# Exploring the Influence of Social Threat and Value Reinforcement on Emotional Reactions to Value Transgressions

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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**Table of Content**

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## Preface

*"Oh God, I have no knowledge except what you taught, for you are the Knower of the Unseen."*

**Acknowledgement**

First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my dearest people to me, my mother and my father (May God grant mercy upon their souls), for showing me unconditional and unwavering love and care. I also want to thank my advisor, Dr. Sergio Carvalho, and my committee members, Dr. Fang Wan and Dr. Marian Morry. I appreciate all their contributions of time, ideas, and thoughts to make my Ph.D. experience productive and stimulating. I also would like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Anne Lavack for agreeing to serve as an external examiner for my thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for all their love and encouragement. I am grateful for the presence of my supportive, encouraging, and patient wife here in Winnipeg for the duration of my college years.

*Thank you all*
*University of Manitoba*
*Hesham Fazel*
*Winnipeg, 2013*

## List of Tables

## List of Figures

**Abstract**

Religiosity and morality constitute the fundamental components of any culture and set up rules and regulate interpersonal behavior. In the context of religion, to understanding value transgressions, their emotional consequences and the moderating role of social threats (in-group and out-group interactions), the psychological underpinnings of value-reinforcement, and complementing role of self-affirmation at a group level represent the focal points of this dissertation. The findings of study 1 show that value transgression has a direct effect on the level of negative emotion experienced by the transgressor. The social threat that is manipulated by the presence of an out-group member during the time of transgression moderates the relationship between value transgression and level of negative emotion. Furthermore, value reinforcement (e.g, endorsing group value) can weaken the effect of threats and mitigate negative emotions. Study 1 findings show that value reinforcement's absence qualified previous proposition of value transgression and social presence interaction. In study 2, I carry on the investigation by showing that granting opportunities to affirm important group values mitigates their emotional tension. Study 2 results show that group-affirmation may work as a complementary factor that further explains the relationship between value reinforcement and emotional reaction in the event of transgressing group values.

## Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview

### *1.1 Introduction*

Why do we pay attention so deeply to what other people may do, especially when their actions are interrelated with our own values? And how do we decide that someone else has done something to affect our emotions? We live in a world that is guided by the dictates of religion, nationality, political ideology, race and many other different social groups. These social groups in turn construct our own identities, and each one prescribes a distinct set of membership standards and values. Social identity theorists argue that intergroup resentment arises due to the psychological benefits conferred on certain group members, particularly those associated with in-groups (Tajfel &Turner, 1986). These benefits include acceptance, rules, norms, values, and beliefs that guide behavior. Groups increase our sense of distinctiveness from others (Turner, 1987), helping us to feel more certain of the social world around us and our place within it (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Yet, people sometimes threaten their own social group by exhibiting behavior that goes against the group's own value systems.

People occasionally lie, cheat, and behave unethically in order to avoid harm or to gain benefits, even though they know such behavior is considered wrong, according to moral and societal norms (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). When we transgress or make mistakes, aversive feelings of shame, guilt, or embarrassment are likely to ensue. Alternatively, when we do the right thing, positive feelings of pride and self-approval are likely to emerge (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Moral emotions represent an important but often discounted component of our human apparatus. Moral emotions are imperative in understanding people's behavioral devotion (or lack of devotion) to their groups moral standards. Haidt (2003) defines moral emotions as those "that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent" (p. 276). One of the basic characteristics of any social group is that the expectations of certain behavior that represents one's group should be obvious to others. Inconsistency might threaten the validity of the group value system (Haidt, 2003).

Many researchers have investigated the activation, motivational, and adaptive functions of emotions (e.g., Barlow, 1988; Izard & Kobak, 1991). However, it remains a contentious issue to determine what is appropriate or inappropriate in the moral values and social experiences, as well as the threats of surrounding environment that govern a person's emotions. In the context of intergroup threat theory, an intergroup threat is experienced when members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Intergroup threat theory draws upon social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to reveal the inescapability of perceiving threats from other groups, due to a basic human inclination towards vigilant perceptions of out-groups (Haselton & Buss, 2003). According to intergroup threat theory, there are two basic types of threats: *Realistic threats* that may cause the in-group some degree of physical harm or loss of resources. *Symbolic threats* are challenges to in-group norms and values, and, at the individual level of analysis, these threats may be associated with loss of face, challenges to self-identity, and potential threats to self-esteem (Stephan, et al., 2009). In this research, I examined the symbolic threat that concerns the integrity or soundness of the in-group's value structure. Even when a threat from an out-group leads to non-hostile behavioral responses, the emotion and affective responses to it are likely to be negative (Stephan et al. 2009).

People tend to favor and defend their groups, for example, allocating more resources to their groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and making attributions that reflect positively on them (Lau

& Russell, 1980). People defend their group because important groups are seen as part of the self (Tropp & Wright, 2001). Although being a member of a group can lead to defensiveness on behalf of that group, the overall argument in the research is that the transgressor's group's values can serve as a psychological resource from which group members can draw to confront information thate4 is potentially threatening to the self and the group and may decrease potential negative emotion. I examine, on the one hand, whether the absence of affirming values that are central to a group can further explain the transgressor's negative emotion. On the other hand, I examine whether affirming values that are central to the transgressor's group value can reduce possible negative emotion.

*1.2 Research questions*

In this research I investigate four main scopes; 1) the group-values transgression and its emotional effect on the transgressor. 2) The intergroup threat through the presence of an out-group observer. 3) The role of value reinforcement and 4) the role of group-affirmation.

I suggest that reinforcing group values may have a potential impact through the combined forces of emphasis on group-values legitimacy and social connections, meaning that it can reinforce a person's belief that they are a good person because their group values are respectable and worthy of being adopted and followed by out-group individuals in society. People may dispute information that threatens their positive self-views and are unwilling to accept the implications of the threatening information (Baumeister et al. 1998). When people receive an approval of their group's value legitimacy and acceptability by out-groups (value reinforcement), this approval can help them to face threatening events. However, when value reinforcement is absent, people are likely to experience negative emotion. 4) I further propose that self-affirmation at a group level might play a major role in qualifying value reinforcement moderation effect. Specifically, when an opportunity to self-affirm is given, individuals are more likely to experience the same emotion as they would in the presence of value reinforcement, thus resulting in lower levels of negative emotion.

The selection of religion as the framework for this research stems not only from the current lack of investigation in terms of consumer research, but also from the fact that religion and its associated practices generally play an axiological role in influencing many of the important activities and transitions that humans experience (e.g., births, marriages, burial rites); in values that appear to be important to them (e.g., moral ethics of right and wrong); in forming public opinions on social issues (e.g., premarital sex, family planning); in what is permissible and forbidden for consumption (e.g., restraints on eating or drinking); as well as in many other aspects of daily life (Mokhlis, 2009).

Based on an extensive review of the extant research on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), value transgression (e.g., Sabini & Silver, 1998), intergroup threat (e.g., Stephan et al., 2009), and self-affirmation theory (e.g., Sherman & Cohen 2006), and using Islamic religion as the study framework (Kurtz, 1995; Serajzadeh, 2002), my dissertation intends to uncover the consumer experience of negative emotion that results from an intergroup threat to a fundamental value, replicating various pieces of previous research on the relationships between value transgression and emotional reaction (e.g., Doosje, Spears & Manstead, 1998; Davis & Stephan, 2006; Mackie et al., 2000) and introducing several possible moderators that may play important roles in qualifying and explaining the relationship between value transgression and emotional reaction. I present an explanation as to why in-group individuals who stray from their own values experience higher levels of negative emotions and in what types of events those feelings and emotions are most likely to occur and how such negative emotion can be alleviated.

The research hypotheses were investigated within the context of religion, the influence of which has not been adequately considered in the literature of consumer behavior up to this point. Hirschman (1983) proposes three possible causes to explain why religion has not been studied extensively in consumer behavior literature. First, there exists the possibility that consumer investigators are unfamiliar with the possible links between religion and patterns of consumption. Second, within the research community, bias against the insights of religion is deemed to be a taboo subject and possibly too sensitive to be presented as an area for research. Third, religion remains a common theme in our everyday lives and thus may have gone unnoticed by researchers as an obvious variable for study in the consumer-behavior arena. Hirschman made this declaration many years ago, but its reasoning continues into the present day. To date, consumer psychologists have not yet sufficiently explored religion as group value that may influence consumer behavior in terms of consumption patterns and the related emotional effects.

This research proceeds as follows: I introduce group norms, social identity theory, intergroup relations, and threat, and I link intergroup threats to emotional reactions. I then present the moderating role of social threat, which arises because of the out-group observer. I next present the moderation effect of affirmation and discuss self-affirmation at a group level. I suggest two affirmation instruments – value reinforcement and group-affirmation processes – as two influential tactics that might play a role in value transgression, intergroup threats and emotional reaction relationship. A discussion of the study methodological approach follows, which is based on experimental design and uses Muslim consumers as the study's population, with Halal (lawful)/non-halal products as stimuli. The study concludes with a discussion of theoretical and managerial implications and suggests a path for future research.

## Chapter 2. Theoretical Backgrounds

### *2.1 Group Norms*

Group norms often have a powerful and consistent influence on group members' behavior (Hackman, 1976). Most of the classical theoretical work on group norms has focused on identifying the types of such norms (March, 1954) or on describing their structural characteristics (Jackson, 1966). Further research has focused on examining the impact that norms have on other social phenomena. For example, Seashore (1954) and Schachter et al. (1951) use the concept of group norms to discuss group cohesiveness; Trist and Bamforth (1951) use norms to examine production restriction; Longley and Pruitt (1980) use norms to illuminate group decision-making; and Asch (1951) uses norms to examine conformity. Feldman (1984) examines group norms that are enforced and how these group norms are developed.

Norms are universal in social life. They offer a means for expressing and codifying a group's shared values, they provide identity for group members, and eventually, they help people interpret and predict their own and others' behavior (Feldman, 1984). Norms can be descriptive or prescriptive (Miller & Prentice, 1996). *Descriptive norms* reflect members' actual behavior and attitudes and are an informational source of social influence. *Prescriptive norms* reflect the attitudes and behaviors that the group desires or expected behaviors that are sanctioned by the larger relevant system (e.g., the group, organization, or society) with a specific "ought" or "must" quality. Prescriptive norms act as a normative source of social influence (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991). Thus, group norms constitute shared definitions of the way people behave or should behave (Miller, Monin & Prentice, 2000).

There are many definitions of group norms. One definition is that group norms serve as guides for the kind of human conduct that is accepted and expected in a given situation at a given time (Birenbau & Sagarin, 1976). Another view of group norms depicts them as unwritten rules of conduct within a group (Elster, 1989), indirectly specifying desired behaviors and the accompanying sanctions for failing to follow these behaviors within a given community (Kandori, 1992). For example, Raven and Rubin (1976) suggest that norms provide order and meaning to what otherwise might be seen as an ambiguous, uncertain, or perhaps threatening situation. One source of such sense-making norms is the behavior or the expected behavior of others in the situation, because the behavioral patterns of our peers indicate what is appropriate or inappropriate in the situation. One type of norm is implicit while the other is perceived. Implicit norms refer to the behavioral expectations of what one ought to do in a given context, for example, collaboration in social domains but competition in economic domains (Chena, Wastib & Triandis, 2007). Perceived norms, on the other hand, refer to the observed behavioral patterns from others in a given context. Implicit norms and perceived norms may sometimes stand in conflict to each other, such as observing strong competition in an event that is primarily social in nature or observing collaboration in economic settings (Pillutla & Chen, 1999).

Behavior in groups and organizations reflects a profile of norms that can be displayed relative to one another, according to their importance or prevalence within the group (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996). A group's robust norms are those on which the group's members agree and hold intensely (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Robust norms hold both descriptive and injunctive properties, such that members can observe one another protecting these norms and are willing to sanction others for failing to comply with them (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996).

Norms generate noticeable and enduring cues and offer a variety of proficiencies for group members. Norms tend to form around behaviors that are important to the group, such as its attitude on risk-taking or collaboration (Higgins, 2007). These cues and attitudes help people

solicit information about which behaviors are more or less likely to be valued or useful within the group (Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999). Norms can increase a group's reliance on task-related routines to promote efficiency, thereby freeing members to concentrate on non-routine challenges (Higgins, 2007).

Norms can also smooth social interaction, as norm agreement and intensity, even on issues that are trivial or unrelated to the group's purpose, may serve to enhance group cohesion and identification. Conversely, low levels of agreement, even on insignificant issues, may reduce a group's felt cohesion (Phillips, Urbany & Reynolds, 2008). The existence of group norms and their foreseeable enforcement therefore increases a group's longevity and its feelings of distinctiveness (Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy &Polifroni, 2008).

People conform to the norms of their groups for many reasons, but there are two main explanations for such conformity (Insko, 1985). First, people want to be right. They have been taught, sometimes from earliest childhood, that norms represent the right and proper code of behavior. Second, people want to gain social approval or acceptance. Following what the majority does or what the norm would suggest reduces the risk of being excluded from the group. On the other hand, we do observe non-confirmative behaviors as well.

Social identity assumes that group norms express important aspects of the group's identity and that group members are motivated to act in accordance with these norms in order to achieve a positive identity and moral image (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). According to Turner (1991, p.3), "Group norms arise from the interaction between group members, and they express a generally accepted way of thinking, feeling or behaving that is recognized by the entire group because all the group members perceive these norms as the right and proper things to do". Individuals who identify with specific groups may feel committed to these norms through self-categorization processes within particular social contexts. They learn the social norms of appropriate behavior in that group, and finally, they internalize these social norms and act accordingly (Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987). In the following section, I discuss social identification with the group and determine how extensively people adhere to and internalize a group's norms.

*2.2 Social Identity Theory*

Social identity theory, like identity theory, conceives of the self as being socially defined: social identity is a construct that mediates the relationship between the self and the broader social structure of groups and categories (Terry, Hogg & White, 1995). Moreover, both theories recognize the fact that identity theory and social identity theory vary in relative importance to a person's self-concept, although social identity theory considers the contextual salience of a particular identity to be more responsive to direct situational cues than does identity theory (Thoits & Virshup, 1997). Social identity theory focuses on identities that originated from group memberships. Although role identities can be conceived of as broad social aggregates, to the extent that others perform the same roles, they can be contrasted with social identities, which fundamentally constitute group memberships. Rather than being accumulated entities, social identities define the self in terms of membership in a self-inclusive group, and thus, intergroup perceptions, behaviors, and influences constitute important areas of interest for social identity scholars (Terry, Hogg & White, 1995).

