

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LANGUAGE POLICY IN MANITOBA :

THE GENESIS OF BILL 113

by

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## Chapter 1

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

#### Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to describe and analyse, as a process in public policy formation, the development of Bill 113 which was passed by the Manitoba Legislature in 1970. Broadly speaking, the bill granted to Manitobans in general, and to the French minority in particular, the legal right to employ French as a language of instruction in the public schools of the province. The language policy formulated in 1970 presented a significant departure from the arrangements prior to that time.

#### Main Research Questions

The study focussed on the following questions :

- (a) Who were the principal actors involved in the development of Bill 113 ?
- (b) What were the roles of these principal actors in the development of Bill 113 ?
- (c) When did the process which led to Bill 113 begin ?
- (d) Where did the original demand for the policy emanate from ? (Demand is taken to mean a claim made upon public officials by other actors, private or official, in the political system for action or inaction on some perceived problem). What were the pressures which brought the demand to the government's agenda ?

(e) Why did this demand lead to the development of Bill 113 ? Were the timing and the political climate such that the government could overtly support such a policy ?

(f) How was the policy development process conducted ?

### Background to the Study

Through legislation brought about by the Norris government in 1916, French, as a language of instruction, suffered a major setback at least as perceived by the French community in Manitoba. This development has been attributed by some historians (Morton, 1957; Leblanc, 1968), to be a direct consequence of a campaign by the Free Press under the editorship of J.W. Dafoe. Prior to 1916, the Free Press (Morton, 1957:351) had uncovered that the teaching of English within the bilingual school system was not being observed. It should be recalled that the bilingual school system had been the result of the Laurier-Greenway Compromise which had settled the infamous Manitoba School Question in 1897.

In its editorials, the Manitoba Free Press had focused on the linguistic chaos which prevailed in the schools of the province (Morton, 1957:351). There was a fear that this condition, if allowed to continue, would balkanize Manitoba. Consequently, the law of 1916 led to the abolition of the bilingual school system.

From 1916 to 1967, a number of extra-legal concessions were made to the French minority. The Department of Education through its publication, the Manitoba School Journal, of November 1947, officially recognized Français (French Language Option) for grade seven and grade eight. In May 1955, the Manitoba School Journal advised that official recognition of the French Language Option was given for grades four to

six. In September 1963, the teaching of the French Language Option could be initiated at the grade one level. It should be noted that the Thornton Law of 1916, which led to the abrogation of the bilingual school system, had not affected the teaching of "Français" in the secondary grades since few students attained that level. In all instances, however, these concessions amounted to the recognition of French as a subject of instruction and were never included in a legal framework and consequently were not part of the Manitoba Public Schools Act. It was, so to speak, an "entente cordiale" between "l'Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba", and officials of the Department of Education.

Perhaps of greatest significance, to most members of the French community, was the unanimous passage of Bill 59 by the Roblin government in April 1967. The bill reinstated French as an official language of instruction. The stipulations were such, however, that French as a language of instruction could only be used for 50 per cent of the instructional time.

Bill 59 (Appendix A) set the stage for a more flexible law. In the ensuing three years Bill 113 (Appendix B) was developed and in July 1970 the Manitoba Legislature delivered its unanimous support.

### Delimitations

For the purpose of this study the following delimitations were made :

- (a) The study was limited to the investigation of the policymaking process as it evolved during the period from April 1967 to July 1970.
- (b) The study considered only the primary actors involved in the development and eventual formulation of Bill 113. (Primary actors

are those individuals who assumed a leadership role throughout, or at some stage in the policy making process. The identification of the primary actors was conducted according to the reputational approach discussed by Gergen (1968).

## DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

### The Data Sources

The data sources for this study were :

#### (a) Primary Sources

(i) Official government documents related to the issue; pertinent and accessible records of "La Société Franco-Manitobaine", "L'Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba".

(ii) Interviews conducted with the principal actors who were involved in the policymaking process.

(iii) Personal files of M. Laurent Desjardins and the late M. Hubert Préfontaine.

(iv) Personal written communication from M. Rhéal Teffaine and M. Maurice Gauthier.

#### (b) Secondary Sources

(i) Scholarly papers and articles dealing specifically with the issue as it developed.

(ii) Press releases and news items.

### Limitations

The following factors placed limitations on the study :

(a) There will be a degree of subjectivity in the interpretation of the documents and interviews. The fact that this study was

ex-post facto in nature (from 1967 to 1970) increased the subjectivity. Although absolute objectivity was impossible to achieve, a major concern was to compare and corroborate the information gathered through the interview with the documentary evidence. This process, to some extent, mitigated any excessive subjectivity in the interpretation and treatment of the information.

(b) Interviews as a primary source of data are subject to bias and errors. As stated above, interview information was cross-checked with the documentary information.

(c) An analysis involving other than the primary actors would have permitted greater insight into the various perspectives and selective perceptions concerning the policymaking process than this study has permitted.

#### METHODOLOGY

The aim of this section was to provide an overall view of the research design. Specifically, it will deal with the following :

- (a) a brief definition of description and analysis,
- (b) a cursory explication of two subactivities, namely; the interview and the identification of the principal actors, and
- (c) a description of how the data will be treated.

#### Description and Analysis

The initial activity was to describe the policymaking process for Bill 113 as it evolved from 1967 to 1970. The purpose of description, according to Young (1968:5), was essentially, to "delineate relevant phenomena, to generate useful classifications and breakdowns

and to pinpoint the important characteristics of political activities." Additionally, through systematic description, insights and hypotheses were generated. Moreover, Young (1968) states that description is the best technique to categorize information.

The main research questions presented above provided the analytic basis of the study. The questions served to subdivide the policymaking process into its constituent parts. Once the policymaking process had been described, the purpose of analysis was "that of explicit and articulate abstraction and generalization" (Lofland, 1971:5). In this study, chapter four was devoted to the description of the policymaking process with attention given to the social and political context in which the process evolved. Chapter five provided an analysis of the data presented in the previous chapter.

### The Interview

The interview proved to be an effective instrument for three essential reasons. It disclosed insights and information which were absent in the documentation. As a means of retrieving information, the interview yielded a mass of information in a relatively short time. Furthermore, it brought one in closer contact with the proximate policymakers.

### Identification of Principal Actors

The identification of principal actors was based on the reputational approach. According to Gergen (1968:194), the reputational approach, "entails asking various 'knowledgeable' persons in the community to nominate persons whom they feel to be most influential".

In order to ensure that the list of principal actors was as

complete as possible, the interviewees were asked for additional nominations. This procedure served to validate the initial nominations provided by the "knowledgeables."

#### Treatment of the Data

A basic problem associated with qualitative analyses was one of ordering and presenting the data collected. According to Lazarsfeld (1972:226) the problem is one for which, "ready made theoretical categories (for organizing the data) will not exist." This concern raised by Lazarsfeld was approached in two ways. Since the social milieu and the political context were considered to be of prime importance and because of the three year time dimension, the method adopted to present the data was a chronological description of the policymaking process. Thus the major events and the introduction of the principal actors were placed in proper perspective in order to maintain the continuity of the process from 1967 to 1970.

In order to analyze the data, a set of critical questions was developed based on a review of the policymaking literature. This set of questions was divided into two broad categories, the actors and the process. Some questions were further divided into subcategories. The interrelatedness between the two major categories was demonstrated and from there, generalizations were suggested.

In conclusion, it was felt that a chronological description was useful in communicating the salient features of the policymaking process. Further, the set of questions was a helpful aid in organizing and classifying the data for the purpose of analysis.

## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Students of the policymaking process and students of educational administration may find this study relevant for the following reasons :

(a) Although policymaking is a dynamic process in which there are no clear-cut boundaries to determine its beginning or end, this study attempted to delineate the essential factors which led to formal legislation. In short, it investigated how a language policy was arrived at by the provincial government.

(b) Although the study focussed on the policymaking process of the provincial government, an educational issue was used as a vehicle to investigate the process. As such, therefore, educational administrators could be interested in what manner educational policy was formulated in this instance.

(c) The study attempted to analyze an issue which was both controversial and political in nature. To analyze such an issue it was necessary to review the political activities undertaken both within and without the decision-making sphere. Thus, attention was directed at the activities within the government and at the outside pressures exerted by concerned citizens either as individuals or as groups. The study provided insights into the policymaking process.

### Summary

Taken as a whole, this chapter has indicated the purpose and orientation of the study. Briefly, this chapter has : defined and delimited the problem; provided a cursory background to situate the problem in its proper perspective; identified the sources of data and

limitations; presented a methodology to approach and deal with the data; and given a rationale for the importance of carrying out this study.

The following chapter will review the literature related to the policymaking process. From this literature review, a set of critical questions will be developed providing the basis for subsequent analysis. Chapter 3 will examine, from a socio-historical perspective, the major events and factors which affected the French language in the province of Manitoba. Social and political determinants will also be given attention. Chapter 4 constitutes a chronological description of the policymaking process as it evolved from 1967 to 1970. In Chapter 5, an analysis of the data provided in Chapter 4 will be offered. Finally, Chapter 6 will present a conclusion and recommendations for further study.

## Chapter 2

### REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE : TOWARD A SET OF CRITICAL QUESTIONS

This chapter will review the related literature in order to clarify the theoretical bases which gave direction to this study. More specifically, this chapter will present a brief history of the analysis of policymaking. Secondly, a number of approaches to the analysis of policymaking will be discussed. Finally, a set of critical questions deduced from these approaches will be presented. These questions subsequently served as orienting principles and provided a basis upon which the analysis of the data could be conducted.

#### Analysis of Policymaking in Historical Perspective

There exists today a multiplicity of approaches to the study of policymaking. This situation provides considerable assistance and relevant theoretical statements aimed at analyzing the policymaking process.

The scope of the analysis, however, has proven highly contentious. In fact, a perusal of the literature reveals a proliferation of divergent views concerning this problem.

Traditional writers, as Hayes and Hedlund (1970) note, centered their attention on an institutional perspective and on political philosophy. Essentially this led to discussions of the formal properties of political organizations and processes. Such studies tended to be legalistic since they referred to constitutional and legal documents. Moreover,

the activities of political philosophers (see Isaak, 1975) tended to be normative. In other words they made value judgements of what "ought" to be. Plato's "just state" and Rousseau's Social Contract, and more recently, C.C. Rodee, J.F. Anderson, and O.Q. Christol's Introduction to Political Science are examples of this tradition.

The period following World War II (Easton, 1966) saw the emergence of the descriptive or empirical theory. The focus of political science shifted from "what ought to be" statements to the "what is". Empirical statements were based upon evidence referring to the world of experience. According to Young (1962:2), one approach which became influential was the view that political analysis should be concerned with the "nature, focus and utilization of power."

In more recent years political science witnessed another important orientation. This new approach dealt basically with the relations and patterns of interaction among individuals. Vernon Van Dyke (1970:28), a proponent of this view stated :

We should try to identify political actors; to identify the goals that they seek; to analyze interrelationship amongst ends; to describe and assess the means that are or might be employed in the pursuit of ends; to determine the reasons and causes influencing the choice of ends and means; and in general to find out why political issues arise, how the struggle over them is conducted, what governs the outcome, and what the effects of the struggle are or might be.

Thus the individual, and the relationships among individuals became the units of analysis.

New viewpoints emerged. These dealt with the production and allocation of values to society. Easton (1965:130) declares, "A policy, in other words, whether for society, for a narrow association, or for any other group, consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocates values". As Sharkansky (1970:6) notes, a person with a proclivity

for systems theory would be concerned with what is related to what :

He searches for phenomena which interact with the current topic of interest, and his 'system' shows how that topic receives and transmits stimuli in relationship with each other actors.

A related orientation considered the scope of analysis in terms of policy and policymaking. Sharkansky (1970:2) stated :

A primary concern deals with explanation rather than prescription; sophisticated comparisons of the policies...; the search for economic, social, and historical, as well as political and governmental, features to aid in understanding the policies that government choose; and an effort to accumulate research to build theories about policy.

Similarly, Ranney (1958:582) remarked that, "political science has dealt with both policy content and policy process and has considered each of them both descriptively and evaluatively."

As suggested above such a divergence of depth and breadth is bound to create some confusion. However, Young (1968) remarks that this confusion is mitigated by the fact that, in substantive terms, all analyses belong to the same area of endeavour. Although this argument does not settle the issue, the fact remains that there is no generally accepted paradigm for the analysis of policymaking.

From the above discussion it would appear that what ought to be the orientation of the analysis is very much dependent upon the questions being asked. Although this statement could be interpreted as idiosyncratic in nature, the intent is, to be sure, far removed from personal whims and eccentricities. Rather, the thrust is directed more toward a multi-causal framework based on questions being raised by a number of approaches to the analysis of the policymaking process.

Having said this, the discussion will now turn to the question of theories which have been used in investigating policymaking processes. Since this study is basically concerned with the policymaking

process it would seem appropriate to examine what some theories have to offer in order to assist in developing a set of critical questions for analysis. The various approaches, taken together, will serve to shed light on the main research questions being examined in this study.

### APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS

There are numerous approaches used to analyze the policy-making process. For the purpose of this study, the following theories presented in terms of their general nature, their deficiencies, and their applicability will be reviewed :

- (1) Political System Theory
- (2) Group Theory
- (3) Elite Theory
- (4) Functional Analysis
- (5) Institutionalism

#### Political Systems Theory

General Systems Theory, as it applies to political science has, according to O.R. Young (1968), the following functions and is valuable :

(a) Because it helps to sort out large quantities of data and to distinguish patterns and uniformities that link the elements of the system together.

(b) Because it includes the areas of pattern maintenance variables, since such concepts as stability and equilibrium are made more precise.


(c) Because it provides an explicit framework for the

inclusion of material concerning change and systemic breakdown.

(d) Because it facilitates transfer activities, knowledge, insights, and fruitful questions can be adapted to other system levels, from one discipline to another, and, therefore, from one system to another.

(e) Because of its clarity and precision in formulating concepts that exist in other analytic systems, it is more useful in problems of macroanalysis rather than problems of microanalysis.

A strong proponent of the systems theory as a conceptual framework for analysis is David Easton. He gives a diagrammatic representation of the functioning of a political system :



Easton's (1965b:112) Simplified Model of a Political System.

In Easton's (1965b:112) words :

It depicts in their simplest guise the dynamic relationships among the processes of a political system. It reveals that... in its element of form a political system is just a means whereby certain kinds of inputs are converted into outputs.

The value of the systems model to policy analysis (Dye, 1972:19) lies in the questions that it poses :

1. What are the significant dimensions of the environment that generate demands upon the political system ?
2. What are the significant characteristics of the political system that enable it to transform demands into public policy and to preserve itself over time ?
3. How do environmental inputs affect the character of the political system ?
4. How do characteristics of the political system affect the content of public policy ?
5. How do environmental inputs affect the content of public policy ?
6. How does public policy affect, through feedback, the environment and the character of the political system ?

However, systems theory is limited because of its general nature. It tends to strip (Easton, 1965a:112) "the rich and complex political processes down to their bare bones." According to Anderson (1975) it says little about how decisions are made. Furthermore, as Young (1968) notes, it lacks the apparatus to deal extensively with such questions as scope, depth, and weight of power. Finally Young (1968:24) suggests that "it does not offer much for studies dealing

with the political aspects of such matters as perceptions, expectations, formation, or cognition."

### Group Theory

Group theory alleges that political attitude, opinion, orientation, and preference have their origins in group life. Earl Latham (1959:239) states :

What may be called public policy is the equilibrium reached in this (group) struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to weight in their favor.

What makes group theory attractive according to Young (1968) is :

- (1) Its descriptive powers
  - (a) Because it provides for additional conceptualization and categorization.
  - (b) Because it breaks from the more traditional and formalistic categories.
  - (c) Because it is possible to lend substance to many of its categories with interesting examples.
- (2) Its interest in group power and influence.
- (3) Its focus on goal and goal attainment which provides the motivating force to the whole process.
- (4) Its concern about the problems of change.

Young (1968) however, expresses three basic criticism of group theory :

(1) That people are far from being the "joiners" postulated by the theory. Hence some important aspects of human behavior are not accounted for.

(2) That the theory neglects to account for individual political and social phenomena such as leadership, attitudes and opinions, and the importance of role and status.

(3) That the theory neglects to consider more abstract influences of perception and cognition. Lindblom (1968:80) argues that "proximate policymakers are much more active in the play of power than as referees." Further, he contends that although man is a product of group life, he nevertheless has such basic concerns as the self, family and locality.

While Group theory neglects to consider such factors as ideas and institutions it can serve to identify the group(s) whose common purpose or interest is brought to bear on the policy process and seek the attainment of their goal.

### Elite Theory

Thomas Dye and Harman Ziegler (1970:6) in The Irony of Democracy provide a summary of elite theory :

- (1) Society is divided into few who have power and the many who do not. Only a small number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide public policy.

- (2) The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society.
- (3) The movement of non-elites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only non-elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to governing circles.
- (4) Elites share a consensus on the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system.
- (5) Public policy does not reflect demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary. 'What is feasible politically is policy only incrementally, or marginally, different from existing policies'. (Lindblom, 1968:26)
- (6) Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses. Elites influence masses more than masses influence elites.

Elite theory could possibly be supported by numerous examples in the way our society is structured. However, to suppose that this society is being led exclusively by elites is highly questionable. Lindblom (1968:26) argues that elite domination of the policymaking process :

Is a slippery one to pin down for analysis. No group gets its way all the time on every issue. On the other hand, some groups and kinds of participants in the play of power are obviously more powerful than others.

Dahl (1958:464) suggests that if one is to defend the proposition successfully one must identify :

A controlling group, less than a majority in size, that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules;... a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences of preferences on key political issues.

Easton (1965:121) in The Political Process argues that Lasswell's elitist theory

Is only a partial schema of analysis helping us to discern the sources of power over values of certain groups but presenting us with little data about the power of other groups.

Of significance in the elite theory is the fact that it serves to identify and focus attention on the role of leadership on policy formation. Although policymaking is a complicated cooperative process, the theory can serve to point the finger at a "who".

### Functional analysis

Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) have divided functional analysis into three types of analyses. The first type, eclectic functionalism, is concerned with, among other things, the functions or purposes served by the phenomena. The analyst would venture into such areas as structure, history, and ideology as relevant considerations for political analysis. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970:248) add :

There may be reference to the functions of individuals...; groups...; institutions...; or ideas.... Depending on the analyst, this simple form of functionalism may also provide a list of activities in which X is engaged, or it may provide answers to more or less explicit questions with respect to how X contributes to the performance of certain purposes of activities. (emphasis added)

A second type of functional analysis is called empirical functionalism. This form of analysis received its impetus from R.K.

Merton. According to Flanigan and Fogelman (1970:249) functional analysis :

... requires an elucidation not only of manifest functions, the obvious and intended purposes and consequences, but also the latent functions, the more covert and unintended consequences that are equally important and enlightening as subjects for analysis. (emphasis added)

The Mertonian approach to functionalism can offer real insights.

Behavior is not always what it may appear to be at first sight. Silverman (1970:46) states :

The consequences of action may be very different from those intended; what is often thought to be "bad"... may upon closer inspection, be seen to perform vital functions.

In conclusion, Flanigan and Fogelman (1970:249) state in paraphrasing Merton :

... whether or not a general functional theory to explain the social system as a whole is ultimately possible, the most advisable course is to deal with more limited units in reasonably precise concepts.

Finally, the third and most ambitious attempt at analysis has been in the area of structural functionalism developed by Parsons. Structural functionalism (Flanigan and Fogelman, 1970) attempts to provide an integrated theory from which can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects of a political system.

Functional analysis has focussed on various functional activities that occur in the policy process. Lasswell (1956:93) has presented a scheme involving seven categories of functional analysis :

- (1) Intelligence : How is the information on policy matters that come to the attention of policymakers gathered and processed ?
- (2) Recommendation : How are recommendations (or alternatives) for dealing with a given issue made and promoted ?
- (3) Prescription : How are general rules adopted or enacted, and by whom ?
- (4) Invocation : Who determines whether given behavior contravene rules or laws and demand application of rules or laws thereto ?
- (5) Application : How are laws and rules actually applied or enforced ?

- (6) Appraisal : How is the operation of policies, their success or failure, appraised ?
- (7) Termination : How are the original rules or laws terminated or continued in modified or changed form ?

Although Lasswell refers to this as a decision-making process, Anderson (1975:23) suggests that "it goes beyond the making of a particular choice and really involves the course of action on some particular matter."

Planigan and Fogelman (1970:255) suggest that functionalism has enriched the discipline of political science by making several heuristic contributions, namely :

- (1) sensitizing analysis to the complexity of interrelationships among social and political phenomena;
- (2) drawing attention to a whole social system as a setting for political phenomena;
- (3) forcing consideration of functions served—particularly latent functions—by political actors groups as something of an antidote for moralizing and 'rational' analysis.

Functional analysis has not been spared criticism however.

Anderson (1975:23) states :

Its emphasis on functional categories, however, may lead to the neglect of the politics of policy formation, and the effect of environment variables on the process.

Easton (1965) suggests that the identification of functions does not indicate the presence of any special theory. He adds :

At worst, it involves the research worker in a gigantic numbers game to which there is no end; each investigator is encouraged to establish his own favored number of invariant functions and there is no satisfactory way of selecting among the alternatives (Easton, 1965:105).

Functional analysis according to Young (1968) is attractive because it deals with a manageable collection of variables. Furthermore, although Easton (1965) is critical of this approach, he nonetheless allows that functional analysis leads to examine such factors as political motivations, special forms of interest groups, different kinds of political participation and involvement. Mouzelis (1967:58) seems to concur with this when he states :

Functional analysis, as an expository and explanatory tool, is a convenient way for dealing systematically with relations among such parts (various subgroups, roles, norms, and values) as well as with the role that each part plays in relation to the whole.

Both Easton and Mouzelis seem more inclined to the eclectic functionalism defined above by Flanigan and Fogelman.

### Institutionalism

Institutionalism has shifted its focus of analysis in recent years. The basic unit of analysis (Young, 1968) used to be the institution with emphasis on the state and its subunits as governing structures. Although by no means a universal characteristic, many writers insisted that the institutions had to be legal or legally founded. In much the same light, Anderson (1975:25) states, "usually little was done to explain how institutions actually operated, as apart from how they were supposed to operate."

However, attention slowly shifted from the institutions themselves to the individuals as primary units of political analysis.

Thus political science (Anderson, 1975:24) was more intent on "concentrating on the behavior of participants in the process and on political realities rather than formalism."

Institutions represent sets of regularized patterns of behavior. Since these behaviors can have an effect on the decision-making process, and thus an impact on public policy, institutional arrangements, structures, and procedures should not be ignored in policy analysis. There should be a concern for the dynamic aspect of politics if the analysis is to be adequate.

Institutionalism, therefore, directs attention to the rules observed by the institution. How are policy demands dealt with ? How are the numerous demands screened ? What procedures need to be observed to ensure that the demand finds its way to the government agenda ? How do the politicians handle particular demands ?

#### Summary Comment

Throughout the foregoing discussion, it was seen that each theory focussed on different units of analysis although there is overlap among them. Strict purity, that is, no overlap, would be impossible, due to the common basis of analysis, of policymaking. Notwithstanding the major differences in the concepts analyzed, each theory draws attention to a number of factors relevant to the policymaking process. At this point, a summary of the salient factors identified by each theory would be in order.

Briefly, then, Systems Theory is concerned with the operation of the political system, the allocation of values, the relationship between the demands (inputs) and the outputs of the political system, the forces determining the outcome, the nature of the various processes and the structures through which authoritative allocations are formulated and put into effect.

Systems Theory implies a process. The initial stage identifies inputs (or demands) coming from the environment. Some of these inputs at a later date become outputs. These outputs are the result of actions undertaken by the political system. In this study, the cyclic nature of the systems approach will not be considered. In other words, the study does not go beyond the passage of Bill 113.

Group Theory is basically concerned with the identification of groups whose common interest is brought to bear on the policymaking process. This notion is important in that it extends the analytic focus beyond the roles exercised by individuals. It suggests that in some cases concerted actions are undertaken in order to exercise pressure for the attainment of a specific goal.

Elite Theory on the other hand, stands in contradistinction to group theory. The focus here is on the individual whose reputation and/or position defines the leadership element which characterizes political and social actions. Elite theory permits the identification of individuals who are key actors in the process.

Functionalism adds greater scope to an eclectic analysis. It

focuses on such functions as (a) how does the information reach the policymakers; (b) how are recommendations made and provided; (c) what are the interrelationships between the social and political environment; (d) what was the political motivation, participation and involvement of the various actors in the process.

Finally, institutionalism addresses itself to the behavior of the participants. It points to the political realities of the social and political environment while emphasizing the dynamic character of politics.

This therefore leads to the question of what constitutes the best approach to the analysis of policymaking. It would be difficult, or even impossible, to suggest that one approach is "better" than another. Perhaps of greater importance is the perspective one adopts. Young (1968: 98) claims :

It makes a great deal of difference... whether the fundamental unit of analysis is some sociopolitical system or the human individual; whether one is more interested in the results of political processes than in the processes themselves; what one takes to be a 'political act', or whether one assumes political systems to be basically stable or potentially unstable. The formulation of questions... falls into the realm of orientational functions.

The coexistence of numerous approaches is important and healthy. They tend to spell out assumptions while aiding in systematizing analysis, categorizing data, and relating variables to one another. Taken together, they provide insights and reveal phenomena that could otherwise be neglected. Having made this point it seems that one possible orientation could indeed be an eclectic approach.

### From an Eclectic Conceptualization to a Set of Critical Questions

Although each theory discussed above might well serve as a basis for the analysis of policymaking, it seems that the use of any one of them could rule out the inclusion of some pertinent factors. In order to circumvent this problem, the following is an attempt to develop a set of critical questions which will better serve the purpose of this study.

In support of this proposition, Anderson (1975:25) suggests that :

A good rule is to be eclectic and flexible and use those theories as organizing concepts that seem most useful to the satisfactory analysis and explanation of a particular public policy or political action.

In much the same vein, Easton (1965:23) catches the point well when he states that :

Each type of theoretical orientation brings to the surface a different set of problems, provides unique insights and emphasis, and thereby makes it possible for alternative and even competing theories (sic) to be equally and simultaneously useful.

Sharkansky (1970:2) lends support to this approach by noting that "the eclectic approach to the search for 'determinants' of policy is also beneficial because it is not bound by the overt concerns of political philosophy."

Van Dyke (1970:27) argues that the scope of the discipline is set by the questions being asked by the researcher. He adds that contemporary political science cannot be properly defined in terms of a pre-determined range of topics. In abridged form, Van Dyke (1970:28) defines politics as a "Struggle among actors pursuing conflicting desires on public issues." This definition, he continues (Van Dyke, 1970:29) seems

to imply, with respect to scope :

That we should try to identify political actors, to identify the goals they seek, to analyze interrelationships among ends, to describe and assess the means that are or might be employed in the pursuit of ends; to determine the reasons and causes influencing the choice of ends and means; and in general to find out why political issues arise, how the struggle over them is conducted, what governs the outcome and what the effects of the struggle are or may be.

