

“DRANG NACH OSTEN?”
GERMANY’S ROLE IN THE EASTWARD
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

BY
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Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
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**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree**

of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

The scope and application of German foreign policy had the potential to increase dramatically after German unification in 1990. However, united German foreign policy has remained remarkably consistent with West German foreign policy. Even seven years after unification continuity is a cornerstone of German foreign policy and European integration remains a fundamental goal. Yet, European integration has come to take on new meaning for Germany. As Germany continues to deepen its relationship with the members of the European Union (EU), integration now also entails the widening of the European Union to include many states of Central and Eastern Europe. Germany's redefined *Ostpolitik* is an intricate part of its *Europapolitik*.

Germany has led calls for the eastward enlargement of the European Union, because it sees EU membership as the best way to bring the former communist states back into Europe, thereby ensuring peace and stability within the Union. Therefore, Germany is doing all it can to aid these states in their transition to liberal, democratic states with open, market economies. Germany is in the best position to act as advocate to the states of Central and Eastern Europe in matters of EU accession due to its geopolitical location and its historical ties to the region. Eastern Europe has traditionally been German foreign policy territory. Furthermore, it is in Germany's interest to ensure peace, stability and prosperity on all of its borders. By doing so Germany can secure its position at the heart of the EU, no longer situated east of the west. The eastward enlargement of the EU will solidify Germany's position as one of the most influential powers in Europe.

The recurring German question of orientation and balancing its interests will be

solved by bridging East and West and erasing the Yalta division of Europe. Epoch after epoch the East returns to the German agenda and finally Germany has been able to make its eastern and western interests compatible by joining them under the common roof of the European Union. Germany's peaceful "*drang nach Osten*" exemplifies the pursuit of its national and European interests. Finally, Germany is able to assume political responsibilities congruent with its economic might.

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INTRODUCTION

GERMANY: A BRIDGE FOR THE ABYSS

As far as Germany is concerned the agreed prospective expansion seems certain to alter fundamentally its position within the European Union. Germany will become a central rather than a peripheral European state and will seek to reopen many of the historic economic links that were firmly established in Central Europe before the Second World War...Germany will also inevitably play an even more influential economic and political role.

Mark Blacksell¹

Seven years after unification, Germany is gradually settling into its role as one of the most influential powers in Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, uneasy apprehensions and even fears were raised about Germany's European aspirations. Some feared the re-emergence of German power and hegemonic intentions within Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Seven years after the unification of the two German states, it is clear that these fears were ultimately unfounded and that Germany does not have European hegemonic intentions. In fact united Germany's foreign policy can be characterised as much like West Germany's foreign policy. Continuity has characterised German foreign policy since the West German state's inception in 1949. While continuity, seen especially in its multilateral approach to policy creation and implementation, still characterises German post-Cold War foreign policy, it is also characterised by a new self-assurance in its position as an influential European power. Along with its new self-

¹ Mark Blacksell, "Germany as a European Power," in Derek Lewis and John R. P. McKenzie, eds., The New Germany: Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of Unification, (Exeter: The Exeter University Press, 1995), 95.

assurance, united Germany has slowly become more assertive in pursuing its specific policy objectives, usually using multilateral means to do so.

United Germany is maintaining the fundamental shape of West German foreign policy as it pursues a leadership role in Europe. Germany will have a significant influence on the future of European organisations, especially the European Union. Although Germany is not conducting a Hitleresque "*drang nach Osten*," it is constructing, to use Robert Livingston's phrase, a "zone of stability" to its east as it aids the states of Central and Eastern Europe in their bid for Union membership. Never before in its history has Germany been surrounded by only friends and allies. United Germany will take advantage of its position by acting as a bridge between East and West, while it gradually establishes itself as the most influential European power.

Three main areas of interest that shaped West German foreign policy are its Atlantic policy, its European policy, and its policy toward the former Soviet Union. Today these areas of interest still make up the cornerstones of German foreign policy. However, with the end of the Cold War, the emphasis has changed. Germany has re-evaluated and reordered its priorities, continuously balancing its interests and opportunities in each of these spheres in reaction to its partner states, and the legacy imposed by its history.

Nonetheless, as noted by scholars such as Timothy Garton Ash, Elizabeth Pond, Robert Livingston and Harald Mueller², German foreign policy can still be characterised by

² See Timothy Garton Ash, In the Name of Europe: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New York: Random House, 1993), Robert Gerald Livingston, "United Germany: Bigger and Better," Foreign Policy, No. 87, (Summer 1992), 157-174, Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Winter 1996), 25-43, or "Germany in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, (1992), 114-130, or "Letter from Bonn: Visions of the European Dream," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer 1997), 53-72, and Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification," in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992).

continuity - its commitment to multilateralism and the use of non-military means to meet policy objectives. Germany's foreign policy has matured, leaving it more self-assured and confident in its ability to assume political power in congruence with its economic size. Germany is certainly willing to be a leader in Europe, although it would not presume to be the only leader in European affairs. Directly following the quiet revolutions in Eastern Europe, Germany was a reluctant European power. Today it is slowly growing into its role as a European power as it pushes its own priorities up the European agenda.

A survey of the last eight years of German and European politics is not necessary to reveal that Germany has reordered its foreign policy priorities. During the Adenauer era in the 1950s and 1960s Germany gave its Atlantic, read US, policy equal - if not at times greater - priority than its relationship with Western Europe. While its Soviet policy has never been its main priority, Germany worked hard to maintain some semblance of a relationship with the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet state no longer exists, Germany is cultivating its relationship with the Russian federation and the former Soviet states. However, this relationship is no longer assigned the priority that it received during the height of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

Germany's relationship with the United States remains extremely important and it continues to share Germany's primary policy commitment with the states of the European Union. Its relationship with the United States and its commitment to NATO remain among Germany's top foreign policy priorities.³ Nonetheless, the focus of this study will be Germany's European policy, because in 1997 Germany's unequivocal foreign policy priority is its *Europapolitik*. Although it can still be argued that continuity characterises

³ Daniel Vernet, "Europaeisches Deutschland oder deutsches Europa? Deutsche Interessenpolitik in

German foreign policy, the revolutions of 1989-90 prompted a redefinition of Germany's European policy. From 1949 to 1990 Germany's European policy included the states of Western Europe, particularly France and, specifically, the members of the European Community. After 1991 Germany's *Europapolitik* encompasses not only the current members of the European Union, but also the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which are no longer under Soviet influence. Through its *Europapolitik*, Germany will act as a bridge between east and west in Europe.

For the first time in over forty years, Germany's post-Cold War foreign policy is, not developing in accordance with Adenauer directives. Following unification, although choosing not to define its foreign and security policy in narrow terms, Germany affirmed that its future was inextricably tied to European integration. Then Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was quick to quell fears by assuring Germany's European partners that Germany would not try to fashion a German Europe, but would become a European Germany.⁴

As Elizabeth Pond often points out, Germany is the most European state in Europe.⁵ United Germany has firmly entrenched its commitment to European integration into its Basic Law - its constitution. "Readiness to renounce national independence in favour of a European political union was a high 43 percent in western Germany, 54 percent in eastern Germany"⁶ in 1991. Germany's ultimate foreign policy priority is European integration and

Europa" *Internationale Politik*, No.2, (1997), 21.

⁴ Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Statements by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Opening of the Two-Plus-Four Talks in Bonn: Introductory Statement," in Richard T. Gray and Sabine Wilke, *German Unification and the Its Discontents: Documents from the Peaceful Revolution*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 226.

⁵ Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Winter 1996), 25-43. See also, Elizabeth Pond, "Letter From Bonn: Visions of the European Dream," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer 1997), 53-72.

⁶ Elizabeth Pond, *Germany Finds Its Niche*, 29. It should be noted that these figures are for 1991, by 1993

helping the European Union (EU) grow both wider and deeper as it enters the new millennium.

The German government and its leaders have stipulated the importance of enlarging the Union eastward to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe which were isolated from institution building in Western Europe during the Cold War. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel have firmly declared Germany as the advocate of Central and Eastern Europe in matters of EU accession. As a result, the suspicions of EU members were once again peaked and German leaders had to "demonstrate that they were *not* gearing up to betray the West, were *not* carving out for themselves an exclusive sphere of influence in "Mitteleuropa," were *not* turning neo-Nazi."⁷

Germany is following a redefined *Ostpolitik* in its effort to help its eastern neighbours become prosperous, free, democratic states and in order to maintain peace and stability in the states along its borders. By doing so, German leaders hope to erase the Yalta division of East and West in Europe. Epoch after epoch, German interests return to one of its traditional regions of foreign policy, eastern Europe. The states of Central and Eastern Europe will, with Germany's help, rejoin "Europe." The focus of this study is Germany's *Ostpolitik* as it developed since 1949 and has been assigned priority under united Germany's current *Europapolitik*. More so than any other European country Germany's foreign policy, has been a constant balancing act, because it was the divided centre of a divided Europe. The fusion of West and East will likely witness the overlap of Germany's *Europapolitik* and its *Ostpolitik*.

disillusionment with the Maastricht Treaty was taking hold and desire to pursue European integration dropped to 32 percent in western Germany and 25 percent in eastern Germany.

⁷ Elizabeth Pond, *Germany Finds Its Niche*, 29. Emphasis on original.

In Chapter One the history of German *Ostpolitik* will be considered at length. After WWII, with the help of its neighbours, Germany embedded itself in "western" institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Community (EC). At times it even appeared as though West Germany had turned its back on its former eastern territory. Under the first West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic was eventually accepted and firmly incorporated into the Western Alliance. As West Germany rebuilt its relationship with the United States and the states of Western Europe, the balance quite definitely tipped to the West, for Adenauer had no intention of recognising the German Democratic Republic, and therefore legitimising the existence of the "other German state." The Federal Republic was to be the only German state recognised under international law. Thus, in order to maintain its interests the Adenauer government had little choice but to concentrate its efforts on Germany's western borders.

Nonetheless, throughout the years following the end of WWII, Germany has cultivated an *Ostpolitik*, or policy towards its eastern neighbours, including Poland, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia, and most importantly toward the former German Democratic Republic. Although Bonn's eastern policy from 1949 to 1990 may have varied it remained consistent in several aspects. The first chapter of this study will show that successive Bonn governments from 1949 to 1990 had different methods of maintaining relations with the 'other German state' and with the Central and Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact. It cannot be forgotten that historically Central and Eastern Europe have been German foreign policy 'territory.' An examination of Germany's relationships with these states and with East Germany will show that although Germany could not maintain its traditional influence and interest in the region to its east, it did not entirely turn

its back on these states.

Chancellor Willy Brandt's short-lived government, from 1969-1974, became famous for its *Ostpolitik*. It is rare for foreign, or European, policy to become the focus of prolonged public debate in post 1949-German politics, let alone an election campaign, as it did in 1969. Chancellor Brandt's was the first West German government to give *de facto* recognition to the German Democratic Republic, realising that in order to change the status quo it must first accept it. Therefore with increased exchange between the two German states Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* became a symbol of the growing East-West détente.

A survey of Germany's foreign policy toward Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War will illustrate that German influence on, and knowledge of, the region is enormous. Yet with the factors that shaped German *Ostpolitik* no longer existent - the bipolar environment evaporated with the unification of the two Germanys and the collapse of the Soviet Union - what drives German foreign policy toward Central and Eastern Europe? During their transition to democratic market economies, they are particularly costly neighbours for Germany as it leads the international community in aid provided to the region. With its reasserted commitment to the organisations of the Western alliance, especially the European Union and NATO, does Germany really need to maintain such a large commitment to its eastern neighbours? After a deeper examination of Germany's situation in Europe it will be clear that it would be incredibly foolish for Germany to avoid giving priority to its eastern neighbours.

When the Soviet Union imploded, a power vacuum was created in Central and Eastern Europe and Germany is clearly in the best position to fill that vacuum. In Chapter Two the character of united German foreign policy will be compared and contrasted to

West German foreign policy. Germany is filling the power vacuum to its east by following a foreign policy consistent with its Cold War foreign policy. It maintains continuity by balancing its interests in the east with its relationship to the member states of the European Union as well as the United States and, generally, pursuing its policies through multilateral means. United Germany, however, as it normalises its foreign policy, has a lot more room to manoeuvre than West Germany did, and it will use this space from time to time to assert its own national and European interests.

Since 1990 Germany has made it abundantly clear that it will continue to follow the multilateral tradition of its foreign policy and not pursue a hegemonic position in Europe. Germany will become the most influential state in Central and Eastern Europe, though it certainly has no desire to dominate those states as the Soviet Union did. Geopolitically Germany shifted from the eastern edge of the western world closer to the centre of Europe. Enlarging the EU to the east will place Germany at the heart of Europe.

Four main points, which characterise German foreign policy, will be explored. First, united Germany is fully integrated into Western institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU), thus depicting Germany's "self-containment by integration." Continued multilateralism in German foreign policy is also the best way to maintain stability within Germany, because it tends to counteract the nationalist tendency in Germany, as well as other European countries. Self-containment, or self-entanglement helps to preserve Germany's relationship with France which remains a constant among German foreign policy priorities. The second characteristic of united Germany's foreign policy is its commitment to using non-military instruments to achieve its goals, which mitigates the fears of both its western and eastern neighbours. Third, Germany is

responding to demands that it play an increased role on the global stage. Its Cold War role as a trading state has proved beneficial in this regard, as the FRG enhances its global trade relations. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr troops will now be taking part in more out-of-area missions. Finally, and on a related note, Germany reassured its allies that it would neither become neutral, nor revert to the old power politics it has so often practised in the region.

As Germany settles into its role as a European power, all things being equal, German foreign policy should continue along its course as the catalyst of European integration and extension of the European Union to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As will be considered at the end of Chapter Two, there are several things which may not remain equal. For instance, Germany has shown signs of new assertiveness since unification. Its strong desire to be treated as an equal by its major European Union partners is behind Germany's application to have German as an official working language of the Union. Some also point to Germany's early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as an expression of Germany's new assertiveness. Although they may be isolated examples, if they continue they may hinder the multilateralism which has become a hallmark of German foreign policy.

There are also concerns about developments in some sectors of both Germany's foreign policy establishment and its public sphere. For example, a new, intellectually-led, right is developing in Germany with a desire to exorcise the memories of the dark side of its history in order for Germany to reestablish itself as a country like any other.⁸ The goal itself is understandable, yet it could lead to a lack of sensitivity to the fears and perceptions of other states, including Germany's nearest neighbours. A full awareness of the shadow cast

⁸ See Jacob Heilbrunn, "Germany's New Right," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6, (November/December 1996),

by its past has also been a hallmark of German foreign policy, and should remain so. Germany will have to "learn to balance its desire for normality and a leadership role with the humility and modesty necessary to maintain its course of self-containment."⁹

Several new nationalistic overtones are appearing on the German right, especially in the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union's (CSU) foreign policy establishment. While this is not abnormal for Europe or more excessive than in any other European country, it does differ from past German nationalism. The Bonn government must monitor the developments in the new right very closely. Of late there has also been a tendency toward violent reaction among, young, lower-class Germans. Frequently outbursts have been against new immigrants, as sentiments against foreigners in Germany have run relatively high since unification. Though fears of renewed racism in Germany should not be exaggerated, they must not be ignored. Uncontrolled immigration to Germany needs to be curbed. Finally, a strong portion of the German 'left' has emerged with a mixture of pacifism and anti-Americanism. The danger is that this could lead to a lack of understanding and a reluctance to accept Germany's multilateral position. International organisations, which are major factors in Germany's self-containment and political stability, are detested and rejected by the 'left.' This group needs to be watched because a worst case scenario would be the isolation of Germany. Although the above mentioned caveats are real they must be kept in perspective, because separately they all have a low possibility of affecting any fundamental change in the direction of German foreign policy.

The academic debate in Germany on the future of the country's foreign policy will be examined at the beginning of the Chapter Three. A glimpse at the varying theoretical

80-98.

⁹ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 163.

perspectives and the weight each school of thought places on Germany's current policy choices will be provided. Furthermore, in Chapter Three, Germany's role in European integration will be assessed. It seems odd that Germany would so willingly give up much of its newly attained unrestricted sovereignty to the supranational institutions of the EU. However, that is what deeper EU integration entails. As the most European state in Europe, Germany is also more post-national than nations such as France and Great Britain. Germany also has the advantage of having learned to define its power, not in terms of material resources or bargaining strength, but in terms of its soft or institutional power within the EU. "The institutionalisation of power is the most distinctive aspect of the relationship between Europe and Germany."¹⁰ Germany is willing to submit its sovereignty, in part, to the EU, because it is aware that over time these institutions become actors themselves. Germany sees institutional power taking the hard edges off power relations that have historically characterised its relationships with other European nations. "Hence, what is distinctive about Germany is not its unintentional power, which, like all larger states, it possesses in good measure, but the fact that its political leaders exercise power only in multilateral, institutional mediated systems (the EU, the Atlantic community, and broader international fora) that soften sovereign power."¹¹

Germany's desire to widen the Union raises another issue which will be explored in this portion of the study, because Germany is also committed to deepening the Union and does not see a fundamental contradiction between being committed to both widening and deepening. The German government believes the Union can be simultaneously widened to include new members while its original members become more integrated, even to the point

¹⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," Current History, Vol. 96, No. 608, 117.

of sharing a common currency. Germany also believes that the institutions of the EU need to be reformed in order to operate more effectively with new members.

As Germany deepens its commitment to the European Union and the institutions in which Germany has invested a portion of its sovereign power, it is still the country in the best position to aid Central and Eastern European countries in their transition to democratic governments with stable market economies. The lessons it has learned, and is still learning, as it integrates the new *Bundeslaender* into its federal system can and are being applied to Germany's closest eastern neighbours. However, Germany is not doing all it can to aid the transition of these countries just because it is the nation-state in the best position to do so. In order to continue the fifty year tradition of peace and prosperity on and around its borders, Germany needs stable and productive neighbours on all of its borders. It has been the largest provider of aid to the former Soviet Republics, Russia and the former Warsaw Pact members, with aid to its direct neighbours totalling over DM30 billion.¹² Germany has also maintained its position as the largest Western trading partner of many of these nations.¹³ The enormity of the opportunities in this region certainly has not been lost on Germany.

The Bonn government would like more than just prosperous, productive, stable neighbours to its east. It also wants to ensure this as an enduring feature of the post-Cold War world. The best way to achieve lasting peace and stability in the region would be to include many of these nations in already existing institutions. While questions of

¹¹ Peter J. Katzenstein, *United Germany*, 117.

¹² Klaus Kinkel, "Ost-Erweiterung der Europäischen Union - Chance und Herausforderung," Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Dr. Klaus Kinkel, 12. November 1996, Hamburg. [Http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html).

¹³ Internet: Trade with Eastern Europe up ten percent; Particularly strong growth in trade with EU-associated countries. [Http://www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/specials/sp97060302.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/specials/sp97060302.html).

Germany's role in NATO expansion provide an interesting and controversial discussion, its role in the eastward enlargement of the European Union could be pivotal, especially for its direct neighbours. Moreover, EU enlargement is a far less threatening option for Germany to pursue publicly than NATO expansion, simply because it is less threatening to Russia and has greater public support.¹⁴

The European Union is in the process of setting its long-term course for the future, determining the timetable for enlargement, as well as making incremental reforms to ensure more efficient operation of the Union's institutions. Germany's Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, has often asserted that Germany will be Central and Eastern Europe's ambassador into the European Union.¹⁵ Negotiations for enlargement of the Union are set to begin in January, 1998. However, accession will not likely take place until after a long transition period. The EU has not yet decided which states will be accepted into the first round of enlargement, but it is speculated that along with Cyprus and possibly Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will almost certainly be accepted. There is, however, less certainty about whether Slovakia or Slovenia will be admitted into the Union in this round of enlargements. They may have to wait several years until they begin enlargement negotiations with the EU. To prepare for the coming enlargement of the Union Association Agreements have been signed between the EU and eleven Central and Eastern European states¹⁶ to help them meet the accession criteria.

¹⁴ Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 14-15.

¹⁵ See Klaus Kinkel, "A new beginning for all of Europe," Deutschland, No.4, (August 1995), E5, or Ost-Erweiterung der Europäische Union - Chance und Herausforderung. [Http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/6_archiv/2/r/R970624A.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/6_archiv/2/r/R970624A.html).

¹⁶ The eleven states with Europe, or Association Agreements with the EU are: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Germany will benefit politically and economically from its role as champion of the east and its ambassador into the EU. Politically, Germany will have more support to its east on Union initiatives once the Union is enlarged. It must, however, be careful not to alienate any of the other member states, especially France and Great Britain, as it develops a "zone of stability"¹⁷ to its east. Here again Germany has got to balance carefully its interest in strengthening its relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and helping them in their difficult transition to stable democratic states, with its interest in maintaining unimpeded relations with the other Union member states. Nonetheless, Germany will once again be the centre of Europe politically, but for the first time it will be achieved by peaceful means without resorting to the use of force to shift the balance of power. In reality Germany is shifting its political and economic weight eastward to match the eastward geopolitical shift precipitated by unification. Germany fully intends to leave the balance of power in the hands of the EU institutions without precluding that its political influence in Central and Eastern Europe will increase. Economically, Germany is already taking advantage of the new freer markets to its east and the cheap sources of labour which they provide, as well as leading other nations in foreign direct investment in the region.

By promoting enlargement of the European Union to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany has been able to share the burden of policy stabilisation in the area. The Bonn government also wanted to curb the perception that Germany was developing a hegemonic position in Europe given the negative effects such a perception could have on the activities of its major partners. After 1989 it became clear that interests in stabilising Central and Eastern Europe were less pronounced among other EU members

¹⁷ R. G. Livingston, "United Germany: Bigger and Better," Foreign Policy, No. 87, (Summer 1992), 167.

due to their more distant geopolitical locations. Bonn hoped that pursuing enlargement would increase the willingness of its partners to share in the modernisation of Central and Eastern Europe.

Germany is performing a balancing act as it is pulled in two different directions. As noted, there are those who fear the reemergence of German power in Europe, and therefore want Germany kept closely tied to the Western institutions which saw Germany develop into a cooperative, prosperous, liberal democratic nation. These fears remain utterly unfounded: the product of visceral reactions to the increase of Germany's role within Europe. Several countries, conversely, complain that Germany is not accepting global responsibility proportional to its capabilities, especially in the military and peacekeeping context. Germany's failure to send troops with the UN contingent to fight in the 1991 Gulf War is a case in point. In 1994 the German constitutional court handed down a decision agreeing to lift a self-imposed restriction forbidding the Bundeswehr troops from taking part in out-of-area missions. Germany is mediating its position between those who fear increased German power and those who call for Germany to accept more responsibility by maintaining and even slowly strengthening its status on the international stage without being so assertive that it provokes the fears of its closest allies: France, Great Britain and the United States.

European integration is truly the focal point of German foreign policy. Germany's policy of responsibility shapes its vision of an integrated Europe including states east of the former Yalta division of Europe. In time the litmus test of Germany's redefined *Ostpolitik* will be its relationship with its nearest eastern neighbours: Poland and the Czech Republic. They are the people who took the greatest revenge on people of German origin after WWII.

Harald Mueller even goes as far as to assert that Germany's relationship with these countries is far more significant than its ties to the successors of the USSR.¹⁸ Although it has not been an easy endeavour for either side, Germany's efforts show its willingness to be a "good European citizen." Since unification Kohl and Genscher, followed by Kinkel, have been adamant in their support for the association of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the EU. In fact Germany asked its allies to consider admitting these states into the European Union, while others were still dealing with the apparent contradiction between widening and deepening the community. Germany has shown a tremendous commitment in coming to grips with the unpleasant legacy of its history, especially in cultivating its relationship with its direct neighbours in Central Europe.

There is no question that unified Germany is bigger and better, yet it is still characterised as the pressured, or reluctant power. Is this how Germany wants to be seen, in order not to raise the ire of its allies, or is the Bonn government truly hesitant about taking on greater global responsibilities? Germany is willing and quite happy to accept greater responsibility, if it is within Europe. Germany is too conscious of the terrible legacy of its history not to be cautious in its commitments outside of Europe. Germany, however, is ready and willing to act as the bridge between west and east in Europe. In fact a new balance is emerging between Germany's geographic orientation and the renewed political contact that is growing to its east.

Germany is a maturing regional giant whose influence could help determine the pace of EU enlargement, as well as which states will be accepted in the first round of enlargement. There are, along with the merits of EU enlargement, several potential perils

¹⁸ Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification," in Paul Stares, ed., The New Germany and the

enlargement could entail for Germany, which will be discussed in Chapter Four. It is clear that the German government has already weighed the merits and perils of enlargement and has chosen to support the enlargement of the Union as soon as the states of Central and Eastern Europe meet the accession requirements.

Germany is now too powerful not to play a central role in Europe. With its centre of gravity shifted eastward Germany is now the country in Europe with the greatest number of neighbours. Although its future is not entirely in its own hands, Germany is slowly evolving into the role of the most powerful player in Europe. It was not ready to assume this role immediately following unification, nor did it want to "go it alone" in Europe. Germany is prepared to cooperate with its allies in order to get what it wants: a peaceful, stable, integrated Europe which includes Central and Eastern European nations. "The goal of Germany's *Europapolitik* is to achieve peace, stability, prosperity, good neighbourliness, freedom for all Germans and Europeans."¹⁹ It will achieve this goal quietly, for the most part, on an issue by issue basis, without alarming its closest allies. There is, however, no doubt that Germany will become the strongest, largest, most powerful actor in Europe. That it can do so in a multilateral context speaks to the hard lessons Germany has learned throughout the twentieth century and to its new sense of responsibility on the continent. Germany's ultimate goal remains peace and stability in Europe. Its two priorities toward achieving this end are further European integration and drawing Central and Eastern Europe closer to the rest of Europe, with the EU eventually enlarging to accept these nations as members. Hence, Germany's concentration on its *Europapolitik*, especially its redefined *Ostpolitik*, will witness Germany become a pivotal power in Europe.

New Europe, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 146.

¹⁹ Klaus Kinkel, Die europapolitischen Herausforderungen bis zum Jahr 2000, <http://www.auswaertiges->

It is significant that the state most affected by the Cold War and the resulting division of Europe into two ideologically distinct camps is now the country acting as a bridge between these two halves of Europe. Repeated attempts throughout the Cold War on behalf of various revisionists movements in eastern Europe sought to change communism and bridge the gap between eastern and western Europe. This bridge has been sought for many decades in order to create a meaningful Europe ensuring its citizens peace and freedom on the continent. From Gomulka in the late 1940s and early 1950s, to Dubcek in 1968, and the Solidarity Movement in Poland in the 1980s, the attempts of eastern European revisionists failed. How strange it is that Germany, the epitome of the Cold War, should in fact become the “bridge for the abyss.”²⁰ Germany as a distinctly “western,” liberal, democratic, cosmopolitan state will accept this role as a bridge between West and East. It has always been at the centre looking both East and West and can now act as a liaison between both. The intention of this thesis is to examine the viability of the idea of Germany as the bridge for the two halves of Europe. This study will reveal that Germany’s modern-day economic and political “*drang nach Osten*,” is accepted and celebrated by its eastern neighbours. Entering the twenty-first century, Germany no longer needs to use its military might to secure its position in Europe. A military “*drang nach Osten*” is not required to unite Central and Eastern Europe with Western Europe.

amt.government.de/4_europa/10/4-10a.html. Author’s translation.

²⁰ See Richard Hiscocks, Poland: Bridge for the Abyss, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), title.

CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORY OF WEST GERMAN OSTPOLITIK: 1949-1990

*If one wants to dismantle the boundary markers
of Europe one must cease trying to move them.*

Willy Brandt

The outcome of World War II put to an end the militant relationship that Germany had so often had with the countries of Eastern Europe. It also brought to an end German revisionism practised too often in that region of Europe. In the post-war bipolar system dominated by two nuclear armed superpowers, a new and different relationship was expected to emerge between Germany and Central and Eastern European countries, one based on separation rather than on control. Yet, the bipolar system of the Cold War, which produced a Germany divided along the Yalta division of Europe between the West and East, did little to resolve the problems of expansion versus liberation that had characterised German-Central and East European relations for centuries past. While a key feature of the bipolar system was Germany divided into two ideologically distinct states - the Federal Republic of Germany allied with the West and the German Democratic Republic under control of the East - it did not prevent each Germany from having a policy regarding the other.¹ The main focus of this chapter will be West German *Ostpolitik* as it shaped the

¹ It is interesting to note that while the Federal Republic of Germany had an *Ostpolitik* towards the German Democratic Republic, the GDR also had a *Westpolitik* towards the FRG. That is, however, another study.

policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) towards Eastern Europe during the Cold War. Specifically, Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia are of interest. However, one cannot consider *Ostpolitik* without considering the importance of German-German relations (*Deutschlandpolitik*), nor German-Soviet relations (*Russlandpolitik*). It was within this context that the post-war relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern European evolved, the *Osteuropapolitik* as it were.

Germany's post-war foreign policy can be divided into three of areas of interest. To varying degrees each administration attempted to pursue each area of interest without entirely foreclosing the others. Germany, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, sought integration into both the Atlantic and European systems of influence, concentrating on maintaining good relations with the United States as well as becoming more interdependent with its Western European allies by joining the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). While balancing these two areas of interest was not an easy feat, incorporating its third pillar of foreign policy, the "national" option, would prove even more difficult. The third area of interest was national in that West Germany had a foreign policy preoccupation about coming to terms with the division of Germany and dealing with the German Democratic Republic. This third area of interest, which will be the focus of this study, became associated with *Ostpolitik* and the exploitation of the FRG's diplomatic opportunities in the east.

Germany's pre-1945 relationship with Central and Eastern Europe was one of increasing tension, hostility and war. Through WWII Germany had technological superiority, coupled with several attempts to conquer, settle and dominate territories to the

east. Meanwhile, the Slavic population grew to fear and hate the Germans as a result of the mass slaughter of their peoples in two world wars. Germany's defeat and its eventual partition fundamentally altered its relationship with all Central and Eastern European nations. Germany's total defeat destroyed all that German settlement and conquest had achieved in the east since the twelfth century. "West Germans often say that 1945 was *das Jahr Null* ("Year Zero") and so it was - nowhere more than in the east."² Coupled with military and political impotence was poverty and massive destruction throughout the region. Given the state of the international climate in 1945 few would have imagined a post-war German *Ostpolitik*, least of all an *Ostpolitik* that would not be detrimental to the east.

WHAT IS *OSTPOLITIK*?

Although dictionary definitions fail to capture the richness of meaning of the term *Ostpolitik* it will be helpful to examine the word, how it is used and its meaning. *Ostpolitik* translated directly from German means 'eastern politics' or politics towards the east. However, as with so many other German terms from the Third Reich the term has a rather nasty history. Prior to 1945 the term *Ostpolitik* was associated with Hitler's goal of expansion of the German Reich eastwards. Unlike terms such as *Lebensraum* and *Mitteleuropa*, *Ostpolitik* did not retain the unpleasant connotation it assumed prior to 1945. Instead it took on a new context and application. These elements of *Ostpolitik* indicate the varied uses of the term.

The 1984 *Meyer Grosses Universal Lexicon* called *Ostpolitik* "A designation for the

² William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978), 30.

policy of the Federal Republic of Germany toward the states of the Warsaw Pact,”³ while in *Duden* it is defined as “the (especially FRG): policy toward the socialist states of East Europe and Asia; the German *Ostpolitik*.”⁴ Still more exact is *Brockhaus-Wahrig*’s definition:

1. [general] policy toward Eastern countries
- 2.1 [in broader sense] the foreign policy of Western countries towards the East block states
- 2.2 [in narrower sense] the policy of FRG towards the Soviet Union and its allied states in East and Central Europe; the Bonn *Ostpolitik*.⁵

Although it would be convenient merely to accept *Meyer*’s definition, it would be too simple. It is because Bonn’s *Ostpolitik* to Eastern Europe was dependent on Bonn’s policy towards the German Democratic Republic as well as the demands of the Soviet Union that it would be an oversimplification to accept the *Meyer* definition alone.

As implied, there is no single compartmentalisation of policy toward Eastern Europe. While main objectives and factors affecting policy can be identified, they cannot be separated from *Ostpolitik* in its complete context. *Ostpolitik* (read *Osteuropapolitik*, *Deutschlandpolitik*, and *Russlandpolitik*) was present in West German foreign policy from the founding of the FRG in 1949 to the unification of the two Germanys in 1990. It experienced many phases, saw several chancellors and even different parties in power in the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, it remained one of the main continuities of West German foreign policy during the Cold War. *Ostpolitik* was, in essence, the means by which the Federal Republic managed its relationship with the GDR, the USSR and Eastern Europe, not to mention the influence it had on West Germany’s relationship with the Western

³ Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, (New York: Random House, 1993), 34.

⁴ Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, 35.

⁵ Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, 35.

alliance. That is, Germany always had an *Ostpolitik* during the Cold War. However, the *Ostpolitik* of which most people speak is associated with SPD⁶ Chancellor, Willy Brandt, from 1969 to 1974. This period will be the specific focus of this chapter, but it will prove interesting and necessary to consider all of the phases of *Ostpolitik*, to provide a foundation for the development of relations with the East after 1945. First, however, the factors that shaped West German foreign policy regarding the countries of Eastern Europe will be considered.

FACTORS THAT SHAPED WEST GERMAN POLICY TO THE EAST

Two overwhelming factors that shaped West Germany's policy towards Eastern Europe were the latter-day 'German Problem' and the system of bipolarity. What was the meaning of the German 'Problem' during the Cold War? Four main factors can be identified which clearly outline the German 'Problem.'⁷ First, the FRG and GDR were essentially the stage on which the tensions between state and nation, and between political fragmentation and cultural-linguistic unity were played out.⁸ Second, parallel to the historical secular struggle between Prussia and the Hapsburg Empire, from the two Germanys arose the question of who would dominate whom; whose political and economic system would prevail? A third level of the problem, interestingly, does not have its foundation in isolation and rivalry but in cooperation between the two German states. A muting of the bloc tensions and containment was achieved in the early 1970s under the new *Ostpolitik* and détente when Bonn acquiesced in the post-war status quo in Europe and

⁶ Social Democratic Party

⁷ Josef Joffe, "The View from Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," in Lincoln Gordon ed., Eroding Europe: Western Relations with Eastern Europe, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 131-32.

⁸ Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 132.

recognised the *de facto* existence of the East German state. By the 1980s this had developed into a partial alignment by which each insulated the other from the superpower struggles. Finally, the fourth aspect of the German Problem complicated and added to the other three. Their respective alliances influenced the role each German state played on the regional and global scene. From one perspective each is the mainstay of its own bloc and an irreplaceable junior partner of the alliance leader. Conversely, by virtue of their language, culture, nationality and the growing network of human, economic and financial transactions, each was connected to the other. Therefore, each played a dominant role in the other's regional détente aimed at reassociating the two states and weakening the European bipolar order.

Once again, Germany assumes a position in the middle, with a divided Berlin in the metaphoric middle of a divided country in the middle of a divided Europe. It was not until the new *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt that West Germany shed the so-called 'Hallstein Doctrine' which tied the Western allies and several less developed countries to an international policy of refusing diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic.⁹ With the new *Ostpolitik* the mutual subversion and delegitimisation that characterised relations in the 1960s was muted considerably. The German Problem reached a new level as the conflict became three dimensional including state, nation and now "system."¹⁰

This leads to the second factor affecting West German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe: the bipolar Cold War system. Quite obviously, the Cold War shaped the regional and global arena in which policy was played out. Thus, as the Cold War changed

⁹ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy, (New Haven:

to détente and then back to renewed Cold War, Bonn's policy had to change to adapt to the system. To recognise its goal of the unification of the two Germanys, the two halves of Europe had to be reassociated. In turn this required overcoming the bipolar system and weakening its hold on the continent. Therefore, "*Osteuropapolitik* is not so much about Eastern Europe as it is an integral part of East-West relations in all of Europe."¹¹

POLICY GOALS: CONTINUITY IN PRACTICE

While Bonn's main objective remained consistent, it changed its policy several times between 1945 and 1990. This is a central paradox of West German *Ostpolitik* which deserves some explanation. The constant of West German policy, as stated in several treaties, in the Basic Law¹² (FRG's constitution) and countless official statements, was the end of the division between East and West Germany. However, this objective was coupled with a variety of West German policies, ranging from the dismissal of an autonomous *Ostpolitik* in the 1950s to the innovative directions in which policy was taken during the 1970s. There was a great shift from the confrontational posture of the Adenauer era to the permanent goal of détente in the 1970s and 1980s.

To understand the paradox one factor common to all West German foreign policy needs to be examined - that is the interdependence of national diplomacy and the

Yale University Press, 1989), 160.

¹⁰ Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 133.

¹¹ Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 137.

¹² The "Provisional Constitution of the FRG, put into effect in 1949 in order "to give a new order to the state for a transitional period." Its preamble expresses the wish "to complete the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination." The Basic Law set the framework for two paths toward unification: Article 23 provided for a fast unification of the two German states in the form of accession, whereas Article 146 included the possibility of unification on the basis of a wholly new German state with a new constitution ratified by a constitutional committee." Richard T. Gray and Sabine Wilke, eds. and trans., German Unification and Its Discontents: Documents from the Peaceful Revolution, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 301.

international setting.¹³ As the setting changed so to did the policy. “For a state so tightly chained to bipolarity as the Federal Republic, the setting provides both the decisive constraints and the opportunities.”¹⁴ In the short-term the system was obeyed while over the long run it was slowly changed, thus explaining the variation of Bonn’s Eastern policy. Bonn’s policy toward the East can be examined in five phases. While it is the fourth phase, the New *Ostpolitik*, that is of most importance to this study and which will be examined in greatest detail, the other phases will also be briefly considered in chronological order.

1949-1963 Negotiation From Strength

The first phase of West German policy toward Eastern Europe from 1946 to 1963 was a policy of negotiation from strength.¹⁵ 1949 was the year the FRG was founded and its Basic Law created. Unification was a long-term goal of Konrad Adenauer’s CDU¹⁶ government which was in power from 1949 to 1963. However, it first had to gain room to manoeuvre. The West German government refused to acknowledge the existence of a German state east of the Elbe, referring to it as the *Unrechtstaat* or the ‘outlaw state.’ The non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic and of the Oder-Neisse line became the unshakeable basis of West German foreign policy, and remained so into the 1960s. In addition, the FRG alone was to be the only successor state to the defunct German Reich, which meant that there must be only official contacts (by the West) in East Berlin. Based on these assertions one can see that the strategy of the Conservative government in its policy towards the East was to refuse to have one. To have an *Ostpolitik* would be to

¹³ Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 138.

¹⁴ Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 138.

¹⁵ David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to Present*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 171.

recognise their illegitimate next door neighbour to the East.

In 1954 at the Berlin Conference an agreement under the Paris Treaties with the three occupying Western powers ensured that:

1. FRG was the only state entitled to speak for Germany;
2. boundaries would not be recognised until they reached a freely negotiated settlement (thus reassuring against a "Potsdam Treaty" being imposed on Germany by the four occupying powers);
3. the US, France and Great Britain vowed "to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrating within the European community." This pledge was the cornerstone of the whole bargain, because it formally committed the West to German unification.¹⁷

These fruits of Adenauer's labour guaranteed the enduring hostility of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR, as well as to prevent any independent West German *Ostpolitik*. The result, however, was to attain veto power over Western *Ostpolitik* - the Federal Republic had the final say. This helped put to rest Adenauer's "nightmare of Potsdam," which is best summarised in this excerpt from a radio interview with him in 1953:

It is no coincidence that the Soviets kept referring to this agreement over and over again. To them it represents an eternal Morgenthau Plan imposed by the Four Powers. ... Every Soviet reference to this agreement constitutes a Soviet invitation to the West to conclude such a bargain behind our backs. ... Potsdam signifies nothing but: Let us strike a bargain at Germany's expense. ... Bismarck spoke about his nightmare of coalitions against Germany. I have my own nightmare: Its name is Potsdam. The danger of a collusive great power agreement at Germany's peril has existed since 1945, and it has continued to exist even after the Federal Republic was founded. The foreign policy of the Federal Government has always been geared to an escape from this danger zone. For Germany must not fall between the grindstones: If it does it will be lost.¹⁸

¹⁶ Christian Democratic Union

¹⁷ Curl, ed., Documents On American Foreign Relations, (1954), 116-17, quoted in Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 139-40.

¹⁸ Radio interview with Ernst Friedlaender, June 11, 1953, quoted in Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 140-41.

The 1954 settlement to prevent an independent German *Ostpolitik* also precluded the West having a free hand in Europe and Moscow, and left FRG in control of the “policy of the open status quo” and when it would in fact be addressed. Though it remained unresolved, the German Problem became a distinct barrier to the entire East-West relationship, with the Federal Republic in the pivotal position.

Adenauer’s answer to the German Problem was to consolidate one hundred percent with the West and be completely immobile where ever the GDR was concerned. He turned his back on any eastern alliance and committed Germany entirely to the western alliance structure under the American security umbrella. The FRG was eventually completely accepted into the Western alliance and in 1955 was accepted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Germany was drawn even closer into Europe as the Franco-German alliance developed ideas for the formation of the ECSC and the EEC. While trying to balance its three areas of interests in its foreign policy, Germany remained committed to both the Atlantic and European systems, and eventually its relations with the Soviet Union began to thaw.

After establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955, to consolidate their policy of isolation of the GDR, the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’ was formulated. It deemed the recognition of the GDR an “unfriendly act tending to deepen the division of Germany.”¹⁹ The doctrine was intended to prevent international recognition of East Germany by threatening third countries with the severing of relations with the FRG. Moreover, it was a self-denying ordinance for the FRG itself, because, according to the doctrine Bonn could not exchange ambassadors with the Eastern European nations which had already established

¹⁹ Quoted in Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 144.

diplomatic ties with East Berlin.²⁰ In fact Adenauer's policy was strongly resisted from within Germany. However, liberal capitalists like Ludwig Erhard were "constrained from advocating a more adventurous reunification policy, both by the devotion to the American connection and by their antipathy toward communism."²¹ These self-defeating inhibitions became evident in the CDU's *Ostpolitik* following Adenauer's term in office.

1963-1966 Orthodoxy Redefined: The Policy of Movement

After the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963, and Kennedy's assertion that German unification was "an unrealistic negotiating objective,"²² Bonn's temporary veto power was implicitly withdrawn. The Federal Republic was being diplomatically isolated and would have to 'go it alone' or revise its policy. On October 15, 1963, after fourteen years in office, Chancellor Adenauer resigned and Ludwig Erhard was elected to succeed him.

CDU Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder led Germany's "policy of movement" wherein economic engagement would begin in Eastern Europe, thereby circumventing the GDR and USSR. Because the policy assumed such an anti-GDR, and anti-Soviet thrust, it failed. The policy was based on an overestimation of the strength of anti-Soviet and revisionist movements in Eastern Europe to overcome communism and to obtain independence. Contrary to Bonn's expectations, the development of trade relations with Eastern Europe did not translate into positive political relations. Nonetheless trade missions were established by Bonn in Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Its failure to come to

²⁰ Josef Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 144.

²¹ David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered*, 171.

²² Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, (Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 399. In Joffe, *The View from Berlin*, 142.

an agreement with Czechoslovakia revealed the limits of deutschmark diplomacy. Prague refused to discuss trade without first achieving a resolution of the 1938 Munich Agreement.²³

Both Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder failed to understand the central role of the GDR and the Soviet Union. Instead of isolating East Berlin it did just the opposite. Pursuing the policy of movement pushed the GDR closer to the USSR and made it more important to the USSR. The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Alliance between Moscow and East Berlin in June 1964 illustrates this point. *Osteuropapolitik*, it becomes obvious, could not be developed without, much less against, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

1966-1969 Limited Reformation: The Grand Coalition

Josef Joffe calls the third phase of the FRG policy towards Eastern Europe “half hearted reformation” under the Grand Coalition between the CDU and SPD with Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as Chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as Foreign Minister. By trying to outflank the GDR, the isolator itself became isolated. In addition, the Federal Republic was forced to shift its stance by its own allies, France and the US, who were moving towards détente with Moscow. They were not willing to let the Federal Republic impose its conditions on détente in Europe.

²³ “The Munich Agreement by which Czechoslovakia was forced to cede the Sudeten territory to Hitler’s Germany in 1938 remained a persistent source of contention between Bonn and Prague until 1973. After the war the Sudetenland had reverted to Czechoslovakia, which proceeded to expel about three million Germans. While the Erhard government (1963–66) fell short of conceding the invalidity of the agreement, it did renounce all claims to the Sudetenland. Thereafter, the remaining issue was whether the agreement was invalid from the beginning or only rendered void by the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and who could lodge material compensation claims against whom. On December 11, 1973, Bonn and Prague finally signed a treaty establishing diplomatic relations and renouncing compensation claims.” Joffe, *The View from Bonn*, 143.

With the shift of focus by France and the US, so did West German *Ostpolitik* undergo a shift of focus. The Grand Coalition prepared the way for the new *Ostpolitik* which was based on the complete reversal of the orthodox order of things, building upon the foundation that had been laid by Adenauer beginning in 1955 and cemented in 1961 with the building of the Berlin Wall around West Berlin. As the Federal Republic tried to rejoin the mainstream of allied policy, however, it was not ready to recognise the GDR. It did succeed in dismantling the 'Hallstein Doctrine' that blocked diplomatic relations in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the GDR had imposed the 'Ulbricht Doctrine' - a sort of Hallstein doctrine in reverse - on the FRG. There was to be no recognition of the FRG without the latter's recognition of the GDR. It was cemented with twenty year friendship treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Thus, Bonn had failed to get to the core of the Warsaw Pact by trying to undermine Soviet influence and the stage had been prepared for the new *Ostpolitik*. However, "just as policy shifts in Bonn were an essential precondition of agreement, so too was a considerable change in the attitude of Moscow towards western Europe."²⁴ Moscow's new attitude with the FRG would have a significant impact on *Ostpolitik*.

1969-1974 New *Ostpolitik*

In the historic election of September 28, 1969 Willy Brandt became the first SPD leader of the FRG in its twenty year post-war existence, and formed the first SPD-FDP alliance in the Bundestag. The election campaign had focused on foreign policy issues,

²⁴ Wolfgang Wagner, "Towards a new political order: German *Ostpolitik* and the East-West realignment,"

specifically *Deutschlandpolitik* and *Ostpolitik*, which had become very domestically motivated. Brandt proceeded to make monumental policy changes right from the very beginning of his term. "The feeling, which had grown up during two decades of Christian Democratic rule, that the previous relations of the Federal Republic with its eastern neighbours constituted a chain of neglected opportunities required a change of course without delay."²⁵

Brandt proceeded to do what every other Bonn administration had resisted; he accepted the post-war status quo. He knew that in order to change it, the status quo first had to be accepted. Although Brandt was more preoccupied with unification than other post-war leader, he knew that it was impossible in the foreseeable future and not once did he use the word 'unification' in his inaugural address.²⁶ Although Brandt did not formally recognise the GDR he gave them *de facto* recognition by giving up the Federal Republic's claim to be the sole representative of Germany and by recognising the Oder-Neisse line as the Western border of Poland. Brandt spoke of "two states in one Germany," and the acceptance of the GDR's "territorial integrity." This amounted to the settlement of WW II twenty years later, seen in the renunciation-of-force agreements with Moscow and Warsaw, the Basic Treaty with East Germany, and a treaty with Prague that declared the 1938 Munich Agreement null and void.

While the GDR was the main obstacle, Moscow acted as the US had over half a decade earlier and removed East Berlin's veto power over East-West relations in Europe. The GDR had to be satisfied with the second prize: *de facto* recognition as it did not get *de*

International Journal, vol. 27, no. 1, (Winter 1971-1972), 19.

²⁵ Wolfgang Wagner, "Towards a new political order: German *Ostpolitik* and the East-West realignment," International Journal, vol. 27, no. 1, (Winter 1971-1972), 19.

²⁶ E. H. Albert, "The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany," International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2,

jure recognition from the Federal Republic. The distinction was maintained by having permanent missions instead of embassies in each other's capitals.

The ideas of Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* were not new. It had become apparent by the end of the 1960s that the German question had become Europeanised and its focus needed to be changed. This focus had to shift from an issue of enlarging territory to one of enlarging human contact between the German people and improved relations between the two governments.²⁷ Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* envisaged a "European peace order"; that is, a context in which, while the Germans would not achieve unification, there would be a solution to the German question through a gradual process of "change through rapprochement." Ultimately, this would lead to a regulated coexistence in Europe. The Brandt government subscribed fully to George F. Kennan's remark made in the late 1940s that "if Germany had to be united, then she must be a part of something larger than herself. A united Germany could be tolerable only as an integral part of a united Europe."²⁸

The Brandt government was determined to reconcile what had been conflicting elements of Bonn's previous Eastern policies, and combine them into a politically consistent package:

to accept the reality of the GDR and lend it some measure of juridical legitimacy with the principle of "two German states within one German nation," to accept the Europeanisation and deterritorialization of the German question and along with it the legitimisation of the general European territorial status quo, and to approach the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with a diplomacy that conveyed accommodation and rapprochement rather than threats to the existing border arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁹

(1970), 297.

²⁷ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 196.

²⁸ Quoted in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 197.

²⁹ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 197

Therefore, above all else Brandt was willing to renounce what had been the central tenet of German policy during the Adenauer years; there would have to be progress on the German question before there would be rapprochement with the East. Chancellor Brandt believed that the time had come to reach accommodation with the East and to move beyond the confrontations of the past for not only political, but also for moral reasons. Central to Brandt's Eastern policies was not "an illusion that the political, economic, and ideological circumstances of Eastern Europe or East Germany would in the foreseeable future permit a process of East-West 'integration' - that seemed unlikely - but the recognition that entertaining territorial aspirations in the East was as politically outmoded and morally questionable as in the West."³⁰ Chancellor Brandt was determined to commit the same political accommodation and moral sensitivity to the East that Adenauer had extended to the West.

Chancellor Brandt was very aware that in order for his *Ostpolitik* to work he had to maintain continuity in German foreign policy towards the western alliance while he improved relations with the East.³¹ During negotiations with the East Bonn was very careful to keep its allies informed not only because it did not want them to think that it was contemplating a neutralist policy between East and West, but also because it was very sure that its new policy to the East could only work with the support of the West. Indeed, Bonn had to be very careful to balance its policies between East and West, so as not to alienate one or the other.

As Wolfram Hanreider observes, there were two dimensions of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*: the general East-West conflict and the narrower Soviet-German conflict over the division of

³⁰ Wolfram F. Hanreider, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 198.

Germany and the German border issues.³² However, as long as West Germany pursued its narrower conflict, it could not accept, without a lot of reservations, the détente policies of its Western allies in the 1960s. Herein lies one of the main reasons that Bonn faced diplomatic isolation during those years. Therefore, a main goal of the new *Ostpolitik* was to get Bonn out of the corner it had painted itself into, and surprisingly the Soviet Union was of some assistance in this endeavour. By the end of the 1960s it was clear to Moscow that a policy directed at disintegrating NATO would not work, but a policy aimed at stabilising and legitimising the European status quo would have the support of the Federal Republic. The Soviet Union saw what an essential partner the FRG could be in maintaining détente and perhaps in helping to gain ground on the issue of the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). More will be said later of the importance of the German-Soviet relationship to *Ostpolitik*. It is, however, important to note that this relationship was being cemented during the East-West period of détente.

The relaxation of tensions between the East and West, more specifically, between the Soviet Union and the United States, was fundamental to Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Without détente, the Federal Republic would have had a very difficult time balancing its Western allies and its intentions to develop a closer relationship with the East. Its Western allies would have been far too suspicious to accept such a turn of events. The treaties that came out of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* would not have been possible outside of the context of East-West détente.

The concrete manifestations of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* were the treaties signed between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union in August of 1970 and by the Federal Republic

³¹ E. H. Albert, *The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany*, 298.

³² Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 200.

and Poland in December 1970. These were followed by the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in 1971, the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in 1972, and the West German Czechoslovakian Treaty in 1973. These treaties were part of Brandt's policy of 'small steps,' making incremental gains in relationships with the East.

In 1970 the German-Soviet Treaty was signed after intense and intricate negotiations and was based on the mutual renunciation of the use of force and on the West German declaration that it had no territorial aspirations outside of its post-WWII boundaries. In effect, the treaty acknowledged the political and territorial consequences of WWII. The importance of this treaty for Bonn was in its symbolic and political impact. It led the way for Bonn to turn its attention to Eastern Europe and East Germany and it gave the implicit approval of the Soviet Union. In addition, it let Bonn participate actively in the détente policies of the 1970s. In fact, both Bonn and Moscow viewed the treaty as a symbol of their reconciliation.

Ostpolitik and the Moscow Treaty became an important ingredient in an intricate set of dealings between and within the two alliances, cutting across several kinds of issues and strung together by a series of preconditions, "pre-payments," and quid pro quos, in which all parties involved sought to maximise their gains while hedging against possible losses.³³

The treaty's central terms showed Bonn's acceptance of the status quo, however, this was somewhat conditional. There was a letter about German unity from then Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, attached to the treaty. In essence, the West German government reserved the right to work toward self-determination and to recover its unity. Chancellor Brandt tied the ratification of the treaty to the successful resolution of the Berlin problem. This meant the "satisfactory general agreement among the Four Powers, and second a

³³ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 203.

subsequent, subsidiary, inter-German agreement settling the issue of access to Berlin through East Germany for West Berliners.”³⁴ Bonn felt that if they recognised the European status quo that the Soviets must recognise the status quo in Berlin.

For the Soviet Union the treaty was of great importance because it was the first step toward convening a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), something the Americans had been very reluctant to do. West Germany, led by Chancellor Brandt’s friend and chief negotiator, Egon Bahr, agreed to support the CSCE in a declaration in the German-Soviet treaty. In 1971 Chancellor Brandt visited General Secretary Brezhnev and promised to accelerate efforts to arrange a conference on security in Europe.

The treaty between the USSR and the FRG paved the way for the treaty between Poland and West Germany. The German-Polish Treaty contained provisions similar to those in the German-Soviet Treaty such as provisions regarding territorial boundaries and political relations, and above all the renunciation of force. The treaty sought to normalise relations between the two countries. A shift in the Warsaw Pact was beginning as the usual multilateral agreements gradually gave way to bilateral agreements.

By far the most difficult and intricate treaty negotiations were with the GDR. Willy Brandt made it clear that he was willing to accommodate the East Germans in several important respects:

- 1) to accept the reality of the German Democratic Republic as a state and deal with it on the basis of full equality;
- 2) to renounce implicitly previous West German claims that only the Federal Republic could legitimately speak for all Germans;
- 3) to treat the frontier between East and West Germany as an inviolable political-legal border rather than a “demarcation line”;
- 4) to negotiate a treaty with East Berlin;
- 5) to refrain from interfering between East Germany’s trade and cultural exchanges

³⁴ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 203.

with the Third World.³⁵

One will observe, however, that this policy stopped short of giving the German Democratic Republic full recognition and accepting it as the second state of Germany under international law. The Brandt government emphasised the idea of two German states in one nation. It also emphasised the continuing responsibility of the Four Powers³⁶ and made clear that without them the Federal Republic could not, on its own, declare the permanent division of Germany. Furthermore, Bonn made it clear that it preferred that allied and Third World countries not give East Germany formal recognition, though West German leaders understood it would inevitably occur.

