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M.A. Thesis U. of M.

1914

ACCEPTED IN CANDIDATURE
for the
MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE
May 15th, 1914


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CANADA
AND
IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
1914.

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*Approved for
M.A. Thesis
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P R E F A C E .

The story of our Empire and the study of its future for many years has had for me a peculiar charm. To the lover of history the rise and fall of nations cannot fail deeply to impress the mind, and it is a natural, almost unconscious tendency to contrast features of their development with our own; to seek the cause of their decadence and apply the lesson to avert a similar fate. To do so, at some point or other leads us to the question of defence.

No one can be more sensitive than the writer of his limitations in dealing with this very important and difficult theme. Breadth of view and amplitude of knowledge, on an issue affecting a vast world Empire can only fully be attained by travel and by a study at first hand of those manifold conditions and facts, geographical and otherwise which in the subject of Imperial defence, even restricted in application to Canada, is so essentially a pre-requisite to intelligent discussion.

The extreme difficulty of properly dealing with such an intricate question as Imperial defence in the space of a short review is only realized when the attempt is made. The constant necessity of assumption - of sweeping generalization and even of important omission leaves one's argument open to attack and almost induces the view that a subject of more limited scope would for our purpose here have served us better. Of suitable themes connected with our

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CHAPTER I.

I N T R O D U C T I O N .

Of the making of books it is said there is no end. The statement is almost equally true or at any rate not beyond the bounds of truth that there is no end to what has been written and spoken on the subject of Imperial Defence and Canada's relation thereto. For almost half a century this theme, or some of its many phases, has from time to time, and of late years, continuously engaged the earnest thought and attention of statesmen, historians, politicians, constitutionalists, military authorities, naval experts and indeed practically all intelligent and serious-minded citizens.

We are not surprised to find therefore that the question is daily made the subject of editorial comment in our newspapers, particularly since the question of Canada's participation in the naval defence of the Empire has become an issue in our politics¹. Magazine and journal, book and pamphlet are alike favourite channels utilized by students and writers for the communication of their views and ideas. It is here that we find some of the ablest discussions of an intricate problem. In addition cognizance is to be taken of a veritable mass of literature emanating from defence leagues, navy leagues, nationalistic clubs, peace societies and bureaus², confederation leagues and imperialistic organizations, all bearing, directly

or indirectly, on some one or other phase of this exceedingly extensive subject. And last but not least in volume we might mention that large body of official and quasi-official literature contained in Hansard and in other reports of committees, conferences and parliamentary bodies.

All this written material which defies even a cursory perusal (not a little of it indeed being unworthy even of such, though in the main it represents real public opinion) is but an index of the intense public interest aroused in our subject. It is doubtful if in Canada any question³ since confederation has aroused such heated discussion and controversy and attracted such widespread attention throughout the length and breadth of our land as the problem before us. Indeed it has aroused a world-wide interest and attention, for, the important bearing and influence of the solution of this question upon the nations of the world are openly recognized. Few can gainsay and none can overestimate the vital and tremendous importance to our Empire of a proper and sound solution. Great issues are at stake. On such a solution, some go so far as to say, may depend the future welfare, if not the very existence of the Empire. In view of the universal interest, but especially in view of the great importance attaching to the problem before us, it is submitted that no subject is more worthy of our earnest thought and consideration, nor can any more fittingly be made the topic of careful and serious study.

Such a study reveals the fact, the realization of which becomes more complete as we proceed in our investigation that many mistaken theories and wrong impressions obtain in certain quarters resulting and being manifest in illogical argument and fallacious reasoning. Some of the argument we regret to say seems prompted by a spirit of specious sophistry

and political expediency. Only honest mistake in a matter of such grave importance is pardonable. Apart from the argument which exhibits a 'mens rea' however there is oftentimes lacking the evidence of careful investigation and study. The subject is the last one to be pronounced upon from superficial impressions merely. Its importance forbids that even if its intricacy and complexity did not call for accurate thinking and clearest expression.

Many difficulties stand in the way of a clear analysis. Certain advantages will, it is hoped, follow from an enumeration at the outset of some of the more outstanding of these, and in directing the attention further to certain features of the problem which are together responsible for some unfortunate results. Simply to recognize these difficulties will help us to avert similar results or worse misfortunes and to appreciate the better, sound argument and clear opinions when we find them.

In the first place it should be remembered that we are dealing with a present situation which is ever changing. Bagehot experienced the force of this difficulty in sketching the constitution which he termed a 'living' subject, - one undergoing constant change. This difficulty is not felt by the historian who deals with the past or the events and their consequences during a stated period of time, but the author referred to is at pains to point out that "a contemporary writer who tries to paint what is before him is puzzled and perplexed, for what he sees is changing daily"⁴. We who are in the very midst and thick of this change may not always see in proper perspective the bearing of each new factor in the drama of the ever-present.

In our case too this difficulty is more marked in that the extent and rapidity of the changes materially altering or modifying the situation and conditions in matters relating to the defence of our country are very much greater than in the case of those changes affecting the growth and development of a constitution which, so far as relates to British institutions at any rate, are comparatively slow. In the field of our enquiry every day may bring to light some fact or development which adds a new aspect to some particular phase. Science and invention which are responsible for the dreadnought, the superdreadnought, the submarine, cruiser and torpedo boat destroyer have in this way alone brought about a complete change in naval warfare in the space of a single decade. Who can say what further startling effect may not be produced in a lesser space of time by the science of aviation, or what will be the full import and final effect of the opening of the Panama Canal? There is moreover the possibility of our study being rudely interrupted or our views and opinions shattered or coloured by some transient attitude of another nation. Treaties, ententes, alliances are continually being made and unmade. The existing facts of today may justify a complete reliance on the state of some international relationship wholly unwarranted in the added knowledge of the immediate future. One year our relations with a certain power may be the most cordial, the next may see them strained to the snapping point.

Thus, not only do we experience in greater degree the difficulty of the constitutionalist, but we have a further extension of the same difficulty in that the future element plays a far more important role in our enquiry. Our policy of defence is framed to meet the estimated requirements of future conditions. Great Britain's programme of ship-building

for instance is planned for several years to come. We must lay down so many ships in 1915, such a number in 1918, and so on. These requirements are based largely on the programmes of other nations which are also drawn with an eye to the future. But none of us can read the future with absolute precision. We do not know when or from what source will come the danger, if indeed it come at all. The statesman, Cassandra-like, may but how are we to know the statesman until he stands revealed in the light of tomorrow? It is at once seen that this necessary forecasting of the future introduces a very uncertain element into our study and is alone accountable for the distinction between the 'emergency' and 'permanent' policies of our political parties. If politicians differ on matters that are past and present there is infinitely greater latitude and opportunity for divergence of opinion as to what is to happen in the future, and consequently on the question of the policy to be adopted. Little wonder that there are conflicting opinion and schisms on this question, in which above all matters it is essential that unanimity prevail.

A second main source of difficulty lies in Canada's anomalous position. What is Canada? What is the British Empire? True we have in some degree common conceptions of the significance of these names. Geographically speaking for instance our conception of Canada is exact and definable although in some quarters a deplorable lack of a true conception or knowledge of Canada, her extent and resources, is manifest⁵. Her role in history is equally definable. It is in regard to her constitutional status that the difficulty arises.

Thirty years ago the difficulty was not experienced. Canada was then in common with the other self-governing

dominions of the Empire styled a colony plain and simple, and our Empire has in consequence frequently been called a "Colonial Empire"⁶. No one questioned the use of the term. During recent years however there has been a quickening sense of nationhood among Canadians which has demanded greater recognition. Her steady progress following confederation, the noticeable increase in her population, her growing popularity in the eyes of other countries as a possible future home, the increasingly large measure of self-government she has enjoyed, and not least of these causes her glorious participation in the Boer War, have all led Canada gradually to realize the change in herself. Reflection gives rise to expression⁷. Her consciousness of nationhood could not but force such a recognition from the so-called Mother Country, a recognition tardily given⁸, but now tacitly and even openly admitted⁹. "Canada is a nation", so that even the poet sings "Last born of nations, the offspring of freedom".

And yet the statement is not the whole truth. As a nation she differs from the United States or France, opinion in one quarter to the contrary notwithstanding¹⁰. The difference lies in her connection with the British Empire. This it is which constitutes the anomaly referred to. History affords no precedent for her position, nor does it afford an example of an Empire such as the British Empire.

The word "Empire" when used in reference to territory connotes a supreme power or sovereignty exercised by one country over another or as it is defined in Murray's dictionary "an aggregate of subject territories ruled over by a sovereign state". In this strict sense the use of the words in the expression 'the British Empire' is correct only in such a

relationship as that existing between Great Britain and India, and so the reference to our sovereign as Emperor of India is strictly accurate. Even in this case however it is pointed out that the word 'Empire' should refer strictly to the Indian Territory alone and not in addition to that of Great Britain, the ruling state. But as expressive of the relationship existing between Great Britain and the colonies so-called, the appellation is a mis-nomer and in the words of Lord Milner "with the idea of ascendancy or domination inevitably associated with it a very unfortunante mis-nomer".

