

THINKING ABOUT SECURITY

By

Bailey Jessica Harris

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

The University of Manitoba

In partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

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Of

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ABSTRACT

The advancement of Security Studies has been lead by four main schools: Traditional Security Studies, the Copenhagen School, Third World Security Studies, and Critical Security Studies. Despite a vast library and the appearance of wide agenda, Security Studies provides a narrow and ultimately incomplete analysis of international security. This thesis suggests that Security Studies has made a fatal error in adopting positivist principles of theoretical dominance evidenced by the articulation of the security dialogue in terms of realist conceptions of the state, threats, and reactionary actors. In order for Security Studies to provide a useful analysis of the international security dynamic, it must move beyond grand theories and blind dedication to paradigmatic ideals. The theoretical divides among the four main schools are artificial and the schools have far more in common than their adherents would care to admit. The field must learn from Critical Theory and reject the notion that one theory or school provides all of the answers. By expanding the research agenda of Security Studies and embracing both the commonalities and differences among the schools, the field will enhance its understanding of security and will become a more useful endeavor.

CHAPTER I: WHAT IS SECURITY?

The study of national security is based on the assumption that relations among states are naturally antagonistic. As a result, Security Studies focuses a disproportionate amount of time on the politics of war. This can be attributed to two factors. First, war is simultaneously frightening and fascinating. It is a constant possibility in the relations among states that makes people want to understand it. The nightmarish qualities of war encourage a study of its avoidance. Second, given the apparent consistency of conflict, scholars have longed hoped that it would be relatively easy to make a science out of the study of war. This is a desirable endeavor given the devotion of the modern social sciences to the pursuit of paradigmaticism. To be recognized as valid study within the social sciences, Security Studies, like its parent, International Relations, has sought to develop a scientific explanation of war, assuming that validation would accompany such an accomplishment.

Since Thucydides wrote that the patterns of war are a constant theme among inter-state relations, the science of security began to grow from the belief that the patterns of war could lead to a prescription of peace. This has since encouraged scholars to lead the study along the road of the social sciences, hoping to gain a greater understanding of war. E.H Carr wrote, the “[desire] to cure the sickness of the body politic has given its impulse and its inspiration to political science...The wish is father to the thought.”¹ In *Peace and War: a Theory of*

¹ E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1939.) p. 3.

International Relations, Raymond Aron echoed Carr as he describes international relations as “the science of war and peace”² where the primary interest of the discipline lies in the study of the tides of conflict. Hans Morgenthau sought to develop a theory that would “bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.”³

However, despite the gallant attempts of some the greatest minds in the field, theoretical solutions to war under the guidance of Thucydean realism, Wilsonian liberalism, and Marxist revolutionism have sought to explain the causes and origins of war without providing an appreciable conclusion.⁴ They have each elicited a full spectrum of ideas and prescriptions, but have been unable to prevent the serial aggression of the twentieth and now the twenty-first, century.

The heuristic ‘failure’ of the major branches of international relations did not, however, thwart attempts to develop a single theory of international relations that could and would explain the recurrence of conflict. What evolved was the dominance of a single perspective that catered to the post war security dilemma and the Cold War security complexes. The war dialogue has been dominated by realist and neorealist epistemology, led mainly by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz respectively. Driven by the main tenets of *realpolitik*, the realist ‘paradigm’⁵ provides the most comprehensive and articulate war dialogue.

Realism, under the authority of Morgenthau, maintains that the “main signpost” of

² Raymond Aaron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox. (New York, NY.: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers, 1967.) p. 6.

³ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace*. Fifth edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 3.

⁴ See Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996) p. 10.

⁵ I use the term ‘paradigm’ loosely. As will discussed in Chapter 4, realism is not a paradigm in the true sense of the term. In fact, international relations have yet to achieve paradigmatic status.

international politics “is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”⁶ In contrast, neorealism or structural realism under the guidance of Waltz asserts that states seek security over power.⁷ Together, the tenants of realism and neorealism have shaped the security discourse. Struggles for power resulting in war or the quest for security resulting in insecurity are both indicative of the basic complexes of the security dialogue. The final result is always the same: conflict among states is chronic.

Ironically, the effort to create a single theory to explain perhaps the greatest challenge among states, has largely paralyzed the field, slowing theoretical progress, and thwarting attempts to bring the field in line with the realities of the twenty-first century. The quest to be recognized as a social science, to study the patterns of war and cure the body politic has weakened the field and left large gaps in the literature. The security dialogue that has formed the foundation on which the field has developed is largely incomplete; the most blatant absence being the inability to understand war, security, and peace. Thus the basis for this thesis is simple: the status of security studies is uncertain because the study has failed to fully conceptualize security. This is mainly a result of the dominance of realism and neo-realism which are to be understood as isolated theories, dominating over secondary theories such as Critical Security Studies, Third World Security Studies, and the Copenhagen School. Should Security Studies have future in the modern security discourse, the field will have to

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ED. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. p. 5.

⁷ See Kenneth N. Waltz Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959) and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Berkley, California: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979).

abandon the pursuit to be a social science and instead focus its energy on developing a literature that understands the impossibility of theoretical simplicity.

Realism

Morgenthau saw the nature of conflict as being central to the human personality: man always seeks power. Power is the ultimate end to which all political relations are directed. It is the drive for power that produces the conditions of war.⁸ Skillful diplomacy and a balance of power may instigate a struggle for peace, but “at best, these offer only temporary respites from the perennial problem of war driven by the human being’s search for power.”⁹ While states may act on other considerations, such actions are not “of a political nature.”¹⁰ Thus the politics of states are naturally intertwined with the power politics of war.

Realism postulates that security is a political objective that may only be achieved through political means. However, security must compete with often conflicting objectives. Given the absence of a governing authority within the international system, competition for scarce resources naturally results in a struggle for power enacted through conflict or war. This struggle arises for two reasons. First, men crave scarce resources which cause conflict among those who share their desire. Man is not bellecist by nature, but simply greedy. The second root for conflict seems to be given the most weight in Morgenthau’s thesis: the primary cause for conflict is “the *animus dominandi*, the desire

⁸ See Doyle, Michael W. Ways of War and Peace. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1997, p. 46.

⁹ Kalevi Holsti, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁰ Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 27-28.

for power.”¹¹ Man’s drive for power is far more influential than the rare conditions under which struggles for power may occur. He writes, “in a world where power counts, no nation pursuing a rational policy has a choice between renouncing and wanting power; and if it could, the lust for power for the individual’s sake could still confront us with its less spectacular yet no less pressing moral defects.”¹² Morgenthau concludes that man’s innate lust for power is a sufficient cause of war.

Security, therefore, falls somewhere after the pursuit of power. If security, either domestic or international, can result in a greater power differential for a state, then it is a high priority. If, however, security may only be achieved by sacrificing the potential or actual power of a state, then not only would this reduce any incentive to seek secure relations, but would likely result in greater insecurity as states seek greater power. Security is merely one of many tools to achieve power.

Neorealism

Neorealism “sees power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it.”¹³ As such, states try to have an appropriate amount of power in order to ensure state security. Where realism was ultimately concerned with power as the desired end, neorealism has revised this prescription and instead identifies *security* as the ultimate concern. More significantly, neorealism walks further away from its original namesake by rejecting Morgenthau’s one-directional approach to explaining the causation of war. Instead, neorealism contends that in order to

¹¹ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 192.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹³ Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, Ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, (New York, NY: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1989), p. 40.

understand international politics, it is necessary to examine the effects of structure at the unit-level. Simply, Waltz's theory tries to dissect the pressures on the state within the international system that can be attributed to war. By so doing, the expectation is that maps to security may be drawn. Thus where Morgenthau understood security to mean the desired end (power), Waltz seeks to determine routes, or means, to security.

Waltz suggests that a direct correlation between actions and outcomes in a complex dynamic such as the international system is far too simplistic and would ignore other variants that undoubtedly have an effect. Governmental organization, economic (dis)equilibrium, social institutions, and political ideologies have all been sourced as contributing causes of war. But the identification of causes at the unit level has not resulted in the eradication of war. Waltz writes, "[i]f an identifiable condition seems to have caused a given war, one must wonder why wars occur repeatedly even though their causes vary."¹⁴ He suggests that international outcomes result from interaction at the unit and structural level. Causes at the unit level interact with those at the structural level thereby explaining how a one-directional focus misdiagnoses causation. Taking this further, Waltz provides a systemic portrait of international politics comprised of states acting as unitary actors within an anarchic system. He identifies the "twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy:" first, states in an anarchic order must provide for their own security; and second, threats or perceived threats to state security are always present. As such, relations among states are constantly tense, giving way to suspicious and hostile relations. Individual defensive intentions typically yield arms races and alliances, further exacerbated by the familiar 'security dilemma' where measures to enhance one state's

¹⁴ Waltz, "The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory, op. cit., p. 41.

security typically diminish another's.¹⁵ In an anarchic system, "the source of one's own comfort is the source of another's worry."¹⁶

Waltz agrees with Morgenthau that some states simply lust for power for power's sake. However, neorealist theory demonstrates that it is not necessary to assume an innate hunger for power in order to explain competition among states in an anarchic arena: "In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety."¹⁷ War is bound to occur. This analysis, however, is far from reassuring nor is it particularly helpful given security as the identified objective. Where Morgenthau undertook the quest to determine origin and prevention through his analysis of one-dimensional causation, neorealist theory does not attempt to explain why wars are fought. Instead, it tries to explain the recurrence of war through the millennia. Waltz points to the structure of the international system as the primary culprit. The Treaties of Westphalia created sovereign states without imposing a system of law enforceable to all among them. What transpired was the creation of a system wherein each state judges its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own desires and logic, often leading to conflict, and sometimes leading to war. States function within a self-help system where "to achieve a favorable outcome from such conflict a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern."¹⁸ Thus, given the structure of the system, states are compelled to focus first and foremost on security.

¹⁵ See John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, II (1950), 157-180. This concept originates in Thucydides account of the 'inevitable' cause of the Peloponnesian War, "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta."

¹⁶ Waltz, "The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44

¹⁸ Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 159.

States are most concerned with the use and exercise of force. Given that all states operate within this self-help system, it is assumed that all states concern themselves with securing a force structure, thereby further exacerbating the security dilemma. As Waltz notes, "in anarchy, there is no automatic harmony."¹⁹ In order to maintain or establish a secure environment, a state will use force if deemed necessary and the prospects for success outweigh the likelihood of failure. Adopting Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means,"²⁰ it could be argued that the use of force is always a possible means employed by states to implement its policies. Because this option is always present, states must be prepared to counter force with force, or be prepared to embrace the cost of weakness. Preparation for insecurity may, therefore, contribute to greater security, it may also aggravate the security dilemma and diminish security at a rapid rate.

According to the neorealist epistemology, force is "a reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy."²¹ The study of this system naturally gravitates towards the study of war. Holsti writes:

The Clausewitzian concept of war as a means of serving state interests continues to form the intellectual and conceptual foundation for international organizations, national military institutions, the practices of diplomacy, and the academy. The ultimate problem for all of them remains war between states.²²

¹⁹ Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 160.

²⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Ed. And Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 99.

²¹ Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 238.

²² Kalevi Holsti, op. cit., p. 6.

The role of international relations theory and Security Studies specifically, as Waltz suggests, is to “explain what historians know: War is normal.”²³

The trouble, however, is to reconcile this observation with the general objective of security. This is difficult because Waltz does not tell us what security is and how it may be achieved. He does not provide a roadmap for those wishing to enhance state security while also seeking to avoid greater insecurity. Simply, Waltz tells us that security is the primary objective, but that states seeking to enhance security may do so at the expense of other states thereby aggravating the security equilibrium and doing very little to bring about secure relations among states. Security therefore, is temporary, indefinite, and a source of war. This is not only counterintuitive but also not particularly helpful. Waltz identifies an objective among states but only initiates a security dialogue that requires a great deal of attention. In the initial stages of the discourse, all that can be determined is that security is not the absence of war, for how can it be so if it is a cause of conflict. Therefore despite the efforts of perhaps the leading scholar of security and strategic studies, the academia is no closer to understanding what security actually is or how it can be achieved.

What is security?

Scholars of all denominations maintain that security is the basic nutrient of the state. Waltz suggests that ‘security is the ultimate concern of international politics.’

Richard Ullman insists that of all goods provided by the state, “none is more fundamental than security.”²⁴ Without it, as Hobbes observed,

²³ Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁴ Ullman, Richard. “Redefining Security.” *International Security*. Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), p. 130.

There is not place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor the use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no instruments of moving and removing such things require much force, no knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.²⁵

While security discourse monopolizes theoretical and political debate, a standard definition of security evades the both academy and practioners. Attempts to establish empirical definitions of security have hit normative roadblocks. Security is a value-laden term that can be individually, ethnically, nationally, religiously, or regionally based. Moreover, security encompasses a wide array of referent objects which can change and transform over time thereby demanding constant redefinition. The end result is the noticeable absence of a universal definition of security. Instead, there are a multitude of definitions to choose from, many of which are so ambiguous that they reflect very little on the term. The result is two fold. First, the academy devotes far too much attention disagreeing over the thesis of the study. Second, the study cannot easily be translated to any degree of practical value. Stanley Hoffman suggests that scholars have two reasons to be dissatisfied: the state of the world, and the state of their discipline. He adds, "if only these two reasons always converged."²⁶ The first step towards enhancing the value of the study while simultaneously working towards a more secure world, is to determine what security actually is.

²⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part 1, Ch. XIII as Quoted in Ullman, Richard. "Redefining Security." International Security. Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), at p. 130.

²⁶ Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," ed. Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. Jarvis, International Relations – Still an American Social Science? Towards Diversity in International Thought, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001) p. 50.

Is Security Synonymous with Peace?

Aristotle wrote, “we make war that we may live in peace.” While the inevitability of war has been generally accepted, the desire for peace has not been forgotten by scholars of international relations. E.H. Carr dedicated his famous work *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* “to the makers of peace.” Modern history has been marked by statements and proclamations for peace;²⁷ yet peace research has received little attention within Security Studies. There are four reasons for this. First, peace is perceived to be a utopian ideal. As Waltz noted, ‘war is normal.’ Although it may appear logical to assume that the absence of war is peace, most scholars insist that peace is not only an unrealistic proposition, it is defunct of real meaning. Lenin wrote, ‘peace is a meaningless aim;’ “Absolutely everybody is in favour of peace in general, including Kitchener, Joffre, Hindenburg and Nicholas the Bloody, for every one of them wishes to end the war.”²⁸ In other words, peace is an easy quick answer to the end of the torments of war, but in most cases, state leaders are simply offering lip service to an otherwise obsolete alternative. Morgenthau and Waltz clearly outlined that states select a course of action based on their particular interests at a particular time. One state may only seek a peaceful resolution to a conflict or ongoing peaceful relationships if such a course of action suits the needs of that particular state at that moment. Therefore, where Country A takes the appropriate course of action towards a peaceful resolution with Country B, if such a resolution is not in Country B’s favour, then the resolution will fail and peace will not be obtained. Both

²⁷ See Carr, *op cit.*, at p. 52: “Peace must prevail, must come before all” Briand, *League of Nation: Ninth Assembly*, p. 83; “The maintenance of peace is the first objective of British Foreign Policy” Eden. *League of Nations: Sixteenth Assemble*, p. 106; “Peace is our dearest treasure.” Hitler, in a speech to the german Reichstag on January 30, 1937, reported in *The Times*, February 1, 1937; “The Principle aim of the international policy of the Soviet Union is the preservation of peace.” Chicherin in *The Soviet Union and Peace* (1929), p. 129; “The object of Japan, despite propaganda to the contrary, is peace.” Matsuoka, *League of Nations: Special Assembly 1932-33*, iii. P. 73 .

²⁸ Lenin, *Collected Works* (Eng. Transl.), xviii. P. 264. Quoted by E.H. *op. cit.* p. 52.

countries may proclaim to 'want peace,' but until the interests of both states coincide, peace is untenable. Carr explains:

The utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is identifiable with the interests of each individual nation helped politicians and political writers everywhere to evade the unpalatable fact of a fundamental divergence of interest between nations desirous of maintaining the *status quo* and nations desirous of changing it.²⁹

Peace may be desirable, but it is not desirable to all at the same time or to the same extent.

The second problem facing peace research is that while peace is desirable, it is difficult to achieve. A peace process is long and complicated and often involves periodic surges in violence and social unrest before it may be achieved. Moreover, peace is an elusive concept. If peace is understood simply to be the absence of war, then peace research is confronted with one major challenge: what is a war? Take for example, the Canadian military's role in Afghanistan. Although Canadian cities are free of violent military attacks, members of the Canadian military are involved in military operations outside Canadian domestic borders wherein soldiers have been killed and injured and lead operations against Afghani and Taliban insurgents. Canada is not 'at war' in the traditional sense, but Canadian soldiers are involved in significant military operations and it appears will remain so for quite some time. Similarly, the war in Iraq has resulted in the death of over three thousand American soldiers and an unknown number of Iraqis, yet the war has not resulted in violence within the domestic borders of the United States. The economic and political effects of the war, have however, been felt directly by American civilians. The Bush Administration maintains that the 'war' is over and the current

²⁹ Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

operation is part of the transition towards an independent and 'peaceful' Iraq. However, American military expenditures along with military casualties reflect a very 'war-like' environment.

A third conceptual challenge facing peace research is the tendency to characterize threats as violence against states. The ongoing 'war on terror' highlights several issues. The threat of a terrorist attack on Canadian soil, although generally perceived to be remote, is a threat of violence against Canada that has implications on military expenditures, training, and deployment within Canada and around the world. Any threat against a state results in a serious degradation of an existing domestic peace. Similarly, a threat against the United States has serious implications to Canada. Any attack against the United States will be felt in Canada given shared borders, an integrated economy, and political and military alliances. Peace, therefore, may be jeopardized even if a state is not under direct military attack.