The negotiations between the German states were fairly deadlocked until 1971 when the Four Power Agreement on the status of Berlin was signed. The three Western powers agreed that the situation would not change drastically and although West Berlin was not a constituent part of West Germany, the Soviet Union agreed that ties between West Germany and West Berlin could be developed and maintained. The Berlin agreement gave a Soviet guarantee of unimpeded access from West Germany to West Berlin, and West Berliners the right to visit East Germany and East Berlin, and also let West Berlin retain its ties to the Federal Republic. In return, the Soviet Union received Bonn's word that no constitutional business would be conducted in West Berlin, nor would presidential elections be held there. The legal and political status of West Berlin had finally become solidified. After this Quadripartite Agreement was completed German-German relations began to attain results.

³⁵ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 205.

³⁶ These powers occupied Germany after WWII: France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.

The German-German Treaty was concluded in 1972 and in essence was the status quo ante. After all, Bonn knew that it had a stake in the prosperous existence of the GDR. This treaty symbolised the beginning of cooperation and mutual coexistence of the two Germanys. In order to attain its ultimate goal of unification Bonn had to first recognise the status quo in the GDR. Under Willy Brandt, Bonn learned the value of sacrifice. The thaw in relations between the GDR and the FRG also led to increased relations between Eastern European countries and the Federal Republic.³⁷ In essence, the Basic Treaty, as it was called, included a number of issues on which the two governments agreed to disagree. Each government recognised the equality, boundaries and territorial integrity of the other, but neither made any specific reference to sovereignty. The two Germanys agreed to exchange permanent representatives instead of ambassadors. The treaty did not close the door on unification, although it was not specifically given mention in the text.

Finally, in 1973 the German-Czechoslovakian Treaty was signed and Prague received its desire that the 1938 Munich Agreement be declared null and void. This treaty provided the impetus for West Germany to resume diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. The Helsinki Conference capped off the momentum *Ostpolitik* had gained with the Eastern treaties. The CSCE was unique in that it included both the Soviet Union and the United States, states from both West and East Europe as well as both East and West Germany. There was a side of the 'Helsinki' to suit both Eastern and Western members. At Helsinki, however, the most important achievements were in the human rights commitments that were made. The CSCE is an example of Bonn's policy of change

³⁷ See the appendices provided for a history of trade relations between the Federal Republic and countries of Eastern Europe. Appendices A and B are from Lincoln Gordon, Eroding Europe: Western Relations with Eastern Europe, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), 155, 156, 336. Appendices C and D are from Timothy Garton Ash, In the Name of Europe: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New

through communication at work³⁸ and it was finally completed in 1975, before détente began to disintegrate.

1974-1980s Beyond *Ostpolitik*

Chancellor Willy Brandt's term in office from 1969 to 1974 were the formative years of his *Ostpolitik*. However, even when he was no longer in office there remained a continuity in German foreign policy to the East. While Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl did not pursue *Ostpolitik* with the same conviction that Brandt did, they did not necessarily have to because he had laid the foundations for them to build upon his policy. Although the period from 1974 to reunification in 1990 cannot always be characterised as positive and mutually beneficial, relations between Bonn and East Berlin did not degenerate to the lows witnessed during the late 1950s.

In 1974 the period of uneasy consolidation began and the most intense phase of *Ostpolitik* ended. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was more pragmatic in his approach to politics and less a visionary than Willy Brandt. Nonetheless, under the Schmidt administration Bonn entered an agreement with Poland that allowed 120,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate in exchange for \$95 million in trade credits and pension settlements. In addition a new transportation agreement was negotiated in which East Germany provided easier access to West Berlin.

The period of consolidation was mixed with disappointments and satisfactions as the strain between the two Germanys jockeying for position on the international stage persisted. Their relationship was characterised by cooperation and suspicion and this

York: Random House, 1993), 652, 653.

³⁸ Edwina S. Campbell, Germany's Past and Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign

naturally influenced West Germany's relations with other East European states. Even though the dynamic period of *Ostpolitik* was over the Schmidt government was able to deal with its allies and opponents from a more flexible and stronger position thanks to the efforts of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. West Germany's diplomatic base had been dramatically increased and in subtle ways Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* had made as many gains in Germany's diplomatic relations with the West as with the East.

However, the continued success of *Ostpolitik* depended largely on East-West détente and the maintenance of a healthy relationship between both blocs. Therefore, the demise of détente at the end of the 1970s made it more difficult for West Germany to pursue its eastern policies and generated Western suspicions about the FRG's intentions toward neutrality. West Germany had once again to play a careful balancing act, and was eventually able to conduct its own mini-détente with East Germany, even after East-West détente was lost to the return of the Cold War under the last years of the Carter administration and the Reagan administration in the US.

Furthermore the intra-German mini-détente was not achieved without a struggle because the central issue between the two German states remained. "East Germany wanted to be recognised and treated by West Germany in legal, diplomatic, and political respects as a foreign state like any other."³⁹ West Germany, nonetheless stuck to its assertion that the German-German relationship was 'special' and that there existed two German states on German soil, but only one German nation.⁴⁰

Yet, the two German states worked very hard to preserve their bilateral relationship. It is surprising that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not unduly affect German-

Policy, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 128.

³⁹ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 214.

German relations. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* continued to produce results:

greater freedom to travel for East and West Germans, facilitating long-uninterrupted meetings of families and friends; assured and eased access to Berlin; intensified cultural and scientific contacts and exchange of information; cooperation on environmental issues such as industrial pollution; expanded trade; and a variety of subsidiary arrangements that tended to ease the barriers between the Germans on either side of the European divide.⁴¹

The importance of *Ostpolitik* for Bonn was witnessed in 1981 with its refusal to follow its Western counterparts in imposing economic sanctions on Poland in response to the suppression of the Solidarity movement.

Helmut Kohl succeeded Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor in 1982 and did not choose to redirect German *Ostpolitik*. In fact in his first government declaration, Kohl made it clear that he would not change Bonn's *modus vivendi* with the East, even though his party had strongly opposed it a decade earlier.⁴² Throughout the mid-1980s, there seemed to be a metamorphosis of German identity on both sides of the division. The East seemed to be discovering its long-rejected past and began to show appreciation for German historical figures such as Martin Luther, Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck. The West too began to reinterpret Germany's common history. Richard Loewenthal, a renowned German professor and analyst of German affairs noted:

what has created the striking sense of common political interest between two German states of very different political structures and ideologies has been, first, the revival of a sense of common nationhood during the period of détente, and second, the rising sense that they face a common threat as détente has given way to confrontation between the superpowers.⁴³

⁴⁰ E. H. Albert, *The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany*, 301.

⁴¹ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 214.

⁴² Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, 214.

⁴³ Richard Loewenthal, "The German Question Transformed," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2, (Winter 1984-85), 313.

It seemed that the Kohl government was willing to nurture German-German relations more than the Schmidt government and took pride in the progress made during Germany's mini-détente. In fact in 1987 Erich Honecker, the East German Prime Minister, visited the Federal Republic, in what became a truly historical event. Because this was interpreted as a state visit, the German Democratic Republic essentially received what it had so long been demanding: it was recognised as the political and diplomatic equal of the Federal Republic.⁴⁴

Although German-German relations leading up to the end of the Cold War in 1989 could not be characterised by mutual goodwill they appeared sufficiently cooperative to other European countries. Pivotal to *Ostpolitik* was the German-Soviet relationship, which thus far has not been examined with the detail that it deserves.

Without the cooperation of the Soviet Union it would have been impossible to conduct any sort of *Ostpolitik* in Eastern Europe, let alone in the GDR. As Wolfgang Wagner points out "the miracle of German *Ostpolitik* is that it coincided in time with a new Soviet *Westpolitik*."⁴⁵ Willy Brandt, followed by Helmut Schmidt, worked very hard to put German-Soviet relations on the solid foundation that led eventually to the close relationship between Chancellor Kohl and General Secretary Gorbachev. A measure of mutual trust had been established over the decades, without which no progress could have been made on *Ostpolitik*. While Chancellor Schmidt may not have left the impact on German foreign policy that Brandt or Kohl have, he was crucial to the German-Soviet relationship.⁴⁶ "Chancellor Schmidt's political weight as head of the FRG was small but his personal

⁴⁴ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe*, 216.

⁴⁵ Wolfgang Wagner, "Towards a New Political Order: German *Ostpolitik* and East-West Realignment," *International Journal*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (Winter 1971-72), 19.

⁴⁶ Avril Pittman, *From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations Since 1974*,

weight was strong. He was accepted as an interlocutor by the Soviets and he was trusted by them."⁴⁷ It was due in large part to Chancellor Schmidt that this measure of trust had been created and it cannot be emphasised enough how important Soviet cooperation was to the success of *Ostpolitik*. Having considered the phases and important relationships of *Ostpolitik*, how *Ostpolitik* was put into practice needs some consideration.

MEANS OF POLICY: TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE

Often 'deutschmark diplomacy,' as Josef Joffe refers to it, was used as means to policy ends during *Ostpolitik*. Inter-German trade had a privileged position in German economic policy, even in the worst days of the Cold War. Inter-German trade was classified as intra-German trade and was thus exempt from tariffs, therefore attaining silent semi-membership for the GDR in the European Economic Community because East German goods entered West Germany duty-free. West Germany also gave the GDR special no-interest overdraft privileges in settling its trade deficits with the FRG.

During the decade of détente, using 1971 to 1981 as a time frame, German-German trade and trade with Eastern Europe grew by a factor of four, and trade with the GDR and Eastern Europe was quite profitable for the Federal Republic during détente.⁴⁸ By 1984 the FRG had accumulated an aggregate excess of exports over imports of DM 3 billion in its trade with the GDR and in its trade with Eastern Europe the figure was a staggering DM 34 billion.⁴⁹ The former economics minister, Otto Count Lambsdorff, said Eastern trade is "a foundation of peaceful coexistence between East and West. It is an element of a policy of

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 145.

⁴⁷ Avril Pittman, *From Ostpolitik to Reunification*, 145.

⁴⁸ See Appendix A, B, C and D for trade figures.

⁴⁹ Josef Joffe, *The View From Bonn*, 154.

peace.”⁵⁰

Trade became more a tool of political influence with both the GDR and Eastern Europe. With the GDR money was often used for political payoffs.⁵¹ For example, in July 1985, the FRG raised the swing from DM 600 million to DM 850 million and on the same day, the GDR announced that it would close its international airport to asylum seekers from Asia who did not have West German visas. During the first half of 1985 over 17,000 foreigners entered West Germany illegally via East Berlin as the illegal immigrant problem in West Germany began to take root.

In the past, the FRG was able to buy political concessions from the GDR, in a not very subtle manner. In 1981 the FRG extended a swing agreement that was about to run out and the GDR suddenly announced a series of humanitarian improvements that increased opportunities for East Germans to travel westward on urgent family business. It is also estimated that the GDR received DM 2.5 billion in cash annually from the FRG in exchange for political prisoners. Figures published by the *Deutschland-Archiv* state that the FRG bought 2,500 political prisoners in 1985.⁵²

During the Western credit squeeze of the early 1980s the FRG still brokered loans to the GDR and the East European states. In return, more humanitarian concessions were made by Prime Minister Erich Honecker. Thus, while East-West détente was degenerating money from the FRG facilitated the insulation of the German-German mini-détente from the superpower struggle. The results were similar in Eastern Europe, attaining freedom of emigration for ethnic Germans. West Germany had finally become very adept at practising what Henry Kissinger called “linkage politics” by linking economic benefits to political

⁵⁰ Quoted in Josef Joffe, *A View From Bonn*, 155.

concessions.⁵³

PROBLEMS WITH *OSTPOLITIK*

Although through the policy reorientation of *Ostpolitik* the Bonn government made several gains in its relationship with the GDR, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there were still some problems posed by the attempt to cultivate this new relationship. As stated *Ostpolitik* really was a large balancing act for the Federal Republic and was dependent not only on the cooperation of the GDR and the states of Eastern Europe, but also the Soviet Union, the United States and the other Western allies. *Ostpolitik* was a breathtaking gamble played out by the Bonn government, led by Willy Brandt. The gamble was that a consistent policy of economic rewards and political reassurance could stimulate a process that would encourage Moscow to loosen its hold on the Eastern regimes it had built up after WWII. Josef Joffe characterises *Ostpolitik* aptly as the Federal Republic's "excruciating tightrope act in Eastern Europe."⁵⁴

Even once West Germany had achieved some changes in relations with the Eastern bloc, it had to proceed at an acceptable, safe rate. Proceeding faster than the threshold acceptable to Soviet sensibilities could lead to repression of the entire process. As well, too quick a pace could destabilise the Eastern regimes as had occurred four times in previous decades and in each case the response was Soviet intervention. There was also the Western dimension of *Ostpolitik* to consider. All of this had to be achieved without alienating the West or weakening the alliance.

⁵¹ Josef Joffe, *A View From Bonn*, 156.

⁵² In Josef Joffe, *A View From Bonn*, 157.

⁵³ Josef Joffe, *A View From Bonn*, 158.

⁵⁴ Josef Joffe, *A View From Bonn*, 179.

The rationale behind this gamble was a change in attitude across the political spectrum in West Germany. The East Europeans began to be regarded as victims of the system that had been imposed on them rather than as enemies. There were also economic, political and psychological ties that connected members of Europe across the Yalta division. The dilemma was how to navigate its silent partners to the East and help end the partition of Europe without raising the ire of the Soviets. Nor could the East be punished for Soviet transgressions. This, however, is where *Ostpolitik* collides with *Westpolitik*.

The problem was how to maintain détente in Central Eastern Europe, which meant keeping the Soviets on board, without alienating the Western alliance. Therefore, the FRG had to protect détente in order to protect its gains in the East. As Josef Joffe explains,

the Federal Republic resisted adamantly in the 1950s and early 1960s, when the global and regional process threatened to outpace Bonn's capacity for détente on the inter-German level. It did the same during Cold War II of the 1980s, when the United States, moving in the opposite direction, shifted toward militant neo-containment and threatened to foreclose the options détente had brought.⁵⁵

This demonstrates the tightrope Bonn was walking in order to maintain and regulate the pace of global and regional détente and balance its relationships with both East and West. It was the skill and vision of Willy Brandt that started the dynamic new *Ostpolitik*, and it was a commitment to the project which he had begun that pushed both Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl to continue along the same lines of policy. While it can be disputed, the under-lying goal of *Ostpolitik* was ultimately German reunification. Brandt knew that for this to occur he could not focus his efforts on it directly, but rather he had to overcome the division of Europe and the way to do this was through rapprochement and increased political, economic and human contact between West Germany and East Germany, Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION: *OSTPOLITIK* AFTER UNIFICATION

Ostpolitik consisted not only of West German policy to Eastern Europe, but also to the GDR and the Soviet Union. This is crucial, because one could not be pursued without taking the others into account. Nor is *Ostpolitik* only the period from 1969 to 1974 when Willy Brandt was the Chancellor of West Germany, although this is the period of the *Ostpolitik* of which most is spoken. From its founding as a nation in 1949 West Germany had an *Ostpolitik* which had five main phases starting with Adenauer's phase of negotiation from strength from 1949 to 1963, to the failed policy of movement from 1963 to 1966, followed by the grand CDU-SPD coalition from 1966 to 1969. The phase of the new and intense *Ostpolitik* under Chancellor Brandt lasted from 1969 to 1974 and laid the foundation for the development of closer political, economic, cultural and human relations between West Germany and East Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The fifth phase of *Ostpolitik* lasted from 1974 to 1990 when the two Germanys became one. One of the fundamental means of implementing the latter phases of *Ostpolitik* was through trade and the exchange of money for political and humanitarian concessions with the GDR and the Soviet Union.

The problem and then ultimately the main success of *Ostpolitik* was the incredible balancing act performed by West Germany. It was crucial that the West Germans keep their Western allies happy and confident that they did not intend to pursue a policy of neutrality in Europe. Just as crucial was maintaining the pace of change within the context

⁵⁵ Josef Joffe, *A View From Bonn*, 184.

of détente so as not to cause any destabilisation in Eastern Europe or to arouse the suspicions of the Soviets about West German intentions in the GDR and Eastern Europe. This feat was performed fabulously by Willy Brandt and quite well in many respects by both of his predecessors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl.

Ostpolitik formed the basis of German-Eastern relations in the post-WW II era. This era came to an abrupt end when the Berlin Wall collapsed on November 9, 1989 and the division Germany ended with the unification of the two states on October 3, 1990. As the circumstances on the international stage changed so too did the situation for Germany. When the Cold War came to an end and relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were at their highest point of the post-war era, the division of Europe along the West-East 'Yalta' axis ended. By 1991 the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, as did Comecon. With these changes came opportunities for a united Germany as the state with the most influence on the future direction the countries of Central Eastern Europe will take in Europe.

As will be illustrated in the chapters that follow, united Germany has maintained the essence of *Ostpolitik* within its *Europapolitik*, although it is implemented differently. In Chapter Two the character of united German foreign policy will be considered, especially with respect to its redefined *Ostpolitik*. United Germany is still performing a balancing act between East and West in its foreign policy. Nonetheless, there remains remarkable continuity in the nature of West German and united German foreign policy. While West Germany conducted its *Ostpolitik* in an effort to manage its relationship with East Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, United Germany is pursuing a redefined *Ostpolitik* which seeks to act as a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe. United Germany has

incorporated its *Ostpolitik* into its *Europapolitik* as it carries out a peaceful “*drang nach Osten*” in order to help stabilise the states of Central and Eastern Europe. In an effort to achieve lasting peace and security in Europe, Germany will act as the ambassador of these states in matters of EU accession. An examination of the character of united German foreign policy will reveal the incentives and motivations which inspire Germany to perform this role in Europe.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CHARACTER OF UNITED GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

*A united Germany could be tolerable only
as an integral part of a united Europe.*

George F. Kennan

For the first time in nearly forty years German foreign policy is not developing entirely in accordance with Adenauer directives. Post-unification German foreign policy is evolving slowly, as a more mature Germany attempts to normalise its foreign policy. To be sure, united Germany's priorities will remain peace, prosperity and stability throughout Europe. However, Europe, for Germany, no longer ends at the WWII Yalta division of the continent. The countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which prior to WWII, had usually associated themselves with "western" Europe, are eager to join Western institutions such as the European Union (EU), NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Germany is the country in the best position to assist these states in their transition to open, liberal, market-oriented democracies. No country in Western Europe knows and understands this region better than Germany. Therefore, while German priorities remain peace, prosperity and stability in Europe, they have shifted eastward with Germany's geopolitical shift eastward.

This chapter will examine German post-unification foreign policy showing that

Germany is intent on being the bridge between EU-Europe and many of the former Warsaw Pact member states. While questions of Germany's role in the eastward expansion of NATO are very interesting, its role in the enlargement of the European Union could be pivotal, especially for its direct neighbours. Without delving too deeply into the argument, it is clear that EU enlargement is a better option for Germany to pursue publicly than NATO expansion, simply because it is a lot less threatening to Russia.

Considering the normalisation of German foreign policy will include a brief look at how unification occurred, a comparison of West German foreign policy and united Germany's foreign policy globally. This will be followed by an examination of Germany's policy toward the European Union and the Eastern Europe, which by its own declaration, are the two most important regions for Germany. In addition Germany's current political and economic power will be compared to its status prior to unification. It will be evident that Thomas Mann's question of a German Europe or a European Germany will be answered in favour of the latter. However, that is not to say that a European Germany will not play a more assertive and influential role on the continent.

THE ROAD TO UNIFICATION

An examination of the events between November 1989 and October 1990 indicates that West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, did not steam roll unification without meeting with neighbours and allies. No one predicted that the peaceful Monday evening demonstrations in Leipzig, and across East Germany, had rallied the people of East Germany and loosened the government's grip on East Germany enough to topple the Berlin Wall. However, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) government had to give in to pressure, seeing that no help was forthcoming from Moscow, and promised that East Germans could

travel freely. The will and determination of the East German people brought down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Thus began the fast paced momentum of events which, leading up to German unification, ultimately signalled the end of the Cold War.

On November 28, 1989, without prior notice to his allies or his coalition partners Chancellor Kohl announced his Ten Point Plan for unification in the German Bundestag. Initially, Helmut Kohl was not striving for unification. He had proposed a confederate structure with federation as a distant goal. He was clear in his commitment to involving all of Germany in the Western integration process. The ten points were:

1. Institute measures to facilitate travel between East and West Germany.
2. Expand technological co-operation with the GDR, as in environmental protection, telecommunications, and railroads.
3. Expand economic aid to the GDR on a large scale *if* "a fundamental change of the political and economic system is bindingly resolved and irreversibly started in the GDR." This meant free elections in the GDR with no guarantee of SED monopoly on power, as well as dismantling of centralised economic planning. "We do not want to stabilise conditions that have become untenable," said Kohl.
4. Establish a "treaty community" with the GDR to cooperate institutionally on a variety of common problems.
5. Proceed, after free elections in the GDR, to develop "confederative structures" between the two German states [not a confederation] and, eventually, a federal system for all Germany. The policy of "small steps" to mitigate the consequences of division would be replaced by new forms of co-operation, starting with joint governmental committees and a common parliament. "Nobody knows today what a reunited Germany will ultimately look like," said Kohl. "I am sure that the unity will come if the people in Germany want it."
6. Embed in the development of inter-German relations "in the all-European process and in East-West relations."
7. Encourage the EC to open itself to a democratic GDR and "other democratic countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe."
8. Speed up development of the CSCE, perhaps including new institutions for East-West economic co-operation and environmental relations.
9. Support rapid progress in arms control.
10. Strive for a "peace order" to allow German reunification as one state. As for the "particularly difficult" question of "transnational security structures," said Kohl, embedding the German question "in the all-European development and in the East-West relationship" might allow for "an organic

development which takes into consideration the interests of all parties concerned and guarantees a peace order in Europe.”¹

This plan indicates that Kohl had no intentions of abandoning his allies and attaining unification at their expense. Yet, nearly eight weeks later the momentum had not slowed and Kohl had to modify his plan as events dictated.

Chancellor Kohl had to consider the horrendous situation of the German Democratic Republic's economy, which was even worse than imagined. Kohl also came to the realisation that there could be a mass exodus of people from the GDR if the situation did not quickly improve. The people wanted change and Helmut Kohl and, then foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher acted decisively. German unity became an economic and political imperative. The process was accelerated by initiating economic unity, which was needed to ensure stability not only in the GDR, but also in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, political unity was still seen as a mid-term prospect approximately three to five years into the future.

It was domestic political considerations that dictated unification before the scheduled year end elections. Adding to the momentum, in March 1990, the East Germans elected the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with a wide margin of victory. Thereafter, Kohl presented himself as the “father” of German unity and was determined to be the first chancellor of a unified Germany.

Coupled with the desires of the East Germans and simple electoral politics, one other factor contributed to Kohl's decision to proceed with unification as quickly as he did.

¹ Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) 120. See Richard T. Gray and Sabine Wilke eds. and trans., Document 26: “Helmut Kohl's Ten-Point Plan for overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe: Speech Before the Bundestag (Nov.28, 1989),” German Unification and Its Discontents: Documents from the Peaceful Revolution, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 81-86.

No one could be sure about how strong Gorbachev's control of the government of the Soviet Union was, but many estimated that there was only a small window of opportunity and that Gorbachev would be ousted from power.

Thus, by January of 1990 Kohl and Genscher were on the fast track for both political and economic unity. Kohl felt that unification needed to be achieved quickly and he did not have time for a protracted political discourse. They used the European Community and NATO to express their views and rally support. At the time fears were expressed that Germany may accept neutrality as a condition of unity. However, after receiving backing from Washington, it was clear that Germany would remain a member of the NATO alliance.² Once this support was evident, the rest of the allies had to fall in line and accept the German government's chosen course of action. After the decision was made to unify before the end of 1990, unification was co-ordinated with the allies with the only condition being that a united Germany remain in the European Community and NATO. The "Two Plus Four" talks took place that spring in Ottawa and Kohl continued to support the mandate he announced earlier in the year.

There should not have been any surprise that Helmut Kohl, and the Germans, took advantage of the unique historical opportunity open to them. Unification cannot be seen as rigid German unilateralism. However, many of the allies expressed fears, often quite unfounded, about the possibility of renewed German power and aggressiveness in Europe.³ Apprehension over German unification was greatest in the Netherlands, Denmark, Great

² Josef Joffe, "Putting Germany Back Together: The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, (January/February 1996), 162-163.

³ Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe," in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany and The New Europe, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992), 252.

Britain, France, Italy and Spain.⁴ Even in 1992 Germany still remained a point of contention in Europe.⁵ Fears were voiced most loudly by Great Britain and France, countries which had both shared responsibility for Berlin's security and Germany's future. Neither Thatcher, nor Mitterand hesitated to express their fears about the possible danger a united Germany could pose to Europe. Yet, as Catherine McArdle Kelleher states, "unification represents not a break with the past, but a breaking open of the past."⁶ Elizabeth Pond is also optimistic about the future role Germany will play in Europe asserting that the "Federal Republic is leading the way toward the European future not only because it is finally converting its economic weight to political power, but also because it made the original conceptual leap to a post-national European identity four decades ago."⁷ Germany is not destined to relive its past, rather it is maturing into a new position of responsibility in Europe. German unification represents the beginning of the "normalisation of Germany", and for the first time since the 1950s, a shift away from Adenauer directives.

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Before examining Germany foreign policy after unification, Germany's post-war foreign policy needs to be considered again, if only briefly. West Germany's foreign policy was established under highly extraordinary circumstances, which made its foreign policy distinct in comparison with other large, Western countries. West Germany is often described as "the epitome of what Richard Rosecrance called a "trading state," one whose international relationships are defined more by its commercial and financial roles than by its

⁴ Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, *The Implications of German Unification*, 252.

⁵ Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, *The Implications of German Unification*, 251.

⁶ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The New Germany: An Overview," in Paul B. Stares (Ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 12.

military or political power.”⁸

Philip H. Gordon succinctly divides West German foreign policy into four types of policy: “policy of responsibility,” a civilian policy, a parochial policy, and a multilateral policy.⁹ Germany’s policy of responsibility, as embodied by former foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, attempted to make amends for Germany’s tarnished history by adopting

a generous and considerate foreign policy that included full integration into friendly alliances, a constitutional ban on wars of aggression, a liberal political asylum policy, compensation to victims of the Nazis, and the banning of weapons exports to areas of tension.¹⁰

After the atrocities of WWII, the Bonn government knew it had to go a long way to prove that they had abandoned nationalistic “power politics” in favour of a more humane, universal approach. German leaders placed a great deal of importance on the way their policy was perceived and avoided any actions that might be viewed as assertions of national strength, or that might imply that Germany had not learned from its past.

After WWII West German foreign policy focused nearly exclusively on economic instead of military power, establishing what Philip Gordon calls Germany’s civilian policy. German leaders believed that their military should be used only for territorial defence, going so far as to include this in Germany’s Basic Law.¹¹ Germany’s “economic miracle” after rebuilding its war ravished industries shows the effort Germany focused on its economic power, rather than developing its military potential.

Philip Gordon describes West Germany’s foreign policy as parochial because, for a

⁷ Elizabeth Pond, “Germany in the New Europe,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, (1992), 114-15.

⁸ Philip H. Gordon, “Berlin’s Difficulties: The Normalisation of German Foreign Policy,” *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No.2, (Spring 1994), 225-26.

⁹ Philip H. Gordon. *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 226-27.

¹⁰ Philip H. Gordon. *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 226.

¹¹ Article 87a (Build-up, strength, use, and functions of the Armed Forces) dictates that the “Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defence purposes. David P. Conradt, *The German Polity*, 6th Ed., (New York: Longman Publishers, 1996), 308.

global economic power, its political role beyond Europe's borders remained limited. German leaders focused their attentions on the role Germany could play in Europe and therefore influenced the development of the European Community, instigated *Ostpolitik*, maintained Germany's defence interests within NATO and played an active role in democratising Portugal, Spain and Greece. West Germany had no colonies or foreign military bases and was able to maintain a low profile on the international political stage. Unlike the US, it did not play a role in Middle East peace process or take action in Vietnam or Central America. Conversely, German firms were less than parochial, and took advantage of the stability provided by the Cold War in regions which were rich with natural resources and could import German goods.