According to social identity theory, an important component of the self-concept is derived from memberships in social groups and categories. When people define and evaluate themselves in terms of a self-inclusive social category (e.g. gender, class, team), two processes come into play: (1) categorization, which perceptually accentuates differences between in-group

and out-group, as well as similarities among in-group members (including self) on stereotypical dimensions; and (2) self-enhancement, wherein the self-concept of self-enhancement is defined in terms of group membership and seeks behaviorally and perceptually to favor the in-group over the out-group (Hogg & Williams, 2000).

People define their self-concept in terms of their memberships in various social groups. Different aspects of a person's self-concept may become salient in response to the distribution of characteristics of others who are present in a situation (Markus & Cross, 1990). A salient social category is defined as one that functions psychologically to influence a person's perception and behavior and how others treat the focal individual (Turner et al., 1987). Higher similarity among members, which initially is determined by visible and immutable similarities like race and sex, makes in-group membership more salient. Once people have defined themselves as an in-group member, they are more likely to cooperate with in-group members and compete against out-group members (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2001).

Social identities are cognitively characterized as group prototypes that describe and prescribe beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that improve a balance between minimization of intragroup differences and maximization of intergroup differences (Derks, van Laar & Ellemers, 2007). If a particular social identity offers a salient basis for self-conception, then the self becomes integrated to the perceived in-group prototype, which can be thought of as a set of perceived in-group norms such that self-perception, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors are defined in terms of the group prototype (Terry, Hogg & White, 1999). Thus, social identities should influence behavior through the mediating role of group norms, since people will be more likely to engage in a particular behavior if it is in consensus with the norms of a behaviorally relevant group membership, particularly if the identity is a salient basis for self-definition. If the group membership is not salient, then people's behavior and feelings should be in consensus with their own personal and individual characteristics rather than with group norms (Terry, Hogg & White, 1999).

Also, research has reported the powerful impact of people's social identities on their perceptions, emotions, and behavior. Examples of this influence might include research participants who stick together with an unsuccessful group, even when they have the opportunity to leave (Ellemers, Doosje & Spears, 2004), or activists who may jeopardize their personal well-being for causes or principles that are unlikely to affect their own immediate outcomes (e.g., environmental activists) (Drury & Reicher 2000; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Across a variety of groups in different cultural contexts, people's judgments of their group in terms of its morality were found to be even more important than were the evaluative judgments of the group based on its sociability, irrespective of (high versus low) group status or group type (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). When group members were asked to describe their identity, they often referred to shared values as being important to their social identity and indicated that shared values were a more important guide for their individual behavior than were aspects of their personal identity (Stephan et al. 2002). Other researchers have also proposed that normative expressions of morality at the group level may function as a situational cue that determines the moral behavior of individuals (Aquino, Freeman, Reed II, Lim & Phelps 2009).

Furthermore, as a rule, people are eager to obtain and maintain a positive identity, and they strive to achieve this goal through alignment with positively valued in-groups and by differentiating themselves from negatively valued out-groups. People are thus able to see themselves and their groups not only as different from other groups but also as better besides (in-group favoritism) (Supphellen & Rittenburg, 2001). For our consumption behavior, we achieve a

positive social identity (and avoid a negative social identity) through utilizing a variety of strategies, such as decreasing affiliations with groups that do not convey positive associations (e.g., Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). Examples of such behaviors include evaluating the in-group products or brands more positively (e.g., Jackson et al. 1996) and avoiding products associated with negatively viewed social identities (Argo, White & Dahl 2006).

Comparing between an individual's in-group and other groups can lead to positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and can confirm perceived superiority of the in-group over other groups (Turner, 1975). A major assumption of social identity theory is that being a member of a high-status group is more desirable than being a member of a lower status group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, people seek to gain a high status through preserving the norms and values of the desired group, since membership in that group represents a rare resource, one that many social groups struggle to achieve (Turner & Brown, 1978; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). However, social identity scholars suggest that a group's status can be realistically and symbolically threatened through the actions of in-group members, which often leads in-groups to feel that group-esteem is threatened (Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe, 2002).

*2.3 Intergroup Social Threat*

In this section, I discuss the ways people respond to a threat to their group's value. Here, the dominant motive is to avoid the negative group identity that has been imposed and possibly align with preferable ones instead, such as those instrumental to the individual self. Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002) determine the contradiction that a negative evaluation of one's group should be perceived as threatening to the individual self for those low in-group commitments. Indeed, some have proposed that self-affirmation strategies may not be necessary if the individual self is primary or stronger than the group self (Gaertner et al., 1999), which may be particularly true for those with low commitment to the group.

Further research has also argued that explaining negative reactions of others to the self by referring to the category may actually form a way of protecting the individual self (Crocker et al., 1998); however, the generality of this strategy has been disputed (e.g., Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). Unless they can hide their group membership, members of stigmatized groups are likely to be chronically treated in terms of their devalued group membership, regardless of their group commitment. Thus, it would be misleading to assume that group commitment is always necessary to protect the individual self from negative group identities (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002).

Intergroup threat theory was originally categorized (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) into four types of threats, but now two basic types are developed: realistic threats and symbolic threats (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). Negative stereotypes, which were primarily considered to be a separate type of threat, currently appear to be a cause of threat involving characteristics of the out-group that could have a negative impact on the in-group (e.g., aggressiveness, immorality). Negative stereotypes have been identified as an important factor of both realistic and symbolic threats (Stephan et al., 2002).

Additionally, intergroup anxiety, which involves the expectation of negative outcomes from intergroup interaction, was considered to be a separate threat but now appears to be a subtype of threat that centers on apprehensions concerning interactions with out-group members (Stephan et al., 2009). These anxieties arise from a number of different sources, including concerns that the out-group will exploit the in-group, concerns that the out-group will perceive the in-group as prejudiced, and concerns that the out-group will challenge the in-group's values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Moreover, with relevance to realistic and symbolic threats, the first revision of the theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002) made a distinction between threats to the in-group as a whole and threats to individual members, in which individuals experience threat as a function of their membership in a particular in-group. In an example introduced by Stephan et al. (2009), a Caucasian male with a good job might believe that affirmative action threatens his group, but he may feel no individual threat. However, when an African American walks in a neighborhood where the majority of the inhabits are Caucasians, he may feel his own welfare is threatened but at that moment may not be concerned about the threats that Caucasians pose to African Americans more generally.

Realistic group threats constitute threats to a group's power and general welfare. Symbolic group threats pose threats to a group's religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview, while realistic individual threats concern actual physical or material harm to an individual group member, such as pain, torture, or death, as well as economic loss, deprivation of valued resources, and threats to health or personal security. Symbolic individual threats concern loss of face or honor and the undermining of an individual's self-identity or self-esteem (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Stephan et al. (2009) conceptualize threat in relation to the position of social identity theorists, who posit that the actions of out-groups often lead in-groups to feel as though their group's status is threatened. However, the social identity definition of "status threat" involves both tangible resources (e.g., bleak prospects on the job market; see Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe, 2002) and group esteem (e.g., believing that the other group views the in-group negatively; see Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers & Doosje, 2002; Cameron, Duck, Terry & Lalonde, 2005). Threats to tangible resources can be considered realistic, whereas threats to group esteem can be considered symbolic.

The social identity perspective (Tajfel &Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner et al., 1987; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) argues that individuals not only derive a sense of self by assessing what makes them distinctive from other individuals (personal identity), but also, they base their self-respect on the social categories to which they belong (i.e., their social identities in terms of such things as gender, ethnicity, occupation). Therefore, it is important for individuals not only that their individual identity is valued and respected by others, but also that the groups and social categories on which they base their self-concept are admired and valued (Derks, van Laar & Ellemers, 2007).

According to extensive research by Inzlicht, Good, and McKay (2006), intergroup settings constitute "threatening environments" in which group members are more aware of their devalued identity, a situation that can result in performance deficits. For instance, women who took a difficult math test in a mixed group of males and females showed lower performance than did women who took the same math test in the presence of other women only (see Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; and also see Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003). This result is consistent with predictions from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), which posits that intergroup settings increase the contextual salience of group membership and of the relative standing of one's group (see McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976). As a result, for group members, the need to protect social identity is higher in out-group settings than in in-group settings. Accordingly, research on the effects of solo status indicates that being a minority in a context consisting of out-group members is especially damaging for members of that minority group (Swan & Wyer, 1997).

Further research on the emotional reactions to threat is likely to show such responses to be negative. Examples would include fear, anxiety, anger, and resentment (Davis & Stephan, 2006); contempt and disgust (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000); and vulnerability (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). Threats directed at the group as a whole, by contrast, would be expected to evoke emotions tied to a concern for the welfare of the group (e.g., for the group's image or reputation), such as anger, resentment, and collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). Supporting this idea, research has shown that different types of threats trigger different types of emotions. For instance, perceived threats to the in-group's possessions may evoke anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). In another study, facial electromyography was used to measure emotions (Davis & Stephan, 2006) and found that group threats led to greater activation of facial muscles associated with anger (relative to fear). The authors argued that when the entire in-group has been threatened, anger was likely to be a more adaptive response because it may activate the in-group willingness to respond to the threat (Smith, 1993).

For members of groups that hold a certain societal status, such as ethnic minorities or religious affiliates, being confronted with a low evaluation of their group threatens their self-concept. As a result, and again, as stated earlier, it is imperative for individuals not only that their individual identity is valued and appreciated by others, but also that the groups and social categories on which they base their self-concept are admired and valued (Derks, van Laar & Ellemers, 2007). Depending on how influential the group is to an individual's self-definition and how contextually salient that identity is, finding oneself in a social setting in which this group is devalued or negatively evaluated can certainly affect one's social identity and self-concept. Research has revealed that social identity threat has an impact on the affective responses, cognitions and behaviors of the devalued person (Crocker & Quinn, 2000; Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl & Hull, 2000; Levin & Van Laar, 2006).

Several studies have shown that self-image threat can lead to negative evaluations of out-groups (Gibbons, Blanton, Buunk & Eggleston, 2000), partly because information that threatens the perceivers' sense of self-worth evokes the need to restore a positive self-image, a goal that can be achieved by negatively evaluating out-groups (Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999). Unless other internal motivations are activated, such as a goal of accountability (Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, 1989), social desirability or equality motives (Dovidio et al., 2004), or self-image boosted with a self-affirmation procedure (Fein & Spencer, 1997), as Steele et al. (1993, p. 885) stated "people may find the denigration of out-groups to be an effective way of maintaining an image of self-integrity".

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) makes a similar statement. Like the self-affirming processes at the individual level, positive evaluations of in-groups and unfavorable responses toward out-groups are presumed to serve self-protective and self-enhancing functions. Group members use comparisons to their own group to maintain or enhance positive social identity and self-esteem, and, as a consequence, they are motivated to perceive an in-group member's transgression as a descriptive norm, making it less objectionable than if an out-group member performed the same act (Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009).

*2.4 The Affective Basis of Religiousness: Group Norms and Value Transgression*

Religion refers to a belief binding the spiritual nature of people to a supernatural being. Mostly, it exists as a sub-system of culture that controls the cultural norms of humanity. This system is presumed to influence believers' conduct (as a signal of respect or faith) and that of the believers' opponents (as a pillar of natural cultural environment) (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). Psychology and sociology researchers have realized that it is extremely difficult to find an

accepted theory or definition of religion (Clarke & Byrn, 1993). Experts have determined at least three important denominations of the term "religion": (1) supernatural power to which persons must respond, (2) a feeling present in the individual conceived as a power, and (3) the ritual acts performed on that power (Wulff, 1997). Such designations have resisted social scientific agreements, and therefore "it is difficult to make any generalizations about religion that are universally valid" (Peterson, 2001, p. 6).

As a result, research literature from different backgrounds often uses different theories and definitions of religion. Among these, religion has been defined as: "The belief in God accompanied by a commitment to follow the principles believed to be established by God" McDaniel & Burnett (1990, p. 110). Terpstra and David (1991, p. 73) define religion as "a socially shared set of beliefs, ideas and actions that relate to a reality that cannot be empirically verified but is believed to affect the course of events natural and human." However, Sheth and Mittal (2004, p. 65) stated that religion is "a system of beliefs about the supernatural and spiritual world, about God, and about how humans, as God's creatures, are supposed to behave on this earth." Specific to the current research context, Islam describes religion as a term that has multiple meanings, such as *language meaning*, which includes method, doctrine, customs, and respect; and *spiritual meaning*, which includes obedience, servitude, and submission under the dominion of another. *Religious meaning* is clearly defined in the Quran as a value that constitutes an obligation owed to God in the form of complete submission and obedience to Him and to his commands and prohibitions:

> *"Legislation is not but for Allah. He has commanded that you worship not except Him. That is the correct religion, but most of the people do not know" (Khan. Muhammad Muhsin, Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali trans., 2001; Yusuf: 40).*

In religiosity commitment, the most methodically researched multidimensional framework is that of Allport (1966), which distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. The literature suggests that intrinsically oriented people view God as benevolent, tolerant, and available when needed – in short, as a source of unconditional love and support (Spilka, Shaver & Kirkpatrick, 1985). An image of a benevolent God is a foundational value that institutes and maintains the values of numerous religious groups. Muslims' ideology, belief, ritual, and practice, for instance, have placed God, His word, and His will at the center of Muslim life. Drawing from the image of God, the idea that God is caring, wise and knowing comes the belief that events are generally meaningful, controllable, beneficial, and reasonable (Spilka et al., 1985). Positive association between religion and benevolence was found in the literature and was in line with previous literature on personality correlates of religion (Saroglou, Delpierre & Dernelle, 2004).

There are numerous instances in which religion shows the important role it can play in people's lives. As noted earlier, consumption norms may facilitate the communication of religious identity; however, an individual who violates these consumption norms might present a negative image to the entire group. Once others know of an individual's offence concerning his/her own religious values, they may view the violation as something that derogates that group's values. The level of commitment to a particular reference group affects the extent to which an individual is influenced by the norms of that group (Bergan, 2001).

A given religion normally provides a distinctive set of consumption norms that become the outline for its followers (Coşgel & Minkler, 2004). For example, Muslims express their consumption guidelines by obtaining halal products, while Jews express their consumption rules through kosher products. Other examples of religious expression include necklaces adorned with

a cross and ornamental items such as candles for the purposes of celebrating religious holidays. A Muslim woman can express her religious commitment by wearing a headscarf, and audiences are prone to interpret her headscarf as a sign of her identity (Coşgel & Minkler, 2004).

A religious commitment is often at the core of an individual's sense of identity. Social scientific studies of religion have shown the variety of ways in which religions robustly serve the identity instinct. As Seul (1999, p. 553) states, "Religions often serve numerous psychological needs more comprehensively and potently than other repositories of cultural meaning that contribute to the construction and maintenance of individual and group identities." Every religion generally provides its groups with a discrete theology and a coherent and constant set of norms, institutions, traditions, and moral values that serve as the basis for a group or an individual to establish and maintain a firm identity. When an individual has decided upon a religious identity, that person often feels a need to translate and explicitly express this chosen identity through interactions with others (Seul, 1999).

