

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

A STUDY OF SELF FROM A SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM PERSPECTIVE:
SELF-IDENTITY AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

BY

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
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ABSTRACT

Symbolic interaction theory views the self as a complex of meanings which an individual holds toward himself as a separate entity. These self-identities (self-meanings) are acquired by the individual through interaction with others in a process of interpreting their meanings with respect to the self. In short, we define our social reality, including the self, by interpreting the meanings of others.

It is important to realize that, since individuals are exposed to a multiplicity of reflexive self-meanings, the self is not unidimensional but multidimensional, consisting of such dimensions as self-concept (negative or positive), self-structure, self-clarity, and so on. Moreover, individuals will differ on the various dimensions of self since each individual's interaction with others varies and thus the reflexive self-meanings each individual is exposed to will also vary. These varying multiplicities of reflexive self-meanings will differ for each individual both in the types of self-identities one is exposed to and in the level of shared consensus between others' definitions of self.

From this theoretical perspective, two hypotheses are derived. First, it is hypothesized that individual differences in social participation will be related to individual differences in self-structure; that is, to individual differences in the types of self-meanings that are used to identify the self and to their relative frequency. Second, it is hypothesized that individual differences in self-clarity will be

related to the level of consensus inherent in the various types of reflexive meanings used to define one's self; that is, identities possessing a relatively high degree of shared meaning between an individual and others should lend clarity to his conception of self.

These hypotheses are tested utilizing a sample of subjects from the Winnipeg area. Self-structure and self-clarity are operationalized using the Twenty-Statements Test. Social participation is operationalized using Chapin's Social Participation Scale. In general, the results support the hypotheses.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Symbolic interaction theory - as first formulated by Cooley and Mead - offers a systematic account of the emergence, development and structure of the "self." It views the self as a complex of meanings which an individual holds toward himself as a separate entity. These self-meanings, or self-identities,¹ are considered a product of social interaction in that they derive from our interpretation of the meanings of others with respect to our self. Through social interaction, the theory emphasizes, we come to know what is expected of us, what objects to take into account and what meanings to attribute to these expectations and objects. In short, we define our social reality, including the self, by interpreting the meanings of others.

Although symbolic interaction theory provides an explanation for the emergence, development and structure of the self, empirical studies utilizing this perspective have followed a very narrow path. Research has been largely restricted to investigations of the relationship between self-evaluations and social others aimed at empirically demonstrating the Cooley-Meadian hypothesis that we evaluate ourselves "... not directly but only indirectly, from the particular standpoint of other individuals"² Only minimal

¹ For our purposes the term self-identity denotes a set of meanings that an individual uses to identify to himself the type of separate entity he is.

² George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 138.

attention has been given to other aspects and phases of the self, particularly the structure of the self.

Footnote #2 cont'd - Examples of research restricted to self-evaluations when investigating the relationship between the self and others are: Carl J. Couch and J.S. Murray, "Significant Others and Evaluation," Sociometry, 27: 502-509 (1964); Theodore D. Kemper, "Self-Conceptions and the Expectations of Significant Others," Sociological Quarterly, 7: 323-343 (1966); Melvin Manis, "Social Interaction and the Self-Concept," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51: 364-370 (1955); Bilha F. Mannheim, "Reference Groups, Membership Groups and the Self-Image," Sociometry, 29: 265-279 (1966); S. Frank Miyomoto and Sanford M. Dornbush, "A Test of Interaction Hypothesis of Self-Conceptions," American Journal of Sociology, 61: 399-403 (1956); E.L. Quarantelli and Joseph Cooper, "Self-Conceptions and Others: A Further Test of Meadian Hypotheses," Sociological Quarterly, 7: 281-297 (1966); Leo G. Reeder, et al., "Conceptions of Self and Others," American Journal of Sociology, 66: 153-159 (1960); John J. Sherwood, "Self-Identity and Referent Others," Sociometry, 28: 66-81 (1965); and Stephen P. Spitzer, "The Self-Concept: Test Equivalences and Perceived Validity," Sociological Quarterly, 7: 265-280 (1966).

CHAPTER II

GENERAL ORIENTATION AND PROBLEM

The focus of the following discussion and empirical research is the structure of self-identity. We view the self as an "accruing structure of available reflexive meanings." The term "structure," as it relates to the self, denotes the organization of self-meanings, and the social reality they mirror. By focusing our discussion on self as structure we do not intend to undermine self as process. Self as structure, and indeed all social structure, must be seen as particular instances of ongoing processes. In other words, self-structures must be viewed as specific forms (which are constantly changing) of an ongoing process. However, given current weaknesses in research methodology, one is almost forced to adopt a static approach in dealing with self empirically.

Individuals are exposed to a multiplicity of reflexive meanings in terms of the categories they belong to, their personal attributes, their performance of social activities, and so on. In appreciating this multiplicity of available reflexive meanings with respect to the self, it seems reasonable to assume that the organization of these meanings is an important aspect of self-identity, and that an increased

³ Chad Gordon, "Self Conceptions: Configurations of Content," in Chad Gordon and Kenneth J. Gergen, editors, The Self in Social Interaction (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 136.

⁴ Marvin E. Olsen, The Process of Social Organization (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. vi.

⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

understanding of this organization should contribute to an increased understanding of the self in general. We are in agreement with Gordon:

The very fact of conceptualization in terms of a multiplicity of available meanings leads to investigation of the actually encountered TYPES of meanings and the relative frequencies of their occurrence. The plural view also leads away from the simplistic notion of "the self concept" of an individual, toward determination of the relative CONSISTENCY of the elements. The idea of a structure of available meanings encourages inquiry as to their ORGANIZATION. ⁶

The limited empirical evidence available concerning the structure of the self indicates that there are various types of self-meanings, and that self-evaluations constitute only one dimension of self-identity. ⁷ Other dimensions include self-meanings in such terms as roles and statuses, interests and aversions, conceptions of goals, and ideological beliefs. Research has further revealed significant differences between individuals in the organization and frequency of these various types of self-meanings. It has been shown, for example, that one individual may identify his self almost entirely on the basis of roles and statuses while a second individual may only minimally use this type of self-meaning ⁸ to identify his self, relying instead mainly upon evaluative statements.

⁶ Ibid., p. 116.

⁷ See for example, Stephen Spitzer, et al., The Assessment of the Self (Iowa City, Iowa, Sernell, Inc., 1973); Manford H. Kuhn, "Self-Attitudes by Age, Sex, and Professional Training," Sociological Quarterly, 1: 39-55 (Jan.: 1960); Manford H. Kuhn and Thomas S. McPartland, "An Empirical Investigation of Self-Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 19: 68-78 (1954); and Harold A. Mulford and Winfield W. Salisbury II, "Self-Conceptions in a General Population," Sociological Quarterly, 5: 35-46 (Win.: 1964).

⁸ Kuhn, op. cit., 1960.

