Vidyāranya's Pañcadaśī: A Study of Its Theory of Consciousness and Its Sanskrit Terminology

by

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Abbreviations

BSB	Brahma-sūtra-bhāsya
DDV	Drg-dṛśya-viveka
JMV	Jīvanmukti-viveka
PD	Pañcadaśī
SDS	Sarva-darśana-sangraha
Upad	Upadeśa-sāhasrī
VPS	Vivarana-prameya-sangraha

Introduction

The topic of consciousness is one which at the present time is drawing considerable attention in Western scientific and philosophical circles. Fritjof Capra traces this renewed interest in consciousness to the findings of quantum physicists that the human observer cannot be excluded from his observations. With the consequent understanding that the barriers between mind and matter cannot stand, a fundamental change in Western theories about the universe was set in motion. The mechanistic view of the universe is giving way to a view which finds the universe to be a harmonious whole based on the interdependence of all its components. This "paradigm shift" will change our ideas about the nature of reality and consciousness, and will result in a re-evaluation of the bases of many disciplines.[1]

Charles T. Tart believes that interest in consciousness may in part be linked to the widespread use of psychedelic substances in the 1960s, one of the positive aspects of which was to stimulate the desire to comprehend the significance of those experiences which carried many young people beyond the limitations of everyday life.[2] However, preoccupation with the novelty of psychedelic experimentation has long since been transformed into solid research into the role of consciousness in a broad spectrum of scientific fields.

In the exploration of consciousness a number of scientists, realizing that a wealth of material was to be found in Eastern religious traditions, became involved in a study of Eastern thought. Two prominent examples of this development are Ken Wilber, a spokesman for the new

school of transpersonal psychology who has been a practitioner of Zen Buddhism, and David Bohm, nuclear physicist and philosopher, who has had a close relationship with Jiddu Krishnamurti.

Bohm, along with neurosurgeon Karl Pribram, is at the centre of the development of what is known as the holographic paradigm. Bohm tells us that in his work, both scientific and philosophical, his "main concern has been with understanding the nature of reality in general and of consciousness in particular as a coherent whole."[3] He has developed a theory that the wholeness of reality may be looked on as an unending flux, as "Undivided Wholeness in a Flowing Movement," and he has given the name of 'holomovement' to this wholeness.[4] At the time that Bohm was evolving his philosophy of reality and consciousness, Karl Pribram was studying the brain. He concluded that the brain operates very much like a hologram, in that encoding of information takes place in many parts of the brain, not in localized centres. Information may then be retrieved frcm the brain in much the same way as it is from a holographic picture -- from one part of the picture the whole is made known.[5] The linking of the theories of the holomovement and the holographic brain opens many lines of thought. Bohm speculates that if reality is seen as undivided wholeness, then the world may be thought of as an implicate order enfolded within this wholeness. As this order unfolds, it becomes manifest as the explicate order of the universe in which we exist. With this theory the separateness of mind and matter disappears, for both are understood to be different manifestations of one source of flowing consciousness. The research of these two men has ignited the creativity of researchers in

many fields--physics, biology, psychology, physiology--as scientists test the possibilities of the holographic paradigm, for the new theory suggests that there are parallels to be found in such diverse areas as, for example, particle physics, the nature of consciousness, and religious texts which record the experiences of seers.

In the traditions of Vedānta and Buddhism the study of consciousness has a history that is long and continuous, for the transformation of individual man's consciousness has soteriological significance in these traditions. The seers and sages of these great religions have left many accounts of their understanding of consciousness. Going back to the beginnings of the Advaitic tradition to which Vidyāranya belongs, we find that Gaudapāda made an extensive analysis of the Māndūkya Upanisad teachings on consciousness in the states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep. In the eighth century Śaṅkara, who first systematized Advaitic thought, set the stage for many later discussions of consciousness by his affirmation of the identity of the consciousness of the individual being and *brahman*.

The high regard of modern Indian scholars for the Advaitic exploration of consciousness is shown by a psychology project launched in Madras in recent years. This is a study designed to determine how ancient knowledge can be applied in overcoming problems today. The first step in this undertaking is to survey all the references to consciousness in the very extensive Advaitic literature, beginning with Gaudapāda in about the sixth century A.D.[6]

To isolate consciousness as a theme in Vidyāranya's works, then, is not to deal with a topic which is of historical interest only. The

framework within which Vidyāraṇya views consciousness is still part of the Indian religious tradition and his works are still accorded great respect.

Before a detailed discussion of Vidyāraṇya's theory of consciousness is undertaken, the early chapters of this thesis will place Vidyāraṇya's work and life in a broader setting. Chapter one will give a brief historical perspective on his long and varied life. The problems of establishing the authorship of his works will be presented, along with a listing of his works which are available at the present time. In chapter two his position in the Advaitic tradition of thought will be discussed, with particular emphasis being given to clarifying his views on *ābhāsa-vāda*, *pratibimba-vāda*, and *avaccheda-vāda*, theories which describe the relationship of *brahman* to the individual human being. Chapter three deals with Advaitic thought, giving a general outline of its features. With this background Vidyāraṇya's theory of consciousness may be seen in a broader perspective.

Chapter four introduces the Pañcadaśī itself, with its five *dīpa*-s, the core of Vidyāraṇya's theory of consciousness. An overview of this theory and a discussion of Vidyāraṇya's aims and methods in this book prepare the way for the detailed analysis of chapters six to ten of the Pañcadaśī which follows. In these sections, comprising chapters five to nine of this thesis, each of the *dīpa*-s is perceived to be a perspective on *brahman* as pure consciousness. The special understanding of consciousness which is given in each chapter will be summarized and commented upon.

The Sanskrit terms which play an important role in each of these

sections will be isolated and analyzed according to their roots. In Appendix A an index will be given of the Sanskrit terms in the Pañcadaśī which relate to consciousness in its various dimensions. For each term there will be a listing of its location in every chapter of the Pañcadaśī. Such an index may prove to be an aid to further study of Vidyāraṇya's vocabulary and use of terms. Finally, a glossary of Sanskrit terms used in the thesis will be found in Appendix B.

Chapter 1

Vidyāranya's Life and Works

In India there has not been a tradition of preserving with accuracy the names and personal histories of the authors of literary works. When this tendency towards anonymity is coupled with the practice within Indian spiritual circles of assuming a new name to mark stages in one's spiritual life, it is not surprising to find that there is often confusion and doubt concerning the ascription of authorship. Such is the case with Vidyāranya.

Controversy begins with the question 'Who was Vidyāranya?' In his interpretive translation of the Pañcadaśī T.M.P. Mahadevan accepts the traditional view that Vidyāranya was the name adopted by Mādhava when he took the vow of *samnyāsin*, but he gives credit to neither for being the author of the Pañcadaśī. Instead, he follows Appaya Dīksita in contending that Bhāratītīrtha wrote the Pañcadaśī, the Vivarana-prameya-sangraha and perhaps the Drg-drśya-viveka,[7] and furthermore, that Bhāratītīrtha (who, he believes, also had the appellation Vidyāranya) is not the same person as the Vidyāranya who was previously Mādhava.[8] S.K. Ramachandra Rao refers to an old tradition which treated Bhāratītīrtha and Vidyāranya as two individuals who possibly collaborated in writing the Pañcadaśī; at the present time, however, the two are tentatively identified as the same person.[9] Confusion is compounded by the identification of Sāyana with Vidyāranya by Pandit S.S. Sastri and

T.R.S. Ayyangar, translators of the Jīvanmukti-viveka,[10] and by Dr. A.C. Burnell's suggestion that Sāyana is another name for Mādhava.[11]

P.V. Kane has conducted an extensive investigation into the question of the identity of Vidyāranya through his study of literary texts and traditions, and of archaeological evidence in the form of inscriptions on stones and copper plates. If we follow the argument of Kane, which is confirmed by that of R. Thangaswami,[12] we find affirmation of the traditional Indian view that Vidyāranya was originally known as Mādhava or Mādhavācārya.[13] The name of Vidyāranya was taken by Mādhava late in his life when he took the vow of *sannyāsin* and retired from the world.

Born about 1296 A.D., Vidyāranya was educated to play an important role in society. Cited as his gurus are Vidyātīrtha, Bhāratītīrtha and Śrīkantha.[14] His two younger brothers were Sāyana and Bhoganātha. All three brothers became learned men and authors of literary works, but they were involved as well in the political life of their society. During their lifetime the Hindu culture of South India was under the threat of Muslim domination from the North. Many wars were fought to establish the territorial claims of the *rāja*-s of the Deccan. As *kula-guru* (family teacher) to the royal house of Vijayanagara, Vidyāranya was called upon for advice on both spiritual and political matters.[15] In fact, both he and Sāyana undertook to serve their rulers in the capacity of political ministers.[16] Their literary endeavours had as one of their goals the strengthening of the Hindu religious tradition among their people, as a counter-measure to the incursions of Muslim influence.

Vidyāranya's wise statesmanship is credited with being a factor in

the establishing of the Vijayanagara Empire.[17] One of the notable historical incidents associated with him involves the founding of the city of Vijayanagara. A traditional story relates that as King Harihara I walked by a river, he saw a hare and a hound lying peacefully together. Vidyāranya recommended this place as an auspicious spot for the building of a new capital city.[18] Harihara, at the time of his coronation in 1336, laid the foundation of this new fortress city on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadrā river. Vijayanagara, or Vidyānagara, as the city was sometimes called, became the centre of the Vijayanagara Empire which was to be a political force for two centuries.[19]

Another aspect of Vidyāranya's life was his association with the famous Śrngerī Math, one of the four *āśrama*-s or monasteries founded by Śaṅkara as bulwarks of Vedāntic learning and devotion. Eventually Vidyāranya became the occupant of the *gaddi* of this *math*, taking on responsibility for its order of monks by becoming their pontifical head. Throughout his long years of life Vidyāranya devoted himself to serving his order, his rulers and his fellow man. When at last he took the step of becoming a *saṃnyāsin*, he was revered as a saintly man. So well-regarded was he that upon his death about 1386 A.D., King Harihara II in his eulogy speculated that Vidyāranya was more than god-like, that he was "the supreme light incarnate."[20]

The legacy of writings which Vidyāranya left behind is a considerable body of works, highly esteemed to this day and recognized as a valuable contribution to the understanding of Vedāntic thought. The difficulty in determining the authorship of manuscripts is similar to the problem of ascertaining the identity of Vidyāranya. However, if the identity of Mādhava and Vidyāranya is accepted, it will be

found that there is a certain degree of consensus on which works of this man are still extant. Using as sources the New Catalogus Catalogorum edited by K. Kunjunni Raja, supplemented by the Bibliography of Indian Philosophies compiled by Karl H. Potter and R. Thangaswami's paper "Śrī Vidyāranya and His Works", the following works, which are in existence today, are attributed to Mādhava-Vidyāranya:

Commentary on Atharva-veda-samhita[21]

on *dharmaśāstra*:

Kālanirnaya[22]

Parāśaramādhavīya or Parāśarasmrtibhāsya[23]

on Pūrva Mīmāmsā:

Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara[24]

on Vedānta:

Anubhūti-prakāśa[25]

Aparoksānubhūti-dīpikā[26]

Aitareyopanisad-dīpikā[27]

Brahmavidāśīrvādapaddhati

Brhadāranyakavārtika-sāra

Commentary on Daksināmūrtyastaka

Kaivalyopanisad-dīpikā

Taittirīyopanisadbhāsyavārtika-laghudīpikā

All the works listed to this point are not yet available in English.[28] Those which have already been translated into English are:

Drg-drśya-viveka[29]

Jīvanmukti-viveka[30]

Pañcadaśī[31]

Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha[32]

Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha[33]

Chapter 2

Vidyāranya Within Advaitic Tradition

Advaita Vedānta sets a high value on recording the succession of teachers (*jagadguru parampara*) who have become pontiffs of the *matha*-s founded by Śaṅkara. In a list of its *ācārya*-s published by the Śṛngeri Maṭh in 1879, Vidyāranya is cited as having served as the twelfth head in the years from 1380-86 A.D.[34] Those who preceded him are Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Nityabodhaghana, Jñānaghana, Jñānottama Śivācārya, Jñānagiri, Simhagiri, Iśvaratīrtha, Narasimhatīrtha, Vidyātirtha, and Bhāratītīrtha. References to the works of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara appear often in Vidyāranya's writings, but there are other famous figures whose works have influenced him. These include such men as Gaudapāda, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman and Śrī Harsa Miśra.

The body of work credited to Vidyāranya has earned him a respected place within this tradition. In his History of Dharmaśāstra, for example, Kane calls him "the brightest star in the galaxy of *dāksinātya* [southern] authors on *dharmaśāstra*," a figure whose "fame stands only second to that of the great Śaṅkarācārya."[35] According to Ramachandra Rao, Vidyāranya's great scholarly work, the Vivaranaprameyasangraha, has become as famous as the work which it elucidates--Prakāśātman's renowned Pañcapādika-Vivarana.[36] Vidyāranya indicates his high regard for Prakāśātman, whose work is fundamental to the Vivarana tradition, by concluding the Vivaranaprameyasangraha with an expression of hope that Prakāśātman would be pleased with Vidyāranya's labours in producing

"this work [which] has been written with great devotion."[37]

Within the post-Śaṅkara Advaitic tradition there has been a basic division between the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools. Differences of opinion range over several areas, but the distinction which we are concerned with here concerns the *vāda*-s (theories) which have been developed to illustrate the relationship between *brahman* and the *jīva* (living being). Those in the Vivaraṇa tradition subscribe to the *pratibimba-vāda*, or reflection theory, whereby the *jīva* is described as a reflection of *brahman* or, more accurately, of *brahman* as the prototype (*bimba*) *īśvara*, the Creator.[38] The Bhāmatī tradition, however, advocates the *avaccheda-vāda*, or theory of limitation, which promotes the view that the *jīva* is to be regarded as *brahman* defined or limited by *avidyā* (nescience).

In Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha *pratibimba-vāda* is expounded and seemingly approved by Vidyāraṇya. However, this endorsement cannot be taken as final evidence of Vidyāraṇya's preference, for, as Mahadevan implies, Vidyāraṇya's purpose in that work was to give a faithful rendering of Prakāśātman's views.[39] In the Pañcadaśī, *pratibimba-vāda* is referred to but we find also that Vidyāraṇya makes considerable use of a variant of *pratibimba-vāda* called *ābhāsa-vāda*. In this theory the *jīva* is defined as an *ābhāsa* of *cit* (pure consciousness) in *avidyā*.[40]

Ābhāsa may be translated as 'reflection' (as is *pratibimba*), but it has the connotation also of being 'a semblance, mere appearance.'[41] Śaṅkara's commentary on Brahma-Sūtra II.3.50 "*Ca ābhāsa eva*," on the relation of *jīva* to *paramātman*, brings in both aspects of meaning, for he says that "it is to be understood that this individual soul is a

reflection of the supreme Self like the semblance of the sun in water."[42] That is to say, just as the sun is unaffected by its reflections in the water, which shift and ripple according to the waves, so *brahman* remains unchanged even though the *jīva*-s which carry the reflected appearance of *brahman* take many forms. The root from which *ābhāsa* derives, *bhā*, brings in the further connotation for *ābhāsa* of 'illuminating, shining.'[43] As we shall see, one of the functions of the *cidābhāsa* in cognition is to illuminate the object to be cognized.

Because these *vāda*-s are theoretical assumptions, devised for the purpose of making clear a particular teaching, they should not be regarded as rigid articles of faith. For this reason it is possible for teachers to move from one *vāda* to another without being considered as having overturned their whole philosophy. Examination of the text of the Pañcadaśī indicates that in this work Vidyāraṇya does not maintain *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba* as mutually exclusive terms. In this book he employs *ābhāsa-vāda* many times in, and only in, chapters six, seven, and eight, sections of the text which deal with Vidyāraṇya's ideas about consciousness. The only time *ābhāsa* occurs outside these chapters is in IX.135, where its meaning is 'not genuine,' in the sense of 'fallacious,' rather than 'appearance.' *Pratibimba* , on the other hand, is used far less frequently than *ābhāsa* but is found in various forms throughout seven chapters.

There are four *śloka*-s which bring the two terms together and which indicate, it would seem, that in the Pañcadaśī at least, Vidyāraṇya does not consistently discriminate between the two. In Pañcadaśī VIII.32 *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba* are both said to be partial manifestations of *bimba*.

Then, in Pañcadaśī VIII.31 the first line speaks of the *pratibimba* which is found in a metallic measure, while the second line draws a parallel between this reflection and the *ābhāsa* which is found in *buddhi*. A similar parallel usage is seen in VI.153, where in line one the consciousness which is reflected (*pratibimba*) on *vāsanā*-s in the *buddhi* is described in line two as *cidābhāsa*. Finally, in VI.23, where Vidyāraṇya gives a definition of the *jīva*, we find that he uses the term *citpratibimbaka* to indicate the reflection of *cit* which is found in the *buddhi*. This is the only instance in which *jīva* is so described, whereas the term *cidābhāsa* is used so frequently that it becomes in this work a synonym for *jīva* (although somewhat inaccurately for, as will be shown, *jīva* must also have a substratum of consciousness with this reflection or appearance of *cit*). It seems, then, that the Pañcadaśī text will not prove that Vidyāraṇya shows a decided preference for *ābhāsa-vāda* or *pratibimba-vāda*, but that he uses both with some degree of interchangeability.

Two scholars who have differing views on Vidyāraṇya's use of these *vāda*-s are Satya Deva Miśra and T.M.P. Mahadevan. Miśra's provocative essay "The Advaitic Concept of Ābhāsa" presents the case for treating *ābhāsa-vāda* as a theory in its own right, as a "parallel and separate school of interpretation," equal to *pratibimba-vāda*.[44] In order to clarify the difference between the two, he advocates that *ābhāsa* be translated as 'appearance' and that 'reflection' be reserved for *pratibimba*. Beginning with Śaṅkara, Miśra traces the line of those Advaitins he considers to have been proponents of *ābhāsa-vāda*, citing passages from their works to support his contention that this theory has indeed been used as an independent, coherent theory.

Miśra claims that Vidyāranya is one who "pins his faith on the notion of appearance" in several works, including the Pañcadaśī.[45] Although Mahadevan would disagree with the whole thrust of Miśra's attempt to elevate *ābhāsa-vāda* to having independent status, Miśra tries to enlist his support by quoting with approval Mahadevan's judgement in The Philosophy of Advaita that "'according to the theory propounded in the Pañcadaśī, the *ābhāsa* is wholly illusory.'"[46] This quotation re-inforces Miśra's attempt to prove that difference exists between an illusory *ābhāsa* and a *pratibimba* which is identical with its *bimba* or prototype. To demonstrate Vidyāranya's view, Miśra cites Pañcadaśī VIII.32 in which, he says, Vidyāranya "defines *ābhāsa* as a very partial manifestation of its prototype (*Bimba*)."[47] What he omits to tell the reader is that in the same passage Vidyāranya brings out the similarity between *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba*, for while it is true that he declares the *ābhāsa* to be a partial manifestation of the *bimba*, he goes on to say that it resembles the *pratibimba* in being so: "*īsadbhāsanam ābhāsah pratibimbas tathāvidhah*." By stressing the similarity between *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba*, Vidyāranya undermines Miśra's contention that *ābhāsa-vāda* should be clearly differentiated as a separate and distinct theory. Miśra's essay, although an interesting discussion of *ābhāsa-vāda*, does not win his argument.

In The Philosophy of Advaita,[48] Mahadevan professes to see in Vidyāranya's works a progressive change from *pratibimba-vāda* in Vivaranaprameyasaṅgraha, to a conflict between this theory and *avaccheda-vāda* in the Pañcadaśī, ending in a final position in Drg-Dṛśya-Viveka which declares *avaccheda-vāda* to be the best explanation for the identity

of *jīva* and *brahman*.[49] Mahadevan takes note that in the Pañcadaśī Vidyāraṇya makes use of *ābhāsa-vāda* but he does not seem willing to grant *ābhāsa-vāda* much credit as a viable theory. He remarks that *ābhāsa-vāda* requires that the process of *bādha* (sublation) be brought into play as an extra step to account for the identity of *ābhāsa* and its prototype, whereas the *pratibimba* and its prototype are seen simply as identical. Because Mahadevan understands *ābhāsa* as used by Vidyāraṇya to be "wholly illusory,"[50] he objects strongly to the notion advanced in Pañcadaśī VI.133 and VI.155 that *īśvara* is an *ābhāsa*. If this is the case, he says, *īśvara* is reduced to being an attenuated reflection, on a par with *jīva*, and is rendered incapable of being the Lord and Controller of the *jīva* and *jagat*.[51]

As for Mahadevan's argument in The Philosophy of Advaita that Vidyāraṇya shows signs of being an *avaccheda-vādin* in Dṛg-Dṛśya-Viveka, the evidence is not persuasive. *Śloka* 32 of the Dṛg-Dṛśya-Viveka asserts that of the three kinds of *jīva*--*avacchinna* (limited), *cidābhāsa* (appearing in the *buddhi*), and *svapnakalpita* (imagined in dream)--it is the first of them which is *pāramārthika* or real. Then, in *śloka* 34, it is said that the great Vedic sayings, such as '*Tat tvam asi*' declare the identity of *brahman* with the *avacchinna jīva*, but not with the other two. These statements seem to demonstrate that Vidyāraṇya is choosing *avaccheda-vāda* over *ābhāsa-vāda* unless it is realized that he is not making a direct comparison of the two.

