LORING CHRISTIE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 1913-1941

BY

MICHAEL FRANK SCHEUER

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Chapter VII: "For Canada, No Commitments is the only answer..."[1]: Christie and Canadian External Policy, 1935-1939

Christie's return to the Department of External Affairs in September, 1935 coincided with the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, an affair which set the tone for the period of escalating international tensions through which he would live and work until becoming Canada's Minister to the United States four years later. Christie never believed that it would be possible to keep Canada out of the approaching war, although he considered the goal of non-participation as ideally the most appropriate Canadian response to a new European conflict. In the period between 1935 and 1939, Christie believed -- just as he had when he broke with the editorial committee of the Round Table in 1925-1926 -- that Canada confronted a situation in which it was linked inextricably to the affairs of Europe through its continuing constitutional relationship with Great Britain. His attitude toward the problem in 1935 was the same as it had been in 1926, namely, that until and unless Canadians convened a constitutional conference and decided therein to amend the British North America Act so as to give themselves complete control over the issues of peace and war, Canada would continue to be involved automatically in any war embarked upon by the British ministry of the day.[2] The constitutional ties between the two countries, Christie contended, could not be dismissed as "legal niceties" or "legal technicalities." "I think some of my friends regard me as being what they are pleased to think of as 'too legalistic,'" he told Frankfurter in 1938, "but I have found that this line helps to

get below the passing froth and call the turn on what will probably turn up in the end."[3] For Christie, these legal and constitutional connections between Canada and Britain prevented Canada from assuming its place as a distinct, sovereign nation. Until these links were broken, therefore, any assertion by Canada that it exercised the full powers of a responsible government was an exercise in pretense and sham.[4]

Because he believed that the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship made it legally impossible for Canada to remain neutral in the event of Britain's going to war, Christie spent the years between 1935 and 1939 devising lines of analysis and argument with which he sought to limit the commitments Canada would find itself obligated to fulfill at the outbreak of a new war. His primary approach to this goal was to focus on the external commitments made by Canada since the Great War and to try to find ways to reduce or abandon them. He also attempted to prevent the government from entering into any new commitments. As had been the case since the mid 1920s, the League of Nations was in Christie's eyes a major culprit in involving Canada in binding prior commitments because it held out the possibilty of drawing the country into a war in two separate ways. First, Canada might be called on to support the economic or military sanctions provided for under the Covenant of the League. Second, Canada might be drawn into a war as the result of Britain's undertaking some regional military action under the League's auspices. Such an event would incite Canada's small but politically influential imperialist community, which, in turn,

would arouse public opinion to the point where the government would be forced to go to Britain's assistance. Christie feared that in the latter situation Canada's imperialists would take advantage of the public's interest in the conflict, and the widely held popular notion that Canada was "morally" obligated to support the League, by injecting "all the force that is gathered around the conception 'When Britain is at war Canada is at war.'"[5] At that moment, Christie wrote with some sense of despair, "[i]t need not be imagined that statesmanship can take any effective control."[6] For both of these reasons Christie believed that Canada should withdraw from the League at the earliest possible moment.

As has been noted, Christie believed that the problems presented by the existing legal ties between Great Britain and Canada could only be dealt with and resolved through constitutional revision. The expansion of Canadian diplomatic representation abroad and the country's involvement in the affairs of various international organizations -- which he had urged since the end of the Great War as the essential complements to constitutional change -- had not by themselves been enough to ensure Canada's attainment of sovereign international status. He urged no unilateral Canadian denunciation of the existing constitutional arrangements, however, largely because he feared the potential for great internal disruption in Canada that he believed was inherent in any such action. In other areas of Anglo-Canadian cooperation, however, such as assisting Britain to recruit Canadians to serve in its armed services, providing

military training centers for those forces, or helping to facilitate the conclusion of contracts between interested British government departments and Canadian armament manufacturers, Christie fought tooth and nail to avoid arrangements that might foster new commitments for Canada. In regard to the United States, Christie also sought to avoid all commitments that might foreclose Canada's options in the future;[7] this despite the fact that he believed that the United States was a far more important factor than Britain when it came time for Ottawa to devise policies aimed at protecting Canada's national interests.

From at least the time he attended the conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs at Kingston in May, 1935, Christie believed that a new war was coming, that Canada would unavoidably play a part in it, and that the only questions open were when the conflict would begin and what sort of role Canada would play in it. Christie was never an isolationist. He did not believe that it was possible -- or desirable -- to establish a position for Canada from which it would be able to remain self-sufficient in North America and therefore able to divorce itself from world affairs generally and from the approaching war specifically. Until the outbreak of the war, Christie consistently supported arguments in favor of opening up the world trading system. He thought that this process of liberalization -- or "economic appeasement" as it was more popularly termed -- might resolve some of the economic complaints that were then sharpening political confrontations both in Europe and Asia. Likewise, he opposed economic sanctions not only

because they might lead to military sanctions and war, but also because they undermined this solvent-like property of international trade.

Indeed, so little was Christie an isolationist that in the years after his return to the Department of External Affairs he urged that Canada undertake initiatives on the world stage -- he thought it an appropriate goal for King to work for at the Imperial Conference of 1937, for example -- in support of measures aimed at increaseing the ease with which international trade could be carried on. Christie, an advocate of protection and imperial preference in 1923-24 as a means of sealing off Britain and the Empire from the European powderkeg, had by the late 1930s come to view his country as one whose economy was largely dependent on trade, and the international political system as one whose stability was strengthened by the interdependence bred by ever-increasing international trade. While he believed that Canada should develop its abundant natural resources to their full potential and thereby become self-sufficient to the extent that development allowed, he did not believe that Canada should attempt to cut itself off from the rest of the world. Isolation, like all other dogmas, was anathema for Christie because it eliminated the possibility of a flexible response and pragmatic adaptation to changing and unpredictable domestic and international events. "[W]hile isolation may be a convenient short-hand expression in conversations among 'intellectuals' who share a common conviction or emotion," he told Escott Reid in late 1936, "it is such a

loose, question-begging abstraction that to use it for the purposes of a serious contribution designed to enlighten the public is, I am sure, to render the contribution almost meaningless.[8]

Neither was Christie a neutralist. He believed that the adoption of a neutralist policy was not possible under the country's existing constitution, and, just as importantly, that such a declaration of neutrality would tear irreparably the fragile fabric of national unity.[9] Accepting the inevitability of Canadian participation in the coming war if Britain were involved in it, Christie in the years before 1939 sought to avoid all commitments that might conceivably limit Canada's freedom to decide upon the nature and extent of its involvement. For Christie, the national interest in this period could best be served by creating an environment in which, when war came, the government of the day could decide whether Canada's commitment to the war would be to the last soldier and the last dollar as in 1914, or one of a more limited nature managed so as to meet the requirements of maintaining national unity.

"Sanctions" (Swiss for "War")[10]: Getting Out of the League

The controversy over Italian actions against Ethiopia allowed Christie to present his arguments against Canadian participation in the League of Nations immediately upon his return to the Department of External Affairs. This occasion, however, was only a starting point and he would continue to flay the League in memoranda and private letters until the beginning

of the war. His opposition to Canada's remaining in the League was threefold: (a) the League of the mid-1930s was not the type of organization to which Canada had committed itself in 1919, (b) the manner in which the League currently operated was, in a world where the concept of the sovereign nation-state held the floor, a patent and dangerous political and legal absurdity; and, (c) the potential ramifications of League membership for Canada -- that is, the possibility of being involved in enforcing economic and/or military sanctions -- raised the likelihood of domestic disunity and strife of a degree endangering the country's continued existence. Not for a moment did Christie believe that there was a manner in which the League could be reformed so as to make it less threatening to Canada. "The propaganda [in favor of the League] is still going, and politicians are still fooling themselves and the people with catch phrases and equivocations," Christie wrote to Lothian in 1936. "They will yet land us in a mess needlessly and disastrously. I would resign from the League with a declaration of willingness to co-operate on non-political issues."[11]

Christie consistently believed that Canadian membership in the League would benefit the country only if the League, as an institution, developed in a way that satisfied certain specific criteria. He argued that when Canada endorsed the Covenant in 1919 it had agreed to support a plan that was "no more than a project, a statement of principles to be filled in" and that in order to have met Canadian requirements the "filling-in" process would have had to result in a League

> (a) that ... was to become a universal thing, supported by all regions of the earth, and particularly by Canada's neighbour on this continent; (b) that it was not to become an armed alliance to support the status quo established at Versailles; but (c) that by continuous co-operation and discussion it would eliminate disputes and more particularly would act as an instrument of equity to readjust the status quo under Article 19. ...[12]

"On such a basis," Christie wrote, "it might be safe [for Canada] to enter; on such a basis the thing might work or grow into something workable; but nothing less could by any chance be regarded as either safe or workable."[13] For Christie, however, such a basis neither existed nor was possible to create in 1935, and he believed that it was time for Canada to recognize those facts and to act accordingly by withdrawing. "Today, ... it is clearly seen," Christie railed,

> that as for (a) the League is not universal: the only Great Powers distinctively of the American hemisphere and the Asiatic region respectively are not supporters, the United States having declined from the outset to give the guarantees both of the Covenant and of the draft Anglo-France-American Reinsurance Treaty; while the League's essentially European character was underlined by the discovery, through the Manchurian and Chaco incidents, that the League, because of the instability of the European balance, cannot intervene in the Asiatic and American regions but, practically speaking, must remain aloof unless immediate, direct and vital European interests are involved. This is now re-underlined by this year's development of the crisis in North Africa [that is, Ethiopia] (which geographically is part of the European-Mediterranean region). We see the former Allied Great Powers acting in parallel in two capacities: in the one as the "Concert of Europe" in the traditional sense; in the other as the initiating members of the Council of the League. At one moment the "Concert" conception is uppermost; at the next there is the effort to invoke the League conception not only in Europe but to to bring in the other regions.
>
> As for (b), we see the failure of the European members to achieve a basis for co-operation that would keep Germany at Geneva; the instant recognition by the European members that the Italo-Abyssinian Affair means a European crisis, coupled with the fact that the "Concert" conversations upon

> the crisis have been confined to Great Britain, France, and Italy, with no indication of any real effort to bring Germany into the Concert; the anxieties expressed concerning the possible weakening or exhaustion of Italian energy; the stipulations by France for future support of her position in Central and South Eastern Europe -- all this and more forces the serious question whether we have not today in effect the exact opposite of the second real basis upon which Canada accepted the League, i.e., that it was not to become an armed alliance against Germany in support of the status quo.
>
> As for (c) it would be extremely difficult to convince people either that Article 19 has ever been seriously invoked to attempt equitable readjustments, or that 15 years is too short a time to have made an effort, or that there is substantial evidence that the European members of the "Concert" now mean seriously to pursue this third basis upon which the League was accepted.[14]

Christie believed that because "the League is in effect indistinguishable from an alliance of certain European Great Powers," Canada, in its own self-interest, had no choice but to withdraw from an organization in which it had many responsibilities but no control.[15] "The scene of 1919, in which we entered the League and began to conceive our position in the world, is completely changed," he concluded.[16] "It is in this revolutionary new context that we have to read our existing commitments, to decide to take unequivocal steps to withdraw from them, and to determine whether any new ones are feasible."[17] In so far as the League was concerned, Christie thought that the failure to fulfill original expectations was a more than adequate justification for Canadian withdrawal.

Christie's second objection to the League of Nations arose as a result of what he considered to be its unwillingness to recognize the fundamental incompatibility of the idea of collective security and the use of economic and/or military sanctions and the nature and requirements of the modern sovereign

state. "The Canadian Governments and -- outside a small school -- Canadians generally have known from the outset," Christie wrote,

> that the conception of 'sanctions', as among great sovereign states, is an impossible conception of human government. Their [Canadians] long experience of the principles and operation of federalism tells them it is illusory, unworkable, and has disastrous possibilities. A conception which contemplates the organisation of first class passions and wars as an instrument of human government, and implies that you can control the operation of such a system in the sense in which the operations of traditional systems of government are calculable, is to Canadians really a palpable absurdity. Europe will find it out. They will find that to establish a regime of order they will have to go on to some actual derogation of sovereignties and to something of the order of a "United States of Europe", as Mr. Briand said to the governments of that continent a few years ago. If Europe were really in earnest about the "sanctions" conception of the League, it would be really ready for something like federation. But it is harder for man to give up cherished ideas -- like those that cluster around the conception of state sovereignty -- than it is to suffer physical pains. ... "[18]

Because the world was divided into sovereign states, it was useless and dangerous for the League to behave as if they did not exist and to work from the assumption that in the Covenant "something really new has been invented."[19] "For it is in such [sovereign] state structures that the peoples everywhere are politically organised," Christie wrote, "it is these structural instruments which the delegates [to the League] represent; nothing the League has been concerned about has been touched nor can be touched except by means of these instruments; through them and only through them can any action proceed."[20]

Christie believed that the League was confusing two different systems of human management, namely "confederations, alliances or leagues of <u>states</u>, and ... true federations of

peoples." and that this confusion was a recipe for disaster.[21] In its role as an association of individual states, Christie believed, the League could provide a useful service to the international community by facilitating "peaceful joint action" between states in the form of labor, immigration, or disarmament conferences, as well as the investigation, discussion, and arbitration of outstanding international disputes.[22] So long as the League performed this kind of a role there was little harm likely to accrue to Canada from participating in its activities. "If the League can accept Canada's collaboration in [such] peaceful action," Christie wrote, "... there is room for some co-operation, otherwise Canada is automatically excluded."[23]

In the other capacity in which it had tried to function -- that of something approximating a "federation of peoples" -- Christie believed that the League had broken down irretrievably and was now a threat to Canada's interests. Through its pursuit of collective security, and the automatic obligation of member states to participate in any such collective exercise, the League was acting in defiance of the factor that, according to Christie, made the operation of federations feasible; that is, responsibility. "The system pretends to give the League responsibility for the peoples' lives and welfare," Christie wrote, "without giving it political authority over and political responsibility to the people. On such lines there can be no real power -- the citizen's loyalty being constitutionally due, not to the League, but to the state which alone he can call to account."[24] No sovereign state would or could turn over to

another authority its responsibility for making the most crucial of all decisions, that is those regarding peace and war. Such a surrender of responsibility would, in and of itself, amount to a denial or at least a derogation of the sovereignty of individual states. It was in this area, according to Christie, " -- i.e., to the extent that it has been an experiment in the broad field of [individual] state confederation -- [that] it [the League] has broken down."

> Considering experience, recent and remote, why has it broken down and why is it that it cannot be made to work? ...
>
> Because, as a confederation or alliance of sovereign states, the League in this sense has had to depend on war as its ultimate instrument of authority. War has always been the arbiter among such states. ("War": the reverse of the medal of which "sovereignty" is the obverse.) The Covenant frankly adopted this traditional last resort -- though with the conception that you might systematise it -- canalise it. All such Leagues have broken down. Why cannot you systematise war in this sense?
>
> Sovereign states will not go to war -- nor make lesser contributions of pressure or money -- together simultaneously and obey directions from outside. The [League] system contemplates a practically automatic war; but can offer no assurance -- automatic or otherwise -- that either the burdens or the fruits will turn out to have been even approximately equitably apportioned among the many peoples concerned. Such a defect is fundamental. ...
>
> The system demands that you idealise war. ... Many are indeed saying outright it would be "ideal" if every nation would agree to go to war for each nation. ... It drives them to a position where war, instead of being regarded as a human failure -- as an explosion, instinctive or otherwise, of impulsive, passionate feeling and action -- is to become an object of intensive scientific organisation. It forces them to have to assert that you can start war and all its cataclysmic passions and that you can then manage it, guide its course, stop it when you like, be reasonably sure of your "peace settlement", measurably predict and control its consequences, political and social, and so on -- that out of a process of that kind you can imagine an ordered, intelligible, predictable, workable system of human government. It drives you into a position where the common

> sense of the plain man everywhere revolts at the intellectual and moral paradoxes involved -- as we have seen this past year [1935-1936] and in similar attempts at idealisation of war throughout human experience. ...[25]

Because the concept of individual and absolute state sovereignty was the dominant feature of the postwar international organization, Christie believed that there was no point in pretending that the League had succeeded in subordinating that concept in the interest of the commonweal.[26] The League was a threat to Canada and other member states exactly in proportion to the degree to which it ignored the requirements of the concept of state sovereignty and required individual nations to put themselves in positions where their commitment to the League shifted the responsibility for decisions over peace and war to the hands of men assembled in Geneva rather than those in their own capitals. Canada simply could not afford the luxury of chancing its future survival on such a failure to appreciate the realities of world politics. "That, therefore, so long as great areas of the earth must retain their present [sovereign] political structures," Christie concluded,

> those responsible for the welfare of the people of Canada can only take and use the instruments of sovereignty entrusted to their hands as they find them. In using these instruments -- with whatever good will and enlightenment -- they must respect their limitations. They can apply only those hand to mouth expedients which are appropriate to such instruments and which, experience has shown, may on occasion be useful -- "conciliation", "arbitration", "intervention", "non-intervention", "holding the ring", and so on-- and their choice among these expedients for any given situation that may arise cannot be determined or fettered in advance. It has to await the shaping of the actual event. It has to be made in the light of such experience and information as may be available in this realm and according to the limits imposed by the special interests, position and power of the Canadian people. Such expedients can never be very successful at any period and can never offer permanent

> stability; but with the instruments available to us there is no alternative.[27]

For Christie, the League's championing of a collective security system flew in the face of the realities imposed on the world by the nature of the sovereign state. Because such a system could "operate in such a way as to bring us into the operation [of sanctions] to all intents and purposes automatically," Christie contended, "... the general objective [for Canada] seems clearly the elimination, as soon as possible, of the last vestige of our formal commitment, either direct of indirect, to the coercive alliance features of the League."[28]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Christie's overriding desire to preserve Canadian unity moved him to urge that the country divorce itself from the League except for "a willingness to collaborate on non-political matters and to continue contributing in some way to the League budget. ..."[29] For Christie, the Italo-Ethiopian crisis in 1935,[30] along with the on-going resurgence of German power in Europe,[31] were events that were introducing an era of ever-greater instability in European political affairs. Until a new point of equilibrium in the European regime could be found, there was an increasing likelihood of a new war which could involve Canada as the result of its obligations to the League of Nations. In the face of such a deteriorating situation, Christie believed that there was a "deep necessity [for the Government of Canada] to exhaust every last device which may be calculated to preserve Canadian unity in the face not only of the present European crisis [Ethiopia] but of the coming years of crisis of which this is only too plainly

the precursor. ... [The] necessity for Canadian unity overrides and dominates every other objective until it is attained. ..."[32] Chief among those unity-maintaining devices was a withdrawal from any commitment to the League that might involve Canada in the operation of sanctions and thereby in any European war that might result from their application.

In this regard, Christie believed that the only necessary measure needed to determine the proper course of Canadian action was an estimate of the requirements of the national interest. The idea that Canada should become involved in a European war automatically because of its membership in the League was, for Christie, one that "strikes deeper in our [Canada's] vitals than any we have been called upon to face since the time when we declared we had assumed full control of our external policy. Beside it the ordinary domestic legislative and even constitutional issues ... are bagatelles."[33] For Canada to take part in a collective security operation under the League's auspices would result in a situation where "a new precedent would actually have been set; that conditions of Canadian intervention in European affairs would have been established in an entirely new sense; that in essence it would be a revolutionary act -- and this in the full certainty that, so long as the self-contained sovereign state remains, Europe for years to come will present to us crisis after crisis, for which we should have established this new precedent and a principle of conduct. This time it is Italy; next time it may be Germany, or it may be Russia."[34] Such a situation for Christie was nothing short of sheer lunacy for it

had nothing whatsoever to do with protecting the primary national interest of preserving Canada's domestic order and unity. "What immediate, direct, vital Canadian interest is at stake?" Christie asked.

> In what circumstances is it a Canadian interest to intervene in European affairs? Is the application of hostile Canadian pressure upon a part of Europe likely to be appeasing for Europe? Is it likely to be appeasing or useful from a worldwide point of view? Can we in any degree adopt the principle of Canadian intervention in European security arrangements and at the same guarantee that Canadian energy will not be so exhausted or diminished as to leave us without hope of influence or defence in the face of non-European developments? To what extent, if any, can we expend energy across the Atlantic without weakening our resistance to events impinging from the south or from across the Pacific? How would you define this extent; how set about making sure you would not be drawn into exceeding it? Is it possible to conceive the continued existence of a Canadian nation occupying half of this island continent on the basis of a principle under which, whenever -- say every two or three decades -- a European issue of law and order, or balance of power, arises it is required (a) that Canada shall intervene; (b) that she shall do this alone from the outset as the representative of North America and carry on indefinitely, no matter whether the United States intervenes or not, and (c) that she shall so intervene whether or not all European countries themselves take up the cause? Could an attempt to embark upon such an exhausting course be regarded as in the interests of the world, the League, or the British Commonwealth? What practical considerations are there, in justice, in equity, in wisdom, to carry our obligation beyond our traditional policy? On what basis do you estimate that 10,000,000 Canadians can undertake more than the holding of this seat and line of communication of civilisation? If you propose more than this and yet recognise the absurdity of Canadian participation to the full in the European "collective" security arrangements now going on, how -- by what stipulations and limitations -- are we to limit our intervention?[35]

The answers to all of these questions Christie believed were of a nature that required Canada to dissociate itself from the political side of the League. Because the League was not universal, was seemingly being used to maintain the status quo in Europe, had not readjusted political disputes in the postwar

world to foreclose the necessity of using force, and was itself increasingly dependent on economic sanctions which led inevitably to the use of military force in order to exert its influence in the world, none of the criteria that Canadians had established for their country's membership in 1919 were being fulfilled in 1935. For that reason, according to Christie, Canada had no interest in remaining in the League, and he rejected any arguments that suggested that Canada agree to participate in League actions simply to preserve the institution, and thereby the theoretical possibility of its eventually being reformed. "How can it be calculated that Canada's intervention in the present crisis [Ethiopia]," he asked, "would contribute to 'saving the League' in the sense that Canada's interests [that is, those of 1919] demand?"[36] Christie maintained that no such calculation was possible and that because sanctions might drag Canada into war automatically, Canadian membership in the League violated "the sound principle that the exercise of responsibility must be coupled with knowledge and direct interest" and therefore had to be terminated. "We have no business gambling," he told Escott Reid, "even on the accident that might happen today. We are fools to establish the precedent of intervening in all European crises. ..."[37] Christie contemptuously rejected the advocates of the League who with "sublime arrogance" thought they "could change the nature of war by calling it a 'sanction'," and concluded that for Canada "continued, active, political integration with European processes [through membership in the League] means exhaustion and futility in the end."[38]

Seeking the Longest Possible Arm's Length: Canada's Relations with Britain, 1935-1939

Because Christie believed that Canada's constitutional relationship with Britain would result in putting the country at war if Britain went to war, he concentrated -- between 1935 and 1939 -- on trying to limit the nature and extent of commitments accruing to Canada as the result of its political, economic, and military relations with Britain. This basic constitutional reality, according to Christie, controlled the situation and there was no way for Canada to avoid it. "For the Dominions," he wrote, "it is the 'constitutional' angle of this one thing [that is, foreign policy] that will always be paramount in our actual political and administrative processes until it is finally settled."[39] Christie was -- to say the least -- not happy with the constitutional arrangement as it stood in 1935[40] and had championed its radical alteration since at least 1925. Nonetheless, he could not see any point in denying the reality of Anglo-Canadian constitutional ties and the control they exerted over Canada's future. In an attempt to cope with the constitutional circumstances as he found them, Christie, in the four years before the war, labored assiduously to find means with which to limit Canadian participation in a new war. Christie's efforts toward this end are best illustrated in his work on and attitudes toward the Imperial Conference of 1937, the development of an armaments industry in Canada, the military aspects of the Anglo-Canadian relationship, and the evolution of Canadian

defense policy during the interwar period.

For Christie the Imperial Conference of 1937 was an opportunity to insure that Canada would not enter into any new commitments with Great Britain that might compromise its ability to control the nature and extent of its war effort. He did not see the conference as an opportunity to alter the existing constitutional relationship between Canada and Britain. As in 1926, when he had dismissed the Canadian delegation to the Imperial Conference of that year as being unqualified to make constitutional changes on Canada's behalf which would determine whether London or Ottawa controlled the "lever of war," Christie argued in 1937 that only a constitutional conference in Canada, in which representatives of all regions, linguistic groups, and political organizations would take part, could make such fundamental alterations. Christie believed that the best that Mackenzie King and his colleagues could do at the 1937 conference was to avoid entering into new or enlarged commitments. In this regard, Christie suspected that certain elements in the British government were looking for a more formal and public diplomatic and military alliance with the dominions,[41] and he was determined to do his best to prevent anything of the kind. "I cannot say that I am too keen on this [attending the Imperial Conference of 1937] ...," he told Frankfurter. "The fuss and feathers [of the coronation and conference] at this time will be stifling. I shall probably get into a number of dogfights and while of course there is a kick in such a fight I am lacking in the combativeness that gets pleasure out of courting such affairs. And such

exhilaration as I shall get out of them will I fear have a slightly unholy aspect!"[42] In the event, Christie was closely involved with the major aspects of the Department of External Affair's preparations for the Conference, sailed early along with John Read, his cousin and the Legal Adviser in the Department of External Affairs, to represent Canada in preparatory discussions on constitutional issues with civil servants from Britain and the other dominions,[43] worked closely with Skelton and Mackenzie King during the course of the conference itself,[44] and served as the Canadian representative on several of the Conference's specialized technical subcommittees.[45] In the end, Christie was presumably satisfied with the role he played and influence he exerted at the Conference, as well as with Mackenzie King's success in avoiding new commitments for Canada. Professor Eayrs's judgment that "[i]n 1937, as in 1923, Mackenzie King, fighting off 'Downing Street domination,' had ended by dominating Downing Street" was one in which Christie certainly both shared and rejoiced.[46]

In the Department's preparations for the Imperial Conference, Christie sketched out a foreign policy position for Canada that took the then existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship as a given and sought to promote goals that would limit both Canada's commitments to Britain, and those of Britain internationally, that might have the effect of dragging Canada into a war as a result of London's involvement. The Canadian delegation's task at the Imperial Conference, Christie wrote, was to steer the conferees to

> ... Reject the conception of a single, common, agreed foreign policy with joint and several liability to maintain and enforce it. (It is understood that this conception has never been accepted; such an attempt to create a nebulous "collective security" system within the British Commonwealth being regarded as unworkable and destructive of permanent friendliness and confidence between the peoples). Rather: (a) Recognise that the reality of our political nexus with the U.K., however impossible of precise definition, faces us with the situation that the policies and European commitments of the U.K. as a Great Power may well draw us into some general conflict by decisions in which we should have no real part -- a situation analogous to the U.K. as analysed by the Chief's of Staff Paper -- i.e., that the French nexus with the Soviets and Eastern Europe may well draw the U.K. into a general European war by decisions in which she had no part. (b) To Canada (which, as a Small North American Power, cannot be integrated into a European political or alliance system, but is concerned to avoid inviting Europeans to embark on conflicts which might reach a worldwide scale) it is highly important that the U.K. should hold a position whose consequences in the actual events are calculated to give the greatest chances, in all contingencies, of harmony with the position of the United States. (c) Recognise our limitations, and the U.K.'s as well; avoid the course likely to spread any conflict that might start; the most that can be hoped for is to confine the conflict and prevent its attaining the world scale where statesmanship is helpless to control its progression and consequences and can scarcely do more than watch it burn out. (d) Repudiate any line or policy based on a conception that members of the British Commonwealth, alone or in company with others, can dominate the world, or hold a mandate to preserve the status quo, or can either give or withhold something they do not own -- e.g., "a freehand" for somebody else in Central or Eastern Europe.[47]

The actions necessary for the Commonwealth to achieve these ends included a British decision to terminate all of its alliance- and military-type ties with France[48] and a decision by Britain and each of the Dominions to dissociate themselves "by some unequivocal legal procedure from ... [the] provisions of the [League of Nation's] Covenant involving or implying coercive commitments or 'sanctions' or commitments of any type except those to consult together, to employ conciliatory procedure, to arbitrate, etc."[49] These actions, Christie believed, would put

each nation of the Commonwealth in a position of promoting conciliation rather than coercion internationally, having the opportunity to attain the near-common consent of its population -- thereby protecting national unity -- for its foreign policy, and of conducting itself in a way that stood the best chance in the event of war of compelling the United States "in her own interest to take action which would be equivalent to collaboration with the British Commonwealth."[50]

Christie's major intervention during the Imperial Conference itself came in response to a draft resolution on "Co-operation in Imperial Defence" that was submitted by Australia's Minister of Defence Archdale Parkhill. The Australian resolution argued that because the "[m]embers of the British Empire are ... bound together by ties of loyalty, sentiment, and common ideals and interests ...", and that because inimical forces threatened each of their national interests, "[i]t is vital for a common understanding to exist between the members of the British Commonwealth as to the manner in which measures should be concerted between them for the maintenance of their common ideals."[51] This being the situation, the Government of Australian recommended that,

> In order therefore that Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations may be aware of what they are required to provide for their Defence, its expansion in war, and for the assistance they may be prepared to extend to any other Member or Members of the British Commonwealth, it is a matters of mutual arrangement between any such Members, in accordance with the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1923 which invites consultations on all matters of mutual defence, to prepare plans for their common defence.[52]

The Australians concluded their paper with the traditional -- if,

in this case, unconvincing -- reaffirmation of the autonomy of each member of the Commonwealth. "[I]t is declared," the resolution solemnly said, albeit in direct contradiction to the centralizing intent of the preceding words, "that the preparation of any such plans does not involve a commitment by one member to another in any shape or form, or limit the sovereign control of its Policy by any Member."[53]

The gist of the Australian proposal, as Christie accurately summarized it, was a call for the members of the British Commonwealth "to prepare plans for their common defense," to prepare those plans in collaboration with the Committee for Imperial Defence on which Dominion representatives would sit, and to craft those plans with the idea in mind that they would ultimately have to be employed against Germany, Italy, and Japan.[54] Not surprisingly, given his abhorence of the project proposed in Parkhill's resolutions -- as well as the convoluted style in which it was presented -- Christie moved swiftly to recommend to the Canadian delegation -- in what Colonel Stacey has described as "characteristically acid comments"[55] -- that the Australian scheme be killed at birth. "For political basis the paper resorts to incantation," Christie contended.

> The proposal is imbedded in a farrago of the jargon and catch phrases which nowadays in many quarters seem to pass for thinking both in international and in British Commonwealth Affairs, and which bid fair to stultify and compromise everyone's policy in all directions. The idea apparently is to please all tastes, or at least, the main varieties. ...
>
> What would be the effect of such a draft resolution as a whole? Within the Commonwealth States it is difficult to see how it could serve any useful purpose whatever. Its effort to please everyone is patent and it would seem more

> likely to irritate all, furnishing fresh fuel for disunity in many quarters. As for the rest of the world, it would seem worse than useless. The effort is to produce something that looks like meeting the military and totalitarian Powers on their own ground -- to parade the British Commonwealth as a single military Power -- "a manifestation of solidarity", in the Australian words, as "a deterrent to aggression". On that ground, however, the draft is surely a hopelessly weak weapon. Its ambiguities, its equivocations, its wholly optional nature -- all these attributes seem bound to make other General Staffs smile rather than shudder. At the same time it would be provocative and in spots furnish fuel for adroit use by foreign propagandists.[56]

Christie contended that nothing in the Australian resolution was acceptable to Canada as the basis for a communique announcing the outcome of the Conference's deliberations on foreign and defence policy, and he held that if any of the other conferees wanted to include it in the Conference's communique Canada should take steps "to enter definite disclaimers or caveats" to dissociate itself from the offending clauses.[57] By far the best course for the Conference to pursue, Christie argued, was the abandonment of the Australian proposal and the adoption of a decision

> (a) That under both headings, 'Foreign Affairs' and "Defence", there should be no attempt [by the Conference] to draft general resolutions. (Their object would be to define, for propaganda and for foreign consumption, conceptions of "common policy", or of "solidarity" in policy and defense, which are indefinable in the few words of a resolution. The attempt would be practically certain to miss the mark both inside and outside the Commonwealth).
>
> (b) The Conference's public records should confine themselves to statements that in Foreign Affairs and Defence the Members of the Conference reviewed the position from their respective points of view and exchanged full information. (Considering the matter from the strategic viewpoint, which the proponents of elaborate Conference resolutions have in mind, a simple, non-commital statement seems the better course; for it at least would keep others guessing and it would have the great merit of corresponding exactly to the inescapable political realities of our case).
>
> (c) If the current conversations respecting economic appeasement of the world progress far enough, there might be

> room for a careful resolution or declaration on that aspect of Foreign Affairs which would be of some use (In short, let the Conference, if it can, say something positive and ameliorating to the world, and, for the rest, say nothing).[58]

Doubtless Mackenzie King needed little of this sort of encouragement from Christie -- indeed Professor Neatby has argued that the creation of atmospherics conducive to a course of worldwide economic appeasement conducted under British and American auspices was one of the Prime Minister's central goals at the Conference[59] -- but it is interesting to note the similar manner in which both men approached the conference and how closely King followed Christie's recommendations in his at-times-acrimonious discussions with the other Commonwealth prime ministers over the content of the Conference's final communique.[60]

Another issue arising at and after the Imperial Conference of 1937, one which seemed to hold out the possibiltity of closer Anglo-Canadian military ties, was London's interest in developing what Professor Hillmer has described as "a shadow armaments industry in the dominion with active Canadian government assistance. ..."[61] British officials believed that because the United Kingdom's industrial capacity was, in 1937, already being strained by the production of the arms and munitions required to fulfill the country's rearmament program, and because those production facilities were likely to be disrupted by aerial bombing in the event of war, they must arrange for an accord with Canada in which it would agree to take up the slack in the case of reduced production in Britain's war industries. In London's

view, Canada was the ideal candidate for such a role because it possessed the necessary physical plant and technological expertise to produce high-quality war materials, and because its geographical remoteness from Europe put it out of reach of attacks from the air. In addition, if it could be arranged for Canada to serve as a source of armaments and munitions, Britain's likely loss of the United States as a supplier of such material in wartime as a consequence of the application of that country's neutrality laws would be largely balanced. King, however, balked at all such suggestions at the Imperial Conference, saying that commitments of that type would undermine the veracity of his pledge to the Canadian electorate that Parliament would decide Canada's obligations in the event of war. King simply refused to act on the British request and no Canadian commitment to serve as a primary supplier of war material to Britain appeared in the Conference's final communique.[62]

In the period before the Imperial Conference Christie apparently felt that he had to tread lightly in regard to the question of the Canadian government's serving as an active agent for London in arranging for the production of arms and munitions for Britain in Canada. Presumably because such orders would create jobs in an economy still suffering heavily from the Depresssion, Christie phrased his arguments on the matter in a way that did not amount to outright opposition, but in a manner that left little question about where he personally came down on the issue. Broadly speaking, Christie wrote in late January 1937, there were two alternatives open to the Canadian government

in regard to the placing of British munitions contracts in Canada. "If the policy is to urge or influence the British Government to place munitions contracts in Canada," he contended, "-- either as a means whereby Canada might be regarded as contributing to some common defence program, or as recognising the organisation of Canadian productive capacity as an auxiliary to the British defense program -- then, logically, the Canadian government might be expected to take a good deal of administrative responsibility regarding such contracts"[63] If, on the other hand, Ottawa's policy was not to urge the British government to place such contracts in Canada, administrative responsibility could be left in London's control, the Canadian government would not need to intervene in the situation as an active middle-man, and Canadian manufacturers could be left to deal directly with British authorities.[64] "As regards relations between Canada and the United Kingdom [on the issue of munitions procurement in Canada]," Christie concluded,

> it might be argued that Alternative A [direct involvement by Ottawa] would be appropriate to the view that in the realm of defence there is something like a federalised relationship, or at least a firm alliance relationship. Alternative B [no involvement by Ottawa in placing British contracts], it might be argued, would avoid such implications. If it were felt that this is to read too much into the matter, it would still remain that in practical consequences Alternative A would be calculated to accelerate the momentum of Canadian armament production and this raises further purely practical questions. Is it clear at this stage that a considerable Canadian armament industry -- of a necessarily unplanned character (or at least not planned on the basis of Canadian needs) -- is a sound thing to encourage? Even assuming the worst kind of catastrophe to happen, would this represent the most effective kind of Canadian production of supplies? Are there other fields of supply into which Canadian productive capacity might better be concentrated?[65]

In the period after Mackenzie King told the Imperial Conference of 1937 that Canada had no interest in becoming a center of production for the arms and munitions required for the expansion of Britain's armed services, Christie shed all of his earlier circumspection in commenting and launched into rather scathing denunciations of government-to-government cooperation in defence-related manufacturing, the unregulated growth of Canada's defense industries, and the motives of those in Canada and Britain who were advocates of such cooperation and growth. "The idea of developing Canada as the 'Arsenal of the British Empire', or at least as a major arsenal, is getting increased publicity," Christie noted in the summer of 1938.

> The prominent place it held in the U.K. Chiefs of Staff "Review of Imperial Defence" circulated just prior to the Imperial Conference, 1937 will be recalled. ... Both parliamentary statements and the public journals in Great Britain have been stressing this idea during the past year, and recent public discussion in Canada has been linking it to the growth of the Canadian aramament industry that has been going on. Since the idea is calculated to advance the particular interests of Canadian munition makers, it may be concluded that they are not neglecting opportunities to stimulate the publicity. The idea is based considerably on what Sir Thomas Inskip, [Britain's] Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, is reported by the Canadian Press to have described a few weeks ago as Canada's "almost certain immunity from air attack", when urging that Canadian industry should participate in the British armament program. ...
>
> Since the Canadian government does not own or control Canadian industry and no one proposes public ownership of the armaments industry, it is hard to see the elements for any very decisive comprehensive and concrete government policy or program toward the growth of this business. But occasions arise, as regards some project or other, where the question of direct governmental responsibility may be measurably involved -- for example, where co-operation in investigating the possibilities of Canadian industry or the granting of some degree of diplomatic support may be in question. The attitude to be taken and its extent have to be determined by various considerations. The considerations

in favor of business -- that it helps to finance plant at home for our own defence, that it provides employment and increases revenues, and so on -- are familiar and need not be elaborated. But because it is almost always ignored in public discussion, the other side of the picture needs attention also.

Those who are urging Canada's immunity from air attack in this connection mean her physical immunity. At the same time it should not be overlooked that, according to the extent that Canada actually becomes an "arsenal of the British Empire", she forfeits such political immunity from attack as her circumstances might otherwise render probable and in effect challenges those against whom her arms industry may be used to do their utmost to overcome her existing physical and technical immunity. ...

Such a development [co-operation between Canadian industry and British military expansion] could also be regarded as a linking of Canada with the European military complex. Whether, and the sense in which, this might have repercussions in the U.S. so as to affect our relations there is a point which might need some watching. In this connection a further complication might arise if, because of legislation or political conditions there, U.S. armament interests should begin to participate substantially in the Canadian development.

On the economic side there is, on the one hand, the immediate stimulus to employment and, on the other, the danger of interference with the real and permanent economic interests of the country. The U.K. Chiefs of Staff review for 1937 recognised that there should be a "minimum of interference"; while Mr. Chamberlain's most recent statement of U.K. Defence Policy -- March 7, 1938 -- laid great emphasis on their effort "to avoid undue interference with ordinary trade and commerce". ... The U.K. might avoid some of this danger by shifting part of their arms production to another country if strategically feasible; and it is therefore necessary to consider how far this point may be influencing present developments. That it may actually be at work may perhaps be conjectured from the circumstance that the military aircraft industry in Great Britain and their trade journals have been complaining bitterly against orders being placed outside [Britain] and contending that they could handle a great deal more business."[66]

After impugning the motives of British officials and Canadian industrialists, warning of complications in bilateral relations with the United States and Canada's closer involvement in the chaotic political affairs of Europe, holding out the

spectre of potential opponents improving their weaponry so as to have the means with which to attack Canada from the air, and citing the potential distortion of the development of the national economy, Christie concluded that it was hard to see any advantage to be derived by Canada from acting as the British Empire's arsenal. "Opponents of the growth of the [Canadian armaments] industry have been arguing publicly that in effect it involves some 'war commitments' in advance," he wrote, "and it is not easy to furnish a wholly satisfactory answer, particularly if in fact the Canadian industry should become effectively geared to the requirements of the British defence program. ... Whether 'commitment' or no, it seems fairly plain ... that a really substantial armament development carries with it the acceptance of a new liability in advance. ..."[67]

If Canada was not going to permit itself to become the arsenal of the Empire, Christie, not surprisingly, could see little justification for allowing it to become a primary recruiting ground[68] or training center for the British military.[69] As Professors Eayrs, Stacey, and Neatby have all ably described, the representatives of the British government spent the better part of three years attempting -- with little or no success -- to persuade and/or force Mackenzie King into sanctioning the construction of British training facilities in Canada and the recruitment of relatively large numbers of young Canadians for Britain's armed services.[70] At every step along the way of this campaign, Christie contributed his aggressively negative analysis of the various British requests. "It seems to

me all these schemes [for recruitment and training] are unsound," he wrote just after the first such idea was broached in the spring of 1936, "unless it is to be assumed or decided now that Canada will join Great Britain in any war that may involve the latter."[71] Christie, as has been shown, did assume that because of existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship Canada would go to war if Britain did, but he did not believe that the extent and nature of that participation necessarily had to be of the all-out variety that had occurred in 1914.[72] His opposition, therefore, to large-scale British recruitment and training activities in Canada was based, in part, on a belief that such efforts would blur the distinction between the British and Canadian defense efforts and result in a situation where the public would view the two as one, thereby foreclosing any chance for the government to regulate or limit the degree of Canadian participation in a conflict in which Britain became involved. "In the practical, technical and administrative sphere," Christie argued in a paper opposing a scheme submitted by the British in 1939 for training airmen in Canada,

> the contract with the British Government to inject into the normal Canadian Air Force establishment (now geared to train a number of Canadian pilots on the order of 50 annually) a new, perhaps somewhat separate establishment geared to the different purpose of training British pilots and involving numbers of the order of 300 annually, is naturally bound to have a considerable impact upon Canada's home defence establishment and program. Even the layman must conclude that, as the project works itself out, a series of somewhat abnormal practical consequences and incidents are likely to arise and force themselves to be dealt with by the Government, even though he cannot picture them in precise technical terms.
>
> If in fact the establishment for the British contract is at the outset or later becomes greater than the strictly

> Canadian establishment, this fact will gradually become well known and will loom up in the public mind. The Canadian home defence air program may well come to be pictured as incidental or supplementary to the British contract, instead of vice versa as the original announcements appeared to suggest. A further likely political consequence is that all developments and increases in the strictly C.[anadian] A.[ir] F.[orce] program subsequent to this date will be pictured as being in effect simply supplementary to or impelled by the British contract. The tail will appear to wag the dog.[73]

In sum, Christie believed that the creation of an armament industry in Canada expressly designed to meet the needs of British military expansion, and the recruitment of Canadians for the British services and their training at British bases in Canada, all amounted to prior commitments to Britain that would limit sharply the government's discretion in the event of war. Moreover, they were activities that -- if undertaken -- would be degrading to Canadian sovereignty and would be viewed by Britain's potential enemies as hostile acts. The adoption of any of these courses of action would amount to an abandonment of the sound policy, Christie wrote, in which "we have studiously (apart from or since the [Bennett-Ferguson-Riddell] fiasco re Italy) avoided interventions in Europe or anywhere else -- i.e. that has been the position of Canada as such."

> The business of establishing armament industries in Canada has its bearing on this. So far as they are for our own purposes (i.e., for sales to our own Defence Department or represent Canadian manufacturers competing in world markets) they do not have the colour in question. But so far as they may be tied directly up with the British program they would be taken as a menace toward Europe. The recruiting in Canada for U.K. forces has the same colour. All the talk of "shadow industries", "reserve industries", "war potential", etc. to be built up in Canada by the U.K. does not help. See Winterton for the Air Ministry on May 12 talking about their [the British] "building up war potential in Canada" as if he were talking of an English county.

> To European countries this must all appear as with the consent or connivance of Canada and it must appear as a menacing step toward them.
>
> It is really the first post-war menacing step we have taken. ...
>
> The proposal that the U.K. set up in Canada flying schools, aerodromes, machinery and go in for training their pilots here would be a further and more dramatic step up of the kind in question. ...[74]

Christie believed that any of these projects would be a fundamental break with Canada's policy of no commitments and would reduce drastically the country's room to maneuver in the event of war. "The closer we can stick to our non-menacing position as a Canadian people," he concluded, "the less we are compromised and the better chance for Parliament to decide (if and when the time comes) on a Canadian policy so far as the character, purpose and extent of our participation are concerned."[75]

When resisting the possible entangling aspects of the resolutions suggested by the Australians for adoption at the Imperial Conference of 1937, and the new snares for Canada inherent in British efforts to promote the development of a Canadian munitions industry geared to London's military expansion program and to recruit Canadians for Britain's armed services and train them at British bases in Canada, Christie saw himself as trying to ward off a new set of commitments that potentially could limit the freedom of King's government to decide on the nature and extent of Canadian participation should war come. In all of these efforts, he believed that the government was successful in preventing the acquisition of new commitments. The

one area in which Christie had the most difficulty -- and, indeed, the least success -- was in regard to the commitment to Britain inherent in the pervasive pro-British bias and traditions of the Department of National Defense which resulted in the focusing of Canada's military policy and programs on the preparation of an army organization that could be quickly expanded and dispatched to Europe as an expeditionary force which would complement the British Army in training and equipment.[76] Between 1935 and the outbreak of the war, Christie consistently attacked these plans,[77] arguing that the only legitimate tasks for Canada's armed forces were the protection of the country's coasts, trade routes, and rights as a neutral. Toward the end of redirecting the objectives of Canada's defense policy to North American rather than European concerns, his primary goal in these years was to utterly sap the ability of the Department of National Defence to make extensive preparations for sending an expeditionary force to serve with British forces on the continent of Europe.[78] "More than ever I think the Canadian Government would do well," he wrote in the spring of 1938,

> as regards defence appropriation already voted and the preparation of future expenditures, to underline any previous instructions and insist emphatically upon the following lines:
>
> 1. Canadian expenditure and preparations to be heavily concentrated on naval and air services.
>
> 2. The army services to be stripped to the bone, excepting those designed for coast defences (plus internal security against sabotage, etc.) -- e.g., fortress garrisons, coast artillery, anti-aircraft guns, searchlight services, etc. ...[79]

Christie contended that the development of Canadian defence

policy since 1919 -- especially in so far as the army was concerned -- had been marked by two themes: (1) the elimination of all perceptions of a possibility of war between Canada and the United States, resulting in a situation where the requirements for "home defence" were "accordingly laid aside," and, (2) an assumption that "the possibilities of Canada being involved in a transoceanic war had increased."[80] Christie accepted -- and needless to say applauded -- the validity of the first theme, but rejected the second out of hand arguing that it was absolutely absurd to find that "the official basis for militia organisation is the assumption of a necessity for an overseas force in a future Empire war. ..."[81] One of the reasons he believed that defense planning had taken this course was that the government had been lax in asserting its control over the General Staff in so far as the setting of defense priorities was concerned.[82] As a result, the military planners, in their estimates, had given lip sevice to the need for defending Canada's coasts and maintaining the country's neutrality in the event of war between other states, but had primarily concentrated on "the possible despatch of a Canadian Expeditionary Force to fulfill League of Nations obligations ... [or obligations] consequent upon our British Commonwealth relations."[83] The first step toward recovering this lost ground then, according to Christie, was to reassert civilian control over the establishment of defense priorities. All acts of Parliament pertaining to defense fully justified such an action Christie noted, by assigning "the discretion in all aspects [of defense planning] upon the Governor

in Council," thereby allowing the government of the day to establish the planning orientation with which the General Staff would be required to work.[84]

Christie also maintained that the acts of Parliament which established the paramountcy of the civil power over the military, also established "[l]ocal defense" as "the accepted limit of [the government's] responsibility. ..."[85] This being the proper primary aim of government defense policy, Christie believed that the formulation of that policy carried out in a way that complemented the government's overall effort "to preserve and enhance the relative energy and unity of the Canadian people in an anarchic world. ..."[86] Such a goal, however, was not attainable so long as the General Staff continued to base their plans on the assumption that a Canadian expeditionary force would be sent overseas immediately upon the outbreak of a war. In a memorandum on defense policy written in the fall of 1936, Christie outlined his reasons for dismissing the "overseas hypothesis" and suggested in its place what he considered to be the only sound basis on which Canadian military planning could proceed. Christie claimed that there were several factors making it unnecessary for the government to base its defense plans on the overseas hypothesis.

> (a) Considering the state of Canada's commitments and inter-state relations, either under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under Imperial Conference resolutions or British Commonwealth conversations, as invariably interpreted by Parliament [and] by successive Canadian Governments, there is no obligation upon Canada to despatch such a force in any event.
>
> (b) Considering the international situation as a whole, the adoption of such a basis as a primary objective in defense

> policy and a primary factor in planning the strengths, organization and equipment of the respective [Canadian] forces would not be justifiable.[87]

This being the case, Christie recommended that

> ... in order to place the Government in a position to establish clearly that the actual defence program when sanctioned corresponds to the approved basis of policy, as well as to judge what priorities, funds and allocation of funds are appropriate, the service staffs be requested to report specifically what strengths, organisation and equipment of the respective forces are in their opinion proper to provide for (a) the defence of our coasts (including the focal points of sea-borne trade routes), in the event of Canada being at war, and (b) the maintenance of our neutrality in the event of war arising between other states, the West Coast being given priority under both heads, and it being understood that such a report would exclude all consideration of an overseas Expeditionary force.[88]

All of these arguments were, of course, part and parcel of Christie's constant fear that an all-out, 1914-type Canadian participation in a new war would divide Canadian society, possibly to the point of bringing Confederation to the brink of dissolution. His efforts to deflate the resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1937, to prevent the British from increasing the recruitment and starting the training of military personnel in Canada, to block the growth of a British-oriented and perhaps owned arms industry in Canada, and to divorce the Canadian General Staff from their adherence to a belief that the country's first military responsibility was to develop a field force compatible with the British Army and ready for immediate despatch to Europe, were all designed to preserve an environment in which the country's political leaders could decide the nature, extent, and timing of Canada's participation in the war at the moment of its outbreak. To allow, in other words, for at least

the possibility of a more limited, less divisive war effort than that which occurred between 1914 and 1918. Although written specifically to address military planning, the following portion of a memorandum by Christie offers a succinct synopsis of his thinking regarding prior commitments, and his belief that the national interest could best be served by leaving as many options as possible open for the government's consideration once war began. "On general grounds there must surely be a striking lack of proportion, and immense incongruity," he wrote,

> in a conception which accepts major overseas operations as the ordinary permanent basis of design and structure for Canada's army organisation. It is too soon to admit that armed invasions of other continents are anything but extraordinary episodes in history. The conception [that is, the overseas hypothesis] is one which concentrates the minds of our military thinkers and advisers along one channel. And it is unlikely to be a productive channel. They plan for years and in the extraordinary event they have to improvise. In August 1914 the plans for a Canadian Expeditionary Force were thrown overboard [?] overnight, Kitchener's Army and Lloyd George's munitions program were never planned, nor the American Expeditionary Force. Perhaps the essential reality is that our institutions do not permit our planning for such extraordinary events, and so improvisation must be the law of our life. Could we, then, deliberately plan for the ordinary [that is, home defense] -- for the thing which, if it [war] happens, will have a shape that we can predict with some confidence? Such a course might stimulate the military mind, force it to the initiative. The result might, even when the extraordinary event requiring improvisation arose, be fully as productive as the present proceedings (under which the question arises whether a Canadian soldier need bother to think at all).[89]

Airtight, prior commitments of all kinds, Christie believed, resulted in a situation where neither the soldier nor the politician "need bother to think at all," where events would simply play themselves out according to the prearranged pattern of interstate arrangements and commitments.[90] Between 1935 and the start of the war Christie strove mightily but largely

unsuccessfully to disrupt this pattern of prior commitment. Although he did help to ward off such new commitments to Britain as would have been involved in allowing increased military recruiting and training in Canada, and Imperial Conference resolutions committing Canada and the other Dominions to a common foreign and/or defense policy for the Empire/Commonwealth, Christie was unable to do anything about the less tangible but -- as he well knew and accepted -- more binding ties of blood, sentiment, and common heritage. In view of the enduring strength and vitality of these latter Anglo-Canadian links, Christie's tinkering with the former in an attempt to limit -- for he knew he could not prevent -- Canadian participation in the approaching war, seems, in retrospect at least, rather a lost cause.[91]

Christie and the Americans: The Increasing Importance of the United States in World Affairs, 1935-1939

Christie's involvement with Canada's day-to-day relations with the United States in the years between 1935 and 1939 was sporadic and limited to a number of issues which combined legal and technical questions in particular sets of negotiations. He dealt in this period, for example, with talks with Washington on trans-Atlantic air services,[92] the North Pacific Halibut Convention,[93] American proposals to build a highway from the state of Washington to Alaska through British Columbia and the Yukon,[94] and such hardy bilateral perennials as the St. Lawrence Seaway and diversions of the Niagara River for the production of hydro-electricity.[95] None of these issues occupied much of

Christie's time and, indeed, throughout this four-year period Canadian-American relations were dominated by commercial issues and trading arrangements with which Christie dealt not at all.[96] Christie paid far more attention to a generalized consideration of the influence of the United States on the formulation of Canadian external policy, specifically analyzing the philosophical basis for American neutrality and the official legislation in which that concept was enshrined. He also devoted some effort toward analysis and speculation about the likely position and power of the United States vis-a-vis both Canada and the rest of the world in the event of another world war.

In considering the basis for American neutrality, Christie clearly recognized that the concept -- and the motivation behind it -- was one that was as old as the nation. "This measure [the Neutrality Bill before the Congress in early 1936]," Christie wrote, "represents for the U.S. a conception, a purpose, an aspiration, which go back to the earliest days of the Republic, when they first began to imagine their position in the world. Their first neutrality act was passed in 1797 -- the first in history, according to some students. The Wars of 1812 and 1914-17 have disclosed some of the practical aspects and difficulties of the conception. Evidently they are going to try again."[97] Christie did not believe, however, that the sulphurous debates between rival congressional factions, and the bitter exchanges of invective that were accompanying them, were merely the predictable recurrence of a persistent contentious theme in American history. Christie believed that the debates were rather

the result of two factors: first, a constitutional battle between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, resulting from their experience of 1914-1919, over control of the war-making power; and, second, and more importantly, the acrimony was resulting from the lessons drawn by the United States from the manner in which it had come to be involved in the Great War. "One special feature of the debate [over the neutrality legislation] may be noted," Christie explained in regard to the first of the above mentioned points.

> ... The [Neutrality] Bill proposes, in Section 6, that any embargo "shall apply equally to all belligerents, unless the Congress, with the approval of the President, shall declare otherwise." ... In the legal and constitutional sense the clause is superfluous, since Congress in any case could not preclude itself from exercising its power to amend its own acts at any time. But what the words underline in one aspect is the old issue between the executive and legislative powers. Congress, which by the Constitution alone has the war-making power, has looked at the past, particularly 1914-1917, and it thinks the executive has at times exercised what is in effect a war-making function or policy which has rendered illusory the intention of the Constitution. The promoters of this Bill in Congress say in effect: "We will try to keep the country from going into an extra-American war simply on commercial issues. First, we will have the impartial embargoes in existence at the outset of the next first-class war, so that the executive alone cannot allow a war-making situation to grow up in this country. If anybody says that the war might so develop as to make a vital American interest to discriminate [as between belligerents], we do not necessarily deny that; but we do intend, whatever happens, that the decision shall be in our hands; that it shall be taken not in advance but in the light of the actual circumstances as they arise; and that the case must be submitted to us and we must be convinced before any critical decision is taken committing the country to a course which might in effect compromise our constitutional responsibility toward the issues of peace and war.
>
> ... The Legislation represents in one aspect the determination of Congress to safeguard as far as possible their war-making prerogative. They see no guarantee against war; but they think they can do something to minimize the impacts of a foreign conflict upon their economic structure

> as well as the dangers of being drawn in; that at least they can try to postpone their entry to the point of plain necessity, avoiding incalculable commitments in advance and insuring to some extent their own choice of fighting ground; feeling that, given existing conditions and their particular position in the world, such lines offer the best long-run chances of preserving their civilisation and enhancing their relative strength. On such lines they have had a remarkable growth from the outset, and the case for revolutionary departures is not yet clearly made.[98]

Christie accurately saw the constitutional jealousies involved in the neutrality debate, and from the tenor of his prose he obviously sympathized with the Congress's wish to preserve its prerogatives and avoid prior commitments. Goals such as those, after all, were no more than he had been urging the Canadian government to assume since at least 1926.

Christie also believed that the divisive debate over neutrality in the United States was a direct consequence of the nation's experiences between the start of the Great War and the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty. The virulence of the Congressional debate on neutrality, he wrote, was in part the result of an "intense preoccupation with the experience of 1914-1917, which led the nation into its first invasion of Europe."

> The broad conclusion was drawn that, as a people, they had been somewhat simple and had got "sucked" into the War because they had not thought out their position. The resolve to avoid such a war again was unanimous. Emphasis was placed not on the direct devastation of 1914-1918, but also upon the disruption of the whole national economy with uncontrollable results for years afterwards. ...
>
> In short, the broad purpose [of the proponents of the neutrality legislation] is an effort to keep the United States at peace, to keep them from going into other peoples' "wars" amd "sanctions" simply on commercial issues; to protect the American commercial, financial and industrial structure, and the nation as such from the consequences which, so it is argued, arose directly in 1917 and indirectly in the post-war period, from the virtual alliance which gradually grew up between American Business and the

Allied Powers from 1914 onward. ...[99]

Christie believed that the neutrality legislation of the United States was based solely on the national interest -- and a selfish and narrowly-defined sense of the national interest that he apparently applauded -- which allowed Washington to decide if, when, and where the United States would become involved in any given conflict.[100] Again, in essence, this is nothing more than the course he had been urging Canadians to adopt since the signing of the Locarno treaties. Although he never explicitly recommended the course pursued by the American Congress to his superiors in Ottawa -- he accepted the impossibility of that course given Anglo-Canadian constitutional realities -- he left no doubt with them as to his overall sympathy with it as a means whereby Canada could best protect its own unique national interests. In a draft statement be prepared for Mackenzie King to consider presenting to the Imperial Conference in 1937, Christie suggested that the American example was one that might profitably be emulated by each nation of the Commonwealth and might even form the basis of a common imperial foreign policy. "Bearing in mind these considerations [that is, the intention of the United States Neutrality Legislation to embargo munitions and credits to all belligerents], what I should like to throw out is this," Christie recommended the Prime Minister tell the Imperial Conference,

> that it may well be that all countries who are concerned to avert a further catastrophe to civilisation should study this actual experiment in Non Interventiton in conjunction with the movement in the United States -- for I think, considering its purposes as explained in Congress and its relation to analogous events in the past, that the recent

> legislation could be more accurately described as a Non Intervention Act than as a Neutrality Act. ...
>
> No one can say just what circumstances another conflict might assume, if despite all efforts, conflict should arise, but there could well be circumstances, I think, in which those responsible for government [in the nations of the Commonwealth] would be forced to ask themselves whether something in the nature of a combined Non Intervention might not be their truest course in the interest alike of their own people and of civilisation as a whole. If such a course proved feasible it would obviously be of the greatest value that there should exist the possibility, in effect if not in name, of the collaboration of the United States.[101]

Despite the close attention he paid to the development of neutrality legislation in the United States, Christie seems to have regarded it as having very few direct implications for Canada, and none of a really serious sort. "For Canada," he wrote rather disinterestedly, "they [the neutrality statutes] would in the event of their enforcement present a special kind of problem, for it seems not unlikely that attempts would be made to use our territory as a field of evasion and, if the evasions reached a noticeable degree of magnitude, resentments and difficulties might arise which would need careful handling on the part of the two governments.[102] Still, he did not think this risk of much consequence, adding that there was little the Canadian government could do because that "kind of difficulty might arise whether Canada was neutral or belligerent."[103]

Christie, in fact, showed virtually no inclination to push for closer formal ties with the United States at any time during the four years before the war. He evinced little interest of any sort in closer military ties with the United States in the face of what appeared to be an approaching war in Europe. He appreciated, for example, President Roosevelt's pledge in his

speech at Kingston, after the opening of a international bridge across the St. Lawrence River in August, 1938, "that the people of the United States would not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire," but he advised against offering "a reciprocal assurance to the United States" or indeed treating the words as anything other than "fresh evidence of the special neighborly relations between Canada and the United States.[104] "We should recognise," Christie wrote, "that this event [Roosevelt's speech] affords no reason for shirking our own responsibility for our defence," -- echoing a sentiment he had expressed over a year earlier by saying that while it was nice to find that Washington's Monroe Doctrine included Canada within its protective scope "it would be an incongruity to say that we are going to put our defence in the hands of the United States. That would virtually make us a Protectorate of the United States -- ... We do not mean to be anyone's Protectorate."[105]

Finally, although Christie was fully cognizant of the danger that as "our [Canada's] economic life is so interrelated in many ways with theirs [the United States] ... and would be particularly affected in many ways if they actually introduced their emergency [neutrality] regime it might be valuable to have in advance a good idea of what we would be up against so far as commerce and intercourse with them went,"[106] he apparently gave no thought to seeking cooperative bilateral economic planning for the event of war until three months before the war began.[107] Even at that late date, however, Christie maintained that if such discussions were held it must be made clear that "the

conversations are designed to meet purely hypothetical contingencies: that no commitments or agreements should be entered into; and that no question arises of taking a final decision now on action to be taken, if the contingencies materialise, which remains a matter solely for the Government of the day. ..."[108]

In his views of relations between Canada and the United States in the prewar years, Christie seems to have been guided, as he was in Anglo-Canadian affairs, by a simple desire to avoid advance commitments of any sort, by a certain wariness of Roosevelt as an adventurous and somewhat less than forthright individual,[109] and, most of all, by a belief that the economic and political powers of the United States were on a rapid upward trajectory that would ultimately make it the dominant international power, thereby possibly presenting Canada with the spectre of simply exchanging a British yoke for an American one. Regarding the first consideration, Christie was simply being consistent, he no more wanted Canada to be bound to participate in an American war against Japan than he wanted it to be bound to join in a British war against Germany. Frequent, informal high-level contacts between Canadian and American politicians, and even between Presidents and Prime Ministers, were fine -- "Doubtless you have seen that Mackenzie King has been to the White House," he wrote Frankfurter in March 1937. "Whether they 'settled' anything or not this sort of thing is good business"[110] -- but formal, binding statements or agreements of a Canadian-American variety were no less anathema to him than

were those of an Anglo-Canadian sort.

