

Dep. Coll.
Thesis
B644

DEPOSITORY
COLLECTION
NOT TO BE
TAKEN

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANTOCCA
LIBRARY

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

A THESIS

Presented to the University of Manitoba
In partial fulfilment of the requirements
For the Degree of
Master of Arts
of the
University of Manitoba
by

A. A. Boone, B. A. '26.

September, 1930.

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	1
Chap. I - Science and the Problem of Immortality	8
Chap. II - Philosophy and the Pro- blem of Immortality	27
Chap. III - Ethics and the Problem of Immortality	60
Chap. IV - Immortality and Religion	82
Bibliography	104

A N A L Y S I S

INTRODUCTION:

	<u>Page</u>
1. Theme. Various views of immortality.	1
Writer's view.	2
2. Theme as vital issue:	
(a) Death universal	3
(b) Man vs. lower orders re death	4
Man's outlook	4
(c) Christianity and the idea of	
immortality	5
(d) The Reformation in Europe	5
(e) Influence of Darwin. Biology.	5
(f) The average person's attitude	
to the idea of immortality.	6

CHAP. I - SCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY:

I. Science as critical of the problem.

1. 19th Century science and the problem	8
2. Biology. Simple organisms reveal	
purposiveness; a fortiori, man.	9
3. Materialism: mind product of	
lower forces.	13
4. Psycho-physical parallelism.	13
5. Return to data and conclusion	
of biology.	15
6. Summary and conclusion.	16

II. Science as favourable to problem.

1. The Society for Psychic Research.	18
2. Alleged evidence of survival.	19
3. Objections to 2:	
(a) Telepathy	19
(b) Automatic writing	20
(c) Dream-consciousness	21
(d) Clairvoyance	22
(e) Triviality of messages	23
(f) Prophetic inspiration	23
4. Conclusion	25

CHAP. II - PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY:

The problem as dealt with by the most representative philosophers -

1. Plato: contribution in following dialogues,-	29
(a) Symposium	30
(b) Phaedrus	32
(c) Republic	32
(d) Phaedo	33
(e) Timaeus	35
2. Aristotle	36
3. St. Thomas Aquinas	36
4. Descartes.	42
5. Spinoza	46
6. Leibniz	47
7. Kant	50
8. Hegel	52
9. Bradley and Bosanquet	53
10. Conclusion: Metaphysical proof, either way, fails. Appeal to ethics.	59

CHAP. III - ETHICS AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY:

1. Possibility of proof; proof defined. Ethical postulate of personal immortality.	60 62
2. What the postulate does.	63
3. Ethical facts which lead to postulate: (a) Claims of justice; (b) Incompleteness of ethical life.	64 68
4. Consideration of (a) and (b)	70
5. Conjunction of (a) and (b) effected by postulate of immortality.	72
6. Objections: (a) Charge of 'other-worldliness' (b) Transcendent world merely ideal of this world. (c) Moral argument too prominent. (d) The creator (producer) of values lives in his work, hence in the race.	72 73 74
7. Difficulty of finding final form for moral ideal. Religion effects final form.	75 78
8. Conclusion.	80

Analysis (Cont'd)
(c)

Page

CHAP. IV - IMMORTALITY AND RELIGION:

1. Postulate of immortality cannot stand alone. Faith.	82
2. Definition of faith.	83
3. Divine transcendence. Subject and object; fellowship	84
4. Idea of divine transcendence in	
(a) simplest form	84
(b) highest form	85
5. Faith looks to transcendent God for assurance of human destiny in a transcendent world	85
6. Thus relation between ideas of God and immortality vital. This is illustrated	
(a) in pantheism	86
(b) in pluralism	86
(c) in theism	87
7. Theism alone assures personal immortality	87
8. Two aspects of eschatological problem: individual and collective. Their synthesis. These aspects illustrated	
(a) in Judaism	88-91
(b) in Christianity	91-96
9. Nearer determination of Christianity's doctrine of immortality; Redemption and reconciliation	97
10. Hence unique value of human personality	97-98
11. Religion completes ethical argument	99
12. Summary and conclusion	102

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

INTRODUCTION.

THEME:

The idea of immortality, in some form, has been entertained by man, apparently, from the earliest times. Doubtless primitive man's idea of an after-life was crude; and we are in constant danger of reading into his notion a meaning which it did not hold. For the purpose of this thesis, however, we are not mainly interested in what the earliest men thought about death and the possibility of another life, but in stating clearly what we ourselves understand by the immortality of the human soul. To make our position clear, we propose to introduce several ideas of immortality, indicating our acceptance or rejection, with our reasons in each case.

There is, first, the idea of immortality as the shadowy life of the human individual after death. This existence is a ghost-like survival of the "dead" in the place of Hades, or Sheol. Such a condition is not life. The ghost in this case is not a real self; it is not spiritual as we understand such. Taken altogether, the life indicated is mere survival, and is inferior to that of earth.

Another type of immortality was taught by the Orphic Mysteries, namely, mystic union of the human soul with God. This union was the entering of the initiate into the immortal life of the deity. The Eleusinian Mysteries (which were related to the Orphic) promised a happy immortality to all who celebrated the mystery of Demeter and Kore. The unconsecrated were excluded. Here we have an immortality based

not upon the character of the human soul but upon obedience to a ritual. This is quite inadequate.

The Persian idea of human immortality contained the principle of ethical retribution in a world to come. The righteous were to be rewarded, the evil, punished. This ethical principle represents an advance in the cultural idea of immortality, showing, as it does, the development of the idea of human personality, and the consequent principle of individual responsibility. The main criticism of the Persian conception is that it was founded upon a dualism, the individual soul choosing either good (i.e. Ahura Mazda), or evil (i.e. Ahriman). We cannot conclude to a dualism at the heart of things. Absolute opposites are a contradiction in terms. Further, the Persian idea of immortality points out that salvation or damnation, as the case may be, is for eternity. We reject this phase also.

The Christian idea of human immortality, which, substantially, we accept, is thoroughly ethical. As we shall endeavor to show ⁽¹⁾ this idea is founded upon the character of God, and upon man's fellowship with Him. The purpose of the immortality of the soul is to secure man's reconciliation with God, which latter is the purpose of redemption.

When we speak, then, of immortality, or survival, in the following pages, we mean not the mere continuity of the human soul elsewhere, but the preservation, beyond physical dissolution, of the human soul or self-conscious principle

(1) v. Last Chapter.

which is the basis of rational thought and action, and in those activities which are germane to its nature as soul.

In the following chapters we shall endeavour to develop this idea of qualitative (as against a mere quantitative) immortality. Before proceeding to the discussion proper, we will pause a moment to consider, and endeavour to point out, the vital nature of the problem.

One of the age-long problems has been the earnest attempt to establish the reality of an existence after death. Death is universal. We are accustomed to refer to this dissolution of the body as an evil. Yet, if it be an evil, it is a serious fault, because it is undoubtedly deeply rooted in the constitution of the world. Some, on the other hand, have spoken of it as an ultimate good. Can death, looked at from any angle, be, in the long run, a good? Good is relative; then, good for whom? for what? We indicate these questions to show what is the intimate personal nature and the universality of the problem.

"The prince and the peasant,
The renowned and the obscure
Travel alike the road which leads to the grave."

To the lower orders of organic life, death would appear to present no problem. This may be because all their desires and appetites are supplied and satisfied here. Death can constitute no problem when the creature is satisfied, contented. But, given discontent, and discontent accentuated by an outlook beyond the present sphere, and we have death as a problem. Only man appears to have an outlook beyond the actual, present life, while the lower orders (all, that is,

inferior to man), fit into the natural scheme of things, satisfied and not fearing or contemplating death. Death, however, disturbs man; and because man is reflective, the mystery of death takes sombre form before him. It enters into his calculations, and he must come to some kind of conclusion about it. This conclusion will determine whether his meditation henceforth shall be about life or death;⁽¹⁾ but he will always be aware that, although he use as his maxim "memento vivere" instead of the older "memento mori", these two mottoes are but the negative (or pessimistic) and the positive (optimistic) phases of the original question, death. Man transcends the life of instinct; he conceives ends, forms ideals and strives to attain, realise them. Death defeats the ends of instinct, but it seems, also, to inhibit those higher ends, thwart those ideals. It assumes the character of an interrogation: "Can man escape the doom incident to the natural order? Can man escape annihilation? Can he claim exemption from the forces which kill the plant and the animal? Is man a product of and bound by the natural order?" These are obstinate questions.

We have been speaking in general terms. We must be aware, however, that individuals have not, everywhere and at all times, precisely the same feelings and thoughts on this great subject. The idea of a future life has fluctuated greatly in the course of human history; it has meant more for some races and individuals than for others. There have existed religions devoid of this belief; but since the com-

(1) Spinoza: Ethics, IV, 67.

ing of Christianity, belief in immortality has been an essential element in the life of Western peoples. "Because they believed the Roman Stranger could reveal the mystery of the after-life, our Saxon fathers accepted Christianity." (B. H. Streeter in vol. on 'Immortality', introd. p. vii.) But amongst the Western nations of the modern world there is a temper and outlook regarding religion in general, and the problem of immortality in particular, which stands in sharp contrast to the attitude of the middle ages towards the same matters. With the Reformation there came a revolution in religious thought and life. The authority of the Church in matters of faith and conduct - an authority hitherto inviolable - was attacked and undermined; and it was in the consequent freer intellectual atmosphere that both science and philosophy found opportunity of development. Men asked - took leave to question; doubt no longer hid her face, but was encouraged to reveal herself. The faith of the fathers was submitted to criticism, and upon the result of this scrutiny it was either rejected or accepted "*mutatis mutandis*". Thus it was inevitable that the idea and hope of immortality should no longer receive the unhesitating acceptance which had been accorded the doctrine in earlier times. Men now perceived difficulties where their fathers had seen none.

The first great modern event in the sphere of thought came in the nineteenth century, - the enunciation of the Darwinian hypothesis, the principle of evolution. Its adoption meant the dissolution of the sharp division between organic types in nature, and between men and the animal world;

the mutability of species. The idea of a gradual development had come to stay and to have far-reaching effects in the domain of science. Biology was born, and with it the kindred sciences. Man was now regarded as the culmination of the developmental process; he was nevertheless looked upon as belonging within the natural order. This was the classification of man in virtue of his status qua animal; his inward and spiritual nature was ignored. Thus, religious faith, or hope, in the destiny of man was confronted by radical doubt.

There had been a day when men took a measure of comfort in, and assurance from, what was called man's high place in the universe, and the legitimacy of his hope in immortality as supported by religious truth. But the historical criticism of our sacred literature has weakened that comfort and assurance when it was based upon a mere literal interpretation of the text of scripture. For example, we can not cite as specific proof of human immortality the resurrection of Jesus.⁽¹⁾ The sceptical are unmoved by such an argument.

It may be said by some that the great mass of men are not troubled by the doubts of the few, that there is little evidence of a general abandonment of the hope of immortality on the part of the people at large. This, however, cannot be taken as meaning that the doctrine occupies an active place in the minds of ordinary people - an issue which deeply and consciously affects life and conduct. Does the belief in immortality directly and intimately affect their daily

(1) F.C.S. Schiller: "Riddles of the Sphinx", 2nd ed. p. 173.

lives? We do not think so. The majority of people accept the idea of immortality in what seems to be a passive way; they do not strive to give "good reasons for as much as they are persuaded to believe"; nor are they consciously influenced by the doctrine. The "struggle for existence" inhibits many an activity of reflective thought, many an enthusiasm, in the lives of ordinary men. "The world is too much with us",⁽¹⁾ said one who had penetrated many a depth of the human soul, - his own, - who had seen with the "inward eye" what it is not given to many to look upon. Yet, although the idea and the hope of immortality may not fill the conscious foreground of the ordinary mind, it may form a stable background, which may quietly and steadily influence the outlook. We believe that there must be some relation between the doctrine and human life, because we find that no doctrine persists after it has ceased to occupy the minds of men. A real faith in immortality will maintain itself only if the doctrine stands in vital relation to human life. This vital relationship must be able to meet the doubts incident to the doctrine as a working theory for human life and conduct. The voice of science has often sponsored these doubts; she has many converts. Let us examine her evidence.

(1) Wordsworth: Sonnet, "The World is Too Much with Us."

CHAPTER I.

SCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

The contribution of science to our problem begins to take definite form in the course of the nineteenth century. That century was an era of science. The natural sciences could boast of a number of notable achievements; and as a result of their endeavours the lot of man was improved. These sciences, in the pursuit of their investigations, frequently came into contact with settled opinions, prejudices often held by, and sheltered under, the aegis of organised religion. Here was an unloved task - at least so some would call it - to undertake the dissipation of ancient prejudice. Yet science, committed to the investigation of truth in her own realm, was bound to reveal what truth she from time to time discovered, whether that revelation disturbed the religious atmosphere or not. Science had no vested interests in the pursuit of truth, did not attempt to secure a 'corner' in truth, but believed it to be a thing of value to men and to be brought to them. Science was committed to a great and noble task. We propose to study, briefly, her contribution - from her own sphere of thought - to the problem of immortality.

It was about the middle of the nineteenth century when the powerful wave of materialism swept over Western Europe. Many came within the sweep of that wave, who willingly trusted themselves to it, who ventured upon it "like little wanton boys that swim on bladders . . . but far beyond their depth." There was one fundamental claim which is of profound interest for our problem. It was affirmed that matter was not merely

a condition of mind, but that in matter lay potential mind. The answer of the opponents of materialism is to be found in the succeeding thought of the 19th and 20th centuries; and we may reflect that thought by affirming that the intervening years have not seen a substantiation of the claim in question. Materialism as a creed has not died, but it has lost prestige; its main title to notice is as represented by some more or less modified forms. There is a considerable faith in the sciences of nature, because, primarily, they claim to use accurate and verifiable means towards the discovery of truth. Their results are therefore claimed to be both accurate and able to be proved. On the other hand, speculative thought seems to move about in deep water where, as the old Scots woman remarked, we have "nae groun", but "juist gae soomin' aboot." Thus, it was expected that the natural sciences might be able to throw some light upon the question of the origin and destiny of man. What has science to tell us about the problem of immortality? Can it furnish evidence to affirm or to deny human survival after death? Can science prove that human life after death is impossible?

We shall begin by a brief examination of the evidence furnished by biology.

This science deals with living forms, from the simplest to the most complex. Among the former, natural death is not found. The unicellular organisms have, apparently, never ceased to live as individuals⁽¹⁾ - if we may employ that term to denote separate bodies in this class.

(1) Newman Smyth: "The Place of Death in Evolution", p. 17.

They live; and they reproduce by a process called "fission".⁽¹⁾ That is, periodically the organism reaches a state of maturity during which it throws off a portion of its body, or in other words, divides itself into two portions. The new portion, like the immediate "parent", possesses the same principle of development and fission. Now, if by immortality we meant simply the absence of death, we should be satisfied to conclude our search and problem here. But immortality is not merely the absence of death, as here shown. It is not an indefinite continuity of rudimentary physical life; it is the survival of a true individual. We must look farther afield.

Biology has studied evolution. It has observed that life is represented by a hierarchy of forms, orders. It perceives that there is a continuous development within the extraordinary range of that hierarchy - from lowest to highest, from the simple to the most complex. But the biologist asks - What is the principle which lies back of that development? Is it a vital or a mechanical principle? He tells us that the simplest individual organisms must react to stimuli in ways which tend to conserve life - theirs. To this end they must, and do, appropriate from their environment only those elements which they need in order to live. Incidentally they avoid all other elements which are harmful to them. In pointing out these scientific data, biologists are aware they are arguing - consciously or unconsciously - that the movements described are

(1) Newman Smyth: "The Place of Death in Evolution", p. 18.

purposive; because the response of the organism in every case means appropriation or avoidance, never misappropriation. If then the movements are purposive, no mechanistic theory can account for them. This is an example of purpose upon the lowest level, but it is purpose nevertheless. A mechanical theory has no room for purpose; a vitalistic theory has. Therefore, upon the vitalistic theory alone can the fundamental selective movements of the simple, unicellular forms be explained. ⁽¹⁾ Then, a fortiori, complex forms exhibit purpose. As organisms develop outwardly, there is a corresponding inward development. The needs of the physical change, become more complicated; and the needs of the psychical alter correspondingly. Sentient life emerges into conscious existence, and the latter form finds its highest development in man. Is man the last step in the process of evolution of living forms? Some unhesitatingly affirm that he is, and they add: Therefore, man is heir to a larger destiny than that of his humbler fellow-creatures. It is argued that man transcends nature, that he is rational; hence, that he must be superior to the (natural) doom of death. ⁽²⁾ In criticism of this rather dogmatic view we need say little. We admit that man enjoys an honoured place in nature; that, because he is a rational soul he is entitled

(1) J. A. Thomson, "Bible of Nature", p. 100.
(We have been apprised of the fact that there is by no means a consensus among biologists as to the alleged fact of purpose, here stressed. We have, nevertheless, felt a degree of confidence in referring to Prof. Thomson.

