# REFUGEE MIGRATION AND REPATRIATION:
# CASE-STUDIES OF SOME AFFECTED RURAL COMMUNITIES
# IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

By

Joshua Otor Akol

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate

Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the

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ABSTRACT

This study describes the migration of Southern Sudanese refugees during Sudan's civil war and their subsequent resettlement and rehabilitation after the war ended in 1972. It assesses the impact which displacement had upon the refugees' socio-economic conditions after their return to selected case-study areas of Yei, Maridi, Gilo and Aweil. The impact which the civil war had on the degree of displacement of populations from these areas varied significantly, and reflected a variety of factors including the intensity of fighting, distance from the nearest international border, and the degree to which the local physical environment provided adequate shelter and security. Population displacement during the war generated both internal and external refugees, with the latter seeking refuge largely in Uganda and Zaire. A sampling of displacees showed that on their return from exile, external refugees transferred back to Sudan new experiences and farming techniques which they had acquired while in exile. It is suggested that these experiences are largely responsible for significant difference in current economic performance experienced between internal and external displacees.

The differences in the post-war economic performance between internal and external displacees are reflected in their current farm sizes and income levels, with external refugees reporting larger average farm sizes as well as higher average incomes. This is especially the case in Yei District, where farming is the primary economic activity and where the highest rates of adoption of innovations have occurred. Significant differences are also observed in current income disposition

by displacees. Those who were externally displaced during the war from Yei and Maridi Districts tend to exhibit a greater variety of ways of disposing their incomes, which reflects in part their attempts to maintain levels of social services which they had become used to while in exile. Displacees who returned to settle as independent farmers in Yei and Maridi areas following the war demonstrate a much higher level of economic independence than do their counterparts who participate on government development schemes such as on the Gilo and Aweil case-studies.

This study presents an original contribution to literature on refugee migration in general and in Africa in particular because it departs from the more common thrusts of refugee research. By focusing on the after-effects of a refugee migration, it deals with issues which have hitherto been neglected by researchers. Voluntary repatriation is still seen by African governments as the main solution to their refugee problems. Although repatriation has frequently occurred in many parts of Africa, the process of repatriation and the refugees' subsequent readaptation to home country has not been a topic that has been researched. Currently, the potential for repatriations in Africa remains great, yet since there has been little or no research into the experiences of past repatriations, future repatriations can not draw effectively on the experiences of other African countries. This review of Southern Sudan's repatriation and resettlement exercise is therefore a contribution to the sharing of experiences on this facet of refugee migrations.

This Thesis is Dedicated to:

My Loving Mother for her

Patience and Concern

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an analysis of Southern Sudan's refugees, their emergence, repatriation and rehabilitation after the civil war which ended in 1972. The North-South conflict in the Sudan, which lasted from 1955 to 1972, cost the South over one million lives or 25% of its population.[1] During this period, the countryside became dotted with empty homesteads and villages, and fields where crops used to be grown or livestock grazed were abandoned. In some areas, entire populations disappeared and their villages were burnt down by government army units. These were the common features of rural Southern Sudan prior to 1972 (Figure 1.1).

In 1972, the civil war, about which most of the world knew little and cared less, came to end as a consequence of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Appendix A). This was a major break through in the relations between Northern and Southern Sudan and the Agreement was a welcome surprise to the people of both North and South alike. News of the Agreement brought thousands of people onto the streets of Khartoum and throughout the other cities of the country. A general feeling of a 'new beginning' was in the air. As an observer on the streets of Khartoum, I too was affected by the general euphoria. The end of that year brought me to Southern Sudan where I met a number of returnees whose accounts of experiences in their countries of refuge were both interesting and intriguing. They had changed, and I wanted to know why. This interest

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[1]David Roden, "Sudan After the Conflict", Geographical Magazine, Vol. 44 (9), June 1972, p. 593.

## Figure 1.1 Southern Sudan : Location Map



ultimately led me to undertake this study.

The thesis examines the refugee state as a process with a beginning (flight), a transitional period (life in exile) and an end. The end may be voluntary repatriation, or local integration in the country of exile or resettlement in a third country. This framework will be used in assessing the after effects of population displacement and in comparing the displacees' current economic performance with their pre-war conditions.

The shift in physical space by migrants often involves a degree of detachment from their usual and familiar surroundings. Jackson points out that this entails a transition and an involvement with a new environment, a new context of physical space and social relationships.[2] Adjustments made by displacees in the new environment differ significantly from one place to another depending on various factors including physical distance travelled. In general, displacees who migrate beyond their social and economic territorial space tend to be more prone to experience changes than those who remain within the same social and economic space.[3]

The socio-economic spaces traversed by Southern Sudanese displacees during the civil war are divided into six zones, each representing a sub-unit of the whole (Figure 1.2). Displacees who remained in their villages for most part of the civil war are represented by Zone 1, while those who took refuge within ethnic, regional or national territorial space are represented by Zones 2 - 5. Refugees who sought asylum in

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[2]J. A. Jackson (ed.), "Introduction", Migration (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 2.

[3]For example, White and Woods suggest that introduction of a migrant into a new social and cultural setting may lead to the alteration of the migrant's attitudes towards social and cultural

Figure 1.2 Southern Sudan: Population Displacement and the Impact of Socio-Economic Spaces in the Rehabilitation Process.




(Adapted From J. D. Porteous, 1977.)

neighbouring countries are in Zone 6. Thus, given the diverse nature of the displacement of Southern Sudanese during the civil war, it is pertinent to examine whether such experiences across different social and economic spaces have generated variable effects on the displacees since the war. The basic question is whether the displacees who took refuge outside the national territorial space and in alien environments, experienced greater change in their lifestyles after the war than did those who remained within ethnic socio-economic environments.

## REFUGEE MIGRATIONS IN AFRICA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Migration has been an integral part of human history, and in Africa, people have all along been on the move as pastoralists, invaders, pilgrims and traders.[4] In Africa, three periods can be recognized during which differing forms of migration have taken place. These periods are the pre-colonial period, the colonial period and the post-colonial period. In the pre-colonial period, a major form of migration was voluntary and seasonal in nature. People moved either as farmers seeking better land or as nomads in search of water and pastures for their animals.[5] Equally important, however, were involuntary migrations caused by inter-tribal wars whereby weaker tribes were

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behaviour. For details, see Paul White and Robert Woods (eds.), "The Foundations of Migration", The Geographical Impact of Migration (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980), pp. 1-20.

[4]Patrick O. Ohadike, "African Immigration and Immigrants in Zambia: A Study of Patterns and Characteristics", in Pierre Cantrelle (ed.), Population in African Development, Vol. 1 (Liege, Belgium: Ordina Editions, 1981), p. 141.

[5]Gaim Kibreab, African Refugees: Reflections on the African Refugee Problem (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1985), p. 11.

displaced (when not incorporated) by stronger neighbours. Such was the case, for example, with the Zulu expansion through southern Africa.[6] During the colonial period, many of the causes of involuntary population movements were brought under control, but the volume of voluntary migration increased as a result of urbanization and the development of agricultural schemes. In the post-colonial era, the scale and nature of population migration have again changed, with involuntary migration of refugees, especially across the borders of the newly emerged states, becoming a dominant form of population mobility.

Africa currently has a serious refugee problem. It dates mainly from the mid-1950's with the beginning of decolonization process and the granting of independence to African states. Among the first refugee movements to be experienced were those from Algeria to Morocco and Tunisia, resulting from the war of independence from France during the 1950's. Parallel to this movement was that of Southern Sudanese to Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire beginning on the eve of Sudan's independence. By 1964, an estimated 400,000 persons had become refugees in various African countries of asylum.[7] Six years later, their number had increased to over one million.[8] Since then the number of refugees has continued to grow, especially as a result of the

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[6]Ronald Oliver, "The Problem of the Bantu Expansion", Journal of African History, Vol. 7 (3), 1966, p. 373.

[7]United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, "Report of the Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problem", Addis Ababa, 9-18 October 1967. UN DOCUMENT E/CN.14/442, 1969.

[8]Sadruddin Aga-Khan, "The One Million Refugees in Africa", Migration News (4), July-August 1971, pp. 3-12.

conflicts in the Horn of Africa. It is estimated that as of March 1984, the number of refugees of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 2.9 million, constituting more than 25% of the world's refugee population[9] (Tables 1 and 2). Apart from the sheer numbers that have been generated over the years, the duration of refugee migrations has become increasingly long-term or permanent rather than short-term or temporary. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been inextricably involved with African refugees both as an area of exodus and as one of asylum. In order to effectively place Sudan's refugee problem into the African context, it is useful to briefly review the nature and scale of Africa's refugee migrations.

## THE CAUSES OF REFUGEE MIGRATIONS IN AFRICA

For an understanding of the nature of the refugee problem in Africa since the 1950's, it is necessary to briefly discuss the major causes of exodus. Having done this, we can proceed to an examination of how these causes apply specifically to Southern Sudan's situation. Five basic causes of refugee migration can be identified. These migrations are in response to secessionist movements, to independence movements, to ethnic conflicts, and to political and religious repression.

### Secessionist Movements

Refugees resulting from secessionist tendencies in Africa include those from Chad, from the Provinces of Eritrea and Tigre in Ethiopia, from the former Province of Katanga (now Shaba) in Zaire, and from the

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[9]UNHCR, Refugees Magazine (9), September 1984, p. 24.

TABLE 1.1

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF REFUGEES OF CONCERN TO UNHCR IN AFRICA

(a) 1964

| Country of Asylum | Number of Refugees | Principal Country of Origin |
|---|---|---|
| Burundi | 8,500 | Rwanda, Zaire |
| Central Arrican Republic | n.a. | Sudan, Zaire |
| Senegal | 1,500 | Portuguese Guinea |
| Sudan | n.a. | Ethiopia, Zaire |
| Tanzania | 3,000 | Mozambique, Rwanda, Zaire |
| Uganda | 14,800 | Rwanda, Sudan, Zaire |
| Zaire | 71,800 | Angola, Rwanda, Sudan |
| Zambia | n.a. | Angola, Mozambique |

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the Conference on the Legal, Economic, and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problem, Addis Ababa, 9-18 October 1967. UN DOCUMENT E/CN.14/442, 1969.

(b) 1974

| Country of Asylum | Number of Refugees | Principal Country of Origin |
|---|---|---|
| Botswana | 4,300 | Angola, Namibia, South Africa |
| Burundi | 48,500 | Rwanda, Zaire |
| Central African Republic | 5,000 | Zaire |
| Kenya | 2,500 | Various |
| Senegal | 86,500 | Portuguese Guinea |
| Sudan | 53,500 | Ethiopia, Zaire |
| Tanzania | 195,000 | Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zaire |
| Uganda | 112,000 | Rwanda, Zaire |
| Zaire | 500,000 | Angola, Burundi, Rwanda |
| Zambia | 40,000 | Angola, Mozambique |
| Total | 1,047,300 | |

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1974-1975 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Program and Budget for 1976, A/AC.96/516. August 13, 1975

TABLE 1.2

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF REFUGEES OF CONCERN TO UNHCR IN AFRICA

1984

| Country of Asylum | Number of Refugees | Principal Country of Origin |
|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 167,000 | Western Sahara |
| Angola | 99,000 | Namibia, South Africa, Zaire |
| Botswana | 4,200 | Namibia, South Africa, Zaire |
| Burundi | 256,000 | Rwanda, Zaire |
| Central African Republic | 6,800 | Chad |
| Cameroon | 4,300 | Chad |
| Djibouti | 23,000 | Ethiopia |
| Egypt | 5,500 | Ethiopia |
| Ethiopia | 46,800 | Sudan |
| Kenya | 7,300 | Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda |
| Lesotho | 11,500 | South Africa |
| Morocco | 500 | Various |
| Mozambique | 600 | Zimbabwe |
| Nigeria | 4,600 | Chad |
| Rwanda | 49,500 | Burundi, Uganda |
| Senegal | 5,200 | Guinea-Bissau |
| Somalia | 700,000 | Ethiopia |
| Sudan | 699,700 | Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire |
| Swaziland | 7,000 | South Africa |
| Togo | 1,500 | Various |
| Tanzania | 180,000 | Burundi, Zaire |
| Uganda | 173,000 | Rwanda, Zaire |
| Zaire | 293,500 | Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda |
| Zambia | 103,000 | Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Zaire |
| Zimbabwe | 60,400 | Mozambique, South Africa |
| TOTAL | 2,908,900 | |

Source: UNHCR, Refugees, No. 9, September 1984, p. 24.

Eastern Region of Nigeria. In Ethiopia, the refugee exodus began in the mid-1960's as a consequence of Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea in 1962. Armed conflict between the resistance movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front, and the Ethiopian Government, resulted in the displacement of thousands of Eritreans who sought asylum in Kassala Province in north-eastern Sudan. A similar secessionist war erupted in the mid-1970's in Tigre Province, which also resulted in the Tigrean refugees entering Sudan. In Chad, the refugee exodus resulted from the conflict between a Moslem secessionist movement in the north and the Southern Christian dominated central government. Most of the refugees generated by this conflict fled to Central African Republic and to Darfur Province in Sudan.

In Zaire, independence in 1960 was immediately followed by political instability, and the attempted secession of Katanga Province. The resultant civil war was a reflection of regional disparities and a political vacuum created at independence. Although most refugees were internally displaced, some sought refuge in Tanzania and Zambia. In Nigeria, the attempted secession of the Ibo dominated Eastern Region in 1967, also generated large numbers of refugees, although most of them were displaced within the national boundaries of Nigeria rather than across the borders to neighbouring states.

## Independence Movements

While most African countries attained independence without bloodshed, some countries had to fight for their independence. Such independence wars were mainly in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). These

conflicts generated the largest number of refugees in Africa during the 1970's. Prior to their independence in the mid-1970's, 60.2% of Africa's refugees originated from the Portuguese colonies, and especially from Angola.[10] It was estimated that of the 500,000 refugees who were in Zaire in 1975, 95.4% came from Angola.[11] Following the independence of these Portuguese colonies, the independence war in Zimbabwe also started to generate large numbers of refugees seeking refuge in Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. More recently, the conflict in the South African occupied trust territory of Namibia between the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the South African Government has resulted in an increasing number of refugees fleeing to Angola, Botswana and Zambia.

Ethnic Conflicts

Conflicts and feuds between ethnic groups in Africa have existed since pre-colonial times over such things as grazing or territorial rights. However, modern ethnic conflicts and the resultant refugee situation have been in part exacerbated by colonial development policies. In some countries, certain regions or ethnic groups received preferential treatment over others, resulting in uneven social, economic and political development among regions or ethnic groups. On independence, these differences in development generated discontent among neglected groups, as did instances in which political power was

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[10]Neville Rubin, "Africa and Refugees", African Affairs, Vol. 73 (292), July 1974, pp. 290-311; and B. Da Ponte, The Last to Leave: Portuguese Colonialism in Africa (London: The Russell Press Ltd., 1974).

[11]UNHCR, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1974-75 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Program and Budget for 1976. A/AC.96/516. August 13, 1975. Geneva.

usurped by a particular ethnic or minority group. In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis was a direct result of preferential treatment in education and training provided to the Hutus in Rwanda and the Tutsis in Burundi, first by the Germans and then by the Belgians.[12] In Rwanda, the conflict between the ruling majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi in 1962 resulted in the latter fleeing to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. Likewise, in Burundi, tensions between the ruling minority Tutsi and the Hutus in 1972 drove large numbers of Hutus to neighbouring states for refuge, especially to Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. Elsewhere in Africa, ethnic conflicts between various groups have also generated refugees from Uganda, from Eritrea and Tigre Provinces of Ethiopia, and from the Eastern Region of Nigeria.

Political Repression

Refugees resulting from political repression currently constitute the largest category of refugees in Africa. They originate from two source areas: Southern Africa and independent Black African states. In South Africa and Namibia, the racial policies pursued by the white minority government have resulted in an increasing number of refugees seeking asylum in other African countries and abroad.[13] However, the majority of the political refugees in Africa originate from independent Black African states, which include Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique

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[12]Warren Weinstein and Robert Schrire, Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi (New York: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1976), p. 10.

[13]John R. Rogge, "African Refugees and Canada", International Perspectives, September/October 1983, p. 26.

and Uganda. The situation in Chad has been referred to already. In Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, increasing dictatorial rule and fighting between government forces and various guerrilla groups, have been responsible for the creation of political refugees.

Religious Persecution

Religious persecution has also been a cause of refugee migration, but has often been meshed with political considerations. Members of the Lumpa Sect in Zambia and the Jehovah's Witnesses in Malawi, for example, fled their country not only because they could not be politically tolerated by the respective governments but also because of their religious beliefs. Their interpretation of the Bible was so critical that it was considered 'heresy'. Consequently, the members of these religious sects were outlawed by their governments from practising their religious beliefs.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the causes of refugee migration in Africa are many. In much of the continent, refugee movements have resulted from a combination of causes, which may be political, ethnic, racial or religious in nature.

Three distinct groups of countries can be identified (Figure 1.3). First, countries which are source areas for refugees only. Examples include Chad, Namibia and South Africa. In the second group are those which experience refugee inflows only. These include Gabon, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. Countries in the third group are those which have both generated and received refugees. They are located largely in east-central Africa, and include Angola, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Sudan.

Figure 1.3 Major Refugee Flows in Africa Since 1950.



However, as the flight of refugees is unpredictable, the roles which many African countries play as source areas, as asylum states or as both, also constantly change with varying political conditions. For example, Angola and Mozambique which were once source areas for refugees prior to their independence, are today playing both roles. Also, Uganda which was a major recipient country of refugees in the past, is currently a major generating state.

Sudan illustrates this constantly changing mozaic of African refugee migrations perhaps better than any other African country. It began as a source area of Southern Sudanese refugees in the mid-1950's. By mid-1960's it had also become a recipient country when Zairean refugees fleeing the Simba rebellion in north-eastern Zaire entered Sudan. These were immediately followed by the influx of Eritreans to north-eastern Sudan. Later, Chadians also entered Sudan and in the last few years, the biggest influx from Ethiopia and Uganda has occurred. Currently, Sudan is once more becoming a country of exodus as Southerners are again fleeing across the border to Ethiopia. All of the causes discussed above with the exception of wars of independence can be readily identified in these migrations into and out of Sudan.

## THE REPATRIATION PROCESS

Voluntary repatriation to one's country of origin is usually considered the optimum solution to a refugee problem. Of all other solutions, such as local integration in the country of exile or resettlement to a third country, African states have generally favoured repatriation. However, repatriation has so far occurred only in selected areas where peace and stability have followed protracted civil

wars or insurrections.[14] The major repatriations of refugees have been back to the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique following their independence; the return to Southern Sudan after the 17-year civil war ended in 1972; to Chad, in the mid-1970's and again in 1982-83; and to Zimbabwe on its independence in 1980. Altogether it is estimated that over one million refugees have been involved at one time or another in a repatriation exercise.[15] However, little or no research has been undertaken on any of these repatriations. This is regrettable because the process and problems of rehabilitation of refugees following their return should be better understood, since the prospects remain that many of the continent's current refugees may well be repatriated at some point in the future. The potential for repatriation remains for the majority of refugees originating from Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda and Western Sahara, if and when the political conditions that led to their exodus ever improve. Southern Sudan is examined in this thesis as an example of a major repatriation.

## The Case Study of Southern Sudan

The North and South of Sudan are two very distinct regions in terms of language, religion, ethnicity and culture. The North is inhabited by a population of mixed African and Arab descent and is Moslem and Arabic-speaking. In the South, on the other hand, the population is Black African with sub-saharan African cultures and Christian

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[14]Rogge, John R. "Refugee Migration and Resettlement", in John I. Clarke and Leszek A. Kosinski (eds.), Redistribution of Population in Africa. London: Heinemann, 1982), p. 40.

[15]UNHCR, Refugees Magazine, December 1983, p. 16. However, it should be noted that these figures are only estimates because refugees have been constantly on the move with changing political conditions, as

influences, and is non-Arabic speaking. The causes of the 17-year civil war were entrenched in these basic ethno-cultural differences. As was suggested in the preceding discussion, many of the causes that have generated refugees in other African states have also manifested themselves in Southern Sudan.

With the intensification of the civil war in the mid-1960's, the Northern-controlled government devised ways and means of strengthening its grip on the South. In that process, ethnic conflicts between the two regions were further intensified; political repression was sanctioned by the government; and the spread of Islam by government agents was stepped up. All these policies resulted in an increasing number of displacees seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.

While Southern Sudan can be seen to illustrate Africa's refugee problem in a broader context, there is nevertheless a more fundamental cause that is at the root of the problem. In order to appreciate this underlying problem between the North and South, it is useful to reflect on British colonial development policies in Sudan because these policies exacerbated long-standing North-South hostilities.

The Sudan was administered as a 'dual' periphery, with the North being the focus of peripheral development and the South being an outer periphery and experiencing economic stagnation. Thus, the relationship between the metropolitan core (London) and the periphery (Sudan) was a chain dependency, with Khartoum (capital) depending on London, and in turn Juba (where the Southern administration was based) depending on

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shown by the case of the Southern Sudanese refugees who have once again crossed the borders into their former host countries.

Khartoum. While social, economic and political development were taking place in the North, the South remained an isolated and undeveloped outer periphery. On the eve of independence, these inequalities in regional development revived the old fears of domination by the North, and this subsequently led to the civil war and the emergence of refugees. Given this underdeveloped nature of the South at independence and the protracted civil war that set in, the development problems of the South were intensified. The economic activities, especially in rural areas, were curtailed by the fighting and the few social services and roads that existed were destroyed. After the civil war, these problems became especially visible as preparations for the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees were undertaken.

## OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In recent years, the question of refugees in general and in Africa in particular has drawn attention of scholars in many disciplines including geography. However, their analyses of refugee problems have generally focused attention on causes, on migration trends and on refugee settlement and adjustment in countries of asylum.[16] Little attention has been paid to the repatriation of refugees and the subsequent rehabilitation process that is necessary once the refugees return to their home country.

In the context of Southern Sudan, which experienced one of the largest repatriation operations on the African continent, some research has been conducted on the origin of the refugee problem and the flight

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[16]For example, see J. O. Akol, A Geographical Survey of the Nature and Patterns of Refugee Migration in Africa. Unpublished M. A. Thesis, The University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1976; P. Kolenic,

of refugees during the civil war, but none has dealt with the socio-economic transformation which the refugees underwent during the displacement process.[17] The impacts of these experiences upon the post-civil war socio-economic rehabilitation of the displacees, and the contrasts that have emerged between different refugee groups upon their return, remain to be studied.

A further dimension of Southern Sudan's refugee problem was the displacement which occurred within the South, often referred to as the "flight to the bush". While such displacees were also refugees in the broad context of the word, only the 'external migrants' to neighbouring countries were ever accorded official refugee status. Yet after the war, both groups were involved in the repatriation and resettlement process. To this writer's knowledge, there has not been any research conducted on the internal displacees.

Given this relative dearth of research into Southern Sudan's refugee experience, the basic objectives of this study are:

(a) to describe the repatriation process of Southern Sudanese refugees after the civil war, in order to show the magnitude and nature of problems encountered by the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission in that exercise, and to assess some of the successes and failures of this repatriation operation; and

(b) to discuss the rehabilitation process in four case-study areas,

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African Refugees: Characteristics and Patterns of Movement. Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Ohio University, Ohio, 1974; and Maxine E. Olson, Flight, Settlement and Adjustment: Refugee Experience in Laos and Other Developing Countries. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, 1978.

[17]Mohamed Omer Beshir. The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968); M. A. Salih, "The Round Table Conference and the Search for a Solution to the Problem of the Southern

with a view of exploring the types of adjustments refugees made after they had returned to their homeland.

In discussing adjustments which displacees have made, it must be emphasized that the aim is not to compare the four case-study areas (given their different experiences during the civil war and varying levels of economic development), but rather to compare the conditions of the people in the respective areas before and after the war. In other words, the objective is to determine whether or not the participants are better off economically now as compared to the pre-war period. The documentation of Sudan's experience with its repatriation should be of use to persons or agencies involved in future repatriation and rehabilitation programs for refugees.

## SELECTION OF CASE-STUDY AREAS

As has been previously stated, the study aims at describing the repatriation exercise of Southern Sudanese refugees after the civil war and discussing the rehabilitation process in four selected case-study areas in order to explore the types of adjustments refugees had to make after their return home. Also, the development strategies adopted in these areas and the subsequent impacts which they had upon the participants are discussed with a view of assessing different levels of performance after the war.

Two sets of rural population were selected. The first set is

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Sudan, 1964-69. Unpublished M. Sc. Thesis, University of Khartoum, 1971; and John W. Sommer, The Sudan: A Geographical Investigation of the Historical and Social Roots of Political Dissension. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Boston University, 1968.

comprised of farmers who settled spontaneously after the war or who were independent of government development schemes. Farmers in the Yei and Maridi areas were selected as representative of this set. The second set consists of farmers depending upon government developmental schemes, and those in the Gilo Potato Project and Aweil Rice Scheme were chosen as examples.

A brief description of each case-study area is given below to provide the reader an idea of their location relative to the international political boundaries. Geographical location played a major role in displacees' decision-making regarding the nature of their dislocation during the civil war. Yei District lies in the equatorial belt in the southern most part of Sudan. It has an area of 10,027 sq. km. and had an estimated population of 112,800 persons in 1973, of which 100,868 were rural.[18] A total of 200 farmers were interviewed, whose household members (1,420) represented 1.4% of the rural population. Maridi District also lies in the equatorial zone to the northwest of Yei District. It has an area of 22,478 sq. km. with a population of 86,470, of which 76,842 were rural.[19] As was in the case of Yei, 200 farmers were interviewed whose household members (1,260) constituted 1.6% of the rural population.

The Gilo Potato Project is a post-civil war development project.

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[18]Government of Sudan, Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics, Population Census of Sudan, Khartoum, 1973. The 1973 census figures are the most recent in Sudan. Since independence in 1956, there were only two census counts, one in 1955/56 and the other in 1973. In 1983, a third census enumeration was undertaken but the results have not been published.

[19]Ibid.

Located adjacent to Gilo village in Torit District some 208 km. southeast of Juba, it is situated in a low-lying area of the southern mountains of the Ironstone Plateau. Torit District has an area of 18,896 sq. km. with a population of 107,723 persons as of 1973.[20] A total of 40 farmers were interviewed on this scheme, representing 62.5% of the scheme's participants.

The Aweil Rice Scheme is situated some 150 km. northwest of Wau in Aweil District and adjacent to Aweil town. The history of this scheme predates independence. The district lies in the high woodland savana zone and covers an area of 18,874 sq. km. with a population of 393,903 in 1973.[21] A total of 42 interviews were conducted on the rice scheme, which represents 25.5% of the total farmers on the scheme. Interview of a larger number of scheme's participants would have been appropriate, but as was previously stated, many of the farmers were not available.

Criteria Used in the Selection of Case-study Areas

The case-study areas were selected to discuss changes which their populations experienced after the war. The selection criteria took into account variations in social and economic structure of the communities under investigation, and as well as their location with respect to international borders. Specifically, the criteria used in selecting the four case-study areas were:

(a) Relative Accessibility. This was the major determining factor in the selection process. The lack of adequate and reliable

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

transportation in Southern Sudan is one of the main constraints to social and economic development. The problem was compounded by the protracted civil war (1955-72) during which virtually all the existing roads and bridges were destroyed. Consequently, the selection of case-study areas by this writer was in part dictated by access to the respective areas.

(b) The Nature and Scale of Population Displacement During the Civil War. These considerations were important in the selection process because the Southern population experienced varying degrees of displacement during the civil war. Examination of the nature and scale of population displacement is therefore useful in order to determine whether the areas which experienced large-scale population displacement across the international borders underwent greater changes in economic transformation after the war. The nature and scale of dislocation depended upon the intensity of fighting during the civil war, and upon proximity to border areas. For example, the Aweil area experienced only minimal population displacement because it was peripheral to major centers of confrontation and was also located at some distance from border areas. Those who were displaced at Aweil, tended to migrate for only relatively short distances into the'bush', or alternatively to the security of Aweil town. Only a few undertook the longer migration further northwards into Darfur and Kordofan Provinces in Northern Sudan. In contrast, the Yei, Maridi and Gilo areas all experienced large-scale population displacement caused by the direct impact of the armed conflict between government forces and the 'Anyanya'. Displacees migrated either into the 'bush', or,

because the areas were relatively close to the border, took advantage of the greater levels of security afforded in the neighbouring states.

(c) Variation in Ethnic Backgrounds and Socio-Economic Practices. Southern Sudan is inhabited by many ethnic groups with different cultural, economic and social backgrounds. Such differences are important in analysing human responses to measures of socio-economic development. It is suggested that communities with varying backgrounds, aspirations and external influences, differ in their responses to development.[22] The four case-study areas are inhabited by populations of widely differing backgrounds and attitudes. The Aweil area is inhabited by Malual Dinka, a nilotic group, who are largely pastoral nomads but also practice some substistence farming. At Yei, the population is mainly Kakwa, while at Maridi and Gilo the Baka and Lotuka people dominate respectively. All these three groups are of nilo-hamitic origin, and traditionally engaged in subsistence farming. The case studies were partly selected therefore to determine how such diverse peoples, with varying economic practices and who experienced different levels of contact with external economic forces during the civil war, reacted to the stimulus of post-war rehabilitation schemes.

(d) History of Development in the Respective Areas. The differences in development among the four case-study areas were also used as a selection criterion. In the Aweil and Gilo areas, the history of

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[22]For example, see Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. "Risk, Uncertainty, and the Subsistence Farmer: Technological Innovation and Resistance to Change in the Context of Survival", in George Dalton (ed.) Studies in

the two schemes' development is examined to establish whether or not there is any significance in performance between the one whose development dates from pre-war years, with that of the post-war development scheme. The Aweil scheme was begun in the early 1950's as an experiment in deep water rice cultivation in the swamps of the Aweil area. Although its development was interrupted by the civil war, the Aweil community had been introduced to a rudimentary cash economy prior to the civil war, which greatly assisted the post-war rehabilitation of the scheme. The Gilo Potato Project, on the other hand, was introduced after the war into a local economy which had no prior cash-cropping experience. The analyses of these two schemes will provide some insights into their impacts upon their respective areas.

Development in Yei and Maridi areas dates from the late colonial period, when cash-cropping was introduced into parts of Equatoria Province, and especially with the establishment of the Zande Cotton Scheme in western Equatoria. In both Yei and Maridi Districts, local farmers were encouraged to grow cash crops such as coffee, tea and tobacco. However, in Maridi District, which was an integral part of the Zande Scheme, the growing of cotton was mandatory. Each family was required to cultivate at least 0.5 feddans of cotton as a public service.[23] Although these efforts were brought to a halt during the civil war, most local populations

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Economic Anthropology, Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1971, pp. 151-78 and Charles Price, "The Study of Assimilation", in J. A. Jackson (ed.), Migration, London: Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 187-237.

[23]Government of Sudan, Resettlement Office, Yambio, Zande District Standing Orders, Local Order (Agricultural Control), No. 2, Yambio, 1950.

in these areas had been introduced to at least some form of cash-cropping economy by 1956. It is therefore useful to examine how the cash-cropping experiences in Yei and Maridi areas prior to and during the war affected the displacees' post-war rehabilitation process and economic performance.

(e) The Nature of Rural Development Strategies Adopted in the Region. The nature of rural development strategies in Southern Sudan are such that both 'bimodal' and 'unimodal' strategies have been employed. In the selection process, the case-study areas included areas that have undergone both types of strategies. In the Yei, Maridi and Gilo case-study areas, differing levels of a bimodal strategy have been adopted, whereby a larger population base benefits from agricultural extension work provided by both government agents and international agencies. In the Aweil area, on the other hand, a unimodal strategy is employed, where the development scheme does not generate demonstration effects in areas beyond the immediate target population. An analysis of these development strategies in the case-study areas is therefore important in order to assess their impact upon farmers' performance and overall post-war economic well-being in the respective areas.

## DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This research is based on both secondary and primary sources of data. The secondary sources of data were documents and reports furnished by the Regional Ministries and Departments in Juba, and in their branch offices in districts where the case studies were conducted. In particular, reports of the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission

provided valuable background information on the Commission's activities in the repatriation and resettlement exercise. However, it should be mentioned that these government documents and reports often lack consistency, and that there is some question about the accuracy of some of their data. As a result, the figures obtained from these sources may not necessarily always reflect reality. Nevertheless, as these documents and reports constitute the only official sources of information and statistical data on the region, they are therefore valuable to this research. In addition to data extracted from government sources, published material by international agencies pertaining to Southern Sudanese refugees in particular and to refugees in general were also consulted, especially materials from UNHCR and from various voluntary organizations. These secondary data were used to describe the whole resettlement process of Southern Sudanese refugees after the war.

The primary sources of data generated for this thesis consisted of a questionnaire schedule and unstructured interviews with officials. The questionnaire was administered among a sample of population in four case-study areas, Yei, Maridi, Gilo and Aweil (Figure 1.4). The information extracted from these questionnaires provided valuable data on the impact of the civil war in these areas, as well as on changes in the refugees' socio-economic conditions resulting from their displacement during the war. Unstructured interviews with government officials, community leaders and village chiefs also provided insights into general socio-economic conditions and the impact which displacement had upon returnees.

These surveys were conducted with the assistance of local

Figure 1.4 Southern Sudan: Location of Case-Study Areas.




Case — study area
International boundary
Southern Sudan's boundary
District boundary

agricultural officers, since they spoke the local languages and also knew most of the farmers in the study-areas. In all, nine agricultural officers were involved in the surveys, four in Maridi, three in Yei and one each in Gilo and Aweil. Prior to the survey, the assistants were given an orientation of the survey's objectives, and this was followed by a field-test of sample questions to ensure that the contents of the questionnaire were understood by both farmers and interviewers.

The distribution of target populations varied from one place to another. In Yei and Maridi, the population was distributed over a much greater space than was the case in Gilo or Aweil. Consequently, in both Yei and Maridi, the survey areas were divided into zones based on the main roads servicing the respective districts. Four zones were thus identified and one interviewer was assigned to each zone.

The survey was conducted under very adverse physical conditions which made accessibility to most rural areas difficult. As a result, data collection was limited largely to areas which were accessible, and the sample was drawn essentially from an area within a 50 kilometer radius of the towns of Yei and Maridi respectively.

The analysis in this study is qualitative because statistical data from secondary sources are inconsistent or incomplete and do not therefore lend themselves readily to any quantitative evaluation. Also, the nature of data generated by questionnaire survey is not detailed enough in order to employ any sophisticated quantitative analysis. Furthermore, even if the data had lent themselves to quantification, the constraints in sampling procedures were such that no statistically significant inference could have been readily drawn from the sample for the whole populations of the respective regions. As a result, both the

secondary and primary sources of data are used in this thesis primarily as qualitative descriptors.

With these sets of primary and secondary data sources, an analysis of the process of population dispersion and the change that has occurred in displacees' socio-economic conditions during and since the civil war is undertaken. Pre-war conditions are first described so that comparisons with post-war situations can be made in order to determine the magnitude of change that has taken place. In this study, 'change' is used to refer to how displacees evaluate their conditions after the war: whether they experienced improvements, no improvements or even declines in their socio-economic conditions. The extent of change among the displacees is examined by testing the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1

Displacees who migrated outside their social and territorial space during the civil war will experience more changes than those who remained within the same social and economic space.

Hypothesis 2

The longer the people have been exposed to a more commercial economy while in exile, the easier it is for their subsequent rehabilitation compared to those who have been locally displaced and had no similar experiences.

Hypothesis 3

The greater the ethnic mix of a population the greater will be the 'absorbing capacity' of the people, and hence the greater the tendency towards adaptation of new methods.

Hypothesis 4

The lesser the accessibility of an area to which refugees flee in search of security, the greater will be the propensity of them maintaining to a status-quo on their return from exile.

## THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire was designed with the sensitivity of both the research topic and target population in mind. Some leading questions which were considered sensitive to potential respondents and may therefore have jeopardized the fieldwork, were not pursued. For example, questions pertaining to the sex and age of children were not asked because of strong belief by local populations in sorcery that strangers could inflict on their children. Also, questions relating to other sources of secondary incomes which were suspect, such as black marketeering in coffee, cigarettes and liquor across the Uganda and Zaire borders, were not pursued because such trade practices were against the official government regulations, and consequently the interviewees were not going to answer them. Thus, the questionnaire focused on questions to which respondents were most likely to be receptive, such as their age, ethnicity, marital status and family size. Such characteristics establish status within a community and thus interviewees were willing to provide such information without reservation.

The questionnaire consisted of four parts. The first part was concerned with personal characteristics relating to age, ethnic group, marital status and family size. The second part investigated the socio-economic conditions of farmers prior to the civil war, to

establish the basis of their way of life before their displacement. The third part focused upon the civil war period in order to identify the nature of their displacement during this period as well as the forms of their economic activities. The last part of the questionnaire evaluated their post-war socio-economic conditions to assess differences between displacees' current economic performance and their pre-war situation (see copy of questionnaire attached as Appendix B).

## THE SAMPLE POPULATION

Having delimited the dimensions of the sample areas in Yei and Maridi, the chieftainships and villages falling within the study areas were identified. In Yei District, five of the total of 13 chieftainships fell within the survey area, and in Maridi, seven of the 17 chieftainships were covered (Figure 1.5). Within each chieftainship, samples of subchiefs and headmen were selected, using lists of names provided by the chief. Finally, a sample of farmers was drawn from each headman's or subchief's community, depending on the accessibility of homesteads and the availability of a head of household. The interviews were conducted in the farmers' homes. As custom and code of social conduct do not permit males to interview females, the survey of heads of household was therefore limited to households with male heads. However, the number of female heads of household in rural areas after the civil war remained relatively small. Many of them either remarried or, because of the difficult conditions in rural areas, migrated to towns where they engaged in various forms of petty trading.

The sample chosen in Yei and Maridi was 200 farmers each. This number was considered of sufficient size to provide a representative

Figure 1.5 Yei and Maridi Areas: Structure of Village Administration.

| % | Yei Sample | | Maridi Sample | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38.5 | 5/13 | Chiefs | 7/17 | 41.2 |
| 21.5 | 14/65 | Sub-Chiefs* | 10/68 | 14.7 |
| | 35 | Village Headmen | 20 | |
| | 200 | Farmers | 200 | |

* Estimates

understanding of these areas. Furthermore, given the problems of limited accessibility it would have been difficult in terms of time to interview a larger sample.[24] Generally, in Equatoria Region, the population has no tradition of communal settlements in the form of compact villages. The settlements designated as villages are only loose associations of individual homesteads, not even connected to each other by footpaths. Instead, the homesteads connect directly to the main road (Figure 1.6). Also, a fear of neighbours as sources of potential danger to one's family and property (through witchcraft and local medicine) is still prevalent in rural areas, which reinforces a desire for separate homesteads.

In Yei area, the resultant sample population encompassed 11 villages (Figure 1.7), and in Maridi area, the sample included 20 villages. The larger number of villages drawn into the sample from Maridi area was because of the district's greater mixture of ethnic groups which has generated a much larger network of independent settlements (Figure 1.8).

In the Gilo area, interviews were conducted with farmers participating in a government agricultural scheme. The scheme employed a total of 64 persons, and of these, 40 were interviewed. Their selection was not randomly based, but rather was determined by their cooperation or availability for interview. Unlike in Yei and Maridi areas, where accessibility to villages was a constraining factor, in Gilo area, the majority of the participants lived within one mile of the scheme. However, 15 resided in villages in remote mountain areas and

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[24]Much time was spent travelling to the villages, and was often wasted because the chief or headman could not be located. Although the hierarchy of village administration referred to above is the basis for

Figure 1.6 Rural Settlement Pattern in Yei and Maridi Districts




Homestead for individual family

----- Foot path

NB: Note the absence of connections between homesteads

Figure 1.7 Location of Sample Villages in Yei Area.



Figure 1.8 Location of Sample Villages in Maridi Area.



were thus not included because it was not possible to reach these areas.[25]

The survey of the Aweil Rice Scheme was conducted with the assistance of both the Extension Unit Officer of the scheme and the village chiefs' representatives. The scheme's representative facilitated the survey by identifying the 165 tenant farmers who were engaged on the scheme. The chiefs' envoys assisted in identifying from the official list of the tenant farmers those who were available in their homes at the time of the survey and those who had gone to either the 'toich'[26] with their family herds, or north to Southern Darfur and Kordofan Provinces to seek temporary dry season employment. Of the tenant farmers remaining in the area, a total of 42 were interviewed in the villages of Udhum and Maduany-Akong.[27] Only the full-time tenant farmers were selected and all who operated on an occasional basis were excluded.

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the smooth running of local affairs, it frequently proved to be an obstacle in conducting the survey. Before farmers could be interviewed, it was necessary to obtain authorization from the chief, and down the hierarchy to the village headman. At times, headmen were not found and thus farmers were reluctant to be interviewed. On other occasions, farmers themselves were not available in their villages. Such situations therefore resulted in 2 - 3 hour travelling times producing only one or two interviews, and sometimes none at all.

[25]Nine of the 64 participants on the scheme refused to be interviewed.

[26]'Toc' or 'toich' is Nilotic referring to a seasonally inundated grassland area that occurs between the permanent swamps (sudd) and the intermediate grazing land. During the dry season, the 'toich' land serves as a valuable source for both pasture and water for the livestock.

[27]For the purpose of this study, the villages of Maduany and Akong were treated as one sample area because they fall under one chief.

## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The main problem in undertaking a study in a developing country such as Sudan is the lack of a systematic data base. In Southern Sudan in particular, this problem was compounded by the 17-year civil war during which no official data were compiled, and the records which had previously existed were largely destroyed. Even after the civil war, data remained scarce, and what was available was often incomplete or in an unusable format. Also, most of the documents of the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission were classified information to which the writer did not gain access.

The problem of accessibility to rural locations in order to collect primary data also limited the study. In Southern Sudan seasonality determines access to rural areas, and thus a rural survey can only be conducted in the dry season when roads are passable. Moreover, during the rainy season, farmers are busy with their agricultural activities, and are thus not readily located, or alternatively are too busy to be interviewed. These factors, together with a time constraint for conducting the field-work, limited the size and the range of the population sampled.

The selection of a sample population for interviewing was based on the availability of people in their villages during the period of the survey, and also on those willing to be interviewed. Rural communities in Southern Sudan are closed communities, and as a result outsiders are always viewed with suspicion, especially when undertaking research which is not seen as fulfilling their immediate needs. Under the circumstances therefore, the 'sampling' method used was the only one

that was practical. Notwithstanding the limitations in the way the sample was selected, the relative homogeneity in socio-economic conditions of the Southern Sudanese population in general and the selected case-study areas in particular, allows generalizations to be made about prevailing conditions of the respective regions.

Lack of direct communication with the local population was a major constraint in the Aweil area, because the writer had no knowledge of Dinka, the local language. While in the other three study areas 'pidgin' Arabic was widely spoken, in Aweil area it was hardly spoken at all. Because of the language barrier, it was necessary to rely on an officer assigned by the scheme's management to assist in translating the questions from English to Dinka language and vice versa. This lack of direct communication with the interviewees may have resulted in some loss of information in the translation process.

## ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis is organised into seven content chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 discusses the origins of the North-South conflict which led to the migration of Southern Sudanese refugees to Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire. The aim of this chapter is to show how both the British and the national government's respective administrative policies generated political discontent in Southern Sudan which resulted in the refugee situation. Although it is recognized that there exists considerable literature on the origins of the North-South conflict,[28] such literature falls short

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[28]For example, see Abel Alier, "The Southern Sudan Question", in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration (London: Frank Cass, 1974), pp. 11-27; and Mohamed Omer

of an exhaustive treatment of the spatial aspects of the refugee displacement process. This chapter, therefore, attempts to provide for the reader with little or no background on Southern Sudan's political history a concise summary of the events which led to the refugee movements. Chapter 3 examines the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees following the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. The intent of this chapter is to highlight the magnitude and complexities of the problems encountered in that exercise, and to outline some of the lessons that can be learnt from South Sudan's repatriation operation. Chapter 4 discusses the resettlement phase that followed the repatriation, and identifies the different categories of displacees handled by the government resettlement agency, the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission. It analyses the strategies used by the Commission in attempting to meet the needs of the various categories of returnees on the one hand and the problems which the Commission encountered in attempting to fulfill its mandate on the other.

Chapter 5 commences with a brief review of some concepts of rural development and of how rural development strategies have been employed in Africa in general, and in Southern Sudan in particular. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the role which rural development schemes played in the resettlement process of returnees.

