

The “Mailed Fist” and the “Velvet Glove”:

A Hermeneutic Phenomenological Study of Canadian Soldiers’ Roles and Identity in Peace

Support Operations

by

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Abstract

This study makes an original contribution to the peace and conflict studies literature by examining Canadian military experiences with peace builder roles. The goal of the research is to understand if, and how, Canadian soldiers transition from trained warrior to expected peace builder in international peace operations deployments. I use peace agency, third side roles, and citizen empowerment as well as ideas about ontological agency, military transmutation and cultural inversion to create a comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding the experiences of twelve former Canadian soldiers. The soldiers were deployed to international peace support missions in the former Yugoslavia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan between 1990 and 2014. Using hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry, I highlight the Canadian soldiers' spatial, temporal, material, corporeal, and relational experiences of encounters with a peace support role, military identity, and the concept of peace in international peace support deployments. In addition to uncovering new understandings of soldiers' experiences in peace operations, the research shows that informal peace builder roles, creating a safe space, and engaging in micro-level contact with the local lived other are relevant aspects of these soldiers' encounters with peace. The findings of this research have implications for the way that practitioners and researchers think about peace operations, military-other contact, and intervener neutrality. In addition to identifying areas for further investigation based on the new understandings, the study highlights the importance of validating informal third side roles for soldiers in international peace operations.

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Dedication

For Brian, LeeAnn, and Hannah.

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Prologue

Rape and other forms of ill treatment of women have been employed as tools of military strategy. (Jeong, 2000, p. 76)

One of the first texts on the subject of peace and conflict studies (PACS) I read was *Peace and Conflict Studies, an Introduction*. The book was assigned reading for my first course in the PACS Doctoral programme. Up to that point, my scholarship had been rooted in political studies. This quote comes from Chapter 7, “Feminist Understandings of Violence”, where Jeong explains instances of violence against women as a deliberate military strategy using the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as an example. He goes on to point out that a “dichotomy has been drawn between men and women in the historical context of western traditions” (p. 77). That dichotomy polarizes attitudes towards war and peace. War is macho, physical, and rooted in masculinity. Peace is merciful, supportive, and rooted in feminism.

As a former military officer who worked to implement strategy, I could not see how Jeong (2000) could be right. I had never seen this interpretation of military strategy, concepts of war and peace, or even feminism before this reading. As a woman (a Black woman from a lesser developed country) who also served in the armed forces, I encountered neither the essentialist claims to female nurturing and male physicality nor deliberate military strategies of ill treatment of women (or men) in my lifeworld. Yet, I know that my experience is only my experience. I could see where Jeong’s statement resonated with other students in my Doctoral studies program. During my conversations with fellow learners, I gathered that the consensus was that Jeong (2000) was right. To disagree with his point is to be inhumane, patriarchal, and statist. The concluding sentiment among my PACS colleagues was that the military, with its armaments, poor treatment of women, atrocious peacekeeper behaviour, and large scale gobbling up of

national fiscal resources was the problem. There was even palpable fear: one student revealed to me that she was apprehensive and distrustful of military and police personnel. She had not been comfortable with the idea of being in a class with me and another colleague (a police officer), until she came to know us better as individuals. This made me wonder about what it means to fear what we do not understand.

During one of my multiple interviews for this research project, I learned the lyrics of a song by Canadian singer-songwriter, Bruce Cockburn. The song is called *Wondering Where the Lions Are*. A participant brought the song to my attention when he quoted this verse from it:

Young men marching, helmets shining in the sun,
Polished and precise like the brain behind the gun
(should be!) they got me thinking about eternity
Some kind of ecstasy got a hold on me.

The participant wanted me to take note of the idea that there was a brain behind the gun. If there was a brain, there had to be a face and a living body, thoughts, deeds and multiple identities rolled into the personality carrying the gun. What was interesting to me was the back-story to Cockburn's song. You see, Cockburn (1979) was inspired to write this song after a close friend (or relative) of his who worked in some mysterious realm of Canadian defence told him that the world was on the brink of nuclear war due to developments on the Sino-Russian frontier. The time was 1979 and although there was an "understanding" between the Americans and the Russians, no such understanding of mutually assured destruction defined relations between Russia and China. According to www.cockburnproject.net, the songwriter's friend told him over dinner that "we could wake up tomorrow to a nuclear war". That night Cockburn dreamt about lions. It was a recurring dream he had been having for some time. The dream was about "lions roaming the streets in a terrifying fashion". Only this time, the lions were not threatening at all. Cockburn says when he woke up the next day, "it was a really nice day and all this good stuff

was going on”. It makes sense then that his song begins: “Sun’s up, uh huh, looks okay, the world survives into another day”.

I think that the military is the PACS field’s own lion. One reason for this opinion is the dearth of research about the experiences of soldiers who work to build peace. Notwithstanding the numerous published memoirs and personal accounts of soldier’s deployment experiences, there is little understanding about the ways that soldiers encounter or try to enact peace in international operations. A difficulty with assessing the methodological value of soldiers’ experiences is part of the problem. As Paul Diehl (2008) points out, practitioners and former military officers who study peace operations tend to make assertions that are suspect because the recommendations are “based on the biased and personal experiences of the observers as applied to unsystematic conceptions of peace operations success derived from a single mission” (Diehl, 2008, p. 133). He goes on to say that focus on micro-factors such as elements of command, control and communication are better understood as aspects that affect operation efficiency, not success. Therefore, these “micro-factors should be the stuff of military manuals rather than strategic plans for policy makers” (Diehl, 2008, p. 133).

On the one hand, I agree with Diehl (2008) that the micro-factors are the stuff of military manuals, not foreign policy and peace studies. When such micro-factors are contrived based on problem-solving thinking that bear little affiliation to established research strategies, they lose their place in credible discussions about operational success. On the other hand, it is micro-factors like the recommendations made by Steven Bullimore (2006) which matter on the ground in multidimensional peacebuilding environments. In a Strategy Research Paper, Bullimore (2006, p. 12) recommended that that the US military should work to expand its role in post-conflict governance and design troop support structures that increase military capacity for

stabilization and reconstruction operations. Similarly, practitioner findings collated by Rudd, Bayley, and Petruczynik (2006), illustrate the operational needs and complexities of the new war landscape that was already laid bare by Mary Kaldor (2006, 2013). To treat practitioner and former military recommendations as micro-factors ignores the soldiers' experience in peace support operations and the outcomes of their orientations to peace.

And so, like the descriptions of peace operations experiences reported by Canadians Romeo Dallaire (2004) and John Conrad (2011), quotes like this one cited in Bullimore (2006) leave me perplexed:

On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody. On the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build the economy, restructure the infrastructure, build the political system. And there's some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with NGOs and political wannabes running around, with the factions and a culture he doesn't understand. (Gen. Zinni quoted in Bullimore, 2006, p. 1)

Just like Jeong's line about military strategy, it makes me think about how military interveners approach to their work in doing peace and how the *what-it-is* of what they do translates for the people who are living in the deployment spaces. Jeong's line reflects what we know about soldiers in peacebuilding; publications outlining military failures and conflict producing interactions are plenty. There are issues regarding the use of force, systemic violence, racial and gender discrimination, sexual abuse and intolerance, militarization, masculinization, and resource allocation to name a few of the problems captured in the literature. These behaviours are not limited to professional militaries, but the nature of military socialization and military work, seems to bring these issues into focus. Militaries are generally seen as ineffective conflict resolution tools regardless of their wide-ranging utility in a number of scenarios. Liberalism's identification with individualism and civilian control creates agreement that militaries, with stakes in the old order, are outside of the liberal consensus (Huntington, 1957, p. 155); yet

soldiers are an important part of the liberal peacebuilding toolkit, performing violence abatement, stabilization and reconstruction tasks on behalf of third party interveners.

Understanding military experiences is important here. How does the soldier reconcile his personal and organizational identity when he has to do the job of building peace? As I reflect on Jeong's statement and listen to the experiences of the soldiers in this study, it occurs to me that we may be searching for lions in a space filled with dinosaurs and unicorns.

Chapter 1: Introduction

There are various ways to *understand* a phenomenon. Max Weber (1947) discusses *Verstehende* or interpretive understandings as awareness of the explanatory and motivational bases that complement direct observations. This study explores an interpretive understanding of soldiers' experiences with peace operations.¹ To understand in this sense is to not only perceive the intended meaning of the soldier's participation in peacebuilding, but also to deduce the lessons that can be drawn from observing the spectrum of experiences that soldiers encounter in peace support missions. I set out to interpretively understand the soldiers' experiences by doing two things. First, I establish a rigorous and systematic methodology for identifying the soldiers' peace operations experiences. Second, I analyze the soldiers' experiences to determine what peacebuilding values are being projected. I use hermeneutic phenomenology to achieve this interpretive understanding. Phenomenological inquiry is a commitment to understanding experience and analyzing the sociopolitical context in which the experience is embedded (Cosgrove & McHugh, 2008). Using the hermeneutic phenomenological method laid out by Max van Manen (1990, pp. 30-34), I focus on the micro-level of peace operations by turning to the nature of the soldiers' lived experience, reflecting on the essential themes of the experiences that characterize the phenomenon, and then describing the phenomenon through evocative writing that illustrates the nature of the lived experience as well as its sociopolitical context. This chapter provides an overview of the structure of the thesis, the purpose of the study and the relevant research questions. Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace operations have various meanings; I also outline these and other related key terms in this chapter.

¹ I use soldier to describe all members of the armed forces, regardless of their rank.

As van Manen (1990) points out, phenomenological research involves describing the essence of a phenomenon through the art of writing and rewriting. The research process unfolds as one of reductive analysis and vocative writing where processes of bracketing, analyzing, and interpreting the data flow together to bring the reader into nearness with the phenomenon. Appropriate hermeneutic analysis shows what the experiences are as well as the meaning of the experiences when they are subject to interpretation. The writing of the research project is an important element of the phenomenological vocative. The vocative speaks to the way that the researcher presents data gathered from the experiences. In presenting the findings of this study, I explore ways of bracketing the participants' experiences as I analyze the structure of peacebuilding intervention and connect the parts, the what-it-is of the soldiers' experiences, with the whole, the context of peace operations. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the implications for the key findings and mentions the agenda for future research.

Key Terms

Peacekeeping. Generally, the term peacekeeping is used to signal one military mission type that happens with the consent of all the major parties involved in a conflict as part of the peacebuilding process. Peacekeeping missions typically have a mandate to monitor and/or implement the conditions of a peace agreement under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Missions that feature a more coercive mandate authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are categorized as *peace enforcement*. This kind of peace operation is visually represented as soldiers wearing the UN blue beret or blue helmet. The term *peacekeeper* is used differently. While peacekeeping traditionally implies UN mandated operations, the peacekeeper is an identity. A peacekeeper engages in police-like, humanitarian activities in a non-war deployment scenario (see Volker Franke, 2003, p 32-35). The peacekeeper identity is expected to be evoked

in UN mandated missions, as well as other forms of operations that may be undertaken by another entity such as NATO. I use *peacekept*² to describe the people who live in the recipient states of UN and hybrid peace operations.

Peace Operations. Presently, the UN and NATO use the term “peace operations” to signal that the “boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred” (UN, 2008, p. 19). Peace operations incorporate a spectrum of civilian and military efforts including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping as *peace support* efforts serving different purposes at different points in the unfolding political process. I use the *peace support operations* and *peace operations* interchangeably to signal the image and purpose shift from UN mandated military deployments to hybrid structures that feature regional and/or multinational coalitions taking UN Security Council approved action, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia and, more recently, Afghanistan.

Peacebuilding. Peacebuilding refers to cohesive efforts from various actors to support the political, economic, social, and security structures of a conflict space. I consider two aspects of peacebuilding in this research. There is the designation of peacebuilding that downplays peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking activities, focusing on transforming conflict relations over the long term. This is *transformative peacebuilding*. There is also peacebuilding that consists of various actors and arrangements, including peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement as part of a conflict settlement and post accord reconstruction strategy. This form of peacebuilding focuses on conflict management and is usually described as *post-conflict*

² Christopher Clapham (2000) uses “peacekept” to describe the recipients of UN peacekeeping interventions. Denis Tull (2013), Kathleen Jennings (2015), and Virginia Page Fortna (2008) use peacekept to describe the demand side of UN peacekeeping and the people who are in the conflict space. In this study, I apply the concept to UN approved hybrid operations as well as UN mandated peacekeeping missions.

peace-building or PCPB in the literature. It is an important first step towards conflict recovery, but it does not address the underlying causes of the conflict in the way that transformative peacebuilding suggests. I use *peacebuilding* to refer to the transformative arrangements, whereas I use *post-conflict peace-building* to describe the conflict settlement aspects of international intervention. The *peace builder* is another identity. Johan Galtung (2007, p. 29) uses *peace builder* to refer to a peace worker who works towards the goal of depolarization, humanization, and positive, helping, cooperative relations, among other things.

Purpose of the Study

There are three reasons for this study. First, I want to develop a methodological framework for investigating soldiers' experiences in peace operations. Second, I want to understand military experiences in peace operations. Third, I want to use the interpretive understandings of the experiences to improve military peacebuilding effectiveness. By systematically gathering and analyzing data on twelve Canadian military experiences in peace support deployment, I aim to discover the soldiers' role and identity encounters and see how those encounters influence the soldiers' perceptions and experiences of peace. I use future visioning techniques to generate a participant-driven checklist for improving peace operations. Methodologically, I approach the research as a hermeneutic phenomenological investigation to learn the essence of peace operations deployment and interpret the experiences. Although the findings focus on the experiences of twelve Canadian soldiers, I also use data from six other participants (two experts and four non-Canadian soldiers who also deployed to international peace support missions) to frame my analysis of the Canadians' sociopolitical context.

Research Questions

This study uses an interdisciplinary approach to craft a conceptual framework that synthesises the intersections of three constructs: roles, identities and peace. However, the research begins with the phenomenological question: *What is the lived experience of Canadian soldiers deployed to international peace support missions?* This main research question is broken down into four sub-questions. (1) How do the soldiers experience their role in peace support deployment? (2) How do the soldiers experience their identity in peace support deployments? (3) How do the soldiers experience peace in peace support deployments? (4) How can the soldiers' lived experiences in international deployment inform initiatives for improving peace support in the future?

Overview of Chapters

I organize the thesis into ten chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, outlines the key terms, the purpose of the study, the research questions and the overall structure of the thesis. Chapter 2, Context, provides an overview of military participation in conflict settlement and peacebuilding interventions. I outline the role that soldiers play as they act on behalf of third party interveners and highlight some ways that understanding their experiences could help to fill gaps in the peacebuilding literature. Chapter 3, Conceptual Framework, organizes the key concepts and models that frame the findings and discussion about soldiers' experiences with peacebuilding. Using an interdisciplinary approach, I unite three streams of thought. First, I establish the constructions of peace and military roles and identity. Then I synthesize a variety of ideas related to transformative peacebuilding, paying attention to the idea of the peace builder. Next, I examine the phenomenological concept of ontological agency and conclude the chapter with a brief discussion about how the three streams of scholarship come together. Chapter 4, Research

Method, explains the research techniques used in this study. Due to the different approaches to phenomenological inquiry, I provide a detailed explanation of the reduction strategy used in the project as well as a supported argument for my interpretation of the two-part phenomenological reduction process. Other relevant aspects of the research procedures are laid out in this chapter, including information on the representational and secondary participants and the way that their data is used and presented.

Chapters 5 to 8 present the data and key findings of the research project. Each chapter corresponds to one of the four research sub-questions. In Chapter 5, Encountering a Peace Support Role, I present and discuss findings about the soldiers' experiences with peace support roles. I organize the lived experience descriptions (LEDs) to follow the chronology of peace operations from early UN operations to hybrid operations from 1990 to 2014. The key findings in this chapter focus on the ways that spatiality, temporality, corporeality, materiality and relationality present themselves in the soldiers' responsiveness to the evolving demands of peace operations deployment. Chapter 6, Encountering a Military Identity, presents and discusses findings related to the soldiers' identity encounters. I organize the soldiers' lived experience descriptions according to five identity-making themes, and then I identify the essences of the identity experiences and distill key findings that show the ontology of the soldiers' identity encounters. In Chapter 7, Encountering Peace, I consider LEDs that demonstrate the soldiers' encounters with peace, organizing them into themes that focus on post-conflict peace-building and transformative peacebuilding outcomes. I then discuss understandings about the soldiers' peace encounters, relating the soldiers' experiences to peacebuilding constructions and criticisms. In Chapters 8, Visions for the Future, I present the findings of a future image interview with study participants. Data presented here illustrates the way that the soldiers'

experiences in peace operations deployment influence their mental picture of future operations. The soldiers' hopes and fears for the future are analyzed for their peacebuilding implications.

Chapter 9, *Lessons for the Future*, examines the spatial-relational understandings of the soldier's lived experience of peace operations deployment using the findings identified in Chapters 5 through 8. This main discussion segment for the thesis returns to some ideas in the conceptual framework to consider how the findings illustrate the ways soldiers can access peace builder characteristics. In this chapter I also reformulate the soldiers' narratives from the future vision interview, turning them into an action plan for future planners and practitioners. Finally, Chapter 10, *Conclusions*, summarizes the research findings and highlights the significance of the study. Within this chapter, I acknowledge some limitations of the study and identify areas for future research and illustrate the implications for the new understandings generated from the study. A brief epilogue and relevant appendices follow the conclusion chapter.

Conclusion

This thesis uses phenomenological inquiry to understand military peace operations experiences. This introduction chapter provides an overview of the structure of the thesis and the purpose of the study. It also clarifies some key terms and outlines the way that the findings and discussions are organized throughout the thesis. In the upcoming chapter, I describe the context of the research problem as I separate what we know from what we understand about soldiers' experiences in peace operations.

Chapter 2: Context

In this chapter, I describe the military peace operations context. I begin by providing a brief overview of military peacebuilding connections using the evolution of UN peacekeeping as a start point. That UN peacekeeping relationship is then explained as a component of the liberal peacebuilding culture, which is problematic but universally applied by formal third party interveners. I highlight that the peacebuilding focus is complex, even though it overlooks some micro-level components of building peace that other scholars and researchers have identified as necessary bottom-up approaches. I establish in this context that the soldier acts as an external third party intervener, but recent research shows how the soldier presents as a component of the micro-level determinations of peace.

The Peace Operations Context

Military forces do not exist for the sake of peacebuilding. Michael Howard (2002) argues that waging war is an act that arises from a superabundance of analytical rationality. Militaries act on behalf of states as instruments of legitimate collective violence. To defeat or deter an identified enemy in the name of the national interest is the professional army's *raison d'être*. Warfare against a foreign enemy is the simpler aspect of the organization's role. Peacebuilding interventions are, however, far more complex. How does one move from being an institution designed for war making to an organization expected to contribute to building peace? Military interventions earned its new status as a tool for managing international conflicts in the mid-20th century with the creation of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has no agreed upon definition, but the term commonly refers to multinational military operations undertaken to monitor a conflict or facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement, as mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, with the consent of all the major parties involved in the conflict. The first group of UN

peacekeepers deployed to Palestine in June 1948 under the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). These soldiers were unarmed, charged only with observing the implementation of a truce negotiated between Israel and its Arab neighbours: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In August 1949, Resolution 73 (1949) assigned monitoring roles to UNTSO under Chapter VII (Article 40) of the UN Charter. Before that, in January of 1949, observers were deployed to the borders between India and Pakistan under UNMOGIP.

By 1956 the first formal peacekeeping mission, UNEF I, was deployed to the Sinai in response to the Suez Crisis. UN action in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 (ONUC) as well as operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and Lebanon (UNIFIL) took a different turn, consisting of mostly interpositioning actions between fighting forces within the territory of a single state. That the UN Security Council voted to approve peace enforcement in defence of South Korea in 1950 is a controversial side note in peacekeeping history. The US-led intervention in Korea was approved because, with the Soviet Union absent from the Security Council at the time of voting, the opposing power was unable to cast a veto (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2004, p. 71). By 1988, UN peacekeeping forces earned the Nobel Peace Prize. Thirty-one years earlier, the “Father of United Nations Forces”, Canadian statesman, Lester B. Pearson, won the same award. Between 1988 and 1993, the UN added 20 new peacekeeping missions to its list of interventions (Bellamy et al., 2004, p. 76).

With the development of UN peacekeeping, foreign military interventions now had an expectation to contribute to global peace and security, albeit this was initially in the shadow of the Cold War power struggles that made individual state interventions dangerous for peace and security. Peacekeeping as monitoring and buffering operations became the softer, more palatable representation of the use of military interveners; but it eventually gave way to more complex

operations. Today, military interventions are part of the post-conflict peace-building framework. It is often used as a mechanism for settling a conflict after violence has erupted, forming one part of the peacebuilding triangle. External military forces play an important role as third party interveners by raising the cost of defecting from peace agreements and working with other actors to build local capacity and control deter local hostility (Michael Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). This post-conflict peace-building orientation was recognized with *An Agenda for Peace* (UN, 1992). In that document, the UN drew distinctions among interveners and their respective roles in conflict situations. Making peace, the UN established, was the responsibility of political leaders and diplomats. Keeping and enforcing peace was the domain of soldiers and military strategists. Building peace was the duty of international institutions, including non-government actors.

Peacebuilding provides a pretext for foreign interventions that have the result of replicating values associated with liberal states. Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams (2009) emphasise liberal value replication as the “software” approach to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding architecture breeds cultural complexities and scholars like Nadim Rouhana (2004) point out that it can reinforce power differentials. Peacebuilding architectures such as the creation of the United Nations Peace Building Commission (PBC) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have changed the scope of what it means to engage in post-conflict recovery. The PBC was established in 2005 as an integrated peacebuilding strategy to promote greater strategic coherence and coordination among a variety of actors working in countries under the commission’s agenda (Sandole, 2010, p. 164). Kristoffer Liden, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver Richmond (2009) argue that the PBC only puts the concept of peacebuilding at a crossroads where the enlarged liberal peacebuilding toolbox aspires to move from internationalism to cosmopolitanism, but it remains mired in a Westphalian state system that obscures the obvious

defects of the global liberal order. R2P is another mechanism that, as of 2005, incorporates preventative, reactive and rebuilding functions into the international community's responsibility to act where sovereign states fail to prevent egregious harm to their own citizens (Badescu, 2011). David Chandler (2004) observes that R2P reifies the liberal peace thesis by creating justifications for new interventionist norms. More recently, Chandler observes that the liberal peacebuilding experiment has created its own crisis (see Chandler, 2017).

Oliver Richmond (2004) observes that this new found connection between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is a reflection of the liberal desire to achieve positive peace. Contemporary peace operations are a complex range of intervention activities that extend beyond traditional peacekeeping, which had only a negative peace effect. Rather than merely enforce or monitor a negative peace, internationally supported peace interventions were re-imagined as opportunities to compel states emerging from civil wars to conform to western structures (Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009, p. 18). Thus, we have peacebuilding operations, which “combine the pursuit of civil peace, including security sector reform, disarmament and reconciliation, with the promotion of democracy and free market economy” (Liden et al., 2009, p. 590). Critics of the liberal peace charge that contemporary methods of building peace conflate with the liberal democratic order. For instance, Mac Ginty (2006, p. 175) describes the liberal democratic peace as “a confluence of behaviours, attitudes and structural factors that encourage a particular type of peace and peacemaking” that, among other things, prefers a certain type of engagement with certain types of actors in a war-torn society. Liberal peacebuilding is widely promoted as international peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery models favoured by leading states and international financial institutions. It is, however, highly criticised for the way that it shapes the international political system and its constitutive parts without really changing the underlying structure of

conflicts. See for example, Charles Theissen (2011) who collates the range of scholarly criticisms of the liberal peacebuilding agenda and brings together a number of views on achieving emancipation. Severine Autessere's (2010) study of peacebuilding in the DRC is another relevant critique of how international peacebuilding culture influences intervener understandings of conflict and shapes conflict resolution outcomes.

Roger Mac Ginty (2006, 2008) consequently calls liberal peacebuilding illiberal because it promotes a specialized form of liberalism that is highly prescriptive, dependent on external experts, and reflective of western norms. One important aspect of liberal peacebuilding is its promotion of interventions construed as efforts to rebuild a state system according to the liberal peacebuilding consensus. Thus, Richmond (2004) argues that comprehensive peacebuilding means using a variety of interventions to democratize a failing state, solve a humanitarian problem, or create a new state using a range of peace operations efforts. There are numerous other positions on what liberal peacebuilding culture means for the outcome of peace in domestic and global spaces. Several scholars offer different positions on how one could view the proliferation of global liberal governance through international interventionism. For example, Paris (2004, 1997) argues that the liberal peace's market democracy focus ignores the destabilizing effects of their own remedies. Military interveners like NATO, Paris (1997) points out, are committed to the inherent principles of democracy and market economics that reinforce one concept of peacebuilding. In addition, Andrew Williams (2007) argues that post-conflict reconstruction has come to mean new form of imperialisms given over to the liberal peace paradigm, which is based on a belief by intervening states that what they are doing is self-evidently right. Moreover, Toby Dodge (2013) points out that hybrid and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq served the universal neoliberal peacebuilding template by making

statehood, democracy and individualism the cornerstone of the intervention initiatives, but the result is a weaker, not stronger Iraqi and Afghan state over time.

Soldiers as Third Party Interveners in Peacebuilding

Some key pieces of the literature suggest that the way a scholar frames the intervention needs of a post-conflict space determines the way that they use terms like peacebuilding and peace operations. For example, Peter Jakobsen (2006) qualifies his use of the term peace operations by narrowing his definition to an operation that is legal under international law, authorized to use force beyond self-defence, and has a UN mandate (2006, p. 74, n. 2). Arno Truger (2011), who argues that peacebuilding is based on a human security approach, frames military intervention differently, noting that “in a peacekeeping setting, peacebuilding is part of a multidimensional peacekeeping approach including military and civilian components in a co-operative and co-ordinated, but distinct manner” (p. 127). Taking a legal approach, Sylvia Maus (2011), argues that peacekeeping operations are not the same as peacebuilding operations with regard to the differences in their overall goals and intentions. While peacebuilding aims at reducing the risk of relapsing into conflict in the long term by strengthening local capacities, peacekeeping operations generally aim at preserving peace after the end of fighting and assisting in the implementation of peace agreements (Maus, 2011, p. 59).

Organizing literature around these various approaches can be complex, and so I use the term peace operations to refer to all types of military operations, including preventative deployments, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. Peace operations are an important aspect of the liberal peacebuilding culture; but the concept of peacebuilding itself can be indeterminate. Some scholars see military intervention in post-conflict peace-building as relevant only because, as Jeong (2003) points out,

“warring factions do not suddenly change behaviours after a peace accord is signed” (p. 234). Sometimes, militaries acting on behalf of third parties (states or the UN) must use forceful intervention or coercive diplomacy, particularly in situations where political institutions do not exist to regulate the behaviours of the local parties involved (Jeong, 2003, p. 234). External military forces work synergistically with other actors in conflict management and conflict resolution to allow time for the parties involved in the conflict to cool off (Diehl, 2008, p. 24). They function to create the conditions for sustainable peace so that their withdrawal does not result in renewed violence (Jakobsen, 2006, p. 51).

This view of military intervention requirements is evaluated differently within the broader notion of transformative peacebuilding. *Beyond Intractability* uses a widely known description of peacebuilding as “a long term process that occurs after violent conflict has stopped”. The *Beyond Intractability* database further states that peacebuilding is “the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping”. Michelle Maiese (2003) expands on this basic definition of peacebuilding by explaining the exclusive and inclusive concepts of peacebuilding practice. The eschewing of peacemaking and peacekeeping and the suggestion that peacebuilding is the long-term action that occurs *after* a violent conflict has slowed or stopped is the more exclusive concept of peacebuilding. A more inclusive perception of peacebuilding obtains for those who see it as an “umbrella concept” that encompasses ongoing transformative efforts as well as peacemaking, peacekeeping, violence prevention, humanitarian assistance and the establishment of peace zones (Maiese, 2003).

A number of scholars provide analyses of the evolution of military operations as part of the conflict settlement outlook on peacebuilding. For example, Dennis Sandole (2010) provides historical grounding for the hyphenated word, peace-building, and differentiates it from the non-

hyphenated peacebuilding, particularly with regard to interventions in Bosnia in the early 1990s. He argues that peace-building tends to be reactive, focusing on crisis response where third parties attempt to act as interveners after the emergence of a conflict involving significant human rights violations, thus fulfilling roles as conflict managers and/or settlers (Sandole, 2010, p. 12). As such, Sandole identifies post-conflict peace-building as minimalist peacebuilding. Minimalist peacebuilding does not deal with the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict. It is pre-disposed to negative peace, only stopping direct violence; although it may inadvertently include some element of positive peace (Sandole, 2010), which Galtung (1996) describes as social justice based on the removal of structural and cultural means of harm and the promotion of human rights and human security. Maximalist peacebuilding, on the other hand, is a rare and recent phenomenon; Sandole (2010) argues that it is complex, multi-actor, multi-level and situation specific. Maximalist peacebuilding purposely builds positive peace.

External military forces act on behalf of intervening states and institutions as part of the Track 1 peacebuilding infrastructure, carrying out official third party functions. Within peacebuilding, third parties mediate, negotiate, and provide technical expertise, resources and infrastructure (Fisher, 1993, 1995, 1997). David Last's work on peacekeeping and stability operations is of note here. Last (1997, 2000) illustrates how military interventions serve to de-escalate and stabilize conflict settings. Building on a conflict resolution theory guided by A. B. Fetherston (1994, 1998, 2000) and Ronald Fisher (1993, 1997), Last (1997) finds that military forces are relevant for their role in controlling and preventing violent confrontation. Soldiers act as coordinated third party interveners that are employed in conflict de-escalation activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of peace operations. Last (1997) separates the military role in conflict de-escalation from discussions about maximalist peacebuilding. He notes, in

keeping with Fisher's de-escalation model, that militaries are most relevant at the operational and tactical levels where troops enact peacekeeping principles and de-escalation strategies.

Last's work is important for its analysis of leading states' peacekeeping doctrine and approaches to conflict resolution theory. One significant point from his work is the identification of de-escalation functions that have been foisted onto soldiers under the guise of peacekeeping. Last (1997, p. 23-37) collates those varied functions into categories of combat and contact tactics. He observes that combat tactics are those in which basic military skills and physical force predominate, while contact tactics are those in which interpersonal communications and personal contact skills are dominant (Last, 1997, p. 55). Recognizing the relevance of the contact tactics as an important element for a peacekeeper, Last agrees with Fetherston (1993, p. 77-78) that the essence of the third party role makes contact tactics more relevant than combat in post-conflict peace-building settings. Yet from as early as 1960, Morris Janowitz theorized that soldiers would reject any expectation that they fulfil constabulary-like peacekeeping functions. Janowitz (1960) presumed that contact and combat tactics were not in keeping with the same military identity. Last's review of peacekeeping and de-escalation doctrine among leading states seem to reinforce this presumption of differentiation. He writes, "the status of peace operations (or any 'operation other than war')" seems "somehow peripheral to the business of soldiers" (Last, 1997, p. 43).

The "Warrior"/"Peacekeeper" Gap

What is interesting about Last's analysis of peacekeeping and military third party roles is that the analysis of contact and combat skills does not reveal much about the soldiers' interactions with local civilians or his other conflict stabilizing functions. Furthermore, the discussion of combat and contact skills as official and formal interactions between intervening forces and belligerents limit the meaning of "contact". For instance, Last (1997, p. 67-87)

observes that data on operational experiences in conflict zones focus on the ways that soldiers handled violent and potentially violent incidences. Hence, there are descriptions that contact experiences in CANBAT1 in Croatia and CANBAT2 in Bosnia increased with military rank, and that Canadian media interviews were the most consistent form of contact (Last, 1997, p. 81). More recent peace operations, particularly those undertaken under the remit of hybrid stability and reconstruction operations, call to mind a more involved consideration of contact. For instance, Christian Dennys (2014) illustrates the effects of stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Nepal, pointing out that “a military operation is only potentially stabilizing for a community if there is a political process prior to, during and after the operation” (p. 131). In addition, Kathleen Jennings (2015), who examines peacekeeping missions as a form of neo-colonial enterprise, highlights the significance of the peacekeeping economy and its stabilizing and destabilizing human contact functions.

Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2010) offer an evaluative framework in which they assess peace operations based on the mission goals that separate traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Taking a holistic approach to assessing mission activities, the Diehl and Druckman devise an empirical approach to assessing various military deployments by according various missions types to a theoretical outcome. According to Diehl and Druckman (2010), peacekeeping operations have goals of violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. Peace operations aim to achieve election supervision, democratization, humanitarian assistance, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Peacebuilding operations aim to achieve local security, the rule of law, local governance and conflict transformation. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2012) employ Diehl and Druckman’s evaluative framework in their case study of the UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (UNMIC). They

observe that the ebbs and flows in the UNMIC mandate, evolving peace agreements, changes in governments and outbreaks of violence meant that Diehl and Druckman's evaluative framework needs to be able to capture a "moving picture not simply a single snapshot" of the military operation (p. 254). Bellamy and Williams (2012) also found that the peacekeepers' role as a third party remained disassociated from conflict settlement. This was because UNMIC was not mandated to pursue settlement and because, in reality, settlement tasks fell to diplomatic types while peacekeeping forces concentrated on confidence building and information gathering. Furthermore, Bellamy and Williams (2012) pronounced that it is difficult to judge operations success in violence abatement goals when the nature of the violence changes from civil war to election violence, as it did in Cote d'Ivoire. Bellamy and Williams allude to the changing felt space and military utility of soldiers' peace support work.

Diehl and Druckman (2010) provide an updated template for naming various aspects of what happens in international military deployments, but their work does not help to explain how military interveners transition among the various operation types that are part of the moving picture of what it takes to build peace on the ground. John Braithwaite (2012), who also uses Diehl and Druckman's framework to evaluate peace operations outcomes in Timor Leste, agrees. He sees the Diehl and Druckman template as a useful "sensitizing repertoire" for interveners (p. 282). However, he points out that the fundamental problems of operations evaluations lie in understanding the connections between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as originally articulated in *An Agenda for Peace* (Braithwaite, 2012, p. 284). Braithwaite's study raises concerns about operational phasing and the lessons that are potentially being missed when we overlook the way that interveners transition through peace operations phases.

Peacebuilding operations are contextualized by international “experts” who represent an imposed approach that can frustrate rather than further the peacebuilding process. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) support this point. They cite Chandrasekaran (2007) who writes about US administrators in Baghdad who were involved with Iraq’s Coalition Provisional Authority thus,

[The administrators] lived in hermetically sealed compounds with air-freighted fast food, US sports television channels and other comforts. The security situation meant that many administrators rarely left the compound, while only a few Iraqis could gain access to their new rulers. (Chandrasekaran (2007) cited in Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009, p. 50)

This is not unlike the experiences of international aid workers studied by Niklas Serning (2011). In a phenomenological study of seven civilian international aid workers returning from deployment to complex emergency scenarios, Serning (2011) found that the participants reported that they did not engage with the populace. The intervener isolation was partly due to institutional requirements for personnel security and protection, yet Serning also observed that some participants had a reduced sense of solidarity with the plight of the mission country. Serning (2011) reports that less than half of the aid workers he studied gave accounts of care and concern for the countries to which they deployed.

Other experience-based studies highlight the intricacies of micro-level peacebuilding relationships in post-conflict spaces. Recently, human science research has begun to draw out some of the complexities of military deployment experiences. Some of these studies indicate how soldiers working in the locus of conflict mediate conflict intervention goals. For example, Marie Shaw and Mark Hector (2010) conducted phenomenological interviews with 10 American males returning from military deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan to find out how the soldiers experienced deployment and resettlement. The authors found three main themes in the participants’ narratives about their experiences: “job”, “being there” and “deployment”. Within the theme of “job”, Shaw and Hector (2010) observed that participants explained their

experiences as duties and missions undertaken because of the nature of their job. Under the theme “being there”, the authors found that participants held self-views of themselves as the good guys and peacemakers during their deployment. Under the theme of deployment, the authors found participant experiences of returning to the routine at home to be a major stressor.

In a beginning study of military deployment experiences, Emet Brulin (2012) found that Swedish soldiers who worked in Afghanistan as part of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) had different on-base and off-base spheres of being. The on-base sphere of being was to take care of oneself and to manage boredom. Being off-base for patrols and meetings was experienced as more meaningful for the soldiers. Peter Jensen and Duncan Simpson (2014) used phenomenological inquiry to study nine male soldiers’ experiences of killing during hand-to-hand combat. They identified that the participants viewed killing as necessary to preserve their own life, even though killing by hand-to-hand combat is more physically taxing. These studies represent an emerging body of literature that applies phenomenological analysis to military deployment experiences. Each study brings into focus the lived experience of military people who deployed on international intervention missions. They emphasize the need to understand how soldiers working on the ground translate macro-strategic conflict management and conflict transformation requirements into personal, relational, structural, and cultural encounters.

By investigating experiences of military and former military persons, a few phenomenological studies bring to the fore a number of themes relevant to peace and conflict studies. For example, Stephanie Westlund (2012) uses experience-centered narrative as a qualitative method for investigating rehabilitation among a group of eleven CAF veterans suffering from PTSD. That research concluded that the veterans’ recovery was ultimately tied to their experiences with nature. Westlund (2012) uses that qualitative evidence to argue for

incorporation of nature into post-conflict healing strategies. Recommendations from this study could impact the four dimensions of conflict transformation as well as the ways in which social change and desired future projects are framed. In another study, Joseph Asbery (2015) uses interpretive phenomenology to explore the effects of toxic leadership among five US army personnel. That research concluded that the participants related toxic leadership to decreased morale, suicidal tendencies and early ending of careers. These observations may be relevant in considering the unspoken cultural and personal baggage that conflict intervening groups carry into the deployment space, which ultimately influences their self-other relations. There is also a study by Megan Spence (2015), which explores experiences of gender-based violence among nine female US army veterans. Using interpretive phenomenological analysis, Spence (2015) determined that gender-based violence in the military created a sense of a lack of safety among participants. This could have implications for the peacebuilding interests and affects of military middle-range leadership in a conflict space.

Additionally, John Tsukayama (2014) conducted an interpretive phenomenological analysis of fourteen American military and intelligence veterans who observed, objected to, or perpetrated abusive violence in deployment theatres. Tsukayama (2014) identified that the participants' experiences with abusive violence were tied to their experiences of fear, frustration, anger, and mission pressure. This understanding of abusive violence led to the researcher's observations that cases of abusive violence seem to be motivated by individual and small group survival, not macro-strategic aims. Further, Tsukayama (2014) found that the participants' retrospection on their lived experiences of observing, objecting to, or perpetrating violence reflected aspects of guilt, shame and inadequacy for committing or failing to stop abuse. Altogether, these experience-based studies feature a common interest in understanding how

soldiers, whether they are survivors or perpetrators of violence, experience military work and deployment. While the studies are small and cannot generalize about experiences or form the basis of new theories, they provide recommendations based on understandings drawn from military first-person perspectives. The first-person perspectives are an important feature in peace studies where attention is paid to peace psychology, peace cultures, and conflict transformation through interpersonal communication and reflective practice (Boulding, 2000). Focusing on the experiences of twelve Canadian soldiers, my study aims to contribute to this emerging discussion about the way that micro-level experiences of peace help to illustrate macro-strategic conflict management and conflict transformation requirements.

Conclusion

Volker Franke (2003), Laura Miller (1997), and Donna Winslow (1995) are some examples of studies that focus on warrior and peacekeeper identities. The warrior identity embraces intensive combat tasks while the peacekeeper is expected to embrace constabulary-like functions and practice a humanitarian ethic. While these studies help to explain why soldiers may reject some peacebuilding goals, they do not illuminate the ways that soldiers experience their differentiated roles in peace operations. There is also extensive literature on deployment goals, mandate effectiveness, and intervention phases. Scholars like Diehl and Druckman (2010) and Bellamy et al. (2004) illustrate the types of international military deployments and the multiple functions that the military has within the peacebuilding space. Still, there is little understanding about the experiences of soldiers who must transit between combat and peacebuilding functions. It is clear that peace operations do not take place in a vacuum. There are international, multinational, and local level dynamics that play into the peacebuilding milieu. The dynamics create concerns for liberalism as a neo-imperialist intervention mechanism that

takes militarism as a normal and controllable *force de jure* based on its peacebuilding rhetoric. The thesis proceeds from this context, having identified that our knowledge about military involvement in peacebuilding could benefit from experience-based understandings and that phenomenological methods can be relevant in this respect. In the next chapter, I frame a conceptual orientation for understanding military experiences and their link post-conflict and transformative peacebuilding. Chapter 3 highlights how individuation and tuning in to personal experiences can reshape understandings of military contributions to peace.

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

Yosef Jabareen (2009), who writes about constructing an interdisciplinary conceptual framework, defines a conceptual framework as “a network, or “a plane,” of interlinked concepts that together provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena” (p. 51). It is a construct in which each concept plays an ontological and epistemological role in the understanding and interpretation of the research (Jabareen, 2009). In this chapter, I explore an interdisciplinary conceptual framework that grounds the understanding of military roles, identities and peace. I use concepts from constructivism, which Daniel Druckman (2009) observes is the root of subjective phenomenological understandings of peace and conflict; transformative peacebuilding, which John Paul Lederach (1997) describes as peacebuilding that addresses the relational and personal changes that make conflict transformation possible; and phenomenology, which van Manen (1990, 2014) describes as a method and a philosophy for understanding phenomenon. This chapter addresses some relevant ideas about accessing the experiences of the soldier; the methodological aspects of phenomenology are discussed exclusively in Chapter 4. The conceptual framework connects the three streams of literature by first highlighting the social construction of peace and military culture. Thereafter, I consider Lederach’s integrative peacebuilding framework and Galtung’s TRANSCEND model along with ideas about peacebuilding agency and third side roles as methods of engaging with transformative peacebuilding. Then, I use phenomenological depictions of the lifeworld and explanations of ontological agency to show how soldiers could experience a variety of encounters beyond the taken-for-granted aspects of their role and identity constructions. The streams are connected in the discussion section where I link the soldier’s ontological with the peacebuilding framework and evaluate constructions of military culture.

The Social Construction of Peace and Military Identities

Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) describes constructivism as one of the critical international relations (IR) theories. Yet, constructivism is not substantive theory; it is an approach to understanding. Constructivism unites post-modernism, neo-Marxism, and feminism with a concern for how world politics is socially constructed. Its opposition to materialism and rationalism remove it from the cluster of problem solving approaches identified by Cox (1986). There are four core observations in constructivism. First, reality is socially constructed. Second, agency and structure are interdependent. Third, there is no material reality. Fourth, norms and functional rules exist as behaviour regulating social structures. Constructivists claim that reality is socially constructed. Our perceptions, identities, and interests are social facts that exist only so long as there is social agreement that they exist (Barnett, 2005). Human beings act as agents while norms and rules create the structure of our interactions. Agency produces and reinforces rules and norms that specify behaviours. The perceptions, identities, and interests of individuals and individuals acting in groups are socially constructed in instances of actions and interactions (Barnett, 2005). At the same time, structures help to shape the agent's identities and interests by defining standards of appropriate behaviour (Howard, 2004; Ruggie, 1997). Thus, agency and structure are said to be interdependent and co-constitutive (Adler, 1997).

Constructivists also argue there is no material reality, only a socially constructed reality in which language, symbols, and ideas make things relevant. There is no set thing that has a reality of existence unto itself. For instance, we understand money as capital or currency through language, symbols, and ideas. The same goes for things like gender, which is a social and cultural construct that characterizes what it means to be masculine and feminine. As an example, Cynthia Enloe (2000) points out that militarism is a symbiotic process fed by the physical and

social milieu. Social construction is a top down and bottom up process of reinforcement and reification. Both soldiers and civilians recharge militarism through their participation in the reproduction of military legitimacy and the diffusion of military values. Gender reinforces and reifies militarism, which in turn reproduces constructions of security and war (Wilmer, 2002). The Christian doctrine of just war aims to create a civic virtue in Western culture by using the myth of the strong male Warrior amid portrayals of the female as the Beautiful Soul (Elshtain, 1987). When applied to a gendered analysis, the constructivist outlook maintains, as Franke Wilmer (2002) states:

That the state is a socially constructed institution, that war is a social practice, that identity is the social and psychological factor upon which both rest, and that civilizing the state and reducing the incidences and horrors of war necessitate taking the process of social construction seriously. (p. 5)

Constructivists also see regulative and constitutive rules in the structure of interactions. Regulative rules are those rules that order an activity. Regulative rules serve to control an activity or behaviour. Constitutive rules specify what counts as an activity. Whereas regulative rules order the nature of an activity by specifying how people should behave or act under certain conditions, “constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any particular consciously organized activity” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 22). Regulative and constitutive rules create the structures for interaction and they construct the interests behind the interactions (Barnett, 2005). Norms also have a structuring effect because they define standards of appropriate behaviour. Rules and norms provide interpretive frameworks that define behaviour in different situations (Checkel, 1998). Norms and rules can change overtime as the intersubjective interactions change (Wendt, 1992). For example, there is potential for reconstruction of the long accepted norm of state sovereignty as the international community re-evaluates the use of humanitarian military interventions (Finnemore, 2003).

Constructivism also serves as logic for understanding how people act as cultural beings. For constructivists, intersubjectivity shapes the construction of identity, sovereignty, and roles. It also shapes the way that agents mobilize action using myths, cultural norms, or talk. For example, Jean Bethke Elshtain (2008) explains the historicism of “sovereign talk” as a discourse that helped to lay the basis for the juristic conception of the state, its definition of security, and the ideologies that support it. She discusses how just wars and militarist values reproduce militarist values in wider society. Iris Marion Young (2003) argues that the security state is authoritarian and masculine in its avoidance of democratic citizenship and political equality among the world’s peoples. These intersubjective arrangements of self-other identifications are the basis of international action. The ways that actions are perceived and interpreted are themselves constructed within the normative practices upon which an agent bases its understandings of peace, war, security, rights, and so on. Each construct brings a distinct understanding of peace, military roles and identity into view.

Peace as (Positive) Social Construct

Johan Galtung (1990) describes peace as positive peace or social justice to distinguish the cultural and structural aspects of violence that happen behind the scenes, even when killing and maiming are not apparent. Galtung’s concept of peace contradicts many elements of the construction of peace derived from the security approach that militaries are engineered to accomplish. According to Galtung (2007, p. 24), those who favour a security approach promote the construction of an evil other, monopoly of the means of coercion and a particular kind of discourse that justifies the need to defeat or deter. Those who favour the peace approach are concerned with the omissions of the security discourse: the ignorance of the unresolved and underlying causes of conflicts, the true conflict arenas, the structural, cultural and direct forms of

violence, the human dimension, and the confusion of the cessation of direct violence with peace. The peace approach ties the quest for peace to the search for positive peace. Negative peace, what we get with the security approach, only stops direct violence. Charles Tilly (1985) suggests that a lot of the violence militaries are charged with stopping is of their own doing. Militaries function as instruments of collective violence where government interests in exploitation and opportunity hoarding create the pre-conditions for the security approach. Tilly (1985) argues that militaries respond as enforcers within the quintessential protection racket. They deliver “damage under discipline” through monopolization of the use of legitimate force (Tilly, 2003, p. 233). A sovereign state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate violence allows it to engage in competitive conflicts and then use the same claim to violence to ensure its survival.

Peace, like gender and sovereignty, is a social construct. Peace is defined based on person-to-person interactions that occur within a specific situation or space. According to Webel (2007), we know peace, not for what it is, but for what it opposes. Peace is the opposite of war, perhaps the opposite of violence. It could also be the opposite of inner or outer, self-other, or intergroup conflict. Prevailing social norms structure the conditions of measurement and help to distinguish relational and spatial states of peace. There is no one idea of peace, but its social construction makes the prevailing ideas and symbols of peace relevant. One construction of peace that goes to the heart of military activity comes from Galtung’s hypothesis of cultural violence. Galtung (1990) argues that cultural violence, those aspects of culture that justify and legitimize direct or structural violence, must be understood within the context of “*militarization* as a process and *militarism* as the ideology accompanying that process” (Galtung, 1990, p. 296). Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look and even feel right by “changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable” (Galtung,

1990, p. 292). It also works by “making reality appear opaque so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent” (Galtung, 1990, p. 292). With cultural violence, hostile violent action is not only legitimate, it is expected and encouraged. Importantly, we fail to identify the structural and normative practices that reproduce the readiness for military action and the dissemination of militarism (Galtung, 1990, p. 296). Galtung (1990, p. 302) describes this problem as a disunity of means and ends, where justifications derived from the “hard core of a culture” do not fit with the tools and ideologies that are used to achieve those justifications. Lederach (1995, p. 21-22) echoes this point in what he calls the Gandhian paradox of process and outcomes. We encounter a dilemma when we do not pay attention to the way that we approach, discuss, and decide on conflict issues. Similarly, the interest in a solution or outcome overlooks the process of achieving an acceptable or humanizing result.

Military deployments seem to be caught up in this dilemma of process and outcomes that can perpetuate cultural violence. The consequences of war indicate that militaries have a stake in dehumanizing results. As an organization that is founded on the principle of war making, its members are trained and expected to practice dehumanization of the Other, the exclusion of another human being from the moral order of being a person. Studies on dehumanization conclude that this is the only way that soldiers can escape the self-condemnation that may come from taking a human life in battle (see for example Albert Bandura, 1999, and Phillip Zimbardo, 2007; Stanley Milgram’s experiments on obedience offer another account of the apathy involved in followership. See also Sean Byrne and Jessica Senehi (2012) who assemble a typology of violence theories that help to explain the psychological, group and structural dimensions of conflict). Processes of deindividuation such as stripping away the soldier’s civilian identity and replacing it with a number, rigorous physical activity, and the use of physical activity as

punishment or as methods of hazing, helps to detach the soldier from his civilian status and bind him to the military group (Zimbardo, 2007; Winslow, 1995). These rituals also serve a practical training purpose. They impart lessons of combat readiness and allow for fighting unit solidarity alongside other skills deemed essential for the organization's function in national security and as an instrument of foreign policy (Dyer, 2004).

Within the cultural violence hypothesis, 'choseness' is the defining factor. 'Choseness' is varyingly defined by religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science and formal science (Galtung 1990). 'Choseness' is the dictum of exclusivity which culturally delineates and exalts the 'Us' as being not only different from, but superior to 'Them'. Galtung (1990) writes:

'Choseness' presupposes concepts of hierarchies where human species are chosen over animals, plants, and nature, resulting in ecocide; men are chosen over women, resulting in sexism; people of the Western Christian God are chosen over others, resulting in nationalism and imperialism; Whites are chosen over Coloreds, resulting in racism and colonialism; and upper classes are chosen over lower classes, resulting in classism and exploitation. (p. 297).

The grand result is an inherent system of othering that debases, exploits, and dehumanizes. Galtung (1990) contends that all these ideas are strong in Western culture, which is noted for its achievement orientation. Liberal democratic practices that underscore *realpolitik* ideologies promote the interests of the chosen. Sherene Razack (2004) identifies this choseness in international peacekeeping as another form of neocolonialism. The torture and murder of a Somali teenager by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1993 is central to Razack's cultural anthropological study about Canadian peacekeeping identity. She writes, "the Northern peacekeepers have constituted themselves (and they are constituted) as men of superior morality whose task is to instruct and sort out the natives... the overriding framework is a civilized North and a barbaric South" (Razack, 2004, p. 58). Razack's cultural anthropological study leads to the conclusion that peacekeeping premises the construction of an "Other" that requires domination.

Furthermore, Canadian disassociation of peacekeeping from endemic racisms fuels the mythology of the white nation-state (Razack, 2000).

Other authors who study the outcomes of interventions and peacebuilding on local stakeholders echo frames of a benevolently imperialistic and neocolonial North that pushes its own peace and security agenda onto the South as a liberal peacebuilding program that is invested in state building. Dichotomization of liberal/non-liberal, peace/war, modern/traditional, North/South are liberal peace characterizations of “common sense” (Mac Ginty, 2008). The model constructs peace as obtainable and in the hands of outside deliverers (Mac Ginty, 2006). Violence on the part of interveners from the Global North is made legitimate as they claim the superiority of western models that underpin the solutions that are arrived at (Richmond, 2004). Mac Ginty (2006) argues that the success and danger of liberal peacebuilding is that it has convinced countries and peoples that there are no alternatives to it.

Military Roles and Identity as (Negative) Social Constructs

Wendt (1992) posits that ideas and practices of sovereignty and anarchy inspire actors to define their identity, interests, and perceptions in ways that can provoke self-perpetuating security dilemmas. Identity, the fact of being what a person or thing is, cannot be separated from the socially learned way of living. Identity is therefore best seen as social identity where social use of cultural markers are used to claim, achieve, or ascribe group membership (Black, 2003, p. 126). Different social identities mean that there will be different perceptions, understandings and behaviours relevant to a conflict and its method of management. Military roles and identities draw on the cultural orientations to conflict that accompany the organization’s embeddedness in state security. Galtung (1996, 2007) points out that the military is a power archetype, with interests in a negative peace orientation and security approaches.

Military (Organization) Culture

Culture is a way of understanding the constitution of an organization's identity and the grounds upon which the organization distinguishes itself from other entities through functional specialties. Culture is what a group learns over time as that group solves its problems of survival and integration. It is observable artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions that empower rituals and symbols (Rubinstein, 2008). The soldier's identity is nested within military organizational culture. Organizational culture includes the organization's assumptions, practices, and habits, which reflects the values and beliefs of its collective membership (Kramer, 2010). Group identity works as a source of psychosocial support for members who use cultural markers to distinguish themselves from others. Culture is the regulator of knowledge and meanings that people share with other individuals in a social group (Avruch, 2003; Halloran & Kashima, 2006). It is a "derivative of individual experience, something learned or created by individuals themselves or passed on to them socially by contemporaries or ancestors" (Avruch, 2006, p. 5). F. G. Bailey (1991) sees culture as a collection of constructs in the form of beliefs and values "about the way the world is, about the way people are, and about the way the world should be" (p. 61). According to Ali Mazrui (1990) culture has several distinctive functions. It provides lenses of perception and cognition through which people see the world and others. It motivates and prescribes human behaviour. It provides criteria for evaluating events, behaviour, and language. It provides a basis for identity. It is a mode of communication. It is a basis for stratification. Culture is also a system for value production and consumption. The foundational ideas about culture and conflict influence current perspectives that overcoming war cultures, what we get with the security approach, requires cultivating cultures of peace within early

childhood, school, and higher education settings (Power, 2014) as well as through grassroots empowerment (Lederach, 1995).

Militaries have well defined decision-making and authority structures. They feature redundant methods for the devolution of command and responsibility. The organization's social control and coercive role of as a security institution is reflective of its embeddedness in what Ted Gurr (1988) observes as the state's use of coercive power to police, project, and defend its interest and establish its internal and external authority. Like other organizations, communication within work groups continually creates and recreates military culture. That communication happens through processes of socialization that involves internalization. Cultural artifacts, specifically: language, rituals and ceremony, symbols, myths, and technology help to reinforce the communicative process. Unlike most other organizations where socialization is informal and occurs while newcomers are actually working at their jobs, socialization into the military culture is an intense and deliberate process designed to create a wide-reaching cultural system that is deeply entrenched in its internal and external environment (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). In this sense, militaries are reflective of Erving Goffman's (1973) total institutions, those environments where all aspects of life are carried out in the same place, under the same single authority, in the company of others who are treated alike. Total institutions also feature real and symbolic barriers that indicate a break with society and sharp splits between supervisors and members. Within the total military institution the soldier, and his immediate family, is socialized into the work structure on a 24-hour basis. Liberal ideology eschews this kind of authoritarianism and collectivism in favour of individualism and freedom (Huntington, 1957).

Sociological investigations into the Canadian military, particularly those spurred on by the Somalia Affair, provides some insight into Canadian military identity and culture. For

example, Winslow (1995) confirms that language, ritual and ceremony, symbols, myths, and technology are the means by which military culture is diffused and reified among its members. The military has its own jargon, language patterns and terms that serve a unifying purpose, while reinforcing methods of functionality. Speech patterns, the use of acronyms, and euphemisms constitute a form of “secret military language” that distinguishes the military from civilian society (Winslow, 1995, p. 54). Ceremonies, rituals and customs also provide for the psycho-cultural differentiation between the military and civilian society (Winslow, 1995; English, 2004). They serve to reinforce the laws and traditional values of the organization. Military parades such as the Trooping of the Colour, soldiers saluting officers, and initiation ceremonies and rituals are examples of customary and ceremonial practices that communicate historical heritage, teach and reinforce discipline and the organization’s values. Symbols are representative of the separate identities military members hold. Uniforms, badges, Colours, flags, emblems, trophies, medals, and awards project the military member’s separation of personhood and status from the civilian society, while symbolizing the individual’s ties to the military group and nation-state (Janowitz, 1960). Similarly, the display of those symbols project the abstract values which stand behind military ideals (Loomis, 1996). Myths and stories, those interpretations of historical events or news that are told as heroic tales or legends, embody the principles and worldviews of the group (Winslow, 1995). Myths and stories appeal to patriotism, instill confidence in the organization, carry hidden messages about correct and incorrect behaviour, and celebrate legacy (Winslow, 1995). Finally, technology places the military organization in an untouched realm of distinction from civilian society. No other organization has the kind of monopoly on the use of special technology like the military (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Granatstein, 2011). These

special technologies range from small arms, artillery and nuclear fire power to communications equipment, heavy lift, and transportation capabilities.

Social Identity and Identity Selection

Intersubjective interactions reinforce identity and culture at all levels. These cultural patterns are often invisible to the group members because they are “largely constituted of taken-for-granted, seldom articulated patterns of everyday action and belief” (Dubinskas, 1991, p. 188). Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s (1986) social identity theory sees social groups as groups of people who share common characteristics, social experiences and behaviors, which in turn create a common identity with other group members. Membership influences identities and socialization into in-group practices, values, norms, and ideologies. Thus, identity is socially constructed through iterative processes of human interaction that occur through communication, language and meaning making moments that help to define institutions and roles. For different groups that would have a commonly constructed reality and identity, culture provides the spectrum through which some behaviours are perceived as natural, normal and commonsensical, while other acts are perceived as being abnormal and against cultural norms (Geertz, 1973). People have several roles and identities because of their membership in different groups (Ashforth, 2001; Ashforth & Johnson, 2001). They can interchange personal and collective identities according to contexts. Individuals who identify with a particular group or organization will participate in and exhibit the cultural systems associated with that group or organization. Yet, it is possible that the individual may move fluidly from one cultural system to another as he or she draws on different identities shaped by different experiences (Cook-Huffman, 2011).

A number of sociological and organizational studies show that individuals possess certain identities nested within other identities, and that people draw upon their identities as situationally

relevant (see for example Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brewer, 1995; Mueller & Lawler, 1999). Studies by Franke (1997, 2003), Miller (1997), Miller and Moskos (1995), and Winslow (1995) pay attention to the group identity derived from membership within the military. Two aspects of how identity selection processes could influence the soldier's role and identity construction are relevant.

Blake Ashforth & Scott Johnson – Higher and Lower Order Identities

In their study of identity selection, Ashforth and Johnson (2001) categorize identities along a low to high spectrum. At the bottom of the spectrum are lower order identities – identities found within organizational divisions, departments, workgroups, or geographic clusters that create homogeneity, interdependence, and more specificity in the common perceptions of reality (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001). At the top of the spectrum are higher order identities, which all members claim regardless of their specific lower order identities (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001). Whereas organizational and occupational identities, such as being a soldier or being a particular rank in the military are examples of lower order identities, national identity, such as being Canadian or Jamaican, is a form of higher order identity. Ashforth and Johnson (2001) conclude that higher order identities tend to be less salient, meaning they are less likely to be invoked, than lower order identities; however, the more salient the higher order identity for a group member, the more likely he or she will exhibit the behaviour that is associated with that identity. They surmise that national identity may be less outstanding than organizational or occupational identities because it requires direct interactions with another national out-group for salience.

Ashforth and Johnson's study indicate that, while national identity may be taken for granted in some contexts and for some groups, it can be highly significant for other groups in certain contexts. Those who define themselves as part of the nation group adopt the beliefs, values, customs, meanings, behaviours, and expectations that are a part of that national cultural

system, but are unlikely to transcend organizational or occupational identities in certain contexts. However, when nationalism is a motivator of an identity selection, individuals whose primary occupation is service to country and preparation for the ultimate sacrifice – as with the soldier trained for the defence of the nation – may be more likely to invoke their national identity over their organizational identity in the appropriate situational context. This context could be deployment into an international theatre where they interact with other nationalities. The military's inclusion of national symbols, such as the national flag, within their own organizational symbols and ceremonies is an invocation of national over organizational identity (Rubinstein, 2008). Even within multinational contexts where diverse militaries share a common intervention mandate, militaries retain their own national symbols and rituals (Rubinstein, 2008).

Volker Franke – Warrior/Peacekeeper Identity

Volker Franke (1999) shows that some types of peace operations have not been conceptually accepted or cultivated within officer training programmes in the United States armed forces. Franke (1997, 1999, 2001) conducted surveys of social, political and professional attitudes and values among cadets from the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point to determine the military members' commitment to post-Cold War operational roles. Volker Franke and Lindy Heinecken (2001, p. 581-582) found that fewer West Point seniors than plebes liked the “human side” of peacekeeping missions and fewer still considered peacekeeping as being relevant to their military training. Franke (1997, p. 53) concludes based on his findings that overall most USMA cadets had a positive view of the need for military involvement in peace operations, but they had a less positive attitude towards peacekeeping missions and global institutions like the UN the longer they had been at West Point. In a further study that compared the social, political and professional attitudes of USMA cadets and their civilian counterparts, Franke (2001) argues that military self-selection as well as military socialization plays a role in

negative military values and attitudes towards globalism and positive attitudes towards warriorism. In a further study, Franke (2003) uses social identity theories and their array of descriptions about the way that individuals can order their personal and group identities based on the organizational culture. He establishes four categories of identity tensions. Soldiers may engage in identity denial, where the valence of the peacekeeper identity is reversed and the military member takes it that “anyone can be an enemy” (Franke, 2003, p. 42). They may bolster or hyperinvest in a warrior identity where they see warrior as a more appropriate and honourable role than peacekeeper. They may engage in identity differentiation, a situation where the soldier’s identity is split into discordant sub-identities that enable him to interpret a non-war role as concordant with military professionalism. Soldiers may also engage in identity transcendence or integration if the warrior and peacekeeper identities are combined under a superordinate identity (Franke, 2003).

