

A Study of Social Background
Characteristics as Predictor of Attitudes:
The Case Study of the Israeli
Political Elite in 1967

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by

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Acknowledgements

This thesis will be concerned with the ruling elite in Israel. It will look at the association between their social background and their parties' stances. It is an analysis of the Israeli ruling elite's social background and their parties' stances. The possibility of finding a partial explanation of the stances of the Israeli parties towards the Arab-Israeli relation will be explored by examining the social composition of its leadership.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In recent years studies of political elite have come to occupy a prominent position on the research agenda of political scientists, historians, and other scholars in social and behavioral fields. The theoretical framework was developed beyond its original sources in the classical literature of the Greeks by Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels.

A brief survey of the earlier elite theory as well as the more contemporary theory, especially those studies which concentrate on social background analysis, will provide a foundation upon which the significance of this thesis may be appreciated.

The Course of Social Background Analysis

Let us begin by looking at the basic or earlier elite theory. Mosca dealt with the characteristics of the ruling class.⁽¹⁾ Peter Bachrach agreed with Mosca that "The world of politics, indeed the destiny of the nation, lay... in the hands of the ruling class."⁽²⁾ However, the key to this destiny as controlled by the ruling class lay in maintaining open channels of access to the ruling class, and in this respect there existed equality, in the sense of equality of political opportunity for the masses.⁽³⁾ This implies that society is divided into at least two parts - the rulers and the ruled.

¹ Mosca, G., The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939).

² Bachrach, Peter, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Boston: Brown and Co., 1967), p. 10.

³ Ibid., p. 17.

Pareto's elite, whether "lions" or "foxes" - according to his classification - were not presented as reflections of their group origins. They were analyzed in terms of their success in setting styles and standards and whether they did what was needed to stay in power.⁽⁴⁾

Michels is in basic agreement with Pareto and Mosca in dealing with the ruler-ruled aspect of society. In his view, leadership was a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life. The law of oligarchy is primarily based upon a series of facts and experiences.⁽⁵⁾ The difference in Michels from, Pareto and Mosca was that "organization implies the tendency to oligarchy... In every organization... The aristocratic tendency manifests itself."⁽⁶⁾ There are many other studies in the course of political elite research such as Max Weber's, Karl Mannheim's and T.B. Bottomore's.

Studies that deal with social background ^{analysis} have three tributaries:

First are those writings of the normative theorists, beginning in earnest in nineteenth century England and carrying on to the present, which were concerned with improving democratic representation. The social background approach was generated through research efforts

⁴ Pareto, V., The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1937).

⁵ Michels, R., Political Parties (New York: Heart's International Library Co., 1915).

⁶ Keller, Suzanne, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 72.

to gather data on the representative's education, age and social origin.⁽⁷⁾ These normative theorists believed that justice could be approximated when the representatives were of similar social background to their constituents. Some writings such as of J. A. Thomas, contain some quantitative data on social background of the political elite.⁽⁸⁾ In addition, countless non-quantitative studies exist which rely on information related to the political elite and their social background.⁽⁹⁾

A second tributary flows directly from elite analyses developed by American political scientists in the 1930's when quantitative social inventories or elite profiles were constructed for the purposes of drawing preliminary behavioral and structural inferences. Elite analysis in the United States has tended to focus on investigation of either national or local political elite. These have for the most part been treated as analytically exclusive categories though they are empirically interrelated. Whereas empirical

⁷ Greaves, H.R.G., "Personal Origins and Interrelations of the House of Parliament since 1832," Economica 9 (June, 1929), pp. 173-184.

⁸ Thomas, J.A., "The House of Commons, 1832-1867," Economica 13 (March, 1925), pp. 49-61.

⁹ See for example Laski, H.J. "The Personnel of the English Cabinet, 1901-1924". American Political Science Review 22 (February, 1928) pp. 12-31. See also Nightingale, R. T. "The personnel of the British Foreign Service and Diplomatic Service, 1851-1929," American Political Science Review 24 (May, 1930), pp. 310-331.

studies of community power structure in the United States have lately produced a host of studies in theoretical and explicitly methodological contexts,⁽¹⁰⁾ investigations of the national elite have been comparatively few in number and have often lacked the closeness to the data displayed by the local studies.⁽¹¹⁾

Elite studies in this tributary, even on the local or national level, have a tendency to narrow their scope of attention to one man or to a small group of men. Charles Merriam in his book Four American Party Leaders concentrated his attention upon a study of the careers of Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and William Jennings Bryan.⁽¹²⁾ Salter's study is based on interviews with six ward politicians in Philadelphia.⁽¹³⁾ Lasswell based his book Psychopathology upon a relatively small number of psychological case histories.⁽¹⁴⁾ In other words each researcher studies only a small number of subjects.

¹⁰ For an exception, see: Wendell Bell Richard, J. Hill and Charles R. Wright, Public Leadership (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961).

¹¹ See for example, Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), and Robert Presthus in Men at the Top, Studies of Community Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

¹² Merriam, Charles: Four American Leaders (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1926).

¹³ Salter, J. T., Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1935).

¹⁴ Lasswell, H., Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

Since these studies were based on a small number of subjects, it is risky to generalize from them. Later American social scientists studied the political elite in large aggregates in order to be able to make valid generalizations.

The study of political elites in large aggregates is the third tributary. In this type of social background analysis American researchers investigated empirically the association between background and behavior. Data was gathered and correlational techniques applied to relate mass backgrounds to voting patterns, and to relate legislative backgrounds to behavioral patterns.

Theories linking social background characteristics to elite's political behavior grew out of the work of Lasswell and Lerner.⁽¹⁵⁾ Their volume contains most of the studies done under the Hoover Institute (RADIR PROJECT). In this volume, George K. Schueller reports the study of 27 men who sat in the Soviet Politburo from 1917 to 1949. He went beyond just reporting elementary data. Robert C. North compared 287 Kuomintang Central executive committee members (1924-1945) with 86 members of the Chinese Communist Politburo or central committee (1921-1945). Lerner examined 538 out of some 1600 biographies in the Nazi Fuhrerlexikon of 1934; and Lasswell tabulated data on 539 Fascist officials of about the same time.

¹⁵ Lasswell, H., and Lerner, D., World Revolutionary Elite, Studies in Coercive Ideological Movement. (The M.I.T. Press, The Massachusetts Inc. of Technology, 1965).

Lasswell's study included data on "skills," some of which were rather whimsically defined.⁽¹⁶⁾

Recent discussions of the linkages between social background characteristics and behavior are found in Eulau's and Sprague's study of lawyers as politicians in four American states, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee and California.⁽¹⁷⁾ Frey examined the relationship between education, occupation, age, and place of birth, and the behavior of 2,210 Turkish deputies (1920-1957), using official directories which covered the variables concerned.⁽¹⁸⁾

Edinger and Searing went beyond just behavior to discuss the relation between social background and attitude. They offered a research strategy resting upon the development of adequate multi-variate techniques for tracing social background - attitudinal relationships in large and complex elite data.⁽¹⁹⁾

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 182. For pitfalls in the methodological sophistication, see: Rustow, D.A., "The Study of Elites, Who's Who, When and How", World Politics, XVIII, No. 4 (July, 1966), pp. 697.

¹⁷ Eulau, H. and Sprague, J., Lawyers in Politics (M.I.T., The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1964).

¹⁸ Frey, F.W., The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965).

¹⁹ Edinger, L. and Searing, D., "Social Background in Elite Analysis, a Methodological Inquiry", American Political Science Review LXI, (1967), pp. 428-445.

Among the best contribution to the methodology are Quant, Finer et.al.,⁽²⁰⁾ and Mathews.⁽²¹⁾

After studying masses of accumulated data, there are three conclusions which may be drawn to guide our examination of the Israeli elite and their parties' stances regarding Arab-Israeli relations:

First. That the following indicators are most often found to be important in describing elites' attitudes and behavior; age, education, place of birth, party affiliation, family background, class, father's profession, foreign language knowledge and religious affiliation. These indicators are considered to be the standard background variables. There are other indicators used also in the literature such as race, origin, marital status, etc.. Even the most non-quantitative, non-behavioral study of politics is likely to stress the importance of some social background facts such as the following: the "old school tie" in the British cabinet, the dominant role played in Israeli politics by Central European and Russian emigrants, the growing influence of technically trained bureaucrats in communist systems. In virtually every country, some characteristics based on social background facts can be found. For the purpose of this study, emphasis will be placed on the quantitative variables (indicators) that were applicable to all of the members of the Israeli Knesset.

²⁰ Finer, S. E. et.al., Background Opinion in the House of Commons (London: Penguin, 1961).

²¹ See Quant, W., The Comparative Study of Political Elite (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1970), pp. 217-227.

Age has been reported in several ways, no two of which are strictly interchangeable. The percentage of the members of a political body falling into each five-year age group is often reported and has the advantage of showing the distribution of cases. In this study we followed the categories of a five-year age group, but in correlating age with the political parties' stances, the category differentiated between those who are over 70 years, those who are between 55-69, 40-54 years old and those who are under 40 years old.

Some indication of the difference in attitudes can be found by correlating age to political attitudes. Age may be used as an indicator of political generations, and thereby of distinctive experiences in politics or as an indicator of the conflict of generations. (22)

Data on education are occasionally reported in terms of the average number of years of education of the political elite. More frequently, percentage of these attaining various levels of education are given.

Some problems may arise from the distinctive terminology used in different educational systems. For the purpose of our analysis the most useful categories are those of pre-university education, university education and post-university education. Data on distinction between the universities where political elite were educated - such as Israel universities, American universities, Russian universities or European universities - are available, but will not be used in

22 Armstrong, J. A., The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, A Case Study of Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966), p. 143.

this study.

Activity or occupation is the third common social background variable. The term which has been used in the literature is "occupation." The variety of descriptive terms used to present this information is remarkable, and only with considerable uncertainty can the analyst try to recombine data into comparable categories. The categories that appear most often in the literature are: lawyers, agriculturalists, industrialists, businessmen, journalists, doctors, bureaucrats, military officers, labourers. In this study we use the term activity, and we differentiate between activity before 1948 and after 1948. The categories used in this study are: military, economic, labour, cultural and religious for the period after 1948. For the period before 1948, the categories are: labour, Jewish Agency, kibbutz, and cultural. We shall try to find out if there is a relation between the type of activity and parties stances.

Second the stated or implicit underlying assumption of the literature is that knowing the leadership's or political elite's social background will facilitate the researcher's understanding of the political system. The researcher can infer a good deal about the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite relationship and about elite-mass relationship⁽²³⁾ by studying the political

²³ Waller, Derek J., The Chinese Communist Political Elite. Paper presented at the Conference on Political Elite in Communist China, August 18-24, 1970, Banff, Canada, p. 4. See also Deutsch, K. W., The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 155-156.

elite's social background and comparing it with the social background of the masses.

How can the study of social background contribute to an understanding of political system in terms of elite-mass relationships? On the basis of what principle of selectivity should political elite be chosen? Dr. D. R. Matthews said: "a far broader and less formalistic conception of the selection process is needed. Who becomes a political decision-maker is not just decided by elections, primaries, and voting but rather is also the results of a continual sifting and sorting of the citizens who enter the quest for political power. By conventional devices and practices, societies set up barriers to political advancement for some and encourage others."⁽²⁴⁾ By studying the social background of the political elite, the researcher can determine which barriers prevent political advancement for some people, and also answer the question whether or not the political elite are representative of their background. The literature indicated that in United States, Great Britain, and Germany, the political elite have been a fairly heterogeneous group. The leaders of the Soviet Union were probably the most homogeneous in their background of any other group. Furthermore, the data on political elite in England and Germany show that they as a group can become somewhat more representative, more like "an average sample of ordinary men" under certain conditions.⁽²⁵⁾

Also, by studying the social backgrounds of political elite, we may be able to see how the changes in society are reflected in the

²⁴ Matthews, D. R. The Social Background of Political Decision-makers (Doubleday and Company Inc., 1954), p. 4.

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 20-55

background of the top level government officials.⁽²⁶⁾

This study will attempt to use the social background indicators to understand some aspects of the Israeli political system and the political development there. These aspects are included in the study to provide background that will lead to the discussion of the association between parties' stances and social background.

Third. Social background data are collected because they are presumably intended to identify contexts of formative experiences which contribute to explaining the behavior and attitudes of the elite. The political attitudes of elite and their behavior are often seen as an outcome of environmental conditions. The idea permeates everyday life. The questions often raised in social contacts, "Where are you from?" or "Which church do you attend?" or "What is your job?" etc. are designed to reveal something about the respondent's character and ideas.⁽²⁷⁾

The study of social background of political elite contributes to a deeper understanding of the attitudes and actions of those in positions of political authority. The political elite's attitudes and behavior are influenced by their personal life experiences. Matthews says, "Human beings perceive what goes on about them within a frame of reference determined by their total previous experiences."⁽²⁸⁾ Many

²⁶ Ibid. , pp. 42-48.

²⁷ Bendix, R. and Lipset, S. M., "The Field of Political Sociology," Political Sociology, Coser, M. L. (ed.) (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1966).

²⁸ Matthews, D. R., The Social Background of Political Decision-makers op. cit., pp. 2-3.

studies were built upon these foundations, such as the Hoover Institute RADIR elite studies. Social background studies tend to employ all background variables as though they were equally strong indicators for elite attitudes. Later studies shed some light on these assumptions by examining the relationship between social background variables and attitudes. They found that some background indicators have more relevance than others for elite attitudes within political systems and the relative importance of the relationship between background and attitude varies from one system to another. (29)

To summarize the findings of the literature in studying the relationship between the social background as a predictor of attitudes, we can say that attitudes on the whole can be related to relatively few background variables.

Generally, the problem is that social background analyses have considered the relationship between social background indicators and behavior as well as attitudes. What we need to do is to associate social background to other variables, such as parties' stances. Further empirical study in the relationship between social background and parties stances is therefore needed.

This thesis will attempt to explore this problem by analyzing the relationship between the party affiliation, party stances and the social background of political elite in Israel. Other variables, such

29 Edinger, L. J. and Searing, D. D., "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," op. cit. p. 431.

as political situation, which place constraints on the political attitudes and parties' stances, will be included.

The focus will be on the relationship between the Israeli political elite's social background and their parties' stances.

What are the characteristics of the Israeli political elite? What if any, relationship can be found between these characteristics and their parties' stances? Is it possible to find a partial explanation of the Israeli parties' stances on Arab-Israeli relations by examining the social background composition of their leadership?

This study will focus on the association between parties' stances and social background variables and will not explore their relation to political attitudes or behavior. In the last Chapter the question of the effect of the possible relationship between our research question and the elite's attitudes and behavior will be re-opened.

The importance of the study

Israel seems to provide a suitable locus for this study for the following reasons:

First, it offers a unique case study because of the tremendous variation in its elite's social background. This is due to the structural characteristics of the Israeli society. Israel is a country composed mainly of immigrants from different backgrounds. The psychological make-up of its people varies according to the place where they grew up.

They are people of many tongues, backgrounds, and outlooks - people who are as yet partially integrated in their own country. The population comes from many countries and cultures, from the U.S.S.R., East Europe, West Europe, United States, and underdeveloped countries. Its people come from a bewildering variety of backgrounds. Inevitably, they brought with them the cultures, norms, values, and patterns of behavior of their countries of origin. The heterogeneity resulting from the variety of backgrounds of the immigrants has been complicated by division along ethnic, colour, and religious lines.⁽³⁰⁾ It is almost a microcosm of the cultural differences of the world. As a result, there are fantastic variations in groups and attitudes. The population is divided also by the motives that impelled immigration to Israel. For some, it was social idealism, for others, Israel was the only refuge or safest refuge; still others looked for religious fulfillment. There are gaps between the settlers who came to Palestine as Zionist pioneers and idealists, who feel little in common with the recent immigrants. Moreover, the old settlers were European, eager to create a new and better Europe in Palestine, whereas the newcomers are largely of Oriental origin.⁽³¹⁾

30 See Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (London: Routledge, 1954), p. 106. See also, Shuval, Judith T., "Emerging Pattern of Ethnic Strains in Israel," Social Forces, 40, No. 4 (1962), p. 325.

31 Seligman, L., Leadership in a New Nation, Political Development in Israel (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).

There is also a wide and little understood gap between the outlooks of the young, especially the Sabra, the Israeli-born Jew, and the old, or more precisely between the veterans of the Yishuv and, for the most part, their offspring, the younger generation of native Israelis. The younger generation has little sympathy with the traditions and values of the Eastern European Jewry. The East European tradition of Yiddish literature, ideological contention, deep involvement with Jews everywhere, ghetto humor and sensitivity to persecution are, as Leonard J. Fein says, unpleasant and ill-befitting the youthful, self-reliant image which independence has brought.⁽³²⁾

Second, studying the relation between the political parties' stances and the social background of their leaders in Israel is important because the political parties there have a supreme authority over the political elite. As we shall see in the next chapter the political elite in Israel (the Parliament members) is derived largely from the leadership of the political parties. The supreme authority of the political parties is due to:

1. The election system which is the "proportional representation of party lists." Members of the Knesset are elected by both male and female citizens of eighteen years of age or over. The election system operates in this way: each party places before the electorate a list of candidates for the 120 seats, and its percentage of the total voters'

³² Fein, Leonard J., Israel Politics and People (Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown & Company Limited, 1967-68), p. 68. See also: Erik H. Erikson, (ed.), Youth Change and Challenge (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963), especially the chapters by S. N. Eisenstadt and Talcott Parsons.

cast determine the number of the party's seats in the Knesset.⁽³³⁾

The voters do not choose candidates but party lists; they have no candidates on the list. The lists contain the top leadership in the political parties. This means that the Knesset members, for the most part, are themselves the party leadership.⁽³⁴⁾ Israel's electoral system provides the key mechanism for maintaining the central authority of the party leadership.

Of much greater significance to the studying of political elite is an extra-procedural phenomenon: the fact that members of the Knesset are not representatives of geographic constituencies. Because Israel's elections are based on a national constituency, in which the only identifiable supporting group is the party membership, the concept of loyalty to a highly specific electorate is rather meaningless.⁽³⁵⁾

The operative theory of representation suggests that a member of the Knesset represents the party on whose electoral list his name appeared, the party to which he owes his nomination, and his placement in a high enough position on the list to bring about his ultimate election. He must know that, unless he becomes one of the key political personalities of his party, few voters will ever read far enough down

³³ For more details about the Knesset structure, membership, sessions, procedure and rules, function, etc., see Basic Law (The Knesset, 5718-58), passed on February 12, 1958, Laws of the State of Israel XII (5718-1957/58), 85-89.

³⁴ Safran, N., The United States and Israel, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 115-119.

³⁵ Although Seligman reports in his study that eighteen members of the =

to reach his name; they choose his party, as his party chose him.

2. It is also clear that the Knesset is the House of Parties. As

Asher Zidon says:

All important Knesset debates are organized on a party (as distinct from personal) basis, in which individual members can get the floor only through the party which they represent. A motion for vote of non-confidence may be submitted only by a party, and the privilege to make statements on the floor explaining abstentions in a vote applies not to individual members but to a party delegation only.⁽³⁶⁾

Almost all Knesset debate time is assigned on a party basis, and the party decides which of its members shall speak in such a debate. Although in practice, decisions are made by the Knesset delegation, they do reflect party policy. All debates on the Knesset floor are preceded by intra-party consultations on the question to be raised. Each Knesset party delegation meets once or twice a week, at which time it receives general reports from the Cabinet Ministers, from representatives serving on various standing committees, and from the Chairman of the delegation. It is at these meetings that the party decides on the position it will take on important issues about to be raised in the Knesset.

These consultations appear to reflect the party's historical ideology and its positions on similar issues; for the views expressed at this conferences are not just simply the thoughts of individual

= Fourth Knesset regard themselves as representatives of geographic areas, it is still the party which makes the decision. See Seligman, L., op. cit., pp. 182-185.

³⁶ Zidon, Asher, Knesset, the Parliament of Israel (New York, Herzl Press, 1967).

members of the Knesset, but are rooted in the party's ideological stances and reflect the party's policy and the political situation.

3. The members' loyalty and faithfulness to the party's ideology are very strong.

There are differences of opinion and attitudes existing within each party's delegation in the Knesset. As Seligman reports:

When we asked members of the Knesset which party they regarded as closest to their views, it was expected that members would choose the parties adjacent to their own in the traditional left-right spectrum, but the actual distribution deviated considerably from this model... (37)

These differences do not affect the members' loyalty and faithfulness to the party's historic ideology.

Three remarks are essential to clarify the member's allegiance to his party:

A. As mentioned before, a member of the Knesset represents a certain political philosophy in the name of which he appealed to the voters and on the strength of whose platform he had been elected, not as an individual but as a name on a party list. It follows, therefore, that every member of the Knesset is no more than a cog in the mechanism of his party and so has no right to act independently of it while he is in office.

B. While the Knesset does not have party whips on the model of the British House of Commons, all parties represented in the Knesset attach great importance to the maintenance of

³⁷ Seligman, L., Leadership in a New Nation, op. cit., p. 42.

party discipline. In theory, every member of the Knesset, once in office, represents the interests of the nation as a whole rather than a particular political group. But in practice, as a result of the voting system, each Knesset member is bound to his party and its views, since party policy is determined not by the individual Knesset representative, but rather by the majority of the party.

C. The question of party discipline and the Knesset member's freedom to express his opinions cannot be discussed in generalities. For instance, a line of distinction is drawn between the member's opinion and his vote or manifest attitude, and another one is drawn according to whether the issue is a minor matter, or a question of policy. While a party will not make an issue of a member's speech in the Chamber that deviates from the party line, it will insist that his vote be in accordance with the views and policies of the party on the subject under discussion.

In minor matters, where no basic principle is involved, the representatives of a party may not all be of one mind and will not be expected to vote as a party but rather as individuals. However, in questions involving basic policy, such as the policy towards the Middle East or security affairs, the parties wield an iron discipline and insist that their representatives in the Knesset adhere closely to the party line.

The party's Knesset delegation must keep in close touch with the various party organization, generally through joint meetings and personal contacts between the Chairmen of the party organization and of its Knesset delegation. It is difficult to state in unequivocal terms whether the party organization or its delegation in the Knesset is the decisive factor in the party's attitudes and stances. For the purpose of our study it is not necessary to draw a line between the two bodies; because the party's delegation in the Knesset has to follow the party attitude and policy, and insists on fidelity to their historic ideologies.

