THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION IN THE SOVIET UNION:

AN INTEREST GROUP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH

BY

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

In December of 1991, the USSR officially ceased to exist. At the heart of the disintegration of the Soviet Union lay the inability of the Soviet central government to find a solution to the nationalities question, which had troubled Soviet governments to varying degrees since the USSR first came into being. This thesis presents the evolution of the nationalities question from the inception of the Soviet Union to its demise, examining Soviet leaderships' theoretical approaches to the question (including an analysis of the elements of the Soviet constitution having to do with the nationalities issue), and contrasting the theoretical approaches to the actual relations the centre had with the non-Russian republics. To provide a general base for this study, and in order to look at the nationalities question from a different vantage point, a theoretical framework involving interest groups and social movements is developed. By utilizing a framework that is culled from western-based research, the nationalities question in the USSR can be examined from a broader comparativist perspective.

The thesis concludes that this framework, although developed from western literature, adds to our comprehension of how and why national movements in the republics occurred when they did, and why these movements had not developed to the same extent previously. Moreover, through this analysis of national movements in the USSR it is seen that three of the main approaches to social movements in the west are not contradictory but complementary, as each adds to a fuller understanding of the development of social movements, not only in democratic systems, but in other political systems as well.

INTRODUCTION

On December 8, 1991, three of the major republics making up the Soviet Union announced that "We, the republic of Byelorussia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine...state that the USSR, as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence (Bohlen, 1991)." This declaration, following the previous declarations of independence of the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as Ukraine on August 24 of that year, meant that the Soviet Union was no more, and that a new political order, in the form of a commonwealth, was to take its place. At the heart of the disintegration of the Soviet Union lay the inability of the Soviet central government to find a solution to the nationality question, which had troubled Soviet governments to varying degrees since the USSR first came into being.

The nationality question in the Soviet Union referred to the roles that various 'nations' (or nationalities) would play, and the power these 'nations' would hold within a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This was a critical question, for not only did the USSR eventually come to be made up of fifteen republics, ostensibly representing fifteen nationalities, but within the boundaries of the USSR there also existed smaller autonomous republics and autonomous regions. Overall, according to official sources there were 140 nationalities represented in the Soviet Union (Smith, 1990). Ethnic Russians made up about 50% of the Soviet population. As

Edward Allworth (1971, 6) explained, "the question represents in itself the self-interest of the different nationalities in preserving or relinquishing their special identities, as balanced with the desire of the authorities to persuade them to abdicate the social or political content of those identities in the interest of the centralized government and state." The issue becomes even more contentious when one considers that the central state was usually equated with the Russian republic, thus equating the minority nationalities with the Russian majority.

This paper will present the evolution of the nationality question from the inception of the Soviet Union to its demise. To provide a general base for this study, a theoretical framework involving interest groups and social movements will be developed, to show how the representation of the nationalities' interests within the USSR have changed under various leaders over the years. The rationale for utilizing this type of theoretical framework is threefold.

First of all, there has recently been an increasing criticism of Sovietology in general, arguing that too much of it consists of descriptions of events taking place in a very volatile time in the USSR's history, or of historical accounts of the various nationalities in the USSR (Motyl, 1990, 1992). Analysts such as Alexander Motyl argue that not enough time is spent thinking about issues in the Soviet Union in a theoretical fashion or from a comparative perspective. Rather,

Sovietologists are sometimes trapped within a narrow perspective and are unable to make broader conceptualizations and interpetations. In choosing contributors for his volume on the Soviet nationality question, Motyl, for the most part, chose authors whose main areas of specialization did not include the Soviet Union, so that they would be able to write without "Sovietological preconceptions and prejudices," and be able to bring a comparativist perspective to Soviet studies (Motyl, 1992).

Although this paper will attempt to provide the reader with an historical description of how the nationality question has evolved over the years in the USSR, there will be a modest attempt at incorporating this comparativist perspective, and thinking theoretically about the nationality question. The theoretical framework will be built around the study of interest groups, developed mostly from the western academic literature, including writers such as David Truman and Stanley Kochanek writing from an American perspective, and Paul Pross writing from a Canadian perspective. The recent literature on social movements shall also be discussed, explicating the two main approaches to the study of movements, the resource mobilization approach, and the new social movements approach. Using this background, representation of the nationalities' interests in the Soviet Union will be examined, to see to what extent the interest group and social movement literature from the west can be utilized in an analysis of the nationality

question.

The second rationale behind the use of this framework is that in 1971, Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths edited a volume titled Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, which stated that, particularly under Stalin, the only interest group in the Soviet Union consisted of the Communist Party, and that there were no struggles over ideas or interests, or no rival groups within the Soviet system. As Skilling wrote (1971, 13): "There can be no doubt that communist society, in spite of its monolithic appearance and the claims of homogeneity made by its supporters, is in fact as complex and stratified as any other, and is divided into social classes and into other categories distinguished by factors such as nationality or religion." Although the Skilling and Griffiths volume focuses on groups such as the military, the security police, the party apparatchiki, and so on, this paper will supplement their work by focusing on the nationalities as interest groups.

The final rationale is related to the above volume as well. Writing in 1971, Skilling remarked, that "...in the seventeen years since Stalin's death the Soviet political system has been passing through a period of transition, characterized among other things by the increased activity of political interest groups and the presence of group conflict (13)." Writing in 1992, this transition is, of course, in even greater evidence. Even five years ago, it would have been difficult to visualize the types of changes that have taken

place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a whole. As the Soviet Union has died, and the Commonwealth of Independent States has risen from its ashes, it has become necessary to reevaluate and update analyses that were written previously. This paper will thus attempt to provide a contemporary examination of one type of interest group referred to in Skilling's volume, that of representation of the nationalities interests.

At a theoretical level, the central government position on the nationality question can be seen as being particularized through the country's constitution. For example, the Second All-Russia Congress of the Soviets adopted a constitution in 1924, that affirmed that all members of the state were there willingly and were equal. As more republics entered the USSR, the constitution continued to evolve, so that under Stalin, in 1936, a new constitution was developed where constituent republics were to have their own constitution, would have sovereign rights and would have the right to freely secede from the USSR (Strong, 1937). By looking at the constitution then, it would seem that the Soviet Union was able to accomodate the interests and aspirations of the disparate nationalities within its borders. A group of juridical authors, writing in 1968, went so far as to say, "In multinational Russia the nationality question - one of the most critical social problems - was settled. Under Soviet government conditions all nations (natsii),

nationalities (natsional'nosti) and subnationalities (narodnosti) found genuine freedom..." (Allworth, 1971, 8).

In practical terms, however, the constitution notwithstanding, the republics, especially once Stalin ruled over the country, became extensions of the centre, and were forced to follow Moscow's every order. Even as terms such as "self-determination" and "sovereignty" were used to describe the republics' existence in the Union, the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (centred in Moscow) was being solidified, making the republican Communist Parties (and thus republican governments) more subordinate to Moscow. As the system of central planning developed, most of the decision-making with respect to cultural, economic, social and political matters was occurring in Moscow. Dissent from the party line was not tolerated during Stalin's time. Since Stalin's death there have been varying degrees of tolerance and supression with respect to debate concerning the legitimacy of the Union and its constitution.

This paper will examine individuals, interest groups, and social movements representing nationalities from this perspective. The character and the importance of these different kinds of groups will be analyzed, as will their concerns. These concerns will then be compared to the official pronouncements by the central government on the nationality question, and how these concerns were handled in a theoretical way (primarily by examining changes that have been made to the

constitution), and how they were handled in a practical manner. It will be seen that as interest groups and social movements ultimately formed, and grew in size and complexity, the government's attitudes towards these groups was also changing. Eventually many of these interest groups that led these movements transformed themselves into political parties that held the reins of power in their republics.

Chapter one provides a brief overview of interest group and social movement theory. It is beyond the scope of the paper to look at broader aspects of group theory. The chapter focuses on some of the main characteristics of interest groups in western society - how and why they form, how they evolve, what stages they go through, and so on. The social movement literature will then be examined in the same manner, and the two sections will then be combined to arrive at one comprehensive framework through which the evolution of the nationality question can be viewed. This section will also examine various theories having to do with interest group proliferation in Canada and the United States, to see whether comparisons to the proliferation and success of nationalist interest groups in the USSR are possible. The aim of the chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of nationalist interest groups in the Soviet Union.

Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, a theoretical base has underlaid Soviet policy towards the national

question, mainly from the writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Chapter two will provide a brief analysis of their works on nationalism and the nationality question. The chapter will also focus on Lenin's struggles to establish the Soviet Union, and his struggles to get republics to join the USSR and also to follow the policy line emanating from the centre. It will be seen that at the beginning, the interests of the main nationalities were not represented by interest groups as such, but rather by the governments representing the various republics and/or nationalities. Under Stalin, the republican governments would become instruments of the centre (more specifically, of the CPSU), and would no longer represent nationalist aspirations as such.

Chapter three will examine Stalin's views on the nationality question, as well as his practical response to it. Under his totalitarian regime, virtually all decision-making was made by the central party apparatus in Moscow, and disgreement or questioning from the periphery was in no way tolerated. As a result of the great deterrent imposed by Stalin against any form of dissent, there was practically no representation of nationalities' interests in this time, particularly following the Artificial Famine of 1932-33, and the Great Purges of the 1930s.

Chapter four will focus on the changes that occurred following the death of Stalin to the arrival of Gorbachev. In this thirty year period, groups representing nationalities

began to develop, and grow in importance. At first it was only a few members of the intelligentsia that spoke up, but eventually more organized groups began to form. The type of reaction against the state was not yet so organized that one could call them interest groups or even full-fledged social movements, but they were important enough to set off a new campaign of repression by the state against those representing nationalities' interests.

Chapter five will examine the Gorbachev era, and the further evolution and proliferation of these interest groups and social movements to the point where the death of the Soviet Union was declared. It will be seen that some of these interest groups have been transformed into groups that no longer try to influence those who hold power, rather, these groups hold the power themselves. As well, the literature on social movements in the west will be directly applied to the evolution of the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union. It will be seen that elements of all the approaches taken in the west can be applied to the study of nationalist movements in the east. This chapter will also compare recent theories concerning western interest groups with the proliferation of national interest groups in the Soviet Union over the last seven years.

Although there are a variety of interest groups that have emerged in the Gorbachev era that will not be studied here, and although there are a variety of other problems that have

contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union (the economy, crumbling infrastructure, etc.) that will also not be discussed here, the nationality question has been, and still is, of the utmost importance. By utilizing the theoretical framework of interest groups and social movements in examining this question, the paper provides a different approach that may offer new insights with respect to nationality issues, not only in the Soviet Union, but in other countries with multi-national constituencies.

[Note: Although I realize that the republics are now independent, and that the Baltic states and Georgia are not a part of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, for the purposes of this paper, the geographic territory that was the Soviet Union of 1990, may still be referred to as such in terms of events taking place in 1992, after the disintegration of the USSR.]

Chapter One

INTEREST GROUP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Before developing a theoretical framework on which to base this thesis, the reasons for deciding on interest groups and social movements as the framework should be explained. First of all, as mentioned in the introduction, Skilling and Griffiths' 1971 volume showed that the interest group framework was a very useful one for Sovietologists to use. For the most part however, the book focused on such groups as the military, the secret police, the party apparatchiks, etc. Nationalities did not receive much attention. While it would be interesting to see how the roles and tactics of such groups as the bureaucracy and the military have changed over the last twenty years, and in particular since the policy of perestroika was implemented, it is the role of the nationalities that will be examined here. There are a great many explanations for the breakup of the Soviet Union, but the nationalities issue must be considered as central in all of them.

The interest group or social movement framework would not have been as useful for Sovietologists before Khrushchev's era, especially since most of the literature dealt with the evolution of these groups within democratic societies. However, as Soviet state and society became more democratic in character (in degrees that will be analyzed later), and especially when policies of democratization and glasnost' were

in full swing under Gorbachev, leading to the eventual
collapse of the monolithic Communist Party and the USSR, the
interest group framework became more applicable, and also
necessary for understanding the changes that have recently
taken place, and understanding possible future trends.

In describing the role that public interest groups play
within the Canadian political system, Susan Phillips (1, 1990)
notes that their role is much greater than that of lobbying
those in power:

> Public interest groups also create and reinforce
> politicized identities among people, such as a
> political consciousness of being a woman or
> disabled or concerned about the environment.
> Through this process, they enhance representation
> within democracy by giving voice to a multiplicity
> of interests and issues and serve to educate the
> public about these concerns. Finally, public
> interest groups provide small p-political
> experience for individuals who as a result may
> enter partisan politics or may simply pay more
> attention to political events and debates.

In examining the Soviet Union over the last few years, the
flourishing of movements and organizations representing the
interests of various nationalities has created the same
characteristics in the USSR as public interest groups have
created in Canada. For example, the group Sajudis that first
spurred the development of a nationalist movement in
Lithuania, and then transformed itself into a political party
that was elected to lead the government, showed all these
characteristics. First, the group managed to reinforce the
politicized identities of the populace as Lithuanians and not
as Soviets. Through this process they gave voice to concerns

that affected the populace as Lithuanians - cultural issues, language issues, economic issues and so on - issues that were not being represented or discussed by the Communist leadership, and educated the public about these issues. Finally, this group served as a base for political experience as several years later, leaders of this interest group became leaders of a political party that would gain power in Lithuania. As well, involvement in this interest group led many people who had previously been members of the scientific community or the arts community to become interested and actively involved in the political community as well. Therefore, in order to try to better understand the present condition of Soviet state-society relations and federal-republic relations, an examination of the nationality question within the suggested framework has been chosen.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a comprehensive framework of interest groups and group theory in general, the goal of this chapter is to provide enough of a background on interest groups and social movements so that one will be readily able to make the proper connections between the Soviet nationality question, and the interest group and social movement literature developed in the west. The terms interest groups and social movements shall be defined, and an evolution of interest groups will be provided. The differences and similarities between interest groups shall be elaborated, and various approaches to how and particularly why people

become involved in such groups shall be examined. Finally, there will be an exploration of recent literature concerning the importance of understanding the proliferation of interest groups in contemporary western societies to see if the same reasoning holds true in contemporary Soviet society. The rest of the paper will then use the framework developed here to look at the evolution of the national question in the USSR.

Interest Groups and Social Movements Defined

In his seminal volume on interest groups in Canada Group Politics and Public Policy, Paul Pross uses the term pressure group rather than interest group, to focus more on what he terms the groups' chief characteristic - that of persuading governments to pursue policies the groups advocate. As such Pross defines these groups as "organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest (1992, 3)." This definition is a little too narrow to properly define the types of groups that will be referred to later. Public interest groups, as defined by Susan Phillips (1990), have a broader purpose. Not only do these groups try to promote public policies for their groups' common interest, but they also have the objective of benefitting people beyond their own membership. Membership in the group is seen as relatively open. Even though there may be some restrictions to entry based on the interest or identity base of the group, given the broad social groupings characteristic

of public interest groups, barriers to entry are seen as minimal. The types of groups to be analyzed in this paper have a nationalist or ethnic base, meaning that a wide range of people would find these groups open for entry. For Phillips then, these public interest groups have characteristics different from those of more "traditional" interest groups, such as business or professional associations, or labour unions for example.

Pross (1992) sees interest groups developing through a funnel of mobilization. At the earliest stage there are latent interests, and unaggregated political action. At this stage, individuals may have common interests with other individuals, but they do not recognize their common interests, and do not act together. The second stage consists of solidary groups. At this level there is a heightened awareness of common interests, and a movement between people to support each other informally. Formal associations have not yet been formed to take collective action. The final stage consists of the formation of formal interest groups, prepared to promote the common interests of the membership. Pross refers to the major middle class social movements of the 1970s, such as the women's movement and environmentalism, as having gone through similar types of mobilization.

Pross further offers five criteria to determine whether or not an organization can be characterized as an interest group: 1) a full-fledged group will possess a formal

organization; 2)membership is inclusive of the interest community, self-elected from that community, or selected from that community by the existing membership; 3)the group seeks only to influence, not to seek power; 4)The group is free to deploy its members and resources as it sees fit; and 5)the group is free to determine its own common interest and long range goals.

According to Pross, the first aspect of organization is very important, separating the pressure group from the mob or from the movement. The mob is seen as a product of chance that may win some immediate victories but cannot provide for the future because it can't provide for its continuing existence. Movements, which can be defined as "a form of behaviour in which a large number of people try to bring about or resist social change" (Clark et al., 1975, 1), on the other hand exist over periods of time, representing progressions of opinion, but are seen as being made up of too many distinct elements to be termed a pressure group. As such, nationalist movements are not treated as pressure groups, even though some of these groups participate in such movements.

However, the study of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union still fits in with Pross' study of interest groups, for as Clark et al. (1975) go on to explain, social movements have a very developed institutional structure (although Pross might argue that pressure groups have more developed institutional structures than do social movements). Through a common set of

norms and values, and through leadership, the behaviour of members of a social movement can be controlled to a greater extent than members of other types of collective behaviour such as crowds or fads. As social movements continue to evolve, they may become more institutionalized, to the point where the values and norms may be virtually unanimously accepted, and the collective behaviour may become routinized. Clark (1975, 31) refers to routinization as "the establishment of consistent and stable institutional guides... when values, norms, and leaders are not so much being created, as they are simply being accepted or followed." At this point, we would no longer refer to this group as a social movement.

Social movements may also decline because unsatisfactory progress is made towards achieving goals, and members get discouraged and leave, or conversely, the movement may achieve its goals, thereby removing the raison d'etre of the group. Although it is not clear at which point social movements cease to become movements, and become something else, it is interesting to note how the movements may evolve into entities such as political parties, or interest groups, with perhaps differing goals from the original larger movement. It will be seen that the mobilization of interests with respect to nationalist identity evolved in the type of pattern described by Pross, and that the groups organizing the nationalist movements eventually became so institutionalized that they took on characteristics of political parties.

The Rationale behind Collective Behaviour

David Truman's 1951 work The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Political Opinion is generally considered as the piece that brought interest group theory into the mainstream of political science. According to Truman (1951, 21), "...the group experience and affiliations of an individual are the primary, though not the exclusive, means by which the individual knows, interprets, and reacts to the society in which he exists." The group was seen as the prime political actor, not the individual. Society is seen as a mosaic of overlapping groups. An interest group is based on shared attitudes, and will make claims on other groups in society. If these claims are made on a government, it is referred to as a political interest group. At any given time, society was deemed to be in a state of equilibrium as groups interacted with one another, as individuals were members of more than one group at a time, thus preventing groups from making demands that could result in conflicts with other interests of its members. However, if some major social change occurred, new interest groups could come into existence to move towards a new equilibrium (Kochanek, 1980). However, as Phillips (1990) notes, Truman simply assumed that groups formed because they were needed, meaning that the issue of how and why interest groups formed was avoided. Studies focused more on how groups impacted on government and public policy, and concentrated more on some type of economic interests, and

less on the issue-based or public interest organizations that began to proliferate in the 1970s.