Research addressing itself to change over time in the structure
of self-identity is very limited,⁹ but there is evidence to suggest that
the structure of self does change over time.¹⁰ Kuhn has found that the
frequency of self-meanings in terms of roles and statuses steadily
increases from seven year olds to twenty-four year olds.¹¹ Kuhn accounts
for this change by suggesting, "as the average individual grows from the

⁹ This situation has been well documented. Quarantelli and Cooper (E.L. Quarantelli and Joseph Cooper, "Self Conceptions and Others: A Further Test of Meadian Hypotheses," Sociological Quarterly, 7: 281-297 (1966), p. 282) criticize this sparsity pointing out that the processual aspects of behavior are central in the interactionist frame of reference. Kuhn (Manford H. Kuhn, "Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction Theory in the Past Twenty-Five Years," Sociological Quarterly, 5: 35-46) claims that the process by which self-conceptions change has been largely neglected and Kemper (Theodore D. Kemper, "Self-Conceptions and the Expectations of Significant Others," Sociological Quarterly, 7: 323-343 (1966), p. 324) states this to be especially true of long term processes involved in self change. Rose (Arnold M. Rose, editor, Human Behavior and Social Processes [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962] p. 63) feels that the emergent and ever changing 'self' has been extensively studied in its early stages but that it has been rather ignored in its adult transformations. It is further emphasized by Schmitt (Raymond L. Schmitt, "Major Role Change and Self Change," Sociological Quarterly, 8: 311-322 (1966), p. 312) that, "our knowledge of real life situations on personality is especially limited."

¹⁰ Kuhn, op. cit., .960.

¹¹ This finding tends to support our theoretical orientation that "the individual is emergent out of a social process and constantly develops or changes" (Rose, op. cit., p. 63). As Strauss (Anselm Strauss, "Transformation of Identity," in Rose, op. cit., p. 65) and Becker (Howard S. Becker, "Personal Change in Adult Life," Sociometry, 27: 40-53 (1964), p. 40) point out this orientation differs from much of the social psychological literature which suggests that the "essential core" of an individual's self is laid down early in life and that later changes have little effect on the "deeper components" of self. Becker states that whether the roots of behavior are viewed as needs, defenses, identification, etc., or as values, both positions see these aspects of the self as being inculcated in the young during childhood and regard change in adulthood as essentially superficial - a new expression of an underlying system. Brim (Orville G. Brim, Jr., "Personality as Role-Learning," in Ira Ibco and Harold Stevenson, editors, Personality Development in Children (Austin: University Texas Press, 1960), pp. 127-159), for one, has persuasively argued against the notion that there are "deep" personality characteristics or traits of character which persist across all social roles.

age of seven to that of twenty-four, he becomes - or so we would suppose - a member of more groups, and his roles are differentiated on the basis of divergent categories.¹² Kuhn's explanation seems reasonable but thus far it has not been empirically investigated. This neglect, we feel, is unfortunate. While research has pointed out individual differences in the structure of self and has observed that self-structure changes over time, very little effort has been made to account for these occurrences.

Even less effort has been devoted to investigating the possibility that individual differences in the structure of self may be related to other dimensions of self, such as differences in clarity of self - clarity referring to one's certainty of ambiguity in knowing what type of object he is. As Gordon states, "since we are dealing with meanings, questions of CLARITY to the person immediately arise ... in [reference] to the ... problem of the factors shaping relevance and salience."¹³ Research has shown, at least implicitly, that, while some individuals are relatively certain as to what type of object they are, other individuals are "confused." Research has not, however, investigated what factors have "relevance and salience" in contributing to clarity of self. Presumably such clarity, or lack of it, could have important behavioral consequences. Our theoretical orientation follows Foote who states that what motivates and therefore guides individuals in their activities is self-identity,¹⁴ and that therefore the unambiguous establishment of one's

¹² Kuhn, op. cit., 1960, p. 45.

¹³ Gordon, op. cit., p. 116.

¹⁴ Nelson N. Foote, "Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation," American Sociological Review, 16: 14-21 (1951).

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identity to one's self is extremely important in interaction. Identities give common meaning, stability and predictability to one's own behavior as long as we cling to them.

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The proposed research will address itself to certain of these apparent lacunae in the research literature on the self. Specifically, it will examine individual differences in self-structure and the possible relationship of these differences to differences in social participation and clarity of self.

15 Ibid., p. 18.

16 Ibid., p. 18.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead have made the most notable contribution to the symbolic interactionist treatment of the self. Both Cooley and Mead regarded the self as being a reflection of the definitions about oneself that a person perceives others to hold. Therefore, they both insisted that self-development requires social interaction. Cooley states, "There is no sense of 'I' ... without its correlative sense of you, or he, or they."¹⁷ Along the same line Mead claims:

The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process.¹⁸

Although there exists this basic parallelism in the thought of Cooley and Mead on the development of the self, a more in-depth scrutiny of their views reveals significant differences. It is necessary to point out these differences in light of the fact that most empirical investigations of the self, from a symbolic interactionist perspective, claim to be investigating the theory of Mead while in actuality they are more accurately addressing the theory of Cooley.

¹⁷ Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Schocken, 1964), p. 182.

¹⁸ Mead, op. cit., p. 135.

Cooley's discussion of the self is directed largely at self-evaluations and primary group influence on these evaluations. His emphasis is on the importance of face-to-face groups for supplying the social basis of self-evaluations. This can be seen by examining the three principal elements of his concept of the looking-glass self, namely:

The imagination of our appearance to the other person, the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling such as pride or mortification. ¹⁹

Mead, on the other hand, was more concerned with self as object ²⁰ than with self-evaluations. This led Mead to develop a perspective which is much more complete and systematic than Cooley's. He moved the concept ²¹ of self toward a theory of internalization and socialization, placing special emphasis on the importance of one's status-sets or, more directly,

¹⁹ Cooley, op. cit., p. 184.

²⁰ Mead was concerned with the process by which a person becomes an object to himself and with the social basis on which an individual defines himself as an object.

²¹ Internalization is the process of defining objective reality as one's own subjective reality. This leads one to take for granted his subjective orientation as objective reality or vice versa. Internalization is an aspect of the more encompassing process of socialization which is the development of selves, i.e., the development of one's becoming an object to himself. What is really being transmitted during socialization is meaning and language. In order to communicate with one's self (which is the process of gaining a self), one must internalize a language. (It should be realized that the internalization of a language arises in and facilitates interaction - interaction and the internalization of a language do not occur separately but rather occur simultaneously during the process of socialization.) Through this internalization of a language an individual can take account of objects, including the self.

one's role-sets as the key determinant of self-identity. Mead viewed self-identity as being socially determined stating that the self is structured by the nature of our participation in society, that is by the multiplicity of roles one performs. In Mead's words:

The unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects the unity and structure of one of the various aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated. In other words, the various elementary selves which constitute, or are organized into, a complete self are the various aspects of the structure of that complete self answering to the various aspects of the structure of the social process as a whole; the structure of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process. ²³

To better appreciate Mead's emphasis on the importance of roles and statuses to self identity, we will examine the perspective in greater detail. Throughout this examination it should be kept in mind that social interaction is considered necessary for self-development and that we interact through role playing.

In order to define our roles, following Mead, we must interpret the definitions of others towards us. This necessitates our adopting a group standpoint, defining the situation as others define it by taking the roles of the other (individual or group). In so doing, we construct our definitions by "aligning" them to what we perceive to be the expectations of others. Mead stresses that definitions of role performance,

²² Our usage of the terms 'status-sets' and role-sets' follows that of Merton. He states (Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure [New York: The Free Press, 1968, Enlarged Edition/, p. 434) that "the status-set refers to the complex of distinct positions assigned to individuals both within and among social systems" and that (Ibid., p. 424) by 'role-set' he means "that complement of role relationships which persons hold by virtue of occupying a particular social status."