It is now clear that the Knesset is the House of Parties. From the seating arrangements to the voting procedures, the party is the core. For these reasons this study will show the relationship between these parties' stances and the social composition of their leadership.

Third, studying the relationship between political parties' stances and the social background of their leaders is justified by the strong association of party affiliation with attitudes of parliament members, who are at the same time the top leaders of the political parties. This association was established by D. D. Searing in his secondary analysis of Seligman's data on the Knesset members.⁽³⁸⁾

³⁸ Searing, D. D., "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization." op. cit.

Searing recoded Seligman's data and recorded that the best attitudinal predictor in Israel was the party affiliation.⁽³⁹⁾

Data for Israeli leaders are presented in the next table. The predictability measure is the maximum likelihood estimator which indicates the percentage of correct respondent classifications on a dependent attitudinal variable made by an independent background variable in the data. Prediction will therefore refer to this measure of accuracy of classification.

The scope index represents the total number of all elite attitudes in a study predicted by background variables at the .05 level. Finally, the strength of measure is the mean predictability for this set of attitudinal predictions.

Looking at the findings for Israeli leaders in the table, we see that while all social background variables display some degree of relationship with Israeli elite attitudes, some background variables are clearly much better attitudinal predictors than are others. All background factors predicted at least one Israeli elite attitude at the .05 level. With regard to the scope criterion-number of all attitudes predicted, background factors varied widely. The best attitudinal predictor by this index was political party affiliation, classifying more than two and one-half times (51%) the number of attitudes predicted,

³⁹ In Seligman's study, out of 120 members in the Knesset, 93 were interviewed (76%). Background and attitudinal data were included in the study. Leaders were asked a broad range of questions concerning attitudes towards both domestic and international political environment.

Israeli Respondents: Relationships Between Social Background
Factors and Set of 55 Attitudes by
Scope, Strength, and Prediction Range**

BACKGROUND FACTOR	RELATIONSHIP TO SET OF 55 ATTITUDES			
	SCOPE		STRENGTH (BY MEAN)	PREDICTION RANGE
	Number of Attitudes Predicted	Percentage of all Attitudes Predicted		
1. Political Party Affiliation	28	51	.69	.49-.87
2. Group Important to Nomination	10	18	.65	.41-.84
3. Residential Stability	9	16	.67	.45-.69
4. Urban-Rural Experience	9	16	.67	.45-.79
5. Year of Arrival in Israel	8	15	.66	.64-.70
6. First Israeli Occupation	8	15	.62	.46-.76
7. Age	7	13	.67	.62-.73
8. Part of Week at Permanent Residence	7	13	.67	.61-.80
9. Number of Years in Pre- sent Elite Position	6	11	.69	.62-.77
10. FQ Group Representing	5	09	.76	.68-.83
11. Jewish Education	5	09	.79	.68-.89
12. Part of Week in Jerusalem	4	07	.69	.63-.70
13. Level of Education	4	07	.65	.48-.75
14. Arrival in Israel Alone	4	07	.69	.61-.79
15. Positions in Zionist Organization	3	05	.73	.60-.85
16. Type of Public Contact	2	04	.68	.63-.73
17. Membership in Zionist Organization	1	02	.74
18. Membership in One Volun- tary Association	1	02	.56

Number of Respondents (N) = 89

Number of Attitudes = 55

Source:

*Searing, D. D., op. cit., p. 476.

**Scope is the number of attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (55 possible attitudinal predictions). Strength is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level. Prediction Range specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.

by other background factors. Seven background variables were significantly related to form 13 to 18% of the Israeli elite attitudes while the last ten background variables were related to only 2 and 11% of the same attitudinal set.

These three factors - the tremendous variation of the political elite's social background, the strong influence of the political parties on the political elite, and the identification of party affiliation as the best predictor of political attitudes - make Israel a suitable locus for this study.

My intention is to control for party affiliation on the particular subject, Arab-Israeli relations, by classifying members of the Knesset by party affiliation. Then I shall examine the relationship of social background factors to the so-classified parties and party-leadership. In the following chapter (two), the Israeli political elite will be identified and parties' stances will be classified as being hawks, moderates, and doves. Chapter Three examines the differences in the social backgrounds of these various parties' leaders. Chapter Four summarizes the analysis and findings, and investigates the implications of this study for social background analyses and for the Arab-Israeli relations.

CHAPTER TWO

ISRAELI

ELITE IDENTIFICATION AND PARTIES' STANCES

Israeli Elite Identification

Identifying the political elite is one of the most troublesome areas of political inquiry. Studies of the meaning of the political elite have not been guided by any consistent conceptualization. It seems necessary at the outset to spend some time on the question of what the political elite is, or in other words, "Who governs?" We move towards a reliable answer by successive approximations, in which each additional step adds refinement and complexity to an initially general description, and leads to setting down an operative definition that will guide our analyses of the stances of the Israeli political parties on the question of Arab-Israeli relations, and the relationship to the social composition of their leadership.

The examination of the Israeli formal institutions of rule will not be sufficient to identify the political elite. There may be a greater or lesser degree of relationship between formal allocation and actual location, but it is certain that the relationship is never perfect, or even nearly so. Therefore it is also useful to try other channels which lead to identifying the political elite status such as, identifying it in terms of distribution of power. This means providing a working definition of power in Israel.⁽¹⁾

¹ Lasswell defines elite as follows: "The elite are those with most power in a group; mid-elite, those with less power, the mass, least power." See Lasswell, H., and Kaplan, A., Power and Society, a Framework of Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 201.

It is generally true that power, especially in complex modern societies, is diffuse both in its source and in its distribution. The source of power varies from one society to another. Defining the sources of power in Israel or any other society means making explicit the interaction between the political structure and political culture. What yields the greatest access to power in Israel - age, wealth, education, or seniority? What is the distribution of power?

The chief difficulty in answering these, and related questions, derives from the ambiguity of power as a concept and in reality. A full understanding of the power structure of Israel's political system requires a more mature theory of power than political scientists have yet developed. At this point one should note that, for our purposes, it will suffice if we define power arbitrarily and approximately in terms of decision-making.⁽²⁾

If we accept the definition of decision as "what officials decide," the task of locating the political elite will be simple. This means we are concerned primarily with the members of the total governmental organization in Israel.⁽³⁾ As we shall see, the political

² Ibid., p. 75.

³ Snyder, R. C., "A Decision-making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," in Young, Roland (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Northwestern University Press, 1962), pp. 15-16.

elite in Israel is derived largely from the leadership of her political parties. We shall reproduce a list of those leaders, primarily those who have secured parliamentary representation in the election of the sixth Knesset.⁽⁴⁾

Before proceeding with the analysis of our research question, it will be useful to make a brief remark about the Knesset.⁽⁵⁾ The Knesset is Israel's parliament. It is composed of 120 members and legislates laws, deals with fiscal and economic problems, as well as internal and external policy.

Members of the Knesset are elected by both male and female citizens of eighteen years of age or over, using the method of party list system of proportional representation rather than single-member constituencies. The party list system operates in this way: Each party places before the electorate a list of candidates for the 120 seats, and its percentage of the total votes cast determines the number of the party's seats in the Knesset.⁽⁶⁾

The voters do not choose candidates but party lists. These lists contain the top leadership in the political parties. This means

⁴ The sixth Knesset was elected on November 4, 1965 and lasted until after the war in June, 1967.

⁵ The analysis in this section is institutional rather than personal.

⁶ For more details about the Knesset structure, membership, sessions, procedures and rules, function, etc... see Basic Law (The Knesset), (5718 - 1958), passed on February 12, 1958, Laws of the State of Israel, XII (5718 - 1957/58), 85-89.

that the Knesset members, for the most part, are themselves the party leadership.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, Israel's electoral system provides the key mechanism for maintaining the central authority of the party leadership. This fact will be of much greater significance if we add to it the formal and the actual power of the Knesset in Israeli political life.

The absence of a constitution in Israel gives her parliament more formal power. It is theoretically possible for the Knesset to pass any law it wants to pass.⁽⁸⁾ The formal power of the Knesset lies in its functions which are broad and varied, covering all areas of government, both domestic and foreign. It passes laws, resolutions and emergency regulations. It passes policies and programmes, and supervises the administration and enforcement of laws and administrative regulations. It elects the president of Israel, and may declare him to be temporarily or permanently incapacitated, or may oust him from office completely. It passes the budgets, appropriate moneys for the operations of government, and exercises control over the economy. The Knesset also provides a forum for debate on important public issues.⁽⁹⁾ No public officer or body other than the Knesset

⁷ Safran, N., The United States and Israel, op. cit., pp. 115-119

⁸ Krains, Oskar, Government and Politics in Israel (Boston: The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961), p. 45.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 34-35. See also Zidon, Asher, Knesset, the Parliament of Israel, op. cit., pp. 227-229, 233.

op. cit

itself may dissolve Israel's parliament and call for a new election prior to the expiration of its term of office. This formal power shows the importance of the Knesset in Israel's politics and how it is the supreme authority in Israel.⁽¹⁰⁾

Although the primary concern of this study is with the Knesset members, one must also focus on a list of those leaders who secured a position as a minister in the Cabinet in 1967, since the Cabinet is formed by the members of the Knesset who are the leaders of the political parties with the most seats in the Knesset.

The law requires that the leader of the largest party in the Knesset be invited by the President to form a government; this leader selects the various ministers of the government either from among Knesset members or from persons outside the Knesset.⁽¹¹⁾ The government has always been formed by the Mapai party, but a government based upon Mapai alone could not win the Knesset's confidence, since the Mapai party has never held more than 47 of the 120 Knesset seats. This is why in Israel there has always been a coalition government. The Cabinet continues in office only as long as it retains parliamentary confidence.

The Prime Minister and the ministers together form the Cabinet, or Government. The Government has exclusive power over its

¹⁰ Blston, D. R., Israel, The Making of a Nation (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 61.

¹¹ Krains, Oskar, Government and Politics in Israel, op. cit., p. 99

organizational structure, procedures, methods of work, and conduct of business.⁽¹²⁾

While the Knesset by legislation assigns duties and responsibilities to Cabinet ministers, it may not dictate the manner of their performance. Nevertheless, by its powers of questioning and investigating into activities for which the Government is directly or indirectly responsible, the Knesset can exercise some degree of control and influence over the Cabinet.

Due to the many political parties represented in the Knesset and in Israel's Cabinets, Israel's Prime Minister has less power over a less disciplined Cabinet and Parliament than his English counterpart. Since Israel's Governments have all been coalitions of many competing parties, each minister has generally sensed the need to safeguard his party's interests when proposals are made by ministers who are members of parties other than his own.

The minister safeguards his party's interest also because he owes to the party his position as minister.

As Benjamin Akzin says,

Cabinet portfolios are not assigned by the prime minister to men of his choice within the coalition but are assigned in the course of inter-party negotiations to one or another of the coalition parties... and it is the party itself that chooses the individual who is to join the Cabinet and hold the portfolio.⁽¹³⁾

¹² Ibid., p. 106.

¹³ Akzin, B., "The Role of Parties in Israel's Democracy," Journal of Politics XVII, No. 4, 1955, p. 510.

Therefore, the ministers must adopt the parties' policies and stances within the Cabinet, in order to maintain their Cabinet posts. This fact will facilitate classifying the ministers stances within the Cabinet according to their party affiliation.

We move a step closer to an understanding of the relation between the parties' stances and the social background of their leaders if we examine not only those who occupied office in the Cabinet in 1967, but also those who have held the reins of Government since 1948.

The importance of studying Israel's Cabinet ministers since 1948 lies in the fact that they represent those members of the Knesset who possess a special rank in the power structure in Israel. These people as a party delegation in the Knesset and as ministers are the party's best political minds. They are always involved in the thick of developments and are abreast of all events on the broader, inter-party scene.⁽¹⁴⁾

Other Centers of Power

Up to this point we have been concerned only with identifying the political elite in Israel. We have not considered institutions and groups other than the Knesset and the ministers. In the next pages, we shall look briefly at the other institutions that influence policy and we shall identify the top leaders of these institutions, who are "Influential" or lieutenants.

¹⁴ Zidon, Asher, op. cit., p. 94.

The influential elite are the second rank of the ruling elite. As Pareto pointed out, these influential elite or lieutenants are frequently more important than the ruler. He says:

A governing class is present everywhere, even where there is a despot, but the forms under which it appears are widely variable... There are always people who play a very important part in actual government. To be sure they must now and again bend the knee to the whims of ignorant and domineering sovereigns and parliament, but they are soon back at their tenacious, patient, never-ending work, which is of much the greater consequence. (15)

1. The Bureaucracy:

The Prime Minister is not only the head of Government but also the chief of administration. In Israel, government is the largest employer of labour, the largest owner of land, and the largest investor in economic enterprise.

Although the elite in the bureaucracy are not very important in a study about the political parties' stances towards the policy in the Middle East, the importance of studying the bureaucracy lies in the accelerated speed of the process of professionalization in Israel⁽¹⁶⁾. In popular perception, the new sectarianism of management skill overlaps significantly with the tension between old and young. It is evident that there is a communication gap between old and young, but their attitudes are in balance: the old are more sensitive to political and ideological nuances, the young to "pure data".

¹⁵ Pareto, V., Mind and Society, op. cit., p. vv, 1573.

¹⁶ In 1959, Israel began to move towards secularizing the civil service through competitive examinations and merit hiring.

and impersonal doctrine.⁽¹⁷⁾

Therefore, studying the bureaucratic elite may be an indicator of the circulation of elite in non-political units. This is because since 1959 Israel began to move towards secularizing the civil service. Although the effects of the older patterns have not yet been completely erased, at least they have begun to be replaced in the bureaucracy. If the school of the founding fathers with its anti-professional bias starts to decline then the emergence of a scientific managerial elite with substantial policy-making power starts to ascend. If we can find empirical proof of this assumption, we would have a good indicator for the possibility of change in other power centers under the pressure of the situation. We are going to analyze the major characteristics of the bureaucrats in terms of the minister's offices and the Directors General of the minister.

2. The Judicial Power:

The judicial system, especially Israel's Supreme Court, in both theory and practice, is totally outside the maelstrom of party politics. In a country where the popular assumption is that anyone

¹⁷ Many people read the import of the Mapai-Rafi dispute in the 1965 election as a choice between expertise and ideology, with the young professionals and managers drawn to the Ben-Gurion Camp and the old (and young) ideologues loyal to Eshkol.

in power is an ideological partisan, the role of judicial power, at best, is to be a pressure group. The Supreme Court in Israel, unlike the United States Supreme Court, has no power of judicial review. It cannot invalidate legislation passed by the Knesset as unconstitutional.⁽¹⁸⁾ It is concerned with local ordinances, with ordering the release of persons, with secular courts, tribunals, or any judicial, religious courts, administrative regulations, and so on. In examining matters of national-local jurisdiction and possible violation of individual rights by government, the Supreme Court either interprets legislation or determines whether public officials have adhered to proper policies and procedures as laid down by the Knesset. It is empowered to command Ministers and officers to explain why certain actions have or have not been taken.⁽¹⁹⁾

3. Histadrut - General Federation of Labour:

Israel's General Federation of Labour known as the Histadrut represents more than 60% of the population of Israel and consists of wage earners and self-employed workers above the age of 18. Every member is also a member of "Hevrat Ovolum," the General Co-operative Association of Labour in Israel, which is the economic branch of the Federation.⁽²⁰⁾

¹⁸ Warsoff, L., "The Legal System of the State of Israel," New York Law Forum, II (October, 1956), p. 378.

¹⁹ Krains, O., op. cit., pp. 145-148. See also Louis, W., op. cit. p. 379.

²⁰ Who's Who in Israel, 1968 (Tel Aviv: Bronfman-Cohen Publishers Ltd.), p. 673.

Histadrut power comes from its status as a trade union, or rather a federation of trade unions, since it grew out of the Union of Agricultural Workers that had been established prior to World War I. Interestingly, the Histadrut has changed neither its character nor its functional structure since its foundation. The functional structure is a key to its power because the leaders of the Histadrut are the political leaders of its members. Thus, it is a political organization. The functions of the Histadrut include caring for its members. For instance, it is a holding company in which, nominally, every member has a share. Also it is a mutual assistance company, especially regarding health care. Though the Histadrut cares for its members, it makes life very difficult for anyone outside its union.

The development of Histadrut-owned economic enterprises soon formed a link between the people and the establishment. It started out as a kind of lopsided realization of the all-embracing worker's commune, a party to fight unemployment. Eventually, the Histadrut became Israel's largest employer, owned the country's second largest bank, completely dominated heavy industry and controlled a good portion of all trade - imports and exports and so on. The control thus exercised upon a large sector of the national economy became translated very smoothly into political power.

To have a better understanding of the relationship between Histadrut and Government, however, requires explaining the Histadrut's political structure. The Histadrut leaders - like the Knesset - are

selected by proportional representation and lists. The Mapai had traditionally won more than half of the votes, but this means that a peculiar relationship exists between the Histadrut, led by Mapai, and the Government, led by Mapai. In one view the result has been a kind of company union. It would not be wholly accurate to conclude that Histadrut policy is entirely subject to Mapai veto, since the independent power of Histadrut is so great that its leaders' demands they, of course, being Mapai leaders - must be taken most seriously.

The Histadrut is not, after all, merely a generator of particularist political and economic demands. Both its personnel and its ideology make of it, instead, an active partner in shaping Government policy, through the Mapai executive, and, indeed, more directly by negotiation with the ministers of Government.

The Histadrut is governed by a Secretariat (Vaada Merakezet), made up of nineteen members. Information on eight members only is available. This represents only a scientifically acceptable percentage of 42%. If this sample, based on the selective criteria of Who's Who in Israel, were representative of the total group, its validity would be greater.

Other influential leaders who will be included in this study are the religious leaders made up of the deputy of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the director general, the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, and members of Rabbinical Courts. Also included are the heads of the economic units whose names appear in Who's Who in Israel.

By using the data about the leaders of the "other centers of power" (Influentials) in Israel, we will be able to compare the social background of the Knesset members with the Influentials as a control group.

This analysis of the ruling elites (political and non-political) of Israel focuses specifically on the social backgrounds of those men who have been identified in this section. The attempt is to answer the question: Was there any clear association between the ruling elite's social composition and their parties' stances towards the Arab-Israeli relation? This requires three things:

First, defining the political parties in Israel and their stances towards the Arab-Israeli relation. However, to characterize the political parties' stances in this regard, we should discuss the political situation, which places not only constraints on the parties' stances and thereby limits their role, but sometimes, directs their action.

Second, discussing the political situation is necessary for the purpose of classifying the parties' stances, since, as we shall see, the parties' stances will be defined in terms of just the general situation. This clarification will also help in explaining why there sometimes is identification among the parties' stances according to the nature of the political situation.

Third, studying the association between the parties' stances and the social composition of their leader (the political elite). An analysis of the political situation must precede the identification of the parties' stances.

The Political Situation

Understanding the relationship between the social background and parties' stances towards the Arab-Israeli relations requires several things, among them a typology of kinds of situation. Only a crude formulation is required here: a general situation and a particular (specific) situation.

The General Situation

In a general situation a problem arises; defining the dimension of the problem is the function of the ruling elites through, or within, the political system's institutions. The general situation ranges from the most general (national security) to the most specific (intelligence report).⁽²¹⁾

In our examination of the general situation of the Middle East since 1948, we do not intend to disclose any articulate, comprehensive, and consistent Israeli policies, but rather to find the choices pursued in regional relations which may yet be of help in analyzing the political elite, and in gauging the likelihood of their reactions to future initiatives and events.

The choices pursued in regional relations during the early period since 1948 may be divided into three distinct phases, which

²¹ See Lasswell's first two phases, intelligence phase and promoting phase in: Lasswell, H. D., The Decision-making Process (Maryland, University of Maryland, 1956), pp. 2-6. See also Robinson and Majak's discussion of the intellectual part of the decision process in their study: Robinson, J. A. and Majak, R. R., "The Theory of Decision-making" in Charlesworth, J. C. (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 180-184.

came to an end with the particular (specific) situation in 1967.

The First Phase: Peace Through Negotiation and Alliance

This phase started with the signing of the armistice agreement with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria between February 24 and July 20, 1949, and lasted to the spring of 1953. This period is characterized by the evaporation of the theoretical alternative and possibilities that seemed to exist for it, and the crystallization of most of the basic facts that were destined to govern Israel's relation with the Arab countries directly or indirectly.

The Israeli political elite knew that settling the conflict with the Arab countries and consolidating its relations with the big powers was crucial for its security, but Israel was looking beyond them to more ambitious goals. In the beginning, everything seemed possible. The political leaders thinking about its alternatives in the first year tended to soar to the realm of imagination, seeing the Jewish state as having a world historical role to play.

A peace treaty with the Arab countries was the object of Israeli leaders' policy and was the center of the programme of the first government as submitted to the first Knesset for approval.⁽²²⁾ One of the goals was: To strive towards a Jewish-Arab alliance providing for economical cooperation with neighboring countries, within the framework of the United Nations and to support every step which strengthened their peace.⁽²³⁾ The political parties in the Knesset supported this program, except Herut, who declared that

²² Divrei Ha-Knesset 53 (March 8, 1949) (Israel Parliamentary Proceeding).

²³ Ibid.

it "was not enough to say we want peace with our neighbors, follow the principles of the United Nations, etc." Herut wanted peace through victory rather than through negotiation.⁽²⁴⁾

The Israeli leaders' policy was to negotiate peace settlements with each of the Arab countries separately, fearing that outside intervention would put pressure on Israel for concessions.⁽²⁵⁾ It should be clear here that Israel was not ready to sacrifice security for peace. It was apparent in Lausanne in 1949, that peace had a lower priority than security, territorial integrity and ethnic balance.⁽²⁶⁾

All these alternatives changed under the impact of the situation in the first two years. During this time Israel failed to achieve any of the basic goals. That is: peace with the Arabs, permanent acceptance on the part of Arab states of its existence, or of the armistice lines as final boundaries.

With the failure to establish peace with Arab countries, Israel was not able to maintain a policy of neutrality with the big powers, and Israel shifted towards the west. There are other reasons which influenced the shift towards the west, such as the changes in

²⁴ Ibid., p. 68.

²⁵ McDonald, James G., My Mission to Israel (New York, 1951), pp. 165-168.

²⁶ Stock, E., Israel on the Road to Sinai 1949-1956 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 28.