If peace is understood only to be the absence of war, and if war is ultimately inevitable in an anarchic system of antagonistic states, the universal absence of conflict is an unrealistic assumption rooted in fantasy rather than fact. This leads to the fourth problem facing peace research: peace is perceived to be a systemic irregularity and consequently presents a challenge to any theoretical endeavor. Scholars like Morgenthau and Waltz were fond of repeating Blaise Pascal's remark that "the history of the world would have been different had Cleopatra's nose been shorter" and then asking "How do you systemize that?"³⁰ Security Studies and International Relations generally strive to recognize systemic regularities. As explained, the dominant perspectives in security

³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Relations: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches," in Norman D. Plamer (ed.), *A Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance*, (Philadelphia, 1970), p. 78. See also, Waltz, "The origins of war in neorealist theory," *op. cit.*, p. 39.

studies see war as the common denominator in the international system. It is a permanent fixture in relations among states. War has long been identified as an innate characteristic of the system. It can be defined in terms of an identifiable end or a means through which policy can be achieved. The same assertion cannot be made of peace; peace cannot be systemized. Peace is not a regular occurrence. It may be desirable but, as discussed, it not sought by all state actors at the same time and to the same extent. Regardless of how the 'system' is defined, peace has never been the common or frequent thread among state relations. Conflict, in some form or another always corrupts what might otherwise be peaceful relations. Therefore state actors do not seek peace. Instead, they seek merely to reduce or refine conflict. Security Studies has adopted, whether consciously or not, Spenser Wilkinson's dictum: "It is not peace but preponderance that is in each case the real object. The truth cannot be too often repeated that peace is never the object of policy: you cannot define peace except by reference to war, which is a means and never an end."³¹ Thus peace cannot be the end politicians and academics seek. Instead, the focus shifts to a more versatile derivative of peace: security.

Defining Security

In a survey of commonly cited definitions, many provide a vague definition of security. For example, Laurence Martin suggests that security is simply "the assurance of future well being."³² John Mroz maintains that security is "the *relative freedom* from harmful threats."³³ Neither definition serves to provide a concise definition that will

³¹ Spenser Wilkinson, *Government and the War*, p. 121. as referred to in Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

³² Laurence Martin, "Can there be National Security in an Insecure Age," *Encounter*, 60:3 (1983), p. 12 as quoted in Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³³ John E. Mroz, *Beyond Security: Private perceptions among Arabs and Israelis*, (New York: International Peace Academy, 1980), p. 105 (emphasis in original), as quoted in Buzan, *Ibid.*, p. 17.

assist either academics or government officials in determining appropriate action nor do they identify the type of threat perceived to be a security concern. In this respect, neither definition is of any great value.

The most common origin of security definitions lies within the principle of *national security*. Penelope Hartland-Thunberg defines national security as “the ability of a nation to pursue successfully its national interests, as it sees them, in any part of the world.”³⁴ The problem with this definition, although better than the two above, is that it is incomplete. Harland-Thunberg does not explain what might be considered to be an issue of “national interests.” Hartland-Thunberg may interpret ‘national interests’ quite differently than Ole Waever or Laurence Martin, for example, based on personal experience or an ethnocentric bias. Any definition of ‘national interest’ depends on the particular nation (not state) wherein security is sought. It is therefore, a subjective assessment of security that is value-reliant. Thus while Hartland-Thunberg might have set out to provide an objective definition, she cannot escape the rigidity of her unique value systems which ultimately determine how she may interpret the national imperatives of her state respectively. Security will ultimately be defined in light of the subjective assessment of insecurity. Although a subjective definition may be the most plausible given the dynamics of the subject matter, it will likely also prove to be rather unsatisfying. Essentially a subjective definition serves only to demonstrate with great vigour the fact that there is no universal understanding of what security is or how it may be achieved.

³⁴ Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, “National economic security: interdependence and vulnerability,” in Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau and Jacques Pelkmans (eds), *National Economic Security*, (Tillburg: John F. Kennedy Institute, 1982), p. 105 as quoted in Buzan, *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Arnold Wolfers acknowledges the role values play in defining security. He suggests: “security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, [and] in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”³⁵ This definition, though popular, relies exclusively on normative interpretations of values. Security to one person, one nation, or one state, is not the same as to another person, nation, or state. If understood in light of threats to values, the study of security will continue to operate without the guidance of some degree of formal lineage. This may not be a bad thing, but given the dedication of theorists and scholars towards conceptual neatness, normative applications have no place in the larger endeavor.

This survey of popular definitions serves only to reveal what Wolfers had concluded years earlier: Security is an “ambiguous symbol” and “may not have any precise meaning at all.”³⁶ Yet this conclusion does not bode well with international relations theorists who are dedicated to the pursuit of theoretical formulation. If security, as Waltz asserts, is *the* ultimate concern for international politics, then it is imperative to establish a tactical definition that serves to assist not only in understanding *what* security is, but also *how* security can serve to establish a theory of international relations. Returning to Blaise Pascal’s remark, ambiguity makes systemization rather difficult. The obsession within international relations for theoretical clarity requires a universal definition.

In order to develop a systemic definition of security, it is first necessary to understand the system in which security is sought. To again quote Ken Booth, “the state

³⁵ Arnold Wolfers. “National Security as an ambiguous symbol” *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150 as referred to in Buzan, People, States and Fear, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁶ Wolfers, *op. cit.*, chapter 10.

system is believed intrinsically to be a 'war system.'³⁷ States are not always at war with one another, but the fear of war is endogenous to the system. Recalling the basic premise of the 'security dilemma,' states cannot predict reactions within the anarchic system. States arm themselves for the sake of security, thereby compelling other states to follow suit and triggering "a vicious cycle into motion."³⁸ States feel less secure because the means to their security lies in the insecurity of others, thereby perpetuating the cycle. This dilemma is fundamentally asserted within the anarchic structure of the international system. The politics of security is contingent upon understanding this system.

Barry Buzan, one of leading proponents of security discourse in international relations, has identified three conditions imposed by structural forces on the concept of international security which have been widely applied to systemic definitions of national security. First, Buzan suggests that states are the "dominant referent object of security" because they are the highest source of governing authority in an anarchic domain. He insists that this serves to explain the dominating policy concern of 'national security.'³⁹ The second condition stipulates that the "idea of international security ... is best used to refer to the systemic conditions that influence the way in which states make each other feel more or less secure."⁴⁰ Buzan extends earlier assertions by realists and neorealists who argue that the actions of states are constrained due to systemic pressures. For example, Aaron insists that "politics, insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to signify – in both ideal and objective terms – simply the survival of states confronting

³⁷ Ken Booth, "War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace," *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, p. 337.

³⁸ Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Berkley, California: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979, p. 186.

³⁹ Barry Buzan, "Is international security possible?" *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security*. Ed. Ken Booth. London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991, p. 34.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

the potential threat created by the existence of other states.”⁴¹ In other words, national security is threatened by the mere existence of other states. Waltz adds that “In anarchy, security is the highest end. ... The Goal the system encourages [states] to seek is security.”⁴² Thus the system is innately insecure which triggers a dedicated response to achieve some element of security.

Finally, Buzan contends that the international system has, and always will be, anarchic. State survival is the first priority given this framework within which insecurity breeds. If this framework is accepted, defining security becomes a much simpler task: “the practical meaning of security can only be constructed sensibly if it can be made operational within an environment in which competitive relations are inescapable.”⁴³ Security must be understood within the context of perpetual insecurity among war fearing states. Unable to ignore periods of stability and peace among states, Buzan pulls from Morgenthau’s argument that “peace is subject to the conditions of time and space.” The philosopher can universalize peace under ideal conditions whereas the “practitioner of the political art” can only examine case by case examples.⁴⁴ Secure relations may exist between individual states or collectivities but will never be universal; the structure of the system ensures this. This means that “under anarchy, security can only be relative, never absolute.”⁴⁵

Based on this analysis, security must be conceptualized within the war dialogue.

Insecurity would imply living *with* the fear of war within an anarchic state system.

⁴¹ Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. Trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox. New York, NY.: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers, 1967, p. 6.

⁴² Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 126

⁴³ Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?” New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, Ed. Ken Booth, (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 34.

⁴⁴ Morgenthau, Scientific Man, op. cit., p. 217.

⁴⁵ Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?” op. cit., p. 34.

Security, on the other hand, would imply living *without* the fear of war. Some, including Ian Bellany⁴⁶, Giacomo Luciani⁴⁷, and Walter Lippman⁴⁸ among others, have offered definitions rooted in the assumption that war and security are exclusive companions. This does not mean that a secure environment is one which is not in the throws of war. Security is far too subjective to fall within such easy empirical classifications. Rather security will be defined in light of the subjective assessment of threats from individual states operating within a generally anarchic and insecure system. States, governments, and individuals will interpret threats differently. Moreover, as Carr and others have said, the absence of fear is not the same as living in peace. To reiterate, peace cannot be systemized; security, on the other hand, can be systemized. It is conceptualized within the war dialogue, operating within an anarchic system consisting of self-serving states wherein the fear of war consistently determines the behaviour of states. Survival is the primary concern which invokes extreme action and reaction to this fear. Security is ultimately understood in light of violent threats or the potential of force against the state thereby invoking the fear of war.

⁴⁶ Ian Bellany defines security as "a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur. Cited in Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, p. 16. See Ian Bellany, "Towards a theory of international security," *Political Studies*, 29:1 (1981), p. 102

⁴⁷ Giacomo Luciani suggests that "national security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad." Cited in Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, p. 17. See Giacomo Luciani, "The economic content of security," *Journal of Public Policy*, 8:2 (1989), p. 151.

⁴⁸ Walter Lippman argues that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war." Cited in Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore: (John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150.

Security Defined as the Threat of War

The systemic conceptualization of security was reinforced during the Cold War where strategic interests lay at the heart of all security concerns. Based on the primacy of violent threats against the state, national security was approached through a mediation of military concerns. With the advent of the atomic bomb, security discourse morphed into nuclear strategy; everything was about the bomb. Previous concern with state survival suddenly gained a new and fatal imperative that demanded immediate analysis. Strategic studies evolved out of this demand and quickly established a precise approach to the study of military threats. These threats required intense focus and narrowed the scope of security further from war to military security specifically. Thus during the Cold War and Post-Cold War era, any systemic definition of security became synonymous with security in light of specific military threats against the state.

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde define securitization as “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”⁴⁹ Within the strategic landscape of international relations after WWII and throughout the Cold War, threats were understood in light of the fear of total war. Thus military security was largely about the absence or presence of a threat of force.

A traditional objectivist definition of military security would suggest that military security is the “pursuit of actual or perceived freedom of threat from organized political violence.”⁵⁰ This definition is problematic because, as Buzan and Herring point out, achievement of such freedom would imply that military security is no longer an issue. If

⁴⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998) p. 25.

⁵⁰ Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) p. 1.

one adopts a constructivist view, then military security is “the way in which states or other actors securitize ... with other actors or situations by defining them as existential threats requiring exceptional countermeasures.”⁵¹

Definitions of military security do not differ in any great respect from definitions of military strategy. Popular definitions include: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy;”⁵² “exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy;”⁵³ “the relationship between military power and political purpose;”⁵⁴ and “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.”⁵⁵ Gray suggests that military strategy is about “force, or the threat of force.”⁵⁶ If taken to be true, military security is synonymous with military strategy. However, this would imply that strategy is synonymous with security. Bull defines strategy as “the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of conflict.”⁵⁷ Strategy, specifically military strategy, encourages a narrow focus on military technologies, military relations between states, and “the interplay between the two.”⁵⁸ If security is understood in this light, then the study of security is fixed in a militaristic direction thereby failing to understand the complex dimensions at play in any security analysis.

⁵¹ Buzam, Waever, de Wilde, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24. See also, Buzan and Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵² B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: the Indirect Approach*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1968,) p. 334 as quoted in Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd Edition*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. XX..

⁵³ Hedley Bull, “Strategic Studies and Its Critics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 2, 1968, p. 598.

⁵⁴ Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1982), p. 1 as quoted in Buzan and Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵⁵ Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), p. 22 as quoted in Buzan and Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵⁶ Collin Gray, *Strategic Studies, a Critical Assessment*, (London: Aldwych Press, 1982), p. 3 as quoted in Buzan and Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 593.

⁵⁸ Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?” *op. cit.*, p. 35.

A second concern worth noting is that strategic interests have immediate policy reactions that reflect a strong ethnocentric bias.⁵⁹ As Ken Booth notes, throughout the Cold War, when asked who the experts on security are, the natural answer was ‘the strategists,’ specifically, a new breed of nuclear strategists in the United States.⁶⁰ As Edward Luttwak has argued, strategic studies is not “a neutral pursuit; its only purpose is to strengthen one’s own side in the contention of nations.”⁶¹ Thus strategy and security during the Cold War were one of the same. This is no real surprise given the military climate at the time, however the trouble lies in the fact that the Cold War is now over and the environment has changed even though the epistemology has not. The intellectual dominance of American literature under the influence of doctrinal realist conceptions of a self-help system, discouraged attempts to introduce an analysis of security interdependence and refine systemic aspects of the concept to meld with a changing political landscape.

This leads directly to a third concern regarding the limited scope of strategic security: the strategic infrastructure is out of date. The fascination with nuclear doctrine was understandable following the advent of nuclear weapons, however, the strategic landscape has undergone a rapid transformation once again. Deterrence, disarmament, and Cold War military-industrial complexes no longer monopolize the security debates among states. As Booth notes, the outlook of strategic fundamentalists of the Reagan era would paint a very different portrait of the strategic landscape than would be required

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

⁶⁰ Ken Booth, “War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace,” New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, Ed. Ken Booth, (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 351.

⁶¹ Edward Luttwak, Strategy and History. Collected Essays, Vol. 2 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1985), p. xiii quoted by Booth, op. cit., p. 371.

today.⁶² Despite this, the works of leading scholars seeking to conceptualize security continue to draw on Cold War semantics. Perhaps more accurately, while there have been efforts to direct the discussion beyond the strategic scope of Cold War nomenclature, security discourse continues to be dominated by several leading works that reflect state-centric interpretations of the Cold War strategic infrastructure. This not only retards scholastic endeavors, but has also resulted in developmental delays in the field. As long as the basis of the study remains fixed in the Cold War language, the study of security cannot evolve beyond the rigidity of the Cold War dynamic. This is true despite the fact that the iron curtain fell over twenty years ago. This remains true given the current strategic and security framework.

A fourth concern is the extent to which the reluctance to broaden “regressive strategic mindsets”⁶³ leads to ideological fundamentalism. If security is understood exclusively under the scope of strategic militarism, then theoretical alternatives to doctrinal realism are limited. A narrow perspective can result in theoretical and disciplinary myopia. When discussing security specifically, a restrictive definition along the lines of Bull’s definition of strategy will result in the erection of fences which prevent a cross-cultural discussion. These fences prevent the rich dialogue required for theoretical pluralism to flourish. They discourage asking “the hard questions” such as ‘what if deterrence fails?’⁶⁴ and ‘how should states respond to non-military threats?’ Academics are dedicated to the standard definition and have become complacent and either fail to acknowledge other possibilities or choose to ignore conflicting interpretations. In the end, this overzealous attachment to strategic security has retarded

⁶² Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 370-371.

⁶³ Booth, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

an honest assessment of security and the development of a universal definition that can mature beyond the strategic stronghold.

Broadening Security Studies?

The complexity of national security has captivated academics from all theoretical denominations despite the ambiguity of the concept and its scope. “Security” retains the intellectual, practical, and rhetorical influence to demand attention, yet with all that has been written about security, there lacks consensus and Security Studies is marred by ongoing debate. There are noticeable divides in the literature which have been deemed to represent individual schools, existing under the broad umbrella of Security Studies and International Relations more generally. Barry Buzan suggests that there are three schools in which the security literature may be divided: Traditional Security Studies which retains a largely military focus; the Copenhagen School (the wideners) who wish to extend the security agenda to include a range of issues⁶⁵; and Critical Security Studies which proposes a critical reexamination of the basic premises of security. There is one other school that Buzan has noticeably ignored that provides a unique and relevant analysis of security in the post Cold War era: Third World Security Studies, which draws attention to the growing security dilemma among developing countries and the impact regional insecurity in the underdeveloped world has on the developed states. Given contemporary security challenges ranging from

⁶⁵ The title ‘Copenhagen School’ was given by Bill McSweeney to refer to the group of individuals writing with Buzan and Weaver since 1988 under the auspices of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. See McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” *Review of International Studies* 22(1), 1996, pp. 81-93.

terrorism to ethnic conflict in Darfur to the war in Iraq, it provides an important voice to the security debate.

For the purpose of this study, four schools will be discussed: Traditional Security Studies, the Copenhagen School, the Third World Security School, and Critical Security Studies. All four schools claim to do four things differently: focus on different threats; identify alternative referent actors; provide a unique systemic analysis of the international system; and rely on varying methodological, ontological, and epistemological applications. In short, each school strives to provide the student with a unique conceptualization of security. However, as will be discussed in the chapters that follow, the debate between the schools is artificial.

Traditional Security Studies is the founding father of security discourse. It originates from realist and neorealist principles of national security, power, war, and strategic significance. It is a product of the Cold War and continues to espouse Cold War thinking in the post-Cold War era. It ties military strategy with national security and asserts the primacy of realist principles of the state, power, bipolarity, sovereignty, and territoriality. Patrick Morgan, a self-proclaimed traditionalist, provides a clear articulation of the traditional perspective; "Security has long been about the survival and physical safety of the actors and their people; by extension it concerns the *deliberate* use of force by states (and some other actors) for various purposes."⁶⁶ The survival of the state and its components (government, citizens, etc.) is the main object.

⁶⁶ Patrick Morgan, "Liberalist and Realist sec Studies at 2000: Two Decades of Progress?" Contemporary Security Policy Special Edition, "Critical Reflections on Security and Change" Ed. Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1999), p. 40.

During the Cold War, security was under-theorized while the focus lay on strategic aims and theories of deterrence and arms control. Strategic Studies was the study of military relations among states wherein nuclear issues were dominant.⁶⁷ The shift to security studies was largely a response to the failure of the predictive power of Strategic Studies and the dissolution of the Cold War.⁶⁸ However, while the title of the discipline changed, the focus did not. As Strategic Studies was replaced with the softer agenda of security, the strategic interests inherent in its predecessor remained largely intact. In probably the most widely cited article in Security Studies following the Cold War, Stephen Walt offers a review of the 'renaissance in security studies.'⁶⁹ Walt was concerned with the widening of the security agenda to include non-military issues under the new Security Studies. He argued that Security Studies ought to be *solely* concerned with the phenomenon of war and could be defined as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force."⁷⁰ He added that Security Studies "fits comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm."⁷¹ This position was reinforced by Freedman who has proposed a "realist revival" in the field in order to prevent over extending security outside the traditional and accepted parameters of the field. Efforts to reinvigorate the ties between the school and realism are very significant as they place clear limits on threat assessment.

⁶⁷ Steve Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," *Contemporary Security Policy, Special Edition*, "Critical Reflections on Security and Change," Ed. Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1999), p. 72.

⁶⁸ For a complete discussion of the transition from Strategic Studies to Security Studies see Smith, *op. cit.*; Thomas G. Mahnken, "The future of Strategic Studies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 2004 Vol. 26 No. 1.