It can be argued that in Dṛg-Dṛśya-Viveka Vidyāraṇya is comparing the *jīva*-s of three different levels: the real (*pāramārthika*), the empirical (*vyāvahārika*), and the illusory (*prātibhāsika*). In this work

he means by *cidābhāsa* the appearance of consciousness in the *buddhi* which animates the *vyāvahārika jīva*, that is, *jīva* on the empirical plane.[52] However, by *avacchinna jīva* he refers to the substratum of *jīva* on which are superimposed the attributes of *jīva*.[53] In the Pañcadaśī this substratum is recognized as being identical with *brahman* and is known as *kūṭastha*, the immutable,[54] or *sākṣin*, the witness.[55] In his notes, the translator of Drg-Dṛśya-Viveka confirms that he understands Vidyāraṇya to refer to *sākṣin* by *avacchinna jīva*.[56] Therefore, it may be said that in using the terms *avacchinna* and *cidābhāsa*, Vidyāraṇya is depicting two different aspects of the *jīva*. This point is made clear in Drg-Dṛśya-Viveka, *śloka*-s 40-42, where an account is given of the sublation of the less real levels by the real. We may conclude, then, that in Drg-Dṛśya-Viveka Vidyāraṇya does not prefer one theory over another but makes use of *avaccheda-vāda* to describe one level of reality and *ābhāsa-vāda* to depict another.

The origin of the three *vāda*-s discussed in this section lies in metaphors used by Śaṅkara to convey his teachings about how *jīva* may be derived from *brahman* without compromising the purity, immutability and non-attachment of *brahman*. Just as Śaṅkara shows no reluctance to choose a variety of metaphors to make clear his meaning, so Vidyāraṇya is willing to take up different *vāda*-s when it serves his purpose. His attitude shows clearly in a passage of the Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha where he describes a number of theories about the creation of *jīva* and the world, some of which have contradictory elements, but all of which are Advaitic "final positions." Even though they do not agree, he finds them to be "taintless" because they have been devised "in order to give

knowledge of the truth."[57] In other words, all are attempts to describe what is essentially indescribable--the creation of *jīva* and the world from *brahman*, the One without a Second. Each theory is a partial truth only, but even with its limitations it may succeed in bringing to light some of the knowledge which is the goal of the Advaitin.

Chapter 3

Advaitic Background to Vidyāranya's Thought

Before embarking on a detailed examination of Vidyāranya's theory of consciousness as found in the Pañcadaśī, it will be helpful to outline the general background from which his thought emerges. As an Advaitin, Vidyāranya find the basis of his outlook in the certainty that the only Reality is *brahman*. Spoken of as the One Without a Second, as supreme and indivisible, *brahman* cannot be encompassed or defined by the mind of man. So far beyond the categories of man's thought is *brahman* that *śruti* describes *brahman*, the *parātman* or Supreme Self, in a negative fashion, as "Not this, not this" in such passages as Brhadāranyaka Upanisad IV.4.20. *Brahman*, then, is the foundation of Vidyāranya's metaphysic and on *brahman*, as will be shown later, his theory of consciousness rests.

To understand what *brahman* means to Vidyāranya, we may look first at his work Sarva-Darśana-Samgraha, in which he discusses the major schools of Indian philosophy. The final chapter is devoted to Śaṅkara, the great teacher who first brought the Advaitic tradition into focus as a systematic study of the Upanisads. In the sixteenth chapter of this book, Śaṅkara's system of Advaita Vedānta is described as "the crest jewel of all systems."[58] According to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Brahma-Sūtras I.1.1 and I.1.2, as expounded by Vidyāranya in this same chapter, the nature of *brahman* may be discussed under two aspects:

the essential or *svarūpa laksana* and the secondary or *tatastha laksana*.[59]

In Upanisadic passages such as Taittirīya Upanisad II.1 we are told that essentially "'Brahman is the real [*satya*], the consciousness [*jñāna*], the infinite [*ananta*].'"[60] In later Vedānta the formulation which became most often used in referring to *brahman* was that which occurs in Pañcadaśī XIII.104, where *brahman* is characterized as being of the nature of "*sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*," that is, as being existence, consciousness, bliss. This is not to say that *brahman* is divided, or possessed of these as properties or attributes, but rather that *brahman* is to be thought of as all *sat*, all *cit*, all *ānanda*, that is, as being, consciousness and bliss at their most pure. In the words of Herbert Herring, "the Absolute is to be thought of as all we are able to experience and to imagine in its highest, unsurpassable perfection."[61] In this way, men may have a positive conception of the Supreme Reality without falling into the error of ascribing to *brahman* any form or attribute.

In his interpretation of Brahma-Sūtra I.1.2, Śaṅkara refers to *brahman*'s secondary characteristic or *tatastha laksana* as that of being the origin of the universe, responsible for its creation, sustenance and dissolution.[62] Through deliberation *brahman* brings everything into creation so that "He Himself is the Self of all," that is, He is the substratum underlying all creation.[63] It is *brahman* that sustains the universe and, in due order, it is into *brahman* that the whole of creation will merge.[64] It may be seen, then, that the created world is completely dependent on *brahman*, and for this reason it is said not to have the same measure of reality as *brahman*.

Taking account of this variation in the degree of reality,

Advaita recognizes a three-tier hierarchy of the real. At the highest level, the *pāramārthika*, is the *brahman*, pure, with no attributes of any kind. Next, the *vyāvahārika* level is that of the world of names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*), which is spoken of as the empirical world. To the ordinary person, this phenomenal world is seen to exist and is believed to be real. It is only when one has reached the *pāramārthika* level and known *brahman* that the *vyāvahārika* world is seen in its true light as having no independent reality and as being, ultimately, false. Advaita says that this world has a relative reality only, and it is recognized as being existent. Finally, at the lowest level is *prātibhāsika*, the realm of the completely illusory. An example of this type of reality is that of the rope which is mistakenly thought to be a snake. As soon as the rope is perceived for what it is, the snake disappears completely, for it has no reality and no basis in existence.

Along with the rest of the phenomenal world, man comes into existence through *brahman*. Man's inmost self, his *ātman*, is, like *brahman*, of the nature of *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*. This identity of *ātman* and *brahman* is at the very heart of Advaita but it is not a self-evident truth. The greatest aim of an Advaitin is to realize this identity, not only as an intellectual awareness, but as a living truth incorporated into his whole life.

The method by which Advaita teaches the identity of *ātman* and *brahman* is that of *śruti-yukti-anubhūti*, or scripture-reasoning-experience. Used together these three methods are correctives for each other and, as Mahadevan points out in his 'interpretive exposition' of

the Pañcadaśī, they contribute to "the uniqueness and excellence of Advaita" which is truly "'a faith that enquires.'"[65]

For examples of *śruti* which teach the identity of *ātman* and *brahman*, we may cite the *mahāvākya*-s or 'great sayings' of the Upaniṣads. They are the subject of chapter five of the Pañcadaśī, where Vidyāraṇya demonstrates through the use of reasoning how they are to be interpreted. Reasoning is used also in such passages as Pañcadaśī V.8-10 where Vidyāraṇya proves logically that *ātman* and *brahman* are of the same nature. This kind of proof, however, is only a step on the way to the further goal of Advaita--the direct experience of the identity of *ātman* and *brahman*. For the Advaitin, the experiential realization of this knowledge constitutes *mokṣa* or liberation.

The identity of *ātman* and *brahman* is a truth which is hidden from the individual who is born into this world. The *jīva* or 'living being' embodies the *ātman*, but according to Advaita he is born with a total *avidyā* or ignorance concerning his true nature. So deep and all-encompassing is this ignorance that it is termed *mūlāvidyā* or root-ignorance. *Avidyā*, in the Advaitic view, is beginningless. It is said to be *bhāvarūpa*, that is, it is not simply an absence of knowledge but it is thought of as having a positive character, in the sense that it is an obscuring and falsification of the truth. In Pañcadaśī VI.26-33 Vidyāraṇya discusses the two functions of *avidyā*. *Āvṛtti* is the power of concealing or obscuring, and in the case of the *jīva*, it is its substratum of *brahman*, known as *kūṭastha*, which is concealed in the first instance. Then, through the second power of *vikṣepa*, there is projected onto the hidden *kūṭastha* the forms of *jīva*. As a result of

this process, *kūtastha* disappears so completely as to be thought non-existent by a man who is ignorant.

Born into a state of *avidyā*, the *jīva* necessarily co-operates in his continuing delusion. In Śaṅkara's analysis, the *jīva*'s false position is due to *adhyāsa* or superimposition. As he explains in the Introduction to his *bhāsya* on the Brahma-Sūtras, superimposition is "an awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a different (foreign) basis as a result of some past experience."[66] There are various theories of *adhyāsa* but all agree that superimposition involves mistakenly attributing "the appearance of one thing as something else."[67] To illustrate the process, Vidyāraṇya uses the well-known example of the mother-of-pearl shell which is mistakenly thought to be silver. What causes this error is, first, that the shell's mother-of-pearl exterior is hidden through *avidyā*. Then, through *vikṣepa*, there is imposed onto the obscured shell what appears to be silver.[68] In a similar fashion the *jīva* is also an example of superimposition. Knowledge of the existence of *jīva*'s underlying substratum, termed the *kūtastha*, is hidden from the unenlightened because of the obscuring power of *avidyā*. However, on the hidden *kūtastha* are superimposed the gross and subtle bodies of the *jīva*.[69] The *jīva* identifies his true self not with *kūtastha* but with what is superimposed on it, his sense of individuality, the *aham* or ego.[70] In this way there takes place a mutual superimposition (*anyonyādhyāsa*) which ensures that the *jīva* continues to live in a state of *avidyā*. This *avidyā*, though undoubtedly beginningless, is not, however, endless. With the advent of *vidyā* (knowledge), the spell of *avidyā* comes to an end.

Advaita Vedānta is a *jñāna mārga*, a way of knowledge, rather than one which is based on *bhakti*(devotion) or *karma* (works). These latter paths are also ways to *brahman*, but a true Advaitin believes that they are helpful only in bringing one to the higher reaches of the path of *jñāna*. In order to arrive at the goal of *mokṣa*, the realization of one's identity with *brahman*, which to the Advaitin is the highest level of reality, a quest for the highest degree of knowledge must be undertaken.

In his commentary on the first of Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-Sūtras, Śaṅkara discusses the prerequisites of the person who wants to make this inquiry into *brahman*.[71] As well as having a longing for *mokṣa*, he must possess discrimination (*viveka*) between the eternal and the non-eternal, renunciation (*virāga*) of the desire for any reward both here and in any other world, and, in addition, a high degree of self-control. This control is gained through mastery of the six virtues: *śama* (calmness), *dama* (self-control), *uparati* (self-withdrawal), *titikṣā* (fortitude), *samādhāna* (concentration), *śraddhā* (faith). Possession of these qualities guarantees that the enquirer has reached a certain level of purification of himself and his motives, and is worthy of proceeding towards his lofty goal. All this is implied by Vidyāraṇya in Pañcadaśī I.2 when he states that the Pañcadaśī aims at increasing the understanding "of those whose hearts have been purified" by serving their *guru*.

For the Advaitin the highest knowledge is that which cannot be sublated by a higher truth. At the lowest level of reality, the *prātibhāsika*, a dream is sublated on awakening and a mirage with the advent of true sense perception. The empirical level of knowledge, the

vyāvahārika, has certain standards of authority by which truth at this level may be ascertained. The *pramāṇa*-s, or means of knowledge, followed by Advaitins are the same as those put forward by the Mīmāṁsakās of the Bhatta school: *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison), *śabda* (verbal testimony), *arthāpatti* (presumption), *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition). But while these *pramāṇa*-s are valid for the empirical world, they do not suffice for the knowledge of *brahman*, who is utterly beyond sense-perception.[72] Empirical knowledge, therefore, may be sublated by knowledge of the highest, which is itself unsublatable.

According to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Brahma-Sūtra I.1.3, it is *śruti* which is "the valid means of knowing the real nature of *brahman*."[73] His argument is that it is only when the Upaniṣadic texts are seen as revealing the nature of *brahman* that they become "fully reconciled."[74] For this reason he rejects the view of Jaimini and the Pūrva Mīmāṁsakās who declare that the Upaniṣads are "useless" because they do not, like the rest of the Vedas, enjoin action.[75] For Advaitins, the Upaniṣads are vital because it is only through them that the central core of Advaitic thought, the identity of the Self and brahman, is made known.[76]

While the *pramāṇa*-s of empirical knowledge are effective in clarifying the differences between the objects under examination, *śruti* operates in another way. Because Advaita holds that *brahman* can never be thought of as an object, whether an object of meditation, of worship, or even of an act of knowing, *śruti* does not attempt to present *brahman* in any objective way. Instead, Śaṅkara states that "the scriptures aim at the removal of the differences fancied through ignorance" which prevent men from realizing the identity of *brahman* and the Inmost Self.[77] When

the effects of ignorance are cleared away through an understanding of *śruti*, the unity of *brahman* and *ātman*, both of whom are said to be self-revealing (*svaprākāśa*), shine forth.

The knowledge of *brahman* which arises from hearing *śruti* may be *paroksa* (mediate) or *aparoksa* (immediate). On this point there is a difference of opinion within Advaita. The Bhāmati school maintains that *śabda*, or verbal testimony, may lead to *paroksa* knowledge only and that continued meditation is a necessary antecedent to arriving at *aparoksa* knowledge. On the other hand, the Vivarana school holds that no action in the form of meditation is required for the *aparoksa* knowledge of *brahman*.[78] Vidyāranya follows the Vivarana tradition, giving, in Pañcadaśi VII. 61-68, instances of how both types of knowledge may arise from *śruti*. Chāndogya Upanisad VI.2.1, for example, gives the assurance that "'Before the Creation *brahman* alone existed,'" which is *paroksa* knowledge. However, the famous statement of Chāndogya Upanisad VI.8.7, "'That thou art,'" is capable of bringing *aparoksa* knowledge of the identity of the *ātman* and *brahman*. In support of his views, Vidyāranya quotes from the Vākyavrtti of Śaṅkara who, he says, was in no doubt that the *mahāvākyas* of the Upanisads are intended to give *aparoksa* knowledge of *brahman*.[79]

Śaṅkara's discussion of the text from the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad II.4.5.: "it is the Self that should be seen, heard of, reflected on and meditated upon (*ātmā va are drastavyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididhāsitavyah*)," enlarges on how he conceives the realization of *brahman* to come about. He rejects outright the suggestion that this passage in whole or in part is intended to convey an injunction, for,

he says, "reflection [*manana*] and profound meditation [*nididhyāsana*] (just like hearing [*śravaṇa*]) are meant for giving rise to immediate knowledge."[80]

The meaning of *śravaṇa* goes beyond its literal meaning of 'hearing.' As Śaṅkara comments in reference to the text of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.4.5, the Self is to be heard about "from the teacher (*ācārya*) and the scriptures (*āgama*)."[81] But after hearing, the hearer is to ponder the texts with a view to discovering their deepest meaning. In this way, *śravaṇa* leads to a "firm conviction" about the identity of the Self and *brahman* and about the possibility of realizing *brahman*.[82]

The task of *śravaṇa* is aided by *manana* (reflection, thinking about) which, Śaṅkara tells us, refers to the process of "argument (*tarka*) and reasoning (*upapatti*)."[83] Reasoning, a well-developed feature of Indian thought, is a strong component in Advaita Vedānta and is used in the service of scriptural interpretation in several ways. Through reasoning the correct meaning of sentences is determined. As well, *śruti*, in order to be regarded as authoritative, must be known to have purport. *Ṣaḍliṅga*-s or six marks, are said to characterize such texts. They are: *upadrama-upasaṃhāra* (consistency), *abhyāsa* (repetition), *apūrvatā* (novelty), *phala* (fruitfulness), *artha-vāda* (eulogy), *upapatti* (intelligibility in the light of reasoning).[84] Reason makes the judgement as to whether they apply. Through *manana*, any doubts about the validity of the *śruti* heard by the seeker of *mokṣa* are laid to rest by the application of logical reasoning, as Vidyāraṇya states in Pañcadaśī I.53.

In Advaitic thought, reason and intuitive experience are both recognized and respected as valid. It is understood that knowledge may be gained through the reasoned application of the six *pramāna*-s. However, this knowledge may be sublated by the higher insights given by *śruti* and the *anubhūti*, or intuitive experience, which *śruti* engenders. Even so, this higher knowledge must not violate or set aside what was truth at a lower level. Instead, it is to include and transcend it.[85] Neither may reason be used to disprove intuition. As Vidyāranya tells us, "The chief function of reasoning is to explain things clearly. One should employ logic following one's own experience and not misuse it."[86]

After all uncertainties have been answered, the mind is free to dwell with unbroken concentration on the Self, a state which is known as *nididhyāsana*.[87] When the truth of the identity of the Self and *brahman* ripens in the mind of the seeker, an experience of *aparoksa* knowledge will come to fruition. This *anubhūti*, or experience, of *brahman* is, in fact, *moksa*. *Moksa* may not be forced and if it does not happen when the aspirant hopes, he is told by Śaṅkara that he must then keep repeating the process of *śravana*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana* until he is rewarded.[88]

Chapter 4

The Pañcadaśī

4.1 Introduction

Intended by Vidyāraṇya to be a spiritual guide for the seeker of *mokṣa*, the Pañcadaśī is written in a more informal style than some of his other works (Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, for example). Nevertheless, it is a very informative book and has long been recognized as a good resource for the understanding of the Advaitic path. Because this path is one of knowledge, Vidyāraṇya sets himself the task of deepening the aspirant's understanding of *brahman* by discussing the three aspects of *brahman*'s essential nature: *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*.

As indicated by its title, the Pañcadaśī consists of fifteen chapters, and is divided thematically into three groups of five chapters each. Chapters one to five deal with discrimination of the real (*sat*) from the unreal (*asat*), chapters six to ten with *cit* in its various aspects, and chapters eleven to fifteen with different kinds of bliss (*ānanda*). This division into three groups is by no means a rigid one, and we find a fair amount of overlapping and repetition of themes. If we keep in mind that teaching is Vidyāraṇya's primary aim in this text, a slight looseness of structure, which might be regarded as a flaw in a more scholarly presentation, will be more understandable.

We may look upon Vidyāraṇya's fifteen chapters as fifteen different perspectives on *brahman* which, taken together, will bring the reader closer to an intuitive understanding of *brahman*. Why Vidyāraṇya should

have adopted such an approach will perhaps be understood if we consider the difficulty of dealing with Supreme Reality as a topic of discussion. Bohm, in writing about Reality as Undivided Wholeness, is acutely aware of this difficulty. He suggests that rather than trying to present a neatly unified, comprehensive theory of knowledge about reality, a more satisfactory and truthful approach would be to recognize that our theories are insights, or ways of looking, and not final truths.[89] He compares a theory to a particular view of an object: "Each view gives only an appearance of the object in some aspect. The whole object is not perceived in any one view but, rather, it is grasped only *implicitly* as that single reality which is shown in all these views."[90] Although Bohm is writing over five centuries later, his words are not inappropriate in describing Vidyāraṇya's approach in this book, and are close to Vidyāraṇya's own position in Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha of accepting *vāda*-s with contradictory elements as being valid attempts to discover truth.[91]

Following this line of thought, we may regard chapters six to ten of the Pañcadaśī as five insights into *brahman* as consciousness. As we see from their titles, they are five lamps (*dīpa*-s) which shed light for our understanding. Each of these chapters will be dealt with separately, with discussion centred on that chapter's primary insight into consciousness as an aspect of *brahman*. Reference will be made at times to other sections of the book which are relevant to the understanding of our theme. Key Sanskrit terms which are used will be a focus of attention, with the aim of clarifying how they are used by Vidyāraṇya.