Meanwhile, a different type of analysis, focusing on why social movements were created, was developing in sociology. The traditional social movement approach stated that these groups formed when grievances existed in society (Klandermans, 1991). Clark et al. (1975) refer to these grievances as institutional deficiencies, where people are either opposed to some aspect of existing norms, values, or leaders in society, or they may see these types of norms and values as inappropriate in some way. For example, if people in a society place a high value on personal liberty, institutions that impinge on this liberty will cause discontent. Put differently, if people's expectations are at a much higher level than what they are actually achieving, there will be discontent.

However resource mobilization theory argued that there were always some types of grievances in society, and that grievances alone were not enough to explain the emergence of social movements (Klandermans, 1991). Rather, the "availability of resources and opportunities for collective action" were more important. This approach is made up of three key elements: the costs and benefits of participation, the level of organization, and expectations of success.

The first element, that of the costs and benefits of participation, is based heavily on rational choice theory, and

in particular, on Mancur Olson's work <u>The Logic of Collective Action</u>. According to the rational choice model, individuals are assumed to be rational actors who will act to enhance their well-being, that is, act in their own best interests. Individuals will have preferences affecting the decisions they make, and different individuals will have different rankings of preferences. It is also assumed that individuals will use strategies to maximize the achievement of their highest preferences in order to achieve the highest net benefit to themselves (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971). Using these assumptions, individuals would join groups in the belief that group action would facilitate individual interests.

However, Olson, still utilizing rational choice theory, took this logic one step further. If it was indeed rational to maximize one's own benefits, would it not be more rational for people not to join the group and not to participate in the group's activities, yet still partake of the benefits that may result from the group's activity (Olson, 1965)? This was known as the "free rider" problem. As groups become larger, this problem becomes more pervasive because individual participation and action means less in larger groups (Phillips, 1990). Olson thus posited that groups would have to offer selective incentives to individuals to encourage participation. This theory thus helped explain why people did not join in collective action, even if the group's goals were in their interests, but it did not explain why people joined

groups without these incentives.

Klandermans (1991) offered several solutions to this dilemma. One suggestion was that individuals participated even without selective incentives knowing that if everybody tried to be a free rider, there would be no collective action. Another suggestion was that the final goal was so important that the chance of success was enough of an incentive to encourage participation. One further suggestion, which would not fit into the theories of strict rational choicers, had to do with ideological incentives, namely, that individuals would get inherent benefits from participating in a cause they believe to be just. As Motyl states (1990), the intensity with which people hold certain values or the intensity with which people want to further their own ends can be critical to the formation of collective action.

These adjustments to Olson's theory are important, for they say that individuals will act to maximize benefits, but that some of these benefits are related to individual values and beliefs. Some of these values and ideals may be combined and defined as culture. Moreover, ethnic groups and nationalist movements can be seen as carriers of culture. Motyl therefore concludes that, "As there is a natural and evident connection between collective action and ethnicity, rational choice theory should be well suited to examining ethnically based collective action in general and nationalist collective action in particular... (1990, 41)." Motyl also

notes that just as there can be positive sanctions offered to gain support for collective action, negative sanctions can also hinder support for collective action. In the case of collective action such as nationalist movements for example, the target of anger and change is the state. However the state has resources that can be used to implement negative sanctions against those participating in collective action. If strong enough, these sanctions can deter the mobilization of collective action. These types of negative sanctions will be examined later. Overall however, the idea of costs and benefits of participation, whether direct or indirect (i.e. ideological), is a key element to resource mobilization theory.

The degree of organization is the second element to this theory, being an important resource for a social movement. The higher the degree of organization, the lesser the costs of participation for individuals, the greater the ability to recruit people, and the greater are the chances of success (Klandermans, 1991). Clark et al. (1975) add that leadership plays a key role, for good leaders are able to organize the group and its activities. As well, good leaders are able to articulate the new values and norms for the group to follow. The final element has to do with expectations of success. When there is a favourable political opportunity structure and chances for success are higher collective incentives to participate seem to increase (Klandermans, 1991). According to

this theory then, the new movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were new only in the sense that they had different political organizations than previously and resource mobilization strategies were new. Thus grievances and ideology don't change, but opportunity structures and tactics in organized conflict do change (Phillips, 1990). Phillips also adds that these theorists make a distinction between the movement and the organizations that represent the movement, and also between social movement organizations and interest groups. Social movement organizations are seen to have linkages and shared interests with other social movement organizations, while private interest groups are more autonomous. Public interest groups, however, can also be considered as social movement organizations if they have a shared network of relations with other organizations. This connection will be further explored later in the chapter.

The second approach, referred to as the new social movements approach, stresses that "the new movements differ from old movements (generally characterized as the labour movement) in values, action forms and constituency (Klandermans, 1991, 26)." First, in terms of values, the traditional values of a capitalist society are questioned, bringing into light new ideas with respect to humankind's relationships to nature, to labour, to the opposite sex, etc. Second, the action forms taken by these new movements are less conventional in nature. The movements often display an

antagonism toward politics, and the organizations around which the movements are run are more decentralized and directly democratic in nature. Third, two population groups are primarily predisposed to participating in these new movements. The first group is made up of those people who have been marginalized by societal developments. The second group is made up of a "new middle class", for though they may benefit from societal changes, they are also aware of problems resulting from these changes (Klandermans, 1991).

There have been a variety of explanations offered by theorists following this approach as to why these social movements have been formed. Some claim that there was a silent revolution in Europe in the 1970s, as children born into a world where their material needs were being met, developed non-material needs such as "self-actualization and participation." Other authors claimed that traditional middle class values and the traditional work ethic were eroding. Another group claimed that the new social movements were a reaction to the welfare state, for as the welfare state has grown, people see themselves as being able to ask for greater entitlements from the government (Klandermans, 1991).

Along a different line of reasoning, another group focused not on an "explosion of aspirations", but on an "increased strain related to industrialization and bureaucratization (Klandermans, 1991, 28)." This leads to a loss of identity, which loosens traditional ties and

loyalties, and allows new loyalties to be created more easily. Others add that as bureaucratization has grown, and as the state has become more involved in people's everyday lives, the state began to take more responsibility for satisfying the needs of the populace than did the market economy. However, this restructuring led to a growing number of unemployed and other types of people not able to cope with the restructuring. As an increasingly complex network of regulatory, ministering and controlling institutions evolved, there was a greater sense of loss of legitimacy, as the state attempted, but was not able to meet everyone's needs, providing breeding grounds for new social movements (Klandermans, 1991).

Whatever the larger causes of the rise of these movements however, the fact remains that they are characterized by the search for a new identity within the society. The major movements referred to, such as the women's, student, environmental, and ethnic movements, all questioned the traditional values of capitalist society (Phillips, 1991). As Melucci argued the new social movements fought for the "reappropriation of time, of space, and of relationships in the individual's daily experience (as quoted in Klandermans, 1991, 29)."

Critics of the two approaches note that resource mobilization theorists presume that collective interests simply exist, without asking why movements come into being. This means that the reasons that people participate in

collective action become irrelevant. The new social movement approach, however, is criticized for concentrating too heavily on the study of movements opening new political spaces and transforming society's values (Phillips, 1991). While complementary in many ways, Klandermans found that protest was not necessarily generated in a mechanical way, either through the availability of resources as was emphasized by the resource mobilization approach, or through the existence of grievances, as emphasized by the new social movements approach. Instead, protest can also be seen as being generated through social construction. In this process, it is emphasized that all social problems do not become issues and do not generate social movements. Even though resource mobilization theorists took this into account when saying that resources played an important role in generating social movements, it did not take into account the process by which meanings are given to events and situations. Just because a problem exists does not mean that a collectivity will see it as important, even if, objectively, it is a crucial issue. How and why do some issues become the foci for collective action? According to Klandermans (1991, 30), there are two important matters with respect to the social construction issue: "1) What determines the individual's behaviour is not so much reality per se as reality as the individual perceives and interprets it; 2) social movement organizations themselves play an important role in generating and diffusing meanings and

interpretations." This involves not only the individual's perception of grievances, but resources, political opportunities and potential outcomes as well.

Having recognized the importance of social movement organizations in and of themselves, it should be reiterated that these organizations should be distinguished from the movements they are built upon (Phillips, 1990). Having defined social movements as "a form of behaviour in which a large number of people try to bring about or resist social change," a social movement organization can be defined as "a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement... and attempts to implement those goals (McCarthy and Zald, as quoted in Phillips, 1990, 15)." The word 'identifies' is key, as that means that groups do not have to spring from the movement itself. In fact such groups can serve to identify and priorize interests and values that may not have been totally articulated. An example of such groups are environmental groups making and defining specific policy preferences for thousands of individuals, even though only a few individuals are actually actively participating.

The literature on interest groups and social movements can now be brought together. When comparing the definitions of social movement organizations and public interest groups, the main difference is that public interest groups can be defined in terms of the pursuit of goals which may be beyond the immediate benefit of group members. The core of the groups'

activities are centred on a broader collective good (Phillips, 1990). New social movements focus on the interests of a certain segment of society. However, different social movements will also pursue the "collective good" to varying extents (which is why many social movement organizations have a shared network of relations with other organizations). Some movements such as environmental movements have a wide scope in terms of the collective good. Nationalist movements can be seen in this light as well, as the movements strive towards having changes made in the political system that would positively affect a broad segment of the population. In this way then, social movement organizations and public interest groups are terms that can be used interchangeably.

Going back to Pross' theory concerning the development of interest groups then, social movements can be seen as falling somewhere between the solidary group and the pressure group, while social movement organizations fall within the realm of pressure groups. This is the typology that will be used in examining the history of the nationality question in the Soviet Union.

The evolution from latent interests to solidary group to interest group will be described, and some of the hows and whys concerning the formation of nationalist movements will be explored, to see which approaches seem to fit with respect to the example in the Soviet Union. Overall, using Phillips' definition of public interest organizations to describe the

groups that led and organized the various social movements, using the elements of Pross' theory of the funnel of mobilization to understand the evolution of these groups, and using the various sociological approaches to the formation of social movements, the development of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union will be better understood. It will become clearer as to how and why these movements began to flourish particularly in Gorbachev's era, and why nationalist concerns were not capable of being expressed in a similar manner in earlier eras. In this way the western literature will be seen as being directly applicable to the Soviet system, even where an approach such as the new social movement approach, which is not directly manifested in the case of the Soviet system, can be used as a tool to better understand the character of the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union.

Contemporary Concerns about Interest Groups

The final section of this first chapter will take a brief look at some of the recent concerns with respect to the proliferation of interest groups in the United States and Canada, and about the role that interest groups have come to play in the policy process. In the final chapter of the paper, these concerns, written from a western perspective, will be compared to recent trends in the Soviet Union, to see if the trends are in any way similar, and if there should be similar concerns about the proliferation and role of interest groups in the new Soviet Union.

From a Canadian perspective, many of the concerns are taken from a National seminar organized by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada in 1981. Although the seminar took place a decade ago, many of the concerns voiced are still valid today. Discussing the proliferation of interest groups in the Canadian system, several speakers offered the view that the state itself was the progenitor and prime mover behind the proliferation of interest groups (Pross, 1982). While many disagreed with this idea of a dirigiste Canadian state, one approach argued that while policy was inspired from within the government, policy would be legitimized if supported by members of the general public. Bureaucracies thus supported the burgeoning of groups to support their policies. Another approach argued that while the state was seen as a mover in the proliferation of interest groups, the onus is not on the bureaucrats seeking support, but rather because the public interest insists that certain groups be involved in the policy process. This explanation was offered for the emergence of women's, aboriginal and environmental groups for example.

Similar arguments are offered from an American perspective. Mark Petracca (1992) states that governments encouraged the proliferation of interest groups both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, "The very size, reach, and influence of the federal government has been both a magnet and an invitation to interest group activity since the 1960s... As government increased its penetration into the

lives of Americans, it created a wide-spread 'interest'... in public policy encouraging group formation (Petracca, 1992, 23-24)." More specific actions such as government legislation, and favourable policies and attitudes by governments, facilitated the growth of interest groups. For example, about 50% of the groups representing the elderly were formed after 1965, the year the Older Americans Act and Medicare Act were passed (Ibid.).

The government has also used interest groups to orchestrate support for its policies directly. Mark Peterson (1992) offers four types of activities that the presidency took on with respect to orchestrating support of interest groups: 1) liaison as consensus-building - bringing groups with diverse backgrounds together in coalitions in order to support programmatic initiatives; 2) liaison as legitimization - getting support from a broad array of organizations and groups to enhance and legitimate the president's image as national representative, and to strengthen his political position; 3) liaison as outreach - convincing groups outside the political mainstream to use the presidency as a representational voice for their interests (for example, blacks, through direct communications with Kennedy and Johnson were better able to get their message to the broader Washington establishment); and 4) liaison as governing party - the president seeks support of groups to help build the coalitions needed in Congress to pass policy initiatives.

Because Congress has become increasingly dependent on interest groups for information, expertise, and political (and financial) support, they have become increasingly vulnerable to influence by such coalitions (Petracca, 1992). Peterson (1992) adds, that when presidents have found that too few groups exist to form such coalitions, they have helped stimulate the formulation of such groups.

With respect to the effect of interest groups on the policy process, there was a concern in both Canada and the United States that with the increasing importance and proliferation of interest groups, the policy role for political parties has diminished to a considerable extent. In Canada that means that Parliament, as an institution, has suffered. At the 1981 conference, it was suggested that pressure groups, trying to influence public policy acting in the interests of their members, also helped the state by acting as sources of expert information, and also by lending support and legitimacy to public policy. The critical change with respect to the declining role of Parliament had to do with the expanded activities and influence of the executive and the bureaucracy (Pross, 1982). Interest groups thus spent more time trying to find new loci of power, and the bureaucracy sought to seek out interest groups for support and/or information. As such, it was agreed that political parties, and thus Parliament, began to play a smaller role in the public policy process. In fact one interest group leader

lamented that "...his organization has to employ six or seven people to perform the traditional MP's role of 'acting like an ombudsman,' [and] confessed to feeling 'very,very nervous' that 'people out there look at our organization as being more legitimate at representing them than the government (Pross, 1982, 180).'"

Similarly, in the United States, interest group proliferation has been linked with the fragmentation of political power. Power in Congress became more and more decentralized through the 1970s, and interest groups found many more points upon which to try to wield their influence. At the same time, Congress became more and more dependent on interest groups for information and expertise (Petracca, 1992). As well, as interest groups have become more and more important in the policy process, political parties have become less important. According to a 1983 Gallup poll, 45% of respondents felt that interest groups best represented their political needs, while 34% felt that political parties best represented them (Ibid.). Petracca concludes by saying: "...in this postelectoral era Americans are much less likely to pursue or express their interests through the election of political representatives. Instead they turn to the interest group system to provide representation and satisfaction for their interests (1992, 27)." The final chapter of the paper will see if these types of concerns - for example, that interest groups have greater legitimacy than political

parties, and that the proliferation of interest groups has had a negative effect on the policy process - are yet appearing in the Soviet Union or Commonwealth of Independent States.

Having provided this rather perfunctory background to interest group and social movement theory as developed in the western literature, the paper will now turn to the evolution of the national question in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER TWO

Chapter Two

LENIN: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Before beginning a detailed examination of the evolution of the national question in the Soviet Union, it is first necessary to provide a brief description of the treatment of nationality and sub-nationality groups in czarist Russia. Moreover, in order to render Lenin's theories useful in analyzing the USSR's handling of the national question, it will be necessary to refer to what Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote about nationalism.

Nationalism in Czarist Russia

In 1721 Czar Peter the Great, having united several medieval principalities that had been under the hegemony of Muscovy (Russia's predecessor), declared the creation of a Russian empire. Much of the self-identity of the region was due to common religious (the Russian Orthodox Church) and cultural foundations (Vernadsky, 1969). The empire had already begun to grow to greater proportions. First, Russia expanded into what is now known as Siberia, but this did little to disturb the ethnic balance of the population, which also followed the Russian Orthodox Church (Smith, 1990). Following the mid seventeenth century, Russia began to expand into areas that were neither Russian nor Orthodox. In 1654, Ukraine, with its Latin and Catholic influence, was brought in. In the 1700's, German Protestant lands in the Baltics were

incorporated. Later in that century, the Crimea, previously under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, was annexed, and then parts of Poland were brought into the empire bringing more Catholics, and Jews as well. Finally, in the 1870s and 1880s further expansion into central Asia brought more Muslims into the Empire (Ibid.). Thus, a propensity for imperialism and expansion has been an important feature of the Russian historical experience. Moreover, this expansionism did not make up a certain phase of Russia's history. Rather, it was a constant in its history (Pipes, 1991).

Throughout the 1700s and early 1800s, administrative assimilation (that is, Russian czars were prepared to grant privileges to local elites in these territories to accomodate their assimilation into a centrally administered empire) was generally considered to be more important than cultural administration and penetration. But with the rise of modern nationalism, the development of Great-Russian nationalism began, which led to aggressive policies of Russification. However, these policies were implemented in an inconsistent fashion, and had varied effects on various nationalities. For example, certain peoples such as the Baltic Germans, and Armenian merchants until the 1880's were promoted, while other groups such as Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles (especially after 1863) were especialliy discriminated against (Suny, 1991). Inherent in this Russian nationalism was an allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church, which bestowed upon its followers a

unique spiritual authority and authenticity. Since Russia adopted Christianity from Byzantium, not Rome, and since Byzantium fell to the Turks in 1453, that meant that Russia was the only state left professing Orthodox Christianity. Surrounded by the Muslims on one side, and followers of the Latin rite on the other, rulers, clergy and peasants alike developed this sense of national-religious uniqueness (Pipes, 1991).

Pipes also noted that Russian governments felt that their internal position would be strengthened by virtue of their expansion into and control of neighboring states: "By inspiring respect in foreign governments, by bullying neighbors, by undermining them and distributing their lands and riches among their own subjects, Russian governments have historically enhanced their claims to legitimacy and obedience (Pipes, 1991, 24)." The various regimes' appetite for aggressive actions (i.e. policies of Russification) against conquered nationalities waxed and waned depending on the civil unrest that followed the implementation of these policies. The 1905 revolution briefly removed the worst oppression, but these policies were soon renewed. Thus, when the tsarist government fell in February, 1917, the non-Russian peoples within the empire felt hope that there would be new opportunities for them. In October, 1917, V.I. Lenin seized the reins of power. Every Soviet leader since then (up to and including Gorbachev) derived his legitimacy from Lenin and his

works. Lenin's Bolshevik Party derived its basic tenets from the works of Marx and Engels (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

Marxism and Nationalism

Although there are no detailed works on the concept of nationalism by either author, there are relevant passages scattered throughout various works. The reason for this, most probably, is that the doctrine of an international proletarian movement was not compatible with nationalism (Connor, 1984).

Looking at Marx in greater detail, according to the concept of economic determinism, economic development is at the heart of the progress of civilization. The degree of interaction among people is determined by the particular economic conditions and by the rules dictated by the political authority (i.e., "the superstructure of economic forces"). In primitive and feudal societies, groups of people lived in isolation from each other. However, as capitalism developed, ethnically based formations evolved into larger national units, called nation-states, characterized by powerful institutional political authority. The number of nation-states grew, and in so doing assimilated smaller ethnic communities located on the periphery into the larger groups. As capitalism continued to evolve, transnational entities such as banks emerged, transforming the traditional sovereignty of the nation-state. As the process continued, the interests of the small and large ethnic groups were subsumed in the interests

of the proletarian (working) class. These interests transcended state boundaries and therefore the loyalties of the workers transcended these boundaries. Patriotism was replaced with internationalist proletarian solidarity (Gleason, 1990).

