone to another university. I mean, my assumption is that it is primarily experimental. I was ok with that, that was what I was looking for, therefore I'm here.

B: Yeah right and .. but looking at, I agree with that but looking at the program would you say it was an experimental program?

C: Yes I would.

B: And that's ...

C: I think there is no question about that and I am surprised they don't put that in bold in the little graduate student handbook. I have a hard time, off the top of my head, thinking of someone who would take me on if I was interested in doing exclusively qualitative work. Obviously my advisor is willing to if we are talking about it now but I mean my assumption was that it would be standard paper, pencil, run some ANOVAs, run some MANOVAs, and get out.

B: Yeah, that's fair enough. I guess my advisor happens to be outside of the department.

C: Right. Yeah.

B: Questions we've probably gone over but I'll just ask them and you don't have to go on too long if you think you've covered it. Did you feel free to pursue your own interests?

C: To some extent. I mean I came here because I was interested in doing [topic]. However, I think I'm a little limited in sort of the type of research I can do and also the .. I think I'm restricted in that I can only research a certain area within that .. a lot of that [s/he] says is because [s/he] doesn't want to go too far outside [her/his] own area of expertise because then [s/he] can't be as much a guide as much help to me. But, I still think it is a restriction. I mean if I'm interested in something, I think at some point [s/he] would say no.

B: Ok.

C: You may want to do that but that is not within my scope and how I envisioned it and so we will have to work on that. That is not to say there is not room for negotiation but it would maybe have to take some twists and turns that I had not originally anticipated.

B: So you kind to, you had to feel, you felt you kind of .. I don't know what the word would be .. curtail it or at least ..

C: It more, I think it is more of a collaborative project. Even though it is my dissertation I think that there is two of us working on it, and it has to .. I mean I am not going to cave completely, it is my project and there are certain things I want to do but maybe the way in which I go about doing it is a little different. Maybe I had intended to do it strictly intro university student, standard paper and pencil but maybe [s/he] feels qualitative with [sample] coming in from somewhere else is more up the alley .. I mean I trust [her/his] judgement because that is what [s/he] is here for but I don't feel 100% free to say, I want to do this.

B: Right, do you, raising that point that you raised about her/him wanting to keep it within her/his realm of expertise, do you think that, what do you think of that as an explanation? I guess that is the most neutral way to put it.

C: Umm ... I mean its reasonable to an extent. I don't expect [her/him] to have to review an entire body of literature to deal with my dissertation cause I am not [her/his] only student and [s/he] does have a work load and everything else, however, I think there needs to be bending on both sides and this may be a good example. I have certain work experiences that open me up to different populations. So rather than having to use a university population I have access to a [variety of different populations].

B: Yeah. That seems that that would be an opportunity for you.

C: [S/he] had said, you know, it is outside of my area. And ..

B: The sample was outside of [her/his] area?

C: The sample was outside the area and would probably result in research that did not go in the same direction as, I mean it is tough to do basic [topic] research with a [specific sample]. I mean they are [characteristic of sample], so that would result in a whole new study. But I was really not impressed when we first had the conversation but I mean I can sort of understand it.

B: Right

C: And also [s/he] wants this to be sort of as painless a procedure as possible and [s/he] wants me to get through in a reasonable amount of time and if there is going to be major delays cause [s/he] has to do all this extra work and if I've got a committee who also doesn't have knowledge in the area then .. that is a problem. I mean I was more miffed about it than I am now .. it seems a little more reasonable. [sentence omitted].

B: Yeah. It seemed like it was an opportunity for you to like start building something on your own.

C: And [s/he] is not saying that I couldn't do the research. [S/he] is saying I can't do it for a dissertation. So if I wanted to go and do the work then that would be on my own.

B: Yeah ok, yeah.

C: It brings up an interesting little point though because if I, when I start doing outside research, I get criticized for not doing research because it is not [her/his].

B: .. Ok. How about methods .. ok it sounds like you're, what you want to do is experimental so I'm not asking like, did you want to use experimental methods but was there .. negotiation with respect to the kinds of methods you could use? We're there some you wanted to use.

C: I mean, I want to use. [s/he] wants me to use the methods that are most appropriate. So now we are talking about, doing interviews with [sample] and originally I had envisioned a project that was strictly experimental, paper and pencil ... spit the numbers out but .. qualitative research is much more rich and I mean that is the one thing I gained from the course I had to take and if that gets me the best data then that is the method I go with. Would it have been the first one off on the top of my head, no it wouldn't have.

B: Are you finding that .. what, having, that the subject matter is lending itself ..

C: Yeah, it dictates. I think your subject matter definitely dictates.

B: It certainly should.

C: Yeah, it should. .. If you want rich exploratory data then pumping numbers out of the machine isn't going to give it to you.

B: .. I think you already kind of touched on them but, did you have, call it power problems with respect to, how did you see the relationship between you and the professor? Your advisor that is. I mean there is committee members too if you want to mention, but .. focusing on it from a slightly different angle, you already sort of talked about it but .. what was, how did you find the relationship, like you already have your own ideas about what it should be anyway. For instance I talked to one person and they, [s/he] said [s/he] deferred in many ways to the advisor. Seeing the advisor as knowledgeable and [s/he] was learning from the advisor and I was wondering, do you have your own ideas about the way that should go? And did you have problems or not and what have you.

C: .. Well I'll talk about committee members first, that is the easiest.. The only real contact I've had with committee members was during my candidacy exams and they were the most helpful bunch of people I could ever come across. So to this point all I have to say is I have a great committee and they seem to be open and encouraging. And they give their advice if I ask for it or even if I don't ask for it if they think it would be useful, so I have no beefs with any of my committee members. I think deferring to your advisor is part of the, is part of the, I don't know, is part of the game? or if it is part of the experience itself because regardless of whether you are at the M.A. or PhD level you are still a student. And I mean, I can do all the reading I want and run all the research, as much research as I want and it still won't be more

than [her/him]. So [s/he] has certain expertise and I assume that if I come up with an idea and [s/he] is very open to any of my ideas and we talk about them but if [s/he] can give me a reasonable explanation why it's a half-ass idea or if it can be done in a different way that would probably be more useful, then I am all for hearing that cause I think that is the role of the advisor. We just had a conversation at one o'clock that was talking about how .. I mean I need to start generating some questions that we want to look at and [s/he] wants everything written down, half-fast or not and then we just do it. So I think that that sort of is the ideal working relationship for me. I can come in with everything I think. We can talk about that and hopefully in our conversation I will learn why, either that is a good idea and I've got a good way to measure it or if there is something a little more appropriate. I can't say we've got real power issues but I mean there has been a couple of occasions like that time with .. the population being offered to me and [her/him] saying no. [Discussion of one incident regarding students activities.]

B: [respond to discussion of incident]

C: [brief elaboration on incident]

B: Yeah. Sure.

C: [final discussion about this particular incident with the following short conclusion] So overall no real power.

B: No, not really. .. well just rehashing. So you see the program as geared to training students to do experimental research.

C: That's right.

B: So .. do you think that is good, do you think that is where social psychology should go?

C: I wouldn't be willing to say that is where social psychology should go but if the department is taking that perspective, I think that should be announced. I don't think it is the only perspective. But I would suggest that anybody who is not interested in an experimental approach maybe look elsewhere.

B: Right. Yes. Ok.

C: Because I don't think that we are required to offer every different slant for every different area and there are a ton of different ways to do social psychology but we are sort of dwindling in professors. I mean the program is shrinking and shrinking and shrinking we can't be expected to teach everything and if we want to specialize in experimental method and experimental design then that's fine but I think people should ..

B: Make it explicit.

C: Yeah.

B: .. Although there would be some students like me where that still wouldn't click. But anyway, you we're saying .. you just touched on this idea you said, do you think the field is shrinking and shrinking? Or do you mean like in the department it seems like social psychology is shrinking? I just wonder if you have any insights on it because I have .. these hypotheses I would love to explore with respect, like I'm interested in history, the history of social psychology too and I'd like to, one thing, this is just like, speculative but I'd like to look at is how perhaps the methods of social psychology have functioned to limit its' realm of application over the years and that there are all these other areas that study the quote unquote social that social psychology has sort of cut itself off from because it wouldn't .. use the kinds of

methods that were necessary because it wasn't, wasn't as tight, you know you couldn't do that kind of tight experimental research. And, I don't know, I'm just asking for your own experiences, what do you think is happening in the field?

C: Specifically the department is shrinking and shrinking in size and we know that by looking at the retiree list right?

B: Right.

C: We are losing faculty left, right and center. Yeah and I mean, they are trying to replace them and get some new blood in here but I don't know that it is working as well as they originally wanted. .. I'm not sure that the area itself is shrinking and shrinking. I'm sure there has been a decrease in the vast areas that we have been covering over the years but again it is sort of a function of program and advisor as to where the research is going and if every single university is specializing in experimental methods then yeah that is going to restrict the area, the areas in which we study but I mean [topic area] is booming and it is booming all over the place from a ton of different angles and attribution theory is never dying it seems. So there is lots of research that is going on in those areas and so I am not willing to say that social psych is dwindling away. I think we do restrict ourselves in some ways and there would be a lot more things we could study if we did a more qualitative stuff or if we did things a little differently but, I mean, part of it is you have to have people sort of willing to do it as well.

B: Yeah, you got to have the ..

C: But I think we are trained from day one. I mean take it back to an undergraduate level, 225, 226. How much qualitative exposure are you getting at that stage?

B: Exactly.

C: None. And that's where we learn the basics. I didn't do an honours degree, I came out of the advanced program. So I mean, I took 225 and 226 and I did an independent research project with somebody that was experimental in nature and that was my introduction to research in psychology. So I mean it wasn't until sort of the master's level where I thought about, yeah I guess I could ask the people instead of getting them to fill in all these computer bubbles.

B: That's right, that's right.

C: So.

B: Yeah, you sort of take it for granted. There's a .. it's like there is an implicit process. Especially when you are first learning. You're in school, you are an undergraduate and you haven't really reached the level where you're starting to like question ..