In Chapter 6, the socio-economic conditions of sample populations in Yei and Maridi areas prior to, as well as during the war, are evaluated. The chapter aims at determining how displacement has affected the socio-economic performance of refugees while in exile. It

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Beshir, loc. cit.

determines whether they maintained their traditional pre-war economic practices while in exile or whether they adopted new economic pursuits? This is followed in Chapter 7 with a discussion of the post-war period in Yei and Maridi areas. Here the current socio-economic conditions of returnees are compared to their pre-war conditions, and the effects which their displacement had on their contemporary performance are evaluated.

While Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the Yei and Maridi areas as examples of spontaneous settlement, Chapter 8 focuses on the government sponsored Aweil and Gilo settlement schemes. It discusses the socio-economic conditions of the sample population prior to, during and after the war, and compares the displacees' current economic performance with their pre-war conditions. In addition, the chapter examines whether the local populations in these areas have benefitted from being participants on organized rural development schemes. Chapter 9 is devoted to the conclusions.

# CHAPTER 2

## BACKGROUND TO THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINS OF REFUGEES IN SUDAN

This chapter focuses upon the origins of the North-South conflict and the appearance of Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first part examines the North-South relationships in the pre-independence period and how policies pursued by the Turko-Egyptian, the Mahdiya and the Anglo-Egyptian administrations contributed to the development of the Southern problem. It is aimed at informing the reader of the differences between the North and the South prior to the civil war. It also provides a background analysis of the socio-economic environment in which resettlement of the refugees in the post-war period was undertaken. The second part concerns itself with the post-independence government of Sudan. It illustrates how the various national governments responded to the Southern problem and to the South's general economic development. It also shows how the suspicion by the South of the Northern intentions have generated political tensions and have further drawn apart the two regions of the country.

The civil war of 1955-72 between Northern and Southern Sudan was caused by many events, some of which were rooted in the pre-independence history of the country. As past weighs heavily on present, it becomes necessary to briefly discuss the past and recent history of the Sudan in the context of the North-South relationships from the period of the Turko-Egyptian administration to the time of the Addis Ababa Peace

Agreement of 1972.[1]

## PRE-INDEPENDENCE ADMINISTRATION OF SUDAN, 1821-1955

The search for the source of the Nile contributed to the opening of Southern Sudan to the outside world. Yet for a long time, in part due to natural impediments, notably the 'Sudd',[2] and in part to the general hostility of the local population, the various expeditions did not reach deeply into the South. It was not until 1841 that the 'Sudd' region was first penetrated by one Captain Selim, and from that time the South began to be opened up by explorers, traders and other outside influences.[3] These penetrations made possible the extension of Turko-Egyptian rule to some parts of the South, and with the establishment of an administration in these areas, further explorations became easier. The search for wealth in the form of ivory and slaves, which was one of Mohammed Ali's principal motives for invading Sudan in 1821, then followed. As Morrison has observed:

> At first it was fairly easy to extract. The traders from outside were able to barter with local chiefs quite close to the Nile. But gradually expeditions had to go deeper and deeper into the interior, and slowly the trade in ivory gave way to trade in slaves.[4]

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[1]The modern history of Sudan begins with the invasion by Mohamed Ali in 1821. Prior to that period little is known about the territory and its peoples.

[2]The word 'Sudd' is Arabic for obstacle or barrier. It refers to the region north of Bor town under papyrus vegetation cover.

[3]Abel Alier, "The Southern Sudan Question", in Dunstan M. Wai (ed), The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 11.

[4]Godfrey Morrison, The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of Wider African Problems, Report No. 5 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1971), p. 7.

As expeditions went further inland, force was used against resisting populations, chiefs were bribed and local warfare was exploited. Henderson has suggested that:

> As ivory grew scarcer the expeditions pressed further and further into the hinterland. Friendly chiefs were rewarded with captured cattle and warring tribes sold their services in return for military assistance.[5]

The Mahdiya administration of 1884-1898 made little effort to abolish the slave trade, which continued to thrive until the end of the 19th century and, although slavery was abolished with the reconquest of Sudan in 1898 by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, some illicit dealings in slaves continued through the first quarter of the 20th century.

The 'condominium' arrangement between Britain and Egypt created, at least in theory, a dual control of Sudan. However, for all practical purposes, the British were the 'de facto' rulers. It should be noted that the impact of the periods of Turko-Egyptian and Mahdiya rule in Southern Sudan was limited to the area immediately along the River Nile and to some parts of Bahr el Ghazal Province. Therefore, when the British assumed control, the South was considered by them as an untamed frontier, and their main concern was to establish law and order. Consequently, during the early years of British administration, pacification was the basis of British policy.[6] During the first two decades of British rule (1900-1920), for example, administrative officials in the South were drawn without exception from the ranks of

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[5]K. D. D. Henderson, Sudan Republic (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 153-154.

[6]Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment", African Studies Review, Vol. 16 (1), 1973, p. 3.

officers seconded from the Egyptian army or from the King's African Rifles to directly enforce law and order. This policy of direct rule in the South was in contrast to the popular notion of indirect rule of British elsewhere. In the North, for example, civilians dominated the political structure.[7] This policy also accentuated the contrast in administration between the North and South which later became an area of concern at independence.

The pacification of the South was protracted. Beshir has observed that after the reconquest of Sudan, Southerners regarded the new administration in much the same light as they did its predecessors, the Turko-Egyptian and the Mahdiya.[8] There was much resistance to and resentment of foreign influence throughout the South. As Alier has suggested, resistance was a reaction against the slave trade, the plundering of property including livestock, the burning of dwellings, and the occupation of land contrary to the local customs and traditions.[9] As early as 1902, British government policy was to isolate the South from the North. The cultural differences between the two regions were so fundamental that the British regarded Southern Sudan as more akin to Black Africa than to Northern Sudan.[10] This view

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[7]Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 230.

[8]Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 19.

[9]For more information on the resistance of various Southern Communities to the Condominium rule during the first quarter of the 20th Century, see Beshir, op. cit., Chapter 3; Alier, op. cit., pp. 13-14; and Sir H. MacMichael (1954), Chapter 8.

[10]Sam C. Sarkesian, Loc. cit.

dominated British policy in the South up to the end of the World War II. Only after 1945 did they promote a union of the two regions into one political entity.

Prior to World War II, the localisation of Southern administration which developed into a Southern Policy in 1930 was reflected in the various measures taken during the first quarter of the 20th century, especially after World War I. These are summarised as:

(a) The first important step in the localisation of Southern administration was the recruitment of a local military force which took full control of the South in 1917. It was argued that the establishment of this force would be valuable in an emergency.

(b) The Christian Sunday was recognised in the South as a weekly day of rest (1918) in contrast to the Moslem Friday in the North.

(c) The English language was adopted in the South as the official language (1918) to the exclusion of Arabic.

(d) Unlike in the North, where government schools functioned along with the various missionary schools, education in the South was mainly entrusted to the missionaries.

(e) By 1921, the Governors of the Southern Provinces were no longer required to attend the annual meetings of Governors in Khartoum. Instead, they were encouraged to have their own meetings in the South and to keep in contact with their counter-parts in East Africa.

(f) In 1922, the policy of 'care and maintenance' took another turn. The Passports and Permits Ordinance (1922) and the

Closed Districts Order (1922) were introduced. These empowered the Governor-General to declare any part of the Sudan either absolutely or partially closed for either Sudanese or non-Sudanese. The areas which were affected by these regulations were those deemed by the authorities as underdeveloped. They included the whole of Southern Sudan and Parts of Kordofan and Darfur Provinces.

(g) With the introduction of the Permits to Trade Order (1925) no person other than a native was allowed to carry on trade in the South without a permit.[11]

These regulations were intended to exclude foreigners, including Northern Sudanese, from engaging in activities contrary to government policies in the South. However, these measures had long-term adverse effects on the social, economic and political development of the South. While justifying the policy as protecting the undeveloped South from outside exploitation, the government had no plans to promote social and economic advancement in the area. Thus, during the interwar period, the South experienced isolation and stagnation while the North began to develop at an accelerated rate.

The localisation of the Southern administration, and entrenchment of the Southern Policy throughout the period 1930-1945, was spelled out in a memorandum to the Governors of the Southern Provinces by the Civil Secretary, Sir Harold MacMichael, who defined the main principles of the policy as:

> to build up a series of self-contained racial and

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[11]For more explanation see Mohammed Omer Beshir, op.cit., pp. 41-42.

> tribal units with the structure and organisation based ... upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.[12]

With the enforcement of the Closed Districts Order in 1930, the South was virtually closed to Northerners including Northern administrative officials. Also, during this period, Northerners were encouraged to leave the South. But the government made no effort to train a Southern civil service to take over. For example, by the late 1930's it was realised that the success of the Southern Policy depended very much upon the development of economic resources of the region. Consequently, trained anthropologists, notably Evans-Pritchard, were invited to advise on social, educational and administrative problems. Also, in 1939, Tothill was appointed Director of Agriculture in Sudan. He was to examine the "possibility of developing Southern agriculture as an economic asset in spite of the remoteness of the country from the world's markets".[13] As a result of his study, Tothill proposed in 1943 the development of the Zande area, although little was done with the proposal until after the end of World War II.

Towards the end of World War II, radical political changes began to take place throughout the various African colonial territories. The Sudan was no exception. Nationalist movements gained momentum, particularly in Northern Sudan. This resulted in a modification to the Southern Policy in order to meet changing political, social and economic conditions. The Southern Policy itself was, however, never discretely

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[12]As quoted in Beshir Mohammed Said, Sudan: Crossroads of Africa (London: Bodley Head, 1965), p. 30.

[13]K. D. D. Henderson, op. cit., p. 167.

defined. For example, the future of the South had been variously discussed in terms of complete union with Northern Sudan or East Africa, and also in terms of partial union with each of them. It was only after World War II that the British government declared that the future of Southern Sudan lay with the North. A new Southern Policy was therefore introduced in the following terms:

> ... we should now work on the assumption that the Sudan, as at present constituted, with possibly minor boundary adjustments, will remain one: and we should therefore restate our Southern Policy and do so publicly, as follows:
> The Policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle Eastern and Arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.[14]

Some political factors were responsible for this change in Southern Policy. These included:

(a) the growing political awareness in Northern Sudan that Southern Sudan was an integral part of the country;

(b) the general fear both in Britain and Sudan that with Sudan disunited, Egypt might be tempted to annex Northern Sudan;

(c) the lack of trained personnel in the South to man the civil service and therefore the administration of the South was largely dependent on the north;

(d) the indifference of the colonial authorities in East Africa to

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[14]The Civil Secretary's Letter of December 16, 1946, Restating Government Policy for the Southern Provinces of Sudan, Khartoum. As quoted in Beshir Mohamed Said, op. cit., pp. 164-65.

> an earlier suggestion that Southern Sudan should be annexed by the British East Africa.[15]

Therefore, in view of these considerations the British Government decided in favour of a united Sudan. However, although some of the British administrators in the South expressed doubts about the new Southern Policy, the unity between the two parts of the country was promoted without regard to the social, economic and political inequalities that existed between the two regions.[16] This became the core problem of the North-South conflict which surfaced after independence.

In 1947, the Juba Conference was convened to ascertain the views of the Southern leaders on establishing a single legislative assembly for Sudan, although that assertion is debatable. Said, for example, has argued that:

> Southern representatives in the Juba Conference decided out of their own free will to throw their lot with their Northern fellow countrymen.[17]

However, the proceedings of the conference do not support this popular Northern notion:

> The view that the majority of Southerners at the conference were in favour of one legislative assembly is not borne out by the proceedings. On the first day of the conference, all the Southerners objected to one assembly. On the second day six

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[15]Godfrey Morrison, op. cit., p. 10.

[16]For example, T. R. H. Owen, the Deputy Governor of Bahr el Ghazal Province argued that it was premature for the South to merge with the North without safeguards or some measure of autonomy for the South. See Beshir Mohamed Said, op. cit., pp. 40-42.

[17]Ibid, p. 72. At the Juba Conference there were 29 participants of which 17 were from the South and the remainder were from the North.

> spoke in favour of one assembly, four spoke against it. The rest were not given a chance to talk and there was no voting to show whether or not they had changed their stand on the previous day. The proceedings do not indicate that the six who spoke in favour of the one legislative assembly spoke on behalf of the other, silent seven.[18]

The inference is that the colonial administration may have used its powers to influence the situation, and unless the Southern representatives agreed to one legislative assembly with the North, the South would have no say at all in the future government of Sudan. To this end, it can not be ruled out that some measure of coercion and intimidation of Southern representatives, many of whom were chiefs, may have been undertaken. In addition, since the Civil Secretary had decided in 1946 to unite the country, it would logically follow that a similar decision had been taken for a joint assembly. One can therefore argue that the Juba Conference was held simply to give the impression that southerners were consulted and accepted the proposals for a unified Sudan.

In February 1953, Britain and Egypt signed an agreement to grant self-rule to Sudan. During negotiations in Cairo, the two major political parties that had at that time been established in northern Sudan (the Umma and the National Unionist Party), were invited for consultation. The Southern Provinces on the other hand were not invited on the grounds that they had neither belonged to any of these parties nor did they have any political parties of their own.[19] However, Southerners believed that they had been deliberately prevented by the

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[18]Abel Alier, op. cit., p. 17.

[19]Beshir Mohamed Said, op. cit., p. 73.

government from participating in negotiations for self-rule.[20] In the same year, both the elections for the first parliament and the Sudanisation of the civil service were in process. The Northern political parties made several promises in their election campaigns in the hope of securing the Southern vote. For example, the NUP, which was the winning party:

> levelled charges against the Umma Party and reminded the Southerners that the leader of the Umma Party and his followers were the descendants of their bitter enemies, the slave traders, and the fate of their oppression at their hands will be forthcoming if they support it.[21]

In its plans for Southern Sudan, the NUP election manifesto stated that:

> Our approach to the question of Sudanisation shall always be just and democratic. Not only shall priority be always given to Southerners in the South but also shall the employment of the Southerners be greatly fostered in the North especially in the higher ranks of the Central Government service. Not only Government jobs, but also membership of the different local government institutions, development committees, shall be as far as possible in the hands of competent Southerners in the Southern Provinces.[22]

However, when the Sudanisation Committee of the civil service announced its results in 1954, it was the North that benefitted by virtue of qualifications, experience and participation in the process of

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[20]In support of this grievance, Beshir has observed that Northern political parties were not keen to have Southerners represented in talks which aimed at independence for fear that Southern views may have complicated matters. See op. cit., p. 71.

[21]Government of Sudan, Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Southern Disturbances, Khartoum, 1956, p. 20; as quoted in Mohamed Omer Beshir, op. cit., p. 71.

[22]The NUP Manifesto as quoted in Beshir Mohamed Said, op. cit., p. 79.

self-rule. Out of a total of 800 senior posts which were Sudanised, only 6 positions were given to the Southerners.[23] This was not only disappointing to educated Southerners, but created hostility against the North. With such developments, the relations between the South and the North steadily deteriorated. The failure of the newly elected NUP Government to live up to its election promises and the wide gap in social, economic and political development between the two regions perpetuated the frustration among Southern Sudanese which led to civil war in 1955.

## POST-INDEPENDENCE ADMINISTRATION OF SUDAN

The civilian government that came to power on independence on January 1, 1956 under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil was short-lived, and its role in shaping the nation's policies in general and the South in particular was relatively insignificant. The new government was faced from the outset with internal squabbling, social and economic problems, and the political instability in the South. These problems caused the Prime Minister to invite the military, under the leadership of General Ibrahim Abboud, to take over the government in November, 1958. Thereafter, post-independence government in Sudan may be divided into four major periods on the basis of the type of governments that came to power:

(a) the military government of General Ibrahim Abboud, 1958-1964;

(b) the civilian government of Sir El Khatim El Khalifa, 1964-1965;

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[23]Sam C. Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 9.

(c) the civilan governments of Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub and El Sadik El Mahdi, 1965-1969; and

(d) the military government of General Gaafar Nimeiri, 1969-1985 (April).

The aim of the brief discussion that follows is to show how the policies pursued by these respective nationalist governments affected events and developments in Southern Sudan.

The Military Government of General Ibrahim Abboud, 1958-1964

With the assumption of power by the military in November 1958, the Southern problem entered into a new phase. The government was determined to use force against opposition in the South. Its policy could only be described as a rejection of all elements of the pre-independence British Southern Policy. Apart from repressive military measures the government promoted, it also undertook:

> the spread of Arabic and Islamisation, in the belief that this was the only way to achieve unity in the future. A number of Koranic schools were established in different districts and Islamic preachers were appointed. Six Islamic Institutes were opened in Juba, Kodok, Wau, Maridi, Yei and Raga. A Secondary Islamic Institute was opened in Juba and centers for preaching and religious instruction for adults were also established.[24]

Other policy measures included the change of the weekly holiday in the South from Sunday to Friday to conform with the Moslem observance of the Friday holiday; the prohibition of religious gatherings outside church compounds; and the issuing of a new Missionary Societies' Act in 1962 to regulate missionary activities.[25] It was generally believed in the

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[24]Government of Sudan, Basic Facts About the Southern Provinces of the Sudan (Khartoum: The Central Office of Information, 1964), p. 79.

[25]The terms of the Missionary Societies' Act were that "no missionary

North that missionary organisations in the South had gone well beyond the limits of their sacred mission. Therefore, it was not surprising when, in 1964, the Government ordered the explusion of all foreign missionaries working in the South, after charging them with engaging in "activities which threatened the unity of Sudan".[26] While the Government was taking measures to curb the missionary activities in the South, its repressive measures had already resulted in an increasing number of Southerners taking refuge in neighbouring countries. Also during this period, Southern leaders increasingly became more politically conscious and the situation, as summarised by Alier, was that:

> The period of General Abboud's regime was not only notable for awakening Southern elite to serious political work; it also witnessed the replacement of the old by a new set of political leaders who would measure up to the intellect of the old guard in the North.[27]

Reacting to the general political instability in the South, the military government began to liquidate or imprison without trial the educated minority among Southerners, charging them as being political agitators.

The expansion of military activities in the South at the expense of national economic development generated increasing concern in public opinion even in the North. Both the general public and the major

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society shall do any missionary act in Sudan except in accordance with the terms of licence granted by the Council of Ministers. The licence should specify the religion, sect or belief of the Missionary Society, and the regions or places in which it may operate". For details see Ibid, pp. 81-82.

[26]Mohammed Omer Beshir, Ibid, p. 82.

[27]Abel Alier, op. cit., p. 21.

political parties considered the military operations a costly venture and a failure. The general dissatisfaction with the Abboud's regime resulted in an uprising in October, 1964, which brought down the military government. In its place, a civilian care-taker government under Sir El Khatim El Khalifa took power.

The Civilian Government of Sir El Khatim El Khalifa, 1964-1965

Sir El Khatim's government was an interim government intended to take charge of national affairs immediately after the fall of the military government until elections could be conducted and an elected Prime Minister sworn in. In an effort to solve the Southern problem, Sir El Khatim announced an unconditional amnesty to permit all Southerners to return home and partake in the development of the country. The most important achievement of his term of office was the convening of the Round Table Conference on the South in March of 1965. This conference was attended by various national political parties, international observers and exiled representatives from the South. Although the conference failed to reach any permanent solution to the Southern problem, it did find a tentative solution aimed at easing the tensions and suspicions between North and South. A Twelve-Man Committee was appointed to study and recommend on the best ways of allaying Southern fears.[28] The recommendations of the Committee were welcomed in the South and there was optimism that the North would also respond favourably. But this was not the case. Alier suggests that there were:

> increased fears immediately after the Committee's recommendations and quite a sizeable section in Northern Sudan, especially the professional

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[28]For details on the Resolutions of the Round Table Conference and the Report of the Twelve-Man Committee, see Dunstan Wai (ed)., op. cit. Appendix IV, pp. 207-209 and Appendix V, pp. 211-217; and Mohammed Omer

> administrators and the merchants, did not welcome them. Obvious pressures were being brought to bear on some of Northern Political Parties to shelve the recommendations of the Twelve-Man Committee, even after endorsement by all Sudanese Political Parties.[29]

In particular, the recommendations that the South should participate more in national affairs as well as be granted a measure of autonomy, were not welcomed by the North.

It should be mentioned at this point, however, that while these political debates were taking place in the North, the 'Anyanya'[30] guerrilla organisation in the South was formed in 1963. Initially, the movement was not coordinated, operating only as loosely affiliated small groups. They were poorly trained in guerrilla warfare, poorly equipped and most of their weapons were obsolete. However, although they were poorly trained and armed, by 1964 the activities of the Anyanya in the South were beginning to be felt by the government.

## The Civilian Governments of Mohamaed Ahmed Mahgoub and El Sadik El Mahdi, 1965-1969

With the election of Mahgoub in July, 1965, the government once more opted for a military rather than a political solution to the Southern problem. Consequently, his government's short-lived reign was marked by more bloodshed in the South.[31] The recommendations of the Twelve-Man Committee were once again shelved. This meant that Northern

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Beshir, op. cit. Appendix 19, pp. 183-185.

[29]Abel Alier, op. cit., p. 24.

[30]The 'Anyanya', the guerrilla organisation which emerged in the South in 1963, was named after a snake venom from the Gabon viper.

[31]Many tragic incidents took place in various parts of the South during this period. The most important ones were the Juba and Wau massacres in July, 1965, during which many of the educated Southern

political parties were not genuine in their promises. From that date on, Southerners felt that the use of force was the only viable option open to them. The Anyanya organisation then declared its objective in the following terms:

> Our patience has now come to an end and we are convinced that only the use of force will bring a decision. From today onwards we shall take action. We do not want mercy and we are not prepared to give it.[32]

With increased Anyanya activities in the South the government applied harsh counter-measures which included the burning of villages, looting and killing of populations both in rural and urban areas. As shown in Table 2.1, for example, all the main towns in Equatoria were seriously affected. Juba town, for example, had a population of 18,000 in 1963 which had dropped to 700 during 1965. Maridi, Nzara and Tambura were very badly affected, losing most of their population. Maridi is the headquarters of the Army's Western Command and it is likely that the huge army units stationed there during the mid-1960s contributed to its desertion by the local population. Yei, Yambio and Torit were turned into ghost towns. Torit, the headquarters of the Army's Eastern Command, was the place where originally the army rebelled in 1955. The local population throughout these areas was forced to seek refuge in anticipation of reprisals by the army. The proximity of Yambio and Yei to border areas, where guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities prevailed, accounted for their total desertion by the local population.

A military solution was not, however, successful, and Mahgoub's

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elite were killed.

[32]Evidence before the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) Committee for Refugees, p. 8. Documents of the Round Table Conference on the Southern Sudan, 1965; as quoted in Mohammed Omer Beshir, op. cit.,

Table 2.1

Population Estimates of Selected Towns in Southern Sudan, 1955/56 - 1965

| Town | 1955/56 | 1963 | 1965 | % Difference 1963 - 1965 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Juba | 10,700 | 18,000 | 7,000 | - 61.1 |
| Yambio | 3,900 | 2,500 | 0 | -100 |
| Nzara | 3,000 | 5,000 | 200 | - 96 |
| Torit | 2,400 | 3,000 | 0 | -100 |
| Maridi | 839 | 4,000 | 29 | - 92.3 |
| Yei | 739 | 3,000 | 0 | -100 |
| Tambura | n.a. | 2,000 | 110 | - 94.5 |

n.a. = data not available

Sources: Department of Statistics, Population Census of the Sudan, 1955/56, Khartoum; and Joseph U. Garang, A Revolution in Action, No. 2-Regional Autonomy for the South (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1970), p. 30.

government was dissolved in June 1966 and El Sadik El Mahdi was elected Prime Minister. His policy toward the South was not very different from that of his predecessor, and the use of military force continued. El Sadik's government was also short-lived, as internal rivalries between the two major political parties, the Umma and the National Unionist Party (NUP) intensified.[33] In May, 1967 Sadik's government was defeated in a vote of confidence and Mahgoub came to power for a second time.

During his second term in office, Mahgoub declared an amnesty for all Southerners in order to have them return home. However, his appeal was not heeded. Two main reasons for this are discernable. Firstly, his harsh policy towards the South during his first administration was still fresh in the minds of people. Secondly, the actual causes which induced Southerners to flee were still present in the South. Furthermore, suspicion of Northern intentions was intensified as the new Islamic Constitution was being tabled in parliament at that time.

The Southern reaction to the inability of the Northern political parties to solve the problem as well as to the introduction of Islamic Constitution was predictable. The intensification of Anyanya opposition led to intensive government counter-guerrilla measures, which in turn resulted in more population displacement within the South, leading to an exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries. The conflict also claimed many lives. It is estimated that disease and hunger claimed 500,000 lives and another 500,000 were victims of fighting, army reprisals and

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p. 84.

[33]The Umma and the National Unionist Parties were led by El Sadik El Mahdi and Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub respectively.

raids.[34] As the fighting progressed, its adverse effects started to gradually unfold. Apart from the heavy toll in human lives and the destruction of property, the public in the North began to feel the economic impact of the war. The maintenance of a large army in the South was becoming a financial liability and was leading to the decline of national economy.[35] Available data show that defence expenditures increased substantially during the 1960s. In 1966, for example, the defence expenditure was 3% of the gross national product (GNP). With increased Anyanya offensive, military spending increased to 5% in 1968 and to 8% the following year.[36] Yet in spite of these increases, the government's military solution to Southern problem was not successful. The protracted discussion on the adoption of the Islamic Constitution in Sudan did not help matters. It was within this uncertain political atmosphere that the Free Officers Movement staged a military coup in May 1969 under the leadership of Colonel Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri.

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[34]David Roden, "Peace Brings Sudan New Hopes and Massive Problems", Africa Report, June 1972, p. 16 and "Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan", Geographical Review, Vol. 64(4), 1974, p. 513.

[35]As the fighting intensified in the South from the mid-1960's, pressures were brought to bear on the governments that were in power. The South was declared a 'war zone', and as a result, special financial benefits were introduced to benefit Northern personnel serving in the South. One was a special 'field allowance' for military personnel, and the second was 'Southern allowance' to benefit all government officials and employees originating from the North. These payments added substantially to the overall deterioration of economic conditions of the country.

[36]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1966/67-1969/70, London, 1969.

The Military Government of General Gaafar Nimeiri, 1969 to 1985 (April)

The Free Officers Movement was motivated by two main factors. The first factor was the failure of the Mahgoub's government and its predecessors to solve the Southern problem. The second was the high costs incurred by the war, which was rapidly depleting both the human and the economic resources of the country. Furthermore, through his personal experience in the South, Nimeiri was convinced that a political rather than a military solution was the only realistic option. Thus, when he assumed power in 1969, Nimeiri declared that his government was fully aware of the magnitude of Southern problem and was committed to a lasting solution. In his 'Policy Statement on the Southern Question', Nimeiri assured the public that:

> The Revolutionary Government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities. It recognizes the historical and cultural differences between the North and South and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built upon the objective realities. The Southern people have the right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan.[37]

To attain such objectives the government resolved to recognise the right of the Southern people to regional autonomy within a united Sudan. Unlike his predecessors, Nimeiri's plan to bring a national integration was based on the conviction that:

> None of the African countries is strong enough to fight a civil war and still go on with development. It is therefore clear that if an African state turns its attention and resources to fighting a civil war, it would of necessity have to give up development while that war lasts.[38]

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[37]Government of Sudan, Policy Statement on the Southern Question (Khartoum: Ministry of National Guidance, 1969).

[38]Statement by President Nimeiri in an interview by Ralph Uwechue, Africa No. 83, July 1978, p. 16.

Nimeiri's plan for the South was based on a 'Four Points Policy' program which he declared on 9th June 1969; these were:

(a) the continuation and further extension of amnesty;

(b) the economic, social and cultural development of the South;

(c) the appointment of a Minister for Southern Affairs; and,

(d) the training of personnel.[39]

The policy to extend amnesty and the establishment of a Ministry for Southern Affairs were implemented immediately. However, the other components of the program were to be accomplished over a longer period. The ceasefire, for example, was only achieved in 1972, after protracted negotiations between the Government and the Anyanya representatives, and with the mediatory assistance of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie.

## The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

The establishment of the Ministry for Southern Affairs in 1969 was the first major initiative taken by Nimeiri's government. Its tasks were at two levels, national and international. At the national level, the Ministry was to prepare a detailed development plan for the South and a plan for the resettlement and rehabilitation of all displaced persons.[40] At the international level, the Ministry was to establish contacts with Southern leaders in exile and to invite them back to take part in the reconstruction task. Apart from these official attempts at reconciliation between North and South, church leaders, both inside and outside the country, also played an important role in the negotiations by holding a series of informal discussions with the government. In

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[39]Government of Sudan, Policy Statement ..., 1969.

[40]For details of the plan, see The Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, The Five-Year Resettlement, Cooperative and Rural Development Program in the Southern Provinces, 1970/71-1974/75, Khartoum, June, 1970.

May, 1971, for example, a Joint Delegation composed of representatives of the World Council of Churches (WCC), All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) visited Khartoum at the invitation of the Sudan Government and received further assurances that Nimeiri was committed to finding a permanent and just solution. Following from these positive consultations, a preliminary meeting between Sudan Government and Southern representatives in exile was held in Addis Ababa in November 1971. This meeting was essentially to assure Southern leaders that the Sudan Government was fully committed to the 9th of June Declaration, which was to grant the Southern Provinces regional self-rule.[41] When the results of this meeting were published both inside and outside the Sudan, Southerners for the first time felt that the government was sincere in its stated policy.

In anticipation of the ceasefire and the end of hostilities, the Sudan Government held a Resettlement and Relief Conference on Southern Sudan in Khartoum in February, 1972. This conference was attended by a number of United Nations' agencies, and by many non-governmental and charitable organisations, as well as by representatives of governments. The primary objective of the conference was to seek local and external assistance for the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of the returnees.[42] With this in mind, the document presented to the conference gave a set of proposals for short-term relief and for medium and long-term projects which were pre-requisites for the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. The document was

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[41]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction in the Southern Region (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, May 1972, pp. 5-6.

[42]Abel Alier, "Foreword" to Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, Relief and Resettlement Conference on Southern Region, February 21-23 (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1972).

primarily to acquaint the participants with the nature and magnitude of resettlement problem. To facilitate sponsorship of the various projects, financing of each of the projects was presented in detail. In total, the projects were valued at US $130 million.[43] These estimates were considered adequate for the resettlement process.

The peace agreement between North and South was signed in Addis Ababa on February 27, 1972. It brought to an end the bitter war which the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU had referred to as "the largest fratricidal war waged on the African continent in the last two decades".[44] Given the past political developments in post-independence Sudan, the restoration of peace in 1972 came as a pleasant surprise to many observers. Soon after its announcement, Sahnoun described the Addis Ababa Agreement as:

> an accord which had warmed the hearts of all the African peoples and continent without exception and has given them comfort and renewed hopes for the realisation of our common ideals and national unity, fraternity, and solidarity which constitute the very basis of our Pan-African aspirations.[45]

After the agreement there was an urgent need to create conditions in the South that would facilitate the return of refugees from neighbouring countries and for the displaced persons to return to their homes. However, as local resources were inadequate to meet the needs of

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[43]For details see Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, Relief and Resettlement Conference ..., 1972. The monetary unit used is the Sudanese Pound (LS.) or United States dollars where appropriate. During the resettlement process, the Pound was worth US $3.00. At the time of the survey in 1982, it had dropped to US $0.55.

[44]UNHCR Report, Nursing a Miracle: The Role of the Office of the UNHCR in UN Emergency Relief Operations in the South Sudan, Geneva, September 1973, p. 6.

[45]Mohammed Sahnoun, Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU, Announcing the Addis Ababa Agreement, February 26, 1972; as quoted in Peter S. Mogga, The Addis Ababa Agreement: A Progressive Reconciliation

returning refugees and displaced population, the government was dependent upon contributions from the international community. In order to generate, distribute and priorize all aid and assistance, the government established three agencies in the South in 1972. These were the Special Fund Committee, the Resettlement Commission, and the Repatriation Commission. The mandates of these committees are discussed below.

The Special Fund Committee.

This committee was formed when it was realised that assistance from national and international organisations and governments required a central agency through which it could be channelled. To this effect, President Nimeiri issued an order (Presidential Order Number 43) to establish the 'Special Fund Committee'. Its functions were:

> to meet the expenses of repatriation, ressettlement, relief and rehabilitation of Sudanese refugees of the Southern Region.[46]

The committee was to provide refugees with cash and aid in kind, and had its headquarters in Khartoum.

The Resettlement Commission.

This commission was constituted by Presidential Order Number 44. Its terms of reference were:

> the resettlement, relief and rehabilitation of Sudanese refugees from the Southern Region now residing abroad, and all expatriates and other Sudanese of the Southern Region who have abandoned

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(Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1977), p. 10.

[46]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction ..., 1972, p. 20.

> their homes in the Southern Region and are now residing in other areas and towns within that Region or outside it.[47]

In discharging its functions, the Commission was to have due regard to the special circumstances of the different categories of refugees as specified below:

(a) refugees from countries neighbouring the Southern Region of Sudan;

(b) persons who had abandoned their original homes and were then residing in the towns of the Southern Region and elsewhere;

(c) persons who took refugee in "the bush"; and,

(d) invalids and other persons incapacitated as a result of military operations, and orphaned children.[48]

As was spelled out in the Order, the first priority in resettlement was given to persons who were internally displaced during the civil war. As a second priority, the Commission was to resettle refugees returning from neighbouring countries. The function of the Resettlement Commission was divided into a two-stage program. In the first stage, it was to receive returnees and to transport them to their original homes or to prescribed new resettlement areas.[49] In the second stage, the Commission was to supply returnees of rural origin with sufficient agricultural tools, seeds and food to carry them through to their first harvest. At this point, the responsibilities of the Commission were over and the persons thus assisted were to be incorporated into the

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[47] Ibid, p. 22.

[48] Ibid, p. 23.

[49] In its early stage of planning, the Resettlement Commission had hoped that the model village concept, based on Tanzania's Ujamaa village principles, could be developed whereby returning populations would be

second phase of reconstruction and development throughout the Southern Region.

The Repatriation Commission.

The Repatriation Commission was created by Presidential Order Number 45. Its responsibilities were:

(a) to register the number of Sudanese refugees in the different countries, specify their identities, professions, trades, ages and original homes;

(b) to prepare a timetable for the repatriation of such refugees from camps where they were staying, in accordance with the resettlement and transportation plan laid down by the Resettlement, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission;

(c) to establish emergency camps inside Sudan for refugees who would not abide by the timetable or those who wished to return immediately to Sudan even before the resettlement plan was put into effect;

(d) to provide refugees in emergency camps with food, medicine and work implements in order to facilitate the maintenance of adequate living conditions and assist them in contributing to national reconstruction until they were resettled; and,

(e) to constitute sub-committees inside and outside Sudan in order to discharge, on its behalf, any task within the

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encouraged to live in grouped villages benefitting from collective social and economic services. However, for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 4, the model village plan never materialised.

framework of the functions of the Commission as set forth in the Order.[50]

In accordance with this policy, the Commission immediately started to esstablish branch offices both inside and outside Sudan. Within Sudan, sub-Commissions were established in each of then three provincial capitals, Malakal, Wau and Juba. A fourth office was located in Khartoum to process refugees returning from abroad and displaced persons who had taken refuge in the North during the civil war. Outside Sudan, sub-Commissions were established in each of the four main neighbouring countries harbouring Sudanese refugees, namely the Central African Republic, Zaire, Uganda and Ethiopia.

In discussing the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, mention should be made about its structure, composition and conditions under which it operated, and which affected the efficiency with which the respective programs were conducted. At the national level, the Chairman of the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission was in charge of the whole operation. Directly responsible to him were the Executive Directors and members of the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission. At the provincial level, a Secretary of the Commission and a Province Resettlement Officer were posted to each province. The former was the policy-maker and supervisor of resettlement work while the latter was the executive officer. However, it was later realised that the Secretaries were duplicating the powers of the Provincial Commissioners, and as a result they were withdrawn to the headquarters. At the

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[50]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction ..., 1972, p. 25.

district level, sub-offices were established and were under the District Resettlement Officers, who in turn were directly responsible to the Province Resettlement Officers and the Commission (Figure 2.1).

When the Commission was established, a total of 1,281 persons were recruited from two sources. The first source was various government departments from which employees were seconded. Because the newly created Southern Regional Government lacked qualified manpower the secondment of some of its limited personnel to the Commission created severe shortages of staff, which exacerbated already existing administrative shortcomings. A second source of employees was the general Southern population, where few skills or qualifications existed.

The repatriation and resettlement exercise was executed under very difficult conditions, one of which was the staffing of the Commission. It appears that no specific criteria were used in recruiting employees. Moreover, because the life of the Commission was to be short - it was stipulated that it was to complete its assignment within the 18 month period from April, 1972 to October, 1973 - little or no training was given, and insufficient time existed for them to gain experience on the job. By October, 1973, most of the refugees had been resettled and as a result over half of the Commission's employees were laid off or were returned to their original jobs. The remainder continued to work for the Commission until it finally completed its activities in April, 1974.

Poor transportation throughout the South also imposed serious problems. During the civil war most roads and bridges were either damaged or destroyed, and reconstruction following the civil war was slow. This determined the speed with which provisions could be delivered to outlying areas as large sections of the road network

Figure 2·1 The Structure of the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission for the Southern Sudan, 1972–1974.



Key to Abbreviations

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| U | : | Uganda |
| Z | : | Zaire |
| CAR | : | Central African Republic |
| ETH | : | Ethiopia |
| Info | : | Information |
| Acs | : | Accounts |
| Est | : | Establishment |
| Cle | : | Clerical |
| Tran | : | Transport |
| Med | : | Medical |
| Edu | : | Education |
| R.R.C. | : | Resettlement and Repatriation Commission |
| Prov. Comm | : | Province Commissioner |
| P.R.O. | : | Province Resettlement Officer |
| D.R.O. | : | District Resettlement Officer |
| U.N.P. | : | Upper Nile Province |
| B.G.P. | : | Bahr el Ghazal Province |

remained unserviceable. Poor transportation frequently resulted in supplies reaching rural distribution points very late or in spoilt conditions, which in turn led to friction between Commission's staff and returnees.

In some areas natural forces also imposed themselves, such as in Upper Nile Province where rural roads were open only during the dry season. In the rainy season, river boats had to be used, and their effectiveness was dependent upon the availability of fuel. Also, many boats wrecked during the war remained in the river channels, and much of the river required extensive dredging after long periods of neglect. However, in spite of many problems, the Commission proceeded with its mandate to complete its task by 1974 and hence must be regarded as an overall success.

## SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the causes of the North-South conflict in Sudan and the emergence of Southern Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries. It has been shown that the Southern problem had been in existence long before independence in 1956. Thus, when the nationalist governments came to power, they were not particularly anxious to find a political solution to the problem. They regarded it as a colonially-induced problem and their main concern was to erase it once and for all. Hence the use of military force was advocated by the military government of Abboud, as well as by the subsequent civilian governments of Mahgoub and Sadik, which perpetuated and intensified the conflict. The net result of these policies was that more and more internal displacement of populations occurred, the exodus of refugees to

neighbouring countries increased, and both the human and economic resources of the country were unnecessarily depleted.

With Nimeiri's ascent to power in May, 1969, a policy of reconciliation rather than confrontation was initiated. His commitment to this policy led to the signing of the peace agreement in February, 1972, which granted the Southern provinces regional self-rule. An administrative framework to facilitate the return of refugees was also established.

The resultant repatriation of refugees will be discussed in the following chapter. It will examine the procedures involved in the repatriation operation and will identify the problems encountered during that exercise.

# CHAPTER 3

## THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF SOUTHERN SUDANESE REFUGEES FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

This chapter sets out to examine:

(a) definitions of refugees to show the large array of 'displaced persons' categorised as refugees in Africa;

(b) the mechanics of repatriation of refugees from the neighbouring countries, prior to and after the Addis Ababa Agreement. In order to appreciate the magnitude and complexity of the problem, other inter-related factors are also discussed; and,

(c) the impact of refugee repatriation on the host countries.

### DEFINING REFUGEES

Most governmental and non-governmental agencies engaged in refugee work employ specific criteria for defining the refugee population with which they are concerned. Such definitions range from the restrictive legal definition of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to the more liberal approaches of some church organisations. But there is no single definition of refugees that encompasses all groups of persons who meet some or all refugee characteristics. In the determination of 'refugee status', various concepts and definitions are used. These are briefly reviewed in order to understand the diversity of involuntary migrants generated both within and outside the Sudan during the civil war era.

Refugees are migrants, but unlike economically-motivated migrants

they have left their homes involuntarily or have been compelled to flee by forces over which they have little or no control. The push-factors or forces that motivate their move are generally considered as being 'political' in nature. However, push-factors are also created by natural hazards, and these migrants are considered refugees.

The definition used by the UNHCR is based on the 1951 Geneva Convention and amended by the 1967 Protocol to the Convention. A refugee is defined as a person who:

> ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or, who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.[1]

This definition is limited to political refugees and implies that they should have crossed an international border to seek refuge in another country. It excludes those persons who have been internally displaced or forced to abandon their homes by the same push-factors that have generated the international migrants.

The American Council of Voluntary Agencies uses a broader definition to cover both existing and anticipated conditions which generate refugees. Accordingly, a refugee is a person who:

> (a) on account of persecution or fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion or belief, or as a result of military operations or natural

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[1]J. Vernant, The Refugee in the Postwar World (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953), p. 11.

calamity, is outside of his usual place of abode;

(b) cannot return thereto or will not return thereto because of such persecution or fear of persecution or military operations or natural calamity;

(c) provided, however, that a national who is out of his usual place of abode and has found refuge in the country of which he was technically a national and cannot or will not return to his usual place of abode for fear of persecution, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion or belief or as a result of military operations or natural calamity, shall not be precluded from consideration as a refugee; and,

(d) not withstanding any other provisions of law.[2]

According to this definition, refugee status is accorded to those who left their homes as a result of inhospitable political conditions, or due to natural push-factors. This differs significantly from the legal definition of the UNHCR, which does not accord refugee status upon some of these categories of refugees.

The All African Conference of Churches considers a refugee as:

> a person who finds himself or herself in some way an outcast from a society he has known and who, because of this, voluntarily or involuntarily leaves this society to seek refuge elsewhere.[3]

The cause of departure from a place of origin is not regarded as important by the churches. Their main criterion is that a person finds himself undesired by society. The involuntariness of the movement is not emphasised. Thus both voluntary and involuntary migrants seeking asylum outside their national borders are considered as refugees.

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[2]As cited in Edmund E. Cummings, "Voluntary Agencies and Refugees", Migration News (3), May-June 1975, p. 18.

[3]All Africa Conference of Churches, AACC Bulletin, Vol. 8 (2), April-May 1975, p. 4.

The World Council of Churches' definition is more humanitarian in nature compared to that of the UNHCR, although it emphasises the legal aspect. According to the Council, a refugee is:

> Anyone who, while abroad, finds himself cut off from support and/or unable or unwilling to return to his country for fear of persecution as a result of political or military events there ...[4]

As defined here a person should be outside his home country and has no source of support and no desire to return home for fear of persecution. The coverage is thus limited to a small portion of the total refugee population.

In some instances, refugees have been defined on ideological and geographical bases. The United States Refugee Act of 1965, for example, limited its definition to specific categories of refugees originating from either Communist countries or the Middle East.[5] However, with increasing political commitments by the United States Government in various parts of the World, such as in Southeast Asia and Latin America, a broader definition was required to include all the refugees to whom the United States Government was committed. The new Refugee Act (1980) identifies two types of refugees. Firstly, the legal refugees as defined by the UNHCR, and secondly, those persons who live under refugee-like conditions within their own countries - as in many Eastern Block countries and in parts of Africa. According to this Act, a refugee is defined as:

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[4]As quoted in Acolia Simon-Thomas, Final Report on the Research on Social and Educational Counselling of African Refugees, January 1971-December 1972. (Geneva: IUEF and WCC, 1972), p. 3.

[5]Section 203(a) (7) of the Act of 1965, for example, stipulates that: "Conditional entries shall next be made available ... to aliens ... at an examination in any non-Communist or non-Communist dominated

(a) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or

(b) in such special circumstance as the President after appropriate consultation may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, natinality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[6]

The original definition of "refugees" contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention was framed by UNHCR's predecessor, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), to meet the needs prevalent in Europe at that time. It should be noted that in the first half of the 20th century, refugees

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country, (A) that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the general area of the Middle East and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry is made; or (B) that they are persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the President who are unable to return to their usual place of abode", as quoted in Donald G. Hohl, "The United States Refugee Act of 1980", Migration News (3-4), July-December 1980, p. 14.

[6]Ibid, p. 11.

originated largley from Europe as a result of the two World Wars. It is only since World War II that Third World countries have become a major source of refugees. In Southeast Asia and the Middle East, for example, refugee problems emerged as a result of the partitioning of Korea, Vietnam, the Indian sub-continent and Palestine. In Africa, refugees were a product of the process of decolonisation in the 1960's and 1970's. Therefore, with the emergence of refugee situations outside Europe, the inadequacy of the definition based upon the European experience was realised. Hence, the 1967 Protocol to the Geneva Convention was adopted to include all persons who became refugees in the post-Convention period.