Moral anger, or righteous anger, takes place mostly because of a perceived violation of cultural or religious morals or ideals. Righteous anger arises in response to a special class of anger-eliciting events, those in which the committer's behavior represents a violation of moral standards. In such cases, one can feel anger upon witnessing morally horrible behavior (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2006). Righteous anger can serve moral functions in that it can motivate witnesses to take action in order to remedy observed wrongs. Among participants in the United States and Japan, Rozin, Imada, and Haidt (1999) found that feelings of contempt were differentially linked to violations of the ethic of community. An individual may experience higher negative emotion when she/he consciously ignores a moral value that has been set by a higher authority (e.g., culture, religion).

Transgressions are situational episodes that may irritate the social fabric by undermining the values on of which group rules and norms are based. It has been argued that the degree to which people perceive threats from another group depends on a variety of factors, one which involves those situations in which the groups must interact (Pettigrew, 2001). The setting in which the group interaction takes place, the structure of the interaction, the degree to which norms exist for intergroup relations, and the degree of support for the interaction from relevant authority figures stand as the cases where situational threats may arise (Davis & Stephan, 2006). Situational threats are those in which people are unclear how to act or they feel unsupported by an authority symbol (e.g., value reinforcement) (Stephan et al., 2009). For example, when a transgressor consciously acts counter to their group's shared expectations of appropriate behavior, these actions indicate that the transgressor disagrees with the values dictating such expectations (Durkheim, 1964). The deliberate transgressions of group values challenge the perception that other group members agree with them, questioning the extent to which there is a shared consensus about those values and, thus, potentially reducing their validity (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997).

Transgressions against religious values in social settings are likely to induce threats to social identity because religion is considered one of the most powerful, worldwide social institutions that can have a significant impact on peoples' attitudes, values, behaviors, and emotions at both individual and community levels (Mokhlis, 2009). Whether directly through taboos and responsibility or through an influence on culture and society, religious values and beliefs are universally accepted as factors that play a major role, both ritualistically and symbolically, on influencing human conduct and on how people experience emotions (Koenig, McCullough & Larson, 2000).

*2.5 Value Reinforcement and Self-Affirmation: Dual components of negative emotional reduction*

When external events violate favorable self-views, it becomes necessary for the individual to defend against the threatening implications of the events (Baumeister et al., 1998; Cramer 1991). In the previous section, I discussed the potential threat that may challenge the legitimacy of group-held beliefs and the emotional reaction that may arise due to such threats. A major responsibility for most people is to maintain self-integrity when faced with the foreseeable setbacks and disappointments of daily life. Defensive responses are adaptations aimed at ameliorating threats to self-integrity. The vast research literature on defensive biases confirms to their robustness and to the frequency with which people use them. One way these defensive adaptations can be reduced, or even eliminated, is through the process of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988; Aronson, Cohen & Nail, 1999; Sherman & Cohen, 2002).

One of the best-documented findings in psychology is that people need to think of themselves as "good" and "appropriate," although they are much more critical of others (Toma, 2010). To maintain this positive view of the self in spite of life's unavoidable setbacks and failures, people engage in a variety of defensive mechanisms (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). For instance, a tennis player who lost a game may make her/himself feel better by saying that the match referee was unfair or the weather was windy. In such cases, people may use a strategy that allows them to maintain positive self-regard and accept threatening information at the same time. Self-affirmation involves bringing to awareness important and positive aspects of the self, such as personal values, goals, or treasured characteristics. When individuals practice self-affirmation, they realize that, in the grand scheme of things, they are valuable and worthy. As a result, any single setback seems less important, and accepting it does not harm the self (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). For instance, when the game-losing tennis player is reminded that she/he has supportive friends or valuable things in life, the previously felt need to make him/her to feel better by devaluing and disregarding the fairness of the referee or the windy of the weather becomes less intense.

Self-affirmation tasks serve to remind individuals of who they are, providing an anchor for their sense of self and helping them to defend and protect their self-integrity in the face of threat. Affirmed individuals appear to adopt a more structured, clearly defined view of the self. That is, self-affirmation centers the sense of self on the significance of the person, anchoring people's sense of self-integrity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Stapel & van der Linde, 2011). Positive self-regard can be derived from any of the domains that comprise the self: social roles (e.g., parent, student), values (e.g., humor, religion), group identities (e.g., culture, nation), central beliefs (i.e., ideology, political beliefs), goals (e.g., health, economic success), and relationships (e.g., family, friends) (Toma, 2010). Self-affirmation, by definition, occurs in a domain unrelated to the one that was threatened. Research shows that the most widely used and persuasive domain of self-affirmation is personal relationships. For example, writing on important values (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000), positive past life events (Klein, Blier & Janze, 2001) or positive aspects of the self (Blanton et al., 1997) and providing an unexpected opportunity to perform a positive behavior (Steele & Liu 1981) may work as an effective strategy to affirm the self and reduce the threat, stress, and defensiveness. Worth mentioning is the fact that self-affirmation occurs unconsciously; people are generally unaware of their own efforts to repair a wounded ego (Sherman & Cohen, 2002).

In marketing, self-affirmation is relatively new. Early explorations of consumer behavior emphasized the importance of the self in consumer judgments and behavior, focusing in particular on the importance of personality differences (e.g., Kassarjian 1971) and self-concept

(e.g., Sirgy 1982). Numerous marketing studies on the self, like those in consumer behavior and psychology, have focused on the impact of threat on consumption decisions. For example, recent studies have examined whether products linked to consumers' identities can serve as proxies for asserting their identities, such that when their identities are threatened, they become more attracted to products linked to the threatened identity (Gao, Wheeler & Shiv 2009; Ward & Broniarczyk 2011). For example, "when consumers feel a threat to their school identities, they try to restore their sense of self with products related to the threatened identity such as a school T-shirt" (Berger & Heath, 2007).

In addition to the scarce examination of self-affirmation in marketing, self-affirmation's beneficial impact on self-reduction in ego-defensiveness has been examined mostly in individual contexts, where researchers measure the individual's judgments and behaviors (e.g., Crocker et al., 2008). Also, most self-affirmations used in social psychology studies have featured affirmation of individual values, such as being religious, politically minded, or socially conscious. Self-affirmations are typically ideographic in that people first indicate what value stands out as being most important to them on a personal level, and then they are given the opportunity either to write an essay about it or to complete a scale or exercise that allows them to assert its importance (McQueen & Klein, 2006). These affirmation exercises make salient additional psychological resources on which people can draw. This conceptualization of psychological resources is consistent with the work of Hobfoll (1989) and his model of how people respond to stressful and threatening situations. He defined resources as "those objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that are valued by the individual or that serve as a means for attainment of these objects, personal characteristics, and energies" (p. 516). The idea of affirmational resources was introduced by Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) as a description of the assets that are situationally activated by self-affirmation and that, in turn, enable people to confront self-threatening information in a non-defensive manner.

Based on the previous discussion, I propose two key factors that modulate the level of negative emotion in social threat settings when a transgressions of a group value occur: 1) When identity is threatened, people are more drawn to a value linked to the threatened identity. Therefore, having situational or contextual opportunities for self-affirmation through reinforcing the group value (including affirming the value by promoting value legitimacy and acceptability at the societal level through adoption of group-values from outsiders) would moderate the experience of negative emotions. 2) Group affirmations or affirmation of a value that is important to one's group identity can serve as a resource upon which individuals can draw when they experience group-threatening events. Such affirmation may help them overcome feelings of negative emotions. Because people are keen to secure their collective aspects of the self from possible threats in the same manner by which they secure individual aspects of self (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), I examine how self-affirmation at the group level influences the way consumers deal with their group's offended value in social-threat settings to overcome emotional effects.

*2.5.1 The Role of Value Reinforcement*

Typically, the feedback that individuals receive from intergroup events establishes evidence as to whether an idea is right or wrong. Only those with whom one identifies, however, can provide such assessments. Conformity means that the act of changing one's behavior must match the responses of others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), since our behavior is directed not only by subjective values or attitudes, but also by the perceived behavior of others (e.g., conformity, social approval) and in particular by social norms (Cialdini et al., 2006). The behavior and evaluation of other people provides information on the normal and anticipated

behavior in these circumstances in terms of what is typically approved or disapproved. Within the field of social psychology research, the effect of group opinion on individual judgments and decisions has been robustly replicated (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), and conformity has been extensively studied. As a result, three central motivations for conforming behavior are suggested: a desire to be accurate by properly interpreting reality and behaving correctly, a desire to obtain social approval from others, and a desire to maintain a favorable self-concept (Aarts, Henk & ApDijksterhuis, 2003).

Psychological studies emphasize the rewarding value of social approval or affiliation with others; however, studies in behavioral economics focus more on the effects of punishment for violation of the norm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Both approaches may suggest that conformity is underlined by reinforcement learning, i.e., social norms selectively reinforce certain behaviors (Klucharev et al., 2009).

Reinforcement is another name for the effects of our behavior; reinforcement value refers to the desirability of these effects. Things we want to happen have a high reinforcement value (e.g., social approval). Things that are undesirable and that we wish to avoid have a low reinforcement value (e.g., no social approval). As with expectancy, reinforcement value is a personal matter, meaning that the same event or experience can differ enormously in desirability, depending on the individual's life experience and commitment to his/her values (Rosenstock, Strecher & Becker, 1988). Feelings of guilt or shame enforced upon the transgressors may negatively reinforce the importance of the religious values. Indeed, this technique might lead to possible decrease of value volition in the future, which would facilitate the re-establishment of the moral order. According to Gordon (2004a), transgressions of value, and particularly religious transgressions, generally contain four elements: 1) the provocation; 2) the punishment; 3) the realization of why the punishment has been imposed; and 4) the re-establishment of the moral order. For instance, when people achieve an outcome that equals or exceeds their religious goals, they would feel successful, which might then lead to a positive evaluation of their groups' image and moral system. Studies have shown that positive reinforcement can be a powerful tool toward altering behavior. Skinner (1974) maintained that positive reinforcement results in lasting behavioral modification, whereas punishment changes behavior only temporarily and presents many detrimental side effects.

People are concerned with having external social approval for achieving certain behaviors, and such approval in turn leads to satisfying internalized standards of support when values are breached (Ashford, Blatt, Vande & Walle, 2003). Approval-seeking is correlated with reducing possible suffering of negative emotion for people in general (Emmons, 2005). Gächter and Fehr (1999) provided experimental evidence suggesting that social rewards and punishments affect behavior. They found that, given some minimal social contact among strangers, when individual contributions were made in a publicly observable way, contributions to the public good were substantially raised. Social approval means that we are the subject of others' appreciation, while social disapproval means that we are the subject of others' contempt. Approval, therefore, makes us proud and pleased with ourselves, while disapproval causes embarrassment and shame and makes us unhappy.

These social rewards and punishments are the basic "currency" that induces children and adults alike to perform certain activities and avoid others (Fehr & Falk, 2002). The important role of social approval is recognized by Harsanyi (1969), who writes that "people's behavior can largely be explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic gain and social acceptance." While social approval may be valued positively because it sometimes generates material

benefits, scholars believe that most of us value social approval positively (and disapproval negatively) for its own sake. A great deal of anecdotal and data-driven evidence supports the view that (dis) approval has behavioral consequences (Emmons, 2005).

Situational and interpersonal feedback works as a reinforcement tool to modify people's behavior in different settings, and as such, peer reinforcement has been shown to be an effective group management variable. Studies that have used peers as sources of positive reinforcement have found that approval techniques can increase the pro-social behavior of at-risk children. Also, the approval technique has been found to affect performance and other aspects of behavior in various surroundings (Fehr & Falk, 2002).

Appraisal theories of emotion (Devos & Smith, 2000; Scherer, 1988), conceptualize personal emotions as complex reactions to specific situations or events that include differentiated cognitions, feelings, and action tendencies. Specific emotions experienced by an individual can be triggered by appraisals (cognitions or interpretations) of whether an event appears to favor or harm the individual's goals or desires and whether the individual has the resources to cope or not. Depending on their particular configuration, cognitive appraisals trigger specific emotional experiences (Roseman, Spindel & Jose, 1990), and these emotional experiences in turn promote certain behaviors (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Devos & Smith, 2000).

If group membership becomes part of the self, events (e.g. positive/negative evaluation) that harm or favor an in-group, by definition, harm or favor the self, and the self might thus experience an emotional effect on behalf of the in-group. With such considerations in mind, Smith (1999) developed a model of intergroup emotions that was predicated on social identification with the in-group. When social identity is salient, appraisals of situations or events related to social identity focus on social rather than personal concerns: Individuals are not necessarily personally concerned with the situation or the event, but they experience emotion around it because their group may be helped or hurt by it. When appraisals occur on a group basis, emotions are experienced on behalf of the in-group, and the in-group and out-group become the targets of the resulting emotion. Moreover, specific intergroup emotions lead to differentiated intergroup behavior, which occurs because specific intergroup emotions have been triggered by particular appraisals of situations or events related to social identity. This group-membership-based approach thus moves distinctly beyond the individual and interpersonal contexts in which appraisal theory had originally been developed and applied (Devos & Smith, 2000). In sum, individual group members do feel happy or sad, depending on the success or failure of a group with which they identify, even if they do not personally contribute to that outcome (Devos & Smith, 2000). The outcome of intergroup events and the experience of intergroup emotions are expected to depend on the salience of social identities (Smith, 1999).

When group membership is accessible, self-categorization theory suggests that social identity also becomes more accessible (Turner, et al., 1994). Referent informational influence was produced from combining social identity theory and self-categorization theory and theorizes that when social identity is accessible, a group prototype becomes activated that illustrates an idealized member of the group with approved behaviors, feelings, thoughts, and beliefs that are indicated by group norms (Hogg, 2000). These group norms are constructed in order to minimize in-group differences and maximize differences between the in-group and other groups. When the group prototype becomes active, the self conforms to the prototype in order to fulfill the need for positive self-evaluation. Thus, when social identity is accessible, people strive to resemble the group prototype, and they are especially likely to adopt the accepted group norms (Terry, Hogg & Duck, 1999). Additionally, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) postulates that people derive

self-esteem benefits from their group memberships. Social identity theory states that because people's identities are linked through their social identity to group membership, they attempt to promote the status of their in-group in order to derive self-esteem benefits from membership in a high-status group (Hogg, 2000).