C: Exactly. How many of us are going to raise our hand and say well maybe, isn't there a better way to do this? I .. take 225, 226 with [prof 2] and see how many questions you ask. Ain't going to happen.

B: Ok. One question on .. was your objective like .. your objective is to become a professor?

C: It was. It has changed very recently. My full intention of doing a PhD and the reason I had done all this teaching was to go through and get the tenure track position and have the nice life in academia but .. I don't know if I am just tired of being in school and just want to get out of here but it seems that .. and I have never wanted to make this whole endeavor about money. I have never wanted to go for the highest paying job, however, when I see that a lot of entry level profs who are on tenure track streams are making

\$38,000 for six years of their life when I can go to investors group and start at \$46,000 and do a little bit of demographic analysis. it is not making sense to me. it truly isn't. So I think that I'm starting to pursue going off into the private sector. doing some consulting work. doing analysis jobs. do some teaching on the side. Then I still get the enjoyment. I teach truly because I love it. I have a blast. But. I don't know. There are other skills I have that seem to make me a lot more money.

B: Did that ever. did that play into your. your interest in experimental research. Was there any relationship between that and the fact that. like I mean obviously someone who is. being interested in experimental research seems to be the way to go if you want success in the field. I guess is the simplest way to put it.

C: I think it opens more doors.

B: Yeah.

C: Because I mean not only. the skills we learn in experimental psychology go beyond psychology. So I mean I use Investors Group as an example. Umm they've got analysts jobs in the financial stream and what they want somebody to do is come in and analyze their consumer satisfaction data for financial services. I know nothing about financial services but I can certainly whip you up a nice graph and write you up and nice report so I mean. they are certainly transferable skills that we are learning.

B: Yeah. Undoubtedly. Ok. Well do you have any questions?

C: I don't think so.

B: Ok. well thanks that was pretty good.

C: No problem.

END.

Student 3.

B: I'm just gonna try to get things going by asking why. how you got interested in social psychology but first of all you're in the Ph.D.. was the M.A. in social psych and the Ph.D. in social psych.

D: Both my M.A. and my Ph.D. are in social psych. I'll go through my academic background.

B: Sure.

D: I have a bachelor of science in micro-biology and zoology. The intent was to go into dentistry. which never came through. During that program I took the first half of social psych and. and it sort of. I can actually recall the incident where I thought. hey this is kinda neat stuff. I was taking it with [prof]. I don't know if you remember [her/him]?

B: I know who [s/he] is yeah.

D: Cognitive dissonance and I was hey that's kind of neat stuff. Getting people to change their attitudes and consciously deciding how to do that .. so I thought psychology was a viable alternative. Finished my bachelor of science. didn't get into .. dentistry. decided that psychology would be an option. So I spent two years as a special student in arts to get the undergrad requirements to apply to grad school and then

applied .. I didn't get in after the special student cause I still needed some courses. I then upgraded to be an occasional student so I could take grad courses I then got in but because I didn't have a B.A. Honours. I had to take a pre-masters year. so I did a pre-masters year and then I did a master's with [prof 2] looking at [topic]. And then .. had some mis-communication with [prof 2], that [s/he] basically didn't think I was continuing on with my PhD where I was intending too. by then I found [s/he] was taking on other students. I found a new advisor on the spur of the moment so I am now working with [prof 3] and the current area of interest is looking at motivations and perceptions in an organizational setting. specifically performance appraisals and the consequences of some of the actions of performance appraisal.

B: Cool. Ok so .. so you've kind of covered your advisors and how you went about picking them.

D: Purely chance.

B: I guess it was by chance.

D: Well actually. do you want to know more about how I kind of got in?

B: Sure talk about the relationships with them a bit. Well we might come at it from different angles but ..

D: Well ok. when I decided I wanted to go into psychology. I decided. I knew I wanted social psychology. I didn't want to be in clinical with the whole autobiographical thing. In my opinion. anyone in clinical seems to be researching some internal problem and so I wanted to avoid that. Do you come from a clinical background or a friend in the clinical tough!

B: No.

D: But social psychology was what I was interested in so I sent a blanket form letter to all the social psychology professors on campus here with the basic thought well if I get a big response I will then pick and choose and bounce people off each other or if I get a minimal response I will take first come first serve. And it turned out to be a bit of both. [Prof 2] was the first to contact me but it definitely seemed to be the most interesting program. I met with [prof 2] and it was sort of .. an intimidating process. [S/he] asked for my transcript. asked about my background. Given that I didn't get into dentistry my background wasn't stellar. But [s/he] was interested in the fact that my psychology grades were better and that I was coming from a science background [s/he] thought well there was analytical. quantitative skills must be good. [S/he] bought my argument and decided to let me in and I started out in a volunteer position doing research with [her/him] that turned into an advisorship where [s/he] oversaw .. the work that I did. both for my pre-masters and masters. And [s/he] ran. [s/he] ran. [s/he] runs a very unique lab I think from what I've seen of this university. where it's definitely a group project. At the time [s/he] had .. four. five PhD students. [S/he] had no masters students and [s/he] initially took me on as a pre-masters student and then subsequently. at that time [s/he] also took on three other students as honours students and a year later [s/he] took me on as a master's student with four honours students and another master's student. So [s/he] ran a lab that had a hierarchical structure .. but it was also a cooperative environment where .. I got my name on AERA and APA presentations where what I was doing was running sessions and participating in group. in group meetings and just bouncing ideas around. And so that was my initial exposure to graduate study at the U of M. There are these labs that get together where Ph.D. students and Ph.D. professors. down to undergrads sit down and just bounce off ideas and the naive perspectives of undergrads was welcome just because it created a greater sense of validity to what was being done. the common sense stuff. But it was also very structured. It wasn't loose or willy nilly. There were things that had to be done. you did them or suffered the consequences. There. excuses weren't welcome. Basically. if you had an excuse you told [her/him]. you'd tell [prof 2]. or I was going to say me. as if I'm the voice of [prof 2] you tell me before the consequences happen. I want to know about them before. There was no reason why you shouldn't. It was very rigorous .. and I assumed that's sort of how things were. But. you know. going

through years of the program I sort of saw that not all labs are like that. I talked to other students about, you know, what their research group is doing and they wouldn't even know who others, what other students were under the same advisor.

B: That's right. They probably don't have research groups at all.

D: Yeah, they don't, research groups is not the norm. You had a bunch of students working independent under an advisors. So none of us, [prof 2] and I completed my masters successfully I think [s/he] was happy with it and would have wanted me on as a Ph.D. student but we had mis-communication. At the time I was sort of weighing whether I wanted to go into employment or not. Very much in a similar situation than I am now where the employment proved to be .. actually happened this time. But he had booked up his time, again [prof 2] is very structured so by March or whenever he had decided what students he was taking on.

B: How were you, how. The program you just described .. were you .. reflecting on yourself in that program how did you see yourself like .. what did you see your role with respect to you and your advisor and your position. You can ask me to clarify if you want but I thought I'd go with that first.

D: I think, well my role .. like with respect to my program with respect to [prof 2] was that I was expected to produce despite the fact being the junior person in the group. I got the photocopying duties but I was still expected to have valuable input into what the research program was doing. I wasn't expected to sit there and just take minutes of the meetings. It was expected that I would gain from the senior students, they were my first sounding board. Like I would talk to them about my ideas with them and present ideas to the group and I would have to defend it. And that .. I wasn't, I don't think I was looked down upon as a junior. I was seen as a peer but to maintain that level I had to show that I was willing to produce, willing to listen to criticism, and alter my thinking to make it, to make it .. my ideas work. I don't know if that interests you ..

B: Yeah, along those lines .. did you have any sense of the ideas you could go with, the ideas you couldn't go with. Did you have your own ideas and they weren't ideas you could use or did, is that not the way that you looked at it. Like listen first, get a sense for the kind of research they were doing and then try to think of ideas that worked with that? You know what I mean?

D: Yeah, I know what you mean.

B: And did that matter to you? How important was that to you?

D: That didn't, that really didn't matter to me for the most part. Going back to my earlier comment about being autobiographical, in a way it was. [Prof 2's] research was academic motivation research in a first year university setting. If you look at my transcript, something happened in my first year .. well actually, in my second year in particular. But I improved it now, so there I was this student who was performing poorly managed to be able to, to get into grad school do some valuable work, work I thought was well done compared to some peers. I did get, I did get a U of M fellowship so there is some validity to my statement that like maybe what I am doing is worthwhile. So it was sort of, I was interested in to start off with .. however, by nature, sort of who I am .. given the circumstances .. I'm interested in whatever comes my way. I wanted to be a dentist but I ended up being a psychologist. I picked my advisor based on sort of, on first come, first serve. At that point was, well what ever research they were doing .. could be interesting and it just so happened I could make it personally relevant. As for my specific topic in there, it was sort of bounded, bounded by [prof 2's] research area of motivation but within that there was questions that I wanted to ask, that I was free to ask and again if I could justify or develop, an argument for that, I was free to run with it.

B: Yeah, so within, so within .. the parameters you could explore any question you wanted right?

D: Yeah, for my masters.

B: For your masters. .. The obvious question given you, given the background from myself was .. did you want to do any non-experimental research? Was that ever something? Did you ever think about that?

D: What do you mean?

B: Was the idea of doing qualitative research, the idea of doing non-experimental, something that didn't involve experiments, something that didn't involve necessarily questionnaires or checklists or what have you?

D: Umm ..

B: I'm just trying to get a sense for .. how, how students look at it. You know, what was their experience was it like .. no I understood it was experimental and that was cool with me, that is what I wanted to do. That sort of thing.