²³ Mead, op. cit., p. 144.

as well as definitions of which are our roles, are always in reference to others:

The principle which I have suggested as basic to human social organization is that of communication involving participation in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other. ²⁴

It follows then that role definitions are always in reference to role demands; in reference to the expectations of others as to what we should define as our roles and how we should perform these roles. In other words we learn how to interact by interacting, and how to define our self by interacting. Not only are our self-definitions constructed on the basis of how we perceive the expectations of others, but this is also the process by which they are confirmed.

Implicit in this theoretical orientation is the view that clarity of self is also dependent on others. That is, our certainty of how to define our self is dependent on the degree of perceived consensus expressed in the definitions of others with respect to our self. If we are being defined consistently by others as a specific type of object in a variety of specific situations, then we are likely to arrive at a relatively clear global self-definition. If, on the other hand, we are confronted with a variety of reflexive definitions as to how we should define ourselves in various situations, then we will, according to Mead, be ambiguous in terms of how we should define ourselves generally.

In short, Mead's theory claims that identities are linked with roles and that therefore an individual's self-identity is determined by how he defines his self (via others) through the multiplicity of

²⁴ Ibid., p. 253.

roles he performs. Clarity of self is seen as a function of the degree to which there is consensus in the definitions of others as to what our roles are and as to how we should perform them. ²⁵

Since identities are linked with roles and statuses, the self is viewed as dynamic. Mead states:

The self is not so much a substance as a process in which the conversation of gestures has been internalized within an organic form. This process does not exist for itself but is simply a phase of the whole social organization of which the individual is a part. ²⁶

The crucial point we wish to make here is that individuals, within a complex society such as ours, differ in the type of "whole social organization" of which they are a part. Merton points this out, stating: "Just as groups and societies differ in the number and complexity of social statuses comprising part of their structure, so individual people differ in the number and complexity of statuses comprising their status-sets." ²⁷ With regard to the complexity of statuses, Mead observes that individuals enter into two basic kinds of social relationships:

Some of them are concrete social classes or subgroups such as political parties, clubs, corporations, which are all actually functional social units, in terms of which their individual members are directly related to one another. The others are abstract social classes or subgroups ... in terms of which their individual members are related to one another only more or less indirectly, and which only more or less indirectly function as social units ... ²⁸

²⁵ The distinction between role, self and identity is, of course, purely analytic.

²⁶ Mead, op. cit., p. 178.

²⁷ Merton, op. cit., p. 381.

²⁸ Mead, op. cit., p. 157 (emphasis added).

We regard Mead's distinction between "concrete" and "abstract" organizations as being essentially synonymous with the more contemporary distinction between "formal" and "informal" organizations. Formal organizations have been defined as organizations which "have been formally established for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals,"²⁹ which parallels closely Mead's descriptions of concrete organizations quoted above as consisting of "functional social units" in which "individual members are directly related to one another." Informal social organizations are said to differ from the formal in that they lack such explicit goals and are therefore normatively less rigid.³⁰ Similarly, Mead describes abstract organizations as consisting of individuals who "are related to one another only more or less indirectly, and which only more or less indirectly function as social units." Since this study utilizes symbolic interactionism as its theoretical framework, the Meadian terminology seems more appropriate in the present context.

It is important to note that while Mead recognized these two basic types of social groupings, he made little effort to discuss how membership in one or the other type might affect the structure and/or clarity of self beyond stating that "the unity and structure of self reflects the various aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated."³¹ The present study is designed specifically to contribute to a better understanding of how membership in a concrete (institutionalized) group, as opposed to membership in an abstract

²⁹ Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 5.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

³¹ Ibid., p. 144.

group, may affect the structure and/or clarity of self.

We suggest that individual differences in structure and clarity of self are a function of individual differences in the degree to which one holds statuses as a member of concrete social organizations as opposed to statuses one holds as a member of abstract social groups. In other words, the criteria by which an individual is defined by others, and therefore the criteria by which an individual defines his self, are different depending on the degree to which an individual's interaction with others is socially structured. ³² Moreover, agreement in the definitions of others toward the individual, with respect to the type of object he is, will also vary depending on the degree to which interaction is socially structured, and this variation should be reflected in individual differences of clarity of self.

The individual participating in concrete social organizations is likely to be defined mainly in terms of the social structure of those

³² We accept Demerath's (N.J. Demerath III, "Synecdoche and Structural Functionalism," Social Forces, Vol. 44 (1965-66), pp. 390-401) statement that social structure refers to the "relatively stable patterning of the social relationships in such a way that it may be treated as structured from the point of view of the system." It should be realized that society is a created phenomenon - created by man. Therefore, one must regard human society as existing in action. The nature of human action is seen by symbolic interactionism to be based on the interpretation or defining of the self, and objects external to the self, instead of simply a response to a set of objectively defined social conditions. However, there are relatively stable patternings of interaction organized around the norms (shared meanings) governing role behavior which set the guidelines for how an individual will define the situation. It is this relatively stable patterning of human activity which enables sociologists to speak in terms of structural aspects of a system. In our opinion, it is essential for sociologists to investigate the ways in which social structure influences the self-definitions of the members of society.

organizations, that is, in terms of his statuses and roles as a member of such organizations. Others in these organizations will interact with the individual and define him mainly on the basis of what they interpret to be his statuses and roles. Interaction in these concrete social organizations will be relatively highly structured and organized largely around the norms governing the individual's role performance. When social interaction is highly structured the idiosyncratic characteristics of the role performer are more likely to be ignored.

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As Jones and Thibaut emphasize, interactions occurring on the basis of highly structured roles reduce the need for inferences about idiosyncratic personal characteristics in that behavior is aligned mainly through the interpretation of social norms. Given our earlier statement that we define ourselves by adopting the definitions of others, it seems reasonable to suggest that group emphasis on defining members in terms of their statuses and roles will be reflected in the self-definitions of members (i.e., members will be prone to internalize their roles and statuses as definitions of their self).³⁴ Moreover, such a group will

³³ E.E. Jones and J.W. Thibaut, "Interaction Goals as Bases of Inference in Interpersonal Perception," in R. Tagiuri and L. Petrullo (Eds.), Personal Perception and Interpersonal Behavior (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 151-179.

³⁴ We recognize that this internalization process may be influenced by organizational characteristics other than the concrete - abstract dimension, namely the perceived prestige ranking of the organization (as well as the various statuses and roles within it). To our knowledge, empirical evidence bearing on this point is lacking, but we would speculate that the prestige dimension of statuses and roles would have less effect on self-structure than it would on self-concept (i.e., positive or negative). At any rate the investigation of the influence of this dimension of organizations would, among other things, require detailed information on numerous organizations in order to establish their prestige rankings, a task which is beyond the scope of the present study.

likely exhibit a high degree of consistency in its definitions of a member, thereby contributing also to a corresponding high degree of self-certainty.