Soviet attitudes towards Israel, economic difficulties, search for physical security.⁽²⁷⁾

All that Israel achieved was the status quo by the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. The Declaration pledged joint action by the United Kingdom, the United States, and France to prevent any alteration of the armistice borders by force. It banned an arms race in the Middle East.⁽²⁸⁾ All Israel got was an ambiguous document. Therefore the reception of the declaration was less than enthusiastic. Ben-Gurion regarded it as a unilateral declaration which was not binding on Israel.⁽²⁹⁾

The Second Phase: Security Through Power and Retaliation: The Road to Sinai.

This phase began when it was perceived that the western powers were not receptive to Israel's alliance policy, and when the lack of security on the regional level continued. This phase extended from the beginning of 1953 to the end of 1956. It was characterized by the rapid deterioration of Israel's position as a consequence of the intensification of the big powers' struggle, and the particular way in which Israel meshed with the conflict with the Arab countries. This impelled Israel to attempt to reverse the process by resorting to war in 1956.

27 Comay, Michael S., "Five Years of Israel Diplomacy," Zionist Newsletter 5 (May 5, 1953), p. 9.

28 Bell, J. Bowyer, The Long War, Israel and the Arabs Since 1946 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 267.

29 Hurewitz, J., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, 1956), Vol. II, pp. 309-310.

Israel's leaders saw a danger in the implications of the American objectives and policies in the Middle East. In 1953, Secretary of State Dulles decided to work for a new Middle Eastern alignment, and two years later the Baghdad pact was born.⁽³⁰⁾ As soon as the Baghdad pact was born, Israel's government made application to be included in the western defence system through NATO, or through other means, but failed.

There was also a chain of events which sharpened simultaneously the deterioration of Israel's position, and the adoption of the policy of force and retaliation. This chain of events are aspects of the particular specific situation of the Sinai War.⁽³¹⁾

A review of the historical events of the specific situation immediately preceding the Sinai war reveals three specific factors which reoccurred almost exactly in the particular or specific situation immediately preceding the 1967 war. These three factors are:

1. The removal of the buffer between Israel and Egypt, first by withdrawal of the British troops, and second, by the withdrawal of the United Nations troops before the 1967 war.
2. Undeclared guerilla warfare, first from the Gaza strip, and second, from the Syrian borders.

³⁰ Bell, J. Bowyer, The Long War, Israel and the Arabs Since 1946, op. cit, pp. 265-268.

³¹ Compare with the particular situation in 1967.

3. The drawing up of the military pact among the Arab states surrounding Israel, and the possible existence of foreign troops in Jordan.

A careful study of the component of each factor in the 1956 war and a comparison of its twin in the 1967 war leads to a tentative law explaining the parties' stances, in the particular situation as being pre-determined. In other words, parties' stances can be determined on the basis of the occurrence of these factors, but the differences in their stances cannot be determined. Therefore the purpose of analyzing the particular situation in this study is to eliminate its effect, because the particular situation shows only a Hawk's stance. (32)

Although the parties stances towards the particular specific situation cannot be taken as normative, it is still necessary to examine the development of events of the Sinai war - and later the 1967 war. It is necessary because later in this study, when we classify the political parties' stances, we will exclude any stance that has been taken in the particular situation period.

The particular (specific) situation of grave concern was the development of events of the Sinai war. The first one was the evacuation of British troops from the canal base after the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in July, 1954, which removed the important buffer between Israel and Egypt and placed the Egyptians in a better position to enforce a strict blockade of the waterway against Israeli ships and goods.

³² See p.48 of this study.

It also increased the possibilities of the Egyptian raids which made deep sallies into Israel.

The second reason was the creation of an alliance system encircling Israel which furnished additional variables in the situation. In October, 1955, a military pact between Egypt and Syria provided for a joint supreme command and general staff, a standardization of weapons, and training and operational plans. A week later an alliance was signed with Saudi Arabia, putting at Egypt's disposal not only the Saudi bases in the Gulf of Aquaba but also the financial means for political action to further an Arab unity movement under Egyptian hegemony in Jordan and elsewhere. (33)

The third reason was the Czech-Egyptian arms deal which was announced in September, 1955. This deal brought an entirely new element into the situation. (34) Moshe Sharett characterized the Czech arms deliveries as an "unprecedented danger" apt to bring about ominous and revolutionary changes in Israel's security position. (35) Later he told the Knesset that the Soviet deal now conferred on Egyptians "an overwhelming military superiority." (36)

David Ben-Gurion who became Premier in November, 1955, warned on March 18, 1956, that war within a few months could not be avoided unless

³³ Stock, E., The Road to Sinai, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

³⁴ Bar-Zohar, Michel, Suez Ultra Secret (Paris, Fayrad, 1964), p. 95.

³⁵ Divrei ha-Knesset 85 (October 19, 1955).

³⁶ Ibid., p. 677 (January 2, 1956).

Israel obtained the arms she needed to counter Egypt's new weapons.⁽³⁷⁾ In his article on the Sinai campaign,⁽³⁸⁾ he said that the "balance of forces between Israel and her neighbours was grievously undermined to Israel's detriment by the Czech deal, because through it quantitative inferiority became qualitative as well."

E. L. M. Burns estimated that it would take the Egyptian army two years to master its new weapons.⁽³⁹⁾ This meant that Israel should start the war within two years time, or as Bar-Zohar said, before they knew how to use these new weapons.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The situation now for the Israeli political elite was not a question of whether to fight, but when and where.⁽⁴¹⁾ There were other factors which participated in defining the time - such as the alliance with British and France which formed a unique opportunity. The air umbrella certainly made Israel's task easier. The war was fought to open the straits of Tiran which had been closed by Nasser to Israeli shipping.⁽⁴²⁾ It is important to realize here that the Suez crisis did

³⁷ Safran, N., The United States and Israel, op. cit., p. 237.

³⁸ Ben-Gurion, D. "Israel, Security and Her International Position Before and After the Sinai Campaign," Israel Government Year Book (1959-1960), pp. 17-25.

³⁹ Burns, E. L. M., Between Arab and Israel (London, 1962), p. 99.

⁴⁰ Bar-Zohar, M., Suez Ultra Secret, op. cit., p. 96.

⁴¹ See the consequence of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal in Bar-Zohar, Ibid., pp. 100-125.

⁴² Laquer, Walter, The Road to War 1967, the Origin of the Arab-Israel Conflict (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1968), pp. 24-27.

not change the situation for Israel because she decided to go to war. The only benefit she got from the crisis was the obtaining of more weapons. (43)

The Third Phase: The Road to the June War.

To understand the situation in 1967, we must pause for a moment to examine the unfolding and conclusion of the power struggle that took place in the area as a whole in the period following the Sinai-Suez war. The Middle East became the arena of a brink-of-war diplomatic struggle between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Throughout the beginning of this phase, Israel could afford to remain relatively passive while the area around her was being contested. This development gave Israel a greater sense of security. There were three reasons for the better situation that Israel faced in the beginning of this phase:

1. The borders had been relatively quiet. Larger quantities of Egyptian equipment were destroyed or captured. The Egyptian military base in Sinai was put out of commission when their fortifications and facilities in that peninsula were ruined; this meant a gain for a few years. Another reason for the quiet borders - which is a gain at the same time - was the posting of the United Nations forces on the Egyptian side of the frontier to prevent border incursions.

⁴³ Bar-Zohar, M., Suez Ultra Secret, op. cit., pp. 139-145.

2. The balance of arms power shifted to the Israel side.
The consolidation of a tacit Franco-Israeli alliance secured an enduring source of first-rate military equipment. Her relation with the United States improved as well.
3. The Arab ring around Israel had been loosened by the defection of Jordan and then Syria from the Egyptian alliance.

As a consequence of the war, Egypt postponed her assumption of effective command of Jordan's troops. In April, 1957, King Hussein launched his coup d'etat, and in 1961, Syria separated from the United Arab Republic. These two events blocked the tendency to tighten the Arab semi-circle around Israel. All these advantages had not yet resolved the issue of Israel's long-term security.

The Particular (Specific) Situation:

In the particular (specific) situation the problem is identified before it can be resolved. Many different solutions (decisions) can be considered at this stage.

When we move from the general situation to the particular situation we face the motivation variable. A brief definition of motivation without entering into a detailed analysis is: (here, we can suggest that motives refer to why questions - Why does the actor or actors act? Why does action take the particular form that it does in a particular or specific situation?) "Motivation refers to a psychological state of the actor in which energy is mobilized and selectively directed towards aspects of setting....The components of the particular situation are:

behavior, attitudes, and frame of reference." (44)

The particular situation stage in terms of Lasswell's process are "prescribing phase," "invoking phase," "application phase," and also "intelligence phase." (45) This stage involves Robinson's social process which includes coalition formation, interest group interactions, and interest aggregation. (46)

The crucial question in the 1967 war is, when to start the particular situation. History is a seamless web; the decision to choose a starting point is always arbitrary. A good case could be made to begin May 15, when the news about the Egyptian troops concentrations reached Jerusalem; but an equally good case could be made in favour of April 7, 1967, the date of the air battle between Israel and Syria; or in favour of the Israeli retaliatory in November, 1966. These incidents contributed greatly to the escalation of the conflict. There would, however, have been no Israeli raids but for the activities of the Arab guerilla units and the Syrian government which gave them full support. If so, January, 1965, when the Syrian-based guerillas began their forays into Israel, or February, 1966, when the new Ba'ath government came to power in Syria, provide logical starting points for the particular situation. On the other hand, it can be persuasively argued that the escalation in 1967 was the direct sequel to the Suez-Sinai war in 1956.

⁴⁴ Snyder, A. Decision-making Approach, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

⁴⁵ Lasswell, H. D., The Decision Process, op. cit., pp. 3-8.

⁴⁶ Robinson, J. A. & R. R. Majak, op. cit., pp. 180-184.

Arbitrarily, I consider May 15, 1967 - when Egypt moved its troops into Sinai Peninsula, a good starting point, because the short-term era in Israel policy came to an end and Israel leaders once more found themselves in a particular specific situation. In other words, the security problems crystallized and required a solution. The three factors which led Israel to begin war against the Arab countries were crystallized. The question among the political parties in this situation was not whether or not to go to war, but when, where and how.

The three factors in 1967 were:

1. El Fatah was active along the Jordanian-Israeli lines, and used also Jordanian and Lebanese territories as a basis of operations for several raids. The Syrian-Israeli frontier remained the most serious trouble spot. Y. Harkabi's opinion is that El Fatah activity was the main factor which led to the war in June, 1967.⁽⁴⁷⁾ El Fatah activity helped produce, in Israel, a nearly irresistible determination to react. While in 1955 and 1956, the Egyptian government assumed responsibility for the fedayeen activity as a reply to Israel's retaliation raids, the terrorists of the mid-1960's functioned extragovernmentally, and the regime on whose territory the raids originated officially disclaimed responsibility.

The problem then was how could the Arab states carry on the fight against Israel without laying themselves open to retaliatory attacks. Israel's reaction was illustrated in November, 1966, by

⁴⁷ Harkabi, Y. Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, (New York: Hart, 1968).

a reprisal raid on the Jordanian village of Samoq which claimed seven victims.⁽⁴⁸⁾

From the Syrian borders the armed attacks followed a standard pattern and during the winter of 1966-1967 became almost a daily occurrence: Syrian border posts opened fire on Israeli settlements or tractors working in the fields. At the same time, the Fatah attacks became more professional and there was deeper infiltration into Israel.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Israel did not retaliate, though in a speech on May 10, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Premier Levi Eshkol warned that further incursions would not go unpunished. This warning became an effective threat with the large scale concentration of Israeli troops near the Syrian border.

2. The next step was Nasser's declaration on May 15, that he was moving troops across the canal into the peninsula; this step was after Damascus appealed to Cairo for assistance.⁽⁵⁰⁾

On May 16, Egypt insisted that some UNEF Units leave their position along certain parts of the demarcation lines so that Egyptian soldiers could take over.⁽⁵¹⁾ The evacuation of the UNEF Units meant the elimination of the buffer provided by these units.

⁴⁸ Walter Laqueur, criticized Tel-Aviv for some of its misguided retaliatory raids into Jordan and Lebanon. See Laqueur, W., The Road to the War, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

⁵⁰ This was according to the defence pact between Cairo and Damascus which was duly signed in November, 1966.

⁵¹ Laqueur, W. The Road to War, 1967, op. cit., p. 112.

3. On Tuesday, the 23rd, Nasser announced the closure of the straits of Tiran. On that morning, Eshkol was told by the military that immediate action had become imperative.⁽⁵²⁾ Signing a military pact among the Arab states was the third factor which closed the circle and allowed no alternative but the decision of war. This factor occurred on May 30, when King Hussein traveled to Cairo and signed a five-year mutual defence pact with Egypt.

Also, Israel's strategy was and is to attack Jordan before the arrival of any troops there. After the armistice, the Jordanian front became the best place for a surprise attack. The armistice demarcation line is 333 miles in length, of which 65 miles border on Israel territory that is no more than 15 miles in width.

The historical description of the general and the particular situation makes possible the identification of political parties' stances. The fact that studying the Israeli parties' stances in a specific historical time which is just the general situation affects in countless ways the theoretical problem we have selected for treatment and the character of our empirical results. These effects will be better understood if the previous characteristics of the general and particular situation are kept before us. Although our empirical analysis is concerned with the association between the parties' stances and their leaders in 1967, these parties' stances will be defined in the period extending from 1948 to 1967 and will be limited to the general situation.

⁵² Ibid., p. 124.

The Political Parties' Stances

The majority of Israel's parties are not political parties in the western European and American manner. They operate daily and weekly newspapers in various languages, and engage in economic enterprises: operating banks, insurance companies, agricultural settlements, health and welfare institutions, sports, schools, clubs, and youth groups for party members and their families.⁽⁵³⁾ They fit the pattern that Neuman has called parties of social integration.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Israel parties originated in East Europe, Poland, and Russia. They were founded nearly fifty years before the state was created. The international Zionist movement itself encouraged the formation of parties in support of Zionism. In fact, all the principal parties in Israel are Zionist parties, and only the small Arab parties and the Communist Party are anti-Zionist.⁽⁵⁵⁾

In spite of the Zionist ideology which provided enough common ground among the Zionist parties, there are divergences towards Israel's policy regarding the Arab-Israeli relations. The political parties that will be studied are the Mapai (Israel Labour Party), Rafi (Israel Labour list), Achdut Ha'avoda, Mapam (The United Workers Party), the Herut Movement, Religious National Party, Mizrahi, and Hopoel Ha Mizrahi, General

⁵³ Akzin, Benjamin, "The Role of Parties in Israel", op. cit., p. 517.

⁵⁴ Neuman, Sigmund, (ed.), Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 404-405.

⁵⁵ Aryan, Alan, Ideological Change in Israel: A Study of Legislators, Civil Servants and University Students (see, Chapter 3, pp. 37-75), Michigan State University. A Thesis. (Microfilm), 1966.

Zionist and other parties such as the Arab parties and the Communist parties.

To characterize these parties' stances towards the Arab-Israeli relations, we followed these three methods:

The first method was to identify some issues that were the subject of most political debates on the Middle East and to specify each party's stances toward each issue, looking at the party's previous stance to a similar problem related to the Arab-Israeli relations.

In the second method we traced each party's historical roots, indicating how some new issue of dramatic turn of historical events occasioned its birth and shaped its development.

The third method was to propose some unidimensional spectrum of ideological persuasion along which parties ranged, such as the traditional left-right economic continuum, in order to appreciate their ideological position. This method is only of secondary importance for our study. The simple socialist-capitalist dichotomy is not sufficient to identify the parties' stances, especially if we moved from the economic arena to the foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli relations. In characterizing the Israeli parties according to socialist versus capitalist, we might begin with the Communist Party at the extreme left, moving right towards Mapam, to Achdut Ha'avoda, (less orthodox than Mapam in its Marxist orientation), to Mapai, and Rafi, (non-Marxist), to the General Zionist Party, to the Progressive, to Mizrachi, and Hapoel Ha Mizrahi, to Herut on the extreme right. (56)

⁵⁶ See Kraens, Oscar, op. cit., pp. 51-83.

To schematize the differences in the political parties' stances towards the Arab-Israeli relations we found that although the right wing parties such as Herut, General Zionist, Mizrahi, and Hapoel Ha Mizrahi express an aggressive stance towards the issues related to the foreign policy regarding Arab countries, there was no complete identification between the left wing parties and the moderate policy. Therefore, we schematize the difference by tracing the parties' historical roots indicating their stances towards the issues on the Middle East problem. The three categories applied here are: Hawks' stance, Moderates' stance and Doves' stance.

Before presenting a brief profile of each party's stances towards the political situation and before applying the previous methods, the following remarks are essential.

First, when we examined the ideological position of each of Israel's major parties, we took care to distinguish between that part which stems from the party's basic Weltanschauung and that part which seeks to win votes.

Second, there is a risk in writing about Israel's political parties' stances in only 1967 for two reasons: The first is that it was a particular situation as previously mentioned;⁽⁵⁷⁾ second, there was an impressive reshuffling of parties, with old coalitions breaking apart and new grouping organizing. It would be hazardous to take the present distribution of ideology to support the classification. Lest therefore we attribute more importance to the parties' stances in 1967

⁵⁷ See p. 46 of this study.

than is valid, we must go back in time, and describe the parties and their programmes and ideology as they appeared in the general situation. With that description as background, it will become possible, in this section, to describe the position (stances) towards the Arab-Israeli relations taken by the major parties and to classify the various stances as hawks, doves, and moderates.

Hawks

During the general situation period (1948-1967), the parties Herut, Mapai, and General Zionist displayed the hawks' stances. They possessed the following characteristics: Zionism, belief in mass immigration and in the expansion of the Jewish state.

Zionist ideology is closely identified with the hawks' parties' program. In the period of our study, Zionism meant the Jewish national movement which fathered the state, and subsequently offered a specific ideology after 1948. Zionism is not a unified system of social, political, and economic organization such as capitalism and socialism. Rather it is a movement calling for return of Jews to their ancient homeland. The messiahism inherent in the Zionist ideology led to a hawkish attitude.

The force of Zionism as an ideology which had brought the state into being had not spent itself in the consciousness of the men who implemented the ideology, though it began to lose its hold on the generation born in Israel. Like any national movement, Zionism created a strong social cohesion in the group through a common myth:

in this case, identification with the religio-historical Jewish heritage and the belief in a revived Jewish creativity in Palestine. The consciousness of "mission" which the Zionist ideology imparted to the group and to individuals was bound to affect the style of Israel's diplomacy. Thus in November, 1953, a Tel Aviv daily said of certain policy-makers that:

Their actions were guided by the spell of the vision, not by reality, both internally and externally. They acted in the U.N. and elsewhere as if they were already speaking for the heavenly and not for the earthly Israel... It is obviously impossible to reconcile a belief in the greatness of the state, in its legitimacy which is equal to that of the greatest power, and in its capacity to bring a message of salvation to the world, and at the same time act within the framework of reality of dependence on neighbors and on other powers.(58)

The hawks' parties adopted the Zionist ideology. The Mapai program is based on a loose combination of Zionism and democratic socialism. Both components are somewhat unclear, as is the connection between them. The obvious preponderance of Zionism over socialism in the party may be due to the break of the more rigorous Marxists from the Mapai during the 1940's.(59)

The Mapai foreign policy towards the Arab countries urges strong military and civil defense against attack by the Arab States; it also uses the army as a basis for foreign policy. A Mapai deputy

58 Stock, Ernest, The Road to Sinai, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

59 Fein, Leonard J., Israel Politics and People, op. cit., p. 103

told the Knesset in debate on the first government's programme,
"The conquests of Israel Defense Army... serve as the basis of our
dynamic foreign policy since November 29, 1947, until today."⁽⁶⁰⁾
The Mapai's Chairman of the Knesset's foreign affairs committee
was not satisfied with the Tripartite Declaration, and welcomed
the right to buy arms as the Arabs did.⁽⁶¹⁾

To understand Herut as a Zionist party, one must go back to
1925 when the Revisionist World Movement was organized by Vladimir
Jabotinsky, organizer of the Jewish Legion of World War I. Under
Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the movement advocated a revision of the Zionist
leadership policy towards Great Britain. It urged an anti-British
orientation, and expansion when the Jewish state would be established
to include both sides of the Jordan River.⁽⁶²⁾

The Revisionists remained in the World Zionist Organization
until 1935 when Jabotinsky led them out and formed the New Zionist
Organization.⁽⁶³⁾ When World War II broke out, two terrorist groups

⁶⁰ Divrei Ha-Knesset 53 (March 8, 1949), op. cit.

⁶¹ Ibid., (May 31, 1950), p. 1576.

⁶² Hertzberg, A. (ed.), The Zionist Idea, a Historical Analysis and Reader (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc. and Herzl Press, 1959), p. 558. See also the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), I, pp. 418-485.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 749-750.

emerged from the New Zionist Organization - the "Irgun Zvai Leumi"⁽⁶⁴⁾ and Lehomei Herut Israel" or Fighters for the Freedom of Israel which were known as Sternists.⁽⁶⁵⁾

When the War ended, the Revisionists left the new Zionist Organization and rejoined the Zionist Organization; but the Irgun Zvai Leumi rejected the move by the Revisionists, split away, and in 1948 formed the Herut Party with a programme resembling that of the old Revisionist organization. Today, in Israel, Herut is the sole exponent of this united body. Ideologically, Herut remained faithful to the Revisionist platform, turning its attention away from the now departed British towards the Arabs inside and outside Israel.

It must be noted that immigration is regarded in terms of national interest quite apart from ideological consideration. The following quotations from an article written by Ben-Gurion for the 1951 Israel Government Year Book are examples: "The cardinal aim of our state is the redemption of the people of Israel, the ingathering of the Exiles."⁽⁶⁶⁾ Eight years later he said, "Israel can have no security without immigration..."⁽⁶⁷⁾

⁶⁴ Sykes, C., Cross Roads to Israel (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1965), p. 260.

⁶⁵ The Esco Foundation, op. cit., II, pp. 1042-1043.

⁶⁶ Israel Government Year Book 5712, (1951-1952), p. ix, xii.