D: I didn't think about it when I was, at the beginning of my masters, however, when I thought I was going to be continuing on with [prof 2] I definitely had a bent, or thought that I wanted to make it more applied .. so, it would still involve questionnaires but I wanted to, to take the whole process and see how it would work in the real world a little more. Going back to, going to students while they are in grade 12 and soliciting them at that point and looking at what they're doing there and bringing it into the university, .. in a real world setting, like here's real students coming in and it's not, like a lot of [prof 2's] work is laboratory. So, it would still be experimental, you would have control and an experimental group but it would be real people in an applied setting and real marks not just reported marks. [S/he] [prof 2] did some work with final grades in introductory psychology, but I wanted to know more than just about intro psych and I don't know how that would have been taken.

B: Umm, right.

D: But ahh .. for, it sort of, what I'm, the .. you don't have this on tape but as I was talking for my current dissertation it is going to be, it is going to be applied. It is going to be a little more non-experimental. I am going to, for the final part, go into organizations and look into their performance appraisal process and I'm not going to have a control group. I'm going to use their actual performance appraisal process. I don't want to go and set up two groups.

B: Right.

D: This is what your doing, I want to see people's reactions to it. I am going to interpret your performance appraisal tool based on the theory that I know and so ..

B: So you're gonna, you're working towards that?

D: Yeah.

B: I was told, I was told by someone else that my questions are leading but I'm just taking for granted that I can ask leading questions you'll just answer them the way you .. you feel.

D: I have my own biases for your questions!

B: Exactly. That is what I've been assuming, especially with graduate students. But .. reflecting on the program, the actual educational program. Being trained to do work, being trained to analyze your research

D: Now there's an assumption, that we're being trained!

B: Heh, heh. I see there being, building a case like I told you for there being an experimental bias or the whole point of the training, don't call it a bias, say the training, is training to be an experimental researcher. You can take that as a criticism or a compliment, it doesn't matter right, you know it depends on your point of view but .. does that make sense to you?

D: .. I think the thing that I've just to answer that .. the alternative being?

B: Non-experimental ..

D: What does that mean to you though?

B: To me it means a qualitative research, research that focuses on .. in-depth interviews on some topic and you may not be coming to any predictive conclusions at all, it may be rich description, it may be, you know, stuff along the lines of anthropological or what you might think of more in terms of sociological social-psychology, that kind of work. .. Work that wouldn't necessarily .. wouldn't take the stance of objective, scientific neutral research where you manipulate variables and predictions. You may not even have variables at all, right, in that sense. You may be trying to understand social behaviour in terms of .. practices and social structures and how those structures and practices are political, ok and how they have relationships to .. society in general and how that's influencing behaviour so you're introducing .. political ideas into it so that you're not just trying to predict behaviour .. without the political context or even, in a sense without a social context. Those are just like .. you ask me the question and so I automatically start thinking of my own interests right. And so, when you thought of social psychology, I guess to ask the question differently, did you think these things were important too?

D: .. They weren't that important to me.

B: Well they don't have to be important to you but, go ahead tell me, but do you think that social psychology should be hardcore experimental or whatever?

D: .. Yeah, I would have to say yeah.

B: Ok, good.

D: My background, I come from a science background, .. analytical. I believe there are universal laws we just don't know what they are, we can't articulate them very well. .. And that, sort of .. I think you are looking at the context being more important than the universal law would be?

B: Yeah, my focus is on .. on context, yeah heavy on context.

D: Yeah, and I .. I don't deny the existence of context but it's not of what's of interest to me and you mentioned its more sociological than sociological social-psychology and yeah there is sort of a grey area that can be blurred there. Having just come out of a sociology course .. ok having listened to the instructor of the course too .. my faith in sociology has gone down a little. I'm not quite sure what I got out of that course and what she's getting out of her research program. So .. that's confidential. Wooo do I have a bias there! But .. and for me, I sort of believe in laws and there is context that influences things but I will rely on that law first and, but there is for me on a personal basis, outside of research, yeah there is context and

I take that into consideration. I don't just look at laws. So .. I. I think to kind of get at it .. if there is anything that I think is contextual that should be included. it is more of an applied setting that I think is really missing from social psychology. That may get to the context area of research. You may have to, you've done, you've done the experiment, now how will it work. That's where I'm heading, the actual usage of it but not just, not necessarily in-depth interviews that can give you information or that can garner. I find my perception of that is that it is very subject specific or it is specific to that situation and that is not what I'm looking for in research and so I don't. I'm not in social psychology because of that I think, it is because it will get me some universal laws that I base myself on.

B: Cool. Reflecting on the program, how would you .. what was the program. Say the M.A. cause you completed it. What was it .. what was it about?

D: What was it about? That's a. that's a little too open. .. What do you mean?

B: Well they are training you ok? We'll assume that that is true, that they are training you. What do they want you to get out of it, what do they want you to come out with?

D: .. There, and the funny thing about my M.A. is that I can't speak to the department of psychology at all. All of my training was pretty much through [prof 2] and [her/his] lab group. [S/he] had an office [location] yeah and ..

B: You had to take certain courses.

D: Yeah I had to take certain courses but one of those courses was with [prof 2]. .. what other courses I took one was with [prof 3] in sociology. Oh and the other course for my masters other than the quantitative courses was the one where each professor comes in for two weeks and chats about their own topic area. I can't remember what it was.

B: Oh yeah, the team taught one. Social psych one, or social psych two I think it was called.

D: Whatever the grad thing and, so they came in and talked and so I didn't have a lot of influence from any one person and I felt from that brief snippet, from seeing a bunch of different professors who would come in and lecture and sit around a table with 5 or 6 graduate students and talk, they could only go into so much of their research area, they only had a total of 6 hours to talk and so my impression of the department, was pretty minimal, it seemed like everything was superficial. That may be because it was limited on time with the contact with each professor .. and so what I got from [prof 2's] program is that psychology is very rigorous. Things are very accounted for. The way [s/he] ran [her/his] lab is very structured. Everything is on a time line. You made the commitment you better stick to it. If you can't you better .. not have an excuse but you better explain it to someone before hand so it can be covered. Mistakes are accepted once, after that you'll hear about it. However, there are other students in your group you can rely on. And so for a lot of my experience there was that, rely on the other students of the research group for a sounding board and for discussing things and .. for emotional problems, that was sort of, keep them to yourself. The Ph.D. has been sort of different than that too. My impression of the department .. when I was about to go and propose for my own M.A. and I made such, I attended a lot of other students proposals to go and see what the standard was and .. the standard was everywhere from spelling errors on overheads to overheads that were, that didn't just have spelling errors but were just poor, to people who didn't really know what their topic was and didn't sound like they had actually thought it out when asked questions. And I had made the mistake of actually asking someone questions during their proposal which I've later seen in this department you don't do. It isn't a forum for discussion. It's a forum for a rubber stamp. So I think the training you get in this department is really dependent on your advisor. It's not, it's not something where, the department .. the first analogy that comes to mind is it takes a village to raise a child. But here no, it's a single parent family .. raising your child.

B: I buy that one, about the advisors. I think it is crucial about what you end up doing, what you can do and whether you get good training or not. .. So your relationship with [prof 2] how, the question I want to ask is one on power, power-relationships, power, where did you see your position, how much influence did you see in the construction of your work. How much of it was your work, how much of it was .. and whether you thought it was good or bad. You know, you're fine with it, it is a learning experience. That is one of the things I've heard from some. From others it was like .. well you had a goal. The goal was professorship and this is the way that training is. .. So what was your experiences like, positive and negative in terms of power, power how, how, did you feel overwhelmed or what have you.

D: [Prof 2] had the power. I didn't have the power. .. But [s/he, s/he] was .. careful in wielding it? .. When it comes to .. to what I wanted to do or maybe, who knows, maybe I was convinced that that was what I wanted to do. [S/he] was .. I guess in my research area [s/he] was open to what I wanted to do .. and I think eventually, I got to do what I wanted to do .. not til after it had gone through scrutiny in the group process .. I don't think it ever at any point. [s/he] ever really told me what I should be doing with my research, however, you knew in [her/his] research group that ultimately [s/he] made the decisions and they were final .. and maybe I just didn't come up against that power. I was going with the power and so I didn't see it. Academically, I didn't see it being used in an adverse way against me. Socially it was a completely different situation. There was no interaction. Could say hello in the hallway and unless you're on [her/his] meeting schedule kind of thing or on [her/his] daytimer to meet with [her/him], you wouldn't get a hello back. Which has actually changed now that I am not a student of [her/his], which is kind of different. See [her/him] in the hallway and we'll talk for longer than during my masters. Yeah, I don't know if that ..

B: Yeah, sure. Like .. it's obviously easier for me, I read about it and its all about power and then you introduce it. I guess I was just trying to get at the idea or ask about the idea to what extent training involves, involves this regulation I brought up. To what extent do you think the graduate program training .. it could be another. I'm not saying it is unique to psychology. I'm talking about the idea of training being this way of directing the way you observe, of directing the way you do research and stuff like that.

D: That issue may be more relevant with my Ph.D. Again, I could have been young and naive for my pre-masters and masters research, that's what I want to do, that's what [prof 2] wants to do. With my Ph.D. I've decided I know what I want to do. And so I'm working with a new advisor now [prof 4] [s/he's] a younger professor [characteristics of professor]. I'm [his/her] first Ph.D. student and so now there is more of a power struggle before us, because I don't think [s/he] is quite sure how to interact with me. [Discussion of professors experience and student-advisor relationships]. And so I'm the first Ph.D. student after, not a lot of graduate supervising experience. I came into the program knowing sort of pretty much what I wanted to do. I integrated my dissertation topic, this idea, I had in my head to incorporate some of [her/his] research to appease [her/him]. I think when I'm working with someone I think I'm getting something from them. They are supervising me, but they should also get something out of what I am doing too. A sort of cooperative effort and so I integrated [her/his] area. [Her/his] research on [topic] but it's still in the context of how I wanted to do it in an organizational setting with performance appraisal. There is a bit more of a power struggle there. [S/he's]. I think maybe doing [her/his] job and ensuring that [s/he] questions me in what I'm doing to ensure I've thought it through so that I can defend any arguments that I make. Though there's, I think a definite feel that [s/he] is wondering why I am doing it and why aren't you doing a little bit more in my area, and why do you want to do it in this context and oh you want to do it in an organizational setting and do it in an applied kind of way, why do you want to do that? That's not social psychology .. so there is a bit of that, that power struggle there and I think because .. if we were to be placed on the ladder, [description of relative experience between student and advisor.]. And I came through a system where I worked with [prof 2] where [s/he's] senior and almost sees [her/him] self above the university. [s/he] has [her/his] own little office and lab happening and so I came out of that thinking this is my relative reference group and now I'm dealing with [prof 4] and the

reference group that I'm switching over to, the transition of a new professor and someone just starting their Ph.D. who wasn't that, that far apart and so I feel that I can say no to [him/her] or feel that I could. I probably have .. to some extent. Though on other issues I have completely jelly-fished, backed down to [his/her] .. was [her/his] little slave boy.