Finally, West Germany's multilateral approach to policy formulation helped shape the character of current German foreign policy. Incorporated into Basic Law is Germany's commitment to "transfer sovereign powers to inter-governmental institutions."¹² Because it was in West Germany's national interest not to act alone, it took a reserved approach at most international negotiations, consistently paid more into the EC budget than it received in return, made economic concessions to the United States, and renounced having its own nuclear deterrent. "Germans preferred a European institutional context for implementing their national policies, shying away from purely national justifications and trying to avoid the perception that they were striving for national independence of action or heavy-handed political influence."¹³ As a result West Germany was able to reassure its neighbours and focus on its own economic success.

¹² Philip H. Gordon. *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 226.

¹³ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 305.

Although West Germany pursued multilateral approaches as much as it could, it was successful in making sure its own needs were met: “NATO’s military strategy of “forward defence,” the 1954 treaties committing the allies to German reunification, an agreement allowing trade with East Germany to be considered intra-EC trade, *Ostpolitik*, and the deployment of American “Euromissiles” in the early 1980s - not only to Germany but also to other European countries”¹⁴ - are just some examples of West Germany’s successful imposition of its national interest on its allies.

Hence, German foreign policy was exceptional in contrast with comparable states, especially given its multilateral, parochial approach and its emphasis on economic, rather than military power, as well as its constant regard for the lessons of its past. With the end of the Cold War and the exceptional circumstances under which West German post-war policy was created no longer present, post-unification German foreign policy has witnessed a shift of the Bonn government in certain areas of German foreign policy.

UNITED GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Similarly, four main points characterise German foreign policy after unification.¹⁵ First, united Germany is fully integrated into international institutions such as the European Union, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union, thereby firmly committing itself to its western neighbours and the United States. This is Germany’s policy of “self-containment by integration.”¹⁶ Continued multilateralism in German foreign policy is also the best way to maintain

¹⁴ Philip H. Gordon, *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 228.

¹⁵ Harald Mueller, “German Foreign Policy After Unification,” in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 130.

¹⁶ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 130.

stability in Germany by helping to counteract the tendency to re-nationalise in Germany, as well as in surrounding countries. This strategy has helped allay fears that Germany would act unilaterally in Europe by confirming that its freedom of action was limited. Germany gave more than just a general commitment to greater integration. It developed special initiatives to develop the institutional growth required for these organisations to flourish. Together with France, Germany pursued political union within the EC framework, as well as taking efforts to improve the CSCE.¹⁷ Germany also supported the predominantly US proposals to reform and strengthen NATO. Self-entanglement remains a main priority of the Bonn government.

The second characteristic of united Germany's foreign policy is its continued commitment to using non-military instruments to achieve its goals. This is, once again, to curb fears among its neighbours that Germany's world economic power would lead to increased political influence and ultimately military pressure. German's non-military policy instruments include providing economic assistance not only to Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the former Soviet states, Russia and developing countries, as well as supporting arms control measures, environmental agreements and proposals for institutional reform, especially of the United Nations.¹⁸ There is also a military component of Germany's self-entanglement policy which included reaffirming its renunciation of all biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and limiting united Germany's armed forces to 370,000 troops.

The third component of Germany's strategy is a set of initiatives to show that it is responding to demands that it play an increased role on the global stage. Hence, Germany led the call for international aid for Russia, the former Soviet republics and for Central and

¹⁷ On January 1, 1995, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe became institutionalised as the

Eastern Europe, arguing that poverty and instability to its east would hurt Western security interests. Germany initiated an internal debate on altering the constitution to allow German soldiers to participate in out-of-area missions and proposed reforms to the United Nations, maintaining that the UN should have the right to intervene in situations involving momentous violations of human or minority rights and to impose sanctions on countries that threaten global ecological security.¹⁹ In September 1994 Germany's constitutional court ruled that Article 24 of the Basic Law authorises the use of the Bundeswehr for missions relating to Germany's membership in any organisation of collective security, provided the Bundeswehr has received prior Bundestag approval. Thus Germany has gained more room to manoeuvre militarily. Furthermore, Germany outlined new criteria for development assistance making an applicants request dependent on its respect for human rights, progress towards democracy and an open market, and restraint in weapons procurement. International environmental policies were enhanced, showing that environmental policy ranks nearly as high on the German foreign policy agenda as economic and security policy. In all of these cases the German government tried to pursue policies in a multilateral approach.

The final component of German strategy is to reassure friends, neighbours and potential enemies that Germany would not, for example, "seek a new Rapallo, turn neutral, or revive the old style of power politics by explaining how Germans"²⁰ see the world and why the new Germany is different from the country which instigated two world wars in

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

¹⁸ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 130.

¹⁹ Mark Blacksell, "Germany as a European Power," in Derek Lewis and John R. P. McKenzie, eds., *The New Germany: Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of Unification*, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 97.

²⁰ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 131.

Europe. This campaign includes speaking openly about the past and asserting that Germany has learned from history, pointing to the stable democracy Germany had become after WWII and its opposition to the revival of nationalism in Europe. European integration became the focal piece of German foreign policy, as German President Richard von Weizsaecker put it,

Of course, the united Germany carries, with its population, its economic power, and its central geographic location, a certain weight in Europe. But it has become - in the old FRG- a totally and completely Westernised country and will remain so after unification. Germany has irrevocably evolved by constitution, basic values, and way of life into a democratic society of citizens that can stand up in every way to a comparison with the other Western democracies. And externally, it has shown far fewer national reservations and more readiness to integrate than many other European countries.²¹

True to oft made assertions one of Germany's two priorities is European integration within the framework of the European Union. More on Germany's role in the evolution of the Union will be said latter. Nonetheless, Germany has, in both words and action, shown that it remains wholly committed to the integration process. Germany's other post-unification foreign policy priority is the stabilisation of the region to its east. However, an evaluation of German political and economic power before and after unification is required before examining how Germany will achieve its specific foreign policy priorities.

GERMAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER BEFORE UNIFICATION

An examination of the German economy before unification will provide an idea of the changes the country has had to address over the past seven years. West Germany had the most powerful economy in the European Community (EC), leading in both trade and

²¹ Quoted in Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 132.

production. The Federal Republic produced 27 percent of the Community's GNP, and accounted for 25 percent of intra-Community trade.²² West Germany became one of the world's major exporters and was the main source of imports for most EC members. Even before unification the Federal Republic was the major net contributor to the EC budget. West Germany became the juncture for trade and emigration between East and West. West Germany's tremendous economic position in Europe has defied most expectations.

West Germany's prosperity, until very recently, can be attributed to continued increases in both production and exports, and to structural surpluses, even though high prices (due to high labour costs and a strong currency) would normally be expected to slow exports and production. The explanation for this apparent contradiction is that West Germany specialised in high-quality equipment and chemical products which are in apparent limitless demand.²³ In turn, due to its high wages and growth, West Germany experienced continued internal stability as its economic system adapted to meet international demand.

German economic leadership in the Community, however, did not translate into political leadership. Germany's lack of political leadership can be attributed to factors such as the sectorization of policy responsibilities among German ministries, Bund-Laender dynamics and party politicisation.²⁴ As a result no clear framework was established to voice and implement German national interests. This is not surprising given Germany's disposition for working within multilateral institutions and not voicing its demands too loudly.

²² Le Gloannec, *The Implications of German Unification*, 254.

²³ Le Gloannec, *The Implications of German Unification*, 254.

²⁴ Le Gloannec, *The Implications of German Unification*, 256.

Germany's limited political strength also had an indirect effect on its status within the Community. It was constrained within post-war frameworks to prevent the expansion of German power. Germany often found itself playing second fiddle to American initiatives and it had to accept inflated French and British status, due its division. Therefore, although Germany enjoyed economic superiority within the Community, for a variety of reasons West Germany was politically inferior relative to its economic position.

GERMAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER AFTER UNIFICATION

Germany has incurred incredible costs, more than anyone had publicly predicted, incorporating the five new Laender into its economy. However, these costs are expected to be short-term. In fact reconstructing the former East German economy will boost the German economy in the long-term,²⁵ just as reconstructing West Germany after WWII gave it a long-term economic advantage over its Western allies. Trade has been, and is expected to continue, expanding even though German trade surpluses were already shrinking drastically by 1991. German investment abroad has been unaffected by unification, although Germany has had to contend with some financial constraints, such as maintaining a tight monetary policy and a Bundesbank increase in interest rates.

The economic upheaval of the 1989-91 revolutions is being overcome and Germany's central economic role is increasing because it has maintained its role as an exporter with a strong import capacity for goods, capital and labour. Germany is also benefiting from the creation of a single market under the 1992 Single European Act. How Germany will adapt to the single currency and economic and monetary union outlined in the

²⁵ Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European Context, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania

Maastricht Treaty has yet to be seen, although prospects for the German economy are quite good. Therefore, although Germany has had to deal with the economic realities of integrating a centrally planned economy into its open market economy, it has remained economically dynamic.

While Germany's economy remains dynamic, in order to continue as a global economic power some adjustments need to be made. Germany's economy is too traditional. It is based too heavily on industry, which is now often subsidised, such as coal, steel, chemicals, machine tools and automobiles.²⁶ "German unification did not widen that production base but reinforced it while driving subsidies higher."²⁷ Some new industry is emerging slowly in the country and Germany's expensive highly trained labour force will have to adapt. Moreover, Eastern Germany needs to develop a better, more competitive export base to help recapture 'traditional' Eastern European markets. Central and Eastern Europe provide a very important export market for Germany, second only to the fifteen member EU export area.²⁸

Germany's economy is an asset and a liability. It is an asset because it can afford to help others by providing aid and investment to central and eastern Europe, as well as the former Soviet states. However, it is a liability because it is not competitive enough in modern industry and needs to become more innovative. Neither will Germany be able to continue to carry the burden of being the EU's largest net contributor, as long as some of the EU's outmoded policies and heavily subsidised sectors remain unreformed. Here the

Press, 1993), 349.

²⁶ W. R. Smyser, "Dateline Berlin: Germany's New Vision," *Foreign Policy*, No.97, (Winter 1994-95), 144.

²⁷ W. R. Smyser, *Germany's New Vision*, 144.

²⁸ Michael Kreile, "Will Germany Assume a Leadership Role in the European Union?" *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 134.

Union's Common Agriculture Policy is by far the most burdensome in terms of over subsidisation.

Unification has cleared the way for more decisive German political leadership within the European Union. Initially Germany hesitated to exploit its new position in Europe. Germany was not yet ready to deal with the military issues brought up by the outbreak of the Gulf War and the US-led UN mission had to be satisfied with German Marks rather than manpower. However, Germany did take the initiative giving early recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, in hopes of limiting further Serbian fighting in secessionist states. The desire for increased political power in Bonn and Berlin can be seen in Germany's decision to request an increase in representation in the European Parliament, making the eighteen observers from the new Bundeslaender permanent representatives. Furthermore, Germany has requested that German be recognised as an official language of the EU. Germany has also requested a seat on the United Nations Security Council. In addition to having the future European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany would also like its contributions to the EU budget redistributed.

Interpretation of the new Germany's requests is broad. Some see Germany's requests in line with its new sense of national purpose and increased political strength, while others see the requests as the leadership's willingness to be more assertive. Judgement on this matter will be withheld until Germany's post-unification priorities are more closely examined.

GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

In 1992 Roger Morgan wrote:

A few years from now, when the traumas of unification have been overcome, and Germany can focus more clearly on its external objectives, it may well be that German designs for Europe will still have the basic shape they have today: commitment to a deeper union of the Western European Community, flanked by a continuing security partnership with the United States and an increasingly close relationship with the Eastern neighbours, tending toward their actual membership of the Community.²⁹

Five years later, while not all of the traumas of unification have been overcome, united Germany has come a long way in stabilising its eastern Laender. True to Roger Morgan's postulation German foreign policy is developing along the lines it set out directly after unification. Germany's united foreign policy is developing consistent with West German foreign policy as it pursues its policy priorities.

The foreign policy announced by the Kohl government after he won re-election in 1994 "could certainly be described as representing both continuity with the past and a broad national consensus about how Germany's objectives in the outside world should be formulated."³⁰ The fundamental goals of Germany's European policy are set out in the Coalition Agreement, between the CDU/CSU and the FDP signed in November 1994. The Coalition Agreement promises a

European policy devoted to further integration (described as essential for Europe's economic competitiveness, environmental protection, technological renewal, immigration control and success in the fight against organized crime), with particular emphasis on stabilizing 'the reform states of Central and Eastern Europe', and bringing them into membership of the EU 'as soon as the preconditions for this are present'.³¹

Germany has linked its two foreign policy priorities - European integration and stabilisation of the central and eastern European countries (CEEC) - by acting as

²⁹ Roger Morgan, "Germany in the New Europe," in Colin Crouch and David Marquand (Eds.), Towards Greater Europe? A Continent Without an Iron Curtain, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 113.

³⁰ Roger Morgan, "German Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics," in Bertel Heurlin, ed, Germany in Europe in the Nineties, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 152.

³¹ Roger Morgan, *German Foreign Policy*, 153.

ambassador of these countries as they try to obtain membership in the European Union. Germany's commitment to European integration, especially its role in enlargement of the European Union, will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four. Considering German foreign policy toward Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, it is evident that German knowledge and influence in the region is enormous. Yet, with the two factors that shaped German *Ostpolitik* gone - the bipolar environment evaporated with the unification of the two Germanys and the collapse of the Soviet Union - what drives German foreign policy toward central and eastern Europe? It could be argued, although not very successfully, that Germany no longer has to give major consideration to its eastern neighbours now that unification has been achieved. It is, after all, very costly for Germany to help reform and modernise these countries. Furthermore, Germany has reasserted its commitment to the organisations of the western alliance, especially the European Union and NATO. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has stated that "European integration has the highest priority. The most important issue for us remains the harmonious integration of our country into a free, functioning Europe which is close to its citizens."³² It would be incredibly foolish for a country in Germany's position to avoid assigning priority to its eastern neighbours.

When the Soviet Union collapsed a power vacuum was created in central and eastern Europe. Germany is in the best position of any nation to fill that vacuum, and is in the process of doing so. German policy in the region will not resemble former German foreign policies. Germany is filling the power vacuum to its east by following a foreign policy remarkably similar to its Cold War *Ostpolitik*.

³² Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, "A New Beginning for all of Europe," Deutschland, No.4 (August

German foreign policy, in general, but also German *Ostpolitik*, were characterised by multilateralism and a domestic need for stability. Even during the formative years of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* there was an understanding that it could not work if Germany did not have the tacit support of its allies. Although it could be argued that after 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Germany had a lot more room to manoeuvre in central and eastern Europe, it initially chose to do so through multilateral institutions. Germany has made clear where its loyalties lie. Nonetheless, that does not preclude Germany from strengthening its relationship with the countries of central and eastern Europe.

Germany will proceed to strengthen its relationship with these states, but it will do so within a multilateral framework. Germany has learned to use multilateralism a tool of political power by ensuring that its European policy achieves the "greatest degree of common ground"³³ for EU members. Although Germany's ties to Central and Eastern Europe are greatest relative to the EU members, there is a strong awareness that a bilaterally oriented policy by Germany toward the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) would quickly create imbalances which had existed in the region in the past. As Germany intensifies the westward integration of Europe, "the eastward enlargement of ... the EU ... is a vital German interest, which must be viewed in the overall framework of the parallelism of Europe's further integration with the states of eastern Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe."³⁴ German leaders would not entertain the illusion that they could undertake the stabilisation of the Central and Eastern European states within a bilateral framework alone.

As stated, Germany is in the best position to aid Central and Eastern countries in their transition to democratic governments with stable, open, liberal, market economies.

1995), E5.

³³ Karsten Voigt, "German Interest in Multilateralism," *Aussenpolitik*, Vol.47, (2nd Quarter 1996), 108.

The lessons it has learned, and is still learning as it integrates the new Bundeslaender into its federal system, can and are being applied to Germany's closest eastern neighbours.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl believes

(o)ur commitment in favour of the states of central and eastern and south-eastern Europe is connected above all with our desire to see a better, more peaceful future for Europeans. The gradual integration of those states whose access to the European Community was denied under communist claims to power as one of the European Union's greatest tasks in the future.³⁵

Germany is not doing all it can to aid the transition of these countries just because it is the nation-state in the best position to do so. In order to continue the fifty year tradition of peace and prosperity on and around its borders, Germany needs stable and productive neighbours on all of its borders. Germany has been the largest provider of aid to the former Soviet Republics, Russia and the former Warsaw Pact members - providing over 50% of the total aid from industrial countries.³⁶ It has also maintained its position as the largest Western trading partner of many of these nations. German trade with Eastern Europe is more than DM100 billion.³⁷ The enormity of the opportunities in this region certainly has not been lost on Germany.

The German government has been clear that its activities can only be of a supportive nature, and their partners must travel this road themselves. It has developed and institutionalised a consulting concept it calls "*Transform*." In light of Germany's experience and strengths, but also due to its limited financial resources, and in order to ensure an efficient range of consulting services the Federal Government's consulting

³⁴ Karsten Voigt, *German Interest in Multilateralism*, 109.

³⁵ German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, "Peace and Freedom can only be secured in a United Europe," *Deutschland*, No.4 (August 1995), E5.

³⁶ Internet: From Facts about Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, 1 [Http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/facts.html#nato](http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/facts.html#nato).

³⁷ Internet: Based on an Address by Dr. Klaus Kinkel, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, made in Berlin,

concept, *Transform*, focuses on the following:

- economic advice on the creation of framework conditions for a social market economy and for the establishment of small and medium-sized business sector;
- assistance in the restructuring, privatisation and decentralisation of firms;
- establishment of tax, customs, insurance and banking systems;
- advice pertaining to the agricultural sector;
- initial and further training in the commercial sector (management training, vocational initial and further training, qualification measures);
- legal advice emphasising the field of commercial law;
- assist in the establishment of administrative structures; and
- advice in the areas of labour market and social policy as well as environmental protection.³⁸

Between 1992 and 1994 the Federal Republic's expenditure for this consulting concept was nearly DM 1 billion.³⁹ This is above and beyond the European programmes, such as Phare and the Europe Agreements (Association Agreements), which Germany supports both politically and financially to assist the transition of the Central and Eastern European states. Germany is acutely aware of the potential for destabilisation in many of these countries.

Another factor draws Germany's attention eastward. Of specific concern for the German government is the large ethnic German minority abroad. In the former USSR there are approximately two million ethnic Germans, followed by four hundred thousand and one hundred thousand in Poland and Romania respectively.⁴⁰ The rights of these German minorities abroad are guaranteed by treaties Germany has signed with the former USSR, Poland and Romania.

Moreover, Eastern Europe has traditionally been German foreign policy territory and now that international constraints on Germany's abilities and opportunities in eastern

October 12, 1995. [Http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/gfp.html#Eu](http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/gfp.html#Eu).

³⁸ Internet: From Facts about Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, 1-2.

[Http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/facts.html#nato](http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/facts.html#nato). and, TRANSFORM - Beratungsprogramm der Bundesregierung fuer die Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas (MOE) und die Neuen Unabhaengigen Staaten (NUS), Juni 1997, 1-2. [Http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/3_auspol/2/3-2-2g.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/3_auspol/2/3-2-2g.html).

³⁹ Internet: From Facts about Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, 2. [Http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/](http://www.docuWeb.ca/Germany/)

Europe are far fewer than during the Cold War, Germany has a freer hand in its relationship with these states. This region is developing more as a German zone because other western European nations and the United States do not have the same German interests, motivations or capabilities in the region. In 1992 August Pradetto noted that there “are growing fears about the internal and external security of these countries resulting from the vicious circle in which they are captured: a weak economic basis and a poor standard of living; weak democratic traditions; patterns of behaviour and identification; and a high potential for internal and external conflicts.”⁴¹ Full membership into the European Community, now the European Union, could be the factor to have the most positive effect on security in the region, as opposed to membership in NATO, which could have disastrously, destabilising effects on the region. Pradetto very convincingly argues that the European Community, thus the Common Market, is the “only possible organisation for intensive co-operation and integration if the Central and Eastern European countries want to get closer to the further developed European countries.”⁴² Although the conditions these countries must meet before they will be ready for EU membership will be discussed in Chapter Three, the role Germany can play in the transformation of these countries will be discussed here.

Germany is in the position of being able to foster a new economic and political landscape in Europe by acting as the bridge between western and eastern Europe. Several facts outline united Germany’s situation in Europe. For instance, unification has made Germany stronger financially and politically than ever before. Over the long term the

facts.html#nato.

⁴⁰ R. G. Livingston, “United Germany: Bigger and Better,” *Foreign Policy*, No.87, (Summer 1992), 167.

⁴¹ August Pradetto, “Transformation in Eastern Europe, International Co-operation, and the German Position,” *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol.25, No.1, (March 1992), 24.

⁴² August Pradetto, *Transformation in Eastern Europe*, 24.

“distance between Germany and other leading European industrial powers will increase.”⁴³

By early 1992, several currencies and economies of central and western European countries depended directly on the German economy and the German Mark.⁴⁴

Moreover, the unification of Germany was not only the symbol of the end of the Cold War, but also of the potential unification of central and eastern Europe with western Europe. Germany is again the dominating power in central and eastern Europe due to its location, traditional relations with the region, and its financial and economic power. Germany's experiences uniting the former German Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic politically, economically and socially, will be of tremendous assistance when helping transform this region and forge a united Europe. The former communist countries are extremely dependent on technology, capital and aid from abroad and Germany is the first country from whom assistance is sought. This is due not only to Germany's financial and economic successes, but also its democratic system with its administrative, judicial, constitutional and political stability. “What is in great demand in Eastern Europe is not the American, but the German way of life.”⁴⁵ For example, in Central and Eastern Europe there has been a tremendous increase of interest in the German language. Until 1991 approximately eighteen to twenty million people learnt German as a foreign language, with nearly two-thirds of this figure attributed to Eastern Europeans.⁴⁶ Now, instead of Russian, German and English are being taught in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Finally, the political leaders in Bonn and Berlin are aware that Germany alone cannot engineer the reconstruction of central and eastern Europe. There is a certain German

⁴³ August Pradetto, *Transformation in Eastern Europe*, 27.

⁴⁴ Eric Owen Smith, *The German Economy*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), 178.

⁴⁵ August Pradetto, *Transformation in Eastern Europe*, 28.

⁴⁶ Richard Stuth, “Deutschlands neue Rolle im sich wandelnden Europa,” *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 43, (1st Quarter,

sensibility due to its geopolitical location and the fact that it is the most affected of the western European countries by the transformation process in central and eastern Europe. German leaders can more easily predict the types of problems that are likely to arise from the transformation of centrally planned economies. Therefore, it should not be surprising and should have been expected that Germany is taking central and eastern European concerns to the European Union. On November 12, 1996, Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, asserted "we are advocates for the Central and East Europeans in matters of EU accession."⁴⁷

German leaders are pursuing *Ostpolitik* with renewed vigour. Without question, and for a variety of reasons, *Ostpolitik* will continue to be a major focal point of German foreign policy. With the resumption of its role as a central European power, Germany is very concerned about the development of central and eastern Europe because instability and dissension in that region could have negative effects on Germany socially, economically and politically. The multiple aims of Germany's policy in eastern and central Europe include: promoting democratic political parties throughout the region; improving the human rights situation in these countries; encouraging environmental clean up; shutting down old nuclear reactors; and advancing German economic and financial efforts in the region. The German government believes that stability will come with prosperity, and trading with the West is the key to that prosperity.

Some fears have been voiced about Germany developing its "sphere of influence" in central and eastern Europe. R. G. Livingston prefers to describe it as Germany promoting a

1992), 25. Author's translation.

⁴⁷ Klaus Kinkel, *Ost-Erweiterung der Europaeische Union - Chance und Herausforderung*, Rede des Bundesminister des Auswaertigen am 12. November 1996 in Hamburg, 2. [Http://www.auwaertigesamt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html](http://www.auwaertigesamt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html). Author's translation.

"zone of stability" to its east.⁴⁸ Regardless of how it is described, Germany continues to assert its influence in the region by promoting market reforms and open democratic political systems.

Germany's major reform efforts are directed toward Poland and the Czech Republic. In fact, Harald Mueller goes as far as to assert "(t)he litmus test for the direction of Germany's foreign policy was and no doubt remains its relationship to Poland and Czechoslovakia⁴⁹, the eastern neighbours who took the fiercest revenge after World War II against people of German origin. This relationship is far more significant than Germany's ties to the successors of the Soviet Union."⁵⁰ Harald Mueller goes on to assert that much of Germany's aid and support to Russia and the new republics can be "interpreted as a new Rapallo, or an attempt to reach an agreement with the Russian colossus on dividing up Central and Eastern Europe."⁵¹ By contrast, Germany's improved relationship with Poland and the Czech Republic "can be seen only as the expression of a willingness to be a "good European citizen," "⁵² although this has not been an easy task for either party.

There are three problems that stood out in German-Polish relations: borders, minorities and accounting for the past. The issue of borders made Poles the most nervous because although the Oder-Niesse line was confirmed as the official Polish-German border by the 1971 Warsaw Treaty, the final legal resolution was supposed to be decided once Germany was united. Chancellor Kohl hesitated, for purely domestic reasons, to promise the Polish government that a united Germany would recognise the Oder-Niesse line as the

⁴⁸ R. G. Livingston, "United Germany: Bigger and Better," *Foreign Policy*, No.87, (Summer 1992), 167.

⁴⁹ In November 1992 the federal assembly voted to disband the Czech and Slovak federation, giving the two republics equal successor status.

⁵⁰ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 146.

⁵¹ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 146.

⁵² Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 146.

official German-Polish border. Finally in June of 1990, after an assertive speech in the Bundestag in which Kohl argued that a border treaty should not be put on hold to accompany a more complicated friendship treaty, both German parliaments confirmed that united Germany would accept the current border as permanent.⁵³

Minority rights were the second major issue in German-Polish relations. In Poland, ethnic Germans were not recognised as a minority by the Polish government and were harassed and suppressed. Predictably there was an increase of immigration into Germany once the borders were opened up. The Polish government was reluctant to recognise German minority rights that would allow Germans to organise culturally and politically. Problems, like bilingual street and town names, could not be resolved.

The final major issue in German-Polish relations was mutual compensation for the past for Poles who were forced to work in German labour camps and for Germans whose property was nationalised in Poland. This issue was connected to the question of Silesians who had immigrated to Germany and whether they would be able to purchase land they had once owned in Poland. In June 1991 the Friendship Treaty was signed by both countries and ensured German minority rights in accordance with CSCE standards. Heads of government, foreign ministers and high ranking officials all agreed to annual bilateral meetings. A foundation set up by the German government promised Poles who had been forced to work for the Germans in World War II limited compensation. German-Polish relations remain somewhat strained with the heavy influx of Polish workers into Germany spurring anti-Polish feelings among east-German right-wing youths. In another assertion of goodwill, both governments in 1990 abolished visa requirements; a step which met with

⁵³ Harald Mueller, *German Foreign Policy After Unification*, 147.

surprisingly little opposition.

On June 21, 1990, Helmut Kohl, gave a policy statement on German-Polish relations to the Bundestag maintaining that the "Polish people must be made to realise that a free, united Germany wishes to be a good neighbour to Poland as well as a reliable partner on the 'path toward Europe'"⁵⁴ He went on to compare the Polish-German relationship to the Franco-German relationship without which "the task of European unification could not have begun; without German-Polish partnership, it cannot be completed."⁵⁵ Early in 1995 Chancellor Kohl visited the Polish parliament in Warsaw with the estimation that Poland would join the European Union by the year 2000, although it might not have full membership by then.⁵⁶ Bonn argues that Central Europe needs to complete its reforms as quickly as possible to match Western standards of living in order to limit westward migration.⁵⁷ Therefore, German banks were willing to bear the costs of the West's write-off of the Polish debt and Germany immediately opened its borders to Poland and consequently, German-Polish trade. In turn, many Poles believe that "Germany leads the way for Poland into the EU and NATO."⁵⁸

Although borders were not in question, the Czech-German relationship suffered similar difficulties with regard to minority rights and accounting for the past, with negotiations becoming more protracted. The rights of the German speaking minority in the Czech Republic proved difficult to resolve. The Bavarian CSU party put the incredibly sensitive issue of restitution for the Sudeten Germans, who had been annexed after the

⁵⁴ Helmut Kohl, "Policy Statement to Bundestag (excerpt)," World Affairs, Vol. 152, (Spring 1990), 236.

