

**From Liberal Peace to Ubuntu: The Turn Needed for Effective Conflict Transformation in
Mozambique**

By

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Dedication

To all Mozambique's victims of hate, civil war, and political violence.

To all men and women of good will who tirelessly strive for social justice, peace, and prosperity

in Mozambique, in particular Edson da Luz (*Mano Azagaia*), the Mozambican social justice

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Abstract

This thesis examines Mozambique's violent political conflict by exploring why it remains locked in a protracted conflict despite the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements. These peace agreements were developed to address the protracted violent political conflicts that have enveloped the country since its independence from colonial Portugal in 1975, conflicts that trace their origins to colonization. The 1992 and 2019 peace agreements were unsuccessful to bring sustainable peace to Mozambique because they were exclusively founded on liberal peace principles. In addition, surveying both agreements this study notes that the negotiation of both agreements prioritized statebuilding and political peace, while glossing over the contextual root causes of the conflict, marginalizing the local actors and peacebuilding dynamics that ensure social peace. Therefore, this thesis argues that Ubuntu, which is based on people's local knowledge and embedded in the culture of Indigenous people, can contribute to building sustainable peace in Mozambique as part of a multi-track peacebuilding process. The marginalized Ubuntu indigenous peacebuilding philosophy and practice embodies qualities such as humanness and empathy, and is founded on the values of unity, justice, ethics, and education and is critical to guide the peace efforts in Mozambique. I arrived at these arguments through my analysis of both peace agreements guided by frameworks such as social cubism, Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP), and Critical Qualitative Methodology (CQM) that embodies autoethnography. Autoethnography as a research method, assists in systematically exploring my stories, life, and work experiences as an academic growing up in a war zone to understand my cultural and social experiences of war and peace.

Glossary and terminology

Biosophia

Broadly, this term can also mean a way of living that pays attention to the practice of spiritual values, awareness, and ethical-social principles that are crucial to community harmony (Kettner, 2002; Adebayo et al., 2014). In this thesis, this term is used to define indigenous knowledge based on the stories, beliefs, culture, and proverbs of the *Macua/Makhuwa* ethnic group of the Northern region of Mozambique. I employ this term in the same context applied by Giuseppe Frizzi in a manual that describes and analyzes the indigenous wisdom of the *Macua/Makhuwa* people of Mozambique. The book is titled, *Murima ni ewani exirima: biosofia e biosfera xirima*.

Communities

The concept of a community may lead to a debate over its different meanings. I will use the term community to signify a collectivity that shares the same space, common values, culture, identity, history, and memories, and has a common understanding of the collective good (Barzilai, 2003, p. 29). In this regard, in this thesis, these concepts refer specifically to Mozambique's collectivities.

Demobuntocracy/ Economubuntocracy

These neologisms were coined and used by Mussomar (2017, 2019, 2021). *Demobuntocracy* is to be understood as the participative, deliberative, and inclusive democracy based on Ubuntu's local wisdom and cultural values and established in Ubuntu's communities (Mussomar, 2019, pp. 67-80). In the same vein, *economubuntocracy* is the economic approach that can act as an alternative to the liberalization of markets following the liberal peace agreements. This is because an economy based on the Ubuntu values envisages economic exchanges without

exploitation, but equilibrium toward social harmony (Mussomar, 2021, pp. 19-57). Both terms are used in the thesis solely when referring to the Ubuntu Indigenous philosophy and practices embedded in the culture of Mozambique's people as the guiding principle for building its sustainable peace.

Ubuntu

Ubuntu is a Nguni term with almost the same denotation in many African languages and practices. Broadly, Ubuntu encloses a set of values and practices shared by many African people, which take the form of African wisdom meaning that “a person is a person through/because of another person” (Ngoenha, 2019; Tutu, 1998; Ramose, 1999). In this thesis, Ubuntu is used in reference to African Mozambican values that are meaningful to transform the conditions of conflict in Mozambique.

CHAPTER 1 – Introduction

Introduction

Mozambique has experienced political violence since the end of colonialism. Following the end of Portuguese colonization, because of political, economic, and cultural dynamics a violent conflict broke out in the country less than two years after the end of colonization. As a result, the 1992 and 2019 liberal peace agreements were developed to address the political conflicts that have enveloped the country since 1975.

However, the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements were unsuccessful to bring sustainable peace to Mozambique. This is because both liberal peace agreements were not followed by the analysis of the contextual root causes of the conflict as liberal peace assumes that liberal values can solve every conflict (Doyle, 2020; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2019).

In addition, liberal peace elements, in particular those applied in Mozambique, namely democracy, elections, military reform, human rights, the creation of institutions such as a capitalist **economy**, political parties, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and economic aid fall into statebuilding and not peacebuilding (Byrne & Thiessen, 2020).

Statebuilding differs from peacebuilding. In fact, the statebuilding objective is the creation of institutions without considering the endogenous crucial processes that facilitate peaceful institutions and address structural violence (Campbell & Petersen, 2013). Peacebuilding, however, puts in place mechanisms to transform the causes of the conflict and restore relationships (Lederach, 1997). Brewer (2010; 2013) also affirms that statebuilding is a top-down process that aims to address the conflict at the political level and achieve political or negative peace (pp. 200-201). Peacebuilding is related to social peace or positive peace, which takes into account the local actors, local and everyday dynamics of societal healing, restoration of broken relationships, the

development of a sense of community and shared responsibility for the future, as well as empathy, trust and forgiveness (Brewer, 2010, p. 5).

Mozambique does need statebuilding that includes human rights and building strong institutions. However, on its own statebuilding can possibly achieve a peace for the elites – political peace – and it may not be able to bring about a sustainable and just peace. Mozambique’s context attests that statebuilding cannot solve the political violence when it leaves out a consideration of the internal dynamics of conflict and without including local peacebuilding guiding principles embedded in the context and the culture of people. In fact, the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements undermined the local dynamics, actors, and the different levels of societal structures that can contribute to conflict and peace.

In this regard, ending Mozambique’s political violence and promoting conflict transformation requires two objectives. The first objective is to analyze and understand the underlying root causes of Mozambique’s military and political conflict. The second objective consists of highlighting Ubuntu as the indigenous peacebuilding method and the contextual guiding principle to introduce sustainable peace in society. Ubuntu embodies important local experiences, practices, practical knowledge, and wisdom that are critical in conflict transformation, yet, these local experiences were sidelined and marginalized by both 1992 and 2019 top-down and political-focused agreements. In this regard, this study proposes that an Ubuntu-focused bottom-up process as part of a multi-track peacebuilding process offers a better alternative and prospect for forging a lasting peace. Multi-track peacebuilding includes a web of interconnected actors, individuals, practices, institutions, and communities that work together to build sustainable peace (Byrne & Keashly, 2000; Diamond & Mac Donald, 1996).

To achieve the abovementioned objectives, the context chapter explores the impact of colonialism and its influence on Mozambique's political violence. Second, the thesis outlines a theoretical background framed within social cubism, to determine the internal root causes of the Mozambique's conflict; liberal peacebuilding allows to visualize the statebuilding elements that were inappropriate to transform the conflict in Mozambique. Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP) is used to highlight the shortcomings of the liberal peace Western values. Finally, Ubuntu peacebuilding is the Mozambique's culturally rooted guiding principle proposed to orient the peacebuilding efforts in Mozambique.

The context of Mozambique's postcolonial political conflicts illustrates that it became independent from Portuguese colonization in 1975. Between 1977 and 1992, a civil war between the leftist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) broke out (Cabrita, 2000). The war was at first incited by the political, cultural, and ideological divisions within FRELIMO, the first well-established movement for liberation struggle at the time. For instance, the push for power among the FRELIMO leadership emphasized more the Southern cultural expressions within the party, not recognizing different ethnic groups, and the leadership opposing ideological positions within the context of the polarized world of the Cold War (Opello, 1975). In fact, during the civil war FRELIMO was supported by the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba (Hanlon, 2010). RENAMO was championed by Rhodesia and South Africa (Huffman, 1992). In 1992, negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO, mediated by the Community of Saint'Egidio of Italy culminated in the signature of the General Peace Agreement (Perry, 2015).

However, violent political conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO re-emerged in 2013. The conflict recalled the insufficiencies of the 1992 liberal peace agreement, which focused on

state-building processes (Brewer, 2010). This is because, at the heart of the conflict was the re-emergence of disagreements regarding the results of the municipality elections, the incomplete 1992 DDR process, and the direct and structural violence instigated by FRELIMO of RENAMO members. In 2019, a new peace agreement mediated by Mirko Manzoni, Neha Sanghrajka, and Jonathan Powell was signed by the leaders of FRELIMO and RENAMO parties, Filipe Nyusi and Ossufo Momade. However, so far peace remains liminal and elusive as the people are trapped in a no-war no-peace situation. This is because the liberal peace negotiations and the international negotiators did not look at internal causes of the conflict, nor determine the adequate peacebuilding strategies to mend the relationship between the two parties. Rather, they perceived peace as a political process without the involvement of local people. That is, the 2019 agreement focused only on negotiation at the regime and political level, and in securing an accord negotiated to bring an end to the problematic relationship between the political parties through a cease-fire and DDR, namely negative peace or the absence of war. These components of liberal peace negotiations in Mozambique's 2019 peace accords did not transform the violent conflict nor reconcile the two political parties to prevent them from returning to the war. Therefore, issues such as the unfair distribution of peace dividends, and the exclusion of RENAMO military members in the demobilization processes fueled direct violence between both political forces putting the country into a spiral of continuous political violence (Bussotti, 2021, pp. 4-8). For example, between 2020 and 2021, a self-proclaimed RENAMO military junta led by Mariano Nhongo discontented with the outcome of the 2019 peace agreement carried out attacks against FRELIMO's government defense forces (Vines, 2021).

The internal root causes of Mozambique's violent political conflict are explored in this study through the analytical lenses of social cubism. Social cubism puts together six interrelated

social forces, namely, history, demography, politics, religion, economics, and psycho-culture to explore protracted conflict, which cannot be understood without a multimodal and multilevel analytical approach. Thereafter, this thesis critically analyzes liberal peacebuilding, which defines peace in terms of statebuilding and political peace through democracy, economic markets, human rights, and security reforms, etc. Therefore, the thesis surveys the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements in particular the liberal values applied in Mozambique such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) to illustrate their inefficiency in that context. In addition, the thesis critiques liberal peace using Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP), which opens up the possibility of contextualizing local peace epistemologies like Ubuntu. Ubuntu can introduce social peace in Mozambique because it is based on the wisdom of the indigenous people as their peacebuilding guiding principle embedded in the people's culture. Therefore, this thesis explores Ubuntu's indigenous peacebuilding method, founded on local knowledge and wisdom for effective conflict transformation. The study's main research questions are: Why has Mozambique remained in violent and political conflict despite the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements? How could an indigenous Ubuntu process as a preferable peace model contribute to addressing Mozambique's enduring political conflicts? To explore these questions, the thesis uses a Critical Qualitative Methodology (CQM) consisting of autoethnography, and document analysis of the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements, policy papers, and reports about Mozambique's conflict and peace processes from local, national, and international organizations. The study does not engage in quantitative research methods, data sets, and interviews. Besides these limitations, this study is relevant for the following reasons. It advances knowledge of Ubuntu's indigenous peacebuilding method and provides useful tools for analyzing Mozambique's conflict situation for local people, academics,

practitioners, policymakers, and peacemakers. It will also act as a steppingstone for future discussions and research on conflict and peace in Mozambique.

Chapters outline

This Master's thesis comprises eight chapters. First is the introductory chapter, which summarizes the scope of this thesis and outlines the issues and questions discussed in each chapter. Chapter Two describes the context of Mozambique's conflict and its connections with colonialism. It focuses on the colonial political, cultural, and religious conditions that contribute to conflict in Mozambique's context. Chapter Three examines the root causes of Mozambique's conflict. The chapter clarifies why Mozambique is in conflict and what are the specific and internal dynamics of the political violence there considering the interrelationship of political, economic, historic, religious, demographic, and psycho-cultural factors. Chapter Four outlines the relevant literature review under which this study is framed. The theoretical background discussed in the chapter includes social cubism, liberal peacebuilding, Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP), and Indigenous peacebuilding, where Ubuntu fits in as an indigenous peacebuilding method. In Chapter Five, this thesis discusses the research methodology and methods used. In this regard, Critical Qualitative Methodology (CQM), which includes autoethnography and document analysis is advanced to explore the study's research questions. Chapter Six scrutinizes the liberal peacebuilding theory. The chapter illustrates that liberal peace statebuilding as peacebuilding falls short in bringing about peace by examining the history, content and the peace strategies that emanated from the 1992 and the 2019 peace accords in Mozambique. Chapter Seven responds to the question of how Ubuntu can contribute to peace. In fact, chapter seven argues that Ubuntu is appropriate for conflict transformation by highlighting indigenous peace practices that sustain the

everyday peace in Mozambique's communities. Chapter Eight concludes this study providing an overview of the research, and key findings, and proposes relevant issues for future research.

Conclusion

Conflict and Peace Studies analysis can entail a wide variety of issues and broader alternatives for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. In this introduction, I elucidated the rationale and the objectives of this Master's thesis, which explores Mozambique's conflict issues and Ubuntu as a conflict transformation method. This thesis discusses Mozambique's conflict and the Ubuntu peacebuilding method in eight chapters. These chapters will also discuss specific terms to denote particular contexts, traditions, and understandings such as Ubuntu.

CHAPTER 2 – Context: Colonialism and Mozambique’s protracted violent conflict

Introduction

When exploring the root causes and the evolution of Mozambique’s violent and political conflict, it is crucial to provide a closer examination of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. This chapter focuses on the role of the colonialism process that contributed to the political violent conflict in Mozambique. This chapter analysis is framed under culture and decolonization, integrating Franz Fanon’s (1963) idea of the colonized’s internalization of oppression, as well as Engelbert Mveng’s (1994) idea of cultural dehumanization. In addition, Albert Memmi (2013), and Samir Amin’s (1974) discussion of colonialism’s economic dimension will build on notions of underdevelopment. It is worth mentioning that Franz Fanon (1963), Edward Said (1993), Paulo Freire (2018), and Albert Memmi (2013) may not have known about Mozambique’s colonial situation nor about Portugal’s colonial strategies. However, their analysis of the role of colonialism in the colonies is susceptible to contextualization in different milieus such as Mozambique, where colonialism had an impact on its politics, economy, culture, and religion. Therefore, I use their studies to inform and frame this chapter and provide the colonial situation that contributed politically, economically, and religiously to Mozambique’s violent conflict. To that end, tapping into my own story embedded within cultural, economic, political, and religious colonialism contributions to violence are discussed. First, cultural identity, resistance, and colonialism are also explored. Second, forced labor provided for the colonial power’s economic gains under imperialism and is also surveyed in this chapter.

From Colonial to Postcolonial Violence: My Own Story

The experiences of ordinary people in taken-for-granted settings makes them open to engage in political conflicts and in building social peace (Brewer, 2010, pp. 17-18). This is because there is an interaction between personal, familial, and public or institutional troubles. The indissolubility of the individuals and social structures ensure that people's private troubles transfer into public issues that transcend the personal context affecting public environments. Similarly, public issues can impact the individuals and shape their biographical experiences of crime, fear, and anxiety. The colonial power's public dehumanizing colonial rules of forced labor as an institutional issue in Mozambique affected the lives of ordinary people influencing them to take violent actions.

For instance, one of my great great grandfathers, *Faife wa Vilakulo wa Magime* became one of the tax collectors in Machocomane, his area of influence in the Vilankulo district. Having taken the time in his work for the colonial system, he would collect the hut taxes, without being paid by the colonial regime. Troubled with the unpaid forced labor, one day, after collecting the taxes, he decided to take all his valued belongings out of his hut, including the collections. He left in the house his empty straw bag pack he usually used for tax collection. Then, he set the hut on fire. Right after, he went to report this event as an incident to the Portuguese colonial administration. His hut was in ashes when the colonial administration visited him. However, this was not enough to justify the course of action. In fact, his action was part of sabotage of the colonial rules and system with aim to benefit himself through a violent strategy similar to the colonial ones. Setting huts on fire, sabotaging and tricking the colonial system for its own benefit were some of the resistance strategies used by tax collector and local people with leadership positions – *régulos* – in colonial Mozambique (Allina, 1997; Serra, 1903). The point made was that as the colonial

regime benefits from local people, whoever was in the leadership position could trick the colonial system for its own benefit, as for the known and repeated saying, “a goat eats where it is tethered.”

Following colonialism, the push for power and acquiring a leadership position was connected to the benefit one would expect from having his own position. That is, the privilege and the benefits of being a leader under colonial regime instilled a desire for powerful positions in the independent Mozambique. As a result, after independence, structural violence and the push for power played an important role in the escalation of political violence. In later years, the ruling elites in government positions exercise power for their own benefit exacerbating violence in different forms. For example, right after the 1992 Peace Agreement, Joaquim Alberto Chissano (the first President of the newly independent country) government was well-defined by *cabritismo* (goatism) – “o cabrito come onde está amarrado.” - “a goat eats where it is tethered.” This meant that petty officials could only profit (“eat”) from what is within their purview (Hanlon, 2021). This included instigating structural violence, corruption, and the sabotage of the public administration system, a violent strategy that locals used during colonialism to resist against the colonial violence. It is in considering this scenario that a Mozambican rapper and social activist affirms “I expelled the colonizers, but never colonialism. Nowadays, black exploiting black, smells of colonial time, and the wars come from established tribal divisions” (Azagaia, 2013). Chapter two further illustrates the linkages between colonialism and Mozambique’s political conflict.

The Cultural, Economic, and Religious Consequences of Colonialism in Mozambique

Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) scholarship asserts that to nurture peaceful transformation it is essential to understand the cultural, economic, and religious impacts of colonialism in the colonies (Byrne, 2017; Rahman et al., 2017; Maiangwa et al., 2022).

According to Franz Fanon (1963) colonialism and its cruel exercise of authority (oppression) generated negative and powerful dispositions, images, and perceptions in the psyche and culture (psycho-cultural dimension) of the colonized. From such a violent experience, colonized people drew their motives to eject the settlers violently (Fanon, 1963, p. 35). The mental images of colonial systematic oppression were stamped in the colonized's minds because they were so clear and easy to be understood and they were internalized by the colonized that accepted the mantle of being oppressed over time (Fanon, 1963, p. 41).

In the case of Mozambique, colonial political violence created 'psychological wounds' in the politically educated elites. As a result, these wounds could only be healed, to some extent, through violence against the colonial power (Macamo, 2016). In fact, what motivated the liberation struggle was not only the unity of Mozambique's elites or its population developing a freedom consciousness. Rather, the liberation struggle was also motivated by the need to overthrow the settlers that were both hated and admired by Mozambicans (Huffman, 1992). On the one hand, they were hated because of the brutal way they treated the colonized. On the other hand, they were also admired as some Mozambicans adopted the colonizer's way of life and they mimicked the violent strategies used by the colonizers during colonialism. Moreover, other Mozambicans collaborated with the colonial regime to prosecute the liberation movement leaders through the secret police, *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE: International and State Defense Police)* (Funada-Classen, 2013, p. 141; De Meneses & McNamara, 2014).

Applying Fanon's (1963), "internalization of oppression" idea to Mozambique, it can also be traced to the adoption of the colonial *modus operandi* by the new elites, whereby the state institutions, including FRELIMO, were led by the elites from Southern Mozambique (Huffman, 1992). In fact, within the Portuguese colonial divide-and-rule context, the North of the country

was marginalized, and the colony's loyal elites were drawn from the South (Sumich, 2005, pp. 68-80). As a result, the Northern elites developed a sense of self-defeat, suspicion, and inferiority regarding those from the South (Bussotti & Nhaueleque, 2022). These colonial divisions shaped the way the Northern and Southern elites regarded each other during colonialism and thereafter. In other words, the political and cultural divisions, the elites struggle for power within FRELIMO, and the origins of FRELIMO leadership were shaped by colonialism. This is because the colonial regime distributed the privileges and ruling power to the Southern elites in detriment of those from the North of Mozambique.

Further, after independence, perceived ethnic and cultural differences within FRELIMO led to lateral violence between the elites and divisions within the organization (Huffman, 1992). For instance, Southern elites seized the power and the leadership positions within the movement, overshadowing the Northern elites (Serapião, 2004). These divergences and discriminations within FRELIMO shaped the way to the war that broke out in 1977 as malcontented members created their own political movements whose agenda included fighting against FRELIMO (De Meneses & McNamara, 2014). Shortly after independence, FRELIMO persecuted the leaders of political parties and all opposition movements, and those resisting FRELIMO's ideology. In these circumstances, André Matadi Matsangaise, and Afonso Marceta Dhlakama from Sofala, in the Central region of Mozambique, left FRELIMO and crossed the border into Rhodesia seeking support to combat FRELIMO. In 1977, both leaders founded RENAMO, which became the second largest well-established party grudgingly competing for power as it opposed FRELIMO with military means (Vines, 2018, p. 5). These same grudges between FRELIMO and RENAMO continue to characterize today's political violence that led to the different peace negotiations and agreements, yet the relationship between the two parties were not transformed.

Cultural Identity, Resistance, and Colonialism in Mozambique

Colonialism is at the heart of the unjust structures that emerged in Mozambique because of cultural poverty that dehumanized the people (Mveng, 1994, p. 156). For example, religion, especially, Christianity was used to justify supposed “civilized” colonial practices. Mudimbe (1988) attests that using the missionary language and discourse of authority enforced and complimented colonial intentions through religious conversion of the “savages” to save their souls using all means possible including violence to attain the colonial objectives (pp. 44-47; Dangarembga, 1988 as cited in Maiawagua et al., 2022, p. 251). It is within this context that civilizing the “barbarous nations” in God’s name and declaring their land as *terra nullius* to implant Western sovereignty was the prophetic mission of the Catholic Church during colonialism (Cross, 1987). Therefore, the destruction of pre-colonial and Indigenous spiritual and cultural traditions as well as their replacement by the colonizer’s religion, cultural traditions, intellectual reduction, and intolerance in the missionary language, characterized the first announcement of the gospel that was meant to Christianize and westernize the “naked,” “cannibal,” and “primitive pagan” practices (pp. 65-74).

What colonialism did in Mozambique was to uproot Mozambicans from their indigenous religious and spiritual traditions. The Portuguese colonizers banned traditional religious leaders and ceremonies that were performed for unity, wealth, and community moralization (Cabrita, 2000; Kayuni, 2016). Consistent with this idea, in 1940, the Portuguese colonizers and the Vatican signed a concordat through which the Roman Catholic Church was declared the state’s official church and the right hand of colonialism (Manuel et al, 2012; Cross, 1987). Hence, the church’s primary colonial mission in Mozambique consisted of uprooting the “savages” from their religious animistic practices, and freemasonry, as well as dispersing with the Islamic roots established in

the North of Mozambique before the arrival of the Portuguese colonizers (Morier-Genoud & Anouilh, 2003; Cross, 1987). This is because the Portuguese colonizers believed that without the extermination of the Indigenous religious values of the “savages” animist religions, Christianity and the gospel would not have space to grow in Mozambique (Cross, 1987).

With the arrival of the independence, the new leadership elite cadre (many of whom had been educated in missionary schools as *indigenas* and *assimilados*) declared the country’s natural religion, and cultural practices as obscurantism (Serapião, 2004). In other words, as a direct consequence of colonial cultural colonization, Mozambique’s elites’ eagerness to modernize the post-colonial society didn’t take into consideration the Indigenous people’s cultural values nor the dynamics of cultural colonization operated by the Portuguese. Rather, after independence, the FRELIMO authoritarian moralization and modernization of the community sidelined local cultural practices, natural religious practices, and traditional customs, creating dissatisfaction and resistance among local people (Coelho, 1998). The overthrow of the Indigenous spiritual, religious, and traditional leaders, who were connected to ancestral worshiping (Kayuni, 2016; Hanlon, 2010; Igreja, 2014) paved the way to the escalation of political violence. This is because FRELIMO’s violence against traditional religion brought about dissatisfaction among traditional religious leaders and their communities.

In such an environment, RENAMO exploited the communities’ frustration and declared itself to be the guardian of the spiritual and Indigenous traditions, and spirituality of local communities (Kayuni, 2016). For instance, one of RENAMO’s guerrilla strategies was *Pica wega* (burn yourself) (Igreja, 2021). That is, when RENAMO entered the villages, it would force people to burn their own huts after removing their traditional and magical objects (Igreja, 2021, pp. 333-335). This was deemed by the populations as RENAMO’s recognition of supernatural forces

(called *nepharamas*) and reinforced their support from the communities, while justifying the violence against FRELIMO (Meneses, 2022; Igreja, 2021). In addition, to exploit their support from the population, RENAMO maintained and allowed religious practices, Christian churches and ancestral worship in their controlled areas. This was also because it was believed that traditional spirits and ancestors would decide the outcome of the war (Igreja, 2014; Lubkman, 2008; Meneses, 2022). In contrast, in FRELIMO's controlled areas (communal villages), African religious traditions were shut down (Lubkman, 2008; Igreja, 2022, p. 334). As of today, local religious spiritual values and actors, and traditional leaders alongside the cultural wisdom of the local Mozambican people are not part of the peacebuilding process. It is within these circumstances that lay the rejection of African traditional, cultural, spiritual values and their actors during colonialism that also accompanied Mozambique's new political regime shortly after independence, and continues to permeate the country's peace processes contributing to political violence.

Forced Labor for Economic Profit, and the So-called Civilization Project in Mozambique

Regarding the economic consequences of colonialism, Albert Memmi (2003) believed economic gain was the colonizer's major objective as the colony was portrayed as a place where one earned more than s/he could spend (p. 48). Hence, the colonizer's economic privileges and the deprivation, humiliation, and subjugation of the colonized characterized the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized (p. 8). The colony and the colonized were the objects of profit, privilege, and power. In fact, the colonizer depended on the colonized and the colonized existed to serve the needs of the colonizer (p. 130). In Mozambique, Portuguese colonialism depended solely on the colonized's forced labor (*chibalo*), and tax collection – (*mussoco*). The forced labor

was institutionalized by the Portuguese colonizers through the 1893 colonial labor code as the backbone of Mozambique's colonial economy (Allina, 1997, 2012, pp. 8-10). In fact, the forced labor was so important to the Portuguese to the extent that they extended the period of forced labor and the slave trade much longer in their colonies when compared to the French and the British. Britain adopted international labor standards in 1930, and France did so in 1937. In contrast, Portugal didn't adhere to the International Labor Agreements abolition of forced labor in its colonies until 1961 (Kleoniki & Juif, 2015, pp. 10-11; Allina, 1997, pp. 11-12; Allina, 2012).

In Mozambique forced labor was used by the Portuguese to subjugate and exploit Mozambicans (Allina, 2012). The colonial relations between the Portuguese colonizers and Mozambique's colonized people were based on forced labor that satisfied the colonizer's economic needs by providing cheap labor and access to raw resources. To materialize and increase the efficiency of the forced labor, the Portuguese engendered a political and economic administration of the country splitting it into three zones, namely: The North of the country was made a peasant-based economy, while companies exploited the Central region (for e.g., the Niassa, Mozambique, and Zambezi companies produced coconut, rubber, sugar, maize, and other crops), and the South functioned as a labor reserve for the mines of South Africa and Zimbabwe (Kleoniki & Juif, 2015, p. 23; Lopes, 2005, pp. 301-305). This division of the country aggravated the cultural, economic, political, and social differences in Mozambique and affected the way each zone and their inhabitants perceived the other. This territorial labor division determined the economic inequalities between the three areas. Those divisions of people by regions and labor characterized the colonial and post-colonial milieus, contributing to disconnection, difficult cohesion and a shared past, separate narratives and stories in the country that consubstantiated and fueled the existing conflict between the elites supported by their zones of influence.

As part of the aforementioned divisions, the Portuguese colonial administrative strategies in Mozambique included the creation of “civilized” alienated Mozambican elites of *assimilados* (the assimilated). The “*Assimilados* were an indigenous petty bourgeoisie during the colonial period” (Sumich & Honwana, 2007, p. 6). They had to swear loyalty to the colonial state, speak only Portuguese at home, adopt “European” habits, abandon “heathen” beliefs and have a Portuguese official vouch for their character (p. 7). This colonial racialization strategy fueled the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO, as the *assimilados*, the supposed civilized people were mulattoes, white people and Indians from the capital Maputo– the South of Mozambique. In fact, in the later stages of colonization within the country, and also within FRELIMO, racialized black people deserted and as those “who lost out in the initial power struggles tried to build support through ethnic nationalism” (Sumich & Honwana, 2007, pp. 8-9). These political and psycho-cultural dynamics played an important role in the escalation of political violence as will be illustrated in the root causes of the conflict in Chapter Three.

Conclusion

Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique contributed greatly to the culture of violence that shaped relations between ethnic groups there. This is because the excessive use of authority by the colonizers dehumanized the locals through forced labor, and marginalization of their culture and spiritual values. First, we can note that the adoption and use of violence by the new elites in post-colonial Mozambique can be regarded as the result of the “internalization of oppression” inflicted by the colonizers on local people during colonialism. Second, colonialism was only possible with the eradication of local culture and spirituality. Therefore, in Mozambique colonialism uprooted the indigenous peoples from their peaceful sustaining values, opening up spaces for disharmony

and conflict. From an economic perspective, making the colonies and the colonized objects of profit, the colonizers ended up underdeveloping the colonies. Therefore, as of today, the lack of economic justice is one of the causes of violence in Mozambique. In addition, unjust political and economic structures established by the colonizers under the control of loyal elites contribute to divisions, hate, and violence. In fact, a huge civil war between two key group elites (RENAMO and FRELIMO) followed the end of colonialism in Mozambique.

As I argue that colonialism is part of violent conflict in Mozambique, I also believe that the peacebuilding approach must consider the colonial damages created by the colonial process. This is because the effectiveness of peacebuilding approaches can only be secured if they address the colonial conditions behind conflict imposed by the colonizers in the colonies.