Studies of American and Canadian soldiers in international peace operations in the Balkans (see for example Miller, 1997) and Somalia (see for example Miller & Moskos, 1995; Winslow, 1995) seem to support Franke’s conclusions about the potential for soldiers’ identity disconnections. Denying a peacekeeping identity and hyperinvesting in warrior identity leave little room for conflict resolution approaches that fit with a sustainable peacebuilding. However, identity differentiation and identity transcendence may hold keys for improving micro-level practices that support the long-term relationship building needs of transformative peacebuilding. On the surface, military culture appears to be incongruent to the liberal social model; but this may be due to the way that peace is constructed. The military’s cultural inversion through UN peacekeeping and then other kinds of peace operations indicates how the structure of peace, and with it military culture is changing.

Peace and Military Cultural Inversion

Robert Rubinstein (2005) uses culture to explain how military intervention moved from unacceptable and foolish individual state behaviour to become considered normal and acceptable. The concept of peacekeeping, Rubinstein (2005) argues, developed with the sway of a root metaphor that the UN was a pacific world order, which symbolized the spurning of national self-interests in the name of empowering the weak, feeding the hungry, conquering diseases, and settling conflicts peacefully (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 537). Military intervention became a part of the cultural inversion in international politics. Previously unacceptable state practices are now acceptable and normal. He writes, “as peacekeeping developed, traditional military activities were used to support this image of the world transformed. Traditional military ritual and symbolism was appropriated and given new meaning in the context of peacekeeping (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 537). He comments that the complexities of the military cultural inversion were left out of consciousness due to the simplicity of early peacekeeping missions and the lack of attention to local-level concerns. Increasing the attention to peace as positive peace and the facilitation of social justice, and not just negative peace or the cessation of armed conflict, plays a role. Additionally, peacebuilding, which involves and affects local stakeholders, creates multiple challenges for the inversion. He recognizes this dilemma as he contends that operations that support the UN inversion of military intervention are the true peacekeeping models. He also argues that, “in situations where the link cannot be made, the operations should be clearly designated and marked as something other than peacekeeping” (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 542).

Rubinstein (2005) contends, based on his ethnographic study of UNTSO and interviews with people who served in Cambodia, East Timor, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, that understanding peacekeeping requires engaging it as a form of cultural practice. He posits that

because peacekeeping's legitimacy, standing and authority are rooted in a meaning system derived from the UN's "moral warrant", one of the most immediate problems is with getting people with different backgrounds, understandings and agendas into that quasi-corporate entity called "the mission" (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 534). Using peacekeeping cultural inversion models derived from Hansen, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (2004), Rubinstein (2005) makes the case that the UN's symbolic capital as bearer of a pacific world order creates expectations by local people that militaries will put aside traditional military "business as usual" dynamics. Rubinstein (2005) concludes that peacekeeping means that the onus on basic war fighting skills, stealth, and victory through force must be put aside. In its place, the metaphor of "pacific world order" means that militaries must work with other multinational forces, engage in negotiation and persuasion, and facilitate conflict management by pacific means. Thus, he writes, "the use of the military without weapons in the service of peace is a core image carried forward from the root metaphor of a pacific world order" (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 537). Peacekeeping is in trouble, he claims, because new missions have too often worked outside of the core meaning of the symbols of peacekeeping. "They have come too close to, if not crossed the edge of, what the root metaphor can support" (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 539).

This inversion is problematic because it is not being driven by insiders. In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington (1957) posits that liberalism is the ideological constant that shapes the contemporary military. Liberalism, Huntington (1957) argues, is hostile to the image of the military profession, even though the ideology is divided in its views on war. The pacifist view is that "the professional military man desires war", while the crusader view is that war must be fought "by peoples, not by professionals" (Huntington, 1957, p. 153). According to Huntington (1957, p. 154), American military origins in the British aristocracy created a picture

of the military institution as a conservative group, allied to the monarchy and vested in the old order. Even after the eventual disengagement from the aristocracy and with no evidence of alliances to any particular social group, the American military is still seen as being outside of the liberal consensus. Huntington (1957, p. 155) contends that “liberalism’s injunction to the military has in effect been: conform or die” through policies of extirpation or transmutation. Extirpation was the clarion call of pacifists and war abolitionists. The demands were associated with the elimination of institutions of violence, a liberal outlook that Huntington (1957) thought seemed to prevail particularly during times of peace when security needs did not require the maintenance of a large armed force. Transmutation was the insistence on rigorous subjective civilian control of the military and a “refashioning of the military institution along liberal lines so that they lose their peculiarly military characteristics” (Huntington, 1957, p. 155).

The resulting military cultural system is one that is distinguishable from civilian culture and antagonistic to the liberal mindset. The role that the military organization plays in modern Western society, however, facilitates a diffusion of the cultural system in the form of a highly militarized social culture where militarization becomes a “step by step process by which a person... comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas” (Enloe, 2000, p. 3). Eventually, as Betty Reardon (1985) argues, militarization leads to militarism. Militarism “involves a shift in general societal beliefs and values” towards support for large standing armies, their leaders, higher taxes and the “less visible deformation of human potential into the hierarchies of race, class, gender and sexuality” (Lutz, 2002, p. 723). Militarization and militarism have come to be associated with masculinity and patriarchy; but not all scholars accept this alignment. Research on peacekeeper behaviours like those by Janie Leatherman (2011), Paul Higate (2007), and Sarah Mendelson (2005) show the effects of militarized

masculinities on local stakeholders. Although, these studies situate their understanding of military behaviour within larger constructs like patriarchy, instability, and hypermasculinity, they ignore an even larger construct - the historicism of war and peace.

Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987, 2008) and Regina Titunik (2000, 2008) take a different approach to explaining military behaviour. Elshtain (1987), for example, uncovers the socio-cultural and political aspects of thinking that feed concepts of masculinity, femininity and the peace-is-feminism/war-is-masculinism dichotomy. Titunik (2000) points to the ideological agenda of those who see cases of sexual harassment or rape in the military as indicative of an aggressive institution that embodies a dominant masculine culture. In an article that highlights the complexities of military masculinity, Titunik (2000) contends that sexual assault scandals like the misconduct allegations made by women trainees in the US military are seized upon by multiple sides, which then use such incidences to further various liberal feminist, radical feminist, or conservative agendas. Antiwar and disarmament imaginaries of the military as a destructive archetypal institution fuel these ideas about militarism and masculinity (Titunik, 2000). The constructed perception is akin to one put forward by Reardon (1985) that maleness is pitted against femaleness in the objective of peace and security. Titunik (2000, 2008) views these claims of masculinity and femininity as under investigated and uninvestigated assumptions that have serious implications. The assumptions make negative masculinity a politically expedient view of military culture that is used to satisfy any aspect of the ideological debate. She argues that conservatives who are determined to roll back the participation of women in the military have an interest in encouraging the perception of the military as a “cesspool of sexual misconduct” and a place where femaleness is “othered” (Titunik, 2000, p. 232). Liberal feminists use this othering to argue for the feminization of the military, for it to include more women and

change training practices accordingly; while radical feminists use the scandals to maintain their dislike of the institution by claiming that it is antagonistic towards women and averse to values associated with femininity (Titunik, 2000).

Outside of the masculinism/feminism debate, practitioners exhibit the relevance of Huntington's transmutation thesis for the twenty-first century military. Military practitioners argue that civilian and academic elites seem to not grasp the fact that the military is a functionally specific organization that is embedded within the state, yet it must be different due to its expectations for performance. For example, John Hillen (1999) argues that the US military has only one constant, the common defence of the nation. The institution's war fighting soul comes from that common defence goal, as do various functional and legal imperatives. Functional and legal imperatives may change with national government mandates, but they are always based on the need for common defence. The war fighting soul, Hillen (1999) argues, is the method of motivation for assuring bodily and mental commitment to the common defence. Thus, Hillen (1999) writes that "civilian elites seemed to not grasp that the military is the way that it is because of what it does and where and under what circumstances it does it" (p. 155). This concept of common defence of the nation contradicts the cultural inversion model that international military deployments try to facilitate.

Transformational Peacebuilding

For those who work with conflicts, the distinctions between peace, conflict and violence are important. Violence is an act or a behaviour that causes harm, whereas conflict is a relationship (Fisher et al., 2000). Peace is a multifaceted process to transform violence and conflict. More than conflict settlement, peacebuilding is one mode of relationship-transforming intervention that tries to address both conflict and violence. It includes conflict transformation,

which tries to address the wider social and political sources of conflict and violence as it seeks to convert the negative energy of war into positive social and political change (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 7; Lederach, 1995, 1997). Peacebuilding can be short term or long term, minimalist or maximalist (Sandole 2010; Jeong, 2003). The short term, minimalist peacebuilding approach is one of crisis management interventions, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement to manage conflicts and end the illegitimate use of organized violence. The long-term approaches are the heart of maximalist peacebuilding. These approaches aim to restore confidence and they involve actors at all levels of society in the peace process (Lederach, 1997, 2003). That long-term approach to peace involves addressing grievances and restoring local capacities (Lederach, 1997). It also involves addressing the dynamic interplay of structural, cultural and behavioural factors that promote inequality and inhibit social justice (Galtung, 1990). Effective peacebuilding also includes a vision for moving forward as well as the identification of who will act to move parties from situations of conflict to situations of peace (Boulding, 2000).

Transformational peacebuilding represents this long-term, sustainable view of facilitating peace. Sustainable peacebuilding takes a long view of conflict and seeks to transform the relationships of the parties involved as well as the structures that promote conflict (Lederach, 1997, p. 75). Lisa Schirch (2004) observes that building relationships is at the heart of peacebuilding; it requires basic value orientations that encourage respect and recognition of other human beings as it empowers individuals to manage conflict peacefully. From this point of view, peacebuilding must be more than the “muscle intervention” of post-conflict peace-building (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009, p. 93). Transformational peacebuilding raises the standards for third parties; soldiers are expected to be part of this cultural shift towards creating sustainable and peaceful relationships among all parties even as they serve a crisis management function.

Two models for peacebuilding provide the conceptual grounding for understanding military roles in promoting peace. The first is Lederach's integrative framework for peacebuilding. The second is Galtung's TRANSCEND approach. I consider both of these models within the wider context of relationship transformation, actor goals and actor culture.

Lederach's Integrative Framework for Peacebuilding

John Paul Lederach (1995, 1997, 2003) sees conflict transformation as constructive change that includes and goes beyond the resolution of specific problems. Conflict transformation means building healthy relationships and communities locally and globally (Lederach, 2003). According to Lederach (2003), conflict is a disruption in the natural flow of human relationships. It therefore requires a transformational framework to address the content, context and structure of relationships. Thus, for Lederach (2003, p. 20), peace is not a static end state. It is a continuously evolving and developing improvement in the quality of relationships. The big picture of conflict transformation requires understanding that conflict issues are embedded within patterns, and the patterns are embedded within history. Future solutions to conflict are embedded in relationships and the relationships are themselves embedded in systems. The catalyst for change lies in the interconnected web of the personal, relational, cultural and structural dimensions of a conflict (Lederach, 2003, p. 34-36). With this understanding of peacebuilding, it is no wonder that Lederach (1997, p. 18) is skeptical about military interventions and the capacity for international mechanisms to deal with the dynamics and root causes of crises. Lederach (1997) argues that peacebuilding is much more than post-accord reconstruction. It is a comprehensive concept that "encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships" (Lederach, 1997, p. 20). This peacebuilding concept

emphasises that conflict needs to be seen from the long view and as having distinct, though non-linear timeframes. Recognizing the timeframes is important to determining the kind of peacebuilding intervention, even though the activities precede and follow formal peace accords.

Lederach's integrative framework for peacebuilding seems to satisfy several of the requirements for a transformational approach. He notes that a transformational approach to peacebuilding involves two things: reconceptualising timeframes and linking the various aspects and dimensions of peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997). Processes of peacebuilding occur in a timeframe that enables sustainable transformation. Time underscores the relationship between the many forms of crisis response and peacebuilding activities; but a "sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the *relationship* of the involved parties" (Lederach, 1997, p. 75). With an eye on this relationship building connection, Lederach (1997, p. 77) envisions a time dimension in peacebuilding which he depicts as a nested structure. In the immediate action (2-6 months), interveners take on crisis management activities including settlement, mediation and negotiation roles typified by complex emergencies. In the short range (1-2 years) interveners take steps to prevent crisis from recurring by engaging in stakeholder preparation and training. Sub-systemic transformation may occur in the five year to decade period of the intervention. It is here that thinking should shift to the desired social change. It is only at the twenty-plus year mark, Lederach (1997) notes, that interveners can expect to be operating around the systemic level of peacebuilding where the deep-rooted causes of conflict are likely to be addressed.

The rethink of timeframes is important in transformative peacebuilding because it suggests that the crisis-alleviating responses must be embedded in a larger, more painstaking task of relationship and confidence building (Lederach, 1997, p. 78). Lederach's thesis for enacting an integrative peacebuilding approach extends the timeframe for conflict analysis and

intervention based on recognition that middle-range actors hold special potential in this transformative framework. Middle-range leaders have “locus with the affected populations and so may be able to cultivate relationships and pursue the design of change on a sub-systemic level” (Lederach, 1997, p. 81). They help to make the vertical and horizontal connections necessary to sustain a process of desired change. Military interveners are not usually seen from this perspective in peacebuilding. Researchers seem to agree that the deployed soldier holds a particular position or place within a conflict as it unfolds because of his formal function as a third party instrument. However, there is no engagement with the soldier’s role as a middle-range leader. Theorizing about military peacebuilding roles seems to focus on the crisis management and prevention stages of the time dimension of Lederach’s framework. The potential for military sub-systemic influence are left out as soldiers tend to defer to other actors at this stage of the conflict. For example, following Lederach’s analysis of the time dimension, Last (2000) distinguishes between military and paramilitary roles in peacebuilding. Effective organization of soldiers for peacebuilding means that short-term military involvement in conflict management via security and then stabilization should give way to paramilitary and police roles in the medium term (Last, 2000). Yet ideas about peace agency and transformative politics suggest that a piece of the conflict transformation puzzle is being overlooked.

Peace Agents and Third Side Peace Builder Roles

Transformational peacebuilding requires a peace culture wherein new learning processes can take hold (Boulding, 1991, 2000). The peacemaker should reflect transformational characteristics. Specifically, he or she should build trust through dialogue, maintain cross-cultural contact, have agency and empowerment, and engage in new ways of thinking while practicing mutual respect and interdependence (Byrne & Senehi, 2012). Vincenc Armengol

(1991) lists these and other attributes as the ten bases for a culture of peace. Among the ten are satisfying basic human needs, breaking free from old myths and symbols, demilitarizing political behaviour, feminizing culture, respecting cultural identities, and vitalizing what is small.

Importantly, vitalizing what is small points to the central role of the individual as an agent of peace culture (Armengol, 1991; Boulding, 1991, 2000). The individual that overcomes mental and behavioural dualisms, interested in relational goals of depolarization and humanization, and practices engaging in positive, helping, and cooperative relations is called a *peace builder* (Galtung, 2007, p. 29). The peace builder is moved into new action, new speech and new thoughts that reverse the cycle of violence. Two orientations to peace builder roles reinforce the idea of vitalizing what is small in order to further peace culture.

Louise Diamond & John McDonald – The Citizen Peace Builder

Lederach (1997) observes that the long view of conflict requires architecture that recognizes and integrates specific roles and functions and the corresponding activities that lead to constructive transformation over time. Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) make similar observations about peacebuilding noting that dealing successfully with conflict requires more than government personnel and procedures. Peacebuilding is multi-track diplomacy that goes beyond the typical state-as-actor framework of Track 1 approaches. Peacebuilding has evolved even beyond the needs of Track 2 options. Diamond and McDonald (1996) understand that peacebuilding is a complex framework of peacemaking activities, which relies on multiple tracks, one of which is Track 4, the private citizen or peacemaking through personal involvement. Track 4 diplomacy includes the various ways in which individual citizens become involved in peace and development activities as citizen diplomats and special interests groups, among other things. Track 4 peace builders work within the assumption that power lies with decision makers and the grassroots; they value personal relationships with others and they

understand that peace and development are partners (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 60).

Diamond and McDonald do not name members of the military as part of the citizen diplomacy framework. In fact, Diamond and McDonald (1996) do not explicitly name militaries as one of the actors in multi-track diplomacy. They however acknowledge government actors and state the peacekeeping action as one of the many options available to governments under Track 1 approaches. Still, the Track 4 approach suggests that there is merit in examining the formal and informal aspects of intervener roles. They argue that Track 4 sub-system attracts a number of professionals, but its style is casual and informal (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 61). As a value-based area, with people choosing to involve themselves because of personal ideals like multiculturalism and humanitarianism (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 60-61), a soldier's participation in this kind of peacebuilding would be overlooked in macro-strategic operational evaluations; but it is discoverable through experience analysis.

William Ury – Third Side Roles

William Ury (1999) identifies ten peace builder roles that cover three opportunities for dealing with conflict. He contends that every conflict occurs within a community that constitutes a third side, ordinary people who can act to prevent, manage, or contain destructive conflicts. Third siders ensure that a conflict that is not prevented is resolved, and what is not resolved is contained before power struggles escalate (Ury, 1999). The third sider can prevent conflict by enabling others to meet their basic needs (The Provider), giving skills to handle disputes (The Teacher), or helping to forge relationships across the lines of a conflict (The Bridge-Builder). To resolve conflicts, the third sider can act to help reconcile the parties' interests (The Mediator), determine rights (The Arbiter), balance the power between the parties (The Equalizer), and repair injured relationships (The Healer). Those who help to contain a conflict act by paying attention

to the conflict (The Witness), set limits on the fighting (The Referee), and provide protection (The Peacekeeper).

Ury's role taxonomy suggests ideal types but in reality, people transit through these roles based on their situation. Daniel Druckman (2003) posits that roles are defined in organizational and institutional contexts. Playing one role may include some things and preclude others. For example, for the military person, playing the formal UN peacekeeping role may preclude enactment of other roles within Ury's third side taxonomy while engaging some. Formally, soldiers involved in UN peacekeeping enact a containment role. Their situation as "boots on the ground" brings them into contact with parties and victims of a conflict. They are in a position to pay attention to the conflict, set limits on the fighting and provide protection, if they are mandated and equipped to do so. However, the reality for soldiers on UN peacekeeping deployments is that these containment roles are never fully realized. Witnessing and refereeing without the ability to provide protection is one of the often-cited frustrations of problematic UN peacekeeping mandates (see for example Chalk, Dallaire, Matthews, Barqueiro, and Doyle, 2010; see also Dallaire and Beardsley, 2004). Additionally, in his formal capacity as intervener, the soldier's role is fixed within containment functions. The policy focus within various mission mandates points to containment as a strategy of impartiality. To resolve or prevent a conflict would require that military interveners act outside the rules of sovereignty and good faith. It would also require a different vision of military deployment timelines that would contravene the peacemaking-peacekeeping-peacebuilding pyramid established by *An Agenda for Peace*. Soldiers in peace operations have no legitimacy, standing, or authority to pursue third side roles as providers, teachers, bridge-builders, mediators, arbiters, equalizers or healers. Nevertheless, a soldier could hypothetically transit through these prevention and resolution activities by

engaging in informal third party roles. Johannes Botes (2003) explains the differences between formal and informal roles in conflict. Like Ury (1999), Botes (2003) contends that everyday people are the third side in the conflicts that they encounter. Informal third party roles exist when people act as third parties outside of the realm of conflict management as a profession. Informal third parties have a continuing relationship with the disputants, as opposed to the transient relationship of formal third party interveners. Informal third parties are more often part of the dispute and have a range of intervention methods or tools available to them. Botes (2003) points out that the informal role is mostly unknown and unseen; these peace builders take on third side roles as a conflict situation evolves.

Anthony Cuculo (1998) demonstrates the unknown and unseen aspects of the soldier's informal third side peace builder role. In a Strategy Research Project paper titled *Grunt Diplomacy: the Role of the Military as a Third Party Actor in Peacebuilding*, Cuculo (1998) illustrates how he and other soldiers transited through multiple third side roles, while they were formally deployed to fulfil a conflict containment function. Cuculo (1998) grounds his analysis of the military activities within the peacebuilding literature as he describes how troops performed roles in confidence building, performing good offices, acting as quasi-mediators, changing perceptions, and building trust among groups. He gives the example of the Arizona Market, a piece of land next to one of the task force's checkpoint that the military brigade designated as a space for roadside merchants. He writes:

Overnight, it became the best four acres in the American sector for changing perceptions. There, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs mingled, shopped, bought and sold sugar, plum brandy, animals, cassette tapes and interacted with each other as though there had never been a war. It became a magnet for what can only be described as cross-boundary tail-gate parties, and was a superb environment to begin rebuilding relationships and trust. (Cuculo, 1998, p. 27-28)

Cucolo (1998) demonstrates that the soldier, like other individuals, has multiple opportunities for dynamic role transitions. Academic studies do not capture how these informal roles apply as conflicts evolve. What comes closest to an understanding of transiting military roles from the soldiers' perspective is the concept of the three-block war coined by former US Marine Corps General Charles Krulak (1997). Krulak's often-used quote summarizes the multidimensional nature of contact. He states:

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peace-keeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day – all within three city blocks. (Krulak, 1997, p. 139)

Current peace operations have created additional complexities that lead at least one other military practitioner to declare that there is a “fourth block”. John Agoglia (2006) contends that administration and reconstruction efforts, restoration and development of infrastructure, and economic development has become the fourth block of the military effort in peacebuilding operations. As such, the current conflict landscape nullifies myths about exclusive military-civilian peacebuilding functions and phased operation approaches (Agoglia, 2006, p. 29).

Galtung's TRANSCEND Approach

For Johan Galtung (2004, 2007, 2010), depolarization and humanization are indispensable elements of peacebuilding. Galtung (2002, p. 181) argues that modern society is poor on institutions that make conflict parties relate to each other in direct dialogue. Conflict parties engage in a conflict culture experienced as a collective sub-consciousness based on archetypes; a two-ness that divides the chosen people from the evil other (Galtung, 2004, 2007; Galtung, Jacobsen, & Brand-Jacobsen, 2002). Conflict transformation, Galtung (2007) contends, requires transcendence, which means going beyond the goals of conflict parties to create a new reality so

that the parties can live and develop together. Thus, Galtung (2007) identifies the TRANSCEND approach as a method for single parties to engage in deep dialogue about their own embedded attitudes, behaviours and contradictions. Galtung (2007) likens peace to the health of an organism and so he sees actors as cells within an organism giving it states of health or peace. He uses the Diagnosis-Prognosis-Therapy model to analyze states of ill health by searching for the causes, context and conditions of violence. A significant component of the TRANSCEND model is its emphasis on therapy. The objective of therapy is to change a violent culture into a peace culture and a violent structure into a peace structure (Galtung, 2004, 2007).

TRANSCEND attempts to challenge archetypes and the dualisms that facilitate either/or analyses of conflict issues, conditions and contexts. The military is one such archetype where its representation of power limits access to peace. Galtung (1996, p. 2) writes that there are four types of power, which create four kinds of violence: cultural, political, economic and military; therefore there are demands for four types of peace. He observes that the military image fulfils the patriarchal objective as a form of direct, cultural and structural violence (Galtung, 1996). Military stasis in a war culture based on *realpolitik* diminishes its peacebuilding potential. Security prescriptions, which are themselves conflict stimulating and precipitating rather than conflict avoiding and transcending, perpetuate the security and peacelessness dilemma (Galtung, 2007; Galtung et al., 2002, p. 103). Nevertheless, Galtung (1996) argues that the goal is not to abolish the military. The goal of peacebuilding is to give the military new tasks that would enhance positive peace outcomes. The new tasks include international peace brigades, use of non-military skills, and employment as peacekeeping forces (Galtung, 1996). Galtung (1996) further argues that everyone is a carrier of peace strategies, but problems arise within the state system. The political dimension of power gives rise to the state's monopoly of violence and the

ultimate monopoly of hegemons (Galtung, 1996). Yet, security of the state and limitations on the use of illegitimate force has proved inadequate in the face of current conflicts (Galtung, 2007; Galtung et al., 2002). Galtung (2007) contends that polarization underscores systems of violence. An untransformed conflict represents a problematic actor, person or state (Galtung, 2007, p. 15). His TRANSCEND approach advocates that individual conflict parties engage in introspection as they consider the ways that they can live and develop with the Other. For those whose goal is security, this introspection involves discontinuing the security approach and replacing it with a peace approach that emphasises conflict transformation over defeat or deterrence and which acts upon the principle that “peace” is the best approach to “security” (Galtung, 2007, p. 23). Acting to achieve states of peace requires a peacebuilder who creates self-sustaining cycles of peace that counteract the war culture, war behaviour, and war structure.

Transformative Empowerment and the Social Capital of Peace Builders

Elise Boulding (1992, 1988, 2000) makes a similar argument in her calls for creating a global civic culture that counteracts the warrior culture. Boulding (1988) conceptualises that focusing on the history of a problem necessitates thinking in the 200-year present wherein we have already experienced a variety of structural and political changes to the idea of the state, its actors and actions. She advocates that utopian imagery is important because peace cannot be achieved if people cannot imagine what a world without war would or should look like (Boulding, 1992). Although the original concepts of utopian imagery were a response to militarism, Boulding’s idea of image literacy is a relevant concept in peacebuilding outcomes because it highlights the importance of citizen empowerment in peace agency. Boulding (1991) conceives that peace research itself is a constant search for common security, which, along with a stable peace, is a learning process. She argues that voices from the periphery and from

marginalized cultures help to generate the skills, imagination and capacity for action that is critical for social transformation of societies from violence to peaceableness (Boulding, 1991, p. 9). These peripheral voices, Chadwick Alger (1991) agrees, are inclusive of themes that flow from various cultural identities, thereby accessing different inclusions and meanings.

The central idea of Galtung's peacebuilding model is that peacebuilding is about building capacity, building relationships, and transforming people. The cultivation of a peace culture and the individual actions of peace agents are important aspects of this transformation process. Transformational peacebuilding involves pushing back against disempowerment of the individual as a peace agent, a situation that occurs when economic-political-military bureaucracies dominate relations within a conflict space. Edward Schwerin's concept of transformative empowerment underscores this concept of agency, even as Pierre Bourdieu's idea of habitus suggests that individual agency can also be untransformative.

Schwerin et al. – Transformational Politics

Edward Schwerin (1995) discusses grassroots democratisation as a new area of social and political transformation (see also Schwerin, 1998; and the anthology by Woolpert, Slaton and Schwerin, 1998). For Schwerin (1995), transformational politics is the politics of participation wherein agency, human growth and consciousness foster empowered citizenship. The logic of transformational politics is that social institutions can be transformed through empowered citizenship. Scholars identified a global participatory community that was based on transnationalism and individual interpersonal connections as an emerging paradigm in which non-traditional approaches to political problems were taking shape (Slaton, 1998; Slaton, Woolpert, & Schwerin, 1998). Schwerin (1995) posits that empowerment happens in three ways. There is psychological empowerment where individual and group self-esteem and self-efficacy are pulled into the milieu of their democratic political participation. There is social

empowerment, which up plays the various kinds of knowledge individuals have, such as social knowledge, street knowledge, and commonsense, and then mobilizes these aspects of knowledge into empowerment skills. Schwerin (1995) also describes political empowerment, where an individual's critical awareness and consciousness of his social and political situation leads to self and situation analysis as it facilitates a future outlook.

Transformational politics is one dimension of cooperative direct democracy that mobilizes the grassroots. Schwerin's (1995) work is associated with calls for citizen action and participatory democracy via community organizations that can act within Diamond and McDonalds's (1996) Track 4 grouping and Lederach's (1995) elicitive approach. The concept of transformational politics also has links to the future imaging work of Boulding (1988) and the relationship transforming ideas of Lederach (1997) and Galtung (2007) as they are employed in this study. Schwerin (1995, 1998) describes transformational politics as the agency of individuals. Agency occurs when individuals are empowered in the psychological, social and political spheres. The transformational critique is congruent with postmodern and feminist politics in that it sees knowledge as being based on multiple perspectives (Schwerin, 1998, p. 95). Transformational politics links with Boulding's future visioning and civic culture ideas in its articulation of a future outlook where individuals ask what values are important for promoting peace, as well as the path that individuals can take to get there. Boulding (1988, 2000) presumes the same potential for peace builder agency in her ideas for building a global civic culture. Both Lederach's and Galtung's conceptual models for relationship transformation come back to Boulding's thesis that we need practical mechanisms by which a peace builder's vision of a desired future are allowed to define his response to a conflict and its dynamics. Still, this kind of peace agency is not typical. For Boulding (1988), future visioning requires engaging the social

imagination, but there are two kinds of obstacles. First, there are obstacles to imaging, which lie in our social institutions where visualising alternatives that challenge existing social arrangements is discouraged. Second, there are obstacles in the minds of people who are not able to or allowed to think critically (Boulding, 1988, p. 109).

Pierre Bourdieu – Habitus and the Limits of Agency

Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990) refers to these obstacles in his concept of *habitus*. People are constrained by habitus, which Bourdieu (1977) describes as:

The systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to [producing] obedience to rules, objectivity adapted to goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (p. 72)

The idea that dispositions are the product of orchestrations that require no conductor is reflective of the Gramscian notion of hegemony, a situation where dominance is maintained without coercion or the use of force (see Cox, 2010). Bourdieu's concept of habitus suggests that people act as agents by becoming accomplices in the pressures that structure their reality. In this way, "agency" must be understood as having its own limitations. Subjective structures limit an agent's choice of goals and blinker the perception of reality. Because social structures are internalized and incorporated through social learning ingrained on the body and imitated in specific bodily action, agency is dubious in its inference that human actions are transformative in any real sense. Bourdieu's central thesis is that people, collectively and individually, transform and reproduce their social structures within specific social conditions that are internalized and incorporated as part of their habitus (Fowler, 1997, p. 23). In Western societies, the school is the bearer of a distinct culture that is rationalized and democratized as inherited culture and diffused to a select few who reproduce it as social culture (Fowler, 1997, p. 48).

From this position on education, Bourdieu (1990) concludes that people are constrained by habitus as the education system reproduces the class system. Agents are therefore constrained by their own limitations of how they can view time and space. Social agents can only anticipate the future based on their rootedness in perceptions of the past and present conditions (Bourdieu, 1990). From this point of view, engaging people in conflict transformation through future visioning would be constrained by historical-social structures already generated by habitus. If the oppressor is himself oppressed, constrained by identities and cultures constructed by the logic of oppression, as Freire (2000) claims, the soldier's construction and lived experience of intervention is ripe for analysis. The soldier's encounters with identity, role and peace should illustrate how they actively choose to do what they are already constrained to do in peace operations deployment.

Phenomenology as Ontological Focus

Bourdieu (1999) is aware of the complex research agenda and methodologies that understandings of habitus and culture engender. His work exemplifies the narration of life stories as life trajectories that highlight the "series of positions successfully occupied by the same agent (or same group) in a space that is itself in flux and undergoing transformations" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 71 cited in Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 22). Following the individual's life trajectory shows the outcome of various fields and their attendant value in the overall economy of symbolic exchanges in which the person operates (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 23). Bourdieu (1999) uses lived experience studies to identify people's relationship to their symbolic and cultural capital as well as their physical and social space. For example, his work on habitus, and in particular cultural taste, is powered by a specific time-space axis rooted in lived experiences (Fowler, 1997, p. 47). Similarly, Bourdieu (1990) relies heavily upon body subjectivity, noting that the body is

exposed and endangered in the world, requiring its acquisition of dispositions that make it open to the world (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 110). His notion of habitus also underscores the situatedness of lived experiences. Individual lives take place within the social and physical spaces defined by their social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1999). His approach to cultural and anthropological studies reflects an appreciation for the phenomenological lifeworld. He writes that “any habitus, any system of dispositions, is only effectively realized in relation to the determinant structure of socially marked positions” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 265). Thus, habitus shapes agency as well as the way that the body relates to space, time, and materiality. Ontological approaches to phenomenology offer a similar conceptualization of individual experiences, which may also be relevant to understanding the soldier’s experiences. This individual level of analysis focus is credited by Weber (1947, p. 101-102) as an element of understanding, where he notes that any interpretation of action must be treated as the acts of individual persons, since only persons, not organizations, can have agency.

Phenomenology focuses on human experiences and so it provides a useful ground for establishing the ontological complexity of soldiers’ experiences in doing peace support. Phenomenology addresses the ontology of the human being by paying attention to the lifeworld and its reflection in *Da-Sein*, Martin Heidegger’s (1962, 1996) description of the entity within. The lifeworld is the realm of consciousness or subjectivity. Lifeworlds are (1) cultural worlds where truth is fixed, (2) the world of the natural attitude where truths can vary, and (3) the natural world, which has primary and secondary qualities (Christiansen, 2012). The goal of phenomenology is to describe experiences from the person’s position within their lifeworld. The concept of the lifeworld is original to Edmond Husserl who articulated a “natural concept of the world” (Christiansen, 2012, p. 211; Habermas, 1987). Husserl (1983) originally used the concept

of the lifeworld to describe the setting of the natural attitude. The lifeworld possesses spatial and temporal indications of the natural world, which needed to be set aside, or transcended, in order to identify the essence of a phenomenon. To transcend is to go to that which constitutes a thing or the what-it-is (*whatness*) of it. It does not try to make meaning of it. Jurgen Habermas (1987) also uses this three-world approach to describe how participants in communication reach an agreement or understanding. He discusses the lifeworld and system, noting, “we conceive society simultaneously as a system and lifeworld” (p. 120). Habermas (1987) also points to other theorists who employ the logic of the lifeworld to make sociological differentiations between collective and individual consciousnesses. His conceptual orientation to the spatial-temporal continuum in which a being finds itself is similar to Heidegger’s (1962) account of the lifeworld. It is Heidegger’s phenomenological focus and of the concept of Da-Sein that provide a method and philosophy for accessing the lifeworld through hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry.

Heidegger’s Da-Sein and the Phenomenological Lifeworld

Scholars confirm the Husserlian logic that the lifeworld is the member’s perspective into the social world, but some argue that it can only be accessed by “a hermeneutic approach that picks up on members’ pre-theoretical knowledge” (Habermas & Seidman, 1989, p. 188). For instance, Bourdieu (1999) makes the point that understanding is *reflex reflexivity* that engages the observer’s presuppositions (p. 608). Therefore, there can be no “perfect innocence” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 608) in perceiving social phenomena. In addition, Habermas (1987) calls attention to the “*lifeworld context of relevance* that is thrown into relief and articulated through goals and plans and actions” (p. 122). Cultural and linguistic pre-interpretations allow for only a “half-transcendence” because there is always context to the process of reaching understanding (Habermas, 1987, p. 125). Weber (1947, p. 94-95) contends that understanding comes from our

inadvertent assignment of meanings to action. Those meanings and actions are socially, culturally and context specific interpretations of the motives and explanations behind what we observe as human actions.

Martin Heidegger, a frequent interlocutor of Husserl, posits a different definition of phenomenology and its use in uncovering the lifeworld of experiences. According to Heidegger (1996, p. 31), “ontology is possible only as phenomenology”. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger offers a reformulation of the concept of phenomenology. He criticizes Husserl’s preoccupation with consciousness and the claim that experiences can be purified. For Heidegger (1962), phenomenology is not concerned with the what-it-is of an object; it is more than mere description of phenomenon. Phenomenology draws us nearer to what is self-evident in the appearance of a thing by calling for an interpretation of how a thing appears in space and in time. This approach to phenomenology claims a focus on the ontological, disputing Husserl’s transcendental approach. Heidegger (1962) writes, “thus ‘phenomenology’ means – to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself ‘phenomenology’ (p. 58). With this definition, Heidegger (1962) posits that phenomenological research is about letting something be seen that would not otherwise have been seen. It requires going to the very question of being. Whereas Husserl’s (1983) transcendental phenomenology philosophy is concerned with purifying the natural attitude, Heidegger’s (1962) hermeneutic phenomenology philosophy is concerned with seeing the meaning of an act. According to van Manen (2014, p. 107), Heidegger’s orientation to phenomenology opens us up to the ways that meaning can be constructed or deconstructed because of how people are positioned within their lifeworld.

By prioritizing being, or Da-Sein, Heidegger (1962) makes it the phenomenological goal to render explicit the structure of understanding involved in experiences. He introduces Da-Sein³ as the phenomenological focus. Da-Sein means being-in-the-world as well as belonging to it. Being in the world signifies awareness of space as well as lived body interactions within a space. Da-Sein therefore has spatiality that is experienced as lived space – the connection of space and place through interactions that give us a felt space (Casey, 2012). The goal of hermeneutic phenomenology is to bring out what is implicit in that felt space understanding of Da-Sein as a referential being by attending to its encounters with entities. Entities can be any tangible or intangible phenomena such as role, identity, or peace. This means that the phenomenological researcher has the task of working out or making explicit the structure of understanding involved in the being's encounters with those entities. Heidegger (1962) announces the multiplicity of lifeworlds for Da-Sein in his discussion of *das Verfallen*. David Cerbone (2008) takes *das Verfallen* to mean *falling*. He describes falling as being together-with in innerworldly encounters. For Cerbone (2008), falling names a being's current absorption. It is the task that one is currently "caught up" with. Falling means that Da-Sein's current absorption "cannot be rendered intelligible as a freestanding time slice" (Cerbone, 2008, p. 65). Falling must be seen in its referential totality as already having "thrownness", which emphasises the ways in which Da-Sein finds itself already structurally engaged and oriented to things (Cerbone, 2008, p. 60).

³ David Cerbone (2008) tries to stay true to Heidegger's original texts so he writes Da-Sein, which he distinguishes as meaning here-being or there-being (*da* meaning here or there, and *Sein* meaning being). Other writers use the non-hyphenated Dasein (see for example Brinkmann, Jacobsen, and Kristiansen, 2014; the edited volume by Luft and Overgaard, 2012; and van Manen, 2014). I find the hyphenated word emphatic in its designation of a here-being or a there-being, a duality that is relevant to my data analysis, so I use Cerbone's writing of Da-Sein throughout this study.

“Useful Things” and “Mere Things”

From this, we get a sense that Da-Sein’s ontology is its historical character. Da-Sein challenges the traditional equivalence of being and presence by claiming its ontology through interactions (Cerbone, 2008; Dahlstrom, 2012, p. 57). Unlike Habermas (1987) who discusses the lifeworld as a communicative structure represented by “a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns” (p. 124), Heidegger (1962) posits the lifeworld as special worlds of useful things, or equipment, which manifest when beings partake of the general structure. Cerbone (2008) explains Heidegger’s orientation to the lifeworld as understanding the natural attitude that presents itself when Da-Sein interacts with *useful things* and *mere things*. Useful things are distinguishable from “mere things” in that the former have a role and are of objective presence (Cerbone, 2008). In other words, what they are used for, and how they are used matter. Useful things can only be apprehended in relation to the activities to which they are put to use; that is when they become equipment (Cerbone, 2008, p. 36). The more smoothly and skillfully one engages with a useful thing (equipment), the less the equipment factors into one’s awareness. Heidegger calls this *circumspection* (Cerbone, 2008, p. 37-38). There is no one useful thing. Rather there are useful things belonging to a totality of useful things (Cerbone, 2008, p. 39). Furthermore, the way of being of useful things is also relational – it is determined by the things’ orientation to other useful things and it is the relations that define the useful thing (Cerbone, 2008, p. 40).

One aspect of relation that underscores useful things is how lived space, lived time and lived other can nullify circumspection. Circumspection creates the paradox of proximity (Cerbone, 2008, p. 44). If we are too close to an object, it becomes familiar and taken-for-granted. That is until we get to a breakdown situation. It is only in a breakdown situation, when

the useful things no longer performs what and how it should perform, that we become aware of the referential relations. Heidegger (1996) writes that in breakdowns:

The context of useful things appears not as a totality never seen before, but as a totality that has continually been seen beforehand in our circumspection. But with this totality the world makes itself known. (p. 70)

In other words, the thing exists and functions as it is without notice, but when a breakdown happens, the lived space, lived other, lived time, and lived body experiences of the thing also change. Cerbone (2008, p. 45) clarifies that most of the time, the breakdown is so temporary or isolated, that Da-Sein spends little time ruminating about the loss of the useful thing. Da-Sein simply resumes its circumspective activity almost immediately. However, if the breakdown is disruptive enough, Da-Sein awards its attention to the world and its constitutive structural relations as it begins to see the useful thing as only a “mere thing”, something unhandy.

The Five Lifeworld Referentials

Heidegger’s orientation to phenomenology claims that lifeworlds are equiprimordial and therefore equally accessible to beings; yet, they manifest only in the ways in which Da-Sein interacts with things in space and time (Cerbone, 2008, p. 37-38). Thus, for Heidegger (1962), understanding the natural attitude must be hermeneutic because it is through interpretation of the useful thing at hand that we get insight into the lifeworld of the being.⁴ The specifics of the hermeneutic phenomenological method are presented in Chapter 4; however, they cannot be separated from the philosophical traditions on which they are based (Vagle, 2014; van Manen, 2014). There are five heuristic devices used to reflect on the totality of the Da-Sein’s lived experiences: *spatiality* (lived space), *temporality* (lived time), *relationality* (lived other), *corporeality* (lived body), and *materiality* (lived thing) (van Manen, 1990, 2014). Together, these

⁴ Habermas (1987, p. 151) also posits that accessing the lifeworld is a hermeneutic process.

elements of the existential allow moments of reflection and deeper inquiry to understand an experience when it is separated out of the natural attitude.

Spatiality (Lived Space). The lived space of a thing is the “felt space” of it (van Manen, 1990, p. 102). Felt space is never really thought about in the natural attitude, even though it can affect the way that we feel and our level of comfort with being who we are. For instance, van Manen (1990) uses the example that in the space of home, we can be who we are. Yet home is not fixed to a particular place. Whereas place is a location or a particular geographical point, space is where things exist and move and happen. It is what happens to the lived body in a particular place that gives us meaning of space as lived space. Spatiality allows us to explore the qualities of the place as we investigate how felt space shapes the phenomena.

Corporeality (Lived Body). Phenomenological scholars maintain the adage that we are always bodily in the world. For example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964) contends that the mind is grounded in body subjectivity. That bodily representation reveals and conceals information about the self at the same time. In the *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman (1959) shows how people interact according to roles assigned to actors in a scene. In a similar way, Alfred Schutz (1967) discusses how intentional conscious experiences are always directed towards the Other’s self. He writes, “I picture you as being moved to a certain kind of behaviour as soon as you have grasped what I am doing. I am then picturing your interpretation of my action as the because-motive of your behaviour” (Schutz, 1967, p. 159). Corporeality references bodily feelings and emotions that come from episodes of interactions with the lived other. Emotions like cheerfulness, anxiety and empathy incarnate themselves into the body and are expressed physically as actions or inactions, emotions, and perceptions (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1964; Bourdieu, 1977). Lived body reflection in phenomenological inquiry allows us to

delve into aspects of physical awareness that, in the pre-bracketed natural attitude, appear and are treated as acting normally. Hyper- and hypo-behaviours, identification of the body as an individual actor, and the body as a group, have phenomenological relevance.

Temporality (Lived Time). Phenomenological reflection is concerned with subjective time; how the past, present, and future all come together in the lived meaning of a moment for an individual. Schutz (1965, p. 45) evokes the concept of the *durée* – the continuous coming-to-be and passing-away of homogenous qualities with heterogeneous time. Actions have temporality because they contain internalizations of lived experiences that are directed towards the future. Van Manen (1990) points out that it is in this past-present-future compression of lived time that things stick and memories are created. These memories thereafter influence our perceptions and leave traces on and in the lived body (Bourdieu, 1977). These traces are the lessons learned that shape cognition. Lived space and lived time intermingle. What we are doing in a space and how we feel in that space affects how we feel about lived time. Lived time experiences help in the understanding of who one is over time, who one is now, one's perspectives on contributions, and one's hope and expectations for things to come.

Relationality (Lived Other). The lived other experience is the relationship that a person has with people in their space. Relationality intermingles with lived space because it is the interpersonal space that is shared when we interact with each other in bodily form. While the lived body (corporeality) speaks to how we present ourselves in the space itself, relationality attends to how we are with the Other within that space. Thus, van Manen (1990), like Schutz (1967), argues that we approach each other in space-bodily arrangements that underscore the way that we physically and socially interact. Relationality is interested in reflecting on self-other experiences of interactions and subject-object relations that help to shape what can be seen in a

thing. This self-other examination helps to identify the *whatness* of a phenomenon as well as its ontological ties to the originary structures that bring people into contact with each other.

Materiality (Lived Thing). Van Manen (2014) explains materiality as lived things by asking what is the significance of things in our life. A thing could be an event, a mindset, a tool, a deed, or an experience. Phenomenological reflection on lived things calls to the fore a need to see how things become or are expressed as extensions of the lived body or how they become attached to a lived space. According to Heidegger's (1962) philosophy, useful things have materiality. Daniel Dahlstrom (2012) identifies Da-Sein's orientation to things as one of its three core elements. Da-Sein always finds itself in the world in a certain way revealing moods and emotions, such as fear; that is its *disposition*. Da-Sein is at the same time projecting possibilities, understandings of what things are for, and how they work; this is its *understanding*. Da-Sein is nonetheless all the while absorbed in the things and tasks at hand while being in the world; this is its *fallenness*. These three things create Da-Sein's unity of "care" (Dahlstrom, 2012).

These five lifeworld referentials are useful for understanding the what-it-is of an experience as well as for distilling interpretive meanings about lifeworld encounters. The referentials intertwine and provide a means for ordering the reduction of experiences to determine what an experience is, the meaning of the experiences, and the ethics of the interaction. They are useful aspects of the phenomenological logic that could help to explain the ontological complexity of the deployed soldier. The concept of a lifeworld and its referential parts grounds military behaviour in a social and spatial milieu that links the soldier to the conflict situation as a conflict insider and outsider. Lived experiences, when understood in relation to the soldier's spatiality, relationality, materiality, corporeality and temporality, could uncover the agency and third side roles that militaries play in peacebuilding.

Summary and Conclusions

The soldier's locus within an affected population is borne out in literature that captures the negative aspects of military combat and contact tactics (see for example Duffey, 2000; Mendelson, 2005; Higate, 2007; and Leatherman, 2011). Consideration of military deployments concentrates on the structural and cultural components of peacebuilding. Yet, as Lederach (1997) points out, peacebuilding can occur descriptively and prescriptively across four independent dimensions: personal, relational, structural and cultural (Lederach, 1997, p. 82-83). The conceptual model explained in this chapter converges on the constructed nature of war, peace, identity and culture. Culture, while not a homogenous thing without internal paradoxes, serves as a regulatory system to shape identities, perceptions, and behaviours in individuals (Avruch, 2006). Individuals maintain membership in different institutions and groups such as their family, work group, or nation, so it is difficult to prescribe or make claims to a specific type or description of culture as individuals can have many different cultures. Generalizing about culture is difficult; but it is possible to determine cultural similarities in the way that groups of people see and interpret the world and intersubjectively construct their reality. In this way, culture is best seen as a flexible, situational, and adaptive system for analyzing behaviour and perceptions that are common to a group or population.

Grounding experiences in the ontology of the being is relevant to understanding how functional roles and identities come together for the soldier in deployment. It is here that subjective phenomenological understandings are useful. That ethical and spatial awareness of the Other deepens the lived other referential by building on the obligation of the being, its disposition, understanding, and fallenness. This has been the fundamental objective of the transformative peacebuilding approach. The military is and has always been a male-dominated

institution, even with the integration of women into the armed forces over time and particularly since World War II. Titunik (2000) pertinently points out that the military experience and war itself is historically founded on initiation into manhood. She adds, “the military is also an institution that diminishes the importance of primordial and personal characteristics and creates a condition of communal solidarity that transcends individual distinctions” (Titunik, 2000, p. 241). Titunik (2000), like Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) feature the military as the sum total of its relation to the polity of the state and world system. Military inversion is problematic because it creates a paradox of process and outcomes that can serve to support or destabilize liberal constructions of peace and peacebuilding. Lederach’s integrative framework shows that the post-conflict crisis management approach is paradoxical for transformative peacebuilding. Galtung’s TRANSCEND model highlights the deficiencies associated with choosing security over peace. Yet, peace itself is an elusive concept where investigation of what-it-is is limited by the different spheres in which beings tend to construct ideas of peace. There is the inner-spatial, the outer-spatial, and the interpersonal (Webel, 2007, p. 10).

Galtung (2007, p. 20) invites us to think about peace as deep structure. Peace requires that we look at what is hidden in infrastructure, deep cultures, and self-other interactions. Peace agency and role transitions are relevant in these constructs of peace. They are part of the framework that powers transformative peacebuilding. Actors either must officially or unofficially exercise agency to shape relational structures that will lead to long term sustainable peacebuilding outcomes. The constructivist, peacebuilding and phenomenological concepts identified in this chapter help to refocus attention on the soldier’s self-other relationship and the need to change dispositions towards those relationships. Franke (2003, pp. 42-45) lists four potential identities for a soldier deployed in peace operations. Denial of a peacekeeper identity

and hyperinvestment within the warrior identity explain the commitment to a warrior culture and the resulting first, second and third order consequences of apathy, polarization, and war identified by Galtung (2007, p. 17). Differentiation incorporates the peacekeeper identity into military professionalism (Franke, 2003, p. 45). Yet, differentiation undermines the kind of identity that is needed to create a self-sustaining cycle of peace. While differentiation is more desirable than hyperinvestment in warriorism or denial, it is not part of a virtuous cycle of peace because it does not go to what Thomas Boudreau (2011, p. 135) calls the “ontological agency” that embodies Da-Sein. Identity transcendence or integration is different. Within transcendence, a superordinate identity subsumes the warrior and peacekeeper (Franke, 2003, p. 45). A “super identity” self-motivates affirmation of a peacekeeper sub-identity as more than “a job that soldiers do” and exposes them to different strategies for responding to cognitive inconsistencies (Franke, 2003, p. 46). The need for relational change may be incorporated into this conceptualization of identity transcendence and integration where ethical self-other encounters are taken into account as part of the everydayness of military deployments. Third side and informal roles help to frame the logic of transformational peacebuilding by accounting for the ways that soldiers could engage with a peace builder identity as his “super identity”.

Still, there are tensions. Bourdieu (1977, 1990) offers a negative prognosis on the outcome of peacebuilding agency as he argues that we cannot attribute conscious or deliberate intentions to social agents. This has two implications for the transformative peacebuilding models outlined to this point. First, the problem of individual rootedness points out that future visioning is a difficult task that involves attempting to overcome the habitus of the dominant and the dominated. Second, Bourdieu’s work highlights that the locus of transformative politics and transformational relationships cannot be investigated at the level of the group alone. Individual

action and behaviour within habitus is elemental. In this way, habitus uncovers a conceptual link between military deployments and transformative peacebuilding logic. If “habitus supplies a regulated set of perceptions and actions within which improvisation typically occurs” (Fowler, 1997, p. 18), then agency for transformative peacebuilding could lie in taking a detailed and in-depth look at the micro-practices found within military-other encounters that exhort conflict transformation. Thus, while habitus challenges the utility of future visioning, it draws in other elements of the transformative peacebuilding logic. The soldier’s participation in peacebuilding is better understood from this point of view that in deployment soldiers actively choose what they are already socially, politically and physically constrained to do. Phenomenology underscores this relationship of the being to structure. Cerbone (2008, p. 52) writes that in everydayness, in the natural attitude, Da-Sein is “caught up” in a world structured by everyday norms and it is pulled to conform to those norms. Therefore, “Da-Sein finds itself oriented and engaged in ways over which it has no say” (Cerbone 2008, p. 61),

Soldiers’ interactions within a space, their learning over time, their interpersonal interactions, their bodily feelings and changes, and their interactions with things could reveal more about peacebuilding roles and identities. Military culture, informal third party roles and the limitations of habitus suggest that there is much more to understand about military identity and role transitions in doing peace. In the next chapter, I explain the methodological framework for my investigation of the soldiers’ experiences. Although some aspects of the phenomenological approach are set out in the conceptual framework covered in this chapter, Chapter 4 details the hermeneutic research orientations and its association with the qualitative approach. Some descriptions of the lifeworld and Da-Sein are relevant to the research techniques and so they will be revisited in the upcoming chapter.

Chapter 4: Research Method

Phenomenology is one of several qualitative research approaches. It is a method for investigating and understanding people's lived experience of a common phenomenon. In this chapter, I explain the hermeneutic phenomenology technique and processes used in the research project. The chapter follows a two-part structure. I begin by explaining the hermeneutic research method and return to some ideas raised in Chapter 3. Next, I provide details about the research questions and method, information about the participants, the data collection and analysis techniques, and other relevant declarations that are specific to this study.

The Hermeneutic Phenomenological Research Method

John Creswell (2007) identifies phenomenology as one of five qualitative approaches; the others are narrative, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. Qualitative research begins with a statement of the research problem or the identification of a need for study. Its basis is to understand, empower, follow-up, or develop new ideas about social phenomenon (Creswell, 2007, p. 40). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), qualitative research approaches allow us to consider the constructivist, interpretive and discursive nature of reality. Qualitative strategies allow individual views and experiences to be recorded and studied in different ways such as in face-to-face interviews, observations, and performances. Qualitative research is also facilitative of inquiry approaches that wish to promote social action and critical theory. Exploratory and emancipatory research objectives work alongside the explanatory and descriptive roles of theory making in qualitative research practices (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Smith, 1999). Research undertaken within the qualitative tradition usually signals an intention to add some emotional, empathic, or artistically appreciative accuracy that exceeds quantification. Sven Brinkmann et al. (2014, p. 19) observe that the term qualitative research is fairly new, having only emerged

around the 1970s. With this emergent self-defining field of inquiry came a variety of *histories* that make qualitative research a polyvocal claim (Brinkmann et al., 2014). Within their review of the multi-voiced histories of qualitative research, the authors treat hermeneutics (or interpretive inquiry) and phenomenology (the study of experiences) as separate histories within qualitative research (see Brinkmann, et al., 2014, p. 20-23).

There are plural understandings of phenomenology as well as various methods of phenomenological inquiry within qualitative research. Mark Vagle (2014, p. 51-52) comments that phenomenology is not a singular concept or method, yet it is this lack of singularity that is the beauty of crafting phenomenological research. Phenomenology is the study of experiences, but it begins with the premise that “all of our knowledge and understanding of the world comes from our experiences” (Spencer, Pryce, & Walsh, 2014, p. 88). Phenomenology describes the lived experience meaning for several individuals of a common concept or phenomenon by reducing the multiple experiences to a description of the universal essence of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2007, p. 57-58). Van Manen (1990, p. 10) defines essence as the structures or internal meanings that can be derived from linguistic constructions of an experience. Robert Sokolowski (2000, p. 2) defines phenomenology as the study of human experience and the ways that things present themselves to us in and through such experience. Simply put, phenomenology is the study of the human experience of encounters with a thing (phenomena) in their lifeworld.

Most accounts of phenomenology begin with the founding contributions of Edmund Husserl (see for example Cosgrove and McHugh, 2008; Hein and Spencer, 2001; Luft and Overgaard, 2012; and van Manen, 2014). In publications such as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*, Husserl identified phenomenology as the study of consciousness as experienced. In this consideration of phenomenology, the

researcher need only focus on a human experience as it unfolds. Whatever determinants structure the consciousness of the experience is removed and the researcher focuses on providing only a description of what was experienced. This leads to what Husserl (1983) called the phenomenological reduction or bracketing. To study consciousness as experienced one must, in a sense, sanitize the consciousness by suspending beliefs and knowledge about the sources and outcomes of the experience. Thus, Husserl's phenomenology is also known as pure phenomenology or transcendental phenomenology, because it is concerned only with describing the essence of the experience. Martin Heidegger posits a different definition of phenomenology. Heidegger's work on ontology and hermeneutics has a strong foothold in qualitative research. For example, in their account of the histories of qualitative research, Brinkmann et al. (2014) note the fundamental importance of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation. The authors invoke Wilhelm Dilthey (1977) as they write, "we *explain* nature through scientific activity, but we have to *understand* human cultural and historical life" (Brinkmann et al., 2014, p. 21). For Heidegger (1962), that understanding arises from ontological hermeneutics. Whereas Husserl (1983) saw phenomenology as the way that we come into a phenomenon, Heidegger (1962) saw it as the meaning we interpret through our observation of a being's interaction with a phenomenon.

Hermeneutic phenomenological research does more than just describe the *whatness* of experiences. It is research that makes manifest what would have otherwise gone unnoticed by going to the structure of understandings involved in those encounters. Hermeneutic phenomenology also provides a basis for interpretation of the experience as part of its revelation. Serg Hein and Wendy Austin (2001) deploy the transcendental and interpretive approaches in a limited study that demonstrates the similarities between the Husserlian and Heideggerian approaches to phenomenology. They note that the methods can appear distinct because of their

different philosophical emphasis. Still, they conclude that both approaches provide opportunities to capture meaning in linguistically expressed experiences (Hein & Austin, 2001, p. 13-14).

The Two-Part Phenomenological Reduction

The essence of the hermeneutic phenomenological technique is the two-part reduction followed by the vocative. The reduction serves as the method for creating textural descriptions of experiences as well as analyzing those experiences. The vocative is the linguistic or artistic expression of the experiences as the phenomenological researcher reports them. Van Manen (2014) posits that the reduction is best seen as two opposing yet complementary moves for explicating meaning. First, there is the epoché-reduction that “brackets” experiences as a general reduction of narrative data to produce lived experience descriptions (LEDs), the narrative “data”, and anecdotes, a short simple story that is constructed from the lived experience description. The second part of the phenomenological reduction, the reduction-proper, entails opening up the methodological process for forms of analysis that give meaning to experience. Noting that phenomenological research is neither inductive nor deductive, van Manen (2014) writes:

The basic idea of the epoché and the reduction is to return to the world as we live it in the natural attitude. All the various aspects and methodological gestures of the epoché serve this purpose: to open oneself to experience as lived – how certain phenomena and events are constituted and give themselves in lived experience. (p. 222)

Phenomenological inquiry entails making contact with the world as it is experienced. The phenomenological researcher does not develop conceptual schemes or try to prove preconceived ideas (van Manen, 2014, p. 222). The researcher’s role is to write the phenomenological study in a way that brings the experiences to life, while staying true to the philosophical underpinnings of phenomenology (van Manen, 2002, 2014). This act of writing is the vocative.

The dual concept of the epoché and the reduction originate from Husserl (1983) who established the two-part reduction as the basis of phenomenology in his original work, *Ideas*.

Husserl's concept of the phenomenological reduction describes going back to the essences of a thing by reducing or bracketing out presumptions, common understandings, theoretical and scientific explanations. In other words, we come to the experiences open to the thing of the experience themselves, "to consult them in their self-giveness and set aside all prejudices alien to them" (van Manen, 2014, p. 93). Heidegger (1962) later clarified the reduction further, proposing that the reduction should avoid purist descriptions by going to interpretations of the encounter. Literature recounting the complexities and variances in the phenomenology and philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger is surfeit. Furthermore, the range of interpretations about the original publications of these philosophers is diverse⁵. A great portion of phenomenology has evolved from Husserl's transcendental approach and so some scholars speak of bracketing as removing the *researcher's* pre-giveness. For example, Renee Spencer et al. (2014) follow a limited concept of bracketing when they write that, "the researcher must first come to understand the assumptions and biases *he or she brings to the research...* Before we can conduct our analysis of our data, we must first explore our own biases or the "taken-for-grantedness" (p. 88, *emphasis added*). Creswell (2007) offers a similar interpretation of bracketing as he writes that "bracketing personal experience may be difficult for the researcher to implement" (p. 62). In discussing the need for bridling, Dahlberg, Dahlberg, and Nystrom (2008) write that "neither

⁵ One reason for the varied interpretations is the translation of the scholars' original works. English translation of (old) German words can sometimes create befuddling, if not contradictory, meanings across different publications. For example, Cerbone (2008) points out the disagreements among translators over one word in Heidegger's work: *Befindlichkeit*. Cerbone (2008) notes that *Befindlichkeit* has no ready English rendition. As such, English conversions have the effect of assigning various meaning. He points to the 1996 edition of *Being and Time* in which Stambaugh translates *Befindlichkeit* as "attunement" whereas in the 1962 version, Macquarrie and Robinson decipher it as "state of mind" (Cerbone, 2008, p. 59). In addition, Brinkmann et al. (2014, p. 21) call *Befindlichkeit* "affectedness". To overcome the problems of what is lost in translation, Cerbone (2008) goes back to where Heidegger discusses *Befindlichkeit* in the original work. He notes that Heidegger originally discusses it under the heading of mood. So Cerbone takes *Befindlichkeit* to mean mood and "throwness", how a being finds itself already oriented to things in a particular way (Cerbone, 2008, p. 60).

researchers nor anyone else can cut off one's pre-understanding... but it can be "bridled" from having uncontrolled effect" (p. 128).

While I agree with these scholars that it is important to separate the researcher's assumptions and biases from the data, I feel that emphasis on bracketing-*out* what the researcher brings to the analysis is counter-intuitive to the concept of interpretive analysis. Van Manen's two-part approach to phenomenological inquiry offers a different picture of what it means to bracket and interpret. A number of other authors that have tuned into the context of both Husserl's and Heidegger's lifetime works on the concept of the lifeworld support van Manen's account of the epoché-reduction and reduction-proper. For example, the anthology of studies edited by Sebastian Luft and Soren Overgaard (2012) support the concept of the two-part reduction detailed by van Manen (2014). Those authors present the phenomenological reduction as the bracketing-*in* of the aspects of the participant's lifeworld that one wishes to separate from the natural attitude. For me, this is a different orientation from the bracketing-*out* of researcher biases, as indicated by Creswell (2007) and Spencer et al. (2014). In support of this point, Sebastian Luft (2012) explains that for Husserl, bracketing is meant to be transcendental or purifying to overcome Cartesian scepticism. The first reduction uses the epoché as a way of bracketing the natural attitude in order to show that the lifeworld exists (Luft, 2012, p. 246). Next, one engages in the phenomenological reduction, a supplemental step of leading the natural attitude back to its constitutive origin (Luft, 2012; van Manen, 2014).

Still, Husserl's method of reduction remains concerned with transcending the natural attitude. To go back to what constitutes a thing is to be concerned with only the what-it-is of it. This is why Husserl's phenomenology focuses on going to the essence of an experience. Heidegger's phenomenology, on the other hand, says that we need to see the meaning in the act

and to find the meaning, we must interpret the act within the wider structure of the lifeworld being investigated (Cerbone, 2012). This orientation to phenomenology as ontology re-evaluated the use of the phenomenological reduction. In observing this, Cerbone cites Hubert Dreyfus (1991) who writes that, “in Heidegger’s hands, phenomenology becomes a way of letting something shared that can never be totally articulated and for which there can be no indubitable evidence show itself” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 30 quoted in Cerbone, 2012, p. 277). In Heidegger’s hands phenomenological reduction meant bracketing an experience in order to come back to how beings situate themselves within their lifeworld. Thus, van Manen (2014) argues convincingly that the reduction is best seen and used as two opposing yet complementary moves for explicating meaning within interpretive phenomenology. He repeats Taminiaux (1991, p. 34):

Negatively, the reduction suspends or removes what obstructs access to the phenomenon – this move is called the epoché or bracketing. And positively it returns, leads back to the mode of appearing of the phenomenon – this move is called the reduction. (van Manen, 2014, p. 215)

This two-part reduction process is the essence of the interpretative phenomenological method (van Manen, 2014; 1990). The first reduction takes the form of the epoché or bracketing that distills experiences as a general reduction of data. The second part of the reduction, the reduction-proper, opens up the methodological process for meaning making analysis. The epoché-reduction serves the purpose of bracketing those worthwhile or meaningful experiences from the everyday of the participants’ lifeworld. In the reduction-proper, we reflect on the *meaning* of a thing as well as *how* people encounter the thing in their lifeworlds.

