

**Political Culture, Social Class and Region:
Their Interaction and Impact on Political Involvement
in Canada**

by

Ian D. Lambert

A thesis
presented to the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in the
Department of Political Studies

Winnipeg, Manitoba

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ISBN 0-315-48122-6

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
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ABSTRACT.

This thesis analyses regional differences in levels of political involvement in Canada. In particular the role and impact of social class, region, and political culture on levels of involvement is assessed.

By testing a number of propositions this study shows how levels of social class consciousness, trust and efficacy differ between provinces. Analysis of data contained in the 1984 Federal Election shows significant differences in the levels of these independent variables between provinces.

Further analysis reveals that these variables, and one's objective class position, have a clear impact on levels of political involvement.

Use is made of existing literature to explain why certain provinces have higher numbers of class conscious respondents, higher levels of trust and efficacy, and higher levels of political involvement. Furthermore, because these independent variables account for only a part of the variance in political involvement levels, this literature is also used to offer other possible explanations for this variance.

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INTRODUCTION.

This thesis is concerned with analysing regional political cultures in Canada. In particular, it examines the effect of social class, efficacy, trust, and region on political involvement in Canada. The core of the discussion can be summarized in the following way. Certain provinces in Canada are politically more 'modern' than are others. In the more 'modern' provinces social class is likely to be a more significant factor politically. A significant role for social class consciousness has been taken to suggest a greater awareness of, and interest in, politics generally. It is expected that social class consciousness will have an impact on levels of 'efficacy' and, to a lesser extent, 'trust', and that a greater degree of involvement will be found in those 'modern' provinces where higher levels of social class consciousness, 'efficacy', and 'trust' are apparent.

The conceptual focus for this study has been derived from three specific sources. The most important of these was the analysis of regional political cultures in Canada by Simeon and Elkins, from which was drawn the political culture typology outlined in Chapter 1. These culture types are created using each respondent's feelings of efficacy and trust towards the government. The proportion of each culture type in each province is taken as an indicator of the political culture of each province. It is anticipated that 'support-

ers' and 'critics', who hold in common a strong sense of efficacy, will be more evident in 'modern' provinces than elsewhere and that these higher levels of efficacy lead also to higher levels of involvement.

The first chapter is concerned with outlining the conceptual and methodological framework for the study. As well as introducing the propositions of the thesis, this chapter argues that 'political culture' should be narrowly defined, in the Almond and Verba sense of 'trust' and 'efficacy'. This interpretation allows for a clear conceptualization of what political culture is rather than a broad, nebulous one, in which political culture becomes indistinct from its causal factors. This study analyses each component of political culture in terms of region and class consciousness though, paralleling the Simeon and Elkins' study, 'trust' and 'efficacy' make up the independent political culture variable ('culture type').

Although 'political culture' is defined in this narrow sense it is acknowledged that wider cultural factors are important in helping to shape it. Post-behaviouralism seems to have led to a tendency, which this study tries to avoid, of classifying broader cultural conditions as part of the political culture. The second chapter offers an outline of the broader historical, economic and social background of each province which help to provide expectations, and possible explanations, for the study's findings. This chapter

also discusses previous studies, notably those of Simeon and Elkins, Jensen, and Wilson, in terms of how provinces have been classified according to their particular criteria. In determining which regions, or provinces, are likely to display 'modern' characteristics, use has been made of the studies of Jane Jensen and John Wilson in which selected criteria were used to rank provinces on a 'modernity' index. These studies, introduced in Chapter 1, rank the provinces in terms of whether they are 'modern', 'transitional' or 'traditional' (Jensen), or 'developed', 'transitional' or 'undeveloped' according to Wilson. This thesis uses the former set of labels.

Although this study does not attempt to produce a specific rank-order of provinces, the studies of Jensen and Wilson provide a general picture of where evidence of 'modernity' is most likely to be apparent. For example, Saskatchewan is considered the most 'modern' on both rankings while New Brunswick is considered the most 'traditional' province. In general, the other Western provinces are regarded as being more 'modern', or at least 'transitional', while the Atlantic provinces, to varying degrees, are considered 'traditional'. Ontario and Quebec are seen as 'transitional' provinces. There are, however, exceptions to these generalizations. Most notably P.E.I. was ranked as the third most 'modern' province by Jensen while it was categorized as 'undeveloped' by Wilson.

The data used to test the propositions of this thesis are drawn from the 1984 Federal Election dataset compiled by Ronald D. Lambert et al. The variables drawn from the dataset which are relevant to this study are listed in Appendix 1. Much of the analysis is conducted using descriptive statistics drawn largely from crosstabulations. These results which are presented in Chapter 3 establish a separate role for social class, region and political culture type in respect to levels of political involvement in the different provinces. An 'objective class' variable is also utilized in order to examine the impact of education level, income, and occupation on involvement levels. Controlling for 'objective class' also helps to assess the independent role of subjective class consciousness.

Multiple regression techniques are also employed and the aim of this analysis is two-fold. First, the amount of variance in the dependent variables that is 'explained' by each independent variable is analysed in order to assess the relative impact that social class, political culture type, and region have on levels of involvement. Second, the regression analysis is also used to assess the combined impact of all the independent variables on political involvement and so demonstrate how much variance is explained by objective and subjective class, political culture type, and region.

In conclusion it is argued that the thesis propositions are, to a large extent, upheld by the data analysis. The

evidence shows that higher levels of political involvement, and 'efficacy', though not 'trust', are apparent in 'modern' regions where economic and industrial development has led to an increased role for class in the political systems of these provinces. Subjective class consciousness, objective class position, region, and 'culture type' all have an impact on levels of involvement. However, inasmuch as the independent variables account for only a proportion of the variance in involvement levels, other possible explanations are offered. These explanations employ the broader historical, economic and social attributes of each province (outlined earlier) to show why class consciousness, 'trust' and 'efficacy' were found to be more apparent in certain regions, and why certain regions support higher levels of involvement.

CHAPTER ONE.

The Rationale, Concepts, and Methodology Behind The Study.

It is the aim of this first chapter to outline the theory behind the study and to present the propositions which, when tested, allow the assessment of the validity of the theory. The concepts which will be employed are described in this section and where existing literature is to be used the reasons for its inclusion are explained. The methodology which has been devised will also be outlined in some detail although the bulk of the data analysis techniques are presented in Chapter 3.

In their pioneering study 'The Civic Culture',¹ Almond and Verba found that certain countries had political cultures which comprised higher levels of trust in the government, stronger feelings of efficacy and higher levels of involvement in the political process while others had more disaffected political cultures. The United States was seen as having the most active political culture and this was held, at the time, though revised later, to be a sign of advanced democracy.

¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: A Comparative Study of Five Nations. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965).

² Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, 'The Regional Political Cultures'. Canadian Journal Of Political Science.

The work of Simeon and Elkins,² and John Wilson³ are of great importance in the field of Canadian political culture. The conclusion that both arrive at is that Canada has not one but ten political cultures, with each province exhibiting different cultures. Simeon and Elkins found that certain provinces exhibited characteristics more closely akin to Almond and Verba's 'civic culture' than did others. Furthermore it is apparent that those provinces where political culture appeared to be more 'advanced' were the same ones that Wilson saw as being the most industrialized and economically developed. Wilson argued that these same provinces had more 'developed' party systems, likened to that of Britain. The implication was that these systems had developed through the increased dominance of economic, and class-based issues in the political arena.

A third Canadian study of relevance to the formation of this thesis is Jane Jensen's 'Party Systems'.⁴ She is more explicit in the use of 'class' as an indicator of a province's 'modernity'. Traits of 'modernity' were found in similar provinces to the ones considered 'developed' by Wilson and to the ones in which Simeon and Elkins found more active political cultures. These regions did not correspond exactly

September 1974.

³ John Wilson, 'The Canadian Political Cultures'. Canadian Journal Of Political Science. September 1974.

⁴ Jane Jensen, 'Party Systems', contained in, David J. Bellamy, Jon H. Pammett, and Donald C. Rowat, The Provincial Systems. (Toronto: Methuen, 1976). Chapter 7.

but the similarities were considered to be significant enough to warrant the examination of a link between subjective class consciousness and political culture.

By examining a series of propositions this study will explore the issue of whether the 'modern' provinces of Canada have more participatory political cultures, in particular, whether a subjective feeling of class consciousness has an impact on levels of involvement. An indicator of objective class status is also introduced to ensure that class consciousness is distinguished from, and seen to have an impact independent of, education level, income or occupation status. As Simeon and Elkins' study suggests an independent role for 'region' this concept is also analysed as an independent variable. 'Culture type'- a sense of trust and/or efficacy- is both a dependent variable related to 'region' and later an independent variable when its impact on political involvement is analysed.

The propositions to be tested by this study are as follows:

- 1) Different political culture types exist in different proportions in different regions. This indicates differing political cultures between these regions. The greater the degree of 'modernity' the greater the sense of efficacy and therefore the greater the proportion of 'supporters' and 'critics'.

2) Class consciousness will be found to be greater in modern regions, where we see a greater 'class' cleavage in terms of voting behaviour (according to Jenson's work discussed below) and therefore a greater awareness among the respondents of their 'class' situation.

3) 'Critics' will be most class conscious followed by 'supporters', the 'disaffected' and the 'deferentials'.

4) While high 'objective' class status respondents may be more involved than those with a lower status all groups will be more involved if they are 'subjectively' class conscious, regardless of their culture type.

5) Class consciousness is strongly linked to active rather than passive involvement.

6) The highest proportion of class conscious respondents will be found among the 'working class' as defined by 'objective' indicators.

7) There will be a strong correlation between this class consciousness and labour union membership.

8) Greatest involvement will be found among 'critics' and 'supporters' in 'modern' regions.

Having outlined the basis for this study and presented the propositions to be tested the remainder of this chapter will examine the concepts and methodology used in the analysis of these propositions.

The development of the concept of political culture is largely a product of an increased prominence of behaviouralism and research methodology beginning in the period following the war. The originator of the term 'political culture', Gabriel A. Almond, has defined it as "the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the members of a political system".⁵ These individual orientations could, according to Almond, be split into three components: cognitive orientations, which consist of knowledge of political objects and beliefs; affective orientations, made up of feelings of attachment, involvement, rejection and the like concerning political objects; and, evaluative orientations, which refer to judgements and opinions about political objects.

Political culture can be seen to have a descriptive as well as an explanatory role. It also serves to "highlight distinctions between political attitudes and values on the one hand and general cultural values on the other".⁶ This is an important distinction to understand, since political culture studies, particularly those on Canada have a tendency to concentrate on more general cultural values. However, the

⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. (Boston: Little, Brown & co. 1960). p.50.

⁶ Lucien Pye, cited in Stephen H. Ullman, 'Regional Political Cultures In Canada: A theoretical and conceptual introduction.' in Richard Schultz, Orest M. Kruhlak, and John C. Terry, The Canadian Political Process. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Of Canada Ltd. 3rd Ed. 1979). Chapter 1.

contention of this study is that political culture is an important concept that can be clearly defined and rigorously applied.

The studies of Almond and Verba,⁷ and of Simeon and Elkins⁸ have taken three sets of attitudes as being the "important components of most definitions of political culture".⁹ These are 'trust', 'efficacy' and 'involvement'. In other words political culture is determined by "the extent to which citizens trust the government, by whether they feel a sense that the government is important in their lives and by the extent to which they feel they can influence it".¹⁰ There are, however, some fundamental differences between these two studies. For Almond and Verba the orientations mentioned above are the basic components of political culture. Simeon and Elkins differ in that they see trust, efficacy and involvement "as attitudes that may be explained by culture or by other factors".¹¹ It is the intention of this study to parallel that of Almond and Verba, and to work with their much narrower concept of political culture. To do so

⁷ Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.

⁸ All references to Simeon and Elkins are taken from 'The Regional Political Cultures' reprinted in, Schultz, Kruh-lak, and Terry, The Canadian Political Process. Chapter 2. Unless otherwise stated page numbers refer to this text.

⁹ Simeon and Elkins; 'The Regional Political Cultures.' p. 16

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 16.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 16.

seems to allow a clear distinction to be made between political culture and the broader cultural factors which may explain it.¹²

It must be borne in mind that in the late 1950's and early 1960's when the 'Civic Culture' study was being conducted there was a general acceptance among political scientists, particularly in North America, of the 'end of ideology theory'. One student of political culture claims that it was "assumed that the Anglo-American state was as efficient, responsive, and democratic as it could be".¹³ The prominence of 'behaviouralism' with its focus on empirical political behaviour rather than on the role or impact of the state or on political ideologies increased the avenues of examination of this assumption. Furthermore Almond and Verba developed an 'ideal' political or 'civic' culture which depended on a "particular balance of participation, deference and apathy".¹⁴ Deviations from this political cultural norm were seen to be the result of an individual's own personality rather than disaffection among particular groups. The

¹² This study is concerned with attitudes towards the federal level of government. However, it is important to note that respondents' attitudes towards the provincial tier of government might be quite different. See, for example, Richard Johnston, Public Opinion And Public Policy In Canada: Questions Of Confidence. (Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1986.). Chapter 2.

¹³ Paul Nesbitt-Larking. 'Toward A New Methodology For The Study Of Political Culture.' Paper presented to The Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference At Windsor University. 10th June 1988. p.9

¹⁴ Ibid. p.9

rationale for these kind of assumptions was a belief that the institutions of the political process were equally accessible to all. In other words Almond and Verba drew a very big distinction between society and politics. A return in the 1960's to the belief that perhaps all was not well with American society after all led to the refutation of many of Almond and Verba's assumptions in particular their lack of acceptance that people's experiences in society as a whole had an impact on their attitudes, values and beliefs regarding the political process specifically.

This strict demarcation between society and the political process is a major point with which Simeon and Elkins take issue. This dispute raises the serious question of the "causal significance of cultural variables"¹⁵ which Simeon and Elkins claim has never really been properly addressed. Almond and Verba merely say that the 'civic culture' is "congruent with" democratic political life.¹⁶ However Simeon and Elkins argue that it is implicit in the work of Almond and Verba that the political culture is formed by extra-political socialization processes such as those of the family or the education system, and that in its turn political culture shapes the political life of a society. It is, however, quite feasible to maintain that the causal arrow runs the other way. Brian Barry makes this point:

¹⁵ Simeon & Elkins, 'The Regional Political Cultures'. p.16

¹⁶ See Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p.493

Might one not argue that a 'democratic' political culture - such as the 'civic culture' - is the effect of 'democratic' institutions? The prima facie case for saying this is not without force. If you ask people whether they expect to get fair treatment from civil servants or whether they think they could do anything about changing an unjust government regulation it is possible that their replies add up to a fairly realistic assessment of the actual state of affairs....¹⁷

Later in the same work, Barry offers a third, more plausible, type of relationship; circularity or interaction. Again using Almond and Verba's study as an example Barry says "surely one would expect support both to effect and be effected by the performance of the regime".¹⁸

The concern of this study with the above argument regards its intention to examine the effects of 'region' and, more particularly, 'class' on the political culture of Canada. Simeon and Elkins claim regionalism is a pre-eminent fact of Canadian life and their work has been aimed at discovering whether the regions of Canada differ in some 'basic orientations' to politics. Differences in these orientations could only be seen as political cultural differences if they could not be accounted for by such variables as personality characteristics, socio-economic and demographic factors and, as mentioned above, 'real' differences in the political authorities and systems of the various regions. 'Class' was a control variable expected to offer a non-political, cultural, possibility for a reduction of inter-regional variation.

¹⁷ Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 1978). p.51

¹⁸ Ibid., p 95

Their analysis "shows that class and education especially have a strong and independent effect on the basic orientations of citizens".¹⁹ However 'class' is not significant in terms of its impact on political culture; rather political culture is seen to be those regional differences which remain once variables such as 'class' have been controlled .

It is on this point that this thesis differs from the work of Simeon and Elkins. It is the aim of this study to show that the regions of Canada exhibit evidence of different political cultures, measured using the proportion of the different culture types in each one and more importantly, to analyse the impact that 'class' has on variations in these political cultures. The emphasis in the latter component is the effect of class on levels of involvement.

Nonetheless, because it is recognized that political cultures are the result of wider societal characteristics - wider in fact than the narrow socialization causes posited by Almond and Verba - it is necessary to look at certain of these characteristics and at the putative causal linkages between these political cultures and political behaviour (see fig.1). The second chapter will examine the different regions, which for the purposes of this study means the different provinces, in terms of their social, economic, and cultural attributes. Using Figure.1 as a framework the analysis will 'fill in' levels 1, 2, and 3, thereby allowing

¹⁹ Simeon and Elkins; 'Regional Political Cultures'. p.19

us to offer explanations for differing political behaviour (measured in terms of levels and types of involvement) between the provinces.

Although Figure 1 is presented as a good diagrammatic explanation of causal linkage, 'level 2' is largely immaterial in the context of this study.


It has been stated that it is the intention of this thesis to devise a methodological framework to examine the relationship between social class and region and levels of involvement in politics. The data for this analysis is drawn from the 1984 Canadian Election Study.²⁰ Nonetheless, there is to be reliance on previous studies and this section offers an explanation as to why certain methodological approaches were taken and why some concepts from the existing literature were utilized.

In explaining the rationale for this study use was made of the influential works of Simeon and Elkins and John Wilson. Elements of both of these studies have been incorporated into this work. While this thesis steers clear, for the main part, of party systems and voting behaviour nonetheless Wilson's argument that Canada in fact has 11 party systems, 10 provincial and 1 federal has been adopted. His study also provides the basis for the assumption that provinces provide the basic boundaries of our 'regions' because they are structured by means of their political institutions.

²⁰ This study was conducted by R.D. Lambert, S.D. Brown, J.E. Curtis, B.J. Kay and J.M. Wilson.

Figure 1.

A Conceptual Framework for the
Analysis of Regional Political
Cultures.



Source: Stephen H. Ullman, "Regional Political Cultures in
Canada: A Theoretical and Conceptual Introduction",
In Schultz, et al., *op cit.*, p. 5.

According to Wilson, Canada has 10 provincial political systems which have developed, over time, into 10 political cultures. His argument is that "different political systems will have different political cultures if for no other reason than that different governments may make different rules and regulations even for the same kind of social and economic conditions".²¹ This thesis shares Wilson's assumption that rather than there being an independent causal relationship between political behaviour and political culture both are determined by the stage of economic development of each system, which is linked to the geographic, demographic and other factors outlined in Chapter 2, and by the elite activities implied in the above quotation.

Wilson chooses to examine the development of Canada's provincial party systems as a measure of political development, although he acknowledges that the condition of any number of elements of the political system could be used for this purpose. Jane Jenson, for example, provides another measure for analysing the political development of the Canadian provinces.²² In her view, the type of cleavage along which political party support is organized is effected by the level of development. Party support is likely to be organized along 'class' lines in modern provinces or along religious or ethnic lines in 'traditional' provinces. It is

²¹ Ibid., p. 440.

²² Jane Jenson, 'Party Systems'. in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. Chapter 9.

from Jensen's study that the labels, 'modern', 'transitional' and 'traditional' are taken.

Although this thesis is to concentrate on levels of political involvement, use has been made of the studies of Wilson and Jenson. Their categories of 'traditional', 'transitional' and 'modern' (Jenson) or 'developed' (Wilson) are useful for the purposes of this study. The work of Wilson and Jenson helps to show the level of development of each province. In turn this provides a means of identifying those areas of Canada in which greater class consciousness and involvement would be expected.

One of the most significant ways in which this study relies on the work of Simeon and Elkins is that the political typologies which they created provide the basic framework for the interpretation of political culture used here. The proportions of each culture type apparent in each province are taken to indicate the political culture of that province. Political involvement, as the dependent variable is measured separately using a number of different indicators.

The political culture typology was created by combining a number of existing variables relating to 'trust' to create a new 'Trust' variable and crosstabulating it with a similar new variable relating to 'efficacy'. The culture types are determined by the levels of 'trust' and 'efficacy' exhibited

by the respondents. The four categories are as follows: The 'supporters' are those respondents who both trust the government and have a high sense of efficacy; the 'deferentials' trust but have a low sense of efficacy or non at all; the 'critics' are those who do not trust the government but do have a sense of efficacy; and the 'disaffecteds' who neither trust the government nor feel that they have a say. Using this typology, the first step was to find out the percentage of each culture type among the survey respondents as a whole. This provides a standard by which to measure provincial differences in terms of the proportions of each culture type prevalent in each province.

It is one of the propositions of this thesis that the more 'modern' or 'developed' regions will contain higher proportions of supporters and critics since a higher sense of efficacy is expected in these regions. This process provides an inter-regional breakdown but it will be seen in chapter 2 that there can be substantial political cultural differences within provinces (see the section on Ontario for example). The dataset does not allow us to probe too deeply into this intra-provincial distinction. It is not possible to control for 'community size,' for example, because cell sizes become too small to allow statistically significant results. Chapter 2 provides information on intra-regional diversity which can be used to help explain the findings of this study.

This first proposition deals with the analysis of the different culture types by region. The second proposition deals with class consciousness and whether or not it is more apparent in 'modern' regions. This proposition is based on the fact that these are the provinces where Jensen found 'class' to provide an important basis of political cleavage. Although this thesis does not attempt to rank-order the provinces, in general terms, the Western provinces, particularly Saskatchewan, were more 'modern' than those of Central and Eastern Canada. According to Jensen, the Atlantic provinces were found to be 'traditional' although P.E.I. was an exception, appearing to be more 'modern'. Wilson's ranking was similar although he categorized P.E.I. as 'traditional'.

Class consciousness is measured using a variable from the dataset which measures whether or not respondents think of themselves as a social class member. The results provide a simple dichotomy of those who do and those who do not think of themselves in class terms. This study is not concerned with which social class respondents feel themselves to be a member of. A feeling of class consciousness is the attribute relevant to this study. The concern of the third proposition is whether certain culture types are more likely to be class conscious than others. The hypothesis is that the critics will be the most class conscious with supporters, disaffecteds and finally differentials showing progressively less class consciousness. This belief is backed up by Wil-

liam Gamson who claims that "a combination of a high sense of political efficacy and low political trust is the optimum condition for political mobilization".²³ Furthermore, it is expected that such class consciousness will be most evident in modern regions where, according to Jenson for example, there is a greater class cleavage in terms of voting behaviour.