(2) of. Tennyson: "In Memoriam", LVI.

to, and does, live on a plane which is higher than that of instinct-governed creatures; and that he can, and does, sublimate, re-interpret, control his instincts. But, having made these concessions, must we perforce conclude that these activities automatically prove that man is immortal? No; all that the evidence justifies us in concluding is, to a probability of survival. We believe that the dogmatic view, above, is not sound inasmuch as there is more in the conclusion which it draws (immortality) than is contained in the premises (man).

There are scientists who have affirmed the immortality of the soul; but they have made the affirmation on grounds other than scientific. Their claim is that the soul (or spiritual influx) came into man at the rational stage, and that by virtue of this addition, survival of death was assured. (It was upon this point that arose the radical difference in the respective outlook, of Darwin and Wallace, the latter contending for man as a special case in the natural system.) The main difficulty in reasoning of this kind is that it is not strictly scientific. The hypothesis may or may not be true, but it is not verifiable. Nor do we think that such a theory is, after all, necessary to explain the facts of evolution. Here the scientists have become metaphysicians, and did we follow them our pursuit would lead us into another field. The phenomena of human development afford us no final argument that man is immortal, and that he will preserve his own personality post mortem. All that we can say, then, is that man appears to be the culmination of a long evolutionary process, and that his appearance suggests that he is a centre of value for whom there may be reserved an after-life.

So far we have seen that science can give no positive proof that man is immortal. There are, however, some scientific theories which, if true, would preclude any hope of such survival. One theory states that the mind of man is the product of lower forces, or matter. Thus mind is dependent upon body, thought becomes a mere function of the brain.⁽¹⁾

Hence the dissolution of the body of which the brain is a part means the destruction of the mind. The theory dispenses with soul as an independent, spiritual entity in the body; that what we see is merely a changing series of mental phenomena which are indissolubly linked to certain brain processes. Thought is, then, a movement in the brain. We refute this teaching; it is inconsistent. The radical materialist holds that matter produces mind. He professes to explain mind by setting out from a material basis which is intelligible only in terms of mind. In this way he assumes what he pretends to deduce. Materialism is thus involved in a vicious circle. It is a hopeless task to try to derive mind from something other than itself. This point is made by McTaggart.⁽²⁾

"Men of ability have maintained that what I call matter is nothing but my thoughts and sensations, and, at the same time, that my thoughts and sensations are nothing but an activity of my brain, which being matter, will itself be thoughts and sensations!" This leads us to the consideration of a more plausible theory.

Psycho-physical parallelism affirms that there is

(1) Streeter: "Immortality", p. 22.

(2) Human Immortality and Pre-Existence, p. 51.

a close correspondence between mind-process and brain-process. It is now granted that matter does not produce mind; but it is claimed that neither does mind produce matter. The theory states that the mental and the bodily states run parallel, each mental fact having a correlated brain-process. The mind or soul is regarded as an epiphenomenon. This theory avoids the gross materialism of the former; but it fails to give the mind any supremacy over man's experiences. The mind has no spontaneity; it is not active on its own account; it has no vital influence upon the series of events, because it is not a unifying principle, a real self. The mind is merely a complementary factor, the body being its correlate. Such a theory cannot face the facts of experience. We conclude, therefore, that an argument against immortality which is based upon psycho-physical parallelism as a final truth is invalid.

It may be objected that our criticism takes no account of the fact that, if the brain does not function properly, the activity of the mind is thereby affected. (2) A lesion in the brain, the effect of drugs, or an insufficient blood supply,- any one of these ills will produce defective functioning of the brain centres, with a corresponding defect in the mental processes. We do not deny these facts; we concede the general correlation of cerebral and mental processes. But when this working view is converted into an absolute metaphysical state-

(1) Spinoza: "The Ethics", Part II, Prop. VII.

Leibniz: "The Monadology", in Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 199 ff.

(2) Streeter: op. cit, pp. 25-28.

ment, we object.

There is a further objection to our criticism.

We are reminded that, in the series of animal forms, including man, the brain structure in every case corresponds to the degree of intelligence. That is, as we find increasing intelligence we find, also, increased size and organisation of the accompanying brain structure. Hence, by comparison, we observe the marked difference between the brain of men and the cerebral structures of the other mammals. We have, again, a body of facts which we do not refute, but accept. But we suggest that care should be taken in the interpretation of these facts. The whole argument assumes the priority and independence of matter. This is equivalent to affirming that structure determines function. On the contrary, we claim that the developing mind fashions for itself its immediate instrument, the brain, making it subject to growth as the mind is subject to development.⁽¹⁾

In fine, we contend that the theory of psycho-physical parallelism is guilty of a dualism of mind-matter. It sets the one over against the other. How do we know that mind and matter are absolutely, and not relatively, different?

Let us go back for a moment to the facts of biology. We must ask ourselves whether these facts oblige us to postulate a unifying principle in organic life. If not, then the plea for the survival of the soul not only can have no weight, but must become meaningless. The main point at issue here has already been tentatively introduced: Can the facts of

(1) cf. Coe: Psych. of Relig. Ch. II.

organic life be explained by the mechanical theory? It remains to conclude the argument. The behaviour of the amoeba, a unicellular organism, is not intelligible as merely mechanical responses, or pure reflexes. Its movements express purpose. This purposiveness argues concerted movement. Concerted movement implies a central, unifying principle. The amoeba, we conclude, acts as a whole, self-regulating from within, and all in the interest of self-preservation. It is evident, therefore, that we must dispense with the mechanistic theory in this connection.

If we carry this immanent principle of unity to its obvious conclusion, we see it in more striking evidence in the higher planes, in those of conscious experience. Thus, man appears to himself as a unity. He is aware of his identity throughout his experiences. This unity implies a unifying principle in him; we call that principle the human soul.

Our discussion, so far, entitles us to conclude that an organism is never an automaton. It is a teleological unity whose simplest reactions have a purposive meaning. This organising principle at every level of life is the condition of development. It is not, itself, created by the material which it organises and vitalises and uses as its instrument.

It may be complained that our argument has not proved anything directly in re the immortality of the soul. To this we reply that we have felt it to be our first duty to clear the way for such a doctrine by showing that the phenomena of life demand a central unifying principle which is unique and not the product of material forces. Thus far we have kept within the limits of the evidence. But the data will bear still

further interpretation. We believe that this principle of unity, when it reaches its highest development in man, has a reality per se, and does not perish with the material body. It will be retorted that, here we go beyond the evidence. We admit that, on the face of it, we seem to be introducing a conclusion to which the evidence does not point; but when we thoroughly weigh and consider the premises, we can at least aver,-

- (1) That our conclusion is not incompatible with the evidence;
- (2) That a true interpretation of the evidence establishes a strong presumption in favour of human immortality. This, however, is taking us too far ahead.

Let us revise the evidence. We have concluded to the existence of a reality which transcends mechanical explanation - a reality with which the natural sciences have nothing to do. If, on other grounds, we are led to postulate the immortality of the soul, biology, physiology, and the natural sciences in general are not in a position to say that it is impossible. So far as these sciences are concerned, the issue is an open one.

We have very briefly surveyed the case of science as critical of the doctrine of immortality. The most that we have been able to derive from the evidence was:

- (1) That mind or soul is distinct from matter.
- (2) That mind or soul is a unifying principle which dominates the body and its functions.

We shall now evaluate certain evidence which suggests that the mind can function without using the recognised channels of bodily sense. In order to make this evaluation

we shall examine briefly the evidence contained in the transactions of the Society for Psychical Research.

The S. P. R. (as we shall term the Society aforesaid) is deeply interested in the procurement of scientific evidence relating to the immortality of the soul. The methods invariably adopted by the S. P. R. are thoroughly scientific. It is not a spiritualistic institution, nor has it any official connection with what is called, variously, spiritualism or spiritism. The S. P. R. is a scientific organisation, interested in the problem of human survival of death. It is not a religious cult. The membership of the Society is eloquent testimony to the honourable standing which this scientific body enjoys. Its investigations and experiments have been many and varied, and in all, conducted from a purely scientific standpoint. With reference to the S. P. R.'s own evaluation of the evidence, there are widely divergent opinions. The opinion of the Society itself may be said to lie between those of the radical and the conservative camps. So far as the so-called evidence of spiritualism is concerned, the S. P. R. has made no official final statement, except in a very guarded manner. The Society points out two main considerations which must be held in mind:-

- (1) Many mediums have been proved to be consciously or unconsciously unreliable.
- (2) In cases where the chance of fraudulent communication has been reduced to a minimum, the Society's most thoughtful members admit that there is evidence, either (a) of telepathic communication between the minds of living persons (and this to an unusual degree); or, (b), of "control"

by a disembodied spirit.

This "either - or" defines the limit of our discussion.

Let us now turn to the alleged evidence of survival founded upon "verbal communications from disembodied spirits." Spiritualism contends that the evidence proves real communication from the sources alleged, that, consequently, the problem of human immortality is affirmatively solved. We deny that the evidence establishes this conclusion. In our survey of the evidence we shall, from time to time, have recourse to telepathy (that is, non-sensuous transference of thought between one mind and another), as a satisfactory interpretation and explanation of the facts. Indeed, we affirm, at this stage, that telepathy actually explains most of the evidence - and may explain it all. Until the mind shall have been discovered wholly as to its powers, apparent and latent, together with the range of these powers, we cannot set limits to this activity which we call telepathic communication. (1)

Sir Oliver Lodge admits "that the possibility of what may be called normal telepathy, or unconscious mind-reading, from survivors raises hesitation about accepting messages as irrefragable evidence of persistent personal existence." (2)

In spite of this statement, however, there are occasions when the telepathic explanation seems, on the fact of it, insufficient. What may be regarded as our best illustration of this is the

(1) Barrett: *Psychical Research*, p. 230.

(2) Raymond, p. 346.
v. also the same author's "The Survival of Man," p. 330.

phenomenon of "cross-reference". Two (or more) mediums, living in different places, write messages automatically while in the trance condition. These messages, separately, are meaningless, but brought together are found to fit in a remarkable way, each message supplemented by - the complement of - the other. (1) Great pains are taken to prevent fraud. The conclusion is then reached that the evidence proves a supernatural "control." It is argued that only one mind could be the source of the message which is thus made to appear fragmentarily, because, if the fragments had several sources the portions would lack coherency. To this point we assent. It is further contended that this single source is that of a discarnate spirit. We disagree. This conclusion is an appeal to the unknown before all appeals to the known have been exhausted. We suggest that an appeal be made to a living - incarnate - source. The hypothesis of telepathy from the dead is a hazard which the evidence does not justify. On the contrary, an appeal to an incarnate source is farther from such hazard and nearer to scientific method. But, we will not dogmatise upon the issue. We do not affirm that the source indicated in the spiritualistic conclusion is not discarnate: we merely aver that a discarnate source is not indicated and proved by the evidence.

A second objection to the spiritualistic hypothesis might be incorporated in the first. It concerns what is valled automatic writing. The theory affirms that the medium is in the

(1) Lodge: "The Survival of Man", p. 329.

control of a discarnate spirit, at whose instance the writing is effected. (1)

The nature of the source - ab extra the medium - renders the medium not only irresponsible but invariably precludes the medium's awareness of the message in transitu. The automatic writer acts as an agent whose principal is a power in the discarnate spirit-world. An obvious criticism of all automatic writing is that the messages thus "received" betray their real origin as in the mundane environment, - in particular, in the environment which is personal to the medium. We are reminded at this point that the Hebrew prophet, for example, neither acted for himself nor received communications (revelations) which were intelligible apart from his own environment. We concede this point, but we submit that the spiritualist would not use such an argument to support his own case. He claims:

- (1) That communications are received by automatic writing;
- (2) That such communications proceed from a discarnate source (that is, they are 'post mortem' messages); and
- (3) That these messages are in character supra-mundane, therefore revealing only such an environment.

The matter of environment recurs in connection with the "dream consciousness". The dream consciousness of the medium has an effect upon the character of the communications which are passed through the medium. The medium self-induces a state of hypnosis. This kind of sleep is not like normal sleep, but a condition of greatly heightened attention. In this state,

(1) Barrett: *Psychical Research*, p. 245.

the mind is withdrawn from voluntary trains of thought and from sensation. The medium is not sensitive to thoughts about, or from, the person with whom she is in 'rapport' and from whom she desires communications.⁽¹⁾ This point the spiritualist stresses. But he overlooks another point, - that the trance state opens the medium's mind to all manner of messages which bear upon the person (control) sought. The mind of the medium thus becomes a quasi clearing-house for communications; a post office, each letter colored by the personality of the sender, and, in this case, still more by that of the receiver (medium). No message has yet been received which was not so affected by the dream-consciousness of the medium (in the hypnoidal state) as to render the theory of a supernatural source ~~high~~ highly improbable.

A fourth objection to the spiritualistic hypothesis also falls within the sphere of hypnosis. This is the phenomenon of clairvoyance or second sight. The Hebrew prophet, Samuel, was a clairvoyant, a seer, as well as a "man of God". His power, men believed, was a special gift from God. Such "holy men" are supposed to reveal the whereabouts of lost articles, are believed to be able to see into closed chambers. They possess an "inward eye". Samuel found the lost asses of Saul, apparently by the exercise of this mysterious power of clairvoyance. In our own day, we are told, persons have been found with this power. There are not many recorded cases, but even though few, the evidence therein seems to indicate the possession by

(1) Streeter: "Immortality", p. 262.

the human mind of a power which appears to have no normal function in this life. It is argued that this power is highly developed in a few, but that it is latent in the majority of people. One writer submits that since this activity is not normal to this world, it therefore points to an after-life wherein it will function naturally. ⁽¹⁾ Be this as it may - though we prefer a conservative attitude towards such an earnest after immortality - the fact remains, that clairvoyance does offer convincing explanation of many mediumistic transactions with "spiritual controls".

Our next objection concerns the trivial nature of the great majority of the messages. It is not charged here that the messages are mostly naive, merely, but that they are flippant. Even although we granted the theory of the discarnate controls, we should have to pause before this disturbing fact - flippant communications. Are we to believe that people who, for the greater part, were unimpeachable here, became, in the other world, subject to censure? We learn that spiritualists themselves feel some disappointment about all communications, because those which are unverifiable are generally feeble, while those which, apparently, are verified, are flippant. ⁽²⁾ Surely this testimony does not improve the case for the spiritualist: it is a damaging subscription.

The last objection which we make here concerns the general claim of "verbal communication from discarnate

(1) Hudson: "The Scientific Demonstration of a Future Life."

(2) Streeter: op. cit. p. 270.