In the post-war period, the need has periodically arisen for region-specific definitions. For example, in the case of Palestine, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has defined a refugee as:

> a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years immediately preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and his means of livelihood.[7]

This mandate limits recognition to persons who had lived in Palestine for a minimum period of time prior to the 1948 conflict. This was done in order to identify the long-term residents from recent migrants, and to limit relief assistance to persons who had actually lost both their homes and means of livelihoods as a result of the conflict.

In the case of Africa, the concept of 'refugees' as outlined by the 1951 Geneva Convention is not sufficiently wide to cover all aspects

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[7]As quoted in H. I. Barakat, "The Palestinian Refugees: An Uprooted Community Seeking Repatriation", The International Migration Review, Vol. 7(2), Summer 1973, p. 147.

of Africa's experience of forced migration. Consequently, a need for an appropriate regional concept prompted the OAU to establish its own definition in 1969 which was to include the specific aspects of Africa's refugees dilemma which were not effectively covered by the UNHCR definition. The OAU was as much concerned with the various forces generating refugees on the continent as it was with the specific legal aspects involved in defining refugees. Hence, the OAU defines a refugee as:

> Any person who through aggression, occupation from outside, foreign domination or events gravely disturbing public order in part or all of his country of origin or the country of which he has the nationality is obliged to leave his usual place of residence to seek refuge outside this country.[8]

In addition to encompassing displacees which would not be recognised as refugees under the UNHCR definition, the OAU definition also includes groups such as freedom fighters.

When the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission for Southern Sudanese returnees was established, the government realised that the OAU definition of refugees would likely deprive certain categories of displacees who needed immediate relief. A modified definition was required in order to meet the specific needs of the refugees and internally displaced persons. Consequently, the Commission broadened the OAU definition to include all persons directly or indirectly affected by the conflict and defined 'refugees' as:

(a) those who had taken refuge in the bush, in towns of the Southern Region and in various parts of Northern Sudan;

(b) those who had sought refuge in neighbouring countries where

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[8]Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problem, 1967. United Nations Document E/CN. 14/442, 1969.

they had come largely under the care of UNHCR and acquired the true status of refugees. Many of these, though with a fair number of exceptions, had been established in the UN sponsored settlements;

(c) those who, because of political instability in the Southern Sudan, had fled to neighbouring countries in search of educational opportunities provided by the various agencies for the refugees;

(d) orphaned children and incapacitated persons.[9]

The foregoing discussion of the definitions of 'refugees' by various agencies and governments shows that there does not exist a universal definition of refugees. There are considerable variations both in extension and flexibility in the definitions according to the source and the local circumstances. Thus, no single definition can be easily adopted to suit all conditions under which refugees are generated.

In the following discussion, the term 'refugees' shall be used as defined by the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission rather than in the more discrete context of the UNHCR. But although the Commission's definition of refugees provides wider coverage, yet a fifth category of refugees may be identified. This group includes those who remained in their villages throughout the war, and who, after the war, suffered even greater psychological impact from the conflict than some of those who abandoned their villages. These people became refugees in their own

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[9]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction ..., p. 23.

villages because they were suspect by government forces on the one hand and by the Anyanya guerrilla organisation on the other.

Having examined the various definitions of refugees, the following section discusses the process of repatriation with reference to the Southern Sudanese refugees.

## VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF SOUTHERN SUDANESE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT

All African asylum states favour voluntary repatriation as the optimum solution, because it is generally considered the best solution to a refugee problem. However, repatriation is only likely to take place if conditions in the refugees' country of origin change for the better, and thereby make it conducive for them to return. The situation in Southern Sudan in the 1960's did not favour such a repatriation. The policies pursued by the governments were too repressive to induce refugees to return to their homes in large numbers. Data show that prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement, only about 1,000 persons had voluntarily returned to their homes from the 'bush' where they had been in hiding.[10] However, such numbers are probably misleading, because first, no accurate registrations were made to determine the number of persons returning, and second, fear of arrest and interrogation by government forces made many rural and self-employed returnees reluctant to identify themselves as returnees to local authorities. The principal exceptions to this were former government employees who wanted to be reinstated in their old positions.

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[10]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - April 1974, Juba, 1974, p. 18.

The Repatriation and Resettlement Commission was established in 1972, after which the repatriation process took on new dimensions. Repatriation Branch Offices were set-up in Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire and Central African Republic and they became directly responsible for all Southern Sudanese refugees wishing to repatriate. In contrast to the pre-1972 period, when repatriates returned to their homes on their own initiative or as a result of encouragement by Sudanese Embassies in their respective countries of asylum, the repatriation process after 1972 became a large-scale organised operation.

Immediately after the civil war the Commission's role included the translation of the text of the Addis Ababa Agreement into the vernacular and its explanation to the refugees. The Commission was also charged with the task of winning back the refugees' confidence. This was important, because many refugees felt that they had been deceived by the government after the 1955 mutiny. At that time, the government had appealed to Southerners who had fled into the 'bush' to return home and had assured them of safety. However, many who did return were subsequently killed. For this reason, many refugees were initially reluctant to repatriate in 1972.[11] The concern for maintaining peace and for creating a climate of reconciliation in North-South relations was the main theme of Alier's speech on the occasion of Unity Day Celebrations. He stated that:

> Our overriding desire and concern has been to guard against a senseless trigger and resumption of hostilities ... in emphasising the problems of the

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[11]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Interim Report on First Phase of Repatriation, Relief and Rehabilitation, Juba, 1973.

> future and not to dwell on the past that had been bitter but to draw lessons from this past to avoid future conflicts that might threaten all that goes with peace, good-will and popular progress ... The other concern has been to lay down a sound foundation that would guarantee future harmonious relations and integrate smoothly those who had yesterday been facing one another in bloody confrontation ...[12]

The anticipated influx of refugees required contingency planning for their orderly repatriation and reception. To facilitate this movement, the Commission established resettlement camps in various parts of the South. Most were located in what has now become Eastern and Western Equatoria Provinces, and into which most of the refugees from Central African Republic, Zaire and Uganda were repatriated (Figure 3.1). Four types of resettlement camps were established, transit, reception, distribution and leper camps.[13] As their names suggest, these camps were designed to perform specific functions for the refugees. Also, their organisation and the type of assistance they offered varied. Furthermore, the location of these camps depended on the functions they were to perform. Therefore, in order to understand their different roles in the resettlement process, a brief explanation of each type is given below.

Transit Camps

These were established to accommodate returnees in transit to other destinations. They were located in border areas along the main routes

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[12]Abel Alier, Speech on the Occasion of the National Unity Day Celebrations, March 3, 1973, Juba.

[13]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - June 1974, Juba, 1974, pp. 42-44.

Figure 3.1 Location of Resettlement Camps for Returnees in the Southern Sudan, 1972-73.




Source : Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - April 1974, Juba, Sudan

of influx or at the intersections of major roads. In these camps, returnees were provided with food, medical treatment and accommodation for a maximum of three days prior to being transported directly to their homes, or to reception centers in their home regions.[14] The Resettlement Commission established a total of seven transit camps: three in western Equatoria, at Source Yubu, Ezo and Gangura, which handled refugees arriving from Central African Republic and Zaire; and three in eastern Equatoria at Gumba, across the Nile from Juba, and at Lainya and Laso in Yei district.[15] These camps accommodated returnees from Uganda and Zaire. The seventh camp was located in eastern Upper Nile Province at Jekau to accommodate returnees from Ethiopia.

Reception Camps

While the transit camps' main role was to provide immediate assistance to returnees on crossing the border, the reception camps were charged with assisting refugees once they arrived in their home regions. At the reception centers returnees were registered, provided with food, clothes and agricultural tools and then transported to their village sites. A total of 46 reception centers were established by the Commission of which 23 were in Equatoria, 13 in Upper Nile and 10 in Bahr el Ghazal provinces respectively. The location of these camps was

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[14]Christopher F.F. Terrill, "The Creation of the Acholi Minority of Southern Sudan: Their Dispersal as Refugees, Repatriation and Resettlement," Paper Presented at the IGU Commission on Population Geography Symopsium on the Causes and Consequences of Refugee Migration in the Developing World, 29th August to 1st September, 1983, Hecla, Manitoba, Canada.

[15]For administrative reasons, Lainya and Laso transit camps were treated as one camp by the Commission.

related to the major routes of influx which the returnees took. Hence, Equatoria had half of the centers. The size of the camps also varied, ranging from 50 to 500 persons. The variation in size can be explained by the rate of influx on the one hand and by prevailing population densities on the other.

Distribution Camps

Unlike the transit and reception camps, which mainly handled large numbers of returnees, the distribution camps were set up to operate at a purely local level. Their main function was to resettle the returnees to remote areas, because it was not possible to transport them directly there from the reception centers. They were largely under the administration of area chiefs and supervision by District and Province Resettlement Officers. For this reason, such camps were located near to the respective chiefs' compounds.

Leper Camps

Three camps were established to accommodate returnees who had contracted leprosy. The Commission argued that "lepers were a special brand of refugees and, therefore, they had to be kept separate from the other healthy returnees".[16] These camps were established at Bariabanda near Source Yubu in western Equatoria to accommodate returnees from Central African Republic, and at Torit and Kajo-Kaji in eastern Equatoria to handle people from Uganda. A total of 479 lepers were processed through these camps, of which 257 came from Central African

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[16]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report ..., 1974, p. 44.

Republic and the balance from Uganda.[17]

After their repatriation, the Regional Government had no definite plans for the lepers. The need to control this disease arose only in the Six-Year Development Plan, 1977/78-1982/83, with the integration of the treatment of lepers into the general health services of the Region.[18] But by then many of those who had returned from exile had dispersed to live on their own or their families had taken charge of them. However, through the assistance of the German Leprosy Team, a National Leprosy Training and Demonstration Center was built in northeast of Wau at Agok in the hope that it would assist in the control of the disease in the South.

## AN ENUMERATION OF THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE REFUGEES

The impact of the civil war in the Southern Sudan was enormous in terms of population displacement. Of a total population of 4 million, over 25% were directly affected and dislocated during the war.[19] However, as was suggested earlier, differences in the definition of refugees adopted by various concerned agencies contributed to diverse, if not contradictory, data on refugee population. For example, at the Relief and Resettlement Conference of February 1972, the government suggested a total of 327,000 persons were in need of relief assistance, while UNHCR proposed a figure of 680,000 refugees in May of that

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Directorate of Planning, The Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977/1978 - 1982/82, June 1977, Juba, p. 249.

[19] L. Robin Mills, Population and Manpower in the Southern Sudan (Report prepared for the International Labour Organisation and the Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Southern

year.[20] However, by the end of its operation in 1974, the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission reported that it had resettled over one million refugees.[21] Until today, the accuracy of the number of Southern Sudanese displaced during the civil war remains in doubt.

For the purpose of this study, the refugee population resettled by the Commission can be divided into three main categories according to the nature of their displacement during the civil war. These are the external refugees, the internal refugees and the Anyanya guerrilla organisation (Figure 3.2). The aim is to determine how displacement affected the refugees' subsequent return and duration of the repatriation process. The classification identifies the various sub-groups of refugees handled by the Commission, each of which required different solutions to its problems. The following discussion focuses on the Commission's efforts to repatriate or rehabilitate these refugees.

## The External Refugees

External refugees are those persons who have crossed an international boundary as a result of persecution in their own country. In Southern Sudan's case, this category of refugees consisted of four sub-groups: politicians, professionals and sub-professionals, students and peasants. Rural farmers or peasants constituted the great majority

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Region, Juba, 1977), p. 9.

[20]Government of Sudan, Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, Relief and Resettlement Conference on Southern Region, 21-23 February (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1972); and United Nations Economic and Social Council, Assistance to Southern Sudanese Returnees and Displaced Persons - Final Report of the UNHCR, June 1974, Geneva.

[21]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction ... 1972, p. 41. Also Mills reports that estimates ranging from 2 to 2.5 million were quoted as being the number of Southern Sudanese refugees.

Figure 3.2 A Classification of the Southern Sudanese Refugees, 1972



of the refugee population, and for this reason, the discussion will focus primarily on rural refugees.

After the Addis Ababa Agreement the Commission reported that a total of 219,400 Southern Sudanese refugees lived in neighbouring countries (Table 3.1). However, their burden was unevenly distributed among the asylum countries. For example, Zaire and Uganda hosted about 70% of the refugees. This uneven distribution caused serious strain on the socio-economic services in those countries where refugees became heavily concentrated.[22]

Apart from such uneven distribution of refugees among host countries, there were also considerable differences in their manner of settlement. Table 3.1 shows that 50.2% of refugees settled spontaneously among the local population in their respective countries of asylum, while the balance lived in organised rural settlements. The largest group of spontaneous settlers was in Uganda (63.%), followed by Zaire (55.2%) and by Ethiopia (42.9%). Spontaneous settlement is usually discouraged by African governments. First, it becomes difficult to distribute relief assistance among a disorganised population, and second, dispersed refugees tend to engage in political activities against their home government which, in turn, causes political tensions

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For details, see L. R. Mills, "Trends and Implications of Recent Population Redistribution and Urban Growth in the Southern Sudan: The Case of Juba, The Regional Capital", Paper Presented at the International Geographical Union Symposium, 8-12 March 1982, Khartoum.

[22]For example, out of the total of 1 million refugees in Africa in 1974, Zaire hosted 50% with the remainder distributed among the other countries, primarily Tanzania (193,000), Uganda (112,500), Senegal (86,500), Sudan (53,500), Burundi (48,500) and Zambia (40,000). Of Zaire's 500,000 refugees, 90% came from Angola with the balance coming from Rwanda (4.9%), Burundi (4.8%), South Africa and Namibia (0.2%) and Zambia (0.1%). See UNHCR, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1974-75 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1976,

Table 3.1

Distribution of Southern Sudanese Refugees by Country of Asylum and Nature of Settlement, 1972

| Country of Asylum | Total Number of Refugees | | Number of Spontaneous Settlers | | Number in Rural Settlement Schemes | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | No. | % | Name of Settlement | No. | % |
| Uganda | 86,000 | 39.2 | 54,600 | 63.5 | Nakapiripirit<br>Agago<br>Onigo<br>Ibuga | 11,600<br>9,600<br>8,500<br>1,700 | 36.5 |
| Zaire | 67,000 | 30.5 | 37,000 | 55.2 | Aba<br>Amadi<br>Nugadi | 15,000<br>10,000<br>5,000 | 44.8 |
| Ethiopia | 35,000 | 16.0 | 15,000 | 42.9 | Gambela | 20,000 | 57.1 |
| Central African Rep. | 30,900 | 14.1 | 3,000 | 9.7 | M'Boki | 27,900 | 90.3 |
| Kenya | 500 | 0.2 | 500 | 100.0 | No rural settlement scheme | - | - |
| Total | 219,400 | 100.0 | 110,100 | 50.2 | | 109,300 | 49.8 |

Source: Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, Juba, 1974.

between the asylum state and the refugees' country of origin.[23] However, where spontaneous settlements occur, two factors should be taken into account. In the first place, the ethnic relations between host populations and refugees tend to encourage such settlements. In much of Africa, colonial political boundaries cut across ethnic groups and tribal lands. The refugee migration that emerged in the post-independence period was therefore within the larger pre-colonial ethnic territories. Second, the failure by host governments to take immediate action on the refugees' arrival, causes refugees to seek their own solutions through spontaneous integration among local populations.

In contrast to spontaneous settlement solutions, organised rural settlements were relatively effective in regrouping refugees in specified areas, where a variety of services and infrastructural facilities could be provided. In Central African Republic, for example, 90.3% of the refugees were settled at the M'boki rural settlement,[24] while in Ethiopia, 57% were settled at Gambella. In contrast, in Zaire and Uganda only 44.8% and 36.5% of the refugees were living in organised rural settlements.

Differences in the manner of settlement by the refugees in asylum countries had varying effects on the subsequent socio-economic performance. The smooth integration of refugees depended upon various socio-economic, cultural and political factors such as the attitude of

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A/AC.96/516, 13th August 1975, p. 55.

[23]John R. Rogge, "Refugee Migration and Resettlement", in John I. Clarke and Leszek A. Kosinski (eds), Redistribution of Population in Africa (London: Heinemann, 1982), p. 41.

[24]UNHCR, The Promise of M'boki (Geneva: March 1969).

the host population towards the refugees, the availability to refugees of cultivable land, and the refugees' own attitude towards the resettlement process. For example, Chambers has observed that the Barundi refugees who fled to Kivu province in Zaire during 1972, experienced years of deprivation of land because of high local population density in the area.[25] Social problems between the local population and refugees resulted in unsatisfactory adjustment by the latter. Similar problems were also experienced at the Nakapiripirit settlement scheme for Southern Sudanese refugees in Uganda. Trappe suggests that the lack of social interaction between refugees and the local Karamojong has contributed to the scheme's inadequate performance.[26] On the other hand, refugee integration has been successful in some areas where social harmony and cooperation existed between refugees and local populations. For example, in Uganda the settlements for Rwandan and Zairean refugees became self-supporting and integrated into the local economy so that the refugees started to pay local taxes on their cash income.[27] Also, in Tanzania, settlements such as Ulyankulu and Katumba for refugees from Burundi are self-supporting and this was similarly the case for M'boki settlement in Central African Republic for the Southern Sudanese refugees. Therefore,

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[25]Robert Chambers, "Rural Refugees in Africa: What the Eye Does Not See", Paper for the African Studies Association Symposium on Refugees, 13-14 September 1979, London.

[26]Trappe argues that apart from stealing the refugees' property, the Karamojong also believed that the refugees were being paid with the proceeds of taxes they had paid to the Government. For details see Paul Trappe, Social Change and Development Institutions in a Refugee Population: The Case of the Nakapiripirit Settlement Scheme in Uganda. Report No. 71.2, Geneva, 1971, pp. 52-54.

[27]United Nations General Assembly, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1974-75 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1976. A/AC. 96/516, August 13, 1975.

when the refugees are repatriated, their degree of success or failure during exile has a bearing on their subsequent socio-economic adjustment after their return.

As the repatriation of refugees progressed, the Commission was optimistic that its task would be completed within the prescribed period. However, between May and December 1972, only 44,608 refugees were repatriated, most of whom came from Uganda and Central African Republic (Table 3.2). As suggested earlier, many refugees were not certain about the government intentions and as a result adopted an attitude of 'wait and see'. Between January and October 1973, a further 109,106 refugees were repatriated by the Commission, of which 69% came from Uganda and Zaire. Between November 1973 and June 1974, when the Commission finally completed its work, another 4,578 persons were registered, bringing the total to 158,292 refugees repatriated by the Commission. However, the number of persons repatriated by the Commission fell short by 61,108 (or 27.9%) of the targeted 219,400 refugees. Of the 61,108 refugees who were not officially repatriated, 13,153 of them remained in Uganda and Zaire purely for personal and/or economic reasons. The balance remained unaccounted for at the end of the repatriation operation, but it is commonly accepted by the government that they returned independently to their homes, and thus were not registered. This was especially the case for refugees living close to the borders and within walking distances of their homes.

Of the refugees repatriated by the Commission, virtually all of the 158,292 passed through the major resettlement camps, of which the Gumba camp was responsible for the largest percentage of refugees processed

Table 3.2

Sequence of Repatriation of Southern Sudanese Refugees, May 1972 - June 1974

| Country of Asylum | Total Number of Refugees | Number Repatriated From | | | UNHCR-Assisted Repatriation | Self-Repatriation | Total Repatriated May 1972-June 1974 | Number Left Behind |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | May-Dec. 1972 | Jan.-Oct. 1973 | Nov.1973-Jun.1974 | | | | |
| Uganda | 86,000 | 17,570 | 37,193 | 4,531 | 52,294 | 15,306 | 74,600 | 11,400 |
| Zaire | 67,000 | 8,808 | 38,259 | 47 | 47,114 | 18,133 | 65,247 | 1,753 |
| Ethiopia | 35,000 | 7,400 | 16,084 | - | 23,484 | 11,516 | 35,000 | - |
| C.A.Rep. | 30,900 | 10,830 | 17,070 | - | 27,900 | 3,000 | 30,900 | - |
| Kenya | 500 | - | 500 | - | 500 | - | 500 | - |

Source: Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, Juba, 1974.

(38.8%).[28] Centrally located, the Gumba center accommodated a wide variety of refugees including ones arriving via Torit, Nimule, Yei and Maridi. Other camps were responsible for much smaller case-loads due to their more peripheral location vis-a-vis the major routes of repatriation (e.g., Source Yubu - 17.8%, Ezo - 6.4%, Kaya - 5.2% and Jekau - 4.5%).

The Internal Refugees

Apart from the refugees who fled to neighbouring countries, the war also generated a large internal population movement. These are referred to as internal refugees, and consisted of three sub-groups:

(a) those who took refuge in the 'bush' within the South;

(b) those who escaped to towns in the South; and,

(c) those who sought refuge in the North.

Following the civil war, the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission found it much more difficult to determine the precise number of internal displacees. This was primarily because only those refugees in need of relief assistance reported to reception centers.

The original estimate of internal refugees was 800,000 persons, but this figure was revised at the end of 1973 to 850,000. It was also believed that over 100,000 refugees were still in hiding in 1973.[29] As was the case with the external refugees, the pace at which the internal refugees returned during 1972 was also slow. For example, by the end of that year, the Commission estimated that only 320,000 refugees had

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[28]A total of 156,655 (or 90%) returnees were processed through the major resettlement camps. See Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - June 1974, 1974.

[29]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report of the Provisional High Executive Council for the Period April 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

returned to their homes.[30] Only after an intensive government campaign among the refugees and their leaders were the apprehensions and fears prevailing among the refugees overcome. Also, with the increased participation of Southerners in the Central Government and after the establishment of the Regional Government in the South, confidence among the refugees grew and increased the volume of those returning to their homes.[31] Thus, by October 1973, the Commission had resettled a total of 600,886 internal refugees. Of these, 53% were in Equatoria, 24% in Upper Nile and 23% in Bahr el Ghazal.[32] Again, it is generally assumed that the balance of internal displacees returned independently to their homes.

A further sub-group of displaced population, deprived persons, was identified. This included orphans, unattached minors and disabled persons. At the end of the war it was estimated that there were 2,300 orphans and unattached minors living in Juba, Malakal, Wau and Aweil, and about 100,000 physically handicapped persons in various parts of the South.[33] However, no estimates exist on other deprived groups such as unsupported mothers and those emotionally disturbed.

The rehabilitation of this group of displaced population will be discussed in the next chapter. It suffices here to mention that the

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[30]The High Executive Council, Peace and Progress, 1972-73: A Report of the Provisional High Executive Council of the Southern Region (Juba: Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, 1973), p. 7.

[31]Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975), p. 76.

[32]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report ... April 1972 - October 1973, January 1974.

[33]Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Directorate of Planning, The Six-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1977/78 - 1982/83, Juba, June 1977, p. 259.

role of the government in rehabilitating them was limited to the initial years of the resettlement program. The responsibility for them fell upon the families or relatives of these disadvantaged groups.

## The 'Anyanya' Guerrilla Organisation

The Anyanya guerrillas constituted a distinct group of displaced population from the rest of the refugees. In 1972, their strength was estimated as over 20,000 men. Although the causes of their displacement were similar to those of the other refugees, their roles while in exile were very different. Unlike the majority of the refugees, who were generally passive and immobile, the Anyanya were militarily active and highly mobile along the borders.

The Anyanya were drawn from a variety of Southern populations. They included those who deserted their jobs such as government officials, the army and police personnel, students, and peasant farmers. During their flight, some Anyanya took their families with them. However, the majority were single or left their families behind. Unlike many of the refugees who settled among the local population or in organised rural settlements in the neighbouring countries, the Anyanya lived in two types of camps in the 'bush' within the national boundaries. First, there were the semi-permanent camps where families and the wounded were kept. These camps were detached from the main army quarters and some subsistence agriculture was practised. However, their degree of permanence depended upon the ability of the Anyanya forces to contain government army offensives. Second, there were the camps from which the Anyanya military forces operated. These camps were highly mobile, and their locations changed with the state of the military

conflict between government forces and the Anyanya.

Having identified and discussed the different categories of refugees handled by the Resettlement Commission, it is also important to examine some of the constraints the Commission faced in achieving its objectives. These problems are discussed in the section following.

## SOME FACTORS IN THE RESPONSE OF REFUGEES TO VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION

The nature and magnitude of problems encountered by the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission in the respective asylum countries varied from one country to another. While in some areas the repatriation process was completed within a short time, in others, it was a protracted operation (Table 3.3). The problems encountered were many, and are summarised below.

### The Nature of Settlement While in Exile

The way refugees had been settled during their exile is important insofar as the repatriation process was concerned. Unlike spontaneously settled refugees who were widely dispersed and thus not easily grouped together for repatriation, those in organised rural settlement schemes were readily mobilised and thus repatriated with minimal problems. In the case of Central African Republic, 90.3% of the refugees were concentrated in a single settlement at M'boki. Also, proximity of some settlements to border areas, and their location along main transport routes facilitated the repatriation process. On the other hand, advantages such as concentration of refugees and proximity to border areas were negated by the fact that the communication infrastructure had been severely dislocated by the war. For example, repatriation from

Table 3.3

Duration of Repatriation of Refugees from Main Countries of Asylum

| Country of Asylum | Total Number of Refugees | Repatriation Process | | | Expenditure US $ | As % of Total Budget[1] (US$1,229,534) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | From | To | Duration | | |
| Uganda | 86,000 | May 1972 | June 1974 | 26 months | 388,693.86 | 29.91 |
| Zaire | 67,000 | March 1973 | August 1973 | 6 months | 219,757.16 | 16.91 |
| Ethiopia | 35,000 | May 1972 | May 1973 | 13 months | 4,949.37 | 0.38 |
| C.A.Rep. | 30,900 | January 1973 | June 1973 | 6 months | 330,000.00 | 25.39 |
| Total | 218,900 | | | | 943,400.39 | 72.59 |

Source: Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, Juba, 1974.

[1] The remaining 27.41% was spent within Sudan in purchase of trucks (19.71%) and operational expenses (7.7%).

Central African Republic was made more difficult by the fact that the road between M'boki and Source Yubu in Sudan needed constant repair and maintenance. Some 2,290 refugees had to be airlifted, even though the distance was relatively short.[34] Thus, what should have been a relatively easy and quick exercise, was drawn out over a six month period from January to June 1973, and cost the Commission 25% of its total budget allocation of $1.3 million.

In Ethiopia, over 50% of the refugees lived close to the border at Gambela settlement (Figure 3.3). Although their repatriation by road between Gambela and Nasir started in May 1972, it was drawn out over a thirteen month period. The use of road was interrupted by the rainy season, and as a result river boats had to be used between Gambela and Malakal. Nevertheless, the costs of the repatriation of refugees from Ethiopia were modest compared to the other countries. The Commission estimated it as only 0.4% of the total budget allocation. Apart from the use of river boats, which were relatively cheaper than road transport, the UNHCR reported that "many refugees preferred to cross the border on foot with their cattle".[35]

In Uganda and Zaire, the proportion of spontaneously settled refugee population was 63.5% and 55.2% respectively. Such high proportions of dispersed populations, especially in Uganda, created many problems in the repatriation process. For example, in Uganda the Commission, with cooperation of the Ugandan Government, was required to

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[34]United Nations Economic and Social Council, Assistance to Southern Sudanese Returnees and Displaced Persons, E/5483, June 1974, p. 4.

[35]Ibid.

Figure 3.3 Regions of (Former) Refugee Influx in the Southern Sudan and Neighbouring Countries.




Key : Former Area of Refugee Influx ; Current Area of Refugee Influx
Former Refugee Settlement ; Current Refugee Settlement
Other Settlments ; Town ; Direction of Refugee Influx
International Boundary

set up 13 holding camps in order to congregate the refugees for processing. Such additional expenses resulted in the cost of the repatriation exercise from Uganda accounting for about 30% of the total budget allocation. The repatriation operation was extended over a two-year period, from May 1972 to June 1974.

In Zaire, the organised repatriation commenced in May 1973 and was completed by August of that year. It cost 16.9% of the total budget. The problems encountered by the Commission in Zaire were more of a border security nature than due to the dispersed settlement of refugees. The border issue is discussed below.

Border Problems

Since many African countries serve as both source areas of refugees and asylum states, sporadic conflicts have erupted as exiles cross back to their country of origin and undertake guerrilla activities or operate as freedom fighters. Tensions are thereby created between the government of the asylum state and that of the country of refugee origin. In the case of Southern Sudan, Zairean refugees had been spontaneously settled in border areas, and the Zairean government was apprehensive that an opening of the Sudan-Zaire border might facilitate and encourage Zairean refugees to infiltrate back to Zaire and engage in guerrilla activities. Consequently, this fear delayed the opening of the border and thereby retarded the repatriation process of Southern Sudanese from Zaire. As a result, the repatriation of the refugees was limited to one crossing point at Aba (Figure 3.4). As described by Betts, this decision by the Zairean Government:

> greatly increased the difficulties of the operation, necessitating an eight to ten day journey for the

Figure 3.4 Routing of Refugees Repatriated From Zaire Between May - August , 1973.




International Boundary

Main Routes of Repatriation

Other Routes

Routes Opened at a Later Date

Centers of Refugee Concentration

Other Towns

Source: RRC , Final Report , May 1972 - April 1974 , Juba , Sudan

> vehicles from Amadi to the frontier and return, and five to seven days from Nugadi. This imposed great strain on both drivers and refugees ...[36]

Also, this meant that the refugees travelling to western Equatoria from Amadi and Nugadi settlements had to make a detour of over 1,000 kilometers.[37] Apart from the long distances involved, the rising cost in fuel consumption and the concentration of refugees at the major resettlement camps were additional problems. Furthermore, the use of only one border crossing forced the Commission into unforeseen expenditures, such as the establishment of a transit camp at Lainya at a cost of about US $23,000. It was not until the establishment in May 1973 of a Joint Commission between Sudan and Zaire to implement and supervise the repatriation process that the problem was eased. With the opening of two additional and shorter routes between Doruma and Ezo and between Yakuluku and Gangura in July of that year, both the large detours and the high cost were drastically reduced, and by August 1973, the repatriation of refugees from Zaire was completed.

## The Treatment and Reaction of Early Returnees

The first impression of the early returnees of the general situation in the country was important because it influenced the return of the rest of the refugees from exile. For example, prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement, the number of refugees who repatriated voluntarily was negligible. In part this was because fighting was still in progress and in part due to the fact that those who did return were left to their own

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[36]Tristram Betts, Spontaneous Settlement on Rural Refugees in Africa. Case Study No. 3 - Sudanese Refugees in Zaire, April 1980, p. 27.

[37]It is estimated that the shortest possible route from Nugadi settlement to Gangura is 275 km and between Amadi and Ezo is 250 km. However, because of the detour, the distances from Nugadi to Gangura and

devices and received no organised government assistance. However, after the war, specific measures in favour of the returnees were taken by government to ensure that they were accorded the same rights and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the population. In addition, a special dispensation was made allowing returnees to bring most of their belongings into the country duty free. In the letter from the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Regional Government, it was stated that:

> the refugees are allowed to bring with them all the personal belongings from the respective countries of refuge into the Sudan and cleared duty free EXCEPT cotton, coffee, skin and hides ... PLUS liquor and cigarettes all of which are NOT DUTY FREE. These specific goods require import or export licenses, wherever applicable, and are subject to custom duties.[38]

Although this exemption did not benefit all of the refugees who had possessions, it was nevertheless a measure that contributed to the return of some refugees.

## Social and Economic Conditions

An important factor influencing the desire to repatriate was the level of socio-economic development that the refugees had achieved while in exile vis-a-vis the prevailing conditions in their home country which awaited the potential returnee. For example, refugees who had become self-sufficient and perhaps even affluent, were reluctant to return to a war-devastated and dislocated economy. On the other hand, those who were living in conditions of poverty, or those who had

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from Amadi to Ezo via Aba and Lainya were 700 and 1,390 km respectively.

[38]Letter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khartoum, NO. MFA/EO/36.3.2, July 16, 1973. As quoted in a Statement by the Director, Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Juba,

developed no economic or psychological attachments to their area of exile, were more readily prepared to return home.

Two groups are used as illustration. After the civil war, some refugees remained in Uganda because they enjoyed good socio-economic conditions. Many had become employed as civil servants or had joined the army. Apart from the employment opportunities and economic prosperity of these refugees, the duration of stay in exile may also have reinforced their desire to remain among relatives and friends. With Amin's rise to power, many of these refugees, especially the 'Nubis', further consolidated their positions.[39] For example, in the army, the 'Nubis' and Southern Sudanese were the core of Amin's support. It is estimated that over 11,000 refugees remained in Uganda and did not return to Sudan until 1979, following Amin's fall and the invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian army.

On the other hand, Terrill has described the reverse situation with respect to the Kal clan of the Acholi. These people fled to Uganda, where they were reluctant settlers and psychologically more attached to the social and economic environment in their home territory in Sudan. As a result, they had lost the wealth and political influence they had enjoyed as feudal overlords.[40] Thus, they were waiting for the chance to return at the earliest possible opportunity, and made little effort

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September 5, 1973.

[39]The 'Nubis', as a group of people, are a product of inter-marriages between the Turko-Egyptian Army during their invasion through Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda during the 19th Century and the local population. They are all moslems.

[40]Christopher F. F. Terrill, loc. cit.

to adjust to their new environment in Uganda.

Ethnic Relations

Social relationships based on common ethnic backgrounds of refugees and the host population may also have been a contributory factor in the refugees' lack of interest to repatriate immediately. As a consequence of the partition of Africa by European powers during the 19th Century, many ethnic groups were divided by the new political boundaries meaning that those sharing common backgrounds are located in neighbouring countries. In the case of Southern Sudan such divided ethnic groups include the Anuak and Nuer in southwestern Ethiopia, the Acholi and Madi in northern Uganda, the Kakwa in northwestern Uganda and northeastern Zaire and the Zande in northern Zaire and eastern Central African Republic. Not surprisingly, therefore, many refugees from the South found refuge across the border among long-time divided families and friends or other relations through marriage. Such ethnic linkages encouraged spontaneous settlement by the refugees, especially in Uganda and Zaire, where they became so well established that they decided to remain.

## THE IMPACT OF REPATRIATION ON THE FORMER HOST COUNTRIES

Although host governments in Africa have borne the heavy burden of refugees for many years, they have nevertheless benefitted from numerous rural development projects which were established by the various international agencies for the refugees. In the short run, the infrastructures created in these settlements benefitted both the refugees and the local population. It is estimated that between 1964

and 1972, the UNHCR spent over US $8 million in establishing and maintaining rural settlement schemes for the Southern Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire and Central African Republic.[41] However, with repatriation during 1972/73, financial allocations by UNHCR to the host countries terminated, which clearly had a negative economic impact in the areas of refugee settlement.

On the other hand, repatriation resulted in socio-economic infrastructure being left for local rural communities. The settlement schemes were generally established in relatively sparsely populated and previously undeveloped areas. At the M'boki rural settlement in the southeast of Central African Republic, for example, large acreages of cultivable land, as well as various buildings, health and educational facilities, were all left behind to the benefit of the local population. The former refugee settlement also provided a nucleus around which subsequent development of the region could be organised.

In Ethiopia, a similar transfer was made at Gambela settlement. Organisation and materials left behind to Ethiopians included health, educational, road and river transport facilities, and agricultural equipment.[42] This was also the case in Zaire with the handing over of the infrastructure at Amadi and Nugadi rural settlements. In Uganda, the government benefitted from social and economic facilities left behind at Onigo, Agago, Ibuga and Nakapiripirit rural settlements (Figure 3.3). For example, the Nakapiripirit settlement has since become the headquarters of the South Karamoja District and the Onigo

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[41]UNHCR, UNHCR Newsletter, No. 6, December 1973.

[42]UNHCR, Supplement to UNHCR Newsletter, No. 6, December 1973.

settlement became a government community center.[43] In this sense, it can be argued that the long-term benefits to host governments tend to offset some of the short-term problems caused by the influx of refugees.

Related also to the presence of refugees are border security problems which arise between the refugees' country of origin and the asylum state. Although the OAU Charter states that the granting of asylum to refugees by a country should not be regarded by the source area of refugees as "an unfriendly act" towards it, there is nevertheless a potential danger of confrontation created. Hostility can mount further if the host government is in sympathy with the causes of the refugees' exodus. Such was certainly the case prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement, when strained relations and at times armed conflicts and boundary violations occurred between Sudan and her neighbours who were generally supportive of the Southern Sudanese resistance movement. With the settlement of Southern Sudan's problem, these border tensions diminished. However, with Sudan now being host to refugees from Ethiopia and Uganda, the situation has become reversed as these neighbouring countries now fear guerrilla activities being perpetuated by their nationals from bases inside Sudan.

## SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed the process of voluntary repatriation of the Southern Sudanese refugees following the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. It has also examined the concept of refugees both at the international and regional levels and the criteria used in each case.

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[43]UNHCR, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1973-74 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1975, A/AC. 96/506. 28th August 1974, p. 43.

It has been shown that with the emergence of refugees in Africa and Asia, the original definition of refugees has been modified to meet the specific needs of different refugee groups. The nature and the scope of voluntary repatriation before and after the Addis Ababa Agreement has also been examined. In contrast to the post-civil war period, the repatriation of refugees prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement was negligible and unorganised.

A classification of the refugees was made and three groups were identified: external refugees, internal refugees and the 'Anyanya' guerrilla organisation. Some of the problems encountered by the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission during its operation were discussed. The political, social and economic factors were identified as the main constraints to the repatriation process. The last section of the chapter has discussed the impact of the repatriation of the Southern Sudanese refugees in former host countries. It was suggested that in the long run, the presence of refugees may have some positive economic spin-offs to the asylum countries. Also, connected with the solving of refugee problems was the diminution of border tensions and conflicts between Sudan and her neighbours.

In the following chapter, the socio-economic conditions in Southern Sudan after the civil war and the nature of the rehabilitation and resettlement programs for the different groups of returnees will be examined.

# CHAPTER 4

# THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE RETURNEES

This chapter discusses the overall resettlement program for the returnees. It examines the impact of the civil war on the socio-economic institutions in the South with reference to agriculture, transport, health, and education. The manpower problems are discussed to show their effects on the performance of the newly established Regional Government in the South. Further, a discussion of the nature, source and volume of the emergency relief assistance to the South during 1972/73 period, and the distribution and utilisation of such contributions in the rehabilitation and resettlement of the returnees is also included.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

### Socio-Economic Problems

The Addis Ababa Agreement between the North and South was only an initial step towards creating political stability in the South. The major problems after the ceasefire were those of reconstruction and resettlement of the displaced populations. Nimeiri claimed that

> the coming stage will be more difficult than the one through which we have passed. We must exert more effort to achieve economic and social development.[1]

The reconstruction period was more difficult because after the civil

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[1]President Gaafar M. Nimeiri Announcing the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement at Wad Nubawi, Omdurman, 3rd March 1972.

war, most parts of the South lay in ruins and there was serious lack of financial and administrative base for development. The socio-economic foundation that had existed before the war was either damaged or destroyed and necessitated a substantial financial expenditure for its reconstruction.

An examination of agricultural production, transport, health services and education will illustrate the sorry state of Southern Sudan's condition at the end of the war.

(a) Agricultural Production. Prior to the mid-1960's, fighting in the South had been essentially isolated. However, with the formation of the Anyanya guerrilla organisation in 1963, the effects of the civil war began to be felt all over the South. After that, many farmers were forced to abandon their land which seriously reduced cultivation. For example, the total area under crop cultivation decreased from 677,000 feddans[2] in 1962/63 to 349,000 in 1965/66, and to 308,000 feddans in the 1967-68 season.[3] This represented a decrease in farmland of 49% and 12% during 1965/66 and 1967/68 respectively. The decline in farmland depended on the type of crop grown, the location of the farms and the degree of insecurity in those areas. While some areas were relatively secure, such as parts of northern Upper Nile, others were much more affected by the conflict as was the case in Equatoria Province. This in turn explained the reduced farm productivity during the civil war (Figure 4.1). For example, the area for sorghum grown in northern Upper Nile dropped by 36% from 382,000 in 1962/63 to 245,000

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[2]One feddan is equivalent to 0.420 hectares or 1.038 acres.

[3]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report of the Provisional High Executive Council for the Period April 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

Figure 4.1 Southern Sudan: Areas under Food Crop Production, 1960/61 – 1968/69




Source : Regional Ministry of Agriculture, 1973, Juba, Sudan

feddans in the 1967/68 growing season.

The area for the production of other crops such as groundnuts, millet, sesame and maize also declined dramatically during this period. The area in groundnuts that was cultivated, for example, dropped by 74% from 95,000 in 1961/62 to about 25,000 feddans during the 1966/67 growing season. Cotton and coffee, which in Southern Sudan are grown exclusively in Equatoria Province, were the most affected. The farmland for cotton, for example, dropped by 95% from 37,000 in 1961/62 to 2,000 feddans in 1964/65. During the war, coffee growing was estimated at a 56% capacity.

(b) Transport. Before the war, rivers and roads were the most important means of transport in the South. Air and railway services were of lesser importance and limited to only a few towns. River transport was the most important means of moving bulky goods from the North, but feeder roads were vital for inland distribution of commodities. During the war, however, most of the roads were either damaged or destroyed. It is estimated that either as a result of military action or because of long years of neglect and lack of adequate and effective maintenance, about 1,609 of the 5,792 km of roads in the South were impassable at the end of the civil war.[4] Consequently road transportation became very unreliable and slow.

One of the main tasks of the Regional Government was to repair the roads to enable the refugees to return to their homes and to facilitate the movement of relief supplies to the reception and distribution

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[4]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction ..., 1972, p. 65.

centers. Coupled with this was the urgent need to repair or rebuild an estimated 520 bridges, without which the transportation of refugees would have been difficult.[5] Of the 520 bridges damaged or destroyed, 68% were in Equatoria, 22% in Upper Nile and 10% in Bahr el Ghazal. Priority in reconstruction was given to 227 bridges on 19 major roads in various parts of the South (Table 4.1) at an estimated cost of LS.249,000 (US $747,000). However, despite the hazardous conditions of these roads, they nevertheless became used extensively since they were the only links in the region.

(c) Health Services. Southern Sudan had only limited health services prior to the war, and facilities that did exist were largely destroyed by the war. In 1972, only 45% of 348 health facilities in the South were functioning. The impact of the civil war on these facilities varied according to location. Rural-based dispensaries and dressing stations, for example, were the most seriously affected. Of the 105 dispensaries and 214 dressing stations in the South, only 50% and 39% respectively were still functioning in 1972 (Table 4.2). In Equatoria, where much of the countryside was deserted by its population during the war, only 32% of the 185 health facilities were functioning in 1972, compared to 46% in Upper Nile and 76% in Bahr el Ghazal.

The decline in health services in the South during this period undoubtedly resulted in increased mortality. Although no data are available, it is believed that the lack of medical attention during the civil war was responsible for the spread of diseases such as malaria,

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[5]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report, 1973/73, Juba, January 1974.

Table 4.1

Estimated Costs of Reconstructing Bridges Damaged or Destroyed on the Major Roads in Southern Sudan During the Civil War, 1955-72

| Province | No. of Major Roads | Bridges | | Estimated Costs (LS.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Number | % | Amount | % |
| Equatoria | 7 | 168 | 74.0 | 176,100 | 70.7 |
| Bahr el Ghazal | 6 | 20 | 8.8 | 11,450 | 4.6 |
| Upper Nile | 6 | 39 | 17.2 | 61,400 | 24.7 |
| Total | 19 | 227 | 100.0 | 248,950 | 100.0 |

Source: Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report from the Period May 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

Table 4.2

State of Health Institutions in Southern Sudan After the Civil War, 1972

| Province | Hospitals | | Health Centers | | Dispensaries | | Dressing | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Fct.[1] | Not Fct.[2] | Fct.[1] | Not Fct.[2] | Fct.[1] | Not Fct.[2] | Fct.[1] | Not Fct.[2] | Fct.[1] | Not Fct.[2] |
| Equatoria | 6 | 4 | 1 | - | 24 | 24 | 29 | 97 | 60 | 125 |
| Bahr el Ghazal | 6 | - | 1 | - | 14 | 2 | 36 | 16 | 57 | 18 |
| Upper Nile | 4 | 6 | 1 | - | 15 | 26 | 20 | 16 | 40 | 48 |
| Total | 16 | 10 | 3 | - | 53 | 52 | 85 | 129 | 157 | 191 |

[1]Fct. = Functioning

[2]Not Fct. = Not Functioning

Source: Justin Y. Arop, A Statement to the People's Regional Assembly, Southern Region, Juba, June 1976.

infantile gastro-enteritis, measles, respiratory and other communicable diseases.[6] As was suggested in Chapter 2, the magnitude of their spread was so great that they claimed over half a million lives in Southern Sudan during the civil war.