While subjective class consciousness is the most important independent variable against which to measure levels of involvement it is also important to assess the impact of a respondent's objective class position. Proposition 4 is concerned with analysing the impact of objective class status on levels of political involvement. Income, and particularly, education level, were seen as important independent variables on political culture by Simeon and Elkins. It is anticipated that these variables will have a significant impact on involvement levels in this study. However, another reason for the inclusion of the objective class measure is to relate it to indicators of involvement while controlling for subjective class consciousness. In this way the independent effect of class consciousness can be measured regardless of the objective class position of the respondents. The three indicators of objective class status used in this study are education level, income (in 1983), and occupation code. The recoding of the three relevant

²³ W.A. Gamson, Power And Discontent. (Illinois: The Dorsey Press. 1968.) p.48

variables from the dataset to create an objective class indicator is given in Chapter 3.

The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the different ways in which class and 'culture type' are measured and controlled or analysed. Having devised a means for controlling for region, class and culture type, the analysis of propositions 4 and 5 involves relating the independent variables to the different measures of involvement. Before discussing the methodology it is perhaps expedient to outline the reasons for choosing involvement - the third component of political culture - as the dependent variable, that is, as the measure of development of the provincial political cultures in Canada. This discussion also serves to further justify the examination of the role of class on Canadian political culture. An argument is made which suggests that, perhaps, Canada is not the classless society that much of the existing literature might suggest.

The reasoning behind the conventional wisdom which sees the effect of class on Canadian political behaviour as minimal may in fact present only a partial and distorted view. One of the major, classic, works which found social class to form no basis of conflict at the federal level in Canada is Robert Alford's 'Party and Society'.²⁴ According to this work the association of social class with voting behaviour in Canada was the lowest among western industrialized coun-

²⁴ Robert Alford, Party and Society. (Chicago: Rand McNally. 1963).

tries. Other writers have concluded that "one of the most persistent images that Canadians have of their society is that it has no classes",²⁵ and that Canadians possess the "lowest state of political awareness in the English speaking world".²⁶ However Richard Ogmundsen provides a valuable critique of these and other interpretations. He claims that there is a "causal chain from individual self-interest to predisposition to cast a vote on the basis of class interest"²⁷ and that the weakness of class voting in Canada must be the result of at least one weak link in this chain. For Ogmundsen the chain consists of four elements - stimuli to the class reference group, the role of class in the social culture, the role of class in the political culture and the outlets available for the expression of political class sentiment.²⁸

While outlining the first link in the chain Ogmundsen suggests that many of the reasons, cited by previous works, for the low class vote in Canada in reality present a mixed view and that some factors, such as high unemployment, vulnerability to fluctuations in foreign trade, relatively low levels of occupational mobility and a deferential, closed

²⁵ John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1965). p.3.

²⁶ Ian Adams, William Cameron, Brian Hill and Peter Penz, The Real Poverty Report. (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig. 1971). p.5.

²⁷ Richard Ogmundsen, Social Class And Canadian Politics. (University of Michigan. 1972). p.11.

²⁸ for a full discussion see: *Ibid.*, Chapter 2.

and traditional society should in fact facilitate higher class voting, higher even, in some cases than in the United Kingdom. In examining the social culture link Ogmundsen uses the findings of Macdonald and Schwartz, among others, to show that social class is clearly "related to viewpoints on a number of issues normally related to class".²⁹ Issues such as unemployment, medicare, taxation and the welfare state - all class issues-continually came up as issues most important to respondents. Issues often thought to be of great importance to Canadians such as ethnic relations, national unity, and religious and moral problems were barely mentioned. In other words the class-related nature of Canada's social culture was found to be quite 'normal' by Western industrialized nations' standards with class issues obviously more pertinent to Canadians than regional, ethnic and religious issues. However this argument is weakened somewhat by the lack of an explanation as to whether economic concerns are related to a sense of class identity.

The third link in Ogmundsen's chain, political culture is also reckoned to be 'well able to support class politics'. In this instance political culture is measured in terms of political class preferences. Respondents were asked to evaluate parties using a scale of 1 to 7 depending on whether a party was 'for the middle class' or 'for the working class' and then to place their 'ideal' party on this scale. This 'ideal' position came out at 4.58 on the 1 to 7 scale,

²⁹ Ibid., p.24

that is slightly towards the 'working class' end of the spectrum. Among the middle class the ideal position is about 4 and among the working class about 5. In other words:

Class position is found to be systematically related to political class preferences in the way one would expect in a country whose political culture is capable of supporting class politics.³⁰

Ogmundsen concludes that his 'weak link', the determining factor in Canada's minimal class voting behaviour, is the classless nature of the country's main political parties. Furthermore, evidence tends to suggest that elite activities, in this case party platforms, determine mass behaviour rather than the other way around.³¹ The authors of The American Voter sum up this argument most succinctly:

The class-oriented voter, to act in accordance with his class position, must perceive that differences exist between the parties that are relevant to class interests.....However attentive the class oriented voter may be, the differences that he can perceive are limited by the divergence that actually exists between the positions of competing parties.³²

Although Canada does have smaller class-oriented parties they have not provided a credible alternative choice at the national level since they have not been perceived as having a chance of forming the government.³³

³⁰ Ibid., p.31.

³¹ For further evidence see, Ogmundsen, Ibid., Chapter 3

³² Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American Voter. (New York: Wiley. 1960). p.364

³³ This argument can also be applied in a broader sense. It is possible to argue that the competitiveness of the political system can influence feelings of trust and

These arguments, while suggesting a genuine role for social class in Canadian politics, also serve to highlight some of the problems in the study of class and voting. Returning to the causal arrow issue which was raised earlier in this chapter, does the political culture determine partisan political behaviour at either the mass or the elite level or is the culture formed by elite activity? The difficulty in answering this question prompted this study to concentrate on political involvement in a non-partisan form. Although the circular relationship between political culture and elite activity is discussed in the concluding section, for the purposes of this study it is more important to assess the broader historical factors that give rise to the political cultures and the political systems in each province. As a descriptive tool political culture is necessarily a comparative concept and these levels of involvement (and how they are related to class consciousness) are intended to show the comparative stages of development of the different provinces.

It is the fourth proposition of this thesis that while respondents with a high objective class status may be more involved than those with a lower status all groups will be more involved if they are subjectively class conscious,

efficacy. Long periods of government by one party may lead to a decline in trust and efficacy among supporters of the other parties. Similarly, it is possible for a party to attain office while remaining unpopular in certain regions of the country which, again, may lead to a growth in disaffection in those areas.

regardless of their culture type. This proposition is tested by crosstabulating the newly created objective class variable by each of the involvement variables and controlling for the class consciousness variable. The variables which we have taken as being indicators of involvement are numerous and are shown in Appendix 1. They can be split into distinct groups. Some of the indicators are explicitly political and refer to such things as 'attention to politics generally'. Some of these variables we have deemed to be indicators of 'passive' involvement while others such as 'attend political meeting/rally' tend to suggest a more 'active' type of involvement. A third group of variables represent less explicitly political involvement such as 'public interest group membership' or 'neighbourhood organization membership'. This latter group may be either 'active' or 'passive' depending on how involved a respondent is.

It is expected that results will indicate higher levels of active political involvement among those with a high sense of efficacy (supporters and critics) particularly in the 'modern' regions and among the class conscious respondents. Again the expectation is that the Critics will be the most involved because of what Gamson calls their "belief that influence is both possible and necessary".³⁴ The Supporters will also be involved though we predict that their 'trusting' characteristic may mean that they see less need to be too involved. Class conscious supporters are more

³⁴ Gamson, Power And Discontent., p.48

likely to be actively involved as they see a collective interest to protect. Among the less class conscious more self-interest or localized issues may be of importance leading to involvement in less explicitly political ways - neighbourhood and community schemes for example. Similarly the low efficacy groups (deferentials and disaffecteds) while less likely to be politically active may, as a result of either class consciousness or a high objective class position (both of which are more likely in more 'modern' regions), be more inclined to be involved in less overtly political ways than would members of the same culture type who lack a class consciousness or who reside in a more 'traditional' region.

The variable concerning labour union membership, while related to the involvement variables, is to be treated quite separately. Membership of a labour union is believed to be determined, at least to some extent by objective class position, particularly one's occupation. In its turn such membership fosters class consciousness and a greater awareness of one's subjective class position. Therefore, in analysing proposition 7, a strong correlation between class consciousness and labour union membership is anticipated. For these reasons labour union membership is not treated as a dependent variable. Such membership is deemed to be an influence on, rather than an example of, political involvement.

Drawing on the contention that labour union membership fosters class consciousness, primarily among the working class, the argument is that the highest proportion of those who are class conscious is to be found among the working class objectively defined. This assertion can be tested by crosstabulating the subjective class variable with the objective class indicator.

Testing these propositions necessitates an analysis of the culture types by the involvement variables while controlling for region. The argument here is that greater involvement correlates with greater class consciousness, that this greater class consciousness will be more apparent in the 'modern' or 'developed' regions and that because of this we will also see a higher sense of efficacy (more supporters and critics) in these regions. By the same token we expect to find less involvement among those culture types which lack a sense of efficacy, and that this phenomenon will be most prevalent in the regions where social class is of lesser importance to the political culture.

While the thesis concentrates on the level of development of the regional political cultures, measured in terms of levels of class consciousness and involvement, it is also believed that the findings may have implications for the federal political parties. It has already been argued in the works of Barry, Wilson and Ogmundsen, that the causal link between political culture and voting behaviour is unclear,

circular and subject to many external variables, such as the choices offered to the electorate through the political parties. For these reasons the study has avoided relating political culture to partisan voting behaviour. However it is likely that any growth in efficacy, and therefore involvement, could have an important bearing on the 'brokerage' style of Canadian politics.

Simeon and Elkins found that supporters and differentials were considerably more likely to vote Liberal than were the other two culture types and that critics were more likely to vote N.D.P.³⁵ If similar results are reflected in the evidence, and the assumptions regarding the higher rates of supporters and critics in 'modern' regions prove accurate then the Liberals and the N.D.P. should be prominent in these regions. If it is assumed, as it certainly is by Wilson and Jenson, that all provinces are at least moving, albeit at varying rates, towards a 'modern' or 'developed' stage, then logically a sense of class consciousness and greater levels of involvement should be the pattern of the future. This suggests an electorate more cognisant of political issues (passive involvement) and increasingly made up of people likely to pursue their own specific interests perhaps through less overtly political forms of involvement - interest group or labour union activity for example.

³⁵ Simeon and Elkins; 'Regional Political Cultures'. in Schultz et al. p.26

In the light of Ogmundsen's data which suggest that class issues are most salient to Canadians, and given that this thesis assumes greater involvement to be linked to class consciousness, it is possible to hypothesize that class oriented demands will increase. Whether elite activity will respond to this and parties will become more class-based or whether the brokerage parties will close ranks and continue to blur the class issue is a matter of pure conjecture. Nonetheless, if the propositions hold true the federal parties may find themselves under pressure and obliged to accommodate new interests, as has been the case for the provincial parties in the more 'modern' provinces. Indeed it is this development that underpins Wilson's study. However it is not anticipated that the results of this study will show class consciousness to have such a great impact on levels of political involvement as to seriously challenge the existing 'brokerage' system of politics.

SUMMARY.

This chapter has provided a description of the methodology employed in this thesis and an explanation of why certain existing literature and concepts have been utilized. In the course of developing a framework for this thesis many different methodological avenues were explored, different propositions examined and variables tested. However, this chapter has dealt only with the main propositions outlined

above and while other findings may be reported it was not felt expedient to describe the complete data analysis. The measures of, and methods for controlling for, class and region were explained, as was the reason for concentrating on political involvement as the dependent variable indicating the stages of the political development.

Armed with a rationale for this study the next phase is to examine the existing literature on the historical, socio-economic and cultural background of the different provinces. Because of the causal linkages problem outlined in this chapter the study does not concentrate on mass voting behaviour or on elite activity. However it does accept the causal linkages between the first three levels (and the non-partisan elements of level 4) of figure 1. The following chapter provides descriptions of the political cultures and the wider societal characteristics of the provinces which will provide the 'flesh' to put on the bones of the results from the data analysis.

CHAPTER TWO.

The Historical, Socio-economic, and Cultural Foundations Of The Canadian Provinces.

The first chapter established the adoption of Almond and Verba's narrow definition of the political culture. However, it is also recognized that many different factors help to shape a system's political culture and that levels of trust, efficacy and involvement within a given region are a reflection of these factors. The present chapter places the Canadian provinces in their sociological, economic and political contexts, on the basis of the existing literature. This research will offer explanations for the findings of the data analysis in terms of the historical experiences which differentiate the political cultures of the different provinces.

One theme that recurs throughout the following pages is the immigration patterns and ethnic composition of each region. The origins of the immigrants and the period of their settlement are crucial variables in explaining a region's political culture. Louis Hartz³⁶ sees 'new societies' such as the United States, Canada and Australia as "fragments thrown off from Europe".³⁷ According to Hartz

³⁶ See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition In America. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955). and The Founding Of New Societies. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1964).

³⁷ Gad Horowitz, 'Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation.' in, Orest M. Krulhak, Richard

the ideologies of these societies is determined by the 'point of departure' from Europe of their settlers as these immigrants do not encompass a whole ideological spectrum but only that part which dominated when they left. Gad Horowitz, who has developed the Hartzian model in the Canadian context, says that the founders of French Canada brought with them the "Tory values of the organic, corporate, hierarchical community"³⁸ because they came to Canada before the growth of Liberal thought in France. On the other hand, English Canada (along with the United States) is considered a 'bourgeois fragment' "founded by bearers of liberal individualism who have left the Tory end of the spectrum behind them".³⁹ The argument is that once the historical development of Europe is left behind then ideologies within the 'new societies' become suspended in time because the impetus for change born out of confrontation is lost. Yet Canada does have a 'Tory streak' which allows the development of corporate, organic collectivist ideas. These ideas when coupled with the rationalist, egalitarianism dominant in North America produce a third ideological strand of socialism.

Schultz, and Sidney Pobihushchy, The Canadian Political Process (Revised Edition). (Holt, Rinehart and Winter of Canada Ltd. Toronto and Montreal. 1973). p.47

³⁸ Ibid., p.48

³⁹ Ibid., p.48

These dynamics which determine ideological and cultural perspectives are the result of immigration patterns and as such their importance should be stressed in the analysis of the different provincial backgrounds.

NEWFOUNDLAND.

Nowhere in Canada is the Tory ideology more apparent than in Newfoundland. As Rand Dyck says, until very recently Newfoundlanders "have made a virtue of the non-materialistic values inherited from their English and Irish ancestors".⁴⁰ The Church and its related cultural organizations (notably the Orange Order) have played a dominant role in Newfoundland and much importance is attached to the family and to a sense of community. Furthermore there is a profound sense of being 'British' as demonstrated by the initial adoption of the Union Jack as the provincial flag when Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949 (although there is some Irish fragmentation to temper this homogeneity).

There are cleavages in the province along geographic, economic, ethnic and religious lines which give it a 'sectarian-factional' character.⁴¹ It can be argued that the ethnic and religious cleavages in particular have mitigated against the development of an economic class cleavage. There

⁴⁰ Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics In Canada. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986). p. 42.

⁴¹ see, S.J.R. Noel. Politics In Newfoundland. (Toronto: University Of Toronto Press. 1979).

have been very few 'left-wing' movements in the province despite such blatant exploitation as that of the outport fishermen by the St. Johns merchants.⁴² Reasons for this lack of militancy in a province that regularly sees seasonal unemployment as high as 20% are offered by David Bellamy.⁴³ The first reason is that the federal government has done much to alleviate the stress and hardship in Newfoundland. A second, cultural reason accounting for the lack of radicalism is that the Newfoundlanders are inured to hardship with a stoic acceptance of deprivation. Thirdly, is the fact that the communities in the province are so widely scattered, with as many as 40% of the population living in towns of less than 1,000 people, which makes the transmission of new ideologies highly problematic. Furthermore the governments of Newfoundland have been highly suspicious of any radical ideas filtering into the province and this has largely been the result of the all-pervasive influence of Joey Smallwood who, to cite one example, suppressed the International Wood Workers Union in the late 1950's. A further reason for a lack of radicalism is that the sea has always enabled the inhabitants to at least eke out a subsistence when nothing else was available, which has taken the onus off the government. However this was only possible when people owned their own vessels and there is a real dan-

⁴² See, for example, David Bellamy's description of the 'truck' system in Newfoundland, in David J. Bellamy; 'The Atlantic Provinces'. in Bellamy et al., The Provincial Systems. p. 4.

⁴³ Ibid. p.9.

ger that capital intensive trawling will continue to erode this last resort. Finally, according to Noel,⁴⁴ there exists in the province a somewhat false illusion of immense wealth that is just awaiting exploitation, which he calls 'the myth of El Dorado'.

There is little to suggest that the organization of fishing along modern industrial lines has led to any growth in militancy. The democratic spirit is weak which can be seen from the paternalistic, semi-feudal attitudes afforded Joey Smallwood. At the same time the role of patronage remains strong although a growing role for the Civil Service Commission has restricted this practice. The evidence of patronage is a recurring theme throughout the Atlantic provinces and it can have a great impact in terms of political culture. Since Confederation education levels in Newfoundland have risen dramatically (witness the establishment of Memorial University) and Simeon and Elkins found that 83% of the electorate read party literature - the highest figure in the country. Furthermore, 100% of respondents could name their Member of Parliament while the national figure was 77%. However, in terms of our indicators of political culture, trust efficacy and involvement, Newfoundland ranked lowest of the ten provinces. Sixty-five percent of respondents felt that they could not influence political affairs (against a national average of 44%). The province also had the highest number of people who felt that government was too complicat-

⁴⁴ Noel, Politics In Newfoundland.

ed, the lowest number who discussed politics with others and who contacted their public officials. Turnout at federal elections has consistently been the lowest in the country (around 60%), though there has been some increase at the provincial level. Furthermore the inhabitants have a low sense of material and life satisfaction and are pessimistic about the future.⁴⁵

Dyck points to a number of factors which should help to change attitudes. These include a growing secularization (integrated schools), a weakening of ethnic identities, better transportation decreasing isolation, a more modern economy and exposure to U.S. and Canadian service personnel as well as T.V.. It is not likely that any radical political culture changes will be evident for some time.

NEW BRUNSWICK.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature about New Brunswick is its relative balance between the English and French speaking communities. Rather than develop animosity the two cultures have existed "together yet apart, in mutual respect and tolerance".⁴⁶ In most other respects however New Brunswick is a typical maritime province. It has the same conservatism -

⁴⁵ These figures are those of Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins; 'Regional Political Cultures.', and of Marsha A. Chandler and William M. Chandler, Public Policy And Provincial Politics. (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1979).

⁴⁶ H.G. Thorburn, Politics In New Brunswick. (Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1969) p.186.

although its own 'quiet revolution' in the 1960s brought a 20th century social services system into being - as well as the same problems of economic development and has in fact had even less success than its neighbours in overcoming them.

There is a clear socio-economic division in the province. The north is largely Acadian, French, Roman Catholic and relatively poor while the south and south-west are primarily Anglophone, Protestant and more prosperous. Fifty-three percent of the population are of British descent while the French constitute over 1/3 most of whom continue to have French as their mother-tongue. Ethnic politics have been prominent but the Acadian community are reasonably strong, united through cooperatives, credit unions and their own insurance company which backs Acadian ventures. The transition to official Bi-lingualism was a relatively smooth one.

Religious and ethnic cleavages tend to be of minimal importance in the province largely because they cut across one another. Catholicism is the majority religion given that in addition to the Acadians one quarter of those of British descent were of Catholic background. Furthermore both the English and the French have economic elites who continue a tradition of co-operation and accommodation with each other. If there is a significant cleavage at all it is an economic one between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'.

The economy is vulnerable with forestry, a notoriously cyclical industry being the main primary industry providing, in some related way, 1 in 7 of the jobs in New Brunswick. Almost 60% of income earners receive less than \$10,000 and only 3.5% make over \$30,000. Nineteen percent of families fall into the low income bracket and unemployment is chronically high, the 1984 rate being 14.9%.⁴⁷ There has never been much solidarity or class consciousness among organized labour despite the fact that the New Brunswick Federation Of Labour has a membership of about 40,000. The influence of K.C. Irving on the economy of the province is substantial and he has been able to obtain many concessions from the provincial and municipal governments. Furthermore Irving has a virtual media monopoly raising questions about the reliability of news coverage in the province.

As a result of its vulnerable economy New Brunswick is highly reliant on the federal government whose contribution to provincial revenues was 45% in 1982-3.⁴⁸ A figure surpassed only by that of P.E.I. and in stark contrast to the 6.5% received by Alberta in 1982-3. Largely because of its successes in negotiations with Ottawa, particularly under Premier Hatfield, the province has few specific grievances against the federal government and New Brunswickers seem to have equal loyalties to province and to Ottawa.

⁴⁷ see Thorburn, Politics In New Brunswick., and Dyck, Provincial Politics In Canada. p.139.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 142.

Both the English and the French communities have similar values and attitudes which "emphasize conservatism, tradition, history and the status quo".⁴⁹ Using the Hartzian model this conservatism is explicable in terms of the settlers point of departure from their homeland which in the case of New Brunswick, and with the Atlantic provinces generally, was before the growth in liberalism in Europe. Later 'English' settlers have tended to be more egalitarian and democratic.

The lack of economic development and 'marginal work world' means that patronage and corruption have been more widely accepted in this province than anywhere else. This creates an anomaly in the political culture of the province in that patronage politics, which is a necessary means of survival, "diminishes political life in the eyes of the very people who depend on it".⁵⁰ It is thought that the continuing increase in the role of the mass media in politics will decrease the use of patronage and it remains to be seen what impact the Liberal landslide victory in the most recent provincial election will have.

⁴⁹ Thorburn, Politics In New Brunswick. p.83.

⁵⁰ Richard Apostle and Paul Pross, "Marginality and Political Culture: A New Approach To Political Culture In Atlantic Canada." Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association. 1981. cited in Dyck, 'Provincial Politics.', p.143.

New Brunswick does not have the political activism of Prince Edward Island, nor the high sense of efficacy of Nova Scotia. It has consistently been a 'subject' or 'disaffected' political culture. According to Simeon and Elkins, 64% of New Brunswickers did not feel that they could influence politics personally, 71% said that they felt that they could do 'nothing' to influence politics, 73% concluded that they had no say in politics, 68% found it 'too complicated' and in terms of 'trust' only 38% felt that the government would do what was right 'all' or 'most of the time'.⁵¹

In spite of this disaffection and the great cynicism regarding the future among New Brunswickers their election turnout rates are quite respectable, averaging, federally 74% and provincially 78%. This seems to give credence to Simeon and Elkins' view that voting in the Maritimes tends to be 'ritualistic' though the 'patronage factor' which incites people to display their loyalties may also play a part in this phenomenon.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND.