CHAPTER 3 – Social Cubism: The Underlying Internal Roots Causes of Mozambique’s Conflict

Introduction

Conflict transformation requires a deep analysis of the root causes and drivers of conflict. In this respect, social theories and models can assist in conflict analysis and conflict transformation. Chapter Three explores the question of why Mozambique is embroiled in violent conflict. Social cubism assists in our analysis of the internal root causes of Mozambique’s violent conflict. It is a multi-modal and multi-level analytical model that puts together six different forces or dimensions (demography, history, political, economic, psycho-culture, and religion) in order to capture the interrelated connections and trajectories of ethnic conflict. It follows that since independence, the FRELIMO party harnesses its economic and political power at the expense of the RENAMO party. As a result, RENAMO employs military means to push for political and economic gains. Additionally, FRELIMO is the majority group that determines the cultural, and artistic expressions imposing its own cultural vision in society. FRELIMO’s segregation of other ethnic groups’ ways of life also creates conflict.

Similarly, as the narration and interpretation of national history lies in the hands of FRELIMO. The RENAMO party and its supporters are left out of the historical glorious independence stories. This also contributes to the escalation of intergroup conflict. Moreover, FRELIMO uses stereotypes to portray RENAMO and other ethnic groups differently from itself. Interactions of this nature foster’s split identities among Mozambique’s ethnic groups so that emotions, frustration, anger, and fear divide the people. Therefore, Chapter three explores the dynamic of the six internal forces in Mozambique’s conflict. First, the demographic factor is explored. Second, the historical force is analyzed. Third, the political dimension is scrutinized.

Fourth, the economic perspective is highlighted. Fifth, the psycho-culture dimension is surveyed, and sixth, the religious facet is examined.

Demographic Force

Understanding the demographic spatiotemporal patterns is crucial in comprehending Mozambique's conflict as population distribution may be related to resource distribution within communities. Issues of minority and majority status within a space and throughout time are significant regarding accessing and controlling political, territorial, and economic resources. That is, economic and political opportunities may be shared within a small minority, and economic policies may also be decided by the minority or majority in power (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 101). Exploration of the demographic drivers of conflict shows that the majority group does not depend necessarily on minority groups for political, economic, and policy decision-making. In addition, dominant groups do not count on minority experiences to exist, while minority groups are dependent on majority groups for their survival (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 70). This situation may lead to minority group's seeking revenge as the majority groups are more likely to control the political and economic systems (Byrne & Carter, 1996, pp. 9-10; Carter & Byrne, 2000).

In the case of Mozambique, the distribution of population and ethnolinguistic divisions are critical to understanding the power dynamics and divergences between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Both parties represent the majority and minority groups. Therefore, their composition is impacted by the groups in the country. There are two main ethnolinguistic groups in Mozambique distributed in the three regions, namely, the South (from Maputo province to the Save River), the Center (from the Save River to the Zambezi River), and North (from the Zambezi River to the Rovuma River). The first group is the patrilineal ethnolinguistic group located in the South of the Zambezi River.

This first group comprises the *Tsonga*, who live South of the Save River (Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces), and the Shona who are located between the Save River and the Zambezi River (Tete, Sofala, and Manica provinces) at the North of the *Tsonga* (Opello, 1975, p. 68). The second is the matrilineal group of people located toward the North of the Save and Zambezi Rivers. It consists of the two largest groups namely, the *Makua-Lonwe* (Nampula and Zambeze provinces), and the *Makondes* (Cabo Delegado province). The colonizer made the people from the Southern region loyal to the Portuguese colonial administration (Cabrita, 2000; Vines, 2010). As a result, they were provided with more education. Equally, the colonial power also allocated economic and social opportunities to Southern *mulattos* and *assimilados* (Allina, 2012; Cabrita, 2000; Funada-Classen, 2013).

The distribution of the population and their ethnolinguistic differences were simplified into regional differentiations. That is, as of today, they are simply considered to be people from either the North or South of the Zambezi River. In such circumstances, political elites from both RENAMO and FRELIMO that participate in the parliament tap into these demographic cleavages to justify their competition for power and resources (Opello, 1975, pp. 75-80). In fact, in Mozambique's parliament, setting a national agenda for the country is more likely to be forgotten. This is because FRELIMO and RENAMO are tempted to push forward the agenda of their related ethnolinguistic groups. In these everyday conflicts, only FRELIMO, the political majority succeeds as decisions in the parliament depend on the political majority. As a result, the political will of the political majority affects the accommodation of positive and constructive policies from minorities (Byrne & Carter, 1996, pp. 10-11). Consequently, minorities and politically underrepresented populations feel insecure regarding political control and access to resources (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, pp. 100-101). In addition, they develop a sense of a siege mentality with

little dialogue with outsiders, which exacerbates the escalation and de-escalation of conflict (Byrne & Keashly, 2000).

Growing up, living, being educated, and working in Mozambique I noted that Mozambique's demographic and ethnolinguistic divides become enduring drivers of conflicts. Economic, social, and political favoritism between different ethnic groups is emphasized by political leaders to propel themselves into power. Access to different kinds of economic and political opportunities in any milieu may depend on one's origin and one's relationship with the governing ethnolinguistic elites. In many cases, nepotism defines political, economic, and social leadership, whereby members of the same family or group lead the economic, political, and social institutions. For instance, Raul Honwana, a well-known colonial civil servant, from the Southern region of Mozambique, had three sons and one daughter. The first, Luis Bernardo Honwana, was a Minister of Culture for Mozambique (1986). The second, João Bernardo Honwana, ended up working for the United Nations and was a commander of Mozambique's air force (1987-1992). The third son, Fernando Honwana, was an officer of the first President of Mozambique. The daughter, Gita Honwana-Welsh, was one of the first public prosecutors and judges in Mozambique (1978), before working at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) between 2011-2013. This is not an isolated case. For example, former President Joaquim Chissano was the Minister of Foreign Affairs right after independence. His father used to be one of the translators for the colonial regime (Sumich, 2005; Sumich, 2018). These patronage dynamics are encouraged in national institutions. However, they benefit only the governing political elites to the detriment of the political minorities and the poor, usually from the Northern region of the country. As a result, conflicts and violence between FRELIMO and RENAMO and their ethnic groups arise.

Historical Force

History is an important puzzle in understanding protracted ethnoterritorial conflict (Byrne & Carter, 1996). In fact, history appropriation and interpretation by conflicting parties shape, control, and legitimate the existing institutions, political opportunities, and motivations of various ethnic groups (p. 5). Moreover, historical prejudices and popular memories of heroism as well as chosen glories and traumas are historical elements that contribute to damaging intergroup relations and keeping ethnic groups apart (Byrne et al., 2001, p. 728; Byrne et al., 2003). History is also key to understanding Mozambique's contemporary violent conflict (See Chapter Two).

FRELIMO elite's prejudices against RENAMO members nurture conflict between the two parties. In the first Mozambique Popular Republic (1975-1990), RENAMO's members were portrayed by the FRELIMO elite as the enemies of Mozambique's history of liberation and as 'armed bandits' (Fauvet, 2007; Cahen, 2018, Chichava, 2018). Therefore, RENAMO's members were controlled and confined to reeducation camps¹, while some activists were executed by FRELIMO in these camps (Benedito, 2018; Machava, 2021, Macamo, 2017).

History can also be used by conflicting parties in many ways to justify their grievances. Sean Byrne and Amos Nandan (2011) assert, for example, that conflicting groups legitimate their historical experiences. Similarly, they devalue and marginalize other groups' glorious past, and in the process, they exclude minorities in historical narratives, and these actions open up spaces for conflicts and insurgency (Byrne & Nandan, 2011, pp. 62-63). In Mozambique, FRELIMO disregarded and devalued RENAMO's efforts during and after the liberation struggle. Rather,

¹ Re-education camps were a network of internment camps established by FRELIMO during its socialist experience (1974-1992). The main objective of the re-education camps was to decolonize and re-educate the known former supporters of colonialism, the enemies of the revolution, and the citizens deemed guilty of wrongdoing, as well as unemployed in the urban areas. The re-education camps employed an oppressive pedagogy to create a new man and a new society under FRELIMO's leadership. Re-education camps were an extension of FRELIMO's oppressive system (Machava, 2018; 2019; Cabrita, 2001; Bartoli et al., 2010; Tavares, 2016).

FRELIMO persecuted other constituencies that contributed to the liberation struggle and the end of Mozambique's colonial rule. In addition, FRELIMO declared itself as the glorious party that liberated Mozambicans from the Portuguese colonial regime. Moreover, FRELIMO acclaimed itself through the national hymn it created (1975-2002) titled "*Viva, Viva a FRELIMO* – Long live FRELIMO," the guide of Mozambican people (Curtis, 2010; Bastos, 2013, Onditi, 2018). After independence from Portugal, FRELIMO's blind triumphalism and paternalism made the party believe that Mozambique's population were now members and supporters of the FRELIMO party. This monolithic interpretation of the independence victory paved the way for conflict. In fact, the escalation of the civil war in some areas of Mozambique showed that RENAMO distanced itself from FRELIMO's ideology of conquering the population, and securing its social reproduction by force (Santos, 2014).

However, RENAMO's position did not prevent FRELIMO's seizure of power. In fact, even after the civil war, the new history books and manuals used in the schools that Mozambican pupils including myself used meant we learned about Mozambique's history that exclusively narrated FRELIMO's history and the importance of its leaders in the struggle. They praised the epic liberation of the country and FRELIMO's heroes that participated in the liberation struggle (Bussotti & Nhaueleque, 2022). For instance, it is inaccurately mentioned in the history books that Eduardo Mondlane is the founder of the FRELIMO party (Paul, 1975; Manguenzi, 1999). However, several scholars argue that FRELIMO is the result of the amalgamation of three different groups²

² In reality, the FRELIMO party was founded in May 29, 1962, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, following the unification of three liberation struggle-led movements namely, *União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique* (UDENAMO), Mozambique African National Union (MANU) and *União Africana de Moçambique Independente* (UNAMI) See Robinson, 2006, p. 53. UDENAMO had its origin in Rhodesia in 1960 and its members were from Southern and Central Mozambique. UNAMI, whose members were from Tete, in the Central area of Mozambique, was founded by migrants in Malawi. Kenyan Mozambican ex-patriates established MANU in 1960. After Tanzania became independent, Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian president who supported Mozambique's struggle, welcomed the three movements and proposed that they unite as one organization (see Opello, 1975, pp. 66-68; Serapião, 2004; Santos, 2014; Hanlon, 2010).

that had different leaders and distinct origins, and Eduardo Mondlane belonged to none of the groups (Dinerman, 2006; Fauvet, 2007; Dokkum, 2020; Serapião, 2004).

These transformations may have upset and inspired RENAMO's freedom fighters to reclaim their due recognition during the colonial struggle through violence (Bragança & Depelchin, 1986). As a matter of fact, there could be an apparent overlap between FRELIMO's and Mozambique's postcolonial history. Nevertheless, the former may have had the potential to unite Mozambicans and prevent minority groups' narratives from inclusion. The latter can only be understood within the global context of Mozambique's history (Bragança & Depelchin, 1986). Otherwise, Mozambique's conflict will always be protracted with one party as the protagonist, and the other as the opponent.

Political Force

Political factors come into play when a threat or perceived threat to someone's political goals, values, interests, or needs leads to conflict (Wim, 2022). Within the social cubism framework, political factors are identified as one of the puzzles that lead to an understanding of conflict and the gaps that need to be met for its successful transformation (Byrne & Carter, 1996; Byrne & Keashly, 2000). For example, exclusion from power, minority scapegoating, nationalism, and structural violence are fundamental power dynamics that determine the upsurge and intensification of conflicts (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, pp. 64-67).

Analysis of Mozambique's violent political milieu reveals that its protracted violent conflict is a result of excluding ethnic groups from political power. The violent conflict is also related to a combination of minority scapegoating and structural violence. Thus, political

segregation nurtures political cleavages that are instrumental in clashes and battles between ingroups and outgroups (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 65).

These points are consistent with the events that created the political conflict in Mozambique where the history of the liberation struggle, the civil war, and political grudges became entangled in a big push for political power between both political parties. To be more precise, it follows that Mozambique became independent in 1975 after the liberation war against the Portuguese, which began in 1964. On June 25, 1975 (Mozambique's Independence Day), the Portuguese government handed over power to FRELIMO (Naidu, 2001). Shortly after independence, FRELIMO persecuted the leaders of all opposition movements and those resisting FRELIMO's ideology. Being outside FRELIMO's political orbit was equal to being an enemy and antagonistic to its ideas and being ineligible for any government institutional position (Dinerman, 2006). Within such circumstances, RENAMO has resorted to violent means. Throughout its political history in dealing with FRELIMO's marginalization from political institutions RENAMO threatened FRELIMO into making concessions. In fact, RENAMO justified its grievances to secure a place in the electoral political landscape of Mozambique's forthcoming democracy (Santos, 2014, pp. 46-47). Additionally, RENAMO decided to achieve political authority by force. By doing so, RENAMO aimed to legitimate itself as an alternative to the state and to lead the institutions in the same way that FRELIMO had done in the past (p. 61).

One other point to note is the structural discrimination planned by dominant groups and emphasized in social and political structures to the extent that being part of the political and social institutions signifies a fight for minority groups (Byrne & Nadan, 2011). As a result, political grievances mushroom, and conflict between groups intensify due to structural violence (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 67; Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 101). As we noted earlier, structural violence

inflicted on Mozambique's minorities by the governing elites has been one of the key sources of conflict. Such conflict follows military dynamics, yet also takes the form of a blaming game in the public milieus such as in the parliament and in the media. For example, RENAMO humiliates FRELIMO as a corrupt political party yet also criticizes FRELIMO for manipulating the structures of the state such as the paramilitaries and electoral bodies that contribute to recurrent large systematic fraudulent behavior in presidential and municipality elections (Republic of Mozambique, 2015). In contrast, FRELIMO accuses RENAMO of creating divisions, lacking patriotism, and having a nationalistic vision, and being enemies of the state (Frey, 2015). In the worst-case scenario, paramilitaries are employed by FRELIMO to persecute and victimize RENAMO's leaders (Vines, 2019; Zitamar, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2018). These dialectic political relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO characterized by exclusion from power, minority scapegoating, and structural violence have been determining the escalation of political violence in Mozambique.

Economic Force

Economic factors can also play a significant role in determining the escalation and de-escalation of protracted ethno-political conflict. Economic exclusion through discriminatory policies leads to poverty and political violence against minority ethnic groups (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, pp. 70-71).

The exclusionary Marxist-based economic policy imposed by FRELIMO on Mozambicans nurtured during Mozambique's civil war were also significant. In the first years of FRELIMO's existence (1962–1974), its ideology was more linked to progressive nationalism. That is, it was oriented toward the liberation struggle against colonialism (Chichava, 2013). In 1977, during the

party's third congress, FRELIMO decided to embrace the Marxist-Leninist ideology (Saad-Filho, 2020; Sumich, 2020). This turn was influenced by the significant support FRELIMO enjoyed from both China and the Soviet Union during the liberation struggle (Witney, 1978, p. 57). This decision was also part of FRELIMO's anti-colonial struggle against Western Portuguese rule (Simpson, 1993, p. 309). By virtue of its economic interpretation of Marxism, FRELIMO emphasized a modern interpretation in which one of the main characteristics consisted of aversion to the peasantry (Sam & Tarp, 2016; Alexopoulou & Juif, 2017; Monjane, 2021).

FRELIMO's interpretation meant that it believed that unlike family agriculture, collective agriculture, and co-operatives were key to developing Mozambique's heavy industry. Moreover, FRELIMO assumed that a large and dispersed peasantry and family agriculture was antagonistic to Socialism (Saad-filho, 2020; Chichava, 2013). Thus, FRELIMO believed that the collectivization of agriculture through the placement of farmers and peasants in communal villages would create a class base for socialism in the rural areas in order to facilitate the consolidation of state farms leading to the formation of a rural proletariat (Sumich, 2020; Saad-Filho, 2020). FRELIMO's modernization of the economy marginalized the peasants seriously undermining the basis of Mozambique's economy. As a result, inflation increased, the market collapsed, the economic revolution strategies failed, and the economic promises of Socialism never came to fruition (Vines, 2021; Sumich, 2020). In these circumstances, RENAMO exploited FRELIMO's failure, reinstalled the local chiefs, and returned the local populations from communal villages (villigization) to their lands (Chichava, 2013). Therefore, RENAMO became the party of the people, mobilizing the people's efforts in the war against FRELIMO (Pitcher, 2002; Sumich, 2019, p. 15-25). RENAMO acted in support of the peasantry by supporting their rebellion and grievances and at the same time justified their own grievances. In this regard, Saad-Filho (1997) affirms that

battles between FRELIMO's modernist Marxism and the Mozambican peasantry were the primary economic cause of the first civil war (pp. 192-193). Moreover, REMANO would not have thrived without extensive support from peasants in the Center of Mozambique (Saad-Filho, 2020).

Economic factors that exacerbate ethnic conflict are not limited to exclusion through discriminatory policies (Byrne & Nadan, 2011) that led to the collectivization of agriculture in Mozambique as mentioned earlier. They also include economic power control, expropriation, and privatization of property (Castelo-Branco & Greco, 2022, pp. 5-8). Economic power control imposed by dominant groups to maintain the loyalty of their ethnic groups and marginalize the out-groups from the economy can also fuel conflict (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 72). With the transition from Socialism to Capitalism in the 1980s, FRELIMO privatized the economy of the country, becoming the main and the only economic actor.

The arousal of capitalism demands the expropriation of the means of production and the creation of property-related rents (Marx, 1976, p. 142). Since the previous years of Socialism and economic centralism, the state represented by the FRELIMO party was the owner of the means of production (Castelo-Branco & Greco, 2022). In other words, the state owned the farms and companies, social and economic infrastructure, land, mineral, and forestry resources (Castelo-Branco, 2014). Therefore, in such a capitalist milieu, the new domestic capitalist classes required state-sponsored programs. Privatization of the state-owned share companies was at the heart of economic exclusion and dissatisfaction that led to conflicts (Cramer, 2001; Castelo-Branco & Greco, 2022). It follows that almost 80 percent of state and private companies were sold by and to FRELIMO's veterans of the national liberation struggle (Hanlon, 2021; Castelo-Branco & Greco, 2022). In addition, in an obvious economic segregation of the RENAMO party and its members, only FRELIMO's loyal members were allowed to take leadership positions and control of the

national and privatized companies (Sumich, 2007; Hanlon, 2021). This opened up spaces for the intensification of the conflict in the country.

Economic factors denote the equal allocation of existent economic resources and socio-economic sustainable development (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 102). Undeniably, economic discrepancies can fuel competition between factions in society. Additionally, institutional favoritism and stereotypes may set the conditions that separate groups (Byrne & Carter, 1996; Carter & Byrne, 2000, p. 14). Consequently, territorial movements and their leaders may use economic asymmetries and the unequal apportionment of economic resources as a grudge to struggle for equal access to economic opportunities and wealth (Byrne & Carter, 2000; Byrne & Carter, 1996, pp. 14-15). In part, the resurgence of Mozambique's conflict in 2013 is a result of economic inequalities and unequal access to economic growth (Regalia, 2017, p. 13-20). Oil and gas resources discovered off the Northern Mozambique coast (Cabo Delgado) increased political divisions between RENAMO and FRELIMO (Regalia, 2017, p. 13-14). In fact, Mozambique's economic inequalities are generating resentment among the RENAMO party and the country at large. There is a perception that national economic gains only benefit the FRELIMO elites (Columbo, 2022). Although the current war in Cabo Delegado is driven by many other factors, the economic marginalization of RENAMO from economic negotiations exacerbates the conflict (International Bar Association, 2022).

Taking the above into consideration, we note that Mozambique's conflicts and violence may take on different dimensions. However, grievances are always manifested in exclusion and economic factors play an important role in understanding the dynamics of conflict.

Psycho-cultural Force

Culture is critical because it defines how groups, communities, and individuals relate and interact with each other, and cultural interactions may be determined by identity, ethnicity, and language (Avruch, 1998). In this regard, social and psychological issues and perceptions may contribute to the eruption and development of conflict (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 102). The way each group categorizes and portrays itself, and sees the other group, may lead to an ethnic bias, such as valuing the world based on its own group's values (pp. 103-104). Equally, segregation and cultural boundaries create differences between groups. Such differences can lead to conflict as they are based on stereotypes, which are employed to construct the other and are offensive to minority ethnic groups (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 68).

In Mozambique, FRELIMO dominant groups categorize, portray, and undervalue different national groups from their own group using stereotypes (Henriksen, 2010; Bussotti & Nhauelque, 2022). For instance, FRELIMO's Southern party and its supporters, mostly from the South of Mozambique, use stereotypes, labels, and offensive local cultural expressions such as *xingondo* to refer to people from the North of the Save River (comprises the Center and North of Mozambique) as inferior that must obey and subordinate themselves to Southern ethnic groups (Bussotti, & Nhauelque, 2022). This behavior has been fueling hate and violence against the Southern ethnic groups allied with FRELIMO, and the Central and Northern ethnic groups, which are connected to RENAMO (Bussotti & Nhauelque, 2022).

The psycho-cultural dimension of ethnic conflict encompasses the symbolic and cultural rituals, which are embedded within ethnic groups' identities. It is within these circumstances, whereby psycho-cultural factors usually contribute to differentiating ingroups from outgroups that create polarization (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 16). In addition, cultural practices, and markers

function to identify the boundaries of one group compared to another (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 68).

The presence of several ethnocultural groups in Mozambique leads to their use of various symbolic and cultural rituals. However, dominant elites did not pay attention to the diversity of cultural rituals and their role in keeping cohesion in ethnic communities (Lavieque, 2020; Bussotti & Gundane, 2019). Rather, dominant elites despised, dissuaded, and on some occasions belittled cultural rituals, values, and beliefs of a group that was different from their own. For instance, the initiation rites, which are cultural practices from the North of the country, were considered by FRELIMO as backward by the new man-building ideology through the theme “down with initiation rites” (Arnfred, 2015, p. 186).

Linked to the first point is the fact that practices from the South of the country, where the elites belong and have support, were exalted, praised, and maintained. Studies about syncretic cults and cultural practices such as *lobolo* (bride price) and *Kutchinga* concluded that such practices are expressions of resistance and cohesion of the local communities (Forquim, 2016; Fernandes, 2018; Granjo, 2004; Honwana, 2022; Bussotti & Nhauleque, 2022). The *Kutchinga* practice implies that the widow should be taken into marriage by one of the brothers of her deceased husband, regardless of whether he is already married (Cruz et al., 2014; Jetha et al., 2021; Osório et al., 2013). This practice perpetuates violence against women and leads to the rapid diffusion of sexually transmitted infections as many of these men are promiscuous (Vera Cruz et al., 2018). In effect, *Kutchinga* or *Pita-Kufa* (as per the local languages of the Center of Mozambique) is a form of polygamy (Gajurel & Deresinski, 2021). In fact, polygamy is diffused in the South of the country where FRELIMO’s leadership elite is drawn from, and where the majority population supports FRELIMO (Amadeu, 2021).

Cultural practices are susceptible to criticism. However, the way they are portrayed by the dominant groups contributes to the creation of cultural boundaries between Mozambique's groups from the South and North. Consequently, feelings of fear, frustration, and anger are developed by individuals and groups from the Center and North of the country regarding those from the South (Nhauelque, 2020; Bussotti & Nhauelque, 2022). What justifies the Northerners' fear and anger is the fact that they believe that Southern cultural expressions and artists may end up destroying or eliminating their cultural and artistic identity-related expressions.

Religious Force

By chance, I was born into a Christian Catholic family. My father who was educated in colonial Catholic schools ended up becoming a devout Roman Catholic believer. All his children, myself included, had to follow his path. It happened that I chose to go to the Seminary with the intention of becoming ordained as a Roman Catholic priest. I joined the National Seminary where all Mozambican young people that aspire to the priesthood live for a period of three years in 2010. While studying Philosophy at Mozambique's Saint Augustin Seminary, one of the compulsory courses in my curriculum was the phenomenology of religion and the Rudolf Otto manual *The Idea of the Holy*. One of the ideas that were stressed in the course is that the experience of the sacred and the encounter with God was tremendous and fascinating. This assumption was combined with other biblical excerpts that consubstantiated Otto's thinking and were apt to inculcate change in future priests. For instance, it would be cited that the encounter between Jesus and Paul resulted in Saul's conversion on the road to Damascus (Act of Apostles, 9, 1-9). Second, the meeting between Jesus and Zacchaeus, the chief tax collector, transformed him and he went from sinner to Jesus's guest (Luke, 19:1-10).

Behind this encouragement, there was a truth: although we were Catholics by force of evangelization being trained for the priesthood, we were also well-rooted in our traditional religion and spirituality. For my colleagues and I, Christianity and the African traditional religion were not incompatible. Therefore, our conversations and our lives meant living fully both the spiritual principles of our culture, namely, the celebration of ancestors during our holidays, consulting the traditional healers when necessary, and being part of the traditional community celebrations. This meant that the conservative Rectors of the College believed that we had not yet met with Jesus because they perceived that meeting with Jesus meant we should live a Catholic religious experience that implied giving up our African spiritual traditions that were rooted in our culture.

As we were learning and doing in the Seminary, so were also doing some of the rituals and practices of other Mozambicans from monotheist religions in the country. Their traditional and spiritual traditions were considered complementary to the monotheism of their religions. In fact, for many Mozambicans and me, it was preferable to care more about the spiritual traditions, which was naturally inherited from our ancestors, than monotheism brought by Christianity and Islam, the two major religions that exist in Mozambique. However, on one side the Roman Catholic Church that came with Portuguese colonialism depicted the spiritual-religious traditions as practices of the “savages.” On the other side, since independence the Marxist FRELIMO showed hostility to both monotheism and local spiritual traditions (Bravo et al., 2022; Serapião, 2004).

Like the Portuguese colonial regime’s practice, FRELIMO discredited the religious traditions of the Mozambique communities as traditional and backward. In the village settlements religious practices were forbidden by FRELIMO as they were considered obscurantist manifestations to deceive, trick, and divide the people (Cabrita, 2000, p. 120; Seibert, 2003, pp. 273-274). This affected the communities to whom consulting the spirits and using magical powers

in the practice of their traditional religion characterized local people's beliefs. In these circumstances, RENAMO exploited the discontentment of the local communities and claimed that it was fighting against FRELIMO in alliance with ancestral spirits to return the land to its ancestral traditions that were banned by FRELIMO (Seibert, 2003, pp. 273-274). Therefore, RENAMO remained loyal to the local communities and their spiritual and religious practices, while fighting against FRELIMO (Machava, 2021). Thus, the approaches adopted by the Catholic Church, the Christian religion at large, the FRELIMO party, and RENAMO can be considered as the religious materials for the escalation and de-escalation of Mozambique's conflict.

In addition, as I realized after leaving the Seminary, although it may be true that the experience of the sacred is fascinating and tremendous, responses from such experiences may be also ambivalent and ambiguous. It was ambivalent to me that I had to forget about the traditional ceremony that since my childhood I have been celebrating with my grandfather in remembrance of my great-grandfather, with whom I share my childhood name for my own blessings and security. Likewise, I could not be convinced that I should not participate in the community ceremony for invocation of the ancestors for purposes of thanksgiving of a bountiful harvest and to ask for rain when droughts affected the communities. On the contrary, I found that phenomena and reactions from the experience of the sacred could also range from peaceful militancy to violent discipleship (Omer, 2015, p. 3). Following this, I also noticed colleagues of mine arguing with their families during holidays for being absent from communal ceremonies and celebrations.

Catholics in the Southern region would regard the Northern region, with the predominance of Islam as violent and loyal to the insurgent Islamic groups in the North of Mozambique. This perception triggered violent relations between people from different regions and led to attacks on Catholics in the Northern parts of Mozambique (Da Silva, 2020, pp. 11-12).

From this personal experience, I clarified that although religion plays an essential role in framing conflicts, it can also assist in conflict resolution, mitigation, and prevention of conflict (Carter & Smith, 2004, p. 280). First, it remains critical to understand that despite Western Christianity's sociopolitical structure, it may not be sustainable if it does not align with the people's values. As so, is human and local values/practices of the Mozambique's people (Ubuntu) can be used to frame what is essential in religion. Second, religious groups and actors, who fill the interpretative gap that hamper peace processes, can be creative peacebuilders (Bartoli, 2014). In fact, Mozambique's 1992 peace experience is the result of the religious groups and religious actors' constructive peacebuilding intervention, such as the Christian Council of Mozambique, the community of Saint Egidio, Reverend Jaime Pedro Gonçalves, and the Bishop of Beira in Mozambique's Sofala province (Serapião, 2004; Bartoli, 2014; Haynes, 2009). Their meaningful actions for the de-escalation of conflict are also one of the characteristics of religion that is pointed out by social cubism. Therefore, religious leaders in Christianity sociopolitical structures may consider including and advocating for the religious human and local values, experiences and practices that promote social peace in Mozambique.

Religion is one of the six interrelated forces of social cubism that is related to the escalation of ethnic conflict, and it may play a crucial role in its de-escalation (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 100; Byrne & Nadan, 1996; Carter & Byrne, 2000; Byrne et al., 2003). The relationship between religion and violence can be illustrated in different ways: First, in many contexts, religious beliefs justify tensions and escalate ethnic conflicts, and likewise, spiritual beliefs may divide social groups (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 64). Moreover, in certain environments religion is used as a source of identity that legitimates the actions of the ethnic parties locked in conflict (p. 65). This point applies to the Mozambique case study as far as the religious dimension of conflict is

concerned. Following the adoption of Marxist-Leninism, FRELIMO believed that the revolution and the formation of the "*homem novo*" (new man) and the new Mozambican society were incompatible with religion (Cahen, 1993). Thus, FRELIMO declared a godless state and abolished the freedom of religion that had existed under the colonial regime (Serapião, 2004, pp. 374-376). For instance, FRELIMO stated that churches were banners of colonialism against whom a popular violent campaign should be organized and waged (Cabrita, 2000, p. 121). Consequently, FRELIMO confiscated church buildings, restricted the people's freedom of religion banning religious teachings in public and private schools, and imposing a pass certificate on church officials (Cabrita, 2000; Serapião, 2004). These measures lit up a conflict between the religious congregations, in particular the Catholic Bishops of Mozambique and FRELIMO (Serapião, 2004). This is because the Catholic missions and structures such as schools and hospitals were targeted, confiscated, and reverted to the state by FRELIMO government. In addition, the Mozambique's bishops operated the mission schools, seminaries, and hospitals, which were no longer allowed to exist. This conflict was justified for different reasons.