There is indeed a strong indication in this statement that Van Dyke is borrowing from a number of approaches to enlarge the scope of the analysis, rather than focussing on such unicausal approaches as Group or Elite theory. In a similar way Easton (1970:201), in drawing attention to the processes through which claims are transformed into issues, states that data is needed to answer a number of questions :

We need to know something about the relationship between the demand and the initiators or the supporters in the power structure of the society, the importance of secrecy, as compared with the publicity in presenting demands, the matter of timing of demands, the possession of political skills or know-how, access to channels of communication, the attitudes and states of mind of possible publics, and the images held by the initiators of demands with regard to the way things get done in the particular system.

In abandoning loyalties to a given approach in favor of flexibility, the eclectism advanced here suggests asking substantive questions for analysis. According to Young (1968:102) "From this perspective it is... quite possible to consider utilizing material from several approaches."

To provide an analytic framework to guide the analysis of the policymaking process, two categories of activity will be used as units of analysis. The analysis will thus proceed on two levels, concentrating first on the participants (or actors) in the policymaking process, and second, upon the system of policy formulation. Schoettle (1968:150) states :

This dual emphasis on the individual engaged in the policy-making process and on the systemic properties of the process itself reflects what we see as the shared orientation of the social sciences in contemporary analysis of policymaking problem.

There are two basic criteria for this approach. First, the approach must stress attributes of the policymaker and the system within which he operates. Second, it must relate variables which intervene between the individual and the system, such as interest group behavior, role-playing, etc..., to the operation of these two basic variables.

Basically, the Eclectic approach addresses itself to :

- 1 - The actors
- 2 - The Policymaking Process

With respect to actors, the following questions were formulated :

- (a) Who were the principal actors involved in the policy-making process ?
- (b) What were the roles of these actors in terms of political motivation, objectives, participation and involvement ?
- (c) Who were the initiators of the demand ? Where did the initial demand emanate from ? Who mobilized support for the demand ?
- (d) Why was this demand considered important by the government ?

With respect to the process, the following questions were formulated :

- (a) When was the initial decision taken to embark on this policy development ?
- (b) Was the timing politically appropriate ? Was there a concatenation of positive factors ?

(c) What forces (or pressures) were brought to bear on the development of the policy ?

(d) What were the interrelationships between the interest group and the politicians ?

(e) How was the process conducted in terms of overt (covert) political actions, individual positions, and so on ?

The approach proposed above served as a map, as a means to uncover the constituent elements making up a process. It provided insights into the political process and shed light upon the formal properties of commonplace, practical and commonsense actions which constitutes the policymaking process.

### Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has presented a history of the evolution of the scope of policymaking. Subsequently, a number of approaches, deemed pertinent and useful for this study, have been reviewed. Finally, an approach for the analysis of policymaking, based on an eclectic conceptualization was developed. The major activities of this study, description and analysis, used the information generated by these questions.

In the following chapter a history of the evolution of the language policy in Manitoba to 1967 will be presented.

## Chapter 3

### A SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the Franco-Manitoban community up to 1967. To this end, the chapter will trace the dominant ideology of Francophones in Manitoba - its source, its preservation, and its faltering grasp on its adherents. A second theme will examine the changing societal context after W.W. II and its effects on the French community. Finally, the chapter will discuss how the changing values in society led to a confrontation between a group of young dissidents, within the francophone community, and the traditional elite. These three themes, developed chronologically, will thus provide the underpinings upon which the events of 1967 to 1970 are set. A chart is presented in Appendix C tracing the main events in French language policy in Manitoba from 1889 to 1967.

#### Some History Prior to 1916 : Church, Ethnicity and Politics

This section gives a brief overview of

- (a) the origin of the ideological orientation of the Franco-Manitoban and the preeminence of the clergy in promulgating this ideology.
- (b) the Dafoe-Langevin conflict which reflected, to some extent, the greater conflict between the French and English, and
- (c) the political climate of the period as expressed by Dafoe.

At the outset, it would be well to recapitulate an historical event of some note - the Conquest of the French colony by the British. The Church, prior to the Conquest, although a powerful force, had to share its power with the king's representatives (Sloan, 1965). After the conquest two things assisted in projecting the Church to a position of power over the people. As Piote (1969:315) remarked "immediately after the surrender of Montreal a large part of the upper-class bourgeoisie set sail for France." Thus a leadership vacuum was created, a leadership which had provided political stability. With the suppression of political power, the Church had no rival with which to compete. Moreover, the colonists were in dire need of leadership if they were to survive in a new and alien political atmosphere. Thus, as Sloan (1965: 26-27) remarks, the Church won by default.

From this point onward the mission of the Church was accepted by the people as a fight for survival of French Canada and its tradition. For this purpose, the clergy were given a place both in and above the society they were protecting. The Church and society became one, and any criticism of the former was looked upon as little better than treasonous of the latter. The faith became the guardian of the language and the language the guardian of the faith.

Blain (1967:18) views the Conquest as the crucial period when the Church filled the leadership vacuum and from that point onward extended its influence into all areas of life :

Dès la Cession, la rupture spirituelle avec la France, l'isolement géographique, le colonialisme britannique et protestant ont mis le clergé dans la nécessité de défendre, avec les valeurs de cultures, les libertés religieuses et civiles. Dans la résistance, l'Eglise est devenue une sorte d'arche de Noé où se sont entassés pêle-mêle tous les vestiges du naufrage, de la législation française à la discipline romaine. Pendant plus d'un siècle, elle a été la seule pensante, la seule institution à représenter la continuité des traditions de l'ancien régime. Toute la politique de ce pouvoir unique s'est tendue vers le seul opportunisme qui lui imposait l'histoire : se maintenir dans l'irréductibilisme en rapatriant à l'intérieur des cadres de l'Eglise toutes les manifestations de la vie politique, sociale, intellectuelle. La s'est institué la fonction de suppléance du Clergé, suppléance à

une société désorganisée, démembrée de ses chefs politiques et de sa bourgeoisie et habituée par surcroît à s'en remettre aux directives de ses prêtres. Par la force des événements, l'Eglise se trouvait dans les conditions sociologiques idéales pour chercher à reconstruire une cité chrétienne et réaliser le royaume temporel dont rêvaient les premiers missionnaires.

Furthermore, the clergy was not recruited from any special class but from all classes of society. It was indeed an honor for each family to contribute a member to a religious order. Farlardeau (1952: 227) observes :

... the clergy is not above and beyond, but within society... the clergy in its entirety is joined to the totality of society. It is impossible for a French Canadian to think impersonally of a problem affecting the clergy... all such problems are ones within the family.

Clerical denomination of Franco-Manitoban society finds its roots in the tradition which developed in Quebec after the conquest. Turenne (1969) suggests that there is no reason to doubt that it could or would be otherwise, since the French were brought West to colonize and raise "large Catholic families" and as a consequence extend Quebec dominance.

The Manitoba School Question of 1890 which suppressed denominational schools acquired an ethnic character because the Catholic minority was essentially French (Clark, 1968). Any attack on religion was by implication an attack on the *raison d'être* of the French. The two, language and religion, were synonymous. Preservation of religious rights meant the preservation of language and culture. The events of 1890, suppression of denominational schools, and of 1916, repeal of the Laurier Greenway Compromise, may be viewed as two important signposts in the conflict over minority rights in Manitoba.

The restoration of religious rights in education was of crucial importance to the survival of the French community. Perhaps the most ardent

defender of these rights during the period 1895 to 1916 was Archbishop Langevin of St. Boniface. For the Archbishop however, the promulgation of the Catholic faith not only ensured the survival of the French group, it was seen in a much larger context. Langevin, like his predecessor, Archbishop Taché, was convinced that the Church had to counter and halt the liberalizing tendencies found in society. His ultramontanism was very much in keeping with the tradition established by Archbishop Taché (McDonald, 1974). Comeault (1976:66) explains Langevin's thinking:

Il en vient à rêver d'un véritable empire catholique dans l'Ouest... L'Eglise y aurait le pas sur le gouvernement civil et aurait tout à dire quand il s'agirait de morale et de politique... L'idéal serait que cet Empire ne tolérerait aucune concession ou libéralisme... Car il lui semblait que la société laïque n'était rien moins qu'une nouvelle barbarie qui serait encore cette fois-ci repoussée par l'Eglise, ce dernier rempart d'un ordre social aux abois.

However, Langevin's actions and motivations may well have been to the detriment of the French minority and, moreover, set the stage for what was to characterize the minority, in terms of ideology, until the sixties. Some elements of the period are noteworthy.

It should be recalled that the Laurier-Greenway Compromise of 1897, included a clause which read :

When ten of the pupils in any school speak the French language, or any language other than English, as their native language, the teaching of such pupils shall be conducted in French, or any other language, and English upon the bilingual system. (Acts of the Legislature of the province of Manitoba, Vol. I, Chap. 26, pp. 99-101, 60 Victoria assented March 30, 1897).

The period from 1897 to 1917 represented, for Manitoba, two decades marked by a great economic boom, a world war, and political crisis (Morton, 1967). Of significance during the first decade, was the massive immigration which was to dot the province with an ethnic mosaic that would become a distinguishing feature. The bilingual clause of 1897

had created a multilingual society much to the dismay of the most ardent anglo-nationalists. J.W. Dafoe, editor of the Free Press in Winnipeg, was advancing the thesis that the new arrivals should, by will or by force, be made to assimilate to the dominant group to create "a new and significant race known as Canadians" (Comeault, 1975). The bilingual clause, according to Jackson (1970:191) had in effect, "... unwittingly turned Manitoba's School System into a latter day Tower of Babel." Thus, there emerged the inevitable confrontation between Dafoe and Langevin which eventually led to the abolition of the bilingual clause.

Dafoe accused Langevin of empire-building; of rallying all Catholics as a common front to advance his political ends :

Archbishop Langevin's encouragement of the Ruthenian national movement is in keeping with his well defined religio-political programmes... which will enable him to bring various Governments to their knees and compel them to yield him concessions on demand. (Manitoba Free Press, February 11, 1919; cited in Comeault, 1971:81).

Langevin, for his part, had declared himself in favor of multilingualism. If "la langue gardienne de la foi" was true for the French, it was also true for any other Catholic group. According to Comeault (1976:76) :

... il en était convaincu, qui perd sa langue perd sa foi! Le dicton ne pouvait mentir. Le régime d'école bilingue serait le seul qui pourrait assurer aux Galaciens l'instruction en leur langue et ainsi sauvegarder leur foi car, l'anglais au Canada, c'était une force pour l'hérésie.

Thus two things appear to have preoccupied Langevin : the restoration of what had been lost in 1890 and the strengthening of the Catholic faith in Western Canada. Comeault (1976:80) adds later :

Langevin ne cessait de recommander aux Ruthènes et aux catholiques pollonais et allemands de réclamer des instituteurs

bilingues qui assureraient la conservation de leur langue à leurs enfants et, par la même, la conservation de leur foi.

But little was the Archbishop aware that his insistence on the bilingual clause for the immigrants, as the sole mechanism for preserving their Catholicism, would in fact compromise "la cause française" for many years to come. Dafoe would argue that the bilingual cause had been a compromise to the French minority. Other groups, he felt, should have been made to join the dominant group, thereby relinquishing all rights to their language and indeed their history. Following the abolition of the bilingual clause and, in the spirit of a "melting pot" theory, Dafoe would write :

There was a general disposition on the part of those charged with dealing with the situation to retain upon the Statute Book certain privileges for the French....If it was found politically impossible to do this, the responsibility rests upon the French people of this province and their leaders... in particular the clergy....There was a conspiracy, the moving spirit of which was the head of the Roman Catholic Church in this diocese, to reduce the teaching of English to a minimum. Further, the influence which turned the supposed bilingual schools into French clerical schools in defiance of the law, and in contempt of the agreement of 1897... deliberately instigated the Ruthenian and Polish sections of the community to claim, under the school law, the rights to which it was the intention in 1897 to limit to the French alone....The agitation against bilingualism in Manitoba was directed primarily against the system of Slavic Schools....If the people, in wiping them out, did not distinguish between them and the French schools... the French, the Polish, and the Ruthenians having made common cause, invited and received identical treatment.

(J.W. Dafoe to T. Côté, April 6, 1916 ; cited in Comeault, 1976:84)

The repeal of the bilingual clause imbued the French community with a sense of loss. With their religion relegated to a trifle in schools and their language removed from the Statute Book, the French community would retreat into itself, form an association which would assume the challenge of "la résistance" and perpetuate the ideology which had been one of the motivating forces of Archbishop Langevin.

The Manitoba government's education policy of 1916 demonstrates how education, as a socializing system, can be used to achieve political ends. By abolishing the bilingual clause of the Laurier-Greenway Compromise of 1897, the policy proposed ethnic unification, or as Massialas (1969:12) observes, "... the quest to bring about a sense of national identity among different people." As in the United States, to note Massialas (1969:13), the school was to become "... the key agency of assimilation of different ethnic groups." This ideology was an outright attempt to expunge diversity in favor of anglo-conformity, an ideology born in Canada with the Durham Report of 1839.

The French leadership of the period (1916) patently opposed the ethnic unification ideology. They opted for a conscious resistance which enjoyed the tacit approval of the French community. It was a self-imposed educational and social quarantine in which ethnic cleavage was maintained and perpetuated from one generation to another. The medium of the resistance lay in the conscience of the clerico-bourgeois elite ; the means lay in the rural-clerical ideology of conservation professed by the elite and maintained within a compact and semi-isolated community structure.

#### Anglo-Conformity versus Franco-Manitoban Resistance (1916-1945)

Prior to March, 1916, the French had begun organizing, anticipating the abolition of the bilingual clause. An ad-hoc committee (Comité de vigilance) had been set up (a) to gauge the actions of the government and, (b) to consider possible courses of action in case of abolition. With the repeal of the law, it was agreed that the only plausible course would be to function within the school system. The

"Comité de vigilance" later formed what was to be known as "L'Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba (AECFM).

At the very first general meeting (June, 1916) of the AECFM, the president, L.A. Prud'homme, county court judge, was quick to express the role of the clergy. In his speech he declared that Franco-Manitobans would always be "attachés au clergé comme une nuée lumineuse guidant nos pas dans la véritable voie", and describing the French language "... qui a été pour nous le véhicule de la civilisation chrétienne au Manitoba." (Archives de l'AECFM, congrès du 27-28 juin, 1916; cited in Leblanc, 1968:28).

The effects of the law were soon felt. Following the general meeting of the AECFM in June, M. Roger Goulet was relieved of his duties as principal of the St. Boniface Normal School and became an inspector. The new school program for the forthcoming school year made no mention of bilingual education. French and German now became optional subjects at the high school level. The inspectoral system was transformed such that Anglo-Protestant inspectors were assigned to previously bilingual schools.

Although the system was transformed in accordance with the amendments to the School Act, the AECFM and the Archbishop of St. Boniface advised the schools to continue as in the past (Leblanc, 1968). In a confidential letter, dated August 17, 1916, sent to the local organizations, the executive of the AECFM advised that they would ask the school trustees to continue teaching French as in the past. The executive added :

Lorsque l'inspecteur visitera les écoles situées dans votre juridiction, il est désirable que les instituteurs le reçoivent avec la plus grande courtoisie et l'assure qu'ils font les plus

grands efforts pour donner un enseignement complet et aussi soigné que possible de la langue anglaise.

(Archives de l'AECFM, Août 17, 1916; cited in Leblanc, 1968:31)

Outright resistance to the law seemed the only alternative which would stifle the assimilative process.

In a letter to Cardinal Begin of Quebec, Archbishop Beliveau reiterated this call to resistance by saying :

... la direction donnée et qui sera suivie... est d'enseigner le français en violation de la loi et de le faire sans bruit...

(Archives de l'Archevêché de St. Boniface Mgr. Beliveau au Cardinal Begin, 24 Août, 1910; cited in Leblanc, 1968:32)

The position of the clergy on the issue was of the utmost importance since the leadership in all Francophone milieux resided with the local priest in practically all matters concerning everyday life.

Although the amendments of 1916 disallowed the use of French in the public schools, the fact remains that in actual practice few things changed for the next thirty years. On the one hand, the Department of Education did not appear overly anxious to conduct a witch hunt. Communications were still very much in a primitive stage and, furthermore, the Department was sympathetic to an organization concerned with the development of education. To be sure there were a number of incidents with school inspectors, but generally speaking the situation was favorable to the French, given the constraints within which they had to operate.

A noted figure during the period (1908-1939), R. Fletcher, Deputy Minister of Education wrote :

Personally I am very much in favor of the children of French parents being taught to read and write in the French language. The bi-lingual system in the province fell because it in reality was a monolingual system with French as the one language. The fault lay not in the system but in the method of its development. (Archives de l'AECFM, correspondance 1921-1928 R. Fletcher au

Père A. Laberge le 9 avril 1924; cited in Leblanc, 1968:38).

On the other hand, the Francophones continued to develop their own system of education based on language and religion. A number of factors contributed to this situation. Francophone trustees controlled the hiring of teachers. Thus, candidates were usually French and Catholic and, if trustees were remiss in their duties, the local priest would intervene. However, few had objections since all trustees were in agreement with the concept of "la langue gardienne de la foi." Additionally, the AECFM had a strong hold on the teaching staff, who were, to a large extent, members of religious orders. Finally, the rudimentary state of societal development imposed, as it were, an independence and self-sufficiency on communities, in large part homogeneous in composition. Schools were, in practice, French Catholic schools. An observer of the Franco-Manitoban milieu, Cannon Lionel Groulx would write in 1928 :

C'est d'ailleurs le sentiment commun au Manitoba que la persécution de 1916, loin de dissoudre les énergies, les a réveillées, tonifiées et que l'école française, pour précaire que reste sa condition, n'a jamais été plus robuste ni plus efficace. En fait, dans les milieux canadiens-français homogènes, où la population peut décider du choix des maîtres et maîtresses, l'école publique n'est rien d'autre qu'une école catholique et canadienne-française.

(L. Groulx, lettre envoyée à l'Action Française et reproduite dans les Cloches de St.Boniface, 1928 p.212; cited in Leblanc 1968:57).

Les Cloches de St.Boniface, the official publication of the St.Boniface diocese would convey essentially the same message in 1930 :

La loi scolaire n'autorise pas l'enseignement du français. Dans la pratique, les nôtres ont su cependant, imposer un régime d'enseignement français supérieur à celui rayé des statuts par le gouvernement Norris.

(Les cloches de St.Boniface "Justes remarques" 1930 p.39; cited in Leblanc, 1968:58).

But could it be otherwise ? Most small communities were homogeneous in composition, independent of outside influences, and rather self-sufficient. Consequently, these closed societal units were by their very nature powerful inhibitive forces to the assimilation process. The emerging society, albeit English, could not yet hone the cutting edge sharp enough to sever the strands of this intricate web.

### The Clergy as a Contributor to Ideological Conservation

The religion adhered to by Franco-Manitobans was a way of life and stood not in juxtaposition to other daily activities but permeated life itself; a life guided by a severe moral code which professed total submission and humility. Daily activities and informal relationships crystallized around the parish. In writing about the parish as an institutional type, Farlardeau (1964:374) wrote :

- ... if the ideal type of the parish is to be approximated concretely, two main social conditions are necessary :
1. that all members (Catholics) of the parochial group share fully the value-system of the Church as the main motivating factor of the whole of their social life;
  2. that the center of the parochial community be geographically remote enough from other community centers that the parochial group can constitute and remain a relatively independent, socially homogeneous, and self-sufficient whole.

These conditions were met in French Manitoba. In this context, the priest "provide all means and services which, according to the Church, men must use in order to live a virtuous life and thereby attain their supernatural end" (Farlardeau, 1964:369). Maurice Blain (1962:206) catches well the import of this subervience to a religious belief :

Look for example in what state of guilt we have been plunged by a religious education that bases the essence of Christian

morality on the fear of sin, of death and of heresy; the rupture of the fundamental unity of the human person by a metaphysical dualism that divides and pits against themselves the spiritual and the carnal, the soul and the body, good and evil.

Thus, ideologically, the Franco-Manitoban community was dominated, throughout its history, by "... the rural-clerical ideology of conservation, unsullied by any significant opposing ideology."

(Vallaincourt and Hebert, 1971:183) As a consequence, the community was stable, static, and rural, church-and-family oriented with the seat of power residing essentially with the clerical hierarchy.

Like most devout Catholic societies, the Manitoba French have been affected by the authoritarian structure of their Church and as a consequence have an "elitist" tendency in politics and social organization : a belief that some are called upon "to lead and others to follow."

(Turenne, 1969:8)

This elite was composed basically of clerical and bourgeois elements.

This ideology was verbalized, elaborated, and transmitted to the population by the community's traditional elite, composed of the clergy, doctors, lawyers and a few minor bureaucrats. An essential part of this elite was made up of persons who controlled the only newspaper (and later) the only radio station in the community (Vallaincourt and Hebert, 1971:183).

To demonstrate how the influence of the elite persisted over time, note the advertisement in La Liberté (The French weekly newspaper) by Edmond Préfontaine, then in the Liberal-Progressive cabinet :

Si je défends le système scolaire en cette province, je ne voudrais pas donner l'impression, qu'à mon avis, tout est bien dans le meilleur des mondes en matière d'éducation au Manitoba. Non, je n'approuve pas les vieilles lois scolaires, mais toujours opérantes qui sont dans les Statuts de cette province depuis 1890 et 1916, et je puis vous assurer que lorsque l'Association d'Education et nos évêques nous diront que le temps est venu d'attaquer de front cette législation, ils

auront mon appui tout entier.

(La Liberté, May 29, 1953)

One wonders when the appropriate time would come with close to forty years having elapsed since the repeal of the law !

### A Changing Environment

Prior to World War II, language and faith were not susceptible to external influences. Communities conserved their homogeneity unpolluted by exterior forces which might have affected their existence. The post-war years were to usher in a new era. Many factors, such as communications, and transportation shared in the task of transforming society in general.

The French community was imperilled by a societal context which had little sympathy for it. During the fifties, teachers, once the cornerstone of "la survivance" were bypassing the AECEM and addressing themselves more and more to the Department of Education. The Department was assuming an increasing degree of responsibility in the area of French education. A number of factors may have contributed to this state of affair. Salaries had become a contentious issue. Father Belcourt, a school inspector for the AECEM, had told the Association executive in 1952 that twenty teachers had accepted positions in English schools because of better remuneration (Leblanc, 1968). Moreover, teaching in "French" schools, which usually meant additional work and benevolent services, was less attractive to the lay teachers. Finally, the teaching force was also changing in composition, admitting a greater number of lay teachers. The significance of this change has been noted by Painchaud (1972:259) :

Schools which were staffed by a steady supply of religious teachers devoted to survival of the French language and culture must now rely on lay teachers. The latter have not demonstrated as complete a dedication to the great cause of "la survivance" as have their sisters and brothers in the past.... They are perhaps more inclined to favor individual solutions than collective ones.

This statement has some truth but is begging the question. Had the objective of perpetuating the dominant ideology and the nationalistic spirit to the young, which devolved from the "religious teachers", not taken ? Perhaps the lack of a teacher training institution (a problem which Canon L. Groulx called "le grand péril des Franco-Manitobains.") had, over the years, proven detrimental. However, the final blow came in the early sixties when a conflict developed within the French teachers' association, "L'Association des Instituteurs de langue française au Manitoba" (Leblanc, 1968: 80-82). The conflict revolved around the question of "l'anglicisation". To some, especially Father P. Raymond, school inspector for the AECTM and R. Rottiers, secretary of the AECTM, anglicization was the result of the schools and a lack of interest on the part of teachers to promulgate language and culture. But the school committee of the AECTM, representing in many ways the elite of the teaching corps, took exception to these accusations. The committee insisted that the root cause of anglicization was the home. The conflict was brought to a head at the general annual meeting of the AECTM in March 1963. A committee member, Marcel Lancelot, along with a number of supporters, resigned from the school committee. They later became members of the French curriculum committee for the Department of Education. "L'Association des Instituteurs de langue française au

Manitoba" did not meet again after 1963.

Who could deny the impact of the mass media; the turning of the globe into a village as McLuhan (1964) so well described it. Painchaud (1972:254) discusses the impact of television on the French Canadian child :

For parents it poses a dilemma.... English may become deep-rooted in the child's mind. In addition there are the sociological implications of essentially English programs whereby children may come to the conclusion that society at large functions only in English.

Urbanization and an altered societal context did much to assist the process of assimilation and eventual integration into the dominant culture. Urbanization has been viewed as the nemesis of rural areas in general. The youth of the small communities were being drawn more and more to the urban centers in search of the "good" life. This drain of human resources effectively held the future of the small communities in a precarious balance.

Moreover, the transformed societal context of the post-World War II era did not sustain for the Franco-Manitoban the identity hitherto bestowed by the previous context. The rural-clerical ideology could not continue to exert its influence on the young. As Berger (1963:100) states :

The self-image can only be maintained in a societal context in which others are willing to recognize him. If this recognition is suddenly withdrawn, it usually does not take very long before the self-image collapses.

For the Franco-Manitoban, the implication is that the withdrawal was more progressive such that the eventual collapse, in some cases, was not immediate but drawn out. Again in Berger's (1963:100) words :

Identities are socially bestowed. They must also be socially sustained, and fairly steadily so.

"La cause" was a concern of the elite but not necessarily of the people. Indeed, it would appear that the gap between the community and its leaders was forever widening, thereby removing the community from the mainstream of "la résistance". Basically it was not part of the culture to be aggressive and to resort to overt political manifestations (en masse) to attain certain ends. The process of negotiations to obtain for the community, which was adopted by the elite, was essentially of the backroom type ("dans les coulisse" as many interviewees admitted). Thus Francophones, generally speaking, were apolitical. As one interviewee intimated, "we needed rebels, but the church did not accept rebels" (E. Gaboury, personal interview, July 1976). It is conceivable that while the elite was intent on advocating the goals of its ideology, the Francophone individual was more interested in earning a living in an English society. As a consequence, this may well have diverted his interests away from the Francophone ideology.

#### Changing Values - A Confrontation

The powerful force of nature on the rampage was soon to come to Roblin's aid in beginning the work of demolishing the creaking structure of the Progressive administration (Jackson, 1970:241).

The soft zephyr which had swelled the sails of the Liberal-Progressive administration for thirty-six years had grown fatigued. The Campbell government had driven itself to stagnation. According to Stinson (1975:73) :

What defeated him (Campbell) in 1958, was a poor record of

achievement, a failure to keep pace with changing times.