And so we must distinguish carefully between our empire and that of those of the old world whether Persian or Macedonian, Roman or Turkish, which were founded on conquest and maintained by force. Ancient history affords but one nearly similar organization in the Grecian confederacies or leagues. Only federation was possible in the case of the Grecian states for the city was a state, there being indeed but one word $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$ for either of our ideas and each new city or colony founded was a distinct state with no political connection with the one from which its founders came. This lack of nexus in the Grecian states marks thus the chief distinction between them and our empire, but it is a distinction which in our opinion loses weight as time goes by for the political connection between us and Great Britain however important theoretically and legally has since Seeley's day loomed less large in importance with Canada's rise to nationhood already noted. Some would even urge that we are actually in a position not greatly dissimilar to that of the old Grecian states, but there is undoubtedly apart even from the legal tie of the Crown a definite and tangible connection between us and the Empire not characteristic of Hellenism. It may be too,

that the secret of success of British institutions and the British Empire alike is based on a dependency on convention and understanding rather than upon finely-spun theories of organization and colonial government. And so whatever be the actual position, whatever be the various views which in fact are held of that position and our status in the British Empire, the situation, it is conceded, is one which bristles with difficulties when we come to a study of Imperial defence.

Opinion differs as to the result of this position of affairs on the subject of defence. One section believes that the tendency in the future will be for Canada to grow into real nationality and gradually to become more like other nations. What section at least favours a local navy. Another group labours for closer union between Canada and Great Britain and prays for Imperial federation¹² or organic union - they find it easier to respond to a suggested contribution towards the maintenance of one Imperial navy. Others fluctuating between these two divisions advocate policies accordingly. Our point then is made, that much difficulty in our subject is due to Canada's peculiar and anomalous position in her relationship with Great Britain and the British Empire. And whatever be the final result none will deny the effect of the present situation as an exceedingly disturbing factor in our investigation.

A third difficulty remains to be noted, a difficulty due to the great scope and intricacy of our enquiry. The subject 'Defence' is many-sided and may be discussed from various viewpoints. To begin with it is dual in nature, being partly scientific and partly political. In the former aspect the subject again presents two divisions, namely, military and naval warfare, each of which alone constitutes a

very wide field. The conditions and principles of the one are in most respects quite different to and independent of those of the other. They are indeed two distinct sciences, each founded on different considerations, each demanding special knowledge and special training.

Another feature of this difficulty is that warfare or defence is not an exact science. All things are possible¹³, many contingencies are to be provided against. Moreover much of our preparation for war and defence is based on theory and has not been tried in the fire of actual practice. Theorists do not always agree. Some for example would contend that the naval armament of Great Britain is sufficient and ample for all purposes¹⁴; others maintain that its condition and dimensions are such as to justify disquiet and create alarm¹⁵. Some protest with vigour that Great Britain's policy of voluntary military service is abject folly, that only by universal training can she raise an army commensurate with her requirements¹⁶. Others decry what they conceive to be a form of conscription and urge the uselessness of any army however large; for, British safety, they claim, admittedly lies in the navy, her first arm of defence. In so far then as our subject is scientific it is speculative, uncertain. Difference of opinion therefore in the science is to be expected; there cannot fail to be a corresponding difference of opinion in the political aspect.

In this latter aspect we shall not anticipate our argument by enlarging here upon the great divergence of opinion and the considerations responsible for such as they are matters of common knowledge. To do so would be to magnify the difficulties presented by crosscurrents of public opinion in-

duced in part by the conflicting forces of imperialism, nationalism and pacifism. Sufficient be it simply to name these phases of the political aspect which raise, apart from the purely political, manifold considerations, geographical, historical, ethnological and constitutional. Our purpose is merely to suggest the tremendous range of our subject, its numerous phases, its infinite ramifications and inevitable complications.

That these three difficulties (others might be mentioned) are experienced and recognized by students of imperial defence in general is clear from the terse summary of one author in these words:-

"No empire in ancient nor yet modern times, has, when providing for its security been faced with a problem so complex as the British Empire of today is faced with. Its vast superficial area, its wide dissemination over the face of the earth, the extraordinary diversity in strategical conditions which manifests itself in connection with its individual component parts, the existence of acute racial problems in certain parts of its states, and not in others, the fact that the great oversea Dominions are in a constitutional sense virtually independent and that they are only linked to the Mother Country by allegiance to the Crown and by the ties of sentiment - all these factors combine with each other to render the question of Imperial defence one of abnormal intricacy."

Enough has been said to suggest the infinite scope of our enquiry, its interest and importance, its intricacy and complexity, and the difficulties in our path. Two qualities are very essential to an intelligent and valuable discussion, the one, a knowledge of history and political science, the other, a fearless and conscientious regard for the truth. By the former we mean not merely a knowledge of historical fact, what we might term an informational knowledge. Admittedly it is very necessary that we have "that minimum of information without which all discussion of Imperial problems is barren if not productive of mischief itself", but in addition there is

insight into the essential principles underlying both historical and political science by which we distinguish the substance from the shadow, by which we may know the tendency of the times, by which we may forecast the future and formulate policy accordingly, an office so admirably suggested by the expressive phrase "telescope of history". Without this and a serious regard for truth our study cannot fail to be barren of good result.

And now we may proceed to a closer examination of the conditions and principles of Imperial defence as affecting Canada. It is our purpose in the following chapter to deal briefly with the military aspect of the subject. The remaining chapters will be devoted to the naval problem - the storm-centre of our enquiry.

CHAPTER II.

M I L I T A R Y D E F E N C E .

It is pleasant to direct our course for a time into the less controversial field of military defence for here we find comparative unanimity of opinion. Even before confederation it was adopted as a guiding principle that the Colonies should provide as far as possible for their own military defence, this being recognizedly a burden more or less incident upon the gift of responsible government. In 1863 the Colonial Office announced to the Australian Commonwealth that Britain would no longer be under the expense of maintaining troops in Australia and these were gradually withdrawn until in 1870 her complete military organization was provided and controlled by Australia herself¹⁸.

In Canada a similar policy was adopted and with confederation an arrangement arrived at whereby the Dominion Government undertook at an annual expense then of \$1,000,000.00 (today increased to \$10,000,000.00), to provide in some measure such military protection as was deemed necessary. It is remembered, however, that British Regulars joined with Colonial troops in the suppression of the locally historic rebellion of 1870; but, in the North West Rebellion of 1885 the volunteer militia alone engaged, with the assistance and the supervision, it is true, of General Middleton and Staff officers loaned from

the Imperial Service. It was not indeed until as late as 1906 that the British troops were completely withdrawn from Canada and we assumed full responsibility for military defence, at which time the Imperial troops and garrison at Esquimault were replaced by men and officers of the Canadian Permanent Corps. The year previous marked a similar change in the case of the garrisoning of Halifax - an action which was prompted largely by the spirit of assistance and a growing conception of our increasing responsibility induced by the Boer War.

This principle of a self-appointed and a self-maintained militia was expressly affirmed at the subsidiary Imperial Conference of 1909 in these words:-

"That it is the duty of each self-governing portion of the Empire to provide as far as possible for its own territorial security".¹⁹

No one doubts the soundness of the principle underlying this settled policy. It is supported moreover by the lesson to be learned from a study of the history of sea-power which emphasizes in the case of an Empire with scattered territory such as ours the extreme importance of local defence and particularly military defence as a necessary complement of naval forces. To this conclusion the history of Venice, at one time a ^{Strong} powerful Naval Power, is most eloquent²⁰, and its validity as applicable to the British Empire which rests largely on the basis of sea-power, is assumed in the resolution quoted. No other policy of Canadian military defence is feasible; none other would be satisfactory to us. We are practically agreed on what might be termed an historical axiom, namely, that if fighting is to be done it is best done by ourselves. Our interests, our homes, our future are here; natural laws and the primal principles of self-preservation and self-help move us to defend them and our rich heritage.

Military science defines the system of land defence; it makes a study of details and on the results we base our military service. Some may disagree with the scope and organization of our system; few, if any, seriously challenge the basic principle on which it lies, that of the duty or responsibility of self-defence cast upon us.

Some, we are aware, have persuaded themselves that the day of wars is over. 'Utinam sit'. We trust that they may be right - we will provide for the possibility of their being in error. History repeats itself and many unexpected developments feature the past of nations. We are living in an uncertain age and may expect further developments. We do not look for danger from the South; we hardly think it likely that the United States shall ever extend northwards to the Aurora Borealis. Our conclusion is not based on a reliance upon the Monroe Doctrine²¹ nor yet on community of interests, ancestry, literature and tradition, but rather on something they may in part be accountable for, that is, mutual respect and confidence, wisdom and justice in policy. These in the words of Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, are

"the foundation of lasting peace and goodwill between
"Canada and the United States".²²

It is more within the range of possibility, however, that we should some day be called upon to meet the invasion of Japan and China, or even of a European country forced to find an outlet for its superfluous population and already looking, it may be, with covetous gaze upon our wealth and resources of which they hear fabulous report. Let us not forget the truth in Admiral Mahan's dictum that

"Communities which want and cannot have except by force
"will take by force unless they are restrained by force".²³

Danger from any of these sources is sufficiently within the range of possibility to justify our action in making ample provision for military defence. The risk and cost of non-preparedness is too great. The rate of insurance for the protection afforded by adequate military defence tempts Canadian business instinct. We believe that the millions already spent by Canada in military defence, the sums now being spent, and the amounts still to be voted, are to be approved.