Brewer (2001) makes several statements about the process through which group membership affects people's self-concepts. The part of the self that is linked to group membership and internalizes group norms is called the *collective self*. As people's collective selves become more important, the boundaries between their individual identities and their group identities become more permeable. As the boundaries become more permeable, people think more in terms of "we" instead of "I." A consequence of thinking "we" is that the group's status becomes more important to the individual's status. Therefore, being associated with a high-status group benefits the collective identity, which in turn benefits the individual's self-esteem (Brewer, 2001). It is more advantageous for people to ascribe favorable characteristics to the groups to which they belong (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). Once the concept of "we" is established, self-esteem can also be enhanced by negatively evaluating those groups to which one does not belong. For example, a person may selectively search for intergroup differences that favor their group and dismiss information that favors the out-group (e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). This practice can lead individuals to view out-group members as inferiors and the actions of those out-group members as a threat.

Multicultural differences within the group can have an important impact on the development of group culture and on the social integration of all members. For example, individualism, competitiveness, and achievement are more highly valued in North American and European cultures than are humility and modesty, which are more prevalent in some non-Western cultures. Similarly, experiences of group survival, social hierarchy, extensiveness, and ethnic identification can powerfully influence the beliefs, ideologies, and values that are held by racially and ethnically diverse members (Hopps & Pinderhughes, 1999).

When the membership of a group is diverse, group culture emerges slowly. Members contribute unique sets of values that originate from their past experiences, as well as from their ethnic, cultural, and racial heritages, and these values become blended through group communications and interactions. In the early stage of group development, members explore each other's unique value systems and attempt to find a common ground on which they can relate to each other. By the later stages, members have had a chance to share and understand each other's value systems, and as a result, a common set of values develops, which becomes the group's culture. This culture continues to evolve throughout the life of the group. During the process of developing group culture, members from different ethnic, cultural, and racial heritages strive to promote their original cultural values and seek dominance in the process of developing the new group culture (Hopps & Pinderhughes, 1999). I argue that one way for members from different ethnic or cultural backgrounds to maintain the relative dominant or high status is though promoting the legitimization and suitability of their original cultural and ethnic values and norms, applying them as a societal value. Once other out-group members adopt the in-group's values and norms, social identity becomes more accessible and elevates the status of the in-group that is based on their ethnicity and cultural heritages, which can further benefit the group's collective identity and lead to a positive effect on the self-esteem of individual group members.

*2.5.2. Self-Affirmation at a Group Level*

Research from a wide range of studies suggests that conceptual similarities exist between the collective self and the individual self (see Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). Studies

featuring connectionist models that show a direct link between representations of the self and representations of one's group suggest that the self and important groups are overlapping cognitive constructs (Smith & Henry, 1996). People are therefore motivated to maintain the integrity not only of the individual self but also of their social identities (e.g., Harvey & Oswald, 2000). People defend against threats to their social identities even when these events do not directly implicate their personal self (e.g., even when the threat involves the behavior of another group member rather than one's own behavior; Cohen & Garcia, 2005; Norton et al., 2003). Group-serving biases are particularly strong among individuals who are highly identified with their group (Castano et al., 2002).

Sherman (2006, p. 37) explains that the phrase "There is no I in team" conveys the concept that the objectives of a group or team are important enough that individuals should be eager to sacrifice their personal ambitions and self-interests for the sake of team success. Self-serving aspirations are antithetical to the team's progress; however, social groups constitute a central part of how people see themselves, and people are motivated to defend their social identities (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Consequently, when explaining the success or failure of their group, people tend to be defensive and group serving. This phenomenon has been observed in several studies examining attributions for success or failure in real-world contexts. For example, letters to shareholders feature more internal attributions after successful years than after disappointing years (Bettman & Weitz, 1983), and athletes' explanations for success feature more internal attributions than do their explanations for failure (Lau & Russell, 1980; Winkler & Taylor, 1979). These biased judgments, which encompass both overstated internal attributions for success and attenuated internal attributions for failure, are group-serving in the sense that they suggest that group members are selectively responsible for causing the positive events that happen to their groups (Sherman, 2006).

Group-value transgressors experience a greater level of negative emotion when their group is threatened by (out-group) social presence. People will defend against threats to the collective aspect of their identity just as they defend against threats to their individual identity, even when the threats do not directly associate with their self-perception. Social groups are a fundamental part of how people see themselves, and people are motivated to defend their social identities (Abrams & Hogg, 1988).

The self-affirmation analysis of such collective threats, however, asserts that because social identities are only one part of a larger, flexible self-system, people can respond to threats to their group memberships or social identities indirectly. That is, they can maintain an overall self-perception of worth and integrity by affirming some other aspect of the self, which is related to their group. This insight has applications to a wide range of phenomena related to group identity (Sherman & Cohen 2006).

## Chapter 3. Hypotheses Development

### *3.1 Value transgression and emotional reaction*

Consumption plays a critical role in the internal and external definitions of collective identity. Cultural scholars identify and define different categories of consumers (e.g., Muslim consumers), and such categories become objectified and shape the cultural instruments available for the formation of collective identities. Further, cultural scholars offer indications and cultural models to people concerning ways to achieve full social affiliation. Individuals use consumption to signal their aspiration to become affiliated with certain symbolic communities (citizens, members of the middle class, etc.); and consumers execute, confirm, and transform the social meaning attributed to specific collective categories (Reed & Forehand, 2007). Thus, a negative impact takes place when an individual's identity confirmation becomes threatened as a result of behaving in a manner that contradicts a salient social identity (Weick, 1995).

Negative emotions have been studied within value-transgression settings (e.g., Bierbrauer, 1992; Frenopoulo, 2004). Bierbrauer (1992) stated that feelings of guilt resulted from transgressing personal standards, while feelings of shame resulted from transgressing societal standards. Emotional responses are likely to be negative (e.g., fear, anxiety, anger, and resentment) (Davis & Stephan, 2006; Renfro et al., 2006). However, in this research, I argue that transgressor' reactions to the adoption of group norms and values by out-group members may differ from what previous research has predicted. Transgressors feel less emotional turmoil when their group's norms and values have been adopted by out-group members. Such adoption may promote the legitimacy and favorability of these group values and, as a result, increase group status within the societies.

Shame and guilt may be classified as aversive states that follow a transgression. Guilt is related to the quality of the transgressor's emotional experience, as determined by the moral evaluation of the transgression. Shame is related to the transgressor's experience, as determined by a cognitive orientation towards the visibility of the transgression (Aronfreed, 1968). Zahn-Waxler et al. (1991) suggested that people who experience moral and social dilemmas remain defenseless to the feelings of multi-faceted depression and ongoing tension within social contexts. They feel powerless yet responsible for the downturn of events in their social lives, events that might affect the moral image of the entire group. Further, these individuals' sense of guilt over their disobedience of social norms might lead to physical symptoms, such as sleeping disorders or eating disorders and cognitive and affective symptoms, such as inactivity, confusion, worthlessness, and derogation (Frenopoulo, 2004).

Previous studies have discussed the emotional reactions to threat and have found that such reactions are likely to be negative (e.g., fear, anxiety, anger, resentment, etc.; Davis & Stephan, 2006; Renfro et al., 2006). However, no previous studies have discussed the linkage between the in-group transgression and an out-group (social presence) and the resulting emotional reaction. I examined the relationship of three dimensions to understand why and when people who transgress their own value system experience emotional tension. One possible answer stems from the surrounding environment. In particular, the presence of an out-group member is a key factor in understanding the phenomenon of experiencing negative emotion when transgressing group values.

Such experience may "generate the internal concept of self as being 'no good' where the individual's focus on their own person is completely on the 'self,' resulting in uncertainty, an inability to think clearly, and an inability to act" (Lewis, 2004, p. 35). For instance, Hirschkind and Mahmood (2002) state that a Muslim woman's feelings of shame, fear, and guilt might arise

if she defies the normative Islamic code of modesty by leaving her home to work in an environment that is full of men who are not her blood relatives or part of a fosterage that prevents marriage (*Mahram*).The woman's feelings of vulnerability to observation by males are intimately associated with shame, and shame is thus closely intertwined in traditional Islamic society, since a cognitive focus on the visibility of transgression will merge with the focus on its punitive consequences for the transgressors (Hirschkind & Mahmood, 2002).

In Islam, the set of religious and moral principles is collectively known as Sharīa, which covers almost all aspects of Muslim life. Sharīa covers in meticulous detail every aspect of people's behavior known to the scholar-jurists, from dietary rules to criminal procedures and from rituals of worship to commercial contracts. Sharīa categorizes all actions within five different types, ranging from obligatory to forbidden, where committing forbidden actions and removing obligatory actions are considered sins for which the transgressor will, in principle, receive their punishment in their current life or in the hereafter or in both (Serajzadeh, 2002).

The system of Islam exerts an enormous influence on the individual and social lives of Muslims, an influence that contributes to the existence of Islamic societies everywhere, regardless of the opposition of surrounding system and cultures (Sayed, 2008). The images of God (Froese & Bader, 2008) portray God as loving, forgiving, and merciful (D'Onofrio et al., 1999). Based on this philosophy, members in this particular group strive to maintain a collective identity based on religious values and constructed fundamentally on the concept of obedience to God and seeking of His pleasure. Followers of these principles believe the group value constitutes a reflection of God's image. They believe the group values and norms are fundamentally laid down in the Quran, which is considered as the foundation for existence and is believed to be the will of God (Yusuf: 40, Khan. Muhammad Muhsin, Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali translation, 2001). Hence, the experience of negative emotion for particular individuals is considered to be a direct result of disobeying the religious values and teachings set forth by God (Sayed, 2008).

The evaluation of the moral transgression for Muslims who resist the religious societal norms, for example, by consuming non-halal products makes these individuals guilty of adopting morally inappropriate behavior. Because of the visibility of this disobedience, the transgressors may bring shame on the self and possibly on their groups (Muslim society), causing the guilty party to want to shrink from others. These transgressors may suffer from the humiliation that accompanies an "undeserved image of oneself" that "can mobilize a conscious intention to right the wrong" (Trumbull, 2003). Accordingly, I argue that in-group members have a high probability of experiencing negative emotion when they transgress their group norms.

*H1: Participants will experience greater negative emotions when they transgress their group norms than when they comply with their group norms.*

In Figure 1, I illustrate that the transgression of a particular value is an influential factor that may evoke a negative emotional reaction, which is ultimately a replication of several prior pieces of research (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Davis & Stephan, 2006; Mackie et al., 2000) that investigate the relationship between value transgressions and emotional reactions in different settings. The objective of the first hypothesis is first to replicate past research to provide a basic understanding of such relationships and to provide a starting point for this research. The second objective is to ensure that the anticipated results of this particular relationship remain consistent with those from extant research, as reported in the findings by Doosje et al. (1998), Daivs and Stephan (2006), and Mackie et al. (2000). Differences from extant research may arise due to different time periods or differences in populations. The third objective is to develop a baseline

for the two potential moderators of this research, which are discussed in detail in the next section.

*1.1: Figure 1: Hypothesis 1 main-effect path.*




*3.2 The moderating role of social threat.*

People maintain many group memberships that remain latent most of the time. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) hypothesizes that, depending on contextual circumstances, the transition from an "I" to a "we" as locus of self-definition arises, and a particular group membership and the associated identity is said to be salient to the extent to which it is "functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one's membership in that group on perception and behavior" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 118).

Social identities are social comparative and reality-based representations of self and others. Thus, social identities come into being and become meaningful in the social context and consequently will vary with the social context. As a result, salience is context-dependent and stands as a dynamic outcome of categorization in context (Turner, 1999). I argue that the presence of other out-group members can be a potent reminder and may turn a "sleeping identity" into a salient social identity, spurring action preparedness on behalf of that identity. Social presence can make a social identity accessible; probably the most powerful factor that brings group membership to mind is conflict or rivalry between groups (Chattaraman & Lennon, 2010). The social identity approach suggests that salient social identity spurs several social psychological processes that facilitate group-serving behavior. For example, when group members define themselves in terms of their collective identity, they focus on the similarities between themselves and fellow in-group members with references to experiences, needs, interests, or goals. As a result, "my" experiences and "your" experiences, needs and so forth are transformed into "our" experiences and needs. Group members perceive that they share problems or grievances, or that their needs, goals, and interests are interchangeable, which is an important first step toward collective social action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Kampmeier, 2003).

Another effective prompt is being a minority. In consumption contexts, the composition of the social environment may directly influence product choice (Grier & Deshpandé, 2001, Forehand, et al., 2002) when we are considered a minority. For example, the self-conception of a Middle-Eastern American man in a grocery store full of Caucasian consumers will differ markedly if he finds himself instead in a grocery store full of Middle-Eastern Muslims. In the first situation, his ethnic identity is salient, which may cause him to approach (or avoid) ethnic-associated products (e.g., Mideast magazine), depending on their social desirability. In the second situation, his affiliation-identity is salient and this may have corresponding effects in his response to affiliation-associated products (e.g. Halal meat), indicating that the social and physical environment may influence our choice of action. In another words, when we are not socially or environmentally supported, we avoid the products that do not fit the surrounding environment. In contrast, when we are socially or environmentally supported, we choose the product that can provide a meaningful outcome to our own selves that is based on the group's values and norms (e.g., a Muslim customer chooses Halal meat when the store is full of Middle-Eastern customers).

Furthermore, in defining their identity, individuals (e.g., Muslims) must be able to differentiate themselves from others by drawing on norms of unity and a sense of shared belonging within their group. Logically then, an internal identification system must be acknowledged by outsiders (observers) in order for a represented collective identity to emerge. If individuals fail to preserve their values, then their behavior may pose a threat to their positive group image and reputation. While moral values may appear to be personal and unchangeable, the environment brings a considerable amount of influence to bear. In particular, in a social context, individuals have the opportunity to observe the consequences of the decisions and actions of others. These observed behaviors in turn yield significant influence over our own personal morality (Shu, Gino & Bazerman, 2011).

Norms usually guide the principles that people use to decide the "right way to behave" in a given situation. When the norms of a specific relationship are salient, they serve as a lens through which people view the world and guide their subsequent behavior. I argue that the actions of an out-group member in line with the in-group member's norms or value systems serve as a potent reminder to the in-group member of the salience of the in-group's norm or value, especially when the in-group member does not adhere to the group norms or values. Such action may turn a self-identity into a salient social identity, such that the identity becomes more accessible and subject to be assigned a legitimate value that can be adopted by many other out-group members. In response, this salience will elevate the status of the in-group values.

Any observer could potentially have an emotional reaction to a transgression. This includes direct observers (i.e., those who directly perceive the transgression) and indirect observers (i.e., those who learn about the transgression by means other than direct perception, such as from newspapers or other observers) (Silverman, 2009). In addition to cultural and personality factors, the relationship between the observer and those directly involved in the transgression may affect the extent of the reaction. Castano et al. (2002) studied emotional reactions of uninvolved observers to transgressions and found that negative emotional reactions to transgressions are significantly stronger when the victims belong to the same group as the observer.