⁵⁵ Helmut Kohl, "Policy Statement to Bundestag (excerpt)," World Affairs, Vol. 152, (Spring 1990), 239.

⁵⁶ Author Unknown, "Germany and Eastern Europe: Just do it," The Economist, 15 July 1995, 35.

⁵⁷ Elizabeth Pond, "Letter from Bonn: Visions of the European Dream," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer 1997), 67.

⁵⁸ Wojtek Lamentowicz, "Erwartungen an Deutschland: Die polnischen Erwartungen," Internationale

war, on the political agenda. Czech President Vaclav Haval, apologised for the forced expulsion of Germans after WWII, provoking protests by nationalists and communists in his country. Kohl hesitated, as he had with the Polish border issue, not wanting to alienate the Sudeten Germans, whose demands exacerbated German-Czech relations after a fairly good start. By January 1992, Kohl signed a German-Czech Friendship Treaty, which Genscher negotiated in October of 1991, thereby silencing the CSU-led protest. Since 1992 German-Czech relations have increased and while the demands of the Sudeten Germans have not been met, they have been less vocal. Both governments remain committed to fostering good relations with each other.

All in all Germany has shown a concerted effort to come to grips with the horrible legacy of German history. Germany's strategy was to clear up the most pressing issues with regard to German interests and then focus on accelerated economic reconstruction and integration into the "western" world for Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the rest of central and eastern Europe.

THE DOMESTIC DEBATE ON GERMANY'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

The domestic debate on the future of German foreign policy can be divided primarily into two groups: those who favour normalisation and those who oppose it. The proponents of a normalisation want an active more assertive German foreign policy which has overcome the country's power angst.⁵⁹ They believe such an approach would precipitate peace and stability in Europe. Proponents of normalisation are most of the members of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, some of to the minority

Politik, No. 1, (1995), 37. Author's translation.

⁵⁹ Philip H. Gordon, *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 233.

Free Democratic Party (FDP), the majority of the foreign policy elite in Germany including the foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel and defence minister, Volker Ruehe. Foreign Minister Kinkel stated that "Germany must accept the normalisation of [its] situation as a reunited, sovereign national and deduce from this [its] international role."⁶⁰

Proponents of normalisation advocate reform of the UN, a seat for Germany on the UN Security Council, and revision of Germany's Basic Law in order to remove the constraints on the use of German military power. They believe Germany has learned its lessons from the past and is ready to accept international responsibility relative to its increased international stature. CDU foreign policy spokesman, Karl Lamers argues that "Germany must...acknowledge its power... Without forgetting its history, Germany must become as normal as possible."⁶¹

Within the proponents of normalisation there are a group of more extreme conservatives who argue that Germany must accept the reality of its national interests, geopolitics and power. Although they do not advocate unilateralism, they want European integration slowed fearing it will dilute German power as it takes advantage of Germany's commitment to multilateralism.

Among the general public there is a strong desire for Germany to act as other European state do. A majority of Germans, 62 percent and 57 percent in 1992 and 1993 respectively believe that Germany should assume a more active role internationally, while in 1993 71 percent said Germany should have greater influence in the European Union.⁶² In fact a majority of Germans, 76 percent, believe that Germany has a special responsibility

⁶⁰ Quoted in Philip H. Gordon, *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 234.

⁶¹ Quoted in Philip H. Gordon, *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 234.

⁶² Ronald A. Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 61 & 48 respectively. See appendix E and F.

toward eastern Europe and the best way to help the countries of central and eastern Europe is through technical and economic assistance, including providing membership in the European Union.⁶³ Although when asked to rank the most important issues facing the German government in 1993 only 47 percent of Germans believed stabilising democracy was the most important issue, while 86 percent cited the containment of right-wing extremism as the most important issue for the German government.⁶⁴ Nonetheless when asked what the most important foreign policy problem facing their government was, Germans cited European unification and Eastern Europe in first and second position.⁶⁵

While the German government and its foreign policy establishment have been clear in stating Germany's foreign policy priorities as both widening and deepening the European Union, the German public from 1991 to 1993 consistently preferred deepening over widening,⁶⁶ with 49 percent of Germans favouring more joint action among EU states.⁶⁷ Of the Central and Eastern Europe states seeking EU membership, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland should be given the greatest support according to the German people.⁶⁸ Even though deepening receives more support from the German public, enlargement of the Union has recently received quite positive support also.⁶⁹ Nonetheless there are still those who oppose any deeper commitment to the EU as well as those who oppose the normalisation of German foreign policy.

⁶³ Ronald A. Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall*, 20-22. See appendix G1 and G2.

⁶⁴ Ronald Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall*, 15. See appendix H.

⁶⁵ Ronald Asmus, *German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall*, 14. See appendix I.

⁶⁶ Ronald Asmus, *German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall*, 50. See appendix J.

⁶⁷ European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Commission*, Vol. 45, (Spring 1996), 63. See appendix K1 and K2.

⁶⁸ European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union*, No. 45, (Spring 1996), B.62, and Ronald Asmus, *German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall*, 51. See appendix L and M.

⁶⁹ European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union*, Vol. 45, (Spring 1996), 66. See appendix N.

Within German foreign policy circles opponents of normalisation believe other states should behave more like the Federal Republic, mirroring Germany's "antimilitarism, parochialism, and humanitarianism...".⁷⁰ Most opponents of normalisation belong to the SPD party, although there is a small portion of the FDPs who oppose the normalisation of German foreign policy. Members of the SPD take the role expected of the opposition party arguing that a normal foreign policy based on national interest would lead to increased nationalism within Germany and increased international competition.

Among the opponents of normalisation there is a radical variant composed of the Green Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) who disputed unification and are adamantly opposed to thinking in terms of national interest or Germany revising its military role.

Aside from the radical variants, present in nearly any political forum, there are two forces in the domestic debate on the future of German foreign policy. There are those in the official opposition who oppose the current direction of German foreign policy and those among the ruling party who favour a more normal role for German foreign policy than experienced throughout the Cold War. The ruling CDU party seems to have support from the general population in its efforts to improve Germany's status relative to its new size and territory as well as in its efforts to help the countries of central and eastern Europe. However, the German foreign policy establishment has not yet completely decided how far Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel should go to normalise German foreign policy.

⁷⁰ Philip H. Gordon, *Normalisation of German Foreign Policy*, 237.

CONCLUSION: A GERMAN EUROPE OR A EUROPEAN GERMANY?

Although their fears were not justified, both France and Great Britain expressed concern that Germany would emerge as a European hegemon. Seven years after unification, now that united Germany's foreign policy has emerged as a policy focused on European integration in a multilateral context, these fears have been quieted to a degree. It has become clear that Germany is too large not to play a central role in Europe. Therefore, the German leadership has done everything it can to convince its neighbours that it wants, to use Thomas Mann's oft cited phrase, a European Germany not a German Europe. Is that to say that Germany cannot be a hegemon within a Europe which is home to a European Germany? As Germany imposes its priorities and problems on Europe it will necessarily Germanise Europe.⁷¹ The fact remains that Germany is the largest country in Europe, with its population increasing by nearly 30 percent after unification to seventy-eight million and its territory expanding by one third. While the new Germany may not take advantage of these geopolitical changes in the same manner as former German states would, it cannot help but to adapt its policy to fit its new situation in Europe.

Not long after unification a new debate emerged both in and outside of Germany about Germany's "new assertiveness." Its early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, requests for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, increasing interest rates right after unification at the expense of its neighbours and its call for German as an official language within the EU are all cited as examples of new German assertiveness. However, these signs of Germany's so-called "new assertiveness," save perhaps the first example which was predicated on German domestic demands, are Germany reacting to its new

⁷¹ Le Gloannec, *The Implications of Unification*, 273.

situation in Europe. Although Germany's foreign policy is based upon multilateralism and embedding itself into European and international institutions it will continue to seek increased recognition and responsibility based on its new position in Europe.

United Germany is not just an enlarged Federal Republic. It is developing as a new Germany with more freedom to pursue its goals. Although Germany may not deliberately set out to Germanise Europe, it is working to shape the new Europe. Germany's mission is to erase the former East-West Yalta dividing line of Europe. Germany is, once again, Europe's true centre and is facilitating thinking and action along the East-West axis. "German policy is beginning to weave a wide web of co-operation that stretches from Paris to Moscow through Berlin and Warsaw."⁷² If Germans work together with other European countries and achieve success, the continent will achieve a greater cohesiveness than the founders of the European Union ever imagined. Even now, particularly in western Europe, economic, political and military borders are vanishing. W. R. Smyser goes as far as to call this unprecedented cooperation "a German reshaping of the continent."⁷³ The fact that Germany is not acting by military means, but by diplomacy, cooperation on institutional reform, and careful financial investment makes the effort even more exceptional. "Never in history has Europe seen the kind of system that the Germans are beginning to establish."⁷⁴ If Germany succeeds it will have served both its own national interest as well as European interest as a system is established which can benefit all countries on the continent. The new Germany is keenly aware that it can achieve far more by working with the states of Europe than against them.

⁷² W. R. Smyser, "Dateline Berlin: Germany's New Vision," Foreign Policy, No.97, (Winter 1994-95), 149.

⁷³ W. R. Smyser, *Germany's New Vision*, 149.

⁷⁴ W. R. Smyser, *Germany's New Vision*, 149.

As Germany's post-Cold War foreign policy slowly evolves it remains clear that it will retain an *Ostpolitik*, if somewhat redefined. As stated, Germany will continue to operate within the multilateral frameworks of NATO, the EU and also the OSCE. Although Germany is thoroughly committed to the international organisations to which it belongs, it still has its own national interests which cannot be overlooked. It is in Germany's national interest to have democratic neighbours with open markets on all of its borders. Therefore one of Germany's foreign policy, or rather European policy, priorities for the end of the twentieth century will be enlargement of the EU to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe beginning with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. They will in all likelihood be joined by other states ranging from Bulgaria to Romania which have also officially applied for EU membership and which have Association Agreements with the EU.

Germany is the main proponent of the eastern enlargement of the EU and as such will likely have a large influence on the pace of the next enlargement as well as which countries will be admitted first. The debate within the German foreign policy establishment will be considered to the extent that it may have some influence on the future of Germany's European policy, as will the outcome of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference on the future of Europe. Germany will have to choose its course with caution as it assumes a more dominant position as the heart of Europe. Nonetheless, Germany will not likely shy away from its chosen role as the bridge between West and East in Europe.

CHAPTER THREE

GERMANY, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EU ENLARGEMENT

Germany in Europe is a political fact that will continue to define the international and national policies of the new Europe.¹

Along with being the leading proponent of further European integration, Germany leads calls for the eastward enlargement of the European Union, to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. A deeper analysis of Germany's future role in the European Union will include a theoretical discussion of 'what is East?' for Germans. As well a closer look at the discourse within the German foreign policy establishment will provide the foundation for a deeper examination of the future course of German foreign and European policy. An examination of Germany's European policy will include analysis of Germany's role in both the widening and the deepening of the European Union and the actions the Federal Republic has taken to further both goals. It will be apparent that German political leaders, led by Chancellor Kohl, are pursuing both Adenauerian and Brandt-like policies as they act as the bridge between the West and East in Europe. Furthermore, the discussion in this chapter will consider the results of the 1996-97 IGC which came to a close in June in Amsterdam producing the Maastricht II, or Amsterdam Treaty on the future of Europe. The possible

¹ Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," Current History, Vol. 96, No. 608,

results will be considered in the context of EU reform in preparation for enlargement early in the twenty-first century. Additionally, NATO expansion must also be given some consideration, if only in brief, as it illustrates Germany's relationship with its allies. Germany will need to take care choosing its exact path in Europe as it assumes a more dominant position at the centre of the continent no longer finding itself situated east of the West.

FOR GERMANY, WHAT IS EAST?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Yalta division of Europe ceased to exist and demarcation between east and west in Europe vanished. Throughout the Cold War Poland, then-Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all part of Eastern Europe under the Soviet sphere of influence, along with Bulgaria, and Romania. States, which before the great wars were considered part of Central Europe, became Eastern Europe and Central Europe was no longer a conceptual territory within Europe.

The unification of Germany and the implosion of the Soviet Union fostered the abolition of Eastern Europe. More than half a decade after the unification of Germany, one of Germany's main foreign policy priorities is to realise stability in Central and Eastern Europe with the ultimate goal of enlarging the European Union eastward. The question arises: how far East do Germans want to go?

In the German mind there is a crucial distinction between its four closest neighbours, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the former Soviet Union, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states.² In the area nearest

(March 1997), 123.

² James Kurth, "Germany and the Reemergence of Mitteleuropa," Current History, Vol.94, No. 595,

Germany there is economic reform and political predictability, which is essential to German industry. In the former USSR there is still economic entropy and political instability. This growing economic distinction is a revival of what Germans formerly thought of as Central Europe, or Mitteleuropa, rather than Eastern Europe. That is not to say that the EU will never be extended beyond Central Europe, however, the states of Central Europe remain Germany's main priority for membership. Germany sees the extension of EU memberships to these Central European states as a way to further economic recovery and to curb nationalist extremes which emerged after the quiet revolutions.

Germans see themselves as part of Central Europe, some would even argue, the core of Central Europe. Nonetheless, they are still deeply embedded in Western European institutions and will remain so. Germany faces the responsibility of acting as a bridge between Western and Central Europe, without reinforcing the division and distinction between these two conceptual territories of Europe.

Although formally the members of the EC [EU] have equal rights, as in every democracy, in reality, the political decisions are influenced, not so much by those who are poor and take the compensations, but by those who have the best-functioning economies and who fulfil the funds of the community. So it will most likely be for Germany and France to decide how the relations between the EC [EU] and the Eastern European countries will turn out."³

Germany will have to be careful that resentment does not grow too strong in Western Europe at German efforts to extend the Union eastward, as initially it appears that Germany will benefit the most from EU enlargement. Nor can it be overlooked that EU enlargement will also cost Germany more than any of the other EU member states.

(November 1995), 384.

³ August Pradetto, "Transformation in Eastern Europe, International Cooperation, and the German Position," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 25, No. 1, (March 1992), 27.

As what some are calling the Berlin Republic asserts itself, distinct contrasts to the Bonn Republic are emerging. Germany will have to put forth a concerted effort to prevent rising tensions between itself and the rest of Western Europe as it helps Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia into Western European institutions, along with other Central and Eastern European countries.

THE FRG'S FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT ON GERMANY'S FUTURE

In 1996 Gunther Hellmann surveyed the German foreign policy establishment, specifically academics, and journalists as well as analysts at foreign policy think tanks to discover how they prioritised German foreign policy. He specifically excluded senior politicians and decision-makers because they were less free to speak their minds. A brief overview of his results provide some interesting insights into the future of German foreign policy.

One interesting result of Hellmann's study is that there are sharp differences between Germans and non-Germans regarding feasible German foreign policy alternatives.⁴

Although unfortunate, it is not surprising that non-German speakers have little knowledge of the German discourse on German foreign policy as the debate has been conducted in German.⁵ Hence, it has received very little attention outside of Germany and Germany is assessed as lacking a mature foreign policy establishment, which students of Germany

⁴ Gunther Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40, (1996), 2.

⁵ It is interesting to note that international relations in Germany is often taught in English, as a great majority of the literature is in English. The same is true of the Scandinavian countries. However, international relations covers a broader range of topics than just Germany's European policy, about which a lot of German literature can be found.

foreign policy quickly protest as untrue.⁶ Although their foreign policy community may not reflect the size of the country or compare to that of Great Britain or the United States, it is not lacking. The importance of this discourse is revealed by Ole Waever's argument that "the foreign policy discourse of a country sets the parameters for foreign policy choices."⁷

Germany's foreign policy establishment, according to Gunther Hellmann, can be divided into five schools of thought which receive varying degrees of support among foreign policy analysts as well as the German political parties.⁸ In brief, the first school of thought can be labelled Pragmatic Multilateralists.⁹ Many who adhere to this school were and are quite influential in foreign policy decision-making circles. Pragmatic Multilateralists believe there is no need to reinvent German foreign policy and that old strategies based on multilateralism can be maintained. Although they accept that German power and responsibility have increased, they place certain qualifications on Germany's increased power. Pragmatic Multilateralists favour the use of 'soft' power and oppose unilateral actions. Germany must legitimise itself within international institutions by continuing along its multilateral course. Pragmatic Multilateralists believe that the importance of interdependence has increased with Germany's increased responsibilities. They also believe in flexibility, but assert that Germany's future lies in the West alone. It is interesting to note the most Pragmatic Multilateralists believe that the EU is just one institution of many and do not hold strong views regarding widening or deepening of the

⁶ At a conference of the Young Atlantic Generation in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan from May 22-29, 1997, in the Netherlands the author was able to speak to several students of international relations from Germany and Europe as a whole.

⁷ Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 2.

⁸ Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 5.

⁹ Gunther Hellmann characterises Karl Kaiser, Helga Haftendorn, Hanns Maull, Michael Stuermer, Norbert Kloten, Norbert Walter, Lothar Ruehl, Gregor Schoellgen, Franz Josef Meiers, Christoph Bertram, Wolfgang Wagner, and Wilfried von Bredow as pragmatic multilateralists. *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 5.8.

Union. Perhaps this reveals the American education many of them received.¹⁰

Europeanists represent the second school of thought within the German foreign policy establishment.¹¹ Europeanists represent a variant of pragmatic multilateralism in that they believe that "Germany, as a matter of principle, should pursue a multilateral diplomatic strategy."¹² The difference which makes it necessary to characterise Europeanists into another school of thought is that they hold strong views on Germany's European policy. Europeanists believe strongly that the EU should be the key to German foreign policy and that both widening and deepening should be pursued at length. In fact, Europeanists do not regard Germany apart from the EU. They believe that focusing on the EU will prevent Germany from reverting back to power politics which have proven so destructive in the past. Moreover it will make the EU more competitive internationally. They point to the fact that Germany has a constitutional obligation to foster European integration.¹³ Europeanists regard Central Europe as an area of German responsibility to which Germany cannot respond unilaterally, for fear of provoking balancing behaviour among its allies. They believe the answer is to extend EU membership to the states of Central Europe. The long term objective of Europeanists is a federal Europe which can be integrated at variable speeds depending on the state. They also assert that Germany should be more deeply integrated into Europe to prevent Germany from becoming too strong.¹⁴

¹⁰ Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 6.

¹¹ Gunther Hellmann considers Werner Weidenfeld, Werner Link, Helmut Schmidt, Josef Janning, Wolfgang Wessels, Konrad Seitz, Gabriele Brenke, and Jens Hacker as Europeanists, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 8-9.

¹² Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 8.

¹³ On December 21, 1992 a federal statute amended Germany's Basic Law, Article 23: With the intention of establishing a united Europe the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is committed to democratic, rule-of-law, social and federal principles as well the principle of subsidiary, and ensures protection of the basic rights comparable in substance to that afford by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat. In David P. Conradt, *The German Polity*, 6th ed. (New York: Longman Publishers, 1996), 296.

¹⁴ Maarten C. Brands, "Ueberforderung durch Machtzunahme? Deutschland als integrierende oder zentrifugale

The third school of thought, another variant of pragmatic multilateralism, are the Euroskeptics.¹⁵ This, perhaps the weakest school of thought, denies that the EU has served Europe for the better. They reject any idea of a federal Europe that will transcend states. Euroskeptics assert that the end of bipolarity has brought the return of the world of states in anarchy and that great powers will re-emerge.¹⁶ Germany will become one of these great powers with special rights and responsibilities. Their three foreign policy priorities include fostering a strong relationship with the United States by using NATO to link Europe to North America, integrating Central Europe into Western institutions multilaterally, and finally rejecting any kind of federal Europe. Euroskeptics also reject any further integration of Europe and the loss of sovereignty it would precipitate. Nonetheless, they advocate more assertive efforts to enlarge the Union eastward.

The fourth school of thought, which is not a variant of pragmatic multilateralism, are the Internationalists.¹⁷ They reject speaking in terms of national interest and assert that foreign policy should be conducted against the background of a complex, interdependent world. Internationalists believe that addressing ecological threats should be global priority and that Germany should assume its share of responsibility. They also adhere to preventive conflict management, cooperative internationalism and sustainable global development. Their two foreign policy objectives are the acceleration of European integration and the creation of a collective security system that transcends NATO.¹⁸ Internationalists assert that

Kraft?" *Internationale Politik*, No. 2, (1997), 37.

¹⁵ Gunther Hellmann asserts that Hans-Peter Schwarz, Christian Hacke, Juergen von Alten, Arnulf Baring, Claus Koch, and Karl Feldmeyer are euroskeptics. *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 10-12.

¹⁶ Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 10.

¹⁷ Gunther Hellmann characterises Juergen Habermas, Dieter Senghaas, Beate Kohler-Koch, Harald Mueller, Klaus Dieter Wolf, Ulrich Beck, Michael Zuern, Dieter S. Lutz, Joschka Fischer, Ernst-Otto Czempel, Hiltrud Breyer, Hanns W. Maull, Michael Kreile, Katrin Fuchs, Albert Statz, Volker Rittberger, Ulrich Albrecht, Reinhard Buetikofer and Richard Rosecrance as internationalists. *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 12-16.

¹⁸ Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 15.

the EU is the only institution that can tame national interests and they advocate early acceptance of Central and Eastern European states into the EU. Conversely, they oppose NATO expansion.

Finally, the fifth school of thought is composed of the Normalisation-nationalists which are most closely associated with the new democratic right.¹⁹ They believe in concentrating on domestic issues while abandoning Germany's "self-hatred." Normalisation-nationalists call for the "revival of the political culture of 'the people of the centre' of the continent distinct from the West."²⁰ For them, this translates into a rediscovery of geopolitics and its German roots. Normalisation-nationalists maintain the importance of good relations with the United States, but have varied opinions on European integration. Many of them side with the Euroskeptics, and call for widening without deepening. Therefore Normalisation-nationalists want the return of the nation-state and geopolitics, stable eastern neighbours and the rejection of total Western integration.

While all five schools of thought have distinct ideas about the future direction German foreign policy should take, they all, to varying degrees, believe in the importance of stabilising Central and Eastern Europe and eventually extending EU membership to most of these states. Naturally, these schools of thought do not share equal status in their ability to influence policy. The views of Pragmatic Multilateralists and Europeanists are most widely shared by the mainstream foreign policy establishment, including the ruling CDU/CSU Party, the FDPs, as well as a small portion of the SPDs. Internationalist views are held by some of the SPD opposition, the Greens and the PDS, while the Euroskeptics

¹⁹ According to Gunther Hellmann, Karlheinz Weissmann, Rainer Zitelmann, Heimo Schwilk, Ulrich Schacht, Botho Strauss, Klaus Rainer Roehl, Karl-Eckehard Hahn, Heinz Brill, Dieter Weiser, Reinhart Maurer, Jochen Thies are normalisation-nationalists. *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 16-19.

²⁰ Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 17.

and the Normalisation-nationalists have only small circles of support.

In his thorough survey Hellmann goes on to outline four grand strategies, or German foreign policy alternatives. It is not difficult to imagine what they are, as they include four distinct paths Germany could take, from pursuing only widening or deepening of the EU, focusing efforts unilaterally on Mitteleuropa, to "going it alone" as a world power. An indepth look at each of these alternatives is not really warranted as Germany is not likely to limit itself to merely one of these strategies. Germany chooses not to choose one strategy over another. Germany will pursue both widening and deepening without asserting itself as a European hegemon, let alone a world power. Nor will it unilaterally try to assert its influence over Mitteleuropa, although it will do its best to help stabilise these states as they continue their transformation to liberal, democratic states with open, market economies. Therefore, none of these options are mutually exclusive, and although they may provide conceptual outlines of distinct directions German policy could take, neither Gunther Hellmann nor Timothy Garton Ash²¹ accurately reflect the German foreign policy establishment by trying to pigeon hole them into one strategy or another. Naturally there will be overlap among the strategies.

Finally, Hellmann makes an interesting comparison between non-German and German perspectives. Throughout the five schools of thought it is agreed that the trading state, as described by Richard Rosencrance, provides the best description of Germany's role in the international system. However, this concept seldom appears in non-German literature. Non-Germans tend to emphasise geopolitics over economic interdependence and integration. It is some what contradictory that American politicians such as former

²¹ In "Germany's Choice," published in Foreign Affairs in 1994, Timothy Garton Ash outlined four possible

President Bush and President Clinton call on Germans to take a leading role in European politics, especially within NATO, while many American academics write about Germany's hegemonic aspirations within Europe.²² Americans often warn that a Germany too strong and too vocal could be divisive for Europe. While it could be argued that non-Germans are perhaps better judges of the direction German foreign policy should take because they stand outside of the country looking in from an Archimedean point, they too have their own interests, such as the Americans wanting Germans and NATO members in general to pay for a greater share of their security alliance. In some instances the point surely rings true. However, German opinions about the future of the country should not be overlooked. Although there has most definitely been a return to the discussion of Germany's geopolitical position in the foreign policy literature it is from predominantly non-German sources.²³ Germans in and out of Germany emphasise the EU and European integration.

GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Germany's role in the future of the European Union can be divided into two sectors: deeper integration of the Union and widening of the Union by extending EU membership to Germany's eastern neighbours. Germany's desired course of action will be considered for each endeavour, with greater emphasis on the latter, as well as consideration of the alleged contradiction between these two German goals.

courses German foreign policy could pursue.

²² Gunther Hellmann, *Goodbye Bismarck?*, 26-7. He notes that writers such as Gary Geipel, W. R. Symser, Gregory Treverton, Philip H. Gordon and R. G. Livingston subtly point to Germany's latent hegemonic potential.

²³ Especially James Kurth, but also Stanely Hoffman, Gary Geipel, Jeffrey T. Bergner and Philip H. Gordon, to name only a few, have focused on Germany's new geopolitical position as a major factor influencing its foreign policy.

Even given its unsurpassed economic and political weight within the EU, Germany alone is unable to dictate the future of the Union. It can make its opinions known, but it cannot determine European policy within a vacuum. In 1987, the Single European Act established qualified majority voting in many areas of policy. Votes are allocated on the basis of each state's size, "which means that Germany's dominance has been formalized in the political decision-making structure."²⁴ The Maastricht Treaty on European Union has steadily extended the scope of qualified majority voting, as a result "the existing hierarchy of states has been enforced,"²⁵ with Germany retaining the highest position. The conclusion of this analysis might lead one to believe that Germany is slowly assuming the position of first among equals within the EU. As a net contributor to the EU budget Germany is in a better position than most member states to pursue its own interests.

Germany is wholeheartedly in favour of forging deeper integration among the current EU member states. Entailed in deepening of the EU is fulfilling the requirement of European Monetary Union (EMU), including accepting the "Euro" as Europe's single currency, and increasing the powers of the European Parliament (EP). Germany would also like to see a change in voting procedures in the Council of Ministers from unanimous to qualified majority voting and possibly weighted majority voting based on population. Leading up to and into the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the future of Europe, federalism throughout the Union is waning. Great Britain especially opposed any use of the term federalism in the Maastricht Treaty.

In an attempt to offer a solution, or an alternative to its vision of a federal Europe,

²⁴ Mark Blacksell, "German as a European Power," in Derek Lewis and John R. P. McKenzie, eds., The New Germany: Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of Unification, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 94.

²⁵ Mark Blacksell, *Germany as a European Power*, 94.

