

Power and Violence: Disposability in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By

Calum Dean

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Abstract

Since 1967, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have plagued the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and caused human rights and humanitarian issues for Palestinians. Despite calls from the international community to halt settlement development, Israel resists and continues to expand and populate settlements, threatening to annex them as Israeli state territory. This exploratory research into the issue of Israeli settlements brings to the forefront issues related to power, structural violence, and death, and explicates the concept of disposability within PACS. Disposability infers a relation between sovereign power and the ability to use or dispose of certain populations at ones' discretion, reducing life to a state of essential nonbeing. By explicating disposability within PACS, the operations of power relations as well as power's connection with violence and death within conflict can be further explored. This research is concerned with bringing to light these processes within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in particular the issue of Israeli settlements.

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Dedication

To my parents Janet and David, without whom this would be entirely impossible, and who I owe my life, success, and joy.

Table of Contents

Abstract	I
Acknowledgments	II
Dedication	III
Table of Contents	IV
Introduction	1
<i>Introduction</i>	1
<i>Disposability</i>	3
<i>Case Study: Settlements in the West Bank</i>	4
<i>Chapter Outlines</i>	5
<i>Conclusion</i>	6
Chapter Two – Context: The Israeli/Palestinian Conflict, Israeli Settlements, and the Role of the UN and the US	8
<i>Introduction</i>	8
1.1 <i>The Israeli/Palestinian Conflict</i>	9
1.2 <i>Israeli Settlements in the West Bank</i>	14
1.3 <i>The United Nations: The Mandate, Partition Plan, Israeli Independence, and the Legality of Settlements</i>	17
1.4 <i>The United States – Financial and Military Assistance, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Israel Lobby</i>	22
<i>Conclusions</i>	27
Chapter Two – Literature Review	28
<i>Introduction</i>	28
2.1 <i>Liberal Peacebuilding</i>	29
2.2 <i>Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding</i>	31
Critical Theory	31
Local Ownership	32
2.3 <i>Power</i>	33
2.4 <i>Disposability</i>	35
<i>Conclusions</i>	36
Chapter Three – Methodology and Methods	37
<i>Introduction</i>	37
3.1 <i>Case Studies as a Methodology</i>	38
3.2 <i>Levels of Analysis</i>	41
3.3 <i>Understanding State Action</i>	43
3.4 <i>Typologies of Structural Violence and Precariousness</i>	45

<i>3.5 Indigenous and Decolonizing Methodology</i>	47
<i>3.6 Data Collection</i>	49
<i>3.7 Limitations</i>	50
<i>Conclusions</i>	51
Chapter Four – A Theory of Disposability: Power and Conflict	52
<i>Introduction</i>	52
<i>4.1 Theoretical Framework of Disposability</i>	52
<i>4.2 Necropolitics</i>	55
<i>4.3 Structural Violence</i>	56
<i>4.4 Precariousness and Grievability</i>	57
<i>4.5 Power</i>	59
<i>Conclusions</i>	60
Chapter Five – Necropolitics: The Politics of Death in Israel/Palestine	61
<i>Introduction</i>	61
<i>5.1 Level 1 - International</i>	62
Israeli Defiance Over Settlements	63
Promoting the Israeli Narrative Internationally	66
Conclusion	71
<i>5.2 Level 2 - National/State</i>	72
Land Appropriation and Ownership in the West Bank	73
Planning Israeli Settlement	79
Settlements and Israeli Political Leadership	83
Conclusion	89
<i>5.3 Level 3 - Local</i>	90
Israeli Civil Society	91
Palestinian Civil Society	93
Conclusion	95
<i>Conclusion</i>	96
Chapter Six – Structural Violence: Technologies of Death	97
<i>Introduction</i>	97
<i>6.1 Physical</i>	98
Food	99
Water	100
Shelter	102
<i>6.2 Economic</i>	103
Employment	104
Economic Development	105
<i>6.3 Health</i>	106
Access to Healthcare	106
<i>6.4 Security</i>	107

Physical Security	107
Oppression	108
<i>6.5 Political</i>	<i>109</i>
Freedom of Speech and Expression and Freedom of Assembly	109
<i>6.6 Social</i>	<i>110</i>
Curfews	110
Separating Families	111
Education	112
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>113</i>
Chapter Seven – Precariousness and Grievability: The Fragility and Devaluation of the Palestinian Life	115
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>115</i>
<i>7.1 Precariousness</i>	<i>116</i>
Physical - Food	116
Physical - Water	117
Physical - Shelter	118
Economic	119
Health	121
Security	122
Political	124
Social	125
Conclusion	127
<i>7.2 Grievability</i>	<i>128</i>
A Jewish Homeland in Eretz-Israel: The Chosen People	129
Security: Threat of the Palestinian/ the Palestinian Terrorist	131
Conclusion	133
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>134</i>
Chapter Eight – Revisiting Disposability: Power in Violent Conflict	136
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>136</i>
<i>8.1 Disposability</i>	<i>137</i>
<i>8.2 Necropolitics</i>	<i>138</i>
<i>8.3 Structural Violence</i>	<i>141</i>
<i>8.4 Precariousness</i>	<i>142</i>
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>146</i>
Chapter Nine – Conclusion	148
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>148</i>
<i>9.1 Performativity</i>	<i>149</i>
<i>9.2 Resistance</i>	<i>150</i>
<i>9.3 Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding: Power's positive, productive capability</i>	<i>151</i>
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>153</i>
<i>Bibliography</i>	<i>154</i>

Introduction

Introduction

During the 2019 election campaign for the Prime Minister of Israel, incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu's interview with Israel's Channel 12 TV garnered much national and international attention for his statements regarding Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In this interview Netanyahu discusses the next stages of settlement development, promising to maintain existing settlements and move towards the goal of annexing settlements and imposing Israeli sovereignty. He states, "From my perspective, any point of settlement is Israeli, and we have responsibility, as the Israeli government. I will not uproot anyone, and I will not transfer sovereignty to the Palestinians" (PBS, 2019). If Netanyahu is true to this election promise, and his appeasement of the right-wing Israeli lobby may solidify its doing, the two-state solution, or any resemblance of Palestinian sovereignty, would become increasingly difficult. The use of settlements to annex West Bank territory has almost always been to disrupt Palestinian mobilization and governance. Putting an end to the potential of a Palestinian state, through the use of settlements, would effectively enforce Israeli sovereignty over the region East of the separation barrier and West of the Jordan River. The ensuing security and mobilization issues would surely spell an end to any formation of a continuous Palestinian state, if not the whole idea all-together.

This may well be a crisis point for the issue of Israeli settlements, a long-standing hope was that settlers would be forced to relocate, and territory would be relinquished back to Palestinians (O'Malley, 2015). If these settlements become annexed by Israel, the prospects of this possibility become desolate and the effects of these settlements on Palestinian lives would endure. With increased Israeli sovereignty over settlement territory, Palestinians' everyday lives

may even be expected to get worse. Needless to say, the need to analyze Israeli settlements in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the processes and mechanisms behind them, is becoming ominously desperate.

This thesis aims to analyze Israeli settlements through a framework of disposability that investigates the relations between power, violence, and death, as well as Kenneth Waltz's (2001) three levels of analysis, and Graham Allison's three models of state decisionmaking. As Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 27) states "sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not." Disposability, in this sense, is associated with the ability to decide who lives and who dies. This is precisely the matter to which this thesis attends, investigating why some are found worthy of protection, and others deemed disposable and justifiably killable; how settlements serve to protect Israel and its citizens, at the expense of Palestinian lives. It proposes a theory of disposability that hegemonic, unequal power relations lead to forms of structural violence, that worsen the social conditions required to support life, leading to the increased chance of death and devaluation for certain populations. In order to explicate the concept of disposability within conflict, in Chapter Five, Allison's (1999) three models of analyzing state decisionmaking – rational actions, bureaucratic, and organizational behaviour - are used, across Waltz's (2001) three levels of analysis - local, national/state, and international – in order to comprehensively examine Israeli state action and decisions as they pertain to Israeli settlements. This is followed by an analysis of the effects of settlements on Palestinians through Galtung's (1996) structural violence (Chapter 6) using documentation from international humanitarian organizations as well as human rights agencies, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and academic scholarship, and precariousness and grievability (Chapter 7) through looking at quantitative indicators related to

structural violence. Building from the work of Michel Foucault, Achille Mbembe, Johan Galtung, Judith Butler, Kenneth Waltz and, Graham Allison this thesis aims to centralize and operationalize power within Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) discourse.

Disposability

Johan Galtung's (1969) concept of structural violence introduced into peace studies the idea that violent conflict can be characterized by more than just overt violence. Galtung expands on this idea further by discussing cultural violence as an overarching mechanism that is used to rationalize the use of both structural and direct violence - the violence triangle (Galtung, 1996). For Galtung (1969, p. 170), the distinction between direct violence from cultural and structural violence at its core, is the presence of an actor committing a violent act. Whereas direct violence involves an actor committing a violent act upon another, cultural and structural violence is violence that occurs without the presence of an actor (Galtung, 1969, p. 170). Cultural violence however, is related to both direct and indirect violence by legitimizing them, making them acceptable or distorting them so they do not feel like violence (Galtung, 1996). Cultural violence refers to the aspects of a culture, the norms and components of a culture, that normalize structural and direct violence (Galtung, 1996). Galtung's three forms of violence, describe the form of violence this thesis is concerned with: structural violence, emanating from cultural violence, that is violence without a name, face, or body, that permeates through cultural and societal structures and causes death. In particular this thesis examines how structural violence relates to power and who becomes the target of this type of violence (see Byrne & Senehi, 2012).

This thesis looks at the processes of slow death, that is the destruction of life, which occurs over time and becomes an intrinsic part of a person's everyday experience and existence

(Berlant, 2007, p. 754). It is important to distinguish between slow death and indirect forms of violence (cultural and structural violence) from direct forms of violence and death. This is because direct forms of violence, which inevitably lead to more direct forms of death, do not contain the same sets of power relations, which can be found in the processes of cultural and structural violence and slow death. Michel Foucault (in an interview with Michael Bess, 1988) makes the distinction between power and force. Force involves a subject directly acting upon a person, whereas power is an unequal relation between two free subjects, where one free subject is acted upon or allows itself to be acted upon indirectly (Bess, 1988, p. 2). Direct violence then, can be viewed as a form of force, whereas cultural and structural violence is a form of power.

The central proposition of this thesis is that violent conflicts involve power relations, which initiate forms of structural violence that result in the slow death and devaluation of certain groups of people who, through this process, become constructed and re-constructed as disposable. The aim of this research is to analyze these power relations and the processes involved in constructing certain people as disposable within violent conflict. In essence, it looks deeper into Mbembe's (2003, p. 27) statement about sovereignty: "who is disposable and who is not."

Case Study: Settlements in the West Bank

In order to examine the relations between power, violence, and death, this thesis looks at existing data related to a specific case study, Israeli settlements in the West Bank. These settlements are established and developed within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict can be defined as a protracted social conflict according to Edward Azar (1978). It can also be seen as an intractable conflict as described by Peter Coleman (2006). The Israeli-

Palestinian conflict is a suitable case for this research because it is a prolonged conflict. This has given time for the power relations and forms of cultural and structural violence, which are the object of analysis in this research, to be measurable and observable. The particular aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this thesis is concerned with are Israeli settlements in the West Bank. These settlements are controversial, as they are illegal according to international law (United Nations, 2016b). However, existing settlements have continued to expand, and new settlements in the form of outposts are being developed. This research is focused on the effects settlements have on the lives of Palestinians. It examines how Israeli settlements result in structural violence against Palestinians, and explains the relation between power, violence, and death within this particular conflict.

Chapter Outlines

In brief, the following chapters outline the key components of this thesis. Chapter One describes the context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the issue of Israeli settlements, and the role of the United Nations (UN) and United States (US) in influencing Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Chapter Two discusses the pertinent literature related to liberal peacebuilding, critical and emancipatory peacebuilding, power, and disposability. Chapter Three goes over the methods and methodologies used in this thesis. These include an overview of case study methodology, descriptions of Allison's (1999) three frameworks of state decisionmaking and Waltz's (2001) levels of analysis, it continues to define the typologies of structural violence and precariousness, as well as the Indigenous-decolonizing research methods included in the research, limitations of the study, and methods of data collection. Chapter Four provides a detailed description of the concept of disposability through looking at each one of its theoretical

components, necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, it concludes by discussing the role of power within the framework. Chapter Five begins the analysis of the data, starting with the necropolitical aspect of disposability. Its purpose is to connect Israeli state actions and decisionmaking (as the sovereign power in Israel) to settlement development through applying Allison's (1999) three models across Waltz's (2001) international, national/state, and local levels. Chapter Six discusses the forms of structural violence that exist as a result of Israeli settlements. This is explored through six categories where structural violence can be felt and that also affect the precariousness of Palestinians. These six categories are physical, economic, health, security, political, social. Chapter Seven looks at precariousness and grievability. It first, examines precariousness by looking at quantitative data for these six categories, to corroborate and further explore the instances of structural violence identified in Chapter Six, and their effect on the precariousness of Palestinians. Second, it analyzes grievability by describing the forms of devaluation that are embedded within settlement development. Chapter Eight re-visits the theory of disposability and describes how the analysis elucidates disposability as well as its theoretical components. Chapter Nine offers concluding remarks, as well as suggestions for future research and developments to the concept of disposability, PACS, and critical and emancipatory peacebuilding.

Conclusion

This thesis analyzes power relations within conflict to examine the ways in which sovereign power operates to influence who lives and dies. This builds on the work of Michel Foucault (1978) and Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 11) who localize sovereign power in the ability to control death and define life. The aim of this thesis is to look at how certain groups of people

become disposable. In doing so it analyzes how structural violence influences the social conditions of life (precariousness) and whose lives matter (grievability). This line of inquiry leads to certain questions, which frame this research. How can critical and emancipatory Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) theory contribute to the understanding of conflict and, in particular, to understand how power operates within conflicts? Researching these questions leads to a series of sub-questions: what is the relation between power and violence? What determines who becomes the target of this violence? And how does this affect the life chances of those who become the target of this violence?

In relation to the exploratory case study of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, these questions can be reframed as such: how does the implementation and development of Israeli settlements affect the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank? Does there exist a form of violence within the continued development of Israeli settlements? If so, how does power operate within the Israeli-Palestinian relation to facilitate this violence and how does the Palestinian become disposable within this process? By examining these questions in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this research explores the operation of power within conflict and how certain populations become constructed as disposable.

Chapter Two – Context: The Israeli/Palestinian Conflict, Israeli Settlements, and the Role of the UN and the US

Introduction

The following context chapter provides a background on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as well as the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It further describes the involvement of the UN and the US. First, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is described chronologically through the formation of the Israeli state and then through essential features and events. Although not exhaustive, this overview of the conflict provides the background in which the issue of Israeli settlements is situated. Second, Israeli settlements are described in brief, overviewing the initial development of settlements as well as the contemporary context of settlement development. Third this chapter looks at the role of the UN in terms of the Mandate, the Partition Plan, Israeli independence, and the legality of settlements in international law. Fourth, this chapter looks at the role of the US in supporting Israel through economic and military aid, the Jewish diaspora in the US, and the Israeli lobby. The overview of the conflict and the issue of settlements provide the context for analyzing the issue of settlements. Additionally, the essential role of the UN and its predecessor the League of Nations played in shaping and substantiating the state of Israel, as well as its role in shaping the international conversation on the legality of settlements, adds to the understanding of the international context important for analysis with Waltz's (2001) three levels of analysis. The role of the US in supporting Israel helps describe the international context as well as the relationship between Israel and their biggest guarantor, which affects international and Israeli state politics.

1.1 The Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

To give context to the exploratory case study being examined in this research, it is important to develop an understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The formation of both Palestinian and Israeli identity is intrinsically linked with the past. Although both Palestinian and Israeli identities are diverse, the conflict exists predominantly between Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Muslims. Both of these dominant religions view the land as holy and important to their beliefs. In Islam, the Qur'an refers to the land as al-Ard al-Muqaddasah, which means the Holy Land, the cities of Jerusalem (al-Quds) and Hebron (al-Khalil) as sacred cities, and al-Haram al-Sharif or the Noble Sanctuary (also known as Temple Mount within Judaism) is the third holiest site within Islam (Farsoun & Aruri, 2003, p. 2). In Judaism, the land is given to descendants of Abraham (the Jewish people) and Israeli-Jews trace their lineage back to the Kingdoms of Judah and Israel (Chapman, 1983). The Temple Mount also holds significance in that it is the holiest site in the Jewish religion as the place where the First and Second Temples were located and destroyed (Persico, 2017). Further, the divisive narratives of Israelis and Palestinians are irreconcilable, and both are addicted to their own narrative: Israeli's to fear and security, and Palestinian to humiliation and resentment (O'Malley, 2015, p. 62). While the significance of the land, and the contested histories that surround it, play an important role within both Israeli and Palestinian identity construction and the conflict, the remainder of this section focuses on the development of the Israeli state beginning with the rise of Zionism in the late 19th and early 20th century, and a chronological look at important points along the conflict's timeline.

Zionism can be connected to several core values within Judaism. These are Messianism and the gathering of Jewish exiles to return to Zion (Weissbrod, 2013, p. 7). For example, in the Book of Isaiah a passage reads, "He will raise a signal for the nations and will assemble the

banished of Israel, and gather the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth” (Isaiah 11:12). This was a central concept of Zionism, which arose in the late 19th century with the father of the Zionist movement, Theodor Herzl (Shapira, 2012, p. 24). Following the conviction of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French army intelligence officer falsely accused of revealing French military secrets to Germany during the 1870 Franco-Prussian war (Blumberg, 1998, pp. 26-27). Herzl recognized the rising anti-Semitism within Europe and the risk this posed to the Jewish people. The proposed solution was to establish a Jewish state in the territory of Palestine (Shapira, 2012, pp. 24-25; Rodinson, 1973; Black, 2017). The fear that resulted from anti-Semitism and the ensuing need for Israeli security has permeated through Israeli society to this day, and continues to be used to justify the existence of an Israeli state (O'Malley, 2015).

The idea of a Jewish state within Palestine, although conceptualized in the late 19th century, began gaining legitimacy during and after the First World War with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British rule over Palestine. Mark Sykes' role in negotiating British rule over Palestine and the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement by aligning himself with the Zionist movement solidified British control over the territory as well as Jewish settlement in Palestine (Shapira, 2012, p. 69; Anderson, 2013). The 1917 Balfour Declaration represented British intentions of supporting and facilitating the migration of Jewish people to Palestine and establishing a Jewish state (although another similar letter was sent to Palestinians) (Black, 2017). In 1919 the League of Nations recognized the British Mandate for Palestine and the terms of the Balfour Declaration were incorporated into the Treaty of San Remo in 1920 (Blumberg, 1998, p. 42; League of Nations, 1922). By this time Jewish immigration to Palestine (known as Aliyas) had already begun, and The Third, Fourth and Fifth Aliya from 1919 to 1936 heavily increased the Jewish population within Palestine (Shapira, 2012, p. 99; Black, 2017).

In response to the growing Zionist movement and increased Jewish migration into Palestine, the Arabs in Palestine revolted. The Arab Revolt from 1936-39 was marked by violence both by the Palestinians against the British and Jewish populations and the British and Jewish populations against the Palestinians (Milton-Edwards, 2008; Black, 2017). The process of resettling Jewish people in Palestine is seen and understood differently by both sides. For example, there are those who see it as a form of colonialism and others who see it as a return to the homeland (Masalha, 2012; Adelman, 2008; Coman, 2018; Rodinson, 1973; Anderson, 2013). Overall, this initial phase of Jewish immigration and settlement within Palestine set the stage for the sequence of events post World War Two and post-Holocaust, which continued to escalate and frame the conflict in its contemporary form.

The following highlights some of the more salient historical moments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These moments are The Holocaust, the Partition Plan and the War of Independence/the *Nakba*, the Six Day War, and the First Intifada.

The Holocaust holds a lot of importance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the genocide reinforced the Zionist movement and reaffirmed the need for a Jewish state and Jewish security (Dowty, 2017, p. 84). The Holocaust has also created a sense of vulnerability that persists within Jewish culture, creating a sense of victimhood within Jewish identity (Kelman, 1999, p. 594; O'Malley, 2015). This sense of continuously being under attack and under siege is perpetuated by the existence of a Jewish state amongst Islamic hostile neighbours and solidifies the Palestinian-Arab as the enemy (Kelman, 1999, p. 594). This in turn, threatens the existence of the Palestinian people as the emergence of a Jewish state ultimately comes at the expense and possible extermination of a Palestinian one.

Another key moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the UN's Partition Plan and the *Nakba*/War of Independence. The Partition Plan was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1947 and initiated the British withdrawal from the land and proposed a two-state solution (one Jewish and one Arab) (Dowty, 2017, p. 87; United Nations, 1947). Immediately violence erupted as the British withdrew (Dowty, 2017, p. 90; Black, 2017). The dichotomy in understanding, and memorializing, the outcomes of this war are dramatically different. For Israeli-Jews the war (known as the War of Independence) was a moment of triumph where they captured seventy-eight percent of the disputed territory, formed a new Jewish state, and gained international recognition (Caplan, 2010; O'Malley, 2015).

For Palestinians the war (known as the *el Nakba* or 'disaster') was devastating, they lost their homeland, saw the destruction of their society, and suffered massive displacement through flight and expulsion becoming refugees in the process (Dowty, 2017; Said, 1992). This war shaped the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it established the borders of Israel and the Palestinian controlled territories, framed the new conflict as an inter-state conflict, the Arab state proposed in the partition plan was never created, there existed a substantial Arab minority within the new country of Israel, and there were massive amounts of Palestinian displacement resulting in many Palestinian refugees within Israel and the West Bank, as well as in the surrounding Arab nations (Dowty, 2017, pp. 93-95)

The Six Day War (named victoriously by Israeli-Jews) or the June War/War of 1967, was another turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as it further entrenched Israeli dominance over Palestinian people. The result of this war was that territories that were under Egyptian (the Gaza Strip), Syrian (Golan Heights), and Jordanian (the West Bank) authority became strictly under Israeli control (Caplan, 2010, p. 146). This allowed for the "land for peace" deals, which

would frame all future peace attempts (Caplan, 2010, p. 148). These “land for peace” deals essentially entail that Israeli forces withdraw from Palestinian territories in return for the cessation of violence. The Six Day War marks the beginning of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Black, 2017; O'Malley, 2015). The captured territory is considered ‘disputed’ by Israelis but is often referred to as the occupied Palestinian territories, due to Israeli presence and control over the area since 1967. The captured West Bank is an important territory for Israelis due to its religious, cultural, historical, and traditional significance, as well as Israel’s security concerns. Israel planned to use the west bank of the Jordan river as its sovereign border, and settlement of the land in the name of security and by religious right has been a part of Israeli politics since 1967 (Palestine Facts, 2011; Progress of the Allon Plan, 1972).

The First Intifada is important in the contemporary form of the conflict as it was the first time Palestinians *born* in the occupied territories rose up against the Israeli forces. The First Intifada began in 1987, exactly twenty years since the Six Day War/War of 1967 (Black, 2017). The uprising began in Gaza refugee camps, as the result of an Israeli truck driver crashing into two taxis bringing Palestinian workers back into Gaza (Black, 2017, p. 275), and spread through to the West Bank. In sum, the intifada was a Palestinian resistance to the intense militarization and oppression within the occupied territories (Pappé, 2011, p. 173). The significance of the First Intifada was that it ushered in a new wave of resistance to the Israeli occupation, especially by those born in the occupied territories, and gave way to organizations such as Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Pappé, 2011).

Since the First Intifada, in 1987, Israel and Palestine have participated in the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 and 1995, as well as peace negotiations in Camp David Summit in 2000 and during the Obama Administration (O'Malley, 2015). The second Intifada began in 2000 and

lasted for five years (Dowty, 2017), and violence has saturated the conflict throughout, from stone throwing between settlers and Palestinians to suicide bombings and Israeli air strikes. This overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflected on some of the key moments in the contemporary form of the conflict as well as some key components of the historical background. Although it does not do justice to the immensity or complexity of the conflict, this overview contextualizes the following analysis and situates the case study of Israeli settlements in the West Bank within the larger scope of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1.2 Israeli Settlements in the West Bank

Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity... It's the first thing that Arabs -- Arab Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories -- whose situation is really quite desperate - the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace (Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 102nd Congress, May 22, 1991 in the Mitchell Report; EEAS, 2001)

The specific exploratory case study examined in this thesis is the Israeli settlements in the occupied territory of the West Bank. These settlements began after the Six Day War/War of 1967 with the first settlement being established in the Etzion Bloc, in the southern region of the West bank (Zertal, I., Eden, V. S., & Eldar, A., 2009, p. 3; Schnall, 1984; O'Malley, 2015) and grew to over 200 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem areas with a population of almost six

hundred thousand (B'Tselem, 2019b). Despite the explicit statement by the UN that these settlements had no legal validity and contravene the 4th Geneva Convention (United Nations, 2016b), and in spite of increasing international pressure, the Israeli government continues to expand and populate settlements as well as argue for their legitimacy both in legal terms and through historical, cultural, and spiritual claims to the land (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The consequences of these settlements on Palestinian life manifest in serious concerns, for example the accessibility of health facilities in East Jerusalem, the ability for emergency vehicles to reach certain areas, UN supply trucks cannot mobilize efficiently, in some cases food accessibility is limited, poverty, water quality and accessibility issues, and security concerns due to violence from settlers and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) (Hartling, 2002; OCHA, 2017; OCHA, 2018a; Palestine Chronicle, 2008; Zeitoun, 2012).

As Schnall (1984) points out, initially settlements were the aspirations of a group of Israeli fundamentalists known as Gush Emunim. Gush Emunim, strongly supported the establishment of settlements and were strong supporters and followers of the Zionist movement (Schnall, 1984, p. 20; O'Malley, 2015). The similarities emanate from the religious belief that the land was promised to the Jewish people, and they have a right to the land (Chapman, 1983). However, settlements soon became a politicized issue. For example, the Israeli government created a plan for establishing settlements in order to enhance the security of major urban centers soon after the Six Day War/War of 1967 (Schnall, 1984, p. 2; Palestine Facts, 2011; Progress of the Allon Plan, 1972). The continued growth of settlements serves several political interests. For example, the Israeli government views settlements as essential for security, there are historical and cultural interests, the annexation of disputed land, and the suppression of Palestinian

independence and statehood (Klein, 2010, p. 49). The politicization and political involvement in expanding and establishing settlements is what this research is most concerned with.

In the contemporary context, the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Peace accords can be seen to have intensified the expansion of settlements. It is believed that Israel, in an attempt to gain greater bargaining power, increased the population of settlements (Klein, 2010, p. 49). The division of territory into Areas A (Palestinian control, 2.8 percent of the West Bank), B (Palestinians have civil control, Israeli Military has security control, 22.9 percent of the West Bank), and C (Israeli control, 74.3 percent of the West Bank), has also plagued the issue of settlements (Black, 2017, p. 340). Although seen as a move forward due to the Palestinian control over major urban centers, it legitimized Israeli control in areas B and C, and the subsequent security apparatus established in these areas has given Israel relative control over area A as well. During and after the failed Oslo Peace process, settlements continued to grow. As settlements grew so did the Israeli control system. The security apparatus now includes 700 physical barriers, the security wall, checkpoints, and outposts (OCHA, 2018b). These are used to annex land and control the Palestinian population, mobility is extremely difficult, bureaucratic restrictions are enforced upon Palestinians, and there is a heavy militarization of the areas surrounding settlements and along the borders of Palestinian controlled territories (Klein, 2010; Ganesan, 2016; OCHA, 2018b). The continued development and expansion of settlements has isolated Palestinian communities and urban centers. Settler violence is also an issue as Palestinians can be attacked by settlers without intervention or protection from soldiers, who have even partaken in attacking Palestinians (B'Tselem, 2018). Although this physical, overt violence goes both ways (Palestinians have also attacked settlers), the relations of power between Israeli's and Palestinian's result in a drastic discrepancy in agency. The settlers are free to move about as they

wish, and Palestinians are confined to certain areas by fences, walls, and checkpoints. This has limited Palestinian mobility between Palestinian urban centres and villages, into and out of Israel, and in the international community as well.