Since nations and nationalities were byproducts of capitalism, they would not survive capitalism. Nationalism was seen as a "bourgeois ideology" that was used to keep the proletariat from realizing its own class consciousness. On a practical level however, Communists (those who would help the proletariat attain this class consciousness), remaining above nationalism, would support any movement (nationalist or otherwise) that would move towards respecting the interests of the proletariat. As the impact of nationalism grew during the lifetimes of Marx and Engels, some of their focus moved towards nationalism, going so far as to support the rights of nations to self-determination (for example, supporting Poland's right of self-determination from Russia) (Connor, 1984). Moreover, in 1869, Marx referred to the Irish question as "not merely a simple economic question but at the same time a national question (Ibid., 17)." The idea of a proletarian revolution became more complex. Out of these different phases of writing arose three identifiable strains of Marxism with respect to the national question.

The first strain, classical Marxism, spoke of a common class consciousness and the irreconcilability of nationalism

with the international proletariat movement. The second strain, strategic Marxism, called for formal abstract support for the right of nations to self-determination, consistent with concrete but selective support for active nationalist movements. Marxism and nationalism could coexist in this case if nationalism was seen as an expression of capitalism that would disappear as the society moved towards socialism. The third strain, national Marxism, referred to nations as the privileged instrument of historical forces, not classes, as was the case with classical Marxism (Ibid.). As a means of gathering support for his Russian Bolshevik Party, Lenin adopted strategic Marxism to his own particular needs.

Lenin and the National Question

Lenin's thinking on the national issue developed in four stages. The first stage dealt with the national question in a rather cursory manner and spanned the years 1897-1905. Following the revolution of 1905, Lenin reevaluated the importance of nationalism, began to read widely on the subject, and critically examined the national question in such works as "critical remarks on the National Question," written in 1913. This stage ended with the Bolsheviks acquiring power in 1917. The third stage dealt with the period following the revolution, and dealt with the changes in thinking (especially with respect to federalism) that came with being in power. The final stage was brief, and described the evolution of his

views from 1922 until his death shortly thereafter (Gleason, 1990). Despite the fact that there were identifiable stages in his thinking on nationalism, there was also a certain continuity. Most of the changes had to do with his views on federalism and a change in emphasis on national self-determination.

The theoretical basis of the national question as discussed by Lenin rests on two fundamental Marxist principles. First, Lenin believed that economic relations were the basis for social and political processes. Second, nations were products of these processes, and different kinds of national formations would be associated with various economic stages. As new economic stages developed, that particular national entity would make the preceding formation obsolete, and at the same time, would create the conditions for the next stage to develop (Ibid.). However, Lenin also added interpretations of nationalism with the national question that were particular to his era.

Lenin viewed capitalism as the main cause of antagonism among nations. Nations developed in two stages. The first stage saw the awakening of national movements and the establishment of nation-states. The second stage was described as a conflict stage where the national level was far less important than the international arena and relations among nations. As this occurred, national identities and attachments would dissolve, and in the end there would be an international

unity of capital, politics, and culture (Ibid.).

Although Lenin was an internationalist and indeed spoke strongly against nationalism (remarking once that "aggressive bourgeois nationalism ... drugs the minds of the workers, stultifies and disunites them in order that the bourgeoisie may lead them on the halter" (Ibid., 28)), he also recognized that nationalism and nationalist movements could be useful in advancing the cause of socialism. Lenin believed that nationalist unity within the czarist empire was due to past oppression under the czars. Once the oppressors were removed from power, the reasons for this antagonism among nations would disappear, and give way to international proletarian identification which would lead to political solidarity. Therefore, under the guise of nationalism, power could be consolidated and put into the hands of the workers (or the party), the causes of socialism could be advanced, and capitalism could be vanquished. Thus, at the Second Congress of the Russian Socialist Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) in 1909, the program included several proposals on the national question brought forth by Lenin, including the right of nations to self-determination (Gleason, 1990).

Even though their "right to self-determination" was meant as a temporary measure to avoid political objections, there was significant conflict with theoreticians of a more internationalist bent such as Rosa Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky. However, Lenin explained that nationalist groups were offered

a voluntary choice to enter the Bolshevik ranks. Once in those ranks, the party assumed the right to control the national destinies. Under Lenin's logic then, a nation, through the right to self-determination, was offered the right to secession. But if the nation were offered the right, it would not use it. On the other hand, if the nation were not offered the right to secession, it would fight for that right (Ibid.). Lenin explained this theory on the right to self-determination in this way:

> The socialists cannot reach their great aim without fighting against all forms of national oppression. They must therefore demand that the Social Democrats of the oppressing countries recognize ... the right of the oppressed nationalities to self-determination.... A Socialist of a great nation or a nation possessing colonies who does not defend this right is a chauvinist. To defend this right in no way means to encourage the formation of small states, but on the contrary, it leads to a freer, more fearless and therefore wider and more universal formation of governments.... On the other hand, the Socialists of the oppressed nationalities must unequivocally fight for the complete unity of the workers of the oppressed and the oppressor nationalities (Kohn, 1971, 48-49).

Thus for Lenin, his position on the national question and national self-determination was not contradictory - it supported nationalism and internationalism at the same time.

However, once the February Revolution had occurred, and the provisional government was in power, Lenin and Stalin contrasted their strong positions on national self-determination with that of the government in power, which offered only vacillating support for the independence movements. At the Seventh RSDLP Conference of May 12, 1917,

both Lenin and Stalin railed against the provisional
government for not extending the right of secession to Ukraine
and Finland. Moreover, the conference endorsed the right of
all nations forming a part of Russia to freely secede and
become independent states (Connor, 1984). As was later
admitted at the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist
Party in 1923, this stress on self-determination of nations
was a key element in the Bolshevik acquisition of power:

> Our Party in its work never tired of advancing this
> programme of national emancipation in opposition to
> both the frankly coercive policy of tsarism and the
> half-hearted, semi-imperialist policy of the
> Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries....
> [T]he policy of emancipation pursued by our Party
> won for it the sympathy and support of the broad
> masses of these nationalities in the struggle it
> waged against tsarism and the imperialist Russia
> bourgeoisie. There can be little doubt that their
> sympathy and support was one of the decisive
> factors that determined the triumph of our Party in
> the October Revolution (Connor, 1984, 45-6).

It is, however, important to note that even as the
Bolshevik strategists were focusing on gathering support from
national movements within the Russian empire by utilizing the
slogan of 'national self-determination,' days before the
October Revolution was taking place Lenin was again making it
clear that his support for self-determination was qualified.
Lenin claimed that the Party had to proclaim the national
right to self-determination, but that workers would be advised
not to use this right (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Lenin wrote
that, while feeling obliged to recognize the right to secede,
"...we do not favour secession. We want as vast a state, as

close an alliance of the greatest possible number of nations who are neighbours of the Great Russians.... We want free unification.... But we want unification.... (Lenin, Vol.26, 1964, 75-6)." This official support for national self-determination continued on after the Bolsheviks acquired power, as both Lenin and Stalin (People's Commissar on National Affairs) signed a document supporting the right to self-determination, and even separation and independence if the nation so wished (Connor, 1984).

Lenin now began developing a new strategy to deal with the nationalities in order to install Bolshevik Party rule in the non-Russian republics. The heart of this strategy was evident in a speech Lenin delivered November 21, 1917:

> We are now 'conquering' Finland ... We are winning Finland over by giving her complete freedom to live in alliance with us or with others, guaranteeing full support for the working people of all nationalities against the bourgeoisie of all countries.... We now see a nationalist movement in the Ukraine and we say that we stand unconditionally for the Ukrainian people's complete and unlimited freedom. We are going to tell the Ukrainians that as Ukrainians they can go ahead and arrange their life as they see fit. But we are going to stretch out a fraternal hand to the Ukrainian workers and tell them that together with them we are going to fight against their bourgeoisie and ours (Lenin, Vol.26, 1964, 344).

For the Russian Bolsheviks then, the true spokesmen for the nationalist movements were the local Bolsheviks, who were members of regional organizations of the Russian Bolshevik Party. The fight against the local bourgeoisie (meaning the non-Bolshevik governments set up in various republics) would

mean that military aid would be needed from the Moscow Bolsheviks. This would result in the overthrow of the local government and the establishment of a Soviet Bolshevik government in its place (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). The local Bolshevik parties sometimes followed this line, and sometimes did not. Lithuanian Bolshevik V. Mickevicus - Kapsukas explained his support for the Moscow line in this way: "We recognize the right of self-determination for all nations, but this does not mean independence.... Since in an independent Lithuania these needs [of the proletariat] may suffer, we reject independence and fight against it (Ibid., 19)." Moreover, in Latvia, the slogan of the Latvian proletariat was "the Soviet Republic of Latvia as an integral part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] (Ibid., 22)."

Between the October Revolution and the end of 1918, at least thirteen new states came into being in what was once the Russian empire, meaning that their national movements had proved ultimately successful. Recognition by the Bolshevik government was extended to many of these new entities. Included in this number was Ukraine. Following the fall of the provisional government, two major groups waged a battle over control of the Ukrainian government: the Kiev Soviet of Workers' Deputies, led by the local Bolsheviks, and the Central Rada, made up of several socialist parties, including the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) and

the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP) (Mace, 1983). The Kiev Soviet of Workers' Deputies meant to take over and recognize Lenin's government in Petrograd, but the Central Rada, with support of a large contingent of troops, held power.

On Nov. 7, 1917, the Central Rada declared that the Petrograd government was not the central government, that the Ukrainian People's Republic had sole power over Ukraine's affairs, and that the goal of the Rada was not to secede from Russia, but to help in its transformation into a federation of equal partners (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Soon after, the Kiev Soviet, worried that the choice between the Rada and the Soviet would look like a choice between the oppressed and the oppressor, changed its name to the "Social Democracy of Ukraine" and announced that it was a Bolshevik party for Ukrainians, one that Ukrainians could support. There was thus a recognition that nationalist sentiment led by the nationalist movements was still strong, and it was focused at the parties making up the Rada, and this sentiment had to be captured. However, even with the new name, at an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets the Bolshevik Party failed to gain support, as the majority of the Congress endorsed the Rada (Mace, 1983). On December 16, 1917, the Russian government adopted a manifesto reaffirming Ukraine's right to self-determination, recognizing the People's Ukrainian Republic, and recognizing its right to secede or to enter into treaty

negotiations with Russia to establish federal relations with them (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).

However, the manifesto also expressed displeasure with certain policies of the Central Rada, particularly the Rada's support of General Kalidin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, who had not recognized the Bolshevik government's power over the Don lands. Moreover, the Rada refused to allow free passage for the Russian Red Guards through Ukrainian territory, and was disarming troops stationed in Ukraine (Ibid.). And, despite the fact that in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks received only 10% of the votes cast for election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in November of 1917 (Mace, 1983), Lenin concluded this manifesto with the following statement:

> We accuse the Rada of conducting, behind a screen of national phrases, a double-dealing bourgeois policy, which has long been expressed in the Rada's non-recognition of the Soviets and of Soviet power in the Ukraine.... Their ambiguous policy, which has made it impossible for us to recognize the Rada or a plenipotentiary representation of the working and exploited masses of the Ukrainian Republic, has lately led the Rada to steps which preclude all possibility of agreement.... In the event no satisfactory answer is received within 48 hours, the Council of People's Commissars will deem the Rada to be in a state of open war with Soviet power in Russia and the Ukraine (Lenin, Vol.26, 1964, 361-3).

The invasion began soon after, from the northeast. By February 1918, Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet forces, and the Bolsheviks had control. As the commander of the Bolsheviks stated to Lenin, the Soviet regime had been implanted by "means of bayonets" (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Ukraine was

a clear example of what the right to self-determination meant in theory and what it meant in practice. When Lenin wrote on Jan. 12, 1918 that "... [it is left] to the workers and peasants of each nation to decide independently of their own authoritative Congress of Soviets whether they wish to participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions, and on what terms (Ibid., 21). In the case of Finland, this voluntariness was observed. In other cases, as has been seen, it was not.

The years 1918-1921 were tumultuous ones for Lenin, as he found himself facing an advancing German army as well as embroiled in a civil war. Even after signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March of 1918, ending Russian participation in World War I, the situation was still very tenuous, as the White Army under Denikin held control over many of the non-Russian republics. As the Whites were fighting against both the Bolsheviks and secessionist forces, and as the Whites refused to acknowledge any right of nations to self-determination, Lenin and the Bolsheviks found it both expedient and essential to stress support for nationalist tendencies, in order to gain the sympathy of non-Russian peoples (Connor, 1984). However, there were shifts in both theory and strategy with respect to the national question and the right to self-determination. The shift in theory has been alluded to with respect to Ukraine, but became more concrete in 1919-1920. Stalin had written in December of 1917 that

Soviet authorities would support secession "if the toiling population of the region deserves it (Ibid., 47)." Moreover, the "principle of self-determination must be subordinated to the principle of socialism (Ibid.)." In March 1919, this narrow view of the right to self-determination became the official position of the Party, as this statement by Lenin indicated:

> The All-Russian Communist Party regards the question as to which class expresses the desire of a nation for separation from a historical point of view, taking into consideration the level of historical development of the nation, i.e., whether the nation is passing from medievalism toward bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy toward Soviet or proletariat democracy, etc. (Ibid., 49).

Thus there was now a flexible formula in place whereby the Bolsheviks could be the champion of national rights, while also stating that self-determination could be denied in any case when it might be detrimental to the Soviet state. If national self-determination was deemed as being against the interests of the proletariat, it was branded as counter-revolutionary. As Stalin wrote in 1920: "the interests of the masses of the people render the demand for the secession of the border regions at the present stage of the revolution a profoundly counter-revolutionary one (Ibid., 49). If the proletariat itself wanted national self-determination, Gregorii Piatakov, the leader of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, explained:

> Now a struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat is in progress in

the Ukraine, and you know perfectly that the fate
of the Ukraine is of immense interest not only to
the working masses of that country but also to the
working masses of Russia, Latvia, ByeloRussia and
the other Soviet Republics.... Can we permit that
form of existence of the proletarian-peasant
Ukraine to be determined exclusively and
independently by the working masses of the Ukraine?
Of course not (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 27-8)!"

Therefore, since the working masses would be led by the
vanguard - the local Bolshevik Party - which would want to
work with the Russian Bolshevik Party, national self-
determination could be supported in the knowledge that
secession would never be desired.

As the Bolshevik Red Army gradually reentered the
territories lost to the Whites or to foreign powers, the
practical strategy with respect to the self-determination of
nations changed as well. The Central Committee of the
Communist Party decided that, rather than incorporating other
nations within the Russian Republic, these nations would
instead be termed sovereign Soviet Republics, with close ties
to Russia. This would serve two purposes. The first goal was
to create a set of buffer states between Russia and Europe. In
case any invasion from the West came, it would meet several
obstacles before hitting the Russian Republic. The second goal
had more to do with the national self-determination question
and the strength of the national movements that the Bolsheviks
had experienced first hand in 1917-18. By creating sovereign
Soviet republics, the local Bolshevik parties could claim
national freedom on the basis of recognized sovereignty, and

undercut nationalist parties, which had been accusing the Bolsheviks of simply continuing the policy of czarist imperialism. Russian parties would not be installed by force, as was done in Ukraine in February of 1918. Rather, the Red Army would 'encourage' local Bolshevik parties to establish their own Soviet governments, which would be recognized as sovereign by Moscow (Ibid.). Red Army troops would thus be met as liberators and not oppressors, and the units could "render all possible support to the provisional Soviet governments in Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine and Lithuania, but of course, only to the Soviet governments (Ibid., 24)." Utilizing this strategy, the central government could later say that these republics had their sovereignty recognized by the Soviet Union, proving that Russia did indeed support a nation's right to self-determination.

As more republics were being established, a paradoxical situation arose. The republics were apparently separate and sovereign, but they were also considered as parts of the RSFSR. The Eighth Party Congress held in 1919 stated that these sovereign republics existed, but also implied that a unitary centralized Communist Party be established to direct all other parties. "All decisions of the RCP and its leading authorities are unconditionally binding on all parts of the Party, irrespective of their national composition (Ibid., 26)." This system was the precursor to the even greater centralization that would take place in later years. By 1920,

Lenin basically regarded the republics as linked in a _de facto_
federation, and decided to work towards closer federal unity.
Rather than have all the republics enter the RSFSR, Lenin
proposed a Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia, with
its own government, creating a federation of republics
possessing equal rights (Ibid.). It is now necessary to
examine the difference in Lenin's attitude towards federalism
before and after the October Revolution.

Lenin and Federalism

Before the revolution, Lenin staunchly rejected
federalism, arguing that it was not a practical solution to
the national question, and that national self-determination
did not equal federalism. Lenin felt that, except for a few
nationalities, most national groups were not localized enough
in any specific territories or homelands - the nations were
too intertwined (Gleason, 1990). Moreover, he stated, "While,
and in so far as different nations constitute a single state,
Marxists will never under any circumstances advocate either
the federal principle or decentralization (Ibid., 31)."
However Lenin was to change his mind. Lenin's support for
federalism after the Revolution does not have to be seen as
contradictory, but instead, as with his views on national
self-determination, can be seen as tactical. A federation
would minimize the fear of Russian dominance, and non-Russian
republics would join voluntarily. Eventually the federation

would erode leaving a unitary government (Ibid.).

A treaty of the Soviet Union, based on a federal form of government, was drafted by Stalin, the Commissar of Nationalities. This draft was objected to by Lenin, so Stalin revised it. This revised draft was adopted on December 30, 1922, as plenipotentiary delegations from the republics (including the Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, and the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia) signed the Declaration and Union Treaty. On Jan.31, 1924, the definitive version of the Soviet Constitution was confirmed by the Second Congress of the Soviets of the USSR (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). In terms of the Treaty and Constitution, this new type of federation ostensibly replaced the Russian federation of 1918 as the central authority, and gave recognition to ethnic claims of identity and equality.

Constitutional Rights for the Nationalities

The 1924 Constitution declared that the Union was formed on the basis of equality between Republics (which entered the Union freely). Moreover, it declared the basis on which Republics could enter the Union, and also stated that Republics could freely secede from the Union. The Constitution also guaranteed the USSR's unity of action in fields of internal and external policy such as foreign affairs, defence, and establishment of a single system of currency. In terms of the republics:

> The sovereignty of the Union Republics is restricted only (1) by the limitations set forth in the present Constitution, and (2) with reference to matters to the jurisdiction of the Union. Outside the limitations, each Union Republic exercises its own state sovereignty independently. The USSR preserves the sovereign rights of the Union Republics (Vyshinsky, 1948, 109).

This last statement may be interpreted as restricting the sovereignty of the republics, as it seems contradictory that the central structure can guarantee the sovereignty of the periphery. If a republic would try to secede, this clause could be interpreted as giving the centre power to stop the process of secession.