(1)
"spirits", or simply, supernatural inspiration. The spiritualistic hypothesis is founded upon a misapprehension of the real nature of divine inspiration. The spiritualistic attitude assumes that God speaks through His prophet, using his mind simply as a receptacle and a channel by which to communicate or reveal the Divine Will. By this theory the prophet is a mere instrument, a means. If we regard him as an agent, it must be as an agent divested of any responsibility, and deprived of power per se. This view, however, is wrong; and the facts prove that it is wrong. The Hebrew prophet (whom we shall use as an example) possessed an outstanding personality. He was a man of unusual personal gifts, mental, moral, spiritual, which constituted his title to the prophetic calling. He was not an ordinary man; he was a leader. Can a mere instrument be a leader of men? an interpreter of God? Can a leader of men and an interpreter of God be made into a mere thoroughfare to the end that he lead the former and interpret the latter? We cannot reduce the prophet of God to a conduit, and then predicate leadership of him. The prophet who reveals the will of God passes through spiritual experiences, one may be permitted to say, *pari passu* with God; and these experiences enable him to understand the message of God, and to co-operate with Him in conveying that message. The prophet is, thus, an intelligent agent who reveals the mind of his God to the people. The life of the prophet must follow the word which he conveys; he is, therefore, a responsible agent. In fine, the prophetic

(1) Streeter: *op. cit.* p. 271 ff.

teaching and preaching are not simply the oracle of God in a man, not merely the will of God imposed upon a man, thence upon a people - via that man. The communication or revelation is co-operative; God and the prophet are the co-workers. Both are necessary; and the defection of either must inhibit the true message; as it is the prophet may fail, then inhibition. The office of the prophet is to mediate the Divine message; this is inspiration in the religious sense. The supernatural source is admitted, - God - but this source is not obtruded; it occupies the background. On the other hand, the human agent is the apparent origin. These observations lead to an important conclusion: all that we know is mediated through human personality, through human minds, - both that class of knowledge which we may call ordinary (normal), and that other class of extra-ordinary (supernatural) knowledge which comes through alleged "verbal communications from discarnate spirits". Our conclusion is the discovery of a law: the spiritualistic hypothesis is contrary to this law, because it alleges that messages are conveyed hither, therefore that knowledge is derived immediately, from sources which are purely supernatural.

We have now concluded our brief examination of the evidence procured by science in relation to the problem of human immortality. Our survey has been very brief, selective; and it may be objected that some points of scientific moment have been omitted. But in a limited essay we are obliged to deal only with salient matters, leaving those of less import-

ance for treatment in a more pretentious study. We have endeavoured, then, to present the case from the salient facts, and we are now prepared to answer the questions propounded at the beginning of this section. The answer of science neither supports nor rejects the hope of immortality. The case of personal survival after death is, to say the least, "non liquet"; the problem is unsolved.

The scientific investigator who examines the evidence qua scientist cannot refuse this indecisive conclusion. He may be of opinion, however, that the destiny of man is, after all, not a scientific problem, but one which transcends the sphere of empirical science. We believe such an opinion has considerable weight. In our next section we shall continue to propound the question, state the problem, and note what answer, if any, or what contribution is made by philosophy.

"The owl of Minerva taketh her flight
When the evening shadows begin to fall."

CHAPTER II.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

We have made and concluded our examination of the scientific aspect, and we have found it necessary to appeal to another sphere in order to seek a solution of our problem. Can philosophy answer?

Early man was uncritical in his thought. He took things as he found them and was not troubled by the need of explaining them, in our sense of the word. Despite this, however, our early man possessed the germ of curiosity, and this curiosity joined with the feeling of wonder was the possibility of the philosophic spirit. This marked only the beginning. Man had to attain to a developed self-consciousness, had to be delivered from the control of animal appetites within him. Philosophy in the ^{full} sense begins its labours when man has attained a view of the world as a whole.

When men began to speculate on the meaning of things it was natural that they should consider the problem of the soul, and try to understand its nature and destiny. Men had thought about the soul long before the advent of systematic reflection, but the traditional ideas of the soul were neither coherent nor consistent. That lack both of coherency and consistency was a challenge to philosophic thought. The philosopher had to sift these traditional ideas of the soul, and eliminate what was useless. The office of philosophy herein was not primarily to construct a theory of soul, but to criticise the extant theories. Thus, philosophy, in an important sphere of human thought, was to introduce order, harmony, and method.

Philosophy has not remained content with the limited task of criticism, but has endeavored to reach positive conclusions. Thus it has boldly attacked the main problem - that of the nature and destiny of the soul, and has endeavored to reach valid and final conclusions. Yet here as elsewhere philosophy has not always delivered the same message; at times it has rejected, again accepted, the idea of immortality.

It is only a spiritual or idealistic line of thought that can countenance the human claim to survival after death. But every form of idealism does not agree with this conclusion. Much depends upon the value which a system of philosophy assigns to the individual whether it comes to a positive or a negative decision on the question of human immortality. Thus pantheism, which sacrifices the claims of the individual to the Absolute, has no place for personal immortality.

We must limit our aim in this section because we cannot attempt to give even an outline of the development of philosophical thought on this important topic. However, a consideration of a few of the more influential philosophical systems in their treatment of this problem may suffice.

In the result of our analysis we may come to the conclusion that ultimate certainty in this matter is not to be reached by metaphysics. Even so, it will be a gain to know just how far the speculative reason can take us in our quest.

PLATO:

The most important treatment of the problem of immortality among pre-Christian thinkers is that of Plato. At the time when Plato wrote, the nature of the soul and its destiny had become a source of perplexity and a subject for discussion among the Greeks. The doctrine of transmigration (1) was taken over by Pythagoras (2) and his disciples from the Orphics and they sought to give a more philosophic form to this and current beliefs in regard to the soul. This school represented the soul as an "attunement" of the body; and with this idea they combined a theory of metempsychosis. The Pythagorean teaching influenced Plato (3), who strove to purify and elevate it by infusing into it an ethical meaning. Of a future retribution for the "deeds done in the body", Plato was assured, and this assurance was prior to the proofs he gave of the soul's immortality. In other words, the determining element in his conviction is ethical rather than metaphysical.

In the elaborations of his ethical system the doctrine of the immortality of the soul plays an important part. Yet Plato does not depend upon this doctrine for the formulation and justification of his system of ethics. Again, it is apparent that this doctrine is a favorite one with Plato, possessing in his eyes an importance per se. He continually refers to it throughout the Dialogues; in one, the Phaedo, it is the chief theme.

(1) Burnet: "Early Greek Philosophy", pp. 84, 93.

(2) Gomperz: "Greek Thinkers", pp. 123-128.

(3) Buangt: op. cit. p. 85.

We propose to comment successively on five of the Platonic dialogues, in order to determine the character and development of Plato's theory of the immortality of the soul.

The Symposium: In all pre-Platonic thought in Greece there was only one kind of life that was worthy of the name - corporeal, i.e., the life that we know in this world, or else some other, but essentially similar, life elsewhere, such as was contemplated by the devotees of the Mysteries. The Greek mind at this period had not thought to separate body from soul, matter from mind. The soul, customarily, was thought of as merely a part of the body, a part invisible it may be, and of a highly refined character, but still corporeal. Further, a complete body was regarded as necessary to a complete soul. From this point of view, immortality - if such a state be conceivable - can mean only the continuance in some form or another of corporeal existence, such as we at present know. Such a notion of immortality seems to have been in Plato's mind when he wrote the Symposium.

There is not very much of importance in this dialogue for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of Plato's own theory, but there are some passages which deserve notice.

In 179 c. we have the legend of Aleestis⁽¹⁾, an illustration of the great power of love. She loved her husband to such a degree that, in order to win immortality for him, she consented to die. The gods were won by such self-sacrifice, so they allowed her soul to return to earth, the reason being

(1) of. Taylor: "Plato: The Man and his Work", p. 213.

that the earthly life was regarded as superior to that of Hades. On earth, where her soul would again be united with her body, the soul's functions could best be exercised. Existence in Hades, like that of the Hebrew Sheol, was not really life at all. This is what the average Athenian thought; but we must not attribute the notion, also, to Plato, even at this early stage of his philosophical career.

(1)
207 D expresses the love passion as due to the overpowering desire of the mortal nature for immortality, Athanasia. What is meant by Athanasia is the everlasting continuance of human life upon earth. No mention is made of a future life in another world. The longing for immortality impels to love, and love results in the production, so to speak, of another self. The perpetuation of the species; corporate immortality.

212 A suggests that, if there be such a thing as immortality for men, it must belong in the truest sense to the man who has beheld the Good itself. Here is no mere continuance of earthly life or of a similar life in another world.

Even at this early stage, Plato's view of immortality is very different from any that had preceded it. He has not indeed as yet elaborated a theory of immortality, but we feel that in the Symposium he is on the way towards a theory. In this dialogue he breaks away from old traditions. His predecessors had spoken vaguely about the soul; he sets out to clarify his idea of it, and to indicate its nature. One can

(1) Taylor: op. cit. p. 227.

discern also in this dialogue the dawn of the Theory of Ideas, and along with it the beginning of the Theory of Immortality. From the first, these two theories are intimately connected; one cannot be adequately studied apart from the other.

The Phaedrus: This dialogue gives us what some scholars believe to be Plato's first definite demonstration of the immortality of the soul. 245 C is a declaration of the immortality of the soul. Here, however, it is not the individual soul but all soul that is immortal. All soul is the vital principle of the universe (psyche pasa athanatos). Thus, so far as personal immortality is concerned the Phaedrus supplies at best a negative argument. At most it establishes a presumption in favor of personal immortality in so far as it tends to invalidate the popular view of the finality of death. But our point is: Does the human individual soul survive death as a conscious personality? That is a question which the Phaedrus proof cannot answer to our satisfaction. The Phaedrus makes a distinct advance upon the conclusions of the Symposium: Plato for the first time makes a definite demonstration of the immortal nature of the soul.

The Republic: Plato's view of immortality in this dialogue is found in the tenth book - 608 D - 611 D. Here Socrates, the speaker, presents a short proof of the immortality of the soul. He affirms that to everything in this world there is attached a peculiar evil (kakos). As a general rule this peculiar evil tends to destroy the thing of which it is the evil. For example, the peculiar evil of the eye is ophthalmia, which tends to destroy that organ of sense. Now the special evil of the soul, the speaker continues, is injustice.

An unjust soul is morally sick, as the ophthalmiac eye is physically sick. But while ophthalmia, if persistent, destroys the sight of the eye (therefore, the eye), injustice does not destroy the soul. Since, then, the peculiar evil of the soul cannot destroy the soul, the soul is inviolable, indestructible. Therefore, the soul is immortal. In criticising this proof, we must ask - what reason Plato had for affirming that injustice⁽¹⁾ is the special evil of the soul? Injustice is an evil to the soul; but is it the evil? We cannot say. If it be said that no evil destroys the soul we may readily concede this, but the problem for Plato has not been made any easier of solution. If this argument proves anything, it is - not the continued existence of the soul as a conscious personality, but simply the indestructibility of soul in general. This is, in effect, what we have been told in the Phaedrus - that no soul, i.e. no portion of the spirit which animates and informs the universe, can ever cease to exist.

The Phaedo: The Theory of Ideas seems uppermost in Plato's mind at this time. The assumption of the existence of the ideal world still remains for him the basis of all his speculation, and the difficulty raised by the question of the cognition of the ideas must be met. How? In these circumstances it would seem natural that he should look for aid to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The proof of

(1) V. B. Bosanquet, Companion to Plato's Republic, p. 404.

his theory that the soul is immortal alone remains to him as a means of preserving the full usefulness of a system of philosophy which nothing would persuade him to abandon. Accordingly he prepares to substantiate it with all his strength. The assumption of the existence of eternal immutable ideas, the objects of knowledge, presupposes the immortality of the soul as an indispensable condition of the attainment of that knowledge.

The question of individual immortality is, of course, the supreme point at issue. Some writers have affirmed, however, that Plato did not believe in individual immortality. Socrates is continually affirming his own conviction that death is no misfortune for the man who has used his opportunities well in this life. Plato could hardly have continued to express himself in similar terms if he did not wish to convey a belief in individual immortality. Moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis is clearly asserted (Phaed. 81 D.E.) If we do not take this passage as metaphorical, we are bound to admit that Plato is declaring his belief in metempsychosis, and this is a doctrine which is applicable only to individual immortality. Yet the fact remains that the doctrine is not proved. Plato has failed to prove that every individual soul continues to exist as the same conscious personality. He proves what he can - that soul is immortal.

In 64 C we learn what is meant by death, namely, the separation of soul from body. The body and the soul are now separately in existence. Further - in 65 D - 67 A - we learn that it is only in this state of separation from the body that the soul can acquire true knowledge. The ideas are im-

material; the soul (separated from the body) is immaterial; communion with the ideas is possible only when the soul is in this unhampered state.

It must be admitted that none of the arguments (1) proves that individual souls as such are immortal. What is proved is the essential indestructibility and eternity of the universal soul. We now turn to the last dialogue in our survey.

The Timaeus: (2) This dialogue sets forth the Platonic cosmology. We found that no theory of personal immortality is essential to the working of Plato's metaphysical system. But from the ontological point of view personal immortality is quite a side-issue. In the Timaeus the problem of immortality is approached in a way different from that of the Phaedo. In the present dialogue Plato makes no attempt to prove that individual souls are immortal. The doctrine of individual immortality is in no way essential to the truth of the general system of metaphysics which is evolved in the Timaeus. But here, no less than in the Phaedo, individual immortality is to Plato an article of belief. He does not, however, any longer seek to indicate his belief by attempting to prove what no one can ever hope to prove. He presents an allegorical account of the generation and history of the soul, describing the origin of individual souls in such a manner as to emphasise and after a fashion to account for the fact that they are immortal. (3).

(1) Rut V. Taylor, op. cit. p. 206 & p. 207 n.

(2) Taylor: op. cit. p. 436

(3) Taylor: op. cit. p. 452.

(1)
Aristotle tells us that there are three souls or life principles: (1) the principle of vegetable life (which is the source of digestion and assimilation); (2) the principle of animal life (which, in addition to (1) possesses sensation and image production); and (3) human life (which possesses both (1) and (2) and a divine principle which this philosopher calls "nous", or pure reason.) Aristotle seems to regard this nous as immortal, but he does not consider it a personal reason. "Nous" is the term which this thinker also applies to God, and this fact would tend to preclude the idea of a personal immortality.

Aristotle does not share Plato's belief in the pre-existence and future pilgrimage of the soul, and his attitude to immortality is critical and negative rather than positive. We may therefore pass from Aristotle with this brief reference. It is not for a long period that the problem of immortality comes again to the front in philosophic thought.

We turn now to the middle ages and to the greatest of the Schoolmen.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS:

Thomas of Aquino brought the scholastic philosophy to its highest stage of development by effecting the most

(1) W. D. Ross: "Aristotle", Ch. V.

W. A. Hammond: "Aristotle's Psychology".

perfect accommodation that was possible of the Aristotelian philosophy to ecclesiastical orthodoxy. He distinguished, however, the specifically Christian and ecclesiastical doctrines of revelation, - which, in reply to the objections of their opponents, could only be shown by the reason to be free from contradiction and probable, - from those doctrines which could be positively justified on rational grounds.

The relation of philosophy to theology in the doctrine of Thomas is most clearly expressed by him in the following words: "It is impossible for the natural reason to arrive at the knowledge of the divine persons. By natural reason we may know those things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, but not those which pertain to the distinction of the divine persons, and he who attempts to prove by the natural reason the trinity of persons detracts from the rights of faith."⁽¹⁾

In like manner, the Church's doctrines of the creation of the world in time, of original sin, of the incarnation of the Logos, of the sacraments, purgatory, the resurrection of the flesh, and eternal salvation and damnation, are not to be demonstrated by natural reason. These revealed doctrines, Thomas regards as above, not contrary to, reason. We are particularly interested in the doctrine of the resurrection, - to which we now turn.

Aristotle had regarded God and the active intellect (*nous poietikos*), which was the only immortal part of the soul, as immaterial - and yet individual forms; yet it is not

(1) *Summa Theologica*: Part I. Q. 32, A. 1.

perfectly clear how he conceived the relation between this immortal intellect and the individual soul into which it was alleged to enter from without. Thomas defended the doctrine of the individual, independent existence of the human intellect (nous), as well as that of God, and ascribed to the soul, regarded as substantial and separate from the body, not only the highest functions, which are implied in thought, but also the lower ones. He discriminates between several classes of forms: immaterial forms are, God, the Angels, and human souls; the forms of sensible objects are inseparably united to matter.

Thomas asserts that all things, except God, were created by God. Like the angels, so also the souls of men are immortal forms. He accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body, but he ascribes to the same soul (which as nous, or rational soul, has individual and yet immaterial existence and is separable from the body), the animal and vegetable functions. So that for him the form-producing principle of the body, the anima sensitiva, appetitiva, and motiva, and finally the anima rationalis, are all one and the same substance. The vegetative and animal faculties, which Aristotle conceived as necessarily connected with the body, are represented by Thomas as depending only in their temporal activity on bodily organs. The intellect alone works without an organ, because the form of the organ would hinder the correct knowledge of other forms than itself. ⁽¹⁾

(1) op. cit. I. Q. 75, A. 2.