There are several justifications for the use of Israeli settlements as the exploratory case study in this research. First, because settlements began in 1967 there is substantial information that has been collected and that has been written about the issue. This allows for a more in-depth analysis as well as the ability to collect data from multiple perspectives to represent the complexity and entirety of the issue. Second, this is an ideal case in that it represents an extreme form of the phenomenon this research is investigating. The power dynamics are apparent and relatively explicit, and so are the repercussions of those dynamics and their subsequent effects on Palestinian life. These two reasons validate the use of Israeli settlements in the West Bank as a single case study and exemplify the reasons for focusing this particular case.

1.3 The United Nations: The Mandate, Partition Plan, Israeli Independence, and the Legality of Settlements

The UN played a significant role in both the Israel-Arab and Israel-Palestine conflicts as well as the issue of Israeli settlements. Beginning in 1922 with the UN's predecessor the League of Nations, the Mandate for Palestine entrusted Britain to oversee the former Ottoman territory of Palestine (League of Nations, 1922). Within this Mandate, Britain was responsible to lay the foundations for a Jewish national home, while safeguarding Palestinian rights (Article 2). Further, Palestinian territory was to be protected and not given to "any foreign Power" (Article 5) (League of Nations, 1922). It is clear that Palestine, building on the Balfour declaration, was intended to be a Jewish home where they could obtain citizenship, and not the Jewish state that

emerged in 1948. Article 7 for example reads, “There shall be included in this [nationality] law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine” (League of Nations, 1922). It is clear the intention was to facilitate the creation of Palestine as a state, in which Jewish people could take refuge and call home, and where they could have citizenship and agency.

The withdrawal of the British forces and further administration of Palestine originates in the Partition Plan and stems from the failure of the Mandate. The Arab Revolt in 1936 and continued violence on all sides made a unified state increasingly unlikely (Byrne & Nadan, 2011). The development of the two-State solution and the resulting Partition Plan calling for a Jewish State on 56 percent of the land, and an Arab state on the remaining 43 percent of the land, with Jerusalem a UN governed international city (United Nations, 1947). Padraig O’Malley’s (2015) deconstruction of the Two-State solution, its failures and impending futility, show how, although well intentioned, the irreconcilability of the Israeli and Palestinian narratives as well as the issues of refugees and settlements amongst others, essentially makes the possibility of peaceful co-existence between two states impossible. Still today, the two-State solution is purported to be the best option on the table, although criticisms are voiced routinely, and alternatives are proposed unabatingly. The partition plan however, solidified the claim for Jewish statehood in the land of Palestine by creating the two-State framework, calling for two separate Jewish and Arab states that would come to dominate the international sphere.

The intervention by the British and the UN in laying the foundations for statehood in Palestine helped Israel gain recognition internationally upon its acceptance as a member state in 1949, despite lingering issues such as Palestinian refugees, unsettled borders, and the city of Jerusalem (Heian-Engdal, M., Jensehaugen, J., & Waage, H., 2013). Further, it entrenched the

Israeli and Palestinian narratives. The Zionist supporters were able to realize their dream of a sovereign Jewish homeland and were given credence to their historical and cultural claims to the land. Contrarily, Palestinians, of whom many viewed the Mandate and subsequent Partition Plan as colonial and imperial, saw a Jewish people establish a nation at the expense of their own, and whose dispossession would characterize their existence as per Edward Said (1992, p. 242), “...Zionist settlers came to Palestine as if to an empty, or negligibly populated, country that was theirs for the colonizing, so too do their successors fail to see in the Palestinian people anything more than a bunch of ‘aliens’ that must be gotten rid of or rendered inconsequential.” The acceptance of Israel as a member state of the UN furthered these divisions, and increased disparity between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel declared independence on the 14th of May, 1947 following the Mandate’s withdrawal (The Knesset, 1948) and on the same day President Truman of the US recognized Israel as the *de facto* state of Israel, extending *de jure* status in 1949 (National Archives, 1978). Israel applied for UN membership on November 29th 1948 (United Nations, 1948), however, it was not until the negotiated bilateral armistice agreements in 1949 with Egypt (24 February), Lebanon (23 March), Transjordan (3 April), and Syria (July 20, although negotiations according to the Israeli government had started on the 5th of April) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1949) which ended the Arab-Israeli war, that Israel was officially accepted into the UN with Resolution 273 on May 11, 1949 (Heian-Engdal, M., Jensehaugen, J., & Waage, H., 2013).

Israel was able to use the application to the UN to put forward several claims, two of which helped position Israel politically. First, that peace in the region relied on Israel being accepted and recognized as a nation, and second, that equality was needed between negotiating parties and this also required Israel to be recognized as a nation like its neighbouring Arab states

(Heian-Engdal, M., Jensehaugen, J., & Waage, H., 2013). Politically, this allowed Israel to establish itself as a state on par internationally with the surrounding Arab nations Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, while simultaneously upsetting the balance of power at home: Palestinians, a stateless people, were now encountering a much larger and internationally influential and connected state of Israel.

The ascension to member state in the UN gave Israel relative international recognition as a sovereign state, although they were not and are still not recognized by every state. Further, it entrenched the formation of Israel as a Jewish State, as depicted by the Partition Plan in 1947, upon which the official Israeli claim to statehood, along with the cultural, historical, and religious factors recognized in the Mandate, was based (Dowty, 2017, p. 94).

The UN played a large role in establishing the Mandate and creating its framework of operation, formulating and operationalizing the Partition Plan, and the recognition and legitimacy of the Israeli state today. These events displayed the intentions of the international community: to protect Jewish people from persecution, in the wake of the Holocaust, by establishing a Jewish homeland. Further the organizational mechanisms and policies of the UN for accepting new states for membership, allowed Israeli to further their politically position internationally. Although the current apparatus of the Israeli state is certainly not what the UN envisioned, the UN played a crucial role in facilitating its development and establishing a sovereign Israeli government and the current political context. It is within this context that Israeli settlements function. In the Occupied territories, the dispossession of Palestinians and the statehood of Israel result in a state of frozen hegemonic power relations, that is entrenched in the international state-system.

The role of the UN in the creation of Israel and its legitimization described here, and the ways it created the structure and framework for Israeli/Palestinian relations, is not the only way the UN has influenced the issue of Israeli settlements. International condemnation of settlements, not limited to the UN, establish an international normative frame of reference for settlements. The UN's official stance is given through a series of resolutions. Resolution 446 in 1979, established that Israeli settlements have no legal validity (Security Council, 1979). In 2003, Resolution 1515 endorsed the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Security Council, 2003). The Quartet recommended, based on the Mitchel Report, to cease all settlement activity including 'natural growth' (United Nations, 2003a). In 2016 these resolutions were affirmed in resolution 2334 and it was further stated, "[The Security Council] [s]tresses that the cessation of all Israeli settlement activities is essential for salvaging the two-State solution, and calls for affirmative steps to be taken immediately to reverse the negative trends on the ground" (Security Council, 2016). These resolutions establish a frame of reference in the international community that Israeli settlements are illegal, settlement construction and expansion (natural and planned) should be stopped, and that settlements pose a threat to the feasibility of the peace process. Israel is seen as a pariah state under international law (Boyle, 1982).

The resolutions by the UN in regard to settlements create a normative international framework whereby settlements are considered illegal and must be halted immediately for any potential peace in the region. Israel defies the UN and other's calls for halting construction and actively continues settlement construction and expansion, while providing justification for their actions and the legality of settlements. For example, the Consul General of Israel in Toronto's web-page on settlements reads, "Attempts to present Jewish settlement in ancient Judea and

Samaria (the West Bank) as illegal and ‘colonial’ in nature ignores the complexity of this issue, the history of the land, and the unique legal circumstances of this case” (Consulate General of Israel in Toronto, 2019). There has yet to be any UN action regarding the continued construction and expansion of settlements, and the international community has followed suit making the international condemnation of settlements of little practical significance. However, by establishing this normative framework around settlements, the UN has effectively created large amounts of international pressure on Israel to halt construction.

1.4 The United States – Financial and Military Assistance, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Israel Lobby

Since recognizing Israel as a *de facto* state in 1948 and a *de jure* state in 1949, the US (the core) has been Israel’s (the frontier settler) largest supporter financially and politically. According to the Homeland Security Digital Library, Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign assistance since World War II, having provided US \$134.7 billion, with over \$34 billion in economic assistance (Sharp, 2018). According to John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2007), unlike other forms of financial assistance given to other countries, this support comes under favourable conditions such as being able to receive the money in a lump sum, the ability to invest almost a quarter of aid received in its own defense industry, and most importantly does not require Israel to account for how it is spent. Further, Israel is “obliged” according to the Foreign Treasury, to spend this money on domestic debt, which admittedly frees up other domestic funds for other projects (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). This lack of accountability makes it hard to track where Israel is spending the financial and military assistance it receives, and the ability to

liberate domestic capital allows Israel to put more domestic funding into settlement construction and expansion.

Politically, the US has supported Israel since it declared independence, being one of the first countries to recognize it as a *de facto* state in 1948. This support is also seen in peace negotiations, their votes on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and recently during the Trump administration, a series of decisions, such as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moving the US embassy there, that support Israel. For example, the US has vetoed forty-two UNSC resolutions critical of Israel and abstained from voting for Resolution 2334 in 2016 (O'Malley, 2015). Jeremy M. Sharp discusses the intentions of the US in its support of Israel in a report for the Congressional Research Service. Sharp (2018) provides four main reasons for the close partnership: domestic US support for Israeli security, historical ties dating back to Israeli independence, shared strategic goals in the Middle east, and shared democratic values (Sharp, 2018). Further, as a potentially democratic and West-leaning state, Israel provides a strong ally in an increasingly US-hostile Middle East. The US-Israeli relation is characterized by mutual benefits. The US gets strategic military and political positioning in the Middle East, including the ability to stockpile weapons (Sharp, 2018). Israel gets unyielding military support, and from 1948 consistent financial support which allows it to, at the very least, free up domestic capital to spend on settlement construction and expansion. These financial benefits as well as the political support provided by the US work to further solidify the power imbalance between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as indirectly allow for and support the Israeli security apparatus and military, as well as settlement construction and expansion.

In the US especially, the Jewish diaspora as well as the Evangelical "Saving Jews for Jesus" movement play an important role internationally in terms of supporting Israel and Israeli

settlements. According to a survey conducted in 2018 on the opinions of 1,001 American Jews by the non-profit American Jewish Committee (AJC), a Jewish advocacy organization, just over half believed it was appropriate for American Jews to influence Israeli policy on national security and peace negotiations with Palestinians (AJC, 2018). In the controversial decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the US embassy there, 46 percent of respondents supported the decision (AJC, 2018). Further, in answering the question "As part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle all, some, or none of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank?", only 15 percent of respondents answered that Israel should dismantle all settlements, while 79 percent believed that at least some of the settlements should remain (AJC, 2018). This suggests that although the American Jewish diaspora generally have mixed opinions about the Israeli state, there are large amounts of the American Jewish and Evangelical Protestant population who support current US foreign policy towards Israel, as well as believing they have a role to play in influencing Israeli politics. In terms of settlements in the West Bank, there is even stronger support for pro-Israeli, pro-settlement policy, as most believe in the continued existence of settlements. This support for settlements in the US Jewish diaspora is further exemplified by the financial assistance American Jewish non-profits and individuals provide to settlements.

According to an investigation by Haaretz, between 2009 and 2015, 50 non-profit groups in the US sent USD \$220 million to Jewish communities in the West Bank (Blau, 2015). Their findings concluded that private individuals through non-profit groups fund most settlement communities (Blau, 2015). Further evidence of support is shown by the appointment of David Friedman as the US ambassador to Israel. Friedman is also the President of the American Friends of Bet El Institutions, which has reportedly supplied millions of dollars in funds for projects in

the Bet El settlement (Beaumont & Borger, 2016; Tibon, 2017). Although the 2015 Haaretz report is one of the only reports on US Jewish diaspora's financial support for settlements, it uncovers an issue that strongly influences the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The financial support, coupled with the strong belief in American Jewish diaspora for the existence of settlements, is also supported by the political influence of the strong Israeli lobby within the US.

The Israel lobby in the US consists of individuals and organizations that work towards promoting pro-Israel US foreign policy (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 5). The Israel lobby pulls substantial weight in creating leniency and forgiving policy towards Israel. The ways in which the Israel lobby affected US foreign policy during the Bush administration are analyzed in Mearsheimer and Walt's (2007) *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. They argue that the Bush administration's support of Israel and against Palestinians were largely due to the pro-Israel lobby within the US, its financial wealth and the lack of an opposition or alternative, as opposed to government initiatives or public opinion (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 226). In the current context, during the Trump administration, there are indications of similar influence on US foreign policy. For example, there are clear government decisions such as the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital that lie in stark contrast to the positions of the UN, EU, and many other nations. David Friedman is the president of an influential pro-Israeli non-profit, and Ambassador to Israel, which is another indication of the lobby's strong influence on current US foreign policy.

The American public's opinion is less supportive of Israel, as a recent survey by PEW in April 2019 suggests, finding that 51 percent of Americans have an unfavourable opinion of the Israeli government (Pew Research Center, 2019). This provides some support that the pressure for the US's current pro-Israel foreign policy is derived predominantly from the work of the

Israel lobby, as opposed to general public opinion. The influence of the Israel lobby however may not lie solely in their ability to influence US foreign policy through financial wealth and lack of an opposition. Keith Kiely (2017, p. 132) argues that the Israel lobby “reproduce, mirror and amplify representations of Israel within foreign policy discourse which ensure that a specific Israel-centric perspective on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and peace process remains dominant.” Kiely (2017, p. 163) argues that during the Clinton administration, it was not necessarily the Israel lobby’s financial wealth or lack of Palestinian support, it was the fact that they were able to shape US policy by aligning their pro-Israel stance with American exceptionalism. Whether by their financial strength and the lack of a visible pro-Palestinian alternative or appealing to American exceptionalism and reproducing pro-Israeli discourse as pro-American, the Israel lobby’s influence on US foreign policy has greatly affected the international politics and context in relation to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the issue of Israeli settlements, by successfully endorsing pro-Israeli US foreign policy.

The international community plays a large role in the current context of settlement construction and expansion. This can be attributed to the support initially given to the foundation of the Israeli state, which entrenched Zionist narratives around land ownership, created the current imbalance between the state of Israel and the stateless Palestinians, and has allowed for the construction and expansion of settlements in the West Bank. The international community, since resolution 446 in 1979, has also created the normative international framework of opposing and condemning settlements, which the Israeli state continuously comes into friction with as the Israeli government continues to defend, construct, and expand settlements. The support of the US and Jewish diaspora provide financial and political security, which allows for pro-Israeli foreign policy and financial support for settlement construction as well as the intense security apparatus

surrounding Palestinian controlled territories. This has contributed to the increasing possibility of complete annexation of all settlement territory (PBS, 2019).

Conclusions

In overviewing the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the issue of Israeli settlements, and the role of the UN and US in shaping Israel and Israeli politics, this Chapter has provided the contextual information for analyzing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the necropolitical aspects of conflict that are described by disposability. The next Chapter provides a review of current literature on peacebuilding, critical and emancipatory peacebuilding, power, and disposability. Through this review, this research is situated within PACS, and more specifically within the emerging critical and emancipatory PACS approach to understanding peace and conflict.

Chapter Two – Literature Review

Introduction

Critical and emancipatory peacebuilding (CEPB) is an emerging peacebuilding approach within PACS that has begun to frame research, activism, and the politics of peacebuilding (Byrne & Thiessen, 2019). This approach differs from its predecessor, the liberal peacebuilding model, by centralizing critical theory and local ownership (Thiessen, 2011). By so doing it differentiates itself by examining and addressing structural inequalities and emphasizing the engagement of local actors within the peace process. One of the debates that is at the forefront of PACS is which direction to go in. Should the liberal peace model be revised? Or should it be abandoned? Or should it be combined with local models in a hybridized way (see Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Hyde & Byrne, 2015)? Locating this research within this new and emerging field is essential in order to realize its potential. As a core tenant of CEPB, critical theory is concerned upmost with the operation of power. In order to move forward with CEPB approaches, programs, policies, and interventions, it is crucial that PACS orient a conception of power grounded in critical theory and operationalize this concept in order to analyze and understand conflicts through their dimensions of power. This chapter first, briefly summarizes liberal peacebuilding and some of its criticisms that have led to the development of CEPB. Second, it describes the central tenants of CEPB: critical theory and local ownership. Lastly, it discusses two central components of this thesis, power and disposability.

2.1 Liberal Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding itself is attributed to Johan Galtung (1969), however it gained more notoriety in the late 1980s early 1990s after the Cold War. This is in part due to the UNs ability to break beyond the East v. West deadlock that had dominated international politics, allowing more international intervention within conflict resolution. The form of peacebuilding that emerged from these interventions is predominantly referred to as liberal peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding refers to building social structures that facilitate the achievement of positive peace, that is the absence of structural violence, and presence of cooperative and equal social structures based on social justice (Creary & Byrne, 2014; Galtung, 1969; Ryan, 2013; Paffenholz, 2013). The notion of peacebuilding became more familiar with Boutros Boutros-Ghali's (1992) *An Agenda for Peace*, which discussed peacebuilding as a preventative measure of post-conflict intervention to address latent issues that may reignite conflict. John Paul Lederach's (1997) conflict transformation model further discussed peacebuilding as a long-term process of reconstructing relationships, to reform social institutions and develop different cultural patterns of dealing with conflict.

As a form of peacebuilding, liberal peacebuilding originates from the liberal peace thesis which asserts that democratic and economically liberal states participate in conflict less frequently (Paris, 2004). From this idea liberal peacebuilding evolved into an externally driven, top-down process that emphasized democratic governance and liberal free-markets as well as human rights and the rule of law, reform of the security sector, and development and state-building models (Richmond, 2010). This form of external, international intervention was the dominant form of peacebuilding efforts through the 1990s and into the 21st century (Ozerdem & Mac Ginty, 2019). David Chandler (2017) argues that the framing of peacebuilding interventions

during this time as ‘liberal,’ was the result of critiquing the liberal nature of peacebuilding. He argues that these criticisms were predicated in the notion that Western liberalism failed due to the Others’ inabilities or underdevelopment (Chandler, 2017, p. 42). The result was a widescale framing of peacebuilding projects as liberal and a further divide between the liberal West and the non-liberal Other (Chandler, 2017, p. 41). Despite Chandler’s compelling arguments, peacebuilding interventions are well understood within PACS to have developed and implemented based on liberal foundations of democracy and liberal free-markets.

The critiques of liberal peacebuilding discussed by Chandler, have none the less reshaped approaches to peacebuilding. These critiques are categorized here into three main categories. The first is the critique of the top-down nature of liberal peacebuilding (Richmond, 2010). Richmond and Franks argue that the emphasis on political elites and state institutions ignored local actors within the peacebuilding process and were unable to factor realities on the ground (Richmond & Franks, 2009). This argument was based on the statebuilding-peacebuilding relationship and emphasizes that this type of track-one peacebuilding de-legitimizes community-based peacebuilding programs and local actors (Richmond & Franks, 2009). The second critique was that liberal peacebuilding was a form of neo-colonialism and post imperialism (Pugh 2004, 2005; Jabri, 2010). This argument posited that liberal peacebuilding projected liberal ideals onto non-liberal Others, that was geared towards reshaping political and economic structures towards a normative liberal ideal (Chandler, 2017). The third critique was that nations were underdeveloped in terms of effective governance structures, to handle the transition between non-liberal and liberal political and economic structures (Paris, 2004). Paris’ (2004) *Institutionalization before Liberalization*, emphasized the need to promote strong social structures that would be able to sustain the challenges of transitioning into liberalism. These

three critiques have led to the re-shaping of liberal peacebuilding, and a subsequent move towards CEPB frameworks.

2.2 Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding

As an emerging approach with the PACS discipline, CEPB breaks off from previous approaches by centralizing critical theory and local ownership (Thiessen, 2011). By doing so, it reframes PACS to look at social and structural inequalities, while simultaneously engaging local actors such as NGO, CSO, and community leaders, to take control and ownership of the peace process (see Byrne, Matyok, Scott, & Senehi, 2019). The two central features of CEPB are critical theory and local ownership.

Critical Theory

Critical theory as a term is used to define a broad range of critical thought that is oriented towards creating social change and social justice, through taking a political stance often categorized by challenging “ideological mystification, class oppression, and hegemony” (Felluga, 2015, p. xxiii). Central to this discourse is an analysis of social inequality and injustice within social structures (Freeman & Vasconcelos, 2010). CEPB incorporates these central components of critical theory by analyzing social inequalities and emphasizing social justice within peacebuilding initiatives (Byrne & Thiessen, 2019). Critical theory also looks at deconstructing linguistic and ideological structures, as well as power and knowledge structures (Felluga, 2015). For example, the critique of liberal peacebuilding as neo-colonial and post imperial deconstructs the liberal ideological foundations of liberal peacebuilding, and how they represent a hegemonic international discourse that can negatively affect peacebuilding outcomes

(Pugh 2004, 2005; Jabri, 2010). By incorporating this aspect of critical theory, CEPB is also able to address, analyze, and problematize the underlying ideological foundations upon which peacebuilding projects are initiated (Paffenholz, 2015).

Local Ownership

The second major tenet of CEPB is local ownership, which is concerned with promoting local agency within peacebuilding initiatives. The idea of local ownership rests on empowering local actors, such as CSOs and NGOs leaders and community leaders, within the peace process so that they feel a sense of ownership over the process (Lee & Ozerdem, 2015). This is in response to the top-down criticism of liberal peacebuilding that external and state actors engage primarily in track one level peace negotiations and peacebuilding activities as well as the Western-centric view of seeing the Other as unable to solve their own issues (Richmond & Franks, 2009). Chuck Thiessen (2011, p. 120) discusses the pluralistic meaning of the term ‘local’ and how local ownership, in its incorporation into peacebuilding, has often preferred to engage local elites, somewhat limiting its emancipatory ability. The term ‘local’ can often be used to represent the local people as individuals, as community groups, or as local elites, and sometimes as a generic term to describe all three. Local ownership, as a central fixture of CEPB, suggests that in order for peacebuilding initiatives to achieve forms of positive peace, those involved in the conflict must take ownership of its resolution and the process through which it is achieved. It also means that we need to distinguish between what and who do we mean by the local and the international and the underlying power structures that are embedded within both (Paffenholz, 2015).

2.3 Power

The centralization of critical theory within CEPB is important because it simultaneously forces questions about power, social inequality, and social hierarchies and stratification. Within PACS, power is often implicit within the discussion of peace and conflict, whether referring to negotiating power, reconstructing relationships to rebalance power dynamics (Lederach, 1997), deconstructing liberal peacebuilding as colonial and post imperial projects (Pugh, 2004, 2005; Jabri, 2010), power and discourses of knowledge (e.g. storytelling), power and research methodologies (Thiessen & Byrne, 2017) or looking at power imbalances between different levels (tracks) of diplomacy (e.g. top-down versus bottom-up approaches). Conceptions of power usually draw from the field of International Relations (IR), social psychology, and the social sciences. The following discusses three influential theories of power within conflict, conflict resolution and economics scholar Kenneth Boulding's (1989) *Three Faces of Power*; power over, power to, and power with; and soft and hard power. These conceptions of power are predicated in IR and see power as the ability to produce certain effects or outcomes through affecting another actor's behaviour, although more recent definitions emphasize the role of social relations as the mechanism through which this happens (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). This realist view is the dominant paradigm within IR, and subsequently within international political analysis (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Barnett & Duvall, 2005).

Kenneth Boulding (1989, p. 10) categorizes power as the ability to get what one wants through three categories: threat power, economic power, and integrative power. For Boulding (1989), realists tend to emphasize threat power (connected to patriarchy) above the other two. Boulding discusses these forms of power both on the personal and organizational level. Threat power is understood as the personal power to threaten some course of action to attain one's

interest, as well as organizational political and military power (Boulding, 1989, pp. 25, 29). Economic power is that of exchange, being able to get what you want through some sort of reciprocity: “you do something I want and I will do something you want,” organizationally it is based on the stratification of the economy (Boulding, 1989, p. 27). Integrative power incorporates “love,” the idea that one can get what they want through social relationships and affiliations, organizationally it is shown through social power, or a form of collective power (Boulding, 1989, pp. 29, 31). Boulding’s conception of power works well to highlight the realpolitik or realist emphasis on threat power and discuss other forms of power derived from exchange and social relationships. Boulding however, emphasizes power over and constructs power as something that is exercised over objects and other humans (Boulding, 1989, pp. 52-53).

The power over, power to, and power with concepts of power take three distinct approaches to understanding power. Power over, predicated in the work of Robert Dahl (1957) and Steven Lukes (2005), suggests that power occurs when one person has power over another, in order to affect the behaviour or actions of that person (Pansardi, 2011). In this sense power is operational when person A threatens to deprive person B of something to ensure their compliance (Dahl & Stinebrickner, 2003, p. 38), or when person A affects person B in a way that is contrary to their interests (Lukes, 2005, p. 30). In both cases, person A has power over person B, which allows person A to affect person B’s behaviour. Power to departs from this idea, and proposes that power is not when one has power over someone, but when someone has the ability to utilize power. Based on the work of Peter Morriss (2002), power is conceptualized as the *ability* of someone or something to bring about certain outcomes. In this sense, those with a greater ability to produce certain outcomes, would be said to have greater power. Pamela Pansardi (2012) has also argued that power over and power to, despite often being treated as

separate concepts, refer to the same social facts, making the logical differences inconsequential. Power with is built off the work of Hannah Arendt and the idea that power is the ability to act together (Pansardi, 2011; Haugaard, 2012). The applied practice wing within PACS as well as feminist scholars looking at collective action, resistance, and solidarity to describe the ways in which power can be ascertained through collaborative efforts utilize this approach. Whether this is described by the previous concepts of power over or power to is debated (Haugaard, 2012).

Hard power originates from the realist perspective in IR and is the predominant conception of power. Hard power describes the way direct, coercive action influences another's actions and behaviours, "[t]he use of force, payment, and some agenda-setting based on them" (Nye, 2011, p. 20). Often described as the 'stick and carrot' approach, hard power relies on threats or payments to influence another's behaviour. Soft power discusses the idea that indirect action can be an operation of power as well. Joseph Nye (2008, p. 95) describes the ability to influence others through "getting [them] to do want what you want," through admiration or attraction. Both of these conceptions of power are derived from the central idea that power is the "ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want" (Nye, 2008, p. 94).