In terms of the legislative system, the supreme organ of power was designated as the Congress of Soviets, which would meet every two years. Between Congresses, the Central Executive Committee, a bicameral legislature consisting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities was supreme. The two Soviets were equal in power. The Soviet of the Union was elected on the basis of the population of each republic, and the Soviet of the Nationalities was elected by the Congress of Soviets of each union republic, autonomous republic, and autonomous region as based on a fixed formula (Gleason, 1990). Thus, the republics seemed to have significant representation at the national (meaning federal) level, as well as have the control and ability to develop their own policies with respect to language and culture. In fact however, this federation allowed for a centralization of power in Moscow, which worried Lenin, but was desired by

Stalin.

As noted earlier, Stalin had differed with Lenin on the original draft of the Union Treaty, as Stalin was trying to establish a very strong centralized federal system with little input from the republics. Noting the fact that Ukrainian delegates deleted the phrase that stated the republics 'are uniting into a single union-state,' Stalin commented, "It is obvious... that we are creating not a Confederation, but a federation of republics, a single union state, uniting military, foreign, foreign trade and other affairs... (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 58)."

Therefore, even though the republics seem to have been granted sovereign statehood, the reality was much different than what was written on paper. Gregory Gleason described the contradictory nature of the new federation and the role of the republics in this way:

> The national-territorial principle [of the federation] gave formal status and political recognition to the leading groups and recognized their claim to a homeland. National statehood came into being. This national-territorial principle gave a sense of self-determination, a promise of autonomy, and a feeling of natural representation to the national minorities. At the same time it integrated them into the central institutional framework in such a way that their legal rights could not be institutionally defended (Gleason, 1990, 33).

Lenin's Last Years

Lenin, in what could be termed his fourth phase of writing on the national question, was becoming increasingly

suspicious of Stalin and was becoming worried about the speed with which the government and the party were forcing assimilation on the republics (Gleason, 1990). With respect to the role of the Russian Communist Party in the republics, Lenin had stressed that the maintenance of the national (republican) language was important in building relations with the republics. With respect to Ukraine, Lenin wrote in 1919:

> RCP members on Ukrainian territory must put into practice the right of the working people to study in the Ukrainian language and to speak their native language in all Soviet institutions; they must in every way counteract attempts at Russification that push the Ukrainian language into the background and must convert that language into an instrument for the Communist education of the working people. Steps must be taken immediately to ensure that in future all employers are able to speak Ukrainian (Lenin, Vol.30, 1964, 163-164).

As well, in terms of the decision-making bureaucracy, Lenin believed Moscow was imposing too much state authority on the peoples of the republics: "It is essential to ensure the closest contact between Soviet institutions and the native peasant population of the country, for which purpose it must be made the rule... that when revolutionary committees and Soviets are being established the labouring peasants must have a majority in them with the poor peasants exercising a decisive influence (Ibid., 164)."

As the process of Russification continued in 1920-1921, Lenin strongly chastised proponents of Russian chauvinism and nationalism, including such leaders as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinskii (ironically, none of whom were ethnic

Russians), and worried that both the party and Soviet bureaucracy were increasingly guilty of chauvinism. Lenin remarked that, "The need to rally against the imperialists of the West... is one thing.... [I]t is another thing when we ourselves lapse... into imperialist attitudes towards oppressed nationalities, thus undermining all our principled sincerity....(Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 54)"

Thus, as Stalin took over the leadership of the Bolshevik Party following the death of Lenin, policies of consolidation of power at the centre (Moscow) along with a greater nationalization of the Soviet system, began to evolve together. The slogan 'socialization in one country', which had been utilized before the revolution, was brought out once again. Within this slogan existed a 'Russian etatiste nationalism', where Bolshevism was recognized as Russian national power, and as having united national movements of non-Russian republics during and after the revolution (Agursky, 1987). This Russian nationalism manifested itself in several policies of Stalin: changing the party and the role of the party apparatus, Russifying the non-Russian republics, purging nationalist elements from the party in the non-Russian republics, and centralizing all aspects of decision-making in Moscow, transforming the party into an instrument of control. These policies added up to making the Russian Republic the centre of power, and making the other republics, sovereign on paper, mere puppets of the centre in reality. Thus Lenin's

suspicion with respect to Stalin, the nationality question, the Soviet bureaucracy, and the worthlessness of the constitution were becoming increasingly well-founded.

Chapter Three

STALIN AND THE SUBJUGATION OF THE NATIONALITIES

Stalin's theoretical views on national self-determination and the national question in general seemed quite sympathetic to the non-Russian peoples. In his 1913 work Marxism and the National Question, Stalin spelled out the main elements of his program for solving the national question: i)the right to self-determination was acknowledged; ii)there was a right to regional autonomy; and iii)there was also a "nationalist equality of right" in terms of matters such as schools, language, and so on, in order to move towards a solution of the national question. After the revolution, up to Lenin's death, Stalin continued to vocalize support for the nationalities - including the need for republics to maintain their national language and cultures. However Stalin's actions of centralization of authority to Moscow and the party hierarchy, and aggressive actions against the nationalities belied his written work and vocal support. The Left Opposition within the Communist Party struggled to maintain Lenin's approach to the nationalities issue, but Stalin was able to strengthen his position in the Party to the point that opposition from all sides was defeated (Saunders, 1974).

The first important step for Stalin in the process of centralization was in the policy of party recruitment. Stalin desired to change the composition of the party so as to neutralize the left-wing opposition that Stalin felt was

overrepresented within the party. Although ostensibly the recruitment was to be worker oriented, in fact, skilled workers did not want to join the party. Rather, new recruits were mostly peasants who had recently left their villages to find employment in the city (Agursky, 1987). It was found that these new recruits were ready to follow the party line. The party soon became predominantly Russian. Also, by enlarging the ranks of the party, Stalin was preparing the party for the ideological changes that were to take place under his leadership. Within this new party continued a much more favourable environment for Russian nationalism (rather than internationalism), as the previous composition of the party had a larger core of left-wing internationalists (Ibid.).

The paid professional staff of the party are referred to as the party apparatus. Under Stalin the reach of the apparatus became all-pervasive. Operating at every level of the Soviet political system, and led by the primary party organization in Moscow, it touched virtually every aspect of Soviet life. The central apparatus in Moscow was supposed to supervise the operation of the Soviet government while the local and regional apparatuses supervised the local and regional governments (Hammer, 1990). The role of the apparatus was to process information that comes from all levels of the system. The apparatus studied this information and briefed the party's decision-makers on any subject. As well, the apparatus made sure the decisions of the leaders were made known to all

levels of the party all over the country (Ibid.).

Another important role of the apparatus was supervising appointments in government and in industry. The power to control appointment - nomenklatura - was used by Stalin to build his political machine. The apparatus thus assigned managerial positions in industry, but also expanded internal propaganda work on behalf of Stalin. Therefore, the apparatus managed the human resources of the country, acted as the dispenser of propaganda, and supervised all the Soviet bureaucracies (Ibid.). Examining the party apparatus in more detail, it is seen that each department within the apparatus supervised a certain part of the Soviet system - ministries as well as agencies and public organizations. Through the party network, each department would constantly receive information concerning all that it supervised. The Department then, would provide information to the Politburo (the innermost circle of power), not only on government agencies, but on virtually every organization in Soviet society (Ibid.).

Through this type of centralization and supervision, it became clear that the Communist Parties of the non-Russian republics were entirely subordinate to Moscow and Stalin. Originally in the Soviet system, there were local communist authorities or soviets which were meant to serve two functions - they were to act as local self-governing councils, and were also to act as organizations through which the state had to carry out its administration. This would have meant that the

republics had some degree of control over 'national' (i.e., local) matters. Under Stalin however, the self-governing function never developed, and the soviets became the lowest organ of the state administration, dependent on Moscow for everything from financing to staffing: "In place of the principle of 'no bureaucracy that is independent of local self-government' came the principle of 'no local self-government that is independent of the bureaucracy' (Mlynar, 1990, 75)."

The loss of even the outward appearance of party democracy and any input from the republics was evident in the frequency of meetings of the Central Committee and Congress. Under Lenin, the Central Committee had lost some of its functions to the inner bodies of the Committees (such as the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat). However it still played an important role as a court of appeal on disputed issues as well as a forum for discussing policy. But it went from meeting 20 times a year in 1922-23 to six times a year in 1926-27 to three times a year in 1927-30, and continued declining in frequency to the point where, between 1936 and 1940, it met only seven times in total. Moreover, the 'supreme organ' of the Party - the Congress - met in 1926, and was not convened again before 1939, as World War II was beginning (Rigby, 1989).

Thus Stalin and the Politburo would have access to all information concerning the Republics, and would then be able

to take action against agencies, organizations or specific individuals that were not following the line coming from Moscow. With this structure in place, Stalin was able to undertake policies of Russification in the republics and also to purge the party of 'undesirable elements.'

A new Soviet constitution, also called the Stalin constitution, was unveiled in 1936 heralding the "victory of socialism." In terms of the national question, the constitution seemed to broaden the power of the republics. It reaffirmed the rights of republics and national minorities, and the equality of rights within the Soviet system. As Article 23 states:

> The equality of rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality and race, in all fields of economic, state, cultural and social-political life is an immutable law. Any limitation of rights of whatsoever sort, and whether direct or indirect, or, conversely, any establishment of civil privileges, direct or indirect, on account of race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of race or national exclusiveness, hatred or contempt is punishable by law (Vyshinsky, 1948, 601-602).

In terms of the use of national languages, usage is guaranteed by Article 40, and in Article 121, instruction in one's native language was seen as one of the conditions essential in one's right to an education. Moreover, the use of one's native language in court was guaranteed in Article 110 (Ibid.). As well, Articles 15, 16, and 17 guaranteed the republics the right to exercise residual powers, the right to their own constitutions, and the right to secession (which had also been in place previously). Furthermore, representation of the

republics was enlarged in the Soviet of the Nationalities, rising from five to twenty-five deputies (Gleason, 1990). However, despite what was written in the constitution, the reality of what was occurring with respect to the national question was quite the opposite.

In 1923, Stalin began to implement a policy of 'indigenization' whereby non-Russian peoples would be involved in the work of the Party and the local branch government, so that the party agencies, previously being largely made up of Russians, would at least have the appearance of being led by the native people, and not by Russian outsiders. As well, within the program "Measures to Raise the Cultural Level of the Local Population," it was proposed to encourage literacy in the native languages through clubs, schools and literature. Both of these policies had the express purpose of gaining popularity for the Party in the Republics and increasing the efficiency of the Soviet bureaucracy within the republics (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Through these policies, progress with respect to national language and culture was made in a variety of republics. For example, in Ukraine in 1927-28, 80% of schools had Ukrainian as the language of instruction. In addition, books published in non-Russian languages rose from one-quarter of the total in 1927 to one-third by 1930 (Ibid.).

However, Stalin's apparatus was now in place to get the republics and nationalities into line with Stalin's thinking. First came a persecution of national elites: former members of

non-Soviet governments, former members of non-Communist parties, Bolsheviks who had previously belonged to other parties, and finally any Bolsheviks guilty of such criminal acts as national deviation.' Almost all of the leaders of non-Russian republics lost their lives. In Byelorussia, for example, almost the entire leadership was executed or arrested. In Ukraine, of 102 members of the Ukrainian Central Committees in the 1920s, only three lived to take part in the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1938. The Muslim republics' leaders were similarly accused of bourgeois nationalism' or Pan-Turkism and were arrested or executed (Ibid.). The party ranks, mostly made up of those who worked within the Soviet system but tried to maintain the national rights ascribed to the national minorities in the constitution and by Stalin himself, were thus decimated, and those who were left had to follow the Stalin line. The plan of indigenization was over, as most of those party leaders replacing the previous leadership in the republics were again Russian (Ibid.).

Along with the destruction of the political elite came a policy of Russification and destruction of the cultural elite. Targets focused on members of the non-Russian (and Russian) cultural intelligentsia, including writers, literary scholars, engineers, and professors, most of whom were charged with various crimes having to do with nationalism. In spite of constitutional guarantees then, freedom of expression greatly suffered. In 1934, Stalin expanded the jurisdiction of the

security police to include the ability to create Special Boards, which did not have to follow procedure according to the Criminal Code, and were not subject to Supreme Court review (Hazard, Shapiro, and Maggs, 1969). Perceived enemies of the state were accused in secret before these Special Boards, meaning there was no evidence of what was happening.

It was mentioned earlier in Chapter One that when grievances exist in a society social movements may develop. As Clark stated, when there were institutional deficiencies, where people stood against certain norms, values or leaders in society, these groups tended to form. Why did this not occur in the 1930s, in a situation where, with respect to the nationality question, the policies were very detrimental to those who held such values as national language and culture as important? Why was this different from when the czars tried to implement a policy of Russification in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and national movements and leaders were prominent in society? The elements of the resource mobilization approach offer clues in response to these questions.

One key element was the degree of organization - the higher the degree of organization, the greater the ability to recruit people, the greater the chances of success. Included in this element was the fact that leadership plays a key role, as good leaders are able to both attract and organize people. However the Stalin purges clearly wiped out a whole generation of leaders of the nationalist causes, both within political

circles, and within cultural circles. Many of the cultural and political elites under czarist rule took leading roles with respect to nationalist movements, and some eventually held positions of power in republic governments, where they were still sympathetic to nationalist interests. Once this generation was lost, a leadership vacuum was created, making organization of a coherent movement very difficult.

A second element was that of costs and benefits of participation. Even if it was important to people to have their national language and culture maintained, and even if this value becomes more important the more that value is threatened, there is a point at which the negative costs (state sanctions) are so strong, those who try to mobilize interests, or those who participate in showing their displeasure are literally defying death by doing so. It thus becomes more logical not to act, even if the value is held dear. For this reason, the leadership vacuum was not filled, and people did not mobilize. Although state sanctions may have been strong in czarist times they were not comparable to those taken by Stalin. The third and related element was that of expectations of success. In this situation, where the state power seemed so strong, and where the costs of participating were arrest or death, the expectations of success must have seemed quite low, offering a further barrier to participation.

This period can also be interpreted with respect to Pross' funnel of mobilization. At the most open-ended part of

the funnel are latent interests, where people have perceived interests, but have not begun to act together on them. If one can think of varying degrees of latent interests, then Stalin's policies would have had the effect of even further dispersing the interests, or in other words, making the interests even more latent, which would make getting to the next stage of evolution, that of solidary groups, even more difficult.

An example of the destruction of cultural elites can be seen with respect to the First Congress of Soviet Writers which met in 1934 and had 700 delegates. Only 50 of these delegates made it to the second such Congress in 1954. One Russian journalist figured that about 700 of the 1000 writers who died in this time were non-Russian, noting: "National [non-Russian] literatures were dealt such a devastating blow that some of them have not yet recovered from it, and will hardly recover in the near future... (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 78)." The losses of others within the intelligentsia, i.e., professors, teachers, technicians, etc. numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Moreover all official business was now conducted in Russian. The language of instruction in technical schools became Russian and more and more secondary schools adopted Russian as the language of instruction, as the costs of doing otherwise were evidently prohibitive (Ibid.). Further extreme negative sanctions by the state, included government engineered famines in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which resulted

in the deaths of millions of peasants. Thus, although Stalin's constitution expressly provided for extensive rights with respect to the republics' sovereignty, and with respect to national language and cultural rights, the realities were that the Party was ridding itself of non-Russian elements (those non-Russian elements that remained supported the Russian line), the republics had no sovereignty as they were being run by the party, decisions were being made in Moscow, and the rights to national language and culture disappeared.

As noted earlier, it seems clear that Lenin, while supporting the republics' right to secede formally, did not actively support this right in practice. The constant theoretical support for secession is interesting, because it was emphasized by Lenin, Stalin, and their successors as well. While this right was never meant to be used, the existence of that right did serve several purposes, the most important of which were symbolic and propaganda purposes, both internally and externally. Externally, by pointing to the Soviet constitution as a model for dealing with various nationalities, the Soviets could be leaders for third world nations and colonies seeking self-determination and independence. Internally, by providing a constitution which said that each republic was a sovereign state and by supporting language, religion and cultural rights in the constitution, the republics were theoretically able to fulfil all their national aspirations, as those were the guarantees

available in an independent democratic state. A more accurate portrayal of Stalin's Soviet Union and the national question is given by Ivan Dzyuba:

> ...having changed from party functionary to ruler, he himself swung right round and expended considerable effort 'to gather all the threads of government into the hands of Russians.' This new volte-face found its concentrated formulation in the ideas expressed by Stalin in his famous toast 'To the Great Russian People' where other peoples of the Soviet Union appeared in a clearly secondary role and where the victory over fascism was attributed not so much to the socialist order as to inborn 'Russian endurance' and the equally in born ability to unite everything 'around the Russian principle (Dzyuba, 1968, 65).'

As Stalin's leadership of the Soviet Union continued, further policies were implemented to facilitate assimilation, and hinder any possible national (ethnic) unrest. First, there were various strategies having to do with the establishment of national borders within the Soviet Union. In Central Asia, in order to keep the disparate groups from developing a pan-Muslim or pan-Turkish national identity (which might make them more disruptive and harder to handle), the area was divided into a number of units - dividing the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirgiz, etc. A different strategy was taken in the Caucausus, as both the Armenians and Georgians had a highly developed national consciousness. Thus these two groups, along with Azerbaijanis were grouped together to form the Transcaucasian Federated Republic (Connor, 1984). In 1936, three union republics evolved, but the borders did not equate with the distribution of ethnic groups. In fact, in the case of Armenia, a majority

of the nation was left outside the boundaries. For union republics, an average of 15% of the total population was excluded from the republic of their ethnic group. In terms of autonomous republics within the RSFSR, the exclusion averaged twice that of the union republics (Ibid.). Thus the strategy in terms of border creation was the mixing of strong national identities to prevent the development of separate but existing consciousnesses, as well as separating different groups that had the potential for fostering one national consciousness, into smaller groups.

A second strategy that was used (until virtually the present day) to facilitate assimilation was the dispersion of ethnic Russians among the non-Russian republics. Between the time of the creation of the republic and 1957, the proportion of the population represented by Russians increased in thirteen of the non-Russian union republics. For all fourteen non-Russian republics, the percentage rose from 7.5% at the time of creation to 16.7% in 1959 (Ibid.). Moreover, in traditionally strong Russian areas, the percentage of Russians dropped from 80% in 1897 to 62% in 1959 (Lewis, 1971).

Other studies showed that Russians did not disperse evenly throughout the Republics. Rather, 74% of Russians living outside the RSFSR lived in cities, where they formed either a significant minority or even a majority of inhabitants. These cities then became 'Russian cultural enclaves' where Russian became the dominant language (Ibid.).

Data presented concerning rates of Russification according to national administration unit show evidence that Russians mixing with nationalities has promoted Russification, especially where non-Russians are Slavs, and also where the total populations of the nationalities are lower (such as in autonomous republics like the Karelian and Komi ASSRs (Ibid.)).