There is no knowledge that is innate and independent of all experience. The human intellect needs, in order to its earthly activity, a sensuous image, without which no actual thought is possible for it, although the senses, as such, grasp not the essence of things, but only their accidents. ⁽¹⁾

The doctrine of the pre-existence of the human soul is rejected by Thomas in favour of the doctrine of its continued existence after the end of its earthly life. To the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence ⁽²⁾ he opposes the argument that for the soul as the "form" of the body, union with the body is natural, and separation, if not contrary, is at least *praeter naturam*, hence accidental, therefore also subsequent to union. God creates the soul as soon as the body is prepared for it. ⁽³⁾ But the important point here is that, according to Thomas, the immortality of the soul follows from its immateriality. ⁽⁴⁾ Forms which inhere in matter are destroyed by the dissolution of this matter, as are the souls of animals on the dissolution of their bodies. But the human soul, which, since it has the power of knowing the universal, must subsist apart from matter, can neither be destroyed by the dissolution of the body with which it is united, nor by itself, since necessary being is implied in the very conception of form, which is actuality, and such being is therefore inseparable from such form. ⁽⁵⁾ Thomas joins with this the argument drawn from the

(1) op. cit. Q. 78, A. 3.

(2) Plato: *Meno*. p. 80 ff.

(3) op. cit.

(4) op. cit. I. Q. 75, A. 6; I. Q. 89.

(5) op. cit. I. Q. 75, A. 6.

longing of the soul after immortality and founded on the principle that a natural longing cannot remain unsatisfied. The desire of unending being is regarded as natural to the thinking soul, because the latter is not confined in its thoughts to the limit of the Here and the Now, but is able to abstract from every limitation, and desire follows knowledge.⁽¹⁾

Immortality belongs not merely to the thinking power, but also to the lower powers, for all of these belong to the same substance with the thinking power, and depend only for their active manifestation, not for their existence, on the bodily organs.⁽²⁾

The fifth article of the same question (76) asserts that "the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of knowledge but also with the power of feeling." Since this thinking and feeling soul is at the same time the form-giving principle of the body, it forms for itself after death, by means of this very power, a new body similar to its former one.⁽³⁾

Let us notice a few points in criticism.

Thomas asserts that the immortality of the human soul follows, not from God, but from its immateriality. This argument is akin to that of Plato in the *Phaedo*, namely, that life is inseparable from the soul according to the very idea of the latter.⁽⁴⁾ Thomas is here arguing from the point of view of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, but his contention

(1) Op. cit. I q. 75

(2) Op. cit. I q. 76

(3) Summa C. Gentiles, n. 79 ff.

(4) *Phaedo*, 105.

would hardly be accepted today as the finding of Christian Theism upon this question. In the language of Professor W. R. Matthews we have a reply to the doctrine of immortality from the immateriality of the soul: "The view that individual selves are inherently indestructible is indeed scarcely compatible with Theism, for it would lead to a view of the place of the self in reality which would compromise the supremacy of God."⁽¹⁾ The alternative view to the inherent immortality of the soul is some kind of conditional or conferred immortality, says the writer just cited, who adds that such a view appears to be most in harmony with Christian Theism.

(2)

In the Summa Theologica, Thomas speaks of the dissolution of the body and the consequent separation of soul from body. This dissolution places the soul in a new condition with respect to the continuation of its life and to the possibility of knowledge, yet Thomas clearly affirms that, while it is for the soul's good that it should be united to a body, and that it should understand "by turning to the phantasms", nevertheless, he adds, "it is possible for it to exist apart from the body and to understand in another way."⁽³⁾ We understand from this that Thomas makes no room for a body in the after-life, that the human soul is simply a soul, and that such a psychic condition is natural to it; but when we compare what Thomas says here with his statement in

(1) "The Destiny of the Soul", in the Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1930, pp. 198 f.

(2) I. Q. 75, A. 6.

(3) Op. cit. I. Q. 89, A. 1.

(1)
the Summa Contra Gentiles (v. ante), namely, that the human soul forms for itself a body for the after-life, we are not convinced.

The supplementary argument for immortality drawn from the longing of the human soul for life after death is unsatisfactory. Thomas, it seems naively, affirms that this longing is natural, and that as such it cannot remain unfulfilled. We are of the opinion that he has not thought of the content of this desire for immortality. Many human souls have, unthinkingly, desired a mere continuation of life beyond physical death: such a desire is, of course, empty, as is the existence which is its object. A modern psychologist asserts that the desire for immortality finds its "main support . . . in the yearnings of the heart for the maintenance of the bonds of love and friendship, and in the desire to think highly of oneself and the universe."⁽²⁾

While we do not fully agree with Leuba, the quotation should at least give the necessary point to our criticism. Human desires may be natural, but they are often thwarted; and mere desire is a claim which we cannot allow.

Our next study takes us to the group of the great modern philosophers. We have chosen Descartes, for the purpose before us.

DESCARTES:

With the rise of modern philosophy in Descartes,

(1) IV. 79 ff.

(2) J. H. Leuba: The Belief in God and Immortality, p. 313.

the problem of the immortality of the soul comes again into the foreground. According to Descartes the soul possesses the three cognitive faculties, thought, sense and imagination. These together constitute its nature, and through them does it exist. But of these, only one is inseparable from it, namely, thought or conception.⁽¹⁾ Neither sense nor imagination belongs to the essence of soul, because we can have a clear and distinct conception of the soul apart from them. Pure thought, alone, is the attribute of the soul. It is true that thought can be conceived apart from sense and imagination, but sense and imagination, since both involve some form of intellection, cannot be conceived apart from it. Sense and imagination are, therefore, related to thought, as modes of their common attribute. In this way D. completes the absoluteness of his dualism. On the one hand, a material world whose whole nature consists in extension alone; on the other, a spiritual world whose whole essence consists in pure thought alone. Each world stands over against the other,⁽²⁾ having nothing in common. D. thinks of the soul, not as a vital principle, but as self-consciousness generated by reflection: "cogito ergo sum". This cogito ergo sum is the ultimate element in the Cartesian System. It is on the face of it not as satisfactory as it promises: for it is a consequence of his dualism.⁽³⁾

(1) Norman Smith: "Studies in the Cartesian Philos'y" p. 127

(2) Op. cit. p. 128.

(3) Op. cit. pp. 13, 14 and pp. 48-52.

By the argument, *cogito ergo sum*, Descartes undertakes to prove what, strictly speaking, cannot be proved. All that can be done is to illustrate the fact of the soul's existence; the argument is superfluous. (1)
"When used to prove existence," says Norman Smith "the 'I' is illegitimately brought in." And the same writer goes on to affirm that the present consciousness does not give us any indubitable certainty of our having existed in the past or of continuing to exist in the future. Further, there is even less reason to regard the immediate consciousness as proving the existence of the self as a simple indivisible substance.

So long as D. has to deal with pure thought he maintains his dualism; but when he has to account for sense-perception and volition, he modifies his dualism. D. regards the last two processes as involving and conditioned by brain processes. He fails to see that in sense-perception also, mind and body must be regarded as distinct. (2)
D. thus violates his dualism so far as to admit that body can act on mind, but with no good result, since the same problem remains, how sensations can arise in a mind whose whole essence consists in pure thought. Again, with regard to the action of mind on body in volition, D. kept consistently to his dualism, so far as to

(1) Op. cit. pp. 42-50.

(2) Op. cit. p. 81.

admit that the mind cannot originate motion in the brain. Yet, incomprehensible as is the action of mind on body, we find him emphatically asserting that, nevertheless, such action takes place. ⁽¹⁾ The facts of most importance here are the feelings and passions which D. regards as the real ground of the knowledge we have of our dual nature, and to explain which he concludes to a fusion of mind and body. They reveal, therefore, the inadequacy of his dualism.

The human soul is represented by D. as continually conserved in existence by God; but his whole line of argument here is unsatisfactory, as illustrating the impossible demands of his rationalism and of the absolute occasionalism ⁽²⁾ which is its only refuge.

Descartes' philosophy gives us a plurality of substances which are related and co-ordinated by the will of the Supreme Being, God. Here we find foreshadowed the problem of the relation of finite substances to the Absolute, of the many to the One. The issue to be met is this: are the plurality of finite substances real, or do they possess merely temporary reality, ultimately falling within the reality and meaning of the One? In other words, are the many only an appearance, or are they real? In the former case we have a monistic, in the latter a pluralistic theory of the universe. The way in which this problem is

(1) Op. cit. pp. 82-3.

(2) Op. cit. pp. 128, 132.

solved has an intimate bearing upon the conception of immortality. Thus, a consistent monism, which reduces all individuals to passing appearances of the One, logically precludes any hope that they will persist as identical centres of experience. On the other hand, a pluralism, which recognises the ultimate reality of individual beings at least leaves room for immortality. Pantheism, however, has no place for individuals who continuously maintain their identity over against the One Real Being. The truth of this contention is illustrated in the system of Spinoza.

SPINOZA:

For Spinoza there was only one real Being, the
(1) Absolute Substance, which is apprehended by us under the
(2) two attributes of thought and extension. The Absolute
Substance is particularised among individual minds and ob-
(3) jects, which are its modes. The individual minds have
(4) no independent reality. They only appear to have a
being for themselves when they are apprehended by that
lower form of mental activity which Spinoza calls "imag-
(5) inatio". For him, "imaginatio" denotes thought which
works through sensuous images. This appearance of in-
dependence vanishes in the fuller light of reason. Spin-
oza, it is true, speaks of the mind's "eternal part";
but what he means here is the impersonal reason, or the

(1) and (2) Rand: *Mod. Class. Philos.* (Rev. & Enlarg. Ed.)
Spinoza: *Ethics* I, Prop. 14.

(3) I. Prop. 16.

(4) I. Prop. 18.

(5) V, Prop. 34; II, Prop. 44.

(1)
divine reason in so far as it forms part of the human mind. This divine reason recalls Aristotle's 'nous', creative reason, which has no personal quality; and Spinoza definitely includes memory in the sphere of 'imaginatio', which is the fallible and mortal part of the mind. All this, by implication, precludes the possibility of personal immortality; for since Spinoza's system does not countenance real individuality it cannot leave any place for the persistence of such individuality.

Let us turn now to a philosopher who is clearly opposed to the rigid monism of Spinoza - to Leibniz, whose philosophy is pluralistic and individualistic.

LEIBNIZ:

The core of reality, according to this thinker, is at once individual and spiritual. In other words, the being of things is not matter but a multitude of spiritual individuals or monads. The monad is not physical, like the atom, but is psychological. (2) Nor are the monads identical one with another. (3) They are capable of the most diverse degrees of spiritual development, and extend from the lowest sub-consciousness to fully-developed self-consciousness. (4) Each monad mirrors the universe in its own specific way. (5) The system of monads is graduated, and each monad is a unity whose internal development is teleological, (6) not mechanical.

(1) V. prop. 30.

(2) Rand: Leibniz - Monadology, 19.

(3) Op. cit. 9

(4) Op. cit. 32

(5) Op. cit. 63

(6) Op. cit. 22

These spiritual substances are the ultimate elements of reality.⁽¹⁾ They combine in various ways to form compound substances or things.⁽²⁾ but they themselves are neither created nor do they perish.⁽³⁾ By this hypothesis physical death is not destruction but metamorphosis.⁽⁴⁾

We have noted the outstanding points of Leibniz's philosophy in the line of our own enquiry. How, then, does his conception bear on the problem of immortality? The answer to that question involves his view of the relation of the soul to the body. The mind or rational soul is a monad which has developed into self-consciousness, the "dominant" or supreme monad⁽⁵⁾ in the body which is a subordinate system of monads. Leibniz affirms that the human soul or dominant monad pre-existed.⁽⁶⁾ This is consistent with his idea that monads are indestructible elements of the world. But he understands this pre-existence not as a rational, - rather as a sensitive soul which later attained the higher degree when physical birth took place.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, the rational soul is not created by the particular group of elements called its body, and when the combination dissolves, the soul does not perish.⁽⁸⁾ Leibniz regards

(1) Op. cit. 3

(2) Op. cit. 2

(3) Op. cit. 6 and 73

(4) Op. cit. 74, 75.

(5) Op. cit. 82

(6) Op. cit. 82-5

(7) Op. cit. 82

(8) Op. cit. 84

the movement by which a sensitive soul becomes a rational soul as the unfolding of the immanent character of a monad, not as an extraordinary act of God. ⁽¹⁾ He differentiates the human soul from the animal, or the vegetative, soul by the fact that, while the sensitive soul merely mirrors the world of things, the rational mirrors the Deity or Author of nature himself. ⁽²⁾ In spite of the importance of the principle of continuity ⁽³⁾ in his philosophy, Leibniz is anxious to emphasize the distinctive character and value of the human soul, contrasting it with the lower forms of psychical life. Hence he maintains a doctrine of personal immortality in which he characterises the assembly of immortal spirits as the "city of God". ⁽⁴⁾

Because of the individualistic strain in his philosophy, Leibniz does endeavor to do justice to the problem of immortality, and he succeeds where Spinoza failed. On the other hand, Leibniz' denial of any interaction between monads ~~xxx~~ made his conception of the relation between soul and body a difficult one. For this meant that the dominant monad, while it was in a condition of harmony with the group of lower monads, could neither directly influence, nor be influenced by, them. A theory which does justice to the facts of experience must accept the principle of interaction between soul and body. If the idea of soul as dominant monad is to be fruitful, it must be taken to

(1) Monad. 82.

(2) Op. cit. 56, 83.

(3). Op. cit. 10

(4) Op. cit. 85.

mean that the soul organises and informs the group of elements which is subordinate to it.

KANT:

After Leibniz, the next important contribution to our subject came from Kant. His treatment may be said to have two aspects, a negative and a positive. In the former he searchingly criticises the metaphysical proofs for immortality, and in the latter he develops his own ethical argument in support of the idea. We shall deal at present with the negative aspect, leaving until the chapter on ethics, following, our treatment of the positive.

Kant did a useful work in his critical analysis of the alleged proofs of immortality, by clearing away misconceptions and exposing fallacies, thus setting the problem in a fuller light.

For Kant, the self is merely another name for a unity which manifests itself in determining a given manifold of sense-data. (1) But this self-conscious principle is a unity which we only think in relation to the process of synthesising the manifold. (2) In and for itself it is not an object of knowledge. (3) and to hypostatise it as an independent reality is illegitimate. On the other hand, Kant's criticism of the old rationalistic (4) notions of the soul as a kind of substance or metaphysical entity (5) was valid and helpful. The Kantian

-
- (1) Watson: "The Philos. of Kant Explained" p. 145-149.
(2) Watson: Op. cit. p. 150.
(3) Watson: Op. cit. p. 150.
(4) Watson: Op. cit. pp. 241-250
(5) Watson: Op. cit. pp. 244, 245.

arguments taught men to see that the forms of thought which were used in outer experience could not be uncritically applied to the self as a centre of inner experience. The idea of a simple, therefore indestructible, substance or entity is a mere abstraction from external experience, and has no relevancy when applied to the soul. Thus Kant affirms that we cannot base immortality on simplicity; for though simplicity avoids the danger of external disintegration of parts, in the case of consciousness it does not avoid the possibility of its gradual extinction through diminution of intensity. The Kantian criticism was effective in finally banishing from modern thought the conception of the self as a kind of metaphysical entity, which was a lingering survival of Scholasticism. Kant's own record of the self, however, was not satisfactory. For him the self is only a transcendental idea to which we are in the habit of referring all possible experiences but which we can never affirm to be real. Hence any assurance of the individuality and permanence of the ego vanishes and experience itself becomes illusory. As Ward ⁽¹⁾ has pointed out, personality, on this theory, could be no more than a bundle of accidents, and there could be no guarantee whatever for its conservation. We believe that the self is real and that its reality is the ground of our idea of self. Our idea of a transcendental self presupposes our experience of a real self. The self is an active substance, a spiritual individual which unifies its own changing states, and is a living centre of action and reaction. This is far different from a metaphysical self - as Kant knew such an entity - and we wish to stress this difference

(1) Ward: "Realm of Ends", p. 390.

when we speak of the self as essentially spiritual, active and individual. This view of self is that of a substance which is primary and fundamental, not an abstraction from experience but the centre and ground of experience.