For groups with a particular religious background, members are more willing to protect not only the image of their group but also the image of God, which is the central component to the identity formation within their religious group. I argue that the group image is threatened by the presence of an out-group observer, which may result in a transgressor experiencing a greater level of negative emotion reaction than might otherwise have occurred.

Religious groups are among the most cohesive and harmonious groups. They preserve the family network, they fulfill a considerable role in the process of socialization, and they provide social support and security for their members (Helal & Coston 1991; Shelly 1981). In the religious world-view of the peoples of Islamic societies, more emphasis is placed on the duties of individuals than on their rights. Individuals' interests are regarded as subordinate to social and group interests. Consequently, family, community, and even state interventions in individuals' private affairs are tolerated and justified for the sake of their social benefits. Basabe and Ros (2005) stated that some religions (e.g., Islam and Hinduism) are generally collectivist by nature, and, like any other group-oriented society, they strive for group harmony and synchronization with others. Allport (1966) argued that all the needs of individuals are brought into harmony with their religious beliefs and prescriptions. Any behavior that breaks or jeopardizes that harmony or the image of the group will cause the perpetrator to suffer emotionally as a result.

Wenzel (2004) found that when individuals observe the unethical misdeeds of in-group members, they feel more comfortable in loosening their own ethical code as well. Thus, when Muslim consumers purchase non-halal products when Halal products are readily available, and this event is witnessed by another in-group member (Muslim) who purchases the same non-Halal products, then social approval takes place, and such an act may encourage positive emotional reactions. However, when an out-group member who purchases the same non-Halal products witnesses the event of value transgression, social approval is lacking, and the observed group loses or discards some of its reinforcing value. Consequently, such an act results in a social threat, which may induce negative emotional reactions that reflect the deep anxiety level of the transgressor to protect the group-image from a downgraded appraisal by outsiders. Thus, I hypothesize that,

*H2a: Participants in the transgression condition will experience greater negative emotions when their transgression is witnessed by an out-group member than when it is witnessed by an in-group member.*

*H2b: Participants in the compliance condition will not be affected by social threat (i.e., who witnesses the compliance).*

In Figure 2, I illuminate the moderation path of social threat that modulates the relationship between value transgression and the emotional reaction that may arise because of the out-group member's presence during the time of transgression.

*1.2: Figure 2: Hypothesis 2 (a.b) 1st Moderation path.*




*3.3 The Absence of Value Reinforcement*

The psychology of self-affirmation suggests that even simple reminders of self-worth may be sufficient to reduce the normal tendency to respond to threat defensively, so that people can incorporate useful but potentially unflattering information about themselves (also see Trope & Pomerantz, 1998). Self-affirmation theory proposes that any strategy that restores the integrity of the self after a psychic assault should alleviate the impact of the new threat and thus eliminate the need to respond defensively. In other words, threats to the self-need not be dealt with at the site of the psychic wound but can be healed more indirect by calling to mind the valued aspects of one's identity in some other life domain. Qualities that are central to how people see themselves represent potential domains of self-affirmation. Such affirmations can center on friends and family, a charity, the observance of one's religion or one's group values. In a difficult situation, reminders of these core qualities can provide people with perspective on who they are, thus anchoring their sense of self-integrity in the face of threat (Steele, 1988). One-way for members to maintain a relative positive self-image and promote a sense of self-worth is through the status of their groups. The higher the social status of the group, the higher the feeling of self-worth that is likely to arise (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). I argue that one way to obtain the

social status of a group is through perceiving the legitimacy and societal acceptability of the group values and norms. The adoption of in-group values by out-group individuals may give broader perceptions of group status and, in return, contribute positively to the self-integrity sensation. People can thus focus not on the implications for self-integrity of a given threat or stressor, but on the informational value that arises from such difficult events. However, the absence of such adoption may cause a threat to remain active, and, consequently, negative emotion remains active as well. Emotions are associated with either pleasant or unpleasant feelings that can act as reinforcement. In this way, emotions can motivate people to approach or avoid certain scenarios. It is often assumed that human decision-making consists of the maximization of positive emotions and minimization of negative emotions (e.g., Hinde, 1999).

Consumer religiosity on an in-group basis denotes the tendency of consumers to favorably evaluate in-group brands and products compared to out-group brands and products. Thus, purchasing products that are considered for out-group consumption might be evaluated as a derogation of in-group values, which can increase the feeling of in-group inferiority and pose a direct threat to the group's image, especially when there is a lack of social approval or authority support (Argo, White & Dahl 2006). Therefore, I predict that when there is no value reinforcing during the time of norm or value transgression (e.g., social approval or authority support), consumers might experience a greater level of negative emotion when this event is witnessed by an out-group member, as they feel that their actions have put the group reputation, group-image, and God-image at risk, with no contextual help. Stated formally,

H3a: *When the transgression is witnessed by an out-group member, participants in the transgress condition will experience greater negative emotions when the out-group witness buys non-halal products (value reinforcement absent) than when he/she buys halal products (value reinforcement present). However, this effect will disappear in the compliance condition or when the transgression or compliance is witnessed by an in-group member.*

H3b: *In the absence of a value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buys non-halal products), participants in the transgress condition will experience greater negative emotions when the transgression is witnessed by an out-group member than when it is witnessed by an in-group member. However, this effect will disappear in the presence of value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buys halal products).*

H3c: *In the absence of a value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buy non-halal products), participants in the compliance condition will experience lower negative emotions when an out-group member than when it is witnessed by an in-group member witnesses the transgression. However, this effect will disappear in the presence of value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buys halal products).*

In Figure 3I show the moderation path of self-affirmation at a group level that embraces the absence of value reinforcement as an effective strategy to mitigate threats.

*1.3: Figure 3: Hypothesis 3 (a,b,c) 2$^{nd}$ Moderation path* **(in bold).**




*3.4 Group-Affirmation*

Predictions derived from self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) have been supported in a wide range of situations involving self-threat. When self-integrity is affirmed, people are less biased in their judgments of information related to their identities (Cohen et al., 2000), their health (Sherman et al., 2000; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998), and their impressions of others (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Spencer et al., 2001). Self-affirmation immunizes people against threat, and thus makes them more open to ideas that would otherwise be too painful to accept. It also reduces the stressfulness of evaluative situations and the cognitive accessibility of threatening cognitions (Creswell et al., 2005). In the same manner, affirming group values may limit the effectiveness of the threatening event since these values increase an individual's receptivity to other values that are important to them and since their self-integrity becomes more secure (Sherman, Kinias, Major & Kim, 2007).

Early work on self-affirmation speculated that the self-affirmation task reminds individuals of who they are, providing an anchor for their sense of self (Sherman and Cohen 2006). As a result, people can protect their self-integrity in the face of threat. This research investigates the influence of affirmation on the emotion of the affirmed individuals when they transgress their group-value system in the presence of a social threat. I expect that providing transgressors with an opportunity for self-affirmation at a group level will attenuate their negative emotions at the transgression of a group-value. When an individual affirms his/her group's values, they may become less concerned with the group-evaluative implications of value transgressions and surrounding threats, which in return may reduce the experience of negative emotion.

When group values are affirmed, individuals realize there are some worthy values that are being overlooked. My argument is that if participants who are granted an opportunity to affirm (e.g., retain information about national brand, ethnic food, or folkloric hobbies or other cultural values), the effect of value transgression and the surrounding threats will be diminished, and thus, negative emotion will occur at a lesser degree of intensity. When affirmation is exercised, individuals may view threatening environments and situations as non-problematic, which may in turn ameliorate negative emotional experiences. The following 4 hypotheses apply to situation when affirmation is performed.

*H4a: In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the value reinforcement present condition are more likely to experience lower level of negative emotion than participants in the value reinforcement absent.*

*H4b: In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the affirmation condition are more likely to experience a lower level of negative emotion than participants in the no-affirmation condition when value-reinforcement is present.*
*H4c: In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the no-affirmation condition are more likely to experience a greater level of negative emotion when value reinforcement is absent than when value reinforcement is present.*
*H4d: In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the value-reinforcement-present condition are more likely to experience a lower level of negative emotion than participants in the value-reinforcement-absent condition.*

In Figure 4, I provide a comprehensive framework of this research, illustrating, once again, the transgression of value as an influential factor that may induce a negative-emotion reaction. I also show the moderation role of social threat, the moderation effects of value reinforcement as well as the effects of group-affirmation exercises on the emotional reactions of the transgressors. (Refer to Appendix A for a summary of the research hypotheses and findings.)
*1.4: Figure 4: Thesis framework & (hypothesis 4 (a,b,c,d) 3rd Moderation path (**in bold**).*



## Chapter 4. Study 1

### *4.1 Objective*

The first objective of Study 1 is to replicate previous findings of the emotional reaction to value transgression performed by an in-group member within a religious framework (herein, the Muslim community). The second objective of this study is to discover the moderation role of social threat that may arise through the presence of an out-group (Non-Muslim) observer. Psychology research has evidenced that individuals use consumption and product selection to signal their identity (Molnar & Lamont, 2002). The third objective is to determine the role of self-affirmation at a group level through examining the effect of reinforcing group values (herein, purchasing halal product by non-Muslims). I posit that in-group members are more likely to experience higher levels of negative emotion when they transgress their group values in the presence of an out-group member in situations where there is no presence of reinforcing of group values.

### *4.2 Methodology*

Approximately 600 adult members of two local Muslim organizations were invited to participate in an online survey in return for monetary incentives. One hundred and seventy-four members completed the survey, for a final response rate of 29 %. The average age of the sample was 29.2 years of age, and 67% of respondents were male.

Islamic culture society enshrines the male-female dichotomy, whereby women are forbidden to mix with men, with the exception of the *maharim* (the plural of *mahram*) (i.e., those who are ineligible for marriage to each other). In some very specific cases, such as for the purposes of education, women and men are allowed to mix. Islamic culture applies this system of gender separation to many aspects of private and public life (Baki, 2007). The fact that Muslim men and women observe these gender boundaries stands as the reason they will not, for example, accept that kindly offer of a ride home on a rainy evening (nor will they offer one) if those involved are not *mahram*; neither will they exchange a handshake or hug, even with someone they like very much, if it crosses a gender boundary (Al Lily, 2011). As a Muslim male, I had easy access to males only, since contacting potential female participants directly, with no intermediary who was *mahram*, would have been challenging. Therefore, I had a higher instance of male participants in my study, at 67%. Demographic questions were enforced, however, to see whether there were any possible effects of this characteristic. The results show that gender differences had no effect on the results; $F$ (1, 169) = .056, $p$ = .814).

Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight cells in a 2 (value transgression: transgress vs. comply) × 2 (social threat: absent vs. present) × 2 (value reinforcement: absent vs. present) between-subject design. Each participant was presented with a grocery-shopping scenario and asked to imagine himself or herself experiencing the situation described in the scenario. Such an approach, used widely in psychology and consumer research (e.g.,Wojciszke, 1994), including that on religious studies (e.g., Fam, Waller & Erdogan, 2002), allowed for an exogenous manipulation of the participants' reactions to the transgression of cultural norms in their consumption behavior, thereby avoiding potential problems stemming from endogeneity (Shugan, 2004), social desirability bias (Fisher, 1993), and ethical concerns (Tracy & Robins, 2004). To manipulate the value transgression (comply vs. transgress), the scenario described a hypothetical situation in which the respondents were either buying non-halal (transgress) or halal (comply) products. To manipulate the social threat (absent vs. present), the scenario explicitly mentioned that the purchase experience had been witnessed by one of the respondent's friends, who is either a Muslim (absent) or a non-Muslim (present). To manipulate value reinforcement

(present vs. absent), the scenario pointed out that the respondent's friend purchases either halal (present) or non-halal (absent) products; refer to Appendix B for all eight of the scenarios.

After reading the given scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they had just experienced the situation described and were then asked to answer some questions related to how they would react to such a situation; they were also asked to provide some demographics (i.e., age and gender). Since none of the demographic variables significantly influenced the hypothesized relations, they were dropped from further analysis. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and thoroughly debriefed on the purpose of the study.

*4.3 Study stimuli (Halal products)*

Halal literally means 'lawful' or 'permitted.' The Koran and the Sunna (prophetical traditions) exhort Muslims to eat the good and lawful products God has provided for them, but a number of conditions and prohibitions do exist (Riaz & Chaudry 2004). Muslims are expressly forbidden from consuming carrion, spurting blood, pork, and any food that has been consecrated to any being other than God himself. These substances are prohibited and thus forbidden. Determining whether food stuff is halal or prohibited depends on the food's nature, how it is processed, and how it is obtained (Riaz & Chaudry 2004). Besides these relatively clear requirements, there are some far more abstract, individual, and fuzzy aspects of context and handling involved in determining the halalness of a product. Another significant Islamic prohibition relates to wine and to any other intoxicating drink products or to ingredients that are prohibited in any quantity or substance (Denny, 2006).

In this research, I used halal products as the study stimuli for three reasons. First, Halal nowadays is the most important subject matter for Muslims who live in the Western countries or countries where Muslims are considered to be a minority group. Exploratory research using the means-end-chain theory confirmed that Muslim consumers eat halal meat in order to follow and express their religious teachings (Bonne & Verbeke, 2006). In a related vein, Bergeaud-Blackler and Bonne (2007) showed that religion is a very important motivator for eating halal meat. Second, today, halal is no longer a mere religious obligation or observance, but is considered as the standard of choice for Muslims as well as non-Muslims worldwide. The halal products are growing in popularity among non-Muslim consumers due to humane animal treatment concerns and the perception that halal products are healthier and safer (Golnaz et al., 2010). For example, Muhammad (2007) stated that some Asian non-Muslims tend to prefer food stuffs stamped with the halal logo for health reasons. The bottom line is that halal food has become an international brand emphasizes safety, hygiene and wholesomeness of food (Golnaz et al., 2010).

Also, the halal food market sizes for 2010 were larger than originally projected, with the total halal market valued at US$661 billion, a figure that marked a 4.2% increase from the 2009 value. The global halal food market has grown substantially since 2004, seeing a 12.6% increase between 2004 and 2010 (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2011). Halal is not just about meat. Rather, the halal market is developing for complete product ranges of pre-cooked meals, toiletries, personal care items, pharmaceuticals, health supplements, and cosmetics products (Kamaruzaman, 2009). The third reason is that halal branding and halalness concepts have not been adequately investigated in marketing or in psychology as contextual factors that may influence many people.