It should also be noted that non-Russians have been encouraged to leave their home republics to migrate elsewhere within the union, thus decreasing the national base in their home republic, and increasing the heterogeneity of the population elsewhere. In fact, in several of the republics, groups other than Russians form the largest minority group within the republic (although a significant portion of those moved to the RSFSR, meaning that ethnic dilution of non-Russian republics was not twofold.) Therefore, for example, there are not a proportionately large amount of Russians in the Transcaucausus, but this was tolerated because there has been considerable ethnic heterogeneity with Azerbaijanis in Armenia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and both of these groups in Georgia (Ibid.).

The final method of enforcing ethnic heterogeneity was very particular to Stalin. This was the deportation of entire nationalities out of their homelands. At the end of 1943, the Kalmyks, Karachai and Balkars were deported from their homelands. In 1944, the same plight befell the Chechens and

Ingushi. Later that year a quarter of a million Crimean Tatars were also driven out to Central Asia (Nahaylo, 1990). Most of these groups had been accused of aiding the Germans during the war. Deportation also occurred in areas of the Soviet Union the Germans never reached: 200,000 Muslims in 1944 and 80,000 Muslims in 1947 were deported from various districts in Georgia that were located along the Turkish border. Stalin thought that in the event of possible Soviet-Turkish hostilities, nationalities such as the Mesketians could be a problem. Deportation was thus seen as the simplest method of eliminating problems (Ibid.).

By the end of the Stalin era, these policies of Russification were also being supported by his theoretical writings. In his 1950 work <u>Concerning Marxism in Linguistics</u>, Stalin examines theories with respect to the evolution of a new classless language in the Soviet Union, and remarks that a new language would take centuries to develop, it could not be formed by means of an 'explosion'. As well, the mixing of languages was also a very prolonged process, and indeed this mixture of languages would not create a new language. Rather, "...one of the languages usually emerges victorious from the mixture, retains its grammatical system, its basic word stock, and continues to advance in accordance with its inherent laws of development, while the other language loses its quality and gradually dies out (Stalin, 1973, 426)." He further goes on to say that the Russian language has always emerged the victor

when it has been mixed with the languages of other peoples, and moreover has always been enriched and strengthened through this mixing process. In this way Stalin was able to justify policies of Russification using Marxist and Leninist theories.

In looking at the Stalin era then, it is clear that severe institutional deficiencies existed. Personal liberty was virtually non-existent, national languages and cultures were being destroyed, people were being arrested and/or killed in mass numbers. In this case, the sanctions implemented by the state against those who showed disapproval was so high, that where one could normally expect some type of social movement to come into being, none did. Moreover, so many of the possible leaders of these movements had been arrested or killed, that any type of mobilization or organization was made even more difficult.

This was the legacy that Stalin left for future Soviet leaders: a centralized party that gave virtually no representation or power over local decision-making of any sort to the republics, and a policy of Russification that prevented the various republics and nationalities from using their native languages, and developing their native cultures. Ironically, these were policies that went against the theoretical works of Lenin and Stalin himself, as well as against the Soviet constitution.

Chapter Four

THE RETREAT FROM STALINISM

Changes with respect to the national question and the republics' role in the Soviet Union occurred almost immediately following the death of Stalin in 1953. The first change had to do with a slight decentralization of power. Ministries that were previously under Union control began to be run as joint republic-Union ministries, in such areas as coal and oil production, and later, higher education. Later on, the republics were given local control over justice, highways and transport, and building materials industries.

Khrushchev and the de-Stalinization of the National Question

The greatest change however, occured in 1956 after Nikita Khrushchev, the new leader of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), delivered his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, where he denounced Stalin. Khrushchev admitted that under Stalin entire nations had been unjustly deported from their homelands, and there had been 'gross violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationalities policy of the Soviet state (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 118). There was also no mention of the importance of the Russian language and no mention of Russians being the leading peoples of the USSR. Khrushchev added that republics should have more say in terms of how budgets were spent, particularly in terms of certain aspects of their local economy (Ibid.).

Soon after, the promised economic decentralization took place as a number of industrial enterprises were taken over by the republics, and an Economic Commission of the Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet was established to give the republics some input into Union economic plans (Ibid.). In terms of language and literature, there was also positive progress made by the non-Russian republics. The party began to admit that the language policy under Stalin was a great mistake. The Byelorussian Party Central Committee for example, stated:

> In many seven-year and secondary schools, all subjects except Byelorussian language and literature are taught in Russian. This adversely affects the students' level of knowledge and impedes their mastery of the Byelorussian language.... Many teachers teach in a mixture of Byelorussian and Russian and fail to impose on themselves sufficiently high standards on the matter of cultivating language. Consequently, students also speak a bastard language and express their thoughts illiterally both verbally and in writing (Ibid., 127).

There were also improvements in the areas of increased teaching in the national languages and cultural revivals.

Despite these apparent improvements however, dissenters who overstepped the limits still ended up as political prisoners. Indeed, even as this policy towards reestablishing national language and culture began to flourish, other nationality policies focused on fusing the nationalities ('sliianie'), where it was argued that the Russian language was a 'mighty medium of communication', and that national narrow-mindedness was keeping the country from drawing

together as close as it could be (Ibid.) This new policy manifested itself in a new education law proposed late in 1958 - Thesis 19 - where parents were to be allowed the right to choose to send their children to schools where the curriculum was taught in Russian or where it was taught in the national language. There would be no obligatory study of Russian in the native language schools, or the native language in the Russian schools. The problem was that since knowledge of Russian was seen as a gateway to science and higher learning, there was an implicit pressure for parents to send their children to the Russian schools. Moreover, as was noted by a Latvian scholar: "To work effectively in a republic a man needs a knowledge of the national language. Abolition of the compulsory study of the Russian and Latvian languages in the schools will hardly promote the strengthening of the friendship of peoples (Ibid., 132)." The Kremlin seemed to retreat from the proposal following intense pressure against it, but, one by one, the republics were soon forced to adopt the policy.

As national dissent and opposition to such policies as Thesis 19 grew, it was becoming clear that Khrushchev was moving in favour of assimilation and 'sliianie'. In fact the arrest rate of citizens accused of nationalist dissent greatly increased (Dzyuba, 1968). Discussion of Article 17, the right of republics to secede from the Union, was seen as treason and the penalties for this 'crime' were severe. The policy of assimilation crystallized in October 1961 at the Twenty-Second

Party Congress. The new policy was both cultural and economic in scope. In terms of nationalities policy, Khrushchev claimed that boundaries between the republics were losing their significance as the various nations within the country were becoming unified, and he warned that there would be no toleration of any "manifestation of national insularity in the moving and employment of workers of different nationalities in the republics." As well, Bolsheviks were to eradicate "even the slightest manifestation of nationalist survival (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 140-141)." Moreover, Khrushchev gave notice that there would be an economic recentralization, including a reform of the Council of Regional Economy (Sovnarkhozy), moving away from the 105 economic regions created in 1957, to 17 regions in 1961, to the creation of one Supreme Sovnarkhoz in 1963 (Gleason, 1990).

Khrushchev also continued to support the policy of Russian migration into non-Russian republics in order to promote ethnic diffusion. The 1961 program indicated the support for this policy:

> The appearance of new industrial centers, the prospecting and development of mineral deposits, virgin land development, and the growth of all modes of transport increase the mobility of the population and promote greater intercourse between the peoples of the Soviet Union. People of many nationalities live together and work in harmony in the Soviet republics. The boundaries between the Union republics of the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance (Connor, 1984, 310).

Despite these types of negative sanctions by the state however, there were considerable stirrings of nationalist

dissent that must be noted.

Renewal of Nationalist Movements

The death of Stalin was a major turning point in terms examining nationalist dissent. Chapter three examined the types of sanctions the state used to facilitate processes of Russification and punish those who in any way questioned the policies of the state. The fact that state sanctions seemed to be lessened following his death, that Khrushchev made a speech denouncing some of Stalin's policies, and that a generally more conciliatory or tolerant approach towards the nationality question was being taken led people who had concerns about ceratin state policies to be more vocal. Rudolf Tokes (1975) divided this increasing post-Stalinist dissent into four phases: 1) from 1946-1954, the subversive militant phase; 2) from 1956-1964, the political counterculture; 3) from 1965-1971, nationwide movement; and 4) beginning in 1971, retrenchment and ideological polarization. Tokes' classification represents the organizational characteristics of dissident movements in this time frame.

The subversive-militant was considered to be made up of various disaffected individuals and smaller groups who worked very much underground, such as imprisoned Red Army officers, communist intellectuals, religious sects, suspected nationalist separatists, and all their study circles. Partly as a reaction to Soviet involvement in Poland and Hungary in

1956, secret discussion groups involving students from Leningrad and Moscow were formed, and samizdat (self-published) journals of poetry and political satire were published by these groups. This was considered the second phase. The last two phases will be examined in the section concerning Brezhnev's era.

Looking at these phases utilizing Pross' funnel of mobilization, the first two phases can be seen as falling into the first stage of mobilization, that of latent interests. Many of these individuals and groups had common interests, but for the most part, they did not yet act together. Considering the loss of cultural and political elites in the Stalin era, and considering the fear of authority that was created, the fact that the mobilization of interests took longer to coalesce is not surprising. Dissent and nationalist revival became even stronger as Khrushchev's reign ended, as the state was beginning to take back some of the concessions, and was being less tolerant of nationalist interests than it had been at the time of Stalin's death. This mobilization of interests continued into the rule of the next major party leader, Leonid Brezhnev.

Brezhnev and the End of the Thaw

In his writings and speeches, Leonid Brezhnev's initial focus on the national question followed two lines, that of strengthening the unity of the country and that of developing

and strengthening the sovereign national rights of the republics. This was not seen as contradictory, but rather as a dialectical solution to the nationalities problem. Brezhnev explained the dialectic with respect to centralization and the republics in this way:

> We have to strengthen both bases of democratic centralization. On one hand, we have to develop centralization, placing at the same time a limit on bureaucratic and localist tendencies. On the other hand, we have to develop democratic bases, the initiation of the locality, and unburden the high echelons of leadership from minor issues, to enhance the operationality and flexibility in the implementation of decisions (Gleason, 1990, 72).

However, Brezhnev eventually focused more on the unity and sliianie side. At the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, there was an emphasis on assimilation, and great praise for the Russian people. A later speech called for a "continuous systematic and thorough cultivation of a spirit of internationalization and Soviet patriotism in all citizens of the Soviet Union" and also called for the removal of national barriers (Connor, 1984, 402).

Although Brezhnev stated that major changes to the federal system were inexpedient at that time, there had been important debates going on, leading up to the adoption of a new constitution in 1977, as to further reducing the roles of the republics, or to eliminating republican borders altogether, in order to improve economic rationality and increase political control (Lapidus, 1984). Even though the constitution did not make these wholesale changes to the

federal system, there was evidence of a move towards greater assimilation of the nationalities. Article 19 read: "The state helps enhance the social homogeneity of society, namely the elimination of class differences... and the all-round development and drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR (Constitution of the USSR, 1977, 28)." Moreover, Article 37 reduced the use of one's national language from a right to a possibility: "Exercise of [equality of citizens] rights is ensured by a policy of all-round development and drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR, by educating citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility to use their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR (Ibid., 39)."

There were other restrictions on the exercise of power given to the republics as well. While Article 78 stated that the territory of a republic could not be altered without its consent, Article 73 could also be interpreted as restricting the right of secession of the republics because approval of boundary changes would be needed (Gleason, 1990). Furthermore, Article 80 gave the right to republics to enter into relations with foreign countries, but this right was restricted by Article 73 as well. This article gave the Supreme Soviet the authority to "establish the general procedures" and coordinate activities of the republics with respect to one another. Although Article 77 granted the republics control over

enterprises within its territory, Article 133 allowed the USSR Council of Ministers to suspend the execution of decrees of the republic Council of Ministers. Article 73 also gave the USSR Supreme Soviet the right to make the republic constitution conform to the Soviet constitution. Finally, the constitution did not include a procedure whereby disputes between the republic and the all-union government could be adjudicated by an independent body. (Ibid.). Overall then, it can be seen that the 1977 constitution limited the republics' rights even more than did the Stalin constitution (although, as noted, those rights existed only on paper). The assimilationist tendencies of the Brezhnev regime thus manifested themselves in this constitution.

Brezhnev later warned against moving too quickly with respect to assimilation, but also indicated that the present nationalities policy was triumphant in the Soviet Union:

> The formation of a historically new social and international community - the Soviet people - has become an important characteristic of developed socialism in our country, an indication of the growing homogeneity of Soviet society and the triumph of the nationalities policy of the CPSU. This means that the common features of Soviet people's behaviour, character and world view which do not depend on social and national distinctions are gradually assuming decisive importance in our country (Connor, 1984, 404).

Despite having seemingly 'solved' the national question, the party focused more heavily on those who disagreed with the 'solution', becoming increasingly militant in its opposition to 'national deviation.' The number of arrests for nationalist

activities increased and many non-Russians were ousted from high level positions in their native republics (Ibid.).

Referring back to the previous section of this chapter, the last two phases of nationalist dissent should now be discussed, as they occurred during Brezhnev's tenure as leader. The third phase, or the nationwide movement (1965-1971), evolved from the earlier two phases. With the publicity generated from the 1965 trials of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel adding a further spark, scores of signed statements by prominent individuals from various societal communities – cultural, scientific, political and so on. A variety of self-published journals and newsletters also appeared at this time (Tokes, 1975). Previously passive elements of society were becoming involved in this dissent.

In terms of Pross' terminology, this phase represents the second stage of the funnel of mobilization, that of the formation of solidary groups. At this stage there was a heightened awareness of common interests among those that were concerned about nationality issues and about the Soviet government in general, but there were as yet no formal associations able to take collective action. It should be noted that although Tokes used the term nationwide movement, the movement described is not quite the same as the social movements in chapter one. The dissident movement was described as a movement because it began to involve more than just a few individuals, and began to involve elites from different walks

of life. However, the movement was still based on these elites, and did not achieve a groundswell of support from the general populace, although a certain discontent may have been growing. Certainly the Stalin era and the memories of extreme punitive action against those who complained about the state remained within the collective consciousness of most of the population.

George Saunders (1974) noted that elements of cultural opposition (spontaneous public readings, passing around of literature, etc.) was becoming more widespread and systematic by 1965, and samizdat was becoming a network whereby uncensored material was regularly produced and passed around. Discontent was growing among workers as well. There were reports of strikes and slowdowns at an automobile plant in Moscow at this time (Saunders, 1974). As well, literary dissidents were becoming better organized, and formed a loose organization called SMOG (there have been various versions given for this acronym). This group was centred in Moscow and Leningrad but other SMOG groups appeared in the Urals and Odessa.

Other organizations that could be described as solidary groups began appearing all over the Soviet Union. These groups had various goals, and various reasons for being, but what they did have in common was that they were dissenting against various Soviet policies. Some of these organizations had nationalist concerns, while others felt that the Soviet regime

had moved away from true Marxist-Leninist principles. Examples of these groups include the Russian Socialist Party which distributed leaflets in Leningrad calling for a general strike; the 1968-69 Union of Independent Youth which appeared in the town of Vladimir and called for socialist democracy based on freedom of organization; the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Committee were organized in the Lviv region, composed mostly of industrial workers; and the Young Workers' Party of Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan (Saunders, 1974). Again, while these groups were part of the beginning of a groundswell of dissent, these groups and interests were not yet acting together, in a formal fashion, enough to be thought of as being the formal groups as thought of in Pross' funnel of mobilization.

The fourth phase (post-1971) referred to retrenchment and ideological polarization. The systematic campaign of repression and increasing vigilance by the state security apparatus drove all but a few dissidents underground. Most of the solidary groups that had formed had been broken up. Those who were not arrested were exiled or forced to emigrate from the USSR. The party was becoming more subtle in its strategy of repression, using such techniques as extrajudicial repression (including expulsion from the CPSU, the loss of job, loss of permission to travel, etc.) to give warnings to those with whom the party is not pleased (Barghoorn, 1975). It should also be noted that according to Soviet legal doctrine,

only actions detrimental to society are deemed as punishable, not thoughts or opinions. However, some relevant statutes were drafted quite loosely and interpreted even more loosely. In practice then, 'improper' thoughts, opinions, and attitudes were indeed punished (Ibid.).

This phase represented a step backwards in the evolution of a nationalist social movement, which can again be largely attributed to fear of punitive sanctions by the state against those involved in nationalist activities. The costs of participation were so high, that it became difficult to get involved. Once again, the fact that most of the leaders were arrested or exiled meant that organization of any such groups was made more difficult as well. In terms of the funnel of mobilization, this was a step backwards into the latent interest stage as well.

There were varying reasons as to why the Soviet government had to crack down so heavily against this dissent. First of all, some of the most outspoken dissidents were not only well-known within their immediate circles, but were known across the country as well. These included such figures as singer-poet Bulat Okudzhava (who was also a member of the Communist Party), Major General Peter Grigorenko from the military, and Andrei Sakharov, one of the most famous Soviet scientists. Such individuals have to be taken seriously. Second, many of these dissidents wrote from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, and explained how and why the Soviet government

was wrong with many of its policies, utilizing the same language that the Soviet government was using in explaining the rationale behind their policies. This then made the dissidents more legitimate (it was harder to put labels on them like anti-Leninist etc.). It also undermined the legitimacy of the government for whom it had always been important to use Marxism-Leninism to legitimize its policies and indeed, its very existence. Sakharov, for example, in complaining about the restrictions of civil rights of the Crimean Tatars, wrote "Nationality problems will long continue to be a reason for unrest and dissatisfaction unless all departures from Leninist principles which have occurred are acknowledged and analyzed and firm steps are taken to correct all mistakes (Dornan, 1975, 369)." Ivan Dzyuba wrote one of the more eloquent books, Internationalism or Russification, critiquing the Soviet nationality policy from this perspective:

> ...we have completely distorted Lenin. Contrary to his direct, repeated, and categorical instructions about the necessity for a persistent struggle against Russian Great-Power chauvinism as the main obstacle to socialist national construction and for maximum concessions towards 'nationals' on questions of their national interest - contrary to all this, for several decades now, we have not only failed to struggle against Russian chauvinism and Great Power ideology, but have withdrawn these very concepts from circulation. Instead 'local nationalism' is proclaimed to be the principal enemy, under which heading have often been placed the most innocuous and elementary manifestations of national life, national dignity and honour. The struggle against this 'nationalism' has been waged with this weapon of terror (Dzyuba, 1968, 59).

This book was even more 'dangerous' in a sense, in that Dzyuba did not call for Ukrainian independence, but called for the upholding of rights that already existed in the Soviet constitution. But under intense pressure from state security, Dzyuba recanted the views presented in the book.

Tokes' fourth phase of retrenchment, with strong repression of nationalist sentiment, continued throughout Brezhnev's tenure and continued into the brief periods that his successors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko held power. Andropov, when he was General Secretary of the CPSU, stated: "Comrades, in summing up what has been accomplished, we naturally give most of our attention to what still remains to be done. Our end goal is clear. It... is not only to bring the nations closer together but to fuse them.... On no account must there be either any forestalling of events or any holding back of processes that have already matured (Connor, 1984, 407)." Chernenko added that the USSR represented the optimum state form for the cohesion of Soviet nations and ethnic groups in order to attain the program goals of the party.