B: So there has been more negotiation?

D: Yeah.

B: Which is good .. from my point of view. And you sort of see that as part of your what, developmental process of becoming your own researcher?

D: Yeah

B: So from your M.A. to your Ph.D. In essence you have you own ideas now and you are more willing to assert them.

D: I have my own ideas, and I know what I want to do and I'm not going to spend four years not doing what I want to do.

B: I got a question. Sometimes I ask questions, they are not necessarily what I'm going for I just become I become interested.

D: That's, that's fine. That's the cool part about interviews.

B: Yeah, it's just that, now as you look back do you think .. you know, going with [prof 4] is going to be more beneficial in terms of you being able to do what you want to do than if you had worked with [prof 2]?

D: .. I would actually .. beneficial I would probably place them about equal though in different ways. With [prof 2] I sort of knew what I would want to do in a Ph.D. setting. It would have been the same area but again I would have been perfectly happy doing that. Again it would have been a little more applied. With [prof 4] I have more liberty to, to not do what [s/he's] doing. My Ph.D. work is still largely based on what I did for my masters, perceived control, attribution theory. And so now it is beneficial that I can take what I've learnt and apply it in a different setting which I wouldn't, with [prof 2] it would have to be education and I thought that I would be happy with that. With [prof 4] I can take it and pretty much apply it to any area I wanted. Power, perception, [s/he] does racial groups between white and aboriginals.. and I can apply what I learned there as well but I wanted to do it in an organizational setting. Sort of beneficial that I have a few more liberties here. However, it would have been a little more structured. The training I would have received with [prof 2] definitely would have been more intense, more rigorous however I had more liberties, working with [prof 4].

B: Sort of like, pros and cons.

D: Yeah, I think I would probably be, would have been more employable as a professor coming out of a program with [prof 2] and more employable outside of the academic world coming out working with [prof 4]. Part of it is the idea that I probably will be becoming some kind of management consultant at some point as well. How to do this properly. With [prof 4] I can explore different areas of taking my research. The most beneficial actually would be, I am beginning to think would be somewhere over in management where they are actually doing the stuff and they actually have partnerships with organizations and I would have had a foot in the door somewhere to get a job after this. However, subsequently, I have now been offered a job and I'm going to try and integrate my academic career with a professional career where I can

do what I want at the end of it all. So they're mutually beneficial to some extent.

B: Is that how you. I presume yes but is that how you looked at this training, your social psychological training in terms of the tools, the tools it could offer you .. in the job market?

D: .. No. No. Just with reference to the job market. I think it has more to do with your job talk and who is appearing as your references and publications on you C.V. then your actual training I don't think has a lot to do with it. The name of your institution you are coming out of ...

B: Right.

D: The actual training you get on the job .. no. I can't see that having that much of an impact. It might prepare you better for it depending on the standards you are used to but I don't think it actually influence like .. again, working with [prof 2] group, you present something to the group in an overhead with a spelling error and it is pointed out to you and if you actually go in public with that you are in trouble. Whereas in this department, I've seen spelling errors on defense overheads and they're little things but you question sort of the training that goes on there. Yet these people, I don't think they are having any problems finding employment once they leave this university though it is not the most established name but it is depending, depending how your references go and the job talk goes.

B: Umm ..

D: I wasn't able to attend any of the hiring or job talks they were giving recently here. But the three positions that they hired for but I really get the impression it is how you do in that job talk and what your reference is that gets you the job then your actual training. You get thrown into your, you hired and you're making it up as you go.

B: Yeah.

D: We don't, we don't get training on how to be teachers and your hired to take on teaching positions, you don't get hired well unless your hired as a postdoc, you're not hired as a researcher you are hired as a teacher which isn't anywhere in our training that I've seen other than presentations in a class.

B: Yeah, you just figure that out as you go.

D: Yeah. Other departments have mandatory undergrad training where you have to teach an undergrad courses as part of your program. In this university different departments and faculties, you have to take an undergrad course and you get evaluated on that. How you do is part of your training. It's probably good .. anyone can put a spin on the research it seems to me to make it sound good.

B: Yeah.

D: And depending on how rigorous the .. it will depend how well your research holds up. And so if you're applying to a lesser university, in quotes, they may not be able to pick up the flaws of your research .. so

B: .. Anything, any comment or questions about the program or anything you think would have been better questions to ask or something like that?

D: I was hoping to talk about how they set you up for the program in this department. They don't at all which is sort of the problem.

B: What do you mean?

D: It seems to be, what hoops you have to jump through seems to be a bit of a secret in this department. I saw that [prof 4] had like a binder on how to deal with grad students. There is apparently a policy manual.

B: Heh, heh.

D: I have never seen one. I would like to get my hands on one of those binders and see..

B: would work in my thesis

D: One of the examples is I started this academic year. I had to have my committee in. Well [prof 4] and I got together, thought out a couple of names, talked about who should be on the committee. Great I've set my committee. Two weeks later I get a call from [grad secretary] asking who was on my committee. I was short one committee member. No one knew that. I couldn't verify it. [Prof 4] I suppose should have told me about it, should have. But I didn't know that so I ended up hunting around for one more committee member and it wasn't .. either of us thought would be of value to the committee, it was a warm body.

B: Umm ..

D: Things like that. I think the training could be a lot better. If there is some sort of orientation or introduction.

B: If they just spelled it out.

D: Yeah .. I'm gonna guess if I went to [grad secretary] and inquired about it then I might be able to get all the information .. know what questions to ask. It's not brought forward. I made the mistake that I had not .. pre-masters program I assumed that means you are going into a masters. Well, after the application deadline, I was phoned by [grad secretary] saying you haven't put in your application for the master's program. Well I'm in the pre-masters program, what the hell do you think I'm doing. I want to do a pre-masters and then go and work at McDonalds. It is a completely separate application process. No one told me about that.

B: Yeah. Administrative stuff. And they won't tell you about it either.

D: And so yeah I think, if you had that, it would be a lot smoother with the program and you seem to be looking to alternatives about how social psychology can be done and, it's an ivory tower in this department for sure. There's one way to do it. Now it happens to coincide with me on how I want to do it.

B: Right.

D: Experimental or maybe it could be a bit more applied but I'm finding if I want to do it applied I'm probably going to come up with some barriers.

B: Yeah, yeah even applied and you can be as hardcore as you want about it and you're still going to have some, some tough questions. Yeah that's a, a good observation. Yeah I do think it comes down to professors. That is something I think I just ... it comes down to your advisor in a way. I mean I had, the problems I had weren't with my advisor, it was with my committee.

D: Yeah. I think [prof 5] is pretty good isn't [s/he]?

B: Yeah.

D: But [s/he's] not here.

B: [S/he's] not here. Yeah. its had its pros and cons cause she is in [city] now but. but other committee members. at least one of them was here and I don't know but I think there was a power struggle. a power struggle ..

D: Who was the committee member?

B: It was [prof 6]. I think there was a power struggle. I think as I reflect .. now. you talk about your advisor being the expert right? [S/he's] the person who knows whether what you're doing is good .. their judgment. .. And I was doing something that was so unusual that I don't think there was this respect for that my advisor comes from a different point of view and [her/his] judgment was go with it. And there was like .. a struggle among them .. this only dawned on me as I was struggling with. oh my god what is going on with my thesis. I started to reflect on educational practices. that is how I got interested in it really based on my own experiences.

D: Autobiographical.

B: Yeah. yeah. so there.

D: That is why I don't want to be in clinical. You can read too much into clinical.

B: But anyway. thanks do you have any questions.

D: No. so you'll write something up and I'll get to edit it before.

B: Yeah.

END.

Student 4.

B: Ok. well I've already kind of spoken to you so you kinda know what I'm doing right?

E: Yeah. sort of.

B: Sort of. And like. I've kind of given everyone else an explanation just about looking at training. focusing on how we're trained. and its kind of from a critical point of view. Saying how it constrains us. leads us into doing experimental type research and stuff like that. And I guess. I should ask do you have any questions? Would you have any questions first?

E: Umm.

B: Or should we just start off from that?

E: .. not really. I might have some after but I'll see how the questions go.

B: Ok. Just to start. reflecting on your own experiences and that (pause interruption)

E: Ok. Sorry.

B: This usually is a good way to get going anyway .. why did you go into psychology?

E: What was the interest? Well I really liked introductory psychology. I thought it was really interesting and .. I had a friend actually who wanted to go into psychology I hadn't decided but she went to the University of Winnipeg, took psychology and absolutely did not like it (laugh). And I didn't have, didn't have a plan exactly but it sounded .. pretty good. So I took .. took intro, liked it and then, of course, you take the advanced courses. I really liked. I took social psychology with [prof] and I liked. I thought it was just really interesting. All the experiments, the clever little experiments you know, especially the classic ones where [s/he] would sit and ask people what do you think happened and whatever and most people didn't .. couldn't guess the results and that sort of thing .. and once they were explained, it made sense. You know, that sort of thing. So I thought that was interesting and then .. for my honours thesis I wound up doing social psychology with my advisor and I liked that. I thought it was interesting. I wanted to stay in psychology but I didn't really want to go into clinical psychology at that time. I wasn't .. I didn't know if I would like clinical psychology .. I thought so .. therapy. And I didn't know if I wanted to do that, so I stuck with social.