2.4 Disposability

Ranjana Khanna (2009, p. 186) describes the three connotations to the word disposable: 'the throw away' (e.g. disposable camera, disposable diapers), 'the available' (e.g. disposable income), and 'the sovereign commandment' (the ability to dispose). In the third connotation, 'to dispose' is intrinsically linked with the power of the disposer to control the disposal of something (Khanna, 2009). Khanna argues for reading this differentiation into the term disposable. In this sense, disposability refers to three distinct qualities: being available for

disposing, being disposed of, and the authority to dispose. Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou (2013, p. 20) discuss disposability in their work *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political*, in the sense of an “assigned disposability”, the idea that neoliberal regimes “allocate disposability and precariousness.” Butler and Athanasiou (2013, p. 19) relate disposability to the ideas of “social death” (Patterson, 1982), necropolitics (Mbembe, 2003), as Butler describes, “those who are left to die through negligence,” and those who live with a higher mortality risk (Gilmore, 2007). To be disposable then, is also connected with living in a state of essential non-being, that is allocated through the stratification of value by the sovereign. This thesis uses the term disposable in line with these conceptions of the word. Disposability in other academic work is used in reference to contemporary forms of slavery (Bales, 2012), as well as in relation to biopolitics and making certain populations invisible in discussing Hurricane Katrina (Giroux, 2006), gender and political economy through analyzing disposable women and capitalism (Wright 2006), and refugees (Mayotte, 1992). Disposability as a concept is gaining more ground within the critical, political left as a way of describing the forms of life that constitute the living dead (Mbembe, 2003), those on the margins who experience a fragile existence.

Conclusions

This Chapter outlined the pertinent literature surrounding liberal peacebuilding, CEPB as well as the concepts of power and disposability. This situates the impending analysis of Israeli settlements and contributions to PACS within a CEPB framework, as well as discusses the general use of power within international politics and the emergence of the concept of disposability within the critical, political left. The next Chapter outlines the methods and methodologies used in this research to examine Israeli settlements.

Chapter Three – Methodology and Methods

Introduction

This thesis seeks to understand the dynamics of power and structural violence in conflict. To explicate the theoretical model of disposability, it utilizes a case study methodology, the object of analysis for which is the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This thesis uses a conceptualization of disposability articulated in Chapter Four to analyze Israeli settlements. However, in Chapter Five, in order to capture the complexity of this issue it also uses Kenneth Waltz's (2001) three levels of analysis - international, national/state, and local - and Graham Allison's (1971) three models of understanding state decisionmaking - rational actor, bureaucratic, and organizational models. Described in this chapter, Waltz's (2001) and Allison's (1999) frameworks allow for a greater explanatory ability and understanding of Israeli state decisionmaking and its connections to settlement development by comprehensively analyzing state decisionmaking. This research also incorporates several features of Indigenous and decolonizing methodologies such as contested histories and Indigenous knowledge. This chapter begins by first, outlining case study methodology. Second, it describes Waltz's (2001) levels of analysis and Alison's (1999) models of state decisionmaking. Third, it details the typologies of structural violence that affect precariousness. Fourth, it describes the tenets of contested histories and Indigenous knowledge from Indigenous and decolonizing research methods used in presenting this thesis and in data collection. Fifth, this chapter overviews the methods of data collection. Lastly, it discusses the limitations of this study.

3.1 Case Studies as a Methodology

Case studies provide an intensive analysis of a single case or multiple cases (Bryman, Teevan, & Bell, 2009, p. 38; Remler & Van Ryzin, 2015; p. 76, Yin, 2009, p. 19). Case studies as a research method can be defined as the indepth study of a phenomenon that incorporates crucial contextual conditions imperative to the study and utilizing multiple methods of data collection (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Although case studies are often associated with qualitative research, they often incorporate a mixed methods approach by including quantitative and qualitative methods of producing data (Bryman, Teevan, & Bell, 2009, p. 38; Remler & Van Ryzin, 2015, p. 77). There are three ways using a mixed methods approach within case study methodology can work as suggested by Hammersley (1996), triangulation, facilitation, and complementary. Triangulation involves using one method of research to corroborate the findings of another, facilitation uses one method to aid researching the other, and complementary uses both methods to describe diverse aspects of the research (Bryman, Teevan, & Bell, 2009, p. 287). This research utilizes two approaches in including both existing qualitative and quantitative data, the complementary and triangulation approaches. The complementary approach is used to comprehensively describe the necropolitical process of disposability, using both existing qualitative data (Chapters Five and Six) and existing quantitative data (Chapter Seven), to describe how Israeli settlements affect Palestinian's lives. The triangulation approach is observed by using existing qualitative data in Chapter Six to identify the structural violence Palestinians face as a result of settlements, and existing quantitative data is utilized in Chapter Seven to explore how these issues affect Palestinian precariousness and corroborate the structural violence identified in Chapter Six.

Robert Yin (2009, p. 4) describes the distinctive features of case studies as trying to understand complex phenomenon that allows the researcher to encapsulate the entirety and significant characteristics of that phenomenon. A case study methodology is useful when research is explanatory and exploratory in nature and looks at a contemporary set of events of which the researcher has little control over (Yin, 2009, pp. 11-13). This research is well suited for using a case study methodology because it fits these criteria. It seeks to explain how and why people become disposable in conflict and examines a contemporary issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which the researcher has no control over.

This research proposes a single-case design with the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank as the object of analysis. The rationale for selecting a single-case design can be described by understanding this particular case as a paradigmatic and an enhanced case (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 80, Druckman, 2005, p. 166). Paradigmatic cases involve using a case example in order to “highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 80). Most prominently, this case is an enhanced case study, which provide a theoretical structure for the collected data through applying particular concepts to the case (Druckman, 2005). These types of cases allow for flexibility and reflexivity in research design, which allows new insights to emerge and reflect back on the research process (Druckman, 2005, p. 48). Further, Druckman (2005, p. 48) points to the descriptive capacity of enhanced cases and their ability to address ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, of which this research is oriented.

Criticisms of single-case studies revolve around their inability to replicate findings due to the unique conditions of the case as well as the fear that case studies may be unable to generalize their findings or theories for similar reasons (Yin, 2009, p. 61). Bent Flyvbjerg addresses these criticisms of case studies. Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 75) argues that carefully chosen, critical cases have

been used throughout the sciences and social sciences to develop or assess theories. Further, it is argued that generalizability is not the only way of producing knowledge and other methods of inquiry are more than satisfactory in the pursuit of knowledge, and knowledge accumulation on a topic or field of study (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 76). Druckman (2011, p. 170) also discusses the weakness of enhanced case studies in particular, which include relevant issues such as “separating the concepts from the case,” reproducing the case, and the ability to analyze the conflict through concepts outside of the framework that might hold explanatory validity, restricting its interpretive ability. These criticisms and weaknesses of case studies are valid yet are outweighed by the strengths of using a case study design for this proposed research.

Thus, one can outline two main reasons for choosing a single-case design. First, it increases the ability to analyze the case of Israeli settlements in greater depth. Settlements have been an ongoing development in Israel since the Six Day War ended in 1967 (Zertal, I., Eden, V. S., & Eldar, A., 2009, p. 3). Therefore, the information that has been generated and is available for analysis is quite large and deserves a rigorous approach that appreciates the breadth of the issue. This includes data collected from news agencies such as the Times of Israel and Haaretz, international organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, CSOs and NGOs such as B’Tselem, the pro-Israeli Regavim, and Yesh Din, international and state documents from the UN and its affiliated bodies as well as the Knesset and the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics, as well as academic scholarship related to the Israel/Palestine conflict and the case of settlements in particular. Further, Druckman (2011) points to the main strength of case studies as the depth of analysis they are able to attain, this descriptive potential of case studies and the wealth of information regarding Israel/Palestine and Israeli settlements serves the purposes of this research well.

As described by others as well, the main benefits of case study research is that it allows for an in-depth analysis of multiple forms of data (Bryman, Teevan, & Bell, 2009, Remler & Van Ryzin, 2015, Yin, 2009, Flyvbjerg, 2001) and this research takes advantage of that capability. The second reason is that using a single case allows for a greater ability to explicate the theoretical framework (Flyvbjerg, 2001, Yin, 2009). Druckman (2011) describes the ability of case studies to demonstrate the “applicability or robustness of theoretical concepts” as well as provide a “basis for comparison” for future research. This takes on increased importance within a PACS discourse. Conflicts are inherently complex. In order to do them justice in terms of analysis and conception, one must embrace this complexity. Therefore, it is imperative that this study contextualizes the application of its theoretical framework to its fullest extent. This does not limit the validity of the theory but enhances it by examining its propositions in a detailed and comprehensive manner.

3.2 Levels of Analysis

This research utilizes an analytical model in Chapter Five based on Kenneth Waltz’s (2001) three images of understanding war. Waltz details these three levels of analysis that have been used to study and conceptualize the causes of war and describes how they must be incorporated together in order to understand the full complexity of conflict. The first is the individual, specifically looking at the individual’s nature and behaviour as the cause of war (Waltz, 2001, p. 16). The second image, the state, refers to the idea that issue within states cause wars (Waltz, 2001, p. 83). Third, the state system, examines the framework that organizes inter-state actions and relations (Waltz, 2001, p. 160). Although Waltz details how each of these images have been analyzed as causes of war on their own, he describes how their interrelatedness

is key to providing a comprehensive analysis (Waltz, 2001, p. 229). This thesis borrows from this idea and uses the three levels of analysis - the local, state, and international - to analyze the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Simplified, these levels can be identified as the international, state, and local levels. In terms of this research, the usefulness of taking an approach that looks at these three levels is in the explanatory capability it provides. The proposed theory of disposability suggests that power is central to conflict development and continuance, as well as obstructing and framing peacebuilding efforts, by constructing and reconstructing people as disposable. These relations of power appear at all three levels, within the international community between states, at the state level between the state and its population as well as among individual state actors, and at the local/individual level between people (for example between Islamic Palestinians and Jewish Israelis). Further, the levels of analysis help explicate the case study. Israeli settlements have garnered international attention and are subject to international pressures (for e.g., the Jewish diaspora and US support, the UN, Arab League, and EU). At the state level, settlements are built into the political framework of legitimizing the Israeli state and delegitimizing Palestinian authority. At the individual level the interaction between Palestinians in the West Bank and inhabitants of Israeli settlements is tense and can be violent, perpetuating the greater conflict as well as individual relations and perceptions of the Other. In order to both adequately apply and investigate the proposed theory of disposability and the case study of Israeli settlements, this research must look at the international, state, and individual levels as described by Waltz (2001) and done in Chapter Five.

3.3 Understanding State Action

Also useful is the three analytical models of understanding foreign policy decisions developed by Graham Allison (1999). Although these models are designed for analyzing foreign policy, they can also be expanded to include issues related to domestic policy (Allison, 1999, p. 7). Allison's conceptual models assist this research by helping explain and understand the decisions states make. As such, these conceptual models can be applied to the actions of the Israeli government in terms of expanding existing and creating new settlements. Through this process, this research can identify the embedded knowledge's and practices within the state of Israel that result in expanding and creating settlements and the subsequent threat to Palestinian lives. Since Israeli settlements are political in the way they are used and established, the decisions made by the state in relation to settlements perpetuates the resulting effects and disposability of Palestinians in the West Bank, with which this thesis is concerned. Therefore, comprehensively understanding these actions and decisions is paramount.

Allison's (1999) three models are the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behaviour Model (OBM), and the Government Politics Model (GPM). Allison has three main arguments. First, the conceptual frames used to analyze state foreign policy decisions affect the content, selection, and focus of information (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 3). Second, RAM is the most frequently used and has framed the study of foreign policy and international relations (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 4). Third, Allison also offers two alternative models to the dominant RAM, which takes different approaches, ask different questions, and provide different explanations (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 5). Allison's critique is that relying on one model, most frequently RAM, frames the analysis in a certain way, and that different conceptual models are needed in order to grasp the entirety of how governmental foreign policy decisions are made.

The models are as follows. The RAM explains governmental decisions by “putting oneself in the governments shoes” through identifying the rational intention of the state’s decision to address its goals, objectives, or interests (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 16). By analyzing the state’s decision in this way, the RAM seeks to explain why the government, as a single actor, rationally chose one action over other possibilities. The OBM analyses how decisions can result as an “output” of organizational procedures (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 143). Allison argues that large organizations require certain standard operating procedures, protocols or routines in order to facilitate efficient organizational operations. The protocols or routines result in certain governmental actions and behaviours that affect state decisionmaking. The GPM looks at the “political game” between the individuals or groups in a hierarchal government structure (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 255). State decisionmaking, through this group think model, is understood as the result of the political process of individuals or groups vying for different options and influencing the decision that is made. In essence, these models all address different ways government foreign policy decisions can be made. The RAM looks at the rational choice among alternatives based on state interests, the OBM looks at the outputs of organizational rules and routines, and the GPM looks at individuals or groups competing to influence government decisions and policy.

By applying these three conceptual models to analyze and explain the Israeli government’s decisions to expand and develop settlements, this thesis can explore the necropolitical aspects of these decisions, and how they result in the increasing disposability of Palestinians. Allison’s (1999) model is used in Chapter Five to comprehensively examine Israeli state action and decisionmaking in relation to settlements across Waltz’s (2001) three levels of analysis. By illuminating how these decisions get made, this research can better analyze the

proposed theoretical model by investigating the effects of these decisions on the social conditions (precariousness) that sustain Palestinian life and their subsequent devaluation (grievability).

3.4 Typologies of Structural Violence and Precariousness

This thesis looks at the politics deathmaking and devaluation. Consequently, it is important to show how the politicization of settlements has resulted in structural violence that affects the precariousness of Palestinians in the West Bank, and that eventually kills. In order to research this point further, there is a need to delineate forms of structural violence that affect the social conditions of precariousness - what are the needs and resources that come under attack through structural violence and constitute precariousness – in order to show how power, through structural violence not only leads to death but a subsequent devaluation of certain bodies constructing them as disposable. By associating necropolitics with structural violence and precariousness we can make a strong link between the politics of settlement construction and expansion and the effects on Palestinian lives, in order to do this, we must describe certain typologies of structural violence and precariousness.

Both Butler (2010) and Galtung (1969, 1996) refer to resources or needs that are required for life to be livable. These resources are what would come under attack from structural violence, and the social conditions associated with them are what constitutes precariousness. To examine the effects of settlements, it is required to look at the outcomes political decisionmaking has had on these needs and resources (Chapter Six), and subsequently the effects of these outcomes on Palestinian everyday life in the West Bank (Chapter Seven). Before this can be done, it is imperative to distinguish the resources and needs that will be discussed.

This thesis uses six categories or typologies of structural violence, physical, economic, health, security, political, and social. The six categories of structural violence stem from the work of Butler (2010), John W. Burton and Edward Azar, and Abraham Maslow. Butler (2010, pp. 21-22) lists certain types of needs or resources that minimize precariousness: food, shelter, work, medical care, education, rights of mobility and expression, and protection against injury and oppression. John W. Burton believed that certain social needs, predicated in biological needs, are universal and would be pursued by people in order to be fulfilled (Sandole, 2013). These needs are identity, participation, recognition, and security (Sandole, 2013, p. 23). In essence, addressing these needs and facilitating ‘win-win’ arrangements where both party’s needs are met, facilitates conflict resolution (Sandole, 2013). Burton is expanded upon by Edward Azar, who emphasized the conflict between people striving to attain basic human needs, and the state retraining their ability to meet those needs (Sandole, 2013). Further, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs expresses that humans work to try and fulfil five basic human needs, physiological, safety and security, love and belongingness, self-esteem, and self-actualization, with people working to fulfil physiological needs first, being the most basic, and moving towards self-actualization (Maslow, 1987).

Using these frameworks, six categories are identified here to explore the relation between Israeli settlements and Palestinian everyday life: physical, economic, health, security, political, and social. These categories are identified through amalgamating the needs described by Butler (2010), Burton and Azar, and Maslow, into general categories that describe where structural violence can take place and the social conditions of precariousness. These six categories by no means comprise the only social structures in which violence can take place, however they are recurrent in Butler, Maslow, and Burton’s theories and do well to describe vital aspects of what

makes life conceivably livable. Each one of these categories is explored in two ways. First in Chapter Six, in terms of the structural violence settlements have inflicted on Palestinian communities, for example settlements have been accused of cutting through Palestinian farmer's land, affecting their physiological and economic well-being. Second, in Chapter Seven, these categories are examined in terms of their effects on Palestinian precariousness, for example what is the availability and accessibility of food or water. The structural violence these six categories describe is what comes under attack through Israeli settlement development. By using Allison (1999) and Waltz's (2001) frameworks to comprehensively understand Israeli state action regarding settlements in Chapter Five, the effects of these settlements are then analyzed using Galtung's (1969) structural violence (Chapter Six) and Butler's (2010) precariousness (Chapter Seven), across these six identified categories.

It is important to note that this is not an attempt to define or provide an exhaustive list of the basic resources or human needs necessary to sustain life. Rather, these different aspects of structural violence/precariousness provide a framework that is broad and measurable, allowing this research to sufficiently and substantially evaluate the effects of settlements on structural violence felt by Palestinians and the precariousness of Palestinians in the West Bank. By using these categories this research examines the politics behind settlement construction and the subsequent effects on Palestinians.

3.5 Indigenous and Decolonizing Methodology

This research also borrows two concepts from Indigenous and decolonizing methodologies. The first is contested histories and the second is Indigenous knowledge. Contested histories are closely linked with Indigenous epistemologies and intrinsically linked

with colonialism and Indigenous struggles to reclaim their histories and knowledge's (Smith, 2001). Contested histories imply that there are multiple perspectives, lived experiences, and knowledge's about stories and discourses of the past (Smith, 2001). Part of decolonizing methodologies is to uncover these alternative histories and hold them in equality with dominant historical perspectives and narratives (Senehi, 2008, 2019). For the purposes of this research, this means a conscious inclusion of both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives on the history of the conflict and the issue of Israeli settlements in particular.

Indigenous knowledge is the second decolonizing/Indigenous concept used in this research. It is difficult to capture the complexity and nuances of Indigenous knowledge because of its cultural and contextual features. Indeed, both reductionist and universal definitions seem to be inadequate to capture what one means by "Indigenous knowledge" (Kovach, 2009, p. 56). Despite this, one can identify some features that consistently emerge: Indigenous knowledge is non-fragmented, holistic, abstract and pragmatic, incorporates language and place, and emphasizes relationships (Kovach, 2009, p. 57). Within Indigenous and decolonizing research, Indigenous knowledge functions in two ways: it acknowledges the breadth of Indigenous epistemologies and it uses Indigenous epistemologies in preparing and conducting research (Kovach, 2009, p. 63). This research by no means tries to insinuate that Palestinian or Israeli knowledge *is* Indigenous knowledge this would be a political statement beyond the scope of this research. However, it does include the premises of Indigenous knowledge by attempting to acknowledge and incorporate local epistemologies and knowledge within the research process.

3.6 Data Collection

Material to identify and discuss this case study will be drawn from a range of archival and secondary sources. As a single exploratory case study using mixed-methods to collect data this research incorporates qualitative resources such as documentation including public records and personal documents, online data sources, and archival records (Yin, 2009; Merriam, 1998) and quantitative resources such as official statistics, administrative records, published data tables, and public use microdata (Bryman, Teevan, & Bell, 2009; Remler & Van Ryzin, 2015). This data will be compiled from a wide range of sources including international organizations and indexes, government documents, CSO, NGO and human rights documentations, news agencies, and previous academic research. For example, published reports like the EU Six Month Report on Israeli settlements published in 2017 (European Union, 2017) or the Levy Commission (produced for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Justice Yaakov Neeman) (Levy, Shapira, & Baker, 2014), open access data such as the World Bank, The Humanitarian Data Exchange, the Economic Cooperation Foundation, and Peace Now, international organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and information collected from government databases such as the Israeli government database as well as the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics.

In keeping with the previously outlined concepts of Indigenous/decolonizing methodologies, the data used in this research makes a conscious attempt to include both Israeli and Palestinian sources, pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian sources, and sources developed by Israeli and Palestinian people as well as non-Israeli and Palestinian people. Bias can be an issue when using secondary data that may be collected with certain intentions or produced with various forms of underlying knowledges' that frame the collection of data. In order to address this issue,

this thesis plans to do background checks on each data source to identify where it comes from and make clear the context and positioning of the sources used. However, this research does not shy away from including data and analyzing data that may be biased, as it may hold analytical value on its own. For example, the narratives that can emerge from these biases often point to underlying assumptions and knowledges' that can be used for analysis and highlight the types of paradigms that can lead to the structural violence this thesis is concerned with. The aim of data collection in this research is to provide a breadth of knowledge, information, and data that can uncover the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank in its entirety and represent the complexity of the issue from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives.

3.7 Limitations

The limitations of this study are threefold, the first is the method of data collection which bears an over-reliance on secondary data. The second is the case study chosen and its uniqueness. The third is its use of predominantly Western theoretical concepts being applied to a non-Western context. The first limitation stems from the inability to do primary research in Israel and Palestine. Although the feasibility of doing this type of research was low due to time and financial constraints, it was clear that the data analysis would have been enriched by interviews from persons involved in the conflict as well as information collected directly through surveys and questionnaires. Although the secondary data uncovered and used was expansive, this too was an issue as relying on secondary data meant sifting through many documents which were not used for the analysis. In essence time management is the concern here, which may also have implications for the case chosen. The second limitation is the uniqueness of the case of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Cultural, traditional, historic, and religious uniqueness aside, this

case is still atypical. Although the oppressive power relations are seen everywhere, the impetus to build settlements in violation of international law and the subsequent disaster this has caused Palestinians (displacement, dispossession, mobility restrictions, demolitions, etc.), makes this a distinctive case and thus, calls the generalizability of its findings into question. Although disposability is detached from this context, in that it has been applied elsewhere, concerns could be raised about this particular conception of disposability and how it might apply to other conflicts. Thirdly, this concept of disposability is framed around mostly Western theoretical concepts that are being applied to a non-Western context. Further, although this study attempts to incorporate local understandings of the conflict and the situation derived from local sources, it is not completely successful as it substantially relies on international organizations for information. These raise concerns over the validity of the findings, in that a Western researcher using a Western research process, detached from the local context, has developed them. In all, these limitations are important to keep in mind, as well as inform future research based on the ideas presented in this thesis.

Conclusions

This Chapter sought to explain the research methods advising this research. It describes the merit and suitability of a single case study methodology, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, in exploring the data and applying the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework of this thesis, and the proposed theory of disposability, is described in the following Chapter.

Chapter Four – A Theory of Disposability: Power and Conflict

Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to describe the main theoretical framework that is applied in this thesis. This theoretical framework constitutes the main tenets of the proposed theory of disposability: necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability. Although Allison's (1999) and Waltz's (2001) frameworks are used to describe Israeli state action and decisionmaking in Chapter Five, they are not central aspects of the theoretical framework of disposability. However, they are important in describing how disposability must be looked at comprehensively and take into account Allison's (1999) pluralistic understanding and explanation of state action and across Waltz's (2001) three levels of analysis. This thesis then uses three theoretical lenses to analyze Israeli settlements, the disposability lens, that is described in this chapter and applied throughout the thesis, and the Allison (1999) and Waltz (2001) lenses, described in the previous methods and methodology chapter, and applied in Chapter Five. This chapter first, proceeds to describe the theoretical framework of disposability. Second, it looks at each one of these concepts in turn – necropolitics, structural violence, grievability, and precariousness. Lastly, it describes the central component of power and its relation to disposability.

4.1 Theoretical Framework of Disposability

The theoretical framework that ties these concepts together and is introduced in this thesis is a theory of disposability. This theory looks at who is disposable and how the process of becoming disposable occurs. It is situated within a CEPB approach to studying peace and

conflict through its analysis of the micro, power relations, and vulnerable populations of those persons on the margins. The proposed theory of disposability has four main propositions based on the theoretical framework. (1) The necropolitical aspect asserts that the sovereign power lies in the ability to govern the death-making process. (2) This power operates through structural violence, which (3) works to deteriorate the generalized social conditions of precariousness that make a life livable. (4) As a life is rendered unlivable, it becomes increasingly ungrievable, which means it becomes devalued. The death and devaluation of this life is what is theorized to construct disposability, in that a life void of value becomes expendable. Power runs through this framework of necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability to render certain populations disposable. This framework is applied to analyze the ways in which power works within conflict and constructs certain populations as expendable.

The usefulness of such a theory of disposability is in its application of power to understand conflict and the subsequent effects upon the everyday lives of people in conflict. This theory would contribute to PACS by establishing a framework for understanding the operation of power and provide a method of analyzing conflicts in the future through their power dynamics.

Achille Mbembe, Judith Butler, Johan Galtung, and Michel Foucault ground the theoretical background for disposability. The critical nature of this theoretical background positions this research within a critical and emancipatory framework. Emerging out of the critiques of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, critical and emancipatory approaches work towards multi-level peace processes with a specific focus on liberating the local within the peace process (Thiessen, 2011, p. 118). This bottom-up approach seeks to provide a voice to local actors and understand what peace looks like on an everyday micro level (Thiessen, 2011, p. 118). The critical and emancipatory framework also challenges the status quo by critiquing peace

processes in terms of reaffirming international and intra-state power dynamics (Thiessen, 2011, p. 125) and including social justice (Byrne & Thiessen, 2019). This research falls in line with this critical and emancipatory approach by critiquing and analyzing the power relations within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This thesis uses five concepts from these theorists to create a framework of a theory of disposability. These concepts are necropolitics, the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle, precariousness, grievability, and power. Together they provide the framework for analyzing the relations between conflict, power, violence, and death.

Briefly, necropolitics examines the relation between power and death. Specifically, it locates the power of the sovereign in the ability to control violence and death. Galtung's (1969) direct-structural-cultural violence triangle describes the types of violence in conflict. The distinction between direct and structural violence is important in describing the types of violence that are in question and how they relate to conflict and power. Precariousness and grievability describes the fragility of life and looks at whose lives matter. Precariousness is important when looking at cultural and structural violence because it examines the social conditions that sustain life and the way cultural and structural violence influences and threatens these conditions. Grievability looks at whose lives matter and what can be apprehended as a life. Grievability describes how value is attributed to certain lives and not others, and the influence this has on defining what is a life. Power is the vein that runs through this theoretical framework and operates through conflict to subject people to violence, killing them, and constructing and re-constructing them as disposable. This proposed theory of disposability offers a conceptualization of the operations of power within violent conflict to inflict violence and create death, and is further explored through these theories below.

4.2 Necropolitics

Achille Mbembe (2003), in his article “Necropolitics” builds upon Michel Foucault’s (1978, pp. 11-12) notion of sovereignty: that sovereignty resides in the ability to control death and define life. Foucault (1978, p. 138) suggests that sovereignty is marked by the right to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death.” For Foucault power lies in the ability of the sovereign to govern life. He describes bio-power as the techniques for controlling bodies and populations and bio-politics as the politics of administering life (Foucault, 1978, pp. 139-140). Mbembe looks at this notion of sovereignty and contemporary forms of violence and builds on Foucault’s concept of bio-power by introducing the concepts of necropolitics and necropower. As opposed to Foucault who focused more on the sovereign’s ability to control life, Mbembe is more concerned with the processes that control death.

Mbembe (2003, p. 40) proposes necropolitics as a concept that describes and analyzes social structures and institutions to reveal the capabilities of the sovereign to govern and regulate death-making processes. Using Mbembe (2003, p. 40), one can look at ‘death worlds’ and the ‘living dead’ as social spaces where inhabitants are exposed to circumstances in which they are both living and ‘marked for death’ in the sense that they experience a fragile existence (precariousness).

Mbembe (2003, p. 14) deconstructs the notion of sovereignty and analyzes the ways it is aimed at “the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations.” Mbembe’s ability to connect power and death is crucial in examining disposability because it locates power relations within a framework that describes the ways in which power operates to inflict violence and kill. Necropolitics grounds the theoretical framework of this proposal because it links power with the destruction of life.