(d) Education. Prior to the civil war, education in the South was essentially limited to primary and intermediate levels. There were only two secondary schools serving the whole of Southern Sudan, and these were transferred to Khartoum in 1965 because of the conflict. The few schools which continued to function during the war were those located in urban areas. Virtually all the rural schools were either occupied by the army or were closed because of lack of security. For example, of the 454 primary and 82 intermediate schools in the South only 70 and 46% respectively were functioning in 1972/73. The area most affected was Equatoria where only 59% of the primary and 28% of the intermediate schools were functioning (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Therefore, as the number of schools continued to dwindle throughout the war, the total enrollment also fell. It is estimated that between 1961 and 1966, enrollment in schools declined by 82%, from 53,000 in 1961/62 to 9,635 in 1965/66 school year.[7]

The other schools which functioned outside the government controlled areas were those administered by the Anyanya in the bush. These schools were limited to those areas in Equatoria Province where

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[6]Regional Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Department of Vital and Health Statistics, Annual Report, 1977, Juba.

[7]David Roden, "Peace Brings Sudan New Hopes and Massive Problems", Africa Report, June 1972, p. 17.

Table 4.3

State of Primary Schools in Southern Sudan After the Civil War, 1972

| Province | Number of Schools Functioning | Schools Damaged or Destroyed | Schools Repaired or Under Repair | New Schools | Ex-Anyanya 'Bush' Schools | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equatoria | 86 | 40 | 20 | n.a. | 334 | 480 |
| Bahr el Ghazal | 138 | 17 | 37 | 2 | - | 194 |
| Upper Nile | 95 | n.a. | 21 | 6 | - | 122 |
| Total | 319 | 57 | 78 | 8 | 334 | 796 |

n.a. = data not available

Source: Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report for the Period May 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

Table 4.4

State of Intermediate Schools in the Southern Region After the Civil War, 1972

| Province | Number of Schools Functioning | Schools Damaged or Destroyed | Schools Repaired or Under Repair | New Schools | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equatoria | 9 | 11 | 9 | 3 | 32 |
| Bahr el Ghazal | 13 | n.a. | 7 | 1 | 21 |
| Upper Nile | 16 | n.a. | 7 | 6 | 29 |
| Total | 38 | 11 | 23 | 10 | 82 |

n.a. = data not available

Source: Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report for the Period May 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

the Anyanya had control. Although their main emphasis was upon sub-grade or pre-primary education, a few also offered primary education. In 1972 the Regional Government reported that 334 such schools were in existence with an enrollment of 65,000 and about 1,100 teachers.[8] These schools were later consolidated, upgraded and incorporated into the national educational system.

This closure of most of the educational institutions in the South during the war created a massive backlog of pupils whose education was either curtailed or suspended. The effects of such interruptions in the educational process for almost two decades were immediately felt after the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, when the South was faced with the critical problem of lack of educated and qualified manpower.

## The Shortage of Manpower

Prior to the establishment of the Southern Regional Government, most professional and other high-ranking positions were filled by personnel from the North. With the withdrawal of this personnel after 1972, a serious shortage of qualified manpower resulted. The newly established Regional Government recruited its personnel from three main sources. First, those who were previously employed within the country. Secondly, those who had been government officials and employees before going into exile during the war, and thirdly, those returnees who had acquired qualifications while in exile. However, the numbers recruited from these groups were inadequate to meet the Regional Government's need. For example, during 1972/73, 2,083 classified posts were created in the various Regional Ministries of which only 34.5% were filled

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[8]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report ... 1974, p. 52. However, in an earlier report by the Provisional High Executive Council in March 1973, it was stated that there were 200

(Table 4.5). This scarcity of qualified personnel varied not only from one professional level to another, but also from ministry to ministry. The most critical shortages of manpower were in administrative and professional posts, where only 28% of the 736 positions were filled. This was followed by technicians, who filled only 35% of the vacancies. The Regional Ministries of Health and of Housing were the most seriously affected, with only 4% and 17.7% respectively of positions filled by Southerners. The root cause of this problem was partly pre-independence educational policies and partly the political instability of the post-independence era. Unlike the situation in the North, colonial education in the South had not been geared to long-term manpower needs. It was specifically aimed at producing primary school teachers and clerks. On independence, political instability was already widespread and resulted in no significant expansions to educational facilities being made because of the insecurity.

Inadequate housing further compounded the manpower problem. The expansion of government machinery in the regional capital, Juba, created serious crises in housing which severely discouraged the recruitment of urgently needed personnel from the North. It also discouraged Southerners from leaving their positions elsewhere in Sudan to return to the South. Limited education facilities for children further acted as a deterrent to those Northerners and Southerners who may otherwise have come to the South for work. Not only were schools limited in number,

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subgrade schools and 44 primary schools formerly administered by the Anyanya. The pupil enrollment was estimated as 25,000 and with about 500 teachers. For more details, see The Provisional High Executive Council, Peace and Progress, 1972/73 (Juba: Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, 1973), p. 28.

Table 4.5

Regional Government Establishment and Posts (Classified) Filled October 31, 1973

| Unit | Super-Scale | | Administrative and Professional Posts | | Sub-Professional and Technical Posts | | Clerical | | Total Classified Posts | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Est. | Filled | Est. | Filled | Est. | Filled | Est. | Filled | Est. | Filled |
| High Executive Council | 3 | 1 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 14 | 11 | 32 | 18 |
| Regional Administration | 9 | 5 | 250 | 41 | 18 | 3 | 66 | 22 | 343 | 71 |
| Public Service | 4 | 2 | 28 | 21 | 47 | 8 | 40 | 14 | 119 | 45 |
| Housing | 6 | 2 | 54 | 5 | 48 | 13 | 38 | 11 | 146 | 31 |
| Health | 9 | 1 | 77 | 3 | 223 | 9 | 154 | 29 | 463 | 42 |
| Communications | 4 | 1 | 13 | 6 | 18 | 15 | 45 | 10 | 80 | 32 |
| Finance | 8 | 1 | 37 | 12 | 26 | 7 | 50 | 18 | 121 | 38 |
| Agriculture | 7 | 4 | 25 | 11 | 32 | 42 | 39 | 38 | 103 | 95 |
| Cooperatives | 4 | 3 | 33 | 15 | 75 | 40 | 35 | 34 | 147 | 92 |
| Education | 12 | 8 | 163 | 63 | 54 | 19 | 55 | 19 | 284 | 109 |
| Information | 5 | 5 | 46 | 25 | 112 | 69 | 82 | 47 | 245 | 146 |
| Total | 71 | 33 | 736 | 206 | 658 | 227 | 618 | 253 | 2083 | 719 |

Est. = Establishment; Filled = Positions Filled

Source: Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report for the Period May 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

but they were also overcrowded because they were catering to both current students as well as a backlog of those denied schooling during the war. The general quality of teachers was low, and thus the level of education was inferior to that available in the North. Moreover, many of the better trained teachers had taken up jobs in other sectors of the employment spectrum. It is worth noting that many of the emergent politicians in the South in the immediate post Addis Ababa Agreement period were drawn from amongst the teaching profession.

## THE NATURE, SOURCE AND VOLUME OF EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1972/73

In the preceding sections it was suggested that the conflict in the South had a major impact on the social and economic development of the Region. It was also stated that during the civil war, the socio-economic and administrative structures were either damaged or destroyed. Following the Addis Ababa Agreement the resettlement of over 1 million displaced people required large sums of money and material assistance which Sudan was unable to generate. Through the UNHCR, the Government of Sudan appealed to the international community for assistance. The consequent donations came primarily from four sources: the United Nations agencies (43.7%), international charitable organisations (18%), friendly states (14.4%), and national institutions and individual Sudanese (23.9%). In addition to the UNHCR appeal, other funds were also raised by a separate Government Agency, the Special Fund for Southern Sudan.

In the original appeal of July 1972, UNHCR presented a priority list of immediate relief requirements for the South. These included

road repairs; food airlifts to the South; material for shelter for returnees; agricultural implements; the construction of new schools, as well as the repair of existing ones; and the reconstruction of medical facilities.[9] These socio-economic structures were considered vital for the relief and resettlement operation. Also, it was necessary to provide at least minimal services in order to induce the refugees to repatriate since many had become accustomed to medical and educational facilitiess while in exile. The UNHCR argued that

> ... it would be wrong to risk an interruption in the schooling of their children and that any such risk, or rumours of non-existent medical facilities, would provide a strong deterrent among these refugees to their voluntary repatriation.[10]

The UNHCR appeal was for a total of US $22.3 million. This sum was based upon an assessment by a UNHCR-UNDP fact-finding mission to Sudan during May-June of 1972. In October 1972, US $12.5 million had been received or pledged in cash or kind, of which the United States contribution accounted for the single largest amount, US $7.8 million worth of food. Many other contributions were also in kind, and only a comparatively small proportion of the response was in cash. This caused UNHCR to launch a second appeal in October, 1972, emphasising a need for contributions in cash. At the same time, a re-assessment of needs was undertaken, and cost estimates were reduced by 21% from US $22.3 to US $17.7 million (Table 4.6). This reduction was possible because of generous bilateral assistance to the Special Fund Agency from various

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[9]T. Betts, The Southern Sudan: The Ceasefire and After (London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1974), p. 14.

[10]UNHCR, as quoted in T. Betts, Ibid, p. 15.

Table 4.6

UNHCR Southern Sudan Operation, 1972/73:
International Appeals (in thousand US$)

| Item | Original Appeal July 1972 | | Revised Appeal October 1972 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Value | % | Value | % |
| Repatriation & Relief: | | | | |
| Transport & Communication | 11,662 | 52.1 | 4,505 | 25.4 |
| Food Supply | 2,990 | 13.4 | 7,810 | 44.2 |
| Shelter | 328 | 1.5 | 200 | 1.1 |
| Agriculture | 100 | 0.4 | 125 | 0.7 |
| Total | 15,080 | 67.4 | 12,640 | 71.4 |
| Reconstruction: | | | | |
| Health | 6,011 | 26.9 | 3,125 | 17.6 |
| Education | 444 | 2.0 | 1,125 | 6.4 |
| Miscellaneous | - | - | 195 | 1.1 |
| Total | 6,455 | 28.9 | 4,445 | 25.1 |
| Administration: | 837 | 3.7 | 630 | 3.5 |
| Grand Total | 22,372 | 100.0 | 17,715 | 100.0 |

Source: T. Betts, The Southern Sudan: The Ceasefire and After (London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1974), Table IIA.

national organisations and from individuals. It was also helped by the fact that about 48,000 refugees returned to their homes independently and at no cost to the government.

The bilateral contributions also resulted in a substantial reduction in allocations to specific relief items. For example, in transportion and communications there was a reduction of 61.4% from the original amount. The same was true for health care where a downward revision was made from US $6 to US $3.1 million.[11] On the other hand, there was a substantial increase in cost estimates for food (from 13.4% of the total budget to 44.2%) and for education (from 2 to 6.4%). With the influx of returnees, food supplies were needed for initial relief assistance until at least the first harvest in mid-1973. The expenditure on food was at least US $7.8 million, in contrast to original estimates of only US $3 million. Likewise, the actual costs incurred for education services exceeded original estimates by nearly US $600,000.

By March 1974, total expenditures on the relief and resettlement of returnees had reached US $16 million, of which 70% had been received as cash contributions. Of this amount nearly half had been spent on food, health services, and transportation (Table 4.7).

UNHCR's appeal for assistance to Southern Sudan had been conducted amidst other serious refugee problems in Africa and elsewhere in the world. For example, in 1972, UNHCR was still concerned with the millions of refugees in India that had been generated by Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. Also, in August 1972, there was the problem

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[11]The original amount for health care was intended to cover reconstruction and equipping of 98 dressing stations, 38 dispensaries and 21 hospitals, drugs and vaccines, insecticides and spraying

Table 4.7

United Nations Immediate Relief Program in Southern Sudan - Budget as of March 31, 1974 (in US$)

| Item | Cash | Kind | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Repatriation | 1,299,534.12 | - | 1,299,534.12 |
| Food | - | 3,835,000.00 | 3,835,000.00 |
| Shipment of Goods | 1,280,467.43 | 816,194.00 | 2,096,661.43 |
| Transport & Communication | 3,460,683.09 | 134,303.38 | 3,594,986.47 |
| Shelter | 333,613.06 | 16,136.19 | 349,749.25 |
| Agriculture & Fisheries | 167,797.47 | - | 167,797.47 |
| Health | 2,947,390.44 | 6,378.06 | 2,953,768.50 |
| Education | 929,595.95 | - | 929,595.95 |
| Administration | 736,185.38 | - | 736,185.38 |
| Total Funds Committed | 11,155,265.94 | 4,808,011.63 | 15,963,277.57 |
| Reserve | - | - | 664,953.89 |
| Grand Total | | | 16,628,231.46 |

Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Assistance to Southern Sudanese Returnees and Displaced Persons - Final Report of the UNHCR, Geneva, June 1974.

of an estimated 80,000 Asians who were being expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin,[12] and in 1973, the Chilean crisis erupted to place yet another demand on UNHCR and its contributory agencies. Consequently, it is not surprising that the sum received in both cash and kind fell US $1.7 million short of budget estimate. It should be mentioned that Sudan's civil war was never as widely publicised in the international press as were some of the other refugee generating events of the early 1970's. It was only after the report of the UNHCR-UNDP fact-finding mission that the seriousness of the situation in Southern Sudan became known to prospective donors. As a result of this, the bilateral contributions to the Special Fund, in receipts and pledges, had reached about $37 million by May 1973, of which 66% was in kind. However, while the amount pledged was commendable, actual receipts were only $8.9 million by May 1973 (Table 4.8).

Since these national and external contributions were crucial to the repatriation and resettlement process, failure by some of the donors to meet their pledges due to the high demands created elsewhere in the world resulted in some of the planned development projects for the returnees never getting started.

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equipment, 230 wells and purchase of 115 vehicles to be used as mobile clinics and ambulances. However, in the course of resettlement, many of these requirements were met through bilateral and non-governmental contributions. Also, some of the health facilities were built locally on a self-help basis. See UNHCR Report: Nursing a Miracle, Geneva, 1973, pp. 23-24.

[12]William G. Kuepper et al., Ugandan Asians in Great Britain: Forced Migration and Social Adoption (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1975), p. 3.

Table 4.8

Summary of Contributions to the Special Fund by Source, May 1973
(in thousand US$)

| Source | Receipts | | | Pledges | | | Grand Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cash | Kind | Total | Cash | Kind | Total | Value | % |
| National and Local | 2,278.2 | 49.4 | 2,327.6 | 6,485.0 | 19.9 | 6,504.9 | 8,832.5 | 23.9 |
| United Nations Agencies | - | 40.4 | 40.4 | 60.0 | 16,028.8 | 16,088.8 | 16,129.2 | 43.7 |
| International Charitable Organisations | 901.6 | 1,763.0 | 2,664.6 | 316.2 | 3,637.7 | 3,953.9 | 6,618.5 | 18.0 |
| Friendly States | 1,949.7 | 1,876.8 | 3,826.5 | - | 1,495.2 | 1,495.2 | 5,321.7 | 14.4 |
| Total | 5,129.5 | 3,729.6 | 8,859.1 | 6,861.2 | 21,181.6 | 28,042.8 | 36,901.9 | 100.0 |

Source: T. Betts, The Southern Sudan - The Ceasefire and After (London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1974). Table 3.

## THE REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE RETURNEES

The rehabilitation and resettlement program was the second phase after repatriation and relief. The policy of the Resettlement Commission was to resettle all returnees with minimal stress and to permit them to resume normal life as soon as possible. The resettlement program was designed to meet the needs of the various categories of returnees. Its implementation involved material assistance of food and agricultural tools to farmers; the reinstatement of government officials and employees in their former positions or equivalent positions; the employment in white-collar jobs of persons who had acquired the necessary qualifications and skills while in exile; and the integration of the Anyanya forces into the national army, the police and the prison service or in other government departments.

On the basis of their previous occupations, experience or qualifications, six categories of returnees resettled by the Commission can be identified. These were the white-collar returnees; the Anyanya forces; students; unattached minors and disabled persons; petty traders; and the rural returnees (Figure 4.2). In the following section, a discussion of each of these categories is undertaken to highlight the main features of government strategy in the rehabilitation and resettlement process.

### White-Collar Returnees

This category of returnees consisted of two sub-groups. First, there were the politicians, some of whom had taken part in the Addis Ababa peace negotiations. Many of these politicians were subsequently appointed as ministers in the Regional Government, while others obtained

Figure 4.2 Types of Returnees Resettled by the Resettlement Commission, 1972-74




Source : Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - April 1974, Juba, Sudan

high-ranking positions in the civil service. Second, there were former government officials and employees as well as others aspiring to white-collar jobs who had acquired qualifications or experience while in exile. This group was absorbed into the various Regional Ministries and Departments. The absorption of former government officials and employees was governed by specific guidelines which the Council of Ministers had established in 1970 in a circular entitled 'Reinstatement of Southern Officials and Employees Returning from Exile into their Former Posts'. The main principles of the re-employment policy were stated as follows:

(a) Ministries and Departments should re-instate immediately ex-Southern officials and employees returning from exile, into their former posts where such posts are still vacant, or they should be absorbed into similar posts. But, where a post has been filled and no other vacant similar post exists, the Unit should request creation of a new post stating the standard of the former post quoting in case of officials the post number in the nominal roll in which the returning official was engaged before leaving the country. In case of employees in groups, the unit should ascertain their previous employment from their records and registers;

(b) Officials and employees not dismissed by Departmental Boards of Discipline were to be reinstated with consideration of period of absence as 'leave without pay'. But re-instatement of officials and employees who were dismissed by Departmental Boards of Discipline should be treated as new appointments and their period of previous service

reviewed for continuous service, after full study of causes and circumstances of absence;

(c) Re-instatement of officials and employees should correspond to the same standard of their former posts, the same salary they were receiving before going into exile, and stipulating the same terms of service.[13]

Prior to the establishment of the Regional Government in the South, the reinstatement of former government officials and employees was administered by the Central Government through the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs. However, after its establishment in 1972, this responsibility was assumed by the Regional Ministry of Public Service based on information obtained for individual returnees. Each returnee was required to complete a questionnaire which enabled the Establishment Unit of the Regional Ministry of Public Service to proceed in the re-instatement process (Appendix C).

Once re-instated, many officials began to transfer to other ministries in the Regional Government. Such transfers were in response to better working conditions that may have prevailed in some ministries or were due to personal or political reasons. The net result was that severe shortages of qualified personnel developed in some departments while others were staffed with personnel lacking necessary qualifications or experience.

## The Absorption of the Anyanya Forces

The success of the Addis Ababa Agreement depended very much upon the satisfactory accommodation of Anyanya forces. For this reason, the

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[13]Ministry of Finance, Establishment Branch, Circular No. 12/70, 6th May 1970, Khartoum.

position of the Armed Forces in the South had considerable significance in the settlement of the Southern problem. Of the ten days of negotiations in Addis Ababa to reach a formula on security in the South, discussions on the size and composition of the future army took up 5 days.[14] These protracted negotiations were to be expected after many years of violence and suspicions between North and South. However, it was agreed that

> The People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and, men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from the Region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.[15]

The precise number of the Anyanya force remains unknown and the various estimates show little or no consensus. For example, at the Relief and Resettlement Conference in 1972, the figure of 12,000 officers and men was used.[16] In early 1973 another estimate put the number at 20,000 persons.[17] A figure of 25,000 was subsequently established by the Regional Government in late 1973, of which over 6,000 were absorbed into the national army and about 4,000 into the police and prison service. The balance, estimated at over 14,000 persons, were employed in various government units as follows - 5,353 in Equatoria, 4,700 in Bahr el

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[14]Abel Alier, "Speech to the People's Regional Assembly on the Process of Integration", Southern Region, Juba, 12th May 1976.

[15]Government of Sudan, "The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan", Khartoum, 12th March 1972.

[16]Government of Sudan, Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, Relief and Resettlement Conference on Southern Region, 21-23 February (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1972).

[17]Abel Alier, "Speech on the Occasion of the National Unity Day Celebrations", 3rd March 1973, Juba.

Ghazal, and 4,200 in Upper Nile.[18]

Matters relating to recruitment and integration of the Anyanya forces into the national army were determined by a six-man Joint Technical Military Commission which consisted of three members drawn from the national army and another three from the Anyanya forces. The government recognised that since the Anyanya forces and the national army had until recently been fighting each other, both needed a period for 'cooling off' before they could accept one another and work together as compatriots. In this regard, the Joint Military Commission took into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops, until smooth integration of the two forces could be achieved over the following five years.[19]

It is estimated that 15,900 Anyanya applied for absorption into the national army, but only 6,139 were eventually inducted.[20] Selection criteria used by the Joint Military Commission were that the applicant had:

(a) belonged to the Anyanya force;

(b) satisfactory academic qualifications;

(c) passed a medical fitness examination; and,

(d) expressed a willingness to continue in the service.[21]

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[18]The High Executive Council, Peace and Progress, 1972/73 (Juba: Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, 1973), p. 48.

[19]Abel Alier, "Speech to the People's Regional Assembly on the Process of Integration", Southern Region, Juba, 12th May 1976.

[20]Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975), p. 118.

[21]Ibid, p. 117.

Furthermore, the Commission stipulated that the selection of the Anyanya for the national army should be divided fairly among the three Southern Provinces, and hence about 2,000 officers and men were to be drawn from each of the three provinces (Table 4.9).

Although the above criteria formed the basis of recruiting Anyanya, the high illiteracy that was prevalent necessitated the use of additional criteria. These included the individual's past performance and rank in the Anyanya force. Also, it appears that the criterion of 'belonging to the Anyanya' was not always strictly followed because some absorbed into the national army, police and prison service had never been members of Anyanya, but were government officials, employees or students who had joined Anyanya camps in the hope of being recruited.

The absorption of Anyanya into the army, police and prison service created a sizeable employment opportunity in the Region. However, because they did not previously have the discipline and training associated with the regular army, many experienced difficulties in coping with their new assignments. The shift to regimentation was, for many, too abrupt, and as a result some were dismissed by their units in the course of integration.

Returnee Students

Students constituted one of the major categories of returnees needing placement. After the Addis Ababa Agreement, the Resettlement Commission assumed responsibility for educating children of returnees and other students who were still studying in asylum countries.[22] With

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[22]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - April 1974, Juba, 1974, p. 34.

Table 4.9

Absorption of the Anyanya Forces into the National Army, 1972

| Province | Total Number Interviewed | Number Selected for Armed Forces | | | Total Selected for Armed Forces | | Remainder | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Officers | N.C.O.'s | Privates | Number | As % of Total Interviewed | Number | % |
| Bahr el Ghazal | 2,559 | 65 | 188 | 1,723 | 1,976 | 12.4 | 583 | 3.7 |
| Equatoria | 7,629 | 70 | 274 | 1,759 | 2,103 | 13.2 | 5,526 | 34.7 |
| Upper Nile | 5,714 | 65 | 465 | 1,530 | 2,060 | 13.0 | 3,654 | 23.0 |
| Total | 15,902 | 200 | 927 | 5,012 | 6,139 | 38.6 | 9,763 | 61.4 |

Source: The Report of the Joint Military Commission, October 1972, Khartoum, Cited in M. O. Beshir, 1975, p. 118.

the influx of returnees after the peace agreement, a total of 17,981 primary school pupils were registered in Equatoria and Upper Nile between April 1972 and October 1973 (comparable data for Bahr el Ghazal are not available). In addition, a total of 64,969 pupils who had attended former Anyanya 'bush' schools in Equatoria were also integrated into the school system (Table 4.10). This increase in the number of pupils placed enormous strains on the limited education facilities in the South. During that time, there were only 327 functioning primary schools with an enrollment of 62,733 children, or an average of 192 pupils per school. The additional enrollment therefore added an average of 254 pupils to these functioning schools. Due to lack of space, however, not all of the returnees' children were placed in schools during the 1972/73 school year. In Equatoria, which had the majority of returnee pupils (93.7%), a 'shift system' was adopted wherever possible to alleviate the problems of both lack of space and insufficient teachers.[23]

At the intermediate school level, the number of functioning schools after the civil war was only 48 with a total pupil enrollment of 4,709. To this number, 5,782 returnee pupils had to be added, most of whom (93.3%) were in Equatoria (Table 4.11). During the 1972/73 school year, only 62% of the returnees' children found placement in the schools. However, the magnitude of the problem varied from province to province. For example, in Bahr el Ghazal, where the number of the returnee pupils was small, all found placement in schools. This contrasts with Upper Nile and Equatoria where only 55 and 62% respectively of the pupils were

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[23]In a 'Shift system' two schools operate in the same premises at different times. For example, consider two schools A and B. Under a 'shift system' School A may be in session during the morning hours and

Table 4.10

Primary School Enrollment in the Southern Region, 1972/73

| Province | Number of Returnee Pupils | | | | | Number of Pupils in Former Anyanya Schools | Number of Other Pupils | | | Grand Total Placed in Schools 1972/73 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Boys | Girls | Total | Placed in Schools | Not Placed in Schools | | Boys | Girls | Total | |
| Equatoria | 12,553 | 4,303 | 16,856 | 15,759 | 1,097 | 64,969 | 11,628 | 7,093 | 18,721 | 100,546 |
| Bahr el Ghazal | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | - | 18,479 | 5,568 | 24,047 | 24,047 |
| Upper Nile | 1,125 | n.a. | 1,125 | 956 | 169 | - | 15,279 | 4,686 | 19,965 | 21,090 |
| Total | 13,678 | 4,303 | 17,981 | 16,715 | 1,266 | 64,969 | 45,386 | 17,347 | 62,733 | 145,683 |

n.a. = data not available

Source: Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report for May 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

Table 4.11

Intermediate School Enrollment in the Southern Region, 1972/73

| Province | Number of Returnee Pupils | | | | | Number of Other Pupils | | | Grand Total Placed in Schools 1972/73 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Boys | Girls | Total | Placed in Schools | Not Placed in Schools | Boys | Girls | Total | |
| Equatoria | 5,229 | 339 | 5,568 | 3,443 | 2,125 | 1,063 | 546 | 1,609 | 5,052 |
| Bahr el Ghazal | 49 | n.a. | 49 | 49 | 0 | 1,350 | 300 | 1,650 | 1,699 |
| Upper Nile | 165 | n.a. | 165 | 91 | 74 | 1,260 | 190 | 1,450 | 1,541 |
| Total | 5,443 | 339 | 5,782 | 3,583 | 2,199 | 3,673 | 1,036 | 4,709 | 8,292 |

n.a. = data not available

Source: Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report for the Period May 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

placed in schools.

The number of girls attending school in Equatoria is relatively large compared to Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile Provinces (Tables 4.10 and 4.11). Unlike in the latter provinces, girls' education in Equatoria has not been a problem because both sexes were given equal opportunities. But in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile where girls are valued in terms of bride-wealth (cattle) they bring to the family, the need for education does not arise. Also, the general attitude of the people has been that school 'spoils' girls, lessening their chances of getting a decent and competitive marriage, or getting married at all which, according to the customs, is a disgrace to the parents concerned. However, since the war, these conceptions of rural communities toward girls' education have changed and more girls are now attending school than before the war. Education is now used as a means of social and economic advancement, and on the contrary, more educated girls tend to have more expensive and highly competitive marriages than was originally believed.

A total of 1,012 secondary school students returned and registered in Equatoria, of which 39% were placed in schools during the 1972/73 school year. No comparable figures are available for Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. The majority of returnee students were from Equatoria because displacees who sought asylum in neighbouring countries were largely from that province. The proportion of students finding placement in Equatoria was small because the capacities of three of the four secondary schools existing in 1972/73 (two in Equatoria and one in

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School B begins in the afternoons.

each of the other two provinces) were each limited to around 160 students. The fourth, at Rumbek was larger. The returnee students thus caused severe overcrowding. For example, during 1972/73, student enrollment rose from 150 to 350 at Juba Commercial School and from 600 to 1,000 at Rumbek Secondary School.[24] The net result of these increases was a general decline in the quality of teaching and student output.

Apart from the returnee students discussed above, the Resettlement Commission registered 128 post-secondary students, which it placed at the University of Khartoum and other higher national institutions. With the completion of the official repatriation in October 1973, the Commission had registered a total of 24,903 returnee students (Table 4.12). Of these, the Commission was successful in placing 83.6% into schools during the 1972/73 school year. In addition to this number, the Commission estimated that a further 4,000 students remained in their country of asylum under the sponsorship of voluntary agencies to complete their studies. Although no records exist, it is generally assumed that they returned to Sudan when their studies were completed.

The overall impact of the war on education in the South was enormous. For almost two decades, most schools were not operational, and consequently, the majority of children had limited or no education at all. This created a huge backlog of children both inside and outside the country. After the Addis Ababa Agreement, only few schools survived the war, and with the influx of the student backlog that had formed

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[24]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report, April 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

Table 4.12

Distribution of Returnee Students by Level of Education, 1972

| Level | Total Number | Number Placed in Schools 1972/73 | | Number Not Placed in Schools, 1972/73 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Number | % | Number | % |
| Primary | 17,981 | 16,715 | 93.0 | 1,266 | 7.0 |
| Intermediate | 5,782 | 3,583 | 62.0 | 2,199 | 38.0 |
| Senior Secondary | 1,012 | 393 | 38.8 | 619 | 61.2 |
| Post-Secondary | 128 | 128 | 100.0 | - | 0.0 |
| Total | 24,903 | 20,819 | | 4,084 | |

Source: Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, 1972-74, Juba, 1974.

during the civil war period, an enormous pressure was placed upon these limited education facilities. Although the Resettlement Commission was successful in placing most of the returnee students into schools, it should be emphasised that it was done at a great cost to satisfy the needs of the returnees. Educational opportunities were far from satisfactory for both current and returning students, as most schools operated in highly overcrowded conditions and the quality was inferior.

The Commission recognised that because of the wide range in ages of the potential student population, and the fact that few schools existed, priority for primary school enrollment was given to the older children (eight years and over) who had not had opportunities both inside and outside of Sudan during the civil war. Consequently, during the immediate years following the Addis Ababa Agreement, the student population included a high proportion of mature students. A further problem generated by the war was that of the language. The returnee students who had been in exile or in Anyanya 'bush' schools had used either French or English as a medium of instruction. On their return, however, they were required to make the transition to Arabic. Not only was this a problem of language, but also one of script. Some attempts were made by the Regional Government to accommodate this problem by establishing exclusive schools or additional classrooms in existing schools where the medium of instruction remained English.

## Unattached Minors and Disabled Persons

The social problems generated by the civil war in the South were enormous. In particular, the emergence of a large number of unattached minors and disabled persons after the war posed a serious problem

previously unknown in Southern towns. While there are no precise data on these groups, estimates show that in September 1972, 900 unattached minors between the ages of 7 - 17 were living in Juba, Malakal and Wau.[25] These children had lost their parents or guardians, or had run away from their homes during the civil war. Another estimate in 1975 showed 2,300 unattached minors living in Juba, Malakal, Wau and Aweil. Also, as a result of the war, the number of the physically handicapped in the South was estimated at around 100,000 persons.[26]

In 1972, the Regional Government recognised that the problem of unattached minors required immediate action. This was also pointed out in a report by the International Union of Child Welfare (IUCW), which recommended that the Regional Government should find homes for the unattached minors. The government's reaction was to establish the Department of Social Welfare with the mandate of:

(a) improving psychosocio-economic conditions of destitute families;

(b) rehabilitating vagrant and unattached minors and psycho-socially handicapped;

(c) providing care for ophaned, abandoned and pre-school infants and children; and,

(d) training personnel to achieve these objectives.[27]

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[25]Report of the International Union of Child Welfare (IUCW), 1972; as cited in T. Betts, The Southern Sudan: The Ceasefire and After (London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1974), p. 66.

[26]Regional Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Progress Report for the Period April 1972 - March 1977, Southern Region, Juba, September 1977.

[27]Regional Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Progress Report for the Period April 1972 - March 1977, Southern Region, Juba, September 1977.

In the resettlement process, the policy of the Department was to encourage the children's closest relatives to take responsibility for them. While there are no specific records, it is generally agreed that the Department was successful in this approach. The government also established orphanages and rehabilitation homes for unattached minors whose parents were not found or whose closest relatives had declined to take care of them. Four such facilities were built in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

With the completion of the resettlement program in 1974, it was recognised that the number of the unattached minors had declined. According to the Department of Social Welfare, this decrease was attributed primarily to parents or guardians becoming more conscious of their responsibilities.[28] However, it can be added that the decline was also due to migration to the North. For example, Khartoum hosts a significant number of unattached minors from the South who had migrated there especially after the civil war.

A second government strategy was to establish institutions such as community or neighbourhood centers to provide services for the disadvantaged persons. These centers rendered services in adult education, sewing, typing, etc., to facilitate the integration of disadvantaged people into society. Six such centers were established in towns where the problem was most visible. Of the six centers, two were located each in Juba and Wau, and one each in Malakal and Aweil.

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[28] Ibid.

The Petty Traders and Small Businessmen

A program of loans to petty traders and small businessmen in the South was initiated by the Commissioner-General and Chairman of the Resettlement Commission to revive small businesses that had been destroyed or dislocated during the civil war. However, the program was not pursued after the first year because of lack of funds. In 1972, the Resettlement Commission allocated a sum of LS.22,800 (US $68,400) to the program.[29] Financial assistance was distributed according to the number of petty traders who applied on the one hand and the extent of damage to their property on the other.

It is not clear how many benefitted from this program, although Equatoria received 56% of the total disbursement, with the other provinces sharing the balance equally. The smaller proportion allocated in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile was in part due to the fact that much of the petty trading and business activity in these provinces was by Northerners, who were ineligible to apply to the program. In Equatoria, in contrast, most petty trading and business was in the hands of Southerners.

Although not documented, there is little doubt that those who benefitted most from the loans were the progressive businessmen who had strong urban connections. It was conditional that potential loan recipients should have properties and be recommended by persons in government known to loan authorities. These conditions were met only by those who had strong backing by individuals in the Regional Government.

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[29]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - April 1974, Juba, 1974, p. 69.

As a result, the economic impact of the loans program upon the smaller businessmen was, on the whole, negligible, which reinforced the already widening gap between the progressive small businessmen and the rest of the traders.

Rural Returnees

Rural returnees were subsistence farmers who had been forced to abandon their homes during the civil war. They constituted a substantial majority of the over one million displaced population resettled after the conflict.

The problem of the displaced rural population was recognised by the Government prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement. When Nimeiri assumed power in 1969, a new five year development plan (1970/71 - 1974/75) was developed. It aimed at

> increasing the production of all agricultural commodities, with particular emphasis on food grains and oilseeds both in the organised and traditional farming sectors.[30]

As a component of this plan, a 'Five-Year Resettlement, Cooperative and Rural Development Program in the Southern Provinces' was drawn up by the Minister of State for Southern Affairs. It set two main objectives, to resettle all returnees who appeared in the wake of Nimeiri's June 1969 Declaration, and to provide them with productive agricultural schemes and adequate housing.[31] Five types of cooperative schemes were proposed, including mechanised farms, as well as fruit and vegetable,

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[30]Government of Sudan, Ministry of National Planning, The Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977/78 - 1982/83, Vol. 2, April 1977, Khartoum, p. 2.

[31]Government of Sudan, Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, The Five Year Resettlement, Cooperative and Rural Development Program in the Southern Provinces, 1970/71 - 1974/75, Khartoum, June 1970.

dairy, and poultry farms and fishing cooperatives. Plans were formulated for 64 such schemes, at an estimated total cost of LS.1.9 million (US $5.7 million). Their development had two main objectives. First, they were to promote self-sufficiency in food crops as well as to serve as alternative sources of employment, and second, to provide uniform and balanced development in the South.[32]

Thirty-nine of these schemes were in the form of mechanised farms, with a total area of 305,000 feddans, and were planned to ensure that at least one farm was located in each administrative unit. Their estimated cost was LS1.8 million (US $5.4 million), which represented 95% of total budget allocation. Fifteen of the farms were planned for Upper Nile Province where the best prospects for mechanised farming existed, and only 11 were planned for Equatoria. The distribution of these schemes was based largely upon the suitability of the planned method of farming in the three provinces rather than on the magnitude of population displacement. Consequently, Equatoria Province, which experienced the largest population exodus, but was considered as less suitable for large scale mechanised farming, was allocated a relatively small number of the schemes compared to the other two provinces (Figure 4.3). Of the remaining schemes proposed in the plan, the fruit and vegetable farms were to be primarily located in Equatoria, where climatic conditions were most conducive for fruit and vegetable growing; the poultry and dairy farms were intended for the three main towns of Juba, Malakal and Wau, which were the principal centers of consumption; and the fishing cooperatives were primarily distributed along the Nile between Juba and

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[32] Ibid.

Figure 4.3 Southern Sudan: Location of the Proposed Resettlement Cooperative Farms, 1970.




Source : Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, The Five Year Resettlement, Cooperative and Rural Development Program in the Southern Provinces, 1970/71 - 1974/75, Khartoum, Sudan, 1970

Malakal. Only 5% of the total budget allocation was to be spent on the establishment of all these schemes.

However, these plans were never realised because the implementation of the five year development program in the South was delayed by the continuing war. Not only did the fighting make implementation impractical, but resources required for the development plan were instead diverted to the war effort. The government was also dependent upon external assistance for the schemes' development, especially in the form of agricultural machinery and implements, but most of the aid received was in the form of food items, which further set back the program. It should be emphasised that the development plan for the South was essentially a political decision by the government aimed at attracting external assistance. No feasibility studies were conducted with regard to actual costs, human needs or the limits set by the physical environment. It was simply assumed that because large areas of the South were suitable for agricultural and livestock purposes, the schemes would 'automatically' be profitable undertakings.[33] Consequently, few of the schemes were ever initiated. The ones that were started, such as at Jebel Lado and Kapoeta in Equatoria, and at Akoka in northern Upper Nile, soon ran into administrative, environmental, and financial difficulties, and became liabilities rather than assets to the government.

Although all these programs were not implemented prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement, they nevertheless became a foundation for agricultural development efforts in the post-civil war period. The newly established

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[33] Ibid.

Regional Government had no development plan of its own, and consequently, the resettlement program for rural returnees and residual Anyanya who had not been absorbed into the army, police and prison service, was largely drawn from the Five Year development plan, with special emphasis placed upon self-sufficiency in food production in Southern Region.

Faced with the need to resettle and rehabilitate much of the region's population following the Addis Ababa Agreement, priority shifted away from long-term socio-economic development to the much more immediate problem of accommodating the returnees. Most important was the problem of residual Anyanya. Conscious of the high expectations which many of the returnees had, the Regional Government outlined a program for the immediate employment of residual Anyanya in various Regional Ministries and Departments. The jobs thus created were seen as temporary until other more permanent opportunities could be generated. Initially this absorption of Anyanya was based on three general assumptions:

(a) the Anyanya population was 12,000 officers and men of which only 6,000 could be absorbed by the national army;

(b) the remaining 6,000 would either be absorbed into the various Regional Ministries or that they would go back to their villages rather than drift to towns in search of employment; and that,

(c) schemes such as the Jute factory at Tonj and the Mongalla and Melut sugar factories would become operational and serve

as additional sources of employment.[34]

Accordingly, the Regional Government earmarked a sum of LS.500,000 (US $1.5 million) for the absorption of residual Anyanya. However, both their numbers and the financial costs in employing them had been grossly underestimated. The remaining Anyanya forces turned out to be over 14,000 instead of 6,000. However, few Anyanya chose to return to their villages, and the anticipated industrial employment opportunities did not materialise. Consequently, most of the residual Anyanya had to be absorbed by the government at great cost. For example, 41% and 32% were absorbed by the Regional Ministries of Agriculture and Transport and Communications respectively.

This employment of largely unskilled or redundant manpower following the war had serious economic implications. The South's resources were too limited to maintain the rising costs of this employment. This was especially the case during the 1973/74 period, when their salaries had to be paid against the Special Development Budget given as grants-in-aid by the Central Government to Southern Region. For example, in the Regional Ministry of Agriculture, which had the largest share of the ex-Anyanya, the payment of salaries cost LS.1.1 million (US $3.3 million) of the approved Special Development Budget of LS.1.2 million (US $3.6 million), thus leaving only about LS.100,000 (US $300,000) to implement development projects.[35]

In addition to the residual Anyanya being absorbed in the towns,

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[34]Interview with H.E. the late Natale Olwak Akolawin, The Regional Secretariat of the Sudanese Socialist Union, Juba, 1978.

[35]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report, April 1972 - October 1973, Juba, January 1974.

the totally dislocated socio-economic infrastructure in rural areas following the war created a strong push factor causing rural returnees to migrate to the urban centers in search of services and employment. Consequently, a huge reservoir of redundant employees was created in almost all government departments. Commenting on the seriousness of this problem and the consequent economic crisis in the South, Alier stated that:

> Many of our citizens who were in exile or in the bushes of the Region worked hard to till the land and lived by its fruits. All of a sudden citizens are turning their back to the land. Many hours in the day and hundreds of hours in the year are lost in pursuit of idleness. Everybody wants a government job. It is not that people want to work for salaries. Our people want to be paid for no work. It is as if Regional Autonomy came so that people may specialise in complaints and search for sinecure jobs in offices. It is as if Regional Autonomy made it a shame to till and live happily on the fruits of one's labour on motherland.[36]

In response to this problem, the Regional Government reviewed its position on the question of absorbing people into government employment. Two options were proposed. First, since other funds were unavailable, ministries should continue to pay employees from funds in the Special Development Budget even though this was at the expense of development projects, and second, employees should, wherever possible, be given severance pay and encouraged to become self-supporting.[37] The first option was impractical since the availability of funds from the Special Development Budget depended upon the goodwill of the Central Government,

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[36]Abel Alier, "A Statement to the People's Regional Assembly", Southern Region, Juba, 6th May 1975.

[37]Secretariat-General of the High Executive Council, Progress Report, 1972/73, Juba, January 1974.

and cash flows between Khartoum and Juba were intermittent and unreliable. Hence, the alternative was the second option, namely to lay-off the redundant employees.

In his policy statement to the People's Regional Assembly in 1974, Alier explained the Government's position in the following terms:

> ... we have today thousands of our citizens in public employment in agriculture, forestry, roads province and local councils. These citizens are there through the peculiar position we were in last year. These citizens today can not farm themselves; they cannot make use of the rich land available in plenty because these citizens are supposed to work in the public sector, on roads, forestry, agriculture, fisheries, etc. It is clear today we cannot maintain these workers because the Government does not have all the money to pay them. The income the government obtains from most of the productive schemes these citizens work in cannot meet even a small fraction of their wages. We have to pay to some of these workers the little money we receive as either grant-in-aid from the Central Government or the small revenue of the Region both of which are earmarked for schools, hospitals, prisons, and as a result institutions cannot be maintained. If on the other hand most of these citizens are offered seeds, simple agricultural implements and some remunerations in advance and these citizens go to till the rich and vast land or rear animals, these citizens will undoubtedly be better-off and this in turn means the Region will be better-off. They would in this way contribute to the Gross Natinal Product from the crops of the farms or dairies. As they are today, they are neither useful to themselves nor to the community where they are ...[38]

After much debate the government enforced the lay-offs of those who had been temporarily employed during 1972-74. In order to facilitate and encourage their return to the land, the government provided the laid-off persons:

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[38]Abel Alier, "Policy Statement to the First People's Regional Assembly", Southern Region, Juba, 1974.

(a) advance payment of three months' wages;

(b) agricultural tools and implements; and,

(c) grain and other food items to feed themselves while waiting for their harvests.[39]

It is estimated that of the total of 25,632 returnees that had been employed using funds from the Special Development Budget, 82.6% were laid off. Most were from the Ministries of Agriculture and Transport and Communications which had about 54% of the total number of laid off persons.

Although the government made substantial savings from implementing this policy, it also generated bitterness and resentment among those affected. Interpretation of the policy differed from one group to another. For example, to ex-Anyanya being laid off represented a breach of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which had promised them the fruits of their struggle. Others rejected the economic explanations given by the government for the layoffs. They argued that the international community had contributed generously to the South's redevelopment, including the provision of employment for returning populations, yet through the layoffs, the government was reneging on its responsibilities and promises.