B: And then you went into it ..

E: Into the graduate level.

B: And that was here?

E: Yeah .. I thought about. I looked into moving around but I didn't have focus at that time so I didn't have a particular place I wanted to go either to live or to work .. you know either a city that I really liked or a person or a program that I particularly liked so I thought it just sort of turned out to be easiest to stay here.

B: And how did you find the program? Or like explain the program.

E: The graduate program here?

B: Sure, sure yeah.

E: Well, it's been quite a while but from (laugh)

B: Yeah

E: There's the .. there's the .. I sort of knew what I was getting into at that point because I was surprised during undergraduate training after introductory psychology there was .. general, advanced general psychology

B: Yeah

E: Which I did not know was research methods, had no idea, not a clue what that was going to be all about so when it, when it came to graduate training I looked into what it was that I was going to need to do. You know what I mean? And I knew there would be a research focus .. I was shocked into that sort of second year.

B: Right.

E: So then .. there were the requirements of the .. I think they were the two statistics courses in advanced level and those were .. didn't really have much to do with social but everyone has to take them so that's a

common experience .. you know?

B: Yeah

E: And then I think I was required to take one or two other quantitative courses which were fine. I managed to take a .. one sort of philosophical.

B: At the Phd Level?

E: I don't remember .. I don't remember how it all fell, what was required at .. Master's and what was required at Phd.

B: Oh I am kind of .. the reason I ask that, is that I have been looking at all the calendars. It seems, seems like you have to take the two stats courses for Master's and then there's quantitative requirements at the Phd level but that's just .. might not be necessarily a course, a specific course ..

E: No there aren't specific courses so you could take anything from .. I know there is sort of a, basically a philosophy course .. and a, and a philosophy of science course with [prof 2] right up to .. I don't know who teaches the, there's courses I think in meta analysis and stuff going on now. You know, and then there are the ones that [prof #3] teaches that are more your sort of straight forward multivariate and all that kind of stuff. So there's kind of a range.. to pick from depending on who is teaching what or who's around.

B: And those are all considered quantitative

E: Yeah, I think so

B: So it's actually more broad then the impression I would get.

E: I am not that familiar with the total range of courses, but .. I am pretty sure there is a course on path analysis or something, but there's also .. that's what I took. I know the clinical people can take a single organism design, I think .. I am not sure if that's quantitative though

B: I've heard that you can do that.

E: I don't know. There's single "O" as they call it (laughing) and then there's a .. I think there's a clinical research thing but I am not .. I am really not clear on what that is all about honestly I don't know. And I don't know, I don't think I could have taken those. I'm certain I couldn't have taken single organism .. they wouldn't have wanted me in that class. But you know.. the others I don't know.

B: Yeah

E: And I was, I was limited throughout the program not just with quantitative but with anything else as to what's available when you want to take a course .. you know what I mean?

B: Yeah I do. Yeah that's what someone else was saying .. there's only so many courses

E: Yeah available in any one year. And I was never in a course, a graduate course with very many people except for intro stats but it's not like there were .. I was in one course with only one other person, you know? And then the course in quantitative that I think there were 7 nor 8 and that was the biggest class I ever had .. in graduate studies I think. .. So it's not like they are just offering a few and they are overloaded they are just few and far between .. so you are kind of limited by that. If you want to wait

around and really try to figure out when things are coming and stuff then you might be able to plan it better .. so

B: So what about your research? What did you do?

E: For research?

B: I guess you've done two things. You can just focus on one if you want to .. yeah, your research .. what did you study?

E: ..Well for master's level everything just sort of .. fell into place as far as .. what I wanted to do and how to go about doing it and that sort of thing..

B: What do you mean by that?

E: Well ..I guess I've always been interested in [research topic] and that sort of thing and so just the topic of the study came about really easily and what sort of .. and I guess how to go about doing it fell within .. you know similar things that were going on with my advisor's students .. you know what I mean? It came together fairly easily .. and I was encouraged to be involved in .. I guess research overall .. other students .. and that sort of thing .. but there was never any formal attempt .. and I've heard that at other universities they have a sort of more .. institutionalized way of getting people all together and talking about their research even if your not in the same lab or with the same advisor and that sort of thing do you know what I mean?

B: Oh really?.. Like research groups and just encouraging dialogue?

E: I think so. Yeah and regardless of whether or not you are .. completely involved in the project, but I don't know how realistic that is either. I .. I've heard these things .. I don't know what people consider a good exchange or whatever but .. I didn't find a lot of that going on I am talking about between students. I guess everyone is so busy as a student, you know what I mean? You are doing your courses and it seems that at U of M most people have to have a job or something .. I do a lot of T.A. work, most people do right, stuff like that. You might have a job elsewhere, so you are doing .. your courses, you are doing some sort of research, whether it's for your thesis or not and then you are doing work elsewhere and you might want to do some life things (laughs) .. some people do, some people don't.

B: In working with your thesis, can you talk about or explain .. the student professor .. the student/professor relationship .. and what that role played in your thesis....?

E: Ok. Well it would probably be better to talk about master's because it's, there is a thing there. For my master's thesis .. I .. as far as actually going about the work .. I, my advisor and I came up with sort of a topic idea together .. I did all the background research as far as, are there any theories relevant to this .. what has been done. Of course you know [s/he] had [her/his] own ideas about what may be relevant but as far as literature review and tying things together and making a story of it, that was sort of left to me but as far as .. you know coming up with a design .. and .. I guess once after I ran, I ran the whole thing, and then you know, verifying analysis and that sort of thing. Those parts were more .. what would you say .. collaboration .. but the writing was up to me, and we went through a lot of drafts. I think a lot of people do that .. it wasn't a very, and we didn't have a strict schedule or formula or anything like that. It was all sort of as it happened. Like I said that one seemed to fall into place, I was very highly motivated. I got a plan very early on .. it seemed to make sense what to do .. I had access, easy access to all of the literature. You know, it took a long time to run. But that's how it goes, we don't have a lot of assistance here or undergraduates helping graduates students it doesn't seem like. I think they have that in other places too. So .. I am not sure what else exactly .. what else ..

B: Ok .. No, no that's good. Well the other thing that I've asked everyone else is just reflecting on .. like .. one of the things I am interested in is power ok, power differential, or if you even perceived it or if you have any reflections on it, reflections on how that relationship may have influenced your research, or if that was a problem or wasn't a problem for you, like it was fine, it was ok, that sort of thing .. I was just wondering if you had any reflections on?

E: Well for my master's .. I was pretty .. I was pretty motivated but I was pretty willing to go along with, the thing is for my master's thesis sort of everything fell into place and I was comfortable with it. So I didn't feel any sort of .. and I was willing to take advice and guidance because I wanted that, I wasn't sure what I was doing, I wanted to get it done and I wanted to get it done properly, and it went very well, and I was happy with it so .. I can remember just little things sort of like writing style that sort of thing, you know those sort of little things where .. it happens in any course like that I found. There are some things .. you know I wrote a paper for a course which I thought was really good .. the professor made some minor changes and it was 100 times better from minor changes but some things I don't agree with and I don't do. And what would happen is that we would have this exchange and it's like ok fine just leave it then. You really don't want to do that because it has to be your work in the end and so .. and then as far as anything else like .. I've heard not necessarily in social psychology but people have these things when it comes to publishing or getting the data out or doing this or that and all I really, I, I .. I did a poster presentation and that was .. you know there wasn't anything that I can remember that was .. that stands out in my mind.

B: Nothing stands out.

E: No not really. It was a collaboration and it was quite smooth and if there were any little things .. I felt like I got what I needed with that .. Does that make sense?

B: Yes.

E: And I .. I wanted the guidance so I didn't want to say or I couldn't at that time say, you know .. I want to do this or I am doing this or whatever because I just .. I don't know I just .. didn't or couldn't.

B: Did you think .. well at that point was that not even a question?

E: I was always told that .. any .. if I wanted to work with an advisor that my topic area and my questions and my method would have to fall somewhere in the general .. parameters of what that professor knows about and is willing to do .. and it was .. sort of explained as being a benefit to both people because as a student, if you pick a topic that, or methodology that's outside of the advisor's area, you're not going to get help because they can't provide it to you. Do you know what I mean?

B: Well yeah I've heard that.

E: So that's .. But I never .. I didn't really want to do that anyways so I didn't feel it was a problem, there was no .. you know what I mean?

B: You were happy ..

E: Yeah

B: You can say you were happy with that. Do you think that .. I am just curious what people think on this .. Do you think that .. I mean I think in a way it makes sense but .. Do you think that .. student's research should always be within .. within the area of the professors I guess?

E: Well, I guess it depends on what the student is willing to accept as far as help goes. Like any agreeable relationship seems fine to me.

B: Ok

E: Do you know what I mean?

B: Yeah

E: And I think that if an advisor is willing to say ok I'll help you as much as I can. And I think people can have input more than they say they can. If you have someone on your committee who's not really in the area and they are kind of like "I don't know about this" they can still help you out in some ways.

B: Yeah

E: Probably more that they think they can .. You know what I mean?

B: (inaudible)

E: Right. I think so. And so if you have a problem with it, it's almost, I don't know if it's worth it to do it then. You might have to seek out someone else is what I am saying. Do you know what I mean? I don't see anything wrong with it but if you can't get that going .. you have to have agreement on both parts .. And I've always sort of thought that student/advisor relationships .. there has to be some congruence between expectations like .. you know, if an advisor wants a student to be done at a certain amount of time or wants them to take these courses no matter what or whatever and the student disagrees sometimes you can work it out and sometimes the advisor will say, "No, this is the way it's going to be" And so .. there has to be some sort of agreement established, you know a relationship you can work these things out hopefully. I've heard of a lot of people changing advisors in lots of areas and for various reasons. But sometimes if you can't get that working thing going where .. you know .. and it's not necessarily over research or what area or whatever but that could be part of it. You know that would be one thing that you would sort of have to be able to negotiate on or whatever .. you know what I mean? So however, whatever relationship is satisfactory for both is .. good. But if I said that no I don't think it has to be and then a student .. but if your advisor's not going to help a student that would be .. because you not only need help but you need support when it comes to.. to ..