4.3 Structural Violence

To further understand how power operates to control death processes, this research incorporates Johan Galtung's (1996) theory of the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle. Doing so highlights connections between different forms of violence, both direct and structural (indirect), their legitimization through cultural violence, and their relation to an overarching mechanism of power (Galtung, 1996, p. 2). Galtung (1969, p. 170) makes the distinction between two types of violence, personal (direct) and structural (indirect), based on the presence or absence of an actor committing a violent act. Galtung (1996, p. 196) later adds to this dichotomy by describing the legitimizing force behind both types of violence as cultural violence. Cultural violence operates to justify the use of either direct or structural violence by making them feel natural or acceptable (Galtung, 1996, p. 196). This creates a triangle whereby direct, structural, and cultural violence are interrelated and work to influence each other (e.g. cultural violence legitimizing direct or structural violence, direct violence as a result of structural violence, cultural violence as a result of direct and structural violence, etc.).

An important distinction in Galtung's work is that personal and structural violence are autonomous from one another. Although they may appear conjoined or concurrent with one another they remain both empirically and logically independent (Galtung, 1969, p. 182). Although this may lead one to believe they must be analyzed equally in order to capture the full breadth of violence, Galtung (1969, p. 182) states that, "even if one now rejects reductionism one way or the other there would still be good reason for focussing research attention more on one kind of violence than on the other." This point is important to this thesis because this research is more concerned with structural violence than direct violence. As noted in the introduction, structural violence is much more akin to power whereas direct violence parallels the use of force.

Galtung (1969, p. 175) makes a similar remark associating structural violence with inequality and most importantly inequality in the distribution of power.

Connecting structural violence with power is important because it provides a valuable linkage between power and a type of violence that affects the social conditions, which sustain life such as having adequate access to water or food and proper health care. The point can be made here that there is a clear relation between Mbembe's necropolitics and Galtung's violence triangle in that sovereign power operates to control death processes, or as Galtung (1969, p. 171) states, "unequal life chances," through forms of structural violence.

4.4 Precariousness and Grievability

Important to this discussion of power, conflict, violence, and death is what constitutes a life and how one can conceptualize a life that is expendable. Here one can draw a connection to Butler's work in *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* Butler discusses two concepts in her work: precariousness and grievability. Precariousness refers to the generalized social conditions, which make a life livable (Butler, 2010). This precariousness implies a relation and interdependence between people we know as well as those anonymous to us that sustain the conditions upon which our lives depend on (Butler, 2010, p. 14). Grievability asks whose lives matter, by looking at whose deaths are worthy of grief. In the absence of grievability, a life cannot be considered a life (Butler, 2010, p. 15). As Butler (2010, p. 14) states, "precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear." In this sense, in order for a life to truly be considered a life it must be valued and thus recognized as grievable.

These two concepts intersect with one another. In order for a life to be precarious it must first be apprehended as a life. Grievability makes a life recognizable or apprehendable and thus gives way to a life being precarious (Butler, 2010, p.15). Grievability then, precedes precariousness because without a life being constituted as a life, it would not be possible to then recognize this life as precarious. However, the dependency on social conditions that make life precarious are also required for a life to be livable and thus grievable (Butler, 2010, p. 23). In this way precariousness would appear to precede grievability, because a life, which is absent of these social conditions would not be considered valuable and therefore not grievable. The differentiation between the two then must be replaced, especially in terms of application (Butler, 2010, p. 22) by an understanding that both precariousness and grievability intersect to a point of indistinguishability and are interdependent. This is not to say that they are the same but that for a life to be grievable it must have and sustain the social conditions that make life precarious, and for life to be precarious it must also be apprehended as a life with value and therefore be grievable.

Another aspect of Butler's work is precarity, which is distinct from precariousness. Precarity indicates that there exist politically induced social conditions that bring about increased exposure to violence and death (Butler, 2010, p. 25). This includes conditions of maximized precariousness where these people must also appeal to the state that is committing such violence for protection (Butler, 2010, p. 26). Whereas precariousness implies solely the generalizable social conditions of living, precarity links these conditions to the political sphere which is of particular importance for this thesis due the political nature of Israeli settlements. Although not central to the theoretical framework of this thesis, precarity provides another link supporting the claims that political or sovereign power, through a form of violence, can result in death.

Precariousness and grievability are important to the theoretical framework of this thesis because they allow a conceptualization of what constitutes a liveable life and provide a frame for analyzing whose lives matter. Because disposability is particularly concerned with structural violence and slow death, precariousness is increasingly important because it describes life as being dependent on social conditions. These social conditions are what come under attack through structural violence and cause a life to be unlivable and bring about death. Through precariousness one can analyze how life comes under threat through structural violence. In addition, precarity links these two concepts to the political by describing the relation between political action and the social conditions that sustain life. Through grievability one can analyze how the deterioration of these social conditions negate what can be recognized as a life.

To associate this with necropolitics and structural violence, this thesis proposes that power, through structural violence, deteriorates social conditions making life precarious, which reduces a certain population's value and makes them ungrievable to the extent that they become devalued and disposable.

4.5 Power

Before concluding this section, it is crucial to define power due to its extensive use and importance in this work. The theoretical framework described above, detailing Mbembe, Galtung, and Butler's work, discusses power and its ability to govern over violence, life, and death. At this intersection between power, violence, and death, we can understand power as Michel Foucault does in *The History of Sexuality*. Here, Foucault (1978, pp. 94-95) outlines his conception of power as relational, productive, fluid, intentional, and how, through sustained hegemonic relations of power, power can become domination. It is important to distinguish also

what power is not. Power is not then, a mechanism to ensure subservience, nor a system of domination (Foucault, 1978, p. 92). As Foucault states in an interview with Michael Bess (1988, p. 2), “power should not be understood as an oppressive system bearing down on individuals from above, smiting them with prohibitions of this or that. Power is a set of relations.” In essence power is not static and does not constitute a structure of oppression, yet it is an unequal set of relations between free individuals.

Although Foucault is clear that power is not a top down force, which oppresses, he maintains that power relations are never equal (Bess, 1988, p. 2). For Foucault (1978, p. 94), “power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.” Power then, is understood as a set of relations through which the sovereign continuously leverages its position to gain an advantage or act in a certain way that results in their favour. Power plays an important role in this theoretical model of disposability because it permeates through the entire process. In the necropolitical aspect, power is seen in the sovereign’s ability to govern death. Structural violence manifests through the continuous unequal relations of power. These power relations also affect the social conditions on which life depends (precariousness) and whose lives matter (grievability) and thus who becomes disposable.

Conclusions

This chapter explicated the theory of disposability, which suggests that sovereign power inflicts structural violence onto certain populations, exposing them to a greater risk of death and devaluation. Through this process certain groups are constructed and re-constructed as disposable through sovereign action. The following chapter discusses the necropolitical aspect of the theory of disposability, and its role in describing Israeli state action and decisionmaking.

Chapter Five – Necropolitics: The Politics of Death in Israel/Palestine

Introduction

Israel is recognized internationally as a sovereign state as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, al-Nakba, or the War of Independence (Caplan, 2010; Dowty, 2017). The sovereignty of the Israeli state is further solidified through its democratic process, which establishes sovereignty over a polity through free and fair elections. This sovereignty bestows upon the Israeli state the ability to control its own affairs within its territory, approximately 78 percent of the disputed land by July 1949. Importantly, the West Bank was annexed and controlled by Transjordan (Black, 2017, p. 130; O'Malley, 2015, p. 16). In 1967 however, this changed. The Six-Day War or the June War resulted in the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and the West Bank (O'Malley, 2015, p. 18; Dowty, 2017). This gave Israel unfettered access to the lands beyond the Partition Lines, and against a dispossessed Palestinian people, the power asymmetry between the two groups is substantially disproportionate, both internally and internationally. The sovereignty of the Israeli state over its own territory as well as the West Bank, despite challenges to its legitimacy, denunciations of colonialism, imperialism, and occupation, changes under the Oslo accords that divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, creates the contemporary context in which necropolitics, the reading of social and political sovereignty to control death, can be explored.

Necropolitics, posits that sovereign power operates upmost to control death, to decide who dies or who is allowed to die (Mbembe, 2003). Disposability draws on this idea to conceptualize how certain bodies – in this case the Palestinian body – become killable in violent conflict, leading to their construction and re-construction as disposable. Through necropolitics,

the sovereignty of the state of Israel can be understood as the capacity and authority for decisionmaking, specifically residing in its right to decide who lives and who dies. The main argument of this chapter is that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements are the result of political endeavours of the Israeli state.

To explore this notion of necropolitics and its role within disposability, this chapter is organized using Waltz's (2001) levels of analysis, to describe Israeli state action on the international, national/state, and local levels. On each one of these levels, Allison's (1999) three frameworks of state decisionmaking are used to describe the actions of the Israeli state. On the international level, the RAM and OBM are used, on the state level all three are used, and on the local level the GPM is mostly used. This approach gives a comprehensive view of Israeli state action and decisionmaking regarding settlements, in order to investigate disposability within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The arguments presented in this chapter are that settlements are political in nature, and further, settlement construction and expansion are intrinsically connected to the sovereignty of the Israeli state. This chapter first discusses the international level, in particular Israel's defiance over settlements and promoting the Israeli narrative internationally. Second, it looks at the national level, describing how land appropriation, settlement planning, and Israeli political leadership are connected to settlements. Third, it discusses the local level by looking at the role of CSOs and NGOs in influence state policy.

5.1 Level 1 - International

Settlements have drawn a great deal of international attention. The UN has condemned them as illegal, based on the 4th Geneva Convention and has set up a monitoring system for human rights issues that are affected by them. Settlements have played an important role in peace

negotiations, especially as bargaining tools as well as conditions for peace (O'Malley, 2015). Even as Israel's key supporter, the US has issued warnings concerning the construction of settlements under different administrations since George Bush Sr. in 1992. Further, human rights organization, CSOs, NGOs, and news agencies bring international attention to the struggles and violence facing Palestinians that are a result of Israeli settlements. The role of the international community in the issue of Israeli settlements, the pressures upon Israel to halt construction and its outright defiance to do so, display the entrenched issues facing Palestinians: the Israeli narrative regarding land ownership and the dispossession, occupation, and subjection of Palestinians. The pertinent actions of the international community as they pertain to Israeli settlements in the West Bank are important in framing the greater politics within which Israeli state action and decisionmaking occur and are laid out in Chapter Two.

The following looks deeper into how the Israeli state responds to the actions and pressures of the international community. This section looks at the responses of the Israeli state to international pressure related to settlements to show how Israel defies the international community and the normalized international legal structure, and by doing so promotes the Israeli narrative internationally. These responses to the pressure of the international community show how settlements are connected to the political action and decisionmaking of the Israeli state at the international level.

Israeli Defiance Over Settlements

There is evidence that shows the Israeli state was aware of the illegality of settlements in the West Bank before the first outpost in the Etzion Bloc was constructed. In a note dated September 18, 1967, Theodor Meron, the legal counsel for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, informed

the Israeli state¹ that settlements in the West Bank would violate the Fourth Geneva Convention (OHCHR, 2013). Despite this consultation, construction of the settlements continued and the first settlement was constructed by 1967 (O'Malley, 2015). The UN affirmed that the 4th Geneva Convention applied within the occupied territory of the West Bank in Resolution 237, on the 14th of June 1967, and requested Israel cease development of settlements in the West Bank as early as 1976 in a statement by the Head of State, and further in 1979, Resolution 446 specified and affirmed the illegality of settlements in particular (OHCHR, 2013). Immediately upon settlement construction, Israel, knowingly contravening international law as laid out by the UN and their own consult, defied the international community and the pressure to cease settlement development, and to this day, has continued to do so. The Israeli response to these issues is a denial of the illegality of settlements, they argue that the 4th Geneva Convention does not cover Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and stress the historical and religious significance of the land for Jewish people and therefore the state. Further, in the face of criticisms around settlement construction and pressure to halt construction, Israel either continues settlement construction unabatingly, or ramps up settlement construction and/or the population of settlements. This continued construction, which is evident since 1967, shows the defiance of the Israeli state to the international community.

After the UN passed Resolution 446 on March 22nd, 1979, the first resolution to specify settlement construction as an issue specifically, Israel passed Military Order 783 5739 allowing Israeli Military Regional Commanders to define and extend settlement borders (OHCHR, 2013). Settlement construction also rose, in 1979 620 construction projects were started in settlements, by 1980 this number rose to 1,790, by 1982 it rose to 3,020 (Peace Now, 2019a). The late 1980s

¹ It is unclear who exactly received the document, but it seems that minimally, Prime Minister Eshkol, who requested the report, as well as the justice minister who was sent the report later would have been informed.

saw the largest rise in settlement construction, most likely in response to the First Intifada in 1987, as security has always been used as an excuse for settlement expansion, the Thousand Hundred Plan, and also possibly in anticipation of the Oslo negotiations (O'Malley, 2015, pp. 87, 225; Gazit, 2004). George Bush Sr. took a hard stance on settlement construction during the Oslo negotiations and Secretary of State James Baker in 1992, threatened to withdraw \$10 million of funding (O'Malley, 2015). Settlement construction slowed, and from 1993 to 1996, as only one new settlement was established (O'Malley, 2015, p. 204) and from 1992 to 1993 construction within settlements dropped from 6,180 to 2,240 (Peace Now, 2019a). However, the settler population in the West Bank continued to rise from 105,400 in 1992 to 146,900 in 1996 (Peace Now, 2019b²). Showing that although construction may be constrained, Israel still responded to international pressure by strengthening settlements, on this occasion through raising the population within settlements. In the wake of UN resolution 446, Israel also passed a law expanding its reach within the West Bank, and amongst increasing concern regarding settlement development in the international community, Israel went through its most prolific settlement construction period. Although construction slowed as a result of US pressure and threats of cutting funding, the population of settlements in the West Bank continued to grow. The continual rise of settlements due to settlement expansion and increasing population sizes has maintained a steady pace until the present, despite of increasing international calls that settlement construction

² Numbers from ICBS do not include East Jerusalem or communities under 5,000 and thus numbers are likely greater than cited. In 2015 for example, based on voter information ARIJ estimated settler population (excluding East Jerusalem) was 449,298, whereas the ICB reported 385,900 (https://www.arij.org/files/arijadmin/2017/set_pop_2017.pdf). Discrepancies can also be seen between NGOs and the state, pro-settler Yesha Council estimates 435,708 settlers in 2017, whereas the ICBS reported 413,400 (<https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population>) (<http://www.myesha.org.il/?CategoryID=335&ArticleID=9165>). Both lower than ARIJ's projected 449,298 for 2015.

be stopped. The continued defiance of the international community is one way settlements are used politically at the international level by the Israeli state.

Promoting the Israeli Narrative Internationally

The second way Israel politicizes settlements at the international level is by promoting the Zionist-nationalist narrative of land ownership and a right to the land of Eretz-Israel, which is the religious basis for settlement of the West Bank. This can be seen in Ariel Sharon's reaction to international pressure from the Mitchel Report as well as the Road Map for Peace produced by the Quartet, and the reaction to UN resolutions by the Netanyahu government, as well as the current US support for Israel.

After the failure of peace negotiations in the early 2000s, the Mitchel Report, led by George Mitchel, a former US Senator and chief architect of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, was published in 2001 and stated, "The [Government of Israel] should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing settlements" (EEAS, 2001, p. 3). Newly elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made a statement in response to the report on May 22, 2001. Following the failed peace talks, Sharon's statement places the onus on the Palestinians for starting the violence, despite his provocative walk at the Temple Mount, and further calls for a commitment to peace, to "stop the violence" and "reach an immediate cease fire" (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001). With a renewed cease fire Palestinians and Israelis could begin implementing the Mitchel Report's timeline, which according to Sharon's statement included:

1. A total and unconditional cessation of violence and terrorism;
2. A meaningful cooling off period;

3. Implementing confidence building measures (CBM's); and,
4. Resuming political negotiations.

(Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001)

Whereas the Mitchel Report called for the immediate freezing of all settlement activity, at best Sharon believed this issue should be negotiated politically at worst he ignored it all together. Sharon had continually claimed he rejected the notion of ceasing settlement expansion, and even pointed to the proliferation of settlement construction under his time as Interior Minister as evidence of his commitment to the goal of settling Eretz-Israel (Miller, Zetouni, & Miller, 2002). In response to international pressure to stop settlement construction, Sharon insisted to the Israeli public he was committed to the nationalist goal of settling the entire Eretz-Israel. This shows how the Zionist-nationalist narrative played a large role in Sharon's response to international pressure. Sharon was further pressured internationally by the Road Map for Peace.

In 2002, pressure on Israel to cease settlement activity came from the three phases of the Quartet's Road Map for Peace. The Quartet includes representatives from the EU, Russia, the UN, and the US (United Nations, 2003a). In Phase One the Quartet reiterated the Mitchel Plan to freeze all settlement activity, and further that the Israeli state "dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001" (United Nations, 2003a). Phase Two would include "further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders" (United Nations, 2003a). In Phase three there would be negotiations to find a permanent resolution on settlements (United Nations, 2003a). Statements by Sharon suggest he supported the Road Map, including statements made at the Fourth Herzliya Conference on December 18, 2003 and to the UN on June 4, 2003 (United Nations, 2003b). However, in reality, Sharon did little to address the issues identified in the Quartet's roadmap or the Mitchel Report including

little action on settlement construction and development. Further, Sharon's Disengagement Plan was created to stall the peace process and allow for the continued settlement of the West Bank.

Up until this point, the settlement issue included settlements in Gaza as well as the West Bank, it is important to note that Sharon's Disengagement Plan withdrew all Israelis from the Gaza Strip as well as parts of Northern Samaria (West Bank) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Carried out in 2005, although four settlements were uprooted, the settlements of Shaked, Reihan, and Hinanit, and one legalized outpost Tal Menashe, remain across the Green Line in the North West of the West Bank to this day. Further, although this was suggested to assist continuity of a Palestinian state (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), removing these settlements did little to address the main issue which is access to East Jerusalem and connections between major Palestinian cities such as Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron, and Jenin, which are imperative for a continuous Palestinian state.

Although no real meaningful changes in settlement construction and population occurred in the rest of the West Bank, overall construction was certainly not restricted during this time. Construction remained stable fluctuating between 1,701 in 2001 to 2,332 in 2008 (Peace Now, 2019a) population continued to rise from 208,300 in 2001 to 281,100 in 2008 (Peace Now, 2019b). Israel, although outposts were constructed heavily in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002, ended outpost establishment in 2005, until Netanyahu reinstated them in 2012 (Peace Now, 2019a). The shift towards disengagement in Gaza has not come without its criticisms, many suggesting that the intention was in fact to disrupt the peace process, further, in the West Bank, the construction and populating of settlements continued. The Israeli state saw these as major concessions however in reality they did little to better the situation and may have intentionally worsened it. What Sharon's response to the Mitchel Report and the Road Map for Peace show is that

settlement expansion into the West Bank was a central interest of the Israeli state and coincided with the Zionist-nationalist narrative of the right to settle all of Eretz-Israel. By adhering to this narrative, Sharon and the Israeli state promoted it uncompromisingly within the international community.

Further evidence of how this narrative has affected the international community and discussion regarding Israel and settlements is seen during Netanyahu's second term, and the Israeli state's response to UN Resolution 2334. Resolution 2334, passed in 2016, called for immediate steps to cease settlements action, as it risked any two-state possibility (Security Council, 2016). In response Netanyahu recalled ambassadors from New Zealand and Senegal, two countries who sponsored the resolution, halted Israeli aid to Senegal, and cut \$7.8 billion in UN funding (The New York Times, 2016). Israel's UN Ambassador Danny Dannon, in addressing the UNSC, condemned the UNSC for passing resolution 2334 saying, "while thousand are being massacred in Syria, this Council wasted valuable time and efforts condemning the democratic state of Israel for building homes in the historic homeland of the Jewish people" (C-SPAN, 2016). Dannon goes on to claim that the resolution reinforces Palestinian terrorism, claiming the resolution "a victory for terror... hatred and violence" (C-SPAN, 2016). He continues to stress the historical connection between the Jewish people and the land and the Israeli state as a solely Jewish state. Interestingly, construction directly after resolution 2334, which was passed in late December 2016, decreased from 3,143 in 2016 to 1,700 in 2017 (Peace Now, 2019a). However, this may have been in anticipation for the impending President Elect Donald Trump who took office in January 2017 and the Pro-Israeli stance of the new government.

Under President Trump former US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, in an address to the UNSC, described resolution 2334 as an impediment to peace because it placed the failure of peace negotiations upon Israeli settlements, as opposed to “Palestinian leaders who for many years rejected one peace proposal after another” (The Times of Israel, 2017a). Trump himself has said the resolution “puts Israel in a very poor negotiating position and is extremely unfair to all Israelis” in a Facebook post (Trump, 2016). Given the pro-Israeli stance of the new administration, it is somewhat surprising Trump has commented to an Israeli Newspaper, Israel Hayom, saying, “I’m not someone who believes that advancing settlements is good for peace” (The Times of Israel, 2017c; BBC, 2017; The New York Times, 2017). Regardless, indications are that settlement construction has increased to 2,066 in 2018, a moderate increase from 1,700 in 2017 (Peace Now, 2019a). However, the Times of Israel reported on April 7th, 2019, that the Civil Administration’s High Planning Subcommittee, who are responsible for administering settlement construction plans, approved plans for 3,600 homes in the West Bank. If construction starts within the year, it would be the highest amount of settlement construction since 2000.

The response of the Netanyahu government to UN Resolution 2334 showed how embedded the right to settle all of Eretz-Israel is within the Israeli state and the narrative it chooses to tell the international community. Further, despite Trump admitting settlements were bad for peace, the Pro-Israeli US government under the Trump administration and the blame attributed to Palestinians by US government officials, as well as the continued construction and increasing population of settlements at potentially the most prolific rates in 20 years, shows how the Israeli narrative influence the international community and the discussion around Israel and Palestine. Although the UN and other countries take the position that the West Bank is an occupied territory and settlements are illegal as per the 4th Geneva Convention, the narrative of

the Jewish homeland and its promotion on the international level, have clearly taken root in certain corners of the international community.

Conclusion

On the international level, looking at the Israeli state's responses to international pressure on the issue of settlements shows how settlements are related to the political action and decisionmaking of the Israeli state through its use to resist the international community and in promoting the Israeli narrative internationally. These two issues show how the Israeli state protects and acts towards advancing certain interests. The main interest behind Israeli political action and decisionmaking in response to international pressure on settlements is promoting and obtaining a Jewish homeland in the entirety of the former Palestine territory. This can be seen in the Israeli state's continuous defiance of international law as well as the international community through continually building, expanding, and populating settlements, and promoting the Israeli narrative internationally. Not only does it advance certain Israeli interests, but Israeli political action regarding settlements can be seen as an organizational behaviour of the state, akin to a 'call-and-response' whereby the international community calls for settlement construction and expansion to stop, and in response Israel continues to build, expand, and populate settlements while justifying them through ancestral, historical connections to the land. This institutes a normalized operational behaviour within the Israeli state where international pressure is continuously responded to by expanding, developing, and populating settlements. These factors reveal how Israeli settlements in the West Bank are connected to Israeli political action and decisionmaking at the international level and in response to the international community.

5.2 Level 2 - National/State

The main objective of the analysis in this section, using Waltz's (2001) second level, is asking how state action and decisionmaking affect the disposability of certain people. To investigate this question in relation to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, it requires a look at Israeli state action as it pertains to settlement development and construction. In order to grasp a complete view of Israeli state decisionmaking, Allison's (1999) three models of RAM, OBM, and GPM, are used to provide a comprehensive framework that looks at the rational intentions of the state, the organizational process and their outputs, and the intra-political game at the national level. Through using these three models, Israeli state action can be investigated in terms of how and why certain actions are taken, and for what purposes and through which processes. In analyzing Israeli state action, it is convincingly shown that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are the results of political actions and decisionmaking, in that they are embedded within and are a systematic part of the Israeli political structure. On the national level this is shown through looking at three major functions of the Israeli state in relation to settlement development: the legal framework of land appropriation, the planning of Israeli settlements, and the relation between settlements and Israeli political leadership. By analyzing these three issues, it is shown that settlements are used to protect and advance certain state interests such as ensuring the safety and security of Jewish-Israelis over Palestinians, establishing a Jewish homeland, and undermining the Palestinian state. Further it is shown that the narrative of the right to a Jewish homeland in the West Bank and prejudice against Palestinians is embedded within the Israeli state and its arms that control settlement development. Finally, that settlements are used by Israeli politicians to appease right-wing and Zionist Israelis in order to improve political positioning.

Land Appropriation and Ownership in the West Bank

The issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is dated to 1967 when Israel gained control over the territory from Jordan, and the first settlements were constructed. Although this marks the start of the physical construction of settlements, several key state decisions before 1967 played a key role in setting the context for settlement development as well as giving evidence for certain narratives of land ownership and Israeli intentions. At the advent of the Israeli state in 1948, The Provisional Council of State was created to act as the governing body of Israel (Sassoon, 1968, p. 405). Its Proclamation on May 14, 1948, revoked the 1939 White Papers, which established three important principles. First, that a Jewish National Home would be founded within Palestine, but not encompass the entirety of Palestine. This is important for several reasons. The White Papers conflict with the Zionist narrative that all of the former territory of Palestine belonged to the Jewish people and would presumably restrict Israel's ability to control the entire area. Second and third, the White Papers restricted Jewish immigration as well as the transfer of Arab land to Jewish people. By revoking these principles established under the Mandate, massive amounts of Jewish immigration followed the 1948 declaration of Independence, the land Israel had inherited from the Mandate was entirely under its control and could be parcelled out as it saw fit, and it removed any restriction within the official legislature of Jewish ownership over the entire Palestine territory. The Provisional Council of State also changed any reference to 'Palestine,' to 'Israel' within the legal system, suggesting an ideological shift, which mimicked the Zionist vision of a Jewish Home in the entire former Palestine.

The Absentee Property Law (1950) as well as the Planning and Building Law (1965) both passed through the Knesset, became formalized laws governing the state of Israel. It has been

documented that both these laws were used for the basis of settlement development. The Absentee Property Law was used to justify state land grabs by transferring property owned by Palestinians to the state of Israel if they were left abandoned after the War of 1948. Israelis have long argued that Palestinians left these homes voluntarily. However, recent information is pointing more in support of the Palestinian view, which states that Israelis forced them from their homes, making them refugees either within or outside Israeli territory (O'Malley, 2015). The Absentee Law, which did not discriminate if Palestinians were absent within or outside the country, was subsequently used by the state to seize more property and settle more Jewish immigrants (OHCHR, 2013). The Planning and Building Law established a bureaucratic process of requiring development plans to be submitted retrospectively and new development to be approved by different planning bodies (national, regional, and local). It also made provisions for the demolition of houses that were in violation of development plans and those that were deemed a 'nuisance.' This law was used to justify the demolition of Palestinian homes (B'Tselem, 2012).

Although Israeli settlements in the West Bank were not constructed until after the 1967 war, there were indications pre-1967 that the Israeli state's objectives were to control as much of the disputed territory as possible and to settle Jewish immigrants and increase the population in this territory. Numbers do matter as Jews are a majority in Israel and Palestinians are a minority, yet the roles are reversed when the Middle East becomes the geographical context. The double majority-double minority reality enhances the both minority ethnic group's sense of being a besieged minority (Byrne, 2008). The narrative that the land belongs to the Jewish people, which is used to this day to justify any Jewish settlement in any part of Israel, is visible through the immediate actions of The Provisional Council of State in revoking the White Papers. Further, the Absentee Property Law (1950) as well as the Planning and Building Law (1965), both passed by

the Knesset, created the legal framework through which the Israeli state's land acquisition operates today, and were used to create the context and conditions in which Israeli settlements emerged after the War in 1967.

The actions of the Israeli state pre-1967 show the importance in advancing the interest of creating a Jewish homeland in the entire former territory of Palestine, that this interest was behind land seizure through enacting Israeli laws, and that this system embeds this logic within the system of land acquisition in the future. Further, the revoking of the White Papers in particular, show how these actions fall in line and work towards appeasing the Zionist and right-wing communities, and their vision of a Jewish homeland.