P.E.I. is the smallest province in Canada with a population of around 127,000. Sixty-four percent of the population is considered 'rural' by Statistics Canada though only about 10% are engaged in agriculture.

⁵¹ see Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures', and Chandler and Chandler, Public Policy. pp.77-83.

The Maritimes generally but P.E.I. specifically have little manufacturing industry. Farming, fishing and tourism are considered to be the cornerstones of the economy with agriculture being the leading primary industry in the province. There is a proportionately large public sector and as with all provinces the service sector is the largest employer. The island has a small proportion of low income families and it has the lowest unemployment rate of the Atlantic provinces. However 64% of income earners receive less than \$10,000 and only 2.7% make over \$30,000. Furthermore, employment is seasonal and there is a heavy reliance on unemployment insurance benefits. The labour movement is weak and the P.E.I. Federation Of Labour has only about 3,000 members.

The islanders are overwhelmingly of British descent so there is no significant ethnic cleavage. In religious terms the island is divided almost equally between Protestants and Catholics and there is little correlation between religion and party preference. There are few internal cleavages and the most important issue is provincial/federal relations because of the fact that P.E.I. depends proportionately more for equalization payments than does any other province with over 50% of its revenues coming from Ottawa.

P.E.I. has shared the Atlantic provinces' values of traditionalism, conservatism and community, parochialism and the sanctity of the family farm. However, since the 1960s there has been some modernization such as the advocacy of

industrialization, an increase in education levels and in mobility and also a diversification of the economy at the expense of agriculture. As a result of modernization, it is claimed that political parties are being displaced in importance by interest groups, bureaucracy and the media. Furthermore, petty political intrigues over appointments, contracts, or public works for example, are seen as overshadowing the more serious issues such as economic development.⁵² Patronage continues to be a more common practice than in most other provinces though according to Noel, P.E.I. is moving towards what he calls clientelism⁵³ whereby bureaucrats replace politicians as the main dispensers of favours.

Despite these apparent indicators of transition within P.E.I. it is still considered to have the same 'underdeveloped' characteristics of its maritime neighbours. Prince Edward Island presents a paradox in that low levels of trust and efficacy co-exist with a high level of involvement. This province often has the highest turnout rate in the country at the federal and provincial levels - 82% and 84% respectively- and the Islanders also rate highly on other indicators of involvement such as attending political meetings, contacting public officials, reading about politics and

⁵² See Frank MacKinnon, 'Prince Edward Island, Big Engine, Little Body'. in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics. 2nd Ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1978.).

⁵³ see S.J.R. Noel's chapter, 'Leadership and Clientelism'. in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems.

engaging in party campaign work. At the same time they have a very low opinion about the ability and trustworthiness of government. Despite this apparent lack of confidence, the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties continue to dominate Island politics. Both parties balance religious and regional interests, maintain an intimate relationship with the 'grass-roots' (a task made all the easier by the smallness of the province) and encourage ties with the federal party. As Dyck says "the pre-industrial two-party system is well entrenched and neither the N.D.P., class consciousness nor ideology seems likely to upset it".⁵⁴

It is generally accepted that the patronage system is behind the high levels of involvement. Despite the fact that patronage has resulted in much government inefficiency it is "an unusually large encouragement of political participation, party loyalty and attention to the governments wishes".⁵⁵ The small size of the population must further exacerbate this situation and patronage is clearly something to account for in the analysis of this study's findings.

NOVA SCOTIA.

⁵⁴ Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.97.

⁵⁵ MacKinnon, 'Prince Edward Island, Big Engine, Little Body.', p.255.

Settlers of Nova Scotia have been overwhelmingly of British and Loyalist stock and by the time of Confederation the vast majority of Nova Scotians had come to agree on the values of tradition and conservatism that characterize the Atlantic provinces. However Nova Scotia is considered to be the most economically, socially and politically developed of the Maritime provinces.⁵⁶ Despite the typical Maritime conservatism evident in the province the Cape Breton area provides a contrast, being the only area east of Ontario to have ever elected an N.D.P. candidate at either the provincial or federal level.

Seventy-three percent of Nova Scotians are of British background and 96% use English in the home, although the province also has a higher proportion of minority ethnic groups, such as Germans, Dutch, Natives and Blacks than its neighbours. Because of this dominance by the British heritage ethnic politics have not been prominent although the situation of the Blacks in Cape Breton has come closest to it.

In religious terms the population is 58% Protestant while a sizeable minority (37%) are Roman Catholic, and this has been of some political importance. It is expected, though slightly less ardently than in P.E.I., that certain offices will alternate between Catholics and Protestants. On the other hand the issue of separate schools had been resolved

⁵⁶ Bellamy, 'The Atlantic Provinces.', p. 11.

before Confederation. While ethnic, religious and class divisions have not constituted serious political problems, Cape Breton, as a distinct geographic region and as a depressed economy, has suggesting intra-regional cultural diversity within Nova Scotia.

There has been a history in Nova Scotia of union and co-operative activity. The largest threat to the dominant two-party system came in 1920 when Farmer-Labour candidates polled 32.3% of the vote and won 11 seats. However, as J. Murray Beck points out, it is "revealing of the Nova Scotian character that the radicalism the province chose to support was the mildest imaginable".⁵⁷ The N.D.P. remains successful only in Cape Breton and the two-party system is not threatened. Furthermore, the co-operative movement tends to reinforce traditional values particularly the sanctity of the small community, and as such tends to channel discontent away from an overtly political direction. Although the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour has 65,000 members they are largely public service employees, which suggests that the Federation is likely to be 'middle class' and distinct from the Mineworkers, for example. The unionized Steelworkers and Mineworkers do engage in political activity such as striking, and they also have a strong affiliation to the N.D.P. to but this is countered by the fact that "many of the farmers, fishermen, and foresters temper their proleta-

⁵⁷ J. Murray Beck. 'Nova Scotia: Tradition and Conservatism.' in Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics. p.182.

rian consciousness with the strong mythology of independence and individualism of small producers".⁵⁸ The traditional attitudes of these small entrepreneurs may be more a reflection of the dominant attitudes of the society rather than a result of their occupation or lifestyle. It is apparent that workers in similar situations elsewhere in the country have different attitudes.

The four primary industries of agriculture, fishing, mining and forestry employ fewer than 10% of the province's population. The province has a relatively high level of manufacturing development with 3 Michelin tyre plants, a Volvo assembly plant and over twenty industrial parks. Furthermore Halifax is the financial and administrative centre of the Atlantic region and the province also has many defence installations. Nova Scotia has a higher per capita income and lower seasonal unemployment (though still 13%) than the other Maritime provinces. Four percent of the population make over \$30,000 while 15.2% of families were below the low income cutoff in 1982.

Although Nova Scotia retains a certain parochialism and dislike of outsiders its relations with Ottawa have steadily improved since Confederation, no doubt largely due to the fact that it receives over 40% of its revenue from the federal government (a figure lower than for other Atlantic provinces but considerably higher than elsewhere).

⁵⁸ Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.106.

The province shares the Maritime values of tradition, caution and conservatism and the fact that the population has remained static means that few new ideas have gained acceptance. It has a deferential political culture, predilection for 'father figures' in provincial leaders, a feeling of economic despondency, and a lack of confidence.⁵⁹ Nova Scotia still has vestiges of a patronage system making it similar to the other Maritime provinces. The province is, however, an exception in that it has its own unique co-operative movement. Its high participation rate has led Dyck to classify it as a 'subject-participant' culture. There are high rates of political activities, such as reading about politics, attending rallies, contacting public officials, working for candidates and working with others in the community to solve a problem.⁶⁰ However, according to Simeon and Elkins Nova Scotia still qualified as a 'disaffected' society despite higher scores than its neighbours. For example 57% did not feel that they could influence politics generally, 63% felt that they could do 'nothing', 64% concluded that they had 'no say' in politics. Nova Scotians also had the highest percentage in the country (78%) who felt that politics is 'too complicated'. Similarly, while their level of trust that the government does what is right 'all' or 'some of the time' (38%) was high for the Maritimes it was lower than the average for the country as a whole.⁶¹

⁵⁹ see Beck, 'Nova Scotia.', p.200

⁶⁰ see Chandler and Chandler, Public Policy. pp.77-83

QUEBEC

Quebec is unique in that it is the only province with a French majority. At the time of the 1981 census 80.2% of the population were of French background, while only 7.7% were British. Other minorities include Italians, Jews, and Greeks who are mainly centred in Montreal. The population in 1985 was over 6.5 million making it second in size to Ontario.

The Roman Catholic church (88% of Quebecers are nominally Catholic) has been central to the province's social and cultural identity. The main employment sectors are services, manufacturing and trade with the most valuable resource being hydro-electricity. Many firms and financial companies have their headquarters in Montreal and much of the more sophisticated manufacturing industries are located in or around the city. These industries include clothing, aeronautics, electronics, pharmaceuticals and chemicals.

However despite the fact that Quebec's gross provincial product is 2nd only to Ontario's, on a per capita basis it has historically ranked anywhere from 4th to 6th. In this sense it is a 'have not' province and it receives over 20% of its revenues from Ottawa. Quebec's problems stem from such factors as a relatively high birth rate (although in recent years it has fallen to be one of the lowest in any

⁶¹ see Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', Table iii. p.23

developed society in the world), labour intensive industry, seasonal employment, a reliance on imported technology and a vulnerability to market fluctuations and foreign competition. A traditional Quebec claim is that federal tariff and transportation policies have discriminated against it and in favour of Ontario.

Unemployment has traditionally been high in Quebec. Although organized labour has, in the past, been weak it is now much stronger with some 800,000 union members. Also since the early 1970's there has been good co-operation between public sector unions to collectively bargain for their members.

French-English cleavage has been at the root of a number of pre-occupations in Quebec politics over the last 25 years or so. The province has taken on the responsibility of protecting the 'French situation' particularly by broadening the jurisdiction of the province under the constitution, the epitome of such efforts being the election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976 and the rise of 'separatism'. Through the defeated referendum, Official Bilingualism and the recent Meech Lake Accord the separatist movement has ceased to be prominent.

Having secured the French character of the province the emphasis has shifted from politics to economics and Quebec has now got a strong democratic commitment which according

to Trudeau was lacking before 1960. In assessing the political culture of the province it is necessary to distinguish between the pre- and post 1960 periods. Before the 'Quiet Revolution' Quebec's political culture

was generally traditional, conservative, patronage oriented, authoritarian, backward, rural, corrupt and heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic church.⁶²

During the period of 'la survivance' under Duplessis, the dominance of the church promoted a "rural, religious, spiritual, family-oriented, isolated, defensive, simple, unsophisticated, French way of life".⁶³ The role of the state was minimal and even Labour unions, farmer's organizations and welfare services came under the auspices of the Catholic church. Patronage was rife under Duplessis, not least when used to attract non-resident corporations into the province, and was even more pervasive than in the Maritimes. To French Quebecers the provincial political system was seen as a dispenser of 'spoils' particularly in terms of jobs and contracts which they would not otherwise get from an economy dominated by the English. They simultaneously developed a deep devotion to partisan politics, a cynical approach to politicians, and a fear for political unpredictability. By the time Duplessis died in 1959 the forces of modernization, industrial development and secularization had already taken hold. The Liberal Party under Jean Lesage was elected in 1960 thus beginning the 'Quiet Revolution' which,

⁶² Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.187

⁶³ Ibid., p.188.

in the words of Ralph Heintzman signalled a "shift in attitudes towards the political process, representing a new confidence in politics and politicians".⁶⁴ This new-found confidence appears to be reflected in the province's support for the current federal government many of whose members, including the Prime Minister, were returned from Quebec. In the intervening years Quebec has developed into one of the most advanced provinces in the country particularly in terms of the ability and scope of its public service and in the control of patronage.

Writings in the early 1970's suggested that Quebec was making a "leap from a quasi-feudal society to a quasi-socialist one, with little or no liberal experience".⁶⁵ According to the Hartzian model of course this is quite understandable given the common values of community and collectivism. Wilson, in 1974, felt that Quebec was going through a 'transitional' phase towards a class based political system and Daniel Latouche among others made the argument that the Parti Quebecois had taken on board much left-wing ideology.⁶⁶ However, as noted earlier, the beginning of

⁶⁴ Ralph Heintzman, 'Political Culture In Quebec 1840-1960.' Canadian Journal Of Political Science. March 1983. cited in Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.189.

⁶⁵ Doug Norman, 'Regional and Provincial Political Cultures.', in, Donald C. Rowat (ed.), Provincial Government And Politics: Comparative Essays. 2nd Ed. (Ottawa: Department Of Political Science, Carleton University. 1973.) p.14

⁶⁶ see Daniel Latouche: 'Quebec'. in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. Chapter 2.

this decade saw a shift in emphasis from politics to economics particularly after the P.Q.'s referendum defeat and a downturn in the economy. Yet despite the increased role in the economy for the state and the larger element of organized labour in Quebec it can still only be said that social class is a more important aspect in the political culture of this province than it is in the Atlantic region. Class remains, according to this literature, less important than in the Western Provinces.

Simeon and Elkins studies found francophone Quebecers to register low levels of trust, efficacy and interest and as such they classified the province as 'disaffected', though less so than the Maritimes. Federal election turnouts are reasonable and provincial ones are high. In terms of involvement Quebecers registered above average scores and if Quebec has consolidated its 'transition' greater class awareness and more involvement is to be expected in this province.

ONTARIO

Ontario is really the cornerstone province of Canada. It is centrally located, has the largest population and constitutes the industrial heartland. It has traditionally been

the most prosperous province, as it has abundant natural resources and it is close to both the Canadian and U.S. markets. Housing the nation's capital and having a population of over 9 million has meant that Ontario's representation in Ottawa has been sufficient to ensure that national policies further its interests.

The province is very diversified in terms of its economy and its population. Services and manufacturing industry are the two largest sources of employment in the province. The federal share of provincial revenues is only around 15% (in contrast to the figure of 50%+ in P.E.I). Immigration has dwindled the numeric superiority of those of British background but through assimilation 86% of the population use English at home. The province is 82% urban according to Statistics Canada. The religious composition is 52% Protestant, 35.6% Roman Catholic and 7.3% no religious preference.

Although Ontario has been marked by some patterns of ethnic and religious politics (notably over the separate schools issue), class politics, regional politics and some urban-rural conflicts none of them have ever been very divisive. Economic development has tended to be the overriding concern and competition has been around the location of new industries. In line with this elections are generally fought on issues such as general government performance, leadership and scandal.

The Province's relations with the federal government have been mixed. On the one hand federal economic policy on such things as tariffs, transportation and banking have favoured Ottawa and the province's central location has mitigated against any feelings of alienation which are prevalent in the West. However, there have been heated battles between Ontario and Ottawa.⁶⁷ Ontario's governments have sought to maximize fiscal resources and, like the other provinces, have been quick to blame the federal government for any difficulties. This latter point was exacerbated by the fact that for a long period Ontario's government was Conservative and the federal one was Liberal. As Ontario has become more defensive in the light of western challenges to its political and economic power it has tended to support federal initiatives particularly those promoting free trade between the provinces while safeguarding its own interests. So relations have improved but the Free Trade Agreement may change all this as Ontario seeks to defend its own privileged position.

In terms of political culture Ontarians have little provincial consciousness and tend to see themselves primarily as Canadians. As well as the obvious centrality factor it is also possible to point to the high immigration rate and migration to Ontario from other provinces as reasons for this high feeling of national rather than provincial identity⁶⁸ It is also possible that increased conflict with other

⁶⁷ For examples see Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.268.

⁶⁸ For a detailed study of the effects of immigration and

provinces may result in a rise in awareness of their own provincial identity.

There are nonetheless certain values and attitudes that predominate in Ontario and these tend to be conservative, one source of which can be seen as the United Empire Loyalists. Yet Ontario is not as 'monolithically' conservative as, say, the Atlantic provinces. The province exhibits both caution and reform and Wilson has labelled it as "progressive conservative".⁶⁹ There is a collectivist side to the province's political culture and areas of Ontario have a strong N.D.P. tradition such that it can be categorized as a 'transitional' political culture. Ontarians rank high in terms of trust and efficacy. They are least likely to feel that politics is too complicated and among those most likely to feel that they can influence politics. Furthermore there is a fairly high level of trust in the province. In terms of involvement Ontarians have only ranked somewhere in the middle and this is born out by turnout rates which are 76% at federal elections and 65% at provincial ones. This latter figure was the second lowest in the country.

migration see David J. Elkins, 'The Horizontal Mosaic. Immigrants And Migrants In The Provincial Political Cultures'. in, Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, Small Worlds: Provinces And Parties In Canadian Political Life. (Toronto: Methuen, 1980). chapter 4.

⁶⁹ John Wilson, 'The Red Tory Province: Reflections On The Character Of The Ontario Political Culture.' in, D.C.Macdonald (ed.), The Government And Politics Of Ontario. 2nd ed. (Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1980.)

In reality, though, these figures give something of a distorted view because Ontario also contains a marginal sub-culture largely in the north of the province. It is described by Dyck as follows:

This is a culture of alienation, dependence, hand-outs and frustration, based on isolated settlements, distance from Toronto, poor communications and inadequate services. The north has its own ethnic diversity - Natives, French, Finns and many others - and has an economy based on extraction of natural resources.⁷⁰

There are many single industry towns which are vulnerable to external markets, high unemployment, emigration and pollution. The large number of native reserves and the isolation of many small communities has meant that few inhabitants of this marginal sub-culture have a strong identity to Ontario. Finally, Ontario is not immune to allegations of patronage and a vast patronage system has operated in the period since the war, rewarding loyal Conservative supporters. However Ontario now has effective election finances legislation that has lessened corporate sponsorship of the Conservative Party. The public service, by comparison, has been based on the merit principle longer than most provinces.

MANITOBA.

Manitoba, which is considered Canada's 'average' province being the fifth largest, fifth most economically advanced, with a balanced economy, average ethnic distribution, and

⁷⁰ Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.270.

the fourth largest Francophone community, is most distinctive in that over half of the population lives in the capital city, Winnipeg.

Manitoba differs from the other Prairie provinces in that it contains large bodies of water and has access to Ocean shipping via Hudson Bay at Churchill. The population of the province is just over 1 million and is 71% urban. Politically Manitoba can be divided into 3 main regions, Winnipeg, the rich agricultural southwest and the marginal north and northeast. Agriculture, mining and forestry remain important in Manitoba though manufacturing is also significant. Hydroelectric power is in abundance and is exported to Saskatchewan, Ontario and the U.S. Despite a relatively low per capita income level Manitoba does have low unemployment rates (8.3% in 1984).

In terms of demography Manitoba shares many important features with the other Western provinces. These provinces have the highest proportion of residents who are of neither British nor French stock. Furthermore, having been settled more recently these provinces contain immigrants, whether from Britain or from continental Europe had quite different ideologies from those who settled the East. For example, the British settlers were by and large trade unionists and various kinds of socialists, those from Europe were often Marxists or social democrats while many of those from America were also recent arrivals from Europe and as such possessed

similar ideologies. These ideologies, of course, had barely existed when the East was settled. Not surprisingly then the west has tended to reject 'national' party systems and have witnessed coalitions, non-party governments, the rise of several third parties and the decline of the Conservative and/or the Liberal parties in all of the western provinces at one time or another. Manitoba, however, witnessed more immigration from Ontario than did the other western provinces which helped to instill attitudes of Central Canadian liberalism with a 'tory touch'. For this reason it can be argued, as it is by Wilson, that Manitoba has as much in common with Ontario as it does with the West.

The labour movement in Manitoba is not particularly strong. The Manitoba Federation of Labour has a membership of just 74,000 and the largest unions are those of the public service. Manitoba receives over 30% of its revenues from Ottawa which in part accounts for the good federal/provincial relations. Demographically Manitoba has the smallest percentage of British descendants outside Quebec (only 37%), and the other dominant ethnic groups are the French, Germans and Ukrainians. Eighty-six percent speak English at home, 57% are Protestant and 32% are Catholic.

The radical elements in Manitoba did not come from among the farming community but rather from the British working class immigrants and a minority of continental European immigrants who formed the basis of labour, socialist and communist movements. Dyck claims that:

Now that the majority of working class continental Europeans have shrugged off their deferential Liberal loyalties the province consists of a more balanced division of classes⁷¹

Such a class-based political system would, using Wilson's or Jensen's framework,⁷² suggest a 'modern' developed political culture in the province, although both studies consider Manitoba to be a 'transitional' province. According to Simeon and Elkins earlier studies Manitoba ranked high in terms of efficacy trust and involvement and was so labelled a 'citizen society'. However, their more recent research⁷³ and that of Chandler and Chandler, suggests that the province warrants a lower rating. Although it has a relatively high score regarding political interest, perception of government's impact and political discussion it ranks low in terms of involvement and high in the belief that politics is too complicated to understand and that people have no say in what government does. Voter turnout is medium to low with figures between 73-75% at both levels. It seems then, that as with so many things Manitoba has a medium ranking on our political culture indicators. It must be remembered that in Manitoba, as in Ontario, aggregate data does not necessarily reflect regional diversity within a province.

SASKATCHEWAN

⁷¹ Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.344.

⁷² see chapter 1 for a discussion of these studies.

⁷³ see Simeon and Elkins, Small Worlds.

While wheat remains the province's most important industry (providing 60% of the national total) there has also been rapid growth and prosperity based on the mining industries and oil, thus transforming Saskatchewan into a 'have' province. Nonetheless agriculture remains very important and is the second largest employer in the province, behind the service sector, with mining third. The population of around 1 million is considered to be 58% urban.

The manufacturing sector is even more limited than those of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick but it is more diverse. The province is second only to Alberta as a producer of crude oil. The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour has only 66,000 members though this is not surprising given the agricultural setting. There is a strong tradition of co-operative organizations stemming back to the original settlers' attempts to counter federal government policies and central Canadian corporations. These co-operatives include the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, retail stores, credit unions, and many service co-operatives covering such things as child care centres, local bus lines, and health clinics. The strength of the C.C.F./ N.D.P. has rested as much on these co-operatives and the farming community much more than it has on organized labour.

In the early years of the province's history there was a political cleavage along religious lines. Saskatchewan has only a tiny French population and the division took the form

of English Protestants voting Conservative and the English Catholics voting Liberal. However since 1930, largely because of the immigration patterns outlined in the Manitoba section, the province has taken on a more ideological character. The urban working class has not been as strong in Saskatchewan as in Manitoba so the cleavage has been between poorer and richer farmers, with a class based ideological pattern that has seen labour join one side and business the other.