B: Well yeah especially from your advisor cause you may have to contend with committee members..

E: Right

B: Need an advisor who will be on side for whatever you do.

E: Right, yeah .. however you want to say it .. it has to be worked out in advance .. that's what, if anyone ever asked me for advice about like going to school and having an advisor or whatever, that's always my advice is try to get things worked out in advance then at least you know what you are in for and if an advisor, or professor, or whomever they are has a particular plan for anything for you, just as long as you know in advance, you can deal with it. You can either reject it or modify it or find someone else or whatever. Just as long as you .. You know? It's not that easy usually because graduate school is so competitive and you get in when you can and all of that kind of stuff and it's a compromise..

B: Reflecting on educational practice at a broader level, we've kind of looked at your interests and a bit of your reflections on the relationships but I don't know how to exactly ask the question .. I don't think I ever get it quite right but .. looking at the program .. what is the program .. what is the objective of the

program? Think of the objective to be trained as a social psychologist.

E: The social psychology program?

B: Does that make sense to you? What are they trying to do .. or what do they want ..

E: I think what they are trying to do is they are trying to produce in .. university .. academics as far as research. I think the focus is on research .. obviously. And they are trying to develop research skills such that a person from .. graduating from here should be able to go out and compete with people graduating from all the other academic programs .. and that's not to say that. I think .. I think that social professors .. most of them .. in fact I think all of them .. like teaching and like to do that and think that's important with communication and all of that kind of stuff in their own individual niche and that sort of thing. But I think the objective of the program is to get .. people trained as academics.

B: Academics.

E: Yeah..

B: When you say research ..

E: There's no .. as far as I know there's not a lot of applied focus .. whether or not you know you can see little bits of it here and there .. but I think to be competitive on the whole. it's not it's not just being competitive at this university but being competitive across the board. You know which journals you want to have on your c.v. and that sort of thing and you know what kind of research to get in those journals and so that's to compete with everyone else too it's not just ..

B: So that would be like .. looking at the program from the point of view like .. actually I like the way you put it. Let's see if I can reflect and you can correct it. Ok so the program is aimed at .. well. not any specific students but what we want our students to come out of here with. so that they can compete so that they can become academics and then you would say research ..

E: I guess the objective if you asked any person would be not just to train people to get a job but to do good research too. to .. I am taking the point of view of you know what the program may be about .. but .. to do research that is new and novel and expands on .. you know what I mean?

B The research that is out there.

E: Yeah. yeah. that sort of thing. In experimental.

B: In experimental.

E: Yeah. to have students who are good researchers. have good research skills .. preferably to be able to communicate those as well to other colleagues and students if that is in the form of teaching or whatever but .. I guess I am saying skills good enough to match everywhere else .. and that means producing good research. moving forward or whatever. Does that make sense?

B: Yeah that makes sense

E: And no particular area .. like topic.

B: Right. right just the ..

E: Yeah

B: Basic approach or what?

E: I guess so. I don't know. I mean each, that's a hard question to answer because each advisor or each professor has their own topic areas of interest .. and so I think students have to some way or another fit in with those. But I don't think that they've, you know anyone has picked a topic and said I want to do this because it's topical and good, there is some sort of interest there. There is some sort of, people have been led .. you know led down the route they are on now, or whatever. And it's interesting to them. So it's not, it's not like .. anyone has a particular topic or there's not a lot of really applied stuff. Like I am thinking about something that would come out of an applied program you know, where you might actually go work outside the university. And a lot of things I think can be applied, so I mean theoretical things and experimental studies can have an applied focus or aspect or whatever but I am talking about the really applied where people might go and work in a .. like something closer to maybe industrial, organizational or those types of things.

B: One of my loaded questions. Do you .. do you think the program, do you look at the program as constraining students? Or .. ok it is an experimental emphasis. How do you understand that in terms of .. well student that may not want to do experimental research. Do you see the program as .. constraining research, the student's research practices or behaviour?

E: Well .. I haven't really .. tried to do anything else so I haven't had this experience myself. So .. I would think obviously it would because there's no .. there are no .. there is no .. support that way in terms of courses or research groups or anything like that within social psychology. So there is sort of nothing within the program itself .. I don't know what else there would be .. I guess courses. And then beyond that it would have to be people who would be either doing that or willing to do something other than .. because everyone is pretty experimental right .. or whatever. Pretty close to that so yeah, I guess, yeah. It is one of those questions that I, I haven't really .. any sort of difficulties that I've had, that I've created for myself or whatever has not be a result. I don't think of constraints of the program but my research has always be in completely. So I haven't had that experience.

B: Right.

E: It's much like asking a woman, how do you feel about discrimination and you can't .. you say yeah, it is a horrible thing but I actually personally have not been discriminated against. So what do you say, there is no discrimination? Or do you say that is terrible when it happens, do you know what I mean?

B: Oh, absolutely I ..

E: So that's what ..

B: I think .. my reflecting on myself, this whole idea of constraint and power relations is all that evident to me because I've chosen to bang my head against a wall.

E: Well that's the thing and like I said .. the part, parts of social, I mean things .. we have now fifty years of research since the classic studies. And we're still doing the same, some of the same studies right. But those are the studies that really grabbed my attention. Now there is no point in doing them again right. We've had people doing them for years and years and years and we're fairly clear on some of these things. Or there is no where, you know what I mean? And so those are the sorts of things that grab my attention and they were experimental studies. They were things that had volunteer subjects come in some of them were questionnaires, some of them were a little bit more interesting than that. I mean we're obviously more limited now. We can't do those really fascinating things like shock the heck out of people

(laughing) or whatever you know. But those, all those really interesting things were all the experimental things that I was interested in. I was not exposed to a lot more. And it is partly a matter of choice because to be exposed to a lot of things, you have to do a lot of things but there is not a lot of exposure within the area of social psychology, for example.

B: Exposure?

E: Well, I don't know, to alternative methods to different ... I think for example, given what I know about sociology ... they're a little bit more broad, they always, in sociological social psychology, they'll keep track of what the psychological social psychologists are doing. And they may not do the same thing or whatever but they'll keep track of it, do you know what I mean? Even though their methods, some of their methods are exactly the same and they have their own research methods courses and I bet their students would complain about them if you asked them.

B: Heh, yeah, yeah, no doubt.

E: But you know what I mean? But it seems they'll keep track of different things and they'll talk about it and they'll be interested in doing some sort of comparison or whatever and they maybe still go on about their own business. Whereas, there is not, I don't think there is as much in psychological social psychology from what I know. I mean I have the limited perspective of the courses I've taken with the people at the particular time that their teaching them and who knows what's going on with them at that time and all that. And the courses I've chosen to take.

B: Personal question, just of your own opinions. Do you think, experimental research is the way to go quote unquote? in social psychology or do you think other methods ... what do you think about that? And you know, you can tie it into practical concerns too. I'm just curious.

E: Well I guess ... I see room for both and I think that the people who want to be doing each should be doing each to the best of their ability and getting the most out of it whether it is applied or expanding theory or whatever the case may be. And they should be able to co-exist perhaps ... ideally, you know what I mean. If you are doing an experimental study, I don't see any reason ... it's hard to come across non-experimental studies, almost, right but there is no reason why they can't ...

B: Within the discipline anyway ...

E: Right. Why they shouldn't be able to ... come together in terms of not necessarily one person doing both unless they want to. It depends, people, whoever is doing whatever they're doing, they have to be well trained. Like I don't know, you're doing some sort of discourse analysis? Or you have?

B: Yeah, yeah.

E: Like I could not do that because I don't know how so I shouldn't be doing it right? But if a person can do that and do experiments fine. If one person is doing you know, something in a particular way and then it's out there for other people to take information from. I don't think one should. I think people favour, obviously.

B: You mean students?

E: No. Everyone in the discipline.

B: Ok.

E: I mean obviously everyone has their preferred methodology that they use and that sort of thing but I don't .. there is an obvious .. there is such an obvious separation or demarcation or whatever and they don't come together. Am I right?

B: You're talking what?

E: Research. like let's say someone is producing a lot of research using different kinds of methods and someone's producing a lot of experimental research on similar topics .. they don't seem to .. you know what I mean?

B: No. I don't think so not in the literature.

E: No. not that I've found anyway. There is not a lot of them referencing one another and that sort of thing. And I don't know, given what I know, I don't know why the findings in one kind of study and the other can't be brought together and, you know what I mean?

B: Do you think that might have something to do with .. this is the only word I can think of, policing. How .. what gets published and who is deciding what gets published and who is deciding .. what to write before you even get to the point of trying to publish?

E: Well .. I think that .. I don't know about that. I don't know that it is an active effort but it is obviously happening. I mean the .. the big name journals and stuff like that are very serious complicated five experiment studies you know that .. and that sort of thing. I think the thing is the competition. The great volumes of literature is what I. you know if you look up anything on psych-lit or whatever you get .. thousands of responses and there from .. there are various kinds. It depends what you are looking for you have to weed through stuff because you could write a paper with ten million references really, you know and so. I don't know. I don't know that it's .. I think it's the way the discipline has just sort of evolved. Are you saying that there is someone going around stamping out ..

B: .. well .. sure. I guess in a way I am saying that. I'm saying .. just from things I've read like you know .. there are .. committees that accept work and that is based on conventions about what is good scholarship and what is poor scholarship and that comes out of a history like you just said. So .. I just wondered if you had any reflection on the institution and what you have to do .. to make it.

E: So you are talking more about right here at the university. I was talking about more or less overall.

B: Yeah. I was talking about overall.

E: Yeah ok cause to be honest. I don't have that many, or I don't have enough knowledge about meta-discipline stuff to feel like I could really comment. do you know what I mean? Like how editors of journals get picked and why .. certain ones have gone in the direction they have and that sort of thing. do you know what I mean?