The war in 1967 between Israel and the surrounding Arab states marks the point when Israeli settlements in the West Bank became possible. The occupation in the West Bank allowed the Israeli state access to these lands, although under international law it was prohibited to take lands won through war (4th Geneva Convention) and/or settle these lands. Despite the international norms regarding the treatment of territory captured during war, Israel has built upwards of 200 settlements, with predominantly Jewish residents in the West Bank (B'Tselem, 2019b). The legal foundation for acquiring Palestinian Land is built through a legal framework of Military Orders and laws passed through the Knesset. In analyzing this framework, it is shown how the Israeli narrative of the right to a Jewish homeland in the West Bank becomes embedded within the state system that controls the administration of settlements, and results in the prejudice within the system against Palestinians.

Immediately after the war in 1967, the Israel state began implementing measures to appropriate land in the West Bank. Military order No. 58 Concerning Abandoned Property (Private Property) allowed the state to acquire properties left by refugees (Badil, 2004). This

order had no time restrictions, allowing the order to be used to acquire land in the future. Military Order No. 59 defined Israeli state property as all property that was, before June 6th, 1967, belonging to the enemy state (Shehadeh, 1985, p. 48), and that those issuing the order could seize this property through “whatever action he deems necessary.” This order was used and designed specifically to seize Jordanian government land, that of the West Bank (Shehadeh, 1985; OHCHR, 2013). Further, Military Order 291 was used to repeal any Settlement Orders or Settlement Law prohibiting the transaction of land, allowing for more land in the West Bank to be declared state land (Israel Law Resource Center, 2007; OHCHR, 2013). These Military Orders were enacted almost immediately following the War of 1967 and were part of a framework of early legislation applied to the West Bank (B'Tselem, 2012). Both were used to seize property for the Israeli state in the West Bank, from Palestinian refugees and from the Jordanian state.

Military Order NO. 418 in 1971, which transferred authority over planning and development to the Israeli Army, followed the immediate provisions for land seizure in the West Bank. This order was used to deny Palestinian construction and growth by refusing permits and limiting industrial and economic projects. At this time Israel passed another Military Order 783/5739, that allowed settlements to be expanded at the discretion of the Israeli Military Regional Commander (OHCHR, 2013). Giving the Israeli state the ability to alter the borders of settlements, thereby allowing their expansion. Not only had land been seized for settlement construction in the West Bank, but by 1979, the state had constructed a legal apparatus for administering the development of the land at its discretion. This gave the Israeli state full authority over the West Bank in terms of who was allowed to build and develop and who was not. In 1980, another Military Order, No. 892, the administration of the size and boundaries of

Israeli settlements was further transferred to the Israeli Military, in that the area of larger settlements, awarded 'local councils,' was now under the discretion of the Israeli Army Regional Commander (United Nations, 2016a). These Military Orders allowed the Israeli state, through its military arm, to expand and define the area settlements occupied. Increasing the settlement size, while also increasingly dispossessing Palestinians of their land.

The state of Israel also plays an important role in populating settlements. For example, the Israeli state approved Decision No. 3292 in 1998 (Adalah, 2010). This decision gave benefits to certain National Priority Areas (NPAs), which disproportionately favoured Israelis (Adalah, 2010). In 2009, the Economic Arrangements Law included settlements as NPAs, which gives the settlement a greater allocation of state resources and benefits for the residents of settlements (Adalah, 2010). These benefits range from housing, education, industry and agriculture, grants and subsidies, as well as compensation for items taxed by the EU, and lower taxes than those within Israel (OHCHR, 2013). These benefits help give financial incentive for moving and population settlements, which is part of the reason settlement growth is larger than the actual growth of Israel. These incentives and programs are offered by the Israeli state to facilitate populating Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

In more recent years, revealed through leaked documents in 2009, the Spiegel Database (Yesh Din, 2009) showed the extent of settlement construction, as well as the violations of building plans, that would make the construction in some settlements illegal within Israeli law. Further, it is documented how Palestinian private land was used for the construction of settlements, confirming the appropriation of private Palestinian land for settlement construction in over 30 settlements, and linking settlement construction directly to the dispossession of Palestinians (Yesh Din, 2009). In 2012, the Levy committee (Levy, Shapira, & Baker, 2014)

published its findings and the legal status of outposts in the West Bank. The report not only establishes that these outposts were constructed without any government authorization, hence their illegality, but that the government was actively involved in establishing outposts, including the Prime Minister (PM), public authorities, and regional councils. The conclusion of the report, despite finding these discrepancies, suggests retrospectively legalizing outposts, as they were clearly the objective of the government (Levy, Shapira, & Baker, 2014). No mention of Palestinians is recorded in the report.

The legal framework around land appropriation and ownership is a major indication of the political nature of settlements. The Israeli state created a framework before, and directly after the War in 1967, that allowed for the state to control dispossessed Palestinian private homes and Jordanian state territory, explicitly used for settlement construction. Further the transferring of authority and control of settlements to the IDF allowed the state to expand settlements and continually re-disposes Palestinians of their land. This also allowed for the Israeli state to control development in the West Bank, favouring Israeli development over Palestinian development. The state of Israel was central in taking the lands needed for settlement construction, and in also populating settlements by offering incentives for Israelis who lived there. The intentions of the Israeli state in these regards have become even clearer as it retrospectively legalizes outposts, expanding the number of settlements in the West Bank greatly.

Although the physical construction of settlements is not done by the Israeli state, construction is not permitted without the explicit approval by the state, through the process of submitting and approving development plans. In all facets of the issue of settlements, land seizure and Palestinian dispossession, populating settlements, constructing and expanding settlements, as well as some issues not discussed here such as securitizing and militarizing

settlements, the Israeli state plays an essential and fundamental role. The Israeli state, through its legal framework of land appropriation and land ownership, and through expanding and populating settlements, is certainly, strongly connected with the development of settlements in the West Bank.

Planning Israeli Settlement

Further evidence of the connection between the Israeli state and settlements in the West Bank is the actual planning of settlement in the West Bank that started immediately after the war in 1967. Through the Allon Plan (1967), the Drobles Plan (1978), the Sharon Plan (1981), and the Hundred Thousand Plan (1983), it is shown that the Israeli state literally planned Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This suggests that not only is the state innately connected to the ways in which settlements are made possible through land appropriation, expansion, development, and populating settlements, but that the Israeli state prioritized and took ownership of settlement development, effectively controlling the entire process.

The Allon Plan was developed in the summer of 1967 after the War and influenced Israeli strategic development in the West Bank ever since (Rubenberg, 2012). The head of the Ministry Committee for Settlements, Yigal Allon, created a plan to establish Israeli settlements along the Jordan river and other strategic positions to increase security in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and working towards a peace agreement (Rivlin, 2010, p. 143; Progress of the Allon Plan, 1972). Allon's plan was based on five principles:

- [1] The historical right to settle the Land of Israel, with due regard for demographic factors in the area, as a moral basis for the plan; [2] the demarcation frontiers as a

strategic basis of the plan; [3] the maintenance of the Jewish character of the state; [4] promoting a social-democratic character and basic structure for the state; [5] the acceptability to the world of the state constituted on the basis of this plan (Progress of the Allon Plan, 1972).

To meet these ends the plan had four main propositions: (1) to control the Jordan valley, control Palestinian access to Jordan, and create separate enclaves of Palestinians; (2) secure Israel's eastern border; (3) annex areas around the Jerusalem corridor to secure Jerusalem; (4) Palestinians would have three separate enclaves, in the north and south of the West Bank, and another enclave incorporating Jericho and a passageway to Jordan (Palestine Facts, 2011). Although this plan was never official adopted by the Israeli state, multiple sources show how the state used it as a blueprint for settlement development. By 1971, 11 settlements in the Jordan Valley had been constructed, 3 were civilian and 8 were semi-military, further, although security was the main reason purported for the development of settlements, it is clear that obtaining land in the West Bank for agriculture and controlling water were also important interests (Progress of the Allon Plan, 1972). By 1977, 21 settlements had been constructed in line with the Allon Plan (Palestine Facts, 2011). The Allon Plan is important because it shows that directly after the War in 1967 the government was planning and following through on the plans made to settle the West Bank. Although the Allon plan was marketed as an attempt at peace and for the security of Israel, it also was aimed to serve other interests. These other interests were keeping the Zionist narrative of the historical right to the land and the emphasis on a 'Jewish' state, cutting access to Jerusalem, and creating a discontinuous Palestinian state whereby the main populous areas

would be disconnected. “As a result of implementing the Allon plan, Israel gained control over 50% of the West Bank lands” (ARIJ, 2019).

In 1977, the Likud party won the Israeli elections, and named their representative to the World Zionist Organization, Matti Droblin, the head of the Jewish Agency’s settlement department (Gazit, 2004, p. 265). In 1978, Droblin released his plan for Israeli settlement, which came to be known as the Droblin Plan and signalled a deeper commitment to settlement within the Palestinian territories. As opposed to the Allon Plan, the Droblin Plan focused more on urban settlements as opposed to agricultural settlements, in unpopulated areas in the West Bank, designed to be set up and populated quickly (Gazit, 2004, p. 268), further, whereas settlements may have been seen as temporary before 1977, the Droblin Plan specified a commitment to long-term settlements and annexation of West Bank territory (B’Tselem, 2002; Gazit, 2004). It states that,

The civilian presence of Jewish communities is vital for the security of the state... There must not be the slightest doubt regarding our intention to hold the areas of Judea and Samaria for ever.... The best and most effective way to remove any shred of doubt regarding our intention to hold Judea and Samaria forever is a rapid settlement drive in these areas. (Matityahu Droblin, Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, September 1980, p. 3 as quoted in B’Tselem, 2002).

The shift within Israeli planning policy in the West Bank towards establishing permanent Israeli settlements in the West Bank is strongly influenced by the ties to the WZO and the Zionist

movement within Israel that was prominent at the time with groups such as Gush Eminent (Gazit, 2004).

Building upon the Drobles Plan, the Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon published his plan, calling for annexation through Israeli settlement in the West Bank. Two important factors of the Sharon Plan were that he blurred the green line, justifying settlement in the West Bank, and he suggested the idea of building a ring of Israeli settlements to enclose Jerusalem within Israeli territory (Miller, Zetouni, & Miller, 2002). The blurring of the Green Line was important in that it disregarded the borders set in 1949 and showed the intention of the Israeli state to argue, on the basis of established and populated settlements, to annex as much of the West Bank as possible and expand Israeli state territory. The enclosing of Jerusalem is important as well, as Palestinians viewed East Jerusalem as their potential capital (O'Malley, 2015), whereas the Israeli state saw Jerusalem as a (w)holy Jewish city and wanted to control the entire territory of, and surrounding, Jerusalem. In 1983 the Ministry of Agriculture published the Hundred Thousand Plan showing its intentions and commitment to increasing settlements in the West Bank until 2010. Developed by the WZO and the Ministry of Agriculture, the Hundred Thousand Plan had a short-term goal of settling 100,000 Jews in the West Bank between 1982-1987, and the settlement of half a million Jews by 2010 (Efrat, 1988, p. 23). Although the government fell short of its population goals, it achieved its goals in terms of settlement development, as well as the construction of roads and infrastructure to support settlements (B'Tselem, 2002).

The strategies of settlement in the West Bank set out in the Allon Plan, Drobles Plan, Sharon Plan, and the Hundred Thousand Plan are an indication of the intentions of the Israeli state to settle Palestinian land. Since the Drobles Plan in 1978, it has been the explicit intent of the Israeli state to annex West Bank territory through settlement construction. Most notably seen

in Netanyahu's campaign promises of annexing all settlements in the West Bank, this intention is still at the forefront of the Israeli political structure (PBS, 2019). These plans shed light on the interests that developing Israeli settlements serve, such as settling the entire territory of former Palestine, based on their historic and religious right to the land, establishing new borders that expanded the territory of the Israeli state into the West Bank, securing and cutting off Palestinian access to Jerusalem, and creating discontinuous Palestinian enclaves, disjointed from one another to disrupt the formation of a Palestinian state. Throughout the entire planning process of settling the West Bank, security remained the primary justification for which settlement construction was perpetuated. However, these plans also signal that settlement construction was undertaken for a multitude of political, social, historic, and religious purposes, that went far beyond the security needs of the Israeli state.

Settlements and Israeli Political Leadership

The last major factor found through this research supporting the political nature of settlements and the connection between settlements and Israeli state action and decisionmaking, is the role of Israeli political leadership. Since 1967, no Israeli PM has intended to halt settlement development and growth. In all, only one, PM Rabin in 1992 froze settlement construction, however this is mitigated by the threats of the US withdrawing USD \$10 million in funding (O'Malley, 2015). In 2010, under Netanyahu, Israel was supposed to stopping settlement construction again for 10 months, however whether this was actually done is contested, as per Palestinians who insisted settlers continued construction (O'Malley, 2015, p. 209). Further, every Israeli PM since 1967 has supported and defended settlement development, further, many have

also referenced the Zionist-nationalist narratives of a Jewish homeland in the entirety of Eretz-Israel while doing so.

After the War of 1967, even though Israel allowed and aided settlement development, it still debated its policies in the newly acquired West Bank. Amidst pressure from the Israeli public, especially from the right wing, nationalist, and Zionist supporters, to annex the territory, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol took a subtler approach, focusing on security and establishing defensible borders (Black, 2017, p. 202). Options were discussed, including plans to return the West Bank to Jordan due to the political implications such as worsening Israeli-Palestinian relations and international scrutiny (Black, 2017, p. 208; The Knesset, 2006). Despite the apparently conflicted Israeli state, several civilian settlements in the West Bank had been established on the basis of returning to the rightful Israeli homeland (Black, 2017, pp. 209-210).

The importance of settlements within Israeli leadership is evident in PM Meir's policy guidelines submitted to the Knesset after she was elected in 1969, which mirrored the Allon Plans call for security in the West Bank through settlement development, as well as her support of the Allon Plan in peace talks with the Jordanian government (Medzini, 2017, p. 523). Meir's government's coalition was also formed with the right-wing nationalist party, Herut-Liberal Bloc, a large proponent of Israeli settlements (The Knesset, 2012).

Israel's next Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin confirmed the connections between settlement development and Israeli political leadership in a statement to the Cabinet, "Settlements in the Administered territories are established solely in accordance with the government's decisions (...) The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence are authorized to implement this policy" (United Nations, 2016a). Rabin's statement connects settlements directly with state decisionmaking as well as to the authority of the Prime Minister and Minister of

Defence to make these decisions and implement pro-settlement policy, a demonstration of the sovereignty the Israeli state had over the West Bank. During the 10 years following the War of 1967, the Israeli government controlled mostly by the Labor government and later by a coalition government with right-wing Herut-Liberal Bloc, began acting on the Allon Plan and increased settlement construction in the West Bank.

In 1977, another major shift towards pro-settlement politics in Israeli leadership took place. For the first time, the Labor party lost to the Likud party, who had strong ties with the WZO (Black, 2017). PM Menachem Begin presented his policy guidelines to the Knesset in which he refers to the Occupied territories as “Eretz Yisrael,” the Zionist term for the entire Israeli/Palestinian territory to which Zionists claim an ancestral, historic, and religious affiliation. This was something he reiterated in his second tenure in 1981 (OHCHR, 2013). He claimed settlement was a right as well as important for national security, before committing to expand the development of settlements. In line with the planning of settlements that went on between 1977 and 1983, PM Begin represented a major shift in viewing settlement in the West Bank as a right for the Jewish people, and moreover, that settlements would be annexed in a more permanent settlement policy than previously instigated, both of which mirror fundamental Zionist beliefs.

This shift lasted in the political policies of incoming Israeli PMs, both Shimon Peres (1984-1986) and Yitzhak Shamir (1986-1992) presented settlement policies similar to the Hundred Thousand Plan and in keeping with the Zionist ideology of settlement within the homeland of the Jewish people. For example, in an address to the Knesset after his election, PM Peres stated,

The map of Israel will not be secure unless all the settlements scattered over its length and breadth are able to develop and put down solid roots, without pause and permanently. Diffusing the population on the one hand, and firmly rooting the settlements in all corners of the land [on the other], will guide us in determining national priorities (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984).

Under these Israeli PMs settlement development saw its highest peak. By the end of Shamir's term in 1992, 141 out of the 150 recognized settlements by the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics had been constructed (PCBS, 2018c), the highest amount of construction projects had been started (13,930 construction starts between 1991 and 1992; Peace Now, 2019a), and population of Israelis in the West Bank settlements grew to over 100,000 (Peace Now, 2019b). The immense settlement project drew the ire of the international community, and President Bush Sr. during the Oslo negotiations demanded that the Israeli's cease settlement construction (O'Malley, 2015; FMEP, 1992).

This led to the revision of settlement policy in 1992 by PM Rabin, which was seen as an essential freeze on settlement construction. However, Rabin had explicitly stated that he opposed a freeze to settlements, although he was more in favour of security settlements over political settlements, he had no issues with constructing settlements across the Green Line in contingency with the Allon Plan (FMEP, 1992). Even so, this potential act against settlements has demonized Rabin in the eyes of some Israeli's, as his son said on the 22nd anniversary of his assassination, "The impression has been created that Yitzhak Rabin woke up in the morning and thought about how to evacuate settlers, how to kill more Jews, how to bring more terrorists" (The Times of Israel, 2017b). Politically, it instilled the need for Israeli political leadership to appease the right

wing and Zionist supporters who called for settlement development and the annexation of the West Bank. This was to be a major political endeavour of the next Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu.

Although his initial government tenancy was only for three years, Netanyahu made clear his intentions for Israeli settlements and under his tenure they accelerated, construction rising in both 1997 and 1998 (O'Malley, 2015; Peace Now, 2019a). In 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister and re-committed Israel to settlement construction. Upon election in 1996, Netanyahu's government was responsible for submitting their policy guidelines for approval by the Knesset. The sixth policy guideline reads,

Settlement in the Negev, the Galilee, the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is of national importance, to Israel's defense and an expression of Zionist fulfillment. The Government will alter the settlement policy, act to consolidate and develop the settlement enterprise in these areas, and allocate the resources necessary for this (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

Netanyahu has consistently committed to the strengthening of settlements, something that continued into his second term in 2009.

Prime Minister Ehud Barak (Labor) was elected in 1999 and presided over the third largest year of settlement construction in 2000 (Peace Now, 2019a; Gutierrez, 2006). His comments to the Knesset after his election expressed his support for Zionism, "The Zionist idea... has brought about a revolution in the life of the Jewish people and restored it to the stage of history as a sovereign, independent, strong and prosperous people" (Israel Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 1999). Ariel Sharon (Lukid) was elected in 2001, and supported settlement expansion (Miller, Zetouni, & Miller, 2002). In his policy guidelines, his eighth national goal was “[to] strengthen, expand, and promote settlement throughout the country,” which remained during his second term from 2003 to 2006 (OHCHR, 2013). The Sharon Plan in 2005 was presented as a step towards peace by withdrawing from Gaza and Northern parts of the West Bank, however, this move has been criticized for actually stalling the peace process, and by settlers for betraying the settlement of Eretz-Israel. Jonathan Rynhold and Dov Waxman (2008) argue that the Disengagement Plan was a sign of fracturing within the Lukid Party, leading Sharon to form the centrist Kadima party, as well as a general shift away from Zionist-nationalism around settling Eretz-Israel. Sharon’s health issues caused Ehud Olmert (Kadima) to become Prime Minister in 2006 and he too marked this shift away from Zionist principles within Israeli politics by being amenable to settler withdrawal in the West Bank despite a strong Zionist upbringing (Aliprandini, 2007; Rynhold & Waxman, 2008). During this time, under PMs Barak, Sharon, and Olmert, new settlement development was limited, and the majority of settlement construction came in the form of expanding and populating existing settlements (OHCHR, 2013).

In 2009 however, Netanyahu was elected for the second time, and would engage in an escalated settlement policy of developing new settlements through illegal outposts as well as increasing settler population (Peace Now, 2019a; OHCHR, 2013). Further his comments regarding the annexation of all settlements indicate that Zionist principles are still strong within Israeli politics, as this was seen as a political move to appease and raise support amongst the right wing, Zionist, and nationalist voters (PBS, 2019). Netanyahu’s support of settlement policy in his second term can be seen by large amounts of settlement construction, continued support for annexing settlements, outpost construction, and retrospectively legalizing illegal outposts.

The support within Israel for this type of action, and also within the political structure itself, is shown by a letter signed by 38 members of the Knesset, to change orders that would demolish outposts in the West Bank, and petitioned the PM to declare “Judea and Samaria [as] ours” (FMEP, 2011). This makes the impending claim that Netanyahu will annex Israeli settlements more realistic as it would have a large base of support in the Knesset.

Conclusion

This analysis of Israeli state action and decisionmaking understands state decisionmaking through Allison’s (1999) three models of foreign policy decisionmaking, namely the rational, bureaucratic, and organizational models. By looking at the rational interest, organizational behaviours, and the intra-political game of the Israeli state, this research attempts to understand Israeli state decisionmaking in regard to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. There are three major points made about Israeli state action at the national level in regard to settlements. These are the legal framework of land appropriation that embeds the Israeli narrative of land ownership within the state affecting settlement policies in other branches of the government, seen in the limited number of Palestinian building permits, the planning of settlements development which shows the interests behind Israeli state action regarding settlement development, and the relation between settlements and Israeli leadership, that shows how Israeli Prime Ministers have consistently supported settlement development to appease the right wing, Zionist, and nationalist communities within Israel.

Through the RAM, it can be seen how Israeli state action serves several interests. Although often constructed and expanded in the name of security, Israeli settlements are related to much more intricate interests of the Israeli state. Along with ensuring the safety and security

of Israeli-Jews, the identified interests are, controlling as much of the occupied territories as possible to establish a homeland for the Jewish people and undermining the formation of a Palestinian state.

The OBM helps explain another dimension of Israeli state decisionmaking, the processes that are inherent to the Israeli state that affect settlement construction and expansion. This can be seen in the expanse of military orders and state laws that show the embedded narrative within the Israeli state, that the West Bank is part of the national homeland for the Jewish People. This favors Jews above Palestinians when each interacts with the political structures ‘organizational behaviour’ dimensions. The GPM describes the more individual political maneuvering that results in settlement construction. Most important in this regard is the consistent appeasement of the right-wing, Zionist, and nationalist Israelis who call for increased settlement development, expansion, and annexation.

The national/state level is perhaps the most important for this analysis as it looks at the actions and decisions of the state of Israel within the context of its own sovereign territory, as well as within the West Bank. The analysis here provides the strongest evidence supporting the relationship between the Israeli state and settlement construction, as it is able to look at state action comprehensively through Allison’s three models to show how settlement construction is an intrinsic function of the Israeli state.

5.3 Level 3 - Local

The local level of Waltz’s (2001) level of analysis model looks at the role of NGOs and CSOs in connection with settlement construction and the Israeli state. NGOs and CSOs play an important role in influencing the actions and decisions of the state because of their ability to

lobby the state and affect state action. This analysis looks at two groups of NGOs and CSOs, those who are pro-settlement and those who are against settlement development. These organizations play an active role in either lobbying for government policy that supports settlements or restricts settlement construction, and organizations that work to highlight the issues with settlement development. These NGOs and CSOs work within both Israel and the West Bank. Through analyzing the role of these NGOs and CSOs it is shown how Israeli state action works to facilitate pro-settlement NGOs and CSOs over those against settlements, and that the Israeli state's actions and decisions regarding settlements favour Zionist NGOs and CSOs.

Israeli Civil Society

Israeli civil society groups tend to fall into one of two categories: “the active peace camp, mostly including the political left, Ashkenazi, middle-class, educated, and secular Jews; and the ‘national’ camp, mostly composed of the religious and nationalist right” (Çuhadar & Hanafi, 2010, p. 214). In looking at 63 Israeli NGO's, Çuhadar and Hanafi found that they work mostly in the areas of advocacy, socialization, and social cohesion (Çuhadar & Hanafi, 2010, p. 216). The internal dynamics of facilitating civil society tend to favor the nationalist camp. Amal Jamal (2018, p.7), argues that influential politicians within the Israeli state, this includes Prime Minister Netanyahu, who supported an NGO transparency bill that was targeted at pro-Palestinian civil society groups (The Gaurdian, 2016). The aims of these nationalist NGOs are quite clear. Right-wing, nationalist groups such as Gush Emunim and extreme Zionist groups, believe all the territory belongs to the Jewish people, some going as far as to argue for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians (Çuhadar & Hanafi, 2010, p. 216; Sprinzak, 1991). Sprinzak (1991), notes that their political influence has increased over time. Yael Yishai (1998) argues that the

three basic Israeli values of a sovereign Jewish people, land settlement, and security are still strongly present in Israeli politics, showing an affinity with nationalist civil society groups.

This trend has continued as the Jewish People Policy Institute, a non-profit Israeli think tank, states, “[the National-Religious] sector’s leadership has in recent years focused on openly and aggressively seeking to provide moral and political leadership for the state and for Israeli society” (The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2017). The rhetoric and narrative behind nationalist-religious civil society can be seen in nationalist Israeli NGOs such as Regavim, who on their website describe the issues Israeli-Jews face: “Ever so quietly, without the roar of battle and clamor of war, the Jewish People is being robbed of the Land of Israel” (Regavim, 2019). Even some civil society groups in the peace camp utilize this same narrative, promoting social change while preserving Zionist-nationalist beliefs (Orr, 2011). The affinity between Israeli nationalist, right wing, and Zionist civil society groups and the Israeli state, and the promotion of Zionist values of land ownership and Jewish sovereignty, support the development of settlements, as well as their annexation, within the Israeli state political structure.

The role of international human rights-oriented NGOs and their influence on Israeli politics is important as well. Most work from these NGOs focuses on the issues facing Palestinians as a result of the occupation, leading to criticism on their role on Israeli politics. Gerald Steinberg (2011) argues that international NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have a strong influence on politics through public discourse, political advocacy, and legal proceedings. Steinberg continues to criticize these organizations in terms of their accountability, transparency, and check and balances to NGO power, as well as their funding from international donors (Steinberg, 2011, p. 45). Further, Steinberg criticizes their narrow focus, targeting and attacking Israel, while ignoring Israeli human rights issues and the

context of the conflict (Steinberg, 2011). These criticisms, which certainly point to the critical nature of international NGOs towards Israel, are also apparent within Israeli civil society. Jamal (2018), argues that nationalist Israeli civil society groups work towards delegitimizing human-rights NGOs by naming and shaming them, as well as through linking them with terrorism, silencing human rights organizations, and disrupting their sources of funding.

In relation to settlements and political activity, the affinity between Israeli political parties and politicians, including Israeli Prime Ministers, as well as the criticisms and work by Israeli organizations to discredit and hinder the operation of human rights organizations that are critical of Israel facilitate nationalist, right wing, and Zionist civil society groups. These civil society groups, who advocate for Israeli settlements, promote pro-settlement policies and consequently, the state adopts and aligns themselves with the same objectives as these groups, including advancing settlement development. Civil society in Israeli is not homogenous as some civil society groups exist within Israel that are critical of the state. These groups argue against settlement development and for returning land to Palestinians and the creation of a functional Palestinian state as well as Arab-Palestinian CSOs (Jamal, 2008). However, compared to pro-settlement nationalist, right wing, and Zionist civil society groups, their influence on the Israeli state is mitigated through policies such as the Transparency Bill, supported by the Israeli government, and the work of nationalist civil society groups.