According to FRELIMO, religion was a source of creating a popular identity that was different from the state's nationalist identity. In addition, FRELIMO accused religious institutions like Christianity and Islam as being part of Western imperialism operating in Mozambique, and that it was not compatible with the socialist revolution (Cabrita, 2000; Serapião, 2004). In contrast, the Bishops of Mozambique saw religion as a source of identity to be maintained on the grounds that not all socialist countries undervalued or attacked religion. The two could in fact coexist. In fact, Kenneth Kaunda, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Sekou Touré, and Julius Nyerere were devout Catholics and were examples cited by the Catholic Bishops to illustrate that Socialism did not mean a restriction on the freedom of religion (Serapião, 2004).

Second, the entanglement between political, social, and religious institutions may foster conflicting relations in society (Byrne & Nadan, 1996, p. 7). Involvement between politics and religion, and loyalty relations may shape cooperation between dominant political groups and religious institutions, actors, and leaders legitimating the power of one over another in society (pp. 8-10). Surveying the religious dynamics of the violent conflict in Mozambique it follows that compared to the Catholic Church that was hated by the FRELIMO regime, the Mozambique Christian Council (MCC) [a group of Protestant Churches] was allied and aligned with the FRELIMO regime (Serapião, 2004). Their alliance came into being because the MCC was able to blame, shame, and demonize RENAMO for the atrocities it committed against civilians and the damage that it created across the country (Serapião, 2004, p. 370). In addition, the alliance between MCC and FRELIMO was possible because FRELIMO's leadership at the time was educated in Protestant schools. For example, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane studied in the Swiss mission in Mozambique, and it provided him with a scholarship to study at Oberlin College in the U.S. (Serapião, 2004, p. 371). In any case, the alliance between MCC as a religious group, and FRELIMO as a political force legitimated FRELIMO's political actions, contributing to the escalation of conflict. Moreover, this alliance reaffirmed FRELIMO's stubbornness to negotiate with RENAMO for peace in Mozambique as the Catholic Church had started to bring the two parties together.

Conclusion

A broader conflict analysis that contemplates a multi-dimensional analysis may illuminate the root causes of conflict. This chapter applied social cubism to understand why Mozambique is embroiled in violent conflict. To that end, this chapter explored demographics, historical, political,

economic, religious, and psycho-cultural dimensions that characterize the internal dynamics of Mozambique's conflict. First, it was noted that Mozambique has two major groups (patrilineal and matrilineal) distributed in the three large regions (North, Center, and South). In this regard, FRELIMO's segregation of the political minority and underrepresented groups (from the North and Center represented by RENAMO) from political power and economic opportunities have fueled the conflict in Mozambique. Second, an analysis of the historic dimension showed that Mozambique's conflict is a result of competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO for power, prestige, and recognition that only history can provide. Thus, history is an exclusive enterprise of the FRELIMO elites as it triggers revenge and contributes to Mozambique's conflict.

Third, the political factors that cause conflict in the country consist of structural and institutional discrimination against RENAMO's leadership and supporters from the governing FRELIMO elites. Additionally, political factors are also related to the monopoly of power in the hands of the one-party elite, and the state centralization model inspired by the Soviet Union's ideologies. Fourth, the collectivization of agriculture placed an emphasis on state farms, and industry to the detriment of family own peasant farms that created economic exclusion and economic collapse that led to conflict. Fifth, cultural stereotypes were used against the people from Northern Mozambique by the elites from the South to sustain segregation among the people. In addition, cultural and artistic expressions from the Center and Northern regions weren't included in the country's ethnocultural identity as political elites prioritized cultural and artistic expressions from their region. Sixth, the demonization of traditional religion and spirituality, and the elimination of religious traditional leaders and healers to protect the Socialist revolution contributed to the escalation of Mozambique's conflict.

Social cubism captures the internal and interrelated dynamics of Mozambique's conflict in many ways. It captures how the six forces of this conflict interact dynamically and it considers a wide range of factors involved in the multiplicity of mutable and evolving circumstances of Mozambique's conflict situation. However, one of the limitations of social cubism may be the fact that it does not take into consideration the role of external international actors as well as natural and environmental factors that play an essential role in Mozambique's and Southern regional conflicts. Droughts, floods, and cyclic cyclones have affected the country altering demographic, political, and economic settlements. Overall, the new forms of conflict following the discovery of oil and mineral resources of Mozambique's coastline (Cabo Delgado – Pemba) require a multi-modal and multi-dimensional conflict analysis. Otherwise, the complexity of the ethno-political conflict will not be fully captured. Therefore, the options to transform the conflict's intractability into a tractable peaceful situation may be reduced and essential grassroots-up peacebuilding approaches may fail to be included to bring about a long-lasting peace in Mozambique.

CHAPTER 4 – Theoretical Background

Introduction

The theoretical background for the proposed research is grounded in the following areas. The first is the social cubism analytical model to assist in exploring the internal root causes of Mozambique's violent and political conflict. Social cubism theory outlines that intergroup conflict is a result of the interrelation of six internal factors: history, religion, demographics, political institutions and non-institutional behavior, economics, and psycho-culture (Byrne, & Keashly, 2000, pp. 99-108; Byrne, Carter & Senehi, 2003). Second, liberal peacebuilding is discussed to examine the liberal peace and statebuilding elements employed in Mozambique's peace agreements and to illustrate their unsuccessfulness to bring peace in Mozambique. The liberal peace intervention model asserts that forms of government such as democracy can guarantee peace around the world (Doyle, 1983, 2011, 2020; Richmond, 2005, 2011; Paris, 2004, 2006). Third, Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP), which advocates for the inclusion of indigenous peacebuilding will be used to critique liberal peacebuilding. Fourth, Ubuntu Indigenous peacebuilding is explored to analyze its potential for institutionalizing conflict transformation in Mozambique. CEP critiques the liberal concept of peace while instead proposing how local values and practices can assist in forging sustainable peace (Autessere, 2021; Richmond, 2021; Thiessen & Byrne, 2017). The Indigenous peace notion embedded in the context and in the culture of the people advances multiple local experiences and peace practices (Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2008, 2016; Tuso & Flaherty). Consequently, these four ideas provide a framework to understand the internal causes of conflict, the failure of liberal peacebuilding, and the role of Indigenous peacebuilding (Ubuntu) in Mozambique (Ramose, 1999; Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011; Mussomar, 2017, 2019, 2021). Therefore, Chapter three explores the social cubism model, analyzes, and

critiques liberal peacebuilding through CEP, and examines Indigenous knowledge and peacebuilding through the Ubuntu method.

Conflict Analysis: Social Cubism Model

Different PACS theories and frameworks propose diverse analytical models to analyze ethnic conflicts. For example, Sean Byrne and Neal Carter (1996) postulate that the analysis of ethnoterritorial conflict is best understood by social cubism, which emphasizes the correlation of psychological and material mechanisms (p. 2). Social cubism has six objective and subjective interconnected internal forces or dimensions that operate together in driving protracted ethnic conflicts: history, religion, demographics, political institutions, non-institutional behavior, economics, and psycho-cultural (Byrne & Carter, 1996). First, historical factors focus on how stories about the past when narrated in different ways influence conflict. Perceptions and interpretations of history may lead to conflict (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 100). Issues that may arise from the historical dimension include the role played by groups in a war, exclusion and independence, folklore, and stories of a golden past (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 6; Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 62).


Second, the religious dimension pays attention to the presence, role, and influence of religious institutions in conflict escalation and peace. In fact, religious organizations, actors, and groups may inspire reconciliation or divisions among groups (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 10). In this regard, religious elements consider the discourses on true believers, God's chosen people, religious traditions, doctrines, and God's given right to own the land (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 4; Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 64). Third, the demographic force examines the size of the groups and how that plays into conflict escalation. The fact that minorities are obliged to mimic the lifestyle of a

dominant ethnic group to survive may lead to conflict. Double majorities and double minorities are also important in terms of shifting borders as an ethnic group in one geographical context can become a majority and in another a minority and vice-versa (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 71). In addition, the presence of a majority and a minority in certain regions can determine the access to and distribution of resources (Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 70; Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 101). In this regard, the analysis of the demographic dimension may look at, interactions between majorities and minorities, culture, and language of both majorities and minorities (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 6).

Fourth, the political dimension explores how politics can contribute to the delineation of political institutions that can be participated in by certain groups and not by other groups (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 101). Consequently, it is important to explore the political structures, issues of nationalism, exclusion from power, and minority scapegoating (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 6; Byrne & Nadan, 2011, p. 67). Fifth, economic disparities between groups are more likely to inspire competition that leads to conflict. This is because, economic power can be harnessed by a dominant group that excludes other groups (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 14; Byrne & Nadan, 2011, pp. 71-72). Therefore, economic factors may consider the following for analysis, internal colonialism, discriminatory policies, favoritism, class differences, and modernization of the economy in areas where the majority ethnic group is dominant (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 4; Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 103). Sixth, the psycho-cultural force or dimension explores the issues regarding social psychological, or subjective aspects of the inter-ethnic conflict as people's cultural identity may be linked to conflict. Therefore, this dimension emphasizes in its analysis the interactions created by groups. The understanding is that emotions, identity, self-esteem, frustration, anger, symbolic rituals, and cultural stereotypes may contribute to shaping conflict (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p.

103; Byrne & Nadan, 2011, pp. 68-70). The correlation of the six forces can be well represented in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Correlation of the Six Forces in a Cube



Source: Byrne & Carter (1996, p. 3)

It is important to note that these six factors are not isolated from one another (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 14). Therefore, they should be analyzed concurrently to understand the trajectory of conflicts in order to ameliorate them (Byrne & Carter, 1996, pp. 17-18; Byrne & Nadan, 2011, pp. 61). Thus, Chapter **three** uses the social cube analytical model to examine the causes of internal conflict in Mozambique. By addressing a wide range of social forces, we increase the opportunities for coordinated and complementary conflict intervention (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 2). In this regard, we note the social cubism idea that conflicts are complex, multi-dimensional, and multi-layered. Thus, only by considering the multiplicity and the interrelation of a conflict's dynamic

social forces does it become possible to holistically understand and solve conflicts (p. 2). This means that a standalone dimension cannot clarify the exact causes of escalation, and de-escalation of conflict (Byrne & Nadan, 2011). A one-dimensional analysis is more likely to hamper the understanding of the conflict, and as a result, this can affect the peacebuilding efforts (Byrne & Carter, 1996, p. 2).

Taking all this into consideration, we choose social cubism because of its potential in exploring how key interrelated forces play a role in Mozambique's violent conflict. Chapter three illustrates how each facet of the cube and the interdependence of these six factors contribute to the escalation and/or de-escalation of Mozambique's violent conflict. This multi-modal and multi-level analytical approach will assist in understanding the underlying causes of the violent conflict as well as proving beneficial in informing the nature of the ongoing interventions. Social cubism's analytical model is now applied to examine Mozambique's protracted conflict between the FRELIMO and RENAMO parties.

From Liberal Peacebuilding to Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding

Analysis, resolution, and transformation of violent conflicts around the world have been dominated by the liberal peacebuilding approach as global inequalities that justify violence and conflicts characterize the global system (Chandler, 2017). Liberal peacebuilding is rooted in democratic peace, which asserts that in the international relations environment where interconnected global institutions are regulated by international law means that democratic states rarely are involved in a war among themselves (Doyle, 2011, 2020; Paris, 2004, 2006; Richmond, 2005, 2011; Byrne & Thiessen, 2019, p. 132). As so defending, liberal peace pretends to be the equalizer of the conditions for peace applying Western democratic values through international

relations. Therefore, the international peace architecture comes from power outlooks and the roles of states and global powers in establishing organizations to diminish war through diplomacy, human rights, elections, trade, liberal norms, and values, security reform, capitalism, and laws excluding any alternative perspective (Richmond, 2021, p. 582). Although, human rights, elections, and security reforms through DDR are important in democratic societies, they do not necessarily bring peace. In Chapter Six, I illustrate that the aforementioned liberal elements are crucial and contribute for statebuilding, yet they fail to achieve peacebuilding's ultimate goal – transforming the causes of the conflict and people's relationships.

Analyzing the Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Accord and the 2019 Peace Accord and their liberal peace ingredients, I will illustrate that the liberal peace is not only characterized by its lack of success in delivering sustainable solutions in divided societies, but it also generalizes the perceived causes of conflict (Randazzo, 2021, p. 142). Liberal peace elections, the creation of political parties, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), and economic liberalization through the International support applied in Mozambique were not successful in bringing about the social peace. This is because they simplified the contextual root causes of the conflict, rejected the cultural factors needed for peacebuilding, and they were not guided and based on the local people's guiding cultural values that contribute to conflict transformation.

Liberal thinking is based on the construction of international order through cooperation over security and processes that sustain the checks and balances emerging with regards to statebuilding dynamics, power institutions, and domestic settings over the two past centuries that did not consider local peace formation processes (p. 583). To promote democracy and peace, liberal peace operates through leading states within the international relations system, international organizations supporting interventions and control of the international architecture, the

international status quo, and state sovereignty (Mac Ginty, 2008, pp. 143-145; Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 578; Mac Ginty, 2012). In these processes, local dynamics, actors, and peacebuilding resources remain underexplored (Lederach, 1997). As Mac Ginty (2008) clarifies, the exclusion of local dynamics is because liberal peace is imposed in standardized templates such as DDR, cease-fires, and peace accords followed by elections, without leaving spaces for alternative paradigms such as Ubuntu or any other local and Indigenous peacebuilding approaches (p. 144). Therefore, the liberal peace fails to engage with local realities (Randazzo, 2021, p. 143), as resources that do not conform to Western peace standards such as local conflict resolution mechanism are ignored (Ozerdem, 2014, p. 7).

Although liberal peacebuilding is considered mainstream in conflict resolution, it has been the target of many critiques. Assessment around liberal values and the failure of liberal peacebuilding stem from Critical and Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP). Such critiques may assist in transforming protracted conflicts (Autessere, 2021; Thiessen, 2011; Thiessen & Byrne, 2017, 2019). CEP suggests that transformative peacebuilding and social justice go beyond political elite accords, and economic programs or covering problems with economic resources (Byrne & Thiessen, 2019). Rather, local societal processes should become the starting point for conflict transformation through building social relations (Lederach, 1997, p. 26; Ozederm & Lee, 2016). In this regard, local understanding, wisdom, and knowledge are crucial in peacebuilding and transformational efforts within societies. In fact, people's local agency and the voices from the grassroots as well as everyday events are essential in peacebuilding (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, pp. 832-834). In addition, local agency and knowledge is connected to the local culture, which is also a fundamental conflict puzzle (Tuso & Flaherty, 2016). Therefore, an Indigenous

understanding of conflict and peacebuilding may support the local transformation of conflict as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding (Thiessen & Byrne, 2017, 2019; Richmond, 2021, p. 592).

In addition, John Paul Lederach (1997) reported that local agencies and structures are the keys to sustainable peace (p. 94). Similarly, Autessere (2014, 2021) noted that local people have the skills and knowledge to promote peace and uphold mechanisms, structures, and networks that perpetrate it (p. 203). Bottom-up peacebuilding approaches are more effective and sustainable than top-down ones because the former are from local communities and make a difference in those communities (pp. 205-206). It is important to mention that John Paul Lederach (1997) was one of the first Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) scholar-practitioners to lead the problematization of linear approaches to peace and democracy focusing more on relationships, practice, and societal processes, in opposition to the international diplomatic agenda (cited in Chandler, 2017, pp. 143-150). Following CEP's logic, which in part advocates for the importance of including Indigenous peacebuilding, local agency and structures, and local peacebuilding knowledge, this thesis will focus on Ubuntu, an Indigenous peacebuilding method that might assist in transforming protracted conflicts. With the inadequacy of liberal peace to build sustainable peace, this thesis proposes Ubuntu as the turn needed to nurture conflict transformation in Mozambique as it is discussed in the following section.

Conflict Transformation: Indigenous Peacebuilding – Ubuntu as an Indigenous Method

In the last two decades, indigenous peacebuilding has captured people's interest in peacemaking milieus and in the debates between PACS practitioners and scholars. The concept of indigenous may differ from that of traditional as the former signifies practices in terms of heritage and their duration, while the latter has to do with the norms and customs inspired by the locals

(Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 149). Indigenous knowledge or epistemology refers to the holistic and inclusive worldviews of local people, as well as their values, beliefs, and cultural traditions. All these materials are products of local people's lived experiences and the relations established between local people, the land, and nature (Tuso & Flaherty, 2016, pp. 3-26). Indigenous peacebuilding tends to be an asset as well as a source of local conflict transformation as it applies locally oriented methods that consider local conditions, people's agency, and structures of conflict and peace. The inclusion of indigenous peacebuilding was captured by the view that they may be considered due to the failure of standardized liberal peace models. In fact, in different violent contexts, liberal strategies have fallen short and are unable to create a sustainable peace and overcome the divisions at the societal level (Marijan, 2017, p. 68). Consequently, indigenous perspectives can fill the gap of the lack of success of internationally supported peace operations (Mac Ginty, 2008, pp. 141-142).

Colonialism inflicted damage on Indigenous people threatening their existence through systematic genocide whereby colonial strategies were employed to exterminate groups of people and their values and traditions (Rahman et al., 2017). In the last decades, however, Indigenous societies have found a way to reflect on their history and have reappeared from the ashes of colonialism mobilizing and gathering in local, national, and international contexts that allow them to advocate for their rights using their agency to change unjust structures, which are antithetical to colonialism. Significant in this struggle of Indigenous people was the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the United Nations in 2007 (Brigg & Walker, 2016, p. 259), as well as the designation of the period that goes from 1995 to 2004 as the Indigenous Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples, and the creation of the Permanent Forum of Indigenous People at the United Nations (UN). These events, which were accompanied by an interest in indigenous

wisdom, restorative juridical systems, and peacemaking circles, were crucial to legitimate Indigenous people and their knowledge within the international community (Tuso & Flaherty, 2016, p. 12). In addition, indigenous methods provide different alternatives to liberal peace challenging mainstream peacebuilding approaches.

Context, which refers to land or place, and local experiences are fundamental elements of indigeneity and are at the heart of indigenous peace processes as indigenous peace methods are based on local knowledge (Maiangwa, Essombe, & Byrne, 2022). Indigenous practices employ several resources including emotions, stories, and ‘biosophia’³, culture, and dance songs (Adebayo et al., 2014). In contrast, liberal peace methods are hierarchical, while indigenous processes are extensively participative and inclusive. Liberal peace is intended to be transported and transportable, while indigenous peace methods are rooted in local and contextual circumstances (pp. 265-266). Indigenous peacebuilding connects with the CEP criticism of the liberal peace that has no legitimacy with local people and is not suitable for sustainable peace, and the need for building appropriate models from cultural and contextual resources for peace, as well as empowering the resources, modalities, and mechanisms for peacebuilding that exist in the context (Lederach, 1997, p. 95).

Customary approaches such as indigenous juridical practices have the potential to recognize the voices and agency of ordinary people in post-peace accord societies at the community villages’ level while pursuing restorative justice. In fact, achieving social justice in a

³ This term can be translated in English as biosophy, which means wisdom of life. It can also mean a way of living that pays attention to the practice of spiritual values, awareness, and ethical-social principles that are crucial to community harmony (Kettner, 2002; Adebayo et al., 2014). Guisepe Frizzi (2008) also uses the same term to define indigenous knowledge based on the stories, beliefs, culture, and proverbs of the Macua ethnic group of the Northern part of Mozambique. See Frizzi, G. (2008). *Murima ni ewani exirima: Biosofia e biosfera xirima*. Maúa. Centro de Investigação Xirima.

society coming out of violence must be part of local peacebuilding objectives. Taking this into account, local juridical methods contribute to peacebuilding as they solve conflicts. In this regard, traditional and indigenous conflict management processes include, for example, the *Nahe Biti* (the laying out the mat customary mediation process in East Timor), and the Afghan *Loya Jirga* (grand council traditional dispute resolution in Afghanistan) (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 155-157), the *Ubuntu* in the Southern Africa region, the *Gacaca* process in Rwanda, the *Mato Oput* (dispute resolution process and consensus-based reconciliation between the *Acholi* communities of Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan), the *Jir* Indigenous court process in Nigeria, and the *Xeer* unwritten, but accepted code of conduct in Northern Somalia (Yusuf & Le Mare, 2005, p. 459 as cited in Murithi, 2008, pp. 20-21).

Consequently, Mozambique's *Ubuntu* peacebuilding process is embodied in the idea that the biosophia of the *munthu* local wisdom and indigenous and traditional worldviews have the potential to transform the conditions of conflict as they touch and are embedded within the cultural, contextual roots and life of the people. Conflict resolution from different cultural perspectives helps to develop a stronger alternative body of knowledge, theory, and practice against violence.

The Ubuntu Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Method

This study postulates that African indigenous knowledge based on Ubuntu can contribute to conflict transformation in Mozambique. This is because Ubuntu is embedded in the life and culture of Mozambique's society to the extent that it can act as a crucial guiding principle for future peace processes. Ubuntu represents a "bottom-up" perspective that can be included within a multi-track peacebuilding process that can contribute to sustainable peace. In this regard, the inclusion

of local views, actors, peace resources as well as focusing on local rather than international conditions for building sustainable peace is crucial for sustainable peace.

Ubuntu is a Nguni term with almost the same denotation in the languages of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the significance of its basic idea is shared by many Indigenous peoples, under dissimilar descriptions. For instance, in Kenya, in some indigenous languages, the term *umuntu* is used. In Mozambique, the words, *umunhu*, and *umuthu* are utilized while the terms, *bumuntu* and *gimutu/bamoto* are employed in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo respectively, and in South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland the terms *ubunthu* and *omoto* are utilized (Ramosé, 1999; Gade, 2012, pp. 484-486). Zimbabwe's Shona language also has an analogous term, which is *unhu* (p. 6). Conceptually, *Ubuntu* encloses a set of values, which take the form of the Nguni language and African wisdom in the following Zulu or Xhosa proverb: “*umuntu ngumuntu ngabatu,*” meaning that “a person is a person through/because of another person” (Tutu, 1998; Praeg, 2017; Tarus & Lowery, 2017). An interpretation of this proverb leads to the interconnected nature of the human being with others. In this sense, everyone exists because he or she has a place within the community (Beight, 2007, p. 7). According to Desmond Tutu (1991), *Ubuntu* is the basis of a human being. It also clarifies that our humanity is bound to others' humanity. Thus, others represent what we are in terms of our human nature. In this regard, the need for interdependence is inscribed in our human condition. We are created for others and together we build the human family. Therefore, having *Ubuntu* means embracing others (as cited in Beight, 2007, p. 4).

Many philosophers and theologians had reflected upon the *Ubuntu* philosophy before it was used in post-apartheid South Africa for the macro reconciliation process. For example, in 1945, Placide Tempels, the Belgian Franciscan missionary wrote a book titled *Bantu Philosophy*

(published in 1959) arguing that Bantu wisdom, psychology, and ethics are based on the idea of the ‘vital force,’ which increases, animates, and characterizes all aspects of the life of the *muntu* (Tempels, 1959, pp. 33-175). According to Tempels, the idea of ‘vital force’ signifies the vitality of the African cultures, and characterizes the African concept of being (Tempels, 1959, p. 44). Each being is permeated by a ‘vital force’ that allows life so that in this regard, ‘vital force’ is the nature of being because being is a force (Tempels, 1959, pp. 43-47). Tempels (1959) was criticized by many African philosophers for his enterprise of discovering the Bantu philosophy by analyzing only the Baluba community from Congo. It is within this context that Alexis Kagamé’s (1959) doctoral thesis titled, *La Philosophie Bantu Rwandese de l’Être* applies the linguistic methodology to analyze the concept of *muntu*. He asserts that on the one hand, the prefix, *mu*, whose plural can be *ba* means the *intellectus* (human being or person). On the other hand, the radical *ntu* signifies living beings in the general sense of the word. Considering this analysis, it follows that the prefix *mu* expresses the concrete and the prefix *bu* indicates the abstract. Consequently, *u-mu-ntu* signifies man, and *u-bu-ntu* defines humanity (Kagamé, 1959, pp. 23-27).

In addition, the history of the African Philosophy of *Ubuntu* also includes the reflection of Vincent Mulago and John Mbiti. The Jesuit priest Vincent Mulago (1965) studied three Bantu groups (Rwanda, Barundi, and Bushi) and elaborated on the idea of vital union and vital participation to illustrate that the first principle of the *muntu*’s life is his/her prolongation, his/her own extension, and the continuity, development, and sustainability of his/her family, clan, ethnic group, and ancestors (p. 67). Community, therefore, is the guiding basis of social unity and integrity of the *muntu*. The Anglican priest John Mbiti (1990) acclaimed a founder of modern African theology, outlines the community identity of the *muntu* as a value, which precedes the individual’s identity. In this regard, community and communal orientation are at the heart of the

African philosophy as its proverb, “I am because we are; since we are, therefore, I am” portrays (p. 4).

The idea or at least the ideal of community in the very sense of *communitas, communis*⁴ exists, is present, and it is consubstantial to the African philosophy in theory and practice (Orberg, 1998, p. 7). Community is the steppingstone for *Ubuntu*. The concept of *Ubuntu* lays its foundations in the conception of a human being as a member of the community. According to Menkiti (1994), fundamental characteristics of human beings are extrapolated from the human being as a self, an individual with physical and intellectual traits. In African Philosophy, however, a man or woman cannot be defined only based on his or her physical traits or as a lone individual, but through the surrounding community (p. 171). Taking the above into consideration, the conceptualization and analysis of the *Ubuntu* philosophy in this thesis is presented as the cornerstone for effective peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Mozambique. As illustrated before, *Ubuntu* is an African anthropological and philosophical worldview and practice that tries to capture the essence of what it means to be human and share humanity between the members of the community. Conflict transformation should be introduced in Mozambique with the articulation of *Ubuntu* principles, which consist of the knowledge and wisdom of local people. Consequently, it is important to include *Ubuntu*'s traditional and stable principles (inclusivity, communitarianism, togetherness, humanness, etc.) to affirm *Ubuntu* as a Mozambican indigenous peacebuilding practice. Further, an *Ubuntu* peacebuilding method that is grounded in unity (local, national, and regional cooperation of the people), justice (to knit and re-knit social and institutional relations), ethics (against corruption), and education (the integral peace education of the person) can be part

⁴ The concept of community may lead to a debate over its different meanings. We will use the term community to signify a collectivity that shares the same space, common values, culture, identity, history, and memories, and has a common understanding of the collective good (Barzilai, 2003, p. 29).

of institutionalizing an effective conflict transformation process within Mozambique. This is because Ubuntu as the community peace wisdom, epistemology, and practice is embedded in the culture of Mozambique's people, and can act as a guiding peacebuilding principle as part of the multi-track peacebuilding, and not as a standalone panacea that will end the violent conflict.

Conclusion

PACS entails a wide range of theories, models, methods, and frameworks for conflict analysis and peacebuilding. This chapter focuses on social cubism, liberal peace, CEP, Indigenous peacebuilding, and the Ubuntu method. Social cubism advances a multimodal approach to conflict transformation. That is, it proposes that analysis of politics, demography, economics, history, religion, and psycho-culture provides a holistic and systemic understanding of the conflict. Similarly, liberal peace attests that democratization and internationalization of markets, promotion of elections, human rights, security reforms, and elite diplomacy are the necessary conditions for global peace. Contrarily, CEP argues that peace must depend on contextual conditions. That is, peacebuilding processes go beyond elite diplomacy, elections, and economic markets. In fact, local dynamics such as cultural values must be considered as the starting point to peace. In the same vein, Indigenous peacebuilding affirms that local knowledge, the sagacity of the community, and their traditional leaders can bring about peace when they are employed. In this regard, Ubuntu is an Indigenous African method based on local settings that has been part of peace processes in many indigenous milieus, such as in the Southern Africa region. Conflict analysis is a complex project. Therefore, a combination of the aforementioned model, theory, and method is crucial in order to secure an effective conflict transformation process.

CHAPTER 5: Methodology and Research Methods

Introduction

PACS embodies a range of critical analytical and peacebuilding methods. In order to explore the root causes of conflict, explicate the failure of liberal peace, and illustrate the effectiveness of Ubuntu in instilling a sustainable peace process in Mozambique, this thesis employs a Critical Qualitative Methodology (CQM). In this study, the CQM is translated into the autoethnography method, which allows us to bond our stories, life, and work experiences to the peacebuilding theories applied in this study. In addition, autoethnography is combined with a documents' critical review and analysis. We consider the peace documents, policy papers, reports, and related research about Mozambique's two peace agreements from local, national, and international organizations to critique the liberal peace. Specifically, the thesis analyzed documents that I had access to relating to Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement and the 2019 Peace Accords. In addition, I used the minutes of meetings provided by the negotiators while the actual negotiation session minutes are not public information. They still remain confidential. In these documents, we sought information about several elements of the liberal peace process (elections, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration [DDR], and liberal economic programs). Results from document analysis of the aforementioned elements are mainly presented in Chapter Six. CQM, which embodies autoethnography combined with document analysis allowed us to understand the root causes of the conflict as they are presented in Chapter Three. In addition, my life and work experiences, and self-reflection, which are entangled within Mozambique's community experiences supported me in formulating the idea that Ubuntu could be a useful peace tool in transforming Mozambique's protracted conflict that are reflected in

Chapter Seven. Chapter **Five** examines the CQM and explains the use of autoethnography and document analysis. Finally, it highlights the benefits of autoethnography, the limitations of this research, and the positionality of the researcher.

Critical Qualitative Methodology

Critical Qualitative Methodology (CQM) intends to change the world by advocating social justice amidst conflicts and violence that marked the end of the Cold War (Cannella & Lincoln, 2016). To do so, it includes knowledge from the oppressed and the disenfranchised that can transform conflict and violence constructively like indigenous ways of knowing, and it defends cultures silenced by Western ideologies (p. 173). In this study, we argue that local knowledge and wisdom is the main source of effective conflict transformation in Mozambique (see Chapter Seven). In fact, Ubuntu is rooted in the culture and values of the community such as togetherness, humanness, and solidarity (Ramose, 1999; Tutu, 1998).