B: Sure.

E: Because I really don't know. I don't know a lot about the politics, which is why .. you know not that anxious (laughs) to get involved in it all. Because I think you have to be aware of what is going on and that way you can form a better opinion you know what I mean and I have sort of not done that.

B: So ...

E: And I don't see it going on in our program .. and I knew that from the start.

B: You don't see what going on?

E: Any sort .. well any .. its pretty fixed about what everybody is doing, you know what I mean. And it is somewhat similar and it's experimental and there is not a lot of other .. I don't think. I think like maybe .. well I could be wrong. I don't know much about clinical but there is a lot more of them I guess. You just get greater diversity because there is so many more.

B: Ok. Well do you have any questions?

E: I think though that the competition for everything, for entering grad school, for getting scholarships and fellowships and all that stuff. Getting published is quite difficult as far as I understand. Do you know what I mean?

B: Well yeah.

E: And those are the things you need. It depends what you wanna, you know if you want to go out and get a good academic job, you need those things. You need all of those things.

B: Yeah, ok.

E: And so, you know I think though that a lot of people that enter social psychology .. like experimental and want to do that. Do you know what I mean?

B: Yeah, that is probably true.

E: That is .. a lot of the elements of that will quite easily, if you know, work hard and do all of that kind of stuff will easily lead you to success right? In getting those things and if you want to go get an academic position you'll have all this stuff on your c.v. that is what people want to see.

B: Did you or do you .. want to become an academic? You're working on your Ph.D. right now right?

E: .. I'm sort of unsure. I don't think so. I don't think so. For many reasons. Not just to do .. actually not a lot of them have to do with the actual program in itself. I think that, you know, if I work hard to get those publications, I don't think it is easy to do those things. I think it takes a lot of work. And if I do those sorts of things, I can do it but I don't think I want to and that is for a lot of different reasons. But I don't think the program, anything to do with the program has really stopped me from doing that. Do you know what I mean? But that is more like, that is sort of the standard way to go right? What people do because what else can you do with a Ph.D. in social psychology, for example. Like what else can you do?

B: Yeah, or you can say .. what else can you do with an M.A. except get your Ph.D. (laughs).

E: Right. Well it's true so I mean that's why I hesitate to say, you know, you say do you want to do this and then I sort of hesitate cause that is like saying .. what else are you going to do right?

B: But I just wondered also like was that the ..

E: I would like it if anything it were more applied. And I think there is room for it but I think, you know, also economic conditions, you know lots of people would probably love to have social psychologists around doing all kinds of different things but everyone has limited money and you have to hire people to get the main bulk of the work done.

B: Sure. I was just wondering .. you talked about the importance .. if you want to make it as an academic,

there are certain important things. Your c.v. and publishings blah, blah .. was there some point where this was the way you were thinking? I mean I was asking if you wanted to become an academic, were you like well aware? Cause like I wasn't. I never have been.

E: You were not aware of what you had to do ..

B: No. Well I never even thought of it that way. I thought about studying what I wanted to do, study ok. But when I talk to other people, you know, you sort of become aware of how people, how like some are very focused.

E: Yes.

B: This is an academic career. This is what I have to do to get it.

E: Yes. These are the seven steps or whatever yeah. No. I was a little bit more naive. But I was willing to .. I mean I don't regret any of my academic studies and I was willing all along to say, I like this I think it is interesting. I think a lot of it is important and that's fine. And then I go out and get a job in something that is not that related that's ok with me. So I was willing to say that all along. But I did know, but not until later .. not til .. probably after Master's.

B: Yeah that sounds about right. That's where you start becoming aware.

E: Yeah, they come about slowly. And I certainly wasn't aware of all the .. you know .. sort of the politics within the discipline and department and all of that stuff. But that comes with time and exposure sort of thing. But you are right I think some people are more well aware of that to begin with. They're not just out there kind of doing there work and seeing what they can learn and .. you know being interested in it and that sort of thing. I mean I think those people are as well but they are also doing all those other things that it is going to take. And I think if you are really motivated to work in a university or whatever, you do have to work pretty hard. You know what I mean? There is no question about that. And the faster you get through, the better you know. I don't know. Does that answer your question?

B: Do you have any questions? Do you have any criticisms of my questions?

E: Umm..

B: Or anything I didn't ask that you think I should have asked?

E: Well .. I guess I would just wonder about. Your questions were more about the constraints of the program.

B: Yeah, basically I am trying to construct a story about how the whole program, it is not just the program. The program is like an example right? Of how the practices function to regulate, to guide, to channel not in any evil way but in a warm and friendly way to direct the students toward experimental research. So I thought I would talk to a few people and get their individual reflections not to support what I think but just to get their reflections.

E: Did .. well I suppose I could read about your thesis anyway so did anyone else suggest that they saw .. like what did they see as. I'm curious .. what they saw as constraining in the program.

B: Well .. people talked about their student advisor relationships in different ways .. I could put it that way. Like .. I mean .. power is a general term and some would talk about power, having power in this relationship, not having power in this relationship and finding in this student-professor relationship there

was more of a power struggle. Or finding that they .. or being aware that they had certain research topics that they wouldn't even .. try to introduce ..

E: Ok.

B: .. because they wouldn't be accepted but to keep them on the back burner for future or something like that. And .. but like .. everyone was .. like wasn't railing against the experimental method like the way I am.

E: Yeah.

B: But that doesn't matter. I didn't expect that anyway.

E: Yeah. Well I think like I said to know .. your not. I guess the thing is your not that exposed to anything in the program. So to know about it you have to find out about a lot of things .. elsewhere.

B: Yeah.

E: I mean you kind of get a brief introduction to it but all this stuff you really read about. is experimental so then you. you know that is what you know and that is what you ..

B: I think what got me going .. probably. this is probably not accurate but I think it was when I started to read about the crisis literature ..

E: Uhum

B: .. and then I read a bit more into that. I realized one aspect of it was criticisms of the experimental method and then I realized well besides. being given Gergen's 1973 article. that was my only exposure to any sort of critique of our methods. That sort of led me on .. a journey.

E: Yeah. Well .. I guess ideally experimental methods would be better than they are but there are practical .. constraints on them too. Do you know what I mean? I think that is what. that would be my comment on ..

B: What do you mean?

E: I mean I like .. I think experiment .. I think experimentation is good I mean but when you actually have to go out and do it. you run into practical problems. Are you going to go out and get a truly random sample from the city. How are you going to get people. you know. are you going to pay people? Does that change .. you know what I mean? It's so difficult and so then you get .. in every institution I think you get you ways of sort of getting around those things. I mean it comes down to things like having to photocopy your questionnaires and stuff like that ..

B: Heh ..

E: .. I mean these are little burdens .. that you have to get around. And not just us but the professors and stuff too. Do you know what I mean? Like they all have to come up with this sort of thing too. you know. and if you don't want to do the stuff yourself. you'll have to find someone else who is going to do the running of experiments and all that kind of stuff which is very time consuming. And that sort of thing so I mean .. ideally you would want to do things in a different way but practically speaking you have to make do with what ..

B: Well true but you could say that about qualitative research as well.

E: Well I suppose that is true.

B: I mean analyzing a bunch of interviews or a bunch of text can take forever to do too. Some might argue that it is a lot easier to run an experiment. A lot of running around but once you got all the numbers together.

E: Yeah. And there are certain rules for it that you can easily follow. Do you know what I mean? So I .. my exposure has been much more limited though so that's what. I think I've commented .. given what I know.

B: Given what you know ..

E: About .. various methodologies. about the overall discipline in North America and that sort of thing. I have limited knowledge of it. So that's why. you know what I mean. I can comment on my own.

B: Yeah. well good. Ok. Questions?

E: I don't think so.

B: Thank you.

E: Ok.

END.

Appendix F

Tables of Content: Assigned Texts for the Required Course(s) of the
Masters' Program at the University of Manitoba

1. Introduction
2. Sets and Functions
3. Elementary Probability Theory
4. Frequency and Probability Distributions
5. Joint Events and Independence
6. A Theoretical Distribution: The Binomial
7. Central Tendency and Variability
8. Sampling Distributions and Point Estimation
9. Normal Population and Sampling Distributions
10. Hypothesis Testing and Interval Estimation
11. Inferences about Populations Means
12. The Chi-Square and the F Distributions
13. The Analysis of Variance: Model 1. Fixed Effects
14. The Analysis of Variance: Models 2 and 3. Random Effects and Mixed Models
15. Individual Comparisons Among Means
16. Problems in Linear Regression and Correlation
17. Other Topics in Regression and Correlation
18. Comparing Entire Distributions: Chi-Square Tests
19. Some Order Statistics

Figure E1. Chapter titles of Hay's (1963) *Statistics for Psychologists*. This was the required text for 17:770 "Problems of Psychological Research," the required graduate course in the 1960s. It was assigned in the 1966 academic year as well as in the 1970s.

1. Planning the Experiment
2. Statistical Inference
3. Notation
4. Completely Randomized One-Factor Designs
5. Completely Randomized Multi-Factor Designs
6. Designs Using a Concomitant Variable
7. Repeated Measurement Designs
8. Mixed Designs: Between- and Within-Subjects Variability
9. Hierarchical Designs
10. Latin Square Designs
11. Expected Mean Squares
12. Analysis of Covariance
13. Further Data Analyses: Qualitative Independent Variables
14. Further Data Analyses: Quantitative Independent Variables

Figure E2. Chapter titles of Myers (1966), *Fundamentals of Experimental Design*. This was one of two required texts assigned in the 1968 academic year (give or take a year).