Palestinian Civil Society

Çuhadar and Hanafi (2011, p. 211) argue there is a significant asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinian civil societies because of the statelessness of Palestinian organizations. Limitations to Palestinian CSOs result from the Israeli occupation, the Palestinian Authority

(PA) and Hamas conflict, and the influence of international donors. These limitations hampered Palestinian CSOs to adequately represent the local, due to mobility issues and reduced volunteerism, clashes between CSOs and the PA, and the fact that CSOs were forced to operate according to priorities set by the international donors, and not necessarily by Palestinian civil society (Çuhadar and Hanafi, 2011, p. 213; European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Despite these limitations, Palestinian CSOs have played an important role in confronting settlements and the Israeli occupation.

For example, the work of Palestinian CSOs towards boycotting goods made in Israeli settlements, as well as highlighting potential discrepancies between official statistics and the realities on the ground, such as the actual number of settlements. For example, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics reported 121 settlements and 100 outposts in 2010, whereas Palestinians sources quoted 200 and 239 respectively (IPS News, 2010). These CSOs have also been influenced by the call in 2005 by the BDS movement to boycott, divest, and sanction Israeli as a way to put pressure upon the Israeli state to end the occupation, recognize the rights of Arab-Palestinians in Israel to full equality, as well as the Palestinian refugees' right to return (BDS, 2019; European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).

Despite the work of Palestinian CSOs towards advancing peace initiatives, reconciliation, human rights, and ending the occupation and Israeli settlements, issues still persist. Yousef Munayyer, the Executive Director of The Jerusalem Fund and its educational programme The Palestine Center, believes there has always been one constant throughout this refocusing on human rights, “the entrenchment of Israeli apartheid through settlement expansion and a wide range of laws that deny Palestinian rights” (Al Jazeera, 2014). Regardless of the counter-hegemonic role Palestinian CSOs play versus the state, the Israeli state has become increasingly

pro-nationalist, right wing, and Zionist. Jamal (2008, p. 303) argues, “The more the Arab NGO sector is active the more the state is becoming more ethnically oriented.”

This is seen in the affinity between Israeli politics and politicians and nationalist CSOs within Israel, and the reluctance of the Israeli state to make changes in policy concerning Palestinians, nor their identities or rights (Jamal, 2018, 2008; Sprinzak, 1991, Yishai, 1998). The inability of Palestinian CSOs to influence Israeli politics is important for two reasons. First, it enforces how Israeli political action regarding settlements clearly favours Israeli nationalist, right wing, and Zionist CSOs, and second, how the state incorporates and mirrors the narratives, beliefs, and objectives of these CSOs. The effect on the Israeli state’s actions and decisionmaking, in terms of settlement development, is the advancement and defense of pro-settlement policy, which is demonstrated in the national and international sections of this chapter.

Conclusion

What can be seen at the local level is preferential treatment of Israeli civil society and restrictions place on Palestinian civil society. The results are that the Israeli political structure influences and is increasingly influenced by right wing, nationalist, and Zionist CSOs and NGOs. The Israeli state, in aligning with the same narratives and objectives as nationalist civil society groups, instills within its political structure underlying knowledges and ideologies predicated in these narratives and objectives. By doing so, pro-settlement decisions by the state’s administrative wings become a form of bureaucratic responses and processes that define state action. Further, in order to appease these groups, individuals vying for political influence must also align their policies with pro-Israeli, pro-settlement stances.

Conclusion

The necropolitical aspect of disposability connects sovereignty to the death and devaluation of certain populations through looking at Israeli state action and decisionmaking. The aims of this Chapter were to establish the centrality of the sovereign authority of the Israeli state over its own territory and also over the West Bank. In doing so it locates the sovereign's right to kill or allow death in the actions and decisions made by the Israeli state regarding settlements in the West Bank. Through looking at Israeli state action at the international, national, and local level per Kenneth Waltz's (2001) analytical model, and using Allison's (1999) three models, it is shown how settlement development is intrinsically connected to the actions and decisionmaking of the Israeli state.

At the international level, the denial of the international communities calls for settlement development to stop and the promotion of the Israeli narrative and right to land in the international community are two ways that settlements development is linked to Israeli state action. At the national level, the appropriation of Palestinian land, the planning of settlements, and the relationship between Israeli political leadership and settlements, exemplify the political involvement of the Israeli state in developing, expanding, and populating settlements, while embedding Israeli narratives into political structures and organizational behaviours. At the local level, this affinity towards the Zionist, nationalist narrative of a right to settle in Eretz-Israel, facilitates pro-settlement civil society, which conversely works to influence Israeli politics. By connecting state action and decisionmaking, and thus sovereign power, to the development of settlements, this analysis is then able to examine the effects of those settlements on Palestinians through structural violence.

Chapter Six – Structural Violence: Technologies of Death

Introduction

A 2019 report by Amnesty International, on the effects of digital tourism in supporting Israeli settlements, identifies the forms of violence and human rights violations within Palestine that are a result of settlements. According to research by Amnesty International, settlements violate the right to life, the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, the rights to adequate housing, freedom of mobility, as well as the rights to enjoy certain standards of physical and mental health, the right to water, education, and earning a living through work (Amnesty International, 2019a). The reasons for these violations range from direct IDF and settler violence, Palestinian subjection to the Israeli military court system as opposed to the civil court system, prohibiting peaceful protest and using violence to suppress peaceful protests, the evacuation of Palestinians and demolition of Palestinian homes, checkpoints, settler only roads, and the separation wall, limited access to healthcare services, access to safe drinking water, destruction of agricultural work and farming crops, and the forced closure of Palestinian businesses (Amnesty International, 2019a, pp. 31-34). Amnesty International's work and that of similar organizations have helped reveal the extent of violence experienced by Palestinians. This violence goes beyond the direct violence of IDF and settler attacks on Palestinians. It also constitutes forms of structural violence.

Structural violence is a form of violence that occurs indirectly through social structures (Galtung, 1969). The connections made in the previous chapter between Israeli state action and decisionmaking, and the development of Israeli settlements, allows us to infer that the effects of settlements on Palestinians are directly linked to the actions and decisions of the Israeli state. In

order to investigate what these effects are and if they constitute forms of violence, the structural violence component of the theory of disposability looks at the effects of settlements in six categories: physical, economic, health, security, political, and social. These six categories or indicators, based on the work of Butler (2010), Burton and Azar, and Maslow, describe the social conditions that sustain life and thus, the areas in which Galtung's idea of structural violence can affect precariousness. By analyzing the effects of settlements on Palestinians, this research shows that Palestinians experience multiple forms of structural violence across all six categories. This is imperative to understanding how the sovereign Israeli state's actions and decisionmaking results in the death and devaluation of Palestinians. The structural violence that results from the direct violence of settlement construction affects the precariousness of Palestinians, increasing their risk of death as well as devaluing them. This chapter examines the effects of settlements in the six identified categories, before providing concluding analysis of the impact of the structural violence affecting Palestinians. This chapter first, describes the structural violence felt by Palestinians across all six categories – physical, economic, health, security, political, and social. Second, it concludes by summarizing the significance of these findings, that Palestinians face structural violence in all six categories, and its connections with disposability.

6.1 Physical

The category of physical structural violence describes the forms of structural violence that affect the physical needs of Palestinians, specifically in terms of food, water, and shelter. These sub categories are looked at in terms of food access, availability, and stability; water access and quality; and the quality and availability of adequate housing.

Food

Looking specifically at the West Bank and issues related to food, structural violence is observed in the effects of Israeli settlements on the agricultural sector as well as in food availability. A summary of the realities and challenges of Palestinian agriculture production and marketing produced by the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ), describes the issues Palestinian farmers face a result of “urbanization, land confiscation by the Israeli occupation, access restrictions on farmers who are unable to reach their agricultural land in area C, and weak agricultural advising and scientific research” (ARIJ, 2015, p. 9). The report identifies the political issues experienced by Palestinian farmers as the most critical, including land confiscation, control over natural resources, and restrictions on mobility in terms of getting products to different Palestinian territories and also to the international market (ARIJ, 2015, p. 9). Mohammad Kittaneh (2018), an assistant professor at Birzeit University, conducted a study looking at the shrinking role of the agricultural sector in the Palestinian economy. He concluded that the decline of the agricultural sector was attributed to shrinking land, in particular mentioning how Israel controls area C, 60 percent of the West Bank, and where 92 percent of the agricultural land is located; issues related to product and people mobility, loss of fertile land and water resources, and an inability to have competitive pricing on their produce; investing in the service sector; labor migration into Israel; and the quality of Israeli produce compared to Palestinian produce (Kittaneh, 2018, p. 13).

Although stemming from issues related to the agricultural sector, Palestinians also suffer from serious food issues. A study conducted research between 2008 and 2010 on poor households in the West Bank. Of the 3500 households that responded, 98 percent had reduced expenditure on food, 95 percent bought poor quality food, 66 percent ate less per day due to the

lack of food, and 70 percent depended on food aid (El-Sughayyar, Ghattas, Hrimat, & Isaac, 2013). The explanations for food insecurity were attributed to lack of income and employment, reliance on jobs in Israel, household size, and the prevalence of disabilities and disease, indicating that food security is interrelated with issues in economics, health, and housing (El-Sughayyar, Ghattas, Hrimat, & Isaac, 2013). Although this study focused on the poor, who are likely to experience food issues, the demographics of the West Bank suggest that this is a prevalent issue, as 50 percent of the West Bank is considered to live below the poverty line (Palestine Chronicle, 2008). The issues of land confiscation, the subsequent loss of fertile land and ownership over water resources, and produce and person immobility in particular, relate the declining agriculture sector and food insecurity directly to the development of Israeli settlements and the land appropriation, security apparatus, checkpoints, and settlement service roads that cut off Palestinian communities from one another. The effects of this not only affect the physical wellbeing of Palestinians through food and agricultural issues, but also economically through labor and market issues and vice versa.

Water

Since 1967, the control over the West Bank gave Israel access to the lower Jordan River and the aquifers north of Jerusalem, and overall increased its access to fresh water by 50 percent (Klare, 2001, p. 170; Lonergan, 2001, p. 121). The water systems within Israel and Palestine are a stark contrast. Whereas Israel's water supply system covers essentially all of Israel, only 70 percent of the West Bank has access to piped water (Zeitoun, 2012, p. 49). Further, due to poor infrastructure, water loss in the West Bank is estimated at 36 percent (Zeitoun, 2012, p. 49). Since 1967, Israel has prevented Palestinians from increasing withdrawals from the underground

aquifers and used the water resources in the West Bank to supply Israeli water demands, including those of settlements (Klare, 2001, p. 171). In fact, the “Jewish settlers [receive] five to eight times more water per capita than the Palestinians” (Klare, 2001, p. 171). Further, when Palestinians, who do not have access to piped water, run out of water, they buy water from Palestinian water tanks, which, due to mobility restrictions, often fill up from Israeli settlements (Zeitoun, 2012, p. 52).

The lack of water resources also negatively affects the Palestinian agriculture sector (Lonergan, 2001, p. 120). Lonergan and Brooks (1994) described the issues related to water in three ways, quantity, quality, and distribution. In all three cases issues for Palestinians can be linked back to settlements or issues connected to settlements. Water quantity, although mostly an economic issue and not a scarcity issue, is mostly an issue of consumption within Israel, as opposed to within settler communities. However, the Occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory allowed Israel to control the quantities of water within the West Bank (Lonergan & Brooks, *Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 1994). Water quality can be directly linked to settlements, as sewage from some settlements discharges into Palestinian fields and wadis (valleys) (Lonergan & Brooks, *Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 1994). Distribution is political as discriminatory laws that restrict access, ownership, and use of water by Palestinians are non-existent for settlers, and there are subsidies for agricultural use of water by settlers (Lonergan & Brooks, *Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 1994).

Although this research is 25 years old, the fact that these issues have not changed suggests the Occupation has maintained water inequalities. The Ma'an Development Center, an NGO based in Ramallah, reports the same or worsening issues as Lonergan and Brooks

identified. Although Lonergan and Brooks stated that settler consumption of water was not an issue, this has worsened. For example, the Palestinian village of Tubas consumed 20L of water per capita, per day, whereas the nearby settlements of Roi and Beka'ot, consume 431L and 406L water per capita, per day, a pattern consistent in other areas of the West Bank (Ma'an Development Center, 2011a). Continued restrictions on Palestinian water use and access have not changed, and settlers still benefit from water subsidies by the Israeli state (Ma'an Development Center, 2011a). Further, Ma'an reports the destruction and demolition of the Palestinian water infrastructure, for example in 1967 there were 774 Palestinian wells, by 2005 this number was reduced to 328 (Ma'an Development Center, 2011b). Water is an important resource, and Israeli settlements and the issues related to settlements such as land annexation, mobility restrictions, and repressive legal and bureaucratic structures, result in structural violence against Palestinians by restricting and limiting their access, use, and ability to develop adequate water infrastructure.

Shelter

Two important issues related to shelter and housing can also be attributed to Israeli settlements. First, the demolition of Palestinian homes for settlement construction, not only contributes to the continued dispossession of Palestinians politically it also creates issues related to inadequate or non-existent housing, as many Palestinians then become refugees. The Global Shelter Cluster, a United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) mechanism to coordinate humanitarian shelter services, published an early 2019 Fact Sheet on the status of shelter in the West Bank. Since January, to the end of April in 2019, a total of 209 Palestinian structures in the

West Bank and East Jerusalem were demolished, 41 percent of which are residential, displacing 301 people (Global Shelter Cluster, 2019). In terms of shelter needs, it is reported that 3,770 shelters in area C in the West Bank, not including East Jerusalem, require aid in order to provide adequate protection and avoid displacement of local people (Global Shelter Cluster, 2019).

Second, the Israeli control over development means that Palestinian development projects do not or rarely get approved, while settlement development plans are continuously approved (Hasson, 2015; Magid, 2018; B'Tselem, 2019a). In a four-year period between 2010 and 2014, Palestinians submitted 2,020 applications for building permits, 33 of these were approved (OCHA, 2016). In comparison, according to Haaretz, 384 plans for housing units in the West Bank were accepted in August of 2018 alone, to which the Yesha Council, an organization of municipal councils for Jewish settlements, stated was “a scant number of housing units, the smallest to be approved in the past 18 months” (Berger, 2018). The two issues of the demolition of Palestinian homes and Israeli control over development in the West Bank result in structural violence through increased displacement and its related ill-effects, and as well, the inability to construct adequate shelter. Further, by denying Palestinian plans, many Palestinians are forced to construct illegally. This places these buildings at risk of demolition under Military Order No. 58, which also contributes to Palestinian dispossession and displacement.

6.2 Economic

Economic structural violence describes the forms of violence felt through economic social structures such as jobs and income. These sub categories are defined further by looking at job security through employment and income in terms of GDP, state expenditure, and household income.

Employment

A report for the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 2017 investigated the relationship between the Israeli Occupation and the Palestinian economy. The report's findings state that economic growth in all sectors is restricted by the Occupation, in specific Israeli settlements and annexation of West Bank territory (UNCTAD, 2017). Reported issues included the dependency of Palestinians on work in Israel and settlements, high youth unemployment, as well as decreasing donor support (UNCTAD, 2017). These issues are compounded by other factors related to settlements and the Israeli Occupation. For example, the separation wall has affected employment in the West Bank as well, due to lack of access to jobs in Israel, reduction in employment in the agricultural sector (although some of this has shifted to the service and manufacturing sector), as well as other issues related to the wall such as, the fact that the wall did provide some income for Palestinian laborers, however this was short-term (Oberholzer, 2015).

The International Labor Organization (ILO), in its annual report, concluded that Palestinians in the Occupied territories and Gaza were the world's highest unemployed group in 2017, indicating that women and youth were of particular concern (International Labour Organization, 2018). The World Bank also expresses this point, Palestine (including the West Bank and Gaza) had an unemployment rate of 30.2 percent, 3.2 percent higher than the next countries South Africa (The World Bank, 2019d). Further, the demolition of Palestinian buildings for Israeli settlements and the refusal of Palestinian building permits (Ganesan, 2016) contribute to the lack of jobs and employment in the West Bank as well. Although unemployment is connected to other factors, there are strong connections between Israeli settlements and negative effects on Palestinian employment.

Economic Development

In 2009, a European Commission official remarked that settlements “[strangle] the Palestinian economy” and increase dependency on donors. In response, Israel’s Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Barak, outright rejected the claim, and amongst other things reinstated that settlements were necessary for security (Info - Prod Research, 2009). Ten years later, in 2019, according to the World Bank, the Palestinian economy (including the West Bank and Gaza) ranked 116th out of 119 economies (The World Bank, 2019c). The Palestinian economy struggles, and in 2018 experienced very little growth (The World Bank, 2019a). The relation between the struggling Palestinian economy and Israeli settlements indicates several issues such as the lack of mobility between Palestinian communities, the inability of the Palestinian economy to compete with the Israeli market, little access to the international market, and the annexation and demolition of Palestinian territory (Isaac & Rizik, 2002).

The strongest evidence of economic structural violence as a result of settlements however, may come from the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), who in 2012 found that the economic base for settlements is founded on Palestinian economic exploitation. This includes four major areas of exploitation: the ground and surface water, quarries and resources from the Dead Sea, touristic and natural sites, and the annexation of land for agriculture and residential purposes (Kanafani & Ghaith, 2012). These forms of exploitation, along with strong donor support, are the main economic basis of Israeli settlements (Kanafani & Ghaith, 2012). This suggests that the existence of settlements alone, independent of the security apparatus, the separation wall, service roads, checkpoints, and outposts that compound the issue,

predicated in the economic exploitation of Palestinians that results in economic structural violence as Palestinians cannot make their basic human needs.

6.3 Health

The category of health looks at the overall quality of life as well as death rates, nutrition, access to healthcare, and Palestinians perceptions of healthcare. These sub categories are broken down further by looking at life expectancy and mortality rates, the prevalence of undernourishment and obesity, self-reported health, and access to services. Structural violence is identified in one main area, which is people's lack of access to healthcare.

Access to Healthcare

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCA) states that access to healthcare in the West Bank is restricted by Israeli checkpoints and settler violence, and further the restriction on patient and ambulance movements worsen the issue (OCHA, 2019). The separation wall is an important issue. In 2005 it was reported that one third of Palestinians would be denied access to healthcare facilities once construction finished (Cohen D., 2005). Other issues such as checkpoints, security gates and their opening times, and a lack of ambulance access to East Jerusalem create further barriers for Palestinian access to healthcare (Devi, 2007). Denying permits to access health services is also an issue.

In 2011, as 19 percent of Palestinians in the Wet Bank who applied for permits to access healthcare services were denied, mostly on the basis of security (Vitullo, et al., 2012). This also includes children, as Waterston and Nasser (2017) suggest permits, checkpoints, and health infrastructure play a role in restricting healthcare access for children. The relation between settlements and access to healthcare is relatively straightforward. The mobility restrictions

caused by settlements, service roads, checkpoints and the security apparatus affect the ability of Palestinians to get the medical service they need, as well as for medical services to reach Palestinians. Although the issue of permits is not directly related to settlements, as a result of the occupation, they contribute to the obstacles Palestinians face in terms of accessing healthcare.

6.4 Security

Security refers to the structural violence that occurs through increased risks to personal security such as physical security as well as oppression. Physical insecurity as a result of structural violence is looked at in terms of direct violence, and oppression in terms of income inequality and poverty.

Physical Security

The OCHA, during the first four months of 2018, documented that there were 217 incidences of settler violence either on Palestinians or on their property, leading to the highest per month average rate since 2014 (OCHA, 2018a). In comparison, there were 144 instances of Palestinian violence on Israelis, a decrease of 33 percent since 2017 (OCHA, 2018a). Accountability for this violence is an issue as well, as B'Tselem reported that in a ten-year review, 85 percent of investigations into settler violence resulted in no further action (B'Tselem, 2019c). The IDF is involved in physical violence against Palestinians too, sometimes participating in direct assaults, and also through unlawful arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, unlawful killings, and the excessive use of force (Amnesty International, 2019b). The raids on Palestinian homes by the IDF are another issue of physical violence, where IDF personnel night raids on Palestinian homes, not only detaining Palestinians but also routinely

killing and harming them (Haaretz, 2018). The relation between settlements and direct violence is seen in the settler violence perpetrated upon Palestinians, and also in the IDF violence, which at times allows this violence to happen by not holding those responsible accountable. Further, the violence committed by the IDF is justified by the state in the name of the security of Israel and Israeli settlements.

Oppression

The oppression of Palestinians is well documented. This analysis evaluates oppression in terms of economics, through poverty and economic inequality in Chapter Seven as indicators of oppression. In terms of structural violence, the oppression of Palestinians reaches across the social and political spheres as well as the economic sphere. Instances of political and social oppression are discussed more in depth in the preceding sections. However, the important point here is relating oppression to settlements, which can be seen in how settlements and the associated infrastructure that makes them viable are predicated in the oppression of Palestinians. Settlements are only made possible through the exploitation and subjection of Palestinians and Palestinian land. Settlements are intrinsically connected with the occupation of Palestine. This includes the annexation of Palestinian territory and the dispossession of the Palestinian people, human rights violations in terms of mobility and security due to the security wall, checkpoints, and service roads, the economic issues related to dispossession as well as Israeli restrictions, and the issues related to basic human needs like food, water, and shelter.

The instances of oppression are well documented in the other sections of this chapter. Important is the idea that without these forms of oppression, whether economic, social, political, or through the denial of basic human rights, Israeli settlements would not be viable. Without

dispossession of Palestinian land, settlements would not be able to be constructed in the West Bank, without exploiting water resources in the West Bank, settlements (and Israeli itself) would risk water insecurity, and by not having roads to connect settlements with Israel, settlers would not be able to go to work in Israel. In sum, settlements rely on the oppression of Palestinians in order to exist and remain viable, constituting a form of direct as well as structural violence embedded within the presence of settlements themselves.

6.5 Political

Political structural violence describes the forms of violence that restrict Palestinian political involvement and activity. This is defined further by looking at democratic and political rights, freedom of speech and expression, and the right to assembly. These sub categories are further investigated through voter turnout, trust in institutions, and the ability to experience the freedoms of speech, expression, and assembly.

Freedom of Speech and Expression and Freedom of Assembly

The West Bank has had continuous protests against the occupation, including against Israeli settlements as well as the settlement apparatus (Amnesty International, 2014). According to the Middle East Monitor, every Friday Palestinians across the West Bank protest the illegal building of settlements (Middle East Monitor, 2019). These protests involve the right to assembly as well as the rights to freedom of expression. In response to these protests, the Israeli state often responds with violence. This includes multiple instances where Palestinians have been killed, for example, earlier in 2019 a 16-year old boy was killed during protests against land seizures for settlements (Haaretz, 2019).

Protest and free speech is even the subject of Military Order 101, which restricts public gatherings, even in cafes and nightclubs not to mention for political protest, and gives the military commander the ability to lawfully carry out the order with any degree of force deemed necessary, while those found to be in violation of the order can be sentenced to ten years in prison and/or fined ten thousand liras (USD \$1.7 thousand) (Military Order No. 101, 1967). This order was enacted on the 27th of August 1967 (Amnesty International, 2017). The connection between settlements and violations on the rights to free speech, expression, and assembly are that Palestinians are injured or harmed, detained and fined, for expressing their right to protest Israeli settlements, and voicing their political concerns.

6.6 Social

Structural violence through social structures involves looking at the people's ability to connect with others, or restrictions on being able to make social connections, whether people feel socially accepted, and the effects on education. This is explored further through looking at social cohesion and social activity, inclusion and exclusion, and educational access, availability, quality, attainment, and expectancy.

Curfews

There are several issues that affect the social wellbeing of Palestinians caused by settlements. These include curfews, the separation of families, and education. Curfews are an extraordinary measure of structural violence. Curfews involve strict regulations and a heavy military presence: "Israeli tanks, military jeeps and snipers patrol the streets of Palestinian towns confining residents to their houses. Anyone seen outside their home can be shot dead or arrested"

(Merip, 2002). Curfews were enforced as recently as May 2019, when Israel imposed a curfew on Huwarra following an attempted knife attack on an Israeli settler (Ma'an News Agency, 2019a). Adam Hanieh, a professor at the University of London, argues that these curfews are not just random responses in the name of security, but deliberate attempts to demoralize and demobilize Palestinians, “another weapon in the psychological war Israel’s occupation wages on Palestinians” (Merip, 2002). The relation between Israeli settlements and these curfews are also presented in the Huwarra curfew example, as they are used to protect and secure Israeli settlers and demoralize, and potentially kill, Palestinians.

Separating Families

The separation of families is also an issue related to Israeli settlements that results in structural violence. Two issues, family unification and the detention of family members, are particularly troubling in this regard. Family unification involves Palestinians in the West Bank who are married to those outside of the West Bank, mostly in refugee camps, the Gaza Strip and in East Jerusalem, but due to Israeli state policy they must apply for permits to relocate in the West Bank and reunite with their spouse or family (B'Tselem, 1999, 2004). In 1999 there were 13,000 pending permits, which B'Tselem reported would take seven years to process, and requests filed in 1999 would take ten years to be processed (B'Tselem, 1999). Protection against this form of structural violence is cemented in the rights to marry and maintain a unified family (United Nations, 2016a).

The relation with settlements is that the Israeli state uses this as a mechanism to slow population growth inside the West Bank, compared to the accelerated growth of the population in Israeli settlements, it becomes a political manoeuvre to change facts on the ground. The other

issue is the detention of family members and the restrictions on visitation placed upon them by the Israeli state. These detentions are often the result of the intense security apparatus of settlements and results in the separation of families due to the unlawful detention of Palestinians, and violations of the rights of political prisoners.

Education

The year 2018 saw a rise in settler and IDF actions that disrupted access or the activities in Palestinian schools in the West Bank. The OCHA reported 17 of these incidents from August to mid-November 2018, resulting in injuries to 323 Palestinians, 225 of which were children (OCHA, 2018c). In November 2018, around 50 settlers from the Yitzhar settlement, joined the IDF for a raid on a school in the Palestinian village of Urif in the Nablus region, injuring eleven, four of which were shot with live ammunition or rubber bullets (OCHA, 2018d; Ma'an News Agency, 2019b). Along with settler and IDF violence against schools, education is also affected by “restrictions on movement, curfews, [and the] denial of building permits and the issuing of demolition orders against schools” (GCPEA, 2014).

For example, in a 2011 survey conducted by the Education Cluster and Child Protection Working Group indicated that 31 percent of students and teachers crossed at least one military checkpoint in order to get to school, affecting 2,500 children a day, 16 percent also indicated they experienced harassment while crossing checkpoints (GCPEA, 2014). Both settlers and the IDF forces protecting settlers commit the physical violence experienced by Palestinian schools, through damage to the schools themselves and on students and teachers. In addition, the settlement apparatus of checkpoints is particularly inhibiting to the ability of Palestinians to attain quality education, let alone attend school. The psychological violence experienced by

children and their teachers' every day is the indirect soul-destroying violence that spillover from the direct violence.

Conclusion

As shown by looking at some of the academic literature as well as information collected by human rights organizations, NGOs, CSOs, news agencies, and government organizations, across all six categories of structural violence, there are connections to settlements. Israeli settlements, as the results of Israeli state actions and decisionmaking, can thus be linked to reported structural violence felt by Palestinians. In the physical category, food is affected mostly through the annexation of agricultural land, as well as the direct destruction of Palestinian farms in order to build settlements and settlement infrastructure, as well as Palestinians facing issues in terms of quality of food and a dependency on food donors. Water is affected by the Israeli control of natural water resources due to land annexation and discriminatory laws that prevent Palestinians from building or maintaining water infrastructure. The demolitions of Palestinian property and settler violence on Palestinian water resources compound the violence. Shelter is also an issue with demolitions of homes to build settlements creating refugees.

As well, the Israeli control over the permit process and development in the West Bank inhibits Palestinians ability to build adequate housing without risking demolition. Economically, unemployment and reliance on Israel and settlements for employment as well as the lack of growth in the Palestinian economy lead to poverty and resulting psychological trauma. Health issues stem mostly from restricting or constraining people's access due to settlement infrastructure, the settlement wall, and checkpoints in particular.