## SUMMARY

This chapter has examined the situation during the immediate postwar period. It has discussed the socio-economic and manpower problems in the South after the conflict. It has been shown that the

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[39]Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, An Adhoc Summary Report on the Number of the Absorbed ex-Anyanya who were Employed Against the Special Funds, April 1972 - April 1974, Southern

damage inflicted on the socio-economic infrastructure was enormous and required large sums of financial assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction. The problems created by inadequate manpower in the South have been examined. It has been pointed out that current manpower problems in the South are directly related to colonial educational policy prior to independence and to civil war in the post-independence period.

The nature, source and volume of emergency relief assistance to Southern Sudan has been discussed. This comprised bilateral and multilateral contributions both in cash and kind from various international agencies and governments. The types of returnees resettled by the Resettlement Commission have been examined and six categories identified according to their occupations, and the measures taken by the Commission in their rehabilitation and resettlement. After having identified and discussed the different categories of returnees, the majority were rural farmers. In the following chapter the concept of rural development with special reference to Southern Sudan will be discussed. It will show that the rural sector is crucial to the overall development of the South because about 90% of its population depend wholly or partially on subsistence farming.

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Region, Juba, 1974.

# CHAPTER 5

## RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

This chapter examines some of the rural development concepts and strategies that have been employed in Africa in general and Southern Sudan in particular. The impact of colonial policies in Africa will be discussed to illustrate how colonial development programs influenced post-independence rural development.

In post-war Southern Sudan, rural development schemes were one of the means used to rehabilitate displacees. Such programs involved the reactivation of pre-war schemes or the introduction of new schemes in areas where there had not been any before. Also, in areas where no organised rural development schemes existed, private farmers were assisted by government in order to rehabilitate themselves as quickly as possible. The four case studies, briefly introduced in Chapter 1, represent two distinct types of rural development strategies. On the one hand, the Aweil and Gilo areas represent localised efforts of government investment aimed at only small proportions of the respective areas' population. On the other hand, the rural development strategy employed in Yei and Maridi areas was directed to benefit much larger population bases.

Rural development efforts prior to and after the Addis Ababa Agreement are discussed to show:

(a) How the pre-1972 rural development planning influenced the post-civil war strategies, and

(b) Whether such rural development plans met the basic needs of the

returnees after the war.

## DEFINITIONS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The question of what constitutes rural development is an extremely complex one to answer. Clearly, regional variations will affect the direction which rural development takes. In its broader context, rural development can be defined as "a process aimed at improving the well-being of people living outside the urbanised areas".[1]

Butterfield has defined this more specifically, emphasising that rural development is an on-going process:

> Rural development is not an end state, but a process by which the rural population of a nation improves its level of living on a continuing basis.[2]

A more comprehensive definition is used by the British Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), which states that rural development is:

> any series of integrated measures having as their purpose the improvement of the productive capacity and standard of life in its broadest sense of those in developing societies who live outside the urban areas and particularly of those people who depend directly or indirectly on the exploitation of the soil.[3]

Although agricultural development is the backbone to any rural development undertaking, improvement of such services as health, education, clean water supplies, etc., is also an essential component of

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[1]S. M. Shah, Rural Development, Planning and Reform (New Delhi: Abhinar Publications, 1977), p. 40.

[2]Samuel H. Butterfield, "Rural Development: Why it is Hard for Developing Country Leadership to Get Started", International Development Review, Vol. 9(1), 1977, p. 8.

[3]Ministry of Overseas Development, U. K., "Report of a Working Group", Community Development Journal, Vol. 5(3), July 1970, p. 120.

the process.

Rural development has been recognised by most African governments as the basic strategy in their economic and social development. The sheer size of the population living and working in rural areas is a compelling reason for focussing attention on this vital, yet often neglected, sector of their economies. However, since most of the leaders that have emerged in Africa have been a product of urban areas, they have frequently had a tendency to pay only 'lip-service' to the needs of rural areas, and allocated the bulk of resources to economic sectors located in urban areas. Legum, in commenting on the trend of development in post-independent Africa, summarised this problem as:

> everywhere, the leaders of independence are the 'modern men' who emerged from the modern sector of colonial society. Their nationalist movements have been cast in modern forms; their aspirations and priorities are those of the modern world. Yet one of the realities of Africa is that its modern elites are small enclaves within each country. The modernising tendencies of colonialism did not shift the traditional bulk of African societies.[4]

Figure 5.1 shows that 47 of the 53 African countries have over half of their populations living in rural areas in 1984. With such large proportions of rural population, the need to allocate more resources for rural development is evident. However, with the emergence of urban 'elite' governing much of Africa, their aspirations and priorities for development have been urban-biased, a carryover from colonial times. These colonial institutions were so entrenched that they were not easy to alter without seriously affecting the economy of the country.

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[4]Colin Legum, "Africa on the Rebound", New Society, No. 243, September 1967, p. 754.

Figure 5.1 Distribution of Rural Population in Africa, 1984




Source : Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet, 1984

Consequently, the development efforts in the immediate post-independence period did not markedly depart from those of colonial administration. For example, mechanised farming and industrial development were emphasised as the principal solutions to economic problems on the continent. As Dumont has noted:

> The problem of mechanisation is crucial, because African elites are seduced by the idea of modern machines. It is difficult to convince them that agricultural progress does not depend on immediate mechanisation.[5]

However, although many African governments had this 'false start' in their development priorities, it should be pointed out that the social and economic institutions which these leaders had inherited from colonial powers played a major role in shaping concepts of rural development on independence. Also, technical advisors tended to be drawn from former colonial administration and often saw the current problems of rural Africa in the same light as they did during the colonial period.[6] Development plans were largely urban-biased because urban problems were more visible to leaders and the decision-making elites than were those of the rural areas. Legum has observed that:

> The modern-minded elites monopolise the rewards of the new political system produced by independence; they have thereby further promoted the colonial process of creating a secondary class of citizens

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[5]Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1966), p. 58.

[6]Based upon the European and North American experience, most foreign advisors saw that application of mass technology to rural Africa would generate wealth and social equality between urban and rural areas. See John H. Kautsky, "The Appeal of Communist Models in Underdeveloped Countries", in W. A. Beiling and G. O. Totten (eds), Developing Nations-Quest for a Model (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970), p. 105.

who largely occupy the rural countryside.[7]

Since economic controls did not change after independence, only a few prospered, and the so-called era of 'neo-colonialism' was instituted.

Since those early post-independence days, African leaders have come to realise that there are no short-cuts in their attempts to solve problems of social and economic development on the one hand, and the persistent unbalanced growth between urban and rural sectors on the other hand. They have also realised that the development of rural areas is an essential component to overall socio-economic advancement and political stability. In introducing the Second National Development Plan for 1972-76, for example, President Kaunda of Zambia emphasised this point in stating:

> For us, developing the rural areas is a matter of life and death, though we do not underestimate the problems involved ... We must first of all succeed in developing the rural areas, no matter what our performance is in other sectors.[8]

Similar concerns were also expressed by President Nyerere in his Arusha Declaration in 1967 through which he sought to improve rural life and to reverse the long-time lopsided and urban-biased development programs. In his call 'let us pay heed to the peasants', Nyerere pointed to the negative impact of the prevalent development policies on rural areas. He considered the inherited colonial economic and social relationships between the urban and rural areas as non-reciprocal, and urged a new approach to national development that would equally benefit rural population. He said that:

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[7]Colin Legum, op. cit., p. 755.

[8]Kenneth Kaunda, "Speech introducing the Second National Development Plan, January 1972 - December 1976", Lusaka, Zambia, 1971; as quoted in Robert O. Chambers, Managing Development-Ideas and Experience from East

> Our emphasis on money and industries has made us concentrate on urban development ... Yet the greater part of this money that we spend in the towns comes from loans. Whether it is used to build schools, hospitals, houses or factories, it still has to be repaid. But it is obvious that it can not be repaid just out of money obtained from urban and industrial development ... Where, then, shall we get it from? We shall get it from the villages and from agriculture. What does this mean? It means that the people who benefit directly from development which is brought about by borrowed money are not the ones who will repay the loans. The largest proportion of the loans will be spent in, or, for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers.[9]

This statement points to the fact that post-independence economic and social benefits in the developing countries accrue largely to the minority urban population. These imbalances in growth between urban and rural sectors over the past two decades resulted in the belief that an appropriate development model for the developing countries should be sought.

Although it is recognised by most African states that rural areas are important to the development of their economies, there are different views regarding the best strategy for rural development. Two principal strategies are frequently cited as directions rural development should take, the 'unimodal' and the 'bimodal' approaches. The former places emphasis upon the use of intensive technology and capital inputs in selected areas, while the latter addresses itself to the problems of rural development at a more modest scale and involving a larger

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Africa (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974), p. 11.

[9]Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 26-27.

population base. A brief discussion of these strategies with respect to rural development efforts in Africa in general, and to Southern Sudan in particular follows.

## RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN AFRICA

Rural development in Africa remains a crucial problem because of the large majority of population dependent upon subsistence farming. Both 'unimodal' and 'bimodal' development strategies aim at improving the socio-economic conditions of rural populations, but their emphasis varies with regard to levels of technology and manner of execution.

### Unimodal Strategy

The 'unimodal' strategy to rural development is characterised by heavy reliance on intensive technology and capital inputs which invariably results in only a small number of beneficiaries. In this approach, diffusion philosophy is emphasised, whereby a large investment is made at a single selected growth point -- thus the use of unimodal -- in anticipation of innovation subsequently spreading to the whole population. The main argument for this strategy was spelled out in an International Labour Organisation (ILO) report in which it was summarised that:

(a) modern techniques of agricultural production are efficient and their adoption by developing countries would enhance a speedy development and social and economic equality between urban and rural areas;

(b) modern technology provides economies of scale which result in capital accumulation;

(c) modern technology promotes the achievement of high quality standards for international markets; and,

(d) reliance on obsolete, labour-intensive technology retards development and promotes stagnation.[10]

This strategy dominated rural development schemes established in Africa prior to and immediately after independence. These schemes were largely metropolitan in origin with little or no consideration to the basic needs of local populations. Their prime objective was to produce export staples to ease the postwar economic crises in Europe. Among schemes of this type were:

(a) Office du Niger in Mali. This scheme was started in 1947 by the French to produce cotton and rice in the Niger River Delta. By 1962, a total of $105 million had been invested in social and economic development plans, but only about 1% of Mali's population had become involved in the scheme.[11] This limited achievement was wholly out of proportion to the costs incurred. De Wilde[12] has listed a variety of factors contributing to its failure, among which were technical-planning deficiencies; lack of labour and settlers because most of the population was largely nomadic; distances from market areas; high costs of inputs in relation to value of output; and shortage of staff and poor coordination in the implementation of the object.

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[10]For details, see International Labour Organisation (ILO), Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 141.

[11]Michael Frank, Cooperative Land Settlements in Israel and Their Relevance in African Countries (Tubingen, Mohr: Kyklos Verlag Basil, 1968), p. 147.

[12]John de Wilde, Experience with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, Vol. 2 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 249-53 and 263-64.

(b) The Groundnut Scheme in Senegal. This project was started in 1947 to produce edible oils for metropolitan France. It was executed with more concern for speed than costs. Also, the equipment and methods employed on the scheme were ill-adapted to local conditions because they were originally designed for agricultural production in the United States.[13] However, as costs increased without adequate returns, the government changed to a more labour-intensive policy by employing local farmers on the scheme.

(c) The Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika. This project was conceived to meet shortages of edible oils in Britain. It was hastily implemented, and little thought was given to the dry and unsuitable climatic conditions for the crop. Its costs rose astronomically, and consequently, it too was abandoned.[14]

(d) Farm Settlements in Nigeria. These settlements were initiated in 1960, shortly after independence, with the objective of preventing the migration of rural primary school leavers to towns in search of employment.[15] It was estimated that the number of school leavers in Western Nigeria seeking employment rose from 54,000 in 1954, to 180,000 in 1960 and to 700,000 in 1967.[16] A total of 75% of the region's agricultural budget was sunk into the scheme during the first

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[13]Rene Dumont, op. cit., p. 56.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Government of Western Nigeria, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, The Future of the Western State Farm Settlement Scheme Conference, 20-21 February, 1972, Ibadan, Nigeria.

[16]Mordechai E. Kreinin, Israel and Africa: A Study in Technical Cooperation (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964), p. 56; and W. Roider, Farm Settlements for Socio-Economic Development: The Western Nigeria

half of the 1962-68 Development Plan in the hope of attracting some of the school leavers, yet the number of beneficiaries remained minute, with only 885 settlers involved in the scheme in 1973. Lack of proper planning, together with limited enthusiasm led to the high rate of desertion and the scheme's eventual failure.[17]. These examples are only four of the many rural development projects that failed.

Of course, not all African rural development schemes have been failures. The Gezira Scheme in Sudan, for example, is one development that has survived, and indeed has been often used as a model for agricultural development elsewhere in Africa. The success of the Gezira Scheme derives from a combination of natural and economic factors. Natural advantages played a large part in the success of the scheme. They included favourable climates and soil conditions and a landscape in which gravity flow could be used for irrigation purposes at a low cost. Apart from these natural advantages, the concentration of resources in the Gezira area as well as emphasis upon specific economic objective resulted in an economic success. The partnership between the government and the tenants aimed at the maximisation of profits, which in turn generated more incentive to production. Furthermore, Gaitskell has suggested that the long experience in cotton growing in the area helped to evaluate the most suitable crops and their treatment as well as a workable arrangement with the local population.[18] However, even the

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Case (Munchen: Welforum Verlag, 1971), p. 29.

[17]John R. Rogge, "Rural Development Problems in Africa: Some Lessons from Western Nigeria", Canadian Geographer, Vol. 21(30), 1977, p. 262.

[18]For details, see Arthur Gaitskell, The Gezira Scheme: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), Chapter 21.

Gezira Scheme has in recent years been plagued with difficulties arising from its macro-scale organisation and capital intensive structure.

Some measure of success was also achieved with the introduction of small-scale agricultural projects such as in the Sabi Valley in today's Zimbabwe. Roder has suggested that in comparison to the pre-scheme period, the irrigation project enabled settlers to obtain a much higher standard of living, comparable to that enjoyed by urban workers, and well above other native farmers.[19] The success of the Sabi Valley project was attributed largely to its small scale operation and its use of focal points of development rather than a single growth pole.[20] Kimble has argued that small projects were generally suitable for African conditions because they were less costly, more understandable to local farmers and they often strengthened rather than disrupted the local economies.[21] It was also realised that unlike large scale mechanised farms, small-scale projects, using simple methods, increased the rate of adoption by local farmers.

Even with some successes, the negative experiences with most of these capital intensive schemes led many African leaders to re-examine 'unimodal' approaches to rural development. The main arguments now advanced against the strategy is that African countries, with their limited financial resources, are incapable of employing such capital

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[19]Wolf Roder, The Sabi Valley Projects, Research Paper No. 99 (Illinois: Department of Geography, University of Chicago, 1965), p. 189.

[20]George H. T. Kimble, Tropical Africa, Vol. 1: Land and Livelihood (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960); cited in W. Roder, Ibid, p. 10.

[21]R. J. Harrison Church, "Observations on Large Scale Irrigation Development in Africa", Agricultural Economics Bulletin for Africa (E/CN.14/AGREB/4), No. 4, 1963; cited in Ibid, p. 206.

intensive farming methods without serious adverse effects elsewhere in their economies.[22] Because "unimodal" thrusts have negligible or non-existent development benefits to the majority of the population, the growth points created by such strategies often remain as "small islands" of privileged farmers. Empirical evidence from various developing countries supports this view. For example, studies conducted by Myrdal in India, by Friedmann in Venezuela, and by Furtado in Brazil have revealed that the unimodal strategy has not generated the desired economic growth among the general population, but rather has further promoted growth in the already prosperous areas.[23]

Bimodal Strategy

The term 'bimodal' refers to rural development strategies which promote a broader perspective to rural development problems in the developing countries. 'Bimodal' strategies place rural development in the context of existing social and economic conditions. It is argued that because of the prevailing levels of poverty, low literacy levels, and poor standards of living in Africa, 'unimodal' approaches to rural development are inappropriate since they do not generate balanced development. Also, it can be suggested that although 'unimodal' strategies were successful in developed countries, similar effects have not been demonstrated when such strategies have been applied to Africa.

The main arguments in support of 'biomodal' strategies in developing countries have been put forth by the International Labour

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[22]Hans W. Singer, "Appropriate Technology for a Basic Human Needs Strategy", International Development Review, Vol. 19(2), 1977, p. 8-11.

[23]Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London: Duckworth, 1957); John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966);

Organisation, emphasising that:[24]

(a) a technology should be in harmony with the socio-economic environment of the society into which it is introduced;

(b) most modern technology originates from highly industrialised economies whose needs and circumstances are different from those prevailing in developing countries in terms of land, labour, capital, entrepreneurship, size of markets, consumer incomes and tastes, skill levels, transport facilities, etc.

(c) the most appropriate technologies for developing countries are those which require little capital per worker; can be used efficiently on small scale; are easily serviced and repaired; do not require high level of education; and utilise locally available materials.

(d) the high cost of advanced technology would mean that only a very small proportion would benefit from this kind of development as surrounding subsistence farmers would not have the capabilities to emulate the new technology.

Schumacher has argued that development starts with people and their education, organisation, and discipline. He has suggested that if new economic ventures are to be introduced in the developing countries, the recipient society must have these tools to promote a healthy development. Short of that, the new economic activity will "remain a foreign body that can not be integrated and will further exacerbate the

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and C. Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

[24]International Labour Organisation, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

problems of the dual economy.[25] Drawing from studies conducted in India, Nair observed that the spread effects of the development scheme were non-existent in the surrounding areas. Instead, the government farm stood as:

> an isolated instance of improved agricultural practices amidst a wide zone which retains its old uneconomic and inefficient practices.[26]

In the developing economies the use of conventional growth models based on a diffusion hypothesis has been a failure, as shown by the examples cited above. As a result some leaders started to think differently. President Nyerere of Tanzania was the first to articulate his thoughts and put them into action. In his Arusha Declaration (1967), he stated that:

> growth must come out of our own roots not through the grafting on to those roots of something which is alien to our society. It means that our social change will be determined by our own needs as we see them, and in the direction we feel to be appropriate for us at any particular time. We shall draw sustenance from universal human ideas and from the practical experiences of other peoples; but we start from a full acceptance of our Africanness and a belief that in our own past there is very much which is useful for our future.[27]

In his 'ujamaa' village settlement concept, Nyerere argues that rural development efforts should first identify the needs of the society, and in the light of these needs, priorities for development can then be determined. The methods employed in the production process should also

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[25]E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful - Economics as if People Mattered (London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 140-41.

[26]Kusum Nair, Blossoms in the Dust: Human Element in Indian Development (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 29.

[27]Julius K. Nyerere, op. cit., p. 92. Following Nyerere, Kenya's President Kenyatta in 1969, and then Presidents Khama of Botswana (1970) and Kaunda of Zambia (1971) expressed similar concerns for rural

be appropriate to local conditions. Nyerere has rejected the 'grafting' or implantation of advanced, capital intensive technology for agricultural production, since a subsistence farmer can not readily comprehend these, let alone adapt to them. Instead, the type of technology required in rural Africa is one that is easily adapted to the farmer's needs and is done so at minimal cost. The direct involvement of the rural population in the development process is also an important factor in the success of any development efforts. Wignaraja summarises the principal objectives of such a development strategy as:

> People are the world's greatest asset. Bringing out their creativity and potential is the means, as well as the end, of development. People must be involved and must feel at home with whatever process is initiated. It must progressively satisfy their needs and they must participate in decisions that affect them.[28]

However, most post-independence development schemes in Africa continue, as in the past, to focus on productivity and other economic dimensions, paying less regard to the social aspects of development. Mabogunje suggests that many of the post-independence rural development schemes in Africa hardly fit into the socio-economic setting of those countries. He argues that the overall effect of these schemes has often been to maintain the status quo rather than promote real social change.[29] Consequently, the participation of local population in these schemes often remains as little more than that of passive farm

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development in their National Development Plans.

[28]Ponna Wignaraja, "A New Strategy for Development", International Development Review, Volume 18(3), 1976, p. 6.

[29]Akin L. Mabogunje, The Development Process - A Spatial Perspective (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1980), p. 104.

labourers. With these concerns in mind, rural development thrusts in Southern Sudan, prior to and after the Addis Ababa Agreement, will be discussed and the strategies used evaluated.

## RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Rural development planning in the Southern Sudan can be divided into two discrete periods. Firstly, the pre-Addis Ababa Agreement period, when development plans came directly under the Central Government, and secondly, the post-Addis Ababa Agreement period, when rural development plans came generally under the Southern Region Government.

### Pre-Addis Ababa Agreement Rural Development Policy

Large scale rural development undertakings in Southern Sudan are few in number and recent in origin. The first attempt was in 1948 with the establishment of a pioneer settlement scheme, based primarily on cotton growing in the Zande area in southwest Equatoria. Tothill, the architect of the scheme, suggested that the economic underdevelopment of the Zande area could be boosted by stimulating internal trade and improving trading and transport facilities.[30] However, before any significant progress was made, development of the scheme was interrupted by the 1955 mutiny in the South.

After independence, a Ten Year Development Plan (1960/61 - 1970/71) was formulated. However, during this period, projects planned for the South (e.g., sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco production) were not implemented, either because of the civil war or due to lack of interest

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[30]Julius K. Nyerere, op. cit., p. 92. Following Nyerere, Kenya's President Kenyatta in 1969, and then Presidents Khama of Botswana (1970) and Kaunda of Zambia (1971) expressed similar concerns for rural

by the central government in the South's economic development. They were either shelved or funds intended for these projects were diverted to the North. This state of affairs continued up to 1969, when Nimeiri assumed power and a Five Year Development Plan (1970/71 - 1974/75) was prepared. It emphasised mechanised agricultural schemes. From the planners' point of view, such schemes would "revolutionise the basic lifestyles of the inhabitants in the rural areas".[31] However, as was previously suggested, the projects ran into difficulties and failed to produce sufficient food or to upgrade living conditions of their rural populations. Mistakes similar to those outlined above were made because the projects were based upon inadequate background information on socio-economic and environmental needs and controls. Feasibility studies were either not undertaken, or were cursory in nature. In other cases, political allegiances rather than economics dictated their location. For example, the Kapoeta Scheme in eastern Equatoria was initiated to produce sorghum over an area of 15,000 feddans. However, no study of the area's suitability for this crop was ever undertaken, and consequently it ran into immediate difficulties. The main constraints to the scheme's development were identified as the remoteness of the area; inadequate means of transport; shortage of labour supply; and inadequate amount of rainfall and water supply because of semi-desert conditions in the area.[32] Thus, during the

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development in their National Development Plans.

[31]Government of Sudan, Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, The Five Year Resettlement, Cooperative and Rural Development Program in the Southern Provinces, 1970/71 - 1974/75, Khartoum, 1970.

[32]Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Report on the Closure of the Kapoeta Dura Scheme, Southern Region, Juba, August 1973.

first two years, 1970/71 - 1971/72, no cultivation was undertaken, and in the following year, only 1,000 feddans (6.7% of the total area) were cultivated, yielding a total of only 30.5 tons of sorghum.[33] Because the scheme was running at a great loss, it was abandoned.

In reviewing agricultural policies in 1973, the Regional Government recognised some of the shortcomings of mechanised farming, stating that:

> the various enterprises undertaken (previously) were mechnaised but showed that the time is not yet ripe for this type of farming. As long as there are no properly trained operators, mechanics, fitters and skilled repairers as well as an adequate supply of replacement parts, the use of power machinery will lead to failure.[34]

It was realised that government farms were not directly benefitting rural populations, because such operations did not encourage private enterprise and created few incentives for hard work. Moreover, management was poor since it did not appear to matter if the schemes made a profit or a loss. Participation of local populations was also passive, since they earned their wages irrespective of whether or not the scheme was a success or a failure.[35]

Apart from the problems associated with the advanced technology employed on these schemes, their limited impact on rural population was also attributed to the type of crops being produced. Government schemes frequently specialised in crops not generally regarded as important food items to local communities, such as rice or potatoes. Food produced on

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Regional Ministry of Agriculture, A New Outlook in Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Wealth in the Southern Region (Pamphlet), Southern Region, Juba, November 1973, p. 9.

[35] Ibid.

the schemes was for marketing outside the area, and farm workers received none of the crop for themselves. Instead, they received monthly or seasonal wages for their labour, from which they were required to purchase their food needs. As long as they remained illiterate and passive to the development process, their cash earnings were unlikely to improve their way of life.

"Development projects must begin with the people ..." was the theme of President Nyerere's keynote address to the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) in 1979. He argued that:

> if people are to be able to develop, they must have power. They must be able to control their own activities within the framework of their village communities. The people must participate not just in the physical labour involved in economic development but also in the planning of it and the determination of priorities. At present the best intentioned governments too easily move from a conviction of the need for rural development into the acting as if the people had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong. At every stage of development people do know what their basic needs are.[36]

His statement reflected the principal problems existing in the South's rural development strategies, whereby the decision-making planners approached problems of rural areas from their own perspective rather than that of the people concerned. In other words, a top-down philosophy dominated planning. This issue will be examined in detail in later chapters in connection with the Gilo and Aweil case studies.

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[36] Ibid.

Post-Civil War Rural Development Policy

The rural development strategies adopted in the post-civil war years were a complete turnabout. Instead of stressing mechanised farming, the emphasis shifted to smallholder farmers. It was recognised that because mechanised farming had been unsuccessful, a logical alternative was to focus attention on smallholder farms. Accordingly, rural policy was redefined:

> to tap and develop the latent capabilities of the rural people through incentives for production, rewarding employment, and to involve them in affairs of their community and nation. Development calls for a joint effort of people and government, one in which greater emphasis than hitherto is placed on man, his organisation and his institutions.[37]

The objective of the new policy was to improve agricultural activities in the South by using existing resources and to make the returnees self-sufficient in food crop production. It was now suggested that the transition in agricultural production should be gradual in order to keep pace with the socio-economic needs of the rural population. The new policy also redefined the roles of both government and farmer in the development process. It was implied that while the government would provide material assistance to farmers and advise them on suitable hand-tools and animal drawn implements, decision-making and actual production of food and cash crops were to be the farmer's responsibility.[38] These changes did not entirely eliminate mechanised farming, but its role became a secondary one, namely to supplement food

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[37]Regional Ministry of Agriculture, A New Outlook in Agricultural, Forestry and Animal Wealth ..., p. 9.

[38]Abel Alier, "Introduction", in Ibid, p. 3.

deficits in the region.

The most common food crops in the South are sorghum, maize, finger millet, cassava, groundnuts and sesame. In order to realise the objectives of self-sufficiency, the Regional Government introduced a number of new measures to stimulate agricultural development. First, it declared Saturday as 'cultivation day' during the rainy season (15th April - 15th October). All government officials and employees were required to participate on that day in growing their own food crops on lands adjacent to the towns. Second, it introduced annual agricultural competitions among farmers. This was to demonstrate how much of each food crop individual farmers were capable of producing. The competitions were at three levels: district, provincial and regional, and farmers obtaining the highest yields were awarded prizes or cash by the government. Third, ox-ploughing was introduced at Rumbek, 539 km northwest of Juba. Here, the objective was to spread the use by smallholders of ox-ploughs, in order to increase production of food and cash crops in the region. However, this project was unpopular because local poulations did not cooperate with authorities due to the fact that they were not ready to cast-off concepts where cattle were ceremonial assets, rather than beasts of burden.[39] Fourth, the Regional Ministry of Agriculture provided improved seeds and extension services to farmers to increase their productivity. Together, these measures were successful in generating at least some degree of self-sufficiency in parts of the South where farming constituted the main economic activity (e.g., Equatoria Province). Other areas, however, were less successful,

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[39]Abel Alier, "Introduction", in Ibid, p. 3.

especially in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal Provinces where populations largely depended on livestock rather than farming.

As part of the overall rural development policy, cash loans were made available to farmers and businessmen by the Regional Development Corporation (RDC) to increase crop production and improve business. However, the administration of these loans was problematic. Firstly, the Corporation had no effective system for securing loans and for collecting repayments from beneficiaries. Secondly, quite often uncertified properties were falsely registered as security, and more importantly, political pressures were brought to bear on loan-officials resulting in awards being made on the basis of nepotism and favouritism. Thirdly, some beneficiaries considered the loans as direct government grants for their resettlement after their return from exile and thus never expected to repay them. Others had no fixed address and thus became 'lost'.[40] As a result of these practices, the loans program benefitted primarily those farmers and businessmen who had strong connectins to the politicians or were related to them. Moreover, the government emphasis on providing loans for cash crops such as coffee, tea, tobacco and Irish potatoes, meant that the farmers benefitting from these loans were largely in Equatoria Province where climatic conditions were most suitable for such crops.

## SUMMARY

This chapter has surveyed some of the general concepts and strategies of rural development in Africa in general and in Southern

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[40]H. E. James Tombura, Regional Government Policy Statement, 19th July 1982; and Emmanuel Bol Kuanyin, "The Role of Public Corporations in the Development of the Southern Region", Paper Presented to the

Sudan in particular. In examining some of the pre-independence rural development thrusts in Africa, it has been shown that many of schemes failed because they were based on 'unimodal' strategies, involving capital intensive techniques. Discussion has focussed on rural development schemes initiated immediately after independence which were frequently carbon copies of those established during the colonial administration, emphasising mechanised farming, and thus also resulting in failure.

More recently, African governments have come to realise that the solutions to rural development were much more than simply mass application of modern technology. It is suggested that 'bimodal' strategies are more appropriate to Africa's socio-economic conditions. Rural development strategies adopted in Southern Sudan followed the pattern experienced elsewhere in Africa, in that pre-Addis Ababa Agreement development strategies were based on mechanised farming, resulting in little or no success, and post-civil war rural development strategies emphasised smallholder farms, in the realisation that 'unimodal' strategies were not benefitting the majority of rural population.

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Conference on Development in the Southern Region, 5-8th April 1983, Southern Region, Juba. For example, in 1983, the RDC Management reported that an outstanding loan of over LS.200,000 was unrecoverable.

# CHAPTER 6

## YEI AND MARIDI DISTRICTS: THE PRE-CIVIL WAR AND CIVIL WAR PERIODS

This chapter examines the social and economic conditions of farmers in Yei and Maridi districts prior to the civil war as well as during the civil war. In so doing, the performance of the two populations prior to their displacement can be determined and easily compared with their post-war economic conditions. The post-civil war period is dealt with in the next chapter. The subject matter for these two chapters is based on a sample of 200 farmers each in the Yei and Maridi districts.

It is necessary to estimate the economic status and technological capacity of a population prior to its undertaking a migration, in order to assess the degree to which it subsequently adapts to new economic systems, or the extent to which new technologies are transferred to it following the migration. Thus, in this section prevailing economic conditions prior to the civil war are discussed, in order to establish the extent to which the sample population's forced migration created changes in their economic circumstances during and after the civil war.

Based on the questionnaire, economic activities of the sample population were divided into main and secondary activities. As the terms suggest, 'main economic activities' refer to those activities which farmers considered as their primary occupations as distinct from other sources of income which played only secondary roles.

## THE PRE-CIVIL WAR PERIOD

Prior to the civil war, the population in Yei and Maridi areas was generally sedentary, and stay at home type. Prior to the war in 1955, contact with the outside world was minimal and most of the population in these districts knew little beyond their immediate social and economic environments. As a result of the civil war, however, many were forced to move out of the region for the first time, thus disturbing the traditional stability that had existed in the past.

In the sample population, the majority stated farming as their main economic activity before the civil war (Figure 6.1). In Yei area, the high percentage (91%) of the population depending on agriculture as their primary activity points to the fact that other economic activities played only minor roles in the area. Farmers who held government jobs or were in private employment, for example, were only 2% and 1.5% respectively.[1] A further 5.5% of the farmers surveyed indicated no economic activities because they were still at schools prior to the civil war, or were underaged. In contrast, in Maridi area, 69.5% stated agriculture as their primary activity but the number of farmers engaged in government employment was much higher, with 22.5% reporting such employment as their main economic activity. This was because the Maridi area was an important component of the Zande Cotton Scheme and offered local populations alternative sources of income as scheme labourers. Only 3% were privately employed, and a further 5% were underaged.

Areas under crop production were also examined in the survey. Acreages were small, with 62% of farmers having plots of land less than

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[1]'Private employment' refers to a wide range of activities such as petty trading, tailoring, carpentry, and similar activities which are taken up by individuals to augment their incomes.

Figure 6.1 Yei and Maridi Areas: Main Economic Activities Before the Civil War.



5 feddans. These small farm sizes were largely due to constraints set by the quality and sophistication of the tools and techniques used by farmers. As is the case throughout much of Africa, farmers in Southern Sudan were entirely dependent upon hoes and 'pangas' (knives) to clear the land. They also depended largely on family labour. Although these limitations in technology and manpower are recognised, the farmers' subsistence needs could generally be met by such small farms. In Yei and Maridi areas, for example, subsistence farmers had responded to these human and technological constraints by adopting inter-cropping systems, whereby, for example, legumes were inter-cropped with other food crops. Also, as these farmers were generally outside the money economy, priority was for food crop production, and any food surplus was largely disposed of through barter trade within the community or with other communities along the Sudan-Zaire-Uganda borders.

In Yei area, the average farm size was 4.4 feddans, with 55% of farmers reporting holdings below average. In Maridi area, the average farm size was 3.5 feddans and two-thirds of the interviewees reported farms below the average (Figure 6.2). The larger proportion of farmers with small farms in Maridi area is attributed to the role played by other sources of income, especially that provided by the Zande Scheme. For example, Figure 7.5 (Chapter 7) shows that over one-fifth of the sample population reported subsistence farming only as a secondary economic activity to the main activity in government employment. In such cases, less time was spent on farming, and thus only smaller areas were brought under production. Finally some 12.5% and 7.5% respectively reported private and government employment as their secondary economic activities prior to the civil war, and 58% indicating no other economic

Figure 6.2 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distribution of Farm Sizes Before the Civil War.



activities apart from the principal ones. In the pre-war period, secondary economic activities were insignificant, and thus the population depended almost entirely on their main economic activities.

In Yei area, most farmers were dependent on subsistence farming as a full time endeavor. This greater commitment to farming probably accounted for the relatively larger farm sizes as well as a higher proportion of farmers (72%) reporting no secondary economic activities. Only 16% of the sample population reported private employment as their secondary economic activity and a further 11% engaged in government employment (see Figure 7.5 in Chapter 7).

Reporting on earnings or material possessions in any population can be problematic. It is common in many developing countries that exact incomes are not disclosed. For example, in Yei and Maridi areas, the farmers were prepared to discuss their grievances against the government or their material losses resulting from government inactivity, while questions relating to their earnings were looked at with suspicion. Belief that witchcraft or bad omens might follow disclosures of wealth and earnings often deterred farmers from providing clear statements of their earnings. Thus, given the fact that income data are subject to respondent biases, the information gathered by the survey might be evaluated with some qualification. The average annual incomes in Yei and Maridi areas were LS.56 and LS.33, respectively. As shown in Figure 6.3, most farmers reported incomes of less than LS.60 per annum. This was particularly the case in Maridi where 60.5% of the sample were in receipt of less than LS.40 per annum, as compared to 30.5% for Yei area. At the other end of the scale, there was a higher proportion of farmers (13.5%) in Yei area with incomes of LS.100 or more than in Maridi, which

Figure 6.3 Yei and Maridi Areas: Average Annual Income Before the Civil War.



had only 6.5% of its sample in that income bracket. A further total of 10.5% and 15.5% of the farmers in Yei and Maridi respectively were reluctant to disclose their earnings. The higher incomes in Yei area could be partly explained by the fact that far fewer farmers there were engaged in government jobs, which were low paying, compared to Maridi area. Yei farmers tended to be more active than were Maridi farmers in other economic activities, such as petty trading and barter trading across Sudan-Uganda-Zaire borders.

The preceding analysis of the pre-civil war economic conditions of the sample population in Yei and Maridi areas has shown that there were significant differences between the two areas. The principal indicators illustrating these differences were types of main and secondary economic activities, farm sizes and levels of income. The data suggest that Yei farmers were economically better-off than those in Maridi area. In Yei area, the great majority of the farmers depended on subsistence farming and were a self-sufficient community; they had larger farm sizes; and consequently, had much higher earnings than those in Maridi area. Such differences in the relative economic performances of the two populations prior to their displacement are important in understanding later changes in farmers' economic performance after displacement.

## THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD

Civil wars are violent in nature. They generate mass population displacement, especially in rural areas in Africa where fighting is often concentrated. An examination of this displacement is necessary because it sheds light on the nature and distance that the population was dislocated. In Yei and Maridi areas, two types of displacement were

identified - internal and external displacement. Persons displaced within the national boundaries are referred to 'internal refugees', while those displaced across an international boundary are referred to as 'external refugees'. Figure 6.4 illustrates the type of displacement and settlement pattern of the sample population during the civil war.

Internal Refugees

Internally displaced persons have also been referred to as 'informal' refugees in contrast to 'formal' refugees, meaning those persons who have crossed international borders into neighbouring countries.[2] The main criteria used in defining the latter are the 'crossing of an international border' and that of 'well founded fear of presecution'. However, as was discussed in Chapter 3, definitions based on such criteria are inadequate in the African context because they exclude many other groups of forced migrants.[3] Rogge suggests that in Africa, several involuntary migrations that are directly attributed to natural disasters or ecological pushes, nevertheless can be seen to have distinct political undertones. The flight of Malian Tuareg to Niger, for example, was as much in response to political factors as it was to the effects of the Sahelian drought. Thus, although "ecological" refugees and other internally displaced populations do not receive international recognition as refugees, their plight and needs are

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[2]Christopher F. F. Terrill, "The Creation of the Acholi Minority of the Southern Sudan: Their Dispersal as Refugees, Repatriation and Resettlement". Paper presented at the IGU Commission on Population Geography Symposium on the Problems and Consequences of Refugee Migrations in the Developing World. 29th August to 1st September, 1983, Hecla, Manitoba, Canada, p. 3.

[3]For details on the discussion of the problems of according refugee status see John R. Rogge, "Refugee Migration and Resettlement", in John I. Clarke and Leszek A. Kosinski (eds.), Redistribution of Population in

Figure 6.4 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distribution of Sample Population by Place of Residence and Nature of Settlement During the Civil War



identical to those of other refugees. In terms of absolute numbers, internal refugees generated by civil wars usually constitute the majority of displacees.[4] In Southern Sudan's case, between 850,000 - 950,000 persons were internally dislocated during the civil war compared to an estimated 219,400 refugees who sought refuge in neighbouring countries.[5]

In the Yei and Maridi sample populations, 188 (47%) of the 400 persons sampled had been internally displaced, 76.6% of whom came from Maridi area. Three groups of internal refugees can be identified: those who took refuge in the 'bush' within Southern Sudan; those fleeing to towns within the South and elsewhere in Sudan; and those who remained in their villages throughout most of the war, fleeing only for short durations at the height of conflict.

Refugees who took refuge in the 'bush' were the largest group, accounting for 78.7% of the 188 internally displaced population. The majority (124) came from Maridi area, and only 24 of the Yei sample sought refuge in the 'bush' (Table 6.1). The large number of displacees from the Maridi area who chose to relocate in the 'bush', did so for a variety of factors. The main reason was because of the distance to the Zairean and Ugandan borders, where the alternative destinations providing safety and security could be found. In contrast, Yei area's proximity to the border led to the majority of its displacees choosing

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Africa (London: Heinemann 1982), pp. 39-40; and Michel Moussalli, "Who is a Refugee?", Refugees Magazine, No. 1, September 1982, pp. 41-43.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, May 1972 - April 1974, Juba, 1974.

Table 6.1

Yei and Maridi Areas: Spatial Distribution of Internal Refugees During the Civil War

| Area | Remained in own village | Displaced in 'Bush' | Displaced in Towns | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Within District | Outside District | |
| Yei | 2 | 24 | 13 | 5 | 44 |
| Maridi | 5 | 124 | 8 | 7 | 144 |
| Total | 7 | 148 | 21 | 12 | 188 |
| % | 3.7 | 78.7 | 11.2 | 6.4 | 100.0 |

to relocate across the border. Secondly, the size and vegetation cover of the respective areas influenced the migrants' choice of destination. Maridi's much larger area and lower population density made it easier for the displacees to 'hide' from government forces. Thirdly, the much denser equatorial forest vegetation in Maridi District compared to that in Yei also proved to be an advantage to the internal displacees. Finally, the greater remoteness of Maridi area compared to Yei, resulted in less military activity being concentrated in that area. On the other hand, Yei's proximity to the border, together with its greater accessibility by road from Juba, the Southern Command military headquarters, caused much more intensive fighting to be focussed in that region, and hence generated a higher level of displacement of civilian population.

As the refugees were basically farmers, lacking education and technical skills, their migration was characterised by predominantly short distance moves from their villages, thus supporting the contention that the distance travelled by a migrant population is a function of information field (awareness) which is brought about by education.[6] Figure 6.5 shows that the majority of refugees were displaced within a 60 kilometer distance from their original places of residence. Of the total number of internal refugees, for example, 53% relocated into the bush within a 48 kilometer radius of their previous places of residence. This was especially the case in Maridi area, which has a much denser vegetation cover. Only a small proportion (5.9%) reported moves of more than 120 kilometers from their homes, mainly to other provinces such as

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[6]Julian Wolpert, "Behavioral Aspects of the Decision to Migrate", Papers and Proceedings, Regional Science Association, Vol. 15, 1965, pp. 62-63.

Figure 6.5 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distance Travelled by Internal Refugees From Place of Origin.



Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Khartoum. However, these relatively long distance moves were motivated largely by presence of working relatives in those areas.

The second group of internal refugees were those who sought refuge in Sudan's towns. However, the Southern towns did not present an attractive destination to many refugees, since they were all occupied by government forces. The army's indiscriminate arrests, torture and killings of civilians in towns during the war discouraged most rural refugees from seeking refuge in them. Apart from insecurity that prevailed in the towns, they were also strange places for most rural peasants, who hardly considered them as likely locations for settlement. Their contact with the towns prior to the civil war was limited to occasional visits and market days. Consequently, it is not surprising that only 17.6% of internal refugees reported that they had migrated to towns during the civil war. Most who did went to Yei and Maridi.

A third and very small group of internal displacees were those who remained in their villages during most of the civil war, leaving only temporarily during times of actual conflict. These were individuals who had resigned themselves to the political situation, and they constituted only 3.7% of the sample.

External Refugees

Refugees who found refuge in Zaire, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia numbered 212 (53%) of the sample population. Of this total, 73.6% came from Yei area (Table 6.2). Virtually all of the external refugees sampled fled to Zaire (58%) and Uganda (40.6%), because of the proximity of the borders and the fact that the population across the border were

Table 6.2

Yei and Maridi Areas: Spatial Distribution of External Refugees During the Civil War

| Area | Spontaneous Rural Settlers | | | Settled on Rural Settlement Schemes | | Settled in and Around Towns | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Zaire | Uganda | Kenya | Zaire | Uganda | Zaire | Uganda | Kenya | Ethiopia | |
| Yei | 9 | 34 | 1 | - | 6 | 70 | 34 | 1 | 1 | 156 |
| Maridi | 26 | 6 | - | 14 | 1 | 4 | 5 | - | - | 56 |
| Sub-total | 35 | 40 | 1 | 14 | 7 | 74 | 39 | 1 | 1 | |
| Grand Total | 76 | | | 21 | | 115 | | | | 212 |
| % | 35.8 | | | 9.9 | | 54.3 | | | | 100.0 |

ethnic kin. Three forms of settlements in these neighbouring countries can be identified, namely 'free' or 'spontaneous' rural settlement, organised rural settlement schemes, and urban settlement.

'Free' or 'spontaneous' rural settlement is defined by UNHCR as:

> a process whereby a group of refugees settle down in the country of asylum either in existing villages or by establishing new villages, in or near the area of arrival, which is usually inhabited by a population of similar ethnic origin, by arrangement with the local village chiefs and other leaders of the local population, as well as with representatives of the central government, but only with ancillary assistance from the outside.[7]

The burden of supporting such refugees is borne by local populations who provide food, clothing, shelter and land for the refugees. This kind of settlement can proceed relatively harmoniously, especially when the host population is of the same ethnic origin, and adequate land and food resources are available. For example, in a report on Southern Sudanese refugees in northeastern Zaire, it was suggested that many refugees opposed transfer by Zairean authorities from border areas to the interior of Zaire because they had good social and ethnic relations with local populations in the area of first settlement. They argued that:

> we are of the same ethnic origin as the local people, speak the same language, have the same customs and are inter-related.[8]

A total of 75 refugees in the sample population spontaneously settled across the border in Uganda and Zaire.[9] In the case of

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[7]Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problem, Addis Ababa, 9-18 October 1967. UN Document E/CN.14/442, 1969, p. 14.

[8]Tristram Betts, Spontaneous Settlement of Rural Refugees in Africa. Research Project: Case Study No. 3 - Sudanese Refugees in Zaire (London: Euro Action-ACORD, 1980), p. 9.