Before individual analysis of chapters six to ten is begun, an overview of Vidyāraṇya's theory of consciousness will be presented. Taken together with the schemata presented in this chapter, it is hoped that they will be an aid to understanding Vidyāraṇya's approach as discussed in the five *dīpa*-s.

4.2 Overview of Vidyāraṇya's Theory of Consciousness

A survey of Vidyāraṇya's theory of consciousness as expounded in the Pañcadaśī must take as its starting point his conviction that *brahman*, the One Reality, is of the nature of pure *cit*, and is the originator and sustainer of the universe. Whatever is created has its ground or substratum in pure *cit* which is identical with *brahman*. Known as *kūṭastha* because it is unchanging, this substratum is ever-existent and yet never affected by any of the transformations which may occur in objects of the created world. This pure *cit* is known also as *sākṣin*, the witness who illuminates but never interacts with whatever transpires.

Ābhāsa-vāda and *pratibimba-vāda* are the two theories which Vidyāraṇya employs to account for the way that *māyā*, the *śakti* or power of *brahman*, effects the creation of *īśvara* and the *jīva*. Both are said to be reflections of *brahman* or *ātman* in *māyā*, so that while they are based in *brahman*, their appearance is ultimately unreal, being a *vivarta* or transfiguration of *brahman*, rather than a substantial transformation or evolution. As Lord and *antaryāmin* or Inner Controller of creation, *īśvara* is responsible for bringing about the appearance of *jagat*. *Jīva* shares the creative function with *īśvara* by creating the mental universe in which it lives, making of *īśvara*'s creation objects

for its own enjoyment.

While the *jīva* shares with the rest of creation the same substratum of pure *cit*, it is distinguished from other created objects by having a second consciousness, a reflection of pure *cit* which appears in the *buddhi*. It is this *cidābhāsa* which establishes the *jīva*-hood (*jīvatva*) of the *jīva*, and it is the *cidābhāsa* which enables the *jīva* to function in ways that are not possible for other creatures.

Through its *cidābhāsa* the *jīva* is able to play a special role as a mediator between the unchanging *brahman* and the empirical world. By superimposing names and forms on *kūtastha*, the *jīva* contributes to building up the complexity of the universe, thus leading away from the simplicity of the One. But while the *jīva* in this way contributes to the hiddenness of *brahman*, he is also capable of leading a life of inquiry which leads towards the knowledge of *brahman*. By learning to discriminate between the real and unreal, the *jīva* eventually will come to know *brahman* indirectly and then through direct experience. If for some reason the path of inquiry is not open to the *jīva*, Vidyāranya recognizes the way of *upāsanā* and *dhyāna* (with its requirement of will-power) as a secondary route to knowledge of *brahman*.

Having direct experience of *brahman* is what constitutes *moksa*. Vidyāranya's belief is that the *jīva* may reach a state of liberation while still living in the world. The rest of his life is lived in this state of highest knowledge as a *jīvanmukta*.

In his role as cognizer of the universe, the *jīva* employs both consciousnessesin different capacities. The *cidābhāsa*, which is mutable by nature, makes its appearance only with a *vrtti* of the *buddhi*. It is

the *vṛtti* which is the means by which the *ajñāna* covering an object is removed. With the removal of ignorance, the *cidābhāsa*, by illuminating the object, allows it to be known. The *sākṣin* or *kūṭastha*, the *jīva*'s substratum of pure *cit*, is witness not only to the cognition of the object, but to the state of ignorance which preceded it and to the state of knowledge which ensues. In this way the *sākṣin* and its *ābhāsa* in the *buddhi* may be said to co-operate in the process of cognition, even though, strictly speaking, the *sākṣin* performs no action but is a witness only.

In the cognition of *brahman*, which is the moment of liberation itself, a variation of object-cognition occurs. *Brahman*, being the ground of the universe, cannot be known in the way an object is known. Vidyāraṇya explains that the destruction of ignorance concerning *brahman* is made possible by the pervasion of the *jīva*'s *sākṣin*-consciousness by the *vṛtti*-s of the *buddhi*.[92] But in this case, when the veil of ignorance is pierced, it is not *cidābhāsa* which reveals *brahman*. *Cidābhāsa*, being only a reflection of *brahman*, is re-absorbed into its source, and *brahman* makes itself known through its power of being self-revealing.[93] Here the identity of *cidābhāsa* with *brahman* is emphasized, whereas in other passages, such as PD VIII.33, it is the differences between the two which are brought forward. It is true, as this *śloka* asserts, that *cidābhāsa* differs from the *kūṭastha* in being changeable and attached to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, but when *brahman* is directly known, the *cidābhāsa* merges in *brahman*. In abiding in its own true nature, the *jīva* experiences release.



Figure 1. Creation of *jīva* and *jagat* in the Pañcadaśī

4.3 Vidyāraṇya's Aims and Methods

Looking at the Pañcadaśī from the point of view of Vidyāraṇya's aims and methods, it seems that his primary intention is to communicate as a teacher. He presents not the tightly structured, closely reasoned exposition of a scholarly philosopher, but instead a series of insights into *brahman* which sometimes overlap, digress or repeat themselves. Vidyāraṇya's purpose seems always to be to make certain that he is understood. Frequently he refers to other schools of thought, usually to refute their ideas and to demonstrate his own strong belief in Advaita Vedānta as the greatest of all philosophies. Sometimes it is to show that under the overarching canopy of Advaita other views may be accommodated and seen to be part of the great structure of knowledge which Advaita is. An illustration of this attitude is found in Vidyāraṇya's concept of the *saṃvādi bhrama*, the error which should best be termed as 'seeming error' because it unexpectedly leads to the desired goal. Yogic *upāsanā* and *dhyāna* gain the approval of Vidyāraṇya when they are shown to be *saṃvādi bhrama*-s which lead to knowledge of *brahman* and *mokṣa*.

Even though Vidyāraṇya is strongly committed to Advaita, his attitude as a teacher is not rigidly dogmatic. He seems to follow the lead of Sureśvara whom he quotes as having said that "whatever method helps one to understand clearly the indwelling *ātman* is approved by the Vedāntic classics."[94] To choose Vidyāraṇya's own discussion of the *ātman* as an example of his type of presentation, we find that he begins

by presenting the materialists' view that *ātman* is the gross body and then proceeds to give other ideas of *ātman* which are progressively more refined.[95] He concludes, of course, with the most subtle view of all, one that accords with *śruti* and Advaita, that *ātman* is "infinite, partless and like *ākāśa* all pervasive."[96] This example follows the method which Śaṅkara tells us is used in scriptural instruction about the Self. He describes it as "the line of understanding of common people."[97] First, the Self is presented as the physical body, the way in which the Self is understood by those of dull comprehension. Then the reader is led to a deeper knowledge by being given, in successive steps, more and more subtle ideas of the Self, until he realizes that the Self is identical with the One.

What both *śruti* and Vidyāranya are teaching is discrimination, the method that is essential to Advaita's *jñāna mārga*. By distinguishing what is real from the unreal, that is, what is uncreated *brahman* from the creation of *māyā*, the seeker finds the path to knowing *brahman* directly. An interesting feature of Vidyāranya's thought is his attitude to the world after *jīvanmukti* has been achieved. The *jīva* who is liberated in life is not required to reject the world, unreal as he now knows it to be. Because he is no longer in conflict with the demands of the world, having attained liberation, Vidyāranya believes the *jīvanmukta* is now extremely capable of carrying on whatever duties are left to him by *prārabdha karma*.[98] Furthermore, Vidyāranya teaches that the liberated man is able to enjoy both the bliss of *brahman* and the bliss of worldly objects (*visayānanda*) because he is free of the conflict

of duality.[99] No longer does he see an opposition between *brahman* and the world, but instead he realizes that the happiness he experiences from an acquired object is derived from the bliss of *brahman*.[100] Then he is able to look at the world and discern in it its source in *brahman*.

When seen from this enlightened point of view, *māyā* and its products--*īśvara*, *jīva* and *jagat*--which are known to be ultimately unreal, are seen also to be ways of knowing *brahman*. Worship of *īśvara* leads to knowledge of *brahman*, as does the discrimination which *jīva* undertakes. The *guru* who teaches indirect knowledge to the *jīva* and the *śruti* which brings about the direct experience of *brahman* are both brought into apparent existence by *māyā*. All are ultimately unreal and yet all have their basis in *brahman*. Without them, we realize, *brahman* would never be known. What Vidyāraṇya's visionary understanding gives us, finally, is a universe in any aspect of which there may be discerned, by one whose discriminatory powers have been sufficiently sensitized, its source, the reality of *brahman*.

Chapter 5

Citradīpa, The Lamp of the Painting

Creation is the central theme of chapter six of the Pañcadaśī. How is the created universe to come about when reality is understood to be *brahman*, the One Without a Second? For an Advaitin, creation consists of a transfiguration (*vivarta*) of *brahman*. There is no creation ex nihilo nor is there a final destruction. It is said, rather, that the world is manifested and then, at the time of *pralaya* (dissolution), re-absorbed into *brahman*.

One version of creation is given in chapter one of this book, where the topic under discussion is *brahman* as *sat*, true being. Here it is said that creation comes about through the reflection (*pratibimba*) of *brahman* in *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* refers to the original source of the material world. In I.16-17, two kinds of *prakṛti* are distinguished: the pure, called *māyā*, and the impure, called *avidyā*. The *pratibimba* of *brahman* in *māyā* yields *īśvara* and in *avidyā*, the *jīva*. In his role as creator and lord of the universe, *īśvara* transforms the *guṇa*-s of *prakṛti* into, first, the five subtle elements (*sūkṣma bhūta*), and then, through the complicated process of *pañcikaraṇa*, into the gross bodies (*sthūla mahābhūta*) which make up the visible universe.

The description of creation just given is concerned with *brahman* as *sat*; when, in chapter six, Vidyāraṇya shifts his focus to concentrate on *brahman* as *cit*, there is a corresponding shift in his account of creation. His theory of creation here is encapsulated in VI.289, where he tells us that the world is drawn on supreme consciousness

(*caitanya*) in the way that a painting is drawn on canvas. It is *māyā* who brings about this creation, but it is consciousness alone which remains when all else has been negated. This comparison of the transfiguration of pure *cit* into *jagat* with the transformation of a blank canvas into a painting is a key heuristic device in this chapter and is discussed in detail. Like the realism of our empirical world, the realism achieved in a painting is an appearance of reality only, and cannot be sustained under the scrutiny of a discriminating intellect.

Chapter six of the Pañcadaśī begins with a description of the technique of Indian painting. The basis of a painting is a blank canvas which is prepared for receiving paint by being permeated with a white primer. Objects are then outlined with black crayon. When colours are applied to fill in the objects, they acquire the desired life-like appearance. Referring to figure 2., we see that Vidyāranya draws a parallel between these stages of creating a painting and four stages of *brahman* or *paramātman*.[101]

In Advaitic thought *brahman* is, of course, unchanging, but it is possible to think of four *avasthāna*-s (stages) of *paramātman* having to do with the *vivarta* of *brahman* which results in the appearance of *jagat*. *Brahman*, pure *cit*, when associated with *māyā*, is known as *antaryāmin*, the Inner Controller who pervades the universe. At a further stage of transfiguration, *brahman* is known as *sūtrātman*, the totality of the *sūksma śarīra*-s (subtle bodies) of the universe. Finally, when identified with the totality of *sthūla śarīra*-s (gross bodies), he is called *virāt*.

	Painting	*paramātman*	Stages of *īśvara*		*Jīva* identified with bodies
Absolute *brahman* Veil of *māyā* ←	Bare canvas	*brahman*	*brahman*		*ātman*
avasthāna-s of *vivarta* of *brahman* {	Primer	*antaryāmin*	*īśvara*	totality of causal bodies	*prājña*
	Outlines	*sūtrātman*	*hiranyagarbha*	totality of subtle bodies	*taijasa*
	Colour	*virāt*	*vaiśvānara*	totality of gross bodies	*viśva*

Figure 2. Hierarchical stages of the *vivarta* of *brahman* and of the *jīva*

States of consciousness		*śarīra*-s or bodies		*kośa*-s or sheaths	
turīya	the fourth	*ātman*	Self	*ātman*	Self
susupti	deep sleep	*kārana*	causal	*ānandamaya*	bliss
svapna	dream	*suksma*	subtle	*vijñānamaya*	intellect
				manomaya	mind
				prānamaya	vital
jāgrat	waking	*sthūla*	gross	*annamaya*	food

By drawing out this analogy, Vidyāranya demonstrates that the substratum of the universe, like the substratum of a painting, remains intact under the manifold transfigurations which create upon it another seeming reality. However, *brahman* as pure *cit* is, in truth, forever unattached and unchanging; it is the eternal consciousness underlying this universe and all its creatures.

5.1 *Māyā*

In Vidyāranya's scheme of creation the concept of *māyā* plays a pivotal role as the link between *brahman* and his *vivarta*, the *jagat*. A derivative of the root *mā*, which has the meanings of "to measure" and "to display, exhibit,"[102] *māyā* may be thought of as that which makes entities measurable and as an exhibitor of the world-appearance. Sometimes *māyā* is equated with the world-appearance itself, for in Advaitic thought both of these are insubstantial forms only, having no independent basis of reality.

Māyā has a long history, for the term is found in Vedic literature and in the Upaniṣads, usually with connotations of power and deception.[103] In Advaitic thought *māyā* can be traced back to Gaudapāda. He has been credited with being the first person to declare that the world is based on *māyā*, not reality, and to compare the insubstantiality of the world-appearance to that of a dream.[104] Śaṅkara built on this idea with his *anirvacanīya-vāda* which finds the world to be neither real nor unreal but in a category which is indefinable in logical terms. Both the world-appearance and *māyā* who brings about its manifestation are in the special

category of being indeterminate, for although the world is undoubtedly existent, it is real only in a relative sense. On the *vyāvahārika* level of knowledge, worldly phenomena are thought to be real, but when *brahman* is known directly and one reaches the highest level of understanding, the limitations of the world and *māyā* are discovered. They are known then to be not independent but part of *brahman*.

There is a fine distinction to be made between describing *māyā* as unreal or false (*mithyā*) and as illusory. S. Dasgupta in A History of Indian Philosophy gives a comprehensive account of Advaitic philosophy, but he often refers to *māyā* as illusory.[105] He claims that because Śaṅkara believes that "the world as it appears could not be real," it follows that the world "must be a mere magic show of illusion or *māyā*."[106] This misleading terminology deprives *māyā* and the created world of whatever relative reality they share. Certainly it creates confusion as to Śaṅkara's true position. Swāmī Prajñānanda cautions against those scholars who criticize Śaṅkara as being an "illusionist (Māyāvadin)," for "Śaṅkara has neither invented nor preached the doctrine of illusion or delusion," but "[Śaṅkara] says that the world of appearance is not different from the Brahman, though it appears as such."[107]

It is difficult to grasp the meaning of *māyā*, for what we think of *māyā* depends on our own level of understanding. The ordinary person, looking at the world around him, accepts the world-appearance as being reality. For the reasoning man, the effects of *māyā* are seen to exist, but *māyā* itself remains indefinable or *anirvacanīya*. At the level of highest knowledge, however, *māyā* would fade into insignificance by

comparison with the knowledge of its origin, *brahman*.[108]

Māyā is the *śakti* (power) of *brahman* which enables the *vivarta* of *brahman* to take place, but it is not to be thought of as equal to *brahman*. Its relationship with *brahman* is confined to the question of the creation of the world-appearance, and as *śruti* makes clear, creation is but a small aspect of absolute *brahman*.[109] By casting the reflection of *brahman* upon itself, *māyā* creates both *īśvara* and *jīva*, who together bring forth the entire universe. *Īśvara*, in his role as ruler of *jagat*, has *māyā* under his control, indicating the limits of *māyā*'s power and showing her dependence on *brahman*.

Māyā does retain power over the *jīva*, however, for the *jīva* is born into a situation of being under the spell of *māyā* or beginningless *avidyā*. This *avidyā* consists in not knowing one's true source in *brahman* and in accepting *jagat* to be reality. Here we see how *māyā*'s twin functions of obscuring *brahman* (*āvaraṇa*) and projecting a false reality (*vikṣepa*) keep the *jīva* imprisoned in an unreal world. Although Vidyāraṇya characterizes *māyā* as unconscious (*jaḍa*), the effect she has on the *jīva* goes beyond the passive one of hiding the truth, for she is also capable of actively producing delusions (*moha*) which are entrapments for the unknowing.[110]

It is *māyā*'s skillfulness at bringing forth delights and beauty in the world that has led to her association with magic. Vidyāraṇya speaks of her as *indrajāla* (magical, deceptive) because although her effects may be clearly seen in the world about us, *māyā* herself cannot be determined even by wise and learned men.[111] *Māyā* is unique in being

thought of as the seed (*bīja*) of the world, and at the heart of this seed is the magical mystery of creation.[112] It is a mystery which cannot be comprehended by the mind, for as Vidyāranya tells us, "the mind cannot conceive of the very mode of its creation."[113] No matter how learned we may become, our analysis of *jagat* inevitably founders when it approaches the insurmountable barrier of *ajñāna* (ignorance) which shrouds the origins of the world.[114]

In the Pañcadaśī Vidyāranya acknowledges the seductive beauty and wonder of *māyā* and its effects but, realizing as he does the impossibility of completely understanding *māyā*'s nature, he warns the seeker of *moksa* of the futility of engaging in such a quest. Instead, the aspirant should press on in his search for knowledge of *brahman* without being distracted by *māyā*. Only when he has arrived at this higher knowledge will he know *māyā* for what she is and be free forever from her fascinating spell.[115]

In the Pañcadaśī we find that *māyā* is equated with several other terms. One is *avidyā*, from the root *vid*, meaning 'to know.' *Avidyā* is the beginningless ignorance of the *jīva* which is dispelled only by *vidyā* (knowledge) of *brahman*. In I.16 and 17 the creation of *īśvara* and *jīva* is said to involve two kinds of *prakṛti*: pure *māyā* and impure *avidyā*. This differentiation between *māyā* and *avidyā* is not made by Śaṅkara and, according to Radhakrishnan, is a product of later Advaitic thinkers.[116] Later in the Pañcadaśī Vidyāranya drops this distinction, citing *māyā* alone as the maker of the two in VI.133 and VI.155. Confirmation that he equates *māyā* with *avidyā* is found in

Sarva-Darśana-Samgraha 16:18 where he states that "*śruti*, *smṛti*, *bhāsyas*, etc. agree on the statement of non-difference between *māyā* and *avidyā*."[117] He goes on to declare that this statement holds true even when a distinction is made between the two on the basis of *māyā*'s ability to distract and *avidyā*'s ability to conceal.

Ajñāna, from the root *jñā*, meaning 'to know, to perceive,' is another term which, like *avidyā*, signifies the ignorance or nescience under which the *jīva* labours until set free by *jñāna* (knowledge) of *brahman*. The beginningless ignorance into which the *jīva* is born, whether called *avidyā* or *ajñāna*, is regarded by Vidyāraṇya as an equivalent for *māyā*.

Two other terms which refer to the unconscious source material of the universe are *prakṛti* and *pradhāna*. They are said to be constituted of the three *guṇas* and are the primary unevolved matter of the universe, as opposed to *puruṣa*, the spirit. Vidyāraṇya, in common with other Advaitins, sometimes uses the two terms as substitutes for *māyā*.

5.2 *Ābhāsa*, *pratibimba*, *chāyā*

In chapter two it was noted that throughout the Pañcadaśī, in order to describe the relationship of *brahman* with *jīva*, Vidyāraṇya made use of *ābhāsa-vāda* and *pratibimba-vāda*, using them interchangeably. In the *citradīpa* portion both appear, but *ābhāsa-vāda* is favoured by a large margin in Vidyāraṇya's discussion of creation.

Ābhāsa is derived from the root *bhā*, 'to shine forth, to appear, to exhibit.' Akin to the word 'phenomenon' (from the Greek root *phainomai*, 'to show'), *ābhāsa*, too, has connotations of being perceivable by the senses and yet of being essentially insubstantial. Monier-Williams assigns

several meanings to *ābhāsa* which are relevant to Vidyāranya's use of the term. These are: fallacious appearance, reflection, appearance, semblance.[118]

In this chapter there are only two instances where *ābhāsa* is used in the sense of 'fallacious': VI.59 refers to *vākyābhāsa* (fallacious assertion) and VI.60 to *pratyaksābhāsa* (fallacious perceptual evidence). The only other case outside this chapter where *ābhāsa* is used in a similar way is IX.135, where it is said that whatever is found in the texts of Sāmkhya and Yoga which seems to contradict *śruti* is *ābhāsa*, or 'not genuine.'