As Roblin's Conservatives came to power in 1958, and with a majority government in 1959, the winds of change swept Manitoba and set it on a new course. Roblin opened the floodgates of change giving Manitoba a freshness, an effervescence, a revitalization which projected it squarely into the twentieth century.

Part of this change occurred in conjunction with economic growth and expansion in the province. The Manitoba economy during the sixties was to experience an upward swing. Earl (1967:22) writing in the Western Business and Industry, stated :

... business and government leaders in Manitoba see little reason why prosperity of their province in the last five years shouldn't continue in 1967.

By 1966, record growth was registered in various sectors of the economy such as agriculture, manufacturing industry, mining, and so on. Earl (1967:39) added :

Manitoba has not enjoyed the advantage of money producing resources which are bulging the treasuries of its adjoining neighbours. Nonetheless, its log of economic development in 1966 was one of the most favorable in the history of the province.

This growth based on various indicators would continue.

The Financial Post (1967:17) reported on an investment survey by the Wood Gundy Securities Ltd., saying :

Investment survey sees a rosy future for Manitoba Economy... still strongly agricultural, the province is developing an industrial structure attuned to technological trends and export markets.

This economic development may have served as an impetus to other fundamental changes, namely, social and political attitudes.

It seems reasonable to suggest that the affluence generated by a bouyant economy may have ushered in more optimism and a greater concern for equality and opportunity. As a consequence, an increased tolerance associated with times of plenty would augur well for Franco-Manitobans. Moreover, the sixties would be characterized by a people flirting with new hopes, new aspirations, new values and attitudes. Guided by a generation gripped with an insatiable desire to do away with traditionalism and false pretenses, North Americans would slowly be led to the questioning of their fundamental values.

Against this background of change could be heard the incipient rumblings of an ideological transformation which would characterize the Franco-Manitoban Community during the sixties. The rumblings in Manitoba were not, however, the beginning of a tumultuous revolution but rather the after-shocks of the societal upheaval in Quebec. Indeed, it would be false to suggest that the spirit of Franco-Manitobans had suddenly animated itself. It came rather from the heart of French Canada. Quebec, during that period, was attending to the dismembering of its traditional authoritarian ideology which, under the Duplessis regime, had suppressed all forms of democracy and which, under the spiritual colonialism of the Church, had imposed a tyrannical doctrine and a most rigorous moral code.

This movement which became known as "la révolution tranquille" was greatly influenced by poets and writers alike. Indeed the literature served as an undercurrent to the malaise which led Quebec to lay claim to the sixties as a period of collective reflection.

Blain (1967:12) writes :

Avec des poètes comme Saint Denis-Garneau et Alain Granbois, nos lettres ont assisté à la découverte de la condition humaine, dominée par les thèmes de la possession du monde et de la tentation de l'absolu. Le roman a tenté l'exploration du milieu social et de l'identité collective; Antoine Savard ferme le régionalisme traditionnel, Ringuet ouvre le passage à la civilisation urbaine, Roger Lemelin et Gabrielle Roy imposent la réalité du prolétariat. Roger Charbonneau et Robert Elie annoncent le drame de la bourgeoisie, un drame de culture et de vie spirituelle... Dès à présent, ce phénomène global de conscience et de désillusion collective présente tous les caractères de l'adolescence artistique, mais aussi les signes certains d'une démarche irrépressible vers la conquête de la maturité.

However, while the poets and writers may have served as an impetus to the questioning of the structures and values of society, movements and other forms of literature overtly manifested the prevailing disenchantment. La Pierre (1967:370) remarks :

During the sixties, organizations like the Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques and the Mouvement Laïque de Langue Française, reviews like Cité Libre, Parti-Pris, and the Dominican Maintenant have greatly influenced the re-evaluation of Quebec's traditional institutions, especially the legacy of clerical paternalism.

The Quiet Revolution in Quebec, however, touched upon all aspects of society; it was comprehensive. Of the collective re-evaluation, La Pierre (1967:366) notes :

It is the comprehensive effort of hundreds of thousands of individuals to reassess completely their individual and collective values, their institutions, their way of thinking, their way of life, and even the relationship that binds them to their Creator.

This collective self-appraisal in Quebec, which led to extreme positions such as the separatist movement (cf. Raymond Barbeau's, J'ai choisi l'indépendance; Marcel Chaput's, Pourquoi je suis séparatiste) led the federal government to rethink the entire

concept of Confederation. Indeed the nationalism espoused by Bourassa and later Laurendeau became attractive if only to respond to the separatist threat.

With Quebec coming alive, some elements of the Franco-Manitoban community were injected with a hope that perhaps their existence could now be seen within a larger pan-Canadian context. This new context proposed a federalism in which they could participate, not as a lost people, but as part of a founding people. As Mason Wade (1968:1119) notes :

Throughout the postwar years but more particularly since 1960, French Canada has been a society in full and rapid evolution in all its aspects.... This development has brought an increasing concern in Quebec with the lot of the French minorities in the other provinces and a demand for full equality of the French and English languages throughout Canada.

Although Franco-Manitobans, as their Quebec counterpart, were dominated by an elite, its minority status offered a different dimension. If dissatisfied the individual could easily opt for the dominant group if it represented a way out. A community uninvolved in its affairs soon loses sight of its character. Indeed, the collective will, once a high point of "la survivance" was gravely faltering. The Francophone community was slowly disintegrating. As a minority, it was literally submerged in a sea of North American culture. Its defensive stance had been to preserve the past unaware that this quasi-paranoid concern might serve to destroy it. The old clichés of the past were falling upon insensitive ears. Would it not be easier to simply admit defeat ? It would seem from the following figures that many did indeed choose to relinquish their ethnic affiliation.

TABLE I  
Assimilation rate of Franco-Manitobans  
(Mother Tongue/Ethnic Origin)  
1941-1971

| Year | Manitobans of French Origin | Manitobans whose Mother Tongue is French. | Assimilation Rate |
|------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1941 | 52,996                      | 51,546                                    | 2,74 %            |
| 1951 | 66,020                      | 54,199                                    | 17,91 %           |
| 1961 | 83,936                      | 60,899                                    | 27,45 %           |
| 1971 | 86,515                      | 60,550                                    | 30,01 %           |

Source : Rapport-Centre de Recherches du Collège de St. Boniface  
(Mars 1976).

Linguistically it can be seen that Francophones were, until 1971, being assimilated by the dominant culture at an ever increasing rate. Although attitudes and motivations of parents are difficult to ascertain because of a lack of empirical evidence, it would seem that the following are noteworthy :

- (1) La nécessité au Manitoba d'avoir une très bonne connaissance de l'anglais, surtout en ce qui a trait au marché du travail.
- (2) Auto-perception des Franco-Manitobains comme étant économiquement désavantagés relativement aux groupes dominants de la société, d'où un désir puissant, souvent inconscient, d'intégration à ces groupes au plan linguistique tout autant que dans d'autres domaines.
- (3) L'éducation en français pourrait limiter la mobilité sociale, géographique ou académique de leurs enfants.
- (4) Les débouchés en éducation française sont très limités pour leurs enfants lorsque ceux-ci auront terminé le secondaire. Au niveau universitaire, le Collège de St. Boniface n'offre qu'un nombre limité d'options,

alors qu'au niveau de l'école technique, il se donne aucun cours en français au Manitoba, à l'exception du cours de secrétariat bilingue.

- (5) Les parents venant d'un milieu rural semblent s'inquiéter davantage de la capacité de leurs enfants à maîtriser l'anglais; il semble, que s'il fallait choisir entre la maîtrise de l'une ou de l'autre langue, ils abandonneraient plus rapidement le français.

(Rapport - Rendement Académique et Langue d'Enseignement chez les élèves Franco-Manitobains. Centre de Recherches Manitoba, Mars 1976).

In November 1964 a new weekly, the St. Boniface Courier, made its appearance on the journalistic scene in Winnipeg. The weekly was to be bilingual. Raymond Hebert, a twenty year old Franco-Manitoban, became editor. In February 1965, Hebert demonstrated that the time for serious questioning had arrived. Indeed a rude awakening was to follow. His editorial, in part, read :

Par son omniprésence, qui ne peut être mise en question publiquement, à cause précisément des services d'information fermés, le cléricalisme étouffe lentement la société franco-manitobaine. Le cléricalisme en soi comme système social est une mauvaise chose. Et au Manitoba, encore plus qu'au Québec, un bon chrétien se doit d'être anticlérical, car le problème de la société française ici est beaucoup plus urgent et dépend encore plus de franc parler.

The clericalism referred to by Hebert was defined by Elaine (1967:18) :

Rechercher les causes profondes de l'oppression se ramène à examiner une double annexion de l'Eglise, qui définit l'essence même de son cléricalisme : envahissement du domaine temporel par le pouvoir hiérarchique, envahissement de la vie intellectuelle par le dogmatisme religieux... le second menace plus directement la liberté de l'esprit, comme phénomène d'aliénation de la culture au bénéfice de la théologie, et subtil détournement des valeurs de l'humain aux valeurs du divin.

The battle lines were now drawn; Hebert had fired the first salvo. It was merely a matter of time to mount an offensive. In its editorial of March 18, La Liberté wrote :

Au Manitoba, les "séparatistes", au moins en esprit, ne manquent pas; surtout parmi certains jeunes qui semblent vouloir reprendre en sens inverse le chemin qui a conduit leurs ancêtres du Québec vers l'Ouest.

The following week, in an editorial entitled "La fidélité française du clergé dans l'Ouest", La Liberté (March 25, 1965) intoned :

De plus, la paroisse centre de la foi, dont la langue était autrefois la soeur jumelle, exerce toujours une forte influence comme centre de vie religieuse, dont le curé est l'animateur par sa doctrine, par ses conseils, par son zèle... il faut compter toujours... sur le dévouement d'une élite de la vie religieuse et sacerdotale.

Les Cloches de Saint-Boniface, the official review of the diocese, also reacted to Hebert's article. The editorial entitled "Réaction... non-aggressives..." stated that the expression "anticlericalisme" was ambiguous and that no proof had been provided to substantiate the accusation. While the article was indeed non-aggressive, calling for a cooler rationality, it contained an important and a perhaps significant message. It stated that the Church would welcome the idea of a lay community assuming the responsibilities now held by the clergy "pro tempore". The article was perhaps signalling the end of missionary role of the Church vis-à-vis the French community. While society in general was going through a period of transformation, the Church, following Vatican II, was also in the midst of profound changes.

But the wave of articles kept coming with the St. Boniface College student paper Frontières joining the St. Boniface Courier. With the acrimonious articles becoming a weekly reading fare, the French Catholic reactions were expected. Hebert was accused of collusion, of

being a socialist, an anti-clerical, and a communist. In order to appease the public and with the hope of providing some degree of rationality to a highly emotional situation, Bruno Lagacé wrote an open letter in La Liberté (March, 1965). The gist of the article was an exposé of the pseudo-Christianity which permeated the French community. It emphasized that the role of the priest ought to be one of friendship, of a fellow being rather than as a domineering figure. But the reactions were that much more intense. Instead of one communist, there were now two. As Lagacé stated retrospectively (St. Boniface Courier, February 28, 1968), "Dès lors le conflit entre la langue et la foi était engagé."

During the same period there emerged an ideology which was a slight variation of the first :

The proponents... hold that religious values are supreme and that ethnic values are ephemeral and secondary... non-French Catholic leaders and the lay Catholic elite of various ethnic groups... have convinced certain elements within French Manitoba that the French language will inevitably disappear... in Manitoba and that the process of assimilation should be accelerated to allow a "common front" of Manitoba Catholics. This, they assert, will ensure survival and growth of the Catholic faith and Catholic power in the province. (Vallaincourt and Hebert, 1971:184-5).

On March 15, 1965, the Manitoba Association for Equality in Education was founded. As a Catholic pressure group, its primary objective was the public financing of separate schools. The French clergy backed the new Association. Members of the executive of the AECFM, including the president, joined the executive council. This new coalition in support for denominational schools was interpreted by a growing radical element within the French community as a blatant proof that the AECFM was more interested in political actions which would promote Catholicism. Such public manifestations for language rights had never been undertaken. It would seem that the AECFM was

intent on maintaining Archbishop Langevin's concerns during the early part of the century.

It was in the summer of 1965 that the field of action shifted from clericalism to education. Two articles appeared in La Liberté in consecutive issues. The articles "Ecole catholique et école française" (Aug. 26 and Sept. 2) propounded Catholicism first and relegated the fight for language rights as a secondary issue. Hebert, in reaction to the articles, wrote :

... nous croyons que la langue et la culture française au Manitoba sont bien plus gravement menacées de disparition que la foi catholique. Ensuite, nous devons avouer que nous ne voyons pas encore le rapport inhérent qui pourrait exister entre langue française et foi catholique... la lutte pour les écoles catholiques n'est pas la lutte des canadiens français en particulier mais des catholiques en général... nous ne voulons pas déchristianiser l'école, nous voulons la franciser (St. Boniface Courier, Sept. 29, 1965).

This was the feeling at least to the most radical elements among the Franco-Manitobans. If the French community was to assume a new orientation it was imperative that the AECM be transformed. The twenty-sixth general congress of the AECM was to be held on the thirtieth of October (1965). Lagacé's message was clear :

Si de nouveau cette année nous voyons l'élection d'un groupe de vieux en esprit par des vieux en esprit et pour des vieux en esprit, l'Association continuera son chemin rapide vers sa propre destruction (St. Boniface Courier, Oct. 27, 1965).

The Congress, which saw the two antagonistic groups meet head on, would elect a more pragmatic leadership. A new executive was named whose president was Louis Deniset, judge for the Court of Queen's Bench. Deniset had been more or less acceptable to both groups, thus his stewardship was regarded by some as being part of a transitional scheme. Whether the new executive had elaborated a plan that would

transform the AECFM and thereby provide a revitalized leadership is questionable. To be sure, the twenty-seventh congress in 1966, which marked the association's fiftieth anniversary, had all the trappings and pomp of its past traditions. As Leblanc (1968:90) noted :

Aussi les célébrations du cinquantenaire de l'Association d'Education abondèrent en messes pontificales et mirent en vedette le cardinal Roy, le tout constituant une sorte d'expiation pour les excès du congrès de 1965.

On October 21, 1966, the executive of the AECFM held a press conference to announce the celebrations of its fiftieth anniversary. The Winnipeg Free Press carried the following headline : "French 'Call to Arms' vowed Unless Language Made Official." Rheal Teffaine, a young lawyer and public relations chairman for the Association, stated :

We will use 1966 methods of getting what we demand. We have been waiting 50 years.... The time of briefs is over. We are going to take action to get results. (Winnipeg Free Press, Oct. 21, 1966).

The president Louis Deniset, was reported by the Winnipeg Free Press (Oct. 21, 1966) to have said :

We have been waiting 50 years. We want that law amended and we intend to have it amended... We consider that for all intents and purposes the law does not exist... We were taught in French in spite of the law, because, to quote Dickens, the law was an ass.

The assertion by Deniset immediately acquired journalistic importance and had also serious legal ramifications. La Liberté accused the two English newspapers of racism and of attributing to the judge statements he had not made. Be that as it may, the harm was done. On October 24, Deniset resigned saying, "I didn't think it proper for a judge to be an official of an association that advocates a stand on a political question" (Tribune, Oct. 24, 1966).

It would have been indeed ironic for the judge to declare that "the law was an ass!" There appears to be some ambiguity surrounding this episode. However, a number of interviewees have stated that the press conference, and its eventual consequences, may have been part of an overall plan to change the image of the AECEM in accordance with the more progressive elements of the Franco-Manitoban society. The ideal sought was a more pragmatic, and indeed, a more existential, image concerned with the totality of Franco-Manitoban life. The next two years would see the "old" Association die a quiet death and replaced by a more politicized organization - "La Société Franco-Manitobaine".

The separation had been effected, if not in fact, at least in thought. Language and faith would now coexist, faith being a facet of life not life itself. The basis of the dissatisfaction which ran as an undercurrent to these initial activities was well expressed by Leger. Although written in relation to Quebec, the statement has some importance for the Franco-Manitoban community :

What we pretend to be, to represent, to embody, can have no meaning unless it animates a modern, passionate, creative society that is a place for progress, justice and prosperity for all its members. Otherwise it is really a deception to urge people, and particularly young people, to efforts, sacrifices and a kind of everlasting crusade to maintain at all costs the semi-autonomy of a prostrate nation expressing in a painful patois the vestiges of its culture and the signs of its growing assimilation in all areas (Leger, 1969:310).

In the area of education, the French language was given the status of official language of instruction by the Roblin government in April 1967. The Bill, however, was too restrictive in its application and restricted in its formulation. The leaders of the Franco-Manitoban community would endeavour to get a more equitable treatment.

Summary Comment

The above discussion has touched upon essentially three areas :

- (a) the dominant ideology which has helped the Franco-Manitoban community to conserve its language and culture;
- (b) the failure of the ruling elite to grasp the impact of an evolving society and how it affected its people;
- (c) the main events which have altered the French language policy in Manitoba to 1967.

If the foregoing appears critical with regards to the rural-clerical ideology it does not by extension belittle the crucial role of the clergy in helping to maintain and to transmit the language and culture of the Franco-Manitobans. To be sure, the clergy, by its ubiquitous commitment and presence was most important in combatting the assimilative forces. However, the position of the French since World War II, appears to have been precarious indeed. This raises the question of whether the dominant ideology was in fact well entrenched in the mind and attitude of the general population, or was it the exclusive expression of the elite. It may well be that linguistic and cultural values were subordinated to religious values. In so doing, attention to language and culture was slowly being eroded. Moreover, it would appear that preservation and conservation was as much an accident of history as the work of a well intentioned elite. Indeed, the state of societal development aided immensely in the task, while later developments appear to have precipitated Franco-Manitobans toward a greater degree of assimilation. The Franco-Manitoban elite, in addition to being out of touch reflected a

false image of the people they led. From 1965, some elements of the community undertook the task of transforming both the leadership and the traditional ideology. This transformation was crucial. Essentially, the "new" leadership would have to obtain grassroots involvement to ensure a greater representation.

On the national level, increasing federal involvement in bilingualism seemed more reassuring. Federalism, was slowly generating a greater degree of awareness of the basic essence of Canada and its two founding peoples. The stage seemed set for the events that were to follow. The next chapter will present those events which marked the period while describing the continued experiment of the Franco-Manitobans.

## Chapter 4

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILL 113

This chapter will present :

- (a) the reconstruction of events which had a direct bearing on the development of Bill 113 and,
- (b) a description of the continued evolution of the Franco-Manitoban community. The basis of presentation will be chronological with both themes intermingled in order to preserve continuity and to maintain their interrelatedness. Finally, the evidence presented is based on documents, newspapers, and interview. An events chart is presented in Appendix D highlighting those events which were thought to have a significant impact upon the development of Bill 113.

#### Roblin's Legacy to Franco-Manitobans

Against a background of camaraderie and euphoria which swept Canada during its Centennial year, compounded by the excitement being generated by Expo 67, Bill 59 received royal assent in the Manitoba Legislature on April 27, 1967. The Bill, which passed unanimously, marked a significant departure from any previous arrangement. It heralded the official recognition of French as a language of instruction. Indeed, it appeared to be a major step forward for the Franco-Manitoban community.

Subsection (3) of Bill 59 in part, read:

... the French language, being one of the two languages to which reference is made in the British North America Act, 1867, may be used as a language of instruction. (Statutes of Manitoba, 1966-67, 15-16)

However, section (7) placed the following restriction :

The total time in which a language other than English may be used (a) as a language of instruction... shall not exceed one-half of the instructional time in any day (Statutes of Manitoba, 1966-67, 15-16).

Commenting on the Bill, Ml. Alfred Monin and Rhéal Teffaine remarked that the piece of legislation had been a compromise (Personal Communication,\* July, 1976). At a meeting called by Premier Roblin, attended by various ethnic groups, the bill had been discussed and finally approved "en catimini et sans rouspétance" (Monin, P.C. July 13, 1976). Noteworthy was the fact that representatives of the AESFM had not been asked to participate.

Reactions to the Bill were varied. The Winnipeg Tribune (April 26, 1967) echoed, "Manitoba now third in French Education." Le Devoir (March 30, 1967) was more impressed calling it "un gain substantiel". La Liberté (March 30, 1967) on a cooler note stated, "Un autre pas en avant" - a subtle intimation that perhaps another step forward would be taken later. However, it noted that, finally, linguistic rights had been restored.

The Liberal MlA for St. Boniface, Laurent Desjardins, the most voriferous and, at times, the most acrimonious member to demand language rights and aid to parochial schools, lauded the government (Debates and Proceedings, Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, 1st session, 28th Legislature No. 68-106 pp. 1575-2539, 1966-67) :

I am now pleased to express my appreciation to the Minister of Education... I wish, Sir, my congratulations to be as forceful now as my criticism was in the past.

Desjardins no doubt claimed a certain amount of credit. He had been the motivating force which, through astute planning, saw the Liberal party of Manitoba adopt a resolution recognizing French as a

(\*Personal Communication, henceforth abbreviated P.C.)

language of instruction. The strategy, according to Desjardins (P.C. July 21, 1976), of incorporating the resolution in the party platform was with the hope of giving the Roblin government sufficient internal fortitude to adopt a similar policy.

If Bill 59 was considered by some people a major step forward, it was not without its inherent problems, especially with respect to implementation. W.C. Lorimer, Deputy Minister of Education, indicated that he could see problems in implementating the legislation (Winnipeg Free Press, December 6, 1967). Concerns had been raised by two associates of the Hedlin-Menzies and Associates consulting firm of Winnipeg. In a letter (H. Prefontaine, personal files) to Premier Roblin dated March 22, 1967, MM. B. Lagacé and H. Préfontaine had declared :

The tenor of sub-sections (4), (3) and (9)(d) is unnecessarily negative and defensive and the implication of the chosen wording is a perpetuation of the "ghetto" concept of segregation by language. Evidently, this familiar concept is incompatible with proper determination of district, area, or division boundaries toward the greatest overall qualities of education, and the larger divisions will certainly make effective "ghetto-izing" increasingly impracticable.

In the same letter the authors noted that a dissenting parent could restrict the implementation of the law (H. Préfontaine, personal files) :

... the reference to any single pupil not being required to receive instruction in the French language if his parent or guardian makes written objection and the parallel provision for the instruction of English of any pupil whose parent or guardian makes (such) an objection not only tends to detract from the worthy motivation of the development of the legislation, but renders its implementation subject to unnecessary political, educational, and administrative problem.

Conscious planning and a proper administrative structure concerned with and providing the wherewithal for the implementation of Bill 59 had not been established. It would seem that the Department

of Education had little motivation to assume the responsibility.

According to G.M. Davies (Winnipeg Free Press, September 18, 1968) Assistant Deputy Minister of Education, the onus of French teaching "rests with parents".

The results of the legislation was later expressed (Rallye Handbook, 1968:3) :

De fait, en enlevant à la cause patriotique traditionnelle sa raison d'être et en mettant ainsi à jour toute l'indifférence et la démoralisation qui règnent au sein de la population francophone, la nouvelle loi lançait un défi aux Manitobains de langue française, celui de se prévaloir de leurs droits nouvellement acquis, ou d'accepter le coup de grâce porté à leur identité culturelle.

As 1967 was drawing to a close, Dufferin Roblin would bow out of provincial politics. Armed with a record of economic expansion and the recognition of French, Roblin envisaged the leadership of the National Progressive Conservative Party. At a "Dinner with Duff" which saw sixteen hundred supporters give their best wishes to the departing premier, Roblin stated (Winnipeg Tribune, November 25, 1967) :

Let us strive therefore to accord newer, wider and more generous recognition and respect to both languages and both personalities of our country.

Roblin, as conventional wisdom has it, had had immense sympathy for the French. His cabinet, however, had been very much divided on the issue (P.C. Laurent Desjardins, July 21, 1976).

#### A Search for an Alternative

During the course of 1967, the AECEM had developed a greater awareness of the full import of the changes which had affected its community since World War II. Secularization had brought about significant attitudinal changes with respect to religious values; urbanization

had destroyed the rural-parochial base of the Franco-Manitoban society; mass media had brought the community into the mainstream of North American culture, and the Church had largely relinquished its traditional leadership role, thereby creating a vacuum. The AECM had not planned for these changes. Indeed, its persistence in maintaining an obsolete ideology, blended with an elitist disposition (Teffaine, P.C. July 20, 1976; Gaboury, P.C. July 22, 1976) had opened a tremendous gap between itself and its population. The impact and ramifications of these changes, which seriously impinged upon its continued existence, would have to be gauged, evaluated and finally brought to the fore in order to reestablish itself as the cornerstone of the Franco-Manitoban community. To do so, however, meant conducting a "grassroots operation."

With these various tensions serving as a source of motivation, the more progressive executive set out to explore its environment. The "congrès annuel" which served as a demonstration of unity and solidarity were now being viewed as an exercise in futility. The agenda consisted of bringing a few amendments to an outdated constitution. As Maurice Gauthier, then president of the AECM, allowed (P.C. July 15, 1976), "Il n'y aurait plus de congrès avant que l'on puisse établir son bien-fondé".

At a January 1967, meeting in St. Leon, the executive struck upon a means of extending itself into the community. The process involved a modified form of social animation. With the aid of a social animator provided by the federal government's ARDA administration, a seminar was held in Gimli in June (Valliancourt and Robert, 1971). The seminar brought together "representatives" of the Franco-Manitoban community. The outcome of the seminar was a new enthusiasm which hopefully would

translate itself into an animation programme. The Gimli experience caught the attention of La Liberté (June 15, 1967) :

L'association fait une expérience unique....  
C'est l'association qui a pris l'initiative  
simplement parce que les Franco-Manitobains  
se disaient de plus en plus que cette  
organisation ne valait plus rien dans nos  
temps modernes.

It would seem, however, that the "representatives" in Gimli had drawn that conclusion and not the general community. Ostensibly, the elitist syndrome was difficult to shed.

By the end of 1967, the executive of the ABCFM adopted the following resolution (ABCFM archives, 1967) :

Que le grand colloque 'Convention des Franco-Manitobains' soit organisé pour la fin d'avril, en se servant de la procédure des ateliers de travail et que l'on s'arrange pour que tous les secteurs de la population soient représentés.

Additionally, an independent commission composed of five individuals was set up, "en vue de découvrir et de former des chefs de file..." (Rallye Handbook, 1968:5). This Commission had two primary objectives: (a) to consult the Francophone population scattered throughout the province, and (b) to plan and organize the "Rallye du Manitoba Français" to be held in June of 1968.

With its mandate well defined, the Commission set out on an exploratory mission. It had approximately six months to perform a task which, according to experts (Report by M.D.W. Associates, "Le Rallye du Manitoba Français" Secrétariat d'Etat, Juillet 1966), would normally have taken a few years.