⁶⁹ Stephan Walt, "The Renaissance in Security Studies?" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1991, pp. 211-239.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

Attempts to widen the security agenda offered by traditionalists have been widespread since the early 1980s. The decline of political-military issues triggered Buzan and others to examine a progressive security agenda. These writers were originally referred to as “wideners” and later began to fragment into two groups or schools. The first group under the leadership of Barry Buzan was dubbed the Copenhagen School. As Ken Booth has argued, Buzan’s 1983 book *People, States and Fear* “remains the most comprehensive theoretical analysis of the concept [of security] in international relations literature to date, and since its publication, the rest of us have been writing footnotes to it.”⁷² Buzan is credited with expanding the agenda of Security Studies beyond the traditional military focus. He offers five security sectors (political, military, economic, environmental and societal) that he argues must be assessed based on changes in the security environment since the early 1980s. However, despite encouraging a widened agenda, Buzan’s framework serves to reinforce state centrism and provided a “sophisticated neorealist account of security.”⁷³

The second group tends to distance themselves from the neorealist affinities of the Copenhagen School and has produced a number of significant articles which examine non-traditional threats. Although Buzan refers this second group as the Wideners, this title has not been widely accepted. This is primarily due to the noticeable absence of a clear theoretical parent such realism, neorealism, or neoliberalism and the absence of any sort of framework or common ground other than their acceptance of non-traditional security threats. Writers such as Ullman, Tuchman Mathews, Haftendorn, Baldwin, Nye, and Lynn-Jones are critical of the narrow agenda of the Traditional School but are united

⁷² Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1991, p. 317 as Quoted in Steve Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁷³ Steve Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

only in their criticism and their advocacy for a wider agenda. They each call for the need to redefine security in light of new security threats such as population growth and resource scarcity, but they do not add much else to the discussion. Unlike the Copenhagen School, the so-called 'Wideners' do not examine threat assessment generally, but rather examine specific threats carefully. This is helpful only insofar as bringing non-traditional threats to the attention of security writers. It does not assist writers in determining whether such threats ought to be considered *security* threats specifically. There is no concerted attempt to redefine security in light of these threats, but rather a call for a redefinition of security in light of threats or simply the acknowledgment that such threats exist.

Smith appears to group these writers into the traditional camp which is both presumptuous and incorrect. Buzan is also incorrect in asserting a notable connection between the Copenhagen School and these writers. Instead, the so-called 'wideners' can be best associated with Critical Security Studies not because they provide a similar assessment of where Security Studies ought to be directed, but rather because this school is most welcoming to basic threat assessments that offer no more than that.

Before looking more closely at the Critical School, it is important to briefly examine Third World Security Studies because like the Copenhagen School, it too provides a critique of the Traditional School, but upon closer examination, it actually builds on the Traditionalists' main assumptions. Third World Security Studies is critical of Traditional Security Studies in several ways. First, the traditional literature discusses Third World security only insofar as it

affected the bipolarity of the Cold War system.⁷⁴ As the Traditional School maintains loyal to the Cold War literature, very little changed following the end of the Cold War and the Third World continued to be under studied. More specifically, the post-Cold War security literature tends to take for granted that the world is more secure as writers and policy makers celebrate the end of the War, the demise of repressive regimes, and a safer environment for democracies.⁷⁵ However, this optimism cannot be carried outside the developed world as the majority of the world's population in underdeveloped states is faced with ongoing conflict, genocide, and regional displacement. As violence persists and the death tolls grow, policy-makers and academics have been forced to acknowledge the evolving security dynamic in the Third World. Greater attention to Third World security was evident in the early nineties as think tanks began to catalog wars, civil violence, and refugee flows in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.⁷⁶ As the catalogs grew, it became apparent that the underdeveloped world had become "the exclusive arena of conflict in the postwar system."⁷⁷ The Third World Security School brought underdevelopment to the forefront of security discussions, thereby merging development and security, attempting to force people to see poverty and underdevelopment as a threat.

⁷⁴ Steve Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁷⁵ Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* Ed. Brian L. Job, (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1992), p. 11. See also John Gaddis *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security*, 13:2, pp. 55-79.

⁷⁶ See SIPRI Yearbook, 1990, Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*, (Washington DC: World Priorities, 1991); Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Contests and International Order, 1648-1989*. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁷⁷ Job, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Despite the accomplishments of this study, the Third World Security School picked up where the Traditional School left off. As policy-makers and academics began to make the correlation between development and security, they were confronted with inadequate theoretical tools to try to understand and explain the dynamic. As Brian Job notes,

[T]raditional concepts and theories of international relations theory, articulated in the central premises of realist thinking – territoriality, sovereignty, national-statehood, nonintervention, and separation of domestic and foreign policy – proved inadequate to the task at hand. Internal and external, domestic-international distinctions make little sense in situations where penetration and intervention by other states and groups is the norm rather than the exception.⁷⁸

Thus, the Third World Security School was faced with the daunting task of not only trying to reformulate such conceptions, but first trying to convince a reluctant audience that such revisions were necessary. The outcome has been an ongoing struggle for Third World Security Studies which far too often results in sacrificial compromise and yielding to the pressure of the dominance of the Traditional School.

Smith suggests that Critical Security Studies is “the most sustained and coherent critique of Traditional Security Studies.”⁷⁹ This is a rather easy assertion to make given the primary purpose of the endeavor is to provide an alternative to the status quo and tends to be perceived to be first and foremost a critique of the Traditional School. However there are two schools of thought within Critical Security Studies and only one actually serves to provide a ‘sustained and coherent critique’ to the Traditional School.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷⁹ Steve Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

The first school of thought is that of Keith Krause and Michael Williams. In their 1997 co-edited volume, they sought to bring together critical perspectives that challenge the standard practices in security studies and to signal “that critical approaches ... are more than a passing fad or the idiosyncratic obsession of a few scholars.”⁸⁰ They surveyed writers who, to varying degrees, fall outside the mainstream, and whose orientation and perspectives do not coincide. The combination of perspectives was not intended to invoke a “new orthodoxy of Critical Security Studies” or to reconstruct the traditional conceptualization of security.⁸¹ Instead, Krause and Williams sought to be “theoretically inclusive.”⁸² The contributors were united on two things. First they rejected the ‘renaissance’ of strategic studies that Walt and other traditionalists purport. Second, they were equally disillusioned with the expansionist argument of the so-called Wideners and echo Walt’s concern that “indiscriminate broadening of the definition of security threatens to make the concept so elastic as to render it useless as an analytic tool.”⁸³ In short, the writers Krause and Williams selected were critical of elements in all security studies literature.

According to Krause and Williams, the primary task of Critical Security Studies⁸⁴ is to:

Compel scholars, students, and practioners to think seriously about the conceptual limitations of orthodox conceptions of security, the difficulties inherent in attempts to redefine or broaden the concept, and the practical

⁸⁰ Keith Krause and Michael Williams, Critical Security Studies: Cases and Concepts, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. vii.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. viii.

⁸² Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 89.

⁸³ Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” Critical Security Studies, Eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 121.

⁸⁴ Small ‘c’ critical security studies refers specifically to the school of thought belonging to Krause and Williams. Capital ‘C’ Critical Security Studies refers to the Frankfurt School.

research questions and strategies that can be used to move beyond critique toward more intellectually satisfying reformulations of security studies.⁸⁵

While this is a worthy endeavor, this is, as Wyn Jones argues, “little more than a typology device – a useful label to apply to those approaches to the study of security that are not based on the narrow metatheoretical assumptions that underpin much of security studies, especially in the United States.”⁸⁶ Krause and Williams have simply chronicled ‘critical’ approaches to security studies whose central assumptions and theoretical underpinnings may very well be contradictory. This school of thought “does not constitute a distinct approach in itself” and as such, it is not particularly effective.⁸⁷

However, the school has many benefits, the most notable being that it introduces several writers who might not otherwise have the opportunity to bring their agenda to the forefront. While it would be misleading to assume that this is in fact a distinct school, some of the work in the collection does prove useful in assessing critics of the Traditional School, it does not offer much in terms of a theoretically valuable study of security.

The second school of thought is referred to as the Frankfurt School⁸⁸, which, under the direction of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones provides a clear framework for reconceptualizing security studies. Booth and Wyn Jones are dissatisfied with the statism and scientific orthodoxy of the Traditional School and instead argue that the focus ought to shift to human emancipation; “Only a process of emancipation can make the prospects

⁸⁵ Krause and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. xx.

⁸⁶ Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*. (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1999), p. ix.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

⁸⁸ The Frankfurt School is also referred to as the Welsh School because it is based on the work of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones from the University of Aberystwyth. The Frankfurt School serves as a superior title because it clearly links the work of Booth, Wyn Jones and others with the school’s originators of Critical Theory, Habermas and Horkheimer.

of security more likely.”⁸⁹ In this context, emancipation has three roles: it is “a philosophical anchorage;” it is “a strategic process;” and “it is a tactical goal.”⁹⁰ Booth argues that emancipation “offers a theory of progress for politics, it provides a politics of hope and it gives guidance to a politics of resistance ... emancipation is the only permanent hope to becoming.”⁹¹

The Critical Security Studies of Booth and Wyn Jones is deeply rooted in the origins of Critical Theory in the works of Jurgen Habermas. They offer a striking criticism of the narrow positivist view of security offered by the Traditional School, based on its alignment with realist and neorealist ontology and epistemology. The task of theory, according to Habermas, is to apply emancipatory cognitive knowledge to identify human potential. Technical and practical cognitive interests allow little room for an internal dynamic that can serve to produce genuine knowledge. Habermas endorses emancipatory cognitive interests that serve to “free” the confines of knowledge produced under rigid theoretical constructs. The purpose of theory is to make humans expand their preconceived notions of understanding: we know more than we believe we understand. He therefore rejects positivist theoretical constructs for their limited scope of knowledge. The task is to free Security Studies from the confines of the statist perspective premised on a scientific objectivist understanding of knowledge.⁹² As Booth argues, “The next stage of thinking about security in

⁸⁹ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 90-91.

⁹⁰ Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” ed. Tim Dunne and Nick Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1999), p. 41-45.

⁹¹ Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991), p. 321.

⁹² Wyn Jones, *op. cit.* p. 95

world affairs should be marked by moving it out of its almost exclusively realist framework and into the critical philosophy camp.”⁹³

Conclusion

Wyn Jones argues, “all disciplinary boundaries are only a necessary convenience, valuable as a source of both intellectual and administrative orientation and organization but unhelpful if they are regarded as more than that. When these boundaries become reified, even fetishized, they can become a hindrance to the very understanding that they were intended to promote”⁹⁴ The following chapters examine the four schools introduced above in light of security threats, reactionary actors or agents, and finally security specifically. The difference between the schools is far less drastic on close reflection than their adherents care to admit. The division of schools of thought is largely smoke and mirrors as scholars try to draw swords over rather minor details that separate one school from another. In effect, the schools are active participants in a theoretical game of cat and mouse. Each is critical of other ‘schools’ of thought and is adamant that alternative interpretations are incorrect, overly optimistic, dangerously ignorant, or simply far too ambiguous to be of any use. This is not to say that all ‘schools’ are the same. There are clear boundaries which divides the literature. However, there are far more similarities between the ‘schools’ than anyone would care to admit and the divisions currently in place fail to grasp the purpose or intent of the literature. The reluctance of scholars to acknowledge such similarities is symptomatic of the common practice of trumping one school over

⁹³ Booth, *Security and Emancipation*, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

⁹⁴ Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

another in a naïve attempt to achieve paradigmatic status and declare victory to one theoretical construct. Instead, it is necessary to focus on both the similarities and differences of the so-called schools in order to better understand their intent and also to better apply their library of resources in the quest to understand security. Only then will Security Studies begin to shed light on the important topic of security in any meaningful way.

CHAPTER II: SECURITY STUDIES AND SECURITY THREATS

This chapter looks at security defined in terms of threats. The basic premise being that military threats over and above all other environmental, social, political, and other threats form the basis on which security is understood in security studies. This is the case largely out of necessity as there are risks to the basic structure of the study in expanding the assessment of threats beyond the traditional military scope. A narrow understanding of threats provides a definable framework in which to refine the study of security. It is simply more manageable. However, this narrow understanding is also suffocating the study of security generally. That being said, there are several schools of thought who appear on the surface to support a more broad interpretation of threats, but there is an innate reluctance to expand the analysis beyond the military realm. This leads one to conclude that security understood in light of threats remains fixed within the Traditional School.

Why Threats?

Richard Ullman suggests that security may be described to be a consequence of particular conduct. In this respect, security is not a tangible reality, but rather is multifarious, myopic, and a product of its environment. Ullman introduces the dichotomy of nature versus nurture into the security studies debate. Security is not a natural condition; it is a product of its upbringing, its environment, and the so-called parents' or international actors. Moreover, if security is a consequence as Ullman suggests, then a secure condition would appear to be an abnormality – a consequence. If his thesis is true, then security is not an easy recipe that can be whipped up upon demand. Instead, a

“recipe” for security requires one to reverse engineer a condition of security and determine whether there are any common denominators that can direct the mechanic to create such a recipe.

If we place Ullman’s thesis in the context of the discussion from Chapter 1, to understand security, one has to understand the elements that make the environment secure or, conversely, insecure. Ullman suggests that the value of security may not be understood until it is threatened. In this sense, security may be defined and its scope identified by “the threats which challenge it.”⁹⁵ Thus understanding what threatens international stability will help us to understand what security is.

Ullman offers what he sees to be a useful definition of threats to *national security*. This includes threats which: “1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or the private nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”⁹⁶ The first category may include a full spectrum of possible disturbances ranging from external wars to natural disasters.⁹⁷ The second category is more difficult. Again hard political disturbances such as external or internal war will undoubtedly threaten policy choices, but so too would other less commonly cited examples such as the interruption of critical foreign aid or the chronic deterioration of environmental subsystems within a state which jeopardize the economy or natural ecosystems of a community. Both categories are sufficiently broad to escape the traditional interpretation

⁹⁵ Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), p. 133.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 133-135.

of threats as being primarily military in nature. However, in order for threats to receive security responses, political will must be appropriated.

Hobbes concluded that security is a public good and regardless of the threat, must be defined as such. Based on Ullman's definition of threats, it is fair to assume that, at any given time, there are many threats to national security. But, it is impossible to garner the political will necessary to respond appropriately to all threats. As such, threats are assessed and addressed based on a suggested hierarchy. The more visible a threat, the more political will garnished. In this regard, non-military threats such as natural disasters for example, receive an unenthusiastic response and very little attention until faced with the aftermath. Only if the threat is understood to place national security in the traditional military understanding at risk, will political will be infused with a rapid reaction mandate. National security must be tied to basic survival instincts if a threat is to receive due attention. Therefore security understood in light of threats always returns to an understanding founded on military security and survival. As Ullman suggests, if "the connection to security is [not] immediately apparent, opponents find easy ways to reject or simply ignore such arguments."⁹⁸ Tied to survival, security claims immediate measures because the finality of the risks deems a priority of action; if action is not immediate, it could be too late and the situation may never be reversed or ratified. It follows, that the basic rhetorical structure of security serves to justify extraordinary means to assess threats.

⁹⁸ Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

Language Theory: Understanding the Language of Threats

Both Buzan and Weaver maintain that security is, in language theory, called a speech act. Weaver suggests that “it is the utterance itself that is the act...By saying ‘security’ a state representative moves the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block the development.”⁹⁹ Buzan argues that the mere utterance of ‘security’ is not sufficient to instigate such extraordinary measures, but rather the security analyst is tasked with understanding the process of “constructing a share of what is to be considered, and collectively responded to, as a threat.”¹⁰⁰ The threat must be designated as an existential threat “requiring emergency action or special measures, and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.”¹⁰¹ Thus political will must be assessed based on an evaluation and the dramatization of the threat thereby marking an element of urgency to the call. Security raises issues above the standard level of ‘normal politics’ and into “the realm of ‘panic politics’” where otherwise common activities are insufficient to react to significant threats.¹⁰² As such, security demands an extreme form of politicization operating within a framework for addressing existential threats.

This politicization of security is vital to developing a definition of security. Buzan suggests that emergency responses to existential threats may take place on a political spectrum, ranging from politicized (where the threat is understood to be an issue of public policy and requires state action) to non-politicized (where the threat is not part of public

⁹⁹ Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community,” Security Communities, Ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, (New York, NY: Cambridge University press, 1998), p. 80.

¹⁰⁰ Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997), p. 14.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 14

debate and therefore does not require the participation of the state). He maintains that “the placement of issues is open: depending on circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum.”¹⁰³ This may be true in theory, but if, as Buzan argues, political will is required in order to garnish the reaction necessary to address the threat then the issue must be of public concern. Based on Buzan and Weaver’s assertion that security is a speech act, thereby precipitating emergency responses, it can be assumed that the salience attributed to the concept requires political involvement if, for no other purpose, than to simply mediate responses. As long as security is tied to issues of survival, political involvement cannot be avoided. Even if the classic politico-military interpretation of security is dropped, other commonly cited examples of security issues including environmental security, economic security, and social security all include, to varying degrees, political debate. Unless Buzan is prepared to accept a very broad definition of the term whereby security in international relations could be tied to issues that typically fall outside the immediate purview of the state, such as the survival of certain animal species (threat from extinction), it is difficult to assert a non-political response to security threats.

Dimensions of Security: Assessing Threats

Brian Job has identified four primary dimensions of contention that surface in all discussions of security and are helpful in deciphering threat assessment.¹⁰⁴ First, the normative dimension highlights the contentious debate on both theoretical and practical levels. Job suggests that threat assessment may vary according to the core values of the

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ Job, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17.

individual or group that make the assessment. The second dimension concerns 'whose security' is at stake. As Job points out, at any time, the security of more than one actor may be an issue.¹⁰⁵ The third dimension of security and threat assessment concerns the scope of security or scope of the threats. Finally, it is necessary to consider the theoretical perspective or school of thought. These four dimensions will be examined in light of the perspectives of the Traditional School, the Copenhagen School, Third World Security Studies, and Critical Security Studies.

Traditional Security Studies

Job's first dimension – the normative dimension to the Traditional School is fairly straightforward. Realism and neorealism explicitly separate morality and value judgments from international politics. Morality is not ignored, but rather is divorced from politics. Morgenthau writes, "Man is a political animal by nature, he is a scientist by chance or choice, he is a moralist because he is man."¹⁰⁶ However, he segregates a particular role for morality rather than allow it to be applied in all sectors of political life. "The simple philosophy of the moral crusade is useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshalling public opinion behind a given policy."¹⁰⁷ But the ultimate end of politics is the survival of the state. Power is the only and immediate goal to this end. Morality and normative claims to action are incapable of ensuring survival. As such, they are reserved for the exercise of democratic impulse.