With good reason the people of Saskatchewan see themselves as politically sophisticated. Their need to collectivize in the face of adversity, particularly during the depression was aided by the dominance of social democracy and radical populism which, according to Wiseman,⁷⁴ among others, was a result of having more British working class settlers and fewer Ontario liberals than was the case in Manitoba. The growth of the C.C.F. party and later the N.D.P. stemmed from the co-operatives and as Lipsett has argued there was a very strong class-consciousness and a sense of involvement as so many C.C.F. voters and supporters were active in co-operatives. Furthermore, the election of the C.C.F. in 1944 meant that Saskatchewan developed modern bureaucratic government earlier than the other provinces. In order not to dilute the party's aims the bureaucracy was a combination of merit and sympathy for the C.C.F. position.

⁷⁴ Norman Wiseman, 'The Pattern Of Prairie Politics.', in H.G. Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics In Canada. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall. 1967.)

In terms of efficacy and trust Saskatchewan residents only rank in the middle of the range although they clearly reject the idea that government does not care what people think. Furthermore, according to both Simeon and Elkins and Chandler and Chandler, the province ranks very high in terms of political participation with provincial and federal turnout rates being 80% and 76% respectively. They were also most likely to participate in a campaign, contact public officials and work with others in the community to solve problems. These latter points are examples of the type of political involvement which this thesis believes are important to the political culture and linked to class consciousness.

Using Wilson's and Jensen's frameworks, outlined in chapter one, Saskatchewan is seen as a 'developed' province (Wilson) and a 'modern' one (Jensen) in that it has a class-based two party system and that class is the major cleavage for the mobilization of the electorate. Strange as it may seem in a traditionally agricultural province, Saskatchewan has been seen as the most politically advanced of all the provinces.

ALBERTA.

Despite being a poor agricultural province for the first forty years of its existence Alberta is also seen as "the home of fabulous petroleum wealth, gorgeous mountain scenery

and smouldering western alienation".⁷⁵

Alberta has a population of around 2.3 millions over half of which live in Calgary and Edmonton. The province is, according to Statistics Canada, 77% urban, with urban and rural differences providing one of a number of tensions. Others include those between Calgary and Edmonton, the North and South as well as those between the agricultural and the petroleum industries, though none of these tensions have been too injurious.

Alberta's affluence is reflected in its per capita income levels and in the fact that it has the lowest proportions of low income families. The Alberta Federation Of Labour has about 100,000 members which is proportionately quite low and is thought to be a product of a general conservatism, government policies to discourage unionism and the fact that the petroleum industries offer high wages and the promise of a secure future⁷⁶ (the extent to which this latter point still holds true is debatable). The large numbers of American settlers at the beginning of this century bringing into the province a populist liberal ideology may also influence the lack of union militancy. These factors can also account for the relative weakness of the N.D.P.

⁷⁵ Dyck, Provincial Politics. p.444.

⁷⁶ See Jack Masson and Peter Blaikie, 'Labour Politics In Alberta'. in Carlo Calderola, ed. Society And Politics In Alberta. (Toronto: Methuen, 1979) p.282.

Although only 43.6% of the population are of British descent, the small Francophone influence has meant the assimilation of other immigrant groups into English so that 92% use it at home. The religious breakdown is 56% Protestant, 28% Catholic, and 12% with no religious preference. There has been remarkably little division in the province along either ethnic, religious or class lines.

The real antagonisms exist, not internally, but rather externally, in the form of provincial/federal relations. Sources of conflict have included tariffs, freight rates, natural resources legislation, problems of credit and the central banking system as well as bi-lingualism (only 2.8% of the population have French as their mother tongue) and the National Energy Program which raised threats of Albertan separation in the early 1980's. Alberta's ability to retaliate is largely due to the fact that it does not receive equalization payments and the federal governments contribution to provincial revenues was (in 1982-3) only 6.5%, the lowest rate in the country. Relations with central have actually improved since the fall of Trudeau and the Liberals and the rise of the Conservatives.

The province has a very positive self image and its remarkable internal consensus means that it has little time for external obstacles. This is not merely the result of an arrogant, wealthy, western conservative ideology but is rather a part of a longer tradition of unusual political

movements with a penchant for direct democracy. The United Farmers Of Alberta (U.F.A.) who governed the province from 1921 to 1935 were radical democratic populists like those in Manitoba and in the co-operatives in Saskatchewan. However, the U.F.A. and its successor the Social Credit Party espoused 'right-wing' populism rather than 'left-wing' populism and this is considered to be a result of the fact that Alberta had fewer British working class settlers and more Americans with their radical brand of individualistic, liberal populism and an emphasis on monetary theories.

Social Credit was more authoritarian than the U.F.A. had been and was far less concerned with direct democracy and popular participation. It concentrated on an anti-socialist platform. As a result there is a lack of participatory spirit in Alberta and the Conservative dominance of the last two decades has done nothing to change this. Turnout rates are very low at both levels largely as a result of the authoritative and one-party government. The province has rated a medium score in terms of trust and efficacy (see Simeon and Elkins and Chandler and Chandler) and low in terms of involvement such as following politics, discussing it, attending meetings or working in a campaign. However in Wilson's terms Alberta ranks high as ethnic and religious cleavages have given way to an ideological one. While this is largely a one-party system dominated by the Conservatives and a free enterprise spirit the N.D.P. does form the main

opposition force providing a social democratic alternative, albeit a weak one.

BRITISH COLUMBIA.

British Columbia is in many ways the most unorthodox of the Canadian provinces, a lush green paradise always among the wealthiest of the provinces yet somehow cut-off from the rest of the country.

The service and trade sectors are the two largest employers, with tourism being particularly important. The manufacturing, transportation, construction and government and finance sectors all employ more people than the primary industries, the largest of which is forestry. The province has a high per capita income and relatively low proportions of low income earners and low income families. However the unemployment rate is often high (14.7% in 1984).

The population of B.C. is made up of 51% British descendants, 7% German, 3.6% Chinese, 3.4% French, as well as Scandinavians, Dutch, Natives, Ukrainians and Italians. Assimilation has meant that 92% of the population use English at home. Fifty per cent of British Columbians are Protestant, 20% Catholic and 21% of no organized religion. There have never been political cleavages along ethnic or religious lines. The traditional pre-occupation has been with

economic development though B.C. does have its regional cleavages. In particular, Vancouver is often seen as a parasite, siphoning off the wealth of other regions. Because settlement in B.C. occurred later than it did in central Canada the British immigrants at the turn of the century represented a 'fragment' of a parent society which was witnessing increasing class consciousness, the formation of trade unions and the rise of the Labour Party. As a result there has been a long history of labour political activity and class consciousness among the workers, not just in the urban centres but also in the forestry and mining towns where the divisions have been a class oriented 'workers versus management' dichotomy. Strong trade unionism is responsible for the high incomes in the province and for the relative prominence of the N.D.P.

However, at the other extreme of British Columbia's bipolarity one finds values and attitudes emphasising individual achievement and economic growth. Galbraith suggests that B.C. represents "a fragment of Edwardian Britain"⁷⁷ and that along with the working class, union oriented settlers came a large class of white-collar clerical workers with their own middle-class aspirations and a desire to disassociate themselves from the manual workers. This end of the spectrum are represented by the Social Credit party at the expense of the Liberals and the Conservatives which suggests a certain

⁷⁷ Gordon S. Galbraith, 'British Columbia'. in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. p.69

'populism' though not as strong as on the prairies.

This lack of dominance by the 'traditional' parties also indicates B.C.'s disassociation from central Canada and the federal government. Relations between the two are indifferent rather than hostile and the province receives less than 15% of its revenues from Ottawa. The political culture is one of self-centredness and self-satisfaction, and the continuing of immigration into the province, particularly from East Asia, is of people who know nothing of central Canada.

According to Simeon and Elkins⁷⁸ British Columbia's high levels of efficacy and trust gives it the most highly developed political culture of any province. British Columbians were also the least likely to agree with statements such as 'government is so complicated that it cannot be understood', 'government does not care what people think' and 'people have no say in what government does'.⁷⁹ The province ranks highest on questions of political interest, material and life satisfaction, and reading and discussing politics. It also ranked second in attempting to convince others to adopt a particular political opinion.

The great polarity and the fact that the parties are so different undoubtedly provide reasons for these findings and in terms of Wilson's model B.C. has a 'developed' political culture, that is a political system with a class based

⁷⁸ Simeon and Elkins, Small Worlds. p.51.

⁷⁹ see Chandler and Chandler, Public Policy. pp. 76-83.

cleavage. It is also worthy of note that this is a province-wide phenomenon and not merely confined to urban centres. Both the working class movement and the middle class entrepreneurs have united across geographical divisions in order to defend themselves against the other. As Galbraith says, "the existence of each is vital to the maintenance of internal discipline within the other"⁸⁰

SUMMARY.

These brief outlines of the cultural settings of the provinces of Canada are intended to provide a framework from which explanations for the findings of this study can be drawn. Previous political culture studies, such as those of Simeon and Elkins, Jensen and Wilson have been discussed in order to provide a basis upon which to build the methodology for this study and to give some indicators as to the validity of both the reasons for the study and of the conclusions that can be drawn from it.

It is time to turn to a description of the specific methodology employed by this study and to analyse the results in order to see how the thesis propositions hold up. Each stage will be described along with other related findings which resulted from our exploration of methodological approaches. Any deviation from the expectations of the study and any qualifications which have to be made in terms of the validity of the data processing will be discussed.

⁸⁰ Galbraith, in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. p.70.

CHAPTER THREE

The Acid Test: Do The Propositions Stand Up?

The emphasis of this chapter is on the data processing procedures and the results that they yielded. To keep to a strict format the individual propositions are examined separately although other relevant information which came to light through the examination of these propositions will also be discussed. This chapter will offer only bare explanations for the findings as the final chapter attempts to draw together these results in terms of how they relate to the existing literature on Canadian political culture.


The initial proposition deals with the effect of region on the political culture. A frequency table depicting the proportions of each culture type in the national sample acts as a standard against which to assess regional variation. The political culture types were created using variables very similar to those utilized by Simeon and Elkins.⁸¹ The variables pertaining to efficacy were as follows: 1) 'politics/Government too complicated'; 2) 'respondent does not have any say'; and 3) 'does not matter if respondent votes or not'. These variables were recoded and a new variable 'efficacy' was created. A similar 'trust' variable was created using four existing variables: 1) 'people in Federal government dishonest'; 2) 'Federal governments waste tax money'; 3) 'trust Federal government doing'; and 4, 'smart peo-

⁸¹ Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures', p.26.

ple run Federal government'. The 'trust' and 'efficacy' variables were then dichotomized into those who do and those who do not have a sense of trust and a sense of efficacy. Crosstabulating these variables creates the culture type ('Cult') variable. The frequency table for this new variable showed results very similar to those of Simeon and Elkins, (see Figure 2). The 'supporter' category constituted 25.3% of respondents, the 'disaffecteds' 35.2%, the 'critics' 29% and the 'deferentials' 10.4%. Simeon and Elkins' figures were: 24% 'supporters', 34% 'disaffected', 30% 'critics', and 10% 'deferents'.

It is worth noting that an analysis of the separate 'trust' and 'efficacy' items produces quite different results, depending on which indicator is employed. For example, taking the two variables 'Respondent does not have any say' and 'trust Federal government doing' as the most obvious indicators of efficacy and trust produced a typology which was constituted as follows: 24% 'supporters', 26.4% 'disaffecteds', 11.1% 'critics', and 37.2% 'deferents'. Obviously each different indicator yields widely differing responses even though they may be tapping similar political orientations. The decision to sum a number of different variables to create one indicator of each orientation should enhance the validity of the combined measure just as it increases the degree to which the present study is comparable to the earlier research done by Simeon and Elkins.


FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CULTURE TYPES



In order to control for region, the culture type variable was crosstabulated with the 'province of interview' variable. The proposition that different culture types exist in different proportions in the different regions (ie. the regions have different political cultures) is clearly supported by the results in Figure 3. For example, New Brunswick contained by far the highest proportion of 'disaffecteds' (53% of New Brunswickers fell into this category) and, equally clearly, the lowest level of 'supporters' (11.8%). Not suprisingly this province also contained very few 'critics' and 'deferents'. P.E.I. contains the highest proportion of 'supporters' and the second highest number of 'deferents'. It's low ranking in terms of the number of 'critics' suggests that the adult population of the Island is highly trusting but has a low sense of efficacy.

Higher levels of 'critics' are evident in the Western provinces and, to a certain extent, in Ontario. British Columbia has the highest proportion (38.4%) with Alberta second (34.2%). Correspondingly, B.C. has the fewest 'deferents' and the second fewest 'supporters' suggesting very low levels of trust despite its high levels of efficacy. It is interesting that the four Western provinces all exhibit high levels of efficacy and low levels of trust. With the exception of New Brunswick the Maritimes show higher levels of trust and lower levels of efficacy. Newfoundland is some-

FIGURE 3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CULTURE TYPES BY REGION
AND THE NATIONAL SAMPLE



thing of an anomaly as it contains high proportions of both 'supporters' and 'disaffecteds' suggesting two quite distinct sub-cultures. Less suprisingly, Newfoundland contains the lowest level of 'critics'. Quebec's high proportion of 'supporters' and 'deferents' indicates high levels of trust in the province. The proportion of Ontario respondents, in all four categories, is close to the mean figures though the province shows slightly higher levels of 'supporters' and 'critics' and lower levels of 'disaffecteds' and 'deferents'. Possible explanations for all of these findings will be discussed in Chapter 4.

In testing the second proposition that greater class consciousness is to be found in modern regions, the item which taps class consciousness (Do you think of yourself as a social class member?) was crosstabulated with the 'province of interview' item. The 'think social class member' variable has been taken as the indicator of class consciousness because it was felt that a respondent placing him/herself in a social class without prompting suggested a certain awareness about one's subjective class position. Seeing oneself as a class member implies a sense of class consciousness.⁸²


⁸² While this measure has been employed as the indicator of 'class consciousness' there are weaknesses in it which need to be acknowledged. The most important of these is that this measure does not explain what 'class consciousness' means to a respondent. It may mean no more than an awareness of one's socio-economic position rather than a shared sense of 'community', identity, and role in the economic system which is the marxist connotation of the term.

Nationally 46.5% of respondents said that they did think of themselves as a social class member while 53.5% did not.

The most significant regional variation occurs in Quebec. In this province 66.2% considered themselves to be a social class member while only 33.8% did not. Generally the figures tend to support the proposition (see Figure 4). Quebec excepted, the highest rates of class consciousness were evident in Ontario and B.C.. The lowest levels, as expected, appeared in the Atlantic provinces particularly P.E.I. (19.4%) and Newfoundland (25%). Nova Scotia and especially New Brunswick had figures much closer to the national average. These figures suggest that there is a weak association between class consciousness and region ($\Lambda = 0.0766$), although this distribution is statistically significant at the .001 level.

The third proposition examines the proportion of class consciousness evident in each culture type. To this end the class consciousness variable was crosstabulated with the 'cult' variable. The null hypothesis is that there will be no relationship between class consciousness and a sense of trust or efficacy. The results (see Figure 5.) suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected as the figures are significant at the .001 level although the level of association is not strong. The proposition that 'critics' and 'supporters' are more likely to be class conscious than 'disaffecteds' or 'deferents' is clearly borne out. Both the 'support-


FIGURE 4
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CLASS CONSCIOUS VS. NON-CLASS
 CONSCIOUS RESPONDENTS BY REGION AND THE NATIONAL SAMPLE



ers' and the 'critics' categories contain over 50% of class conscious respondents while the 'deferents' contain 42.8% and the 'disaffecteds' 41.8%. The two categories which imply a feeling of efficacy are the most likely to be class conscious while the deferents (trust only) are more likely than the 'disaffecteds' (neither trust nor efficacy) to be class conscious. Although the proposition is borne out and the results are statistically significant the low level of association ($\Lambda = 0.02233$) means that any attempt to link a sense of efficacy to class consciousness must be cautious.

It seems from the evidence so far presented that class consciousness is somewhat more apparent among the culture types with a higher sense of efficacy. Assuming that respondents with a sense of efficacy are more likely to be involved in politics at some level than are those who do not feel that they have a say, then it follows that greater involvement should be expected from those with a sense of class consciousness. The fourth proposition of the thesis is concerned with this notion. It is expected that while high 'objective' class status respondents may be more involved than those with a lower status all groups will be more involved if they are subjectively class conscious. To test this proposition each indicator of involvement was crosstabulated with a newly created 'objective' class variable (Oclass) while controlling for class consciousness.

FIGURE 6
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CLASS CONSCIOUS AND NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS
 RESPONDENTS AMONG CULTURE TYPES AND THE NATIONAL SAMPLE



The discussion in the first chapter specified that the objective class variables used here are education level, income (in 1983), and occupation status. These three variables were each dichotomized, with labels of 'lower' and 'upper' class being assigned to each one. In each case the decision as to the demarcation point between 'lower' and 'upper' was not an arbitrary one. In the case of education level 'lower' was deemed to be those educated only up to, and including, the high school graduate level. This decision was made on the grounds that when education level was cross-tabulated with class consciousness the results showed that up to the 'high school grad.' level all categories contained less than 50% of class conscious respondents. In all categories of education above this level the situation was reversed with over 50% of respondents being class conscious. Furthermore the 'high school grad.' category contained the median response. A similar picture was apparent for 'income'. In all income categories up to those earning \$20,000 per annum there were less than 50% of respondents who were class conscious, while almost all categories above this level were more likely than not to be class conscious. In this instance the \$15,000 to \$19,999 category contained the median response. In the case of 'occupation status' the demarcation point was even more straight forward - a dichotomy between manual and non-manual workers. The 'Blisshen Scale'⁸³

⁸³ see, B.R. Blisshen; 'A Socio-Economic Index For Occupations In Canada'. Canadian Review Of Sociology And

was examined but was considered more detailed than is required here.

The combined objective class variable (Oclass) was also dichotomized into 'lower' and 'upper' class. All those respondents who fitted into the 'lower' class value of two or more of the three indicators were ranked 'lower' on the new variable. Similarly, all those who rated 'upper' in two or more of the original variables were rated 'upper' in Oclass. This combined measure of objective class was then crosstabulated with the involvement variables, controlling for class consciousness.

The first involvement indicator that was examined measured the likelihood of respondents to vote in federal elections. This variable was chosen as the starting point for the analysis of involvement because it taps a basic form of political participation and as such is included in most studies of the subject. Three variables, concerned with whether the respondent voted in 1979, in 1980 and in 1984, were dichotomized into 'yes' or 'no', and then summed to create a new variable called 'vote'. The procedure was as follows. A 'yes' response on the original variables scored '1' while a 'no' scored '2'. A respondent scoring '1' on all three variables therefore had a combined score of '3' on the new 'vote' variable. Respondents who voted in two of the three elections (two scores of '1' and one of '2') scored

Anthropology. (February 1968).

'4' on the new variable. Similarly a score of '5' on 'vote' signified a respondent had voted in one of the elections but not in the other two, while a score of '6' meant that a respondent had not voted in any of the three elections. The new variable ('vote') was then recoded so that a score of '3' became '1' (and labelled 'often'), '4' became '2' (labelled 'sometimes'), '5' became '3' ('seldom') and '6' became '4' ('never'). The results of this procedure are presented in Table 1i.

Table 1i. shows that the 'upper' class respondents are clearly more likely to vote 'often' (approximately 84%) than are the 'lower' class respondents (77%), and are only about 1/3 as likely to 'never' vote. However, it can be seen from these figures that even among the 'lower' class respondents 90% of people are likely to vote at least 'sometimes'.

The relationship between class consciousness and voting in federal elections is equally clear although less dramatic. Regardless of objective class status, respondents who were non-class conscious were less likely to vote 'often' than those with a sense of class consciousness, and were more likely to 'never' vote than the class conscious respondents.