⁶⁷ David Ben-Gurion, "Israel's Security and her International Position Before and After Sinai Campaign," op. cit., p. 57

As Ernest Stock said "...the only way in which the Zionist origin of the state affects foreign policy is through the policy of immigration..."(68)

Menahem Begin, a Herut party leader said on March 8, 1949:

Foreign policy must tell us how we can achieve victory over our enemies who threaten us from day to day, and how it plans to bring us real peace, which will enable us to achieve our historic mission of absorbing millions of returners to Zion and making our state a true home for them.(69)

The belief in the expansion of the Jewish state was sharply outlined in the Herut Party platform for election of the Fifth Knesset. "The right of Jewish people to the land of Israel in its historic completeness, is an eternal and inalienable right."(70) It demands an aggressive defence policy against the Arab neighbors.

The last two parties classified as hawks are the "General Zionist" and "Rafi." The General Zionist was the dominant party in the World Zionist Movement, although until recently it was very weak in Israel. (71)

68 Stock, Ernest, Israel on the Road to Sinai, op. cit., p. 12.

69 "Divrei Ha-Knesset" 53 (March 8, 1949), op. cit., p. 68.

70 Herut Party, Principles and Ways of Action, Platform for Election to Fifty Knesset (Tel Aviv: E. Moses Printers, 1961), p. 5.

71 State of Israel, Government Year Book 5720 (1959-1960), p. 109

E. Moses Printers, 1961, p. 5.

The General Zionists have no special ideology, and the general policy of its leaders is private initiative, free enterprise economy with a minimum of governmental interference.⁽⁷²⁾ In its foreign policy, besides being oriented towards the west, it deplored Israel's yielding to the United States and withdrawing from the Sinai Peninsula in 1956.⁽⁷³⁾ It urges that world opinion should influence the Soviet block to permit the Jews to leave and settle in Israel.⁽⁷⁴⁾

The last party in this category is Rafi. We classify this party as hawks although it represents the young Mapai, a new generation which has cut its political teeth. Although it was composed of Mapai members who had been demanding power for themselves over the past years, its spokesman was Ben-Gurion. The curious aspect here is Ben-Gurion's identification with the younger generation, he himself being the oldest of Mapai's active veterans. His reasons, largely inscrutable, have no doubt included his knowledge that many of the younger men in the Mapai were people he himself had brought into position of responsibility, people therefore, who would be loyal to his conception of Israel's future and Israel's politics.

Doves

Doves in Israel's political context are not easy to identify. Are they the leftist, the radicals, or the opposition? Actually the

⁷² The election platform of the General Zionist Party (5715, 1955 - Tel-Aviv: Israel News Service).

⁷³ Krains, Oscar, Government and Politics in Israel, op. cit., p. 75.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

doves' attitude in Israel includes aspects from these three groups.

Those who believe in Israel without being Zionists are people such as Uri Avnery, the leader of Ha'olam Hazeh, which is a small party. This small party has two members of Knesset. Uri Avnery was the first political figure to wave the flag of Palestinian entity and to draw public attention to the growing role the Palestinians play in the Arab world. (75)

Also, it includes those who function in opposition to the Greater Israel Movement which defines the Jewish state by its historical boundaries. An example can be found in the Movement for Peace and Security, founded by a group of professors from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and led by Y. Ravravy. (76)

Among the members and supporters of this movement are some of the university's leading names: Yehoshu Bar Hillel (philosophy), Ya'akova Talmon and Yehosha Arieli (history), and Agigdor Levontin (law). The movement, which has substantial following among younger faculty members and the student body, has pleaded, at meetings and through newspaper advertisements, against annexation of Israeli-occupied areas and the creation of faits accomplis in the new territories, and for a moderate policy which would leave open every option for a peaceful settlement.

75 See: Avenery, Ury, Israel Without Zionists, a Plea for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

76 Cygielman, Victor, "La Lutte Entre 'Faucons' et 'Colombes': Les intellectuels s'inquiètent pour l'avenir de leur pays," Le Monde Diplomatique (Octobre, 1969 - No. 187), p. 10.

Si'ah, a new radical-left group is considered dovish. It has been involved in noisy demonstrations and occasional clashes with the police. It has no ordinary membership. About 500 people participate in its activities and another 500 are regarded as supporters. They come from three sectors: members of left wing (Mapam) Kibbutzim, who are disillusioned with their party's participation in the Coalition Government, ex-Communists who frown upon their leaders' returning to the fold, intellectuals and artists who associate themselves with the New Left. Prominent members are two students at Tel-Aviv University: Ron Cohen, 31 (economics), member of Kibbutz Gan Shmuel and a reserve officer in the paratroop corps, and Yossi Amitai, 33 (Middle Eastern student), member of Kibbutz Gevulot.

Says Ron Cohen:

We regard ourselves as Zionists and radicals, Our philosophy is based on self-determination within Palestine, for Arabs and Jews. We regard the Six-Day War as a justified defensive war, but because (it was this), we are against any annexation and any Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. We believe in the possibility of a peaceful settlement which will give the Palestinians their inherent right to self-determination and will, at the same time, insure Israel's security.(77)

The Israeli Socialist Organization started its struggle in 1962. Its aim is to develop within Israel a joint struggle of Jews and Arabs against the Zionist regime. The goal of I.S.O. is a socialist revolution throughout the Middle East. It is explicitly anti-Zionist.

These groups could not obtain strong influence in the Israeli political life because of the completely proportional electoral system,

77 The New York Times Magazine, (July 26, 1970), p. 44.

under which members of the Knesset are picked by party nomination committees; there is a tendency to disregard minority groups. For example, the Peace List⁽⁷⁸⁾ which, in November, 1969, ran in the Knesset election, failed to win even one seat.

The fact that all of the doves, according to the previous analysis, are not members of the political elite in Israel and that the only group representative is Ha'olam Hazeq, leads us to consider also the Mapam party and the Communist party, as doves. The Communist party and the Mapam are the only major parties in Israel which rigorously championed the cause of the Arab minority. The Communist party history has been one of a small minority party isolated entirely from the Zionist realm, and its importance in Israel is its fierce anti-Zionism. No other party is anti-Zionist. The importance of its anti-Zionism is that the Communist party relates the Zionism to suppression of the Arab minority. During the Mandate period the party attacked Zionism as a tool of British imperialism and advocated an independent Arab state in Palestine.⁽⁷⁹⁾ After 1948, it condemned Israel policy in almost every direct conflict with the Arab nations.⁽⁸⁰⁾ When the merging of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic in 1958 stirred a certain restlessness in Israel's Arabs, the Communist party leaders suggested the possibility of an independent Arab Galilee to be linked with the new Arab state. Since many of the Arab communi-

⁷⁸ The Peace List was headed by two young professors: Gadi Yatziv, a sociologist, and Saul Vogel, a mathematician.

⁷⁹ Krains, Oscar, Government and Politics in Israel, op. cit., p.73.

⁸⁰ Fein, L., Israel Politics and People, op. cit., p. 113.

ties in Galilee and elsewhere along the borders have been under military government since 1948, the party demands the abolition of such rule.⁽⁸¹⁾

The Communists oppose mass Jewish immigration. In the mid-1960's the party split into two wings, the one Moscow oriented, the other Peking oriented. This split did not affect the party's stances towards Arab-Israeli relations. The last split occurred in 1965, on the issue of policy towards Arab nationalism and Israel. Maki has undertaken to criticize the policies of Arab nationalist leaders with regard to Israel. Rakah, continued the old line. Both recognized the "right of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine to self-determination." Therefore both wings were considered in this study as doves.

The other party to be classified as doves is the Mapam. Before 1948, Mapam argued for a binational state rather than partition. Until 1967, it favored relaxing restrictions against Arabs and increasing attention to integrating the Arab minority. The political appeal of the Mapam's ideological platform earned the party significant support among Arab voters.

The Mapam was founded in 1948 as a coalition of left-wing groups that had left Mapai and more orthodox Marxists (Hashomer Hatzair). In 1929, when the Mapai was formed, Hashomer Hatzair had rejected the idea of forming one large political party embracing all the various shades of socialist Zionist beliefs. For nineteen years Hashomer Hatzair remained an independent organization resembling a

⁸¹ Krains, Oskar, op. cit., p. 73.

political party, favouring not a Jewish state but a binational Arab-Jewish state.⁽⁸²⁾

When Achdut Ha'Avadah broke away from the Mapai in January 1948, because it felt the latter had become too moderate in its socialism, Hashomer Hatzair joined with it and also with Poalei Zion Smol (Left Workers of Zion) to form the Mapam (United Workers Party).⁽⁸³⁾ Its programme calls for ultimate establishment of a classless socialist society, with Jewish-Arab unity, based on the political leadership of collective farmers.

Combining Zionism and revolutionary socialism, Mapam stresses policies of class struggle, equal rights for Arabs, and a collective economy. Like the Communist party, the Mapam party opposed the military rule in the country's Arab communities and, therefore, the party representatives demanded the abolition of military rule in the country's Arab communities, declaring that this would be the first step in achieving peace with the Arab states.⁽⁸⁴⁾

The Moderates

We have not exhausted the list of Israel's political parties in the Israeli parliament. The rest of the parties are religious parties such as Mizrahi and Hapoel Ha Mizrahi which have presented

⁸² Ibid., p. 69. See also, Eisenstadt, S. N., Israel Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p. 326.

⁸³ Krains, Oskar, op. cit., p. 68.

⁸⁴ See for example "Divrei Ha-Knesset," 33 (February 20, 1963), p. 1317.

a united list in parliamentary elections; the combined party is known as the National Religious Party (N.R.P.). We consider these parties as moderate because they have not committed themselves politically. Also, we will classify the other parties such as Agudah and Agudah workers as moderate parties.

Classifying the religious parties as moderates may be explained by the fact that up to the late twenties, Zionism and the Jewish religion were largely in opposition. There had been, even from Herzl's period, a small number of believing Jews, as well as a few rabbis, who considered themselves part and parcel of the national movement. The major part of the organized orthodox Judaism, however, was strongly opposed to the idea of founding a modern, Jewish national state. They maintained that to do so would be akin to "forcing the end," that is forcing God to send the Messiah. This, they said would be against the basic rules of Judaism.

The gradual change in mandated Palestine helped the religious groups to adopt a moderate position later on. In mandated Palestine, synagogue centered communities were founded from which the nuclei of the religious parties emerged. They were extremely careful not to take extreme sides in the political struggle and they usually adopted a moderate stance.

In this Chapter, we tried to control the consequences of the political situation on the parties' stances. To control the effect of the political situation variable, I applied the method of classification. Only a crude formulation was required, a general situation as

opposed to a particular situation. Since we apply only two categories, we have "dichotomous" rather than "multiple" classification.⁽⁸⁵⁾

This helped us in controlling the influence of the particular situation on the parties' stances because the particular situation was the situation of war. As a result of the war situation, all parties were identified with hawkish stances. For example, when a group of people are faced with a situation of war, their attitude at this time will be aggressive. Consequently, in classifying the parties' stances, I excluded completely any stance taken during the particular situation of war. The classification was done just for the general situation. In terms of this general situation, we classified the parties' stances as hawks, doves, and moderates.

The parties' stances classification developed above will be used as the dependent variable and the other social background variables as independent ones. Having reached this point, we will be able to focus directly on the research question: Is it possible to have a partial explanation of the stances of Israeli parties towards the Arab-Israeli relations with reference to the social composition of their leaders? We shall attempt to answer several questions: What sort of people reached this topmost level of power in Israeli society? What type of men became political elites and Influentials? Was there any clear association between the ruling elites' social composition and their parties' stances?

⁸⁵ Brecht, Arnold, Political Theory (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 44.

To make the research question clear, we will attempt to answer these questions in the following chapter.

1. Is it true that those ruling elite with East European and Russian origins tend to be initially older than those with Arab World, United States, and other countries origin?
2. Is it possible that the percent of younger elite with different origins will increase among the political elite in the future?
3. Will the circulation of elite change the parties' stances when more young people and those with origins other than East European become part of the ruling elite?
4. Are those who suffered from anti-semitism more likely to be affiliated with parties adopting the hawkish stance?
5. Is participation in the World Zionist Organization more likely to be associated with the old age group among the Israeli ruling elite?
6. Is participation in the World Zionist Organization more likely to be associated with the hawkish parties?
7. Is the effect of military experience and participation in the 1948 war associated with hawkish parties?
8. Do those who specialized in humanities and social sciences tend to be affiliated more with doves' parties than their counterparts in the sciences and applied sciences?
9. Are those with a higher level of education less likely to be affiliated with hawkish parties?
10. What is the association between having published books and articles and the parties stances?

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE RULING ELITE AND THEIR PARTIES' STANCES

This chapter intends to examine the characteristics of the members of the Israeli ruling elite. This examination will furnish a broad panorama of the subject, and by comparing the data about the political elite with the Influentials, we will be able to find out which background variables are important in choosing the political elite. It is intended also to cross tabulate the social backgrounds with the parties' stances to answer the research question - Is it possible to find a partial explanation of the stances of the Israeli parties by examining the social background of its leadership? There are two possible methods of collecting data about the social background. The first uses questionnaire. The second employs a "Who's Who" type of reference. With regard to this study, the latter method was used.⁽¹⁾ Data about the person background of 278 of the power elite was collected in this manner.

¹

See:

- Who's Who in Israel 1967.
- Who's Who Middle East and North Africa 1967.
- International Who's Who 1967.
- Israel: Divrei Ha-Knesset (Parliamentary records).
- Sayegh, A. (ed.) and Daniel, G., Members of the Knesset (Facts and Figures No. 33, Palestine Liberation Organization, Research Center, Colomaniat of Sadet St., Beirut, Lebanon, 1970).
- Autobiographies such as:
 1. Litvinoff, Barnet, The Story of David Ben-Gurion (London: C. Tinleng Co. Ltd., 1960).
 2. Bar-Zohar, Michael, The Armed Prophet: a Biography of Ben-Gurion (France, Fayard, 1967).
 3. Begin, Menachem, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951).
 4. Dayan, Moshe, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (English translation) (London: Nicolson Ltd., 1966).
 5. Avnery, Uri, Israel Without Zionists, op. cit.

Our list of the power elite includes two groups:

First - the Political Elite

As mentioned before in Chapter Two, the political elite in Israel are those party leaders who have secured parliamentary representation. Out of 120 members in the sixth Knesset, data about 91 members were available in "Who's Who" type of reference.

Second - the Influentials (the Lieutenants)

The Influentials are the second rank of the ruling elite. Our list of the Influentials (lieutenants) includes the top leaders of the bureaucracy, the judicial power (Supreme Court judges), members of the Histadrut Central Committee, the religious power, and the heads of economic units whose names appear in Who's Who in Israel.

We shall compare the data about the power elite, according to the previous definition, with the cabinet members. Data about all 45 ministers who participated in government in the period extended from 1948-1967 were available. (2)

² In analyzing some social background variables, one should realize that in dealing with Knesset members and the Ministers, we are using statistics for the purpose of summarizing the information (descriptive statistics), and not statistical inference. This is because we have here the population and not a sample. As a measure of association, the statistical test of lambda (Guttman's Coefficient of predictability for nominal scales) will be used. For further information, consult Appendix III.

The Variables

Age

(Old and Young)

The problem of tension and the difference of the outlooks between the generations and ruling elite is diffused, but also important. There is more than one way to look at the problem; but this study is looking at this problem as it exists in the Arab-Israeli relations.

Does the gap between the outlooks of the young and the old and the little sympathy of the young with the traditions and values of the Eastern European Jewry affect their affiliation with parties that have dove or moderate stances towards the Arab-Israeli relations? Our findings on this problem indicate that a high percentage of persons belong to age group 40-54 - 41.8 percent among the Knesset members, and 35.5 percent among the Influentials. The percentage over 55 is 52.8 among Knesset members and 55.4 among the Influentials. (See Table No. 2). The table also shows the significance of old age among the ruling elite in Israel. Seniority is a necessary condition for the exercise of public authority. Comparison of the data about the Israeli political elite with other countries indicates that the Israeli Knesset members have been somewhat older than most national legislators especially in the emerging nations. The Indian Lok Sabha of 1952, for instance, had an average age level of 46.3 years. Members of the same house seem to have been younger between 1957 and 1961,⁽³⁾ while the average age of

³Jones, Morris, The Parliament of India (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 115.

Table No. 2

AGE BY ELITE GROUP

Elite Group Age	The Sixth Knesset		The Influentials	
	Number	%	Number	%
Over 70	16	17.6	23	19.0
55-69	32	35.2	44	36.4
40-54	38	41.8	43	35.5
Under 40	3	3.3	10	8.3
Not known	<u>2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Column Total	91	100.0	121	100.0

the Turkish ten assemblies was under 48.3.⁽⁴⁾ The Pakistani legislators serving between 1956-1958 appear to have had an age distribution roughly comparable to the Turkish.⁽⁵⁾ Also, the average legislators' age in western countries is somewhat less; the average of the mean ages in the British House of Commons from 1918 through 1935 was 50.1 years.⁽⁶⁾ United States Senators in 1949 averaged 56.5, while Representatives to the seventy-seventh Congress had an average of 52 years.⁽⁷⁾ The German Bundestag of 1949 averaged 50 years.⁽⁸⁾

What is then the effect of age on Israel's top political leaders' behavior? Of course, it is difficult to state with precision exactly whose behavior is involved. But generally we mean here the top leaders in the political parties who were making the fundamental recruiting decisions. Some interesting inferences into the sorts of considerations that seem to have been uppermost in these leaders' minds can be drawn from comparing the data about the political elite

⁴ Frey, F. W., The Turkish Political Elite, op. cit., Table p. 170.

⁵ von Vorys, Karl, "The Legislator in Underdeveloped Countries," PROD, III (November, 1959) p. 25.

⁶ Ross, J. F. S., Parliamentary Representation (London: Eyre & Spottiswood - 2nd ed., 1948), p. 32.

⁷ Matthews, D. United States Senators, op. cit., p. 56. See also Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the 77th Congress," American Political Science Review, XXXVI (February, 1942), p. 67.

⁸ Kirchheimer, O. "The Composition of the German Bundestag, 1950," Western Political Quarterly, III, No. 4 (1950), p. 591.

(Knesset members and Ministers) and the Influentials. The question then is: Is age important in choosing the members of the political elite? In gross, Table No. 2 indicates some relationship between being of old age and being a member of the political elite especially as a minister because all of them were over 50 years old. A specific conclusion from the data is that old age seems to characterize the ruling elite in Israel. This indicates that the system works on seniority principles. Additional information can be drawn when we control for the other variables to know the nature of each age group.

There is evidence of a relationship between origin and age. Those political elite and Influentials with East European and Russian origins tend to be initially older than those with Arab World, United States, and other countries' origins. In the older age group the percentage of those who have East European background is high, and the percentage of those who have Arab World and United States background is low. In the younger age group, the percentage of those who came from the Arab World, United States, and other countries is high, while the percentage of those who came from East Europe and Russia is low. The percentage of those who came from Germany and West Europe is still the same. Therefore, the results indicate that it is more likely that the circulation of elite will follow the same pattern; with the circulation of elite the percentage of those who came from the Arab World and Palestine will increase among the ruling elite, while the percentage of those from East Europe and Russia will decrease. (See Table No. 3). The same pattern will be among the Influentials with less opportunity for those who came from the United States and other countries and more

Table No. 3

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY
ORIGIN AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBER

Origin \ Age		East Europe & Russia	Germany & West Europe	Arab World & Palestine	U.S.A. & Others	Row Total
Over 70	Count	14	1	1	0	16
	Col. %	23.7	25.0	5.6	0.0	17.6
	Row %	78.5	6.2	6.2	0.0	
55-69	Count	23	2	4	3	32
	Col. %	39.0	50.0	22.2	30.0	35.2
	Row %	71.8	6.2	12.5	9.5	
40-54	Count	21	1	10	6	38
	Col. %	35.6	25.0	55.6	60.0	41.8
	Row %	55.3	2.6	26.3	15.8	
Under 40	Count	1	0	2	0	3
	Col. %	1.7	0.0	11.1	0.0	3.3
	Row %	33.3	0.0	66.7	0.0	
Not known	Count	0	0	1	1	2
	Col. %	0.0	0.0	5.6	10.0	2.2
	Row %	0.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	
Column Total		59	4	18	10	91
		64.8	4.4	19.8	11.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.056 with age dependent, 0.062 with origin dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.058

opportunity for those who came from Germany and West Europe. (See Table No. 4).

There is also evidence of a relationship between old age and activity in the World Zionist Organization. The percentage of those who participated and those who are over 70 years old (35.0) is larger than the percentage of those who did not participate and are over 70 years old (12.7). With the decrease in the age groups the percentage of those who participated in World Zionist Organization decreases and the percentage of those who did not participate increases. All the three members under 40 years old did not participate in the World Zionist Organization. In age group 40-54, the percentage of those who did not participate is higher than those who participated. (See Table No. 5). The same result can be drawn from Table No. 6 about the Influentials. The percentage of those over 70 years old and who participated in the World Zionist Organization is 27.3, while those who are over 70 years old and did not participate is 17.3. Among the age group under 40 years old, 90 percent did not participate. Therefore, we can conclude that old age is associated with the participation in World Zionist Organization.