Roughly speaking our military defence today consists of a small permanent force of 4000, a militia in active training of 50,000, with an available war establishment of slightly over 100,000 trained men²⁴. By the Militia Act, R.S.C. Cap. 41, Sec. 10, it is provided that-

"All the male inhabitants of Canada, of the age of eighteen years and upwards, and under sixty, not exempt or disqualified by law, and being British subjects, shall be liable to service in the Militia: Provided that the Governor General may require all the male inhabitants of Canada, capable of bearing arms, to serve in the case of a "levee en masse".

Our reserve force from this source is estimated ²⁵ at a nominal strength of about 1,000,000, but its value in time of war is very much impaired by want of training.

The authorities²⁶ in military science are agreed that these provisions are not adequate or satisfactory for the defence of our country extending as it does across a whole continent. Opinion gathers weight that we in Canada should adopt a measure of compulsory military training as has recently been done in New Zealand, Australia and South Africa, following the inspection and report of Lord Kitchener in 1909²⁷. The outstanding feature of this system is the application in a limited degree of the principle of universal liability for service. It is not conscription in any proper sense of the term. The training required extends over a period of twelve

or thirteen years commencing with boys at the age of twelve. Three divisions are made, the first being known as junior cadets composed of boys from twelve to fourteen years of age in which attention is devoted chiefly to physical development and discipline; the second, senior cadets, of youths from fifteen to eighteen when military training proper is commenced; and the third comprising adults who have graduated from the senior cadets. Service in this group is required to the age of twenty-five years after which the men pass into a reserve force. While the training is not onerous it usually includes a short annual attendance at camp where formations, rifle practice and general drill are learned. Although it is yet too early to venture a reliable prediction of the results to be thus achieved, it is generally conceded that an unqualified success is assured.

For the expenditure involved the results are striking in comparison with our costly and ^{an}adequate system. The inducing cause in their case, the fear of an Oriental swarming, should be almost equally operative with us. In applying such a system, however, we experience difficulties unknown to our sister Dominions and even to the United Kingdom (where in spite of her reliance on the Navy, National Service is being seriously urged²⁸) in that we lack as in the case of New Zealand and Australia a homogeneity of population, and as in the case of South Africa a dangerous native element which renders immediately necessary more than ordinary measures. Our French Canadians in Quebec are extremely averse to militarism in any form; our American immigrant has not had time to become thoroughly Canadianized, ^{? of similar low class in U.S.} and many of our Continental Europeans have come to us with the express object of avoiding the onerous duty of military training and service.

A strenuous opposition from these sources is naturally to be expected. To create a sufficiently strong public opinion to warrant the adoption of this system in Canada is no small undertaking, but we believe from a military point of view alone the end is one greatly to be desired and one for which we should strive²⁹.

The advantages moreover in the physical, moral and disciplinary improvement of our race and in fostering a higher sense of citizenship among our cosmopolitan population would likewise justify us in its support. In any event we should encourage in every manner possible such worthy movements as cadet corps, boys' brigades, boy scouts³⁰, rifle clubs and such like quasi-military organizations. The possibilities of all these are splendid; they do not, we believe, among Anglo-Saxons tend to militarism³¹, but rather provide laudable means of social amelioration. Courtesy, obedience, discipline, resourcefulness, self-reliance, physical fitness and chivalrous conduct are desirable qualities to foster in our Canadian youth and coming Canadian manhood; their importance from the standpoint of our military defence cannot be over estimated. By emphasizing all such forms of juvenile military training we believe the day may not be far distant when a policy of universal military service may be adopted in Canada with very beneficial results. Then we may have the satisfaction of knowing that we can defend ourselves and this, in military matters at least, is our best contribution to Imperial defence.

But it is not all that we may do. Heretofore in this chapter we have been dealing entirely with Canadian military defence on the assumption that such properly provided for is virtually imperial defence. While this is quite true, there remains to be considered the other aspect, namely, that

of our assistance to or co-operation with Great Britain and the other self-governing Dominions in military defence in its more general form.

Such assistance or co-operation must in the very nature of the case be voluntary. It is true that the B.N.A. Act, Sec. 15, provides that -

"The Command-in-Chief of all the land and naval militia and of all naval and military forces of and in Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen".

This undoubtedly operates to vest the command of all our forces in the Crown in the event of the hostilities in Canada³².

It does not, however, enable the British Parliament or the Crown to insist as a matter of right on commanding the services of our military or even of our naval organizations outside of our territorial limits. Such a proposition has never seriously been contended. On the contrary it has been expressly denied when Canada in 1884 under the premiership of Sir John A. MacDonald declined to send any troops to the Soudan War, insisting on our right to say when and to what extent we would participate in European, African or Asiatic conflicts in which Great Britain might be involved³³. Canada's noteworthy assistance to the Motherland in the Boer War was entirely voluntary³⁴. If any further doubt were entertained on the absence of any obligation or expressly defined duty on the part of Canada to assist in all wars of the Empire no matter where arising it would be immediately dispelled in reading the reports of the Colonial and Imperial Conferences for 1907, 1909 and 1911³⁵ where the control of even the naval services of Canada and Australia was openly conceded to lie with their respective Parliaments. The Naval Act of 1910, which still adorns our Statute Books, indicates that Canada retains complete control over naval affairs and the provision is made

therein that the Governor-General-in-Council 'may'³⁶ in time of war place our naval forces at the disposal of the British Admiralty.

So much for our obligations. We admit their limitations but far too much is made of this aspect of the case. Too little account is taken of and too little reliance placed on the 'privilege' of co-operation. That privilege will be exercised "as and when the need arises". In view of the existing loose arrangement between Great Britain and Canada no other more definite plan is possible, but our fears of Canada not participating in an important British War are surely groundless.

The lesson of history is that when the occasion is presented no power can prevent our giving every assistance ^{with} in our means. Who of us will soon forget the spirit of patriotic enthusiasm which swept over Canada when the privilege of serving in the South African War and of assisting the Motherland was afforded? What bitter disappointment was experienced by dozens of applicants who failed to pass a strict examination! How eagerly we awaited the incoming of daily mails with news of the tide of battle! How we wished we had been men and not merely bearded youths attending country backwoods schools in order that we too might have joined one of the contingents on its way to the front! And this be it remembered was not a war with another nation but simply the subjugation of a small farming republic. What would be the response if Great Britain were to find herself matched against a worthy foe in one of the European nations with the very existence of the Empire at stake?

That this attitude and desire for co-operation on the part of Canada and the other Dominions exists, has been

recognized at the Imperial Conferences. In 1909 important steps in the co-operation of the armies of the Empire were taken providing for the standardizing of the various military organizations in methods of training, arms, formations, etc.; and the result in the words of the Prime Minister of Great Britain was,

"a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are called while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous imperial army."³⁷

This we consider a big step towards the imperializing of our military forces.

No less important an event with the same tendency was the formation of local sections of the Imperial General Staff in each Dominion³⁸. Officers of the Dominion War Staffs, it is expected, will be attached at times to the War Office as part of the Imperial General Staff and vice versa in order that there may be in Great Britain a staff well acquainted with the conditions in the overseas dominions, and on the other hand a staff in each Dominion familiar with the conditions elsewhere throughout the Empire.

These two important steps in Imperial co-operation provide the solution of the military problem of Defence. By them we are afforded all the advantages of unity in organization while yet retaining our autonomy and all the valuable features of individuality and emulation springing from distinctive nationality³⁹.

We have dwelt thus long on the military aspect because in the case of Canada we believe it to be a very important phase of our defence. Our attention has of late been directed more closely to the naval side which is no doubt very important and necessary, but that it should monopolize

our entire attention to the exclusion of this now less prominent but equally important branch, ought not to be permitted. If Canada, therefore, trains as large a number of her citizens for military activity as possible and at the same time co-operates, as now, with the Motherland and the other Dominion to perfect organization and to insure success in united effort, she has gone a long way to discharge her duty and to perform her fair share in the matter of Imperial military defence.

CHAPTER III.

NAVAL DEFENCE - HISTORICAL REVIEW.

To turn from the military to the naval side of Imperial defence is to have come quickly out from the peaceful waters of the sheltered bay into the pitching whitecaps of a storm-tossed lake ere yet one has had time to determine with precision which way the wind blows. In both situations all faculties must be alert for disaster may be the certain price of a wrong or careless move.