Although respecting Franklin Roosevelt as an effective politician and appreciating the power of his charming personality,[111] Christie seems to have harbored a certain suspicion of his motives not only toward Canada but toward the world generally. Just after the President's speech at Kingston in August, 1938, for example, Christie wrote not only an official memorandum suggesting some "points to be considered" by the government,[112] but an unofficial note burlesquing the Kingston speech in the following manner.

F.D.R. - Kingston 18, 1938

> "The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give you the assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.

Paraphrase

> To Miss Canada: These dictators have got to be cleaned up. But don't worry about your part of the job. I'll keep an eye on your farm till you get back.
>
> To John Bull: Don't get me wrong. There's no seduction business here. You'll notice I spoke like a Dutch uncle to Little Nell as one of your girls. We family men understand one another and what's good for the girls, and besides it suits me to have her stick around your fireside. The main thing is that I've got to have Hitler and Co. cleaned up. Don't you worry about that either. Go to it and take little Nell along. What! Me? Oh! no, I'm staying home; but I'll look after her farm while she's away. And I'll sell you all the stuff you want from my farm to boot. As my cousin T.[heodore] R.[oosevelt] said to [E.H.] Harriman: "What's the Constitution between friends?"
>
> To Steve Early: Boy, and [sic] I a trader, or am I! You Yankees may know a thing or two about that business, but you can't beat the Dutch.[113]

Christie's unofficial memorandum almost certainly was meant to be as instructive as it was sarcastic. He clearly respected

Roosevelt's talents but he was just as clearly unwilling to trust his intentions or their motivations at face value. "Roosevelt is a Dutchman crossed with a Yankee," he told L.B. Pearson at one point, "and that means tough trading [for Canada] and not maybe."[114]

Augmenting, or perhaps, even causing, Christie's suspicions of Roosevelt was his belief that the power of the United States was so great and still increasing that it was on the verge of becoming the world's dominant state. Behind the realism and self-interest of its neutrality laws, for example, Christie believed lay an eye for the main chance, a controlling idea that held that "even if the United States ultimately failed to avoid implication in the [next] conflict, yet its eventual participation might as a result of the legislation be greatly minimised, both in character and in time, and its relative position and power in the world might in the long run be heightened."[115] The disarray and chaos of the European and international political arena in the late 1930's, Christie wrote, presents such countries as the United States, Russia, and Japan -- it is interesting to note that Christie placed the United States in a category with Russia and Japan, two nations he consistently regarded as expansionary powers -- with "both responsibility and opportunity for either profit or self-denial."

> Especially must this be so for the United States as the greatest concentration of power in the world. In their case, as with others, the whole scene has not failed to stir their aspirations, their ambitions and their doubts. It evokes an increasingly vigorous and sustained debate in the Congress, in the daily and periodical press, and over the radio. Beneath the emotional responses to the "war of ideologies" there is a hard core of preoccupation with their

> strategical necessities and advantages as a state. Their own "Balance of Power" calculations have to be concerned with the world as a whole, and the European division is only one though an important factor. Their military students and historians have been producing a series of illuminating books. The power commanded by the United States is so great beyond precedent that, if mobilised and thrown into one scale or another, it must have great practical consequences. It is not necessarily to be assumed that they will be the consequences intended or will be good consequences or can be clearly foreseen. In the eyes of Central and Western Europe an outstanding practical consequence of 1914-18 has been the upward advance of the United States in the scale of relative power. It seems clear enough that, should a comparable European disaster occur again, a further acceleration of that advance must result whether the United States wished it or not, whether they joined in the battle or not; for the physical factors are such that their participation even at the maximum must be incomparably less exhausting and torturing than that of the Europeans.[116]

Christie's attitude toward the United States between 1935 and 1939, then, was largely circumspect, seeing it as an important influence on Canadian policies, or at least providing a model for and justification of some of the policies he was suggesting for Canada, but not identifying it as a refuge from the storm with which Canada ought to align itself. As has been seen, he was wary both of Roosevelt's ambitions and of the possible international consequences of American decisions regarding its national interests. There is no reason, Christie wrote in regard to the likelihood that self-interestedness would drive American foreign policy decisions, "to suppose that they [the Americans] are somehow different and are not aware of or may be indifferent to the sovereign state and its law of supreme self-interest."[117] Perhaps just as clearly as in regard to his aversion toward commitments to Great Britian, his opposition to closer and more formal ties with the United States underscores

Christie's fundamental belief that Canada must stand alone and decide what was, in fact, in its national interests; acting in conjunction or cooperation with others was perfectly acceptable, acting because others acted was anathema. "Canadians cannot expect," he wrote, "that other communities will find the most favourable position for Canada. They have no compulsion to do so -- that is not their responsibility. Nor can they know how to do it."[118] Christie was wary of the ascendancy of American power, and his attitude toward the United States, and what he believed to be the basis upon which its international actions would be based, reflected that wariness.[119]

Once Again to War: Christie and the Issue of Responsible Government

Despite his efforts to end Canadian participation in the League of Nations and to warn the government away from making prior commitments to either the United Kingdom or the United States, Christie in the period between 1935 and 1939 was unable -- as he knew he would be unable -- to promote the changes he believed were necessary in the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship in order to give the Canadian government complete control over the issues of peace and war. Because this central problem was one which Christie perceived himself unable to influence -- although this perception did not lessen in any degree the frustration he felt over being unable to promote constitutional change[120] -- he accepted as a given the idea that Canada would go to war if Britain did and, instead of railing

against this inevitability, he focused his efforts on limiting Canada's commitments in an attempt to give the government a chance to determine the timing, nature, and extent of its participation. These battles on arms sales, air training, and Imperial Conference resolutions were really the core of his efforts to which everything else took a back seat. Even the major international political, diplomatic, and military events of these four years were not of very much importance to his overall calculations; so long as the existing constitutional relationship was not changed the only thing that mattered for Canada was the advent of war. "Sooner or later the lines of hostile division [in Europe] seem bound to be irrevocably drawn," Christie wrote resignedly, and the individual events that combined to bring the war about were, as a consequence, of relatively little importance.[121] The European events of 1935-1939 therefore drew strong reactions from Christie, but little sustained analytic effort.[122] For the most part, each new European disaster simply provided another occasion upon which to develop his argument that Canada was in a sorry fix because, since the end of the Great War, it had not resolved its constitutional ambiguities.

The underlying tone of Christie's memoranda and correspondence during the 1935 and 1939 period is one of fatalism, a resigned acceptance of the idea that Canada was "constitutionally bound to the European system" and as such had "some of the attributes of a colony and some of those of a Protectorate with part-sovereign status, though on the whole as something not quite either but a new class. But it is a

subordinate class, and of the constitutional link with and dependency on Great Britain, and hence on the European system, there can be no doubt."[123] "Our constitutional advances since colonial days," Christie wrote

> seem to have had the incongruous practical consequence that, while we have no real share in the processes of the European system to which we are tied, we have now in effect a lesser, weaker discretion as regards liability for the cost of its [Europe's] 'legislation [conflicts]'. Colonies were not expected to intervene in Europe, or indeed to look after other colonies as such, though they might interest themselves in the fate of neighboring colonies in their own direct interest. So that we do not by any means stand where we stood [before 1914] as regards [European] liabilities and taxations [that is, Canadian participation in a European conflict]. ...[124]

The constitutional situation left Canada in a position -- as he had repeated over and over again after 1925-1926 -- where it was unabashed pretense to claim that Canada enjoyed full responsible government. "The outstanding circumstance in the present context," Christie wrote defining exactly what the lack of complete responsible government meant, "is that the Canadian community, while occupying a part of North America, are a dependency of the metropolitan state, Great Britain, which exercises the full-sovereign function, and are therefore immediately and automatically affected by or dependent upon the operations of the European system."[125] Canada was therefore dependent on London to make decisions for it "in the most vital field of all ... the issues of peace and war. ..."[126]

Beyond the issues of war and peace, however, Christie believed that there was another significant, and perhaps a more fundamental aspect to this constitutional dependency. He believed that without full self-government Canada would never be

able to direct either its internal or external affairs in a manner that would insure its survival as a nation. "There is good ground for believing," he wrote,

> that the most serious disadvantage of the existing position lies in its effect upon the morale of the community. The lack of full responsible self-government must have a damaging effect upon the character and behaviour of the individual members of the community. The assumption of full political responsibility for their own fate must be regarded as the central, essential condition of impressing an adequate sense of responsibility upon each of the citizens in his measuring of his own state's possibilities and limitations within the world complex of states. A person who is not a self-supporting, fully responsible being -- such as a minor, a ward, or a son not thrown out on the world but living under his father's protection and decisions -- does not measure realistically the world in which he lives. He does not have to, and he gains no experience to show him how. If he is faced with a necessity for significant action all the chances are his effort will be misguided.
>
> The community's assumption of full responsibility for its own fate appears to be the essential condition for breeding self-respect and commanding the respect of other communities. People who have not been through the fires of having to take their own decisions are as unlikely to be listened to by the political rulers of the world as the dilettante in any other sphere. ...
>
> Without responsibility and with no generally accepted, simple, coherent, intelligible idea of their own position in the world, but only a set of largely esoteric and certainly self-contradictory doctrines and abstractions that have to do service instead, plain men everywhere in the community are necessarily baffled and bewildered. The community as a whole is poorly equipped with the power of discrimination in the face of special propagandas from without and of like operations by special or sectional interests inside with their own domestic axes to grind. The youth in our universities and elsewhere are said to be baffled and bewildered by the picture presented to them by the operation of our political institutions. The position is not well calculated to breed in them an intelligent faith and to command understanding loyalties; and it can scarcely be said that they will not need full political manhood and its tests of responsiblitiy when they have to take up the tasks of their coming generation.
>
> The lack of responsibility for its own fate in the world complex must have its effects not only upon the

> community's attempts to deal with its contacts outside; it must have effects on internal affairs. The external life and the internal life, and their experiences, are not really separate things which can be kept and dealt with in separate compartments. Today in Canada many men recognise that internal constitutional readjustments are an imperative essential of "peace, order and good government" in decisive economic, financial and social fields. It is described as a necessity for "re-confederation", for "national unity", and so on. Today exhaustive studies are being made by an able Commission of investigators. But it has to be seriously questioned whether substantial or adequate progress upon this internal program can be expected, so long as the compulsion of the consciousness of final responsibility for their own fate in the world does not exist to force the community and all conscerned to face all things and make the necessary exertions of will. The drive of those who are urging the internal readjustments is to bring about national unity. It may well be the people will want to know to what purpose in the world this unity is to be devoted, and if no clear answer can be made the efforts may encounter great obstacles.[127]

Believing that the gaining of Canadian control over issues of war and peace, and, indeed, over the policies that would result in a more equitable and durable domestic society and economy, required fundamental constitutional change, Christie was able to come up with a ready conclusion regarding the correct form a resolution of "The Canadian Dilemma" should take, but with no means with which to get the country from where it was constitutionally to where he believed that it should be in its own best interests. "What has to be faced," Chrisite concluded forthrightly, "is that the only change that you can be confident will make Canada a really responsible, self-governing community is that she should become an independent, full-sovereign state in the full sense of that status as known to other members of the world political system who enjoy that status."[128] These strong words not withstanding, Christie could not discern a safe and ready path to this end. To reach the goal he thought essential,

he wrote, would require "such a breach with the past, such a breach of the basic legal continuity, [that it] would be in the nature of what within states is called a revolutionary act. It is not a thing that has been or can be done by ordinary political means."[129] This realization was anathema to both his legalistic education and turn of mind, but more especially -- and one of the most enduring hallmarks of progressivism in his thinking -- to his abiding fear of social disorder, the fear of doing "deep violence to the fabric of community life [in Canada]."[130] He believed that to "pitch this fundamental issue into the political arena in Canada would be to produce a disastrous split in the national unity," and as a result of this belief he could do little more than accept the necessity of supporting the status quo and hoping for the best.[131] The situation for Canada as he sketched it in the closing days of 1938 was one from which he could not see a way out in time -- that is, before a war -- to give the government the type of constitutional control he deemed necessary to the country's survival -- it also underlines his own feeling of relative helplessness in this regard.

> ... As regards the change adequate to meet the community's necessities in the light of the probable behaviour of the world political system, so far as the community's ordinary, orderly political processes are concerned, if you attempt any significant action you will precipitate an extraordinary crisis immediately. On the other hand, if it is impracticable to do anything by any means, the community is bound to drift and enter into an extraordinary crisis and trial at some sudden, unpredictable moment, the timing and incidence of which is not in anybody's control. It is difficult to avoid the calculation that, if there is stalemate as regards change adequate to meet the external problems, it must in effect greatly affect the possibilities of producing change adequate to meet internal problems, the problems of "re-confederation". Another practical consequence of the incapacity of the ordinary political

> processes to tackle the problem seems to be that the community is largely deprived of the values in the way of instruction and moderation which are asserted to follow from open and widespread debate and discussion of the common necessities and which are professed to be one of the chief merits of the democratic method.
>
> It appears to be a harsh dilemma. It would seem to be worth a good deal more attention than current discussion seems to be giving it; for if there is anything in this analysis, the Canadian people are entitled to a great deal of sympathy. If "continuity with the past is not a duty but only a necessity", ..., the people's conscience is not involved at any point, and the sympathy might well, therefore, be all the greater. Comfortable solutions are not always available for hard necessities arising from the indifferent, impersonal flow of events, and sometimes they have to be faced without transcendent supports.[132]

Faced with this constitutional impasse, the maintenance of national unity became Christie's nearly exclusive objective during the last few months of peace. The method that he believed should be followed to insure unity, while at the same time allowing the maximum scope for Parliament and the government to decide on the exact nature of Canadian participation, was an immediate official recognition that if Britain was at war Canada was at war.[133] Such a situation would satisfy existing constitutional requirements, and by following the constitution would draw no clear battle lines between the country's imperialists and those who argued for neutrality. In response to two possible alternative courses of action for Canada in the event of war suggested by O.D. Skelton on several occasions during the summer of 1939 -- (A.) recognizing Canada's full belligerent status immediately and proclaim the the War Measures Act; (B.) declining to officially recognize that if Britain was at war Canada was at war, wait for Parliament to direct the government to declare war, and proclaim the War Measures Act in

effect "on the ground of apprehended war as a precautionary or preparatory measure"[134] -- Christie wrote that "I have the strongest possible conviction that A ought to be chosen."[135]

> Alternative A seems the preferable course in spite of the distaste it might cause in many quarters. It avoids formal explicit endorsements, whatever may become politic to say in speeches. It simply accepts the position of the Balfour Memorandum and the Statute of Westminster. That work of systematic action made certain provisions for peacetime functions and relations, but avowedly it did not attempt to cover the war situation. On balance, so far as procedure (not practicality) is concerned, it seems best to let the central legalities take their course. There is a great danger that any attempt to improvise hurriedly a precedure designed to represent an "advance" in our [constitutional] position would in practical consequence represent a retrograde and even a disastrous step. At such a time as this the safest course is that which allows the greatest flexibility and leaves the most doors open, and against this there appears to be only certain considerations concerning status which are themselves of highly doubtful real value.[136]

By following this procedure Christie believed that Canada would make it clear both at home and abroad that it was going to war because of constitutional necessity and was not "intervening to preserve [the] European status quo or to shape European inter-state relations and boundaries."[137] Canada's role in the war would therefore be, Christie wrote on the last day of August 1939

> 6. ... Reduced to a fight, so far as Europe is concerned, on behalf of another member of [the] British Commonwealth of Nations which has got into a fight in its own region.
>
> 7. This means the object is the defence of that member's integrity (i.e., U.K.) and Canada's fight could not fairly be carried beyond that object -- e.g., the defence of U.K. integrity does not necessarily involve either the support of [the] U.K.'s ideas of readjustments, boundaries and legislation to be imposed upon Europe or the defence of all the Imperial possessions of the U.K.
>
> 8. The European war in which the U.K. has participated in producing will create a situation involving the direct defence of Canada.

> 9. Canadian resources and action will have to meet this situation.
>
> 10. More broadly, this involves the situation of the region of which Canada is a member, namely, the North American region, or perhaps it should be considered as the Western Hemisphere.
>
> 11. This necessitates measuring Canada's objectives and action with careful relation to her position, present and future, in the Americas. ...
>
> 13. Considering that Europe as a whole and its political system are now plainly discredited and that the greatest doubt must be entertained as to its future, Canada, while still significantly linked to that system, will be driven to recognise the paramount claims of the real facts arising from her actual existence in North America and her doorstep on the Pacific and Asia, and no government today should shape its statements or program on any basis that says we are intervening to shape or reshape the European system and its boundaries, still less that says we have an obligation to that end, like "the last dollar and the last man" of 1914.[138]

To meet these circumstances Canada's war effort should center on the defence of Canada -- focussing on coastal defence, coastal trade routes, and internal security -- and only thereafter on cooperation with the United Kingdom. Significantly -- and consistently given the nature of his writings between 1926 and 1939 -- Christie urged that cooperation with Britain be concentrated on the defence of Newfoundland and the West Indies and defending the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom proper through providing supplies of all sorts and particularly air force units.[139] If Christie had had his way -- and he believed that following the above mentioned Alternative A would have established this as a legitimate option for the government -- there would have been no Canadian Expeditionary Force, the Canadian army would have remained entirely in Canada executing duties pertaining to internal security and coastal defense.

The international issues of the period between 1935 and 1939 effected Canada so directly, eventually leading it to war, Christie believed, because Anglo-Canadian constitutional relations were not adequately addressed via a Canadian constitutional convention after the Great War. The great European events of the period, the rise of fascism, and the advent of Nazi military agression were not matters, he believed, which would have involved Canada directly if it had not been for its transoceanic constitutional link. Faced with the reluctance of Canadians and their political leaders to treat what he considered this central, pervasive issue, Christie worked until the start of the war to provide the government with some scope to decide on the nature and extent of the participation which would be a legal necessity. Neither an isolationist nor a neutralist, Chrisite might best be described in this period as seeking to protect what he deemed to be the country's pre-eminent self-interest, national unity, through a rather bald and decidedly legalistic analysis of the problems confronting Canada and a range of possible solutions aimed at preventing a rupture in the country's social fabric which would disrupt the order and stability of the community, perhaps even threatening its continued existence as an unique political entity.

Christie's efforts in the four years before the war, and indeed throughout the interwar decades, were predicated on the single goal of preserving the Canadian nation and were conducted in a thoughtful and sober manner. "Meanwhile, with that kind of prospect [that is, social disruption in the event of war] at

least a measurable possibility." Christie wrote in a passage of a late 1938 memorandum which neatly summed up the nature of his efforts following his return to the Department of External Affairs,

> it is believed that it is always a good thing, in whatever sphere of activity, political or otherwise, to try to measure as best you can what your position actually is, what your commitments and resources are, and what avenues may appear practical and what ones are not practical to meet the possible troubles inherent in your position, the worst ones not excluded; and that it is also a good thing to lay such things down for private discussion without blinking. If you can do that you may at least save a good deal of otherwise wasted thinking, emotion and action while at best you may unexpectedly come upon perspectives opening up passable avenues.
>
> As former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Lord Salisbury, once gave the advice, "Never let your diplomacy outrun your resources". This may be taken to mean resources in morale as well as in material. As regards a political problem, it may be taken also as an attempt to measure and admit to the simple underlying principles that may safely be invoked in the handling of human nature in any community committed to democratic, representative institutions, whatever the formal structure and trappings may be. In this stormy transitional period of human affairs Lord Salisbury's advice may not be bad advice for Canadians in their negotiations and activities both in their external and in their internal affairs.
>
> Men entrusted with the management of other people's affairs are not entitled to look far beyond their own day, nor to base decisions upon apocalyptic pictures of future generations that may have caught their personal fancy. About all they can do as events force decisions upon them is to try as best they can to extract from the past and from the experience of their own day such practical guides and rules for the safe handling of the materials at hand by the instruments at hand as seem most valid for each successive emergency; to submit to these rigorously in their day to day conduct of affairs; and leave it at that. They are not bound to imagine that their successors will be completely helpless and incompetent men.[140]

Chapter VII: Notes

1.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 21, Folder 74, p. 19841, L.C. Christie, Random Notes. Ideologies, June, 1936.

2.) Christie believed, the constitutional situation being what it was, that there was little Canada could do, by taking a more active role at Geneva or in international affairs generally, to make its participation in the next war less likely. "So far as a 'constructive' line is concerned," he wrote in the fall of 1936,

> "anyone speaking as a Canadian, private or official, has in reality no scope. In spite of the mystical facade of resolutions, formulas and ideas erected by politicians and pundits, he sees that he has no real responsibility. The dynamics of the so-called Commonwealth, League, alliances, etc., are such that all that matters is London's decision. The last word is there; the rulers there are responsible to their own people, who alone can call them to account; and while they doubtless do their best to take account of other peoples' positions, yet they are bound to do this from the point of view of their own peoples' interests and safety, and at the final moment of decision that must prevail. All that Canada can do is disclose as honestly as possible the realities of her own position (which may sometimes turn out to have an indirect influence on certain trends elsewhere) and to refrain from direct advice or demands of a compromising nature.
>
> As for immediate practicalities, one has to work on the assumption of a 1st class war in, say '37 or '38 or '39. So far as Canada's action is concerned, if Great Britain gets into the fight, it hardly matters a damn what policy London pursues in the meantime. Whatever your line, 'hold the ring', 'collective security' or what not, we will probably get into the fight -- to what extent it's not much use attempting to reckon; and we will probably have an internal mess -- of what proportion no one knows. On this score about all a Canadian can do is await the shaping of the event and hope that wits will be bright and cool enough to prevent disunity here on top of the catastrophe elsewhere."

This rather fatalistic view remained Christie's fundamental operating assumption between 1935 and 1939. He did, however, as will be seen, attempt to discern and then shape the manner in and the extent to which Canada would participate in the war. See, PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, pp. 23958-23959, L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 20 October 1936.

3.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 12 December 1938.

4.) Christie put little if any stock in the significant

alterations that were made to the legal relations between Great Britain and the Dominions during the interwar years. The Statute of Westminster, for example, is mentioned several times but only in passing in the body of his papers. Likewise, the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation (ODL), whose report mandated such substantial legal changes as invalidating the Colonial Laws Validity Act as it applied to the Dominions and ending Westminster's ability to legislate for the Dominions without their permission or to disallow or reserve Dominion legislation, and which contained the initial draft of the Statute of Westminster, is alluded to only once in Christie's papers. For Christie, somewhat illogically given his legal training and turn of mind, all of the above amounted to nothing more than inconsequential constitutional tinkering because he did not believe that any of the measures fundamentally altered the Dominions' inability to control the issues of peace and war. For three very helpful essays on the legal and constitutional modifications flowing from the ODL Conference, as well as a look at how those changes were viewed from three separate Dominions, namely, Canada, the Irish Free State, and New Zealand, see Norman Hillmer, "The ODL, 1929: A Neglected Imperial Conference," Bulletin of Canadian Studies, 6/7, (Autumn, 1983), pp. 15-24, and David Harkness, "Patrick McGilligan: Man of the Commonwealth," and Angus Ross, "New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster," both in Norman Hillmer and Philip Wigley, (eds.). The First British Commonwealth. London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd, 1980, pp. 117-135 and 136-158.

5.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, p. 24145, L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935.

6.) Ibid. Although Christie believed that Canada would be at war if Britain was at war, he did think that there was a difference in what Canada's commitment would be if it entered the war as part of the British Commonwealth only or as a member of both the Commonwealth and the League. In the case of the former, he believed that Ottawa would have at least a chance to determine the timing, nature, and extent, of its war effort, but in the latter case he believed it would, as in 1914, be an all-out effort from the start. "I have heard it suggested that this [the idea of limiting Canada's commitments by withdrawing from the League] is all academic," Christie wrote,

> "because we are bound by the Imperial nexus anyhow and the League nexus will only come to the same thing in practice. I am unable to follow that. The League nexus may carry a whole host of commitments -- as to the terms of the alliance, the sense of our intervention in Europe, the time and sense in which pressure is relaxed, the terms of peace, and so on -- which do not necessarily flow from the other nexus at all. At Geneva, with its written constitution and esoteric arts of interpretation now so extremely developed, the chances of defining and controlling the sense of our

intervention would, I am sure, be a very different thing.

> Then there is the psychological disadvantage: The machine started by an appeal that means one thing there [the interests of the European Great Powers], but accepted by so many Canadians because they think it means something else [collective security under the League]: the sluice way deliberately maintained and greased at our own expense from beginning to end for what is and will be essentially a vicious European propaganda.
>
> They [the European Great Powers through the League] can force us to a meeting whenever it suits them. That is automatic. I see an unbearable incongruity of a spectacle of a Canadian delegation put on the spot in Geneva at such a time in such a cause; roped perhaps by the technique of the 'silent vote'; with all the circumstances of haste and hysteria, the hole and corner itself, the demands for instantaneous instructions from the Cabinet in Ottawa, and so on. Some incongruities have to be put up with, I do not believe this one has to be."

Shed of its membership in the League therefore, Canada would be once again in a position -- even if Britain entered a war under Geneva's auspices -- to take advantage of "a certain detachment ... [which] permits a certain leisurely deliberation without national risk." See PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 191, Folder 1783, pp. C-134149-134151, L.C. Christie, Re Draft Notes on "Canadian Policy Regarding the League of Nations," 17 March 1938.

7.) Although by the 1930s Christie had concluded that it was more important to factor in American than British concerns when formulating Canadian foreign policy, he was unwilling to make arrangements with either nation that might lead to a situation wherein an act of aggression or provocation by another nation could commit Canada to hostilities automatically. A good example of the pervasiveness of Christie's abhorence of prior commitments in even seemingly minor matters is available in his reaction to a suggestion by an American diplomat that Canada should consider joining with the United States in addressing a problem posed by Japanese fishermen in the Northern Pacific. In January, 1938 Christie met in Ottawa with American officials who were interested in enlisting Canadian participation in a plan to exclude Japanese fishermen from the salmon fishery in Alaskan waters. In response, Christie admitted that there was some apprehension among Canadian fishing interests that the Japanese might move into the halibut fishery in British Columbian waters if they depleted the salmon stocks off Alaska. He concluded, however, that his government deemed any such joint action premature because "Canadian interests have not thus far been directly affected by Japanese fishing." Christie bid the American farewell by leaving the option of cooperation open, but making it clear that a decision by Ottawa to join such a scheme

would have to await the direct involvement of Canadian interests. Christie consistently argued that prior commitments to aggressive actions -- even down to the seemingly innocuous level of forcibly removing foreign fishermen from domestic fishing grounds -- should be avoided resolutely. Just as he feared Canada's being dragged into war in Europe as a result of its constitutional ties to Britain, Christie feared any ties with the United States that might lead Canada into war as a result of a quarrel between the Americans and the Japanese. For the discussion on the fisheries question see FRUS, 1939, Volume II op. cit., pp. 169-179, Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Leo D. Sturgeon of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. 28 January 1938.

8.) Escott Reid Papers, L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 30 October 1936. Despite the contentions of Professors Granatstein and Bothwell there is little evidence to suggest that Christie "was a confirmed isolationist" who "went so far in his resistance of foreign entanglements as to suggest autarky as a desirable end ot Canadian policy." Their sourcing for these assertions claims that "Christie wrote many lengthy memorandums on Canadian foreign policy. Those that best express his thought are 'The Canadian Dilemma' November, 1938 and 'Responsible Government: The Last Stage', 1926...." Neither of these memoranda, nor any of Christie's "many" others, however, prove that he was a confirmed isolationist. Much less do they even remotely reflect a proponent of autarky. Christie never accepted isolationism as a viable foreign policy for Canada. Indeed, he did not believe that Canada could make fundamental decisions in the field of external policy unless the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship was redefined to give Ottawa exclusive control over the "lever of war." This sort of exclusive responsibility -- not isolationism or autarky -- was the major theme of Christie's "many" memoranda. From first to last, Christie believed that so long as the Anglo-Canadian constitiutional statu quo was maintained, isolationism for Canada was not only a legal impossibility but also a policy that was potentially disastrous for the country's social order and sense of national unity. See J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, III, 2 (January, 1975), 213 and 230, note 6.

9.) Christie believed that neutrality for Canada -- although probably possible theoretically -- would be a disastrous step because it would not change Canada's basic constitutional relationship with Britain and because it would deeply divide Canadian society. "I dislike and distrust these nostrums like [J.S.] Woodsworth's 'right to neutrality,'" Chritie wrote in the spring of 1939.

> "They seem to me bad advice to the people of Canada -- bad medicine -- illusory -- chloroform. They are trifling with a very serious business. They would lull people by obscuring the fact that they completely sidestep the real

thing -- i.e., they in no way affect the present position that the conduct of foreign affairs or foreign policy leading us to the issue of peace or war is left (and, given the legalities, has to be left) in the hands of the U.K. ...

We cannot sidestep the rules laid down by the world of states. There is only one way to get full responsible Government -- to become a responsible people -- to be free to decide our own fate -- to get a capacity to measure our diplomacy and action according to our strategic realities and our resources (or even pretend we are making a contribution to civilisation) -- i.e., become a full sovereign state in every sense as fixed and accepted by the world of states. I do not like to see people promoting a movement that undertakes to advise the people of Canada that they can get these things any other way. If anything is to be done for the people they ought to at least be told the whole truth and be assured of their title deeds.

The 'right to neutrality' is no more than the 'right to secede'. In a loose sense we can say we have the 'right' to secede if we want to. It is not so much a 'right' as a political power or privilege and actual material capacity which we are confident would not be challenged, or could [not] be successfully challenged, if we made up our minds to exercise it. But when you speak of a 'right' you ordinarily mean that there is an established and well understood process by which we can get the substance of it. To lay down merely that you have a 'right to neutrality' without drawing up the full process by which you can effectively exercise it in an orderly way, seems to be trifling with people. And I do not see how anyone can expect to command the respect either of our own people or of the peoples of the other parts of the Commonwealth, or of foreign peoples, through a program which says we have 'common citizenship' but want such a 'right' and want to exercise it only, if at all, at the moment of danger. ...

The debate on these things seems to be badly vitiated because many of the proponents will not or cannot say what they are really driving at. They are driven to saying or implying or hinting that, while they want the 'right', they do not mean to exercise it.

Some of them say this would be a 'step'. They seem to think that by a series of 'steps' they can put a fast one over on the peoples of Canada and, as a result, we will some morning wake up a sovereign state and a fully responsible people. I do not believe there are such 'steps. ... I am quite sure they cannot slip over on the people unawares something that absolutely requires the most deliberate and fundamental act of will which a people can take.

I am sure the thing they have in mind -- if they have

in mind responsible government -- cannot be reached by our ordinary political processes, parliamentary or party. It is a thing requiring substantially common consent. To attempt it by ordinary, majority-rule, parliamentary processes would do irreparable harm to our democratic fabric. ..."

While rejecting the option of neutrality because of the existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship, Christie may have pictured neutralism as an ideal model for Canadian foreign policy if the constitutional problems could have been resolved to the general satisfaction of the country. That he would have ever pressed for a neutralist policy seems doubtful, however, because even with the exclusive constitutional control he long desired Christie would have continued to respect the emotional and sentimental attachments of many Canadians to Britain and to fear the resulting divisive influence a neutralist policy would have had on national unity. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 821, File 700, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 2 March 1939, and Ibid., RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1803, File 731, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 2 March 1939.

10.) Christie uses this phrase as the subtitle to his memorandum entitled "Notes on the European Crisis." See L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., p. 24126.

11.) L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 20 October 1936, op. cit., p. 23958.

12.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., pp. 24128 and 24132-24133.

13.) Ibid., p. 24133.

14.) Ibid., pp. 24133-24134.

15.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 715, File 4, Vol. 4, L.C. Christie, League of Nations: Proposed Program for Canadian Representatives, 4 November 1936. Christie described his interpretation of the absurd extent and nature of Canada's committment to the League under its current method of operation in a manner fairly dripping with venom. "So that, when a 'sacred-schoolman [that is, a champion of the League as an institution to preserve peace through the use of economic and/or military sanctions] addresses a group of Canadians, warning them not to be welshers," he wrote,

"and someone asks him just what obligation Canada did undertake, he must really reply: 'My friends, I cannot tell you. No one in Canada can tell you. No one anywhere can tell you -- not even in Europe. When the time comes the European Great Powers, who are running the League, will say, first, whether they want to start the machine, and then, from time to time, how fast and how far to run it. They control so much of what is needed to make it go that without

their say-so it can't go; though your things help. If they start, you start. If they don't, you don't. Where they go, you go. When they stop, you stop. What they do at any moment depends on what their various neighbors are doing and thinking. That, my friends is your obligation as nearly as anyone can tell you today. But if you don't come across when it suits them, you are a welsher. I thank you.'

In other words, you can contribute force or coercion of some kind, but your contribution of intelligence or opinion about policy and the settlement must be negligible, for that depends on what the machine has done and can do, which you don't control."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 21, Folder 74, pp. 19838-19839, LC. Christie, Random Notes. Ideologies, June, 1936.

16.) Ibid., p. 19840.

17.) Ibid.

18.) L.C. Christie, Notes Re the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., p. 24147. Christie believed that since 1919 the nations of Europe had made virtually no progress toward the derogation of state sovereignty which alone could make the League's system of collective security through sanctions workable. Indeed, he argued that the Europeans had made the League another vehicle through which to achieve their individual aims. The League therefore was entirely under their control and non-European members were more or less only along for the ride, committed to participate in League actions -- which would be decided on by the European powers only -- but unable to contribute effectively to pre-sanction deliberations. "Europeans -- or certain elements of Europe --," Christie argued,

"have set up a legalistic conception which they call 'the framework of the League'. This they have filled in with a sort of re-inforced concrete -- a network of special multi-lateral and bi-lateral arrangements. They have done this independently of the non-European members, who cannot even be sure that the complete file of all the arrangements has been registered at Geneva; though they can be morally certain all the notes of the resulting multi-lateral or bi-lateral general staff conversations have not been registered. No living man can say what these treaties, taken together, really mean legally and get anything like substantial agreement on his view. Nor could any Court. They are drawn by legal draftsmen; but their real content and consequences are purely in the political realm. One wholly natural consequence of the network is to produce a majority in the Council of the League whenever motions upon certain issues are allowed to reach the stage of formal consideration by the Council. The issue may take the form of a legal interpretation and judgment or it may take

another form; but in essence the decision is political and the majority is assured by the operation of the network. ...

Europe is still struggling to legislate for her regime by such a system of treaties. It is a kind of 'law' that defies calculation and predictability in operation so far as reason goes. It is unintelligible to the ordinary man and can only be effectively used to inflame national emotions. No one can tell when these may get beyond control. Though the 'legislation' may be seen by intelligent Europeans to have been unrealistic in conception and to have become unworkable in practice, inflamation is the ordinary outcome; there being no process for orderly constitutional revision. ..."

Christie believed that such a overlaying of a system of treaties on the League of Nation's framework only served to reinforce traditional conceptions of sovereignty and thereby make the interstate cooperation necessary for the achievement of any real form of collective security even more impossible. "The nature or consequences of the sovereign state cannot be altered by treaties," he wrote. "The agencies of these supreme creatures cannot by mere agreement amongst themselves really affect their masters constitution nor the human consequences that flow from it." For Christie, this situation served to prove that the Europeans were not prepared to deal with the question of sovereignty because "you can't get that derogation [of sovereignty] by mere treaty between the existing state structures. You have to conceive of new structures." "If the Europeans were really in earnest," he concluded,

"about what they call 'collective security' and 'sanctions', they would intellectually be ready for the necessary drastic changes in their state structures, -- the changes by which alone you can organise the new intellectual conception ... and give it flesh and blood and life."

See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 715, File 4-volume 2, L.C. Christie, Notes on Majority Rule in the League, 16 March 1936; PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 764, File 284, vol. 5, L.C. Christie, "Reform of the League": Canada's Position Addendum, 9 September 1936; and, Escott Reid Papers, L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 25 October 1935.

19.) L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 25 October 1935, op. cit. Christie believed that the proponents of the League of Nations system had confused the peoples of its member states by leading them to believe that something new had been created at Geneva that could deal with the world's problems in much the same way as an individual government dealt with its domestic problems. Christie believed that there was really no basis for such a belief and that the Covenant had really changed nothing in so far as relations between sovereign states were concerned. In a

memorandum discussing a motion made in the House of Commons urging Mackenzie King's government to demand that the League live up to the aims of the Covenant -- such as, the quick application of sanctions against aggressors, the devising of methods and agreements to reduce armaments, and the inauguration of an international system of "open diplomacy" -- or threaten that Canada would, in the words of the motion, "refuse to participate in any foreign war no matter who the belligerents may be," Christie outlined the confusion which he believed the League's advocates had foisted on the world. "Common sense, on merely looking at all this, will say that the sense of proportion is lacking somewhere. Where?," Christie asked,

> "... [The] keynote of the motion is prohibition, pains and penalties, force, threat, ultimatum. All very well in domestic affairs where you have real law and legislatures and machinery of equity; though even there wise statesmanship is circumspect about such methods. But this [relations at the League] is not domestic. The stuff the mover [of the motion] demands we deal with comprises sovereign states -- nominally 50 or 60, but really for practical purposes 7 Great Powers -- all dominated in their structure and mode of action and in their peoples' minds by well-marked traditional conceptions of exclusive state sovereignty. Your process is not really motion, bill, debate, enactment, writ of summons, impartial court, judgment, sheriff, customary general submission, all operating on the individual citizen. Instead all you have is negotiation, conciliation, persuasion, operating on governments of sovereign states -- representing [an] immense variety of needs and standards of conduct -- requiring long patient study of what you can offer to them to get what you want -- all this in issues great and small."

Because nothing had changed since 1914 and the world was still run through relations between sovereign states, and in no way through a super-government based at Geneva, Christie believed that the proponents of the League as a new system of international order and security "have a heavy responsibility today. They have propogated a set of phrases and generalities, and these phrases thus held out as a promise and encouragement, have profoundly moved many people everywhere, leading them to believe that, with no substantial or revolutionary alteration of their cherished ideas and forms of government, but rather through some relatively simple and feasible manipulations of the three score existing state sovereignties, they can hope to attain their aspirations toward a world of order and justice and equity. A primrose path to the promised land!" See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 21, Folder 74, p. 19866, L.C. Christie, Mr. Douglas's Motion on the League of Nations, 17 February 1936, and L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 25 October 1935, op. cit.

20.) L.C. Christie, "Reform of the League"; Canada's Position Addendum, 9 September 1936, op. cit.

21.) Ibid. "Consider the tremendous propaganda inflicted on the people during recent years as a result of the failure to consider these distinctions (between traditional alliances and federations);" Christie wrote,

> "The panopoly of phrases -- charged with hope and deliverance -- and yet inapplicable and false in the existing context -- e.g. 'law', 'law enforcement', 'law abiding state', 'law breaker', aggressor', 'third-party judgment', 'policeman', and so on. These analogies between the citizen in the state and the state in the international complex [are] fatally misleading. No safe analogy between a policeman dealing with an individual delinquent and great armies, navies and air squadrons dealing with a whole people or group of peoples -- the authority, intention, the checks and balances behind the policeman, the law and rules under which alone he can be invoked, the method, predictability, controllability and physical and emotional consequences of his action -- all put his job in an utterly different sphere from that of the cataclysmic action of great armed forces meeting each other at war.
>
> The possibilities of disaster [are] inherent in this propaganda; the danger of doing as great a disservice to mankind as any propaganda now loose in the world. If they really meant what these phrases say, they would be ready mentally and emotionally to tackle the anarchy inherent in the sovereign states and to lead their people to go on, within feasible areas, to organise some form of true federalism. If they do not mean that, they are holding out hopes calculated to lead the people to failure and disaster."

See Ibid.

22.) Ibid.

23.) Ibid.

24.) Ibid.

25.) Ibid.

26.) Christie was not a champion of the concept of individual state sovereignty, far from it, but he did advocate, as always, facing the world as you found it and not as you wished it was. Indeed, he wrote, in 1936, "[i]f people must have someone to blame and burn [for the League failing to live up to expectations], let them try digging up, for example, the long line of jurists, national and international, who have conceived and built up the intractable conceptions of sovereignty and nationalism which today dominate the human scene."

"By a process of accretion, with alternating contributions from the opportunisms of diplomacy and the fundamentalisms of the juridical world, the conception of the sovereign state and its intellectual and emotional consequences have reached an extremity of mysticism and absurdity which is now indistinguishable from insanity, as any plain ordinary traveller, trader or diplomatist nowadays knows. ... From this central obsession -- which in many ways has become an inviable sanctum -- the germ of madness has flowed out into the people's minds all over the earth; as may be seen in every other news despatch and editorial today."

For many reasons -- including the modern means of communication and transportation which allowed nation-states to get at each other much more easily and damagingly than in the past -- Christie believed that the conception of sovereignty was anachronistic and dangerous. He did not, however, expect to see its early demise. "I shall not pretend to give," he told Escott Reid,

"or try to give, the whole reason for the survival, but I rather think the greatest responsibility should be laid at the door of the thinkers in this field [of sovereignty], the international jurists, the domestic jurists, the Austinians in the English speaking world and their opposite numbers elsewhere. Our trouble comes from riding their intellectual conception to the bitter end, just as other intellectual conceptions called religions have dished mankind before this. Only an intellectual conception can lift us out of the mess."

Not surprisingly, Christie the lawyer turned from the legal conception of sovereignty to the legal conception of federalism as the basis on which the international system could pull itself "out of the mess." "But to raise the question, how [to] promote co-operation between peoples thus separately organised within the well known concept of the sovereign state," Christie contended,

"is simply to call up an equally well known political invention -- one known and partially explored and solved in various regions, where people were once organised in separate sovereign states -- e.g., England and Scotland; Germany; Switzerland; United States; Canada; Australia; South Africa; and in essence Russia and India know it -- the device of federalism in its broadest sense. ...

"[I]f you are to create a bond capable of replacing the anarchy inherent in the exclusive sovereign state, you have to conceive something in the nature of true federalism -- a bond between peoples -- with its coherent, firm systematising of responsibility, authority, loyalty, order, debate, equitable relief by legislature and courts, and so on.

Along such lines you find automatically the answer to all the obstacles noted above [regarding sovereignty]; you do not have to idealise war; you find an intelligible and manageable basis for approaching what today are regarded as insuperable political and economic inequities and tensions between states; you have the basis for faith between peoples that justice and equity will be done as between them.

The nature of true federalism [is] indicated by the derivation of the word. 'Federal': from foedus, covenant; cognate with fides, faith (etymologically they have a common ancestor). It concerns arrangements between peoples -- fair means calculated to make it likely that they can have and keep faith in one another -- covenanting between peoples, not between states."

For Christie, a generally emotionally undemonstrative and realistic individual, federalism was one of the few topics that struck his imagination and passions. He did not for a second believe that the displacement of the conception of sovereignty was possible in the foreseeable future, and he did not base his judgments on the possibility of its early demise. He did, however, see federalism as a sort of ultimate salvation for an international system characterized by recurrent warfare and tension. For Christie federalism was a system that is "(given good will) at least conceivable within the realm of political thought and experience as a pathway to an ordered regime by voluntary and civilised agreement. ..." Also, in his belief in the eventual applicability of federalism to the international system lies one of the strongest bases on which his friendships with Frankfurter and Lord Lothian were built. For the foregoing see L.C. Christie, "Reform of the League": Canada's Position Addendum, 9 September 1936, op. cit., and L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 25 October 1935, op. cit.

27.) L.C. Christie, "Reform of the League": Canada's Position Addendum, 9 September 1935, op. cit. Christie believed that the nature of the sovereign state ruled out the formulation of any sort of a set, consistent foreign policy because the fundamental goal of such entities -- which Christie termed "self-perpetuation" -- was best served by an ability to adapt to the unpredictable course of international events. In his remarks on a draft of Escott Reid's essay entitled "Mr. Mackenzie King's Foreign Policy, 1935-1936" -- later published in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science for February, 1937 -- Christie emphasized this need for flexibility and the consequent impossibility of crafting a single, consistent foreign policy. "But about all this sort of thing [that is, discussions of foreign policy] I have an initial reservation -- a sort of caveat," Christie told Reid.

"We talk about Mr. X's [King's] foreign 'policy', Canada's foreign 'policy', and so on. What are we driving at? Do we

picture some definite completely articulated course of action drawn up on a blueprint and filed away for future reference? A.J. Balfour once said: 'England never has had a policy, has no policy, and never will have a policy.' There is indeed a certain unreality in attempting to attribute something called policy to these vast soulless creatures called sovereign states whose inner compulsion must needs be simply the business of self-perpetuation. They act on something that is perhaps like instinct, and from a bird's-eye view of each one's behaviour one may discern a kind of consistency according to its circumstances. The individual statesman's 'policy' seems to be a sort of guess or calculation. The creature is his master. One makes the bold assumption that he can do something to steer it; and makes the much easier assumption that his intentions are good and broadly speaking are one's own intentions. He is then perpetually confronted with the problem of penetrating the inner mystery both of his own master-creature and of others who are part of the environment. The environment is perpetually changing and so his attempt to define the specific means of carrying out the broad intention has to undergo a perpetual sort of restatement and refinement in order to correct calculations that have turned out to be off the mark, to take account of new conditions, and so on."

Implicit in this exposition, of course, is Christie's belief that prior commitments -- be they to the League or to Great Britain -- limited Canada's ability to insure its "self-perpetuation" and were therfore to be avoided. See L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 30 October 1936, op. cit.

28.) L.C. Christie, League of Nations: Proposed Program for Canadian Representatives, 4 November 1936, op. cit.

29.) Ibid.

30.) In regard to the specific situation and circumstances surrounding the Italo-Ethiopian crisis in the fall of 1935 Christie found himself, along with O.D. Skelton, in opposition to Prime Minister Bennett's desire to have Canada support the League's plans to impose economic sanctions on Italy. Christie considered all sanctions anathema, and said that the distinction between economic and military sanctions was one of "extreme uncertainty" and carried with it the "dangers of people drugging themselves with phrases." "Let us not muffle and obscure what we are doing," Christie argued. "'Economic sanctions' are not mere commercial measures. They are in design, intention and reality a means of imposing the will of one nation or group upon another nation or group -- i.e., they are of the nature of war." In the developing Ethiopian crisis in October, 1935, Christie almost certainly hoped to cause the delay of a Canadian decision in regard to participating in sanctions until after the general election of that month which seemed destined to return the Liberals and Mackenzie King, thereby sounding the death knell for

an activist pro-sanctions policy by Canada. In the meantime, Christie believed that if Bennett felt honor-bound to join in the League's sanctions the Department of External Affairs should do its best to circumscribe the terms of Canadian participation to the point where the country would actually be committed to very little and, more importantly, no precedent for future Canadian action would be set. "If sanctions are adopted at Geneva," he suggested to Skelton, "and the Canadian Government feel compelled, before meeting Parliament, to take a decision to join -- [we should] consider the incorporation, in Canada's declaration, of stipulations or reservations of the following nature:

> "(1.) No participation by Canada in military sanctions or in any blockade.
>
> (2.) No Canadian action to be considered until all European members have, in the opinion of Canada, actually and seriously commenced action.
>
> (3.) Canadian participation in other sanctions to be defined by Canada with special regard for her special geographical position and interests.
>
> (4.) Safeguards against Canadian action imposing upon Canada a more onerous burden than European members, or any of them accept.
>
> (5.) Any Canadian action to be without prejudice to a reconsideration, after this experiment, of the whole question of sanctions and of the proper relation of non-European members to European incidents."

The first four of the above provisions probably would have made Canada's decision to participate in sanctions relatively harmless in the period prior to King's election. The fifth would have given the new Prime Minister scope for what Christie expected him to do, namely, to prohibit any further Canadian participation in League-sponsored sanctions. These qualifications, Christie thought, would give the country a chance of avoiding immediate and all-out participation in a new European war. "Even if Canada is to be pitched in [to a war] to some extent," he told Skelton, "I still think there is an opening for her to do a little bit for sanity [by qualifying her acceptance of sanctions]. ... It's far better and safer to be in a position of starting as near sanity as possible and to be pushed up to insanity rather than the reverse." See L.C. Christie, Mr. Douglas's Motion on the League of Nations, 17 February 1936, op. cit., pp. 19868-19869; PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1719, File 927-II, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 7 October 1935; and, Ibid., File 927-III, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 28 October 1935. For the two best accounts of the Ethiopian crisis from the Canadian perspective see James Eayrs. In Defence of Canada. Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament. Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 1965, pp. 3-33, and C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit., pp. 179-190.

31.) Christie's attitude toward Germany appears to have been a combination of feeling that the Germans had some grounds for resenting the terms of the Versailles Treaty -- which he argued resulted in the occupation, [and] constant bedevillment" of Germany by the Allies, a practice that made "government impossible and hatred certain" -- and not believing that even a much revitalized Germany presented as great a threat to the safety and stability of Europe as some others claimed. He believed that the Versailles settlement had been too harsh on the vanquished and as a result "the story of resurgent Germany ... [is in part] the story of the 'Dissatisfied peoples.' The journalist John A. Stevenson later recalled that Christie considered some of Germany's actions in Europe in the 1930s as simply attempts to reassert its interests as a Great Power which had been denied or ignored in 1919. In depicting a rather acrimonious meeting of an informal dining club to which both he and Christie belonged, Stevenson described Christie's attitude clearly.

> "There was one very painful meeting of the [dining] club during the time just before the calamitous pact of Munich when Christie argued powerfully that Hitler in his moves for the incorporation of the part of Czechoslvakia inhabited by Germans and called the Sudetenland into the German Reich was doing only what the British had done in S.[outh] Africa, when in 1899 they had goaded President Kruger into war for the purpose of bringing the Transvaal and the Orange Free State under British rule and he maintained that Canada should not join in a war for the suppression of Hitler. None of the other members present agreed with his views and used very harsh words in their condemnation of them."

"They [the Germans] were simply following our [Britain's] precedent," Stevenson later explained that Christie concluded, "in using their power to incorporate into their empire two minor states [Czechoslovakia and Austria] which were a nuisance to them."

Neither did Christie believe that Germany was powerful enough to be able to dominate Europe, let alone the rest of the world. Britain, however, appeared to be operating on just such an assumption and was thereby taking a chance of being dragged into war over a threat of German domination that was based, in his opinion, more on myth than reality. "I would drop all Locarno business in any event," Christie told Lothian in suggesting what he thought was a more sensible basis for British foreign policy,

> "still more when the French are hooked to the Russians (the most vicious thing in post-war Europe). Perhaps this is academic; perhaps you don't drop it; perhaps you are already

hooked by the League nexus and other writings and incantations.

But if you could assume a clean slate, or could somehow wipe it off, where is the case for writing on it at this juncture? The Low Countries and Channel Ports line? Is not the case there somethng like this: not that you have to guarantee Dutchmen, Belgians and Frenchmen possession of that coast absolutely and forever (if that were so you ought to federate with them); but that the North Sea coasts should not fall into the hands of a great naval and military Power? Does such a Power exist today? Such a Power may develop? Can you trust anyone to know this so certainly as to justify the 'preventive war' gamble? Does it not assume the strong probability of a naval and military Power dominating all Europe and from the base of the central plateau being able to reach out and dominate the world? Is this reality or is this fantasy? It was perhaps intelligible in dynastic times, but can you, in this industrial age, really imagine the 66,000,000 Germans pulling it off? Could they be managed and driven along such a line? Could they themselves manage the peoples of Europe as a machine to such an end? Rulers in Germany and the rest of Europe have to carry their people's minds in one way or another. The technique varies as the kind of machine varies, but they all have to get and keep the consent of the people.

For myself I remain deeply sceptical both of the theorem itself and of any leader who is so confident of his own omniscience as to be ready to stake his people on the preventive gamble it involves.

How much myth is there in it? There seems to be a myth of German invincibility. Recently I read a bit about witches and myths. The Germans seems to be so deeply bitten by a myth about a Jewish power of evil magic as to attribute to 600,000 Jews in Germany a power to corrupt and manage 66,000,000 Germans (or whatever the number is). Victors throughout history have attributed superior magic to the conquered. The world seems to have developed notions about the magic of 66,000,000 Germans."

See L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., p. 24136; L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 21 November 1937, in John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI:1935-1939, Document 102, p. 105; Queen's University Archive, Collection 2167, John A. Stevenson Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Fragment from Stevenson's unfinished autobiography; Ibid., Folder 2, John A. Stevenson to Lord Eustace Percy, 1 December 1951; and, L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian, 20 October 1936, op. cit., pp. 23959-23960.

32.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., p. 24130. Christie's concern for national unity

led him to alter his earlier assertions that foreign policy be kept exclusively under the aegis of the executive branch of the government, and he came to support a somewhat greater scope for Parliament's participation. In regard to a decision to participate in any sanctions imposed by the League against Italy in the early fall of 1935, Christie contended that not only should Parliament be consulted by the government before a decision was reached but that, in the interest of Canadian unity, parliamentary consent ought to be nearly unanimous before the government acted. "This [national] unity does not mean only 'majority rule' [in Parliament]," Christie wrote.

> "It seems, as Mr. [C.H.] Cahan said in the 1926 debate, you must 'insure that the action of parliament, and of the government which this parliament maintains and sustains, shall have the approval not only of the majority of the electoral constituencies throughout Canada, but also have the substantial support and co-operation of the constituencies in every important section, district or province of the Dominion". There is only one way to begin your search for that united support -- whatever your eventual policy may turn out to be -- and that is through the machinery of Parliament. The dangers of any other course -- the dangers to the country, to parliamentary institutions themselves -- were well stated by Mr. Cahan in the same debate. In today's peculiar circumstances, there being not even a House of Commons with a known or calculable majority, let alone a known substantial unanimity, all this means only one thing: to wait for the new House to assemble. To take action, or any commitment whose sequel must be action, and thus to present to the country and the new House a <u>fait accompli</u>, would seem the one sure road to a rupture of every chance of substantial unity. ..."

By 1935 Christie realized that there was no chance of a constitutional conference's being called to decide on the extent and nature of Canada's external autonomy of the type he had suggested in the period after the conclusion of the Locarno treaties. He had suggested c. 1926-1927 that one of the reasons that Parliament was not qualified to make such fundamental decisions was because a government with a solid majority could certify any decisions it made whether or not its majority represented all sections of the country. Because no constitutional conference was possible, however, Christie in 1935 turned to Parliament and assigned to it some of the tasks which he had previously assigned to such a conference. The following passage by C.H. Cahan which Christie chose to quote in his paper "Notes on the European Crisis" to justify Parliament's involvement in the question of sanctions against Ethiopia, is indicative of the change in Christie's approach -- Parliament instead of a constitutional conference -- but the consistency of his goal -- a foreign policy able to be understood and endorsed by virtually all Canadians. "Canada shall only undertake," Cahan had suggested to the House of Commons in 1926,

"Such inter-imperial and international responsibilities as may be undertaken with the general approval of all sections of the country, and so insure that the action of Parliament, and of the government which this Parliament maintains and sustains shall have the approval not only of a majority of the electoral constituencies throughout Canada but also have the substantial support and co-operation of the constituencies in every important section, district and province of the Dominion. I am confident, Mr. Speaker -- and my sole excuse for speaking is that I feel so strongly about this matter -- that it is only by restricting all our external commitments and obligations within such limits as to obtain and merit the approval, as I said, of each and every section of Canada, that we can even hope to have such cordial co-operation between the peoples who compose the Canadian electorate as will enable us to solve our domestic problems in such a manner and so successfully as to maintain the continued solidarity and unity of the great Canadian nation, and thereby promote for all time the peace, progress and prosperity of the country."

It seems likely that in both 1926 and in 1935 Christie was counting on representatives of French Canada -- in the one instance in a constitutional convention, in the other in Parliament -- to act as a brake which would facilitate the creation of a consensus in support of an external policy that would limit Canada's external commitments and thereby reduce the chance of the country's being drawn into wars automatically. In his fine essay "French Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign Policy. 1935-1939," Professor P.B. Waite notes the link between Christie's thought and what he terms "[t]he instinctive isolationism of French Canada" which had influenced the society of Quebec to the point where "[t]he French Canadian, like the American, had become a continentalist; little interested him beyond his own frontiers." While Christie's interest in the world clearly extended beyond the frontiers of Canada -- and he was not an isolationist -- he surely recognized the utility of French Canadian opinion in any attempt to limit the ability of League advocates or imperialists to commit Canada to situations wherein decisions pertaining to peace and war would be made outside the country. While Christie clearly could not be identified as an isolationist in the French-Canadian model described so well by Professor Waite, it is equally clear that he believed that the extreme nature of that isolationism could act as a counterbalance to power exerted by the advocates of prior commitments -- League and/or imperial -- through what he believed was their dominance of the public prints in Canada. See L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., pp. 24130-24131 and 24140-24141, and P.B. Waite, "French Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," op. cit., p. 135.

33.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October

1935, op. cit., p. 24132.

34.) Ibid., p. 24137.

35.) Ibid., p. 24137-24138. Christie was as assiduous in trying to limit Canadian commitments and responsibilities in the Pacific region as he was in regard to Europe. Between 1937 and the outbreak of the war, Christie resolutely opposed any sort of embargo on armaments or strategic materials or resources aimed against either China or Japan. He believed that such an embargo could not be executed in a nondiscriminatory manner and would appear inevitably as a hostile act toward Japan that would put other parts of the Commonwealth at risk as a result of a Canadian action. Morover, as in Europe, Canada's national interests were not directly involved in the conflict in the Far East. "To consider the question of Canada's embargoing the export of arms, ammunition and implements of war to the Far East -- to both China and Japan," Christie wrote, one should keep in mind that

> "... Canadian arms exports to either side have been practically non-existent, and exports in prospect (chiefly aircraft) seem likely to remain small compared with what others [Europe and U.S.] are doing. In fact, however, by far the greater part of existing orders are for China (100 aircraft for China; 1 for Japan), and this proportion would likely remain, -- for Japan has plant to make her own implements of war. On the other hand, for the same reason, the greater part of export of Canadian strategic materials to the Far East (nickel, zinc, copper, etc.) go to Japan and will continue to do so. On the factual basis, therefore, the arms embargo in question, without a similar strategic materials embargo would, so far as Canadian resources count, be to the advantage of Japan; while a combined arms and strategic materials embargo would apparently be to the advantage of China. ..."

"In view of our commercial treaty [with Japan]," Christie argued, "such a discriminatory embargo, not undertaken as retaliation for some commercial discrimination against us, but as a form of pressure to impose certain political views, would necessarily, however we might describe it, be regarded by Japan as a hostile act, and would therefore be in effect to invite retaliation against Canada or Canadians by any means at her [Japan's] command."