Waltz extends on Morgenthau's assessment. He argues that action is spurred by instincts for survival rather than moral impulse; "the survival motive is taken as the

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁰⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

ground for action in a world where the security of states is not assured.”¹⁰⁸ Consequently, as survival is given the primacy of all action, moral or normative claims are discouraged from influencing vital political debate. Threats, therefore, must fall under what Wolfers identified as ‘objective threats,’ threats that can be readily identified. Threats to state survival, understood specifically in light of military threats of force are examples of such.

The second dimension Job discusses is the need to determine “whose security” is at stake. Traditionalists do not disagree with Job’s position that many actors may be threatened at one time, and rely on the foundation provided by realism and neorealism to provide a clear answer to whose specific security is at stake. First, the Traditional School limits the number of actors that may be at risk. The primacy of the state is central to the discussion. Buzan argues that as more actors become active participants in the military game, traditionalists are forced to “loosen their state centrism.”¹⁰⁹ However, the majority of the literature is provided by those who defend the centrality of the state.¹¹⁰ As such, the state is the central actor whose security is the ultimate concern.

Second, states are preoccupied with one end – survival achieved through the maximization of power.¹¹¹ A theory must then strive to determine the “most effective use that can be made, by states, of means or capabilities at their disposal in order to achieve this end.”¹¹² Threats to the capacity of states to maximize power put the security of the state at risk. Realism relies on several partial or middle theories such as hegemonic

¹⁰⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

¹⁰⁹ Buzan, “Rethinking Security After the Cold War,” *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹¹⁰ A few still maintain the primacy of the state while they ease into the link to military conflict. See Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Weaver, *Concepts of Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects*, Copenhagen Papers no. 1.

¹¹¹ Murielle Cozette, “Realistic Realism? American Political Realism, Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on the Problem of Means and Ends in International Politics,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (September 2004), p. 433.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 428.

stability theory in order to illustrate this point. Robert Gilpin's analysis of hegemonic stability theory asserts that the presence of a hegemon ensures the preservation of peace and stability in the international system. Hegemonic states provide international order that serves to further their own interests and the interests of those states benefiting from the hegemonic state's preponderance of power.¹¹³ As long as the power relations insure the stability of the hegemonic system, security is maintained. If the power relations shift in favour of competing states seeking the position of hegemon, Gilpin argues that a hegemonic war would ensue, thereby destabilizing the system and threatening the state. Thus realism not only clarifies whose security is at stake, but also provides a framework for determining what conditions may result in the insecurity.

Moving to the third dimension of security – the scope of security, Walt argues, the main focus of Security Studies is “the phenomenon of war.”¹¹⁴ This is the most troublesome dimension for the Traditional School. Traditionalists have been forced to acknowledge the changing face of war and military conflict. In 2004 there were 19 major armed conflicts, all of which were classified as intra-state conflicts.¹¹⁵ Traditionalists remain focused on the centrality of the state and its authority to exercise force against other states. Realist principles of territoriality, sovereignty, and nonintervention limit the extent to which the war dialogue may be broadened. The rise in intra-state conflict coincides with changes in the way in which wars are fought, the actors involved in the conflict, and the manner in which conflicts are resolved. The Traditional School has long based its literature on the conventional features of European wars and the Cold War.

¹¹³ See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). See also Stephan Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” *World Politics*, April 1976; Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” *International Organization*, Vol 39 No. 4, Autumn 1985.

¹¹⁴ Walt, *op. cit.*, p, 212.

¹¹⁵ *SIPRI Year Book 2004*, <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=2#contents>.

Intra-state conflicts rarely involve the declaration of war, the clear distinction between combatant and non-combatants, or accepted rules of engagement.¹¹⁶ Even if traditionalists enthusiastically maintain the standard scope of security, they are forced to confront the evolution of military threats and the use of force.

As the scope of military threats evolve, so too do the causes and origins of such threats. Perhaps more troubling for traditionalists is the persistence of writers from other schools such as the Third World Security School who explore non-traditional threats to state security. For example, issues such as economic insecurity, environmental degradation, and social injustice may trigger violent conflict. Given the frequency with which intra-state conflict erupts, such non-traditional threats may instigate violent uprising. Traditionalists are then tasked with the dilemma of determining the extent to which such non-traditional threats may be incorporated into their agenda. Walt argues that attempts to widen the security agenda outside the military domain run the risk of “expanding ‘Security Studies’ excessively.”¹¹⁷ He continues,

[B]y this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to ‘security.’ Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.¹¹⁸

Walt does not reject the significance of these other threats, but rather argues that they fall outside the scope of Security Studies.

¹¹⁶ Kalevi J. Hosti, “International Theory and War in the Third World” The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, Ed. Brian Job. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 1992), p. 37-38.

¹¹⁷ Walt, op. cit., p. 212.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 212-213.

Other more moderate traditionalists employ a different strategy which permits widening the agenda only insofar as the link to the threat of force or the use of force between political actors can still be made. John Chipman writes,

The structuring elements of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force. ...Non-military aspects of security may occupy more of the strategist's time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or alliances to procure, deploy engage or withdraw military forces must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst's inquiries.¹¹⁹

Chipman may move away from strict adherence to state centrism to permit a discussion on the role people and nations play in defining security, but he restrains the discussion by restricting the focus to *military* security. His argument is typical of the new wave of traditionalists who attempt to maintain one foot in the traditionalist camp while eagerly trying to avoid criticism of blind loyalty to Cold War conceptions in a post-Cold War era.

All traditionalists, regardless of the degree to which they adhere to the military agenda, are sensitive to the threat of expanding the agenda too far. In a final analysis, the scope remains on military threats to the state. This leads to Job's final dimension of contention - theoretical perspective. The Traditional School is loyal to realism and neorealism in all facets of its analysis. Concerns over the theoretical endeavor override concerns of excluding possible threats or providing a far too narrow agenda to Security Studies. Thus any threat analysis must operate under the guidance of realist and neo-realist principles.

¹¹⁹ John Chipman, "The Future of Strategic Studies: Beyond Grand Strategy," *Survival* 34(1), 1992, p. 129.

The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School, based on its affiliation with neorealism offers a strong assessment of threats. Returning to Job's dimensions of security, this threat assessment may be easily identified. Buzan argues that threat assessment must be an intersubjective process. Objective threat assessment is not an easy task unless the threat is sufficiently obvious (for example, tanks crossing an international border). Moreover, states will perceive threats uniquely based on individual assessment and different thresholds for defining threats. A brief survey of military expenditures by state would illustrate this point clearly.¹²⁰

By broadening the security agenda to include threats in five sectors, Buzan appears to welcome a variety of security threats which presents a new challenge to Job's normative dimension. Actors within each sector may prioritize threats based on the core-values central to their participation or alignment with their respected sector. For example, analysts for the World Resource Institute are expected to highlight threats to the earth's ecosystems resulting from over population, carbon monoxide emissions, and a thinning ozone layer. They would identify existential threats within the environmental sector that they insist ought to be categorized as a threat to state survival.

However, Buzan places a rigid conduit on threat assessment. He defines an international security threat as "existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement for emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind."¹²¹ The referent object is understood to be the state which, under political leadership, endorses emergency measures in the form of force or traditional

¹²⁰ SIPRI Yearbook 2004, "Military Expenditures,"
<http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=2#contents>

¹²¹ Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *op. cit.*, p. 13.

military deployment. Security threats trigger 'panic politics' where standard norms and practices¹²² are disregarded in order to ensure the security or survival of the state. He acknowledges that what may be considered to be an 'existential threat' and 'emergency measure' may vary according to sector, but threats must be assessed based on their immediate impact on the security of the state. Normative assessments must meet this criterion. The risk that Buzan must now contend with is the extent to which the security agenda may be widened but still fit within the definition he outlines and the neorealist theoretical perspective he adheres to.

This leads to Job's second dimension, considering whose security is at risk. Buzan insists that the state is the only viable referent object because only the state had the responsibility and the authority to cope with sub-state, state, and international security dilemma. The state is the primary actor in addressing and alleviating insecurity due to its monopoly of force. Finally, Buzan argues that the state is the dominant actor in the international system.¹²³ He is able to draw this conclusion because, as the Traditional School counterparts suggest, international security has a distinct agenda found in the traditional political-military understanding of security. Within this context, Buzan argues that "security is about survival."¹²⁴ Although threats may arise in other sectors and may not be military in nature, in order to be considered a *security* threat "they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely

¹²² By standard norms and practices, Buzan includes due process. Panic politics justifies secrecy, excessive executive powers, and "activities that would otherwise be illegal." See Buzan, *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹²³ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹²⁴ Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *op. cit.*, p. 13.

political.”¹²⁵ Therefore, the only threats that matter are the threats to the referent object – the state.

Any threat may be determined to have political consequences and therefore the scope of the threat is often a challenge. Over population, for example, leads to resource depletion and pollution (among other things). Both threats fall under the purview of the state as governments are tasked with the responsibility to provide an acceptable standard for their citizens. The Copenhagen School considers both such threats as valid and is criticized for doing so.

Buzan’s response to the traditionalists’ critique of the widened agenda is to refer to Waever’s definition of security which understood the concept to be a speech act. Buzan repeats the argument that security instigates a specific rhetorical structure in which security is tied to survival. By doing so, Buzan must then walk the fine line between the traditionalist and widening camp. It is easy to assert a purely militaristic interpretation of survival whereby violent conflict overrides all other considerations. Buzan, on the other hand, loyal to the Copenhagen School, suggests that acknowledging existential threats outside the traditional politico-military spectrum still allows the relationship between security and survival to flourish. By identifying security sectors (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental) which each purport different types of interaction, the units and values will differ by sector and that the nature of survival and threats to these units or values may be unique. Buzan maintains that security is vital within all five sectors, but that each sector will have different threats. However, security across all sectors necessitates the presence of *existential threats* requiring immediate “emergency action or special measures, and the acceptance of that designation [of security threat] by a

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

significant audience.”¹²⁶ However, by defining threats as existential and defining emergency measures as the presence or exercise of force against threats Buzan’s analysis is in effect not very different from that of the traditionalists.

If political will is required in order to assure that the necessary reaction against a security threat is taken, then the issue falls within the political spectrum thereby requiring the involvement of the state. As long as security is tied to issues of survival, political involvement cannot be avoided. This politicization results in the securitization of a range of issues that perhaps ought not to be considered security threats. Moreover, the politicization of security across all sectors may not be desirable and may result in excessive securitization. It is possible to imagine a full range of issues within each sector that could feasibly be asserted to be ‘emergency measures’ from the state to respond to existential threats that ought not to involve the full capacity of the state. Securitization has benefits, specifically for the referent object; however, there are also costs to be considered. Monetary costs aside, illogical or excessive securitization will negatively affect the broader security framework encompassing all sectors and a range of referent objects. The task is to determine how best to balance the costs and benefits.

Given the urgency with which security discourse may assert political action, the scope and definition of security must be assessed based on the effects on political life. Excessive securitization stifles societal growth, cripples the economy, legitimizes an intrusive and coercive state, and intensifies the security dilemma between neighbours.¹²⁷ As such, it is desirable to limit excessive securitization in order to promote a more stable, and ultimately secure, environment.

¹²⁶ Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹²⁷ Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” *op. cit.*, p. 21.

By this logic, Buzan must shift from offering a widening agenda to one closer to the Traditional School. He suggests that a wider agenda “certainly does extend the range of knowledge and understanding necessary to pursue Security Studies.”¹²⁸ Buzan goes one step further and suggests that there are two bigger concerns with a wider agenda. First, security asserts a specific political function thereby extending a call for state mobilization against identified threats.¹²⁹ If the agenda has been widened, then this call can be extended to a wide range of issues which may traditionally fall outside the purview of political action. This may prove to be counterproductive to many sectors including the economic sector which often perceived political intervention to retard economic growth.

Buzan also notes that a wider agenda may elevate security into a “universal good thing – the desired condition towards which all relations should be moved.”¹³⁰ While a secure condition (wherein the threats have been stabilized) may be more desirable than an insecure condition (where threats have not or cannot be stabilized), security does not assume the absolute absence of threats. Conflict may continue to be apparent, although countermeasures would have minimized the threat to some extent. Security is not the same as peace. Where peace requires the absence of conflict, security does not. More importantly, while peace is always desirable, security is not; security is not always a *good* thing. For example, too much security in the economic sector would cripple the market economy. In this respect, economic relations require a degree of insecurity in order to function. A wider security agenda would require ‘good insecurity’ to be viewed in the same light as ‘bad’ or undesirable insecurity. Some degree of insecurity is actually healthy and normal.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹³⁰ Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Given Buzan and the Copenhagen School's analysis, the fourth dimension of Job's analysis ends up looking a great deal like that of the Traditional School. It is easy to see how Smith was able to conclude that despite an impressive attempt, Buzan presents a 'sophisticated neorealist account of security.'¹³¹ State centrism combined with a traditional military scope of security and the reluctance to broaden the discussion outside established parameters reveal a strong affinity to the confines of neorealist debate. Admittedly Buzan plays with the boundaries of realism by acknowledging other sectors besides the traditional military-political sector, but he is able to manipulate the discussion only so far and ends up admitting that his school shares some common assumptions with its traditional counterpart.

Third World Security Studies

The Third World Security School emerged during the Cold War and provided a more extensive definition of security than that found in the traditional literature. Caroline Thomas' 1987 book *In Search of Security* identified the insecurity of Third World states as a result of the "relative weakness, the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack of room for maneuver which Third World states have on economic, political and of course military levels."¹³² In this respect, the Third World Security School seeks to provide a wider threat agenda than that provided by its traditional counterpart. Instead of an extensive focus on military threats, this school examines threats as they affect underdeveloped states more generally. Economic, political, social, and environmental considerations are given due attention along with military threats. However, despite

¹³¹ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹³² Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Brighton, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987), p. 4.

being critical of the narrow agenda purported by the Traditional School, the Third World Security School maintains a rather strong military focus. While clearly trying to distance themselves from the Traditional School, threat analysis reveals strong commonalities between the two.

Returning to Job's dimensions, threat assessment within the Third World Security School is quite different than that from the Traditional School and the Copenhagen Schools. Writers within this school acknowledge that normative judgments will influence threat assessment. The internationalization of the Third World popularizes moral sentiment against poverty and the ill-effects of underdevelopment. This sentiment is often referenced by advocates for increased foreign aid who see development to be "not only a moral right, but can also be justified as a form of enlightened self-interest."¹³³ Thus threats are to be understood within a normative context and are intrinsically linked to a moral code developed to bring about a more secure third world.

The Third World Security School provides a rather broad answer to the question of whose security is threatened. This again depends on a normative assessment of the threat and the actors associated with this threat. In contrast, the traditional literature offers a simplistic answer to this question: the security of the state is fundamental and is assessed based on the immediacy of a military threat. Adherents to the Third World Security School suggest that "as a compliment to the concepts that are the common currency of traditional power politics ('high politics'), such as security guarantees and arms control, we must now introduce concepts appropriate to the community level ('low politics'), which have to do with preventing crises, enhancing stability and reducing the

¹³³ Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security, (New York: Zed Books, 2001). p. 37.

element of unpredictability in the system.”¹³⁴ Therefore, in order to determine “whose security” is at stake, traditional conceptions must be relaxed.

In order to do this, the Third World Security School pulls from early post WWII testimony that asserts a strong tie between the poverty and instability in one region of the world and the security in the West. The Truman Doctrine argued in 1947 that half of the world’s population was living in “a miserable condition” and that their poverty was “a handicap and a threat to both them and the more prosperous areas.”¹³⁵ Since the mid 1960’s, the economic and political instability in the South have been slowly internationalized. The end of the Cold War intensified this process and connected underdevelopment in the South with the security of the north. As Mark Duffield argues,

Security threats to the North are no longer seen solely in terms of traditional forms of interstate conflict to be approached through the politics of alliance and nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the demise of political alternatives in the South, together with the declining remit of nation-state competence, has further internationalized the effects of the instability. ... [R]ecent opinion has reinforced the view that the modalities of underdevelopment themselves represent a security issue.¹³⁶

As this process continues, the more interconnected the developed and under/less developed regions of the world became. A Swedish government report explained that “threats to our own security today are assumed to be associated, inter alia, with global population trends, combined with slow economic development and social justice.”¹³⁷ Duffield argues that a country’s ability to deal with the issues that accompany underdevelopment (poverty, resource competition, unemployment, population growth,

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹³⁶ Duffield, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹³⁷ MFA, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Study – executive Summary and Recommendations*, Stockholm, Sweden: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997. Quoted in Duffield, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

crime, environmental degradation, disease, illiteracy and so on) tend to lead to antagonistic relations are ought to be included in the wider security framework.

As Thomas noted in her analysis of insecurity in Third World states, economic, environmental, and political security threats are at play. The Third World Security School extends this dimension beyond just the actors at stake, but also to the sectors wherein these actors may be located. This leads to the scope of the security threats. Traditionalists assume a purely military scope, but Third World Security requires a widened scope in order to grasp adequately the security problem of the Third World. If underdevelopment is perceived to be a security threat, then the threat assessment must encompass economic, political, and social criteria as both Thomas and Duffield have noted. However, the larger agenda of Third World Security Studies accepts Thomas and Duffield's position only in part.

The extended agenda is accepted only insofar as its effects trigger military outcomes. In order to illustrate this point, adherents often rely on cause and effect models. For example, environmental degradation may lead to scarce food supplies thereby making it difficult for some populations to feed themselves. As the desperation for subsistence persists, tensions in impoverished areas tend to flare and food supplies are subsequently converted into a form of weapon.¹³⁸ Governments or rebel groups may withhold food to control the population or hold government ransom. Conflict ensues and refugee flows across international borders follow. Conflict is the final and predictable result from the initial threat of environmental degradation. Thus directly or indirectly, environmental factors are integrated into the strategic landscape of the discussion.

¹³⁸ As was the case in Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan. See Robert Kaplan *Surrender of Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2003).

Although many events must be at play in order for this model to work, the Third World Security School views all threats in this light. Security is broadened to include nontraditional threats, but the final assessment is the same: violent conflict is the ultimate threat. As Job argues, “security is about political-military threats.”¹³⁹ Therefore although the Third World School takes strides away from the Traditional School in its normative analysis of whose security is threatened, when determining the scope of the threats, the analysis once again returns to a military focus.