'Reflection' is a term often used to translate *ābhāsa* but, as Miśra has pointed out, the result is confusion with *pratibimba*, for this term's usual translation is 'reflection.' The translator of the edition of the Pañcadaśī used in this thesis sometimes translates *ābhāsa* as 'reflection,' but more often he uses *ābhāsa* and *cidābhāsa* untranslated. This is a feasible solution to the problem of finding exact English equivalents for Sanskrit terms, as long as the reader clearly understands the meaning of *ābhāsa* and *cidābhāsa*, for Vidyāranya uses them as technical terms in his account of *ābhāsa-vāda*.

In reference to *ābhāsa-vāda*, the most appropriate translation of *ābhāsa* is 'appearance' or 'semblance.' Most often it is the appearance or semblance of pure *cit* which is indicated. It will be found, however, that Vidyāranya often uses *ābhāsa* alone, leaving *cit* to be inferred. Where it is not specified what the referent of *ābhāsa* is, it may be assumed to be *cit*.

In view of Vidyāranya's use of a painting (*citra*) in this chapter

as the central metaphor to illustrate his notion of the *vivarta* of *brahman*, Coomaraswamy's discussion of *ābhāsa* in his book The Transformation of Nature in Art provides a possible link between the two. Referring to ancient treatises on art, Coomaraswamy shows that *citra* in these texts means not a painting but a three-dimensional sculpture. *Ardha-citra* is the term for a half-sculpture, or a relief, and the term *citrābhāsa* refers to a painting which is literally an image or semblance of a sculpture.[119] *Ābhāsa* is taken to be a painting on canvas or on a wall which is made as if to appear in relief, that is, as having the volume of a solid. Shading of colour provided this sense of volume. One of the notable characteristics of Indian painting has been its lifelike quality, found in full-bodied painted figures which seem about to emerge from their flat, painted surfaces.

Coomaraswamy claims that *citra* and *ābhāsa* have a fundamental meaning of 'image,' with both of them owing what reality they possess to whatever object they are depicting.[120] He draws a parallel between *citrābhāsa*, literally the semblance of an image, and *vastrābhāsa*, the semblance of clothes, used in VI.6 in reference to the painting of clothes on figures in a painting, as well as to *cidābhāsa*, one of Vidyāranya's key terms. While Coomaraswamy translates *cidābhāsa* as "reflection of absolute intelligence," it could more fittingly be translated as 'semblance of pure consciousness' or 'appearance of pure consciousness' from which pure consciousness shines forth.[121] The root *bhā* from which *ābhāsa* derives carries the sense of 'illuminating' or 'shining forth.' Similarly, *citra* can mean 'conspicuous, bright, clear,' so that both words share a quality of showing forth something more than their own form. What is most important about the *cidābhāsa*'s role in

ābhāsa-vāda is not its form, which is, after all, a mere transitory appearance, but the fact that it is a vehicle through which *brahman* as pure *cit* is able to shine forth.

In the *citradīpa ābhāsa* is shown to be part of the very beginning of creation, for when *māyā* creates *īśvara* and *jīva* it is through *cidābhāsa*, the appearance of pure *cit* or *ātman* on itself (VI.133). Or, in VI.155, *māyā* is said to make *īśvara* and *jīva* simply through *ābhāsa*. We are to understand by these explanations that *īśvara* and *jīva* are grounded in *cit*. When together they create *jagat*, it too has its basis in the pure *cit* of *brahman*. As VI.211 tells us, the whole universe, in the form of *īśvara*, *jīva* and all objects, animate and inanimate, appears like a dream in the non-dual reality which is *brahman*.

A secondary *cidābhāsa* is posited by Vidyāranya in connection with animate (*cetana*) objects. Since all objects, whether conscious or unconscious, have the same substratum of *cit*, the difference between the two is said to be found in a second *cidābhāsa* which appears within the *buddhi* of the *jīva*. This second *cidābhāsa* seems to result from a double process of creation, for we are told that the seed (*bīja*) of creation, *māyā*, along with an *ābhāsa* of *cit*, develops into *dhī* or *buddhi*. Then within the *buddhi* the *cidābhāsa* becomes clearly visible (VI.154). This second gift of consciousness is the distinctive characteristic of the *jīva*. Technically, the *jīva* as consciousness is a combination of the consciousness of its substratum and the consciousness which appears (*cidābhāsa*) in the *buddhi*. However, because it is the *cidābhāsa* which establishes *jīva*-hood, Vidyāranya often uses this term to stand for the whole *jīva*. The consequences for the *jīva* of possessing this second tier of consciousness in the *buddhi* will be

discussed in a later section.

Earlier it was said that *pratibimba-vāda* was used by Vidyāranya along with *ābhāsa-vāda*. *Pratibimba* is the counter-image of its prototype (*bimba*) and is usually translated as 'reflection.' *Pratibimba* is used throughout the Pañcadaśī in various nominal and verbal forms, and refers in about equal proportions to consciousness (*cit*) and to bliss (*ānanda* or *sukha*). Here is one difference between *pratibimba* and *ābhāsa*, for Vidyāranya does not employ *ābhāsa* with reference to *ānanda* or *sukha*. *Viṣayānanda* is the reflected bliss experienced when *jīva* satisfies his desire for an external object. As the *vṛtti*-s of desire subside, and the *dhī* directs the *vṛtti*-s inward, then a glimpse of the *pratibimba* of *ānanda* is enjoyed by the *jīva* (XI.86-87).

Pratibimba-vāda is used in an account of creation in I.15 and 16, where the *pratibimba* of *brahman* in *prakṛti* is said to be the first stage of the *vivarta* of *brahman*. This description closely resembles the description of this step in VI.133 and VI.155 which speaks of an *ābhāsa* of *brahman* in *māyā*. Although *prakṛti* is said to include *māyā* and *avidyā*, the three terms are often used interchangeably, so that Vidyāranya's theory of consciousness is not significantly altered by the change in terminology.

In the *citradīpa*, and in other chapters as well, *pratibimba* serves, like *ābhāsa*, as the means by which *cit* occurs in the *buddhi* of the *jīva*.[122] There would seem to be nothing to choose between these two expressions when they are used in this connection.

A variation in the use of *pratibimba* occurs in XIII.91 where we

are told that in the *dhī* of a living being there is a reflection (*pratibimbata*), not of *cit*, but of the shadow of *cit* (*cit-chāyā*). The term recurs in III.7 and IV.11, where it is used in the same sense as *cidābhāsa* or *citpratibimba*, to indicate the presence of *cit* in the *vijñānamaya* sheath (III.7) and in the subtle body (IV.11). In the only other occurrence of *cit-chāyā*, we are told that because of its association with the shadow of *cit*, the unconscious *māyā śakti* has the appearance of being conscious (III.40). None of these examples of *cit-chāyā* adds more to our knowledge of Vidyāranya's theory of consciousness than what he imparts through his use of *ābhāsa* or *pratibimba*.

5.3 *Īśvara*

If *māyā* is the *śakti* of *brahman* which enables the whole process of creation to be set in motion, it is *īśvara* who plays the next most important role in bringing about the manifestation of *jagat*. *Māyā* creates *īśvara* by causing an *ābhāsa* of *cit* to appear on herself. In turn, *īśvara*, with *māyā*, creates the *jagat*. In VI.157 Vidyāranya summarizes what to him is the concept of *īśvara*. He suggests that *īśvara* is a *cidābhāsa* in *māyā* which controls *māyā* and which is the omniscient inner ruler (*antaryāmin*) and cause of the universe.

Īśvara is the first of the transfigurations of *brahman* of which the end result is the creation of the universe of names and forms. Referring to figure two, we see that *īśvara* may be compared to the primer which is applied to the bare canvas of a painting. The primer penetrates each thread of the canvas, and although imperceptible in the final painting, it becomes part of every aspect of it. In a similar way *īśvara* pervades the universe and yet is unperceivable by the senses. Our knowledge of

īśvara must come from the wisdom passed down to us by the seers through *śruti*, and from our own powers of reasoning, according to Vidyāranya (VI.167).

With *śruti* as his authority, Vidyāranya tells us that when *īśvara* created *jagat*, he then entered into the created objects, so that as *antaryāmin*, his control of these objects comes from their innermost depth (VI.213). Within the *jīva*, *īśvara* is said to rule from the innermost sheath, the bliss sheath, from which he can exercise control over the four outer sheaths (VI.163). It is from his intimate knowledge of the latent impressions (*vāsanā*-s) stored in the bliss sheath of each *jīva* that *īśvara* is said to achieve his omniscience.

Everything in the world may be looked upon as a manifestation of *īśvara*, the lord of creation, and men have been moved to worship him in many forms, from recognized deities to men or animals, to inanimate objects such as sticks or utensils. It is true, Vidyāranya tells us, that worshipping them as *īśvara* will bring a reward of some kind (VI.208). However, as he has already pointed out in VI.5, there is a gradation in the value of beings, from Brahmā, the god-like, down to the animate and inanimate. He warns that worship of *īśvara* will be rewarded in a way appropriate to that form of *īśvara* which is chosen. But since all these forms are operative within the phenomenal world, the reward will be of limited value. For the highest goal, *moksa*, knowledge of the reality of *brahman* is needed.

Vidyāranya stresses the importance of keeping clear the difference between *īśvara* and *brahman*. Because some passages of *śruti* like Taittirīya Upanisad II.1.1-2 speak of the elements and created objects

which arise from *brahman*, it is a common error to confuse the two. However, inquiry into such texts will lead to the conclusion that *brahman* is *asaṅga* or unattached, associationless, with no conditioning by *māyā*, while *īśvara*, the creator, is conditioned by *māyā*.[123] Sometimes the difference between the two is expressed by speaking of *brahman* as *nirguṇa* or indeterminate and of *īśvara* as *saguṇa* or determinate.[124] *Brahman* as pure *cit* is on a plane separate from any of its transfigurations, and remains always unchanged and unaffected by its appearance as *īśvara* or by the variations of *īśvara* which give rise to *jagat*. These transformations of *īśvara* will be discussed more fully, along with the *jīva*'s role in creation, in the section that follows.

5.4 The roles of *jīva* and *īśvara* in creation

The *jīva*, the individual living being, is said to be created, like *īśvara*, through an *ābhāsa* of *ātman* on *māyā*. Both *jīva* and *īśvara* have roles to play in the subsequent creation of *jagat*, but these roles are not identical. Their different functions are explained in a passage which Vidyāraṇya considers important enough to insert into three different chapters:

> From the determination of *Īśvara* to create, down to His entrance into the created objects, is the creation of *Īśvara*. From the waking state to ultimate release, the cause of all pleasures and pains, is the creation of *Jīva*.[125]

We see that *īśvara* as the lord of creation, through the power of *māyā*, creates everything in the universe, including the *jīva*-s, entering into

his creations to become their *antaryāmin*. For his part, the *jīva* is the creator of "all pleasures and pains."

In an earlier chapter Vidyāranya elaborates on how the *jīva* may be the cause of all pleasures and pains.[126] First, he differentiates between objects which are *mṛnmaya*, that is, composed of matter, and those which are *mānomaya*, or produced by the mind.[127] When *īśvara*, associated with *māyā*, creates objects, the product is what we call the physical world of animate and inanimate objects. A second stage of creation takes place when the animate *jīva*-s invest the inanimate objects with their own particular meaning. A gem, for example, while remaining the same object created by *īśvara*, may be an object of desire, indifference or aversion to a *jīva*, depending on his individual preference. Through its *buddhi* and mental modifications (*manovṛtti*-s) the *jīva*, in this way, transforms the objects of the universe into objects for its own enjoyment (*bhoga*). *Jīva* becomes an enjoyer through its *karma* (action) and *jñāna* (knowledge).

This is not to say that Vidyāranya is putting forward a form of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi-vāda* and claiming that objects are created by the subjective perceptions of each *jīva*, having no objective existence. Some Vedāntins uphold this theory, but Vidyāranya follows what is the usual Vedānta line of thinking by recognizing that objects are phenomena which, because they may be perceived by the senses of all *jīva*-s, assuredly have an empirical existence.[128]

In the mental world which *jīva* creates for himself, he experiences the whole range of emotions from pleasure to pain and is tied by his emotions and desires to that endless round of birth and death, *saṃsāra*.

Although the *jīva* has, in this way, the ability to create his own bondage, the same power of mental activity can lead him to *mokṣa* through his discovery of his identity with *brahman*.

According to the various stages of the creation of *jagat*, *īśvara* and *jīva* are thought to have corresponding relationships. Referring to figure two, we see that at the causal stage of creation, before *jagat* is projected, the first *vivarta* of *brahman* is *īśvara*, the creator. *Īśvara* is associated with the totality of bliss sheaths, the innermost of the sheaths of the *jīva*. From his presence in the bliss sheath, *īśvara* is said to control all the outer sheaths in his role as *antaryāmin*. Through the bliss sheaths *īśvara* has access to all the *vāsanā*-s of all *jīva*-s. His quality of being all-knowing derives from this association (VI.161).

On an individual scale, the *jīva* identified with his causal body and bliss sheath is called *prājña*. Derived from the root *jñā*, 'to know,' *prājña* has connotations of knowledge and of bliss, and is translated as 'wisdom.' In Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 5 *prājña* is described as a mass of cognition, for it is consciousness before the objective *jagat* has been projected.[129] This state of the *jīva*'s consciousness is equivalent to deep sleep, for *jagat* is present only in potential form. *Prājña*, in this way, retains a tie with the world, whereas the higher stage of consciousness, *turīya*, is completely transcendent.[130]

The next stage of the manifestation of *jagat* takes place on the level of the subtle. Here *īśvara* is known as *sūtrātman*, who joins the subtle bodies of the *jīva*-s in a totality (VI.200), or as *hiraṇyagarbha*, literally

the golden egg or womb of creation (VI.198). Here the world is assuming its final shape but its outlines are as yet indistinct, just as, in creating a painting, the final form is first seen only as a sketched-in outline. The *jīva* identified with his subtle body is known as *taijasa* (the bright, shining). In terms of the stages of consciousness, this is the dream state, before the manifestation of the world.

Finally, when the world is fully manifest, *īśvara* is known as *virāṭ*, the body of the universe, and as *vaiśvānara*, the macrocosmic being who is everywhere present. This stage, when *jagat* is fully displayed, corresponds to the waking state of the *jīva*. When the *jīva* is fully awake and identifying with the gross bodies, he is known as *viśva*, the universal *jīva*.

5.5 The analogy of *ākāśa*

The central metaphor of chapter six of the Pañcadaśī is that of the scroll painting. However, Vidyāranya introduces another metaphor which has provoked some comment. In VI.17-25 he discusses the *ātman* as *ākāśa* (space), in a figure of comparison which has been criticized by Mahadevan as being an awkward attempt to harmonize two views of the *jīva*.[131] Before evaluating this criticism, let us examine what Vidyāranya makes of this comparison.

In this passage, *cit*, or absolute consciousness, is thought of as four kinds of *ākāśa*. *Brahman* is like "all embracing *Ākāśa*" which is unlimited by any *upādhi*. *Ghaṭākāśa* (pot-space), or *ākāśa* limited by a pot or container, is said to be like *cit* as *kūṭastha*.

Kūtastha, as we know, is the unchanging substratum of the *jīva*. On it are superimposed the gross and subtle bodies of the *jīva*, so *kūtastha* is said to be conditioned or limited by these bodies (VI.22).

So far *ākāśa* has been discussed as either unlimited or limited by an *upādhi*, the terminology used by *avaccheda-vādin*-s. In discussing the next two aspects of *ākāśa*, Vidyāranya brings in *pratibimba* (reflection). He begins with *jīva* described in conjunction with *kūtastha*. If the pot containing *ākāśa*, representing *kūtastha*, is filled with water, two things occur. First, the pot-*ākāśa* is hidden and second, the water in the pot reflects the *ākāśa* of the sky with its clouds and stars. The *jalākāśa*, or *ākāśa* in water, corresponds to the *jīva*. This elaborate conceit is intended to demonstrate the relation of *kūtastha* to *jīva*. The hidden substratum of consciousness is the unchanging basis of *jīva* and yet it is always concealed by the surface reflection of *jīva*.

The fourth aspect of *ākāśa* in this comparison is *meghākāśa*, or *ākāśa* in a cloud. If we imagine a cloud of water particles suspended in space, we may suppose that the space of the sky is reflected in those water particles. Similarly, we may think of *īśvara* as *cit* reflected not in a clearly defined way, as is the case with a reflection in *buddhi* (or in water in a pot), but in a more diffuse, distant reflection which we may not know by direct perception.

In The Philosophy of Advaita Mahadevan expresses dissatisfaction with this metaphor of four-fold *ākāśa*. In speaking of *cit* in terms of being limited and also in terms of being reflected, Vidyāranya brings together the two theories of *avaccheda-vāda* and *ābhāsa-vāda* in what

Mahadevan sees as an unsuccessful attempt to join two incompatible ideas.[132] For Mahadevan it is an "adventitious" notion that finds expression in the Pañcadaśī's delineation of the *jīva* as "mere reflection," as he terms it.[133] Furthermore, he believes that Vidyāraṇya makes a "fruitless distinction" when he speaks of *kūtastha* as limited or defined *cit* and of *jīva* as a *pratibimba* of *cit*.

Mahadevan's claim that after the Pañcadaśī Vidyāraṇya abandoned any type of reflection theory and reverted to *avaccheda-vāda* alone in Drg-Dṛśya-Viveka has already been discussed in this thesis. It would certainly appear that Mahadevan himself has a preference for *avaccheda-vāda*. Although he goes to some length to reproduce Vidyāraṇya's discussion of *pratibimba-vāda* and his arguments against *avaccheda-vāda* as found in both the Pañcadaśī and Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, he finds much of it "unconvincing."[134] It is the contention of this thesis, however, that an examination of Vidyāraṇya's argument will show that it has been carefully thought out with cogent reasons being given for his views, and that his use of two theories to describe *jīva* has interesting implications for the roles of consciousness and the *jīva* in this universe.

The Pañcadaśī was written as a manual for the spiritual guidance of a person seeking *mokṣa*, and for this reason the theoretical basis for the advice offered is often omitted in this book. When we find grounds to support the discussion of the Pañcadaśī elaborated on in the more theoretical Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, it seems fair to assume

that Vidyāranya had given considerable thought to these points and that he had a definite purpose in mind in using them as a basis for the training of those following a spiritual path.

It may be argued that Vidyāranya found *avaccheda-vāda* to be complementary rather than antagonistic to the reflection theories of *pratibimba* and *ābhāsa*. For proof, let us look at Vidyāranya's discussion of the *jīva* in Vivaranaprameyasaṅgraha. Here he prefaces his presentation of the metaphor of *jīva* as *ākāśa* by the assertion that the view that the *jīva* may be seen as reflection is "established" by three different sources in *śruti*, *smṛti* and the Brahma-Sūtras.[135] These three sources are regarded as authoritative by Advaitins and the fact that Vidyāranya points to support from all three indicates that he is determined to elicit agreement for his thesis. He also defends the notion that *brahman*, though non-corporeal, may be reflected by making an appeal to the same comparison found in Pañcadaśī VI.19, that of space with clouds and stars being reflected in water.[136]

Vidyāranya's theory about the structure of the *jīva* becomes clear in his statement: "If it be said that the *jīva*, like pot-ether, is defined by an adjunct (and) is not a reflection, no."[137] Here Vidyāranya makes a distinction between pot-ether/space, which in Pañcadaśī VI.18 is posited as a metaphor for *kūtastha*, and *jīva* as reflection. It should be remembered that *kūtastha* is described in the Pañcadaśī as *cit* limited or conditioned (*avacchinna*).[138] In other words, Vidyāranya distinguishes between the *jīva*'s substratum of *cit*,

kūtastha, and the reflection of *cit* in the *jīva*'s *buddhi*. There is a purpose in making this distinction, for the substratum and the reflection in *buddhi* have different functions. As Vidyāranya says: "...everywhere in the *śāstra* the simile [*drstānta*] of pot-ether is instrumental to establishing non-attachedness [*asaṅgatva*], not to establishing the *jīva*-hood [*jīvatva*] (of the defined)."[139] The *jīva*'s substratum is pure *cit*, or *brahman* unassociated with *māyā*, and this substratum is the same that underlies the entire *jagat*. If *jīva* had only this one portion of *cit* as part of its makeup, then how would *jīva* be distinguished from the rest of creation, which also has a substratum of pure *cit*? What sets *jīva* apart as a being which is conscious (*cetana*, *ajada*) is the reflection of *cit* in its *buddhi*; this is what establishes the state of being a *jīva*.