The probable consequences of such an action by Canada being some sort of Japanese retaliation, Christie warned that the country's membership in the British Commonwealth raised the possibility that Tokyo might strike out at another member of the Commonwealth -- Australia, New Zealand, or British possessions or facilities in the Far East -- because of its geographic proximity. "Canadians are doubtless entitled to provoke others so long as they are willing and practically prepared to take the consequences upon themselves," Christie concluded.

"But in this case [of embargos], because we are so far away and others are nearer, the provocation would be at the expense of others. Canada's political position as a member of the British Empire is such that the victims of our action would without doubt regard it as open to them to strike back at other members of the Empire. Whether they actually struck or not, the provocation would be there and the further straining of already strained relations, and the burden and risks of the consequence of our action, would fall mainly upon the United Kingdom and the other Dominions who are more fully concerned with the countries in question than Canada is. ..."

"The risks of such an action [an embargo aimed at Japan] on our part," Christie argued, "and the burdens that would have to be carried if conflict resulted, are risks and burdens that would fall mainly on others. It must be evident that no Canadian administration could decently take the responsibility for action which involves risks of this kind." Christie's argument here was fully consistent with points he had made since the end of the Great War in regard to taking actions for which others would have to take the brunt of the responsibility and/or exertions or suffering. He believed, for example, that the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921 had created just such a situation for Canada. "The [Anglo-Japanese Alliance] affair," he told Escott Reid, "raised a serious problem of Anglo-American relations -- or of British Empire-US relations -- and in the event of a bad outcome Canada, by reason of geography, would have been left to bear the brunt. ..." Having successfully opposed a plan in 1921 that would have put Canada at risk because of another nation's actions, Christie could see no reason for Canada's taking actions in the late 1930s that would put other countries similarly at risk as a consequence of Canadian actions.

Finally, Christie believed that any sort of Canadian interference in the affairs of the Far East was unnecessary and put the country at risk of retaliation for no good reason. Quite simply, Christie wrote at New Year's 1938, "... no hostile attack has been directed against such special interests as Canada has in the Far East and so far no situation has arisen otherwise which would justify the Canadian Government in undertaking hostile activity in that quarter." In so far as the agitation for intervention in the region under League auspices was concerned, he believed that, as in Europe, the League was being used to cloak actions designed to advance the interests of the Great Powers. "Coercion, nominally on behalf of China on grounds of League ideology," he suggested, "would find its effective driving force in the concern which European Powers and the U.S. feel for their prestige and their Far Eastern investment and commercial interests; and the outcome would be dictated by that factor." Domestic agitation for Canadian intervention in the Far East, on the other hand, emanated from "a very small fraction of our population," and while they had to be answered, there was absolutely no case for letting such a small tail wag such a big dog. In sum, Christie concluded, the considerations that caused

Canada to believe in 1921-1922 that intervention in the Far East was not practicable held true in the late 1930s. "At the Washington Conference of 1921-1922," Christie reminded Skelton late in 1937,

> "the conferees (including Canada) informally considered whether it would be feasible to attempt to stabilize conditions in the Far East by positive action, involving financial assistance, administrative and organising intervention in China, backed if necessary by force. This idea contemplated co-operation with Japan. The idea was deliberately and quickly abandoned as impracticable. Instead the line of conciliation was adopted; essentially the Far East would have to solve its own problem, assisted by the laying down of various self-denying principles regarding extra-territoriality, customs, etc. Stability has not yet arrived. But if positive intervention in the Far East was so clearly found impracticable in 1921-1922 when there was no serious danger of repercussions in Europe and when it would have been action with Japan, what is to be said of positive intervention in the Far East in 1937, when Europe is in crisis with an alteration of the balance of power and when it would mean action against Japan?"

Rather than active Canadian intervention in the Far East, Christie wrote, Canada's national interest required only that its rulers, and those of all other countries, "leave it to the unfolding events themselves to disclose as clearly as may be what the issue really is and what vital concern their people may have in it -- meanwhile preparing themselves for eventualities as best they may." See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 723, Folder 64-volume 2 (I-C-187A), L.C. Christie, Far Eastern Conflict Arms Embargo Question, 11 February 1938; Ibid., L.C. Christie, Consultations on the Far Eastern Situation, 21 October 1937; Ibid., RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1753, File 804, Volume VIII, L.C. Christie, Far Eastern Conflict, 18 January 1938; Escott Reid Papers, L.C. Christie, Comments on E. Reid's Essay "Mr. Mackenzie King's Foreign Policy, 1935-1936," 30 October 1936; and, John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER VI; 1935-1939, Document 939, p. 1149, L.C. Christie, Note on the Proposals for a Canadian Embargo on War Materials to Germany, Italy and Japan, 29 March 1939.

36.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., p. 24149. The very fact that Christie expressed virtually no interest in efforts to preserve the League as an institution and reform it into being an instrument with which to arbitrate international disputes provides ample evidence of the abhorrence he held for the commitments it involved. For Christie the progressive there was absolutely no correlation between the International Joint Commission and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario -- both of which he believed applied the knowledge of specialists in a manner benefitting society as a whole and foreclosing the possibility of debilitating conflicts between, respectively, Canada and the United States, and the

Government of Ontario and the private business community -- and the League of Nations. The League as an institution had developed into a confusing bureaucratic machine which did the bidding of the European Great Powers. By late 1937, Christie wrote, Canada was confronted by "numberless procedural maneuvres for which the confusing 'jurisprudence' of the Geneva Secretariat gives such scope to any Powers who because of their interests may wish some violent action taken or provocative declarations made, but who may wish to cover up their real purpose as much as possible."

> "... The standing committees, the elaborate rules of procedure, the esoteric technique of interpretation and manipulation, the devices like that of decisions based on silences, now present such a machine that, given a measure of ingenuity and persistence, one or two States can press the button and almost automatically a public international conference comes forth, even though the general consensus [of the League members] may consider such a meeting not only useless but obstructive to other efforts being made to deal with the problem in question. ..."

This basically European-oriented bureaucracy at Geneva therefore confronted non-European members with a system that reinforced and, in fact, facilitated the control of the League, its apparatus, and decisions by the Europeans. Because of these conditions no amount of tinkering could make the League acceptable from the Canadian point of view; only fundamental changes that would meet the criteria of 1919 would turn that trick. "Canada could act permanently as an effective collaborator [in the League]," Christie concluded,

> "only in an international system which would be one able to secure, so far as Europe is concerned, the collaboration of Germany (so that we [that is, Canadians] might feel that we are not once more taking part in the age-old battle between the French and German peoples, Western and Eastern Europe); which would enlist the co-operation of Japan; which particularly would secure the co-operation of the United States; and which would attempt, much more than has been attempted, to make distinctions between world-wide issues and local regional issues. ..."

Corrupted as an institution by the ability of the Europeans to manipulate the League bureaucracy, and unable to satisfy any of the original Canadian prerequisites for membership, Christie believed that a clean break with the League was the only course of action satisfactory to Canada's national interests. See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1753, File 804-VII, L.C. Christie, Far Eastern Conflict - Far East Advisory Committee of the League of Nations, 10 December 1935, (also printed in DCER, VI, Document 856, p. 1048); Ibid., Volume 1752, File 804-V, L.C. Christie Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Far Eastern Situation, 29 October 1937; and, L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5

October 1935, op. cit., pp. 24157-24158.

37.) L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 25 October 1935, op. cit.

38.) L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 30 October 1936, op. cit., and, L.C. Christie, Notes on the European Crisis, 5 October 1935, op. cit., p. 24157.

39.) Escott Reid Papers, L.C. Christie to Escott Reid, 5 April 1937. In the same letter, Christie criticized those individuals, belonging to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and like organizations in Britain and the other Dominions, who argued that constitutional matters could be treated as a separate subject which did not necessarily touch on the defense and foreign policy relations of the nations of the British Commonwealth. Christie told Reid that he could not undserstand why such people worked under

> "... the assumption that you can usefully attempt to put 'constitutional problems', 'foreign policy' and 'defence policy' into separate compartments and get anywhere. This may all be very well for politicians framing an official Imperial Conference agenda. They are driven to a certain amount of foolery. But it is not real and it is not candid to suggest that the three things belong or can be kept apart. They are all essentially one and the same thing, as any one, who has actually to deal with any of them on his desk, finds every day. Most of the confusion of our public discussion in Canada -- editorial and otherwise -- arises from this separate compartment method. Some are innocent in this; some are not and it is easy to see their motive."

40.) To say that Christie was unhappy with the constitutional arrangement as it stood is more than a slight understatement. "In short," he wrote in the spring of 1939, "I believe on balance that our membership of the British Empire is a bad and vicious thing for Canadians, both materially and morally -- and that the balance is overwhelmingly that way and that the vicious consequences are bound to grow worse so long as we remain wards and refuse to become full-grown, adult, human beings." That said, however, he also believed that the constitutional changes needed to terminate the relationship would not occur "except as the result of the impact and shock of some unforseeable event which will produce the substantially common consent [needed among Canadians to alter the relationship] -- people seeing no other practical alternative. I do not know of an Empire or agglomeration where such a thing has come about in an orderly way of the ordinary political character." The terrifying dilemma for Canada, Christie contended, was that the current constitutional relationship meant that if Britain went to war Canada went to war, but that only involvement in war through such a scenario would promote a common and near-universal desire for constitutional change among Canadians.

Pending the war that would produce such a desire, Christie

sought after 1935 to change whatever constitutional symbols he could in an attempt to begin to drive a legal wedge between Canada and Britain in terms of constitutional ties and responsibilities. One such opportunity arose in the spring of 1937 during preparations for the coronation of King George VI, when Christie was assigned the task of assisting in the drafting of the "Canadian Coronation Address to the King." "I must away to an intriguing little job --," he told Frankfurter at the time, "trying to draft an Address by Parliament to the King to be read by the P.M. at the Coronation! The problem is to imbed in the bilge a few meaty words that show that Parliament has its own ideas about the meaning of the public Oath George VI is going to mumble to the Archbishop -- i.e. meaty enough but not too raw to upset tender stomachs! At least that is the problem as I see it. What I can get by Willie King is another matter -- and that doubtless is the real problem" Because in his coronation oath George VI would be, for the first time, recognizing the changes wrought in the legal structure of the Empire since 1914, Christie believed it was Canada's responsibility to delineate the basis of what "the crown means for Canada." "[I]t seems clear that those responsible to the people of Canada," he contended,

> "must, in their turn, assert publicly and clearly though briefly the principles and conditions upon which they tender homage and support on behalf of the people. This assertion is the more called for in that this is the first occasion for any utterance on behalf of the people of Canada as such at a Coronation. The assertion naturally should comprehend the dual aspect -- the traditional field of civil rights (which could logically have been claimed on behalf of Canada at previous Coronations) and the newer field of freedom in the inter-state relationships (which arises at this Coronation for the first time)."

Christie succeeded imbedding in the "bilge" two references to the changed relationship in international affairs -- describing the Commonwealth as "a community of free States, responsible for their own destinies" and as a "free association" -- although presumably he would have been better pleased with something more direct. Likewise, he suggested that Mackenzie King also publicly note in his opening statements to the Imperial Conference, which was to occur in tandem with the coronation ceremonies, the changed nature of the oath George VI was taking. By doing so he would underline the fact that the oath marked "the first occasion when Canada is mentioned individually, the King thus formally and solemnly making His declaration that His rule and reign will be in the interest of the people of Canada according to their law, and for the first time recognising at this great ceremony that relationship between Himself and the Crown, on the one hand, and the people of Canada, on the other, is direct." The point perhaps was a constitutional nicety, but it was an important one for Christie and one which he believed gave Canada a bit more legal control over its external affairs by widening the gap between the British and Canadian governments and

their respective relationships to the crown. He suggested that the Prime Minister underscore the constitutional precedent being set by telling the Conference that,

> "Most important, is the new form of [coronation] Oath by which the King solemnly declared the sense in which he accepted the Crown. For the first time Canada is named as such. His majesty thus solemnly records that sovereignty is to be exercised in the interest of the people of Canada according to their own law and custom, and for the first time at this great ceremony it is recognized that the relationship between the King and the people of Canada is direct. Whereas the Oath has traditionally embodied the principle upon which our system of democratic governance is built, it now recognizes that the relationships of the several peoples under the Crown, one with another as well as with foreign nations, have become interpenetrated with the old principles of freedom and rule of law. Thus it may be said that the new Oath in simple fashion embodies our political faith and mirrors the structure of this group of free, equal and autonomous States now known as the British Commonwealth of Nations."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1803, File 731, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 2 March 1939; Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 7 March 1937; John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI, Document 22, pp. 27-28, L.C. Christie, Notes on Canadian Coronation Address to King, 8 March 1937; Ibid., Document 23, pp. 28-29, Address to His Majesty King George VI on the Occasion of His Majesty's Coronation, 10 April 1937; and, PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1787, File 318-II, L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference, 1937. Points for Prime Minister's Opening Statement, 14 May 1937.

41.) In evaluating one of the pre-conference papers that had been prepared by the Committee on Imperial Defence (CID) and dispatched to each Dominion government by London, for example, Christie noted that it proposed certain policies that each Dominion should adopt and actions that each should take in the interest of overall imperial defence. In a letter he drafted for O.D. Skelton to send to the Department of National Defence to alert them to the possible entangling aspects of the CID recommendations, Christie wrote that,

> "It may also be noted that, while the Paper (Imperial Conference E(37) 1 - Review of Imperial Defence by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the C.I.D) purports to expound a scheme of policies and liabilities on behalf of all the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and also to make specific proposals and actions to be taken by each member, including Canada, there has been, so far as I am aware, no invitation or request by the Canadian Government that such an exposition and such proposals should

be made by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on Committee of Imperial Defence; nor, so far as I know, does the present procedure represent previous practice."

The propensity of some British officials to behave as if they could dictate the scope of Dominion participation in imperial defence was one of the issues that Christie consistently challenged between 1935 and 1939, believing that if such assumptions were not quashed each time they arose they would have an accumulative effect which when war came would allow London to dictate the nature of the Canadian war effort. For the above see, PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1787, File 318-I, L.C. Christie, Draft of Letter from O.D. Skelton to Colonel L.R. LaFleche, Deputy Minister, National Defence, 30 March 1937.

42.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 28 March 1937.

43.) "In advance of the Conference there are to be some discussions," he told Lothian, "between officials of the Dominions and the U.K. on 'Constitutional questions' and I am one of the victims. ..." For Christie's assignment to this task see Scottish Record Office, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/336, L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian. 31 March 1937; Harvard Law School Library, Manuscript Division, A.W. Scott Papers, L.C. Christie to A.W. Scott, 3 April 1937; and, L.C. Christie to Felix Fankfurter, 28 March 1937, op. cit. For Christie's work on one of the Conference's constitutional committees -- the one discussing the issue of common citizenship -- see the synopsis of its proceedings in PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 177, Folder F-1638, pp. C-126325-C-126330, Imperial Conference, 1937. Preparatory Meetings on Constitutional Questions. Committee on Constitutional Questions. Sub-committee on Technical Experts, 27 May 1937.

44.) It is interesting to note that while he was busy helping King and Skelton scupper what the three of them perceived as the would-be plans of Downing Street to ensnare Canada in defense schemes, Christie was also keeping company with Lothian and the editorial board of the Round Table; spending the weekend of 1-2 May 1937, in fact, at Lothian's country home "Blickling" with "[m]ost of the Round Table editorial Committee" also in attendance. See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 13, Folder 42, p. 12673, H.V. Hodson (Editor, Round Table) to L.C. Christie, 8 April 1937.

45.) Christie was a member of the Canadian delegation to the Conferences's Committee on Munitions and Food Supplies and the Committee on Shipping Questions. He was the primary Canadian representative to the Technical Sub-Committee of the former, and the Sub-Committee on Pacific Shipping of the latter.

Christie was just as alert in the Imperial Conference's less glamorous and more technical discussions to any attempts to tie Canada to agreements that smacked of "imperial unity" or pictured

the Commonwealth as a single political entity. In regard to the Conference's consideration of communication systems -- be they aircraft, shipping, cables, or wireless -- Christie professed to see schemes aimed at yoking Canada to a binding, Empire-wide plan. "It is of interest," Christie wrote prior to the Imperial Conference,

> "that over the whole range of these Communications Questions -- though more emphatically in the Marine and Air branches -- what is proposed [by the British Government] amounts to a fairly comprehensive system of Imperial Preference.
>
> But all of them, after a slight shift of focus or concentration, appear to resolve themselves into a system of Imperial Defence -- like the lines in an optical illusion trick.
>
> In the Marine and Air branches particularly, it is of interest to note the value attached to the Imperial Conference resolutions or discussions as counters or weapons in diplomacy and how they have been used in this sense by the U.K. Government."

In regard to U.K.'s proposal for the discussions of the possibility of establishing an "Imperial Preference in the Air Shipping Trade," for example, Christie found a dual threat to Canadian interests. London's proposals -- if accepted by the Imperial Conference -- would designate air shipping between the members of the Commonwealth a form of trade that would be reserved exclusively for carriers based in those countries; in short, it would become an all-British system. In this regard, Christie wrote, London's "two secret pre-Imperial Conference papers entitled 'the Commonwealth (variation 'Imperial') Air Route Around the World" ... sounded as if they had been written by a literate schoolboy who had been stuffed with Rudyard Kipling and E. Phillips Oppenheim. ..." Christie found this idea repugnant in that it would tie Canada to an imperial bloc competing in the international air shipping business, and because it might have adverse repercussions on Canada's relations with the United Staates. "With this weapon of 'exclusivity', or reservation of the inter-Commonwealth routes as coasting trade," Christie wrote,

> "we are invited to enter a contest which is pictured as a contest for 'world domination in civil air transport'. This somewhat sensational picture may be valid so far as the main interest of the U.K. is concerned. Her main line of trading, communication and Imperial interest is the line around the Great Continent: England-Near East-Egypt-India-Far East and Australia. There the competitors are France, Germany, Netherlands. Canada, however, is not on that line, The only foreign country that comes substantially into our picture is the United States. We have not yet really asserted the principle of 'exclusivity' against the

United States as a weapon. Our whole practice has been co-operation. In this picture, as in so many others, because of the geographical realities, it seems inevitable that, so far as principles are concerned, ours must be co-operation with the U.S. equally with the U.K.; while, as concerns substance, our actual business with the U.S. will in fact be in far greater volume than with anyone else."

Christie argued that because Canada had rejected the idea of imperial exclusivity aimed against the United States in the Transatlantic Air Agreement -- which had been negotiated among Canada, Britain, the Irish Free State, and the United States in December, 1935 -- "There seems no compelling reason why Canada should associate herself with the [British] effort [at the Imperial Conference of 1937.]" At the Conference in 1937, Christie would work against all of the schemes seeking to establish all-imperial routes of transportation and communication. "It [Canada's concurrence in the plans and their subsequent application] would imply that the British Empire is one economic unit," Christie concluded, "and even lead in argument to be its being something like one political unit." For Christie's tasks at the Imperial Conference see PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Reel C-4268, pp. C-127915 and C-128286. For Christie's worries and warnings about the dangers inherent in the Imperial Conference's subsidiary discussions of communications and transportation see J.A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI: 1935-1939, op. cit., Document 122, pp. 133-134, L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937 - Imperial Communications - Marine, Air, Cables and Wireless, 23 March 1937; L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 1 December 1937, op. cit.; J.A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI; 1935-1939, op. cit., Document 235, pp. 303-304, L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937 - Civil Air Questions. Preliminary Notes Respecting Canadian Position, 23 March 1937; and, PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1687, File 79-B-V, L.C. Christie, Pacific Shipping -Imperial Conference 1937. Canadian-Australian Line Ltd. - Matson Line Competition. Notes Respecting Canadian Position, 6 May 1937.

46.) James G. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., p. 91. For analysis of Canada at the Imperial Conference of 1937 see Ibid., pp. 53-61 and 85-91: C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit., pp. 202-209; Rainer Tamchina, "In Search of Common Causes: The Imperial Conference of 1937," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, I, 1 (October 1972), pp. 79-105; Norman Hillmer, "The Pursuit of Peace: Mackenzie King and the 1937 Imperial Confernce" in John English and J.O. Stubbs, (eds.), Mackenzie King: Widening the Debate, op. cit., pp. 149-172; and, J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," op. cit., pp. 218-219. Although now 20 years old, Professor Eayrs's discussion of Canada's part in the Conference of 1937 is still the best of the lot, standing superior to and as the model for all subsequent accounts.

47.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1787, File 318-II, L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference of 1937. Foreign Policy. Note Respecting Canadian Position, 10 April 1937. As reflected in this passage, Christie was always particularly worried about the influence of the Soviet Union on the stability of Europe. Christie the progressive seems to have been repelled by the utter lack of moral considerations in Moscow's foreign policy decisions, while Christie the pragmatic realist seems to have had a grudging admiration for the apparent ease with which the Russians could decide what was and what was not in their national interests. Because of this lack of moral considerations, Christie wrote, it was difficult to predict which way the Russians would jump in any particular situation. One had to be wary of the Soviets, he wrote, because they "regard it as a high doctrinal duty to bring off a catastrophe as a necessary means to their millenial end." "Russia is not so clear," Christie noted in a memorandum written in 1936 in which he suggested that the countries of Europe were on the verge of resigning themselves to the inevitability of a new war.

> "They are ready for war mentally; they are apparently far advanced physically. They are satisfied with their political possessions and resources and will not directly start anything on that score. They are ready to use 'collective security' in their own sense. Their leadership have had unique experience as successful revolutionists. They are ruthless, hard-bitten realists in going after their purposes. Their purposes are of a social and semi-religious nature and therefore proselytizing and driven to spread. In their dialectic a European war might conceivably produce a situation peculiarly apt to furnish good soil for the seeds of their purpose. Their task would be to avoid being drawn too deeply into the physical impacts and destructions. E.g. they would look with equanimity on a war between England and France against Germany and Italy. They would reduce their commitment to the minimum and wait for the inevitable weakening and social collapse of the others, thus leaving themselves in a position to assume leadership in the end."

Christie saw his predictions played out in the crises over Czechoslovakia during 1938, and in his recounting of the Russian role in the affair there is mingled both a clear distaste for what he termed "the Russian game in the European crisis" and a sense of amazement over the ease with which Moscow identified and sought to serve its own self-interest. Christie contended that the Russians had sought to manipulate "the League - through Litvinoff's [sic] tricky words at Geneva during [the] September meeting of the League -- into starting a European war, without the slightest intention -- as witnessed by the absence of the 'Soviet War Commissar' in Siberia during the height of the crisis -- of becoming significantly involved. "Considering that the center of the trouble was in Eastern Europe," Christie wrote,

"i.e. Russia's own backyard and presumably her own primary regional interest; considering that the Czecho-Slovaks were fellow Slavs of the Soviets, the natural thing would have been for Russia herself to jump in or to take a lead. But all they did was to try and intrigue others into starting a war against Germany and Italy at a time when the heads of her own war machine were thousands of miles away and most of her competent army officers had already been shot and the head of her state [Stalin] gave no assurance whatever and all his office boys could say was that they would do 'their bit'.

All this fits exactly the best line from the Russian point of view, namely, to get Western and Central Europe into a first-class war; Russia to make minimum contributions; out of the ensuing catastrophe political regimes in as many countries as possible to emerge as communist regimes with the Russian Soviets the daddy of them all, ready to guide, direct and tell them where to get off."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26 Folder 107, p. 24085, L.C. Christie, Note on Munich, 1 November 1938; Ibid., RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1720, File 927-VIII, L.C. Christie, Why War is Likely, 15 June 1936, and Ibid., Volume 1782, File 254-VI, L.C. Christie, Re the Russian Game in the European Crisis 1938, 10 December 1938.

48.) L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937. Foreign Policy, Notes Respecting Canadian Position, 10 April 1937, op. cit., In this paper Christie also mentioned the possibility of forming a group including Canada, the United States, Britain, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand which would divorce itself from the affairs of Europe. He suggested that the Imperial Conference "[i]nform all states that in the event of war or armed conflict, civil or otherwise, between or in other countries, it is intended to adopt what for short may be called the 'Armed Non-Intervention' position; and declare a readiness to discuss with any state in advance the practical details of such a position." This idea was as close as Christie ever came to advocating a isolationist or neutralist position for Canada, and he believed that it was only attainable for Canada in conjunction with other like-minded states. In essence, the idea was another form of Christie's usual effort to woo Great Britain away from its European commitments; if it was constitutionally true that if Britain was at war Canada was at war -- and Christie believed it was true -- and the constitution could not be changed in short order -- and Christie believed it could not -- then the sole remaining option was to do what could be done to avoid Britain's going to war, hence the idea of a multi-state organization to carry out a policy of "Armed Non-Intervention." Christie first broached the idea in letter to Lothian in the fall of 1936. "I mentioned the idea to you of an Armed Neutrality," he wrote at that time.

"I haven't thought it through. I do not mean any public declaration now; rather a thorough secret C.I.D. study.

I don't think the 'First and Second Armed Neutralities' of 1780 and 1800 would fit the probable case. The primary emphasis then seemed to be on defending or extending commercial 'rights'; localising the conflict was secondary. Today there is reason to reverse the emphasis. And the self-sufficiency trend everywhere, growing naturally out of the necessary state intervention in the national economy everywhere (which is not necessarily a bad or unmanageable thing, and might become a more reasonably managed thing than the old laissez faire thing), makes the shift of emphasis conceivable. Today's line would be more an 'Armed Non-Intervention', for nowadays to insist upon the 'right' to furnish supplies to belligerents is in effect to intervene. This seems to be in essence what the American 'neutrality' legislation is driving at. The present Spanish (Civil War) business may be pointing that way.

It might not fit the actual case that may arise; but again it might. And so it ought to be studied and planned in every practicable detail, so that you might be ready to spring it.

At a certain stage, if it looked like sense, it might be handed confidentially to the United States and perhaps to others. No request should be made for any agreement. You simply say, 'This is one of the things we have been thinking of as a possibility. You may care to study it. We have been looking carefully at your legislation and ideas.' At the hour of decision you might get co-operation by the force of events. It seems well worth studying from that point of view.

You might find a situation where, before the storm had actually broken, you could usefully publicly declare for such a line.

As I say I haven't thought it through. There is no equipment or personnel for that sort of thing here. Anyhow as we have neither responsibility nor naval power, it is not our business, as we might quite properly be told. But I think it's worth looking into very carefully."

For Christie the solution of divorcing Britain from Europe and eventually tying it and the Dominions in a bloc of armed non-interventionists which included the United States was an ideal solution for Canada's international dilemma. He suggested the idea to the Canadian government in the fall of 1936 and again recommended it in anticipation of the Imperial Conference of 1937, but there was apparently little or no debate on the point within the Department of External Affairs on either occasion.

See L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937. Foreign Policy, Notes Respecting Canadian Position, 10 April 1937, op. cit.; L.C. Christie to Lord Lothian , 20 October 1936, op. cit.; and, L.C. Christie, League of Nations: Proposed Program for Canadian Representatives, 4 November 1936, op. cit.

49.) L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937. Foreign Policy. Notes Respecting Canadian Position, 10 April 1937, op. cit.

50.) Ibid. As Profesors Hillmer and Tamchina have noted, Mackenzie King also viewed the Imperial Conference of 1937 as an opportunity to promote Anglo-American co-operation internationally as, in Professor Hillmer's words, "a force and example for economic appeasement and world peace." It seems unlikely that Christie shared this rather grandiose expectation for the product of Canadian "linch-pin-ism;" he was merely looking for a way to divorce Britain from Europe and believed that anything that would put Britain and the United States in lockstep in world affairs would turn that trick quite nicely. In short, while King was looking for the creation of an Anglo-American bloc that would right the world's troubles, Christie, on the other hand, was simply seeking a means of protecting Canada's interests and shielding it from war; the traditional rhetoric of calling for common cause among the three nations of the North Atlantic Triangle suited both of their purposes. See Norman Hillmer, "The Pursuit of Peace; Mackenzie King and the 1937 Imperial Conference," op. cit., pp. 158-159, and Rainer Tamchina, "In Search of Common Causes: The Imperial Conference of 1937," op. cit., pp. 91-92.

51.) PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 174, File 629, pp. C-123515-C-123516. Mimeographed Copy of two portions of an Australian Paper prepared for and submitted to the Imperial Conference of 1937, entitled "Advantages of Empire Co-operation in Defence" and "Proposal Submitted by the Commonwealth Government [of Australia]" and signed Archdale Parkhill, Minister for Defence and dated 8 March 1937. (Hereafter cited as A. Parkhill, Australian Resolution, 8 March 1937 with appropriate page number.)

52.) Ibid., p. C-123516.

53.) Ibid., p. C-123517.

54.) PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, p. C-123505, L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937. Notes on Australian Draft Resolution respecting "Co-operation in Imperial Defence," 31 May 1937.

55.) C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit., p. 206.

56.) L.C. Christie, Imperial Conference 1937, Notes on Australian Draft Resolution Respecting "Co-operation in Imperial Defence," 31 May 1937, op. cit., pp. C-123505-C-123507.

57.) Ibid., p. C-123507.

58.) Ibid.

59.) H. Blair Neatby. William Lyon Mackenzie King, Volume III: 1932-1939. The Prism of Unity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976, pp. 217-218.

60.) For a reflection of the similarity of the approaches of Christie and King to what the Conference should say publicly at its conclusion, and a quite masterly analysis of King's successful campaign to destroy the Australian resolution, see James Eayrs. In Defence of Canada. Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 87-91.

61.) Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: the Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," International Journal, XXXIII, 3 (Summer, 1978), p. 607. Indeed, Professor Hillmer notes that two of Mackenzie King's ministers -- Ian Mackenzie and C.A. Dunning -- had received overtures pertaining to an enhanced Canadian role in "imperial defense" from British officials in London in July 1936, and it appears that it was on these approaches that the British pitch at the Imperial Conference in 1937 was based. Ibid., p. 604.

62.) See H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon MackenzieKing, VOlume II: 1932-1939. The Prism of Unity, op. cit., pp. 215-216: James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Disarmament, op. cit., pp. 85-86; and Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: the Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," op. cit., p. 606-607. Professor Hillmer has also pointed out that the British believed that if Canada accepted such a role as a supplier of munitions and armaments to Britain "the prospect of large wartime profits would attract American capital and raw material into Canada ..." and thereby help to overcome the baleful impact of Washington's neutrality legislation. See Ibid., p. 607.

63.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, File 241-I, L.C. Christie, Procedure Respecting British Munition Contracts in Canada, 26 January 1937. While it would clearly be too much to say that Christie manipulated Mackenzie King -- at most he probably added a bit of momentum and guidance to the direction in which the Prime Minister was already travelling -- he was nonetheless extremely conscious, as was Skelton for that matter, of King's prejudices and fears and was not beyond trying to stoke both with the choice of words and phrases he used in his various notes and memoranda. In this particular memorandum, for example, he followed his sketch of "Alternative A" with two remarks that struck squarely at King's concerns about prior commitments and British control of Canadian affairs. After laying out the first alternative, Christie raised -- as a matter for "consideration" -- "what effect would such a policy have upon Canadian freedom of

decision as to participation in war?" He then pointed out that

> "... [i]n many cases in England, where contractors (not ordinarily armament producers) have to build new capital plant for the present 3-year defence program, it is provided that the plant (since it has to be paid for solely out of the government contracts) will become government property, thus forming what is called the 'shadow armament industry', which will be ready for intensified production in the event of war. Would such a practice be extended to Canada, and would the British Government become the owner of plants in Canada."

Again, it is too much to claim that Christie forced on King any policy that the Prime Minister would not have adopted anyway, but it is interesting to note that Christie wrote for King with a much keener eye toward his personal opinions and biases than was apparent in his efforts for either Sir Robert Borden or Arthur Meighen. See Ibid.

64.) Ibid. Christie also sought to prevent the government from assisting Canadian munitions and armaments makers in selling their products in foreign countries. In a general philosophical sense, Christie was opposed to the development of a large-scale arms industry in Canada, believing that the very existence of such an industry -- given the great financial investment needed to insure its initial growth, and the increasing number of jobs that became dependent on it as it grew -- created a vested interest which might involve the government in situations or commitments that would compromise its freedom of action in time of war. This he believed was true whether the armaments and munitions were being purchased by Britain or by another foreign country, although, truth to tell, he was clearly more concerned with the dangers for Canada of becoming a principal supplier of arms to the British government. In response to a suggestion that Canada's trade commissioner service should become actively engaged in promoting foreign sales for Canadian munition makers in order both to increase their profits and facilitate the expansion of the industry, Christie wrote that

> "(1) Even on the view that some arms producing capacity is an advantage on national defence grounds, that can be handled in other ways. There are lots of drummers around. To let a Government agency itself act as the drummer is to stultify many aspects of the general Canadian attitude [against the growth of a large domestic armaments industry], and it is hard to believe, even on the most realistic calculation, that the game would be worth the candle.
>
> (2) To use the government's influence to get orders for Canadian arms producers in foreign countries and to refuse the same assistance as regards orders from Great Britain ssems a wholly impossible course. Even if policy were changed in the latter case, however, the case against the

other would still remain, and action should be taken without delay [to prevent such use of the trade commisioners]. ..."

Such a refusal to become involved officially, Christie would later write, avoided "putting the Government into the position of a mere solicitor of arms orders or of directly promoting or facilitating the indiscriminate expansion of the arms industry in Canada."

Christie's concern with the possibility of creating binding prior commitments for Canada as the result of government-facilitated foreign arms and munitions sales also applied -- and perhaps with more force -- to the issue of allowing Britain to raise funds in Canada from either the government or the private financial markets for military purposes. "It seems to me," Christie wrote in the spring of 1939,

> "[that] the Canadian Government ought to approach with the greatest possible caution any project involving lending Canadian money or credit abroad, either by Canadian Government loan or by Canadian financial institutions or the Canadian public, and whether for Pre-War or War business. ...
>
> If, for Pre-War business, the Canadian Government itself lends the money, or facilitates borrowing in Canada, or permits the Canadian financial world to finance the business in any way outside the ordinary commercial basis between trader and trader, how could we possibly avoid going on to do the same thing for years for War business to the limit of Canadian revenues. The Canadian financial world and everybody in Canada dependent on the arms and munitions industries or on raw materials, minerals, grain, food, etc., will see to that."

Even in the final weeks of peace in the summer of 1939, Christie continued to take the strongest issue with the idea of allowing the British government to raise such loans. "I have read with great interest," Christie wrote,

> "your Memo to [the] Prime Minister today re U.K. purchases in Canada and related financing questions and I entirely agree, except I do not see how it could be said that 'a British loan ... placed on our market would be satisfactory from our standpoint.
>
> I find the greatest difficulty seeing how the [Canadian] Government, itself being barred by sound reasons from financing the U.K. for a European war, could justifiably give a go-ahead signal of any kind to the U.K. to go into the Canadian market and get the money from our citizens. I do not think the distinction really holds water and I think that such a signal would be an extremely doubtful exercise of trusteeship.

I believe there is no law or rule today against other countries raising money in Canada. I would like to see such a rule, but so long as it does not exist others can come in on their responsibility. This is not very satisfactory, but it is better than the position we would be in if we gave a consent or an encouraging signal either to the U.K. or the Canadian financial world. Lansing and Wilson gave such a signal before 1917 and the U.S. financial world got hooked for about 2 1/2 billions which had to be sustained in the end."

In opposing the encouragement of loans to Britain, Christie followed the course of many progressives -- as is evidenced in the interwar writings of such men as Charles Tansill, Walter Millis, and Charles Beard -- who believed tht the monetary interests of the munition makers and financiers in an Allied victory helped to push the United States into the war in 1917. Indeed, the continuity of Christie's progressivism in the period between 1935 and his death in 1941 is quite apparent in his attitudes toward this subject. See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1805, File 853-II. L.C. Christie, Memo for DR. Skelton. Canadian Trade Commissioner Service And the Arms Trade, 23 February, 1937; Ibid., RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, Folder 241-volume 2, L.C. Christie, Re Introduction of Canadian Munition Makers to British Defence Authorities, 3 March 1939; Ibid., Volume 757, File 244, L.C. Christie, Memorandum. Secret. Private, 10 May 1939; and, Ibid., MG 30 E 44, Christie Papers, Volume 27, Folder 10, pp. 24968-24971, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 16 August 1939.

65.) L.C. Christie, Procedure Respecting British Munitions Contracts in Canada, 26 January 1937, op. cit.

66.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, File 241-volume I (II-B-82), L.C. Christie, Note Respecting the Growth of the Armament Industry in Canada - Secret, 12 July 1938. Christie had long been concerned with the potential economic -- in addition to political and military -- impact of developing a Canadian arms industry that was basically an adjunct to Britain's defence program and had listed the dangers in the following manner as early as 1936.

"B. Use and organisation of Canadian productive capacity as auxiliary to British defense program.

I. What efect upon our national economy?

1. Consider to what extent the proposed engaging of our productive capacity may be impelled by a need to keep British productive capacity as free as possible for their ordinary export trade.

2. Consider to what extent our acceptance of this role might damage our own position in world commerce?

3. Consider that, if we encourage the starting of such business now, we should be expected to allow it to go on if Britain became engaged in war.

4. Consider that, if such business were encouraged on grounds of unemployment relief, a vested interest would grow up.

5. Consider the long-term consequences of a repetiton of the 1914-18 experience; the creation of unproductive goods and credits; the dislocations of the national economy, industrial, agricultural, financial; the resulting depression. ..."

See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 818, File 668, L.C. Christie Memorandum on Defence Policy, 1 September 1936. For the closeness of Christie's views to those of Mackenzie King and Skelton in regard to the possible military, political, and economic problems accruing to Canada as a consequence of becoming the "Arsenal of the British Empire" see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 115-131.

67.) L.C. Christie, Notes Respecting the Growth of the Armament Industry in Canada, 12 July 1938, op. cit. Christie never abandoned this attitude. In the final months of peace, for example, he argued that "it seems to me too soon to admit officially or by implication even that in War we [Canada] have got to be geared to their [Britain's] War machine, which will in effect be 'totalitarian' as it is in fact and effect fast becoming already; and certainly it seems too soon to admit that we have got to start meshing the gears now." See L.C. Christie, Memorandum. Secret. Private, 10 May 1939, op. cit.

68.) Christie opposed any official efforts on behalf of the Canadian government to assist in recruiting Canadians for the British armed services because he believed such assistance would (a) amount to a prior commitment to come to Britain's aid in the event of war, and (b) because it might threaten Canadian unity by creating an issue which would polarize Canadians between those who wanted a maximum allegiance to the British connection and those who wanted Canada to steer a foreign policy course suited to its national interests alone. Passages from two draft letters prepared by Christie for the Prime Minister to send to the British High Commissioner -- the first never sent, the second sent in a slightly altered form -- suffice to show his concerns on the points just noted.

(A.) "Finally, we [King and his Cabinet] should have to consider the special implications of our deliberately promoting a continuous and growing use of Canada in peace

and war as a recruiting base or source for United Kingom military forces, and whether in reality there might not be involved commitments of a type which the peoples of this country have traditionally considered unwise and inexpedient and a movement radically at variance with the underlying nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

(B.) "... We recognize that it is open to the [British] Admiralty to make known in Canada opportunities of service in the British Navy and to individual Canadians to enlist of their own accord. However, as regards participation by Canadian official agencies in schemes for recruiting officers and men in Canada for service in the United Kingdom Navy, Army and Air Force, it is felt that so much misunderstanding would arise and so many implications would be certain to be read into it that this practice should not be extended beyond the limited number of existing schemes which have come into existence gradually over a considerable number of years."

See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, File 243-I, L.C. Christie, Draft - Prime Minister to Sir F.(rancis) Floud, 15 August 1938, and Ibid., Volume 818, File 655, L.C. Christie, Draft Letter: Prime Minister to Sir Gerald Campbell, British High Commissioner, 16 January 1939. For other examples of Christie's opposition to British recruiting schemes in Canada see Ibid., RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1838, File 512, L.C. Christie, Proposed Co-operation in Recruiting Canadians for United Kingdom Navy, 12 July 1937, and Ibid., L.C. Christie, Re Admiralty Recruiting in Canada, 9 September 1938.

69.) In addition to opposing British military training centers in Canada on the grounds that they amounted to a commitment to participate in future British wars and that they threatened to divide the Canadian populace and thereby undermine national unity, Christie also crafted a constitutional objection to them. No doubt Christie sincerely believed that there was an important constitutional principle involved, but he was also certainly alert to the Prime Minister's sensitivity to anything that smacked of a British attempt to force Ottawa's hand. In an often-quoted memorandum written in June, 1938 in response to London's suggestion that a British-run flying school be established in Canada, Christie argued that the scheme was constitutionally unacceptable. "Long ago," Christie wrote,

"Canadian Governments nailed down the constitutional principle that in Canadian territory there could be no military establishments except they were owned, maintained and controlled by the Canadian Government responsible to the Canadian Parliament and people. ... No man in his senses can imagine at this date, a reversal of that principle and that historic process. Such domestic ownership, maintenance and control of all military stations and personnel is one of the really indispensable hallmarks of national sovereign self-

government. Outside its homeland a state may have military stations and quarter military personnel in countries which it 'owns' -- in its colonies or 'possessions', or in its mandated territories according to the trust deed, -- or in countries over which it has assumed or been yielded, by some arrangement, what amounts to a protectorate (e.g., Egypt, Iraq). But no country pretending to sovereign self-control can permit such a state of affairs or its international implications or consequences.

Having established the questionable constitutionality of establishing British-owned military bases in Canada -- a point which, as Professor Eayrs has pointed out, Mackenzie King eagerly picked up on -- Christie was quick to re-emphasize the point in August, 1938 when a plan authored by the British and blessed by Canada's Department of National Defence to train 300 Canadians for service in the Royal Air Force was leaked to the press after King had rejected it. Knowing that the Prime Minister needed little prodding to resent the blatant British attempt to corner him, Christie simply moved to underscore the potential dangers of British bases by writing a memorandum graphically describing the extraterritorial authority exercised by British forces in their training bases in Egypt. "The [Anglo-Egyptian] Treaty [of August, 1936] nominally terminated the military occupation and what then amounted pretty much to a protectorate; but it recreated very much the same conditions under the guise of an alliance." Christie wrote,

> "5. By Article 7 [of the Treaty] each will come to the aid of the other 'in the capacity of an ally.' The aid to be given by the King of Egypt will arise 'in the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency'. It will consist in furnishing on Egyptian territory "all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of ports, aerodromes and means of communication'. The Egyptian Government is to take all administrative and legislative measures necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective.
>
> 7. By a note of the same date as the Treaty, Egypt agrees that such foreign instructors for her air force as may be necessary shall be chosen from amongst British subjects only and that Egypt will avail herself of a British military mission. The British will train in Great Britain such Egyptian personnel as may be desired. Armament and equipment will be similar in type to those of the British forces, and the British will facilitate supplies from Great Britain at prices equal to those paid by the British Government.
>
> 8. A convention signed on the same day as the Treaty settles the position as regards jurisdictional and fiscal matters of the British forces in Egypt. It provides for freedom of movement and communication between British camps,

the use of all kinds of facilities, diplomatic immunity regarding the official correspondence of British forces, etc. Members of the British forces are not subject to criminal jurisdicition of Egyptian courts, nor to the civil jurisdiction in any matter arising out of official duties."

Without once mentioning the British recruiting and training schemes for Canada, Christie sketched out a sort of worst case scenario in regard to the possible sovereignty-denying aspects of the location of foreign-controlled military bases in one's country. With Mackenzie King already believing that the plan that had been leaked to the press "was a war plan - to make sure of a base for training in Canada when war comes - with certainty on part of Defence Department Canada would be in it - co-operating in defence of Empire," Christie's little memorandum on what British bases in Egypt meant to any claims of sovereignty by that government almost certainly served to buttress his early constitutional argument and to remind the ever suspicious Prime Minister of what might be possible if he opened the door to the British overtures on air training. See PAC RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, File 243-I, L.C. Christie, The Imperial-Flying-School-in- Canada Idea, 19 June 1938 (this memorandum is quoted by C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit., p. 223 and is printed in J.A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, Volume VI: 1935-1939, Document 153, pp. 208-210); for King's use of Christie's constitutional argument see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit., p. 223, and the lengthy quote by King in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 96-97; for a fine description of the British plan to train Canadians in Canada for service in Britain and its leaking to the press see Ibid., pp. 98-102; PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 755, File 243-I, L.C. Christie, Air Force Training Schools Question - Note Concerning Position of British Air Force in Egypt, 15 August 1938; and, the quote from Mackenzie King about the British training plan being a "war plan" is cited in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., p. 100.

70.) For three good accounts of this three-year struggle, with Professor Eayrs' work again the cream of the crop, see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 91-103; C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit., pp. 220-224; and H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Volume III: 1921-1939. The Prism of Unity, op. cit., pp. 281-283. Christie shared with King and Skelton a deep and bitter resentment of British attempts to force Canada into accepting plans for recruiting Canadians for the Royal Air Force and training them at British bases in Canada. Writing in response to the discussions held on the subject between Mackenzie King and British High Commissioner Francis Floud and a British official named J.G. Weir, who was in North America to discuss aircraft production, Christie told Skelton that as a result of their

presentation he believed that "[T]his is indeed putting on the heat."

> "This evidence [the approach of Floud and Weir] of a readiness to barge into Canadian politics and engineer an appeal to the Canadian electorate to put pressure on the Government suggests for consideration whether some means should be taken by the P.M. privately to give Neville Chamberlain a tip -- either directly or through Massey.
>
> This thing comes from the Air Ministry -- as have a number of other insistent pressures over the past 2 or 3 years.
>
> I recall a conversation I had with Floud last fall just before he went to England on leave. He came to talk about recruiting Canadians for the U.K. Air Force and also some wrangle re transatlantic air. It happened that I had just been dealing with the latter and was fed up. I told him I was going to tell him personally just how the Air Ministry struck me personally after two years of dealing with it. They struck me as a very different breed from any other British Department I had ever dealt with and at times I had had quite a lot of dealings with the other Departments in the past. I said I had been trying to pin down in my own mind what they were and as near as I could get at it they gave me the impression of 'high school boys educated on E. Philips Oppenheim and Kipling', that they were 'politically infantile' and were inclined to be 'self-consciously hard boiled'. Floud thought [Lord] Swinton [Minister for Air] was hard boiled and the rest he put down to the fact that the Air Ministry is really a very new Department.
>
> I do not know whether it is that they are a new Department or that a new sort of breed is taking charge of England and beginning to run it.
>
> At all events my view of the Air Ministry remains what it was and more so. My own working rule is that anything coming out of the Air Ministry is *prima facie* wrong or at least suspect."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, Volume 756, File 243-II, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, Re attached strictly confidential Memo of May 13/38, 22 May 1938. Colonel Stacey notes that King did indeed contact Neville Chamberlain regarding the Floud/Weir presentation and quotes Christie's statement about the British Air Ministry being "*prima facie* wrong or at least suspect." See C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era*, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223. For a lively recounting of the Floud/Weir sortie against Mackenzie King see James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-97.

71.) J.A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, Volume VI: 1935-1939, Document 134, p. 173, L.C. Christie, Recruitments of Canadians for R.A.F., 5 May 1936.

72.) Christie apparently did, however, believe that many individuals in important posts in the British government assumed that Canada and the other Dominions were commited to participating in the next war in the same all-out fashion as they had in the Great War. Moreover, these British officials were not in the least reticent about leading the rest of the world into making that same assumption. During the London Naval Conference in January, 1936, for example, Christie called to Skelton's attention a statement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty after the Japanese delegation had walked out of the conference. "One aspect of the First Lord of the Admiralty's statement ... is worth noting...," Christie wrote.

> "In his statement and six points he is reported as speaking variously of 'we' finding 'ourselves in complete agreement with the principal delegate from the United States'; of 'Britain' being 'as desirous as Japan for naval reductions'; of 'the British Government and people' feeling 'the Japanese plan would create a situation disadvantageous to Britain' and 'to accept the proposal would be an act of suicide'; of 'the Power with greater naval needs'; of 'a Power with world-wide responsibilities'; of 'Britain' as having 'to guard routes over the seven seas'; of 'the British Commonwealth, which must take into account responsibilities in European waters, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans'; of the Japanese proposal facing 'Britain with a strange situation'; of 'the feeling among the British delegation' being 'one of regret at the Japanese move, but it was hoped it would not lead to a deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations'; and so on."

"He leaves the world no room for doubt," Christie concluded, "that he is purporting to speak for one Power. He apparently equates 'Britain' with 'the British Commonwealth' and leaves it to the world to make up its mind what special content to give, though conceptions like 'the British Government and people' and 'Anglo-Japanese relations' might assist the world in this task.

Commentaries of this sort pepper Christie's writings between 1935 and 1939, and he used them to argue against Canada's giving additional commitments to Britain. Such commitments, he believed, could only serve to give reality to these assumptions. One further example will suffice to demonstrate the exasperation and worry with which he received such statements by British officials and politicians. In early 1938, Christie warned Skelton that not only did the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship that had existed in 1914 vis-a-vis the power to declare war still hold the floor, but that British politicians were planning policy on that basis and counting on Canada and the other Dominions to play a role identical to that which they played during the Great War.

"10. The process by which the legal status of war came about in Canada in 1914 has been noted above -- i.e., as an instantaneous consequence of the declaration delivered soley on the responsibility of the then British Ministry. There being no specific 'convention' and no legal discontinuity, does the possibility of a like procedure obtaining in the future have to be envisaged? In a defence debate in the House of Lords less than a year ago [3 March 1937], Lord Halifax, the Government leader, spoke as follows ... :

> 'But the real guarantee against war, or against war for any but the clearest and most overwhelming reasons, is that which the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, referred to in his speech when he said that it was impossible for any democratic Government in these days to make war unless it could count on the overwhelming support of the country behind it in doing so. That is true. And what is not less true, but I do not think the noble Lord mentioned it, is that it would be impossible for any Government in this country to decide on a declaration of war unless they are morally confident that not only this country but also the whole Empire was associated with them, in their decision.'

Does this envisage anything really different from the 1914 position? He sees the whole Empire at war; he sees the decision to declare war being taken by the British Ministry. He indicates no legal or conventional procedure for associating other Ministries of the Crown with the Act. The British Ministers have only to be 'morally confident' that the whole Empire will be prepared to associate itself with the decision. Was not this essentially the position of the Asquith Ministry in 1914? ..."

Christie used examples of this sort of thinking in government circles in London to remind King and Skelton that some British officials continued to think of Canada as an entity still akin to a colony, and to pave the way for his arguments against new commitments. See John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER VI: 1935-1939, Document 504, pp. 674-675, L.C. Christie, Re London Naval Conference, 16 January 1936, and, PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 803, File 731, L.C. Christie, Mr. MacNeil's Proposed Resolution - "The Right to Declare War or to Remain Neutral," 14 February 1938.

73.) PAC, RG 25 D1, Volume 755, File 243-I, L.C. Christie, Canadian Air Force Program: Note Respecting Proposed Contract with British Government to Train Pilots, 5 September 1938.

74.) Ibid.

75.) Ibid.

76.) Bearing out Christie's estimate of the deep pro-British bias of Canada's armed forces, Professor Hillmer has quoted General Maurice Pope as having said that Canada's interwar army "was indeed British through and through with only minor differences imposed on us by purely local conditions." Hillmer also notes that close cooperation between the Canadian and British military services was "sanctioned, encouraged and extended by one Canadian government after another."

> "Coordination with the British military on matters of organization, training and equipment was obviously cheap and convenient, and it was one sense in which, British motives not withstanding, the [Anglo-Canadian] 'alliance' could be said to have operated to Canada's advantage. It ensured that doctrine, if not arms (there was a relatively limited relationship between the two in the Canada of the 1930s) remained relatively up to date. Such arrangements were supplemented by a wide range of British information and intelligence and a number of specific agreements reached at the political level which outlined Canadian action in support of British forces should a war break out involving both countries. ... This series of agreements constituted a formidable limitation on Canada's freedom of action should Great Britain become involved in a major war."

Christie clearly would not have agreed with Professor Hillmer's contention that the close cooperation described above worked to the advantage of Canada because the doctrine of the country's armed services was kept relatively up to date. Christie would have felt that the only thing the trans-Atlantic transfer of doctrine and planning procedures did was to make the two armed services all the more similar, thereby reinforcing the already strong pro-British bias of the Canadian military as well as their intention to prepare an expeditionary force to support Britain in Europe. This sharing of doctrine and planning procedures through the vehicle of the documents produced by the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.), for example, was opposed by Christie and he recommended that the documents not be distributed within the Canadian government. "The whole point of all these papers," he wrote, "is prepartion for war. Whether our departments should undertake preliminary co-ordination measures for Canadian defence in such an eventuality, is a question for the Government. Until some special decision or plan is arrived at in that connection, the idea of a future distribution of these papers seems to be doubtful." Indeed, Christie almost certainly would have been willing to see the Canadian military abide by slightly outdated doctrine, if such a system lessened its allegiance to the idea of an expeditionary force. Whereas Professor Hillmer has contended that although "[t]here were feelings of empire kinship and even dependence [on Britain] in the Canadian armed forces of the 1930s ... the Canadian military, however, based its assumptions and policies primarily on a

rational assessment of national needs and national realities, not on imperialist impulses or colonialist instincts," Christie believed tht the opinions and mind-set of Canada's defence planners were indeed for the most part driven by "imperalist impulses" and "colonialist instincts."

In regard to the "number of specific agreements reached at the political level," Christie would have agreed completely with Hillmer that they tended to compromise Canada's freedom of action in the event of war. Among these measures were coordination of British and Canadian naval forces on the North American and West Indian stations in the event of war, the Canadian government's issuing of notice to Royal Navy reservists in Canada to mobilize in the case of the threat of war, use of Esquimalt by the Royal Navy in the event of war and for storage during peace, and the supply of naval intelligence from Esquimalt, Ottawa, and Halifax. Although, care had been taken during the negotiation of these arrangements "to guard against these provisional technical agreements being taken as having a political bearing ...," Christie wrote,

> "[b]ut, in spite of all such caveats, there must still remain a disturbing doubt whether a position has not grown up which on moral grounds might compromise the freedom of action of the Canadian Government and Parliament at the time of actual crisis. Looking at some of the measures ..., it seems conceivable that the British defence authorities may be relying confidently on their being carried out, that alternative measures have not been contemplated and arranged for, and that consequently in respect of these special measures the British Government might be badly embarrassed by a Canadian decision not to co-operate in the actual event."

On this basis, Christie argued tht the Canadian government make it clear both to its own citizens and to the British government that this set of arrangements has "no practical bearing and does not involve any commitment as to the course that might be adopted by Canada in the event of war. ... and it follows that the decision as to the necessity of executing any specific measure would be for the Canadian government to make at the time." For the foregoing see Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: The Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," op. cit., pp. 596-598 and 600; PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 818, File 663, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for Dr. Skelton. Distribution of C.I.D. Documents, 25 March 1936; Ibid., Volume 755, File 239, L.C. Christie, Canadian Defence Commitments, 19 February 1936; and, Ibid., Volume 818, File 668, L.C. Christie, Re Mr. Woodsworth's Question, Hansard, February 10, 1936, page 38, 11 February 1936.

77.) In early 1937, for example, Christie complained that "the overseas hypothesis is almost universally adopted by militia officers and other writers, in articles and editorials in the Canadian Defence Quarterly, as the basis upon which peace-time organization, training and equipment should be designed and

carried out. ..."

> "The practical effect of the choice [between organization for local defence or an oversea's effort] upon the actual character, design and organisation of the units, upon equipment and training methods, upon allocation of funds among the three services, is immediately decisive, far-reaching and easily visible to the public at home and abroad.
>
> ... [the oversea's hypothesis is] a most incongruous policy to adopt as our primary peace-time position, and one that must almost completely discourage original thinking in the most important (local) fields of our defence problem. It is indeed the very reverse of the position outlined in the Imperial Conference resolutions.
>
> The [Canadian] General Staff [is] to be instructed to produce a new scheme of organisation, based on the local defense of Canada, regardless, for the time being, of the overseas expeditionary force hypothesis.
>
> Doubtless the General Staff would be unable to keep the other hypothesis out of their minds -- and no one can prevent them from concocting paper schemes that would employ for that hypothesis any organisation that might be designed on the local defence basis -- but it ought to be possible to pin them down to something that could be intelligibly described to the public and that might be of some value from the point of view of promoting national unity. ..."

Christie finished this memorandum by quoting Lloyd George's conclusion from his Memoirs that British statesmen had waited too long to assert their primacy over the soldiers during the Great War, thereby expanding the devastation caused by the conflict. "For this conclusion," Christie wrote,

> "his [Lloyd George's] six volumes, particularly the last two, constitute indeed an extraordinarily documented and closely reasoned case. To this case no one appears as yet to have undertaken the outline of a serious answer. ...
>
> If this is so in wartime, it is even more so in peace-time. Further, as appears again and again in all the various studies of 1914-18, the time to exercise the control effectively is at the outset of any new departure."

In his remarks on the idea of organizing Canadian defense efforts around the necessity of despatching an expeditionary force to Europe, Christie was attacking both the lack of logic in the idea of sending a force abroad, without adequately meeting defense needs at home, and the prior commitment it involved; namely, with the armed services organized to be sent overseas there would be precious little option but for the government to

despatch them when the war began. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 721, File 47, L.C. Christie, Defence Policy and Organisation - Militia, 26 February 1937. For recent verification of Christie's analysis of the trend of thinking among the officers of the Canadian military in the interwar period see James H. Lutz, "Canadian Military Thought, 1923-1939: A profile drawn from the pages of the old Canadian Defence Quarterly," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 9, 2 (Autoumn, 1979), pp 40-48; Stephen Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939." Military Affairs, XLVI, 3 (October, 1982), pp. 120-129; and, Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: the Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," op. cit., pp. 600-601.

78.) Another aspect of Christie's opposition to preparing to send a Great War-type of expeditionary force to Europe was the fear tht the British General Staff would use the Canadians as cannon fodder. After reading a paper prepared by the British government stressing the need for increased mechanization of the British Army, Christie wrote that it was time for Ottawa to look closely at what the cost would be to Canada of supporting such an army with an infantry force. "The implications of such a highly mechanised land force," Christie explained,

> "might be specially significant for a small country like Canada if it got into a position of sending land forces to co-operate with U.K. mechanised forces anywhere. For lack of resources a small Power's forces cannot be highly mechanised and trained in advance. In co-opertion therefore it [the small power] might be relegated to the role of supplying mostly infantry, involving disproportionate drains and losses of manpower. The argument might then be, not to think of a self-contained national army, but to merge its forces into the Army of the Great Power, where it could be furnished the advantages of mechanisation, though in that case it might still find itself unable, because of the difficulty of control, to escape supplying disproportionate numbers of manpower and suffering disproportionately accordingly."

PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 27, Folder 8, p. 24637, L.C. Christie, Notes on U.K. Foreign Policy, 16 June 1938.

79.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 818, File 664, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for Dr. Skelton, Canadian Defence Policy, 24 June 1938. Christie was pleased with the reallocation of defense resources away from the army and toward the air and naval branches contained in the defense estimates for 1938-1939, but he probably believed that the change was coming much too late in the day. For a description of this reallocation see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 134-153.

In this same memorandum, Christie also attacked another aspect of Canadian military policy which he believed was certain

to limit the scope for Canadian action on the outbreak of war, namely, the principle of uniformity of equipment, training and organization between the British and Canadian armies. He believed that for a number of practical reasons -- the questionable security of Britain as a source of supply, the applicability of British equipment to local Canadian defense needs, and the inability of the British to give Canadian orders priority over their own, for example -- the uniformity principle was, by the middle 1930s, an absurdity, but his major objection remained that it amounted to an insuperable prior commitment to Britain. Christie rehearsed all of his objections to the uniformity rule in a commentary on a General Staff Paper, entitled "The Defence of Canada - A Survey of Militia Requirements," in early 1938. Although he threw up a host of objections, the central one rings through loud and clear.