*4.4 Dependent variable*

The value transgression manipulation check was assessed using a three-item, five-point scale (1= not feeling this way at all: 5 = feeling this way very strongly): "You feel like you should have known better what to buy," "You feel like you deserve to be reprimanded for having

purchased such a product," "You feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation" (α= .88). The manipulation check for social threat asked participants on a five-point scale whether or not they felt "ashamed" and "embarrassed" for having purchased such products (r=. 95). Previous research suggests that self-conscious emotion involves a self-evaluative process that takes into consideration how people see themselves through the eyes of others (Tracy & Robins, 2004, 2006, 2007). It is important to notice that social threat is expected to occur only when the value is transgressed. Finally, as a manipulation check for value reinforcement, using a five-point scale, I asked participants whether or not they felt "good," "pleased," "valuable," and "proud" for having seen others purchase the same products as they did or products that were intended to be for in-group consumption (e.g., Halal) (α =.84). Prior research suggests that approval-seeking is correlated with reducing possible suffering of negative emotion and social-approval makes us proud and pleased with ourselves (Emmons, 2005).

For us to be able to adequately examine our predictions with less complication and to reduce possible sensitivity in order to answer some questions – especially within religion consumption context – I used the Consumption Emotion Set (CES) by Richins (1997) to measure emotional reaction. Based on extensive research, Richins (1997) constructed CES so it would incorporate most, if not all, emotions that can emerge in consumption situations and was developed to distinguish the varieties of emotion associated with different product classes. CES can be easily divided into positive and negative affect. The advantages of the division in positive and negative affect are that the model can be kept simple, and the mixture of a person's positive and negative affect is indicative of his/her attitude (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). CES reveals 22 negative emotions that are among the most frequently encountered words in the psychological emotion literature (Laros & Steenkamp, 2003). Therefore, I used only these 22 negative emotions that are mostly encountered in the psychological literature. Negative reaction to the purchase scenario was used as the main dependent variable for this study and was accomplished by asking the respondents to indicate on a five-point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much) the extent to which they would feel the following emotions if they had just experienced the situation described in the scenario: angry, irritated, annoyed, aggravated, mad, furious, discounted, unfulfilled, worried, tense, nervous, concerned, uneasy, sad, depressed, miserable, bad, defeated, afraid, and anxious (α = .98).

*4.5 Results*

*4.5.1 Manipulation-Checks.* Manipulations were tested with 2 (value transgression: transgress vs. comply) × 2 (social threat: absent vs. present) × 2 (value reinforcement: absent vs. present) between-subject ANOVAs, with perceived value transgression, socially driven emotion, and perceived socially approved emotion as dependent variables. The results showed (a) a main effect of value transgression on how participants would perceive that they had transgressed their own cultural value if they experienced the situation described in the scenario (F (1,149) = 36.56, $p< .001$); and (b) a main effect of social threat on the extent to which participants would have felt socially ashamed and embarrassed (F (1,149) = 48.09, $p< .001$); and (c) a main effect of value reinforcement on the extent to which participants would have experienced socially approved (positive) emotions (F (1,149) = 3.82, $p = .052$). Table 1 shows the manipulation checks for all examined variables.

*1.1 Table1. Study 1 Manipulation checks*

| **Independent Variable** | **Conditions** | **Means** | **F** | **Sig** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Value Transgression | Transgress | 2.91 | | |
| | comply | 1.1.73 | (1,142) 18.89 | .000*** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Presence | Present | 2.93 | | |
| | Absent | 1.56 | (1,142) 48.09 | .000*** |
| Value Reinforcement | Present | 3.47 | | |
| | Absent | 3.16 | (1,142) 3.82 | .052** |

*** <.001
** <.05
* <.10

*4.5.2 Factor Analysis*

Twenty-two items were used to measure the level of negative emotion among participants, and internal consistencies for negative emotion items were examined using Cronbach's alpha. To increase alpha for the negative emotion factor, two items were eliminated: *(1) The situation described in the scenario makes me feel scared* and *(2)the situation described in the scenario makes me feel threatened).* The remaining 20 items demonstrated high internal consistency (α = .97). The factorability of the 20 negative-emotion items was also examined; Table 1 presents the results of the principal components factor analyses using a varimax orthogonal rotation on the 20 emotion items. The eigenvalues showed that the factor (negative emotion) explained 72% of the total variance. The eigenvalues on the screeplot for the negative emotion factor are greater than 1 (eigenvalues = 14.50).

*1.2 Table 2. Factor loadings and communalities based on a principle components analysis with varimax rotation for negative emotion items*

| *DV* | *Negative Emotion* | *Commonalities* |
|---|---|---|
| The situation described in the scenario makes me Angry | .875 | .765 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me irritated | .860 | .739 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me annoyed | .861 | .741 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me aggravated | .883 | .780 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me mad | .852 | .726 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me furious | .872 | .760 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me discontent | .876 | .768 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me unfulfilled | .868 | .753 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me worried | .826 | .683 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me tense | .801 | .641 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me nervous | .831 | .690 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me concerned | .756 | .572 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel uneasy | .860 | .740 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel sad | .836 | .698 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel depressed | .839 | .703 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel miserable | .844 | .712 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel bad | .864 | .747 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel defeated | .941 | .885 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel afraid | .771 | .594 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel anxious | .901 | .812 |

*4.5.3 Main Effect*

There was a significant main effect of value transgression on how participants experienced negative emotions when they perceived themselves as transgressing their own

cultural norms, (*M*Transgress = 2.33, *M*Comply = 1.63; F (1,149) = 18.89, $p < .001$, $\eta\rho^2 = .11$); in general, transgressing in-group norms led to a higher level of experiencing negative emotions than did complying with in-group norms. No main effect was found for social threat, F (1,149) =, 966, $p = .327$, $\eta\rho^2 = .006$) or value reinforcement, F (1,149) = 1.77, $p = .185$, $\eta\rho^2 = .012$). Table 2 summarizes the main effects.

*1.3 Table 3: Study 1 Main Effects*

| **Independent Variable** | **Conditions** | **Means** | **F** | **Sig** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Value Transgression | Transgress | 2.33 | | |
| | Comply | 1.63 | (1,142) 18.89 | .000*** |
| Social Presence | Present | 2.57 | | |
| | Absent | 2.40 | (1,142) .699 | .327 |
| Value Reinforcement | Present | 2.26 | | |
| | Absent | *1.84* | (1,142) 1.773 | .185 |

*** <.001
** <.05
* <.10

*4.5.4 Two-way interaction effect*

Further analysis was conducted 2 (value transgression: transgress vs. comply) x 2 (social threat: present vs. absent) to determine whether a value transgression by social threat interaction would qualify the transgressor's negative emotion occurrences found above. As hypothesized in H2, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between value transgression and social threat on how participants would experience negative emotions if they were in the situation described in the scenario F(1,149) = 5.02, $p < .05$, $\eta\rho^2 = .033$). Planned contrasts suggest that participants in the transgression condition who were confronted with the presence of a social threat (a non-Muslim observer) experienced a higher level of negative emotion (*M*Present = 2.59) than participants in the condition who faced no social threat (a Muslim observer; *M*Absent = 2.07; *F* (1,149) = 5.04, $p < .05$). In other words, the findings revealed that participants reported higher levels of negative emotion when out-group members were present (social threat present) compared to when in-group members were present (social threat absent) during the event of transgressing group values or norms (herein: purchasing non-halal, traditional products). There was no significant effect of social threat on negative emotions in the comply condition. In addition, an effect of value transgression on how participants in the social threat present condition (the presence of a non-Muslim observer) experienced negative emotions was found to be significant, such that the participants who said they would have transgressed the value experienced higher negative emotions (*M*Transgress = 2.59) than participants who said they would have complied with the value (*M*Comply = 1.53; F (1, 149) = 21.70, $p < .001$). Figure 5 illustrates the two-way interaction effects.

**2.1 Figure 5 a, b : Two-way interaction effects of Social threat and Value transgression.**

*Fig. 5a*




*Fig. 5b*




*** <.001
** <.05
* <.10

*4.5.5 Three-way interaction effect*

To test for H3, I evaluated the three-way interaction. The results revealed a significant value for the transgression × social threat × value reinforcement interaction ($F$ (1,149) = 6.48, $p$ < .05, $\eta\rho^2$ = .042). Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the value transgression condition who faced a social threat (a non-Muslim observer) experienced a greater level of negative emotions when the non-Muslim observer purchased a non-halal product (value reinforcement absent) $M$Absent = 3.00) than when he/she purchased a halal product (value reinforcement present) $M$Present = 2.19; (F (l, 149) = 6.17, p < .05). There were no significant effects of value reinforcement in the comply condition or when the transgression or comply condition was witnessed by an in-group member. Further, participants in the transgress condition, when value reinforcement was absent, experienced greater negative emotions when the transgression was witnessed by an out-group member than when it was witnessed by an in-group member (F (l, 149) = 8.64, $p$ < .05). This effect was reversed for participants in the comply condition (F (l, 149) = 3.77, $p$ < .05). That is, when the value reinforcement was absent, these participants experienced lower negative emotions when an out-group member witnessed the comply ($M$Present = 1.39) than when the comply was witnessed by an in-group member ($M$Absent = 1.95). Finally, these effects were not significant when value reinforcement was present. Thus, it is evident that value transgression negatively affects emotional reaction at a greater level when social threat (an out-group member) is present and there is no value reinforcement, such as social approval or promoting group high status. See Figures 6.a, b and 6.c.

2.2: **Figure 6.a, b: Three-way interaction effects of social threat and value transgression in the absence of value reinforcement (transgress condition)**

*Fig. 6a*




*Fig. 6b*




2.3: **Figure 6.c: Three-way interaction effects of social threat and value transgression in the presence of value reinforcement (comply condition)**



*** <.001
** <.05
* <.10

*4.6 Discussion*

The results of the present study provide substantial support for the hypotheses derived from the interaction effect that exists in emotional experiences among in-group consumers (Muslim) in situations where there is an out-group social threat. Specifically, I argue that when in-group consumers purchase non-halal products, they are transgressing their religious values and norms, and thus they would experience higher levels of negative emotion. I tested value transgression phenomenon within a religious context, and the findings replicates previous research studies in different domains (e.g.,Tangney et al., 2006; Rozin et al.,1999) , which supports that value transgression leads to negative emotion. Further, I hypothesized that the relationship between value transgression and emotional reaction is moderated by social threats that arise from an out-group presence during the time of transgression. Specifically, these findings suggest that the presence of an out-group member shows a direct threat to the in-group value and norms. Therefore, compared to those in the compliance condition, participants in the transgressor condition experienced greater levels of negative emotion. Thereby indicating that people are keen to protect their social identity from an out-group, one way to protect the one-self comes from preserving group benefits as a collective identity, which in turn benefits the individual's self-image.

The results from this study also provided important empirical evidence for the relationship between value transgressions and social threats qualified by value reinforcement. The findings suggested that value transgression will lead to a greater level of negative emotion, not only when a social threat was present but also when no value reinforcement (such as social approval or promotion of group high status) took place at the time of the transgression.

In sum, generally, group value transgression leads to negative emotion and to the social threat associated with the presence of an out-group member, as qualified by the previous statement. In addition, the absence of value reinforcement as an affirmation technique to overcome threats plays a contributing role in this relationship. When there is no value reinforcement in place, the negative emotion resulting from group value transgression will be significantly greater than when value reinforcement is present, because people often seek external approval to legitimize certain behaviors; social approval leads to satisfying internalized standards of support when values are transgressed (Ashford et al., 2003).

## Chapter 5. Study 2

### *5.1 Objective*

In Study 1, I examined the role of reinforcing a group value as a defensive process that helps participants to discount social threats, which in turn affects the level of emotional reactions experienced by the participants. In Study 2, I aim to explore another defensive process that may qualify the influential role of value reinforcement and reduce the experience of negative emotions. In particular, I examine the moderation effect of self-affirmation at a group level on the relationship between value reinforcement and consumers' emotional reaction. Study 2 sheds light on how group-affirmation moderates the relationship between value reinforcement and negative emotion due to group-value transgression. Therefore, encapsulating the previous discussion, I posit that in-group members are more likely to experience higher levels of negative emotion when they transgress group values in the presence of an out-group member (social threat), when there is no group-value reinforcement present and members have no opportunity to affirm significant group values in order to overcome wounded norms or values.

### *5.2 Methodology*

Members of a local Muslim organization were invited to participate in paper-and-pencil surveys in return for monetary incentives. Approximately 114 paper-and-pencil survey questionnaires were distributed. Seventy-three members completed the survey, for a final response rate of 64.03 %. The average age of the sample was 26.1 years of age, and 69.9 % of the respondents were male. The same as in study, 1 I had a difficult access to female participants. Therefore, I had lower female participants in study 2 with 30 %. However, demographic questions were imposed to see if there are any possible effects. The results show that gender differences had no effect on the results; $F$ (1, 69) = .009, $p$ = .925).

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four cells in a 2 (Value reinforcement: absent vs. present) × 2 (Group-affirmation: affirmation vs. no-affirmation) between-subject design. As for the study scenario, I followed the same format as in Study 1, with some appropriate modifications to the scenarios for manipulation purposes. Each participant was presented with a grocery-shopping scenario and asked to imagine himself / herself experiencing the situation described in the scenario. In particular, all participants (herein Muslims) were requested to hypothetically imagine themselves in a scenario where they transgress their group norms by purchasing non-halal products in the presence of an out-group (non-Muslim) member (social threat).

To manipulate value reinforcement (present vs. absent), I followed the same format as in Study1, where the scenario pointed out that the participant's friend is purchasing either halal (present) or non-halal (absent) products; refer to appendix C for the scenario. Fein and Spencer (1997) examined whether an affirmation of an individual's self-integrity reduces the need to stereotype an out-group member. Self-affirmation manipulation was conducted by asking participants to complete a self-affirmation study through writing about an important value (versus a control condition where they wrote about a relatively unimportant value). I adopted the same format where the affirmation/no-affirmation manipulation was introduced as a part of the conversation between the two individuals in the scenarios. Respondents were asked about the most significant value linked to either their culture identity (affirmation) or to their marriage life (no-affirmation).

After reading the given scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they had just experienced the situation described in the scenario and were asked to answer some responses to questions related to how they would react to such situation; they were also asked to provide some

demographic questions (i.e., age and gender). Responses to demographic items had no effect on the results and were not discussed further. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and thoroughly debriefed on the purpose of the study.

*5.3 Dependent variable*

As a manipulation check for value reinforcement, I utilized the same assessment as in Study 1. Using a five-point scale, I asked participants whether or not they felt "good," "pleased," "valuable," and "proud" for having seen others purchase the same products as they did or products that are intended to be for in-group consumption (e.g., Halal) (α= .75).