Abstract social organizations, on the other hand, "emphasize process rather than structure."³⁵ Social relationships in these types of social groupings are conducted more through a "bargaining" process of trying to establish shared definitions, a trying to align expectations. In order to align definitions of the situation and behavior, individuals will have to seek the more "personal" meanings of others in that there will not be unambiguous performance guidelines associated with their relatively unstructured roles. Therefore, an individual in this type of group will be defined by others and, we suggest, will thus define his self, more in terms of what others in the group perceive to be his idiosyncratic characteristics. Furthermore, given that these definitions depend more on a bargaining process than on already existing norms for their development, we would expect less consistency in how others, and thus the individual himself, define the individual's self.

Hypotheses

We are now in a position to suggest the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis I: THE GREATER AN INDIVIDUAL'S PARTICIPATION IN CONCRETE SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS THE MORE LIKELY HE IS TO DEFINE HIS SELF IN TERMS OF HIS ACHIEVED STATUSES AND ROLES

³⁵ Quarantelli and Cooper, op. cit., p. 286.

It follows, moreover, that if an individual is to achieve a relatively high degree of self-clarity, then there must exist a relatively high degree of consistency in how the individual is being defined by others. Structure, by definition, implies shared meaning. Therefore if an individual defines his self in terms of structure, (i.e., in terms of his statuses and roles in structured groups), then this should lend greater clarity to his self in that there will exist a relatively high degree of consistency in the meanings and definitions of others with whom he interacts. Hence our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis II: THE GREATER THE DEGREE TO WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL DEFINES HIS SELF IN TERMS OF STATUSES AND ROLES, THE GREATER WILL BE HIS CERTAINTY OF SELF-IDENTITY

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Information to test the preceding hypotheses was gathered via questionnaires. The questionnaire was divided into two sections: Part A, consisting of the "Twenty-Statements Test" (TST)³⁶; and Part B, containing the Chapin's Social Participation Scale (CSPS)³⁷; and four closed response questions concerning the respondent's age, sex, level of education completed and marital status.

Sample

The technique of cluster sampling was employed to obtain our sample of two hundred and thirty-eight respondents from three stratified groups of individuals. Cluster sampling was necessitated by the need to make the most productive use of funds and time available, as well as by the difficulties in obtaining a simple random sample.

The stratified groups from which the cluster samples were drawn consisted of (1) full-time university students, (2) working adults (who, for the most part, were attending university), and (3) senior citizens. It was felt that a sample drawn from these three stratified sources

³⁶ For an excellent discussion on the development, variations, usage, findings, validity and reliability, and so on, of the TST, see Spitzer, op. cit.

³⁷ Published in F. Stuart Chapin, Experimental Designs in Sociological Research (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), Appendix B, pp. 275-78.

was likely to exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity with respect to the degree of participation of the individuals in concrete social organizations, for the following reasons. Full-time university students are typically in the later stages of their adolescence, a period which is traditionally characterized as one of disturbance for the individual's self-identity.³⁸ This is a period during which individuals, especially university and college students, are more or less going through a preparatory stage for adult life and as such tend to be less committed to concrete social organizations and structured roles.³⁹ Adults, on the hand, tend to be associated with and committed to many concrete social organizations. As Becker suggests, "One way of looking at the process of becoming an adult is to view it as a process of gradually acquiring ... a variety of commitments which constrain one to follow a consistent pattern of behavior in many areas of life."⁴⁰ Finally, old age (retirement) is typically viewed as a period during which the individual loses a "variety of commitments." Senior citizens are likely to be less committed to concrete social organizations than they previously were especially in reference to the institutional structures of the nuclear family and the occupational system.⁴¹

Consequently an effort was made to obtain a relatively equal distribution of respondents from each of these stratified groups, not

³⁸ Roberta G. Simmons, et al., "Disturbance in the Self-Image at Adolescence," American Sociological Review, 38: 553-568 (1973).

³⁹ Norman K. Denzin, "The Significant Others of a College Population," Sociological Quarterly, 7: 298-310 (1966).

⁴⁰ Becker, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴¹ Zena Smith Blau, Old Age in a Changing Society (New York: New York University, a division of Franklin Watts, Inc., 1973), pp. 12-13.

for the sake of randomness but for the sake of heterogeneity in participation. However, due to unforeseen difficulties encountered (e.g., lack of cooperation, physical and/or mental incapacity in the case of senior citizens, etc.), this was not possible. It was necessary to solicit the cooperation of a large majority of working adults from university evening classes and therefore these respondents were both working adults and part-time university students. Moreover, the total number of senior citizens in the sample was very much lower than anticipated. These inadequacies notwithstanding, the sample did provide an acceptable level of heterogeneity with respect to social participation, as well as in the control variables of age, sex, level of education completed, and marital status.

All two hundred and thirty-eight respondents in our sample were drawn from the Winnipeg area. Of these respondents, one hundred and ninety-three were solicited from university classes. This group consisted of one hundred and two full-time students and ninety-one part-time students (composed almost entirely of full-time working adults and housewives), and was drawn almost exclusively from sociology classes. A group of working adults, thirteen in number, was obtained from the teaching staff at a local school, and a final group of thirty-two respondents was solicited from senior citizen housing developments in the City of Winnipeg.

⁴² See Appendix II for the distribution of respondents on these variables.

Method of Data Collection

The required data were solicited from the respondents through the use of questionnaires. These questionnaires were distributed to respondents during the months of March and April, 1974, by the researcher. In the case of respondents obtained from university classes, the questionnaires were administered in class by the researcher and collected after sufficient time had been allowed for respondents to complete their answers (approximately twenty minutes). For the remaining respondents, the questionnaires were self-administered and dropped into the slot of a conveniently placed box which was subsequently retrieved by the researcher. Response differences due to this unevenness in administration procedures were not investigated.

The key variable on which information was collected from the respondents were: (1) structure of self-identity; (2) social participation; and (3) clarity of self-identity.

Operationalization of Variables

Structure of Self-Identity

The standard form of the "Twenty-Statements Test" (TST)⁴³ was used to operationalize the structure of self-identity. The TST was designed⁴⁴ by Kuhn and McPartland to elicit the respondent's self-meanings in the order of their salience. The salient self-meanings of the individual, which this test is said to elicit, are equated with the importance of

⁴³ See Appendix I, Part A.

⁴⁴ See Kuhn and McPartland, op. cit.

⁴⁵ that identity. To reduce the possibility of contamination of responses to the TST (an open-ended test), subjects were instructed to answer this part (Part A) of the questionnaire before proceeding to the rest of the questionnaire.

The instructions which were given to respondents are basically the same as those originally developed by Kuhn and McPartland, as follows:

There are twenty numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty different answers to the simple question "Who am I?" in the blanks. Just give twenty different answers to the question. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not someone else. Write the answers in the order that they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or "importance." Go along fairly quickly while answering this question.

The TST was selected as the most appropriate instrument because it is considered the best available indicator of the organization and types of self-meanings. Other methods which have been used to operationalize self-identity include checklists, Q-sorts and projective techniques. Checklists and Q-sorts can be criticized on the grounds that they are structured (thereby requiring individuals to respond to certain categories which may not be their own) and highly susceptible to response-set errors. Projective techniques were rejected because they require a very high degree of subjective interpretation on the part of the investigator.

The TST, as Kemper points out, allows the individual to produce responses containing a minimum of investigator bias. It allows the

⁴⁵ C. Addison Hickman and Manfred H. Kuhn, Individuals, Groups and Economic Behavior (New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1956), pp. 242-247.

⁴⁶ For a detailed discussion of these procedures see Ruth Wylie, The Self Concept: A Critical Survey of the Literature (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1961).