Both 1992 and 2019 liberal peace agreements put in place by the West to end Mozambique's civil war are explored with the CQM lens. This supported us to clarify who and what was helped by both negotiated agreements, and who and what are privileged, legitimated, or oppressed as both political parties are returning to the war. Liberal peace as the peace celebrated by elites has benefitted Mozambique's elites to some extent. By so doing, the liberal peace did not resolve the problems of Mozambique's disenfranchised communities at the grassroots level. Therefore, the liberal peace did not bring the violent conflict to an end. CQM does not take for granted any metanarratives. Rather, it is skeptical of dominant epistemic narratives. CQM advocates multiple perspectives and human experiences that resist grand truths or narratives that

marginalize cultures, and peoples so that this methodology is committed to the emancipation of human experiences (White, 2015, pp. 4-7).

Taking the above into account, this study explores Mozambique's war by critically confronting the mainstream liberal peace negotiations that were applied that ignored the human experiences of the local people. Therefore, in contrast, it advocates for an Ubuntu indigenous knowledge, which considers the human experiences of the local populations. CQM uses various qualitative research methods such as discourse analysis, self-study, participant observation, narrative inquiry (White, 2015, p. 6), textual analysis, theatrical forms of observing and producing data, and ethnographic data collection (Canella & Lincoln, 2016, pp. 172-179). However, in this study, I employ document analysis and autoethnography. It is through autoethnography that I expose my vulnerability and that of the communities, and the community structures to resist neocolonial dominant structures. For instance, my story work experience at the United Nations, Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) showed me that neocolonialism is at the heart of new behaviors such as the persecution of people with albinism in Ubuntu communities (See Chapter Seven). My lived experience with the Macua/ *Makhuwa* community and in the research center (North of Mozambique) consubstantiates the relevance of *Makeya* Ubuntu practices for peace in Mozambique (Chapter Seven). One of the ultimate goals of critical thinking in research is reframing and illuminating hidden theoretical structures of power (Thomas, 1993). Therefore, while advocating for Ubuntu, I also critically note that Ubuntu is not perfect. Questioning the odds faced by local Mozambican communities I submit that Ubuntu should focus on unity, justice, ethics, and education.

Autoethnography as a Method

I was born in the middle of Mozambique's civil war (1977-1992). This was a 15-year-long devastating war that killed about a million people and displaced over three million people (Hanlon, 2010). Mozambique has lived in conflict ever since, one peace negotiation after the other. It is now 56 years since the liberation war began and through this time Mozambique has been in violent conflict for 36 years. After a relative period of tranquility, unfortunately, the peace was shattered in 2013 by the return of war as the political landscape was dominated by frequent armed conflicts and skirmishes. In addition, since 2017 Mozambique has also faced deadly terrorist attacks perpetrated by unidentified groups that may have included ISIS. It concerns me personally to see my country in constant conflict, as the violence takes the lives of people, destroys livelihoods, generates displacement of people, and exacerbates poverty.

As a Mozambican citizen, I worked as a lecturer at Saint Thomas University, and early in 2019, I joined UNESCO Mozambique as a full-time employee, serving as the Project Officer for Information and Communication. Through my work, I supported the organization's mission which is "building peace in the minds of women and men" through information and communication. As a lecturer and UNESCO Mozambique project officer that liaised with the United Nations Communication Group (UNCG), I had many opportunities to engage with members of both conflicting parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) as well as the negotiators of the 2019 peace accords. In addition, my experience as a Catholic seminarian (2006-2013), studying Philosophy at Saint Augustine Seminary (2010-2012) empowered me to gain insights about the 1992 General Peace Agreements through the conferences and meetings I attended with Jaime Pedro Gonçalves, the Bishop that mediated the 1992 General Peace Agreement, together with the Saint'Egidio

community. It was living within these circumstances that shaped my understanding of violent conflict, and the lack of social justice for local people.

Taking the above into account, in this study I apply autoethnography as a research tool that seeks to systematically analyze (graph) personal experiences (auto) to understand cultural experiences (ethno) (Ellis, 2004; Leavy, 2020, pp. 50-53; Denzin & Giardana, 2009). In this thesis, I employ autoethnography to explore my personal experiences in relationship with the social experiences of the conflict and the peace phenomenon that evolved in Mozambique. For the scope of this study, I expose four main stories based on my life and work experiences. The first story aimed to illustrate that violence is intrinsically related to colonialism (Chapter Two). The second story explored my individual and collective cultural and religious experiences to conclude that religion and culture can drive conflict that is buttressed by social cubism (Chapter three). The third story includes the idea that local celebrations and traditional practices such as *Mhamba* are more appropriate to restoration, reintegration, and reconciliation than DDR liberal processes (Chapter Six). Chapter Seven is built on my work experience at UNESCO and the experience of living with the *Macua/ Makuwa* community. The point I make is that Mozambique's Ubuntu indigenous method has an important role to play in peacebuilding. Therefore, peace processes must include Ubuntu's indigenous peacebuilding methods.

I found it fundamental to incorporate personal narratives into this academic writing because stories of the self are part of a new reading of one's own particular social experience (Boulaga, 1977 cited in Mara & Thompson, 2022, pp. 373-378). In this regard, Mizzi (2010) states that in autoethnography, stories of the self are transformed in different narrative voices. This has to do with the non-existence of single temporality in autoethnography and personal stories can be deconstructed in different phases and contexts (pp. 2-10). Consequently, this thesis connects the

abovementioned stories of the self with the demands of Mozambique's context. Multi-voices in such stories consist of the fact that they are from experiences lived in different times and in different contexts. That is, in my stories I represent a young Mozambican, a son born in a disenfranchised group (first story and third story). In addition, I represented a seminarian, a religious member of the revered Catholic religion, but also as a member of the community practicing a natural traditional spirituality (second story). Moreover, I am portrayed as a researcher living with the communities, and as a worker with an international agency (fourth story). Therefore, I engage in different narratives that stem from my experiences, emotions, values, and background which are intertwined with the social context that I am living in, and I am a member of. By offering this vivid "insider" perspective (Mizzi, 2010), I believe that my stories, life, and work experiences provide insights into the root causes of conflict, the flaws of liberal peace, and how to tackle political violence by applying Ubuntu indigenous peace methods.

Data Collection

Qualitative research data collection methods are illustrative in nature and are envisaged to explicate and clarify the rationale of studied phenomena (Yamagata-Lynch, 2010). Using autoethnography, this study considers the stories, memories, life, and work experiences of the researcher. Data collection in autoethnography can be possible through observation, using ethnographic field notes, and accessing external data such as photographs, letters, diaries, reports, or other artifacts related to the study (Cooper & Lilyea, 2022, pp. 199-200). The thesis uses self-reflexivity to disclose chronological events, stories, life, and work experiences that inform this study. We extract from the aforementioned experience, the ingredients that reflect the root causes of conflict, and expose the possibilities for conflict resolution in Mozambique. For instance, from

the fourth story in Chapter Seven, I unfold the local practices that inspire peace, which are also relevant to exploring the Ubuntu peace method.

Autoethnography can be combined with document analysis as the content analysis of documents and secondary sources are also cornerstones in social research (Tight, 2019). In this regard, this study taps into and analyzes Mozambique's peace agreements and its related documents such as reports and policy papers. This information is available from a wide range of national, and international organizations. For instance, Chapter Six illustrates how RENAMO's misfortunes in elections results negatively affect its relationship with FRELIMO by drawing data on elections provided by online resources such as Mozambique's Secretariat of Electoral Administration. Likewise, in Chapters Six and Seven I particularly build on the data from the United Nations sources to argue that the liberal peace has not brought peace to Mozambique. When analyzing documents arising from Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Accord and the 2019 Peace Accords, I pay particular attention to Protocol II on multiparty democracy. Similarly, Protocol III on elections, and Protocol IV on military issues Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), as well as the Declaration for humanitarian assistance are also analyzed. In addition, the study reviews the 2019 DDR agreement that resulted from the failed 1992 DDR. As a result, the application of conceptual models such as social cubism, liberal peace, and CEP as well as the Ubuntu peace practice was possible through autoethnographic and document analysis.

Ubuntu Indigenous Knowledge and Peacebuilding: The Benefits of Autoethnography

Unlike traditional ethnography, autoethnography is beneficial in many ways. First, autoethnography values the experiences of the researcher, challenging traditional research methods. Second, it facilitates the shape of new knowledge from individual and social experiences.

Third, autoethnography is different from ethnography as the disenfranchised or marginalized are part of the research through narrative and self-reflexivity.

In reality, autoethnography values the connected life experiences of the researcher in the research. This is because life experiences and stories intersect with multiple truths, voices, and realities (Mizzi, 2010, p. 1-8). In this thesis, our stories are a reality and are very context-based. For example, the context of the fourth story is the community of *Macua/ Makhuwa* people and the *Emakhuwa* cultural research center. The story voice is entangled with the voices of the *Macua/ Makhuwa* people, the founder of the center, and the literature that attests to the existence of a research center and the life experiences of a broader *Macua/ Makhuwa* community (see Chapter Seven). These personal and individual experiences may be partial and subjective, yet they are essential. This is because they provide knowledge that does not exist while loyalty and consciousness to social justice and social change begin with the self (Hicana, 2015). In fact, the stories in this Master's thesis, which are based on our personal (indigenous) experiences may contribute to ameliorating conflict when applied constructively. Similarly, society wouldn't evolve if it rejected creativity and individual experiences. Thus, failing to acknowledge how individual experiences would impact one's thesis would ignore a significant part of one's identity (see Custer, 2014, p. 9).

In this regard, the autoethnographic method challenges the traditional Western ways of doing qualitative research by accommodating the experiences of the researcher to explore who is connected to what, how, and why the scholar is researching (Adams et al., 2015). By so doing, autoethnography contributes to others' lives uncovering realities that were not known before as it captures what cannot be achieved by more traditional research methods (Méndez, 2013, p. 282). While researching the root causes of Mozambique's conflict I highlight the lived experiences that

fuel political divisions among the elites. For instance, based on my personal experience, I demonstrated that nepotism and patronage dynamics in national institutions contribute to conflict among elites (Chapter Three).

Benefits from autoethnography have been noted in different forms. For instance, several Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) M.A. students, and Disability Studies M.A. students at the University of Manitoba are using the autoethnographic method to frame their studies. For example, Tringa Lila Vejsa (2019), a PACS alumnus conducted her thesis on the conflict in Kosovo using this methodology. She was able to shape the knowledge about the sense of freedom and peacebuilding in Kosovo using her lived conflict experiences (p. 33). Having experienced war trauma, autoethnography facilitated her healing process through the expression of her past, present, and future concerns (pp. 34-38). In the same vein, Dr. Mary Anne Clarke (2014) another PACS alumnus, also employed autoethnography in her M.A. thesis. She noted that autoethnography empowered her to conclude that as a social worker in the First Nations that the province's neocolonial Family Social Services policies and practices toward First Nations should be consistent with peacebuilding and contribute to conflict resolution (pp. 106-109).

Thus, autoethnography allows authors to operate a self-narrative with the objective of critiquing and reflecting in relation to their experiences, and knowledge concerning others in a social context (Ellis, 2004; Denzin, 2008). In this regard, researchers are situated as focal and starting points so that a new understanding of the problems, culture, and situations emerges (Starr, 2010, pp. 1-3). Using autoethnography I participate in this research by organizing my experiences (as a youth, researcher, religious, ex-seminarian, worker, activist, and Mozambican) as part of this research. It is looking at the outward that comprise my relationships, communities, and culture that I noted that Ubuntu values are challenged by neocolonialism. Thus, I propose new hope that

Ubuntu (based on unity, justice, ethics, and education) can fill experiential gaps of external liberal peace strategies implemented so far and strengthen harmony and coexistence among the people. Readers and members of the same community as myself may experience different voices. However, Ubuntu is the starting point from which the self and others in the same or related communities, as the survivor of the experiences they lived, can think, or start thinking about conflict transformation. As Ellis and Bochner (2000) point out autoethnography allows the researcher to evoke the past, while representing the struggle of moving forward (pp. 745-746). In the same way, in this study, I use autoethnography to analyze the root causes of Mozambique's violent conflict, and the failure of liberal peace while advocating for the utilization of Ubuntu to facilitate conflict transformation in Mozambique.

Positionality

I am a member of the Mozambican community and I have experienced political violence in different circumstances. However, in this study, my position consists of adopting a neutral stance, regarding the main conflicting parties by representing the communities that experience conflict in Mozambique. I aimed to be neutral when reflecting on the causes of the conflict that are related to two distinct parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO. I also aimed to express my concerns about the consequences of Mozambique's political conflict, and I outlined why I consider Ubuntu to be critical in building long-lasting peace. Capitalizing on my personal background, stories, life, and work experiences I shape this study about the underlying root causes of Mozambique's political violence, and the failure of liberal peacebuilding there. Our proposal of Ubuntu as the indigenous method to lead the efforts to build sustainable peace in Mozambique is neutral and free from any ideology. In fact, we believe that our premises in this thesis are obvious to any researcher,

PACS scholars, and practitioners. In addition, as an insider the research process empowered me to propose a local and indigenous method to nurture peace and conflict transformation in Mozambique.

Significance and Limitations of the Study

This study is significant at several levels. There is a body of research on conflict resolution, and liberal peacebuilding in Mozambique that is discussed in this thesis (Vines, 2021; Cahen, 2005). However, less attention has been given to the systematic analysis of the root causes and development of the conflict since independence. Likewise, liberal peacebuilding has been studied and applied in Mozambique, while indigenous practices such as Ubuntu are also underexplored and marginalized. In addition, a small number of authors have reflected on Mozambique's practice of Ubuntu without focusing specifically on peacebuilding processes (Igreja, 2013; Ngoenha, 2019; Mussomar, 2021). In fact, the literature remains silent as far as Ubuntu indigenous peacebuilding is concerned. Therefore, this study enhances our knowledge about the suitability of Ubuntu for institutionalizing effective peacebuilding processes in Mozambique.

By highlighting Mozambique's context-based experiences, especially engaging in the deep analysis of failed (liberal) peace processes, this research adds value to existing knowledge, and it also fills the literature gap regarding indigenous peacebuilding practices, while being beneficial for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers in their research related to conflict transformation and sustainable peace. In addition, this study functions as a steppingstone for future discussions about conflict analysis at the local, national, and international levels.

The limitations of this study are threefold. First, the research doesn't include interviews or focus groups, or large quantitative data sets. It is primarily an autoethnographic study combined

with document analysis. Autoethnography is vulnerable to criticism. For instance, although full of meaning and in reflecting cultural values, our stories, memories, life, and work experiences may not find objective interpretation by some readers. Second, the analysis of the conflict's causes is built on the social cubism analytical model. This analytical framework is susceptible to some critiques when Mozambique's specific problems are concerned because the general premises of the analytical framework might not always capture the peculiarities of the context. For instance, social cubism doesn't include external international factors which are essential to analyzing Mozambique's conflict. Third, the social sciences may be vulnerable to the downsides of subjectivity given the fact that they deal with issues that are close to the researcher's own experiences and daily life (Diefenbach, 2009, pp. 876-877). Therefore, one of the limitations of this study, which can be traced back to autoethnography, is related to my interpretation of Mozambique's global situation. Analysis of the context, root causes of the conflict, and experiences of failed peace efforts in Mozambique that led the author to support the Ubuntu peace method (unity, justice, ethics, and education) are mainly consubstantiated through autoethnography.

Conclusion

Research methodology and methods assist the researcher to address the research problems. This thesis addresses its research problems using CQM, which embodies autoethnography and document analysis. CQM advocates social justice by uplifting marginalized knowledge, such as the indigenous Ubuntu peace approach. Similarly, autoethnography allows the theorizing evolution through life stories and experiences of the research. Thus, autoethnography is beneficial as it contributes to shaping new knowledge from individual and community experiences.

As a result, this study is significant because it adds value to Mozambique's as well as PACS's theories on Ubuntu indigenous peacebuilding, and it acts as a steppingstone for future research. However, this research has its limitations because it does not use quantitative methods, and it is mainly based on autoethnography and document analysis.

CHAPTER 6 – Peace Experiences in Mozambique: From Liberal Peacebuilding to Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding

Introduction

Conflict resolution embodies a wide variety of approaches and methods that can be applied to transform war-torn environments. Liberal peacebuilding was applied to bring peace to Mozambique. Liberal peace prioritizes democracy through formal institutions, market structures, human rights, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), security reform, and elections and emphasizes the notion that democracy is a panacea to all protracted conflicts (Mac Ginty, 2008). Following the 1992 and 2019 peace accords, democratization, the liberalization of markets, and DDR were the peacebuilding methods that were applied in Mozambique.

Democratization includes the transformation of groups into political parties, the enhancement of civil society mechanisms, and elections while the liberalization of markets comprises the integration of national, local economies into the international marketplace, the implementation of economic rehabilitation, and the implementation of development projects, and DDR is part of the security measures used to solve conflict in societies emerging from war (Richmond & Franks, 2009). To this end, Chapter Six explores the foundations of liberal peace, examines democratization and elections, scrutinizes the liberalization of markets, surveys the impact of security issues through DDR, and critiques liberal peacebuilding through CEP that introduces Indigenous peace practices.

Chapter Six argues that liberal peacebuilding operationalized through elections, market structures, and security measures did not bring an effective and sustainable peace to Mozambique. This is because the liberal peace strategies that were implemented fell into the space of international statebuilding and political peace or negative peace (the absence of violence).

Experience of Wars and Unknown Peacebuilding: My Own Story

My father lived in Mozambique's colonial and civil wars periods. He experienced somehow the grim reality of colonialism and the Mozambican armed struggle against the colonial power as well as the bitterness of the civil war that he was forced to fight in. He voluntarily handed over his Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle at the end of the war. Thus, he was not disarmed, nor demobilized, but he was compulsorily reintegrated back into his community in the same way that he was recruited by force by FRELIMO.

The harsh times imposed by the liberation war in the north of the Inhambane province compelled most of the young people to flee to South Africa, or to Beira in Sofala. In 1972, at 18 years old, my father had to work in the metalworking industry in Beira. As the winds of independence were blowing from Portugal to Mozambique, the owners of the company foresaw the reprisals that FRELIMO planned to execute when the colonial system collapsed. Hence, they fled to Portugal and closed the company. Consequently, my father went to work at *Sociedade dos Armadores das Pescas em Moçambique* (ARPEM) (Society of Fisheries Shipowners in Mozambique) (Diário do Governo, 1971, p. 1-2), a company that commercialized shrimp harvesting at that time. With FRELIMO's nationalization of this private organization in 1974, ARPEM became known as the *Empresa Moçambicana de Pescado* (Mozambican Fisheries Company) (Ministério das Finanças, 1980).

With the escalation of the civil war in (1985), FRELIMO introduced a mandate of compulsory recruitment through the resident governor of the Sofala province. Marcelino dos Santos said, "either you go to war, or you all get married to my daughter," providing the youth with the only options available to them. The latter option was not affordable for many young people, including my father while the FRELIMO governor had only one daughter. Therefore, in

these circumstances, my father became involved in the civil war after three months of training in the Nhapalapala Dondo district. My father and his colleagues were FRELIMO soldiers positioned at Casa Banana around 20 km from the major RENAMO base in the Serra da Gorongosa. In March 1987, Casa Banana was assaulted in a deadly attack by RENAMO forces. Some FRELIMO soldiers escaped and managed to reach Gorongosa town's military base. On a certain morning, my father was enlisted by his commander to join the security convoy team accompanying the Governor from Gorongosa town to Beira city. Once in Beira, he became part of the FRELIMO military brigade, and right after he decided in May 1987 to take the boat from Beira to Vilankulo as he deserted from the military because he was fed up with the ongoing violence.

He was not disarmed as he chose to leave his gun. He was not demobilized as the war was still ongoing and DDR was not implemented by either FRELIMO or RENAMO in local Mozambican communities. However, he was reintegrated back into his community through traditional rituals like *muphalho wa mhamba*,⁵ as integration is part and parcel of the traditional culture of local communities. He shared to me that former soldiers would experience psychological problems and would not be lucky in life without going through their community's purification rituals after they had participated in war. Most importantly, he noted that it was crucial for him to marry a local woman in the traditional cultural practice of *lowolo – lobola* (see Chapter Three). At the time, even after the civil war, marriage was a rite of passage that eliminated mistrust and changed the mindset in the portrayal of former combatants. For example, Lundin (1998) noted that in many Mozambican tribes, a man that has in-laws is considered to be a respectable person (p. 110). Thus, liberal processes such as DDR would have been less costly and fruitful if they

⁵ *Muphalho wa mhamba* is a community ceremony that includes a ritual of presentation of the sons of the land, the newborns, the lost and then reappeared people of the clan, tribe, and group of ancestors. It normally takes place under the leafy tree called the "Tsonzozo," (*Brachystegia spiciformis*) or a baobab tree.

respected local Indigenous people's peace values. In addition, this story is consistent with Chapter Five because it illustrates how elites engage in war using ordinary people as cannon fodder. The role of recalcitrant ethnic elites is one of the key political causes of the Mozambican conflict as certain groups of people were disenfranchised and sent to war to defend the interests of the political elites.

Towards Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Accord

Mozambique's General Peace Accord (MGPA) was signed after a long process that started in 1989. In that same year, FRELIMO held its fifth party congress, where it deliberated over having an open membership to the party following the pressures from the war (Matonse, 1992; Fernandes, 2013). In reality, FRELIMO decided that individuals previously expelled from the party could be readmitted (Berman, 1996, p. 22). In the same congress, Joaquim Chissano, the new president of the party proposed starting negotiations with RENAMO making public his 12 negotiation principles (Maier, 1989; Darch, 2018; Berman, 1996).

Rapprochement between FRELIMO and RENAMO was made possible through the good offices of the Catholic Church and political leaders, namely, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya (Robinson, 2006; Berman, 1996; Sengulane & Gonçalves, 1998). Both leaders were willing to mediate the talks. In fact, the first two rounds of talks prior to the negotiations in Rome took place in Nairobi and Malawi in 1990 (Berman, 1996 p. 23; Sengulane & Gonçalves, 1998, p. 30). It was in this context that Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO's party president replied to Chissano's 12 negotiation principles, with 16 negotiations points of his own (Darch, 2018; Sengulane & Gonçalves, 1998, p. 30). However, after six months of unsuccessful mediation, the negotiations moved to Rome as the two conflicting parties accepted the Catholic

Church and the Sant'Egidio Community to be third-party intermediaries in their conflict (Venâncio & Chan, 1998).

The decision of both parties to accept the Catholic Church was influenced by the relationship both party leaders developed with it and particularly with Archbishop Jaime Gonçálves dos Santos. The FRELIMO leader, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, was a devout Catholic educated in Catholic schools (De Carvalho, 2015). Afonso Dhlakama also had a close relationship with Archbishop Jaime Gonçálves, who is from the same area where the RENAMO leader had his military bases and where he took refuge when he was persecuted by FRELIMO's regime. Coincidentally, Archbishop Gonçálves was not only from the same ethnic group (the Ndau) as many members of RENAMO's leadership, but he was also from the RENAMO leader's hometown, Chibabava (Sofala) (Saul, 1999, pp. 139-141).

The General Peace Accord negotiations were shaped by two events. The first was the agreement of both political parties to create a joint verification commission to oversee the cease-fire processes (Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992, p. 2). The second was the promotion of the former observers as mediators on November 9, 1990 (Berman, 1996, p. 22; Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992). In this regard, the mediators included Mario Raffaelli, the representative of the Italian government, and the coordinator of negotiations, the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçálves as well as Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi who were both from the community of Saint'Egidio (Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992, p. 7). Overall, the peace negotiations were marked by FRELIMO's "winner take all" position refusing the international actor's and RENAMO's pressures to create a powersharing government (Sumich & Honwana, 2007, pp. 5-8; Manning, 2022; Regalia, 2017; Hanlon, 2021). However, both parties agreed on the liberal peace package that promoted institutional democracy, democratization, liberalization of

markets, security reform, and DDR (General Peace Agreement, 1992). Consequently, on October 4, 1992, President Joaquim Alberto Chissano and Afonso Marceta Dhlakama signed the General Peace Accord in Rome.

Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Accord

The final document signed by FRELIMO and RENAMO consisted of seven protocols. The first protocol signed on 10-18-1991 included the basic Accord principles (General Peace Agreement, 1992, pp. 6-8). The second protocol was also concluded on 10-18-1991 which outlined the criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of both political parties (pp. 8-11). The third protocol included the principles of the electoral act, and it was signed on 03-12-1992 (pp. 12-18). The fourth protocol addressed military questions (pp. 19-31) while the fifth protocol defined the guarantees of the parties in putting into practice the accord (pp. 33-38). The norms about the cease-fire were outlined in the sixth protocol (pp. 39-46), and the seventh protocol laid out the reflections that emerged from a donor's conference, and it was signed on 10-04-1992 (pp. 47-49). The agreement included FRELIMO and RENAMO's declaration on the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance that were the responsibility of the UN to implement it (pp. 51-53). The limited scope of this thesis means that we will analyze democratization through elections, using the principles of the electoral act (Protocol III). Second, we reflect on Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration contained in the military issues of Protocol IV. Finally, we scrutinize the declaration by FRELIMO and RENAMO about the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance. The declaration raised economic issues, which put into perspective the liberalization of markets, development projects, and multi-donor programs that followed the signing of Mozambique's General Accord.

Mozambique's Liberal Multi-Party Democracy through Elections

Democratizing is one of the key aims of liberal peacebuilding as peace is deemed to be necessarily linked to democracy. For example, Paris (1997) asserts that liberal peacebuilding develops a progressive and controlled process of democratization in war contexts, by creating political parties, delaying elections, until passions have cooled down (pp. 58-59), and the elections are designed to reward moderation rather than extremism (p. 58). Mozambique's General Peace Accord (MGPA) falls into the aforementioned liberal peace strategies. First, Protocol II verses on criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties. It defines that the General Peace Agreement "negotiated the necessity of guaranteeing workings of a multi-party democracy in which the parties would freely cooperate in shaping and expressing the will of the people and in promoting democratic participation by the citizens in the Government of the country" (Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992, p. 8). As so stating, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) envisioned peace through liberal multi-party democratic system to manage and cool down the two political conflicting groups (FRELIMO and RENAMO). In other words, for the liberal peace transforming the conflicting groups into political parties to run the elections is one of the conditions for peace in conflicting environments. So, it was done in Mozambique. Although Mozambique had several political movements, the General Peace Agreement only empowered RENAMO to become a political party to compete against FRELIMO (the only established political party at the time) in the liberal election's agenda of the Agreement. In fact, the Agreement stated, "the parties agree that, immediately following the signature of the GPA RENAMO shall commence its activities as political party, with the privileges provided by law" (Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992, p. 11). As a result, peace – as the will of Mozambican people – was schematized in the willing of only two parties in detriment of many

different Mozambican grassroots movements and actors, such as community leaders that have been contributing to peace from ages.

Second, preparing the grudging political parties to elections, liberal peace endorsed the competitions instead of the intended cooperation between the two political parties. As so, the relationship between FRELIMO and RENAMO since independence was not transformed and it is characterized by competitions. In addition, competitions increased with the loss of RENAMO in the elections lighting the conflict. In this regard, in Mozambique's case, creation of political parties, "partidocracy", and elections fell short to transform the conflict in Mozambique as involvement of the whole Mozambique society, the local actors, and systems of conflict transformation would have done (Ngoenha, 2019).

The Protocol III on principles which should guide the drafting of the Electoral Act make elections and peace interchangeable as it states that to guarantee peace, "the elections shall take place within one year after the date of the signing of the General Peace Agreement" (Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992, p. 14). To this end, the MGPA laid down the general principles which should guide the drafting of the Electoral Act and any possible amendments to the laws in connection with the conduct of the electoral process. It stated that, "the Electoral Act shall be drafted by the Government, in consultation with RENAMO and all other political parties" (Mozambique's General Peace Accord, 1992, p. 12). In addition, it affirms that, "for the purpose of organizing and conducting the electoral process, the Government shall set up a National Elections Commission (CNE). One third of the members to be appointed to the Commission shall be nominated by RENAMO" (p. 14).

The first peace solution presented in Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement (MGPA) is the electoral system. Dismissing the causes of conflict, the liberal peace influenced the


political parties to build democracy through elections within one year after the conflict (Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement, 1992). Without looking at local dynamics that required peace, the liberal peace, which favors elections to transform the conflict environments assumed that a ceasefire followed by elections between parties can establish peace in short period. However, in the case of Mozambique, timeframes considerations impinged the effectiveness of peacebuilding. In fact, as peacebuilding requires substantial time commitment (Brewer, 2010). It takes time to accommodate the problem of interpersonal issues between the political conflicting groups, to heal the relationship and reconcile a society (Brewer, 2010).

For the election's organization processes, the MGPA gave responsibility and the privilege to the Mozambique's government. This government was made up by FRELIMO since from the independence in 1975. Dismissing the historical and demographic causes that led to the war (see Chapter Three), the General Peace Agreement emphasized the liberal majoritarian democratic approach in detriment of the consensual one, placing the will of the majority. That is, the government of the day (led by FRELIMO) as the majority was in advantageous position to decide about new CNE institution and the elections processes. Since then, Mozambique's elections processes exacerbated hostilities and mistrust between both parties. Hostilities and mistrust that escalate conflicts during the election preparation, are based on the lack of consensus regarding the composition and political nature of the CNE, and lack of transparency in the electoral results. For instance, in the first elections of 1994 after MGPA, RENAMO accepted the election results under pressure from the international community (Harrison, 1995; p. 117; Bussotti, 2021, p. 7). The second elections held in 1999 were similarly controversial and violent. FRELIMO's candidate Joaquim Alberto Chissano secured only 52 percent of the votes and he almost lost power. To avoid such an event from happening in the future, "administrative measures" were implemented whereby

votes in the RENAMO provinces of influence, such as Zambézia were not processed (Nuvunga, 2005, 2014; Bussoti, 2021, p. 11). The RENAMO party did not accept the election results and called for protests to boycott them. Following these protests, RENAMO members were jailed and tortured, and some were killed (Hanlon, 1998, p. 6). In addition, RENAMO members withdrew from the National Commission of Elections (CNE) (p. 6).