The theoretical perspective of the Third World school is perhaps the most controversial dimension because scholars in this school appear to adhere to tenets of several perspectives. As Job notes, realism and neorealism have been the dominant theoretical construct within the field. The traditional literature pulls from this construct and is intrinsically tied to it. Although many writers in the Third World Security School are critical of both realism/neorealism and the Traditional School, they are drawn to neatness and easy answers that both provide. Job argues, “Through the assumptions of realist international theory, the contentions and contradictions of the security interests of individuals, nations, regimes, and states are resolved.”¹⁴⁰ Moreover, as threat assessment seems to always return to a military focus, realist assumptions are best suited to provide the theoretical foundation to both explain and analyze this phenomenon.

The attraction to the realist/neorealist perspective may be understandable, but there are clear incongruities between the arguments of Third World Security scholars and realism/neorealism generally that make it impossible to accept a seamless union of the two. As Job has argued, the central premises of realist thinking are inadequate. Concepts

¹³⁹ Job, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁴⁰ Job, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

such as sovereignty, territoriality, nonintervention, and the separation of domestic and international considerations are not helpful in explaining the current environment in the Third World. Moreover, the acceptance of the normative interpretation of threats runs counter to the tested practice of rejecting value based appraisals within the realist camp.

Despite these incongruities, the belief that in order for a school to be asserted any legitimacy it must position itself within a single theoretical perspective still reigns over all discussions of security in International Relations theory. Job identifies realism/neorealism as a “paradigm” which implies that there is universal acceptance of this construct.¹⁴¹ The Third World Security School criticizes the standard faults within both realism/neorealism and the Traditional School but is careful not to distance itself too far from the safety of its theoretical security blanket. As such, it can still claim to fall within the growing parameters of the realist/neorealist camp.

Critical Security Studies

With emancipation as its goal, Critical Security Studies endorses a normative focus that is sensitive to the diversity of interpretations of security. It strives to break from the barriers of rigid empiricism and instead encourages an open intellectual environment in which scholars and students are encouraged to question the validity of knowledge. According to Wyn Jones, understanding security is “dependent on deeper assumptions concerning the nature of politics.”¹⁴² These assumptions vary according to personal experience, preference, and expectation. Critical Security Studies rejects the assumption that security can be assessed from a neutral vantage point. Wyn Jones notes

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁴² Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

that even the arguably ‘value-neutral’ assessment of the traditionalists is in fact, normatively based.¹⁴³ Acceptance of statism involves a normative claim that accords states the highest value. Assessing threats is reliant on the acceptance of this claim, thereby determining which threats require immediate emergency measures.

The Critical School, on the other hand, perceives all threats to involve normative commitments. This poses a unique challenge in that all viewpoints may be assessed to be threats. This is, however, counterbalanced by determining “whose security” is at stake. Where Traditionalists romanticizes the state, Critical Security Studies identify the individual as the primary referent object for security. This assessment originates from Horkheimer’s belief that critical theory “should be concerned with the corporeal, materialist existence and experiences of human beings.”¹⁴⁴ Horkheimer does not exclude the importance of other actors or collectivities such as the state or class nor does he romanticize the individual in the same way Traditionalists romanticizes the state. He argues that the existence and experience of human beings cannot be understood without seeing them as one part of a larger dynamic. The primary task for theorists is to ensure that they never lose sight of the effects and implications such dynamics have for individuals.¹⁴⁵ The significance of having the individual as the primary referent object is twofold. First, there is the normative importance of avoiding the risk of placing “man as such [rather] than human beings in particular” in this highly regarded position.¹⁴⁶ Second, by making the individual the referent object, analysts are “encouraged to understand the various contexts that impinge upon an individual’s security and

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁴⁴ Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁴⁶ Alfred Schmidt, “Max Horkheimer’s Intellectual Physiognomy,” in Seyla Benhabib, Wolfgang Bonb, and John Mc Cole (eds.) *On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 30, as quoted in Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

simultaneously is discouraged from their reification and fetishization.”¹⁴⁷ Thus, as long as the individual is understood to operate within a broader security complex consisting of multiple actors and collectivities, each influencing the security of the individual, then security discourse remains sufficiently far reaching so as to permit epistemological freedom and a widened agenda.

In this respect, this school adopts a rather broad scope within security studies. Echoing Ullman’s sentiments, Nye suggests that conceptualizing security in a restrictive manner means that specific security threats will elude Security Studies.¹⁴⁸ Walt’s arguments citing the threat to intellectual coherence fall on deaf ears here. As Booth and Herring argue: “When studying any human phenomenon it is preferable to have open intellectual boundaries (which risk only irrelevance) rather than rigid ones (which risk ignorance)”¹⁴⁹

The study of security ought to be strongly committed to emancipation which ensures that the security agenda is sufficiently broad so as to encompass a variety of threats to the individual. Booth writes,

“Security” means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and as groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order produces true security.¹⁵⁰

Criticalists generally, do not identify specific threats in the same way as Third Worldists or the Traditionalists do. The School is more concerned with the potential of ignoring

¹⁴⁷ Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁴⁹ Booth and Herring, *Key Guide to Information in Strategic Studies*, (London: Mansell, 1994) p. 20
Quoted in Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

¹⁵⁰ Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” *op. cit.*, p. 319.

threats relating to such things as the environment and migration.¹⁵¹ It is possible, therefore, to consider the work of Richard Ullman, Helga Haftendorn, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews as part of the broader agenda of the School's threat assessment, though not part of Critical Security Studies' epistemological endeavor. However, Critical Studies rejects attempts to hyphenate security based on attempts to accommodate such threats. The attachment of various appellations such as "environmental," "economic," or "identity" to security risks the potential for the militarization and confront-orientated attitude attached to the nomenclature of security. This can be seen with regards to the tendency of Third World Security scholars who adopt a militarized cause and effect analysis to threat assessment. This can be avoided by accepting a deeper understanding of the political origins of security. Walker, for example, suggests that the expansion of security to non-military threats is inevitable because security concerns are intrinsically linked to the legitimization of the sovereign state. He writes,

In the end it has never been possible to pin security down to concrete practices or institutions with any great precision, no matter how insistent the voices of military and defence establishments might be. The whole point of concepts of security that are tied to the claims of state sovereignty is that they *must* expand to encompass everything within the state, at least in its every potential state of emergency.¹⁵²

As a result,

Concerns about [broadening] the practices of security policy into other spheres of political life may be well founded ...but the extent to which practices of security are already part of the broader social, political,

¹⁵¹ See Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 461-476; Jef Huysmans, "Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of 'Securitization' Societal Issues," in Robert Miles and Dietrich Thahardt (eds), Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, (London: Pinter, 1995).

¹⁵² R. B. J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in Critical Security Studies: Cases and Concepts, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 76.

economic, and cultural arenas is not something that can simply be wished away.¹⁵³

A narrow scope left to traditional military and state centric threats is ultimately inaccurate. The concept of security must be broadened because it is connected to various forms of governance.

Critical Security Studies operates within the unique theoretical landscape of Critical Theory as discussed in Chapter One. Critical Theory cannot, in many respects be considered a theory according to the standard measures within International Relations Theory. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.

Conclusion

A threat analysis provides a helpful vantage point from which to examine security. By considering the normative dimension, one can determine how to assess the threat. When considering whose security is threatened, it is possible to determine both the reference object and also the range of potential threats that are considered within the study. The scope of the threat provides the opportunity to determine the nature of the threat and the appropriate response measures. Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of the analysis provide the lens with which to examine the analysis in its entirety.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

CHAPTER III: SECURITY STUDIES AND SECURITIZING ACTORS

Edward Kolodziej suggests that “security studies is what diverse actors decide and do about security rather than what security scholars say it is.”¹⁵⁴ This raises an interesting point. First, it dismisses Baldwin’s claim that empirical observation ought not to be included in the explication of the concept of security. If actors determine what security is then the conceptualization of security relies almost exclusively on empirical assessment. Kolodziej implies, just as Buzan and Waever have stated, that security is a speech-act which assumes a particular response given the heightened value in its utterance. In this respect, security is understood to be an action and must be assessed on how it is achieved. Thus, the value of security cannot be found solely in a deductive scholastic exercise.

As discussed in Chapter One, the security scholarship has neglected the concept of security. Theorists have been able only to determine what security is not (i.e. peace or war) as opposed to what it is. Therefore by introducing an empirical component based on actor assessment, the hope is that experience will shed light on the examining the scope and intent of the field.

Where Chapter Two explained how security may be defined based on threat assessment, this chapter examines how security may be defined based on actor assessment. The actors discussed in this Chapter are what will be termed reactionary actors; actors who respond to threats which may be distinguished from those actually threatened. An assessment of the reactionary actors in the security dialogue is useful in not only determining the second category of actors within the security matrix, but also in

¹⁵⁴ Edward Kolodziej, “Security Studies for the Next Millennium: Quo Vardis?” *Contemporary Security Policy, Special Issue Critical Reflections on Security and Change*, Eds. Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1999), p.25-26.

determining how security is assessed based on a systemic interpretation of the security system. Both assessments go hand in hand. Actors determine the appropriate course of action based on the threat and according to the structure of the system.

Traditional Security Studies

Traditional Security Studies is based on the early work of international relations theorists who provided a rudimentary interpretation of international politics which relied on the suggestion of the basic unit of analysis in international relations. The central theme in the study is evident in the title of the discipline: *inter-national* politics which identifies the state as primary unit of analysis and defines politics accordingly. State centrism or statism permeates throughout the Traditional School, providing a concrete yet often simplistic interpretation of actor assessment specifically and security generally.

As the primary actor within this system, traditionalists suggest that states are both the threatened and the reactionary actor. The state and state system are, respectively, the basic unit of governance and the “ideational and institutional foundation of international order.”¹⁵⁵ No other alternative may provide the quality and quantity of security assumed by the state within this system. This is not to suggest that alternative mechanisms and actors in the form of multilateral cooperation in international institutions and organizations are unable to enhance order within the system, but as Kolodziej argues, such mechanisms “do not fundamentally alter the essential make up and incentives of a decentralized solution to global governance.”¹⁵⁶ Security, therefore, is confined within the parameters of the identified referent object – the state – and the perceived nature of

¹⁵⁵ Kolodziej, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

the system in which states strive to survive. The response of the state to such threats determines the scope of the security dialogue.

The traditional security dialogue is loyally rooted in realist and neorealist epistemology which serves as a chart for determining the scope of the traditional agenda. When assessing the dominant reactionary actors within the state system, traditionalists have chosen to shift from the purely power orientated analysis under realism towards the more broadly defined structural analysis of neorealism.¹⁵⁷ Waltz's portrait of international politics details the system in which reactionary actors respond to threats thereby providing a comprehensive analysis of the traditional perspective. He suggests that international outcomes result from the interaction at the unit and structural level wherein states act as unitary actors within an anarchic system. The behaviour of states within this system is confined by the nature of the system and the security problematic that the structure reinforces. Based on a historic account, Waltz insists that the Treaties of Westphalia created sovereign states without imposing a system of law enforceable to all among them. What transpired was the creation of a system wherein each state judges its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own desires and logic, often leading to conflict, and sometimes leading to war. Under such conditions, threats or perceived threats to state security are always present thereby requiring states to first provide for their own security.¹⁵⁸ Individual defensive measures exasperate the security dilemma where measures to enhance one state's security while typically diminishing

¹⁵⁷ In this respect, neorealism may be identified as structural realism under the direction of Kenneth Waltz.

¹⁵⁸ See Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 41.

another's.¹⁵⁹ Reactionary actors, therefore, respond to the threats conceived of as a result of the systemic pressures on states.

Given that all states operate within a self-help system, it is assumed that all states concern themselves with securing a force structure, thereby further exacerbating the security dilemma. As Waltz argues, "in anarchy, there is no automatic harmony."¹⁶⁰ Although states may all strive towards similar goals, namely security, the pursuit of such goals creates antagonistic relations among the primary actors within the state system. Traditionalists insist that given the systemic pressures inherent in state relations, available policy options designed to respond to the security dilemma are limited. In order to maintain or establish a secure environment, a state will use force if deemed necessary and the prospects for success outweigh the likelihood of failure. Joseph Nye argues that "as long as international politics remains anarchic, the ultimate recourse for states will be self-help, and the ultimate form of self-help is military force."¹⁶¹ The pursuit of secure relations embeds the use of force within the basic response structures of the state system. Building on Clausewitz's famous dictum: "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means,"¹⁶² traditionalists insist that reactionary actors first course of action against a threat is always the employment of force. Given that the domain of threats is believed to reside within the military realm, states are prepared to counter threats with a similar threat of force. Security, therefore, is achieved through the military response by states to threats against states.

¹⁵⁹ See John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, II (1950), 157-180. This concept originates in Thucydides account of the 'inevitable' cause of the Peloponnesian War, "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta."

¹⁶⁰ Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

¹⁶¹ Joseph Nye, "The contribution of Strategic Studies" *Adelphi Papers*, Part I, no. 235, Spring 1989, p. 24.

¹⁶² Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

The Traditional thesis rests on two assumptions: first, that states maintain the preponderance of force and are the sole possessors of the legitimate exercise of force; and second, that states will always choose force to react against threats. However, traditionalists have been confronted with the changes to traditional military responses. There are three factors at play which challenge the traditional perspective. First, major powers have not gone to war with one another since the end of the Second World War. This does not coincide with the realist and neorealist assumption intrinsic in the Traditional School which places a large emphasis on external state conflicts. Not only has conflict between major powers noticeably diminished, but conflict between states has also been on the decline.

In 2004, there were 19 major armed conflicts throughout the world. All 19 conflicts were classified as intra-state conflicts. While this standard of classification would have once deterred participation from outside forces, modern intra-state conflicts are becoming “international in nature and in effect.”¹⁶³ The conflicts blur the lines between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ as states and NGOs are compelled to intervene. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute insists that intra-state conflicts “can be brought to an end only through sustained and comprehensive external engagement.”¹⁶⁴ In 2004, three conflicts were sustained by the contribution of external states: in Rwanda where Burundi contributed troops to assist the Rwandan Government; in Iraq, where the U.S.-led coalition contributed troops to the Iraqi interim government; and in the conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda where a multilateral coalition supports the U.S.

¹⁶³ SIPRI, *The SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, < http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=193#contents>.

¹⁶⁴ In 2004, three conflicts were sustained by the contribution of external states: in Rwanda where Burundi contributed troops to assist the Rwandan Government; in Iraq, where the U.S.-led coalition contributed troops to the Iraqi interim government; and in the conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda where a multilateral coalition supports the U.S. Government's bid.¹⁶⁴ See SIPRI, *The SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, < http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=2#contents>

Government's bid.¹⁶⁵ Changes to the Cold War security framework challenges the traditional theoretical constructs and underlying principles based on previously accepted notions of international war and sovereignty grounded in the experience of Western states.¹⁶⁶

The second challenge to the traditional perspective is the frequency with which non-state actors participate in the military game.¹⁶⁷ Actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) greatly contribute in areas of economic development, poverty alleviation, and emergency relief, all of which contribute to greater security. International NGOs (INGOs) are also playing a significant role in responding to international crisis and have been increasingly called upon to accompany multilateral military contingents operating in part as peace enforcement and peace builders. Kenneth Bush views the growing role of INGOs as "the militarization of the international relief system" because these military contingents represent "the arrival of a major new player in today's humanitarian operations."¹⁶⁸ Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating add that the development of armed humanitarianism represents, at the very least, the changed character of global politics and the international community's response to this change.¹⁶⁹ However, the change is characterized, the traditional camp applying the realist or neorealist structure cannot properly explain the role of INGOs play in responding to

¹⁶⁵ SIPRI, *The SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=193#contents>

¹⁶⁶ K.J. Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, pp. 37-60.

¹⁶⁷ Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁶⁸ Hugo Slim, "The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Practitioner: Some New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon," *Disasters*, 19, No. 2 (June 1995), p. 10-126; See also Kenneth Bush, *Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding, Building Sustainable Peace*, Ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2003), pp.23-47

¹⁶⁹ Tom Keating and Francis Kofi Abiew, *Humanitarian NGO's and Peacebuilding Operations, Building Sustainable Peace*, Ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2003), p. 96.

conflict. This represents a serious weakness for the Traditionalists. As the nature of the conflict continues to shift, it is safe to assume that the role of non-state actors such as NGOs and INGOs will continue to grow.

Third, even if states choose to respond to threats unilaterally, recent events have shown that military force is often not the first option. The threat of nuclear escalation is no longer pressing and deterrence theory is now unable to provide a conduit to military action. Instead, states choose not to respond to threats by force for a number of reasons. Popular opinion opposed to the human costs inherent in military operations has begun to influence policy orientations. The images of war brought into the homes of the general public through advancements in telecommunication and multimedia provide a new form of education for the voting public.¹⁷⁰ Also, the use of force often has uncertain and negative effects on a state's economic objectives. While traditionalists may be adamant that security ought to be restrained within the military realm, new breeds of security, specifically economic security, play to the heartstrings and wallets of the general public and government officials. The costs of war no longer extend to casualties, but also to the economy of the state.

The Copenhagen School

Like the Traditional School, the Copenhagen School identifies the state as the primary reactionary actor. The referent object is understood to be the state which, under political leadership also endorses emergency measures against threats. As such, the state is understood to be both the threatened and the reactionary actor. In many respects, both

¹⁷⁰ This of course has a far greater effect in developed democracies than in either underdeveloped states or in states under totalitarian rule.

schools are very similar. However, where the weakness of the Traditional School lies in its inability to grasp the systemic changes that evolved out of the Cold War, the failing of the Copenhagen School lies in its inability to provide a coherent structural and systemic analysis of security. Ultimately, Buzan and his cronies are unable to provide a clear conceptualization of security.

Buzan maintains the centrality of the state within an anarchic system and argues that security is tied to survival. In this respect, Buzan's framework is almost identical to that offered by the traditionalists. However, the Copenhagen School makes a significant adjustment to the traditional framework. Buzan reconceptualizes the state and by doing so, changes the security dialogue. Traditionalists suggest that the state is a function of its environment and nothing more; the state is an independent, self-regarding unit coacting with functionally similar units within an anarchic system. Buzan, on the other hand, argues that the state is an organic entity and a product of both the domestic and international realms. He writes,

States are partly self-constructed, from their own internal dynamics, and partly products of the competitive and sometimes fierce anarchic environment. The domestic and the international environment are both essential to security analysis, as is the complex relationship between them.¹⁷¹

This conceptualization results in a far wider security agenda and complicates both the systemic analysis and reactionary response to insecurity. The structure of the system determines the response by the reactionary actor against threats. When only the international framework is considered, the systemic analysis is fairly straightforward. The system is understood to be anarchic and responses to threats are drawn as a reaction against the security dilemma and are believed to be military in form. The only actors that

¹⁷¹ Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

influence the security outcome are states. When both the domestic and international realms are considered within the security problematic, security responses are quickly complicated. These complications, however, are not necessarily bad. In fact, by considering both the domestic and international units of analysis, the study addresses some of the weaknesses of the Traditional School. However, the problem for the Copenhagen School is that while widening the agenda, it fails to fully conceptualize security. Specifically, the Copenhagen School does not complete its analysis of who acts to what threats. The result is that the dialogue is left incomplete.