Kant dissipated some old prejudices and superstitions which gathered round the problem of immortality. He made thinkers realise the difficulties in the way of a metaphysical proof of immortality, and those who have learned of this philosopher are aware that a proof of the soul's simplicity and indestructibility - even were such proof possible - does not guarantee the soul's spiritual destiny.

HEGEL:

The attitude of Hegel to the problem of immortality⁽¹⁾ is that of a speculative monist; but his position is not clear and it has been variously interpreted.

For Hegel, the ideas God and immortality are necessarily related. Man knows himself in God thus he knows his imperishable life in God. He refers to immortality as a present possession of the spirit to whom belong freedom and universality. Personal immortality is not definitely asserted; the essential thing is the eternity of the spirit which is divine and universal.⁽²⁾ God is an all-inclusive unity, - he unifies all differentiating - hence there is no room for the conscious survival of personalities after death. Individual souls, then, can be but functions of the divine or universal reason; and these functions are specialised or differentiated by their relations to their

(1) Stirling: The Secret of Hegel. I - 244.
(quoted in And. Seth: "Hegelianism and Personality") .

(2) A. Seth: Op. cit. p. 171.

respective human bodies. With the disintegration of these bodies, the differentiating factors would vanish and the spirits fall back into their pure universality. Nothing would remain to conserve individuality. Of course the individual would probably survive, in some way, in the universal consciousness, but there would be to him no awareness of his own personality.

Hegel's philosophy is not alone in this difficulty of the conservation of the human personality. We saw this difficulty in the system of Spinoza, and it occurs in some others with which we shall now deal.

In English philosophy the views of Bosanquet and Bradley on the status of the finite individual are representative of the school of thought with which we have been dealing.

The view taken of the possibility of immortality is closely connected with the conception of personality. According to Bosanquet, ⁽¹⁾ and Bradley, ⁽²⁾ the human self is not ultimately real; it belongs to the realm of appearance. The notion of the finite self involves contradictions, says Bosanquet, and he adds, that only reality survives the test of the principle of non-contradiction. Everything to which a contradiction attaches is condemned as a mere appearance, which is ultimately dissolved in the Absolute. ⁽³⁾ These centres, it is claimed, have merely an adjectival ⁽⁴⁾ existence; and the truth of the finite is to be taken up into the Infinite. Bradley follows the same principle

(1) Pringle-Pattison: "The Idea of God", Lectures XIV, XV.

(2) Ditto.

(3) Ibid, pp. 273 and 274

(4) Ibid, pp. 270-4

when he enunciates his view of the plurality of souls as "appearance and error".⁽¹⁾ He contends that human souls fall within

the realm of appearance and error, that they are not real. They are, but, as such, do not have reality. To gain consistency and truth these souls must be merged and recomposed in a result in which their individual specialties must vanish. It is clear that these two philosophers regard man, the individual, as adjectival.

We read further that, according to Bosanquet,⁽²⁾ the human self is, beyond escape, an element in the Absolute, here and now, consequently it is an "inconceivable abstraction" to place eternity and perfection in a future beyond time. While man desires the conservation of values, it is urged that we cannot identify this with the conservation of persons. The same writer speaks of the world as "the vale of soul-making".⁽³⁾ Souls are

moulded in order to be transmuted into the Absolute, to whom they are contributions.⁽⁴⁾

He affirms that there is no finite individual survival, values⁽⁵⁾ only survive in the Absolute. The contribution is the real issue. Bosanquet does not make quite clear how this very contribution may not be consistent with the survival of individual personalities who are per se contributing values to the Absolute and at the same time maintaining their own

(1) Ibid. pp. 276 and 7.

(2) Ibid. p. 270

(3) Ibid. p. 278

(4) Ibid. p. 278-9

(5) Ibid. p. 278.

individualities. (1) He claims that the value of the individual human self lies in its content; (2) and this content depends upon the extent to which the self appropriates a common heritage of ideas and interests. The life of the finite individual as it builds up its true self is thus a continual process of self-transcendence. (3) Its true personality or individuality does not lie in unshareable feelings but in the richness and variety of its thoughts and interests. (4) The content of the finite self is identical in all selves - shareable. (5) It is impotence, Bosanquet says, which keeps finite selves apart; at their strongest they become confluent. (6) "The social fabric (7) is the certain, intelligible and necessary thing," the "something deeper and more real" as underlying the precarious and superficial system of finite appearances. In his criticism of this, Pringle-Pattison argues that "we must remember, a social whole is the sustaining life of its individual members, but it melts into thin air if we try to treat it as an entity apart from them." (8)

What do we mean by an individual? Bosanquet replies: "Individuality is a matter ultimately of content, and individual differences, consequently, must be so explained." (9) Pringle-Pattison retorts: "Are individuals like articles which are machine-made? No. "Every individual is a unique nature, a little world of content" . . . a "focalization of the universe which is nowhere exactly repeated." (10)

(1) Ibid. p. 279
(2) Ibid. pp. 266-7
(3) Ibid. p. 263
(4) Ibid. p. 263
(5) Ibid. p. 263
(6) Ibid. p. 264
(7) Ibid. p. 265

(8) Ibid. pp. 265-6
(9) Ibid. pp. 266-7
(10) Ibid. p. 267

Bradly regards souls as falling within the realm of appearance and error, as being unreal. They are, but, per se, do not have reality. To gain consistency and truth, these souls must be merged and recomposed in a result in which their individual specialities must vanish. (1)

But, if souls are appearances, says Pringle-Pattison, then they must be, and therefore be true appearances; that is, the Absolute really does appear or differentiate itself in that way. The plurality of finite centres is a true appearance. (2)

Pringle-Pattison criticises the adjectival theory held by Bradly and Bosanquet. He asserts the substantive nature of the individual. To exist means to be the subject of qualities, to have or possess a nature. The substantive in a thing is not a "core" surrounded by qualities . . . "a self which is merely the channel or mouthpiece of another self is not a self"; (3) not even as the channel through which the Absolute pours itself is it a self. A self thinks and acts from its own centre: we act, we think, not the Absolute in us.

Bosanquet appeals to the great experiences (4) of our life as carrying us out of the temporal, mundane things and their claims, into a deeper spiritual membership "where such claims disappear in the intimate consciousness of union with our fellows, with the beloved object, or with God." (5) But Pringle-Pattison

(1) Ibid. pp. 276, 7.

(2) Ibid. p. 277

(3) Ibid. p. 288

(4) Ibid. p. 289.

(5) Ibid. p. 289.

appeals to the same experiences to prove the absolute necessity
(1)
of "otherness", if they are to exist at all. It takes two
to make a bargain, to love and be loved, to worship and be wor-
shipped, and many combined in a common purpose to form a society
or a people.

"Sweet love were slain
Could difference be abolished." (2)

"As in the love of man and woman, so in a great friendship, the
completest identification of interests and aims does not merge
the friends in one." (3) And so with the religious conscious-
ness (which Bosanquet defines as 'self-recognition'), (4) if the
specific religious insight is the recognition of dependence, (as
Bosanquet says) it is only inasmuch as we have a certain indepen-
dent status that we can recognise and affirm the dependence. The
religious attitude presupposes "individual difference" (5) in the
selves who worship.

The character or the formed will is the concrete
personality. (6) As such a will, man is independent; a self.
The source of action is the self or person, a terminus ad quem
(or a quo). "We cannot go behind him and treat him as a thor-
oughfare, through which certain forces operate, and contrive to

(1) Ibid. p. 289

(2) Ibid. p. 289

(3) Ibid. p. 289

(4) Ibid. p. 290

(5) Ibid. p. 290

"produce a particular result." "This freedom belongs to a self-conscious being as such, and it is the fundamental condition of the ethical life; without it we should have a world of automata."⁽²⁾

The creation of beings who are really selves apart, independent, is according to Pringle-Pattison,⁽³⁾ the "main miracle" of the universe. "In asserting the freedom of the self we are not asserting anything additional and extraneous about our experience,"⁽⁴⁾ he says, and adds that we are simply describing its nature as it appears to us from within, as we know it from within. And we are applying, in this supreme instance, the principle which has guided us throughout,-⁽⁵⁾ the principle of the reality of appearances. The same philosopher concludes that "individuation . . . seems to represent the fundamental method of creation, or . . . the fundamental structure of the actual world."⁽⁶⁾

The type of thought above, which finds in human individuality the key to the meaning of reality, seems to us to be the most important contribution of philosophy to the solution of our problem. The contribution does not solve the problem, but we believe that it enables us to see a way in which personal survival after death is possible. More than this we may not demand from philosophy.

(1) Ibid. p. 292

(2) Ibid. p. 292

(3) Ibid. p. 293.

(4) Ibid. p. 294.

(5) Ibid. p. 294.

(6) Ibid. p. 294.

A metaphysical proof of immortality will always fall short of demonstration, - will even appear to disappoint the hope herein which itself has aroused. Even when we base that immortality ultimately upon the fact of human individuality and personality, the proof fails. If a solid conviction is to be won, it must be the fruit of reflection on moral and spiritual experience rather than the outcome of speculative discussion. The case for immortality will be greatly strengthened if it can be shown that it is strongly supported by ethical considerations. The failure of speculative thought to demonstrate immortality will be adequately atoned for if it can be made clear that immortality is a valid postulate of the moral consciousness of the human individual.

CHAPTER III.

ETHICS AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

A theoretical proof of immortality is, we have concluded, not possible. From the data at our disposal we cannot reach the goal by any irrefragable logical process. Our speculative results in this connection do not amount to more than a probable argument, and the human mind craves for more. After the speculative reason has shown a way or ways in which a life after death may be realised, men naturally desire some definite assurance that these possibilities are actualities. To many it has seemed that the ethical argument supplies such an assurance. The facts of moral experience, when their meaning and bearing are examined, are thought to justify faith in a future life. In other words, they are believed to warrant the faith that man's life on earth is only a stage in the development of his spirit. A higher and a transcendent form of existence appears to be necessary, if man's experience in this world is to be justified by the moral reason. There are those who regard with hostility any attempt to introduce what they call theological implications into ethics. Ethics, it is said, has its own sphere, which is complete in itself. Ethics deals with the values of human experience, and has no need to go beyond them. Our moral judgments are quite independent of any beliefs about the future destiny of the soul. In evidence of this independence it is urged, that man's ethical life is not really influenced by a belief in immortality. As a practical motive the belief does not count. But I doubt that, if the belief were practically useless, it could have maintained itself as it has done. Be-

liefs which have been divorced from action wither and die, while beliefs which persist always stand in some vital relation to practice. Nevertheless, there is this element of truth in the opinion we are considering: the system of moral values will not be revolutionised by the presence or absence of faith in immortality. A man may retain his faith in duty after he has lost his faith in a future life, as there are examples to show. Yet to admit this is not to say the conviction, that our existence here is teleologically related to a higher form of existence hereafter, does not exercise a real influence on our valuations. If it does not subvert our moral values, it sets them in a new prospective and lends them a deeper significance. The fact gives a higher importance to our acts of moral choice, that we recognise they go to the making of a character which persists after this earthly form of being has passed away. And if all moral values are doomed in the end to perish, they must lose in meaning and reality even though good continue to be good for the individual, and evil evil.

We do not think, therefore, that what are called the religious postulates of ethics are practically of no effect. They certainly invest experience with deeper significance. Yet the issue we have in view is not directly concerned with the sphere of ethics or the bearing of immortality on ethical conduct. For, quite apart from the opinion we have on this subject, the main question with which we have to deal is the question whether the data of human experience can be justified and found consistent by the developed moral consciousness. This is not a matter of theory but of facts. If, as the result of a dispassionate survey, we find our present experience reveals moral

anomalies and inconsistencies, we shall then be in a position to consider whether the situation is not remedied, if we postulate a life to come and a supramundane order of things. To answer the question in the affirmative is, of course, to recognise that ethics raises issues which transcend the present world order. This is the general problem with which the ethical argument for immortality deals.

Let us now examine more closely the nature of the so-called moral proof for immortality. It is usual to speak of proof in this reference, but it is well to point out that it is not a proof in the scientific sense of the word; for, we do not deduce immortality by the method which shows that, from a certain rational connection of elements, a further connection inevitably follows. The moral argument is not a strict deduction from given data, but a demand. It is a claim that man, as an ethical being, makes on the universe in which he lives and acts. In other words, it is a postulate put forward to harmonise the facts of experience, and to make them consistent with the demands of the moral consciousness. To identify this procedure with an argument from human wishes and desires is quite unfair and misleading. Those who persist in doing so, easily succeed in showing human desires are variable, often inconsistent, and sometimes such that in the nature of things they are doomed to disappointment. A recent writer, already quoted, ⁽¹⁾ has dealt with this desire for immortality.

(1) Leuba: The Belief in God and Immortality, p. 313;
and vide
Tennyson: "In Memoriam", XXXIV.

And were this all that could be said, it would be fair to point out, as the author in question does, that such desires carry with them no guarantee of their realisation. It is man's fate often to desire in vain. But this line of reasoning does grave injustice to the moral argument, which rests, not on subjective feelings, but on the demand of the practical reason for coherence and harmony in a moral universe. There is nothing arbitrary or casual in making a postulate which is needed for the moral organisation of life. The point is to show that it is needed. Nor is the method of postulation singular. The philosopher and the man of science alike make postulates. The former bases his attempt to rationalise experience on the postulate that the universe is a rational whole; the latter postulates that the uniformities he discovers in nature will hold good in the future, as they have done in the past. These postulates cannot be strictly proved, but they are demands necessary to justify the procedure of the thinker - philosopher or scientist. Of course it may be said even by a sympathetic critic that the universe would not become a "sheer irrationality" apart from the postulate of personal immortality.⁽¹⁾ And it is true that man can live an orderly life in the world without accepting the doctrine. But the larger question remains, whether, without the postulate of immortality the facts of ethical experience can be conceived as a consistent and harmonious whole. That is, can we, apart from the acceptance of immortality in some form, justify the world as a moral cosmos? We shall endeavor to show that we cannot do so. In order to answer this question, we shall first consider the

(1) Bringle-Pattison: "The Idea of God", p. 45.

nature and meaning of the ethical facts which lead to the postulate of personal immortality. They consist of two general lines of evidence, which can be distinguished though they are related: the former rests on the claims of justice, and the latter, upon the incompleteness of the ethical and personal life. We go on to discuss them in order.

(1)

JUSTICE:

The argument based on justice affirms the importance and value of justice. It takes for granted that justice is an essential element in the order and working of the universe, just as it is essential to human society. The argument turns on the value of justice and the need that its claims should be met. If justice is to be realised in the universe and in the lives of individuals, man's life on earth can be only a stage of his development which leads up to and issues in a supra-mundane form of existence. This view has a prominent place in Plato, to whose treatment of the problem we shall now look.

We have already seen (in the preceding chapter) that in Plato's discussions on immortality the ethical interest is dominant; and this was the determining factor in forming his faith in a life of the soul after death. He was assured that justice (the principle of perfection in society and in the individual) also reigned in the universe. In virtue of this, a law of retribution was operative which was not confined to this life. Here and now, justice is the health and injustice the disease of the soul. Justice has its good reward, and injustice brings a hard fate, but these goods and ills are only the foretaste of the greater things to come. (Rep. 613 E ff.) Evil

disfigures the soul during its life here, so that it comes to resemble the sea-god, Glaucus, whose identity was obscured by the incidents of his position. (Rep. 611 C D) Suppose death to be the end of all; then the wicked man would be satisfied with the prospect of being rid at once of body and soul - a good bargain. (Phaedo, 107 C). In the Phaedo and the Gorgias, also Laws, 838 b.c., 880 e.f., Plato affirms the fact of a future retribution for the deeds now done in the body. The Phaedo and the Republic, in mythical form, present symbolic pictures of the punishment of the wicked and the fate of the soul in the after-world. Plato distinguishes, also, among the wicked, those who are curable and those who are incurable (Gorgias, p. 525; Phaedo, p. 113). Tartarus is reserved for the latter; while the curable, for their sins, go through purgatory, after which they attain heaven (Phaedo p. 114 e.) This earnest of a world to come wherein Justice shall accomplish her mission imparts a new seriousness to human life. Human choice, when it involves a life which extends beyond this world, takes on a greater significance, and this truth is illustrated mythically in the Phaedrus. After death, according to this myth, there follows a period of retribution for the deeds done in the body. Souls sink again to the world, when a thousand years have elapsed, and choose the lives which they are to live for another term of existence. The soul which has thrice consecutively chosen the best life passes, freed from the body, to the realm of spiritual bliss (Phaedrus, p. 249; also Repub. pp. 619-21). Here we have the moral truth told in story form. We seem to see above all the sincerity of Plato in this matter of human choice as having consequences which

reach further than the present life. According to this view, punishment has a part to play both here and hereafter, whether by way of retribution or as a deterrent. The "curable" souls will be gradually liberated from the thrall of sensuous desire. For the utterly and incurably bad, Plato suggests that the punishment may be eternal. (Phaedo p. 113 E).