The second indicator of involvement that was examined measured the respondents' 'attention to politics generally'. This variable was chosen because it was felt to be the first

TABLE 1i
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF RESPONDENTS TO VOTE IN FEDERAL ELECTION BY THEIR OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
OFTEN	84.7	78.6	83.1	75.0
SOMETIMES	9.7	10.8	11.3	12.3
SELDOM	4.0	6.8	3.9	7.0
NEVER	1.5	3.8	1.8	5.6
(N)	(452)	(660)	(337)	(925)

GAMMA = 0.206
 SIGN. = 0.0187

GAMMA = 0.247

TABLE 1ii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S ATTENTION TO POLITICS GENERALLY BY THEIR OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
VERY CLOSELY	26.7	16.6	22.6	15.9
FAIRLY CLOSELY	49.1	43.3	50.1	39.2
NOT MUCH AT ALL	24.2	40.1	27.3	45.0
(N)	(550)	(813)	(381)	(1121)

GAMMA = 0.299

GAMMA = 0.287

TABLE iii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S PASSIVE INVOLVEMENT (READING ABOUT POLITICS IN THE NEWSPAPER AND WATCHING POLITICAL PROGRAMS ON T.V.) BY THEIR OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
OFTEN	56.9	40.9	52.8	36.6
SOMETIMES	34.4	37.6	35.2	36.7
SELDOM	7.3	18.8	9.2	20.7
NEVER	1.5	2.7	2.9	6.0
(N)	(550)	(812)	(381)	(1124)

GAMMA = 0.3216

TABLE iv
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S LOW-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (DISCUSS POLITICS AND CONVINC OTHERS TO VOTE THE SAME) BY THEIR OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
OFTEN	16.5	12.3	11.3	7.6
SOMETIMES	37.8	28.2	38.0	24.7
SELDOM	42.2	48.6	42.2	45.7
NEVER	3.5	10.9	8.4	22.0
(N)	(550)	(811)	(379)	(1124)

GAMMA = 0.251

TABLE 1v
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEDIUM-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (ATTEND POLITICAL MEETINGS AND CONTACT POLITICIANS) BY THEIR OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
OFTEN	6.6	2.7	5.3	3.3
SOMETIMES	21.7	13.9	16.4	11.0
SELDOM	39.2	34.6	44.3	29.6
NEVER	32.5	48.7	34.0	56.1
(N)	(548)	(811)	(379)	(1120)

GAMMA = 0.294

GAMMA = 0.336

TABLE 1vi
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S HIGH-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (WORK FOR AND GIVE MONEY TO POLITICAL PARTIES) BY THEIR OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
OFTEN	4.0	3.0	3.9	2.9
SOMETIMES	13.7	8.5	10.0	6.5
SELDOM	24.5	20.6	27.9	16.9
NEVER	57.8	68.0	58.2	73.8
(N)	(547)	(812)	(380)	(1120)

GAMMA = 0.2019

GAMMA = 0.296

TABLE 1vii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN NEIGHBOURHOOD ORGANIZATIONS BY THEIR
 OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
VERY ACTIVE	1.1	0.6	1.8	0.6
FAIRLY ACTIVE	5.3	3.4	5.8	2.2
INACTIVE	4.2	2.2	1.8	1.0
NOT A MEMBER	89.5	93.7	90.6	96.2
(N)	(550)	(813)	(381)	(1124)

GAMMA = 0.267
 SIGN. = 0.0381

GAMMA = 0.4429

TABLE 1viii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THEIR
 OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
VERY ACTIVE	3.1	1.5	1.8	1.3
FAIRLY ACTIVE	8.4	4.9	4.7	3.3
INACTIVE	6.7	3.7	3.9	2.5
NOT A MEMBER	81.8	89.9	89.5	92.9
(N)	(550)	(812)	(381)	(1124)

GAMMA = 0.314

GAMMA = 0.202
 SIGN. = 0.21

TABLE 1ix
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS BY THEIR
 OBJECTIVE CLASS POSITION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

	CLASS CONSCIOUS		NON-CLASS CONSCIOUS	
	UPPER	LOWER	UPPER	LOWER
VERY ACTIVE	1.3	0.4	0.5	1.2
FAIRLY ACTIVE	3.3	1.8	2.6	1.7
INACTIVE	2.2	1.6	1.8	0.4
NOT A MEMBER	93.3	96.2	95.0	96.8
(N)	(550)	(812)	(381)	(1124)

GAMMA = 0.289
 SIGN. = 0.0633

GAMMA = 0.2159
 SIGN. = 0.014

stage towards more direct or active involvement. As Ronald D. Lambert et al. point out,⁸⁴ paying attention to politics can be seen as a precursor to becoming more actively involved in politics. The null hypothesis, to be examined was that neither objective class position nor a sense of consciousness effect ones 'attention to politics generally'. The findings suggest that this null hypothesis can be rejected (see Table 1 ii.). The results again were statistically significant.⁸⁵ Of those who are class conscious 60% are 'lower' class, objectively defined, while 40% are 'upper' class. The 'upper' class are disproportionately highly represented among those who follow politics closely (52.1%) and low among those who pay 'not much' attention (29%). The 'lower' class constitutes 71% of this latter category. A similar situation is apparent among those who were not class conscious although it must be made clear that fully 75% of these respondents fall into the 'lower' class category. The pattern remains that 'upper' class respondents are more likely than 'lower' class respondents to pay close attention to politics.

The second stage of this proposition is that a feeling of class consciousness will also increase one's 'attention to politics generally' independently of objective class posi-

⁸⁴ Ronald D. Lambert et al. 'The Sources Of Political Knowledge.' Canadian Journal Of Political Science. June 1988.

⁸⁵ All results presented in this thesis were significant to the 0.01 level unless otherwise stated.

tion. The results indicate that this is the case although the measure of association is less strong than for the objective class measure. Among the class conscious respondents it was found that 20.7% paid 'very close' attention to politics, 45.6% paid 'fairly close' attention and 33.7% paid 'not much' attention. For these same categories among the non-class conscious respondents the composition was 17.6% 'very close', 41.9% 'fairly close' and 40.5% 'not much' attention. A clear pattern is apparent here with a reasonably strong level of association ($\Gamma = 0.29928$ and 0.287) suggesting a quite definite impact by class consciousness on 'attention to politics generally'.

The same methodology was applied to the entire list of variables which constitute indicators of political involvement. Each variable is discussed separately here although some of them are grouped together to produce the tables presented later in this chapter. The second indicator which was examined covered the extent to which respondents 'read about politics in papers'. The results proved very similar to those for 'attention to politics generally'. The higher objective class status respondents record highest levels of involvement. This indicator shows high levels of involvement for both the 'lower' and the 'upper' classes (almost 70%, and 85% respectively). Almost 80% of respondents who think in class terms were likely to read about politics 'often' or 'sometimes'. As expected the figure was lower among the non-

class conscious respondents, dropping to 69%. Similar levels of participation were recorded for the variable relating to 'watching political programmes on t.v.'. In both the class conscious and non-class conscious categories about 70% of respondents reported using this medium for information 'often' or 'sometimes'. Objective class position had less bearing on these results which confirms the pervasive nature of television.

To this point the indicators of involvement have not implied participation. The following variables however suggest at least some form of action on the part of the respondent. These variables are presented in order according to the degree of participation by the respondent which each implies. The first 'active' involvement indicator is concerned with whether the respondent 'discusses politics with others'. Among the 'upper' class respondents 75% do so 'often' while among the 'lower' class the figure is only 58%. The impact of objective class status is, therefore, quite significant. This is also true of class consciousness. Of the class conscious respondents as a whole, 68.3% discussed politics at least 'sometimes' while this figure for the non-class conscious was reduced to 58.8%. The non-class conscious respondents were twice as likely to 'never' discuss politics (20%) than were the class conscious respondents. Of the non-class conscious respondents in the 'never' category 90% were from the 'lower' class objectively defined. These

figures are significant and have a reasonably strong level of association (a Gamma value of 0.325).

One very significant trend which is apparent from the results is that as the type of involvement which the indicators tap becomes increasingly participation-oriented so the percentage of respondents who answer 'often' or 'sometimes' decreases. Among the class conscious only 21.6% of respondents try to 'convince friends to vote the same' 'often' or 'sometimes'. The two objective classes are equally represented in these categories. However the 'lower' class constitutes 64% of those who never try to convince their friends. The 'upper' class is higher in the 'seldom' category. Among the non-class conscious respondents only 15.8% try to 'convince friends to vote the same' 'sometimes' or 'often'. Seventy-three percent of the 'lower' class (non-class conscious) and 60% of the 'upper' class 'never' do so.

Even among the class conscious respondents the percentage who attend political meetings or rallies 'often' or 'sometimes' is less than 20%. Twenty-two percent of the 'upper' class, class conscious respondents are likely to do so while for the 'lower' status group the figure is 16%. Among the non-class conscious respondents these figures are lower still. Only 16.8% of these respondents attend meetings 'often' or 'sometimes', with an objective class breakdown of 19.8% 'upper' and 15.8% lower' class respondents. At the other end of involvement scale 69.2% of lower status respon-

dents and 54.2% of 'upper' class respondents claim that they 'never' attend such meetings or rallies.

Although the number of respondents in the highly active involvement categories are quite low this is not a surprising finding. Of significance here is that a clear pattern has emerged of the 'upper' class respondents being more involved than the 'lower' class respondents and that a feeling of class consciousness further increases involvement levels. In terms of the respondents' propensity to contact politicians this pattern continues. One quarter of the class conscious respondents do so at least 'sometimes', while among the non-class conscious this figure is only 18%. Among the class conscious the 'upper' class are almost twice as likely as the 'lower' class to be involved in this way 'sometimes' or 'often'. The difference is only slightly less pronounced among the non-class conscious. Taking the respondents as a whole, 52.8% of the class conscious 'never' contact a politician while among the non-class conscious this figure is 62.6%.

The 'upper' class and the class conscious are more likely to 'work for a political party'. Although the numbers in the highly involved categories are low, 18.5% of the 'upper' class respondents among the class conscious work for a political party at least 'sometimes'. This figure is twice as high as that for the 'lower' class respondents in the non-class conscious category. The similar findings for the

variable concerned with 'giving money to political parties' allows the two variables to be summed and presented in one table. This process is outlined below and the results are reported in Table 1 vi..

The variables which dealt with involvement in neighbourhood and political organizations and public interest groups showed, perhaps not suprisingly, that membership figures are very low. (see Tables 1vii. to 1 ix). In the case of neighbourhood organizations and public interest groups less than 10% of respondents in either the class conscious or non-class conscious category were members. However, it is significant that those who are members were more likely to be upper class and class conscious. In the case of political organization membership almost 20% of the 'upper' class, class conscious group were members, a figure almost twice as high as among the 'lower' class. Ten percent of the 'upper' class, non-class conscious respondents were members of political organizations as against 7% among the 'lower' status group.

It was noted earlier that these involvement indicators can be ranked according to the different type and level of involvement that each implies. In order to highlight this distinction, and for ease of presentation, some variables have been 'summed' together to create new variables. For example, 'reading about politics in the papers' and 'watch political programmes on t.v.' were deemed to be tapping a

similar form of passive involvement, that is a low and individualistic type of political involvement. To use the terms of Verba, Nie and Kim⁸⁶ this is a 'particularised' mode of activity that does not involve co-operation with others. A score of 1 ('often') on one variable and a score of 1 on the other variable gives a composite score of 2. The new variable 'Passinv' was recoded so that 2=1 and a score of 1 had a value label of 'often'. A composite score of 3 ie. a score of 1 on one variable and a score of 2 ('sometimes') on the other variable was also recoded as 1 ('often'). A score of 2 on both variables was recoded so that for 'passinv' 4 equals 2 ('sometimes'). This process was continued down the scale to 8 (a score of 4 or 'never' on both variables) and 'passinv' was recoded as 4 ('never') on the new variable. The results are reported in Table 1 ii..

Other variables which were 'summed' together in this way were, 'discuss politics with others' and 'convince friends to vote the same', to create 'actinv1'; 'attend political meetings/rallies' and 'contact politicians' to create 'actinv2'; and 'work for political party' and 'give money to political party' into 'actinv3'. (see Tables 1 iv. to 1 vi.)

It is believed that these three new variables measure differing levels of active involvement. Furthermore, using the model of Verba et al.,⁸⁷ it can be argued that the pas-

⁸⁶ Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978). p.54.

sive involvement indicator (passinv), the low-active involvement indicator (actinv1) and the medium-active involvement indicator (actinv2) all suggest 'particularized' participation, ie. largely individualistic with little conflict being apparent. On the other hand the indicator which represents high active involvement with a political party (actinv3) implies more communal activity, greater co-operation among citizens and greater conflict.

The three variables which pertain to neighbourhood organization, public interest group and political party membership have not been grouped together as it is believed that they tap different types of involvement. Neighbourhood organization membership suggests a community type of involvement but on a local scale often with narrow and specific aims where little conflict is likely. Membership of a public interest group may have similar traits though it may be more broadly based depending on the type of interest group. Political party membership is clearly more broad based, conflictual and overtly political which means that, along with actinv3, it is the most 'active' type of involvement. These categories closely parallel those devised by Lester W. Galbraith.⁸⁸ The only significant difference between this study and that of Galbraith is that 'giving

⁸⁷ Verba, Nie, and Kim, Participation And Political Equality. p.53-54.


⁸⁸ Lester W. Galbraith, Political Participation: How And Why Do People Get Involved In Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally. 1965). see, particularly, p.18.

money to a political party' is seen here as an active form of involvement, while Galbraith calls it a 'transitional' one. Further discussion of this model is given in Chapter 4.

This examination of involvement has certainly borne out the proposition that both objective class situation and a sense of class consciousness have an impact on levels of involvement. A higher objective class position is clearly linked to higher levels of involvement. Class consciousness also has an independent impact on levels of involvement though how much influence it has will be examined later in this chapter. One point that is suggested by the examination of proposition 4 is that class consciousness is not evenly distributed among the objective classes. Testing proposition 5 helps to establish this.

This proposition is that the highest proportion of class consciousness will be found among the working or 'lower' class as defined by objective indicators. The null hypothesis to be tested is that class consciousness will be evenly distributed between the two objective classes. A crosstabulation between the class conscious variable and 'oclass' clearly shows that it is the 'upper' status respondents that are more likely than the 'lower' or working class, to be class conscious. (see Figure 6). Across the sample population as a whole 67.5% were found to be 'lower' class and 32.5% to be 'upper' class. However, 59.1% of the 'upper'


FIGURE 6
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OBJECTIVE UPPER AND LOWER CLASS
RESPONDENTS BY CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND TOTAL SAMPLE



class considered themselves to be class conscious while only 42% of the 'lower' class did so. A frequency chart showing in which class the respondents who considered themselves class conscious would place themselves revealed that 70% of the class conscious deem themselves to be middle-class. Among those respondents who were not class conscious but were 'forced' to assign themselves a social class only 51.8% claimed to be middle class. Two things are apparent from these results. Firstly the perception of Canada as predominantly middle class society seems to be borne out (in subjective terms at least). Secondly, and in terms of this thesis, more importantly, is the fact that by far the highest proportions of class consciousness is to be found among the middle class rather than among the working class.

In testing proposition 6 it was found that there is a relationship between a sense of class consciousness and labour union membership. The figures show that 57.6% of labour union members are class conscious, (see Figure 7), while only 44% of non members were class conscious. Although in the population as a whole only 18.4% were members of a labour union the figure among the class conscious was 22.8%. However the link with working class consciousness is virtually non existent. Labour union membership among the class conscious is a good reflection of the figures for the sample as a whole (67.8% are middle class and 32.5% are

FIGURE 7
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR UNION MEMBERSHIP BY CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS AND TOTAL SAMPLE



working class). It is among the non-class conscious segment, where labour union membership totals only 15.1% of the sample, that we find high proportions of working class members. Nineteen percent of those who, when forced to choose, labelled themselves working class were members of a labour union. This body constitutes 58.6% of the non-class conscious membership. It seems, then, that although the working class are slightly more likely to be union members than the middle class, there is no evidence to suggest that labour union membership is a strong impetus to class consciousness or that it is likely to foster political involvement as it has done in Britain, for example. Chapter 4 will examine why this might be the case.

Having established a relationship between objective class, class consciousness and involvement it becomes necessary to find in which regions and among which culture types high levels of involvement are to be found. The proposition is that the greatest involvement will be found among 'critics' and 'supporters' and in 'modern' regions. To this end the 'cult' and the region variables were each crosstabulated with the new involvement indicators.

The relationships between culture type and the involvement indicators are presented in Tables 2i. to 2ix. There is a clear pattern that the Supporters are the most likely to be involved, closely followed by the Critics with the

TABLE 2i
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF RESPONDENTS VOTING IN FEDERAL ELECTION BY CULTURE TYPE
 (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
OFTEN	86.3	75.0	83.6	78.7	80.8
SOMETIMES	8.9	13.0	10.4	10.9	11.0
SELDOM	3.9	6.0	4.9	6.0	5.2
NEVER	0.9	6.0	1.1	4.4	3.1
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.0	29.3	10.1	
(N)	(460)	(631)	(529)	(183)	(1803)

GAMMA = 0.0475

TABLE 2ii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S ATTENTION TO POLITICS GENERALLY BY CULTURE TYPE
 (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
VERY CLOSELY	29.8	12.5	25.9	14.9	21.0
FAIRLY CLOSELY	50.5	42.0	50.5	43.4	46.8
NOT MUCH AT ALL	19.7	45.5	23.6	41.6	32.2
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.3	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(537)	(745)	(614)	(221)	(2117)

GAMMA = 0.09

TABLE 2iii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S PASSIVE INVOLVEMENT (READ ABOUT POLITICS IN THE
 NEWSPAPER AND WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS ON T.V.) BY CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
OFTEN	61.1	34.6	56.1	35.5	47.6
SOMETIMES	31.5	41.3	33.2	42.3	36.5
SELDOM	6.7	18.5	10.1	18.2	13.0
NEVER	0.7	5.6	0.7	4.1	2.8
% OF TOTAL	25.4	35.2	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(537)	(746)	(615)	(220)	(2118)

GAMMA = 0.0778

TABLE 2iv
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S LOW-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (DISCUSS POLITICS AND
 CONVINCE OTHERS TO VOTE THE SAME) BY THEIR CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
OFTEN	14.7	8.6	16.6	10.9	12.7
SOMETIMES	41.0	25.5	35.9	26.7	32.5
SELDOM	39.5	48.9	41.3	48.0	44.2
NEVER	4.8	17.0	6.2	14.5	10.5
% OF TOTAL	25.4	35.2	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(537)	(746)	(613)	(221)	(2117)

GAMMA = 0.04

TABLE 2v
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEDIUM-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (ATTEND POLITICAL MEETINGS AND CONTACT POLITICIANS) BY THEIR CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
OFTEN	7.5	2.1	6.0	4.1	4.8
SOMETIMES	20.6	12.1	18.3	10.0	15.8
SELDOM	39.8	30.5	43.2	33.3	36.8
NEVER	32.1	55.3	32.5	52.5	42.5
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.3	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(535)	(745)	(613)	(219)	(2112)

GAMMA = 0.05

TABLE 2vi
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S HIGH-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (WORK FOR AND GIVE MONEY TO POLITICAL PARTIES) BY THEIR CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
OFTEN	5.4	2.1	5.2	3.2	4.0
SOMETIMES	13.7	6.7	11.9	6.8	10.0
SELDOM	23.4	16.6	26.0	20.5	21.4
NEVER	57.5	74.5	56.9	69.5	64.6
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.3	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(534)	(746)	(612)	(220)	(2112)

GAMMA = 0.018

TABLE 2vii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN NEIGHBOURHOOD ORGANIZATIONS BY THEIR CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
VERY ACTIVE	1.9	0.5	1.5	0.5	1.1
FAIRLY ACTIVE	4.7	1.5	6.0	2.7	3.7
INACTIVE	3.4	1.2	4.2	1.8	2.7
NOT A MEMBER	90.1	96.8	88.3	95.0	92.4
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.3	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(537)	(746)	(614)	(221)	(2118)

GAMMA = 0.025

TABLE 2viii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THEIR CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
VERY ACTIVE	3.0	0.7	2.8	2.3	2.0
FAIRLY ACTIVE	7.6	3.5	7.8	4.1	5.9
INACTIVE	4.5	3.1	4.9	2.3	3.9
NOT A MEMBER	84.9	92.8	84.5	91.4	88.2
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.3	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(536)	(746)	(614)	(221)	(2117)

GAMMA = 0.020

TABLE 2ix
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS BY THEIR
 CULTURE TYPE (WITH PERCENT OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

	SUPPORTER	DISAFFECTED	CRITIC	DEFERENT	% OF TOTAL
VERY ACTIVE	2.0	0.4	1.0	0.9	1.0
FAIRLY ACTIVE	3.5	0.7	2.8	3.3	2.2
INACTIVE	1.3	0.8	2.1	1.4	1.4
NOT A MEMBER	93.1	98.1	94.1	95.5	95.4
% OF TOTAL	25.3	35.3	29.0	10.4	
(N)	(537)	(746)	(614)	(221)	(2118)

GAMMA = 0.04

Deferents and the Disaffecteds consistently less likely to be involved. The Deferents are consistently more likely to be involved than the Disaffecteds. Table 2i., for example, clearly shows the Supporters and Critics to be more likely to vote in federal elections than the Deferents and the Disaffected. While 86.3% of 'supporters' claim to vote 'often' the figure for the 'disaffecteds' is only 75%. Furthermore, 12% of the 'disaffected' category vote 'seldom' or 'never', among the 'deferents' this figure is 10.4%, among the 'critics' it is 6% and just 4.8% among the 'supporters'. A sense of efficacy is obviously the determining factor here (being the orientation which distinguishes Supporters and Critics from the other two categories) although the fact that Supporters rank slightly higher than Critics and that Deferents are generally a little more involved than the Disaffecteds suggests that a sense of trust does have a small impact on involvement. In two instances this pattern is changed slightly. Tables 2vii. and 2viii. suggest that Critics are slightly more likely to be members of neighbourhood organizations and political organizations than are Supporters. However these differences are small and the low cell sizes do not allow strong conclusions to be drawn.