When we cross tabulate age by activity after 1948, the data support the notion that the most important activity which helps the young to join the political elite is military activity; 16.7 percent among those under 40 who joined the political elite are mainly identified with military activity. Cultural activity is the next highest activity (3.6 percent) which is conducive to political

Table No. 4

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY
ORIGIN AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Age \ Origin		East Europe & Russia	Germany & West Europe	Arab World & Palestine	U.S.A. & Others	Row Total
Over 70	Count	14	1	3	5	23
	Col. %	25.9	4.2	11.1	31.3	19.0
	Row %	60.9	4.3	8.7	26.1	
55-69	Count	21	10	9	4	44
	Col. %	38.9	41.7	33.3	25.0	36.4
	Row %	47.7	22.7	20.4	9.2	
40-54	Count	18	12	7	6	43
	Col. %	33.3	50.0	25.9	37.5	35.5
	Row %	41.9	27.9	16.7	13.5	
Under 40	Count	1	1	8	0	10
	Col. %	1.9	4.2	29.6	0.0	8.3
	Row %	10.0	10.0	80.0	0.0	
Not known	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	Col. %	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.8
	Row %	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	
Column total		54	24	27	16	121
		44.6	19.8	22.3	13.2	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.051 with age dependent, 0.11 with origin dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.08

Table No. 5

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION
AMONG KNESSET MEMBERS

Age	W.Z.O. Participa- tion			Row Total
		Yes	No	
Over 70	Count	7	9	16
	Col. %	34.0	12.7	17.6
	Row %	43.9	56.1	
55-69	Count	7	25	32
	Col. %	35.0	35.2	35.2
	Row %	21.9	78.1	
40-54	Count	6	32	38
	Col. %	30.0	45.1	41.8
	Row %	15.8	84.2	
Under 40	Count	0	3	3
	Col. %	0.0	4.2	3.3
	Row %	0.0	100.0	
Not known	Count	0	2	2
	Col. %	0.0	2.8	2.2
	Row %	0.0	100.0	
Column Total	Count	20	71	91
	Col. %	22.0	78.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric)= 0.018 with age dependent, 0.0 with origin dependent

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.013

Table No. 6

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY
WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

<div>W.Z.O. Participa- tion</div> <div>Age</div>				Row Total
		Yes	No	
Over 70	Count	6	17	23
	Col. %	27.3	17.3	19.2
55-69	Count	6	38	44
	Col. %	27.3	38.8	36.7
40-54	Count	9	33	42
	Col. %	40.9	33.7	35.0
Under 40	Count	1	9	10
	Col. %	4.5	9.2	8.3
Not known	Count	0	1	1
	Col. %	<u>0.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Column Total		22	98	120
		18.3	81.7	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.039 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.030

elite membership, but this result is due to the large number of people involved in cultural activity (see Table No. 7). Similar comparison of data in the Influential group indicates that the young age group (under 40) came mainly from economic, labour, cultural, and other activities, and none came from military activity. (See Table No. 8).

A cross tabulation between the age variable and the level of education among the two groups (political elite and Influentials) shows no relationship between the two variables. The following two Tables, No. 9 and No. 10, contrast the percentage of each age group within the labels university and pre-university education of the ruling elite. The Tables show no association between the education variable and the recruiting of the political elite among the younger generation. University education is not a criterion. On the contrary, in the young age group there is a higher percentage having pre-university education than university education. However, in the Influential group the trend in the relation between level of education and age is that, as age group decreases level of education increases, in other words, there is a higher percentage of university degrees than pre-university degrees. Therefore, this suggests that university education seems to be a criterion for membership in the Influential group rather than the political elite.

Graduate studies also are not a critical factor in the young age group's membership in the political elite. The next two Tables, No. 11 and No. 12, show that the percentage of those who have

Table No. 7

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY
ACTIVITY AFTER 1948
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBER

Age	Activity After 1948							Row Total
		Military	Economic	Labour	Cultural	Religious	Others	
Over 70	Count	2	1	4	4	1	4	16
	Col. %	16.7	8.3	30.8	14.3	16.7	20.0	17.6
55-69	Count	4	7	5	9	2	5	32
	Col. %	33.3	58.3	38.5	32.1	33.3	25.0	35.2
40-54	Count	4	4	4	12	3	11	38
	Col. %	33.3	33.3	30.8	42.9	50.0	55.0	41.8
Under 40	Count	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
	Col. %	16.7	0.0	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.3
Not known	Count	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
	Col. %	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Column Total	Count	12	12	13	28	6	20	91
	Col. %	13.2	13.2	14.3	30.8	6.6	22.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.075 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.043

Table No. 8

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY
ACTIVITY AFTER 1948 AMONG
THE INFLUENTIALS

Activity After 1948 Age		Military	Economic	Labour	Cultural	Religious	Others	Row Total
Over 70	Count	2	3	1	3	3	11	23
	Col. %	25.0	18.8	9.1	18.8	37.5	17.7	19.0
55-69	Count	2	6	5	4	3	24	44
	Col. %	25.0	37.5	45.5	25.0	37.5	38.7	36.4
40-54	Count	4	5	3	7	2	22	43
	Col. %	50.0	31.3	27.3	43.8	25.0	35.5	35.5
Under 40	Count	0	1	2	2	0	5	10
	Col. %	0.0	6.3	18.2	12.5	0.0	8.1	8.3
Not known	Count	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Col. %	<u>0.0</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Column Total	Count	8	16	11	16	8	62	121
	Col. %	6.6	13.2	9.1	13.2	6.6	51.2	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.064 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.044

Table No. 9

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY EDUCATION AMONG THE
KNESSET MEMBERS

Education Age		Univer- sity	Pre Univer- sity	Not Known	Row Total
Over 70	Count	11	0	5	16
	Col. %	17.7	0.0	23.8	17.6
55-69	Count	22	2	8	32
	Col. %	35.5	25.0	38.1	35.2
40-54	Count	25	6	7	38
	Col. %	40.3	75.0	33.3	41.8
Under 40	Count	2	0	1	3
	Col. %	3.2	0.0	4.8	3.3
Not Known	Count	2	0	0	2
	Col. %	<u>3.2</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Column Total	Count	62	8	21	91
	Col. %	68.1	8.8	23.1	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.018 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.012

Table No. 10

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY EDUCATION AMONG THE
INFLUENTIALS

Education Age		Univer- sity	Pre Univer- sity	Not Known	Row Total
Over 70	Count	16	3	4	23
	Col. %	17.2	37.5	20.0	19.0
55-69	Count	33	3	8	44
	Col. %	35.5	37.5	40.0	36.4
40-54	Count	33	2	8	43
	Col. %	35.5	25.0	40.0	35.5
Under 40	Count	10	0	0	10
	Col. %	10.8	0.0	0.0	8.3
Not Known	Count	1	0	0	1
	Col. %	<u>1.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Column Total	Count	93	8	20	121
	Col. %	76.9	6.6	16.5	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Table No. 11

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY GRADUATE STUDIES AMONG
THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Graduate Studies Age		Yes	No	Not Known	Row Total
Over 70	Count	0	16	0	16
	Col. %	0.0	22.5	0.0	17.6
55-69	Count	12	19	1	32
	Col. %	63.2	26.8	100.0	35.2
40-54	Count	6	32	0	38
	Col. %	31.6	45.1	0.0	41.8
Under 40	Count	1	2	0	3
	Col. %	5.3	2.8	0.0	3.3
Not Known	Count	0	2	0	2
	Col. %	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Column Total	Count	19	71	1	91
	Col. %	20.9	78.0	1.1	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.132 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.095

Table No. 12

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY GRADUATE STUDIES AMONG
THE INFLUENTIALS

Age \ Graduate Studies					Row Total
		Yes	No	Not Known	
Over 70	Count	4	17	2	23
	Col. %	14.3	18.9	66.7	19.0
55-69	Count	15	29	0	44
	Col. %	53.6	32.2	0.0	36.4
40-54	Count	7	35	1	43
	Col. %	25.0	38.9	33.3	35.5
Under 40	Count	2	8	0	10
	Col. %	7.1	8.9	0.0	8.3
Not Known	Count	0	1	0	1
	Col. %	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.8
Column Total	Count	28	90	3	121
	Col. %	23.1	74.4	2.5	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.103 with age dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.074

graduate studies and belong to age group of 55-69 is higher than the percentage of those who do not have graduate studies and belong to the same age group. When we compare it to the next younger age group (40-54) the data show that the percentage is higher for those who have not completed their graduate studies.

Age and Parties' Stances

When we cross tabulated variable age with parties' stances we did not find a large difference between the young elite and the old elite in their affiliation with the political parties. Among the young elite (under 40), no one belonged to parties classified as doves. In the other age group (40-54) a greater percentage belonged to doves' parties than those who belonged to hawkish parties. Similar results applied to the next age group (55-69). But a difference exists in the over 70 age group, the percentage of those who belong to hawkish parties (20.9) is greater than the percentage of those who belong to doves' parties (12.5). The degree of association between these two variables is .01 Lamda which is very low. (See Table No. 13).

Table No. 13

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY PARTIES' STANCES AMONG
THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Age	Parties' Stances				Row Total
		Hawks	Moderate	Doves	
Over 70	Count	14	00	2	16
	Col. %	20.9	0.0	12.5	17.6
55-69	Count	21	4	7	32
	Col. %	31.3	50.0	43.8	35.2
40-54	Count	28	3	7	38
	Col. %	41.8	37.5	43.8	41.8
Under 40	Count	3	0	0	3
	Col. %	4.5	0.0	0.0	3.3
Not Known	Count	1	1	0	2
	Col. %	<u>1.5</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Column Total	Count	67	8	16	91
	Col. %	73.6	8.8	17.6	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.188 with age dependent

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.012

Table No. 14

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE
BY PARTIES' STANCES AMONG
THE INFLUENTIALS

Parties Stances Age		Hawks	Moderate	Doves	Row Total
Over 70	Count	4	4	15	23
	Col. %	12.5	23.5	20.8	19.0
55-69	Count	11	8	25	44
	Col. %	34.4	47.1	34.7	36.4
40-54	Count	14	4	25	43
	Col. %	43.8	23.5	34.7	35.5
Under 40	Count	3	1	6	10
	Col. %	9.4	5.9	8.3	8.3
Not Known	Count	0	0	1	1
	Col. %	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Column Total	Count	32	17	72	121
	Col. %	26.4	14.0	59.5	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.038 with age dependent

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.023

Origin

(Place of birth and immigration)

On the basis of data collected, it becomes clear that political power in Israel rests largely in the hands of veterans of the second and third Aliyah, settlers who arrived in Palestine from East European countries (especially Russia) between 1905 and 1914, and 1917-1923.

From these immigrants of the second and third wave ranks, came the first power elite of Israel, up till 1967. Our results give evidence to support this viewpoint. Thus, of the 91 members of the sixth Knesset, 59 (64.8 percent) were born in Eastern Europe and Russia, and of 121 Influentials, 54 (44.6 percent) were born in Eastern Europe and Russia. Also, from the data about the ministers since 1948, out of 45 ministers, 31 (68.9 percent) were born in the same area. (See Table No. 15).

Comparison of the origin variable in the political elite (Knesset members and ministers) and Influentials reflects the behavior of the top leaders who were making the fundamental recruiting decisions. The percentage of those who came from East Europe and Russia increases among the political elite rather than among the Influentials; and within the political elite it increases among those who hold a ministerial position. Common Staedtl origin formed the socio-psychological background common to the members of the "inter-in-group."

Table No. 15

ORIGIN OR PLACE OF BIRTH BY ELITE GROUPS

Elite Group Origin	Knesset Members in 1967		Ministers since 1948		Influential Group	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
East Europe & Russia	59	64.8	31	68.9	54	44.6
Germany & West Europe	4	4.4	5	11.1	24	19.8
Arab World & Palestine	18	19.8	6	13.3	27	22.3
U.S.A. & Others	<u>10</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>13.2</u>
Total	91	100.0	45	100.0	121	100.0

In order to understand the social and psychological characteristics of these elite we should study the development of the seven waves of Jewish immigration, especially the second and the third. The waves are known in Zionist historiography as Aliyot (plural of the Hebrew term Aliyah).⁽⁹⁾

1. The first wave of Jewish immigration (Aliyah) into Palestine - the so-called Biluim immigration from Russia in the 1880's and continuing until 1903 - found a Jewish community already established in Palestine, the old "Yishuv." In judging the impact of the Biluim, however, the extremely small size of the immigration should not be overlooked. In a period of five years after 1881 a total of about 250 people came, most of them idealistic young people fleeing the pogroms of Alexander III.

They did not integrate with the existing social organization. They did not have an easy time in the country because of their inexperience, malaria, a long untended soil, the suspicious Turkish officials, etc. They could not adjust to the existing patterns of life of their co-religionists. Rather, they immediately isolated themselves from both the Jewish and the Arab society around them. For those who remained farmers the only way was, first, a gradual acceptance of the more experienced Arab farmhands and, later, financial rescue by Jewish banker millionaires in France and England. Neither the old Yishuv nor the Biluim immigration, however, formed the nucleus of the

⁹ Safran, Nadav, United States and Israel, op. cit., pp. 65-72.

power elite in Israel today.

2. The second wave of immigration began about seven years after the first Zionist Congress at Basle in 1897. Yet, it did not come mainly as a consequence of Zionist political activity, but rather as a result of Russia's defeat in the war against Japan, and of the debacle following the 1905 revolution. Thus, came the need to vent feelings prompted by these two defeats, which resulted in another set of pogroms and, inevitably, in another mass emigration from Russia. This time a much larger part of the affected Jewish communities left Russia for good, but only 25,000⁽¹⁰⁾ of these multitudes decided to risk immigrating to Palestine. While this is a rather small figure compared with the immigration to other places, it still represented a sizable addition to the existing community.

These immigrants of the second wave are of extreme importance to our theme because they formed with the third wave the political elite in Israel today. Therefore, it is important to examine the social and psychological characteristics which throw light on their political attitudes and behaviors.

Most of these immigrants came from Jewish centers in Russia that had suffered from the pogroms of 1905. Although from basically the same background as the Biluim, they were nevertheless much closer to the culture and the handicaps of the Ghetto or the Staedt1. At the same time, however, they had been under the influence of the Russian

¹⁰ In another source, 40,000. See Safran, Nadav, ibid., p. 67

socialist movements longer and they were affiliated with the World Zionist Organization⁽¹¹⁾ before they arrived in Palestine.

The early source of power of the second Aliyah and the factors which helped them to play an important role in the society were three-fold:

First, they developed unions of rural and urban workers, co-operative enterprises, and mutual aid societies which became the foundation of the Histadrut. They gave a powerful impetus to the "Return to the Soil" movement. They founded the Kibbutz - collective settlement - movement, etc. In 1948, it was primarily people of the second Aliyah who controlled the central institutions of Israel. This is because they formed an "elite class,"⁽¹²⁾ before 1948, according to their cultural homogeneity; they spoke one language and had the same way of thinking, same customs, and same tradition.

Second, the dominant myths of the society before 1948 placed great value on those qualities which had come to be associated with the second Aliyah: pioneering voluntarism and co-operation.

Third, the central position of the second Aliyah veterans in the struggle for statehood made them come to be seen as the founding fathers of the nation; the public consciousness was focused on the heroes of the struggle for independence, and it was they who emerged

¹¹ Ibid., p. 67

¹² Using the term class in this context does not imply the Marxist definition but means elite class as a class consciousness. ✓

as the truly legitimate leaders of the society.

3. The third wave: They came to Palestine after the first World War, between 1918-1922 and brought 25,000 Jews, mainly from Russia, in the course of the next five years, after which the exit of Jews from that country was barred. They have the same social background as the second wave.

Essentially, this was in many respects a continuation of the second Aliyah. The people of the third Aliyah were predominantly pioneers belonging to the Zionist-Socialist movements and shared the ideologies and aspirations of the men of the second Aliyah.⁽¹³⁾

Cross tabulating the data giving the country of origin with that giving the activity after 1948 indicate that origin can relatively be associated with the type of activities in the ruling elite. The data indicate almost equal distribution of activity among those who came from East Europe and Russia. The percentage are as follows: military 13.6, economic 16.9, labour 18.6, cultural 18.6, religious 8.5, others 23.7.

It is rather surprising that a community which in Germany had supplied a large number of political decision makers, did not produce a large percentage in Israel. Also none of those of German origin are in the major activities such as military, economic, and labour. They participate mainly in cultural activity (75.0 percent).

¹³ Ibid., pp. 68-69

The Jecke (German Jew) was, and is, anathema to the establishment because he lacks practically all the characteristics expected in the political elite. Efforts to build up an independent political force (the Aliya Chadasha) were quickly stifled by the power elite, thus making sure that things continued to be handled the "right" way. This is why the Jews from Germany and West Europe failed to make any dent in the socio-political set-up of Jewish Palestine. Also, those who came from the Arab World, the United States and other countries were mainly identified with cultural activities (44.4 percent coming from Arab World and 40 percent coming from United States and other countries). (See Table Nos.16 and 17).

Origin and Parties' Stances

If we compare the data giving the country of origin with that giving the parties' stances, we come to the following conclusion: In the three different groups under study, the most consistently over represented places of birth are Eastern Europe and Russia. These countries together with Arab World developed a great proportion of political elite affiliated with hawkish parties. The data for the other countries are not significant; the number of persons in these categories being too small. Among the Knesset members who came from Eastern Europe and Russia, 74.6 percent were classified as "Hawks." (See Table No. 18).

Table No. 16

CROSS TABULATION OF ACTIVITY
AFTER 1948 BY ORIGIN
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Origin Activity		East Europe & Russia	Germany & West Europe	Arab World & Pales- tine	U.S.A. & Others	Row Total
Military	Count	8	0	3	1	12
	Col. %	13.6	0.0	16.7	10.0	13.2
Economic	Count	10	0	1	1	12
	Col. %	16.9	0.0	5.6	10.0	13.2
Labour	Count	11	0	2	0	13
	Col. %	18.6	0.0	11.1	0.0	14.3
Cultural	Count	11	3	8	6	28
	Col. %	18.6	75.0	44.4	60.0	30.8
Religious	Count	5	0	1	0	6
	Col. %	8.5	0.0	5.6	0.0	6.6
Others	Count	14	1	3	2	20
	Col. %	<u>23.7</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>22.0</u>
Column Total	Count	59	4	18	10	91
	Col. %	64.8	4.4	19.8	11.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.047 with activity dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.031

Table No. 17
CROSS TABULATION OF ACTIVITY AFTER 1948
BY ORIGIN
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Origin Activity		East Europe & Russia	Germany & West Europe	Arab World & Pales- tine	U.S.A. & Others	Row Total
Military	Count	7	0	1	0	8
	Col. %	13.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	6.6
Economic	Count	7	2	3	4	16
	Col. %	13.0	8.3	11.1	25.0	13.2
Labour	Count	5	0	5	1	11
	Col. %	9.3	0.0	18.5	6.3	9.1
Cultural	Count	8	1	5	2	16
	Col. %	14.8	4.2	18.5	12.5	13.2
Religious	Count	5	1	0	2	8
	Col. %	9.3	4.2	0.0	12.5	6.6
Others	Count	22	20	13	7	62
	Col. %	<u>40.7</u>	<u>83.3</u>	<u>48.1</u>	<u>43.8</u>	<u>51.2</u>
Column Total	Count	54	24	27	16	121
	Col. %	44.6	19.8	22.3	13.2	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with activity dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Table No. 18
CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY ORIGIN
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Origin		East	Germany	Arab		
		Europe	& West	World	U.S.A.	Row
Party		& Russia	Europe	& Pales- tine	& Others	Total
Hawks	Count	44	2	14	7	67
	Col. %	74.6	50.0	77.8	70.0	73.6
	Row %	65.7	3.0	20.9	10.4	
Moderates	Count	5	1	1	1	8
	Col. %	8.5	25.0	5.6	10.0	8.8
	Row %	62.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	
Doves	Count	10	1	3	2	16
	Col. %	16.9	25.0	16.7	20.0	17.6
	Row %	<u>62.5</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>12.5</u>	
Column Total		59	4	18	10	91
		64.8	4.4	19.8	11.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Table No. 19

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY ORIGIN
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Origin Party		East Europe & Russia	Germany & West Europe	Arab World & Pales- tine	U.S.A. & Others	Row Total
Hawks	Count	19	1	8	4	32
	Col. %	35.2	4.2	29.6	25.0	26.4
	Row %	59.4	3.1	25.0	12.5	
Moderates	Count	11	3	3	0	17
	Col. %	20.4	12.5	11.1	0.0	14.0
	Row %	64.7	17.6	17.6	0.0	
Doves	Count	24	20	16	12	72
	Col. %	44.4	83.3	59.3	75.0	59.5
	Row %	<u>33.3</u>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>16.7</u>	
Column Total		54 44.6	24 19.8	27 22.3	16 13.2	121 100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with parties' stances dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Tying this with the preceding section shows that power rests largely in the hands of the second and third Aliyah, explaining why the general attitude of the political elite is affiliated with hawkish parties. Therefore, those who suffered from anti-Semitism are more likely to be affiliated with hawkish parties. A glance at Table No. 19 would show us that if the circulation of elite is between political elite and Influentials, the affiliation with hawkish parties is likely to be changed. Only 35.2 percent of the Influentials who came from East Europe and Russia are affiliated with hawkish parties (74.6 percent for the Knesset members). Statistically, the degree of association between the party affiliation and place of birth is .0 Lamda.

Education and Specialization

Edward Shils' observation: "The intellectuals have created the political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants."⁽¹⁴⁾ led me to look at the educational level and specialization of the political elite and the Influentials in Israel.

What is the profound effect of the difference in degree and kind of education on the self-images and attitudes of the members of the Israeli ruling elite? This I shall answer after providing the overwhelmingly intellectual character of the ruling elite there. This intellectual character is sharply reflected in even the most elementary aggregate profile of their formal education. As the data indicates, 68.1 percent of 91 Knesset member had obtained education at the university level and 20.9 percent of the Knesset members had obtained graduate level degrees.

Comparing the social background differences between the political elite (Knesset members) and the Influentials probably reflects the behavior of the top leaders who were making the fundamental recruiting decisions. Now, the question is: Did the level of formal education of an elite make much difference? In gross, the data indicates no direct relationship between the level of education and membership

¹⁴ Shils, Edward, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," World Politics, XII, (April, 1960), pp. 329-330

in the political elite. The percentage of those who have a university education among the Influential group is greater, 76% of 121 persons. Also, the percentage of those who have a higher education is more - 23.1 percent. All that the data can indicate is the overwhelming intellectual character of the ruling elite in Israel.

Education and Parties' Stances

At this point it is appropriate to ask whether the different educational backgrounds in terms of pre-university and university levels is associated with the parties' stances. Does the level of education of political elite vary in accordance with differences in their parties' stances? Does the specialization vary in accordance with differences in parties' stances? The answer to both questions appears to be "yes." The difference in degree of education has a profound effect on the self-images and affiliation of the members of the Israeli ruling elite.

Looking at the results in the tables which show the number of individuals at different levels of education belonging to different parties' stances groups, we find that they support our hypothesis among the Influentials only, the higher the level of education, the less likely the elite are to be affiliated with hawkish parties.