> "6). The U.S. Neutrality legislation is assumed [by the General Staff] as a very important factor and disability [to Canada's looking to arms manufactures in the United States as an alternate source of supply]. But here the question of a narrower hypothesis as to the attacker comes in. Suppose the attack is on our West Coast from Japan -- or Russia -- do we really have to assume the Neutrality Legislation as a barrier to supply? Would the situation be very different in the event of an attack on our East Coast? If the primary assumption regarding immediate action as to equipment and supply is as summarised ... above -- i.e., defence of our coasts -- should not the whole question of the U.S. as a source of supply be more deeply and seriously considered? The Paper says ... that we cannot wait for supply from the U.K.; but there upon it recommends ... a course which appears to mean we must wait for items like heavy coastal guns and armour piercing ammunition from the U.K. Does not the whole paper force us to face seriously the question whether we can realy regard the U.K. as a source of supply for certain armaments assumed to be essential for our own defence? If the defence of our shores is a matter so grave and urgent as stated [by the General Staff], is there not a serious question of responsibility to be faced in hesitating to explore other possibilities? How does the weakness arising from the chances of the [United States] Neutrality Legislation operating against us compare with our weakness arising from the inability to get orders filled in the U.K.?
>
> 7). The principle of uniformity of Empire equipment is also seen to be a very important factor in this whole problem of supply for our own defence. If our immediate problem is to make sure of the defence of our own homeland and if that principle of uniformity conflicts -- if we literally cannot get the Empire equipment needed for an immediate problem assumed to be so grave and urgent -- what weight are those responsible for the defence of Canada entitled to attach to that principle now? Is the principle of uniformity here a weakness?

8). There is perhaps another sort of dilemma implicit in the Paper. The General Staff probably cannot get away from it; since they are bound, without further instructions, to make the assumptions they have made, regarding the principle of uniformity of Empire equipment and the U.S. Neutrality Legislation. The upshot appears to be that, while the Paper purports to base calculations, on a policy of defence of our own coasts,etc. (for which we might probably rely upon the U.S. as a source of supply), it seems at the same time to take as necessity that we must now prepare for the contingency of our fighting forces abroad (where conformity [of equipment] would be relevant) under conditions where we could not get supply from the U.S., i.e. that our forces would go abroad in advance of the U.S. (for if we went abroad concurrently with the U.S. we could presumably count on co-operation and pooling as regards supply). Indeed, a hostile critic of the Paper might say in the upshot that it comes perilously close to a position that the defence of our coasts is not a very grave question after all and that what we are planning for is something else."

That "something else" was of course, in Christie's opinion, an expeditionary force, and he himself was, indeed, a "hostile critic" of the type he referred to in his commentary above. To rid Canada of the prior commitment inherent in the doctrine of uniformity in Empire military organization, training, and equipment, Christie recommended that henceforth such considerations "be governed completely by the necessities of these purposes [the requirements for local defense], regardless of the old and now harmful and obstructive principle of uniformity." Only this the way could Canada neutralize, he told Skelton, "the vicious practical consequences, that is, complete readiness for overseas duty of the rule of uniformity of equipment, training and organisation now becoming more and more apparent. ..." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, MG 30 E44, Volume 27, File 8, pp. 24617-24619, L.C. Christie, Notes on the General Staff Paper of January 7, 1938 on "The Defence of Canada - A Survey of Militia Requirements," 19 January 1938; L.C. Christie, Memorandum for Dr. Skelton. Canadian Defence Policy, 24 June 1938, op. cit.; and, PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 721, File 47, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 16 November 1938.

80.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 725, File 47, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Defense of Canada, 14 January 1936. Christie always focused on the military planners, rather than the naval or air planners, when venting his spleen. He consistently praised the naval and air planners between 1935 and 1939 for basing "their respective schemes of organisation ... [on] defence of our own coasts and the maintenance of our neutrality." The army planners, on the other hand, he consistently equated with the imperialist community in Canada -- the phrase "our general Staff and Imperialists in Canada" or some such similar combination is found often in Christie's writings in this period

-- and warned that rather than looking to limit the country's prior commitments they were looking to expand them. See L.C. Christie, Memorandum on Defence Policy, 1 September 1936, op. cit.; and L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 16 November 1938, op. cit.

81.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Defence of Canada, 14 January 1936, op. cit.

82.) Christie also thought that the government should take steps to reduce or eliminate direct, long-established contacts and exchanges of opinion and advice between British and Canadian military officers as another means of distancing Canada from the problems he saw arising from the Anglo-Canadian commonality of equipment, training, organisation and doctrine. In the spring of 1938, for example, Christie wrote a memorandum in which he described the Department of National Defence's annual practice of sending to Britain a report detailing the air and military resources then at the disposal of the Government of Canada. Christie noted that although both the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence "agreed that this procedure is inconsistent with constitutional developments and is liable to misinterpretations," the latter department favored the maintenance of the exchange because it was "desirable ... from the point of view of Canadian defence" and suggested that it be continued "by means of the unofficial Periodical letter from the Chief of the General Staff, Canada, to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London." Christie did not flatly urge the immediate termination of the procedure, but he did stress that it was a practice reminiscent of "earlier Colonial days," that it aided London in preparing a "secret Return showing the establishment and strength of Dominion, Colonial, etc, forces," and that London did not reciprocate in that "[i]t does not appear that we [Canada] have been furnished with a Return showing the establishment and strength of the U.K. forces." For all of these reasons -- and for the constitutional consideration -- Christie strongly inferred that it was best that Canada cease sending the annual return. If that was not possible, he suggested that a new non-military channel of communication be established which would require a two-way "inter-change" of information under the auspices of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and the Dominions Office in London.

Christie also, not surprisingly, sought to limit the development of any new direct contacts between the Canadian and British militaries, and to channel those which were unavoidable in a manner that insured that they would be placed under civilian control. When the Department of National Defence wanted in the fall of 1937 to send Colonel C.P. Loggie to London to serve in a manner so as to expedite the filling of Canadian military-related orders by British manufacturers, Christie laid out guidelines that sought to prevent the type of direct service-to-service contacts he feared created an underlying prior commitment for Canada. In regard to Loggie's appointment, Christie explained

"2. The officer's duties would be to facilitate arrangements between the Department [of National Defense] and the [British] War Office regarding supplies obtained from the U.K. for Canadian forces. The great U.K. armament program causes delays in getting deliveries and plans and specifications needed here and a man on the spot is considered necessary.

3. In previous discussions [regarding the appointment] the following conditions and points have been noted:

(a.) The term 'Liaison' should not form part of his title. He might be called Ordnance Representative of the Department of National Defence. (The High Commissioner would seem to be the real 'liaison' between Canada and the U.K.)

(b.) That he would be under the general supervision of the High Comissioner. This would accord with the Statutes and Orders in Council regarding the activities of various Canadian departmental agencies in London.

(c.) That, if practicable, office quarters be provided in Canada House. This would seem more appropriate than the method adopted some years ago of the Canadian Air Liaison Officer who was given quarters in the Air Ministry building.

(d.) Should he be authorised to attend meetings of the U.K. Principal Supply Officers Committee or other organs of the Committee of Imperial Defence? It has been suggested that this is not essential to his function and might be miscontrued.

4. It is for consideration whether it would not be desirable at the same time to change the title of the 'Canadian Air Liaison Officer', and to arrange for his accommodation at Canada House or some other Canadian quarters in London."

Christie won this battle against new military-to-military contacts hands down. E.A. Pickering, the Prime Minister's secretary, recorded a week after Christie had submitted his memorandum that "Council approval of a Canadian Ordnance Officer in London, along the lines indicated by Mr. Christie's memorandum. ..." Christie long believed "that the really fatal pre-1914 manoeuvre [in so far as tying Britain to all-out participation in a war on the continent] was the Anglo-French Staff Conversations," and he seems to have believed in the same vein that close Anglo-Canadian staff cooperation would result in committing Canada to the same sort of total participation in the next war. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 818, File 688, L.C. Christie, Annual Return of Military and Air Resources of

Canada, 14 March 1938; Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Reel C-4253, pp. C-108104-C-108106, L.C .Christie, Appointment of Canadian Ordnance Officer in London, 21 September 1937; and, Ibid, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 817, File 661, L.C. Christie, Memorandum for Dr. Skelton: Defence Policy in Great Britain, 14 November 1936. For a glimpse of the type of direct military-to-military cooperation and communication that Christie found most worrisome see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 83-84 on General Staff-to-General Staff communications involved in the "liaison letters" episode, and Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: the Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," op. cit., p. 597 on interwar Anglo-Canadian naval cooperation and communication.

83.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum on Defence Policy, 1 September 1936, op. cit.

84.) Ibid.

85.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 721, File 45, L.C. Christie, Note on Replacement of Destroyers CHAMPLAIN and VANCOUVER, 18 December 1935. Christie described these "local" responsibilities of the Department of National Defence as "(a) to protect our territory against invasion from the coasts, particularly the Pacific Coast; (b) to support and maintain the civil power; (c) to protect shipping in our coastal areas; and (d) to preserve our neutrality." It is interesting to note that when jousting with Canadian defence planners between 1935 and 1939 Christie always chastized them for paying insufficient attention to the defense needs of the Pacific coast. He never, however, spelled out the threat he perceived from that direction -- aside from vague speculations about an attack from Japan or Russia -- and one suspects that he simply believed that if Canada's primary defense orientation was toward the Pacific coast it would take a good deal of time and effort to rearrange things and move them first eastward and then across the Atlantic to participate in a new European war. While that realignment was underway, Christie probably thought that the government might just have a bit of time to withstand the emotional storm caused by the outbreak of a war and devise a plan calling for something short of all-out, Great War-type participation. For Christie's enumeration of local defense tasks and his stress on Pacific defenses see L.C. Christie, Notes on the Defence of Canada, 14 January 1936, op. cit.

86.) L.C. Christie, Memorandum on Defence Policy, 1 September 1936, op. cit.

87.) Ibid.

88.) Ibid.

89.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Defence of Canada, 14 January 1936, op. cit.

90.) Christie, of course, was never able to persuade the government to move the military planners away from the "overseas hypothesis" and do more than pay loud but inconsequental lip-service to home defense. All of his fears in this regard were realized in the form of a memorandum delivered to the government by the Chiefs of Staff six days before the war began. "As regards the Chiefs of Staff Memo.," Christie wrote with a pen dripping with anger, sarcasm, and frustration,

> "three outstanding points have occurred to me on a first reading:
>
> (a) Their basic case for the need of a Canadian Field Force in Europe is the demand on Great Britain's man power for (a) air defence and (b) war industry. That is to say, British man power would work at home (war industry is wholly at home and so is air defence as distinguished from air attack); while at great expense Canadian man power would be transported across the ocean, across Great Britain and pitched into Europe. There would be an Army Corps of 60,000 as a starter: the Chiefs of Staff entitle their paper 'Canada's National Effort (Armed Forces) in the Early Stages of a Major War'. They give no estimate of how many more 60,000's would be needed as reinforcements -- an estimate indeed which no one could make. It seems evident that the project raises questions in at least two fields which presumably the General Staff regard as outside their competence: the field of economics and the field of equity.
>
> (b) The paper may perhaps give some notion of why certain things (presumably regarding local defence) have been left undone in the past years at the Woods Building. They were spending most of their brains on this baby. ... It has been most painstakingly worked out ... -- 'the product of years of careful thought and effort, and is complete in so far as existing conditions will allow'. ... I like this last clause and 'existing conditions'!
>
> (c) The need for home defence is now thrown overboard ... -- something of a hairpin curve from the line of the propaganda of recent years about the attacks on Canada."

See PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 395, File 52, pp. C-278308-C-278310, L.C. Christie, Dr. Skelton: Re Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of August 29, 1939, 6 September 1939.

91.) During the 1935-1939 period Christie was often viewed as an excessively legalistic and ruthlessly logical individual who was incapable of taking human emotions and sentiment in account when devising the advice he offered to the government. For example, soon after he returned to the Department of External Affairs General H.D.G. Crerar said that while he admired Christie's intellect "his reasoning is cold and his conclusions, on such

matters as I know about, always seem to ignore the human factors such as sentiment"; at the Imperial Conference in 1937, the Winnipeg Free Press's Grant Dexter told Dafoe that Christie was "a very cynical, disillusioned man and he hit me like an ice-cold bath"; and, in reaction to one of Christie's memoranda in the summer of 1939 Hume Wrong wrote that it sounded as if it "might have been written by some superior being in Mars," while L.B. Pearson remarked on the same paper that it "was so superior and remote from reality as to be most irritating."

All of these opinions are wide of the mark, and, in fact, drastically underestimate the importance Christie attached to the motivational power of such basically irrational elements as tradition, racial and nationalistic sentiment, and pure emotion. Far from being immune to these "human factors" -- as Crerar called them -- Christie consistently kept them to the fore in his calculations and he bent his efforts along legalistic lines not to negate them but to create an environment in which formal legal commitments would not add additional momentum to that imparted by the more irrational elements just mentioned. He believed that nowhere were these factors more substantially influential than at the beginning of and during a war. Christie's estimate of the role of the irrational in wartime was that it led to a situation which no one could control and from which only catastrophe could result. "That little book I showed you -- 'The War in Outline 1914-1918' by Capt. Liddell Hart -- is worth reading," he told Frankfurter in early 1937.

> "It is I think the most terrible book on the war I have read. Beside it, stuff like 'All Quiet on the Western Front", and Romain Rolland's stuff etc, is mere froth. This thing of Hart's is the very anatomy of modern war -- the concentrated essence and poison -- and you can take it in two or three hours.
>
> You see [in Hart's book] these things called Great Powers have to work under the conception implicit in their name (i.e. 'politics' in terms of calculations of 'power'). It is quite clear that these vast organisms in conflict cannot survive. The mass becomes so great, the structure and organisation so intricate, intelligence so diffused and remote, that the function of direction becomes, for the 4 or 5 human beings who have to take the ultimate decisions, a really impossible thing. If they get locked in conflict these great organisms are seen to be blind, reeling, staggering absurditites. At two or three points 1914-1918 turned on events that had no discoverable human direction at all. With the growing mass and intricacy under modern state conditions the blindness will become essentially deeper. There is no evidence that any state has produced more godlike generals and directors in the intervening years. The best evidence seems to be that conflict between these modern oragnisms -- provided they are highly organised and can really get at one another -- can

produce no intelligible, calculable, long term political decision or settlement, but only mutual devastation."

The advent of war, Christie argued, brought forth a wave of irrational motivations that were internationally contagious and from which no country, large or small, could claim to be immune. "All who were conscious of August 4, 1914," he wrote a year after the above letter to Frankfurter, "will recall also the instant and profound psychological consequences of the transition to the legal status of war. The declaration of this status was the pulling of a lever setting in motion [in Canada] a tremendous engine of mass emotion. The nation and people became a different thing overnight. The mode of operation of the constitution, all political processes, were deeply affected. It was also seen later that the obligation to make war was unlimited. There was no formal scope for stipulating with the Allies and Associates as to the character and extent of the contribution, or as to the terms on which peace might be made, or for choice as to whether or not to enter into an agreement with others making peace separately."

It was precisely because Christie respected the power of irrational forces to sweep all before them that he set about after the Great War to find legalistic or diplomatic ways in which to limit Canada's "obligation" to make unlimited war next time around. He never believed that anything could be done which would effectively break the bonds of tradition and sentiment, but he did believe it was possible -- through such means as a constitutional convention to define the nature of Canadian sovereignty in the late 1920s, and the largely negative campaigns to prevent a host of new and formal Anglo-Canadian economic and military ties a decade later -- to limit the numbers of binding legal commitments with Britain, and thereby to produce a Canadian war effort that was in keeping with the requirements of national unity and which therefore served the national interest. Even as late as 5 September 1939, for example, Christie, while recognizing that a Canadian declaration of war was a foregone conclusion, believed that there was ample time available to reflect on exactly what sort of participation Canada should undertake. The following lengthy memorandum, submitted to Skelton on that date, was in effect the culmination of Christie's effort to limit Canada's binding commitments to Britain. In fact, he believed that the thorough-going examination of national options he recommended therein was possible only because the government had steered clear of specific binding commitments during the interwar period.

"1. In spite of the insistent demands which may arise throughout the country the Government seems scarcely yet in a position to announce a comprehensive policy. As regards some specific projects which might be proposed, there are important considerations whose answer depends upon the formation of judgments and estimates for which the material facts are not yet available and may only be disclosed by the course of events over perhaps a considerable period.

2. Of these considerations two chief ones are:

(a) The Government should have much clearer information than is yet available of the war operations planned or intended by the British and Allied Governments. It is not enough to get simply suggestions from the British as to what Canadian action would be the most effective without at the same time having the information in question, so that the Canadian Government can form their own judgment whether the Canadian action suggested would in reality be the most effective.

(The question how to get such information as to British and Allied plans is for considertion. Perhaps it would be difficult to get them to commit much of it on paper. This has a bearing on some War Conference in London, or perhaps sending some Minister there with adequate assistance.)

(b) If there were a question of sending any large number of Canadians overseas, the Government should first have assurance from the British Government that they could get across without being sunk, with full explanations of the methods proposed by the Admiralty, so that judgment could be formed here as to their effectiveness and possible implications.

(Here again there might be some difficulties in getting such information.)

3. Such considerations may apply with greater or lesser degree to the different kinds of participation that might be proposed:

(a) As regards Naval participation, they do not appear to apply particularly to Canadian Naval action around our Coasts, and perhaps not to the numbers of Canadians who might wish to serve in the British Navy. ... Paragraph 2(a) would have some bearing on Canadian Naval action in the Western Atlantic, e.g., Newfoundland and the West Indies.

(b) As regards Air Force participation, these considerations may not be so important or decisive as in the case of land forces, but they should be taken into account.

(c) As regards any question of a Canadian Expeditionary Force of soldiers, both considerations -- i.e., both (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 -- apply with full force.

4. (a) There would be no use talking about an Expeditionary Force without some assurance that in crossing the ocean they would not meet a disaster that might cause political revulsions in Canada.

(b) If Canadian overseas land forces were to be

considered, the question whether there should be a self-contained, more or less autonomous, Canadian Division or Army Corps, or whether Canadian units should operate as units of the British or Allied Forces, and in what theatre or theatres, would be a far-reaching question. The demands for a separate Canadian Army Corps as in the late war would be strong and intelligible. On the other hand, as 1914-1918 showed, the pressure of vested interests, prestige and so on results in steady, unforeseen growth and in practically unanswerable demands for keeping the Corps at full strength. He would be a bold man who would assert that once such a course was entered on he could set any limit to the commitment or envisage the consequences. For example, what would be the consequences, in the event of the various kinds of outcome of the war that might be envisaged, if a large Canadian Army was in existence on the soil of Europe, Canada having no Navy or transports of her own to bring them back? The risks involved in this sense are risks of the highest political and national character. If the question arises for actual decision, it would be necessary to ask and answer the question whether a Canadian Army shall be placed on the soil of Europe in advance of a United States Army there.

(c) The British and French have concentrated heavily on mechanized armed services. Canadians could not be sent over, volunteers or not, as simple infantry who suffer the greatest casualties. The training of mechanized units and services is a long process. If any Army troops are to go, it might turn out to be best to postpone any question of sending infantry and begin training men in mechanized warfare in Canada. If a line of this sort could be considered, it might get around the far-reaching question of a full Canadian Division or Army Corps -- that is to say, confine Canadian overseas land action to specialised units and services to be trained in Canada before embarking.

5. Whatever the eventual decision, so far as the question of Canadian overseas land forces is concerned, the position indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 remains, and it is not seen how the Government can even begin to consider any comprehensive question in this field intelligibly or effectively without having the information and estimates there indicated. Some of the information and estimates will depend on the course of events. As regards land forces, therefore, the answer to questions in Parliament this month might perhaps be simply that a good deal more information is needed than is presently available before any conclusion can be reached and that the Government are getting such information together. ..."

The very fact that Christie wrote a memorandum such as the foregoing on 5 September 1939 underscores the point that while he never believed that there was a way to prevent Canadian

participation in the war, he did believe that the lack of prior commitments would allow the Canadian government to do the things mentioned above, namely, delay action until certain information and assurances were received from London, review the reaction of the United States to the start of the war, consider objectively the type of forces it would send to Europe, and, most importantly, allow time for the first waves of hysterical emotion to spend themselves and be replaced by calm reason. That all of these beliefs on Christie's part were naive and unreasonable may be granted; in many ways they were similar to his naive faith in the ability of non-partisan politics to carry the country through periods of national crisis. The poignancy of Christie's miscalculations of man's ability to limit or even restrain the power of the bonds of racial and nationalistic sentiment is perhaps captured best in the photograph in Professor Eayrs's book showing a transport carrying elements of the 1st Division leaving Halifax in December, 1939 under which is Colonel Stacey's estimate that "... the preparations were entirely inadequate...." In the end, as the photograph demonstrates, Christie was wrong, the defeat of the various would-be formal Anglo-Canadian military or military-type agreements in the late 1930s and the movement of defense resources away from a near-exclusive emphasis on an expeditionary force did not give the govenment full scope within which to determine the timing, nature, and extent of Canadian participation; the ties of blood and history were simply too strong and an expeditionary force was sent more or less as a matter of course. Nonetheless, Christie's method of operation in the late 1930s in no way indicates a lack of appreciation for the power of the irrational, rather it indicates an incisive appreciation of that power and an attempt to create an environment in which formal legal commitments would not enhance its ability to steamroll reason and all sense of proportion before it. The four estimates of Christie's cold intellect and logic have appeared in the works of Professors Stacey and Granatstein and can be found originally in PAC, MG 30 E157, H.D.G. Crerar Papers, Volume 10, Folder: Liaison 2-File-M.Pope, H.D.G. Crerar to Lt. Col. M. Pope, 11 April 1936; Ibid., MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Volume 10, Folder: 1937, January-June, Grant Dexter to J.W. Dafoe, 23 April 1937; Ibid., MG 26 N1, Pearson Papers, Volume 6, Folder: H.H. Wrong, Hume Wrong to L.B. Pearson, 27 June 1939 and L.B. Pearson to Hume Wrong, 29 June 1939. For Christie's clear and indeed fearful appreciation of the power of irrational forces see Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 30 January 1937, and L.C. Christie, Mr. MacNeil's Proposed Resolution, 14 February 1938, op. cit. For the memorandum seeking to take advantage of what Christie believed were the fruits of the interwar policy of no commitments see PAC, RG 25 G1, Volume 1976, File 902-A-part I, L.C. Christie, The Question of Canadian Overseas Forces. Points for Consideration, 5 September 1939. The photograph mentioned is found in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., facing page 115.

92.) See USNA, Diplomatic Branch, State Department Papers, No. 811.79640/117, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 5 December 1935, and PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1766, File 72-M-I, L.C. Christie, Memorandum Respecting Transatlantic Air Services, 2 March 1936. An interesting sidelight to these discussions on trans-Atlantic air services among the United States, Great Britain, Canada, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland was Christie's obliquely expressed concern that by promoting the development and expansion of such service Canada might be tying itself to a British program aimed at developing air transport for not only civil but also military uses. "Finally," Christie wrote in the March, 1936 memorandum mentioned above, "in view of the general European political instability, the great rearmament program now a certainty everywhere, and the increasing attention devoted to air armaments and plans, it is for consideration to what extent Canada should join actively in projects which may be calculated to assist in extending the range of the air arm." Although this concern apparently elicited no response from his superiors, it does underscore with what deadly seriousness Christie opposed any sort of prior committment by Canada and the alacrity with which he sought to grind his heel on any attempt -- real or imaginary -- to elicit a commitment.

93.) See PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Reel C-4285, pp. C-150068-C-150075, L.C. Christie, Notes for Use on Bill No. (?) Regarding the Halibut Convention Signed at Ottawa January 29, 1937, 18 March 1937.

94.) Skelton seems to have taken the Alaskan highway issue seriously and dropped it into Christie's lap largely because President Roosevelt was personally interested in the project -- after Congress had asked him to pursue the issue -- and it therefore could not be dismissed out of hand. The problem from the Canadian viewpoint, according to Christie, was that there were no funds available for the project in either federal and British Columbian coffers. Moreover, he wrote, "[t]he Federal Government has already undertaken extensive commitments to subsidize a trans-Canada highway, and this east-west undertaking might be regarded as having priority over a north-south project in one province." Nonetheless, given what he described as the "keen" interest of Roosevelt and the Congress in the Alaskan highway, Christie dabbled with the project between 1935 and 1937 -- arranging for some relatively inexpensive aerial reconnaissance of the proposed route, for example -- in order to make it appear Canada was responding while leaving "room ... for some drawing out of the affair. ..." See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1739, File 221-I, LC. Christie, Memorandum for Dr. Skelton: Alaskan Highway, 5 November 1936; Ibid., O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 27 November 1937; Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Reel C-4263, pp. C-121610-C-121611, L.C. Christie, Re Alaskan Highway, 1 October 1937; and Ibid., Volume 171, File 1594, pp. C-121625-C-121628, L.C. Christie, Alaska Highway, 24 November 1937.

95.) Christie's contributions on waterway matters primarily consisted of thorough memorandums recounting the history of Canadian-American dealings since 1900 on the entire catalogue of boundary water-related issues -- paying particularly close attention to the federal-provincial component of those dealings. His consistent recommendation was that Ottawa and Washington strive to reach a settlement that would include all outstanding disputes along the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway system and avoid a piecemeal approach which he believed was too easily frustrated by special interests or the narrowly defined positions of the various sub-national governments involved. For two good examples of Christie's efforts in this area see PAC, MG 26J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 182, File 1665, pp. C-128986-C-129011, L.C. Christie, Survey of Great Lakes-Niagara-St. Lawrence Boundary Waters Negotiations - (In Connection with Bill Respecting Export of Electrical Power), 26 February 1938, and Ibid., RG 25 B3, Volume 2454, Folder: St. Lawrence Seaway Agreements, L.C. Christie, Survey of Great Lakes-Niagara-St. Lawrence Water Negotiations, 23 March 1938. These two documents are similar in their recapitulations of the history of Canadian-American post-1900 boundary water negotiations, but the second offers an excellent analysis of the federal-provincial angle of those negotiations, especially in regard to the difficulties that King's government experienced in dealing on these issues with the Hepburn government in Ontario.

96.) For the heavily trade-oriented content of Canadian-American relations in this period see the excellent analysis of Norman Robertson's activities in this regard in J.L. Granatstein. A Man of Influence. Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statescraft, 1929-1968. Montreal: Deneau Publishers and Company, Ltd., 1981, pp. 55-79.

97.) PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 225, File: 2144, pp. C-153134-C-153135, L.C. Christie, Notes on the Neutrality Bill Pending in the U.S. Congress, 21 January 1936.

98.) Ibid., and PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 225, File-2144, p. C-153173, L.C. Christie, U.S. Neutrality Law, 1936, 14 March 1936.

99.) L.C. Christie, U.S. Neutrality Law, 1936, 14 March 1936, op. cit., and L.C. Christie, Notes on the Neutrality Bill Pending in the U.S. Congress, 21 January 1936, op. cit.

100.) Christie's seems to have been delighted with the hard-headed self-interest embodied in the American neutrality legislation, considering that approach to be a a much sounder basis for the foundation of policy than had been Wilson's adherence to abstract rights such as "the freedom of the seas" or as those enumerated in the former President's Fourteen Points. The American neutrality bills of the 1935-1939 period offered, Christie wrote approvingly, "(a) fresh emphasis upon their [the United States'] historic, dominant policy of Non-Intervention or

'entanglement' politically in other regions, coupled with a realisation, drawn from the experience of 1914-17, that in modern conditions trading and financing of certain kinds, does in effect amount to political intervention and 'freedom of the seas' is subordinate to 'non-entanglement.'" Christie gave both President Roosevelt and the Congress high marks for this "realisation" and went on to savage the notion that a country could protect its national interests by proclaiming a strict adherence to a number of rights recognized by international law while at the same time allowing its citizens to conduct "business as usual." Christie maintained that the American legislation made it clear that if the United States

> " ... is to avoid serious trouble [it] must do far more than merely comply with the 'legal' obligations of 'neutrality' as these are stated by 'international law' writers. To avoid complications with belligerents it must impose much more far-reaching restrictions on its citizens. It must get ready to reliquish many 'rights' and contentions hitherto asserted. Not a single contention made by the United States against the belligerent Powers from 1914 to 1917 has ever yet been admitted by them, or been tested by any post war judicial or arbitral proceeding. A Great Power fighting for its life will not respect these so-called "rights'. If victory is at stake it will violate them up to the full limit of the point where it considers further violation might bring the neutral Power into the war against it: that is to say, it will only balance the advantages against the disadvantages of acquiring another opponent in the war. Practically, therefore, the neutral Power can only make the corresponding calculation: are the advantages of going to war to enforce its 'rights' of commerce with that part of the world which comprises the war zone likely on the whole to outweigh the results of relinquishing that commerce? Under any real conception of law, then, these so-called 'rights' are a fiction and there is no use talking about them. Governments should be extremely cautious about inspiring in their citizens a belief in the existence of a 'right'. The public are more apt to be influenced by their beliefs as to the fact than by the fact itself. Inculcation of a belief in a 'right' is definitely an inflammatory act."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1999, File 652-A-III, January, 1938-April 1939, L.C. Christie, U.S. Neutrality Act, no date, and L.C. Christie, Notes on the Neutrality Bill Pending in the U.S. Congress, 21 January 1936, op. cit.

101.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1999, File 652-A_II, L.C. Christie, Re U.S. Neutrality Act, n.d. but almost certainly February-May, 1937.

102.) Ibid.

103.) Ibid.

104.) John A. Munro, DCER, VI: 1935-1939, Document 465, pp. 606-607, L.C. Christie, Points To Be Considered Re President Roosevelt's Kingston Speech, 19 August 1938.

105.) Ibid., and John A. Munro, DCER, VI: 1935-1939, Document 138, p. 177, L.C. Christie, Re Monroe Doctrine, 16 February 1937. Christie thought it was important that the Prime Minister make it very clear to Canadians -- and in doing so, to the Americans as well -- that Canada was in no way interpreting Roosevelt's assurances as a substitute for further defense efforts of its own. Christie's sensitivity to the meaning for Canada of burgeoning American power and his resulting determination that King should stress the point that Canada was a full, not a junior partner in the defense of North America is apparent in the following paragraph which he drafted for the Prime Minister's use in public comments on Roosevelt's speech at Kingston.

> "And, as Mr. Roosevelt has said, we are good neighbours and good friends because we maintain our own right with frankness. The people of Canada, as I have said, deeply appreciate this occasion. At the same time they know they have their own responsibilities for maintaining Canadian soil as a homeland for free men in the western hemisphere. They will recognise today that there is no room for shirking these responsibilities. During the past two years we have been making special efforts to put our own means of defense in order. The country has approved the many measures taken to this end and I am confident that, within the limits of our capacities and responsibilities, the country intends that we shall keep on going forward on that course. In that way, I am equally confident, we shall best play the part of a good neighbour."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1873, File 359, L.C. Christie, Re President Roosevelt's Kingston Speech, 19 August 1938.

106.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1944, File 756, L.C. Christie, Department of External Affairs, 12 September 1939.

107.) Ibid., RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 757, File 244, L.C. Christie, Memorandum on Conversations Re Relationship Between United States and Canadian Economies in the Event of War, 1 May 1939.

108.) Ibid.

109.) In a memorandum discussing British foreign policy written in the spring of 1939, Christie reflected on the ambitions and opportunism of Franklin Roosevelt. "The [Americans] are not, however," he wrote, "in spite of a considerable change of front in the past year, prepared to abandon their policy of North

America first and fight with Hitler. The President apparently is. He genuinely believes that great issues are at stake, he is not unaware of the value of a diversion from troublesome domestic difficulties, and he has a very big slice of the Teddy Roosevelt readiness to run the world." Christie also later hinted that Roosevelt's "ambition to play a great part in world affairs" might bear some watching because "he has a great measure of executive discretion and pressure." See John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI: 1935-1939, Document 946, p. 1162, L.C. Christie, The New British Policy in Europe, 12 April 1939, and Ibid., Document 981, p. 1214, L.C. Christie, The European Situation, 19 July 1939.

110.) L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 7 March 1937, op. cit.

111.) In 1936 Christie related to Frankfurter a story about one of his encounters with Roosevelt's legendary charm. "My business there [in Washington]," Christie wrote, "was to talk about flying the Atlantic -- something which God knows I look on with great reserve. But we got somewhere -- which is more than most international conversations do nowadays. Among other incidents there was the United Kingdom, Irish Free State and Canadian delegations being asked to go to the White House and the extraordinary ease with which your FDR captivated the whole lot of us. ..." See L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 5 December 1936, op. cit.

112.) L.C. Christie, Points to be Considered Re President Roosevelt's Kingston Speech, 19 August 1938, op. cit.

113.) This memorandum is printed in John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, VI: 1935-1939, op. cit., footnote 1 on p. 607. The memorandum is unsigned and immediately follows Christie's official paper on the Kingston speech. From internal evidence -- especially the constant use of contractions and, more especially, the frequent use of slang phrases -- the unsigned paper was unquestionably penned by Christie. The piece can also be found in Christie's papers, see PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 89, p. 22262.

Another factor of note in this memorandum is that Christie did indeed believe that Roosevelt was exerting pressure on Britain -- to which London was responding -- to begin to stand up to Germany, and as a result was increasing the likelihood of a European war in which Canada would be unavoidably involved. "After Munich," Christie wrote in the spring of 1939,

> "the President was more convinced than ever that Hitler had to be stopped and that with Chamberlain and Daladier falling down on the job, it was up to him to do it. Hence the calling back to Washington of the American Ambassadors at London, Paris and Berlin; the favoring of French and British airplane orders, the talk to Senators, later denied, about first line of defence on Rhine, the pressure for the revision of the Neutrality law, and the strong Roosevelt-

Hull-Ickes-Welles attacks on Germany -- and, incidentally, not on Italy. It is clear that the British were anxious to regain the good opinion in the United States, and anxious to show Roosevelt that they are prepared to act with vigor, in some direction or other."

Christie concluded that this "back seat driving from Washington" had had the impact Roosevelt was seeking. "There is little doubt," Christie wrote, "that the definite expectation of United States support for a vigorous anti-Hitler policy and apprehension of United States criticism if an appeasement policy was continued, were among the imponderable factors in the sudden shift of British policy in March [, 1939]."

There is a fascinating irony in the difference in the effect of Roosevelt's brand of Anglo-American cooperation, and the variety which Christie had advocated since the end of the Great War. Christie had consistently believed that cooperation between the two North Atlantic powers -- because of the traditional isolationism of the United States and the fact that each primarily was a naval rather than a land power -- would limit Britain's ability to enter into continental commitments and thereby reduce the possibility of Canada's becoming involved in another land war in Europe. Roosevelt's criteria for Anglo-American cooperation -- that is, British opposition to the expansion of Hitler's Germany -- had just the opposite influence, however, driving Britain into ever more binding continental commitments which simultaneously increased the chances of Canadian involvement in a European land war. In this light, the upshot of Roosevelt's brand of Anglo-American cooperation could not have helped but somewhat jaundice Christie's opinion of the President. See John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, Volume VI: 1935-1939, Document 946, p. 1162, L.C. Christie, The New British Policy in Europe, 12 April 1939, and, Ibid., Document 981, pp. 1205 and 1212-1213, L.C. Christie, The European Situation, 19 July 1939.

114.) L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 1 December 1937, op. cit. Christie's wariness about Roosevelt also comes through clearly, albeit indirectly, in a short memorandum he prepared in response to a letter on American foreign policy written by Henry L. Stimson and published in the New York Times on 7 March 1939. "Mr. Stimson speaks," Christie began his memorandum,

> "in the authentic tones of the influential element [in the United States], particularly in the East, who have long been aware of their country as a Great Power, who do not fail either to think in terms of Great Power politics or to omit the ingredient of messianic destiny, who in this century, and more than ever since the last European catastrophe, are becoming conscious of themselves as the Greatest Power. ...
>
> That the Administration in Washington should welcome his utterances is intelligible. In this realm of affairs he and the President doubtless think and see much alike (and, I suppose, influential members of the State Department too);

though he by nature is much more sober and less adventurous than the President.

It is noticeable that Mr. [Herbert] Hoover has been taking a different line from Mr. Stimson [and by implication from Roosevelt's]. Mr. Hoover's origins, upbringing and experience have been very different. By nature he is simpler, in some ways less sophisticated, more resistant to the corrosive effects of power, and represents a more wholesome strain in the American make up. I imagine he is still a political force, though doubtless he himself realises at a certain point poise and judgment give way when the inertia of national 'destiny', massive and indifferent, is given free run by fears and hysteria. ..."

Christie recommended that this memorandum be sent to the New York Times as a rebuttal to Stimson's missive, to be either signed with his full name, just with his initials, or "by a member of the Department," but Skelton quickly scotched the idea See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 27, Folder 3, pp. 24412-24415, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 23 March 1939.

115.) L.C. Christie, Notes on the Neutrality Bill Pending in the U.S. Congress, 21 January 1936, op. cit., p. C-153139.

116.) Adding to Christie's apprehensions regarding the ultimate ambitions and aims of the United States, as he noted in this same paper, was "the fact that the actual United States defence program, in it scheme of organisation, equipment and supply for army, navy and air force, as well as in its industrial and other provisions, can scarcely be said to be one adopted only to the necessities of territorial defence; for it is consistent with a purpose to conduct large scale operations abroad." This realization must have been particularly distressing for Christie in that he had consistently maintained that if Canada sent its armed forces overseas in advance of those of the United States it would necessarily deplete economic resources essential to its survival as a distinct nation in North America. Although this argument probably was always a mixture of sound analysis and contrived pleading aimed at preventing a Great War-type Canadian expeditionary force, American preparations for overseas conflicts, along with Franklin Roosevelt's readiness to take the United States into European affairs, knocked one of the major props out from under Christie's argument and presumably frustrated him greatly.

In response to the overall draft cable, Skelton wrote that it was "excellent and penetrating" but that he had "doubts as to putting on paper some of the statements ... re the U.S. ... ." Christie concurred, saying "Yes I see some of this may be too strong meat for airing ..." and excised it from the version of the cable that was finally dispatched. Christie did, however, manage to get some of these ideas to an outside audience by including a condensed version of the cable in a letter 10 days later to Felix Frankfurter. See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers,

Volume 1782, File 254- VIII, L.C. Christie, Draft Telegram to Vincent Massey, Canadian High Commissioner in London, 14 March 1939; Ibid., MG 30 E44, Volume 23, Folder 89, pp. 22206-22207, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 14 March 1939, and, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 14 March 1939, and, Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 25 March 1939.

117.) PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, p. 24088, L.C. Christie, Note on Munich, 1 November 1938. Christie's strictures regarding the nature of sovereign national states were another factor in his belief that the United States was no more attractive than the United Kingdom as a partner to which Canada might commit itself, thereby limiting its freedom ot action. "The rulers of the United States -- the President, the Senate and the Congress -- like those of other states," Christie wrote,

> "will always in the last resort be driven to measure their responsibility and their trust as the nature of the sovereign state requires them to measure it. It need not exclude their acting with a humane regard for the position of other peoples, provided that this is consistent with a humane regard for the well-being and interests of their own people, who elect them and pay their salaries. But the proviso is decisive and overriding. That is the final test imposed upon each one of them, to say nothing of their own personal life -- long habits and loyalties and feelings. In the case of the United States, as in the case of other states, no one is entitled to assume that they will go -- or could properly go -- a single inch beyond the position dictated by a cool calculation of their interests and a humane regard for their own peoples' well being."

See Ibid., pp. 24090-24091.

118.) Ibid., p. 24111.

119.) Christie believed that in regard to public discussions about the possibility of Canadian involvement in a war in Europe not nearly enough was being said about the resulting drain of Canadian resources and the possible ramifications that might have on the country's ability to resist domination by the United States. In his critique of a memorandum prepared by Skelton, Christie wrote that he thought it was about time that the government take the lead in acquainting the public with the tenuousness of Canada's place on the North American continent. "I am attaching a rider," Christie wrote,

> "which might perhaps be inserted at this place [in Skelton's memorandum]. The point has been mentioned before in departmental memoranda but has had surprisingly little public attention. I think myself that it is a very real point; that the time has definitely come to bring it into

the open; that it has to be indicated with a good deal of explicitness; that all other governments are producing for their people precisely this kind of exposition; that Canadians need it even more than others, for from various sources inside and out the Canadian people are, quite literally, being fed more concentrated slops per capita than any other people on earth with the possible though doubtful exception of the 'totalitarian' peoples; that it is up to the Government to give the lead in such directions and help them think. No one anywhere can properly take exception to such a point, and it is a good point for London and Washington as well as at home.

Suggested Insertion p. 49 (2)

War is an exhausting business for any people, requiring the severest possible scrutiny of all practical consequences, which often turn out to be far from those desired or predicted. Besides thinking of their coasts, when considering the nature and extent of their share directly in or towards operations in European and Asiatic regions and theatres of war, Canadians would also doubtless have to reflect and take counsel lest their national expenditures of energy in some universal cause of freedom and civilisation should thoughtlessly or insensibly become unreasonably disproportionate to the efforts put forth by other countries of the Western Hemisphere, resulting in such an undue exhaustion of Canada's energy and future stamina as to mean, in practical reality, a degradation of her relative position as such a country. Any such result the Canadian people, as the builders and responsible owners and guardians of such a great homeland in this region, would inevitably come to regard as incongruous and as not the less better because it could not advance the great cause at stake."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 89, pp. 22258-22261, L.C. Christie, Memo for Dr. Skelton, 27 March 1939.

120.) "The various kinds of jargon which national states hurl at one another nowadays," Christie wrote to Walter Lippmann in the fall of 1937, "and which many good people have to invent to square themselves as members in good standing of these creatures have a quality which is becoming extremely hard to distinguish from lunacy and the whole business becomes very depressing." Christie's letter is an accurate reflection of the increasing unhappiness and frustration he developed after returning to the Department of External Affairs in 1935. The causes of Christie's dissatisfaction appear to have been at least two-fold: (a) a deep and almost hopeless sense that peace in the world was impossible so long as it was divided into sovereign nation-states, and, paradoxically, (b) a continuing frustration with his absolute inability to prompt any movement in Canada toward constitutional changes that would establish it as an independent state exercising complete control over the conduct of both its internal

and external affairs. Added, for good measure, to the unhappiness resulting from these two matters was a dash of the personal restlessness that had driven him from Ottawa to London to Toronto to Montreal and back to Ottawa between 1923 and 1935.

The reading of the second volume of Lionel Curtis's Civitas Dei in the fall of 1937, drove Christie to define the problems he saw as inherent and unavoidable in a world dominated by sovereign nation-states. "I walk a good deal by myself, and the other Sunday up Hog's back way [in Ottawa] a line of reflection got going," he told Curtis in a letter discussing his reaction to Civitas Dei.

> "So often nowadays, looking at what is going on in the world, either through newspapers or though official windows, one finds oneself muttering, What antics, How insane, What lunacy, How idiotic. Mere figures of speech to relieve feelings perhaps; but look at the thing closely and they seem to take on a deadly reality. (After some reflection on the shading of these four words my estimate began to veer toward 'idiotic' as perhaps the nearest to the point). Is there anything whatever more supremely sovereign than an idiot? He is bound to nothing subject to nothing, knowing and feeling and sharing nothing in common with others; he is supremely alone, in a void, dissociated, lost.
>
> What price the sovereign state? The sovereign state as it now stands and behaves, created by the fundamentalisms of the juridicial world and the opportunisms of diplomacy? The behaviour of these creatures among one another; their trappings; their jargon in talking about their 'relations' with one another (could any sober person in the world feel clean in putting before some civilised stranger the state documents of the 1914-18 campaign and their 'post-war' sequels?); their ceaseless kaleidescope of mad, secret, esoteric 'strategies' against one another; their dark, blind, screaming clashes when they do clash (not suicidal there, because ultimately in the clash they are incapable of intention, self-regarding or otherwise, but only of jargon, and they simply have to stagger on to physical exhaustion).
>
> Then there are the antics of men and women everywhere in the world on occasions when, each according to his passport, they have to behave and speak as members of such a sovereign creature. Decent, clean, hopeful people feeling lost unless they can feel this monster to be a moral creature responsive to their own code and a thing they can identify themselves with; and in truth utterly lost so long as they must cling to this lost creature and attempt the task of identification -- baffled and driven like Sisyphus, their defeat inherent in the inner meaning and necessities of their creature. Look at their individual behaviour and trappings and jargon. (Would anyone like to show the civilised stranger the stuff poured out now for 20 years by Geneva, by our League of Nations Unions, by American Peace

Societies, by Communist Societies, Nazi Societies and what not?)

They goad their creatures into 'judging' one another. What they say as moralists inflames themselves and others as patriots, with the practical result that they increase the chances of clashes coming off and then insure that the clashes shall become absolute and unmanageable. Perhaps the classical myth is too dignified for this monster. The modern, homely picture of "barking up the wrong tree' may be enough for truth and pathos.

Then I reflected on what I had to do to earn my keep. I am a member of one of these sovereign creatures -- Canada. I am paid by other members, the people of Canada, to help manage and express their creature in its 'relations' with others. The ultimate test on my desk is, Will this 'save' the people of Canada? The chain of responsibility allows me no escape from this. I am not at this moment recoiling from having to mess around in the filthy, mug's game which is called 'diplomacy' and 'international relations'. I am simply illustrating (to you, who need no illustration!). I have seen the inside of this creature; I have had to concoct and even mouth his gibberish; I know how lost these monsters are. Of course I do not yet know what the job of being one of their servants will eventually do to me.

I know the softer colours that might be laid on to dim this lurid metaphor; but they are really no use. 'Relations' -- the settled relations of stable minds -- there cannot be between these lost creatures; nor 'strategies' among the blind and incalculable. In a book by a Dutchman not long ago I read that since the Middle Ages there have been 10,000 treaties between sovereign states -- with an average life of two years! They cannot 'treat'. There is no way. The agents of these creatures have not the power to do it. The agents can agree verbally or in writing. We will ride them as a squadron to such and such an end. In the field we speak of it cannot be done by any set of human beings, and their saying they can must be a monstrous audacity and pretense,"

"The sovereign creature will have to give way to something else. ... The creatures themselves will somehow in the end have to be sunk," Christie concluded in his letter to Curtis. "I have known it a long while. You have known it longer. ..."

The second source of Christie's dissatisfaction arose from his inability to promote a break in the constitutional chain that he believed linked Canada to Britain inextricably, resulting in a situation where "Canada is really a dependency in regard to Great Britain." His frustration in this regard is evident in a number of points he made in a memorandum for O.D. Skelton in the spring of 1939 in which he summarized a paper he had written entitled

"The Canadian Dilemma."

"22. ... In spite of the pronouncements of the Balfour Report, the responsibility for conducting the vital foreign affairs of the Empire had to be left in the hands of the Imperial Government as always. ...

23. Since Canada does not participate equally in the conduct or function of diplomatic acts she would have been automatically at war in 1938 [at the time of the crisis over Czechoslovakia] if Britain had declared war on behalf of the Empire, it is clear that Canada does not possess responsible government in the true sense of the word. ...

26. The [constitutional change] needed is something to give Canada control of her own fate in the vital decisions on the issues of war and peace, and fully responsible government.

27. Canada cannot reach full responsible government within the framework of the present constitution. The only sure change that will make Canada a responsible self-governing state is that she should become independent and fully sovereign, and this is the political problem.

28. This change is such a break with the past that no ordinary means are sufficient. In effect, it could only be done by revolutionary means. Parliament is not able to do it because it must act within the British North America Act. Yet members can only do it by a tour de force, and existing political parties are excluded because they have accepted the legality of the constitution.

29. Since the essential duty of political leaders and parties is to preserve the constitutional status quo, one cannot complain if they keep this fundamental issue from the public. As long as fundamental issues are not involved, political leaders and parties recognise simple majority rule. When a fundamental constitutional issue is involved, many democratic communities in the past have recognised that this operation of majority rule cannot be properly invoked. Moreover this issue if introduced into popular politics would split Canadian national unity. ...

33. Such needed change to meet external problems effected within the community's orderly political processes will precipitate an extraordinary crisis immediately. Yet, if it is impracticable to do anything by such means, the community will drift into extraordinary crisis at some unpredictable moment, the timing of which is not in anybody's control. This stalemate will consequently affect the possibilities of adequate change to meet the internal problems, the problems of 're-confederation', and will deprive the community of valuable debate and discussion. ..."

Having laid out the problem as he saw it, and basically concluding that there was very little that could be done safely to alter the status quo, Christie hinted that the considerations he had outlined might, once again, cause him to decide to leave the public service. "I am not going to do anything but sleep on it [the above notes and the longer memorandum from which they were drawn]," he told Skelton in a covering note, "since (1) it is still only a draft, 'work in progress' as they say, and (2) in any case I could not very well do anything about it unless I got out, or were kicked out, of the public service."

Christie never did pursue the points he raised with Skelton after the spring of 1939 -- no doubt the run-up to war raised the necessity in his mind of sticking to his post and doing his duty no matter what intellectual discomfort it caused. He had, however, in the fall and early winter of 1938 explored the possibility of resigning from the Department of External Affairs -- he told Norman Lambert at that time of "his own sense of futility in his present post" -- and gaining employment in New York City. He apparently intended to secure such a post and then distribute the above mentioned paper -- "The Canadian Dilemma" -- in an attempt to stimulate debate about ways in which the problems he posed therein could be resolved, "I've been flirting casually with the notion," he speculated to Frankfurter in the fall of 1938, "that if I could get around to going over it ["The Canadian Dilemma"] and were in a position where I could properly do so, I might eventually hand copies to a very few limited people I know well who are Bigshots in politics, finance, etc., in these parts, so that they might chew on it. ..." In an earlier letter to Frankfurter he had explained his frustration in Ottawa and his plans to seek a new post, and noted that he had a paper in progress that might force him to move on. "I have had for sometime a feeling coming on which I recognise," he wrote,

> "and which I used to think of sometimes as a mark of doom though now I am not so sure. I suspect that I am running into a blind alley here and a vicious one and have got to move. I am now engaged in testing it but see little chance of escaping the necessities. I'll probably have something ["The Canadian Dilemma"] -- now in draft -- finished before long which I can show you and which may interest you apart from the consequences it may have for myself. If I have to get out, I'll have to earn a living and between ourselves, and the thing I am going to do during my holiday in New York [in December, 1938] is to try to feel out whether there might be something I could fit into -- possibly along the lines of finding some private organisation, business, financial or what not, to whom it is important to know what is going on in Canada economically but particularly politically (things are going on and no doubt about it) -- something preferably that would mean my having to go about this country [Canada] a good bit but also living in New York a good deal of [the] time and occasionally Washington etc.

Doubtless this sort of thing sounds like looking for a

needle in a haystack. But it won't do any harm to look. I am sure the needle ought to be there; I am fascinated by the North American continental problem and it happens from the sort of life and experiences I have happened to live in the United States and Canada and in England and Europe, I have somewhat unusual equipment which I feel confident I could bring to bear with effect and value to some needle. There may be an ideal needle; but a needle will do me. My own needs are not extravagant -- a decent living support for my domestic appendages and myself and ability to get around."

Christie went as far as to send his curriculum vitae to Winthrop Aldrich -- a law-school classmate and Chairman of the Chase National Bank -- and met with him on 27 December 1938 "to ask for advice or information which you could give me" on a position of the type he mentioned in the letter to Frankfurter. Nothing ever came of this effort, however, and in March 1939 he wrote Frankfurter that "nothing further has developed from what I mentioned to you, and I still fear there is no place for me." With no new employment opportunity in sight, Christie resignedly remained in the Department of External Affairs accepting that the nature of sovereign states probably meant war in the near future and that the existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship certainly meant Canadian participation in that war. "[I]t [his effort to find another post] may be overtaken by events ...," he wrote fatalistically. "The events move on and do not surprise me and Canadians can do nothing really but sit tight and wait."

A final interesting sidelight on Christie's frustrations and the actions they caused him to consider taking is found in an exchange of correspondence he had with L.B. Pearson in the summer of 1937 on the possibility of the formation of a national government made up of all parties. "From what I have gathered from various 'observers' during the past week," he told Pearson in early July, "I imagine there are strange things going on in this country. St. James Street and King Street seem to be chattering again about "national government" and they have picked some extraordinary players for their game, It does not look like a very safe bet." Pearson responded that he had had a long talk with George McCullough -- owner of the Toronto Globe and Mail -- and had been told by him that there was yet a chance for a national government. This being the case Pearson asked Christie what course of action would be best to give himself a chance to become part of such a government. "In response to your very sensible query," Christie wrote.

"I think there ought to be a very good chance for bright, pure and vigorous young men to horn in on this National Government racket! But the crucial problem for us is one of timing.

Your chances ought to be good for I see you have been getting the dope straight from the horse's mouth [McCullagh]. I do not know McCullagh, but I hear strange things of him from my Press Gallery friends. He has a

mission. He told a private luncheon of Montreal Big Shots at the Mount Royal Club that it was from God. He is now Mitch's [Hepburn] inspiration, which makes Mitch almost divine. To spread the gospel better there is a chance for Wright, his mining millionaire angel to buy the Montreal Gazette. ... I gather George Drew is in the picture somewhere. He went to England to study the British way of handling trade unions, so we can tell the C.I.O. where to get off.

Mitch is now running his election campaign, anti-C.I.O., anti-power barons, anti-succession-duty-evaders [?]. I don't myself know why it won't work in these cockeyed times.

R. B[ennett] is going to carry on as you have seen. In timing your play it might be worth watching how he and Billy [King] behave among one another over the next year.

... When God uses people like Aberhart, McCullagh, John Bassett and Company, you have to watch your step. ..."

Despite the jocularity and facetiousness of Christie's letter it seems revealing that in response to Pearson he said that, in regard to the formation of a national government, "the problem for us is one of timing." A year after this correspondence, Christie's writings, as seen above, described a situation which he did not believe could be settled by party government and simple majority rule. Indeed it may be surmised that one of the things he envisioned promoting by leaving the civil service and publishing "The Canadian Dilemma" was the formation of a national government in which he might play a part. Non-partisanship in addressing "national" issues was always a consistent theme in Christie's thought and it appears that he believed that a national government might as late as 1937 be a key to preserving national unity. To close this particular circle regarding the national government agitation he discussed with Pearson, Christie came to believe by the end of 1937 that the group that surrounded McCullagh were more of a threat to than a solution for the country. "That Saviour [McCullagh] keeps running true to form and one hears perfectly astounding stories about his 'mission', his meglomania and his ignorance," he told Pearson in September.

"John Basset told a friend of mine not long ago quite seriously 'Just you watch us; McCullagh and I are going to take this country in hand and run it.' It's probably safer not to laugh this stuff off but to watch it. It may well be a portent. Mitch has swept the boards again and in various ways shows his contempt for what he regards as the Ottawa sissies. Looking at him, Duplessis and other gents, this country has a fair chance of getting into queer hands in a few years -- not 'fascists' but tough, hard boiled lads with no reverences. And McCullagh looks as if he has the makings of a good yes man and propogandist. ..."

For Christie's fatalism regarding the future of an international system dominated by sovereign nation-states see Yale University Library, Walter Lippmann Papers, Box 61, Folder 434, L.C. Christie to Walter Lippmann, 4 October 1935, and PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 106, pp. 23968-23971, L.C. Christie to Lionel Curtis, 28 September 1937. For his feeling of impotence over the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship see Ibid., Volume 29, L.C. Christie, Summaries of Sections (of "The Canadian Dilemma"), 4 April 1939; and Ibid., L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 4 April 1939. For Christie's attempt to find a post in the business world in New York City, and his toying with the idea of publishing "The Canadian Dilemma," see Queen's University Archive, Collection 2130, N.P. Lambert Papers, Box 9, Lambert Diary, Entry for 10 November 1938; L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 11 November 1938, op. cit.; L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 12 December 1938, op. cit.; L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 25 March 1939, op. cit.; Harvard University, Baker Library, Winthrop Aldrich Papers, L.C. Christie to Winthrop Aldrich, 18 December 1938; and, Ibid., Winthrop Aldrich to L.C. Christie, 21 December 1938. For the exchange of correspondence with Pearson on the possibility of a national government see PAC, MG 26 N1, L.B. Pearson Papers, Volume 1, Folder 1: L.C. Christie, 1937, L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 8 July 1937; Ibid., L.B. Pearson to L.C. Christie, 16 July 1937; Ibid., L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 21 August 1937; and, L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 1 December 1937, op. cit.

121.) L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 25 March 1939, op. cit.

122.) Christie's examination of European events between 1935 and 1939 was sporadic in the sense that he paid no continuous analytic attention to them. He of course followed their unfolding closely through the press, periodicals, prints and cables from the British Foreign and Dominions Offices, and Canadian reporting from London and Geneva, but they did not seem to interest him in the same way that Anglo-Canadian relations did. In fact, they interested him only to the extent that Britain was involved in situations that might lead it -- and therefore Canada -- to war. As a result, reading Christie's memoranda on European events during these years leaves the distinct impression that he viewed them as an outsider looking in, an attitude he recommended from 1938 to all Canadians to use in order to remember that the events were "a European crisis and a European responsibility. Only if it should develop into a war and that war should develop a clear, immediate challenge of world dominance by inimical forces (as was assumed in 1914) would Canada's interests and responsibility be engaged." Throughout the period he pictured European events as the normal working out of political relations on the continent that were the business of the Europeans, and issues in which Canada would have had not direct interest whatsoever except for the participation of Britain therein. The Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938, for

example, he saw as nothing more than the great powers of Europe reactivating the "Concert of Europe" approach to continental political problems in order to both strike a balance of power and maintain peace. "The main point of the 'Concert of Europe' expedient [as it was used at Munich]," Christie wrote in a dispassionate, almost schoolmasterish way,

> "is that it is confined to the Great Powers of Europe. By negotiation and bargaining among themselves, as occasion arises, they have to contrive to settle the main lines of European affairs and to avoid war among themselves. The process of overt 'collective bargaining' at multi-lateral meetings may not have to be employed often; the ordinary routine would be bilateral arrangements flowing from consultations through the usual diplomatic channels.
>
> The Concert device does not exclude rivalries, competitions, ulterior motives, calculations and balancing of power, armaments. On the contrary all these things are inherent in the basic law and frontiers. They can often be kept in the background, but often they must come into high relief, particularly in any region containing several states who have become 'Great Powers', great elemental human forces. The acceleration of the armament race in Great Britain and France has to be regarded as a means of maintaining, or regaining, an adequate bargaining position at the table.
>
> For illustration, the implied bargain at the first meeting of the Concert at Munich, as between the British and the Germans, may perhaps be broadly put as follows. Germany is recognised as having a 'special sphere of influence' in Central and Eastern Europe. Her influence -- of which her armed force and economic capacity are necessary ingredients -- will be the determining factor there. On the other hand, her tactics are to be such that if a change in the fundamental 'law' of Europe to meet actual changed conditions is in question -- i.e., some change of frontiers, some change touching state sovereignty -- this is to be brought about by respecting, in form, that law's essential corollary -- the obverse of the medal -- the system's only conceivable principle of conservation -- namely, that any such change must be by the formal consent and agreement of the state sovereignties affected, however, that consent may be obtained short of open, visible, unprovoked violence. (It will be recalled that the Germans went to some pains to dress up the Austrian case in that form). On the other side of the bargain also, Germany recognises Great Britain's position in Western Europe, her naval position, and recognises that other questions, like colonies, should be adjusted between them by consultation, i.e., by bargaining, but without war.
>
> It has to be faced that, while by some rapid and bold

changes, the Concert may keep the system going for a considerable time, it is essentially a precarious device,. It also in its own way is an esoteric affair; it has to be operated by a very few men and has to depend on very nice and finely drawn calculations on their part. It involves a kind of 'legislation' where there is no retracing. A major error of judgment inside the Concert, or the act of some knave or fool outside, or some other accident to the Concert's calculations, may easily mean irreparable disaster and an end of things. ..."

Christie's dissertation on Munich was typical of his analysis of European events in its distant almost clinical tone. Without doubt he approved of Britain's appeasement policies toward Hitler's Germany. His approval, however, was based on simple considerations of power politics and not with any feeling of a need to sate German desires because of the "wrongs" inflicted on that nation by the Versailles settlement. Appeasement was preserving the peace and preventing a war into which Canada would be drawn and so appeasement was the proper policy for Britain to follow. He entertained no illusions about European politics or the personalities involved therein. He recognized that "Italy and Germany had plotted and supported the revolt" by Franco in Spain, and that Britain's policy in response to it was to cynically reverse "accepted rules of international law by putting government and rebels on an equality and which rapidly became a policy of agreeing to shut one's eyes to obvious intervention;" described Hitler as "arrogant and incalcuable" and his absorption of Czechoslovakia as a "ruthless and wanton breakup and occupation;" and believed that Czechoslovakia's Benes was a "clever intriguer and blackmailer." Christie clearly believed that European politics were headed toward collapse and war, and just as clearly he believed that no Canadian interest was directly involved in any of the continent's quarrels. The uphsot of his analysis was that so long as Britain pursued a policy of appeasement the Canadian government should support it while at the same time avoiding commitments to Britain of a type that would come into play if the policy should prove bankrupt and a war ensue.

Christie's analysis of European events became a much more serious endeavor in the spring and summer of 1939 when London orchestrated a foreign policy reversal which he believed might have dire consequences for Canada. He was not surprised that the British finally chose to abandon the policy of appeasement; what he did find maddening, however, was their decision to undertake military commitments to countries in Eastern Europe. "That the British Government should suddenly end its policy of trying to come to terms with Hitler and seek to build stronger barriers against future aggression was not at all surprising," Christie wrote in April, 1939.