Part 1. Guideposts for Evaluation

1. The Scientific Importance of Experimental Data
2. The Reliability and Generality of Data

Part 2. Replication

3. Direct Replication
4. Systematic Replication


Part 3. Variability

5. Intrinsic vs. Imposed Variability
6. Variability as a Scientific and as an Engineering Problem

Part 4. Experimental Design


7. Pilot Studies
8. Steady States
9. Steady States (continued)
10. Transition States
11. Selection of an Appropriate Baseline
12. Control Techniques
13. Control Techniques (continued)

Figure E3. Chapter titles of Sidman's (1960), *Tactics of Scientific Research: Evaluating Experimental Data in Psychology*. This was one of two required texts assigned in the 1968 academic year (give or take a year).



Introduction
Elementary Probability Theory
Frequency and Probability Distributions
A Discrete Random Variable: The Binomial
Central Tendency and Variability
Sampling Distributions and Point Estimation
Normal Population and Sampling Distributions
Hypothesis Testing
Inferences about Population Means
The Chi-Square and F Distributions
The General Linear Model and Analysis of Variance
The Analysis of Variance: Models II and III. Random Effects and Mixed Models
Comparisons Among Means
Problems in Correlation and Regression
Further Topics in Correlation and Regression
Analyzing Qualitative Data: Chi-Square Tests
Some Order Methods

Figure E4. Chapter titles of Hays (1981) *Statistics*. This was the required text for 17.776 “Problems in Psychological Research” for the 1986/87 academic year.



Simple Linear Regression
The Least Squares Regression Equation
The Matrix Approach
The Use of Computer Programs in Simple Regression
The Use and Interpretation of the Regression Equation
Measuring Error in Estimation
Inferences Concerning the Regression Coefficients
Correlation
Appropriateness of the Model
Exponential and Polynomial Models
Multiple Regression
Correlation in Multiple Regression
Tests of Significance in Multiple Regression
Dummy Variables
Some Variable-Selection Procedures
Analysis of Residuals in Multiple Regression

Figure E5. Chapter titles from Younger's (1985) *A First Course in Linear Regression*. This was the required text for the 1986/87 and 1992/93 academic years.

1. Introduction
2. Organizing and Graphing Data
3. Describing Distributions: Measures of Central Tendency and Variation
4. Percentiles and Standard Scores
5. The Normal Distribution
6. Correlation: A Measure of Relationship
7. Linear Regression: Prediction
8. Probability, Sampling, and Sampling Distributions
9. Hypothesis Testing: One-Sample Case for the Mean
10. Estimation: One-Sample Case for the Mean
11. Hypothesis Testing: One-Sample Case for Other Statistics
12. Hypothesis Testing: Two-Sample Case for the Mean
13. Hypothesis Testing: Two-Sample Case for Other Statistics
14. Determining Power and Sample Size
15. Hypothesis Testing, K-Sample Case, and Analysis of Variance, One-Way Classification
16. Multiple Comparison Procedures
17. Analysis of Variance, Two-Way Classification
18. Linear Regression: Estimation and Hypothesis Testing
19. Multiple Linear Regression
20. Analysis of Covariance
21. Other Coefficients of Correlation
22. Selected Nonparametric Tests

Figure E4. Chapter titles of Hinkle, Wiersma and Jurs' (1988), *Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences*. This was the required texts for 17.776, "Problems of Psychological Research," for the 1992 academic year.

Endnotes

1. I will briefly distinguish between psychological social psychology and two other major definitions or approaches: (a) symbolic interactionism, and (b) psychological *sociology*: “*Psychological social psychology* refers to the mainstream of social psychology within the discipline of psychology, which has increasingly focused on psychological processes in relation to social stimuli, using laboratory experiments, and which is embodied institutionally, for example, in the American Psychological Association’s Division 8 and *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. *Symbolic interactionism*, often considered the sociological variant of social psychology, is characterized by the study of face-to-face social interaction via naturalistic observation. *Psychological sociology* refers to another sociological variant of social psychology which relates macro social phenomena (e.g., organizations, societies, and aspects of social structures and processes thereof) to individuals’ psychological attributes and behavior, usually using quantitative but nonexperimental (often survey) methods,” (House, 1977, p. 161).
2. I intend to use the term “experimental” throughout to denote a quantitative approach to social analysis in the form of the measurement of operationally defined variable relations as informed by an objectivist epistemology. Consequently, “experimental” is intended to include research designs of an experimental, quasi-experimental and correlational nature.
3. It would be chronologically more accurate to discuss my good fortune in having Dr. J-L Magnusson lecture for two classes of a team taught social psychology seminar course some years back now. Dr. Magnusson had us read a chapter from Parker’s book, “Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology,” (1992). What has always remained with me since that time was a comment Parker make in the introduction to the first part of the book: “I cannot pretend that a focus on institutions, power and ideology is not a moral/political matter (and perhaps it is only that), and the following chapters in this book rest on the assumption that amoral/apolitical psychology is worse than useless,” (p. 1).
4. My focus on educational practices in social psychology necessarily also involves focusing on those of psychology in general. There is a set of required courses that any student of psychology must take that in the main pertain to research methodology and statistical analysis. Consequently I will often refer to the methodological practices and prescriptions of psychology because they are the exact same methodological practices and prescriptions of social psychology.
5. Prilleltensky earned his Ph.D. at the University of Manitoba with a dissertation entitled, “Psychology and the Status Quo.” Its importance consequently lies not only in its critique of theoretical and research practices in psychology but also in its relative uniqueness as being one of the few non-experimental knowledge products to come out of the department.

6. My focus has been on relating the development of experimental research on aggregates of individuals largely as this has been detailed in Danziger (1990). Danziger's account is based on tracing the development of particular research practices as they are evidenced in particular key journals of this period (e.g., *Journal of Experimental Psychology* and *American Journal of Psychology*). What is clearly not focused on in this account is the specific research practices of behaviourism with its focus on individual psychophysical systems. My purpose in examining the growth of experimental research with groups is intended to provide the necessary background for understanding how social psychology came to take on the particular research practices it did. As we will see, psychological social psychology, also adopted the behaviourist perspective in its early years but by the late 40s it was beginning to adopt the methods of analysis upon which I have focused.

7. Apfelbaum (1992) comments about the difficulty of talking historically about "social psychology" given its subject matter has been problematic and divided from the beginning. That is "social psychology" has been multiply defined and has grown off in various different directions often with little communication between the different perspectives. To avoid such problems Apfelbaum suggests we "analyze the history of the emergence of a discourse about 'the social', and of the constitution of such a discourse as a scientific object; we might then see how social psychology as an institutionalized discipline fits into this project," (p. 535).

8. Plus, of course, both Hilgard (1987) and Farr (1996) mention the book with Farr claiming it an important symbol of the break psychological social psychology was on the verge of making with anything less than an experimental approach to social relations.

9. Billig (1990) provides an interesting analysis related to this "peculiarity" focusing on how research in support of a principle leads to research in support of the opposite principle. As he puts it, "A seemingly simple psychological principle occasions a burst of research activity, which then in its turn produces the discovery of the reverse principle. Research on the reinforcing qualities of rewards has been countered by research on intrinsic justification, in which rewards lessen the chance of behavior being repeated; research about attitudes giving rise to behaviour has been followed by studies showing the reverse process, as behaviour is shown to produce attitudes; studies revealing people to avoid inconsistent information are followed by those in which people seek out such information; studies showing people having a propensity to explain events in terms of personal, rather than situational, qualities are then countered by studies revealing an opposing propensity. In each case a simple theory, or psychological principle, is confronted by the opposite theory, or principle. And, in each case, both principles have their respective empirical justifications and, rhetorically speaking, are quite reasonable," (p. 58).

10. To use a Euro-centric symbol for the highest of attainments.

11. Of course, if one follows through on the logic of the thesis it would appear clear that psychological inquiry has in no small measure contributed to the formation of the general convictions and values of the public.

12. I want to note that I do realize the educational apparatus is immensely more complicated than I have characterized it. I understand that I am barely scratching the surface of the institutional dynamics and relations of power that operate in the domain of academic and scientific knowledge production.

13. This analysis, as the title of the article indicates is Foucauldian in nature.

14. Just try applying for the position of social psychologist at the U of M with a curriculum vitae full of feminist and interpretive approaches to social inquiry. Go ahead. I dare you!

15. Altheide and Johnson (1987) claim that four criteria for the general evaluation of ethnographic quality are, "plausibility, credibility, relevance, and importance of topic," (p. 490).

16. In addition I obtained information from the Dafoe Library Archives regarding some of the textbooks assigned that were not provided in the general calendar (year 1976).

17. The early calendars suggest that an undergraduate student took a five year program. In second year the psychology student took the introductory course, in third year the Advanced General Psychology course. I have adjusted this for the purposes of the table so that year two indicates the second year where the honours student studied psychology.

18. "'Textbook' is intended here to refer to those fairly weighty volumes which are often used to introduce social psychology to students. Well-known examples are those by Kretch and Crutchfield, Brown, Secord and Backman, Hollander, Wrightsman and so on," (Stringer, 1990, p. 17).

19. I had completely forgotten about this article until I was reviewing my notes. Farr (1996) has since published a book entitled *The Roots of Modern Social Psychology* that was very helpful in building my historical analysis. It covers the period from 1872 to 1954. Farr designates this as pre-modern and dates the first experimental Handbook of Social Psychology (in 1954) as the beginning of the modern era in social psychological practice.

20. I will include here the titles of the theses and dissertations omitted because the titles clearly indicate the non-social character (even by social psychology's standards) of the research: 1. "Perception of figure orientation and delayed recognition memory in nonambulatory profoundly mentally retarded children," 2. "Detection of malingered mental illness with a forensic population: An analogue study," 3. "Implicit learning of first and second order transition probabilities," 4. "Type A behavior, physiological reactivity and hostility: A comparison of three approaches to assessment of Type A behavior," 5.

“Development of an adult attachment scale,” 6. “Revision of the adult attachment scale,” 7. “Self esteem and academic achievement across generations,” 8. “Inflated contingency in non-depressed person: Error in judgment or error in method?,” 9. “Difference or make a difference: A comparison of actual control metrics.”

21. Double checking half myself was done to avoid “cruel and unusual infliction of pain” on the colleague kind enough to help me with this less than exciting research activity.