In 2014, the election results showed that RENAMO's candidate achieved 36 percent of the votes, while FRELIMO's candidate reached 57 percent, and 19 percent were cast for the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), and other political parties (Nuvunga, 2017; Bussotti, 2021). As a result, RENAMO requested a recount of the votes and promoted a country-wide campaign. Moreover, RENAMO announced that it was willing to use force to take over the provinces it had won during the elections (Regalia, 2017). In fact, RENAMO's project was to convert the region where it had influence into autonomous provinces, dividing Mozambique, and controlling the provinces it had won during the election (Hanlon, 2015; Regalia, 2017; Bussotti, 2021). Mozambique's academia deemed it feasible that RENAMO's project was part of the country's constitutional provisions. For instance, Gilles Cistac, one of the professors at the Faculty of Law at the University Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique was killed following his public legal opinion legitimizing RENAMO's request (Guambe & Do Rosário, 2020; Cistac, 2012). As the post-electoral-related violence continued, RENAMO's president was forced to take refuge in Sofala province, which had been his military base of operations since 1977 (his soldiers were not demobilized, demilitarized, nor re-integrated). Armed skirmishes and hostilities between RENAMO and FRELIMO that resulted in restrictions on the freedom of expression in public contexts would continue until 2019 when they signed a new accord.

Building on the course of events that took place in Mozambique, they seem different from what the liberal peacebuilding through elections envisaged would occur. It is not always true that election as part of the democratic peace thesis always brings sustainable peace. In addition, democratic statebuilding is more likely to fail in divided societies (Brewer et al., 2011). What is true is that elections drew Mozambique into conflict as the results fueled suspicion and distrust among the parties and most Mozambicans. The international actors influenced the establishment of narrow and limited democratic rules and liberal principles through Mozambique's General Peace Accord. In other words, democracy was conflated into party creation and election advocacy, while emphasizing the role of the winner and international actors in political sphere and electoral processes. Consequently, liberal peacebuilding intervention through elections and liberal principles collapsed the efforts toward forging an effective peace in Mozambique. Elections have always suggested division in the country, tensions between communities, and renewed political violence (Sambo, 2023; Manning, 2002; Pitcher, 2017, 2020). One of the reasons this happened is the fact that they are only won by one party since the first elections after the signature of MGPA as the Figure 2 below illustrates.

Figure 2: Results of Elections since the 1992 General Peace Agreement

Data source: Republic of Mozambique Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral (STAE) and Comissão Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE). <http://www.stae.org.mz/>

One of the liberal peacebuilding election principles that paved the path toward violence is the “winner takes all” principle subscribed to in Mozambique’s peace negotiations (Vines, 2021; Nuvunga, 2005; Honwana & Sumich, 2007). As a result, the “winner take all” principle potentially strengthens the majority elites’ position. In addition, it promotes the misunderstanding that government responsibilities and power cannot be shared with minority groups. As a result, power-over instead of power-with or power-sharing (Pranis et al., 2003; Chinn, 2018) qualified Mozambique’s electoral processes. Moreover, complaints, conflicts, mistrust, and a push for political power favored reciprocal elimination and non-cooperation as conflicts escalated (Bussotti, 2021, p. 9; Naidu, 2001; Vines, 2018). During the last decade, Mozambique has been in

violent conflict in the aftermath of elections whereby the belligerent political parties exhibited their military power. This pattern suggests that liberal peacebuilding through the DDR process might also have failed to bring about peace in Mozambique.

Mozambique's Liberal Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration Process

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is one of the liberal peacebuilding remedies for war-shattered contexts. This strategy is applied and embedded within the roots of liberal peace and it includes the formation of defense and security institutions. For example, Richmond (2005) identifies four roots, namely, victor peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace, and civil peace. These four roots lead to the existence of conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory liberal peace models (Richmond, 2005, p. 186; 2009). The conservative root is dominated by negotiations between international and local actors for a balanced and multilateral, but still state-centric peace (Richmond, 2005, p. 187; 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2009, pp. 5-12).

In Mozambique's case, the model falls between the conservative and orthodox formulations. It is conservative as it required military institutional formation and interventions aiming at establishing a cease-fire. The Protocol IV of Mozambique's General Peace Agreement asserts that, "The Mozambique defense force (FADM) shall be formed for the service throughout the national territory" (Mozambique's 1992 Peace Agreement, 1992, pp. 19-20). Outlining the nature and the purpose of the FADM, the same Protocol affirms that "the FADM should serve the country with professionalism, respect the democratic order and the rule of law" (pp. 19-20). In this regard, MGPA's Protocol IV made a provision for DDR that was framed around the creation of a security institution and the accommodation of the supposed needs of the political parties. The integration essentially meant the incorporation of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers into a new

defense and security organization, the FADM, while dismissing the integration of demobilized soldiers into the communities and including local effective structures, actors, and strategies toward that end.

In addition, the DDR process consisted of the establishment of Mozambique's defense force and "personnel of the FADM in each of the services branches shall be provided by FRELIMO and RENAMO, each side contributing 50 per cent" (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 19). In so doing, the liberal peace's DDR determined the structural exclusion of any other groups, movements, and individuals in the country as the condition to become part of the National defense force meant that one had to be either a member of FRELIMO or RENAMO. As of today, this structural discrimination incites and contributes to the escalation of violence as RENAMO and other minority and powerless groups and individuals continue to be excluded from FRELIMO's government structures. This structural exclusion is not so different from the one, which encouraged RENAMO to engage in war against FRELIMO (See Chapter Three), which means that the liberal peace's DDR did not pay attention to the processes around exclusion, victimhood, and the proper reintegration of the ex-combatants (Brewer, 2010, p. 13). Consequently, RENAMO's dissidents resisted this discriminating institutionalization, and returned to war as they profited more from the war economy than the post-conflict defense force and security institutionalization.

The orthodoxy of the liberal peacebuilding perspective consists of security operations and donors and organizations, under the UN Mission allow paternalistic interventions impose top-down peacebuilding (Richmond, 2005; Donais, 2012). This is because the international community frames the conflict societies as ill, dysfunctional, traumatized, or immature thereby legitimizing the creation of therapeutic governance, whereby the international community takes over the responsibility for a polity that is no longer capable of managing its own affairs (Donais,

2012). Consistent with this, is the fact that unlike the other abovementioned Protocols, Protocol IV of Mozambique's Peace Agreement on military issues was "negotiated by the mediators and the observers of the United Nations, the Government of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal" (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 19). This implies that in the peace processes the locals are likely to be viewed with either pity or suspicion to manage certain affairs without the international actors. Consequently, as paternalistic interventions are allowed through the UN and other international actors, local ownership is limited to the responsible outsiders, who set the parameters (Donais, 2012). As Mozambique's case illustrates, the UN imposed a situation that, "by the time of elections, FADM shall exist" (p. 20). In addition, the Mozambique's political parties were urged to "accept the role of the international community, particularly the UN in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Agreement, particularly the cease-fire" (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 55). To that end, "the deployment of the UN personnel in Mozambique's territory to verify the cease-fire shall begin in the E-day – the day on which the General Peace Agreement is adopted" (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 40).

Therefore, the UN's DDR military intervention process required the deployment of 6,625 troops, and the mission included military support personnel, 354 military observers, and 1,144 civilian police (United Nations, 1996, pp. 336-37; United Nations, 2023). The UN mission (ONUMOZ) military objectives, led by the Italian Aldo Ajello included monitoring the cease-fire, and was aimed at reducing the concentration of armed forces, as well as securing the demobilization of combatants, and the mission's objective consisted of collecting, storing, and destroying weapons (United Nations, 1992). Thus, the DDR's narrow scope that aimed to establish

a cease-fire through conservative and orthodox liberal peace interventionism by international actors, fell short in bringing about an effective peace in Mozambique.

First, the DDR only focused on creating a cease-fire, which “is a brief, dynamic, and irreversible process of predetermined duration” (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 39). Although the cease-fire was important in bringing both parties together, it was only one step needed to manage the conflict. The cease-fire, however, didn’t transform the threats of renewed violence. If we are to push onward to implement positive peace in Mozambique it is crucial to manage the country’s needs that includes both victims and ex-combatants as well as implementing a truth recovery process and encouraging new forms of memory that heal the people, while dealing with social cleavages that marked the social structures before the war (see Brewer, 2010, pp. 13-14).

The DDR process as part of Mozambique’s cease-fire was only instrumental for the liberal statebuilding process as it allowed for separating FRELIMO and RENAMO’s military forces, bringing the parties to the negotiation table and preparing them for elections. Second, DDR as part of the cease-fire was set by the international actors, while it undermined the local actors, the local cultural dynamics, and the causes of the conflict and local people’s ideas about what the peace should look like. With the deployment of UN personnel on the ground, the peace process was highly professionalized, while at the same time marginalizing the local communities and grassroots practitioner’s voices and practices that were building integration on the ground (see Stanton & Kelly, 2015, p. 44).

The first peace agreement stated that, “the United Nations should assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of entire demobilization process” (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 29) and that “the reintegration commission shall be presided by the

United Nations and the representatives of the other international organizations” (p. 30). The internationally negotiated peace agreement subordinated the local to international actors. However, the international actors didn’t always understand the local realities. Each cultural context, location, history, and internal politics is unique with its own set of alternative peacebuilding techniques and practices like community networks, peaceful values, ceremonies, and embedded conflict resolution practices that resolve tensions (Lederach, 1995). As the DDR process didn’t consider this reality, the cease-fire in Mozambique was counterproductive to embedding sustainable peace that is contextually appropriate and rooted in cultural relevance.

The Drawbacks of Mozambique’s DDR Process

The UN Mission to Mozambique would have been successful if internal military forces were disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated on time. Analysis of UN documents and reports regarding the 1992 Mozambique’s peace processes illustrate that the liberal peace’s DDR process in Mozambique was not effective nor efficient. FRELIMO had around 75,000 soldiers, while RENAMO had almost 20,000 troops by the end of the 1977 and 1992 political conflict (United Nations, 1992; the World Bank, 1993, pp. 8-11; Berman, 1996). By June 1994, the UNOMOZ mission had disarmed and demobilized almost 15,000 men (United Nations, 1994). In addition, the mission was characterized by delays in the deployment of the UN military. Roland Paris (1997) points out that liberal peacebuilding operations delays are inherently linked to the liberal internationalist approaches (p. 58). This is because the creation of central bodies for peace operations gives rise to the postponement of these operations from the current norm of one to three years, or from seven to nine years. Additionally, as part of liberal peacebuilding, disarmament of the parties is a necessary condition for organizing elections. Thus, DDR tends to be extended as a

provision to prevent grudges between the losing party and the new government (Paris, 2004, p. 71). This is consistent with Mozambique's case where on December 16, 1992, Mozambique's Security Council's resolution 797 (1992) established ONUMOZ until October 31, 1993. Nevertheless, the ONUMOZ was extended until the end of January 1995 (United Nations, 2023). These postponements were also linked to political, financial, and logistic challenges.

Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's report to the Security Council outlined the DDR-related hardships. The first was the transference of weapons from assembly areas to regional warehouses. This drawback was influenced by the exaggerated reliance on international organizations, in particular the UN, in detriment to local institutions that should have led the process. For instance, Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement states that "collective, individual weapons including weapons on the board aircraft and ships, shall be stored in the warehouses under the UN control" (p. 43). Likewise, the UN took over the burden of the DDR process as the agreement affirmed that "the troops shall be able to leave their respective assembly and billeting points only with the authorization and under the supervision of the UN" (p. 43). The concentration of the responsibilities in the hands of the UN can also be illustrated with the collocation that, "all movements of the party forces shall take place under the supervision and coordination of the UN" (p. 42). Thus, the imposition of international liberal peace actors and international organizations technical practices in Mozambique's peace processes, particularly the use of DDR was not emancipatory. Rather it overwhelmed and disempowered the local leadership and sidelined the local actors and undermined local peace dynamics. UN Peacekeeping troops had the burden of implementing DDR. Consequently, peace processes that undermine local actors, and the conflict's dynamics, and aren't embedded in the people's contextual situations fails to meet

the local people's contextual-based needs, reduces local ownership of the peace processes, and increases local resistance (Donais, 2009; Randazzo, 2021, p. 144).

Second, RENAMO's lack of financial capacity to transform itself into a political party as per the MGPA was also testing (United Nations, 1994). Connected to these challenges was the fact that RENAMO kept most of its army. This is because the MGPA stated that RENAMO's leaders could have his own security guard to provide for his exclusive safety. In other words, "RENAMO shall be responsible for the immediate personal security of its leaders. The Government of Mozambique shall grant police status to the members of RENAMO assigned to guarantee that security" (Mozambique Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 36). Interpreting the aforementioned part of the 1992 Mozambique's General Peace Accords in the broader sense, RENAMO resisted to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate most of their soldiers. As so doing, RENAMO put the country in a "no-war and no-peace" situation as in many circumstances, RENAMO recurred its military to force FRELIMO to make political and economic concessions. With less attention to this fact, on April 22, 1994, the ONUMOZ mission reported that there were 14,306 soldiers demobilized, 365 of whom were from RENAMO (United Nations, 1994). Therefore, the final update from the UN mission announced in September 1994 was that 70,335 government and RENAMO soldiers were demobilized, and the new state army would have 12,000 men in place by October 1994 and not the original 30,000 soldiers (24,000 army, 4,000 air-force, and 2,000 navy) as planned by Mozambique's 1992 Peace Agreement (pp. 20-21).

The abovementioned DDR-related challenges suggest how the external liberal peace was a vain attempt to Mozambique's peacebuilding process. In fact, Mozambique's 1992 DDR process was a target of different criticisms by scholars. For instance, it was noted that if the UNUMOZ mission was effective, it may have supported the efforts to create lasting peace in the country

(Berman, 1996; Vines, 2021). However, the UNOMOZ priority during the period seemed to be more focused on employing international top-down diplomacy to transforming the belligerent elites into political parties as so to fulfill the election agenda (Regalia, 2017; Bussotti, 2021; Vines, 2010, p. 10). Also, the international community undermined the local actors and the realities of creating peace and reconciliation by reintegrating former combatants into society, which should have been the cornerstone of the peace process. Consequently, after 30 years of civil war, RENAMO has military bases and the contingency to continue conducting political violence against FRELIMO.

Reintegration and Reconciliation: The Lost Chance to Disarm the People's Minds and Hearts

Liberal peace statebuilding strategies can be conservative and orthodox (Richmond, 2009, pp. 558-560). The conservative and orthodox are top-down models motivated to promote security and stability between the broker powers. Therefore, they overlap with the liberal peace agenda of international security (Richmond, 2009, p. 559; Brewer, 2010). In Mozambique, top-down liberal peacebuilding was applied. In other words, emancipatory and Ubuntu indigenous features that are embedded in the community and the people's cultural values, and aiming to promote social peace, that falls into the needs of the local people and to foster reconciliation, were neglected. Beyond FRELIMO and RENAMO's sabotage of both peace processes, the UN and other orthodox international organizations took full responsibility for implementing all DDR procedures. For instance, when the traditional leaders and the healers started to play a role in the reintegration of the ex-combatants, they were misread by the international humanitarian organizations as discrediting the sustainability of the peace process (Alden, 2002, p. 353; Igreja, 2013). What is true is that Indigenous people who best know their history, culture and politics and local context

are best able to identify, develop and employ the resources necessary to build sustainable peace (Bush, 1996, p. 86; Ozerdem, 2014, p. 2). As a result of the people's cultural knowledge and Ubuntu's cultural peaceful strategies, ceremonies and rituals such as *Magambas*, *Makeyas*, and *Mhambas* (See Chapter Seven) conducted by communities for the demobilization process in rural areas became major avenues for people's healing. Consequently, the return of many ex-combatants from war could only be celebrated in the communities and by the communities through these aforementioned rituals. This is because Mozambique's liberal peace integration process contemplated the financial benefits for the demobilized and reintegrated ex-combatants. However, it lacked forgiveness, reconciliation, and trauma healing mechanisms, which are crucial to the reintegration of former combatants and forging the communities' sustainable peace. Moreover, there was a lack of programs to deal with the psychological trauma of war, and the ex-combatants' disenchantment within the violent movements because of their unfulfilled promises that they would become powerful people (Igreja, 2013; Lundin, 1998). Ex-combatants were frustrated with their lack of education, job skills, and rewards for service to the motherland (voluntarily or coerced). Some were frustrated with the impossibility of ever returning to their land that made them much more vulnerable (Lundin, 1998). It is within these circumstances that unlike liberal integration methods, community practices, values, and traditions played an essential role in the reintegration of Mozambique's ex-combatants back into their communities (Barnes, 1997, pp. 45-48; Lundin, 1998, p. 109).

Paris (2010) argued that liberal peacebuilding does not apply methods and/or features not consistent with liberal peace because such practices would create more problems than they could solve (pp. 358-360). As so, liberal peacebuilding contributed to the failure of the peace processes aimed to end the Mozambique's conflict. This is because it rejected and marginalized the local

peace settings and resource deemed inconsistent with liberal peacebuilding. For instance, local integration ceremonies were excluded from DDR processes. Consequently, the DDR process, which are liberal peace main feature aiming to establish national and international security, managed the nation's political peace process and reduced the threats of conflict associated crimes to other states (mostly those in the Southern Africa region) through cease-fire and institutional formation of the Mozambique's Defense Force (FADM). However, DDR liberal peace statebuilding dynamic fell way short in their peacebuilding scope as they didn't include local embedded features of forgiveness and reconciliation, which are more likely to effectively reach the scope aimed at by DDR processes.

What followed after the war in Mozambique was a sense of insecurity and mistrust in the people's psyche as the war was cruel to both combatants and civilians (Lundin, 1998, p. 114; Lundin, 2002). Combatants were worried about the people and what they could do as peace arrived while civilians were fearful of the demobilized ex-combatants (Lundin, 1998; Igreja, 2013). This fear was reinforced by the ex-combatant's constant intimidation of civilians and the rise in the number of crimes in urban areas (Vines, 2021). On one side, some demobilized combatants were suffering from war fatigue and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as they regretted being part of the civil war's violence. On the other side, some soldiers hoped to be integrated into society and longed for a quiet and normal existence (Lundin, 1998; p. 115). The people's general fear of violence and civil unrest was justified by their apprehension about what might happen if the society failed to reintegrate the ex-soldiers. It was believed that soldiers not successfully reintegrated into society would revert to criminal activities like theft and fraud upon the cessation of the reintegration programs (Lundin, 1998; p. 115). In these circumstances, community action performed by the local traditional elites, reflecting traditional customs and rituals like *Magambas*,

and *Makeyas*, contributed to peace of the minds and hearts of individuals playing a crucial role in the reintegration process (Lundin, 1998, p. 117; Igreja, 2010, pp. 153-161; 2013). While traditional and cultural rituals alone cannot solve Mozambique's troubles, their peacebuilding mechanisms are rooted in the people's local culture. Therefore, they are an indispensable substratum within the multi-track peacebuilding process aimed at contributing to social and sustainable peace.

Liberal Peacebuilding and the Destabilizing Effects of Marketization in Mozambique

Explicating the orthodox graduation of liberal peace Richmond (2009) noted that development through liberalization of the market is imposed in war-torn contexts (p. 560). The imposition is made possible through top-down international-aid and humanitarian institutions that are promoted under liberal economic rules (p. 561). Post-conflict international and humanitarian aid includes economic infrastructure rehabilitation and central state institutional establishment, and sponsorship in the security sector in tight time frames (Donais, 2012; Randazzo, 2021). Thus, post-conflict international aid falls mainly into statebuilding and not peacebuilding. The consequences of these statebuilding efforts is to facilitate negative peace, asymmetrical statebuilding, and post-peace accord society dependency on the international community.

The Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement noted that under United Nations/International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices, the parties agreed "to permit and facilitate the immediate use and rehabilitation, where necessary, of other access routes to affected populations, including routes coming from neighboring countries." (p. 52). Aside from the establishment of political parties, the liberal peace statebuilding process uses international organizations and international aid to rehabilitate and build new state infrastructures. International organizations work with the state only and are not beholden to the state, and are less interested in

reinforcing accountability between the state and the society. Consequently, both international organizations and the state contribute to negative peace. One could argue that Mozambique's conflict and peace depends on the goodwill of the political parties involved. To some extent this is true. However, beyond the goodwill of or the sabotage emanating from political parties such as FRELIMO and RENAMO, international and humanitarian aid was easily controlled by the outsiders that supported statebuilding processes. Therefore, international actors should engage political parties in attaining peacebuilding in a much broader sense (Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement, p. 337).

Similarly, international organizations, and the UN in particular must consider involving and empowering local structures, and local grassroots actors to develop their resources of wisdom so that they can hold Mozambique's political parties accountable and participate fully in the peacebuilding processes. So far, liberal statebuilding has been a political parties' affair there producing political and negative peace and excluding and marginalizing local actors in working to build an inclusive and sustainable social peace. Thus, Mozambique peacebuilding efforts need the inclusion of multiple actors other than top-down elites who do not relate to the real needs of peace.

Therefore, bottom-up approaches like the Ubuntu indigenous peacebuilding mechanism can include Mozambique's local actors and resources that need to be applied and involved in the peace process if social peace is to be achieved. Related to this point, is the fact that international statebuilding and humanitarian aid when focusing on building central state institutions reproduces unequal development between parties and peoples of the same country, that is, asymmetrical statebuilding (Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement, p. 342). For instance, the Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement states that, "Freedom of movement and respect shall be guaranteed for persons and means which, under the flag of the United Nations or of ICRC,

are engaged in humanitarian actions and are not accompanied by military escorts” (Mozambique’s 1992 General Peace Agreement, p. 51). This led to a point in Mozambique whereby the new institutions were built at the central level for the benefit of the international actors and political elites at the expense of provincial and very local levels and populations. This is because urban national central institutions, and national and international leadership as well as international organizations headquarters are located in the capital city. This led to the overdevelopment of one region (Maputo capital city and the Southern Mozambique) and underdevelopment of another (Central and Northern Mozambique) as statebuilding resources and infrastructures are drawn in the same region.

Moreover, while Mozambicans in the South have continuous access to a wide range of institutions, economic resources, and opportunities, Mozambicans in the Center North of the country have less access. In addition, urban areas are detached from other parts of the country. These regional discrepancies take different dynamics and constitute the cause of the conflict (see Chapter Three). Both peace processes were revived by market liberalization so that international statebuilding and humanitarian aid led to divisions between ethnic and rural communities undermining the liberal peace’s efforts to institutionalize peacebuilding in the country. Liberal peacebuilding’s international and humanitarian aid benefits only political parties, and it only creates political peace (Brewer, 2010).

In addition, liberal peacebuilding can deepen the economic discrepancies between political parties and dependency in post-peace accord environments (Donais, 2012). Competition for resources made available by the international community can create new economic discrepancies as only some privileged groups have access to resources (See Chapter Three). In Mozambique, the Protocol VII of Mozambique’s 1992 General Peace Agreement stipulates that “the Parties agree

to request that, of the funds provided by donor countries, an appropriate share should be placed at the disposal of political parties to finance their activities” (p. 47). This Protocol illustrates that in Mozambique, the General Peace Agreement was accompanied by foreign aid through humanitarian assistance. As a result, a profound structural economic asymmetrical imbalance between the political elites was created (Cruz et al., 2020, pp. 4-5). Consistent with this practice, was the “winner take all” position that FRELIMO occupied after the 1994 elections positioning FRELIMO’s elites and their families to benefit from liberal peace dividends, externally led statebuilding and privatization and the creation of a market economy (Pitcher, 2002). As so, international support led to new competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO as the international organizations are allied to the Government, which is led by FRELIMO. Competition and economic discrepancies between the two political parties escalated their political rivalry inciting a return to war.

Linked to this point is the fact that the demobilization and reintegration financial support provided by international humanitarian aid organizations were not accessed by the ex-combatants. The UN reports on the UN mission to Mozambique (UNUMOZ) illustrate that the liberal peace MGPA provided financial support for 6 million Mozambicans, in particular to ex-combatants to help them to resettle during the following two years (United Nations, 2023). It was projected that between 4 to 4.5 million internally displaced persons, 1.5 million refugees, and 370,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependents would benefit from humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2023). However, only a few ex-combatants were able to access the support (Alden, 2002, pp. 347-349). Most of the time the donors decided whom to give the financial aid to determine who could and could not access the opportunities (Mbembe, 2003). For example, the ex-combatants dissatisfaction with the peace process since the first agreement was exploited by

RENAMO to return to the war as its ex-combatants were marginalized by FRELIMO. For instance, the Association of Demobilized Soldiers of Mozambique (*Associação dos desmobilizados de Guerra*) railed against the absence of assistance, employment, and opportunities (Alden, 2002, p. 352; Vines, 2021, p. 11).

The problem lies in the fact that liberal peace investments promise support, discourage domestic responsibilities increasing dependency, and do not follow people's local needs and the poverty of disadvantaged classes.

Within the framework of Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement, both political parties decided to request the Italian Government to convene a conference of donor countries and organizations to finance the electoral process, the emergency programs for the reintegration of displaced persons, refugees, and demobilized soldiers (Mozambique's General Peace Agreement, 1992, p. 47).

The economic support, which followed the international organizational agenda in the country shows that no amount of externally generated policy and support can shift post-peace accord societies away from a culture of violence to a culture of peace (Brewer, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2012). In Mozambique's case, external support for elections are unpredictable affairs and often fail to produce conciliatory consensus. Second, funded DDR did not succeed to integrate the ex-combatants into society as RENAMO soldiers continue to be dissatisfied. In addition, the sharpened inequalities created by the lack of access to resources for some groups of people result in anger and frustration continue to rise among Mozambicans contributing to renewed violence.

Resurgence of the Conflict and the Maputo 2019 Peace Accords

The 1992 General Peace Agreement brought new internal changes politically, economically, and socially to the country. In other words, the 1992 liberal Peace Agreement had contributed to the creation of political parties, and negotiated the cease-fire, and the economic support of one group of ex-combatants, namely FRELIMO, yet the conflict was not transformed. As illustrated earlier in this Chapter, the peace settlement has only produced an agreement for the elites and managed only the war between two belligerents (negative political peace), in detriment of deep-seated roots of the conflict, open the possibility of potential future conflicts. Undeniably, top-down peace processes do not always bring about sustainable peace. In fact, in Mozambique's case, peace was eventually shattered in 2013 with the renewal of violent conflict. Mozambique was regarded at that point by the international community to be a successful case of liberal peacebuilding (Moran & Pitcher, 2004; Maschietto, 2015; Naidu, 2021, p. 1). This may not be the case today as the country was marked by the return of civil war as local people were dominated by frequent political violence. In this respect, the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (MAPR) is a result of six years of negotiation efforts (Saraiva, 2022; Vines, 2021).

The first effort was led by religious leaders.⁶ After more than 100 rounds of talks, they reached a cessation of hostilities agreement and initiated the decentralization dialogue between both parties (Government of Mozambique, 2015; Vines, 2021; Saraiva, 2022). The second effort was led by multiple international mediators, including the former President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, and the former President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete (Saraiva, 2022). The third was led by Mirko Manzoni, the Swiss Ambassador, and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General António

⁶ The mediation team included the Muslim cleric Sheikh Saide Habibo, the Catholic priest Fr. Felipe Couto, the Revd. Dinis Sengulane, the Anglican Bishop of Mozambique, Revd. Anastácio Chembeze, the Methodist Pastor and peace investigator at Africa University, and academic Dr. Lourenço do Rosário (Vines, 2018, p. 16; Saraiva, 2022).

Guterres. The UN through Mirko Manzoni's mediation efforts negotiated once again a peace settlement between both political parties. On August 6, 2019, the MARP was signed (Maputo Accord, 2019; Peace Support Secretariat, 2019, p. 6). The signatories included Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, the president of Mozambique and RENAMO's new President, Ossufo Momade as the former President Afonso Dhlakama unexpectedly passed away in May 2018, while negotiations were ongoing (Saraiva, 2022, p. 98).

As it is typical of Mozambique's liberal peace agreements, both peace processes have only privileged track-one elite diplomacy excluding local actors, cultural, and social dynamics and the underlying sources of conflict as well as peace knowledge and practices. In addition, in the first phase (domestic negotiations) in (2015) RENAMO demanded a depoliticization (nonpartisanship) of the public administration and integration of RENAMO members, in particular its military forces in the Government structures (RENAMO, 2015, pp. 1-2). This is because according to RENAMO, "all regulations and restrictions of public administration are to benefit FRELIMO. Also, FRELIMO promotes promiscuous practices in public administration, such as the collection of quotas, acquisition of material goods for the party, and dispensation from work for party activities, among others" (Republic of Mozambique, 2015, p. 2). Thus, structural exclusion through public administration at the hand of the governing party is one of the political root causes of the conflict (See Chapter Three). However, the second phase of the negotiation, which privileged the liberal peace acting through international professionals and organizations, dismissed the issues on the depoliticization of the State as well as the other root causes of the conflict. Rather, the cease-fire and DDR permeated the second and the third phases of the negotiations. Therefore, the 2019 Maputo Agreement contemplates and emphasized two crucial signed documents, namely, the Accord of the Definitive Cessation of Hostilities and the Memorandum of Understanding on

Military issues, which includes DDR (Maputo General Agreement, 2019, p. 2; Republic of Mozambique, 2019, pp. 3816-3819). Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I explore the new DDR processes as the cornerstone of the 2019 MARP (Republic of Mozambique, 2019, pp. 3816-3822).