Van Manen’s Approach to Hermeneutic Phenomenological Inquiry

This research project uses van Manen’s (2014,1990) two-part reduction model as well as the author’s six-step approach for doing human science research. In *Researching Lived*

Experiences, van Manen (1990) uses the hermeneutic method as a modality for doing human science research, even as he challenges the use of the word *method*. He acknowledges that:

The method of phenomenology and hermeneutics is that there is no method, yet there is tradition, a body of knowledge and insights, a history of lives and thinkers and authors which, taken as an example, constitutes both a source and a methodological ground for present human science research practices. (van Manen, 1990, p. 30)

For van Manen (1990), phenomenological research is hermeneutic phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology is multiple things. It is the study of lived experience; the explication of phenomenon as they present themselves to consciousness; the study of essences; the description of experiential meanings we live as we live them; the human scientific study of phenomena; the attentive practice of thoughtfulness; a search for what it means to be human; and a poetizing activity (van Manen, 1990, p. 8-13). Thus, “method” is a restrictive way to discuss the structure of the phenomenological inquiry process. Nevertheless, he describes hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry as a dynamic interplay among six research activities (van Manen, 1990, p. 30-34). In the first step, we must turn to a phenomenon that deeply interests us and commits us to being-given-over to phenomenological research. According to van Manen (1990), research is “always a project of someone: a real person who, in the context of particular individual, social, and historical life circumstances, sets out to make sense of a certain aspect of human existence” (p. 31). This sense of being-given-over to means that there is significance in the role of the researcher as well as the expectation of a commitment to engage in reflection throughout the research process.

The second step is to investigate experience as we live it. This is a call to connect to the reduction of lived experiences by engaging in the process of bracketing that was originally made known by Husserl (1970, 1983). In doing so, we “re-awaken the basic experience of the world” by suspending our prior knowledge and beliefs about it as we look differently at it (van Manen,

1990, p. 31). Third, we reflect on the essential themes that characterize the phenomenon, “brining into nearness that which tends to be obscure” (van Manen, 1990, p. 32). This invokes the interpretive orientation to phenomenology as we engage in analysis that leads to the derivation of meaning from the data. Fourth, we bring the research to speech by describing the phenomena through the art of writing and rewriting as we bracket pre-suppositions and make interpretations. Fifth, the researcher maintains a strong and oriented relation with the data. As a result, the phenomenological researcher is constantly within and being-given-over to the data throughout the study. Reflexivity happens all along the way in the data analysis and research reporting, making phenomenological inquiry a self-learning experience for the researcher. Sixth, one must balance the research context by considering parts and whole. For van Manen (1990, 2014), there is value in breaking phenomenon down to its *whatness*, but it needs to be built back up to its structural meaning through interpretive analysis. The parts (the what-it-is) of a phenomenon must be complemented by interpretation that uncovers the ontology of the being in its encounter with the phenomenon (the whole). The final research report should reflect this parts and whole orientation as it realizes another key component of the method, the vocative.

Achieving nearness through evocative writing

Writing the phenomenological study is equal parts rationality and resonance. According to van Manen (2014, p. 240), phenomenological writing “should aim to create a sense of resonance with the reader”. There is an expectation that the methodology will stay true to its inherent philosophical concepts like consciousness and being. This means that phenomenological research must be systematic and involve the use of phenomenological methodologies to inquire into the experiences of others (Hein & Austin, 2001). Weber (1947, p. 91) suggests a similar approach that values certainty and “empathetic or appreciative accuracy” attained through sympathetic participation in the agent’s experience. Interpretive phenomenology brings the

added requirement of finding ways to reflect upon the meaning of a phenomenon as people encounter it. There is, as part of the reflective and interpretative component of phenomenological inquiry, a need to connect with the telling of the experiences. Appropriate phenomenological writing is a reflective and pre-reflective vocative expression of the systematic method of inquiry. One aspect of the vocative, the bringing to speech of experiences, which van Manen illustrates in *Phenomenology of Practice*, is the evocative method. He writes, “the evocative method practices a perceptive address to living meaning in the act of writing. It lets the text speak to us in an addressive manner so that the reverberative meanings seduce us to attentive recognition” (van Manen, 2014, p. 249). To evoke means to bring or recall to the conscious mind. The *evocative* method uses words to explicate the presence of a thing.

There are subtle differences between the evocative and other methods of the vocative. The *revocative* method attempts to bring experiences vividly into presence through some form of imagery that the reader can recognize without reflection or thinking, such as the use of poetry or a meditative quote. The *invocative* method also uses poetic language, but it does so in a way that the story or the poem becomes the image of the study. The *convocative* method appeals to communal senses by pulling audiences towards empathic experiences. For van Manen (2014), the evocative method works in two ways. It uses words, language, metaphors, and speech to pull audiences towards a sense of nearness with the experience of others, and it calls out to readers to listen to or see the image that is represented in the text itself throughout the bracketing process.

“Bracketing” in the Epoché-Reduction

Not all phenomenological inquirers use van Manen’s approach to the study of experiences. For example, Clarke Moustakas (1994) works within transcendental phenomenology by focusing less on interpretations made by the researcher and more on empirical descriptions of the lived experience. Amedeo Giorgi (2009) also offers a descriptive

phenomenology, staying true to Husserl's (1983) model, albeit with some modifications such as contextualizing without interpreting. Karin Dahlberg et al. (2008) move closer to interpretive phenomenology, but they adopt a different orientation to the concept of the phenomenological reduction, opting to "bridle" instead of bracketing pre-understandings. Still, there are many ways to bracket experiences. Heuristic, hermeneutic, experiential and methodological methods of engaging in the epoché-reduction represent the different philosophical approaches to phenomenological study (van Manen, 1990, 2014). According to van Manen (2014), each procedural orientation to the epoché implies a differentiated approach to the first reduction process. For example, in the method of heuristic epoché-reduction, bracketing means to disturb or shatter the attitude of taken-for-grantedness (van Manen, 2014, p. 223). The heuristic method is interested in creating distanciation, an interruption of the lived experience to make sense of it. Heuristic epoché-reduction at its most basic level consists of an attitude or mood of wonder that comes through discovering the "unusual in the usual" (van Manen, 2014, p. 225). Heuristic devices such as spatiality, relationality, temporality, corporeality and materiality help to bring to the fore moments of discovery that appear when the everyday attitude is interrupted.

Bracketing can also mean overcoming one's subjective feelings and practicing critical self-awareness in the pre-reflective and reflective stages. Thus, hermeneutic epoché-reduction focuses on bracketing being openness centered on the declaration of the researcher's own positionality, as well as looking at a thing in several ways for different representations of meaning (van Manen, 2014, p. 224). A third philosophical approach to bracketing is to see it as the literal suspension of belief. In the experiential epoché-reduction format, bracketing looks for living meaning that is removed from theory or theoretical meaning (van Manen, p. 226). This is perhaps the aspect of bracketing that is closest to Husserl's (1983) original concept. Here, the

researcher brackets experiences to determine their *whatness* before reflection. There is also the methodological epoché-reduction, which van Manen (2014, p. 227-228) discusses as another type of bracketing. Here, bracketing uses all the conventional techniques of the heuristic, hermeneutic, and experiential epoché-reduction strategies combined.

Exploring meaning via the Reduction-Proper

The epoché-reduction gives us the narrative text of experiences. Data derived from the epoché-reduction is analyzed in the realms of the *what* and the *how* to determine the way that people encounter a phenomenon. As with the epoché-reduction, the reduction for *whatness* and meaning is a multimodal process. There are five methods to the reduction-proper: eidetic, ontological, ethical, radical, and originary reductions (van Manen, 2014, p. 228-239). Below, I explain the eidetic and ontological reductions, which I use in this study.

The Eidetic Reduction

The eidetic reduction goes back to Husserl (1970, 1983) who focused on the what-it-is of an experience. His phenomenology was interested in the essences of pure experiences, that is, experiences as they occurred in the primordial or conscious self, “before interpretation, theorizing or explanation” (van Manen, 2014, p. 89). The eidetic content or the phenomenology of the noema claims that the *eidos* (essence) is a phenomenological universal that is based on the “invariations that makes a “something” what it is” (van Manen, 2014, p. 229). This incorporation of invariants unifies experiences to define all the little things that make a thing what-it-is. Thus, the eidetic reduction is the identification of the *whatness* of an experience. Within the eidetic analysis, the researcher asks *what* the experience of a thing is. Within this frame of understanding, the search for the essence of an experience creates the potential for seeing sameness within experiences. This search for sameness could cause disregard for the origins of those experiences and the individuality of beings in their lifeworlds. For instance, military roles

may generate some concept of sameness of experiences. Embeddedness within the structure of the state means that soldiers function similarly to protect the security interests of states.

Therefore, one may find common essences among military experiences. However, van Manen (2014) worries that the eidetic approach may imply generalizability within phenomenology. He observes that the eidetic reduction is ambitious in its aims to make disparate descriptions of encounters seem related to the prevalence of other conditions or events.

The Ontological Reduction

In keeping with the hermeneutic call to overcome purist approaches, van Manen (2014) cautions that to avoid a fallacy of idealism, one must see past the generalizations to the particularity of experiences. The phenomenological researcher does this by continually looking beyond the patterns of meaning that may be emerging to the lived experiences themselves. Pairing eidetic analysis with the ontological reduction method helps to reduce the dangers of generalizability (van Manen, 2014, p. 229-230). The ontological reduction focuses on individual ways of being in the world that belong to the phenomenon. Within the ontological reduction, the researcher asks the meaning-giving questions that satisfy the focus on the being of a thing. This aspect of the reduction-proper is based on Heidegger's (1962) interpretive phenomenological approach, which investigates the mode and mood of Da-Sein. Heidegger's mode of thinking about phenomenology was to avoid the artificial imposition of themes and to go to the things themselves in their presentation of themselves (Cerbone, 2008; 2012).

My Role as a Hermeneutic Phenomenological Researcher

To ask a soldier what is his experience of peace operations deployment is to put their lived experiences into expressive function by way of interpreting the meanings of various signs. Schutz (1967) uses the term sign to mean something used by a person to express subjective

experience. Signs have expressive function because the researcher as interpreter puts herself in the place of another person and imagines that she is selecting and using the sign (Schutz, 1967, p. 127). This means that my own lived experiences, knowledge bases and meaning making framework can never be fully separated out of my interpretation of a respondent's signs, although, to follow Dahlberg et al. (2008, p. 128), they "can be "bridled" from having an uncontrolled effect on the understanding. I agree with Habermas (1987) that the lifeworld is already subject to pre-interpretations based on cultural and linguistic communications. To this end, I see my role as researcher of lived experiences as one of engaging in the epoché-reduction and the reduction-proper, while accounting for where my own meaning making experiences come from. The hermeneutic phenomenological approach treats the research process as one of self-reflection for the researcher and the participants. As participants recollect experiences, the researcher reflects on those experiences so that she may bring to light "the consequential in the inconsequential and the significant in the taken-for-granted" (van Manen, 1990, p. 8). My role in this process centers on presenting relevant epoché-reductions that bring the phenomena into nearness as well as expressing the findings of the reduction-proper through vocative writing. Bourdieu (1999, p. 622) points out that the transcription of an interview is itself a rewriting that can sometimes fail to convey the true language and expression of the interviewee. The evocative approach to the lived experience descriptions allows me to achieve nearness with the participants' narrative without separating the emotional, colourful or idiosyncratic language that participants themselves use to elucidate their own context.

Nevertheless, in the modality of phenomenology and qualitative research, I must acknowledge that listening to the experiences of others could create moments where I reflect upon my own military experiences and current researcher-participant lifeworld encounters.

Researchers like Bourdieu (1990), van Manen (1990, 2014) and Vagle (2014) suggest that these encounters should be embraced and, where necessary, highlighted since they also represent aspects of the lifeworld encounter that are relevant to the thing at hand as well as the researcher's positionality. Wherever these moments occur, I take care to delineate them from the presentation of the participants' data. This is a relevant aspect of my evocative research writing in this study. In each data presentation chapter, I indicate my positionality and my own phenomenological reflections within the introductory framework that I use to ground the understanding of the participants' experiences. Importantly, I do this without overriding a participant's telling of an experience. I use precursors such as "Tuning In" or "Excursion" to show that these are my own phenomenological encounters and moments of reflection created in the process of the data gathering and analysis.

Research Procedures

The central research question for this study is: *What is the lived experience of Canadian soldiers deployed to international peace support missions?* This main research question is broken down into four sub-questions. (1) How do the soldiers experience their role in peace support deployment? (2) How do the soldiers experience their identity in peace support deployments? (3) How do the soldiers experience peace in peace support deployments? (4) How can the soldiers' lived experiences in international deployment inform initiatives for improving peace support in the future? To answer the research questions, I interviewed a total of eighteen persons over twelve months. The data collection and initial analysis overlap in this phenomenological study; however, another six months was spent on in-depth data analysis and writing up the research results. Below, I explain the processes for the selection of participants, use of the data, and the data collection, analysis and presentation.

Participants

Mark Vagle (2014) is specific about the role of the researcher and the role of the participant in the hermeneutic phenomenological method. He writes, “we do not want the research participant to unpack the phenomena, connecting it to other phenomena, etc. Rather, we want the research participant to bring us to their experiences of the phenomenon” (Vagle, 2014, p. 58). Participants in hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry serve the important role of bringing the researcher into contact with their lifeworld. As such, phenomenological investigators select participants based on their ability to bring insight into aspects of the lifeworld that are ordinarily out of the investigators’ reach. Participants in this study are individuals who served in one or more international or multinational peace support mission between 1990 and 2014. Importantly, all of the soldiers in this study are retired. This means that they are no longer on active military service in the professional armed forces. The status of being ex-military is important in this study. I wanted participants to be retrospective about the whole of their military service. Here, I am agreeing with van Manen (1990, p. 10) that “a person cannot reflect on lived experience while living through the experience”.

The criteria for participation in this study are: (a) service in the professional armed forces of Canada, the United States, or Jamaica, (b) retirement and/or release from active service in the professional armed forces, and (c) deployment to one or more international peace support missions between 1990 and 2014. Participants in this study fall into two categories. Representational participants are participants who meet all three criteria. Secondary or expert participants are contributors who did not meet all of the criteria. There were sixteen representational participants. Twelve of them are Canadian soldiers; three are Jamaican and one is American. These representational participants are further divided into instrumental and

opportunistic data sources. Because this research focuses on the experiences of Canadian soldiers, the data analysis in this study attends to the Canadian experiences; but information from non-Canadian soldiers is used to help frame the understandings of the sociopolitical context in which the Canadian soldiers experiences are embedded. Information from the secondary participants is used also used in this opportunistic way. One secondary participant met criteria (a) and (b) only, while the other individual has never served in the military and so met only criteria (c), having deployed extensively on UN peace operations. These experts contributed information that was relevant to the interpretive analysis and future visioning aspect of the study.

Table 1: Summary of Participants’ Peace Operations Deployments by Region

Deployment Locations	Afghanistan, and/or the Persian Gulf	Former Yugoslavia and/or Balkans Peninsula	Cyprus	Lebanon, Egypt, and/or Syria	Haiti and/or Grenada	Other (mainly African continent)
CAF	x	x	x	x		
JDF					x	
US Army	x					
Other						x

Table 1 shows a summary of the deployment history of expert and representational participants. Deployment locations include Afghanistan, the Balkans Peninsula, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cyprus, Somalia and the Golan Heights. All of the participants, with the exception of the civilian expert, come from a variety of service units. The soldiers held various ranks across the Canadian, Jamaican, and United States’ armed forces throughout their service careers. Specific service units or ranks are not of relevance to this study and so they are not used. The representational participants have an average of 29 years of military service among them. The longest record of service stands at just over 44 years, while the shortest period of service before retirement is approximately eight years. The sample draws from both genders, although the

majority of persons who participated in this study are male. Additionally, representational and secondary participants deployed on various international missions for an average minimum of six months. A few of the soldiers were deployed to some locations for more than six months as a result of unit and role changes.

Use of Opportunistic and Instrumental Data.

The study focuses on Canadian military experiences because of the number of peace operations that the state has been involved in since the birth of UN peacekeeping and over the period 1990 to 2014. However, interviews with non-Canadians serve the purpose of bringing in lifeworlds that are not defined by a national history of peacekeeping involvement. I agree with Boulding (1992, p. 385) that images of the future being “generated in the South need to be studied, discussed and worked over” as part of the dialogue about the future. I use the non-Canadian and expert LEDs as opportunistic data in order to achieve a view from the South. Care is taken to separate the opportunistic data from the instrumental data by depicting the former clearly in the “Tuning In” and “Excursions” text, where I reflect on my experiences with the data, or by setting them apart from the latter with the heading “A view from the South” in the general data presentation and discussions. All of the findings and themes in this study are derived from the Canadian soldiers’ LEDs.

Sample and Location.

I recruited research participants through a combination of purposeful and snowball sampling strategies. I used my own personal networks within the ex-military community to make contact with individuals who I knew had served internationally between 1990 and 2014. I then asked these people to assist me in identifying other persons who fit the representation criteria. The sampling strategies had an unintended effect on participant clustering. My personal network

led to an initial sampling plan of working in three location clusters for the research project: Winnipeg and its environs, Toronto and its environs, and New York and its environs. I selected these areas because of the existing personal networks I had in the three cities, as well as the large network of community-based associations that serve ex-military persons living in these areas. With this sampling plan, I had envisioned achieving roughly equal numbers of participants from all three locations. Although the purposive sampling strategy for each city was successful, the further snowball sampling strategy produced mixed results. Instead of achieving roughly equal numbers of participants in each cluster as I had anticipated, most of the participants who met the representational criteria and consented to participate in the study were recruited through the Winnipeg cluster. This does not mean that the bulk of participants are from Winnipeg. Rather, it means that the majority of participants were identified through snowballing from the purposive sample in Winnipeg. Persons interviewed in the study are situated in a variety of cities throughout Manitoba and across Canada. A few participants are situated in the United States.

Confidentiality and Ethics

The University of Manitoba Joint Research Ethics Board (UMJ-REB) approved this PhD research project. A sample of the participant consent form is included as Appendix I. Each participant provided written consent to take part in the study after I explained the details of the research to them, including the potential risks and benefits associated with the study. I also ascertained each person's ongoing consent before the start of each interview. Outside of the potential for some amount of emotional distress associated with recalling deployment and training experiences, participants faced no more risk than they would in their daily lives. Nevertheless, evoking emotional distress or a trauma episode was a potential risk for persons with diagnosed and undiagnosed post-traumatic stress. There were no incidences where participation in the study evoked a trauma or distress episode.

I took all the necessary steps to ensure that information from each participant remains anonymous. I personally managed all the data collection and audio recordings. I applied pseudonyms and did not refer to specific participants or their locations, units or deployment dates during discussions with the sample group overall or in the presentation of data. I removed any personal identifiers and some references to other cities, units, supervisors and deployment locations from the transcripts, and I changed some of the identifiers to ensure participant confidentiality and anonymity. I personally secured all of the research notes and files. The ex-military community, which includes local and national organizations, veterans support centers and unit affiliations, is extensive but close knit. During the data collection phases, I discovered that while I can maintain participant anonymity and confidentiality on my part as the researcher, I cannot guarantee this within the community itself where participants interact, share stories and communicate their experiences. I learned that some of the participants may have aspects of their experiences with others before the time of my research, and I worry that some of the lived experience descriptions contained in this study could be attributed to a participant based on their own “self-outing”. To decrease the risk of losing participant anonymity in this way, I created an additional layer of personal obscurity by removing descriptors such as the specific role or deployment responsibility of each contributor. In one instance where I felt that removing the deployment details was not enough to ensure anonymity, I changed the gender of the narrator. In instances where these additional means of stripping personal markers from the data would alter its content or meaning, I chose either to provide only a gist of experience or to leave out that narrative altogether from the presentation of the data.

Data Collection, Analysis, and Presentation

To answer the research questions, I interviewed a total of eighteen people over the course of twelve months. I conducted approximately 70 interviews between September 2015 and September 2016; the 16 representational participants were interviewed an average of four times, while the two secondary participants were each interviewed once. Each interview lasted between one and two hours. Interviews were audio recorded with each participant's permission. I transcribed the audios to produce interview transcripts. I then used the transcripts to generate lived experience manuscripts. I divided the research project into two phases. In phase one, I addressed sub-questions one to three. I addressed sub-question four in phase two. The phase one interview questions focused on the soldiers' roles, identity and experiences of peace. Specifically, I was interested in the each soldier's (1) peace operations experiences, (2) training and peace operation preparation, and (3) identity formation and transition experiences. The interview questionnaire was the primary data collection instrument. Interviews consisted of open-ended and semi-structured questions related to each of the three components. Each component had one main question where I asked people to tell me about their experiences. These open-ended questions were aimed at eliciting a participant narrative that would be free flowing and pregnant with their own naive descriptions of their experiences. Where necessary, I followed up with one or more probing questions to more fully disclose the picture of the experience narrated by the interviewee. Probing questions were semi-structured and I sometimes asked them multiple times in a single interview to elicit additional information about several different incidences and experiences related by the interviewee.

In the first interview with each representational participant, I collected descriptions of their experiences in training, deployment preparation and the mission space. Transcripts of this

interview were analysed to identify initial working themes. Field notes generated from this initial analysis of individual transcripts established the first categorizations of experiences. These categorizations revolved around the issues participants associated with their deployment experience, for example: working with NATO or the UN, family support, or language barriers. I derived a set of topics organic to each participant from this initial review of the data and I provided each participant with an interpretive summary showing those topics and my own observations. In a second interview with each representational participant, I discussed those organic themes to determine (a) if the reduction of the transcript accurately reflected the experiences narrated in the first interview, (b) what else they could tell me about the experiences raised in the first interview, and (c) if there was anything that they would change about the experience. Participants were able to use this interview as an opportunity to validate the reduction of the data as well as provide input on the researcher's interpretations. Where necessary, I noted any clarifications and adjusted the field notes accordingly.

I then used the transcript of the second interview to frame a re-reading of the first interview and re-evaluate the initial set of topics identified. Upon this re-reading, I recast the organic topics into common themes across participants. In doing so, I created a new interpretive framework where I looked for commonalities of experiences, ideas and role assumptions. I also noted areas of dissimilarities. Interpretive summaries brought these collective topics into the view of each participant. I conducted a third interview with each participant where we discussed how the collectivized topics resonated with each individual. The third interview was also an opportunity for participants to verify if the summary and interpretation of the narratives were accurate to their experiences. Where necessary, I noted any clarifications and adjusted the field notes accordingly. I used transcripts generated from this third interview, along with re-readings

of interviews one and two, to generate experience themes. I also did continual fact checking and document analysis to verify some experiences as well as the deployment context and background of each participant's overseas mission.

During phase two of the research project I collected data to satisfy the future visioning component. Data collection in this phase consisted of one or two interviews with each representational participant. Using a different interview instrument, I asked participants to articulate their own vision for the future of military peace operations in phase two interviews. The interview instrument used in this phase was an adaptation of a future visioning exercise developed by Boulding (1988, p. 172-176). I used semi-structured questions adapted from Boulding's workshop format; the questionnaire solicited a narrative response about each participant's hopes and fears for the future. This final questionnaire also served to member-check some of the experiences discussed in early interviews. In a few instances, the phase two questions were discussed with participants in the same sitting as the third interview for phase one. In the future visioning interview, I asked participants to draw on their most hopeful vein to articulate a future for international peace support. I asked them to recall some of the experiences they discussed in earlier interviews, explain their hopes and fears for the future of international peace support, and share what they would like to see in terms of things changing or staying the same. I analyzed the data collected in this phase of the project first for its contributions to refining the experience themes and second for its representation of lessons for the future. See Appendix II for a list of the interview questions.

I drew epoché-reductions from participant recorded narratives of their experiences as I distilled descriptions related to each of the central research components. I then used eidetic and ontological methods to analyze the experience texts. The eidetic reduction served as an analytical

first glance at participant experiences that is used to determine the *what* of an encounter. In the eidetic analysis, I searched for spatiality, relationality, temporality, corporeality and materiality, which form the essence of a lived experience (van Manen, 1990, p. 77-109). Spatiality or lived space experiences are representations of felt space and narratives about space and place that define the experience of being on deployment. Corporeality or lived body experiences are representations of actions, emotions, behaviours and perceptions that define the experience within and across different spaces. Temporality or lived time experiences are representations of lessons learned that shape the individual's identity and cognition of the conflict space, their definition of peace and their military identity. Relationality or lived other experiences are narratives of the other and self-other interactions that (a) define the lived body experience, (b) define the lived space experience, and (c) define the lived thing experience of deployment. Materiality or lived thing experiences are representations of how things (tools and equipment) are experienced or expressed as extensions of the lived body. Materiality also describes the ways that things illuminate the character of the felt space.

The ontological reduction served as an analytical second look at the participants' experiences. In short, the ontological reduction is a broad gesture of going back to the being of a thing in its historico-social reality. I used it to bring the parts-to-whole and derive the meaning of the experience encounters. In my ontological analysis of the lived experience descriptions, I ask *how* participants experience the "thing" of role, the "thing" of identity and "thing" of peace within their lifeworld by harkening to the structural, personal, cultural, and relational presentations of the phenomena.

Writing the Research Report

Phase two of the study also includes the writing up the research report. According to van Manen (2014, p. 296), “the researcher-as-author is challenged to construct a phenomenological study that possesses concreteness, evocativeness, intensity, tone and epiphany.” I meet this obligation to the hermeneutic phenomenological method by creating textural descriptions as part of the epoché-reduction process. These descriptions bring the participants’ lifeworld into what van Manen calls *nearness* (2014, p. 249, *emphasis added*). Creating lived experience descriptions and anecdotes is one way to be evocative. Lived experience descriptions (LED) illustrate an encounter with one or more of the lived space, lived other, lived body, lived thing or lived time referentials. Lived experience descriptions differ from anecdotes in the sense that the former tells us more about the details of a first person encounter. An anecdote, on the other hand, is a more vivid and ‘punchy’ account of an experience drawn from the lived experience descriptions (van Manen, 1990, p. 118-120). The anecdote is an example of a short and simple story that brings into focus a central moment in an experience. Unlike the LED, which describes several moments, the anecdote hones in on a particular aspect and amplifies it. I use anecdotes, as well as more fulsome lived experience descriptions throughout the data chapters to bracket and illustrate the phenomena.

I took great care to ensure that the lived experience descriptions and anecdotes remain true to the narrators’ voices. In most instances, I reproduce the lived experience descriptions as the participants tell them. One benefit of framing a questions as “Tell me about your experience...” is that it elicits many instances of “I remember...” or “One time ...” followed by a rich description of an event or memorable experience. In a few instances, I rewrite some narratives to present a chronological sequencing of a particular story or incident so that they may

be themed. In all cases, I discuss the lived experience descriptions with participants in order to clarify my interpretation of the events and the language used to describe the event or experience.

Conclusion

The goal of this research is to understand the lived experiences of Canadian soldiers deployed on peace support operations from 1990 to 2014. The study focuses on the experiences of 16 representational and two secondary participants using hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry. Vagle (2014) points out that one can scarcely engage in phenomenological inquiry without first understanding how phenomenology defines itself as a method of inquiry and as a philosophy. Working with the hermeneutic phenomenological method proves Vagle's point. It is impossible to construct phenomenological research without an understanding of how the techniques fit within the broader philosophies and presumptions of key phenomenological philosophers. Consequently, this chapter on the research strategy and method begins with the philosophical precursors to the research model as it situates the method within the qualitative tradition. It ties into the framework established in Chapter 3 where I outlined key ideas behind the lifeworld, Da-Sein, and human agency. Using the two-part reduction and vocative arrangements, I enact eidetic and ontological reductions of the data in the upcoming chapters by first showing the what-it-is of the phenomena and then uncovering the meaning of the experience for the participants involved in the study.

Chapter 5: Encountering a Peace Support Role

In this chapter, I analyze participants' description of their deployment experience in peace support. The epoché-reductions presented here and in the following chapters come from experiences lived in a variety of UN, multinational and alliance operations. I organize the narratives into four categories spanning the period 1990-2014. The section titled "Experiences from Early UN Operations" collates experiences in operational deployments from 1990 to 1995. "Experiences from the Balkans" collates the soldiers' descriptions of their deployment in the Balkan Peninsula from 1995 to 2002. "Experiences from Afghanistan" clusters descriptions of deployment to that country from 2001 to 2014. "Experiences in Peace Support at Home" collates descriptions of some domestic operations that help to explain the similarities and differences between national and international deployment. I ground the role experience themes within the lifeworld referentials, namely spatiality, relationality, corporeality, temporality and materiality. The chapter concludes with a discussion about how the findings help to shape an understanding about soldiers and their contribution to peace support. The chapter begins with a tuning-in that highlights the lived experiences of one participant who did "traditional" peacekeeping.

Tuning In: A Conversation with a "Traditional" Peacekeeper

As I sit down with BG to ask him about his experiences in peacekeeping in the early years, he laughs and tells me that we are about to trade lies. "When we army people get together, that's all we do. We trade lies. And the more we talk about it, the bigger our lies get". BG's references to tall tales are not new to me. In my experience, soldiers have a way of probing each other, correcting the retelling of stories, and challenging truths about who did what to whom and when. They compete to see who can tell the better story. These stories happen frequently at

veterans' events, unit parades and community celebrations. Nearly every chance for a military get-together is a chance to trade lies.

BG is a "traditional" peacekeeper. His overseas deployments happened in the 1960s and 1970s when peacekeeping was characterized as the neutral interpositioning of UN troops between two state parties who have agreed to cease fighting. BG's experience falls outside of the timeline that is the focus of this study. However, his reserve force experience, which extended well into the 1990s, as well as his post military work routinely brought him in contact with contemporary Canadian peace support specialists. Today, BG works in a number of different capacities. One that he is happy to talk about is his work with newer CAF veterans as well as other former UN peacekeepers from across the country and around the globe. I thought BG could provide some insight into how peace support roles have evolved since the time of "traditional" peacekeeping. When I begin to reference my notes about early peacekeeping, he stops me. His first point is that peacekeeping in those days was just as fraught with danger. He tells me:

You would not believe it to hear the UN or any politician talk about it, but there were many moments of "Halt or I will shoot!" And that was usually backed up with the first shot fired into the air. The next shot is aimed at the head. Of course, whoever is at the other end is going to back up.

BG paints me a picture of his tour in Cyprus. It is an interesting mix of military and seemingly non-military actions. For example, there was intelligence gathering that was also something else.

He relates this experience:

The Greek and Turkish police hated each other, but we had to deal with both sides. I would often have to go over to the Turkish side of the checkpoint and talk to them. Then I would have to go over to the Greek side of the checkpoint and talk to them. I would usually take another soldier with me. His job was to listen and watch. My job was to talk. We would go to the Turkish side, chat with them, and have a coffee and so on. Then we would go back to the Greek side and go talk with them. But every time I am leaving, I have to make sure to say, "I am going back across, but tell your people that I want to come back". We would do that back and forth a few times in order to get things resolved that day. At the end of it all, the other guy and I would combine our notes and brief the

intelligence officer. I was not the only one doing this. We all had to do this thing as a one-on-one, at the very lowest level. I think things worked out really well for me. I didn't get shot."

BG was also involved in what he calls "community work" amid his official job of ceasefire monitoring. He explains:

A great deal of my job was about monitoring observation posts. But I was also in the regiment band, so I deployed with my bagpipes. There were maybe a dozen times at least where I would be at my post and I would get a call from my CO to come to some gathering on the Turkish side of the post with my bagpipes. Our people would be there, talking and interacting with the Turkish officers, everyone is speaking English and drinking booze. I would make it through the Turkish checkpoint holding up my bagpipes so the Turkish guard would not shoot. Then I would get to this gathering and my CO would ask me to play. While I am playing, our people, the people who represent the UN, and the Turks are talking. They are all talking and I am providing background music to dialogue. I remember one time, I was asked if I could play something slow to remind the general of a day when he was a boy in the mountains of Turkey herding sheep. I did not realize it at the time, but it was helping a little bit. I was a soldier. I was prepared to do whatever. But I had my bagpipes and it played a role too.

When I ask BG what he thinks about public representations of peacekeeping today, he quotes a line from Rudyard Kipling's poem, *Tommy*:

For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck him out, the brute!"
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.

BG gives *Tommy* spatial and corporeal context as he tells me about his work with Canada's newest cohort of veterans, soldiers returning from Afghanistan:

We are a different generation, but we have the same issues. When I came back from my last tour in Cyprus, I walked around Edmonton for seven days. I just walked. As I walked, I could feel something in my mind coming down to level. I do not know if it was PTSD, but it was stress. Walking really helped me. The guys I work with now are coming back even more scrambled. But what they did over there is moving things forward. There is a lot more now in terms of PTSD support. It is no longer "suck it up buttercup". They helped us get a lot of recognition too. I was in the reserves when the military went through its decade of darkness when parliament had cut military funding. People just saw us as peacekeepers. As far as people outside the military were concerned, we did not fight wars. I used to say, "I am a soldier that was sent on a peacekeeping mission. I am not a peacekeeper." Now, after Afghanistan, anywhere you go wearing the uniform, people are giving you the thumbs up. Before that, they would just ignore you.

BG's experience suggests dynamism in military roles, even under a traditional peacekeeping mandate. BG talks about a variety of tools as well as opportunities for personal interaction that was ultimately important for him in his work. He also rejects the peacekeeper identity. Our conversation makes me wonder if there is more to keeping and building peace than mandates imply. What could this mean for the way military people encounter their peace support roles?

Drawing Near: Canadian Peace Support Roles, 1990 -2014

BG's deployment dates fall outside of the 1990-2014 timeline that is the focus of this study. However, I use his story as a means of tuning in to the narratives of others who deployed overseas since 1990. BG takes issue with the peacekeeper label, noting that it did not define his role in international deployment. In describing his experiences, BG talks about the relationality of his work in Cyprus. Doing his job is a one-on-one event that happens at the lowest levels. He discusses his relationship with the tools of his job, revealing awareness that his bagpipes were part of his materiality. The bagpipes played a role in facilitating dialogue between the interveners and the belligerent forces. Finally, BG makes the point that he is a soldier who was sent on a peacekeeping mission. He prefers judgement for the work that he did, not the type of mission. BG's story provides some initial themes about military roles that I will explore further in the investigation of 1990-2014 deployment experiences. One emerging idea from BG's experience is that the peace support role is a one-on-one interaction with the lived other. Another premise is that the peace support role makes use of things other than weapons. A third matter emerging from BG's narrative is that the mission space shapes the soldier's peace support role.

A number of persons interviewed for this study served in multiple peace operations over the period 1990-2014. For example, there are persons deployed to UNEF before 1990 who also served in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Below, LEDs from the participants are organised into

chronological segments. Each segment begins with an overview of the missions in which the various interviewees served. I identify some of the lifeworld components of military roles within each time segment and discuss them later on in the chapter.

Experiences from Early UN Operations

Since the 1950s, Canada has been involved in a number of UN peacekeeping operations. These operations include UNEF I and UNEF II which were set up in 1956 and 1973 respectively to monitor the withdrawal of French, Israeli and British forces from Egyptian territory and to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Canada has also been involved in UNFICYP (1964), UNDOF (1974), and UNFIL (1978). There are a number of participants in this study whose deployments included these existing UN operations, which continued until the Canadian military withdrawal in the early 1990s. For this cluster of experiences in early UN operations, I provide a brief background about the UNDOF and UNFICYP deployments as well as the UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

Canadian participation in UNDOF was under the name Operation DANACA. The Canadian contingent served in the Golan Heights. Their task was to provide first line logistics for all Canadian persons in UNDOF as well as communications and second line logistics support for other multinational contingents. The UNDOF mandate was to maintain the ceasefire line between Israel and Syria and supervise the 75 kilometre long area of separation (AOS) and the contiguous area of limitation (AOL). At its peak, Canadian deployment to UNDOF comprised of more than 200 persons in theatre. This included smaller contingents that served as task forces working with UNITSO as UN Military Observers (UNMOs). They occasionally monitored UNFIL as well as UNDOF positions. In 1964, the UN Security Council created UNFICYP. Under Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), the intervention force had a mandate to “use its

best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting” among Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. New hostilities in 1974 led to a renewed mandate for UNFICYP, which retains a presence in Cyprus today. Canada continues to contribute a small observer team to this mission. In total more than 25000 CAF personnel served in Cyprus under Operation SNOWGOOSE by the time it wound down in 1993. By the time Operation DANACA ended in 1993, more than 12000 CAF personnel served in UNDOF. These persons are usually called peacekeepers because they worked under the auspices of the UN, wore the blue beret, and were part of monitoring and disengagement missions. The same goes for persons involved in UNPROFOR. From 1992 to 1995, the Canadian military deployed to the former Yugoslavia as Operation HARMONY and Operation CAVALIER. Under UNPROFOR, Canadians were part of a multinational force charged with protecting non-combatants and ensuring the security and demilitarization of UN protected areas in Croatia. The intervention force mandate was also to ensure security and the functioning of the Sarajevo airport, deliver humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, protect convoys of released civilian detainees, monitor the “no fly” zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and monitor the border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

One UNPROFOR veteran describes his assessment of the mission contribution thus:

Notwithstanding the challenges and the lack of success that the UN had in the former Yugoslavia, it is worth acknowledging that for 4 years, 3 million refugees were kept alive and the conflict did not spill out over the borders. This is a huge accomplishment because it was entirely possible that the conflict and bloodshed could have spread to other states like Montenegro to the south, which was part of UNPROFOR, and Bulgaria and some of the other states. So there was containment. In the end although the UN did not necessarily set the conditions for success, they certainly contributed to it. The biggest accomplishment was getting the humanitarian side of it right. (TB)

There is a formal or official aspect to the military role in deployment as TB points out in his perspective of what his team was able to accomplish. Keeping people alive (the humanitarian role) and containment (stopping the fighting role) are claimed as key aspects of the deployment

outcome. Yet, the soldier's lived experiences show that there is more to the peace support role encounters than the organizational goals indicate. For instance, TB's own lived experience description of being on the ground points to a number of complexities. He explains:

For me, Cyprus was the classic peacekeeping deployment where you had Greeks, Turks and the UN in between. It was literally that simple. Bad guys over here, bad guys over there, and the UN in between. There, we had a peace to keep. The UN declared no man's land and we patrolled it. I had a sector that I was responsible for and there was not a lot of drama associated with that. The former Yugoslavia was far more complex. Here I am in this place that has devolved into four countries that were based exclusively on ethnic lines. I have to deal with various cultures, ethnic backgrounds, governments, and organizations that declared themselves as government. It took me several months to figure out who was who in the zoo. (TB)

TB provides a comparison of his lived time experiences of doing peace support work in Cyprus and then the former Yugoslavia. He speaks to his own temporality of living through peacekeeping, which had evolved from its traditional, pre-Cold War form to the more complex type demanded in the former Yugoslavia. He highlights the lessons he draws from this temporality – there is complexity in the new context. Separation defined the previous lived space of deployment. It was simple and one-dimensional. The new operational space is more complex. Previously, he was in a position to dominate the space; the UN declared “no man's land” and there was no drama. In the UNPROFOR space, he uses the allegory “who is who in the zoo” to describe the confusion and chaos of being in this space where the lived other did not conform to their expected conflict roles.

Another participant shares this experience of preparing for UNPROFOR:

Here we are getting ready to go into the former Yugoslavia. We are already trained and ready to take on the highest level of combat engagement due to our NATO engagement in Germany at the time. When we get there, we discover that this was not a peacekeeping mission. We had done peacekeeping missions in the Golan Heights and in Cyprus, where we wore the blue helmet. In those places, the two forces had agreed to stop fighting and we would come in and ensure they made peace. There, the blue helmet was highly respected. We were armed but only lightly armed in those scenarios. In the former Yugoslavia, they were still at war, so we knew it was going to be more intense than a

standard peacekeeping operation. We could not go to the highest level, which is what we are trained for. So we went through all of these training scenarios, as we tried to prepare for the unexpected. It was really good that we did that, yet the important thing was that we did it completely independent of any kind of manuals or training doctrines that we had at the time. Because we were the first ones to go over there and there were no standards set for us to follow. (RS)

In this LED, RS shares his experience of having to adapt from the Cold War combat mentality to the new peacekeeping mission environment. But adapting did not mean going back to earlier operation postures. Spatially and temporally, the experience was not a return to what was practised in Cyprus or the Golan Heights where the physical representation of the UN and its role as arbiter was respected and understood. RS describes his learning that the deployment spaces are different and that orientation to the UN was different. The new conflict space was an unknown space; it was different from anything else he had seen. Being the first ones meant reinventing the job of peacekeeping. The new space conveyed that the level of protection offered by the blue helmet had diminished. There was the need to re-evaluate the bodily orientation to wearing the UN designation, as well as the military-other relationships within the conflict space.

In this LED about an encounter during her UNDOF deployment, DP illustrates the concept of adaptability to a changing situation. She explains:

I was a truck driver here and over there. Just as we had to pick up a load and move logistics here, we had to do that over there. Of course, where we were working there were other people who had responsibility for making sure no one violated the zone of separation. As logistics personnel, we tended not to get involved in that. But one Saturday morning we got a call that we had to go and take the trucks out and surround a ditch digger. Apparently, when they questioned this guy that was using the ditch digger, he said he was digging an irrigation ditch. But the dimensions matched a tank ditch, so it did not add up. So they had us move the trucks out to stop this guy. It was really strange. They probably should have sent a combat unit, not a logistics unit, but I guess we were the only ones there at the time and we had equipment big enough to get in the guy's way and stop him from doing what he was doing. We used five or six trucks and we took the trucks out in a convoy. I was leading the convoy in my truck. We used the trucks to surround the ditch digger. The guy inside it stopped what he was doing. You know, he just sat back and put his feet up and went, "I get paid by the hour. I don't care." That kind of thing. (DP)

In DP's ditch digger LED, we see how the ability to adapt becomes a feature of the soldier's peace support role, even in early operations. DP illustrates her lived experience as a military logistician who at some point is thrust into a role that requires more direct interaction with the lived other in a conflict space. In this case, the lived other is the local population in the operational area, including the person in the ditch digger, who may or may not have been acting surreptitiously. Those who have combat-related tasks are also a lived other for DP who makes the point that as a logistician, she was not normally involved in interdicting violations of the zone of separation or enforcing the operational mandate. DP also speaks about a lived thing or tool that she uses to do the job on deployment. The truck is her tool for work at home as well as in the deployed space, yet the way that she uses the truck overseas is different from its ordinary use at home. DP also points out that her job was to do the same thing "over there" as she did "here". There is lived space logic in this, which suggests the soldier and his or her tools are constant, yet the way that the tools are used depends on the conflict space.

A first glance at early peace support roles identifies that there is an organizational and personal aspect to the role encounter. Persons may speak about their organizational accomplishments, but these are formal functions. They do not adequately represent the range of experiences involved for the soldier who is carrying out the work. Official organizational mandates in early deployments included containment, keeping people alive and enforcing a zone of separation. Yet participants' lived experiences of their military role tell another story of what it is like to be there in that role. There were lived other experiences: identifying "bad guys" and being one-on-one with the conflict parties. There were lived space experiences: being "here" versus "over there". There were lived thing experiences: the truck becomes a tool for the role; the bagpipe becomes a tool for the role; the UN blue helmet means less over time. There are

lived body experiences: adapting to the unexpected; feeling diminished protection under the UN blue helmet; transiting into new actions. There are lived time experiences: creating a new standard and adjusting to the complexities of the new era.

Experiences from the Balkans

Subsequent to participation in UNPROFOR, the Canadian military served in EU, UN and NATO missions in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia. Post-1995 deployments to the Balkan Peninsula were aimed at implementing and monitoring the conditions of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord. Among other things, the peace agreement was concerned with regional stabilization, holding democratic elections and assisting refugees. In October 1995, operations shifted from UNPROFOR to a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). Operation ALLIANCE was Canada's contribution. Deployed soldiers no longer wore the UN blue helmet. In 1996, the IFOR stage of the mission ended and operations shifted to deterring violence under the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). Canada participated in SFOR under the name Operation PALLADIUM. By April 2004, Canada reduced its military presence in the Balkans to 650 persons. In response to the anticipated handing over of the mission to the European Union (EUFOR), the Canadian military further reduced its contingent to 85 persons. Personnel were divided among Operation BOREAS, Canada's EUFOR contribution of Liaison and Observation Teams, and Operation BRONZE, Canada's continued work with NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. Operation BOREAS ended in March 2007. Operation BRONZE ended in March 2010. Other operations that featured Canadian involvement in the Balkans during the period 1995 to 2010 include Operation CHAPERON (February 1996 – September 2001) where Canadian military persons served as UNMOs in Prevlaka. There was Operation QUADRANT (June 1999 - September 2002) in which Canadian military persons were

part of the UN Mission Interim Administration in Kosovo. Operation KINETIC (June 1999 – June 2000) saw Canadian military personnel performing patrolling and peace support duties as well as humanitarian aid operations such as roofing buildings, reconstructing schools and medical facilities, and installing small bridges and building playgrounds. Operation FORAGE (August 2001- September 2002) was a 30-day mission that saw Canadian troops involved in the collection and destruction of weapons surrendered by ethnic Albanian groups in Macedonia. That mission evolved into a follow-on NATO mission to provide a monitoring presence. The CAF provided one person to work at the Task Force Headquarters until September 2002.

A first glance at some Balkans peace support roles shows a number of the experiences identified in early UN operations. Yet it is clear that there is a newfound complexity. The new peace support roles have more dimensions and they change quickly. For example, DF provides this lived experience description of his time in the Balkans:

I was sitting in my office at the base when the Brigadier walked in and snapped his fingers and said, "Fire service chief, you're it". Suddenly, I am heading up a town's fire service. I had Serb crews and I had Albanian crews. The Serbs were real firefighters. The Albanians were nepotistic appointments; cronyism and family ties got them the jobs. I had a Serb deputy chief, an Albanian deputy chief and an Albanian chief. They did not want to work with each other. The Albanians did not want to put out fires at Serb houses. People did not know how to operate their equipment because they got the job through some kind of cronyism. There was always something. It was frustrating. All this is going on while I am doing EOD [explosive ordinance device] clearances to get into these bombed-out trucks so we could salvage the batteries to put them into the fire trucks to get them working. After a while, I begin to think to myself, "What? This is what I'm risking my life for?" (DF)

In this LED, DF shows how lived time can be compressed as he finds himself immediately thrust into another function with the snap of his commander's fingers. His self-other relations become categorized by the need to do a job (run the fire service) and work with people who may be unqualified or uninterested in working together. There is also the materiality of the experience, which is the fire service itself. For this participant, getting the fire service to work goes beyond

working with others (Serb and Albanian firefighters) to working with things (the bombed-out fire trucks). He describes the task of having to clear explosive devices to get the materiel for the fire service to function. But at some point, the experiences of the lived space and the lived other begin to dominate his sense of purpose. The corporeal presentation of this role-related conflict is a feeling of frustration as well as self-awareness that he is risking his life within a space where the lived other did not seem to care about the outcome.

DF's fire service LED depicts one aspect of the contrariness associated with military roles. Other experiences illustrate how the referential totality of lived space, lived other, lived body, lived thing, and lived time can contribute to role contradictions. For example, BT gives this description of his experience:

Our first rotation in Bosnia was in 1997. Back then, we had a lot of work to do to monitor the no fly zones and keep the Serbs and Croats separated. By 2002, things had gotten better. It was not even a real tour for us anymore. It was mostly about patrolling, just as we did in our workup training, but it was more of going through the motions. Things had calmed down a lot compared to when we were there in 1997. People knew what not to do. No one was pushing our buttons anymore. They knew not to piss around because if they screwed with us, we would call the IPTF. Those guys would then get the local police whom they had been mentoring, to come deal with their people. Because by now, it was mostly some drunken idiot trying to push us around. (BT)

This anecdote about change over 5 years in Bosnia demonstrates the soldier's orientation to subjective time and the feeling of being in the space. BT notes that over the course of several deployments he could feel a change in the security situation in Bosnia. The spatiality, his felt space changed overtime. His LED provides a sense of the shifting lived other relations taking place within the space. In 1997 there was "a lot of work" to do to keep factions apart and defend oneself. But 2002 was "not even a real tour" anymore. These words signal a different orientation to the lived other relationship within the conflict space. The daily relationality in 1997 is hinted at in BT's description of the bodily feeling of security that he had gained by 2002, when people

were no longer intentionally “pushing their buttons”. Without the perception of an intention to harm accompanying the appearance of physical threats within the deployment space, BT’s patrol group used alternate approaches to keep the peace. He intimates how his own role vis-à-vis the lived other transitioned with the evolution of the felt space. For him, things were now more mundane. The soldiers were now just “going through the motions”; the taking action role had been handed over to another party, the International Police Task Force (IPTF).

BT’s spatial experience is reflected in other soldiers’ narratives of how their perceptions about the lived other’s intentions influenced their role manifestation. Sometimes the roles were perceived differently than what was required for a macro-strategic goal. For example, FL shares what it was like to learn about Bosnians in this LED of his work-up training:

We had a case study scenario as part of our work up training for Bosnia. In this exercise, you are supposed to imagine you are on patrol, and you hear shots being fired. You go down the road and discover that there is a man there hiding a rifle and he is drunk, what do you do? Well my reaction as a policeman was to draw my revolver and to be prepared to shoot him. But that was not what they were looking for because in Bosnia, shooting in the air is a common occurrence. They would be drinking and then they would start shooting. So the answer was to have been more focused on a verbal de-escalation of the incident rather than an armed confrontation. And that was kind of interesting for me because in the military, you are focused on speed and violence – that is how you accomplish the mission. If you want to win, you use maximum force. In the police service, you are taught to use minimum reasonable force. In Canada, we are taught to use only enough force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish your lawful purpose. So this case study now is my first exposure to the roles being reversed. Here I was a policeman prepared to shoot this drunken Bosnian. But here is the army saying, “No, you have to talk to him and settle him down because it is a cultural thing”. (FL)

For FL, the peace support role within the conflict space was counterintuitive to his expectations about his function as a soldier. He personalizes his lived body as the foundation of that contradiction. FL has two different training backgrounds that are now in conflict. At home in Canada, he has a different materiality with his weapon, which is an extension of himself in his regular work. He explains that as a police officer here, he would draw his weapon because the

peace of Canada did not create a need for understanding cultural practices involving using weapons while drinking. As a soldier over there, he was expected to be accountable to the organizational mandate to use his skills differently by working to de-escalate, instead of going to the use of deadly force. The reversal is paradoxical for FL's corporeality; but it makes sense in the context of relationality where cultural understandings matter. It also makes sense in the lived space context where certain social norms are prevalent and therefore may require an adjustment to the intervener's corporeality and materiality. FL's LED signifies some relevant differences between being "here" (in Canada) and being "over there" (on deployment).

The following descriptions from CW also show that corporeality and materiality are complex issues for the deployed soldier. He had this to say about his own lived experience of working in Bosnia:

The only thing that worked in that place was NATO standing on the necks of the factions. Most of the time when I got out it was to meet with the factions and talk about implementing various aspects of the Dayton Accord, like the right of return. As we drove around, we would pass all these places where ethnic cleansing had taken place. One of those places was a town called Prijedor, which had a Muslim enclave. There was only one house left there and it belonged to a Serb, the rest of the place had been destroyed, flattened like a table-top. They had bulldozed it down so that the Muslims could not come back. Around Prijedor, all the Muslim houses had been blown up in such a way that they could not be rebuilt. The walls had been blown out so that the roof would fall in. Clearly they did not want these people to return. But we had to enforce the right of return so that people could go back and we had to help them rebuild. If NATO was not there standing on their necks, nothing would have changed. (CW)

CW also shares this anecdote, which is a relevant contradiction to his own role of standing on necks:

John was a Sergeant in one of the Bosnian task forces. He was in charge of a section that would spend a lot of time in one particular valley. The people in this valley would call him King John because every time he went out on patrol, he would load up his vehicles with stuff for the village: water, clothing, food, schoolbooks, whatever he could get his hands on. He would go out and distribute it among the villagers. When it was coming to the end of John's tour, one of the elders came to the headquarters to find out if there were

other Canadians coming in to replace him. John was loved so much, the people were willing to make him their own personal king. (CW)

The narrative of “standing on necks” and the anecdote of King John present military materiality and corporeality in oppositional ways. Both texts come from the same participant’s deployment experience in Bosnia. On the one hand, CW explains that peace could only be achieved by NATO standing on the necks of the belligerents. Standing on necks is a representation of the alliance’s willingness and capability to use force to stop belligerents. Materiality orients us to the use of force and weapons as things for doing the job there. Without that use of force, people could not return to rebuild their lives in places like Prijedor. Yet CW also evokes the legend of King John, a soldier in his unit who used his role in the space to bring things that would satisfy local people’s basic human needs.

There is corporeality in both descriptions of military roles as well. Standing on necks implies that an empowered and upstanding NATO meets the belligerents in a bodily form with “boots on the ground” in order to stand on necks. The belligerents also have a bodily representation. They are a coherent group that that can be likened to a human form, thus they have necks to be stood upon. King John seems to be an anomaly in this representation of corporeality. His relationality to those in the lived space is different. He is one of many boots on the ground that delivers peace in a different way. He does it by interacting with the lived other in the lived space in an unofficial capacity, often while officially doing the work of patrolling and reinforcing the NATO function within the space. King John and the “standing on necks” tell us that there are many ways that soldiers relate to the tools, self-other and bodily representations of their role within a conflict space. The stories also tell us that a good portion of the soldier’s peace support role involves distinguishing the people worth helping from those who should have their necks stood upon.

Some experiences in post-1990s deployment show that there were many instances where this “good guy/bad guy” differentiation was not as simple. Below, RS shares how difficult this can be for the person on the other side of the conflict space when the lines between the “bad” and the “good” guys are blurred:

Our team was tasked with working with the Serbs to open up humanitarian corridors. So basically, we would find a designated place in the ceasefire line and work through the various levels of warlords until we could get to a point where we could open up a space. Our counterparts on the Croat side would do the same. But imagine doing this supposedly humanitarian job while you are seen as part of the enemy. Our team was perceived to be working behind enemy lines because the Serbs were seen as the “bad guys” in this conflict. We had to endure some very difficult scenarios behind these perceived enemy lines and kind of try to make our way through as we tried to meet up with the various warlords. There are some very offensive and very negative experiences that come with that. There were a number of things that really challenged my sense of what is wrong and what is right. We were isolated and by ourselves on the other side of the line the whole time. On the rare occasion when we were able to come into the main camp, which was on the Croat side, we were not allowed to say anything about what we were doing. We had one person in our team that could speak the Serbian accent. He had to have a false name to protect himself when we were on the base. Because we were working on the Serb or the perceived “enemy” side, if information about him or what we were doing got out, it would have gone badly for all of us. (RS)

In this anecdote of working behind “enemy lines”, RS shares his experience of transiting through the conflict space to negotiate humanitarian corridors. For him, the space is geographically defined by the cease fire line, but the felt space is hostile on either side of the line. Lived other relationships are challenged for this soldier. Being bodily with the Serbian people and their warlords within their space interrupts the publicized good-guy/bad-guy imagery that was prevalent at the time. RS and other participants note in their wider experience narratives that the Serbs were generally perceived as the bad guys while the Croats were seen as the good guys. RS explains the happenings in part as follows:

Very early on, we realized that many of the people who were killing each other were neighbours. We quickly discovered that there was no one “bad guy”. The Croats and the Muslims were as vicious as the Serbians. But the Croats had a much better ability to manipulate the media. The Serbs still had that former Soviet pact mentality of secrecy

and so they paid heavily on the media side of being the “bad guys” throughout the conflict. (RS)

Being on the other side of the conflict space meant that the participant and his team were “isolated and by themselves”. Yet they were bodily situated with Serbian factions whom they soon discovered had been former colleagues and neighbours. Being there, RS saw and heard things that challenged his sense of what was right. Coming to the main base on the Croat side of the ceasefire line changed the place, but it did not change his feeling of insecurity or isolation, a lived body sensation. RS’s team remained “by themselves”, even on the Croat side, because of worries about the team’s work and safety given the social perceptions about the felt space.

The first glance at some Balkans peace support roles continues a number of the experiences identified in early UN operations while adding more complexities to representations of the soldiers’ existence in overseas deployments. The early roles revealed that the spatial, relational, temporal, material and corporeal relations of the soldier in his work overseas are all intertwined. Relationality encounters in the Balkans included an added complexity of separating bad guys from good guys and then physically dominating the former while helping the latter. The need to be one-on-one with the local people is also a continuing aspect of the lived other experience that has a formal and informal place in the soldiers’ work. Spatially, we can still see the delineations in felt space where being at home and being over there matters. Experience narratives from participants who served in the Balkans suggest that the perception of an intention to harm is also relevant to their appraisal of how it feels to be in the space. The Balkans deployment experiences also illustrate materiality encounters. The soldiers use tools engineered for the use of force (weapons and armaments); this is in addition to other tools that do not have a role in violence, such as food and books – things that satisfy people’s basic needs. The soldiers also experience frustration over the relational dynamics. This is one aspect of the lived body

feeling associated with a space. RS points out that the conflict space can create bodily feelings of isolation and feeling alone, even in the company of one's counterparts. This provides an understanding that lived other experiences in a conflict space are not only military-local people orientations. The lived other includes other soldiers as well. Subjective time encounters are also notable among some Balkans participants. Roles can shift and change immediately; they evolve with training, through orders and through interactions with the lived other in the conflict space.

Experiences from Afghanistan

From 2001 to 2014, the Canadian military conducted operations in Afghanistan as part of a larger NATO-led, UN-sanctioned mission. According to the Canadian National Defence website, the ultimate goal of the campaign was to “help Afghans rebuild Afghanistan into a viable country that is better governed, more stable and secure” while denying terrorists a safe haven. The Canadian military mission in Afghanistan was a multi-operation deployment that began with Operation APOLLO (October 2001 to October 2003), the CAF's military contributing to the US-led international campaign against terrorism. The aim of this operation was to dismantle the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and oust the Taliban regime. In August 2003, the CAF transitioned to Operation ATHENA, a peace-supportive military operation that lasted until 2011, which saw the CAF working in mainly two Afghan provinces, Kabul and Kandahar, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). According to the Canadian National Defence website, “protecting Afghans where they live and sleep, reducing the influence of the insurgency, eliminating insurgent strongholds and creating a secure environment for development work to take place” were the mission aims. A significant portion of the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan was combat-oriented. The Canadian government deployed a robust Special Operations Task Force to Kandahar that targeted insurgents. In addition, the Canadian

government installed military mentor and liaison teams who worked alongside and within the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Operation ATTENTION followed in May 2011. The locus of this phase of Canadian military involvement was the provision of training and professional development to the Afghan National Security Forces under the auspices of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A).

One interviewee explains that the Canadian role in Afghanistan was to create a “security blanket”. TB had this to say:

If you speak with any soldier today who has been to Afghanistan or the Balkans they will tell you about the multidimensional aspect of doing operations. It is common knowledge now that you cannot establish peace until you have the deeper economic and political problems taken care of. You need governance, municipalities, provinces, and so on. And you have to make sure that people are safe. The military cannot do that by themselves. They can assist by providing that security blanket that is thrown over the area that allows other people to move freely within an area to provide assistance, deliver resources, and provide infrastructure. The military provides that security to allow all that to happen. But unless that happens, unless towns are re-established and gardens are growing, and all the basics and the necessities of life are re-established, there is not going to be peace. We saw it in Afghanistan where there would be an attack on a village to get the Taliban out. The citizens would have left the village to the Taliban. Unless we can provide security, unless we can stay there for other people to come in and help, but more importantly to help get the citizens to come back and to have them rebuild their village, then it won't work. In the early part of the operation, there weren't enough troops. Soldiers would move into a village, kill off the Taliban and then move on to the next village. But all that would happen is that the Taliban would move back into the last village the soldiers just cleared. So you need that security blanket to allow other support to come in. Then they can move quickly to get the citizens to come back in and settle their villages. (TB)

This official orientation to the military role is one of presence. The idea of a blanket conjures up warmth and bodily representations of refuge and comfort. Note, the “security blanket” is “thrown” over the area and must remain in place long enough to allow support to come in and for normalcy to return. TB's narrative of what Canadian forces were doing in Afghanistan indicates spatial, relational and temporal orientations, which I shall return to in Chapter 7 where I uncover military encounters with peace. For now, I will note that the refuge that TB speaks about in this

narrative is not only for the citizens in the conflict setting. It includes those who must come in to do infrastructural, developmental and political work to reclaim the conflict space. Without that cooperation of resources and aims, TB explains, the efficacy of the security blanket can be lost. Participants were unanimous in this appreciation of the military intent.

The idea of the military as a security blanket in a wide-ranging international peacebuilding mission like the one undertaken in Afghanistan means that the job of the soldier will be diverse. One soldier who worked in Afghanistan had this to say about his role there:

The team that I worked with was directly involved in giving the tools to the Afghan National Army (ANA). The way that the team interacted with the Afghan Generals and the rapport and relationship that they built would have taught them a lot that would make them better at their jobs. As advisors, we were helping and teaching these people. They now have a vast amount of experience helping them, coaching them and setting them up for success. This advising and the training stuff is probably one of the most important things that we can do. We cannot fight their war for them forever. And they have to learn to do it for themselves. The way that they are going to learn to do it is through learning from us. There will be stability once the army and the police and the border police, all those people that we are advising start to do their work. (SP)

SP's mentoring role stands in contrast to another participant's description of working in Afghanistan. BT had this to say about his operational experience there:

Afghanistan for me was different from Bosnia. I was not in Afghanistan to make peace with anyone or keep people from killing each other. My job there was to fight a war. Many people thought we were building schools and sitting around in the airfield at Kandahar or drinking Tim Horton's coffee at the base. But I was in the fog of war the whole seven and a half months that I was there. We have the casualties to prove it. If I was not in a firefight, I was being blown up, or watching people I knew get into firefights or being blown up. We were at war the whole time. (BT)

In his LED about the mentoring role, SP notes that coaching the lived other in the conflict space is an important part of his job. He sees his task of mentoring and training the ANA as an important aspect of the military function in the conflict space. This is in contrast to BT who describes his experience as being in a "fog of war". BT goes on to point out in his wider narrative, "everyone gets the same medal, but not everyone has the same service". The

differences in service could be characterised as different felt space and lived time representations of what it means to be deployed in Afghanistan. Both participants served in Afghanistan, but in diverse areas and at different times. They may have the same medal and recognition as CAF veterans; yet they are spatially, relationally, temporally, corporeally and materially diverse in their orientation to what their roles are in the conflict environment. For instance, SP's LED demonstrates an interest in giving ANA officials intangible tools to improve the country over time. He notes that this is the more sustainable venture. In his anecdote, BT describes a lived other relationship that is defined by firefights and bombings. The initiative of the mentoring role is to change the conflict landscape by causing the lived other to enact certain behaviour in their decision-making in the future. In the "fog of war", BT is invested in the here and now of preserving his own physical being from death and maiming. This leads to an understanding that soldiers may react differently based on their perception of safety within the felt space, not just according to what is actually happening in the space itself.