⁴⁷ Kemper, op. cit., p. 329.

respondent to define himself on the basis of how he views his self, rather than on the basis of categories established by the investigator.

⁴⁸
Schwirian has pointed out however that responses to the TST may not be as uncontaminated as they appear, for what is elicited seems to be a function, at least in part, of how a question is asked as well as the space and time allotted for description. Nevertheless, we view the TST as the best available indicator of self-identity. It has been used in a wide variety of contexts, as Spitzer, et al. point out: "Some studies are concerned with methodological issues: instrument construction, application, scoring. Others have related TST scores to other instruments, ranging from other self-concept measures to measures of group attractions. Some investigations have linked the self-concept to various types of behavior."⁴⁹

Social Participation

⁵⁰
The Chapin's Social Participation Scale (CSPS) was used to operationalize social participation. This scale was developed by
⁵¹
Chapin to measure a person's (or family's) participation in community groups and institutions, or, to use our terms, participation in

⁴⁸ Kent P. Schwirian, "Variations in Structure of the Kuhn-McPartland Twenty-Statements Test and Related Response Differences," Sociological Quarterly, 5: 47-59 (1964).

⁴⁹ Spitzer, et al., op. cit., p. 73. The authors also provide an extensive inventory of research findings based on the TST.

⁵⁰ See Appendix I, Part B.

⁵¹ Published in F. Stuart Chapin, Experimental Designs in Sociological Research (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). Appendix B, pp. 275-278.

concrete social organizations. It is said to provide a measure of the total participation pattern.

The CSPS comprised the second part (Part B) of the questionnaire, accompanied by the following directions.

1. List by name the organizations with which are affiliated (at the present time) as indicated by the five types of participation No. 1 to No. 5 across the top of the schedule.
2. An organization means some active and organized grouping, usually but not necessarily in the community or neighborhood of residence, such as club, lodge, place of employment or business or political or professional or religious organization, labor union, educational institute, etc.; subgroups of a church or other institutions are to be included separately provided they are organized as more or less independent entities.
3. Record under attendance the mere fact of attendance or non-attendance without regard to the number of meetings attended, therefore merely check 'yes' or 'no.'
4. Record under contributions the mere fact of financial contributions or absence of contributions, and not the amount, therefore merely check 'yes' or 'no.'

The five types of participation are: (1) Member; (2) Attendance; (3) Financial Contributions; (4) Member of Committees; and (5) Offices Held. These components are said to measure both extensity (by No. 1) and intensity (by Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5) of participation. The reliability of this scale has been found to range from $r = .89$ to $.95$. In reference to the validity of this scale Chapin states: "Since it includes a series of weighted components that consist of actually observed forms of social participation such as organization membership, attendance, contributions committee memberships and organization offices held, the scale has a strong element of internal validity inherent in its very

52 structure." The scale's validity has also been tested by correlations with external criteria, the results ranging from $r = .52$ with income class, to $r = .76$ between husband and wife.

Clarity of Self-Identity

A content analysis of responses to the TST was used to operationalize clarity of self-identity. The "indicators" used in scrutinizing the responses are similar to those used by Hurlburt, namely: 53

1. The individual must be able to identify himself. Giving less than five out of twenty statements indicates a lack of this ability.
2. Conflicting statements indicate a lack of clarity (e.g., I am intelligent - I am stupid, I get along with everybody - nobody likes me, I am nothing - I am everything).
3. Statements indicating a doubting, unclear self-definition (e.g., I don't know where I am going, I am a mixed-up girl, my parents must know who I am, I am confused).
4. Repetitive statements of frustration are taken to indicate a lack of clarity of self-identity (e.g., I am helpless, I am one who fails miserably, my strength is not my own, I get anxious, I am searching for something but I don't know what).

Control Variables

Questions concerning the respondent's age, sex, level of education completed, and marital status were included in the questionnaire. The first three variables were included in order to investigate the

⁵² F. Stuart Chapin, "Social Participation and Social Intelligence," American Sociological Review, 4: 157-166 (April 1939), pp. 159-160.

⁵³ Julia K. Hurlburt, "Role Expectations of the Self: An Empirical Study of Their Relationship to Marital Adjustment," Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1960. Hurlburt's indicators had to be modified slightly as she was also attempting to measure the respondent's conviction to their identities.

possibility that self-structures and/or clarity of self-identity are merely a function of a person's age, sex or level of education.

Marital status was included as a control since the CSPA does not tap this variable in assessing a respondent's social participation.

Coding of Data

Self-Identity

A modified version of the Kuhn Five Category System was used in coding responses to the TST. To facilitate a more accurate test of our first hypothesis, Kuhn's five categories were subdivided into the following eight categories: (1) ascribed statuses and roles; (2) achieved statuses and roles; (3) kinship statuses and roles; (4) ideological beliefs; (5) personal aspirations and achievements; (6) interests and aversions; (7) personal characteristics and self-evaluations; and (8) abstract identifications. Only six of these categories were actually used in the test of our second hypothesis as a result of collapsing three categories (ascribed, achieved and kinship statuses and roles) into one, statuses and roles, as it was not necessary to delineate between types of statuses and roles. This delineation was not necessary as Hypothesis II addresses itself to all statuses and roles and therefore it was not necessary to distinguish between types. Responses to the TST were placed into their appropriate categories and the mean

⁵⁴ Kuhn's five categories consist of: (1) social groups and classifications; (2) ideological beliefs; (3) interests; (4) ambitions; and (5) self-evaluations. Hickman and Kuhn (op. cit., p. 245) state that an inclusive study of responses made by more than two hundred respondents indicates that all responses can be subsumed in these five categories. It was necessary to expand on these categories for the purposes of this research.

number of responses falling into each category was calculated.

To investigate our first hypothesis, it was necessary to subdivide Kuhn's social groups and classifications (making clear reference to position in social structure) category into three categories: (1) ascribed statuses and roles; (2) achieved statuses and roles; and (3) kinship statuses and roles. This subdivision of Kuhn's consensual category was not necessary for the investigation of our second hypothesis. The distinction between ascribed and achieved statuses and roles was necessary in Hypothesis I in order to investigate more directly the relationship between social participation and self-identity where our major concern was with achieved statuses and roles. We would not really expect the number of ascribed status and role identity statements given by the respondent to be a function of social participation, but we are hypothesizing that the number of achieved status and role identity statements given will increase with increased social participation in concrete organizations. Further, as kinship participation was not included in our assessment of social participation, it was necessary to establish a separate category for kinship status and role referents in an attempt to avoid contamination in our investigation of the relationship between achieved status and role referents and social participation. The category of "abstract statements" was created to contain responses which did not appear to fall directly into one of the other categories. On this basis, the following scheme was used in content analyzing the subjects' responses to the TST on the variable of self-structure for Hypothesis I.

⁵⁵ Our scheme is very similar to the one outlined in Spitzer, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

1. Ascribed Statuses and Roles - Placed into this category were all statements about statuses and roles which are acquired by the respondents at birth. These included statements of social category such as age, sex, race, national origin, name and social class. We dealt with a reference statement such as "woman," which could be construed as an ascribed characteristic or as a self-evaluation, in the following manner. If no other statement was given relating to sex, then "woman" was coded as an ascribed status and role statement. If a sex referent statement was also given, such as "female," then "woman" was coded as a self-evaluation referent.

