Uncovering: Gendered Perspectives on Resistance and Peace in North Sumatra, Indonesia

By

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A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

The University of Manitoba

In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

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Winnipeg

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Abstract

The current research responds to calls for decolonization of resistance and peace and conflict studies as well as the lack of research about women and their roles within grassroots nonviolent resistance and peacebuilding. This research, built on the ethnographic fieldwork in the villages of North Sumatra, argues that women and men play culturally embedded gendered roles within resistance. The women and men in my case study have developed their own methods of nonviolent resistance, which I define as *protective* and *proactive* nonviolent resistance. The methods they developed are culturally gendered, for example, *farming as resistance* is led by women, whereas *discursive/dialogic resistance* is employed more widely by men. Based on my data, I argue that women, despite their disproportionately dominant roles within grassroots nonviolent resistance, are still facing gender-based discrimination and violence, and the identity-based organizing does not provide enough space to address the question of gender justice within its current framing. This calls for a critical exploration of organizing and analysis of these gendered dynamics of resistance to critically assess these campaigns for local NGOs, so that they are more inclusive of women and women's issues. My case study indicates that women often face gendered discrimination and violence that remain unaddressed by the local civil society organizations and their international partners due to the focus on other more potent issues. However, it is exactly within a process of transformative events, such as overt social conflicts, that lies an airy window of opportunity for a positive social change and re-restructuring of power-laden relationships, including gendered ones.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been submitted without the support of numerous people I have met throughout my studies and before I even started envisioning the project. I remember Mama Salo, Theresa, Patrick, Yulianus, and Theo and my teammates, Esther, Jacob, Meriam, Harold, and Katrin in Papua. My time in Papua, conversations with my teammates and our “partners” shaped the way I perceive and think today. I have spent most of my time in Papua with Esther and Jacob, and they will always remain in my memory as the people who shaped me in numerous ways through our conflict, where femininity and masculinity clashed and made us all aware of how powerful the dynamics can be in very real ways and affect our personalities and passions in fundamental ways. I am also grateful for the experiences following this, especially with Serge and Gemma. The research project we worked on together made me forever curious about social movements in connection to culture and the film projects we produced and disseminated eventually connected me to KSPPM and North Sumatra. My committee worked very hard to ensure I produce quality work and was very supportive throughout. Dr. Hamdesa Tuso (my initial advisor), Dr. Maureen Flaherty (my subsequent advisor and previously, a committee member), Dr. Mia Siscawati, and Dr. Fabiana Li. I am honoured to have worked under their supervision. Each of them brought into the committee their own expertise tacitly encouraging me to be aware of various theoretical approaches to the concepts of peace and conflict. They also have been highly supportive probably without being quite aware how grateful I have been throughout and felt 100% supported all the way through. Dr. Flaherty managed to adjust quickly to her new role as a supervisor and managed it superbly. For this, I will be grateful forever. I am also deeply honoured to have worked with numerous activists and community members. I am grateful to Suryati Simanjuntak, Delima Silalahi, David Rajagukguk, Rindu Capah, Esther Simanjuntak, Ibu Dewi, Fransiska Sinaga, Angel Manihuruk, Nando Nainggolan, Doharta Sirait, Kelok Sirait, Iwan, Bobby, Roganda Simanjuntak, Ruth Tambunan, and other former and current staff members of AMAN TB, the Sitompul family in Siantar, Prof. Bungaran Antonius Simanjuntak, Saur Situmorang of Komnas Perempuan, Devi Anggraini of Perempuan AMAN, and Andiko. My deepest appreciation to KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak as organizations that supported me in my fieldwork. I am greatly indebted to my host families in the villages I have stayed in, the Lumban Gaol, the Lumban Batu, the Sihite, and the Sinambela families in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, the Simanjuntak family in Nagasaribu, the Sumanjuntak