In the case of the Knesset members and the ministers (political elite), the education variable did not have an effect on the affiliation with parties. 17.7 percent of the Knesset members who have university education are affiliated with doves' parties, but the total percentages

Table No. 20

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY EDUCATION
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Party	Education				Row Total
		University	Pre- University	Not Known	
Hawks	Count	45	5	17	67
	Col. %	72.6	62.5	81.0	73.6
	Row %	67.2	7.5	25.4	
Moderates	Count	6	1	1	8
	Col. %	9.7	12.5	4.8	8.8
	Row %	75.0	12.5	12.5	
Doves	Count	11	2	3	16
	Col. %	17.7	25.0	14.3	27.6
	Row %	<u>68.8</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>18.8</u>	
Column Total		62	8	21	91
		68.1	8.8	23.1	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

Table No. 21
CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY EDUCATION
AMONG THE MINISTERS

Education					Row
Party		University	University	Not Known	Total
Hawks	Count	24	4	5	33
	Col. %	70.6	80.0	83.3	73.3
	Row %	72.7	12.1	15.2	
Moderates	Count	7	1	0	8
	Col. %	20.6	20.0	0.0	17.8
	Row %	87.5	12.5	0.0	
Doves	Count	3	0	1	4
	Col. %	8.8	0.0	16.7	8.9
	Row %	<u>75.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>25.0</u>	
Column Total		34	5	6	45
		75.6	11.1	13.3	100.0

Table No. 22

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY EDUCATION
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Party	Education			Row Total
		University	Pre- University	Not Known
Hawks	Count	23	3	6
	Col. %	25.0	37.5	28.6
	Row %	71.9	9.4	18.8
Moderates	Count	11	2	4
	Col. %	12.0	25.0	19.0
	Row %	64.7	11.8	23.5
Doves	Count	58	3	11
	Col. %	63.0	37.5	51.4
	Row %	<u>80.6</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>15.3</u>
Column Total	Count	92	8	21
		76.0	6.6	17.3
				121
				100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

of doves in the Knesset is 17.6 percent. Education did not increase the percentage; in other words, there is no association.

Among the Influentials who have a university education, 25 percent are affiliated with hawks' parties, and 63 percent with doves' parties. (The total percentage of those who affiliated with hawks' parties among the Influentials is 26.4 and those of doves' is 59.5 percent). Among those who did not attend university, 37.5 percent are affiliated with hawks' parties. But, the degree of association between these two nominal scales is 0.0 according to Lambda. The association between higher education and affiliation with doves' parties is 0.0. But if we look at the percentage among those who completed graduate studies, we see the result is that 14.3 percent are affiliated with hawkish parties and 67.9 percent are affiliated with doves' parties (See Table No. 23).

Let us look at the association between the educational specialization and the parties' stances while the education variable is held constant. What is the association between the parties' stances and the educational specialization? Does the specialization in humanities and social sciences and the specialization in applied science make a difference in the elite affiliation to special parties' stances? I submit that it does.

Among members of Knesset who studied the humanities and social sciences, 61.5 percent are affiliated with hawkish parties whereas the total percentage of those who affiliated with hawkish is 73.6 percent.

Among the Knesset members who studied applied science, 88.2 percent are affiliated with hawkish parties. The degree of association in this case, applying Lamda (Symmetric) is (.05). These results are also valid (with different percentages) among the ministers. Among the Influentials the results are still more convincing. (See Table Nos. 25 and 26). Therefore, those specializing in the humanities and social sciences tend to be affiliated with doves' parties more than those studying applied sciences, but with a low degree of association.

If we compare the background educational specialization between the two groups - Knesset members and Influentials - again the data does not indicate that the specialization has any importance in recruiting the political elite. If we add the educational specialization to the level of education to explain the affiliation with the parties, the degree of association will be (.04).

Before rounding out this analysis by investigating the effect of publications (cultural variable) on the ruling elite parties' stances, I must warn the reader that data was available only on those whose published articles or books were listed in Who's Who references. With this fact in mind let us examine Table No. 27, which cross tabulates published works with parties' stances. The table illustrates a slight increase in the percentage of those who published and are affiliated with hawkish parties. The difference is 5.5 percent and the degree of association is .05 Lamda with the publications as the

dependent variable and .03 Symmetric Lamda. These data also indicate very low association between the two variables. The degree of association is higher among the Influentials with publications as a dependent variable Lamda (Asymmetric) is .19 and Lamda (Symmetric) is (.10). (See Table No. 28). The comparison between the two groups for the purpose of the aggregate criteria also indicates that publication did not affect the decision of the political leaders who select the political elite.

Table No. 23

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY GRADUATE STUDIES
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Party	Graduate Studies				Row Total
		Yes	No	Not Known	
Hawks	Count	4	27	1	32
	Col. %	14.3	30.0	33.3	26.4
	Row %	12.5	84.4	3.1	
Moderates	Count	5	12	0	17
	Col. %	17.9	13.3	0.0	14.0
	Row %	29.4	70.6	0.0	
Doves	Count	19	51	2	72
	Col. %	67.9	56.7	66.7	59.5
	Row %	<u>26.4</u>	<u>70.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>	
Column Total		28	90	3	121
		23.1	74.4	2.5	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

Table No. 24

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY EDUCATIONAL SPECIALIZATION
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Party \ Educational Specialization		Humanities and Social Sciences	Applied Sciences	No Specialization	Row Total
Hawks	Count	24	15	28	67
	Col. %	61.5	88.2	80.0	73.6
	Row %	35.8	22.4	41.8	
Moderates	Count	5	1	2	8
	Col. %	12.8	5.9	5.7	8.8
	Row %	62.5	12.5	25.0	
Doves	Count	10	1	5	16
	Col. %	25.6	5.9	14.3	17.6
	Row %	<u>62.5</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>31.3</u>	<u> </u>
Column Total		39	17	35	91
		42.9	18.7	38.5	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .05 with party dependent.

Table No. 25

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY EDUCATIONAL SPECIALIZATION
AMONG THE MINISTERS

Party	Educational Specialization	Humanities and Applied			Row Total
		Social Sciences	Science	No Specialization	
Hawks	Count	16	6	1	33
	Col. %	69.6	85.7	73.3	73.3
	Row %	48.5	18.2	33.3	
Moderates	Count	6	0	2	8
	Col. %	26.1	0.0	13.3	17.8
	Row %	75.0	0.0	25.0	
Doves	Count	1	1	2	4
	Col. %	4.3	14.3	13.3	8.9
	Row %	<u>25.0</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>50.0</u>	
Column Total		23	7	15	45
		51.1	15.6	33.3	100.0

Table No. 26

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY EDUCATIONAL SPECIALIZATION
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Party	Educational Specialization				Row Total
		Humanities and Social Sciences	Applied Science	No Specialization	
Hawks	Count	10	8	14	32
	Col. %	15.4	38.1	40.0	26.4
	Row %	31.3	25.0	43.8	
Moderates	Count	10	2	5	17
	Col. %	15.4	9.5	14.3	14.0
	Row %	58.8	11.8	29.4	
Doves	Count	45	11	16	72
	Col. %	69.2	52.4	45.7	59.5
	Row %	62.5	15.3	22.2	
Column Total		65	21	35	121
		53.7	17.4	28.9	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .07 with party dependent.

Table No. 27
CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY PUBLICATIONS
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Party	Publications	Published Books	Did not Publish	Row Total
Hawks	Count	39	28	67
	Col. %	76.5	70.0	73.6
Moderates	Count	3	5	8
	Col. %	5.9	12.5	8.8
Doves	Count	9	7	16
	Col. %	<u>17.6</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>17.6</u>
Column Total		51	40	91
		56.0	44.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

.05 with publications dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = .03

Table No. 28

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY PUBLICATIONS
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Party	Cultural			Row Total
		Published Books	Did not publish	
Hawks	Count	19	13	32
	Col. %	33.3	20.3	26.4
Moderates	Count	11	6	17
	Col. %	19.3	9.4	14.0
Doves	Count	57	64	121
	Col. %	47.1	52.9	100.0
Column Total				

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .19 with publication dependent

Lamda (Symmetric) = .10

Activity

The political elite's activity in Israel is more important than education not only in determining his position among the political elite but also in his selection. Practical experience, especially since 1920, is more critical than anything else. Eshkol's famous remark whenever he received some piece of advice he did not like ("Hot er gemacht a piaster? - Has he made a dollar?") is typical of this attitude. (15)

To complete the initial survey, let us now examine closely the data to learn what activity is pursued, what other social background characteristics are associated with or attend the type of activity, and whether the difference in activity indicates any prerequisite for membership in political elite. The last point to be examined is the association between the activity variable and the parties' stances.

First, I must explain the activity variable classification. The analysis of this variable will involve the difference between the activities of the ruling elite before and after 1948. Although the classification of activity labels within these two periods are usually straightforward, sometimes they occasion

¹⁵ The other variable which influences the elite's status is that based upon his East European origin.

some difficulty. The analysis proceeds on the premise that years of work or activities with which an individual was primarily affiliated would result in an identification with that activity.

The labour category includes those who participate in the labour movement, workers, and industrialists. The Jewish Agency includes those who participate administratively in its activity.

Religious has been construed very strictly. If a man was both Rabbi and Judge at the same time, he was not classified under religious but under "other" activities. I have not placed men in the religious category, unless I had definite evidence that they affiliated with this activity more than any other activity.

Kibbutz activity category includes the active members in the Kibbutz. Also, the classification depends on the number of years the person spent as an active member in one of the Kibbutz before becoming a member in the ruling elite.

Economic includes mainly those who made their living through agricultural, commercial activities. The "bankers" and the economic companies' managers are included in this category.

The military activity category includes those who affiliated mainly with the military organization. Cultural activity includes journalists, publishers, artists, teachers

and authors. The others category includes other activities or the unknowns.

Activity Profiles before 1948

Most of the political elite started their activity in Palestine before 1948.⁽¹⁶⁾ Table No. 29 concerns the activity characteristics of the ruling elite before 1948. It gives the count and the percentage of all Knesset members and Influentials who identified with the different activities.

We see, first of all, that more than half of the ruling elite had labour activity - 62.6 percent of the Knesset members and 51.2 percent among the Influentials. The remaining half was divided among the other four labels of activity.

The order differs from the Knesset members and the Influentials. Among the Knesset members, the largest group after labour was that of cultural followed in order of size by Jewish Agency, Kibbutz, and religious. In the Influentials, the order after labour is the Jewish Agency followed by religious, Kibbutz and cultural.

This comparison shows that the activity variable (labour)

¹⁶ The percentage of those who immigrated after 1948, among the political elite, is 2.2 percent. None among the ministers immigrated after 1948. The percentage of the immigration after 1948 is 9.1 percent.

Table No. 29

BY ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948 AMONG
KNESSET MEMBERS AND INFLUENTIALS

Activity \ Elite Group	<u>Kneset Members</u>		<u>Influentials</u>	
	No	%	No	%
Labour	57	63.3	62	51.2
Jewish Agency	8	8.9	23	19.0
Religious	6	6.7	16	13.2
Kibbutz	7	7.8	13	10.7
Cultural	<u>12</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5.8</u>
Column Total	90 *	100.0	121	100.0

* There is one individual whose major activity cannot be ascertained.

is high in both groups but it is higher within the Knesset. Therefore, it could be one of the criteria in choosing the political elite. The other over-represented activity is cultural activity. The result here, should be taken as only a crude guide, because the difference is not very distinctive.

The Kibbutz has an important place in Israeli imagery, but membership in a Kibbutz is not a prerequisite for membership in the political elite. The total number of active Kibbutz members in the Knesset is 7 (7.8 percent), which is not very great. The total number of Kibbutz members among the Influential sample is 13 (10.7 percent) which is more than in the Knesset, but it is still not very great. This is not too surprising, however, if we remember that the leaders of the third wave, though always eloquent on the subject of returning to the soil, actually lived in towns. Nevertheless, the gap between ideology and practice prompted a rather bad conscience among the ruling elite, and this helped inflate the Kibbutz image out of proportion to reality, which is that less than 3 percent of the population ever chose this form of life.

Activity after 1948

Now let us seek the significance of the activity differences after 1948. At first glance, the tables show that

among Knesset members, 13.2 percent are military, 13.2 percent are economic, 14.3 percent are labour, 30.8 percent are cultural and 6.6 percent are religious. Comparing these percentages with activity percentages previous to 1948, we find the percentages of labour activity strongly decreased, and the percentage of cultural activity strongly increased. Religious activity percentages are still comparably the same. Among the Influentials we reach the same conclusion after comparing activity before and after 1948.

Next we must once more ascertain how the Knesset members compared with the Influential elite, along the dimension we are exploring. Was the percentage of each activity label the same? If it differed, which activity was overrepresented and which was underrepresented? Table No. 30 presents the comparison between the two groups. The data provided in the table should be taken also as only a crude guide to indicate the recruitment criteria to the political elite position. The previous table indicates differences between the distribution of activity between the Knesset members and the Influential group. The Influential group is preponderantly in the category labelled others. Over 50 percent were engaged in other activities among the Knesset members; however, other activities occupied less than 25 percent of the total group.

The military, labour, and cultural activities were well represented. Military category is 12.2 percent among Knesset

Table No. 30

ACTIVITY AFTER 1948 AMONG
KNESSET MEMBERS AND INFLUENTIALS

Elite Group Activity	Kneset Members		Influential Elite	
	No.	%	No.	%
Military	12	13.2	8	6.6
Economic	12	13.2	16	13.2
Labour	13	14.3	11	9.1
Cultural	28	30.8	16	13.2
Religious	6	6.6	8	6.6
Others	20	22.0	62	51.2
Total	91	100.0	121	100.0

members while it is 6.6 percent among the Influentials, labour category is 14.3 percent among Knesset members while it is 9.1 percent among Influentials and cultural category is 30.8 percent among the Knesset members while it is 13.2 percent among the Influentials. The significance of this data is that it tends to place three basic activity groups in a hierarchical array with the political elite most favored, those who have cultural activities most favored, those who have labour activity less favored, and those who have military element least favored.

The same ordered pattern is displayed in Table No. 31 which controls the activity for the level of education among the two groups.

When we controlled for educational level we still had the same activity hierarchical array, cultural, labour, and military within those who had university education. Controlling for those pre-university the hierarchical array was military, economic, labour and then cultural. These results give more weight to the labour, and military activity as a criterion for selection to the political elite position. These results also show the importance of activity compared with education as a criterion in recruiting political elite.

The same ordered pattern of activity holds when we control the activity for publication.

Table No. 31

ACTIVITY BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AMONG
KNESSET MEMBERS AND INFLUENTIALS

Activity after 1948	Elite Group & Educa- tional Level		Kneset Members						Influentials							
	Univer-		Pre		Not		Total		Univer-		Pre		Not		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Military	6	50	1	8.3	5	41.7	12	13.2	5	62.5	1	12.5	2	25.0	8	6.6
Economic	6	50	1	8.3	5	41.7	12	13.2	12	75.0	3	18.8	1	6.3	16	13.2
Labour	7	53	2	15.4	4	30.8	13	14.3	7	63.6	2	18.2	2	18.2	11	9.1
Cultural	24	85.7	2	7.1	2	7.1	28	30.8	12	75.0	1	6.3	3	18.8	16	13.2
Religious	5	83.3	1	16.7	0	0	6	6.6	6	75.0	0	0	2	25.0	8	6.6
Others	<u>14</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>82.3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>51.2</u>
Total	62	68.1	8	8.8	21	23.1	91	100.0	93	76.9	8	6.6	20	16.5	121	100.0
Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.04 with activity dependent.									Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.03 with activity dependent.							
Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.03									Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.02							

Since the three activities - cultural, labour and military were important as a criteria for recruiting we are going to cross tabulate these three activities with other social background variables. This cross tabulation will provide useful insight into important characteristics of the members affiliated with these activities.

The Cultural Activities

There is continuity in this label; 83.3 percent of those affiliated with cultural activities after 1948 were involved in the same type of activity before 1948. They are well educated elite (38.7 percent out of those who have university education and 42.1 percent out of those who have graduate studies). They compose 25 percent out of those who participate in the World Zionist Organization and 15.4 percent out of those who participate in terrorist activities. They did not have a leadership role in Palestine before 1948.

The percentage of those who belong to hawkish parties is less than other activities but still 68 percent. They have the highest percent among those who published books or articles.

Labour

There is a complete continuation in this activity; those who are affiliated with labour activity after 1948 were in the same activity before 1948. In general this group has the same characteristics as the previous group in terms of education and specialization. But the percent of those who participated in World Zionist Organization among them is almost the same 20 percent. They did not participate in terrorist activity. They are affiliated with hawkish parties (11 individuals out of 13).

Military

In many respects, there is continuity in this activity - before and after 1948 - as with the other labels. For example 75 percent of those identified with military activity after 1948 were identified with military activity before 1948. Ten percent of all political elite with University-level education are military. Ten percent of all those who had graduate studies were affiliated with military activity. Of those who specialized in human and social science 15.4 percent were military. Most of them immigrated before 1948 (80%). The percentage of those

who participated in World Zionist Organization or terrorist activity is not very high. More than 50 percent had a leadership role in Palestine before 1948, especially in labour activity.

All of the military were affiliated with hawkish parties. The last interesting point is that among those who published books or articles, 15.7 percent were identified with military activity.

Activity and Parties' Stances

Thus far, nothing has been said in detail about the association between activity and the parties' stances. Table Nos. 32 and 33 present the association between the activities before 1948 and the activities after 1948 and the parties' stances among the Knesset members (political elite).

As the previous two Tables, Nos. 32 and 33 indicate, among Knesset members the percentage of those who affiliated with hawkish parties is higher among those who participated in labour activities, Jewish Agency, and Kibbutz before 1948, than those who participated in religious or cultural activity. Among those who have labour activity in their background, 84.2 were affiliated with hawkish parties, while 5.3 percent were affiliated with moderate parties, and 10.5 percent were affiliated with doves' parties. The Kibbutz label has the

Table No. 32
CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948

Party	Activity Before 1948						Row Total
		Labour	Jewish Agency	Reli- gious	Kibbutz	Cultu- ral	
Hawks	Count	48	5	0	6	7	66
	Col. %	84.2	62.5	0.0	85.7	58.3	73.3
Moderates	Count	3	2	3	0	0	8
	Col. %	5.3	25.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	8.9
Doves	Count	6	1	3	1	5	16
	Col. %	<u>10.5</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>41.7</u>	<u>17.8</u>
Column Total	Count	57	8	6	7	12	90
	Col. %	63.3	8.9	6.7	7.8	13.3	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.125 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.052

Number of missing observations = 1

Table No. 33

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY ACTIVITY AFTER 1948
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Party	Activity After 1948	Military	Economic	Labour	Cultural	Religious	Others	Row Total
Hawks	Count	12	11	11	19	0	15	67
	Col. %	100.0	83.3	84.6	67.9	0.0	75.0	73.6
Moderates	Count	0	0	0	3	3	2	8
	Col. %	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.7	50.0	10.0	8.8
Doves	Count	0	2	2	6	3	3	16
	Col. %	<u>0.0</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>17.6</u>
Column Total	Count	12	12	13	28	6	20	91
	Col. %	13.2	13.2	14.3	30.8	6.6	22.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.125 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.034

same percentage affiliated with hawkish parties. Over 60 percent affiliated with Jewish Agency affiliated later on with hawkish parties, 25 percent with moderates and 12.5 percent with doves' parties. Among those who affiliated with religious activities, 100 percent affiliated with moderate and doves' parties. About 42 percent with cultural background activity affiliated with doves' parties. Therefore, we can conclude that those who were affiliated with labour, Jewish Agency, and Kibbutz are more likely to be associated with hawkish parties than their counterpart religious and cultural who are more likely to be associated with doves' or moderate parties. The degree of association here according to Lamda is .12, thus a knowledge of the activities before 1948 will eliminate 12 percent of the errors one makes in guessing the parties' stances.

Analysis of Table No. 33 which cross tabulates the activity after 1948 and the parties' stances indicates that among Knesset members the percent of those affiliated with hawkish parties is higher amongst those who participated in military activity than amongst those who participated in labour activity. Labour activity is higher than economic activity, which itself is higher than cultural activity. None amongst those participating in religious activity became identified with hawkish parties. Therefore, if we set points of order on activities which create more affiliation with hawkish parties, the result is: military, labour, economic, cultural, and then, others, in that order. The same conclusion can be observed from the data in reference to ministers.

On the other hand, military activity did not produce any affiliation with moderate or doves' parties, especially among the Knesset members and the ministers. The degree of association here, according to Lamda, is .12.

The next two Tables, Nos. 34 and 35, present the cross tabulation between the parties' stances and the activity variable among the Influential group. Among the Influentials the result is different from the political elite. It is worthwhile here to recall what was previously mentioned about the difference between the Influential group who are not participating directly in the authority and the political elite who hold the power and work within the governmental structure. Table No. 34 indicates that the percent of those who were affiliated with labour activity before 1948 affiliated later on mainly with doves' parties (59.7 percent). The same result is shown about the activity label Jewish Agency. There is not much difference in the label Kibbutz but the percentage is less. Those who affiliated with the religious and cultural activities also affiliated mainly with doves' parties. The percentage among the Influentials are more than the political elite.

If we sort the activities after 1948 which also created more affiliation with doves' and moderate parties, the order will be: religious, cultural, economic, labour, and then, other activities. The degree of association between the activity variable and parties' stances is .02 for the activities before 1948 and .24 for the activities after 1948.

Table No. 34

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948
AMONG INFLUENTIALS

Activity Before 1948 Party		Labour	Jewish Agency	Religious	Kibbutz	Cultural	Row Total
Hawks	Count	18	6	0	7	1	32
	Col. %	29.0	26.1	0.0	53.8	14.3	26.4
Moderates	Count	7	3	7	0	0	17
	Col. %	11.3	13.0	43.8	0.0	0.0	14.0
Doves	Count	37	14	9	6	6	72
	Col. %	<u>59.7</u>	<u>60.9</u>	<u>56.3</u>	<u>46.2</u>	<u>85.7</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Column Total	Count	62	23	16	13	7	121
	Col. %	51.2	19.0	13.2	10.7	5.8	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.020 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.009

Table No. 35

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY ACTIVITY AFTER 1948
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Party	Activity After 1948							Row Total
		Military	Economic	Labour	Cultural	Religious	Others	
Hawks	Count	6	9	6	6	0	5	32
	Col. %	75.0	56.3	54.5	37.5	0.0	8.1	26.4
Moderates	Count	0	2	3	4	4	4	17
	Col. %	0.0	12.5	27.3	25.0	50.0	6.5	14.0
Doves	Count	2	5	2	6	4	53	72
	Col. %	<u>25.0</u>	<u>31.3</u>	<u>18.2</u>	<u>37.5</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>85.5</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Column Total	Count	8	16	11	16	8	62	121
	Col. %	6.6	13.2	9.1	13.2	6.6	51.2	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.244 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.148

So far, nothing has been said about the association between the ruling elite and the terrorist activity and the participation in the World Zionist Organization. Our hypothesis here was that there is an association between the participation in World Zionist Organization and the tendency for the elite to be affiliated with hawkish parties or doves' parties. Among the Knesset members who participated in World Zionist Organization, 75 percent were affiliated with hawkish parties. Among those who did not participate, 73.2 percent were affiliated with hawkish parties. Hence, for the Knesset members this factor is not a determinant.