The study of sea-power⁴⁰ is a most fascinating one. Even in the 'galley' days its value as illustrated in the history of Phoenicia, Carthage, Greece and Venice, is evident from the prominent positions it enabled each successively to attain. Its importance in the second stage of development, viz., the era of the sailing-vessel lasting to comparatively modern times, is attested by and typified in the flagship 'Victory'. To sea-power in this form under such admirals as Drake and Nelson the 'Expansion of England' and the foundations of our vast colonial empire are due. Similarly Holland, Spain, France and Portugal were enabled to establish large empires by the strength of their 'wooden walls'. In modern days of steam, sea-power plays an even greater part than ever before in the world's history. Certainly to the British Empire the value of her 'sea-dogs' remains incalculable. To her a navy is a necessity, not a luxury⁴¹. On it depends

her continued cohesion and corporate existence⁴². It is sea-power which safeguards our great commerce and protects the trade routes spreading like a net-work to every corner of the world. It is sea-power which insures Britain's national physical existence, in the guarantee which it alone affords for the free importation of food⁴³. It is sea-power which lends weight to her views in the realm of international diplomatism and in the councils of the world, which enables her also to maintain an equilibrium and balance of power, thereby insuring the safety of the empire, *James Cameron, John Channing, Haldane, Balfour, etc.* and the peace of the world. The necessity of its continued maintenance naturally follows⁴⁴.

Heretofore Great Britain has been able singlehanded to provide that margin of safety in sea power so essential to her own welfare and the development of the colonies and of the Empire as a whole. Great changes are taking place however and the situation confronting us today is vastly different to that which presented itself even but ten years ago. Everywhere about us we see navies springing up. Even the smallest of states and republics in South America, Europe and Asia alike are laying the foundation of navies. Many indeed are acquiring battleships of the most modern and scientific type, 'the best that money can buy'. Brazil, Argentine, Columbia, Chile, Mexico, Sweden, Greece and other countries of their standing can be cited as examples, the motive in all these cases being undoubtedly the simple desire to protect the commerce and trade routes in which these countries are interested.

Combined with this feature of the situation however, is another of even greater import, namely, the phenomenally rapid increase in the strength and naval power of certain of the stronger nations as for instance, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, France and United States⁴⁵. At the present moment it

is true this development in certain instances does not seriously affect the position of our Empire. With many of these countries we are on the best of terms, with many we have binding alliances, but it is the possibilities of the situation which are serious. The rapid increase, for instance, in Germany's navy has forced us to abandon our former two power standard⁴⁶, and the present sixty per cent. basis of superiority is difficult to maintain. Today Great Britain is Mistress of the Seas in a far more restricted sense than for many decades. To insure success in a war against us the authorities of one nation have openly pointed out that they do not require a navy of equal size⁴⁷. The element of fortune sometimes plays a large part in war and might lend an inopportune success to the efforts of an enemy. Moreover in considering the possibilities of the situation allowance must be made for the likelihood of a combination of forces directed against our strength. It is natural that Britain's continued supremacy at sea should arouse the jealousy of the other nations who fain would wield the 'trident of Neptune'.

One of the most startling effects of these recent developments has been the forced withdrawal of the British man-of-war from the outlying portions and distant seas of the Empire and the concentration of practically her whole naval armament in the waters immediately adjoining and surrounding her insular state. No longer does the British flag appear in Chinese waters. This is less serious, however, than the consequent reduction of our squadrons in the Mediterranean Sea, a sea which throughout the history of the world has been the arena of great naval encounters on which have turned the destiny of nations. The continuous possibility of complications arising in this important 'basin' enhances the

strategic value and emphasizes the necessity of our being able at all times to maintain a strong squadron there⁴⁸.

One distinctly beneficial result has followed this concentration of our fleet in the North Sea, in that the colonies have been aroused both to a sense of their unprotected condition and to an appreciation of the protection they have received in the past, as well as to a conception of the part they should now and in the future play in providing the naval protection of which they feel the need and of the necessity of assisting in the general defence of the whole Empire. What, in view of the present situation, is Canada's duty, what her share in and attitude towards Imperial naval defence? These are the questions before us.

Before entering into a discussion of these questions, it will serve us advantageously to bring into sharp review Canada's attitude and action in the past. To do so we must go back a long way, over a quarter of a century or to be exact to 1887. That Canada's participation in Naval Defence has for this long time been a practical question demanding solution attests the extreme difficulty in determining a satisfactory policy.

On investigation we find that there are no less than three natural divisions in this period of inactivity each corresponding to peculiar conditions on which were based her stated reasons for making no move towards the naval defence of the Empire. Roughly speaking, the first of these divisions ends with the Colonial Conference of 1902; the second is terminated by the Naval Aid Service Act, 1910; and the third extends from then down to the present.

The commencement of the first period is synchronous with the first Colonial Conference in 1887 called as a result

of the Russian War scare of 1885 for the express purpose of determining what assistance in defence the colonies could give and how that assistance might be given. It was at this Conference that Australia and New Zealand arranged for contributing annually to the British Navy the sum of £126,000, and later in 1903 raised to £240,000. In return for this they were to enjoy certain continuous protection against a forcible entry of Japanese and Chinese, the possibility of which has always been keenly dreaded. Canadian delegates however could undertake nothing in view of Canada's financial condition. She had just completed the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Other matters of internal development demanded immediate consideration and it was urged that attention to these was Canada's best contribution to the strength of the Empire. The completion of the Transcontinental Railway in 1885 for instance by shortening the distance from the United Kingdom to the eastern Asiatic nations by several days is admittedly of real Imperial value. Every mile of rail, of telegraph, of canal, of roadway, every improvement in any of the means of communication⁴⁹, every new homestead on which entry is made, every new industry commenced, every new immigrant brought to our shores, all alike add to the defensive powers and strength of our country, to the value and security of the 'granary' of the Empire all alike are an invaluable contribution to the strength of Empire⁵⁰. And that very large sums have been spent in the material development of our country during this first period and even subsequently was forcibly argued by the Right Honourable R.L.Borden who, in speaking before the Royal Colonial Institute July 10th, 1912, said:-

"In building that railway (the Intercolonial) and in

"giving necessary aid to other railways in Canada, we have
"spent since the birth of our Confederation no less than
"\$380,000,000. I speak of this because you should under-
"stand that in a country like ours, with an enormous area of
"land capable of great development and with a sparse
"population, the means of effective and cheap communication
"is more vital to us than perhaps to any other country in the
"world. So not only upon railways but upon that great
"system of inland waterways which Canada possesses; on the
"St. Lawrence River, the Ottawa River, and the Great Lakes, we
"have spent up to the present time nearly \$200,000,000. I
"venture to say that there is not a man round this board who
"will not agree that that was money well expended. We have
"spent upon aids to navigation \$35,000,000, on steamship
"subsidies \$26,000,000, on the protection of our fisheries
"\$16,000,000, and last, but perhaps not least, on that
"splendid force which is upholding law and order in the great
"Western territories of Canada, the Royal North-West Mounted
"Police, we have expended \$27,000,000. Upon militia and
"defence since Confederation no less than \$109,000,000 have
"been expended out of the Public Treasury of Canada. So
"that I think that I may claim for the people of Canada that
"in undertaking this vast work they have made very worthy
"efforts, and that the accomplishments of the past fifty
"years from Confederation up to the present time disclose a
"record of which no Canadian need be ashamed". 51

As a forceful argument in justification of our non-
participation in direct assistance to the British Empire,
however, the plea of material development and financial in-
ability was officially abandoned at the Colonial Conference in
1902, from which the second stage of our inactivity and delay
dates. During this succeeding period our objections were to
the means of assistance suggested, viz., cash contribution and
they arose -

"not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief
"that the acceptance of the proposals would entail an import-
"ant departure from the principle of Colonial Government.
"Canada values highly the measure of local independence which
"has been granted her from time to time by the Imperial
"authorities and which has been so productive of beneficial
"results, both as respects the material progress of the
"country and the strengthening of the ties that bind to the
"motherland.....
"At present, Canadian expenditures for the defence services
"are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government
"are prepared to consider the naval system of defence as
"well. On the sea coast of Canada there is a large number
"of men admirably qualified to form a naval reserve, and it
"is hoped that at an early date a system may be devised which
"will lead to the training of these men and to the making
"of their services available for defence in time of need". 52

As our rise to national status becomes more certain our objection to contribution becomes more deeply rooted and pronounced. On March 29th, 1909, there was passed the historic unanimous resolution of the Canadian House of Commons, one clause of which is as follows:-

"The House is of the opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence".⁵³

Meanwhile the obstinate insistence of the Admiralty on the policy of contribution was slowly giving way. Already in 1907 a valuable concession was obtained at the Colonial Conference, in the admission of the value of local naval defence the provision of which began to find favour as an alternate policy. The climax came in 1910 largely as a result of the joint resolution in part quoted, when with the approval of the Imperial authorities the construction of a local navy was begun. The passing of the Naval Act in that year brought to an end Canada's long procrastination in coming to the assistance of the Mother-Country in naval defence.

Unfortunately it proved to be but a temporary intervention for with the change of Government in 1911 the Conservative party was returned and all action under the Act suspended. This marks the commencement of the third stage in our inactivity. The introduction of the Government Bill in March 1912 to provide immediate and effective aid to meet an emergency said to be confronting the Empire, the spectacular opposition by the Liberal party, the passage of the Bill by a resort to closure on debate, the virtual defeat of the measure

in the Second Chamber by the addition of an amendment that it be referred to the people, all this is still fresh in our minds:

And still we do nothing! We cannot choose between alternative policies or forms of assistance. We admit the need of giving aid to the Empire. We squabble among ourselves as to the form our aid should take. How much longer are we to mark time? When will this protracted delay end? Not, we venture to say, until the people have delivered their verdict, and, strange to say they never as yet have had an opportunity of doing so. What will their verdict be is the interesting enquiry before us?