The National Negotiations toward the 2019 Maputo Peace Agreement

Reports and the minutes of the negotiation sessions illustrate that like in the past, political and structural exclusion of RENAMO and everyday local people continues to be one of the puzzles that maintains the conflict. As the demands at the table of negotiations indicate, one cannot deny the unsuccessfulness of the 1992 General Peace Agreement to address the conflict's deep roots. In addition, the failure of the first DDR in integrating the RENAMO's ex-combatants continued to highlight the conflict between both political parties. For the sake of illustration, at the headquarters of negotiation Saimone Muhambi Macuiana, the president of the party's jurisdictional council and head of RENAMO's delegation questioned "why RENAMO's former combatants and army officers are not heads of the army and of positions even with the work experience they have? Could it be that there is a hidden plan in the demobilization?" (Republic of Mozambique, 2015, p. 8). Responding to this accusation, Gabriel Serafim Muthisse, the member of the Government delegation affirmed that "RENAMO members are integrated and those who feel wronged, put the case on the table to be resolved within the military structure under the rules of the armed forces of defense and security of Mozambique" (Republic of Mozambique, 2015, p. 4). In these circumstances, Lourenço do Rosário, head and observer of the mediator group reminded both sides that "the Government asked RENAMO to present the list of citizens that it considers to be unjustified and those who have been disadvantaged since the Rome Agreement and who have been

placed as auxiliaries over time” (Republic of Mozambique, 2015, p. 10). In addition, Sheik Said Habib added that “a solution could be sought in the Declaration of Principles on the De-Partisanship of the State” (p. 19). In reality, beyond a convenient integration of RENAMO forces into Mozambique’s national defense forces, RENAMO and the mediators may have been very concerned with the hierarchical structure’s exclusion of RENAMO’s members, including those from the defense forces.

The structural exclusion of the RENAMO members in Mozambique is not a new phenomenon. As illustrated in Chapter Three, it is at the core of the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The 1992 liberal peace agreement did not address the aforementioned structural exclusion properly as it focused on army institutional building without defining the guiding principle of the institutional relations between both parties. In addition, failing to accomplish DDR, the Mozambique’s 1992 General Peace Agreement lost the opportunity to integrate RENAMO forces into the new Mozambican army. It also failed to heal and transform RENAMO and FRELIMO’s relationships as well as in promoting a sense of community and shared responsibility in the newly created political institutions. As I further illustrate, the same was repeated in the 2019 Maputo Peace Agreement DDR. It is within this circumstances that this thesis proposes Ubuntu as a guiding principle to inform the peace process and its actions because Ubuntu stems from the local culture that encapsulates norms that promotes reconciliation. This reconciliation may start with a cease-fire and political peace. However, the case of Mozambique shows that negotiating a cease-fire and institutionalizing the nation’s armed forces left untouched the task of societal healing because these liberal peace negotiations guiding principle didn’t contemplate addressing societal healing, reconciliation, and the intercommunal compromise needed to build the social peace or a justpeace.

The 2019 Peace Agreement: Cessation of Hostilities and the Memorandum of Understanding on Military Issues

The 2019 Maputo Agreement included a cease-fire and DDR and was characterized by the predominance of international actors, tight disarmament schedules, and the lack of concrete actions for nurturing reconciliation. And if one considers the root causes of the conflict then one can observe that the features of the Maputo peace agreement are insufficient to nurture a sustainable peace in Mozambique.

By its very nature, the liberal peace employs international organizations and peace professionals (Autesserre, 2021; Donais, 2012; Lederach, 1997). The resurgence of the conflict in Mozambique captured the attention of the international community. Consequently, the “personal envoy of the UN-Secretary and the Ambassador of Switzerland in Mozambique was sent with the responsibility of facilitating the dialogue and between RENAMO and FRELIMO and guarantee the implementation of the agreement” (Republic of Mozambique, 2019). In addition, an international Observer Mission of the Cessation of Military Hostilities (EMOCHIM) was created (CDD, 2020, p. 2). The group was composed of Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Cape Verde, Italy, Portugal, the UK, and the United States (CDD, 2020, p. 2; Republic of Mozambique, 2015).

External international professionals are critical to Mozambique’s statebuilding process, however, their expertise alone really fall short of bringing a sustainable peace because they have a moral high ground that dismisses local ideas as they operate in a hierarchy with standard international strategies (Autessere, 2021). In addition, outsiders have skills that local grassroots organizations really need (Autessere, 2021). However, insiders possess the historical, cultural and linguistic resources needed to understand the root causes of their conflict and they can support a

sustainable peace process. Conversely, the international actor's marginalization of Mozambique's local actors and peace resources didn't contribute to forging a social peace. Rather, it produced a contract between local elites and the international community, which led to cessation of hostilities between RENAMO and FRELIMO. This was counterproductive to embedding peace in Mozambique as it decreases local everyday people's ownership and escalates the possibility of a return to the war as some actors aren't involved in the peace process. Right after the 2019 agreement, RENAMO's military junta led by Mariano Nhongo returned to the war (Vines, 2021).

That said, the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities stated that "the parties should avoid violent armed attacks against civilians, their properties, positions of defense forces" (Maputo Agreement, 2019, p. 4; Republic of Mozambique, 2019, p. 3817), should be read and implemented in conformity with the Memorandum of Understanding on Military issues. This document mentioned that the "the dismantlement of the military bases related to the military hostilities should be finalized in fifteen days after the agreement, that is, August 21, 2019" (Republic of Mozambique, 2019, p. 3818). Conflating peace processes solely to negotiating a cease-fire to ensure the cessation of hostilities can be beneficial to the international security agenda, but not to the local people's peacebuilding agenda. This is because the cease-fire only contributes to ending the direct violence between the parties, but it doesn't introduce the needed peace into the society. In addition, short-term missions for disarmament projects following standardized liberal peace templates can mechanically separate the military forces but they aren't able to reconcile and integrate the rival parties peacefully (Brewer, 2010). The failure in establishing Mozambique's peace through cease-fires and DDR lies also in the fact that these short-term projects were designed and funded by international staff who have limited knowledge of local people, national needs, institutions, and peacebuilding dynamics. In addition, together within tight schedules, it becomes

difficult to control the expenditures, achieve the expected targeted results, and hold the parties accountable.

Another problem with the liberal 2019 Maputo Peace Agreement was the conflation of the re-integration of ex/combatants with economic support and the lack of concrete actions for reconciliation. The 2019 Maputo Agreement itself is titled “Peace Accord of National Reconciliation” (Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation, 2019, p. 1) and it affirms that “the parties decide to consolidate the national reconciliation privileging dialogue for resolution of their conflicts” (p. 1). However, other than technical elements and schedules for the integration of RENAMO military forces into the Mozambique’s defense and security forces that are located within the DDR framework, no initiative was envisaged for reconciliation. In addition, following the established DDR schedules set by the international community, by 2020, a total of ten out of sixteen military bases were shut down (Peace Support Secretariat, 2019, p. 1).

To facilitate the integration of the disarmed and demobilized soldiers a multi-donor project was launched in October 2021 to support reintegration by promoting local economic development opportunities (Italian Development Agency, 2021). The project is funded by the Austrian Development Agency, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, and the UN Capital Development Fund (United Nations, 2021). In contrast with the 2019 peace Agreement document, this project doesn’t include local and grassroots integration and reconciliation initiatives. Due to the complexities of the process, it may be difficult to predict if that the on-going DDR will be successful. However, it is crucial to note that these peacebuilding processes might be peace-sensitive and less time-dependent (Vines, 2021, p. 336). Also, if the international community’s support does not pay attention to local needs it may end up excluding minorities. In fact, experiences from the past show that accessing international funds remain highly competitive and

the donor policies decide who does and who does not matter (disposable), who are and who aren't the beneficiaries of the aid (Mbembe, 2003, p. 27). While emphasizing DDR and economic support, liberal peacebuilding may consider refining its strategies using a CEP perspective. The financial injection of a significant economic resources that benefit only privileged groups in conflict environments may create new incentives for conflicts as people compete to access opportunities and resources. Otherwise, liberal peacebuilding applied in its current form and scope is doomed to be inappropriate and will continue to be criticized.

Critiquing Liberal Peacebuilding: Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding toward the Indigenous Peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding is a mainstream conflict resolution process applied around the world and its peacebuilding efforts have paid little attention to liberal approaches that marginalize non-liberal ones. This is one of the reasons why liberal peacebuilding has been the target of many critiques from CEP scholars. For example, Richmond (2022) points out that the problem with liberal peace versions is that they rely on fragmented mobilization. Equally, they emphasize hegemonic forms of neoliberalism through which the actors involved in the peacebuilding process refuse to give up power (p. 133). Thus, the problem with Mozambique's liberal solution is that it underscores the role of the hegemonic and divided political elites in bringing about peace to the local people (Pitcher, 2020; Manning, 2002; Nuvunga, 2005). Thus, liberal peace intervention promotes statebuilding through political parties rather than peacebuilding that aims at being inclusive. The liberal peace version may have actually accentuated their division through an agreement that did not even encourage powersharing, and in reality, escalated competition between RENAMO and FRELIMO (Nuvunga, 2014; Pitcher, 2017). As result, liberal peacebuilding

interventions may be regarded as a historical source of violence and the promotion of neo-colonialism (Byrne & Thiessen, 2017, 2019, p. 133). Mozambique's historical violence is a result of the imposition of Western views and structures that are not consistent with the context, but with the interest of the international community. In this regard, Richmond (2008) speaks of the "emperor's new clothes" to demonstrate that liberal peacebuilding can be related to neocolonialism (Richmond & Franks, 2008).

Undoubtedly, since 1992 Mozambicans need peace because the ongoing war is undesirable. However, it is not doubtful that democratization based on elections and the liberalization of markets through international aid were far from the population's desires (Harrison, 1996, pp. 19-21). The resurgence of violent conflict in Mozambique in the aftermath of both peace agreements suggests that liberal democracy through elections, DDR, and international support were imposed by external forces with minimal involvement of the population (p. 21). This external imposition may have decreased the local populations' level of ownership of the peace processes and increased their resistance to statebuilding imposed from the top. After Portuguese colonialism, the enforcing of current liberal values through peace agreements in Mozambique can be compared to the new clothes given by the international community to Mozambique. Similar to colonialism, such new clothes revived violence among Mozambicans.

Paris (2010) attempts to save liberal democracy from the criticism related to colonialism (pp. 337-365) so that modern peacebuilding interventions do not entail the civilizing mission, rather they lead to exploitation, and destruction as colonialism did in the past (pp. 348-349). However, he fails to explain why liberal peacebuilding is self-promotional. It seems that the liberal peace approach promotes its own values in other lands rather than the values of the people it pretends to support to get to peace. In this respect, liberal peace intervention is not emancipatory

as far as local dynamics and local people are concerned. In fact, emancipatory peacebuilding should hold the idea that individuals and communities require and attain social justice and the power to choose (Richmond, 2022). However, this is not the case in Mozambique as the liberal methods applied there are not genuine to the people's actual choice and willingness and capacity to defend themselves (Sabaratnam, 2011, p. 13-18; Harrison, 1996).

As far as the liberalization of markets and international support are concerned, Paris (2010) accepts that the liberalization of markets can be destabilizing in post-conflict environments (p. 360). Nevertheless, he is skeptical about the existence of an alternative to liberal peacebuilding. In addition, he denies that non-market-oriented economics can create growth and wealth (p. 361). Moreover, he adds that those criticizing the economic dimension have only called for less aggressive adjustment strategies to reduce economic liberalization, without rejecting liberalization (p. 361). The liberalization of Mozambique's markets widened the gaps between the poor and the rich, and it has been destabilizing and pushing people into poverty (Hanlon, 2010; Hanlon & Cunguara, 2010). Similarly, international support following both of Mozambique's peace processes that included DDR didn't contemplate the national initiative to reconciliation and the re-integration of the ex-combatants into society. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter Seven, Mozambique's scholars propose democratic and economic approaches that may respond to the needs of the people such as *Demobuntocracia/ Ubuntueconomia*⁷ (Mussomar, 2021). In addition to the rejection of the liberalization of markets and international financial support, scholars argue that people are concerned with the lack of employment, a poor harvest, and the rising prices of goods and services, rather than the rising integration of Mozambique into the international economy (Harrison, 1996, p. 27). Further, Sabaratman (2011) noted that Mozambique's

⁷ See Chapter Seven on Ubuntu.

populations are against the waste of resources and the use of money on issues that are not a priority to the people (p. 18). For instance, development projects may consider spending more resources on the implementation of project-related activities, rather than on studies and salaries of international and national employees (pp. 18-19).

The CEP scholarship critiquing liberal peacebuilding is immense, and it is also relevant as it acts to prepare the way toward including indigenous methods and epistemologies as integral to local peacebuilding. For example, Autessere (2021) points out that liberal peacebuilding as a top-down approach is elite-centric, and the problem with top-down is that it does not consider the problems of ordinary people (p. 131). A top-down approach contributes to ending a conflict among and between the elites yet, elite-driven strategies are not sustainable (Autessere, 2021). Autessere's point is useful regarding Mozambique's case where the political elites signed an agreement. Autessere also noted that in many states such as Congo, where elections and agreements were institutionalized, Congo's unification and the creation of a new constitution did not solve the underlying conflict (pp. 134-136). Moreover, Autessere pointed out the flaws with the "peace-landers" peacebuilding efforts like their dearth of knowledge about local contextual issues as well as their lack of time to execute their missions as they are pressured to implement quickly and meet the deadlines (Autessere, 2014, 2021, pp. 138-140). Peacebuilding initiatives cannot force elections and/or democracy on people because transitions from dictatorship and conflict situations may lead to disasters. Democratization may need to follow an analysis of the existent conditions to support democratic institutions otherwise, a democracy imposed by external actors may lead to civil wars (Autessere, 2021, p. 144). Therefore, instead of pushing for democracy and election elements within the "package deal," it is crucial instead to provide time for conflict transformation

and in addressing the root causes of the conflict such as poverty, inequalities, unemployment, discrimination, and poor access to land, water, and social justice (Autessere, 2021, p. 145).

In the same vein, liberal peacebuilding interventions are accused of being a rescue mission to replace indigenous forms of social and political organization and peacebuilding practices rapidly and forcefully with Western versions to indirectly ensure the security of the West (Thiessen, 2011; Thiessen & Byrne, 2017, 2019, pp. 132-133). Similarly, Ozederm and Lee (2016) pointed out that liberal peacebuilding interventions attempt to build new institutions, norms, and values, and states that end up institutionalizing sectarian and ethnocentric conflicts so that at the local level reconciliation and deep peace fail to take hold in the long-term (also see Lee, 2015; Tadjbakhsh, 2019; Thiessen, 2011). Rather, they promote a virtual peace, recognized and beneficial to international interveners and not to the local populations (Richmond & Franks, 2007). What sustains the abovementioned critiques are their concerns for local populations at the local level and their pursuit of everyday justice and peace (Byrne & Thiessen, 2019, p. 134).

This thesis acknowledges the strengths and importance of liberal peacebuilding in promoting statebuilding in Mozambique through the creation of political parties, the defense of human rights, and international technical support and financial aid. However, liberal statebuilding doesn't address the scope of social and positive peace as it focuses on transplanting the Western models of democracy and political structures to conflict affected environments, in particular to Mozambique. In addition, the statebuilding process that includes human rights, DDR, and international support cannot bring social peace or positive peace to local communities if it emphasizes only international professionals, their organizations, and their ideas while rejecting local actors, their knowledge and wisdom, their cultural resources, and culturally rooted peacebuilding practices. Therefore, this thesis taps into the way laid forward by CEP scholarship

to understand the Ubuntu Indigenous peacebuilding method and its possible application to Mozambique's peacebuilding process. Chapter Seven argues that Ubuntu is a communitarian approach that is embedded in Mozambique's populations' culture that can act as a guiding principle to peacebuilding as part of a multi-track peacebuilding process that enacts and promotes peace from below.

Conclusion

Liberal peacebuilding theory encompasses a considerable number of peace methods to address conflicts. Although liberal peace roots can be traced back to the eighteenth century, they became mainstream in the 1990s. Thus, Chapter Six explored the question how liberal peace failed to establish effective peace in Mozambique. To do so, the Chapter examined the liberal peace foundations, and liberal peacebuilding features such as democratization based on elections, market structures through international financial support, cease-fires created by DDR that were applied in Mozambique in the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements. The main conclusion noted is that liberal peacebuilding methods were not effective to bring about peace in Mozambique for several reasons. First, the 1992 and 2019 Mozambique Peace Accords privileged international professionals, and their strategies and organizations to apply liberal values (democratization through elections, creating political parties, international support) that excluded local actors, their peacebuilding philosophy, resources, and institutions to build sustainable peace in Mozambique.

This Chapter noted that conflation of democracy to elections did not contribute to building peace in Mozambique because it did not emphasize powersharing and power-with strategies. Rather, "the winner takes all" ensured that FRELIMO elites ended up with more gains to continue disempowering and excluding the myriad of political, cultural, and religious groups that were

different from their own. Second, economic liberalism did not address the damage and poverty brought on by the war. On the contrary, the liberalization of markets through international support introduced a change for the worse. The poor became poorer, and the rich became richer. The economy collapsed and the communities continued to lack employment and social provisions as the prices of goods and services escalated. This paved the path for new conflicts to emerge.

Third, Mozambique's cease-fires and DDR were built into a statebuilding and not a peacebuilding process. This is because the cease-fires were aimed at creating political parties, bringing them together for elections, and creating security institutions such as the Mozambique defense force. This statebuilding resulted in political or negative peace. This is because the liberal peace political strategies such as DDR marginalized the local conditions of peace and conflict, excluded the culturally rooted peacebuilding mechanisms, and didn't contemplate local initiatives and avenues for forging reconciliation between both political parties and all Mozambicans. For instance, the first General Peace Accord in 1992, excluded local community methods of trauma healing and reintegration rituals and strategies. In addition, international aid assistance did not privilege every community as it created economic inequalities among the people. Fourth, the critique of liberal peacebuilding by CEP found that there is no "one-size-fits-all" peace method. In addition, liberal peacebuilding may be a fundamental international strategy to address Global South conflicts, yet it wasn't a good fit for the Mozambican context as its efforts did not change the no-war and no-peace situation. I acknowledge the importance of the liberal peacebuilding elements such as human rights and democracy, however, whatever peacebuilding methods used by international and local peacebuilders should be consistent with the contextual dynamics that nurture conflict including local peacebuilding practices and epistemologies that contribute to peace. If local knowledge and wisdom aren't included, then any Global North drive peacebuilding

strategy that is applied in a war-torn context is unlikely to achieve its aims to bring about sustainable social peace there. The following Chapter builds on the shortcomings of the liberal peacebuilding to further argue that Mozambique Ubuntu's indigenous peacebuilding, which is a contextual peacebuilding process and rooted in the local wisdom of the people provides prospects for social peace as part of multi-track diplomacy. In this endeavor, instead of imposing its views, liberal peace may only support local communities, peace resources, and actors to apply their local and Indigenous methods, values, and practices to ensure local ownership and long-lasting peace in Mozambique.

CHAPTER 7 – Ubuntu: The Indigenous Approach for Peace in Mozambique

Introduction

Challenges facing mainstream liberal peacebuilding strategies call forth alternative peace strategies. Analysis of the 1992 and 2019 externally devised and driven liberal peace agreements demonstrates that Mozambique's enduring political violence is due to the conflation of peacebuilding to statebuilding. In other words, without looking at the direct causes of the conflict, external liberal peacebuilders assumed that turning RENAMO and FRELIMO into political parties and supporting elections would solve the conflict. Similarly, liberal peacebuilders advocated the formation of security bodies and new liberally based institutions. Moreover, in these statebuilding processes, the liberal peace approach emphasized the role of international organizations, professionals, and financial support over local actors. Consequently, political peace instead of social peace was achieved.

Liberal statebuilding efforts were important in Mozambique in areas of institutional rehabilitation, human rights, financial support. In fact, strong and democratic institutions are needed in Mozambique. Good governance, strong institutions, and human rights are important and need to be institutionalized within the Mozambique's state structures. However, strong institutions that aren't humanistic and are discriminatory and foster competitions aren't able to address the root causes of the conflict such as structural violence. Consequently, human rights projects and good governance that emphasize the role of national and international elites at the expense of grassroots local actors only risk achieving the international community and the political elite's political agendas.

Therefore, Chapter Seven argues that in order for Mozambique to achieve social peace, peacebuilding processes should be considered based on Ubuntu as the local guiding principle imbued with meaning, cultural wisdom, and peace action. Ubuntu is the holistic platform of an African notion of humanism (Eze, 2020, pp. 250-251). Such humanism is oriented toward a communitarian ethos, which strives for harmony that can be achieved through empathetic relations in the community (Metz, 2019, p. 119; Eze, 2020, p. 251; Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011). Within the current circumstances of political violence, Ubuntu principles of synchronic solidarity (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011), togetherness, humanness, friendliness, restorative justice, and forgiveness (Tutu, 1999; Metz, 2012; Ramose, 1999; Bujo, 2001) may be considered to guide Mozambique's conflict resolution processes.

Therefore, this Chapter proposes and illustrates how Ubuntu is well-placed to transform Mozambique's political conflict after the challenges faced by the liberal peace approach in Mozambique. Ubuntu is a recognized indigenous peacebuilding based on local knowledge or epistemology and the wisdom of local people is more appropriate for a sustainable peace. This is because it is embedded in the cultural and contextual conditions of the people, which create conflict and inspire peace. In this regard, instead of applying liberal democracy, compacted into elections, and inspired by liberal Western values, an Ubuntu-based communitarian and deliberative democracy is needed to transform the protracted conflict.

The Ubuntu principle and values of sharing and solidarity can lead the international support and the Reintegration, Restoration, and Reconciliation (RRR) through communitarian processes are better suited to the local context. In this endeavor, neocolonialism, and globalization challenge Ubuntu's cultural values.

Although Ubuntu is better situated in helping to bring real peace to Mozambique, it participates in these efforts as part of the multi-track peacebuilding process, which brings peace from below through local actors, and peace resources based on local and cultural norms and values. Local communities have been engaged in some peacebuilding practices (Paffenholz, 2015), but local communities and Ubuntu peace mechanisms in Mozambique are characterized by new problems such as division, corruption, and unjust structures in their communities (Castiano, 2010, 2011; Eze, 2020, p. 257; Murithi, 2018). To overcome these challenges, Ubuntu societies, leaders, and practitioners must encourage unity, justice, ethics, and education among local people. In this regard, instead of imposing liberal values, the role, and the resources of the international organizations and professionals would be better spent in empowering local peoples conditions and peacebuilding resources taking into consideration local people's efforts to foster unity, justice, and education.

This chapter discusses indigenous knowledge and indigenous peacebuilding, democratic and economic restoration and re-integration, and reconciliation based on Ubuntu as well as the weaknesses of indigenous peacebuilding. Finally, an Ubuntu-centered on unity, justice, ethics, and education is proposed to transform Mozambique's protracted conflict.

Local Knowledge and Indigenous Peacebuilding

Indigenous peacebuilding has its substratum in indigenous epistemologies. The existence of local and indigenous knowledge is also embedded within local and indigenous peacebuilding mechanisms. Indigenous knowledge is the set of understandings, skills, and philosophies developed by communities with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings (Mac Ginty, 2008). Local knowledge encapsulates the cultural intricacies of social interactions,

language, rituals, customs, spirituality, systems of classifications, and religion of the communities (Tuso & Flaherty, 2016, pp. 3-26; Mac Ginty, 2008). In this regard, rather than seeing the local as space, the local really has to do with how people live, how they manipulate the tools and the tactics they have at their disposal, and how they know how to live in harmony (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 834). Therefore, local knowledge enlightens local communities' decision-making about crucial aspects of day-to-day life.

In this study, the interest in indigenous knowledge is based on the idea that valuing Indigenous culture, values, and wisdom is equal to “looking outside the box” of the Western tradition, and assumptions about the nature of humanity, society, and politics (Fry & Souillac, 2002, pp. 124-125). Our understanding is that Indigenous knowledge, values, and beliefs can lead to peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, just as they lead everyday decision-making. Therefore, I propose rethinking peacebuilding in two ways. In the first place, peacebuilding should mean considering the Indigenous knowledge about peace. This is because customary approaches have the potential to recognize the contextual roots of conflict and the voices and agency of ordinary people in post-accord societies at the community level (Tom, 2016, p. 76-84). As a matter of fact, peacebuilding efforts may be sensitive to cultural circumstances (Mac Ginty, 2016, p. 141). That considered, participation and sustainability in peace processes would consequently be the benefits accrued from the application of traditional and indigenous peacebuilding methods. In the second place, rethinking peacebuilding should mean reflecting on the shortcomings and failures of the previous mainstream approaches while projecting the strengths of Indigenous peacebuilding.

Critical assessments of mainstream peacebuilding have contributed to shedding light on local people's experiences that are marginalized by mainstream approaches. For instance, it followed that liberal peace interventions have a top-down, technocratic nature, with an emphasis

on stabilization and securitization (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 159). In addition, it was noted that because of the top-down bias, liberal peace interventions don't recognize the cultural, local, psychological relational, and contextual deep-rooted dimensions of conflicts (p. 160). Rather, top-down liberal peace approaches have labelled the local as lacking progress and capacities, and that it is imbued by problems, failures, and as representing backwardness (Kappler, 2015, p. 879).

In reality, the implication of conflict being a cultural phenomenon means that the culturally typical ways of perceiving and responding to conflict remain in some ways invisible to outsiders and their imposed frameworks (Fry & Souillac, 2002, pp. 125-127). Therefore, there is a need to harness appropriate models from local cultural and contextual peace resources. This includes empowering the resources, modalities, and mechanisms for peacebuilding that exist within the local context (Lederach, 1997, p. 95). This is because external actors' ignorance of local and everyday events means that little can be reached beyond the rhetoric on local ownership and local participation. In addition, peace efforts implemented by international peacebuilding actors will necessarily be unsuccessful as they are inconsistent with the local conditions, they further violence and disempower the local population through the reproduction of societal hierarchies and internal divisions (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 833). In this regard, one of the important steps would be moving from prescriptive models, which focus more on the knowledge of the experts to elicitive models, which are embodied in the knowledge of the participants (Lederach, 1997). Following this understanding, this thesis argues that conflict resolution in Mozambique should be articulated with Ubuntu principles, which consist of the knowledge and wisdom of local people. Ubuntu is an indigenous and traditional peacebuilding method that includes consensus-decision making, and the restoration of relationships so that it is a stronger alternative body of knowledge, and practice against violence. Consequently, local perspectives toward peace can minimize the shortcomings

of international liberal peacebuilding as building peace from below as part of a multi-track peacebuilding process. This is because compared to liberal peace practices that pretend to build peace without the understanding and inclusion of the local and contextual means of conflict and peace, local approaches embrace local people's agency and their peacebuilding practices and structures. As the following section unpacks, Ubuntu indigenous knowledge and wisdom are embedded in the African and Mozambique's people's cultures as well as their local agency and their peacebuilding knowledge.

Ubuntu Philosophy and Indigenous Conflict Transformation

Ubuntu wisdom embodies principles of synchronic solidarity (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011), togetherness, humanness, friendliness, restorative justice, and forgiveness (Tutu, 1999; Metz, 2012; Ramose, 1999; Bujo, 2001). These principles are crucial for facilitating social and positive peace. For instance, togetherness nurtures harmony and restorative justice and forgiveness can minimize the damage to victims and offenders. Therefore, the inadequacy and failure of the application of statebuilding and liberal peace values in Mozambique such as human rights, securitization, and political parties' formation means that Ubuntu principles can be the cornerstone for its peacebuilding project. In this regard, the expected peace, which the liberal peace applying liberal international values didn't deliver between the 1992 and 2019 Peace agreements means that a real peace could be reached if local people and their practices are included in a multi-track peacebuilding system. These norms and values were inherited by African and Mozambican communities down the ages because Ubuntu is at the root of African philosophy in that the being of an African person in the universe is intrinsically anchored to Ubuntu (Ramose, 1999, 2022; Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011; Eze, 2020).

To illustrate this point, Mogobe Ramose (1999, 2022) argues that the African tree of knowledge stems from Ubuntu and relates to Ubuntu. Similarly, Ubuntu is the wellspring flowing with an African understanding of the nature of being (ontology) and the nature of knowledge (epistemology) (p. 36). Considering that both epistemology and ontology are the bases of Philosophy then African philosophy has long been established in and through Ubuntu (pp. 37-46). Apart from ontology and epistemology, Placide Temples (1959) argues that Ubuntu encapsulates the psychology, wisdom, and anthropology of the Bantu Philosophy (pp. 33-175). To Alexis Kagamé (1959), Ubuntu is the foundation of the linguistic understanding of the Bantu people (pp. 23-27). Studying the Bantu people, Mulago (1965) also noted that Ubuntu is the basic principle of African Philosophy as it permeates the social unity and social integrity of the *untu* (pp. 67-68). Finally, John Mbiti (1990) asserted that Ubuntu holds the religiosity and the spirituality of the African people wholistically together (pp. 101-107). Consequently, this combination of local people's contextual wisdom, linguistic, religious, and spiritual resources and their peacebuilding practices is crucial for the ownership of peace. Imposing liberal Western knowledge may create confusion among the locals and harm the peace efforts. In this regard, the empowerment of local communities' wisdom and their spiritual resources are fundamental for building a justpeace.

The conceptualization and theorization of Ubuntu as a foundation of African Philosophy imposes two requirements. The first is the geographic localization of the Bantu to avoid excessive generalizations. The second is related to linguistic analysis of the term, which can contribute to unpacking the concept and its definition. Regarding the first, the Ubuntu Philosophy is attributed to the part of the African continent that stretches from the Nubian Desert (in the North of Africa) to the Cape of Good Hope [in the Southern part of Africa] (De Tejada, 1977, p. 304; Ramose, 1999, p. 35). The same delimitation applies to the region that goes from West Africa (from

Senegal) to Zanzibar (East Africa) (De Tejada, 1977, p. 304). In other words, the Ubuntu worldview is well rooted in Southern Saharan Africa. Such a principle makes it possible for the unification of cultural values existing in this immense territorial landscape (De Tejada, 1997, p. 304). This has to do with the fact that there is a “family atmosphere,” that is, a sort of interconnectedness and kinship among and between the indigenous people of Africa (Ki-Zerbo, 1972, pp. 606-609; Ramose, 1999, p. 35). However, this is not to say, that there are no variations in the Ubuntu worldviews that characterize the aforementioned “family atmosphere.” Rather, the blood circulating through the family members is the same in its values, which surmounts the variations of the Bantu–Ubuntu languages, practices, and methods (Ki-Zerbo, 1972; Ramose, 1999).