Existential awareness of a lived space is important for the kind of peace support role the soldier is mandated to perform, but some participants have experiences where they premise the lived other relationship, regardless of the felt space. There are participants who speak about being in the combat zone, but they experience the space and the lived other in different ways. For example, KD shares this lived space experience from her Afghanistan deployment:

You get to learn a lot from the people who come in to work at the base, especially when the base is being shot at and everyone, from the cleaners to the General, is on lockdown for hours. During one of those lockdowns, I learned from one of the civilian women that there is an orphanage for girls nearby where the girls could stay until they were age 14 or something like that. She said that they were always in need of stuff so I started collecting things for them. I just put boxes out in all the quarters for the people that are leaving ISAF so that when they are going home, they can leave all their toiletries. Because nobody's hauling home bottles of shampoo to wherever they come from. So we just collected all that kind of stuff including feminine hygiene products and we took them to

the orphanage. Then they took what they needed for their everyday use and what they did not need they would pass to other churches and stuff like that. (KD)

In this anecdote about the girls' orphanage, KD relates an experience of lived other interaction that came out of one of many episodes of being on security lockdown. An interest in using her own resources helps to shape her relationality. In describing the events that led to the one-on-one interaction with the cleaner, KD illustrates that direct violence incidences that could cause physical harm to people by maiming and killing define the immediate conflict space. This same conflict space is felt by BT, who describes being in the fog of war except his job was to be outside the base interdicting insurgents. The interaction with the lived other within the safety of a base lockdown allowed for a difference in the feeling of the space. Thus, it gives added meaning to the distinction between being "here" (inside the wire) and "over there" (outside the wire).

KD's anecdote also points out that unevenly distributed resources define the conflict environment in as much as direct violence incidences. SP, who mentors the ANA is also feeling this lived space of unevenly distributed resources, as opposed to a bodily threat. In his case, Canada has the knowledge, the expertise and the wherewithal to teach the ANA how things should be done. Materially, his tools must be different from the soldier caught in the fog of war. For BT, who describes being in the fog of war, the lived body experience of being physically threatened creates a materiality that is framed as the use of force. Overall, participants like KD and SP who did not have immediate, face-to-face, physical security challenges framed their materiality and spatiality as one where structural violence creates a number of unmet needs. There seems to be a personal orientation to this diversity in spatial and material context among participants. The Canadian military was officially engaged in combat and nation-building operations in Afghanistan. What is interesting is that there were some soldiers who tried to do more, regardless of the combat or non-combat task they were officially assigned in the mission

theatre. For example, in addition to the girls' orphanage anecdote from KD, there are other stories of soldiers helping in an unofficial capacity. CW provides this description:

When we were in Afghanistan individuals would take it upon themselves to write home and say to people, please send stuff – clothing, school supplies and what not. We would go into refugee camps and distribute stuff. It was happening all over the place. When we went down to Kandahar, we saw some American mentors there for the Afghan army and there were some Special Forces guys there as well. But two of the American guys that were there were from the American National Guard. These guys were professional farmers back home. In the year that they were there, they taught the local farmers how to irrigate. They assisted them with sustainable fish farming. They helped them dig the ponds. They planted a plant that grew quickly. They reintroduced beekeeping, which had been the purview of the women, but it died out under the Taliban. So they had to reintroduce it. So these two guys in their spare time – not on their duty time – went into the villages and said to people, I can help you learn this or that. Not because they had to, but because they had the wherewithal to do so. It all helps the bigger mission in the end, but it is something that you do not necessarily expect. (CW)

A number of participants shared similar stories of having an interest in sharing resources as a means of helping within the felt space. This concern with materiality and the sharing of things that one has is an important feature among soldiers in this study. Note that this is all happening outside of the context of an established humanitarian mandate or task for military interveners. This gives added meaning to the idea of the “security blanket” as a multidimensional military role played over an extended period in a given space. The blanket has the potential to be an individual that is simply engaging in acts of humanizing the lived other through one-on-one interactions and attempts to satisfy basic human needs.

The first glance at military experiences in peace support roles in Afghanistan reiterates some of the experiences from previous deployments, including the one-on-one interactions and diverse orientations to things as an important part of doing military work. Experiences from Afghanistan showed additionally that felt space correlates to how the participants see themselves and their self-other interactions. Participants also differentiate official work from unofficial ways of helping the lived other. Using their off-duty time and sharing their own resources are informal

ways of interceding in the conflict space. This leads to an understanding that lived other and lived thing orientations within the conflict space influences peace support behaviours.

Experiences in Peace Support at Home

In sharing experiences in international peace support operations, a number of interviewees provided insight into their lifeworld at home. The Canadian military also fulfils a mandate to assist local authorities. When such domestic deployments are necessary, they are named, staffed and equipped with the same internal processes that facilitate an international deployment. Some domestic deployments relevant to the experiences captured in this study are Operation LUSTRE (May 2011) where the Canadian military was deployed to assist local authorities after the Assiniboine River flooded between Brandon and Winnipeg, Manitoba. In Operation FORGE (2011), the Canadian military assisted provincial and municipal authorities in northwest Ontario with emergency evacuation and firefighting. There was also Operation PODIUM (February 2010), in which the Canadian military participated in the RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit at the Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games.

One NATO veteran described his “at home” experience of doing firefighting this way:

It was definitely not the most fun thing I have ever done – tramping through the bush with a bunch of guys putting out little forest fires, and in the snow at one point. We would patrol along the edge of the burn area after the airplanes had put out the main forest fire. We had to go about fifty or a hundred meters into the green to look for little wisps of smoke coming up where a tiny little root was burning but can flare into a new forest fire. We were doing that for weeks and during that time the weather turned to crap. I remember clearly, I had three other guys with me at the time. There was an episode when we were patrolling and we came up to a big swamp. We checked the map and realized this is a really big swamp. We decided to go through the swamp. Everybody's going through the swamp, going up to their chest in the water, holding their pumps and their hoses and their picks and their shovels and stuff over their head. Coming up the other side it had turned to cold, wisps of snowflakes were coming down. Absolutely bloody freezing. So we found a hot spot, piled a bunch of wood on top of it, got a good fire going so we could dry everybody out. Then we put that fire out and came home. That was firefighting day. (JR)

This UN and NATO operations veteran shared this experience of working with soldiers returning from Afghanistan as they prepared for domestic deployment:

One of the battalions that came back from Afghanistan was engaged in combat activities on almost a daily basis. Their next tasking was going to be providing security at the Vancouver Olympics. So we had to work with these guys to teach them how to talk to people who live here. These people are not the enemy. The guys took it really well too. They admitted it was hard for them to get out of that mindset that the people they are engaging with are not enemy or suspected enemy, or at the very least collaborating with them. We had to show them that they are going to have to deal with folks differently here. This is your Aunt Sally here, and your cousins showing up at a roadblock. They didn't know that this road was blocked. They are not here because they are trying to blow something up. They are here because they are lost. (MB)

Both descriptions reinforce an earlier observation about the lived space experiences of being “at home” and abroad. Firefighting day illustrates JR’s experience of his peace support role at home. At home, JR has a more conciliatory role as an aid to the civil authority, as opposed to a security or defence role as was the case in his Balkans peace enforcement deployments. Materially, JR’s orientation to his task as firefighter gives him different tools as the extension of himself. Even though he uses the military language to situate himself in the domestic environment (patrolling the burn area), the shovel, axe and pick have replaced more lethal equipment. MB’s experience of transition training also demonstrates the different expectations of soldiers in the domestic environment. In the transition training anecdote, the Canadian felt space changes the context of lived other interactions. “This is your Aunt Sally or your cousin” intimates a familial bond to the people and the positive self-other relations of the Canadian context. “Aunt Sally and your cousins are not trying to blow something up”; they idealize a lived domestic space that is different from the foreign deployment space.

The “*Whatness*” of a Peace Support Role

A first glance the soldiers’ experiences reveal a number of observations about the essence of the peace support role. Each way of experiencing or being in the peace support role relates to

a different aspect of the soldier's referential totality. Still, the lived space, lived body, lived thing, lived other, and lived time experiences interrelate to demonstrate the findings about the essence of the soldier's peace support role.

Spatiality and the soldier's role

The lived space dictates the soldier's role. Spatiality is not just where things happen, but how one feels in the space. If there are feelings of comfort, or at least a sense that there is no intention to harm, the space is reassessed and the role is adjusted accordingly. The range of deployment experiences from 1990-2014 demonstrate that each conflict scenario ranges from neat and predictable to messy and chaotic. The felt space therefore ranges from comfortable and predictable to unfamiliar and perhaps threatening, as evidenced by RS's anecdote of being behind enemy lines. For him the peace support role requires reinventing and doing things differently on the ground. Felt space also influences military roles as the soldiers operate differently in the space "at home" compared to the space "over there", where terms like war and "boots on the ground" tend to be used. At home, the space requires transition, a stepping down of violent perceptions about the lived other in order to act as aids to the civil power. Thus, the soldier's peace support role is dependent on his anticipation of a threat in a felt space. This has meaning within the liberal peacebuilding framework where one of the criticisms about liberal peacebuilding culture is that it legitimizes the intervener's use of violence in target states (see for example Autessere (2010); Jabri (2010)). Participants see themselves working in a different way in overseas deployments than when they are at deployed at home.

Corporeality and the soldier's role

The soldier's peace support role is a presence that dominates in high conflict and recedes when things have calmed down. This "boots on the ground" physical presence influences the

conflict landscape in multiple ways. What is uncovered here is that soldiers can be acting officially or unofficially in their capacity as a physical presence. The soldier has to be trained and prepared for anything that occurs within the lived space. A certain level of training prepares the military person to move into and out of roles as the situation in the lived space dictates. For instance in the ditch digger incident, DP points out the differences between a logistics and a combat unit's tasks. Yet, when the time comes, the logistician must do the job of interdicting the lived other and dominating the space. The soldier must know when to transition between different roles by reading the situation on the ground. The lived body of the soldier must also adjust to the materiality of his/her own position as well as the circumstances of the lived other in each context. Participants' experiences point to the difficulty in distinguishing different phases of a conflict when one deploys into the thick of belligerency. A rounding out of combat skills with contact training is often cited as necessary for peace support within the literature (see for example Franke, 2003; Diehl, 2008; and Duffey, 2000). Participant experiences show that knowing when to use which aspect of training is also very important.

Materiality and the soldier's role

Many tools are required to fulfil the peace support role. There are several things, other than weapons, that serve as tools for achieving positive and negative self-other interactions. A tool is any item used to carry out a particular function. Some LEDs provide obvious examples: picks and axes are useful in firefighting; a truck is a useful thing to block a ditch digger. In the hands of the military person, useful things range from the obvious weapon to any other implement associated with doing work on the ground. Phenomenologically, tools are things that become an extension of the body and the mind (van Manen, 2014). Knowledge, advice, donations and help, even from unofficial sources, are also tools that are a part of the materiality

of the military role in peace support. The anecdote of King John is illustrative of this point. The military person's relationship to various tools and their use in interactions with the lived other suggest that the soldier's materiality, his orientation to the things at hand as he carries out his work in the conflict space, defines his formal and informal roles.

Temporality and the soldier's role

The soldiers' experiences feature two things that are relevant to lived time. First, role transitions are immediate and unexpected. The peace support requirements can change abruptly for the soldier who must transit through various ways of interacting with others in his lived space. Thus, the conflict scenario demands that the soldier find a right fit or balance for responding to changes in events. The experiences show that transitioning requires a good understanding of usefulness and confidence in skill sets. Limits in problem solving skill sets or an understanding of usefulness will diminish the soldier's ability to respond to immediate changes. Second, it is difficult for the military person to make sense of his or her role in the immediate ongoing situation. As demonstrated in DF's fire service experience, it takes time for the soldier to figure out the nature of his work within a conflict space, despite elaborate mandates that are passed down as orders. An appraisal of the felt space as well as personal perceptions of threats seem to precipitate actions; yet, the soldiers in this study also show that they rely on their training to determine what is relevant or appropriate for each scenario. Some aspects of preparation for deployment consider this, as demonstrated in FL's description of counter intuitiveness in Bosnia work-up training and MB's description of transition training for the Vancouver Olympics. In both instances, the soldiers were required to tune-in to cultural realities within the deployment spaces through simulation and scenario building exercises.

Relationality and the soldier's role

Military roles require some level of duality in interactions with the lived other in the conflict space. There is a need to distinguish between those who should be defeated and those who need help. Lived other interactions are separated into “bad guys” and others. The peace support role requires that there be an enemy or belligerent, someone to eradicate. The duality here is that the peace support role requires that there also be someone to protect from the belligerents. The soldiers demonstrate these self-other orientations in several lived experience descriptions. For example, RS’s experience behind enemy lines, SP’s experience of mentoring in Afghanistan, and BT’s IPTF story support this duality of helping the good and interdicting the bad. The soldier’s role is defined by this relationality within a given space and time. One moment the role requires fighting, the next moment the role requires embracing those who are not fighting. Relationality also requires a separation of the peace support effort into an official and unofficial character. The official peace support soldier carries out the organization’s tasks using the tools expected and provided to achieve the desired outcome on the ground. The unofficial peace support soldier is represented as a personal ethos of sharing the resources while engaging in everyday interpersonal interactions that are taken for granted.

Understanding the Soldier’s Role in Peace Support

Ontological reduction provides an understanding of how the soldier’s experiences explain the phenomenon of peace operations deployment. The goal of this reduction is not to purify or extricate the experiences, but to allow for interpretations that describe the what-it-is of participants’ experiences *and* the meaning of the experiences. Here, I pay attention to how these soldiers’ role encounters fit into a conflict analysis and transformation discussion. A key aspect of my ontological analysis is to uncover how participants see their peace support function in the

conflict environment. Here, Heidegger's (1962) concept of Da-Sein is relevant. Cerbone (2008) explains that the essence of Da-Sein lies in its existence, for it is in its day-to-day activities that we find Da-Sein,

Taking a stand on the kinds of being it is, not declaring itself as one thing and not another, but engaging in some activities and not others, taking up some tasks, rather than others, adopting certain goals rather than others. (p. 34)

Da-Sein does this through its structure of referential totality. Spatiality and relationality are strong cognitive shapers for role behaviours because of their impact on the soldier's materiality, corporeality, and temporality. Cerbone (2008, p. 51) notes that Da-Sein experiences certain norms as binding all the time. If it is constantly taking a stand on the kind of being it is, it is possible that Da-Sein can become a fractured self, having an everyday self and an authentic self, much in the way that Goffman (1959) describes the role-playing self.

A view from the South

Peace operations involve some level of contrasting, if not counterintuitive, behaviour. The Canadian soldiers provided stories of how they managed the duality of their formal and informal encounters with the lived other in deployment spaces. The following lived experience description is a view from the South that illustrates a similar sense of duality identified in Canadian experience:

I worked in the medical centre at the military base in Haiti. Initially, I was only supposed to treat only our own troops. Soon after we were there, it came down that we were to assist with an outreach program that the UN had created. Basically, we had permission to give the local civilians who needed first aid treatment the required help and assist them to a hospital where necessary. It was funny though for me to be in this situation where people would need help and you have to get special permission to offer it. Where I come from, we do not have a set policy about treating or not treating civilians. It was more of a "use your discretion" kind of thing. Because as a paramedic, your first priority is always to save a life, whether it is military or civilian life. I have had incidences back home where I have had to treat civilians to save a life on the spot. It is just something that you do because it is part of the duty. (JL)

For JL, the official extension of the intervening force's function to include lived other interactions outside of the war-fighting role was an afterthought. Her experience amplifies some of the structural and relational undercurrents of working at home and overseas. At home, there is familiarity with the local culture, customs and laws. There is also a shared sense of ownership of resources. At home, she was able to adopt a more discretionary posture concerning medical treatment of civilians. In the peace operations deployment, JL's concept of "duty" is formalized as it is consumed by the larger international and multinational structure that determines lived other relations within the new space.

The "Mailed Fist" and the "Velvet Glove"

Heidegger's phenomenology asks how the being of a thing (in this case the soldier's peace support roles) shows itself as revealing a Being itself. Heidegger (1962) calls this to mind in his charge "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself" (p. 58). Examining each participant narrative by itself and with others from this Heideggerian impulse for deconstruction reveals a dualism in the military role. This duality seems to be defined by each soldier's adjustment to his peace support role according to the felt space, which influences the structure and meanings of deployment actions. The whole and parts analysis of the LEDs point to a lived body difference of being "here" and being deployed "over there". One participant provided a useful metaphor for this duality during an interview when he talked about the things that soldiers do. FL explains:

The fighting soldiers, they are your mailed fist to make sure people are behaving themselves. Then, a velvet glove comes in at the same time. These are other soldiers who are working to get the message across that people need to love their neighbour and to move the conversation to talking about the progress that is being made in the country.
(FL)

As FL relates the concept of the “mailed fist” and “velvet glove” to me, his hands move to emphasise the imagery of the fist and the glove. The mailed fist and the velvet glove are existential representations of the dual role of the military. They are a right hand and a left hand working together to do a task. The metaphor symbolizes the physical or bodily representation of how the organization approaches its duties. On the one hand, the fist is clenched to exact a blow. The other softly gloved hand is extended in order to provide comfort, safety and support. In addition to the corporeal representation of the military, there is relational and spatial logic with this analogy. The velvet glove is more than a civil-military liaison tasking. It suggests a way of being in the conflict space, regardless of the soldier’s formal or official job.

Phenomenological analysis presents one way of understanding peace support roles as an organizational duality that is imbibed by the soldier who adapts the two-handed approach. The two-handedness also signals that there are official and unofficial ways of living and thinking about the deployment expectations. The soldier’s way of being within a peace support role is adjusted according to the felt space in which his self-other interactions take place. These different ways of being in a space call to mind the Jamaican colloquial *inna yaad* and *outta yaad*. Being “at home” or *inna yaad* connotes a certain spatial and relational logic where lived body and lived other relations are private, mostly unknown, and rarely disclosed. *Inna yaad*, one is informal as behaviours are relaxed. *Inna yaad*, one is never judged for it is your own space. There is accommodation and understanding of the behaviour. When one is *outta yaad*, the expectations of behaviour and the presentation of self are different. The character stepping into the public sphere is expected to conform to a satisfying picture of social standards. The public space represents the external and the international. As such, the *outta yaad* self is the ambassador and representative of his collective group.

The mailed fist and the velvet glove deploy simultaneously so that they may work cooperatively within the same space. Yet, while the mailed fist is the “fighting guys”, the velvet glove is composed of a plethora of skill sets other than fighting. Whereas the mailed fist is about “getting people to behave”, the velvet glove means to help people move forward and begin the dialogue of recovery. *Outta yaad*, the soldier’s peace support conduct must conform to the structural arrangements that gave rise to the role of the military organization as a fighting institution. *Inna yaad*, the more conciliatory role that emphasises different representations of security is exercised as the velvet glove. In lived experience descriptions such as DP’s ditch digger incident, JR’s firefighting day, and MB’s transition training, the representational participants emphasise their *inna yaad* orientations to being velvet gloves at home, even though they acted as mailed fists abroad. Still, anecdotes like King John and lived experience descriptions about sharing resources in Afghanistan show that there are certain ethics of interactions that underlie the mailed fist and velvet glove orientations overseas. These anecdotes suggest that it is possible for mailed fists, those who are sent overseas to make people behave, to become velvet gloves in their personal interactions with the lived other. King John and others did the softer, more agreeable aspects of peace work in their own time, in addition to the mailed fist work of patrols and interdictions. Thus, the official structure of the soldier’s peace support role demands differentiation between those who need protection and help, and those who need interdicting. On a personal level, all participants point out that the lines are not neatly drawn. The soldier’s role in peace support must feature that duality in order to address the needs of lived space and the lived other.

Conclusion

Roles can be viewed broadly as socially expected behavior determined by an individual or organization's purpose and status. Roles can also be viewed narrowly as the function assumed or the part played by a person or thing in a particular situation. Overviews of deployment mandates demonstrate the expected action of the organization, but they do not speak to the experiences of the soldiers deployed in these situations. The *eidos* of the soldier's role in peace support is multidimensional yet contrasting, requiring reinvention to fit the lived space. Fulfilling Bourdieu's (1977, 1990) notion of being free to choose to act within existing constraints, the soldier effectively plays a role in international deployment. The lived space and lived other experience in the conflict environment determines the soldier's role; but it is dynamic. First, the concept of the mailed fist and the velvet glove represents the lived space and lived body practice of the soldier's peace support function. Second, the metaphor alludes to the soldier's accompanying *inna yaad* (at home) and the *outta yaad* (over there) performances. The fist is mailed, sent overseas and away from home to restore a state of security. The velvet glove deploys domestically. It also deploys officially overseas along with the mailed fist when there is a formal peace support mandate. Unofficially, the soldier may deploy as a mailed fist, but he sometimes takes it upon himself to find ways to simultaneously work as a velvet glove. The LEDs show that this happens at the lowest levels of lived other interactions that are not part of the mandated peace operations functions. Next, I will examine how soldiers identify with or become absorbed in these dualistic roles. The LEDs in Chapter 6 illustrate the way that the formal and informal peace support and the felt space orientations help to shape the soldiers' identity selection.

Chapter 6: Encountering a Military Identity

In this chapter, I examine how the soldiers in this study absorb their peace support roles and explore ways of understanding how the roles shape the soldiers' military identity. The "Tuning In" section precludes the main five themes of the soldiers' identity experience. Each theme groups a set of lived experience descriptions that help to characterize how these Canadian soldiers select their peace operations identities. The Canadian experiences are analysed for their existential references and then further unpacked using Heidegger's concept of useful things as the ontological framework for understanding the soldier's identity. In some instances I incorporate the view from the South to add a supporting or contrasting perspective to the main narrative; however, the key findings and conclusions are based on the Canadian experiences.

Tuning In: Recalling the Garrison Cemetery

I am sitting with TB in his den as he tells me the story of how two soldiers died. Before he begins the story, he pulls out a map of the UNPROFOR operational area. He shows me the various sectors and tells me who was responsible for each area. The Canadian sector is a multinational one. Troops from Argentina, Nepal, Jordan, Kenya, Russia and Ukraine are among the coalition of intervening forces. TB's map is an original operations map. Bright orange, yellow, black and red markers circle various locations and mark out access routes, safe zones, humanitarian corridors, "pink zones", and sector boundaries. I listen intently as TB tells the story while pointing to various places on the map.

In this sector, we had a couple of UN checkpoints along this loosely agreed upon line between the Serbs and the Croats, which was really a road separating Serb and Croat controlled areas. The group of soldiers responsible for monitoring that line were from one country. The commander for the sector was from another country. One day the Croatians decide that they were going to move their position into the line, effectively moving the agreed checkpoint. I got the call very early in the morning. So I told the commander in that area to go there and get the Croats out and bring them back to their original point.

Well, he pretty much refused at first then he said he did not know how to do it. So I said “Go to that outpost, go tell the Serbs what you are going to do, then grab these guys and bring them back to where they were to start with, because they are violating the ceasefire agreement”. He kind of agreed to do it, but nothing happened. I went out there a little later, nothing had changed, and the Serbs were starting to see what was going on. There was another incident that happened up north in this little town that was getting pretty nasty, so I told the commander to get the thing sorted out or it was going to blow up. Then I left and went up north to deal with that incident, which got sorted out pretty quickly. By the time I came back to this position, people from the Croat village were milling around and making a nuisance of themselves. Eventually, this commander sends two of the soldiers over to the Serb location. I do not know who sends two soldiers anywhere. The soldiers end up taking fire. Eventually they were killed because by now, the Serbs began to react and so they are bringing down artillery fire on the location.

As TB tells it, the soldiers’ death is a sad but avoidable event. If that commander had done his job, things would have happened differently. TB explains:

This is what happens when we do not have competent commanders. I ended up having to answer to many people for what took place that day. This guy was not competent. He would not make a decision. He could have de-escalated the situation, but he chose not to do it. As a result, the Serbs got a bee in their bonnet, which caused a lot of consternation and two young soldiers were killed.

TB’s complaint about this other UN commander’s role in the soldiers’ deaths makes me wonder if all soldiers are as equal in life as they are in death.

As TB orients me to the map and shows me the corridor that doubled as the ceasefire line pertinent to his story, he describes the whole picture: who is where, what is what. Then he zones in on the area of his narrative. He uses his pen to point out the little town and road between the two villages where things went down. For a moment, I feel as if I am back in uniform. It is as if TB is taking me through an operational briefing. My mind races back to multiple orders, estimate and tactical exercises. I float to delivering orders during my promotional exams and doing operational briefings during my various appointments. Then I settle on a memory of myself as the headquarters duty officer. I am taking a call from a weary but stayed infantry officer duly reporting that there had been a contact incident and someone was injured. My mind races again

to being at the Garrison Church for a soldier's funeral. The church is packed and people are spilling out the doors. I feel myself slow marching from the church to the Garrison Cemetery to solemn drumbeats. Our soldier's casket is leading the procession. The Jamaica Defence Force's rites for the deceased soldier are similar to the parade standards that other Commonwealth militaries afford their deceased. Regardless of rank or the type of work one did, the funeral parade and the regimental activities happen the same way. Still, TB's story brings to mind that not all soldiers are the same.

Drawing Near: Showing the Soldier's Identity

TB's description of the events leading up to the death of two soldiers exhibits his lived experience with other members of the multinational force. His interaction with the commander is a bodily experience that evokes the subjective time and feeling of the space. TB speaks vividly about how he initially heard about the incident, how he spoke to the commander by phone and then in person, left the scene, and came back to the scene. TB makes it clear that it was not for want of instruction or understanding why this tragedy happened. It was because of incompetence. It was because a soldier did not know how to do his job. The operations space required certain qualifications. In TB's experience, this other commander had neither the skills nor the resolve to use them appropriately. For TB, as well as other participants in this study, successful peace support work was contingent on having appropriately trained and equipped men and women who understand their role within the operations environment. In the experience of most Canadian participants, troops from lesser developed countries (LDC) were found wanting. One soldier called these countries that are relatively new to international operations "neo-peacekeepers". The soldiers believed that these LDC forces were essentially "out to lunch" on

what it means to be internationally deployed. More so, they were out to lunch on what it means to be working in support of peace efforts.

Identity is apparent in the way the soldiers distinguish themselves from others. In articulating their experiences of deployment, the soldiers told stories about how they interacted with other militaries and the lessons that they drew from those interactions. They made judgements about other armed forces as well as the civilians that they encountered in the deployment space. The soldiers also spoke about their identity experiences upon returning to Canada where they had to make adjustments. I show these military identity encounters in the theme clusters below.

“I am the weapon”

Each soldier in this study defined his identity based on his specialized training as warrior. Participant routinely cited that they are “a soldier first”, an indication that they self-identify with a generic role more than any specific mission task. A number of the participants took issue with the peacekeeper label even if they wore a UN blue beret or helmet during deployment. The common point among interviewees was that peacekeeping was a term invented by politicians and international organizations to soften the image of war and sell it to the public. These soldiers were sure that peacekeeping did not represent their identity or the way that soldiers are expected to behave in a conflict space. Where a few persons were willing to accept the label “peacekeeper”, they make the point that it is not a military characteristic, merely a type of operation or task. This LED from FL is a good example of the way UN veterans in this study view their military identity:

I have no objections to being called a peacekeeper. I remember going to visit some family in Vancouver after I had returned from Bosnia. As I was telling them about my experience over there, my niece was sitting there politely listening to me drone on about what I had done and seen. Then I said something and her eyes lit up and she said, “Uncle,

were you a peacekeeper?” And I said yeah. Then all of a sudden, she was interested because that was the flavor of the month in those years. Now people talk about, “going back to our traditional peacekeeping role”. Well that is not our traditional role. The Canadian army is a war fighting organization. NATO is a war fighting organization. It is because of the skills that we have as war fighters that we are able to be successful peacekeepers. You cannot just send a bunch of guys with blue helmets in that are nice to everybody and expect them to keep two warring nations apart. It is not going to work. Especially in this day and age where you are more often peacemaking than peacekeeping. You need the war fighting skills. It is those skills that helped us to be good peacekeepers. It gives the military discipline. It gives us a focus on selection and maintenance of the aim. It gives us organization, the military hierarchy, and the ability to use military force if required. If somebody wants to call me a peacekeeper, that’s fine, but I am first and foremost a soldier. I am a Canadian soldier. And if they think that that brings peacekeeping skills to the table then that is fine. But it also brings war fighting skills to the table. (FL)

The core element of this LED is the belief that the soldier’s role in working for peace comes from his war fighting effectiveness. FL points to several personal observations that reinforce his own sense of what it means to be a soldier. He notes that the “peacekeeping role” generates interest because it works as a “flavour of the month”. People are talking about it and romanticizing it without fully knowing what it entails. The term sounds nice, but it does not capture the reality of the soldier’s existence. FL also notes the ambiguities of the “traditional role” and clarifies that it is “war fighting” skills that make the peacekeeping task possible.

The soldiers feel that the war fighting function of the CAF is its most important element for ensuring that its soldiers could go anywhere and work to support peace in principle and actions. In these veterans’ experience, training for war is the core of the soldier’s existence. It removes ambiguity about the military purpose in situ. Peacekeeping creates an ambiguity that devalues the soldier’s functionality. One example of the way the soldiers see their functionality comes from DF. He had this to say:

When you are a deployed soldier, you are the weapon. We used to say that the C7 rifle is not the weapon, it is a tool. I am the weapon. The fact that I have a rifle only makes me a more effective weapon. My status of being a weapon is my attitude, my training, my capability, and my morale. And don't think for a second, that morale means being happy.

My morale is my ability to succeed despite the odds. So if we prepare for the highest end of the spectrum, which is combat, chances are we can fill in the other roles along that continuum from benign disaster assistance, to assistance to the civil authority and aid to the civil power. Think of the FLQ Crisis or the Oka Crisis or the floods and ice storms and things like that, all the way up to combat. That is what a combat capable, multi-purpose force looks like. It is a well-trained soldier who knows he is the weapon. (DF)

DF highlights a lived body orientation by claiming that the soldier is the primary weapon. He suggests the soldier is dynamic; as such, he soldier should be valued for what he brings to the situation, not the tools that he uses. For DF, as for many other persons in this study, that dynamism is an ethos that goes back to the soldier's go anywhere, do anything mentality. Below, DF explains how his identity as "the weapon" allows him to overcome some of the challenges and discomfort associated with certain tasks. He had this to say about what he learned from working with a group of firefighters divided by the ethnic conflict in the Balkans:

Working with them was such a challenge. Yet it was fun because you never knew what it was going to be that day. The experience was valuable for me because I realized after that that when you are doing a negotiation with a contractor or you are back in Canada or you are working with another military, nothing is going to be as hard as that was. In that role, 100% of the decisions were mine and all I knew was that I had to get the fire hall working. So when I am back home in Canada and negotiating with a contractor to put a wall in a building or split one office into two offices I can take a step back and look at things differently. I know being here that first off; no one is going to die. There is no life-and-death decision we are going to make under budgetary circumstances here. So in my post-military life, if I do not get my budget report in on time, it's okay. (DF)

For DF, a bonus of his service is that the soldier first identity carries on into his post-deployment and post-military life. For him, being a soldier at home is nowhere near as challenging as being a soldier over there.

The soldier learns important skills that he transfers from those high intensity encounters to the much lower intensity conditions of his at home environment. The soldiers feel that this is the result of their military training. They recalled their experiences with training as being tough, but positively reinforcing of what it takes to succeed in war fighting. Two narratives provide

examples of how military training shapes the soldier's identity selection. RS explains that the training defines the individual. He had this to say:

My training experience was life changing. I look back at those experiences fondly. Military training has to be difficult, not to the point of deliberately failing someone, but to the point of testing your mettle. If it is not that way, then we are in danger of doing the individual, and the force in general, a disservice. I think the training standards have to be tough and they have to be held highly and we should never make any exceptions. Because it is hard, we should go through military training and look back on it fondly because it was something that we got through. And of course, our next level of training should be harder, and then next one and so forth. Then at some point, particularly for officers, the challenge becomes more cerebral. (RS)

For RS, tough training standards and new challenges help to shape the soldier's mettle.

Deployments are an opportunity to prove that mettle and rise to the challenges that may come.

Hard training prepares the soldier for work in different at different levels in different spaces and contexts. KD provides a similar view in the anecdote below. Her identity as soldier is revealed in her assessment of pre-military and post-military gender experiences. She had this to say:

I joined the reserves initially for a summer job. Our family owned a factory and I wanted to work there, but my mother said it was no place for ladies to work. So I worked as a mother's helper the summer before I joined. Then the next summer I signed up for the reserves. They were paying me four times what I earned as a mother's helper and most of all, I liked what I was doing so nobody was going to talk me out of it. My basic training was a summer infantry course after which they would place you in one of the units: artillery, armoured, and so on. At that time, if you are a woman, you had to go into a female trade. Females were not allowed to do any combat trades so we could only become medics or clerks or supply techs. Eventually, the rules changed and women could go into any of the trades. My unit was very good at letting me do a lot of the combat arms stuff, as much as they could considering it wasn't technically legal at the time. The military for me was a place I could do different things. I liked being hands-on and I was good at it. It didn't matter whether I was a girl or not. I was good at it. I liked it. It was just pushing that envelope everywhere it could go. I was able to work in a bunch of different areas that I would never have thought to work in or that I would ever be good at. Like doing tactics – to this day, I still can't play chess. I never learned. Who would think that I would love tactics as much as I did? Everybody tells me you have to be a chess player to lead tactics. For me it was just loving what I did and where it took me. (KD)

For KD, the military represented a place where she could do things considered inappropriate or uncommon for women in her time. She notes that she had a love for what she did and where it

took her. For KD and RS, military training has a multidimensional significance. Their stories resonate with a number of other soldiers who point out that the soldier first ethos is both philosophy and lifestyle. The soldiers note that one never really leaves the army; the principles and standards they learned during their time of service still applies in their post-military lives.

While many objected to the peacekeeper label explaining that it was the job of the soldier that allowed them to do well in peacekeeping, reflecting Franke's (2003, pp. 44-45) concept of identity differentiation, one soldier had a different view. BT expressed a preference for one aspect of the military identity over another. He explains it thus:

I was deployed to Bosnia and Afghanistan. In Bosnia, we were supposed to be helping people to make peace with each other. Afghanistan for me was different though. I was not there to make peace with anyone or keep people from killing each other. I was there to fight a war. And don't get me wrong, I was happy to be there in Afghanistan. I literally begged to be sent because I wanted that experience. I wanted to go because I trained a lot of those people who went over there and I felt bad staying behind. I kept asking myself, how I could be training people for war; but I never experienced it. So after a while, I felt bad staying behind and then hearing people come back and say this, this and this happened and this thing you taught me really saved my life. It is like teaching surgery but never cutting someone open. I equate being in the military to learning to play the piano. Yeah, there were performances in Germany and Bosnia and so on. But Afghanistan was my big concert and I felt that I had to go to prove something. (BT)

BT prefers one kind of military role to another, fitting Franke's (2003, pp. 42-43) categorization of warrior bolstering or hyperinvestment. BT states his preference for the active combat role, pointing out that it is an opportunity to prove himself and his skills. He equates his military training to teaching surgery and never doing an operation. This is a significant point because BT's Bosnia deployment was under the NATO SFOR mandate. However, BT sees helping people to make peace with each other as being different from being deployed specifically for combat. Going to Afghanistan to do the job of fighting a war was an opportunity to prove what he knew. Previous deployments to Bosnia, and to Germany before the end of the Cold War, did

not satisfy this need for him. Those spaces did not require that he prove his mettle as much as he anticipated Afghanistan would have.

A view from the South

The following description is a view from the Global South. Here, TK shares what it feels like to be called a peacekeeper.

Although I was a UN peacekeeper, I was still operating under the JDF structure. So there was not much difference in how we worked. It was the same command structure as if we were at home. I was working with people I had worked with before, so it was not much different. We were just operating in a different environment. So being a UN peacekeeper is not something that meant a big deal. The only difference was that the CO was getting his orders from somewhere else; but it was not any different when it came down to how we saw ourselves or the work that we were doing on the ground. (TK)

This view from the South reinforces the Canadian soldiers' message of being the same soldier on their peace operations deployment as they are in other kinds of missions. In most instances, they used the same training and skills as they carried out the same tasks overseas that they did at home. The peace operations mandate did not change their way of work or the way that they related with people within their deployment teams. The soldiers experienced their mission roles as one of many aspects of a multidimensional job.

“[Those] soldiers do not have the empathy”

The soldiers shared several experiences of working in environments where they felt that the wrong person, the wrong equipment, or the wrong organizational approach had significant consequences. TB provides one tragic example in his LED about the death of two soldiers featured at the beginning of this chapter. Several other descriptions illustrate what it means to be credible as a soldier in peace operations deployment. For instance, the following anecdote from TB shows how deployment can change the meaning of impartiality and what being neutral means for trustworthiness in a lived space divided by ethnic and religious differences.

The conflict in Bosnia is one that is drawn on ethno-political and ethno-cultural differences. It matters who you are and where you are in the former Yugoslavia. But the way things worked was that if a country has X number of troops on the ground, then that country is entitled to X number of positions in the headquarters and if you have something of a larger contribution, then you are entitled to some of the more senior appointments in the headquarters. Now imagine for instance, what happens when you are a country like Jordan, who sends a lot of troops to the UN operation. Because of that, you manage to secure a high-level position like Chief of Staff for the Croatia command. On paper, a Jordanian Chief of Staff negotiated by his government sounds harmless, right. In reality, having a Muslim lead the negotiations with the Croats is counterproductive. So I am in this very large headquarters of 170 or 180 people, but of that number there was only about 30 or 40 people who were useful. (TB)

Here, TB describes his experience with UNPROFOR as one of inefficiency due to “hangers-on” and quota making troop contributing nations (TCNs). TB’s anecdote is one illustration of the experience of working in a multinational scenario. Impartiality and neutrality take on new meaning when the cultural and religious backgrounds of the external military forces are considered. The result for TB was that although the UN headquarters had the numbers, the job fell to only a few competent people. Thus, for TB competence is not only about knowing how to fight a war; it is also about knowing how to put the right set of resources and skill sets together that will support the peace. The soldiers in this study feel that this was something most other armed forces that they have worked with are unable to do. For instance, this RS shows how he came to see some of his multinational force counterparts:

It really bothered me to see soldiers from other countries trading sugar on the black market, while people were starving to death. These were UN peacekeeping forces robbing the poor people of sugar to sell it on the black market to people who could afford to buy it. So I became very disillusioned by the quality of peacekeepers that were being sent into the operation. I saw for example, the Nepalese, who had to sell their equipment to get money to buy food because their own country was not paying them properly. The country was taking the UN transfer of their commitment, but whatever the Nepalese government was using it for, it did not include using it to feed the soldiers or send the required support to their troops who were in the field and that was very sad. I saw Argentinean, Columbian, Jordanian and Nepalese forces trying to deal with the humanitarian scenario, where they had no base. They came from areas where there was no human rights. They had no idea how to deal with a scenario. They did not know what right or wrong was. (RS)

RS shares his experience of witnessing other forces harming, rather than helping. He points out the indirectness of the method of harming; it comes from having no human rights base. For RS, what is practiced *inna yaad*, in the domestic lived space, travels with the soldier *outta yaad* to the peace support space. Negative at home behaviour are exported to the detriment of the lived other in peace operations settings.

In observing other multinational forces, the soldiers define their own identity as Canadian military by suggesting there is something that separates the way they behave from the way that other multinational forces behave. Canadians presumably have a human rights base *inna yaad* and that base is represented *outta yaad* by being with the lived other in a positive way. This difference between “us” and “them” was not limited to LDC and non-western militaries. Some participants also draw a line between themselves and other forces such the Americans whom they describe as “more kinetic”. They felt that these kinetic forces were more willing to use violence or other aggressive tactics to get a job done. For instance, a few participants used experiences from their Balkans deployment to show where American leaders seemed quick to want to “bomb the Serbs” because they perceived them as the bad guys, even though there was no one bad guy in the conflict. Similarly, the following anecdote about life in a coalition headquarters in Afghanistan reflects a situation faced by some Canadian soldiers as they tried to reconcile the dual roles of mailed fist and velvet glove within the wider body of the NATO coalition. CW had this to say:

In Afghanistan, the houses are built inside walls. So they build the wall first and that wall is higher than the house so that the women can walk around outside the house freely without being seen. So you have these all these little compounds that look alike. Now if you want to bomb a compound because you have been told that there is a large group of insurgents gathered there, you need to know exactly what’s there before you drop that 500-pound bomb. Because if this is the compound where the bad guys are where you should have dropped the bomb, but your grid reference is off a little bit and you drop it

over here on this house or this hospital and kill all these women and children, then the village is going to ask why should we trust you when you are the one killing our women and children. The villagers are going to tell you that the bad guys are over here and they are not killing our women and children, you are. We had that happen a few times. And whenever it did, [Afghan President] Karzai would pick up the phone and call my boss. And the sad thing is that my boss was not the one he should be calling about it. He should have been calling some divisional two-star. But we were the ones who were intimately involved in interacting with the Afghan senior leadership and government. So we would get the phone call from Karzai saying “you assholes just bombed a wedding”, when it wasn’t us. That was not our decision or role. And so we would call the guys responsible for the bombing and they would say, “hey it wasn’t me that Karzai called so what does it matter”. The reality is that there are some forces within the coalition that are dealing with the uneducated, the insurgents, and the terrorists. These soldiers did not have the empathy. So they can drop a bomb without thinking about the consequences of dropping a bomb. And they can say “hey, what do I care, Karzai is not phoning me”. But it just strains the relationship that we have with the government of Afghanistan every time something stupid like that happened. (CW)

For CW, empathy for the people in a space is not something that all soldiers practice. Where there is no empathy, the peacebuilding results are unlikely to be positive.

“It’s because I’m Canadian”

The soldiers draw a clear line between themselves and other multinational forces noting that they bring a certain level of credibility into the conflict space that is not readily possessed by TCNs. They paint pictures of what it feels like to be Canadian soldier in peace operations deployment. The pictures often indicate some kind of national suitability for the peace support role. For example, TB had this to say about Canadian combat training and discipline standards:

Our training gives us discipline. The training imparts that discipline to know what has to get done under certain circumstances. There is also the discipline of doing what you are told. But it is the wider discipline of being able to actively respond to situations, applying the rules of engagement, and so on. The Canadians were able to do that because we had the credibility. We had the training. We had the firepower. We had the equipment. That credibility and capability is fundamental to why we are better at peacekeeping than anyone else. What we are doing is really stepping down from combat on a conflict scale to a much lesser demand for the training and discipline that we have. You cannot do it the other way. You cannot move up a scale for what you do not have. We saw that repeatedly in the deployment while we were working with other multinational forces. If you do not have credibility, you cannot enforce a mandate because the factions will not believe you. There were many examples of nations, other military guys who would tell the Serbs, if

you do this or that, we will come and get you, and the Serbs would just laugh at them. When we said that, they knew very well that they should watch out. (TB)

TB believes that Canada's high training standard gives it the credibility and functionality it needs to operate well in any conflict setting. The sentiment however, is that not all TCNs are this capable. In addition to training, other soldiers point to what motivates Canadians to join the armed forces. For example, BT had this to say:

One of the biggest lessons for me about working overseas is that the Canadian military is good. We know our stuff. Our military is on average better educated than most, including the Americans I think. Here in Canada, we have different reasons for people joining the army. But in the US, it's mostly because people are poor or they want to go to college or they are from a dead end neighbourhood. For example, I met a guy from Detroit recently whose Dad has been unemployed for more than 15 years. He joined the military just so he could have a job because there was nothing in Detroit. In Canada, we tend to join the military for different reasons. That said, I do not mind working with the big militaries, you know Germany, France, America, Australia, Britain, so on. I had to work with all kinds of militaries across all my deployments. The ones that I did not like working with though are the conscript armies. They were right out to lunch. They did not give a shit about anything. That is who you don't want to go to war with is a bunch of people who are like, "I don't want to be here". We had guys who would just leave their guard post. They just walked away. They are like, "I don't want to be here. Fuck this!" and left. I am saying to them, "You can't just leave! Who's guarding?" But they didn't care. Why would they? They are conscripts. (BT)

BT expresses a preference for working with mainly western forces. He also perceives that Canadian soldiers are generally better educated than their American counterparts. This anecdote from MB shows Canadian emphasis on professionalizing military service, even during operational deployments:

After a while of being in Bosnia under NATO things had settled down enough that we had to find things to do. We ended up bringing in high school and upgrading courses into theatre for the guys to do because they were getting bored. The patrolling was getting very mundane and they were doing it in shifts. So I thought about how we could get educational resources back home to ship over some courses. If a guy is sitting around doing nothing for three days while waiting for his next shift then maybe we could use that time. We could help him put that time to good use because we had a lot of soldiers at that time who had not finished high school but wanted to because at that time there was a fairly large rift between the skill of a soldier and how that skill would have been quantified in a civilian context. In Afghanistan, we did a fourth year leadership and ethics

course while we were there. It was 10 weeks long, one lecture per week and everyone had to do three papers. And what better place is there to do this? Leadership is happening right there every day on the ground. When we had the lectures people could express their ideas and talk about things without using names. People were learning from each other and it was a great opportunity for everyone to find out what their peers were thinking. This was all part of the ongoing professional development that is paramount to doing the job. (MB)

According to MB, soldiers in his deployment team benefited from continued training, partly to combat boredom in the operational theatre and partly to fulfil requirements for professional courses. He notes that some of the in-theatre courses like those on leadership and ethics provided opportunities for people to learn and talk about things as they happen in real time on the ground.

These examples of Canadian soldiers' lived experiences with identity encounters come together to show how people distinguished themselves from others that they work with in multinational coalitions. The soldiers feel that their combination of skills, motivations for service, and on-going education creates a balance. It is this balance between being kinetic and interfacing with local people that participants hold in high regard as they separate themselves from other forces. This story from DF illustrates the way that most participants think about this balance that they bring to the multinational deployment space.

The Major who I was taking over from was a guy named Andy. He was your classic British officer, super-polite, very English in his mannerisms. A kind of "I am meeting the Queen for tea" kind of fellow. He was a really nice guy, but just a little pompous. We are set to do a hand-over at this outdoor meeting with all the firefighters, about 25 or 30 of them sitting around picnic benches inside the military base. These firefighters had wanted to bring their cars onto our camp. I had told them, "No. You are not bringing your vehicles into our camp. It's just too dangerous, and we're not going to search your car for bombs and illegal people in the boot and everything else". So we get to the part in the meeting where Andy is introducing me as the person taking over from him and he asks if anybody has any questions. One guy in the back at the far end of the picnic tables asks, "When are we going to be allowed to bring our cars in?" Now Andy, in a very British way, he just goes, "Right. That's a problem". When the guy heard that, he threw his helmet down, spat at the ground, and then he turns his back to Andy. Andy, all he says is, "Oh, I say, that's quite rude". So, I turned to him and I said, "If I may, Andy". He says, "Oh, please do". So I got up from the head of the table and I walked around to the end of the picnic tables to where this guy is. I walked right over to the guy and I get my hand up

in his face and I said, “You turn the fuck around right now and don't you dare disrespect my fucking Major again or I'm gonna rip your fucking head off and shove it up your fucking ass. And I know you fucking understand me”. At that point, one of the translators asks if I wanted that translated. I keep looking this guy in the eyes as I say to the translator, “No need”. The guy then turns back around. I go back to the table with Andy and as I sit down, I say to him, “There you go, Andy”. Andy goes, “Oh. That's a little bit more direct than I had anticipated”. I just said, “It's because I'm Canadian”. So Andy introduces me again and this time I get up and speak to the whole group. This time I have the interpreter translate as I say to the firefighters, “I've only got one thing to say: I'm not as nice as this Major is; but we're going to have fun working together”. (DF)

DF highlights what other participants refer to as Canadian credibility. The soldiers see credibility as integrity and trust that comes from seizing opportunities to act and doing the right thing under different circumstances. Credibility is finding that right balance. DF associates his directness with the rude firefighter with his Canadian-ness. This is unlike “the very British way” that the other person chose to deal with the situation. This sense of balance contributes to the majority view that Canada is a good fit for peace support work.

A view from the South

It is not only Canadian soldiers who hold themselves and their training in high regard. The Jamaican soldiers involved in this study also see themselves as being a part of a well-trained professional force. Participants from the Global South point out that their skills were imparted through training opportunities provided by Western, industrialized countries, namely Britain, the United States and Canada. Consequently, they feel that they are professionally equal to their industrialized partners, even though they lack the national fiscal investment in resources. VM explains his readiness for interoperability with leading forces thus:

I did most of my training with the British and Canadians. From basic officer training to my professional development and specialization courses to staff college, it was all outsourced to either Canada or Britain through courses or attachments. When we deployed to Haiti, we did pre-deployment training with the Americans in Puerto Rico. But by then, I didn't really learn anything new. Everything that they were teaching or going over, I had been taught it from before from any one of the courses that I had done with the British or the Canadians. But I could see that it did come across as new for some of the other CARICOM countries. Even some of our soldiers found the information

useful. Mostly the younger ones, because they would have been accustomed to patrolling just based on what they learn in Jamaica alone. For example, in Haiti, the patrol teams were by the book, just like I had learned it on my courses overseas. A lot of what I learned about patrolling was based on the British experiences in Northern Ireland. But I appreciated that even though I had never trained in the US, I felt like our manuals and orders are written in such a way that they ensure that if and when these different forces come together, it is not difficult for us to work with each other. (VM)

VM's description of his training and working experience with the Americans suggests that the Western, industrialized standard of military training that Canadian soldiers claim to have could also be the reality for a developing nation like Jamaica. From a training perspective, VM sees himself as equally skilled as his industrialized training partners. However, he realizes that other members of the CARICOM forces may not be at the same level, thus they benefited more from the pre-deployment training package. However, there are some important existential dimensions inherent in VM's narrative. First, VM places himself in the lived body of an officer, which is materially distinct from that of "younger" soldier. The more experienced officer benefits from years of international training and attachments with leading forces; as opposed to the soldier who learns his job based on local training alone. The younger soldier learns according to his local context and the resources available in the *inna yaad* space, while the officer learns in an international, developed country context that brings a different felt space experience altogether. There is also VM's self-realization of his own credibility in that he perceives himself as being on par with his multinational partners. By the time of his deployment to Haiti, he had learned "nothing new". The deployment was a reiteration of the training scenarios he had learned and exercised with the Canadians and the British. The Canadian soldiers in this study all feel that they are suitably trained; soldiers from the Global South speak of their experiences in accessing American, British and Canadian instruction as means of improving their local training standards.

“We are only guests”

As CW explains it, it is important for military persons to see themselves as visitors or guests within a deployment space. He points out:

I have to constantly remind myself and I say it to other people that we are only visitors here. We will eventually leave. The people who live here are going to stay behind. So what we have to do is ensure that when we leave the place we leave them better off and in a mode that they can survive without us. Over there, you have to act just as how you would act if you were a guest in someone else’s home. You do not shit anywhere you please. You use common sense. (CW)

Participants agree that being internationally deployed requires recognizing that you are not in your own space. Being abroad means accepting that one is acting as the *outta yaad* self and therefore, must be willing to conform to the lived other’s expectations of behaviour in the space. Several soldiers shared experiences where this respect for their hosts sometimes meant that they had to repress aspects of their own identity and culture. Nevertheless, they all make the point that they do it to serve the larger mission goal. Some examples of this come from women soldiers who point out that their physical form as western women tended to elicit misogynous and discriminating treatment from local people and some multinational force members in the deployment space. One soldier recalled how she spent a lot of time “feeling offended by how men treated women over there” during her UNDOF deployment. Another UNDOF veteran describes her interaction with a male member of the Polish Battalion; his parting comment was “holy fuck, women and weapons”. Below, KD explains how and why she managed her personal identity during her Afghanistan deployment:

When we were over there we would wear headscarves, just to be polite. They really did not know how to treat women that were very forward and in charge but as long as you are polite, you can get a lot done. Polite does not mean that you take the back seat. It is also not about saying, “this is the way that we would do it” or “this is best”, or “this is the person in charge”. It is more about understanding that it does take people a while to get used to you being there and that they are scared. It is understanding that the interaction can seem confrontational. So the polite way to handle it is to show that you understand

the concerns and that you try and minimize the effects. These are the instances when the strategic corporal has to come out. That can be the woman in uniform doing whatever.

For KD, the willingness to “be polite” comes from a place of understanding that she was not in her own space. Furthermore, she acknowledges that it takes the lived other time to adjust to the changes that they are experiencing in their felt space. She shares this anecdote about how “being polite” works for successful lived other interactions that support the mission goal:

One time I heard another NATO woman talking about her experiences in Afghanistan. She was in charge of a village in Afghanistan. Whenever she went into the village, the chief would only talk to the guys she had with her, which was her protection detail, plus she had one of her captains and whatever else there. This chief would talk to the junior people, not to her, even though she was in charge. Finally, she said, she took a different approach and became casual about it because she realized that the chief did not want to lose face in front of the guys. When she changed from trying to show him she was the boss to just being casual and asking questions about him and his organization, he ended up telling her that his brother in law was in charge of one group and had not been seen or heard from for almost three weeks. The chief thought maybe his brother in law had gone off with the Taliban and was making a bunch of money. It was interesting because this chief would not say that to the male soldiers there. He would have lost face in front of them because it would seem like he did not have control over his people. Somehow, he could say it to a woman and only after she stopped trying to show that she was the one in charge. (KD)

For KD, understanding the situation faced by the lived other in his own circumstance and culture was an important lesson. She points out that the commander’s decision to put herself and her position aside and simply listen to the other in his space helped to fulfil the mission aim.

KD points out that this is what happens when the strategic corporal comes out. The strategic corporal is an idea that the deployed soldier embodies a number of leadership, combat and contact capabilities that makes his an effective tool for achieving an overarching objective. I explore the concept of the strategic corporal further in Chapter 7. For now, I will point out that although all of the Canadian participants had something to say about the abilities of the strategic corporal, no one believed that being a soldier in peace operations deployment is a simple adjustment. Just as how being a guest in someone’s home could at times create a certain level of

discomfort, the soldiers spoke about episodes of uneasiness with doing their jobs. For instance,

MB describes how interactions in Bosnia affected his view of humanity. He explains:

I remember my commander's interpreter. She was a Bosnian Muslim. Whenever the commander was talking to Croat or Serb senior militia people, you could see it in her eyes that she was really uncomfortable interpreting for those guys. This made me wonder about what had happened before we got there. There was also our bartender. On the camp, we had a bar and we were allowed two beers a day. Our bartender was a girl, about 18. But she was maybe somewhere between 10 and 15 when the ugliness was going on. She had some really horrendous stories and that one thousand metre stare. But she wanted to talk about it; she wanted us to know what happened because I guess she felt that we needed to know so we could make sure it never happened again. But as comforting as that thought was, it was difficult to hear what had happened. Whenever I was talking to someone in that country, I would try to imagine what this person was doing 3 or 4 years ago. It was hard for me to put trust in anyone over 30. While I was there, I kept thinking anyone around that age that was living there would have had a good chance of being involved in the massacres in some way. (MB)

For MB, hearing the stories and seeing the results of the carnage left him deeply uncomfortable with the idea of trusting anyone over the age of thirty. He explains that he always wondered if a person he was interacting with had a hand in violence that engulfed the space. This discomfort led to his lack of trust for certain people in the deployment space. Another participant had this to say about his experience of working with Serbian warlords "behind enemy lines":

As we went along, we discovered that many of the Serbian warlords were brothers in arms with their Croat enemies because they had grown up together in the same neighborhoods. So that plays on your sense of what is right. They were former colleagues in the same military and that sort of thing. So for somebody who has a perception of what balance is and what is right and what is wrong, everything was turned upside down for us. (RS)

RS describes his feelings of discomfort that came with living and working conditions that challenged his perception of right and wrong.

A view from the South

Helplessness is also a feeling of discomfort that comes with being deployed. Here, JL shares what it feels like to want to help, but cannot because it is not your role in the conflict space. She had this to say:

As a foreign military person, you go into these operations and a big part of you wants to help. But there were times when I felt helpless instead. Take for example, Haiti after the earthquake and what was happening with the distribution of food. There were massive amounts of food coming in; but it would end up stuck in the warehouse and there was no one to distribute it. That was not our job, but as a military person, you are looking on and seeing this and you know that with a bit of coordination, with a bit of logistics, just people from different agencies coming together to talk to each other, the problems could be solved. Instead, the food would stay in the warehouse and rot. There were a lot of people there, but I did not see where people were talking to each other. They were just sitting and looking on. So as an individual, I felt somewhat helpless because I am seeing this. I am in the country to help, but there was nothing I could do. (JL)

JL's narrative speaks to the way that she sees herself in the conflict space, describing it as a desire to do something to make things better. Maintaining the mandated peace support role was difficult for each participant under the various circumstances that challenged their sense of self and their sense of purpose. For JL the need to maintain her official role affected her self-characterization as being in the space to help, creating discomfort with being deployed. In a similar way, having to give up or suppress a part of their own personality, their gender, or their sense of ethics contributed to the Canadian soldiers' sense of discomfort in deployment.

“Coming down a level”

Still, the work that one does peace operations deployment can have an impact on the military person's life at home, leading to feelings that the soldier lives in two different worlds. The soldiers shared experiences of trying to adjust to post-deployment life. It often involves “coming down a level”. For example, SM describes what it was like to return home after her early 1990s deployment:

For a short period of time, I was more aggressive than before I had left. I spent six months over there being offended and feeling defensive because I was a woman. It was six months of constantly being given these looks and not being spoken to if there was a man beside me. When I came home, if my husband or even some of my co-workers would tease me and make some smart-ass remark, I would come back with a response that really was not appropriate. My response was harsher. I had forgotten how to be teased a bit. About three weeks after I came back, my husband left to work in another province for about two months. I really welcomed that time alone to readjust. By the time

he came back, three months had passed since I returned. It was around that time that I was ready to be a wife again and to pick up my responsibilities with respect to our home. (SM)

For SM, the lived body reaction to suppressing a portion of her identity as a woman led to moments of backlash at home. She notes that it took her time to resettle into the mode of learning to not take teasing seriously in this different felt space.

Other soldiers have similar experiences of feeling out of sorts upon returning home and needing to allow time to pass before they reconnected with their old selves. Here FL provides insight into his experience of being out of sorts upon returning home. He compares the readjustment after deployments in Bosnia and Afghanistan as follows:

I saw the deployment in Afghanistan as an opportunity to gain credibility as an officer. This was the opportunity to practice the skills that I had learned and to really make a difference by helping my commander to achieve his mission, which was to make Afghanistan a better place. Truth be told, I was disappointed. The jobs that I had there did not leave me with a sense that I was being useful. Whereas Bosnia for me was a really good experience where I felt like I was useful and that I had contributed, Afghanistan for me was unsatisfactory. In Afghanistan, I certainly felt like I was in a theatre of war, but one cannot derive a sense of contribution from putting oneself in dangerous situations solely. When I came back from Bosnia, people asked me how it felt to be home and I would give some answer like, "It was great to be home. We have it so much better here than those people have it in that part of the world." But at home, I was grumpy. And my wife would say to me, "Well you keep telling people that you are happy to be home, but you are not showing it". I think I was grumpy because when you are over there in that deployed scenario, you are only responsible for yourself. You have the people in the headquarters to worry about, but when you are there, everything is provided. Food is there and so on. You just do certain things at a certain time and carry on with your life and you carry on with the mission, whatever that may be. But then you come home and you have these pesky interruptions like your wife and your kids, and having to get groceries, and making sure that bills are paid, all those things. So I think a large part of it was just the challenge of getting settled back into a normal routine. When I came back from Afghanistan, I did not go through that. But the experience of being in Afghanistan was not as satisfying for me. Afghanistan made my hair turn gray. Literally. When I came back, my hair was much grayer than before I left. I think it was just the stress of being there that did it. So maybe I was truly happy to be back and get on with those "pesky" domestic chores that I found so intrusive when I came back from Bosnia. (FL)

For FL, readjusting to the expectations of being back home is an identity confirming experience that works in two ways. First, FL describes that he found his work in Afghanistan less satisfactory than the work that he did in Bosnia. Note that this is opposite to BT who found his Bosnia experience less satisfactory than his Afghanistan deployment. This contrariness in role expectations suggests that the “soldier first” orientation is only a foundation upon which different personalities look for purpose in their deployment contributions. For BT, his sense of contribution was to fight a war. For FL, his contribution was to be useful in a way that he feels was unfulfilled. Yet both individuals proceed from the same “soldier first” narrative. Second, FL makes a point that is common in a number of other soldiers’ experiences. He talks about returning to a normal life marked by family commitments, paying bills, and other “pesky” chores. SM makes a similar point about readjusting to her family commitments. Being “over there” is a completely different world where life on the base feels very different from the everyday life of being a soldier at home. Being “back here”, was a step back into ordinary life and ordinary circumstances that required identity and lived other readjustments.

“Afghanistan made us walk a little taller”

The soldiers spoke about their readjustment to life after deployment as one aspect of their lived other and lived space interactions at home. They also spoke about interactions with the wider at home community. Most soldiers expressed the feeling that civilian Canadians did not understand the military role overseas. Some soldiers were disappointed when, “back here”, public perceptions of their jobs do not match with the experiences that they faced in deployment. For example, BT related that some of his family members thought that he was off building schools in Afghanistan, when he was in fact being shot at and getting blown up on a regular basis. The soldiers used instances like these to connect public misconceptions about

peacekeeping with misunderstandings about the CAF's value. However, they all felt that Canadian involvement in Afghanistan changed the civilian perception of the CAF for the better. As these soldiers see it, outside of the Great War contributions, civilian Canadians did not previously identify with the war fighting logic of the CAF. The soldiers felt that the public presumed that peace at home meant that there was the perception that there was peace overseas. They suggest that many Canadians began to identify with the peacekeeping role as a benign and comforting new direction for the armed forces because of this misperception, even though in reality, the soldiers had "no peace to keep" in their overseas deployments.