families in Sabungan Nihuta V and IV, the Sitorus family in Lumban Sitorus, and the Barimbing family in Sugapa. I also thank all the women in these villages. They have all been given pseudonyms to follow the Ethics requirements of my university and have been informed about this when I was living and conversing with them. I am grateful to the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Manitoba, and the Province of Manitoba for scholarships and awards that supported me throughout my studies. I am grateful to the International Centre on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC). The funding received from ICNC enabled me to spend as much as I needed in the field. I hope that this study can contribute to greater knowledge about the gendered dynamics of nonviolent resistance and enrich theoretical discussions, but most importantly contribute strategically to social justice for the women and the villages across the world to gain land rights for sustaining and relational peace. I also hope the study contributes to our understanding of social conflict dynamics, which then eventually helps to make policy-making socially just for the most vulnerable in our society. It would have been harder without the administrative support of Annette, Jason and Susan at the Mauro Centre. Finally, I am grateful to my own family, my in-laws, my friends I have kept in touch with and who supported me throughout my studies, Dani, Wei, Dan, William, Pervin, Sardana Nikolaeva, Suzanna Eddyono, Yulia Sugandi, Agustini Hutabarat, Anggara Sitompul, Janine Tijhoff, Lars Stenger, Cheria Noezar, Eduardo Soto Parra, Wendy Kroeker, Olga Skarlato, David Timothy, Marion Kiprop, Arthur and Meyta, Tessa, my girls from my undergraduate studies, but most of all, my husband Heru and my daughter Noeme for their patience, love, and support.

Dedicated to my hard-working, positive, fun-loving and supportive parents, Khristina and Anatoly, and all the villagers, both women and men, who opened their doors and hearts to me.

Glossary

AMAN	Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago, *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*
AMAN TB	AMAN branch in Tano Batak
ATR/BPN	Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency, *Kementerian Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Badan Pertanahan Nasional*
BAL	Basic Agrarian Law 1960, *Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*
BFL	Basic Forestry Law, *Undang-Undang Nomor 5 1967 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kehutanan replaced by Undang-Undang No. 41 1999 tentang Kehutanan*
BML	Basic Mining Law, *Undang-Undang No. 11 1967 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Pertambangan*
BPN	National Land Agency, *Badan Pertanahan Nasional*
BPS	National Statistics Agency, *Badan Pusat Statistik*
BTI	Indonesian Peasants' Front, *Barisan Tani Indonesia*
DPR	People's Representative Council, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*
HGU	Commercial use rights, *Hak Guna Usaha*
HPH	Logging rights, *Hak Pengusahaan Hutan*
HPHTI	Industrial tree plantation right for timber extraction, *Hak Pengusahaan Hutan untuk Tanaman Industri*
HKBP	Batak Christian Protestant Church, *Huria Kristen Batak Protestan*
HkM	Community forest, *Hutan Kemasyarakatan*
HD	Village forest, *Hutan Desa*
HTR	Community-based timber plantation, *Hutan Tanaman Rakyat*
Humbahas	Humban Hasundutan district
JKPP	Network of Participatory Mapping Work, *Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Participatif*
KKP	Contract of work for mining, *Kontrak Karya Pertambangan*
Komnas HAM	National Commission on Human Rights, *Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*
Komnas Perempuan	The National Commission on Violence Against Women, *Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan*
KP	Mining authority, *Kuasa Pertambangan*
KPA	Committee for Agrarian Reform, *Komite Pembaruan Agraria*
KSPPM	Community Initiative Study and Development Group, *Kelompok Studi dan Pengembangan Prakarsa Masyarakat*
MHA	Indigenous peoples within the context of Indonesia, *Masyarakat Hukum Adat*
MOF/MoEF	Ministry of Forestry/Ministry of Forestry and Environment, *Kementerian Kehutanan/Kemeterian Lingkungan dan Kehutanan*

MPR	People's Consultative Assembly, *Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat*
Perda	District regulation, *Peraturan Daerah*
PKI	Communist Party of Indonesia, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*
PKK	Family Welfare Group, *Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*
PT IIU	PT Inti Indorayon Utama
PT TPL/TPL	PT Toba Pulp Lestari
RUU PPMHA	Bill on the Recognition and Protection of Indigenous Peoples Rights, *Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Pengakuan dan Perlindungan Hak Masyarakat Adat*
TAP MPR IX/2001	Decree on Agrarian Reforms and Natural Resource Management, *Ketetapan MPR no. IX/2001 Tentang Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam*
Taput	Tapanuli Utara district
Tobasa	Toba Samosir district
UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The news about the resistance of the two villages of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta in North Sumatra broke into the national and international media in early 2013. These villagers were resisting the logging of their benzoin forest by the company called PT Toba Pulp Lestari (TPL) under a concession permit. Sixteen villagers were arrested, but also there was a national outpouring of solidarity and support from key organizations working on agrarian and Indigenous peoples' issues leading to a strong advocacy campaign. I have followed the case since 2011 when I visited this area for the production of a film about pulp and paper plantations and their impact.