We have very briefly tried to show how Plato anticipated most of the later ideas on the subject of human immortality. The main thought which governs his view of the soul's fate is the principle that the claims of justice must be fulfilled. A man must reap, in this life or in an after-life, what he has sown. But retribution is not an end in itself; rather, punishment must be regarded as a means of improving and educating the individual. The latter way is the judicious employment of punishment - the reformation of the individual that he may assume the full onus of his place in society. To appeal, therefore, to fear of future punishment as an inducement to virtue and a restraint from vice is futile; the effect upon conduct is small, and in any case exposes the life based upon the hope of reward as governed by lower motives. Contrast with that view this one, that justice is a principle immanent in the social and individual life. There is a law of justice operating now in the lives of men. The man who sins damages his own soul in consequence. On the other hand, the man who practices virtue gains an abiding inward reward.

We may accept this principle of immanent justice; but we are still faced with the problem whether this principle works itself out adequately in this world. If not, then we must

ask whether this principle argues to a life beyond the present. If justice, generally speaking, be the "giving to every man his due", are we satisfied that this has always been, is always being, realised? Can we affirm that every man, when measured by inward (spiritual) test, gets his due in this life? Some think that the good who suffer for their integrity are nevertheless happy with their lot because they have not yielded to base motives. But why should a good man suffer? ⁽¹⁾ Is happiness alien to the pursuit of virtue? We believe that a complete view of human good implies a union of virtue and happiness or well-being. Job, a good man, is unhappy. That is an anomaly which is aggravated when we are asked to believe that it can never be remedied. We could not say that a full good was attained by an individual of high character, whose fruitful activity was constantly thwarted by adverse circumstances, or whose life was prematurely cut short by death. Virtue may be separated from happiness, but we do not believe that such separation is, in the nature of things, real: eventually there must be a coincidence. We cannot, however, affirm this coincidence; we can affirm, merely, that there is a tendency towards this coincidence, in the world.

On the other hand, we have only to open up the pages of history to discover innumerable cases of serious discrepancy between virtue and happiness. How often has suffering been brought upon the undeserving? Do we need to illustrate this point at all? Non amplius!

(1) H. P. Smith: "The Religion of Israel", p. 266.

Even when we attempt to ameliorate the grey facts, we cannot maintain that the theory of an immanent justice fully realised on earth covers all the experiences of human life. The "thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to" seem to contradict the idea. In the face of the stern facts of life some have concluded to a materialistic interpretation of the universe. This of course is an attempt to find the ultimate interpretation of the higher in the lower. Should we refuse this expedient, we must accept the alternative - that justice is a principle immanent in the social and individual life (a spiritual value), and that since it is imperfectly realised here, it seems to point to another life, following, in which it will be realised. Here we must postulate the persistence of the personal life, post mortem, because it is in living persons that all ethical values are realised.

(1)

THE INCOMPLETENESS OF MAN'S MORAL LIFE:

The second form of the ethical argument cites the incompleteness of man's moral life, and proceeds to postulate its continuance and completion after the death of the body.

As a moral being, man possesses an active ideal, and side by side he discerns his actual moral life and achievement. He cannot but discern between these two a serious discrepancy. Is man, after all, merely a product of the natural order? The animal appears contented, thus circumscribed, but that must be

(1) Kant: Crit. of Prac. R., pp. 218-9.
(Abbott's trans.)

Watson: "The Philos. of Kant Explained". pp. 379 and 380.

because it has no desires which are not satisfied in the present. This is equivalent to saying that the animal has no outlook; it is contented. But man is discontented; and he has an outlook, which also disturbs him. If we can show that man has this outlook, then it will appear that he must continue to live after his body has paid its tribute to the natural order from which it came.

Kant has given us the popular form of this argument.

This philosopher derived the proof of immortality, like those of freedom and of God, from the practical reason. He regards the moral law as a categorical imperative, ⁽¹⁾ a principle of universal obligation. The moral law must be the sole motive of good action. This, perforce, eliminates all motives based on sensuous feelings and desires, ⁽²⁾ which Kant affirms cannot give moral conduct. But when he came to determine the nature of the Chief Good, he saw that happiness must be included; otherwise the summum bonum would be an incomplete good.

The question arises, - How does the moral reason achieve the ideal? Man is sensuous as well as rational. ⁽³⁾ "The good that I would, I do not, but the evil, I do." How can man, constituted as he is, achieve that perfect accordance of his will with the moral law? This perfection, which is necessary, can be realised only gradually and in a progress which must go on

(1) Watson: Op. cit. p. 321.

(2) Watson: Op. cit. p. 319.

(3) Watson: Op. cit. p. 379.

(1) ad infinitum. But a progress ad infinitum is possible only on the supposition of the endless duration of the existence and personality of every individual rational being. (2) That is, in order to the realisation of this perfection, the summum bonum, human souls must be immortal. (3) Consequently, this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason. (4) (Crit. of Pract. Reason, pp. 218-19 (Abbott's trans.))

If we overlook the matter of endless time, which is inconsistent with Kant's view of duration in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the matter of dualism between the intelligible and the sensuous realms, we may consider the significance of the moral ideal.

It is a demand, as Kant saw, for the realisation of the highest good; and we must examine this fact in its bearing on human experience. Man is aware of the discrepancy between his life and this ideal; he is aware that he is never what he ought to be. The moral life is a struggle on his part to be better than he is. The struggle never ends in the awareness of perfection. The lower nature is always with him, and while he may subdue it in part, he is never perfectly free from its native power. The best men, moreover, are the humblest candidates for the honors of moral attainment, are the most sensitive to their failure herein. This is no anomaly. Indeed, we believe that it is simply because of this sensitiveness to failure that the best men are awakened to the existence and the power and the

(1) Watson: Op. cit. p. 379
(2) Watson: Op. cit. p. 379
(3) Watson: Op. cit. p. 379
(4) Watson: Op. cit. p. 380

challenge which the ideal makes for them. And from it all there comes an earnest of a future victory wherein the ideal is fully revealed and realised. There is nothing arbitrary about this seeking the ideal,- it proceeds from our inner nature. If it were not so, we were involved in a hopeless alternative. That is, we should be led to believe that man, by the ~~risk~~ spirit in him, is led to enter on a quest which is bound to be vain, and doomed to end in defeat; that the vision of the Good is an apparition; that the moral goal is a figment of the brain. And this is not all that we would have to believe. We would be bound to admit that, consequently, there is a radical contradiction in human life, in the universe, because man should have been constituted to strive after an ideal Good which did not really exist. If at this point we affirm that the postulate of personal immortality is no mere expression of subjective feelings or wishes, but an issue from the need of harmony in the facts of experience, we believe that the affirmation is not extravagant. The postulate is thus put forward in order to remove a real difficulty: it is a demand that man makes upon the universe in order that his moral world may be consistent and harmonious. Apart from this postulate we must be satisfied with a life of moral endeavor which must be incomplete and a thing "of shreds and patches"; and we should have to be reconciled to the consequent loss of moral value with the death of the person producing (or realising)

it. On the other hand, the postulate of immortality conserves the value already gained by conserving the producer.⁽¹⁾ The moral goal is not reached in this world, where we find the personal life fragmentary, hence the postulate of a supramundane sphere, a transcendental realm, in which the personal life is continued and brought to fruition. We therefore see, at this point, the coming together of our two general views of the ethical argument. For, there cannot be justice without the attendant fact of fruition or completion; and they are brought together by the postulate of immortality. This postulate of immortality involves a purposive development of the personal life to its completion in a transcendent world.

Some objections have been made.

First, there is the charge that the ethical argument thus stated implies "other-worldliness".⁽²⁾ To this

(1) Note:

It is objected that the existence (in time) of Shakespeare e.g. is not necessary to the value of his plays.

In reply to this objection, we note, first, that our objector admits that Shakespeare's plays have value. Further, the objection states explicitly that the existence meant is merely durational (i.e. "in time").

(1) If values must be produced, then they must be dependent. Dependent upon whom? Upon their producers, severally. If then, these values are immortal, a fortiori their producers are immortal.

(2) A mere durational existence would be empty.

(2) Bosanquet: "Essays and Addresses", p. 98.

we reply that the transcendent world is thought of as teleologically related to life here. This conception of the relation between the transcendental, and the present, world is not arbitrary; rather does it assume the nature of necessity. The future is intimately related to the present. This is not saying that the present is swallowed up in the future; the present loses nothing of its significance, - indeed it is precisely by this intimate relationship that the present is adequately appraised. Yet the present passes, must pass, like youth, in order to reach its completion, its maturity. No one would say that youth simply passes away; it has a contribution to make which is necessary to the attainment of full maturity. Similarly we may regard human personality, as we know it here, and its relation to what it promises to become in a transcendent world. Take away the maturity, the goal of youth, and we rob youth itself of her peculiar glory; take away the transcendent sphere, the goal of human personality, and we deny to it its real significance.

Again, it is sometimes argued that the transcendent world is just the ideal truth or reality of this world.⁽¹⁾ We are told that the other world - the world of truth, of good, etc., is not after or beyond this world but immanent in it. We are to believe that the other world is merely the spiritual world which is immanent and operative in the world of common experience. Yet if we ask whether such a theory makes it pos-

(1) Paulsen: "System of Ethics", p. 440.

sible for man to reach his moral goal and find self-realization, we are told that he will, within the present world-order. We would then have nothing to do with another world. Our duty would be apparent - thoroughly to regulate and systematize this world in order to understand it perfectly. But can we merely regulate the errors of this world, and can we naively systematise a world of infinite perplexities? Would such a procedure fulfil the hitherto unsatisfied needs in human experience? In truth, we cannot, by any legitimate means, ignore the fact that this world (even if it were in-dwelt by the ideal world) is not a moral cosmos; moral justice does not reign supreme. Therefore we cannot conclude to such a theory - to a reduction of the transcendent world to an immanent aspect of the present world, as a solution of the moral problem.

It may be said that our whole position gives too much prominence to the moral argument. The existence of ethical personality is a fact of paramount importance. It rightly belongs to ethical personality to claim that the laws which are at work in the world ought to be in harmony with its judgments. We reiterate our postulate, that there must be, somewhere, a transcendent completion of this life. This postulate makes a great demand; but there is a reason: ethical personality is that reason.

Further, an ethical personality is a centre of
(1)
value. Being finite, however, an ethical personality must

(1) Hoffding: "Phil. of Religion", p. 274.

grow; and its growth demands a goal and fulfilment in a transcendent sphere. Can we afford to be sceptical of this? Surely distrust of the working of our moral consciousness is as subversive as (what Socrates warns against in the Phaedo)⁽¹⁾ distrust of the working of the intellect. In both cases the end is rank scepticism. Hence the demand that the moral and spiritual values have objective validity, and a place and function in the real universe. This introduces a further thought which has been used to imply an objection to our ethical argument.

Along with the claim of the ethical values to enter into the texture of the real world is the claim that these values should be conserved. Value is good; the good must endure. But it is argued that only the value produced by the individual ethical personality lives: he is reckoned a fugitive appearance. The values produced are taken up into the life of society where they are conserved. The individual, according to this view, is merely a producer, who dies, while his product lives on. The creators of art, music, literature, are become mere producers whose products are of greater importance than they! This is spurious reasoning. If values are produced and live, a fortiori, the producers of these values live.

The above argument is somewhat modified, when we are told that the producer or creator of values does not

(1) Phaedo, 89a - 91c, quoted by A. E. Taylor in "Plato, the Man and His Work", pp. 195-6.

really die, but that he lives in his creation which has now
become a part of the treasure of the race. (1) The supporters of this theory argue that their hypothesis commends itself, particularly, because of its complete absence of selfish motive. At first blush this seems a plausible affirmation. What could be more honourable than to surrender one's own desires to the good of the race? On the other hand, the theory makes certain assumptions which are of doubtful validity. First, we are told that the man lives in his created work which has become a part of the culture of the race. But, in what form does he so live? Is a man simply the sum of his works? Simply the summation of values created by him? We grant that he may have produced works of profound value, - an "Unfinished Symphony", let us say. Yet, Schubert was not wholly represented therein, nor even in all of his musical works, his great tone-poems! Himself was the greatest poem of them all - all together. If it be said, then that his works, his values-in-music do not die but live, incorporated in the value-treasures of the race; if it be said that we cannot contemplate the loss of any of those values; then we are bound to conclude, that neither can we conceive the loss of that unique personality who has been the "cause of their composition". Now we know but one way whereby we are assured

(1) Jno. Caird: "The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity". Vol. II, p. 269 ff.

v. also same author's "University Sermons", p. 176.

that values are not lost. It is by a postulate such as we make - that human personality is conserved.

In the second place, if the social system or the race is to be the sole and ultimate repository and conservator of all values, we must postulate its persistence or immortality. Thus, a corporate will take the place of an individual, survival. It must be shown, however, that such a survival of the race is possible. Ex hypothesi, the permanence of the race is demanded, while that of its individual members is denied. How can we make such a demand consistent? If the members who compose the race are fugitive, as the hypothesis states, then the race cannot be permanent. We cannot, out of impermanent elements, construct a permanent whole. We therefore conclude that the values which are produced by individuals cannot be conserved by the race. We cannot afford to lose faith in personal immortality, because we thereby lose assurance of the final persistence and victory of the good.

Even though the race should persist, it is quite another thing to conceive of it as the ultimate end of the individual. The reason why we object here is that the social system shows the same discrepancy between the ideal and the actual, as we have discovered in the case of the individual.⁽¹⁾ All earthly societies are imperfect. How then can an imperfect society be a perfect ethical end for its individual

(1) Th. Green: "Prolegomena to Ethics"
in Rand's "Classical Moralists", p. 745.

members? Societies, like individuals, grow, are in process of development. But a process of development is not perfection. What about an ideal society? We must substitute an ideal society if we are to have an adequate ethical end for its individual members. But, not an earthly ideal society; ⁽¹⁾ such would be static, with no room for moral effort or aspiration for its individual members. Surely such a social order would be greatly lacking; because it belongs to man "to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield." This sort of society would offer no hope of real progress: there would be no goal beyond the present. Yet we believe that "man's reach is greater than his grasp, or, what's a heaven for?" The attempt to find in society the ultimate goal for its individual members leads into a cul de sac. Nor is the conception of an ideal society satisfactory to the individual as he is constituted: he must have the opportunity of far-reaching development.

We begin to see the difficulty in finding a final form for the moral ideal. The solution, we believe, lies in calling in the help of religion. Morality is not a final form; but religion, added, may make it so. There is no real conflict between morality and religion; ⁽²⁾ what apparent conflict there is, is reconcilable. We believe that religion must be sought for the solution of the moral problem, because the re-

(1) Pringle-Pattison: "The Idea of God";
Note on Rosanquet's 'Social Analogy'. pp. 296-7.

(2) Sir H. Jones: "A Faith that Enquires". Lect. IX.

religious consciousness demands a transcendent world as its final goal. That is, by implication, no earthly goal will suffice for the ethical progress and self-realisation of the individual. The final end of progress is in the supramundane sphere. It may be objected, that we cannot conceive of a supramundane sphere as sequent to the mundane order, except by an appeal to the miraculous. We are, however, not arguing for a miraculous transformation: we admit - as we must - that we do not know the *modus operandi* of that change. That is a point upon which our silence must be conceded. At the same time, we are of opinion that the solution is not to be found in that direction, but that it will be found in our recognition of the unique value of human personality.