#### Federalism or a New Canadian Nationalism

Canadian federalism took on a new élan during the Pearson

years. A new conception of Canada was slowly emerging at the federal level, precipitated by a growing restlessness with the separatist movement in Quebec. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Prime Minister, was motivated to state (House of Commons Debate, December 17, 1962; cited in Arès, 1972:21):

Pour les Canadiens de langue française, la Confédération créait une nation bilingue et biculturelle. Elle protégeait leur langue et leur culture dans tout le Canada. Elle signifiait une association et non une domination. Les Canadiens francophones ont cru que cette association signifiait des chances et des possibilités égales pour les deux races fondatrices, à toutes les étapes de la croissance du pays. Les Canadiens de langue anglaise reconnaissent bien sûr, que l'entente confédérative protégeait les droits des Canadiens français dans la province du Québec, au Parlement et dans les tribunaux fédéraux. Mais la plupart avaient l'impression... qu'elle ne s'étendait pas plus loin que ces limites, du moins jusqu'à une époque encore très récente. Cela signifiait qu'à toutes fins utiles, il existerait un Canada de langue anglaise, avec un Québec bilingue. Ce qu'on appelle le fait français devait être quelque chose d'uniquement provincial.

The French Canadian conception of Confederation, as outlined by Pearson, was essentially the one proposed by Henri Bourassa at the turn of the century. Bourassa, a staunch French nationalist, had appealed for the support of a compact theory. Bourassa declared in 1917 (Cook; 1966:51):

The Canadian nation will attain its ultimate destiny, indeed it will exist, only on the condition of being biethnic and bilingual, and by remaining faithful to the concept of the Fathers of Confederation: the free and voluntary association of two peoples, enjoying equal rights in all matters.

Cook (1966:51) adds:

For Bourassa and his followers, Confederation was a federation of two cultures, as well as of provinces in which French - and English-speaking Canadians - had

a moral claim to equality of linguistic, religious, and civil rights from coast to coast.

It was during the years of crisis over the rights of French minorities outside Quebec, in Ontario in 1912 and Manitoba in 1916, that the compact theory was evolved. But countering this French nationalism was an English nationalism. According to Arès (1972) this form of nationalism can be summarized as follows: a bilingual Quebec within an English Canada. Thus the French fact would be limited to a single province, Quebec. An advocate of this view was, and still is, the historian Donald Creighton. In an article entitled "The Myth of Biculturalism or The Great French-Canadian Sales Campaign", Creighton (Saturday Night 81:35-39, September 1966) outlined his views:

For six long years, ever since the lately deposed Premier Jean Lesage won power in the Province of Quebec, English Canadians have been subjected to what is undoubtedly the most extreme example of political hardsell in their entire experience... the advocates of French Canadian "nationalism" have used every conceivable form of persuasion, compulsion, shock and menace to compel English Canadians to buy a particular view of Confederation.... They appropriated two fine, big words, "bilingualism" and "biculturalism", to describe the ideal at which Canadian society ought to aim.... Their campaign had not gone very far when it was given magnificent official recognition and approval by Prime Minister Pearson, who obligingly established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Creighton's (1970:333) position was made yet clearer when he remarked:

By the time the Liberals gained power at Ottawa in the spring of 1963, the validity of the French-Canadian grievances, the need for reparation by English Canada, and the deficiencies of the Canadian constitution had become the nation's three most popular dogmas. They dangerously undermined Canada's cohesive strength at the very moment when its continued existence as an independent nation was threatened by the pressure of external forces.

For Creighton, the English nationalist, the compact theory stands as a false interpretation of the legal basis of Confederation. However, if Creighton appears convinced of his interpretation, other historians appear as convinced of the compact theory. Ares (1967) in his book Dossier Sur le Pacte Fédératif, reviews the debate from 1864 to 1965, and concludes that the debate is far from resolved. Ares (1967:250) remarks "De la réponse qu'on donne à cette question dépend l'avenir du Canada, du Canada français et du Québec."

Stanley (1974) in an article entitled "Act or Pact? Another Look at Confederation" traces the origin and growth of the compact theory. Stanley (1974:95) states:

That civil strife in Canada has never degenerated into civil war has been due, in part at least, to the recognition by both peoples of the necessity of some modus vivendi and the recognition by each of the rights of the other. The recognition and definition of these rights is the basis of the entente, understanding, pact, compact... which is the foundation of our political unity... it is a gentleman's agreement, an understanding based upon mutual consent, with a moral rather than a judicial sanction.

Whatever the arguments put forth by the Anglo - or French - nationalist, to some the survival of Canada was at stake. Pierre Trudeau (1967:39-40), a staunch federalist, would state prior to his entry in Federal politics:

Un des moyens de contrebalancer l'attrait du séparatisme, c'est d'employer un temps, une énergie et des sommes énormes au service du nationalisme fédéral... On doit faire sentir à tous les citoyens que c'est seulement dans le cadre de l'Etat Fédéral que leur langue, leur culture, leurs intentions, leurs traditions les plus sacrées et leur niveau de vie peuvent échapper aux assauts de l'extérieur et aux conflits de l'intérieur.

Separatism could be fought only through constitutional arrangements which would recognize the concept of two founding peoples, and their harmonious co-existence within a context called Canada.

Pearson reiterated his concern over the survival of Canada by warning (Free Press, May 21, 1963):

I cannot imagine anything at this time more serious to the progress, indeed, to the survival of our country as Confederation than a successful resolution of this problem.... So Quebec, to be Quebec, must be Quebec in Canada.

Thus it would appear that if the compact theory is not interpretable from the legal formulations of the Constitution of 1867, the federal government was, during the Pearson years, and continues to be, during the Trudeau years, the strongest advocate of the theory. Indeed, the most concrete support of the theory was when the Pearson government commissioned a Royal Inquiry on the question of bilingualism and biculturalism in the summer of 1963. The terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism were to (Innis, 1973: forward):

... inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend that steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between two founding races, taking into account the contribution to the enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.

The Preliminary Report of the Commission was tabled February 1, 1965. The ten member commission had travelled throughout Canada for months in order to apprehend the extent of the problem. What was discovered was "that Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history".

(Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Preliminary Report, 1965:13).

Two and one half years later, the Commission submitted the first report entitled Official Languages. Essentially, the report urged equality of both the French and English languages (Winnipeg Tribune, December 5, 1967) :

The Royal Commission... recommends that French Canadians outside Quebec should be accorded the linguistic equality already enjoyed by English Canadians within Quebec.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, however, did not resolve Canada's problem or crisis. To be sure, the ethnic cleavage between French and English is as strong and as polarized as ever. The Commission undoubtedly created a greater degree of awareness of the problems confronting the Canadian population as a whole. The Commission, as most interviewees unequivocally stated, created a different climate. Gauthier (P.C. July 15, 1976) stated that "... commission B and B a donné un nouvel enthousiasme aux francophones." Justice Monin (P.C. July 13, 1976) intimated :

"Les enquêtes de la Commission Laurendeau - Dunton créèrent un élément de crise. La communauté francophone, de par le passé, avait réussi à masquer sa faiblesse. Devant la Commission, elle dut dévoiler cette faiblesse."

The full import of the Commission is difficult to assess. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that it gave Franco-Manitobans a resurgence of hope. Perhaps there was reason to believe, as in the case of the leadership, in efforts to revive the waning spirit of the community, since to this point the Franco-Manitoban community had had to fend for itself in its project of survival. Now the Federal

Government was showing signs of being concerned.

### The Constitutional Conference

As part of its ongoing efforts to promote its federalist project, Prime Minister Pearson, acting upon the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, called a Constitutional Conference. The major focus of the conference was to have French language rights entrenched in the Constitution. However, the three day constitutional conference which began February 5, 1968, did not result in a New Jerusalem. But Prime Minister Pearson referred to it as "a great new act of accommodation." (Winnipeg Tribune, February 5, 1968). The Prime Minister reiterated (Winnipeg Tribune, February 5, 1968) before the ten provincial premiers, that "What is at stake in my opinion is no less than Canada's survival as a nation."

Essentially, the conference could be described as  
(Time - The Weekly Magazine; 1968, 91(7):9)

... an historic reversal of the first century's whittling away of French minority rights....  
The conference agreed that 'as a matter of equity and as proposed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; French speaking Canadians outside Quebec should have the same rights as English speaking Canadians inside Quebec.'

There was agreement by all provinces that French language rights should be recognized in all of English Canada. However, there was hesitation by both Alberta and British Columbia as to the entrenchment of linguistic rights within the Constitution. Premier Bennett of British Columbia was the most reticent, representing perhaps the most ardent anglo-nationalistic view by calling his

province (Time - The Weekly Magazine; 1968, 91(7):10), "the friendly society of unhyphenated Canadians."

Manitoba's Walter Weir acknowledged that he would support the entrenchment of linguistic rights in the Constitution. However, his later pronouncements supported the concept of bringing the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada, as suggested by the other Western premiers. Edinborough in Saturday Night (April, 1969: 12, 15) summarized the attitudes of Weir and Strom :

The Supreme Court can rule on the constitutional validity of the proposed legislation (Official Languages Act), but it can only interpret the present Constitution; and it was to change this that the Prime Minister called the meeting that Strom and Weir so effectively disrupted. It seems very small minded to reject the present Constitution on the one hand, and then to shelter behind it on the other.

Concrete implementation of French linguistic rights in Manitoba would later be shaded by a policy of "gradualism".

### The Grand Experiment

If the Pearson government was committed to its federalist project, the French leadership in Manitoba was no less committed to its project of social animation. Following the Gimli seminar in June, 1967, the French leadership had made plans to approach the French community. By February of 1968, the Rallye organizers were ready to launch their project. At a press conference, Hubert Prefontaine, the technical director, stated:

Manitoba's French community today announced an audacious programme of social, economic and cultural development among its 80,000 members. The first stage of the scheme, which has been christened "Le Rallye du Manitoba Francais" or Manitoba French Rally,

includes a province wide process of collective self-appraisal and leadership development. The principal aims... are real popular representation, and an unbiased study of current social, economic and cultural prospects... The new group responsible for the plan is independent of existing structures and organizations... The group has selected for its theme: "French-speaking Manitobans face Canada's second century". This general heading was chosen to avoid imposing any predetermined ideology, and patriotic cause, any assumptions about specific goals and concepts. (Press Release, Commission du Rallye, February 9, 1968).

The Rallye's technical director, Hubert Prefontaine, stated that the plan was designed (Winnipeg Free Press, February 9, 1968), "to develop leadership among French-speaking people in the province; study whatever problems we may have as a community; discover for certain just what the position of the French-speaking Manitobans really is, unify." The president of the AECFM, Maurice Gauthier, stated (Winnipeg Tribune, February 9, 1968) that he fully endorsed the Rallye and avowed that, "Le Rallye will bury once and for all the contention by certain people that the French fact is dead in Manitoba."

The Rallye was based, from its earliest stage, on the principles and techniques of participation proposed by the process of social animation. During a period of three months, from March to May, five animators visited the Franco-Manitoban centers. In a first round, the local leadership was made aware of the Rallye - its procedures and its possibilities. At a second meeting with the social animators, local organizations selected delegates to the June convention.

The time restrictions and lack of personnel posed some problems. The M.D.T. associates' evaluation report noted (Secretariat d'Etat, Juillet 1968):

L'animation sociale proprement dite est un processus de longue haleine et il est clair que le Rallye n'a utilisé qu'une forme mitigée d'animation... Le fait que les techniques de l'animation sociale n'ont été utilisées que partiellement... a posé plusieurs problèmes ... ces lacunes se situent au niveau de la représentativité, de la directivité... Le Rallye, étant donné ses limites de temps et de personnel, n'a pu que prendre le premier pas vers une organisation réellement représentative.

Notwithstanding the preparatory phase and the constraints therein implied, the Rallye was held from June 7 to June 9, 1968. The experience, in general, was a success. The three hundred delegates were involved in workshops dealing with four basic themes (Rallye Handbook, 1968:8):

- Politics: (i) Constitutional matters; Manitoba, Quebec, and Ottawa
- (ii) Language rights and linguistic districts.
- Culture: (i) Education, educational research, schools, and adult education
- (ii) Communication, radio and television, newspaper, and culture.
- Social: (i) French-English relations at the institutional and organizational levels, group and individual level.
- (ii) Urbanization, assimilation, reorientation and adaptation, immigration
- Economic: (i) Personal and family economy, professional and technical training, job and revenue, buying and saving
- (ii) Community and political economy, industries, cooperatives, and business.

The focus of the Rallye was intentionally more pragmatic, reflecting, the consensus of the larger society. Education, while not deemphasized, took its place on a level of importance with

other preoccupations such as economics, sociology, and politics.

La Liberté (June 12, 1968) summed up the Rallye as:

Travail positif très sérieux... C'est surtout en tant que Franco-Manitobain que nous l'avons senti... Ils découvraient tout à coup que notre vie française ne se résume pas à quelques cours de français ou à des manifestations folkloriques ou culturelles, mais qu'elle se prolonge aussi dans la politique et dans l'organisation économique et sociale... si le but du Rallye était de faire prendre conscience par tous les délégués de la nécessité pour eux de retrousser leurs manches et de travailler sans plus tarder à l'animation de leur propre milieu, nous croyons que ce but a été atteint...

The Winnipeg Free Press (June 10, 1968) reported that "A Quiet Revolution was born this weekend in St. Boniface." The self-analysis touched upon such items as the inferiority complex of the Franco-Manitobans, lack of pride in the French language, re-evaluation of the priest in the Franco-Manitoban community, dissatisfaction with French education of the youth both at home and at school (Winnipeg Free Press, June 10, 1968). Apart from the self-analysis or "prise de conscience," concrete action was taken as follow-up to the convention. A ten member commission was set up with a mandate to create a new organization which would in effect reflect all sectors of the Franco-Manitoban society.

In the perception of many, the Rallye was a tremendous success. Indeed, it served to generate a significant amount of discussion and involved a fairly important segment of the community. However, not everyone supported this contention. Roland Marcoux, a social animator, extensively involved in the preparatory phase of the Rallye expressed an opposite view (P.C. July 1976), "Le Rallye 68 fut raté royalement. L'objectif du Rallye se fixait dans un cadre économique; le message a été mal compris."

On a more fundamental note, Valliancourt and Hébert (1971:181)

were highly critical the ten-member commission :

Within a very short period of time, however, this commission had been expanded to include the five-member executive of l'Association d'Education since many members of the original ten-person commission could easily be considered members of the community's traditional elite, the balance of power within the expanded commission had in effect precluded the possibility of creation of a radically different organization, based upon broad popular participation.

Maurice Gauthier (P.C. June 15, 1968) explained this move in terms of the need to preserve unity. It was his opinion that had the radical element prevailed and obtained the power they sought it might well have created a disastrous schism within the community; a division which would have effectively alienated a large portion of Franco-Manitobans. To maintain a proper balance, Gauthier felt that both groups had to be represented, thus maintaining a certain degree of unity.

In terms of ideology, there is reason to believe that Gauthier's rationalization may well have stifled the development of a new orientation. Moreover, it prevented the emergence of a new leadership by coopting the radical element within the existing power structure. The foment of the mid-sixties was effectively suppressed; the visions of a "new" ideology were obscured and the traditional elite was instrumental in preserving the ambiguity of the emerging ideology (Valliancourt and Hébert, 1971).

Notheless, the Rallye marked, at least in the perceptions of the interviewees, a significant change, that is, of laying to rest one component pervasive in the traditional ideology.

E. Gaboury (P.C. July 22, 1976) noted:

Nous ne voulions plus du passé. Il fallait agir politiquement et économiquement afin d'obtenir des "choses". On a mis de côté la religion catholique qui, jusqu'à ce temps, nous avait conditionnés à la soumission.

In much the same vein, R. Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) asserted:

Quant à la dualité langue-foi, le comité des quinze, organisé pour fonder la nouvelle association (S.F.M.) a supprimé tous vestiges de foi. Le concept de foi était devenu vieux jeu et d'ailleurs, les jeunes n'en voulaient plus.

Edward Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976) reflecting upon his personal perceptions on this subject, noted:

It was surprising to find that the issue of religion had lost its importance. I had equated both. The language-religion duality was still maintained by the older generation, but there was a marked distinction between the pre-war and post-war attitude. There was a general change of attitude.

In summation, the Rallye did initiate two fundamental changes: (a) it began a process of popular participation which brought the French leadership in face-to-face contact with its constituents, and (b) it served to alter the composition of the ruling elite.

#### A Significant Incident

In August 1968, Philippe Rossillon, a citizen of France, made a visit to Manitoba. His visit would have gone unnoticed had it not been for his position within the French government. Rossillon, as it turned out, reported directly to France's Prime Minister Couve de Murville. As head of a special

committee, Rossillon was concerned with the defence and expansion of the French language. Being a high ranking civil servant, protocol deemed it necessary that his presence in Canada be announced through the proper channels. However, it seemed that Rossillon wished to remain inconspicuous.

According to the spokesman of the French group welcoming Rossillon in St. Pierre, René Mulaire, the visit was strictly on a friendly basis and, was not in any way related to the plight of Francophones in Manitoba. Nonetheless, the Winnipeg Tribune (September 11, 1968) caught well the reaction of the federal government: "De Gaulle Agent Invades Manitoba. French Government agent here to Agitate", Prime Minister Trudeau quickly expressed his resentment by calling the incident a "sureptitious and underhanded act" of pure political agitation by the French government (Winnipeg Tribune, September 11, 1968).

The RCMP had unearthed that Rossillon had previous ties with the separatists in Quebec. Thus, the federal government was afraid that the affair would result in a backlash from the English community. For its part, the Francophone leadership in Manitoba dispelled the entire incident as (La Liberté, September 18, 1968), "Une tempête dans un verre d'eau", alluding to the fact that reactions had been grossly exaggerated. Prime Minister Trudeau used the occasion to advance the bilingual cause by saying (Winnipeg Tribune, September 17, 1968), "It will not be sufficient for governments leaders or public bodies to declare themselves in favor of bilingualism or even to pass legislation on the subject."

In other words, very much convinced of contrived interference by the French government, Trudeau accused the provincial premier of foot-dragging. Many viewed the affair as inconsequential, a mere incident, perhaps a gaullist affront. To be sure, De Gaulle stated (La Liberté, September 18, 1968), "Les rapports franco-canadiens ne changeront pas."

The Francophone leaders, however, construed the incident as a means of piercing the federal bureaucracy. Indeed, Justice Monin, very much the "grey eminence" (Gaboury, P.C. July 22, 1976) of the francophone leadership, was instrumental in causing Ottawa to look upon the Franco-Manitoban situation with a more focused attention. As Monin recalled (P.C. July 13, 1976):

De passage à Ottawa, j'ai rencontré Gérard Pelletier, Secrétaire d'Etat. J'ai précisé que le fédéral avait nettement exagéré l'incident; que le fédéral avait littéralement pris le mors aux dents. J'ai de plus expliqué que la minorité francophone était en voie de disparition si le gouvernement n'était pas en mesure d'offrir de l'aide. Les conséquences éventuelles seraient très graves. Peu après, M. Gauthier, président de la Commission du Rallié, reçut un appel d'Ottawa demandant une rencontre dans le plus bref délai.

Thus, by playing on the federal government's policy pronouncements to help French minorities outside Quebec, and by ringing the death knell of the Franco-Manitoban community if the federal aid was not forthcoming, there is reason to believe that Monin might well have precipitated the process. To be sure, shortly thereafter a delegation arrived in Ottawa to meet MM. Trudeau and Pelletier. The Winnipeg Tribune (October 24, 1968) carried the following item, "French Manitobans will meet Trudeau... to discuss the translation into facts of the national goals of the present

government." La Liberté (October 23, 1968) in a similar vein noted:

Le but sera de discuter des meilleurs moyens de faire passer dans la vie quotidienne des Franco-Manitobains les objectifs que le gouvernement actuel s'est fixés relativement aux questions de bilinguisme et de biculturalisme dans le Canada tout entier et plus particulièrement au Manitoba.

A few days later, La Liberté (October 30, 1968) reported the following:

M. Trudeau aux Franco-Manitobains: Vous pouvez compter sur des gestes concrets dans un avenir immédiat."

The Winnipeg Free Press (October 26, 1976) expressed it as, "Manitobans Get Ottawa Aid Pledge; French Leaders Promised Cultural Assistance." The assistance would take the form of (La Liberté, October 30, 1968):

assistance financière pour préparer le congrès de décembre; payer le salaire de six animateurs sociaux dont la tâche sera de combattre l'apathie chez les Franco-Manitobains; financer le maintien d'un secrétariat au service de la minorité francophone.

Thus, the repercussions of the Rossillon Affair could be viewed as beneficial to the Franco-Manitobans. Gauthier in responding to a Winnipeg Tribune reporter (Winnipeg Tribune, October 26, 1968) stated "... it enabled us to attain our objective a bit more quickly than we expected". Gauthier (P.C. July 15, 1976) reiterated that the Rossillon Affair was undoubtedly instrumental in bringing Ottawa in touch with Franco-Manitobans:

La visite de Rossillon a servi à faire démarrer Ottawa. L'incident nous a permis d'exprimer nos besoins, etc... auprès de M. Trudeau et de M. Pelletier. Cette rencontre a servi de déblocage.

Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) supported this contention:

L'affaire Rossillon eut des conséquences extraordinaires. Elle permit un déblocage avec le gouvernement fédéral. Lors d'une rencontre avec M. Trudeau, on lui fit part du fait que la loi concernant les langues officielles n'était pas suffisante.

It would seem therefore that the Rossillon Affair was used successfully as a political gambit to draw forth the attention of the federal government to the Franco-Manitoban situation. If the affair was fortuitous, the events thereafter played into the hands of the Francophone leaders.

"La Société Franco-Manitobaine" is born!

If the federal politicians had shown a certain degree of altruism toward the Franco-Manitobans, the provincial premier, Walter Weir, did not manifest any signs of benevolence. Indeed, in response to a French delegation which had met the premier to discuss matters related to the French community, Weir was non-committal (Free Press, November 13, 1968), "... to me, matters relating to the economy of the country are more important." La Liberté (November 13, 1968) reported Gauthier's frustrations:

Il semble que M. Weir nous met tous dans le même sac, avec les Indiens, les Ukrainiens, les Islandais et le reste et que nous, les Franco-Manitobains, sommes au fond du sac.

According to Gauthier, the premier indicated that everything possible was being done in the province relative to bilingualism; that he believed in multiculturalism; that problems relating to Bill 59 should be taken up with the Minister of Education. To conclude, Gauthier stated (La Liberté, November 13, 1968), "Le seul espoir que

nous avons c'est qu'on n'a pas fait claquer la porte derrière nos dos."

M.P. Aubry, editor of the French paper, wrote, in part, about the meeting with the premier (La Liberté, November 20, 1968):

Il a certainement pas donné l'impression d'être habile politique quand il a laissé entendre aux Franco-Manitobains qu'il ne pouvait pas leur accorder autant d'attention qu'au million d'autres Manitobains... Mais ce que M. Weir ne veut pas dire ou ne semble pas vouloir comprendre, c'est que la masse anglo-saxonne ne se soucierait plus depuis longtemps des différentes cultures ethniques s'il n'y avait à la base de la constitution canadienne l'élément français qui, par sa ténacité et sa lutte acharnée, a bloqué toute assimilation, toute politique du "melting pot" si chère à l'impérialisme anglo-saxon nord américain. M. Weir, comme beaucoup d'autres de cette région du Manitoba où le spectre du sinistre Dr. Schultz est encore omniprésent, s'empresse de faire jouer la note "multiculturaliste" chaque fois qu'il se sent coincé par les exigences du bilinguisme essentiel pourtant à la réalité canadienne.

Desjardins, (P.C. July 21, 1976) reflecting on Weir's politics, intimated:

Weir jouissait d'un "backlash" contre les francophones. (Weir's claim to fame!) Weir n'était pas un chef de parti, bien qu'il s'était prouvé efficace comme ministre. Dans trois élections partielles, ce "backlash" s'était traduit en victoire pour les conservateurs. En raison de ce support, Weir adopta une politique de gradualisme par rapport au français.

Justice Monin, looking retrospectively upon Weir's episode with power, stated (P.C. July 13, 1976):

Les années de Weir au pouvoir marquèrent le creux de la vague pour les francophones. Il n'y avait rien à espérer de Craik et de Weir.

By December 1968, the "Commission du Rallye" and the old association AECFM would fuse and form what was to become known as "La Société Franco-Manitobaine (S.F.M.)". The christening was conducted on December 8 and hopefully, a phoenix-like rebirth would instill vigor and life to the Franco-Manitoban community. The principal aim of the

S.F.M. was (Free Press, December 9, 1968), "to promote the growth and development of economic, political, cultural, and educational values in the French population of Manitoba." Maurice Gauthier became the S.F.M.'s first president. The president made sure that one of the first items in the new archives would express his animosity toward the Premier (Winnipeg Free Press, December 9, 1968). "For Mr. Weir, English-language citizens are one notch above all other groups, and there is no regard for the real rights of French Canadians."

As 1968 was drawing to a close, the portents of coming changes were in the air. The second report of the B & B Commission was released. The report advocated the learning of French from grade 1 for English students, and the learning of English from grade 3 for French students. The Commission was providing added support to the French leadership. Weir (Winnipeg Free Press, December 10, 1968) refused to comment; Craik, Minister of Education, was unavailable for comment.

#### The Stirrings of Change and the Schreyer-Desjardins Alliance.

January 1969 saw the S.F.M. resolutely attempting to make good its promises. Information filtering out of the Boundaries Commission, set up to examine the creation of larger school divisions, suggested the annihilation of existing school divisions. The Commission was concerned with financial efficiency. The school divisions were concerned with their parochialism. The S.F.M., having a vested interest, would have to grapple with the problem. Further, the social animation program would be operationalized in order to jar the Franco-Manitoban population out of its "laissez faire" attitude.

In its New Year editorial, La Liberté (January 1, 1969) indicated that new Canadians were sabotaging the fundamental forces of Canada. Their hope to survive did not lie in attacking French Canadians. A similar attitude was voiced later by Sidney Green (P.C., 1976) where, in his opinion, supporting French language rights gave credence to the safeguarding of various cultures.

Manitoba's language bill also came under attack. La Liberté (February 12, 1969) rendered its verdict; "Le Bill 59: faut-il lui préférer des écoles françaises." The article explained how implementation was being stifled by "une politique de lenteur" emanating from higher sources. The Social Studies program, thought by many to be the saving element when complimented by the "Français" course, was not yet completed.

Moreover, there were additional causes for concern: the law was only being partially implemented; an insufficient number of French teachers were available; parents were ambivalent to language instruction while their support was considered the cornerstone in the implementation process; the law was discriminatory in that, if applied, left little time for such courses as music, physical education; teachers were divided on the issue of language instruction.