The regional differences in involvement patterns are considerably less consistent although it is possible to establish certain trends. The results are presented in Tables 3i. to 3ix.. The 'vote' indicator of involvement produced

TABLE 3i

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF RESPONDENTS VOTING IN FEDERAL ELECTION BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
OFTEN	78.6	69.4	80.6	83.0	82.8	79.6	78.8	74.0	83.3	79.5	74.1
SOMETIMES	11.5	14.3	9.7	13.4	11.2	11.3	12.5	14.5	7.7	11.2	9.4
SELDM	5.9	7.1	3.9	1.8	3.4	6.4	4.7	7.0	5.9	5.6	10.5
NEVER	3.9	9.2	5.8	1.8	2.6	2.7	4.0	4.5	3.2	3.7	5.9
(N)	(2791)	(98)	(103)	(112)	(116)	(637)	(802)	(200)	(222)	(215)	(286)

GAMMA = 0.034

TABLE 3ii

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S ATTENTION TO POLITICS GENERALLY BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
VERY CLOSELY	18.5	20.1	18.8	19.7	11.8	16.6	20.1	18.7	18.3	19.0	19.7
FAIRLY CLOSELY	44.0	34.3	43.8	34.1	44.9	41.7	43.9	50.6	44.4	49.8	47.3
NOT MUCH AT ALL	37.5	45.5	37.5	46.2	43.4	41.7	36.0	30.7	37.3	31.2	33.0
(N)	(3372)	(134)	(112)	(132)	(136)	(777)	(964)	(251)	(252)	(263)	(351)

GAMMA = 0.079

TABLE 3iii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S PASSIVE INVOLVEMENT (READING ABOUT POLITICS IN THE
 NEWSPAPER AND WATCHING POLITICAL PROGRAMS ON T.V.) BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
OFTEN	43.2	34.3	54.5	43.2	33.8	38.4	44.0	44.0	46.4	51.3	46.0
SOMETIMES	36.5	42.5	29.5	39.4	35.3	37.8	34.9	37.6	36.9	33.5	38.3
SELDOM	16.4	17.9	15.2	15.2	25.0	19.4	16.4	13.6	15.9	12.2	12.6
NEVER	3.9	5.2	0.9	2.3	5.9	4.4	4.8	4.8	0.8	3.0	3.1
(N)	(3373)	(134)	(112)	(132)	(136)	(778)	(966)	(250)	(252)	(263)	(350)

GAMMA = 0.08

TABLE 3iv
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S LOW-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (DISCUSS POLITICS AND
 CONVINCE OTHERS TO VOTE THE SAME) BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
OFTEN	10.7	7.5	7.1	11.4	10.3	9.9	9.7	11.6	13.9	11.8	13.7
SOMETIMES	29.4	26.9	23.2	31.1	25.0	28.2	30.3	29.1	28.6	30.4	34.2
SELDOM	45.6	45.6	54.5	40.2	44.9	46.2	45.4	47.4	44.8	47.9	41.9
NEVER	14.3	20.1	15.2	17.4	19.9	15.7	14.7	12.0	12.7	9.9	10.7
(N)	(3369)	(134)	(112)	(132)	(136)	(777)	(961)	(251)	(252)	(263)	(351)

GAMMA = 0.088
 SIGN. = 0.078

TABLE 3v
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEDIUM-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (ATTEND POLITICAL MEETINGS AND CONTACT POLITICIANS) BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
OFTEN	3.9	3.0	5.4	5.3	2.9	3.2	4.5	2.4	6.0	3.8	3.4
SOMETIMES	14.3	15.7	15.2	13.7	13.2	12.7	14.4	17.5	17.1	13.7	13.2
SELDOM	34.5	26.1	35.7	36.6	36.0	30.3	34.9	32.7	37.5	40.7	39.0
NEVER	47.3	55.2	43.8	44.3	47.8	53.7	46.3	47.4	39.4	41.8	44.4
(N)	(3365)	(134)	(112)	(131)	(136)	(778)	(960)	(251)	(251)	(263)	(349)

GAMMA = 0.058
 SIGN. = 0.0399

TABLE 3vi
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S HIGH-ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (WORK FOR AND GIVE MONEY TO POLITICAL PARTIES) BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
OFTEN	3.2	0.0	3.6	5.4	1.5	3.0	3.1	5.5	8.7	1.5	3.2
SOMETIMES	8.6	2.3	8.1	7.7	5.9	8.2	9.5	12.8	8.7	9.5	6.9
SELDOM	20.9	18.0	19.8	21.5	22.1	20.7	20.6	16.0	25.4	21.0	23.5
NEVER	67.2	79.7	68.5	65.4	70.6	68.0	66.8	68.8	57.1	67.9	66.5
(N)	(3361)	(133)	(111)	(130)	(136)	(776)	(962)	(250)	(252)	(262)	(349)

GAMMA = 0.0558

TABLE 3vii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN NEIGHBOURHOOD ORGANIZATIONS
 BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
VERY ACTIVE	0.9	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.7	0.6	1.2	1.6	0.0	2.3	0.3
FAIRLY ACTIVE	3.3	0.7	2.7	0.8	1.5	2.2	4.5	3.2	4.8	5.8	2.6
INACTIVE	2.3	0.7	1.8	2.3	0.0	2.1	2.6	1.6	2.8	4.2	2.3
NOT A MEMBER	93.5	98.5	94.6	96.9	97.8	95.1	91.7	93.6	92.5	87.7	94.9
(N)	(3372)	(134)	(112)	(131)	(136)	(779)	(966)	(251)	(252)	(260)	(351)

GAMMA = 0.176

TABLE 3viii
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
 BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
VERY ACTIVE	1.7	0.7	3.6	3.1	0.0	1.4	1.4	2.0	4.0	2.3	0.9
FAIRLY ACTIVE	4.7	0.0	2.7	4.6	2.9	5.5	4.9	4.8	11.1	2.3	2.8
INACTIVE	3.6	0.7	0.9	1.5	2.2	3.5	3.0	5.6	6.3	6.2	3.4
NOT A MEMBER	90.0	98.5	92.9	90.8	94.9	89.6	90.7	87.6	78.6	89.2	92.9
(N)	(3371)	(134)	(112)	(131)	(136)	(778)	(966)	(251)	(252)	(260)	(351)

GAMMA = 0.105

TABLE 3ix
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENT'S MEMBERSHIP IN PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
 BY REGION

	NAT.	NFLD.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	QUE.	ONT.	MAN.	SASK.	ALTA.	B.C.
VERY ACTIVE	0.8	0.0	1.8	1.5	0.0	0.5	0.8	2.0	1.2	0.8	0.6
FAIRLY ACTIVE	2.0	0.0	5.4	0.8	0.0	2.4	2.0	2.0	4.8	1.9	0.0
INACTIVE	1.2	0.7	1.8	1.5	0.0	1.0	0.6	2.8	1.2	1.9	2.3
NOT A MEMBER	95.9	99.3	91.1	96.2	100.0	96.0	96.6	93.2	92.9	95.4	97.2
(N)	(3371)	(134)	(112)	(131)	(136)	(778)	(966)	(251)	(252)	(260)	(351)

GAMMA = 0.07

results similar to those apparent in later tables. Saskatchewan has the highest percentage of respondents who vote 'often' in federal elections. The high turnout rates expected in the Maritimes (excluding Newfoundland) are evidenced by the fact that Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and P.E.I. follow closely behind Saskatchewan. At the other end of the scale, the respondents from British Columbia and Newfoundland are clearly the most likely to vote 'seldom' or 'never'. Nova Scotia respondents were the least likely to 'never' vote or to do so only 'seldom'. Table 3ii. shows respondents from the western provinces to be least likely to pay 'not much' attention to politics. Nova Scotia and, particularly, Newfoundland produce paradoxical results. Newfoundland has the highest proportion of respondents in the country who follow politics 'very closely' and yet also has the second highest proportion of respondents who follow 'not much at all'. Nova Scotia has the highest proportion of respondents who pay 'not much' attention while also ranking fourth in terms of the respondents who pay 'very close' attention. New Brunswickers are considerably less likely than residents of other provinces to pay close attention to politics generally.

Table 3iii. shows that Alberta and B.C. respondents are the most likely to read about politics and watch political programmes on t.v. All of the western provinces are above the national average on this indicator, as are P.E.I. and

Nova Scotia respondents. Ontario and Manitoba have similar results and are slightly less involved, in this instance, than are the other western provinces. Newfoundland and Quebec fall below the mean and once again New Brunswick is considerably less involved than all other provinces.

Table 3iv. serves to further illustrate the higher levels of involvement in the 'modern' regions of the west. In this instance the respondents of B.C. are clearly the most likely to discuss politics with others and to convince friends to vote the same. Saskatchewan and Alberta, along with Nova Scotia, also rank high on this indicator. Again Ontario and Manitoba display similar results around the mean score. Quebec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland are less likely to be involved and P.E.I. is the least involved of all regions on this indicator despite it's high ranking on others. The lower level of statistical significance may, in some way, account for this latter result given P.E.I.'s low cell sizes, though Chapter 4 examines other possible explanations.

Saskatchewan, the most 'modern' province according to both Jenson and Wilson, is the most involved province in terms of contacting politicians and attending meetings or rallies. P.E.I. also ranks high followed by Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Ontario. Surprisingly, Newfoundlanders are also above average in terms of being involved 'often' or 'sometimes'. Alberta and B.C. both rank low on this indicator

along with New Brunswick and Quebec. Table 3v. contains some anomalies. Although few Albertans are involved 'often' or 'sometimes' on this indicator, they are second only to Saskatchewan in terms of being unlikely to 'never' be involved. At the other extreme, Newfoundlanders, despite their high levels of involvement are also the most likely to 'never' be involved. Interestingly this pattern was seen earlier and is discussed in the final chapter.

Saskatchewan is also the highest ranking province in terms of respondents who work for, and give money to political parties 'often' or 'sometimes'. Although the national mean score is only 11.8%, in Saskatchewan the figure is 17.4%. Like the results of Table 3v. Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Ontario follow Saskatchewan in the rankings. New Brunswick and Newfoundland are considerably less likely to be involved. However, according to Table 3vi. relatively few B.C. respondents were likely to 'never' donate to, or work for, a political party, even though few of them were likely to do so 'often' or 'sometimes'. A reverse situation is apparent in Manitoba. The most important result in this table remains the relatively low number of Saskatchewan residents who 'never' get involved with a political party according to these indicators.

In terms of Neighbourhood organization membership (Table 3vii.) Albertans are the most likely to be 'fairly' or 'very' active and this is the only province where more than

10% of the respondents claimed to be members of such an organization. Above average involvement was registered in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan while in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia less than 1% of respondents were active in a neighbourhood organization.

Table 3viii provides some familiar results. Saskatchewan respondents are twice as likely as the next province to be active in a political organization. Nova Scotia ranks second followed by Quebec, Manitoba and Ontario. Predictably, the lowest results were in Newfoundland and New Brunswick, though B.C. also ranks low. The provinces with the lowest percentages of non-members are Saskatchewan followed, though not closely by Manitoba and Alberta.

Members of public interest groups constitute less than 10% of respondents in any province (see Table 3ix.). P.E.I. has the highest number of respondents who are actively involved in interest groups followed by Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The lowest levels of involvement are apparent again in Newfoundland and New Brunswick where no respondents at all claim an active involvement in interest groups, and in B.C. where less than 1% of respondents do so.

Certain patterns can be gleaned from this collection of tables. Newfoundland and particularly New Brunswick are consistently least involved provinces while P.E.I. and Nova Scotia appear to be involved on some indicators and not on

others. Interestingly, these two provinces also proved to be anomalies in Jenson's study.⁸⁹ While all of the western provinces show the highest levels of involvement on the less active indicators only Saskatchewan consistently ranks high on the more active indicators. Alberta generally ranks high while B.C. displays low levels of involvement on the more active indicators. Ontario and Manitoba produce some very similar results and are generally above average in terms of involvement.

The preceding analysis of the thesis propositions has concentrated on descriptive statistics. In order to establish which of the independent variables - culture type, region, objective class position and subjective class consciousness - have the most significant impact on levels of involvement multiple regression analysis is employed to examine the amount of association between the dependent and independent variables. Furthermore, this technique is used to find the amount of variance in political involvement levels that is 'explained' by all of the independent variables. In the case of 'culture type' and 'region', where the variables are nominal ones, 'dummy' variables have been created. In order to enhance the validity of the multiple regression analysis the objective class and subjective class variables have been broken down into their component parts which allows the use of interval measure variables rather than the

⁸⁹ Jane Jenson; 'Party Systems.' in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. Chapter 7.

dichotomies used in the descriptive statistics. The procedures and findings of this multivariate analysis are outlined below.

Multiple regression can be explained in the form of the following mathematical equation:

$$Y' = a_0 + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 \dots\dots\dots b_{99}x_{99} + e$$

This equation can be explained by reference to variables used in the study. Where:

Y' is the predicted level of involvement, for example, 'attention to politics generally'.

a_0 = the average value of Y when each independent variable equals 0.

b_1 = the average change in 'attention to politics generally' associated with a unit change in x_1 when the effects of other variables are held constant.

x_1 = the respondents education level.

b_2 = the average change in 'attention to politics generally' associated with a unit change in x_2 when the effects of other variables are held constant.

x_2 = the respondents income level.

and so on through the entire list of independent variables as they appear in Table 4.

e = 'error' term; ie, any variance in Y not accounted for by variance in the independent variables in the equation.

The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. Firstly the aim is to provide an estimate of the independent effect that a change in the value of each independent variable has on the dependent variable. The second intention is to find out the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable (political involvement) that is 'explained' or accounted for by variation in all of the independent variables. The first task involves 'standardizing' the variables so that they are all measured in the same units. The standardized partial regression coefficients are known as 'beta weights' and represent the average standard deviation change in the dependent variable associated with a standard deviation change in one independent variable when all of the others are held constant. The beta weight scores for the independent variables on the measures of political involvement are reported in Table 4. The proportion of the change in political involvement levels explained by all of the independent variables together is presented by the R square values in Table 5 along with the analysis of variance. Note should be taken of the F score which reflects the ratio between explained and unexplained variance and is, therefore, an indicator of the probability that the variance occurred by chance. The higher the F score the less likely this is.

TABLE 6

R. SQUARE SCORES: THE AMOUNT OF VARIANCE IN EACH INDICATOR OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT THAT IS "EXPLAINED" BY THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	R. Square Analysis of Variance					
	D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F =	Signif. F =	
Voting	Regression	6	56.03866	9.33978	17.44512	.0001
	Residual	2320	1242.08253	.53638		
Attention to politics generally	Regression	6	139.68874	23.28112	48.79341	.0001
	Residual	2800	1335.98266	.47714		
Passiv: "Read and catch T.V. programs about politics"	Regression	9	216.77746	24.0838	38.32761	.0001
	Residual	2796	1757.09318	.62843		
Actinv1: "Discuss politics and convince friends to vote the same"	Regression	6	187.79202	31.29867	47.51167	.0001
	Residual	2795	1841.22726	.65876		
Actinv2: "Attend political meetings and contact politicians"	Regression	7	167.63851	26.83379	41.58452	.0001
	Residual	2790	1801.20802	.64559		
Actinv3: "Work for and give \$ to a political party"	Regression	7	99.39515	14.19931	24.28424	.0001
	Residual	2790	1631.34860	.58471		
Member of neighbourhood organization	Regression	5	21.72894	4.34639	19.30125	.0001
	Residual	2802	630.82826	.22513		
Member of political organization	Regression	7	41.95531	5.99362	17.57407	.0001
	Residual	2799	954.59545	.34105		
Member of public interest group	Regression	4	6.44057	1.61014	9.65335	.0001
	Residual	2802	467.36349	.16680		

Table 4 was produced using stepwise regression so only those independent variables with a 'PIN' greater than .05 are included. These are the variables which exert the most influence on each political involvement indicator. It is evident from this table that objective class status, particularly education level and income level, has the greatest impact on political involvement. The impact of education seems to be the most significant. For example, one standard deviation change in education level is associated with a standard deviation change in a respondent's propensity to attend political meeting and contact politicians of .229. There is also a positive, and at times quite strong association between involvement and social class and between involvement and culture type, at least 'supporters' and 'critics'. This latter point suggests a positive association between political involvement and a sense of efficacy which is the political culture orientation which 'supporters' and 'critics' have in common.

The impact of region on political involvement is rather more sporadic with generally weaker, and often negative, associations. Where it is significantly associated at all, being from Quebec, for example, is negatively associated with political involvement. Being from B.C. is negatively associated with being a member of a political organization and to voting in federal elections. On the other hand, as the descriptive statistics suggested, Saskatchewan is more

strongly and positively associated with the more active measures of involvement. It is most strongly associated with the two most active indicators of involvement, working for and giving money to political parties, and being a member of a political organization. In the latter instance being from Saskatchewan was the most significant of all of the independent variables, including education level.

One's subjective class position is also positively associated with involvement particularly voting, paying attention to politics generally and working for, and giving money to political parties. The strongest beta weight for subjective class is in association with attention to politics generally. The score of .0957 suggests that for every one standard deviation change in subjective class position there is a corresponding change in attention to politics generally of approximately 1/10th standard deviation. While these levels of association are significant they are not as strong as those for objective class on most indicators. However, only Saskatchewan and education level have higher beta weights than subjective class position on the two most active measures of involvement mentioned above.

'Supporters' and 'critics' have relatively high measures of association with most of the involvement indicators though their impact is slightly less strong on the more active measures. Only on the measure regarding public interest group membership is the level of association for 'sup-

porters' and 'critics' not significant. There is a slight, negative, association between public interest group membership and being 'disaffected'. It should be noted, also, that while the beta weights for 'supporters' and 'critics' are similar on most indicators 'critics' generally have a slightly higher association with involvement than do 'supporters'. This suggests that a sense of 'trust' is not a spur to greater involvement.

Having examined the independent impact of each independent variable on political involvement levels the final step of this analysis is to establish how much variation in political involvement is accounted for by the combination of all of the independent variables. The multiple regression procedure provides a coefficient of multiple determination, known as R square. R square can range from 0 to 1 and the closer it is to one the greater the percentage of the change in the dependent variable that is 'explained' by all of the independent variables. Table 5 shows that this percentage of 'explained' variance differs substantially from one indicator to another. For example, the amount of variation in reading about and watching t.v. programmes about politics that is 'explained' by the independent variables is almost 11% while only 1.3% of variation in public interest group membership was accounted for by these independent variables. The R square scores are lowest for the indicators on which only small numbers of respondents were actively involved.

The lower values of the F scores also reflect the small cell sizes and make it less certain that these results did not occur by chance though on no indicator is the F score low enough to make this likely and furthermore, the 'significant F' column suggests that all of these figures are statistically significant.

It would appear from the regression analysis that the findings of the descriptive statistics have been borne out. Social class, both objectively and subjectively defined, region and 'culture type' all have an impact on political involvement levels in Canada. However the majority of the variance remains unexplained by these independent variables. It is the aim of the final chapter to draw conclusions from the data presented in this section and to offer explanations for the findings. Why is class consciousness more apparent in some provinces than others? Why do rates of 'trust' and 'efficacy' vary between provinces? Furthermore, if these factors offer, at best, only partial explanations for variation in political involvement then what are the extraneous factors that help to shape the apparently different political cultures in the different areas of Canada? These issues are addressed using the broader historic, economic, social and cultural backgrounds presented in Chapter Two.

CHAPTER FOUR

An Explanation Of The Results.

It is the aim of this final chapter to draw together the findings of the earlier chapters and to offer explanations for the results that have been presented. Chapter 2 dealt with the broader cultural aspects which, it is believed, have helped to shape the political cultures (as defined by Almond and Verba) of the ten provinces of Canada. The demographic, economic and social conditions of each province were examined in order to offer possible explanations for the findings obtained from the data analysis outlined in Chapter 3. The propositions of this thesis, presented in Chapter 1, have been analysed individually in the preceding sections and a similar format is continued in this section.

The first proposition that was examined was that different proportions of each culture type exist in different regions. In other words, the different regions, or provinces, of Canada have different political cultures. In particular it was expected that those provinces regarded by existing literature as 'modern' would have a greater sense of efficacy and hence contain higher proportions of 'supporters' and 'critics'.

The 'modern' provinces of the West were actually shown to have fewer 'supporters' than the more 'traditional' or 'transitional' provinces of Central and Eastern Canada. The

highest levels of 'supporters' were actually recorded in P.E.I. and Quebec. In the case of P.E.I., as mentioned in Chapter 2, there can be little doubt that the small size of the Island's population and the resulting access to patronage is largely responsible for the high levels of political support and trust in the province. As Frank Mackinnon says, '(e)veryone is interested and the opportunities for participation and patronage are numerous'.⁹⁰ It is not surprising, therefore, that P.E.I. also contained the lowest percentage of 'disaffecteds'. It must be remembered, however, that all results concerning P.E.I. must be treated with some scepticism because of the small number of respondents from this province.

Simeon and Elkins found, in the early 1970's, that levels of trust among French-Canadians was high,⁹¹ and this study also found a high percentage of 'deferents' in Quebec. However, it was noted in Chapter 2 that advances had been made by Quebec, not merely in terms of what Dyck called 'expansion and growth' (or epanouissement) but also in terms of their cultural 'survivance', particularly through the adoption of Bi-lingualism. It is possible to argue that such changes have transformed Quebecers from 'deferents' into 'supporters'. Furthermore, the survey data used in this study was collected shortly after the 1984 Federal election

⁹⁰ Mackinnon, 'Prince Edward Island', in Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics. p.230.

⁹¹ Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', p. 31.

in which Quebec had returned an overwhelming number of Progressive Conservative M.P.s (58 out of 75) including, significantly, the Prime Minister himself. It is no surprise, therefore, that many Quebec respondents were supportive of the federal government.

The high percentage of 'supporters' evident in Newfoundland presents something of a paradox as the province also recorded high levels of 'disaffecteds'. One possible explanation for this is that, as in P.E.I., patronage serves to keep large numbers of people interested in, and supportive of, the political system. Jensen sees Newfoundland as a 'transitional' province where community size offers the only significant political cleavage.⁹² According to her model the Conservatives are more highly supported in urban areas while the Liberals take more of the rural vote. The urban areas, mainly St. John's, are the home of the economic elite, and since the fall of Joey Smallwood in 1971 the province has been in the hands of the Progressive Conservatives. It seems likely, then, that the 'supporters' come from amongst those close to the urban centres, the economic elite and the patronage, while at the other extreme the rural residents who subsist in the 'marginal work world', and who are largely divorced from the economic development of the rest of North America, fall into the 'disaffected' category. It was beyond the methodological scope of this study to examine

⁹² Jane Jensen, 'Party Systems.' in Bellamy et al. Provincial Systems. p. 125

intra-provincial variations in political culture, though it is a significant area which is worthy of more attention.

The percentage of Ontario respondents in each of the four culture type categories reflected, quite closely, the mean figures for the country as a whole. It should be made clear that this may be a result of the fact that Ontario respondents accounted for almost 30% of the total number of respondents in the survey. However there was some discrepancy between the national figures and those for Ontario. The province did have slightly higher levels of 'supporters' and 'critics' and lower levels of 'deferents' and 'disaffecteds'. This was to be expected in a province which is the most economically developed in the country. On the other hand it was argued in Chapter 2 that Ontario remains a very conservative province which could account for its fair degree of 'deference', while the ethnic minorities of its remote North may account for the 'disaffecteds' in the province.

Although the Western provinces did not have higher proportions of 'supporters' they did have high levels of 'critics'. In other words these provinces display higher levels of efficacy but lower levels of trust than those in the East. As Figure 3 showed there is some consistency among the four Western provinces which adds some legitimacy to the commonly used practice of categorizing them together. The fact that these provinces were settled later, by people who,

as was discussed in Chapter 2, carried with them different ideological baggage, has meant that a different view of Canadian politics has proliferated in these areas. The fact that these provinces have tended to be more populist (hence the growth of the Social Credit and C.C.F./N.D.P. parties) has led to a decline in the significance of the Liberal and/or the Progressive Conservative party in one or other of these provinces. Although these provinces differ in many respects it is not surprising that at the federal level they contain higher proportions of respondents who are critical rather than supportive of the national government in Ottawa.

The highest levels of 'critics' are evident in British Columbia where some of these western traits are most obvious. The province is largely self-contained and self-centred being economically developed and comparatively less reliant on federal government subsidies. Its polarized political system, which makes it a 'traditional' province according to Wilson, is a contest between the Social Credit party and the N.D.P. Many of the recent immigrants to the province are from East Asia and have little knowledge of, or affinity to, Central Canada. All of these are factors which mitigate against a strong sense of support for the federal government. At the same time B.C. has been described as a 'citizen society',⁹³ with a high sense of efficacy and this description is clearly borne out by the high levels of 'critics' shown in Figure 3.

⁹³ Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', p. 31.

It is also apparent that the Western provinces all contain relatively high proportions of 'disaffected' respondents. Simeon and Elkins have argued that in Alberta and Saskatchewan, at least, this disaffection may be the result of feelings of being small suburban enclaves divorced from the 'dominant Canadian and American metropolis',⁹⁴ although to a lesser extent than in the Maritimes. Since the time of Simeon and Elkins' study the oil boom has perhaps lessened this impact on Alberta. It seems to be an argument that might better be applied to Manitoba where Winnipeg is the only major urban centre and where northern areas are relatively underprivileged. Western alienation which has grown from a dissatisfaction with federal government policies and central Canadian corporate practices might also be seen as a source of such 'disaffection'.