We continually affirm the moral satisfactoriness in the social good as a motive for the individual; but this affirmation does not include the other alleged fact, that the well-being of human society is the ultimate end of the individual members. We claim that society is not an end but a means to the unfolding of personal lives. It may be objected that this view encourages the individual to regard society as a useful means to his own development. Society is an end to the individual, in the sense that it is wrong and futile for the individual to ignore the common good. And to this end the individual is strengthened by the social order which becomes a condition to his own growth and enrichment. But there is another and a deeper sense in which society itself finds its end in the personal, ethical lives of its members. Society is thus the medium in which its members develop by interaction.

If we take away the members, we reduce society to an abstraction. Further, the progress of society itself is conditioned fundamentally and ultimately upon that of its individual members. We therefore conclude that society and its development are not an end in themselves. Ultimately they are a means to the evolution of personal and ethical individuals. Nor can an earthly society embody a perfect good; at most it can discover a growing good.

The postulate of immortality provides a solution of the problems of the conservation of values and of the meaning and goal of social development. The postulate does not undertake to explain many things in human experience, but it removes some of the contradictions of experience, softens what is harsh in the human lot, and gives coherency to man's outlook on life.

The postulate of human immortality is a great one; but human personality is a great, a unique fact.⁽¹⁾ Human personalities are the creators and sustainers of the world of values. The demands of human personality have given us the spheres of ethics and religion. Development in these spheres and in the inner spirit of personality proceeds *pari passu*. We cannot speak of good (or evil) except as personal; impersonal forces are amoral. The unique character of the human personality, and the values which are created by, and hence inseparable from, it, establish this postulate of human survival after death - beyond a world which is insufficient for the full development of man's powers.

(1) Pringle-Pattison: "The Idea of God", p. 267.
v. also Coo: Psychology of Religion, p. 250.

Our discussion of the ethical proof of immortality has presented two general avenues of thought,- the demands of moral justice, and the incompleteness of man's moral achievement when contrasted with his ideal. These two avenues of thought converge upon the goal which is our postulate of human life after death.

Our conclusion is, that the doctrine of personal immortality is an answer to difficulties and a fulfilment of needs which are germane to human experience. The doctrine, as we have tried to show, is an ethical postulate, a postulate which makes the world of experience a more reasonable world.

If it be complained that our postulate does not tell us anything about the contents of the idea, or as to how the idea is to be actualized, we can only answer that the circumstances of the case do not warrant dogmatic statements on these matters. As we saw in the previous section, speculative thought has offered suggestions in this connection; but it cannot speak dogmatically. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man . . ." these things of another world.

Immortality is the object of faith, not of sight,- and still less, we may add, of philosophic speculation, - yet we believe, as Sir Henry Jones would say, that it is a faith which can give a valid reason for itself.⁽¹⁾

(1) "A Faith that Enquires." Lect. VI.

CHAPTER IV.

IMMORTALITY AND RELIGION

In the two preceding chapters, we have noted the general results of philosophical and ethical thinking on the problem of immortality. We found that the most positive and convincing argument was developed from the ethical. Immortality, we concluded, was a legitimate postulate advanced by the moral consciousness, which claimed that the world should be a moral cosmos. The postulate was necessary in order to give consistency and harmony to the facts of experience. We felt that the argument was legitimate. But in one aspect it lacks conclusiveness. How do we justify the postulate as workable? How do we know that the postulate works? How do we know, further, that the facts of experience can be made perfectly coherent and consistent? May they not be, in fact, beyond the reach of the postulate in question? In fine, how do we know that the universe is a moral cosmos? There can be no accurate affirmative answer to any one of these questions. We do not know; indeed, it may be said that we have moved from the position of knowledge and taken our stand on that on faith. This new position, however, does not per se imply distrust of philosophic or ethical reason; nor does faith discount reason - it accepts the other at its intrinsic value. The point, then, is, that the several contributions of science, philosophy, and ethics, to the solution of our problem are not so much wrong as they are insufficient; they are discarded where they are wrong, completed where they are insufficient. The postulate of the moral consciousness - immortality - stands for a principle, namely, the moral reasonableness of the universe in which man lives

and acts. But how do we know that the universe is morally reasonable? We do not know; yet we may be persuaded that it is as we assume. This persuasion is the result, the fruit of faith. Faith, for our purpose, is such an assent of the understanding to the moral reasonableness of the universe as shall commit the individual to the postulate of personal immortality. By faith we apprehend the ground of things as ethical; that ethical principles govern the universe and its development; that justice is at the heart of things. Moreover, this faith bespeaks the ethical and spiritual ground of the world, which is the assurance and security for the presence and victory of ethical and spiritual elements within the realm of human experience. That is, an ethical and spiritual God who is the cause of the world, upon whom all experience depends, is the sufficient reason that the moral demands man makes upon the universe will find an adequate response in the universe. Faith, then, in the moral character of the universe in which men live and act becomes, by implication, faith in the moral character of God. Thus, it is not enough to claim immortality on ethical grounds. The demand must lead up to and find support through a religious faith in God. Such a God is the source and consummation of all value and cannot be indifferent to the ethical values which are realised in human experience, or be satisfied that men and values should perish. We believe, then, that the ethical argument, and the postulate therefrom, is completed by faith.

We have defined this faith, in part, by calling it an assent of the individual understanding. We may suggest an equivalent term, the religious consciousness. Here, then, we

have tried to show the vital or organic relation in which faith in immortality stands to the religious consciousness. This relation will be better understood if we make a fuller and nearer determination of the religious relation. That relation involves two factors,- subject and object. The religious consciousness expresses an act of faith on the part of the subject in the object. That is religion signifies an act of faith on the part of the human spirit in a Being who is divine. This faith bespeaks, and originates in, the sense of need and incompleteness which man experiences. Thus, religion as realised in human experience means fellowship with the divine. This fellowship is a conscious communion. It is not absorption into God: the religious relation preserves both factors - the subject, man, and the object of worship, God. It is true that God is immanent in the human individual; but this immanence is not absorption of the individual in the divine. This relation is subject to great development. In its beginnings it is crude; but with growth and culture the religion undergoes development and acquires higher meaning. With the development of his self-consciousness, man improves his conception of God, and of the tie that binds them. The two ideas, of man himself and of God, develop *pari passu*: a better society means a better idea of God.

Every religion, crude and cultured, involves a belief in a future life, a world beyond the immediate environment. This belief may not be stated in terms, as in many crude religions, but it is, at least, always implied. In the crudest natural religions the object of veneration is never merely a common object among man's external surroundings. If it be a tree, then there is something about it which has made it outstanding, (Gen.

21:33, et al). The tree possesses a mysterious power, and it is to this power that the devotee addresses himself. Here we have the idea of transcendence in its simplest, crudest form. The idea becomes more definite as the religious consciousness develops. The divinities of the place (genii loci) gradually separate from their material habitations. In the evolution of Greek religion, the spirits of the trees and springs were succeeded by the greater gods who dwelt apart on Olympus. In early Hebrew religion, Yahweh, the covenant God, had his abode on Sinai. Yahweh himself was originally a mountain-god. He was the god of the land where his people dwelt. Later, in the monotheistic religion of the Hebrew prophets - heralded by Amos and Hosea - Yahweh ceases to be a local deity; he is God of all nations. (Amos 9:7). In a fully developed spiritual religion like Christianity, the Deity does not dwell in temples made with hands: He is not contained in nature or limited by it. He transcends nature. Immanent, he is also; but it is an immanence which gives full recognition to the divine transcendence. This two-fold idea is sometimes denoted as transcendence-immanence. A long, tedious process of religious development underlies this conception of a Deity who transcends the spacially extended universe and the recognition of the divine transcendence has had a profound influence on the idea of man's goal and destiny. A pure spiritual faith looks to a transcendent God as the assurance of a destiny of man in a transcendent world. The mundane order is the sphere wherein moral beginnings are made; but a supramundane world is essential to the consummation of the moral and religious life of man. The former sphere is regarded as transitory in character, while the latter affords the opportunity of a goal and

fulfilment, self-realisation. God transcends the world, therefore the destiny of the human individuals who worship Him must be with Him in a transcendent world.

The relation between the idea of God and the idea of immortality is vital. We see this clearly when we alter the idea of the former: the latter correspondingly changes. For, if we deny the transcendence of God, and regard him as merely immanent, the idea of immortality is altered. For example, the pantheism of Spinoza, which draws God wholly down into the world and allows him no being apart from the world, precludes personal immortality. Man, in this view, is merely an appearance of the Absolute: God is impersonal. Faith in a personal God is necessary to faith in a personal immortality.

We are little better off when we subscribe to a pluralistic theory, that resolves the universe into a multiplicity of finite centres, and so is diametrically opposed to pantheism. This theory of finite centres in interaction contains no definite assurance that they will work out the harmonious consummation of individual selves. What guarantee can we have on the basis of pluralism that the different ideals of the different centres may not prove incompatible? (Ward, "Realm of Ends", p. 421.) Mere plurality does not contain the ground of its own unity. The difficulty can be overcome only if we modify this pluralism to show that all the finite centres together form a teleological whole whose ultimate ground and final end is God. But pluralism as such makes no provision for such a modification. God, we

affirm, must be the governing principle and end. Only as such can he guarantee the coherence and unity of the many.

If we now turn to theism we find that therein is real support to our hope of personal immortality. In order to see this as clearly as possible, we must consider what it is that the religious consciousness seeks in its doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Does it desire mere survival? That is empty. A clue to the answer is the fact that human life as moral striving is not concluded, nor is religious communion with God fully realized, within the scope of earthly existence. Thus, the purpose of that striving and communion is reconciliation with God, which is the purpose of personal immortality. The process of reconciliation, or redemption, cannot work itself out in the earthly life, where weakness and sin hinder. Thus, the highest spiritual religion, which is reconciliatory or redemptive, postulates a supramundane form of being in which the redemptive process comes to its full and unimpeded realisation. To this end and for this purpose the mundane and the supramundane spheres are essentially related.

The problem of man's future life has a double aspect - the individual and the collective. These views severally are stressed, sometimes that of the individual, again, that of the group. But a complete view, we believe, is a synthesis of both aspects. We may profitably study these aspects of the eschatological problem by using specific examples. For this purpose we shall confine our enquiry to the respective fields of the Hebrew and the Christian religions.

The Hebrew eschatology is meagre and primitive until a comparatively late period. The ideas herein were those which are usual to primitive and nature religions, rather than those we associate with a spiritual and ethical religion. The Israelite for long had no hope in a personal immortality. The question of a future state of man is raised by the writer of the Book of Job (7:9 f): "As a cloud is consumed and vanishes away, so he that goes down to Sheol comes up no more. He shall return no more to his house, neither shall his place know him any more." Sheol, the place of departed spirits, was a dim and unhappy realm, like the Greek Hades where the ghosts of the dead dragged out a wretched and hopeless existence. This rude Hebrew eschatology survived even until the time of the eighth century prophets whose ethical teaching made new discoveries in the sphere of religion. An explanation may be accepted in the fact that in the Hebrew religion the nation, not the individual, was the dominant idea. Yahweh dealt with the nation, was in covenant with the people as a whole. The individual could partake of the covenant blessings only as a member of the chosen race. Likewise, the promises, which were the reward of religious loyalty, were made to the nation, and no mention was made of the individual. Thus, the future to which the devout Hebrew looked was one of national glory in terms of the covenant with Yahweh, their God. The nation obscured the individual.

The catastrophe of the Exile was fatal to the old hope of a glorified Israel. It now became necessary to

differentiate between the faithful and the faithless Israel. (Neh. 1:6-9). The vicissitudes of fortune had at least taught the pious Hebrew that the sovereignty of Yahweh was over all nations. With the wider sphere of Yahweh's power came also the profounder inward, ethical significance; Yahweh desired mercy rather than ~~zakkat~~ sacrifice; and his law must be written on the heart. Gradually a greater value came to be set upon the individual; and with the emergence of the individual there is discovered one of the finest fruits, one of the profoundest truths, of ethical and spiritual religion. Although the eighth century prophets addressed, essentially, the nation, and their hope was a national hope, late in the following century the new individualism began to appear. Jeremiah is the herald of the new thought, the new hope. He introduces the idea of personal responsibility, and retribution for personal sin: "Every one shall die for his own iniquity." (31:30). The prophet of the Exile, Ezekiel, repeats the same general thought when he affirms that "every soul is God's." (18:4). This discovery of the individual as a responsible agent in morals and religion, along with the profounder feeling of the value of the individual soul, led the Hebrew mind to a faith in a future life for man. We find this idea struggling for recognition in the Book of Job: "And after my skin (body) has thus been destroyed, yet from my flesh shall I see God." (19:26) When we turn to the Psalms we find that the majority of the writers are negative upon the hope of a future life. "In death we no longer remember thee; in Sheol, who praises thee?" (6:6) "In the very day in which

"a man's breath goes forth, he returns to the dust and his thoughts perish." (146:4). These two quotations may be regarded as typical of the general belief of the Psalmists. There are, however, a few isolated passages which seem to offer some hope of future blessedness; but one Old Testament scholar warns us against reading into these passages a Christian interpretation. (H. P. Smith, op. cit. p. 327). "Yahweh I keep ever before me, with him on my right hand I shall not be moved. Therefore, glad is my heart and my liver rejoices, my body also shall rest in peace; for thou wilt not commit me to Sheol nor suffer thy faithful one to see the pit; thou teachest me the path of life; in thy presence is fullness of joy, fair gifts in thy right hand forever." (16:9-11). There is still doubt whether the idea of a future life is clearly intended here. A more explicit statement is the following: "Yet do I stay by thee forever; thou holdest my right hand fast; thou leadest me according to thy counsel and wilt afterward take me in glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee; whom besides thee do I care for on earth? My body and my heart may pass away, but the rock of my heart and my portion evermore is God." (73:23-26).

At the beginning of the third century (B.C.) the doctrine of the resurrection had been developed, and it was linked with the thought of the immortality of the righteous in the Messianic Kingdom. The Book of Isaiah contains a late addition which gives the conception of a resurrection to new life of the members of the holy people. (26:19). This resurrection was the sequel to a righteous life on earth. In the Book of Daniel the illustrious saints

and teachers are to have part in a blessed resurrection, while notorious apostates have a resurrection to "shame and everlasting contempt." (12:2-3). By this time the idea of an eternal Messianic Kingdom on earth had been abandoned, and the resurrection and final judgment come at the close of the Messianic Kingdom. But the notion of immortality is not put forward as a purely individual hope. This hope is a common weal which the righteous Hebrew hopes to share with the righteous people. It had its chief source and support in the Apocalyptic literature of the last two centuries B.C. It is important to realise this point if we are to appreciate the position of the belief in early Christianity. It was not until modern times that the great significance of this Apocalyptic literature for primitive Christianity was appreciated.

In our survey thus far we have seen that the story of the progress of Hebrew religion towards a doctrine of immortality illustrates the truth that a belief in immortality must find place in a religion which is truly spiritual. When the religion of Israel became ethical, personal and inward, the new value set on the individual led necessarily to faith in his eternal destiny. Yahweh will not leave the soul of the faithful in Sheol.

Apocalyptic ideas permeated the religious atmosphere of primitive Christianity. The ideas of resurrection and a future life were familiar, and a belief in immortality was held by many - though not by all - Jews. The teaching of Jesus on the subject was characterised at once by profound insight and by great reserve. He dealt only with the central

fact; but on this matter he spoke with amazing confidence. For him, the individual life is not annihilated by death. He does not announce an arbitrary or casual opinion here: it is a conviction to which he gives utterance. He derives the individual's future destiny from his relation with God - the relation of son and Father; hence the conviction. Jesus himself was, above all, conscious of a divine fellowship with God, whom he called his Father in heaven; and he brings into vital relationship with this sonship (which he extends to all men) the doctrine of individual immortality. In this way Jesus imparts an assurance to the hope of a future life. Again, in the light of this experience of fellowship with God - which he indicated as the privilege of all men - he taught the value of the individual soul and the infinite possibilities of human life. Not only is God the Father of Jesus; he is the Father of all men, whom he loves; He knows all their needs. It is surely impossible that this intimate fellowship should be destroyed by death. This communion of the human soul with God is according to the divine purpose and a fact of supreme value. The doctrine of immortality bespeaks the conservation of this value. It is a legitimate demand that such value be conserved. God is the Father of men; he is Love. Upon that predicate do we base the hope of personal immortality.