Among the Influentials who participated in World Zionist Organization, 31.8 percent were affiliated with hawkish parties; among those who did not participate, 25.5 percent were affiliated with hawkish parties. The effect of this factor on the Influentials is apparent. In the case of the Knesset members, another factor is more important and has the decisive effect which is: being in authority or having power. (See Table Nos. 36 and 37).

Terrorist activity leads to the previous conclusion, which is, in the case of the Knesset members the other factors are more important than participation in terrorist activity. Among those who did participate, 92.3 percent were affiliated with hawkish parties. Among those who did not participate, 70.1 percent were not affiliated with hawkish parties. The difference is not as significant as it appears to be at a first glance, because only 13 percent of the members participated in terrorist activities. For this small

Table No. 36

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Party	W.Z.O.			Row Total
		Yes	No	
Hawks	Count	15	52	67
	Col. %	75.0	73.2	73.6
Moderates	Count	2	6	8
	Col. %	10.0	8.5	8.8
Doves	Count	3	13	16
	Col. %	<u>15.0</u>	<u>13.8</u>	<u>17.6</u>
Column Total	Count	20	71	91
	Col. %	22.0	78.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Table No. 37

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Party	W.Z.O.		Yes	No	Row Total
	Count	Col. %			
Hawks	Count		7	25	32
	Col. %		31.8	25.5	26.7
Moderates	Count		4	13	17
	Col. %		18.2	13.3	14.2
Doves	Count		11	60	71
	Col. %		<u>50.0</u>	<u>61.2</u>	<u>59.2</u>
Col. Total	Count		22	98	120
	Col. %		50.0	81.7	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Number of missing observations = 1

percentage the risk of error is too great to allow us to draw a strong conclusion.

Among the Influentials, 63.6 percent of those who participated were affiliated with hawkish' parties, and 22.9 percent of those who did not participate were hawks. The degree of association in the Influential group is .08 Lamda, while there is no association in the Knesset members. (See Table Nos. 38 and 39).

Table No. 38

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY TERRORIST ACTIVITY
AMONG THE KNESSET MEMBERS

Party	Terrorist Activity				Row Total
		Yes	No	Not Known	
Hawks	Count	12	54	1	67
	Col. %	92.3	70.1	100.0	73.6
Moderates	Count	0	8	0	8
	Col. %	0.0	10.4	0.0	8.8
Doves	Count	1	15	0	16
	Col. %	<u>7.7</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>17.6</u>
Column Total	Count	13	77	1	91
	Col. %	14.3	84.6	1.1	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.0

Table No. 39

CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY TERRORIST ACTIVITY
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Terrorist Activity Party		Yes	No	Not Known	Row Total
Hawks	Count	7	25	0	32
	Col. %	63.6	22.9	0.0	26.4
Moderates	Count	0	16	1	17
	Col. %	0.0	14.7	100.0	14.0
Doves	Count	4	68	0	72
	Col. %	<u>36.4</u>	<u>62.4</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Column Total	Count	11	109	1	121
	Col. %	9.1	90.1	0.8	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.081 with party dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.065

Publications

Having published books and articles is not a criterion for recruitment to political elite position. The percentage of those who have published among the political elite is high (56 percent) but the same percentage is also high among the Influentials (47.2 percent).

Cross tabulating the data about publication with political parties' stances, the result is that, the degree of association is not very high. But it is important to realize that the data about publication varies among the two groups, the political elite and the Influentials. Among those who published books or articles the percentage of those who affiliated with hawkish' parties among the political elite is 76.5 percent while it is 33.7 percent among the Influentials. The percentage of doves among those who published is only 17.6 among the political elite and 47.4 among the Influentials. Among those who did not publish books or articles, the percentage of those who affiliated with hawkish' parties among the political elite (70.0) is much higher than the percentage of those who affiliated with hawkish' parties among the Influentials (20.3); while those who affiliated with doves' parties is much less (17.5 percent) among the political elite than among the Influentials (70.3 percent).

Therefore, the affiliation with political parties did affect the publication with a degree of .05 Lamda among the political elite and .19 Lamda among the Influentials. (See Table Nos. 40 and 41). It is important to realize the influence of being a member of the

Table No. 40
CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY PUBLICATIONS
AMONG POLITICAL ELITE

Party	Publications			Row Total
		Published	Did not Published	
Hawks	Count	39	28	67
	Col. %	76.5	70.0	73.6
	Row %	58.2	41.8	
Moderate	Count	3	5	8
	Col. %	37.5	62.5	8.8
	Row %	5.9	12.5	
Doves	Count	9	7	16
	Col. %	17.6	17.5	17.6
	Row %	<u>56.3</u>	<u>43.8</u>	
Column Total	Count	51	40	91
	Col. %	56.0	44.0	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent,
0.05 with publications dependent.
Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.03

Table No. 41
CROSS TABULATION OF PARTIES' STANCES
BY PUBLICATIONS
AMONG THE INFLUENTIALS

Publica- tions Party			Published	Did not Published	Row Total
Hawks	Count		19	13	32
	Col. %		33.7	20.3	26.4
	Row %		59.4	40.6	
Moderates	Count		11	6	17
	Col. %		19.3	9.4	14.0
	Row %		64.7	35.3	
Doves	Count		27	45	72
	Col. %		47.4	70.3	59.5
	Row %		<u>37.5</u>	<u>62.5</u>	
Column Total	Count		57	64	121
	Col. %		47.1	52.9	100.0

Lamda (Asymmetric) = 0.0 with party dependent,
0.192 with publications dependent.

Lamda (Symmetric) = 0.103

political elite (or the role variable). The role creates more affiliation with hawkish parties and less affiliation with doves' parties among those who have published. Among those who did not publish the role creates more affiliation with hawkish parties. Therefore, the role is the predominant variable in this context.

In the preceding sections we have examined the significance of social background variables for the composition of the Israeli ruling elite and parties' stances on Arab-Israeli relations. We have found very little association between each variable and the parties' stances as measured by Lamda; in other words, the knowledge of the values of one of the social background variables did not aid in guessing the values of the variable, parties' stances.

MULTIPLE VARIABLES IMPACT

As we have seen, the association between each background variable and parties' stances was not very strong. Let us in this section look at more than one variable, keeping in mind the basic breakdown of each variable. The reason for this is that adding the variables to each other may explain more of the relationship with the parties' stances than any single variable alone. Using more than one variable on the basis of knowledge of the other, is reflected in the increase of values of the coefficient from 0 to 1.00. The effect of multiple variables may be observed in Table 42.

Age and Other Variables:

The degree of association between age and parties' stances is .01 Lamda (λ), among the ruling elite and .03 Lamda (λ) among the Influentials. Keeping in mind the basic breakdown into age groups, we may look at some additional characteristics of the ruling elite. The degree of association, Lamda (λ), will increase slightly if another variable such as origin is added to age. In this case, the association is .08 Lamda (λ) among the political elite, while it is still a low of .02 Lamda (λ) among the Influentials. The same result will be obtained by adding the educational level and educational specialization to the age variable; the degree of association is .08 Lamda (λ) among the political elite while it is .22 Lamda (λ) among the Influentials. Adding different types of social background variables such as activity and contact with Israel increases the degree of association. For

Table No. 42

No.	The Composition of the Variables	The Degree of Association (λ_a)	
		Political Elite	Influentials
1	PARTY BY ORIGIN, EDUCATION, GRADUATE STUDIES, W.Z.O. ACTIVITY OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY.	.0	.0
2	PARTY BY TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND W.Z.O.	.0	.0
3	PARTY BY AGE	.01	.03
4	PARTY BY CONTACT WITH ISRAEL.	.04	.0
5	PARTY BY ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE.	.04	.27
6	PARTY BY ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY.	.04	.06
7	PARTY BY ORIGIN, ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE, W.Z.O. AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY.	.04	.21
8	PARTY BY TERRORIST ACTIVITY, W.Z.O. AND ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE.	.04	.06
9	PARTY BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, GRADUATE STUDIES AND SPECIALIZATION.	.04	.06
10	PARTY BY SPECIALIZATION.	.05	.07
11	PARTY BY CULTURAL.	.05	.19
12	PARTY BY AGE AND ORIGIN.	.08	.02
13	PARTY BY AGE, EDUCATION, AND SPECIALIZATION.	.08	.22
14	PARTY BY ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948.	.12	.02

Table (cont'd)

No.	The Composition of the Variables	The Degree of Association (λ_a)	
		Political Elite	Influentials
15	PARTY BY ACTIVITY AFTER 1948.	.12	.24
16	PARTY BY ORIGIN, EDUCATION AND SPECIALIZATION	.13	.20
17	PARTY BY ORIGIN AND ACTIVITY AFTER 1948.	.25	.39
18	PARTY BY ORIGIN, EDUCATION, SPECIALIZATION AND PUBLICATIONS (CULTURAL).	.25	.36
19	PARTY BY AGE, CONTACT, W.Z.O. AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY.	.25	.27
20	PARTY BY AGE, ORIGIN, EDUCATION AND SPECIALIZATION.	.29	.50
21	PARTY BY ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948 AND ACTIVITY AFTER 1948.	.37	.43
22	PARTY BY ORIGIN AND ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948.	.42	.12
23	PARTY BY AGE, ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE AND ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948.	.42	.25
24	PARTY BY ORIGIN AND ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP ROLE, ACTIVITY BEFORE 1948 AND ACTIVITY AFTER 1948.	.63	.59
25	PARTY BY EDUCATION, GRADUATE STUDIES, SPECIALIZATION AND PUBLISHED ARTICLES OR BOOKS (CULTURAL).	.79	.24

example, by adding to age the variable contact with Israel, World Zionist Organization, and terrorist activity the association increases to .25 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .27 Lamda (λ a) among the Influentials. It should be noted here that the increase in the association does not depend on the number of variables, but the kind of variables. A clear example is shown by adding to age the activity before and after 1948. The degree of association is .42 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .25 (λ a) among the Influentials. In the final combination obtained by adding to age, origin, educational level, and educational specialization, the association is .29 Lamda among political elite and .50 (λ a) among the Influentials.

Origin and other Variables:

The same result is obtained by adding other variables to origin. Statistically, the degree of association between origin and parties' stances is .0 Lamda (λ a). Adding the educational level and the educational specialization increases the level of association to .12 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .20 Lamda (λ a) among the Influentials. Controlling for one more variable which is the publications (cultural) variable increases the level of association to .25 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .37 (λ a) among the Influentials.

Adding the variable activity before 1948 to the origin variable makes the degree of association .41 (λ a) among the political elite and .12 (λ a) among the Influentials.

Education and other variables

The association between the variable education and parties' stances was low. Adding the other variables to education increased the degree of association.

Adding graduate studies and specialization to educational level gives us .04 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .04 Lamda (λ a) among the Influentials. If we add the variable publication the result is a very high association, .79 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .24 Lamda (λ a) among Influentials. Adding age, origin, and specialization to educational level gives us .29 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite and .50 Lamda (λ a) among the Influentials. Adding the activity variables will produce a high level of association as we shall see.

Activity and other variables:

Let us now apply the same technique used before by adding the other variables to the activity variable. If we add activity before 1948 to activity after 1948 to explain the association with parties' stances, the degree of association will be .37 (λ a) for the political elite and .43 (λ a) for the Influentials. This increases one's ability to make accurate guesses of parties' stances on the basis of knowledge of not only the activity variable but others also. By adding the activity before 1948 to the activity after 1948 we have .37 Lamda (λ a) among the political elite while each variable alone gave .12 Lamda (λ a). Adding the variable activity in terms of a leadership role in Palestine before 1948, the degree of association will be .46 (λ a) for Knesset members and .47 (λ a) for Influentials. Let us now try to add another variable

outside the category of activity, which is origin. The degree of association will be .63 Lamda (λ_a) for Knesset members and .59 (λ_a) for Influentials. Therefore, adding the variables to each other gave us a more accurate guage to eliminate the errors we might make in guessing the parties' stances. Table Number 42 shows how the level of association increases by adding the variables to each other in various combinations.

Therefore many different socialization experiences often contribute to the formation of particular attitudes and behavior (affiliation with special party). Combinations of background variables associated with parties' stances do raise the degree of association.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

This chapter will evaluate as well as comprehensively summarize the results. Several analytic techniques were employed in analyzing the data.

The first analytic technique was a comparative analysis. The social background of the political elite were compared with relevant characteristics of the Influentials. The question to be answered was whether the political elite actually do differ in social background from this control group. The differences were used, of course without certainty, to find out which background variables are important in choosing the political elite. The conclusions from the previous analysis are: Although age (old age) and education (high level of education) seem to characterize the ruling elite in Israel, these two variables were not criteria in recruiting for a political elite position. Origin (East Europe and Russia) and activity were important in the recruiting of the political elite. The data did not just provide useful insight into the importance of the activity variable as a whole, but also into the activity ^l labels which seemed to be the most important ones. The order of importance were cultural, labour, and military. Participation in the world Zionist Organization or participation in terrorist activities were not significant as a recruiting criteria. ✓

The examination of the social background according to the previous analytic technique identified some particular aspects of the political leaders' behaviour, such as their recruiting decisions. In one sense, the difference between the Knesset members' social background and the Influentials' background--in which we control the recruitment variable --is itself a behavioral indicator, but not an individual one.

Knowing what sorts of people are selected provided some insight into the processes of selection, eg. the behavior of the selectors.⁽¹⁾

The second analytic technique was the cross tabulation. This was used to avoid mere presentation of a single variable of social background, such as giving only the age of all deputies, then giving--again alone--their educational level and so on. Instead, an attempt was made to cross-tabulate the various social background variables as much as possible to know which characteristics were regularly associated with each other. This cross-tabulation provided this study with useful insight into the important characteristics of the members who belong to each group of social background.

By analyzing the personal histories of the ruling elite in Israel in 1967, the following profile emerged:

- (1) Born prior to 1910.
- (2) Came to Palestine in the second and third Aliyah between 1905 and 1914, and 1917-1923.
- (3) Born in East Europe and Russia or of East European or Russian parents in Palestine.
- (4) Had practical experience in Palestine before 1948 especially in labour activity. Activity before 1948 in terms of leadership role counts more than anything else as a pre-requisite for membership in the ruling elite.

¹ Cecil Gibb refers to these as "the phenomena of succession" and argues that: This power of incumbent leaders to determine their own succession and to influence future leadership cannot be overlooked. Commonly they compel the group to select their own kind, as when the Nazi regime set up machinery for inducting leaders of the same temperamental make up as the incumbents themselves.
See Gibb, C., "Leadership", in Lindzey, Gardner (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), II, p. 913.

It should be clear when we draw a profile for a group (ruling elite in Israel), that profile does not apply exactly to every one in this group. In other words, there are some members who deviate from this composite picture.⁽²⁾ The profile applies to the majority of the ruling elite.

After identifying the profile of the ruling elite and after the social background material was examined, the following results were obtained:

- (1) There was evidence of a relationship between age and origin. Political power in Israel rests largely in the hands of the veterans, the Second and Third Aliyah settlers who arrived in Palestine from Eastern Europe and Russia. Those political elite with east European and Russian origins tended to be older than those with Arab world, United States, and other countries' origins. The data shows that with the lower age group the percentage of those who came from the Arab world, United States, and other countries increases, while the percentage of those who came from East Europe and Russia decreases.
- (2) The results indicate that it is more likely that the circulation of elite will continue in the following pattern: people from the Arab world, the United States, and other countries will replace those from East Europe and Russia.

²For example, Abba Eban, born in South Africa in 1915, brought up in England. He went to Jerusalem with the Allied Forces as Liason officer of Allied Headquarters to secure participation of Jewish volunteers in special missions in the Near East and Europe. Mr. Eban remained in Jerusalem after the war to enter the service of the Jewish Agency, remaining with it until 1948. See Eban, Abba, Voice of Israel (New York, Horizon Press, 1957).

(3) The next question in this regard was: Is there any association between the variable origin and the parties' stances? There was no association between the variable origin and the political parties' stances. Therefore once the political power moves to the orientals there will not be changes in their parties' stances.

(4) The data did not support the hypothesis that with the circulation of elite, the stances of the parties which have more young people will be more likely to be different from those parties having veterans of the old people. This may be explained by the fact that many of the younger elite in power were people brought into positions of responsibility by the old veterans of the Second and Third Aliyah⁽³⁾, people therefore who would be loyal to the old elite's conception of Israel's future.

(5) Also the data did not support the hypothesis. Those who suffered from anti-Semitism are more likely to be affiliated with parties adopting the hawkish stance.

(6) The data proved the hypothesis that participation in the World Zionist organization is associated with the old age group. With the lower age group the percentage of those who participated in the World Zionist Organization decreases and the percentage of those who did not participate increases.

(7) The degree of association between parties' stances and activity before and after 1948 was high. Lambda Assymmetric was .12 with parties' stances as dependent and activity before 1948 as independent. The same degree of association existed with the variable activity after 1948.

³ See p. 59 of this paper.

But activity in the World Zionist Organization and the participation in the terrorist activity did not create more affiliation with hawkish parties.

(8) Also there was no association between military experience and the affiliation with hawkish parties.

(9) The data did support the hypothesis that those specializing in humanities and social sciences tend to be affiliated more with doves' parties than their counterparts in the sciences and applied sciences but with a low degree of association (Lamda was .05).

(10) The data did not prove the hypothesis that the higher the level of education of the political elite the less likely his affiliation would be with hawkish parties.

The data proved that those who have published books and articles are more likely to be affiliated with doves' parties among the Influentials, but with hawkish parties among the political elite. (The degree of association was .05 Lamda for the Political Elite and .19 Lamda for the Influentials.)

To summarize the finding we may say that the association between the background variables and the parties' stances among the ruling elite in Israel was not generally very strong. But this is not to deny it is still adequate for the purposes of a social background approach in elite studies because it shows that all background factors are not equally associated with parties' stances. The association became more adequate when we applied the third analytic technique which was multiple lamda (λ).

As we have seen, the association between two variables was not very strong; in other words the knowledge of the values of one of them did not aid in guessing the values of the other. Adding another variable increased the degree of association.

Applying this technique increased one's ability to make accurate guesses of parties' stances on the basis of the knowledge of other social background variables in various combinations.

Therefore, as mentioned before, many different socialization experiences often contribute to the formation of particular attitudes and behavior (affiliation with special party). Combinations of background variables associated with parties' stances do raise the degree of association.

Looking at the findings in the previous Chapter, we see also that all of the social background did not display the same degree of association with parties' stances. Some background variables do not have any association while others have great association. It is also noteworthy that when we add the social background variables to each other, the result yields a higher degree of association.

Therefore, more than one background independent variable will be able to explain a dependent one with a higher level of association.

In comparing the strength of association and the composition of the social background variables the results indicate that age, education, specialization, and origin cause more levels of association (.29 (λ_a) among political elite and .50 (λ_a) among Influentials) than age, education, and specialization (.08 (λ_a) among political elite and .22 (λ_a) among Influentials). It should be noted here that the association between the variable origin alone and parties' stances is .0 (λ_a).

The results also indicate, for example, that the origin, educational level, and specialization associations with parties' stances are stronger than the origin, activity in Palestine in terms of a leadership role, participation in World Zionist Organization and terrorist activity variables.

Comments on the Political
System and Development

Before explaining the reason for the inability of standard background variables to serve as reliable predictors of party stances, I should note two facts: first is that many divergent insights into the nature of the Israeli political system are suggested by the analysis of the social background of the country's political elite. The aggregate profile, for example, revealed the importance of two main social background characteristics: origin and activity.

To this very day, the national Israeli elite with East European origin and practical experience in Palestine before 1948 dominate the political life of the nation. For this reason, the left opposition labour leaders such as M. Yaari and M. Tabenkin were always much closer to Levi Eshkol, the former prime minister, than members of his own party such as Abba Eban. Second is that an awareness of the social background tends to contribute decisively to one's understanding of many political developments in Israel. For example, it is possible to understand the development of the civilian-military relations in Israel when Ben Gurion took over the defence structure. He found it was necessary to bring all military structures under the direction

of one political headquarters, the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The years 1945-1947 were crucial for the future of the armed forces and their role in the campaign for establishing Israel.

The Haganah headquarters was assailed by an intense conflict over the destiny of the military structure and their relationships to society and politics. While some Palmach leaders foresaw the Palmach as the cadres that would produce Israel's people's army, the NMO advocated the formation of independent military and terrorist organizations to end the British rule in Palestine. Left-wing Socialist Zionists and right-wing Revisionist Zionists clashed at this time, with the aid of the military structure at their disposal.

In late June 1949, the political struggle for control of the army became inevitable. Ben Gurion ordered a Palmach battalion stationed in Tel-Aviv to destroy the "Altalena",⁽⁴⁾ a ship commanded by the NMO, which was attempting to distribute arms to its independent troops waiting on the shores of Natanya on the Mediterranean coast between Haifa and Tel-Aviv. After this showdown, the NMO was dissolved. Further, after taking steps to bring military policy under the control of a unified political leadership, on October 29, 1948, the Chief of Staff, General Ya'aqiov Dori, issued an order that Palmach headquarters also be dissolved. In 1949, after Ben Gurion's successful nationalization of the army, he proposed that the army be small and professional, with a large reserve system....⁽⁵⁾

⁴Begin, Menachem. The Revolt: Story of the Irgun. op. cit. pp. 154-176.

⁵Perlmutter, Amos. "The Israeli Army in Politics, the Persistence of the Civilian over the Military", World Politics, Vol. XX, No. 4 (July, 1968) pp. 617-619.

Awareness of the social background, especially the terrorist activity, and the limited number of these who have a former role in these organizations among the ruling elite in Israel tends to contribute in understanding the process of nationalism and professionalization of the Israeli army.

Social Background as an
Indicator of Parties' Stances
Towards Arab-Israeli Relations

The importance of defining the association between social background and political parties' stances, toward Arab-Israeli relations, may be demonstrated in terms of elite circulation between hawks and doves. In other words, between those who are partisans of a hard line and those who are known as favourable to a conciliatory policy and concessions. The political elite's social background and parties stances also may determine political attitudes, behavior and the outcome of the political situation in the Middle East.