CHAPTER IV.

P A C I F I S M ^{54.}

One would naturally suppose in answering the question before us that we should examine the positions taken and the views held by our two political parties. While this is to a certain extent true, still such a division is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is not exclusive, for there are not lacking many conspicuous instances in which citizens and politicians have on this issue deserted the ranks of party. This is as it should be in a matter of such national importance. Moreover the Conservative party is nominally strengthened by the support of the Nationalist forces - an artificial alliance, it may prove, when the supreme test of the ballot is made. Nor yet is a strictly political division exhaustive. Our two political parties assuming the need of Canada's participation in the naval defence of the Empire and differing merely on policy, find their common postulate assailed by a growing and responsible body of opinion. That is to say, the need or expediency of Canada's assistance or co-operation in naval defence hitherto assumed, is itself in dispute, and hence the political classification on this two-fold ground must be rejected.

In its stead there is suggested a more natural three-fold division. First, those who question the need or

desirability of Canada's assistance in Imperial defence (the Pacifist), second, those who realizing the force of such a need maintain that it can only be met and that Imperial defence is best served by a Canadian naval service (the Nationalist), and third, those who differ with the latter group only on policy maintaining that the best plan is one of contribution (the Imperialist). As the task of establishing the need of assistance naturally precedes a discussion of the relative merits of the opposing policies, and as further the need of assistance in turn pre-supposes the possibility of war and the likelihood of attack upon the Empire, we proceed to examine the argument of Pacifism in general as well as in its more limited application to and bearing on our position in Canada.

We are not surprised to find in the onward sweep of civilization a growing revulsion from the atrocities of war. The wide dissemination of knowledge; the higher standards of living among the masses; the effective means of communication afforded by the newspaper, the telegraph, the cable and the wireless; the immense increase in international trade, are indeed the remarkable features of our present age, tending to bring the nations of the world into closer touch with one another, to make them interdependent and to bring nearer the day when we may fully realize that our interests are not in any sense conflictive but similar, and when we shall, at last, in truth be free to beat our swords into ploughshares.

The consequence is a growing and world-wide desire for peace. The advance made in the settlement of international dispute by reference to arbitration and the Hague Tribunal, and the possibilities these institutions reveal; the able advocacy of the fallaciousness of many common theories of war by such writers as Norman Angell, author of "The Great Illusion"⁵⁵, and

the united efforts and campaigns waged by these and many similar forces throughout the civilized world, all hasten the day we hope when "equity shall usher in.....a brighter day", the dream of universal peace.

As an expression of this feature of our age we find in Germany forty per cent. of the electorate are Socialistic in tendency and vote for a reduction of armament. In Great Britain and United States there are very very many peace advocates, and others opposed generally to large naval expenditures. On all sides there is much talk of and desire for disarmament, so that we need not be shocked to find in our new western nation a general and increasing antipathy to warfare and armaments and to the expenditure incidental thereto.

The following newspaper report of a resolution moved in the Grain Growers' Convention held in Brandon in December of last year is typically illustrative of the attitude of the Pacifist on the prairies.

"A very long resolution on the navy question was passed. The gist of it was that instead of spending its money on a navy, the Dominion Government should spend the money on Canadian Government owned merchant vessels, which would be used to break up the combine in ocean trading to and from Canadian ports".⁵⁶

Similar resolutions were passed in Alberta and Saskatchewan and even stronger resolutions met with the approval of the delegates in similar conventions the year previous. These organizations it is known are representative of the farming classes of Western Canada. On our boundless prairies we are far removed from the theatre of war. We are a busy people and the art of agriculture is a peaceful one. We are the wealth producing class but we are not wealthy. Our whole efforts are required in the struggle for existence for pioneer days are still the common lot and hardships, physical and financial, cheerfully faced though they be, are yet our general portion.

Do we wonder that the farmer, on whom must fall the burden, seriously questions the wisdom of the additional expenditure naval assistance entails? Do we wonder any the less at the similar attitude of the European immigrant or our American cousin? And when we add to this an even greater and popularly recognized lack of enthusiasm over military expenditure among French Canadians have we not a volume of opinion in Canada deserving of respect?

All sane men appreciate the dream of universal peace and some day we trust it may come true. But our desire is one thing, the likelihood of its realization immediate or remote or the means to be adopted to hasten its fulfilment is another. Indeed it is precisely because of our desire for peace that we advocate Canada's generous assistance in the naval supremacy of the Empire, for, Nationalist or Imperialist, we believe that the peace of the world and the freedom for national development enjoyed by many small nations, Canada included, are in no small measure due to the powerful influence and force of British supremacy.

Our policy then is framed with a view to peace but it must be practical and meet the conditions and facts of life. Norman Angell, the stoutest exponent of Pacifism, from the standpoint of economics, says:-

"So long as current political philosophy in Europe remains what it is I would not urge the reduction of our war-budgets by a single sovereign or a single dollar."⁵⁷

What is that current political philosophy? All Europe 'an armed camp' - a 'bursting out of naval armaments everywhere' - all nations 'armed to the teeth'⁵⁸; this is typical of it and illustrates its tenets. Are not the nations of the world still vaguely influenced by the predatory instincts of their warlike ancestors and by the traditions of -

".....the good old rule
.....the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."

2. of interest to the subject

Much is expected of the Hague Tribunal. It has done much and we trust the principle of arbitration it embodies may yet do more, but that it is far from an effective prevention of war is particularly clear from the recent Turko-Italian war in which the stronger nation forced the issue before intervention, which it did not desire, was possible.⁵⁹ Nor has it succeeded in preventing a dozen wars of considerable magnitude since its inception in 1899. The limitations of the principle of arbitration in the settlement of international dispute are also established by the reception accorded by Germany to the recent promising proposals emanating from the United States. Their acceptance would indicate as pointed out by the German Chancellor a willingness on the part of nations to abide by the statu quo⁶⁰, a requisition obviously inconsistent with the expansion of Germany and for similar reasons our suggestions for a naval holiday were coolly ignored.

Regrettable though it be then we reluctantly conclude that there is no immediate relief from Imperial armament and adequate defensive measures. We may seek comfort in the thought that any expenditure is designed for defence and not aggression. Peace is our goal and despite the violent attacks on the maxim 'si vis pacem para bella' we still believe in it as a sound national motto in view of current political philosophy. Even the sanctimonious Sunday School scholar may be forced to defend his person or self-respect by resort to the primitive means of self-defence, and war is often not a matter of choice. Goldwin Smith says that -

"War is, and until human nature shall have greatly changed, will be necessary for self-defence or for the peace of nations".⁶¹

John G. ...

And hence we reject the philosophy of Pacifism. We believe with the finding of the Imperial Conference that "without superiority at sea the Empire cannot be maintained"⁶². Our interests demand the preservation of the Empire. It must be able to resist any attack that may conceivably be made against it, let the cost be what it will. We can be satisfied with nothing less than reasonably absolute safety. What part then Canada is to have in maintaining that requisite 'superiority at sea' is the question still before her.

*More arduous ~~prostitutes~~ not concerned
by either history or logical arguments.*

*The above is a very superficial and
short-sighted enumeration of
the numerous perils of Pacifism
and ignores the great and growing
dangers of ^{cultural} the war-spirit, and the
assertion of the "Supremacy" doctrine
in the face of the fact that every nation
which has asserted its "Supremacy"
has first been a trained and finally
shattered strength.*

CHAPTER V.

QUESTION OF POLICY (1) EMERGENCY PROPOSAL

The Liberal Party in Canada, has in the Naval issue, taken a stand consistent with the philosophical ideal of Liberalism. An intolerance of domination, a faith in the genius of the people, and a cherishing of national dreams had rendered impossible any other attitude on their part to suggestions emanating from the Admiralty, that Canada should contribute in cash or ships to the up-keep of the British Navy. That it savoured of tribute made it distasteful to the strong spirit of Nationalism which had developed so remarkably in more recent years. Even the Conservative party felt the power of this mighty current which has borne our Ship of State far on its way to a position of dignified national status.

Consistent with this force, the establishment of a local Navy appeared to be the only desirable solution, and so the form and extent of Canada's assistance were finally decided in 1910 in accordance with such a view. As to the extent of the aid provided by this Act, there was much room for criticism and the Liberal party subsequently acknowledged its shortcomings in this respect. It was at least a start and in this its importance lay, it was the first move towards assistance long overdue; and, the beginning of the establishment of a Navy, is a very big step in a gigantic undertaking. Had the party in power undertaken in all seriousness the providing of a more

extensive service on this basis, as was done in Australia, it would have saved the principle of autonomy, on which it was founded from much discredit and abuse.