Consequently, the conceptualization and theorization of peace and the institutionalization of peace processes in Mozambique are likely to be successful if they consider the conceptualization of how the people see the root causes of the conflict and include the Ubuntu dimensions for peace. For instance, the loss of the Mozambican people’s interconnectedness were influenced by the Portuguese colonial strategy of divide and rule (see Chapter Two). The people’s interconnectedness and harmony was harmed by the structural violence inflicted by the political governing elites onto some groups. The statebuilding process didn’t solve these root causes of Mozambique’s conflict. In fact, the harmony that had existed between FRELIMO and RENAMO was not re-established by liberal peacebuilding because it didn’t grasp the fundamental conflict fissures and the “solution” favored the international actors’ interests. Therefore, Ubuntu, which by nature preconizes local people’s wisdom, and cultural peace mechanisms is the local turn needed to support building an inclusive and sustainable peace process in Mozambique.

Turning to the linguistic analysis and operationalization of the Ubuntu construct, it follows that Ubuntu is actually two words in one (Ramose, 1999). It consists of the prefix *ubu-* and the stem *ntu-*. *Ubu* – calls forth the idea of being in general; it is the involved being before it manifests itself in the tangible form or mode of existence of a particular entity (Kagamé, 1959; p. 23; Ramose, 1999, p. 36). *Ubu* – as an enclosed being tends always toward unfoldment. In other words, it moves incessantly towards its concrete manifestation through specific ways and modes of being. Therefore, *ubu* – is oriented towards – *ntu* (Kagamé, 1959; Ramose, 1999, p. 36). Consequently, there is no separation and division between *ubu-* and – *ntu*. *Ubu* – and – *ntu* are not two radically separate and irreconcilably opposed realities. On the contrary, they are mutually connected in the sense that they are two aspects of being as oneness and an indivisible wholeness (Ramose, 1999, pp. 36-38). This relational nature of Ubuntu translates the nature of *umuntu* – wo/man/person, who is anchored in, revolves around, and towards *ubu-* (humanity). This contemporaneous and indissoluble coupling of *ubu-* and *umuntu* is explicitly illustrated through the maxim *umuntu ngumuntu nga bantu/ motho ke motho ka batho* – a person is a person through another person. A person is as such because s/he belongs, s/he participates, and s/he shares humanity with other humans (Tutu, 1999, pp. 34-35; Ramose, 1999, p. 36; Metz, 2019, pp. 110-120).

The English language cannot exhaust the meaning of the aforementioned maxim or aphorism. However, it operationalizes the meaning encapsulated in Ubuntu, whereby Ubuntu is a holistic platform of an African notion of humanism (Eze, 2020, pp. 250-251). Such humanism is oriented toward a communitarian ethos, which strives for harmony that can be achieved through sympathetic relations in the community (Metz, 2019, p. 119; Eze, 2020, p. 251; Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011). Mozambique's community transformational relationships cannot be achieved through bureaucratic, time-oriented, and complex liberal peace statebuilding strategies as the

political elite's negotiations reach only a mechanical solidarity stuck in both political parties political and negative peace. Within the current circumstances of political violence, Ubuntu principles of synchronic solidarity (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011), togetherness, humanness, friendliness, restorative justice, and forgiveness (Tutu, 1999; Metz, 2012; Ramose, 1999; Bujo, 2001) can be the shift needed conflict resolution in Mozambique. Therefore, in the following section, this thesis explores Ubuntu's indigenous knowledge and peacebuilding practices that can contribute to effective peacebuilding in Mozambique.

Mozambique's Ubuntu Indigenous Peacebuilding Method

The experiences and values of ordinary everyday people make them open to mobilization in the social peace process (Brewer, 2010, p. 18). Two personal experiences allowed me to theorize and reflect on why Ubuntu is critical in terms of building a viable and long-term peace in Mozambique: my work experience at United Nations, Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2019-2022) and my community engagement through religious work (2010-2014). It was at UNESCO that I understood and learned the practical meaning of liberal peace statebuilding initiatives, and I had the opportunity there to advocate for Indigenous Ubuntu values. However, I trace my deep interest in Ubuntu back to 2013. In 2012, I finished my philosophical studies at the Saint Augustine Philosophic Seminary in Maputo. In 2013 during the novitiate year,⁸ my other 11 colleagues and I started our missionary experience work with the communities of Northern Mozambique. We were hosted at the church parish research center of the Macua/ Makhuwa-

⁸ The novitiate is a year in which life in a religious Catholic institute begins. It is regulated by the Code of Canon Law. See Code of Canon Law, Admission to Novitiate. § 641 *et seq.* (1917). https://www.vatican.va/archive/cod-iuris-canonici/eng/documents/cic_lib2-cann607-709_en.html#ADMISSION_TO_THE_NOVIATIE

Xirima people (Vilanculo, 2013). The center has focused its research on the Emakhuwa cultural matrilineal group located North of the Save and Zambezi River (see Chapter Three).

The founder of the center, Father Guiseppe Frizzi (1943-2021) had been an active participant supporter of Ubuntu Indigenous knowledge in Mozambique since 1972. For instance, he published the *Xirima* – Portuguese as well as the Portuguese – *Xirima* dictionaries, and the grammar needed to improve the local literacy rate (Frizzi, 2005). Additionally, he published the bilingual anthology of biosophy as well as the biosphere Macua/ Makhuwa-Xirima languages, and the biosophy and biosphere *Xirima* (Patias, 2021; Premawardhana 2018; Brambilla, 2022). He was the only priest I knew, to whom the Macua/Makhuwa and the people of Mozambique could be Christians without renouncing their sense of Macua/ Makhuwa (Ferrão, 2021). I learned from Father Frizzi to value the Indigenous knowledge and local practices that I would later argue to be a significant part of local peacebuilding processes, first through my work at UNESCO and now as a PACS graduate student.

Mozambique's Ubuntu Indigenous peacebuilding stems from local knowledge, which inspires traditional celebrations and peacebuilding events. There is a considerable number of Ubuntu peacebuilding methods and practices located within the diversity of the country's communities. For instance, in the North of the country, *Makeya* is the *Macua/ Makhuwa – Xirima* biosophy and biosphere. It is present in all sectors of life of the *Xirima – Macua/ Makhuwa* people. It includes a traditional rite that consists of throwing sorghum flour on the ground and invoking God and the ancestors. *Makeya* acts as an element of harmony among the people as it is used in the community, for peacebuilding processes, and domestic and community reconciliation. It is festive and commemorative by its very nature. Father Guiseppe Frizzi, accompanied by three community leaders offered *Makeya* for the first time in 1989 during the civil war (Frizzi, 2016).

They invoked God and the Macua ancestors to protect them and provide them with water as they were surrounded by RENAMO forces. As a result, from January 8-13, 1989, 52 families had drinking water flowing from the wood-made baptismal font (Frizzi, 2016; Schneible, 2015; Maina, 2019). After scientific investigations, this event was classified by scientists as the “miracle of the multiplication of waters.” Surprisingly, the same event was approved by the Roman Catholic Church as a miracle for the beatification of Irene Stefani, a nun that worked with the indigenous people in Kenya and Mozambique. This is because the communities declared it to be one of the ancestors they invoked during the celebration of *Makeya*.

During colonialism and the international 1992 and 2019 statebuilding projects, the Catholic Church marginalized local cultural peace building efforts. However, the example above illustrates how indigenous practices contemplate inclusion and harmony without rejecting other parties’ values. In other words, Father Frizzi and the locals found space for local cultural expressions within Catholicism. This is radically different from what colonialism and the new post-independence elites did in the past when they rejected and marginalized local peacebuilding practices and in opening up spaces for local people to advocate for their needs (See Chapter Three).

This study does not specifically focus on Mozambique’s Ubuntu practices as they are discussed elsewhere in the literature. However, it is crucial to mention that in Southern Mozambique, *Mhamba*⁹ is one of the peacebuilding practices and ceremonies. For example, Victor Igreja (2008) and Iraê Lundin (2002) illustrate exhaustively how Ubuntu local practices, such as the *Ma/Gamba* spirits ceremonies and traditional leaders in the Center of Mozambique opened

⁹ The mhamba is one of the main celebrations of the *vatshwa* populations of Southern Mozambique. It consists of a major gathering of the clans of a certain region to invoke God and the ancestors when the community is facing challenges such as conflict, or persistent illnesses in the clan families (Amaral, 1996, p. 7; Langa, 1992; Junod, 1996). The celebration of a *mhamba* is part of the alleviation of sufferings. It can also be celebrated to thank the spirits and ancestors for the successes reached. *Mhamba* is at the same time a matter and value of the whole community, which needs to invoke and renew its prayers to acquire fortune, tranquility, and peace (Siquisse, 2006, pp. 62-79).

social spaces, facilitating restorative justice (Igreja, 2008, pp. 60-79; 2009, pp. 277-300; Igreja & Limore, 2013, pp. 181-203; Lundin, 1998). Nevertheless, indigenous knowledge has been neglected in Western decision-making milieus. Indigenous peacebuilding experienced a history of denial and neglect particularly in the post-war 1992 and 2019 liberal peacebuilding processes (Igreja, 2004, pp. 166-182; Lundin, 1998, pp. 111-115). In addition, local and traditional leaders and communities at the grassroots level were not included in both liberal peace agreements.

Following this observation, this thesis portrays Ubuntu-based and peace-inclusive processes to transform Mozambique's conflict that consider and are based on indigenous knowledge. For instance, instead of solely relying on Western democracy conflated with elections and a liberal economy with international support, it is important to place Ubuntu-embedded and guiding principles at the heart of sustainable peacebuilding. In addition, if peace agreements are to restore relationships and harmony at all levels, expensive DDRs within peace processes should embrace Ubuntu restoration, healing, and reconciliation mechanisms. An Ubuntu wisdom and peacebuilding mechanism is grounded in local and contextual values, strategies, and worldviews that can support the efforts for peace as an integral part of multi-track peacebuilding.

To illustrate this idea, the analysis in the following section aims at operationalizing Ubuntu as a guiding principle in peace actions in Mozambique that could lead to an enduring peace there. The section is framed within the libertarian paradigm of Mozambique's scholar Severino Elias Ngoenha, and (inter)culturalists philosophers such as José Paulino Castiano, Celestino Victor Mussomar, Victor Igreja, and Iraê Baptista Lundin. Ubuntu located at the grassroots level is part of the social peace or social justice that includes a communitarian and deliberative democracy, reconciliation, restorative justice, and transitional justice.

Insight into Democratic Ubuntu Peace

Reflections on Ubuntu Indigenous issues contributing to conflict transformation in Mozambique follow two approaches, namely the libertarian view and the (inter)culturalists one. The first places freedom and the struggle for liberty at the heart of its reflections. Therefore, libertarians are inspired by social justice movements like the Harlem Renaissance in NYC, and Pan-Africanism (Ngoenha, 2004, pp. 74-75; Castiano, 2015, p. 37; Rettová, 2021, pp. 35-38). Second, interculturalists explore cultural issues related to African personality and authenticity, and ethnophilosophies (Castiano, 2015, p. 39; Mucale, 2015). Therefore, culturalist topics include local knowledge, practices, and values (Castiano, 2015, p. 39; Rettová, 2021). This thesis applies both approaches that are not necessarily adversarial to clarify how Ubuntu as a democratic practice not in the Western sense of peacebuilding, is well placed to provide conflict transformation in Mozambique.

As noted in Chapter Six, the 1992 and the 2019 peace agreements only were able to negotiate cease-fires, elections, DDR and financial support to Mozambique, and not a long-term sustainable peace process. Severino Elias Ngoenha, the most notable philosopher of Lusophone Africa, argues that liberal democracy failed in Mozambique because peace processes focused on the elites (FRELIMO and RENAMO) needs as they only struggled to achieve outcomes for the ethnopolitical elites' (Ngoenha, 2011). Therefore, Mozambicans should concentrate their efforts on the conditions of democracy and social harmony, i.e., the sociocultural dimension (Ngoenha, 2011, pp. 13-45). A contextual and cultural-based democracy requires a conceived action inspired by the authentic realities of the Indigenous communities that are perceived from within (Ngoenha, 2004, 2011, pp. 34-37). Ngoenha (2011) indicates that social harmony and peace can only be achieved through a system where groups, cultures, society, and individuals are involved and can

express their needs (Ngoenha, 2011; 2019). He also adds that there are Mozambican mechanisms that can guarantee peace and social justice than representative democracy. He argues that in Mozambique, representative democracy has only promoted “*partidocracia* – partyocracy,” which is totally against the interests of the Mozambicans (Ngoenha, 2004, 2011, 2019).

The challenges facing the democratic processes in the aftermath of liberal peace are notably felt by many scholars. The way out from such difficulties can only be made possible through *demobuntocracy* (Mussomar, 2017, pp. 11-37; Mussomar, 2019, pp. 71-72). By definition, *demobuntocracy* should be understood as participative, deliberative, and inclusive democracy embedded within Ubuntu’s cultural values (Mussomar, 2019, pp. 67-80). I understand that Ubuntu solutions in contrast to liberal peacebuilding elements such as democratization should consider the contextual dynamics. However, it seems that neither Ngoenha (2011) nor Mussomar (2017) build a new reality other than naming with neologisms what is known. In addition, their proposal moves from outside-in, to inside-out, that is, their starting point is Western democracy (a Western word with Greek origin) to propose, demo – *ubuntu* (an African word and values) – cracy.

What remains true is that Western liberal democracy made up of elections and disarmament of combatants included in the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements were inadequate for creating social peace. Therefore the Mozambican communitarian local Ubuntu practice emanating from and embedded in the local culture could shape the democratic processes as part of a multi-track peacebuilding strategy to forge social peace. Including Ubuntu as part of multi-track peacebuilding requires the inclusion of local peace actors, local communities, civil society, social movements and grassroots leadership (bottom-up peace diplomacy), who by their very participation can hold the top-down peace diplomacy accountable to the people who own the peace process. Peace deals and social peace is too serious matter to leave to the national and international politicians alone.

Economic Ubuntu Alternative

Liberalization of markets through the liberal peace has placed Mozambique at a grievous fault, and this is because the satisfaction of economic interests was placed at the heart of social life and peace (Ngoenha, 2011). Contrarily, the *dollarcratization* (the power of the dollar) in Mozambique's society weakens the country's peace efforts (Ngoenha, 2006; Ngoenha, 2011, pp. 33-34). With the 1992 peace agreement, Mozambique was trapped by ultraliberal marketization carried out by large international organizations and corporations. Yet, the liberal equation has been incapable of providing peace to Mozambique (Ngoenha, 2006, pp. 125-128). Rather, the international organizations used the power of the dollar to harness the division between FRELIMO and RENAMO, as well as to govern indirectly (Ngoenha, 2011, p. 37). While the international community cannot militarily occupy Mozambique or nominate its ministers and governors, it imposes its rules and interests through the government in power (pp. 37-38).

Given these circumstances, Ngoenha (2006) argues that peace cannot endure without economic justice and social peace. There is a need for economic solidarity based on the social distribution of common goods (pp. 129-131). In fact, post-peace accord societies that neglects social distribution may face problems of the people's frustrated expectations over international aid and foreign support that in fact leaves the same level of disparity across societal social cleavages as in the past (Brewer, 2010, p. 13). At this level, Ngoenha (2006) postulates that the Ubuntu system for global justice by nature is consistent with the economy of gratuity, sharing, and distribution of common resources (Ngoenha, 2019; pp. 131-133; Mussomar, 2021, p. 18). Nevertheless, because of liberal peace strategies and following the peace agreements, Mozambique contracted an immense debt to the neoliberal trinity, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization (Mussomar, 2021). Financial support through

contracted debts was not applied for peace-related initiatives, which would contribute for peace in Mozambique. If the international support and economic debts had been applied to promote sustainable peace they would allow all groups and the Mozambican community at large proportional access to resources. The abovementioned institutions would provide individuals and groups with equal opportunities for prosperity – reducing intergroup competition and increasing economic growth by opening up markets and encouraging the free flow of goods. This would increase the avenues of peaceful conflict transformation by addressing the economic grievances between groups. However, the liberalization of markets increases gaps among the elites and between the elites and grassroots communities. Given these circumstances, it is important to apply the economy of gratuity sustained by African values and oriented by the African biosophia (Mussomar, 2021, p. 20). In this regard, *economubuntocracy* is the economic alternative to the liberalization of markets and in reducing people's grievances in Mozambique (p. 19). This is because an economy based on the Ubuntu values envisages economic exchanges without exploitation, as equilibrium and social harmony are more important than profit (p. 57).

Thus, it is crucial to note that while *economubuntocracy* and *demobuntocracy* are based on Ubuntu's cultural values then the second should precede and sustain the first. This is explained by the fact that an economic dimension (*economubuntocracy*) can be well sustained by an ethic-political dimension (*demobuntocracy*) (Mussomar, 2022). This sounds more like turning the Marxist idea of infrastructure and superstructure upside-down. Marx noted that the economic structure of society (infrastructure) should be the base sustaining the political, juridical, and ideologies of the state (superstructure) (Marx, 1972). Both Ngoenha (2011) and Mussomar (2021) have tried to operationalize Ubuntu to support social justice and contribute to building peace in Mozambique. However, the Marxist deterministic relationship between the superstructure and the

infrastructure cannot always be valid if the context and the cultural situations are overlooked. In addition, because Ubuntu is not able to subordinate the relationship between structures, agency and actors, a dialogue between the structure, agency, and societal actors would be appropriate to foster peace.

From DDR to Ubuntu Restoration, Reintegration and Reconciliation

Reintegration, Restoration, and Reconciliation (RRR) are crucial ingredients for effective peacebuilding. Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter Six, Mozambique's liberal peace contemplates DDR instead of RRR. In this Chapter Seven, building on Mozambique's culturalists scholars, we illustrate how Ubuntu can transform the conflict through RRR informed by locally rooted cultural, spiritual, and religious practices. Mozambique's culturalist scholars draw their inspiration from the Negritude movement, African ethnophilosophies, Afrocentric ideas, and Ubuntuism (Asante, 2000; Rettová, 2021, pp. 35-38; Castiano, 2015). In their theoretical starting point, culturalists criticize the libertarians who portray the Mozambicans as victims and objects of liberal peace and the liberalization of markets (Castiano, 2015). The culturalists' thesis in this regard is that Mozambicans may need to position themselves as the subject of their own history (Castiano, 2010, 2011, 2015). This can be made possible through the appropriation and institutionalization of local knowledge in peacebuilding processes (Castiano, 2010, pp. 162-178).

Following the culturalists' view, Mozambique's peacebuilding process must consider inclusive restoration and reconciliation (that are not limited to FRELIMO and RENAMO's elites). RRR must be based on indigenous and endogenous knowledge and practices (Castiano, 2021). In this regard, ceremonies and rituals conducted by communities for demobilized settings in rural areas have been crucial paths to healing and restoration (Alden, 2002, p. 353; Lundin, 2002; Igreja,

2010, 2013). For instance, the *Magamba* spirits in the Center of Mozambique were invoked by healers and traditional leaders to ameliorate local people and ex-combatants post-traumatic suffering after the civil war (Igreja, 2013). In the same vein, local religious institutions mostly syncretic faith communities engage in the process of reconciling individuals, social groups, and communities (Igreja, 2013). For example, forgiveness is a vital part of the reconciliation and Ubuntu practices that is celebrated through *Mhambas* in Southern Mozambique (Bono, 2014, pp. 189-199).

Regarding re-integration, we can identify two local Ubuntu features. First, the traditional, cultural, and spiritual integration of former combatants to their communities through *curandeiro* – where the traditional healer alleviates the ex-combatant’s spirit possessions (Igreja et al., 2010; Lundin, 1998). The second is marriage between former combatants and local women that played a critical role in their reintegration into local communities (Lundin, 1998; 2022). It also facilitated the integration of former soldiers into the broader community. Ex-soldiers entered into the traditional institution of the community, which placed them evenly within the local social web of obligations. Consequently, former combatants constitute kinship ties within local communities to the extent that they are tied into new web of relationship and bear the obligation to not go back to war but instead to protect their families and communities (Lundin, 2002; Alden, 2002, p. 353; Bono, 2014).

What is portrayed here is the natural religiosity and spirituality based on local Ubuntu knowledge, and this facilitates RRR without demanding huge resources. It is in this way that we believe that Ubuntu as culturally experienced in the communities can bring about conflict transformation in Mozambique.

Ubuntu: Weaknesses of Local Knowledge and Indigenous Peacebuilding

In the last decade or so, the interest in indigenous, traditional, and customary peacebuilding is increasing in Peace and Conflict Studies and other Social Sciences. In some cases, interest about the local goes from the demonization to glorification of local people's agency (Kappler, 2015, p. 875). The idea behind this movement is that by nature indigenous peacebuilding is participatory and based on the community's agency and structures apt to bring peace based on the local dynamics (Mac Ginty, 2008). However, scholars also warn not to romanticize Indigenous peacebuilding because it can be destructive just as it is transformative (Mac Ginty, 2008, 2011; Ombati, 2015; Eke & Byrne, 2022, pp. 315-321). Therefore, the romanticization of Indigenous peacebuilding methods such as Ubuntu should be resisted through a consistent conceptualization and analysis of existent indigenous peacebuilding mechanisms (Mac Ginty, 2011). This is because, on the one side, Indigenous processes contain a range of progressive values. On the other side, Indigenous methods and contexts may also be imbued by oppressive and unjust systems of power that marginalize minority groups (Murithi, 2008, p. 28; Surulola & Byrne, 2022, p. 320). Related to this point is the fact that indigenous patriarchal milieus have been undermining the role of women and youth in peace and peacemaking processes (Murithi, 2008, p. 28). For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, women were often considered mere tokens in peacebuilding milieus (Eke & Byrne, 2022, p. 320; Ombati, 2015; p. 637).

In the same vein, local related knowledge present in aphorisms, stories, proverbs, cultural practices, and local rituals carry constructive means and inspire elicitive peace from local knowledge through stories (Senehi, 2000, 2019, 2022; Lederach, 1997; Eke & Byrne, 2022). For instance, Ubuntu inspired a peaceful political transition after Apartheid in South Africa using the

Ubuntu reconciliation process (Tutu, 1999). Similarly, Ubuntu practices are instrumental in transforming conflicts over land and water between herders and farmers in Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabwe (Maiangwa, 2017; Shonko, 2022; Marfo et al., 2022). Likewise, Ubuntu practices in Mozambique facilitated local peace and reconciliation in Mozambique (Igreja, 2013; Lundin, 2002). Notwithstanding, local narratives and their actors may also be destructive and foster negative peace (Senehi, 2000, p. 23). For example, in Mozambique, the national and cultural narrative of eliminating tribalism to establish a nation through common national values have exacerbated the divisions as local cultural differences were ignored (Ngoenha, 2011). In addition, Tanzania's *Ujaama* was an Ubuntu-like narrative used by the leadership to harness its political power mandate and legitimacy (Ngoenha, 2011; Eze, 2020, p. 256). Moreover, the Ubuntu sharing value was used by Zimbabwean academics to justify the invasion of white-owned land by locals in racial Apartheid Rhodesia (Eze, 2020, p. 255).

Considering the aforementioned dynamics, it remains clear that Ubuntu is apt to bring about conflict transformation in Mozambique. However, Ubuntu peacebuilding and philosophy is not perfect nor can be a panacea. In addition, globalization and neocolonialism through liberal peacebuilding values continue to co-opt, disorient and challenge the Ubuntu Indigenous knowledge and peacebuilding mechanisms (Santos, 2014, pp. 189-191; Castiano, 2011, pp. 193-206; Eze, 2000, pp. 257-259). As result, Ubuntu Indigenous peace tends to be also exclusive, discriminatory, and it has emulated violence. Local leaders tend to be corrupt and co-opted by liberal peacebuilding structures and on some occasions promote destructive statebuilding. This is because when local civil-society leaders and organizations are funded by international organizations they tend to hold the local leadership and institutions accountable in destructive criticisms that fuels violence (Paffenholtz, 2015). To overcome this issue some scholars, argue that

hybrid peacebuilding approaches (liberal and indigenous peacebuilding) can be a solution (Mac Ginty, 2011). This thesis however, argues that the solution lies in locating Ubuntu as part of multi-track peacebuilding rather than forcing cooperation on the local through hybridity as the power and resources still rest with the international actors. In addition, as a significant part of multi-track peacebuilding, Mozambique's Ubuntu must focus on fostering unity, justice, ethics, and education. These ingredients must be informed by Ubuntu local knowledge as they are compatible with it. Unity will foster cohesion and cooperation among the people. Justice will foster the institutions and eliminate exclusion. A system of ethics will be able to ameliorate corruption, and education will act to nurture, preserve, and communicate the Ubuntu values, practices, and methods throughout the generations.

Mozambique's Ubuntu and the Liberal Peacebuilding: The Inadequacy of Hybrid Peacebuilding

Hybrid forms of peace include a combination of international blueprints for the liberal international community and local socio-historical dynamics of conflict (Richmond, 2015, p. 52). In this regard, hybrid peace can describe a result of the interplay between external and local actors' negotiating reconciling two visions of peace (Tardy, 2014, p. 95). One vision sees peace as imposed by external actors and the other justifies peace as a purely homegrown process (Tardy, 2014, pp. 95-96). When exploring the liberal peace (that Chapter six found to be inadequate within Mozambique's context) and Ubuntu indigenous peacebuilding it may appear that both peacebuilding approaches are not that different from each other beyond the fact of being local and foreign. This may suggest a hybrid peacebuilding model that includes both the liberal peace and Ubuntu to bring a lasting peace to Mozambique. However, the analysis of Mozambique's context

suggests that although the liberal peace and Ubuntu's elements (like Western democracy and demubuntocracy – communitarian democratic approach) can potentially complement each other, they are contextually different in nature. More critical is to note the tensions that emerge from such differences, which create negative peace and make the use of a hybrid peacebuilding model quasi-impossible. This is because on the one side, Ubuntu is a democratic practice that is not located in the Western sense as it is a Mozambican communitarian local practice emanating from and embedded within the local culture. On the other side, the liberal peace and the Mozambican state's Western style democratic processes lie in stark contrast to its communitarian process as "local peacebuilders have 'phronetic forms of knowledge' or important local experiences, practices, practical knowledge, and wisdom that are critically important in building sustainable peace yet are often ignored and marginalized by funders, media, and politicians" (Stanton & Kelly, 2015 cited in Byrne, 2023, p. 1).

First, if the basic principles of both peacebuilding approaches were not so different, then there could be no marginalization, and hybridity and mutual consent would be a solution for forging an effective peace process in Mozambique. However, hybridity cannot be a solution because international interventions favour and put at the center one type of agency and international organizations over the other national and local actors (Richmond, 2015, pp. 52-53). For example, Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement asserts that "the United Nations should assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilization process" (p. 29). Similarly, the 2019 Maputo Accord favored international community negotiations and noted that, "the present accord should be implemented with the support of the international community" (p. 2). In addition, with specific mention of the role of international professionals, the

accord affirms, for instance, that the UN personal envoy should be responsible for negotiating the dialogue between RENAMO and FRELIMO and the implementation of the Accord (p. 4).

As a result, the marginalization of the local actors by the international actors can make hybridity impossible or can produce hybrid negative peace (Richmond, 2015, p. 51). This is because positive peace implies significant agency legitimacy that emerges from the local context, and a more hybrid form would require a representative of contextually rooted processes and actors that co-participate in addressing the political and social injustices of the conflicting parties (Mac Ginty, 2010). Related to this point is the fact that the liberal peace requires the political elites and not the local leaders and their constituencies consent (Randazzo, 2021, p. 143). For instance, the 1992 General Peace Agreement insisted that “the Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall submit a formal request to the United Nations for its participation in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement” (p. 37). This lack of local consent stems partly from cultural identity insensitivity on the part of the external actors and their unwillingness to alleviate pressing needs through the inclusion of local grassroots actors (Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 56). Consequently, liberal interventions and their aforementioned implementations suffer from a local legitimacy deficit as statebuilding processes are implemented where there is a lack of local representation due to the marginalization of local actors (Mac Ginty, 2014). Consequently, this makes hybridity impossible and only creates negative peace in the political realm as there is no reception of liberal values in Mozambique.

Second, during colonialism (as discussed in Chapter Two) and both the 1992 and 2019 liberal peace agreements (Chapter Six), local and indigenous knowledge, and cultural and contextual wisdom were rejected in decision-making and in the peacebuilding process (Autesserre, 2021; Igreja, 2010). Statebuilding efforts that are not immersed in local knowledge and wisdom

are more likely to be ineffective as Mozambique's case illustrates. The 1992 Peace Agreement and the 2019 Maputo Accord didn't include community healing practices aside from the DDR processes. This fact represents a possible conflict between global (DDR) and local Reintegration, Restoration, and Reconciliation (RRR) norms. The underlying tensions between both the global and the local, where the global excludes the local continues to create negative peace in Mozambique. Social peace in Mozambique must also include Ubuntu experiences (reconciliation, reintegration, accommodation, social justice through local ceremonies) as part of multi-track peacebuilding. Otherwise, peacebuilding turns into domination and a lack of respect of local practices and identities, religion, and traditions (similar to what happened during the colonial era) will always result in negative peace or simply the absence of direct violence.

Third, the liberal peace has been characterized by its role in governing conflict societies rather than cooperating with local actors and their cultures to co-create peaceful solutions (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011). The liberal peace's obligation to include liberal rights and norms in peace agreements are not enough to bring effective peace to societies trying to navigate out of a violent past. They may only realize the external liberal peace's political agenda that excludes the local's social peace. For example, Mozambique's 1992 Peace Agreement dictates that, "the parties undertake to guarantee throughout the national territory the exercise of democratic rights and freedoms by all citizens as well as the performance of party work by all political parties" (p. 37). I acknowledge that the exercise of freedoms is important in all societies including in Mozambique's society. However, forcing Western values and rights on people doesn't fit well in the Mozambique's post-peace accord environment, where meeting local people's basic human needs are the basic condition for exercise of their freedoms rather than kowtowing to the mirage of liberal values.