Buzan's analysis of the international framework characterizes the international domain by what it does not have: the absence of a central governing authority. The domestic realm is hierarchically organized, consisting of various units subject to different pressures. Economic, political, social, environmental, military, and international interests are all at work within the national framework. Although this is an accurate portrayal, the more actors at play, the more complicated the security response. When multiple influences interact, the security discourse has the potential to be bogged down with a variety of perspectives and the security outcome is less clear. For example, the military sector will perceive threats against the state to require a forceful response while the economic sector might suggest another reaction such as economic sanctions. Similarly, the political sector might encourage diplomatic negotiations. Thus, the reaction by states against security threats varies according to the sector. The Copenhagen School attempts to address the complications by reverting back to a traditional statist position. Specifically, Buzan asserts that although the reaction may vary by the sector, the appropriate actor to respond is the state and, therefore, there is some element of continuity among the responses. This is an overly simplistic assertion. In most Western developed

states, there are multiple actors within various sectors charged with responding to threats. Although in many states, the government oversees the vast majority of responses, in some sectors, most notably the economic sector, the non-governmental actors are left to deal with threats to the market place.

This leads to a further problem in Buzan's analysis. Although he is clear when identifying the state as the reactionary actor in security discourse, he is very ambiguous when explaining what may constitute an 'emergency measure' or the appropriate reaction against threats. He recognizes that "what constitutes 'existential threats' and emergency measures' is not the same across different sectors."¹⁷² As such, while it is clear who is charged with responding to threats, the Copenhagen School does not explain how security may actually be achieved. Buzan acknowledges this problem and suggests that "security is a generic term which has a distinct meaning, but varies in form."¹⁷³ Again this response is overly simplistic. It does little to help understand or conceptualize security and certainly does not fit with his earlier thesis.

The Copenhagen School makes significant progress in terms of identifying additional actors within various sectors, but it does not go far enough. Coupled with the discussion in Chapter Two, the Copenhagen School reverts back to the traditional perspective of military threats and continues to trump the state as the primary reactionary actor. Simply acknowledging additional actors does not go far enough. It is necessary to provide a framework that explains how these additional actors will react within the broader statist framework. The analysis as it currently stands is simply a traditional thesis

¹⁷² Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

responding in some mild form to the criticisms stemming from changes in the international system. The response is incomplete.

Third World Security Studies

The Third World literature provides a unique perspective of actor assessment and systemic interpretations that have been overlooked by mainstream alternatives. The most notable contribution to the security discussion has been the reformulation of accepted conceptions of security in light of changes to the security framework following the end of the Cold War. Where traditionalists and the so-called wideners of the Copenhagen School focus on the structural questions relating to the anarchic state system, Third World Security scholars have focused instead on the practical changes to security that have been the result of a growing disparity between the developed and underdeveloped states within the system. They do not question the assertion that the system is dominated by states, but rather look at how states are conceptualized within this system. Thus, according to the Third World School, the problem with the systemic analysis lies in the inadequacy of the standard concepts within the security discussion as opposed to the structural analysis of the system per say. As Brian Job notes,

[T]raditional concepts and theories of international relations theory, articulated in the central premises of realist thinking – territoriality, sovereignty, national-statehood, nonintervention, and separation of domestic and foreign policy – [have proven] inadequate to the task at hand.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ Job, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

As a result, third world scholars attempt to enlighten the security discussion with non-western conceptions of the state and the state system. The final result is an alternative explanation as to how security may be achieved.

According to Third World scholars, the fundamental misconception within the traditional assessment of states and the state system is the assumption that all states are created equal and have a shared history, structure, and purpose. An ethnocentric interpretation of the state system prevents traditionalists from realizing the western conception of the state does not apply in all cases. Traditionalists provide a blanket assessment of states as unitary actors, externally motivated by the security agenda, dedicated to the pursuit of power, and meet the standard criteria of a sovereign political entity. This assessment, however, should not extend to all states within the system. Many third world states would not, consequently, be considered to be a state if this broad categorization applied equally.

Ali Mazrui has identified what he terms the “defining characteristics” of all states, namely “the twin principles of centralized authority and centralized power.”¹⁷⁵ The foci of the centralized power within Third World states do not differ in any great respect from other states. The coercive capacity of the state is centralized to a substantial degree. This results from the accumulation of force by the postcolonial state apparatus which has ensured that the coercive power of the state exceeds that of contending power centres.¹⁷⁶ However, the similarities between third world states and other states end here. A comparable assessment does not apply with regards to the centralization of authority, or

¹⁷⁵ Ali Mazrui, “The Triple Heritage of the State in Africa,” in The State in Global Perspective, ed. Ali Kazancigil, (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1986, p. 917 as cited in Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Predicament of the Third World: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective,” in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Job, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 66.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 66.

the legitimate right to use power in the Third World. Authority provides the power centre with the right to rule. In most Third World states, there are competing foci of authority, typically weaker than the state in terms of coercive capacity, but equal or stronger than the state in terms of legitimacy or the right to rule.¹⁷⁷ Mohammed Ayoob suggests that this dissonance between the loci of authority and of power lies at the heart of the security predicament in the Third World.¹⁷⁸ In this respect, the primary source of insecurity is located within the internal security problematic as opposed to external security framework. This ultimately reflects on the states or other actor's ability to respond to threats. This analysis contradicts the systemic analysis of the Traditional School which remains focused on the external dynamic.

This narrow analysis of the traditional camp is due to the tendency of traditionalists to subordinate domestic developments and focus exclusively on the international domain. The state is defined "primarily in external or outward directed terms relative to the international arena."¹⁷⁹ Security is tied to the survival of the state against other states in a self-help system. Threats to survival do not extend into the domestic realm and as such, are not part of the security equation. This is not the case in the Third World. Responding to the failure of Mazrui's 'defining characteristics' of the state to represent Third World developments, Ayoob merges the international and domestic political realms. This merger is controlled differently than that proposed by the Copenhagen School. Buzan suggests that the domestic realm influences the international dynamic while Ayoob argues that international developments affect domestic

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁷⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," *Critical Security Studies: Cases and Concepts*, eds Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 124.

developments in the third world. The management of the internal security problems is the main priority of the overall security agenda of third world states. As a result, Ayoob suggests that the domestic realm includes more than political and administrative responsibilities; Political life “concerns all those variables of activity that influence significantly the kind of authoritative policy adopted for a society and the way it is put into practice.”¹⁸⁰ The state is involved in the social development of all human activity and not merely the governance of community and the protection of territory.

The significance of the domestic framework in the security dialogue is not at the expense of the international dynamic, but demands that theorists reexamine the traditional scope of the international framework. Third World Security scholars agree with their traditional counterparts that the international realm is primarily concerned with the security of states in the military realm. However, they suggest that the international dynamic must also take into account developments in other realms ranging from the economic to ecological realms. Careful not to extend the international security agenda too far, they argue that when developments in these realms threaten to have immediate political consequences then they become a part of the international security calculus.¹⁸¹ In this respect, domestic influences permeate outside the boundaries of national concern and are given due consideration in the international security agenda.

The introduction of domestic influences into the international security problematic presents a challenge to the traditional conception of the state. Traditional evaluation suggests that states are unitary actors “responding to external threats or posing such

¹⁸⁰ David Easton, *The political system: An Enquiry into the State of political science*, (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp, 128, 129 Quoted in Ayoob, “Defining Security,” *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁸¹ Ayoob, “Defining Security,” *op. cit.*, p. 129.

threats to other states.”¹⁸² The state structure includes unitary and rational states who are externally motivated. As previously mentioned, domestic variables are not considered to be a part of the security agenda. The complexity of the third world security problematic where domestic variables are given the same weight as international ones, demands that changes be made to traditional standards. The Third World School dismisses the standard of ‘unitary actor’ and reconceptualizes the character of the state structure. Ayooob suggests that the state must be defined in light of its territory, institutional machinery, and regimes. Responses to security threats may originate in any of the three components of the state structure. This structure is universally applicable and not isolated to the third world. However, the degree to which all three structures are adequately developed in any state is relative to the stage with which a particular state may be located within the evolutionary process of state making.

The Traditional discourse assumes that states are able to provide security at the domestic level and therefore restrict the scope of ‘national security’ to the provision of security against the international security dynamic. However, as Third World scholars are quick to point out, responses against insecurity cannot be isolated to the state if the state is not equipped to respond. Robert Jackson makes this point quite clear:

Contemporary international relations theorists are reluctant to look inside states and usually content to postulate independent statehood as inherently valuable. This is reasonable, as developed democracies can be termed “substantial domiciles.” But what can “national security” possible mean if the state does not provide or protect domestic political goods?¹⁸³

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 124.

¹⁸³ Robert Jackson, “The Security Dilemma in Africa,” The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed Brian L. Job, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1992), p. 81.

Security is achieved through the cooperation of units in all three quadrants of the state structure: territory, institutions, and regimes. Once the domestic arena is stabilized, states can once again be integrated into the international security game.

Traditionalists assume that states have met both of Mazrui's characteristics of a state and are subsequently equipped to address effectively the security predicament of the anarchic state system. The state system relies on the ability of states to provide political order. If this cannot be assured, then "security is likely to remain elusive or, at best, ephemeral."¹⁸⁴ The traditional argument does not acknowledge the potential for states who have failed to meet the standard criteria of statehood. The state making process is believed to be a zero-sum game: either a state is a politically competent sovereign actor or else it is not considered to be a state.

Third World scholars argue that there is a direct correlation between state making and security. An accurate account of state making in the contemporary framework reveals that states located in the Third World are operationally incompetent and cannot contribute to their own security or the security of the system. In fact, the failure of these states contributes to the growing insecurity of the state system. Consequently, third world writers suggest that Security Studies must recognize the effect failed states have on the security of the international system.

Actor assessment reveals that the Third World School may best fall within a neoliberal institutionalist framework. The system is still understood to be anarchic and states are still the only major actors in world politics, but international institutions are believed to play a major role in facilitating cooperation and stabilizing the system.

Threats continue to be directed towards the state, but non-state actors have an important

¹⁸⁴ Ayoob, "Defining Security," *op. cit.*, p. 132.

role to play in building secure relations. This is largely due to the fact that third world states are unable to respond to the same extent as developed states. By moving away from the realist and neo-realist perspective, third world writers are able to bring the study outside the statist and militarist straightjacket confining both the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools. The state remains of utmost importance, but the state is no longer trumped to be the primary reactionary actor which encourages a far more broad agenda that is more reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century.

Critical Security Studies

Wyn Jones suggests that where most contemporary scholars favour broadening the security agenda, the agenda must simultaneously be extended. In effect, what Wyn Jones is suggesting is that it is not only necessary to look beyond the state as the main reference object in security analysis and consider other and alternate actors, it is also necessary to extend the scope of the dialogue to consider what role the state takes in the new security dynamic.

Wyn Jones begins his thesis on broadening security with Buzan's argument advanced in *People, States and Fear*, specifically, the need to move beyond a purely military focus for the security agenda. Buzan's central argument is that Strategic Studies, distinct from security studies, must focus on the impact of military technologies on international relations. In contrast, Security Studies, ought to concern itself with more broadly defined threats to the "security of human collectivities."¹⁸⁵ Buzan's argument was criticized on the ground that by introducing non-military issues to the security agenda he

¹⁸⁵ Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, op. cit., p. 19.

had thereby undermined the field's intellectual coherence.¹⁸⁶ Critical theorists have been quick to support the wider agenda and reject arguments of a weakened study explaining that a broad agenda will in fact strengthen the field. Booth and Herring argue: "When studying any human phenomenon it is preferable to have open intellectual boundaries (which risk only irrelevance) rather than rigid ones (which risk ignorance)."¹⁸⁷ Critical Security Studies therefore expands on the broadened agenda of the Copenhagen School, moving forward where Buzan left off and providing the framework for a boundary-less analysis. By doing so, the statist perspective of both the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools begins to dissolve thereby revealing a more accurate assessment of the reactionary actors in the new security dynamic.

The first step in moving towards a broad agenda is to quickly distinguish between the broad agenda proposed by the Copenhagen School and what is actually proposed by critical theorists. Wyn Jones criticizes Waever's argument in favour of 'desecuritizing' as many issues as possible. The premise of Waever's argument is simple. Security has become a broadly used term used by state officials to justify often extreme measures against a range of issues perceived to be threats to the political order. Waever suggests that the term must be limited, essentially wishing to narrow the application of security to a small number of issues. Therefore while Weaver subscribes to Buzan's broad agenda and the widening of the Copenhagen School, the fear of going too far in addressing a full range of security actors ends up bringing the discussion to a cold stop. Critical Security theorists agree that security has become a widely used concept but instead maintain that is a good thing. Essentially, the argument they present is that the security dynamic is so

¹⁸⁶ See Stephan M. Walt, "The renaissance of security studies" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 211-239 as cited in Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 106

¹⁸⁷ Booth & Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

broad that a narrow application of security does not fit. This then translates to a very interesting discussion about responding to security threats.

Critical theory is by its very nature against identifying a single referent object. Some theorists such as Smith suggest that the focus should be on the individual. Others such as Shaw and Rues-Smit suggest the notion of civil society. Yet others propose that ethnonational and religious identities are appropriate referent objects for security. Critical theory, under the leadership of Horkheimer, heralds the individual as the ultimate referent object. Horkheimer believed that theory ought to be concerned with the physical and material existence and experiences of human beings. He did not reject outright the importance of class or state, but rather maintained that in analyzing the dynamics within societies and institutions, the focus must remain firmly fixed on the implications such a dynamic has on the individual. Class and the state are simply further considerations at play in the larger and more complex analysis.

Wyn Jones brings Horkheimer's argument within the security dynamic and suggests that "by making the individual the ultimate referent, the security analysis is encouraged to understand the various contexts that impinge upon an individual's security and simultaneously is discouraged from their reification and fetishization."¹⁸⁸ Booth reminds the field that rather than make the state the referent object for the security discourse, analysis should instead concentrate "on real people in real places"¹⁸⁹ However, while Wyn Jones praises the individual as the referent object, he also notes that at times, the particular referent object will vary on a case by case basis. He maintains that the inability to discern with full confidence a single referent object is not cause for concern.

¹⁸⁸ Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁸⁹ Ken Booth, "Human Wrongs and International Relations," *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 123.

Rather he celebrates the shift away from the statist perspective of the traditional scholarship.

The trouble for the Critical camp is that while it may be necessary to reject the rigid boundaries of the statist perspective, identifying the individual as the referent object provides very little assistance in terms of identifying who or what responds to insecurity. The individual may serve to broaden the epistemological perspective of the field, but it does not provide a practical conceptual framework for analysis. However, it is difficult to criticize to any great extent the shortcomings of the Criticalists. This is the case because its primary purpose is to simply encourage a broad study. In this respect, it is very different than its counterparts. Critical theory evolved out of the celebratory response to the demise of positivism. It was provoked by the “growing sense that something [was] wrong with the way in which the relevant issues and options [were] being posed” and the desire to change “the categorical structure and patterns within which we think and act.”¹⁹⁰ The open dialogue invited those who were “concerned with metatheoretical inquiry” and perceptions of human nature and “reality” that had been shaped by the dominance of scientific rationalism.¹⁹¹ It does not try to provide the answers because there is growing awareness that the answers will change depending on the set of circumstances particular to the time in issue. Therefore, while Critical Security Studies does not provide a great deal of guidance in terms of identifying how security threats are or ought to be responded to, it instead provides the field with the opportunity to consider all threats and all potential

¹⁹⁰ Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*, London: Methuen, 1976 as quoted in Jim George, “International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, 1989, p. 270.

¹⁹¹ Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospectus of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33 (September 1989), p. 236.

responders. The hope is that by doing so, the scholarship will avoid repeating the failures of the Traditional School.

Conclusion

Both the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools provide a statist assessment of reactionary actors. The result is that both schools neglect to reform the modern security dynamic. Third World Security Studies and Critical Security Studies on the other hand, provide a far more relaxed and ultimately more accurate portrayal of threat response. The Third World School again enforces a statist perspective, however, it expands on the shortcomings of the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools and in the end, provides a useful critique of the state and opens the door for a new dialogue. Critical Theory, in contrast, rejects the state as the referent object and instead celebrates the individual. While this may be conceptually impractical, the usefulness of this approach is the ultimate rejection of the statist stronghold in Security Studies and the opportunity to finally embrace a broadened and expanded security agenda.

CHAPTER IV: THE FUTURE OF SECURITY STUDIES

The preceding chapters outlined the positions of the four schools with regards to threat assessment and securitizing. The schools represent signposts charting the study of security and hoping that they assist in a better understanding of the topic of this examination. However, the schools have offered little more than a glimpse into what international security actually encompasses today and how security studies seeks to provide future analyses. With all that has been written about security, there lacks a consensus and security studies is marred by ongoing debate. As Alan Lamborn argues, debate is expected given the complexity of the subject however, “while the debate is understandable, it is too often destructive and self-defeating.”¹⁹² Debate is valuable only insofar as it does not consume the theoretical exercise. At this time, the debate between the identified schools of thought has served only to exasperate honest reflections in security studies and frustrate a devoted drive to understand the intricacies of international security. If Security Studies continues to be divided according to the schools identified in this study, then it will fail to ever successfully provide a conceptual, practical, or theoretical examination of security.

It is necessary to move beyond epistemological debate and embrace common ground. Security writers have not accurately portrayed the divisions within the security literature and have consequently misled the security dialogue. The division of schools is largely smoke and mirrors as writers try to draw swords over rather minor details that separate one school from another. This is indicative of a larger problem facing Security

¹⁹² Alan Lamborn, “Theory and the Politics in World Politics,” International studies Quarterly, Vol. 41 (1997), p. 188.

Studies. Just like its parent discipline, Security Studies has been led down the paradigm path where the value of the discipline is believed to lie in a scientific assessment of the endeavor.