This was the legacy left to Mikhail Gorbachev, the next leader of the CPSU. In contrast to the last three leaders, Gorbachev was a young, dynamic leader who represented the possibility of change to many. The next chapter will focus on the many transformations that took place in both the state and society in the Soviet Union.

Chapter Five

GORBACHEV: A NEW ERA

Before Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power, there was little evidence that the national question was a priority in his mind. He was the first Soviet leader whose political career did not include a period in a non-Russian republic. As such, he came to power relatively ill-prepared to deal with the nationality question, and early speeches contained only the usual platitudes on the subject (Lapidus, 1989). During his career in Stavropol in the north Caucausus, he made speeches with respect to "friendship of peoples." As the Central Committee Secretary of Agriculture, Gorbachev delivered a speech in Lithuania on the fortieth anniversary of Lithuania's annexation to the Soviet Union entitled "Friendship of the USSR Peoples - an Invaluable Achievement." These early speeches showed evidence of following the official line and expressing an optimism towards the Soviet 'solution' to the question (Motyl, 1989). On May 8th, 1985, shortly after being appointed General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev stated: "The blossoming of nations and nationalities is organically connected to their all-round drawing together. Into the consciousness and heart of every person there has deeply entered the feeling of belonging to a single family - the Soviet people, a new and historically unprecedented social and international community (Ibid., 157). Speeches such as these, basically repeating the party line as delivered by

Brezhnev, showed Gorbachev's complacency in this area.

By the time the 27th Party Congress was convened in February 1986, Gorbachev's overall direction of policy-making was becoming much clearer. The main focus had to do with an acceleration of economic growth. As his thinking and policy-making developed, Gorbachev developed the concept of perestroika:

> Perestroika is the all-round intensification of the Soviet economy, the revival and development of the principles of democratic centralism in running the national economy, the universal introduction of economic methods, the reconciliation of management by injunction and by administrative methods, and the overall encouragement of innovation and socialist enterprise. It means unceasing concern for cultural and spiritual wealth, for the culture of every individual and society as a whole. Perestroika means the elimination from society of the distortions of socialist ethics, the consistent implementation of the principles of social justice (Gorbachev, 1988, 21).

Hand-in-hand with the policy of perestroika (emphasizing economic reform especially) was the policy of democratization.

Gorbachev stated that one of the major problems with the Soviet economy was that the political system had some major shortcomings that were hampering such aspects of the economy as housing, food supply, and transport. Moreover, the principle of collective leadership in the party had been violated, as leaders seemed to be above criticism, and were at times at the centre of criminal activities. Democratization would put ordinary people back at the forefront, making them managers of their own destinies (White, 1990). Democratic structures of management had given way to "command-

administrative" structures. The bureaucracy had increased to huge proportions - more than 100 central ministries and another 800 in the republics, and was able to dictate its will on the general population, bypassing the will of soviets and other elected bodies (Ibid.). There were two sets of rules that were followed by the bureaucracy: the first step had to do with providing "sound ideological slogans" that would provide the theoretical base for their activity; the second had to do with rules aimed at maintaining and strengthening their positions and interests (Hazan, 1990a). Thus, several reforms were put forward, shifting the emphasis from an excessively centralized management system relying on orders from the centre to a more decentralized and democratic system, where associations and enterprises would have more independence and authority. These bodies would move to become more self-financing and self-accounting, and the work collective would be responsible for both efficient management and the final product (Gorbachev, 1988).

The Re-evaluation of the National Question

The focus of Gorbachev's book <u>Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World</u> was on economic and social reform, as well as foreign policy. However, there was little mention of anything to do with nationalities policy within the Soviet Union. The book did deal with reforms having to do with decentralization, and the subsequent increase in power given to the republics, which will be discussed in more detail

later. The sole analysis of the nationality question was perfunctory. Gorbachev argued that: "If the nationality question had not been solved in principle, the Soviet Union would never have had the social, cultural, economic and defence potential as it has now (Ibid., 104)." At the same time however, he stated that the nationality question was not problem-free and that the past seemed to stress the solution to the problem even as the question was not totally resolved. Gorbachev went on to write that the growth of a nation's self-interest in its roots and culture were laudatory except when certain sections of the people developed narrow national views and national rivalries. He concluded that national feelings should be respected, but should also be countered with Soviet patriotism and internationalism. As well, in this section, the Russian people and Russian language were especially praised (Ibid., 105-107). Thus, although Gorbachev acknowledged that certain problems existed with respect to the nationality issue, he also continued to emphasize the internationalist angle, with the Russian language as the basis of communication among the peoples, a line not very different from preceding leaders.

In a later edition of the book, however, there was an addendum which included Gorbachev's closing speech at the 19th All-Union Party Conference in July 1988. It was clear that, only a year after the original book was published, the nationality question had risen greatly in Gorbachev's

thoughts, as a major section of the speech had to do with relations between Soviet nationalities. Gorbachev mentioned the existence of a 'new historical community' - that of the Soviet People, but he also stressed a growth of national self-awareness. There was also a deeper criticism of past Party attitudes towards the national minorities of the Soviet Union:

> It was claimed that there were no problems in relations between nationalities. The needs for the social, economic, and cultural development of certain republics, autonomous entities and ethnic groups were not fully taken into consideration. Many acute questions that derived from the very development of nations and nationalities were not resolved promptly enough. This led to public disaffection, which now and then escalated into conflicts.... The negative phenomena that accumulated over the decades had been neglected and ignored for a long time, and were not properly assessed by the Party.... Greater independence of the Union republics and autonomous entities is seen by the Party in indissoluble connection with their responsibility for the strengthening and progress of our multinational state (Ibid., 283-284).

Gorbachev also recommended that the role of the Soviet of the Nationalities should be enhanced, that the legislation with respect to autonomous republics, autonomous regions and areas be examined, and that the principles of self-government representation of nationalities should be made clearer.

Gorbachev also stressed that national cultures and languages had to be maintained. While stating that it was still important for all Soviets to learn Russian as a means of communicating with one another, the speech focused more on Soviets being bilingual and maintaining their native tongues:

> Every condition should be provided for national-Russian bilingualism to develop harmoniously and

> naturally, with an eye to the specific features of every region, and without formalism; more concern should be shown for the active functioning of national languages in various spheres of political, public and cultural life; the study of the language of the republic by citizens of other nationalities residing in it, above all by children and young people, should be encouraged (Ibid., 286).

What events precipitated this change?

On Dec. 17-18, 1986, anti-Russian riots took place in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, following the replacement of a native Kazakh, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, with a native Russian as Party First Secretary of the Republic. Even Komsomol (Young Communist League) and Communist Party members participated in the demonstration (Motyl, 1989). Throughout 1987, nationalist demonstrations took place in the Baltic capitals of Riga, Tallin, and Vilnius as well as in other cities such as Lviv in western Ukraine. This year of national demonstrations climaxed in February 1988 as Armenians marched in Yerevan, demanding that Nagornyi-Karabakh, an autonomous region that was of predominantly Armenian descent but that belonged to Azerbaijan, be annexed to Armenia. This situation soon led to violence and death as hostilities broke out between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait (Melville and Lapidus, 1990).

There are varying reasons behind this outpouring of nationalist sentiment. First of all, many of these deep-seeded feelings had been held back for years, during the periods of repression held previously, and with a new leader (a leader who was not one of the gerontocracy, i.e., one of Brezhnev's

old cronies), some of this emotion was bound to come forth. Second, it is significant that some of the major demonstrations took place in the Baltics and in western Ukraine, which only became a part of the Soviet Union in the 1940s, meaning these areas had not experienced some of the worst repression of nationalist sentiment under Stalin. The third point, related to the first, is that this outlet for nationalist expression came in the form of another Gorbachev policy, that of glasnost' (or openness), one of the pillars of perestroika.

Glasnost' has been described as a path to change and a path towards democratization, where people were told the truth, both the bad and the good, and nothing was concealed from them. Within glasnost' and perestroika lay the basis for a new non-governmental political culture (Ibid.). By promoting glasnost' Gorbachev hoped to get people to vent their frustrations with the Soviet bureaucracy openly. It was believed that criticism from below would lead to changes in the bureaucracy. With support coming from below, changes made to the bureaucracy from above would be legitimized, and there would be even more pressure on a bureaucracy attempting to maintain all its prestige and power to implement the desired changes (Braun and Day, 1990). As a result of this type of reform, the senior ranks of the government and Communist Party bureaucracy were cut by 30-40% (Colton, 1990). As well, there was a proliferation of voluntary associations appearing,

everything from philanthropic foundations to hiking clubs.
This was tolerated and at times encouraged by the state. In
fact some of these associations were incorporated into the
institutional framework of the state (Ibid.). By December,
1987, it was estimated that about 30,000 unofficial grassroots
organizations had come into being, many of which began to move
away from recreational type groups to more controversial
groups such as those based on environmental issues, those that
represented veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and those
based on national identity (Bonnell, 1991). As well, several
independent unions were formed by professional groups, such as
the Union of Lawyers, and the April Committee (a writers'
union) (Ibid.). Finally, by 1988, 1610 religious associations
were registered in the Soviet Union, including the Russian
Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim and Pentecostal faiths
(Ibid.).

It is interesting to note that the fact that the state
encouraged the proliferation of these associations in order to
legitimize the changes it was trying to make is similar to how
western writers have viewed the proliferation of interest
groups in Canada and the United States. That is, that the
state needs the support of the interest groups in order to
legitimize policies in the areas those groups are concerned
with. Two of Peterson's four types of activities in terms of
orchestrating support of interest groups apply here: first,
the liaison as consensus-building - bringing diverse groups

together in coalitions to support programmatic initiatives, and second, liaison as legitimization - getting support from a wide array of organizations and groups to legitimate the leader's image as national representative and to strengthen his political position. In making the types of changes he was proposing, Gorbachev was making certain groups very uneasy (for example the bureaucracy, the conservative wing of the party), and the more legitimacy and political support he was seen as having, the greater the success he would have of implementing his policies. However, Gorbachev did not foresee that by allowing these associations to form, and by allowing certain criticisms against the state to be tolerated, he was also opening up the possibility for people to feel that they had the freedom to speak against the state and form groups with respect to other issues, such as the nationality question.

Another important concept within perestroika was that of socialist pluralism. When Gorbachev made reference to a need for a "socialist pluralism of opinions" at the 1988 party conference that adopted the resolution on glasnost', it provided a boost for the more radical reformers. Even though the word socialist was placed before pluralism, meaning there were still limits as to what could be printed, there was also a new legitimacy provided for political debate and a diversity of opinion on political and social issues in Soviet publications (Brown, 1991).

One other aspect of perestroika that promised to have a significant bearing on national movements and political dissidents in particular, was that of the Soviet state moving towards a rule of law, establishing itself as a 'legal state.' As has been noted, the Soviet government, during Stalin's time and after, has not acted within a principle of a rule of law. Although the constitution guaranteed a wide array of civil rights for its citizens, Stalin, whenever necessary, got rid of his enemies using 'extralegal ' procedures (Thornburgh, 1990). Moreover, part chiefs have often included in their reports to the CPSU congresses, statements that are basically directives making law an instrument of party policy (Barghoorn, 1975). Thus, even when the USSR Fundamentals of Civil Legislation was adopted in 1961, defining legal relationships such as contractual obligations, insurance, credit, and treaties, an escape clause was added, declaring: "Civil rights shall be protected by law, except as they are exercised in contradiction to their purpose in socialist society in the period of Communist construction (Thornburgh, 1990, 16)."

But in 1988, the 19th Party Conference approved a resolution calling for the development of a legal state. As Gorbachev declared in his opening speech at the conference:

> ...the most important thing characterizing a legal
> state is ensuring in practice the supremacy of the
> law. No state body, official, collective and party
> or social organization, and no individual is freed
> from the obligation to submit to the law. Just as
> the citizens bear responsibility to their state of

> the whole people, so does the state power bear responsibility to the citizens. Their rights must be reliably defended from any arbitrariness by the authorities and their representatives.... [Moreover], there needs to be a strict adherence to the principle that everything is allowed which is not prohibited by law (Hazan, 1990b, 139).

This type of reform, together with independence of the judiciary (another reform that was to be implemented), would mean that in theory, republics and citizens would have the right to speak out against the government. As an example, political dissidents could not be arrested for having certain attitudes or certain thoughts, but rather only for action. If the right for a republic to secede was in the constitution, then a person had the right to talk about secession. If these reforms were implemented and strictly followed by the party and the government, it would mean having a government with more limited power, but it would have a greater legitimacy with the people (Thornburgh, 1990).

As has been seen so far, Gorbachev was more worried about economic reform and political reform (in so far as the existing political structure was hampering economic reform) than reform having directly to do with the interests of the republics and the various burgeoning nationalist movements. Only when these movements began to gain momentum did Gorbachev find himself making certain concessions with respect to the national question. This type of strategy characterized Gorbachev's policy-making in this area, it was entirely reactive, and not proactive. Viktor Sheinis, a Soviet doctor

of economic science, analyzed the strategy in this way:

> The events in Karabakh signified the deepest
> political crisis in the course of perestroika, from
> which it is necessary to draw lessons.... The most
> obvious of these lessons is that any situation is
> easier to take under control before it
> deteriorates. In the meantime, there was revealed
> in nationality policy, and not for the first time,
> an inability to notice in time the growth of a
> crisis situation. The conviction that as long as we
> have not recognized it, the thing does not exist
> fully corresponds to the stereotypes of the
> previous political thinking and behaviour, but it
> is inexplicable in conditions of the dismissal of
> dogmas. It is still more difficult to explain the
> inactivity of the centre and locally once the
> conflict already was out in the open. The
> expectations that everything would take care of
> itself, that the pressure would ease when fatigue
> took its course, resulted in a loss, not a gain, of
> time (Melville and Lapidus, 1990, 235).

As time would go on, Gorbachev would find himself in this position over and over again. By the time he would react to one situation, it would already have progressed to the next stage, making his original reaction obsolete.

In certain respects Gorbachev, even before the beginning of the turbulence with the various nationalities, was moving towards a more decentralized system. As mentioned, local firms and enterprises would be self-managing and self-financing. Furthermore, Gorbachev criticized the gradually decreasing role of the soviets in the country. Originally, the soviets were to express and protect working people's interests. Eventually though, management of economic enterprises ignored the demands of the soviets and followed the agenda given to them by Moscow. Moreover, party agencies began to take over the role of the soviets. Gorbachev thus called for "the need

to restore completely the role of the soviets or bodies of political power as the foundation of socialist democracy (Gorbachev, 1988, 98). This strategy, although it ostensibly decentralized power somewhat, and gave more power to the periphery, was devised more for overall economic reform than for the benefit of the republics.

However, as noted, glasnost' soon moved from the realm of exposing corrupt bureaucrats and lazy workers. It now began to extend to nationality issues, issues that would have brought prison sentences only a few years before to those people openly discussing them. These nationality questions were not only brought forth by the Baltic republics (which forcibly became a part of the Soviet Union in 1940 and still had very distinct national identities), and central Asian republics (consisting of peoples of a very different ethnic and religious background than Russia), but also by republics which had previously been dismissed as not having a distinct ethnic identity, such as Byelorussia. Even that republic began to express concern over the loss of its language and culture, and demanded a change in policy (Motyl, 1989).

Of the thousands of unofficial groups that emerged, a large number had specifically nationalist interests. Some represented extremist fringes (for example the ultranationalist organization Pamiat'), while other groups aimed for the greater protection of the national cultures and language (such as the Tuteishyia group in Byelorussia)

(Beissinger and Hajda, 1990). However, among the most important groups to emerge were nationalist movements, such as Sajudis in Lithuania, and Rukh in Ukraine. These movements started out with small numbers of intellectuals taking advantage of glasnost' and perestroika and getting certain nationalist concerns out in the open, but soon attracted thousands and thousands of followers, including a significant percentage of Communists, to their ranks. As these movements grew in number, a high degree of political participation began to develop, as leaders of the movements used mass demonstrations involving, at times, hundreds of thousands of people, to show the state apparatus how many people were unhappy with past and present policies of the Soviet state. As the media became more open, large-scale demonstrations were shown nation-wide, and were thus seen by other groups, giving them incentives and ideas for showing their concerns. For example, demonstrations by Crimean Tatars and Jews in 1987 gave rise to a major outbreak of nationalist demonstrations throughout the Baltics, and later in Ukraine as well. This type of participation was seen as antithetical to the process of assimilation:

> An ethnic group that is politically passive and
> whose members do not participate in political life
> may more easily be assimilated or... incorporated
> into political life than an ethnic group that is
> already self-conscious of its own identity and is
> already politically organized to deal with the
> political system in which it lives.... [W]here
> ethnic minorities are already self-conscious
> participants in the political system, then the
> option of assimilation as a means of building

national sentiment is generally not feasible (Ibid., 135).

It thus came about that glasnost' was more of an instrument for awakening nationalist sentiment rather than an instrument for accelerating economic reform.

Utilizing the theoretical background concerning the evolution of interest groups and social movements from chapter one, it can be seen that these groups moved through the various stages of development relatively quickly. For example, in Lithuania, (as in other republics), at the beginning of Gorbachev's tenure, most nationalist concern was at the latent interest stage, with individuals and small groups having similar interests, but not acting together. With the advent of glasnost', there was a heightened awareness of common interests in Lithuania with respect to nationality issues. On May 23, 1988, the final stage was attained when the group Sajudis (Lithuania's Perestroika Movement) was officially formed, a group that was ready for collective action, and that would eventually lead a nationalist movement in that republic. Sajudis was an example (at that time) of a public interest organization, where the group was acting not only on behalf of its members, but in the interests of most of the population of Lithuania. By August 23 of that year, this group was able to organize demonstrations of a quarter million people to show support for one of the major tenets of Sajudis, that of republican sovereignty (Vardys, 1991). Similarly, some of the nationalist groups in Estonia began working together, and on

April 1-2, 1988, a plenum of Estonian Creative Societies passed a resolution aiming for greater changes in the republic and in the republic's relationship with Moscow, changes that would lead to real economic and political autonomy. Within a couple of weeks, a popular front was organized to press for these changes, within the framework of perestroika (Missiunas, 1990).

Groups campaigning for greater republican rights all over the Soviet Union began to coordinate activities and policies. On June 11 and 12, 1988, leaders from national rights groups from Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine met in Lviv and established a Coordinating Committee of the Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the Soviet Union. While many of the leaders involved in the meetings were advocates of independence for their respective republics, the final programmatic policies adopted fell into the framework of perestroika and democratization, and called for the "complete political and economic decentralization of the Soviet Union", and the transformation of the USSR into "a confederation of separate sovereign states (Nahaylo, 1991)."

The formation and increasing popularity of the nationalist groups and movements were becoming an increasing concern for Gorbachev, but there were two main reasons why he did not move to quash these groups. First, given the fact that Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership felt that Soviet resources and attention should be concentrated on domestic

restructuring, the USSR made many concessions in the foreign policy arena: ending the military intervention in Afghanistan, negotiating significant arms reduction treaties, assisting in the settlement of regional conflicts (Namibia, Cambodia), and especially not intervening in Eastern Europe when the reigning Communist reegimes fell, and the two Germanies were reunited (Dallin and Lapidus, 1991). This type of restraint and statesmanship earned the Soviet Union a great deal of respect abroad, and helped open the way for western investment and aid for the restructuring process. This goodwill may have been jeopardized with a move backwards into Brezhnev type policies of nationalist repression.