On another front, the constitutional conference had closed with little consensus as to the Official Language Bill. Weir insisted (Winnipeg Free Press, February 10, 1969) that the concerns of Canadians should be focused on fiscal matters rather than constitutional matters. Gauthier (Winnipeg Free Press, February 14, 1969) followed the conference, "with a deep sense of disappointment and frustration. We deem it most unfortunate that the premier of

Manitoba would wish to associate himself with other premiers from western Canada and engage himself in what we consider retrogressive thinking by their actions at the constitutional conference."

It seemed that Premier Weir, along with some western premiers, was questioning the constitutionality of the Official Language Bill, (Winnipeg Free Press, April 10, 1969). "We only question the constitutionality in moving into provincial fields. The whole question of language rights is not involved..." The matter, it was felt, ought to be brought before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Whatever the motivation of the Premier, a general election was called for June 25. Weir no doubt was seeking a mandate from the citizenry; a mandate which by virtue of replacing Roblin, had not been won. The strategy, perhaps based on three previous by-elections where the Conservatives had been victorious, would prove unsuccessful. The issues in the elections varied from spending restraints, to the flooding of South Indian Lake, to a growing concern over the Churchill Forest Industries. However, and perhaps more fundamental, Manitobans were more inclined to be impressed by personalities and the appeal generated by the candidates than they were by issues.

From a Franco-Manitoban perspective, however, linguistic rights seemed to be the prevalent concern, and each party leader represented a differing ideology. Bobby Bend, the newly chosen Liberal leader, was either negative or uninterested. His pronouncements were at best ambiguous.

Premier Weir, for his part, attempted to make it a non-issue, by insisting that fiscal matters were the top priority. In a government pamphlet, (Government of Manitoba, What Tomorrow, Canada, p. 12), the Conservative party position was clear:

... drastic extension of language privileges by legislation must fail in its objectives and divide rather than unify the nation. More effective is the extension of those privileges by the process of gradualism.

Schreyer, the New Democratic Party leader, whose rise to prominence was nothing short of meteoric, was direct and to the point in his support of language rights (Free Press, June 10, 1969)

A New Democrat government in Manitoba would support most of the principles of the Official Languages Act because we believe it is right for our country - even though it may cost the party a few votes in some areas. We may lose this election, if the people of Manitoba are narrow-minded and prejudiced against their fellow man. Premier Weir's stand on language and constitutional matters cannot help but endanger the future of Canadian nationhood - if we are to survive as a nation, we cannot afford narrow or petty attitudes about the rights of French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec.

Schreyer's attitude toward the French was based on a greater understanding of the Canadian political context. While serving in the Manitoba Legislature, Schreyer had, on a number of occasions, accorded his support to Desjardins, the St. Boniface M.L.A. His years in the House of Commons had served to mitigate the parochialism which a wider experience tends to offset (P.C. July 21, 1976):

While serving in Ottawa, one is certainly much more open to the realities of Canada as a whole. One has to go beyond provincial concerns. There is no point in pretending; we would not only want to accommodate (the French) but take important measures.

But the prominent actor in this developing scenario would be the Liberal MLA from St. Boniface. Although his party had adopted a

definitive stand on the language issue prior to Bill 59, Desjardins was not satisfied that this same party had truly internalized the principle. To him the choice of Bend as party leader represented a shift to the right thereby rendering Liberal policy similar to that of the Conservative party. Desjardins (P.C. July 21, 1976) stated:

Lors d'une conférence de presse, j'ai annoncé que si les libéraux allaient à l'encontre de mes principes, je supporterais le parti qui ferait avancer la cause française.

Desjardins' position was thus made quite clear; if the Liberal party did not support of his campaign for linguistic rights, he would offer support to the party which would be committed to his concerns. He would break away from party ranks if he did not agree with the provincial Liberal party's policy on the official language issue. He acknowledged that he was ready to fight the election as an independent liberal or sit in the house as one. Desjardins further declared that he would cross party lines to vote with any party which proposed a better policy on the language issue, (Winnipeg Free Press, May 31, 1969), "I would break party lines only on this issue. I would still be a Liberal if they kicked me out."

La Liberté (June 4, 1969) reported Desjardins as saying:

Je ne puis accepter et je n'accepterai pas le principe dit de "gradualisme" tel que préconisé par M. Weir. Ce serait de revenir en arrière dans le climat politique de cette province. Nous ne faisons que commencer à nous mieux faire confiance les uns les autres. Nous ne pouvons pas perdre de terrain; nous devons résister à tout prix à ces opportunistes qui sont tellement assoiffés de pouvoir qu'ils sont prêts à diviser notre population pour conquérir.

La Société Franco-Manitobaine, for its part, was urging its membership to have the various candidates clarify their position relative to language rights in Canada. Moreover, the French weekly asked each party leader to respond to questions which it considered vital. Attempting to couch its true intent the questions focused on regional development, tax reform, education and bilingualism, and various government programs. In its issue of June 18, 1969, La Liberté produced the results. Schreyer offered an unequivocal support to bilingualism. Bend responded to all questions except the one treating with language. Weir did not offer an opinion.

On June 25, 1969, the face of Manitoba politics was unexpectedly transformed much to the surprise of the most astute observers and political pundits. Ed Schreyer led the New Democratic Party to a majority of seats. After the final count, however, the New Democrats had gained 28 out of the 57 available seats - a minority position.

In a paper entitled "Some Factors in the 1969 N.D.P. Victory in Manitoba", (1970), Peterson and Barber outlined a number of points which may have led to the N.D.P. victory. In terms of the Liberal leader, Robert Bend, Peterson and Barber (1970:6-7) stated that :

When the Liberals on May 10, 1969 elected as leader Robert Bend, of British stock, rural-minded and identified with the south-west (a conservative stronghold), their decision in effect forced them to compete directly with Mr. Weir for what was already a diminishing base.

Further, Peterson and Barber (1970:9) showed that the Ukrainian vote contributed to the Liberal decline and the N.D.P. success:

divorced from any offensive association with socialism... the N.D.P. became more moderate, particularly under Schreyer, who could speak Ukrainian as well, while the Liberal party became more conservative under Bend.

Moreover, Peterson and Barber (1970:12) added:

Its opponents' conservatism enabled the N.D.P. to bring forward numerous reform proposals without competition: there included reduction of medicare premiums, more public housing, establishment of an ombudsman, marketing and credit assistance for farmers and fishermen, public auto insurance, better legal aid, an independent auditor-general, a permanent Speaker, action to restrain rent increases and rising food prices, strengthening the planning authority of the metropolitan government, greater efforts to attract investment and industry, more help for Indians and Metis, and more assistance for northern development including better highways and possible isolation allowance.

Thus, while the Conservatives and Liberals were professing fiscal restraints, the N.D.P. were carrying the campaign with a wide array of proposals. Finally, in terms of leader impact upon the voters, Peterson and Barber (1970:11-12) remarked:

Mr. Weir's appearances tended to lack organizational preparation and his speeches were reported to be casual and off-the-cuff; while Mr. Schreyer's speeches gave evidence of careful composition. And on television, whereas Mr. Weir appeared seldom and then with visible discomfort, Mr. Schreyer was self-assured and flourished. To many independent voters, Mr. Schreyer appeared energetic while Mr. Weir fairly or not appeared ponderous.

#### A Gentlemen's Agreement

The N.D.P. needed one seat, the Conservatives, seven. Which coalition would be the most viable? Since the four liberals agreed to go as a block and not join either parties, this precluded the Conservatives from forming the government. Thus, the N.D.P. was to win by default and become Manitoba's first socialistic government. The question then shifted to survival.

The man of hour was Laurent Desjardins. Desjardins had made his position explicit; Schreyer had expressed agreement in relation to that position - a point which Weir's hard line politics should have considered for just such an eventuality. The problem then became one of gaining the support of the St. Boniface M.L.A. Sidney Green (P.C. July 27, 1976) stated:

A key factor was convincing Larry Desjardins to join our party. Immediately following the election, I phoned the Premier saying that Larry would have to support us. Between Weir and our party there was no question. The pressure exerted on Desjardins, however, was much greater from the Conservatives than from our party.

But Desjardins' liberal ideology was well engrained after ten years as a Liberal M.L.A. It appears that from this political perspective, M. Desjardins was highly suspicious of the N.D.P. The political philosophy of the N.D.P. of socialism was being viewed in some quarters as a threat to free enterprise. This was M. Desjardins' prime concern (R. Toupin, P.C., August 1976). However, a mutual arrangement would be devised and M. Desjardins would become a Liberal Democrat.

An important dimension in the scenario was, according to Justice Monin (P.C., July 13, 1976), "la grande amitié qui existait entre ces deux hommes politiques." Justice Monin recalled that Desjardins, as a director of St. Paul's College, had been instrumental in Schreyer becoming a staff member. Further, as M.L.A. from Brokenhead, Schreyer had supported Desjardins in his search for language rights and aid to separate schools. Against this background, therefore, the dilemma was that much more intense.

Prior to the elections, Schreyer had informally met with the francophone elite. According to Gauthier, (P.C. July 15, 1976):

Avant le congrès à la direction du parti néo-démocratique, M. Schreyer nous avait rencontré afin de savoir si sa mise en candidature serait reçue par les Francophones. Il voulait aussi s'assurer d'avoir des candidats francophones aux prochaines élections.

Gauthier (P.C. July 15, 1976) then indicated to Schreyer that René Toupin might be a person to contact as a possible candidate. Toupin assured Schreyer, at a later meeting, that he would indeed seek election if Schreyer won the party leadership.

Rhéal Teffaine, a St. Boniface barrister and once a staunch Conservative supporter, had shifted his allegiance to the N.D.P. by virtue of his dissatisfaction with the Weir administration's stand on bilingualism. Teffaine noted (P.C. July 20, 1976):

Auparavant, je supportais Roblin étant donné que mon oncle, M. Boulic, avait siégé à l'assemblée législative comme député conservateur... M. Schreyer demanda de nous rencontrer à la suite d'une conférence de presse lors de laquelle il déclarait qu'il poserait sa candidature à la direction du parti néo-démocratique... D'après mes convictions personnelles, je croyais que le seul moyen de sauvegarder la langue française était bien l'école française. Nous fûmes satisfaits que M. Schreyer voulait poursuivre un tel objectif.

Gaboury, another member of the francophone elite, (P.C. July 15, 1976) summarized well the position which his group had adopted prior to the election:

Il fallait devenir politique - jouer la politique réelle. Weir était une nullité exceptionnelle. On ne devait plus se rattacher à un parti politique mais plutôt aux "leaders" qui nous semblaient sympathiques et qui étaient prêts à nous accorder nos droits.

In response to a query related to his attempt at trying to gain the favor of the French leaders, Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976) indicated:

I took satisfaction in trying to form a government which would be representative of the Manitoba mosaic. I tried to get French representativity [sic] which would reflect, in proportion, the French minority as a whole.

Against this background, therefore, it would seem that the French elite had adopted a political position which would help them in gaining favor from politicians sympathetic to "la cause". Schreyer, it appeared, was disposed to do this, and thus the shift in allegiance was effected despite the "socialistic" underpinnings of the N.D.P.

Ostensibly, the elite's "new" orientation would bring added pressure to bear on Desjardins' attempt to preserve ideological purity. The situation called for a compromise and so it would be. According to Desjardins (P.C. July 21, 1976):

A la suite de plusieurs réunions avec Teffaine, Toupin et, par la suite, avec Ed Schreyer et Doug Rowland, j'ai finalement accepté de supporter M. Schreyer.

Gauthier (P.C. July 15, 1976) corroborated this by saying:

Il y eut plusieurs rencontres avec M. Desjardins qui, essentiellement, se résumaient à lui dire qu'il n'avait rien à perdre en supportant le gouvernement.

Notwithstanding the "behind-the-scene negotiations," which were of considerable importance, Desjardins' support was predicated on receiving due consideration for concerns expressed during the election campaign. However, Desjardins (P.C. July 21, 1976) noted:

Il ne s'agissait pas là d'un "trade-off" politique, mais il est certain que les principes que j'avais énoncés durant la campagne électorale seraient certainement étudiés. J'avais certaines causes à faire avancer et celles-ci le seraient.

Justice Monin (P.C. July 13, 1976) remarked retrospectively:

Il (Desjardins) offrirait son support au gouvernement Schreyer, qui se trouvait toujours en position minoritaire, seulement si on lui accordait certaines "choses".

But the trading did not turn out to be all that difficult, especially when consideration is given to what was at stake. Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976) intimated:

I met with him (Desjardins) and we discussed, and I was happy to tell him that his concerns posed no problems.

The concerns once translated into specific proposals were, according to Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976): a language law, which later became Bill 113, a teacher training institute, and a French cultural center (Cf. Appendix E).

Thus, on July 1, 1969, Laurent Desjardins, liberal M.L.A. from St. Boniface, became a Liberal-Democrat, and declared that he would grant his support to Mr. Schreyer. The liberal leader, Bobby Bend, anticipating the support, was guardedly cautious, stating (Winnipeg Free Press, July 2, 1969) that he "would be interested to see a definition of a Liberal-Democrat." Steve Patrick (Winnipeg Free Press, July 2, 1, 6), a liberal M.L.A., suggested that "the right winger had caught Schreyer mania. No doubt the French language question figured in Desjardins' decision." The Winnipeg Free Press (July 2, 1969) reported:

The real move began several days later (after the election) when members of the French-Canadian community suggested that Mr. Desjardins talk to the N.D.P. He did.

On July 7, 1969, the French organization "la S.F.M." issued a press release. (La Liberté, July 9, 1969) stressing its approval of Desjardins' most opportune decision:

M. Desjardins a toujours fait preuve d'honnêteté, d'intégrité et de sincérité. Ses convictions, ses principes ne sont jamais contredits. Les Manitobains ont droit à un gouvernement stable immédiatement, sans recourir à une autre élection.

It is interesting to note that the people issuing the statement were those who had in fact insisted that Desjardins support the government.

Desjardins had not completed the task fully. He felt obliged, out of respect, to present his case to his constituents in the St. Boniface riding. On July 8, 1969, before a crowd of 800 people, Desjardins presented his case to his electors. He would remain a Liberal but had decided to support the Schreyer government (Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg, July 9, 1969):

I did not defect. I am still a member of the Liberal Party until you kick me out. I did not join the N.D.P. party... but right now Mr. Schreyer should not be denied his time at bat.

The response was overwhelming. Desjardins was assured of support. Later he would sit on the government-side of the house next to the Premier and as a Liberal-Democrat. His special duties would constitute being legislative assistant to the Premier and director of the Dominion-Provincial Secretariat. The main focus of the secretariat would be to conduct a study on how the B and B Commission recommendations could be implemented in Manitoba.

#### The Final Phase

By July 9, 1969, the Federal Parliament had adopted the Official Languages Act in a vote of 197 to 17. The significance of the

event for Manitoba was that the Act provided the necessary context within which provincial governments could henceforth promote and develop language policies. Schreyer's position in relation to French in Manitoba was based essentially on the Federal government's position. As Schreyer recalled, (P.C. August 9, 1976), "I did not want to go contrary to the Official Languages Act; I wished to compliment the Act."

In September, as tradition had it, the S.F.M. called upon the Premier of the province to express their aspirations and desires in relation to the status of French in Manitoba. La Liberté (September 17, 1969) reported the general tenor of the proceedings, "Un entretien cordial en grande partie en français... Le Premier Ministre Schreyer recoit l'exécutif de la S.F.M." Maurice Gauthier, S.F.M. president, remarked (La Liberté, September 17, 1969) "Après cinquante ans de bataille, nous sommes enfin reçus comme des citoyens du Manitoba."

A brief was submitted to the Premier outlining some of the most pressing concerns. The brief read, in part (La Liberté, September 17, 1969):

- 1) L'établissement d'une école normale rattachée au Collège de Saint-Boniface pour la formation pédagogique d'enseignants d'expression française.
- 2) L'amendement de la loi scolaire afin de faire du français une langue d'enseignement sur le même pied que l'anglais.
- 3) La nomination au sein du ministère de l'Éducation d'un haut fonctionnaire à mentalité française directement responsable du programme d'enseignement en français.

4) L'établissement d'écoles publiques françaises - la section secondaire du Collège de Saint-Boniface pourrait servir de projet pilote.

5) Le maintien des divisions scolaires actuelles contrairement aux recommandations de la Commission des frontières.

Les délégués sont convaincus d'avoir enfin trouvé une oreille sympathique et attentive sous la coupole du Ganin d'Or.

The Winnipeg Free Press (September 15, 1969) reported:

S.F.M. met with Ed Schreyer to request a change in legislation to allow French to become a language of instruction in certain Manitoba schools. According to Maurice Gauthier, S.F.M. president, the 50% of instructional time now devoted to French "succeeds in anglicizing the small children". The Premier was very favorable.

In part, to emphasize the need for immediate action and perhaps to ensure that the government be true to its word, the Franco-Manitoban Trustees Association issued a statement requesting the "same rights as the English speaking minority in Quebec", (Winnipeg Free Press, November 4, 1969). La Liberté (November 5, 1969) outlined the Association's recommendations:

La vie française doit être maintenue au Manitoba; l'enseignement en français - un droit non une option; les frontières scolaires ne doivent pas être changées; amender la loi scolaire; subsides spéciaux; 50% d'enseignement en français de 7 à 12; supprimer le cours de French; une école normale française.

The Association did not represent any formidable political force. Nonetheless, it gave added impetus to the notion that other sectors of the community were concerned with the matter of linguistic rights.

On the national level, (La Liberté, October 15, 1969) the federal government was undertaking to operationalize its bilingual policy. Federal aid to support French minorities outside Quebec was to

be in excess of one million dollars. Further, the government projected that 80 per cent of the civil servants in Ottawa would be bilingual by 1975.

On December 17, 1969, the B and B Commission tabled its third report dealing essentially with the "Work World". In it, the Commissioners warned of "national disintegration" and demanded (Winnipeg Tribune, December 18, 1969), "that the federal public service be transformed from an Anglophone cultural preserve into a service reflecting the equal partnership of English and French-speaking Canadians." Further, the B and B report stated (Winnipeg Free Press, December 18, 1969) that, "French be the main working language at all levels in private business and industry in Quebec".

In Manitoba, a long awaited event was to take place. On December 6, 1969, Premier Ed Schreyer addressing the participants of Rallye 69, the annual convention, outlined (Winnipeg Tribune, December 8, 1969) the following proposals:

The establishment of a French normal school next year; the founding of a Cultural Center in St. Boniface, and... we intend to bring about the necessary changes so that your children be given every opportunity to receive instruction in their maternal tongue first of all, and then in the second language.... To this end, we intend introducing immediately at the next session, laws that will permit the teaching of French from K to grade 12 and extending far beyond the 50 per cent already allowed from the primary grades.

Reaction to the speech was predictable; euphoria and tumultuous applause.

Following immediately upon his promises at the convention, Schreyer, along with Desjardins, was making a bid to establish a

French teacher training institute in Manitoba by meeting with the Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier (Winnipeg Free Press, December 10, 1969). Later, (La Liberté, March 4, 1970) a special study was commissioned by the government, chaired by Father Clement Cormier, a member of the B & B Commission, to provide evidence which would demonstrate that Manitoba was indeed the province for the establishment of a French teacher training College. The Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Relations, for its part, undertook an inquiry whose objectives were to study (La Liberté, February 11, 1970):

le changement de la loi scolaire en ce qui concerne la langue d'enseignement et l'aménagement d'un système scolaire vraiment adapté aux besoins linguistiques et culturels des francophones au Manitoba.

The French Cultural Center was also part of the package. La Liberté (February 25, 1970) carried the following item:

Une subvention gouvernementale de \$1 million. Le Centre Cultural sera construit à St. Boniface.

### Bill 113

On June 1, 1970, Bill 113 was introduced in the House. Second reading was scheduled for June 24. Saul Miller, Minister of Education, presented the Bill, referring first to Bill C.120 - the federal government's Official Languages Act - stating that, "For the federal government and its areas of jurisdiction French was on an equal part with English as an official language of Canada". He remarked that the province should follow the federal initiative, "in fact the real tasks involved in the nation-wide implementation of

the official languages principle lay with the provinces." Miller assured the House that there would be no coercion to force the learning of the French language. The Education Minister continued:

The Bill is a simple and straight forward attempt to provide French-speaking Manitobans, and others who are interested as the case may be, with their established right be instructed in the official language of their choice within the framework of our public school system... We favor no melting pot philosophy.  
(Debates, Legislature of Manitoba. 2nd session, 29th Legislature, No. 106-145, pp. 2717-3754, 1970).

On July 16, in a voice vote, Bill 113 received royal assent. The Winnipeg Free Press (July 17, 1970) commented:

The long battle for French language rights in Manitoba public schools is over. It ended quietly Thursday when the members of the Manitoba legislature, by a voice vote, unanimously gave third and final reading to a bill that allows the use of French as a language of instruction in any public school. They were no ceremonies to mark the end of a bitter 54 year struggle, which had roots dating back another 27 years. But if one listened closely after the members had left the cavernous corridors... one could almost hear the ghostly cheers of those who once waged the battle...

### Summary Comment

This chapter has presented the chronology starting with the assent to law of Bill 59 under the Roblin administration to the passage of Bill 113 by the Schreyer government. Particular attention had been given to the continued development of the Franco-Manitoban community especially with its "prise de conscience". Further, a number of key events have been included as they related to the framework which permitted the eventual formulation of Bill 113.

The next chapter will constitute an analysis of the evidence in light of the eclectic conceptual framework presented in chapter two.

## Chapter 5

### AN ANALYSIS

The present chapter was viewed as providing an analysis of the development of Bill 113 based on the set of critical questions formulated in chapter 2. This set of questions was divided into two major components; the actors and the process. An important dimension which provided the basis upon which the policy development evolved was the social, historical and political landscape. It was therefore with this perspective in mind that the analysis was conducted.

At the outset, it would be well to restate the questions.

With respect to the actors, the following questions were identified :

1. Who were the principal actors involved in the policy-making process ?
2. What were the characteristics of these actors in terms of political motivation, objectives, participation, and involvement ?
3. Who were the initiators of the demand ? Where did the initial demand emanate from ? Who mobilized support for the demand ?
4. Why was this demand considered important by the government ?

With respect to the policy development process, the following questions were identified :

1. When was the initial decision taken to embark on this policy development ?
2. Were the timing and political climate appropriate ?
3. What forces were brought to bear on the development of the language policy ?
4. What were the interrelationships between the interest group and the politicians ?
5. How was the process conducted in terms of overt (covert) political actions, individual positions and so on ?

#### The Actors

The identification of the principal actors was conducted on the basis of the reputational approach presented by Gergen (1968). Four "knowledgeable" persons, extensively involved in the Franco-Manitoban community during the period being studied, were asked to nominate individuals whom they felt were the most influential in the development of Bill 113.

This exercise resulted in eight persons being consistently named as having contributed directly either throughout, or at some point in the policymaking process. These eight persons, defined as "actors", became important sources of information through interviews.

In order to validate the initial nominations, as suggested by Gergen (1968), each interviewee was asked to nominate person(s) who had contributed to the policymaking process. With one exception, the names given did not differ from the first list provided.

On the assumption that public officials (politicians) initiate authoritative actions and make authoritative decisions, such public officials may be called official actors. In a sense, they become the "insiders" to the decision. On the other hand, decisions may be taken in response to issues and demands brought to the attention of official actors by groups or individuals external to the formal decision-making process. These groups or individuals may be referred to as "outsiders".

Question 1. Who were the principal actors involved in the policy-making process ?

In this study, the principal actors can be divided into two discrete groupings. Four actors were leading franco-phone representatives and were defined as insiders. These actors were (the position given was the one held at the time of the interview) :

- Honorable Edward Schreyer; Premier of Manitoba
- Honorable Laurent Desjardins; Minister of Health and Social Development
- Honorable Sidney Green, Q.C.; Minister of Mines, Resources and Environmental Management
- Honorable Rene Toupin; Minister of Tourism, Recreation and Cultural Affairs.

The remaining four actors were considered leading Franco-Manitoban representatives for the period studied. These actors were :

- Justice Alfred Monin
- Maurice Gauthier
- Rheal Emile Teffaine, Q.C.
- Etienne Gaboury

Question 2. Roles of the actors in the policymaking process.

Alfred Monin :

M. Monin's role in the policymaking process is somewhat clouded and begs speculation. There appear to be little doubt that M. Monin had been a prominent individual within the ranks of the traditional Franco-Manitoban elite. That his active participation was terminated leads one to conjecture that (a) the semi-purge of the traditional elite during the sixties might well have alienated M. Monin from the mainstream of activities of the French Association, and that (b) the French Association may have become too overtly political and thus his involvement might have compromised his position. On this latter point, the Deniset incident is well worth considering.

Notwithstanding these speculations, M. Monin was not an individual to be ignored. Indeed, his many political contacts, especially in Ottawa, as indicated by the "knowledgeables", were too important and crucial to neglect. Two individuals provided some insights into M. Monin's role. Gaboury (P.C. July 22, 1976) referred to M. Monin as "l'émminence grise." Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) went further, stating that, "on venait le chercher à l'occasion." Thus, while M. Monin's role was not a visible one, it seems that

his counsel nevertheless was sought on occasion.

M. Monin's brief stopover in Ottawa following the Rossillon Affair, to discuss the state of the francophone community in Manitoba, would lend credence to the above. Of this meeting with Gerard Pelletier, Secretary of State, M. Monin (P.C. July 13, 1976) stated :

J'ai aussi expliqué que la minorité francophone était en voie de disparition si le gouvernement fédéral n'était pas en mesure d'offrir de l'aide. Les conséquences éventuelles seraient très graves.

M. Monin appeared to imply that this encounter with the Secretary of State might have served as catalytic agent for a meeting between the federal government and the A.E.C.F.M. M. Gauthier, in a personal letter (February 24, 1977; cf. Appendix F), seemed totally oblivious of this meeting, "Si le juge Monin a intercedé, c'est à mon issu, mais je ne crois pas." M. Monin appears to have been involved but not in any central way.

Maurice Gauthier :

From the available information, M. Gauthier might well be considered one of the most important actors during the period being studied. Shortly after Deniset's resignation, M. Gauthier became president of the A.E.C.F.M. From that point onward, he was intent on changing the French Association so that it would profit from a popular support of its constituency. Whether this end was achieved is questionable; however, the process was initiated.

In order to give a new direction and a new appeal to the A.E.C.F.M., the traditional elite which controlled the association had to be modified or diffused. Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) stated :

Il serait faux de dire que la vieille élite fut remplacée. Il y eut diffusion de cette élite. Auparavant, il fallait avoir 65 ans et être amis d'un curé afin d'être accepté. Aujourd'hui, n'importe qui peut y accéder...