After conflict, local communities long to have their basic human needs (food, health care, education, shelter, jobs) met, rather than engaging in civil rights, voting in elections, or participating in political parties. Disregarding people's basic human needs has made international emergency humanitarian aid ill-equipped to provide for their local needs (Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 60). This is because when local needs are not included in peace processes as political freedoms then the material rights of local communities are undermined, and their enjoyment of peace dividends are neglected. Consequently, inflicting external rights on the people while excluding their basic human needs indicates that hybrid peacebuilding models are indeed problematic. In addition, liberal peace institutions can make Civil Society Organizations weaker escalating tensions and frictions among them as they are co-opted to make the government accountable and apply the liberal peace agenda in exchange for financial support, which perpetuates a dependent relationship (Ngonha, 2023; Chiziane, 2023). In Mozambique, most CSO's depend financially on external international organizations and agencies, which means that they have to comply with international statebuilding liberal values and standards to access the funds, and they are not funded to promote local people's ideas about making peace and rebuilding war torn societies (Richmond, 2015, p. 54). In this context, a hybrid liberal and local model would reveal and distort existing power relations and imbalances that the subaltern, i.e., local CSO's cannot modify because their actual power is rather limited (Bhabha, 1994, p. 330). In addition, CSO's might engage in a negative dialogue with the government that might reproduce violence between the different actors as it has done in Mozambique.

Fourth, peacebuilding hybrid theorists have noticed that there is a cognitive injustice and epistemicide because Global North epistemologies fail to recognize Global South epistemologies (de Sousa Santos, 2014). For example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) states with regards to

the legitimatization of knowledge that modern Western thinking consists of rigorous lines of distinction between Northern and Southern epistemologies, and the lines of separation are so radical to the extent that the other side (the Global South) vanishes, becomes inexistent, and is regarded by the Global North as such (pp. 189-191). The Global North fails to recognize the diversity of knowledge in the Global South through which peoples shape their existence (de Sousa Santos, 2014).

Given these circumstances, Indigenous peoples may consider saving their pieces of knowledge from devastation as they adopt strategies that facilitate recovery, survival, development, and production of knowledge (Smith, 1999, p. 109). To materialize these strategies, Indigenous scholars should be engaged in turning the spaces of marginalization into spaces from which hope and resistance can spring forth (Thambinathan & Kinsella 2021, pp. 5-9). Both the epistemicide promoted by Western liberal values and the protective mechanisms that reside in local wisdom and cultural knowledge can make the cooperation between the liberal peace and Ubuntu peacebuilding tense and unbalanced. Given the fact that empathy, inclusion, and emancipation, which are required for peacebuilding hybridity are hard to be achieved, the Ubuntu indigenous epistemology and practice can be downgraded and sidelined by external actors. To achieve social peace, therefore, Ubuntu could act effectively within a multi-track peacebuilding process (that includes government, professional conflict resolution, business, private citizens, research, training and education, activism, religious leaders, funding, and public opinion and communication) because it is grounded in local culture and wisdom, and it is supported by local actors and organizations that are entrenched in nurturing peace from below.

Ubuntu as Part of the Multi-Track Peace Diplomacy: Unity, Justice, Ethics, and Education

Introducing peacebuilding in societies caught up in endemic violent conflict is complex because aside from the subjective and objective elements of conflict (for e.g., polarized political interests, fear, distrust, disempowerment, and a low rate of intermarriages) the root causes of the conflict stem from the intersectional relationship of political, economic, demographic, psycho-cultural, historic, and religious forces (Byrne & Carter, 1996). In Chapter three we noted that the analysis of conflict and peacebuilding in Mozambique requires a multi-level and multi-modal because multi-track peacebuilding is able to address a broad range of the conflict's root causes (Byrne & Keashly, 2000, p. 97). Consequently, the Ubuntu indigenous peacebuilding model is a significant part of the multi-track model because it is rooted in local settings and it also embraces the grassroots level as part of the social peace or social justice that includes reconciliation, restorative justice, and transitional justice. Given the complexities of peacebuilding, Ubuntu can only be effective if it is included as a critical part of the multi-track peacebuilding process.

Clarifying the idea of multi-track peacebuilding, Jean Paul Lederach (1997) identifies actors and peacebuilding foci to assist peacebuilding efforts. The first is the top leadership, which consists of military, political, economic, and religious leadership with high visibility. They are involved in high/level negotiations and negotiating cease-fires. Second is the middle range leadership that includes ethnic and religious leaders, government and intellectual leaders, and humanitarian and non-government organizations leaders. Their contribution includes being an integral part of problemsolving workshops, conflict resolution trainings and peace commissions. Finally, the grassroots leadership, which consists of local leaders, leaders of Indigenous non-government organizations, community developers, local health officials, refugees, and grassroots leaders. The grassroots leadership includes local peace commissions, grassroots trainings,

prejudice reduction activities and psycho-social work in addressing post war trauma (Lederach, 1997; Stobbe, 2019, p. 442). Similarly, Diamond and MacDonald (1996) argue that building peace requires the inclusion of different institutions, individuals, communities, and activities. Therefore, at least nine tracks namely, government, non-government, funding, communication and media, professional business, religion, private citizens, research, training and education, and activism among others (Diamond & MacDonald, 1996, pp. 2-5).

As far as Mozambique's peacebuilding processes are concerned, the 1992 and 2019 Peace Agreements provided a lot of attention to international peacebuilding and top leadership or track-one diplomacy (government, military, political and religious leaders). This is because the 1992 General Peace Agreement was negotiated, mediated, and observed by military, political and religious leaders. For instance, Mario Raffaelli, Representative of the Government of Italy, Archbishop Jaime Gonçalves, Andrea Ricardi, Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Saint Egidio were the mediators that were instrumental in that process (p. 4). Consequently, the consensus reached among these mediators only promoted a political and negative peace. The 1992 Agreement states that there, "is a need to send the United Nations team to Mozambique to monitor the implementation of the agreement until the holding of general elections" (p. 2). This illustrates how the international top leadership was favored for implementing the Agreement that excluded the plurality of local actors that can contribute to peacebuilding. It is within these circumstances that the philosophy and local wisdom of Ubuntu could sustain Mozambique's local structures through an indigenous peacebuilding mechanism that can enact peace from below.

Peacebuilding requires the participation of grassroots individuals, groups, and activities working with others at various levels (Lederach, 1997). Therefore, Ubuntu, which embodies humanness (the essence of each human being including selfness and a commitment to one's group

and community) can shape, enhance and work with liberal peace statebuilding processes within a multi-track peacebuilding that cooperates to transform local and national problems in a systemic way. In contrast with the liberal peace, which only sustained political peace in Mozambique, Ubuntu embodies gentleness, hospitality, empathy, deep kindness, and compassion and can fit into the overall peace system (Mangena, 2023). Granted utilizing a multi-track peacebuilding model depends on the goodwill of FRELIMO and RENAMO's political elites. However, the global powers can use a carrot and stick method, i.e., providing resources and threatening to use power, to get the political elites to comply with the Mozambican people's wishes. After negotiating a future cease-fire and political agreement in Mozambique, Ubuntu can be an integral part of a multi-track sustainable social peace transforming the subjective and interpersonal elements of conflicts by including local traditions and peace practices, celebrations, trauma healing, storytelling, and reconciliation (Senehi, 2022).

This is not to over-romanticize the Ubuntu indigenous peace process and Indigenous communities as they are not perfect, and they have their limitations and challenges (Mac Ginty, 2010; Murithi, 2008, p. 28). On some occasions, local communities resist corrupt local leaders and officials more than they do for international agencies and organizations (Paffenholz, 2015).

Ubuntu communities' limitations can be portrayed in different ways. For instance, when I was working at UNESCO as a communication and information officer, my tasks included tracking the occurrences of the persecution of people with albinism, and journalists. This is because, until recently, the persecution of people with albinism in Mozambique's rural areas, where Ubuntu practices are also rooted, was a serious concern for the government and the international community (Ero, 2021, pp. 25-37). Therefore, I was also part of UNESCO's efforts to tackle the issue through resource mobilization and social media campaigns (*Nações Unidas*, 2021). This

experience compelled me to question why such a conundrum exists in Ubuntu Mozambican communities, where values such as solidarity, togetherness, and humanness characterize the community life. In fact, Ubuntu is an African and Mozambican inherent worldview that encapsulates a set of values that can constructively address conflict and establish peace. If so, why are Ubuntu conflicting and contradictory events taking place in Ubuntu-related milieus? Other questions I have considered included: Why and how are issues taking place related to an underlying schism among Ubuntu tribes? How is this violence and ostracization directed against single women, disabled individuals, people with albinism, and those practicing witchcraft in Ubuntu societies (Eze, 2020, p. 256)? There may not be an answer. However, guided by the previous chapters' reflections and the diversity of scholarship on Ubuntu I propose a reiteration of the following. First, the liberal peace, globalization, and neocolonialism continue to challenge Ubuntu's cultural values, methods, and practices (Eze, 2020, p. 257). This is because globalization and neocolonialism encourage the disappearance of knowledge from the Global South classifying it as barbaric and primitive (Santos, 2014, pp. 189-191; Castiano, 2010, 2011; Eze, 2020, p. 257).

Second, neocolonialism practiced through liberal peacebuilding and its politics, "institutionalizes a complex morbid denigration of the other" (Eze, 2020, p. 257). This contributes to a pattern of subjective development in which the local people understand themselves to be inferior assimilating external processes of disorientation. In addition, local people start to despise their cultural values as substandard compared to those of the neocolonial actors. Consequently, the natives accommodate the logic of inferiority as their identity (Eze, 2020, p. 258; Ngoenha, 1993, 2011), and this encourages them not to respect their culture and cultural values. Added to the aforementioned reasons, is the fact that liberal peacebuilding destroys and replaces the system of values with other imposed Western values and practices. Moreover, the new markets and

international financial support face local actors with new challenges such as corruption, greed, and power fights. Given these circumstances, this thesis proposes that Ubuntu leaders, scholars, and practitioners who are part of the multi-track peacebuilding must pay attention to the role of unity, justice, ethics, and education in order to strengthen Ubuntu values in the communities.

Unity

In unity lies the strengths to overcome the division among communities with a diversity of cultural expressions, values, and languages. The libertarian movement affirms that unity was the cornerstone of Mozambique's liberation struggle toward independence. As so, libertarians currently argue that peace can only prevail when there is unity in the communities (Ngoenha, 2011). Libertarians recall the unified view of Africa's liberation struggle that included leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Nkwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and Amílcar Cabral of Bissau-Guinea. For instance, Mondlane's unity view (1975) led to the amalgamation of the three movements (see Chapters Two and Six) that formed FRELIMO (Mondlane, 1969; Ngoenha, 2009; 2011). In Krumah's vision (1963), Africans must unite to stand firmly together against international imperialist forces, which fuel division and make African countries such as Mozambique embroiled in war (pp. 132-149). In addition, the unity of the communities must be used to exorcise every vestige of contending interests and balkanization (p. 193).

Thus, Ngoenha posits that Mozambique's colonial process was in part possibly due to internal divisions and Portugal's "divide and rule" strategies (Ngoenha, 2011, 2014). However, the history of the liberation struggle shows that when the communities are united then they can achieve more (Ngoenha, 2011, pp. 13-43). To this end, it is important to promote critical spaces

of dialogue, solidarity, and reconciliation. For instance, political parties and community leaders may be adversaries, but they are not enemies, and they can choose not to hold a grudge because of one's ethnic belonging or the international support they receive (Ngoenha, 2011). Rather, they should focus on opening up reconciliation and mutual understanding spaces (Ngoenha, 2011, p. 40). By grounding peace within Ubuntu practices, Mozambique's societies and their leaders may not neglect efforts to foster unity and integration as Ubuntu is by definition inclusive. This implies that they hold respect for people's human dignity and the diversity and particularities of each group. This is fundamental to achieving the deeper meaning of Ubuntu, which is the iconography of the rainbow nation (Ngoenha, 2006). Unity, integration, and reconciliation must always be the aims of Ubuntu-based justice.

Justice

Peace can only endure with social justice. There is no peace without social justice. Consequently, Ubuntu peace methods and their actors must be vigilant to the conditions that can secure Ubuntu-based restorative and social justice instead of procedural justice. Mozambique's traditional courts must foster the application of Ubuntu restorative justice in legal and related-court cases even though it has less power in decision-making processes (Ngoenha, 2006). In contrast to retributive justice, which adds suffering to the indicted (Green, 2010; Murphy, 2015), Ubuntu-based restorative justice must pursue the aims of re-uniting the people, re-integrating the indicted, and the victims to their communities (Ngoenha, 2006; Tutu, 1999; Metz, 2010, 2016). The local Ubuntu justice system must not overlook its mission, which is submitting punitive justice to reconciliation. In this context, the public recognition of perpetrator's wrongful acts, the penance

allotted to them, and their willingness to re-integrate into Ubuntu (community, humanity) is a fundamental condition to reknit social relations and networks (Ngoenha, 2011, 2006).

Community leaders, juridical actors, and everyone involved from the community should contribute to the kind of Ubuntu-related justice that is expected, that is, the justice of the “dressmaker” (Ngoenha, 2019). This means that community leaders and juridical actors should pay attention to their role as the “dressmakers” that stitch the community’s social fabric with patience, self-denial, and courage (Ngoenha, 2019). This is because the social fabric (community) needs to be reknitted that includes a lot of thread and embroidery to endure the wrong social pressures (Ngoenha, 2011, pp. 73-74; Ngoenha, 2006, pp. 129-131; Ngoenha, 2019). The solidification of the social fabric can only be fostered by the just economic distribution of common goods and having less corrupt and unjust institutions in the society such as patriarchy that exclude women and youth in peacebuilding and reconciliatory circles (Ombati, 2015, p. 637; Tursunova, 2014, p. 27; Eke & Byrne, 2022). In this regard, it is crucial to validate Ubuntu’s ethics and moral values against corruption and any other moral ills that erode Ubuntu communities.

Ethics

Modernity and globalization have been followed by a crisis of human values, and this also affects Mozambique’s communities. In 2019, Severino Elias Ngoenga (libertarian paradigm) and José Castiano (intercultural paradigm) published a book titled *Manifesto: Por uma terceira via* (*Manifest: For a third way*). They argue that Mozambique is experiencing a desolation and dissolution of Ubuntu’s moral values (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2019, p. 3). Their thesis is that in the first wave (From Mozambique’s independence to 1990’s) – Socialism – the country had no freedoms, but there was a sense of social justice. The second wave (1990’s to date) – liberal

democracy and marketization, means that freedoms are to some extent respected. However, Mozambique lacks social justice. Moreover, the liberalization of markets reinforced deviant behavior in the public milieus, such as embezzlement of the public treasury¹⁰, corruption, individualism, and competition (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2019, p. 54; Ngoenha, 2019; Mazula, 2005, pp. 64-65). The race for the dollar and unjust accumulation of wealth marked the second wave (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2019, p. 54). In these circumstances, conditions for peace imply a third wave and this should be characterized by the social justice and reconciliation of the Mozambican people (p. 54). In the same vein, Brazão Mazula (2005), the ex-rector of Eduardo Mondlane University, notes that with marketization it is believed that honesty and hard work throw the just people into misery, while wealth emboldens the unjust people (pp. 65).

In these circumstances, we argue that communities and their leaders must place their attention on Ubuntu's ethical values to resist liberal economic ills such as corruption. The Ubuntu principle of "a person is a person because of another person" nurtures the ethical values that may lead to social justice (Tutu, 1998; Menkiti, 1998; Ramose, 1998). In addition, Ubuntu's ethical basis encourages a sense of togetherness among people and prevents economic stratification, and power imbalances that lead to divisions and ill-will (Metz, 2016, p. 21; Metz, 2019, pp. 119-120). I also believe that peace education based on Ubuntu values, as well as the introduction of Ubuntu values in the school's curricula may also help to foster unity, justice, and ethics.

¹⁰ The 2019 "hidden debts scandal" are the most noted case of corruption in history of Mozambique's economy. See Cortez et al., (2019). *Costs and consequences of the hidden debt scandal of Mozambique*. CIP. https://www.cipmoz.org/old_new/2021/05/27/costs-and-consequences-of-the-hidden-debt-scandal-of-mozambique/

Education

Education had been portrayed as a powerful weapon to transform individuals, and societies and transmit positive social values (Boulding, 2000). However, the discourse about the kind of education to foster peace in the mind of women, men, and those living in conflict-prone environments remains open. I believe that peace education based on local knowledge and Ubuntu values may contribute to peace, and this is because Ubuntu is, by its definition, a system of values that prioritize social harmony, solidarity, tolerance, humanness, and togetherness (Tutu, 1998; Ramose, 1998; Ngoenha, 2014).

In Mozambique, an *Emakhuwa* proverb states, “*Muthu murimawe*” – meaning the person is his heart. Following this, Mussomar (2021) argues that the education of women and men in Mozambique should focus on their hearts (pp. 177-183). This is acceptable if we consider that to achieve and share Ubuntu it is necessary to educate the heart of the people through stories as well as listening to the needs of the community. However, we argue that the education of women and men’s minds may help to dismantle unjust structures through critical reasoning. In addition, the *muthu* should be educated to be aware of the differences and how to live with others, and this is because “a person being a person through another person” (Tutu, 1998) is an invitation to interculturality (Castiano, 2021). While engaged in a web of relationships and interconnectedness with others, the *muthu* is also invited to pay attention to the risks of globalization and modernity. That is, the *muthu* must share her/his humanness with the world, without losing her/his Ubuntu-based cultural values that foster social harmony and peace.

Conclusion

Indigenous peacebuilding, which is rooted in local principles, methods, and practices must be adapted to eliminate the root causes of local conflict. Chapter Seven concludes that Ubuntu as the indigenous peacebuilding located at grassroots and part of multi-track peacebuilding has potential to transform conflict in Mozambique. This is because Ubuntu is consistent with Mozambique's resources and conditions for peace, that is, Ubuntu – “a person is a person through another person” – implies a sense of togetherness, humanness, and forgiveness. These values constitute the critical ingredients needed to empower local people's agency to work for social harmony. In Mozambique, these values are embedded in indigenous practices such as *Makeya*, *Mhamba*, and *Magambas*.

It is following the relevance of these peacebuilding practices that this chapter envisions that local and Ubuntu-based peacebuilding models can be adapted into an overall conflict transformational process to finally end the political violence and bring peace to the people. In fact, I believe that *demobuntocracy* – a deliberative, participative, and inclusive communitarian democracy practice would sustain the social contract and instill harmony between Mozambicans. In order to do so, peace processes in Mozambique have to recall the conflict root causes and the liberal statebuilding initiatives in lieu of peacebuilding. For instance, this thesis notes that the economic gaps imposed by the liberal peace through the liberalization of markets can only cease with the Ubuntu economic model that embodies solidarity and sharing. In addition, peacebuilding local mechanisms related to RRR led by the communities and their leaders are more appropriate for peacebuilding than costly externally imposed elections, international support, and DDR processes.

We recognize that given the complexity of local issues related to patriarchy, unjust structures, political violence and peace processes Ubuntu cannot be a panacea. Ubuntu communities, actors, leaders, and peace practices should be regarded as part of multi-track peacebuilding in order to bring social and justice in Mozambique. In addition, to overcome the Ubuntu communities vicissitudes, this thesis introduces the idea that Ubuntu societies, their leaders must, as well as international organization leading statebuilding processes, should strive to preserve unity, uphold justice, and maintain ethics through education. As the matter stands, unity is crucial for the integrity of society, and to keep a person bound to another person avoiding divisions from the outside. Justice is fundamental to rebuild social relations through trust-building, to facilitate forgiveness, and create the conditions leading to social harmony. Similarly, Ubuntu ethics and moral values lead to social justice when the society is safe from liberal economic ills such as corruption. Education will assist in decolonizing the society through the transformation of individuals while also supporting the transmission of Ubuntu values to the people. Overall, Mozambique's conflict transformation process must be informed by Ubuntu's indigenous cultural-rooted values. Otherwise, peacebuilding initiatives are doomed to repeated unsuccessfulness without removing the underlying and contextual root causes of Mozambique's political violence.

CHAPTER 8 – Conclusion

Introduction

As we reach the conclusion of this Master's thesis, in this section we summarize the thesis main points. In the Chapter One, we announced the objectives of this study, including the research issues that this thesis explored. In addition, we outlined the abstracts of the other chapters in this research project. In Chapter Two, we analyzed the context that characterized colonial Mozambique, which influences the ongoing conflict. Chapter Three focused on the root causes of Mozambique's conflict using the social cubism analytical model. Chapter Four highlighted the relevant literature review as the study was framed under social cubism, liberal peacebuilding, Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP), Indigenous peacebuilding, and Ubuntu. Critical Qualitative Methodology (CQM) and autoethnography was applied in this study were discussed in Chapter Five. In Chapter Six liberal peace enacted through the 1992 and 2019 peace agreements was surveyed to illustrate the unsuccessfulness of the statebuilding processes in Mozambique. CEP was employed to critique the top-down liberal peace strategies that did not transform the Mozambican conflict. In Chapter Seven, Indigenous peacebuilding through the Ubuntu as part of the multi-track peacebuilding was highlighted as an appropriate indigenous peace method to transform Mozambique's conflict. Chapter Eight summarized the key findings in the thesis and pointed out future areas of research.

Key Findings

In most cases, research is motivated by problem-solving objectives. This study envisaged addressing primary and secondary queries that stem from the existence of Mozambique's violent

conflict. Primarily, the thesis inquired about the rationale behind the violent conflict and the placed Ubuntu as an adequate approach to transform the conflict. Secondary questions included the relationship between colonialism and conflict, an analysis of the nature of the drivers of Mozambique's conflict, and the inefficiency of the liberal peace process applied there. In this connection, the core findings of this thesis arise regarding to the impact of colonialism and the conflict's root causes, the liberal top-down peace process, and the Ubuntu bottom-up approaches in Mozambique. Accordingly, the key findings are threefold:

The first key finding is that the long war in Mozambique is tied to the damages created by colonialism. This is because the long history of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique (1500-1975) has politically, economically, and culturally impaired the country and damaged the people. For instance, at the political level, the violence that the Portuguese used to rule the country was and is used by FRELIMO and RENAMO political elites to govern the country. Likewise, violence characterizes and influences the political elites' engagement in Mozambique's wars. Moreover, grudges between Mozambique's political elites were nurtured by the Portuguese colonial power through the unequal distribution of privileges among people from Southern (mostly privileged) and Northern (under-privileged) regions of Mozambique. This is because, loyal groups were assimilated, and provided educational opportunities and some power by the colonial regime. As a result, marginalized groups during the colonial experience remained marginalized even after independence. This continues to nurture and fuel violence and schisms between powerful and powerless political elites. This marginalization is extended into the economic and cultural levels, where structural violence takes place in the form of the exclusion of minorities and the dominant prevents disloyal party individuals from accessing resources and economic opportunities. In this regard, the analysis of the colonial and the current violent situation uncovers that, although the

colonizers were expelled, the actions embedded within colonialism such as power elites exploiting minorities, and “black exploiting black” continue (Azagaia, 2013; Macamo, 2016). This endorses the fact that Mozambique’s political violence is an inheritance of colonialism.

The second important key finding is that liberal top-down peace approaches only managed Mozambique’s political conflict between the parties, but they were not successful to bring social peace. The reason for this is that the 1992 and 2019 liberal peace agreements and strategies enacted in Mozambique through elections, financial support, and DDR were consistent with statebuilding instead of peacebuilding. Therefore, violence still characterizes the elites’ inter-relations because social peace at grassroots level was not introduced. In fact, elections, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) somehow benefitted the elites but did not eliminate the root causes of the conflict. Consensus between elites in the two abovementioned agreements did not mean consensus among Mozambique’s population. Hence, the liberal peace was unsuccessful in securing the inclusion of the communities in the peace settlements that resulted in the failure in reconciling the communities. Taking this into account, it remains obvious that liberal peacebuilding will hardly succeed unless it includes the local and cultural dynamics (Richmond, 2007). In the case of Mozambique, this means that (liberal) peace approaches must embrace Ubuntu as the guiding principle for peacebuilding and the communities in peace processes. This brings us to the third key finding of this thesis, which is related to Ubuntu’s contextual dynamics.

Another finding that stands out from this research is that Indigenous knowledge and wisdom are imbued by comprehensive practices able to transform Mozambique’s conflict. This is because Ubuntu – “We are because of others” – is by nature inclusive, embedded in the culture of the people, and it invokes togetherness (Tutu, 2002; Ngoenha, 2019; Ramose, 2022). Following this, Ubuntu peace can act the guiding principle for peace processes. In addition, it can endure as

it is not dependent on the political elites only, but to everyone together. For instance, looking at the Restoration, Reintegration, and Reconciliation (RRR) *Magamba*, *Makeya*, and *Mhamba* ceremonies in the aftermath of the civil war (Lundi, 2022; Igreja, 2013), we can contend that Ubuntu is able to transform Mozambique's conflict.

In contrast to liberal top-down peace approaches, which did not emphasize facilitating reconciliation in Mozambique, Ubuntu practices place forgiveness and reconciliation at the heart of peace processes (Ngoenha, 2019; Igreja, 2013). As far as reality shows, individual and collective reconciliation is fundamental to healing individuals and "re-stitching" the social fabric (Lederach, 2010, pp. 202-206; Ngoenha, 2019). In this regard, following the unsuccessfulness of liberal peace agreements, which excluded the cultural and local dynamics, Ubuntu can transform Mozambique's conflict by embodying cultural, and local knowledge and principles. However, it is important to note that, Ubuntu alone cannot solve the conflict due its contextual limitations, and the complexities of violence and peace. However, it can introduce social peace from below as part of the multi-track peacebuilding diplomacy.

Future Research

The situation of Mozambique's political violence is evolving. New violent dynamics arise. Therefore, analysis of the queries and factors that determine the conflict, as well as the approaches to address it are open-ended. As far as this thesis is concerned, future research may consider exploring the impact of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. Second, future studies may also take more variables into account as new conflicts are more complex when compared to those studied here. Third, future investigations, may assess the risks of the exclusion of local cultural

dynamics in peace processes. In addition, future research may explore addressing the challenges faced by Ubuntu due to globalization.

Regarding colonialism, the thesis noted that Mozambique's violence can be traced back to colonialism. However, the motions of Mozambique's colonialism are still in need of further research. Undoubtedly, the colonizers do not completely leave their ex-colonies. Therefore, it is important to look at the role of ex-colonizers in the Mozambique's current conflict. In addition, looking at issues of coloniality, and neo-colonial structures that marginalize local knowledge and wisdom fueling violence may provide more new insights into the impact of colonialism on terrorism, and insurgency in Cabo Delegado (North of Mozambique).

Considering that this thesis focused on the internal root causes of Mozambique's conflict, I believe that future reflections can contribute to understanding the current conflict and the escalating trend of violence applying broader and multimodal approaches that include international level factors and variables. Therefore, future studies may need to adopt PACS frameworks, models, and theories that clarify the role of international actors, such as the role of the diaspora and international organizations in the escalation and de-escalation of Mozambique's conflict.

Future investigations may consider assessing the risks of the exclusion of local communities' cultural dynamics from peace processes. In connection with this point, it is crucial to raise awareness that peace can only be achieved if all societal constituencies are involved. In this regard, new exploratory case studies may need to tackle the shortcomings of (liberal) peace approaches. In addition, neo-liberal structures overwhelm, challenge, and hamper the Ubuntu Indigenous structures from functioning. For instance, there are emergent deviant behaviors such as the corruption, and prosecution of people with albinism in Ubuntu communities as well as the exclusion of women and other marginalized communities like women, disabled people, ex-

combatants, youth, and LGBTQIA+ people in peace processes (Ngoenha & Castiano, 2011, 2019). Therefore, future analysis may consider the implications of this behavior and how to strengthen the Ubuntu values against the odds of globalization and neo-colonialism, such as the dollarization of life, which divert the Ubuntu communities from their cultural values.

Conclusion

Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) provides a wide range of tools to deal with conflicts. However, effective conditions for the tractability of civil wars, which characterized the post-Cold War, may vary according to the categories of space and time in which each conflict evolves. This Master's thesis explored Mozambique's context embroiled in a violent conflict and argued that Ubuntu can contribute to the tractability of the conflict. The inclusion of Ubuntu as part of the multi-track diplomacy for peacebuilding was facilitated by the analysis of the root causes of the conflict, and a critique of the liberal peace strategies enacted in Mozambique. From context examination, colonialism is an enduring driver of conflict, as national elites are somewhat as violent as the colonial system ever was. Equally, the employment of the social cubism analytical model enabled us to conclude that the exclusion of underrepresented elites from power by dominant elites as well as their unequal access to resources between the aforementioned groups are the sources of Mozambique's conflict.

Connected to this point is the fact that the conflict also stems from stereotypical relations between the North and the South of Mozambique. Assessment of the liberal peace agreements signed by the elites to end Mozambique's civil wars disclosed that elections without power-sharing did not secure peace. Similarly, humanitarian assistance, and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) were limited conditions of Mozambique's negotiated peace. Therefore, the

liberal peace did not endure in Mozambique. Consequently, this thesis discussed Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding (CEP), which critiques the liberal top-down approach and opens up space for bottom-up approaches. In these circumstances, this research noted that Ubuntu Indigenous peace methods have “seminal reasons” for leading to enduring peace. Ubuntu, which is based on community values of togetherness, humaneness, and solidarity is appropriate to transform Mozambique’s conflict. However, this thesis also noted that Ubuntu is not perfect, and continues to be challenged by globalization. Thus, this study proposed that Ubuntu communities should cherish unity, justice, ethics, and education to counteract globalization’s new dynamics.

The key finding of this study also includes the following: First, Mozambique’s conflict is embedded within the people’s experience of colonialism. Second, liberal peacebuilding has shown an inadequacy to eliminate the conditions of Mozambique’s conflict. Third, Ubuntu is an appropriate Indigenous method to transform Mozambique’s conflict. In this regard, future research may consider looking at the linkages between Mozambique’s conflict and coloniality. Also, it is crucial to apply models that envisage understanding the role of international factors in national conflicts. In addition, it is urgent to increase our awareness about the damages of liberal peace approaches that exclude local cultural wisdom, practices, and demands. Overall, this Master’s thesis concluded that Mozambique’s peacebuilding efforts must be an Ubuntu-based peacebuilding enterprise because external (liberal) peace approaches that do not include local cultural practices actors and resources will find it hard and challenging to establish peace.

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