2. Achieved Statuses and Roles - Included here were all statements about achieved social position. These included statements of social category such as religious membership, political affiliation, other formal and informal group membership, plus statements regarding physical characteristics of the subject (on the grounds that these are pertinent to his group's assignment of him to some status or role).

The key criterion for coding responses into this category was that the referent be related to membership in an organization or group (at least one other person). For example, "swimmer" was coded into this category only if there was a reference given to membership in some social organization; such as lifeguard, swimming club, or water polo team, etc., in the CSPA. If no such reference was given then "swimmer" was coded as an interest statement. A statement such as "intermediate swimmer" automatically relates to an achieved status and role. A second illustration is the statement "worker." If the statement "worker" was given without a job reference on the CSPA, then "worker"

was coded as a self-evaluation statement. If a job reference was mentioned on the CSPA, then "worker" was coded into the category of achieved statuses and roles unless another more direct statement related to the respondent's job was also provided (such as teacher), in which case "worker" was then coded as a self-evaluation statement.

Some examples of responses falling into this category of achieved statuses and roles relating to informal group membership are "taxpayer," "legal drinker," "neighbor," "housekeeper," "partner," "friend," "lover," "voter," "companion," "hostess," "roommate," "associate," "bridge player," "temporary resident of Winnipeg," and "senior citizen."

3. Kinship Statuses and Roles - All statements of social position referring to kin relations were included in this category.

4. Ideological Beliefs - Includes all statements having to do with religious beliefs, philosophical assumptions or on the general nature of morals and ethics.

5. Interests and Aversions - Included here were statements of the general order of "I am interested in ..." "I like ..." "I despise ..." "I avoid ..." "I prefer ..." "I follow baseball ..." "I play the piano" "I am a drinker" "I'm very much in love." As already mentioned under the second category, statements such as "I am a swimmer" or "I am a golfer" were coded into this fifth category if they were not related to some specific social organization or group on the CSPA.

6. Personal Aspirations and Achievements - This category includes all statements indicating what the respondent expects to do or be in the future and all statements indicating what the respondent has done or been in the past. The crucial variable is tense; these statements have to do with the future and past.

7. Physical Characteristics and Self-Evaluations - All evaluative statements were placed in this category including statements assessing one's own mental, physical and other abilities, physique and appearance, relatedness to others, persistence, industriousness, fortitude, emotional balance, tenacity, material resources, habits of neatness, comprehensive self-typing, including these in clinical or quasi-clinical terms. Moral and ethical self-evaluations were also placed in this category.

8. Abstract Statements - Included here were all statements of a cosmic nature such as "I am a particle of the universe" "I am everything" "I am a cog in something turning" and all statements which are abstractions such as "I am a flower" "I am a human being" "I'm running out of answers."

As earlier stated, a slightly different coding scheme was employed for Hypothesis II. The single category STATUSES AND ROLES was created to include all statements of (1) ascribed statuses and roles, (2) achieved statuses and roles, and (3) kinship statuses and roles. The remaining categories are identical to those used for Hypothesis I.

General

A few general comments about the coding schemes are in order. Whenever a qualified statement appeared, it was coded as two responses. For example, "I love my family" was coded as one interest statement and one kinship status and role statement. Similarly, "I am a good Catholic" was coded as one self-evaluation response and one achieved status and role response. Clauses joined by the conjunctions "and" or "but" were coded separately. Illegible writing and foreign language was not coded. In a few cases, responses were written in essay form, and an effort was then made to code every unit of meaning (i.e., every sentence).

Ideally, when coding responses to the TST, the panel method should be used for the classification process. However, in this study, due to a lack of funds and resources, all coding was done by the researcher. To offset this deficiency in the coding procedure (at least in part), fifty questionnaires were selected randomly from the sample and coded by an undergraduate student who was not familiar with the study, following the procedure outlined above. The level of consistency in the scoring of responses between this undergraduate student and the researcher was found to be 89.6 per cent.

Social Participation

The respondents' social participation score was calculated using a Guttman-type scale with reproducibility coefficients of .92 to .97 for the groups it was tested on (groups of leaders - i.e., executives). The final score was computed by counting each "membership"

as 1, each "attended" as 2, each "contributed to" as 3, each "committee membership" as 4, and each "office held" as 5, and then totalling these scores. For example, if the respondent was a member of five social organizations, attended four of them, contributed to four of them, was a member of two committees and held one office, then his or her social participation score would be thirty-eight. The respondent was placed into one of five categories of social participation, as follows: (1) raw scores 0 through 9; (2) 10 through 19; (3) 20 through 29; (4) 30 through 39; and (5) 40 or more.

Chapin describes his scoring procedure in this way: "It is evident that this score card to measure social participation is still a rough instrument because the weights are arbitrarily assigned and the continuum has not been calibrated. The test of its dependency has, however, been met by reliability and validity coefficients."⁵⁶

Clarity of Self-Identity

Using the indicators of clarity of self-identity outlined earlier, respondents were placed into one of three categories: (1) high clarity; (2) medium clarity; and (3) low clarity. Some protocols were readily classified whereas others were more difficult to place.

The following scheme was used in content-analyzing the subjects' responses to the TST on the variable of clarity of self-identity.

⁵⁶ Chapin, op. cit., (1939), p. 159.

1. High Clarity - Included here were those respondents who met all three of the following criteria: (a) provided ten or more referents; (b) gave no statements indicating a doubting, unclear self-definition; and (c) gave no more than one conflicting statement indicating a lack of clarity or statement of frustration.

2. Medium Clarity - Included here were all respondents who met one of the following four criteria: (a) gave five to nine referents; (b) gave one statement indicating a doubting, unclear self-definition; (c) gave two conflicting statements indicating a lack of clarity and/or statements of frustration; or (d) gave one statement indicating a doubting, unclear self-definition and one conflicting statement indicating a lack of clarity or statement of frustration.

3. Low Clarity - Included here were all respondents who met one of the following two criteria: (a) gave less than five referents; or (b) gave three or more statements indicating a doubting, unclear self-definition and/or conflicting statements indicating a lack of clarity and/or statements of frustration.

General

Again, all coding was performed by the researcher even though a panel-of-judges method would have been preferable. However, when fifty questionnaires were randomly selected from the sample and coded by a "non-partisan" undergraduate student, following the scheme outlined earlier, a 94 per cent level of consistency in the scoring of respondents was found between the student and the researcher.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

The primary statistical techniques used in the analysis of data were correlation analysis and tests of significance.

Findings

Hypothesis I - THE GREATER AN INDIVIDUAL'S PARTICIPATION IN CONCRETE SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS THE MORE LIKELY HE IS TO DEFINE HIS SELF IN TERMS OF HIS ACHIEVED STATUSES AND ROLES

Table I presents the mean number of TST responses dispersed into the various categories of self-identity for the differing categories of social participation. As predicted, there tended to be an increase in the number of achieved status and role referents with increased social participation in concrete social organizations (second horizontal line in Table I). The range in the mean number of achieved status and role responses elicited varies from 1.32 for individuals with social participation scores of 0 to 9, to 5.31 for individuals with scores of 30 to 39. There is, however, a slight drop in the mean number of achieved status and role referents in the highest category of social participation (40 or more) for which we are unable to account.