That the underlying principle of Nationalism was itself challenged however, soon became evident, in spite of the united stand of Parliament in 1909. There has always been in Canada a strong imperialistic element which leans towards any influence and favours any tendency suggestive of imperial federation or centralization. The force exerted by this element is spasmodic; its foundation lies in philosophical conservatism and the generating cause of fear which rises and falls according to international conditions. Imperialism was bound to view with alarm such an apparently disruptive action as the creation of a local navy, one which might be utilized in the wars of the Empire, only if the Canadian people saw fit to sanction such a use. What were we coming to? And if with us the policy was questioned it is a safe prediction, that protest would be made in no uncertain voice by the British Imperialist from whom so many in this country are ready to take their cue.

And thus by slow degrees, the Liberal-Conservative party, true to its tradition of real philosophical conservatism and for obvious political considerations began to exhibit hostility to the Laurier proposals. This necessitated the framing of a counter policy and hence the resort to the discredited system of contribution. Hardly had they discovered themselves in the question when, upon another issue and to their own surprise, they were returned to power with a free hand to give effect to any naval measures they might see fit. Accordingly, though they realized the difficulties and dangers in the way, yet, anxious to make good their pre-election promises, their so-called Emergency Bill was framed and

introduced. At once the forces of Imperialism and Nationalism hitherto largely dormant but now become conscious of contradictory phases in their nature, clashed in the open field of politics. The recoil of Nationalism upon Imperialism afforded perhaps the greatest display of political pyrotechnics ever staged in Canadian politics.

There can be no doubt that the situation in 1911 was indeed a serious one⁶¹. Anglo-Germanic relations were strained to the most critical point in the Moroccan episode. We may concede that the Borden Government were moved to consider the whole matter in all its seriousness and from the standpoint of a real emergency. The desire being to relieve the immediate gravity of the situation, the British Admiralty were asked in what form any 'immediate aid' that Canada might give would be most effective. Since December, 1912, however, the heavy atmosphere has cleared. At the present session of the House in Ottawa, the Government has indicated that the Navy Bill will not be introduced, it being felt that in view of the Senate's opposing majority such a course would be useless. We are to wait until the natural demise of senators and a redistribution bill allow of an increased Conservative representation in the Upper Chamber. This attitude of laissez-faire would appear to justify the contention of the opposition that there is now no emergency such as was claimed; for, that a real emergency could exist and that our Government could refrain from appealing to the country for the necessary support of the only policy adequate to such a situation is unthinkable.

Recent events confirm the correctness of our surmise. The Budget of the British Government lately announced, makes provision for the minimum number only of battleships, namely, four. It includes no increase because of Canada's failure to

make good her proposals. Moreover we are more than relieved at the departure of a squadron to Gibraltar indicating a decided and much welcomed improvement in the European situation and marking a return to the conditions existent five years ago. During this period moreover, England has effected the enormous reduction in her national debt of over \$250,000,000.⁶², a signal proof of confidence in her position and of ability to "watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire". Bonar Law sums up the situation as to an emergency, in these words:-

"But in spite of all that has been said does the country, do the House of Commons, do any of us really, believe that there is danger and vital danger? I confess that I have the greatest difficulty in believing it myself".⁶³

But while we are inclined to the view that time serves to fortify the contention of the opposition as to the absence of a distinct emergency, which professedly at least prompted the bill, we confess our regret in its failure and we can do so in no more fitting words than these taken from the Admiralty's memorandum to the Canadian Government, dated the 25th of October, 1912:-

"But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. Any action on the part of Canada to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial Navy and thus widen the margin of our common safety would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire and to a renewal of the resolve to the Overseas Dominions to take their part in maintaining its integrity".⁶⁴

An immediate and generous offer of three ships or its equivalent would have been at least a partial discharge of the debt we owe for protection received during long years from the British Navy and to which our continued peace and freedom from molestation are surely due.

It has been contended that we owe nothing to British connection, that in fact we have suffered distinct loss thereby

and in proof we are reminded of British Diplomacy in the Alaska Boundary Dispute, the Ashburton Treaty, the Behring Straits Settlement, and the North Atlantic Fisheries Question, etc.⁶⁵


We hold no brief for British Diplomacy. The conclusion which these arguments suggest, is rather a reform of the manner in which these international differences, in which Canada is interested, are settled. We can conceive in it no argument for a severance of the imperial tie nor any justification for the cry for independence. And so in spite of blunders in Colonial management in the past, we still maintain that we have received valuable protection from the Mother Country. Canada is absolutely the only nation which has not provided one dollar for the protection of her own commerce and merchant marine, (in which latter respect we rank fourth among the nations)⁶⁶. If we were in fact an independent nation, could we escape an obligation experienced by every single nation in the world great and small, and there are at least a dozen of lesser importance and standing than Canada. It is no less certain that this protection which we should have been obliged to undertake at great expense has been for over one hundred years supplied at the expense of the British tax-payer alone. That Britain has received value and benefit is not denied, but the benefit and value are mutual between us. Should not the obligation be likewise?

The objection to the contribution on the ground that it would commit us to a continuance of such a method of discharging our obligation and liability is to be appreciated and yet it seems to be forgotten that Australia and New Zealand, on discovering after a twentyyear experiment that the method was unsatisfactory, found no difficulty in discontinuing their

*Might not there be evidence that the policy
was a backward step.*

policy of subsidy. A more serious objection in the minds of some lay in the injury and offence conceived to be done to nationalism. In the eyes of the autonomist it appeared a false and backward step and coming at a time when our complete autonomy was everywhere recognized, the stubborn opposition of liberalism was to have been expected.

But interesting though it would be, we do not propose to consider this temporary measure further. The immediate situation it was designed to meet has passed. We must now briefly consider our policy from the permanent standpoint.



CHAPTER VI.

QUESTION OF POLICY. (II) PERMANENT MEASURES.

When we come to consider our permanent policy in Naval Defence, we discover that there are two kinds, namely, Local and General⁶⁸. The former has to do with defensive naval measures necessary for the protection of our coasts, harbours and sea towns. Under this head also comes provision for dockyards, harbours, coaling stations, the construction of fortresses and mines, the acquisition of cruisers, and as we become more able the larger ships of war.

This branch of naval defence at any rate should be provided by Canada herself. It is part of her duty as defined by the principle already affirmed that she in common with all the component parts of the Empire should as far as possible see to her own territorial security, and in conformity with which, steps were first taken in 1905.⁶⁹ While it has been always the tendency of the Admiralty and War Office to minimise the importance of local defence as compared to the more general aspect of imperial defence, secured by one navy, nevertheless by her insistence of her dislike for the system of contributions Canada finally obtained from the Admiralty at the Imperial Conference of 1907 the following important admission of the value of local defence:-

"In the opinion of the government, while the distribution of the fleet must be determined by strategical requirements of which the Admiralty are the judge, it would be of great assistance if the colonial governments would undertake to provide for local service in the imperial squadrons the smaller vessels that are useful for defence against possible raids or for co-operation with a squadron; and also to equip and maintain docks and fittings establishments which can be used by His Majesty's ships. It will further be of much assistance if coaling facilities are provided, and arrangements can be made for a supply of coal and naval stores which otherwise would have to be sent out specially or purchased locally. I understand that in Australia particularly, and in South Africa, it is desired to start some naval service of your own. Perhaps I might suggest that if the provision of the smaller craft which are necessarily incident to the work of a great fleet of modern battleships could be made locally, it would be a very great help to the general work of the navy. You cannot take the small craft such as torpedo boats and submarines, across the ocean; and for warships to arrive in South Africa, or in Australia or in New Zealand or in Canada, and find ready to their hand well-trained men in good vessels of this kind would be an enormous advantage to them. It would be an enormous advantage to find ready to their hand, men well trained, ready to take a part in the work of the fleet. There is, I think, the further advantage in these small flotillas, that they will be an admirable means of coast defence; that you will be able by the use of them to avoid practically all danger from any sudden raid which might be made by a cruising squadron".⁷⁰

Canadians of both political parties have recognized the importance of local defence and the urgency of immediately providing this was indicated in a resolution moved by the Honourable George E. Foster, on the 29th March 1909 in these words:-

"That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports".⁷¹

In the event of war, at present, we would be completely at the mercy of a cruising squadron which might destroy our sea towns, blockade our ports and cripple our whole industry and trade. A necessary feature of our policy then, must be the immediate provision of a local naval service. This is the duty that lies nearest to us, just as the first care of

Great Britain must be her own particular protection. The continued neglect of such duty is almost criminal. Even if one Imperial fleet were the policy finally adopted local defence is still and may long be absolutely essential to us.

Goldwin Smith has said:

"Not a word can be said against the creation of a navy strong enough to protect the widespread commerce of the United States to guard American coasts from insult and forever put an end to all threats of bombarding New York. Nor can a word be said against the provision of such coaling stations as the navy may require".⁷²

And we believe that Halifax to us is quite as important as New York.

Fortunately from a strategetical standpoint, our position has its redeeming features. While our coast line is of great length, it is one which both in the East and the West, lends itself admirably to inexpensive and effective defence. On the Atlantic seaboard, our large volume of commerce finds its outlet through five channels and it is pointed out that in each case small cruisers and submarines would effectively ward off an attack by a much superior force. Apart from our own safety the importance in maintaining open ports in time of war lies partly in permitting our wheat-laden ships to find their way out to the blue waters of the Atlantic with free access to British ports.