[9]Only one person sought refuge in Kenya.

Uganda, the majority concentrated along the northern borders with Sudan in West Nile, Madi and Acholi districts (Figure 6.6). These areas are all inhabited by the same ethnic groups on both sides of the border, and include the Kakwa, Madi, Lugbara and Acholi. The ethnic, linguistic and social cohesions between refugees and host populations led to the smooth integration of the former with the latter. Similar positive experiences of successful spontaneous integration have occurred elsewhere in Africa, as for example among Angolan refugees in western Zambia. Hansen has observed that:

> The refugees who were living in the Zambian border villages were those who found relatives who welcomed them and local political headmen who accepted them. Those refugees in camps were those who failed to find kinsmen or who could not generate enough social and local political support.[10]

In Zaire, a similar situation prevailed in that refugees settled primarily along the northeastern borders in Haut-Zaire Province, and integrated with local ethnic kin (e.g., the Zande).

The second type of settlement was on the organised rural land settlement schemes. Such schemes have been defined as:

> a deliberate and coherent process of administrative and technical measures whereby a group of refugees is enabled to settle on land, usually in an uninhabited or sparsely populated area, with a view of creating new self-supporting rural communities that ultimately will form part of the economic and social system of the area.[11]

They are widespread throughout Africa, and have generally been introduced as joint ventures between host governments and UNHCR. In

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[10]Art Hansen, "Case Study No. 1 - Angolan Refugees in Western Zambia", as quoted in Tristram Betts (1980), op. cit., p. 5.

[11]Economic Commission for Africa, op. cit., p. 15.

Fig. 6.6 Uganda: Administrative Regions, 1967



addition to providing refugees with agricultural land, such settlements also provide basic socio-economic infrastructure.

As was previously discussed, the number of Southern Sudanese external refugees living on organised rural settlements in Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire and Central African Republic during the civil war was estimated as 49.8% of the total refugee population in exile.[12] Of the Yei and Maridi sample, the proportion settling on such rural settlement schemes in Uganda and Zaire was smaller, totalling only 9.9% of the external refugees. Those in Uganda settled at the Agago rural settlement scheme in the Acholi district and at Nakapiripirit in the Karamoja district (Figure 3.3). In Zaire, the refugees from Maridi and Yei congregated at Nugadi rural settlement in the northeast. As was suggested earlier, the relatively small proportion of refugees from Yei and Maridi who chose to locate on organised rural settlements was in part due to the close socio-ethnic relations existing on both sides of the borders that promoted spontaneous settlement.

The third form of settlement was in urban and semi-urban areas. Refugees choosing to relocate to urban areas constituted 54.3% of the total external refugees sampled. Of the 115 displacees in this category, 113 settled in towns in Uganda and Zaire. Since Yei district was a major source area of external refugees, it follows that they also made up the majority of 'urban' refugees. Nearly two-thirds (64.3%) settled in the district towns of Aba and Aru in northeastern Zaire. In Uganda, two major urban destinations were sought by refugees. Firstly, they settled in the smaller border towns in northern Uganda's West Nile,

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[12]Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Final Report, Juba, 1974.

Madi and Acholi districts. Secondly, some found their way to southern Uganda, settling in East and West Mengo and Busoga districts and around Kampala and Jinja (Figure 6.7). Others took refuge in towns such as Kitgum, Gulu, Masindi and Mbale.

Most of the external refugees remained close to the border. The sample showed that 56% settled within a 48 kilometer distance of the border, and only 20% reported that they had migrated distances of more than 120 km (Figure 6.8). The UNHCR policy requires that refugees be moved inland from the borders by at least 50 kilometers. This stipulation is to avoid border friction that develops between the host government and the country of refugees' origin as a result of the presence of refugees close to their common borders. However, in the case of refugees from Yei and Maridi who settled spontaneously in Uganda and Zaire, this policy was not effected because the refugees were immediately integrated into the local host communities with whom they had strong ethnic relations. With common ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, it was thus difficult to differentiate refugees from the local population. Also, as most of these rural refugees were militarily passive, they posed no serious threat to the harmony among the local population as well as the security on the Sudan-Zaire-Ugandan borders.

The refugees settling in border towns were largely in the same ethnic territorial space. These towns were small in size, rural in outlook and less heterogeneous in populations than the industrial towns in southern Uganda. Thus, the socio-economic experiences and change that the refugees encountered were limited. In contrast, those who migrated to the larger urban areas away from the border, such as Kampala, became exposed to radically different socio-economic conditions

Figure 6.7 Yei Area: Dispersion of External Refugees.



Figure 6.8 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distance Travelled by External Refugees From the Border.



and ideas. Many refugees who went to the southern towns of Uganda did so because they had relatives already settled in those towns. The accessibility of the larger towns by road proved to be a 'pull-factor' for the refugees, as was the fact that they were centers of economic and industrial development, and hence provided employment opportunities. As a component of their economic success in the southern towns, some sources suggest that many Southern Sudanese refugees began to consider themselves as Ugandans or even acquired Ugandan citizenship while in exile.[13] This process was in part facilitated by the presence of some Southern Sudanese in the Ugandan government hierarchy.

Nature of Exodus and Economic Activities

The flight of refugees is usually sudden, disorganised and as a result they take little or no personal belongings with them.[14] In some cases, entire villages may be affected. In this study, distinction is made between refugees who fled their villages as individuals and those who left as a group or complete village during the civil war. This distinction is important in determining the magnitude of danger or threat to which the refugees were exposed before their flight. Since guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities in Africa are often concentrated along the border areas, the local populations in these military buffer zones are usually more affected than people in areas farther away from the borders. The magnitude of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities is in turn reflected in the nature of

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[13]Information gathered from refugees who were in Uganda during the civil war.

[14]However, although this is generally the case, refugees do take advantage of the time lag before the real danger reaches them. The influx of the first wave of Ugandan refugees into Sudan in 1979 is a

flight by displacees. It is suggested that areas which experienced intensive military activities also generated large-scale group/village exodus of refugees. Of the Yei and Maridi sample, 46.3% of the total fled individually, while 52% reported that their exodus was part of one affecting their entire villages (Table 6.3). The displacement of whole villages was more marked in Yei than in Maridi area, especially among external refugees. The Yei sample shows that of the 156 external refugees, 121 (77.6%) reported that their movement across the border involved their entire village.

In Maridi area on the other hand, of the 195 refugees who completely abandoned their villages during the civil war, 62.5% fled individually, while 35% were affected as entire villages. These differences in the nature of flight between Yei and Maridi samples clearly show that the degree of danger to which the population was exposed was much greater in Yei area than in Maridi area.

Relocated to their new environment, refugees generally adjusted in accordance with levels of skills that they had brought with them from their countries of origin. In this context, Olson defines economic adjustment of refugees as:

> the acquisition of an occupation or income equivalent to others in the host environment with similar training and skills.[15]

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case in point. When the Tanzanian-backed forces of Milton Obote were still fighting in the southern districts of Uganda, many refugees who fled at that time took with them trucks, cars, buses, tractors, building materials and household furniture. These 'anticipatory' refugees knew well in advance that it was a matter of time before the fighting reached their areas. Their flight was therefore organised, taking with them some of the things they needed in the new environment.

[15]Maxine E. Olson, Flight, Settlement and Adjustment: Refugee Experience in Laos and Other Developing Countries. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, 1978, p. 73.

Table 6.3

Yei and Maridi Areas: Nature of Population Exodus During the Civil War

| Refugee Group | Individual Exodus | | Group/Village Exodus | | Total* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yei | Maridi | Yei | Maridi | No. | % |
| Internal Refugees | 25 | 86 | 17 | 53 | 181 | 45.3 |
| External Refugees | 35 | 39 | 121 | 17 | 212 | 53.0 |
| Sub-total | 60 | 125 | 138 | 70 | | |
| Grand Total | 185 | | 208 | | 393 | |
| % | 46.3 | | 52.0 | | 98.3 | |

*7 (1.7%) respondents claimed that they remained in their villages during most of the civil war period (2 in Yei and 5 in Maridi).

In the African context, where the skills of the majority of refugees are those associated with subsistence farming, economic adjustment poses no serious problems when adequate cultivable land is provided to them by host populations. In the Yei and Maridi survey, farmers were asked what their main economic activities were while uprooted during the civil war. Of the 400 farmers surveyed, 84.3% reported subsistence farming as their primary economic activity. This represented a 4% increase over the 80.3% reporting subsistence farming as their main economic activities prior to the pre-civil war period. This change was a direct consequence of the loss of opportunities of government employment during the civil war era.

Significant differences were observed between respondents in Yei and Maridi areas. In Yei area, the proportion of the sample population engaged in subsistence farming as their main economic activity actually declined by 9% from 91% prior to the war to 82% during the conflict. In contrast, there was a 17% increase in this sector among displacees from Maridi area - from 69.5% prior to the civil war to 86.5%. The decline in the number of refugees engaged in subsistence farming as their main economic activity in Yei area was due to the fact that while in exile, some farmers found government employment - 7.5% took up government jobs while in exile (Figure 6.9). On the other hand, the increase in the number of refugees in subsistence agriculture in Maridi area was explained by the fact that during the civil war, former government employees lost their jobs. Also, the majority of displacees from Maridi area were locally displaced in the 'bush', where no other means of livelihood existed except subsistence farming.

Since the basic objective of refugees is that of survival, their

Figure 6.9 Yei and Maridi Areas: Main Economic Activities During the Civil War.



Figure 6.10 Yei and Maridi Areas: Secondary Economic Activities During the Civil War.



main concern is usually that of food production for their families. Consequently, secondary economic activities, focussing upon cash earnings are of lesser importance. In Yei and Maridi areas, only 11.8% of the refugees reported private employment as secondary economic activity during the civil war, and a further 7.3% were government employees while in exile (Figure 6.10).

## SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the pre-civil war and civil war periods in Yei and Maridi areas. It has examined the economic activities of the sample population and their earnings prior to displacement. It has discussed the nature and the extent of population dislocation, the place of residence as well as the ethnic relations between the refugees and host populations. The nature of economic activities of the sample population during the civil war has been examined and compared to the pre-civil war period. The economic activities were grouped under subsistence farming, government and private employment.

The economic activities of the sample population prior to the civil war have been discussed, firstly, to assess the impact of dislocation on their pre-civil war economic activities, and secondly, to determine whether there were any significant differences between the refugees who were internally displaced and those who took refuge in neighbouring countries. These differences will be discussed in Chapter 7, which deals with the return migration of the refugees and their subsequent resettlement.

# CHAPTER 7

## YEI AND MARIDI DISTRICTS: THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD

This chapter discusses the post-civil war period in Yei and Maridi districts. It examines the demographic characteristics of the sample population, as well as their current place of residence in relation to their pre-civil war locations. The date and nature of the refugees' repatriation prior to and after the Addis Ababa Agreement is examined to identify whether the return migration was on their own account or aided by UNHCR. The farmers' current economic activities are examined to determine if dislocation caused any changes to their economic activities. The extent to which new farming techniques were adopted by the refugees while in exile is also investigated. The last section discusses the respondents' perception of their socio-economic conditions in the post-civil war period compared to the pre-civil war period.

### Age Structure

One of the initial questions in the survey attempted to ascertain the farmers' age. Age is an important characteristic in demographic analysis, since this forms the basis of fertility studies. However, in Africa age is also significant from a social point of view, especially in rural areas, where age is a symbol of recognition of an individual's social standing and respect in the community. In contrast to western societies where age would not generally be a lead question in a questionnaire survey, in Southern Sudan age is not considered as a delicate question. The people, especially the elderly, like stating their age because they are proud of it, since associated with age is

accumulated knowledge and experience.

Age also relates to population mobility, since it is generally accepted that a younger population is more mobile than an older one. Thus, the younger the population the greater the probability of mobility. In both Yei and Maridi areas (1982), respondents were mainly over 25 years, with the majority of them being between 30 and 49 years. The mean age and the median age were 44.1 and 44.2 respectively. In the Yei sample, there was a smaller proportion of younger farmers between 20 - 34 compared with Maridi. The majority of farmers sampled (73%) were concentrated in the 34 - 54 cohort while in Maridi sample, 61.5% were in this bracket (Figure 7.1).

The smaller proportion of the sample populations between 20-34 years reflects a general deficit in male population in the South following the civil war. For the Southern Region, the 1973 census showed that sex-ratios ranged from 74 males per 100 females in the 25-29 cohort to 99 males in the 15-19 cohort. Between the ages of 20-24 and 30-34, sex-ratios were 75 and 84 respectively. In Equatoria province the sex-ratios were even lower, at 71 males per 100 females in the 25-29 age group.[1] Consequently, the small proportion of the sample falling into the 20-34 cohort in Yei reflects the general trend of Equatoria's demography.

The reasons for this male deficit in the population can be attributed to:

(a) the civil war during which many young males were killed;

(b) migration to towns, especially to Yei and Juba, in search of

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[1]L. Robin Mills, Population and Manpower in the Southern Sudan, Research Paper No. 1, University of Juba, Population and Manpower Unit, Juba, 1977, p. 15.

Figure 7.1 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distribution of Sample Population by Age Groups, 1982.



job or educational opportunities. For many, their experiences in exile generated a sense of urban association, and in the post-civil war period led to large-scale migration to towns in search of 'better' opportunities. A recent study conducted on migration to Juba town confirms this assertion. It was found that 20% of the in-migrants originated from Yei district;[2]

(c) the fact that some who took refuge in Uganda and Zaire were very young at the time of migrating, and grew up in exile as 'Ugandans' or 'Zaireans'. Hence after the civil war, they decided to remain in those countries. However, although these conditions were primarily true for the male population in the South, the female population was affected too.

It was earlier shown that in Maridi area, the majority of population was internally displaced and hence experienced fewer major changes in their lifestyles as a result of migrating. Consequently, a higher proportion of young persons returned to their villages following the war. This is reflected in the 20 - 34 cohort in the Maridi sample.

Ethnic Composition

The ethnic mix of the two study areas was examined to determine the extent of socio-economic change after the civil war. It is generally accepted that heterogeneous populations are more prone to experience changes in their way of life than are homogeneous groups. For example,

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[2]Roger L. Hill, Migration to Juba: A Case-Study, Research Paper No. 2, University of Juba, Population and Manpower Unit, Juba, 1981, p. 115.

an ILO report on income-generating activities for Afghan refugees in Pakistan suggests that ethnic diversity of the refugee population and a strong tradition of leadership by achievement have played major roles in generating competitive attitudes and economic prosperity among the refugees.[3] Like most other districts in the South, Yei and Maridi districts are inhabited by diverse ethnic groups (Figure 7.2). However, in some areas the diversity is much greater than in others. In Yei district, for example, the major ethnic group is the Kakwa, whose ethnic territory extends into northeastern Zaire and northwestern Uganda. They constituted 79% of the sample. The balance was mainly composed of the Fajulu (8.5%) and the Mundu (6.5%) peoples. In the Maridi sample a much more diversified ethnic structure exists, with the largest ethnic group being the Baka (30%), followed by the Avukaya (19.5%), the Mundu (19%) and the Zande (16.5%). The remaining 15% was composed of other smaller ethnic groups. This distribution reflects the general trend of ethnic groupings in the district where the Baka, Zande, Avukaya and the Mundu constitute the dominant groups.

Based on the sample, it can be stated that Yei's population is more homogeneous while Maridi is heterogeneous. As was mentioned earlier, heterogeneous groups are assumed to be more competitive and prone to rapid socio-economic changes than homogeneous populations. Therefore, Maridi's population might be expected to be more progressive than Yei's homogeneous population. However, in Maridi area, little change was observed because forces within the society controlled progress. The use of witchcraft and local medicine (dawa) against those aspiring to become

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[3]International Labour Organisation, Tradition and Dynamism Among Afghan Refugees: A Report on Income-generating Activities for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (Geneva:International Labour Organisation,1983),p.17.

Figure 7.2 Yei and Maridi Areas: Ethnic Composition.



successful farmers often deterred such farmers from improving their output. The farmers are illiterate and tradition-bound and this has in part contributed to the widespread belief in and practice of witchcraft and 'dawa'. Even after the civil war, no change is apparent that can be directly ascribed to ethnicity, largely because their displacement was local and territorially within the overall heterogeneous community. But in Yei area, with its predominantly homogeneous population, dispersion during the civil war was to Uganda and Zaire, where they became exposed to a variety of ethnic groups and consequently also to new ideas. After the civil war, the experiences of exile led to the adoption of new ideas, and generated more competitive attitudes among the population.

Marital Status

Marital status is discussed to determine the impact of the civil war on nuptuality among the sample population. In most African societies, marriage has its social and economic commitments in the community. In Southern Sudan, for example, the role of women in the social and economic functions of the community is vital. Thus, the presence of married couples in a village is crucial to the functioning of that community. Within the framework of the family division of labour, women perform a variety of social and economic functions, both within and outside the communities. In particular, these include activities which require communal participation, such as organisation of festivities, farming, harvesting, and food processing. In this sense, marriage is not viewed only in its demographic context, but also with

regard to the special roles women play in the community. In Yei and Maridi almost nine-tenths (89%) of the sample were married. This figure is somewhat higher than the 83% recorded in the 1973 census for Equatoria's rural male population of 25 years and over.[4] However, the census is believed to have under-enumerated the South, which may explain why the difference between official data and the sample exists. The small proportion of single (3%), divorced (3.3%) and widowed (4.8%) persons in the sample is due to the fact that communal laws impose codes of social conduct on its members. Marriage and divorce are not private affairs; the community has a say in their settlement. Compared to rural Equatoria (with 10.2% single, 4.6% widowed and 2% divorced), the averages for Yei and Maridi areas generally appear to follow regional norms.[5]

As will be examined below, the major impact of the civil war on marital status in Yei and Maridi areas was to delay marriages and to create long periods of separation of spouses.

Family Size

Number of persons in each family is examined to determine if the civil war had an impact on the sample population's fertility. It is hypothesised that the population which experienced major displacement, such as during the civil war, would have fewer children than a population that had not been disturbed.

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[4]Ministry of Finance, Planning and National Economy, Department of Statistics, Population Census Office, Second Population Census (Equatoria Province), 1973. Khartoum, December 1976.

[5]Ibid.

It has long been recognised that family size plays a role in rural communities. Many writers argue that children are economically useful in that they contribute to economic well-being of their families. For example, in their case-study in Kenya, Anker and Knowles state that:

> the economic contribution of children to their parents is so important that is frequently said to be the major reason for high fertility rates in developing countries.[6]

The authors argue that when parents grow old and no longer capable of providing for themselves, they are usually supported by their children, and this old age support is often considered to be one of the main reasons for high fertility in developing countries. However, apart from the economic importance of children suggested by Anker and Knowles, their social and political roles should also be emphasised. In Southern Sudan, most communities believe that the greater the number of children in a community, the wider the social and political prestige of the area. Such inclinations toward having more children are often reflected in lyrics, and are particularly the case with Nilotic ethnic groups.

Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of married couples in the Yei and Maridi samples by family size.[7] The average family size for Yei sample was 7.1 and for Maridi was 6.3 persons. This compares to the estimated national average family size of about 7 persons.[8]

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[6]For details, see Richard Anker and James C. Knowles, Fertility Determinants in Developing Countries: A Case-Study of Kenya (Liege, Belgium: International Labour Organisation, 1982), pp. 27-50.

[7]'Family size' was used to refer to the number of persons who lived or came directly under the responsibility of the headman of the family interviewed.

[8]Ministry of Finance, Planning and National Economy, Department of Statistics, Population Census Office, loc. cit.

Figure 7.3 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distribution of Family Size , 1982.



The modest differences in the average family size of married couples in the sample reflects the distribution of age cohorts, in that family sizes tend to be smaller in Maridi because it has a greater number of younger farmers than Yei. In the Yei sample, the number of married couples having no children was 6% compared to 11% in Maridi area. Family sizes of 3 - 8 persons were reported by 67.5% in Yei while nearly one-quarter (24.5%) reported 9 or more persons per family. In Maridi, 66.5% of the sample had family sizes of 3 - 8 persons, while 18.5% had 9 or more persons. The fact that a few families reported very small sizes may be because some people went into exile at a very young age, and married only after they had established themselves in the post-war period.

The data show that there were no significant differences in the average family sizes between respondents who were externally dislocated and those who were internally displaced or between displacees and the general population. Therefore, although the civil war had marked economic impact on the displaced population, it had not generally affected their family sizes.

## THE REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT PROCESS

As was discussed in Chapter 4, government appeals to Southern Sudanese refugees to return to their villages prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement were unsuccessful because fighting still continued. For this reason only 8% of the sample had returned to their villages during 1968-71. After the Addis Ababa Agreement, however, attitudes changed and refugees started to return home from the 'bush' or from neighbouring

countries, either with the aid of UNHCR or on their own. During 1972, 57.5% of refugees were resettled, and a further 18.8% in the following year. Thus, between 1972-74, 83% of the refugees had returned. Those who repatriated after June 1974 did so exclusively on their own. Among the sample population, some 7.3% returned to Sudan from Uganda and Zaire between 1975-80, and most of them were residents of Yei area (Figure 7.4). After the war, the displacees from the 'bush' were the first to return to their villages. Thus, the internal displacees who repatriated after 1974 were only those who took refuge in towns among relatives.

The return of this group of 'residual' refugees, especially from Uganda, should be viewed in the light of political changes which took place in Uganda during the late 1970's. Under Amin's administration, Uganda was sympathetic (taking ethnic relationships into account) to Southern Sudanese in Uganda, and many were employed in the civil service and the army. However, with Amin's overthrow in 1979, Obote's government adopted a strong anti-Southern Sudanese attitude. Sudanese in the civil service or army were associated with the astrocities of Amin's government. As a result, they were forced to return to Sudan together with the growing number of Ugandan refugees who were also fleeing into Sudan at that time.

Having returned to Sudan, the issue of whether or not refugees returned to their traditional village areas needs to be explored. Rural populations throughout Southern Sudan do not normally migrate much outside of their tribal areas. Urbanisation in the South, for example, has barely begun. Certainly prior to the civil war in 1955, very little permanent migration had occurred. Thus the question of whether the displacement caused by the civil war led to longer term permanent

Figure 7.4 Date of Return by Yei and Maridi Sample Population.



out-migration from home areas after the war is of interest.

In the case of Yei area, the survey showed that 88% of the sample had lived in their current villages prior to the civil war, and another 9% came from within the immediate district. Only 3% lived in locations outside their current areas prior to the war. In Maridi area, the situation differed slightly in that 69.5% had lived in their current villages prior to going into exile or fleeing into the 'bush', and a further 22.5% reported that they had lived in other parts of the same district. Thus 8% in Maridi area after the war were 'outsiders'. The relatively large proportion of respondents in Maradi area living outside their current villages prior to the war was attributed to employment opportunities provided by the former Zande Scheme at various locations throughout the Maridi area, and probably accounted for the somewhat higher level of mobility in this area vis-a-vis Yei.

Following the civil war, the sample population returned to their current villages either directly, or indirectly after staying at other locations temporarily. Of the 400 respondents, 77.8% returned directly to their current villages, while 20.5% went through various transit centers. Little difference was encountered between the experiences of returnees in Yei and Maridi, with approximately 65 - 70% returning directly in each case. A determinant of the directness of return was accessibility of their home villages from their areas of exile. Many villages in Yei area were close to major routes of repatriation, such as the Laso-Yei and Kaya-Yei roads (Figure 1.7). Also the distances from the border to their villages was short. In Maridi area, the majority of displacees returned from the 'bush', and again only short distances were usually involved, with many able to repatriate on foot.

The returnees who passed through transit camps (14% in Yei and 27% in Maridi) did so because of two main factors:

(a) The remoteness of their villages; some villages were so remote that returnees were unable to cover the distance on foot. Therefore, they required material assistance and transport facilities provided by these centers.

(b) Their inability to pay for transportation. Although in many cases returnees were unable to pay for the costs of transport back to Sudan, it can also be argued that others simply decided to take advantage of the free transportation offered by UNHCR.

The manner of repatriation is examined here to determine if returnees who came directly back to villages subsequently experienced advantages over those who returned indirectly or at a later date. It is assumed that external refugees benefitted more from UNHCR's-aided repatriation than did the internal displacees. However, the data show that most refugees returned unassisted. As was shown in Chapter 6, the majority of the sample found refuge at only short distances from their home villages and consequently required no UNHCR repatriation assistance. Fear of official registry may also have deterred some refugees from taking advantage of the organised repatriation exercise because immediately after the civil war, many refugees remained uncertain of the durability of the peace-agreement. Thus they preferred anonymity and chose to return to their villages on their own. In the Yei and Maridi sample, only 46 and 20 respectively returned with UNHCR's assistance. They were mainly external refugees from Uganda and Zaire.

On the other hand, 327 (81.8%) of the 400 farmers in Yei and Maridi sample reported returning to their villages on their own. Of these the majority (254) came on foot, but nearly a one-third (73) were able to afford commercial transport. The fact that some were able to pay for transportation suggests that they had attained higher levels of self-sufficiency during the civil war compared to those who sought government assistance to repatriate (Table 7.1).

It might be hypothesised that returnees who came back directly, and immediately following the end of the war, gained better access to land compared with those who returned indirectly or arrived home much later. However, this does not appear to be the case. Even after lengthy periods of abandonment of the land, customs allow the farmer to reclaim title to a particular piece of land that he previously cultivated. In Yei and Maridi areas, land title was related to landscape or other features (e.g., mango trees) so that a returnee could readily recognise plots of land to which he had title. Thus the temporal sequence of return did not influence accessibility to land.

However, although this was true for Yei and Maridi areas, traditional land-tenure laws vary in application by ethnic regions. For example, Terrill has observed that in the Acholi area in Torit district, the 'Labong' (commoner clan) who returned to their villages directly following the end of the civil war, occupied the prime land traditionally settled by the 'Kal' (aristocratic clan), who tended to stay in exile longer until safety was guaranteed. He suggests that in the Acholi land-tenure laws, any land can be farmed by another person as long as previous cultivation marks are not visible to warrant any claim

Table 7.1

Yei and Maridi Areas: Nature of Repatriation by the Returnees

| Area | UN-Assisted Returnees | Returned on own Account | | | | Those who remained in their villages | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | By Truck | | By Foot | | | |
| | | Internal Refugees | External Refugees | Internal Refugees | External Refugees | | |
| Yei | 46 | 4 | 45 | 36 | 67 | 2 | 200 |
| % | 23.0 | 2.0 | 22.5 | 18.0 | 33.5 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
| Maridi | 20 | 14 | 10 | 124 | 27 | 5 | 200 |
| % | 10.0 | 7.0 | 5.0 | 62.0 | 13.5 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 66 | 18 | 55 | 160 | 94 | 7 | 400 |
| % | 16.5 | 4.5 | 13.8 | 40.0 | 23.5 | 1.8 | 100.0 |

of ownership by its previous user.[9]

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

### Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Economic Activities

The discussion of contemporary economic activities in the sample areas is intended to show the extent to which displacement changed the economic behavioral patterns of the returnees. In particular, it is necessary to establish whether after returning, farmers continued with economic activities that they had practiced prior to the civil war period, or whether they introduced new modes of production into their economy.

The data show that after the war, farming has acquired a more dominant role in the economy of Yei and Maridi areas. This contrasts with the pre-civil war conditions, especially in Maridi area, when only 69.5% of the sample had been primarily engaged in farming (see Chapter 6). After the war, other economic activities, such as government service and private employment, which had been reported as main sources of livelihood prior to the war, were either rated as secondary sources of income or simply did not exist. This change of emphasis to agriculture following the civil war can be attributed to five factors:

(a) The low wages paid by government jobs were inadequate to sustain employees. The average monthly income for a laborer in government service in 1982 was LS. 40, from which he has to feed his family and meet other expenses. Because of the high cost of the basic food items, workers were frequently

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[9]Christopher F. F. Terrill, "The Creation of the Acholi Minority of the Southern Sudan: Their Dispersal as Refugees, Repatriation and Resettlement", Paper Presented at the IGU Commission on Population

left without money to purchase food. A sack of sorghum which would be required per month by an average family of 7 persons, for example, cost between LS.32 and LS.50.[10] Cassava, which is another important staple, cost between LS.5 and LS.7 per tin, and an average family would consume about 3 tins per month.

(b) The frequent long waits for wages to be paid - sometimes up to four months - resulted in many farmers abandoning government employment as their main source of livelihood. Following the civil war, the Southern Regional Government remained dependent upon the Central Government in Khartoum for payment of all salaries and wages. Lack of liquidity in Khartoum or delays in transfer of funds to the South frequently led to long periods of waiting and frustration. This was especially the case in rural areas, because funds received tended to be paid first to urban labourers.

(c) The rise in local market prices for food crops resulting from the general food deficit prevailing throughout the South. Because of the influx of so many returnees after the civil war, and the fact that the economic infrastructure was devastated, food supply was unable to keep pace with demand, resulting in spiralling local market prices. These high

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Geography Symposium on the Causes and Consequences of Refugee Migration in the Developing World, 29th August to 1st September, 1983, Hecla, Manitoba, Canada, p. 16.

[10]A sack of sorghum contains 6 tins and each tin weighs about 35 pounds.

prices, however, acted as an incentive to farmers to intensify their production. This was particularly the case in Yei area, which is a major source of food for Juba's 57,000 population.

(d) The call by the Regional Government to all small-holders in the South to take up farming seriously in order to produce sufficient food and cash crops. This call was in realisation of the fact that the problem of food shortage in the South could only be minimised by promoting local food self-sufficiency. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the introduction of incentives such as the 'agricultural competition' and 'agricultural prizes' throughout the South were components of this strategy.

(e) The farming experiences and economic independence which many farmers had gained while in exile, also influenced their decision to pursue farming as their main economic activity after the civil war. During the war, most displacees, especially from Yei area, had been exposed to a much more competitive and intensive small cash-crop economy in Uganda and Zaire. Because of this experience, after their repatriation they were eager to introduce agricultural innovations they had adopted in exile. Examples of these will be discussed later in this chapter.

Although government employment and petty trading have not figured prominantly as primary sources of income since the civil war, these activities do however continue to be significant secondary sources of

income. Because of the seasonal nature of small-scale farming, and the fact that yields fluctuate widely from season to season, many farmers are forced to supplement farm income with off-farm economic activities.

In particular, petty trading has come to figure significantly as a secondary source of income, especially in Yei area. Essential commodities (e.g., sugar, wheat flour, kerosine and cooking oil) are generally in short supply in the South, which has led to widespread black-marketeering in these commodities at rates well above officially fixed prices. Liquor and beer smuggling from Zaire are also a lucrative petty trade because domestic supplies are either absent or insufficient to meet local demand both in Yei and Juba towns.[11] These changes in secondary economic activities after the civil war are summarised in Figure 7.5.

Farm Size

To further assess the impact and dimensions of dislocation upon the population, farm sizes are examined to determine whether the farmers cultivated farm sizes similar to those cultivated prior to the civil war. Before 1955, average farm sizes in Yei and Maridi areas were 4.4 and 3.5 feddans respectively. Since the war, average farm sizes have increased, especially in Yei area where the average size was 7.1 feddans in 1982. The proportion of small farms of less than 5 feddans has declined from 55% of respondents prior to the war (Figure 6.2) to only 27% in 1982. On the other hand, the number of farms of 11 feddans or more multiplied four-fold from 4% to 16.5% (Figure 7.6).

In Maridi area, increase in average farm size following the civil

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[11]Since the introduction of Sharia Law (banning consumption of alcoholic beverages) in 1983, there were no domestic supplies at all. As a result, liquor black-market prices increased dramatically because

Figure 7.5 Yei and Maridi Areas: Secondary Economic Activities Before and After the Civil War.






Figure 7.6 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distribution of Farm Sizes After the Civil War.



war was less than in Yei, namely from 3.5 to 5 feddans. A change that has occurred is in the number of very small farms. Currently only 45% have farms of less than 5 feddans compared to 69% prior to the war. However, although numbers of small farms have declined, there are few larger farms in Maridi (Figure 7.6). This smaller change in farm size in Maridi can be partly attributed to Maridi's much smaller market for cash crops and to the fact that it is too far from Juba to supply the urban market. Also, while only 13.5% of farmers supplement their farming with income from government jobs in Yei, in Maridi the proportion is 30%, suggesting that smaller farm sizes reflect the extent of off-farm activities. A similar situation exists on the Gilo Potato Scheme (to be discussed in Chapter 8), where all farmers supplement their incomes with off-scheme government jobs, and are found to cultivate only small farms averaging 2.6 feddans, which differ little from their average 2.5 feddan farms of the pre-1955 period.

As was suggested earlier, increases in the average farm sizes following the civil war, especially in Yei area, were a result of government incentives and market forces. After the war, the Regional Government started a program of boosting food and cash crop production in the Southern Region by providing extension services and small cash loans to the farmers, and annual prices (in cash and in kind) for farmers with outstanding performance in specific crop production.[12] However, apart from these economic incentives, Yei area has other favourable qualities that have made its farmers more responsive to the

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the risks involved in smuggling from across the border from Zaire became even much greater.

[12]Regional Ministry of Agriculture, A New Outlook in Agriculture, Forestry, and Animal Wealth in the Southern Region (Pamphlet), Southern Region, Juba, November 1973, pp. 9-10.

government policy:

(a) it has an ideal climate that can sustain a variety of tropical crops; and

(b) it is a major source of food commodities for the Juba urban market (160 km distance).

These two factors have largely contributed to a positive farmer response toward expansion of farm sizes and increased production of those 'crops' (e.g. cassava, yams, maize, rice, groundnuts and coffee) whose relative economic returns have improved. In addition, the influx of Ugandan refugees into Southern Sudan since 1979 has provided local farmers with a cheap labour supply, and further encouraged larger farms to be brought into production.

It was shown earlier that refugees from the 'bush' and those in Uganda and Zaire returned at differing intervals and at different rates. Some came back immediately after the civil war, while others took a much longer time to repatriate. It was also shown that most refugees whose villages were close to their places of asylum returned on foot, and those who lived in remote areas used either commercial transport or took advantage of UNHCR-assisted repatriation. Furthermore, it was established that because of the traditional land-tenure laws, returnees who went directly to their villages immediately after the civil war did not gain better access to land compared with those who returned at a later date.

After the civil war, farming became more dominant than was previously the case. Also farm sizes increased, especially in Yei area. It was suggested that Yei and Maridi areas were not radically different in their socio-economic outlook prior to the war. However, differences

that emerged between the two areas following the war are attributable to the nature of their populations' displacement and the displacees' experiences during the civil war. These differences in the Yei and Maridi samples following the post-civil war period are examined in the sections that follow.

Socio-Economic Performance of Farmers Following the Civil War

Although the causes of displacement may be similar, displacees react in different ways to their uprooting. Thus they experience varying degrees of psychological and socio-economic adjustment to their new environments. Depending on the level of adjustment achieved by displacees while in exile, the uprooting may have a positive or negative impact on their socio-economic performance after repatriating.

The survey attempted to gauge the extent to which farmers in Yei and Maridi areas viewed their socio-economic conditions after the war compared to conditions prevailing prior to 1955. The objective was to determine whether there were significant differences in post-war economic performance between externally and internally displaced refugees. It is hypothesised that because of the nature of dislocation, external refugees experienced much greater improvements in their socio-economic performance than did internal refugees who had remained within the same socio-economic space during the war, or indeed, by fleeing into the 'bush' had regressed in terms of their developmental levels.

Of the sample population, 83% reported that they considered themselves relatively better-off since the civil war, while only 10.8% stated that they had been better-off prior to the war. The balance

found no difference between their current and past economic conditions (Table 7.2). Of the 332 farmers indicating improved conditions, 55.1% had been in exile abroad. However, when 'improved conditions' are related specifically to the external refugees, 183 (86.3%) of the 212 externally displaced refugees in the sample suggested that they were better-off.

Since most external refugees had originated from Yei area, it follows that the highest percentage reporting better conditions since the war were located in Yei area. Notwithstanding this, Maridi also had over half of its sample indicating better post-war conditions. This improvement, however, was less due to external experiences; rather, it reflects the fact that they had become wholly dependent upon farming compared to their pre-war dependence on low-paid government jobs on the Zande Scheme.

Of the 43 returnees reporting poorer economic conditions after the war, 28 were internal refugees from Maridi district. This appears to substantiate the suggestion that refugees locally displaced into the 'bush' had indeed regressed in terms of their socio-economic conditions. On the whole the sample shows that external refugees (mainly from Yei district) have experienced the greatest socio-economic transformation and levels of prosperity following the war. This assertion can also be illustrated by examining adoption rates of new crops and agricultural techniques by the returnees, and by comparing average incomes among the two populations.

(a) Adoption of Innovations. Displacement has many facets, including the mental attitudes to adapt to new environments. Generally, displacees who adapt well to their host environment and societies tend

Table 7.2

Respondents' Perception of Whether Their Economic Conditions Had Improved

| Area | Conditions Better Before Civil War | | Conditions Better During Civil War | | Conditions Better After Civil War | | No Difference | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Internal Refugees | External Refugees | Internal Refugees | External Refugees | Internal Refugees | External Refugees | Internal Refugees | External Refugees | |
| Yei | 2 | 5 | - | 7 | 40 | 138 | 2 | 6 | 200 |
| % | 1.0 | 2.5 | - | 3.5 | 20.0 | 69.0 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 100.0 |
| Maridi | 28 | 8 | - | - | 109 | 45 | 7 | 3 | 200 |
| % | 14.0 | 4.0 | - | - | 54.5 | 22.5 | 3.5 | 1.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 30 | 13 | - | 7 | 149 | 183 | 9 | 9 | 400 |
| % | 7.5 | 3.25 | - | 1.75 | 37.25 | 45.75 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 100.0 |

to acquire new levels of innovation. For example, Rogge notes that the Eritrean refugees at Qala en Nahal settlement in eastern Sudan are from a nomadic background and have demonstrated a remarkable sense of adaptability and openness to change.[13] Also, in this regard, Kibreab argues that:

> For these (Eritrean) refugees, settlement did not only mean changing from nomadism or semi-nomadism to sedentarised agriculture, which in itself represented a radical change in life style, but they also had to adapt themselves to mechanised cultivation.[14]

Thus the question of whether adoption rates of new crop varieties and of better agricultural techniques were higher among external displacees was examined. New crop varieties were identified as those currently grown by the farmers which had not been in their crop cycle prior to the civil war.

In Yei area, 10 crops had been adopted by farmers following the civil war (Figure 7.7). The most popular of these was the serena DX (sorghum variety) which had been adopted by over half of the sample (54%). This was followed by coffee (39%), 'makulu red' groundnuts (31.5%) and improved maize (13.5%). Serena sorghum was especially popular because of its short maturing period (60 days, and therefore less susceptible to disease) and its higher yield per unit area (estimated as one and a half times that of the local variety). This strain of sorghum had diffused from Kenya to Uganda during the 1950's

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[13]John A. Rogge, "Africa's Resettlement Strategies," International Migration Review, Vol. 15 (1 and 2), Spring-Summer 1981, p. 208-209.

[14]Gaim Kibreab, African Refugees: Reflections on the African Refugee Problem (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1985), p. 125.

Figure 7.7 Rate of Crop Adoption in Yei and Maridi Areas After the Civil War.



and 1960's, and the returnees who adopted it stated that they had first encountered it while in exile.[15] However, the Regional Government was also promoting it in Equatoria following the war.

The high demand for coffee in Sudan, especially from Northern merchants, has been responsible for this crop's growing popularity among small-holders. Thus 39% of the sample have adopted coffee growing. Again, these returnees emphasised that they started growing coffee while in exile in northern Uganda and northeastern Zaire. Although groundnuts have long been an important food commodity in Equatoria, the adoption of the 'makulu red' variety has generated enthusiasm among the farmers because the 'makulu red' is much larger and has a higher yield per unit area and a much higher oil content. In Uganda, Tiley has observed that this variety is preferred by the farmers over the local variety, because it matures early and is more convenient to cultivate, and also by the traders because it contains more oil.[16] As question number 37 has shown, the adoptors had previously encountered 'makulu red' while in exile, especially in Uganda's West Nile, Acholi, Teso, Busoga and Bunyoro districts where this variety was dominant. Some 13.5% of the sample had adopted this crop. However, the adoption of 'makulu red' by other population groups is attributed to the Project Development Unit of the Regional Ministry of Agriculture, which promoted its cultivation in

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[15]Serena sorghum variety was introduced to Uganda in the 1960's by Dr. H. Doggett at Serere Research Station in Teso district, southeast Uganda. Dr. Doggett established that the improved variety had much higher yield (3,000 lb of grain per acre) than the local variety (500 - 1,000 lb of grain), and thus recommended its adoption by farmers. For details, see H. Doggett, "Sorghum", in J. D. Jameson (ed.), Agriculture in Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 223-26.

[16]G. E. D. Tiley, "Groundnuts", in J. D. Jameson (ed.), Ibid, p. 231.

Equatoria Province after the war. The relatively lower adoption rate of fruits (pineapples 7.5%, Indian mango 6%, oranges 6% and bananas 5%) was attibuted to their perishability and lack of adequate storage facilities.

In Maridi area, levels of adoption of new crop varieties were much lower than in Yei (Figure 7.7). The highest level of adoption was for pineapples (32.5%), an important cash crop in western Equatoria, followed by coffee (31%), bananas (10.5%), oranges (9.5%) and Zairean rice (9.5%). The adoption of new crops (especially pineapples and coffee) in Maridi area may be attributed to the overall changes in the farmers' attitudes toward farming since the civil war - they became more conscious of their impoverished economic conditions because of their dependence on low-paying government jobs. Prior to the war, government employment on the Zande Scheme had been the main source of livelihood for many people and farming focussed only upon growing basic food requirements. However, more importantly, the adoption of pineapples and coffee by a sizeable proportion of the returnees appears to have been in response to the growth of both internal and external consumer demand. Northern retail merchants based in Maridi, Yambio, and Wau, for example, depend on western Equatoria for pineapples, coffee, and other tropical products, which they in turn sell in northern markets including Khartoum. This external demand has therefore generated an economic incentive for the farmers to produce more. Since the war, the adoption of new crops in Maridi area appears to be largely due to the initiative of the Regional Ministry of Agriculture which has promoted cash crop production in Equatoria. This fact is substantiated by 30% and 28% respectively of the sample who reported the Extension Unit and Project

Development Unit of the Regional Ministry of Agriculture as their sources of innovation. Only 8% of the sample stated Uganda and Zaire as direct or indirect sources of new crops. Thus, in Maridi area, both new ideas and new crops were largely introduced into the district by the government.

In Yei area the situation is different in that many farmers came back from Uganda and Zaire with new concepts of agricultural crop production (i.e., primary innovation). Since the civil war, these new ideas were promoted by the Regional Ministry of Agriculture, resulting in 63.5% and 47% reporting Project Development Unit and Extension Unit respectively as their sources of secondary innovation (e.g., purchase of seeds or seedlings in the case of coffee). The high adoption rate by Yei farmers suggests that many had encountered these new crops while in Uganda and Zaire during the civil war.

Although some crops have gained higher adoption rate since the civil war, others, such as local varieties of sorghum, groundnuts, tobacco, rice and maize, have lost popularity. However, the number of farmers who have completely abandoned growing traditional crops is small, ranging from 2 - 5%, which suggests that the majority of farmers grow both traditional and new varieties alongside one another.

The introduction of new crops is also associated with the adoption of new skills and new methods of cultivation. Farmers reporting adoption of new agricultural techniques were found only in Yei area. None of Maridi's sample indicated adopting new farming methods after the civil war. In response to the question (number 39): "What new farming techniques and methods have you adopted since the war?", three new methods of farming were identified in Yei area. A new technique

reported by almost half of the sample (48.5%) was that of 'planting in rows'. This was followed by 'appropriate crop combination' (17.5%) and 'use of natural manure' (10.5%) made up of decomposed leaves and vegetation cover.

The traditional way of cultivation was to broadcast seeds haphazardly over fields without paying attention to any pattern of cropping.[17] Broadcasting can give good results provided that the land is well prepared and the seed rate is high enough to ensure an even spread over the area (10 to 15 lb of seed per acre is recommended).[18] The use of rows allows for more space between the crop and reduces crop density, while in turn providing higher yields. Also, planting in rows makes for easier weeding and harvesting (Figure 7.8). Doggett maintains that for serena variety, the rows should be 1 foot apart, and the plants be thinned out to 9 - 12 inches apart in the rows, so that a hoe can be used easily between them.[19] However, although this method of cultivation has advantages over the broadcast system, the farmers reported that it has made the soil more prone to erosion in certain areas.