"Opinion in the country [Britain] had been nearly evenly divided. Now, the persecution of Jews and Christians in Germany, the realization at last that London had placed its

money on the wrong horse in Spain, and finally the cynical disregard of pledges, the naked reliance on force, the open demand for 'living room' for the German people, that marked Germany's action in Czecho-Slovakia, turned the scale. It was clear that Hitler was more ambitious, more reckless, more dangerous than had been admitted, and that more effective steps must be taken to guard against a possible attack on the liberties of Britain. What was surprising was the overnight decision to seek that safeguarding by plunging into a policy of military alliances anywhere and everywhere in Eastern Europe, and equally surprising, the curious fumbling and lack of understanding of the European situation that marked the execution of the new policy.

To abandon the policy of no commitments beyond the area of direct British interest, to adopt in principle the policy of fighting preventive wars, was an abrupt reversal. Particularly surprising was the application of these new policies, the search for allies and the giving of pledges in Eastern Europe. True, it was there that Hitler had greatest likelihood of success in further penetration or aggression; true, if he succeeded in picking the eastern leaves of the artichoke one by one, he could then more effectively attack the central French and British core. But durability was one thing, feasibility another. The question British policy in these weeks presents is how did the Foreign Office come to believed they could build up a firm and effective alliance in the East, find reliable allies there, and give them effective aid?

It was not a promising field of action. From the Baltic to the Mediterranean stretched eight or ten small states, separated by feuds of centuries, divided by race and religion. All were backward industrially. Not one was genuinely democratic. In many, a feudal class or a military dictator ruled over a people sunk in misery by force and arrogance. There was not one morally reliable statesman in all the men at the helm. Poland was strongest in men and guns, but her people were divided and her Foreign Minister, Beck, was a notorious double-crosser. Beyond lay Russia, a natural foe of Nazi Germany, but weakened by the purges, angered by the complacent if tacit encouragement given Germany to expand in the Ukraine, and by British and French snubbing during the September [Czechoslovak] crisis, and realistic enough to demand her price -- and incidently anathema to nearly all her small neighbors. Further, it was not clear how in fact Britain could effectively aid any of the countries to the east of Germany -- the land passage being blocked by a solid Baltic to Mediterranean Fascist belt, the Baltic a German lake, and the Mediterranean a precarious sea; to the southeast Turkey could be helped; Greece doubtfully. ...

The British Government is committed to the Eastern

Policy. It will doubtless make further efforts. ... But thus far the Government's efforts have yielded little result, in fact have only served to confirm the evidence of German domination in Eastern Europe. Mr. Chamberlain said a few days ago, in discussing these consultations [with eastern European governments], that he was not going to show his cards for the present; in reality, he apparently should have said he had lost his Spanish and Czech cards, and did not know what other cards he had or who would be his partners, but would bid a grand slam all the same. Or to vary the metaphor, it is not a case of swopping horses when crossing the stream, but of jumping off the Appeasement horse and finding the Eastern Alliance horse isn't there."

Christie argued that the pertinent question to be asked of this policy is not whether it "is well-meant or strongly supported. The question is, can it be carried out, is it succeeding? Was the policy within the capacity of Britain? Has it been carried out with competence and sureness? To these questions the answer is much more dubious." "The New Policy," Christie concluded in mid-July 1939,

"is termed a reversion to collective security, a 'back to the League' policy. But the League as a War League is not there to go back to. The United Kingdom has made more than Covenant commitments just when the Covenant has faded away. It has outdone Article 10 and Article 16 in firm commitments when every great power except France is formally or practically out of the League, when Latin America is wholly aloof, when the states that were once the moral backbone of the League, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, are firmly and passionately resolved to neutrality and no League or other war alliances.

The League being unavailable, the candidates for collective security have been sought [by Britain] in the hedges and byways of Europe. They have been selected not because of their moral steadfastness or even their military strength, but according to the danger of their position and in some cases their inability to help themselves or anybody else. Poland has courage and martial ability, but no industrial staying power, and is ringed about by Germnay or her satellites. Turkey is steadier and farther away. Greece and Rumania are liabilities not assets. To challenge Germany in her strongest and Britain's weakest point, and to rely on fickle Mr. Beck for stability, King Carol for moral fervor, and Stalin and Metaxas for the support of democracy, is another Charge of the Light Brigade."

He believed that there was only the slimmest chance that the new British policy might, by giving the aggressors "pause" in Europe, provide a basis for a lasting peace, and then only if all parties assumed a "reasonable or realistic attituide. ..." He was most dubious of this possibility, however, and believed that Britain's

explicit commitments in eastern Europe had resulted in a situation where "the less becomes the possibility of mediation, the narrower [becomes] the range of diplomatic action, the wider [becomes] the explosion if it comes at all. Paris and London have lost their mobility of world action so long as they are tied to the Vistula."

The story of Christie's view of European political situation ends in the final weeks of peace in the summer of 1939 in much the same way as it began in the fall of 1935, that is, that it was an exclusively European affair in which Canada had no direct interest aside from those resulting from its constitutional relationship with Britain. What would happen in Europe would happen and there was little Canada could do beyond limiting its commitments to Britain. Christie's ambivalent, almost clinical attitude toward Europe, as well as his resigned acceptance that Canada's future probably would be decided there, is underscored eloquently in a draft cable prepared during the last week of July, 1939 and intended for the Canadian High Commission in London. "Canada retains in significant measure her technical dependence upon the European system," Christie wrote.

> "Historic sentiments will command great sympathy [in Canada] for the men [in the United Kingdom] responsible for facing the problems with which the operations of that system have now confronted them. On the other hand, the condition has to be faced that the actual dependence of Canadians and their life and society upon the status quo in Europe has in fact undergone significant changes in the circumstances of the world today, and in such a period no one can confidently predict the nature and impact of further such changes. Their [Canadians] attitude toward the situation must be different in kind and not merely in degree from that of the actual members of that region -- as in fact it has been in all sorts of ways -- and the differences must have significant practical consequences. At the moment this condition obliges those responsible for safeguarding the Canadian national life to maintain as objective an attitude as possible, and this is not the less so because they have no place in determining the operations of the European system. They have neither duty nor necessity to endorse the system or its operations at any stage, and their own responsibility obliges them to treat with great reserve the estimates and expositions that may be put forth regarding such operations, whether the perpetuation of the system and its methods are professed to have some necessary or desirable connection with the 'cause of democracy' or whether they are concerned with less abstract and elevated causes."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1719, File 927-II, L.C. Christie to W.D.H. [erridge?], 30 September 1935; John A. Munro, (ed.), DCER, Volume VI: 1935-1939, Document 881, p. 1080, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 30 November 1937; L.C Christie, The New British Policy in Europe, 12 April 1939, op. cit., pp. 1156-1162;

L.C. Christie, The European Situation, 19 July 1939, op. cit., pp. 1219-1221; and, PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1783, File 254-X, Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in London, No. 300, 26 July 1939.

123.) L.C. Christie, Note on Munich, 1 November 1938, op. cit., pp. 24095-24096. As late as November-December, 1938. Christie believed that the whole process of interwar imperial constitutional development had, from Canada's perspective, been futile because it had done nothing to alleviate the situation of automatic participation in which Canada would find itself should the British government go to war. The interwar constitutional process, in sum, did nothing to give Canada control of its external affairs because Christie believed -- as he had explained in 1926 -- that such constitutional control could only be achieved by a unilateral action by Canadians gathered in a non-partisan constitutional convention. "Where do we actually stand in the complex of states?" Christie asked in late 1938.

> "Some of the complicated and esoteric formulas invented [since 1917] to define our status invite and get endless talk; but for the present purpose the vital point seems clear enough. In 1867 the British North American colonies -- to use the words of the Act of the Imperial Parliament -- were 'federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland'. Powers of domestic self-government were devolved and assigned to the respective federal and provincial authorities. Before the [Great] war the federal Government had assumed the supervision or conduct of the relations between Canada and foreign countries in certain commercial and technical spheres, using the British diplomatic service or special delegations for the purpose; and some tentative efforts had been made to invent ways of associating Canada and certain other parts of the British Empire in the discussion though not what is called 'the conduct' of foreign affairs, i.e., the vital political relations with foreign countries. By intergovernmental declarations and agreements through the war and post-war years, Canada received something called 'equal status, which has been exemplified by a variety of 'constitutional conventions' and statutes defining, for purposes of imperial affairs, relations and functions as between the metropolitan Government and the domestically self-governing countries of the Empire. In the field of international affairs, as an implied result of entering and being received by foreign states into certain formal international political proceedings, Canada was recognised as having what is called 'Dominion status' in the world complex of states. To some extent consultations with the Imperial Government take place on broad principles of 'foreign policy'. But it was recognised in the joint Imperial declarations that as regards international affairs 'function' is something different from 'status', that in the 'conduct' of the significant political relations with

foreign countries and, to a considerable extent, in guidance in defence matters -- that is to say, in the most vital, decisive field of all, involving the issues of peace and war -- the 'function', the ultimate responsibility, had to be left to the metropolitan Government of the Empire in London. This in fact must be so. The Dominions have actually no machinery -- no adequate means -- to carry out this 'function'. Hence the existing machine in London carries on. There is simply no practical alternative.

The foregoing is believed to be a fair representation of the main gist of the 1926 Imperial Conference Report, which included the well known 'Balfour Memorandum'. The whole document and its doctrines have given its proponents some very baffling difficulties and have been very hard for the plain man everywhere to understand and therefore to give intelligent support to them. It was the production of party Governments who had no authority to propose or carry through any real or substantive constitutional change affecting the central notion of sovereignty in the Empire in a world system of sovereign states. Such a change could scarcely be contemplated except through the people acting by non-party political processes. The document (like many international documents which also are the product of governments) was permeated by ambiguities and silences. It was open to the proponents, in facing the different popular views in each of the countries concerned, to say in one place that it said more than appeared and in another place that it meant less. The document was silent or ambiguous on the central crucial point of sovereignty, which involved the point as to the control of the issues of peace and war. Somewhat obscurely it recognised that the conduct had to be left in the same hands as before; while, for the reason already indicated, it had to be completely silent upon the question of any real change in this sphere or of furnishing or proposing any means of change in the future. (e.g. - it was not open to party Gov[ernmen]ts to provide or even propose such means).

At later stages the idea, implicit but not very clearly stated in the document, of a 'common Imperial foreign policy' came to arouse misgivings, and it became customary to assert that there could be a separate 'Canadian foreign policy' in this sphere. Practically the only way to give an appearance of reality to this line was by refraining from participating in various political theatres and guarantees given by the British Government and by occasional statements of broad principles in Parliament and elsewhere. But such declarations, whether made independently or jointly at Imperial Conferences, are more accurately to be regarded as formulations of what seems desirable than as a policy itself in a real sense. Policy is the course actually adopted in day-to-day conduct of affairs. In view of the ultimate law of the constitution and of the world system of states, it

still remained that the 'function', the responsibility for conducting the day to day vital foreign affairs of the Empire had to be left in the hands of the Imperial Government as always."

See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 26, Folder 107, pp. 24039-24042, L.C. Christie, The Canadian Dilemma, 10 December 1938.

124.) L.C. Christie, Notes on Munich, 1 November 1938, op. cit., p. 24097.

125.) L.C. Christie, The Canadian Dilemma, 10 December 1938, op. cit., pp. 24042-24043.

126.) Ibid., p. 24043. This dependency was so complete for Canadians, Christie wrote, that "so long as they live their lives in Canada they cannot have full citizenship as that notion is understood in the world. The only way that a Canadian can have that is to go and live in the metropolitan state, Great Britain, where by his vote in the elections he can help decide what men are to take on his behalf the ultimate decisions on which his fate rests." See Ibid., p. 24050.

127.) Ibid., pp. 24046-24049. As a foreign service officer, Christie believed that the Department of External Affairs had a special role in enhancing Canada's sovereignty, and in providing Canadians with the "power of discrimination" in regard to international events which he had noted in "The Canadian Dilemma" was sorely lacking. The expansion of the foreign service, and especially of permanent Canadian representation abroad, would not only allow for the collection of relevant information but would -- as he had been arguing since the end of the Great War -- also help convince other nations that Canada was not a mere adjunct of the British Empire, but rather a separate international entity. "As regards the placing of new Legations I should like to submit the case as I see it ...," Christie wrote in 1937.

> "Up to date our missions abroad have been placed in Great Britain, [the] United States, France, and Japan, i.e., we have sent them already to four of the Great Powers. This selection, while growing out of various circumstances, reflects, I think, a sound instinct. I would strongly urge that we follow the past and go on now, first of all, to the rest of the Big Seven: Germany, Russia and Italy. If there is a question of spacing in time I would put Germany first.
>
> These together with the four we already have direct contact with, are the energetic, managing races and States where the decisive movements and events of our generation are being shaped and must be dealt with. ...
>
> The people of these great races, their rulers, those who shape and guide their outlook on the world -- all look

on the British Empire as practically a centralised military machine and as something practically like an economic group or even Zollverein. That seems to be their dominating conception of us. They hold this despite all the doctrinaire pictures painted by the artists of the Third British Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the British League, and so on. That they do so is not unintelligible, considering that few of them can know anything of these confused and contradictory pictures which anyhow only purport to depict an incomplete and growing thing; that all pictures have to be scanned in the light of that 'ruthless egotism' which a highly placed observer recently noted as a mark of our make up and history.

A concrete way of letting them get the picture right is to get into direct contact and to manage directly our relations with them; so they can see for themselves how the machine works and smell it out, so that we can do our best to see that the machine works as we want it and shall not have to depend more than necessary on second-hand demonstration through someone else's agency.

Practically this is the only way to open up this Department to make any contribution to the effort that all have to make. The predicament now facing the world is such that nothing that may be practicable ought to be left undone.

Even if the worst [that is,war] should happen it would be better that the Canadian Government and people should be in direct management. Beyond that there would ultimately come the day for picking up and reweaving the broken strands -- a job we ought to do for ourselves next time. ..."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1850, File 925, L.C. Christie, Note on Placing of New Legations. Secret, 23 September, 1937.

128.) L.C. Christie, The Canadian Dilemma, 10 December 1939, op. cit., p. 24051.

129.) Ibid., pp. 24051-24052.

130.) Ibid., p. 24054.

131.) Ibid., p. 24053. Skelton shared Christie's frustration in this regard, recognizing the dilemma facing Canadians but being unable to discern a method of approach which would give the federal government control over the issues of peace and war without at the same time threatening national unity. "There are only two logical and consistent solutions," Skelton wrote bewilderedly in the spring of 1939,

"to the present conflict between our theory of complete

self-government and the fact of London control of our war-time destinies. One is the way of [imperial] federation, the development, as some Australians urge, of a common empire foreign policy, hammered out by some new central parliament or council or High Commission group, in which we would all be represented, and for which we would all be responsible. That solution, it is clear, runs too directly counter to national feelings and divergent national interests to have any chance of acceptance. The other solution is the way of independence, the assumption of clear-cut, adult responsibility for our policies and our destinies, in friendly co-operation with other countries of like-minded ideals, but with full freedom to make our own decisions in the light of our own knowledge and aims and interests. That solution, also, it is clear, runs counter to strong instinctive imperial feelings, and has no chance of acceptance today. The balance of opinion [between the two points of view] ... rules out both clear-cut solutions. It is too late for the one; it is too early for the other."

Such being the case, there was little Canada could do in the late 1930s to change her constitutional relationship with Britain without threatening nation unity. Skelton noted resignedly that although the question of Canada's ultimately gaining full control over the issues of peace and war was not, as some writers contended, an academic one, -- indeed, he wrote, "if any British politician has and is to indefinitely retain the right to send tens of thousands of Canadian youth to war and death by pressing a button in London, it would seem a very practical necessity to consider if that is actually the situation, and if so, whether it should be changed" -- it may well be "that nothing very definite can be done about the question in the year 1939. ..." See PAC, MG 30 E44, Christie Papers, Volume 23, Folder 89, pp. 22191 and 22185, O.D. Skelton, Automatic Belligerency, 3 March 1939.

132.) L.C. Christie, The Canadian Dilemma, 10 December 1938, op. cit., pp. 24057-24058. Although faced with this stalemated position, Christie did not despair and in fact deprecated what he identified as "a certain amount of discouragement and what is called 'blue ruin' talk going on in Canada today." Optimism and a solid faith in the eventual triumph of rationality were hallmarks of the progressive mind, and neither deserted Christie even in the dark days of the late 1930s. "There is no need to take a tragic view of the Canadian position," he wrote.

"It may well be that Canadian society does not possess a clear-cut, satisfactory means of [constitutional] change ready to hand to meet vital necessities; yet that need not mean it is bound to collapse or fail to conserve itself.

It may well be that for present there will have to be a good deal of internal political instability and drifting, which may present difficulties for the Canadian economy and

for the morale of the people. ...

On the other hand, there are many reassuring factors. There are many countries in far worse position. Canada's external circumstances on this Continent are favourable, and she can expect understanding and friendly sympathy and forebearance. In other spheres it has been customary for the Canadian people to display a good deal of self-reliance, intelligent capacity and resourcefullness in meeting events, while the difficult circumstances of their topography have inculcated perhaps a certain caution and sobriety that may be of value. In the immediate post-war decade political actors and students in Canada appeared to feel that we were in for a very long period of peace or stability in the world generally and consequently Canadians need not worry about thinking out their position in the world; but that particular optimism has passed and some of the people are now thinking much more realistically. If some of the leaders of the new generation now beginning to take charge of affairs have sometimes produced manifestations which the pre-war men find it hard to understand, there is no good reason to suppose that the essential underlying qualities already mentioned do not persist ready to assert themselves in time. If change becomes necessary there is no good reason to suppose that the coming leaders must necessarily fail in the task of improvising on the spot some means of change that will prove adequate to meet the necessities without too great a shock to the community's fabric."

See Ibid., pp. 24058-24060.

133.) Christie always believed that the government would decide whether or not Canada was at war and that Parliament would be concerned only in defining the nature of the country's participation. To suggestions that Parliament should meet after Britain went to war to decide if Canada would do likewise, Christie responded that the nature of existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional arrangements left nothing for Canada to decide on the issue of war and that, in any event, such a decision, if available to be made, was the prerogative of the government not Parliament. "I would have said," Christie wrote in late August, 1939, "what the common understanding is that what Parliament is to determine is practical participation [in war], its nature and extent. I am bound to say that is what I have myself always understood." See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1946, File 769, L.C. Christie, Dr. Skelton: Re your Note of August 29, 30 August 1939.

134.) Ibid., O.D. Skelton, (Alternatives in Case of War), 29 August 1939.

135.) L.C. Christie, Dr. Skelton: Re your Note of August 29, 30 August 1939, op. cit.

136.) John A Munro. (ed.) DCER, VI: 1935-1939, Document 996, p. 1239, L.C. Christie, Alternative Canadian Procedures If Great Britain Becomes At War, 24 August 1939. Christie believed that Alternative B had to be rejected because it ignored constitutional realities, and more importantly, because he believed that it gave the field to Canada's imperialists and would commit Canada to an all-out, 1914-type war effort. "What would Alternative B involve politically?," Christie wrote.

> "It would mean asking Parliament to approve a positive, separate declaration of war against Germany. To sustain this you ought to be in a position to assert that an issue has been drawn directly between Canada and Germany, which negotiations between Canada and Germany has failed to settle, and to produce a White Book containing the steps in such direct negotiation. It would mean that you would have to frame the issue on which you propose to fight -- the terms without which you would not make peace and a description of your relations with your partners and allies in the fight. We could not do these things. Practically all we could do would be to produce the British White Book or Books, and also the British statement of the issue. It would mean giving them and the whole conduct of British diplomacy a formal, explicit endorsement and asking for a positive vote of Parliament to that effect. The consequences of such a procedure internally are for consideration. The consequences externally might in effect be far-reaching, affording grounds upon which the Government might be pushed into extravagant positions regarding the form and extent of our participation in the conflict and ultimately in any peace discussions. ..."

In sum, Christie concluded, the "most important" arguments against Alternative B were "the very great political risks of any other course [than Alternative A] -- e.g., that from soi disant, quasi-independent action will flow all sorts of practical liabilities throughout the conflict and its ultimate settlement. In effect B means giving the 'Imperialists' a far better handle than A. The B line has done this throughout the post-war period. No practical ground has been adduced for following this line and making such an innovation at this of all times. It seems to me purely gratuitious. ... [S]uch independent Canadian action (as contemplated in B also) would really be outside our accepted constitution and an improper exercise of responsibility by Canadian Ministers." See Ibid., and L.C. Christie, Dr. Skelton: Re Your Note of August 29, 30 August 1939. op. cit.

137.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1783, File 254-X, L.C. Christie, If Canada at War - Various Points, 31 August 1939. Christie wanted to make it absolutely clear that Canada was going to war only because of its constitutional relations with Great Britain, with the object of focusing the nation's attention and resentment on this binding link. For example, even as late as 25

September 1939 on the occasion of presenting his letters of credence to President Roosevelt, Christie, in his public remarks, emphasized that Canada was at war "in consequence of the tragic events now afflicting Europe...." In this regard, Christie feared that rhetoric about other motives for going to war would blur the sharpness of what he considered a debilitating Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship. Of particular concern to him -- given his memories and experiences during the Great War -- was the possibility of the revival of such Wilsonian slogans as "making the world safe for democracy" which would cloud and perhaps obscure the factors leading Canada to war. In the spring of 1938, for example, Christie suggested that Skelton include in a memorandum he was writing entitled "Canada and Foreign Policy" several paragraphs warning of the dangers of what Christie called "ideological crusading." "There seems to be some conscious support in the country for such crusading," Christe wrote, "while many more articles, editorials, speeches, etc., in effect, though unconsciously perhaps, serve to promote the notion. Herewith a few paragraphs to indicate more correctly what I have in mind."

> "We cannot frame a foreign policy on the basis of a 'democratic front' or alliance or of supporting or joining some ideological 'front' or combination against another. What we actually have to deal with are national states and, considering the nature of such bodies and the nature of relations between them, it is now extremely difficult, practically speaking, to see how the terms of such a combination could be drawn up. How define the causus belli? Would the terms be subject to adjustment according as one or more of the enemy became more or less 'communist' or 'fascist'? Or suppose one of them changed colour.
>
> But the idea of attempting to inject a democracy into such crusading causes goes deeper. To us all these isms and ideologies appear to have unbalanced and unhealthy features.
>
> Democracy is no ism, no ideology, no vain dream that men at some passing moment of time can imagine and stake out man's fate.
>
> Democracy is only a method -- a form of exercise to produce healthy, self-respecting men -- a release of man's, every man's, creative visions and energies -- a lesson slowly built from the hard experience of past centuries -- a method of approach and a sowing of seeds for yet greater harvests none of us will ever see.
>
> We believe that this is the only way for healthy minds and spirits. For us the final ill health, the suicidal insanity, would be to imagine democracy hitching itself to some military crusade of one of these ideologies against the others, or starting some military crusade of its own against one or more of them.

So long as other states, whether called communist or fascist or what not, launch no attack on us, we intend to preserve correct relations with them, and we do not intend to discourage between their peoples and ours the intercourse and trading which is the normal impulse of human beings everywhere and which has solvent properties of its own. Against the infection of unhealthy doctrines we have to rely on the success of our own slowly built lesson and practice of democracy. To that preventive or remedy, speaking in the most exact and realistic sense, there is no alternative whatever."

A commitment to preserving democracy in the world, or some other such rhetorical and emotional excess, Christie believed, negated the government's ability to limit the extent of Canada's participation in war and made for a situation in which "the drainage of our energy might imperil our continued existence as a nation." Where and if war come, Christie argued, Canada's statement upon its entry should avoid any remarks regarding the reasons for its decision or the objectives it would pursue. "[A]ny formal, official statement to be issued immediately after the event and before Parliament meets should be as objective as possible;" he wrote, "should cover no more than is absolutely essential at the moment; and particularly should avoid any definition of the causes or objects of the war or implication that Canada's definition is to be identical with other peoples' definitions." Christie's draft statement of government policy to be released after Britain declared war stressed the centrality of the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship, emphasized the local nature of Canada's first wartime activities, and was silent about the causes and objects of the war.

"Draft Statement

The people of Canada are aware of the (tragic) course of recent events in Europe which has today culminated in a declaration of war against Germany by His Majesty the King on the advice of the United Kingdom Government.

The Government are advised that consequently, in view of the existing constitutional position, the Dominion of Canada is at this moment legally in a state of war with Germany. ...

Meanwhile the Government have instructed the appropriate Departments and agencies to put into effect certain national defence and security measures already planned for such an emergency. These include measures relating to financial stability, sabotage, shipping, aliens, censorship, and other like matters as well as certain measures for the same purpose by the three military services. ...

Meanwhile also the Government, during the short time

available, will endeavour to study every aspect of the position with the purpose, in accordance with constitutional practice, of submitting to Parliament when it meets a full statement of the position as it affects Canada and such proposals as may appear appropriate.

No words are needed to impress upon the Canadian people the gravity of the position confronting their community life today, and unnecessary words cannot help. The Government are confident the uppermost purpose of all will be to find ways of overcoming this juncture of our history in union."

The only thought that Christie could think to add to his draft statement was something that would further underline the localized nature of Canada's war effort. "Does the War Measures Act contain any qualifying term such as 'the defence of Canada'?," Christie asked, "If so, it might well be quoted in some way in this [the fourth] paragraph [of the draft statement]." PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, p. 224889, L.C. Christie, Remarks on Presenting Letters of Credence, 25 September 1939; Ibid., RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 715, File 3(I-C-2-B), L.C. Christie, Re Ideological Crusading, 4 April 1938; Ibid., File 4 (I-C-2-B), L.C. Christie, pencilled notes on a paper by Skelton discussing J.S. Woodsworth's motion regarding Canadian neutrality, no date but apparently March-April, 1938; and, John A. Munro (ed.), DCER, Volume VI: 1935-1939, Document 891, pp. 1092-1093, L.C. Christie, Re: Draft Statement, 15 September 1938.

138.) PAC, Rg 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1783, File 254-X, L.C. Christie, If Canada At War - Various Points, 31 August 1939.

139.) Ibid., Christie's concentration on local defense also seems to have been in part based on a perception that Canada might well be backing a loser and that hedged bets were clearly in order. "I think it entirely possible," Christie wrote in the last week of August, 1939,

"that many people here [in Canada] have been influenced and will continue to be influenced in certain directions because, subconsciously perhaps, they consider a victorious conclusion a matter of course and do not stop even to think of any other kind of outcome.

Failing General Staff advice one has to do his own speculations. I do not see how victory can be taken as a matter of course. I do not believe a picture of the 1918 type can be confidently assumed. There might be a stalemate or worse.

I think it would be well for anyone choosing between 'Alternative A' and 'Alternative B' (as indicated in previous memo) to keep this sort of thing in the back of his mind, however completely he would have to keep it out of his

mouth.

> It would be one thing to see the British Prime Minister and Government leading Canada and the Canadian people into an unsatisfactory outcome as part of the British Empire in persuance of its and our real status in the world and with our acquiescence. It would, I think, be a very different thing to get into a position which meant that the Canadian Prime Minister and Government had, on the basis of their knowledge and share in events, undertaken the onus of leading us into stalemate, defeat or some such kind of mess. ..."

See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1946, File 769, L.C. Christie, Re (1) Alternative Canadian Procedures if Great Britain Becomes at War, (2) Specification of War Aims by Canadian Government, 26 August 1939.

140.) L.C. Christie, The Canadian Dilemma, 10 December 1938, op. cit., pp. 24060-24062.

Chapter VIII: A Bittersweet Ending: Christie'e Ministership in Washington, September, 1939 - April, 1941

The twenty months encompassed by Christie's ministership in the United States were among the most professionally effective and personally fascinating of his career. During this period he was able to renew many of the friendships and acquaintances he had made in his youth with individuals who were now influential members of the Roosevelt administration or among America's leading publicists and commentators. In addition, he commanded the affairs of Canada's most important legation during a period of intense and often crisis-driven activity. His direct influence on the formulation of Canadian external policy in these months, however, was not as great as it had been when he had been the Department's Counsellor. Although he had worked cheek-by-jowl with Mackenzie King and Skelton for four years, he did not escape the circumspect and, at times, wary treatment they traditionally accorded Canada's diplomatic representatives.[1] Christie had endorsed this arm's length treatment while he was working in Ottawa and the evidence does not suggest that he objected to it after he took up his duties in Washington. The Prime Minister and Skelton clearly respected Christie's judgment and discretion -- and particularly valued his personal sources of information -- more than they did those of Vincent Massey in London, but he nonetheless primarily acted in a representational and reporting capacity and not in a policymaking role while stationed in the American capital. Within the confines imposed by King and Skelton, however, Christie performed in an

exceedingly effective manner.

Christie's tenure as minister -- which was punctuated by two lengthy absences due to illness: mid-May through 10 July 1940, and 23 November 1940 through his death the following April -- was marked by three significant Anglo-American controversies which directly involved Canadian interests but in which Christie was involved only tangentially. The first two, involving the question of establishing a British contraband-control station at a port on Canadian territory and protecting the cryolite mine at Ivigtut in Greenland, occurred during the fall of 1939 and the spring of 1940. The last centered on the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Anglo-American destroyers-for-bases deal in August 1940. The contoversy surrounding the question of establishing a British contraband-control station at a port in Atlantic Canada will be analyzed in some detail here in order to depict the sort of role Christie typically played in the important diplomatic activities of his ministership. Preceding the discussion of that episode, however, will be treatments of Christie's appointment as minister, his efforts to reorganize the legation so as to better cope with its greatly increased wartime responsibilities, and his working relationship with his longtime personal friend Lord Lothian, the British Ambassasdor in Washington. A final section will discuss the controversy surrounding Christie's performance as minister which was fought out in the Canadian press in the weeks immediately before his death.

"A somewhat odd stroke of fate:" Christie Appointment as Minister

"Some of us were a bit surprised about Christie's appointment to Washington. What is the story behind it?" This question was included in a letter Scott Macdonald wrote to Norman Robertson from the Canadian Legation in Paris in December, 1939; it was a valid question then, it remains so now.[2] On the surface, Christie's appointment as Minister to the United States appears to be exactly what Lester Pearson, from his observation post at Canada House in London, termed "strange business."[3] Once feared by Mackenzie King, who had mistakenly perceived him as a leading proponent of imperial federation, Christie had, by 1939, earned the Prime Minister's trust as an ardent defender of Canadian autonomy against the real and imagined intrigues of Downing Street. This altered perception was a major factor in King's conclusion that Christie was worthy of Canada's most important diplomatic appointment. The available evidence pertaining to the basis for Christie's appointment is scattered and fragmentary. Once it is assembled, however, the strangeness accorded the appointment by Pearson dissipates and Christie appears, as Professor Granatstein has suggested, to be taking up the post "he was best fitted for."[4]

The need for a new Canadian minister in Washington coincided with the outbreak of war in Europe. Sir Herbert Marler, then Canadian Minister, had been seriously ill throughout the summer of 1939 and on 4 September Lady Marler informed O.D. Skelton that her husband had taken another turn for the worse and that she

"did not think he would ever be able to resume his post." In view of her husband's deteriorating physical condition, Lady Marler told Skelton that "she would on his behalf offer his resignation."[5]

Until Marler's rapid physical decline in early September, and before the war had actually commenced, Skelton had intended to leave him in place as a figurehead and appoint a new Chargé d'Affaires to carry on the day-to-day business of the legation. To make room for the new Chargé, Skelton had planned to transfer Dr. Walter Riddell, the current holder of the post, to another assignment.[6] Riddell had never been able to escape the pall that had settled over his career -- at least in the eyes of King, Skelton, and Christie -- as a consequence of his having taken the initiative in seeking to strengthen the set of sanctions the League of Nations was preparing to impose on Italy as the result of that country's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.[7] The combination of Marler's illness, the government's lack of confidence in Riddell, and the opening of hostilities in Europe, however, altered Skelton's view of the situation in Washington. He advised the Prime Minister that "under the present circumstances it would appear desirable to appoint a Minister immediately. A Charge d'Affaires does not carry the weight that a Minister does."[8]

After weighing all of these factors, and believing that relations with the United States were "one of the most essential and difficult aspects of Canadian war policy," Skelton concluded that Christie "would be much the best man in sight for

appointment as Minister" to Washington. "I do not know of anyone," Skelton wrote to King,

> either inside or outside the Service, who would do as good a job as Christie. He lived in Washington for a time after his graduation from Harvard Law School as secretary to Mr. Justice Holmes [sic], and came to know many of the people who are now influential in Washington. While a thoroughgoing Canadian, it happens that he is one of the close friends of Lord Lothian, the new British Ambassador, and would be able to work effectively with him.
>
> As a member of the Department of External Affairs during the last war, he had an intimate knowledge of the questions that arose with both the United Kingdom and the United States.... He has the personal qualifications required for such a post.[9]

Skelton's arguments convinced King, who seems to have agreed to send Christie to Washington on 5 September. "Christie has the training," King wrote in his diary, "but it is unfortunate he has not a wife with him, and that he has not been more in touch with people outside a small circle. However, he will keep a close touch on matters in Washington, and his previous associations there will stand him in good stead." King's only reservation in regard to the appointment was, it appears, conditioned by his reflection that "it will be a big loss to us and to Skelton in particular to have Christie drop out."[10]

King's decision to send Christie to Washington as minister was based on the fact that he shared Skelton's opinion that an amiable and effective bilateral relationship with the United States was essential to the successful prosecution of the Canadian war effort. This common perception caused both men to focus on Christie primarily because of his lifelong association with Lord Lothian,[11] and his personal network of friends, acquaintances, and connections in the federal bureaucracy and

among the leading publicists, political commentators, and editorial writers in the United States.[12]

While not mentioned specifically by either King or Skelton, it seems clear that another of Christie's friendships almost certainly figured prominently, perhaps most prominently, in his selection as minister. Since at least 1911, Christie had maintained an intimate friendship with Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter was himself an intimate friend of Franklin Roosevelt and, since August, 1939, an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Frankfurter's close relationship with the president and his unrivalled -- indeed, nearly legendary -- capacity for manipulating, influencing, and eliciting information from all levels of the federal bureaucracy and the Washington media made him Christie's most important contact in the American capital. Although referring specifically to the degree to which the British government appreciated Frankfurter's connections and abilities, B.A. Murphy's recent study of the Justice's "political" activities offers considerable insight into just what type of asset Frankfurter's friendship was for Christie.

> Frankfurter's friendship with the president and his vast contacts in the administration finally paid off in his intense campaign to secure American support for Great Britain during the war. The justice's single-minded and at times almost desperate endeavors here are easily explained by his love for that country. He was truly the Anglophile of Anglophiles....
>
> For their part, members of the British government came to view Felix Frankfurter as one of their central contacts, and perhaps even their best representative in Washington. Though the justice did not know Winston Churchill personally, he was close to several of the Prime Minister's colleagues. His friendship with Lord Lothian, the British

> Ambassador in Washington until late 1940, had been forged when they worked together at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919....
>
> British officials had more than adequate reason, in fact, for viewing the justice as their most important contact in Washington. They were well aware not only of his access to an extraordinary array of political figures throughout the administration, but even more important for them, of his intimate friendship with President Roosevelt. Whenever the justice spoke, it was simply assumed in London that the words were coming directly from the president of the United States, and thus represented the will of the American government. Who better, then, to become the central conduit for all the information the British wanted Washington to have and the requests they wanted to make? This data was sent in a torrent of mail to Frankfurter in the hopes that he would use it in his daily conversations with other Washington officials. In turn, Frankfurter's mastery of all this information, frequently available to no one else, increased the justice's prestige and influence in Washington even further.[13]

Murphy also notes in his study that Frankfurter was very close to Lord Eustace Percy, a member of Lothian's staff at the British Embassy, and that Richard Casey, Australia's first minister to the United States, was "another of the Justice's allies."[14] Lothian, Percy, and Casey were all individuals whose friendship Christie had long shared with Frankfurter.[15] In short, Christie was able to step directly and fully into the mainstream of influence and inside knowledge that flowed and eddied about Frankfurter's chambers.

In addition to his personal associations, Christie's appointment to Washington owed much to the fact that he had wholly repented his earlier imperialist sympathies and had developed a stubbornly nationalistic outlook. Christie had been realistic enough in the prewar years to accept the fact, albeit reluctantly, that Canada would -- because of the existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship -- enter the approaching

conflict along with Britain. Nonetheless, even after the war began, Christie continued to hope for a degree of Canadian participation utterly unlike the country's all-out effort during the Great War.[16] Christie's nationalist beliefs were shared in full measure, and perhaps more, by Skelton, and to a lesser degree by Mackenzie King. Late in his life John Read remembered that the Prime Minister was quite concerned about Christie's strong opinions in regard to limiting Canadian participation in the war and that his cousin "went down [to Washington] on very firm commitments that he would carry out the policy of the government and not permit his feelings in regard to isolation affect him."[17] Read's recollection probably is a bit faulty and should not be relied on; indeed, as has been shown, Christie's reservations about Canadian participation did not cross the line to isolationism. Whatever qualms, and they were few in number, that King had about sending Christie to Washington stemmed from his traditional unease over the possible repercussions arising from the activities of Canada's diplomats and emissaries overseas -- witness his constant suspicion of Vincent Massey's motives and activities in London throughout the 1935-1939 period, and his belief that Massey wanted to be a European diplomat rather than a High Commissioner and that the former role was one he was "always over zealous to assume."[18] It hardly seems likely that King would have sent an individual he did not fully trust to assume so important a post as that of minister in Washington.

Christie's nationalism, or, as Skelton termed it, his "thorough-going Canadianism," may have, contrary to John Read's

testimony, contributed to his appointment in a positive manner. It seems not unreasonable to assume that Skelton and King thought that Christie's associations in Washington would not only allow him to expedite business of a Canadian-American nature, but also would permit him to keep an eye on British activities in Washington. The Christie-Lothian-Frankfurter connection, for example, would be of obvious use in this regard and might provide information enabling Christie to forestall British actions harmful to Canadian interests.[19] Too much stress probably should not be put on this aspect of the appointment, but it nevertheless seems safe to say that both King and Skelton intended the selection of Christie as a means of emphasizing the importance Ottawa placed on maintaining good relations with the United States, and as a clear indication that the definition of Canada's national interests in 1939 had a much greater North American component than had been the case during the Great War.[20]

Aside from Skelton's remark regarding Christie's nationalism noted above, there is little other direct evidence on this aspect of the appointment emanating from the two principals responsible for making it. Skelton's response to a letter praising the selection of Christie, however, gives an indication that he was not unaware of the connotations that would be put on the dispatch of Christie to Washington. "The only criticism I have seen of Christie's appointment," E.J. Tarr, then National Director of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, wrote Skelton in early October, 1939,

> is because of his so-called isolationist views. This criticism seems to me to be extremely short-sighted, because

> what we need at Washington at this juncture is an individual who, beyond question, is genuinely sympathetic to the desire of the United States to keep out of the war if it can do so in its own national interests. It is such a person that has the best chance of avoiding mistakes as he tries to further Canadian interests at Washington.[21]

Skelton agreed with Tarr's view of the situation and even hinted that he, for one, might be feeling a bit more secure with Christie and his stridently nationalistic outlook neatly installed in the Washington Legation. "I entirely agree with you," he responded to Tarr, "I cannot see any possible ground for objecting to the appointment of a North American to a North American post."[22] It seems doubtful that Skelton's opinion would have been unknown to King and, indeed, it is even more unlikely that Skelton could have engineered the appointment of a "North American" without the Prime Minister's recognition and approval of the sentiment and, more importantly, the symbolism behind it.[23]

On 5 September, King told Skelton that he was willing to send Christie to Washington and on 9 September he secured the Cabinet's approval for the assignment. On the latter day only Skelton and the Cabinet knew of Christie's selection as King intended to keep the matter quiet until he had obtained His Majesty's concurrence and the agreement of the United States government.[24] On 11 September, however, King was questioned in the House of Commons by Conservative leader R.J. Manion about Marler's ill health and the effect it was having on the management of Canadian affairs in Washington. In response, King acknowledged the severity of Marler's illness and the probability of his resignation in the near future; he did not, however,

disclose Christie's appointment.[25] While Manion's questions were unwelcome, King had, by 11 September, delayed long enough to insure that both Washington and and King George VI had agreed to accept Christie.[26] Mackenzie King wanted the stage set before he made an official announcement because he feared that Manion and his party would -- if the vacancy in Washington was publicized before it was filled -- begin to call for a bipartisan approach to external affairs and would foment "agitation to have Howard Ferguson and others recommended. [The] Tories are beginning to try to get their people into these posts."[27] King's silence and delaying tactics succeeded in preventing the formation of effective partisan opposition to the appointment[28] and the announcement of Christie's selection was made in Ottawa on the evening of 15 September 1939.[29]

Christie's own reaction to his appointment is a bit difficult to gauge. Without question, it seems to have taken him somewhat by surprise;[30] he told Henry Stimson, for example, that his appointment to the minister's post struck him as "a somewhat odd stroke of fate."[31] Professor Granatstein has noted that during the summer of 1939 Christie told L.B. Pearson that he expected to leave the Department of External Affairs before long on the grounds of his firm opposition to Canadian participation in the coming war.[32] Throughout the period between his return to the Department and the outbreak of the war Christie had indeed done everything in his power to limit the extent of Canadian participation in any new war. And while it is true that ideally he wanted no Canadian part in the war, it is not accurate to say

-- as Pearson suggested -- that Christie believed it was possible or even desirable for Canada to stay out of the war.

As has been shown, Christie believed that the existing Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship legally required Canadian participation in a war in which Britain became engaged. To do otherwise when war came, according to Christie, would cause a massive rupture in constitutional continuity, would divide Canadian society along French-English and imperialist-nationalist/isolationist lines, and would amount to the morally despicable action of deserting longtime friends at a time of dire emergency. One suspects that if Christie was considering leaving the Department just prior to the war -- and he was -- it was because he realized that despite his best efforts, and those of Skelton as well, the Canadian war effort would closely mirror the total effort made during the Great War rather than the limited participation he had been championing. It probably is this sort of frustration that caused C.A. Ritchie to remember that "I had the impression that he [Christie] felt his views were disregarded in the making of policy and that his abilities were not used and that he was bitter about this."[33] Another acquaintance of Christie, this one from outside the Department, likewise seems to have detected his frustration with having been unable to limit the Canadian role in the war. "You on the other hand," Arthur Lower wrote in a letter of congratulation after Christie's appointment was announced, "will now have an end to the 'shadow-boxing' that has been distressing you at Ottawa, or so one would surely expect."[34]

Whatever his personal frustrations, Christie was genuinely pleased with the end result of Mackenzie King's interwar external policy, that is the bringing of a fairly united Canada into the war. Shortly after he had informed Christie that the order-in-council appointing him would be put through on 15 September, King recorded in his diary that

> Christie then asked me if he might say how greatly he admired my own work in Foreign Affairs, and particularly to all the matters pertaining to the war, and the way in which the country had been brought into the war, that he did not think anyone could have done the work as well.[35]

Christie followed the reported statement with a letter which was, if anything, even more fulsome in its praise. Writing to thank the Prime Minister for " such a striking mark of your confidence," Christie continued,

> No one, I suppose, charged with public responsibility can face these somber days with a light heart, but I shall do my best to justify the decision. May I add that I find great reassurance and support in the reflection that toward the general war situation, and not the least toward the particular relations with which I must now deal, there exists at the center of responsibility in Ottawa such intimate understanding and wisdom -- a fact which I myself, better than most, have been in a position to know and measure from the evidence of my own eyes during the recent years.[36]

Christie's reaction to his appointment underscores the dramatic change that had occurred in his attitudes toward Mackenzie King since the 1920s. Although Christie never completely overcame his distaste for King's penchant for procrastination and the Prime Minister's utter inability to provide leadership of a galvanizing sort,[37] he did come to have a tremendous respect for the care King took to insure that his government adopted policies that promoted unity and not division

in Canadian society. So while the diary entry and the letter just quoted might seem to cast Christie in a rather unflattering, even sycophantic light when compared with the harshness of his opinions on King in the early 1920s, they merely reflect the concern he had come to share with the Prime Minister during the interwar years over the fragility of Canadian society. It probably is not too much to say that Christie only really came to know his own country after he left the Department of External Affairs in 1923. As his memoranda and correspondence show he developed a profound belief that Canadian society existed in a finely balanced but always tenuous equilibrium between the competing interests of region, religion, and language; an equilibrium that could be easily upset with disastrous, even catastrophic consequences for the country's ability to survive as a distinct political entity in North America. Mackenzie King became for Christie the protector of this balance. While his profuse compliments upon his appointment as minister may be seen as having been calculated to benefit himself and his legation's effectiveness, Christie's words to the Prime Minister almost certainly were a sincere and accurate description of the essential role he believed King was playing in defense of Canadian unity.

In the strictly personal sense, Christie could hardly have helped being intensely pleased with his appointment. Washington was, of course, the jewel of the few ministerial posts then at the disposal of the Canadian government. Christie's acquisition of the post must also have made up for some of the chagrin he

felt upon returning to the Department in 1935 and finding himself junior to several younger and less experienced officers.[38] He must also have looked forward to renewing his close friendships with Lothian and Frankfurter and reestablishing associations with such influential individuals as Henry Stimson and Walter Lippmann. Likewise, Christie presumably was pleased with the opportunity to return to live in Washington, D.C., a city he considered "absorbing."[39]

Finally, Christie could only have been slightly short of delighted that the Washington appointment had been made from within the Department of External Affairs. By coming from within the Department the appointment marked another step in the growth of the Canadian diplomatic service -- something he had worked to achieve since 1913 -- and it also satisfied his progressive bias toward placing specialists in important government positions. In regard to the latter point, during his first tour of duty in Washington, as an attorney with the United States Department of Justice from 1910 to 1913, Christie had adopted as his own the progressivism espoused by the New Republic crowd -- Croly, Frankfurter, Lippmann, et. al. -- which stressed the beneficial role of the expert and the technician in conducting the affairs of society. Christie was now returning to the scene of his post-university political education in the role of an accomplished professional involved in managing the affairs and protecting the interests of his nation.[40]

Pleased in every sense with his appointment, Christie faced a troubling and potentially undermining public commentary on it

almost immediately after the announcement was made. On 23 September 1939 the Financial Post published an article in which it was stated that personal relations between Christie and King had never been cordial and, in fact, that the latter had all but forced him out of the Department of External Affairs after he came to power in 1921. "Mr. Christie's advice was no longer sought;" the Financial Post claimed that "he found himself sidetracked in his office in the East Block.... Mr. Christie -- a lifelong Conservative -- was not deemed the best Counsellor in foreign policy for a Liberal Administration." The article also suggested that Christie's relations with Skelton were somewhat less than the best.[41]

After reading the article Christie wrote to K.R. Wilson, the Post's editor, to refute the allegations printed by the paper. In his letter, Christie indicated that he had not resigned in 1923 because of the Prime Minister's attitudes or actions toward him, and insisted, to the contrary, that King had "pressed" him to stay and had made "very favourable suggestions regarding his future career in the Department." "I resigned," Christie wrote, "because for a considerable time I had wanted to both see more of England and Europe at first hand and to see something of the business world." Christie also noted that there had been "a very private motive" for his departure "having nothing whatever to do with him [King] or with my work, which impelled me, somewhat precipitably, to go away at the moment." Christie also dismissed out of hand the idea that there was a rift between himself and Skelton, saying that such a suggestion "does an injustice to Dr.

Skelton and to our friendship...." In conclusion, Christie told Wilson that the accusations contained in the Post's article had been current on and off since 1923, that they were incorrect in their entirety, and that he was "sorry to see them revived both because they are incorrect and because now, if they were to have any effect, it could not be helpful from the point of view of the Legation."[42] After writing to Wilson, Christie called the article to Skelton's attention, sending him a copy both of it and his response, and requested that he show them both to King at some point in the future.[43]

Christie arrived in Washington on 24 September 1939 and presented his credentials to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt on the following day.[44] Roosevelt received Christie in the White House's Oval Office and after the formal ceremonies requested that he remain for a private conversation. Christie later wrote King that the President had astounded him by recalling that they had met in London during World War One "at a dinner at Grey's Inn, where I had went [sic] with Sir Robert Borden and where, as Mr. Roosevelt said, Lord Birkenhead 'got tight and made a fluent and witty speech out of turn.'" This informal, conversation lasted for about forty minutes and dealt mostly with "the number of common friends and acquaintances" they shared. It also included some general discussion of the war and some specific points about what Christie described as Roosevelt's particular concern with the defense of Canada's Atlantic coast. Christie concluded his description of the conversation by telling King that he understood that such an interview "is unusual on

such occasions, and I have no doubt it was deliberately intended as a mark of his friendly attitude toward the Canadian government and people."[45]

Christie, then, began his brief tenure as minister in Washington under rather auspicious circumstances. In regard to professional experience, pertinent personal relationships, and the knowledge and ability to weave through Washington's bureaucratic labyrinth it is difficult to believe that King could have found an individual better able to promote and protect Canadian interests in the American capital during the initial stages of the war. "Study of Christie's career sheet," the Montreal Standard noted shortly after the appointment was announced, "gives one the uncanny impression that the whole thing must have been planned from the beginning with the thought in mind [of] fitting him today for the particular job that he has been given in this particular war."[46] The "impression" detected by the Standard is surely an accurate one.

First Task: Organizing the Legation for War

Among Christie's first actions after assuming his post were a number aimed at making the Legation and its staff better able to cope more efficiently with the crush of wartime activities. In this regard, it seems that Christie initially considered taking a flat somewhere in Washington in order to make more room available in the Legation for conducting its day-to-day business. Skelton and Mackenzie King, however, quickly put an end to that plan and directed their new Minister to maintain his

quarters on the Legation's premises so as not to complicate rapid communication between him and Ottawa.[47]

Christie's appears to have been well satisfied with the size and quality of the Legation's staff and his first impulse was merely to do a bit of reshuffling. The most important problem that he believed needed to be addressed was to find a new posting for W.A. Riddell, who was the Legation's Counsellor and Charge d' Affaires and who had been past over for the ministership when Marler resigned. "As to Riddell," Christie told Skelton,

> I am getting on with him very well so far. He has taken very well indeed a situation which I suppose was disappointing to him. But I feel sure it would be better all around for the Legation if he could have some other post or position. I am sure he wants to be moved. In view of his past positions, his equipment and his nature, I have a great doubt whether he could ever be made into an effective unit of what the organisation here should be.... But I think he would always in effect be something of a drag. I speak frankly of this to you alone, and hope that I am not being unjust. I am not writing this in an effort to press you to hurry other arrangements, but rather as part of the exposition I am about to lay out.[48]

After discussing the Riddell problem, Christie went on to propose that his staff consist of one Counsellor, one Second Secretary, two Third Secretaries, and a Trade Commissioner. For the Counsellor's post Christie recommended that Merchant Mahoney, then the Legation's longtime Commercial Counsellor, be named to take Riddell's place. "The more I hear about Merchant Mahoney," Christie told Skelton, "and hear about his standing in this town the more I feel, if and when Dr. Riddell is transferred, Merchant Mahoney be seriously considered for promotion to Counsellor and second in command [of the Legation]."[49] Skelton acted quickly on these suggestions by transferring Riddell to New Zealand as

Canada's High Commissioner and confirming the organizational plan Christie had submitted.[50] The only recommendation that Skelton turned down was the idea of promoting Mahoney, believing that he was needed in the commercial post he presently occupied and that another appointment should be made to handle the work of the diplomatic counsellor.[51]

The one additional organizational improvement Christie sought for the Legation was the attachment to its staff of attaches representing each of Canada's military services. Even before he had been sent to Washington, Christie and Skelton had been attempting to persuade Mackenzie King to authorize the appointment of service attaches who "would be able to make contacts and obtain information in a way that could not otherwise be done."[52] Almost immediately after his arrival in Washington Christie resumed his efforts to promote the posting of military attaches. In early November, 1939, for example, he told Skelton that,

> In view of our conversations before I left Ottawa regarding the possibility of [the Department of National] Defence sending Service Attaches to this Legation, I have taken one or two informal opportunities to get some general information about the position and function of the Service Attaches at the British Embassy. ...
>
> On technical matters each attache gets his instructions from his own department direct and replies direct to his own department. This includes such inquiries regarding prices, sources of supply, etc. on munitions and other material as this Legation has been handling during recent years through its diplomatic staff. It also includes technical reports on defence plans and appropriations of the United States Government and generally all technical information touching the military and defence activities of the United States Government.

> It is very clearly understood that the Service Attaches must not report to their own departments on political matters. If there is any question of drawing the line between the technical and the political, they consult the Ambassador. They may sometimes write reports to the Ambassador concerning information on estimates which have come to their attention and may have a political complexion....
>
> P.S. I doubt if our diplomatic staff, being laymen in this regard, can handle technical military inquiries as quickly and effectively as service men could; and if you anticipate a great deal of this work I would think the Service Attache question worth considering soon.[53]

Christie quickly followed up this report outlining the responsibilities and operations of the British military attaches in Washington with a missive describing the difficulty the Legation was encountering because it did not have attaches of its own. On fairly short notice in mid-November, Christie told Skelton, the Legation had been called upon to arrange a meeting between R.J. Magor, Chairman of the National Steel Car Company of Montreal, with representatives of the Glenn Martin Company of Baltimore, Maryland to discuss a matter pertaining to a defense-related product each was manufacturing. Christie said that while his staff had succeeded in arranging such a meeting in this particular instance, it had required quite a bit of behind-the-scenes wire-pulling that probably would have been unnecessary had Canadian military attaches been available in Washington. "Steps taken [to facilitate Magor's visit] were simply this," Christie explained to Skelton,

> Instead of writing to the State Department and waiting for our note to reach the War Department by ordinary channels, the State Department had agreed that the Legation should call on the [War Department's] Foreign Liaision Officer ... bringing to his attention the name or names of the plants which are to be visited. I understand that a military attache having been accredited is entitled to go direct to

> the Foreign Liaision Officer and arrange the visits immediately as the Foreign Liaision Officer is in a position to state whether there is objection to the visit or not. In the present case the State Department allowed the Legation to do that, but the Legation is loathe to request this practice as a general practice, though it is the only way in which such visits can be arranged in the course of one day.
>
> From this indication of the procedure it will be realized that if service attaches were detailed to the Legation not only visits of this character but many other matters of concern to the Department of National Defence could be arranged at very short notice.[54]

Christie's urgings, together with Skelton's strong support, finally convinced the Prime Minister to appoint an Air Attache -- Air Commodore W.R. Kenny -- to the Legation in February, 1940. Although pleased with his success, Christie continued to insist that additional attaches representing the army and the navy were also needed if Canada's military interests in Washington were to be protected adequately. In the summer of 1940, for example, Christie told Skelton that he did not believe that a single attache could oversee all of Canada's military relations with the American government and that additional appointments were needed at the earliest possible date.[55] The Minister's arguments finally carried the day in Ottawa and on 26 July 1940 the Cabinet War Committee approved in principle the appointment of military and naval attaches to the Legation in Washington.[56] Colonel H.F.G. Letson and Commodore V.G. Brodeur were appointed to those posts in August and September, 1940 respectively.[57]

With the appointment of Colonel Letson in September, 1940, Christie had his full complement of service attaches -- in this regard Skelton gave Christie full credit for authoring this particular innovation in Canadian diplomatic practice, noting

when the appointments were announced that it had been Christie who had "initiated the first suggestion of appointing Service Attaches"[58] -- and the organization of the Legation as he wanted it was complete. From the available evidence, Christie was well satisfied with his staff,[59] and given the lengthy periods he was absent from the Legation due to illness -- most of May, June, and early July, 1940 and from mid-November, 1940 until his death in April, 1941 -- the judgment of the American diplomat John Hickerson that the Legation functioned very efficiently during his absences seems a tribute to Christie's organizational and managerial acumen.[60]

Riding Herd on a Friend: The Christie-Lothian Relationship in Washington

Although some recent scholarship, especially that of Professor David Reynolds, has contained an almost completely positive appraisal of Lord Lothian's American ambassadorship,[61] the experience of Canadian officials with Lothian's machinations in Washington -- particularly those of the noble Lord's longtime friend Loring Christie -- suggest that some historiographical revision may be in order. Indeed, the "imperial" manner, impetuous nature, and unorthodox and at time duplicitous diplomatic behavior of the British Ambassador placed the Canadians, on more than one occasion, in the position of having to attempt to forestall what they saw as a potential for Lothian-inspired disruptions in Anglo-American-Canadian relations. A brief examination of the Canadians' attitudes towards and perceptions of the Marquess's ambassadorship seems to confirm

that Lothian on several occasions acted in a manner that endangered the prospects for the success of his American mission and thereby put at risk, at a highly inopportune moment, London's relations with Washington and Ottawa. An examination of Lothian's behavior through Christie's eyes lends credence to the words of a a recent critic of Professor Reynolds's work who argues that Reynolds perhaps accepts too much at face value Lothian's "own flattering self-portrait, as one who understood the Americans thoroughly, and swung public opinion in the United States."[62]

Loring Christie was closely involved with Lothian between September, 1939 and the Ambassador's death in December, 1940. Christie also was, because of his intimate and longstanding personal and professional relationships with Lothian, in an excellent position from which to judge the impact of his performance as ambassador. Christie and Lothian -- then Philip Kerr -- apparently first met during the Great War when Christie accompanied Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden to London for meetings with British officials and the representatives of the other Dominions. They worked together especially closely after British Prime Minister Lloyd George convoked the Imperial War Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. Both Christie and Kerr served their respective prime ministers as idea men and general factotums and spent considerable time together again after the war at the Paris Peace Conference. In 1923, Christie resigned from the Canadian civil service and entered the employ of Sir James Dunn in London. While living in The City,

Christie served with Kerr on the editorial board of the Round Table and both men were active in the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

As has been noted, Christie was appointed Canadian Minister to the United States in September 1939, in part, because he fully shared -- and at times exceeded -- the utter distrust King and Skelton had for British diplomacy and its potential for involving Canada unnecessarily in affairs of an exclusively European nature. Likewise, his appointment also came as a consequence of the wide circle of influential friends and acquaintances he enjoyed in the United States, a varied group that included Felix Frankfurter, Henry L. Stimson, Walter Lippmann, Louis Brandeis, and Franklin Roosevelt. King and Skelton obviously expected these longstanding personal associations in the United States to aid Christie in expediting the handling of business of a Canadian-American nature. It also seems reasonable to assume that King and Skelton hoped that Christie's personal network of contacts and informants -- including his close friendship with Lothian -- would permit him to keep an eye on British activities in the American capital and enable him to detect any that might conceivably complicate dealings between Ottawa and Washington.

Although Prime Minister King had publicly welcomed Lothian's appointment as British Ambassador to the United States in April, 1939, he almost certainly continued to worry about the troublesome potentialities inherent in the Marquess's impeccable imperialist credentials. King's abhorrence of what he understood to be Lothian's idea of "proper" imperial relationships, and the

manipulation of the Dominions inherent in that conception, was complete and notorious. King probably believed, however, that there was no one better equipped to keep a watch on the imperialist Lothian than one who had renounced the imperial faith and now was at times prone, with all the zeal of a convert, to see imperial conspiracies in most Anglo-Canadian disagreements. King and Skelton were no doubt convinced that Christie would keep close tabs on his former Round Table colleague. As matters worked out, Christie found much to worry about and discuss with his masters in regard to Lothian's behavior. In the fifteen months prior to Lothian's death, Christie discovered, and sought to blunt, in the British Ambassador what he considered to be a certain imperiousness and recklessness in manner, approach, and attitude that he feared could conceivably complicate, and perhaps disrupt, Anglo-American-Canadian relations.

Almost immediately after arriving in Washington in September, 1939, Christie found Lothian about to make what he considered an unnecessary error in dealing with the American bureaucracy and one which might have made Britain's procurement of armaments and munitions in the United States more difficult. "One other part of my conversation with Lothian is worth mentioning," Christie wrote to Prime Minister King.