We have said that the problem of man's future life has a double aspect - the individual and the collective; and we maintained that neither view should be stressed alone, that the only adequate view is a synthesis of both. Jesus conceives man's destiny never as a purely individual matter,

but as a union of the individual and social aspects of the problem. This means that the self-realisation of the individual person is achieved by the interaction of the individual with his fellows, never in isolation. The individual cannot, in a true sense, secure his own salvation, privately; he can do so only by living as a member of the Kingdom of God. His future destiny is bound up with the development and consummation of that kingdom. This does not deny the personal nature of salvation or redemption; in fact, this "social way" is the condition to his securing it. The Kingdom of Heaven is both present and future. It is becoming; but it finds its goal and completion beyond this world, because the Highest Good is not realisable here. The individual, as a member of the redeemed society, reaches self-realisation in the kingdom of heaven as transcendent. The Christian hope is both personal and social.

The charge has been made that the Christian ideal encourages men to neglect social good here. An attempt has been made to answer this charge by affirming that, if the Christian ideal has seemed to encourage the neglect of present social weal, it can be shown to be an ideal which has lost touch with the spirit of Jesus. The Christian's vocation, we are reminded, is to labour for the kingdom of heaven here and now by the promotion of individual and social good; for without this work now there can be no harvest in the future. That is, the kingdom of heaven in no way weakens earthly social values, rather does it enhance them by setting them in a new perspective, and by conserving them to a future world where they may be fully realised.

In the teaching of Jesus, the future life is not a mere replica of this life; it is something more glorious and more satisfying than the life which we know. Again, he is opposed to a materialistic conception of the resurrection; "flesh and blood cannot enter into the Kingdom of God."

A study of the teaching of Paul on the subject of the resurrection shows that he is at one with Jesus regarding a materialistic idea of immortality. But Paul is, on the other hand, not satisfied with a purely spiritual existence. Greek thought argued on behalf of a pure, intellectual life hereafter; but to Paul the conception of God as Love, - which is also the highest emotion in man, - precluded a mere intellectual after-life. And since love has intimate relationship to the life of the body, its conservation as a supreme value demands a body of some kind. Paul argues for a "celestial" body. (I Cor. 15:42-44).

This brief statement regarding Paul's teaching on the subject of human survival of death leads us to his fundamental belief, - that the hope of immortality is intimately associated with Christian experience. Fellowship with God is the promise and pledge of immortality, for Paul as well as for Jesus. For this Apostle, "the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." (Rom. 8:18). To Paul, the experience of the new life was a pledge that the Christian possessed a power which could not be impaired by the decay or death of the body. "Though our outward man perish, our inward man is renewed day by day." (II Cor. 4:16).

When we turn to the Johannine writings we find the same emphasis on Christian experience as the basis of the hope of immortality. There is an inner life in the individual which must rise superior to the doom of death. For the writer (or writers) the vade mecum of the Christian who looks for the realisation of his hopes in a future life is not knowledge but love. In "the love of the brethren", men have passed from death to life; and believers are assured that eternal life is their possession now. (I John 2:17). The Johannine summum bonum is this eternal life. It is not a fortuitous thing, but is derived from God, the source of life. It is communicated to the individual soul by virtue of his fellowship with God. (I John 5:11). But although eternal life is communicable and enjoyable now, its full fruition will be achieved in the transcendent Kingdom of God.

We see, then, that to Paul and the writer (or writers) of the Gospel and the Epistles of John, the witness to immortality is in spiritual experience. But Paul also connects the Christian hope with the resurrection of Christ. "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." (I Cor. 15:14). This statement of Paul's opens up a new point in the doctrine of immortality. The Pauline statements already considered have been experiential; this one is metaphysical. In this quotation Paul regards the resurrection of Christ as in itself ample confirmation of the hope of immortality, and an assurance that there is in the universe a power which is able to overcome decay and death. To many Christians, the alleged resurrection of Jesus is the equivalent of a proof of human immortality; so far as

a plea of criticism is concerned they affirm that there is "no case". This Christian argument is an appeal to a solitary (indeed, unique) historical event - that is, supposing that we grant its historicity. There are serious difficulties amongst the resurrection narratives, and these difficulties must be, and are, noted by those who approach this question with open minds. Are those who honestly doubt the validity of the records in this matter merely cavilling at the 'revealed word'? We think not: the fundamental canons of reason as well as of literary criticism support the doubters, because they refuse to regard a single instance as a sufficient basis for a universal inference. Then, Jesus, according to the orthodox tenets of the Christian Church, is not an ordinary man, but he is "very God of very God", the "express image" of God, God manifest in the flesh, that is, absolutely identified with God. The Homeric Greek immortality was limited to the Gods; men were inexorably excluded. Yet in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the "Son of God", some find an unanswerable argument for human immortality. We cannot assent to his alleged resurrection as the basis of a universal inference; that is, we do not see any necessary connection between the minor premise and the conclusion. (We believe that a Greek (at least of the pre-Platonic school) would argue to this effect: If Jesus be a superhuman individual a god, a fortiori, his resurrection cannot be repeated in the case of mere men.) The sceptic turns from the Christian evidences unconvinced; while the Christian believer finds it confirm his faith that death is but the portal to a life beyond.

"If, in Adam, all die, . . . in Christ shall all be made alive."

The result of this short survey of the idea and the hope of immortality in the Christian religion has shown us that faith in a future life has its ultimate ground in faith in the character of God. Faith in the character of God was the very heart of Christ's teaching on the subject of immortality and this is involved in the Pauline and Johannine arguments from Christian experience. We pass now to a nearer determination of the argument for immortality which is advanced by Christianity.

What is the purpose of a future life? In a highly developed spiritual religion like Christianity, immortality has an essential place. Christianity is a redemptive religion. The doctrine of immortality is put forward in order to secure the purpose of redemption. Man's reconciliation with God is not fully realised in this world. The earthly life is only a stage in the process of reconciliation or redemption; but the mundane stage is related to another beyond this life. It is in this supramundane stage that the redemptive process is completed. We have said that God, in one aspect of his nature, transcends the present space-time world. Thus, if man's future be with God, it must be, likewise, beyond this world. The point may be raised, however, as to the certainty of man's title to such a future. Upon what foundation, it may be asked, do we presume to rest man's title to immortality? The point has already been stressed, that the Christian religion bases the hope of immortality upon the character of God and upon the fellowship of man with God. From this we argue that there is a valuation put upon the human individual

which validates his title to immortality. The human personality is a unique datum. This value of the individual is not the result of an appraisal of him apart, because, isolated from God, he has no value at all, - nor meaning, nor existence. Christianity emphasises the fact of man's organic relationship to God, - a relationship which is suggested, or represented in part, by the figure of father and child. This naive figure, further, presupposes the complementary aspect of God, - his transcendence and his immanence. The immanence of God appears in his redemptive work in the souls of men. This work points out the supreme value of spiritual experience and communion with God. The Divine, then, cannot suffer the individual soul to perish. Death is a crisis to the Christian individual as it is to other men; but it is a crisis which marks the point of transition from earth to heaven, from a lower to a higher form of being. How, otherwise, could man be at once admitted to fellowship with God, and denied the most obvious benefit of such communion? - access to a higher life which shall afford the opportunity of self-realisation. Can we imagine man as enjoying a fellowship which gradually gives him mastery over his lower appetites so that he can subdue the world as well as his own spirit, and after all be cast aside, no more to rise? The answer is "No", according to the Christian view of personality. If we reject this view, we cannot look with any favor upon the claim of personal immortality. It is here that religion comes to the side of ethics in dealing with the problem of personal immortality. The ethical conception of life cannot stand alone. But it is not intended that it should stand alone. The ethical view

of man and his vocation - when its implications are thought out - leads to the religious view. God will not suffer the individual soul to perish. But how does God conserve that unique value which we call a human personality? How does the lower existence pass into the higher? The Christian religion has no clear doctrine on the subject. We are told that the lower is a preparation for the higher life; but the manner of the coming of the kingdom of heaven is obscure. Jesus showed great reserve upon this point; and the Apostle Paul (although betrayed by his zeal into certain rash statements), later, exercised the same forbearance. The full realisation of the heavenly kingdom would come when the redemptive process was completed. The man would enter into the full enjoyment of the transfigured life. Death would then be transcended, and the good would suffer no more hindrance but would reign supreme.

There are other points which are of interest in the traditional eschatology. For example, the question has been asked - what will happen ultimately to the incurably bad? Will they be annihilated? Or, will they be restored at last? A great deal of discussion has arisen around this issue, much of it, we fear, useless. We shall avoid a dogmatic answer to the question, and attempt such a reply as shall be consistent with the religious and ethical principles which have already guided us in the larger issue. We have affirmed that God is Love. Man is a creature of God. No man, no creature, so endowed from the hand of God, can be called absolutely bad, absolutely other than the nature of God whose creature he is. No man is incurably bad. Absolute negatives defeat their own purpose, dissolve. Were even one human soul absolutely incor-

rigible, that fact would declare the failure of God. It would be a contradiction in the nature of God himself. And since, from the failure of God, it could be said that the spiritual development ended in a contradiction, that is closed in failure, the whole Divine plan would be an acknowledged defection. This would result from there being a dualism at the heart of things.

Some have favored the idea of a finite, struggling Deity. Such a theory can make room for the issue just mentioned; but the belief that the incurably bad are annihilated cannot be reconciled with the Christian idea of God as a God of infinite goodness and love, who works for the redemption of human lives. God redeems because he loves. Evil must be overcome, eventually, by the transforming power of his redemptive love. We cannot deny this without at the same time surrendering the very foundations of spiritual, Christian faith. If the power of good be not a conquering power ultimately subduing all to itself, then a belief in human immortality were abortive.

The kingdom of heaven, as we have seen, is a transcendent kingdom in which is the consummation of personal and social development. This world is the beginning of or the preparation for the larger life to which the former is organically related. No doubt sin and evil continually oppose the progress which is involved in the working out of this great destiny. But sin and evil are not permanent forces; they are not intrinsically real, since we have concluded that there is not a dualism at the heart of things. Therefore sin wins no lasting victory; and we believe that it is part of the task

of the good to subdue sin to itself - not to annihilate but to transform, restore. There is no other way. Value must be conserved, and it may be that, in the case of the transformation, restoration of sin, it shall need to be augmented before it can be conserved.

And, since evil opposes good, human progress moves intermittently forward, like the tide on the ocean sand, creeping now apace, now falling temporarily back, and again making a new mark of progress. It is ever thus: human progress is not a predictable, manageable thing: it is a spiritual task, and individual - social discipline and education. The progress is painfully slow; but all great undertakings are slow, must be slow. The outcome of it all means that the human soul knows himself and God better. This reminds us that the progress is not simply man's task. God and man are fellow-workmen, bound up in one bundle of life. Man's progress implicates God, and here we touch the paradox of true religion, which the Apostle has set forth in the well-known words:

"Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who worketh within you" Man works, but an immanent God works in and through him, although without superseding the man's freedom, or taking away his initiative. And as man works, communes with God, his faith deepens and enriches, because it is a faith which can give a good reason for itself, a faith which is even the assent of the individual, of his religious consciousness - the binding of his heart, the assurance of his loyalty ^{to} -/the service of a spiritual Being who transcends the world, yet who is the "deus ex machina", the invisible spring of all pure thought and aspiration and life in the

world. In fine, this faith is a profound belief in the value of the soul and a confidence in its transcendent goal.

Even the strongest argument for personal immortality - the ethical argument - would be weak if there were not in the universe an Infinite Being who is Love. In the language of a Gifford Lecturer we have a noble confession of faith: "God is. God is perfect. His loving kindness and power are unlimited; and his greatest gift to man is the gift of the power, tendency and opportunity to learn goodness. God's goodness being unlimited, the opportunity not made use of by man in the present life is renewed for him in another life, and in still another; till, at last, his spirit finds rest in the service of the God of Love. For my part, I wish for no stronger proof of the permanence of the spiritual process, and I ought not to care for aught beside: that supreme good involves every good." (Sir Henry Jones: "A Faith that Enquires", p. 348.)

We have now concluded our survey. What have we found? The problem of personal immortality has been viewed from various standpoints in succession. First, we asked what science had to contribute in the way of an answer to the problem. We concluded that the answer of science neither supports nor rejects the hope of immortality. The problem was then studied from the philosophic standpoint, where, after a brief survey, we concluded that speculative thought could contribute nothing definite to the solution of the problem. But the science of ethics was called in to take up the question and, if possible, render a satisfactory answer. The sphere of morals promised more than those of science and philosophy, and the promise was largely fulfilled. Yet, there was, after all - after we were

satisfied with the postulate of personal immortality based upon man's moral life and needs - something lacking. At last, we appealed to religion, to the highest type of spiritual religion, Christianity, wherein we found the factor which was lacking in the ethical argument.

The final answer does not amount to a proof - as logic demands - but it does amount to a deep persuasion, conviction, based at once upon the character of God and the human individual's communion with Him.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ames, E. S. Psychology of Religious Experience. Boston, 1910.
- Aquinas, St. Thos. Summa Theologica, Part I, Third Number, Trans. by Fathers of the Dominican Province, New York, 1912
- Barrett, W. F. Psychological Research, New York, 1911.
- Bible, The Authorized ver. 1611; English revised ver. 1881.
- Bosanquet, B. The value and Destiny of the Individual London, 1913
- Bradley, F. H. Appearance and Reality, London, 1897
- Browning, R. Works, Boston, 1895
- Burnet, J. Early Greek Philosophy. London, 1908.
- Caird, John Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, Vol. 2, Glasgow, 1899
- Coe, Geo. A. Psychology of Religion, Chicago, 1916.
- Descartes, Rene In Rand: Modern Classical Philosophers, Boston, 1907
- Fiske, J. The Destiny of Man, Boston, 1884
- Green, T. H. In Rand: The Classical Moralists, Boston, 1909
- Hoffding, H. The Philosophy of Religion - Translation by B. E. Meyer, London, 1914.
- Hegel, G.M.F. In Rand: Modern Classical Philosophers.
- Hudson, T. J. The Scientific Demonstration of a Future Life - Chicago.
- James, Wm. Varieties of Religious Experience, London, 1903.
- Human Immortality. Boston, 1898.
- Jones, Sir H. A Faith that Enquires, London, 1922.

Bibliography (Cont'd)

- Kant, Emmanuel In Rand: Modern Classical Philosophers.
- Leibniz, G. W. In Rand: Modern Classical Philosophers.
- Leuba, J. H. Psychology of Religious Mysticism, New York.
The Belief in God and Immortality, Boston, 1915
- Matthews, W. R. The Destiny of the Soul, in Hibbert Journal,
January, 1930.
- Moore, G. F. Metempsychosis, Boston, 1922.
- Pillsbury, W. B. Essentials of Psychology, New York, 1911.
- Plato In Rand: The Classical Moralists

Everyman's Library: Symposium, Phaedrus,
Phaedo, London, 1920.

The Republic, Davies & Vaughan trans.
London, 1921.

Timaeus: in Gaye (R.K.) The Platonic
Conception of Immortality, Cambridge,
1904.
- Pratt, J. B. The Religious Consciousness, New York, 1923
- Pringle-Pattison, A.S. The Idea of God, in Recent Philosophy,
Oxford, 1920.

The Idea of Immortality, Oxford, 1922

Hegelianism and Personality, Edinburgh, 1887
- Rand, B. Modern Classical Philosophers

The Classical Moralists
- Royce, Josiah The World and the Individual, New York, 1908
- Smith, H. P. The Religion of Israel, New York, 1928.
- Smith, Norman K. Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy,
London, 1902.
- Spinoza, B. In Rand: Modern Classical Philosophers.
- Stirling, H. The Secret of Hegel. 2 Vols. London, 1866
- Streeter, B. H. Editor, Immortality, London, 1917

Bibliography (Cont'd)

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| Taylor, A. E. | Plato: The Man and his Work. New York, 1927 |
| Thomson, J. A. | The Bible of Nature - New York, 1908. |
| Tsanoff, R. A. | The Problem of Immortality - New York, 1924 |
| Ward, James | The Realm of Ends - Cambridge, 1912. |
| Watson, John | The Philosophy of Kant Explained. |
| Webb, C. C. J. | God and Personality - London, 1918 |
| Wright, H. W. | Self-Realisation - New York, 1910 |
| | Faith Justified by Progress - New York, 1916 |