There are three common analytical methods that attempt to measure scientific progress and attach value to a study: theoretical validity; paradigmatic achievement; and parsimony and heuristic ability. According to positivist principles, only one school may achieve all three and consequently only one school may provide a valid assessment of security. As a result, each school is critical of the other schools of thought and is adamant that alternative interpretations are incorrect, overly optimistic, dangerously ignorant, or simply far too ambiguous to be of any use. The reluctance of scholars to acknowledge similarities is symptomatic of the common practice of trumping one school over another in a naïve attempt to achieve paradigmatic status and declare victory for one theoretical construct. Moreover, given the complexity of the field of study, a heuristic and parsimonious method of analysis may not serve to provide accurately a sufficient examination.

The standard measurements of validity must then be reassessed. Current positivistic practices have only served to provide a contrived and blinkered perspective of security. There is more than one right answer to the study and all schools have valuable contributions to make. Security Studies must provide a post-positivist profile of security. This would bring the field into what has been termed the “third debate” in international relations theory where scholars are encouraged to embrace a critical reassessment of common theoretical measurements. The task of the third debate, as identified by Yosef Lapid is, “neither the discovery of some ahistoric and universal scientific method nor the attainment of some objectively validated truth about world politics. It is rather a matter of

promoting a more reflexive intellectual environment in which debate, criticism, and novelty can freely circulate.”¹⁹³ It then attempts to de-militarize the field and encourage cooperation among traditionally offensive theories. The hope is that as defences come down, commonalities will become more apparent.

The primary thrust of this chapter is to evaluate the commonalities within the security literature and to assess what may be drawn from such an examination. As Chapter One argued, security is a neglected concept, torn by a preoccupation with epistemology and a fascination with grand theories. The division of Security Studies into independent schools serves only to exasperate these tensions and very little can be learned about security. This chapter suggests that security studies must reject positivist principles of disciplinary triumph and celebrate a future of theoretical and scholastic pluralism. It is divided into three sections. Section one examines the transition away from the behavioural crutch that has crippled the field. It will assess Security Studies in light of its parent discipline, international relations theory, and suggest that the disciplinary offspring ought to follow suit. Section two examines the commonalities within the literature. Once security studies moves beyond a rigid application of positivist science where only one approach may be granted legitimacy, a cross-sector analysis has room to flourish and proud walls between the schools begin to tumble. Three areas of convergence will be identified: the state; threat assessment; and reactionary agents. Finally, section four will assess the future of Security Studies and determine where the field ought to go from here.

The Scientific Value of International Relations Theory

¹⁹³ Lapid, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

Since World War II, international relations theory has relied primarily on scientific measurements of theoretical value. In 1939, E.H. Carr wrote: "The science of international politics is in its infancy."¹⁹⁴ In the beginning, IR theory did not adopt strict positivist principles, but rather took refuge in the relationship between science and human interest. Unlike traditional scientific analysis where facts are independent of individual opinion, "in the political sciences, which are concerned with human behaviour, there are no such facts."¹⁹⁵

Carr relied on the identified purpose of international politics to define much of his understanding of role of science in the field. He wrote, "[desire] to cure the sickness of the body politic has given its impulse and its inspiration to political science...The wish is father to the thought."¹⁹⁶ Unlike traditional science, the purpose remained married to the investigation and became a part of the analysis. Therefore, the theory is never separated from its human genesis and becomes both analytical and normative in its application; "Political science is the science not only of what is, but what ought to be."¹⁹⁷ Thus theory was judged both on its analytic capabilities and on its normative example.

Hans Morgenthau built on Carr's work and sought to expand the role of science in the discipline. Theory, according to Morgenthau, "must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ E.H.Carr, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, op. cit., p. 3.

Morgenthau's realism sought to strike a balance between deterministic science and subjective understanding of human development. He did not exemplify true positivist empiricism, but rather, he presented a theory of international relations that understood theory to imply a deductive process by which facts are discovered and "[given] meaning through reason."¹⁹⁹ He insisted that realism be empirically and pragmatically tested to ensure that the theory is "consistent with the facts and within itself."²⁰⁰ He established 'principles' such as power and the supremacy of the state, through which one could "bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena" that would otherwise remain "disconnected and unintelligible."²⁰¹

Morgenthau's empiricism was rooted in a "historically established tradition" based on intersubjective understanding of historical and cultural knowledge. While Morgenthau stressed the empirical value of his "scientific undertaking,"²⁰² he maintained a role for subjective interpretation, insisting that "examination of the facts is not enough."²⁰³ As Richard Ashley suggests, Morgenthau's realism did not obey strict adherence to positivist principles. Instead, it clung to the traditional community of international relations; one that endorsed the "uniquely human" character of study, and maintained the innate relationship between knowledge and action.²⁰⁴ "no study of international politics...can be disinterested in the sense that it is able to divorce knowledge from action and to pursue knowledge for its own sake."²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁰⁴ Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 25:2, June 1981, p. 209.

²⁰⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

In contrast to Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz adopts rigid, positivist understanding of theory based heavily on Thomas Kuhn's scientific analysis. As his title suggests, Waltz established a *Theory of International Politics* based on a technically applied understanding of science. Theory, according to Waltz, "is understood to be a set of statements embodying assumptions and explaining laws, where laws are repeatedly observed relations between variables of an objectified reality."²⁰⁶

Waltz applies deductive empiricism to invent theory. He insists that theory "cannot be constructed through induction alone...theoretical notions can only be invented not discovered."²⁰⁷ The "invention" of theories to which Waltz refers, is based on the application of Thomas Kuhn's stages of theorization.²⁰⁸ Waltz applied Kuhn's analysis to create a seven step requirement for theorization in international relations:

1. Identify the theory to be tested.
2. Hypothesize.
3. Test the hypothesis.
4. Apply relevant definitions of terms and concepts to the theory.
5. Eliminate or control variables that are not relevant to the theory.
6. Devise several possible tests.
7. If the theory is seen to be "logical, coherent, and plausible," then the theory must be tested. If the theory fails, reflect whether the theory requires repair or restatement, or whether the relevant terms must be redefined or narrowed in scope.²⁰⁹

Steps 6 and 7 are particularly important. A theory must pass a "dual test"²¹⁰ to determine its empirical and pragmatic value. A theory is useful if it is determined to

²⁰⁶ Ashley, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

²⁰⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁰⁸ Kuhn identified three stages of theorization: (1) problemation, (2) hypothesis, and (3) testing.²⁰⁸ A theory can only be affirmed upon completion of all three steps. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

²⁰⁹ See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15-17.

provide a logical system that produces plausible and reliable results. Thus, value is associated with usefulness.

Unlike both Carr and Morgenthau, Waltz separates theory from the reality it seeks to explain.²¹¹ Waltz understands theory to be divorced from practice and “cannot be made identical to it.”²¹² Theories, though axiomatic, do not attempt to proclaim “truth.” If one applies theory to determine “truth” or “reality,” this implies a misunderstanding of both the definition and purpose of theory.²¹³ The success of theory is, therefore, measured not by how accurately it reflects reality, but rather by its usefulness: its predictive and explanatory ability. Therefore, Waltz measures the value of theory in terms of its usefulness as determined by the full application of the three scientific methods of value measurement: a theory must be valid, it must be universally accepted, and it must be parsimonious and heuristic.

Reliance on science alone limits theoretical opportunities. As such, international relations theory has begun to move beyond scientific measurements of theoretical validity to determine unique conceptions of value. The relationship between reality and theory in international relations prevents the reliance on theoretical validity as the sole measure of value. Steven Smith argues that the utility of theory lies in its policy relevance. Theory must be more than mere philosophy; theory ought to reflect the reality in which it is constructed.²¹⁴ Smith highlights the premise that IR theory reflects the historical developments of the Twentieth Century. International events have triggered theoretical development since IR’s conception: World War I brought about the First Debate in IR;

²¹¹ See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, op. cit., p. 7.

²¹² Ashley, op. cit., p. 216.

²¹³ See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, op. cit. p. 9.

²¹⁴ See Steve Smith, op. cit., pp. 189-205.

the arms race of the Cold War and the launch of Sputnik affirmed neorealism; and the rise of international institutions, multinational corporations, and other non-governmental actors encouraged challengers to neorealism's supremacy.

Moreover, transformations in the dominant unit of analysis within the international system impacts theory. For example, as the role of the state changes, the dominance of neorealism begins to decline as alternate theories emerge that include other actors as their unit of analysis. Multiple levels of analysis within the field represent a challenge to theory dominance. But, as Barry Buzan notes, the levels of analysis can be severed which permits a theory to focus on one unit exclusively. However, while the levels of analysis can be severed, the levels of interaction cannot. This prevents the dominance of a single paradigm in IR theory. The field is innately dynamic and requires multiple levels of theory in order to provide a useful analysis.

The result has been the creation of metatheory which links partial or middle theory to grand theory.²¹⁵ It allows for more universal theory that attempts to prevent the disqualification of the analysis that ensues after major structural or systematic changes. Carr was one of the first in the field to recognize the value of metatheory. While he acknowledged the relationship between purpose and investigation, he was reluctant to analyze policy in terms of his broad theoretical framework. This allowed him to present grand theories "that could not be proven wrong by immediate events."²¹⁶

The introduction of Kuhn's concept of "paradigm" and the application of the scientific method confirmed, for many, the scientific value of international relations theory. However, Kuhn's "scientific revolution" did not occur and international relations

²¹⁵ See James Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: a Comparative Study, 5th Ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), p. 17-18.

²¹⁶ Paul Howe, "The Utopian Realism of E. H. Carr," Review of International Studies, (1994), 20, p. 288.

theory did not achieve paradigmatic status. Despite the dominance of Waltz's application of theory constructs and the ideological hegemony of neorealism, objective empiricism was criticized for its affinity to the natural sciences. Pressure to establish paradigms with reference to a vision more appropriate to the hard sciences, resulted in a critical reappraisal of the theoretical objectives of international relations theory.

Critics argue that a pre-paradigmatic field should not be confined by rigid measures of scientific achievement, but must be expanded to include a social process wherein value and hermeneutic considerations gain influence. Expansive cumulation, a process which expands and broadens research horizons by producing a multitude of research options beyond existing models, variables, relationships and techniques, is one alternative to the prevailing 'paradigm building blocks.' Expansive cumulation strives to establish a catalogue of concepts, techniques, data, archives, and models. The pre-paradigmatic research agenda of IR is clearly expansive in nature with an extensive catalogue of ideas but without a strong commitment to any of them.

The heuristic function of theory remains a priority for international relations scholars. The problem though is that while it may be useful to attempt to predict future directions of theory, the practical arena is so dynamic that this is nearly impossible. James Rosenau suggests that change is the only constant in world politics. He characterizes the field as one wrought with turbulence and is unsure when and how the turbulence will ever subside. It is "sheer craziness" to assume that one could correctly predict how future events will unfold, but it is reasonable to ask scholars to attempt to understand and manage change.²¹⁷ Thus, the heuristic function of theory has been called

²¹⁷ See James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) and James Rosenau, "Probing Puzzles Persistently: a Desirable but

into question. Instead, theory ought to be valued by the extent to which it can explain and manage the turbulent system. Only then can it be both useful and practical.

Similarly, parsimony is criticized for simplifying the complex dynamics of the international system. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach argue that international relations theory must “downplay the virtue of parsimony in [its] models.”²¹⁸ Scholars understandably yearn for simple and coherent models that can explain everything, but unfortunately, the world is not willing to cooperate.

Rosenau adds that by definition, parsimonious theories ignore vital components of world politics. Turbulence operates at the micro and macro level of analysis and simple theories are unable to grasp limited fields of knowledge thereby missing part of the equation. While certain theoretical limits are necessary to ensure focused research, excessive parsimony prevents a full understanding of world politics.²¹⁹ Ferguson and Mansbach concede. They argue that determination to be parsimonious has led to “dangerous reductionism, with the result that most present models are caricatures of ‘reality.’”²²⁰ Theory then ought to be fully conceptualized regardless of the ineloquence of the exercise. This does not imply that theories can be justly complicated, but rather that they should examine the phenomenon to the fullest extent. Parsimony must take a back seat to full academic endeavor.

Security Studies has followed the same path as its parent discipline. It has mirrored the evolution of international relations theory and as a result, it too has adopted a positivist path much to its detriment. The criticism towards paradigmaticism has yet to fully

improbable future for IR theory,” *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 309-317.

²¹⁸ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard L. Mansbach, “Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, December 1991, p. 369

²¹⁹ See Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 23-24.

²²⁰ Ferguson and Mansbach, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

consider the run-off of the narrow-mindedness of international relations theory onto Security Studies. Regardless, the ill-effects of the current devotion within IR are being felt in Security Studies and the same recommendations can be made. In order for Security Studies to provide a useful analysis of the international security dynamic, it too must move beyond grand theories and blind dedication to paradigmatic ideals. It must not be confined to rigid measures of scientific achievement and instead adopt expansive cumulation so as to broaden its research horizons in order to better understand and explain the security dynamic. The study must moreover understand that it will fail in predicting what the future holds. The heuristic function of theory is no longer a requirement. Finally, attempts to simplify the complexity of the security dynamic will only serve to ignore the very nature of the challenge of the study. The black and white reality of the Cold War has ended and it is no longer possible to ignore the multifarious quality of the post-Cold War dynamic. The first step in moving beyond the positivist stronghold, is to consider Security Studies in its entirety, looking at the commonalities of the existing theoretical constructs to identify common ground.

Commonalities in Security Studies

In many respects, Security Studies has become an exercise in hermeneutics, concerned with interpretation as opposed to conceptualization or theorization. The schools all say pretty much the same thing but in different ways. There are three possible explanations for the similarities between the schools. First, the traditional ontology may be far too superior and in this respect, perhaps we are best to embrace the achievement of metatheory and stop bickering about the details. However, it is not difficult to find significant weaknesses in the traditional literature that can be addressed by examining the

work of contesting schools. A second possibility may be that there is a growing lack of creativity in security scholarship. This may be attributed to the end of the Cold War or perhaps because debate within the literature leads nowhere significant and writers are frustrated with the lack of progress. While this very well may be the case, it does not help to explain why writers continue to recycle security analysis, hoping that perhaps this time the analysis will serve a useful purpose. Third, the similarities between the schools may be attributed to the possibility that the answers that have evaded scholars since the inception of security and strategic studies may have already been answered. Scholars may simply be spinning their wheels because they are either too proud or too accustomed to the debate to accept the accomplishments of the field. The epistemological and ontological tools may already exist within the literature but have been masked by bitter debate and rueful neglect. Debate is taking the field nowhere and perhaps it is, for the time being, necessary to consider that there is no need to proceed any further at this point. The library is sufficiently vast to search for the answers that are required in order to bring Security Studies into the twenty-first century. It is necessary to take the time to find them. The next section assumes that the latter explanation is true. Once the study has moved beyond positivist interpretations of theory and have the opportunity to embrace plurality, futile debate and a fascination with grand theory may cease and for the first time, scholars may use what they have to determine where to go next.

State centrism

All theories of security are state centric, it is simply a matter of degree. Not all schools identify the state as the referent object nor do they insist that the state is the sole reactionary agent. However, all schools are captivated by the role of the state in security

relations. By identifying the primary thrust of the discussion as ‘international’ or ‘national’ security, the state claims a unique role in the debate regardless of the extent to which the state is herald.

The Traditional School is the most obvious in its loyalty to the state. Waltz writes: “states are *the* units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems. They will long remain so.”²²¹ He adds, “States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones.”²²² The condition of states is one perpetuated by violence; “because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at the mercy of their more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war.”²²³ Consequently, “security is the highest end.”²²⁴

The dominance of the traditional literature serves to license a state centric perspective in the field. The state has become a conceptual pawn in the theoretical debates that have developed over the past thirty years. Some schools, the Critical Theory of Keith Krause and Michael Williams for example, are simply critical of this for the sake of being critical. However most examine the state centrism of the Traditional School and propose alternate interpretations that attempt to correct the traditional failings or expand the agenda of the state in international security relations. Where the traditional literature seeks to explain the position of the state in relation to international security, the focus has now shifted to try to understand the role of the state in relation to a more complex security environment consisting of alternate actors. As Smith suggests, this is a

²²¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, op. cit., p. 95.

²²² Ibid., p. 93.

²²³ Ibid., p. 102

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 127.

remarkable and massive change of focus.²²⁵ Regardless of tactics, all schools must address the role of the state in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of security in the post-Cold War era.

The Copenhagen School, although determined to distance itself from its traditional counterpart, provides a rather traditional account of the role of the state in the international security discussion. The strength of Buzan's state centrism is the reason why critics including Steve Smith suggest that Buzan provides nothing more than a 'sophisticated neorealist account of security.'²²⁶ Buzan writes, "In the contemporary international system, the standard unit of security is ... the sovereign territorial state."²²⁷ He insists that the state is the sole referent object for three reasons: it is the only actor capable of coping with the sub-state, state, and international security problematic; the state is the primary agent tasked with responding to security threats; and the state is the dominant actor in the international system. Although Buzan claims to widen the security agenda outside a purely state centric scope, he and his cohorts fail to move beyond a traditional assessment of state security.

Where the work of Traditional and Copenhagen Schools is the product of the Western nation-state model, the Third World literature examines non-Western settings and rejects the western conceptualization of the state. This impacts the security dialogue because various understandings or interpretations of the state unit naturally leads to varying interpretations of the role of the state in the security dynamic. If the state is understood through a realist and neorealist lens as in both the Traditional and Copenhagen School is then the state is perceived to be a legitimate authority seeking

²²⁵ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²²⁷ Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 18-19.

power in the pursuit of security. However, the third world literature, also concerned with the state, has a very different perspective of both state power but also the ability of states, understood in the traditional sense to bring about security.

Buzan and the Copenhagen School identify three components of a state. Which include: 1) a physical based comprised of a population and territory; 2) the institutionalization of the physical base, consisting of all government institutions and the laws and procedures that govern their operation,²²⁸ and 3) an 'idea of state,' "embodying a legitimating idea based upon ideology, national identity, values, among others, shared by wide sectors of the population."²²⁹ This final aspect is, as Buzan suggests, the 'binding' idea that allows the other two aspects of statehood to prevail. The 'idea' holds the "territorial-polity-society package together, and defines much of [the state's] character and power as an actor in the international system."²³⁰ This relates to the fixation of realism and neo-realism within both the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools. The theoretical underpinnings in both assert power to be the primary concern of states.