> He said that the British Government were planning to send a supply or purchasing mission to operate in the United States.... Apparently they had received intimations that they had better keep in touch with the Navy and War Departments here about what they were doing, but they did not like this idea. I told him I was sure that they would not get far unless they kept in touch with those Departments. ... there are a lot of ways by which the Departments could prevent or greatly obstruct the business of getting supplies in this country if they felt that anyone

> might be prejudicing their plans or trying to sidetrack them on their own ground.[63]

Christie went on to say that he had explained to Lothian that the Canadian government always co-operated closely with the departments in question and "never failed to get good results."[64]

In this instance, Christie succeeded in persuading Lothian to have his subordinates study some booklets prepared by the American government on its "Industrial Mobilization Plan" which explained the procedures to be used by organizations of the type London planned to dispatch. It appears, however, that Lothian and his staff continued to act in the rather headstrong fashion which Christie had sought to deter. Indeed, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Lothian's personal assistant, has written that

> ... by the end of 1939 a feeling of intense annoyance with Britain was manifesting itself both in public opinion and official circles in the United States, and which many feared might disturb the cordial nature of Anglo-American relations. This arose largely through the insensitivity of British officials in handling Americans; their stiffness in dealing with the U.S. mails, the delays in the examination of ships passing through the blockade and such like difficulties.[65]

In his memoirs, Wheeler-Bennett goes on to suggest that Lothian's "extraordinary flair for public relations" did much to reduce this resentment beginning in early 1940. Christie, however, appears to have believed that the Ambassador's public relations efforts did little to relieve the tension. In late February, 1940, for example, Christie was detecting the same American annoyance with Britain as was Wheeler-Bennett, but he did not believe that much was being done to cause it to abate. Indeed, he felt that Lothian and other British officials in Washington were acting in much the same imperious manner as they

had when he arrived the preceding September. "One effect of British policies or methods so far," Christie told King,

> has been, I feel, to create in some minds here an impression that the British think that the United States is bound to come to their support eventually anyhow and so they need not take such pains or make such concessions as may be necessary or politic as regards other countries or regions. It is quite possible that they are taking too much for granted and would do well to plan as carefully about the "United States front" as any other. If the impression I mention should gain ground it would naturally irritate and hamper the best of friends here, while of course it would tend to harden those who may be cool or indifferent to start with.[66]

Certainly more distressing for Christie -- and, as Professor Reynolds has shown, for certain members of the British Foreign Office, the Cabinet, and the aristocracy as well[67] -- was what he considered to be the poor public relations practices of Lothian's embassy, that is, the Marquess's penchant for becoming completely immersed in public speaking and propagandizing activities in an attempt to elicit American support for Britain in the war. Although he agreed that a certain amount of public speaking was an unavoidable part of diplomatic routine, Christie -- as well as King and Skelton -- believed Lothian was doing far too much of it.[68] After just a few weeks in Washington, Christie concluded that many Americans resented the public relations strategies that the belligerent governments had begun to employ in an effort to enlist their sympathy and support.[69] To buttress this point in regard to Lothian's activities specifically, Christie undertook an informal poll among three of his longstanding and influential Washington friends: former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann, and Congressman Charles Eaton, the second-ranking Republican member

of the House of Representative's Committee on Foreign Affairs. After gathering their opinions as to what sort of public role he should play in the United States, Christie told Skelton that

> all of them quite independently gave it as their strong opinion that I should not accept such speaking engagements [that is, of the type and frequency of those in which Lothian was engaging] during the war period, or at least until some now unforeseen significant alteration should occur in the relations of the United States towards the war and the respective belligerents.[70]

Christie also said that Lippmann had told him that Americans would really only be interested and influenced by speeches made "by the responsible political leader of each belligerent country" and for that reason he had "his own apprehensions" over the wisdom of Lothian's activities. Christie ended his report by adding that he had been told in private conversations with the Irish and South African Ministers in Washington that they had decided not to pursue a public-speaking effort similar to Lothian's.[71]

Throughout the period in which they both served in Washington, Christie -- with Ottawa's concurrence and blesssing -- maintained a much lower public profile than did Lothian. The Canadians' reservations and anxieties regarding the Ambassador's behavior, together with those that Christie discovered among prominent Americans and the diplomatic representatives of two other Dominions, suggests that "Lothian-doubters were not confined to the Foreign Office."[72] Indeed, official Ottawa seems to have fully expected trouble to result from Lothian's public activities and, though it could not thwart him at every turn, it clearly did what it could to temper his rashness and to make sure

that Christie did not adopt the Marquess's public style as his own.

In Canadian eyes Lothian's behavior crossed the line from the irritating to the dangerous during the negotiations preceding the Anglo-American destroyers-for-bases deal in July and August, 1940. Lothian's activities were not of the public variety in this instance -- although the actions he urged certainly were -- but rather involved two approaches to the Canadian government through Christie and, when these did not produce the results he desired, he passed by the Canadian Minister and wrote directly to Prime Minister King. On all three occasions Lothian's plans, requests, and suggestions apparently were made on his own volition and without London's sanction.

Twice in late July and early August 1940, Lothian approached Christie and asked him to suggest to Ottawa that "the Prime Minister of Canada should make some kind of public appeal" to the President of the United States "on the possibility of furnishing old destroyers for the use of the United Kingdom." Informing Skelton of Lothian's proposals, Christie commented that "he was not convinced that such a move would be really effective at this stage." He also said that he understood that the idea of involving Mackenzie King publicly in the matter "was Lothian's personal suggestion and had not been made by the Government of the United Kingdom." Skelton, in turn, reported Lothian's suggestion, and Christie's opinion thereon, to King, who -- probably with all his loathing for imperial manipulation seething anew -- rejected the idea out of hand. "I would not think of

doing so," King told Skelton. "It would undo for the future any influence I may have. Such a step would be in the nature of 'coercion'. No wonder some diplomacies fail."[73]

Unsatisfied with the results of Christie's approach to King, Lothian next took it upon himself to circumvent the Canadian Minister, as well as the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, by writing directly to the Canadian Prime Minister in an attempt to convince him to undertake the action he desired. After claiming that he had talked the matter "over fully with Loring Christie" -- and thereby giving King the inaccurate inference that he had Christie's approval for the missive -- Lothian said that he was "[t]rusting to our old friendship and therefore breaking all protocol ... to write you a private and personal letter about the destroyer situation here." Lothian then related Britain's precarious military situation, the battles then raging between those in Washington who supported the destroyers-for-bases deal and those who were opposed, and concluded by suggesting a special course of action for Canada to follow.

> I venture to write this to you which represents the fruit of long conversations with many leading Americans, including the President, Mr. Hull, Colonel Stimson, Colonel Knox, Mr. Morgenthau, etc., because it may be useful to you to know how the situation appears to me and because I feel that the time may come when Canada may be able to exercise a decisive influence. I don't think the time has come yet. The President tells me that he hoped to raise the question with Congress this week. Even if he doesn't there are people here that mean to go on pressing the basic destroyer thesis until action is taken. But if public debate becomes acute or the balance in Congress is narrow, it may well be that a public or private intervention from Canada might make the difference, and turn the scale.[74]

Needless to say, Lothian's elbow twisting awakened in King

and Skelton many of their old anti-imperialist concerns, not to mention quite a little resentment over the Ambassador's attempt to get Canada to act according to plans of his own making rather than London's. Moreover, Lothian's inference that he and others meant "to go on pressing the basic destroyer thesis" even if Roosevelt did not pursue the matter immediately with Congress, presumably must have filled King and Skelton with dread as to the possible consequences for Canada should Britain's representative attempt to push Roosevelt into acting before he was ready to do so. Lothian was acting now, as King believed was his propensity since at least 1922, as if the Empire/Commonwealth was his own "special preserve."[75] In response to this letter, King thanked Lothian politely for his letter and said that he stood ready "to lend whatever assistance" he could "either by private personal appeal to the President, or public pronouncement at an appropriate time."[76] Fortunately for King and his government, the destroyers-for-bases deal was completed before Lothian considered it necessary to call on Ottawa to make a public appeal to Washington.[77]

Despite push never coming to shove in this instance, these examples of Lothian's rather imperious attitude and unorthodox diplomatic behavior during the destroyers-for-bases negotiations provide a good glimpse of the trouble Christie had in coping with the free-lance enterprises of the British Ambassador. In a letter to Skelton, Christie expressed his exasperation with Lothian and his ways and, in so doing, neatly summed up Ottawa's views of the Ambassador's unpredictability and its reactions to

his playing -- albeit rather unsuccessfully -- the role of the imperial statesman. "As I said," Christie wrote to Skelton in regard to Lothian's unanticipated letter to Prime Minister King,

> it was sent without my knowledge, and he had not previously indicated to me any intention of writing to the Prime Minister. However, I do not write with the purpose of raising trouble about "protocol." ...
>
> The upshot, therefore, is that Lothian is returning in this way to his idea of some public plea addressed to the United States by Mr. King. I had already passed this idea of his to you early last week, and I have your personal letter of August 9th indicating Mr. King's response to it.
>
> I may add that I have not encouraged Lothian in this idea. On the contrary, I told him last week that although I would pass the idea on to you, I was not myself convinced. I have said to him that I certainly could not see a case for it at present and that I found it difficult to envisage a situation where the advantages of such a step could be definitely measured as outweighing the risks. I have also said to him that, even if a set of circumstances arrive which might seem to indicate to some people the advisability of such a step, I do not think it should be taken unless we had a very clear indication that it was practically unanimously supported and urged in the various United States quarters, official and unofficial, who are actively interested in this question and who are really managing its development here.
>
> This morning, somewhat to my surprise, Lothian told me that in the course of a conversation with the President yesterday afternoon he had asked the President about this idea of some public statement by Mr. King. He said that the President replied that such a step might turn out to be all right, but he did not think it advisable at this stage.
>
> I suppose Lothian and myself approach such a matter from different angles. He often speaks, both publicly and privately, as though he felt that the official representative of a democracy could speak practically as freely to the people of a foreign democracy as to the people of his own country. He seems to suggest that if this cannot be done, the cause of democracy is practically hopeless. I am afraid that I am not convinced by this, and I do not think it sufficiently takes account of various relevant distinctions and risks.
>
> I recall also more than once he pointed out to me that before coming here he had never been a diplomat, but had been engaged in public life and public speaking, and that he

> assumed therefore that his Government in appointing him intended him to go in for a good deal of public speaking.
>
> I am a little disturbed by Lothian's insistence upon writing this idea to Mr. King after I told him that I passed it on to you last week. Sometimes in the course of conversation he drops remarks indicating that his mind sometimes runs in the direction of trying to force some other person's hand toward some action by means of confronting him with an inescapable case in writing or otherwise. I do not mean to say that he has disclosed such intention to me in this particular case. But as I am a little baffled in this matter, I thought it well to speak to you in this personal and confidential way.[78]

None of the foregoing, of course, invalidates all of Professor Reynold's conclusions regarding the successes and general overall effectiveness of Lord Lothian's tenure as British Ambassador in Washington. Indeed, Reynolds's works provide a signal service in beginning to move beyond J.R.M. Butler's biography of Lothian[79] toward a more analytic appraisal of a very full, active, and interesting life. The troubles experienced and the problems perceived by Christie, Skelton, and Mackenzie King as a result of Lothian's activities in the United States do, however, suggest that Reynolds has perhaps taken the Marquess too much at his own word. The apprehensions, exasperation, and, at times, anger which were rife in the correspondence and cable traffic that passed among the three Canadians and which is quoted here at some length -- all of which, by the way, is conveniently located in Canadian archival repositories, although it has been inexplicably ignored or greatly underutilized by most non-Canadian historians of Anglo-American relations -- seem to indicate that Lothian, at least for the Canadians, was not a man "who understood Americans thoroughly, and swung public opinion in the United States."

In sum, the view of Lothian's ambassadorship from both the Canadian legation in Washington and from Ottawa seems to have been that the ambassador and his embassy were cut too much from the cloth of the imperial England that once had been, the one which was, in Christie's words, even in the dark summer days of 1940 still too "used [to] instructing other countries what was to be done."[80] Christie's judgment probably would have to be that Anglo-American-Canadian relations during the period of Lothian's ambassadorship remained amicable as much despite the nature of his performance as because of it.

On the Periphery: Christie's Involvement in the Question of a British Contraband Control Station in Canada.

Christie's involvement in the controversy over the question of establishing a British contraband-control base in Atlantic Canada provides ample evidence that he was treated by Mackenzie King and Skelton in much the same way as Canada's other diplomatic representatives; that is, he was used to report pertinent developments in the capital to which he was assigned, deliver messages from his masters in Ottawa, and otherwise was little involved in the making of policy. Christie's chief advantage over his counterparts in London, Paris, and Tokyo was, of course, his extensive range of information sources in Washington. As a result of this personal network, Christie was able to stay on top of all of the negotiations relating to the contraband control station, although he was still not a decisive factor in the formulation of Canadian policy in this regard. The

contraband base issue, then, provides a case study of Christie's remaining on the periphery of one of the most important negotiations to occur during his ministership. It also underlines the nettlesome and at times duplicitous activities of the British Ambassador.

Never an easy diplomatic relationship to manage, the relations among the three members of the North Atlantic Triangle seldom have been as strained and difficult as they were during the two periods -- 1914-1917 and 1939-1941 -- that found Canada and Great Britain at war with Germany while the United States remained neutral. The United States was always the prickliest of neutrals, adopting intricate and stringent neutrality legislation while simultaneously proclaiming a self-righteous and often self-serving defense of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Washington's position, more often than not, betrayed little recognition of the complexities involved in waging war and instead primarily was based on domestic political expediency. Between 1914 and 1917 the Admiralty and Whitehall had searched for measures with which to maintain an effective economic blockade and, at the same time, to avoid alienating the United States completely. Methods of blockade management were painstakingly developed by the British government to calm American distress -- the most effective instrument of which was known as the "navicert" -- but trans-Atlantic tensions remained high over the conduct of economic warfare until Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917 brought America into the war.[81]

Faced with the memories of these troubled times, both American and British officials moved quickly in September, 1939 to attempt to prevent their repetition by reviewing the desirability of reinstituting the navicert system. These good intentions were derailed, however, by a number of misunderstandings, arrogances, connivings, and stupidities that produced resentment and anger on each side of the Atlantic and, more dangerously, altogether failed to establish an effective navicert system. This breakdown also put Canada in a highly difficult position, for without effective navicerting British officials began to study the feasibility of establishing a contraband control station at a port on Canada's Atlantic coast.

London's desire for a control facility pushed Ottawa into a situation where it had either to refuse to co-operate with its wartime ally -- by denying the British permission to establish a base -- or deliberately offend its continental neighbor by allowing the use of a port to which the Roosevelt administration objected. In a situation strikingly similar to that of the "clandestine submarines" of 1914-1915 described so excellently by Professor Gaddis Smith, Ottawa's problems were compounded by Britain's failure to be honest with the Canadians and its penchant for "treating Canadian interests as if they were local, British, and to a degree expendable."[82] Operating much like the great colonial power it once had been, London attempted to cut a deal with the Americans on contraband control and then present Ottawa with a _fait accompli_. This unnecessary and dangerous drama was played out between September, 1939 and April, 1940 and,

once again, tensions remained dangerously high until the very end of the period when -- as in 1917 -- an unexpected German action restored some measure of diplomatic tranquility to the North Atlantic Triangle.

The day after hostilities began in Europe, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull turned to the problem that would arise unavoidably as the result of Britain's attempt to strangle Nazi Germany's economy through the imposition of a naval blockade. On 4 September, Hull discussed with Lord Lothian the possibility of designating

> experts to confer with a view to adopting something like the certificate system that was in operation during the last part of the World War, and otherwise simplify in every possible manner the British and American situation as it would relate to the interference by Great Britain with American commerce destined especially for small countries in Europe, such as Scandinavia, Holland and Belgium;....[83]

Hull was pleased to find Lothian "interested" and told him that he hoped that "this proposed step would avoid the chief portion of the difficulties and serious controversies which raged between our two Governments during the first two years and more of the World War."[84]

Before an experts' discussion could be convened, however, the British government announced that it intended to use its "belligerent rights to the full ... to prevent contraband goods from reaching the enemy."[85] On 10 September -- the day Canada declared war -- Lothian delivered a note to the State Department describing Britain's establishment of a far-ranging contraband control system.

> In order to secure their objects, His Majesty's Government have established contraband control bases at

> Weymouth, Ramsgate, Kirkwall, Gibraltar, and Haifa. Vessels bound for enemy territory or neutral ports affording convenient means of access thereto are urgently advised to call voluntarily at the appropriate base, in order that their papers may be examined, and that, when it has been established that they are not carrying contraband of war, they may be given a pass to facilitate the remainder of their voyage. Any vessel which does not call voluntarily will be liable to be diverted to a Contraband Control base if an adequate search by His Majesty's ships at sea is not practicable.[86]

The curt language of the note was only negligibly moderated by its declaration of London's intention to "at all times be ready to consider sympathetically any suggestions put forward by neutral governments to facilitate their bona fide trade."[87]

London's rather inflexible approach to contraband control was soon complicated further by two events behind which Washington was the driving force. On 3 October, the Inter-American Conference issued the "Panama Declaration" which created a "Hemispheric Safety Belt" of between 300 and 1,000 nautical miles in width -- depending on the indentations of the hemispheric coastline -- off the coasts of all of the 21 American republics. The Declaration stated that the signatories established the safety zone in an effort to insure that the area it encompassed would be "free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent."[88]

Next, on 4 November, the United States Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1939 which proclaimed as "European danger zones" -- or, more popularly, "combat zones" -- the waters of the Atlantic surrounding the British Isles and the entirety of the North and Baltic Seas. The Act closed these combat zones to American merchant shipping under threat of financial penalty. In

addition, the Act effectively precluded vessels registered in the United States from calling voluntarily at a contraband control base in the United Kingdom. The Act also made it unlawful for vessels of American registry to carry "any passengers or any articles or materials to ports in Canada east of sixty-six degrees of west longitude."[89]

The Panama Declaration's safety belt and the Neutrality Act's exclusionary zones, both of which were announced before a navicert system was implemented,[90] made Britain's contraband control activities much more difficult to execute. Regarding Canada specifically, all of its Atlantic ports except Sydney and Louisbourg, Nova Scotia were in the belligerent zone as defined by the Neutrality Act. The Panama Declaration placed all of Canada's Atlantic ports south of and including Halifax in the zone from which all belligerent operations were banned -- only St. John, New Brunswick fell outside the Panama zone. The Panama Declaration, the Neutrality Act, and London's determination to conduct economic warfare against Germany at the most efficient level possible boded ill for Anglo-American relations and placed Ottawa -- at first without its knowledge -- squarely in the center of an evolving trans-Atlantic controversy.

The Neutrality Act of 1939 placed the Scottish port of Kirkwall -- the port at which the Royal Navy had been examining American merchantmen bound for neutral Scandinavia -- into an exclusionary combat zone. London immediately protested against that aspect of the Act, asserting that the American law could not prevent the British government "from carrying on the war, and

that their rights as belligerents took precedence of other considerations." British officials in Washington also told their American counterparts, in a meeting on 8 November, that His Majesty's Government "reserved the right to take American ships bound for Bergen [in Norway] into Kirkwall for examination." Led by F.R. Hoyer Millar, First Secretary at the British Embassy, the British delegation requested that an amendment be made to the Neutrality Act that would exempt from penalty those American ships taken into Kirkwall as a result of the Royal Navy's "legal compulsion."[91]

Pierrepont Moffat and John Hickerson, respectively the Chief and Assistant Chief of the United States State Department's Division of European Affairs, responded that such an exemption was most unlikely and also politely rejected the idea that such naval compulsion could be considered "legal" by Washington. In addition, they said that Washington would hold London responsible financially for ships that were sunk or otherwise damaged as a result of being diverted to Kirkwall. More importantly, Moffat and Hickerson warned the British that such diversions "would probably raise an amount of public resentment here [in the United States] out of all proportion to the cargo involved."[92]

In response, Hoyer Millar recommended that the navicert system be looked at on a more urgent basis -- an experts' discussion had been held on 12 September without success. He pointed out that during World War One cargoes had been examined at Halifax, Nova Scotia and suggested that such a Canadian-based operation might again be possible. Hickerson responded, however,

that Halifax was as much in the exclusionary zone as Kirkwall and therefore was equally unacceptable. Hoyer Millar then mentioned Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, and Bermuda, both of which were outside of the combat zone, as possible alternative examination points. The meeting adjourned at this point with both sides promising to expedite their consideration of the contraband control problem. The 8 November meeting apparently was the first at which the use of a Canadian port was considered and, significantly, no Canadian representative was present during the discusssion.[93]

The Anglo-American contention that arose over the implementation of a navicert system between 4 September and early November, 1939 derived, in part, as an offshoot of the attacks of the American isolationists on the Roosevelt administration. In the opinion of many of the leading isolationist spokesmen, the mandatory use of navicerts would denigrate the sovereignty of the United States because they implied Washington's acquiescence in the exercise of control over American trade in American territory by a foreign power, in this case Great Britain, to facilitate its war aims.[94] The isolationists, and some business leaders, also argued that Britain would derive commercial advantage through the use of navicerts by picking up the trade with neutral Europe that would be denied to American firms by the limits imposed on them by the adoption of the commercial passport system. As a result of this opinion, and the political pressure it could bring to bear, the Roosevelt administration refused to approve publicly the creation of an effective navicert system. American officials were likewise hesitant to give the system their unofficial

sanction except in a most guarded form.

On 9 November, Hickerson informed Sir Owen Chalky, Commercial Counsellor at the British Embassy, that his government would take no official position on navicerts and would regard the system solely "as a matter between those American exporters who may desire to take advantage of it and the appropriate British authorities." In short, the State Department viewed a workable system of navicerts as desirable, but believed that for domestic political reasons it was too dangerous for the Department to become officially involved in implementing the scheme. Hickerson then laid out a set of "assumptions" upon which the United States government might fail to object to an "informal" navicert system.

> 1.) The proposed Navicert System will in no sense be used to interfere with the normal volume of exports of genuine neutral character from the United States to any neutral country,
>
> 2.) The proposed navicert system will not be used in any way to discriminate against the United States and United States exporters.
>
> 3.) The granting or rejection of a navicert shall be conditional upon circumstances related solely to the character of the goods and in no respect upon conditions related to American exporters or to the United States.
>
> 4.) Whenever applications for Navicerts are rejected a clear, concise statement of the reasons for such rejections should be given to the applicant for the navicert.[95]

Hickerson's much-qualified acceptance, if, indeed, it can be called that, all but abandoned the active American role in instituting a navicert system Secretary of State Hull had promised in September.

Apparently frustrated with Washington's waffling and back-

tracking, and believing that the sooner a mutually acceptable contraband control system was in place the better it would be for Anglo-American relations, Lord Lothian announced, on 20 November, Britain's decision to unilaterally establish a navicert system on a strictly voluntary basis as of 1 December.[96] Suspecting that there probably would be trouble ahead with the State Department over the matter,[97] Lothian began an active behind-the-scenes campaign aimed at establishing a contraband control base in Canadian waters -- out of the Neutrality Act's exclusionary zones -- and apparently began discussing the matter with the Foreign Office at least as early as the first week of December.[98] It is not, however, unreasonable to assume, given Hoyer Millar's discussion of the use of Halifax with Hickerson and Moffat on 8 November, that the matter may well have been bruited about in official channels at a much earlier date.

On 8 January 1940, Lothian informed Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles unofficially that London was working out a plan that would eliminate the use of Kirkwall as a site for inspecting American ships. Welles recorded that Lothian said that

> as a result of [the plan] ... the British Navy in the future would refrain from taking American merchant vessels into ports within the combat area [i.e., Zone I]. The Admiralty at first, he said, had intended to designate Halifax as the port to which American ships, the cargoes of which the British desired to inspect, would be taken, but in as much as Halifax was within the combat area, the Admiralty was now settling upon either St. John's, Newfoundland or another port the name of which the Ambassador thought was Yarmouth and which he believed was in New Brunswick. The Ambassador said that navicerted ships would of course be examined on the high seas and that only ships whose cargoes had not been navicerted would be taken for inspection to the two ports he had in mind.[99]

Four days later, Lothian told Welles that the Admiralty had

altered its opinion and now believed that St. John's, Newfoundland was -- because of difficult weather conditions and the need for merchantmen diverted by the Royal Navy to cross convoy routes -- an "inconvenient place" for the inspection of non-navicerted cargoes. The Royal Navy , Lothian continued, had now determined that Halifax would be much the best location for a contraband control base. Noting that London realized that Halifax was within the safety zone laid down by the Panama Declaration, Lothian also asked how Washington would react to its selection as a control station. Welles replied that he believed that his government would object to such a clearly "belligerent activity" in the Panama Zone, but would consult with the State Department's legal officers before giving a final answer.[100]

By 15 January negotiations between the British and Americans regarding the designation of a Canadian port as a contraband control station were deadlocked. On that date, Welles informed Lothian that he had discussed the possible use of Halifax with President Roosevelt and that he had been instructed to tell him that Washington

> could not even tacitly acquiesce in the taking of American ships to Halifax for inspection since Halifax was a port included within the zone laid down in the Declaration of Panama. The President requested me to add ... that if St. John's [Newfoundland] was the port selected by the British Admiralty, the Government of the United States would hold the British Government accountable for any damage that might be incurred by American vessels so diverted from their normal course through the dangers of icebergs or collisions in the fog which was so frequent in that region.[101]

Faced with the unacceptability of Halifax, and the dangers of Newfoundland's unpredictable coastal weather, London was forced to seek another suitable port in Canada. "The whole British

picture is getting unhappy," Assistant Under Secretary of State Adolph Berle wrote in his diary at the time. "We have protested the censorship of our mails, and their taking of our ships into British ports...."[102] Moreover, Ottawa was only just about to learn the depths to which it already had been involved in that unhappiness without its knowledge.

It apparently was during a mid-January, 1940 visit to Washington by O.D. Skelton to discuss the St. Lawrence Seaway and other war-related questions, that Lothian first officially broached the idea of locating a contraband control station in Canadian waters.[103] On 26 January, Skelton wrote to Christie that on his return from Washington he had questioned Sir Gerald Campbell, the British High Commissioner in Canada, about a contraband base as the result of Lothian's having mentioned the "possibility of contraband control being shifted to Canadian ports" during his recent visit. Campbell had replied that he expected London would soon ask Canada formally for permission to establish such a control base -- an answer that indicated that the High Commissioner also had been let in on the substance of the Anglo-American contraband control discussions well before Ottawa. Campbell also added that the idea of a base in Canadian territory was one that President Roosevelt "had given complete assent to." He also said that at the present moment the intention was to use a Canadian site only for the inspection of American ships -- previously established control bases presumably would be used for the ships of other neutrals -- and that they would only be diverted there if their cargoes had not been fully

navicerted before sailing. Skelton told Christie that he had informed the High Commissioner that the matter "certainly appeared a question that should have been taken up with us [Ottawa] before it was taken up with Washington." Skelton ended the interview with Campbell icily by saying that he was sure that the matter "would be given immediate consideration, but it was not possible for us to answer in a day a question which had apparently been under consideration in London and possibly between London and Washington for three weeks."[104]

In the same letter, Skelton directed Christie to call on the State Department and "informally, but officially" ascertain Washington's attitude toward the establishment of a contraband control base in Canada. On his 30 January visit, Christie told Adolph Berle that his government

> was not pleased at learning that the establishment of a contraband control station in Canada had been discussed for some time by the British government and mentioned informally to us [the United States] although the Canadian government had not been consulted until Lord Lothian threw it out casually.

Christie also told Berle that it was his "personal view" that Canada probably would not be eager "at having to assume the onus of that kind of station, which might affect the special friendship which existed between the United States and Canada." Berle acknowledged that the question had been "discussed occasionally" with the British for some time, but added that the State Department had not made a final decision regarding the official position of the United States.[105]

On the following day, 1 February, Campbell forwarded to Skelton a memorandum on the contraband control issue from the

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in which London sought to shift the blame for the tangled matter from Britain's shoulders to Washington's. "Our own view," Dominions Secretary Anthony Eden wrote to Mackenzie King, "is that the attitude toward the full navicerting of cargoes so far maintained by the United States authorities is really the source of the difficulties experienced by us and by them." A desire to save Ottawa from unnecesary involvement in a potentially nasty situation, Eden explained rather paternalistically, had been the sole reason behind "our reluctance" to broach the question officially with Canadian authorities at an earlier date. Fear of involving Ottawa "in questions which are the subject of active controversy between ourselves and the United States," Macdonald claimed, was the reason for London's silence.[106]

The memorandum then moved on to emphasize to Ottawa that "in the view of some neutrals including the United States the adoption of any practicable alternative methods [to diversion to Kirkwall] would be desirable." Eden then described what Lord Lothian had in fact been discussing with the State Department for some time past.

> The position has now been reached where we should be glad if the Canadian Government would consider the matter and let us have their views. The particular point on which we should be glad to have their observations is whether, as soon as our difference of opinion with the United States as to the examination of the mails has ceased to be an issue of real difficulty, the Canadian Government would be prepared to the establishment [sic] of a base for the examination of mails and passengers only at St.John, New Brunswick, subject to such conditions as they would consider suitable for its operation and control.
>
> The Canadian Government might also wish to consider whether such a base at St. John might not be conveniently

> used in connection with the examination for enemy exports for which it is hoped they will be prepared to provide ....[107]

Throughout the memorandum, Eden took great pains to try to convince Ottawa that Washington's objections to the search of its mails was the major obstacle to terminating the controversy over contraband control and the prime factor that had so far prevented "the operation of the navicert system which functioned with success during the last war."[108] Campbell followed up the less-than-truthful Dominion's Office memorandum on 5 February with a note saying that it would be "unfortunate" if Ottawa ruled out cargo inspections because this would give Washington only a choice between having US merchant ships diverted to Kirkwall and adopting a navicert system formally, a situation which might "have the worst possible effect on United States opinion."[109]

While he was being courted by Campbell and Eden, Skelton, on 5 February, was told by the Department's Legal Adviser John Read that he believed that the only Canadian port available for contraband control duties was St. John, New Brunswick. All other Canadian Atlantic ports, Read said, contravened the provisions of the United States' Neutrality Act of 1939 if American ships entered them voluntarily.[110] Skelton remained uncertain despite Read's legal opinion, and cabled Christie instructing him to again sound out the State Department on the idea of using a Canadian port for contraband control. Christie was told to explain to the Americans that Ottawa's sole object in sanctioning the establishment of such a station

> would be to contribute to the solution of the difficult questions that have arisen as the result of the diversion of

United States ships to Kirkwall or other ports where they are forbidden to go under the provisions of the Neutrality legislation.

It is desirable that the State Department should appreciate the reasons that might lead the Canadian authorities to consider such a course and also to ascertain whether the State Department are of the opinion that such a course might promise to be helpful in the solution of the general question.[111]

Christie called on Sumner Welles on 6 February and informed him that the Canadian Cabinet was considering London's request for the establishment of a contraband control station in Atlantic Canada. He also told Welles that "the Canadian Government itself had no interest in the matter and was not anxious itself to undertake any form of contraband inspection or control." Christie concluded by telling Welles that before Ottawa made a decision it "wanted to ascertain what the views of this [the United States] Government might be."[112]

Welles thanked Christie for his "friendly and courteous" message and recounted for him what had passed in conversation between Lord Lothian and the State Department on the contraband controversy, most of which he had taken part in.

I [Welles] said that the possibility of the utilization of a Canadian port for this purpose had been first broached to me by the British Ambassador some three or four weeks ago. Lord Lothian at that time told me that the British Government were concerned by reason of the protest made by the United States concerning the taking by British warships of American flag ships into the port of Kirkwall for examination inasmuch as that port is within the combat area laid down by the President in accordance with existing neutrality legislation and into which American flag ships were prohibited from entry. The British Ambassador had then said that the British Admiralty were considering requesting the Government of Canada to permit the use of either the ports of Halifax, St. John's, Newfoundland, or some port in Nova Scotia, the name of which Lord Lothian at that time did not recall. I said that I replied to the Ambassador stating that the use of the port of Halifax would be clearly

> objectionable to this Government inasmuch as Halifax lay within the restricted area laid down by the Declaration of Panama. With regard to the other two ports, I said that the utilization of either one of those ports would avoid the objection which this Government had legitimately raised against the utilization of British ports for inspection purposes inasamuch as the two Canadian ports referred to were not within the combat area. I had told the Ambassador, however, that if the British Government determined to use one of the Canadian ports for inspection control purposes, I should make it clear that this Government would reserve all rights accruing to it under international law.[113]

Welles also told Christie that the President had been informed of the plan and had only noted that Washington would reserve its rights to present claims against London for any "injury" resulting to American ships because of "weather conditions or because of any other mishap." Welles concluded by adding that Lothian had never mentioned St.John, New Brunswick only St. John's, Newfoundland.[114]

In his report of this conversation, Christie told Skelton that he believed that the general tone of Welles's response amounted to "an indirect answer in the affirmative." Christie said that Welles stressed, through his own words and his description of Roosevelt's reaction, that St. John's, Newfoundland would be of concern to the United States primarily because of naturally occurring hazards at sea and not because it was in a prohibited area. The important consideration for Washington, Christie said, was "the entering of prohibited areas" rather than ships being forced by the Royal Navy to call at belligerent ports. As long as American vessels cleared harbors in the United States bound for their final ports of destination, rather than a prohibited area or port, the President and the State Department would not object if they were diverted for cargo

inspection to areas permissible under the Neutrality Act and the Panama Declaration.[115]

In a separate letter to Skelton, Christie said that Washington's attitude was that "if the Admiralty was to establish such a base on this side it would be at their own risk," but that he understood that the United States Justice Department held that while American ships were legally forbidden to carry either passengers or cargo to St. John's Newfoundland, they could carry anything but the implements of war into the port of St. John, New Brunswick. In addition, Christie said that Lothian had told him that Churchill had given an assurance to Roosevelt that no further United States shipping would be diverted to Kirkwall "subject to a practicable alternative [i.e., navicerting and/or a Canadian contraband control base] being evolved."[116] Christie said that Lothian had passed this qualifier on to the State Department and that it appeared to him that Churchill's attempt to accommodate the American demands made a Canadian base all the more necessary.[117]

Christie also explained to Skelton that Lothian had told him that London continued to believe that full navicerting was the only way to wholly eliminate its contraband-control controversies with the United States. Lothian insisted that a Canadian base therefore was essential because "the preservation of the right to take them [American ships] into a control base was necessary in order to provide the inducement [for Washington] to accept full navicerting." Although admitting that the possibility of establishing a Canadian control station was being used by the

British as a lever to pressure Washington, Christie concluded his message without expressing his own displeasure over Lothian's conniving and by trying to soften Ottawa's resentment at being thrust unexpectedly into the middle of a set of acrimonious Anglo-American negotiations that were already in progress. "I should also mention," Christie wrote,

> ... that in the course of our conversation Mr. Welles went out of his way to say that at the outset Lord Lothian had made it plain to him that their tentative and informal discussions were subject to the position the Canadian Government might take. With both Mr. Welles and Lord Lothian I was able without difficulty to intimate the desirability of avoiding publicity while such matters were under discussion and undecided by all concerned, and both entirely agreed.[118]

Christie's stress on Ottawa's desire to avoid further publicizing the issue of establishing a contraband base almost certainly was due to the general election campaign that was then in progress. Prime Minister King had dissolved Parliament in late January after the Ontario government -- under Liberal Premier Mitchell Hepburn -- had passed a bipartisan resolution through the provincial legislature at Queen's Park censuring King's administration for its "inefficient" conduct of the Canadian war effort. King would eventually score a stunning electoral victory, but while the campaign was in progress he did not want to take the chance of letting the Tories exploit the contraband control episode and use it as evidence that Ottawa, by refusing to give London a free hand vis-a-vis a station, was doing less than everything it could to promote its own and its ally's war effort. Between dissolution and the vote on 26 March, therefore, Christie and Skelton made it clear to both American

and British officials that their government deemed it absolutely essential that no publicity be given the issue if Ottawa was expected to co-operate in establishing a base at a later date.[119]

Despite Christie's report, Skelton continued to be displeased with the position that Ottawa had been placed in by the schemes of London and Lothian. He told Sir Gerald Campbell on 12 February that Canada would co-operate regarding St. John, New Brunswick only in so far as mail and passengers were concerned and, to that extent, only after the controversy over the censorhip of mails "had ceased to be an issue of real difficulty" between Britain and the United States.[120] Skelton knew that this arrangement would not in anyway meet the objectives which the British had outlined for the station -- i.e., cargo inspection in lieu of American compliance with navicerting procedures -- but, besides his own disgruntlement, his subordinates were advising against Canada's taking any sort of lead or initiative in the affair. John Read wrote on 13 February that a Canadian-controlled base was "superficially" but not actually the best solution to the controversy. "The problem of economic warfare," Read said,

> involves diplomatic conflict with the neutral nations of the world. There is no diplomatic situation presenting more difficulty or danger.... In so far as Canada is concerned, we have no diplomatic missions in some of the most important neutral capitals. We could not take the lead in the conduct of economic warfare if we wanted to. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that we should not be placed in a position where we are taking the driver's seat in this matter.[121]

Therefore, Read wrote the following day, Ottawa must make sure "that the United Kingdom authorities will accept the entire

responsibility for compelling diversion of neutral ships and for the diplomatic defense of the diversion." Read argued that Canada's responsibilities should be limited to the efficient administration of the ships, passengers, cargoes, and mails diverted to its ports.[122] Skelton accepted Read's proposals and on 16 February sent Christie to make the same points to the State Department. According to Berle, Christie told him that the Canadian government had suggested to London "that the British admiralty had better take over the complete control of the station, rather than leaving it to Canadian authorities, so that disputes about the operation of the station might continue to be between the British government and our own [the United States]."[123]

For the next several weeks, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa and the Department of External Affairs continued to fence over the question of the base. Skelton continued to say that Ottawa would agree to establish a station at St. John, New Brunswick to examine passengers and mail -- with the possibility of cargo inspection at a later date -- if all Anglo-American disagreements were "resolved" and if London "would establish and control the operations of the base."[124] Campbell, on the other hand, urged Canada to become fully involved in the station's operations -- presumably including the Canadian navy's assistance in diverting American ships to the base -- and to allow for the expansion of the range of its activities to include the examination of cargoes. He also indicated that London continued to believe that an effective base in Canada would maintain

pressure on the American government to adopt full navicerting, which, Campbell added, was the only "satisfactory alternative" to the forced diversion of United States shipping.[125] Skelton kept Campbell at arm's length during this period apparently because he believed that the current shaky state of Anglo-American relations might deteriorate rapidly. He wanted to ensure -- by not antagonizing Washington through authorizing a base at a location it did not approve of -- that, if Anglo-American relations did indeed collapse, Canada's relations with the United States would not suffer a similar fate. "It would not, however, as you indicate," he wrote to Massey on 27 February,

> be safe to assume that the present extraordinary friendliness which on the whole marks the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom, will necessarily continue. If differences on economic and financial questions come to the fore and if at the same time there appears to be no likelihood of Allied defeat, the results on public opinion in both countries is likely to be bad.[126]

At this point, the issue of a Canadian control station became enmeshed in a broader set of contraband control discussions in Washington among the representatives of France, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. In a meeting of the representatives of the four countries on 13 March, F. Ashton-Gwatkin, head of the British delegation to the talks, again suggested that if Washington could not condone contraband control operations at Kirkwall the only suitable alternative control sites, in London's opinion, were at Gibraltar or in Canada. Berle said that the State Department would take note of the second suggested location, and James C. Dunn, the State Department's Legal Adviser, asked for details regarding the

possible use of a Canadian port. Dunn said that only one such port had been mentioned to date but he felt that others "might well come into the picture." Christie noted that the British government recently had asked his government's permission to establish a base at St. John, New Brunswick and Ottawa had replied that it would agree to such an arrangement if it "would contribute to a solution of some of the problems pending between the United States and Great Britain." Ashton-Gwatkin then negated what looked like a promising start by suggesting that mail could be removed from American ships at St. John and forwarded to England on the next fast British boat. Berle replied angrily that while a Canadian port might indeed improve the overall situation, Ashton-Gwatkin had "skipped a point," namely, that Washington was trying to avoid acquiscence in a system that would enable Britain to censor American mail. Hickerson buttressed the point by asking "whether the value of mail censorship to Great Britain was sufficient to offset tremendous neutral irritation." Ashton-Gwatkin then indicated that it was London's opinion that the value of the censoring operation was worth the risks it entailed and the meeting broke up without agreement.[127]

As the troubled discussions in Washington wore on, the British government continued to put pressure on Vincent Massey in London regarding the establishment of a contraband base. "The United Kingdom Government regard this [Ottawa's co-operation in contraband control]," Massey wrote on 20 March,

> as a very valuable contribution to a solution of the problems and desire me to express the hope that the Canadian

> authorities will be prepared to agree that their co-operation in this matter should now be represented to the United States Government. They would like to be in a position to inform the United States Government, conjointly with the Canadian Minister at Washington, that it now has been decided to establish the base for the inspection of outward and inward cargoes, also passengers and mail, indicating at the same time the location of the base and the probable date of its establishment.[128]

In addition, Massey said that London wanted Ottawa's "concurrence" for the "early despatch" of the HMS Vandyk to whichever port was decided on with "sufficient personnel to examine passengers and if necessary transfer mail." The British went on to reiterate to Massey their assertion that the lack of widespread and effective navicerting in the United States was still a problem, but that even if full navicerting procedures were implemented "the base will still probably be required for the inspection of ships' papers"[129] -- a direct contradiction of earlier assurances given by both Lothian and Campbell that effective navicerting would make such diversions unnecessary. Massey's cable clearly showed unabated British pressure and London's insensitivity to Canadian concerns about tampering with American mail. Most ominously, Massey's message indicated that even total United States compliance with London's wishes -- that is the establishment of an effective system of navicerting -- would not eliminate the need the British felt to physically inspect United States shipping, a position that would unavoidably rekindle Washington's ire.

In the meantime, Ashton-Gwatkin had journeyed to Ottawa to discuss the matter with Canadian officials. He reported to Hickerson on 22 March that King's government had ruled out the

use of St. John, New Brunswick and Halifax and Shelburne, Nova Scotia, but was actively considering the port of Sydney, Nova Scotia. The latter port, Ashton-Gwatkin noted, was north of the Panama Declaration's neutrality belt -- so as not to be objectionable to Washington on that score -- and had a good harbor and satisfactory facilities. Saying that he knew that the United States preferred St. John's, Newfoundland for similar reasons, Ashton-Gwatkin asked whether given Sydney's appropriate qualifications it "might be no more objectionable" than St. John's.[130]

On 30 March discussions among the United States, Britain, Canada, and France reopened with Ashton-Gwatkin stating that, in London's view, the matter was becoming rather "difficult and complicated." Hickerson responded by saying that Washington considered three ports -- St. John's, Newfoundland and Sydney and Louisburg, Nova Scotia -- as being "least objectionable," but worried that Sydney was ice-bound. Christie replied that Sydney was not technically ice-bound but rather was troubled from time to time by a certain amount of ice in the harbor which made navigation difficult. He added that when that situation actually occurred, the port of Louisburg, which was only about 25 miles to the south, could be used. Christie also said that in Ottawa's opinion St. John's and Sydney were the only real choices because the facilities at Louisburg were such as to make it suitable only as a subsidiary or alternate destination when Sydney was not clear of ice.[131]

Hickerson then said that the proposed base was being

referred to within the State Department as a "phantom control station" on the basis of the prevailing American belief that if the cargoes carried by American ships were covered almost entirely by navicerts there would be no need to take ships into whichever port was eventually chosen for inspection. In acquiescing to the establishment of such a base in Canada, Hickerson said, Washington believed "that in the overwhelming number of cases there would be no necessity to take vessels in and we have understood the British position to be that if the cargo was covered by navicerts ... the British would not want to take in every ship." N.M. Butler, the Counsellor at the British Embassy, responded -- again making a lie of the assurances given earlier to Ottawa and Christie by Campbell and Lothian -- that to the contrary the Royal Navy would want to take most ships in and check cargoes against navicerts and that the base "must be more than a phantom station." He then rather petuantly said that the "proposal to establish a contraband control base on this side had, after all, been made in deferrence to American law" and added that he hoped it would not be "necessary to raise the question of the neutrality belt." Before the discusssion could deteriorate any further, Ashton-Gwatkin stepped in and arranged an adjournment until he had a chance to visit Ottawa once again and gain further insights as to the Canadian government's wishes and desires.[132]

After the meeting, Christie reported to Ottawa that Washington regarded St. John's Newfoundland and Sydney, Nova Scotia "as [the] only ports of those so far mentioned that can be

considered, they being outside the Panama Zone." The State Department, he added, realized that American ships would have to be taken in by force to either port but that it did not view this as a vital point. The Department did, however, rule out the use of any of the other ports mentioned because "they do regard violation of [the] Panama Zone [as] out of the question ... and the President had definitely insisted that no violation of the Panama Zone could be considered." Christie said that despite Hickerson's firm words in this regard, the British had made a "strong plea" for either Halifax or Shelburne for safety reasons and had argued "than an extraneous question such as the Panama Zone be left out of consideration." "My own inclination," Christie concluded,

> would be not to press for a port in the Panama zone. However, if it is decided to approach the Secretary of State with this end in view, I think that the approach should be made by the British Ambassador on the grounds that the United Kingdom is taking the initiative and, as pointed out in your letters to [Sir Gerald] Campbell of February 5th and 26th, the Canadian Government is accepting the United Kingdom's proposal only on the assumption that they will contribute to the solution of the difficulties which have arisen between the United Kingdom and the United States.[133]

While one would have thought that Christie was preaching to the choir regarding a port in the Panama Zone, opinion in Ottawa was shifting in favor of the port of Shelburne, Nova Scotia. On 3 April, Rear Admiral P.W. Nelles, Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff, informed Prime Minister King that "from the seaman's point of view" neither St. Johns's, Newfoundland, nor Sydney nor Louisburg, Nova Scotia could be recommended. St. John's and Louisbourg were too small, according to Nelles, and Sydney was a defended port and an alternate convoy assembly point. In

addition, all three required the extensive diversion of apprehended vessels and the necessity of their transiting heavily travelled convoy lanes. In the Naval Staff's opinion, the two best ports for contraband control duty were Shelburne and Halifax. Nelles said that of the two Shelburne was the "most suitable" because Halifax was too busy as a naval base, a commercial port, and as a convoy assembly point.

> Shelburne, however, is at present used for nothing except a small local fishing industry. It is ideally situated and equipped for a Control Base. From the neutral vessels' point of view it possesses the advantage of requiring a minimum diversion from the regular trans-Atlantic route, and it is easy of access all the year round.
>
> Furthermore, a vessel clearing from Shelburne could shape a course which would take her parallel to and southward of the regular convoy route and no question of crossing crowded shipping lanes would be involved.[134]

On 4 April, Skelton summed up the entire contraband control matter for the Cabinet War Comittee noting that although Washington had objected to Shelburne, and had shown a willingness to accept tacitly Sydney, Louisburg, or St. John's, Ottawa had agreed to support London -- in part on the strength of Nelles' memorandum -- in an effort "to have the United States accept the Port of Shelburne as being the most suitable and convenient port available."[135]

On 5 April, Mackenzie King replied to the requests made in Massey's telegram of 20 March in a letter to the British High Commissioner in Ottawa. Campbell was informed that Ottawa had decided that for navigational reasons, and so as not to disrupt the operations of the Royal Canadian Navy, neither Sydney nor Loiusburg, Nova Scotia nor St John's, Newfoundland could be

used. Instead, King wrote, Washington should be asked to "reconsider Shelburne as the location of the base." Ottawa was satisfied that if American mail was transferred to British ships and inspected in Britain no problems would accrue to Canada. Finally, Campbell was instructed to tell his government not to dispatch personnel or ships until the port to be used was named and Washington's definite approval was secured.[136]

At the same time, Christie was told that Ottawa had decided in favor of co-operation with the British government on contraband control and believed that any port save Shelburne was eliminated by "overwhelming practical difficulties" and that therefore it was desirable that the United States "reconsider [the] question of [Shelburne's] theoretical conflict with the Panama line." In support of the decision, King asserted

> that even on a strict interpretation of the United States Neutrality Legislation, there would be no difficulty in a United States ship proceeding to a point within Canadian waters, but not in a Canadian port, and there be compelled to enter the Canadian port. (The element of force applied would be fictional rather than substantial).

Having said all of this, King was obviously not yet ready to support London without reservation in an attempt to persuade the United States into agreeing to accept Shelburne. "If the United States authorities maintain their objections to Shelburne, on political grounds," King cautioned Christie, "the question will have to be reconsidered further by the Government."[137]

Before the matter could come to a break point, however, Germany, as it had in 1917, stepped in and removed the vexatious question of Britain's economic blockade from the diplomatic agenda of the North Atlantic Triangle. Early on 9 April,

Christie told Ottawa that Berle had said that only Sydney was acceptable to the United States and "that if either of the first two [Shelburne or Halifax] were selected we could expect a formal protest." Berle added that so far as he could see the only way to get around the problem was to convince President Roosevelt to reconsider the position of the United States vis-a-vis the Panama Declaration or at least its application.[138]

Later the same day, however, Christie and Lothian met with Sumner Welles to discuss the repercussions of the German invasion of Norway which was then in progress. Lothian said that because of the invasion he believed that the question of establishing a contraband control base in Canada was now more or less a theoretical problem. Welles intimated that he concurred, adding that it was his impression that "it seemed highly probable that the President would have to modify the combat zone so as to include the entire Norwegian coast and that if this were done, it would be impossible for American ships to travel from the United States to Norwegian ports." Nevertheless, Welles closed the conversation in a manner that suggested that if the German invasion had not occurred the three countries would definitely have continued at loggerheads over the issue of a contraband control station. "I said, however," Welles's record of the conversation states,

> that, by instruction of the President, I wanted to make it clear to both the Ambassador and the Minister that in the event that a contraband control base were to be set up in some Canadian port, this Government would not agree to the selection of the port of shelter as proposed by the British and Canadian Governments since that port [Shelburne] lay within the restricted zone laid down by the Declaration of Panama, and that this Government, of course, could not

> acquiesce in any infringement of the terms of the Declaration. I stated further that the President wished me to say that any contraband control base should be to the north of Halifax and that consequently Sydney and Louisburg, Nova Scotia would seem to be the most desirable ports from every point of view. The Canadian Minister undertook some discussion as to the respective merits of various ports, but finally agreed that Sydney and Louisburg could be made practicable bases of contraband control. He said he would inform the Canadian Government of the statements I had made so that they might be fully aware of the point of view of this Government."[139]

The German invasion of Norway therefore rescued Ottawa, London, and Washington from a situation that would not have been easily resolved. For reasons of domestic political expediency -- that is to avoid giving the isolationists in Congress and the press an issue with which to flog them -- President Roosevelt and the State Department were determined to secure respect for and adherence to the Panama Declaration's safety belt and the Neutrality Act's exclusionary zones. London, on the other hand, appeared equally ready to ignore these considerations and press Washington -- and Ottawa -- for a control station within the Panama Zone. Both of these attitudes left Ottawa caught in the middle between its two essential associates. As matters worked out just prior to the invasion of Norway, Ottawa appeared to have decided to cast its lot with London and support Britain's demand for use of a port in the Panama Zone -- that is, Shelburne -- by pressing Washington toward that end.

In this case, however, appearances almost certainly are deceiving. By deciding to support London's plan to use Shelburne as a control station, King's government insured that it could not be hurt politically by charges from domestic Anglophiles that it was failing to support Britain; likewise, in such a circumstance

London could not complain of Canadian intransigence. At the same time, however, Ottawa knew that it was aligning itself with a plan that would never get off the ground -- Christie had told both King and Skelton repeatedly that neither Roosevelt nor the State Department would ever agree to a port that violated the Panama Declaration. In addition, because they had already judged all of Canada's other Atlantic ports unsuitable on the strength of the Naval Staff's memorandum, King and Skelton were putting London in a position of being forced to use St. John's, Newfoundland after Washington -- as they fully expected it to do -- scotched the Shelburne plan. The use of St. John's, because it was located in the crown colony of Newfoundland and not in Canada, would, of course, have eliminated Ottawa's dilemma over contraband control. Finally, by leaving it to Lothian and the British to push the scheme on the Americans -- as both Christie and Read had suggested -- King made sure that the brunt of Washington's anger would fall on London, thereby leaving Canadian-American relations relatively unscathed.

Fortunately for the wartime relations of the North Atlantic Triangle, this whole sorry and unnecessary melodrama was cut short before the final act came on stage. Ottawa, in the end, managed to string out the affair -- probably with no firm idea of how to resolve the problem, but with a solid determination to avoid involvement[140] -- and arrive at a strategy that would have most effectively limited the damage accruing to it as a result of establishing a base. Ironically, when the cavalry arrived to save the day it happened to be dressed in the field grey of the

Wehrmacht. Caught between Washington's legalisms and Roosevelt's domestic political requirements and penchant for mapmaking, on the one hand, and London's realism, predilection for imperiousness, and Lothian's plotting on the other, Ottawa was fortunate to escape with friends remaining on both sides of the Atlantic.

The contraband control episode shows graphically that although Christie was at the center of the negotiations he had relatively little influence on Ottawa's policy decisions. Indeed, his suggestion that Ottawa not support London in seeking Washington's approval for a Canadian port within the zone established by the Panama Declaration was ignored by Skelton and King, albeit because they probably were seeking to wreck the British plan rather than to facilitate it. The important point is that King and Skelton treated Christie in much the same way as they treated Canada's other diplomatic representatives, and that Christie apparently acquiesced in this method of procedure without complaint. In each of the three major diplomatic issues of his ministership -- contraband control, destroyers-for-bases, and Greenland -- Christie was circumspect in offering policy-oriented suggestions to Ottawa.

It seems probable that such a silence was difficult for him to maintain -- having been so long at the center of activity in Ottawa -- and that the contraband control question probably was particularly trying. Throughout the interwar period Christie had written repeatedly that Anglo-American cooperation in naval affairs was essential both as a means of promoting international

order and stability, and, more importantly, to avoid placing Canada in an untenable position between the two North Atlantic powers. "Personally," Christie wrote in 1924 and repeatedly thereafter, "I feel that the British bloackade should never be used without previous consultation with the U.S.A. -- the possibilities [for both Britain and Canada] are too serious."[141] Given this strong opinion, the fact that Christie maintained his silence during the contraband control controversy -- and never strayed from his instructions at any time during his tenure in Washington -- seems to speak volumes about his fundamental approval of the Skelton-King concept of the proper functions of the diplomat.

"It was over in about 15 minutes": Troubled Last Days

Despite beginning on the happy note of a new marriage -- Christie's first wife had died in November, 1939 -- the final months of Christie's life constituted a sad and controversial ending to his career. On 23 November 1940, Christie married Marian Turnbull, who had been in charge of the legation's social affairs.[142] Immediately after the ceremony the couple left for New York City for a honeymoon which Christie had expected to last for ten days or two weeks. In a note just prior to the wedding thanking the Prime Minister for his good wishes, Christie had remarked that he was very happy and that he was "looking forward to the future with a great sense of contentment and security."[143] Shortly after arriving in New York, however, Christie was stricken with a heart problem and entered the

Rockefeller Foundation Hospital for treatment. He remained there until his death on 8 April 1941.[144]

During his stay in the hospital Christie became, early in February, 1941, the target of bitter personal attacks by several Canadian newspapers which focused on his talents and the manner in which he had discharged his duties as Canada's minister in Washington. The harsh criticism of Christie was part of an on-going attack by the Conservatives and their supporters in the media against King's government for its refusal to undertake an extensive, high-profile publicity campaign in the United States to acquaint the American public with the magnitude and expense of the Canadian war effort. The Toronto Globe and Mail, the Ottawa Citizen, the Montreal Gazette, and the Financial Post all joined in a chorus of intense -- albeit wholly uninformed -- criticism and personal abuse of Christie.[145] The Montreal Gazette fired the most damning shot in the barrage early in February with a stinging attack on Christie's abilities and performance.

> Before the Government gives more of its attention to the proposed establishment of Canadian legations in South America -- at more expense to the taxpayer -- it should, with far more advantage to this country, consider and deal with the gravely unsatisfactory condition into which the important office at Washington has been allowed to fall. Loring Christie is the accredited Canadian Minister there, appointed to succeed the late Sir Herbert Marler, who had been a former federal minister and was in addition an experienced diplomat. Mr. Christie was taken out of a subordinate position in the Department of External Affairs and sent to the U.S. capital at a time when the responsibilities of office called for the selection of the ablest, most resourceful and tactful envoy that the Government could possibly have found. Those responsibilities have steadily increased in weight as the months have passed and they have not been discharged. The Christie administration has been negative and unproductive, the legation inactive and without influence; national and international issues of the most transcendant importance

> have been in weak hands and have been allowed to suffer, if they have not been wholly neglected.
>
> It is not enough to say that the Canadian Minister at Washington has done his best, if he has done that. It would be an acknowledgement of unfitness. It is fair to say that Mr. Christie's health has not been good, but physical indisposition cannot be accepted as an adequate explanation of a failure so complete. In any event, an incapacitated Minister should have been replaced, in his own interest as well as that of the Dominion, but the plain fact is that Mr. Christie has at no time measured up to the exacting position in which the Canadian Government placed him. His lack of qualifications for the office would have sufficiently detrimental under normal international conditions; it can be disastrous now. ...[146]

The editorial writers also claimed that it was particularly unfortunate that Christie "had none of the imagination of the Marquess of Lothian and did not shine in circles where it was essential that Canada should be represented by a man of great personal magnetism."[147] As a result of this failing, the Toronto Globe and Mail contended,

> there has been at this critical juncture a complete neglect of the very necessary task of giving to the great American public a clear picture of the role that Canada is playing in the present war. It is a role that is highly creditable, but, even before Mr. Christie was laid aside by his regrettable illness, no serious attempt was being made to illuminate the American mind about it. From this omission very serious consequences have followed.
>
> Editorials in leading American papers, upon which we have commented, suggest the widespread prevalance throughout the U.S. of the belief that Canada is making a relatively meagre contribution to the fight for freedom and democracy, and the question is being asked why the U.S. should be called upon to put her industrial and other resources at the disposal of Britain without stint when Canada, a partner nation of the British Commonwealth and an active belligerent, is not seriously straining herself in the common cause. ...[148]

The attacks on Christie in the press brought several other editorial writers to his defense across Canada. The Montreal Star, for example, contended that Christie "had the equipment of

wide experience with Sir Robert Borden at Versailles, Paris and London and also was in many missions to Washington. ... His qualifications are questioned by no one who really knows him."[149] Christie's appointment to Washington, the Ottawa Journal argued, was fully justified on the basis that he "had connections in Washington possessed perhaps by no other Canadian" and that the "newspapers criticizing Mr. Christie do not appear to be aware of these things."[150] Christie's longtime friend J.W. Dafoe published the stoutest defense of his performance as minister on the editorial page of the Winnipeg Free Press.