It should be re-iterated here that Vidyāranya uses *pratibimba-vāda* and *ābhāsa-vāda* interchangeably. *Pratibimba* is used to denote the reflection of *cit* in the Vivaranaprameyasaṅgraha passages just discussed, while in exploring the same topic of the metaphor of *ākāśa* in the Pañcadaśī, he most often uses *ābhāsa* meaning 'appearance'.

The question arises as to how Vidyāranya is able to use these two terms interchangeably when most Advaitins regard *pratibimba* as a real reflection of its *bimba* and *ābhāsa* as only an apparent manifestation of what it reflects. Mahadevan, as has been pointed out earlier, emphasizes the difference between the two by claiming that *ābhāsa* is "wholly illusory" in the Pañcadaśī.[140] In our judgement Mahadevan

distorts Vidyāranya's attitude, for it seems that Vidyāranya refrains from defining these terms as extreme opposites. In Vivaranaprameya-saṅgraha he tells us that while he does not find the essence of the *pratibimba* to be illusory (*mithyā*), he does find illusoriness in "the character of being a reflection [*pratibimba*]."[141] While finding, in this way, some limitation to the reality of *pratibimba*, Vidyāranya, conversely, grants to *ābhāsa* more reality than Mahadevan allows. He does so by declaring *ābhāsa* equal to *pratibimba* by virtue of their both being a "partial manifestation" of the original.[142]

Contrary to Mahadevan's conclusion that Vidyāranya's use of *pratibimba-vāda* constitutes an unnecessary element in his theory of the *jīva* and detracts from its integrity, it would seem that Vidyāranya has valid reasons for using all three theories of *avaccheda*, *pratibimba* and *ābhāsa*. Vidyāranya retains *avaccheda-vāda* alongside the two reflection theories because each of them functions to clarify different truths about the *jīva*. We may point to Vidyāranya's use in the Pañcadaśī of *avaccheda-vāda* to explain the substratum of *jīva*, along with reflection theory to account for the reflection of *cit* in the *buddhi*, as confirmation of our previous contention that in Drg-Dṛśya-Viveka the two theories are used in a parallel way to portray the *jīva* on the *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* levels.

Furthermore, we may conclude that Vidyāranya's concept of a double-tier consciousness in the *jīva* accounts for a number of characteristics of the *jīva*. It is the reflection of *cit* in the *buddhi* that sets the conscious *jīva* apart from the rest of the inert *jagat*.[143] Its double consciousness is the factor which allows the *jīva* to be the co-creator

of the *jagat* with *īśvara*.[144] Not only does the reflection of consciousness enable the *jīva* to create the mental universe he inhabits, but it may lead the *jīva* to *moksa*. This it does by making it possible for *jīva* to know the truth of *brahman*. The role of *cidābhāsa* in the process of cognition will be developed more fully in chapter eight. All of these reasons are grounds for disagreeing with Mahadevan's criticism of Vidyāranya's use of *pratibimba-vāda* and *ābhāsa-vāda* in his theory about the constitution of the *jīva*.

ākāśa	space	stages of Absolute *cit*
mahākāśa	all-embracing	*brahman*
meghākāśa	in cloud	*īśvara*
ghaṭākāśa	in pot	*kūṭastha*
jalākāśa	in water	*jīva*

Figure 3. *Ākāsa* asa metaphor for pure *cit*

Stages of the *jīva*

7. *Trpti*
6. *Śokamoksa*
5. *Aparoksa-jñāna*
4. *Paroksa-jñāna*
3. *Viksepa*
2. *Āvrtti*
1. *Ajñāna*

Figure 4. The *jīva*'s ascent to *moksa*

Chapter 6

Trptidīpa, The Lamp of Perfect Satisfaction

In this chapter Vidyāranya explores what it means to be liberated in life, that is, the state known as *jīvanmukti*. His analysis of this condition is based on his theory of the structure of the *jīva*, with its double-tiered consciousness. In the life of the *jīvanmukta* Vidyāranya posits seven stages, as depicted in figure four. The *jīva* following this path is led from the beginningless *avidyā* into which he was born, through a mistaken belief in his own bondage to *samsāra*, to stages of knowledge when he finally realizes his identity with *brahman*. These stages culminate in a state called *trpti*, where knowledge and bliss mingle and the *jīva* experiences perfect satisfaction.

6.1 Consciousness in the *jīva*

Like *jagat*, the *jīva*, too, is created by *īśvara* and is a *vivarta* of *brahman*, having as its foundation the pure *cit* of *brahman*. Vidyāranya expresses this notion in the idea of the *kūtastha*, the substratum of *jīva* which consists of pure *cit* and which is unattached and immutable. Deriving its name from its characteristic of being 'unchanging,' this substratum is also spoken of as *sāksin*, the witness, because it is the observer of everything that occurs within the *jīva*. This ever-constant primary tier of consciousness contributes to the *jīva*'s secondary consciousness by making fleeting appearances in the *jīva*'s *buddhi*. In the *trptidīpa* chapter this type of consciousness is always referred to as *cidābhāsa*, although in other sections of the book Vidyāranya sometimes calls it *citpratibimba* or *cit-chāyā*.

6.2 The *jīva*'s states of consciousness

The relationship between *kūṭastha* and *cidābhāsa* can be illustrated by analyzing the states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep. In waking and dreaming, *cidābhāsa* is occupied with perceiving objects, whether they be the empirical objects of the waking world or the transitory objects perceived in dreams.[145] In deep sleep, however, the *cidābhāsa* no longer operates and when the *jīva* awakens, he is aware that he has not been perceiving anything. What allows the *jīva* to recognize his lack of perception is, according to Vidyāraṇya, the *jīva*'s substratum of consciousness. One of its names is *kūṭastha*, but in several places throughout the book Vidyāraṇya uses other terms to indicate the consciousness which underlies the three states of consciousness.

In I.6 *saṃvit* and *bodha* are terms which refer to this consciousness. These words have their roots in *vid* and *budh*, both of which have connotations of 'knowing' as well as of 'experiencing.' *Saṃvit* is found in the Pañcadaśī only in four *śloka*-s at the beginning of chapter one,[146] except for a quotation from Sureśvara in VIII.11 where *saṃvit* is taken to refer to the *phala*-consciousness in cognition. In chapter one, *saṃvit* is consciousness which is established as being self-revealing, homogeneous in all states and times, and different from all objects of knowledge.

Bodha in I.6 is described as consciousness distinct from objects, which is present in deep sleep and the dream state. In this *śloka* *bodha* and *saṃvit* are equated. *Bodha* is a term used throughout the

Pañcadaśī, very often in the sense of 'knowledge.' However it is also used as 'consciousness' in several ways. *Bodha* may be waking consciousness as opposed to sleep or it may refer to awakening in the sense of enlightenment. It may signify consciousness limited by *antahkarana*, that is, individual consciousness, or it may be used for consciousness which is the nature of *ātman* and which underlies the sheaths of the *jīva*.[147] To use *bodha* in the sense of the highest consciousness, as Vidyāranya does in the passage under discussion, is a recognized usage of the term. In his book Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy, S.K. Saksena identifies *bodha* with *cit* as an "unchanging and unmodified" conscious principle of the highest order.[148]

In VII.211 we are told that *anubhūti* is the consciousness which is the same in the three states. Derived from the root *bhū*, 'to be or to be born,' *anubhūti* means perception, direct knowledge, or experience. From the meanings of these words it is clear that Vidyāranya, in the concept of *kūtastha*, intends to convey the sense of a consciousness which, while being a witness, also in some way registers experience. An indication that this is his intention is found in VII.218, where the *sāksin* is said to perceive (*anubhūyate*) the temporary dissolution of *cidābhāsa* during deep sleep.

At the same time, we know that *kūtastha* inhabits a state of consciousness called *turīya* (the fourth) which is utterly beyond the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, having no connection with them or the rest of the empirical world. By discriminating between the *kūtastha* and *cidābhāsa*, the *jīva* learns to distinguish

which part of himself is real and which unreal. The knowledge which he gains propels him toward his goal of *moksa*, for it teaches him to detach himself from *cidābhāsa* and to identify with his *kūtastha*.

6.3 Empirical *jīva*

As a created being, the *jīva* is a mixture of the conscious and unconscious, of the real and unreal. Having been born into a state of *avidyā*, he is unable to avoid the error of confusing these elements and his most important task in life should be to discover what is real and to identify himself with it. Only in this way will he find the true freedom of *moksa*.

One of the most deeply rooted of his errors is to make a mutual superimposition of *kūtastha* and his empirical self, so that he believes his body to be his real self. The *jīva* is said to have three *śarīra*-s (bodies): *kārana* (causal), *suksma* (subtle), and *sthūla* (gross). Each is prey to certain diseases and afflictions, which the *jīva* mistakenly believes to belong to himself (VII.233).

Another description of the *jīva* is in terms of the five *kośa*-s (sheaths): *ānandamaya*, *vijñānamaya*, *manomaya*, *prānamaya*, and *annamaya*. Their relationship to the *śarīra*-s is illustrated in figure two. The *kośa*-s are said to enfold the *jīva*'s central core, the *ātman*. By learning to differentiate the unreal *kośa*-s and *śarīra*-s, the *jīva* may be led to discover the *ātman* and attain *moksa*.[149]

Another concept which relates to the *jīva* is the *antahkarana* (inner organ), the instrument by which the *jīva* relates to the empirical world. A product of *avidyā* itself, the *antahkarana* has the ability to

manifest an *ābhāsa* of *cit* in that part of itself which is composed of the very finest matter, the *buddhi*. If we remember that it is *cidābhāsa* which establishes the *jīva* in its *jīva*-hood, it will be seen that the *antahkarana* plays an important role in Vidyāranya's understanding of the *jīva*.

The *antahkarana* has various functions to perform and is called different names according to these functions, although not all Advaitins use the same terminology. Dasgupta follows the usage of Vedānta-Paribhāsā, which links *buddhi* with certainty of judgment, *manas* with doubt, *ahaṅkāra* with ego, and *citta* with recollection.[150] Vidyāranya's use of terms is generally in agreement with this list, except for *citta*. For him, *citta* is not so much 'recollection' as 'mind.' In his Jīvanmuktiviveka, Vidyāranya divides 'mind' into two: "it is called *manas* from its function of simple thinking; it is called *citta* when it localizes the sensation, in other words, performs an act of perception."[151] In the Pañcadaśī *citta* is mentioned as performing an act of cognition by assuming the form of objects in IV.28 and in XI.113, but it is otherwise used in a more general sense. Chapter seven, for example, speaks of *citta* as mind devoted to *samsāra* (29), as curbed (121), as troubled (189), as one-pointed (208), and as fixed on *brahman* (241).

Mind as *manas*, in the Pañcadaśī, along with its modifications, the *vrttis*, and the sense organs, collects sense data through acts of cognition. *Buddhi* or *dhī* uses this data as the basis for making judgments, one of its primary functions. The important capacity to carry the *cidābhāsa* and allow it to shine forth also belongs to the *buddhi*. Vidyāranya uses both *ahaṅkāra* and *ahaṅkrti* to indicate egoity.

When *jīva* mistakenly (through mutual superimposition) identifies his real self with that part of him which is phenomenal rather than eternal, he regards himself as a doer of actions and an enjoyer of desires. Then he believes himself to be "bound by the pleasures and pains of this world" (VII.7). His mind-created fetters will continue to shackle him until he relinquishes his attachment to that part of himself which is not real.

An example of how the *jīva* must learn to refine his understanding is found in Vidyāranya's treatment of the several ways in which *aham* (I-ness), the notion the *jīva* has of himself, may be regarded. Ideas of *aham* differ according to the degree of understanding *jīva* has about *kūtastha* and *cidābhāsa*. Those people who are unenlightened take *aham* to mean simply the mutually superimposed *kūtastha* and *cidābhāsa*. Those who have some awareness, however, make a distinction between two aspects of *aham*. When speaking in philosophical terms, they use *aham* to mean *kūtastha*, the real unchanging substratum of *jīva*. When speaking in terms of the *vyāvahārika* or phenomenal world, they understand *aham* to refer to the *cidābhāsa* (VII.9-13). One who hopes to follow the path of knowledge to its highest goal begins by having this clear distinction always firmly in mind. By reason of its being an appearance only, *cidābhāsa* is not fully real, but when its unreal aspects are sublated, *cidābhāsa* is found to be one with *kūtastha* (VII.15). When *jīva* or *puruṣa* comes to this realization and is able to say,"I am *kūtastha*," with full knowledge of its ramifications, that is the dawning of *mokṣa* (VII .18).

6.4 Stages of the development of the *jīva*

Vidyāranya lists seven stages of the *jīva*'s life: *ajñāna* (ignorance), *āvṛtti* (obscuration), *vikṣepa* (projection), *parokṣa jñāna* (indirect knowledge), *aparokṣa jñāna* (direct knowledge), *śokamokṣa* (freedom from grief), and *tṛpti* (unrestricted bliss) (VII.33). As indicated in figure five, the first three of these are said to belong to *cidābhāsa*, for they are based on what is not ultimately true. These stages are responsible for the *jīva*'s bondage, for at each level they reinforce the chains of ignorance which bind his mind. *Jīva*'s original *ajñāna* is a generalized condition which involves taking the *vyāvahārika* world at its face value as being the only reality. This ignorance is enhanced through *āvṛtti*, when it is believed that there is no such thing as *kūṭastha*, in other words, that the world does not have a substratum in *brahman*. *Vikṣepa* involves the *jīva* in identifying with what is only superimposed on *brahman*.[152] As a consequence, *jīva* develops two erroneous beliefs which have deep roots and which are extremely difficult to eradicate: he believes firmly that the world is real and that he himself is nothing more than his body (VII.103).

6.5 *Parokṣa* and *aparokṣa* knowledge

The last four stages of the *jīva* are ones which Vidyāranya assigns to *kūṭastha* rather than *cidābhāsa*. They refer, that is, to the eternal realm rather than to the *vyāvahārika* world, and they are concerned with the *jīva*'s liberation, not his bondage.

Parokṣa, or indirect, knowledge is knowledge understood in an intellectual way, and is a matter of belief or faith rather than

experience. From the *guru* and from *śruti* the *jīva* learns to lay aside his doubt about the non-existence of *kūtastha* and to accept the possibility that *brahman* is the substratum of the universe. This is the first stage of the *jīva*'s relinquishment of false ideas and tentative acceptance of truth. Although *paroksa* knowledge is to be superseded by what is *aparoksa*, it is not to be denigrated as false or illusory, but should be accepted as a part (*amśa*) of the final truth.[153]

Aparoksa knowledge springs from the immediate, direct perception of truth. The vehicles for this truth are the *mahāvākya*-s of *śruti*. There are numerous instances in *śruti* of sages who acquire direct insight by pondering the great sayings.[154] Using Śaṅkara's exposition of the famous utterance "*Tat tvam asi*" as an example, Vidyāranya shows how that which is indicated by the word '*tvam*' (thou), that is, consciousness (*bodha*) within the adjunct of the individual *jīva*'s *antahkarana*, may be said to be identical with '*tat*,' that is, consciousness which has *māyā* as an *upādhi*, which is the cause of the universe, and which is of the nature of *satya*, *jñāna*, *ananta*.[155] By applying the logical rule of *bhāgalaksanā*, under which the identity of two terms of a metaphor is proven by retaining for each a part of their primary meaning and removing the rest, we find that if '*tat*' is regarded as *brahman*, free of any *upādhi*-s and without any attributes such as omniscience, then '*tat*' may be seen as pure *cit*. Then, taking '*tvam*' to be the *jīva* without its adjunct of *antahkarana* or any of its characteristics beyond its nature of pure *cit*, the two seemingly disparate terms may be said to be identical in the sense of

being of the nature of pure *cit*.[156]

With this demonstration of the absolute identity of the consciousness of *brahman* with that of the *jīva*, the *jīva* perceives his non-difference from *brahman*. It is said that *cidābhāsa* "is merged in *brahman*" (VII.94) and knows its true oneness with *brahman*. His former *parokṣa* knowledge is displaced by the blissfulness of *aparokṣa* knowledge, and this knowledge will never be lost.[157]

6.6 Terms to express 'knowledge'

The words used most frequently in this chapter to refer to knowledge are *jñāna* and *bodha*. *Jñāna*, (from the root *jñā*, 'to know, to perceive, to experience'), is used in several ways by Vidyāraṇya, but most frequently it denotes 'knowledge.' This knowledge may be knowledge of *brahman* and its realm, whether direct, as in VII.48, or indirect, as in VII.50. However, *jñāna* is not confined to higher knowledge but also expresses knowledge at the *vyāvahārika* level. In VII.55, for example, we find "*ghatajñāna*" or 'knowledge of the pot.'

Another derivative of *jñā*, *vijñāna*, most often carrying the meaning of 'intellect,' is occasionally used by Vidyāraṇya as an alternative to *jñāna* in relation to knowledge. We find *vijñāna* used as direct knowledge of *ātman* in I.64, as indirect knowledge of *brahman* in I.63, and as knowledge of a lump of clay in XIII.61. In his study of Sureśvara's word usage, S. Hino refers to a Vedāntic tradition which reserves *vijñāna* for lower knowledge and *jñāna* for higher. He finds that Sureśvara breaches this rule frequently and does not make a deliberate distinction between the two.[158] Vidyāraṇya follows

Sureśvara's example. *Jñāna* is cited as an aspect of *brahman*'s nature and as an equivalent to consciousness in VII.66, while *vijñāna* is used in the same way in a quotation from the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad in XI.61. In III.34 he employs a derivative of *jñāna*, *jñānatva*, in the same way, as being of the nature of *brahman*, along with *satyatva* and *anantya*.

Sometimes *jñāna* is used to mean 'perception' (VI.75) and 'cognition' (VIII.6). An unusual usage is found in IV.14 and 17, where we are told that *jīva* converted the objects created by *īśvara* into objects for his enjoyment through *kriya* (action) and *jñāna*. Translated in our text as 'reflection,' *jñāna* could mean 'knowledge' or 'thought.'

Bodha, (from the root *budh*, 'to wake, to perceive, to learn, understand'), has been discussed earlier as 'consciousness,' both in the sense of 'enlightenment' and as simply 'awakening from sleep.' It can be used to mean the highest consciousness of *ātman* and the consciousness within the *jīva*.

As a term for 'knowledge' *bodha* is used by Vidyāranya in different ways. There is knowledge on the intellectual level, the 'idea' or 'notion' of VII.16,17, or 'instruction' of XII.64. However, Vidyāranya seldom chooses *bodha* to express knowledge at the *vyavahārika* level. Usually he employs *bodha* to indicate knowledge of the reality of *brahman*, sometimes in the sense of 'indirect,' as in VI.283, but very often as direct knowledge which enlightens. This is the knowledge of truth which, he tells us, triumphs over *avidyā* (VII.281) and destroys *ajñāna* and its effects (VII.282). *Bodha*,

although sometimes used as an equivalent for *jñāna* and *avidyā* with respect to higher knowledge, does seem to connote a special sense of awakening to another level of insight. For this reason it is an appropriate term to choose when discussing knowledge which leads to *mokṣa*, as we find in VI.281. Here *bodha* as knowledge is counted as the most important of the virtues which lead directly to *mokṣa*; renunciation and withdrawal of the senses are said to be its subordinates. *Bodha* as knowledge which awakens the unenlightened is found in VII.289, while its derivative, *prabodha*, is used in the same way in VII.290.

6.7 *Mokṣa*

The advent of *aparokṣa* knowledge constitutes *mokṣa* for the *jīva* but Vidyāraṇya warns that until one is completely established in this new knowledge, it is necessary to maintain the practice of "*śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana*," the same method advocated by Śaṅkara for those who are at the stage of aspiring to *mokṣa*.[159]

In his book, Jīvanmuktiviveka, Vidyāraṇya analyzes *mokṣa* in considerable depth. He shows here that there is a qualitative change in the understanding of one who exchanges *parokṣa* knowledge for *aparokṣa*. In his terms, the seeker (*jijñāsu*) then becomes the knower (*jñānin*).[160] In order for knowledge of truth to become unassailably ensconced, some time is needed for past errors to die away. Until the knower becomes *sthita-prajñā*, or firmly established in truth, he must continue the same discipline of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* which he practised as a seeker.[161] Otherwise he risks being carried away by the temptations to action and enjoyment which are everpresent in this world. Whereas the seeker followed a discipline in order to reach truth, the knower does so for the sake of *manonāśa* (dissolution or quieting of the mind) and

vāsanā-kṣaya (obliteration of latent desire).[162] Only after he has successfully accomplished these goals will he be truly at the stage of *jīvanmukti*.[163]

6.8 *Prārabdha karma*

The process of stilling the mind and obliterating *vāsanās* is made difficult because the knower is subject to the effect of *prārabdha karma*. Carried into the world at birth, as a result of action in past lives, *prārabdha karma* must come to fruition even though knowledge of *brahman* has been realized. As he does in Jīvanmuktiviveka, so also in the Pañcadaśī Vidyāraṇya advises the knower to curb the mind gradually by concentrating on *brahman*.[164] At time he will be subject to bouts of uncertainty concerning his experience of *brahman*, but we are assured that minor regressions will not defeat the knower (VII.246).