In examining the remainder of the grouped data presented in Table I, there does not appear to be any discernible pattern of increase or decrease in the remaining categories with changes in social participation.

TABLE I: THE MEAN NUMBER OF TST RESPONSES DISPERSED INTO THE CATEGORIES OF SELF-IDENTITY FOR THE VARIABLE OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION *

	Social Participation Scores					Range 0-115
	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40 or more	
Structure of Self-Identity ascribed statuses and roles	1.44	1.50	1.40	1.86	1.38	0-6
achieved statuses and roles	1.32	2.50	3.96	5.31	4.11	0-12
kinship statuses and roles	1.00	1.85	2.65	1.96	2.14	0-7
ideological beliefs	.46	.36	.12	.34	.14	0-5
personal aspirations and achievements	.32	.47	.47	.31	.48	0-6
interests and aversions	2.69	2.22	1.47	2.00	2.37	0-13
physical characteristics and self-evaluations	8.11	6.71	5.74	5.44	7.45	0-18
abstract statements	.90	1.03	1.09	.48	.25	0-14
n	43	76	55	29	35	N = 238

* The mean number of TST responses per individual was 17.55.

Table II reports the correlation coefficients and P values for the relationship between the number of TST responses per respondent and the social participation score in each of the self-identity categories. The correlation between the number of achieved status and role TST referents and social participation score is .489 ($P = .001$, second horizontal line in Table II). In other words, there is less than one chance in a thousand that this positive correlation is due to chance rather than to actual individual differences.

The statistical analysis of the raw data also reveals that the number of TST responses given per respondent in three other categories of self-structure yields correlations which have P values of .05 or less, namely: (1) kinship status and role responses; (2) ideological belief responses; and (3) abstract statement responses. The relationship between kinship status and role TST responses and social participation score yields a P value of .002 with a correlation of .191 (third horizontal line in Table II). Two possible explanations can be suggested for this particular finding on a speculative basis. First, it is possible that the tendency for an individual to define his self more in terms of achieved statuses and roles with increased participation in concrete social organizations may predispose the individual to also define his self in terms of his other statuses and roles such as his kinship statuses and roles. However, this does not appear to hold in the case of acquired status and role referents. Second, it is possible that the individual who does not participate to any great extent in concrete social organizations is also less inclined to participate with his kin groups.

TABLE II. CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF TST RESPONSES PER RESPONDENT AND THE SOCIAL PARTICIPATION SCORE IN EACH OF THE SELF-IDENTITY CATEGORIES

	Pearson Correlation Coefficient	P
ascribed statuses and roles	.053	.209
achieved statuses and roles	.489	.001
kinship statuses and roles	.191	.002
ideological beliefs	-.134	.020
personal aspirations and achievements	.021	.375
interests and aversions	.056	.193
physical char- acteristics and self-evaluations	-.081	.106
abstract statements	-.133	.020

Structure of Self-Identity

N = 238

The relationship between the number of ideological belief TST responses and social participation score yields a P value of .02 ($r = -.134$) as does the relationship between the number of abstract TST responses and social participation score ($r = -.133$). Given our theoretical perspective, these negative correlations could be expected in the sense that identities in terms of ideological beliefs and abstract considerations are not likely to be salient aspects of social participation in concrete social organizations.

Table III presents the correlation coefficients and P values in respect to the relationship between the number of achieved status and role referents given per respondent and social participation score, controlling for the variables of age, sex, level of education completed and/or marital status. The analysis indicates that, whether these variables are controlled for separately or in combination, the positive correlations between the two major variables retain P values of .001. This suggests that these positive correlations are very unlikely to be due to any correlations between the variables of age, sex, level of education completed and/or marital status and the variable of the number of achieved status and role responses given per respondent.

TABLE III: CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF ACHIEVED STATUS AND ROLE RESPONSES PER RESPONDENT AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION SCORE, CONTROLLING FOR THE VARIABLES OF AGE, SEX, LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED AND/OR MARITAL STATUS

Control Variable	Partial Correlation Coefficient	P
Age	.492	.001
Sex	.486	.001
Level of Education Completed	.486	.001
Marital Status	.488	.001
Age, Sex, Level of Education Completed and Marital Status	.489	.001

N = 238

Hypothesis II - THE GREATER THE DEGREE TO WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL
DEFINES HIS SELF IN TERMS OF HIS STATUSES AND
ROLES, THE GREATER WILL BE HIS CERTAINTY OF
SELF-IDENTITY

Table IV presents the mean number of TST responses dispersed into the various categories of self-identity for the three categories (high, medium, low) of clarity of self-identity. As predicted, there tended to be an increase in clarity of self-identity with an increase in the number of status and role referents given by the respondents (first horizontal line in Table IV). The range in the mean number of status and role responses elicited varied from 7.37 for the category of high clarity, to 3.51 for the category of medium clarity, and to 1.83 for the category of low clarity.

There also appears to be a discernible relationship between one other category of self-identity (ie., abstract statements) and clarity of self-identity, as is indicated by the progressive increase in the number of abstract statements elicited as clarity of self-identity increases (sixth horizontal line in Table IV).

Table V reports the correlation coefficients and P values of the relationship between the number of TST responses per subject and the self-clarity score in each of the self-identity categories. The correlation between the number of status and role TST referents and self-clarity score is $-.414$ and yields a P value of $.001$ (first horizontal line in Table V).

The statistical analysis of the raw data also reveals that the number of abstract TST statements given per respondent yields a P value of $.001$ when related to self-clarity score ($r = .202$). This relationship

TABLE IV: THE MEAN NUMBER OF TST RESPONSES DISPERSED INTO THE CATEGORIES OF SELF-IDENTITY FOR THE VARIABLE OF CLARITY OF SELF-IDENTITY

	Clarity of Self-Identity		
	High Clarity	Medium Clarity	Low Clarity
statuses and roles (ascribed, achieved and kinship)	7.37	3.51	1.83
ideological beliefs	.28	.28	.66
personal aspirations and achievements	.47	.22	.16
interests and aversions	2.22	1.68	1.66
physical char- acteristics and self-evaluations	6.73	6.60	6.00
abstract statements	.73	1.02	3.50
n	197	35	6

N = 238

TABLE V: CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF TST RESPONSES PER RESPONDENT AND THE SELF-CLARITY SCORE IN EACH OF THE SELF-IDENTITY CATEGORIES

	Pearson Correlation Coefficient	P
statuses and roles (acquired, achieved and kinship)	-.414	.001
ideological beliefs	.054	.205
personal aspirations and achievements	-.099	.064
interests and aversions	-.079	.112
physical char- acteristics and self-evaluations	.026	.347
abstract statements	.202	.001

Structure of Self-Identity

N = 238

is not too surprising in that self-identity statements of an abstract nature would seem to imply a lack of self-clarity.

Table VI presents the correlation coefficients and P values in respect to the relationship between the number of status and role referents given per subject and self-clarity score, controlling for the variables of age, sex, level of education completed and/or marital status. The analysis indicates that, whether these variables are controlled for separately or in combination, the negative correlations between status and role responses and clarity of self-identity retain P values of .001. This again suggests that these negative correlations are very unlikely to be due to any correlations between the variables of age, sex, level of education completed and/or marital status and the variable of clarity of self-identity.