As for affirmation manipulation check, previous studies have shown that the mechanisms by which affirmation manipulation boosts self-worth or positive self-image are largely implicit and non-conscious (Tesser, Martin, & Cornell, 1996). Therefore, standard self-report manipulation checks on self-worth following affirmation would be unlikely to show any differences (Sivanathan et al., 2008). Furthermore, there is even more evidence to suggest that such manipulation checks can disrupt affirmation processes (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). Importantly, awareness of the self-affirmation process has been argued to moderate the impact of self-affirmation (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Framing blatant items to assess participants' perceived affirmation may make participants aware of the purpose of the self-affirmation task (e.g., "The questionnaire made me think about positive aspects of myself" or similar items, Harris &,Napper, 2005). Thus, a manipulation check may undermine the effectiveness of the study's manipulation, thereby making it difficult to test self-affirmation affects the way it is proposed.

For the study's main dependent variable (negative emotion), again, I used the same 20 variables as in Study 1. I used the Consumption Emotion Set (CES) by Richins (1997) with 22 negative emotion variables, leaving out 2 of the variables as in study 1. Participants were asked to indicate on a five-point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much) the extent to which they would feel the following emotions if they had just experienced the situation described in the scenario: angry, irritated, annoyed, aggravated, mad, furious, discounted, unfulfilled, worried, tense, nervous, concerned, uneasy, sad, depressed, miserable, bad, defeated, afraid, and anxious (α = .97).

*5.4 Results*

*5.4.1 Manipulation-Checks.* Manipulations were tested with 2 (value reinforcement: absent vs. present) × 2 (group-affirmation: affirmation vs. no-Affirmation) between-subject ANOVAs. Results showed a main effect of value reinforcement on the extent to which participants would have experienced socially approved (positive) emotions (*M*Present= 2.42, *M*Absent = 1.79; $F(1,69) = 9.21$, $p < .01$).

*5.4.2 Main Effect*

2 (value reinforcement: present vs. absent) x (group affirmation: affirmation vs. no-affirmation) was conducted. There was a significant main effect of value reinforcement present in the way participants experienced negative emotions when they would perceive themselves as transgressing their own cultural norms, (*M*Absent= 4.10, *M*Aresent = 2.58; $F(1, 69) = 64.86$, $p < .001$, $\eta\rho^2 = .48$); in the event of value transgression, value reinforcement led to a lower level of experiencing negative emotions when it was present than when it was absent, thus supporting H4a. No main effect was found for group-affirmation (*M*No-affirmation = 3.44, *M*affirmation = 3.23; $F(1, 69)$ $p = .266$, $\eta\rho^2 = .018$). ). Table 3 summarizes the main effects.

*2.1 Table 4: Study 2 main effects*

| Independent Variable | Conditions | Means | F | Sig |
|---|---|---|---|---|

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Present | 4.10 | | |
| Value Reinforcement | Absent | 2.58 | (1,69) 64.86 | .000*** |
| | Affirmation | 3.44 | | |
| Group-Affirmation | No-Affirmation | 3.25 | (1,69) .1.25 | .266 |

*** <.001
** <.05
* <.10

*5.4.3 Two-way interaction effect*

A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between value reinforcement and group-affirmation on how participants would experience negative emotions if they were in the situation described in the scenario (F (1, 69) = 5.39, $p < .05$, $\eta\rho^2$=.072). Planned contrasts suggest a significant interaction effect. First, when value reinforcement is present, the participants in the no-affirmation condition reported greater levels of experiencing negative emotion (*M*Noffirmation = 2.91) than participants in the affirmation condition (*M*Affirmation = 2.26; *F* (1, 69) = 5.84, $p < .05$), which supports H4b. Second, in the no-affirmation condition, participants reported a greater level of experiencing negative emotion when value reinforcement was absent (*M*Absent = 3.98) than participants in the value reinforcement present condition (*M*Present = 2.91); *F* (1, 69) = 16.19, $p < .001$); this finding supports H4c. Finally, when both sets of participants had opportunities to affirm their group-value, participants in the value-reinforcement-present condition experienced a lower level of negative emotion (*M*Present = 2.26) than participants in the value-reinforcement-absent condition (*M*Absent= 4.21; F (1, 69) = 54.64, $p <.001$), which supports H4d. See Figure 7a,b,c.

**3.1 Figure 7 a,b,c: Two-way interaction effects of value reinforcement and group affirmation.**

*Fig. 7a*




*Fig. 7b*




*Fig. 7c*

*Fig. 7c*




*** <.001
** <.05
* <.10

5.5 *Discussion*

In Study 2, I hypothesized that value reinforcement has an impact on people's emotional reaction when they transgress their cultural values. Further, I posited that the previous relationship between these two aspects is moderated by group-affirmation. When people have opportunities to affirm their significant group values, they feel more positive about their actions, (Stone et al., 2011) and therefore, they experience less emotional tension. The results of Study 2 provide considerable support for the hypotheses derived from the interaction effect that exists in emotional experiences among participants (Muslims) in situations where there are affirmation/no- affirmation occurrences.

In general, the findings of Study 2 show that participants would experience greater levels of negative emotion when they did not affirm (compared to when they did affirm) significant values in their life only when value-reinforcement is present. When there is no value reinforcement in place, and participants had no opportunity to affirm, they experienced higher levels of negative emotion than participants who had an opportunity to affirm. In addition, when participants were given a chance to affirm their important group values but did not also receive value reinforcement at the time of the value transgression, they experienced negative emotion at a higher level than that of participants who received value reinforcement. These findings explain that self-affirmation at a group level qualifies the role of value reinforcement and further explains how people may react to threats and emotional tensions.

## Chapter 6. General Discussion and Conclusion

*6.1 General Discussion*

Theoretically, the present research has provided some new information that adds to our current limited stock of knowledge concerning the influence of value transgression on consumers' emotional reactions and the role that social presence and value reinforcement play in this relationship. Generally speaking, negative emotions have been studied within value-transgression settings (e.g., Bierbrauer, 1992; Frenopoulo, 2004). Bierbrauer (1992) stated that feelings of guilt resulted from transgressing personal standards, while feelings of shame resulted from transgressing societal standards. Emotional responses are likely to be negative, include fear, anxiety, anger, and resentment (Davis & Stephan, 2006; Renfro et al. 2006). However, in this research I argue that, transgressors reaction to the adoption of group norms and values by out-group members may differ than what previous researches predicted. Transgressors would emotionally feel less trouble when their group's norms and value are adopted by out-group members. Such adoption may promote the legitimacy and favorability these group values and as result increase group status within the societies.

I provide support for the position that the social presence of an out-group member serves as a threat that moderates the in-group's negative emotional reactions when a transgression of in-group values occurs. Moreover, the absence of value reinforcement (e.g., social approval) may further qualify the previous interaction. This finding stands as the major contribution of this research since, until now, the existing literature on the subject has not covered the relationship of these dimensions.

In Study 1 represents an empirical manifestation and support of previous studies that showed that transgression and violating the value-system of a group lead to negative emotional reactions. The results of Study 1's analysis of variance indicate that feelings of emotional negativity were due to the transgressing Islamic values of purchasing lawful products. This study presented an initial empirical effort to examine this relationship among members of the Muslim population.

Second, although the original version of threat theory focused primarily on changes in attitudes toward the out-group (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), it is apparent that threat carries a number of other cognitive, affective, and behavioral outcomes. This approach was not discussed in prior studies that have sought to further expand our knowledge about the relationship between symbolic threats and value transgression.

In addition, I argued that the action of the out-group members (who are seen as a threat) can mitigate emotional reactions due to in-group value transgression. The adoption of in-group values from out-group individuals may give broader perceptions of group status and, in return, contribute positively to a sense of self-integrity. Thus, instead of focusing on the implications for self-integrity of a given threat or stressor, people can focus on the informational value that arises from such difficult events. In other words, when out-group members adopt in-group values, such adoption may be perceived as a way of promoting the volubility of such values, thereby increasing the status of the group in the eyes of other groups. Emotions are associated with either pleasant or unpleasant feelings, which can act as reinforcement. In this way, emotions can be mitigated because what was perceived as a threat is no longer seen as a threat once the in-group values have been adopted.

In Study two I examined how group-affirmation affects cognitive processing of threatening information. I hypothesized that the effect of group-affirmation on emotional reactions is likely to vary as a function of the presence or absence of value reinforcement.

Specifically, group affirmation may complement or support the effect of value-reinforcement on the relationship of value transgression and on the level of emotional reaction. The findings of Study 2 have important implications for self-affirmation theory. Various scholars have stressed the importance of examining potential factors that enhance our understanding of the effects of self-affirmation (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Study 2 has met this call by demonstrating the relationship between self-affirmation at the group level and value reinforcement, which both moderate the effect of transgressing group value on emotional reaction.

The majority of previous research has suggested that self-affirmation generally increases extensive, careful processing of information that poses a threat to self-integrity (e.g., Sherman et al., 2000). Other research findings indicated that self-affirmation can also decrease processing of threatening information (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). This research, however, discussed group-affirmation from a different angle. Specifically, this research showed that self-affirmation at the group level will work more effectively to decrease feelings of negative emotion when another form of defensive process is activated at the same time.

The present research contributes to the existing literature on transgressions and social-threat in several important ways. First, the findings indicate that individual differences in experiencing negative emotion are based on the situational and contextual supports. The more supports transgressors may have at the time of transgression, the less negative emotion they will experience. Second, the research findings provide a novel demonstration that self-affirmation at a group level attenuates negative emotion for individuals who transgress their own cultural values.

Managerially, this study should serve to broaden the vision of marketing managers by helping them to understand the relationship between group values and, more specifically, the reactions of groups that base their values on religious systems and the related consumer emotions that exist within religious backgrounds other than Western religions. My findings suggest marketers not only need to know how their customers feel about their consumption experiences, but they also need to know the environmental factors that may affect their customers' consumption experiences and emotional reactions, thus helping marketers to control those experiences and reactions.

*6.2 Limitations and Future Directions*

Results from several independent research programs suggest that people do not self-enhance at all costs (Markus & Wurf, 1987) but are motivated to maintain rather than to maximize a positive self-image and that their "psychological immune system" kicks in only when the self experiences some degree of threat (Aspinwall, 1998). This self-image preservation perspective suggests that the minute a positive self-image has been restored, whether through a self-affirmation or through another defensive process, there will be no further need to restore the self as there will be no threats to undo with regard to any ensuing affirmation (Critcher, Dunning & Armor, 2010). Self-affirmation offers a strategy that people can use to remind themselves of who they are, providing an anchor for their sense of self (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Therefore, excessive self-affirmation can work as a reminder of transgressions, involving transgressors in further cognitive thinking and evaluating of the transgression event, which might limit effectiveness of self-affirmations. A promising research venue should investigate whether one defensive process can wash out the threat, leaving no further threats for any ensuing defensive processes to diminish and, thus, no need to restore the self, and inquiring as to what emotional reaction may arise due to this phenomenon. Self-affirmation may serve to increase instead of decrease perceived threats.

Understanding the effect of different cultural dimensions on how people may use or react to an affirmation process represents a promising and important area for research. Along with power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, long- and short-term orientation, indulgence/restraint, individualism, and collectivism all stand as recognized cultural dimensions that differentiate national cultures (Hofstede, 1980). Heine and Lehman (1997), however, suggested that members of collectivist cultures (e.g., Asia) might be less motivated to protect self-integrity because their culture places less emphasis on maintaining a positive self-image. However, it is also possible that members of collectivist cultures are just as motivated as members of individualist cultures to protect self-integrity, but that they would be more responsive to collectivist affirmations (e.g., of social relationships) than to individualist affirmations (e.g., of personal values; see Heine & Lehman, 1997).

I note that the generalizability of this study's findings is limited to only one type of product (halal) and to only one type of consumer group. Investigating the potential differences in value transgression among other groups and in other consumption contexts represents a suitable path for future research. Also, other coping strategies may impact emotions, and, given the negative nature of value transgression, I would expect consumers to adopt a variety of strategies to avoid or reduce the negative emotion that might result from transgressing their group values.

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## APPENDIX– A

**Table 5: Hypotheses Summary and Thesis Findings**

| No | Independent Variable | Moderator Variable | Hypothesis Explanation | Supported |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | Value Transgression | ------- | Participants will experience greater negative emotions when they transgress their group norms than when they comply with their group norms. | Yes |
| H2a | Value Transgression | Social Threat | Participants in the transgress condition will experience greater negative emotions when their transgression is witnessed by an out-group member than when it is witnessed by an in-group member. | Yes |
| H2b | Value Transgression | Social Threat | Participants in the comply condition will not be affected by social threat (i.e., who witnesses the compliance). | Yes |
| H3a | Value Transgression | Social Threat & Value Reinforcement | Participants in the transgress condition, when the transgression is witnessed by an out-group member, will experience greater negative emotions when the out-group witness buy non-halal products (value reinforcement absent) than when he/she buy halal products (value reinforcement present). However, this effect will disappear in the comply condition or when the transgression or comply is witnessed by an in-group member. | Yes |
| H3b | Value Transgression | Social Threat & Value Reinforcement | Participants in the transgress condition, in the absence of a value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buy non-halal products), will experience greater negative emotions when the transgression is witnessed by an out-group member than when it is witnessed by an in-group member. However, this effect will disappear in the presence of value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buy halal products). | Yes |
| H3c | Value Transgression | Social Threat & Value Reinforcement | Participants in the comply condition, in the absence of a value reinforcement (i.e., the witness buy non-halal products), will experience lower negative emotions when the transgression is witnessed by an out-group member than when it is witnessed by an in-group member. However, this | Yes |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | effect will disappear in the presence of value reinforcement (the witness buy halal products. | |
| H4a | Value Reinforcement | Group Affirmation | In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the value reinforcement present condition are more likely to experience lower level of negative emotion than participants in the value reinforcement absent. | Yes |
| H4b | Value Reinforcement | Group Affirmation | In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the affirmation condition are more likely to experience a lower level of negative emotion than participants in the no-affirmation condition when value-reinforcement is present. | Yes |
| H4c | Value Reinforcement | Group Affirmation | In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the no-affirmation condition are more likely to experience a greater level of negative emotion when value reinforcement is absent than when value reinforcement is present. | Yes |
| H4d | Value Reinforcement | Group Affirmation | In the event of value transgression in the presence of a social threat, participants in the value-reinforcement-present condition are more likely to experience a lower level of negative emotion than participants in the value-reinforcement-absent condition. | Yes |

# APPENDIX– B

## (Study 1 – Questionnaire)

### Letter of Information

Welcome to the Study: Consumption Behavior among Immigrants

Thank you for expressing interest in my study.

I would like to invite you to participate in a study investigating various aspects of the consumption behavior of different immigrant groups living in Manitoba. This study is being conducted by Hesham Fazel of the Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba.

This particular survey requires you to answer questions regarding your reactions to a hypothetical scenario related to a consumption experience. Your response will become part of a larger study that explores various aspects of the consumption behavior of immigrants living in Manitoba.