Considering then that for a reasonable outlay, possibly in the end not much larger than the expenditure involved in the adoption of the Emergency Policy, we could obtain satisfactory and adequate local defence, (the necessity and value of which both to ourselves and to the Empire must now be clear), should we not immediately take steps for its provision? Do we not owe it to ourselves, our country and our posterity to provide the very first guarantee of our safety and our

heritage? This is surely the duty which lies nearest to us, and it may well be that in taking this first step the second duty shall have already become clearer.

Our next step leads us to a consideration of the question of general defence. This is no doubt the more important division of our subject. Purely from the Imperial standpoint our local defence though necessary and desirable is after all of less direct and permanent value, for spasmodic raids though they may do great damage locally do not affect the general supremacy at sea on which the fate of the Empire depends.

Just as in military defence we were inclined strongly to approve of imperial co-operation so here too in naval defence we would favour a like co-operative principle. Now in the final analysis there can be for Canada but two methods of permanent co-operation; the one, a policy of fixed annual contribution (whether by ships or by cash is immaterial); the other, a policy in which we assume the defence of our own ports and coasts and in addition establish an independent navy to co-operate with the other Dominions and Great Britain for the common protection of our United Empire. This is pointed out clearly by Geo. E. Foster in his speech on March 29th, 1909, when he says:-

"When you boil down all the propositions that are made, you get down to two propositions, one or the other of which must in the end be adopted,.....the first is a policy of a fixed annual contribution, etc....the second policy is the assuming by ourselves of the defence of our own ports or coasts".

"The policy of a fixed annual contribution divides itself, apparently, into two branches, but it is really the same thing. One man says send \$1,000,000 or \$2,000,000 a year; another man says send a dreadnought or two dreadnought, and so far as Canada is concerned, these two are absolutely one. When we translate our contribution into dreadnoughts it comes down in the end to money which would be sufficient to build and equip a dreadnought, and, therefore, I say they are both parts of the one proposition".⁷²

Which of these are we to adopt as a permanent policy? The Conservative party have been at pains to make it clear that they express views only in regard to an emergency policy. The other, in their statement is something which requires time for consideration, something which must be slowly and carefully worked out, for it is a question involving great issues. It is further, they say, the real problem of Imperial existence necessitating the determination of our status in the Empire as an enabling condition to a satisfactory basis of permanent co-operation. Such a solution it is conceived may not be impossible.

None the less it seems clear that not a few favour the policy of contribution as such a permanent basis of co-operation realizing, of course, the necessity of our having a voice in the control of foreign affairs and defence. Our Premier himself in his speech in support of the emergency proposals says:-

"If Canada and the other dominions of the Empire are to take their part as nations of this Empire in the defence of the Empire as a whole, shall it be, that, we contributing to that defence of the whole Empire, shall have absolutely as citizens of this country, no voice whatever in the councils of the Empire? I do not think that such would be a tolerable condition. I do not believe the people of Canada would for one moment submit to such a condition. Shall members of this House, representative men, representing 221 constituencies of this country from the Atlantic to the Pacific, shall no one of them have the same voice with regard to those vast imperial issues that the humblest taxpayer in the British Isles has at this moment? It does not seem to me that such a condition would make for the integrity of the Empire, for the close co-operation of the Empire".

The answer of the British Government to our request for this control has been anything but encouraging for it unequivocally declares that -

"responsibility for foreign policy could not be shared by Great Britain with the Dominions."

and further that -

"the Committee of Imperial Defence is a purely advisory

"body and is not and cannot under any circumstances become
"body deciding a policy, which is and must remain the sole
"prerogative of the Cabinet, subject to the support of the
"House of Commons". 75

Here is an impasse: the contributionist is brought face to face with the stone wall of taxation without representation. It is ever so with schemes of federation; friction is inevitable; you cannot federate nations.

If then according to the contributionists themselves a voice in the control of policy and defence is deemed indispensable in the case of an isolated contribution of three ships it must be very much more a sine qua non in a policy involving a series of contributions. And so it would appear that immediate action along this line is blocked even if Canadian people as a whole would otherwise have approved of the policy. Thus whether we would or not we are driven to the only policy immediately capable of adoption, viz: a local Canadian navy.

It would not serve our purpose to weigh further the alternative policies (even if we believed both were possible of ultimate and permanent adoption), nor to enumerate and criticise the countless arguments of weight which are advanced in support of either policy. Many able men have essayed that without satisfactory results and space forbids even were it desirable. After all, the views even of the greatest minds which from either side have addressed themselves to this most difficult question, are not so much the product of intellect as of heart. It is our attitude - our pre-disposition which finally decides, this in turn being compounded of the elements of ancestry, environment, place of birth, education, length of residence in Canada, mental temperament, and political bias, all inducing the philosophically political differentiation of nationalism and imperialism, and Canadian attitude we believe

will finally assert itself at the polls as nationalism, consistent with which, federation being impossible, the only permanent solution of naval defence is the construction, management and control of a navy of our own.

Imperialism in Canada is strong. You may strengthen it as you please and by any movement - Hands Across the Sea, Interparliamentary Associations, Daughters of the Empire, Interchange of Teachers, Round Table Conferences, Navy Leagues, Rhodes Scholarships⁷⁵, or a score of such. We care not. You cannot turn backward the tide of nationalism which they but serve to emphasize. Nationalism in Canada is inevitable. Sir John A. MacDonald was a Nationalist, Sir Wilfred Laurier the Prince of Nationalists, Hon. R. L. Borden too a Nationalist⁷⁶ - an Imperial-Nationalist if you will but a Nationalist nevertheless. How can it be otherwise? For a time you may thwart the course of nature. For a time the stream of British immigration will give our nationalism its deep red hue and we rejoice that this is so, that it may long be so. In the end, ultimately and indisputably, true nationalism will reign supreme - not sectional nationalism, not a nationalism that is necessarily independence but genuine spontaneous irrepressible nationalism that is due in part to, and that alone can weld our cosmopolitan peoples; a nationalism that is not pseudo-loyalty or lip service but as true and natural to sons of Canada as for the plant to take its life-food from the soil in which its roots are fixed. There may be wafted to it the gentle breezes from the south and to us the fructifying breezes of imperialism but nationalists in essence we are and shall ever be, for in Gladstone's ringing phrase "Time is on our side".

Fifty years from now our population will exceed that of Great Britain. The late Lord Strathcona predicts that

before the end of the century it will reach 100,000,000. Should we be content then to leave the control of foreign affairs wholly in other hands? Is it possible to conceive of our contributing then, to another navy? Then indeed shall we have sown the seeds of decadence, then indeed may the world once more witness the folly and the failure of centralization of which the history of Athens in the naval encounters at Salamis and Syracuse is so eloquent.

No! Rather with our own army, our own navy, and our recognized status of dignity, honour and power, we shall, as equals, as co-partners be welcomed to the councils of Empire even as we shall welcome there our equals from the corners of the world. Then shall we be joined in the loose but with Britannic institutions the effective bonds of a real Britannic Alliance⁷⁷, to the power of which we shall bring all the backing, all the strength, all the prestige, all the distinctiveness of a free united Canadian Nation - an alliance, a union, whose elasticity may allow of absolute freedom of national development, of indefinite extension, which may indeed in time allow of the inclusion of all the force and genius of the Anglo-Saxon races; an alliance whose guarantee for the inviolate preservation of freedom, justice and liberty, and whose influence for international peace, comity and goodwill are the warrant for its existence; and, an alliance strong in that strength, than which there is no greater, the collective union of distinctive nations each contributing of its own substance, each stimulated in defence as in all matters to its highest effort for the common interests, by the invigorating force of emulation. This is the ideal, this the vision which determines our attitude and which we venture to predict will finally determine Canadian attitude.

The rest is clear, it is detail. We leave it to the expert.

(FINIS)

FOOTNOTES.

1. March 29th, 1909 - date of the Unanimous Resolution of House of Commons.
2. See Christopher West - Canada and Sea Power p. 127 for enumeration of these.
3. Query - Reciprocity.
4. Bagehot Introduction to "The English Constitution".
5. Taft speaking before the Western Economics Association in Orchestra Hall, Chicago, on Reciprocity in 1911 is reported to have referred to "These four great Western Prairie Provinces, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Assinaboine".
6. See Seeley "The Expansion of England", p. 44 and ff. for a criticism of this juxtaposition. His argument is not confirmed entirely by subsequent history. N.B. While there is strictly speaking an inaccuracy in the use of these terms 'colony' and 'Empire', they have for us popular conceptions.
7. One could quote references to our nationhood from every statesman of note both in Canada and England. Borden, the champion exponent of Canadian Imperialism, is in many ways a strong Nationalist; Laurier in the political world, Ewert in the field of essay, and Jebb from the British point of view stand out as the able exponents of real Nationalism.
8. e.g. the expression 'colonial nation'.
9. The principle of 'exclusive control' of our naval forces affirmed at the Imperial Conference 1911 speaks volumes.
10. John S. Ewart who favours out and out independence finds a precedent for our position as separate nations under one Crown in the Hanoverian Regime, also in the case of King James of England and Scotland. While a writer of brilliant force and of clear jurist style he overlooks the factor of the sentiment of Imperialism to which he is a total stranger.
11. See Ewert "Kingdom Papers" No. 2 Imperialism p. 25 and Seeley already referred to.
12. The dream of Imperialism in the Nineties. Several organizations were formed for its practical adoption with no success. The idea is again looming up. Jebb in his latest book "The Britannic Alliance" considers it still a possible solution though not in favour of it.
13. Ewert in speaking of the likelihood of war with the United States tritely quotes Huxley's expression "That it was possible for a crocodile to have a tail a mile long".
14. Alan Burgoyne "What of the navy".
15. Lord Charles Beresford "The Betrayal".