Prārabdha karma causes the knower to experience the rise of desires, but by maintaining his detachment from the pleasure and pain these desires bring, their power to bind him is attenuated. Because of his detachment from them, these desires do not have the ability to create future *karma* for him, for, like roasted grain which may be consumed but cannot be seeded, these desires have lost their potency.[165] The knower should be no more attached to the experiences of his waking life than he is to those in his dreams.[166] It is only a seeming paradox that because the knower is not attached to his actions, he is more effective at performing worldly duties. This is so because his certainty about his identity and his detachment from his actions free him from the conflict between the demands of the world and the search for *brahman* which he experienced as a seeker (VII.131).

6.9 The final stages

Although, according to Vidyāraṇya, it is commonly understood that the enjoyer of desires is the *cidābhāsa* along with its substratum

of *kūtastha*, by careful differentiation between *cidābhāsa* and *kūtastha* it becomes clear that *kūtastha* is always unchanging and separate from every state. It is *cidābhāsa* who is in truth the enjoyer. As his understanding of the separateness of *kūtastha* and *cidābhāsa* deepens, the knower loses his taste for identifying with the enjoyer.[167] Instead of enjoying objects of desire, he directs his love for them towards the Self instead (VII.204).

By no longer identifying himself as the enjoyer, the knower lays to rest his deep-rooted attachment to the body and to his belief in its reality. Keeping his mind concentrated on *kūtastha*, the *cidābhāsa* becomes more and more free from illusion and at last he takes shelter in, or merges in, *kūtastha*, the witness (VII.236). This process of identification is described in Mundaka Upanisad III.2.9 as one in which "'The knower of *brahman* becomes *brahman*.'" (VII.241). The consciousness reflected in *cidābhāsa* is the same consciousness found in *kūtastha* and both are *sva-prākāśa* (self-luminous) (VII.229). Whatever caused the identity between the two to be obscured was a creation of *māyā* and was, therefore, ephemeral and liable to destruction. The real difference between *jīva* and *brahman* lies only in the presence of the *antahkarana*, the *upādhi* in which the reflection of *brahman* is found (VII.85).

As *cidābhāsa* becomes one with *kūtastha* and *prārabdha karma* is used up, the *jīvanmukta* becomes fully established in his knowledge of *brahman*. As a result he reaches the sixth stage of the *jīva* and is released from the suffering (*śokamoksa*) caused by his former delusions (VII.251). The seventh stage follows upon this and the *jīvanmukta* experiences the perfect satisfaction (*trptiriyam trpti*) which arrives in

the train of his perfected knowledge of *brahman*. He is satisfied that "all that was to be achieved has been achieved, and all that was to be enjoyed was enjoyed" (VII.252).

The Pañcadaśī describes the sense of perfect freedom and bliss felt by the *jīvanmuktā*. No longer bound to satisfy desires or perform rituals, his perfected knowledge of *brahman* removes the need even to study *śruti*, to pursue philosophy or to meditate on *brahman*.[168] Being released from ignorance, he has merged his identity with *brahman* and he rejoices that "I am the sum of all the experiences (*anubhava*) in the universe; where is the separate experience for me?" (VII.266). The only duty he might be said to have is to awaken to knowledge of *brahman* those who remain in ignorance (VII.290). All that remains for him is to experience the blessedness of his blissful state of knowledge.

Chapter 7

Kūtasthadīpa, The Lamp of *kūtastha*

Having discussed the creation of *jīva* and *jagat* in chapter six of the Pañcadaśī, and *jīva*'s goal of *jīvanmukti* in chapter seven, Vidyāranya here makes a more intensive analysis of the *jīva*, focussing on *kūtastha*, its substratum. *Kūtastha*'s role is clarified by showing its relation to other concepts, such as *brahman*, *ātman*, *cidābhāsa*, *jīva*, *īśvara* and *jagat*. Through a discussion of the process of cognition we are shown how the *jīva*'s double consciousness, consisting of *cidābhāsa* and *kūtastha*, is able to cognize objects and to realize *brahman*.

7.1 *Kūtastha* as identical with *brahman* and *ātman*

The consciousness of *kūtastha*, being unchanging and unchangeable, provides *jīva* with a steadfast substratum on which its unconscious components, its bodies and senses, may be superimposed. If we look at the world as a whole, we are told that the substratum of *jagat*, on which all names and forms are superimposed, is *brahman* itself. Stripped of the superimpositions which obscure them, *kūtastha* and *brahman* are found to be identical. Both are of the nature of pure *cit* (VIII.51).

Ātman, the Self or inner principle of the *jīva*, is also of the nature of pure *cit* and so is identical with *kūtastha* and *brahman*. *Kūtastha* and *ātman* are described as "*avināśya*" (imperishable) and

"*asaṅga*" (unattached), terms which indicate the difference between the two of them and the rest of *jīva*, which is superimposed (VIII.40). Like *brahman*, *ātman* and *kūtastha* are said to be *sva-prākāśa*, or self-revealing. Although the *jīva*'s ignorance may prevent his awareness of *kūtastha*, *kūtastha* is the ever-shining witness (*sākṣin*) which is the foundation of *jīva*(VIII.25). *Kūtastha* never fails to illuminate *jīva* whether in waking, dreaming or deep sleep states, during fainting spells or in the state of deepest concentration (*samādhi*) (VIII.21).

7.2 Differentiating *kūtastha* from the created

Vidyāranya cites the highest authority, *śruti*, to emphasize that *kūtastha* is to be differentiated from any creation of *māyā*.[169] As we know, Vidyāranya states that *māyā* created *īśvara* and *jīva* who in turn created *jagat*. Both *īśvara* and *jīva* are said to be *ābhāsa*-s of *brahman* in *māyā*. They are different from the rest of the universe because they seem to have the power of consciousness. But this is only one of the delusions of *māyā*. In fact, *jīva* and *īśvara* are different from the material universe because they are "transparent (*svaccha*)" and so are capable of revealing consciousness.[170] It is a case similar to that of the *buddhi* which, although still unconscious and a part of the body, is made of such subtle matter that it is able to reveal the reflection of pure *cit* within itself as *cidābhāsa* (VIII.31). It must be clearly understood that *kūtastha*, being identical with *brahman*, is no creation of *māyā* and is always unattached from *jagat*, *jīva* and *īśvara*.

7.3 *Kūṭastha* and the Double Character of *cidābhāsa*

In this chapter Vidyāranya shows how *cidābhāsa* and *kūtastha* are to be distinguished. The main point to be understood about *cidābhāsa* is that it is characterized by doubleness and this double character is a feature of how *cidābhāsa* functions.

In contrast to *kūtastha* which illuminates *jīva* with a light of consciousness which is constant and never wavering as long as *jīva* exists, the consciousness manifested by *cidābhāsa* is born and then dies--and then is born again (VIII.24). The first sense in which *cidābhāsa* is double, then, relates to the variability of its appearance.

Secondly, *cidābhāsa* is seen as double because it is both different from *kūtastha* and similar to it. Its features of being changeable (*vikāra*) and attached (*saṅga*) mark *cidābhāsa* as being distinct from *kūtastha*(VIII.33). Attachment relates to its dependence on *buddhi*, for *cidābhāsa* arises only in conjunction with the *vṛtti*-s (modifications) of the *buddhi*. That is to say, *cidābhāsa* is always tied to the *antahkarana* (inner organ), a part of the *jīva* which is superimposed on *kūtastha*.

But even though *cidābhāsa* is found only within the *buddhi*, the two are not identical. The *buddhi*, while being more purely sattvic, more transparent (*svaccha*) than the rest of the *antahkarana*, is still, in the final analysis, part of the material world. Even the finest, most subtle matter is still conditioned by *avidyā* and must be considered to be an *upādhi* of *brahman*.[171] Because of its proximity to consciousness, *buddhi* may appear to be conscious itself, but this fallacy should be

understood as only another proof of *māyā*'s power to delude.

Because of its association with the superimposed part of *jīva*, *cidābhāsa* is termed a "creation of error (*bhrama*)" by Vidyāranya (VIII.52). And yet, this is only one aspect of *cidābhāsa*, for in an important respect *cidābhāsa* resembles *kūtastha*. Both *cidābhāsa* and *kūtastha* shine with the light of the same consciousness. It is this reflected consciousness of *cidābhāsa* which allows the *jīva* to perceive its world by cognizing objects, both external and internal (VIII.33). As will be shown in our discussion on cognition, the *cidābhāsa* has a special role to play as a link between the world of *kūtastha* and the world of *jagat*.

Another point to be made about *cidābhāsa*'s double character relates to its degree of reality. Is it real or unreal? Or is there a finer distinction to be made? What is the difference between '*ābhāsa*' and '*pratibimba*'? Does Vidyāranya give a particular flavour to these terms? By a close examination of the text of chapter eight we will show that Vidyāranya uses '*cidābhāsa*' in a way that goes beyond the usual conceptions of this term to convey his own understanding of the *jīva*'s relationship to *brahman*.

For its discussion of cognition and the role of *cidābhāsa* in cognition, the Pañcadaśī's chapter eight exhibits in several ways an affinity with Śaṅkara's Upadeśa-sāhasrī. We find that Śaṅkara's comparison of the *buddhi*'s reflection of *kūtastha* as *cidābhāsa*, with a mirror's reflection of a face, is central to the thought of both authors. Vidyāranya, in fact, quotes directly from Upadeśa-sāhasrī XVIII.43 on this point in Pañcadaśī VIII.26. Then, in Pañcadaśī VIII.12

he refers to Upadeśa-sāhasrī as the authority for his interpretation of a quotation from Sureśvara given in Pañcadaśī VIII.11, for he assumes that Sureśvara, like he himself, follows the teachings of Śaṅkara on cognition. No doubt Mayeda is correct in his statement that "the exposition of *ābhāsavāda* in the Pañcadaśī is largely indebted to Śaṅkara's view."[172]

However, Mayeda goes on to state that "Vidyāraṇya, like Śaṅkara, regards the reflection as wholly unreal,"[173] citing Mahadevan as his authority. This pronouncement of Mahadevan in The Philosophy of Advaita, that "according to the theory propounded in the Pañcadaśī, the *ābhāsa* is wholly illusory,"[174] is also accepted uncritically by Miśra in his discussion of *ābhāsa-vāda*.[175] This thesis proposes to show that Mahadevan's statement does not express the full truth about Vidyāraṇya's view of *cidābhāsa*. By comparing Upadeśa-sāhasarī XVIII.43 with Pañcadaśī VIII.26 (which is largely but not totally a direct quotation from Śaṅkara), we will find that Vidyāraṇya's and Śaṅkara's views on *ābhāsa* need not be seen as identical.

The first line of these two *śloka*-s is identical: "*ātmā ābhāsa āśrayās ca evaṃ mukha ābhāsa āśrayā yathā*," meaning 'as the face, its appearance, and its locus [mirror] are related, so too are related *ātman*, its appearance, and its locus [*buddhi*].' Śaṅkara's second line continues: "*gamyante śāstrayuktibhyām ābhāsa asattvaṃ eva ca*," which may be translated as: 'Through authority and logic these [relationships] are understood. And so the appearance is unreal.' Vidyāraṇya changes this line to read: "*gamyante śāstrayuktibhyāṃ iti ābhāsas ca varnitaḥ*." Translated this line reads: 'Through authority

and logic these [relationships] are understood. And the appearance (*ābhāsa*) is described as such.' By his choice of where to end the quotation from Śaṅkara, Vidyāranya changes the description of *ābhāsa* considerably. He has chosen not to say that *ābhāsa* is unreal and implies instead that *ābhāsa* is to be understood according to the relationships of face, etc. and *ātman*, etc.

So far we have shown only that Vidyāranya may be seen not to subscribe to seeing *ābhāsa* as 'wholly illusory.' Now, in order to determine how Vidyāranya does conceive of *ābhāsa*, let us look at PD VIII.32. Here the terms *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba* are brought together and are shown to be similar in being "partial manifestations (*īsad bhāsana*)" of their "*bimba*-s" (prototypes). *Ābhāsa* is said to lack the characteristics (*laksana*) of the *bimba* but to resemble it in having some of these properties. The next *śloka*, PD VIII.33, gives us an example of what is meant. Here *ābhāsa* is said to be without the characteristics of its *bimba* (understood as *kūtastha*) because of its being "associated (*saṅga*)" and "variable (*vikāra*)." And yet *ābhāsa* is said to be like its *bimba* by "rendering objects capable of being cognized (*sphūrtirūpatva*)." This passage was quoted earlier in this discussion in order to show the doubleness of *cidābhāsa* in relating to the two different worlds of *kūtastha* and *jagat*. Now what is to be emphasized is the linking of *ābhāsa* with the terms '*bimba*' and '*pratibimba*.'

In bringing together *ābhāsa-vāda* and *pratibimba-vāda* in these *śloka*-s and drawing a parallel between *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba*,

Vidyāraṇya brings different shades of meaning to them. *Pratibimba*, as used by most adherents to the Vivaraṇa school, is said to be as real as its *bimba*. Now Vidyāraṇya tells us that it is only a "partial manifestation" of the *bimba* and is equivalent to *ābhāsa*. It must be concluded that *pratibimba* loses some of its reality. It could be said that, as used in this chapter, *pratibimba* moves closer to the Dvaitic notion of *pratibimba*. To the Dvaitins, the *pratibimba* is not equal to its *bimba* in reality, but is said to be similar to and dependent on the *bimba*.[176]

Ābhāsa, on the other hand, is enhanced in importance by Vidyāraṇya's use of the term. Vidyāraṇya refrains from dismissing *ābhāsa* as unreal, noting that it has some similarity to *kūṭastha*, and he recognizes its usefulness in functioning as an essential instrument in the cognition of objects, whether internal or external. Without *cidābhāsa* to pervade and enlighten it, the unconscious *vṛtti* could never achieve cognition (VIII.9).

In an ultimate sense, of course, *ābhāsa* is unreal, as is everything other than *brahman*, for the Advaitin. However, as a concept for explaining the structure of the *jīva*, *cidābhāsa* is a useful idea. It may be argued that Vidyāraṇya's understanding of the term involves recognizing that *cidābhāsa* has a double character in the sense of being both unreal and real. Its unreality relates to its being a reflection. As Vidyāraṇya said of *pratibimba* in Vivaraṇa-prameyasaṅgraha, the very fact of being a reflection brings in a certain difference (*bheda*) between the reflection and its prototype.

He finds "illusoriness" (*mithyātva*) stems from the property (*dharma*) of being a reflection.[177] The reality of *cidābhāsa*, however, has to do with the fact that the consciousness which is reflected is the same consciousness as that of its *bimba*, the *kūtastha*. For proof that this is so, we may point to the initial image of chapter eight, that of a wall illuminated by the sun and the reflection of the sun. It is said that the reflection of the sun adds to the illumination, just as the *ābhāsa* of *kūtastha* adds to the illumination of the *jīva* (VIII 1,2). Furthermore, when the *buddhi* is without *vṛtti*-s (as in deep sleep), only *kūtastha* shines within *jīva*. On the arising of *vṛtti*-s, *cidābhāsa* adds to *jīva*'s illumination by augmenting that of *kūtastha* (VIII.22). *Cidābhāsa* differs from *kūtastha* in changing from manifest to unmanifest, but it is like *kūtastha* in showing the identical *cit* in its reflection. This identity is clearly illustrated in Vidyāraṇya's discussion of the *jīva*'s realization of *brahman*. Upon his full understanding of the *mahāvākya* 'I am *brahman*,' the *jīva* knows that he and *brahman* are one consciousness. In the account of the realization of *brahman* in VII.94, it is said that *cidābhāsa* and *brahman* merge into one. This would not be possible if the consciousness *ābhāsa* reflects were not the same pure *cit* of *brahman*.

This outline of Vidyāraṇya's interpretation of *cidābhāsa* demonstrates that in the Pañcadaśī he uses the term in ways that go beyond the conventional usage. Understanding the double nature of Vidyāraṇya's *cidābhāsa*, and recognizing to what extent it is both real and unreal,

we find the concept to be usefully employed by Vidyāranya in a number of ways. It is *cidābhāsa* which defines *jīva*-hood for Vidyāranya, for without this second consciousness, *jīva* would be no different from the other objects of creation (VIII.28). Because of this special gift of consciousness, *jīva* is capable of becoming a co-creator of the world with *īśvara* (VIII.69). Furthermore, without *cidābhāsa*, the *jīva* would be rendered incapable of taking a role in cognition. Not only would objects not be perceived, but the realization of *brahman* would be impossible.

7.4 Cognition

Kūtastha and *cidābhāsa* resemble each other in making the cognition of objects and emotions possible, but Vidyāranya's discussion of the process of cognition clearly shows that he visualizes differences in the functions of the two. In cognition the *cidābhāsa* is to be found with the *vrtti*-s, those modifications of the *antahkarana* which arise and disappear in the fitful activity of the *jīva*'s mind. Here we see an example of the *cidābhāsa*'s variability. *Kūtastha*, however, true to its steadfast character, shines constantly to illumine the *jīva*, unchanging whether *cidābhāsa* appears or not (VIII.3). These two modes of consciousness bring *jīva* two kinds of knowledge, for while *cidābhāsa* makes known the unknown, *kūtastha* brings awareness of the new knowledge (VIII.15).

The process of cognition of an object outside the *jīva* begins when *vrtti*-s arise within the *antahkarana*. Now, because the *antahkarana* and its *vrtti*-s are unconscious and insentient (VIII.8),

they cannot of themselves bring about cognition. However, the *vṛtti* is a vehicle for *cidābhāsa* and is said to be "tipped with *cidābhāsa* in the way a spear is tipped with metal" (VIII.6). It is perfectly equipped to break through the cover of *ajñāna* which veils unknown objects.

According to Advaitic theory, when the *jīva* directs his gaze at something unknown to him, the *vṛtti*-s are directed outward and surround the object, conforming completely to its shape. The *cidābhāsa*-s carried by the *vṛtti*-s then pierce the covering of ignorance. At this moment the object is revealed, illuminated by the self-luminous consciousness of *cidābhāsa*. This is what Vidyāraṇya terms *phala*-consciousness, the consciousness which results in the direct knowledge, 'This is the pot' (VIII.12). Once cognition has been accomplished, the *cidābhāsa* quickly fades as the *vṛtti* subsides, demonstrating its variability, compared with the constancy of *kūṭastha*.

We saw earlier that *kūṭastha* is a source of unchanging illumination for the *jīva*, being present in all states of consciousness, even those such as deep sleep, fainting and *samādhi* when *vṛtti*-s are completely absent. It is present at all stages of cognition; before, during, and after the appearance of *cit* in the form of *cidābhāsa*.

The kind of knowledge rendered by *kūṭastha* is not the direct knowledge that *cidābhāsa* makes possible. Indeed, prior to the act of cognition *kūṭastha* illumines the *jīva*, making it possible for the *jīva*

to be aware of its lack of knowledge. Then, as a witness to the cognitive act, *kūtastha* illumines the *vṛtti*-s, *cidābhāsa*, and the pot itself, and so reveals that an act of knowing has taken place (VIII.13). In its role as witness, *kūtastha* provides a way of acknowledging the specific cognition, bringing it into a more general kind of knowledge, that of the "knowledge of knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*)" (VIII.15). After a pot has been cognized, *kūtastha* makes it possible for the *jīva* to be aware that it knows that pot.

The play of such a double consciousness in the cognition of objects external to the body is found also in internal cognition. All *vṛtti*-s of the *buddhi* are pervaded by *cidābhāsa*, including the *ahaṃvṛtti* having to do with egoity, and those which relate to the emotions and any inner activity of the *jīva*'s *buddhi*. These *vṛtti*-s are made manifest by the light of *cidābhāsa*.[178] And, as in the case of external cognition, the *vṛtti*-s, *cidābhāsa*, and the cognition are all illumined by the *cit* of *kūtastha*.

The direct realization of *brahman* takes place according to a similar process, for it is said that *vṛtti*-s of *dhī* can pervade inner consciousness to remove its covering of ignorance just as they do when cognizing other objects of knowledge. However, in this instance, the *cidābhāsa*'s role is confined to piercing the veil of *ajñāna*, for it is not needed as an illuminator. Once *ajñāna* is removed, *brahman* itself shines forth in its self-luminous splendour, as pure *cit*.[179] The *ābhāsa* of *cit* which is minute in comparison, merges its tiny light with *brahman*, and direct realization is accomplished.