I ask that you please take about 15-20 minutes of your time to complete the following electronic survey.There are no known psychological, physical, economic or social risks associated with participation in this study. You are NOT going to be asked to make any financial commitment and are NOT obliged to answer any questions that you find objectionable. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you can choose to discontinue the survey at any point while you are working through the questionnaire; however, once you have submitted your responses (at the very end of the questionnaire), you will not be able to withdraw your responses.

Your responses will be kept completely anonymous. Please, note that even though we will ask you some demographic questions about yourself, those questions are generic questions and will not be sufficient to identify who you are. In addition, you are in no way obliged to answer those questions if you do not feel comfortable in doing so.

Be assured that your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. Your responses will not be viewed by anyone other than the researchers listed in this letter. In addition, all data will be stored indefinitely in secured computers and only the researcher named will have access to the data. Finally, all data from the survey will be reported in group totals only.

After clicking “continue” below you will be asked to give your consent to participate in the study.

The Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board at the University of Manitoba has approved this research. If for any reason you have concerns or complaints related to this study, please contact Hesham Fazel at (204) 474-8975, or by e-mail at hfazel@hotmail.com. You may also contact the University of Manitoba’s Human Ethics Secretariat at 474-7122 or by e-mail at Margaret_bowman@umanitoba.ca.

Thank you for taking the time to consider being part of this research activity.

Sincerely,

Hesham Fazel (Ph.D. Candidate in Marketing, University of Manitoba).

**Dear Participant,**

**On the next page, you will see a hypothetical purchasing scenario and will be asked to imagine yourself experiencing the situation described in the scenario. Please, read the scenario carefully and answer the questions that follow to the best of your knowledge. There are no right or wrong answers. All of your answers will be kept confidential.**

**Some of the questions may look the same to you. However, each is intended for a different purpose, and all questions are very important to us. We ask you that you answer each question as sincerely as possible in order to guarantee the success of this research study.**

**THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR TAKING**
**THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY.**

**Imagine yourself in the following scenario**

**In a sunny day, you went to a local supermarket to buy some groceries. The supermarket store you went is well known in the community for selling traditional (non-Halal) as well as Halal certified products. The prices of Halal certified products are comparatively the same as those of traditional (non-Halal) products. You then decided to buy meat from the traditional products that do not have Halal certification seal on them. Before you leave the store you accidentally bumped into a non-Muslim friend from the university. Your friend noticed that you are buying food that does not have Halal certification seals. Interestingly, you noticed that your friend was buying only Halal certified products. The two of you exchanged greetings and engaged in a relaxed conversation about your community and life in general. Once you finished buying all the products you need, you said goodbye to your friend, paid for your groceries and left the store.**

**Write down the thoughts that crossed your mind and how you were feeling, as you read the scenario. We do not want you to describe what was in the scenario, but rather what was going through your mind as you read it. These thoughts and feelings may or may not be related to what the scenario was saying. We want to know what you were thinking and feeling as you read the scenario.**

**Write down only those thoughts/feelings you had while reading the scenario and do not make up any now.**

**Imagine that you have just experienced the situation described in the scenario you read. The following are some statements that may or may not describe how you would react to the situation described in the scenario. Please rate each statement using the 5-point scale below.**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| You would feel good about yourself | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would want to sink into the floor and disappear | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel remorse for the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would regret having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel worthwhile, valuable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel small | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel tension about the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like you were a bad person | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would not stop thinking about the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel proud about the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel disgraced | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like apologizing for the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like confessing the mistake you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel pleased with the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel worthless, powerless | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel bad about having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like you should have known better what to buy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like you deserve to be reprimanded for having purchased such product | | | | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel guilty for having purchased such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel ashamed of having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel embarrassed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel uncomfortable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You should recognize you made something bad and avoid doing it next time | | | | | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

You would probably think it over several times wondering if you could have avoided such situation

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| You would regret buying such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Now, consider your friend's shopping behavior as described in the scenario (the friend you met at the supermarket). The following are some statements that may or may not describe how you would react to your friend's shopping behavior as described in the scenario. Please rate each statement using the 5-point scale below.**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Your friend should feel good about himself | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel like sinking into the floor and disappearing | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel remorse for the purchase he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should regret having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel tension about the purchase he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel like he was a bad person | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should not stop thinking about the purchase he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should be proud about the purchase he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel disgraced | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should apologize for the purchase he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should confess the mistake he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel pleased with the purchase he made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel worthless, powerless | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel bad about having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should know better what to buy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should be reprimanded for having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel guilty for having purchased such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel ashamed of having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel embarrassed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should feel uncomfortable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should recognize he made something bad and avoid doing it next time | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Your friend should think it over several times wondering if he could have avoided such situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Your friend should regret buying such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Again, imagine that you have just experienced the situation described in the scenario you read. Please indicate to what extent you would experience the following emotions:**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The situation described in the scenario makes me Angry | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me irritated | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me annoyed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me aggravated | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me mad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me furious | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me discontent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me unfulfilled | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me worried | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me tense | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me nervous | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me concerned | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel uneasy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel sad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel depressed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel miserable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel bad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel defeated | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel afraid | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel scared | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel threatened | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel glad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel delighted | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel cheerful | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel excited | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel thrilled | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel amazed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel astonished | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel anxious | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Please give us your opinion about the scenario you read. Circle the appropriate number on the following scales to reflect your opinion about the scenario:**

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unrealistic | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Realistic |
| Unimportant to me | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Important to me |
| Irrelevant to me | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Relevant to me |
| Bad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Good |
| Dislike | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Like |
| Unpleasant | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Pleasant |
| Unfavourable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Favourable |
| Negative | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Positive |
| Worthless | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Worthy |

**In the following, indicate how much you agree/disagree with each of the statements below. We would like you to answer the questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Please, keep in mind that the questionnaire is anonymous and all answers will be kept confidential.**

I enjoy reading about my religion.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

I go to Mosque because it helps me to make friends.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

It doesn't matter much what I believe as long as I am good.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Strongly Agree |

I have often had a strong sense of God's presence.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Strongly Agree |

I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Prayer is for peace and happiness.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I go to Mosque mostly to spend time with my friends.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

My whole approach to life is based on my religion.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I go to Mosque mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

**In the following, indicate how much you agree/disagree with each of the statements below. We would like you to answer the questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Please, keep in mind that the questionnaire is anonymous and all answers will be kept confidential.**

Halal products were readily available in the supermarket described in the scenario.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you bought only Halal certified products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you bought some traditional (non-Halal) products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend looked to see if you were buying Halal certified products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend noticed whether or not the products you were buying had Halal certification seals.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend bought only Halal certified products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend bought some traditional (non-Halal) products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you looked to see if your friend was buying Halal certified products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you noticed whether or not the products your friend was buying had Halal certification seals.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I felt the presence of GOD when I was reading the scenario

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

**Please answer the following questions regarding your personal beliefs about Halal certified products.**

There is a lot of choices in Halal certified products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Halal certified products are healthier than traditional (non-Halal) products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Halal certified products are safer to consume than traditional (non-Halal) products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Information on Halal certified labels is clear

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

There is sufficient information available on Halal certified products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

It is important for me to buy only products that have Halal certification seals.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I only buy products that have Halal certification seals.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

If I go to a store and cannot find Halal certified products, I leave without buying anything.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

**Final Questions:**

The store described in the scenario sells Halal certified products as well as traditional (non-Halal) products
YES NO

In the store described in the scenario, the prices of Halal certified products are comparatively the same as the prices of traditional (non-Halal) products
YES NO

In the situation described in the scenario, you bought traditional (non-Halal) products.
YES NO

In the situation described in the scenario, you bought only Halal certified products.
YES NO

In the situation described in scenario, the friend you met at the store is Muslim
YES NO

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend bought traditional (non-Halal) products.
YES NO

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend bought only Halal certified products.
YES NO

**Some general information about you….**

Gender:
Male

Female

Age:

In which country were you born?

Do you consider yourself to be:

☐ Canadian

☐ Non-Canadian

If Canadian, which province?

If non-Canadian, how long have you lived in Canada?

What do you consider to be your native language?

Have you ever heard about this study before participating in it today, if so what did you hear?

What do you think is the purpose of this study?

*Thank you very much for your participation,,,*

# APPENDIX– C

**(Study 2 – Questionnaire)**
**Letter of Information**

Welcome to the Study: Shopping behavior

Thank you for expressing interest in my study. This study is being conducted by Hesham Fazel of the Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba. There are no known psychological, physical, economic or social risks associated with participation in this study. You are NOT going to be asked to make any financial commitment and are NOT obliged to answer any questions that you find objectionable. You can choose to discontinue the survey at any point while you are working through the questionnaire; however, once you have submitted your responses (at the very end of the questionnaire), you will not be able to withdraw your responses.

Your responses will be kept completely anonymous. Please, note that even though we will ask you some demographic questions about yourself, those questions are generic questions and will not be sufficient to identify who you are. In addition, you are in no way obliged to answer those questions if you do not feel comfortable in doing so. Be assured that your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. Your responses will not be viewed by anyone other than the researchers listed in this letter. Finally, all data from the survey will be reported in group totals only.

The Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board at the University of Manitoba has approved this research. If for any reason you have concerns or complaints related to this study, please contact Hesham Fazel at (204) 474-8975, or preferably by e-mail at **HYPERLINK "mailto:hfazel@hotmail.com" hfazel@hotmail.com** or **HYPERLINK "mailto:umfazelh@cc.umanitoba.ca" umfazelh@cc.umanitoba.ca**. You may also contact the University of Manitoba's Human Ethics Secretariat at 474-7122 or by e-mail at Margaret_bowman@umanitoba.ca.

Thank you for taking the time to consider being part of this research activity.

Sincerely,

Hesham Fazel (Ph.D. Candidate in Marketing, University of Manitoba).

*Imagine yourself in the following scenario*

**In a sunny day, you went to a local supermarket to buy some groceries. The supermarket store you went is well known in the community for selling traditional (non-Halal) as well as Halal certified products. The prices of Halal certified products are comparatively the same as those of traditional (non-Halal) products. You then decided to buy meat from the traditional products that do not have Halal certification seal on them. Before you leave the store you accidentally bumped into a Muslim friend from your work. Your friend noticed that you are buying food that does not have Halal certification seals. Interestingly, you noticed that your friend was buying only Halal certified products. The two of you exchanged greetings and engaged in a relaxed conversation about life in general. This topic inspired your friend to ask you, (In your opinion, what is the most significant value that is linked to your own cultural identity) "*_In your opinion, what is the most significant value linked to marriage?"_**

**Imagine that you are experiencing the situation described above, what would be your answer to your friend's question?**

_____

**Let's suppose that your friend wanted to continue the conversation and ask you, "Tell me three reasons why this value you mentioned in your answer is so significant to marriage?" What would be you answer to this new question?**

_____

_____

Write down the thoughts that crossed your mind and how you were feeling, as you read the scenario. We do not want you to describe what was in the scenario, but rather what was going through your mind as you read it. These thoughts and feelings may or may not be related to what the scenario was saying. We want to know what you were thinking and feeling as you read the scenario.

Write down only those thoughts/feelings you had while reading the scenario and do not make up any now.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

**Imagine that you have just experienced the situation described in the scenario you read. The following are some statements that may or may not describe how you would react to the situation described in the scenario. Please rate each statement using the 5-point scale below.**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| You would feel good about yourself | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would want to sink into the floor and disappear | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel remorse for the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would regret having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel worthwhile, valuable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel small | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel tension about the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like you were a bad person | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would not stop thinking about the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel proud about the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel disgraced | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like apologizing for the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like confessing the mistake you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel pleased with the purchase you made | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel worthless, powerless | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| You would feel bad about having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like you should have known better what to buy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel like you deserve to be reprimanded for having purchased such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel guilty for having purchased such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel ashamed of having made such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel embarrassed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would feel uncomfortable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You should recognize you made something bad and avoid doing it next time | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would probably think it over several times wondering if you could have avoided such situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| You would regret buying such product | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Again, imagine that you have just experienced the situation described in the scenario you read. Please indicate to what extent you would experience the following emotions:**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The situation described in the scenario makes me Angry | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me irritated | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me annoyed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me aggravated | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me mad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me furious | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me discontent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me unfulfilled | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me worried | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me tense | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me nervous | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me concerned | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel uneasy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel sad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel depressed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel miserable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel bad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel defeated | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel afraid | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel scared | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel threatened | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel glad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel delighted | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel cheerful | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel excited | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel thrilled | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel amazed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel astonished | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The situation described in the scenario makes me feel anxious | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Right now, how do you feel about yourself?**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very negative | | | Neutral | | Very positive | |

**Now, consider your FRIEND'S PURCHASE described in the scenario you read. Please indicate to what extent your friend's purchase would make you feel:**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Good about being a Muslim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Proud to be Muslim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Pleased to be Muslim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Glad for being Muslim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Delighted with the purchase made by your friend | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Excited with the purchase made by your friend | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Thrilled that your friend selected to make such purchase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Amazed by your friend's purchase choice | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Please give us your opinion about the scenario you read. Circle the appropriate number on the following scales to reflect your opinion about the scenario:**

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unrealistic | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Realistic |
| Unimportant to me | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Important to me |
| Irrelevant to me | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Relevant to me |
| Bad | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Good |
| Dislike | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Like |
| Negative | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Positive |

**In the following, indicate how much you agree/disagree with each of the statements below. We would like you to answer the questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Please, keep in mind that the questionnaire is anonymous and all answers will be kept confidential.**

I enjoy reading about my religion.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

I go to Mosque because it helps me to make friends.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

It doesn't matter much what I believe as long as I am good.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

I have often had a strong sense of God's presence.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

Prayer is for peace and happiness.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I go to Mosque mostly to spend time with my friends.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

My whole approach to life is based on my religion.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I go to Mosque mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

**In the following, indicate how much you agree/disagree with each of the statements below. We would like you to answer the questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Please, keep in mind that the questionnaire is anonymous and all answers will be kept confidential.**

Halal products were readily available in the supermarket described in the scenario.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you bought only Halal certified products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you bought some traditional (non-Halal) products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend looked to see if you were buying Halal certified products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend noticed whether or not the products you were buying had Halal certification seals.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend bought only Halal certified products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, your friend bought some traditional (non-Halal) products

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you looked to see if your friend was buying Halal certified products.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In the situation described in the scenario, you noticed whether or not the products your friend was buying had Halal certification seals.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

I felt the presence of GOD when I was reading the scenario

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

**Some general information about you….**

Gender:
Male

Female

Age:

In which country were you born?

Do you consider yourself to be:

☐ Canadian
☐ Non-Canadian

If Canadian, which province?

If non-Canadian, how long have you lived in Canada?

What do you consider to be your native language?

Have you ever heard about this study before participating in it today, if so what did you hear?

What do you think is the purpose of this study?

*Thank you very much for your participation,,,*