Second, most of these groups were formed through his own policy of glasnost' and many of these groups were using his own slogan of perestroika in their names. Gorbachev still had hopes of getting these groups to help him fight his battles for economic and political reform (as these groups were not asking for independence from the USSR, but were asking for more control over economic and political affairs), and besides, getting rid of groups that were ostensibly supporting some of your policies would have meant that those policies were a total failure. Gorbachev's call for a reexamination of the USSR's history, and in particular, those of predecessors such as Brezhnev and Stalin, had particular repercussions in the Baltics, as nationalist leaders began calling the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 (in which the Soviets and Nazis

partitioned the Baltics) illegal, meaning that the Soviet Union had brought the Baltic countries into the union illegally. These types of issues made Gorbachev's position difficult, as in many ways, he had started the processes that brought these issues to light.

As has been noted, Gorbachev's speech to the 19th Party Congress seemed quite sympathetic to the republics and to the nationalist movements. However, part of the political reform proposed by the conference seemed to have the opposite effect on the republics than was desired. One of the reforms included a redistribution of representation of the republics in a newly constituted legislative assembly called the Congress of People's Deputies. The proposed constitutional revisions further accelerated nationalist demands, as not only the Baltics, but other republics loudly criticized the amendments as they amounted to "a virtual denial... of sovereignty for the various republics not as national states but as merely administrative units (Gleason, 1990, 122)." The Georgian Supreme Soviet sent a report stating that they opposed the proposed amendments because they infringed on republic sovereignty and also constituted a threat of permanent martial law. Moreover, under this martial law, local authorities would not be allowed to participate in governing (Germroth, 1989). As well, Gorbachev did not agree with the proposals for total economic autonomy (Vardys, 1991).

These nationalist movements eventually forced leadership

changes in the local Communist parties of the Baltic republics, and the new leaders, in order to keep some semblance of popular support, took on a more nationalist bent as well (Missiunas, 1990). In fact, on Nov. 17, 1988, the Estonian Supreme Soviet made a declaration of "republican sovereignty" and placed the republic's legislation above all-Union laws and the all-Union Supreme Soviet (Vardys, 1991). Before Lithuania could follow suit, Party First Secretary Brazauskas was called into Moscow, and on Nov. 18, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet refused to pass similar declarations. This led to a new development in the evolution of these nationalist groups. Sajudis representatives were incensed with this decision, and on Nov. 20, declared that "Lithuania's will is its highest law ...only those laws will be respected in Lithuania that do not restrict Lithuania's independence (Ibid., 17)." Sajudis was now no longer a public interest organization, trying to influence policy. It was now transformed into a political party seeking power, and stood in clear opposition to the Communist Party in the forthcoming elections to the Congress of People's Deputies.

As other nationalist public interest organizations in other republics transformed themselves into parties, and as polls showed, these new parties had a much higher popularity than did the local Communist Parties, following a meeting in Moscow on May 11, 1989 of the three Baltic leaders and the Politburo, the First Secretaries explained how important it

was that certain changes had to be made in order for the local parties to retain some degree of legitimacy. Some of the concessions made to the Baltic republics included the Communist Party of Estonia legalizing the Estonian national flag and confirming that economic autonomy would begin in Estonia in 1989, cutting off the republic's links with the relevant ministries in Moscow, thus allowing Estonia to establish a market oriented economy (Germroth, 1989). Similarly in Latvia, concessions were made promising economic autonomy for that republic, as well as promising to allow amendments to the Latvian constitution with respect to the Latvian language, citizenship and culture (Ibid.). Lithuania also passed similar language laws in 1988. In May of 1989, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared that all laws passed by the all-Union Supreme Soviet were only valid if approved by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. As well, the revised constitution provided for Lithuanian citizenship, and a law on economic self-management was also issued. Finally a declaration of republican sovereignty was also passed (Vardys, 1991). This all represented a great victory for Sajudis, the public interest organization, for these were the exact declarations that they were seeking six months before. This showed the great influence the group had, and also showed the legitimacy they had in the eyes of the general population.

At first the Soviet government reacted very strongly against some of these concessions. A week after Estonia made

their declaration of republican sovereignty, the Soviet government formally invalidated several articles of the Estonian constitution, arguing that they "...ran counter to the supreme national law. The amendment passed by Estonia contained a number of provisions that ran counter to the norms of Soviet law on which the constitution of the USSR is based. Therefore, according to the national constitution of the USSR, national law overrides that of the republics (Germroth, 1989, 152)." The USSR's Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies also overrode the Lithuanian laws on sovereignty, citizenship, and military conscription for the same reasons as they had overridden Estonia's declarations previously (Olcott, 1990). However Gorbachev and the Party realized they had to listen to the nationalist concerns of the Baltic and other republics, because in the March 1989 elections, Baltic nationalities won strong pluralities and went to the Congress of People's Deputies to wage the republics' battle versus the centre (Gleason, 1990). For example, Sajudis won 36 of 42 seats in Lithuania, and had an approval rating 46 percentage points higher than the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Gorbachev thus again began to reformulate his nationalities policy. Although he remained steadfast about overriding republic law with all-union law, Gorbachev increasingly admitted the weaknesses of the old nationalities policy, and called for the building of a completely new federation, where a loose federation of republics would be

created, republics that were on an equal footing, and republics that would have more power over self-determination (Kux, 1990). The CPSU Nationalities Platform, held late in 1989, admitted that the republics' sovereignty was in reality only "legally formal." Gorbachev also went so far as to concede that "up to now our state existed as a centralised and unitary state and none of us has yet had the experience of living in a federation (Ibid., 2)." Moreover, the political and economic realities "violate the constitutional provisions of the Soviet federation both in letter and spirit" with the result that "the very idea of federation has been seriously compromised (Ibid.)."

Despite these types of pronouncements, however, Gorbachev and other Party leaders did not take a firm stand on the national question. There was no timetable set on drafting a new constitution, no mandate was given, and Soviet leaders stressed that the road to reform should not be too hasty (Ibid.). Although events with respect to the nationalities may already have been moving too quickly for any leader to have been able to deal with effectively, by not taking a proactive stance and not taking any strong direct action in support of the republics, Gorbachev may have lost his last chance at defusing (however temporarily) the situation with respect to the nationality question. Instead, events continued to speed along, dictating the need for specific measures to be taken with respect to the state-republic relationship, and Gorbachev

found himself offering concessions that were probably two or three years too late in coming. As well, local Communist Parties found themselves having to take strong measures to try and retain power.

On Dec. 20, 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party voted to break away from the Soviet Communist Party (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Moreover, in early 1990, Sajudis won 75% of the seats in the new Lithuanian legislature. Soon after, Lithuanian and Estonian parliaments began to call for their republics' full independence rather than full sovereignty. As well, great national unrest in Central Asia in such cities as Baku, Tblisi and Samarkand meant that the Red Army had to move in and take control (Kux, 1990). In Baku, 20,000 troops were sent in to crush the Azerbaijani Popular Front's attempt at seizing power. At least 150 people were killed (The Economist, Sept. 29, 1990). Nationalist public interest organizations all over the Soviet Union moved away from support for perestroika and republican rights, and transformed themselves into parties, ready to field candidates, and began to campaign for outright independence. For example, in the fall of 1990, Rukh, the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perebudova (perestroika) declared that the ultimate goal of the movement was no longer perestroika, but "renewal of independent statehood for Ukraine." As well, the phrase 'for perebudova' was dropped from the name of the organization (Hadzewycz, Nov.4, 1990).

Gorbachev's initial reaction to these developments was

one of great anger. Late in 1989, Gorbachev castigated nationalists and separatists in the republics and declared that, "The ideas of national separatism were always alien to the spirit of socialist internationalism which is the core of the foundation of the Soviet multi-national state (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, 346)." However, Gorbachev also continued to try to appease the republics. The major concession had to do with taking away the guarantee that the Communist Party would play the leading role in society (Article 6). Gorbachev stated that the monopoly on power had to be given up and the CPSU would have to compete directly with other political groups for the right to govern (Sallot, 1990a). This was a further victory for nationalist organizations as they had previously been calling for the removal of Article 6.

Furthermore, a law on secession was adopted in April 1990. This was seen as a crucial step by the government because, even as previous constitutions declared that secession was a right for every republic, there was no mechanism for secession. By adopting this law, the party saw itself as legitimizing the right to self-determination and secession. The law declared that if a republic wished to secede, it had to hold a referendum on the issue. This decision to secede would be considered by the union if approved by at least two-thirds of those citizens entitled to vote. As well, the law specified how Union-republic negotiations would transpire in a transition period if the

referendum passed (<u>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</u> (CDSP),
May 16, 1990).

To further legitimize the Soviet constitution and Soviet
laws, a Constitutional Review Committee was established late
in 1989. The Review Committee would be made up of specialists
in the fields of law and politics, and would consist of 27
members, elected by the Congress of People's Deputies for ten
year terms. The Review Committee would have the authority to
consider questions of conformity to the USSR constitutions of
Soviet laws drafted and adopted by the Congress, and would
also be allowed to review Republic constitutions, to consider
their conformity to the USSR constitution. In disputes between
the republics and the central government, the Review Committee
would have the authority to rule on the constitutionality of
both USSR and republic laws and constitutions (<u>CDSP</u>, Apr.4,
1990).

The independent nature of this Review Committee was
especially stressed. Article 24 stated: "Persons elected to
the USSR Constitutional Review Committee are independent in
the performance of their duties and are subordinate only to
the USSR constitution. They are not to ask for or receive
instructions from any state agencies, public organizations, or
officials (Ibid., 15)." Article 25 stated that: "A person who
is elected to the USSR Constitutional Review Committee cannot
be at the same time a People's Deputy or a member of any
agency the acts of which are reviewable by the Committee

(Ibid., 16)." This legislation thus responded to one of the criticisms of previous constitutions, i.e., that there was no independent organ for adjudicating constitutional disputes between the republics and the Soviet government.

Moreover, legislation was passed in May 1990 where the laws concerning the demarcation of powers of the USSR and the republics were explained. These laws stressed that "each Union republic retains the right of unrestricted secession from the USSR," explicitly listed the jurisdictions of the union, and declared that republics would have all power not assigned to the USSR (CDSP, June 13, 1990, 23). This delineation of powers formed the basis of a new Union Treaty which was unveiled in November 1990. Gorbachev hoped that the republics would freely sign this new treaty, creating a new federation of republics with a much higher degree of legitimacy (i.e., voluntary inclusion of the republics) than the previous one.

The Union Treaty ostensibly dealt with many of the republics' concerns. First of all, it expressly stated that "Each republic that is a party to the Treaty is a sovereign state and possesses full state power on its territory (CDSP, Dec.26, 1990, 14)." Moreover, the republics would be able to independently determine their state structure and systems of administration, and democracy based on popular representation would be recognized. The republics would be considered as owners of the land, and the protection of all forms of property ownership, including that of citizens and their

associations, would be guaranteed (Article 7) (Ibid.).
Finally, the treaty declared that republics would
independently make their budgets and taxing policies (Article
8), and that republic legislation would have supremacy on all
issues, except those issues that fell within the Union's
jurisdiction (Article 9) (Ibid.). It thus seemed that
Gorbachev offered the republics a great deal in return for
their signatures on the Union Treaty. In reality however,
there were numerous concerns with respect to the law on
secession and the Union Treaty, and the Treaty was never
adopted.

In terms of the secession law, first of all, separate
referenda could be held in autonomous regions or minority
enclaves within the republic. The law then stated that
"Peoples of autonomous republics and autonomous formations
shall retain the right to decide independently the question of
staying in the USSR or in the seceding Union republic, as well
as to raise the question of their own legal status (CDSP, May
16, 1990, 20)." Moreover, the results of the referenda on
these rights would be considered separately from the other
results. If the referendum were passed, a five year transition
period with negotiations would take place, and after all that,
the Congress of People's Deputies would still have to ratify
the republic's secession. Therefore, despite having a
mechanism for secession in place, there was still a great deal
of confusion as to what would result even with a successful

referendum. What would happen if an autonomous region in the territory rejected secession? Would this nullify the overall result? What would entail a "concentration of national groups", and what if they rejected secession? The law also stated that if the referendum failed, a new referendum could not be called for another ten years. As well, if the referendum passed, a call by 10% of the population would allow for a new referendum to take place. The seceding republic would also have to pay for the resettlement of any person wishing to remain in the USSR (Ibid.).

Another problem many republics would have is that non-nationals make up a significant portion of most of the republics' populations, and these citizens would tend to vote more for staying in the Union (although, in the 1991 referendum on independence in Ukraine, a majority of non-Ukrainians voted for independence). For many republics then, two-thirds of a vote might be too high. This might not be as great a problem in a republic such as Lithuania, where 20% of the population are not ethnic Lithuanians. But in other republics, the native ethnic group makes up a much smaller proportion of the population. Estonians, for example, make up 61% of the population of that republic, Moldavians make up 64% of their republic, while Latvians make up only 52% of their republic's population (Olcott, 1990).

The draft of the new Union Treaty, while seemingly providing major concessions to the republics, was also full of

caveats that would have the potential of limiting republic sovereignty. Many of these caveats appeared in Article 5 of the treaty, where the powers of the Union were discussed. Section 2 of this article was particularly ambiguous. This section gave the USSR the powers of: "protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union; fixing and guarding the USSR state border; [and] ensuring the state security of the USSR (CDSP, Dec.26, 1990, 15)." This provision seemed to give wide-ranging powers to the union, and a republic seceding from the union could very well be seen as falling under the "state security" provision of the law, thus allowing the union to prevent secession if it saw fit to do so. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 further supported this ambiguity, stating that "USSR laws adopted with respect to questions within Union jurisdiction have supremacy and are binding on the territory of all republics (Ibid., 16)." Again, in conjunction with Article 5, the Union would seem to have the authority to override a wide array of republic legislation, including the right to secede.

There were also a variety of obstacles to meaningful economic autonomy for the republics. The central ministries still controlled much of the economy in the Baltics, especially in the enterprises that had "all-Union significance," including power plants, railways, shipping lines, and other important industries. Other examples of central interference included the Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet instructing the Baltic republics to adjust their budgetary and pricing measures according to all-Union legislation (Kux, 1990). As well, the Baltic republics were to be allowed to set up their own banking and credit systems, but the Central State Bank seized all savings deposits in the Baltics to prevent the republics from using that money to establish their own currency (Ibid.). Moreover, some republics have benefitted over others because of the pricing mechanisms and absence of a real market system. As a result, some of the regions of the country richest in resources, had to sell off these resources at prices well below market value, and ofttimes these regions were built up without thinking of the environmental consequences. Many of these regions ended up suffering and facing ecological disaster (Ibid.). The two tier system of Parliament was also criticized as weakening the principle of equal representation of republics and watering down the idea of a union of sovereign member states. A Soviet law professor concluded: "The Supreme Soviet is not in fact a parliament, but rather a grand committee of the Congress [of People's Deputies].... First, it does not possess sovereign legislative power, for all its decisions can be rescinded by the Congress. Second, it is not directly elected by the people (Ibid., 15)."

Over and above the problems of economic autonomy and possible interpretations of the law of secession and the draft of the Union Treaty, was the idea that the laws and treaties

did not even apply to many of the republics because those republics had been annexed illegally by the Soviet Union, meaning the republics did not belong to the Union. For example, the Baltic republics declared that Soviet laws had no effect on them, and that Baltic delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies would not participate in preparing any internal legislation of the USSR, but would attend only as observers (Ibid.). The law on secession would therefore not apply, and the republics would therefore not follow the procedures of this law, but follow their own processes. This was the justification for six republics boycotting the national referendum on unity that was held Mar. 17, 1991.

It must also be stressed that despite the adoption of these laws, the drafting of the union treaty and developing a mechanism for secession, Gorbachev continually declared his desire to keep the country unified. In March of 1990, Gorbachev stated, "Over the decades the interests of the republics and the people have become so entangled that if we now started to divide the entire country, this would lead to trouble.... That simply cannot be allowed to happen (Fisher, Feb. 9, 1991, D6)."

Moreover, in creating the position of executive president for himself, Gorbachev would have the right to introduce legislation and veto bills, and would also have the right to unilaterally declare a state of emergency in any republic and then take over local administration of the republic. If the

republic would not consent to this, a two-thirds majority vote in the Supreme Soviet would allow the President to declare a state of emergency (Sallot, 1990b). This position of president, as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, placed him above the Party, since the Supreme Soviet had assumed some of the functions previously performed by the Party (as a result of some of his reforms), and there was no longer a preponderance of members of the CPSU Central Committee in the Supreme Soviet. In fact, when the Supreme Soviet was elected in May 1989, only three members of the Politburo and Secretariat succeeded in winning seats. Gorbachev thus headed both the Party and the state, meaning if the Party were to lose its influence, Gorbachev would still have the powerful position of the presidency to rely upon (Teague, 1990).

On the surface then, Gorbachev appeared to be making very significant concessions to the republics, including the concessions of republican sovereignty and economic autonomy. But one also had to consider Gorbachev's statements about keeping the country unified, the various military actions and economic blockades that Gorbachev used (for example, the economic blockade against Lithuania after their declaration of independence in 1991, and the subsequent storming of a TV tower in Vilnius causing numerous civilian deaths) against the republics that went too far in his view. One also had to consider the various contradictions in legislation concerning republic-state relations, and the new powers of executive

presidency. The republics thus did not sign the Union Treaty, and in fact events continued to move along to the point that the Baltic republics were internationally recognized as independent states, and the USSR eventually disintegrated, with the individual republics gaining independence. Some of these republics then joined together in a very loose federation known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. To offer more clues as to why the national movements moved so quickly and fervently towards independence, it is again time to look at the western literature concerning the evolution of social movements.

Social Movements Compared

According to the resource mobilization approach, there are three key elements that have already been referred to when discussing the evolution of these nationalist movements in earlier eras. The first element had to do with costs and benefits of organization. This was discussed earlier with respect to negative sanctions by the state against those who participated in nationalist dissent. Under Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost', not only were these nationalist groups not punished, but they were encouraged (at the beginning) by Gorbachev. Therefore the positive sanctions that people received for supporting dissent, which in other words can be the internal benefits the individual received for supporting one's own language and culture, outweighed any

negative sanctions that may have existed, and meant the movements of Gorbachev's era had a great potential for popular involvement.

The second element was that of degree of organization. These nationalist movements were first organized by public interest groups. Sajudis was typical in their organization of the popular fronts. This group used mass meetings, demonstrations, and public events to mobilize support and establish a base from which to develop (Vardys, 1991). The public meetings became places where the anger against decades of Soviet rule was finally allowed to be expressed. Eventually these organizations were able to head enormously popular movements, and were granted legitimacy by the various nationalities, taking away legitimacy from the local Communist Parties. Also contributing to this high level of organization was a very strong leadership at the helms of these movements. Many of these leaders had an instant respect from the general population as they had paid their dues during previous regimes, many of them having been political prisoners jailed for their nationalist views during the Brezhnev era. Not only were these leaders granted an instant respect and legitimacy as leaders, they were also living symbols of previous of what Soviet policy did to the minorities of the country.