In terms of security, physical violence from settlers and the IDF, little to no accountability for settler violence, raids by the IDF, and IDF mistreatment in terms of torture and detention are all related to direct violence directed against Palestinians. Oppression is an omnipresent issue, as most of these cases result from the oppression stemming from the occupation since 1967. The important point is that the settlements rely on this oppression to exist and remain viable. Politically the situation in Palestine is difficult, due to the separation of territory into areas A, B, and C, and the different administrative structures. However, in regard to settlements, structural violence is seen in the repression of the people's rights to free speech and expression and to freedom of assembly, through the IDF repression of peaceful political protest.

Socially, structural violence can be seen in the use of IDF curfews, justified through protecting the security of settlements, the separation of families, namely the issues of family unification and detention of Palestinian family members, and through restriction on education caused by settlement infrastructure, while direct violence is visited upon Palestinian schools by settlers and the IDF. These forms of structural violence are the result of settlements and the settlement infrastructure of checkpoints, service roads, the separation wall, and the security apparatus, as well as settlement policies of land appropriation and the demolition of Palestinian property. The ways these forms of structural violence affect the precariousness and grievability of Palestinians is explored in the next chapter.

Chapter Seven – Precariousness and Grievability: The Fragility and Devaluation of the Palestinian Life

Introduction

Galtung's (1969) structural violence is intrinsically linked to Butler's (2010) concepts of precariousness and grievability. Galtung (1969, 1996) noted that structural violence emanates from power asymmetries, mainly in the distribution of resources and the ability to decide the distribution of resources, with the idea of exploitation at the center. This means that some get more, while others get less through interacting with social structures. This leaves those with less to either die or suffer from a poor quality of life (Galtung, 1996). These resources relate to the social conditions of a livable life, implied by Butler's precariousness, that these resources needed to sustain a life rely on innumerable social relations. Grievability suggests that these social conditions also influence the valuation of certain people. Grievability implies that the valuation of a life rests on the realization of the social conditions of precariousness.

Through structural violence, the deterioration of these social conditions affects both the precariousness and grievability of certain groups of people, resulting in devaluation and greater risks of death. This chapter has two sections. First it explores precariousness, how the structural violence identified in Chapter Six affects the precariousness of Palestinians, by first overviewing the indicators for the physical category, broken down further into food, water, and shelter, and then the remaining categories of economic, health, security, political, and social. It then concludes this section by summarizing the effects on Palestinian precariousness. Second, it looks at grievability, the devaluation of Palestinians, through looking at the embedded devaluation in settlement development. It does this through examining the Israeli claims of a right to the land and the notion of Israeli security predicated in the notion of the Palestinian as a threat or terrorist.

7.1 Precariousness

The precariousness of Palestinians is examined through exploring factors and indicators of wellbeing across the categories of physical, economic, health, security, political, and social that are identified by inflicting structural violence upon Palestinians. By assessing the general state of wellbeing for these categories, it is shown that Palestinians are affected by settlements within each category. These effects subsequently show how the social conditions of precariousness are affected by settlement development.

Physical - Food

Food security is an issue within Palestine, in 2014 26.8 percent of Palestinian households were food insecure, according to the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) (2016). This issue is more pronounced in Gaza, however, in the West Bank 556,000 people were considered food insecure (MAS, 2016). A preliminary study in 2018 by the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics (PCBS), indicates that this issue is improving as the percentage of food insecure households in the West Bank dropped from 15.0 percent in 2014 to 11.6 percent in 2018 (PCBS, 2018d). However, with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), a major humanitarian service provider for Palestinians, facing financial issues this improvement is likely to decrease, despite overwhelming international support and financial aid to overcome the USD \$446 million shortfall and reduce it to USD \$21 million (UNRWA, 2018). Surprisingly, the 2018 preliminary report also indicated that urban and rural Palestinian households are less food secure than Palestinian refugees in the West Bank. This means that the improvement in overall food insecurity in the West Bank is mostly attributed to the change in percentage of food

insecure households in refugee populations, which dropped drastically from 20.7 percent in 2014 to 9.9 percent in 2018 (PCBS, 2018d).

Several indicators point to undernourishment related issues. Stunted growth in children under 5 for example, increased from 2000 to 2014, however other indicators such as wasting and underweight children were not significant (PCBS, 2014). In general, the World Health Organization (WHO) classifies stunting issues <20 percent to be low-mild public health problems (Ministry of Health, 2005). The prevalence of anemia in pregnant women and children is another indicator related to nutrition, in particular iron deficiency, according to WHO data, over the past 25 years Palestinians have had a greater prevalence of anemia in both pregnant women and children than in Israel. The WHO suggests that anemia percentages between 20 percent and 39.9 percent are of moderate significance (Palestine anemia percentages ranged from 30.7 percent to 37.9 percent in women and between 25 and 39.2 for children) (WHO, 2011). In pregnant women, anemia levels in Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) have risen since 2003 from 30.9 percent to 33.1 percent in 2016, indicating that this issue may become a severe issue in the future (The World Bank, 2016) Although a quarter of Palestinian households are food insecure, indicators suggest there are mild to moderate effects food insecurity has had on Palestinian health. The prevalence of anemia in women is the most concerning as it is close to becoming a severe issue.

Physical - Water

The differences in water access between Israeli and Palestine are an important statistic. As described in the literature around water, Israel's control and use of West Bank water resources is a major political and humanitarian issue. From 2000 to 2015 virtually all of Israel

had access to basic drinking water, in comparison, only 87.6 percent of Palestinians had access to the same basic sources of drinking water (The World Bank, 2015b). Further, while the Israeli situation for 15 years has gone unchanged with its desalinization program, data shows that the Palestinian situation is getting worse, albeit only by -0.5 percent, still the political implications around water in the West Bank suggest that this number will continue to decrease with the ongoing demolitions of Palestinian water supplies. In terms of water quality there is a major discrepancy between Israel and Palestine as well. In Israel 93.3 percent of people had access to sanitation facilities compared to 60.3 percent of Palestinians (The World Bank, 2015c).

The rate of growth for access to sanitation facilities between Israelis and Palestinians is also vastly different too, while Israelis access rose by 14.4 percent in 15 years, Palestinians access in Palestine only rose by 2.6 percent (The World Bank, 2015c). Other factors compound the issues related to access and quality. Water use for example is more prevalent in Israel. Israel used an average of 150-180L of water per capita, per day, compared to 79.7L of water per capita, per day used in the West Bank (OCHA, 2017). This includes water use in Israeli settlements, which is six times more than in the West Bank (Ma'an Development Center, 2011a). With Israel facing droughts in the past 6 years (The Times of Israel, 2018), water scarcity may become an increasingly important issue. With the current politics surrounding water ownership in the West Bank, this may cause increasing water shortages for Palestinians.

Physical - Shelter

Shelter and housing are related to settlements due to the demolition of Palestinian homes in order to build Israeli settlements or related settlement infrastructure. Statistically, in terms of housing density, which looks at rooms per person, Israel and the West Bank are very similar with

the former at 1.2 rooms per person (OECD, 2018) and the former at 1.3 (PCBS, 2017d). This suggests that density in terms of person per room is similar. However, looking deeper into these numbers raises a few concerns. Based on data from the CBS, statistical abstracts of Israel, Erez Cohen of Ariel University, calculated that the average percentage of Israelis living in overcrowded housing (3+ people per room) between 2005-2014 was 1.11 (Cohen E. , 2018). In comparison, based on PCBS data, between 2003 and 2013, 13.1 percent of Palestinians lived in overcrowded homes (PCBS, 2016d). However, the Palestinian number is getting closer to the Israeli average, as in 2017 only 7.4 percent of Palestinians were in overcrowded homes, with the West Bank doing slightly better at 4.9 percent compared to Gaza which is 11.7 percent (PCBS, 2017b).

Although the overall averages are the same, in terms of housing density, the main issue is in the number of homes that are overcrowded. It is important to note that cultural norms play a role in these numbers as well, however the culture on both the Israeli and Palestinian in terms of housing is similar. Another source of information is households with access to basic sanitation, there is a 33 percent difference between Israelis and Palestinians in terms of access to sanitation facilities. This suggests that not only are Palestinian homes overcrowded, but they also lack some basic necessities compared to Israeli homes.

Economic

Economic structural violence is seen in two categories, employment and the economic development of Palestine. The employment rates in the West Bank certainly indicate major concerns for Palestinians. Not only is there a major discrepancy in employment rates between Israeli (4 percent unemployment rate; World Bank, 2019d) and the West Bank (30.2 percent;

PCBS, 2015). Yet the employment rate in the West Bank increased from 14.3 percent in 2000 to 25.9 percent in 2015 reported by the PCBS (PCBS, 2015) and up to 30.2 percent in 2018 (World Bank, 2019d). Importantly, the increase in unemployment rates also mirrors large bouts of construction in Israeli settlements, as the peak years of unemployment, 2002 (31.2 percent), 2004 (26.8 percent), 2008, (26.6 percent), 2014 (26.9 percent), and in 2018 (30.2 percent) (The World Bank, 2019d), occur at the same time or in the few years following the peak years of settlement construction starts, 2000 (4,958), 2003 (2,069), 2008 (2,332), 2013 (2,946), and 2016 (3,143) (Peace Now, 2019a). Employment in the West Bank is also heavily affected by outbreaks of violence, for example the biggest jump in the unemployment rate is from 2000 to 2001, which corresponds to the Second Intifada. However, the prolonged high rates of unemployment, coupled with the increasing unemployment rates since 2000 and the relation between peak construction starts and peak unemployment rates, support the idea that settlements and the settlement infrastructure negatively affect Palestinians employment.

In terms of economic development, the West Bank's GDP in 2014 was USD \$5.75 billion and per capita was USD \$2.27 thousand, with a real GDP growth rate of 0.1 percent (PCBS, 2016c). Some discrepancies may be evident, as World Bank data suggests that the total GDP for Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) in 2014 was USD \$12.7 billion, creating a USD \$7 billion gap, which would have to be produced by Gaza (The World Bank, 2015a). However, despite inconsistencies, and even taking the greater of the two numbers, they still pale in comparison to the Israeli GDP of USD \$310 billion produced by the Israeli economy, the subsequent USD \$37,733 per capita, and 3.9 percent growth rate (The World Bank, 2019a; The World Bank, 2015a). West Bank GDP growth rates also show major fluctuations in the West Bank and Gaza data, with highs of 14 percent and lows of -12 percent, compared to a relatively stable Israeli

economy, whose percent growth rate has never dipped below zero since 1967 (The World Bank, 2019a). These statistics indicate an extreme gap in the Israeli and Palestinian economies, influencing household and individual income, as well as a slow and volatile growth rate compared to the relatively robust and stable Israeli growth rate. The indications are that Palestinians live in much worse economic conditions and suffer from less economic security, coupled with high and worsening unemployment rates, there are causing serious economic and health issues facing Palestinians in the West Bank.

Health

Health access was the main area identified through which structural violence is felt by Palestinians. The effects on Palestinian lives are evident through life expectancy and mortality rates, nutrition, and access. In 2017, life expectancy in Palestine was 9 years less than in Israel, in 1990 it was 8.5 years left, which is an indication that Israelis not only live longer but are increasing people's life expectancy at a higher rate than Palestinians, albeit by a relatively insignificant amount. The infant mortality rate in Palestine in 2017 was 17.9 deaths per 1000 live births, compared to Israel at 2.9 deaths per 1000 live births, this signals a significant difference (The World Bank, 2017). Palestinian infant mortality rates have improved dramatically since data was collected by the World Bank in 1975, when the infant mortality rate was 76.9 deaths per 1000 live births (The World Bank, 2019b). Although this is great sign of improvement, it still only places Palestine on par with where Israel was 40 years ago in 1978, when Israel had an infant mortality rate of 17.2 deaths per live 1000 births (The World Bank, 2019b).

In terms of nutrition, the percentage of pregnant women with anemia in Palestine from 2003 to 2006 ranged from 30.7 percent to 37.9 percent and ranged from 25 percent to 39.2

percent for children, classifying them as moderate in significance (The World Bank, 2016). Although information on obesity is limited several surveys indicated high levels of obesity, stemming from a low quality of food. Further, the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) reported that malnutrition and dietary risks were the most important risk factors in driving death and disability (IHME, 2019c). These indications suggest that there are issues related to nutrition, which contribute to the death of Palestinians. Further, in terms of access, using the IHME Healthcare and Access and Quality Index (HAQI), in 2016 Palestine (which includes Gaza) received a score of 57.4/100, the Israeli score on the HAQI is 84.8/100, for comparison, Canada's score is 93.8/100 (IHME, 2019a; IHME, 2019b; IHME, 2019c). In looking at health, indications are clear that Palestinians experience issues with health, life expectancy, mortality rates, and nutrition, and access to healthcare, which affect their wellbeing and precariousness.

Security

Structural violence on Palestinian security occurs through direct violence as well as oppression. Getting a complete understanding of settler violence is difficult, as anecdotal evidence suggests instances of settler and IDF violence are on the rise. According to PCBS data however, reported settler violence on households in 2016 was low, at 1.3 percent compared to earlier years, such as 2012 where it was reported at 4.4 percent and in 2004 where it was 7.1 percent (PCBS, 2016a). Further, personal reported violence perpetrated by settlers and soldiers was also lower than in previous years, as 17.1 percent experienced settler or soldier offenses, compared to 42.8 percent and 62.7 percent in 2012 and 2004 respectively (PCBS, 2016a). In terms of crime, the number of criminal offenses rose from 7.22 percent in 2008 to 11.2 percent in 2016 per 1000 people (PCBS, 2016b). The number of reported thefts and assaults also increased

steadily from 1996 to 2016 (PCBS, 2016b). The number of demolitions of Palestinian homes in the West Bank spiked between 2011 and 2016 accounting for 67.8 percent of demolished homes between 2003 and 2019 (Until May 31st) (B'Tselem, 2019d).

However, in the last two years it has reduced considerably, as 274 homes were demolished in 2016, and subsequently 100 and 82 homes were demolished in 2017 and 2018 respectively (B'Tselem, 2019d). In looking at oppression, poverty has decreased in the West Bank from 2009, where 19.4 percent were in poverty and 9.1 percent in deep poverty, to 2017, where 13.9 percent and 5.8 percent were in poverty and deep poverty respectively (PCBS, 2017c). Further, related to oppression and especially in terms of restricted mobility, in 2018 OCHA recorded 705 obstacles restricting Palestinian vehicular and pedestrian movement, a rise in 3 percent according to their survey in 2016 (OCHA, 2018b).

In terms of security, the increased number of reports of violence from settlers will be interesting to monitor, as the data suggests there was less settler and soldier violence experienced by Palestinians than in more recent years. Overall crime experienced by Palestinians however is on the rise and indicates that they have experienced a general increase in direct violence. In terms of oppression the percentage of households in poverty has decreased in the West Bank. However, the anecdotal evidence on the dependency of external donors and humanitarian assistance calls to question the sustainability of these changes, due to the lack of humanitarian aid (a deficit of USD \$21 million in 2015; UNRWA, 2018). Further the increase in obstructions to Palestinian movement within the West Bank is of serious concern, as many indications of structural violence, such as food, water, and healthcare access, unemployment, revolved around restricted mobility.

Political

Political structural violence is explored in relation to suppressing the right to free speech and expression and the freedom of assembly. Data on political freedom is derived from Freedom House, a US government funded NGO. According to Freedom House, the West Bank scored 28/100 on their scale compared to 79/100 for Israel, indicating that Palestinians in the West Bank experience less political freedom (Freedom House, 2018a; Freedom House, 2018b). Although some indicators relate to the internal politics within the West Bank, others point to issues related to settlements and the occupation. For example, when looking at freedom from foreign powers where the West Bank scored a 1/4, Freedom House refers to the restrictions on mobility due to settlement infrastructure (Freedom House, 2019b). Further, when looking at the question, “Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?,” Freedom House refers specifically to the development and expansion of settlements as well as land annexation.

In terms of the right to free speech and expression, practices inhibiting the right to express ones’ faith were inhibited by restrictions on movement. Within the West Bank, Freedom House reports that individuals are relatively free to express their political views (Freedom House, 2019b). However, no comment is made in terms of expressing views against the Israeli state or in relation to Israel. Further, in terms of freedom of assembly, Freedom House specifically refers to Military Order 101 and the repression of peaceful demonstrations by force as major obstacles and scores the West Bank ¼ respectively due to these measures (Freedom House, 2019b).

From the data collected by Freedom House, as well as the anecdotal data it provides for their assessments, the effects of settlements and the settlement infrastructure on Palestinians in

terms of political structural violence occurs mostly through the restrictions on mobility as well as the use of force to repress political protest. The difference in scores between the West Bank and Israel highlight the discrepancies that Palestinians and Israelis face in their day-to-day lives in terms of experiencing political structural violence.

Social

Social structural violence is seen in the implementation of curfews, the separation of families, and through direct violence and impediments to accessing education. According to the World Values Survey conducted from 2010 to 2014, Palestinians show several signs of mistrust affecting social cohesion and connections. In addressing the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?,” 73.4 percent responded they needed to be very careful³ (World Values Survey, 2019). Political participation, in terms of active membership in a political party, was low, where 80.6 percent of respondents indicated they were not members of political parties, a further, 46.6 percent indicated they would never attend peaceful demonstrations (World Values Survey, 2019). Membership of charitable and humanitarian organizations was low as well, as 86 percent of respondents said they were not a member of any of these organizations (World Values Survey, 2019).’ In terms of looking at social indicators of Palestinians’ social wellbeing, the mistrust in others and their low involvement in political parties and humanitarian organizations demonstrate the centrality of social issues within the West Bank. Low political involvement is a characteristic of Palestinian communities, as they tend to boycott the political process, however the percentage of those who would not be involved in peaceful protest is indicative of the repressive measure by the IDF against freedom of assembly.

³ Possible responses were “most people can be trusted,” “need to be very careful,” and “don’t know.”

In terms of education, the mean number of years of schooling in the West Bank for those 15 and above in 2018 was 10.72, the first time this rate has lowered since 2000 (PCBS, 2018b). From 2000 to 2017, the mean number of school years had increased from 8.71 to 12.54 (PCBS, 2018b). The Israeli mean years of schooling was 13 in 2017 (UNDP, 2018), indicating that levels of education attainment in the West Bank and Israel were relatively similar, although the lowering of the mean years of schooling in the West Bank for 2018 indicates educational discrepancies may be getting worse. Literacy rates in men and women have increased from 1995 to 2018 as well currently the West Bank has a 97 percent literacy rate (PCBS, 2018a). Drop-out rates in the West Bank generally improved as well from 1997 to 2011, however in 2017 the drop-out rate in the West bank rose to 30.7 percent, which was the highest since 2001 (PCBS, 2017a). The increased obstacles reported by OCHA and discussed in the security section of this chapter also raise concerns, as barriers to mobility were a main source of issues in terms of access to education.

Further, checkpoints in particular were potential spots of harassment affecting workers, children and teachers on their way to schools. As reported by the Education Cluster and Child Protection Working Group, 31 percent of students and teachers crossed at least one military checkpoint, and 16 percent had experienced harassment (GCPEA, 2014). In terms of education, the structural violence issues pertained to violence against schools, students, and teachers, as well as mobility restrictions affecting access to education. Literacy rates in the West Bank are also high indicating that certain levels of basic education are maintained despite restrictions to access, disruptions to school activities, and a 30 percent drop-out rate. The drop-out rate is particular concerning. Further the increased number of checkpoints risks threatening the access of Palestinians to education and employment in Israel.

Conclusion

In examining precariousness, the importance of describing the general welfare of Palestinians in the six categories of structural violence, is derived from the notion that life is sustained through social conditions that allow for that life to be livable. When these social conditions deteriorate, life becomes increasingly precarious and leads to greater chances of death, bestowing upon people the necropolitical label of ‘the living dead.’ Those who are not yet dead live within socially precarious conditions that facilitate their death. By looking at indicators related to the six categories of structural violence, it is shown how Palestinian lives are affected by settlements and settlement infrastructure. This can be seen across all six categories, as Palestinians face issues related to their physical, economic, health, security, political, and social well being.

The structural violence that is purported in Chapter 6 to result from Israeli settlements, relates the actions and decisions of the Israeli state in terms of settlement development, to the effects on Palestinian precariousness. The data investigated in this chapter supports the claims that settlements, as the result of Israeli state actions and decisionmaking, affect the death and dehumanization of Palestinians through structural violence by indicating and exploring the observable effects on indicators related to precariousness. The next section of this chapter explores the relationship between precariousness and grievability, and the connection between the death of Palestinians through increasing levels of precariousness and their subsequent devaluation.

7.2 Grievability

Forms of devaluation are used in several ways as a way to justify violence, especially as a retaliatory mechanism (Moaz & McCauley, 2008; Moaz & Eidelson, 2007). It can be used to illicit images of dehumanization such as the person or group being compared to a lesser being, akin to an animal, object, or machine, and it can be used as a way to distance oneself from violence. The devaluation that is involved in the development of settlements is derived from Butler's (2010) concept of grievability and is distinctly connected with precariousness. Butler (2010, p. 31) states, "The shared condition of precariousness leads not to reciprocal recognition, but to a specific exploitation of target populations, of lives that are not quite lives, cast as 'destructable' or 'ungrievable.'" In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, devaluation of the other is seen on both sides. In terms of Israel, devaluation within Israel towards Palestinians is by no means scarce. Statements by Israeli leadership show devaluation at the upper echelons of Israeli politics, it is evident within Zionism, Israeli soldiers' have been found to hold dehumanizing views of Palestinian women, Israeli media has been criticized of dehumanizing Palestinians in their reporting, and although major forms of devaluation are no longer present, there still exist large amounts of negative characterizations of Palestinians within Israeli textbooks (Cohen, 2001; Fox, 2017; Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, 2016; Atawneh, 2011; Pappé, 1997).

Focusing particularly on Israeli settlements, this section looks at how devaluation is interwoven with the development of settlements. Disposability infers that devaluation, through grievability, is intrinsically connected to precariousness, and therefore, as a sovereign power expresses its right to kill through structural violence, affecting the precariousness of certain groups, the grievability, or value attributed to those groups is affected as well. By looking at the connection between settlements and devaluation, this section shows how the devaluation of

Palestinians is tied to the development of settlements. It is argued that embedded in the two main reasons for settlements, Israeli security and the Jewish sovereign right to the land, are narratives that devalue Palestinians and are reinforced with the continued development and expansion of settlements. This section looks particularly at these two narratives and their related features that are central to settlement development.

A Jewish Homeland in Eretz-Israel: The Chosen People

The right to settle a Jewish homeland, and the identity and formation of Israel is predicated in two notions, the need for a sovereign Jewish state and the right to settle in Palestine/Eretz-Israel (Falk, 2017; Chapman, 1983; O'Malley, 2015, p. 203). The rise in anti-Semitism, and in Eastern Europe especially, that preceded the World Wars helped instil within the European Jewish populations the need for a sovereign state, where Jews would be secure, and heavily influenced the ideology of Zionism (Shapira, 2012; O'Malley, 2015). Palestine was not the only choice, so was Argentina, but due to its religious, cultural, and historical significance, it was a logical one that the leaders of the Zionist movement believed would facilitate immigration (Rodinson, 1973, pp. 41-42). This led to the second idea, the right to settle in Palestine/Eretz-Israel. These two ideas, a sovereign Jewish state and the right to settle the territory, are usually expressed as the right to settle in the Jewish homeland and are fundamental, not only to the formation of the Jewish state, but also to the development of settlements.

The prominent role the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine played in the formation of Israel continues to be reiterated to this day, in particular in defence and in the planning of settlements. The belief in the right to a Jewish homeland in Israel is derived from the Torah, specifically that God gave the land of Israel to the Jewish people (Chapman, 1983; Jewish

Virtual Library, 2019). According to the Jewish Virtual Library, this “choseness,” is not related to a greater ideology of superiority, but the spreading the knowledge of God around the world (Jewish Virtual Library, 2019). However, the Aliyahs into Palestine were not about spreading the word of God, they were about establishing a Jewish state in Palestine based on the right of the Jews to the land, predicated in the notion of the “chosen people.” Further, A Pew survey found that 79% of Jewish respondents believed Israeli Jews deserved preferential treatment in Israel. It is through this promise that Jews are considered the Chosen people, and thus have a right to the land. Although contested, it is clear that this idea devalued the Palestinian’s historical, traditional, cultural, and religious claims to the land, in favour of Jewish ones, and further, there is a strong belief in Israel that Jews deserve better treatment. Whether invoked intentionally or not, settlements are predicated in this idea, and the continued expansion of settlements into the West Bank, is derived from a logic that inherently situates Jewish people over Arab-Palestinians.

The right to settle the entire territory of Palestine as a Jewish homeland is displayed prominently through the various planning stages of settlement development. Further, when discussing their intentions on settlements many Israeli PMs stated they would continue to develop settlements on the basis that the territory was the right of the Jewish people to settle (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Statements to the UN and by prominent Israeli politicians and right wing, Zionist, and nationalist groups provide further evidence of this fact (see Dannon comments or NGO Regavim’s comments). The idea of settlements, their existence as well as their expansion into the West Bank, is predicated in the notion of establishing a Jewish homeland in Eretz-Israel, the entire territory of Palestine including the West Bank. Where this right to the land is developed, and where it evokes the devaluation of Palestinian people, is in its religious

foundations: god gave the land to the Jewish people, and as such they are considered the Chosen people (O'Malley, 2015; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1949; Efrat, 1988; Chapman, 1983).

The devaluation that occurs from the idea of the Jews are the Chosen people is through the de-legitimization of the Palestinian claim to the land and the subsequent entitlement of the land to Jewish people. This creates a social hierarchy where Jewish people are positioned above Palestinians, devaluing them in the process, through a denial of their claims, religion, history, culture, and traditions that are tied to the land, in essence it denies them as a people. This represents a growing narrative within Israel that denied Palestinian claims to the land, that the Palestinians and Palestinian statehood evolved only in relation to the growing Zionism and calls for Jewish statehood within Palestine (O'Malley, 2015, p. 41). These ideas led to statements such as Golda Meir's infamous quote on Palestinian (non)existence, "there is no such thing as a Palestinian people" (as quoted in O'Malley, 2015, p. 176), and the general belief in the Israeli population that Jews should receive preferential treatment.

Security: Threat of the Palestinian/ the Palestinian Terrorist

The representation of the Palestinian as a terrorist or as a threat is another example of devaluation that is linked with settlements. The connection with settlements is that, although imbued with deeper meaning, settlements are seen by Israel as necessary for Israelis' security, both for settlers in the West Bank and citizens within Israel. The security argument for settlements is prevalent in most discussions of settlements. For example, calls upon Palestinians to cease violence, the initial basis of PM Eshkol to begin settlement construction on security concerns, and the Allon Plan's, and subsequent settlement plan's, place emphasis on security (Black, 2017; B'Tselem, Settlements, 2019; Consulate General of Israel in Toronto, 2019;

Dowty, 2017; O'Malley, 2015; Progress of the Allon Plan, 1972; Palestine Facts, 2011). The security argument however, does not just include Israeli protection. Within the security argument is the reason why Israelis need security: the Palestinian.

The security argument is almost always predicated in juxtaposing the need to protect Israeli life against a Palestinian threat. If not Palestinian, then most certainly against an Arab threat. The Palestinian is constructed as a threat to Israeli life, and thus measures of security such as settlements, the security wall, and checkpoints are seen to be needed, and then implemented. Further, this depiction of the Palestinian as a threat is coupled with the evocation of the Palestinian terrorist.