Chapter 8

Dhyānadīpa, The Lamp of Meditation

The way to *mokṣa* which Vidyāraṇya discussed extensively in the *tṛptidīpa* section was a path of knowledge, a *jñāna mārga*. For the Advaitin, the way of knowledge is the highest ideal, for it demands from the seeker great perseverance in leading a disciplined life and it involves his complete spiritual transformation. Beyond the purificatory discipline of developing such ethical qualities as calmness, self-control, withdrawal of the senses and fortitude, he must be able to conduct an ongoing inquiry into *brahman*. This inquiry (*vicāra*), based on *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, carries the aspirant through the stages of *parokṣa* (mediated) knowledge to the *aparokṣa*, the direct experience of *brahman*. In figure five this path to liberation is illustrated.

Not everyone is equipped to undertake *vicāra*. Anyone whose mind is dull, or liable to distraction or restlessness will make no headway with his inquiry.[180] For this reason, Vidyāraṇya recommends an alternative route to *mokṣa* through worship and meditation. He understands this path to be an error (*bhrama*)-- in the sense that the path of knowledge is much to be preferred -- but it is what he terms a *saṃvādi bhrama*, an error which achieves the desired goal through indirect means. The intention of this chapter is to allay any doubts the worshipper may have about following this other road to *mokṣa*.

8.1 *Saṃvādi bhrama*

When a man determines what his goal will be, and then sets out to achieve it by following the wrong path, it seems to be a happy accident when he actually arrives at his goal. Such an event is what Vidyāraṇya calls a *saṃvādi bhrama*. Of course, not all errors are redeemable. For the most part they lead to unachieved goals and disappointment. For the inquirer into *brahman*, one of the most persistent and difficult-to-eradicate of all errors is his superimposed conviction that his body is his real Self (*ātman*). This is a *visaṃvādi bhrama*, an error that leads to no good end, and one which must be overthrown (IX.21).

For Vidyāraṇya, worship of and meditation on *brahman* may be classified as *saṃvādi bhrama*-s because, although he regards them as inferior to the path of *vicāra*, they may lead to the same goal, that of liberation (IX.13).

8.2 Vidyāraṇya's understanding of *upāsanā* and *dhyāna*

The type of worship recommended by Vidyāraṇya is not devotion through making offerings to images or chanting *mantra*-s. For him, worship is *upāsanā* or *upāsti*, words deriving from the root *ās* with the prefix *upa*. This root literally means 'the act of sitting,' but in relation to worship it means attending upon a deity in homage and adoration. *Dhyāna* is used interchangeably with *upāsanā* and *upāsti* by Vidyāraṇya. From the root *dhyai*, 'to think of, contemplate, meditate on,' *dhyāna* signifies the act of directing one's thoughts

to *brahman*. Taken together, these words indicate that for Vidyāranya worship is a mental activity whereby a current of thought is focussed directly on the object of worship.[181] In other words, for Vidyāranya, worship is meditation.

In his scale of worthy activities, Vidyāranya ranks the worship of *brahman* with attributes (*saguna*) as greater in value than the performance of the works and rituals advocated in the Vedas (IX.121). However, even more valuable is meditation on *nirguna* (attributeless) *brahman*, for this meditation may ripen into a direct experience of *brahman* (IX.123). Vidyāranya cites many instances in the *śāstra*-s which declare a preference for meditation on *nirguna brahman*.[182] Rather than meditating on *brahman* in a positive way as being of the nature of *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*, for example, or in a negative fashion as 'Not this, not this,' it is better to meditate on the one indivisible *brahman* as "'That I am' (*so 'ham asmi*).' (IX.73). The worshipper should learn to keep other thoughts from his mind while he directs his attention to the object of his meditation. As he becomes more adept in his practice, his meditation will deepen so that even while he dreams, his meditation will carry on.

8.3 Comparison of the practices of inquiry and of meditation

A comparison of these two modes of achieving *moksa* is given in diagram form in figures five and six in this chapter.

If the seeker of knowledge following the path of inquiry were to be compared with the worshipper on the path of meditation,

parokṣa jñāna would be one characteristic they could be said to share, although their knowledge would take different forms. For the inquirer, indirect knowledge could mean holding the notion 'I am *brahman*' to be a certain truth without having direct realization of that insight. The worshipper, on the other hand, could find his indirect knowledge in being familiar with the forms of a deity as taught by *śruti*.[183] Both seekers could obtain their knowledge from the *śāstra*-s and from a teacher, and both may be said to have faith in their mediate knowledge.

At this point, however, the two paths diverge. One who seeks *mokṣa* through knowledge will not be satisfied with indirect knowledge. He will want to have a deeper understanding, one which can only be accomplished by knowing directly *brahman* within oneself. He must go beyond the knowledge obtained from his teacher and actively seek new knowledge through *vicāra*. This could be a long and strenuous course, with death intervening before results are obtained. Nevertheless, assurances are given in *śruti* that, if not in this life, eventually in some future life, the practice of *vicāra* will receive its reward.[184] This kind of inquiry is not necessary for the worshipper, for all he needs to know are the correct methods of worship. Once these have been communicated by his teacher or through the *śāstra*-s, he may begin to practise. His success will depend on his faithful practice.

While he is meditating, the meditator develops a sense of his identity with *brahman*, but this feeling ends when his practice ceases. For this reason, emphasis is placed on learning to make

meditation continuous. It is the willingness to persevere of the meditator that carries him through. Because of his need to concentrate on his efforts at meditation, he is often in a state of conflict, for the demands of his life in the world serve as a constant threat of distraction.

By contrast, the knowledge-seeker who practises *vicāra* depends on the self-revelation of *brahman* for the experience of enlightenment (*bodha*), not on his own will-power. (IX.74). The direct knowledge of *brahman* changes his understanding in a decisive and irrevocable way, for his total outlook is transformed. His sense of identity with *brahman* never leaves him and becomes so firm that he eventually can give up the restrictions of the disciplined life which led him to *jīvanmukti*.[185] Because of the certainty of his knowledge of the reality of *brahman* and the ultimate unreality of the world, he is not, like the meditator, torn between his spiritual practice and worldly duties. He is, therefore, able to conduct his wordly affairs effectively while not compromising his spiritual life.

For the worshipper who practises constantly, meditation on Absolute *brahman* can modulate into *samādhi*, where the meditator is so concentrated on his meditation that he becomes totally oblivious to what is outside him. Even at this advanced stage of meditation there is still an awareness of a distinction remaining between the meditator and the object of meditation. For this reason *samādhi* is termed '*savikalpa*.' Then, *samādhi* may deepen into a '*nirvikalpa*'

state, called *nirodha*, in which these boundaries between the mind of the meditator and the object of meditation fall away. In this deepest of meditations the knowledge 'I am *brahman*' arises and the meditator realizes *moksa*.[186] The practitioner of meditation is given the same promise as the inquirer into *brahman*, that his efforts will never go for nothing. If not now, eventually they will come to fruition and he will experience *moksa* at the time of death or in the world of Brahmā (IX.150).

In this way the seeming delusion of following the 'wrong' path is found to lead, by an indirect route, to the sought-for goal. By keeping intent on *brahman*, the meditator's mind is gradually transformed until he is fit for receiving *brahman*-knowledge. By leading to this knowledge the *samvādi bhrama* brings the meditator to the *jñāna mārga*. Understood correctly, then, the paths of inquiry and meditation are found to lead to the same goal (IX.123).



Figure 5.
Path of Knowledge according to Advaita Vedānta



Figure 6.
Path of *upāsanā* and *dhyāna*

Chapter 9

Nāṭakadīpa, The Lamp of the Theatre

9.1 *Sākṣin*, the witness-consciousness

Within this brief chapter Vidyāraṇya develops the concept of consciousness as *sākṣin*. Literally *sākṣin* means 'seeing with the eyes,' and refers to a witness who sees directly.

Sākṣin is the consciousness within the *jīva* which is witness to all the activities of the *antaḥkaraṇa* but which takes no part in them. To illustrate this point Vidyāraṇya draws an analogy between a theatrical performance and the inner mental activities of a *jīva*. If we think of the patron who sponsors the performance as the *ahaṅkāra* (ego), the dancer may be thought of as the *buddhi*, the musicians as the sense-organs, and the audience as the sense-objects. As the dance performance takes place, everyone participating in it--performers and audience alike--are bathed in the steady light which illuminates the scene from start to finish. Even if everyone were to leave the hall, the light would still shine on (X.14). In just such a way the light of *sākṣin*-consciousness illumines the *jīva*'s inner life without ceasing.

The *antaḥkaraṇa*, while being responsible for the *jīva*'s inner life, functions as well to cognize what is outside the *jīva*'s body. For Vidyāraṇya the *sākṣin* is that form of *cit* which makes manifest the triad of the doer, the action (*kriyā*) and the objects (X.9). The *sākṣin* itself performs no action, but by its illumination it unites the elements which make up the cognitive act--the cognizer, the act of

cognition and the objects of cognition--enabling the *jīva* to be aware of what it perceives.

Because of its role in the inner life of the *jīva*, the *sākṣin* is commonly confused with the *manas* and *buddhi*, through superimposition. The ceaseless activities of these two are thought to belong to the *sākṣin*, while in truth the *sākṣin* is detached from the *antahkarana* and differs from it in being forever unchanging (X.19).

It is not surprising that mistaken ideas of the *sākṣin* and *buddhi* are common, for the two are intimately related. Through the *buddhi* the *jīva* is actively engaged with the empirical world, incessantly being aroused to perceive, or to project its own creation onto the world. And yet, wherever *buddhi* is, there too is *sākṣin* as its witness. As Vidyāranya tells us, "Whatever form the intellect imagines, the supreme Self illumines it as its witness, remaining Itself beyond the grasp of speech and mind." (X.23). While witness-consciousness is part of everything in the world, at the same time it exists in another, greater dimension, for being identical with *brahman*, it can never be confined within the limits of the *jīva*'s mind or, indeed, of the world itself.

Vidyāranya has discussed this consciousness before in the Pañcadaśī, but under the name of *brahman*, *ātman*, and *kūtastha*, for *sākṣin* is identical with them. All are pure *cit*, forever unchanging and untouched by the created world, while at the same time being the substratum of the world and its creatures. The *jīva*, with its *cidābhāsa* as well as its substratum of *cit*, is affected by this

consciousness, for the *jīva* is capable of perceiving the self-luminous *cit* and of recognizing in it his own true nature. To know the *sākṣin* the *jīva* does not have to seek for it outside himself. When *buddhi* and its activities become completely quiescent, what remains is the *sākṣin*, shining in its self-revealing light (X.20). Then the *jīva* understands what it is to abide in his own nature.

The *sākṣin* is a concept which plays an important role in Dvaitic thought, being assigned the role, not only of witness, but of an "unmediated perceiver" who has a certain autonomy of perception. The *sākṣin* is able to perceive itself, *avidyā*, space, and time, and to recognize the effects of pleasure and pain on the self.[187] These qualities of the Dvaitic *sākṣin* differentiate it from the *sākṣin* as understood by Vidyāraṇya, who is emphatic on the subject of the *sākṣin*'s being non-active and a witness only. His notion of the *sākṣin* is close to that of the yogic notion of consciousness as *kaivalya*, totally separated and isolated from the world.[188]

In his discussion of *sākṣin*, Dasgupta refers to it as "perceiving consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*)" which "can comprehend both the *ajñāna* and the *jñāna* (knowledge) of things."[189] He distinguishes the *sākṣin* from pure consciousness by stating that "perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of *avidyā* (ignorance)."[190] In the notion of a consciousness which perceives there is an element of activity on the part of the *sākṣin* which Vidyāraṇya always takes pains to deny. For him the *sākṣin* never acts but only reveals, through the luminosity which is his own nature. In this final section on consciousness, Vidyāraṇya

emphasizes the role of consciousness as the witness to every aspect of the universe.

9.2 Conclusion

With the completion of this discussion of the five sections of the Pañcadaśī which focus on the topic of consciousness, this study of Vidyāranya's theory of consciousness comes to an end. In assessing Vidyāranya's contribution to Advaitic tradition, it could be said that his greatest success has been in his ability to present Advaita in a clear, forthright manner, so that his work has been regarded as a reliable, lucid guide to the tradition as Dasgupta, for example, acknowledges.[191] At the same time, we find in the Pañcadaśī elements of his theory of consciousness which show that he was not content simply to pass on traditional thought, but that he also made a contribution of some originality. The concept of the *cidābhāsa* was used by Sureśvara, but Vidyāranya employed the concept to show how the *jīva* could share in creation with *īśvara* and to account for the *jīva*'s role in cognition. We have recounted the disapproval shown by such scholars as Mahadevan at Vidyāranya's account of *īśvara* as an *ābhāsa* of *brahman* in *māyā*, for they claim that *īśvara* the creator is diminished in importance if he and his creation, the *jīva*, are both said to be appearances only. Vidyāranya's concern seems to be in maintaining very strictly the non-duality of *brahman*. He grants to *īśvara* special powers, such as being the inner controller of *māyā* and the ruler of the natural forces of the universe, which make it plain that the *jīva* cannot be his equal. At the same

time he maintains that when creation is dissolved in *pralaya*, *īśvara*, too, will return to his source in *brahman*.

As a teacher Vidyāranya sets himself the task of showing the student how to see with discrimination and clarity. Often his method is to begin with a commonplace truth and then to lead into deeper levels of understanding. It is a case of beginning with duality as a way of teaching non-duality, of leading from the unreal to the real. As he explains in VI.227 of the Pañcadaśī, although he may use the concept of the food sheath (*annamaya kośa*) to teach how to realize the *ātman*, in no way does that imply that the *annamaya kośa* is the *ātman*. Similarly, he may employ doctrines of other schools of thought to illustrate his teachings, but no one is to assume that he is adopting the views of these schools. One of the features of the Pañcadaśī is the broad use Vidyāranya makes of views held by others. Sometimes he is critical of them but often he is able to demonstrate how they may be understood in terms of Advaita. His category of the *saṃvādi bhrama* is illustrated by showing that meditation may be understood as an alternative method of achieving the same goals as Advaita. Vidyāranya's unswerving dedication to Advaita is matched by his certainty that under its broad umbrella, all other schools may be understood, if not incorporated.

Vidyāranya's understanding of the universe is based on a vision of *brahman* that is all-inclusive, extending to every aspect of life. He knows that the ordinary, unenlightened person, having been born into a condition of deep ignorance, accepts the world around him at

its face value as the only reality. The first lesson he must learn about the world, then, is that it is false, in that its reality is limited. But Vidyāranya's teaching does not end with rejection of the world, for he goes on to teach a deeper lesson. When it is fully realized that *brahman* is the one true reality, then the world may be seen as another aspect of *brahman*, and every object in the world may be experienced as another expression of *brahman*. In chapter eleven of the Pañcadaśī Vidyāranya develops the concept of the bliss of objects (*visayānanda*) which partially accounts for the life of blissful awareness which awaits the person who achieves liberation.

The ideal of the *jīvanmukti*, who lives out the rest of his life with direct awareness of *brahman* as the source of his life and of the universe, refutes the commonly held notion of Westerners that the holy man of India must be reclusive and world-denying. It is Vidyāranya's belief that the man of realization, having resolved all conflicts through his experience of *brahman*, is better equipped than any man of lesser insight to conduct his worldly affairs. With the realization of *brahman* there comes too a re-appraisal of *māyā*, for to the ignorant man, *māyā* is often seen as the deluder who through her magical effects hides *brahman* and re-inforces the *jīva*'s ignorance. After *moksa*, however, comes the understanding that although *māyā* may obscure *brahman*, it is only through the creations of *māyā*--*śruti*, the *guru*, the *jīva*'s *antahkarana*--that *brahman* may be known.

What Vidyāranya is teaching is how to look at the world with discrimination. The sage who learns this lesson is able to experience the bliss of *brahman* and the bliss that arises from worldly objects as part of a single vision, or as two languages expressing a single truth.[191]

It is Vidyāranya's ability to see the world not as a separate entity but as an appearance of *brahman* that links his thought with some of the most recent concerns of the philosophy of science. The example of the holographic paradigm has been described in the introduction. Vidyāranya's metaphysical concepts of *brahman* and the world as *cidābhāsa* deserve to be studied in relation to D. Bohm's idea of the Undivided Wholeness in a Flowing Movement of which the universe is said to be an insubstantial manifestation. As the Western scientific imagination reaches the limits of objectivity, its ideal for so many centuries, a new turning in the direction of subjectivity appears to be occurring. In the exploration of this topic, authors such as Vidyāranya will be fruitful sources of insight by virtue of their deeply introspective mapping of consciousness. Already there has been a movement within humanistic psychology to probe into consciousness on a level which goes beyond the personal ego. The result has been the transpersonal school of psychology. In the search for a metaphysical basis for such a psychology, Vidyāranya's work could prove to be of great value.

Appendix A

Index of Selected Sanskrit Terms

In this listing of Sanskrit terms which Vidyāraṇya employs when referring to consciousness and related concepts, the terms are grouped alphabetically according to the Sanskrit root from which they derive. The location of the terms within the Pañcadaśī text is given according to each śloka where they may be found.

Root *ci*

cit Chapter I: 10, 15, 48; Chapter III: 7, 40; Chapter IV.11; Chapter VI: 2, 4, 8, 18,23, 87(twice), 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 102, 105, 188(twice), 221, 242, 244, 250, 253, 256, 261, 262, 264; Chapter VII: 5, 8, 13, 89, 123, 215, 229; Chapter VIII: 4, 11(twice), 14, 51, 57, 62, 75; Chapter IX: 18, 19; Chapter X.9; Chapter XI: 60, 65, 72, 89; Chapter XII: 48, 58, 73, 76, 78, 83(twice); Chapter XIII: 15, 62(twice), 70, 78, 80, 91, 92, 93, 101, 102, 103, 104; Chapter XIV: 6, 7, 35; Chapter XV: 9, 10, 26, 27, 31.

citi Chapter VI: 33, 88, 89, 91, 100, 132, 253, 254(twice); Chapter VIII.48; Chapter XII: 73, 74; Chapter XV: 20, 21.

citta Chapter I.55; Chapter II.72; Chapter IV.28; Chapter VII:29, 121, 189, 208, 241; Chapter IX: 79, 91, 132, 137; Chapter XI: 43, 104, 111, 113(twice), 114, 115; Chapter XIV: 21, 25, 30.

cidābhāsa (See also *ābhāsa*, under root *bhā*) Chapter VI: 7, 9, 133, 153, 154, 156, 157, 187; Chapter VII: 12, 15, 29, 34, 37, 91, 194, 216, 217, 229, 230(twice); Chapter VIII: 3, 6, 7, 10, 18, 35.

Root *ci* (continued)

cetana Chapter III.40; Chapter IV.22; Chapter VI: 45, 46, 91, 189, 211; Chapter VIII.63: Chapter XI.91; Chapter XIII.92.

cetas Chapter I.54; Chapter XI: 68, 118: Chapter XIII.27.

caitanya Chapter III.5; Chapter V.2; Chapter VI: 7, 31, 64, 82, 95, 144, 153, 254, 289(twice); Chapter VII.21; Chapter VIII: 4, 10, 12, 14, 15, 22, 24, 50; Chapter IX.88; Chapter XII.73; Chapter XV.11.

chāyā Chapter III: 7, 40; Chapter IV.11; Chapter XIII.91.

Root *jñā*

jñāna Chapter III.37; Chapter IV: 14, 17, 24, 38, 39, 46; Chapter VI: 16, 75, 109, 111, 188, 191, 196, 200, 210, 244; Chapter VII: 20 (twice), 22, 23, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 55, 57, 66, 79, 145, 235(twice), 244, 246, 297(twice). Chapter VIII.6; Chapter IX: 15, 19(twice), 25, 31(twice), 39, 64, 97, 109, 110, 117, 118; Chapter XI: 10, 14, 15; Chapter XII: 81(twice), 83, 84; Chapter XIII.54(twice); Chapter XIV: 15, 64(twice); Chapter XV: 22(twice), 30.

jñānatva Chapter III.34; Chapter VIII.5.

prajñā Chapter IV.47; Chapter VII. 107; Chapter IX.43.

prajñāna Chapter V: 1, 2; Chapter VII.68; Chapter XI: 68, 70; Chapter XIII.63.

prājña Chapter I: 17, 24; Chapter XI: 76, 79.

vijñāna Chapter I: 63, 64; Chapter III.7; Chapter IV.46; Chapter VI: 69(twice), 70, 72, 73, 74, 77, 163, 172, 174, 212, 226; Chapter VII: 79. 198, 216; Chapter IX: 12, 52, 114, 122; Chapter XI: 15, 61, 62, 63, 69, 89; Chapter XIII: 54, 61.