However, third world authors are quick to point out that not all states have power in the international system and more significantly, the internal variables in many third world states do not facilitate a standard characterization of the state and its quest for security. To address the obvious disparities between first and third world states, common qualifiers are attached in the artificial hope that this will help explain away the obvious failure of the traditional literature in addressing state pursuits of security. For example,

²²⁸ Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

²²⁹ Arlene Tickner, "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2003), p. 314.

²³⁰ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

these states are often described as 'weak' or 'failed' states. So-called 'weak states' are described by Ann Tickner as follows:

[states in which a] solid national identity, or an 'idea of state' is absent, or contested by a diverse array of societal actors; socio-political cohesion is especially weak; consensus on the 'rules of the game' is low; institutional capabilities in terms of the provision of order, security and well-being are limited; and the state is highly personalized.²³¹

IR and security scholars cannot deny the presence of often extreme qualitative differences between core and non-core states. The acknowledgement of such disparities has come into vogue in recent years as more and more scholars in nearly all schools try to redress the shortcomings of their earlier frameworks and state analyses. However, rather than try to redefine the framework of statehood in light of security, the popular consensus is to instead provide a distinct category for those states unable to meet Buzan's standards. States who have had limited success in meeting the Western standards of state-building and maintenance have been referred to as 'quasi-states.'

Robert Jackson first offered this qualifier to explain the incorporation of a large number of newly independent states from the periphery into the international system following the end of World War II.²³² Because they lacked the internal legitimacy and authority, these states were mainly constructed from the outside by means of international recognition of their sovereign status.²³³ Moreover, the classification of such states as 'quasi' required a negative interpretation of statehood and sovereignty given their inability to provide the political and social goods to their population as required by standards, and to relate to other sovereign states in a reciprocal fashion as required by

²³¹ Tickner, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

²³² Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 26-31.

²³³ See Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 63-65; Holsti, "The State, War, and the State of War," *op. cit.*

traditional conceptions of sovereignty.²³⁴ In all respects, the 'quasi states' of the periphery failed to adhere to any of the conditions of statehood as provided in the core literature. As a result, when discussing states within the security dialogue, the third world was largely left out because third world quasi-states simply did not fit within the discourse.

This is why and where the third world literature tries to pick up. The weak state and quasi-state literature focuses on the disjuncture between the traditional notions of statehood and the third world state and also on the series of deficits within the third world that prevent a complete cultivation of the modern state model within the international system. The traditional literature assumes that the state is "unproblematic as a primary category in IR."²³⁵ In non-core regions, either the state is not the principle political arbiter of political and social relations, or state deficiencies are attributed to the international system. Both considerations ought to encourage the reexamination of the utility of the state concept rather than focus on the shortcomings of periphery states or a qualitative analysis of the internal variables of core and non-core states.²³⁶ The mainstream literature, however, fails to see the need for this and consequently, the third world literature is left to fill the gap. The result is that the third world literature, just like its counterparts, is equally enthralled with the state and its role in the discourse.

Although all schools are devoted to the study of the state, the traditional scholastic enterprise largely rejects alternative studies of statehood and the strive for security. For example, Mazrui's "twin principles of centralized authority and centralized power"²³⁷

²³⁴ Tickner, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ Mazrui, *op. cit.*, p. 107, in Ayoob, "The Security Predicament," *op. cit.*, p. 66

discussed in Chapter Three further illustrate the disparities between the third world concept of state and the traditional interpretations. In core states, the foci of authority and power lie within the national government whereas in non-core states, the internal variables are so weak that there may be competing loci of authority that vie for power. The origin of such competition lies in a multitude of sources that are not part of the traditional assessment of power or authority.

Returning to Jackson's acknowledgement of 'quasi states' based on arbitrary demarcation of territory, it is possible to assert that preexisting national and ethnic divisions create power dissonance between competing parties vying for political control. Each may have a distinct idea of the state thereby failing to conform to Buzan's study of the state. Although the physical base may be present, conflicting standpoints on the institutional machinery required to establish statehood combined with often violent clashes over the ideological foundation of the state prevents the completion of the modern state building model. However, the failure to meet such a model does not necessarily imply a loss of hope. The creation of a state that meets the standard criteria may not be required for the fulfillment of the primary functions of statehood.

The state may not always be fundamental to political life. As Tickner argues, the diversity of political constructs in African countries illustrates this point quite clearly. The primary functions of a state have often been usurped by a variety of non-state actors including nations, nationalist movements, regional strongmen, international business, and international financial institutions. Tickner does not suggest, however, that this distribution of power is conducive to secure relations within the territorial boundaries of the state, but simply highlights these variables to illustrate that there are non-traditional forces at work within non-core states that are not given due consideration by the

mainstream literature.²³⁸ If the literature were to discard western concepts or to be honestly open to redressing such concepts, the security dialogue within the periphery may begin to shift and answers to the problems facing the so-called 'weak' or 'failed' states may be sought. This will only be accomplished, however, if the third world literature takes the brave step away from the Traditional School and if the Traditional School and its following acknowledge the need for the third world perspective. Where the field currently stands, the shortcomings of the state security dialogue may be somewhat addressed by critically examining the ability of the third world weak/quasi state to bring about security or insecurity within a region. The current dominance of the traditional literature, however, permits this only in a limited arena.

Critical Theory provides the critical perspective of the state centric perspective of the traditional literature and by doing so, encourages a more broad analysis of security that would encourage the third world literature among others. Wyn Jones suggests that realist (and subsequently, the Traditional School) statism is open to criticism on empirical grounds. He takes issue with the traditional perspective that the state is at the centre of the study simply because the state is at the centre of the international system. He insists that one must consider how realistic the realist statism actually is. Wyn Jones points to the differentiation between the sub-state and supra-state levels of analysis which requires realists to only consider the international arena while insisting that a state's domestic politics is interesting though unhelpful with studying international political behaviour.²³⁹ Realists believe that the pressures of the international system will encourage certain state-like behaviors (i.e. the pursuit of power, survival tactics, etc) regardless of the internal

²³⁸ Tickner, *op. cit.*, p. 316-317.

²³⁹ Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

composition of the state. Again, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union are helpful examples. Wyn Jones notes that although the simplicity of the realist perspective is attractive, it is impossible to ignore domestic politics. A full analysis must include the domestic level to understand how the state will respond to the international dynamic. Thus, the failure of the realist paradigm to predict the end of the Cold War can be largely contributed to the inability of realists to consider domestic politics, belief systems and policies of the Soviet Union. Critical theorists further suggest that scholars who continue to celebrate the state with great reverence despite the massive shifts in the international arena in the post-Cold War era, will result in a stagnant study. Simply, such a narrow and dated perspective offers nothing new to the agenda. The result is that empirically, the statism of the Traditional School will ultimately retard the study.

Threats

The Traditional School is fascinated with state survival within the anarchic state system. It therefore perceives security threats to stem from states against states. This focus has been the subject of a great deal of criticism largely due to the frequency with which security threats stem from non-state actors. Moreover, threats often take the form of non-military threats such as environmental or economic threats which equally can have a serious impact on security. Traditionalists however, remain faithful to the militarist and statist perspective and are largely unwilling to agree to a wider agenda. This is where the Copenhagen School claims to offer a more sophisticated agenda. Buzan defines security according to state survival. Buzan writes, "In seeking security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Its bottom line is about

survival.”²⁴⁰ Although he attempts to broaden the range of security threats outside of the traditional security dilemma, threats are believed to invoke political responses initiated by the state. Threats may arise in different sectors and may extend beyond the traditional scope of military security, but in order to ‘count’ as security issues, threats are existential and require ‘emergency measures’ that exceed the normal parameters of political response. The distinguishing feature is that the threat requires an immediate and extreme response otherwise the effects may be far greater than the state may bear. Thus, international security is restricted to threats deemed to be existential in nature and requiring political responses orchestrated by the state. This does not differ to any great extent from what the traditional literature suggests ought to be considered security threats. State survival assured through the maximization of power is believed to be the ultimate end of traditional security. As Cozette suggests, states must determine the “most effective use that can be made ... of means or capabilities at their disposal in order to achieve this end.”²⁴¹ Traditionalists and the so-called Wideners of the Copenhagen School both suggest that states have the legitimate authority to take ‘appropriate’ action against security threats in order to preserve state security.

The second reason why the Copenhagen school fails to offer a non-traditional analysis of security is that the literature is founded on the belief that conflict within the system is perpetrated by states. The security complex is defined according to the security dilemma, pegging states against states in interstate violence. Buzan writes:

Security complexes are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinct regional intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity. A

²⁴⁰ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, op. cit., p.18-19.

²⁴¹ Cozette, op. cit., p. 428.

security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within that complex – by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other.²⁴²

Buzan echoes Waltz's sentiment that the states live in condition of violence. Waltz writes:

Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming. Whatever the weaponry and however many states in the system, states have to live with their security dilemma, which is produced not by their wills but by their situations.²⁴³

Both schools perceive relations among states to be naturally antagonistic and provide a rather narrow interpretation of international violence. Buzan appears to be content with applying the security dilemma to his analysis, but is sensitive to the extent to which his study may be deemed to offer a narrow scope of security. For this reason, Buzan expands on the traditional literature and offers a sectoral investigation of state behavior. However, although Buzan and the Copenhagen School attempts to distance itself from the statist and military focused constructs of the traditional camp, it too shifts its analysis to one very similar to the Traditional School. Focusing on the need of political will triggered by threats to state survival, Buzan and his colleagues take only very small steps towards the broader agenda they claim they offer. In the end, Buzan provides little more than a traditional perspective on threats and security specifically.

The third world literature also ends up being very similar to its traditional counterpart. Although it started out as an alternative to the traditional perspective

²⁴² Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

²⁴³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 186-187.

highlighting the significance of economic, political, social, and environmental threats, the widened agenda is accepted only insofar as it triggers military responses. In the end, when examining whose security is threatened, violent threats against the state demanding a political and ultimately a military response dominate the literature.

Critical theory provides a normative critique of the traditional perspective that states have normative values in and of themselves. The Traditional group focuses on the state as the primary referent object able to provide its citizens with security at a domestic level. This analysis is then applied to a narrow military understanding of security as discussed in Chapters One and Two, wherein threats stem from other states. Wyn Jones notes that this analysis ignores the reality of threats from non-military sources such as the environment and thereby misses a significant part of the security dialogue. The traditional literature, therefore, is incomplete. The Critical Theory advocates focuses on the individual, looking specifically at individual security. This analysis brings an interesting normative framework to the forefront of the study and begs a broadened agenda which includes personalized threats unique to the particular threatened object. This analysis is largely in response to the failure of the other schools to take the necessary steps to consider security outside the traditional scope. Critical Security Studies encourages the study of threats to the environment or the economy, for example, in isolation, without needing to bring military responses or political reliance into the discussion. This thereby provides intellectual freedom for scholars to examine security in a very different light.

A wider security framework is in keeping with the socio-political environment of the post-Cold War era. With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the security climate has evolved beyond the traditional threat assessment and therefore Security Studies must incorporate a far wider

agenda. Although hard threats remain very real, the fall out of the security climate since 2001 has evolved beyond merely hard threats and now includes significant environmental, socio-political, and economic threats that represent significant challenges to state and individual security. In this respect, the more flexible framework proposed by Critical Security Studies is desirable and will serve to strengthen the security literature. If Security Studies wants to remain useful, it has to remain instep with the security challenges of the time. This requires a far wider assessment of threats today.

Reactionary agents/actors

Statism remains firmly entrenched within the Traditional literature. The state is both the threatened and the reactionary agent. The Copenhagen School follows suit and also identifies the state as the primary reactionary agent. The main difference between the two schools of thought lies in the slightly wider agenda of the Copenhagen School which considers both domestic and international levels of analysis whereas the Traditionalists consider only the international realm. Buzan's agenda is widened further by providing a sectoral analysis of threats and, ultimately, responses to threats. However, upon final analysis, the differences between the Copenhagen and Traditional Schools are largely inconsequential. Both are statist and more importantly, neither can successfully translate to the security dilemma of the twenty first century.

The extreme statism of the Traditional camp prevents a wider security framework that acknowledges the growing role of humanitarian actors and preponderance of intra-state conflict. The Copenhagen School does better, but yet it too does not go far enough. Both schools frame threat assessment in light of military threats requiring political responses from the state. This means that the state, and only the state, is equipped and

authorized to act. Security, therefore, becomes a condition that may only be brought about by the state. The problem with this analysis is that while security may be state-dependent, so too is insecurity. The state system is understood to be anarchic with states vying for power and bringing about greater insecurity. Thus, security can be both achieved and dissolved by the state. This ignores the role that non-state actors have in creating both secure and insecure conditions. Whether it is the role of insurgents in Afghanistan in creating greater insecurity or the role of NGOs in enhancing security, the narrow analysis of the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools fails to take in to account alternate actors.

The one benefit of the shortcomings of both schools is that their failures are largely the same. This means that a solution is more easily identifiable. Moreover, it shows that the two schools are largely the same. The similarities should serve to encourage Traditionalists to feel comfortable in adopting a wider agenda. In exchange, adherents to the Copenhagen School should spend less time worrying about criticizing their colleagues and instead focus on trying to address the weaknesses in their scholarship. The similarities also provide an opportunity for the Third World literature to flourish by providing an alternative to the specific and narrow statism of the dominant schools.

Third World Security Studies is equally statist, but challenges the way in which states are conceptualized. The literature is a significant departure from the western statism of both the Traditional and Copenhagen Schools, which provide a different security analysis. Specifically, the dissonance between the loci of authority and power in third world states means that the ability of the state to take on the role as the only reactionary agent is largely squashed. Moreover, the Third World School further addresses the issue of who or what is tasked with responding to internal threats inherent in the domestic

political structure of the state. The traditional literature does not focus on this issue as the concept of the state is largely understood according western and developed norms and democratic stability. Therefore, the Third World perspective is unique and valuable.

Critical Security Studies provides a further significant contribution to the security dialogue by identifying the individual as the primary referent object. Although this analysis is of little help in terms of identifying who or what responds to threats, the contribution is nonetheless important. Where the Third World literature encourages a reconceptualization of the state, the Critical literature encourages a reconceptualization of security response in its entirety. Specifically, the literature warns against too narrow of a focus on a single referent object and consequently, a reactionary actor. This translates to a much more relaxed theoretical framework in which to analyze security. Wyn Jones writes:

Statism is the security blanket of traditional security studies. Its removal will create discomfort; familiar intellectual reference points will disappear. The picture (or pictures) of reality that will be generated once the blanket is cast aside will undoubtedly be far more complex and confusing than those drawn by traditional security studies, however, understanding this complexity is a prerequisite for bringing about comprehensive security. Statism, whether its theoretical justification is realist or poststructuralist, is a hindrance to those intent on pursuing this goal.²⁴⁴

The Critical literature is correct to encourage a move away from statism. This is not to say that the state is not a key reactionary actor nor does it imply that statism does not have some place in the dialogue. Rather by progressing beyond statist dominance, a new agenda may finally evolve. This new agenda would have to include a wider focus, far more wide than that proposed by Buzan, and one that would incorporate the Third World perspective on the state. More specifically, the agenda would have to examine the role

²⁴⁴ Wyn Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

that non-state actors play in responding to threats. This entails examining how security is achieved outside state intervention. Such a study would provide a new and necessary dimension to the security study that would be in keeping with the changing character of the security dynamic.

The Future of Security Studies

When discussing crisis reaction by states, Kenneth Waltz asked “which is worse: miscalculation or overreaction?” He answered, “Miscalculation is the greater evil because it is more likely to permit an unfolding of events that finally threatens the status quo and brings the powers to war. Overreaction is the lesser evil because at worst, it costs only money for unnecessary arms and possibly the fighting of limited wars.”²⁴⁵ The same argument can be applied to security theory. To miscalculate the impact of war would devastate a field dedicated to the study of the state system. Consider the failure of the interwar idealists in denouncing the likelihood of another world war.

Carr describes the early years of WWII as the “abrupt descent from the visionary hopes of the first decade to the grim despair of the second, from a utopia which took little account of reality to a reality from which every element of utopia was rigorously excluded.”²⁴⁶ Similarly, consider the effect the end of the Cold War had on the dominance of realism. Many critics denounced the heuristic value of the theory due to its inability to predict the end of the War. Theoretical bankruptcy is marked by heuristic failure. No one is willing to take that risk with

²⁴⁵ Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealism,” *op. cit.*, p. 47

²⁴⁶ Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

war or with security. As Waltz writes, "Theorists explain what historians know: war is normal."²⁴⁷ It is a "given" that cannot be ignored. Moreover, far too much time and energy has been invested into the dialogue to make drastic changes. The 'status quo' that Waltz describes is far easier to maintain than a reevaluation of the 'powers' that be. As a result, the politics of war remain firmly entrenched and Security Studies remains faithful to the Traditional dialogue.

Despite the simplicity that the Traditionalists provide, there is great benefit to taking an intellectual risk and choosing an alternate route for the field. The risk of miscalculation should not play a role because the Traditional School has continuously miscalculated and yet remains celebrated. A wider security agenda is required in order to ensure that Security Studies is able to provide a useful contribution to the study of international relations. In its current form, the scholarship is far too state centric to meet the demands of a complex and multi-faceted system. While states remain the dominant actor in all security relations, it is far from being the only actor. The rise in intra-state conflict, terrorism, environmental degradation, social unrest, political dissent and economic instability threatens the status-quo of the field. The challenge for the field is not only to reevaluate security, but to reevaluate the values of the scholarship that drive the theory. In effect, this requires moving beyond the quest for paradigmatic supremacy and the turf battles that have ensued. The field must take a lesson from Critical Theory and reject the notion that one idea will conquer all others. As James Rosenau wrote:

²⁴⁷ Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 44.

It is sheer craziness to dare to understand world affairs. There are so many collective actors – states, international organizations, transnational associations, social movements and sub-national groups – and billions of individuals, each with different histories, capabilities, and goals. And they all interact with innumerable others, thus creating still more historical patterns that are at all times susceptible to change. Put more simply, world affairs are pervaded with endless details, far more than one can hope to comprehend in their entirety.²⁴⁸

Simply, one school in isolation is not sufficiently competent to go it alone. Security is far too complex a topic to be understood under the guidance of one line of thinking.

Theoretical and scholastic pluralism is required to better understand what the threats are, who reacts to the threats, and ultimately what the contributing factors are to achieve security. By expanding the research agenda of Security Studies, the field will enhance its understanding of security thereby becoming a more useful endeavor.

²⁴⁸ James Rosenau, "Probing Puzzles Persistently: A desirable but improbable future for IT theory," *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 309.

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