At the other end of the 'trust' and 'efficacy' spectrum lies New Brunswick. As Figure 3 shows this province clearly contains the lowest percentage of 'supporters' and the highest percentage of 'disaffecteds'. The fact that it also contains relatively few 'deferents' highlights a lack of trust as well as of efficacy. Provincial politics in New Brunswick have been described as 'parochial, stagnant and anachronistic'.⁹⁵ Any political cleavage in the province is almost solely based on religion, making it, according to

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 47.

⁹⁵ see P.J. Fitzpatrick, 'New Brunswick- The Politics Of Pragmatism.', in Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics.

Jensen, the most 'traditional' of all of the provinces. New Brunswick also ranks very low in terms of 'modernity' according to Wilson's measures of industrialization and economic development. The lack of trust and efficacy found by this study are borne out by earlier studies in which New Brunswick has consistently ranked at the bottom.⁹⁶ Further reasons cited by Simeon and Elkins⁹⁷ for the lack of a modern political culture in the Maritimes generally, and in New Brunswick particularly, include the high percentage of primary workers in the labour force, few large urban centres, low levels of immigration and high levels of emigration, particularly by the more modern or enterprising individuals. Finally, this lack of trust and efficacy may, indeed, be an accurate reflection of reality as in the Maritimes the democratic spirit seems weaker than in other parts of the country. Fitzpatrick illustrates this point:

Neither party is receptive to the idea, so fashionable elsewhere, of popular participation in government: party leadership is firmly of the opinion that it should lead.⁹⁸

Such attitudes clearly undermine a sense of efficacy. Similarly it is possible to argue that a sense of trust is equally unlikely to thrive in areas where governments at both levels have failed to solve the economic problems of the region. The effect that the demise of Richard Hatfield,

⁹⁶ see Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', and Chandler and Chandler, Public Policy. pp.77-83.

⁹⁷ Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', p. 47.

⁹⁸ P.J. Fitzpatrick, 'The Politics Of Pragmatism.' in Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics. p. 120

and the recent landslide Liberal victory is, as yet, difficult to gauge though it would seem to indicate that some traditional cleavages must be breaking down.

The second proposition examined by this study was that a greater sense of class consciousness would be apparent in the regions, or provinces which have been considered 'modern'. However, as Figure 4 shows, it is Quebec that has, by far, the highest percentage of respondents who think of themselves as a social class member. In 1974 Wilson argued that Quebec was in a 'transitional' phase, moving towards social class-based politics and away from the traditional dominance of the Roman Catholic church. The rise of the Parti Quebecois, which certainly appeared 'left-wing', is thought to have acted as a rallying point for the 'new middle-class' of public servants, teachers and other professionals.⁹⁹ Yet experience of office seemed to modify the P.Q.s and their attack on the labour movement, for example, in Quebec suggests that the party was less 'left wing' than the Liberals. It certainly does not seem that a sense of class consciousness can be attributable to a period of rule by the P.Q.s. It seems more valid to argue that it was the dominance of the Catholic church that fostered a class ridden society. It seems that the French Canadian respondents saw themselves as social class members in a feudal, rather than a 'modern' industrial, sense. This may also offer an explanation for the fact that New Brunswick registered high-

⁹⁹ see Dyck, Provincial Politics In Canada. p. 191.

er levels of class consciousness than did the other Atlantic provinces, as it contains a high percentage of French Canadians. French Canadians having interpreted the class conscious variable differently to the English Canadians seems to offer the best explanation for these results particularly in the light of the fact that conventional wisdom believes Quebec to be more class conscious than the Eastern provinces but less so than those in the West.

The other results contained in Figure 4 are less surprising. The economically developed provinces of Ontario and British Columbia show relatively high percentages of class conscious respondents. The highly industrialized and highly urbanized nature of Ontario offers the best explanation for a feeling of class consciousness in the province. Ontario, however, is not considered a modern province, as its political cleavages have tended to be along religious and linguistic lines. However there is much intra-provincial regionalism within Ontario, and if the presence of a strong N.D.P. can be taken as an indication of class voting then the 'urban and/or heavily unionized'.¹⁰⁰ constituencies particularly Metro Toronto may be classified as 'modern' while the eastern portion of the province remains very 'traditional'. British Columbia, on the other hand, is more uniformly a province which, according to Jensen, 'exhibits a strong rela-

¹⁰⁰ Robert J. Williams, 'Ontario's Party Systems: Federal and Provincial.', in Thorburn, Party Politics In Canada. p. 310.

tionship between class and partisanship'¹⁰¹ Saskatchewan, the most 'modern' province by many indicators, also exhibits a relatively high percentage of class conscious respondents.

As expected a sense of class consciousness is less apparent in the 'traditional', Atlantic, provinces. The percentage of class conscious respondents is dramatically lower in Newfoundland and P.E.I. than it is elsewhere. The figure in Nova Scotia was a little higher, possibly as a result of class consciousness among the Cape Breton respondents where class-based politics are more evident. The higher levels of class consciousness in New Brunswick have been attributed to the large minority of French Canadians in the province. Nonetheless this province provides just one of a number of anomalies which suggest that class consciousness has a weak relationship with political involvement.

The proposition that class consciousness is more apparent among 'supporters' and 'critics' is clearly borne out by the findings of this study. However, a number of caveats need to be given. Firstly, although the descriptive statistics presented in Figure 5 give a clear picture of greater class consciousness among 'supporters' and 'critics' the measure of association is weak. Nonetheless, it seems that class consciousness is tied to a sense of efficacy if not to trust, as efficacy is the common denominator between 'supporters' and 'critics'. Perhaps even more importantly, as

¹⁰¹ Jane Jensen, 'Party Systems.' in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. p. 122.

the following discussion will illustrate, it seems safe to assume, although this study did not address it specifically, that the 'supporters' and 'critics' are also predominantly middle class objectively.

The analysis of proposition 6 yielded results which were more in keeping with what one might expect in a North American country. It seemed surprising that in a supposedly classless society as many as 46.5% of respondents nationally thought of themselves as a social class member while 53.5% did not. However the results obtained from testing proposition 6 temper these findings somewhat. As Figure 6 shows, it was the 'upper' class, objectively defined, who were considerably more likely than the 'lower' or working class respondents to be class conscious.

The apparent lack of working class consciousness in Canada was reinforced by the findings regarding labour union membership. As political partisanship is not dealt with in this study labour union membership was taken to be an area where working class consciousness would be most clearly visible. Although class consciousness among labour union members proved to be greater than among the sample as a whole the majority of the class conscious respondents considered themselves to be middle class. Most of the labour union members who considered themselves working class did so only when 'forced', that is, by the criteria of this study they were not class conscious. It was seen in Chapter 2 that in

all provinces the dominant labour unions were the public sector ones, and that they were largely 'white-collar' ones, which would seem to account for this lack of working class consciousness among the membership. It should be mentioned that some labour unions do have the expected links with the parties of the 'left', principally the N.D.P., and in such diverse regions as Newfoundland and British¹⁰²Columbia.

It seems clear, then, that in Canada a sense of class consciousness is linked to being 'upper', ie. middle, class objectively defined. As expected, political involvement, by all indicators, was greatest among the upper class respondents than among those with a lower objective class status. Furthermore, the levels of association reported in tables 1i. to 1ix. suggest a fairly strong relationship between political involvement and objective class position. As the multivariate analysis, discussed at the end of Chapter 3, showed objective class status to be the independent variable that had the most significant impact on involvement. Although objective class was not the most influential variable on all measures, it was nonetheless, higher than the class consciousness variable in all instances. One's objective class situation clearly has a greater impact on one's political involvement than does a sense of class consciousness.

¹⁰² see Dyck, Provincial Politics In Canada. p. 40 and p. 507.

However, tables 1i. to 1ix. do show that class consciousness does have an independent impact on levels of political involvement. The analysis of proposition 5 illustrated that although the pattern is not strong there is some evidence to suggest that class consciousness has a greater impact on the more 'gladiatorial' forms of involvement. If the nine indicators of involvement used in this study were categorized according to Milbrath's model¹⁰³ the breakdown would be as follows: Var017, 'Vote', 'Passinv', and 'Actinv1' would be 'spectator' activities; 'Actinv2' would be a 'transitional' activity; and 'Actinv3', 'neighbourhood organization membership', 'political organization membership' and 'public interest group membership' would be 'gladiatorial' activities. Calculating the mean level of association between each activity level and class consciousness produced a Gamma score of .162 for the 'spectator' level of involvement, .148 for the 'transitional' level and of .224 for the 'gladiatorial' category. Although the 'transitional' category upsets the trend it is nonetheless obvious that the impact of class consciousness on active or 'gladiatorial' involvement is greater than on the more passive or 'spectator' oriented forms of involvement. Of course the small percentages of respondents who were actively involved must always be borne in mind.

¹⁰³ Milbrath, Political Participation. p. 18.

The analysis of the final proposition helps to put some 'flesh' onto the bones of the previous analysis. To this point the effect of class consciousness has been analysed in three ways. Firstly, it was found that class consciousness is more apparent among the 'supporters' and 'critics' than among the other culture types. Secondly, Quebec and New Brunswick aside, it is clear that a sense of class consciousness is more evident in Ontario and the Western provinces than it is in the 'traditional' provinces of the East. Finally, it is also apparent from the evidence that class consciousness has an impact, independent from objective class position, on levels of involvement.

These findings provide the rationale for the final proposition that the greatest levels of political involvement should be found among 'supporters' and 'critics' in 'modern' regions. Tables 2i. to 2ix. and 3i. to 3ix. present the results of this analysis. On all indicators 'supporters' and 'critics' are considerably more involved than the other two categories although the pattern is less clear on the most active measures of involvement where the cell numbers are so small. It can be argued, then, that a sense of efficacy consistently increases a respondent's level of political involvement. However multiple regression analysis showed that objective class situation has a significantly greater relationship with culture type than does a sense of class consciousness. Although the objective class make-up of each

culture type is not examined here it has been analysed elsewhere¹⁰⁴ with quite clear results. What is most evident, however, is that although class consciousness and objective class have an impact on culture type, their significance should not be over-estimated, particularly because the final section suggests that the role of culture type is also of limited significance.

Despite the fact that levels of involvement tend to be higher in the more 'modern' provinces there are sufficient discrepancies in the findings to suggest that this final proposition is, at best, only partially borne out. This study concludes, like Simeon and Elkins, that even with the independent variables controlled for significant regional variation, in terms of political involvement, remains. It is necessary therefore to draw on existing literature, as well as the data from this study to explain why involvement was higher in some provinces than in others.

Regional voting turnout is one involvement indicator which does not conform to the proposition. Table 3i. shows very high turnout levels in the Maritimes. Although this result is not repeated for other forms of involvement it is not a suprising one. Simeon and Elkins claim that for residents of the Maritimes, and Quebec where turnout rates are

¹⁰⁴ see Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', p. 39. They used education level as the indicator of objective class position and found that the numbers of 'supporters' and 'critics' rose as the level of education increased.

also high, this form of political activity "is a ritual or a social activity carried on with little reference to the affairs of State".¹⁰⁵ In these 'traditional' areas where party affiliation is strongly entrenched, particularly along religious lines, this seems to be a very valid explanation. It can be further argued that the continuation of patronage is also likely to mobilize support at election time. In New Brunswick, for example, Fitzpatrick claims that political allegiance 'is no casual matter'¹⁰⁶ and that:

the relationship between the individual voter and his party is in many cases one of intimate reciprocity, a mutual loyalty sustained by, among other things, a wide distribution of 'honest' patronage.¹⁰⁷

The Maritimes' high turnout rates do not extend to their Atlantic neighbour, Newfoundland. This province consistently has the lowest rate of voter turnout in the country and the findings of this study suggest a continuing trend. The fact that confederation into Canada was so recent may well be an explanatory factor, with affinity to Ottawa still being somewhat weak. The political dominance of individuals, particularly Joey Smallwood, at the provincial level further suggests that the democratic spirit is not yet strong in this, most traditional of societies.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁰⁶ P.J. Fitzpatrick, 'Politics Of Pragmatism.', in Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics. p. 121.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 122.

Patronage, exacerbated by the fact that politicians have a higher profile in smaller communities may account for the high levels of political knowledge in the Atlantic provinces. The same paradox that Newfoundland presented with regard to its culture type distribution is apparent in terms of the respondents' 'attention to politics generally'. The province contains the highest proportion of respondents who pay 'close' attention to politics and the highest proportion who claim to pay 'not much' attention. In a province with a high proportion of 'disaffected' respondents this latter result is not surprising.

An explanation for the high levels of political knowledge is applicable to the Atlantic provinces as a whole. This explanation has been called the 'metropolitan-hinterland' hypothesis.¹⁰⁸ This hypothesis is that respondents in the hinterland provinces, ie. the Atlantic provinces, "probably read more about the premiers of the central provinces than respondents in the central provinces read about the premiers of the Atlantic provinces".¹⁰⁹ Knowledge of a more conceptual nature, such as the placement of political parties along a left/right spectrum was actually lowest in Atlantic Canada and highest in B.C. The high level of this type of conceptual knowledge in B.C. was attributed to the "heavily class-

¹⁰⁸ Ronald D. Lambert. et al.; The Sources Of Political Knowledge. Canadian Journal Of Political Science. June 1988. p. 368.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 368.

oriented politics"¹¹⁰ in this province. It seems, then, that amassing factual knowledge does not necessarily indicate a high level of political sophistication. Nor does it seem to act as a 'stepping stone' to more active political involvement.

Manitoban respondents were the least likely to pay 'not much' attention to politics. This may well be the result of the province's central geographical location which lays it open to influences from both central and western Canada. Following Manitoba on this indicator were Alberta, B.C., Ontario and Saskatchewan. In other words the more 'modern' provinces had the lowest number of respondents who pay no attention to politics.

As Chapter 3 illustrated, the pattern of the 'modern' provinces being more involved becomes more apparent as the indicators of involvement become more active. Although P.E.I. contained the highest percentage of respondents who read, and watch t.v. programmes, about politics this may be a distorted figure resulting from the low number of respondents although Jensen, among others, has been reluctant to ignore P.E.I.'s position as a 'transitional' province.¹¹¹ With this exception, the western provinces ranked consistently higher on this indicator than did the others. As

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 366.

¹¹¹ See Jensen, 'Party Systems.', in Bellamy et al., Provincial Systems. p.124. and Mackinnon, 'Prince Edward Island.' in Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics. p.84.

expected Saskatchewan emerges as the province with highest percentage of respondents who are involved in politics. It ranked first in terms of 'discussing politics with others and convincing friends to vote the same way'. Saskatchewan respondents were also the most likely to attend political meetings and to contact politicians. Talking about politics and convincing others to vote the same way were much more apparent among the four western provinces than elsewhere. British Columbia, particularly ranked high on this indicator.

However, the general finding that the more 'modern' provinces of the west are consistently more actively involved suggests a greater uniformity among them than is actually evident from the findings. For example, British Columbian, and even more so Manitoban, respondents ranked low (in Manitoba's case, lowest) in terms of attending meetings and contacting politicians. While Saskatchewan consistently has the highest proportion of respondents who are actively involved, particularly on the two highest activity level indicators (see tables 3vi. and 3viii.), the other 'modern' provinces are much less consistent. While Albertan respondents were the most likely to be actively involved in Neighbourhood Organizations they were amongst the least likely to work for or give donations to political parties. A similar situation is apparent among respondents from B.C. Although they show high levels of attention to, and, according to existing lit-

erature, high levels of knowledge about, politics they appear to be not particularly active or involved in politics. These findings are similar to those of Simeon and Elkins and provide a good example of the limited impact that this study has found 'class' to have on political involvement.

Why, then, does Saskatchewan follow its expected course, as a 'modern' province while the others appear not to do so? Firstly, it must be remembered that Saskatchewan is the most 'modern' province, according to both Jensen and Wilson, while the other western provinces are less categorically so. Furthermore, trends that are apparent at the provincial level are not necessarily evident at the federal level. While the involvement indicators do not specifically apply to federal politics the survey was conducted in the context of the 1984 federal election. The provincially oriented nature of both Alberta and British Columbia, and the Social Credit tradition of limited populism are important here. While Alberta has, in the past, been the centre of Western Separatism sentiment B.C. has had an almost ambivalent attitude towards Central Canada and the federal government. These attitudes are shown in the low levels of 'supporters' that these provinces contained.

The analysis of Alberta in Chapter 2 showed it to be a somewhat authoritarian province, medium in terms of trust and efficacy and low in terms of involvement. Indeed Alberta

is only considered to approach 'modern' status by virtue of the fact that, according to Wilson, its party system is a contest between the Progressive Conservatives and the N.D.P. However, the opposition status accorded to the N.D.P. is rather weak, while the P.C.s remain strong especially in the urban areas, all of which suggests that a 'transitional' label would be more appropriate.

In the case of British Columbia, the 'modern' provincial party system is not reflected at the federal level. The more traditional, Progressive Conservative party remains strong in B.C. at the federal level, a result, it is argued, that the threat from the 'left' at the federal level was not strong enough to cause the re-alignment of the 'right' that it did at the provincial level.¹¹² Furthermore the results of this study suggest that while B.C. has the highest proportion of 'critics' in the country it has relatively low levels of 'supporters' and 'deferents'. In other words a sense of trust appears to be lower than previous studies have suggested and a feeling of efficacy, which has been found to be the spur to involvement is limited largely to the 'critics'. Martin Robin has argued that B.C. government is as corrupt and patronage-ridden as anywhere in the country undermining trust and efficacy and certainly contradicting the view of B.C. as a model 'citizen-society'.¹¹³ A

¹¹² see Alan C. Cairns and Daniel Wong; 'Socialism, Federalism and the B.C. Party Systems 1933-1983.' in Thorburn, Party Politics. p. 283.

¹¹³ see Martin Robin, 'British Columbia, The Company Prov-

further explanation for the disaffection from politics, especially at the federal level, in B.C. has been advanced in a recent newspaper article.¹¹⁴ The argument is that British Columbians feel left out of federal decision-making because they do not have the high profile members in cabinet that they are used to. It is also argued that the 'softwood lumber affair' damaged attitudes towards the federal, as well as the provincial, government. At the same time the federal election is, in B.C. a contest between the Conservatives and the N.D.P.. This, and the fact that the N.D.P. are also seen as likely victors of the next provincial election seems to suggest that B.C. is indeed a 'modern' province. A more likely reason for the relative apathy apparent in the province is the feeling of self-centredness and self-sufficiency which may be fostered by the economy, geographical location, and immigration from East Asia by people who are unfamiliar with central Canada.

Saskatchewan, on the other hand, seems to have had its claim to political sophistication ratified. In this study, as in others, it has consistently ranked highest in terms of the proportion of its respondents who are actively involved in politics. the province ranked quite high in terms of class consciousness, behind only Quebec and the economically developed provinces of Ontario and B.C. However, feelings of

ince'. in, Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics. p. 38.

¹¹⁴ Joan Cohen; ' N.D.P. Hopes May Hinge On B.C.'. Winnipeg Free Press. 25th October 1988. p.7.

class consciousness and the fact that Saskatchewan has developed economically away from being a purely agrarian society, do not offer the most significant explanations for Saskatchewan's participatory political culture. Rather the answer seems to lie in ethnic settlement patterns, the early economic climate and the resulting development of the collectivist political system. Climatic hazards and exploitation by Central Canada forced settlers into co-operatives, at first individually and later politically. That the political movement took on a socialist character is thought to be largely because of the predominance of British settlers in the rural areas rather than American ones, as was the case in Alberta.¹¹⁵ This is, of course, an oversimplified picture, and by no means were all of the original C.C.F. supporters socialists. However, as Dyck says "it would seem that there was an ethic of co-operation and collective public action ingrained in the province that permitted a socialist party to take root".¹¹⁶ Recent election victories by the Progressive Conservatives suggest that the continued high levels of political involvement are the result of this ethic of concerted public action rather than of socialism per se.

¹¹⁵ For a full discussion of prairie settlement patterns see Nelson Wiseman, 'The Pattern Of Prairie Politics.' in, Thorburn, Party Politics In Canada. chapter 23.

¹¹⁶ Dyck, Provincial Politics In Canada. p. 395.

The fact that Saskatchewan appears so clearly as the province with the highest levels of political involvement while at the same time containing only medium levels of class consciousness, 'supporters' and 'critics', reiterates that the independent variables controlled for in this study have only a limited use in explaining involvement. In attempting to explain the substantial regional differences in political culture, and specifically in levels of political involvement, it was necessary to examine the broader cultural aspects of the provinces particularly their historical experiences.

Certain avenues opened up in the course of this study need to be explored further. The fact that objective class status seemed to have the most significant impact on levels of involvement needs, perhaps to be followed up as does the relationship between culture type and objective class position. More significantly still, is the exploration of intra-regional political cultures. This is an endeavour made difficult by the fact that when 'community size', for example, is controlled for, even in a survey of 3377 respondents, the cell sizes become too small for meaningful analysis. Nonetheless the aggregate data for a province like Ontario is a reflection of neither the attitudes of Torontonians nor the people in the Northern areas.

Finally, though, it does seem that the majority of the propositions were verified and that class consciousness,

objective class position, and culture type all have an impact on political involvement. The image of Canada as a classless society seems to be only partially accurate though those who are class conscious are predominantly middle class. An awareness of one's class position certainly seems to be the result of a higher objective class position. A sense of trust and efficacy are also linked to class consciousness though regional differences remain great even after this variable is controlled for. Political involvement too is linked to class consciousness and both are, in general, more apparent in the economically developed provinces. This suggests that as economic development increases throughout the country so, gradually, all of the provinces will become 'modern' and more involved. This is unlikely, particularly when the political apathy of 'modern' and relatively homogeneous countries like Britain are considered. Regional political cultures, it seems, are best explained through the historical experiences of each, and perhaps, as Simeon and Elkins suggest, they are not cultural at all but rather the accurate reflection of politics, political systems and politicians in each province.

CONCLUSION

The general conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the propositions are borne out by the analysis. It was found, quite clearly that the different provinces of Canada have different political cultures. With one notable exception class consciousness was seen to be more apparent in the more 'modern' regions, as defined by this study. Of the four culture types 'critics' and 'supporters' were the most class conscious. High levels of political involvement were more apparent among higher objective class status respondents and among the subjectively class conscious. The impact of class consciousness was found to be greater on active forms of involvement than on passive ones. High levels of involvement were found to be evident among 'supporters' and 'critics' and in the more 'modern' regions. The only propositions not verified by the analysis were that class consciousness is more apparent among people of a 'lower' objective class position and that such working class consciousness would be most apparent among members of labour unions.