Consequently, the soldiers see Canadian deployment to Afghanistan and that moment of rebranding as the thing that improved national pride in the Canadian military identity. Canadian involvement in that NATO operation helped to counter myths that the CAF was a benign peacekeeping force predisposed to UN operations as its traditional role. As DF explains it, the work to rebrand the CAF as warriors prior to and in the early parts of the Afghanistan campaign "made our backs stiffen, we walked a little taller and we took things much more seriously". Contributors explain that that the CAF rebranding under General Rick Hillier (CDS from 2005-2008) was a positive move for Canadian military identity. They also feel that it was the lessons learned from Bosnia and early Afghanistan that gave way to new thinking about the CAF and its identity as professional soldiers. For example, this anecdote from RS provides a description of how he thinks public attitude towards the military has changed over time:

When I joined the army in 1976, there was really a shortfall of officers and soldiers. The economy was booming and there were lots of jobs for people with a university education. It was almost as if the military was a place where you discard the misfits of society. I had a number of soldiers in my unit who had been placed in the military as punishment for things that they had done. One of them was a semi-professional boxer who had used his skills in a bar fight and had been arrested and charged with a crime. He was given the option of joining the military as a part of him serving out his sentence. I had a guy who was there for grand theft. I had a guy who was just a fighter. In those years, the military

was not looked upon very highly. One time we were invited to Toronto to be part of a TV show that was hosted by Stephen Lewis [a Canadian politician and UN spokesperson]. We came in as a small military contingent that was to be part of a discussion. But we were set upon by everyone who told us about how useless we were as an organization and as a concept, and that Canada should not even have a military. So to go from those days to today is to witness a complete change in Canadian attitude. It all began with what we had to do in Bosnia and then Afghanistan. I am very proud that most people, when you say to them that you have served in the military, they say thank you. I know it started in the US, but it has percolated around here too. (RS)

The soldiers feel that Canadian society has come to learn, acknowledge and accept the role that its military plays in fulfilling the country's national and international security needs. For RS, the relational and corporeal logic of his military identity in his home space has changed over time with public recognition of the hard-fought sacrifices made in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Still, that outward show of public support for the military that the group now appreciates can be counter to each soldier's feelings about his own contribution in the deployment space. For example, as FL points out in an anecdote used earlier in this chapter, his job in Afghanistan felt like a less meaningful contribution than his job in Bosnia. Below, another participant explains his unease with public perceptions about what he had been doing during his deployment as a UN peacekeeper. MB had this to say:

When I hear peacekeeper, I feel like a bit of a fraud because I do not think we were doing that much. It occurred to me when I was deployed to Egypt that the Egyptians did not move because it was not in their best interests at the time and the Israelis did not want to take Cairo. To come back home and have people say "oh, you were doing peacekeeping", well, I think for me not really. I was driving a truck back and forth across the desert; that was pretty much what I was doing. I did not see it as peacekeeping. Even in Lebanon, where there was a significant civil war going on; we were just sitting on the periphery of it, hoping it did not overrun us. So I felt like a bit of a fraud wearing all that UN stuff but not living up to what I had perceived peacekeeping to be. It was a little bit of an internal role conflict. You come home and people are assuming you were doing this or that. And one side of you thinks I was enduring some hardships, so I should accept some accolades. Then I was also thinking, I do not know, I cannot accept credit for this stuff. So I always had that conflict within me taking credit for stuff I didn't do, even though it felt nice to have the recognition. (MB)

Here, MB describes how it feels to be a peacekeeper and the experience of confronting public perceptions about his role in the deployment space. He explains that he felt like a fraud due to a mismatch of his own expectations and actions. MB also describes his feelings about his more recent NATO deployments:

When our engagement in the Afghan war was in full swing I used to stop at a Tim Horton's for coffee on my way to the base each morning. There was one morning a soldier had been killed in Afghanistan. When I got to the front of the line at Tim Horton's, I could not pay for my coffee. There was this young lady at the end of the line that was insisting that I get my coffee for free. No one would let me pay for my coffee. I guess this was people's way of making a gesture that made them feel good, but I thought that this was odd. I felt like a fraud because I was not in Afghanistan, I hadn't put my life in harm's way. I was just in Tim Horton's yet people are going to give me stuff because I am wearing this uniform. That's not right. As the war in Afghanistan went on, it got worse. I went out to dinner in Edmonton with a friend of mine one evening. I did not have time to change so I was wearing my camouflage uniform. I had three glasses of wine and then I could not pay for them. Nobody would let me pay for them and it felt wrong. I thought I am not wearing this uniform out anymore. Eventually, I was deployed to Afghanistan. Coming back to Canada, we flew into Edmonton. So I had to get onto a commercial flight to get home. The lady on the flight asked me if I was coming from Afghanistan. When I said yes, she said to me "Anything you want on the plane, you can have it". I just said no. I just wanted to go home. It felt like I was being a fraud because I had not done anything in Afghanistan. I was not outside the wire getting shot at or shooting back. I was eating pudding every day with lunch for Christ's sake. I lived pretty well. (MB)

MB depicts his own feeling about celebrating contributions he feels he did not directly make. His orientation to UN peacekeeping role is similar to a few other participants who believe that external military forces had a duty to do more than be in the space under a mission name in order to claim the label of peacekeeper. For MB, sitting on the periphery hoping that the war did not overrun him is not providing peace. Yet, even in a space like Afghanistan, where the mandate was more aggressive, he takes issue with being singled out for his peace support service because he was not there as a fighting soldier. MB's uses his non-combat functions to limit his own characterization of himself as a contributor to peace.

The “Whatness” of the Soldier’s Identity

Heidegger (1962) uses the term *das Verfallen*, or falling, to name that aspect of absorption in a lifeworld. As explained in Chapter 3, to be absorbed means to be caught up in a role and that absorption cannot be separated from the referential totality of the individual. I use this concept of being caught up to explore the meaning of the soldier’s identity encounters in peace operations deployments. I do this by first paying attention to the experiences of lived space, lived thing, lived other, lived time and lived body that are noted within their lived experience descriptions. I then examine three aspects of the soldiers’ lifeworld, relating them to the structure of peace operations through interpretive analysis.

Corporeality and the Canadian training identity

One standout expression of what it means to be a soldier in peace operations deployment comes from the Canadian soldiers’ stories about how they distinguish themselves from other military forces. The soldiers speak about what they feel makes Canadian soldiers different and better than their counterparts. Corporeality, or lived body experiences, captures the actions, emotions and behaviours that an individual portrays in a space. It also addresses the way that people define themselves in relation to a lived thing or other actors in a space. The soldiers believe that their training and values as Canadians provide them with a level of credibility that others do not possess. Explanations about their role behaviour in a space focuses on their training as soldiers, yet they see themselves as different from other soldiers who are “more kinetic” or have less of a human rights “base”.

Temporality and the Canadian military identity

The temporality of the military identity runs through its past, present and future iterations of the various lived body experiences. People take lessons from the past, even though there is

always hope for the future; what are presented in the descriptions of experiences are lived time experiences that convey the soldier's identity as a learned skill set. The soldiers internalize their lived other and lived body experiences as perceptions of effectiveness, evaluations of competence, and a preferred working relationship and organizational structure. One notable lesson from the past projected into the present along with the soldiers' peacekeeper qualifier is the different perceptions in professionalism across western and non-western forces. Issues of competence, equipment and capability dominate discussions about what the "neo-peacekeepers" and the conscript armies bring into the operational setting.

Materiality and the "soldier first" identity

Participants evoke their self-identity as a soldier first. They either reject or take time to qualify their acceptance of the peacekeeper title in their interviews. In describing their lived experiences, the soldiers evoke their materiality as *the weapon*. This seems to be the most critical representation of the deployed soldier's identity. The soldiers represent themselves as *the lived thing*, the tool and the idea that is the extension of the lived body. The soldier's materiality is not the handedness of tools or other things, but the way that as lived bodies, the soldier himself is useful for carrying out certain tasks. An important element of this usefulness is the soldier's combat role. It is part of what makes contributors reject the peacekeeper identity. However, the soldiers acknowledge that they usefully act in other ways to support a wider objective.

Relationality and the multiple lived other

The soldiers' LEDs show that interactions with the lived other produce a number of identity making encounters. Relationality or lived other experiences capture moments of self-other interactions that relate to the body, space and things apparent in those interactions. The self-other contacts described by the soldiers illustrate the various ways in which they frame who

is “the other” and who is “the self” in peace support encounters. The narratives illustrate that there are lived other encounters within the soldier’s own military where other soldiers or officers become part of the experience of a place or a thing (the organizational other). There is a lived other experience in the military-civilian encounters in the soldier’s domestic space (a domestic other) as shown in participants’ narratives about interactions with people at home. There is also the lived other in the deployment space (international non-military other) and a lived other within the coalition of intervening forces (multinational other).

Understanding the Soldier’s Identity in Peace Support

The first glance at Canadian military identities tells us that the soldier cannot be bracketed out of where, when, and with whom his lived other interactions happen. Relationality, our being with the other, is one of the referential aspects of the totality of human existence. So is spatiality, being in a subjective space. People become who they are in relation to the lived other within a given space. Work by Schutz (1967) on we-relationships and social interaction and Goffman (1959) on roles and self-presentation support this. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) discusses examining lifeworlds within accounts of our own socio-historical existence as we construct interpretations of who we are. Thus, a second glance, the ontological focus, orients us to how these soldiers encounter their military identity in peace operations. Here, I unpack participants’ experiences further by focusing on what values they discuss and the values they imply as they articulate their training and deployment experiences.

The LEDs show how the soldiers’ materiality structures their lifeworld bodily and with regard to relations with the lived other in a felt space. Military training imparts a fixed identity as that of warrior. This identity contains the premise that individuals are well-trained instruments that are deployed according to a particular appraisal of needs within a space. The theme that the

“soldier is the weapon” is an indication that the soldier’s lived relation with things takes them beyond the everydayness of mere things, which Heidegger (1962) separates from useful things. Useful things are distinguishable from mere things in that the former have a role, are of objective presence, and can only be realized in the context of the activities to which they are put to use (Cerbone, 2008, p. 36). Useful things are not usually seen unless there is a breakdown, a situation where disruptions in the structural relations of the equipment renders it unhandy or useless. Using these concepts of useful things, mere things and breakdowns explained in Chapter 3, I derive an understanding that the Canadian soldier’s identity in peace operations is based on the assumption that the soldier is *the* useful thing. However, the interrelated lifeworld analysis shows that the soldiers’ domestic other and international non-military other presume that all soldiers are *the same* soldier. Furthermore, the way that the soldiers in this study frame their military identity challenges the concept of an international military fraternity.

The (Canadian) soldier is *the* useful thing

The soldiers define themselves in respect of their capacity for war fighting. BT talked about combat training as preparation for a big concert, for instance. Still, most of the soldiers leave room for the “soldier is the weapon” mentality to mean that there is dynamism and multifunctionality that accompanies the soldier’s differentiated professionalism. For example, RS describes military training as hard-earned steps along a path towards a more accomplished self. KD describes being a soldier as an opportunity to discover her own capabilities and to do things that she was good at. The claim that the soldier is the weapon that is merely enhanced by the kinds of equipment and support that the soldier is given is a significant one. The participants convey that their military training forges their identity as soldiers. They further point out that one never really leaves the military; instead, soldiers import the skill sets into their post-military life.

The core tenet of military training may be combat oriented, but the soldiers' experiences show that there is more that can be personally taken away from military training than merely knowing how to fight and use a weapon. The experience descriptions place a lot of emphasis on military training and discipline. Military training imparts some level of self-discovery that helps to inform the individual's identity over time. The assertion that the soldier is the weapon is indicative of the belief that the military lived body is *the* useful thing; however, that this concept of usefulness would not be applied wholesale to other multinational partners. Participants are selective in their association with other militaries because they see others as having limited utility in the peace support space. This has some implications for the way that we understand military identity in peace support. One element is the contradictory way that military identity as a "soldier first" plays out in the domestic and international perceptions.

The LEDs of domestic and international civil-military encounters suggests that there are public assumptions that one soldier's task is the same as another. For example, MB relates his feelings about the peacekeeper title noting that he feels like more of a fraud because he did not feel useful in the situation. He also speaks about his discomfort with public recognition for simply being a soldier when he was not doing the kind of work that other soldiers risked their lives to do. BT reported that some of his family thought he was building schools in Afghanistan when he was involved in firefights daily. In a way, these experience and the soldiers' feelings of frustration about the experiences help us to understand how those who are external to the military organization view the "soldier first" ethos. The narratives convey some instances where the Canadian public seem to take it for granted that all soldiers are the same soldier. Similarly, the story of King John where village elders asked about John's rotation replacement, suggests that the soldier's personal identity is disregarded. Whereas the soldiers see themselves as having

a particular standard of training and discipline that is applied differentially according to mission tasks, “soldier first” may mean that the public sees a monolith. Interactions with the lived other at home leave no room for distinctions between the people charged with combat and contact or those who employ informal velvet glove roles.

What the public sees, as RS’s anecdote about the change in public support for the Canadian military and CW’s anecdote about President Karzai shows, is an entity in which one soldier represents the entire lived thing that is the military itself. In the international peace operations context, this may mean that local stakeholders in conflict spaces may not see Canadian-ness in the way that these participants see themselves as distinct from other forces. Therefore, self-identifications as having a Canadian identity, a humanitarian outlook, or a human rights base may not matter as much in lived other interactions in the multinational deployment space if some soldiers project positive lived other relations and others do not.

The other element of the soldiers’ usefulness relates to the way that these soldiers see themselves as separate from other national forces. The participants gave many examples of instances where they felt that Canadian-ness in the peace operation mattered. One highlight is CW’s description of calls from President Karzai, which demonstrates that there is identity divergence within the coalition of the willing. The job of working for peace brings into focus the compressed spatial, temporal and relational context that causes the action of one unit or force to have repercussions for the role and work of another unit or force. Fielding calls from the Afghan President about civilian killings feels like a blow to the relationship building modality of the Canadian soldier in this situation. The story shows that that carrying out the physical effort to transit between mailed fist and velvet glove, even for separate multinational elements with different roles or tasks, is very difficult. When President Karzai or the international community

looks on at the collateral damage, they do not readily differentiate what was a specific national action. Reinforcing the finding that non-military observers see all soldiers as the same soldier, Afghan political stakeholders in CW's experience see the work of the multinational coalition. Yet, the descriptions of the deployment experiences involves drawing a line between the Canadian military "us" and other military "them".

The essence of the soldiers lived experiences of peace operations deployment raise questions about the claim that there is an international fraternity or "brothers in arms" identity when it comes to peace support interests (see for example Leatherman, 2011; and Oberg, 2007 who make such a claim). The soldiers draw distinctions between themselves and other military forces by calling on the things that make them different from other TCNs. Some persons go further by articulating preferences for working with certain like-minded forces over others. This understanding of Canadian soldier's identity challenges views that external military interveners are a singular entity that acts uniformly under an intergovernmental or multinational mandate. Even within the coalition of the willing, separate military identities, lived other, and lived body logics have implications for how western forces work within a space. This may mean that there will be implications for how intervening forces work within larger bodies or organizations where they cannot control the actions of other military forces.

At the same time, the concept of an international fraternity is not wholly disputed. The soldiers' lived experiences reflect areas of Canadian differentiation with multinational military partners, but western alliances are still embedded within their identity. Overall, the soldiers' lived body and lived other referentials suggest that they have a preferred multinational partner. That preferred partner is the core membership of the NATO alliance. The soldiers explain the NATO framework as one that brings together armed forces with shared professional standards,

capabilities and training. Some soldiers explain interoperability within NATO as a matter of similar training and communication structures. NATO members' use of the Continental Staff System, which aligns military roles and organizational structures, was an often referred to example. A history of cooperative security, World War alliances, and NATO training and posting opportunities are also floated by participants as to why they feel more interoperable with other western, industrialized militaries. Historical and cultural affiliations to other allied forces shape the Canadian soldiers' identity. Those who replicate, match, or exceed Canadian standards of training, military professionalism and civilian oversight are singled out in the LEDs as worthwhile partners and so they remain part of the fraternity. Those who do not replicate the standards of professionalism and capability and who do not have a human rights base sit outside the fraternity. Forces on the outside become mere things; tools that have lost their usefulness due to perennial breakdowns that disrupt their utility in peace operations. Human rights abuses, a perceived lack of professionalism and empathy are some examples of the breakdown situations that affect the soldier's circumspection in a deployment space. A perception of perpetual breakdown for forces outside of the fraternity separates them from the order of useful things.

Conclusion

A first glance at these themes using the five aspects of referential totality suggests a number of things about the "what-it-is" of the soldiers' identity in deployment. There is a lived body iteration of the identity manifested as the soldier first credo. The soldiers reject or qualify their acceptance of the peacekeeper identity based on a belief that their training and organization aims make them a lived thing that does several things. The soldiers' experiences also show various kinds of lived other interactions that help to differentiate the Canadian soldier from other soldiers as well as the Canadian public. In doing so, participants reinforce their own self-

identification as “a Canadian soldier”. The soldiers also incorporate historical and cultural arrangements into their self-identity. Lessons taken from the past facilitate distinctions and alignments with those who fit and do not fit with the standards of Canadian peace support practices. The soldiers also show that their lived thing and felt space experiences come together to create a material and spatial orientation to how they frame and exercise their military identity. Being Canadian and perceptions about what it means to be Canadian is a part of that identity. The idea of a human rights base and perceptions about the standard of training achieved over the years of Canadian peace operations deployments facilitates an at home felt space that has evolved over time. Participants take this felt space at home to be part of their credibility abroad. They use it to support their beliefs that they are useful in a conflict space. That sense of usefulness is not extended to non-western military forces that failed to demonstrate their utility in previous multinational deployments.

This chapter connects with the understandings laid out in Chapter 5. First, it establishes that Canadian military training and *inna yaad* standards of accountability and expectations for behavior shape the soldiers’ perceptions of usefulness. Second, it shows that military training imparts a fixed identity as that of soldier first, which feeds the concept of the multifunctional and multicable armed force. Third, it shows how Canadian participants define credibility in international peace support operations. Fourth, the interpretive analysis shows that while the soldiers’ identity is fixed, their materiality is fluid. The soldiers’ use of the tools chosen (or provided) and their self-identification as *the* tool is a relevant aspect of their peace support role absorption. Fifth, the analysis shows that perceptions of military identity are consistent. The Canadian soldier continues to reject peacekeeper as a superseding identity to that of warrior. Finally, the LEDs show how Canadian soldiers draw identity boundaries around themselves

based on interactions with several lived others, including multinational partners. In the next chapter, I examine the soldiers' experiences to determine the essence and meaning of peace for the deployed Canadian soldier.

Chapter 7: Encountering Peace

In this chapter, I explore the soldiers' lived experiences to identify the essences of encounters with peace. I begin with a "Tuning In" that highlights one soldier's story about winning the peace as well as my own reflections. The tuning in segment grounds the five theme categories that I use to organize the soldiers' construct of peace in peace operations deployments. Lived time, lived space, lived body, lived thing, and lived other awareness is applied to the soldiers' experience descriptions. From that what-it-is analysis, I determine ways to understand the soldiers' encounters with peace. Taken with the data and discussion presented in Chapter 5 about the soldiers' role duality and in Chapter 6 about the soldiers' identity selection, this chapter addresses how peace evolves alongside the soldiers' role and identity encounters.

Tuning In: The "So What" Question

During my time with the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), I found the estimate and orders process to be one of the most challenging yet rewarding aspects of being a commissioned officer. As an officer cadet awaiting my commissioning course, I spent most of my time under the tutelage of various JDF Training Officers learning how to do the combat estimate and practicing my delivery of orders. However, it was at my commissioning course at the Royal Military Academy (RMA) Sandhurst in Britain where I learned the most about the orders and estimate process. At Sandhurst, I learned how to do an effective combat estimate, issue the orders and then work to put the plan into place with my platoon members acting as the troops.

The combat estimate is an intensive task analysis process that involves a systematic consideration of the resources at your disposal, the timelines, overall intent, and the main effort. It is a decision making process laid bare as you assess the problem and come up with a plan of action based on a detailed analysis of your situation, your strengths, and your weaknesses. Once

you have that plan worked out, you write and deliver orders – a step by step outline of what is to be done, when, by whom and with what support. The combat estimate aims to fulfil the logics of a platoon or company level offensive or defensive operation; this was the purview of Second Lieutenants and Lieutenants. By the time I reached the rank of Captain, completed Junior Staff College and with my posting to my battalion headquarters, I found myself working with operation estimates. This is the same combat estimate process applied on a much larger scale. The operation estimate calls into account the need to liaise with other units or organizations and facilitates larger portions time for battle preparation.

One thing drilled into my head with the estimate process at both levels was the need to be aware of the consequences. The question was always: “So what?” Asking so what allowed the person preparing the estimate to consider all of the pertinent factors associated with a plan by amplifying the first, second, and third order consequences of an action, omission, or an event that may otherwise escape notice. A clear, coherent set of orders to troops depended on doing an airtight estimate, which took all of the so what questions into consideration. From the mundane army needs like ammunition, rations, medical supplies, and transportation to the more nuanced and un-seen resource needs like troop morale and public sentiment for or against the military intervention in the area. For example, depending on the nature of the task, if the operation is to be conducted in a built up area, things like the time schools let out and the times bars close may need to be considered in the estimate. The estimate allowed the officer to look for what could go wrong and plan for it. It also helped the officer to identify what needed to go right.

Strategic level estimates are another thing. Strategic estimates happen at the highest levels of the military hierarchy. They turn the political direction received from the head of state or minister responsible for defence and security, or some other highly placed authority that might

have a mandate to instruct the military command, into a coherent action plan. These strategic plans then trickle down into smaller tasks that officers like I would work on implementing at the operational and combat levels. CW shares his experience with estimates at the strategic level. He begins by pointing out that strategic level thinking is not pre-given.

They say when the going gets tough, the average military officer reverts to the level he is most comfortable with, which is section and platoon level. So not everyone is inclined to think strategically. At the senior officer level, strategic thinking is beaten into you. I say beaten-in because it requires more than just training-in. You have to know how to think strategically so that you can look at second and third order effects coming from your decisions. When I first went to Afghanistan, I had to ask what the strategic overarching plan was. We did not have a plan. We did not have anything to tie together the security policy and the agriculture policy and the educational policy. The strategic plan is as much about winning the peace as it is about winning the war. We only needed to look to Iraq to see what happens when there is no strategic plan. When the Americans went into Iraq, they had a plan for winning the war, but they had no plan for winning the peace. So when the Iraqi army collapsed, everything fell apart. So you can think either tactically or strategically. And if you are thinking strategically, you are thinking what are the second and third order effects of what you are about to do.

CW reminds me that the so what question has to be asked at all levels. He tells this vignette about Sir Douglas Haig's court to illustrate his view that decision makers cannot afford to be nonchalant about the consequences of their strategic plans:

Let us go back to World War One. At a certain point in time, the Germans and their allies had their key defensive line running from the Swiss border through to the Atlantic Ocean. Allied Forces are trying to break through the line, but it was a stalemate. Pure carnage. The Headquarters for Haig is miles and miles back from the frontlines. One day, Haig sends a Brigadier forward to the frontlines by car to find out about something that was happening. As the Brigadier is driving away from the headquarters and towards the frontlines, he is seeing more and more of the carnage. When he left the headquarters, things were beautiful. It was green and it was lovely. Women in nice dresses were walking around. Guys were going downtown for tea. They were having parties and mess dinners. But as this Brigadier gets closer and closer to the front lines, there is less and less green. Instead, there is more and more mud, and more and more blood mixed with mud. As he drives along, he is getting more agitated. By the time he gets to where he is going, he is crying. When he gets there, all he can say is, "We have no idea of what we were sending you to do".

The vignette frames a picture of the realities of war. WWI presented many opportunities for military learning as the lessons gave birth to new doctrines for allied partners. Changes in technology also allow commanders to better see the battlefield and maintain contact with troops. We now know what our soldiers are doing to win the war. Do we know the ways that our soldiers are winning the peace? As I listen to the soldiers' stories about their military training and deployment experiences, my mind goes back to my own experiences with the estimate process and asking those so what questions. I find myself thinking about the discipline of the estimate process mostly when the soldiers talk about negative outcomes that they have encountered, witnessed, or learned about from others. It occurs to me that in doing the estimate, my own so what questions never considered the word peace. I never factored peace as a mission strength or weakness. Peace was not an objective that we needed to accomplish at the platoon and company level, yet we took it for granted that what we were doing would eventually get us to that end state. Now I have new so what questions. What if one did not know what peace is or what a peaceful situation would look like altogether? How does strategic consideration of first and second order consequences translate across different levels for the people removed from the front lines and for the people removed from strategy?

Drawing Near: Showing Peace in the Soldier's Lifeworld

My conversation with CW sets the stage for understandings of peace in the soldier's lifeworld. CW's concept of "winning the peace" illustrates the complexities surrounding soldiers' identities, their peace support roles, and understandings of peace support. Doing no harm, curtailing impulses, restoring normalcy and "no peace to keep" are other emerging themes that relate to the CW's idea of having a strategy for peace.

“Winning the peace” is strategy

The soldiers’ descriptions of their deployment experiences showed that their peace support role was a liminal one where evolving lived other and lived space understandings made the battlefield less clear-cut. They make the point that this dynamic conflict landscape means that they are never only peacekeeping or peacemaking or peace enforcing. CW explains it thus:

It becomes a little difficult when you are fighting non-state actors, when you are fighting terrorists, when you are fighting people who do not wear uniforms. You might be in a situation where today you are in a firefight, and then the enemy disappears. Then what do we do? We need to clean up and fix all the wounded and look after the civilians who have been wounded. Then we have to be prepared to go back and fight the enemy. So we have to be prepared for that transition. Because if you cannot make that transition and you see everyone as the enemy, then you are not helping your cause. (CW)

For CW, transitioning is important and it is important that soldiers are ready for that constant pace of change that happens in any deployment. The key, several soldiers note, is not to see everyone as the enemy.

The soldiers talked about winning the peace as a strategy that fluctuates according to one’s lived space and lived body encounters. It demands reorientation to one’s own materiality so that individual actions reinforce the larger strategic aim. One way that the soldiers see this happening is through the Strategic Corporal. CW explains:

We used to tell our soldiers about what it means to be a strategic corporal. It goes back to that principle of do no harm. In the wider world today, if somebody passes wind in Antarctica, everybody knows about it in 30 seconds. So what we used to tell our soldiers is that if you are a section commander, a sergeant, or corporal or whatever, as long as you are doing good then fine, nobody has anything to say. But as soon as you do something bad, everybody knows about it. You are on CNN in nano-seconds. So you as the strategic corporal has just destabilized or destroyed everything that has happened up until that day because of your stupidity. And it may be that you acted according to a threat. But no one is going to say lets zoom out and look at the entire picture and what had happened to lead up to that point when you acted. The strategic corporal understands that his tactical action has a huge impact on the mission as a whole. He understands the overarching plan and his role in that strategic plan. He knows that if he screws up, it is going to have huge consequences. The strategic corporal knows that this action or that action will have either a good or a bad result. And if it is a bad result, well back home in Winnipeg, they will see

it on the news that Rifleman So-and-So screwed up in Bosnia or Afghanistan and there's going to be hell to pay. (CW)

Other Canadian soldiers referred to the Strategic Corporal as the “boots on the ground” representation of the multidimensional military identity. Regardless of rank, the military person in peace operations deployment is always a Strategic Corporal. For instance, BT describes the Strategic Corporal as:

The person who is well-trained. He knows the rules. He can communicate. He can articulate things. He knows when he is within his rights to do certain things. He can make decisions. He knows how to read the situation and when to use force and when not to because he knows the rules of engagement. He is the life saver. He is the guy that gets people working on something because it needs to be done, not because someone told him to do it. He is a think outside the box kind of guy. (BT)

MB had this to say:

The strategic corporal possesses a number of skill sets. In years gone by, operational plans were not disseminated to lower levels. We used to depend on leadership to pull us through. People did not make their own decisions. Nowadays, we expect people right down to the level of the private soldier to be able to make informed decisions because the battlefield is more spread out. The strategic corporal possesses the skills to function intelligently in his environment. He can talk conflict management, negotiation, and alternative dispute resolution. It cannot be only about combat. (MB)

For these participants, the Strategic Corporal possesses numerous skill sets in addition to emotional intelligence. The soldiers describe the Strategic Corporal as an image, not a rank.

The soldiers make the point that although they may be carrying out different roles at any given point in the conflict space, they act as one body as they fulfil their transition from one aspect of the operation to another. From this point of view, transitioning within the conflict space is as much of a top-down issue of communicating peacebuilding objectives and aims to the lowest level, as it is a bottom-up issue of soldiers having the knowledge and capacity to draw on their humanitarian “base” or a “moral compass” to guide action. In Chapter 6, I showed how the Canadian soldiers were unanimous in the view that being prepared for war made them excellent

tools for waging peace. They feel that it is their training, discipline, and expertise as warriors that makes them effective in their peace support roles. Consequently, when it comes to the ways that participants would self-describe their peacebuilding contributions, most saw themselves as soldiers first. The Strategic Corporal embodies the enthusiasm of the “soldier first” mentality.

“No peace to keep”/peace is dirty work

The idea that one has to have a strategy for peace, though widely held, is not the only orientation Canadian soldiers have towards their role in working for peace in peace operations. A number of soldiers shared stories depicting their experiences with doing the dirty work that halts violent action on the part of other state and non-state actors against a population. Participants had a common saying in their narratives: “there is no peace to keep”. Temporality resonates in this concept of no peace to keep. Below, JR shares why he describes himself as a “Cold Warrior” in keeping with this idea that peacekeeping, as we know it, is fictitious:

People of my generation are Cold Warriors. All our entire training life was focused on fighting in big terms the Warsaw Pact and in smaller terms the Czech Army, dancing down the Highway 14 corridor into Germany. That was our purpose in life – to defend the Highway 14 corridor. Then the Soviet Union collapsed and things became far more complex in a hurry. But if you think about it, the Cold War was really the only real “peacekeeping” mission Canada has ever been involved in. Because our presence there kept the peace. The consequences of us not being there would not have been a couple of wrecked villages. It would have been global thermonuclear war. (JR)

For JR, the peace we know today came through the projection of a defensive posture. Without it, the consequences would have been far worse. Other soldiers talk about the problems of assuming that one can keep peace in a conflict zone. Peace presumes an end to the round the clock, tough work that soldiers must do. For example, FL lays blame at the feet of the UN and its flawed approach to peacekeeping. He had this to say about what it took to achieve peace in the Balkans:

We ended up with a lot of major atrocities, like Srebrenica, and a lot of minor atrocities where houses are being blown up and families are being put out and mines are being laid and people are being shot. All because the UN Commander on the ground cannot get

authority to do anything. Everybody has gone home and it is a Friday night now. But NATO goes in strong, with different rules of engagement and after a lot of difficult negotiation and taking a tough stance with these people, it got sorted out. (FL)

FL describes his experience with UN ineffectiveness as a matter of the UN system not recognizing that the world has changed. He thinks that the organization is too invested in trying to please everyone. As a result, they see the UN was a “wishy-washy system”, compared to a strong NATO, which had the ability to “stand on necks”. The experience of NATO needing to stand on necks to make peace is a reminder that bringing a halt to violence and the murdering of people requires more than goodwill and a blue helmet.

Peace is the creation of a situation of calm that the soldiers see themselves contributing to by virtue of their willingness to go anywhere and do anything mandated by their national government. Many persons see the peace we know today as the outcome of someone else engaging in some kind of fight in a different felt space during a different time. A story about Remembrance Day from SM is illustrative of this point. She explains:

People do not see the kinds of condition and the death and destruction that we see when we go overseas. People do not see that here, so they do not appreciate what we have. I have to admit that there are times when I listen to my nieces and nephew and my sisters and, frankly, I just want to slap them. They think Remembrance Day is a holiday. Mind you, I understand where they are coming from because offices are closed, stores are closed, and everyone treats the day as a day off. I try to let them know the real value of Remembrance Day. It is about acknowledging that what we have done matters on many different levels. It is a very important pause because we need to remember the people who came before us. It started with people like Nellie McClung who fought so hard to get women the right to vote, so that we could become persons under the law. World War II brought women into the military because it was a global confrontation. Those women who went through kept opening doors and opening doors to the point where it was made easy for me to join. My generation has made it even easier for the women that are in now. Each generation is riding on the shoulders of a previous generation. That is what the pause is supposed to be about. (SM)

Here, SM places her concern for public misperceptions within her broader identity as that of a woman for whom other women fought to open doors. For her, the concept of Remembrance

entails acknowledging the sacrifices of those who have worked to change the conditions for groups of people overall; it is not just about celebrating those who died in battle. She explains this need for recognition as something that has evolved over time in the Canadian space. The sacrifices are generational in the sense that one group of people work to change things for people not only in their own time, but so that those coming afterwards would benefit. SM evokes Nellie McClung and the “fight” for women’s right to vote, which is another allegory of the theme that peace is dirty work. Fighting requires being in the trenches, doing the day-to-day battles so that others could enjoy the fought-for results.

Curtailing (negative) human nature

MB was deeply bothered by what he saw during his deployment in Bosnia. Here, he describes what it was like to be there:

Every time I went to the other Canadian camp, we would pass this huge Muslim cemetery. There were no names, just wooden grave markers. There were constant reminders of the carnage. It was very hard to see. The whole country went bananas. They were killing their own neighbors for god’s sake. I was uncomfortable the whole time I was there. I have a belief in the goodness of humanity; but when you see the veneer come off and you see, presumably, normal people doing crazy, crazy stuff you begin to wonder how this could have happened. Overall, it really had an impact on my faith in humanity I think. I am not naive enough to think that there is something in southern Slav culture that makes them susceptible to that kind of violence. It is a very thin veneer. Anybody is capable of that and they can always justify it for whatever political or economic ends. And we can philosophize about it, but it does not change the reality. (MB)

MB believes that what he saw in his deployment is possible anywhere else in the world. For him, human nature is universally negative. He replicates the Hobbesian mean world logic by emphasizing that the absence of a strong central government in the conflict space allowed the manifestations of negative behaviours. Other soldiers agree with MB that there is “no peace to keep” when the basic elements of good order and the rule of law are absent. MB explains his

point further by explaining that eventually, his experience moved from watching a conflict to watching people get away with organized crime. He had this to say:

Eventually, the local folks there were settling into organized crime instead of war. I guess they figured out that organized crime pays so much better. Our patrols were watching who was moving stuff where. All these things that came with the breakdown of government. For example, some of the aid that was going there – people were taking things and selling it to the people it was supposed to go to. I remember one event when NATO exposed one of the Croat warlords who was stealing aid. For me that illustrates that human nature is universal and that people will take advantage when there is no central government. In Bosnia, the people who were successful were the ones with the most guns. There were people who were desperately trying to create democracy there, but it was not working all that well because there were still too many people floating around with guns. (MB)

A number of soldiers share the belief that human nature in a lawless space requires a force that is capable of standing on necks. The veterans see NATO's capability and willingness to use lethal force as what brought an end to the fighting in the Balkans. They speak of experiences where being able to stand on necks to achieve a result is part of the experience associated with getting people to do the right thing. For example, JR speaks about a lesson he has drawn about how people in a conflict space treat their own peace.

Part of our mandate was weapons destruction. Our headquarters included a Public Information Officer and he had a photographer or two on the staff. We had a destruction detail scheduled, and the public information guys thought that this would make a good news story. Our guys are taking the weapons out in big cardboard boxes out to Banja Luka to be dumped into the hole where they are melted down at the foundry. The photographer comes along and he catches this picture. This one picture. Here is the hole. Here is the big box of weapons. We use these cardboard boxes for moving heavy goods. Here are three infantry soldiers standing around. The arms were escorted down to the foundry by a section of soldiers. Here is a foundry employee, a Bosnian-Serb. His job is to take weapons out of the box and put them in the hole. Look at this arm. You see this arm coming up from one soldier to the shoulder of another soldier on the other side of the picture? This soldier, a Private, had just seen this Bosnian guy pocket a pistol. As he was moving the weapons, he just slipped one of them into his jacket pocket. Nobody else saw it. The soldier saw it and he is tapping his Sergeant on the shoulder to say, "Hey, did you see that". The photographer just happened to snap the picture at that very moment. Of course, seconds after the picture was taken, they made the guy put the pistol in the hole. To me that was classic friggin' Bosnia. These guys, after killing each other by the tens of

thousands, still didn't learn. Over there, the only reason you need a pistol was to shoot another human being. (JR)

As a soldier, one is always in that place of having to interdict the impulses of the lived other.

Several of the soldiers frame their experience of peace as working under conditions where people did not seem to value their own peace or they sought to do harm to others. JR sums up his memory of the space with the line “classic friggin’ Bosnia”.

The soldiers also described a number of situations where they found themselves working in various ways with different aspects of low-level conflicts conditioned by the larger conflict picture. Finding ways to get people to overcome their impulses is a significant aspect of the peace support process on the ground. In this description, DF talks about what it took to get the lived other to move toward peace so that civil society renewal could begin.

We had one rule at the fire service: every shift had to be a mixed roster. That meant every piece of equipment being used had to come from both sides. It meant people had to treat each other respectfully. It meant that to do their jobs, the firefighters had to get over this little war here and get on with this business of protecting their city. It meant everyone was paid the same. But trying to get a duty roster from the chief was near impossible. I would ask for the duty roster and the chief would tell me he does not have it because he could not get the guys to agree to it. So I took a different approach. I had to go to the fire hall every week with their pay. Each firefighter was paid four hundred Deutschmarks a month, one hundred Deutschmarks a week. I made their problem of not working together an economic one. Come payday, I line up the fire crew and make a big production of sorting out the money to get ready to pay them. I always had two large private soldiers with me. These soldiers were so big that they blocked out the sun. No one was going to mess with them. They would just stand there at my table while I made a production out of payday. Here is my money case. I open that up. I put all the money on the table. I stack it. I move it around. Here are my signing lists. Here is my list of employees. I have the three fire chiefs as well. Everybody is lined up in front of me, waiting to get their money. My translator is right there as well. But before I start paying, I say to the chiefs, “Right! Do you have my duty roster for the week?” This time, when the chief said no, I just said, “Okay”. Then I put the cash back in the money case, put the lid back on, close it; pack everything up and said to the soldiers, “Let’s go”. When that happened, the firefighters asked me where I was going. I let them know that they will get paid after their chief gets me a duty roster and I remind them that the only way they can get a workable duty roster is if they are working together. Then I left. (DF)

DF describes his attempt to manage a conflict by influencing people's behaviour. He notes that he had to monetize the problem of the firefighters not working with each other. Not paying them was his method of driving home the point that they needed to overcome their baser instincts and find ways to work with each other. Note the tools that DF expresses as part of this experience. Money was a part of this soldier's extension of himself and his way of influencing the felt space. Several soldiers point out that peace operations deployment means using one's wits more than one's weapon. DF's experience is one example of the many tools soldiers use to do the job of making peace.

Getting things back to normal

The LEDs presented examples of how external military intervention helped to restore a sense of normalcy in the conflict space. The soldiers illustrated how their deployment halted the violence that prevented local people from doing the things that people take for granted in places like Canada. The soldiers described the restoration of peace within their deployment space as small but noticeable changes that made the environment look more like what they are accustomed to seeing at home. For example, JR had this to say about seeing signs within signs:

Where we were, we could occasionally go for a walk outside the wire. There was a big old castle that we used to walk up to. It would be about four kilometers up the side of a big hill. Then we would stop for coffee then come back. I remember the first time I did the walk, I noticed that all the houses had little blue house signs. After a while of seeing a bunch of these signs going up, it suddenly struck me that the signs themselves were a sign of normality. These little blue signs were a symbol that somebody at the municipal level was actually buckling down and doing some budgeting, ordering, planning, and putting the signs up, and connecting people to the post office. Just the whole restoration of the little things you expect to take you through life at the minor government level. Except, it kind of impressed me about the Bosnians. (JR)

For JR, these little blue house signs were an indication that local governments were once again functioning. He assesses it as a small thing taken for granted in spaces where garbage collection and mail delivery happens because there is no war. It impressed him that the deployment space

had changed sufficiently for these little things to resume. Like all the other soldiers, JR feels that this happened because NATO had the mandate and the capability to end the war.

Another soldier had this to say about how he saw people getting back to normal in the conflict space. For BT, glass windows represent the confidence created by NATO intervention in the Balkans. Here he describes seeing that confidence grow over several rotations:

I first went there in 1997. On that first tour, we were in a platoon house and it was really bare bones. It was kind of shocking to go from what we have in Canada to a place where if you don't fill up the generator, you don't get electricity. There was absolutely no infrastructure in the town. By 2002, you could tell that there had been peace because there was now glass. That was a funny thing. Villages would start to get moved into. People would come back to their villages and you would start to see glass. That was the big one. They put glass on because all the glass was smashed during the war. So if you saw someone put windows in their house you know that they were back, which was good. (BT)

BT feels that overtime the international military presence helped to create a sense of peace that allowed local people to begin rebuilding their lives as they looked forward to the future.

The soldiers also see themselves as being “a small cog in a big machine” that aims to restore hope about the future. They note that their individual job was not to build or make peace. What was important to them was the bigger picture of achieving the strategic mandate where military forces engaged in firefights for a purpose. For example, CW had this to say about the fourteen-year Canadian campaign in Afghanistan:

One of my great joys being in Afghanistan was seeing all the girls going to school every day. Coalition forces tried very hard to ensure the safety of girls going to school. And the extremists would push back very hard to stop the girls from going to school. They would destroy the schools, kill the teachers, kill the girls, and intimidate the parents so that they would not send their girls to school. Over time, school and the idea of going to school became so important there that eventually, there was a shortage of schools and a shortage of teachers. So in places like Kabul for example, little kids went to school in the mornings. Middle school happened in the middle of the day and older kids, high school aged kids, went to school in the night. And when these kids finish school, they would go home and do their homework or help Mom or Dad work. (CW)

For CW, children going to school are part of the normalcy that returns after a conflict has ended.

Children going to school are particularly relevant for CW, who points out that securing access to education was part of the strategy to win the peace. He bases this idea of peace on his own Canadian values. He had this to say:

Everybody has a different view on women's equality depending on where you come from. But for us in here in Canada, everybody goes to school. Because we believe here that if you have a well-educated population of males and females, then extremism cannot take hold. (CW)

For CW, women's equality and education acts as counterweight to extremist logic. Children, particularly girls, going to school are the beginning of the counterweight. The restoration of normalcy in Kabul is far-reaching peace support work that will have implications for generations to come. He and other soldiers believe that military engagement in firefights is only one aspect of the peacebuilding cycle.

A view from the South

There were several stories where soldiers from the Global South describe the conflict space as one that threatened the local people's survival. Jamaican soldiers saw themselves as intervening to guarantee the future of the people caught in the middle of a crisis. Thus, they felt that they played a role in producing peace whenever the strategic goal included restoring a sense of order that allowed people to go back to their day-to-day lives. TK sees the peacebuilding result the same way as Canadian soldiers. He had this to say about one of his deployments:

We were a part of an operation to remove a military regime that committed a coup against the government and took over the country. Because of the brutality of the military regime, you could see that it took some time for people to get used to having foreign military there. Their military had been cruel and vicious. So when they saw us foreign military person out on patrol, everyone would run away and hide because they were not sure what we would do to them. Our role there was to bring back security and peace so that the people could come out of hiding and go back to their normal way of life. After a couple of months, we started seeing people come out of hiding and shops re-opening and people going about their normal life. People were going back to the supermarkets. They were going back to school. They were going back to work. (TK)

For TK, changing the armed forces' lived other relationship changed the felt space and the sense of peace that obtained within that conflict environment at the time. The soldiers seem to appreciate that peace means more than winning a firefight or despatching an enemy force. Peace is how people and things feel in the conflict space over time.

Doing no harm/being "coal-faced"

Several soldiers highlight the challenges that they had to overcome in order to work in the deployment space. They explained that in order to overcome the belief that the challenges were a threat; they learned to appreciate what the people in the conflict zone faced. In these instances, the soldiers described their efforts to do no harm as respecting the local culture and sensitivities of all people even when it was personally offensive. In doing so, they learned to see the people instead of making wholesale references to the limitations of a culture. For example, SM recounts her interaction with Billy, a local merchant in Syria. The encounter happens at a place and time where SM's bodily form as a Western woman affects her interactions with locals. She explains that for her, communications in the space usually elicited misogynous behaviour, which was a vast departure from her experiences in Canada. But a one-on-one moment with Billy helped to re-orient her thoughts about people in the conflict space. She had this to say:

There was a shop in Syria that we used to frequent. The owner's name was Billy. His was the first shop we stopped at and the last one we stopped at before we crossed the area of separation between Israel and Syria. He was a great guy. You walk in there on one day and if you go back in three months later, he remembers what you looked at the first time and he would say, "I finally got some of what you want". He was an amazing man, and he was very genuine, very friendly, and there was nothing condescending in how he spoke to you, even though his views are totally different than mine - him being a Muslim man, me being a Western woman. I remember one day we went into his shop and he offered us some tea, so we sat down. We had the tea, and we were just talking. Then he asked me if as a woman, whether my husband and my family had come over with me. I said, "No. We just come. They stay at home". Then we go on to talking some more and he asks me about children. I said, "I don't have any. I'm unable to have children". He said, "Oh, I'm very sorry for your husband." What struck me was that he was being genuine. He was not being condescending. For him it was just like saying, "Oh, I'm so

sorry to hear that”, the way we would say it. Like if you told me you had a really bad headache, I’d say, “Oh, I’m really sorry. What can I do?” That was the way he was responding. He was very sorry for my husband. (SM)

SM’s story suggests that making a known or personal connection with the lived other in a conflict space helps to re-shape the interpretation of behaviours. This is one way of overcoming the possibility of seeing everyone as the enemy. Thus, doing no harm involves making interpersonal connections that help to separate the people from the problem.

Most soldiers recall similar moments of interpersonal interactions that changed the feeling of the conflict space in a significant way. One example of the life or death nature of that interpersonal interaction and its connection to the combat role shows in this anecdote from RS.

We ended up working behind what was perceived as “enemy” lines because we were working with the Serb warlords to try to push our way through to open up humanitarian corridors at certain points along the cease-fire line. There was no infrastructure for our team. We sort of had to make our way to various places to get to the warlords. So our team would have to find a place to stay wherever we could. One thing that struck me was that whenever we came into a village, the local people – people who had lost everything - were always willing to help. These people would kill their last chicken in their yards to give us a meal, when they had nothing themselves. (RS)

RS’s experience shows that it is in the moment of human connectedness that we can see the meaning of peace for the deployed soldier. It is a feeling of trust and safety that comes from the help that local people offer. RS points out that for him the situation goes both ways. His experience of being with the Serbian people and being dependent on them for survival made him critical of other soldiers who would violate the local people’s trust. The situation made him lose faith in other UN peacekeeping forces. RS’s situation shows that peace is an interpersonal connection wherein a sense of safety is cultivated for both the soldier and the lived other as they experience the space and the subjective time together.

Other participants reinforce this image of peace as they describe their separate standout moments of overseas deployment. Two stories invoke the soldiers' responsibility to do no harm to children. MB provides this anecdote about a little girl:

When we were there, we tried our best to stay in shape. We were on this little compound, which was a working stone crushing plant and we put these trailers in. Once a day, we were allowed to go out and do PT on the outside of the compound. Behind the camp there was a hill, so we would do PT as a hike up the hill. It was about eight kilometres, and it was really steep for the first two kilometres or so. My buddy and I would go out together for PT everyday around 1700 hours. And there was always this little girl waiting for us to come up to walk her home from school. She would wait for us to come up and then she would walk with us until she got to her home. We did not get to go out much to go traveling around Bosnia, outside of the routine work. But it was nice to get out of the confines of the camp and just see reality. And of course there are always these little markers around the place for mines. And you are passing these bombed out houses here and there that used to belong to Muslims who had been driven out. But we always had this little girl waiting for us. And she would not say anything to us. She would just start walking as soon as we got to her and then she would leave us when she got to her home. And my buddy, he was walking pretty fast. I had to run to keep up with him. (MB)

MB's perception is that the military presence offered a sense of safety and trust for the little girl. The soldier has an obligation to do no harm to protect that confidence. Below, BT gives another example of how positive interactions with children help to reinforce their security. For him, there is a larger project at stake if one does not maintain the confidence of the youth in a deployment space. He had this to say:

There is no way that you can get some crusty old Bosnian to listen to you talk about peace and what not. Where we had success, a lot of success, was just in talking to the young people. Minefields were a big hazard in Bosnia at the time. We worry about a kid kicking a ball into the street here. There, kids are kicking balls into minefields. Then they would try to go get it and get blown up. If you walk around, you see all these areas filled with soccer balls. It is because the kids kicked the balls into minefields and the smart ones knew not to go after them. So we did a lot of work with the kids. We were not trying to indoctrinate them or brainwash them. What we would do is we would say, "Hey guys, stay out of the mine fields. That's a no go area and hey look, here are some books". So we would try to do the school thing and the books and stuff. Some activities that we did were about targeting the youth specifically, but most of the time the kids, they were just curious. They just wanted to be kids, and so we would play with them and hang out with them. There were a few times we got our asses kicked in basketball and volleyball. Those were sports they were really good at. But they could not play hockey worth a damn. (BT)

For BT, engaging with the younger Bosnian people in the postaccord peacebuilding process was a matter of saving young people's lives as well as providing them with opportunities to be kids. BT feels that the moments of interaction helped the intervention force to accomplish its overall mission while preserving the do no harm ethic. BT's anecdote resonates with other participants who describe several instances where they felt that the job of making peace involved the use of more than their combat skills and capabilities.

Study contributors make the point that the military obligation in any conflict is to do no harm. For soldiers, this did not mean avoiding the use of lethal force. Doing no harm means understanding the overall strategic intent of the mission and interacting with non-combatants and non-belligerents at a level that would promote their care. The soldiers expressed the belief that they have to be empathic, culturally sensitive, and willing to engage with local people on an interpersonal level in order to do their work. Soldiers point out that empathy for people in a conflict space can only come from being "coal-faced". TB uses the term coal-faced as an analogy for working with people at the micro-level. He explains that:

When the miners are digging coal, they always came out of the mines with their faces covered in coal dust. So "coal-faced" is a term that is used to explain being with people at the working level. (TB)

The soldiers describe their encounters as events that happen as part of the everydayness of the deployment experience. Those encounters create opportunities to build rapport and understanding about why the soldier is in the space and the objectives that are at stake for each person involved or standing by a conflict. There are many illustrations of what it means to be coal-faced in a conflict environment where the intention is to support the peace. For instance, SP talks about doing chai in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, you cannot do business until you have done chai. Almost every day, we would have to go to these meetings with higher ups in the Afghan National Army. We would go in, shake hands and sit down and then the first thing they would do is give you a cup of tea or chai. And before each meeting they would ask how your family is doing. They would ask how you are doing. And then you would get into the business. You could never get right into doing business like we would here in Canada. That was just their culture. They want to know about you and your family. And we would ask the same reciprocal questions, you know, to build that rapport. So some meetings you were in and out pretty quickly, but some you would be in there forever. (SP)

For SP, that coal-faced moment of taking tea was an important opportunity to get to know the people for whom the felt space and the conditions of peace mattered. Other soldiers talk about similar opportunities for learning from the lived other through one-on-one interactions with the local people. Below, KD describes her own coal-faced moments with women in Afghanistan.

I loved being off the base when we were in Afghanistan. Sure there were opportunities to interact with people on the base. For example, I remember talking with one of the cleaners. One day I said to her, “I don't know how you can that wear that hijab. I am dying of heat frustration out here. How can you wear that?” She told me that she had been looking forward to wearing the hijab from when she was young. For her that was a sign that she was now an adult, a lady, and would now be respected. That was something that she was looking forward to. So I learned from her that she has been wearing this for almost 30 years and that it had been something to look forward to and that was such a perfect culture and she was used to it, heat or no heat, she just could not imagine not wearing it. But outside the base I got to meet people in their own reality. For example, ISAF headquarters had a woman's market inside the base gates where women could come and market their goods once a month. That was nice for them. But outside of the base there were big markets where you would only find a couple of women. In these markets, there might have been 200 vendors and maybe only one or two of them would be women, not counting the several dozens of women that are there helping their husbands. One of the vendors I met was a single woman. She told me how hard it was to even get a decent stall because the men would want to take her stall if it was a good one or in a good location. She really had to put up with a lot. She had to be brave to run her stall. I would buy as much from her as I could, just to support her. Overall, it was good to be out there talking with the people in the market, the women and the men too. Not talk down to them, but to ask them about stuff. It does not take long for them to realize that you are not just a dumb woman that is there for some other job with the army. (KD)

KD's narrative resonates with experiences from other soldiers who describe instances of feeling that they were being empathic, culturally sensitive and willing to engage with local people on an

interpersonal level. The soldiers feel that this is something that they bring into the conflict space by virtue of their *inna yaad* experiences as Canadians.

A view from the South

Being coal-faced is a matter of making human connections. That connection to people leads to the consideration that one should do no harm by distinguishing belligerents from non-belligerents and adjusting military behaviour accordingly. Thus, there is the need to know the difference between the good guys and the bad guys within a conflict space. However, peace operations settings are dynamic. They feature cultural and socio-economic realities that are significantly different from the intervener's home country. What TK, a voice from the South, had to say about Haiti is another example of the differences between being at home and over there that all the soldiers encounter:

Haiti was a place unlike anywhere I have ever seen. The people there were different from any other place in the world that I have ever been to. It was so different from even here in Jamaica. The differences between the rich and the poor and the middle class in Haiti are tremendous. The rich and the middle class did not care about or support the poor. There was no security system for that. Other missions that I had been on there is at least some kind of "welfare system" where there is some kind of charity so that people who just did not have it could get help. But there was none of that in Haiti. That was what stood out in my mind. Nobody helps anyone in Haiti. People would go hungry and the people who had food would rather dump it than give it to another person. At least in Jamaica, that support system is there. If you are hungry and your neighbour has food, your neighbour would feed you. But that was not the case in Haiti. Nobody cares for anybody in Haiti. (TK)

Appreciation of socio-economic and cultural differences like these observed by TK create a learning moment. TK describes his sense that everyday people in his home country exercise a sense of care for each other that was absent in the deployment space. Here, he reflects on how different the reality of being in another country was for him.

The *Whatness* of Military Peace Support Roles

The soldiers' lived experiences show that there are multiple ways of winning the peace in a post-conflict setting. In addition to the earlier findings about the soldiers' peace support role and identity encounters discussed in the preceding chapters, this section explores the meaning of the soldiers' experiences showing that the "what is" of peace operations deployment is complex, requiring troops that have more depth and dimension in their lived other encounters than reports about firefights and patrolling outcomes convey.

Relationality and the "off-duty" character

The soldiers define their experiences with relationality in the conflict space as a duty to be coal-faced so they can see the reality of life for the lived other in their felt space. They describe how one-on-one lived other relations create meaningful interpersonal connections that are particularly significant outside of their official military roles. For example, SM and MB demonstrate that it is in the "off-duty" or informal aspects of being on peace operations deployment that they realize peace. Within the referential of the lived other, peace is experienced as relationship building and human interconnectedness. Still, we cannot separate the lived other dimension from other existentials of the soldier's lifeworld. The soldier's materiality, spatiality, corporeality and temporality tie into this positive lived other experience.

Materiality and the multicapable character

When soldiers talk about their experiences restoring normalcy and the need for the rule of law to curtail universally negative human behaviour, they are in essence speaking to the usefulness of themselves as intervening actors as well as the lived thing of a credible government to keep people safe. This evokes materiality, a telling of experiences that show how things: tools, equipment, ideas or values, are experienced as an extension of the lived body. Transitioning

between different tools and using wits and weapons where they matter is an aspect of military materiality. For example, a number of the soldiers proceed from an assumption that peace is not given, but comes from someone else fighting for something. The position reflects a multidimensional understanding of peace. It evokes the concept of the multirole, multicapable soldier who can transition from a fighting role into something else if it serves the larger aim. In this way, the military force itself becomes the useful thing that is the tool for achieving a strategic outcome. This understanding of the soldier's materiality reinforces the concept of soldiers as the "mailed fist and the velvet glove" and *the* useful thing, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. The soldier's materiality in peace operations means that there is a need to differentiate between the people who need the fist and those who need the glove. The soldiers' experiences reflect an understanding that peace is about controlling negative impulses by weeding out or controlling the bad guys. Peace is also helping and supporting the good guys by making them feel safe within the space.

Relationality and a new concept of neutrality

Relations with the lived other are a one-on-one arrangement that involves being together with the lived other within a space. Being together with is significant. Getting to know the people in the conflict space is a big part of the multidimensional military job. Yet in order to get to know people, one must become coal-faced. The soldiers' experiences suggest that there is a need to be neutral in the conflict setting. In order to appear neutral, those who do a peace support job may have to lose face if it means fulfilling the larger aim. Here, neutrality takes on a new meaning. It is more than political non-involvement or personal disassociation. Neutrality becomes a mindset that allows the intervening soldier to put aside prejudices derived from his at home cultural and social norms so that genuine interpersonal connections can happen with the

local lived other. The effects of neutrality are exemplified in some soldiers' stories where they transcend their own cultural norms in favour of promoting the local culture leads to moments of interaction and learning. For example, SP talks about how drinking chai is the informal interaction that sets the mood for the formal engagement with the lived other in Afghanistan.

In the anecdotes about the hijab and the female NATO commander, KD expresses how "being polite" leads to learning and lessens self-other distinctions in a way that affects the felt space. Dialogue with the cleaner reinvents the hijab for KD. In the same way, what it means to be a woman in Afghanistan is also reshaped through her interactions with the cleaner, the woman selling in the big market, and the female NATO commander. In this way, the soldiers encounter peace as interpersonal understandings that come from taking opportunities to be together with people and engage in one-on-one interactions. However, neutrality in lived other interactions do not mean that the felt space itself is neutral. There is a note in KD's story that reminds us that the military presence can create artificial conformity to a desired way of being for the local lived other. It does this by the way that it imposes itself upon a felt space. KD points out that the ISAF market brings in women vendors once a month, but it was by going outside of the base and interacting with people in their authentic spaces that she learns about the reality of un-intervened life for people in the conflict environment. This contributes to an understanding that no entity can impose peace onto a space. Peace is the feeling of the space derived by all the people who live and work within it.

Spatiality and replicating the comforts of home

The soldiers depict that winning the peace includes a duty to control a space. Getting people to protect their city from fires, having a municipal government up and running, and having a welfare system to help people are part of the utility of winning the peace. This also

feeds into the felt space of peace by making the lived space in peace operations deployment, the scene of the conflict, feel more like the space at home where we already know a relative peace. The soldiers' experiences help to shape an understanding of peace as feeling safe and having similar structures and behaviour like the ones they have at home. They use benchmarks based on standards in their home country and the principles of their own upbringing to establish what they consider normal. The soldiers project that sense of normal into the deployment space as they assess the change resulting from their presence. For example, JR talked about being surprised to see that someone was buckling down in Bosnia to do the little things of civil society and local government work. BT talked about the lack of infrastructure in Bosnia compared to what was available in Canada. For CW, normal is a child, particularly girls, going to school and returning home safely in Afghanistan.

The soldiers perceive that what they have and where they come from is an appropriate benchmark for determining what they see and how they see themselves and their relationship with people in the conflict environment. Thus, the soldiers feel that by working to restore their at home experience of law and order, they provide opportunities for peace. The consensus is that their presence enables people in the conflict setting to go back to doing the day-to-day things, which would constitute a normal life. Going to school, shopping for groceries, living in a house, and getting mail are examples of this normalcy that soldiers see themselves facilitating by creating a temporal and spatial break with violence. Controlling the felt space through the curtailing of negative human impulses allowed people within the conflict space to be and feel safe enough to work on their own temporal landscapes. Going to school prepares young children for the future. So does re-building a house and putting up road signs. It signals a hope that the normalcy will endure long enough to make the investment worthwhile.

Corporeality, Temporality, and the dirty work of peace

The soldiers explain in their various ways that winning the peace depends on the multidimensional and multifunctional soldier. The Strategic Corporal is a metaphorical byword for the multiple skills sets and capacity to transition among roles. That lived body relation requires knowledge and understanding of the felt space of peace operations deployment and at home. The lived body must also work within a space by forging interpersonal interactions, even as he or she maintains the belief that there is “no peace to keep”. Training and answerability are essential to everyone’s survival. The soldiers’ experiences reflect that peace is being accountable to those at home and those over there for the felt space that one wishes to create. They see the duty of waging war through combat and defence as part of the dirty work that must be done in order for others to have peace. Fighting is not always literal, although it is a struggle to make life better for someone else in a different spatial or temporal context. The legacy of peace here (and now) cannot be detached from the death and destruction over there (and back then). JR’s story about the Bosnian foundry stands out as a temporal, spatial and corporeal experience that affirms that in the tough stance needed to prevent people from undermining their own peace. Thus, peace involves the dirty work of violently, and sometimes non-violently, interdicting human impulses. The temporal dimension of JR’s story is notable as he points out: “these guys, after killing each other by the tens of thousands, still didn’t learn”. This statement reinforces another common proclamation among Canadian soldiers that “every Roto [rotation] is Roto one”, meaning that the soldier continually faces the same deployment challenges, no matter how far into a deployment he is. In JR’s case, in post-peace accord Bosnia, individuals still had not learned the consequences of waging violence after years of external intervention.

Understanding Military Encounters with Peace

The soldiers' relationality shows that peace is an encounter that produces mutual feelings of trust and confidence founded on credible military behaviour. The soldiers' spatiality registers peace as a feeling of safety that comes with the deterrence or neutralization of a threat as well as positive lived space experiences that replicate what happens at home. Corporeality leads to lifeworld encounters with peace as a multicable soldier engaging professionally with the lived other. Materiality shows us that the military lived body experience is itself multifunctional and multipurpose. Peace requires a variety of useful tools to do the job. The skilled soldier is himself a useful thing that can be an asset or a detriment to strategic goals. These new ways of understanding military encounters with peace can help to organize the way that we make sense of the soldier's effectiveness in peacebuilding. Attention to the ontological analysis of the phenomenological descriptions requires that we tune in to the question of how the soldiers link their actions to peace support effectiveness. This meaning focus allows us to address the language and values of the ideas and experiences presented in the soldiers' narratives.