Root *budh*

prabodha Chapter VII.290; Chapter XI.90.

prabodhana Chapter VII. 106; Chapter XIII.83.

bodha Chapter I: 5, 6(three times); Chapter III: 7, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21(twice), 22; Chapter IV: 50(twice), 51, 56(twice), 64; Chapter VI: 11, 95, 178(twice), 185, 271, 276, 279, 281(twice), 283, 284, 285, 288; Chapter VII: 16, 17, 19, 71, 76(twice), 78, 83, 84, 96, 97, 98, 164, 168, 179, 276, 277, 278(twice), 281, 282(twice), 283, 284, 286, 289; Chapter IX: 74(twice), 88, 101; Chapter XI.73; Chapter XII.63; Chapter XIII: 45, 46, 48, 55, 56, 60, 61.

Root *bhā*

ābhāsa (See also *cidābhāsa*, under root *ci*) Chapter VI: 8, 9, 11, 45, 46, 59, 60, 154, 155; Chapter VII: 3, 10, 11, 14(twice), 18, 91, 92, 196, 233, 238, 239, 251; Chapter VIII: 8, 13, 14, 16, 17(twice), 19, 26(three times), 27, 31, 32, 34, 48, 50, 52, 53, 60; Chapter IX.135.

Root *bhū*

anubhava Chapter VII.217; Chapter XI.60.

anubhūti Chapter III: 13, 34; Chapter VI: 28, 29, 30, 31, 56, 96, 125, 252, 254; Chapter VII.211; Chapter IX.155; Chapter XI: 28, 37, 38, 60, 89; Chapter XIII.70; Chapter XV.12.

Root *vid*

samvit Chapter I: 3, 4, 6, 7; Chapter VIII.11.

Appendix B

Glossary

ajada: not inanimate.

ajñāna: ignorance; equivalent to *avidyā*. See thesis chapter 5.1.

advaita: non-dual.

adhyāsa: superimposition.

anirvacanīya: indescribable; logically indefinable. Śaṅkara finds the world-appearance to be neither real nor unreal but *anirvacanīya*. See thesis chapter 5.1.

anubhava, *anubhūti*: experience, direct knowledge, perception. See thesis chapter 6.2.

antaryāmin: inner ruler. *Īśvara*, the first transfiguration of *brahman*, is the inner controller of the universe. See thesis chapter 5.3 and figure 2.

antahkarana: inner organ of the *jīva*, comprising *buddhi*, *manas*, *citta*, and *ahaṅkāra*. See figure 1.

annamaya kośa: food sheath; the outermost sheath of the *jīva*. See figure 2.

anyonyādhyāsa: mutual superimposition.

aparoksa: direct, immediate; as opposed to *paroksa*. *Aparoksa* knowledge of *brahman* constitutes *moksa*, according to Advaita Vedānta. See thesis chapter 6.5 and figure 4.

avasthāna: stage. For a comparison of the stages of the creation of a painting and the stages of *brahman*, see thesis chapter 5 and figure 2.

avacchinna: limited.

avaccheda-vāda: the theory of limitation by which *jīva* is regarded as *brahman* limited by *avidyā*. See thesis chapters 2 and 5.5.

avaccheda-vādin: one who subscribes to the theory of limitation.

avidyā: ignorance. See thesis chapter 5.1.

asaṅga: unattached, associationless.

asat: unreal; non-existence.

ahaṅkāra, *ahaṅkṛti*: egoity.

aham: ego, I-consciousness.

ahamvṛtti: mental modification having to do with egoity.

ākāśa: space; ether. The first of the elements which make up the universe. Used by Vidyāranya as an analogy for the *ātman*. See thesis chapter 5.5 and figure 3.

ācārya: teacher.

ātman: the inner Self of the *jīva* which is identical with *brahman*.

ānanda: bliss.

ānandamaya kośa: bliss sheath; the innermost sheath of the *jīva*. See thesis chapter 6.3 and figure 2.

ābhāsa: appearance; semblance; fallacious.

ābhāsa-vāda: theory of appearance by which the *jīva* is held to be an appearance of *brahman* in *māyā* or *avidyā*; a variant of *pratibimba-vāda*. See thesis chapters 2, 5.2, and 7.3.

āvaraṇa: obscuring; one of the functions of *māyā*. See thesis chapter 5.1.

āvṛtti: concealing, obscuring.

īśvara: the first *vivarta* of *brahman*; the creator of *jīva* and *jagat* through the power of *māyā*; *brahman* as the totality of the causal bodies of the universe. See thesis chapter 5 and figure 2.

upādhi: limitation; limiting adjunct.

upāsanā, upāsti: worship understood as focussing a current of thought on the object of worship; meditation. See thesis chapter 8.

indrajāla: magical; deceptive.

kāraṇa śarīra: causal body of the *jīva*. See thesis chapter 6.3 and figure 2.

karma: works; rituals.

kūṭastha: the immutable substratum of consciousness of the *jīva*. See thesis chapter 7.

kośa: sheath.

ghaṭākāśa: space limited by a pot. See thesis chapter 5.5 and figure 3.

guṇa: constituent; quality. *Prakṛti* is said to be constituted of three *guṇa*-s: *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*.

guru: teacher.

cit: pure consciousness.

citi: consciousness.

citta: mind.

citpratibimba: the reflection of pure consciousness which appears in the *buddhi* of the *jīva*, according to *pratibimba-vāda*. See especially thesis chapters 2, 5.2 and 7.3.

citpratibimbaka: reflection of pure consciousness in the *buddhi*.

citra: painting. See thesis chapter 5.

cidābhāsa: the appearance of pure consciousness which occurs in the *buddhi* of the *jīva*, according to *ābhāsa-vāda*. See thesis chapters 2, 5.2, and 7.3

cetana: animate.

cetas: consciousness, mind.

caitanya: consciousness

chāyā: shadow. The shadow of *cit* (pure consciousness) is discussed in thesis chapter 5.2

jagat: creation, the universe.

jāgrat: waking state. See figure 2.

jada: unconscious.

jijñāsu: seeker of *moksa*.

jīva: individual living being.

jīvatva: state of being a *jīva*, *jīva*-hood.

jīvanmukta: one who has attained release while living.

jīvanmukti: the attaining of release while still living.

jñāna: consciousness; knowledge; perception. See thesis chapter 6.6.

jñānin: knower.

tatastha laksana: secondary characteristic.

turīya: the fourth; transcendental state of consciousness equivalent to pure *cit*. See thesis chapter 6.3 and figure 2.

taijasa: *jīva* identified with the subtle body. See figure 2.

trpti: unrestricted bliss. See thesis chapter 6 and figure 4.

dīpa: lamp.

dhī: intellect, equivalent to *buddhi*.

dhyāna: meditation, seen by Vidyāranya as a means to *moksa* which is an alternative to the method of inquiry. See thesis chapter 8.

nātaka: theatre.

nāma: name.

nididhyāsana: repeated meditation.

nirodha: a state of intense concentration or meditation in which distinction between subject and object disappears.

nirguna: attributeless.

nirvikalpa: indeterminate.

paramātman, parātman: the highest Self.

paroksa: indirect, mediate, as opposed to *aparoksa*. *Paroksa* knowledge is one of the stages in the *jīva*'s search for *moksa*. See thesis chapter 6.5 and figure 4.

pāramārthika: relating to the highest truth; real.

purusa: spirit.

prakrti: the primary source material of the universe, equivalent of *pradhāna*.

prajñā: higher intuitive faculty; wisdom; consciousness.

prajñāna: consciousness.

pratibimba: reflection.

pratibimba-vāda: the theory of reflection which holds that the *jīva* is a reflection of *brahman* in *māyā* or *avidyā*. See thesis chapters 2, 5.2, and 7.3.

pradhāna: the primary source material of the universe, the equivalent of *prakrti*.

prabodha: knowledge.

pralaya: dissolution of *jagat*.

prājña: *jīva* identified with the causal body. See figure 2.

prātibhāsika: illusory.

prānamaya kośa: vital sheath of the *jīva*. See figure 2.

prārabdha karma: the effect of deeds performed in past lives which determine the *jīva*'s present body and which must come to fruition even though the *jīva* attains *mokṣa*. See thesis chapter 6.8.

phala: fruit. In cognition Vidyāraṇya terms the consciousness which results in direct knowledge *phala*-consciousness or resultant-consciousness. See thesis chapter 7.4.

bādha: sublation.

bimba: prototype of which *pratibimba* is the reflection.

buddhi: intellect. One of the functions of *antaḥkaraṇa*.

bodha: consciousness; knowledge. See thesis chapter 6.2 and 6.6.

brahman: the absolute; the supreme reality of Advaita Vedānta, being of the nature of *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*.

brahmā-loka: the world of Brahmā, a heavenly abode.

bhakti: devotion

bhāvarūpa: actual; being of a positive character.

bhāṣya: commentary.

bhrama: error

manana: pondering, reflecting on.

manas: mind, one of the functions of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

manomaya kośa: mind sheath of the *jīva*. See figure 2.

manovṛtti: mental modification.

mahākāśa: all-embracing *ākāśa*. See thesis chapter 5.5 and figure 3.

mahābhūta: gross element.

mahāvākya: great saying of the Upaniṣads which is capable of bringing about direct knowledge of *brahman*.

mānomaya: produced by the mind.

mārga: path, way.

māyā: indefinable principle belonging to *brahman* through whose power the universe is created. See thesis chapter 5.

mithyā: false; unreal.

mūlāvidyā: root-ignorance.

mṛnmaya: composed of matter.

meghākāśa: *ākāśa* in a cloud. See thesis chapter 5.5 and figure 3.

mokṣa: liberation, release.

moha: delusion.

rūpa: form.

yukti: logic, reasoning.

lakṣana: characteristic.

vāda: theory.

vāsanā: latent impression.

vikāra: changeable

vicāra: inquiry.

vikṣepa: projection; one of the functions of *māyā*. See thesis chapter 5.1.

vijñāna: intellect; knowledge. See thesis chapter 6.6.

vijñānamaya kośa: intellect sheath of the *jīva*. See figure 2.

vidyā: knowledge.

virāga: renunciation.

virāṭ: *vivarta* of *brahman* as the totality of the gross bodies of the universe. See figure 2.

vivarta: transfiguration.

viveka: discrimination.

viśva: *jīva* identified with the gross body. See figure 2.

viṣayānanda: the bliss of objects.

visaṃvādi bhrama: an error that does not lead to a goal. See thesis chapter 8.1.

vṛtti: modification.

vaiśvānara: *vivarta* of *brahman* as the totality of gross bodies of the universe; equivalent to *virāṭ*. See figure 2.

vyāvahārika: empirical.

śakti: power. *Māyā* is the *śakti* of *brahman*.

śarīra: body.

śāstra: works having authority.

śokamokṣa: freedom from grief; one of the results of attaining *mokṣa*. See figure 4.

śravaṇa: hearing; listening to *śruti* and pondering its truth.

śruti: revealed religious texts; sacred knowledge which has been heard and transmitted through tradition.

śloka: verse.

saṃnyāsin: renunciate.

saṃvādi bhrama: an error which achieves the desired goal through indirect means. See thesis chapter 8.1.

saṃvit: consciousness. See thesis chapter 6.2.

saṃsāra: the endless round of birth and death.

saṃkalpa: will.

saguṇa: with attributes.

sat: existence, reality.

satya: the real.

samādhi: state of deep concentration.

savikalpa: determinate.

sāksin: witness-consciousness. See thesis chapter 9.

sukha: bliss, pleasure; equivalent to *ānanda*.

susupti: deep sleep. See figure 2.

sūksma: subtle.

sūtrātman: *vivarta* of *brahman* as the totality of the sublte bodies of the universe; equivalent to *hiranyagarbha*. See figure 2.

sthiti-prajñā: firmly established in truth.

sthūla: gross.

svaccha: transparent.

svapna: dream. See figure 2.

svapnakalpita: imagined in dream.

sva-prākāśa: self-luminous.

svarūpa laksana: essential characteristic.

hiranyagarbha: *vivarta* of *brahman* as the totality of the subtle bodies of the universe; equivalent to *sūtrātman*. See figure 2.

Notes

Introduction

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[3]David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) ix.

[4]Bohm 11.

[5]Marilyn Ferguson, "Karl Pribram's Changing Reality" in The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes, ed. Ken Wilber (Boulder: Shambala, 1982) 18-19.

[6]S.K. Ramachandra Rao, Consciousness in Advaita (Bangalore: IBH Prakshana, 1979) 17.

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[7]T.M.P. Mahadevan, The Pañcadaśī of Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāranya. An Interpretive Exposition (Madras: University of Madras, 1979) xv.

[8]Mahadevan, Pañcadaśī Exposition xvii.

[9]Ramachandra Rao, Consciousness 45.

[10]S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T.R.Srivinas Ayyangar, eds. and trans., Jīvanmuktiviveka (Liberation in Life) of Vidyāranya (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1978) xv.

[11]Mādhava Āchārya, The Sarva-Darśana-Samgraha or Review of the Different Systems of Philosophy trans. E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough (Varanasi; Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1961) fnl;1.

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[16]Kane II.2:781.

[17]Majumdar et al. VI: 272.

[18]T.M.P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita with special reference to Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāranya (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1976) 4.

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[27]Printed Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series Vol. 11, Poona, 1889-90.

[28]Karl H. Potter, ed., Bibliography of Indian Philosophies (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970) 1:224 lists several additional works which he attributes to Vidyāraṇya, Mādhava, or Bhāratītīrtha. They are: Mahānārāyanopaniṣad-Dīpikābhāṣya, Nṛsimhottaratāpanīya-upaniṣad-Dīpikā, Nārāyanopaniṣad-Bhāṣya. Such a listing, however, is not supported by Raja or Thangaswami.

[29]Text used in this thesis is [Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya], Dṛg-Dṛśya-Vivēka. An Inquiry into the Nature of the 'Seer' and the 'Seen', trans. Swami Nikhilānanda, (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1955). DDV is not acknowledged by Thangaswami to be written by Mādhava or Vidyāraṇya. Its author may be Śaṅkara, Bhāratītīrtha or Vidyāraṇya, according to K. Kunjunni Raja, ed., New Catalogus Catalogorum (Madras: University of Madras, 1949-) VIII: 97. However, Mahadevan, Philosophy 225-26 discusses DDV as one of the works of Vidyāraṇya.

[30]Text used in this thesis is Jīvanmuktiviveka (Liberation in Life) of Vidyāraṇya, ed. and trans. S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T.R. Srinivasa Ayyangar (Adyar, Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1978).

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[35]Kane 779.

[36]Ramachandra Rao, Consciousness 31.

[37]VPS 550.

[38]Mahadevan, Philosophy 220.

[39]Mahadevan, Philosophy 219,221.

[40]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225.

[41]Sir Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 145.

[42]Śaṅkarācarya, Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, trans. Swami Ghambīrānanda, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977) 515.

[43]Monier-Williams 750.

[44] Miśra 268.

[45]Miśra 278.

[46]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225 qtd in Miśra 279.

[47]Miśra 278.

[48]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225-26.

[49]DDV *śloka* 34.

[50]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225.

[51]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225.

[52]DDV *śl.* 36,37.

[53]DDV *śl.* 33.

[54]PD VI 22,23.

[55]PD VIII 25.

[56]DDV *śl.* 32.

[57]VPS 458-59.

Chapter 3

[58]SDS, "Śāṅkaradarśanam," trans. Klaus K. Klostermaier, ts., 84.

[59]SDS, "Śāṅkaradarśanam," 82-83.

[60]SDS, "Śāṅkaradarśanam," 83.

[61]Herbert Herring, Reflections on Vedanta (Madras: The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1978) 10.

[62]BSB 14.

[63]BSB 467

[64]BSB 468

[65]Mahadevan, Pañcadaśī Exposition, 9.

[66]BSB 2.

[67]BSB 3.

[68]PD VI. 33.

[69]PD VI. 22.

[70]PD VI. 36.

[71]BSB 9.

[72]BSB 23.

[73]BSB 19.

[74]BSB 21.

[75]BSB 20.

[76]BSB 22-23.

[77]BSB 31.

[78]Mahadevan, Philosophy 58.

[79]PD VII. 70.

[80]BSB 43.

[81]Radhakrishnan, Principal Upanisads 283.

[82]BSB 15.

[83]Radhakrishnan, Principal Upanisads 283.

[84]Mahadevan, Philosophy 57.

[85]Mahadevan, Pañcadaśī Exposition 2.

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[87]PD VI. 54.

[88]BSB 813.

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[89]Bohm 4.

[90]Bohm 8.

[91]VPS 458-59.

[92]PD VII.90.

[93]PD VII.92-94.

[94]PD VIII.73.

[95]PD VI.60-85.

[96]PD VI.86.

[97]BSB I.1.12.

[98]PD VII.131.

[99]PD XI.128-30.

[100]PD XV.17-19.

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[101]PD VI. 1-14.

[102]Monier-Williams 811.

[103]Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II:565 fn1; Dasgupta I:469.

[104]Dasgupta I:470.

[105]Dasgupta I:438.

[106]Dasgupta I:435.

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[108]PD VI.130.

[109]PD II.54-57.

[110]PD VI.126.

[111]PD VI.141

[112]PD VI.147, 152.

[113]PD VI.150.

[114]PD VI.143.

[115]PD VI.136, 139.

[116]Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II:589.

[117]Klostermaier, Śāṅkaradarśanam 63.

[118]Monier-Williams 145.

[119]Coomaraswamy 142.

[120]Coomaraswamy 141.

[121]Coomaraswamy 144.

[122]PD VI.23; VIII.31; XV.5.

[123]PD VI.194-97.

[124]Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II:555.

[125]PD VI.213; VII.4, VIII.69.

[126]PD IV.17-22.

[127]PD IV.31.

[128]Dasgupta II:478.

[129]Radhakrishnan, Principal Upaniṣads 696.

[130]Radhakrishnan, Principal Upaniṣads 698.

[131]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225-26.

[132]Mahadevan, Philosophy 226.

[133]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225.

[134]Mahadevan, Philosophy 220-24.

[135]VPS I.cvii, p. 139. Quotations are from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.5.19, Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad 12 and Brahma-Sūtra III.2.18.

[136]VPS I.cviii, p.39.

[137]VPS I.cviii, p.39.

[138]PD VI.19, 22.

[139]VPS I.cviii, pp.139-40.

[140]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225.

[141]VPS I.cxi, p.141.

[142]PD VIII.32.

[143]PD VI.9.

[144]PD VI.212.

Chapter 6

[145]PD I.3-6.

[146]PD I.3,4,6,7.

[147]Examples of *bodha*: as waking state VI.185; as enlightenment VII.289; as individual consciousness VII.71; as the nature of ātman IX.101; as underlying sheaths III.22.

[148]Saksena 130.

[149]PDI. 33-42.

[150]Dasgupta I.460; Vedānta Paribhāsā 32.

[151]JMV 272.

[152]PD VII.33-37.

[153]PD VII.51-55.

[154]PD VII.63-70.

[155]PD VII.71-72.

[156]PD VII.75-78. *Bhāglaksanā* is also called *jahadajahallaksanā* or *bhāgatyāgalaksanā*. See Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories 251-52.

[157]PD VII.78,62.

[158]Hino 46.

[159]PD VII.97-108.

[160]JMV 179.

[161]JMV 211-17.

[162]JMV 186-87.

[163]JMV 237.

[164]JMV 306; PD VII.122.

[165]PD VII.163-70.

[166]PD VII.172-73.

[167]PD VII.216-19.

[168]PD VII.254-58.

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[169]PD VIII.65-67.

[170]PD VIII.60-62.

[171]PD VIII.29,35.

[172]Mayeda 37.

[173]Mayeda 37.

[174]Mahadevan, Philosophy 225.

[175]Miśra 279.

[176]Ramachandran 89.

[177]VPS I cxi, p.141.

[178]PD VIII.17-19.

[179]PD VII.90-92.

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[180]PD IX.54;131-32.

[181]PD IX.54-55;77-80.

[182]PD IX.62-71.

[183]PD IX.14-16.

[184]PD IX.131-34.

[185]PD IX.74-90.

[186]PD IX.126-28.

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[187]Raghavachar 24.

[188]Saksena 136.

[189]Dasgupta I:455.

[190]Dasgupta I:457.

[191]Dasgupta II:216.

[192]PD XI.128-30.

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