TABIE VI: CORRELATIONAL ANAIYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF STATUS AND ROLE RESPONSES PER RESPONDENT AND SELF-CLARITY SCORE, CONTROLLING FOR THE VARIABLES OF AGE, SEX, LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED AND/OR MARITAL STATUS

Control Variable	Partial Correlation Coefficients	P
Age	-.420	.001
Sex	-.406	.001
Level of Education Completed	-.425	.001
Marital Status	-.418	.001
Age, Sex, Level of Education Completed and Marital Status	-.419	.001

N = 238

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

One basic and major premise of the symbolic interactionist perspective is that in order to understand more fully the actions of individuals one must attempt to discover their "world of meanings," in particular their self-meanings or self-identities and the developmental processes involved. The purpose of this study was to investigate (1) the relationship between social participation and the structure of self-identity, and (2) the relationship between the structure of self-identity and clarity of self-identity.

Mead has suggested that our self-identities arise out of social interaction as we interpret other's definitions of our self, and that therefore our self-identities arise out of our social participation with others. It is generally recognized, however, that individuals differ in the extent of their social participation in concrete social organizations with some individuals participating very actively while others participate only to a very limited extent. It is also generally agreed that the nature of social interaction occurring in concrete social organizations differs significantly from that which occurs in a less structured context; specifically, interaction in concrete social organizations tends to be guided by pre-existing social norms (shared meanings), while in less structured situations interaction is more of a formative process, conducted through informal bargaining in order to establish shared meanings.

Utilizing this general theoretical perspective, the present study has proposed that (1) individual differences in social participation will result in individual differences of self-structure, and (2) that these differences of self-structure will be reflected in individual differences of clarity of self-identity since clarity is one important dimension of self-identity. It has been suggested that others in a concrete social organization will interact with the individual and define him mainly in terms of the structure of that organization; that is, in terms of his statuses and roles as a member of that organization. Consequently, the self-identity arising out of this type of social interaction should be based largely on organizational statuses and roles. By the same token, one would expect that definitions of a more idiosyncratic nature would form the basis of self-identities arising out of a relatively unstructured interaction context. It was further suggested that clarity of self-identity would be related to self-structure. Since there are varying degrees of consensus in the definitions of others, and since structure implies shared definitions and greater consensus, it was proposed that status and role-related self-definitions would lend greater clarity to self than would other types of self-definitions.

In general, the data support the hypotheses. There tended to be an increase in the mean number of achieved status and role identities elicited from the respondent with increased participation in concrete social organizations. There also tended to be an increase in clarity of self-identity with an increase in the mean number of status and role identities given. Both of these relationships were found to yield P values of .001.

These findings suggest that self-meanings are significantly influenced by the nature and context of our interaction with others. More specifically, our findings indicate that the structure of our self-identities is significantly related to the nature and context of our social participation with others. The findings suggest that consensus in the definitions of others with respect to our self is of considerable importance in lending clarity to self-identity.

Given that an individual's self-identity is what motivates and therefore guides him in his activities, the findings of this study raise at least one important implication. Where individuals are unable to participate fully in society (e.g., members of certain minority groups, the disadvantaged, the unemployed, the rejected), the result could well be self-ambiguity, with concomitant social and psychological costs.

In conclusion, it is important to note the limitations of the research design employed for the purposes of this study. The major limitation is probably the use of the CSPS as our indicator of social participation. Although it appears to be the best indicator available, the CSPS still provides only a rough measure of social participation in that it is unable to tap the dimension of saliency and importance. Secondly, the fact that all coding of TST responses was performed by the researcher leaves something to be desired. Thirdly, the sample used for this research did not provide the heterogeneity we were seeking. Finally, the questionnaire administration procedures were inconsistent.

Nevertheless, the study has at least confirmed the need for further, more rigorous research into dimensions of self that have thus far received little attention, and suggests the direction that such investigation might take.

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APPENDIX I

FORMAT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
DISTRIBUTED TO RESPONDENTS

LIFESTYLE QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is designed to explore individual differences in lifestyles. It is part of a study sponsored by the Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba. Please do not write your name on the questionnaire. Your answers will remain anonymous and confidential.

Please answer PART A of this questionnaire before turning to PART B.

PART A

There are twenty numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty different answers to the simple question "Who am I?" in the blanks. Just give twenty different answers to the question. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not someone else. Write the answers in the order they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or "importance." Go along fairly fast while answering this question. (You should not take more than 10 minutes to complete this question.)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
9. _____
10. _____
11. _____
12. _____
13. _____
14. _____
15. _____
16. _____
17. _____
18. _____
19. _____
20. _____

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION SCALE

Name of Organization	1. Member		2. Attendance		3. Financial Contributions		4. Member of Committees (not name)		5. Offices Held	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
1.										
2.										
3.										
4.										
5.										
6.										
7.										
8.										
9.										
10.										
etc.										

PART B

Age:

_____ under 20
 _____ 20-29
 _____ 30-39
 _____ 40-49
 _____ 50-59
 _____ 60-69
 _____ 70 and over

Sex:

_____ male
 _____ female

Level of Education Completed:

_____ 6 yrs. or less
 _____ 7 yrs. to 9 yrs.
 _____ 10 yrs. to 12 yrs.
 _____ 13 yrs. to 15 yrs.
 _____ 16 yrs. or more

Marital Status:

_____ single
 _____ married (legally)
 _____ common law
 _____ divorced or separated
 _____ widow or widower

Instructions for Social Participation Scale (given on page

1. List by name the organizations with which you are affiliated (at the present time) as indicated by the five types of participation No. 1 to No. 5 across the top of the schedule.
2. An organization means some active and organized grouping, usually but not necessarily in the community or neighbourhood of residence, such as club, lodge, place of employment or business or political or professional or religious organization, labor union, educational institute, etc.; subgroups of a church or other institution are to be included separately provided they are organized as more or less independent entities.
3. Record under attendance the mere fact of attendance or non-attendance without regard to the number of meetings attended, therefore merely check 'yes' or 'no.'
4. Record under contributions the mere fact of financial contributions or absence of contributions, and not the amount, therefore merely check 'yes' or 'no.'

APPENDIX II

FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE ON VARIABLES
AGE, SEX, LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED, AND MARITAL STATUS

TABLE VII

FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE ON VARIABLE AGE

Age	No.	%
Under 20	65	27.3
20-29	83	34.9
30-39	37	15.5
40-49	11	4.6
50-59	13	5.5
60-69	6	2.5
70 and over	<u>23</u>	<u>9.7</u>
Total	238	100.0%

TABLE VIII

FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE ON VARIABLE SEX

Sex	No.	%
Male	90	37.8
Female	<u>148</u>	<u>62.2</u>
Total	238	100.0%

TABLE IX

FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE ON VARIABLE
LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED

Level of Education Completed	No.	%
6 yrs. or less	8	3.4
7 yrs. to 9 yrs.	10	4.2
10 yrs. to 12 yrs.	39	16.4
13 yrs. to 15 yrs.	142	59.7
16 yrs. or more	39	16.4
Total	238	100.0%

TABLE X

FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE ON VARIABLE
MARITAL STATUS

Marital Status	No.	%
Single	125	52.5
Married	90	37.8
Common Law	1	0.4
Divorced-Separated	3	1.3
Widow-Widower	19	8.0
Total	238	100.0%