Drawing near to the experiences of soldiers in peace operations deployment provides a framework for defining the soldier's perception of peace. Understanding peace from this perspective may be useful in determining how micro-level states of peace are enacted or compromised by external military forces. The lifeworld study illustrates the multiple ways that soldiers experience peace. The soldiers experience peace through lived other relationships that develop from their multidimensional and multirole influence in a deployment space; the study illustrates the many ways that future soldiers and practitioners can identify and plan for peace. Peace is the deployed soldier acting in good faith under different circumstances. At the same time, peace is finding ways to curtail negative impulses. Peace is restoring normalcy. Peace is

also a feeling of safety within a space when there is calm and predictability. For the deployed soldier, peace happens when the deployment space begins to feel and look more like what he has at home. Peace is also accountability to people at home and abroad. Peace is having an emphatic connection with local people. These representations of peace are not defined by the soldiers. They come from drawing near to the soldiers' experiences and understanding of the experiences from a peacebuilding focus that looks at peace culture, peace agency and transformative empowerment. The soldiers' LEDs demonstrate many of the conceptual constructions of peace as human rights, human security and the refrain from cultural violence. However, the soldiers' experiences show that these states of peace are interpersonal, taken-for-granted, and happen at the lowest level of military-civilian interactions within a deployment space. I call these low-level, contact-relevant outcomes the micro-definitions of peace.

The soldier's micro-definitions of peace

These micro-definitions of peace are often overlooked in studies that focus on the military organization as a unit of analysis as they search for areas of peacebuilding interoperability with other armed forces, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (see for example Last's (2000) and (2010) discussions on military peacebuilding roles; see also Meharg, 2009; and Rostek and Gizewski, 2011). Macro-strategic assessments of operational mandates and plans also miss these micro-level components of peace. There are several attempts to bring in the micro-level understandings of peace for those who are peacekept. Severine Autessere's (2010) work on peacebuilding in the DRC illustrates the ways that inattention to the micro-foundations and multiple representations of a conflict stymie conflict resolution outcomes. Other scholars attend to the micro-level aspects of conflicts that are exacerbated by external military presence. See for example work by Paul Higate (2007),

Sarah Mendelson (2005) and Sandra Whitworth (2004, 2005) that illustrate the problems of militarized masculinity in peacekeeping operations, as well as studies by Sherene Razack (2004) and Denis Tull (2013) who highlight the problems of racialized militarized masculinity.

Taking an individual level focus, the hermeneutic analysis uncovers that winning the peace involves positive lived other relationships occurring at the highest levels of planning as well as at the lowest levels of interpersonal interactions. Winning the peace is a reorientation to the soldier's corporeality and materiality within the lived space of deployment. That the peace has to be "won" suggests that the soldiers associate its achievement with some kind of deliberate action. Soldiers in this study show how efforts to win the peace can be lived in the everyday interactions of those who transit between peace support roles as mailed fists and a velvet gloves. These soldiers, being presumably well trained and credible, use their multidimensional capabilities to execute the formal and informal strategies for post-conflict and transformative peacebuilding respectively. The soldiers play a role as a useful thing that could disrupt the outcomes of various forms of conflict. Winning the peace is higher-level strategy that has to unite various conflict settlement and conflict transformation needs within the deployment space that are not usually associated with the security scenario. Yet, soldiers enact peace on the ground through their living of the micro-definitions, going beyond experiences of peace as violence abatement or stabilization and reconstruction. The soldiers identify the Strategic Corporal as an embodiment of military utility in a dynamic peace operations context. The concept originated with Krulak (1999) in his discussion of the three-block war The Strategic Corporal reinforces "the soldier is the weapon" military identity theme uncovered in Chapter 6. The embodiment also represents a peace support role that can effectively combine combat and contact skills to generate the micro-definitions of peace.

Nevertheless, this peace support role and identity is conditioned by the soldiers' views that peace is achievable through the creation of a strong secure state. A number of the soldiers feel that doing the right thing means accepting that there is never any peace to keep. Most contributors feel that peace requires a defensive posture to restrain the negative aspects of human nature. The soldiers' view of peace as the curtailment of human impulse connects with their vision of peace as a need to restore normalcy by establishing or re-establishing civil law and order. By securing the state and its institutions, the soldiers believe that they create the conditions in which people could go about their normal lives. Strong state institutions, a functioning government, credible security forces, and a working judicial system are the liberal peace's state making objective (Call, 2007; Tschirgi, 2003). The soldiers seem to support this view as they indicate a preference for a strong central government and rule of law structure that would make the peace operations space feel like what they have at home. They depict these experiences in LEDs about the return to normalcy in the conflict environment. Here, the ideas of peace derived from participant lifeworlds reinforce Roger Mac Ginty's (2008) point that western neoliberal orientations to peace are dominant. The soldiers take the liberal peacebuilding culture as a standard, assuming that what works for western states will work for all cultures and geopolitical arrangements. Auteserre (2010), Jabri (2010), Richmond (2009, 2007, 2004), Paris (1997) and others bring attention to this flawed orientation to peace where the international peacebuilding culture influences intervener understandings of conflicts and therefore affects conflict resolution outcomes.

The experience analysis reveals that the soldier's liminality in this peacebuilding discussion. The soldiers' view of peace speaks to a limitation in the way that Da-Sein acts as a being in the world. Da-Sein takes from its social past and projects that knowledge of itself into

the future (Carr, 2012). The being's historical character means that its knowledge comes from its experiences of time and space. The soldiers have an ontological limitation on the way that they define the normality of peace; the limitation is the liberal peace itself, which defines peace as state building efforts in which international and local actors fetishize the state, its institutions and Northern epistemologies of peace (Richmond, 2004). The soldiers identify that peace involved the need for a credible and strong entity to control human impulses. When security institutions interdict negative actions, normal life resumes. The narratives about the restoration of normalcy after conflict reveal that the participants presume that the state-oriented arrangement used in the West is a feasible outcome for other spaces in conflict. The opportunistic data shows that it is not only soldiers from the western industrialized nations who hold this view of peace. The view from the South also presumes that the ideals of state building as peacebuilding are suitable post-conflict recovery goals. The Jamaican soldiers involved in this study, like the Canadians, engage in the fallacy that works at home should work in the peace operations space. Thus, we have an understanding that there are many ways to engage military forces in peace support roles, but focus on state building as peace narrows the options for practitioners begin to make the strategic plans for peace. The result is rigid focus on formal military roles associated with violence abatement and reconstruction along with emphasis on the soldier's warrior identity.

Conclusion

There are several ways to understand peace for the deployed soldier. The soldiers in this study describe peace as a strategic concept. They see the goal of peace as part of the overarching framework of an effective intervention plan. The soldiers see their role as enacting that strategy for peace in the various ways that they do their job on the ground. They share experiences of doing the dirty work of fighting for peace, restoring a sense of normalcy, and doing no harm as

elements of the intent to win the peace. This concept of winning the peace brings in several lived other and lived space references that are specific to the deployed soldier's lifeworld. Van Manen (1990, p. 23) writes that the phenomenological goal is to facilitate understanding of an experience, encounter or phenomena so that the knowledge of the experience can help to illuminate meaning, generate deeper understandings, and thoughtful and tactful action. Winning the peace addresses a range of conflict settlement and transformation needs related to the long-term goal of providing durable help within the conflict space. However, hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of these soldiers' experiences helps to uncover some things that are overlooked or taken for granted in the soldier's peace operations encounters. Spatiality and relationality are important aspects of the soldiers' experiences of peace: they feel they must be accountable to people at home and abroad to do the right thing; their presence had a personal effect on the safety of the local lived other; being coal-faced with local people provided moments of human connectedness. These micro-definitions of peace are important to understanding how soldiers encounter peace. The soldiers experience peace as more than the restoration of normalcy. Restoring normalcy means people can go back to their day-to-day lives, but it promotes the state building focus for which liberal peacebuilding is widely criticized. In the next chapter, I examine how understanding the soldiers' experiences with role, identity and peace can help to improve future peace operations.

Chapter 8: Visions for the Future

Phase two of the data collection for this study consisted of a future image interview with questions adapted from *A Workbook for Imaging a World without Weapons* (Boulding, 1988). Future image exercises are based on the idea of a shared utopia that comes from the expression of experiences and stories. Elise Boulding (2000) feels that we should have a passion for utopia as part of peace culture. She writes that “the very ability to imagine something different and better than what currently exists is critical for the possibility for social change” (Boulding, 2000, p. 29). In this chapter, I present the key themes and findings from the future image data. The discussion focuses on the Canadian soldiers’ visions, hopes and fears for peace operations in the year 2046. Those Canadian military images of the future are contextualized using the view of soldiers from the Global South as well as images from two expert participants whose lived experience descriptions are incorporated into the “Tuning In” and “Excursion” segments of the chapter. These aspects of the opportunistic data are also set apart in other sections of the chapter under the heading “A view from the South”.

Future imaging requires that visionaries engage in free-floating imagination, escapist daydreaming and conscious reworking of sleeping dreams to create focused visions of what the world could look like (Boulding, 2000, 1988). Boulding (1992) points out that future imaging is not a panacea; it can generate good and bad images of the future. The goal of the imaging exercise is to expand one’s temporality by imagining what could be. Future imaging encourages us to consider the strengths and limitations that pave the way to an ideal outcome, thereby engaging with the hopes that visionaries may have for the future based on institutional and cultural strengths that they identify in the present. Fears, the current suite of limitations and losses that would prevent achievement of spatial, corporeal, material, relational and temporal

goals, are also relevant to images of the future. This chapter is structured to highlight the soldiers' visions for the future of peace operations as well as their hopes and fears. I begin with a Tuning-In that sets the socio-political context for the soldiers' hopes and fears for the future of peace operations. In drawing near to the soldiers' experiences, I highlight Canadian LEDs that address the soldiers' replication-worthy deployment memories and their visions for peace operations 30 years in the future. Understandings of peace, peace support roles and military identity from preceding chapters are discussed in this chapter as I incorporate the view from the South and my own reflections on the data into the analysis of the future image.

Tuning In: A Conversation with a UN Expert

ST is a high-level UN employee who has been deployed in a political capacity on a number of peace operations around the globe. When I told ST about my doctoral thesis, he welcomed the idea of contributing to the research. At our first meeting in February 2016, I explain the focus of my study and share that my aim was to understand what it is like to be deployed in peace operations. ST is immediately eager to share his experiences with me; but quickly points out he has never served with the CAF. As we talk, he implies a number of the themes that are emerging from the soldiers' narratives of their experience. It is clear that ST's lifeworld presents an alternate orientation: civilian and higher-level insight as to what it means to be deployed on peace operations. ST and I agree to get together again in June for a recorded interview. It is now mid-June. We are meeting only days after an article published by the Toronto Star (Blanchfield, 2016) brings attention to the Canadian foreign policy and defence reviews and their nexus with the country's bid to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. ST and I engage in small talk about what this means. "It is interesting", he begins in an even tone, then adds:

Our new government is taking a very different attitude towards the UN and has publicly talked about repairing the relationship. We once had a very strong history with peacekeeping. I think as Canadians, we relied a lot on that image and we were respected for it. Now that relationship with the UN has to be rebuilt. It is important that we re-engage in different ways.

ST does not say it, but he is likely referring to the pundits who claim that the previous government's approach to foreign policy was a remission of global peacebuilding efforts.

Blanchfield (2016) for example points out that in 2010, Canada lost its bid for a Security Council seat due to what was interpreted as the international community's repudiation of the Harper administration's pro-Israel stance and its indifference to African issues.

Eventually, ST and I get to the interview where he tells me about what he does on his deployments.

Our primary mandate from the UN Security Council is to support the national forces, so basically we are state building. And the truth is that we really want to avoid having an executive mandate. We are on the ground to support our national partners in moving ahead with state building and peace building. Our military advisors are there to support our national partners as well.

ST's framing of his work with the UN fits neatly with studies like those by Erikson (2009), Crane et al. (2010), Williams (2010), Pugh (2005), Paris (2004), Chandler (2007), Dodge (2013) and Mac Ginty (2011) that recount the state building focus of contemporary peace operations.

Only here, ST speaks from his own lived experience of being deployed. For instance, he is unapologetic about state building. "Peace is a graded concept," he tells me. He continues:

But at least if there are the building blocks for the democratic process to move ahead and there are institutions in place to support it, as well as the rule of law so that the institutions do not crumble with every political whim, then maybe we are on our way to finding peace. In a place like where the team is now, once the political scene changes, everything changes, and that is because the institutions are not rooted. These institutions include military and security forces generally; but they also include the justice system, the justice chain, policing and corrections.

In ST's lifeworld, credible state institutions make the conflict space one that can facilitate a durable peace. In his view, the aim is to ensure that people are secure in their own space.

We want to make sure that people have access, that they have protection, that they have recourse, that they have physical security as well as political security. Our aim is to get these things functioning for the population according to international standards. There is no question that this is long-term work.

Pointing out that no problem ever stands on its own, ST gives an example why the political response is important even though the security element may be massive:

One country that we work in right now has suffered from decades of war. Our team works very closely with the peacekeepers that are there under the African Union. The UN mission supports that group with logistics and so on, but we also work very closely with them to support our national partners. We are interested in getting the state building process underway. The country has some institutions that exist in pieces and are functioning to some degree. But they are primarily dysfunctional across the board and they lack the institutions and systems that prevail under a democratic state. So we engage in a political process to create a functional state. Within that there is the security sector reform that includes the military. What the UN does is it helps in all those facets through each of their lenses, whether it is DDR, SSR, police, justice, corrections or so on. What the military advisors do is they provide technical support in building the military under a democratic state.

Citing the UN's handling of the Ebola crisis as another example, ST highlights the changing nature of the peace support work and what it means for the way that we define and respond to conflicts. He tells me:

This means we have to think about conflicts and violence in a whole new way. If people are marginalized, whether it is for economic, social, political, religious or ideological reasons, that marginalization tends to manifest itself in a number of ways. Recent history has given us Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and so on. These are issues that show us that a military response is not going to be the answer. It can only be part of a sub-set of the answer. Probably because it is necessary from a security point of view; but at the same time the real answer has to be a political one.

ST takes time to clarify his perspective about the military contributions in these kinds of conflicts. He notes that there may always be room for a military response, but it is only part of the answer. The real solution has to be a political response, which entails a number of things.

It is about a number of factors that would support that political process. The country that I mentioned earlier is a good example of that. It has been a conflict hot-bed. It is still ongoing. What we can do there is not preventative as such, although there is always a preventative element to making sure things do not get worse. Yet a military response never stands on its own. There is always politics around that even though the physical security element is massive. We have had to have troops ready to deploy should it be needed if things got out of hand. Having that really strong presence or posture at times can work as a prevention mechanism; but I am not sure that it can always work. It is so contextual. Every place that the UN steps in is unique in many ways. A lot of what we do is structuring the response to the culture and the society, so it's like straightening a quirk. There is no blanket format. If a military response is required, it has to be considered. Whether or not it needs to be deployed and how it is executed is another matter. It really depends on the context.

ST makes the point that there is no one size fits all intervention format. Yet, the context is that the entire landscape has changed. Concepts like Samuel Huntington's (1957) military transmutation and Mary Kaldor's (2006) new wars theses and premise of peace through liberal state building means that military tasks and traditions have changed significantly since the introduction of UN peacekeeping. ST takes note of these factors. "Certainly the peacekeeping tradition has changed and it is morphing with the different types of conflict in which we are being asked to engage", he tells me. The idea that peacekeeping is a troubling word is not lost on ST. He observes the need for a better communication strategy on the part of the UN when it comes to the multifaceted turn in international peace operations. He had this to say:

When it comes to peace support operations, we really do not dub ourselves well. We have come a long way since traditional peacekeeping, yet we still use the same word to describe what we now do in a very different context. We are not putting out there the message that probably should go out there. We are not talking about the good stories, the good work that is being done, what it is about, that kind of thing. The messaging definitely needs to be part of that future improvement packaging. If there is cynicism on the donor side and on the national side, if people keep asking, "What is the UN really doing?" "What are they actually delivering?" That is partially the UN's problem. It is our problem because we did not explain it; we did not make it clear and put it out there. But it is also a problem with UN responsiveness. It is because the UN is not very agile, so often the responses are not appropriate. (ST)

This changing environment brings many questions; for this expert, there are many more questions than there are answers. ST points out:

The question is, should we be doing it? There is certainly a lot of debate and discussion around that. Can we afford to do it? Are member states willing to provide the resources to do so? How does that operate when we have several countries under the single command from one country? How does that function with the troops often reporting back through their own country lines, rather than through the head of the UN forces in any given country? These are some of the challenges.

Given all these challenges, can there be hope for the future? When I ask ST if he has hope, he points to the uniqueness of the UN and what it does. He had this to say:

It is so funny that you would ask about hope for the future, because right there you are getting at something that we often say at the office, “it’s only the idealism that keeps us going some days”. I hate to think that it is desperately challenging and dark sometimes or what the future may hold, because it is really the ideal that the UN is achieving or trying to achieve. It is through idealism that the UN gets to do the things that no one state wants to do, or can do. That is the benefit of the UN. It is hands-on-deck with contributing member-states. We have almost the whole world represented in addressing the issues that affect us globally, regionally and locally. The diversity of the UN brings the whole package that another organization cannot bring. A nation-state that is getting advice, whether it is from the military or whatever else, they are getting advice and perspectives from a number of different countries. That could be very complex and pull things apart and make it disjointed; but it can also make it distinctly rich. You get advice and tactical support that is very unique, given all these things. (ST)

ST’s optimism about the UN’s representation of idealism is one aspect of hope for Force 2046.

ST feels that the UN does something that no one else can. He points out that there is hope in having this unique framework, even with its challenges:

We are it, with all our challenges, et cetera. But with that comes certain principles. Adherence to international human rights standards, for example. This is what donors want to be assured of. Several of our donor countries have the same philosophy generally on issues like human rights. When they ask the UN to do something, they know the package comes with that minimum standard for human rights for instance. That is definitely a huge benefit to the donors and for peace building, peace making and peace support operations on the whole. It also makes a difference for the countries who have asked us to come in and help. (ST)

One example that ST uses to reinforce the idea of UN idealism is the recent Ebola crisis, which affected a number of West African states. According to ST:

With Ebola, the UN was asked to move in when everything else failed and no one else wanted to touch it. The UN was willing to resource it. No one member state was willing to do that. No one wanted to take it on themselves and it needed a global response. The only organization that could do this was the UN. And with all the challenges, it actually worked. And in a sense, that was preventative, even though the response should have been quicker. Had the response not been as successful as it was, I suspect there would have been a huge conflict breaking out, given the fear and the possibilities of people spreading the disease further. (ST)

Context, challenges, the need for a political approach, and the possibilities of Canadian re-engagement; these are the main elements of ST's appraisal of peace operations in its current form. He is optimistic about having a global organization that is oriented to taking on the projects that no one else will touch. Still, he has fears. ST explains:

My fears would include being asked to step into situations that we are not built for. I worry that we would be asked to go in a different direction and be more robust in all our operations like we are in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Our peace operations there were mandated much further and were much more robust than anything we have ever seen before. It is an interesting move. We find that we have been asked to do a lot more. In fact, the UN has never before been engaged in so many conflicts around the world. We are now being asked to stretch ourselves into a few things that are not necessarily traditional peace operations or peacekeeping type mandates. Member states are going to have to keep looking at that, and mind you, they are looking at it. Those discussions are ongoing. But the issue comes back to the resources for doing that. Are member states willing to pay for that kind of engagement of the UN, with troops, with staff, a bunch of resources? So I am a little fearful of what we are doing? What are our peacekeepers being asked to do? And if that is what we really should be doing? And if that is what member states want, can we pay for it? Are we willing to pay for it as a global organization of member states? (ST)

The changing scope of peace operations demands different kinds of military action on the ground, but it also requires resources and a different kind of engagement between the UN and states. ST worries that member states are yet to comprehend the implications for those changes.

It is interesting for me to hear a high-level UN person discuss physical and political security as part of their vision for improving peace support operations. I spent the past year

listening to soldiers whose job it was to think and act in terms of physical security, yet they talked about the need for political security as well. For these soldiers, their own limited knowledge of the conflict dynamics in the peace operations space and bad experiences with UN rules of engagement in the past left a bitter taste. Taking these lessons from their lived experiences, the soldiers' hopes for the future revolve largely around identity frames about who does peace operations, and role frames about how the operations are organized and mandated, what motivates TCNs to be there.

Drawing Near: Visions for the Future of Peace Operations

I asked the soldiers to recall a good or positive memory of an experience that they would like to see replicated in future operations. I also asked them to imagine what the future peace operations force would look like thirty years from now. I use phenomenological analysis to examine each participant's narrative for spatial, temporal, corporeal, material, and relational encounters. Below, I integrate the eidetic and ontological reduction of the soldiers' lifeworld into the interpretive analysis of the images of the future.

Part I. A Good Memory worth Replicating

I asked the soldiers to recall a good memory or experience that they would like to relive. I then asked them how other military interveners could benefit from having similar experiences on their deployments. The soldiers' unanimously reflected upon instances of interaction with the local population during their deployments. Two things are significant about the reflections evoked by the question. First, the interview protocol featured an alternate question. If participants were unable to recall a good or positive memory that was worth replicating, I would have asked them to identify a bad or negative memory or experience that they would want to go back and change. I did not use the alternate question in any of the interviews. Each soldier

immediately identified a positive memory or experience of their peace operations deployment.

The second significant thing is that each soldier recounted at least one instance of positive self-

other interactions with local people in the deployment space. These moments of contact came

about in different ways, but it is interesting that everyone drew on a memory or experience of the way that they interacted with the lived other in the conflict space as something worth reliving.

The replication-worthy themes allude to the personal and taken for granted aspects of the micro-definitions of peace identified in Chapter 7.

“It wasn’t just standing there with a rifle”

The instances of soldier-peacekept interactions came in various forms. Some interactions occurred as troops exercised their formal role as conflict containers in the operational area. For instance, TB shares some examples of his positive experiences across various UN missions:

The Greeks had incurred into a farmer’s field and built a fence. In building that fence, they denied that particular farmer access to part of his land. On the Greek side, there were a whole bunch of his cows and chickens. We helped the individual; I guess there were a couple of families involved in this little farm in Cyprus, so we were able to diffuse that fairly quickly. We also did a lot of escorting of Greeks through Turk held territory so that families could be reunited and parents could see children and children could see parents and grandparents and so on. I remember in one case a family had been displaced from their home and there was some furniture in their home that they wanted moved to where they now were and we moved that furniture for them. In the Balkans we did a project where we simply re-established water flow to the village so the villagers now had their own water, instead of having to transport it in through the other faction's lines. (TB)

TB’s example shows that it is in the everyday moments of work that instances of day-to-day

problem solving contact can occur. He feels that moments of contact like these are miscellaneous

but memorable experiences where he and his team helped to lessen the tension in the conflict

space one person at a time. He adds:

It sounds pretty mundane, but it is the reality if what you are trying to do is just to have some degree of normality while political solutions are being worked out. It was simple things like escorting a farmer to his field and getting his cows through so that they can graze and so the farmer can bring them back at night. It was their life, that was how they

survived so it was important for that normal life, or as normal a life as you could possibly have under the circumstances to continue. So that was a positive kind of thing and there were several incidents of that that went on. If you do that and you add up all those incidences and all those assistance that you provide you see how it helps to provide some degree of normalcy for the folks that are affected by the conflict and that it all helps to keep things quiet. Doing these things also help tremendously to give you credibility. It wasn't just standing there with a rifle. (TB)

For TB, helping the people in the conflict space meant doing much more than standing there with a rifle. His feelings about the nature of soldiers' work in deployment resonates with a number of other participants who speak of similar instances of doing non-combat things that help the local people feel less anxious about the conflict setting or repercussions.

The soldiers see their self-other encounters as fulfilling expectations that are in keeping with the standards of military professionalism. For instance, FL notes that:

In any peacekeeping operation or peacemaking operation, it needs to be apparent that the people going in are there to promote the best interest of the people who live there. It needs to be crystal clear that they are trying to help them and they are truly interested in their lives. (FL)

A number of soldiers echo this sentiment. They reported that they were most satisfied with their deployment roles when they felt that they were doing something that helped the people affected by the conflict. They have an interest in maintaining the humanity of the peacekept. The soldiers see this as people-oriented thinking that complements traditional military roles and situations.

DF explains it this way:

When you are sitting back after a particularly hard operation or a firefight or whatever with the people who are your blood brothers, and you go, "Wow. What did we just go through", these are the things that you think about. You know, that that sense of community, that sense of righteousness, that sense of, "We survived this, and we did well. We served people". Even though in the grand scheme of the war diaries, it is never going to be talked about. It is never going to be written about. But just that sense of your small unit making a difference in a positive way. It is a feeling that washes over you that you will just take with you forever. I can say, "We did the right thing". That is the greatest feeling at all. (DF)

DF's point returns to the miscellaneous nature of military contributions. The soldiers see the positive aspects of their interactions with local people as mundane and perhaps even trivial experiences. Here, DF notes that the feeling that one has done the right thing and served people is not talked about outside of the circle of "blood brothers".

"If you're getting the trust of a six or seven year old kid, then you're are doing it right"

Some soldiers tended to measure their own sense of positive influence in the conflict space through how they perceived children's reaction to their presence. They felt that what children did or how they interacted with international forces was a sign that they were doing something right on a personal or organizational level. For example, CW likened the return of girls to school in post-Taliban Afghanistan to a field of daffodils. He explains it this way:

When we first went into Afghanistan in 2001, there were a couple of hundred thousand boys in schools. There were no girls being schooled in what one would consider the traditional manner. If they wanted to be educated, it was done at home by a father with liberal views or by a mother or somebody else who would teach the girl. By 2007, things changed significantly. The nice part about it was that there were now hundreds of thousands of young girls being schooled. There were girls in their late teens and early 20s that were going back to school because they had never been to school. They were going to school to get educated. The girls were obvious because when they went to school wearing a uniform. Outfits with black bottoms, black top and a white kerchief on their heads. You would see them, all these little white heads going to school. It looked like a field of daffodils. (CW)

CW's point addresses the scope of the operational mandate in Afghanistan. The return of children, particularly girls, to school stands out for him as a positive moment in the deployment experience. For him, this was one area where NATO achievements became a personal reference of positivity in deployment. Below, SP describes the lived body feelings of a positive reception from children in the conflict zone.

Sometimes we would walk back from meetings to our camp inside the green zone. One of our routes took us past a school that seemed to be for kids around five or six years old. If

we walked by at a time when the kids are getting out of school, the kids would always run up to us and be like, “Canada! Canada!” because they would recognize the flags on our uniform. I am sure these kids have seen soldiers there their whole lives, being five or six years old. And these are cute little kids, like you would see anywhere else, only that they are in little school uniforms, blue shirts with dress pants and little ties. I used to like it because I thought it was funny these little kids running out and being so happy to see us. Someone took a photo of me with six or seven of these little kids crowding around me. There’s me with this big smile and these kids. It just felt neat that they actually seemed to care and maybe there is a hope for the country if this these kids do not turn to violence and stuff like that. These kids remind me that there is some good being done. I think if you are having a bad time, you should have some good experiences too. Kids always make people happy. When you see kids, and they are smiling and stuff, it seems to make everybody else happy. The kids never seem to have a problem coming and saying “Hi” and stuff like that. (SP)

SP sees hope for these children in the conflict space. He associates their warm reception with their care and sees them as elemental to the country’s progress.

Other soldiers boil down their interactions with local people, particularly children, to the force’s ability to gain and build to trust. MB, who told a story about a little girl who waited for him to walk over a hill at a certain time of the day each afternoon returned to that experience as he described what he thought future operations should replicate. He had this to say:

I have to go back to when we would go for our walks over the mountain behind our base and the little kid waiting for us. Because to me, that was the embodiment of trust. It made me feel like, “Yeah, we’re doing the right thing here”. If you are getting the trust of a six or seven year-old kid, then you’re doing it right. Especially in a country that had been as ravaged by conflict as this one was. Anybody in a uniform, you would think, would frighten off a kid, but for some reason, we did not. Somewhere in that wisdom of a child, she seemed to think that we were doing the right thing, and that we were there to help. Why else would she be waiting for us? (MB)

Each day after school, the little girl would follow the soldiers wordlessly until she got to a particular point on the mountain path. Then she would disappear into one of the houses. MB sees this as an act of deep trust that others in deployment should experience.

“There was no uniform sitting there, just two people”

A number of soldiers recalled experiences where the self-other interactions occurred while they were off-duty or acting in an unofficial role. When the soldiers wore a different hat, not acting under as a soldier mandated for a violence containment or reconstruction role, but as a person interacting with a person, they found that listening to people was an important part of their memory. Descriptions like this one from FL show the effects of one-on-one encounters when listening to the lived other is a priority:

A chap came into our headquarters. Everyone presumed he was mentally ill. The guards, of course, would not let him into the base and so he was at the guardhouse by the entrance. He was not going away. He was getting agitated. People became concerned that there were going to be problems. I went out there with an interpreter and I talked to him. Well, I listened to him through the interpreter. He was concerned that the NATO forces were spying on him, that we were following him, and we were going to kill him or his family or something. I spent about 90 minutes or something like that with the guy, just listening to him and talking to him. Finally, he left and he was not agitated anymore. He seemed to have been reassured, it may have only been for that moment, I do not know. But that incident stands out in my mind as the time when the soldiers in the guard house and the interpreter realized that we were all there to help. Taking this time to spend with this guy and reassure him and listen to him helped to resolve the problem. I felt satisfied that I had done what I should have done. (FL)

FL's story suggests that time spent listening to people's concerns may be time well spent. His experience tells us that anyone can listen. In FL's case, listening to the young man prevented a situation from escalating. It also showed other members of his team that listening is an effective conflict resolution skill. Below, SM reinforces the value of listening genuinely to the lived other in her recollections about Billy, a shop owner in Syria. She had this to say:

It was shopping but it was not. It was meeting a gentleman in his own country and, to a certain degree, having to conform to his ways, but just sitting and chatting with him and whatnot. The way he spoke, if someone said that to me here in Canada, I would have wanted to slap them upside the head. But there, because of the way he said it and he was so genuine about it, I got to understand where he was coming from. I think I was lucky that I got to meet him. It was good to just to sit and chat, and chuckle, and say, "Oh, this is the way we do it in my home." "Oh, this is the way we do it in mine." Just to sit and

chat and intermingle as just two humans, two people. There was no uniform sitting there. It was just two people. (SM)

SM makes the point that sitting and chatting erases differences. The uniform disappears and it becomes about the people who are in dialogue. She feels that this moment is worth replicating because it shows that perceived differences in culture are not differences in humanity.

“It is not just about two armies colliding”

Many of the replication-worthy experiences centered on interactions with the local people that resulted in the soldiers’ feeling cared for and appreciated. The soldiers saw these kinds of interactions as reinforcement that they were doing the right thing in the deployment space. For example, DF tells this story of an encounter that happened during a moment of high alert.

The greatest experience was coming into a town across the Kosovo border. We pulled up our column, put tail to bumper and got out. We had been travelling for hours with hatches down to get there. It was hot. Hot. Absolutely miserable. We were soaked through with sweat, tired, grimy, dirty, and stinking of diesel. We heard this chanting. We did not know what the hell was going on. We did not know where it was coming from, because we were kind of around a blind curve in a heavily wooded area in this tiny town. So we got ready, we had weapons loaded, everyone had one round up the spout. And then we realized it was the villagers. The whole village came out. They are coming up the road and they are chanting, "NATO, NATO, NATO," and their faces are filled of hope. And there was this little girl and her older sisters, four of them, and they were handing out a few roses. I was wearing a different uniform than the British guys, so this little girl, she must have been three or four years old, comes up to me. The older ones were just kind of pushing her towards me, but you could see that she was kind of shy. So I got down on one knee so that I am at her height, took my helmet off, put my rifle behind me, and she came up and gave me a rose. I gave her a chocolate bar that I had in my pocket. It was probably all melted by then, but she was so excited by that. And with the group you had these eighty year old men who were pushing these mangy, minging Russian cigarettes on you. But you had to take it right and they are going to light it for you. It was like the celebration cigar. *It was a great feeling.* It was a great feeling knowing that they had hope all of a sudden. I will never forget that feeling ever. Then I also felt at the same time a little bit of sadness. I am thinking, “We’re not going to be able to fulfill all your expectations”. You just knew it. But at the time I thought, “Just enjoy the moment”. That was tremendous. (DF)

DF’s story provides insight into the lived body experience of feeling cared for and at the same time feeling accountable to the local people. He explains that he enjoyed the feeling of welcome

and support, but he dreaded that the expectations might have been higher than what the operation could deliver.

Other soldiers talked about how their interactions with people served to remind them of why they were there. For example, DP tells of this encounter:

We could wear anything when we went down to Israel, but whenever we went into Syria we had to wear our uniform. Once when I was there, I came across this older gentleman and this little girl of maybe four or five years old. The man looked more as if he could have been her grandfather rather than her father. He caught my eye because he was urging this little girl towards me and he is pointing at me and talking to her and he's getting her closer and closer to me. So I got down on my haunches and held out my hand. She came up and shook my hand. The old man was really encouraging her to look at my shoulder and see, which I found surprising for over there. It just blew me away. It was as if he was encouraging her to look up to a woman in the military. I was very surprised because this was Syria, you know, women were not seen or treated equally. That moment made me feel good about being there. (DP)

DP's story also points to what a number of soldiers had to say about how local people can make intervening troops feel valued in the conflict space. She explains why that encounter with the little girl is worth replicating for other military interveners:

It just gives you a sense that you are not there for nothing. It is not just about two armies colliding or trying to prevent that collision. It is about all of the people. It is easy to sometimes to just see the soldier. It is a lot harder to see what is behind him or around him, their families, and that kind of thing. So incidences like this brings that connection. (DP)

DP's memory of her experience is a reminder that the humanity of both the deployed soldier and the people in the conflict space are equally important. It is hard to see "the brain behind the gun" (Cockburn, 1979). It is important that future soldiers have occasions where they feel humanized.

Going outside the wire

What is also instructive about soldiers' memories of their interactions is that the majority of positive encounters occurred outside of the confines of military bases. The soldiers described things that happened because they were "outside the wire", either because of their duties or

personal choices took them into the peacekeepers' authentic lived space. The soldiers explained that they took time to embed themselves with local people and their culture in various ways. In some instances, it was through shopping at local stores or in markets or simply walking through communities for physical exercise instead of working out at the base. In other instances, interactions occurred as the soldiers carried out their formal roles in patrolling or while they are traveling from one location to another for work-related purposes. The lessons that the soldiers draw from these encounters with everyday civilians in their own spaces help to shape ideas about what it takes to do the job of peace support. For example, JR describes the beauty of seeing children return to playing, young people going out and about in the evenings and "doing what young people should be doing" as a replication-worthy memory of his deployment. These sights, sounds and feelings of being in the space came about when he went for walks outside the military base. Below, he explains why he would like to see that feeling shared by other soldiers:

If you are going to do something, it has to be done confidently and with resolve and with conviction. In a military sense, that means you go in "armed for bear". You have to be fit, disciplined, trained, supported, well armed, and quite willing to use all these things if you have to. That does not mean going in like a vigilante, shooting first and asking questions later. That is the exact opposite of what I am saying, but you have to be serious about what you are doing and why you are there. That was the lesson I drew from Bosnia whereas for NATO being "armed for bear," prepared to fight for peace. We had to fight to destroy the factions and make them stop fighting. This was what had to happen so that Mommy and Daddy and their 2.3 kids are able to go outside on an evening and do whatever they do and the kids can play soccer again in the street and people can turn on the tap and they get water that's at least capable of being washed with if not drunk. (JR)

For JR, peace is normalcy, a civil order established upon the rule of law and the provision of adequate infrastructure. Restoring the institutions and infrastructure meant that fighting for peace is a commitment to maintaining or returning to that state of normalcy. He feels that sense of normalcy returning for the local people every time he walks outside the base.

One soldier's memory of a positive lived other connections comes from being outside the wire in a different way. RS had this to say about what he learned "working behind enemy lines" with the Serbian people:

We discovered that we needed completely different skill sets than those that we had received in the military because we were largely dealing with interpersonal relations. Ultimately, that is what it was about, me sitting across the desk from a Serbian warlord, and my counterpart sitting across the desk from either a Bosnian or a Croat warlord. We were talking to them on a one-to-one basis about what was happening and trying to reason with them and trying to come up with higher grounds arguments about stopping the killing. In most cases, we had to learn as we went along. We discovered that the skill sets that we formally trained in did not help us. That training helped us get in the door because we had credibility, we had weaponry, we had the uniforms. So we got in the door because there was that level of respect. But beyond that, it was, in many cases, the people who made up the teams. The ones that did the best in that liaison job were the ones that had had some kind of greater interpersonal relationship experience. In the case of interpersonal relationships and selling a concept, the used car salesman was more valuable than the person with combat team experience. (RS)

Away from the protected space of the military base, RS had to rely on interactions with local people for movement and survival. For him, the experience highlights the need for soldiers in future deployments to be diverse in their skills, outlooks and approaches. He makes the point that personality, problem solving and communication skills are more relevant in certain circumstances of dealing with the lived other.

A view from the South

The benefits of interpersonal interactions that occur away from the felt space of the military base and the value of seeing local populations as people are not lost on one participant from the Global South. Speaking about his experiences in Haiti, VM recalls what he learned once he departed the immediate area of responsibility for the wider countryside.

Some of us got involved in doing a reconnaissance operation that took us outside of the immediate area of responsibility and more into the countryside. So we did a number of visits that involved travelling the whole of that side of the country. We were able to experience interactions with people who were responding in an environment that was perceived to be significantly less hostile than that the city where we were based. And, to be honest, hostile may not even be the right word because where we were based in the

city, there was in reality no hostility towards us. But out in the countryside, we had more time and space to interface with the citizens and see their excitement, their appreciation. We could see how them not being in an environment where they were constantly seeing soldiers everyday influenced their reception and responsiveness and the feeling that we were actually there doing something on their behalf. Even though we never had any negative feedback incidences within the city itself, I think the journeys out to the country helped me to feel much better about what I was doing *there*, just because of how the people responded to us. I felt much better about what I was doing. I felt like, okay, I am part of fixing a disaster. (VM)

This view from the South is a reminder that felt space plays a role in relationality. Below, VM explains why it is important to have self-other interactions that transcend the felt space.

When you are constantly on operation mode around the base, you get so involved in a routine. You get up, you do what you are supposed to do, but then you lose the emotional attachment to what you are supposed to be doing. It is as if you forget that you are really dealing with people who have feelings. You are out there, you are doing patrols, and you are making checks, but it is easy to forget that whatever you do, you are dealing with other people who also have feelings and interpretations of how you are doing it and how you are dealing with things. So to be out of the town and get that kind of response was really a good reminder for me that these are people. They have emotions, they have feelings, they have joy and smiling faces. And it is just warming up to that realization that, okay remember that this is a crisis situation and we are here to help them. I am sure that this was not across the board, but a lot of the Jamaican soldiers after a while were more motivated by the fact that they were getting an overseas stipend than what they are doing for the persons there. (VM)

For VM, the lived space of the city-centre base influenced his feelings about being in deployment. Interaction with people in a less contrived setting created opportunities for connections. The felt space around the immediate base was devoid of this sense of local value and appreciation for the positives of the peace operation.

Excursion: The Meaning of Kit (Some Views from the South)

Canadian stories of their encounters with LDC militaries remind me of my own positionality as a Jamaican and a former military officer. Canadian soldiers question what developing nation militaries bring into peace operations. “Neo-peacekeepers”, soldiers from the developing world, now make up the bulk of troops in UN operations. UN data as of August 2016

shows that Ethiopia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Rwanda are the top five TCNs in current missions; Nepal is the sixth largest troop contributor (UN, 2016b). Once leading UN peacekeeping contributors like Canada, Ireland, Australia, Norway and Sweden together contribute fewer troops than newcomer China alone (UN, 2016b). UN statistics as of February 2017 show the same trend. Neo-peacekeepers are doing more in current UN missions, while more experienced and advanced militaries step back from this kind of military engagement.

Canadian accounts of their experiences in peace operations deployments illustrate that they eventually lost faith in some of their military counterparts, particularly those from developing countries. The soldiers identified many instances where interoperability problems affected relations between themselves and LDC soldiers. This contributed to a loss of confidence in the UN as a problem solving organization. It also led to the belief among a number of soldiers involved in this study that some militaries are not qualified to participate in peace operations. Many of the Canadian soldiers shared experiences of working with from LDC soldiers whose lack of resources and equipment left them unable to do the peace support job or compromised the mission. For instance, soldiers from some LDCs would show up in theatre with no boots, no weapons, or no uniform. In other cases, they simply did not do their work. Canadians also shared experiences of dealing with soldiers from other militaries who engaged in organized violence and corruption. Running prostitution rings, selling petrol and humanitarian aid are just some examples of the actions that eroded the soldiers' faith that other forces were participating in peace operations for the right reasons. This caused me to think about my kit.

One of the lessons that I took from my military service is to take care of my kit. In military parlance, kit is essentially the items issued to you for you to do your job. It is your

uniform, your Bergen (rucksack), your boots, your webbing.⁶ Kit is the accoutrements that accompany and adorn the various modes of military dress. If you are out in the field, kit is your eating utensils, your tent, your sleeping bag, your jacket, a stove, or any other piece of equipment. Kit is very important to the soldier. Often, one would get new kit if deploying on a field training exercise. One could see it either as having more stuff to carry or as having a neat new gadget or a piece of clothing that made life away from home a little more comfortable. The right kit could help you run faster, march longer, look smarter, even sleep better.

A number of participants in this study spoke about their experiences and memories with kit. One Canadian soldier talked about his experience of seeing soldiers from one country come fresh into an operational area without basic kit such as boots and uniforms. The Canadian logistics cell provided them with kit. Another Canadian soldier described being in a deployment space and seeing one group of LDC soldiers sell their weapons and kit to buy rations to feed themselves. Another Canadian talked about how much the kit issued to women has evolved over time with the absorption of women into the CAF. A simple piece of kit like a can opener speaks volumes about the evolving gender dynamics of the armed forces. The kit bag, also known as a Bergen or rucksack depending on where one trained, is another telling example. So are boots.

Jamaican soldiers in this study talked about their experiences with resource deficiencies while on deployment in Haiti. They reported going to Haiti with minimal kit. They had full uniforms (boots included) and the JDF issued weapons and other sundries. Yet, new kit was still important. It was the difference between sleeping on or off the ground. It meant having more uniforms for a change of clothes to feel refreshed. It meant having items that made life in the makeshift bases more comfortable. The Jamaican soldiers felt that their involvement in Haiti was

⁶ Webbing is a specially designed harness and belt system in which a soldier carries ammunition, first aid supplies, water bottles, and other items for his personal use.

representational of a wider Caribbean and international effort to help the country. They saw their reliance on the leading American forces for the supply of kit as expected, if not implied, by the invitation to be part of the multinational effort. After all, developing countries like Jamaica do not devote a lot of fiscal resources to “kitting out” their forces; spending on the JDF was .08 percent of GDP in 2012 (CIA, 2016). One Jamaican pointed out that going overseas for training or operations was the best means of accessing quality kit or kit not normally issued by the JDF. Another Jamaican pointed out that you could always tell a soldier who had been on international deployment. He had kit no one else had.

Jamaican commissioned officers are sent overseas for training more often than enlisted ranks. Enlisted ranks often looked forward to working with leading international forces to gain access to cool kit. But none of these soldiers saw deploying with a need or expectation for kit as indicative of their competence or capacity to be professional in their work. For example, TK explains his perception of his role in Haiti as follows:

We went to Haiti as supporting forces. Our job was to provide security and stability so that Haiti would know that they had some friendly Caribbean neighbours looking out for them. The people there tended to behave a little apprehensive at first. It was almost as if they were not accustomed to getting help, so they were very suspicious of us to begin with. But after a while, when they saw that we were there to help them and that they could come to us for different kinds of assistance, they seemed to accept that that was what we were there to do. (TK)

I began the process of thinking about kit wondering if it was something to be ashamed of that small militaries from LDCs like Jamaica would show up in a conflict space without the right kit. Are we incompetent and incapable because of our lack of kit? Is it enough that soldiers like TK show up for the right reason – “to help” and show that there is a “friendly Caribbean neighbour” looking out for the local people who are caught up in a conflict? The Canadian soldiers’ perspectives about LDCs, their human rights base and their kit are a concern for me in my own

analysis of peace operations. Canadian and Jamaican soldiers are concerned about LDC needs and capabilities; but the concerns manifest as different fears and limitations about the future. Canadian visions, hopes and fears for the future revolve around the bigger picture of doing international peace operations and they see it as a situation where all hands, the most capable and credible troops are required. The reality is that the majority of peace support operations are taking place in areas LDCs and feature large numbers of external LDC troops. The Canadian future image charts a pathway to improving peace support roles and operational outcomes for all stakeholders, including the neo-peacekeepers, who may have problems with kit.

Part II. Standing in the Future and seeing Force 2046

If you could stand in the future and see an effective peace operation, what would it look like? Who would be there? How would it be organized? I posed similar questions to soldiers in this study as part of the future image interview. I asked them to imagine what a capable and operationally successful military intervention product would look like 30 years from now in the year 2046. The soldiers' Force 2046 projections represent the lessons learned over time, as well as their equipment and resource experiences and lived body joys and frustrations. Visionaries employ the lessons from their subjective time experiences to frame a mental picture of future international operations whose structure, organization and resources are vastly improved. In this way, the soldier's materiality and temporality prove to be the most salient lifeworld referentials that feeds their image of the future vision. Nonetheless, there is an entanglement of corporeality, relationality and spatiality as contributors identify fantasies that improve upon real world self-other and felt space conditions as well as the actors, functions and support mechanisms that could exist in thirty years' time.

Multipartner, multifunctional, and multimodal operations

Most soldiers see cooperative frameworks other than the UN as the starting point for Force 2046. Security organizations like NATO and certain regional arrangements are viewed as important for overcoming or bypassing the ineffectiveness that accompanies global frameworks like the UN. For example, BT sees hope in the collaborative military structures already entrenched among allied states under NATO. He had this to say:

One of the reasons why NATO missions are so successful is because everything is NATO format. Everything, our orders, everything we do it is a standard NATO format. When I get on the radio to do a contact report, every NATO soldier knows what that means. The vast majority of NATO speaks English or has a basic understanding of English. A lot of the European member countries have English as a second language and that is why we use certain terminology, our pro words and action verbs like 'contact'. It does not matter if you are Dutch, or German, or French, you say 'contact' they know what that means. When we started dealing with a lot of Eastern European countries that just came into NATO they did not get it, but what is good with NATO is that we train to work together and we iron out the problems. (BT)

Training past the language barrier is one of the benefits of continuous training with security partners. BT notes that this was only part of the success of NATO. He uses his experience in Bosnia as an example.

Bosnia succeeded because it was a NATO-run mission. Canada has its own rules of engagement. We reported directly to Canada, the Canadian officers. We were accountable to the Canadian command, but we were also accountable to everybody. We had our own identity as Canadians. When our officer said, "This is what we're doing", we knew it came from NATO. But it basically went to a general. That general, for want of a better term, "Canadianized" it. He goes, "No, we can't do that, because that's against our rules of engagement". We were also subject to the conduct service code of discipline and Canadian laws, and some countries do not get that. What may be legal in one country may not be legal in the other. By the time we got our orders and rules of engagement, it was tailored to Canadians. We worked with the UN. At the same time, if something happened, I did not go to a British UN officer, a regular British military officer with a UN beret on. I phoned up my platoon commander. My platoon commander phoned my OC. My OC called the battle group commander and the battle group commander made the ultimate decision. (BT)

Even though there is continuous training among security partners, national standards are maintained, something BT finds wanting under global arrangements like the UN.

Nevertheless, the soldiers see future peace operations working in multidimensional, multinational and multiagency coalitions that are UN sanctioned. TB had this to say about the need for a multidimensional coalition force:

I think that both Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates will still be relevant. Chapter VI of course being at the lower end of the scale and Chapter VII being where “all means available” can be used in the enforcement of a mandate. With both types of mandates, we will continue to have a multidimensional approach. In other words, it cannot just be military. If you look back at peacekeeping, it never really succeeded because it does not deal with the root causes of the conflict in which the peacekeeping forces were placed. In the future, whether it is Chapter VI or VII operations, it is going to have to be multidimensional with all the bits and pieces that play. It will be more of the 3D approach where other organizations are brought in to focus on development that will address the social aspects of conflict. (TB)

TB goes back to his lessons learned from early deployments. He feels that a UN mandate is relevant, but his lived experience of UN peacekeeping’s one dimensionality would need to change. The way of the future is hybrid operations, coalition forces that work under UN mandates. According to TB:

Defence, diplomacy, and development are all going to be required because in the future we are probably looking at more intrastate conflicts. There may be some exceptions, but I think it will almost exclusively be Chapter VII level operations. I don't think that would come as a surprise to anyone. That is the way it is probably going to be. The UN doesn't have any military, it does not have any command and control or communications capabilities, so it obviously relies on a number of states to provide all that. Having the operation sanctioned by the United Nations is critically important to many countries in the world. Just to be able to say I am here on a UN sanctioned operation is important. (TB)

Hybrid operations may be the new normal; TB sees these operations happening under robust intervention mandates that bear the UN’s stamp of approval.

CW points out that the ideal future requires an ideal inter-governmental organization and ideal soldiers working alongside many invested partners. He explains it thus:

Ideally, the UN would be effective 99% of the time. The soldiers that we send into these operations would be well trained and better equipped than the people they are supposed to be separating. They are not there to make money. They are not there to exploit the women and the children and the resources in the area, which happens in some operations. The mission would have robust rules of engagement to allow the guys to do what they needed to do to protect the non-belligerents and they must be prepared to do so. So we need robust UN rules of engagement and robust national rules of engagement. All of this means then that an ideal mission would not be just a military mission. There has to be humanitarian and governmental aspects to it as well. You cannot just send soldiers in there. You have to send people in there who can deal with the dysfunctional aspects of governance in whatever part of the world you are sending the soldiers. There has to be somebody to deal with the humanitarian and rebuilding aspects of it all. It has to be a multi-faceted operation. It will be a robust, well-armed mission that can protect the people, “the innocents” as I call them. It must be robust enough to allow the governmental and non-governmental organizations that you will require in that country to do their work of looking after people, rebuilding hospitals, schools, infrastructure and what not. (CW)

CW’s point resonates with other soldiers who note that Force 2046 is not a military force. It is a multipartner, multifunctional and multimodal conglomerate, which puts every kind of specialized skill required for protection and for bringing societies back from destruction and conflict to good use. The soldiers agree that the military is only one component within a multifaceted intervention force and that the military has numerous conflict management roles as it works alongside its multiple partners.

Nevertheless, the soldiers fear that the true nature of being multimodal and multifunctional is still to be apprehended by planners and practitioners alike. The soldiers identify an assortment of military skills that are yet to be recognized or developed. For example, JR speaks to the assortment of engineering skills and the follow on benefits that soldiers bring into the deployment space. He explains the situation he faced in the Balkans.

We were connected up to the municipal water system and we tested the hell out of it because I do not think there was 100% trust there. But by the time we were done, everyone could go down to the tap and drink municipal town water. The engineers were obviously talking to their counterparts. You got a bunch of engineers over there, construction engineers running the water plant and supervising construction standards and running the sewage treatment plant and hydro, putting in electricity and doing

whatever they have to do. They are talking to their counterparts outside the base and there is a certain expectation of the standard that would be achieved on the part of the Canadians or say the Brits or French or Americans. A full expectation of a completely functioning, efficient, basic utility that would pass on by osmosis. We also had a huge volunteer effort going on in the Canadian camp. People are going in on their time off to rebuild schools and such. Every rotation, every camp took on a project and it was all volunteer after hours labour. (JR)

The benefits the multifunctional soldier being in the peace operations space are passed on to local stakeholders. JR's narrative illustrates an aspect of non-combat diversity that is sometimes seen as a problem. Non-governmental actors see militaries delivering assistance as an infraction on the supposedly neutral humanitarian space (see for example, Franke, 2006; Guttieri, 2004; and Ball and Febraro, 2011). Soldiers see this as using resources and diverse skills to address the needs of a deployment space. A few soldiers pointed out that the inability to comprehend the soldier's diversity is a problem stemming from the limited understandings of peace, conflict and security found inside as well as outside of the military. On the inside, political mandates constrain military action, recruitment practices, and determine valued skill sets. On the outside, shifting societal values and the new war context complicate the range of skills that militaries must bring to the deployment context. These understandings work to create a set of expectations about soldiers that could limit their opportunities to engage positively with peace support roles in the future. For instance, RS sees ignoring the range of reserve force skill as a limitation that could affect multimodality and multifunctionality. He explains:

I think our military in Bosnia and Afghanistan did really well because we relied on a lot of the interpersonal experiences that people had outside of the military. Reservists, generally speaking, have that kind of skill set. These are the people that can do out-of-the box thinking that is not necessarily leading you to a military solution but they can solve the problem. They did not live their whole life on an army base or in a military community. They live in society and they have to interact with civilians on a daily basis. If you are stuck in the Royal Military College and you go to a series of postings where you are kind of living, breathing and partaking of everything within a military bubble, you are less qualified for the kind of conflict that you are going to be facing in the future. If you can use the huge amount of civilian knowledge and interaction that our reservists

have, living and breathing and partaking in the community and their social circles, their work circles, which are generally non-military, then we can bring those interpersonal and non-military skills into future conflict resolution. (RS)

Several soldiers agree that reserve personnel, due to their limited immersion in the total military institution, bring with them the capability to “speak civilian”. If that skill is not effectively harnessed for the future, Canadian capabilities on the whole will suffer. Incorporating the reserve soldier helps to overcome us/them and either/or thinking. It also guarantees the inclusion of a young people, a group that RS sees as less likely to want to engage with the total institution of regular force culture.

A view from the South

According to VM, the situational awareness that comes from having social, cultural and political knowledge about a space leads to understandings that one will never have a perfect security environment. The best one can accomplish is to minimize risks. This approach works when all stakeholders are involved in the process. He had this to say:

In my mind, there is power in that acceptance that there is never going to be a perfect security situation or a perfect security environment. What is important is that we act based on the risk that we are aware of and that we use the resources we have to mitigate those risks. I find that there are always other people that come out of risk assessments that can affect change and so they should be a part of the discussions and plans from the beginning. (VM)

Even the best-educated and most culturally aware soldiers cannot achieve security on their own. The effort must be part of a multidimensional and multifaceted approach that brings all parties and considerations into the planning, logistics and exit strategy tasks.

Attention to the historical and geopolitical landscape

The places where the peace operations happen is also relevant. The soldiers point to major conflict hotspots in the Middle East and the “deep dark bowels of Africa”. They note that some of these places have no known national or strategic value to Canadians. Yet, these are the

spaces that will continue to be in need of intervention. Most soldiers see a regional approach as the most obvious future operations image. They feel that the location of future operations will be a factor, as future governments will carefully measure the value they derive from military deployments and other forms of intervention. For example, FL envisions that there will be a more pragmatic Canadian assessment of where future interventions will take place. He explains:

I think we need to leave countries to their own devices, particularly if that conflict has been their history. Even if our involvement is only to train military forces and provide equipment, there are still no guarantees that the people that are getting this training and equipment are going to be fighting on the side of right. The whole political situation in each country and in the surrounding area gets changed as a result of our meddling. I think if we are going to do these things, we have to know about the history of the country and we have to rely on the expertise of people who have come from that country, or who know about that country. We have to be strong and well-trained, but we also need to know why we are going in there and how we are getting out. That exit strategy is absolutely critical. (FL)

For FL, getting in and getting out must be evaluated against the context of the conflict.

Knowledge of the conflict's root causes is relevant. FL feels that success depends on intervening states like Canada avoiding some conflicts. RS explains why measuring interventions separately from political goals is important. He had this to say:

Neighboring countries may be more influential in restoration than a third party coming from halfway around the world. If we just look at the Middle East, for example, the long historical conflicts between groups would be a major challenge. That is not a role for the military. That is a role for political, social, religious entities that, even today we can see that there is a huge issue. Understanding that and then going forward and translating that into a military response is important, too. But we have seen example after example in the Middle East where a military came in and has beat down one side only to find that they are now, less than 7 years later, the enemy of the other side because the side they decided to help ended up turning on them. This is what happens when we lack understanding of the cultural balance and the religious balance, all of which could have perhaps been avoided if there was better integration and knowledge of all of the background and history before going into these conflicts with one eye blind. (RS)

For RS, optimistic pictures of peace support success means that future interventions must have minimal guarantees and a deep understanding about the history and socio-cultural aspects of the

conflict. Decision-makers will exercise due diligence. They will pay attention to the historical context of the conflict. In the future, the soldiers see prudent governments weighing up how military deployment could change the conflict for the better or the worse.

Soldiers imagine that in the future, peace operations forces would receive more training. As noted by RS below, if money was not an object, their training would place more emphasis on the soldiers' education in global politics and the geopolitical situation of each conflict space.

From a Canadian army perspective, if budgets and resources were not a huge concern, there would be a period of professional development so that the army in general would become more knowledgeable about the various geopolitical landscapes in the world. So when there is a breakdown in peace that leads to a certain level in the escalation of security, the military becomes involved and the transition from a peacetime scenario to a peacemaking or peacekeeping scenario would be more seamless. The transition would be easier because armies that are involved in the mission would already have a good understanding of the scenario and background related to why this situation has happened. (RS)

The result of the geopolitical knowledge is better use of regional resources. RS adds:

The vision that that neighboring countries would be in the best position to understand the geopolitical situation creates a kind of zone effect. In other words, the zone closest to the conflict would be those neighboring countries and that would be sort of a widening circle of countries that would be involved. In order to do that effectively you would need to go back to the first step in terms of the professional development. Armies in these zones would have to have professionalism and be harmonized to some degree. (RS)

With this learning, militaries could make themselves aware of the multiple ways that they can measure and plan for security. According to RS:

We could use the same principles as emergency preparedness to work out the security responses. In emergency preparedness, you have a first level of security which is individual. It implies that individuals need to be aware of their surroundings. They need to be aware of their neighborhoods and the risks and vulnerabilities related to their own homes in their own neighborhoods. Then you have the community level of security. That would include building security. It would include policing. Another sort of umbrella at the community level. Then, going from there and at the governmental level is where you see the first hint that the military might be involved. So part of the military training related to security would be the knowledge of that scalability of security that you might want to implement. In an escalating security scenario, it would be at a certain point that the military would be involved, but they would be well aware of what was happening

because of the interconnectedness of the entire system. As opposed to now, where it tends to be not connected and it tends to go on a sort of geopolitical basis where third party governments are asked to assist, having never been involved in that country before. (RS)

For RS, paying attention to the conflict space involves a holistic approach to improving military forces. It is about much more than infrastructure. In addition to governments being aware of what they are getting into, future soldiers would be aware of the conflict history and its causes. This should help military planners better adjust their strategies for carrying out peace support mandates on the ground.

JR had similar ideas for cultural training as a resource enhancement strategy for Force 2046. Planners and practitioners can develop better plans and goals if there is better understanding of the culture of a state or region. This deeper cultural appreciation comes from a robust intelligence picture that does not take it for granted that the deployment space is similar to or can be made into the image of the place where the interveners come from. He explains:

If you are actually going to make a significant contribution you need some intelligence about the area you are going into. Who are the players? Who are the key military and civilian players? What is the terrain like? You have to find people with those language skill sets and bring them in and mobilize them quickly. In the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, you need an intelligence structure that once it is on the ground it can develop an intelligence picture, so that you are not floundering around like a moron. When we were prepping for Bosnia we had a half dozen or 10 lectures from Bosnians about Bosnia and the audience was never one hundred percent there because there was so much else going on; but we walked out of those 10 lectures or so with a much better understanding of the place than when you walked in. I think though that we needed some ground education to comprehend those lectures. It would be nice to be able to do that a bit more. Then you can deploy in a week if you are doing three weeks of training just on the cultural background. (JR)

JR sees the training as flowing from a multimodal approach wherein there are enough people involved in it that can provide expertise in any field to prepare the soldiers going into a deployment space.

Some soldiers highlight regionalism as a fear. Seeing it as a double-edged sword, some soldiers identified the mismatch of expectations for regional leadership and western liberal peacebuilding culture. For example, FL explains his view that sometimes a regional focus within a liberal peacebuilding culture can create more problems than it solves. He notes that in some of the current conflict hot spots:

People are so ill-educated and so poor, so isolated that they end up following the guy with the biggest gun, metaphorically speaking. How does the international community resolve that? Well, I think the country has to take responsibility for resolving those kinds of problems itself. If the leaders of the country need help they will ask. I doubt that they will though, because mostly, they do not want help. They want power for themselves. So you have to wait till the situation gets very, very dire before there's any kind of international attention or resources put to it. Then, we go in and we preach democracy as the solution to the country's problems. We just cannot seem to understand that democracy is not the be-all and end-all. It works for us fine, but it is also a relatively new concept for us. The Americans call Afghanistan a democratic country, but what have they gained? (FL)

FL worries that western emphasis on peacebuilding as state building presumes perfection in the democratic processes in the West. While there are more calls from soldiers for more regional involvement in peace operations, some see the uneven distribution of resources, differences in culture and human rights standards as problematic. DF had this to say:

I think we need to have many more regional powers. Now we see part of this right now at UN peacekeeping operations in Africa using African nations. But they have to be regional powers that actually have the wherewithal to conduct these operations and barefoot Bangladeshi soldiers showing up to be your shield without boots does not really cut it. But if we are dealing with an Afghanistan, I think we need to take the powers around there and harness them properly. I think if you are worried about Pakistan helping out for a peace accord we have to solve their fears of India. I think we need to do a better job of harnessing regional powers and getting them sold on it. If all the regional powers are allied against us, I think we are doing something wrong. (DF)

For DF, it is important to assuage regional players' fears as part of that slow build towards peace. This may mean alleviating neighbouring security concerns. It could also mean ensuring that regional actors have the resources to lend a hand.

For most soldiers, their fears of the future return to the deficiencies of regional players, particularly in light of the new security scenario characterized by Kaldor (2006) as the new wars. The soldiers are concerned that the shape of current and future conflicts will bring soldiers into contact with conflict conditions that are increasingly difficult to mitigate. They characterize the future conflict space as somewhere impoverished, possibly a nation that has been exploited by dictators for the last thirty years. These future “hot spots” of the world conjure up what Leatherman (2011, p. 4) calls the “arc of instability”. Kaldor describes new wars as not new, but different in the sense of the actors and the motivations for the conflict. What makes new wars “new”, Kaldor (2006) argues, is that militaries and international actors are yet to come to terms with how to deal with these kinds of conflicts. Leatherman (2011) observes that the new war features rebel armies like the Lord’s Resistance Army and Al-Shabaab who have no ideology and no reason to mobilize civilian support. Since their main goal is wealth accumulation through criminal activities, sympathy for civilians is irrelevant, making the kidnapping of women and children, forced slavery and sexual slavery common place.