CDU/CSU floor leader Wolfgang Schaeuble and Klaus Lamers introduced a position paper to the Bundestag on September 1, 1994. The paper on the future of European integration provided an important and controversial contribution to the debate. The point of the paper was the proposal of a "core Europe...organised according to federal principles."²⁶ The more "community oriented" countries of Germany, France and the Benelux countries would make up the core group, although Wolfgang Schaeuble was careful to cite that no state would be excluded and could join as they met the requirements. Within a core Europe, the legislative function of the EP would be increased and the European Council's would be decreased. The EP would become the first, or lower house, and the European Council would become a type of "Bundesrat" or Senate, maintaining the interests of the member states. Schaeuble and Lamers envisioned the Commission evolving into a European government. This inner core would have complete monetary union as well as an effective common foreign and security policy, using the Western European Union to take necessary military actions, possibly in conjunction with NATO.

Schaeuble and Lamers planned for the eastward enlargement of the EU to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary as well as Slovenia. Finally, they asked France for a "clear and unequivocal" decision to "rectify the impression that, although it allows no doubt as to its basic will to pursue European integration, it often hesitates in taking steps towards this objective - the notion of the unsunderable sovereignty of the *Etat Nation* still carries weight, although this sovereignty has long since become an empty shell."²⁷ Nevertheless, France has yet to provide an unequivocal response.

²⁶ Hans-Peter Schwarz, "United Germany and European Integration," SAIS Review, (Special Issue 1995), 88.

²⁷ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *United Germany*, 89.

In the aftermath of the criticism this paper provoked, a CDU/CSU parliamentary group produced a new paper in June 1995. It did not name any countries, nor did it use the term "federal core Europe." It did, however, insist on "the extension of the economic and currency union into a much closer political union, together with a widening of the EU around the year 2000."²⁸ Clearly, the CDU/CSU maintained adherence to core Europe with a two speed Europe. Wolfgang Schaeuble argued that the slowest member should not determine the speed of enlargement. According to supporters, these are also the views of Chancellor Kohl, as Schaeuble often articulates the Chancellor's opinions.²⁹ The German political elite will not be satisfied with a slow, "natural," evolution of European integration, let alone enlargement. It will do all it can to affect and influence the future composition of the Union - from advocating EMU to accepting five to ten new members over the next twenty years.

In contrast to Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel of the FDP cautions against the unrealistic aspirations of the 1996 IGC, even though he supports qualified majority voting decisions and integration of the WEU in the EU.³⁰ Not surprisingly, the opposition SPD opposes the core Europe plan, and believes it will create a second class in Europe. They too believe in integration, but at various speeds with each state meeting the requirements on its own timetable, which is, in essence, not that different from the CDU/CSU core Europe proposition.

Evidently, Germany can no longer expect to achieve significant deepening of the Union by continuing to pursue only federalist objectives. Thus far, the only alternative is a

²⁸ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *United Germany*, 90.

²⁹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *United Germany*, 91.

³⁰ Author Unknown, "EU Foreign Ministers Debate Reform Proposals; Kinkel Sees Agreement Coming," *The Week in Germany*, (A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center, New York), April 11, 1997, 2.

core Europe. Pivotal to the realisation of such a goal is the Franco-German relationship. France's picture of a core group differs from the German conception, as President Chirac opposes any strengthening of the EP. Yet, it appeals to Jacques Chirac because via monetary union and the "Euro" France would have more control over the Bundesbank. Additionally, a two-track Europe might multilateralise military forces and preserve the French idea of a Eurocorps.³¹ On May 1, when the British electorate provided Tony Blair's Labour Party with a landslide victory over the Conservative government, prospects of cooperation among Germany, France and Great Britain increased. Prime Minister Blair's government is of a Europeanist mind set, whereas its predecessors were Euroskeptics. Therefore the future may hold greater cooperation among the larger European countries as they attempt to reform the EU's institutions so the Union can function efficiently with five to ten more members.

However, as far as integration is concerned, the German dream of a federal Europe has been shelved and piecemeal co-operation with France, and possibly Great Britain, is being attempted. Nonetheless, Germany remains content to be a central European power with the strongest economy in Europe. As it pursues deeper levels of integration, Germany is acting as a bridge between West and East in Europe, calling for enlargement of the EU to many Central European states.

Germany and EU Enlargement

In contrast with its desire for deeper European integration Germany's interest in EU enlargement can be seen in terms of national interest. While integration represents

³¹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *United Germany*, 92.

Germany as a post-national, more fully multilateral, European nation, enlargement reveals Germany's national-interest in preserving stability on its borders and having productive, prosperous neighbours on all sides. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Germany has been a strong supporter of Central European states by providing aid, advice and infrastructure support.

Within the EU, Germany is the leading proponent of enlargement seeing EU membership as the key to stability and prosperity in Central Europe. Germany is aware that its post-war prosperity was partially built on the Soviet victimisation of Eastern Europe.³² Modernisation was able to proceed in the West without being strained by claims to the East. Germany is also driven by the knowledge that any trouble in the fledgling democracies to its east could result in an influx of refugees and asylum seekers. "Germany, suddenly freed from being the tense front-line state politically, has no wish to retain "the east of the West" economically and socially."³³ Hence, Germany has assigned itself the task of advocate of Central Europe within the EU. Germany is pushing the EU to give a formal promise of eventual membership to the Central Europeans. Just as the Marshall Plan helped reconstruct war ravaged Western Europe after WWII and make any threat of war within the region unthinkable, "so should imaginative diplomacy now do the same for Central Europe."³⁴

Imaginative diplomacy has been at work in Germany and Western Europe since the end of the Cold War. Although it may not come in the form of a descendent of the Marshall Plan, agreements and grant programmes are in place to help Central Europe meet the EU

³² Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Winter 1996), 32.

³³ Elizabeth Pond, *Germany Finds Its Niche*, 33.

³⁴ Elizabeth Pond, *Germany Finds Its Niche*, 33.

convergence levels. Currently, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia have signed Europe Agreements, or Association Agreements as they are also known, with the member states of the European Union.³⁵

Following the European Council summit in Copenhagen, the Europe Agreements took on great political significance. The European Council concluded that "the association countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required."³⁶ The Europe Agreements

establish bilateral associations with the EU based on a political dialogue, progressive economic integration and financial assistance. They are of unlimited duration with transition periods for the removal of economic and commercial barriers of up to 10 years for the associated countries. All Union restrictions on the import of industrial goods will be removed by the end of 1997.³⁷

The features of each agreement differ depending on the country involved, though they all aim to improve political and economic relations. Most Central and East European countries (CEEC) will be involved in multilateral dialogues on Union policy, including the second and third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and home and justice affairs respectively. Meetings will be held at the ministerial level as well as among heads of state. Economically, free trade in industrial goods will be achieved and the CEECs will eventually receive preferential treatment for their agricultural products. Obstacles to trade in services will be removed by 2000. Moreover, the CEECs are committed to producing legislation similar to the Union where industrial, property and

³⁵ Internet: Relations between EU and CEEC: EU Agreements, <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/euagce.html>.

³⁶ European Commission, The Phare Programme Annual Report 1995, Comm.(96), 360 final, Brussels 23.07.1996, 4.

cultural cooperation are concerned.

The EU has stated three broad criteria to be met by all future EU members:

- an effective transition to a pluralist democracy and a market economy;
- the capacity to implement the *acquis communautaire*³⁷;
- full acceptance of the political goals defined by the Maastricht Treaty [sic].³⁹

Associations Councils have also been established for bilateral meetings between the EU, members states and partner countries. In 1995, these meetings concentrated on pre-accession strategy and regional cooperation in an effort to help the CEECs meet the criteria.

Along with the Europe Agreements, the Phare grant programme was developed to assist the CEECs achieve these entrance criteria. Phare is the Union's main technical assistance programme for the CEECs.

The Phare programme is the European Union's initiative which provides grant finance to support its partner countries through the process of economic transformation and strengthening of democracy to the stage where they are ready to assume the obligations of membership of the EU.⁴⁰

Phare is the largest grant assistance programme supporting CEECs giving ECU 5,416.9 million to eleven partner countries by the end of 1995.⁴¹ Phare is specifically a source of finance to help the CEECs meet the objectives of the Europe Agreements and implement the EU's pre-accession strategy.

The EU has also made "structured dialogue" a priority of its pre-accession strategy. Herein partner countries are able to discuss issues of common concern with the EU member states, such as cultural cooperation, CFSP, and the CAP. Moreover it gives them a window

³⁷ Internet: Relations between EU and CEEC: EU agreements, <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/euag.html>.

³⁸ *Acquis communautaire* means accepting the entire previous achievements of the European Community and the European Union toward integration and joint Union legislation.

³⁹ Ferdinand Kinsky, The Future of the European Union: Deepening and Enlargement (Nice: Presses D'Europe, 1995), 13.

⁴⁰ Internet: Application Seconde Phare, <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgla/phare/whatisph.htm#Phare1>.

⁴¹ Internet: Application Seconde Phare, <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgla/phare/whatisph.htm#Phare1>.

into EU activities, as well as the opportunity to develop familiarity with the processes and functions of the Union. The partner countries were invited to Councils in Cannes and Madrid where they discussed issues surrounding transport, environment, scientific research, telecommunications and organised crime.

During the week of April 11, 1997, the foreign ministers of the EU's 15 member states met in the Netherlands to discuss the future of the Union. They agreed that over the next several years the EU would become both larger and more deeply integrated.⁴² Concrete proposals for expanding the EU and increasing EU cooperation was given to EU heads of state at the June 1997 summit conference in Amsterdam. The main disagreements at this meeting focused around the future of the European Commission and decision-making for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

It is important that all of the prospective EU members meet the entrance criteria before they are accepted into the Union. For example, the quick and complete absorption of the German Democratic Republic into the EC led to a total breakdown of production in Germany's new eastern Laender. This was accompanied by massive unemployment and the devastation of both financial and human capital. To provide membership to states which do not meet the requirements could be harmful to their economies, especially for the agrarian states.

The accession criteria which the states of Central and Eastern Europe must meet include: implementing stable democratic governments, just legal systems, economic reforms to create competitive market economies, the ability to compete economically within the EU, convergence with the political and economic goals of the EU, acceptance of the

⁴² "EU Foreign Ministers Debate Reform Proposals; Kinkel Sees Agreement Coming," The Week In

common currency and ability to implement the *acquis communautaire*.⁴³

The EU will provide structural and regional funds to the new members as they did for Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, and these funds should help these countries modernise their economies. However, the Union cannot be expected to take on the entire bill in order to make these states compatible and competitive in industrial, technologically advanced market economies.

There are tremendous trade and investment opportunities for the Union, its individual members states and multinational corporations in the Central and Eastern European states. Germany is taking advantage of these opportunities. In Central Europe and parts of Eastern Europe "Germany is the leading western trading partner and of the two top investors in virtually every country, and it gives the most aid both bilaterally and multilaterally."⁴⁴ For example the German firm Volkswagen has made large investments in the car factory Skoda. "The fact that Skoda went to Volkswagen rather than Renault was, however, widely interpreted as a sign of things to come."⁴⁵ Especially, directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union many governments and organisations were slow to take advantage of the opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it has been gradual, foreign direct investment has increased helping countries in this region meet today's technological standards in many facets of industry and daily life.

Furthermore, as the standard of living in the region slowly increases, the demand for consumer products increases. Germany is in the best position geographically and from a

Germany, (A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center, New York), April 11, 1997, 1.

⁴³ Internet: Klaus Kinkel, Ost-Erweiterung der Europaeischen Union - Chance und Herausforderung, Rede des Bundesministers des Auswaertigen Dr. Klaus Kinkel am 12. November 1996 in Hamburg, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html>.

⁴⁴ Elizabeth Pond, "Letter from Bonn: Visions of the European Dream," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No. 3, (Summer 1997), 67.

technological, production perspective to provide these products. Soon, if not already, every household will want a new television, a video cassette recorder, a personal computer and perhaps even a new car. Germany can supply all of these goods to the region as the demand increases and should not forgo this opportunity.

As stated, Germany is already on board in providing advice on industrial and legal reform compatible with EU law as state run institutions are privatised and made competitive. Germany could also be of assistance helping these states reform their agriculture industries making them more efficient. This, however, would pose a problem for implementation of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Unfortunately, the Intergovernmental Conference did not produce any steps on reform of the CAP, something which is necessary before the CEECs can be integrated into the Common Market's agriculture industry. Right now the CAP provides the EU members with heavy subsidies for their agricultural products, thereby distorting international competition in agriculture markets. Beyond the possible dismantling of the CAP, further disagreements surrounding enlargement of the EU have been made public.

The main disagreement on enlargement centred around the future of the European Commission and limiting its membership and size. The five larger countries - France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Germany - favour limiting its size to preserve effective functioning. The smaller countries have rejected various proposals suggesting rotating membership or a combination of temporary and permanent membership. Although these disagreements were not resolved, EU leaders were confident about the prospects for EU reform.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New York: Random House, 1993), 403.

⁴⁶ "EU Foreign Ministers Debate Reform Proposals; Kinkel Sees Agreement Coming," The Week in Germany, (A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center, New York), April 11, 1997, 2.

"Given its economic dominance in the region, this will be a German-led enlargement with all that entails, although cloaked in EU authority."⁴⁷ That stated the question remains: if EU enlargement must be agreed upon by all of the member states, then how can Germany affect whether it will occur and at what pace? "Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, both in absolute and in per capita terms."⁴⁸ Germany's net contribution increased from \$6.3 billion in 1987 to \$13.2 billion in 1992 and will likely be \$18 billion by the end of 1997.⁴⁹ Germany's financial contribution to the EU's income represents two-thirds of its total income, even though Germany's GDP makes up only one-third of the EU countries' total GDP.⁵⁰ Therefore, Germany has become more concerned about its bottom line and insists that its excess payments will have to stop. It will be EU enlargement that will likely be most affected by Germany's waning position as EU paymaster. "Germany favours enlargement more strongly than any of the other main EU powers. But for enlargement to work, the EU and Germany will have to allocate additional funds."⁵¹ This is becoming increasingly difficult for Germany to do. "German budgetary conditions thus are likely to dictate the pace and direction of Europe's future enlargement."⁵²

If Germany wants, as it insists, enlargement negotiations to begin six months after the close of the IGC in Amsterdam⁵³ it will have to sell the merits of EU enlargement to the other fourteen member states, as discussed in Chapter Four. Although Germany is the greatest proponent of EU enlargement it is certainly not its only proponent. German

⁴⁷ George Kolankiewicz, "Consensus and Competition in the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3, (1994), 490.

⁴⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," Current History, Vol. 96, No. 608, (March 1997), 121.

⁴⁹ Katzenstein, *United Germany*, 121.

⁵⁰ Katzenstein, *United Germany*, 121.

⁵¹ Katzenstein, *United Germany*, 121.

⁵² Katzenstein, *United Germany*, 121.

⁵³ The 1996 IGC came to a close on June 17, 1997 in Amsterdam, therefore accession negotiations, according

officials have to find away to use its position as net contributor to the EU budget to its benefit and have the process of enlargement set in motion before German budgetary constraints have too great an impact on the future and pace of the process. Using its institutional power within the EU, Germany must secure greater proportional contributions to the EU budget from the other member states.

Another option that was considered was linking NATO expansion to EU enlargement. Fortunately, however, European leaders have chosen not to link the enlargement of the two organisations as they prepare Europe for the twenty-first century. While EU enlargement may not be appealing to Germany's security community, politically and economically it will shift Germany closer to the centre of Europe. It would do so without threatening Russia, which in Pond's opinion is one of Germany's long-term foreign policy precepts.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the first round of NATO expansion is closer on the horizon than EU enlargement. On July 8-9, 1997, at the NATO Summit in Madrid it was decided that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be admitted to NATO in its first round of expansion. Clearly, Germany has a balancing act to play between being a strong public advocate of NATO expansion and wanting to maintain good relations with Russia. However, the decision to expand to these three Central European states was made with Russia's consent.

The timetable of NATO expansion was also considered at the Madrid Summit. A great deal of Germany's political elite favour this quick NATO expansion. After the negotiation of the Founding Act with the Russian federation in May 1997, it was decided that NATO expansion will take place in 1999. NATO, a strictly intergovernmental

to Germany's timetable should begin in January 1998.

⁵⁴ Pond, *Germany Finds Its Niche*, 33.

organisation, is far more ready to take on new members than the EU. The Central and East European countries are also in a better position to join NATO than they are to join the EU. In this context most Germans do not link membership in one organisation with membership in the other. Germans will do what they can to increase the pace of enlargement of both organisations.

Just as some Germans advocate the simultaneous enlargement of the EU and NATO, some call for both widening and deepening as the EU enters the twenty-first century. While writers such as Elizabeth Pond and Robert G. Livingston believe that widening is a logical extension of deepening and pursuing both does not pose a contradiction,⁵⁵ others, such as Harald Mueller, note a contradiction between the two priorities.⁵⁶ As the EU tries to integrate over twenty states many fear the Union will be too cumbersome and unmanageable. The Germans propose as a solution, "core Europe," which has been discussed.

In 1994, then Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, Ambassador Niels Erbsboll, gave an optimistic view of the future of the EU in International Affairs,

The story of the Community over the past ten years has been one of integration driven by the needs of the member states and of successful answers to their problems. The conventional wisdom that there is potential conflict between widening and deepening, and that deepening should always come first is not borne out by experience. On the contrary, enlargement has tended to mobilise forces for further integration and particularly for better balance between the advantages to member states from the Union.⁵⁷

The Intergovernmental Conference which began in March of 1996 in Italy closed on June

⁵⁵ See Elizabeth Pond, *Germany Finds Its Niche* (1996) and Robert G. Livingston, *United Germany: Bigger and Better*, (1992).

⁵⁶ Harold Mueller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification," in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany and The New Europe, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992), 158.

⁵⁷ Niels Erbsboll, "The European Union: the immediate priorities," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3, (1994), 419.

17, 1997 in Amsterdam. Here a timetable for enlargement, as well as which states will be admitted first, was supposed to be forthcoming. Also on the agenda was EU reform and how best to prepare for enlargement to the CEECs, now deemed immanent by most EU members. Broadly, the IGC was to take stock of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and offer improvements to make the Union more functional both for future European cooperation and in the international community. It is widely agreed that before the EU can accept new members from Central and Eastern Europe, or even Cyprus, Malta or Turkey, it requires a better system of management. Also agreed is that the EU will not become a Europe *a la carte*, where each state chooses the functions it likes best and "opts out" of those it sees as disadvantages.

At the close of the IGC in Amsterdam a new Treaty was produced, the Maastricht II Treaty, or Amsterdam Treaty. There were hopes that it would contain criteria for strengthening the European Parliament, proposals for limiting Commission membership, criteria for qualified majority voting and a timetable for enlargement. Although unlikely, many also hoped that the 'first wave' states would even be named. However, the outcome of the treaty negotiations did not live up to the hopes many had pinned on them. EU leaders found it very difficult to compromise on several issues, ranging from the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the EU's official defence arm, which Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries opposed, to determining representation in the Commission. The smaller countries do not want to give up their right to keep one commissioner, while the larger countries want to retain the right to have two commissioners each in the European Commission, the Union decision-making body. There were mixed results in the area of qualified majority voting. "Leaders agreed that countries would retain their veto in areas of

immigration because Germany insisted on this point."⁵⁸ It was agreed that the Euro would be put into use in 1999 as scheduled, but decisions on which countries would join were put off. Also put off was the decision on which central and eastern European countries would be offered membership in 1998.

Although enlargement will not be delayed, the Amsterdam Treaty did not, as intended, fully prepare the Union to accept new eastern members in 1998. What the CEECs can expect is to join a Union that is not yet entirely ready to accept them. The Union still requires better decision-making procedures, a more democratic European Parliament and a more efficient management system. It is possible that these changes could be met by the time the CEECs have full membership, and after they have completed the transition period, two or three decades into the new millennium. On Wednesday, June 18, 1997, the Associated Press reported that although "European Union leaders failed to reach consensus on an ambitious overhaul of its basic charter" they "salvaged enough changes to pave the way for the EU's eastward expansion."⁵⁹ Therefore, EU leaders are hopeful that enlargement will still take place, even though the Union will not be in the best position to accept new members. The draft Amsterdam Treaty proposes changes to the current composition and operation of the European Union. Twelve broad changes were agreed to at Amsterdam:

Frontiers

1. Open frontiers for people in the European Union,
2. A European policy on visas, asylum and immigration,

Security

3. Greater cooperation between European police forces,

Social Policy

4. The fight against unemployment at a European level,

⁵⁸ Madelaine Drohan, "European Leaders Leave Tough Decision Until Later: Amsterdam Summit Shows EU Official Far Behind Schedule," *The Globe and Mail*, Wednesday, 18 June 1997, A8.

⁵⁹ Associated Press, "EU Expansion Set," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Wednesday, 18 June 1997, D10.

5. European social policy applies to all members,
Environment and Health
6. More stringent environmental legislation in the EU,
7. European policy to protect public health,
Human Rights
8. Freedom, security and justice,
Government
9. Greater openness of European government,
10. Greater powers for the European parliament,
11. Better management of European funds,
12. More effective European foreign policy.⁶⁰

Putting aside the outcome of the IGC there are, as mentioned in Chapter Two, several steps Germany can take to help the CEECs meet the EU entrance requirements. Germany after unification is stronger than before and the distance between Germany and other European industrial powers will only grow.⁶¹ Germany benefits from having several central and eastern, and western European countries depending on the German Mark and the German economy. It is in accordance with the strength of the Mark that bargaining within the EU takes place.⁶² The common market benefits most markets in Europe and the Federal Republic is the strongest market.

Its financial weight gives Germany more bargaining power within the EU. Germany, led by Chancellor Kohl, is likely use this power to push EU enlargement up the agenda until a date is set for accession of the CEECs to the EU. This date will likely be agreed to before the EU accepts the "Euro" as its single currency, if it does at all. It may seem odd that the German government would be willing to part with the strong Deutsch Mark (DM) in return for a single currency, yet political unification of Europe has been the goal of every German leader since Adenauer and remains the goal of Chancellor Kohl.

⁶⁰ Internet: EU Amsterdam Treaty, (6/17/1997), (fact sheet, English), <http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/eurunion/amsterdm/amfacte.html>. The complete text of the draft copy of the Amsterdam Treaty can also be found at this website.

⁶¹ Pradetto, *Transformation in Eastern Europe*, 27.

Kohl sees EMU and implementation of a single currency not as an economic or financial goal, but as a political goal bringing European closer together.⁶³ Nonetheless the timing could be crucial for Germany if both goals - enlargement and a single currency - are to become reality. Given the changing political situation within EU member governments, it appears as though enlargement is being given priority over a single currency in most governments. Great Britain and France⁶⁴ both have left of centre parties which favour EU reform as well as government supported employment initiatives. As the French Communists oppose the Euro, it seems that the EU could well have fifteen members before it has a single currency. The outcome of the IGC has brought Europeans a step closer to their future, and it appears as though it will be both wider and deeper, that is if both enlargement and implementation of the single currency take place according to the current schedule.

CONCLUSION

Germany is playing an active role in helping to ensure that the eastward enlargement of the EU takes place in the next decades. The Federal Republic, via the Phare Programme and "*Transform*", is also assisting many of the countries as they strive to meet the accession criteria. If the academic discourse truly does set the parameters of a country's foreign policy choices, as Ole Waever suggests, the German foreign policy establishment seems to be following the course of the Europeanists. As a variant of pragmatic multilateralism, the Europeanists believe in widening and deepening of the EU through

⁶² Pradetto, *Transformation in Eastern Europe*, 27.

⁶³ President William J. Clinton, Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan (Speech), Hall of Knights, Binnenhof, The Hague, Netherlands, (May 28, 1997).

⁶⁴ On June 1, 1997, the French elected a Socialist parliament led by Lionel Jospin which has formed a coalition

multilateral agreements and mutual cooperation in order to tie Germany more closely to Europe.

How far east the Europeanists want the Union enlarged is another question. Most Germans make a cultural distinction between its four closest neighbours; Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia⁶⁵; and Russia and the former Soviet states. The four states nearest Germany are often included in Central Europe, while the others, in the minds of many Germans, are farther away in Eastern Europe. As the Berlin Republic fashions its European policy, it will readily include Central Europe in discussions regarding the future of the EU. Eastern Europe (the former Soviet states, as depicted in the minds of many Germans) will be included at a much slower pace and then only as a trading area is developed.

The outcome of the IGC in June 1997 in Amsterdam has given the Union clearer starting points for institutional reform and a loose timetable for accession. Here again, Germany is working in cooperation with its partners. However, it is also leading the calls for EMU and a single currency before the EU takes on any new members. The proceeding chapter will provide a more detailed evaluation of the Intergovernmental Conference. The next few years will map out the future direction of the EU and although Germany will not alone decide its course, it will be certain that its voice is heard.

As stated Germany has the most to gain from EU enlargement, however, as the largest net contributor to the EU budget, enlargement could also cost Germany the most. The merits and perils of EU enlargements for Germany and for the Union as a whole will be

with the French Communist Party.

⁶⁵ Romania is also considered, by many, as part of Central Europe, however, it will not be accepted into NATO's first round of expansion, nor is it likely to be accepted into the EU in the first round of enlargement.

considered in the next chapter. It will be shown that although it will be neither an easy nor an inexpensive process, the long-term merits of enlargements will by far outweigh the short-term perils. Although enlargement will cost Germany a lot of money and possibly many jobs in the short-term, it will provide the German economy with several new opportunities for trade and investment in the long-term. Accompanying an examination of the merits and perils of enlargement will also be a look at the process of enlargement and how it may take place. Moreover, the attitudes of the current EU members will be considered as they may affect the next round of enlargement talks in 1998.

Germany is obviously playing a very active role in the future of the European Union, promoting both its deepening and widening. However, the successes Germany achieves are for all of Europe, not for Germany alone, just as Germany achieves these successes by working together with its partners in the European Union, and not by itself. Although EU enlargement may be a German-led project, in the end it truly is a European project that will benefit each member state of the Union in the long-term.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MERITS AND PERILS OF EU ENLARGEMENT FOR GERMANY

(T)he striking aspect of Germany's stance is the regularity with which the popular consensus chooses enlightened, long-term self-interest over short-term gain, especially in European Union (EU) matters.

Elizabeth Pond¹

As previously indicated Germany is leading calls for the eastward enlargement of the European Union. It is not doing so for purely altruistic reasons. EU enlargement is deemed by many in German foreign policy circles² as in Germany's national interest. However, a portion of the German population opposes any further enlargements of the EU, let alone deeper integration.³ The European Commission asked EU citizens how they generally felt about EU enlargement and only 35 percent of German citizens had a positive attitude in 1995. Here the merits and perils of EU enlargement will be examined from both the government's and the population's perspective. Although the German people have apprehensions about EU enlargement it will be demonstrated that the long-term gains will surpass the short-term costs. The discussion will illustrate that although there will be enormous costs associated with enlarging the EU, they will, in the long-term, be far out

¹ Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Winter 1996), 30.

² EU enlargement is seen as inevitable by Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister Ruehe and former Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

³ European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Report Number 45, Spring 1996), 66. See appendix H.

weighed by the benefits a wider EU will bring to Europe and in turn to Germany. Therefore, the merits of EU enlargement will be far greater than the perils.

First consideration will be given to the perils of EU enlargement for Germany as well as for Europe. After these points are given due consideration the merits of EU enlargement for Germany and the EU will be examined. Then some final thoughts on the process itself and its progress to date, as well as the reforms the Union needs to undergo before it will be able to accept new members will be provided. Finally, some long-term predictions and prescriptions will be given in terms of the EU's future in Europe and Germany's place within Europe.

THE PERILS OF EU ENLARGEMENT

Though Euroskeptics would argue there are hundreds of reasons not to provide EU membership to states from central and eastern Europe this study will only take the most important reasons into account. Because each factor is important and could be assessed as the most important depending on what perspective is taken, the factors will be considered without any specific ranking, though some will obviously be given more importance than others.

Directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union fears were voiced about potential German hegemonic intentions in Europe, including the former Warsaw Pact countries. To counter these fears the German government has been very clear about its general foreign policy philosophy. Although it is undergoing a normalisation process, it remains firmly committed to the international institutions to which it belongs and to the multilateralism for which it is known. Neither the current German government, nor the German people foster

any aspirations about transforming Europe into a German empire.

Yet, some still question whether Germany is becoming an economic hegemon in Europe. The prognoses of the German economy are so varied that one can hardly predict where exactly it will stand in relation to the other European economies in 25 to 50 years. That being said, however, it cannot be forgotten that the economies of western Europe especially are linked and are growing more interdependent year by year. Therefore, what benefits the German economy will also likely benefit the French and the British economies directly. Conversely, when the German economy experiences setbacks so too will the other Single Market member states as well as states which have pegged their currencies to the Deutschmark. Therefore, as the largest economy in Europe, it is in each country's interest that the German economy remain stable and prosperous. As long as Germany does not try to impose unilaterally its will on the members of the EU most are content to let Germany play a leading role in central and eastern Europe.

Another concern that arises out of the eastward enlargement of the EU is how the Russian Federation will react. It is not the intention of the EU, and especially not of Germany, to isolate Russia. In fact as far as EU enlargement is concerned Russia holds few reservations. NATO enlargement, on the other hand, is an entirely different question, which has already been briefly discussed. The EU even has a grant programme in place - Tacis - to help Russia rebuild its economy. Therefore Russia is not likely to denounce EU enlargement as it is also in its interest to have stable, prosperous states in central and eastern Europe.

One of the greatest objections to the eastward enlargement of the EU is the economic cost for Germany. Due to a failing European *Ostpolitik* EU enlargement will cost

Germany more than all of the other EU members combined.⁴ Therefore, as earlier discussed German budget constraints will likely determine the pace of enlargement. It is hard to estimate the total cost of EU enlargement for Germany and its citizens. Conversely, it is difficult to assess the long-term cost of not opening the Union up to new central and eastern European members. If the states of central and eastern Europe are to once again become part of the thriving western economies as in centuries earlier, they must accede into the EU. Of course, this has been acknowledged by the EU and the accession states must first meet the entrance criteria. This will also be a costly endeavour. The German government is willing to accept the costs of enlargement, but would like to see them spread more evenly throughout the Union. This alone could determine the pace of enlargement.

Another peril of EU enlargement is that all new members will have to be accepted by the governments of the individual member states. Herein two concerns arise. First, the Mediterranean states Greece, Italy, and Spain are not greatly in favour of eastward enlargement as they fear regional funds will be directed away from them to the eastern states, which will in all likelihood be the case. Acceptance of Malta and perhaps Cyprus in the first round of enlargement would help curb this specific discontent. The second, and related point, is that a portion of the German population opposes eastern enlargement. The sentiment is that they have already paid for the absorption of the former GDR through an increase in taxes, they do not want to pay more for a larger Union. A small minority of the German left detests Germany's commitment to multilateralism and rejects enhancing any commitment to international institutions, including widening and deepening of the

⁴ Maarten C. Brands, "Ueberforderung durch Machtzunahme? Deutschland als integrierende oder zentrifugale Kraft," *Internationale Politik*, No. 2, (1997), 39.

European Union.⁵ While this group's attitude represents a potential impediment to achieving Union enlargement, it is the opinion of only a small minority of the German population. It could be conversely viewed that EU enlargement would be beneficial because, if successful, it may help to silence this extreme portion of the population by delegitimising its views.

There is another growing attitude among the German public that could cast an unpleasant light on Germany's desire to widen the Union eastward. Among those who call for normalisation of Germany's foreign policy is a small, intellectually-led, right-wing group which favours exorcising memories of the dark side of German history in order for Germany to reestablish itself as a country like any other.⁶ Although the goal is understandable in some senses, it could also lead to the perception that Germany has not learned from its past. It could also lead German official to overlook the fears and perceptions of other states, especially Germany's close neighbours. Thus, in order to pursue enlargement without being accused of having ulterior motives, the German government, as it has for so long, will have to maintain a respect for, and understanding of, the legacy its past has imposed on its future foreign policy actions. There are other problems Germany will also have to consider before EU enlargement can be carried out.

The just completed Treaty of Amsterdam proposes EU reforms, some of which need to occur before new members can be accepted. This treaty will be put to a referendum in member states potentially slowing the process of enlargement, especially if it is blocked in any country, as nearly happened with the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France.

⁵ Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification," in Paul B. Stares, The New Germany in the New Europe, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 164.

⁶ Gunther Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany," Mershon International Studies Review, (1996), Vol. 40, 15.

However, the Amsterdam Treaty is far less controversial than the Maastricht Treaty and should be ratified by the member states without any significant problems. As of yet there has not been any public dissension to the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference in June 1997, except perhaps that it did not mandate enough institutional reforms.

One thing is certain: to make any significant progress on EU reform, which is needed before enlargement can take place, Germany and France will have to cooperate. It would not hurt to have the UK's cooperation as well. Newly elected British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, assured Chancellor Kohl that he would do all he could to ensure that the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty come to a successful conclusion.⁷ The new socialist French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, also had good intentions going into the Amsterdam negotiations, although he did not receive the support he wanted on his European employment initiative. Additionally it cannot be overlooked that he must cooperate with the communist portion of his coalition who are vehemently opposed to a single currency. Nonetheless, he has asserted that the French socialists have the same goals as the British socialists, just different means of achieving them.⁸ Without the cooperation of, at the very least, the largest EU powers, EU reform will be an unachievable task and the Union will not be prepared to accept new members.

Other perils of EU enlargement are more tangible. For example, it is hard to counter the argument from a German labourer that jobs in Germany will be lost to the cheaper source of labour in central and eastern Europe. Germans do look on the CEECs as North American do Mexico as a source of cheap labour. Beyond the lost employment in the

⁷ Author Unknown, "Blair: Europa braucht Reform," Allgemeine Zeitung Rhein Main Presse, 7. Juni 1997, 1. Author's translation.

⁸ Author Unknown, "Blair: Europa braucht Reform," Allgemeine Zeitung Rhein Main Presse, 7. Juni 1997, 1. Author's translation.

labour sector, applying the Common Agriculture Policy to the CEECs will be a nearly impossible task not to mention the protest it will evoke from French, Spanish and German farmers. The CAP has outlived its usefulness and should be dismantled, although if and when this will happen is not yet known. This may be the only way of integrating the central and eastern European agriculture industry into the European common market.

From the constant balancing act that makes up the foreign policy of most industrialised nations stems another potential peril of the enlargement of the EU for Germany. Germany, as any nation, must balance its foreign policy with its domestic policy in order to pursue a foreign policy acceptable to the German electorate. While it is clear to the German government that the electorate would never accept any substantial adventurism in German foreign policy (nor would the government consider it) the government has to pursue a foreign policy in line with what is acceptable to the German people. Any changes, especially away from Germany's enlightened multilateralism, must be made slowly.

The constitutional ruling in 1994 on German out-of-area missions is a case in point. The German establishment had long been debating the future role of the German military and whether it should be permitted to take part in UN peacekeeping missions outside of NATO's territory. The German public was initially adverse to the Bundeswehr playing a larger role, even in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. However, dissent diminished after the court ruled that German soldiers could constitutionally take part in such missions. Since 1994 Germany has been able to take greater responsibility in international affairs by sending officers on a UN military observer mission in the former Soviet Union in Georgia, and taking part in Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia.

This is an example of how Germany must balance its foreign policy priorities with

its domestic policy and the opinions of the German public. For Germany the best way to persuade the German electorate that EU enlargement is a foreign policy priority is show them how they will benefit from enlargement by having prosperous, stable neighbours to the east. Additionally, the demand on the German government to accept more refugees and immigrants will likely decrease as the east prospers. The German government must convince the German people that the costs of not enlarging the Union are far greater than the costs of enlarging the Union.

None of these potential perils of EU enlargement are insurmountable. From this brief survey it is clear that the cost of enlargement, especially for Germany, is the greatest concern. Nonetheless on June 5, 1997, Chancellor Kohl declared to US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, that "the Germans and the Americans must work together with the people in central and eastern Europe to bring solidarity to the region."⁹ He suggested a plan to help these states help themselves, something modelled after the Marshall Plan. In fact he argued that helping these states into international organisations is one of the most important goals of the entire western community.¹⁰

THE MERITS OF EU ENLARGEMENT

Although the merits of the eastward enlargement of the EU have been brought to light in numerous areas of this study they will be considered here again as they are measured against the perils of enlargement. It should be apparent that, in the long-term, the merits of enlargement far outweigh the perils, especially for Germany.

⁹ Helmut Kohl, "Kohl: Marshalls Ideen wegweisend fuer Osteuropa," Allgemeine Zeitung Rhein Main Presse, 7. Juni 1997, 2. Author's translation.

¹⁰ Internet: Press Release, Speech by Dr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on receiving the George C. Marshall Foundation Award on the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan,

Germany's fundamental European policy concern following the end of the Cold War and into the year 2000 is to have peace and stability in all of Europe. With the war in Bosnia finally being settled, its wishes may be fulfilled. Through, generally multilateral policies, Germany has been actively pursuing goals it believes will ensure peace and stability on the continent.

Of utmost importance, for the Kohl government, is that the former communist states of eastern Europe make a complete conversion to free, open democratic societies. Kohl has already stated that it is Germany's responsibility to assist these fledgling democracies build the foundation of fair, constitutional democracies. This is done by running multi-party elections, maintaining freedom of speech, religion and the press, as well as formulating fair, firm judicial systems. In these regards Germany has provided advice and infrastructure support to several of the CEECs.¹¹

Next Germany asserts the importance of neighbours that are not only politically stable, but are also economically stable. For many of these countries, especially Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Germany and the EU have been of enormous assistance in the transition from closed, centrally planned economies, to open, liberal, market economies. Because Germany wants its own economy to flourish it cannot stand by and watch the economies of its neighbours stagnate. Germany has provided advice on transforming state run institutions into competitive public and private institutions.

With economically and politically stable neighbours to its east Germany can rest assured that peace and freedom will soon characterise every European state. Soon the

Washington, DC, 5 June 1997, 1. [Http://www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/pm/pm97060501.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/pm/pm97060501.html)

¹¹ Internet: Dr. Klaus Kinkel, Ost-Erweiterung der Europaeische Union - Chance und Herausforderung, Rede des Bundesministers des Auswaertigen Dr. Klaus Kinkel am 12. November 1996 in Hamburg. [Http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/de/europa/r961114.html). Author's translation.

thought of war anywhere in Europe will be entirely unimaginable. Moreover Germany benefits from economically sound neighbours as its trade and investment opportunities in the region grow. The Federal Republic is the most important trading partner for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as well as being the main source of foreign direct investment for countries in this region.¹²

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in the former Yugoslavia Germany experienced a sharp influx of immigrants and refugees. In 1992 alone Germany took in more than five hundred thousand refugees accounting for "79 percent of all the refugees accepted by the EC and six times as many as the much larger United States."¹³ Germany has tightened its rather relaxed refugee and immigration policy. However, the government knows the best way to curb the steady migration of immigrants over its borders is to help make life in the countries which they flee happy and satisfying. In addition, it has helped to curb the violent reactions among young, lower-class Germany against foreigners in Germany. The youth tend to blame these immigrants for their own misfortunes. As displaced as this rage is, it will be mitigated with Germany's tighten immigration policy and the eastward enlargement of the EU, as this will eventually raise the living standards in the CEECs. This is just another way Germany and Germans benefit from having stable, economically prosperous neighbours to its east. Once the convergence with western economies is complete, the best way to integrate these states into western Europe is to provide them with membership in western institutions, especially the EU.

Another merit of enlargement of the EU is that the third pillar of the Maastricht

¹² Michael Kreile, "Will Germany Assume a Leadership Role in the European Union?" in Bertel Heurlin, (Ed.), Germany in Europe in the Nineties, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 134.

¹³ Philip H. Gordon, "Berlin's Difficulties: The Normalization of German Foreign Policy," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 2, (Spring 1994), 232.

Treaty, which deals with justice and home affairs issues such as organised crime and drug trafficking, would have expanded jurisdiction. As of yet the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty has progressed as slowly at the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nonetheless, by the time the Union is ready to accept new members its justice and home affairs pillar will likely be in better working order, ready to combat organised crime and drug trafficking across the continent.

Germany is also pursuing the eastward enlargement of the EU to protect its interests in maintaining security in the somewhat fragile region to its east. Admittance of these countries into the EU, as well as NATO, will help Germany and its partner states ensure that security in the region is maintain. Here it is interesting to note the simultaneous cooperation and tension in the Franco-German relationship as Germany seeks to have its interests highlight the European agenda. "(T)he influence of history, culture, and geography ensure that French and German interests in the East will differ. Without voluntaristic policy cooperation from Paris and Bonn, the structurally greater German interest in the East could force French and German foreign and security policies toward that region to diverge."¹⁴

Especially after 1993 and 1994 when Germany led the calls for NATO membership for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to fill the strategic vacuum in the region, the policies of Germany and France seemed to diverge. France proposed as slower acceptance of these countries into NATO coinciding with their acceptance into the Western European Union on a more consultative basis.

(B)oth France and Germany sought to dispel the impression that Central Europe was being slighted (or that French and German policies were out of sync) and announced plans for a joint "*Ostpolitik*" to be implemented during

¹⁴ Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 47.

their successive presidencies of the European Union.¹⁵

Although they have tried, France and Germany have not been able to overcome the fact that their national interests in Central and Eastern Europe do not always coincide. For example, France favoured NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, as well as Romania and Slovenia, however, Germany refused to engage in a numbers game. It did not publicly support membership for the latter two countries, as did France and Canada.

Germany's relationship with France can be seen as a merit of EU enlargement when the two work on joint initiatives, but it is also an impediment in light of French accusations of a reassertion of German power in the region. What is important is that the two countries are attempting to converge their policies in the region. Philip H. Gordon, without speaking directly about German foreign policy, sums up the slow metamorphosis united German foreign policy has undergone since 1990:

(I)f France and others fail to respond to German particular interests in the East, Germany will be obliged to take action itself. It seems a fundamental challenge for France and the other allies not to let Eastern Europe become a domain of exclusive German responsibility.¹⁶

Germany is attempting to maintain consistency in its foreign policy and will seek to involve France and the other allies in stabilising the region. However, as previously witnessed, when multilateral attempts to pursue its interests do not meet with success Germany will pursue unilateral means to satisfy its foreign policy priorities. For Germany, seven years after unification, the stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe, and hence its entry into the European Union, remains a foreign policy priority. It will no longer be "the eastern border between stability and instability in Europe."¹⁷

¹⁵ Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance*, 52.

¹⁶ Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance*, 53.

¹⁷ Maarten C. Brands, *Ueberforderung durch Machtzunahme?*, 39. Author's translation.

Finally, with the enlargement of the EU Germany will act as a bridge, as it is already doing, between western and eastern European countries. Doing so will give Germany greater political influence within the EU. For instance Germany in 1992 was already the leading foreign direct investor in eastern Europe investing 1 980.8 million ECU in the region.¹⁸ In 1996 German trade with this region expanded by 10.8 percent at a record volume of DM 130 billion.¹⁹ Once countries of central and eastern Europe become members of the EU, Germany will potentially have more voting allies with in the Union. An illustration of Germany's increasing influence in the region is the fact that German, along with English, have become the leading foreign languages in Central Europe, replacing Russian. More foreigners in Eastern Europe are learning German than anywhere else in the world.²⁰ The interests of the CEECs are more likely to converge with German interests than with Italian or Greek interests, especially if Germany asks the new members for their support. Naturally it also appeals to Germany that as the bridge between western and central and eastern Europe it would become the centre of the European Union.

Having clearly outlined the merits and perils of the eastward enlargement of the EU for Germany some consideration needs to be given to the stance other EU members on EU enlargement. After all without the cooperation of the rest of the EU, or at least some of the other members, Germany's goal of enlargement will be impossible to achieve.

HOW ENLARGEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED

Historically Germany has been a proponent of widening, as well as deepening the

¹⁸ European Commission, Regional Development Studies: The Impact of the Development of the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the Community Territory, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996), 28.

¹⁹ Internet: Auswaertiges Amt, Trade with Eastern Europe ten percent; Particularly strong growth in trade with EU-associated countries. [Http://www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/specials/sp97060302.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/specials/sp97060302.html).

²⁰ Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance*, 47.

Union, although at times Europeanists and Atlanticists were split on the timing of specific enlargements and moves to deepen the Community. Germany has supported prior Community and Union enlargements to include the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995. In 1973, although Britain saw Community membership as a way to reorient its trade toward Europe, in reality it tied it closer to German economic decision making.²¹ Germany's position in the Community was definitely strengthened by the addition of the three new countries in 1973. While the addition of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s did not necessarily strengthen Germany's position in the Community it did confirm the status quo of German predominance, while at the same time widening the economic gap between the member states.²² The addition of Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 has helped to redistribute more wealth to the poorer regions of the Union, because they "are expected to make net contributions to the EU budget and to help finance the necessary transfer of resources"²³ to these regions.

Contrary to current day enlargement discussions, the issue of enlargement in the 1960s was tied to disagreements over the political and economic purpose of the Community, and how best to solve the monetary problems experienced that decade.²⁴ Current debate surrounding EU enlargement focuses not on the political or economic purpose of the Union, but on the sequence in which events should take place. Some states would prefer to deepen the Union before accepting new members, while others see no

²¹ Mark Blacksell, "Germany as a European Power," in Derek Lewis and John R. P. McKenzie, (Eds.), The New Germany: Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of Unification, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 93.

²² Mark Blacksell, *Germany as a European Power*, 93-4.

²³ Mark Blacksell, *Germany as a European Power*, 94.

²⁴ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy, (New Haven:

problem with simultaneously deepening and enlarging the Union, which would inevitably produce a two-speed, or 'variable geometry' Europe. Germany belongs to the latter group. Therefore, although the future of the Union is not entirely mapped out, the member states have come a long way since the 1960s when they were still trying to determine the purpose of the Union, which today is largely agreed upon. The Union is working toward creating an integrated Europe which serves the interests of each member while promoting Europe on the international stage as a strong economic, financial entity. The exact way this will be done is being worked out but the general goals have been agreed upon by all of the member states.

Germany alone cannot bring about enlargement of the Union. Under the leadership of Prime Minister John Major the British government favoured EU enlargement over deeper integration of the Union. The UK hoped this would dilute deepening and increase diversity in the Union as well as possibly leading to the end of the terribly inefficient Common Agriculture Policy.²⁵ Now that John Major has lost power to Prime Minister Tony Blair's Labour government, the UK may even be more cooperative in the area of EU reform. To date, however, the United Kingdom remains committed to the eastward enlargement of the Union.

The Benelux states would like to see deepening before widening as they prefer supranational growth of the Union over increased intergovernmental affairs.²⁶ There are fears among the Benelux states that if the Union were to become larger before deeper more power would be placed in the hands of the larger states.

Yale University Press, 1989), 254.

²⁵ Josef Janning, "A German Europe - A European Germany? On the Debate Over Germany's Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, 72, 1, (1996), 39.

²⁶ Josef Janning, *Germany's Foreign Policy*, 39.

Spain and Italy, although Italy has distanced itself from the debate, do not seem to have a strong preference between widening and deepening. Their main concern is assuring that the Mediterranean front continues to receive the attention and resources to which it has become accustomed.

Last, but certainly not least, France "would opt for a deepening along the lines of its own preferences but shares some interest in widening in order to tie Germany to the Union and fulfil the Union's principal role on the continent."²⁷ France would be willing to accept enlargement if it did not have to give major financial transfers to the east. However, in order to keep Germany as closely tied to the Union as it would like, France may have to agree to a larger financial contribution. At one time France's main concern was meeting the criteria for monetary union, but now that the parliament is led by a Socialist-Communist coalition support for the common currency is waning. The other member states either share one of these positions or are not committed to any position.

The Outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference

Directly after the close of the Intergovernmental Conference no apparent Franco-German pact was forthcoming, but that does not preclude future cooperation of the two larger EU members. Any form of Franco-German cooperation in the area of widening and or deepening would surely hasten either project. Germany and France were expected to put forward a joint statement on the IGC; a statement developed outside of the Reflection Group.²⁸ Although this statement was not made public, Kirsty Hughes suggests that both governments may have come to agreement on the application of qualified majority voting,

²⁷ Josef Janning, *Germany's Foreign Policy*, 39.

and on strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy.²⁹ The Amsterdam Treaty put forth a number of relatively small changes which will help make the Union more effective, transparent and democratic, albeit not very quickly. The IGC was reluctant to call for grand changes to the Union. After the public dissatisfaction with the Maastricht Treaty, ratification of this Treaty would be difficult if it called for too great an overhaul of the Union too fast. The change in government in the United Kingdom has allowed for optimism on the prospect of EU reform, with substantial progress being made at the IGC. In fact in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy progress was made with the appointment of German, Juergen Trunpf, as the EU's foreign policy spokesperson. Security policy was the source of some disagreement in Amsterdam. Germany and France proposed to have the Western European Union slowly assume responsibility for performing EU military operations. This proposal was resisted by Great Britain who argued it would dilute NATO's role in Europe. The EU leaders compromised by including an article in the Amsterdam Treaty recognising the WEU as an important component of the EU's evolution and maintained the possibility of a closer relationship between the two organisations.

On decision making, it was agreed that the European Commission should be limited to its current size - twenty members - even after new states join. That means that the larger states, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain which each have two commissioners will each have to give up a commissioner as the Union expands. They agreed that in compensation these states will have votes weighted based on their populations. How this will work has not yet been decided.

²⁸ Kirsty Hughes, "The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and EU Enlargement," *International Affairs*, 72, 1, (1996), 5.

²⁹ Kirsty Hughes, *The 1996 IGC*, 5-6.

Although the German press did not herald the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference a success, German leaders are asserting their satisfaction with the outcome. Chancellor Kohl told reporters that while “not everyone was able to push through their favourite ideas - there were too many differences and interests for that - the Amsterdam Treaty is a solid foundation for the tasks that lie ahead.”³⁰ Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel displayed satisfaction with the outcome of the conference, believing that “Amsterdam has freed the way for the acceptance of states of Central and Eastern Europe, and Cyprus into the European Union. ... The progress will come in incremental steps, but it will come!”³¹

Contrary to the reaction of German leaders the German press was generally disappointed with the outcome of the conference. The *Sueddeutscher Zeitung* argued that all that came from the Amsterdam summit was “mini-reform” and it did not satisfy the great expectations surrounding it.³² The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* was less critical saying that the conference brought Europe a step closer to what it is striving for.

In Germany, the standard for this judgement comes from the chancellor. Helmut Kohl, who has tied his political fate to the euro and Europe, has come far enough, in his view, to stand again as a candidate for re-election. And he will use the (Amsterdam) resolutions, no matter how feeble they may be in the details, as ammunition in the election campaign.³³

Indeed Helmut Kohl has tied his political ambitions to European integration and enlargement. If both are to proceed as quickly as Germany would like continued incremental progress will have to be made on EU reforms, especially with regard to the

³⁰ Helmut Kohl quoted in, “EU Prepares for the Future with Adoption of Currency Stability Pact and Reform Treaty,” *The Week in Germany*, (A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center, New York), June 20, 1997, 2.

³¹ Klaus Kinkel, *Erklärung Kinkels zu den Ergebnissen des EU-Gipfeltreffens von Amsterdam*, 19 juni 1997. Internet: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.government.de/6_archiv/2/p/. (Author’s Translation.)

³² Author Unknown, Excerpt in “The Press ... Reforming the European Union,” *The Week in Germany*, (A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center, New York), June 20, 1997, 4.

³³ Author Unknown, quoted in “The Press ... Reforming the European Union,” *The Week in Germany*, (A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center, New York), June 20, 1997, 4.

functioning of EU institutions.

As witnessed by the outcome of the Amsterdam negotiations, the changes required to make the EU a more efficient institution will occur gradually over the next decades, rather than being implemented instantly through the passage of one treaty. EU leaders have to work together to ensure that the required changes do occur in time for the Union to accept new members to the Union.

CONCLUSION

There will be merits and perils to EU enlargement for Germany. However, as a supporter of all of the EC/EU enlargements to date this enlargement could have the greatest impact upon Germany's stature within the EU. After 1989 Germany did not change how it related to Europe. The Federal Republic continues to pursue its relationship to Europe as it did during the Cold War - through European integration. For Germany widening the Union, making it accessible to more European countries has always been apart of European integration.

However, making the European Union accessible to more countries will have costs, both economic and possibly political. It is no secret that enlargement will be very expensive for Germany and its people. If the German government fails to redistribute the costs of enlargement more evenly among the Union members, it may face great political backlash from its electorate, thus potentially jeopardising Kohl's re-election chances. The Kohl government has got to persuade the German people that the costs of enlargement are minimal compared to the long-term benefits enlargement will bring.

Not only will this enlargement put Germany at the centre of the Union, as a bridge

between eastern and western Europe, it will allow Germany a more active role in assuring the continued stability and prosperity of all of its neighbours. Additionally Germany will be able to share more of the cost of enlargement with its EU counterparts as multilateral efforts such as the Phare Programme over take German bilateral efforts in the region.

Cooperation with the members of the European Union is fundamental if Germany is to acquire not only a redistribution of the budget contributions of current members, especially the amount they contribute to the Phare Programme, but also a commitment that enlargement will take place as soon as the CEECs are ready. If it means receiving Germany's commitment that it will not become more than a regional power in Europe, France will likely cooperate with Germany on EU enlargement. The British have reasserted their commitment to EU enlargement and are not likely to shift it to the back burner along with a commitment to deeper European integration.

The timeline for enlargement is not yet fixed, however, negotiations with the first round of new members should begin in January 1998. Who exactly the new members will be is not yet public. In all likelihood along with Cyprus and perhaps possibly Malta, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be offered membership in the first round. It is unclear whether Slovakia and Slovenia will be able to meet the entrance criteria at that time. Although negotiations for membership will begin in 1998, membership will not likely occur until five to ten years into the new millennium and even then long transition periods are likely to be put in place.

These long transition periods will give the EU members more time to determine exactly how they will reform the institutions of the EU to prepare them for new members. The number of commissioners each member state will receive once the Union has more

than twenty members is still subject to discussion, as are voting procedures. It would benefit the Union to heed the multitude of criticisms of its Common Agriculture Policy and either drastically reform the CAP or dismantle it completely. The Union also faces the task of making the European Parliament more democratic and accessible to the European population. With all of these daunting tasks before it, the Union will surely provide the eventual new member states with long transition periods to adapt to its methods and institutions.

Therefore although enlargement of the Union will cost Germany more than it will cost any of the other EU members and it may be difficult to sell to the German public, it is in Germany's best national and European interests to continue to act as the advocate of central and eastern Europe in the European Union. Eventually Germany's *Ostpolitik* under its *Europapolitik* will succeed in erasing the demarcation between east and west in Europe as Germany grows as a pivotal power in Central Europe. Germany's peaceful "*drang nach Osten*" will bridge the divide between West and East in Europe, thereby helping to ensure lasting peace and stability on the continent.

CONCLUSION

GERMANY'S *EUROPAPOLITIK*

This study complements the vast number of journal articles and editorial compilations which discuss and assess Germany's role in the new Europe. Since 1990 a growing body of literature has emerged evaluating Germany's increased stature in Europe in a positive light. There have also been many studies on the impact of unification on the European Union and the future of European integration. The consensus among writers both inside and outside of Germany, such as Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helga Haftendorn, Karl Kaiser, Gunther Hellmann, Josef Janning, Josef Joffe, Elizabeth Pond¹, Ronald Asmus, Roger Morgan, Philip H. Gordon, W. R. Smyser, R. G. Livingston, David Calleo and Timothy Garton Ash² has been that Germany is and will remain committed to European integration. Although many of these writers consider how the EU will evolve over the next two to three decades submitting that enlargement will take place, few of them directly examine the role Germany is playing in the eastward enlargement of the EU. Timothy Garton Ash, in his book *In the Name of Europe*, provides an in depth study of *Ostpolitik* and its successes and failures, however, he spends very little time prescribing the best role for Germany to assume in the new Europe.