The third element referred to expectations of success. This element can be thought of in two ways. First of all, people who participated in these movements, after listening to

Gorbachev speak about perestroika and glasnost', may have felt that the chances of getting changes made in their republics, especially with respect to a certain amount of cultural and political autonomy, were much greater than they had ever been since Lenin's time. This would have encouraged greater participation. However, once these expectations were not met, and once Gorbachev showed that he was not clearly supporting republican rights, the demands may have begun to change to getting out of the union altogether in order to get these demands met. And once Gorbachev offered the republics the concessions they had originally sought, this may have further raised the expectations of participants in these movements, to the point where independence was the ultimate goal. Overall then, all the elements of resource mobilization theory are helpful in describing the evolution of the nationalist movements throughout the time frame of the existence of the Soviet Union.

However, the new social movements approach also offers some insights into the development of the nationalist movements of the last decade. The social movements approach stressed that the new movements differed from the old in terms of values, action forms and constituency. When referring to the western literature, the values referred to are the traditional values of a western society. However, in this case, it is clear that the Communist model under which these republics existed was coming under intense scrutiny. Some of

the Soviet policies of the past that caused dissent to develop have been discussed here. Even considering the weaknesses of some of Gorbachev's concessions, could government proposals have been interpreted as moving into different directions from the policies of previous leaders enough so that he would have been given more of a chance? The answer is obviously no. Although it is difficult to pinpoint precisely why, there are several hypotheses that could be offered. First of all, the various movements may have felt that, considering the success that Eastern European nations had in getting out from the Soviet grasp, a unique opportunity in history was presenting itself, and it had to be followed to its ultimate conclusion.

Second, and related to the question of values, is that despite the concessions, Gorbachev still represented the Communist Party, and still called on Leninist principles to be followed in making changes to the Soviet Union. In fact Gorbachev and Lenin both developed their theoretical perspectives on the nationalities question in a similar fashion. Lenin, in the first stages of his thinking, almost totally disregarded nationalities, as he focused on an international proletarian revolution, where class consciousness would predominate, not national consciousness. However Lenin began to realize the strategic importance of nationalism and national movements. By aligning his party with national movements, he would be able to gain widespread support, especially among non-Russian peoples, to gain power.

Once in control, this type of support, in theory, would also allow the Communist Party to maintain its support among the non-Russian republics. Gorbachev also placed little emphasis on the national question early in his tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU. Only when his policy of glasnost' began to be implemented, leading to the development of strong national movements in all the republics, did Gorbachev realize the importance of nationalism in the Soviet Union. At first Gorbachev was able to align himself and his policy of perestroika with these groups, hoping to legitimize the party's leading role in the country and hoping to accelerate economic reform. However, Gorbachev's pace of reform slowed, while the demands of the republics stepped up, leaving the two in a confrontational position, rather than a conspiratorial one. Lenin and Gorbachev had similarities in confronting the republics as well. They were both willing to give the republics some degree of cultural and economic autonomy, and both were afraid of too much party bureaucracy, and too much power in the centre. It is quite clear that both Lenin and Gorbachev supported a nation's right to self-determination and secession only in so far as it allowed the party to gain favour in the republics. But neither leader gave any indication that they would ever allow the Soviet Union to break apart, despite granting the republics the right to secede. They made several statements to this effect, and Lenin sent in armies into republics where the Bolsheviks had very

little popular support, while Gorbachev sent in the army to the Baltics and to Central Asia to keep control, again even when the popularity of the Communist Party was negligible. Both leaders would tolerate a certain decentralization and economic and cultural autonomy, but only within the federation.

Therefore even though Gorbachev did indeed instill many positive reforms in the Soviet political system , reforms that would benefit the republics, ultimately, he was still seen as offering the same package that had been offered previously, and that the wrapping to this package (i.e., the Communist Party and the USSR framework) was still the same as well. The fourth phase of development in the dissident movement in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era as described by Tokes was that of retrenchment-ideological polarization. A major element of this ideological polarization was the giving up on the idea that Communism and socialism could work. It should be remembered that many of the dissidents of the sixties wrote that changes had to be made with respect to nationalities, but these were changes within the federation and within the Communist system. Also, the first stage of the nationalist movements under Gorbachev supported major changes to the federation within Gorbachev's policy of perestroika, but when reforms did not come quickly enough, then the movements began to demand wholesale changes, including independence, a wholesale dismembering of the Communist system, and a move towards a

free-market oriented economic system.

This last aspect is ironic as the new social movements in the west moved away from capitalism, while these movements fought to move closer to capitalism. However, considering the fact that Soviets discovered under glasnost', that after decades of Communism, the standard of living in the Soviet Union was so much lower than in Western Europe, and even Eastern Europe (this was especially difficult to take as Soviet governments previously had told them how much better off they were than were their neighbours), and that the economic situation was worsening under Gorbachev, not getting better, then this was no real surprise that the new movements focused on capitalism to cure their economic woes, not some other form of socialism.

However, one aspect of the nationalist movements that had its counterpart in the new social movements in the west was that of concern for the environment, particularly, that the centre was showing little regard for the ecological repercussions of their policies on the republics in which these policies were taking place. For example, one of the first reasons that Sajudis was spurred into existence was that Moscow had made a decision to expand Lithuania's chemical industry, ignoring the Lithuanian government's declaration forbidding further expansion of this industry due to the terrible pollution that already existed in the cities (Vardys, 1991). The most important example of this concern was probably

in Ukraine, following the disaster of the Chernobyl nuclear plant in 1987. First of all, there was great anger at the Soviet government for not informing people in the immediate areas of the great danger that existed because of the accident, and being more concerned about the government image than the well-being of its citizens. But in terms of the whole Union, this accident also brought into question the whole issue of "guaranteed safety" with respect to the nuclear program that the Soviet government had been espousing the previous decade, as it had already been proven erroneous once (Marples, 1988). This accident brought together members of the Ukrainian scientific and literary community, and provided a powerful reason why Ukraine had to become sovereign and make its own decisions, not Moscow. Environmental concern was to become a major component of the Rukh platform.

The second aspect of the social movement approach focused on the action forms taken by these new movements as being unconventional in nature, while the third aspect focused on the constituency of the movements as being made up of the marginalized class and the new middle class. More research with a greater analysis of individual movements needs to be done with respect to these two aspects before a proper comparison can be made. With respect to the action forms, the nationalist movements certainly did not show an antagonism towards politics, as many (if not most) of the major public interest organizations that were leading the movements became

political parties, seeking power. Considering the only alternative available to voters was the Communist Party, this attraction to form parties and actively seek power is not surprising. However, some of the tactics used by these movements to generate support and publicity were certainly unique, such as the organization of the human chain linking Lviv and Kiev to commemorate the anniversary of Ukrainian independence in January 1991. In terms of the constituency, the various republican nationalities can definitely be considered as a marginalized class, although not in the same way perhaps as the western literature thought of as marginalized. But they were definitely marginalized to the extent that all decisions pertaining to virtually all aspects of their lives were made outside their republic. It would however, be interesting to see whether all walks of life (e.g. intelligentsia vs. labour, men vs. women) were involved in these movements and to what extent. Overall, both the social movements of the west and the Soviet nationalist movements were characterized by the search for a new identity in their society. In the Soviet case, this meant discarding the identity as a Soviet, and finding one's own ethnic identity.

The social construction approach also offers some clues as to the development of these national movements. For example, the first idea behind this approach was that what determines the individual's behaviour is not reality per se but reality as the individual perceives it. In the case of

these movements, individuals may have perceived that the Communist Party and being in the Soviet Union was responsible for all the ills plaguing society, economic, environmental cultural, etc. Whether or not this was the objective reality is impossible to know, but this may have been the perceived reality for many of the people who got involved and supported the movements that would rid them of Communism and the Soviet system.

The second idea was that social movement organizations themselves play an important role in generating and diffusing meanings and interpretations. Why is it that when concessions were given that had been asked for by the movements previously, the movements asked for more? One reason is that the leaders organizing the public interest organization that led the movements may have decided that the goals had changed or that the concessions were given with conditions. The organization can often decide where and when and what type of manifestation of dissent will take place, and how the movement will react to certain situations, and whether concessions offered are positive or negative. As Klandermans stated, the individual's perception of grievances, political opportunities and potential outcomes can all be influenced by the social movement organizations, and there is certainly evidence of this in the nationalist movements. Thus, all three approaches referred to in the western literature are very much applicable to the study of the nationalist movements in the Soviet

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system, although the Soviet movements may have the occasional twist that differs from the western social movement.

Interest Groups in the Contemporary Soviet Union

The final section of Chapter One referred to the proliferation of interest groups in the United States and Canada, and about the role that interest groups have come to play in the policy process. Is the proliferation of interest groups now going to take place in the ex-USSR and are they going to play an important role in the policy process?

First of all, as Skilling and Griffiths noted in their 1971 volume, even when the Communist Party made all the decisions in the country, there were various interests that had differing views on what types of policies should be implemented, and the same is still true today. Elements such as the bureaucracy, the military, conservatives, etc. all have certain interests, but these blocs are not yet represented by formal associations or groups as such. As the former Soviet Union moves towards a market economy, private businesses may begin to coalesce and form associations that may try to influence government policy. While policy may be influenced informally, it is still to early for these types of associations to have developed to the extent they have in the west. The interests of private businesses would still be considered at the latent interest stage of development. Labour has made some headway as various segments of the work force

(such as coal miners) have used the weapon of a strike to influence decision-making by the government. It may take some time for trade unions to become true representatives of their workers, rather than instruments of the Party as they were before, but these organizations can probably be considered as being at the solidary group level or slightly higher.

But the most important interest groups were the public interest organizations that led and organized the national movements in the republics. These public interest organizations organized and led the burgeoning nationalist movements, providing new idenities (those of that particular ethnic group) to its followers. They also helped create certain expectations (as Gorbachev also did), with respect to such things as improvement in the economy, better relations between the centre and the periphery, within the general populace. These groups gained such legitimacy, and filled such a political void that they were often able to transform themselves into political parties that were able to gain office. As stated earlier, Gorbachev himself allowed for the development and growth of these organizations and movements to take place, and actually encouraged it to gain support for his policies and for himself. But events, and heightened expectations for success, overtook Gorbachev, and he found himself constantly changing policy to try and appease the nationalist groups, and at other times he would go against the nationalist groups to appease other interests such as the

military or the conservatives.

In Canada, the role of public interest organizations in the policy process seems to have grown since the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This can be seen even today as the government consults various organizations in its process of constitutional reform. Again, it is a case of the government seeking the approval of these groups to legitimize and gain support for its policies.

One major difference is that, due to the political vacuum in the Soviet system, many of these public interest organizations were transformed into political parties, to run against the local Communist Parties and offer alternatives. This is not as common in the west, although various protest parties have been formed that stemmed from certain movements (e.g. the Greens in Germany from the environmental movement). This does bring up however, one other interesting point of comparison. In Chapter One, from the American perspective, interest groups were seen as having more legitimacy and were seen as better representing people's political needs than were political parties. The same trend (for differing reasons) also existed in the Soviet Union, as support for these public interest organizations was so high, and these groups were so obviously seen as the legitimate representatives of the majority of people, that they went on to become political parties that were often able to obtain power. However, most of the time the public interest organizations will try to

influence changes within the system, and not try to seek power to make the changes themselves.

Thus, it is probably too early in the evolution of the entity that was once the Soviet Union to make a very useful comparison of the role of interest groups in the two systems. The interest group system as it exists in the west has not (and it remains to be seen whether it will) yet developed, and more research and time to study the effects of a market economy on this aspect of the political system will be needed. However, there are interesting similarities and interesting comparisons to be made. As well, it will be interesting to see how interest groups and interests (including the interests of smaller nationalities within the republics) affect the policy making of the republican governments.

nationalist dissent moved from the latent interest stage to the solidary group stage to the public interest organization stage, then how these public interest groups helped organize and promote the nationalist movements, and finally how these organizations moved from being interest groups to being political parties. By the time of the coup attempt and the disintegration of the USSR, this transformation was, for the most part complete, meaning the details of these events, while crucial to the eventual outcome of the situation, were not critical to the study.

There are many aspects that have been touched on in this paper, but are deserving of more research. For example, a fuller updating of Skilling and Griffiths' volume would be fascinating, to see how the various elements that they referred to have continued (or have been unable to continue) to influence decision-making by the government(s). In particular, it would be interesting to do a study on how the bureaucracy has managed to protect its own interests, and hinder the progress of Gorbachev's economic reform, and his policies of glasnost' and perestroika. It will also be interesting to note, as the countries of the former Soviet Union move towards a market economy, how and when interest groups representing businesses (and perhaps other elements of society, such as consumers, women, etc) develop, and whether they will have the same influence on the policy process as they do in the west.

Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare the leadership of the various nationalist groups (i.e., were they members of the intelligentsia, working class, ex-Communists, etc.), as this might help gain some insight as to the differences with respect to nationalism in different regions. Along with a comparison of the leadership, a comparison of and detailed look at the movement membership would also help in understanding the nationalist phenomenon - one would try and note whether there was a rural-urban split, a split along religious lines, a division along regional lines within a republic, or even a split among those who still retain the knowledge of the national language and those who are no longer able to speak the language. A demographic study of this type would provide clues as to the pervasiveness of nationalism, and how widespread the support for the movements really was.

In conclusion however, this paper has shown that the western literature on social movements and interest groups (particularly in the form of public interest organizations) can be used to discuss the evolution of said groups in a different political system. The vital importance of the nationalist public interest organizations in the Soviet Union has been noted. They have played an even greater role in the evolution of the Soviet political system than similar groups have played in the west. By using the idea of a funnel of mobilization with respect to the formation of interest groups, and by utilizing the three sociological approaches to the

formation of social movements, we are better able to understand how and why the national movements in the Soviet Union appeared when they did, why they had not appeared earlier, and how and why the nationalist public interest organizations leading these movements were able to gain the popularity and legitimacy that they did.

What these approaches do not help us understand however, are more basic questions, such as why concepts such as nationalism, or having a particular identity, play such an important role. For example, why has their been such a revitalization of the national language and culture Belarus, a republic that was thought to be the most assimilated? Why do so many people suddenly find this important? It is not enough to say that under Gorbachev, the economy began to stagnate more rather than be revitalized as the restructuring policies promised to do, and therefore people in the non-Russian republics felt that it was in their economic self-interest to support the eventual independence of their republics. This would be a strict rational choice analysis. But it is only a part of the overall equation. The reality is however, that many people hold ideas such as culture and language in very high regard, so high in fact that many would sacrifice their well-being to support these concepts (although most people would have a limit as to how important it was to support these ideas). These types of concepts must be included when dealing with a particular person's decision-making process (such as

whether or not to support a national movement), but are not in a rational choice analysis. However, if these types of variables are included in the particular calculus of the decision-making process, then the whole concept of rational choice is nullified, because the premise upon which rational choice is based, that is, that people will act rationally to better their self-interest, is nullified. Support for a national movement may be rational if one can see a potential benefit coming from that support, i.e., better government and better policies that might help eliminate certain economic hardships. But is support for a national movement for the sake of preserving one's language and culture, or because one now identifies oneself with an ethnic group or gender, particularly rational? One could reply that it is rational as long as it does not physically harm that person, but then the idea of what rationality is is broadened. This would then make rational choice theory much less useful, because it would then say people make decisions based on preferences based on what would be in their self-interest, and based on what they like, or what they feel (and it may be an impulsive feeling at one particular moment).

If one does include all these choices within rational choice, then the theory loses all value as a predictive tool of understanding human decision-making behaviour (such as why people participate in collective action). If these types of non-rational preferences are not included, then we have gone

too far in simplifying the human decision-making process, and have gotten no further in understanding concepts such as nationalism, why such concepts are important in a person's psyche, and how these concepts could affect the decision-making processes. The social construction approach offered by Klandermans, which suggests that it is not reality per se, but perceptions of reality which will affect people's decision-making processes, and that the public interest organizations play an important role in creating this reality, is an interesting step towards understanding the more basic issues mentioned above. The new social movement approach also captures some of this emotive element, as it traces the roots of these movements to structural changes in society. This does not mean that the resource mobilization approach (with its rational choice focus) is without its merits, but rather emphasizes the fact that these approaches are complementary, rather than contradictory.

Overall then, the study of nationalist movements has provided some clues as to the importance of looking at all three approaches to the study of social movements offered in Chapter one. Each approach provides a certain way of looking at how and why social movements form, and by building on all three, one has a more comprehensive outlook on the evolution of nationalist movements, and social movements in general, and a base from which to work in order to gain a better understanding of why people participate in collective

behavior, and perhaps, in some way, even get a grasp on how and why people make the decisions they do, the way rational choice has tried, but failed, to do.

The nationality question in the former Soviet Union has not yet been fully settled. Despite the fact that the republics have become independent states on their own, or are participating in a Commonwealth of Independent States, numerous contentious issues still remain with respect to the relations between these republics, and with respect to new nationality questions in these new entities. For example, there are numerous border issues that are still to be settled. Will Crimea belong to Ukraine, Russia or become independent? Will the Commonwealth of Independent States, considering the present hostilities between Ukraine and Russia, much of which is caused by a historical mistrust of Russia by Ukraine, be able to survive? In terms of new nationality questions, Boris Yeltsin was recently having problems as the Tatars, Adyge, and Bashkirs began to assert sovereignty. In February of 1992, 14 of 20 republics within the RSFSR rejected a draft federal treaty "Agreement on Demarcating Objects of Jurisdiction and Powers Between the Federal Bodies of State Power of the Russian Federation and the Bodies of Power of the Republics, Territories, Provinces, Autonomous Provinces and Autonomous Regions within the Russian Federation (CDSP, Mar.25, 1992, 1). There will also be a need for a reassessment of the Russian relationship with the Moslem world, as Turkey and Iran are

joining in a struggle for influence over the ex-Soviet Moslem states (CDSP, April 8, 1992).

As well, it will be interesting to see how the newly established states will treat their minorities (particularly the Russian minorities) now that they are in the majority. As well, the final fates of the public interest organizations that led the nationalist movements are not yet known. While many groups have transformed themselves into political parties, other organizations, such as Rukh in Ukraine, are split as to whether their role should be to seek power on its own, or support the ex-Communist government as long as that government seems to be sincere about strongly representing Ukraine's interests (Kolomayets, Mar.8, 1992).

Thus the nationality question has been and continues to be of the utmost importance today, not only in the Soviet Union, but in other countries with multi-national constituencies such as Yugoslavia, and even Canada. Violence rages in various areas of the former USSR as national tensions that had lain hidden for decades begin to emerge. Tensions have also increased in territories such as Moldova, which was forcibly annexed to the Soviet Union by Stalin, where some factions wish to rejoin Romania, while others wish to keep the Moldovan state intact. If the new republics are to experience some form of stability in the future, it is apparent that, not only must they hope for success in terms of economic reforms, but they must work at solving their own particular national

questions now, before unrest in the minorities has a chance to develop, fester, and perhaps ultimately tear apart the states that people worked so hard to establish.

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