M. Gauthier's questioning of the role of the A.E.C.F.M. was fundamental to the survival of the Association and the French language. He felt that the French community had to assume leadership in its survival and that this could only be achieved through direct involvement. The process adopted was to move away from backroom negotiations to a more public expression of the needs and concerns of the French community. Political actions, as confirmed by Teffaine and Gaboury, based on the results of the social animation program was envisaged as the proper means of openly expressing what was needed to ensure the growth of the French community. That the leadership became more attuned politically and developed a closer rapport with its constituency can be attributed in large part to M. Gauthier's sense of urgency to the problems of "la francophonie".

The Rossillon Affair represents an important event since it brought the federal government into contact with the problems experienced by the French minority in Manitoba. M. Gauthier (P.C. February 24, 1977) suggested that a concerted effort on his part had been undertaken to meet with MM. Trudeau and Pelletier :

Il me semble que l'évènement qui a provoqué une demande de

rencontre fut l'annonce par le premier ministre Trudeau qu'un agent français, peut-être un espion ou tout au moins fouteur de trouble était au Manitoba. Cette annonce d'Ottawa suggèrait que nous de l'association (A.E.C.F.M.) étions complices dans une affaire clandestine et nous avait fortement déplu. Nous avons immédiatement communiqué avec Jean Lagassé et René Préfontaine pour leur dire notre mécontentement.... C'est à la suite de discussions téléphoniques avec Préfontaine et Lagassé que nous avons communiqué avec le Bureau du Secrétaire d'Etat, M. Gérard Pelletier, pour demander une rencontre.

Thus, it was following this first encounter that the federal government began its financial involvement with the French minority in Manitoba.

M. Gauthier's dissatisfaction with the Weir administration with respect to the rights of the French minority, caused the French leaders to seek out politicians who were more sympathetic to their cause. In this sense, it would appear that the coming of Mr. Schreyer to the political scene in Manitoba was timely.

Finally, M. Gauthier's direct involvement in convincing M. Desjardins to give Mr. Schreyer an absolute majority greatly enhanced "la cause". This particular effort must be regarded as perhaps the turning point for the French minority's search for linguistic rights.

#### Rhéal Teffaine, Q.C. :

M. Teffaine's involvement with the issue being studied spans the entire period. As secretary of the association, he was the one to issue "a call to arms". M. Teffaine believed that the articulation of francophone interest and concern would best be achieved through political action.

M. Teffaine was part of the delegation which met with MM. Trudeau and Pelletier following the Rossilon Affair. Following this meeting with federal officials, the French leaders met with Premier Weir. Subsequently, it was Teffaine's disillusionment with Premier Weir's stand on bilingualism which caused him to seek an alternative because, "auparavant je supportais Roblin". Prior to the provincial election, June 1969, the French leaders met with Edward Schreyer. Schreyer's stand on the Official Languages Act and his concern for the French minority impressed M. Teffaien. He (P.C. July 20, 1976) stated :

... je croyais que le seul moyen de préserver la langue française était l'école française. Nous fûmes satisfaits que M. Schreyer voulait poursuivre un tel objectif. Il n'était plus question de promesses; il nous fallait une législation. C'est alors que j'ai appuyé sa (M. Schreyer) candidature.

Finally, M. Teffaine's most significant contribution to the development of Bill 113 was the intermediary role he played between Mr. Schreyer and M. Desjardins. M. Teffaine in a personal letter (January 26, 1977) states, "Effectivement, j'ai initié les pourparlers entre MM. Schreyer et Desjardins au lendemain des élections de 1969..." This intermediary role led eventually to an accord between the two politicians such that :

... le Centre Culturel de Saint-Boniface, ainsi que l'Institut Pédagogique et la loi 113, ... étaient des conditions essentielles à cet appui.

Etienne Gaboury :

M. Gaboury (P.C. July 22, 1976), for his part, was extremely

critical of the professed ideology of the traditional elite :

C'était les petites formules - formules de sermons de dimanche, formules de coulisses. Elle (l'A.E.C.F.M.) était imbue de traditionalisme et bien qu'elle était menée par de bonnes gens, personne était intéressé. Il fallait ouvrir les portes et trouver des éléments de solutions.

M. Gaboury was perhaps the most articulate interviewee in stating that political action, devoid of party politics, was the most appropriate means of obtaining for the French community.

M. Gaboury (P.C. July 22, 1976) stated :

Il fallait devenir politique - jouer la politique réelle. On ne devait pas se rattacher à un parti politique mais plutôt aux "leaders" qui nous semblaient sympathiques et qui étaient prêts à nous accorder nos droits.

M. Gaboury's involvement spans the entire period studied. His participation in the French organization, along with other more progressive elements, served to alter the association's ideology. He later became the S.F.M.'s second president.

#### Edward Schreyer :

Mr. Schreyer's involvement can be traced to meetings with Gauthier (P.C. July 15, 1976) and Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) prior to the leadership convention of the New Democratic Party a month before the provincial election in June, 1969. It was during this period that the French leadership decided to support Mr. Schreyer by virtue of this attitudes toward the federalism professed by the federal government.

Mr. Schreyer appeared well informed of the problems facing

the French community. Further, he was not surprised that language and religion had been separated although the "older generation" was wont to maintain the traditional ideology. The duality of language-faith, according to Mr. Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976), was no longer valid essentially because of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the quiet revolution in Quebec, and the Ecumenical Council.

Mr. Schreyer did not wish to mention specific names during the interview with the exception of M. Desjardins. He (P.C. August 9, 1976) allowed however that the following groups had been in contact with him : (a) "La Société Franco-Manitobaine", (b) "l'Association des Commissaires d'Ecole de Langue Française", (c) "l'Association des Directeurs Généraux", and (d) individual communications. His identification of the S.F.M. would have brought him in contact with MM. Gauthier, Teffaine, and Gaboury since all three were part of the executive.

Mr. Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976) attested to the fact that M. Desjardins' role had been significant; "he (Desjardins) was profoundly concerned with the historical restrictiveness of the issue. I had no problems with that." Once Mr. Schreyer agreed to satisfy M. Desjardins' concerns, he thereby ensured his party more political stability. It would appear, however, that the concessions to M. Desjardins were not difficult decisions. Teffaien (P.C. January 25, 1977) wrote :

D'Ailleurs, il s'agissait là d'éléments du programme politique même de M. Schreyer de sorte que nous n'avons pas eu à s'éterniser étant donné que nous étions tous d'accord.

Laurent Desjardins :

M. Desjardins was, since his election to the Legislative Assembly in 1958, the most persistent elected official to call for language rights for the francophones of Manitoba. Whatever the claim of any individual or group to the recognition of language rights for the French in Manitoba, M. Desjardins would have to figure as the most prominent individual in this area.

M. Desjardins' strategy which saw the Liberal Party of Manitoba, at its 1966 convention, adopt a resolution for the recognition of French as a language of instruction, as part of the party platform, would attest to the fact that he was committed to restoring language rights. Whether the Roblin government was inspired in formulating Bill 59 in 1967 by the Liberal policy is another issue, although M. Desjardins would not discount the possibility.

It could be argued that it was his convictions which ultimately led M. Desjardins to support Mr. Schreyer. There were pressures from various quarters and undoubtedly these figured in his decision. However, it would appear that he placed personal convictions before party loyalty despite the fact that he had served as a Liberal M.L.A. for some ten years.

The Liberal party may well have been instrumental in M. Desjardins' support of Mr. Schreyer. Robert Bend, the party leader, did not appear to endorse the Official Languages Act. His utterances were at best ambiguous. M. Desjardins (P.C. July 21, 1976) appeared

disenchanted with the party :

En acceptant Bobby Bend, un conservateur d'ailleurs, les libéraux ont accepté une position de droite semblable à la position des conservateurs sous Weir. Alors, il m'apparut que j'aurais mal vécu sous un tel régime. Par conséquent, j'ai annoncé que si les libéraux allaient à l'encontre de mes principes, je supporterais le parti qui ferait avancer la cause française.

Thus, while wishing to grant support to the party which would promote his cause, Desjardins appeared less enthusiastic when this party turned out to be the N.D.P. Toupin (P.C. August 16, 1976) stated :

Officiellement, Schreyer était plus libéral. Par contre, Desjardins mettait en cause la philosophie de base du N.D.P.

Therefore, Desjardins' concern with socialism seemed to be the underlying cause for his reluctance to join Schreyer. His eventual move, however, became the cornerstone for the government's decision to build a cultural center, a pedagogical institute and to pass Bill 113.

#### Sidney Green :

Sidney Green's direct involvement in the policy development, and for that matter with the cause espoused by the French community, was short-lived and issue specific. Mr. Green indicated that when the issue was before the Cabinet, his support was instrumental, "I fought it politically, as much as, if not harder than, Larry Desjardins." Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) mentioned that Mr. Green's support in Cabinet had greatly helped and enhanced the acceptance of Bill 113. Hence based on limited information, Green seems to have acquired

importance while the Cabinet was deliberating the issue.

René Toupin :

M. Toupin's role was in many ways similar to Mr. Green's, although one might suspect that he had a vested interest in the issue. M. Toupin's involvement is more issue-specific. He acquired importance during the period when attempts at convincing Larry Desjardins became a daily adventure. M. Toupin, along with Gauthier and Teffaine, urged Desjardins to offer his support to Schreyer.

Question 3. Who were the initiators of the demand ? Where did the initial demand emanate from ? Who mobilized support for the demand ?

To all three questions, the answer would have to be the leaders of the francophone community, more specifically the executive of the A.E.C.F.M.

The movement to revitalize the French community served as background upon which the elite could express their demands. The meeting with Premier Weir in November 1968, following a successful meeting with MM. Trudeau and Pelletier, proved to be a failure. Indeed, the demands put forth fell upon deaf ears.

Rallye 68 served to reinforce the notion that the elite was once more a worthy representative of its constituency. The social animation program served as a mechanism to mobilize support for the elite's future activities. The elite could therefore point out that their expressed wishes were those of its constituency.

Question 4. Why was the demand considered important by the government ?

Two things appear to have given this demand priority. On the one hand, Schreyer was an avowed federalist and supported the Official Languages Act. Moreover, he had expressed a desire to help the francophone minority. This was made explicit in his meeting with Gauthier (P.C. July 15, 1976 and Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976). On the other hand, Schreyer saw an opportunity to gain the support of Desjardins by satisfying his concerns and thus at the same time give his New Democratic Party an absolute majority in the House. The two positions were inextricably linked to one another.

The Process

A first concern addressed in approaching process was the temporal dimension, that is, delimiting the boundaries of the time period during which Bill 113 was developed. To this end, the passage of Bill 59 by the Roblin government in April, 1967, was thought to be a natural starting point. Although a more flexible law may have been anticipated by Franco-Manitobans prior to the passage of Bill 59, it was felt that any future modifications to the language legislation would have to begin with Bill 59 as a point of departure. Since this study focussed on the development of Bill 113, the logical end point was its passage to law in July, 1970. While these boundaries may be logical and natural, the historical background is of paramount importance since events prior to 1967 did serve as an impetus to the process.

With the time dimension defined, two other salient features of the process were its dynamic and evolutionary components. On the one hand, the dynamic component was characterized by specific and identifiable actions undertaken by the Francophone leadership. These actions were conducted in two areas, namely, within the Franco-Manitoban community and within the political environment at the provincial and federal levels. The reciprocal responses by the community members and the politicians were considered part of this component. On the other hand, the evolutionary component consisted of three discernable but overlapping phases: a period of self-analysis by the Franco-Manitoban community initiated by its leaders, the communication of the Francophones' concerns, needs and aspirations to both the provincial and federal governments, and the acceptance by the government of the Francophones' demand which led to the passage of Bill 113.

#### Marker Events

In reviewing the process in toto, a number of key events stand out as especially important to, indeed were intimately related with, the development of the language policy in Manitoba. These events occurred at both the federal and provincial levels.

Events of a federal nature, serving as background to the Manitoba situation, were important. Their importance stems from the fact that the expenditure of time, effort, and money to linguistic and cultural rights with respect to the French in Manitoba, can only be viewed within the national context. The developments with respect

to language policies at the federal level and those at the provincial level were thus inextricably linked to one another. From this perspective, Franco-Manitobans could more articulately and confidently express their discontent vis-a-vis the educational and cultural arrangements which prevailed in Manitoba.

At the federal level, the constitutional conference of February, 1968, the publication of Book II (Education) and Book III (Work World) of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism gave added momentum to the question of survival of the French in Manitoba. These may well have increased the French leadership's desire to pursue its efforts in gaining the recognition they sought within the definition of Confederation being evolved by the government in Ottawa. Although the effects would be difficult to assess, most interviewees attested to the positive consequences of these events.

The Rossillon Affair had both a national and a provincial impact. Nationally, Rossillon created what amounted to a furor. A Gaullist spy had infiltrated and was actively instigating the French minority! Provincially, the affair had a positive dimension, offering the French leaders an opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Trudeau and Secretary of State Gerard Pelletier. This meeting was described as crucial by the French leaders. Indeed, it provided a forum to express the critical state of the French minority in Manitoba. Eventually, this led the federal government to pledge financial support to the French minority.

On the provincial level, a number of important events appeared to have propelled the process forward. As suggested in Chapter 3, the

Manitoba economy was experiencing an upswing. This development may have provided the impetus for other more fundamental changes. Hoselitz (1964:152) suggests that "economic development may then be considered as associated with a transformation of social behavior...." Lewis (1955:143) indicates that as economic circumstances change, social institutions may well have to go through a period of adjustment, "once economic growth begins it will... erode the old institutions, and create new ones more compatible with further growth." With respect to the social dimension, Lewis (1955:143) adds:

... change begins at some spot in the web of belief and relationship and spreads outward from there... there has to be also a new sense of values.

Almond and Powell (1966:94) appear to concur with the effects of economic growth on social beliefs and attitudes:

socio-economic change have also been associated... with a breakdown in traditional patterns of belief and in traditional forms... of social life.

From a policy standpoint, Dye (1966:293), in a study of state politics in the United States, concluded:

Economic development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic developments.

In light of the above, it seems reasonable to suggest that the sixties may have augured well for Franco-Manitobans. Economic growth would usher in optimism, affluence and perhaps increased tolerance. People's concern for equality and opportunity may well have lent support to Franco-Manitobans.

The "Rallye du Manitoba Français" (Rallye 68), despite its shortcomings brought in a new era. This particular event was a first

stage in a period of self-analysis. It was an attempt at solving the identity crisis of the francophones and a means of restoring a sense of solidarity. That these purposes were achieved is a debatable issue. That a process of self-analysis was initiated (the minority's position with respect to the larger community), and continues to this day, appears as a more valid statement.

The meeting with Premier Weir and the French leaders was significant because it demonstrated that the Conservative government under Weir's stewardship was not in sympathy with the group's interests. Weir's conduct at the Constitutional Conference and his subsequent utterances would suggest that fiscal matters were uppermost on his agenda.

While the meeting was perceived by the French leaders as being less than satisfactory, it may be regarded as having had some positive consequences. On the one hand, it caused the French to be openly critical of the policy of gradualism espoused by the Conservatives. On the other hand, it created the need to seek alternative solutions. One such such alternative led to the support of Edward Schreyer. While not an important political force in Manitoba, the French leaders in this particular instance helped deliver what amounted to a majority decision. But in retrospect, perhaps Mr. Schreyer had prepared for such an eventuality. Prior to the elections, he had sought candidates from the various groups of the Manitoba mosaic. Although not considering himself an "ethnic politician", he nevertheless felt it important to get a cross-sectional representation (Schreyer; P.C. August 9, 1976). With the elections won by the N.D.P. and a Cabinet named, Marshall in Maclean's

(December, 1970:35) commented, "Never have the minorities in Manitoba been so represented." The Cabinet (Marshall, 1970:35) was made up of "... four Anglo-Saxons, three Jews, two Ukrainians, one French-Canadian, one Pole, one Icelandier, one Austrian German (Schreyer)."

Finally, the provincial election of June 1969, which saw Edward Schreyer lead the N.D.P. to victory was one of the main event in the development of Bill 113. The decisive event, however, was Laurent Desjardins' support of Mr. Schreyer. The ramifications of this support were threefold : a cultural center, a normal school and a language law.

The above therefore represent marker events; events which led to the development of Bill 113. Some events were planned but others were in many ways of a fortuitous nature. Of the latter, the Rossillon Affair could be singled out. Such events suggest that political processes may have an unpredictable dimension. Depending on the astuteness of the actors involved, such events may reveal advantages which can be exploited.

Question 1. When was the initial decision taken to embark upon this policy development ?

When Laurent Desjardins made a firm commitment to support Mr. Schreyer, the die was cast; the machinery was set in motion for the formulation of Bill 113. However, Desjardins' decision was not taken in isolation, but in light of a supporting cast of events which had marked the process to that time and of individuals who had a vested interest in gaining recognition for their demands.

Question 2. Were the timing and political climate appropriate for the development of Bill 113 ?

From the available evidence, the timing and political climate appear to have been appropriate. The evidence does not suggest that the general populace, nor groups or individuals, was intent on contesting the government and the passage of Bill 113. On this point, Mr. Schreyer (P.C. August 6, 1976) indicated that the issue was not as intimidating as it might have appeared, "It was not so much a negative mood as an absence of negative opposition." In a sense this relates to the question of issue relevance (Gergen, 1968) or issue involvement (Jennings, 1964). Gergen (1968:184) notes :

... the greater the relevance of an issue to a person, the stronger will be his attempt to exert leverage... the more likely he is to be motivated in affecting the outcome of the policy.

However, if people do not find the issue to be particularly relevant, not much importance is ascribed to the question and hence, reactions are not forthcoming.

During the election campaign, Weir called for a policy of gradualism while Schreyer advocated support of the Official Languages Act and further, indicated taking important measures in this area. That the issue figured prominently in the election is a highly questionable point. M. Desjardins made it known that he would support the party which would support his area of interest. The French leaders did ask their members to ask the candidates' stand on the language issue. But in general, it would appear that the language issue was part of a number of issues brought forth by

the N.D.P. (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of issues by Peterson and Barber). Furthermore, perhaps the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism might have attenuated some of the more serious objections to the language issue by unveiling an impending national crisis. On this point, Doern (1971:423) states :

In many ways the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism has been a combined travelling clinic and a mobile history van commissioned to educate the Canadian people and return them to the spirit that originally governed the confederation.

Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) reflected on the prevailing attitude of the time by saying that as long as the "honeymoon with Trudeau lasted", people would be more disposed to accept bilingualism.

Question 3. What forces (or pressures) were brought to bear on the development of the policy ?

The task of developing Bill 113 was given to the Secretariat on Dominion-Provincial Relations under the directorship of Laurent Desjardins. Pressures directed at the Secretariat and to politicians, in general, were not in evidence. However, one group did in fact make some public pronouncements by asking the government to consider seriously taking action on the language issue. By making such pronouncements, the French leaders may have wanted to give the impression that the Schreyer-Desjardins agreement had not necessarily yielded any significant concessions. Thus, the brief presented by the S.F.M. executive in September, 1969, constituted a formalization of a previous, yet not public, agreement. From an institutional perspective, this amounted to observing the "rules of the game" as it were by people in public office.

If external pressures were not apparent, there is reason to believe that some forces were operative within the system. In particular, members of Cabinet were not all supportive of the piece of legislation. Mr Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976) stated, "Out of 16, two were not sure... sceptical." M. Desjardins (P.C. July 21, 1976) also alluded to this disagreement. Further Teffaine (P.C. July 20, 1976) acknowledged that Mr. Green had lent his support to defend the issue in Cabinet. Green's own account (P.C. July 27, 1976) of the debate is suggestive, "I fought it politically as much, if not harder, than Larry Desjardins."

Another point is worth noting. As a language policy, Bill 113 was in fact to be contained within the Public Schools Act as an amendment to Section 258. The fact that its development became the responsibility of the Secretariat on Dominion-Provincial Relations may be of significance. It would seem that the Department of Education should have been involved from the outset. President Johnson (cited in Anderson, 1975:106) was quoted as saying, "The best way to kill a new idea is to put it in an old line agency." That such was the reasoning is not known. However, perhaps placing it under the jurisdiction of a new agency would expedite matters. But the Department of Education would be involved in later stages. According to M. Desjardins and a "knowledgeable", some departmental officials were inclined to offer modifications to the bill to the extent that the modified version would not be significantly different from the existing legislation.

Question 4. What were the interrelationships between the interest group and the politicians and/or government ?

From the time of passage of Bill 59, 1967, to Rallye 68, 1968, there appears to have been little by way of overt political action. The period was marked by a "grass-roots operation". As Valliancourt and Hébert (1971:176) remarked :

Indeed, the organizers had from the start taken a non-directive approach in conducting the meetings and seminars, both prior to and during the Rallye itself, in order to facilitate the emergency of a new popular leadership.

This new "popular leadership," it was felt (Valliancourt and Hébert (1971:176) would ultimately lead to "radical structural change which many felt to be essential to the long term survival of the French-Canadian language and culture." While this "new" leadership did not surface, there was, however, a change in the modus operandi of the French leadership. Indeed, they began to express their concerns more openly, more publicly. Some of the political actions undertaken can be summarized as follows :

- (a) being openly critical of the treatment the French minority had received from the provincial government in Manitoba,
- (b) being openly critical of the Weir government's stand on bilingualism and the Official Languages Act,
- (c) trying to instigate a sense of urgency with its population but also with politicians,
- (d) using the Rossillon Affair in order to advance their cause,
- (e) seeking out politicians sympathetic to their cause,

- (f) suggesting to their members, during the 1969 provincial election, that they ought to be aware of the election candidates' position on the Official Languages Act,
- (g) urging Laurent Desjardins to support Mr. Schreyer.

These were political actions directed in the main at politicians in an effort to direct attention to their problems. As such, these actions represented an important departure from the manner in which demands had previously been made.

Question 5. How was the process conducted in terms of overt (covert) political actions, individual positions, and so on?

For the sake of convenience, the process can be divided into three phases, namely; a period of self-analysis, the period of interest articulation, and the period which saw the development of Bill 113.

The first phase, based on popular participation, was an attempt, not only at developing new leadership, but at recapturing a waning identity. Realizing that the old formulas of the past had proven ineffectual, it was imperative that new methods be tried in order to create, to some extent, a sense of belongingness. Thus, Rallye 68 was organized on a number of themes, namely; economics, social, political, and cultural. Noteworthy was the fact that religion, an important adjunct of the traditional ideology, did not figure in the discussions.

Valliancourt and Hebert (1971) have been most critical of this phase. Indeed, they (Valliancourt and Hebert, 1971:187) contend that this popular movement and the Rallye failed, "at renewing

leadership and effectuating radical structural change... in the French community." In light of the situation, the statement is only partially true. It must be remembered that the social animation conducted prior to Rallye 68 was at best a diluted version of social animation per se (see M.D.T. Associates, "Le Rallye du Manitoba Français" in which the problems are spelled out). The process itself ought to have taken a few years. Thus to assume that leaders could have emerged ipso facto is highly unlikely. To suggest on the other hand that "radical structural change" failed to take place presupposes that it could have occurred; it further presupposes that the members of the community, generally, were ideologically prepared for such a transformation. The contention here is that the community was in fact not prepared. Indeed, it was argued that the Franco-Manitoban community, as a collectivity, was highly diffused; that assimilation was rampant; that the distance between the leaders and the membership was increasingly widening; that the community's sense of identity was being diluted with that of the larger society due to such factors as urbanization and the communications media. Under these circumstances, how can one suggest that radical changes could have been effected? Rein's (1976:177) statement is perhaps of some value :

Radical change appeals only to those too young or too unfortunate to have acquired a secure sense of their social identity - and those who have incorporated a radical ideology as part of their interpretation of life.

Another factor suggested by Valliancourt and Hebert (1971:187) is that : traditionally-oriented elite assured its

self-perpetuation by maintaining organizational control of the Rallye. The "traditional-oriented" elite referred to by the authors is what, in this study, was defined as a "diffused" elite. That this elite preserved vestiges of past traditions is conceded. But it was also making an outright effort to search for a more pragmatic approach. Perhaps the transformation of the elite to a radical leadership could have significantly modified the "structures" but not necessarily the membership. Maurice Gauthier (P.C. July 1976), on the other hand, appeared more interested in maintaining a balance between the traditional and radical elements. The process at that point was one of transition and, while change theory will not be discussed, radical changes might well have proven detrimental in the short term and thus in the long term.

Finally, Valliancourt and Hébert (1971:188) note that : members of the community sensed that the "new ideology" of the protestors was not a completely worked out alternative. This "new ideology" was, according to Valliancourt and Hébert (1971:187), one :

which aimed at destroying the old, or at least at shifting emphasis towards values felt to be more appropriate to an urban-industrial society.

Along with this was an emphasis on socio-economic concerns. Economic considerations were important but this aspect reflected in many ways what Levesque in the Lesage Cabinet in Quebec had referred to as "la reconquête de notre économie". Lagassé, one of the protestors and an economist, would possibly have argued

that a solid economic base went a long way in exercising political power. Roland Marcoux's (P.C. July 1976) statement that the basic orientation of the Rallye was misunderstood and that economics did not emerge as the important focus is significant. But the suggestion proposed here is that there were more fundamental issues to be resolved before economics became a prime concern. The collective will had to be re-established and the whole question of the French minority within a urbanized setting, and indeed the French minority within a highly technological environment, had to be redefined. In this sense, economics could not be viewed as the solution. Language and culture could previously survive within the community milieu and the educational arrangements prior to W.W. II. But these had never been reassessed in terms of societal changes. Bill 113, whose implementation is only now being seriously undertaken, the "Centre Culturel", and the "Institut Pédagogique" are possibly more realistic solutions. Perhaps economics will become a more serious focus of attention. There is reason to believe that perhaps some efforts are now being directed in this area.

Once it was established that there still remained a constituency interested in its survival, the process turned to interest articulation. This phase is bounded by the time period after Rallye 68 to the time when Desjardins decided to support Schreyer, in July 1969.

It appears that interest articulation took on a new form. Rather than working behind the scene, the leaders adopted the media to make public statements, to publicize the Rallye (A Quiet Revolution

was born in St. Boniface, etc...)). It sought impact to make itself known and heard. If the French leaders sought recognition of their plight, they were given an uplift from two important events, namely, the Rossillon Affair and the provincial election. It is fair to assume that the Rossillon Affair was not contrived with the hope of generating provincial and federal interest. Nonetheless, it offered an opportunity for the French leaders to express their problems. They, thus, capitalized on the situation.

Again, fate played a supportive role in the provincial elections in 1969. A quick election call with the opposition parties ostensibly in a state of disarray, saw Weir come out on the losing side. Schreyer had courted the French leaders prior to the election. This had been part of his strategy to gain representation from the various groups making up the Manitoba mosaic.

With Schreyer's views on federalism compatible with their own, the French leaders were more than happy to offer their support. This pre-election meeting served to establish personal contacts in the event that the N.D.P. became an important political force. It did and both sides were to gain from the association.