The intent of this study has been to consider Germany's *Ostpolitik* from the

¹ These writers are all working from within Germany.

² These writers are all working from outside of Germany.

inception of the West German state in 1949 to present, and reveal the impact it has had on Germany's position in Europe and its future in Europe. The end of the Cold War and the unification of the two German states opened the door for the normalisation of German foreign policy. As it has taken on responsibilities akin to its increased size and position in Europe, Germany has remained committed to *Ostpolitik* in its foreign policy. United Germany's foreign policy has remained remarkably similar to West Germany's foreign policy, with the essence of *Ostpolitik* still intact in a radically reordered Europe.

Continuity has also characterised German foreign policy from the West German state's inception in 1949 to 1997, seven years after the unification of the two German states. Although the emphases may have changed with regard to areas of interest and influence, the Federal Republic's fundamental foreign policy priority remains European integration. Germany's long-term foreign policy priority has been to promote and preserve peace, stability and prosperity in Europe.

Following the creation of the Federal Republic after WWII in 1949 the German government sought to meet this end by embedding itself in "western" institutions. Together with France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, Germany was an original member of the founding institutions of the European Community, and subsequently the European Union. Germany also accepted guidance from the trans-Atlantic community and became a member of NATO. Finally, Germany maintained, in various forms, an *Ostpolitik*, or policy toward its eastern neighbours including the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact states and the German Democratic Republic.

Germany's *Ostpolitik* has been a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Germany's pre-

1945 relationship with many of the states of Central and Eastern Europe was one of tension and hostility. During WWI and WWII Germany tried to conquer and dominate the region in an assertion of its economic, cultural and territorial superiority. However, Germany's defeat and ultimate partition fundamentally changed its relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is fitting that West Germans call 1945 *das Jahr Null*, because it was particularly a new beginning for Germany's relationship with its eastern neighbours.

Part of the continuity of post-1945 German foreign policy has been its commitment to first developing and then maintaining relations with the states to its east, even when that meant ultimately giving the "other" German state *de facto* recognition. Germany's adherence to its *Ostpolitik* is a function of several factors, including its desire to cultivate relations with people of German origin who merely through circumstance became citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) instead of the Federal Republic. Its *Ostpolitik* is tied to Germany's underlying foreign policy precept of ensuring peace and stability in Europe. During the Cold War, for example, the Federal Republic was able to maintain a mini-détente with the GDR as relations between the superpowers soured, ending the détente they enjoyed during the 1970s. Germany's means of implementing its Cold War *Ostpolitik* ranged from trying to increase trade with Eastern Europe to offering money for humanitarian and political concessions from the Soviet Union and the GDR. The Federal Republic developed a unique relationship with the GDR and eventually all trade between the two German states was tariff free, thus providing the GDR with silent access to the European Community and its markets.

The height of Germany's *Ostpolitik* was from 1969 to 1974 when Willy Brandt was Chancellor of Germany. In fact it is this era of *Ostpolitik* which received the most attention, even from the German public. Foreign policy became the focal point of the federal election campaign, which is very rare in German politics. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* completely altered West Germany's stance on relations with East Germany. West German governments prior to the Brandt government were reluctant to recognise the other German state because that would imply that it was a legitimate state, which in the minds of West German government officials it was not. Brandt recognised and accepted the post-war status quo with the knowledge that changing the status quo could only be accomplished by first accepting it. Brandt gave the GDR *de facto* recognition, foregoing the Federal Republic's claim that it was the sole representative of Germany. Brandt developed the idea of "two states in one Germany," as he tried to capitalise on neglected opportunities in the region. Under Willy Brandt the East was to receive the same political accommodation and moral sensitivity which the West received under Konrad Adenauer. No one fundamentally challenged *Ostpolitik*, not in Paris, Washington or Moscow, because they silently acknowledged that it needed to be done. There was no disputing that rapprochement with the East, beginning with East Germany, had been required for a long time.

Throughout the Cold War Germany played a delicate balancing act between maintaining its relations with the west and developing relations with the east. The continuity of Germany's foreign policy, including its *Ostpolitik*, during and after the Cold War stems from its ability to balance its western and eastern interests without permanently alienating members of either region. Germany as a divided state in the middle of a divided

Europe learned to balance its interests and was able to keep its western allies satisfied by pursuing multilateral policy means.

The abrupt end of the Cold War and unification of Germany led many to question the future of German foreign policy. Germany, however, learned many valuable lessons throughout the Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl years and they would not be forgotten. United Germany remains committed to European integration and the international institutions to which it belongs. A united Germany would not try to dictate the terms of Europe's future to its allies, nor would it attempt to 'go it alone' on the continent.

Germany's post-Cold War foreign policy is still characterised by its belief in pursuing its goals through multilateral means, in a non-military manner, and by responding to calls for it to play a greater role on the global stage while assuring its allies it will not become neutral or revert to its old power politics tactics. For Germany power is no longer defined in terms of bargaining strength or military might, but in terms of both soft and institutional power. Thus, united Germany does not have the same difficulties as other European nations pooling its sovereignty in the institutions of the European Union. As one of the most European, post-national states in Europe, Germany's foreign policy priorities are enmeshed in the institutions to which Germany belongs, most importantly the European Union.

Nonetheless, unification prompted the normalisation of German foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War West Germany was never entirely free to choose its own foreign policy course, with the possible exception of its *Ostpolitik*, which was also constrained by the necessity of keeping Germany's western allies content. With unification Germany

became a completely sovereign nation free to choose its own course in domestic and global affairs. The normalisation of German foreign policy, still under way, has prompted Germany to seek political responsibilities commensurate with its economic status. The proponents of normalisation of German foreign policy have requested that Germany receive a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, additional reform of the UN, as well as the removal of the constitutional constraints on the use of Germany's military power. The latter goal was achieved with the 1994 constitutional court decision to allow the German military to participate in UN peacekeeping missions as approved by the Bundestag. The Kohl government has also requested the use of German as an official language of the European Union. Yet, perhaps the greatest example of the normalisation of German foreign policy was the German government's unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, after all multilateral attempts to achieve joint-EU recognition failed.

These are all examples of Germany's new 'assertiveness' in European and international politics. While it is clear that Germany is very content to pool its sovereignty in the supranational institutions of the European Union, it has gained a new self-confidence as well as greater room to manoeuvre on the European stage. Embodied in Germany's new self-assurance is its redefined *Ostpolitik*, which has as its main priority the eastward enlargement of the European Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe with the potential to produce massive poverty and instability in the region. United Germany tied the eastward enlargement of the EU to its main foreign policy priority: European integration. For Germany European integration includes all of Europe, not only the current members of the European Union. German

leaders have called Germany the ambassador of Central and Eastern European states to the European Union, while Foreign Minister Kinkel declared Germany the advocate of Central and Eastern Europe in matters of EU accession.

United Germany is acting as a bridge between western and eastern Europe. It is doing so not only to take advantage of the increased investment and trade opportunities in the region, but also because it has a direct interest in ensuring that the region is peaceful, stable and prosperous. Any instability in the Central and Eastern Europe could send another influx of refugees and immigrants to Germany, which accepted more immigrants during the war in Bosnia than the United States or all of Europe combined.³ The German polity is sure that the country and its people are not ready take on a vast number of refugees again in the near future. It is in Germany's interest, economically and politically, to have stable, prosperous neighbours on all of its borders. Therefore, Germany is doing all it can, bilaterally and multilaterally, to assist these states in their transition to open, market economies with liberal, democratic governments.

Germany is arguably the country in the best position to provide aid and assistance to the states of Central and Eastern Europe not only because of its geographic proximity or its economic might, but also because culturally, and historically these states have more in common with Germany than with any other European state. Germans see themselves as part of Central Europe, some would argue, as the heart of Central Europe. The best way to ensure continued stability in Central Europe is offer these states membership in the institutions which have maintained peace and stability in Western Europe since WWII.

³ "New NATO, new Bundeswehr and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," NATO Review, No. 3, (May/June 1997), 5.

However, as the German government leads calls for the eastward enlargement of the European Union, the German foreign policy establishment (consisting of academics, journalists, and foreign policy analysts) is also debating the future of German foreign policy. The debate can be divided into five schools of thought including: Pragmatic Multilateralists, Europeanists, Euroskeptics, Internationalists and Normalisation-nationalists. All hold varying views on the way German foreign policy should be prioritised. While all five schools have distinct ideas about Germany's future and its relationship with the European Union and the United States, they all generally favour Germany's role as advocate of the Central and Eastern European states in matters of EU enlargement. Although adherents to each school of thought have different motivations, they all believe in the importance of stabilising the region and that Germany has a special responsibility toward these states which should not be shirked.

Germany has linked its two European policy priorities: deeper European integration and widening the European Union eastward. Germany alone is not able to determine the pace of either deeper European integration or European enlargement. It can, however, make its opinions known and try to gain support for them. Germany's commitment to European integration entails fulfilment of European Monetary Union, including the implementation of a single European currency. Germany has also called for significant reform of some of the EU's institutions in order to prepare the Union to accept five to twelve new members over the next twenty years. Some of the reforms include strengthening the European Parliament to make it more democratic and transparent, altering voting procedures on many issues in the Council of Ministers from unanimous to qualified majority voting, as well as limiting

the number of commissioners each state has in the European Commission. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which came to a close in June 1997, was to deal with many of these issues and more.

While many, including Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel, were satisfied with the outcome of the IGC it really did not take great measures to prepare the Union to accept new members in the near future. Decisions were made limiting the number of commissioners in the Commission to twenty. However, once the Union has more than twenty members the limit will have to be reassessed. At the IGC EU leaders reasserted their commitment to implementing the single European currency in 1999. However, not all EU members will meet the currency criteria by then and its implementation will likely be staggered. After the public dissent against the sweeping changes called for by the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty will make only incremental changes in order to avoid public dissatisfaction with the Union.

A concrete decision emanating from the IGC is that EU enlargement will commence in January 1998. However, which states will be offered membership first was left undecided. The states which are offered membership will not join the Union in 1998, which is when membership negotiations will take place. It is not likely that the chosen states will receive membership before the turn of the century and even then a long transition period will be put in place. The transition period will give the Union more time to reform its current institutions and practices making them more capable with a larger Union.

There will be several merits and perils of enlargement for Germany and in turn for the EU. Of the perils, the cost of enlargement for Germany will likely be the greatest.

Germany will also have to contend with unemployment issues as German firms take advantage of the source of cheap labour Central and Eastern Europe provide. Speculation about Germany's intentions on its eastern borders will also have to be addressed, although, thus far, Germany has been able to assure its allies that it does not have hegemonic intentions in Europe by, in theory and in practice, committing itself to a more integrated Europe. Once the next round of new members is determined they will have to be accepted by all of the current member states, which should not pose too great an obstacle provided that the Mediterranean states are represented with the inclusion of Cyprus in the next round of enlargement. None of these perils will prove insurmountable, but they cannot be overlooked.

For Germany the merits of enlargement are plentiful. Of utmost importance to the German people is the stability and lasting peace Union membership will bring to Central and Eastern Europe. German public and private enterprise will benefit from having neighbours which are not only politically but also economically stable. The increased trade and investment opportunities in the region will certainly not be lost on the German business community, nor the German government. With EU access to Central and Eastern Europe, the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, justice and home affairs, will be applicable to organised crime, and drug and weapons trafficking in the region. Finally, the eastern enlargement of the EU will put Germany at the heart of Europe linking east with west, enhancing Germany's role as a European power, while at the same time overcoming the Yalta division of Europe.

Germany is too powerful not play a central role in Europe. United German foreign

policy has maintained the same continuity as West German foreign policy focusing its priorities on the European Union. Although its future cannot be determined without consideration of its neighbours and allies Germany is slowly evolving into the role of the most powerful player in Europe. Germany has no desire to become a European hegemon and will be content to play the role of the a central power on the continent cooperating with its allies to fulfil its ultimate priority: a peaceful, stable, integrated Europe which includes nations from Central and Eastern Europe. Germany knows it can achieve more working with its partners than against them. The Federal Republic will achieve this goal quietly on an incremental basis in cooperation with its closest allies. There is, however, no question that Germany is becoming the largest, strongest, most able actor in Europe. That it is doing so through multilateral means speaks to the lessons Germany has learned as it pays heed to the legacy imposed by its unpleasant history. German foreign policy continuity is embodied in Germany's policy of responsibility as it gathers with the architects of lasting peace and stability in Europe to further European integration and EU enlargement.

For there to be any type of meaningful Europe whose citizens are committed to freedom and peaceful coexistence with each other, the abyss between east and west needs to be bridged. After so many decades, Europeans did not expect Germany to become the bridge between eastern and western Europe. Germany was, after all, the epitome of the Cold War as a divided state in the middle of a divided continent. Even though it seems that this is almost Germany's "natural" role in Europe, it has been largely unexpected, just as the abrupt end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union were unexpected. Germany's development from 1949 throughout the Cold War prepared it to assume this role

in Europe. The evolution of Germany's *Ostpolitik* and its incorporation into *Europapolitik* have guided the country to its position as the most influential state in Europe, acting as the "bridge for the abyss."

As Europe enters the twenty-first century, war among European countries will become unthinkable because they will eventually all be members of the European Union. For such an aspiration to become a reality Germany will have to continue to pursue both its national and European interests within multilateral contexts. That Germany's current "*drang nach Osten*" is supported by most members of the EU is a powerful example of German multilateralism at work. The Federal Republic must also maintain the continuity it has established in its foreign policy and balance its relationship with the member states of the European Union and the United States and the Russian Federation. Above all Germany can never again attempt to 'go it alone' in Europe. As it slowly assumes the role of the most powerful state in Europe, it has to act in concert with the other EU member states. Although today war among the members of the EU is unimaginable, if circumstances were altered by an overly powerful state at the centre of Europe the situation could change.

There is no doubt today that German leaders are very conscious of the role Germany must assume in Europe, acting as a bridge between west and east, without ever unilaterally dictating the terms of the construction or future use of the bridge to current or future members of the EU. The multilateral, German-led "*drang nach Osten*" will likely solidify future peace and prosperity in Europe. German leaders are very aware of the consequences of leaving Central and Eastern Europe out of the organisations to which Western Europe's stability is anchored. The isolation of these states would prove disastrous for Western

Europe, especially Germany. By continuing to respect its role in Europe and the limits of its influence, the German state should have a long and fulfilling future as one of the most powerful states in Europe.

MAP 1


‘Versailles’ Europe. Main frontiers in 1925.*



* SOURCE: Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, (New York: Random House, 1993), 646.

MAP 2


‘Yalta’ Europe. Main frontiers in 1961.*



* SOURCE: Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New York: Random House, 1993), 647.

MAP 3

Germany and the European Union.*



* SOURCE: Mark Blacksell, "Germany as a European Power," in Derek Lewis and John R. P. McKenzie, eds., The New Germany: Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of Unification, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995, 92.

APPENDIX A*

Figure 1. *Merchandise Trade between West and East Germany, 1975–86*





Figure 2. *West German Trade with Eastern Europe (Excluding the GDR) and the USSR during the Decade of Detente, 1971–81*



* SOURCE: Josef Joffe, "The View from Bonn," in Lincoln Gordon, *Eroding Europe: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), 155–6.

APPENDIX B*

Eroding Empire

Table A-6. *West German Trade with Eastern Europe, by Country, Selected Years, 1965-85*

Millions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified (exports f.a.s., imports c.i.f.)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1983</i>	<i>1984</i>	<i>1985</i>
<i>Exports to</i>									
East Germany	302	660	1,594	2,908	2,467	2,626	2,724	2,247	2,684
Czechoslovakia	101	289	679	1,036	891	803	758	734	820
Hungary	77	143	582	1,207	1,176	1,086	950	961	1,053
Poland	92	180	1,301	1,459	960	884	833	828	972
Bulgaria	55	66	418	478	501	501	488	470	568
Romania	116	197	663	895	669	378	274	314	317
Eastern Europe total	743	1,535	5,237	7,983	6,664	6,278	6,027	5,554	6,414
Soviet Union	146	422	2,824	4,373	3,394	3,870	4,418	3,800	3,603
World (billions of dollars)	18.2	34.9	91.7	195.8	178.6	179.1	172.2	174.0	186.6
Eastern Europe as percent of world	4.1	4.4	5.7	4.1	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.4
<i>Imports from</i>									
East Germany	315	546	1,359	3,065	2,677	2,732	2,697	2,713	2,594
Czechoslovakia	84	199	469	1,045	921	845	866	840	859
Hungary	72	134	365	999	886	761	733	722	772
Poland	109	203	582	1,376	943	879	854	971	1,060
Bulgaria	41	65	94	179	206	194	176	151	162
Romania	72	159	403	878	662	561	496	535	545
Eastern Europe total	693	1,306	3,272	7,542	6,295	5,972	5,822	5,932	5,992
Soviet Union	275	342	1,313	4,076	4,072	4,690	4,631	5,031	4,690
World (billions of dollars)	17.9	30.5	76.3	191.1	166.6	158.1	155.6	155.7	161.1
Eastern Europe as percent of world	3.9	4.3	4.3	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.7
<i>Balance with</i>									
East Germany	-13	+114	+235	-157	-210	-106	+27	-466	+90
Czechoslovakia	+17	+90	+210	-9	-30	-42	-108	-106	-39
Hungary	+5	+9	+217	+208	+290	+325	+217	+239	+281
Poland	-17	-23	+719	+83	+17	+5	-21	-143	-88
Bulgaria	+14	+1	+324	+299	+295	+307	+312	+319	+406
Romania	+44	+38	+260	+17	+7	-183	-222	-221	-228
Eastern Europe total	+50	+229	+1,965	+441	+369	+306	+205	-378	+422
Soviet Union	-129	+80	+1,511	+297	-678	-820	-213	-1,231	-1,087
World (billions of dollars)	+0.3	+4.4	+15.4	+4.7	+12.0	+21.0	+16.6	+18.3	+25.5

Sources: See table A-4.

* SOURCE: Josef Joffe, "The View from Bonn," in Lincoln Gordon, Eroding Europe: Western Relations with Eastern Europe, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), 336.

APPENDIX C*

III. MAIN WESTERN TRADING PARTNERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND IN 1936, 1956 & 1986 (percentage of total trade with a set of Western industrial states)

1936	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Germany	29.7	31.5	19.4
France	7.9	1.9	5.9
UK	11.6	9.0	24.4
Italy	1.7	13.5	2.6
Austria	10.4	21.9	6.9
US	11.7	4.9	12.5
1956			
Germany (West)	20.7	22.0	17.6
France	10.3	9.3	10.3
UK	11.9	10.3	18.0
Italy	5.2	8.3	2.4
Austria	9.6	15.0	8.2
US	1.4	0.8	4.3
1986			
Germany (West)	37.2	32.0	31.6
France	6.4	5.2	7.2
UK	6.0	4.8	9.7
Italy	7.9	9.0	7.7
Austria	12.0	17.6	6.8
US	3.2	6.7	5.5

NOTE: Figures represent the trade done with each major Western partner as a percentage of the country's total trade with the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (in 1936; West Germany for 1956 and 1986), Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

SOURCES: 1936—*International Trade Statistics* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1937)
 1956—*Direction of International Trade* (New York: United Nations, 1960)
 1986—*Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1989)

* SOURCE: Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, (New York: Random House, 1993), 652.

APPENDIX D*

IV. MAIN TRADING PARTNERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND IN 1991 & 1992 (shares in total exports and imports in per cent)

	Czechoslovakia				Hungary				Poland			
	Exports 1991	Exports 1992	Imports 1991	Imports 1992	Exports 1991	Exports 1992	Imports 1991	Imports 1992	Exports 1991	Exports 1992	Imports 1991	Imports 1992
Soviet Union	19.6	10.9	29.9	24.6	13.4	13.1	15.3	16.9	11.0	5.5	14.1	8.5
Czechoslovakia	—	—	—	—	2.2	2.7	4.1	4.3	4.6	3.8	3.3	3.2
Hungary	4.3	4.4	1.9	1.6	—	—	—	—	0.7	..	0.9	..
Poland	7.3	4.7	4.7	3.6	2.1	1.3	1.9	1.6	—	—	—	—
Germany	25.2	30.6	21.5	24.7	26.9	27.7	21.4	23.5	29.4	31.3	26.5	23.9
Austria	5.8	7.4	8.4	9.3	10.8	10.7	13.3	14.4	4.5	3.2	6.3	4.5
Italy	4.5	5.7	3.4	4.9	7.6	9.5	7.2	6.3	4.1	5.5	4.5	6.9
France	2.4	2.9	2.5	4.0	2.9	3.2	2.7	3.1	3.8	3.6	3.6	4.4
UK	1.9	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.9	7.1	4.3	4.0	6.6
USA	1.0	1.6	1.9	4.3	3.2	3.2	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.3	3.4
Japan	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.7	1.7	0.9	2.7	2.4	0.6	0.5	1.6	2.1


NOTE: Whereas until 1989 these countries' trade inside Comecon and that with the West was measured in different and strictly non-comparable units of account, for 1991 and 1992 it is possible to get an all-round picture. For 1992 it is, of course, the former Soviet Union.

SOURCE: Calculations by Dariusz Rosati, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, on the basis of national statistics.

* SOURCE: Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, (New York: Random House, 1993), 653.

APPENDIX E*

German Attitudes Toward a More Active International Role




SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 61.


APPENDIX F*

Desire for Greater German Influence in the EU (1993)



SOURCE: KAS 6/93.

Defending German Interests in the EU (1993)




SOURCE: KAS 6/93.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 48.


APPENDIX G1*

Germany's Special Responsibility Toward Eastern Europe



SOURCE: RAND.

Reasons Behind Germany's Special Responsibility Toward Eastern Europe




SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 20-1.

APPENDIX G2*

How Best to Help Eastern Europe




SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 22.

APPENDIX H*

Most Important Tasks Facing the German Government



SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 15.

APPENDIX I*

What Are the Most Important Problems Facing the Country?


Domestic	1992	1993	Foreign Policy	1992	1993
Unemployment	33	65	European unification	26	21
Economy	33	26	Eastern Europe	12	20
Asylum-seekers	56	24	Role of Bundeswehr	—	20
Hostility to foreigners	15	15	Détente, arms control	10	17
Unification problems	11	12	Germany's world image	14	12
Crime	9	12	War in ex-Yugoslavia	16	11
Right-wing extremism	31	9	Immigration	13	7

SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 14.

APPENDIX J*

German Preferences for Broadening or Deepening




SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 50.

APPENDIX K1*

The Immediate Future of the Union by country and EU15



■ New countries should join □ More joint action in existing EU □ Should stay as it is

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNION				
Country	Stay the same	More joint action	New member states to join	% change for enlargement from EB43
EU15	16	55	13	-4
Austria	18	48	10	-5
Belgium	21	50	8	-4
Denmark	22	39	27	+2
Germany	24	49	11	-5
Greece	10	67	10	-14
Spain	11	48	18	+2
France	14	63	8	-4
Ireland	21	35	28	+2
Italy	9	69	11	-5
Luxembourg	25	49	10	-2
Netherlands	11	67	15	-2
Portugal	14	53	17	+1
Sweden	5	55	19	-3
Finland	10	61	18	-3
UK	21	44	15	-9

* SOURCE: European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union 45, (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Spring 1996), 63. This survey was taken in 1995.

APPENDIX K2*

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (% by country)

Question :

Which of these 3 options for the immediate future of the European Union would you prefer ?
(SHOW CARD - READ OUT) Please give one answer only.

EB 44 Mega	EU15	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	
				WEST	EAST					
A. The European Union should stay as it is	16	21	22	23	24	28	10	11	14	21
B. The existing member countries should take more joint action in the existing European Union	55	50	39	50	49	44	67	48	63	35
C. New member states should join	13	8	27	11	11	12	10	18	8	28
Scrap the European Union (SPONTANEOUS)	5	10	6	6	6	5	2	4	7	2
None of these (SPONTANEOUS)	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	1
Don't know	9	9	3	8	8	9	8	18	5	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* SOURCE: European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union 45, (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Spring 1996), 63. This survey was taken in 1995.

APPENDIX L*

SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP (% by country)

Question :

For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future ?


EB 44 Mega

	EU15		B		DK		D				EAST		GR		E		F		IRL	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
• : In favour																				
• : Not in favour																				
a) Albania	26	50	19	59	23	65	12	68	13	65	17	53	26	66	47	20	16	65	28	35
b) Belarus	28	48	18	60	22	67	20	62	21	60	24	51	45	39	45	21	16	65	25	35
c) Bosnia-Herzegovina	29	51	19	60	24	65	18	65	18	64	16	61	47	39	49	21	17	66	30	36
d) Bulgaria	37	42	27	52	30	57	24	58	28	54	43	36	53	34	51	18	25	58	35	31
e) Croatia	31	48	22	58	26	63	22	61	21	61	17	60	48	39	48	21	19	64	31	36
f) Cyprus	43	36	35	45	35	53	34	47	34	45	35	37	85	10	50	19	27	55	47	25
g) Czech Republic	44	36	32	48	46	43	39	46	43	41	61	22	55	31	51	18	29	54	35	32
h) Estonia	37	40	25	53	57	34	34	47	35	46	37	39	46	38	47	20	21	61	30	34
i) Hungary	51	30	38	43	49	41	54	33	56	30	66	19	59	29	53	17	36	48	43	27
j) Iceland	57	25	45	36	73	20	56	30	56	28	55	24	60	27	56	15	51	36	51	21
k) Latvia	38	39	27	51	58	33	37	45	37	44	37	39	44	39	44	19	22	59	32	33
l) Lithuania	37	40	26	52	57	34	34	48	35	46	36	39	45	39	48	19	22	59	31	34
m) Malta	50	29	39	40	42	45	47	35	46	34	41	30	59	29	50	18	32	51	50	22
n) Moldova	30	44	24	52	24	61	18	59	19	56	22	47	47	35	46	20	19	61	28	34
o) Norway	70	15	64	20	85	10	75	16	75	15	77	11	66	23	62	11	65	24	63	15
p) Poland	49	33	38	44	56	35	35	51	37	48	46	36	58	31	55	16	42	44	50	23
q) Romania	38	42	28	52	32	56	21	62	22	61	26	55	57	32	53	18	30	55	38	30
r) Russia	33	47	22	58	22	68	21	61	23	59	30	50	58	31	51	21	23	62	29	42
s) Slovakia	38	41	27	52	38	51	32	51	36	47	51	29	49	35	48	19	22	60	27	37
t) Slovenia	34	43	26	52	32	56	26	55	27	52	30	45	48	35	48	19	19	61	27	37
u) Switzerland	72	14	68	18	75	19	77	14	77	13	78	10	72	19	65	10	70	19	65	14
v) Turkey	36	44	26	54	28	62	36	48	36	48	35	43	10	83	48	22	24	61	44	28
w) Ukraine	31	46	21	57	24	64	21	60	23	57	31	45	49	36	47	21	21	61	29	35
x) Current Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro	29	49	20	59	24	65	16	67	16	65	16	60	60	27	49	21	20	63	28	37

* SOURCE: European Commission. Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union 45, (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Spring 1996), 63. This survey was taken in 1995.

APPENDIX M*

Support for Expanding EU Membership to Various Countries




SOURCE: RAND.

* SOURCE: Ronald A. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall: 1990-1993, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 51.

APPENDIX N*

POSITIVE RESPONSES TO ENLARGEMENT					
50% or more		32% - 49%		31% or less	
Netherlands	57%	Denmark	41%	Belgium	31%
Sweden	53%	United Kingdom	40%	Luxembourg	29%
Greece	52%	Ireland	37%	Austria	29%
Spain	51%	Germany	35%	France	29%
Italy	50%	Portugal	34%		
Finland	50%				



* SOURCE: European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union 45, (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Spring 1996), 66. This survey was taken in 1995.

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




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