The Palestinian as a terrorist is evoked by Israel, and even officially recognized by some, as Hamas, the main authority in Gaza that is labelled a terrorist group. On connotations alone, the word terrorist has certain implications. Further, the terrorist is killable, more so, the terrorist ought to be killed (Barrinha, 2011). Israel does not fall short of accusing the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority (PA) of facilitating and aiding terrorism. For example, Defense Minister Ben-Elevier stated, “[a]s long as the terrorism continues, everything as of now is kosher”, referring to retaliatory attacks against Palestinians (Miller, Zetouni, & Miller, 2002, p. 387). Further, for Israelis, Palestinians have been unable to deliver on their security promises, such as stopping terrorism, and thus the actions of the state are seen as justified (O'Malley, 2015). Ceasing Palestinian violence and Israeli settlements are key issues during peace agreements, and the Israeli view is that Palestinians have not fulfilled their commitments to stopping violence, and therefore, Israel feels justified in its continued settlement expansion into the West Bank on the basis of security.

The devaluation in labelling Palestinians as ‘threats’ and ‘terrorists’ is two-fold. First, it reduces a person or group to being killable, and second, it negates the identity of the Palestinian people, as well as the struggles that have led to their resistance. In the first form of devaluation, the notion that labelling a group ‘terrorists’ coincides with reducing them to a group that must be killed as opposed to another that is an ‘enemy’ to be negotiated with (Barrinha, 2011). Juxtaposing this with the Israeli security argument, the Palestinian becomes killable as a threat or a terrorist in order to protect Israeli life. This is a clear differentiation in the valuation of Israeli and Palestinian lives, as one is made killable in defence of the other.

The second form of devaluation inherent in labelling Palestinians terrorists is that it denies their identity: they are no longer Palestinians they are ‘subhuman threats’ or ‘terrorists’. This is a form of dehumanization that strips Palestinians from their personhood, which devalues them. Further, as Edward Said (1994, p. 342) argues, “the one thing about ‘terrorism’... that seems most striking is its isolation from any explanation or mitigating circumstances.” This dynamic denies Palestinians, not only their identity, but also the context through which their actions can be explained. In essence, it sustains Israelis and the Israeli narrative, and removes the Palestinians and Palestinian narrative. Both of which are forms of devaluation.

Conclusion

The devaluation of Palestinians through settlement development is shown through the narratives of the right to a Jewish homeland and the Palestinian terrorist that are intrinsic to the logic of Israeli settlement in the West Bank. As settlements continue to expand and their reach spreads, so too does the devaluing logic they are predicated in. Through the Israeli state’s continuous development of settlements and settlement infrastructure, the dehumanization that is

intrinsic to the logic of settlement development is further embedded within Israeli society. By showing how Palestinians are inherently devalued through the development of settlements, it is also shown how the structural violence that results from settlement development, not only affects the precariousness of Palestinians, but also works to entrench their ungrievability. This devaluation subsequently affects future violence upon Palestinians, as research has shown the importance of forms of devaluation, such as dehumanization, are to ethno-centered conflict and in justifying violence (Moaz & McCauley, 2008). In this way, disposability can be understood as reiterative, as it describes the repetitious way in which sovereign action and decisionmaking result in the death and devaluation of certain groups through structural violence, and how the devaluation of these groups increases their risk of future violence and increasing levels of disposability.

Conclusion

Through precariousness and grievability, the connections between power, sovereignty, violence, death, and devaluation are used to explicate the idea of disposability in conflict. By analyzing the effects of settlements on Palestinian precariousness, it is shown how Israeli state action comes to affect the lives and subsequent risk to life Palestinians face through settlement development. Further through grievability it is shown how the devaluation embedded within the ideology of settlement development is reinforced and re-constructed with every pro-settlement action or decision the Israeli state makes. Through looking at indicators of wellbeing across the six identified categories of structural violence, the negative effects of settlements on Palestinian life describes the ways in which the social conditions of Palestinian's lives have deteriorated, and their level of precariousness increased.

This has inferred upon them something akin to Mbembe's (2003) "living-dead," Patterson's (1982) "social death," or Gilmore's (2007) "greater risk of death." In essence they are conferred the status of those on the limits, living a liminal existence, where they are in essence "marked for death" (Mbembe, 2003). Further, by looking at the devaluation implicit in settlement development, it is shown how this necropolitical process works to devalue Palestinians, which affects their future disposability and susceptibility to violence. In this way disposability is a reiterative process that repetitiously constructs and re-constructs certain populations as disposable.

Chapter Eight – Revisiting Disposability: Power in Violent Conflict

Introduction

Violence can be both direct and systemic (Galtung 1969). As proposed in the introduction, direct violence is more akin to force, that is directly or indirectly coercing another person or group's behaviour, while structural or indirect violence is more closely associated with the Foucauldian concept of power. In the realpolitik 'stick-and-carrot' approach to power, and in most other conceptions of power within PACS and IR discussed, power is seen as an object, something to be accumulated, held, wielded, and exerted, at the whims of those who have it. Gaining power is theorized to come through economic strength, military force, or group cohesiveness, and utilizing power is seen in getting others to act against their interests.

Although more recent ideas have begun to include the importance of social relations, these conceptions of power are fundamentally different. Whereas in the IR models, power is seen as an object, Foucault defines it as a relation. Power then, is not the accumulation of the material (economic, military, or people) and the subsequent ability or capacity to influence (power to), or have power over, others' behaviour. Instead, power is understood as an omnipresent relation between free individuals, it does not manifest through social relations as the IR theories would suggest, but it is embedded within this relation. Whenever Arabs and Israelis interact, in the streets or in boardrooms, whether directly through discussion or action, or indirectly through social structures, the relations of power between them influence the nature of that interaction.

The upmost expression of these power relations lies in the sovereign authority, the Israeli state, and its right to decide who lives and dies (Mbembe, 2003). In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the Israeli state continually

implements policy and engages in actions that result in the death of Palestinians. It continually protects the Jewish life, at the expense of the Palestinian life. Whether this is justifiable by means of security or the historical, cultural, or religious aspects of the conflict is not the point of analysis however. The reason for analyzing this issue is to explicate the idea that in conflict, sovereign power operates to construct and reconstruct certain people as disposable, that is expandable and killable.

This chapter revisits the theory of disposability that is proposed in this thesis, to describe the process in which sovereign power kills or allows to die through the concepts of necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability. This chapter begins by discussing disposability in light of the analysis of Israeli settlements. It follows by revisiting each conceptual aspect of disposability – necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability. It concludes by discussing disposability as well as the importance of a comprehensive approach using Allison's (1999) and Waltz's (2001) theoretical frameworks.

8.1 Disposability

Disposability describes a necropolitical process within conflict: it describes how sovereign power operates indirectly through structural violence, to affect the precariousness and grievability of certain people, resulting in their death and devaluation, and constructing them as disposable. This centralizing function of necropolitics describes the whole process from sovereign action and decisionmaking, to the death of certain populations. Although necropolitics grounds the proposed theory of disposability, each concept within the theoretical framework, necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, describe its different aspects.

The first component, necropolitics, locates sovereign power and links this sovereign power to certain actions and decisions. The second, structural violence, describes the indirect, negative effects on people caused by these actions and decisions. These negative effects subsequently affect their precariousness, the social conditions that make life livable. As Butler (2010) suggests, precariousness is inseparable from grievability, in that the deterioration of the conditions of precariousness for certain people is intrinsically linked to the inherent value of those people. Thus, as precariousness is affected by structural violence related to political actions and decisions, so too is grievability, in that those devoid of the conditions on which life is predicated, are and become devalued. Through this process, political action and decisionmaking result in the death making and devaluation of certain people. Through Chapters Five to Seven, it is shown how the actions and decisions of the Israeli state, through its political use and development of settlements, result in structural violence that affect the precariousness of Palestinian life, which subsequently results in Palestinians' death and devaluation. The following looks at each one of these components of disposability more closely before re-examining the theory of disposability.

8.2 Necropolitics

The proposed theory of disposability is centered around Mbembe's (2003) necropolitics. Mbembe (2003) locates sovereign power in the ability to decide who dies or the ability of the Y to let X die. Using Israeli settlements, war machines in Africa, and suicide bombers as examples, Mbembe (2003) describes how sovereign action affects others' livelihoods, resulting directly or indirectly in their death or greater chances of death. This process seems apparent: the sovereign power acts or makes decisions that affect the wellbeing, for better or worse, of others; those who

are neglected, either by not benefiting from state action or being directly harmed, will inevitably suffer poorer life-chances and are at a greater risk of death. However apparent, identifying how this process works is imperative in understanding different forms of violence, and specifically within PACS, how different forms of violence and power work within and affect conflict.

Disposability does not just reiterate necropolitics, it explicates the necropolitical processes within conflict and shows how these processes devalue certain groups, constructing and re-constructing them as disposable. The necropolitical part of the theory of disposability, aside from its centralizing function, identifies two important points. First, it identifies wherein sovereign power lies, and second, it associates specific acts or decisions with this sovereign power. This research argues that the Israeli state is the sovereign power within Israel as well as in the occupied or disputed territory, and further that Israeli settlements are the result of actions and decisions by the Israeli state.

In the current geopolitical landscape, necropower and sovereign power often reside in the state as the centralizing, governing body. As Mbembe (2003) suggests, in democratic countries, the democratic process legitimizes this, whereby being representative of the population legitimizes the authority of the state. This is certainly the case in Israel, a democratic country whose state derives and legitimizes its authority through elections. Since 1967, the authority of the state of Israel has also encompassed the West Bank, although the Oslo negotiations slightly changed this dynamic in 1995, the large majority of territory is still under IDF and Israeli state control. Further, the security apparatus of the Israeli state in Areas B and C, effectively gives them control over Area A. This dynamic gives the Israeli state authority as a governing body in Israel as well as the West Bank, which makes it the sovereign power of the region.

For purposes of analysis, the second point is much more poignant, that Israeli settlements are the consequences of actions and decisions by the Israeli state. It is shown that before 1967, the Israeli state was interested in developing within the West Bank, and the war in 1967 provided the opportunity to do so. The state acted immediately, allowing construction within the year. The connections to settlement development and Israeli state action and decisionmaking are clear, as shown in Chapter Five. By connecting Israeli settlements to state actions and decisions, the necropolitical aspect of disposability allows this analysis to connect the effects of Israeli settlements, directly to the state. This allows for the ensuing analysis of the effects on structural violence, precariousness and grievability, and the ability to connect those effects to sovereign power. If the connection between settlements and state action is not made, then it would be difficult to conclude that the effects of settlements on Palestinians was a result of sovereign power, or in this case Israeli state action.

These two connections are an essential first step in understanding how sovereign power results in the disposability of certain people, in this case the Palestinians. Not only because it locates sovereign power, but also because it describes the actions and decisions that are a result of the power relations between the sovereign power and the Other. The relation of power between the sovereign and the Other, allows for the sovereign to produce in their favour. The Israeli state then, is able to produce in their favour (e.g. constructing and developing settlements) because of their position in relation to Palestinians. Chapter Five illustrates that as a dispossessed people, in a frozen power asymmetric relation with the Israeli state, Palestinians and their private land are politically and literally bulldozed for settlement construction. The necropolitical aspect of the theory of disposability essentially opens the door for the rest of the analysis. It allows the

theory of disposability to connect Israeli state action and decisionmaking to settlements development, the effects of which are then examined in terms of structural violence.

8.3 Structural Violence

Structural violence is one form of violence that can occur during conflict. As opposed to direct violence, which involves direct action, or cultural violence, which are the norms and aspects of a culture that justify other forms of violence, structural violence is the indirect violence that can occur through social structures (Byrne & Senehi, 2012; Galtung, 1996). This research identifies six categories in which structural violence can occur, physical, economic, health, security, political, and social. The importance of structural violence to the theory of disposability is that it identifies the occurrence of structural violence and relates it to the actions and decisions of the sovereign power. In Chapter Six using information from NGO groups and international organizations that work and research in the West Bank and on the issue of Israeli settlements in particular does this.

By using the narratives, stories, and human rights claims reported by these NGOs and agencies, it is shown that in each of these six categories, certain forms of structural violence are reportedly linked to Israeli settlements. These forms of structural violence are connected to the development of Israeli settlements by these organizations, and the evidence of which can be seen in Chapter Six. The important function of structural violence in the theory of disposability is identifying the occurrence of structural violence and connecting this with sovereign action and decisionmaking. By analyzing this data, it can be seen that Palestinians experience structural violence, and that this structural or invisible violence is a result of settlement development.

Identifying the occurrence of structural violence and showing its connection to Israeli state action through settlement development is an important part of disposability. It shows how the actions and decisions of the sovereign power result in violence upon certain populations. This violence is what leads to the death and devaluation of these people and in this way contributes to their disposability. The power relations that allow for Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank are also involved in creating and perpetuating these forms of structural violence. They allow for the Israeli state to construct settlements, in the name of security for Jewish Israelis and on the grounds of the Jewish cultural, religious, and historical claims to the land, at the expense of Palestinian lives and their cultural, religious, and historical claims to the land.

Not only do the relations of power, through settlement construction, produce these forms of structural violence that leads to death, they also perpetuate this violence through continued devaluation of the Palestinians. The death and devaluation of Palestinians as a result of the structural violence caused by Israeli settlements in the West Bank are analyzed using the concepts of precariousness and grievability.

8.4 Precariousness

Precariousness defines the fragility of life, based on the reliance on social conditions that make a life livable (Butler, 2010). These social conditions are sustained by social structures within society in order to provide the adequate supports for life. Structural violence affects these condition's which threatens the precariousness of certain populations. Chapter Six describes the forms of structural violence felt by Palestinians as a result of Israeli settlements. In Chapter Seven, these forms of structural violence are analyzed to see the effects upon Palestinians in six categories. From the data collected, it is shown that Palestinians see negative effects in each one

of these categories. The initial deprivation in these categories can be attributed to the War in 1948, the mass displacement and dispossession of Palestinians, and the war of 1967.

However, there continues to be issues faced by the Palestinians since 1967, and in some cases these conditions have worsened. Because of these factors, attributing the causes of the issues facing Palestinians to Israeli settlements is challenging. Who's to say whether the discrepancy between Israelis and Palestinians is caused by the Israeli settlements, the direct violence of the IDF and settlers, the initial violence of the Wars in 1948 and 1967, or the mass dispossession of Palestinians? Therefore, an important question to address is whether Israeli settlements are responsible or contribute to the structural violence faced today by Palestinians.

One indication is the continued issues faced by Palestinians. This indicates that the occupation of the West Bank since 1967 has sustained the issues that have affected the lives of Palestinians. As an integral part of the occupation and in development since 1967, Israeli settlements are certainly a major factor in the conditions in which Palestinians live in today. The anecdotal evidence suggests this as well, as Palestinians themselves emphasise the settlements amongst their major concerns and many attributed their plight to Israeli settlements. The data collected in this regard, the narratives and research by NGOs and international organizations, as well as the quantitative data on Palestinian lives support the idea that Israeli settlements cause structural violence on Palestinians that affect the conditions upon which their lives depend. As these conditions worsen, the precariousness of Palestinian lives increases, and as a result of poverty, poor water quality, disease and poor healthcare, food deprivation, and other forms of structural violence, Palestinians experience worse life chances and are at a greater risk of death.

Precariousness is a crucial concept for the theory of disposability because it connects structural violence with a greater risk of death through decaying social conditions.

Precariousness describes how sovereign power's actions and decisionmaking, through structural violence, have the capacity to kill. As Mbembe (2003) states, this capacity, and the authority to decide who lives and dies, defines the apex of sovereign power. The power relation between the sovereign power and the others embeds that relationship with this authority in the everyday lives of Palestinians.

As stated earlier, the Israeli state, as a democratic state, is legitimized through electoral processes and derives its authority from representing the Israeli population. As the sovereign power, and with essential control over its own territory as well as the West Bank, the power relations between Israelis and Palestinians contributes to the Israeli state's actions and decisions regarding settlements. The death of Palestinians as a result of the structural violence and subsequent effects on their precariousness caused by settlements, defines the necropolitical process that disposability attempts to explain. However, disposability also suggests that this necropolitical process works to devalue populations through the relation between precariousness and grievability.

8.5 Grievability

Grievability relies on the idea that certain lives are viewed as more or less valuable based on the social conditions of precariousness (Butler, 2010). Those who are under worse conditions of precariousness are then devalued compared with those with better conditions of precariousness. It is this connection between the conditions of precariousness and the value of life that allows disposability to suggest that structural violence not only kills but devalues the Other. By worsening the conditions of precariousness, Israeli settlements as the result of Israeli state action and decisionmaking, result in both the death and devaluation of Palestinians. The

role of grievability in the theory of disposability is to explicate this process by connecting the devaluation of Palestinians to Israeli settlements.

Chapter Seven outlines the forms of devaluation that are present within the Israeli narrative and present within Israeli society. Although this does not characterize the entire Israeli society, it is evident that there are strong narratives devaluating Palestinians within Israeli society. Attributing these views and narratives as a result of Israeli settlements is more difficult. However, the actions of the Israeli state provide evidence that these views and narratives affect state action and decisionmaking regarding settlements. The narrative of land ownership is predicated in a devaluation of Palestinians, as the land is given to Jewish people, the chosen people, bestowing on them a right to the land over others. The emphasis on security as a justification for settlements, outposts, and the intense security apparatus is predicated in the narrative of the threat of the Palestinian or the Palestinian terrorist.

Labelling the Palestinians as terrorists devalues them by making them justifiably killable as well as dehumanizing them. Settlement construction is not only predicated in this idea but also reinforces it. Settlements inflict structural violence upon Palestinians, simultaneously they provide security and prosperity for Israeli settlers. This demonstrates the Israeli state's different valuation of Israeli and Palestinian lives. By continually acting and making decisions that increase the number of settlements, settlers, service routes, and military infrastructure that drastically benefit Israelis over Palestinians, the Israeli state exhibits a pattern of continually devaluing Palestinians.

Grievability concerns itself with the devaluation of people based on the worsening of the social conditions of precariousness (Butler, 2010). Disposability suggests that sovereign power, through structural violence, worsens the conditions of precariousness, which leads to the

increased risk of death for certain populations. Through this process, grievability suggests that these populations become devalued as well. By incorporating this idea, disposability is able to connect the actions of the sovereign power to structural violence as well as the death and devaluation of certain groups. The power relations between the sovereign and the Other produce the conditions in which this process occurs.

The power asymmetry between the dispossessed Palestinians and the Israeli state allow for settlement construction and expansion to operate relatively easily. The actions and decisions of the Israeli government regarding Israeli settlements results in structural violence; this behaviour increases the chances of death and devalues Palestinians. In concert, the concepts of necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, create the framework for the theory of disposability and describe the death and devaluation that is a result of sovereign power and structural violence.

Conclusion

Disposability incorporates the concepts of necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, and describes how they function collectively to understand how power works within conflict, and how it can produce systems and discourses of inequality that result in the disposability of certain populations. The utility of this theory is in its ability to describe how power operates in conflict and how, through necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, it can cause the death of and devalue certain populations. Each concept has a certain role in describing a different aspect of disposability. Necropolitics locates sovereign power and associates specific actions and decisions to this sovereign power. Structural violence identifies the forms of violence that are a result of these actions. Precariousness

explains how this violence affects peoples' lives putting them at a greater risk of death, and grievability shows how this violence devalues.

It is also pertinent to describe the role of Allison's (1999) and Waltz's (2001) framework in exploring the concept of disposability. Although not central to describing disposability, in order to comprehensively discuss disposability as a result of state action and decisionmaking Allison's (1999) framework of rational interests, bureaucratic processes, and organizational behaviours provide a comprehensive understanding of state decisionmaking. These three frameworks for understanding state action avoid reductionism in describing how states make decisions and act, while simultaneously allowing connections to be made across the political sphere. Waltz's (2001) levels of analysis are also important for situating and contextualizing disposability as they show how political actions on all three levels – international, national/state, and local – affect internal politics and the operations of states, affecting the disposability of certain populations.

In its entirety, disposability shows how the actions and decisions of sovereign powers within conflict, result in the death and devaluation of the Other. The power dynamics between the sovereign and the Other, lie at the heart of this theoretical framework, as they affect the ways in which people interact with each other and also with social structures. By centralizing power in this way, and re-orienting a relational understanding of power, disposability provides a framework for operationalizing this concept of power within PACS and provides a central component to the theoretical underpinnings of critical and emancipatory PACS research.

Chapter Nine – Conclusion

Introduction

This research analyzes the ways in which power operates within conflict, how forms of structural violence can result from power relations, and how certain populations become disposable within the exploratory case study of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It is based in a critical approach to studying conflict and peace, which contributes to its originality within PACS. The analysis of power within PACS can be enhanced through this form of research, which looks at the intricate operations of power and how it works to influence conflicts. The aim of this research is to develop a theory of disposability that brings together aspects of power, violence, and death to describe the ways in which people become constructed as disposable.

By situating this theoretical model in CEPB, this research takes a particular stance in that it challenges the status quo and the dominant orientations and epistemologies within society. Disposability supposes that within conflict sovereign power decides who dies and who is devalued within society, making the re-occurrence of violence against them more likely. This strongly challenges oppressive state action, predicated in frozen, asymmetric power relations, that works to reduce the Other to a form of living dead (Mbembe, 2003), usable and expendable at the will of the sovereign. Allison's (1999) framework describes how this state action operates and is connected to structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, and Waltz's (2001) levels of analysis show how this operates and is situated in the international, national/state, and local levels. The contribution of such an approach can be described in two ways. The first is that it challenges the dominant liberal discourse within PACS and asks us to reconsider the epistemological foundations from which this discourse arises. Second, it orients a discourse of

PACS towards analyzing the relations between ethnic groups that emphasize deconstructing power relations within the conflict and their effects on conflict development and escalation.

Further exploration in this area is imperative. Creating a strong critical voice within PACS will only contribute to the diverse number of voices within the discipline and help address issues related to power and inequality (Byrne et al., 2019). With contributions from critical voices such as Gender Studies, Critical Race Theory, Queer Theory, Disability Studies, Critical Education, Critical Theory, Critical Environmental Studies, etc., the PACS discipline would not only benefit, but our practice as peacebuilders and peacemakers will become more effective as well. As the PACS discipline shifts towards increasingly critical and emancipatory approaches, drawing on the existing breadth of critical knowledge to construct a new politics of peacebuilding is essential.

Before concluding this thesis, several more points are worth articulating about the potentials of future research in this vein, including the concept of performativity, looking at Palestinian resistance, and power's positive capabilities in terms of peacebuilding.

9.1 Performativity

The most well known work of Judith Butler is her work on gender and performativity. One aspect of this conceptualization of gender is that it is reiterative, that gender is repeatedly defined and re-defined through action. Although this in itself has in-roads in terms of restructuring how PACS views and utilizes gender and feminist discourse, it also suggests an interesting idea for the theory of disposability, as well as understanding devaluation and power. If gender is reiterative through social action, the processes of disposability and devaluation may be seen in the same vein.

I would suggest future research look at the idea that the actions and decisions of sovereign power, in most cases the state, are reiterative as well, in that they continually represent and re-define the normative structure. This view could provide insight into how certain forms of dehumanization become entrenched within certain cultures, as well as how disposability is continually reinforced through state action and decisionmaking. In essence it creates a more fluid and cyclical understanding of power, devaluation, and disposability, one that I feel is truer to the realities of these phenomena, as opposed to the static, top-down, dominating view of power and dehumanization, which is often utilized.

Using performativity as a theoretical lens is something that I believe would increase the explanatory power of the theory of disposability. The process of disposability is certainly circular, as state action kills and dehumanizes, it also paves the way for more death and dehumanization in the future. This is built into the theory through precariousness and grievability. As violence deteriorates the social conditions of a person's precariousness, so too is the person devalued and dehumanized, as they become increasingly devalued and dehumanized, they also become increasingly susceptible to greater levels of violence, creating a cyclical process. Incorporating performativity would help explicate the reiterative process of disposability more clearly and open up new opportunities for research in this area.

9.2 Resistance

Another aspect of this research that could be expanded on, as a result or extension of this research, are the ways in which Palestinians resist the constraints of power relations, and how power produces resistance within conflict. Palestinians perform acts of resistance every day, from more official forms of resistance such as peaceful protests and demonstrations to everyday

forms of resistance stemming from the Occupation. The Arab Spring is an example of this type of resistance through mass protests against an oppressive government and the role of resistance to power regimes as well as a catalyst for change within conflict are important components of PACS research. Looking at resistance at an individual level as well as on a collective level, whether that be at the community, national, or international spheres, and the relations between power and resistance could provide important insight into how power relations cannot only produce negative outcomes such as oppression, dispossession, and subjugation, but also power's positive, productive capacity at different levels of analysis (See Waltz, 2001). The theme of nonviolent resistance within PACS would also benefit from an exploration into how pragmatic, strategic, nonviolent resistance can lead to constructive social change and expose social inequalities while working to address those inequalities.

9.3 Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding: Power's positive, productive capability

Forms of resistance are not the only way power's positive and productive capabilities can facilitate peacebuilding. This research focused on power's negative, productive capabilities such as the necropolitical. These are often formed by frozen sets of power relations where one group holds a consistent hegemonic position of power, leading to systems of domination. The more egalitarian sets of power relations are fluid power relations, where both parties can influence each other's behaviour in different contexts. This fluidity resists the constraints of power relations by essentially giving both parties agency to affect one another. Here is where I believe critical and emancipatory peacebuilding may be developed further.

Investigating how more fluid relations of power, through the emancipation of the marginalized groups, can address structural inequality within conflict and during peacebuilding

processes could provide basis' for peacebuilding initiatives to address structural violence. For example, Northern Ireland's powersharing political structure would be an example of how both Republican Nationalists and British Loyalists are able to politically influence one another through fluid relations of power that allow both sides are given equal footing to affect each other politically.

Further, by using Allison's (1999) models of understanding state decisionmaking, the complexity of political action, and thus the complexity of resolutions to oppressive political action, are shown to be intricate parts of the process of disposability. The power dynamics that affect the political operations of states are innumerable, and truly it can feel like a quagmire of relations that affect state decisionmaking. Therefore, CEPB in incorporating disposability and power, must also appreciate the entanglement involved in political actions, the seemingly inseparable and intertwining strands that affect state action, and work towards demystifying political actions in order to improve the dynamics of peacebuilding, through establishing more fluid power relations, and reveal the inner-workings of oppressive governmental structures.

Lastly, Waltz's (2001) levels of analysis were imperative to understand how the necropolitical process of disposability was affected by the actions of actors on all three levels. The role of NGOs and CSOs, the UN and international partnerships such as that between the US and Israel, as well as many actors on the national/state level, all influence the issue of settlements and the processes of disposability within conflict. Analyzing power across these levels is also important because it illuminates how power structures in the international level, affect the national/state level, and the local level, and vice versa. For CEPB, the dynamics of the Western, foreign, international problem solver, and the disempowered local, have come under much scrutiny. By illuminating power structures and how they influence and work across all of Waltz's

(2001) three levels, CEPB can better address the external/internal power dynamics that shape and control the peacebuilding process.

Conclusion

To conclude, this research ventured to describe a concept of disposability that could be applied to conflicts in order to understand the power dynamics within them. Through necropolitics, structural violence, precariousness, and grievability, it is shown how Israeli state action (e.g. sovereign power) results structural violence that affects the precariousness, and thus the death, and the grievability, and thus the devaluation, of certain populations. This research is situated within the emerging CEPB phase of PACS and suggests that power should be centralized and operationalized within these emerging approaches to understand its role within conflict. Further, as a concept, disposability offers the possibilities of analyzing conflicts through their power dynamics, as well as their necropolitical aspects. Future research in this regard is strongly recommended as it may lead to more power-fluid peacebuilding approaches and more power-fluid, and peaceful, post-conflict societies.

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