16. Lord Roberts. He and Beresford are a running pair.
17. Colonel C. Collwell in 'Imperial Defence' United Empire Journal, August 1912, being a lengthy essay running through five issues.
18. Keith Responsible Government in the Dominions p.1249, chapter on Military Defence.
19. C.W.Robinson "Canada and Canadian Defence" p. 3.
20. Hannay "The Navy and Sea Power". pp.47 and 240.
21. Stephen Leacock writes illuminatingly on this subject, University Magazine, October 1909.
22. "Canadian Defence" February 1914, p.127, report of speech at recent Taft Banquet.
23. Interest of America in sea power p. 253.
24. Annual report of Department of Militia, the figures are only approximate.
25. On a basis of one in eight. C.W.Robinson.
26. Report of inspection - General French.
27. For full outline see Round Table volume 1, No. 4, p. 511.
28. Lord Roberts heads the movement. Cable reports recently to hand report that the Premier chided him when he appeared with the delegation to urge their claims and stated that the navy was capable of repelling all serious attacks.
29. A vigorous campaign is being prosecuted by the Canadian Defence League which issues 'Canadian Defence'.
30. For a terse summary see Canada Year Books 1911. p.35.
31. Principal Gordon, Queen's University, speaks strongly of universal military defence. See Canadian Defence, January 1914, p.100. He says in part "I am thoroughly in favour of military drill.....for school boards.....for University students.....for all men throughout the country. One of the first lessons of citizenship is that every man should be ready to defend his country, etc."
32. See Clement Canadian Constitution, p.103.
33. Keith-Responsible Government in the Dominions, p.1249 ff.
34. W.Sanford Evans - The Canadian Contingents chapter on 'Government action'.
35. The memorandum of the latter year provided for the 'exclusive control' of naval forces by the Dominion parliaments.

36. Section 23 Naval Service Aid Act 1910. See also Round Table volume 1, No. 4, p. 402. 'Much acrimonious discussion has taken place on this small word involving the so-called doctrine of 'colonial neutrality'.
37. Round Table volume 1 No. 4, p. 401.
38. Keith p. 1266 full outline.
39. The success of colonial regiments in South Africa is a strong argument for Nationalism and Imperial co-operation See also Silburn who suggests that because of their natural fitness for military service the colonials should be responsible for land forces and England for naval forces.
40. Hannay "Navy and Seapower" suggestive summary.
41. Burgoyne - "What of the Navy?" p. 17.
42. Phillips Woolley - "The Canadian Naval Question " p. 13.
43. Admiral Mahan's speech "It is upon their national security (assured by naval supremacy) that their economic future, their food, clothing and housing depend". Daily Mail, July 4th 1910.
44. Matter fully considered under Pacifism.
45. See Round Table volume 1 No. 3 "The New Problem of Imperial Defence" p. 248. Burgoyne also gives valuable tables of comparison p. 23 and 45.
46. Sometimes spoken of as 'Two-Keels-for-one-Standard'.
47. Preamble of Germany's Naval Act 1900 Round Table same as in 45.
48. Admiral Mahan's recent article recently reported in our local press.
49. Silburn emphasizes this in the "Colonies and Imperial Defence".
50. See Borden's speech quoted below.
51. "United Empire" August 1912.
52. Proceedings Colonial Conference 1902, p. 130. See also Ewert "Kingdom of Canada", p. 197.
53. Hansard March 29th 1909, quoted on many occasions and placing Conservatives in an awkward situation.
54. A new word. So also Pacifist. Usage would seem to sanction the term in our subject.
55. Norman Angell, *nomme de plume* for Ralph Lane.
56. Nor'-West Farmer, January 1914. For resolutions of the year previous see Grain Grower's Guide, January 15th,

- 1913, These favour the expenditure of our money in favour of peace.
57. "The Great Illusion" p. 334.
 58. Lord Rosebury's welcome home address to press delegates.
 59. Sir Thomas Harclay. Introductory chapter in "Turko-Italian War and its Problems".
 60. Round Table, volume 1, No. 3, p. 238.
 61. Commonwealth or Empire by Goldwin Smith, p. 20.
 62. Robinson 'Canada and Canadian Defence', p. 3.
 - 61A. See Article Round Table - "Germany, France and Great Britain".
 - 62A. Ewart - K.P. No. 15, p. 162.
 63. Bonar Law - Ibid.
 64. Hansard, Dec. 5, 1912.
 65. Ewart, K.P. No. 4, British Protection. Jebb, Colonial Nationalism.
 66. Hamilton - University Magazine, Oct. 1909.
 68. Admiralty Memorandum, Hansard, Dec. 5, 1912.
 69. Garrisoning of Esquimaux then assumed.
 70. Colonial Conference 1902. See Ewart, Kingdom of Canada, p. 197.
 71. Hansard, p. 3484, and ff.
 72. Goldwin Smith, Commonwealth or Empire, p. 30.
 73. Hansard, p. 3484, and ff.
 74. Hansard speech, Dec. 5, 1912, p. 693.
 75. Harcourt's reply, Dec. 10, 1912, See Ewart K.P. No. 15, p. 153.
 76. The writer has spoken to more than one returned Rhodes Scholar who are stronger nationalists than ever.
 77. Borden says "Canada today is a nation and we are all proud to hail Canada as one of the greatest nations in the greatest Empire that the earth holds". Mch. 29, Hansard p. 3513, ff.
 78. Richard Webb - "The Britannic Question".

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

All history is full of very valuable material to the student of Imperial defence. Much important literature is to be found also in articles and essays, in magazines, journals and periodicals. It is possible for us here simply to cite the books read and make reference to some of the more important sources in which information may be found.

- (1) Seeley "The Expansion of England", a classic although not true of the position of the Empire today.
- (2) C.W. Robinson "Canada and Canadian Defence", a work with useful suggestions.
- (3) W. Sanford Evans "The Canadian Contingent", a very interesting history of the South African War.
- (4) David Hannay "The Navy and sea-power", a concise historical outline of sea-power in ancient medieval and modern times.
- (5) Alan Burgoyne "What of the Navy?" 1913, a semi-scientific book containing the latest word on the condition of the British Naval forces.
- (6) Lord Charles Beresford "The Betrayal", a story of the mismanagement of Britain's navy prior to 1909.
- (7) Archibald Hurd "Command of the Sea", dealing with Britain's position in view of Germany's increasing navy and aggressive policy.
- (8) Charles Savolea "The Anglo-German Problem" written from an independent standpoint, the author being a Belgian who sees danger from German expansion.
- (9) Norman Angell "The Great Illusion", an "Epoch-making Treatise" showing the insensate folly of war.
- (10) Christopher West "Canada and Sea-power" Angell Canadianized.
- (11) Goldwin Smith "Commonwealth or Empire".
- (12) Richard Jebb "Colonial Nationalism", "The History of Imperial Conferences" (two

volumes) and "The Britannic Question" (his most recent production 1913). These all contain exceedingly valuable material to any student of Imperial defence. (13) A.B.Keith "Responsible Government in the Dominions" (in three volumes, a very recent work) a chapter on military defence being useful. (14) Colonel Denison "The Struggle for Imperial Unity", reminiscent in style dealing with the days following confederation up to the Boer War. (15) C.Dilke "Problems of Greater Britain", rather ancient. (16) The League of Empire's, "The British Empire past, present and future". (17) P.A. Silburn "The Colonies and Imperial Defence", prompted by Boer War and written from Colonial viewpoint. (18) John S.Ewart "The Kingdom of Canada" with essays on "Imperial Federation", the "Colonial Conferences", "Alaska Boundary" and other essays. Also the Kingdom Papers, an invaluable series of arguments written in clear concise style from the point of view of the Canadian independent dealing entirely with the constitutional phase. (19) "Parliament of Press", containing many short speeches by leading authorities. (20) "Ency. Britt." re Hague Tribunal; also first two chapters in "Turke-Italian War and its Problems" by Sir Thos. Barclay.

In addition to the above the official proceedings of the Colonial and Imperial Conferences should be read for first hand information. So also the reports of Parliamentary Debates in Hansard. Of periodical literature the most valuable is the Round Table. It contains considerable information on current events and thought in the dominions of the Empire, and professes to be an impartial statement by anonymous authors. "The United Empire" being the Royal

Colonial Institute journal is also worthy of mention. See
too "Canadian Defence" the official journal of the Canadian
Defence League. "The University Magazine", 19th century
contains in many volumes useful information.