> That the relations between Canada and the United States since the breaking out of the war have been handled with quite exceptional efficiency is beyond question. The difficulties and complexities attending matters in which both countries have found themselves involved have been dealt with most effectively and with a minimum of formalism, red-tape and time wasting technique. This has been the result of close direct personal contacts between people in important positions who had long known one another and who trusted one another implicitly. The Canadian officials who served this country with consummate skill were Dr. O.D. Skelton, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Loring Christie, the Canadian Minister to Washington. But Dr. Skelton is dead and Mr. Christie's health is broken; and it is therefore necessary to make other arrangements. But whatever these may be, they will not be directed toward rescuing an impaired situation, but rather in the hope that the high standard of efficiency established by those upon whom the high responsibilities have hitherto rested will be maintained.
>
> It is scandalous that Canadian newspapers of rank should seek to disparage Mr. Christie by belittling references to him as an "obscure official" of the Department of External Affairs, and that sort of thing. If the history of Canada for the last twenty-five years is ever accurately written, Loring Christie's name will be bracketed with that of Sir Robert Borden as joint originators of policies that contributed powerfully to Canada's emergence into nationhood. When he went to Washington as Minister, he was not going into strange territory; but was returning to a field with which he became familiar by means of years of service in the United States Department of State (sic) in a position of responsibility with which he was entrusted

> despite his Canadian citizenship. Part of the equipment which he carried to Washington was personal acquaintance with American public officials of high position -- including one, Franklin D. Roosevelt.[151]

Mackenzie King apparently had been originally willing to bide his time and see how long Christie would be laid up, but was spurred into looking to make other arrangements for representation in Washington when the press attacks began in early February.[152] Although he strongly defended Christie's abilities and performance as minister in debate in the House of Commons on 17 February,[153] he and the Cabinet War Committee had already decided -- on 11 February -- to name Leighton McCarthy to take over Christie's duties in Washington.[154] Before announcing the new arrangements publicly, King sent H.L. Keenleyside to New York City to meet with Christie and discuss with him the need -- given his illness -- for other representation at Washington, and to offer him a lengthy leave of absence with pay and an appointment as minister to one of Canada's new legations in South America upon his return to health.[155] Keenleyside reported that Christie "greatly appreciated" King's "concern for his recovery" and that he "had been worrying about the Washington situation himself...."[156] Christie agreed, Keenleyside added, that new arrangements were needed at an early date in Washington and said that "he was very interested in being appointed to one of the new South American legations...."[157] With all of these arrangements completed Mackenzie King informed the House of Commons on 25 February 1941 that McCarthy would replace Christie at Washington,[158] and that Hume Wrong would accompany him and serve as senior counsellor at the legation.[159]

Christie was not recovering from his heart condition, however, and by the first week in April it had become apparent that his illness was terminal. He died early in the morning of 8 April with his wife, sister, and son at his side. Christie's death was noted in American newspapers in New York and Washington and, of course, in most major Canadian papers.[160] The New York Times, for example, described him as "one of Canada's chief authorities on international law" and as a diplomat who "exemplified in his career the closeness of American-Canadian relations....[161] His untimely death at 56 robs this country of a stalwart friend, Canada of an able spokesman."[162] The Montreal Gazette, hypocritically given its recent vitriolic attacks on his abilities and actions, praised him "as an exceedingly competent departmental official, with a profound knowledge of international law and an unusually broad experience in international affairs...."[163]

J.W. Dafoe predicted in the Winnipeg Free Press that Christie would be ranked -- along with Sir Robert Borden, O.D. Skelton, and Mackenzie King -- as a primary author of "the constitutional developments of the past twenty-five years which transformed the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations...."[164] Dafoe maintained that Christie would be remembered in particular for his contribution to the formulation of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917. "In the contribution made to this momentous development [the drafting of Resolution IX] by Canadians," Dafoe concluded, "Mr. Christie was second only to Sir Robert Borden himself. With this in mind, and

adding to it his other achievements, including the part he played in bringing about Anglo-Canadian-American understanding, out of which momentous policies of co-operation have arisen, Mr. Christie must be given a high and permanent place on the roll of Canadians who have given distinguished service to their country in these decades of trial, of development and of readjustment."[165] Finally, in Parliament Mackenzie King paid tribute to Christie as an individual who contributed greatly to the development of the Canadian diplomatic service and "whose premature passing will be felt as a great loss not only in Canada, but also in the United Kingdom and the United States."[166] "In the passing of Mr. Christie," King said, "Canada has lost an exceedingly able and devoted public servant whose influence made itself felt in the shaping of national affairs during two very critical phases of our history."[167]

Conclusion

Because it was marred by recurrent illness and media controversy, Christie's ministership provided a bittersweet counterpoint to what should have been the crowning glory of his life and career. Within the confines imposed on him by King and Skelton, Christie performed in a splendid manner, using his personal network of contacts in Washington to elicit an amount of quality information pertaining to Canadian interests that it seems unlikely any other individual could have matched. Nonetheless, the policy of limited involvement which he had championed between 1935 and the outbreak of war had been cast

aside, and in Washington he presided over the American end of a Canadian war effort that would be every bit as all encompassing as it had been during the Great War. At times during his ministership, as had been the case in the prewar years, Christie grew depressed with man's apparent inability to influence the course of human events. "The shadows of human tragedy lengthen and deepen and words grow dim," he wrote to Frankfurter on one occasion, and all one could do was accept "[t]he universal need of fortitude with which to face strange new worlds."[168] In another instance he reflected in a letter to Mackenzie King that "[e]vents are moving with appalling speed. It is hard to find words for them and one can only hang on in faith."[169]

The impression left of Christie in the final weeks of his life is that of a brilliant and decent, and yet a sad and melancholy man -- an individual of great talent and charm who perceived himself as having never quite realized his abilities and ambitions. The certain sense of pathos that surrounds Christie's last days and, indeed, much of his adulthood, is perhaps best caught in a passage of a letter written by Hume Wrong describing the simple memorial service for Christie at Arlington National Cemetery on the day after his death. "It is difficult to estimate how many [people] were there, but I should think that the total would be over two hundred," Wrong wrote.

> Among those I noted were Lord Halifax and the three Commonwealth Ministers, several other members of the Diplomatic Corps including the Belgian and Argentine Ambassadors and the Dutch Minister, Mr. [Henry] Stimson, several representatives of the State Department, Sir Gerald Campbell and perhaps a half dozen others from the British Embassy, Lady Lindsay, Mr. and Mrs. Frankfurter, Mr. Walter Lippmann, and, of course, the entire Legation staff was

present. The service was out of doors, on a perfect spring day. The prayers were read just inside the [receiving] vault by Msgr. Buckey, who married Loring and Marian. There was a great mass of flowers. It was over in about 15 minutes.[170]

Notes: Chapter VIII

1.) King underlined his distrust of diplomatic representatives and his determination to limit severely their ability to act independently of the government in a discussion with Roosevelt in the spring of 1940. "Told him [Roosevelt]," King recorded in his diary,

> "I personally felt that Legations and Embassies were not much to be relied on; that these men took themselves too seriously and often were little governments in themselves. I thought it was all wrong to have great international affairs settled by a few individuals; much better to have a more frequent exchange of views between leading members of government. [or] Individuals entrusted with a special message."

After such a lecture it seems unlikely that Roosevelt would have been prone to overrate Christie's influence upon the formulation of Canadian foreign policy.

Skelton too was anxious to limit the scope for independent initiative among Canada's diplomatic representatives. In addition to testifying to the restrictions placed on his own activities in London, for example, Vincent Massey implied in his memoirs that Skelton likewise restricted Christie in Washington. "I find myself in sympathy," Massey wrote, "with a remark that is quoted in my diary, made by Philip Lothian, while British Ambassador in Washington: 'Philip said apropos of his relations with Christie, his Canadian colleague, that they would be better if Skelton did not regard co-operation with anyone as a confession of inferiority." See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1940, p. 414, Entry for 23-24 April 1940, and Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue, op. cit., p. 134.

2.) PAC, MG 30 E163, Norman Robertson Papers, Volume 2, Folder: Personal Correspondence, 1939, Scott Macdonald to Norman Robertson, 18 December 1939.

3.) Pearson's 13 September 1939 diary entry is quoted in J.L. Granatstein. The Ottawa Men. op. cit., p.75. Pearson later expanded on this sense of surprise in his memoirs. "It was one thing to declare war." he wrote,

> "It was something else to decide how Canada would implement that declaration. Would the pattern of 1914 be followed? There were those in Ottawa who felt that it should not. One of them was Loring Christie, a man of great ability, deep sincerity, and considerable influence in the East Block. I knew his doubts about Canada's all out participation in the war. Therefore the fact that soon after its outbreak his appointment as Canadian Minister to Washington made me wonder what the government's policy would be, now that we were a full-fledged belligerent."

See Lester B. Pearson. Mike. Memoirs, Volume I: 1897-1948. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 140.

4.) J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 75.

5.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1963, File 853, O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Re: Canadian Legation, Washington, 4 September 1939.

6.) Ibid.

7.) Neither King nor Skelton brought up Riddell's part in the 1935 episode at this time, but their still smouldering animosity toward him was obvious. When describing the necessity for appointing a new minister in Washington, Skelton remarked that Riddell lacked "the necessary administrative capacity or qualities required to secure co-operation on the part of the United States authorities." King's opinion of Riddell was a bit more blunt and indicative of his residual anger.

> "I was a bit irritated and annoyed later in the evening when I read over letters that had come in through the day, to receive one by special delivery from Riddell asking that he should receive this appointment. The reason among others that we are making the appointment at once is Riddell's own incompetence at Washington and the need for getting him away from there at this time."

Earlier in 1939, King had written that "Riddell almost got Canada into the position of being responsible for a European war." See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1963, File 853, O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Canadian Legation in Washington, 9 September 1939, and Ibid., MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Entries for 14 September 1939 and 8 March 1939.

8.) O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Re: Canadian Legation, Washington, 4 September 1939, op. cit.

9.) Ibid., and O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Canadian Legation in Washington, 9 September 1939, op. cit.

10.) PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entries for 5, 14, and 15 September 1939. King apparently broached his concerns about the additional workload that would be placed on Skelton when he spoke with Christie on 14 September. In response, Christie said that "he would keep in touch with Dr. Skelton and, if necessary, would fly back from Washington at any time to lend a hand."

11.) Since the early 1920s, Mackenzie King had undergone a very considerable change of heart in regard to both Christie and Lothian. In 1922 King wrote, after lunching with Christie and

Lothian -- then still Philip Kerr -- that "the luncheon was a hurried affair as well. The truth is I feel that Kerr while a very able and fine looking fellow has that 'superior' outlook of some Englishmen, has been filled with prejudice against me, part of a 'sacred circle' to which Christie and some others who feel the Empire is their special preserve, belong and I am not comfortable and can [not] be myself in conversation with him." Christie was the first of the pair to return to King's good graces. As has been pointed out, some negotiations probably went on among Skelton, Christie, King, and R.B. Bennett in the late summer of 1935 in order to insure that Christie would be continued in his post in the Department of External Affairs should the Liberals be returned in the October general election. Presumably King would have issued no such assurance had he not been satisfied that Christie's imperialist inclinations had long since disappeared.

The point at which Lothian wandered back into King's affections is a bit more difficult to peg. One would suspect that Lothian's interwar desire to deal peacefully with Hitler and the Nazis appealed to King's own predilection for appeasement. For whatever reason, King apparently was delighted to see Lothian appointed as Britain's Ambassador to Washington in April, 1939. "Greatly pleased to see Lord Lothian has been appointed British Ambassador to the United States;...," King wrote in his diary, "Sent him a cable of congratulations and hearty endorsement of his appointment. I think it is really excellent." See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1922, Entry for 9 November 1922, and, Ibid, Volume 1939, Entry for 25 April 1939.

12.) Several examples should suffice to demonstrate the level and extent of Christie's contacts in Washington. In regard to the United States' State Department, with whose officials he would have to work on a day-to-day basis, Christie's appointment was most welcomed by John Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs and State's senior desk officer on Canadian affairs. "I have known Mr. Christie personally for a number of years," Hickerson told Cordell Hull at the time, "and have the highest personal regard for him." Hickerson later recalled, "I met Loring Christie soon after I was assigned to Ottawa in 1925. He had been a member of the professional staff of the Department of External Affairs but had resigned and gone back to what they now call the private sector. In 1939, he came to Washington as Canadian Minister. At that time I was the desk officer on Canadian affairs and I got to know him very well."

In regard to other influential figures, both inside and outside of the United States government, Joseph Alsop, long a leading syndicated columnist in the United States and the confidant of many in the Roosevelt administration, offers the following description of the circles to which Christie gained access following his arrival in Washington.

> "Loring was already a friend of Justice Frankfurter when he came to Washington. ...the Justice was one of the central figures in the most important group of that period,

the men who most strongly advocated dealing with the Nazis in the firmest possible manner. These were Jean Monnet, Harry Hopkins, Bob Lovett, Jim Forrestal, Dean Acheson, Bob Patterson, Jack McCloy, and Archie Macleish. I was lucky enough to have been accepted as a very junior member of the group too. Loring was almost instantly admitted as a full member of the group...."

Finally a quick look at Christie's outgoing correspondence in the period immediately after his arrival in Washington indicates that he wasted no time in putting his network of contacts into operation. He acted quickly, for example, to alert his longtime friend Walter Lippmann to the state of economic and political affairs in Canada by sending him a pamphlet on the political scene written by B.K. Sandwell, editor of Saturday Night, and arranging for him to receive the monthly economic surveys published by the Royal Bank, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the Bank of Montreal, and the Bank of Nova Scotia. Soon after his appointment, Christie deflected criticism of his reluctance to assume a greater public role as minister by polling several of his influential friends on the subject. Christie discussed the matter with Walter Lippmann, Associate Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, and Charles Eaton, the second ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, and reported to Skelton that their collective opinion was that he should not assume a more prominent public role. See USNA, Diplomatic Branch, State Department Papers, 701.4211/219, John Hickerson to Cordell Hull, 15 September 1939; John Hickerson to the author, 28 April 1981; Joseph Alsop to the author, 15 October 1979; Yale University Library, Walter Lippmann Papers, Box 61, Folder 434, Loring C. Christie to Walter Lippmann, 8 December 1939; and, PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 224971-224972, Loring C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 13 October 1939.

13.) Brian Allen Murphy. The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection. The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 207-209. Frankfurter, who had met Lothian at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and had corresponded with him during the interwar years in connection with Lothian's duties as an administrator of the Rhodes Trust, had wasted no time in attempting to gain Lothian's confidence. Shortly after the latter's appointment as British Ambassador in April, 1939, Frankfurter sent him a letter of congratulations in which he included some of his views regarding the conduct of British foreign policy. The Justice's letter elicited a long comment on the subject from Lothian which he ended by saying, "I shall greatly enjoy seeing more of you when I get to Washington." As Murphy correctly points out, Lothian did indeed see much of Frankfurter in the American capital. See Library of Congress, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Container 72, Lord Lothian to Felix Frankfurter, 10 May 1939.

14.) Brian Allen Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection.

The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices, op. cit., p. 209.

15.) Christie's friendship with Casey was a longstanding one. "The new Australian Minister has just arrived," Christie wrote to King early in 1940. "Casey and I were friends in London fifteen years ago and I am looking forward to renewing the friendship and working with him." It is interesting to note that Casey, too, recognized the value to his work in Washington of a close working relationship with Frankfurter. "I was fortunate," Casey recalled in his memoirs,

> "to meet Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court soon after I reached Washington, and he was to become a valued friend. Highly intelligent and well informed, a friend of President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, Dean Acheson and many others in high places, he was a goldmine for discussion of matters of consequence...."

See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 285, p. 241079, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 23 February 1940 and Richard G. Casey. Personal Experiences, 1939-1945. New York: David McKay, Inc., 1963, p. 51.

16.) On 5 September 1939, Christie was still, in fact, warning Skelton that London was seeking to manipulate and control the war efforts of the Dominions in much the same way as it had during the Great War.

> "(Dominions Secretary) Eden says 'It has been arranged that I shall have special access to the War Cabinet at all times, in order that I may be in a position to maintain contacts between it and the Dominion Governments.'
>
> This seems to indicate that he and they regard him as the representative of the Dominions.
>
> This was Walter Long's conception during the late war when he was Colonial Secretary. I think he made a claim to go into Lloyd George's War Cabinet as such in Dec./16.
>
> All the same things over again!
>
> This time the small War Cabinet has been set up at the outset instead of waiting two years. Will they, like Lloyd George, ask almost immediately for sessions of an 'Imperial War Cabinet'? His first Imperial War Cabinet, I think, met in Feb./17 or within two months of setting up his War Cabinet."

Professors John Munro and J.L. Granatstein have also pointed out that both Christie and King continued to hope for passive or limited Canadian involvement even after the war had broken out. Indeed, Granatstein claims that had the arrangements for the

British Commonwealth Air Training Program (BCATP) been announced before 10 October 1939, the BCATP rather than an expeditionary force might have been Canada's main contribution to the war effort. Such a development would have suited Christie perfectly, and, indeed, would have vindicated his prewar critique of Canadian defense policy. See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1946, File 775, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 5 September 1939; John Munro, "Loring Christie and Canadian External Relations, 1935-1939," Journal of Canadian Studies, VII, 2 (May, 1972), pp. 34-35; and, J.L. Granatstein. Canada's War. The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 42-50.

17.) PAC, MG 30 E148, John E. Read Papers, Volume 10, Transcript of Interview of John Read, no date. The worry Read attributes to members of King's government appears also to have been shared by John W. Dafoe who apparently was anxious over the appointment of Christie, whom he considered to be a strong isolationist, to the Washington post. Dafoe wrote, in late 1940, that initially he had been concerned about the pairing of two men he identified as isolationists -- Christie and Escott Reid -- in Washington "because their private views are closely akin to one another, and they both held attitudes in the period preceding the war which were exasperating to me."

Despite the concerns of Read and Dafoe, however, the one man who really counted -- Mackenzie King -- apparently was unworried over Christie's "private views." An indication of King's confidence in Christie lies in his reaction to a draft throne speech Christie had written before departing for Washington. "I went over the draft speech from the throne taking, as a basis, the one prepared by Christie, which I thought very good," King wrote on 5 September, "[c]arefully avoiding jingoist language, making clear the cause of the war and the policy of the Government to co-operate with Britain." King and Christie apparently were thinking very much along the same lines in the early days of the war. See John W. Dafoe to J.M. Macdonnell, 16 September 1940, quoted in J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 244, and, PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, File: September-December, p. 961, Entry for 5 September 1939.

18.) PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1937, Entry for 19 October 1937. Throughout the period between 1935 and 1939 King worried that Massey was trying to create a special niche for himself in the imperial scheme of things in London, particularly when he began to attend meetings of the Dominion high commissioners at the Dominions Office.

> "I spoke [in Council] about Massey attending meetings of High Commissioners but said that [it] was for purposes of becoming informed himself and getting atmosphere in which he could read despatches and be helpful in giving us added data, but we would not recognise anything that he might send as being from the British government specifically.... We

wanted these matters of State importance in despatches so no question could arise as to exactly what was meant.... Pointed out that Massey was not filling the role of a diplomat or a Minister Plenipotentiary in London. The King represented himself there."

Shortly after King had made this entry in his diary, Christie drafted a memorandum which showed that he and the prime minister were of one mind on the subject of "collective" meetings between the Dominion High Commissioners and the Dominions Secretary in London. After noting that such meetings had not been sanctioned by the proceedings of any of the Imperial Conferences or by the Canadian Parliament, Christie proceded to set out the potential dangers for Canada that he saw in the exercises.

"Assuming such collective meetings to be wholly informal as in recent years, the most important practical or technical objection repeatedly emphasized in the official correspondence on the question, is that the absence of carefully considered and agreed minutes or records of the proceedings involves the serious risk that what may be designed to provide merely 'supplementary information' and 'atmosphere' might actually in effect cause confusion or misunderstanding between the United Kingdom and Canada regarding some formal direct Government to Government communication and one party or the other might attempt to use such proceedings in some way to fortify some particular interpretation of such direct communication.

...[This might especially be the case since] this practice is to be brought into effect only at times of 'grave emergency'; that is to say, at the times when the two main dangers long cited against such meetings might be expected to be at their worst: the danger of compromising or confusing direct Government to Government communications, and the danger of misinterpretations or misunderstandings on the part of the public at home and abroad.

At the same time, it would remain that this new, special 'crisis' practice would have -- perhaps even in pronounced degree -- the characteristics noted above in considering the collective meeting device as a general practice in ordinary times; namely, that they cannot be expected to furnish the Government anything really significant beyond what arrives through the established channels, and that their practical effect must be to impair a High Commissioner's discharge of his official function and duty.

If, upon grounds not covered here, collective meetings are to be held, if the recent special 'crisis' practice is to be continued, it is submitted, in view of all the foregoing and in order to mitigate the dangers in some

degree, that some occasion should be taken to announce to Parliament that such meetings are not official, that they are purely informal and are held only for the convenience of the High Commissioners personally, that no record of them is kept, and that the Government receives no communication or report from them; while the High Commissioners should be definitely instructed to furnish no report of the proceedings of such meetings. At the same time, it would have to be realized, there would remain the impairment of the High Commissioner's real representative function and the injurious effect upon the national interest without any discoverable compensation."

In a covering note with the memorandum, Christie told Skelton that "the final paragraph sounds like a reductio ad absurdum; but, since I can discover no valid answer to it, I thought not to leave the matter without such a recommendation." Clearly, it did not take much encouragement for King and Christie to suspect that London was seeking to surreptitiously tie the Dominions into a common empire foreign policy. In this memorandum, Christie was, if anything, even more suspicious of London's intentions, and Masseys' susceptibility to imperial blandishments, than was King. See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entry for 24 March 1939; Ibid., RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1799, File 535, L.C. Christie, Collective Meetings of Dominion High Commissioners And British Ministers Between Imperial Conference Sessions, 25 April 1939; and, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 28 April 1939, op. cit.

19.) Christie did, it seems, find reason to think that British attitudes toward the United States would produce Anglo-American difficulties and, on several occasions, he exerted a sort of restraining influence on some of Lothian's activities in Washington. At this point two examples are relevant. In the first (a) Christie gives an indication that Britain's relations with the United States were destined to be troubled not only by the normal wartime difficulties between a belligerent and a neutral, but also by London's attitude -- which he contrasts with that of Canada -- toward the United States. Although Lothian had written to Lady Astor in the same period that Britain's relations with the Americans would be fine unless "they think we are ignoring them," Christie found that the British had forgotten the cardinal rule Lothian outlined and were acting in a rather imperious manner. In the second (b) J.W. Dafoe notes, with some disgust, the censoring role Christie had played effectively in regard to the preparation of Lothian's Pilgrim Dinner address in late 1939.

(a.) "I sometimes wonder also whether the directors of British policy, when they have to decide some line touching this country [the United States], really think of the United States as a 'Great Power.' In practical situations in foreign affairs a method or line of approach suitable or successful in dealings with 'Small or Lesser Powers' may not

be appropriate to the case of a 'Great Power.' A great many people in this country are now thoroughly aware that it is a 'Great Power,' that certain redistributions of power have taken place in our time. This is not perhaps often explicitly mentioned in connection with the relations now in question, but I do not think that this factor and the elements of 'prestige' and 'national honor' surrounding it can be wisely ignored.

Perhaps I may add this. It seems to me that it can be said on the facts that the Canadian Government, in considering specific war measures that might affect the United States, have adopted and pursued so far as practicable the course of talking them over informally with the United States authorities with the object of discovering what from both points of view might be the most suitable or least objectionable solution. I am convinced that this is a sound procedure."

(b.) "Saturday noon -- lunch with Christie and a talk that lasted all afternoon. Christie is going about his work in a cool headed and competent manner, keeping his social activities to a minimum and eschewing public speaking, of which Lothian is doing too much. He [Christie] told an extraordinary story of a paragraph in Lothian's Pilgrim address which was deleted at his request. I guess the British are hopeless in the matter of constitutional relationships."

See Lord Lothian to Lady Astor, 22 January 1940, quoted in J.R.M. Butler. Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, 1882-1940. London: Macmillan Company, Ltd., 1960, p.270; PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 285, pp. 241080-241084, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 23 February 1940; and, Ibid., MG 30 D45, John W. Dafoe Papers, Reel M-78, J.W. Dafoe to George Ferguson, 20 November 1939.

20.) While evidence from the pens of King and Skelton is scarce, there is a bit of evidence to suggest that certain prominent Canadian Tories viewed Christie's appointment in just this manner. "The greatest insult that has been levelled at England in recent years," R.B. Bennett wrote to Arthur Meighen in the fall of 1940,

"was the appointment of Christie to Washington. I had no idea that he had been so outspoken in his antagonism to the British people at the last Imperial Conference until I was informed by those who had been in contact with him. One of the Ministers told me how unfair they thought the appointment was, but the Governor General (Lord Tweedsmuir) told me in January that he thought Christie had improved, and that the violence of his opposition to Great Britain had to some extent subsided."

Meighen responded, in a rather repugnant fashion given the fact

that Christie's mind and pen had allowed him to win whatever standing he had as an imperial statesman, with an enthusiastic endorsement of Bennett's view.

> "I am in entire agreement with you as to Loring Christie. King has taken no step that illuminates more faithfully his own mind and heart as respects Great Britain than his appointment. It may be, as your informant in England suggested, that he has somewhat modified his aversion to things British. This applies to nearly all the parlour pinks and Professional critics throughout the Dominion. Nonetheless, his appointment was an affront to every lover of the Empire and to every faithful adherent to its cause."

The note sounded by King and Skelton in making Christie's appointment apparently was not missed by these two imperialists. See PAC, MG 26 I, Arthur Meighen Papers, Reel C-3587, pp. 136367-136368, R.B. Bennett to Arthur Meighen, October, 1940, and, Ibid., p. 136374, A. Meighen to R.B. Bennett, 22 November, 1940.

21.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1963, File 853, E.J. Tarr to O.D. Skelton, 2 October 1939.

22.) Ibid., O.D. Skelton to E.J. Tarr, 4 October 1936.

23.) Mr. J.W. Pickersgill has explained the basis for Christie's appointment in a manner that differs markedly from the one offered here. "Events in 1939 convinced us both [Pickersgill and Christie]," Pickersgill has written,

> "that public opinion and the predominant view in government and Parliament made neutrality for Canada politically impossible and the best Canada could hope for was to avoid becoming too deeply involved while the United States remained neutral. The course of the war in the spring and summer of 1940 and the military strength of Nazi Germany which both of us had failed to recognize before the war led us to realize that for Canada, U.S. participation as soon and as completely as possible was our highest national interest. It was, I believe, Skelton's and Mackenzie King's belief that Christie as Canadian representative in Washington could most effectively further that interest that led to his appointment. The fact that he was a lifelong friend of Lothian no doubt influenced the choice."

Although Mr. Pickersgill was on the scene in 1939, it hardly seems possible that King and Skelton sent Christie to meddle in the affairs of the United States in a manner that would tend to prompt its early entry into the war on Britain's side. It seems even more unlikely, given the history of his ideas and attitudes between 1935 and 1939, as well as his personal knowledge and experience of the United States, that Christie would have

accepted the post in Washington if it had been suggested that he perform in the manner described by Mr. Pickersgill.

Christie himself told Pickersgill that he thought that there was very little chance that Canada could play a major role in the direction of the war. "Practically speaking," he wrote Pickersgill in the spring of 1940, "I am afraid ... [that] a Canadian voice, decisive or otherwise, 'in the general conduct of the war, both strategy and tactics', is a will-o'-the-wisp." More specifically, he rejected a direct Canadian role in the area of trying to push the United States into offering balatant public support for Britain. In the summer of 1940, for example, he opposed a plan concocted by W.H. Herridge to send a high-powered Canadian trade mission to Washington -- led by Herridge himself -- to influence the opinion of the American government and public. "Believe me, dear Dr. Skelton," Herridge had written when broaching the plan to Skelton and Mackenzie King, "if this mission does its job aright the nation [the United States] will hurl itself into de facto belligerency in the most constructive and helpful meaning of that term. And this mission will come to be the outward and visible sign of Anglo-Saxon union...." "Personally I do not believe for a moment that the Administration here would accept the new [Herridge's] proposal," Christie wrote.

> "The objections which would be raised against it would be based both on principle and on political expediency, but it seems unnecessary to labour them here. Further, I believe that Canada would be in danger of straining her credit here and loosing the confidence of the Administration, the Congress, and the people....
>
> The part that Canada can successfully play between the Empire and the United States is, of course, a most interesting and important question. I think a good deal has been and can be done through personal and informal contacts of the kind with which we are familiar. But to go beyond that and venture into the field of formal definitive proposals of the kind in question is a very different thing. In such connections I sometimes think of the dictum -- I think it was Lord Salisbury's, the one time Foreign Secretary -- 'Never let your diplomacy outrun your resources.' And whatever the United States are going to do about the war, the leadership in that regard can only be their own leadership."

In sum, Christie was sent to Washington to protect Canada's interests there and that meant behaving in a manner that could in no way be interpreted by either the press or isolationist politicians as trying to push the United States into the war as Britain's ally. Perhaps Professor Lower hit closest to the reasoning behind sending Christie to Washington when he wrote to Christie, "It is indeed something saved from the wreck [caused by Canada's almost pro forma entry into the war] to have such a staunch Canadian as yourself as his country's representative in so important a post." One suspects that Lower's "staunch

Canadian" attribute struck very close to Skelton's reason for wanting Christie in Washington. See J.W. Pickersgill to the author, 26 December 1980; J.W. Pickersgill Papers, L.C. Christie to J.W. Pickersgill, 30 April 1940; PAC, MG 26 J4, Volume 400, File 73, p. C-281452, W.H. Herridge to O.D. Skelton, 8 June 1940; Ibid., pp. C-281462-C-281463, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 22 July 1940; and, Queen's University Archives, ARM Lower Papers, A.R.M. Lower to L.C. Christie, 21 September 1939.

24.) PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entries for 5 and 9 September 1939.

25.) Ibid., 11 September 1939.

26.) According to Arthur Meighen, Ottawa also received a great deal of support -- indeed coercion -- from the British government for Christie's nomination. "About that time the British Government wanted Lord Lothian to accept the British ambassadorship at Washington," Meighen wrote many years later.

> "At the Paris Peace Conference, Christie, as Secretary to Sir Robert Borden, got to know intimately Sir [sic] Philip Kerr, then Secretary to Lloyd George. Several years later Sir Philip became the eleventh Marquess of Lothian when a cousin died. Lord Lothian told the British P.M. he would accept the ambassadorship to the United States if the Canadian Government would send Christie to Washington as Canadian Ambassador [sic]. Strong insistent pressure from Downing Street forced King's hand and Christie was flabbergasted when King sent for him and frankly explained his predicament. Christie promptly accepted...."

Meighen's story is difficult to deal with. On the surface, its plausibility seems unlikely in the extreme. In the first place the timing is wrong since Lothian became British Ambassador in April, 1939, while Christie was not named minister until September. Moreover, it is hard to imagine any circumstance in which King would have acquiesced to "strong insistent pressure" from London which, in this case, would have amounted to the British government ordering the Prime Minister to make a major foreign policy decision along the lines it desired. On the other hand, Christie and Lothian did indeed share a very long and intimate friendship. Moreover, if there was indeed pressure from London to appoint Christie that began about the time of Lothian's appointment, some credence could be given to King's assertion -- see note 30 below -- that he and Skelton had discussed Christie's appointment for several months before deciding to make it. Finally, Meighen notes that this story was related to him in March 1953 by Miss Bessie Macgregor, who was a member of Canada's foreign service and the sister of Fred Macgregor. The latter Macgregor was one of King's principal private secretaries in 1939 and may well have been in a position to know the entire story surrounding Christie's appointment. On balance, Meighen's tale probably should be rejected, but not quite out of hand. See PAC,

MG 26 I, Arthur Meighen Papers, Reel C-3590, pp. 139758-139760, Arthur Meighen to Colonel Hugh Clark, 18 February 1955.

27.) PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entry for 15 September 1939. Howard Ferguson's name was always one which made King see red. At an earlier date King had written, "It is interesting that Howard Ferguson was more responsible for the difficulty between Italy and Britain over sanctions in Ethiopia than any other person. It shows were this country would be under Tory rule." Ibid., Entry for 8 March 1939.

28.) King apparently was also under some pressure from Liberal Party circles outside the government to appoint Toronto businessman, lawyer, and longtime party stalwart and contributor Leighton McCarthy to the Washington post. He may also have been under some pressure from Franklin Roosevelt toward the same end. On the day the Cabinet approved Christie's appointment, King wrote in his diary,

> "Leighton McCarthy was recommended for the appointment and might have done the job well but I think Christie will be better. I am a little afraid of men in these posts who are 'good fellows' in their way, having too much of a free hand in [the] matter of commitments involving heavy financial obligations."

Earlier, in the spring of 1935, King had expressed an even dimmer view of McCarthy. "I don't altogether care for McCarthy," King wrote after having lunch with him, "-- he is fond of wealth, a plutocrat in outlook, etc. -- with a happy manner, but he would like to hold others in his power and is selfish."

In regard to what appears to have been pressure from the White House in McCarthy's favor -- McCarthy was a personal friend of Roosevelt's and a patron of and an investor in the president's polio rehabilitation spa in Warm Springs, Georgia -- King was able to sidestep it in 1939. During Christie's terminal illness, and after designating McCarthy as the new minister, however, King told Roosevelt "I am glad that, at last, I was able to persuade our friend Leighton McCarthy to take on the mission at Washington which we both agree he was in a better position to fill than anyone else." Even more revealing of Roosevelt's wishes in regard to the Canadian ministership is a farewell note he sent to McCarthy on his leaving the post in December, 1944.

> "This is a little note carrying my affectionate regards at this Christmas season but it is more than that -- I need hardly tell you how horribly sorry I am that you are leaving Washington. It took me about eight years to get you there and now you are being forcibly removed, and I shall miss you a very great deal."

For Liberal Party pressures on King to appoint McCarthy and his own opinion of the would-be appointee see PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM

King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entry for 15 September 1939, and Ibid., Volume 1935, Entry for 31 May 1935. For the King-Roosevelt-McCarthy connection see Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary File, Container 35, File: Canada, 1941, W.L.M. King to Franklin Roosevelt, 8 March 1941, and Ibid., File: Canada, 1944-1945, Franklin Roosevelt to Leighton McCarthy, 28 December 1944.

29.) 15 September was a day of very hectic activity between Ottawa and Washington. After the Cabinet had approved the order-in-council appointing Christie, Skelton despatched Riddell to the State Department to request the president's immediate approval for the appointment. Riddell told Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, that the prime minister "for special reasons was anxious to make the anouncement with the least possible delay -- preferably this evening." Skelton followed up Riddell's effort with a long-distance telephone call to John Hickerson to again stress that King wanted Christie's acceptance expedited "in every possible way." Hickerson carried the message to Cordell Hull who immediately sought and received Roosevelt's approval. Christie's friendship with Hickerson may have paid dividends in speeding up American confirmation. With his note to Hull carrying Skelton's request, Hickerson told the Secretary that he had known Christie for a number of years and "I know of no reason why the President should not reply favorably to this request."

While all of this hurly-burly was in progess Christie was far away from the scene. In September, 1939 Ottawa was preparing to impose foreign exchange controls. On 13 September, J.L. Ralston, the Minister of Finanace, asked King to send Christie to brief United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau on the control program. King approved and Christie left Ottawa by train on 14 September, spoke with Morgenthau at his farm in Beacon, New York on 15 September, and was back in Ottawa the next day. In his report of the meeting, Christie wrote that it "may be noted that apart from its immediate purpose, the decision to send me on this visit may be regarded as a useful one from the point of view of the Legation's effectiveness in Washington. For Ottawa's request for quick American action on Christie's appointment see USNA, Diplomatic Branch, State Department Papers, 701.4211/219, Pirrepont Moffat, Memorandum of Conversation, 15 September 1939, and, John Hickerson to Cordell Hull 15 September 1939, op. cit. For Christie's journey to brief Morgenthau see PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 777, File 367, L.C. Christie, Foreign Exchange Control - Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Henry Morgenthau, 18 September 1939.

30.) There is little evidence -- see note 26 above -- available that indicates the idea of appointing Christie was anything but a fairly rapid and unanticipated development, occasioned more by Marler's illness, Riddell's ill-repute in Ottawa, and the emergency created by the outbreak of the war than anything else. On 14 September 1939, King wrote in his diary that he had told Christie that he and Skelton had been discussing the

appointment for some "months" and that they were both glad "that his services should be recognized in this way." To this point, no solid evidence has been found to corroborate King's assertion of several months discussion preceding the appointment. See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entry for 14 September 1939.

31.) Yale University Library, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Box 132, L.C. Christie to H.L. Stimson, 9 October 1939.

32.) J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., p. 75. Professor Lower has noted that in 1939 Christie believed that Canada was being led into all-out, 1914-type involvement in the coming war because the country's "managing minds are wholeheartedly imperialist." Both Christie and Skelton believed that a majority of the leading positions in business, finance, publishing, and the law were held by men who had come of age during the height of imperialist sentiment in Canada and that because these men had ready access to, and sometimes controlled, the media they would provide a powerful influence on public opinion in favor of unlimited Canadian participation in the next war. Queen's University Archives, ARM Lower Papers, A.R.M. Lower to L.C. Christie, 21 September 1939.

33.) C.A. Ritchie to the author, 24 April 1981.

34.) A.R.M. Lower to L.C. Christie, 21 September 1939, op. cit.

35.) King Diary, Entry for 14 September 1939, op. cit.

36.) PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, p. 224884, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 19 September 1939. This basically was the party line Christie adopted for all comers. He used virtually the identical paragraph in the text of a letter he wrote to Dafoe on the following day. See PAC, MG30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Reel M-78, L.C. Christie to J. W. Dafoe, 20 September 1939.

37.) As late as the winter of 1937 Christie was including some unflattering remarks about King in his personal correspondence.

> "I enjoyed that somewhat sensational G.R. Stevens effusion in the Yorkshire Post which you sent me and his picturesque sketch of Billy King ('As a politician he is the greatest inside three quarter of all time. He has perfect swerves, shifts, and hand-offs. In 25 years he has not advanced the ball a yard, but he does know how to hang on to it.') That is good abuse and it strikes the double note found in practically all comment about that statesman: the baffled, exasperated note of those who want to get their hooks on the ball with a note of their unwilling admiration for his skill in hanging on to it himself."

See L.C. Christie to L.B. Pearson, 1 December 1937, op. cit.

38.) Christie's cousin John Read, who held the post of Legal Adviser when Christie returned to the Department of External Affairs in September, 1935, has testified to Christie's frustrations in this regard. Read has explained that in the 1935-1939 period, Christie "was rather embittered because he had been the real founder of External Affairs and it hurt him to come into External Affairs (although he came in with his eyes open) as Counsellor to find out that he was junior to Dr. Skelton, junior to Beaudry, junior to myself. It was hard on him." See John Read Interview, no date, op. cit.

39.) L. C. Christie to H.L. Stimson, 9 October 1939, op. cit.

40.) Several other individuals also commented approvingly on the appointment of a professional from within Canada's foreign service. "I think the principle is a good one," wrote Arthur Lower, "and of course am no end pleased that the choice should fall on you: there could have been no happier selection, especially during these crucial days." In a letter to Skelton, E.J. Tarr remarked that the one thing "about the appointment that certainly pleased me is its recognition of a career diplomat." See ARM Lower to L.C. Christie, 21 September 1939, op. cit., and E.J. Tarr to O.D. Skelton, 2 October 1939, op. cit.

41.) The Financial Post, 23 September 1939, p. 6.

42.) PAC, MG 30 E44, L.C. Christie Papers, Volume 29, L.C. Christie to K.R. Wilson., 4 October 1939.

43.) In a letter to Skelton, Christie explained the "very private matter" which had caused his departure from the Department in 1923.

> "In the letter to Wilson I have mentioned a 'very private matter' which impelled me to get away in 1923. I do not remember if I ever mentioned this to you. The fact is that within only a short period of months before my resignation my father and mother had both died and I felt driven to get a long way away from the scene."

King's record of his conversation with Christie on 14 September 1939 seem to confirm the latter's assertions to Skelton.

> "Christie then said to me that, at that time [1923], he was hardly responsible for his actions. He had lost his mother and father within a year of each other, and was wanting to get away altogether for a time. I told him I had understood his feelings as I had gone through a similar bereavement with different members of the family. He spoke as though the frontiers of life had been taken away.

In the same diary entry, King describes the "very favourable suggestions" Christie had mentioned to Wilson. King wrote that

he had once "offered him [Christie] the position Dr. Skelton now holds."

> "He [Christie] said he would like to say to me in all honesty he thought that it was fortunate that he had not got the appointment offered, but that Skelton had secured it. He was sure that Skelton was better qualified in every way than himself, and that E.[xternal] A.[ffairs] was better advanced in consequence."

It must be noted, of course, that although all that Christie had said about his personal restlessness, desire to see Europe and make some money, and sense of loss and despair after his parents' death, is true, it is nonetheless also true -- as has been shown -- that there was no love lost between Christie and King in the 1921-1923 period. This last point, of course, would have been an impolitic one to make to the editor of the Financial Post. See Ibid., L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 4 October 1939, and, King Diary, Entry for 14 September 1939, op. cit.

44.) It appears that there was almost a last minute change of plans for Christie, an alteration that would have sent him to London to assist Vincent Massey. On 21 September 1939, King recorded in his diary:

> "Also spoke with S.[kelton] of possibility of sending Christie to London to help Massey, and getting some other person at Washington, this arising out of a very important despatch which came this afternoon and sent in while I was in Council. It spoke of the desirability of having a Canadian Minister in London; also of additional aides as representatives of the Defence services...."

King apparently wanted to send no additional representatives to London but presumably thought that if he was forced to do so Christie, given his strident anti-imperialist views, probably would be the best and safest candidate. The prime minister's overall reaction to the British proposal was that it was, at base, nothing more than an "attempt again to get a War Cabinet of some kind."

King's reluctance to send a Canadian Minister to London was reinforced by Skelton's negative reaction to the idea. Agreeing that if someone had to go Christie would be the best choice, Skelton urged King to hold off because "there were other alternative procedures possible re London." He also advised the prime minister:

> "If you happen to see Christie again before he leaves [for Washington], I venture to suggest saying nothing about the possibility of a transfer [to London]. It would be upsetting just when he was starting out on a difficult task with great enthusiasm and a determination to justify the confidence you have placed in him."

There is no evidence available suggesting that Christie ever learned of the possibility of a last-minute change of assignment. See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entry for 21 September 1939, and, Ibid., MG 26 J1, Volume 280, p.237164, O.D. Skelton to W.L.M. King, 22 September 1939.

45.) PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 224885-224886, Canadian Minister to the United States to Secretary of State for External Relations, No. 1786, 25 September 1939. After their initial meeting in London, Christie and Roosevelt had renewed their acquaintance at least twice during the interwar years, once when Christie guided Roosevelt, who was then governor of New York, through the Beauharnois power project and canal in 1931, and on a second occasion in December, 1935 when Christie represented Canada at a conference with the United States, Britain, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland in Washington on the subject of establishing trans-Atlantic air routes.

Two days after presenting his credentials, Christie, in a letter to Skelton, reemphasized the genuine warmth of Roosevelt's greeting, as well as the President's apparent inclination to be open to Canadian concerns.

> "At the end [of the conversation] the President said -- and repeated just as I took my leave -- that if ever at any time I wanted to see him I should come along. He said I should drive in the East Gate (which, he said, 'the journalists have not yet started picketing') and enter the Executive Office by the private door the President uses to and from the White House. This friendly offer is one which, I feel sure, I should take up only on special occasions and then only by asking for the appointment through Mr. Hull (which Lothian told me is his procedure as regards a like offer). Nevertheless, it is an intimation which the Government in Ottawa might wish to keep in mind."

It is also interesting to note that although Christie and Lothian were to be allowed the same privileged access to the President, at least one high-ranking American official believed that the Canadian representative could be spoken to more frankly than his British counterpart. "As I said in one of my despatches," Christie wrote in the fall of 1939,

> "Mr. [Cordell] Hull intimated that he and the Department would speak more freely to me than the representatives of other countries. After saying this, he added an explanation to the effect that he had difficulty in speaking freely to British representatives because of the Foreign Office practice of printing desptaches to and from each Mission and furnishing copies to other Missions. ..."

L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 5 December 1936, op. cit.; PAC, MG 26 J1, Volume 265, pp. 224891-224897, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 27 September 1939; and, Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King

Papers, Volume 405, Folder 93, p. 285087, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 10 November 1939.

46.) Montreal Standard, 23 September 1939.

47.) As evidenced by his diary entry, Mackenzie King was particulary anxious that Christie's plan to take living quarters outside the Leagtion not be allowed to proceed.

> "S. [kelton] ... will come back [from taking his daughter to college] via Washington taking up with Christie his plans regarding the Canadian Legation. Christie had thought of taking a flat for himself, and converting part of the Legation into offices. I told S. to insist very strongly, in fact rang him up a second time to speak of it, on Christie remaining in the Legation, making a part of it into a suite for himself, and giving over other parts for offices of possible special use but not to attempt securing a flat outside. This would make very difficult matters of communication and (create) great confusion."

It seems likely that Christie, in seeking to remove himself from the legation's premises, was trying to limit the number of occasions on which he would have to participate in the normal fuss and feathers of day-to-day diplomatic entertainment, as well as to provide additional working room. His abhorrence of such formal diplomatic activity is apparent in a note he sent to the Department shortly after arriving in Washington. "I have had some talk here [in Washington]," Christie wrote, "on the subject of diplomatic uniforms. I have none, and personally would devoutly hope that I should never suffer the experience of being poured into one. However, that may not altogether be for me to say." Having indicated his preference to avoid any occasion on which such dress would be required, he went on to ask about the Department's regulations regarding formal dress, its cost, and -- most importantly -- if the government paid for it. See PAC, MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1939, Entry for 21 September 1939, and, Ibid., RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 311-part 2, File 1184, L.C. Christie to K.A. McCloskey, 4 October 1939.

48.) Ibid., RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 793, File 454-III, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 4 October 1939.

49.) Ibid.

50.) Although Christie did not request an immediate expansion of his staff -- perhaps in part from fear of stoking Mackenzie King's suspicion that he was trying to create "a little government" of his own in Washington -- he did let Skelton know early on that some expansion would ultimately become necessary. As early as the fall of 1939, Christie told Skelton that the workload of the Legation was expanding rapidly, and that while he did not see an immediate need for additional staff, future

augmentation might be necessary and that "it does not seem to me inappropriate to give such an indication [now]...." "In this connection," Christie added,

> "I have been reflecting a little in recent weeks on the volume of work done by this Legation and how it compares with what the other Missions in Washington have to do. Of course, concrete analyses in this regard are not very practicable; but I would not be surprised to find that this Legation turns out more work than any other in Washington with the possible exception of the British Embassy. Mr. Mahoney, whose experience here has been so long, is inclined to think that this is not a wild estimate. Considering the proximity and the relationship of the two countries it would not seems altogether unnatural if this was so.
>
> I am not entirely sure that the British Embassy would turn out to be an exception...."

Christie's hint became a request in the summer of 1940 when he asked Skelton for another third secretary. "Christie has been asking for several months," Skelton told Mackenzie King, "for an additional Third Secretary to cope with the work there. He has been very reasonable about it, but has pointed out that the British Embassy has added about 80 people in the last year, and even South Africa, which has not one-quarter as much to do as we have, has added five or six." The new third secretary took up his position in October 1940. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 793, File 452, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 10 November 1939; Ibid., RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 311-part 2, File 1184, O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Third Secretary at Washington, 21 September 1940; and, Ibid., O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 27 September 1940.

51.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 793, File 454-III, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 7 October 1939.

52.) O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. Re: Canadian Legation, Washington, 4 September 1939, op. cit., and O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Canadian Legation in Washington, 9 September 1939, op. cit.

53.) PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 1996, File 1253-A-I, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton 10 November 1939. Christie and Escott Reid also discussed the way in which the American government decided on suitable personal qualifications for attaches and the manner in which they were appointed to its embassies with John Hickerson of the State Department and with various officials in the United States War Department. See Ibid., Canadian Minister in the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, No. 153, 28 November 1939, and, Ibid., L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 27 February 1940.

54.) Ibid., MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 225137-

225138, Canadian Minister in the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, No. 2252, 20 November 1939.

55.) Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 400, File 76, p. C-282060, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 26 July 1940.

56.) Ibid., RG 2 7C, Cabinet War Committee Records, Reel C-4356A, Cabinet War Committee, 25th Meeting, 26 July 1940. It seems likely that some indirect pressure from President Roosevelt may also have prompted Mackenzie King into announcing the decision to appoint service attaches at this time. On 29 July, after the Cabinet War Committee had sanctioned the appointment of attaches in principle but before the timing of an official announcement had been decided on, Christie had an interview with Roosevelt during which the president stressed the importance he placed on early General Staff discussions between the United States and Canada regarding common North American defense problems, particularly those relating to the Atlantic coast. "With this point [regarding staff talks]," Christie reported, "he [Roosevelt] definitely linked the fact that the United States Government were about to send a Naval Attache to their Legation in Ottawa." With nearly lightning speed, Skelton shot back a reply on the same day explaining the he, King, and the Minister of National Defense had decided "that additional Canadian representation [in the form of service attaches] would be very useful." As the Cabinet's decision in favor of attaches had already been made it would be inaccurate to say that Roosevelt prompted the positive decision. Nonetheless, it may well be that Roosevelt's personal interest in the subject as explained by Christie prompted King to make an official announcement of the appointments sooner than he had intended. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 781, Folder 394, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 29 July 1940, and, Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 400, File 76, C-282059, O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 29 July 1940.

57.) Stanley N. Dziuban. Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959, pp. 71-72.

58.) O.D. Skelton to L.C. Christie, 29 July 1940, op. cit.

59.) Christie believed that one other addition, albeit an unofficial one, might profitably be made to the roster of Canadian representatives in Washington, namely a resident correspondent of a Canadian press agency who would provide continuing reporting on affairs in the American capital. From such a position, Christie argued the reporter would be able to begin educating the Canadian public as to how the American government and political system operated, and might also be able to provide the Legation with valuable information. "Before I leave [for Washington]," he wrote to J.W. Dafoe in mid-September, 1939,

"I should like to put a practical point to you. I wonder if

the Canadian press are thinking of sending a resident correspondent to Washington to be stationed there permanently. I should think it would be of great value to Canada. I feel certain it would be of great value to myself and the Legation in many ways. For example he would have access to the press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and would be thus able to give me a quick tip which might sometimes be useful. I should value the benefit of his observations on many things. ..."

Christie further developed this argument a month later when the Canadian Press recalled the correspondent it had sent to Washington to cover the debate in Congress over neutrality legislation. "I do not believe that this experiment," Christie argued,

"was enough on which to base a decision that the C.[anadian] P.[ress] representative here is of no special value to Canada. A decision taken on such a basis would, in my view, show a bad lack of understanding of the position here. It would show a misunderstanding of the government machinery here and the way it operates. [The Canadian Press representative's] instructions were to follow the neutrality debate. He could scarcely leave the Senate Press Gallery. He was, I understand, unable to attend the press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State, except perhaps once or twice. Equally important he was unable to get around Washington and find out anything about the activities of the multitude of Government Departments, Boards, Administrations, etc. which inhabit this town and which, to anyone familiar with the United States system, must be regarded as being fully as significant as the co-ordinated legislative arm of the government.

I do not believe this question could ever be tested unless the C.P. should send a representative to be resident here (with necesaary assistance) for a period which would enable him to become familiar with the whole of the U.S. Government and make the necessary contacts and acquaintances. If he could do that I am convinced that he would frequently turn up material of importance to the Canadian public which the A.[ssociated] P.[ress] are bound to overlook simply because they are not Canadians and have not the Canadian position in their bones. The A.P. men recognize this quite frankly. Hadley, a U.S. newspaperman who also sends a weekly despatch to the Montreal Star, tells me the same thing. He occasionally asks me if I can help him get the Canadian background so that he can send more acceptable material. But of course neither he nor I can give much time to such a process of education."

See PAC, MG 30 D45, J.W. Dafoe Papers, Reel M-78, L.C. Christie to J.W. Dafoe, 20 September 1939, and, Ibid., RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 748, File 172-(J-U-136), L.C. Christie to O.D.

Skelton, 21 October 1939.

60.) USNA, Diplomatic Branch, John Hickerson Papers, John Hickerson to L.C. Christie, 13 January 1941.

61.) See in this regard the relevant sections of David Reynolds. The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941. A Study in Competitive Co-operation. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, and especially the same author's quite laudatory Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1983. For a partial corrective to Reynolds's too-positive assessment of Lothian see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Inestimable Advantage of Not Being English: Lord Lothian's America Ambassadorship, 1939-1940," Scottish Historical Review, LXIII, 1, No. 175: April, 1984, pp. 110-114.

62.) Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Inestimable Advantage of Not Being English: Lord Lothian's American Ambassadorship, 1939-1940," op. cit., p. 110.

63.) PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 224891-224897, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 27 September 1939.

64.) Ibid.,

65.) Sir John Wheeler-Bennett. Special Relationships. America in Peace and War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975, p. 72. Validating Wheeler-Bennett's recollections -- and also demonstrating the importance of personal contacts in Washington -- was a report that Christie sent to Ottawa describing American attitudes in the period discussed by Lothian's lieutenant. In relating a conversation he had just had with Felix Frankfurter -- who for security reasons he identifies as "X" -- Christie emphasizes the dissatisfaction in high levels of the United States government with British blockade practices. "X's sympathy with the Allied cause and with Canada and his keenness about good British-American relations are of longstanding," Christie wrote.

> "He is a good deal disturbed by the effect upon those relations of some of the recent incidents arising from the British blockade, contraband control, and economic measures. He believes there is a growing irritation among a good many important Administration officials, Senators and Congressmen. It is not ordinarily shown publicly, but it is pressed upon the President and Secretary of State. While the sympathies and dispositon of both these men to understand and make every practicable allowance are clear enough, yet the constant unloading of complaints upon them from official congressional and business quarters puts them in a difficult position and may have unfortunate consequences.
>
> (I may interpolate here that, independently of X's information, I have myself become aware in various ways of

the irritations, and even resentments, to which he refers.)

> X puts the matter broadly in the following sense. In the recent technical and legalistic polemics the right may be on the one side or the other. But that is beside the point. Practically it is a British need not to lose or impair more than necessary the existing sympathy in this country, and the chances of getting indirect assistance and favours in various ways. The principle that war and belligerent operations have their hard necessities must of course be admitted. But every practical method raises questions of expediency, method, judgment, the weighing of gains against losses. The actual facts have to be faced and carefully considered. ...

PAC, MG 26 J1, Volume 285, pp. 241080-241081, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 23 February 1940.

66.) Ibid., and L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 23 February 1940, op. cit., p. 241084. The validity and salience of Christie's point here had been foreshadowed ten months earlier in a letter from Walter Lippmann to Lothian during the Congressional debate over the question of amending the neutrality legisaltion of 1937 to allow the export of arms to belligerent nations on a "cash and carry" basis. "Our main concern at the moment," Lippmann warned Lothian,

> "is that the impending hearings and debate on the American neutrality law will cause great confusion in world opinion, both in discouraging your government and encouraging Hitler to take great risks. I am unable to guess how the issue will be decided in Congress this spring but of one thing I am certain, -- the more it appears that the coalition [Britain and France] which you are organizing depends on American support, the stronger will be the isolationist forces in this country. You will understand because you know America that if it is made to appear that the coalition is depending ultimately on America, people here will turn away from it, whereas if it appears that the coalition is strong and determined in its own right, the chances of our helping by measures short of war could be greatly improved.
>
> From every point of view it seems to me important that the British and French should take the attitude that they are doing what they are doing for their own reasons, and will do it whether or not they obtain more or less assistance from the United States."

See Walter Lippmann to Lord Lothian, 5 April 1939 in John Morton Blum, (ed.). Public Philosopher. Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann. New York: Ticknor and Field, 1985, pp. 377-378.

67.) David Reynolds. The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941. A Study in Competitive Co-operation., op.

cit., pp. 46-47.

68.) By 1939, King, Skelton, and Christie had grown quite weary and wary of those of His Majesty's representatives who took it upon themselves to discuss publicly the foreign policy of the country to which they were accredited. A case in point was the anger that was aroused in official Ottawa by Canadian Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir's -- the mystery novelist and former member of Milner's "kindergarden" John Buchan -- predilection for discussing Canada's external policy in his public speeches during the immediate prewar years. "A good many people," Christie wrote acidly to Lester Pearson in 1937,

> "are beginning to get fed up with our extremely articulate Governor General. It's hard to open a paper any day without being confronted with some damn speech or other to some women's, boy's, or girl's club of some kind. The Ottawa Journal people tell me there's never been such organised press-agentry at Rideau Hall in history. I'm told that [former Conservative Prime Minister] R.[ichard] B.[ennett] is going to open up on him in the House about a speech in Montreal re foreign policy. [Conservative Member of Parliament C.H.] Cahan has already written and published a letter about it and I suppose will say some thing in the House. There's a story that the Gov't did not know of Tweedsmuir's invitation to Cordell Hull to visit him until they read it in the papers, though that's hard to believe. To a friend of mine who saw him shortly after his visit to Washington he spoke of having sent off a memorandum to Roosevelt. Obviously he sees himself as a Pro-Consul in the grand manner. The royalties [of Buchan's novels] are doing pretty well to."

Canadian officialdom apparently had been able to prepare to cope with Lothian's meddling by dealing with the similiar activities of Buchan before the war. By the time he got to Washington, therefore, Christie was well aware of the difficulties resulting from such public activities. See L.C. Christie to Lester B. Pearson, 1 December 1937, op. cit.

69.) As early as 1920, Christie had expressed his opposition to any official efforts by the Canadian government to conduct propaganda activities in the United States. "It should be borne in mind that the Americans are particularly sensitive to anything that might be described as foreign propoganda. ...," Christie told Prime Minister Meighen in a memorandum discussing the future of the Canadian Information Bureau in New York City. "In any case, it is very inappropriate that the Department of External Affairs, which is primarily responsible for the conduct of our foreign relations, should be directly engaged in conducting a news service in a foreign country, and I would recommend that this part of the work as at present conducted be abolished."

Christie's opinions in this regard did not change over the

course of the next nineteen years and one of his first despatches from Washington drew Ottawa's attention to the dangers he perceived of conducting official propaganda activities in the United States.

> "(8.) Undoubtedly the people in this country also resent the plans they feel certain belligerent governments have adopted to arouse their sympathies by propaganda activities. A number of people feel, as Colonel Lindbergh put it:
>
> > 'If our people know the truth, if they are fully and accurately informed, if they are not misled by propaganda, this country is not likely to enter the war now going on in Europe.'
>
> (9.) The feeling that the United States is going to be 'propagandized' into taking part in a war in which its own interests are not involved was expressed by a number of speakers during the last session of Congress. They drew attention to the book published in England recently 'Propaganda in the Next War' by Sidney Rogerson. The statement was made in Congress that the British Government has suppressed the book because they realised that the effect of their propaganda activities in the United States in the next war would be greatly weakened if the United States knew in advance of the plans the British Government had for 'dragging them in'. ...
>
> (10.) A substantial part of the United States public appears to feel certain that the United States is being deluged with foreign propaganda; it resents this propaganda; it fears its results. To protect the United States public against propaganda the Congress probably will subject foreign war propaganda to continuous investigation by two congressional committees. In addition a number of unofficial committees will be publishing periodic studies on the subject. For this reason it would appear to me highly desirable that the Ministries of Information and other similar organizations of the Allied Governments lean over backwards in their efforts not to arouse resentment in this country against what might be called by their suspicious critics their propaganda activities."

Although Christie regarded Lindbergh as "a case for a psychiatrist" -- Lindbergh was then asking American newspaper readers if Canadians "had the right to draw this hemisphere into a European war simply because they prefer the Crown of England to American independence?" -- he considered valid the Colonel's assertions in the matter of the intense resentment the American public felt toward foreign propaganda. In regard to such activity on the part of the Canadian government Christie argued strenuously against it. "So far as the Legation is concerned," he told Skelton in the summer of 1940,

"it seems to me all right that we should continue the practice of issuing public statements on specific matters whenever this is necessary to deny or counteract statements appearing from other quarters. But I still remain of the opinion that it would not be useful, and indeed would probably be harmful, for us to set up anything in the nature of a publicity organization attached to and working under the legation, either in Washington or in New York. For that matter I do not see the case for such a Canadian organization in this country independent of the Legation. I believe that in our own special circumstances we can in the end depend upon the Canadian case reaching the public in this country through the various publicity channels owned and operated by American citizens -- the newspaper press, the pictorial press, and motion pictures, the radio, and so on. It would be better I think, that Canadian publicity should not be intermingled with other 'Allied publicity'. ...

... I strongly believe that it is in the long run preferable that the diplomatic establishment should not be directly engaged in such activities. I believe that by refraining from such activity, the Legation and its members are greatly strengthened in the estimation of the State Department, the other Executive and Legislative branches here, and also in other quarters."

Christie suggested that the most that King's government should do "to dispel the ignorance in this country about the Canadian position and activities" was to assist in providing "better facilities for reporting from Canada by independent U.S. agencies through the medium of the U.S. press and through the medium of the news reels." Christie also thought that it would be "legitimate and useful" to make arrangements for Mackenzie King's speeches to the Canadian public to be carried over networks in the United States. Likewise, "it would be useful if some arrangement could be made whereby an independent U.S. commentator, such as Lowell Thomas, could broadcast periodically from Canadian soil some purely descriptive material." For the above see L.C. Christie, Report Upon the Canadian Bureau of Information, New York City, and the Canadian War Mission, 27 October 1920, op. cit., pp. 029858-029859; PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 224901-224904, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 1827, 30 September 1939; Ibid., p. 225013, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 2061, 28 October 1939; Ibid., RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 807, File 581, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 21 October 1939; Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 400, File 75, pp. C-282051- C -282052, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 27 July 1940; and, Ibid., MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, p. 224970, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 13 October 1939.

70.) PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 224971-224972, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 13 October 1939. Christie much preferred to accept invitations to speak privately before

small groups of influential individuals. After attending such a small function in New York City arranged by his former classmate at Harvard Law School and current Chairman of the Chase National Bank Winthrop Aldrich -- which included among its attendees John D. Rockefeller, Jr, Ogden Nash, President of the New York Herald Tribune, and about 35 of the leading members of the city's business and financial communities -- Christie told Skelton that he thought that this was the best path for him to pursue in informing Americans about Canada's war effort. "Mr. Aldrich has it in mind to arrange several other gatherings of this kind during the winter," he wrote,

> "to enable me to meet various representatives of business, journalism, etc. I feel that this will be useful. I also feel that it will be far more useful to take a little time away from the Legation for this kind of thing than for the opportunities to appear in public which arise simply because the officers of some society or other have a programme to fill up and look around for some figure to feed to their members. ..."