Before demonstrating these two points, I should answer the following questions. Why was the low association found? What does this mean to the Arab-Israeli relations questions? We have found that the association between parties' stances classified as hawks, moderate and doves--and the social background of parties leaders is very low. For

example, there was no difference between the elder leaders and the younger leaders and their affiliation with the political parties. Also the origin, and education variables did not make much difference, while educational specialization and activity variables did affect the affiliation with parties. It is important to realize here, that there was a difference between the political elite and the Influentials. The association was higher among the Influentials. This means that being in authority and within governmental structure influences the ruling elite's affiliation with political parties more than social background variables.

If we look to each social background variable separately the data about age variable indicate that differences in age do not affect affiliation with hawks or doves parties. This may be explained by the fact that this study concentrates on the difference between the generation of elders such as Ben Gurion, Weizmann or Golda Meir; the Palestinian Jews of European immigrant parents such as Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allons. We did not find much difference between these two groups in their affiliations with political parties and those parties' stances in regard to Arab-Israeli relations.

People like Assaf Dayan, son of Moshe Dayan, who was born in Israel, are not included. Therefore we might have differences when these people arrive to political authority. These new Israelites are the first Jews, in that long span of history, who do not know what it means to live as a minority or in a ghetto. None of them suffers from any of these plagues of man because he is Jewish.

For the first time in the history of Israel, the spring of 1973, the young outnumber the old. Fifty-five per cent of the population is under 30, according to the census figures of 1970. The largest age group is composed of children; those 15 years of age and under (28.6 per cent). The next largest, is the age group 16-29. This group, as the future leaders of Israel, with their own culture, their own psychology, way of life, politics, and world view, represent 26.4 per cent of the population. Those approaching or entering middle age, (33-44 years of age), at the peak of their physical and intellectual powers, represent 26 per cent. Add up the still youthful adults, the youth, and the children, and the percentage will be 81 per cent of the present Jewish population.

To be sure, the elders are still the leaders of Israel. The percentage of those over 70 years of age is 17.6 and those from 55-69 years of age is 35.2. These two age groups which include the Ben-Gurion-Golda Meir age group, over 70 and representing only 7 per cent of the population, and Moshe Dayan, who is entering his sixties and in the upper ranges of an age group totalling 12 per cent, are no longer representative of today's population in Israel.

The young and the maturing citizens of Israel are restive. They are seeking a greater voice in affairs, both public and private. Their restiveness is growing rapidly. Great changes are impending in Israel during the decade ahead, especially on the Arab-Israeli questions. This study indicates that there is no difference between the young leaders or old leaders toward the Arab-Israeli relations. This indicates that

neither Golda Meir nor her immediate successors will determine the final answers to questions related to Arab-Israeli relations.

The new Israelites, when they come to power, and since they are Israelites born and bred with less of the traumas and doctrines of the past to influence them, may be different than their fathers and forefathers. But when we consulted the national survey on some questions related to Arab-Israeli relations:⁽⁶⁾ we found, in nearly every survey on almost every major issue, that there is a symmetry of views between young and old. Also, David Schoenbrun's study and his interviews in depth showed, that there is no generation gap. There are, however, real differences in culture, ideology, and life style between the children of reality, and the fathers of the dream. This could be illustrated by what Assaf Dayan said.

I do not approve of some of those policies, particularly on the occupied--excuse me the 'administered territories' to use the official euphemism. I hold opposition views on relations with the Arabs, on peace negotiations. Ever since we were born--my generation, the state--there has been war--three major wars--guerrilla fighting, a state of siege. This is no way to live. There must be another way. There must be an end to this. If there is a high price for peace, then let's find out what ⁽⁷⁾ it is and see whether the price is right.

Another example is the occurrence in the summer of 1972, when an important political grouping came into existence demanding that

⁶ See Appendix No. IX.

⁷ Schoenbrun, D. op. cit. p. 118.

the government in Jerusalem define clearly its politics on Arab territories under Israeli occupation and on the rights and status of Arab citizens of Israel. They went so far as to assert the rights of the Palestinian people to a state of their own, a very severe challenge to the elders' views. Thus considering the survey findings, David Schoenbrun's interviews, and our findings, we may conclude that a change in ruling elite in Israel, today, will have occurred when they are replaced not only by the young generation, but also replaced by certain minorities, who belong to radical left groups. This leads to the second variable which is origin.

The study indicates that there is no association between origin and parties' stances toward Arab-Israeli relations. But it is important to realize, that the people under this study are the ruling elite, and most of them are older in age. Also, the percentage of those who came from East Europe was very high. But when we looked at the association between 'origin', and parties' stances, keeping in mind the basic breakdown into age groups, the result was a higher level of association. What does this mean in terms of the future in Arab-Israeli relations? This means that to have change in the affiliation with parties adopting doves' stances, a young elite is not enough, but also people who came from countries other than East Europe and Russia should replace today's political elite.

The study indicates that there is evidence of a relationship between age and origin. Those political elite and Influentials with East European and Russian origin tend to be initially older than those with Arab World, United States and other countries' origin. In the older age group, the percentage of those who have East European background is high, and the percentage of those who have Arab World and United States

background is low. In the younger age group, the percentage of those who came from the Arab World, U.S.A., and other countries is high, while the percentage of those who came from East Europe and Russia is low. Therefore, as mentioned before, the circulation of elite is more likely to follow the same pattern: an increase of those who came from the Arab World and Palestine, and a decrease of those who come from East Europe among the ruling elite. With this result in mind, not only young people but young people with oriental origin should be in power, to have change in their affiliations with the political parties.

Therefore, the association is higher by adding origin to age. The association is higher when we add other variables, it is .29 Lamda (λ) when we add age to origin to education to specialization. If we add activity before and after 1948, the association will be .63 Lamda (λ). This means that these variables, together, vary with parties' stances in a patterned way. If we try to relate this association to the Arab-Israeli questions we may be able to conclude that change in the parties' stances could vary as the numerical increase of their leaders with these backgrounds: young age, other than East Europe background (orientals), higher level of education, specialization in social sciences and humanities, and having mainly a cultural and religious background.

We do not have such a group in Israel as yet. There are some groups which possess some of these characteristics. For example many of these radical left groups who could not obtain strong influence in the Israeli political life because of the completely proportional

electoral system. Therefore, there may be changes in the parties' stances when these groups reach power positions within the political parties, and the Knesset. Zvi Hagadi is a good example, he was born in 1947, of parents who had emigrated from Poland. He had worked on his thesis on Comparative governmental system. He was a member of Siah, the new left movement in Israel. He said

The most important is peace. We think our government is hard-line, that not nearly enough is done to explore every avenue of peace, to offer real sacrifices for peace. We don't need to hold the Sinai. Perhaps a bastion at Sharm-el-Sheikh, in the high ground, something minimal. We cannot and must not annex the West Bank. We should be pushing for a Palestinian state, not against it. ⁽⁸⁾

Another example is the members of the Israeli Socialist organization. ⁽⁹⁾
It includes both Arabs and Israelies.

The second point which can be demonstrated from defining the association between social background and the political parties stances is the relationship between this association and the political attitudes and behavior. Party affiliation as mentioned in the introductory Chapter is the best predictor of political attitudes in Israel. If we add to this fact the importance and the influence of the political parties on the manifest attitudes and the behavior of the Knesset members, we may be able to explain the political behavior or attitudes.

⁸ Schoenbrun, David: The New Israelis (New York, Atheneum 1973) pp. 59-60.

⁹ Bober, Arie (ed.) The other Israel, the Radical Case Against Zionism (New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972).

Could the association between social background variables and the parties' stances help in explaining the relationship between background variables and political attitudes? Attitudinal studies frequently assume that the party affiliation holds considerable relevance for the respondent's political attitude and behavior. As explained before, this relevance is very strong in Israel. The question now is to try to sort logically the four variables: social background, party stances, political attitudes, and political behavior to see the kind and direction of the relationship. Focusing on the relationship between the attitudes and behavior, we realize that the attitude cannot always be predicted by observing the behavior of a given subject. A specific attitude towards specific objects abstracted as it is from the subjects other beliefs and preferences may be less associated with the subjects behavior pattern. Behavior is not always consistent with attitudes. If we hope to describe those attitudes most relevant to behavior, these may be underlying orientation and belief systems which are probably best studied through other research methods such as selective depth interviews in addition to broad systematic survey research.

This brings us back to the social background approach and parties' stances in hopes that they represent a major component of elite attitudes and behavior. We have found that the association between parties' stances and the social background of party leaders is very low. We cannot forecast with certainty the parties' stances with currently employed background variables. By adding the social background variables, we realize stronger association. In this regard, standard background variables are inadequate for the purpose of predicting with certainty the subject's affiliation with special parties. ✓

The truth is that the political scientist's ability to handle behavioral analysis, as arbitrarily distinguished from attitudinal and formal structural analysis, is currently very limited. In the United States there is much research done with roll-call votes. But voting is far less revealing under most circumstances in most other societies since party discipline obtrudes. When voting is omitted, the residual arsenal of techniques for the analysis of the behavior of politicians is meager, indeed. In fact, we might generalize this to social science as a whole. Our present ability to approach certain attitudinal phenomena far outstrips our ability to analyze it. Probably the greatest problem facing social background research is the relatively feeble development of our techniques for obtaining, discerning, and analyzing data on nonverbal or partially verbal behavior and on information and unstructured verbal material. Forecasting political attitudes within the social background approach, therefore, appears unattainable. Where attitudinal data are unavailable, the background data will be inadequate to forecast them. In short, the value of the social background approach to elite analysis so far is limited to divergent insights into the nature of political elite, political systems, awareness of political development, identification of the patterns of political recruitment to top level political position, and to a great extent to the relationship between social background and some particular aspects of political behavior.

APPENDIX I

Members of the Sixth Knesset

MEMBERS OF THE SIXTH KNESSET

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Abramov S. Zalman | 33. Dayan Moshe |
| 2. Almogi Joseph Aharon | 34. Dgani Amos |
| 3. Alon Igal | 35. Dinstein Tzvi |
| 4. Aloni Sulamith | 36. Eban Aba |
| 5. Aranne Zalman | 37. Eliav Arie |
| 6. Arbeli Shoshana Almozolino | 38. Erem Moshe |
| 7. Arzi Reuben | 39. Eshkol Levi |
| 8. Avniel Benjamin | 40. Fischer Joseph |
| 9. Avneri Uri | 41. Galili Israel |
| 10. Koah Hadash | 42. Gez Matilda |
| 11. Azuabi Seif Aldin | 43. Golan, Izchak |
| 12. Azania Baruch | 44. Goldstein Aharon |
| 13. Bader Yochanan | 45. Govrin Akiva |
| 14. Baram Moshe | 46. Gross Solomon Jacob |
| 15. Bahir Arie | 47. Hacohen David |
| 16. Barkat Reuben | 48. Harari Ishar |
| 17. Beigin Menachem | 49. Hassine Asher |
| 18. Becker Aharon | 50. Hausner Gideon |
| 19. Ben-Eliezer Arie | 51. Hektin Ruth |
| 20. Ben-Gurion David | 52. Kahana Kalman |
| 21. Ben-Meir Israel Solomon | 53. Kargman Israel |
| 22. Ben-Porat Mordechai | 54. Klinghofer Isaac H. |
| 23. Bibi Mordechai | 55. Kremerman Joseph |
| 24. Biton Avraham | 56. Landau Chaim |
| 25. Burg Joseph | 57. Levi Daniel Itzhak |
| 26. Chabibi Emil | 58. Lewin Izhak Meir |
| 27. Chazan Jacob | 59. Lin Amnon |
| 28. Chazani Michael | 60. Lorincz Shlomo |
| 29. Cohen Meguri Chaim | 61. Luz Kadish |
| 30. Cohen Menachen | 62. Meir Golda |
| 31. Cohen-Zidon Shlomo | 63. Meridor Jacob |
| 32. Cohen Gavriel | 64. Mikunis Shmuel |

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 65. Muadi Jaber | 96. Stern Mordechai |
| 66. Nakhleh Elias | 97. Suaretz Frigia |
| 67. Namir Mordechai | 98. Surkis Mordechai |
| 68. Navon Itzhak | 99. Talmi Emma |
| 69. Netzer Deborah | 100. Tamir Joseph |
| 70. Ofer Modechai | 101. Tiar Abraham (Albert) |
| 71. Peled Nathan | 102. Toubi Tawfic |
| 72. Peres Shimon | 103. Tsour Zeev |
| 73. Perlstein Shlomo | 104. Unna Moshe |
| 74. Petel David | 105. Ubeid Diab |
| 75. Porush Menachem | 106. Uzan Aharon |
| 76. Raphael Itzhak | 107. Uziel Baruch |
| 77. Rasiel Naor Ester | 108. Verdiger Abraham |
| 78. Rimalt Elimelech Shimon | 109. Vertman Moshe |
| 79. Rosen Pinchas | 110. Vilner Meir |
| 80. Rosen Shlomo | 111. Warhaftig Zerah |
| 81. Sadan Dov | 112. Ya'ari Meir |
| 82. Sanhedrai Tova | 113. Yedlin Aharom |
| 83. Sapir Joseph | 114. Yedid Menachem |
| 84. Sapir Pinchas | 115. Yeshayahu Sharabi Israel |
| 85. Sardinas Moshe | 116. Zabari Rachel |
| 86. Sasson Eliyahu | 117. Zadok Haim Joseph |
| 87. Serlin Joseph | 118. Zar Mordechai |
| 88. Shaari Yehuda | 119. Zimmerman Zvi |
| 89. Schachor Benjamin | 120. Zuabi Abdul Aziz |
| 90. Shapiro Haim Moshe | |
| 91. Shemtov Victor | |
| 92. Sherf Zeev | |
| 93. Shofman Joseph | |
| 94. Shores Shmuel | |
| 95. Shostak Eliezer | |

APPENDIX II

The formula applied to Collect the
social background data.

THE ISRAELI ELITE BACKGROUND

The Unit No. _____

The Case No. _____

Name: _____

1. Age

- | | | |
|------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 Under 40 | 2 40 to 54 | 3 55 to 69 |
| 4 Over 70 | 5 Not known | |

2. Origin

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 Russia | 2 East Europe | 3 West Europe
except Germany |
| 4 Germany | 5 U.S.A. | 6 Arab countries
except Palestine |
| 7 Palestine
before 1948 | 8 Others | 9 Not known |

3. Education

- | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------------|
| 1 American
University | 2 West Europe
University | 3 East Europe
University |
| 4 Israeli
University | 5 Russian
University | 6 Others |
| 7 Pre-university
training in
place of birth | 8 Pre-university
training outside
place of birth | 9 Not known |

4. Has the Leader Followed Post-Graduate Studies?

- | | |
|-------|------|
| 1 Yes | 2 No |
|-------|------|

5. Educational Specialization

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 - Humanities | 2 - Science |
| 3 - Applied Science | 4 - No specialization |
| 5 - Not known | |

6. Contact with Israel

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 - Born before 1948 | 2 - Born after 1948 |
| 2 - Immigrant before 1948 | 4 - Immigrant after 1948 |

7. Participation in Zionist Movement (for the Immigrants)

- | | |
|---------|--------|
| 1 - Yes | 2 - No |
|---------|--------|

8. Terrorist Activity

- 1 - Participated in terrorist organization and in 1948 war.
- 2 - Participated in terrorist organization but not in 1948 war.
- 3 - Did not participate in terrorist organization but participated in 1948 war.
- 4 - Did not participate in terrorist organization nor in 1948 war.

9. The Activity in Palestine before 1948
in Terms of Leadership Role

- | | |
|---------|--------|
| 1 - Yes | 2 - No |
|---------|--------|

10. Type of Activity before 1948

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 - Labour Movement | 2 - Jewish Agency |
| 3 - Religious activity | 4 - Kibbutz and Moushav |
| 5 - Cultural activity. | |
-

11. Activity after 1948

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 - Political | 2 - Military |
| 3 - Economic | 4 - Labour |
| 5 - Cultural | 6 - Religious |
| 7 - Professor | 8 - Minister in 1956 |
| 9 - Minister in other times | 10 - Diplomatic Corps |
-

12. The Political Party

- 1 - Mapai (Israel Labour Party)
 - 2 - Rafi (Israel labour list)
 - 3 - Achdut Ha'avoda
 - 4 - Mapam (The United Workers Party)
 - 5 - The Herut (movement)
 - 6 - Religious National Party
 - 7 - Mizrahi and Hapoel Ha Mizrahi
 - 8 - General Zionist
 - 9 - Other parties
 - 10 - Does not belong to any party
-

13. Parliamentary Life

- 1 - Participated in Knesset
 - 2 - Did not participate in Knesset
 - 3 - Not known
-

14. Cultural Activity (Publications)

- 1 - He has published books.
 - 2 - He has published articles.
 - 3 - He has not published books or articles.
-

APPENDIX III

Multiple Lamda Asymmetric

While this technique has no standard symbol, sometimes, it is called Guttman's Coefficient or predictability, or G, and sometimes g. It is a measure of association of nominal data. For the purpose of this study and the type of data we have, Multiple Lambda was applied. This is because it imposes no restrictions on the number of classes in the scale; it requires no unrealistic assumptions about the distribution of the variables, and is directly interpretable.

Multiple Lambda varies between 0 and +1. A value of 0 indicates that the variables are independent, that there is no association. And increasing values from 0 to +1 indicate increasing association between the variables.

Theoretical Formula

λ_a is a proportional reduction in error (PRE)* measure of association where

$$\lambda_a = \frac{VD - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k n_j VD|I_j}{N}}{VD}$$

where

VD = variation ratio of the dependent variable.

N = total number of observations.

$VD|I_j$ = variation ratio of the dependent variable for I_j th value of the independent variable (or combination of independent variables).

k = number of values (or categories) in this independent variable (or combination of independent variables).

n_j = number of observations in each category of independent variables (or combination of values of independent variables).

$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^k n_j VD|I_j}{N}$ = Average Variation Ratio of the dependent variable for all values or combinations of values in the independent variables.

* Costner, Herbert L. "Criteria for measures of association". American Sociological Review 1965, 30: 341-53.

Computing Formula

The general formula to compute Multiple Lambda is:

$$\lambda_a = \frac{\sum f_i - Fd}{N - Fd}$$

where

f_i = the maximum frequency found with each subclass of the independent variable (or subclasses of combinations of the independent variables).

Fd = the maximum frequency found among the totals of the dependent variables.

N = the number of cases.

λ_a will produce artifacts under the following conditions:

1. When the modes in each column of values (or combinations) of independent variable(s) are in the same row as the mode for the dependent variable, $\lambda_a = 0$.
2. $\lambda_a = 1$ when we have one observation in each column of values of the independent variable(s). This is comparable to the determination in multiple regression when the number of observations is equal to the number of variables.

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APPENDIX IV

Polls and Analyses of The National Survey

The following tables were prepared by Dr. Elie Kenan, staff analyst of the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research and Senior lecturer in political science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Studies published for the first time in David Schoenbrun's book about The New Israelies in 1973.

The questions and answers published here are those related to the Arab-Israeli relations. These questions were asked in surveys conducted since 1969.

I. The following questions were asked in the survey of July-August, 1969:

1. To what extent are you favorable to a harder line for Israel in respect to the Arab countries?

	Youth*	Adults
Very favorable	31%	32%
Favorable to a large extent	37%	30%
Not so favorable	20%	20%
Not favorable at all	12%	18%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

2. Among various measures, which, in your opinion, is the best way to reach agreement with the Arabs?

	Youth	Adults
Direct negotiations	88%	83%
U.N. mediation	4%	3%
Other country mediation	6%	7%
Other replies	2%	7%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

3. What do you think of the manner in which we are presently behaving toward Arabs in the occupied territories?

	Youth	Adults
We are behaving much too well	39%	40%
Perhaps too well	31%	26%
Just what it should be	27%	33%
Not well at all	1%	--
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

* In the breakdown, youth is considered to be under 30 and adults over 30.

- II. The following question is taken from a special study, "Israeli Culture in 1970," conducted by Professor Elihu Katz in May-July, 1970, based on a sampling of about 4,000 interviewees.

You know, of course, that in Israel there is talk about "hawks" and "doves", the hawks being partisans of a hard line, while the doves are known as those favorable to a conciliatory policy and concessions. How would you classify yourself, on the following scale, in which 1 would represent the most conciliatory position and 9 the hardest line?

	Youth	Adults
1.	4%	4%
2.	2%	2%
3.	3%	5%
4.	5%	5%
5.	19%	19%
6.	14%	14%
7.	19%	21%
8.	14%	12%
9.	20%	20%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

- III. The following questions were all based on national samplings of about 2,000 interviewees:

1. In your opinion, are the Arab countries presently disposed to speak about real peace with Israel?

	Youth	Adults
Absolutely	1%	2%
Perhaps	16%	18%
No, not yet	66%	66%
Less now than ever	17%	14%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

2. In the present state of things, do you think that policy toward the Arab Countries should be firmer or more moderate?

	Youth	Adults
Much firmer	19%	19%
A bit firmer	27%	22%
Just the way it is now	43%	50%
A bit more moderate	10%	8%

	Youth	Adults
Much more moderate	1%	1%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

3. Concerning the territories occupied by Israel since the six-day war, which, in your opinion, is the greatest concession to be made to reach a peace agreement with the Arab Countries?

	Youth	Adults
Give up all the territories	1%	1%
Give up almost all the territories	6%	2%
Give up part of the territories	25%	28%
Give up a small part of the territories	39%	40%
Don't give up anything at all	29%	29%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

4. In your opinion, should the state of Israel resolve the problem of the Arab refugees of the War of Independence?

	Youth	Adults
Yes, absolutely	9%	11%
I think, yes	31%	29%
I think, no	31%	22%
Absolutely not	29%	38%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

5. Concerning Arab refugees who left their homes during or after the Six-day War, should the state of Israel authorize them to return home now?

	Youth	Adults
Yes, absolutely	12%	6%
I think, yes	31%	24%
I think, no	27%	25%
Absolutely not	30%	45%
	-----	-----
	100%	100%

6. Would you be prepared to accept an Arab as a friend?

	Youth	Adults
Yes, absolutely	30%	31%
That would depend on circumstance	42%	32%
No	12%	17%
Absolutely not	16%	20%
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%

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