After the final count, the N.D.P. were short one seat for an absolute majority. M. Desjardins, by now a disaffected Liberal, had made it clear during the campaign that he would support the party sympathetic to his concerns. Ironically, what M. Desjardins had not anticipated was that this party would espouse a socialistic ideology.

Viewing the situation ripe to promote the cause, the French leaders embarked on a course of selling the idea that their rights

took preference over political ideology. By some fateful happening, the events had unfolded in a most unpredictable but highly auspicious manner. To bring the play to a favorable ending involved convincing M. Desjardins that liberalism and socialism were not such strange bedfellows. Further, how could political ideology come in the way of a search which had now spanned more than fifty years.

Presumably, it took some convincing and required many hours of urging by Teffaine, Gauthier, Gaboury, Toupin and Rowland. In the final analysis, the French leaders were successful in attaining their objective.

Explicit in M. Desjardins' support of Mr. Schreyer were three important issues that needed to be resolved. Since Mr. Schreyer felt quite at ease with these demands, a gentlemen's agreement sealed the pact. As a liberal-democrat, M. Desjardins had not rejected his liberalism; with an additional seat, Mr. Schreyer could live more comfortably with an absolute majority; with the agreement between the two, the French leaders had achieved a resounding success.

But was Mr. Schreyer's concessions to the French political expediency or was his decision made out of conviction to the cause ?

While a definitive answer will remain with the actors of the piece, the suggestion is that it might be "a bit of both." On the one hand, Mr. Schreyer had approached the French leadership prior to the election campaign. This particular action would suggest that he did harbour sympathies for the French cause. His admission that Ottawa broadened one's perspective on the problem suggests that he was sensitive to the issue. Finally, he came out publicly in support

of the Official Languages Act during the election campaign. On the other hand, the political realities might have proven helpful in forming a decision. Without belittling Mr. Schreyer's conviction, and indeed because of these convictions, he was in a position to respond positively to M. Desjardins' concern. But the question of remaining in a minority situation or gaining a seat with M. Desjardins' support, and thus ensuring a majority did arise. According to Mr. Schreyer (P.C. August 9, 1976), some members were quite ready to sit as a minority government and await a defeat. The feeling was that another election would return an N.D.P. majority. But Mr. Schreyer was less inclined to accept such a prognosis. Political stability would be a better solution if it could be achieved. Thus, by accepting M. Desjardins, political stability was achieved. The decision to follow the route taken was in keeping with personal conviction while at the same time offering perhaps an easier path to the maintenance of power.

The final phase of the process saw the development of the language bill. On September 17, 1969, following a meeting between the French leaders and Premier Schreyer, La Liberté reported the following :

Un entretien cordial en grande partie en français. Le Premier Ministre Schreyer reçoit l'exécutif de la S.F.M.... Les délégués sont convaincus d'avoir enfin trouver une oreille sympathique et attentive sous la coupole du Gamin d'Or.

It is well to note that the brief presented to the Premier contained in large measure those items which had been negotiated two months earlier. What the meeting achieved, however, was a

formalization of the demand through the "proper" channels. Further, it shifted emphasis from the informal, "behind-the-scenes" to the more formal manner in which demands are made, that is in the public view. Any future public declarations could now be traced back to this meeting, not to the previous negotiations.

Hence the development of the bill was placed under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Once it was formulated and after passing under the close scrutiny of officials at the Department of Education, it was presented to Cabinet. From the Cabinet, it entered the House and was passed unanimously.

#### SUMMARY COMMENTS

In the foregoing analysis, questions were addressed and conjectures were offered as part of an attempt to elucidate the development of a language policy in Manitoba. The set of critical questions, drawn from a number of analytic models, brought out some of the salient features of the development of the language bill. It was felt that this eclectic approach provided a wider scope in this study. In developing a rationale for such an approach, Van Dyke (1970:33) has argued that :

If an issue arises, the object... is to identify the actors and interests, the legal and institutional arrangements, and the conditions, methods and procedures that relate to the outcome, and to analyze and perhaps assess their relative role or influence in shaping the outcome. General knowledge of the nature of the process and the factors affecting its functioning is what is sought.

In many ways, the approach used in this study has addressed Van Dyke's recommendations. Moreover, it has proven a useful device in capturing the elements making up the policymaking process. Finally,

the approach has served to alleviate some of the concerns raised by Dye (1975:277) relative to policy analysis :

What it has lacked is a clear picture of the linkages between environmental conditions, political activity, and public policy.

Dye's concern is typical of questions raised by systems theorists. As Anderson (1975:29) states :

Systems approach suggests that policymaking cannot be adequately considered apart from the environment in which it takes place.

In the present study, it was shown how the language policy in Manitoba evolved out of a general climate in the country as a whole. This climate was created in part by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and the strong nationalistic feelings developing among the "québécois", and the federal government's desire to promulgate a new Canadian federalism to counter a growing separatist threat. This climate was further enhanced provincially by increased economic growth, changing values and attitudes, a changing political environment, the Rossillon Affair. These environmental forces provided the landscape upon which could be drawn the more specific portrait of the French minority struggling for recognition.

This portrait, however, acquired meaning and substance by including those individual actors who provided the driving force which urged the process forward. Gergen (1968:182) notes, "... that the subunits of greatest importance are individual persons... and that a thorough understanding of public policy will ultimately depend on knowledge of individual participants". The focus on individuals brought to light their motivations, aspirations, perceptions and purposes which

were basic to the activities undertaken. The identification of the French leaders as principal actors and a description of their roles gave insights into their activities as individuals but also in terms of individuals as part of a group.

Group theory was useful to this study since it raised important issues such as influence, pursuit of goals, problems of change and so on. These factors were operative in attempts made by the French leadership to initiate a process which would coalesce the membership. Furthermore, it can be argued that francophones, during the Weir administration, were competing against what the Premier felt was a problem of greater importance, namely, the economy. In this sense, perhaps Premier Weir viewed the economy as a more legitimate objective to pursue, which meant, however, that the French were not given the attention they felt was in their best interest. Perhaps Premier Weir was experiencing greater pressure from the economic community.

This attempt by the French to gain recognition from Premier Weir demonstrates the dynamic character of the political process. While Weir may have had his reasons to consider a policy of gradualism, a policy which the French leaders outrightly rejected as "retrogressive", a change of political climate altered the political climate to a considerable degree. Under the Schreyer administration, the interests of the French gained in importance. Overall, these various events show how a group can conduct itself to promote its cause.

In light of this, further consideration can be given to the first phase of the process that is the "grassroots operation". Although

this phase sought to make explicit the concerns and problems of the Franco-Manitobans, it may have gone beyond these expressed purposes. Specifically, it is suggested that this particular phase may have led to the creation of an interest group. On this point, Anderson (1975:44) states that the influence of an interest group depends on a number of factors :

They include (subject to the rule of *ceteris paribus*) the size of the group's membership, its monetary and other resources, its cohesiveness, the skill of its leadership, its social status, the presence or absence of competing organizations, the attitudes of public officials, and the site of decision-making in the political system.\*

The suggestion is not that the French minority possessed all these characteristics. However, it is suggested that some were present to a lesser or greater degree and that as a group, Franco-Manitobans were being sensitized to the exigencies required for their survival and growth. The French leaders did initiate a process which hopefully would result in the development of a common purpose which could then serve as basis for making their interests known.

Some of the characteristics mentioned above were operative within the intent of the social animation program. The size of the group while representing only six per cent of the Manitoba population, could be made more effective if members could be rallied behind a common cause and through a leadership component which legitimately represented the aspirations of the group.

Cohesiveness was sought by developing a greater awareness of the problems facing the francophone group and by postulating areas of future orientation, as suggested by the themes discussed at "Rallye 68".

As to the leadership skills, one can only evaluate their effectiveness with respect to using the events, unpredictable as they were, to advantage. Noteworthy are the Rossillon Affair, Schreyer's coming to Manitoba, and Desjardins' position relative to the results of the election.

Finally, as David Truman (1951:37) notes, "... an interest group... becomes political if and when it makes a claim through or upon any of the institutions of government." The political nature of the group was amply demonstrated by its meeting with Premier Weir, Prime Minister Trudeau and Secretary of State Pelletier, and Premier Schreyer. These meetings in essence reflected the group's attempt at using the political route to gain satisfaction.

Throughout the study, elitism was said to be characteristic of the francophones leadership in Manitoba. Perhaps the most important evaluation that can be made of the traditional elite was the fact that it had lost sight of the significant changes which had taken place in society. Entrenched in an ideology which had little appeal to its members, the elite was, by this lack of perception of reality, leading the French community to total integration within the larger community. The distinctness of the minority group may well have been lost. During the sixties, the traditional elite was said to have been diffused but was by no means eliminated. Although the social animation program sought to include participative values within its modus operandi, the elite survived and was maintained albeit with a modified ideology.

Elitism further implies, according to Dye (1975:25), "That public policy does not reflect demands of "the people" so much as it

does the interests and values of the elites.<sup>4</sup> Dye's contention in this case is only partially true. The meeting in St. Leon and the seminar in Gimli represented a reevaluation of the elite's value position. Values would have to account for those of society in general but would also have to encompass those of the minority. Thus, the elite would profess values which included a wider range of social concerns, namely; politics and economics. The deviation from a pure elitist position was that the social animation program brought the leaders face to face with its constituency. These participative values were also novel.

Finally, Dye (1975:26) remarks :

Elitism also asserts that elite share in a consensus about fundamental norms underlying the social system, that elites agree on the basic "rules of the game" as well as the continuation of the social system itself.

There appeared to be little doubt as to the intentions of the elite. The common elements drawn during the interviews with the francophone representatives point to the survival - linguistic and cultural - of the French community. This survival would be assured to the extent that the government was ready to give the French minority the rights which history had abrogated. The social animation program constituted the "rules of the game" which would ultimately help to rebuild a strong community. However, there is reason to suggest that much of the dialogue has been, and still is today, centered around language and culture. This leads to the suggestion that perhaps survival will have to be extended, with as much fervor afforded language and culture, to other areas. Consolidation of

linguistic, cultural, political and to a much greater degree, economic concerns might well enhance the minority's position vis-à-vis the larger community. In the final analysis, perhaps elitism, from a minority perspective, is the best means of survival since it acts as a safeguard to the pressures and forces which are forever leading the minority to the edge of social integrating. Having said this, however, the elite must also keep a close vigilance on the changes occurring in society if it is to reflect an image congruent with reality. But another important point needs to be stated in terms of the prevailing attitude of survival. Survival has always been a major imperative of the Franco-Manitoban community. It seems that as long as the constitutional arrangements and institutional structures do not reflect the permanence required, survival will remain a major objective. Thus, instead of speaking in terms of "épanouissement" or growth, the major issue is to ensure that services will be retained, either from one period to another or from one political party in power to another. During one period, the clergy was a prominent force in the quest to retain identity, ideology, and distinctiveness. Then followed a period in which social and technological forces were at odds with the dominant ideology. The result was a period of ever increasing integration and assimilation to the dominant culture. Politically, no party appeared overly anxious to offer solutions. Then Roblin intervened with Bill 59 but not only was the bill shown to be restrictive, it was very much a question as to the manner in which the incumbent Minister perceived its application. Jaenen (1968:33) remarks :

Given an individual in office who is sympathetic to the Franco-Manitoban community (and its vote no longer means as much to politicians), there can be a return to the bilingualism originally envisaged for the province, but on the other hand, an insensitive or hostile Minister could frustrate the intent of the act.

Following the passage of Bill 59, the Department of Education did not appear overly anxious to commit itself to its implementation. The Assistant Deputy Minister had unequivocally stated that the implementation was dependent upon parents making application to the Department. It seems somewhat ironic that departmental officials would await parental request for some programs while taking the initiative in others.

The Weir administration on the other hand was more outspoken on its policy toward bilingualism. Gradualism would be the operational definition of the policy. To the French leaders, the Weir administration represented the trough of the wave. However, with the N.D.P. in power, Schreyer has shown a high degree of understanding and his government has initiated a number of important programs.

This brief excursion shows how French linguistic and cultural rights are very much dependent upon the prevailing social and political climates. Since 1969, the French minority has enjoyed and benefited from Schreyer's benevolence. But these benefits have been bound to Schreyer's personality as an individual, because he saw merit in bilingualism, and as a politician, because he chose to respond to Franco-Manitobans' demands. A change in leadership or indeed, in political party, may well alter significantly this arrangement.

Institutional arrangements such as the "Bureau de l'Education Française"<sup>11</sup>

within the Department of Education can quickly be made ineffective by an insensitive or hostile Minister.

### Conclusion

This chapter has endeavoured to (a) shed some light on the characteristics of the actors involved in the development of Bill 113, (b) give some insights into the way the process evolved, and (c) relate some of these insights and characteristics to the literature on policy analysis. The eclectic approach has proven useful in guiding the analysis. The final chapter will present some summary remarks and recommendations for future study.

## Chapter 6

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Summary

The purpose of this study was to describe and analyze the development of a language policy in Manitoba with regards to the Franco-Manitoban community. To place the study in proper perspective, a socio-historical description of the French community was provided. This description showed that between 1916 and 1945 the French minority, led by a ruling elite, opted for an insular existence. Such a self-imposed quasi-isolation assisted greatly in strengthening the preservation of the rural-clerical ideology characteristic of the French community. Inextricably linked to this ideology were language and religion. It was argued that, due to the state of societal development during the period, the French minority did in fact manage to preserve its essential characteristics. Most notably, language was unobtrusively maintained within a school system which disallowed its use. Furthermore, through a homogeneous community structure and a strong family milieu, the French language thrived as the medium of communication.

The period following World War II ushered in important changes in the areas of technology and communications. These changes pierced the quasi-isolation of the French community and introduced it to the mainstream of the larger society. The home, the school, the community, once strong inhibiting forces to assimilation began to collapse. The clergy, perhaps

the greatest single influence in the francophones' daily life slowly began to lose its impact. The language-religion duality also showed signs of faltering. However, despite these very real changes, accompanied by secularization and urbanization, the elite continued to maintain its traditional values never fully realizing that the group it represented was being drawn more and more to the values and morals of Manitoban society. As changes were dismantling many traditional myths and taboos in society, francophones could not rely on other institutional arrangements to preserve their language and culture. Thus, as new arrangements were not replacing the old, more and more francophones had come to the conclusion that to compete in society, integration offered an attractive alternative. This attitude still appears to be prevalent today.

The Quiet Revolution in Quebec and the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism had some profound effects on the fabric of Canadian society. Repercussions upon the French in Manitoba were noted. The mid-sixties saw a concerted effort on the part of a few individuals to bring out in the open the problems affecting the French minority's survival. An unassuming populace was stirred out of its complacency by a confrontation between an entrenched elite and a group of young dissidents. This confrontation led to a series of important events. The language-religion duality was laid to rest; the leadership exercised by the clergy gave way to a lay leadership; the traditional elite was contested and was later replaced by a more pragmatic group of individuals. As a result of these changes, a new direction was proposed and later operationalized through a social animation program. From the Manitoba government came Bill 59 in 1967 which gave recognition to French as a language of

instruction. Its effects, while not documented, appear to have been less than impressive. However, a new era could perhaps be envisioned.

### Conclusions

Against this historical backdrop, it was possible to offer an analysis of the policy movement. Its formative stage was located during a period marked by the francophones' quest to regain a sense of identity, a greater degree of solidarity, and ultimately, recognition. The policy acquired greater specificity through a period when the French leaders began to articulate their interests publicly. Finally, the policy was concretized with the passage of Bill 113. This movement was described in terms of changing values of the interest group, reflecting in many ways the changing social and political attitudes in society, economic growth and the responsiveness of a government to demands from Franco-Manitobans.

In 1968, when the French leaders met with their constituency, armed with the bare essentials of social animation, they came with a new set of values. First, the language-religion duality was not being promoted as an objective to be sought. Second, the leaders encouraged active participation from their membership. This participative value was new. Previously, the membership filled a role of a captive audience. Finally, economics and politics made their way into the changing ideology. These new values constituted in large measure the leadership's approach in what they envisioned as a new direction. Overall, the approach initiated a process of attitudinal and value changes. These changes to some extent reflect the dialogue now in evidence within the French community.

Throughout the period studied, another important consideration may be adduced. It can be said that prior to 1967, the French group's

position was one of relative obscurity. This was due mainly to the group's non-participative character exemplified by the manner in which the leadership made its concerns known. The group had no impact publicly or otherwise. After 1967, this mode of operation appears to have changed. The policy development herein described in many ways reflects a process in which the group acquired a legitimate interest group status. The degree of legitimation can be viewed in terms of the role the leaders played vis-à-vis the political system. Further, with the Schreyer government, the French acquired a status which led them to be party in the development of the policy. This consultative role appears to have continued to this day.

Finally, it can be argued that the recognition given to the French signalled the introduction of a pluralistic character within the educational system. This fact was pointed out by Sidney Green (P.C. July 27, 1976). His hope was that recognition of the French group would, by extension, lead to a more moderate attitude toward other groups and further, give added meaning to a more pluralistic society.

### Recommendations

Throughout the above, the focus was maintained on events which impacted on the development of the policy and on people who, through deliberate actions, steered the process to the adoption stage of the policy. The policy movement was traced to its passage into law in 1970.

Any policy, however, takes on a multiplicity of guises and is viewed differently at many points in a complex system by: pupils, teachers, school administrators, school boards, officials of the Department of Education, the electorate and so on. Further, it was seen how Premier

Edward Schreyer exhibited enormous authority in first making a commitment and then in laying down a language policy. However, the Premier does not manage the schools. Once the policy was enacted into law, the center of authority shifted to the Department of Education and to school divisions.

If the policy process is viewed as continuous in moving to implementation and then to evaluation as Anderson (1975:26-27) suggests, then a number of questions could well serve as basis for future research:

How did the Department of Education choose to use its authority for the implementation of the policy? What expertise was called upon to transform the policy into an action oriented program? What kinds of institutional arrangements were instituted to implement the policy? How did the policy alter the institutional arrangements of the francophones? How long did it take for noticeable changes to make their way into the educational system? How was the policy received by those most affected? What kinds of resources were allocated to the implementation of the policy?

These questions, although by no means exhaustive, could direct attention to the implementation of Bill 113 and provide valuable insights into that process. Further, it would generate some valuable information on a government agency such as the Department of Education, and how a policy moves through the bureaucracy.

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APPENDIX A

BILL 59

## CHAPTER 49

BILL No. 59

An Act to amend The Public Schools Act (2).

(Assented to April 27th, 1967)

HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the  
 Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, enacts as follows:

S. 240 rep.  
& sub.

1. Section 240 of The Public Schools Act, being chapter 215 of the Revised Statutes, is repealed and the following section is substituted therefor:

English as  
language of  
instruction.

**240.** (1) Subject as in this section otherwise provided, English shall be used as the language of instruction in all public schools.

Use of other  
languages at  
certain times.

(2) When authorized by the board of trustees of a district, area or division, a language other than English may be used in any school in the district, area or division

(a) during a period authorized for religious teaching;

(b) during a period authorized by the minister for teaching a language other than English; and

(c) before and after the school hours prescribed in the regulations and applicable to that school.

Use of French  
as language of  
instruction.

(3) Subject as herein provided, the French language, being one of the two languages to which reference is made in the *British North America Act, 1867*, may be used in the public schools as a language of instruction.

Proposal to  
instruct in  
French.

(4) A board of a district, area or division may request the minister to approve a proposal to use, subject as herein provided, the French language in the instruction of social studies and such other subjects as the minister may, by regulation, stipulate, in a school in the district, area or division, as the case may be.

Form of  
proposal.

(5) A proposal made under subsection (4) shall be in a form prescribed by the minister, and the minister may require such additional information as he considers necessary in respect of the proposal.

Contents of  
proposal.

(6) A proposal made under subsection (4) shall set forth the subject or subjects in which it is proposed to offer instruction in the French language, subject to regulations made under subsection (11), and shall set out the duration of periods of time during which a language other than English will be used under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (2), together with any other information required by the minister under subsection (5).

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PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2)

1967

Maximum use  
of languages  
other than  
English.

(7) The total time in which a language other than English may be used

(a) as the language of instruction under a proposal made under subsection (4) and approved by the minister under this section; and

(b) under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (2);

shall not exceed one-half of the instructional time in any day.

Pupil not re-  
quired to be  
taught in  
French.

(8) No pupil shall be required to receive instruction in the French language under a proposal made under subsection (4) if his parent or guardian makes written objection thereto.

Approval.

(9) The minister, in his absolute discretion, and having regard to pedagogical and administrative factors, may approve, reject or suspend all or any part of a proposal made under subsection (4); and, where he approves a proposal or a part thereof, he may approve it subject to such terms and conditions as he may deem necessary or advisable, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing he may, in connection with any such proposal,

(a) limit the use of the French language as a language of instruction under the proposal to certain subjects or to certain parts thereof;

(b) specify the grades in which the French language may be used as the language of instruction under the proposal;

(c) prescribe the qualifications for teachers who may use the French language as a language of instruction under the proposal; and

(d) require the board to make satisfactory provision for the instruction in English of any pupil whose parent or guardian makes an objection under subsection (8);

or do any one or more of the things mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d).

Establishment  
of committee.

(10) The minister may establish a committee to advise him on any matter arising under this section.

Regulations.

(11) The minister may make regulations and prescribe courses of study and textbooks that may be used in carrying into effect proposals, or parts of proposals, approved in accordance with this section.

Commencement  
of Act.

2. This Act comes into force on the day it receives the royal assent.

## MANITOBA REGULATION 72/67

being

A REGULATION UNDER THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACT

RESPECTING THE USE OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE

IN THE INSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL STUDIES

(Filed July 6th, 1967)

## Definitions

1. In this regulation,

(a) "Act" means The Public Schools Act;

(b) "bilingual teacher" means

(i) a teacher holding a valid and subsisting Collegiate Certificate issued under The Education Department Act and who has standing in Français 300, its equivalent or better; or

(ii) a teacher holding a valid and subsisting Collegiate Certificate issued under The Education Department Act and who has standing in Français 200, its equivalent or better, and who has obtained a Certificate of Oral Proficiency in French from a University in Manitoba, or standing equivalent to such a certificate as determined by the minister; or

(iii) a teacher holding a valid and subsisting certificate issued under The Education Department Act which entitles the holder to teach in an elementary school and who has standing in Français 200, its equivalent or better; or

(iv) a teacher holding a valid and subsisting certificate issued under The Education Department Act which entitles the holder to teach in an elementary school, and who has standing in French 200, its equivalent or better, and who has obtained a Certificate of Oral Proficiency in French from a University in Manitoba, or standing equivalent to such a certificate as determined by the minister.

(c) "board" means the board of trustees of a school district, school division or school area;

(d) "department" means The Department of Education;

(e) "district" means a school district that is part of a division and a remote school district;

(f) "division" means a school division or a unitary school division established under Parts XVI, XIX or XIXA of the Act.

July 15, 1967

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- (g) "elementary grades" means kindergarten and grades 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8;
  - (h) "Inspector" has the same meaning as in the Act;
  - (i) "school" has the same meaning as in the Act;
  - (j) "secondary grades" means grades 9, 10, 11 and 12;
  - (k) "teacher" has the same meaning as in the Act.
- Subjects                    2. The French language may be used in the schools as a language of instruction in social studies, including history and geography, in those grades from kindergarten to grade 12 inclusive for which a proposal has been approved and a course has been duly prescribed by the minister.
- Courses                    3. Where the proposal has been approved and where the course has been prescribed by the minister, the instruction in social studies in the French language shall be as outlined in the curriculum guides issued under the authority of the minister.
- Time allotments           4. Subject to section 240 (7) of the Act, the instruction in social studies in the French language shall receive the same weekly time allotment in the different elementary and secondary grades as is recommended for the instruction in social studies in the English-language in the comparable grades.
- Textbooks                5. The textbooks to be used shall be those prescribed by the Minister of Education, including such supplementary and reference materials as may be approved from time to time for this instruction by the minister and listed in the Teacher's Guide, curriculum pamphlets, or other official publications of the department.
- Permission to offer       6. The use of the French language in the instruction in social studies in the schools shall be restricted to those schools the boards of which have submitted a proposal to the minister in the form and manner set out herein, which the minister has approved and shall be subject to such terms and conditions as the minister may impose.
- Form of proposal          7. A proposal for the instruction in social studies in the French language submitted by the board of a district, area or division shall be in the form prescribed by the minister.
- Teacher qualifications    8. The instruction in social studies in the French language in any of the elementary or secondary grades shall be conducted by a bilingual teacher.
- Parental concurrence    9. Where a proposal by a board for instruction in social studies in the French language in any school in its district, area or division has been approved by the minister, the board shall ascertain, in a manner satisfactory to the minister, that no pupil in the school is required to receive such instruction if his parent or guardian objects thereto.

Instruction  
in English

10. Where a parent or guardian of a pupil objects to his receiving instruction in social studies in the French language, the board shall provide for that pupil instruction in social studies in English.

APPENDIX B

BILL 113

Bill 113

## CHAPTER 66

## AN ACT TO AMEND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACT (2).

(Assented to July 16, 1970)

HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, enacts as follows:

**Sec. 258 rep. and sub.**

1 Section 258 of The Public Schools Act, being Chapter P250 of the Revised Statutes of Manitoba, 1970, is repealed and the following section is substituted therefor:

**English and French as languages of instruction.**

258 (1) Subject as otherwise provided in this section, English and French being the two languages to which reference is made in the British North America Act, 1867, are the languages of instruction in public schools.

**Use of other languages.**

258 (2) When authorized by the board of a school district, school division or school area, a language other than English or French may be used in any school in the school district, school division or school area

- (a) during a period authorized for religious teaching;
- (b) during a period authorized by the minister for teaching a language other than English or French; and
- (c) before and after the regular school hours prescribed in the regulations and applicable to that school.

**Establishment of English Language Advisory Committee.**

258 (3) The minister shall establish a committee (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "English Language Advisory Committee") composed of nine persons to which he may refer matters pertaining to the use of English as a language of instruction in public schools.

**Membership of English Language Advisory Committee.**

253 (4) The members of the English Language Advisory Committee, of whom

- (a) two shall be appointed from not less than four persons nominated by the Manitoba Association of School Trustees;
- (b) two shall be appointed from not less than four persons nominated by the Manitoba Teachers Society;
- (c) one shall be appointed from not less than two persons nominated by the Faculty of Education of the University of Manitoba; and
- (d) one shall be appointed from not less than two persons nominated by the Faculty of Education of the University of Brandon;

shall be appointed by the minister for such terms as he may determine.

S.M., 1970, c. 66

## PUBLIC SCHOOLS

### Establishment of French Language Advisory Committee.

258 (5) The minister shall establish a committee (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "French Language Advisory Committee") composed of nine persons to which he may refer matters pertaining to the use of French as a language of instruction in public schools.