As in most parts of Equatoria region, there are two cropping seasons in Yei area. As is shown in Figure 7.9, the first planting starts in March and the first harvest is in June/July. After this the

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[17]Broadcasting is usually done either by hand or 'kalabash' (bowl) depending upon the size of seed grains. For larger seed grains (e.g., maize) hands are used while for smaller grains such as sorghum and sesame a 'kalabash' is often convenient. In so doing, an even spread of seed grains is maintained.

[18]H. Doggett, op. cit., p. 224.

[19]Ibid.

Figure 7.8 Methods of Crop Cultivation in Yei Area.



FIGURE 7.9 A GENERAL CALENDAR FOR FOOD CROP PRODUCTION AND CROP COMBINATION IN YEI AREA



empty land is cleared for a second planting in July. Because different crops have different maturing periods, the second harvest starts in September and continues through to November. The common food crops grown in Yei area, as in the whole of Equatoria, include cassava, groundnuts, maize, sorghum, seasame, beans, sweet potatoes and millet. Vegetables are grown during the dry season in low-lying areas along Yei river and other streams.

Although the crop combinations adopted by farmers since the civil war are not radically different from the pre-war period, a significant change was in the response to climatic requirements of the new crops that have been adopted. For example, maize (katumani and western yellow varieties) and groundnuts (makulu red and mani pinter varieties) are now grown earlier in the rainy season for optimum yield.[20]

Crop rotation is commonly practiced in Equatoria region. It is a system where crops are grown in rotation on the same field, and it is found especially in the southern borderlands which support perennial crops and land rotation. Land rotation is the system where land is cropped and rested by turns, but neither the community nor the individual moves to a fresh site.[21] By rotating crops, the soil balance is maintained because crop requirements from the soil differ as do the nutrients added to the soil by different crops. In all rotations, legumes such as beans are important because they protect

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[20]Wesley M. Chicago, "The Contribution of the P.D.U. in the Development of Farming in the Southern Sudan, with Special Reference to Crops", Paper Presented at the Sudanese Socialist Union - University of Juba Conference on Development Problems on the Southern Region, January 10-15, 1979, Juba.

[21]Stephens differentiates land rotation from shifting cultivation and defines the latter as a "system where the community crops land until its fertility declines to an unprofitable level and then moves to a fresh

rapid soil erosion and are also a source of valuable nutrients to the soil. Also, although cassava adds no nutrients to the soil, it protects the soil from erosion.

The reports on Southern Sudanese refugees on rural settlement schemes in Uganda (Nakapiripirit) and Zaire (Amadi and Nugadi) indicate that the refugees were exposed to the same food and cash crops they are currently growing while in exile.[22] These findings support the assertion by the returnees that although the crops and methods of cultivation they have currently adopted were largely introduced by the Regional Ministry of Agriculture and international development agencies after the wary, they had grown the same crops and used the same methods of cultivation while in exile.

Since Maridi's climate is similar to Yei's, cropping cycles and crop variety in the two districts are generally the same. However, significant differences in farming techniques exist. Unlike in Yei district, where field rotation is widely practiced, in Maridi district shifting cultivation predominates. As was stated in the previous chapter, Maridi's area (22,477 sq. km) is more than double that of Yei's (10,027 sq. km) but it has a much lower population density than Yei district. The continuation of traditional shifting cultivation methods is therefore possible since large tracts of available land exist. This is not the case in Yei district.

The use of natural manure from decomposed leaves and vegetation has a limited impact upon plant growth in that the humus added to the soil

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site, building new houses at each move". See D. Stephens "Soil Fertility", in J. D. Jameson (ed.), op. cit., p. 84.

[22]Paul Trappe, Social Change and Development Institutions in a Refugee Population - Development from Below as an Alternative: The Case of the Nakapiripirit Settlement Scheme in Uganda, Report No. 71.2,

lasts for only one or two cultivation seasons. During the first field preparation, the grass and bushes are slashed and first digging is made. The leaves are then left to dry and decompose. The second field preparation takes place during the first rains. This involves ploughing, collecting and burning the undecomposed material before planting the first crops.

(b) Income Levels. It has now been established that following the civil war significant differences in socio-economic performance developed between external and internal displacees. Also rates of adoption of new crops and new techniques were higher among external refugees. Consequently, it is to be expected that average incomes generated by external refugees will be somewhat higher than those of internal refugees. Similarly, income levels in Yei should be higher than those in Maridi.

The survey showed that mean average income from primary sources of employment for Yei area was LS. 289.400 m/ms while that of Maridi was LS. 182.000 m/ms per annum. Of the Yei's sample 26.5% reported incomes of LS. 500 or more, but almost half (48.5%) earned less than LS. 200. In contrast to Yei area, only 8.5% of Maridi's sample were earning LS. 500 or more while 75% reported average incomes of less than LS. 200 per annum (Figure 7.10).

In addition to primary sources of income, many farmers had also secondary incomes, especially from illicit trading across Sudan-Zaire-Uganda borders. Because of the nature of such income

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Geneva 1971, pp. 32-39; and Tristram Betts, Spontaneous Settlement of Rural Refugees in Africa: Case-Study No. 3 - Sudanese Refugees in Zaire, April 1980, p. 7.

Figure 7.10 Yei and Maridi Areas: Distribution of Average Annual Incomes of Sample Population.



respondents were reluctant to discuss secondary incomes derived from black marketeering. However, suffice it to say that although the survey data do not reveal the actual number of farmers engaged in various forms of secondary economic activities since the war, information gathered from the chiefs indicates that after the war, many farmers became actively involved in illicit trade across Sudan-Zaire border in an attempt to diversify and improve their economic base. These improvements in farmers' economic well-being are reflected in the current ways of spending money, especially in Yei area. For example, hiring farm labourers for cash payment is a new concept introduced from Uganda. Traditionally, communal farm workers were paid in kind, such as with produce or local beer. Now they commonly receive cash for farm work, which clearly reflects the higher incomes of many farmers. Also, with the influx of Ugandan refugees into Yei district following the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979, a reservoir of cheap farm labour has been created for the local population. In addition to hiring farm labourers, up-keep of petty trading, education and health were also important in farmers' rating their disposition of earnings. The greater concern for children's health and education since the civil war reflects the fact that many refugees had been exposed to such social services while in exile. This concern for children's education is also shown by the fact that most of the 300 'private or parents schools' which were built through self-help programs after the civil war were located in Yei district.[23] This contrasts with the other districts where the population depended largely on public schools.

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[23]Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, The Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977-78 - 1982-83, Juba, Sudan, June 1977, p. 206.

The socio-economic conditions of the sample described above for Yei and Maridi areas reflect the general situation of populations in the two districts. In Chapter 6, it was shown that the average incomes in Yei area were higher than Maridi's (Figure 6.3). After the war, these differences in economic performance were further perpetuated by differing experiences the populations of the two areas udnerwent during the war. In Equatoria, Yei has become the most self-sufficient district and is the largest producer of food and cash crops for Juba urban market. The adoption rate of new crops and farming techniques is also much more evident in Yei than anywhere else in the whole South. Related to these innovations and economic incentives are larger farm sizes and higher average incomes. Yei farmers command higher incomes than their counterparts in other districts and provinces.

## SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the post-civil war conditions in Yei and Maridi areas. Age and marital status were found to be important from a social point of view. For example, age is a symbol of recognition of individual's social standing and respect in the community. Also, women have special socio-economic roles in the functioning of rural communities.

Contrary to the general view, heterogeneity in Maridi area was found not to have generated competitive attitudes among the population because their displacement was local and within the same ethnic territory. On the other hand, the homogeneous population in Yei area, which was displaced outside its territory and was exposed to diverse ethnic groups in Uganda and Zaire, experienced much greater change and

competitive behavior.

Although the civil war had marked economic impact on the displaced population, it had not affected their family sizes. No difference in the average family size was found between external and internal returnees on the one hand and the general population on the other.

After the civil war, the refugees who returned immediately to their villages did not gain any better access to land compared to those who returned at a later date since prevailing land-tenure laws allow all individuals to reclaim lands they had previously cultivated. Farming became the main economic activity for virtually all returnees, leading to increased farm sizes, especially in Yei area. Also, with the aid of government incentives, most farmers now considered themselves better-off than before the civil war. This is especially the case among the external returnees. Adoption rates of new crops and of new farming techniques were also found to be higher among external displacees, which in turn has led to average annual earnings and consequent spending power being much higher among the external returnees. Chapter 8 discusses the Gilo and Aweil samples.

# CHAPTER 8

## THE GILO AND AWEIL SETTLEMENT SCHEMES: THEIR ROLE IN THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS

This chapter examines two additional sample populations, one drawn from the Gilo Potato Project in Torit district, and one from the Aweil Rice Scheme in Aweil district. The purpose is to illustrate the role of organised settlement schemes in the post-war resettlement and rehabilitation process. Although the two sample populations share similar characteristics in terms of their participation in government development schemes, they will be discussed consecutively because of their different experiences during the civil war. For example, virtually all the Gilo sample was displaced during the war, while in the case of Aweil, all the population remained in their villages throughout the war. Thus Aweil's population contrasts markedly with the other populations studied, in that it experienced only minimum disruption during the civil war years.

The chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which focuses upon the Gilo scheme, and the second on the Aweil scheme. As in Chapters 6 and 7, the chapter will trace the samples' socio-economic conditions in the pre-civil war, civil war and post-civil war periods to determine the changes in the respective populations' well-being that were a product of the civil war era. The assumptions raised in Chapter 7 with respect to the Yei and Maridi populations will also be examined here for Gilo and Aweil.

It was suggested in Chapter 5 that two principal rural development strategies have been commonly adopted in development planning, namely

the bimodal and unimodal thrusts. For example, in Yei and Maridi areas, bimodal thrusts were adopted, in that the population was involved in basic peasant subsistence farming, but was also receiving broader support from the government in terms of extension service and technical advice with the objective of achieving self-sufficiency. In the Gilo and Aweil areas on the other hand, unimodal thrusts have been employed. Here, government development schemes which are commercially oriented, have been introduced into areas of peasant farming and subsistence-oriented economies. Because such schemes were alien to the socio-economic environments of the recipient societies, they remained largely as 'foreign' bodies within the local economies.

Having discussed the bimodal thrusts in Yei and Maridi areas, where it was determined that Yei was more successful than Maridi for reasons given in Chapter 7, it is appropriate to place the Gilo and Aweil schemes into a similar context. Here, two basic questions are pertinent: (a) Are the farmers on the organised schemes better off than the surrounding population who are independent farmers? If so, why? If not, why not? (b) Are there differences in the success of farmers in Gilo vis-a-vis Aweil since the war? If so, are the different levels of displacement experienced by the populations at Gilo and Aweil responsible for such differences?

## PART 1: THE GILO AREA

### THE PRE-CIVIL WAR PERIOD

Virtually all the sampled population (37 of the 40) had been residents of Torit district prior to the war (Figure 1.4), and over half had lived in Katire area prior to fleeing into exile (Figure 8.5).

Before 1955, most people in the district practiced some form of subsistence farming. However, unlike in Yei and Maridi districts, where farming had been practiced on a relatively large scale, in Torit district farming had been very marginal due to the unsuitability of soils and terrain. Large areas in the district, especially in the south, are hilly and contain only thin and poor soil cover. Because of these constraints, farming had not been taken too seriously by many people. This is illustrated by the fact that 65% of the sample had held some form of government employment in the Forestry Department for their principal source of income prior to the war.[1] Only 22.5% of the sample stated that farming had been their principal economic activity. The balance (12.5%) had been underaged at the time of the war. Unlike in Yei and Maridi areas, where private employment had also played a role in the pre-civil war local economy, this does not appear to have been the case in Gilo area. However, while farming had not been a primary source of income among the Gilo sample, it was nevertheless a significant secondary economic activity, as 62.5% of the sample stated that they had been so engaged.

Farm sizes prior to the civil war reflected this relatively underdeveloped farming economy. Average farm sizes were 2.5 feddans, compared with averages of 4.4 and 3.5 feddans in pre-war Yei and Maridi. Of the sample, only two persons cultivated areas of over 9 feddans, but almost half had farms of less than 2.5 feddans. Given these limited economic activities, it is not surprising that overall earnings were also low, averaging only LS. 35 per annum. Only 11.6% of the sample

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[1]Prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, the only major source of employment in Katire and Gilo was the Department of Forestry, which operated saw-mills in both locations.

reported earnings of over LS. 80 prior to the war while three-quarters had incomes below the average. Such low incomes appear to reflect the general situation prevailing in the South prior to 1955.

## THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD

As was the case in Yei and Maridi areas, the war period generated both internal and external refugees from the Gilo area. The fact that as many as half of the displacees were only locally displaced may appear surprising, given the proximity of the sample area to Sudan-Ugandan borders. The large proportion of internal displacees in the Gilo sample reflects the general situation that prevailed in Torit district during the civil war. Because the Imatong mountain range provided adequate security from government troops, the majority of the district's population opted to take refuge locally. Only a small proportion crossed into Uganda and Zaire. It is necessary to differentiate between the two groups of displacees, because of their very different experiences while being displaced.

### The Internal Refugees

The internal displacees constituted 52.5% of the sample, all of whom took refuge in the 'bush' in the surrounding mountain areas, which were remote from the areas of conflict. The distances travelled by the refugees were generally short and were limited to within the same ethnic territory.

The physical environment of Torit district clearly played a major role in limiting population movements across the borders during the civil war, for despite the area's proximity to Uganda, only about

one-third of the displacees took refuge there. This contrasts sharply with the Yei area where local conditions provided little safety from the fighting and most of the sample found refuge in Uganda and Zaire. The Gilo population shows that proximity to an international border is not in itself sufficient reason for displacees to cross a border, especially if local environments provide the necessary 'cover' for refugees to escape war conditions. Moreover, close ethnic affinity also helps to determine the distance and directions which displacees move. For example, Terrill has shown that in the Acholi area:

> ... the Kor clan from the Acholi (border) village of Farajok moved almost completely to settle with the remote Parri people of Lafon (north of Torit town), high on a mountain and surrounded by swamps.[2]

Similar moves into remote areas of ethnic kin characterised the Gilo population.

A further group of displacees took refuge in the 'bush' for only short periods rather than for the duration of the war. Some 15% of the sample reported that they remained in their villages for most of the war, leaving only temporarily during exceptionally heavy flare-ups in the fighting between Anyanya and government forces. None of the sample reported having migrated to towns during the civil war. Again, this is not surprising since, as was discussed in Chapter 2, most towns in Equatoria were totally deserted by civilians during this period.

## The External Refugees

External refugees constituted one-third of the sample. Because of the study area's proximity to Uganda, it was the only country of asylum

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[2]Christopher F. F. Terrill, "The Creation of the Acholi Minority of the Southern Sudan: Their Dispersal as Refugees, Repatriation, and Resettlement", Paper Presented at the IGU Symposium on the Problems and

to which Gilo refugees fled. As had been the case of refugees from Yei and Maridi, the Gilo refugees also settled in three ways while in exile: spontaneously in rural areas, in organised rural settlement schemes, or in urban settlements.

Those who settled spontaneously did so mainly in the zone of initial influx across the border in northern districts of Acholi and Karamoja (Figure 6.6). The Sudanese Acholi were particularly drawn to their ethnic kin on the Ugandan side of the border. The second category of displacees settled on organised rural settlement schemes such as the Agago settlement in Acholi district or the Nakapiripirit settlement in Karamoja district (Figure 8.1). Settlers on these schemes were drawn from various ethnic origins, and differed from the host societies among which they settled. Almost all of these displacees settled in localities beyond their ethnic territories. This contrasts sharply with those who had been internally displaced, and had thus remained within their ethnic regions.

A third group of external displacees were those who migrated to towns such as Kitgum and Lira in the north, or to Ngoro and Jinja in the south. Such refugees were also of heterogeneous ethnic make up, and clearly settled in urban areas completely outside of their ethnic regions.

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Consequences of Refugee Migrations in the Developing World, 29th August to 1st September 1983, Hecla, Manitoba, Canada, p. 15.

Figure 8.1 Nature of Settlement in Uganda by External Refugees From Gilo During the Civil War.



The Refugee Exodus and Their Economic Activities During the War

It was suggested in Chapter 6 that the complete displacement of groups or villages reflects a higher degree of danger to personal life than is the case of flight by individuals. In the Yei area it was shown that such group migrations were common. It was also demonstrated that Yei area was especially heavily involved in the fighting. Also, it was suggested that if the source area is close to a border area, this would stimulate the flow of external refugees. Yei's situation illustrated this well.

In the case of the Gilo sample, of 34 respondents who went into long term exile either in the 'bush' or in Uganda, 28 of them fled as part of an entire village group. The balance reported that they had fled as individuals (Table 8.1). However, the majority of those who fled as part of a group were internally displaced. This suggests that external displacement of refugees can not always be explained simply by the intensity of a threat to safety, or by the apparent closeness of an international border. In Gilo, the threat to safety was clearly great, as the extent of group migration implies, yet local refuge was preferred by many rather than the greater apparent safety of Uganda. The remote and relatively inaccessible physical environment of southeastern Sudan clearly provided levels of safety considered adequate by the displacees. In this regard, an important question can be asked: What were the impacts on these internal refugees, as they withdrew further into the remote and completely undeveloped 'bush' areas of Southern Sudan? For the sample population - which was also true for the general population - a net impact of the displacement was that they were forced to turn to subsistence farming as the prime, and usually only, source of

Table 8.1

Gilo Area: Nature of Population Exodus During the Civil War

| Refugee Group | Individual Exodus | Group/Village Exodus | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Internal Refugees | 4 | 17 | 21 |
| External Refugees | 2 | 11 | 13 |
| Sub-total | 6 | 28 | 34 |
| Remained in Own Village | - | - | 6 |
| Total | | | 40 |

livelihood. Some 85% reported farming as their only economic activity during the civil war. Of the balance who reported government employment, all found such employment outside Sudan. For the internal displacees living in the 'bush', no opportunities other than subsistence farming existed.

Moreover, while some of the Yei and Maridi refugees in the sample were engaged in petty trading or other secondary economic activities during the war, no such income diversification was available or undertaken by those in the Gilo sample. This was largely due to the lack of opportunities in the areas to which the refugees fled, but may also have reflected a reluctance or inability to engage in economic activities to which they had not previously been exposed.

## THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD

### Contemporary Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Population

It is useful to commence the examination of the post-civil war experiences of the Gilo area with a review of the contemporary demographic structure. This allows us to determine whether or not the sample population is typical of that of Southern Sudan. In terms of age, for example, the sample is relatively young, with a mean age of 39.4 years, and 57.5% of them are below the average (Figure 8.2). In Chapter 7, it was suggested that a similar young age-sex distribution in Maridi vis-a-vis an older population in Yei, may be in part explained by the extent of local or internal displacement during the war. It was hypothesised in the case of Maridi, that local displacement into the 'bush' led to the population being exposed to fewer external influences, and consequently resulted in a higher proportion returning to their home

Figure 8.2 Gilo Area: Distribution of Sample Population by Age Groups



areas after the war. The same appears to be the case for the Gilo sample.

In terms of the ethnic mix of the Gilo sample, an analogy may again be drawn with the Maridi and Yei populations. As was suggested in Chapter 7, the more exposed people are to a heterogeneous population mix, the greater the likelihood that they will assimilate new concepts or adopt changes in their way of life. Although Torit district is inhabited by several ethnic groups, the Lotuka dominate the area, and especially the southern part of the district where the Gilo area is situated. They constitute nearly one-third (32.5%) of the sample population, followed by the Acholi (12.5%), Dongotona (12.5%), Lango (10%), and the Bari (7.5%). This distribution of the ethnic groups among the sample is therefore perfectly in keeping with the general distribution of the ethnic groups in the district, according to the 1973 census for Torit district. However, this ethnic mix appears to have had little impact in terms of changing socio-economic conditions when compared to Yei area. In Gilo area, displacement during the war was generally local, within each respective ethnic area. Thus little contact between groups occurred and hence there was little transfer of socio-economic concepts and practices.

While marital status among the sample population after the civil war does not appear to differ much in Gilo from conditions prevailing in the other study areas, or in Southern Sudan in general (80% were married in the Gilo sample compared to 83% for Equatoria Province), the civil war has had an impact on marital status by delaying the age of first marriage as well as to generate long periods of separation of spouses during the civil war. This has clearly had an impact on family size.

It has already been suggested that populations which underwent a major displacement during the civil war experienced a reduction in fertility, leading to smaller families than the norm after the war. This may be borne out in the Gilo area where the average family is 5.8 persons, compared to higher average of about 7 persons for the rest of the Sudan. But the smaller family size also clearly reflects the age-cohort distribution in the Gilo area, where there is a high proportion of relatively young people. Since few married couples have no children, and family sizes of 3 - 5 persons (1 - 3 children per family) were reported by 25% of the sample, it can be suggested that where small families do exist, it is primarily due to delayed marriage caused by the war on the one hand or by the high proportion of young households on the other. Moreover, in this regard there does not appear to be a significant difference between internally and externally displaced people in Gilo area on the one hand, and between them and areas in Southern Sudan affected by the war on the other hand.

The foregoing discussion suggests that the Gilo's population age structure was similar to that of Maridi in that the young people returned to their villages immediately after the war. However, in Yei area, this was not the case because many of the young population, having been exposed to new ideas while in exile, migrated to towns. As was the case in Maridi, ethnic mix in Gilo area did not appear to have influenced changes in socio-economic conditions of the displacees because their displacement during the war was within ethnic territories and little or no interaction occurred with outside groups. The Gilo's sample differed significantly from the Yei's sample because the latter

was exposed to new ideas while in exile. In terms of marital status, the Gilo's situation did not appear to differ signficiantly from conditions prevailing in other study areas or in the Southern Sudan as a whole.

## The Repatriation and Resettlement Process

The repatriation of displacees after the civil war is examined here to determine if there was any difference in the experiences encountered by internal and external refugees. Since the majority of the sample were internally displaced, one would expect that they all repatriated much earlier than their external counterparts. Indeed, of the sample, about one-quarter of the internally displaced had already returned to their villages voluntarily prior to the Addis Ababa Agreement in anticipation of the war ending. Unlike in Yei and Maridi areas, where many refugees delayed their repatriation because of their better socio-economic conditions in exile, in Gilo's case, this does not appear to have been the case, and refugees from the 'bush' as well as those from across the border, repatriated voluntarily almost immediately after the Addis Ababa Agreement. By early 1973, virtually all had repatriated (Figure 8.3).

Moreover, almost all of the sample returned to their original villages in which they were resident prior to the war. Of the 34 respondents who returned from either the 'bush' or Uganda, two-thirds did so on foot and without any assistance, while the balance passed through the Gumba transit camp. This latter group included those assisted by UNHCR, as well as some who were unable to return directly to their villages because of lack of transport due to roads still being

Figure 8.3 Gilo Area: Date of Return to Former Place of Residence After the Civil War.



unserviceable.

## THE DEVELOPMENT SCHEME

The Gilo Potato Project was established in 1974 as an outgrowth of the Regional Government's development strategy for the post-war period. This policy set out to establish new agricultural schemes in the South to increase food and cash crop production and to facilitate the resettlement of the returnees.

The main objectives of the scheme were threefold:

(a) to provide high quality food and cash crop for the Southern Sudan;

(b) to provide healthy potato seeds for local farmers in the area;

(c) to establish Gilo as a seed multiplication center for the Southern Sudan. This was the long-term objective of the project.[3]

In the realisation of these objectives, the Regional Ministry of Agriculture proposed six more sites for potato production in eastern Equatoria. They were proposed at Yei and Iwatoka in the Yei district; at Nagishot in Kapoeta district; and at Lerwa, Palotaka and Palwar in Torit district. It was suggested that the development of these centers would generate interest among local populations - largely the Kakwa in Yei, the Didinga in Kapoeta, and the Acholi in Torit - to adopt potatoes as both food and cash crop.

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[3]Interview with the Potato Project Officer, Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Southern Region, Juba, 1978.

The Gilo scheme is a small scale one, containing an area of only 30 feddans. The area is divided into blocks of 1.25 feddans (0.5 hectare) each. Figure 8.4 shows a partial layout of the scheme (17 blocks) as of September 1977. However, since then, expansion has been made and the whole area was brought under potato production.[4] The scheme is based principally on Irish potatoes, which are suited to local conditions.[5] The climate is cool and quite favourable to potato growing. There are two growing seasons for potatoes, one beginning in April and the other in September. Crop rotation is practiced in order to maintain soil fertility. In this process, potato cultivation in the blocks alternates with fallow or legumes (e.g. beans) within one year of planting and also from one year to another.[6] The other precipitating factor responsible for the development of the scheme was the need to diversify local food production. Gilo is a remote area, yet has traditionally depended upon food from other areas. The introduction of potatoes to the area was to reduce this dependency on other areas. Moreover, since the area had no previous cash crop experience, it was anticipated that the scheme would lead to a diffusion of cash cropping by encouraging local population not involved on the scheme to also grow potatoes on their holdings. Such demonstration effects of agricultural schemes have frequently been

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[4]Interview with the Potato Project Officer, Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Juba, 1982. An updated map of the scheme was not available to this writer.

[5]In addition to potatoes, vegetables such as carrots, cabbages, sprouts, radishes, cauliflower and spinach have been experimented with and proven successful.

[6]Interview with the Field Supervisor, Gilo Potato Project, Gilo, November 1982.

Figure 8.4 The Gilo Potato Project.




Source: Gilo Potato Project Reports, Juba

promoted by African settlement and agricultural schemes. The participants on the Gilo project were employed by the government as farm labourers, and except for their wages, they are in no way committed to the scheme. This rural development strategy does not give the producer incentive to hard work or emotional attachment to the scheme's development.

As a means of developing a rural economy, the Gilo Project has been less effective in making the local farmers adopt the growing of potatoes on their plots. The number of farmers known to have started growing potatoes in the area was small. In the late 1970's it was reported by the Department of Agriculture that around 10 farmers in the Gilo area had successfully started growing potatoes on their private farms, averaging 0.5 feddans per person. The average yield per feddan was 9 tons of potatoes, with an average net income of LS. 600 per head, which was considerably high by local standards.[7] The initial enthusiasm of the local population to grow potatoes waned because of lack of transportation to the market. The potatoes grown on the government scheme were sold largely at Juba market, 208 km northwest of Gilo, but no similar arrangements were made for off-scheme producers. This lack of direct access by growers to markets made them vulnerable to the middlemen who have the means of accessing the market and thus reaping high profits from potatoes.[8] As the early results have shown, assured transportation to the market and an attractive price for the crop would be major incentives for the farmers to grow potatoes on their plots.

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[7]Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Report on the Sale of Gilo Potatoes for the Season of 1976-77, December 1977, Juba.

[8]For example, in 1978, the cost of potatoes from a local farmer was 15 piastres per kilogram and the middleman sold it in Juba market at 46 piastres per kilogram. Loc. cit.

As was discussed in Chapter 5, the government schemes often ignore the basic needs of target populations, especially local food crops. The crops produced on such government schemes are usually unrelated to the food requirements of the local population. Consequently, the produce is consumed outside the immediate region of production. The Gilo Potato Project is no exception. As an exercise in rural development, the project has remained as an isolated instance of development in a peasant, subsistence economy. To date, only two centers - Upper Talanga and Nagishot - have started to grow potatoes outside Gilo.[9] The demonstration effects which were intended to occur among the local population have not been realised. First, the farmer was not taken seriously in the planning stage. He was expected to conform with what was said by the government agent. To adopt new crops, the farmer would have to be aware of the benefits, and here, farmer education through agricultural extension is vital in promoting the success of development plans. Unlike in Yei and Maridi districts, where agricultural extension work was widespread, in Torit district, this was not the case.

Second, the population's dietary habits and how they would adopt Irish potatoes as a component to their food requirement, were not investigated by the government. When the project was conceived, major concerns centered around the suitability of the area in terms of climate and the production aspect in terms of labour force. No serious thought was given to the human element in the development process, and the marketing factor, given the remoteness of Gilo area. Third, participation on the scheme was only in terms of labour input, and as

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[9]Amin Julla, "Agricultural Potential of the Southern Sudan", Paper Presented to the Conference on Development in the Southern Region, April 5-8, 1983, Juba.

such farmers do not feel that they are part of the scheme.

Returnees' Response to the Gilo Scheme

The discussion of current economic activities of the sampled population is intended to show the extent to which the returnees have changed their economic behaviour.

As has already been shown, the sample population returned to their original villages following the war. It was only after their resettlement that their secondary migration to the Gilo Project took place. Their departure from their home villages was in response to the limited socio-economic opportunities which they encountered after their return to their villages. First, the rural areas were all devastated by the war, thus making farming unattractive to many returnees. Consequently, farmers sought employment elsewhere. Second, with the establishment of the Regional Government in the South, many returnees anticipated that many well-paying government jobs would be created, and thus they migrated to the towns in search of such jobs (see Chapter 4). In Gilo area, the establishment of the Potato Project and the rehabilitation of the Katire and Gilo Forestry Projects also became vital pull factors for populations from various parts of the district (Figure 8.5).

All the respondents reported government employment on the scheme as their major current economic activity. Thus there has been an increase from the pre-war situation, when only 65% had been engaged in government employment. This increase is also a reflection of the proportion of the sample population that had been underaged prior to the war. As the farmers were employed for wages, they were expected to produce their

Figure 8.5 Gilo Sample : Location of Source Areas.



food on off-scheme plots. Because of this arrangement, subsistence farming outside the scheme was an important secondary economic activity. Apart from farming, no other secondary economic activities were reported by the sample population, suggesting that people rely heavily on government employment for their livelihood. As much of the day's work was spent on the government scheme (7 A.M. to 3 P.M.), the farmers often had less time to spend on their private farms. Consequently, farming was limited to after-work hours (3 to 6 P.M.) and on weekends and holidays. Also, many had farms located far away (8 kilometers or more) from the Gilo settlement, because much of the land closest to the scheme was part of the Imatong Forest Reserve, which produces commercial softwoods. As a result, much of the farmers' spare time was spent walking to and from the farms rather than on actual cultivation. The net result was that there has not been any substantial increase in the average farm size of the scheme's participants in the post-war period. The average farm size was 2.6 feddans (compared to 2.5 feddans in the pre-war period), with 70% of the respondents reporting farms below the average. This figure is far below the Yei's and Maridi's average farm size of 7 and 5 feddans respectively.

The sample populations's economic conditions before and after the war are now compared in order to assess the changes that have occurred in the post-war period. Their responses to the question on their current economic conditions were mixed, depending on their specific experiences since the war. One-third reported that they considered themselves better-off since the war, while 7.5% stated that they had experienced better conditions prior to 1955. A further 22.5% reported experiencing better economic conditions during the war. The balance

(37.5%) found that there were no differences between their current and past economic conditions prior to their exodus. Of those indicating improved conditions, two-thirds were internal refugees who had been displaced in the 'bush', and had led a marginal subsistence way of life. This suggests that despite the low pay they received from employment on the government scheme, they regarded it an improvement over their past economic conditions. Two-thirds of the external displacees reported that they had been better-off while in exile, implying that after repatriating, they had regressed in terms of their socio-economic conditions. These data do not agree with findings at Yei and Maridi, where the vast majority believed that their economic conditions improved after the war. On the whole, therefore, the Gilo case-study shows that after the war, the external displacees regressed more in their economic conditions than their internal counterparts. Consequently, no significant differences in economic performance were observed between the two groups of displacees.

## THE ADOPTION OF INNOVATIONS ON OFF-SCHEME PLOTS

An examination of the extent of adoption of new crop varieties and of new farming techniques by returnees, as well as an examination of their average incomes since returning, will shed further light on the extent of change in their economic conditions brought about by their displacement. In the Gilo area, levels of adoption of new crop varieties were much lower than those reported in Yei and Maridi areas. As was stated earlier, the majority of the sample were displaced locally within ethnic territories, and thus had no interaction with outside groups during their exile. Crops such as cotton, coffee, groundnuts,

tobacco, maize and sweet potatoes had been adopted by a few displacees, but their adoption rates were very low, ranging from 2.5 to 7.5% of the sample.

The few farmers who had adopted new crop varieties tended to be from among those who had been externally displaced. Also, only 22.5% of the sample had been active farmers prior to the war. The few crops that were adopted in Sudan were all food and cash crops common to Northern Uganda, and it is clear that refugees were introduced to growing these crops while in exile.

The low adoption rates of new crop varieties in Gilo area can also be attributed to the adverse physical environment of the region. Gilo is 1,900 meters above sea-level, with annual rainfall of 2,260 mm. Thus given the altitude and heavy rainfall throughout the year, the Gilo area is unsuitable for many of the common food and cash crops which the displacees might have had experience with in Uganda or in their home villages prior to migrating to Gilo. For example, crops such as cotton, coffee, groundnuts, and cassava, do not do well in Gilo. Thus many returnees experienced declines in income because they were unable to grow the profitable cash crops which they had been producing in exile. In this regard, the Gilo's experience contrasts with that of the Yei and Maridi farmers, who were able to introduce new crop varieties into their cropping cycles after their return from Uganda and Zaire.

Since it has been established in the preceding section that there have been no significant differences in economic performance between internal and external displacees in Gilo area since the war, and that rates of adoption of new crop varieties have been negligible, it is not surprising that average annual incomes of the sample population are

found to be low, especially when compared to the Yei area, where higher rates of adoption of new crop varieties have occurred. The average income for the Gilo sample was LS.237 per annum[10] compared to LS.289 for Yei and LS.182 for Maridi. On the basis of such income differences, one may be tempted to conclude that the Gilo sample population is better-off than that of Maridi. However, it must be remembered that the Gilo farmers on the project depend almost entirely upon government employment for their cash income, and are less self-sufficient in food production (as is the case throughout the district) than are either the Maridi or Yei farmers. While the latter are able to invest earnings in self-improvement, in Gilo area, most income is spent on the purchase of food.

The socio-economic conditions of the Gilo case-study described above can be considered as reflecting the general situation of the population in Torit district. In this district, the majority of the rural population were locally displaced during the war, and as a result, they experienced no significant changes in their socio-economic conditions after the war. Also, many of those who became exposed to new farming techniques and new crops while in exile, did not adopt them on their return to Torit either because of the differences in the terrain and micro-climatic conditions or due to the problems of marketing. Except in the Acholi area, where significant improvements in socio-economic conditions were made by local farmers following their displacement, the bulk of the district's population have experienced no

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[10]It should be noted that the average annual income for the population on the government scheme was much lower than that earned by those farmers who have adopted growing potatoes on the plots (LS. 600 per annum).

significant changes in their socio-economic conditions since the war.[11]

Terrill's findings in the Acholi area appear to be atypical of the post-war economic conditions of the district. He found that the return of the Acholi from exile or 'bush' was only in space, but not in time. The various changes in attitudes to society and economy during the war were so great that they "could not be reversed or simply annulled" after their return. According to him,

> the Acholi repatriates and returnees brought with them the perceptions, attitudes, values, ideals, needs and, in some cases, skills, trades and savings variously moulded, developed and accumulated during the period of asylum in a wide range of locations and socio-economic conditions.[12]

Terrill has also observed that although the Acholi were one ethnic group, after the war, they were diverse in their social and economic aspirations. In particular, those who had taken refuge in Uganda during the war tended to be more aggressive toward life, and more responsive to the work of foreign development teams (e.g. the Norwegian Church Aid) in the area.[13] Thus, the traditional experiences, outlook and behaviour that characterised the pre-war society, were replaced by a diversity of often conflicting economic and social strategies. These experiences, described by Terrill in the Acholi area, appear to be minimal or non-existent in other parts of Torit district. Rather, the findings in the Gilo area seem to be more typical of the general socio-economic conditions of the district.

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[11]Christopher F. F. Terrill, Loc. cit.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

The scheme's objectives remain to be realised. Although the scheme has succeeded in providing potato seedlings to some local farmers, its overall impact on the participants in particular and the surrounding population in general has been minimal. As a food crop, the Irish potatoes have only appealed to urban dwellers, who have the taste for them. Cassava and millet remain the principal food requirement for the rural population. The major deterrent factors to the growing of potatoes by local farmers on their private farms were identified by the respondents as:

(a) the fear of risk-taking. Potato growing in Gilo area is recent, and local farmers were afraid to take risks in economic pursuits they were not exposed to; and

(b) the problems of storage, transport, and marketing, given the remoteness of Gilo area from the potential market towns of Torit and Juba.

Because of these considerations, the impact of the scheme on the participants and the surrounding population has remained limited.

## PART 2: THE AWEIL AREA

The Aweil district is the most populous district (contains 50.7% of the 1.3 million population) in Bahr el Ghazal Province.[14] Four-fifths of the population belong to the Malual Dinka ethnic group and the remainder are Jur, an ethnic group related to the Luo people.

As was already noted in the introduction to this chapter, the case study in Aweil considers the Aweil Rice Scheme. The discussion of the scheme focuses on its impact on the local population and how their experiences with the scheme have influenced their current economic performance. As was mentioned in Chapter 6, the Aweil area experienced minimal population displacement during the war compared to the other case study areas. In this section, the Aweil situation will be examined to determine if its population experienced changes in socio-economic conditions similar to those experienced by populations which underwent major displacement during the war. In examining these differences or similarities, Aweil's population will be compared and contrasted with that of Gilo on the one hand and with Yei's and Maridi's populations on the other.

### THE DEVELOPMENT SCHEME

The Aweil district lies in a lowland savanna area which experiences seasonal flooding, especially from the River Lol. Given this ecological setting, preliminary rice growing trials in the late 1940's showed that the Aweil swamps had potential for producing high quality swamp rice.

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[14]Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Department of Statistics, Population Census of Sudan, 1973. In 1983, the four districts (Raga, Wau, Aweil and Gogrial) that constituted Bahr el Ghazal

Thus, in 1951 a government rice farm was started, with the objectives of:

(a) contributing to making the country self-sufficient in rice production, thereby reducing heavy reliance on imports; and,

(b) teaching local populations living in swampy areas to grow rice both for cash and as an alternate food crop.[15]

The Aweil Rice Scheme is a medium-size scheme, 30 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide (Figure 8.6). It was recently estimated that some 30,000 feddans of 'toich' land in Aweil area have the potential of producing between 30,000 - 50,000 tons of paddy rice per year.[16]

The concept of the scheme was not initially welcomed by the local population because they believed that it was intruding into their lives and was depriving them of traditional grazing lands. However, during the war, the scheme began to attract some of the surrounding villagers, especially through the encouragement of the village chiefs, but also because it became recognised that the scheme was a potential source of earning cash. During the war, only 50% of the sample had worked on the scheme. Limited initial enthusiasm for the scheme may have been due to community attitudes towards 'working for cash'. Engagement in seasonal employment among the Dinka has traditionally been associated with 'poor' families, and those who do not possess large herds of cattle.

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Province were divided into two provinces, namely Eastern Bahr el Ghazal Province (Aweil and Gogrial) and Western Bahr el Ghazal Province (Raga and Wau).

[15]Interview with Sayed Santino D. Teng, Former Minister of Animal Resources, Aweil, 1978.

[16]UNDP, Report on Land Development Project, August 1974 (No. Sud./73/001/E/01/12).

Figure 8.6 Location of Aweil Rice Scheme and the Surrounding Villages.




Source: Aweil Rice Scheme, Irrigation Unit

The Ten Year Development Plan, 1960-61 - 1970-71, aimed at developing an area of 15,000 feddans of rice to meet the country's then annual requirement of 11,000 tons.[17] At the beginning of the Plan period, an area of 400 feddans was under rice production, with a gross output of 370 tons and a yield of 950 kgs per feddan. At the end of the period, the area under crop cultivation had expanded to 8,000 feddans in 1968/69 and to 11,000 feddans in 1970/71. However, in spite of these increases in farmed area, production levels continued to decline during the war period. The lowest level was in 1970/71, when the total production was 1,335, with a yield of only 126 kgs per feddan.[18] This low achievement rate and relative stagnation in rice production was a direct result of political, physical, and economic factors. These were:

(a) the top management of the scheme was from the North and their departure during the war jeopardised the scheme's activities.

(b) lack of a proper irrigation system. The scheme was divided into large blocks which rendered irrigation virtually impossible to control. This was reflected in the yields.

(c) an inadequate tenancy system. The plots were concentrated in the hands of a few people, especially the chiefs, thus depriving many people from participating on the scheme.[19]

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[17]Government of Sudan, Projects for Relief and Reconstruction in the Southern Region (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, May 1972), p. 122.

[18]Tristram Betts, The Southern Sudan: The Ceasefire and After (London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1974), p. 120.

[19]Ibid.

During the civil war, Aweil's population remained largely in their villages. Unlike in the other study areas, where the displacees had a choice of where to take refuge during the war, in Aweil area little choice existed. Both the spatial isolation of the district and the natural environment of the area were unfavourable alternatives for refuge during the war. For example:

(a) Aweil district is far from the nearest international border, and hence it was difficult for the population to leave their villages without endangering their lives. Consequently, most of the population risked remaining in their villages during the war period.

(b) The lack of thick vegetation cover in the area was a deterrent to population taking refuge in the bush. Unlike Equatoria region, which has thick forests or mountainous terrain, Aweil district lies in the flood plains of the savanna belt which do not provide suitable refuge.

(c) The nature of the main economic activity of the population was another factor limiting their mobility. Because their economy was based on livestock, it was difficult for them to migrate without exposing themselves to danger from either government forces or the 'Nyagat'.[20]

(d) A further factor is that most Nilotic ethnic groups resent abandoning their ancestral homes for strange places. The tendency has always been that of continuity of what the ancestors had established. As Deng has suggested with

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[20]The term 'Nyagat' referred to organised gangs of armed robbers that emerged in the South during the civil war period. They were engaged in looting of public property in the countryside, taking advantage of the

regard to their practical life:

> ... the Dinka are more concerned with ancestral spirits and clan divinities, ... because they can either protect or injure people, as their whims may dictate.[21]

(e) Finally, the fighting was more concentrated along the border areas where the Anyanya guerrilla activities were widespread. Because Aweil district was in the interior of the Region the fighting was much more sporadic and less intensive compared to that in the border areas of Equatoria region. Furthermore, few Anyanya camps were located in the district because of its proximity to the Northern provinces of Darfur and Kordofan.

Thus, since both the scheme and the population of the Aweil District were less affected by the civil war than were the other case-study areas, the population tended to maintain their pre-war economic activities throughout much of the war. Cattle herding, subsistence farming and fishing constituted the core of their economic base, with participation on the scheme being regarded essentially as a secondary activity.

## THE PRE-CIVIL WAR AND CIVIL WAR PERIODS

The previous case-studies discussed populations which had undergone major displacement during the civil war. The Aweil area differed from the other case-studies in two fundamental ways, in its main economic activity - predominantly cattle keeping - and the nature of population

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political chaos in the region.

[21]Francis M. Deng, The Dinka and Their Songs (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 48; also see Tradition and Modernisation: A Challenge for Law Among the Dinka of the Sudan (New Haven,

displacement during the war, which was minimal. As was previously mentioned, the Aweil case-study resembles that of Gilo in that the sample was drawn from a population currently engaged on a government agricultural development scheme.

It is useful to reflect on the traditional economy of the Malual Dinka during the pre-scheme period in order to determine the extent to which the development scheme has changed the socio-economic conditions for those choosing to opt into the scheme. The effect of the civil war period must also be examined to assess how the war has affected the local population participating in the scheme.

As has already been suggested in the preceding section, the economic and social life of the Dinka rovolves mainly around livestock, supplemented by subsistence farming and fishing. The ecology gives to this mixed economy a bias in favour of cattle keeping. With the introduction of the rice scheme into the area, the transition which the participants had to make was significant. The distribution of time among the different economic activities during the rainy season (cattle herding, off-scheme farming and work on rice plots) became important to the participants. Most of the fishing activity is conducted in the dry season when the 'toich' water has receded.

In the Aweil area, the population experienced minimal disturbances during the war, and more or less continued with their pre-war economic activities throughout the period. Therefore, since the sample remained in their villages during the war, their post-war economic performance has not differed significantly from their pre-war conditions. However,

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Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1971), Chapter 8.

it is necessary to assess if their relative continuity during the war has produced economic conditions that currently make the Aweil farmers appear to be better-off than those who experienced major displacement in Gilo, Yei and Maridi areas.

## THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD

The post-civil war period is discussed to compare and contrast the Aweil's conditions with those prevailing in other study areas and the Southern Sudan. Demographic characteristics are considered first to determine if there are significant differences between the Aweil sample and the other study areas.

### Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Population

The average age for the Aweil sample is 39.6 years, with 64.3% being younger than average. This is similar to the Gilo sample, but different from Yei and Maridi areas, where the population averages about five years older.