The soldiers fear the newfound irrationality that seems to dominate conflicts in these geopolitical spaces. Irrational belligerents are the most dangerous as RS explains:

On the geopolitical side, I think my greatest fear is that we are dealing now with a threat that’s irrational. We are seeing so many more conflicts where people who grew up together as children would be on opposite sides of the fence trying to kill each other and having forgotten all the history of how they grew up and how they met and the friendships because of a historical rift between the cultures. We saw that firsthand in Bosnia. It happened in Northern Ireland, in previous years, in Cyprus. There are so many other examples where people have grown up together and there is an irrational sort of hatred that is built on a long-standing historical conflict and cultural differences. But, as an entity, the groups tended to be rational thinking in a way that you could go to whoever was running the two opposing forces and you could negotiate a cease-fire or a temporary end to hostilities. It seems to me now that we are in a new era where some of the fanatical organizations that are behind some of the conflicts now are even more irrational. I think that is my biggest fear. How do you even approach that? (RS)

RS worries that new war irrationalism may lead interveners to consider options that in the long run, benefits no one. He explains,

We may want to go down a very dark path of eradication and one can easily become sold on the idea that these folks would never have a rational thought. That a country or a culture could allow their children to put on a suicide vest and walk into a mall and blow everybody up. It would be easy to go down a dark road to say, “Eradication is the best solution,” which would be wrong thinking. It is scary at the same time, because how do you approach it? How do you even have a conversation with fanatical groups that think that way? That is my biggest fear. (RS)

RS points to the duality of his own fear. On one hand, he fears that populist appeals to eradication, in whatever form, may take hold. On the other hand, he fears that there are few credible options to the “dark path” of eradication. In this vein, the soldiers also express fear that the new war context may fuel military misuse in the short and long term. The soldiers see careful conflict and TCN selection as the only solution for a successful Force 2046.

For most of the soldiers, UN due diligence did not seem to work very well. In the majority view, there were still too many TCNs involved in peace operations for the wrong reasons or with the wrong resources. For example, TB had this to say:

When it comes to peacekeeping, the African nations are very, very weak. It is not the soldiers’ fault or the military’s fault it is just that they are not trained nor are they equipped to enforce their will on the factions. That is why the Congo keeps going around and around because the peacekeeping, the UN forces, are simply not capable and therefore they do not have the willingness and they do not have the credibility that needs to come with peacekeeping forces. They have almost become mercenary like in a sense that for every soldier they contribute its \$1,000 a month. If you have 1,000 soldiers there, that is a pretty good cheque they are getting from the United Nations every month. There was definitely some of that going on in Bosnia too. We had Kenyans there and we had Egyptians and others who were terrible. They were totally incapable of doing what they were sent to do. (TB)

TB, drew on his experiences of working with other militaries to explain his doubts about “neo-peacekeepers” who seem to be doing the bulk of the heavy lifting today. JR adds that sex abuse and assault issues are the tip of the iceberg. Noting that even Canada has had its moments of

shame, he feels that lesser educated and lesser resourced forces are bound to make significant errors. Below, he explains his point with reference to recent reports about sexual exploitation and abuse allegations against intervening forces in some African states:

I guess that whatever is coming out of places like CAR, Mali and Chad are just the tip of the iceberg and they are just going to get worse and worse. Hell, we got into trouble in Croatia with sexual exploitation of people, at least one of the battle groups did. It was buried in Somalia because Somalia was the flavor of the month. One of our battle groups was essentially running a whore house for a while and got caught. If we are doing that, with all this scrutiny and the education that we have going into it; then a bunch of guys with even less support and grade three education are going to have issues. (JR)

A few other soldiers echo this point of view, even as they acknowledge that the CAF is not without its own conduct and discipline issues. Still, they hold that the Canadian military has evolved based on the lessons learned from those early operations “black eyes”. The new problem, according to these soldiers, is that this evolution is something that occurred largely in Western advanced militaries and the Canadian military in particular because it was willing to take a hard, long look at itself.

The soldiers see the lessons of the past as part of the hope for the future. Many worry that other states, particularly LDCs, had not achieved this evolution in thinking and behaviour. The soldiers see modern, western democracies and institutions as given to improvements. They worry that non-western, developing country militaries suffered from stasis. Having a Western, liberal upbringing is seen to add value to TCN credibility and positively influence troop conduct at home and abroad. From this point of view, it is easy to understand why some participants seem to prefer working with some militaries over others. For example, BT relates how his deployment experiences have cemented his dislike of working with some militaries. It adds up to what he calls his anti-UN rant:

Afghanistan was successful because you are taking, again this sounds terrible, vast amounts of European and North American armies. Professionalism. Boom, problem

solved. Like I said, I don't like conscript soldiers, because when we deal with them, they are so unprofessional. They do not give a shit and there is no doubt in my mind they used to steal from us. If you are going to steal from a fellow soldier, what else are you going to do? The way I look at it is there are certain people I trust. I trust my banker because I have a good repertoire with him, we are professional, and we have a good relationship. Now, if some guy comes up and says, "Hey man give me a thousand bucks, I could really make some money". Would I trust him? No. Why would I trust another country that just shows up and says, "Hey man, we're here, we are going to be working with you, we all wear blue berets". I am certain we all wear underwear too but that does not give us a basis for a friendship. (BT)

BT feels that a global, all states are welcome orientation to peace operations is flawed. Not all TCNs are qualified to do the job.

Additionally, some participants see the difficulties in troop conduct and discipline arising from the way that some militaries are employed in their home countries. According to MB, what is extrapolated to *outta yaad* is inherently ugly if the *inna yaad* dynamic is also negative. He had this to say:

I would say that any kind of military structure being employed by the UN would have to be governed like a military in a constitutional democratic nation. Those militaries that come from less than democratic nations tend to have a different philosophy of what the military is all about. There are places where the military is primarily an internal security organ. It is there to suppress any kind of dissent within the country. Is that what we want in peacekeeping? I do not think so. We want militaries that embody some measure of professional empathy, that can recognize what the problem is and not say, "Hey! That looks just like our country. This is okay." (MB)

MB worries that militaries that come from states that do not themselves practice the basics of human, political and civil rights would be hard pressed to do otherwise in an international or regional conflict scenario. The soldiers agree that asking TCNs to do more is only half the battle. Believing that one can neither aspire to nor audit behaviour that is not practiced at home, a number of soldiers make the point that liberal democratic attitudes such as tolerance, diversity and gender equality, which they see as more prevalent in Western militaries, make for better

peace operations forces. This raises fears about who will do the bulk of future operations. For example, TB points out that the credible TCNs are western states.

I think if you want to maintain the fundamental principles of impartiality and the willingness to use force and the credibility of forces, unfortunately you're probably looking at western style forces. So NATO type of forces or European, North American type of forces who have the ability and capability of enforcing mandates. I do not think that is going to go away except for those low-level peacekeeping operations that would not require that level of force perhaps. (TB)

According to TB, western nations are favoured because their resources, training and capabilities under duress make them better at being integrated into a peace support goal.

Nevertheless, the soldiers are fearful of what mostly Western led or Western-oriented interventions could mean for future operations. JR sees no solution in putting only “white boots” on the ground. He notes:

You have to address it because you cannot possibly have just white boots on the ground. That would look bad. We cannot have just Europeans or North Americans or just NATO. (JR)

For JR, the problems of troop conduct and discipline is a resource issue that has to be addressed. Eliminating regional players in favour of northern “white boots” can be detrimental. JR’s point illustrates some of the soldiers concerns about trying to balance improving peace operations and troop conduct while appearing to be fair to LDC and non-Western states. Throughout the future image interview the soldiers struggled with the concept of trying to improve the deployment spaces or TCN credibility without appearing racist or neocolonial. For example, RS explains that there is a history of distrust that makes North to South operations problematic. He explains:

Canada has a very good training and professional development system that could help those countries that do not. Again, there are lots of complicating factors in that vision, not the least of which would be just the historical cultures and differences in, for example, historical distrust. First world countries coming to help third-world countries become more professional in their armies, there is this historical distrust because of colonization and that sort of thing. (RS)

With that historical distrust comes the attempt to be politically correct. One soldier worried that speaking frankly about the matter may make her seem racist or islamaphobic. Other soldiers expressed that attempts at political correctness translates into inaction. They acknowledge the need to be mindful of intervention appearances, but identified that the urge to be politically correct risks the problem of silencing sensible conversations.

A reformed system for political decision making

The soldiers recognize that military forces do not act on their own in a vacuum. There is always a wider political and strategic context for where and when interventions take place. As a result, the soldiers put forward images of a unified and competent intergovernmental body that could provide timely, transparent and decisive political directions for intervening forces. For several soldiers, this meant that the current UN structure would need to change to accommodate better use of information and allow for transparent and democratic decision-making. JR explains:

My dream force 2046 is acting under a competent and decisive political direction. The countries involved have managed to work through all the competing claims and are coming up with some kind of consensual approach to the problem. So I am seeing an improved UN or some other mechanism capable of deciding and then acting in a coherent fashion. It would have a robust capacity to collect information, I don't think the UN is allowed to use the term "intelligence", but it has to know about where things are and what is going on at all levels. (JR)

JR goes on to point out that it is transparency and intelligence that is thrown aside because of organizational bureaucracy. For him the structure matters because the UN is not a "black box in which you say, "do this" and it happens". Who the key players are, who has power and who does not have power matter.

All of the soldiers qualified their hopes for any engagement with the UN as a global peacebuilding institution as one that must be reformed before it can achieve its potential utility. For instance, FL notes:

The United Nations needs to become way more effective than it is. Ideally, you would have an organization under the auspices of the United Nations that would go into countries and be all of those things that I have described. That is a bit of a utopia, though. The UN would have to change an awful lot. (FL)

RS had this idea about how the UN would be organized in the future:

I would be naïve to think that this would happen; but if you could take the United Nations with its ability to reach out to so many different countries and include them as part of the organization, but then you take away the political interference that prevents it from being completely inclusive, and then you add the military prowess of, say, an organization like NATO, then maybe we will be on our way to a more balanced approach. It would imply that those former victors of World War II would give up some of their power and influence and voting rights to some of the newer countries so that the body could fully explore everyone's capabilities. But what you would get is a new inventory of skill sets that could be more relevant on this huge, international scale. That would be a marvelous thing. We would need UN-type organization that included all countries, but had NATO type military capability, and a huge understanding of all the skill sets of all the countries involved, not just the top 5 or 6. That would be my vision. (RS)

RS and FL are not the only soldiers who qualify their future image with words like “naive” and “ideally”. It seems that visioning an optimistic outcome for peace operations was a challenge for a number of the soldiers. Most felt that future thinking that draws on their most optimistic vein places them in a realm of utopianism. It is a space that they seem to be uncomfortable with given the lessons that they have imbibed from working with the UN and other actors in international deployments. The ideal is therefore often qualified with a statement that it would be impossible, if not extremely difficult, to achieve given the primacy of political goals and the nation-state orientation of global politics. For example, MB had this to say about the extent of UN reforms that are required for optimistic outcomes in peace operations:

I think in order for it to be effective, it really has to be hived off from the political concerns of the United Nations. There has to be a less politicized governing body that implements peacekeeping. Just look what is going on in Syria. We cannot do anything there, because the countries that have vetoes are on opposite sides of the conflict. Effective peacekeeping would be easy if it was left to the tactical concerns of the military people involved. For instance, take Rwanda. If Dallaire had been left to do what he was capable of doing or given the resources that he wanted, it would have been no issue, but the UN just ignored him. (MB)

What participants learn from their contact with the political structure, either through their own lived experiences or through the experiences of others with similar lifeworlds, helps to shape their vision of the future structures for effective peace operations.

Mostly, the prognosis is negative. JR voices a common fear about the future if leading states' involvement with the UN worsens. He uses the conflict in one African country as an example to make this point:

One of my fears is that the UN collapses utterly. That it does not improve itself. There are bits of it that work. With all the types of UN missions out there, they are probably doing very good stuff. That said, what makes the headlines is Al-Shabaab killing people and the UN force, which is an entirely African force, having to face off with Al-Shabaab and taking fairly heavy casualties. If the media is to be believed, we are looking at the tune of hundreds of dead, not dozens. I do not know how it has not collapsed, but it is not a success story. It is hard to find any other significant UN success stories. We just had a senior player in the UN bureaucracy come out and say the thing is dysfunctional, where for example, a force commander cannot relieve his subordinates without going through whole UN structure in New York. So, my fears are that the UN gets worse and there's nobody that steps up. The UN is bad now, but people have to step up. What if the UN stays the same or gets worse and people stop stepping up? (JR)

JR explains his idea of a nightmare scenario against the backdrop of two international events unfolding at the time of his 2016 interview: campaigning for the "Brexit" vote and the US presidential election primaries. He had this to say:

What if the Americas stop stepping up? There is an incompetent UN, there is the western world incapable of acting in a coherent fashion, and you have a couple of other state actors who are capable of acting in a coherent fashion; but do not share our views of morality and politics. There are the Russians who are playing a completely different game. I do not think the problem is going to be with the force. You could generate a trained, equipped group of soldiers and others in a few years and it is always a total package; but what takes time is the political will piece and the information piece. The problem is the political capacity to act, including resources. You could do any of those things I think if you could make the United Nations or the generic international organization robust enough and workable enough to be able to act. (JR)

JR's nightmare scenario is set against the current events of today. His chief concern is who will act when the West seems to be losing coherence over the liberal peace ethic. The soldiers worry

is that if leading states become reticent, it will compromise future peace operations in a significant way. For example, KD has fears about what robust peace operations would look like for the countries that are left to do peace support. She explains:

First of all I think there is the fear that the UN is going to send in a force that is unable to protect itself and will be annihilated. Then we will be afraid to send peacekeepers in anywhere, which would mean peacekeeping could come to almost a stand still. If a country goes in under the banner of the UN without sufficient military weapons, protection, and whatever else to stop these incursions, they are either going to be so ineffective so as to be useless and not asked for again anywhere or the UN itself will be considered a useless organization. If these unprotected forces are annihilated, then all of a sudden these countries that were willing to send people because they needed the money for their forces or because it was good training and opportunities to develop will not want to go. No one would support them going anywhere anymore. Not only that, we would be looking at a horrible massacre which will be extremely unfortunate and it would have repercussions in so many ways. Then we will go in the opposite direction. It will no longer be about peace support or sending a small peacekeeping force that is able to look after themselves and stop small incursions. Countries are going to be coming with the hammer. If the interests are such and it is such a dangerous situation, then we will be coming in with a hammer and there will not be any peacekeeping. It will be full on peacemaking in the way of an invasion by another country. (KD)

KD expresses concern for what may happen when UN failure and selfish state interests collide. If peace operations continue to fail due to unprotected, poorly trained, and ill-equipped forces, the go to action may be full on war.

The right tools being used for the job

The soldiers unanimously envision that the fighting component of Force 2046 would be multifunctional, multicapable, trustworthy, and deployed in a timely manner. To this end, troop resources and capabilities are a paramount aspect of the future vision. The soldiers saw the ability to deploy, what troops deploy with, and the infrastructural support they have in theatre as critical to mission effectiveness as well as troop behaviour. For example, TB points out how national strategic resources can affect the timing of deployments:

Until we got the Starlifter aircraft, we simply did not have any strategic capability to quickly deploy internationally. That is now being fulfilled and that I think at all costs,

strategic airlift capabilities need to be maintained. Same thing with our “big honking ships”. They get troops deployed quickly by sea. I think that is still going to be a very valid requirement for international operations. Strategic airlift and sealift are already in place and I would see those staying in place in the future because they are so critically important for Canada. If we are going to maintain our international commitments through NATO and other coalition operations, then we need to be able to deploy our forces, which is something we've never been able to do before. We always relied on the Americans or somebody else to do that for us or we just took so long to get there. (TB)

TB calls attention to how strategic airlift and sealift capabilities fit into the deployability of the CAF. He also highlights the need for special operations forces, which bring counterterrorism skills that are critical to engagements in the new wars context. However, the caveat expressed by the soldiers is that the broad strokes of the political plan will continue to define military resources and troops will deploy accordingly. The soldiers had the vision that being robust in peace operations means that intervening forces must get there early enough and then stay there long enough to make a difference. But they worry that Force 2046 will never mobilize quickly enough due to the political nature of intervention objectives and mandates. They place the onus for timing and action within the control of the cooperating member states that define the actions of organization like the UN and NATO and share their resources with it.

A pressing fear among the soldiers on this topic was that efforts to reengage or reassert Canadian presence in international peace operations under the UN system would mean going back to UN peacekeeping missions. The soldiers perceived that peacekeeping was an albatross around their necks, even though they celebrated its offspring, UN-sanctioned alliance operations, as a more suitable fit. They are adamant that misconceptions and misunderstandings about peacekeeping is a factor that will set Force 2046 up for failure. For example, SM believes that the concept of peacekeeping does not do soldiers justice. She explains:

When Afghanistan started and even just before Afghanistan, if you listened to the news and the man on the street, you would hear everyone saying, "Bring our soldiers home. Let's go back to peacekeeping." I still believe that when a Canadian talks about

peacekeepers, they do not have a schmuck as to what they are talking about. Mind you, that is not entirely their fault. If you are not told, you do not know. What I think that Afghanistan did was it made people realize once again that the military has soldiers that are trained to go to war. Because I think they forgot that. Before, it was all love and peace and daisy chains and whatnot. Still, when they say, "Oh let's go back to peacekeeping" they have no idea what they are talking about. I have always believed that I am walking in there with a weapon. That automatically makes me an antagonist to a certain degree to someone, be it whoever. The public, they just do not know. When you talk about peacekeeping, it is well and good for the politicians who will really play it up, but it is not the reality. I think that Afghanistan made the people think that the military was the military again, and it was not just a bunch of hippies. (SM)

SM voices some of the stymieing effects that rhetoric about peacekeeping has had on the Canadian military. The soldiers agree that political representations of peacekeeping failed the CAF. Afghanistan was the CAF's opportunity to reclaim its identity as a fighting force. The soldiers believe that the CAF's combat and reconstruction work in Afghanistan reshaped public understandings of the military role. For the future, they worry that peacekeeping sounds nice, but is only political rhetoric that is designed to put a clean face on the dirty work of fighting or intervening in wars. Accordingly, the soldiers feared what it would mean should Canada "go back to peacekeeping". For instance, DF had this to say:

I fear that we are going to go back to what we have always termed traditional peacekeeping. I think that defence review that is coming out is playing to those who are saying, "What we do, we want to do well, but we are not going to do everything". I think that is smart. But my fear is that politically that gets turned into the Golan Heights and Cyprus type missions, which do nothing but erode your military capability, because you're not employed properly, you are not equipped properly. It is not really serious what you are doing. That is not what your military is all about, because when we were called to go to Afghanistan for real action, man, did we have a lot of lessons to learn? Are we going to train for peacekeeping and still pretend we are part of NATO? I think the difficulty our politicians have and our people as well is that we want to have a say in the world. We want to be counted. "We are Canadian". "We are good people". "You have got to listen to us". "We have got good things to say". And you know what? I think we do, but you have to back it up. You have to pay to be at the table. If you are not willing to pay NATO, they are not going to listen to you. When we can say, "We're carrying the bulk here with the Americans in Afghanistan," and our Prime Minister's in Brussels at the meeting they had to listen to him. We actually had a voice then. If you withdraw from that, my fear is, we withdraw from our collective security requirements, and we do things

to become the boy scout of the world again but in the end, we are not helping our own nation and we are not helping world stability. (DF)

DF hedges his fears for the future on the outcome of the 2016 defence policy review. For him, going back to peacekeeping will not benefit Canada. The soldiers see the initial public apathy going into Afghanistan as a derivative of the Canadian peacekeeping myth. For these soldiers, the peacekeeping discourse suggests a benign conflict role that requires no national mobilization of resources. Without adequate resources, the veterans worry that future soldiers will be asked to do more with less; a situation that sets them up for failure. The visionaries see more Afghanistan-type peace operations in the 30 year future.⁷ If the goal is timely deployment and valuable peace support for these kinds of conflicts, governments must invest in the multiple capabilities and skills required of each soldier.

A basic force package

To be able to accomplish multidimensional peace operations, the soldiers stress that certain basic resources must come as a standard package of infrastructural support. JR inventories the basic needs of the future force thus:

To have one battalion ready to go they have to be at a state of high readiness. To be at a state of high readiness means that you can actually roll out the door in a politically expedient amount of time, which would be in the order of days, a week maybe, or two, but not months. So you have to have all this vast amount of individual training going on behind the scenes and churning people through units and stuff. You will need a lot of troops to keep relatively few people at high readiness. When we deploy people, we have to take care of them. You need preventative medicine people to deal with environmental health problems and local diseases. Everybody goes potty every day. You cannot go to a place and do it out in the fields, it is not allowed in the western world. So you need

⁷ Canadian participation in Afghanistan from 2001-2014 was its largest overseas deployment since the Balkans. Writing in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Lane Anker (2005, p. 26) refers to CAF deployments under Operation Athena in June 2003 as a type of peacekeeping operation. Drawing on a broad framework that transmutes peacekeeping into global peace support, Anker (2005) argues that Canadian public opinion about peacekeeping remains mired in anachronistic understandings of peacekeeping. The average Canadian continues to perceive peacekeeping as UN missions involving blue-helmeted troops monitoring buffer zones. The participants' experiences in Afghanistan are explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

sewage treatment plants, you need portable water and you need water treatment plants. To run this you need vast amounts of diesel fuel. You need people to handle all these things. You need trucks to pull these things; you need airplanes to fly the trucks that pull these things and the people. Then you need to feed them and so you have the whole food services thing. Where do you get your food? That takes time to set up. You need the ability to drive around. You cannot be tethered to an airport. So you need vehicles, not just armored vehicles, but also logistics vehicles. Depending on the environment you are going into, they may need to be mine protected. That means they will weigh more, which means they are harder to fly, which means they have less capacity, so you will need more of them. You need the whole medical structure. You need helicopters. These are basic needs; there is nothing particularly elegant here. We have not gotten into attack helicopters, fighter jets, and the rest of it yet. This is just a basic force package. It is what has to be ready to go. (JR)

To work at an acceptable standard abroad, one should be doing no less than what one would do at home. JR notes that the basic force deployment needs are reflective of Western standards and expectations for soldiers at home. He uses the example of Nepalese soldiers in Haiti to add weight to an observation that behaviours and standards of accountability *inna yaad* are unthinkingly transferred *outta yaad*. He explains:

A few years ago, we saw the Nepalese introduce a new strain of cholera to Haiti, which probably happened because they were not fully equipped to do what they had to do. This gets back to a simple little thing like your own sewage treatment capacity. But that is expensive. It is hard to bring that last little piece of support with your force. Again, that expectation that it would be provided should be there based on the standard that one would aspire to. If you do not have that standard to aspire to, it is pretty hard to get there. These poor Nepalese guys in Haiti are accused of bringing cholera, which came from them crapping in the river. If you are from a farming village in Nepal, which is probably very cramped with little or no infrastructure, why would you go for a sewage treatment plant if you have no idea what that is? You probably cannot aspire to a standard if you do not have any idea that it exists. (JR)

The uneven distribution of resources between the developed and developing world are more than disparities in bearing the fiscal costs of deployments. Nepalese forces in Haiti are a relevant example of what it means to have trust. Haitian citizens accused Nepalese troops of introducing cholera to Haiti when the contingent came as part of an international disaster relief mission following the 2010 earthquake. To date, thousands of people have died from cholera. Civil rights

advocates acting on behalf of the affected citizens filed a class-action lawsuit against the UN. In August 2016, a US federal appeals panel quashed the lawsuit. JR's example gives real context to the kinds of resources and costs that are included in visions that see, ideally, those who have more sharing the burden of participation for those who do not have the resources and capabilities. His narrative also points to the magnitude of intervener trustworthiness when structural and cultural violence are considered.

The soldiers generally hold local people's trust in high regard. They note that trust must be ongoing. Future intervening troops must secure trust from the outset and work to keep it. KD explains that without trust, there is fear and fear leads to the "horror stories". She had this to say:

Some of the countries who go in with the multi-national operations do not always have that same level of trust. Not everyone helps to keep the peace professionally, fairly, et cetera, and support the communities. So I think a lot of countries are afraid to have the UN come in because they think everybody will be against them or they have heard horror stories. This means there are two things that have to be done. The number one thing is that to do peace operations, we have to be really accepted as trustworthy and unbiased. People should feel that we will respect the populations, but be firm and fair. Number two, we can only achieve number one if the UN is more judicious about some of the basic rules for selecting countries and pulling out or admonishing countries that are not ensuring that their forces are acting properly. (KD)

The soldiers see oversight of the standards of Force 2046 TCNs as relevant to the successful operations picture. As a result, many feel that the future force will be multinational in its make up, but a credible military authority will be in command. MB explains why this is important:

There has to be a credible military authority that has full control over the troops under their command so that countries cannot say, "Oh, well, we're not buying into those rules. We'll look after disciplining our own people". There has to be uniformity. Uniformity of rules, uniformity of action, so it looks like it is a monolith and not a bunch of social clubs operating on their own rules and trying to get it together. When it is not uniform, they spend all their time coordinating between each other, instead of looking after the mission at hand. That authority would also make sure that the resources afforded to the individual soldiers are the same too, so that you do not have a huge disparity between this country and that country. It does not encourage any kind of solidarity when you have one group over here making two bucks a day, and one group over here making \$1400 a day. (MB)

MB feels that there should be no major operational or ethical disparities among troops in multinational peace support operations. They see having a central military authority along the lines of a security organization like NATO as one way to accomplish that. The soldiers highlight the uneven distribution of resources and the disparate standards among TCNs in their future vision. Military budgets and spending on the military support infrastructure is an issue that would have to change to facilitate the successful future peace operation.

A view from the South

One aspect of the resources issue is who pays. One VM who had this to say about who should bear the cost of resourcing a future international force:

I believe there is a responsibility that the more resources you have, then maybe the more countries you should be helping. In an ideal world, the decisions should be based on questions like, what do I have that I can contribute to other countries to prevent or aid in the preventing or mitigating the particular disaster or disturbance or whatever unfortunate crisis. If our focus is on stability, we should be looking to see what we can do and give within our budgets and capabilities. (VM)

VM takes the position that in an ideal world, the developed countries with larger national budgets and more political power would have an international responsibility to contribute what they could. Developing countries with smaller militaries and budgets also have a role to play. The more one has, the bigger the burden; but everyone has something to contribute.

The “long war”

The most significant difference in the soldiers’ images for Force 2046 success was the length and purpose of the peace operation deployment. Some soldiers felt that Force 2046 should prepare for the “long war”. The long war is contrary to the “fast food” or McDonald’s style approach to wanting speedy results. This long war means working with young people in various ways in the present to facilitate conciliatory learning about the Other, while changing the security infrastructure of the conflict space in the lifetime of either that one generation or across

multiple generations. The intervening force would provide the “security blanket” that would help older generations reform, perhaps forcefully, while the younger people take on a more decisive role in their societies. Preparing for the long war and avoiding the fast food approach means that careful planning and consideration of where and when to intervene would be as critical as reforming international institutions and managing political goals. For example, JR explains:

My 2046 force is going to have to be capable of going in for the long term. It is a complete load of bullocks for anybody to think seriously that it would take a year or two to deal with a problem that has been generations in the making. It cannot be done even for over a generation sometimes. So, this whole thing, this 2046 thing is dependent on us having completely new mechanisms than what exist now. What we have cannot do this. There has to be a change in the political structure to do this thing. (JR)

Visionaries who saw the ideal future peace operations as the long war acknowledge that in order to meet post-conflict recovery standards in any location, one must first define the measures of success for that space and then be prepared to remain for as long as it takes to achieve that outcome. Leaving too soon would only set back the political and security improvements achieved by the intervention in the first place. However, some soldiers rejected the idea that one should avoid the fast food approach. They make the point that indefinite deployments are not an option. While they agree that many conflicts require a generational and multigenerational focus, their arguments for specialization add weight to their future image of external military involvements in peacebuilding being limited to a conflict settlement capacity that departs the scene once hostilities are under control. This frees the peace operations force to be ready to take on the next crisis in the next location.

Additionally, while all the soldiers believed that a multidimensional and multicable peace operations force means that the military must work alongside several non-military partners, they disagreed on how the military would be integrated into future peacebuilding efforts. Some soldiers saw the 3D approach as a good yardstick for success since there is room

for defence, diplomacy and development to mean that militaries could be useful in any phase of a conflict. CW refers to Krulak's (1997, 1999) concept of the three-block war in his vision of third party integration:

I would see it again as Krulak's vision of a three-block war where you may be fighting in one block, doing peace support operations in another and humanitarian operations in the third block. So in this type of mission, you need all facets. (CW)

CW's image is one of fluidity in deployment. This fluidity means that the soldier's roles and functions would be mutable, as it would entail doing a variety of things to prevent, resolve and contain conflicts at all levels of interaction. Soldiers in Force 2046 would then continue to engage in formal conflict management and containment roles, while acting as conflict resolving informal third parties within their local settings. The participants' replication-worthy experiences illustrate that this is an unavoidable aspect of the soldier's relationality within the conflict space. KD offers one image of what multidimensional and multicable means when it comes to the soldiers' self-other relationships during deployment. For her it involves transiting between episodes of deliberate contact and combat. She had this to say:

I think it is important we have a multi-capable, quick response force that can get into place quickly. To think you can go in though without having sufficient weaponry or at least protection would be lovely, but really naïve. Troops have to have sufficient weaponry to provide self-protection and to deal with insurgents and others who are dissatisfied with the order being established. At the same time, you need to have people who can get out of a vehicle, who can actually go and talk to people. This can be challenging if they do not have enough equipment to protect themselves. Hopefully, over time things will get to a level where they will get to disarm, or kind of relax their protection more and more as it becomes more a safer and more stabilized area. (KD)

Future military forces would have to be capable of walking the line between fixing and fighting. KD's thoughts on what is needed for the future highlights the constantly changing nature of the felt space in a conflict zone.

Future interveners play a role in repairing the psyche of the local people. These are small steps towards the larger conflict transformation goal. Examples of this kind of situation where small things add up came from a number of participants. For example, SP recalls what he saw of the British in their area of responsibility in Afghanistan. He sees it as a best practice that is worthy of replication.

I think the British did it where they did a lot more foot patrols and if they were mounted, they used a lot more open skin vehicles so they could interact with the population. They also had a smaller area that each company would be responsible for so they would patrol the same area and see the same people. So if something was going on or a bad person was coming in, they could see who is there and they could recognize who was who. I do not know how successful they were overall in their AOR, but it seemed to me that how they operated a bit was a bit better. They could interact with the population. I think that is key. If you are going to build peace, you need to interact with the population to get the population on board. When you are rolling around with tanks and armour, you cannot stop and talk to people and get to know them. When you show up in a vehicle and it crushes people's crops that they are growing, you are not really winning any hearts and minds there. With those big vehicles come bigger IEDs and stuff like that to take them out and that causes more damage. Why not, if you are going to go meet somebody, instead of driving up in a big vehicle, why don't you go by foot? (SP)

The example shows that it is possible for soldiers to be a part of the conflict creating and conflict reducing actions that permeate third party interventions. Additionally, the narratives from KD and SP offer two sides of the future force vision. KD sees equipment as vital for protection. This protection could be lessened as the physical security of the space stabilizes. SP sees where reliance on protective equipment could alienate people. Both points reinforce images that targets for security and stability would be set, met and maintained based on the felt space. If the space feels physically secure and non-threatening, contact etiquette should improve.

On the other hand, not all participants are keen to see military specialization overtaken by contact etiquette. DF refutes the visions articulated by KD and SP. He points out that militaries have a specialized function and that specialization is war fighting. For DF, even in

multidimensional peace operations, the military must do the job for which it is uniquely trained and equipped. He explains:

I see the constituent pieces of the puzzle doing the jobs they are trained to do. Many times, we go in there and we are using the military to do things that we were not designed for. The military engineers are building the school. Well, military engineers are for mobility and counter mobility operations. Why did we pave the road in Kandahar? It is because we did not like driving on IEDs. You are not using the military for regional economic development. You are using your military for security. For everything else, you have the NGOs. You have the diplomats. That is why we have Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic side of the house. That is why we have CIDA, the development side of the house. Then you have the military and you have various NGOs. Although I am not opening the door to just any NGO and not a lot of NGOs want to be associated with military type stuff either, for fear of compromising their own charters as it were. You see, everybody has a seat at the table. I think they all have to be at the same table, but you need an overall coordination. To me the ultimate is the openness and the ability to learn as much as we teach and adapt; but everybody knows their place. (DF)

DF places emphasis on appropriate coordination of all kinds of peace support actors, not on militaries becoming a jack-of-all-trades that can fit various peace support roles. From DF's point of view, when it comes to matters of contact, if the security situation allows for a change in the equipment required then a military force should no longer be required. This is a common position in the current peacebuilding literature.

Understanding the Vision Goals

Canadian hopes and fears for the future of peace support operations can be related to each of the five lifeworld referentials. There is evidence of spatiality, corporeality, temporality, relationality and materiality in the soldier's explanations about the things that make them optimistic and pessimistic about Force 2046. There is an array of hopes for the future of peace support. Force 2046 stands to succeed if it attains diversity, if it works with broader mission mandates, if it continues to learn from the past and from others, and if has a global framework for action that is led by Canadian values. It is useful to see how these modes of being in the world inform people's fears for the future. Fears for the future are many. They include worries

about the UN's image, Canadian credibility, other TCN credibility, troops conduct, state interests and resources. These aspects of optimism and pessimism about a future peace support product can be deconstructed further to reveal some conflict resolution and peacebuilding implications for soldiers in peace operations deployment.

Modeling peace culture through goal restraint

The ABC model of conflict analysis is a starting point for analyzing and resolving several kinds of conflicts. The triangle model is a useful tool early in the process to gain insight into what motivates the different parties, as well as later in the process to identify what factors may be addressed by intervention (Fisher et al., 2000). The goals envisioned by participants in this study speak to both aspects of the ABC model. In addition to the structural goals of improving resources and capabilities, setting and monitoring standards, reforming decision-making bodies and diversifying Force 2046, the soldiers helped to identify a number of interpersonal goals through their replication-worthy memories. Those goals include being with the people, accentuating credibility, embracing opportunities for local interaction, using multiple skills, and humanizing the lived other. The list of aims addresses a number of conflict causes and consequences that could result from military attitudes, behaviours and contexts. Galtung's TRANSCEND model of diagnosis helps to frame the meaning of these goals (see Galtung (2004, 2007, 2010) and Galtung et al. (2002) for examples and full descriptions and analyses of the model). As discussed in Chapter 3, Galtung promotes TRANSCEND as an opportunity to engage in deep analysis of conflict causing problems based on a medical model approach to the ABCs of conflict. According to Galtung (2007), conflict transformation requires transcendence and transcendence is a peaceful changing of relations between the parties so that those involved in a conflict can live and develop together. Galtung (2007) argues that if we look at peace as the

health within an organism and violent conflict is the disease, a medical model approach would allow us to see that actors can function like cells in an organism, giving it states of health or disease. The causes, conditions and contexts of the disease of violence must be searched for in Nature, Culture and Structure where we will find polarizing behaviours, attitudes and contexts that feed first, second and third order consequences that promote violence (Galtung, 2007).

Galtung (2007, p. 19) applies the ABC triangle to the diagnostic element of the TRANSCEND model by placing attitudes (A) within the realm of “Culture”, behaviours (B) in the realm of “Nature”, and context (C) within the realm of “Structure”. Accordingly, he defines attitudes as basic ideas of “the true, the good, the right, the beautiful and the sacred that have been *internalized* in people” (Galtung, 2007, p. 19). Nature presumes a need to engage in violence. Violence-causing or violence-reacting action links what is *internalized* through culture with what is *institutionalized* as structure. This process of internalization and institutionalization creates behaviour that is dissociative and dehumanizing, while promoting structural, cultural and direct violence. Whereas attitudes may make the violent behaviour seem right, the context matters. Deep contradictions institutionalized within structure create deep cultures that promote and produce direct and structural violence as normal. Galtung (2007) argues that the ABCs that value rivalry and competition produces very narrow security interested aims, which limit the achievement of positive peace. From here, he projects future goals of actor conflicts, indifferent and incompatible goals and interests, and longstanding structural conflict. The prognosis is vicious conflict cycle that sustains a war culture, war behaviour, and the war structure. The therapy for conflict causing goals is goal restraint, “learning not to demand too much from themselves and others”, focusing on the relationships and satisfying needs, rights and dignity so that a micro peace culture and peace structure can grow (Galtung, 2007, p. 19).

I have yet to discover studies that comprehensively address the ABCs of peace operations. However, pieces of research that examine separate components of peace operations from which one can infer aspects of military ABCs exist. For example, studies of gender-based violence and military masculinity in peacekeeping operations, like those by Higate (2007), Mendelson (2005) and Whitworth (2004, 2005), focus on military attitudes as upheld within systems of patriarchy. Studies about racial identities and North-South imbalances in peace operations, such as those by Whitworth (1998), Razack (2004), Pouligny (2006), and Tull (2013) focus on the behaviours of interveners whose socialization into military culture they see as designed to reproduce a wide-reaching neo-colonial framework. Studies about stakeholder security, operational outcomes and neoliberalism's securitizing approaches, such as those by Andrew Linklater (2005), Beatrice Pouligny (2005), Janie Leatherman (2011), and Kathleen Jennings (2015) highlight the context of interventions by elucidating the problems of the state security focus in peacebuilding arrangements. Images of an ideal interpersonal relationship between soldiers and local people and the list of Force 2046 capabilities indicate that the voices of former practitioners can help to deepen understandings of military contributions. Taken with the understandings drawn from the what-it-is of the soldier's deployment experiences, the future images respond to Galtung's concept of actor goal restraint in multiple ways.

First, vision goals of people-to-people, humanizing interactions help to challenge wholesale presumptions that military-civilian interactions are always belligerent and conflict causing. The experiences captured in this study reflect that there are many instances of positive self-other interactions. These interactions happen at the lowest levels as part of each participant's relationality. If we are to replicate those interactions for future interveners, we must look at ways to maximize these kinds of micro-level connections and treat them as part of the operation

success measurement. Military doctrine may have a name for what they think this is. Strategists may call it the hearts and minds campaign or PSYOPS or civil-military relations. However, replicating the interpersonal experiences of study contributors is much more than anything that military strategists alone can comprehend. Thinking about the military-other interpersonal experience in this way suggests an inauthentic approach to self-other arrangements aimed at disseminating a set story about military involvement. Rather than actually emphasising relational qualities among soldiers that promote positive lived other interactions, it effectively perpetuates the Gandhian paradox of disconnected means and ends (Lederach, 1995).

The soldiers make the point that the base for trust comes from credibility in action and a reputation built on feelings of accountability at home and overseas. The soldier's spatial and relational lifeworlds are important connections to peace. Considering Galtung's' ABCs of conflict, the outlook for Force 2046 calls for a re-examination of who the future interveners are as well as the *inna yaad* and *outta yaad* dynamics that they bring into the deployment theatre. This has implications for the attitudes and behaviours that are manifested in future peace support operations. Currently, the top five TCNs for UN peacekeeping operations are drawn from what Leatherman (2011, p. 4) calls the "arc of instability". The arc of instability has a heavy concentration of failed or failing states that themselves suffer from the highest levels of resource deprivation and gender discrimination (Leatherman, 2011). In their recollection of replication-worthy experiences, a majority of soldiers drew on instances that revolved around children or families being in and around their homes, schools, farms or other areas of their local communities. In her analysis of sexual violence and armed conflict, Leatherman (2011) notes that the places where some military interveners as well as belligerents perpetrate sexual violence on local populations are the safe havens – hospitals, clinics, schools, farm fields, etc. These are

the same physical spaces where participants in this study situate their own recollections of helping and feeling that they have done a good job in restoring dignity to the local people. Additionally, the soldiers' vision goals de-emphasize combat skills while asserting communication and interpersonal skills in certain contexts. The contributors envision future soldiers embodying both contact and combat skills and the judicious application of both. These aspirations indicate that one cannot interpret hypermasculinity as a given in the institutionalized character of the soldier's identity. If hypermasculinity "draws on excessive forms of toughness and deploys violence in order to maintain or reassert dominance and control in limited arenas under extreme circumstances" as explained by Leatherman (2011, p. 20), then emphasis on interpersonal connections as a lived experience of deployment nullifies the hypermasculinity as a feature of all military-civilian interactions. This would mean that there is a need to identify what factors would cause some soldiers to exhibit hypermasculinity while others, such as these participants, exhibit what Titunik (2000) identifies as feminist attributes.

Second, vision goals concerning the mandates, organization and resources of Force 2046 are reflective of the structure or context of the international system. The soldiers, in their visions of Force 2046 pay attention to the constraints that feed into the first, second, and third order consequences identified by Galtung (2007). Vision goals include finding ways to overcome the nature and orientation of the international system, processes of state making, claims to sovereignty, and interstate rivalries. These conditions create contradictory goals among members of the international community who value achievement of their own national interests. The soldiers also touch upon some of the structural factors that facilitate apathy and low participation among capable nations. Violence resulting from acts of omission is especially noteworthy in the narratives. The visionaries point out that when support infrastructure is absent; local people

suffer. When we overlook the resources for troop protection, military interveners may never feel safe enough to interact positively with local people outside the wire. The structural implications of the vision goals help to highlight the artificial distinctions drawn between high and low politics. They also bring to the fore the flatness in the way we conceive military roles within the current international peace and security architecture and they lay out the realities of military infrastructure and human resource deficiencies.

The third point also relates to the flat conception of the soldier's peace support role. The preservation of national affiliations and statehood contribute to a narrow future image from the soldiers. They did not envision any alternative organizational arrangements beyond the intergovernmental structure of the UN, individual states, and collective security arrangements like NATO. Although the soldiers could see where the entities overlapped or could benefit from each one ceding some responsibilities to the other, their focus on the state, NATO and the UN suggests that there is continued polarization of organizational identities, including national identities, which help to reify the war structure and specific military and non-military conflict management roles. Nevertheless, in their interpersonal interactions, the soldiers illustrate peace as more than physical containment of direct violence or state building. The soldiers posit the vision outcome of helping others and doing no harm to non-belligerents as the ultimate goal of intervention, but they do not imagine that happening outside of individual state actions. To this end, visionaries see a conflicted multinational Force 2046 that tries to intervene with care while it attempts to separate itself from individual national interests in order to ensure goal restraint.

Fourth, the vision goals and the soldier's descriptions of their experiences with other forces point out that Leatherman's (2011, p. 105) tune of the perceived "international fraternity" formed by international male peacekeepers is contrived. There is no coherent standard of

behaviour or intent to bring “goodwill”, be “saviours” or “rescuers”. The soldiers use their own experiences of working with other multinational forces to vision instances where there is improvement, if not parity, in LDC military training, resources and standards. They indicate that the intent to bring goodwill pivots on levels of military professionalism, intervener capabilities and the *inna yaad* dynamics of the troops sent on deployment. They feel that military forces from Western nations and those from non-Western nations do not operate at equal standards. Another relevant aspect of the understanding then is to consider the *inna yaad* differences between modern, economically developed, Western liberal democracies and that of developing and underdeveloped nations that are expected to exhibit the same attitudes and behaviours.

Leatherman (2011) sums this point up well where she identifies that those countries within the arc of instability feature higher levels of gender discrimination as a taken for granted part of their social interactions. The soldiers’ future images identify the need for careful TCN selection as another technique of goal restraint. If militaries are not equal in terms of training, capabilities, credibility and resources, who the interveners are and what they bring into the conflict space in terms of *inna yaad* and *outta yaad* practice may matter more for future peace operations success than having the right protective equipment or the right mandate.

Conclusion

The objective of the future image interviews reported in this chapter is see how the soldiers’ lived space, lived time, lived other, lived thing, and lived body relations shape the way that they think about the future and the things that need to change or stay the same. The soldiers use their experiences of positive interpersonal interactions to imagine a future where more opportunities for military-civilian interactions could aid in reducing tensions in a conflict space. The lesson drawn from this exploration of experiences is that future forces can contribute to in-

situation local conflict resolution by building peaceful relationships with local people in conflict spaces. The soldiers draw their aspirations for the future from their lived experiences where lessons from the past, instances of interpersonal interactions, resources and capabilities, and organizational mandates have influenced their lifeworld dynamics. But in spite of the optimism and positive memories of deployment, the soldiers expressed many fears about the future and the things that can limit the peacebuilding aim of Force 2046.

A number of soldiers associated optimism with naiveté and utopianism. While mobilizing resources and the will to act was perhaps the most talked about worry, the soldiers are concerned that major limitations stemmed from the negative aspects of political organization. There were also doubts about the real understanding of what it means to think, act and tolerate diversity within a global environment that requires different kinds of players with different kinds of tools and skill sets. The soldiers also worried that the contemporary concept of peace operations has not unseated the traditional picture of UN peacekeeping. The soldiers' experiences with tools, equipment and ideas such as statehood and national identity create a future image that mediates state orientations only slightly. They still see individual states and soldiers operating under ad hoc security arrangements dominated by the structures that they already know: the UN and NATO. Nevertheless, the soldiers envision a future space where broader mandates, better resources and more long-term commitments to building peace could make cooperative structures more relevant and effective. The soldiers' attention to safe spaces for non-combatants, interpersonal interactions, and TCN resources foreshadow their hopes and fears for the future. Going forward, these understandings could have some implications for the way forces are mandated, how they are trained, as well as who is selected for future operations. Chapter 9 addresses these implications as a discussion about the lessons for the future.

Chapter 9: Lessons for the Future

This chapter serves two purposes. It is a space for organizing the soldiers' future images into an agenda for action. The goal of presenting the vision interviews in this way is to show the experience-based images of international peace operations effectiveness in an actionable format. The second purpose of this chapter is to relate some concepts and ideas outlined in the conceptual framework to the main findings of the study. Here, I present some ways to think about military roles and identities in peace support that come from understanding the soldier's lived experience of peace operations deployment. Of importance is the way that the soldiers' role, identity, and peace encounters and vision goals presented and discussed in Chapters 5 to 8 demonstrate the micro-definitions of peace and the distinctions between formal and informal peace support functions in the deployment space. I begin the discussions about lessons for the future with an Excursion to the past. My phenomenological reflection incorporates other views from the South to set the context for valuing the perspectives of the deployed soldier. Thereafter, I examine the understandings of role, identity, and peace within the context of a peace builder identity. Then I present the checklist of Force 2046 goals and consider its implications for military peacebuilding effectiveness.

Excursion: Soldier X (Another view from the South)

Many years ago, I served as the Adjutant to my own military's combat support battalion. It was during that time that I met John⁸. John was a young man who worked with me in the unit headquarters at the main base. One day, we started chatting about operational deployments. He was among several soldiers in our battalion who were tasked to make up an additional platoon that was to be deployed with the infantry battalion that night. The force was on high alert. We

⁸ Pseudonym.

were all caught up in a particularly high level of domestic deployment. The infantry units were strapped to the point where traditionally non-combat units like mine were being tasked to provide manpower for the infantry effort. As we are standing outside my office waiting for the troops to assemble for evening muster, John tells me that he is not comfortable with having to go “out there”. You see, earlier in his military life, John was an infantryman. As a young soldier, he patrolled the very same community where he grew up. Now, John is telling me how much he is saddened by the way that the people he grew up with currently see him. He is now an outsider. John tells me that being posted to the combat support unit was an opportunity for him to serve his country and earn a living without seeing the familiar faces that disavowed him from his community. He is not happy that tonight he has to go back out there.

Internal Security (IS) operations are a standard task for the JDF. The force’s core mission, as stated on its website, is “to provide military capability to deter and/or defeat threats against the Jamaican state and/or its interests”. The country has no threats to its claim to state sovereignty. It has no international disputes either. A relatively uneventful transition from British colonial rule in 1962 gave way to an at times troubled but stable alliance with the United States throughout the Cold War. In addition, Jamaica is small. Tiny by most geographical standards, the island state is an area of about 10,991 square kilometres. Its population is estimated as 2,970,340 as of July 2016. The JDF is also small. Its ground forces, coast guard, air wing and support units make up roughly the equivalent of one brigade group. Though defence against external threats to Jamaica’s sovereignty is the primary mission, the JDF has a number of other tasks related to a wide range of security threats facing the island. For instance, the *World Factbook* identifies Jamaica as an international transshipment point for cocaine from South America moving to North America and Europe. Narcotics traffickers favour the island for illicit financial transactions.

Money laundering, corruption and violent crimes associated with the illicit drug trade are problems for the economy and for the people who live in gang controlled communities.

There are other insecurities coterminous to the illicit drug trade. Arms trafficking, forced labour, sex trafficking of children and adults, sexual exploitation of women and children, and numerous missing children are major concerns. IS operations are a significant aspect of the JDF's mission. Threats to the Jamaican state and/or its interests are mainly internal and so the JDF works closely with the nation's police on a continuous basis to provide patrol, surveillance and law enforcement assistance. The drug trade makes monitoring and control of airspace and maritime jurisdictions an internal security mandate as well. The bulk of interdictions are related to illegal drugs, illegal fishing, and refugee movements. Disaster relief is also a core military task. The JDF works closely with other government agencies and departments to mount disaster relief, recovery, and reconstruction operations. The force also uses its equipment and capabilities to mount search and rescue (SAR) operations within its SAR region. Members of the JDF have also been deployed in regional peace support efforts, most notably in Haiti where they have undertaken humanitarian, UN peacekeeping and multinational conflict intervention roles.

These deployments are not without some humanizing or dehumanizing element. Learning about the soldiers' lifeworlds through their lived experiences show that there is much more to an experience of military-civilian interaction than meets the eye. For John, part of the complexity of his forthcoming interaction with people in his patrol zone was his own fears about relationality. Going "out there", back to interfacing with the people who rejected him is a problem that affects his views of the felt space as well as his corporeality. It may also influence the way that John will do his patrolling job. But what about the people who live in that space?

My own childhood memories of living in a patrolled community cannot be generalized, but it stands out as a learning moment for me. The time was the 1980s when election violence fuelled by drug and arms trafficking competition besieged many Jamaican communities. Our urban community of Duhaney Park was one of the places where violent clashes between political party supporters resulted in frequent police-military operations in the area. I vividly recall opening the front door one evening to find soldiers clad in olive green and police clad in dark blue crouching in our front yard. One green clad figure, helmet on, weapon in hand, face barely visible, whispered softly but firmly, “Go back inside”. I gave that soldier a name: Soldier X. It did not matter at the time who Soldier X really was. He is not an individual, but an embodiment. As a little girl, I thought all good soldiers were Soldier X.

Each time I listen to Cockburn’s song, *Wondering Where the Lions Are*, I cannot help thinking about the times in the past when my husband, a military pilot at the time, had to avoid wearing his uniform outside of the base. Eyes and ears on the ground told us that our newest military aviation resource, helicopters equipped with a forward-looking infrared device (FLIR), made army pilots lucrative murder targets. I probably would have uttered Cockburn’s opening words each day if I had known the song back then. For me, “Sun’s up... The world survives into another day” has a distinct meaning. From an early age, I could see the brain (and face and life) behind the gun. It was always Soldier X. Soldier X is John, people like my husband who see themselves as professionals with a skill and a purpose.

Years after my mother moved us away from Duhaney Park, Soldier X found us again. This time it was with humanitarian relief. Soldier X was the soldier who drove a water tanker into our neighbourhood in September 1988, sometime after a major hurricane ravaged the island and left us without electricity and potable water. Soldier X pulled up in front of our house. He

connected the water hoses and people came from everywhere to fill their buckets. “*Sun’s up, uh huh, looks okay. The world survives into another day*”: Our community got clean drinking water; the kids got chocolate and candy bars. In that moment, I felt safe. Best of all, that day I did not have to be that 10 year old girl who had to walk the good mile or so through an out-of-the-way field to a secluded stable yard to fill buckets with water. We all have our lions.

Interview participants from the Global South who contributed to the vision exercise express that their fears do not lie with the international picture for Force 2046. Rather, they are concerned with the implications for the JDF in the future. Can a future JDF remain a professional force given perceptions about the changing security environment? The post-911 world brought terrorism to the forefront of national security agendas. It also meant that leading states invested less in Caribbean military forces as the focus shifted to the “hot spots” of the world. How will the changing focus of security and the increasing intensity of things labelled “crime” change the Jamaican security landscape by 2046? For one Jamaican soldier, the worry is that the internal security situation creates a demand for private security contractors whom he feels are far less accountable to the public. Those who are hired to secure and keep the peace are arguably in a better position than those who are being peacekept. VM worries that we could be fuelling a mercenary culture as worries about the local security picture escalate. He had this to say:

I think my biggest fear is that there is a trend now towards contracting private security to be at the heart of the overall operation. I would want to hope that the armed forces can maintain the frontline. It is easy for there to be occasions where some persons would use their position of having more resources than the local people as a means of getting favors, including sexual favors from persons. In my mind that is abusing whatever incidence of power that you may have. At least within a military system, we can control it and we can do something about it. With private security contractors, I do not see how that can be managed. (VM)

Indeed, we all have our lions.

Can Soldiers be Peace Builders?

In the preceding chapter, I pondered the differences between the military of my home country and the resource-rich CAF. The vision goals identified by the soldiers highlight a future force that meets certain criteria based on the soldiers' experiences of positive self-other interactions and the lessons learned from their individual deployments. Probing the factors that could potentially strengthen and limit the achievement of Force 2046 goals reveals a number of hopes; yet, the limitations for a positive Force 2046 are monumental. The soldiers fear that planners and practitioners do not understand and apply diversity. They fear a future where individual state interests could trump community interests. They worry about maintaining credibility and see troop conduct and discipline as major factors that destabilize any operation. What do these fears mean for understanding peace operations now and for the future?

In August 2015, media outlets reported that the head of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), General Babacar Gaye of Senegal, was asked to resign following recurrent reports of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN forces operating in the CAR under the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). According to several reports, the allegations of troop misconduct are far reaching as French and African troops have been implicated in several allegations of rape and abuse of women and children. The fact that French soldiers were involved in this latest round of scandals challenges the Canadian perspective captured in this study that soldiers from the "West" have imbibed the basics of human rights and are therefore better at avoiding negative conduct and behaviour issues. If anything, the situation points to the difficulty in generalizing aspects of troop behaviour based on perceptions of access to resources and capabilities. Nevertheless, the soldiers' fears for the future seem to be a foretelling of what could happen should the current

inefficiencies in the international cooperative framework for doing peace operations continue. Vision interviews were completed in the summer of 2016. On 1 November 2016, the international media reported that the UN Secretary General had taken the unprecedented step of firing a UN peacekeeping force commander. Lieutenant General Mogoia Kimani Ondieki of Kenya was dismissed after a special investigations team identified several serious shortcomings in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). According to a UN report, the mission suffered from a lack of leadership, preparation and integration among mission components; there was a culture of reporting and acting in silos; the Chinese, Ethiopian, Nepalese and Indian contingents lacked a unified force command; and the soldiers were risk averse (Narayan, 2016).

These problems resonate with some of the lived experiences of captured in this study. Playing out the study participants' fears that state interests would prevail over the greater good of moral action, Kenya subsequently announced its withdrawal from UNMISS. It plans to withdraw its over 1000 troops and cancel its pledge of an additional 4000 as it "disengages from the South Sudan peace process" (Unknown, 2016). UN data on troop contributions as of February 2017 show that the Kenyans did just that. The TCN has 900 less soldiers doing the work of the UN in February 2017 than it did in August 2016 (UN, 2016a, 2016b). Other issues seem to realize the soldiers' worse fears. On 9 November 2016, the US elected its forty-fifth president whose populist rhetoric of American interests, illegal immigrant expulsion, refugee refusal, and trade protectionism has escalated conflict within the US and with some of its partners. This follows on the heels of the 23 June 2016 British referendum to leave the European Union (Brexit). The unfolding events show that the soldiers' worries about international cooperation, commitment to diversity, troop conduct and discipline, TCN credibility, and regional leadership of peace support are realistic fears.

Bourdieu (1977, p. 72) suggests that people act as agents by becoming accomplices in the structures that order their daily life. Individuals and communities transform and reproduce their social structures without consciously aiming to do so. They are conducted by knowledge systems that reproduce other systems. The individual is pre-disposed to certain actions that are determined by his historical-social structures. The individual's agency lies in how he interacts with the structure materially, in space and in time. Fowler (1997, p. 18) explains this as habitus regulating the perceptions and actions within which improvisations occur. The hermeneutic phenomenological analysis uncovers that these soldiers act with awareness of only one aspect of their habitus. The soldiers in this study are mindful of the structure; they are adamant that they do not get to decide where they go or with what resources. Their role, as they see it, is to execute a political mandate and hope that the political decisions are taken with the utmost care. Soldiers do not have the luxury of objecting or disputing political decisions. Their job is to strategize how to make the desired outcome possible and enact it. The soldiers place the locus of fear into the nature of political interactions within the international system. They speak openly about the limitations of the political structure, but they do not identify the salience of their individual actions on the structure of the conflict that they become involved in as a result of their daily interactions with the local lived other.

The informal interactions and the micro peace outlooks of the lived experience analysis suggests that soldiers are limited and constrained officially by the structure of their peace operations work, but can act unofficially as peace agents by working within the constraints of that structure. Da-Sein presenting as a here-being or a there-being is relevant to this interpretive understanding of how the felt space of deployment influences these soldiers' lived-other orientations. Cerbone (2008) writes that Da-Sein is constantly "taking a stand on the kinds of

being it is, not declaring itself as one thing and not another, but engaging in some activities and not others, taking up some tasks, rather than others, adopting certain goals rather than others” (p. 34). Da-Sein experiences certain norms as binding all the time (Cerbone, 2008, p. 51), thus the soldier’s being is physically, socially and culturally determined by military ethos. Da-Sein’s disposition is supported by Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus, which points to the historical-social structures that are already in place that can cause actors to become accomplices in the pressures that order their reality. Habitus is an allusion to Da-Sein’s awareness of the structures that order its existence. The soldier’s mental, technological, and physical disposition within the military structure allows for the psycho-cultural differentiation between the himself and civilian society (Winslow, 1995). Yet, if it is constantly taking a stand on the kind of being it is, it is possible that Da-Sein can become a fractured self, having an everyday self and an authentic self, in the way that Goffman (1959) describes the role-playing self.

This research shows that the soldier cannot be bracketed out of where and with whom his lived other interactions happen. Relationality, being with the lived other, is one of the referential aspects of the totality of human existence. So is spatiality, being in a subjective space. People become who they are in relation to the lived other within a given space. Work by Schutz (1967) on we-relationships and social interactions as well as Goffman’s (1959) thesis on roles and self-presentation support this point. In his formal capacity as intervener, the soldier’s role is fixed within conflict containment and settlement functions as military forces act holistically as agents of top-level leaders. Military interveners have no legitimacy, standing, or authority to pursue third side roles as Providers, Teachers, Bridge-Builders, and so on. The mandates of the various peace operations point to containment as a strategy of impartiality. However, the findings of this study show that a soldier transits through these conflict prevention and conflict resolution

activities by engaging in informal third party roles. The prognosis derived from this hermeneutic study is that if practitioners and planners vitalize these informal peace builder responses by incorporating them into military recruitment, training, and deployment initiatives, they could improve military peacebuilding effectiveness.

Recognizing the soldier's potential as a peace builder is important in this reframing. The soldiers in this study are themselves unaware of the peace builder functions that they perform. This may be due to the structures that order their dispositions. A contributor to the habitus is scholarship on peace operations. For example, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) identify that UN peace operations and multilateral enforcement operations can have an effect in ending violence, but there are biases and failures of these forms of third party interventions. This work is in line with other formal and top-down approaches to examining the military participation in peacebuilding. A number of academic studies examine military peacebuilding participation as foreign military and joint civil-military interventions wherein formal third parties serve a conflict settlement and stabilization function. Work by Diehl (2008) and Last (2000, 1997) identify that militaries, acting as third party interveners, are concerned mainly with waging a defensive battle to stop violent conflict between warring factions so that other actors can engage in peacebuilding work with non-belligerents. Combat is perceived as the formal role while intermediate non-fighting belligerent engagement is perceived as an informal military role that requires other than combat skills; hence, the arguments for a range of contact skills including mediation and negotiation. Chief findings from evaluations of military participation in peacebuilding are that military interventions fail to secure peace (see for example Peksen (2012), Pearson & Olsen Lounsbery (2011), and Call and Cousens (2008)); they conflate peacebuilding with state building – at the expense of local stakeholders (see for example Oberg (2007), Mac

Ginty (2008), and Paris (1997); and facilitate human security and human rights violations in instances of contact with local people (see for example Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah (2010), Rubinstein (2005), and Leatherman (2011)).

This hermeneutic phenomenological study suggests that there are elements of role informality that could be engaged in order to achieve transformative peacebuilding effectiveness for soldiers in peace operations deployment. Peace scholars like Boulding (2000, 1988) and Schwerin (1998, 1995) describe transformational politics as the agency of the individual who is empowered within the psychological, social, and political spheres. Galtung (2007) also refers to the transformative work of the peace agent. He contends that the peace builder must overcome the mental and behavioural dualisms that feed Self-Other and Us-Them polarizations so that he may create self-sustaining cycles of peace. Additionally, Ury (1999) hypothesizes that a person can act as a third sider to prevent, manage, or contain destructive conflicts by adopting any of ten peacebuilding roles. Understanding the soldiers' linguistic construction of the deployment experience yields this useful analogy: the "mailed fist and the velvet glove". One soldier used the analogy of the mailed fist and velvet glove to describe fighting forces and civil-military operatives working simultaneously to achieve a joint outcome. Yet, the parallel speaks to other aspects of the spatial-relational logic of the soldier's peace builder role. The glove and the fist deploy simultaneously so that they may work cooperatively within the same space. The fist is mailed, sent overseas and away from home, to restore a state of security abroad. Ordinarily, the velvet glove deploys domestically as an aid to civil authorities thereby performing a helping role in the domestic context of national emergencies, floods and other events. The velvet glove is deployed officially overseas along with the mailed fist when there is a peace support mandate that involves rebuilding and reorganizing security infrastructure within the conflict space. While

the mailed fist is the fighting force charged with violence abatement, the velvet glove is composed of a plethora of skills other than fighting. Whereas the mailed fist is about “getting people to behave”, the velvet glove is there to help people move forward and begin the process of recovery through positive civil-military engagement.

The literature on peace agency and peace builder roles support a hypothesis that the soldier can be aware of the formal structures that order his existence and functions in a conflict space as a mailed fist, but he may still find ways to engage in a peace culture by performing informally as a velvet glove. The soldiers in this study exhibit a range of informal peace builder roles as they engaged in unofficial forms of contact with local people in the deployment space. By engaging in these informal and unofficial aspects of addressing conflicts, the soldiers enact a range of third sider functions that further transformative peacebuilding. They acted as velvet gloves in instances of low-level, one-on-one interactions with local people, even though they were officially mandated to perform duties as mailed fists during their deployments. Anecdotes like the King John story show that there are certain ethics of interactions that underlie self-other relations overseas. The lived experiences infer that it is possible for the mailed fists to informally become velvet gloves in their interpersonal interactions with the lived other.