### Membership of French Language Advisory Committee.

258 (6) The members of the French Language Advisory Committee, of whom

- (a) two shall be appointed from not less than four persons nominated by l'Association des commissaires d'école de langue française du Manitoba;
- (b) two shall be appointed from not less than four persons nominated by les éducateurs franco-manitobains; and
- (c) two shall be appointed from not less than four persons nominated by Le Collège de Saint Boniface;

shall be appointed by the minister for such terms as he may determine.

### Languages of Instruction Advisory Council.

258 (7) The English Language Advisory Committee and the French Language Advisory Committee together constitute a council to be known as: "Languages of Instruction Advisory Council", to which the minister may refer matters pertaining to the operation of this section.

### Use of English or French as language of instruction.

258 (8) Where there are in any school district, school division or school area

- (a) twenty-eight or more pupils in an elementary grade who may be grouped in a class for instruction; or
- (b) twenty-three or more pupils in a secondary grade who may be grouped in a class for instruction;

and whose parents desire them to be instructed in a class in which English or French, as the case may be, is used as the language of instruction, the board of the school district, school division or school area may, and upon petition of the parents of those pupils requesting the use of English or French, as the case may be, as the language of instruction in respect of those pupils, shall group those pupils in a class for instruction and provide for the use of English or French, as the case may be, as the language of instruction in the class.

### Minister's discretion for fewer pupils.

258 (9) Where the number of pupils concerned is less than the numbers mentioned in subsection (8) as requirements for the application of that subsection, the minister, where he considers it practical and upon the advice of the English Language Advisory Committee or the French Language Advisory Committee, as the case may be, may require the board of a school district, school division or school area to make arrangements for the use of English or French as the language of instruction in any class.

### Language of administration.

258 (10) The administration and operation of a public school shall be carried out in the English language or the French language as the minister may, by regulation, provide.

## PUBLIC SCHOOLS

S.M., 1970, c. 66

English as subject of instruction.

258 (11) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, English

- (a) may be a subject of instruction in any grade; and
- (b) shall be a subject of instruction in every class in Grades IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, or XII where French is used as the language of instruction.

Agreements by boards.

258 (12) A board of a school district, school division or school area may enter into an agreement with the board of another school district, school division or school area for providing jointly, classes in which the language used for instruction is English or French as the case may be, and the pupils in those classes may be included in the numbers required to meet the requirements of any provision of this section or the regulations.

Regulations.

258 (13) The Minister may make regulations for carrying this section into effect.

Commencement of Act.

2 This Act comes into force on a day fixed by proclamation.

## Manitoba Regulation 179/70

*Being a Regulation made under Section 258 of The Public Schools Act  
respecting Languages of Instruction and Languages of Study*

*(Filed November 23, 1970)*

## DEFINITIONS

1. In this regulation
  - (a) "Act" means The Public Schools Act;
  - (b) "division" means a school division or a unitary school division established under Parts XVII, XIX or XX of the Act;
  - (c) "elementary grade" means kindergarten to grade VIII inclusive;
  - (d) "language of instruction" has the same meaning as in the Act;
  - (e) "language of study" means any language approved or prescribed by the Minister as a subject of study in the schools, including English and French when taught as second languages;
  - (f) "secondary grade" means grades IX, X, XI and XII.

## LANGUAGES OF INSTRUCTION

2. Courses of study may be taught in the schools in either of the French or English languages in those grades from kindergarten to grade XII for which a course of study has been duly prescribed by the Minister or for which a proposal and course of study have been duly approved by the Minister.

## TIME ALLOTMENTS

3. Time allotments for courses of study taught in either English or French shall be the same; except where English is a required subject under subsection (11) of section 258 of the Act for those classes using French as a language of instruction, the time allotment for English shall not exceed 25% of the total instructional time.

## INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PUPILS

4. The board of a district, area or division which is in receipt of a petition requesting the use of French or English as the language of instruction under subsection (8) of section 258 of the Act and which is unable to group together in a class for instructional purposes the minimum number of pupils required under that subsection, or to make satisfactory arrangements with the board of another district, area or division for the provision of joint classes as permitted under subsection (12) of section 258 of the Act, shall inform the Minister accordingly.

## LANGUAGES OF STUDY

5. Languages of study may be taught in the schools in those grades from kindergarten to grade XII inclusive

- (a) for which a course of study has been duly prescribed by the Minister; or
- (b) for which a proposal and course of study have been duly approved by the Minister in the form and manner set out herein.

## PROPOSAL

6. A proposal and course of study for instruction in a language of study shall be submitted by the board of a district, area or division in the form prescribed by the Minister and its approval shall be subject to such terms and conditions as the Minister may approve.

## TEXTBOOKS

7. The textbooks and supplementary materials to be used for languages of study shall be those authorized or approved by the Minister.

## TIME ALLOTMENTS

8. Time allotments allocated to a language of study other than English approved by the Minister under a board proposal shall not exceed the time allotments allocated to other languages or study authorized by the Minister and set down in curriculum guides issued under the authority of the Minister.

**LANGUAGE OF ADMINISTRATION**

9. (1) In a school in which English is used as the language of instruction for 75% or more of the school day in the elementary grades and 60% or more of the school day in the secondary grades the administration and operation of the school shall be carried out in the English language.

9. (2) In a school in which French is used as the language of instruction for 75% or more of the school day in the elementary grades and 60% or more of the school day in the secondary grades the administration and operation of the school shall be carried out in the French language.

10. In a school in which instruction is given in the English language or in the French language for a period of 50% or more, but

- (a) Less than 75% of the school day in the elementary grades; and
- (b) less than 60% in the secondary grades;

the administration and operation of the school shall be carried out in either English or French depending upon the predominance of the language of instruction in that school; but the intent of all administrative and operational procedures and directives shall be duly communicated in the other language to those members of the staff and to those pupils for whom the language of instruction is not easily understandable.

**TERM OF OFFICE**

11. Except for members appointed to complete the term of a member who has resigned or died or ceased to be eligible as a member before the end of his term, members of the Language Advisory Committees shall serve for a period of two years and thereafter until their successors are appointed.

12. Notwithstanding section 11, in the initial appointments to these committees the Minister shall provide for one-half of the members to be appointed for a one year term.

**REAPPOINTMENT**

13. Appointed members of the Language Advisory Committees shall be eligible for reappointment for a second consecutive term of office; but shall not be eligible for appointment for a third or subsequent term of office as a member of the Committee unless one year has elapsed since the expiry of any previous term of office as a member of the Committee.

**VACANCIES**

14. (1) Where a person appointed to a Language Advisory Committee ceases to be a member of the association, society, institution or group that nominated him, he shall cease to be a member of the Committee.

14. (2) Where an appointed member of a Committee vacates his office from any cause before the expiry of his term of office, his successor shall be appointed or nominated and appointed in the same manner as he was, for the unexpired portion of his term.

**ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN**

15. (1) At their first meeting in each calendar year, each of the Language Advisory Committees shall proceed immediately to the election of a chairman and a vice chairman who shall hold office for that calendar year and until their successors shall have been duly elected.

15. (2) The chairmen of the Language Advisory Committee shall serve in alternate years as chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the Languages of Instruction Advisory Council in such a way that when the chairman is from the English Language Advisory Committee, the vice-chairman shall be from the French Language Advisory Committee, and vice versa, with the chairman of the French Language Advisory Committee serving as first chairman of the Languages of Instruction Advisory Council.

**APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY**

16. The Minister shall appoint a secretary to the Languages of Instruction Advisory Council and to the Language Advisory Committees.

## PROCEDURE

17. The Language Advisory Committees and the Languages of Instruction Advisory Council may make rules, not inconsistent with the Act, respecting their own procedure and fixing their own quorums.

## MEETINGS

18. (1) The Language Advisory Committees shall meet at least annually, and at such other times as they determine or as the Minister shall direct.

18. (2) The Languages of Instruction Advisory Council shall meet at the request of the Minister.

19. Manitoba Regulation 79/67 is repealed.

## Manitoba Regulation 160/70

*Being a Regulation under The Public Schools Act  
To Amend Manitoba Regulation 146/69*

*(Filed November 27, 1970)*

1. Manitoba Regulation 146/69 is amended by adding thereto immediately after section 13 thereof, the following section:

13.1 Notwithstanding any other provision of this regulation, the board of a school district, school area or school division may, with the consent of the minister, and subject to any conditions the minister may impose, operate one or more schools in the district, area or division, or offer courses in any school in the district, area or division, during the whole year, or during portions of the year, and in varying terms and hours.

## Manitoba Regulation 181/70

*Being a Regulation under The Public Schools Act  
To Amend Manitoba Regulation 18/67*

*(Filed November 27, 1970)*

1. Subsection (2) of section 20 of Manitoba Regulation 18/67 is amended by striking out the word "fifteen" in the first line of clause (a) thereof and substituting therefor the word "eighteen".

2. Subsection (3) of section 20 of Manitoba Regulation 18/67 is amended by striking out the word "ten" in the first line of clause (a) thereof and substituting therefor the word "fifteen".

3. This regulation shall come into force on the first day of December, 1970.

APPENDIX C

MAIN EVENTS IN FRENCH LANGUAGE POLICY  
IN MANITOBA - 1889/1967

Main Events in French Language Policy

in Manitoba - 1889/1967

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Event</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1889        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| August      | Portage la Prairie - Dalton McCarthy, grand master of the Orange Order for British North America, expounds the evils of state-supported Catholic schools and the official use of the French language (Jackson, 1970).                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| September   | Manitoba Gazette published in English only !                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1890        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| January     | Abolition of official use of French in the Legislative Assembly, the civil service, government publications, provincial courts and the removal of Catholic "fête" days from the calendar of public holidays.                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| March       | Abolition of the denomination school system. The Bill provided for a non-denominational school system to be administered by local boards of trustees and a Department of Education with a minister responsible to the Legislature. (Morton, 1967).                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1897        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| March 30    | Laurier-Greenway Compromise <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Religious instruction allowed from three-thirty o'clock to four.</li> <li>- "Where ten of the pupils in any school speak the French language or any language other than English, as their native language, the teaching of such pupils shall be conducted in French or any other language, and English upon the bilingual system."</li> </ul> |

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Event</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1913        | <p>Herbert Samuel reveals that in matters of education, Manitoba was a generation behind the civilized world. (Morton, 1967 : 333)</p> <p>Manitoba Free Press - in a series of sixty-four articles exposed the defects of the bilingual schools.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| November    | <p>Meeting of the Liberal Association. Speaking of the Bilingual Clause of 1897, T. C. Norris, the Liberal Leader stated : "The idea of those who drafted these provisions was that it would give the French, who with some show of right, lay claim for special consideration in this matter... However, all must learn English. If it means recasting of the law as it stands, this will be done." (Leblanc, 1968 : 18)</p>                            |
| 1914        | <p>Free Press - in an extended inquiry, it revealed that the schools were in effect perpetuating mother tongues without English. (Morton, 1967)</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 1915        | <p>School Inspector C.K. Newcombe revealed that linguistic chaos had been produced in many districts. (Morton, 1967)</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 1905 - 1915 | <p>Every year annual conventions were held bringing together all bilingual french teachers (60% of which were religious teachers). According to the Free Press this clericalism "fostered a separatist spirit." (Oct. 25, 1915)</p> <p>Free Press (Nov. 3, 1915) Such encounters were not only racial but denominational. "We have always doubted the propriety of public school teachers, as such, meeting together under denominational auspices."</p> |

1916

January

French delegation led by P.A. Talbot and H. Chevrier met with Premier T.C. Norris. According to the Winnipeg Telegram (Jan. 10) "Norris backs up on Bilingualism." Premier Norris is said to have definitely proposed that the French-Canadian people will not be interfered with in the proposed anti-bilingual legislation and that the Laurier-Greenway Agreement will not be abrogated.

February 9

Free Press - "Cabinet is Divided on Bilingualism." It is expected that special exemption will be made in the case of French-Canadians and Mennonites.

Dr. Thornton, minister of Education - of the opinion that the only remedy for a chaotic situation was to abolish the bilingual system entirely and make English the sole language of instruction in the schools. (Morton, 1967)

February 17

First meeting of the "Comité de vigilance" a committee organized to keep a close eye on the actions of the government relative to bilingual education.

February 29

New organization formed and named l'Association des Canadiens Français du Manitoba. It was later that "Education" was added.

March 10

Liberal government of T.C. Norris in a vote of 36 to 8 abolished the bilingual clause of the Laurier-Greenway Compromise.

June 27-28

First general meeting of the AECFM held. A motion presented by the president, L.A. Prud'homme was accepted unanimously by the assembly. "Les membres de l'Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba affirment leur attachement inviolable à la langue ancestrale et protestent énergiquement contre l'abolition de l'enseignement de la langue française dans leurs écoles..." (cited in Leblanc, 1968 : 28).

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Event</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1916        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| June 27-28  | In a brief address, Archbishop Beliveau stated : L'Association est l'oeuvre des laïcs. Il devrait en être ainsi. Ils sont les pères et les frères de ceux qu'on attaque et ils se sont noblement levés pour les défendre. On s'est demandé, en certains lieux, si votre archevêque en serait. J'en suis. Le clergé en est aussi. Nous sommes avec vous et nous y resterons jusqu'au bout. " (Cited in Leblanc, 1968 : 29). |
| August 17   | <u>Signs of Rejection</u> - In a confidential letter sent to each local association the AECFM wrote : "...de demander aux commissaires d'écoles dans les districts scolaires français de continuer l'enseignement du français comme par le passé. " (Cited in Leblanc, 1968 : 31).                                                                                                                                         |
| August 24   | Archbishop Beliveau reiterates position on School Question. In a letter to Cardinal Begin, Archbishop of Quebec, Archbishop Beliveau wrote : " Pour ce qui est de notre question scolaire, la direction donnée et qui sera suivie nous l'espérons, est <u>d'enseigner le français en violation de la loi</u> , de le faire sans bruit, d'y mettre de la dissimulation au besoin. " (Cited in Leblanc, 1968 : 32).          |
| 1922        | End of party government in Manitoba until 1958 when the Conservatives, led by D. Roblin, gained power.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1924        | A committee, made up of academic people, presided by W.F. Osborne, made an inquiry into the teaching of French at the high school level. It seems however that the committee was concerned with pedagogy and culture.                                                                                                                                                                                                      |

| <u>Year</u>      | <u>Event</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1931             | <u>First sign of recognition.</u><br>Although ambiguous, a statement in the Teacher's Guide, published by the Department of Education, read :<br>" In districts where the speech of the people is other than English the method of instruction must vary from that usually employed. "<br>(Cited in Leblanc, 1968 : 60) |
| 1938             | In the Programme of Studies of the Department of Education the following appeared : "A foreign language may be studied in the larger schools where it is found possible to provide proper instruction."<br>(Cited in Leblanc, 1968 : 62).                                                                               |
| 1941<br>(Summer) | A delegation of the AECCM met with the minister of education Hon. Ivan Schulz to have French recognized as an official language from grade four. Mr. Schulz requested that a letter be sent to him by Father A. d'Eschambault and not by the AECCM " afin d'éviter tout danger futur. "                                 |
| 1947<br>November | The Manitoba School Journal stated that French was being recognized as a subject of instruction in grades seven and eight as in the higher grades (these programmes were essentially the programmes used by the AECCM).                                                                                                 |

1950

October 8-9

At its general meeting, the AECFM passed a resolution asking the Department of Education that the French course intended for French students be called "French for French speaking students."

The department of Education promised that the Manitoba Textbook Bureau would henceforth provide French textbooks for grades seven to twelve.

1952

Government enacts a law with respect to the language of instruction to fill the legal vacuum which had existed since 1916.

- (1) Subject to subsection  
English shall be used as a language of instruction in all public schools.
- (2) When authorized by the board of trustees of a district, a language other than English may be used in any school in the district.
  - a) during a period authorized herein for religion teaching;
  - b) during a period authorized in the program of studies for teaching of a language other than English; and
  - c) before and after school hours prescribed in the regulations and applicable to that school.

1953

Brother J. Bruns wrote a report, adopted by the AECFM, entitled "An Inquiry into the feasibility of teaching French as a subject of instruction in grades one to six in the Public Schools of Manitoba." The Report presented pedagogical, cultural, and political arguments. No follow-up was given to the report after its presentation to Premier D. Campbell.

1955

May The Department of Education authorized the teaching of French in grades four to six.

December The AECM demands authorization for the teaching of French in all grades.

1957

Royal Commission on Education under the chairmanship of Dr. R.O. MacFarlane, was instituted by the Campbell Government.

1959

Report of Royal Commission on Education tabled. Among the recommendations could be found one which read: "The Commission recommends that permission be granted for the teaching of conversational French or German as a subject of instruction from Grade I in all schools in which a duly qualified instructor is available... This recommendation pertains to the teaching of French or German as a second language, and not as a language of instruction in place of English."  
(Report of the Royal Commission, 1958, p. 128)

1959

June Department of Education approved a list of textbooks which distinguished between "French" and "Français".

1960

October The Winnipeg Free Press and the Manitoba Teacher Society declared themselves in favor of teaching French from Grade I.

1962

April Ed. Schreyer, W.B. Scarth, S. Roberts stated in legislature that French should be recognized from Grade I.

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Event</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1962        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| June 21     | Minister of Education Hon. Stewart McLean sent a letter to the director of "La Liberté", Father Durocher, stating that the Department of Education "is going to initiate studies with a view to the organization on a standard basis of French classes in grades one, two and three." (Cited in Leblanc, 1968:68).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 1963        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| March 12    | Premier Roblin, in a speech given in French, in the Legislature, stated: "Afin d'encourager un plus ample usage de nos deux langues officielles, le ministre de l'éducation écrivait l'automne dernier au Secrétariat du Bureau des Aviseurs du Département lui demandant de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin que l'enseignement soit initié aux grades un, deux et trois. J'espère que nous recevrons bientôt un rapport favorable du Bureau des Aviseurs à ce sujet. Dans l'intervalle, je crois que tous les députés seront d'accord que l'enseignement du français dans nos écoles dès la première année est un moyen efficace de bénéficier de l'héritage biculturel de notre pays." (Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, Debates and Proceedings, March 12, 1963, pp 163-164). |
| July 4      | Hon. Stewart McLean, Minister of Education in a speech to a group of French teachers in Brandon declared: "In conformity with the resolution of the Advisory Board, the Government is now embarking upon a new programme in the teaching of French for the pupils whose mother tongue is French. The new course, to be known as Français I, has been                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Event</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1963        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| July 4      | approved and will commence in September 1963. When carried to its completion, this will provide the courses of instruction in French throughout all the elementary grades commencing at Grade I." (Declaration reproduced in "La Liberté" July 15, 1963).                                         |
| 1964        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| June        | Department of Education recognizes "littérature française" in Grade II.<br><br>Responsibility of French instruction transferred from the AECFM to the Department of Education. For the first time, the Department published the French programmes.                                                |
| 1966        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| January     | At a Press conference, the AECFM asked that the Public Schools Act be amended so that French become an official language of instruction. There was a clear consensus of opinion among the two hundred delegates at the general meeting of the AECFM that the one hour of French was insufficient. |
| November 19 | Liberals, at their annual convention, approve a motion by M.L.A. for St. Boniface L. Desjardins, that French be reinstated as an official language of instruction.                                                                                                                                |
| April 27    | Roblin's Bill 59 - which reestablishes French as an official language of instruction - was passed unanimously by the members of the Legislative Assembly. The Bill permitted the teaching of French to fifty per cent of the instructional time.                                                  |

APPENDIX D

MAIN EVENTS : 1967-1970

Events Matrix

| <u>Event</u>                                             | <u>Year</u>       | <u>Government Level</u> |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Bill 59                                                  | April 1967        | Manitoba                |
| Dufferin Roblin<br>leaves provincial<br>politics         | November 1967     | Manitoba                |
| Weir chosen premier                                      |                   | Manitoba                |
| Federal Constitutional<br>Conference                     | February 1968     | Federal                 |
| Federal Liberal<br>Leadership                            | April 1968        | Federal                 |
| Rallye du Manitoba<br>Français                           | June 1968         | Manitoba                |
| Premier Robarts supports<br>concept of French school     | July 1968         | Ontario                 |
| B & B Commission 2nd Book<br>(Education)                 | May 1968          | Federal                 |
| Rossillon Affair                                         | August 1968       | Manitoba and Federal    |
| French leaders meet<br>Trudeau and Pelletier             | October 1968      | Manitoba and Federal    |
| French leaders meet<br>Premier Weir                      | November 1968     | Manitoba                |
| Société Franco-<br>Manitobaine formed                    | December 1968     | Manitoba                |
| New Democratic Convention<br>Schreyer Chosen as Leader   | June 1969         | Manitoba                |
| Provincial Election<br>N.D.P. win minority<br>government | June 25/1969      | Manitoba                |
| Desjardins supports Schreyer                             | July 1969         | Manitoba                |
| S.F.M. meets Schreyer                                    | September 15/1969 | Manitoba                |
| Desjardins leaves<br>Liberals                            | November 1969     | Manitoba                |
| Rallye 69<br>Schreyer addresses<br>convention            | December 6/1969   | Manitoba                |

| <u>Event</u>                                                                                 | <u>Year</u>   | <u>Government Level</u> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| B & B Commission 3rd Book<br>(Work World)                                                    | December 1969 | Federal                 |
| Schreyer and Desjardins<br>meet Secretary of State<br>(French Teacher Training<br>Institute) | December 1969 | Manitoba and Federal    |
| Bill 113 introduced in<br>House                                                              | June 1/1970   | Manitoba                |
| Bill 113 -second reading                                                                     | June 24/1970  | Manitoba                |
| Bill 113 -royal assent                                                                       | July 16/1970  | Manitoba                |

APPENDIX E

LETTER FROM R. TEFFAINE TO  
LEO LETOURNEAU, JANUARY 26, 1977

Rheal Teffaine, B.A., LL.B., Q.C.  
Michel Monnin, B.A., LL.B.  
Alain J. J. Hogue, B.A., LL.B.  
Léo Teillet, B.A., LL.B.

201 - 185 Provencher  
P.O. Box 36 / Casier Postal 36  
St-Boniface, Manitoba R2H 3B4  
Telephone: 233-1426

Dossier / File: 77-4946T

le 26 janvier 1977

M. Léo Létourneau  
236 Michener Park  
Edmonton, Alberta T6H 4M5

Cher Monsieur,

Suite à la réception de votre lettre du 17 janvier 1977, je puis confirmer l'impression qu'on vous a laissé. Effectivement, j'ai initié des pourparlers entre MM Schreyer et Desjardins au lendemain des élections de 1969 étant moi-même un des manitobains qui voyait dans la personne d'Ed Schreyer, au moment où il a annoncé sa candidature pour le poste de chef du N.P.D., un politicien susceptible de rectifier les injustices du passé.

Ayant appuyer M. Schreyer avant le congrès de nomination, et, connaissant M. Desjardins depuis plusieurs années, j'étais de l'avis que ces deux hommes politiques sauraient travailler ensemble car ils avaient des objectifs communs.

Nos discussions ont essentiellement porté sur une formule qui permettrait à M. Desjardins, à titre de Libéral-Démocrate, d'appuyer le gouvernement socio-démocrate de M. Schreyer et donc de porter le N.P.D. au pouvoir.

Comme un des supporteurs de M. Schreyer, le Centre Culturel de Saint-Boniface, ainsi que l'Institut pédagogique et la loi 113, faisant du français une langue d'enseignement au Manitoba, étaient des conditions essentielles à cet appui.

D'ailleurs, il s'agissait là d'éléments du programme politique même de M. Schreyer de sorte que nous n'avons pas eu à nous éterniser étant donné que vous étions tous d'accord.

Bien que MM Schreyer et Desjardins favorisaient l'aide aux écoles séparées, je croyais qu'il était désirable de ne pas mêler les cartes de nouveau et d'établir la division claire entre langue et religion.

..2..

M. Léo Létourneau  
le 26 janvier 1977  
page 2


On procèda donc immédiatement à la réalisation des éléments culturels qui sont maintenant sur place. Je crois que les événements ont justifié la confiance que j'avais mis dans la possibilité de voir MM Schreyer et Desjardins travailler ensemble à assurer un gouvernement socio-démocrat orienté davantage sur les éléments essentiels de justice que les franco-manitobains n'avaient pas connu depuis 1890.

J'espère que ces quelques renseignements vous seront utiles.

Bien à vous,

TEFFAINE, MONNIN & HOGUE

Par:

  
Rhéal Emile Teffaine, C.R.

/DSA

APPENDIX F

LETTER FROM M. GAUTHIER TO  
LEO LETOURNEAU, FEBRUARY 24, 1977

534 Bourgeault

Le 24 fev. 77

Cher Ami,

Excusez ce retard de plus d'un mois. Je n'ai vraiment pas de raisons valables, seulement des excuses.

En réponse à votre question : "Qui fut l'élément catalytique qui aurait expédié la rencontre entre Trudeau et Pelletier et nous?" Ne crois pas que ce fut le juge Monnin. Après 10 ans le déroulement des événements n'est pas aussi clair qui pourrait l'être.

Il me semble que l'évènement qui a provoqué une demande de rencontre fut l'annonce par le Premier Ministre Trudeau qu'un agent Français, peut-être espion ou tout au moins fouteur de trouble, était au Manitoba. Cette annonce d'Ottawa suggérant que nous, de l'association (A.E.C.F.M.), étions complices dans une affaire clandestine, nous avait fortement déplu. Nous avons immédiatement communiqué avec Jean Lagassé et René Préfontaine à Ottawa pour leur dire notre mécontentement. Est-ce eux qui nous ont suggéré de demander une rencontre avec le Premier Ministre ou est-ce notre propre initiative, je ne m'en souviens vraiment pas. Je suis certain cependant que c'est à la suite de discussions téléphoniques avec Préfontaine et Lagassé que nous avons communiqué avec le Bureau du Secrétaire d'Etat M. Gérard Pelletier pour demander une rencontre. Nous avons fait affaire avec le Chef de Cabinet de M. Pelletier, M. André Ouellette, qui devait plus tard devenir le sous ministre de la santé au Manitoba. Ouellette a d'abord refusé de nous organiser une rencontre avec Pelletier et Trudeau. Par la suite, il nous suggéra une rencontre avec M. Pelletier à Winnipeg. Nous avons refusé disant que nous voulions rencontrer également M. Trudeau. Après maintes conversations téléphoniques avec Ouellette et Préfontaine et Lagassé qui nous guidaient discrètement, la rencontre a eu lieu. En autant que je me souviens, c'est ce qui c'est passé.

Si le juge Monnin à intercédé, c'est à mon insu, mais je ne crois pas.

Si vous désirez d'autres précisions n'hésitez pas à m'écrire de nouveau, je tâcherai d'être ponctuel.

Amicalement,

M. Gauthier

Note : This is a typed-written letter of the original sent by M. Gauthier. The text is presented in its integral form. The illegibility of the xerox copy of the original letter necessitated this procedure.