However, it was seen in Chapter 4 that these general conclusions do not tell the whole story. The studies of both Jensen and Wilson suggest a significant role for 'class' in the politics of the 'modern' provinces. While the findings of this suggest that a sense of class consciousness, as defined by whether the respondent considers him/herself to

be a social class member, is by no means the most influential variable in determining levels of political involvement. Perhaps not surprisingly, objective class status, particularly education and income levels, appear to have a greater impact on involvement levels than do the other independent variables.

The fact that, with the exception of Quebec, a sense of class consciousness was found to be more apparent in Ontario and the west, was an expected result. In Ontario, and to a lesser extent B.C., this can be explained by the high levels of industrial and economic development. In the Prairie provinces and B.C. it is, perhaps, best explained, by the immigration patterns in these provinces. The fact that many Americans settled in the rural areas of Alberta, while more British and European immigrants did so in the other prairie provinces, may account for the lower levels of class consciousness in this province than elsewhere in the west.

Class consciousness is consistently lower in the Eastern provinces although there are wide discrepancies between them. New Brunswick has higher levels of class consciousness than the other Maritime provinces despite its rating on all other indicators as the most 'traditional' province. P.E.I., on the other hand, which displays high levels of involvement on some indicators and was considered by Jensen to have a significant class cleavage, has the smallest percentage of respondents who consider themselves to be a member of a

social class. The slightly higher levels of class consciousness in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia is reflected in the fact that the N.D.P. can garner as much as 15 to 20% of the popular vote in these provinces. The Cape Breton area of Nova Scotia differs from the rest of Atlantic Canada in that it has periodically elected C.C.F./N.D.P. candidates at both the federal and provincial level since 1939. It is likely that this industrial area boosted the province's level of class consciousness although the fact that this study was unable to tap intra-provincial distinctions makes this difficult to substantiate.

The fact that class consciousness is highest in Quebec, and to a lesser extent Ontario, where levels of involvement are moderate at best serves to demonstrate the limitations of class consciousness as a predictor of political involvement. Although the extra-ordinary level of class consciousness in Quebec has been attributed here to a different connotation being placed on the concept of social class by Quebecers, the example of Saskatchewan, where involvement levels are significantly higher than elsewhere while levels of class consciousness are moderate, further suggests that factors other than class consciousness account for changes in political involvement.

It seems that the affect of 'culture type' - 'trust' and 'efficacy' - is also limited. There is no doubt that 'supporters' and 'critics' are both more likely to be class con-

scious and more involved, with a significant association with almost all indicators of political involvement. Yet the association levels are barely any different to those for subjective class consciousness. The four Western provinces display similar patterns in terms of culture type, with fewer 'supporters' and more 'disaffecteds' and 'critics' (especially in B.C.). The higher levels of 'disaffecteds' and lower levels of 'supporters' are somewhat surprising given the greater 'modernity' of these provinces, though it can be explained in terms of 'western alienation' and, in the case of Manitoba and Saskatchewan where disaffection is higher, as a result of the 'small town in mass society' alienation which is more usually applied to the Maritimes. The high levels of 'critics' in the West are not surprising although the fact that Saskatchewan has the lowest rate of the four provinces illustrates the limitations of 'culture type' in explaining political involvement.

Undoubtedly objective class status plays a role in determining political involvement levels. Specifically, education and income levels are the most significant of the independent variables used in this study. Simeon and Elkins suggest that inter-regional differences are eroded at the extreme top and extreme bottom of the education and income scales while 'in the middle ranges the effects.....are more ambiguous, or conflicting, so that there is more room, so to speak, for community norms to operate'.¹¹⁷ The fact that in

¹¹⁷ Simeon and Elkins, 'Regional Political Cultures.', p. 45

this study even objective class status was seen as 'explaining' only a small percentage of variance in political involvement levels would seem to suggest that this 'middle range' constitutes the bulk of the population. In other words substantial regional differences remain after the independent variables were controlled for.

This study has offered broader cultural, historical, and sociological factors as the explanations for the difference in provincial political cultures. The historical period, and ethnic sources, of immigration and settlement patterns were deemed to be of particular importance. The Hartz/Horowitz argument is that new societies become 'fragments' of the old societies from whence the inhabitants came. Discussions in this study have highlighted and contrasted the impact of Loyalist settlers in the Maritimes, their traditional values and their ideologies from pre-industrial Europe with those of the later immigrants to the Western provinces who brought with them socialism from Britain and Europe and radical populist liberalism from the United States as well as Central Canadian liberalism 'with a Tory touch' from Ontario. All of these influences acquired differing levels of prominence in the different provinces and one must be wary of assuming homogeneity in either Eastern or Western Canada. While there are similarities which allow some categorizing, in terms of political orientations each province is quite distinct.

The lack of industrialization and economic development in Atlantic Canada is also seen as a reason for low levels of trust and efficacy in these regions. However, these provinces, too, have their own economic elites, a fact which, along with patronage, bolsters levels of 'supporters', voter turnout and some factual knowledge of politics. Simeon and Elkins suggest that:

politics in the Atlantic provinces is a game enjoyed and supported by a small stratum at the top. The spectators perform their required activities, like voting, but rather than being a satisfied audience they have turned their back on the game.¹¹⁸

The fact that both federal and provincial governments have, in these provinces, continually failed to solve economic problems is another factor which may explain high numbers of 'disaffected' respondents in New Brunswick and Newfoundland, as well as low levels of 'critics' in all four Atlantic provinces.

This latter point suggests that political orientations may, in fact, be an accurate reflection of the political system in each province. This raises the 'causal-arrow' question. Is it that the lack of issue-based politics and the dominance of patronage are the result of a lack of popular interest and involvement or is this system of politics born out of the fact that a lack of protest and challenge means that there is little to shake the existing elites out of their inertia and away from the traditional, patronage

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 45

and personality-based politics? There is obviously a circular relationship here, and it is possible to argue that political culture is usually seen as the determining factor although it is more important, in the context of this study to ask what it would take to break this vicious-circle.

It would seem that industrialization and economic development, coupled with the rise in education and income levels which this implies, are necessary for the development of a more participatory and effective political culture. Yet the results of this study suggest that even these developments would be of limited impact in countering decades of socialization and displacing the 'fragments' of old societies. Such a process would be inevitably slow and the findings of this study suggest that in only one province does there appear to be evidence of a transition towards greater 'modernity'. Along with rapid economic development Quebec has also witnessed social and cultural changes. The dominance of the Roman Catholic church has diminished, the battle for official Bi-lingualism has been won, and more recently the province has its claim to status as a 'distinct society' legitimized. In this context it is not surprising that this study found Quebec to have as high a proportion of 'supporters' as anywhere in the country.

Further analysis along the lines of this study, perhaps using a 1988 Election dataset, could be used to assess whether 'involvement' levels in Quebec increase as a result

of such development. Such analysis could also explore whether the apparent revival of a three party provincial system in Manitoba undermines Wilson's model, and whether the recent Liberal landslide victory in New Brunswick's provincial election is a sign of changing attitudes and breaking down of traditional cleavages in this most 'disaffected' of provinces. However, the greatest supplement to the findings of this study would be the inclusion of data relating to intra-provincial differences in basic political orientations. One would anticipate that providing more specific data than merely provincial aggregates, for instance analysis based on community size, that a stronger link between industrialization, class consciousness and political involvement than that found in this study may be evident.

APPENDIX 1

A List Of The Variables Drawn From
The 1984 Federal Election Dataset
Which Were Used,
Either In Their Original Form Or In A Recoded Version,
In This Thesis.

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
 VAR018 Q.A-3 ATTN. TO FED/PROV/LOCAL POLITICS 4
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

NAME POSITION
 VAR004 SCREENER: CITY SIZE OF INTERVIEW 1
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

- | VALUE | LABEL |
|-------|--------------|
| 1 | OVER 500M |
| 2 | 100M TO 500M |
| 3 | 30M TO 99.9M |
| 4 | 10M TO 29.9M |
| 5 | 1M TO 9.9M |
| 6 | RURAL |

VAR016 Q.A-1 INTEREST IN THE 1984 ELECTION 2
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

- | VALUE | LABEL |
|-------|---------------------|
| 1 | VERY INTERESTED |
| 2 | FAIRLY INTERESTED |
| 3 | SLIGHTLY INTERESTED |
| 4 | NOT INTERESTED |
| 8 M | DONT KNOW |

VAR017 Q.A-2 ATTENTION TO POLITICS GENERALLY 3
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

- | VALUE | LABEL |
|-------|-----------------|
| 1 | VERY CLOSELY |
| 2 | FAIRLY CLOSELY |
| 3 | NOT MUCH AT ALL |
| 8 M | DONT KNOW |

VAR031 Q.A-9C POLITICS/GOVT TOO COMPLICATED 5
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

- | VALUE | LABEL |
|-------|----------------------|
| 1 | STRONGLY AGREE |
| 2 | AGREE SOMEWHAT |
| 3 | DISAGREE SOMEWHAT |
| 4 | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 7 | NEITHER AG NOR DISAG |
| 8 M | NO OPINION |

VAR032 Q.A-9D R DOES NOT HAVE ANY SAY 6
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

- | VALUE | LABEL |
|-------|----------------------|
| 1 | STRONGLY AGREE |
| 2 | AGREE SOMEWHAT |
| 3 | DISAGREE SOMEWHAT |
| 4 | STRONGLY DISAGREE |
| 7 | NEITHER AG NOR DISAG |
| 8 M | NO OPINION |

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
19:40:25 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
VAR037 Q.A-9I SMART PEOPLE RUN FED. GOVT 11
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	AGREE SOMEWHAT
3	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
7	NEITHER AG NOR DISAG
8 M	NO OPINION

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
19:40:25 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
VAR033 Q.A-9E DOES NOT MATTER R VOTES OR NOT 7
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	AGREE SOMEWHAT
3	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
7	NEITHER AG NOR DISAG
8 M	NO OPINION

VAR034 Q.A-9F PEOPLE IN FED. DISHONEST 8
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	AGREE SOMEWHAT
3	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
7	NEITHER AG NOR DISAG
8 M	NO OPINION

VAR035 Q.A-9G FED. GOVT WASTE TAX MONEY 9
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	AGREE SOMEWHAT
3	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
7	NEITHER AG NOR DISAG
8 M	NO OPINION

VAR036 Q.A-9H TRUST FED. GOVT DOING 10
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	AGREE SOMEWHAT
3	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
7	NEITHER AG NOR DISAG
8 M	NO OPINION

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
19:40:25 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
VAR038 Q.A-10A READ ABOUT POLITICS IN PAPERS 12
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	AGREE SOMEWHAT
3	DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
7	NEITHER AG NOR DISAG
8 M	NO OPINION

VAR039 Q.A-10B WATCH POLITICAL PROGRAMS ON TV 13
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	OFTEN
2	SOMETIMES
3	SELDOM
4	NEVER
8 M	DONT KNOW/REF.

VAR040 Q.A-10C DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS 14
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	OFTEN
2	SOMETIMES
3	SELDOM
4	NEVER
8 M	DONT KNOW/REF.

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS OS MVS 19 OS MVS
 19:40:25 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 AMDAHL 5870

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
 VAR041 Q-A-10D CONVINCED FRIENDS VOTE THE SAME 15 VAR045 Q-A-10H GIVE \$ TO POLITICAL PARTY 19
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	OFTEN
2	SOMETIMES
3	SELDOM
4	NEVER
8 M	DONT KNOW/REF.

VAR042 Q-A-10E ATTEND POLITICAL MEETING/RALLY 16 VAR081 Q-C-1A R'S FED. ID. -PREFERENCE 20
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	OFTEN
2	SOMETIMES
3	SELDOM
4	NEVER
8 M	DONT KNOW/REF.

VAR043 Q-A-10F CONTACT POLITICIANS 17
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	OFTEN
2	SOMETIMES
3	SELDOM
4	NEVER
8 M	DONT KNOW/REF.

VAR044 Q-A-10G WORKING FOR POLITICAL PARTY 18
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	OFTEN
2	SOMETIMES
3	SELDOM
4	NEVER
8 M	DONT KNOW/REF.

VAR082 Q-C-1B R'S FED. ID. -INTENSITY 21
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 7, 8, 9

VALUE	LABEL
1	VERY STRONGLY
2	FAIRLY STRONGLY
3	NOT VERY STRONGLY
7 M	REFUSED
8 M	DONT KNOW
9 M	NA

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
19:40:25 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 OS MVS

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
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09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
19:40:25 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
VAR307 Q-J-2A SOCIAL CLASS R BELONGS 26
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 7, 8, 9

VALUE	LABEL
1	UPPER CLASS
2	UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS
3	MIDDLE CLASS
4	WORKING CLASS
5	LOWER CLASS
7 M	REFUSED
8 M	DONT KNOW
9 M	NA

VAR308 Q-J-2B SOCIAL CLASS R BELONGS -FORCED 27
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 7, 8, 9

VALUE	LABEL
1	UPPER CLASS
2	UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS
3	MIDDLE CLASS
4	WORKING CLASS
5	LOWER CLASS
7 M	REFUSED
8 M	DONT KNOW
9 M	NA

VAR362 Q-L-7A R'S EDUCATION LEVEL 28
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE	LABEL
0 M	REFUSED.DK.
1	SOME ELEMENTARY
2	GRAD. ELEMENTARY
3	SOME HIGH SCHOOL
4	HIGH SCHOOL GRAD.
5	SOME TECHNICAL
6	GRAD. TECHNICAL
7	SOME UNIVERSITY
8	GRAD. UNIVERSITY
9	NO FORMAL SCHOOL

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
VAR124 Q-E-1A DID R VOTE IN 84 ELECTION 22
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	VOTED
2	DID NOT VOTE
8 M	DONT KNOW

VAR156 Q-E-6A DID R VOTE IN 1980 ELECTION 23
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8, 9

VALUE	LABEL
1	VOTED
2	DID NOT VOTE
3	NOT ELIGIBLE
8 M	FORGET
9 M	REFUSED

VAR160 Q-E-7A DID R VOTE IN 1979 ELECTION 24
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 8, 9

VALUE	LABEL
1	VOTED
2	DID NOT VOTE
3	NOT ELIGIBLE
8 M	FORGET
9 M	REFUSED

VAR306 Q-J-1 R THINK SOCIAL CLASS MEMBER 25
PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 7, 8

VALUE	LABEL
1	YES
2	NO
7 M	REFUSED
8 M	DONT KNOW

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
 19:40:26 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA ANDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
 VAR380 Q.L-11C FREQ. UNION MEETING ATTENDANCE 31
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8, 9

VALUE	LABEL
0	NONE
1	ONCE PER YR.
2	TWICE PER YR.
3	3 OR 4 PER YR.
4	5-12 PER YR.
5	MORE THAN ONCE/MO.
6	ONCE PER WK.
8 M	DONT KNOW
9 M	NA

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
 19:40:26 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA ANDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
 VAR371 Q.L-9A R RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 29
 PRINT FORMAT: F2
 WRITE FORMAT: F2
 MISSING VALUES: 88

VALUE	LABEL
0	NONE
1	ROMAN CATHOLIC
2	UNITED CHURCH
3	ANGLICAN
4	PRESBYTERIAN
5	BAPTISH
6	LUTHERAN
7	UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC
8	GREEK ORTHODOX
9	JEWISH
10	PENTECOSTAL
11	SALVATION ARMY
12	JEHOVAH WITNESS
13	MENNONITE
14	EVANGELICAL
15	CHRISTIAN REFORMED
16	CHRISTIAN
17	MORMON/L.D.S.
18	CHURCH OF CHRIST
19	7TH DAY ADVENTIST
20	CHRISTIAN ALLIANCE
22	CHRISTIAN SC.
28	OTHER PROTESTANT
29	MUSLIM
31	HINDU
32	SIKH
33	BUDDHIST
34	NO REGULAR CHURCH
35	MISC. VAGUE ANS.
88 M	REFUSED

VAR393 Q.L-12.12 NEIGHBOURHOOD ORGANIZATION 33
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
0	NOT A MEMBER
1	INACTIVE
2	FAIRLY ACTIVE
3	VERY ACTIVE
8 M	DONT KNOW

09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
 19:40:26 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA ANDAHL 5870 OS MVS

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
 VAR394 Q.L-12.13 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 34
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

VALUE	LABEL
0	NOT A MEMBER
1	INACTIVE
2	FAIRLY ACTIVE
3	VERY ACTIVE
8 M	DONT KNOW

FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT

VAR395 Q-L-12.14 PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 35

VAR463 INFO: PROVINCE 39

VAR464 INFO: CITY SIZE 40

VAR435 Q-L-17A R GREW UP IN CITY/SUBURB/ETC. 37

VAR525 Q-L-1B R'S OCCUPATION CODE - SHORT LIST 41

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F2
 WRITE FORMAT: F2
 MISSING VALUES: 12, 13, 99

VALUE LABEL
 0 NOT A MEMBER
 1 INACTIVE
 2 FAIRLY ACTIVE
 3 VERY ACTIVE
 8 M DONT KNOW

VALUE LABEL
 0 NEWFOUNDLAND
 1 PRINCE EDWARD ISL.
 2 NOVA SCOTIA
 3 NEW BRUNSWICK
 4 QUEBEC
 5 ONTARIO
 6 MANITOBA
 7 SASKATCHEWAN
 8 ALBERTA
 9 BRITISH COLUMBIA

VALUE LABEL
 0 NOT A MEMBER
 1 INACTIVE
 2 FAIRLY ACTIVE
 3 VERY ACTIVE
 8 M DONT KNOW

VALUE LABEL
 1 CITY
 2 SUBURB
 3 VILLAGE, SMALL TOWN
 4 FARM, RURAL AREA

VALUE LABEL
 1 NOTHING
 2 UNDER \$5,000
 3 \$5,000-\$9,999
 4 \$10,000-\$14,999
 5 \$15,000-\$19,999
 6 \$20,000-\$24,999
 7 \$25,000-\$29,999
 8 \$30,000-\$39,999
 9 \$40,000-\$49,999
 10 \$50,000-\$99,999
 11 \$100,000 & OVER
 96 UNABLE TO ESTIMATE
 97 DONT KNOW

VAR396 Q-L-12.15 CREDIT UNIONS OR CO-OP 36

VAR464 INFO: CITY SIZE 40

VAR435 Q-L-17A R GREW UP IN CITY/SUBURB/ETC. 37

VAR525 Q-L-1B R'S OCCUPATION CODE - SHORT LIST 41

VAR525 Q-L-1B R'S OCCUPATION CODE - SHORT LIST 41

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 8

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F2
 WRITE FORMAT: F2
 MISSING VALUES: 12, 13, 99

VALUE LABEL
 0 NOT A MEMBER
 1 INACTIVE
 2 FAIRLY ACTIVE
 3 VERY ACTIVE
 8 M DONT KNOW

VALUE LABEL
 0 NEWFOUNDLAND
 1 PRINCE EDWARD ISL.
 2 NOVA SCOTIA
 3 NEW BRUNSWICK
 4 QUEBEC
 5 ONTARIO
 6 MANITOBA
 7 SASKATCHEWAN
 8 ALBERTA
 9 BRITISH COLUMBIA

VALUE LABEL
 0 NOT A MEMBER
 1 INACTIVE
 2 FAIRLY ACTIVE
 3 VERY ACTIVE
 8 M DONT KNOW

VALUE LABEL
 1 CITY
 2 SUBURB
 3 VILLAGE, SMALL TOWN
 4 FARM, RURAL AREA

VALUE LABEL
 1 PROFESSIONAL
 2 OWNER/MGR./EXEC.
 3 SALES
 4 CLERICAL
 5 SKILLED LABOUR
 6 UNSKILLED LABOUR
 7 FARMER
 8 HOME/MAKER/WIDOW
 11 STUDENT
 12 M REFUSED
 13 M DONT KNOW
 99 M NA

VAR435 Q-L-17A R GREW UP IN CITY/SUBURB/ETC. 37

VAR464 INFO: CITY SIZE 40

VAR435 Q-L-17A R GREW UP IN CITY/SUBURB/ETC. 37

VAR525 Q-L-1B R'S OCCUPATION CODE - SHORT LIST 41

VAR525 Q-L-1B R'S OCCUPATION CODE - SHORT LIST 41

PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1

PRINT FORMAT: F2
 WRITE FORMAT: F2
 MISSING VALUES: 12, 13, 99

VALUE LABEL
 1 CITY
 2 SUBURB
 3 VILLAGE, SMALL TOWN
 4 FARM, RURAL AREA

VALUE LABEL
 1 OVER 500M
 2 100M TO 500M
 3 30M TO 99.9M
 4 10M TO 29.9M
 5 1M TO 9.9M
 6 RURAL

VALUE LABEL
 1 CITY
 2 SUBURB
 3 VILLAGE, SMALL TOWN
 4 FARM, RURAL AREA

VALUE LABEL
 1 NOTHING
 2 UNDER \$5,000
 3 \$5,000-\$9,999
 4 \$10,000-\$14,999
 5 \$15,000-\$19,999
 6 \$20,000-\$24,999
 7 \$25,000-\$29,999
 8 \$30,000-\$39,999
 9 \$40,000-\$49,999
 10 \$50,000-\$99,999
 11 \$100,000 & OVER
 96 UNABLE TO ESTIMATE
 97 DONT KNOW

VALUE LABEL
 1 PROFESSIONAL
 2 OWNER/MGR./EXEC.
 3 SALES
 4 CLERICAL
 5 SKILLED LABOUR
 6 UNSKILLED LABOUR
 7 FARMER
 8 HOME/MAKER/WIDOW
 11 STUDENT
 12 M REFUSED
 13 M DONT KNOW
 99 M NA


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09 NOV 88 1984 CANADIAN ELECTION FILE DATA FOR THESIS
19:40:26 UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA AMDAHL 5870 OS MVS OS MVS
FILE: FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT FILE BUILT VIA IMPORT
MANITOBA
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2
55 VOTE PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 65
SASKATN
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 56
ALBERTA
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 57
B.C.
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 58
SCL
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 59
CULT
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 60
SUPPORT
VALUE LABEL
1.00 supporter
2.00 disaffected
3.00 critic
4.00 deferent
61 PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2
DISAFF
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 62
CRITIC
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 63
OCLASS
PRINT FORMAT: F8.2
WRITE FORMAT: F8.2 64
VALUE LABEL
1.00 often
2.00 sometimes
3.00 seldom
4.00 never

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