Implicit in this judgment is a criticism of Lothian's willingness to speak publicly on almost any occasion that presented itself. In regard to activities such as the Aldrich dinner King heartily approved, and he was especially pleased that the just-concluded event had included his old employer. "Never hesitate to seek Mr. Rockefeller's advice," the Prime Minister told Christie, "on any matter which you think it would be in Canada's interest to have a word with him. I can assure you that he would only be too ready to lend whatever good offices may be in his power toward anything which may serve to further friendly international relations." See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 225174-225175, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 22 December 1939, and, Ibid., pp. 225178-225179, W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, 13 January 1940.

71.) L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 13 October 1939, op. cit.

72.) Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Inestimable Advantage of Not Being English," op. cit., p. 109.

73.) See O.D. Skelton, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 7 August 1940 and L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 9 August 1940, in David R. Murray, (ed.). Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume VIII: 1939-1941, Part 2. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1976, Documents 73 and 74, p. 114. Christie also was approached by at least one prominent American and asked to attempt to persuade Mackenzie King to intervene with the President on the issue of supplying destroyers to Britain. In his memoirs, Dean Acheson recalls that he considered King to be the ideal candidate to intercede with Roosevelt on London's behalf and that he approached Christie with such a suggestion. "The next man to persuade was the President," Acheson recalled.

"Despite his [Roosevelt's] friendliness to me, the course demanded a more potent mediator and advocate. A forthcoming meeting at Ogdensburg, New York, between the President and the Prime Minister of Canada , Mr. William Lyon Mackenzie King, pointed to the man. Unsuccessfully I tackled Mr. Loring Christie, then Canadian Minister to the United States. Something of a Canadian nationalist he would not intervene. Standing discouraged and baffled in front of the Canadian Embassy on Massachusetts Avenue, I wondered what next; then, on an inspiration, took a taxi to the British Embassy. There, at least, one would not have to argue the need for action."

Although a pure speculation, it does seem possible that, given Acheson's prominent membership in the "Committee to Defend America by Helping the Allies," the close ties of the British Embassy to that organziation, and his personal friendship with top Lothian lieutenant Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Acheson's visit to Christie on the subject of the destroyers may have been prompted by the British Ambassador or someone close to him. In regard to the Roosevelt-King meeting at Ogdensburg, it appears that Christie had nothing at all to do with it and was -- like most everyone else in the Canadian government -- informed about the event after the fact. Later, in the fall of 1940, Christie had a hand in cobbling together a statement which met with Roosevelt's approval for King to use in the House of Commons in defense of the Ogdensburg Agreement. See Dean Acheson. Morning and Noon. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1965 pp. 223-224; Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation. My Years at the State Department. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969, p. 3; and, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationships. America in Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 89 and 93-94. For Christie's efforts regarding King's statement on the Ogdensburg Agreement see PAC, RG 25 B3, DEA Papers, Volume 2459, File C-10, L.C. Christie to General E.M. Watson. 9 November 1940, and, Ibid., L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 11 November 1940.

74.) PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 401, File 77, pp. C-282235-C-222837A, Lord Lothian to W.L.M. King, 12 August 1940.

75.) King Diary, Entry for 9 November 1922, op. cit.

76.) Ibid., MG 26 J13, WLM King Papers, King Diary, Volume 1940, pp. 778-iii-778-iv, W.L.M. King to Lord Lothian, 16 August 1940.

77.) Even before Lothian's prompting, the Canadians had informed the American authorities privately that Ottawa fully supported the destroyers-for-bases deal. Prime Minister King, in fact, had sent a personal message on the subject through Christie to Roosevelt. The Canadians recognized the severe problems that Roosevelt was having with American isolationists and anglophobes and they believed that private messages and assurances were as far as Ottawa should go in agitating the issue until Roosevelt himself had decided on the manner in which he wanted to

proceed. See PAC, RG 2 C7, Cabinet War Committee Records, Reel C-4653A, 28th Meeting, 13 August 1940, and, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 401, File 77, pp. C-282245-C-282248, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 16 August 1940.

78.) Ibid., MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 401, File 77, pp. C-282242-C-282244, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 14 August 1940. In addition to its overall negative tone, Christie's letter revealing the fact that Lothian had raised with Roosevelt the matter of a public statement by the Canadian Prime Minister -- giving the President the incorrect impression that Ottawa favored the plan -- before King had had an opportunity to reply to the Ambassador's letter must have caused the Canadians to again feel as though another effort was being made to manipulate their external policy.

79.) J.R.M. Butler. Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, 1882-1940., op. cit.

80.) PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 401, File 77, pp. C-282205-C-282206, W.L.M. King, Memoramdum: Kingsmere, Saturday, 13 July 1940.

81.) A "navicert" was in essence a commercial passport issued by the British mission in a neutral, exporting country certifying that a particular consignment contained no contraband material. Ships whose cargoes were covered by navicerts could expect to receive expeditious treatment from the Royal Navy's contraband control forces and in most cases not be diverted to a contraband control station. For a good discussion of navicerts see W.D. Medlicott. The Economic Blockade, Volume I. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office and Longmans, Green and Company, 1952, pp. 343-376, and James G. Eayrs. In Defence of Canada. Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op. cit., pp. 172-174.

82.) See Gaddis Smith, Britain's Clandestine Submarines, 1914-1915. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964, p. 139, and his "The Clandestine Submarines of 1914-1915: An Essay in the History of the North Atlantic Triangle," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1963, pp. 194-203. Smith's description of the submarine affair during the Great War serves not only as an accurate analogy to the manner in which London treated Canadian interests in the contraband control issue, but also in regard to British actions in the controversy over the protection of Greenland which occurred at the same time. After the Germans overran the Low Countries in the spring of 1940, London became concerned with protecting the cryolite mine at Ivigtut in Greenland from possible German control, cryolite being an essential ingredient in the production of aluminum. Fearing American objections -- based on the Monroe Doctrine -- to British forces' occupying part of Greenland, London tried to persuade Ottawa to serve as its surrogate and send a small armed force to provide for the defense of the area surrounding the mine. Another intention of the British proposal was, of course, to

focus Washington's wrath on Ottawa rather than London. The matter hung fire throughout the spring of 1940 with London pushing Ottawa to send a force to Greenland, Canadian Finance Minister J.L. Ralston -- whose consituency included individuals with a financial stake in the cryolite mine -- also arguing for a Canadian expedition, and Machenzie King resisting both in an effort to keep Canada-US relations on an even keel. The matter was finally settled during a private discussion between King and Roosevelt at the latter's retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia in April, 1940, where King assured the President that he intended to coordinate Canadian policy with the United States. Throughout the affair Christie played virtually no role except that of a message carrier. A great deal of material on the Greenland fracas is located in PAC, MG 26 J4, WLM King Papers, Volume 394, File 47, and the volume of Machenzie King's diary for 1940. For a quick, overall account of the episode see C.P. Stacey. Arms, Men and Government, The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1970, pp. 367-370. For a recent debate over the degree of "Canadian-American rivalry" over Greenland in 1940 see David G. Hagland, "'Plain Grand Imperialism on a Miniature Scale': Canadian-American Rivalry Over Greenland in 1940," The American Review of Canadian Studies, XI, 1, (Spring 1981), pp. 15-36, and the present author's critique thereof, Michael F. Scheuer, "On The Possibility That There May Be More To It Than That: Professor Hagland, the Documents on Canadian External Relations Series, and the Canadian-American Controversy Over Greenland in 1940," The American Review of Canadian Studies, XII, 3 (Fall, 1982), pp. 72-83. Professor Hagland's reply to my criticism is printed in Ibid., pp. 84-87.

83.) United States Government. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1939, Volume I: General. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1956, pp. 718-719, Cordell Hull, Memorandum of Conversation, 4 September 1939. (Hereafter FRUS, followed by the year, volume number and subject, page number, author, title of document, and date).

84.) Ibid., p. 719. For the importance that Secretary Hull placed on the quick establishment of a navicert system see Cordell Hull. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948, pp. 679-680.

85.) FRUS, 1939, Volume I, op. cit., pp. 725-726, Lord Lothian to Secretary of State Hull, 10 September 1939.

86.) Ibid., p.726.

87.) Ibid., p. 725. On 6 October Britain extended contraband control measures to include the inspection of mail bound for Germany. "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom find it necessary," the Foreign Office's Circular Note of that date stated, "owing to the state of war existing between this country and Germany, to examine certain seaborne mails on ships calling at, or diverted to, British ports in order to ascertain that they

do not contain articles of contraband or obnoxious documents." See United States Government. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1939. Volume II: General British Commonwealth and Europe. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1957, p. 266, Ambassador in Great Britain (Joseph Kennedy) to the Secretary of State, No. 1971, 7 October 1939. This message contains the text of the Foreign Office note.

88.) For the origins and intent of the Declaration of Panama see Thomas A. Bailey. A Diplomatic History of the American People, Ninth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974, pp. 686-688; Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan. Hitler Versus Roosevelt. The Undeclared Naval War. New York: The Free Press, 1979, pp. 38-40; and, Robert Dallek. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 205-206.

Soon after the Declaration of Panama was published, Christie underscored for Ottawa the point that Roosevelt and his administration were indeed very serious about the Declaration's intent. Roosevelt's seriousness about the Panama Zone, Christie wrote,"indicate[s] that the United States government has already taken certain diplomatic and other steps and may be contemplating further action with the object of keeping a zone surrounding the neutral nations of the America free from belligerent operations such as seizures, searches, and commerce raiding." See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, pp. 224912-224913, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 1888, 7 October 1939.

89.) The Neutrality Act of 1939 made the waters touching the Norwegian coast north of the port of Bergen a control zone from which American ships were excluded. This designation also put Britain's main contraband control base in the British Isles -- Kirkwall in Scotland -- off limits to American vessels. For a fuller discussion of the "danger zones" barred to United States shipping around the British Isles and Northwestern Europe that were established by the Neutrality Act of 1939 see Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, Hitler Versus Roosevelt. The Undeclared Naval War, op. cit., pp. 35-38.

90.) On 12 September 1939 officials of the State Department and the British Embassy met to review the use of the navicert system during the Great War and to explore the possibilities of reviving it for use in the current conflict. On 16 October, Sir Owen Chalkey, the British Embassy's Commercial Counsellor, told State Department officials that London had authorized the Embassy to begin making preliminary arrangements for reinstituting the navicert system. Thus, while some exploratory work had been done before the passage of the Neutrality Act on 4 November 1939 the navicert system was not in place when the Act became law. See W.D. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Volume I, op. cit., p.344 and FRUS, 1939, Volume I, op. cit., p. 761, Verbal Statement by the Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy, 16 October 1939.

91.) FRUS, 1939, Volume I, op. cit., pp. 770-771, Pierrepont Moffat, Memorandum of Conversation, 8 November 1939.

92.) Ibid.

93.) Ibid., p. 771. Apparently troubled by the American response, Lothian the next day delivered a formal note to the State Department in which the British Government announced that it would "formally reserve their rights to exercise their belligerent rights in respect of United States vessels" despite the regulations contained in Washington's new neutrality legislation. See Ibid., pp 774-775, Lord Lothian to Cordell Hull, 9 November 1939.

94.) W.D. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Volume I, op. cit., p. 351.

95.) FRUS, 1939, Volume I, op. cit., pp. 771-772, John Hickerson, Memorandum of Conversation, 9 November 1939. Hickerson himself apparently believed that the whole matter really had little to do with America's rights as a neutral or those of Britain as a belligerent. He wrote at the time "that it seemed to me to be a rather coldly practical matter which the British Government might well decide to meet in a practical way.... It seemed to me that they [the British] might wish to weigh the advantages and disadvantages and to consider whether there was enough actually to be gained from taking American vessels into the combat zone to offset the resulting unfavorable publicity in the United States, not to mention their increased liability should an American vessel entering or leaving Kirkwall be damaged." See Ibid., pp. 773-774.

96.) W.D. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Volume , op. cit., p. 345.

97.) According to Professor Medlicott, the United States Treasury and State Departments co-operated to put roadblocks in the way of establishing effective navicerting. On 2 December 1939, the Treasury Department reinstituted Section 36 of the Shipping Act of 1916 which gave the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to deny clearance to any vessel which he believed had refused to accept cargo for which it had room because that cargo had not been navicerted. After this measure was reactivated, American shipping lines could not refuse to carry unnavicerted cargo and, as a result, the possibility of a ship's carrying contraband remained open and made inspection by blockade forces on the high seas a necessity in British eyes. The administration's action probably was prompted by concern over commercial advantage accruing to British firms, anger over Britain's delay and censoring of American trans-Atlantic mail and cables, and fear of congressional criticism. The action underscores Roosevelt's justifiable reluctance to antagonize the isolationists in a flagrant manner. See W.D. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Volume I, op. cit, p. 346.

98.) Ibid., p.358. The Neutrality Act of 1939 defined the waters in and around the British Isles and the North and Baltic Seas as a combat zone -- termed Zone 1 by the Act -- and excluded from it, under all circumstances, ships of United States registry. The Act also established Zone 2 which was an area in which American ships were banned only from travelling to belligerent ports that happened to lie within the zone. Theoretically, therefore, Lothian and the British government believed that although Canada's Atlantic ports were indeed a belligerent's ports, the Royal Navy might legally compel United States merchantmen to enter there for inspection because (a) Zone 2 was not an area of absolute exclusion and (b) the ships, being forced to call there, would not be breaking United States law because they would not be entering voluntarily. In Zone 1, on the other hand, which included Kirkwall, the visit of an American ship was illegal whether or not it was made voluntarily.

99.) United States Government. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940. Vol. II: General and Europe. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1957, p. 4, Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, 8 January 1940. Throughout the affair, Lothian and the British displayed an almost unlimited ignorance of the geography of Canada's Atlantic coast. Lothian always appeared more interested in getting a base established on Canadian territory and much less so with its precise location. Yarmouth, of course, is in Nova Scotia.

100.) Ibid., p. 5, Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, 12 January 1940.

101.) Ibid., p. 6, Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Inspection of Amercian Vessels, 15 January 1940.

102.) FDR Library, A.A. Berle Papers, Berle Diary, Reel 2, Entry for 21 January 1940.

103.) Indeed, John Read, Legal Adviser in the Department of External Affairs, had been, as recently as late December, 1939, preparing instructions for all concerned Canadian officials indicating that "it is not intended [by London or Ottawa] that contraband control bases should be set up in Canada, whether on the Atlantic or Pacific coast." More interestingly perhaps, the fact that both Skelton and Christie learned of Lothian's plan to utilize a Canadian port as a British contraband control base only during Skelton's visit to Washington suggests that the British Ambassador was not at all bashful about discussing with the Americans matters touching directly on Canadian interests without consulting his longtime Canadian friend beforehand. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 821, File 695, John E. Read, Draft Instructions to His Majesty's Canadian Ships, To All Naval Stations, And To All Collectors of Customs, 27 December 1939.

104.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 821, File 695, OD

Skelton to L.C. Christie, 26 January 1940. Campbell did not miss the Canadian's ire and after their meeting reported to London that Skelton had been "hard to pacify. His resentment was all the stronger 'in that we were possibly handing Canada a hot potato to hold.'" Three days later Massey added to Skelton's anger by telling him that the London press was reporting that the British would soon establish a control base at St. John, New Brunswick. Massey said that he had contacted the Dominions Office and had been told that London would not consult Ottawa on the matter unless Washington responded favorably to the proposal. The Dominions Office had told Massey that Britain had no intention of concluding any formal arrangement with Washington until a London-Ottawa arrangement was reached and that London "had no illusions about the difficulties in reaching such an agreement" with the United States. The Dominions Office thus contradicted Campbell's response to Skelton assuring him of Washington's wholehearted willingness to co-operate. For the Skelton-Campbell conversation see James G. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament, op.cit., p. 174, and W.D. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Volume I, op. cit., p. 365. For Massey's further measure of bad tidings see PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 821, File 695, Vincent Massey to O.D. Skelton, 29 January 1940.

105.) FRUS, 1940, Vol. II, op. cit., pp 10-11, A.A. Berle, Memorandum of Conversation, 30 January 1940. In his diary entry for the same day Berle captured the crux of Ottawa's dilemma. "The Canadian Minister came in today," Berle wrote. "The British have been arranging to set up a contraband control station to enforce their blockade. They propose to do so in Halifax. They had not consulted the Canadians about it until Skelton came down from Canada in connection with the [St. Lawrence] Seaway, when Lord Lothian causally threw it out over the lunch table." See FDR Library, A.A. Berle Papers, Berle Diary, Reel 2, Entry for 30 January 1940.

106.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, Sir Gerald Campbell to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1 February 1940. This whole episode is, again, uncanny in its resemblence to the submarine affair of 1914-1915. Gaddis Smith has pointed out that only after the keels of the British submarines had been set down in the Vicker's shipyard in Montreal without Canadian authorities having been informed did London send "an apology for the exceptional circumstances which had prevented Ottawa from being properly informed." See Gaddis Smith, Britain's Clandestine Submarines, 1914-1915, op. cit., p. 101.

107.) Sir Gerald Campbell to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1 February 1940, op. cit.

108.) Ibid. Massey, the next day, seemed to buttress Eden's contention that London much preferred having an effective system of navicerting installed rather than involving Canada in the problem. Massey wrote that he understood that Lord Lothian had

told Hull on 30 January that "some alternative system of control must take the place of that at Kirkwall."

> "Mr. Hull did not object and mentioned the proposal which he thought had been made for utliizing St. John [New Brunswick] might not be easy; there would be difficulties about compelling American ships to go to a Canadian port. The best thing to do would be to introduce a system of navicerts for United States shipping."

Massey nevertheless noted that Lothian had told the Foreign Office that, if all of Washington's requirements could not be met, the British government "should appreciate American opinion on these matters and do what it could to make concessions to that opinion. If they could only agree on St. John as a Contraband Control Station that would be a help...." See PAC, RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Vol. 1943, File 739-G-1, Massey to King, No. A44, 2 February 1940.

109.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, Sir Gerald Campbell to W.L.M. King, 5 February 1940.

110.) Ibid., John Read, Re Contraband Control, 5 February 1940.

111.) Ibid., W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, No. 26, 5 February 1940.

112.) FRUS, 1940, Vol II, op. cit., Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, 6 February 1940, p. 14.

113.) Ibid., p. 15. The Nova Scotia port Lothian had in mind probably was either Louisbourg or Sydney.

114.) Ibid. The fact that Lothian apparently had not mentioned St. John, New Brunswick to the Americans while Eden was simultaneously telling Ottawa that it was the port London wanted as a control station is yet another indication of the confusion that was a dominant characteristic of all of these discussions. It also hints at the possibility that Lothian was pushing the issue on the Americans in directions -- i.e., ports other than St. John, New Brunswick -- that London did not know of and had not authorized. Quite simply, it seems that Lothian regarded the contraband control controversy as very much his own personal domain and was determined to bring it to a successful conclusion according to his own best lights. As was the case in the destroyers-for-bases deal, Lothian's free-lancing involved very little thought being given to Canada's sensibilities let alone its legitimate interests. It also indicates that he was willing to embarrass Christie if it suited his purposes, and suggests that the Ambassador realized that Christie would have nothing to do with activities that could in any way be interpreted as attempts to force Washington's hand.

115.) PAC, RG 25 D1, Vol. 821, File 695, L.C. Christie to W.L.M.

King, No. 34, 4 February 1940. An entry in Berle's Diary confirms Christie's suspiciion.

> "Another ruckus about the Neutrality Act: the proposal was made that any American ship that stops at a British control station has violated the law unless all of the goods on board have been sold to foreign buyers first. This means cash-and-carry for everybody, not merely for belligerents. Of course the fact is that no one calls at a contraband station voluntarily; they do it because otherwise a cruiser would pick them up. We settled it by arranging that the ships do not clear for control stations, but for their points of destination, and that they do not have to go into control stations until they are hailed there."

See FDR Library, A.A. Berle Papers, Berle Diary, Entry for 20 February 1940.

116.) PAC, RG 25 D1, Vol. 821, File 695, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 7 February 1940. For Churchill's promise not to bring American ships into the combat zones around the British Isles in return for navicerting and/or other effective contraband control measures see the two notes entitled "Personnel for the President from Naval Person" dated 29 and 30 January 1940 in FRUS, 1940, Volume II, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

117.) L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 34, 6 February 1940, op. cit.

118.) L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 7 February 1940, op. cit. Christie obviously was in a difficult position in trying to calm Skelton and King who it seemed were genetically prone at all times to suspect Lothian, and the British generally, of centralizing, imperialistic activities. At the same time, however, Christie's longtime friend was also fully capable of trying to force Ottawa's hand in the surreptitious manner that Skelton and King always suspected of him. In March, 1940, for example, Lothian attempted to persuade Berle to convince Christie to try to spur Ottawa into deciding in favor of Sydney, Nova Scotia. Berle, quite properly, told Lothian that Washington "could hardly be in the position of suggesting any course of action in connection with control stations to the Canadian government, or any other belligerent.... If there were to be a control station, presumably Sydney would be no worse than any other; but obviously we would not want to be in the position of suggesting it." See FRUS, 1940, Volume II, op. cit., pp. 85-86, A.A. Berle, Memorandum of Conversation, 26 March 1940.

119.) For an excellent analysis of the factors surrounding the election in 1940 and the campaign itself see J.L. Granatstein. Canada's War. The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 73-92. In this regard see also J.W. Pickersgill. The Mackenzie King Record, Volume I: 1939-1944. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960,

pp. 66-73. For the Canadian efforts to keep the contraband control issue under wraps during the election campaign see PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 821, File 695, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 7 February 1940; Ibid., O.D. Skelton to Sir Gerald Campbell, 26 February 1940; FRUS, 1940, Volume II, op. cit., pp. 28, Cordell Hull, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 February 1940; and, Ibid., p. 43, John Hickerson, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 March 1940.

120.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, O.D. Skelton to Sir Gerald Campbell, 12 February 1940. A week earlier Read had made the same point and argued that Britain should be made to exercise complete control over the base under the regulations of the Visiting Forces Act. See John E. Read, Re Contraband Control, 5 February 1940, op. cit.

121.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, John E. Read, Note for Dr. Skelton: Enemy Export Control, 13 February 1940.

122.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, John E. Read, Proposals for Establishment of a Contraband Control Station at a Canadian Port, 14 February 1940. Read's advice apparently lead Skelton to intimate to Campbell that he would be "justified" in assuming that Ottawa might allow cargo inspection "if such a course proved to be desirable at a later stage" and if London took full reponsibility for diversions and if a satisfactory three-way agreement could be reached. See PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, O.D. Skelton to Sir Gerald Campbell, 14 February 1940, and, Ibid., O.D. Skelton, Contraband and Blockade Control, 16 February 1940.

123.) FRUS, 1940, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 23, A.A. Berle, Jr., Memorandum of Conversation, 16 February 1940. According to Berle, Christie also intimated that "there was some slight irritation against the British as to the way in which the matter had been handled."

124.) PAC, RG 25 D1, Vol. 821, File 695, O.D. Skelton to Sir Gerald Campbell, 26 February 1940.

125.) Ibid., Sir Gerald Campbell to W.L.M. King, No. 3, 12 March 1940.

126.) Ibid., O.D. Skelton to V. Massey, 27 February 1940.

127.) FRUS, 1940, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 36-37, R.B. Stewart, Memorandum of Conversation, 13 March 1940. In a meeting of the same participants on 15 March, Ashton-Gwatkin asked if there was nothing to chose among all Canadian ports, "whether they were all equally objectionable." Dunn replied that he could not think of a port that would not be objectionable but Berle interrupted and hinted that if the mail censorship controversy could be cleared up some sort of an accomodation might be possible. See Ibid.,

pp. 40-41, R.B. Stewart, Memorandum of Conversation, 15 March 1940.

128.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, V. Massey to W.L.M. King, No. 5, 20 March 1940.

129.) Ibid.

130.) FRUS, 1940, Volume II, op. cit., p. 43, John Hickerson, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 March 1940. Ashton-Gwatkin also told Hickerson that Ottawa was "not particularly happy about having a contraband control station located in Canada." See Ibid.

131.) FRUS, 1940, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 43-44, R.B. Stewart, Memorandum of Conversation 30 March 1940. The discussion of which port would best suit the needs of each party centered on a list of six possibilities: St. John's, Newfoundland; Sydney, Louisburg, Halifax, and Shelburne, Nova Scotia; and St. John, New Brunswick. The Americans' reactions and objections to each was summarized as follows by the State Department's Legal Adviser James C. Dunn.

> "In order to be frank with the British and French representatives, we have informally and entirely unofficially pointed out to them certain objections to all of these ports. These objections, as you recall [Dunn is writing to Sumner Welles], range from dangers to navigation by reason of ice and fog in the case of the first three ports, and in the case of Halifax and Shelburne to the fact that they are within the zone laid down under the Declaration of Panama; finally, in the case of St. John, New Brunswick, to the fact that it is so close to the American border and is almost within the confines of the Bay of Fundy that any belligerent activities so close to our own coast would be decidedly objectionable.
>
> ... After careful consideration, we informed them [the British] that St. John's, Newfoundland, was the least objectionable, but we were careful not only to reserve all of our rights, but to lay special emphasis upon the President's statement about our holding the British responsible for any damage to American ships caused be ice or by conditions at that port. A little later, we were informed by Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin that facilities at St. John's, Newfoundland, were inadequate and that active consideration was being given to Sydney and Louisburg, Nova Scotia. These ports are both well north of the neutrality belt and we informed him that, subject to these same general reservations which we had made in respect to St. John's, Newfoundland, we had no special objection to either Sydney or Louisburg."

See FRUS, 1940, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 46-47, James C. Dunn, Memorandum for Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 5 April

1940.

132.) See R.B. Stewart, Memorandum of Conversation, 30 March 1940, op. cit.

133.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 54, 1 April 1940. Christie had earlier concluded that it would be unwise for Canada to take any action that might bring public notice to what he regarded as the rather special treatment the country had been accorded under the Panama Declaration. "The Declaration of Panama," Christie pointed out in the fall of 1939,

> "is worded in such a way so as not to prevent the armed forces of Canada from conducting belligerent operations in the [Declaration's] safety zone. The Declaration states that the American republics are entitled to keep the safety zone 'free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation.' So far I have noted no public reference to this peculiar language."

In Christie's view, Canada's own interests could be best protected by taking no action that would focus the attention of American isolationists on its treatment under the Panama Declaration. "Since the begining of the war," Christie told Skelton, "the State Department has shown [a] willingness to find interpretations of United States neutrality laws and policies which would be favourable to Canada if those interpretations can be defended on any reasonable reading of the law." He believed that "this willingness to help us will continue" as long as it did not receive excessive publicity or was not pushed too far by Canada. "[S]ince the [State] Department would be glad to meet us if it could find a way of doing so," Christie believed that if a violation of the Panama Declaration proved necessary for the prosecution of the war every effort should be made to make it known clearly in Washington that the reponsibility for the violation belonged exclusively to London. See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, p. 224916, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 1888, 7 October 1939, and, Ibid., RG 25 G1, DEA Papers, Volume 2001, File 652-A-VIII, L.C. Christie to O.D. Skelton, 30 March 1940.

134.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, Rear Admiral P.W. Nelles, Combat Naval Staff Memorandum on the Selection of a Contraband Control Base in Canada, 3 April 1940. On the same day, John Read also advised Skelton that weather conditions made St. John's, Newfoundland and Sydney and Louisburg, Nova Scotia too dangerous for use as bases. He also said that the use of any of those ports would interfere with "vitally important" Royal Canadian Navy defensive operations -- i.e., convoy assembly and organizational activities -- in the adjacent waters. Read also presumably thought that the military justification provided by Nelles' memorandum would be useful in putting the onus on Britain for pushing for Washington's

acceptance of a port to which it had already made its objections clear. In a late March memorandum, Read, after noting that Christie had reported that the Americans would not accept Halifax or Shelburne because they were in the Panama Zone, suggested that Ottawa nonetheless support London in pressing the United States to accept one of these ports because "[I]f all Canadian ports prove objectionable [to Washington] the problem will then automatically pass back to the United Kingdom Government to be dealt with by the establishment of a base in Newfoundland." Read did not complete his thought in the memorandum, but it obviously was that a control station in a crown colony probably would not undermine Canadian-American relations. See Ibid., John E. Read to O.D. Skelton, 3 April 1940, and, Ibid., John E. Read, Note for the Prime Minister - Contraband Control Base, 23 March 1940.

135.) PAC, RG 2 7C, Reel C-4653 A, Cabinet War Committee, Second Meeting, 4 April 1940.

136.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Vol. 821, File 695, W.L.M. King to Sir Gerald Campbell, No. 8, 5 April 1940. Shelburne also had the advantage, according to Professor Tucker, of coming very close to meeting the guidelines of the Panama Declaration because it was only 45 minutes of longitude inside the Declaration's prohibited zone. Gilbert N. Tucker. The Naval Service of Canada: Activities on Shore During the Second World War. Ottawa: The King's Printer, 1952, p.175.

137.) PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 821, File 695, W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, 5 April 1940. King also informed Christie of the range of activities that would be conducted at the station. The officers of the base would not examine east-bound US mails but might look at those of other neutrals and also those of the US if "contemplated arrangements" broke down. In addition, passengers, luggage, cabins, and crews quarters would be examined together with all east-bound cargoes "unless fully navicerted." West-bound cargoes would also be examined for enemy exports. This list amounted, for all intents and purposes, to everything that Britain had asked for, and much of what Washington was objecting to, and perhaps for those reasons King told Christie that he "might not wish to disclose the plans for the base's operations to the State Department unless it was necessary to do so."

138.) PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Vol. 285, File 1940: L.C. Christie, April to August, pp. 241131-241132, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, No. 59, 9 April 1940.

139.) FRUS, 1940, II, op. cit., p. 48, Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, 9 April 1940. Roosevelt did indeed expand the combat area to include Bergen and the other Norwegian ports on 10 April thereby making plans for a Canadian control station irrelevant. See W.D. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Volume I, op. cit., p. 375 and Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, op. cit., p.736.

140.) Throughout the entire affair King and his advisers were well aware that they were in a no win situation regarding a control station. No matter which nation controlled such a base, Read wrote, "[i]f friction arises, it will be hard for the Canadian Government to avoid responsibility for a base operating at a Canadian port." Read also predicted that such friction would unavoidably cause Ottawa to be faced by adverse public opinion in the United States and formal diplomatic protests from Washington. One cannot help suspecting that King and company were, throughout the matter, looking for a way to sink the whole mess as much as they were looking for an acceptable compromise solution. In this light, supporting London on a plan that Ottawa knew Roosevelt would reject out of hand probably appeared to be the best chance of scuttling the whole project. For Read's prescient memorandum see PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, John E. Read, Note for the Prime Minister: The Establishment of a Contraband Control Base at a Canadian Atlantic Port, 21 March 1940.

141.) PAC, MG 26 I, Meighen Papers, Volume 136, File 177(2), p. 082088, L.C. Christie to Arthur Meighen, 24 April 1924.

142.) Ottawa Citizen, 20 November 1940, and, PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 285, p. 241548. L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 19 November 1940. The Citizen's article also noted that Christie's new wife had been the social secretary for "the Brazilian and Begian embassies and the Netherlands Legation."

143.) L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 19 November 1940, op. cit.

144.) Christie's illness apparently involved a heart condition which had been developing for a considerable period of time. "I was heartbroken," wrote one official of the Department of External Affairs to Christie's sister, "when the final word came through of Loring's death, but after the report regarding the postmortem, I felt that he would never have been well in the condition his heart was found." See PAC, RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 311-part 2, File 1184, K.A. McCloskey to Mrs. Helen Bates, 24 June 1941.

145.) This campaign against the government is described in H.L. Keenleyside, Memoirs of H.L. Keenleyside, Volume II: On the Bridge of Time, op. cit., pp. 95-103. Copies of all the newspaper articles pertaining to Christie that are mentioned in the discussion that follows -- unless otherwise noted -- can be found in PAC, RG 25 D1, DEA Papers, Volume 771, File 342-(IV-221-A)-volume 2.

146.) Montreal Gazette, 8 February 1941.

147.) Toronto Globe and Mail, 5 February 1941. Conservative leader R.B. Hanson was not abusive in his critique of Christie's performance in Washington, but he did support the press's contention that Canada would be much better served by a

publicity-seeking, Lothian-like representative in the American capital. "Then in respect to the position in Washington ...," Hanson said in the House of Commons in the wake of the editorial onslaught against Christie, "I have no doubt in the world that there is an immediate necessity for the appointment of an outstanding Canadian citizen as Minister to Washington, and that he should not necessarily be a career diplomat. In fact I think the appointment should be given to a man who is not a career diplomat. It should be given to one who can represent Canada with dignity and authority; one who, on occasion, can speak to the people of the United States as Lord Lothian did and as Lord Halifax will -- and as Mr. Christie did not. ..." See Canada, House of Commons Debates, Session 1941, Volume I, p. 947, 24 February 1941.

148.) Toronto Globe and Mail, 20 February 1941.

149.) Montreal Star, 11 February 1941.

150.) Ottawa Journal, 11 February, 1941.

151.) Winnipeg Free Press, 19 February 1941. One of Christie's newspaper friends in Washington likewise rallied to his defense in a letter to the editor in the New York Herald Tribune. Because certain charges were being repeated "both in the Canadian press and in certain private circles" that Christie had been an "ineffectual diplomat," nationally syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop wrote that he thought it was "approriate" to record publicly "the facts of Mr. Christie's service in Washington."

> "Never one of those showy heads of mission who seek to justify their existence by feeding very large numbers of people very large quantities of dinner, Mr. Christie always made his first aim the efficient transaction of his country's business. Partly educated in this country, well trained in diplomacy, he also brought to his task peculiar natural gifts of tact, understanding and imagination. Several of the most important men in Washington were already his close friends at the time of his appointment. With others, including the President, he was soon on friendly terms.
>
> Most foreigners, however acute, are both appalled and mystified by the peculiar processes of our government. Christie, supplied with clews [sic] by his friends, his gifts and his training, soon learned his way about this labyrinthine city. Knowing his way about, he knew how to get things done. The man who knows how to get things done in Washington is virtually irreplaceable. ..."

Alsop's opinion was seconded and buttressed by the American Minister in Ottawa Pierrepont Moffat. "When the United States Minister called on me yesterday," H.L. Keenleyside told Norman Robertson in early February, 1941,

"to discuss the war industry situation he took time to refer to the attacks being made in the Canadian press on Mr. Loring Christie. In Mr. Moffat's opinion these attacks are outrageously unfair. He said that Mr. Christie had made effective and useful contacts with all the people of significance in Washington and that he was liked and respected by all of them. He stated that Christie was held in very high esteem by the State Department and that Canada had never had a more efficient, effective and popular Minister. He felt that those who were criticizing Mr. Christie were speaking from either ignorance or malice."

Finally, within the Department of External Affairs H.L. Keenleyside prepared a memorandum defending Christie against what he has described in his memoirs as "the scurrilous personal attacks made upon him [Christie], particularly in the Montreal Gazette." "I noted," Keenleyside recalled, "that the attacks on Christie in some newspapers were untrue and unjust not only to Christie but to the P.M. and the Canadian Government." In his memorandum, Keenleyside especially emphasized the wisdom of Christie's not having followed the publicity-seeking route that Lord Lothian had pursued. "[I]t is true," Keenleyside wrote,

"that Christie has not been in the headlines the way Lothian was, and Halifax is. No Canadian Minister can compete with a British Ambassador in publicity value in Washington. Nor should he try. Christie, moreover, because he does not enjoy speech-making and because he believed that the Prime Minister would prefer him to devote a minimum of attention to that side of his work, has not made many public speeches. If he has thereby lost certain opportunities for publicizing Canada's war effort he has also avoided the pit-falls into which those who constantly speak in public are certain eventually to fall. Lothian is a case in point. On balance his public speeches probably did more harm than good. If his sudden death had not bathed the end of his career in sentiment, he might have been by this time in real difficulties. His last speech would certainly have produced repercussions if he had not died immediately after its delivery and publication. And it is no secret that the President did not find Lothian sympathetic, while he was viewed in the State Department with very mixed feelings. Christie, on the contrary, is on intimate terms with the President (partly as a result of their friendship during the last war) and is very popular with Mr. Hull and other officials in the State Department."

Keenleyside's estimate of the "intimate" nature of the Christie-Roosevelt friendship clearly is overdrawn, but his conclusion that a good part of the credit for the amicable Canadian-American relations existing early in 1941 was due to "Loring Christie's quiet but effective work in Washington" is right on the mark. See New York Herald Tribune, 28 February 1941, and PAC, RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 311-part 2, File 1184,

H.L. Keenleyside, Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: The Attacks on Mr. Christie, 11 February 1941; Ibid, H.L. Keenleyside, Memorandum for Mr. Robertson. The Attacks on Loring Christie, 10 February 1941; and, H.L. Keenleyside, Memoirs of H.L Keenleyside, Volume II: On the Bridge of Time, op. cit., pp. 101-102.

152.) Although Mackenzie King would have made, as a result of Christie's illness, arrangements for more effective Canadian representation in Washington sooner or later, it seems likely that a particular aspect of the press attacks on Christie may have moved him along at a quicker clip than he had planned. As Colonel Stacey has noted King hated the fact that Canadians generally held Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in very high esteem and, to the Prime Minister's intense chagrin, tended to speak of the two men as "our leaders." Thus it may well be that when the Ottawa Citizen criticized Christie's appointment and performance, and contrasted it with the innovative nature of the diplomatic appointments being made by Churchill -- "Under Prime Minister Churchill's leadership there have been some significant departures from precedent at the Foreign Office in London - the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps to Moscow no less than the appointment of Lord Halifax to Washington" -- King may have felt the need to appoint, as one of his chief rivals for the country's affections had done, a slightly more colorful individual. See C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume II: 1921-1948. The Mackenzie King Era, op. cit, pp. 324-325, and Ottawa Citizen, 5 February 1941.

153.) "May I say that I have been amazed, and I might add, in the circumstances, not a little pained to observe recently slighting and belittling references to Mr. Christie," King told the Commons. Proceeding therefrom to sketch out Christie's career, accomplishments, and "intimate knowledge of constitutional and international law and international affairs and his sound judgment ...," the Prime Minister explained to the House the basis on which he had selected Christie and offered his own estimate of the Minister's performance in Washington. "When the war finally broke over the world," King said,

> "and a vacancy occurred in the post of Canadian minister to Washington, I decided that, of all the Canadians available, Mr. Christie was by his training, experience and character, outstandingly qualified to represent the Canadian government in Washington.
>
> The special conditions arising out of the war made many and heavier demands on the Canadian legation than ever before. Mr. Christie's intimate knowledge of government and administrative processes in Washington and of questions arising between Canada and the United States proved of immense value, enabling him to perform services of the greatest usefulness to Canada."

In this speech to the House, King also indicated for the first

time that the government, because of Christie's illness, intended to make "immediate provision for additional or other representation at Washington." See Canada, House of Commons Debates, Session 1941, Volume I, pp. 815-816, 17 February 1941.

154.) The minutes of the Cabinet War Committee meeting in which the decision to appoint Leighton McCarthy to replace Christie was made are phrased in language that suggests that the specific criticisms of the press and the Tories had struck home with King and his Cabinet colleagues.

"Canadian Legation at Washington

> 7. The Prime Minister referred to the necessity of adding to the strength of Canadian diplomatic representation in the United States, in view of the Minister's ill health. At this critical time, Canadian representation should be of the strongest.
>
> 8. A number of names were considered in this connection, the general opinion being that an outstanding Canadian should be selected at as early a date as possible. Mr. Leighton McCarthy, K.C., whose services had been offered to the government, was regarded by the Committee as a person whose appointment would be particularly suitable."

It must also be noted that as McCarthy was a longtime friend of Franklin Roosevelt, King neatly settled on an appointment that would disarm his critics and please the President of the United States. See PAC, RG 2 C7, Cabinet War Committee Records, Reel C-4653A, Cabinet War Committee, 65th Meeting, 11 February 1941.

155.) PAC, RG 25 D1, Volume 771, File 342 (IV-221-A) - volume 1, N.A. Robertson, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 18 February 1941. King received final approval for this arrangement from his colleagues at a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on the same day. At the time, Ottawa was preparing to open new legations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. See Ibid., RG2 C7, Cabinet War Committee Records, Reel C-4653A, Cabinet War Committee, 66th Meeting, 18 February 1941. For discussions of the reasons for expanding Canadian diplomatic representation abroad between 1939 and 1941 see H. Gordon Skilling. Canadian Representation Abroad. From Agency to Embassy. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945, pp. 247-251, and G.P. deT. Glazebrook. A History of Canadian External Relations. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. 423-424.

156.) N.A. Robertson, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 18 February 1941, op. cit.

157.) Ibid. King seems to have felt that it was necessary to arrange matters in a way that suggested that Christie himself -- rather than the press and the Tories -- had provided a good part of the impetus behind the changes at Washington. While visiting the hospital, Keenleyside apparently arranged for Christie to

write to the Prime Minister informing him that his convalesence was likely to be an extended one, and suggesting that new arrangements for Canadian representation at Washington be made at an early date. "I have learned from my doctors," Christie wrote just after Keenleyside's visit,

> "that my full recovery is likely to take somewhat longer than they thought and I had hoped. My absence from Washington, particularly in these difficult times, has been very much on my mind and I know it has caused you concern. I had expected to be able to take up my full duties at the Legation before this, but I quite realize that, with a convalesence in prospect that may take some months, the vital interests of Canada in Washington cannot be adequately maintained without full and effective diplomatic representation there.
>
> In all the circumstances I hope it may be found possible to grant me the extended leave of absence which I am told I must have in order to complete my recovery. I hope you will, therefore, feel entirely free to make whatever arrangements in respect of the Canadian lagation at Washington the needs of the country and the service may require."

In response, King praised Christie's attitude -- "It is characteristic of your thoughtfulness in all that pertains to the public service that your present indisposition should not be allowed to impair in any way the effective representation of Canada at Washington ..." -- and said he hoped that once Christie's convalesence was complete, the government would again be able "to avail itself of your exceptional talents wherever they may be utilized to the best advantage." King read both of these letters into the records of the House of Commons when he announced McCarthy's appointment. See PAC, MG 26 J1, WLM King Papers, Volume 265, p. 255698, L.C. Christie to W.L.M. King, 19 February, 1941; Ibid., pp. 255699-255700, W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, 20 February 1941; and, Canada, House of Commons Debates, Session 1941, Volume I, p. 1004, 25 February 1941.

158). Canada, House of Commons Debates, Session 1941, Volume I, p. 1003, 25 February 1941. In this switch of ministers Christie retained his full status as a minister, apparently in order to make an eventual return to active service relatively simple. McCarthy proceeded to Washington without the usual letters of credence but with the knowledge that Roosevelt and Cordell Hull had agreed that the United States government would recognize him as having "the full authority and status of minister the moment he arrives in Washington without any special letter of credence from His Majesty the King." See Ibid., p. 1004, and, W.L.M. King to L.C. Christie, 20 February 1941, op. cit.

159). Canada, House of Commons Debate, Session 1941, Volume I, p. 1003, 25 February 1941. The appointment of McCarthy disappointed at least one member of the Department of External Affairs in that it did not build on the precedent -- which had

been established in the case of Christie's appointment -- of selecting ministers from within Canada's diplomatic service. "I was sorry to read in the press such bitter attacks on Loring Christie," L.B. Pearson wrote H.D.G. Crerar after the matter had been settled.

> "As you know, I never thought that that was much of an appointment, but I certainly didn't think he deserved the personal attacks he has received. I was even sorrier to see that he was succeeded -- immediately after these attacks -- by someone from outside the Service. Of course there may have been considerations about which I know nothing, but from this distance it seems a strange one."

See PAC, MG 26 N1, L.B. Pearson Papers, Volume I, Folder: H.D.G. Crerar, 1936-1941, L.B. Pearson to H.D.G. Crerar, 15 March 1941.

160). A thick packet of newspaper clippings relating to Chritie's death can be found at PAC, RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 311-part 2, File 1184.

161). New York Times, 9 April 1941.

162.) New York Times, 10 April 1941.

163). Montreal Gazette, 9 April 1941.

164). Winnipeg Free Press, 9 April 1941.

165). Ibid.

166). Canada, House of Commons Debates, Session 1941, Volume III, p. 2251, 8 April 1941.

167). Ibid., The man who brought Christie back to the Department of External Affairs does not seem to have been at all sorry to hear of his passing. "I see poor Christie has gone to his reward," R.B. Bennett wrote a week after Christie's death.

> "His appointment to Washington was a very great insult to the British people, but they accepted the appointment as they always do accept whatever Canada does, without protest or criticism. The fact is, as you know, that he was an Isolationist of the worst type. You will recall that the statement which was read by Mr. King when he was discussing air training and the leasing of bases to Britain was prepared by him.
>
> Lord Tweedsmuir told me in January, 1940 that he thought the responsibilities of office had somewhat lessened his antipathy to our absorption into the European war. However, he has gone, and we need not further concern ourselves about his attitude."

PAC, MG 26 K, RB Bennett Papers, Reel M-3172, p. 593759, R.B. Bennett to Grote Stirling, M.P., 15 April 1941.

168.) Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers, Container 43, L.C. Christie to Felix Frankfurter, 7 July 1940.

169.) PAC, MG 26 JI, WLM King Papers, Volume 285, p. 241322, L.C. Christe to W.L.M. King, 20 May 1940. Christie's most uncharacteristic suggestion that all that could be done in the face of unfolding international events was to "hang on in faith" lends some credence to John A. Stevenson's otherwise unsubtantiated report that "his [Christie's] wife just before their marriage had persuaded him to embrace her Catholic faith." See QUA, Collection 2167, J.A. Stevenson Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, J.A. Stevenson to Lord Eustace Percy, 1 December 1951.

170.) PAC, RG 32 C2, Civil Service Commission Records, Volume 311-part 2, File 1184, Hume Wrong to N.A. Robertson, 9 April 1941.

Conclusion

This study of Loring Christie ends with few far-reaching judgments to make, but hopefully leaves Christie a somewhat better understood and appreciated historical figure. If the consensus conception of Christie as a psychologically unstable, cynical isolationist is begun to be replaced with a more reasonable estimate of the man's character, abilities, and attitudes the job was worth the doing. If the former view is reversed altogether so much the better; perhaps it will be in time.

Christie remains, however, a particularly hard nut to fully crack. Among his memoranda, notes, drafts, compilations, and letters there really is very little material with which to turn the key to his private life and personal relationships. The passion and transparent earnestness of the argumentation in many of his professional writings seems to bear out Frankfurter's pre-Great War assessment that Christie had strong emotions that he kept well hidden.[1] Nonetheless, Christie's story, because it is based so very largely on his writings about public policy, must feature a large measure of speculation. Still, there are some conclusions worth drawing and estimates worth making.

The journalist John A. Stevenson on more than one occasion wrote that he believed that his longtime friend Loring Christie had been one of the ablest Canadians of his generation, and that he considered it a tragedy that Christie had never realized his full potential.[2] Stevenson never made clear what he thought

Christie's potential achievements might have been; indeed, in none of his writings did Christie make explicit -- aside from a repeated desire for a larger income -- what his own ambitions and personal goals were. Professor Bothwell in his thesis suggested that one of Christie's primary aims was to wield decisive influence over the policymaking activities of his political masters and thereby affect the course of national events[3] -- not an unusual aim for a civil servant certainly. Bothwell's assertion is true enough, and the frustration of this aim -- a frustration noted by A.R.M. Lower and C.S.A. Ritchie among his contemporaries, and which Christie himself intimated to Felix Frankfurter on many occasions -- probably was one of the factors that makes Stevenson's judgment that Christie's potential went unfulfilled a correct one.

Despite the force of his arguments and the skill with which he made them, Christie's influence seems always to have been at its peak when it pushed the politician at which it was aimed in the direction he was already travelling, or at least was disposed to travel. Sir Robert Borden won the right to establish Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington, but did not send an envoy. Arthur Meighen helped block the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the Imperial Conference of 1921, but would not push his opposition to the point of trying to force the Conference to a decision to abrogate the treaty. Mackenzie King did reject the idea of establishing Canada as the arsenal of the Empire and an auxiliary supplier of military manpower and training centers, but when war came an all-out, Great War-style

pattern of participation was nonetheless quickly put in train. In none of these instances was Christie able to persuade his master to take the final step needed to complete the policy he recommended.

That Christie influenced the policies of these three prime ministers -- particularly those of Borden and Meighen -- is unquestionable; that he influenced them decisively is less clear, and therein lies the rub. Christie was indeed an influential civil servant, his imprint on Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 is indisputable, as is his provision of the substance of Meighen's magnificent performance in London in 1921. In general, however, it seems necessary to conclude that Christie was usually more the guide of policy rather than its originator.

Christie probably was, as Stevenson and others have suggested, capable of much more than he actually accomplished, but to have put himself in a position to so achieve he would have had to cross the line from civil servant to politician and this he never chose to do. Thus, it probably is fair to say that he was more influential than any other officer of the Department of External Affairs of his time save Skelton, and that if he felt that his abilities and recommendations were not fully utilized -- as he apparently did -- it was not because they were not appreciated but rather because the men who held the responsibility for making final decisions did not believe that the national interest would be best served by their full implementation. There is a certain measure of irony in the

unelected civil servant Christie -- the champion of responsible government -- feeling frustrated by failing to get his advice fully acccepted by those elected individuals who were indeed responsible for promoting and protecting the national interest.

Christie's chagrin over not getting his own policies fully adopted is also symptomatic of another of his shortcomings, namely, a failure to appreciate the necessarily partisan nature of political affairs in a democracy. For all of his undoubted intellectual brilliance, Christie was at times terribly naive when it came to suggesting politically feasible courses of action. His idea that Borden should undertake to lead a non-partisan, educative campaign to assist Canadians in understanding the choices regarding the country's future international status inherent in the issue of the naval contribution in 1912-1913 is a fine example of this naivete. Even better illustrations can be found in his repeated interwar calls for a non-partisan constitutional conference, attended by groups representing all regions, political organizations, and linguistic groups, to draft amendments to the British North America Act designed to enable Canada to become a completely sovereign country. Perhaps, the most stunning example of Christie's naivete can be found in his suggestion that the report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 be debated and approved not only by the federal parliament, but by the legislatures of each of the provinces. What such an attempt to bring the provinces into the making of a major foreign policy decision as full partners would have resulted in is a fascinating question to ponder, with paralysis probably being an appropriate

one word expectation.

It was John W. Dafoe who, on several occasions, poured cold water on Christie's proposals for promoting and protecting the national interest via these non-partisan endeavors. Arguing that such "truces of the gods" were not possible in the bitterly partisan politics of interwar Canada, Dafoe sought to convince Christie that political progress toward firmer national unity, enhanced international sovereignty, or improved economic equity among the regions was only possible through the agency of party government. Borden, Meighen, Hume Wrong, and several others also made these same points to Christie at one time or another, but with little effect. Christie admired politicians -- particularly strong, outspoken ones -- but until late in his life he could never really understand nor bring himself to tolerate the environment of compromise and expediency in which they had to operate. That he should mistake the bluster and debilitating conservatism of R.B. Bennett for effective leadership, while only gradually coming to appreciate the far greater effectiveness of more able and subtle politicians such as Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt, is eloquent testimony to his lifelong inability to grasp the realization that partisanship drove the political world and therefore the progress of society.

The imprint of American progressivism had something to do with Christie's inability to come to terms with the nature of politics and, more importantly, political leadership. He came back to Canada from the the United States in 1913 with a firm belief in the positive role that the highly educated expert could

play in the governing of society, but with little appreciation for the fact that the experts' ability to play any role whatsover was dependent on the elected politician. Christie consistently failed to realize that only if the politician stayed in office could he accomplish anything and that therefore settling for half a loaf would almost always be the order of the day so as not to offend too many voters or interests and to leave open the chance for reelection. His frustration with Borden's failure to send an envoy to Washington, with Meighen's refusal to more assiduously pursue the destruction of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and with Mackenzie King's reluctance to more flagrantly advertise to the public his refusal to enter into new commitments to Britain in the years before 1939 all smack of his skewed vision of the politician's proper function. It seems that only in the final years of his life did it begin to dawn on him that what he generally took to be hesitation or timidity was often really a shrewd judgement by these politicians of what their own constituencies and the national political market as a whole would bear. Christie's political naivete was perhaps his single greatest weakness as a policy adviser.

Other aspects of his experience with American progressivism had a more salutary impact on Christie, in particular the influence of the progressives' willingness to use the central government as a vehicle for promoting modernization, efficiency, and equity in society. Throughout his career he debated the advantages of the federal state, especially in terms of its adaptability to both evolutionary developments and unpredicable

events and its responsiveness to the electorate, with the likes of Frankfurter, Dafoe, Philip Kerr, and Herbert Croly. Proof of the influence of progressivism in this regard is found in the effortlessness with which Christie shifted intellectual gears in the 1930s when R.B. Bennett's administration abruptly jettisoned laisse-faire in 1933-1934, and then -- with an eye toward the impending election -- followed it in early 1935 with a Herridge-inspired, Canadian version of Roosevelt's New Deal. Likewise, he supported King's slow movement toward a social welfare role for the state, and even temporarily left the realm of external affairs to assist in creating the unemployment insurance scheme of the late 1930s. Although Christie dreaded the instrument of totalitarianism that he believed the state tended to become in wartime, he regarded it as the indispensible agent of social fairness and economic equity in modern society.

Perhaps the strongest and most lasting influence of American progressivism on Christie was its inculcation of a largely undoctrinaire approach to international and domestic affairs, and a corresponding readiness to adjust his personal philosophy to accommodate the unanticipated and unpredictable events occurring at home and abroad. The intensification of Britain's commitment to Europe as symbolised by its progression from the Treaty of Lausanne to the Geneva Protocol to the Locarno Pact did not find Christie clinging stubbornly to his earlier attempts to find a workable common foreign policy for Britain and the Dominions, but rather quickly abandoning that plan -- which, indeed, he had been in the process of abandoning since the Imperial Conference of

1921 -- and seeking other means with which to protect Canada's national interests. That he put too many of his eggs in the basket of a constitutional convention as the alternative means may perhaps have been unrealistic -- we will come to that shortly -- and certainly was politically naive, but it was nonetheless a pragmatic attempt to take account of the changing nature of British foreign policy and to accommodate Canadian needs to those altered circumstances.

Likewise, Christie's efforts in the late 1930s to limit the number of commitments Canada made to Britain was an attempt to accommodate the central reality of the Anglo-Canadian constitutional relationship -- which he believed was simply that when Britain was at war, Canada was at war -- to what he believed was the primary national interest of protecting Canadian unity by limiting Canadian participation in a war in a manner that would avoid a recurrence of the French-English confrontation that occurred during the Great War. Of all the adjectives and phrases that have been used to describe Christie in the past -- imperialist, imperial federationist, isolationist, neutralist, etc. -- the best probably would be the non-word "accommodationist" to identify him as one who took the world as he found it and sought to channel events, both expected and unexpected, in a way conducive to the maintenance of Canada's social equity and order, and its national unity.

Part and parcel of Christie's desire to accommodate change at home and abroad was his concentration on the need to change the British North America Act so as to make Canada an

independent, sovereign state and to give to Canadians absolute control over what he liked to call the "lever of war." Much has been made, especially by Colonel Stacey, about Christie's obsession with the need for constitutional change; Stacey, in fact, has claimed that Christie's quest for constitutional change was irrelevant to "the facts of the modern world."[4] That Christie failed to provoke either the convening of a constitutional convention or the amendment of the British North America Act is apparent. What is less clear, however, is that the motivation for the changes he desired is well understood, or that an attempt to promote constitutional change was necessarily irrelevant to the Canadian situation which he confronted during the interwar years.

The consensus among historians to date has been one that assumes that Christie wanted changes in the British North America Act making Canada a fully independent, sovereign state, and giving Canadians exclusive control over the "lever of war," because he believed that they would have had the effect of excluding Canada from participation in another war in Europe. In the body of Christie's writings, however, there is nothing at all that suggests that he believed that amendments of the sort he envisioned would necessarily have had any such consequence. For Christie, constitutional change would not exempt Canadians from the next European war in which Britain participated. What it would do, however, was afford Canadians an opportunity to decide by and for themselves whether or to what degree they would participate. Again, there is nothing in Christie's writings to

suggest that he expected that Canadians would chose to abstain from the next major conflict in which Britain was active simply because the British North America Act had been amended. He understood and accepted fully -- as has been shown, perhaps too extensively -- both the enduring strength and depth of the bonds of blood, tradition, and history linking Canadians and Britons, and the near certainty that the emotions generated in Canada by the advent of a war in Europe involving Britain would make a decision not to participate impossible. Christie never viewed constitutional change as a method of making Canada war-proof, but only as a means of making such a course of action a possibility.

Christie's concentration on the constitution was not aimed primarily at preventing Canada from participating in another war, but rather was designed to complete responsible government in regard to the country's external relations -- by eliminating the chance of Canada's being involved in a war through an act of a British ministry -- and to undo some of the damage done to the federal-provincial balance of power in Canada by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. As has been demonstrated, after returning from England in 1926 Christie was as much concerned with the state of domestic affairs in Canada as he was with the country's international activities and commitments. The memoranda cited by Professors Granatstein and Bothwell as evidence of Christie's isolationist attitude toward foreign policy -- "Responsible Government in Canada: The Last Stage," (1926), and "The Canadian Dilemma," (1938)[5] -- are more properly read as admonitions to his fellow citizens to take hold

of their own and their country's future by making adjustments in the constitution to complete responsible government and to allow Canada to respond to changing international and domestic events in a manner based solely on its own national interests.

Likewise, much of his work at Ontario Hydro and the Beauharnois Company -- along with many private letters written during the interwar period -- dealt with federal-provincial relations, and highlighted the debilitating deterioration in the central government's powers that had resulted from various decisions of the Judicial Committee. The core of Christie's drive for constitutional reform was his opposition to decisions relating to national unity -- such as those pertaining to war and peace -- and the functioning of Canadian federalism -- primarily the distribution of powers between Ottawa and the provinces -- being made by elements of the British government. What he sought to establish through constitutional reform was a situation in which Canadians alone would be responsible for their own future; he was not seeking to permanently enshrine any particular condition -- such as an isolationist/neutralist foreign policy -- in a revised constitution. Given the contentious history of constitutional development in Canada since 1920 it hardly seems reasonable to claim that Christie's aims were irrelevant "to the modern world"; some adaptation clearly was in order. Indeed, given the nationalistic sentiment that grew out of the Great War and the pervasive tendency toward legalism and constitution-making among Anglo-Saxons it is a bit surprising that Christie's efforts did not strike a more responsive chord. In sum, as Dafoe

repeatedly pointed out, the non-partisan approach with which Christie sought to attain constitutional change was singularly unsuited to the bitter partisanship of interwar politics. Nonetheless, Christie's perception of a need to secure full external autonomy in order to validate claims to responsible government, and to rebalance the federal-provincial relationship to make the governing process more efficient and equitable, was quite legitimate.

Christie's lasting contributions to the development of the Department of External Affairs are several in number. As the Department's first professional foreign service officer Christie's close working relationship with Sir Robert Borden established the tradition of close association between External Affairs and the Prime Minister. Save for the single incident of helping to write a Unionist election manifesto in 1917, Christie also set the praiseworthy precedent of strict non-partisanship -- Mackenzie King's worries to the contrary notwithstanding -- by serving with undeviating loyalty whichever party happened to be in power.

Most importantly, from his first years in the Department Christie kept his feet firmly on the ground in so far as deciding what was and was not possible for Canadian foreign policy to attain. His approach to crafting external policy displayed the strong sense of proportion in regard to Canada's power and influence in the international community that has been more or less discernible among Canadian foreign service officers ever since. In his fine book The Ottawa Men, Professor Granatstein

suggests that Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong should be credited for developing the approach to formulating Canadian foreign policy that has come to be known as "functionalism."[6] Functionalism --- which seems to be nothing more than an unnecessarily fancy name for using common sense and retaining a sharp sense of proportion in formulating foreign policy -- certainly could be equated with Christie's constant recommendation that the makers of Canadian external policy abide by Lord Salisbury's maxim "don't let your diplomacy outrun your resources." While taking nothing away from the abilities and vision of Robertson and Wrong, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that they built upon a foundation that had been laid by Christie.

Notes: Conclusion

1.) See Joseph P. Lash, (ed.) From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, op. cit. p. 114.

2.) See, for example, J.A. Stevenson to Lord Eustace Percy, 1 December 1951, op. cit.

3.) See R. Bothwell, "Bureaucratic Imperialism," op. cit., p. 3.

4.) See C.P. Stacey, "Nationality: the Experience of Canada," op. cit., especially pp. 14-17.

5.) J.L Granatstein and R. Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," op. cit., p. 213, note 6.

6.) See J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

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