The soldiers in this study speak of this personal transformation between being a hard fist and helping hand as their own way of achieving the mandated macro-strategic operational outcomes. They also point out that the duality comes from their own personal ethics, a sense of humanitarianism, respect for human rights and tolerance. In describing their experiences in the deployment spaces, the soldiers identified their ability and willingness to move into and out of the formal (mandated) and informal (personal) peace builder activities as the defining characteristics of a “strategic corporal”. They explain that the strategic corporal is not a

particular rank or person; it is a mindset that peace operations succeed or fail because of the soldier who is on the ground interacting with local people in the shared felt space. The strategic corporal is an agent who fulfils a function as a middle- range peace builder. He enacts a flexible peace builder role that embodies the mailed fist and the velvet glove duality of doing peace support work. This velvet glove can be seen as more than an official civil-military liaison tasking that is given to non-fighting troops. It is a way of being in the peace operations deployment space, regardless of the soldier's formal or official job.

An Agenda for Action

Even though there are many areas for pessimism, the soldiers are optimistic that a desired future that may still be achieved in the 30-year present. The soldiers' hopes and fears for the future address all aspects of the lifeworld referentials and can be understood through the centralizing concept of the useful thing. The concept of useful things goes back to Heidegger's philosophy on equipment, which I outlined in Chapter 3 and applied in Chapter 6. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1962) defines lifeworlds as special worlds of useful things where beings partake of the general structure. Useful things can only be apprehended in terms of the activities to which they are put to use. The idea of useful things makes the lifeworld referentials an interconnected framework for seeing and understanding the hopes and fears for vision goals. Below, I address this idea of usefulness as I reformulate the soldiers' visions, hopes and fears into an agenda for action.

The Future Soldier's Experience Replication Checklist

The soldiers' descriptions of their replication-worthy experiences in peace operations deployments show how lifeworld existentials, especially relationality and spatiality, play a role in determining their outlook for a future force. It is interesting that all of the soldiers would draw

upon memories of lived other encounters when asked to talk about a positive deployment memory. In my view, these soldiers could have recalled any aspect of their service, from medals awarded to meeting high-level officials, winning a firefight, or saving another soldier's life. The fact that each respondent drew upon some instance of self-other interaction with local people contributes to an understanding that the soldier's peace support roles in conflict situations are far more dynamic and relevant to the conflict space than can be apprehended without analysis of his lived experience in deployment. When it comes to synthesizing what these experiences mean for visions of peace operations in the future, two aspects of the soldier's lived experience descriptions are most relevant. Spatiality and relationality stand out as critical aspects of the deployed soldier's lifeworld that need to be engaged in future deployment. The soldiers explained how their self-other interfaces with local people in their authentic spaces outside of military base created opportunities for positive lived other encounters. These encounters frame the collective vision of a future force's relationality and spatiality that is worthwhile replicating in other peace operations. To reproduce these positive lived other and lived space experiences, soldiers in future peace operations deployments would do five things. (1) They will be with the people. (2) They will accentuate credibility. (3) They will embrace opportunities for local interaction. (4) They will possess multiple warrior skill sets. (5) They will value their humanity and the humanity of the people living in the deployment space.

Future soldiers will be with the people

A number of soldiers saw their role in deployment as that of helping individuals. The soldiers' face-to-face encounters with everyday people in the deployment setting created many opportunities to diffuse micro-conflicts and lesson tensions at the lowest level. Some of the talked about experiences include grassroots levels of interaction that occur in everyday

patrolling, monitoring or observation tasks. The soldiers believe that these small scale self-other interactions add up to significant gains over time and space. Simple, everyday activities that involve person-to-person contact, providing assistance and problem solving add up to support the political and larger mandated picture of conflict containment. These mundane things, like helping people access their cows or listening to an agitated citizen, come from a position of empathy. If one can empathize with people in their felt space of ongoing conflict or conflict recovery, then one should be able to promote good relations with them. If one can problem solve at the lowest level, it prevents escalation into a major confrontation. The soldiers describe good relations with the people in a conflict space as a feeling that one has done the right thing. For future peace operations deployments, the military uniform should be an emblem of help and safety for the vulnerable and those caught in the middle of a conflict.

Future soldiers will accentuate credibility

Lived experience descriptions across the sample group suggest that the soldier earns credibility through his deeds on the ground. Being a credible force for peace is more than a securitizing concept of using legitimate force to stop violence. Credibility involves a combination of traits ranging from being well trained, armed and willing to use force when necessary, to being useful to the people in the conflict space. Credibility also requires the exercise of physical and emotional discipline. It also demands the use of multiple skills other than combat and tactics. Credibility involves a willingness to use all of these traits together to “fight for peace”. As shown in Chapter 7, the soldier’s encounters with peace are reflective of the liberal peacebuilding project where peace, writ large, is determined by the rule of law and the prevalence of functional civil and democratic institutions. Peace is also the more nuanced day-to-day normality, or the perception of normality, created for the peacekept. In this peace, life in the

deployment space begins to look and feel more like life back home. Future soldiers must have the skills and the credibility to distinguish between the people who would spoil or inhibit these perceptions of peace and the people who need it.

Future soldiers will seek opportunities for local interaction

Each soldier's replication-worthy experience points to interveners spending time observing and learning about the local culture in the deployment space and appreciating its beauty. Being "outside the wire" gives the soldier the chance to interact with locals in their true felt space. Yet "the wire" or being on base seems to be a physical as well as a mental disposition to relations with the local lived other. The descriptions of experiences show that being able to mediate the mentality of combat and the mentality of contact within the same conflict space is an important aspect of being outside the wire. Understanding the local culture creates opportunities for learning what is and is not a worthwhile corporeal threat to the soldier. For many soldiers in this study, leaving the base was a good opportunity to learn why their presence was required. Several soldiers identified the spatial experience as a source of positive reinforcement that reminded them why they were deployed. Interacting with different people in different felt spaces and taking the time to learn how people live with their own cultures is important for creating empathy and personal connections to the operation's peacebuilding goals.

Future soldiers possess multiple warrior skills

The range of replication-worthy experiences accentuated the need for the soldier to have multiple skills, many of which may not normally be associated with military work. The need for combat training, discipline, knowledge about specialized equipment, the laws of war and rules of engagement are the more obvious skills associated with military work. Contact skills are deemphasised, but they are the staples of interpersonal interactions. The soldiers illustrated the

value of listening skills in their narratives of experiences. Authentic listening takes effort and time but it pays dividends in conflict transformation, albeit on the small scale at the lowest levels of interaction. Listening is an informal skill, but it is essential. The soldiers point out that it is in the process of listening and sharing with local people that they understand the Other and his motives. Taking time to listen and learn requires use of various other proficiencies that fall within the contact realm, as opposed to combat.

On the surface of it, listening, negotiating and talking things through do not seem to square fully with the “soldier first” way of thinking that the soldiers expressed in the identity encounters examined in Chapter 6. That is, unless one understands that the soldier first identity is a statement of the mentality, not the capabilities. The future soldier possesses a balance of both contact and combat proficiencies as a package of warrior skills. Integration of multiple handiness sets the stage for the “go anywhere” and “do anything” mentalities to coincide with using multidimensional deployment scenarios. With that, we have a new concept of “warrior”. Sean Byrne and Jessica Senehi (2012) point out this new way of seeing warriors. Warriors are committed to principles, they seek knowledge, they learn and practice skills, they have awareness, they aim for power-with relationships and they know the value of interdependence (Byrne & Senehi, 2012, p. 208). The future soldier will be a warrior, well trained and disciplined enough to know when to pack away the combat skills and bring to the fore the other traits that are equally important to his multidimensionality. This may require that future militaries develop new ways of evaluating fitness for deployment and national service altogether.

Future soldiers humanize the peacekept and the peacekept humanize the soldier

Being there to help, soldiers must be interested in what is going on in the conflict space. In telling their stories of helping, the soldiers in this study suggest that those going into a conflict

space must value their own humanity as well as the humanity of those who live in the deployment space. Valuing one's own humanity is corporeal logic. We would rather survive than die. Most of us would prefer not to be maimed or injured. We want to be treated with respect and we want to maintain our integrity and dignity. A number of the soldiers experienced instances when a lived other reinforced aspects of that humanity for them. When that happened, they felt cared about and appreciated. Maintaining the humanitarian outlook is important to understanding that the intervention is not just about separating two warring factions or military forces. The intervention is also about the people caught in between those fighting forces or who have suffered the effects of those forces engaging in violence. This includes the soldier, who is now an informal third party to other hidden aspects of the conflict iceberg.

The soldiers' replication-worthy experiences also suggest that indifference on the part of the local people is a factor in military lived other relations. In the future, local populations in intervention sites would not take the positive self-other interactions for granted. Public responsiveness to soldiers could help to reinforce a sense of relevance for a variety of peace support roles and the soldier's informal third party functions on the ground. Moreover, local people's responsiveness to soldiers could help reinforce a sense of obligation for the job at hand, thus creating public accountability. Boredom, routine, and a lack of motivation happen in deployments. However, according to the lived experiences captured in this study, these are not problems that are fixed by payment incentives or military higher-ups issuing orders to train more. The way that local people respond and show their support could be more relevant to the soldier's attitude within a felt space. The visionaries feel that the soldiers should walk away from deployments feeling that they did something right. Future soldiers will use the local population's

reaction to gauge what is and what is not being done right. Thus, at all levels of operations and interactions, soldiers will employ more contact skills. The future peacekeeper should do the same.

The Force 2046 Goal Checklist

The soldiers' images of Force 2046 highlight a number of military and non-military components. Contributors envision a multidimensional, multimodal and multicapable intervention arrangement that is well supported and embedded within a political solution that understands the historical entanglements and provides opportunities for balanced and trustworthy decisions. Participants imagine that in the future, intervener actions will reflect modified goals and peace operations deployments will be in keeping with those mediated goals. Drawing on their most hopeful and optimistic vein, participants envision a future peace operations force with improvements in three key areas: its mandate, its organization, and its resources and standards.

Force 2046 mission and mandate

A collective summary of the soldiers' visions for the future of peace operations begins with the image that in the future, military operations will be multinational and multifaceted. Peace operations that take on more hybrid and multimodal forms as UN-approved alliance missions would become the new normal. Peace operations could be based on zonal or regional arrangements with militaries from neighbouring countries contributing more to the peace support effort as part of their own regional security framework. The future force will see soldiers commanded and organized under a credible military authority that would ensure that TCNs involved in peace operations achieve and practice a pre-determined standard of professionalism and deportment. The military authority would also ensure that selected TCNs have sufficient capabilities and resources to address the security needs on hand.

Force 2046 organization and structure

In order to achieve this vision of effective peace operations, intergovernmental organizations would need to change. The soldiers imagine that UN reform would allow for more democratic, transparent and informed decision making. The decision making processes would supersede the interests of individual nation-states, more so the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. The vision for Force 2046 would also mean that TCNs would have to be on an equal footing in terms of the resources, equipment and skills that their militaries possess. Failing an evening out of resources, developed states would have to commit to fill the resource gaps of multinational military partners. Deployments would be multidimensional, multicable, multifunctional, and equipped accordingly with force protection and support being primary concerns. If the current suite of Canadian deployment infrastructure is maintained or improved, the CAF's own deployment time would be reduced.

Force 2046 resources, capabilities, and standards

The vision for 2046 operations is that interveners will pay more attention to the historical and cultural landscape of future mission spaces. This would mean that military training and education would include more focus on teaching soldiers about the historical, cultural, and geopolitical aspects of conflict spaces. This kind of learning would flow from a coherent intelligence picture, thereby enhancing the human resources involved in peace operations. Force 2046 will establish standards for success with multiple partners, including the local people in each conflict space. We could Force 2046 success based on achievement of a set target, after which (a) the soldiers exit and some other entity takes over, or (b) the soldiers remain and continue to work towards further peacebuilding goals alongside other partners. Option A is the short-term deployment vision where the soldiers retain their specialization in war fighting.

Option B is the long war option where soldiers remain in theatre and work alongside multiple agencies and partners to achieve changes in local population behaviour over the long term.

Understanding the Experiences and the Lessons for the Future

Phenomenological inquiry provides the basis for understanding lived body or corporeal experiences as the actions, emotions or behaviours of an individual or self within a space or one's interaction with a thing. It provides a basis for understanding the soldier's identity as a relational encounter wherein his sense of who he is reinforced or disrupted by interactions with the domestic other, the organizational other, the non-military other and the multinational other. Felt space and materiality seem to be a mediating factor in the resulting evocation of a warrior identity. The soldiers materially reject the peacekeeper identity and self-characterize as a soldier first. This is a confirmation of their lived thing experiences where their sense of usefulness and their impact on the felt space define the way that they value their own contributions to peace. These complexities in self-other interactions come from understanding the lived experiences of soldiers deployed in peace operations. The phenomenological concept of equipment or useful thing provides a background for understanding the soldiers' expression of their identity in peace support. Robert Rubinstein's (2005) idea of peacekeeping being the UN's moral warrant and a manifestation of the international organization's own social capital is also relevant. As discussed in Chapter 3, Rubinstein (2005) uses evidence from Somalia to support his point about the limitations of exceeding the root metaphor of "pacific world order". He reports that separation of contact between Canadian soldiers and local people in Somalia retained the "no-contact with civilians" stance of traditional military power politics and was inconsistent with the basic metaphor upon which peacekeeping's symbolic capital was accrued (Rubinstein, 2005, p. 541). Rubinstein argues that once the UN peacekeeping mission broke that frame of symbolic capital,

the local Somali population reinterpreted the way that they understood the mission. The outcome for all involved was mission failure.

Reinventing contact and intervening for the right reasons

Force 2046 may be at risk for a similar kind of failure. The soldiers in this study see little hope for major changes in peace operations because it appears that many of the problems are built into the political machinery. The lived body of the military person can be challenged to do more; however, not much more is expected under a framework where peacebuilding is equated with state building. Thus, the soldiers point to their experiences with liberal peacebuilding itself. The approach comes with a certain dynamic that attempts to make the peacekept state seem like it has the potentials of its western interveners. The soldiers are wary of this; so are several scholars like Dennys (2014), Mac Ginty (2008), and Richmond (2004) who each point out that liberal peacebuilding has been seduced by a security approach that is based on “self” and “other” orientations that fetishize the state, its institutions and Northern epistemologies of peace. Still, understanding the soldiers’ deployment experiences could offer hope for future learning and operations improvement. The phenomenological approach uncovers that learning about the soldier’s experience helps to frame the what-it-is of his hopes, thereby leading to a different kind of messaging. The soldier’s hopes for the future provide the alternate consideration that if there is an orientation towards building positive peace on a personal, organizational and national level, future international peace operations could be a force for good.

The soldiers’ hopes for the future reinforce some themes that are commonly raised in the peacebuilding literature. For instance, the soldiers collectively articulate the need to employ a multimodal, multilevel, and multidimensional approach to future operations. Fisher (1997), Sandole (2010), Mac Ginty (2011) and many others identify the same needs. The soldiers see

hope in having a whole of society approach that incorporates local people, NGOs, IGOs and military capabilities into those approaches. They also value some of the objectives of the liberal peace approach. They see relevance and optimism in international cooperative frameworks that are aimed at stabilization through the development of civil society, the rule of law and state institutions. Scholars like Necla Tschirgi (2003), Thania Paffenholz (2010), and Charles Call (2007) would agree on these points. Many of the soldiers see trade, intergovernmental cooperation and globalization playing a role in making the world more peaceable and, by extension, more secure. Dennys (2014), Byrne (2009), and Williams (2007) confirm that these are reliable expectations, even though there may be limitations.

What is interesting is that the soldiers' images of the future seem to be inconsistent with some of the concepts about military culture, even though they reinforce concepts about liberal peacebuilding. For example, contributors to this study anticipate that Force 2046 could be dynamic and positively reinforcing of diversity, values of tolerance, equality and freedom. In putting forward these visions and the current suite of strengths that facilitate achievement of the vision goals, the soldiers project reflections about peace, military skills and self-other orientations that are scarcely addressed in peacebuilding literature. Their hopes collectively invoke a future operation that promotes civic tranquility, counters human rights abuses, and establishes modes of international and local legal authority, while working with mandates that support actions to prevent the loss of innocent lives. The optimism found in the soldiers orientations to incorporating military forces into peacebuilding seem to suggest that positive attitudes, behaviours and contexts (ABCs) can be achieved or, at the very least, should be promoted at all levels of military-other interactions. This is contrary to the awareness for ABC impact highlighted in scholarly work about military culture and the intersections with

masculinism and militarization. For instance, Pouligny (2006), Rubinstein (2008), and Duffey (2000) confirm that international military deployments create opportunities for a myriad of cultural conflicts, especially when members of the military are expected to interact with different local cultures during peace operations. Without adequately adjusting their ideas, perceptions, or behaviour to the different structural and cultural environment, interveners perpetuate cultural violence. Direct and structural forms of violence take place, but the acts look and feel right to the doers of the act who justify it as, among other things, state building (Galtung, 1990).

The soldiers' LEDs illustrate that are aware of how these other acts of violence can affect their ability to "win the peace". The Canadian soldiers described their relationality with the local population as lived other relationships that are based on respect for local cultures and development needs. They believed that their operational roles were more about helping than harming. They felt that high training standards, discipline, and equipment gave them credibility and differentiated them from other multinational partners. Whereas all the soldiers agree with this sentiment of Canadian credibility, a few point out that the credibility is more than the training-in of military principles. It is also about the human rights base that accompanies Canadian multiculturalism and liberal tolerance. The experiences show that the soldiers understand that it is not only direct violence that would cause physical harm to individuals by maiming or killing that defines the deployment space. Their behaviour towards the lived other is also characterised by an understanding that there is unevenly distributed resources and unfulfilled human needs. This structural aspect to the violence has immediate consequences, which the soldiers try to address. For example, there are basic needs such as food, water, clothing and school supplies that are not always satisfied by the designated aid initiatives operating on the

ground. The soldiers explain how they informally attend to these unmet needs within their conflict settings using a variety of personal resources.

This understanding points to the dimensions of the “us/them” distinctions that could lead to polarizations. Resources become a dimension of the Canadian (and Western) choseness as the images for the future are drawn from perceptions of the haves and the have-nots. The people “back home” in Canada; the well-resourced Canadian soldier; the American farmer/reservist who comes to Afghanistan with useful knowledge and expertise represent the haves in this arrangement. The Jamaican and other LDC soldier who depends on advanced military deployment infrastructure and resources, and the people in the deployment space who lack certain skills or things are the have-nots. This idea of helping signals an understanding among participants that the soldier’s relationship with the lived other in the conflict space is a continuous one that requires immediate human needs stop-gaps, as well as long term, deeper fixes that are beyond military skills and capabilities alone. It also signals that wider economic and structural dynamics that influence military resource capabilities may influence military-other interactions within a conflict space.

In this us/them structure, contact with local people becomes a defining characteristic of the improved structural and cultural relationship. Thus, contact is much more than a suite of skills that soldiers use in their interactions with non-belligerents. Contact is a lived other orientation that reflects what Schutz (1967) calls “we-relationships”. In we-relationships, individuals become aware of each other’s lives and create a co-joined social reality and a common stream of consciousness about each other. Unlike “thou-relationships” where individuals proceed in self-other interactions based on a given stock of knowledge used to create ideal types like good guys and bad guys, we-relationships leave us intensely conscious of the

Other in a reciprocal orientation. The soldiers shared several stories that reflect their capacity to build we-relationship within a conflict space. Interestingly, they describe this capacity as part of their soldier first mentality. It is the work of the Strategic Corporal, which Franke (2003) would identify as a differentiated military identity. The Strategic Corporal is a mindset that military operations succeed because of the soldier on ground interacting with local people within their various settings. However, these Canadian soldiers did not see where other national forces had the capability or the motivation to get involved in peace support for these right reasons. Incompetence, lack of resources, a lack of empathy, and absence of human rights “base” are “us/them” differentiations between the Canadian soldier and the multinational other.

Conclusion

This chapter uses the soldiers’ encounters with role, identity, and peace, and the soldiers’ images of the future in a discussion about the ways that understanding the soldier’s lived experience of deployment can shape military peacebuilding effectiveness in the future. The findings and discussion in this study draw attention to the ways that emphatic and motivational understandings of the soldier’s peace support roles, warrior identity, and representations of peace can be incorporated into discussions about effective peacebuilding. The soldier has the potential to identify with informal peace builder roles. Officially, the soldiers in this study deployed as conflict containers and conflict settlers, but they all described instances in which they took it upon themselves to act as peace builders. The experience narratives show that these informal instances of transformative peacebuilding happen at the lowest levels of people-to-people interactions that are not part of the formal, mandated purposes of the mission. The standards for Force 2046 generated from the soldiers’ experiences challenge wholesale presumptions about military culture as being negatively masculinist, although it supports the criticisms about liberal

peacebuilding culture. The understandings calls for deeper interrogation of the soldier's peace support achievements in deployment spaces. The agenda for action sets the tone for future discussions about an overlooked aspect of the peacebuilding reality. Further research could help to deepen understandings of the deployed soldier's peacebuilding mentality. In the upcoming chapter, I identify some important areas for further study and address the significance and limitations of the overall research work.

Chapter 10: Conclusions

NATO strategic doctrine describes peace operations as any number of civil-military deployments meant to support an unfolding political process in a target state (NATO, 2014). The UN also establishes that peace operations are wide-ranging military efforts that include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities (UN, 2008). While this definition of peace operations may clarify why soldiers are useful in international peacebuilding, it does not convey how soldiers experience the spatial, relational, corporeal, temporal, or material adjustments required for serving a political purpose of creating or restoring peace in post-conflict societies. External military forces act formally in peace operations as a conflict containment tool. The phases of conflict and the timing of interventions amplify scholarly perspectives that soldiers' deployment roles are officially dependent on designated conflict phases and mandates. For example, in his analysis of military peacebuilding organization, David Last (2000, p. 82) notes that military forces play the part of third party retaliators, a role that is instrumentally employed to control hawks (fighters) so that the doves (peace builders) can work. Last (2000) suggests that as the conflict evolves, the external military forces would gradually handover to paramilitary and eventually police forces.

This research takes a fine-grained approach to understanding peacebuilding by looking at the lifeworld of soldiers involved in peace operations. The aim of the project is to learn the lived experiences of soldiers deployed to peace operations and then use that understanding to frame an image of military involvement in future peacebuilding. Learning about the soldier's lived experience of peace operations deployment begins with determining the constructed nature of peace, paying attention to the concepts of peace as either minimalist conflict settlement or deeper transformative relationships that include, but are not limited to, violence abatement and

reconstruction. I use a conceptual framework that builds upon the social construction of peace and military identity, as well as models for relationship transformation and ontological agency, to depart from the macro-strategic and organizational focus on peace operations outcomes. The study uses the hermeneutic phenomenological research method to engage the micro-factors of the soldier's peacebuilding experiences, highlighting how twelve Canadian soldiers experience their roles, identities, and peace in their respective peace operations deployments.

Key Findings

Overall, the research objective was to understand the lived experiences of Canadian soldiers deployed to international peace support missions. The findings of this study are related to each soldier's peace support role as a mailed fist and a velvet glove, his identity as *the* useful thing, his micro-definitions of peace, and the soldiers' collective visions for peace operations goal restraint. These findings are considered together in Chapter 9 where I refocus the overarching research question to determine if soldiers can be peace builders and identify actionable items for the future of peace operations. I summarize the key findings of the project in the sub-sections below.

The mailed fist and the velvet glove

The first step was to determine how the soldiers experience their peace support role in deployment. I presented and discussed the lived experience data related this first research sub-question in Chapter 5. The metaphor of "the mailed fist and the velvet glove" along with the Jamaican colloquial of *inna yaad* and *outta yaad* reflect the key finding about the soldiers' peace support role encounters. The soldiers' lived experiences demonstrate that encounters with a peace support role are dependent on an anticipation of the felt space. The soldiers' experiences show that there are different *inna yaad* and *outta yaad* perceptions that follow a deployment

mandate. At home, the soldier works as an aid to the civil power, taking on domestic deployment tasks that require mainly contact skills and a reorientation to his tools; the mentality of the mailed fist is what is sent overseas. The narratives illustrate that the soldier who works in the mailed fist capacity can voluntarily and informally transit into velvet glove roles during international deployments as he or she sees fit. In fulfilling these peace support role transitions, the soldiers engage with different aspects of their materiality. They rely heavily on knowledge, advice, weapons, communication, negotiation and other non-combat skills within the operations landscape. The LEDs show that the soldiers' experiences of these peace support roles and functions change so quickly that it is difficult to make sense of them in real time. The adjustments happen upon the soldier's micro-reappraisals of himself and the lived other during moments of "contact" in the deployment space.

The soldier is *the* useful thing

The next step in this research project was to determine how the soldiers experience their identity in peace operations deployments. The findings for this second research sub-question are presented and discussed in Chapter 6. The soldier is *the* useful thing enhanced by certain tools. The "soldier first" credo and its representation of the soldier as a lived body and lived thing is the central understanding of the soldiers' identity encounters. Military identity is emblazoned in this notion that the soldier is a warrior, but that warrior needs to be understood as a dynamic character that reflects the soldier's sense of utility. The way that the soldiers describe their experiences of being a soldier first does not fully reflect Franke's (2003) concept of warrior or hypermasculine identity. The soldiers describe themselves as useful instruments of government policy and highlight that military training is a process of self-creation and self-discovery in which war-fighting is one aspect of their usefulness and multidimensionality. They nevertheless

describe encounters that reveal a materiality that characterizes usefulness as the ability to engage with a variety of different tasks using various tools other than lethal force. The soldiers also depict care and empathy for the lived other in the deployment space. A related finding about the soldiers' identity encounters is that the soldiers see themselves as different from other multinational forces that engage in peace operations. They applied judgements about effectiveness based on their lived experiences with other militaries and they used Canadian standards for measuring other forces' peace support fit and levels of professionalism. The LEDs illustrate how the soldiers use their felt space at home to frame their identity, drawing distinctions between themselves and the Canadian public, and Canadian soldiers and other soldiers. Despite this differentiation, some of the LEDs reflect that the domestic and international non-military other perceive that all soldiers are the same soldier.

The micro-definitions of peace

The third step in the research study was to identify how the soldiers experienced peace in their deployments. Findings for this third sub-question are discussed in Chapter 7. The main finding from the examination of the data is the micro-definitions of peace. The soldiers' lived experiences of peace are informal, microscopic, and taken for granted by the soldiers themselves. It is through informal peace support tasks that the soldier participates in peacebuilding. Lived other, lived space and lived body experiences illustrate how the soldiers experienced peace as human connections, care and empathy, as well as feelings of normalcy. The soldiers engage with these micro-definitions of peace in moments of unofficial, low-level contact with local people in the deployment space. The micro-definitions of peace are important to understanding how the soldiers change relationships in the conflict space. The LEDs contained descriptions of how the soldiers engaged in third side tasks, acting as Ury's (1999) version of Providers, Equalizers,

Peacekeepers, etc. The soldiers do not recognize these as peace builder roles. They see their actions as part of the mundane, day-to-day existence of working with people in a deployment space. However, they do recognize the agency of the Strategic Corporal, which embodies the mailed fist and the velvet glove duality that they see as necessary for peace operations success.

Modeling goal restraint

Finally a future vision interview was conducted with the soldiers to determine how their lived experiences deployment could inform initiatives for improving future operations. The soldiers' visions, hopes and fears for the future of peace operations validate and reinforce a number of the observations about their encounters with roles, identity and peace. I present the soldiers' images of who should make up the future operations, the suite of skills and resources required for successful military participation in peacebuilding, and the expected outcomes in Chapter 8. To answer this fourth research sub-question, I considered the soldiers' replication-worthy memories and their images of a peace operations force situation 30 years in the future. The soldiers envision a future force where troops operated on a regional or international scale with multimodal, multipartner and multidimensional actors working together. Their replication-worthy experiences highlighted the salience of interpersonal relations and the soldier's contact skills. The soldiers acknowledge some of the failures of liberal peacebuilding culture in their future images, but they did not imagine any other mode of organization beyond the current intergovernmental and security institutions. Additionally, their visions of the future were not unanimous. Each soldier put forward an instance of self-other contact as a positive, replication-worthy experience or memory, there was also agreement about multidimensional military roles and capabilities. However, the soldiers disagreed on exactly what military interveners could and should be expected to accomplish in the future deployment space.

Taken with the rest of the study, the findings from the vision exercise are somewhat contradictory. The soldiers' LEDs illustrate peace builder approaches that transform relationships between the soldier and local people. The soldiers emphasize informal local contact as part of their peace support duality in deployment. Their descriptions of being "coal-faced" suggest that the soldier's velvet glove orientation cannot be divorced from the mailed fist, and that it is the soldier who determines his enactment of that unofficial peace support role. However, this peace support duality and its accompanying identity were not projected into the participants' images of the future. The soldiers remained stuck in the macro-strategic context of state and intergovernmental arrangements. They return to personal memories of positive interpersonal interactions that occur in the local spaces emphasising empathy, interpersonal connections, and use of various conflict resolutions skills and tools. However, the visionaries did not readily connect these skills and behaviours to Force 2046 as peacebuilding fundamentals. They soldiers see peace operations success as politically directed arrangements featuring professional soldiers who are appropriately trained to do what they are mandated to do in deployment. The replication-worthy aspects of the future image narratives helped to reinforce the understandings of role, identity, and peace as personal, informal, micro-level arrangements. When asked to describe an ideal future, the visionaries returned to the macro-strategic outlook and the problems foisted upon them by the political structure and liberal peacebuilding culture.

Significance of the Study

Phenomenological approaches to soldiers' deployment experiences are not new. The research practice is used in other fields to determine the effects of military deployments on community and family health (see for example phenomenological studies on military deployment experiences by Yambo et al. (2016); Keeling, Woodhead, and Fear (2016); and Rea,

Behnke, Huff, and Allen (2015)). This doctoral study brings hermeneutic phenomenological understandings into peace and conflict studies. It unites the qualitative technique with established ideas about peacebuilding goals and works within a small gap in the peace and conflict studies literature. This investigation of Canadian soldiers' peace operations deployment experience is significant for its contribution to the body of knowledge about military participation in peacebuilding in post-conflict and post-war societies. The study makes an original contribution to knowledge by identifying how soldiers, acting as third party interveners in formal peace operations, can informally transit into third side peace builder roles. The study uncovers that the soldiers experience these informal peace support functions in a way that is considered mundane and taken for granted. But when viewed within the socio-political context of post-conflict peacebuilding and transformative peacebuilding goals, these micro-level experiences represent significant areas for future study that can help to improve military peacebuilding effectiveness. Another significant feature of the study is that it validates the soldier's lived experiences by using hermeneutic phenomenological research techniques to identify and interpret the essence of peace operation deployments for this group of individuals. The findings illustrate how experience-based understandings help to identify the ways that these soldiers define and experience peace, their deployment roles, and their military identity. While the findings are not generalizable, they provide a basis for new avenues of thinking that could guide future research and inform planner and practitioner actions.

Implications of the Findings

Soldiers on deployment are presumed to have limited roles that fall out of their situational learning (Franke, 2003). The military member develops skills based on vocation; when the vocation is war fighting or combat, the assumption is that the deployed soldier will maintain the

containment role or pursue other tasks that are directly related to the larger picture of military combat effectiveness, conflict stabilization or post-conflict reconstruction. Military interveners within peace operations have no legitimacy, standing, or authority to pursue roles as third side providers, teachers, bridge builders, mediators, arbiters, equalizers or healers. Yet, the findings of this study indicate that these kinds of informal roles and related peacebuilding skills are just as relevant to the soldier in overseas deployments. This investigation of lived deployment experiences show that even without those formal designations, soldiers can transit through many of these peace builder functions as they engage in self-other interactions with people in the conflict space. Oftentimes the soldier's occupation of these informal roles is unknown and not understood, as Botes (2003) reports is typical of informal third parties. One of the ten bases for a peace culture is vitalizing what is small (Armengol, 1991). To vitalize the small is to engage in the everyday and seemingly mundane actions of a peace culture that are taken for granted. This study makes apparent what is taken for granted in military-other relationships in deployment spaces. It also vitalizes the micro-peace experiences that soldiers can facilitate or enjoy during peace operations. Practitioners and planners could use this understanding of human and interpersonal actions to evaluate all non-belligerent and local stakeholder interfaces between all soldiers, regardless of their combat or civil-military mandates in the deployment space.

The agenda for action derived from the soldiers' images of the future contradicts understandings about military culture as well as presumptions that military strategy is exclusively focused on a one-sided view of the norms and ideals associated with direct, cultural and structural violence. A lesson for the future emerging from this hermeneutic study is the need to rethink the way that the soldier's micro-definitions of peace, which are lived in face-to-face interactions at the lowest levels of a conflict, can influence overall states of peace. Titunik (2000)

observes that “although warfare requires viciousness, actual participation, ironically, appears to diminish qualities of anger, indignation, vengeance, and aggression that are associated with ‘masculinity’ (Titunik, 2000, p. 238). She further observes that the dominant image of warfare as “machismo” is undone when a closer look at warrior philosophy and combat experiences show that values typically associated with women – tenderness, protectiveness, nurturing, self-sacrifice and submissiveness – are used in warfare training to diminish qualities associated with raw aggression in order to create an effective fighting force (Titunik, 2000, p. 239-240). These points, taken with the soldiers’ hopes for the future, provide a different way to understand the soldier’s perspectives about peace. The understanding boils down to the soldier’s personal and professional commitments to valuing peace and social justice. The soldiers in this study are hopeful that what is trained-in will facilitate effective transition between peace support roles and provide the confidence for future soldiers to exert influence towards a larger peacebuilding goal. Ultimately, the participants’ hopes rest on a lived other orientation that derives from a felt space where diversity, equality and freedom lead to high levels of public and personal accountability for just actions *inna yaad* and *outta yaad*.

If planners and practitioners validate the soldier’s informal third side peace builder function, seeing it as one way that soldiers can participate in and exhibit a peace culture while on deployment, the distinctions between conflict settlement and transformative peacebuilding outcomes could be diminished. For example, the soldiers in the study often claimed that there was “no peace to keep”; identifying that peacekeeping is a misunderstood, overused, and heavily misapplied term. They rejected the peacekeeper identity, seeing themselves as useful tools deployed instrumentally by a legitimate authority. With this problem of no peace to keep, the soldiers felt that the term peacekeeper was a misnomer in a larger sense. They did not see

themselves as doing anything to keep or introduce peace in the deployment space, even when they wore the UN blue beret or helmet. Many saw their jobs not as peacekeeping or peacebuilding, but as doing the same job that they did back home. For example, they drove vehicles, arranged meetings, or provided security details, just as they would have done in any other operation. In hostile environments they engaged in fire fights, interdicted insurgents, patrolled zones, or trained local security forces.

Understanding the soldiers' experiences with peace support roles and identities uncover the way that the ideas of peace and the expectations of military peacebuilding effectiveness are constructed in a way that overshadows the ontological agency of the being. The soldiers define a very limited picture of peace in their description of official roles and actions. They overlook and undervalue relationship transformation routines that occur in their informal interactions. For example, there are those who played soccer with local children, listened to local people's stories, or went shopping in the local markets. These soldiers did not see themselves as fulfilling a picture of peace or peacebuilding in these scenarios. However, if we use Lederach's (1997) integrative framework as a guide, these are small, micro-level examples of relationship transformation activities that occur in the personal dimension. Lederach (1997) shows how relationship transformation is the outermost parameter of peacebuilding while crisis intervention is only a short-term component that is nested within it. These aspects of peacebuilding are taken for granted and pushed out of conversations about the soldier's role in peace support. Focus on the conflict management outcomes and stakeholders' perspectives do not capture the micro-definitions of peace that can be found in the soldier's actions. Practitioners, planners and stakeholders may find these micro-definitions useful in understanding the potentials for military

deployment contributions in the future. The understandings may also help to determine the standards for troop selection in the future.

Limitations of the Study

Lack of generalization. One significant limitation of the phenomenological method used in this study is the inability to make generalizing statements based on the research outcomes. Phenomenology is not a theory generating method of inquiry. Its goal is to facilitate understanding of an experience, encounter or phenomena so that the knowledge of the experience can help to illuminate meaning, generate deeper understandings, and thoughtful and tactful action (van Manen, 1990, p. 23). This study cannot prove inductively derived facts about military contributions to peace or Canadian soldiers in general; that has to be the focus of another body of research. In the vein of the qualitative research approach, phenomenology is less concerned with generalizability and more concerned with understanding the context of a problem and explaining what quantitative data cannot (Creswell, 2007, p. 40). I note the lack of generalization as a limitation out of awareness for the enduring debates about research approaches. Nevertheless, the phenomenological approach offers a systematic structural analysis of the taken for granted. Consequently, the study offers understanding that could inform praxis and the way that we think about certain policies and projects that are correlated to the soldier's experience in peace operations deployment.

The future image interview. I asked participants in their final interview to engage in an adaptation of Boulding's (1988) future visioning exercise. The goal was to have participants envision a successful peace support mission and environment based on reflections upon their own deployment experiences overseas. Responses from some participants in this stage of the data collection tended to elicit more critiques about the existing system and infrastructure for

doing international peace operations, rather than concepts for a future product or institution. While some participants gave themselves over to optimistic visioning, most persons opted to voice their perspectives about what is wrong with the systems in place. As a result, data collected in this phase of the research process varies from participant criticisms about the international peacebuilding infrastructure to constructive concepts of what the future may look like. The challenges in directing the final interviews may have been as a result of how I worded the questions, or it may have been because the image questions came after a lull in the interview schedule for most of the participants. The variety in the responses may also have been due to the short period of time participants had to ruminate over the questions. Boulding (1988) features the visioning exercise as a multi-day practitioner workshop underlined by sessions of reflective practice. For this project, I engaged participants in a one to two hour long discussion of a future that they were no longer involved with. It may have been that participants did not feel sufficiently connected to the problem or well enough informed to make projections about changes for the future. More attention has to be paid to the sample group and timeframe when a future visioning model is being considered. Future research should consider these factors.

Another limitation of the future vision phase of the study is its timing. Since the interviews concluded, Britain voted to leave the European Union. The United States now has a new populist president that has rebuffed a number of cooperative agreements and intergovernmental alliances. A few participants mentioned these events as they were beginning to unfold in the early part of 2016. If the vision exercise interviews occurred after these significant global developments, participants may have had different hopes and fears about the solidarity of Western alliance operations and Canada's role in international peacebuilding. This

is scope for continued research to determine how soldiers make sense of these new developments in their lifeworlds.

Experiences of the peacekept. Missing from this study are the perspectives and lived experiences of local people who live in the deployment setting and are subject to the power asymmetries of international peacebuilding interventions. More research is needed to determine if the positive outcomes and micro-definitions of peace are the same for local people who engage in one-on-one interactions with soldiers. Nadim Rouhana (2004) identifies that group identities and power asymmetries can influence perceptions of justice and legitimacy, and Philip Hultquist (2013) offers that a monopoly of specialized technology and lethal force may play a role in determining conflict settlement outcomes. There are also hidden power asymmetries of culture and gender (see for example Razack (2000) and Leatherman (2011)) to be considered. Because this project focuses on the lived experiences of twelve Canadian soldiers in peace operations deployment, questions about the local population and the application of the study beyond its contributors must be addressed as different projects.

Further Research

In this doctoral research project, I use interpretive phenomenological research methods to investigate an identified gap in the peacebuilding literature. Yet, the understandings of soldiers' roles, identity and peace encounters derived from this study are just the beginning. Three areas of additional research are immediately apparent. The first area for further research is to study the experiences of soldiers within a single unit and deployment space. It would be useful to focus on one peace operations mission and identify the experiences of soldiers belonging to the same military unit and deployment timeline. This new phenomenological study could help to qualify or reinforce some of the experience themes identified in this doctoral research. The new

extended study could also help to strengthen recommendations for future actions. Relating the discussion of the findings to a specific peace operation's goals and outcomes may also be worthwhile. As well, this new project could incorporate the lived experiences of the peacekeeper in the specific deployment setting.

Another key area for future research is to expand the scope and nature of the project. The experience themes generated from this doctoral study could be used to inform a quantitative research approach that tests the extent to which these soldiers' peacebuilding experiences and the micro-definitions of peace can be generalized to the CAF. This quantitative measurement could be useful for generating measurements for Canadian military peacebuilding awareness. The study may move into creating comparative indicators about the factors that contribute to positive peacebuilding awareness among Canadian soldiers. Ultimately, that research could give way to cross-national comparisons among TCNs. A third area for future research would be to assess the images of Force 2046 goals through an action research programme. The "Agenda for Action" in Chapter 9 could form the basis of an action research strategy that is used in concert with planners and practitioners, in simulated or real world deployments, to investigate the potentials for integrating formal and informal peace support roles. Practitioners and policy makers could be invited to analyze the document and implement ways of achieving Force 2046 vision goals as they monitor the peacebuilding outcomes of the project.

Conclusion

This thesis represents an innovative approach to understanding the soldier's roles, identity and contributions to peace. The study focuses on the experiences of twelve Canadian soldiers who were deployed on various peace operations from 1990 to 2014. Among other things, the study identifies that there are ways in which soldiers encounter their peace support

roles, military identities, and peace that are not discussed in the peace and conflict studies literature. Use of the hermeneutic phenomenological research strategy is a significant methodological practice that has helped to illuminate the soldiers' experiences in deployment. This thesis brings together data and analysis that uncovers the micro-definitions of peace, the importance of re-imagining military-other contact, and the soldiers' feelings about the purpose of peace operations. These understandings come from investigating the lifeworld of the soldier, which shows that the individual soldier possesses an ontological agency that is constrained, but not defined by the structure of military work. The soldier's encounters with peace, his understandings of peace, his deployment role and organizational identity are not, at this point, generalizable. However, this research provides insight and an agenda for future action that can be used to shape future soldiers' experiences and peacebuilding outcomes.

Epilogue

At the end of her book on violence, Elizabeth Englander (2007) asks, “Do you “understand” violence now?” (p. 193). While it may be a bit far reaching to presume that one could understand a phenomenon after reading one text, the line is emblematic of what it means to “understand” something. Englander’s employs the question to drive home the point that violence is not one, static thing. Understanding it means accepting that it is in a sense, un-understandable. The important thing is to engage with the phenomena in all its various forms. This study has been about understanding the soldier’s roles and identities in peace support. It would be facetious of me to ask if you now “understand” soldiers’ roles and identities or their contributions to peacebuilding. Understanding is one-sided. It can only come about through the perspective of the person who wishes to interpret the information. Understanding is not theorizing. I cannot (and did not) attempt to explain or generalize results to create a grand theory of military strategy or a meta-theory of peace. My method for understanding is to go back to the human and see how soldiers have made sense of the events that shaped their lifeworlds. My understanding is about seeing how the essences of people’s experiences take meaning within the contemporary liberal peacebuilding environment.

Talking about military operations and peace is not an easy task when one has to walk a very thin space between peacebuilding relationships and micro-factors. One will notice that the soldier is left out of the literature gathered for the review of the problem. Significantly, readings of military participation in peacebuilding point to representations of peace and the discourse of peacekeeping, but it does not include the soldier’s experience or perspective. I, however, am not challenging the literature. This research is about looking at a problem from a new perspective, not as a person who wants to peace military strategy; nor as a person who wants to make peace

operations more robust. The goal of this research is simply to facilitate new ways to understand the soldier's roles and contributions to peacebuilding.

Admittedly, my own pre-suppositions about the soldier and peace operations have evolved throughout this study. I began this research project with my own idealization of peace operations. In my head, I had developed the picture of the soldier as a human security specialist. I expected to hear that military professionalism is all it takes to do the job of peacebuilding right. Soldiers need only engage in role differentiation where they imbibe the peacekeeper and warrior identity into their professional conduct (Franke, 2003). My journey through the literature and with the soldiers in the telling of their experiences has left me with a different picture. I now feel that differentiation can never be enough. Transcendence or integration is the only way to engage in transformative peacebuilding. Only this transcendence does not require a superordinate military identity that subsumes warrior and peacekeeper in the way that Franke (2003) explains it. Transcendence, in the way that Galtung (2007) uses the term, means rising above limited goal orientations. Transcendent military identity requires a superordinate human identity as well as humanizing and humanitarian approaches to deployment activities. Could the peace builder be that transcendent military identity?

Without an understanding of the soldiers' potential for achieving this transcendence, we will continue to search for lions. But, all that we will find are dinosaurs – those anachronistic representations of a military structure that are deemed ill suited to the liberal paradigm, and unicorns – fanciful, yet unrealistic ideals of what military forces should become in the name of building peace. Somewhere in between the dinosaur and the unicorn is a creature that lives the reality of deployment and tries to build its own peace. It behooves us to understand the creature and exemplify its attitudes towards the lived other in peacebuilding arrangements.

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Appendix I: Consent Form



Ph.D. Program in
Peace and Conflict Studies

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CONSENT FORM

Research Project Title: Warrior, Occupier, Intervener, Community Builder and/or Peacekeeper? Understanding Military Peacekeeping Roles and Identities and the Contribution to Peace.

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This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.

Date: _____

Dear: _____

Thank you for your interest in my PhD thesis research on the experience of military peacekeepers. I value the unique contributions that you can make to my study and I am excited about the possibility of your participation in it. The purpose of this form is to

reiterate some things that we have already discussed and to secure your consent to participate in this study. The first 5 pages of this consent form outline the basic information about the study, its procedures and any potential risks and benefits to you. The last page of this document is the participation consent sheet, which you will sign and return with the pre-interview questionnaire that is attached. The pre-interview questionnaire should only be completed after you provide your written consent. In that questionnaire I ask about some basic information that would be helpful to me in preparing for your interviews.

a. Purpose of the Research

The research model I am using is a qualitative one through which I am seeking comprehensive descriptions or depictions of your experience as an international military peacekeeper. This qualitative approach will help me to answer my central research question of how experiences in military role and identity management can help us to understand international peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Through your participation, I hope to understand the essence of military training, your peacekeeping deployment preparation, peacekeeping practice, and your experience of identity formation and transition. I am seeking vivid, accurate and comprehensive portrayals of what the experiences were like for you: your thoughts, feelings, and behaviours as well as situations, events, places, and people connected with your experience. I also want to use the information that I gather from understanding your experiences to generate a design for an improved peacekeeping product. I am seeking your application of your own experiences to a future visioning exercise in which I will record your description of what peacekeeping could be like in 30 years time.

This research is being conducted as part of the degree requirement for the PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies and is being done under the supervision of Dr. Sean Byrne, my doctoral studies supervisor. Although a thesis report is the immediate goal of this study, the findings of this research may inform academic journal and book publications in the near and distant future. In particular, the results of the visioning exercise and your feedback on the policy recommendations that will be included in the thesis may be widely circulated and could be used to inform further research or government policies.

b. Confidentiality

Information will be collected from you about your military training and peacekeeping experiences in 6 different one-on-one, face-to-face interviews with me. All information about you and any data collected from you will be kept confidential. Only I will know any personal information such as your name, years of service and units. Any information you provide to me in the course of the interviews will have such personal identifiers removed or coded as I transcribe the interview recordings. It is this “anonymized” data that will be used in the data analysis and in subsequent publications and dissemination of findings.

My doctoral studies supervisor and representatives of the University of Manitoba’s Research Ethics Board and the Research Quality Management/Assurance Office may also require access to the data for safety and quality assurance purposes. In the event that they need to examine the data, they will only have access to anonymized data and will not be able to identify who the information came from.

c. Recruitment Procedure

At some point in the research, I may ask you to help me identify other former military peacekeepers who may qualify to participate in this study. Should I ask you for your assistance in identifying other persons to recruit, you should know that you are not obligated to assist in the recruitment for this study. You should also know that you are not being asked to recruit study participants on my behalf. If you know someone who is no longer serving in the armed forces and was deployed on an international peacekeeping or peace support mission between 1990 and 2012, I may ask you to share their name and contact information with me or put me in touch with that individual. If you do decide to assist in this regard, I will attempt the recruitment of this individual for the study. You can refuse to share anyone else's name and contact information without any prejudice to your continued participation in this study.

Depending on the information that is collected in this study, I may, in the future, ask you to participate in another research study. If that happens, it will be after this study is concluded and it will involve a completely new process for recruitment, information, and have a different title and consent form. If and when that time comes, you will be notified of the new research study and I will ask you then if you are interested in participating. Please note that you are not obligated to participate in any future studies if you consent to take part in this one.

d. Research Procedures

This research model involves a qualitative data collection and analysis model called hermeneutic phenomenology. It involves using multiple face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews to gather and analyze data related to the research subject. In addition to informing an understanding of the experience of doing military peacekeeping, the data collected will also be used to inform the design of an intervention model that is based on an adaptation of a future imaging exercise. Up to six interviews will be conducted. Each interview will last approximately 1 to 2 hours and will be conducted in a mutually convenient location. The study has two phases.

Phase One: Up to Four semi-structured interviews will be conducted during this phase of the study. The first interview will identify your naïve descriptions of the phenomenon through open-ended questions about your military training, identity formation and peacekeeping experiences. The second interview will be conducted after reviewing the first interview recording. Lived experiences embedded within your telling of your experiences will be used to generate “experience” themes. These themes will be explored further in the second interview to ensure thicker description and deeper identifications of your intentions. You will be provided with an interpretive summary of the themes generated from the first two interviews. The third and fourth interviews will allow you to further narrate your involvement with these “experience” themes. In the third interview, you will be asked to reflect on the summary of the experience themes and to confirm if the findings appropriately explain your experiences. In the fourth interview, you will be asked to reflect on another interpretive summary that contains “learning” themes that are generated from the hermeneutic analysis of the discourse and rhetoric embodied within your narrative of the experiences.

Phase Two: This phase will focus on applying the “learning” themes uncovered in phase one to a future visioning exercise adapted from Elise Boulding's future imaging workshop exercise, *Visioning a World Without Weapons*. I will ask you some questions about what you think peacekeeping could or should look like sometime in the future based on your own military

peacekeeping experience. In the fifth interview, you will be asked about your hopes and fears for the future and your vision of a future peacekeeping product, given the learning themes that are identified. This information will then be used to generate another interpretive summary that will be taken back to you in a final interview where we will discuss the implications for this peacekeeping vision.

e. Potential Risks and Benefits

Participants in this study will be exposed to no more risk than they would experience in their everyday life. However, recalling and discussing memories about activities that took place in a conflict environment may evoke feelings of emotional distress or trigger traumatic episodes. This study will ask you questions about your military training and peacekeeping experiences. Recalling and reliving those experiences may evoke different kinds of trauma as the study progresses. In the event that you experience any emotional distress or trauma, I have provided you with a list of trauma counseling and rehabilitative resources so that you may refer to them at any time. I also strongly encourage you to seek the advice of a family member, close friend, or your health care provider as you consider the risks and benefits of this study.

In the event that your participation in this study triggers emotional distress or traumatic episodes for you, I will immediately stop the interview and offer you the opportunity to take a break from the research. You have the option of either resuming the interview at a convenient time or withdrawing from the study entirely without prejudice. You will also have the opportunity to let me know how participation in this study is affecting you. I will begin each interview session with a quick check-in to verify your continued ability and consent to participate in the study before continuing with the recorded interview.

Despite the risk of emotional distress or the triggering of a traumatic episode, this study may be of benefit to you if you choose to participate. The study offers people the chance to tell their stories of their experiences, which may have a cathartic effect. Participating in the study also offers former military personnel a chance to act as co-researchers in an understudied issue that may help to demystify the military organization. It may also help you to understand your overall contributions to international peace. Additionally, your feedback in the action plan for improving peacekeeping for human security gives you an opportunity to turn your experiences into tangible recommendations that may influence public policy and future research.

f. Credit and Remuneration

There will be no compensation for participating in this study. Depending on the location and duration of our scheduled interviews, I may provide coffee and light snacks. You may be reimbursed for travel expenses associated with getting to the interview locations. This reimbursement will be for public transportation expenses only and will be capped at \$25 CAD per interview.

g. Withdrawal from the Study

You are under no obligation to participate in this study. You may withdraw from participating at any point in time without prejudice. You may also choose to not complete any interview or the pre-interview questionnaire or to not answer any question that I may ask in an interview or on that questionnaire. If you wish to withdraw from this study, you can inform me in person, by email, by phone or by surface mail using the respective methods of contact listed on the first page of this consent form. If you choose to withdraw after the interviews have begun, you may request that your information be removed from the study. Once your

information is removed from the study, it I will destroy it immediately.

h. Dissemination of Research Results

The findings from this study will be used to fulfill the thesis requirement for the PhD degree in Peace & Conflict Studies. However, elements of the research findings may be used in publications and conferences in the near and distant future. I may also seek to have the completed PhD thesis developed into an academic text. Findings arising from phase two of the research study will be included in the final thesis report as a conflict intervention system design that focuses on policy recommendations to improve international peacekeeping. This particular component may also be disseminated separately to other practitioners and policy makers as a further research program. It may also be used in academic publications on its own.

In all cases, I will present the findings of the research without revealing any personal identifying information or characteristics of any participant. I will only use quotations from interview transcripts that have been anonymized.

i. Destruction of Data

All audio recordings of interviews will be destroyed immediately after the interview is transcribed. All personal identifiers of participants will be removed upon transcription. Those identifiers will be coded and kept in a safe and locked location within my home office and on my password protected computer until the final thesis report is submitted, which is expected to be in October 2017. All participants' identifying information will be destroyed by shredding and/or deleting on 27 October 2017. I intend to keep all anonymized transcripts of the interviews indefinitely.

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and/or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

The University of Manitoba Research Ethics Board(s) and a representative(s) of the University of Manitoba Research Quality Management/Assurance office may also require access to your research records for safety and quality assurance purposes. This research has been approved by the Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (J- FREB). If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the J-FREB Secretariat, Maggie Bowman, at 1(204)-474-7122. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Participant Consent

I agree to participate in the research study titled: “*Warrior, Occupier, Intervener, Community Builder or Peacekeeper? Understanding Military Peacekeeping Roles and Identities and the Contribution to Peace*”. I understand the purpose and nature of this study and that I am participating voluntarily. I understand that my participation in this study may involve the risk of emotional distress and trauma. I grant permission for each interview to be audio recorded. I grant permission for the data to be used in completing a PhD degree, including a thesis and any future publications. I understand that my name or any other identifying information will not be used or included in the publication of findings. I have read or have had read to me all the details of this consent form.

If you agree to each of the following, please place a check mark in the corresponding box. If you do not agree, leave the box blank.

- My questions have been addressed ()
- I wish to receive a summary of the findings ()
- I wish to provide feedback on the action plan document ()
- If you agree to receive the summary or provide feedback on the action plan, how do you wish to receive the documents? Email () Surface Mail/Regular Post ()

Address results should be sent to (email or regular post):

Participant Name: _____

Participant Signature: _____ Date: _____

Researcher Signature: _____ Date: _____

Pre-Interview Questionnaire

Title of the Study: Warrior, Occupier, Intervener, Community Builder or Peacekeeper? Understanding Military Peacekeeping Roles and Identities and the Contribution to Peace.

Thank you for your interest in my thesis research on the experiences of international military peacekeepers. Please take a few minutes to complete this short questionnaire. The aim of the questionnaire is to ensure that my interview questions are, as much as possible, targeted to your military deployment experience. Any information collected throughout this research study, including your answers to this questionnaire, will be protected to ensure your confidentiality and anonymity. **Please return this questionnaire with your signed Consent Form.**

You do not have to answer any question if you do not wish to do so and you are free to withdraw from this study at any point in time. If you choose to withdraw from the study, you have the option of having any information you already provided included in the final research report or removed in its entirety.

Participant Name: _____

1. For how many years were you a member of the armed forces?

2. Please identify the country/name of the armed forces in which you served.

3. What UN peacekeeping or multinational peace support missions were you deployed to from 1990 to 2012?

4. In what year did you retire/receive discharge from the armed forces?

Appendix II: Interview Schedule

Interview Questions (Phase One of the Study)

Questions for Interview # 1 (may be broken into two interview sessions if necessary)

Preface: I am interested in understanding your experiences in UN peacekeeping and/or multinational peace support operations deployment experiences, your military training experience and your identity experiences. The aim at this stage of the research is to understand and collate those experiences as you tell them. I have three general questions, but I may ask some more specific questions as we go along to clarify or ensure that I understand your answer.

1. Peacekeeping Experiences

- a. I understand that you have been deployed on (number) peacekeeping missions. Tell me about your experiences.
 - i. What aspects, incidents and people connected with the experience stand out for you?
 - ii. How did the experience affect you?
 - iii. What changes in yourself do you associate with that experience?
 - iv. What feelings were generated by the experience?
 - v. What bodily changes or states were you aware of at the time?
 - vi. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about this experience?

2. Military Training and Peacekeeping Preparation

- a. You joined the armed forces in (year). Tell me about your military training experience.
 - i. What aspects, incidents and people connected with the experience stand out for you?
 - ii. How did the experience affect you?
 - iii. What changes in yourself do you associate with that experience?
 - iv. What feelings were generated by the experience?
 - v. What bodily changes or states were you aware of at the time?
 - vi. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about this experience?
- b. Tell me about your experience with pre-deployment training.
 - i. What aspects, incidents and people connected with the experience stand out for you?
 - ii. How did the experience affect you?
 - iii. What changes in yourself do you associate with that experience?
 - iv. What feelings were generated by the experience?
 - v. What bodily changes or states were you aware of at the time?
 - vi. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about this experience?

3. Identity Formation and Transition

- a. Main question: What does it feel like to be called a peacekeeper?
 - i. What aspects of your experience in being called a peacekeeper can you identify with?
 - ii. Were there any moments when you felt that you could not match what you were doing with what you were expected or trained to do?
 - iii. Were there any moments when you felt that you could not match what you were experiencing while on deployment with the expectations that you had before you were deployed?
 - iv. How did the experience affect you?
 - v. What changes in yourself do you associate with that experience?
 - vi. What feelings were generated by the experience?
 - vii. What bodily changes or states were you aware of at the time?
 - viii. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about this experience?

Questions for Interview # 2

Preface: I am interested in understanding your experiences as a military peacekeeper in terms of the actual peacekeeping deployment experiences, your military training experience and your identity experiences. The aim at this stage of the research is to go deeper into what was understood from our first interview by looking into some of those experiences. The memo that I sent you summarizes the description of those experiences and organizes them into themes.

1. Peacekeeping Experience

- a. Can you tell me if the interpretive memo totally and clearly represents your experience?
 - i. Does this accurately reflect your experience?
 - ii. What else can you tell me about this experience?
 - iii. Is there anything that you would change about this experience?

2. Military Experience

- a. Can you tell me if the interpretive memo totally and clearly represents your experience?
 - i. Does this accurately reflect your experience?
 - ii. What else can you tell me about this experience?
 - iii. Is there anything that you would change about this experience?

3. Identity Experience

- a. Can you tell me if the interpretive memo totally and clearly represents your experience?
 - i. Does this accurately reflect your experience?
 - ii. What else can you tell me about this experience?
 - iii. Is there anything that you would change about this experience?

Questions for Interview # 3

Preface: As you reflect on this latest interpretive memo, I would like you to think about the notes that I have made regarding common experiences across participants in this study. Today I would like us to go into these experiences a little more to ensure that I have captured the essences and meanings of these experiences for you in ways that are (a) as intended and (b) reflect the community experience.

1. Peacekeeping Experience

- a. Can you tell me if the interpretive memo totally and clearly represents your experience?
 - iv. Does this accurately reflect your experience?
 - v. What else can you tell me about this experience?
 - vi. Is there anything that you would change about this experience?

2. Military Experience

- a. Can you tell me if the interpretive memo totally and clearly represents your experience?
 - iv. Does this accurately reflect your experience?
 - v. What else can you tell me about this experience?
 - vi. Is there anything that you would change about this experience?

3. Identity Experience

- a. Can you tell me if the interpretive memo totally and clearly represents your experience?
 - iv. Does this accurately reflect your experience?
 - v. What else can you tell me about this experience?
 - vi. Is there anything that you would change about this experience?

Questions for Interview # 4 (may be merged with interview # 3 if necessary)

Preface: This part of the interview is going to take a look back at all interviews that we have done to date; but I want to shift focus from talking about your experiences to understanding what those experiences may mean. In the memo provided, I highlighted my interpretations. The aim here is to get a better sense of what influences these experiences. Tell me what you think about these interpretations.

1. Peacekeeping Experience

- a. What do you think about these interpretations?
- b. Tell me what you take peace to mean.
- c. How does your experience in deployment contribute to this view?

2. Military Experience

- a. What do you think about these interpretations?
- b. Tell me what you take security to mean.
- c. How does your experience in the military contribute to this view?

3. Identity Experience

- a. What do you think about these interpretations?
- b. Tell me what you take military identity to mean.
- c. Tell me what you take militarization to mean.

Interview Questions (Phase Two of the Study)

Questions for Interview # 5

Preface: Today I would like us to talk about the future of peace support operations, including peacekeeping. I am going to ask you to do an exercise. It is my adaptation of a workshop strategy called *Visioning a World without Weapons* by a peace studies scholar named Elise Boulding. Only we are not going to talk about a world without weapons, we will be talking about visioning a future peace operations product that is based on your own knowledge and experience in military deployments.

1. Given your military background and the experiences that we have discussed throughout this study, and if we are to draw on your most hopeful and optimistic vein, what would you like to see realized in military peace support operations in the future?
 - a. What are your hopes for the future of military peacekeeping/peace support deployments?
 - b. What are your fears for the future of military peacekeeping/peace support deployments?
 - c. What are the specific goals that you would like to see attained or accomplished?
2. If you can think back to any of the experiences that you shared throughout this study, or any that comes to mind now that you did not share before, if you could identify a “good” or “positive” memory, one that you would enjoy reliving or re-experiencing, tell me what it is about that memory or experience that you would like to see replicated in that future operation. **NB. If the participant is unable to come up with a “good” memory, I will ask them to recall something in their deployment experience that they would like to go back in time to change.**
 - a. How did that experience affect you at that time?
 - b. How does recalling that experience make you feel now?
 - c. Why is it important that other people experience this?
3. If you could stand in the future, let us say the year is 2046, thirty years from today, and see an improved and successful peace operations product, what would you imagine that product would look like?
 - a. Describe what is happening in this future.
 - b. Who is involved or not involved in this picture of international peace support?
 - c. How does this future operation provide peace?
 - d. What is most interesting or different in the future that is not currently present in peacekeeping/peace operations?
4. What kinds of structures, organizations, rules or systems exist in this future to enable that kind of peace support operation?

- a. How is social, cultural, family or political life for the soldier organized?
 - b. What kinds of national and international political or economic or cultural systems are in place?
 - c. How does civic and cultural life maintain itself in your local community, nation, and planet in this future image?
5. Let us continue to imagine that you are in 2046 and observing this new and improved operation product, can you imagine or fantasize about what would have happened to bring about those changes in the years leading up to 2046?
- a. Can you imagine what would have happened last year (in 2045) to bring about the world of 2046?
 - b. What would have happened in subsequent five-year increments to bring about the changes?
 - c. Who may have acted to bring about those changes?