The high proportion of a relatively younger population in Aweil area can be attributed to two principal causes:

(a) Families were not disrupted during the war as was the case in Gilo, Yei and Maridi areas. Consequently, the average family size in Aweil is much larger (9.1 persons) than in the other study areas, and in the nation as a whole. Two-fifths of the married couples (35) had family sizes larger than the average. Also, large families are desired by most Nilotics for social, economic and political reasons. A large family in rural communities in Southern Sudan is

important because it is associated with social prestige and respect in the community. In economic terms, a large family is desirable for food production purposes, and at the political level, it plays a dominant role in shaping communal and inter-communal political alliances. Polygamous marriages are therefore encouraged by the society. Over three-quarters of those married were polygamous.

(b) The work on the rice scheme is demanding and this has tended to attract a younger population.

Economic Activities

Because of Aweil's minimal dislocation during the war, there has been a relative continuity of economic activities. Cattle herding supplemented by cultivation, and fishing continue as the principal economic activity, and among the sample population, tenancy on the rice scheme was reported as essentially a secondary economic activity. This contrasts sharply with the situation in Gilo where employment on the Potato Project was reported by the farmers as their main economic activity. Even though there was continuity during the war, a certain degree of stagnation occurred on the rice scheme during this period. As discussed earlier, this was mainly because of the departure of the management staff who were from the North.

After the civil war, the Central Government transferred the scheme to the Southern Regional Government whose aim was to rehabilitate the scheme from the stagnation that set in during the war years, and to introduce new directions in its development policy in order to make the scheme more attractive to its participants. Accordingly, the system of

wage payment which had hitherto existed, was replaced by a share-cropping arrangement, whereby the produce was divided equally between the management and the farmer after the costs of operations had been deducted. However, this system was also found to be unfair to farmers since their incomes were thereby placed at the mercy of natural factors such as rainfall variability and pests, over which they had no control. Consequently, it too was abandoned in 1976, and was replaced by a tenancy agreement whereby the produce from the 2.5 feddan tenancies was wholly the property of the farmer. However, the scheme management became the sole buyer of all rice produced, and prices paid to tenants were based on the costs that management incurred in the operation of the scheme. In comparison to the past tenancy agreements, this new system resulted in relatively higher incomes for the farmers because the net payment received by the individual from his paddy was directly related to his output.

The desire after the war for cash earnings among villagers living around the scheme was directly linked to the effects which the war had on the regional livestock economy. As was the case with the human population, the war greatly reduced the South's livestock population through either disease or army action.[22] Also after the war, cattle prices rose dramatically so that the acquisition of livestock by traditional means such as barter using sorghum, goats and sheep became difficult. Therefore, many local farmers in the Aweil area chose to seek work on the rice scheme or in parts of Northern Sudan, in order to accumulate savings with which they could subsequently purchase cattle.

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[22]It was not unusual for the government troops to shoot down herds of cattle in the 'toich' areas in the South during the war on grounds of being source of food for the Anyanya.

Elsewhere among the cattle-owning communities in the South, out-migration of males for similar reasons has been documented by El Sammani, who has observed that in Kongor area of Jonglei Province,

> ... males are inspired to migrate to earn money to meet individual and family requirements. Using their earnings to obtain cattle is one of the basic motivations for young men to migrate. Assisting in the payment of taxes, to spare the family herd from selling, is another drive.[23]

Deng also has suggested that in recent years:

> ... some of the members of a family that does not have many cattle ... might migrate to El Obeid, Nahud, Khartoum, or the Gezira area where there is a demand for seasonal labour. Some of these people return and buy cattle, goats, or sheep with the money they have earned.[24]

In spite of these limitations, the traditional economic system has remained more or less intact in Aweil area, with cattle herding and supplementary farming remaining as the dominant activity. The rice scheme does not appear to have generated significant changes in the socio-economic well-being of tenant farmers in particular or the other local population in general. It appears that most cash income derived from the sale of rice continues to be used for purchasing livestock rather than for upgrading the tenants' quality of life in the 'Western' context. As far as the farmers are concerned, the quality of life is not defined in terms of 'modern' social amenities, but in regard to the numerical value of livestock owned by the individual. For example, among the sample, 34 reported purchasing at least one livestock unit since joining the scheme, and 7 had purchased over a dozen cattle with money derived from the scheme. More livestock results in polygamous

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[23]Mohamed O. El Sammani, The Demographic Characteristics of the Dinka of Kongor Community, Report No. 7 (Khartoum: The Executive Organ for the Development Projects in the Jonglei Area and the Economic and Social

marriages and larger families, which in turn have social, economic, and political significance in the community.

After the war, no significant change in the size of off-scheme farms was reported by the sample. All respondents indicated that their current off-scheme farms were the same size as that they had previously cultivated. Average off-scheme farm size was 4.4 feddans, with almost 60% of the sample reporting farm sizes below this average. Only 11.9% had farms of 9 or more feddans. Thus compared to Yei and Maridi areas, the average farm size for Aweil area was much lower. In Aweil area, off-scheme farming is mainly limited to sorghum production, which is highly seasonal (May-November). Cattle herding and work on the rice scheme are given priority and consequently less time is devoted to off-scheme farming. A further factor contributing to work on the rice scheme being given higher priority by tenants, is the fear that scheme management will terminate tenancies for those farmers failing to produce adequate crop from the scheme.

Sample Population Response to the Aweil Rice Scheme

Given the relatively limited changes in the economy before, during and after the war, it is interesting to gauge whether the farmers consider themselves better or worse off now vis-a-vis earlier times. Virtually all the sample (97.6%) reported that they considered themselves relatively better-off since the war. Also, when compared to the rest of the district's rural population, those working on the rice scheme indicated better socio-economic conditions than the off-scheme

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Research Council, July 1978), p. 28.

population. As a result of the current tenancy agreement the tenants were now able to earn more income from the sale of rice compared to earlier times during which the participants were paid as wage labourers. Also after the war, herds were regenerated with the consequence that the number of marriages increased, which was by itself regarded as an improvement in the socio-economic conditions in the society.

However, when examining the tenants' average incomes to determine the extent of relative improvement in their socio-economic conditions, it is surprising that the Aweil farmers had the lowest earnings among the study areas. The average income was only LS.119 per annum, with about 60% of the sample reporting earnings below average. The survey therefore suggests that the 'improved conditions' stated by the respondents do not necessarily refer to their living conditions in the 'modern' sense, but rather refers to accumulated livestock purchased with cash earnings from the sale of rice, which in turn illustrates the tenants' priorities in their dispensation of incomes. Four-fifth of the sample had invested their incomes primarily in livestock since joining the scheme, giving an average herd size of 10.1 per respondent. This roughly corresponds with the norm for the families in the area.

The spending habits of the sample populations appear to be in line with local economic practices and their experiences during the war. For example, in Yei area, where farming is the principal economic activity and where the displacees became exposed to outside influences while in exile, incomes were invested in improvement of farming techniques, hiring of farm labour and expansion of farm sizes. In the Aweil area, on the other hand, where farming supplements a livestock economy, priority in spending was in the expansion of the livestock. Clearly,

although the scheme has now been in operation for over three decades, it has not yet led to any radical changes in the participants' economic systems, specifically or among adjacent populations in general. Instead, the scheme appears to have further consolidated the traditional livestock economy by providing a vehicle whereby tenant farmers can augment their herd sizes. Thus, the objectives of the scheme remain to be realised, especially the adoption of rice as a staple food crop by the Malual Dinka.

## SUMMARY

While the Aweil and Gilo populations share some similarities and also exhibit marked differences with each other, they differ significantly from the independent farmers examined in the Yei and Maridi case-studies. The Aweil and Gilo populations are engaged on organised government agricultural schemes aimed at producing cash crops. Both schemes were established in areas where no cash cropping economy previously existed, yet it appears that neither of the samples had experienced 'dramatic' changes in their socio-economic conditions as a result of these schemes. But by examining 'change' from the point of view of the local population, the perception by those in Aweil area is that they have changed. Cash earnings from the rice scheme have enabled them to accumulate more wealth (livestock), resulting in a 'dramatic' improvement in their socio-economic conditions.

However, in terms of economic activities, the Aweil's sample was primarily engaged in cattle herding, and the rice scheme was very much supplementary to this primary activity, while at Gilo the respondents depended on the government scheme as their principal economic activity.

The growing of both rice and potatoes appear to have limited future prospects outside the government-controlled schemes because, as food crops, rice and potatoes have yet to be adopted as staple food crops by the respective local populations.

# CHAPTER 9

# CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to describe the repatriation process of Southern Sudanese refugees after the civil war in order to show the magnitude and nature of problems encountered by the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission in executing its task, and to examine the resettlement process of displacees from selected case-study areas: Yei, Maridi, Gilo and Aweil, in order to determine the extent to which their displacement has contributed to their contemporary socio-economic conditions.

## Principal Findings of the Study

The principal findings of the study can be summarised as follows:

1. The ceasefire in 1972 was not the only incentive required in order to generate enthusiasm for an immediate return among the displacees in general and among the external refugees in particular. Prevailing social, economic and political conditions in the immediate post-war period played an important role in determining the rates of voluntary repatriation after the civil war. Analysis of the return movement of external displacees by country of asylum showed that the rate and duration of repatriation varied significantly from one host country to another. Displacees who repatriated immediately following the civil war tended to be those who were least well-adjusted in their places of exile, while those who had adapted to conditions in their asylum areas, and who had become economically solvent, were in no hurry to repatriate. This

finding is in line with the assumptions that displacees who migrated outside their social and economic territorial space, and became exposed to new farming systems while in exile, underwent greater economic transformation than did their counterparts who remained within the same social and economic space. This condition corresponds with other African areas where repatriation had occurred and where well-to-do refugees were reluctant to repatriate unless otherwise forced to do so. Some of the Mozambicans in Tanzania and Angolans in Zaire are among these groups of refugees.

2. The impact of the civil war upon population displacement varied significantly from one case-study area to another. Factors contributing to the extent of displacement included the intensity of the fighting, the distance from the nearest international borders, and the degree of shelter and security provided by the local physical environment. In border areas such as Yei, where the intensity of the war was especially severe, large numbers of refugees fled across the nearby border to Uganda and Zaire. On the other hand, in the Gilo case-study area, where fighting was also very intense, the proximity of the Ugandan border did not necessarily lead to a high proportion of displacees seeking refuge in Uganda. Here, the mountainous nature of the local environment provided sufficient security, and hence over half of the displacees opted to relocate within the district. This finding supports the assumption that the lesser the accessibility of an area to which displacees flee in search of security, the greater will be their propensity to maintain the status-quo on their return from

exile. But it does not fully confirm the view that the nearer the place of refugees' origin to border area, the greater the number of displacees seeking asylum outside their territorial space.

Both the Maridi and Aweil areas were relatively far from international borders to make the option of external refugee status viable. In the case of Maridi, the surrounding thick bush environment provided displacees with a viable local option for refuge. Finally, in the case of Aweil, the relatively modest fighting and the lack of either a viable local refuge or a nearby international border, resulted in the people remaining in the village for most of the duration of the civil war.

Thus, the extent of population displacement can be seen as a product of push factors created by the civil war. However, the distance moved by displacees, and hence whether they are internal or external displacees, is not only a factor of proximity of a border, but also of the degree to which the local physical environment is perceived by the displacees to provide adequate levels of security. It is clear that other areas in Africa associated with refugee migrations have also experienced this mix of internal and external migratory flows. For example, such a dichotomy of displacees currently exists in Uganda and Ethiopia.

3. There were significant differences in the nature of flight undertaken by the displacees from Yei and Gilo areas on the one hand and from Maridi area on the other. The majority of the refugees fleeing from Yei and Gilo areas left as entire village-groups, while those from Maridi area fled mainly as

individuals. These differences in group vis-a-vis individual migration must primarily be seen as reflecting the different degrees of danger to which the respective populations were exposed, in that fighting was much more intense in Yei and Torit Districts than in Maridi District. Thus, the Yei and Gilo case-study areas confirm the assertion that displacees who fled as entire village groups during the war originated from areas experiencing the greatest intensity of fighting. However, although both group and individual migrations were generated during the civil war, there is no evidence to suggest that either body of refugees preferred internal vis-a-vis external locations for refuge. Village-group migrations were found to locate locally in the 'bush' as well as across the border in Uganda and Zaire, while some individual migrants found their way across the border and others found refuge locally in the 'bush'. Thus, whether refugees move on the basis of group decision or individual decision-making in response to push factors in their home country, the pull factors attracting them to their ultimate destinations will operate equally on both populations. Again, Sudan's experience in this regard is in keeping with trends throughout Africa, where examples of both group and individual refugeee migrations are commonplace. For example, the Eritrean and Ugandan refugees in the Sudan, the Ugandans in northeastern Zaire, and the current Southern Sudanese in Ethiopia, all illustrate a mix of both group and individual migrations.

4. Although in Maridi and Gilo areas the populations experienced displacement during the war, they remained largely in the same

socio-economic space. However, in the case of Yei, population displacement was mainly external and into regions that must be regarded as containing more advanced economic systems. On their return to Sudan following the war, it was shown that the latter category of refugees transferred their experiences and new farming techniques which they had acquired while in exile to their home areas. This confirms the assumption raised in the introduction of this thesis that refugees who were displaced outside their ethnic territories during the civil war experienced a wider range of change in their socio-economic conditions after the war than did those who remained within the same socio-economic space. In much of Africa, refugee migrations across borders have led to people moving into areas of different levels of socio-economic development. Similar diffusion of new ideas and farming techniques to the displacees' home country may have occurred when such refugees subsequently repatriated, or may in the future, if and when such refugees ever repatriate. For example, the Mozambicans who repatriated from organised rural settlements in southern Tanzania transferred new ideas into the much lesser developed areas of northern Mozambique to which they returned. A similar transfer of new ideas and farming techniques may well occur in the future if and when refugees from the Eritrean lowlands who are currently in organised rural settlements in eastern Sudan ever repatriate.

What is not clear from this discussion, is what happens when the converse occurs, namely when a migration takes place from a more advanced economic region to a less developed one. For example, does it follow that those who migrate from a more

developed to a lesser developed area undergo a measure of economic regression?

5. Significant differences were observed between the case-study areas in their major contemporary economic activities. In Yei and Maridi areas, virtually all those sampled reported farming as their primary economic activity. In the case of Yei it was shown that although farming had always been practiced in the area, it had clearly become more important since the war because of experiences and economic independence that returnees had gained while in exile. In Maridi area, although farming is an important economic activity, the experiences and new ideas gained by displacees during the civil war were of a lesser magnitude since the majority of refugees had been only locally displaced in the 'bush'. This confirms the assumption that external displacees experienced greater improvements in their socio-economic conditions after the war than internal refugees. In the Gilo area, the population appears to remain dependent upon government employment as had been the case prior to the war, and farming remains a secondary economic activity. Here, it is not altogether clear as to whether the lack of development in agriculture is due to attitudes toward agriculture not changing during the civil war, to limiting physical conditions or because of the remoteness of the area from potential markets.

In the case of Aweil area, it is suggested that socio-economic conditions of participant tenants on the rice scheme have not changed significantly from those prevailing prior to the civil war.

Participation of the local population on the development scheme appears less motivated by a desire for overall socio-economic upgrading than as a means of rehabilitating and expanding their traditional livestock economies which had been devastated by the civil war.

These differences in economic performance by displacees since the war are reflected in their current farm sizes and income levels. In Yei and Maridi areas, where farming constitutes the primary economic activity, and where higher rates of adoption of innovations have occurred, larger farm sizes were reported by displacees. As a result, the average incomes, especially in Yei area, are much higher than those reported in the other case-study areas. In Gilo and Aweil areas, on the other hand, where much time is spent on government employment or on the government schemes, off-scheme farms have remained small, and consequently, the average incomes generated from off-scheme farming also remains low.

From this discussion, it can be inferred that repatriating refugees elsewhere in Africa may have greater potential for successful resettlement on returning home if, during their exile, they had been exposed to effective organised rural settlement or had spontaneously settled among more economically developed rural communities. Such was the case, for example, among some Angolans who repatriated from Botswana, Zaire and Zambia. Conversely, refugees who have spent extended periods in wholly dependent camps can expect to experience greater levels of difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas after repatriation. Such is the case with refugees from the Ogaden who are currently settled in

'holding' camps in Somalia.

6. The survey showed that displacees have a variety of ways of disposing their incomes. In Yei and Maridi areas, the most important ways, especially in Yei area, were: hiring of farm labourers; up-keep and improvement of petty trading; education of children; and family health care. The greater concern for children's health and education since the war reflects the fact that many refugees had been exposed to such social services while in exile. Throughout Africa, the United Nations agencies and voluntary organisations attempt to provide refugees with social services, especially on the organised rural settlements. On their repatriation, refugees attempt to maintain access to social services and general living - standards that they had enjoyed while in exile.

In Gilo and Aweil areas, local physical conditions and cultural traits respectively determine the way in which incomes are disposed. In Gilo area, for example, earnings are largely used for purchasing food because the physical environment is unfavourable for the growing of common food crops. Thus, little surplus remains for investment into general upgrading of the standard of living or for access to social services. In the Aweil area, where some additional income is generated from participation in a government scheme, traditional social attitudes tend to direct that surplus income to investment in livestock rather than to be applied directly to upgrading their standard of living. This finding is in line with the assertion that displacees who experienced minimal

contact with the outside world during the war tended to maintain a status quo after the war.

7. Displacees who came back and settled as independent farmers in Yei and Maridi areas were more successful and self-sufficient in food crop production than those who participated on government schemes either as employees, as at Gilo, or as share-croppers, as at Aweil. As over half of the independent farmers were externally displaced during the civil war, they came back with new ideas and farming techniques from Uganda and Zaire. The adoption of these innovations by displacees following their repatriation has thus given them economic advantage over those who had no similar experience, as in the case of the population in the Gilo and Aweil case-studies. Apart from this, the differences between independent farmers and those engaged on government schemes are also reflected in the average farm sizes and levels of income. Again, independent farmers reported larger farm sizes as well as higher incomes than their counter-parts on economically weak government schemes. This supports the argument that the longer the people have been exposed to a cash-cropping economy while in exile, the easier it is for their subsequent rehabilitation than those who have been locally displaced and had no similar experience.

However, it should be noted that the differences in incomes and general economic performance emerging between independent farmers and those participating on government schemes may be a reflection of the fact that the schemes in the Southern Sudan are badly organised rather than simply due to displacees' experiences

during the civil war. Also, independent farmers had a much wider freedom to adopt new farming methods on their farms following repatriation. This has clearly contributed to their greater economic well-being vis-a-vis those engaged on government schemes in Gilo and Aweil areas. In these areas, off-scheme farming is limited to producing basic food requirements using only traditional methods.

## Implications of the Civil War and the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement to Southern Sudan

The seventeen-year civil war in Southern Sudan had a marked impact on the socio-economic and political conditions of the population in general and on the displacees in particular. There were both negative and positive impacts of the civil war. On the negative side, it generated large-scale population displacement, it disrupted local economic practices and normal ways of life, and over one million people died either through disease or as a result of military operations. On the other hand, the civil war in the South caused significant changes in the socio-economic and political attitudes of the people. In other words, it awakened a significant proportion of the Southern population. From the Southern viewpoint, the civil war was worthwhile (as peaceful means to generate change had been exhausted), and indeed, it was instrumental in changing the central government's domestic policy toward the South. Although the war was costly in both human and economic terms, it nevertheless generated positive results for the South:

(a) It forced the North to opt for a political solution to the Southern problem by granting regional self-rule to the South in 1972.

(b) Many Southerners, especially those from Equatoria, had been able to

obtain an education while in exile, which would not have been possible if they had remained in the Sudan.

(c) A large number of external displacees, especially from Equatoria, came back with accumulated knowledge and new ideas of farming techniques. Many had also acquired wealth and personal property which they brought back to Southern Sudan. These new ideas, together with their savings and capital equipment resulted in many of them becoming innovative, self-reliant and business-minded following the war.

(d) It generated political awareness among Southerners, and became a cementing factor among the various ethnic groups which had previously been only loosely associated. However, increasing growth of the South as a unified political force in turn caused alarm and suspicion in Northern political circles which subsequently caused the North to adopt policies that led to a devolution of the South's political strength, and is the basis for current renewal of fighting in the South.

## Suggestions for Further Study

This study is a pioneering work in investigating a specific African refugee migration from its beginning, when the people took flight, to its end, when they returned home and rehabilitated themselves. It has examined the experiences and changes that the refugees underwent during the complete migratory process. The significance of this study is that it approached the refugee process in a non-traditional way. While most refugee studies in Africa have tended to analyse the forces that generate refugees and the refugees subsequent adjustment in their

countries of asylum, this study focuses on how their spatial mobility and the nature of their displacement during the war affected their subsequent economic performance after they repatriated to their homelands. That is, the study examines the after-effects rather than the causes of a refugee migration. By examining these after-effects of refugee migration in terms of their socio-economic conditions after their return home from exile, this study provides an original insight into an aspect of Africa's refugee experience that has hitherto not been examined by social scientists. However, this study recognises that many areas crucial to geographic research still remain to be explored. For example:

(a) It is suggested that in Africa, where voluntary repatriation is a much more common solution than permanent resettlement to third countries, the process of reintegration of displacees into their home societies after their return is a major concern that needs to be better understood. Social scientists (sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and psychologists as well as geographers) have yet to examine the question how spatial displacement affects displacees' subsequent readaptation to their home environment after they return. This author is not aware of any studies that have been undertaken examining the rehabilitation and readaptation process associated with any of Africa's major repatriation exercises. For example, the major refugee groups that have repatriated to date to Guinea-Bissau from Senegal, to Mozambique from Tanzania, to Angola from Zaire, and to Zimbabwe from Zambia have not generated any substantive research on their resettlement

following their return home.[1]

(b) Although most of Africa's refugee migrations involve only relatively short distances, the movements are not necessarily confined within either the same physical environments or ethnic territories. The question of the extent to which the displacees' new environments, both physical and cultural, help bring about changes in their economic activities, communal attitudes and ethnic relationships when they subsequently return home, have yet to receive serious attention from researchers.

(c) Another issue that needs study is the impacts that the length of stay in exile and the age at which displacees go into exile have on their rates and levels of acquisition of new technologies and concepts and the extent to which these are subsequently transferred back to their homeland after repatriation. Are higher rates of adoption of new farming methods by displacees related to their length of stay in exile? Are younger people likely to acquire new technology more readily than older displacees? In this study, the results show that the younger displacees tended to be more innovative than the elderly. However, given the nature of the data base, this finding is not conclusive. Further investigation is required regarding the relationship between the length of stay in exile by displacees, the age at which they went into exile and rates of adoption of new farming techniques.

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[1]To the author's knowledge, some research is currently underway in Zimbabwe, but has not yet been published.

Lessons from Sudan's Experience

As a microcosm of Africa, there is much to be learnt from Sudan's experience by other African states whose unity is currently threatened by similar social, economic and political forces that have, and still are, operating in the Sudan. Given the ethnic mix of African states, where patchworks of diverse ethnic groups have been moulded into independent states, peaceful co-existence and equity in the distribution of socio-economic benefits among these diverse ethnic and racial groups have yet to be achieved throughout much of the continent. Consequently, conflicts generating refugee migration continue to manifest themselves.

Since the beginning of the 1960's Africa's refugee numbers have continued to increase. Today, there are between 2.5 and 3 million refugees in Africa compared to only 400,000 in 1964. Because many African governments continue to consider voluntary repatriation as the ideal permanent solution to their refugee problems, the potential for further repatriation exercises remains great. If and when such repatriations occur, the chances are that they will involve substantial numbers. For example, there are currently about 700,000 ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden in Somalia; about 500,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians in the Sudan; about 260,000 Angolans in Zaire; and about 46,000 Mozambicans in Zimbabwe. However, the lessons for these future potential repatriations should be learnt from those countries that have completed, either successfully or unsuccessfully, the repatriation of their refugees. Given the variety of problems that it faced during its repatriation and resettlement process, Sudan serves as a good example for other African states where repatriation exercises are a possibility in the near or distant future. Thus, Sudan's experience should be

studied and its successes and failures analysed so that future problems will be minimised. Among them:

(a) Although the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission offices for the displacees were established at both provincial and district levels after the ceasefire, its hierarchial and bureaucratic structure was a major obstacle for speedy action from the headquarters to the provinces and districts, and vice versa. These problems were further exacerbated by the poor transport and communication systems that were in place following the war.

(b) Personnel involved in refugee work should be adequately trained. In the case of the Southern Sudan, civil servants and political appointees who were inadequately equipped and inexperienced in handling refugee problems, were seconded to the resettlement offices. Their lack of vision of the magnitude of the resettlement exercise, resulted in conflicts between refugees and the staff and also led to much misappropriation of funds by individuals.

(c) Unrealistic propaganda by government agents abroad intended to lure refugees home was found to be detrimental in the case of the Southern Sudan. On occasions, refugees in exile were given a glossy picture of events in the Sudan. On return, facilities or positions promised to them did not exist, causing much resentment among the returnees, and indeed leading to some of them even returning to Uganda or Zaire.

(d) Language has now become a factor in the reintegration process of returnee students. Much attention is yet to be given to this component of the refugee process. In the Southern Sudan, the problem of returnee students who studied in French in Zaire and

Central African Republic was not anticipated. Its magnitude was only realised after their return, which placed the Regional Government into a very difficult situation.

(e) Given the rural nature of most of Africa's refugee populations, rural development plans for returnees should first take into account the socio-economic systems which the target population had acquired in exile prior to undertaking a development project for their reintegration. In Southern Sudan, no attempt was ever made by the government to draw on the experiences displacees had acquired in exile. Also, given the financial and technical constraints in the Southern Sudan, and the mediocre performance by government development schemes, small-holder farming should be more widely encouraged by the government rather than large-scale rural development schemes. With the right incentives (small loans, farmer advice, rural marketing arrangements and attractive prices for crops), farmers will feel directly in charge of production, a factor which is so often lacking on government development schemes.

With the recently renewed and increasing intensity of fighting between the North and the South, some questions come to mind. First, to what extent will the few economic developments that the South has experienced since 1972 regress or stagnate? Second, to what extent are the case-study areas especially affected by the resurgent insecurity? Unlike the first civil war which covered all three Southern provinces, the current fighting is confined to only Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal, from which about 180,000 people have taken refuge in Ethiopia.[2]

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[2]UNHCR, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1984/85 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Program and Budget for 1986, A/AC.96/657, August 5, 1985, p. 95.

Therefore, the direct effects of the war on development efforts are much more conspicous in these two regions than in Equatoria. Among the case-study areas, only the Aweil Rice scheme falls within the current conflict zone. However, because of its proximity to Northern Sudan's border (and thus effective presence of government troops in the region), the scheme's activities are likely to continue unaffected by the war. The other three case-study areas are in Equatoria region, which is currently not involved in the fighting. Thus, the direct effects of the current conflict on the region's development efforts are as yet insignificant.

However, the indirect effects of the war in Equatoria are as great as in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile because of its geographical location with respect to the latter regions, where guerrilla military bases are located. Overland and river transportation between the North and the South are not functional, thus also truncating Equatoria's vital supply lines of essential commodities and in turn its development efforts.

Given the current political stalemate between Sudan's Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, it is probable that the fighting in the South will continue for quite some time. Also, with the possible future expansion of guerrilla activities into Equatoria region, a further population exodus to Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and Central African Republic is likely to occur, thus increasing the ranks of refugees currently in exile from Sudan. Such migration would therefore make future repatriation exercises from those countries a possibility.

# APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN

IN: Source: Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1975), pp. 158-177.

# APPENDIX A

## THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN

*Draft Organic Law to organize Regional Self-Government in the Southern Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan*

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the government of their country, it is hereunder enacted:

*Article 1.* This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force on a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

*Article 2.* This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.

### CHAPTER II: DEFINITIONS

*Article 3.*

(i) 'Constitution' refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any other basic law replacing or amending it.

(ii) 'President' means the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

(iii) 'Southern Provinces of the Sudan' means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood on January 1, 1956, and any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Complex as may be decided by a referendum.

(iv) 'People's Regional Assembly' refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.

(v) 'High Executive Council' refers to the Executive Council appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.

(vi) 'President of the High Executive Council' refers to the person appointed by the President on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.

(vii) 'People's National Assembly' refers to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.

(viii) 'Sudanese' refers to any Sudanese citizen as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act 1957 and any amendments thereof.

### CHAPTER III

*Article 4.* The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region.

*Article 5.* The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and powers of which are defined by this law.

*Article 6.* Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the principal language for the Southern Region

without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which may serve a practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region.

## CHAPTER IV

*Article 7.* Neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are:

(i) National Defence
(ii) External Affairs
(iii) Currency and Coinage
(iv) Air and Inter-Regional River Transport
(v) Communications and Telecommunications
(vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
(vii) Nationality and Immigration (Emigration)
(viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development
(ix) Educational Planning
(x) Public-Audit.

## CHAPTER V: LEGISLATURE

*Article 8.* Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People's Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and conditions of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.

*Article 9.* Members of the People's Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.

*Article 10.*

(i) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the People's Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one-quarter of the Assembly.
(ii) The People's Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during its first sitting.
(iii) The People's Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.

*Article 11.* The People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following:–

(i) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region.
(ii) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.
(iii) Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.
(iv) Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.
(v) Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.
(vi) Promotion of local languages and cultures.
(vii) Town and village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programmes.
(viii) Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders' licences and formation of co-operative societies.
(ix) Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.
(x) Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets;

combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centres, dispensaries and dressing stations.

(xi) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.

(xii) Promotion of tourism.

(xiii) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organizations of trade and cultural exhibitions.

(xiv) Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.

(xv) Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.

(xvi) Land use in accordance with national laws and plans.

(xvii) Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.

(xviii) Development, utilization, and protection of forests, crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.

(xix) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.

(xx) All other matters delegated by the President or the People's National Assembly for legislation.

*Article 12.* The People's National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of administration in the Southern Region.

*Article 13.*

(i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President to relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such request.

(ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.

*Article 14.* The People's Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request.

*Article 15.*

(i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any Bill presented to the People's National Assembly which in their view affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the People's Regional Assembly.

(ii) If the President accedes to such request, the People's Regional Assembly shall present its views within 15 days from the date of accession to the request.

(iii) The President shall communicate any such views to the People's National Assembly together with his own observations if he deems necessary.

*Article 16.* The People's National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts to the People's Regional Assembly for their information. The People's Regional Assembly shall act similarly.

## CHAPTER VI: THE EXECUTIVE

*Article 17.* The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the President.

*Article 18.* The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall act with the approval of the President.

*Article 19.* The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly.

*Article 20.* The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office by the President on

the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council.

*Article 21.* The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President and to the People's Regional Assembly for efficient administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.

*Article 22.* The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the People's Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote, unless they are also members of the People's Regional Assembly.

## CHAPTER VII

*Article 23.* The President shall from time to time regulate the relationship between the High Executive Council and the central ministries.

*Article 24.* The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional Public Service.

## CHAPTER VIII: FINANCE

*Article 25.* The People's Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislation and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels.

(*a*) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:–

(i) Direct and indirect regional taxes.
(ii) Contributions from People's Local Government Councils.
(iii) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with the National Plan.
(iv) Funds from the National Treasury for established services.
(v) Funds voted by the People's National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.
(vi) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the People's Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of June 9, 1968.
(vii) See Appendix B.
(viii) Any other sources.

(*b*) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure of regional services, security, administration, and development in accordance with national plans and programmes and shall submit it to the People's Regional Assembly for approval.

## CHAPTER IX: OTHER PROVISIONS

*Article 27.*

(i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People's Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region.
(ii) The use of the People's Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defence shall be controlled by the President on the advice of the President of the High Executive Council.
(iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements.

*Article 28.* The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National Constitution provided the People's Regional Assembly, after receiving the President's views, may reintroduce the Bill.

*Article 29.* The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the People's Regional Assembly.

*Article 30.* Any member of the People's Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive Council.

*Article 31.* The People's Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National Constitution.

*Article 32.* All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen or citizens solely on grounds of public health and order.

*Article 33.*

(i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.

(ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

*Article 34.* Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat of the Regional Executive and Legislature.

## APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.
2. Equality of citizens.
   (i) All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.
   (ii) All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the right to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interests.
3. Personal liberty.
   (i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.
   (ii) The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
   (iii) Retrospective penal legislation and punishment should be prohibited.
   (iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.
   (v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the due process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty-four hours without judicial order.
   (vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation or torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his favour or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.
4. Freedom of Religion and Conscience.
   (i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favour of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.
   (ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with the relation of their choice.
5. Protection of labour.
   (i) Forced and compulsory labour of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.
   (ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.
6. Freedom of minority to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.

## APPENDIX B: DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OF REVENUE AND GRANTS-IN-AID FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION

1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the Southern Region.
2. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the central list of the Ministry of Treasury.
3. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.
4. Profits on sugar consumed in the Southern Region.
5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.
6. Royalties on leaf Tobacco and Cigarettes.
7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.
8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects (5 per cent of net profits of factories, co-operative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).
9. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses e.g., Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, stamp duties and any other item to be specified from time to time.
10. Licences other than those provided for in the People's Local Government Act, 1971.
11. Special Development Tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region the rate of which should be decided by the People's Regional Assembly.
12. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political Establishment.
13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run by the Regional Government (5 per cent of the initial cost).
14. Contributions from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise (20 per cent of the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).
15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in the following manner:

    Education institutions, 20 per cent of expenses
    Trunk and through Roads and Bridges, 25 per cent of expenses
    Relief and Social amenities, 15 per cent of expenses
    Tourist attraction projects, 25 per cent of expenses
    Security, 15 per cent of expenses
    Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan, 20 per cent of grants, outside the Sudan 30 per cent of grants
    Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural Activities, 25 per cent of expenses.

## AGREEMENT ON THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

*Article 1.* This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

*Article 2.* There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed actions in the Southern Region from the time of cease-fire.

*Article 3.* All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of the cease-fire.

*Article 4.* Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence.

Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease.

*Article 5.* Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and authorized by their respective authorities. The plans for stationing troops from the National Army shall be such as to avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement combat forces.

*Article 6.* A Joint Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all questions related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint Commission shall include members from all the countries bordering on the Southern Region as well as representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

*Article 7.* The Joint Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.

*Article 8.* Each party shall be represented on the Joint Commission by one senior military officer and a maximum of five other members.

*Article 9.* The headquarters of the Joint Commission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

*Article 10.* The Joint Commission shall appoint local commissions in various centres of the Southern Region composed of two members from each party.

## PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

### CHAPTER I: INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

*(Political, Local Government and Civil Service)*

*Article 1.* The President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan shall, in consultation with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (S.S.L.M.) and branches of the Sudanese Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the President and members of an Interim High Executive Council.

*Article 2.* The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other members with portfolios in:

(*a*) Finance and Economic Planning.
(*b*) Education.
(*c*) Information, Culture and Tourism.
(*d*) Communication and Transport.
(*e*) Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries.
(*f*) Public Health.
(*g*) Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons).
(*h*) Housing, Public Works and Utilities.
(*i*) Natural Resources and Rural Development (Land Use, Rural Water Supply, Forestry and Co-operatives).
(*j*) Public Service and Labour.
(*k*) Minerals and Industry, Trade and Supply.

*Article 3.* The Interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a Regional Civil Service subject to ratification by the People's Regional Assembly.

*Article 4.* The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council, determine the date for the election to the People's Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.

*Article 5.* In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional institutions, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform.

*Article 6.* The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from the 1972–73 Budget for such placements and appointments.

*Article 7.* The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.

## CHAPTER II: TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

*Article 1.* These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the President on the request of the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the People's Regional Assembly.

*Article 2.* The People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from the Region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.

*Article 3.* The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The Commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.

*Article 4.* The Joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each side. Decisions of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of disagreement such matters shall be referred to the respective authorities.

## CHAPTER III: AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS

*Article 1.* No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any person in any court of law for or on account of any act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from the 18th day of August 1955, if such act or matter was done in connection with mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.

*Article 2.* If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article 1 is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void.

*Article 3.* All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in respect of offences herein before specified in Article 1 shall be discharged or released within 15 days from the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

*Article 4.* The Joint Cease-Fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees, which register shall serve to certify that the persons therein named are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement provided that the Commission may delegate such power to the Diplomatic Missions of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan in the case of citizens from the Southern Region living abroad and to whom the provisions of this Agreement apply.

*Article 5.* In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces the Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons who shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article 4.

*Article 6.* Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 above a Special Tribunal with ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article 1 of this Agreement. The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease-Fire Commission.

*Article 7.* Cases referred to in Article 6 shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice.

*Article 8.* The Amnesty Provisions contained in this Agreement as well as the powers of the Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President after consultation with the commissions referred to in this Agreement, decide that they have fulfilled their functions.

## CHAPTER IV: REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT COMMISSION

### 1. *Repatriation*

*Article 1.* There shall be established a Special Commission inside and where required outside the Southern Region

charged with the responsibility of taking all administrative and other measures as may be necessary in order to repatriate all citizens from the Southern Region who today are residing in other countries and especially in the neighbouring countries.

The headquarters of the Commission shall be in Juba.

*Article 2.* The Commission shall be composed of at least three members including one representative of the Central Government, one representative of the Southern Region and one representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. For those commissions operating outside the Sudan, a representative of the host Government shall be included, plus the Central Government representative who shall be the Ambassador of the Sudan or his representative.

*Article 3.* The control of repatriation at the borders shall be assumed by the competent border authorities in co-operation with the representatives of the Resettlement Commission.

*Article 4.* The repatriation commission shall work very closely with the Commission for Relief and Resettlement to ensure that the operation and timing of the returning of refugees from across the borders is adequately co-ordinated.

## II. *Resettlement*

*Article 1.* There shall be established a Special Commission for Relief and Resettlement under the President of the Interim High Executive Council with headquarters in Juba and provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau. The Commission, its branches and whatever units it may deem fit to create in other localities in order to facilitate its functions, shall be responsible for co-ordination and implementation of all relief services and planning related to Resettlement and Rehabilitation of all returnees, that is:

(*a*) Refugees from neighbouring countries;
(*b*) Displaced persons resident in the main centres of the Southern Region and other parts of the Sudan;
(*c*) Displaced persons including residual Anya Nya personnel and supporters in the bush;
(*d*) Handicapped and orphans.

*Article 2.* Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government the present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International Organizations should be pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the Organizations within the country.

*Article 3.* The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within the Sudan in the following order:

(*a*) Persons presently residing in overcrowded centres in the Southern Region, and persons desirous to return to their original areas and homes;
(*b*) Persons returning from the bush including Anya Nya Supporters;
(*c*) Handicapped persons and orphans.

*Article 4.* The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighbouring and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:

(*a*) Adequate reception centres with facilities for shelter, food supplies, medicine and medicaments;
(*b*) Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin;
(*c*) Materials and equipment.

*Article 5.* The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:

(*a*) Appeal to international organizations and voluntary agencies to continue assistance for students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and higher institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their repatriation;
(*b*) Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial support from the Sudan Government.

*Article 6.* The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who were attending primary schools.

This Agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D., in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on the other. It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Leader of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. It shall be ratified by the said two Leaders in person or through their respective authorised Representatives, in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of March, in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.

In witness whereof, We the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

1. Abel Alier-Wal Kuai, *Vice-President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs*
2. Dr. Mansour Khalid, *Minister for Foreign Affairs*
3. Dr. Gaafar Mohamed Ali Bakheit, *Minister for Local Government*
4. Major-General Mohamed Al Baghir Ahmed, *Minister of Interior*
5. Abdel Rahman Abdalla, *Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform*
6. Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman
7. Colonel Kamal Abashar.

FOR THE SOUTHERN SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

1. Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza, *Leader of the Delegation*
2. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, *Secretary of the Delegation*
3. Mading deGarang, *Spokesman of the Delegation*
4. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggot, *Special Military Representative*
5. Oliver Batali Albino, *Member*
6. Angelo Voga Morjan, *Member*
7. Rev. Paul Puot, *Member*
8. Job Adier de Jok, *Member*

WITNESSES

1. Nabiyelul Kifle, *Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia*
2. Leopoldo J. Niilus, *Representative of the World Council of Churches*
3. Kodwo E. Ankrah, *Representative of the World Council of Churches*
4. Burgess Carr, *General Secretary All Africa Conference of Churches*
5. Samuel Athi Bwogo, *Representative of Sudan Council of Churches*

ATTESTATION

I attest that these signatures are genuine and true

BURGESS CARR, *Moderator*

Source: Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975), pp.158-177.

# APPENDIX B

## Sample Questionnaire Administered to Farmers in the Study Areas

The questionnaire is divided into four sections. Section 1 records the demographic data of interviewees, while Sections 2, 3, and 4 deal with the pre-civil war, civil war and post-civil war periods respectively.

### General Information

01. Date of interview .....

02. Name of interviewer (if not principal investigator)

.....

03. Place (village) .....

04. Name of Chief of the area .....

### Section 1: Demographic Data

05. Age .....

06. Ethnic group .....

07. Marital status:

    (a) single .....

    (b) married .....

    (c) widowed .....

    (d) divorced .....

08. How many children do you have? .....

## Section 2: The Pre-Civil War Period

09. Where did you live before the civil war?

(a) same place where you live now?

(i) Yes .....

(ii) No .....

(b) if no, specify .....

10. What was your main economic activity before the civil war period?

(a) farming .....

(b) government employment .....

(c) private employment .....

(d) none (explain why) .....

11. If farming was your main economic activity, how large was your farm? .....feddans

12. Did you have other economic activities?

(a) Yes .....

If yes, specify .....

(b) No .....

13. How much money did you use to earn per annum? LS. .....

14. How did you spend your money?

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

## Section 3: The Civil War Period

15. Where did you live during the civil war?

(a) inside the country .....

(b) outside the country .....

(If outside the country, proceed to Question No. 18.)

16. If you were internally displaced, state where?

(a) remained in own village .....

(b) displaced into the 'bush' .....

(c) displaced into the town within Southern Sudan .....

(d) displaced into the town in Northern Sudan .....

17. How far did you live from your village?

.....km

(Then, proceed to Question No. 24).

18. If you were externally displaced, state which country?

(a) Ethiopia .....

(b) Kenya .....

(c) Uganda .....

(d) Zaire .....

(Central African Republic was not included in this survey as a country of asylum because none of the respondents took refuge in that country).

19. How did you settle while in exile?

(a) spontaneously among the rural population .....

(b) in organised rural settlement schemes .....

(c) in or around towns .....

20. If you settled spontaneously among the rural population while in exile, name the area .....

21. If you lived in an organised rural settlement scheme, give the name of the scheme .....

22. If you lived in or around town, give the name of the town

.....

23. In the country of asylum, how far did you live from the border area? .....km

24. How did you flee from your village:

    (a) individual exodus .....

    (b) group/village exodus .....

25. Were you related to the local population in the area settlement during the civil war?

    (a) Yes .....

    (b) No .....

        (i) if yes, how are you related? .....

        (ii) if no, to which ethnic group do they belong? .....

26. What did you do for a living during the civil war?

    (a) farming .....

    (b) government employment .....

    (c) private employment .....

    (d) none (explain why) .....

27. Did you have other economic activities?

    (a) Yes .....

        If yes, specify .....

    (b) No .....

## Section 4: The Post-War Period

28. When did you return from exile or 'bush'? .....

    (If you did not abandon your village completely, proceed to Question No. 32.)

29. How did you return to your village after the war?

    (a) through UNHCR assistance .....

    (b) on own account .....

30. What did you use for transport back to your home?

(a) returned by truck .....

(b) returned on foot .....

31. Where did you go on return?

(a) direct to your village .....

(b) passed through resettlement camp .....

name of resettlement camp .....

(c) went to town .....

name of town .....

32. What is your current main economic activity?

(a) farming .....

(b) government employment .....

(c) private employment .....

33. If farming is your main economic activity, how large is your farm?

.....feddans

34. Do you have other economic activities?

(a) yes .....

if yes, specify .....

(b) no .....

35. How do you spend your money?

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

36. List the new crops which have gained popularity on your farm since the war.

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

(e) .....

(f) .....

37. From where did you introduce these crops?

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

38. List the crops which have lost popularity on your farm since the war.

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

(e) .....

39. What new farming techniques and methods have you adopted since the war?

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

40. From where did you introduce these techniques?

(a) .....

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

41. How do you look at yourself now? Do you think your economic conditions were better:

(a) before the civil war .....

(b) during the civil war .....

(c) after the civil war .....

or

(d) you found no difference .....

if so, explain why? .....

42. How much money do you get in a year? LS. .....

# APPENDIX C

## The Democratic Republic of the Sudan

## Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Southern Region, Juba

## Questionnaire for Returnee Officials and Employees

01. Ministry/Department/Province .....

02. Name of re-instated official .....

03. Date of going into exile .....

04. Country of exile .....

05. Date of returning from exile .....

06. Date of re-instatement .....

07. Salary and scale before going into exile .....

08. Salary and scale on re-instatement .....

09. Present salary and scale of colleagues who remained behind (i.e., those who did not go into exile) .....

10. Other remarks .....

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