The Toba area, also known as Tapanuli, is situated around Lake Toba. The villages where I conducted this study reside around this big lake and identify themselves as Batak Toba. To reach this area, I landed on an aeroplane into the Kualanamu airport in Medan and took a minibus to get to the small town of Parapat where I met with the local NGO, KSPPM (Community Initiative Study and Development Group, *Kelompok Studi dan Pengembangan Prakarsa Masyarakat*) staff and stayed in their homestay. They have two small rooms prepared for guests. Parapat is a hub town that transports tourists into the island of Samosir, which is also known to be the original place of the Batak people. The Batak *marga*s are assumed to have originated from this island. Then, they out-migrated (*merantau*) to other places surrounding the island. I conducted my research in the villages that worked together with KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak (the Toba branch of Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago, *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*). All the villagers are in conflict with TPL, formerly known as PT Inti Indorayon Utama (IIU).

TPL is a sister company of Asia Pacific Resources International Ltd. (APRIL). APRIL is the second major pulp and paper producer in Indonesia after the Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) (IWGFF, 2010 in Obidzinski & Darmawan, 2012; Manalu, 2009). TPL's pulp mill is situated in a small town of Porsea in Toba Samosir district (Manalu, 2009). The first time I went to this town I took a local minivan on the side road and just passed through the town because initially, I did not plan to spend time there. I knew it was Porsea by the specific smell that comes from the mill as well as by the writings on some wooden buildings that read "*Tolak TPL*" (Refuse/Resist TPL). This town was the epicentre of peoples' resistance against TPL in the 1980s-90s (Silaen, 2006).

The company's concession land size was 269,069 hectares (ha) initially; subsequently, it shrunk to 188,055 ha in accordance with the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) decision letter *SK Menhut no. 58/Menhut-II/2011* (TPL, 2017, p. 145; Simanjuntak, 2015). In 2017, the company sold 203,774 tons of pulp (TPL, 2017, p. 9). The pulp and paper industry in Indonesia is one of the biggest contributors to deforestation because most of the wood is harvested from the natural forest (Pirard & Irland, 2007 et al. in Obidzinksi & Darmawan, 2012, pp. 962-963). This is one of the reasons why the villagers of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta fought back to protect the natural forest, which also happened to be their benzoin agroforest. However, many of the villages I visited are in conflict with TPL due to various reasons; agroforestry is not the only one. For example, the Aek Lung villagers would like to reclaim their ancestral land that was taken from them during the period of *reboisasi* (policy of greening by planting trees) in the 1970s-80s. Nagasaribu's benzoin agroforest is bordering a pulp and paper plantation but this bordering plantation is formerly Nagasaribu's ancestral land that was taken over during Suharto's dictatorship. Now Sabungan Nihuta IV and V's Simanjuntaks (two extended families who

represent different family lines of the same *marga*) reclaim the same ancestral forest area called *Aek Napa*. Finally, Lumban Sitorus in the sub-district of Parmaksian in Porsea are in conflict over their "non-compensated" ancestral area that now "belongs" to TPL under HGU (commercial use rights, *hak guna usaha*) permit. The pulp mill was built on their land without due process, as claimed by the villagers and KSPPM.

Research objectives

This study explores the North Sumatra *masyarakat adat*[1] (Indigenous peoples) in their struggles for the recognition of their rights to ancestral land. Because of my interest in the lives of women as well as the differences of perspectives between men and women, I aimed to understand the gendered dynamics of this struggle. My main objective was to understand the gendered experience of the conflict and resistance. I asked the following research sub-questions in order to lead to the overall understanding of the gendered nature of resistance:

1. What is the history of the land? What prompted the villagers to struggle for land? What strategies do the villagers use in this struggle? What role does the identity of *masyarakat adat* play in this?
2. What is the gendered experience of Toba Bataks of a resource-based conflict and their resistance to land/forest appropriation? Here, I pay attention to the impact, roles and motivations of men and women. I also consider the role of Indigeneity in the resistance, the experience of activist women, and the overall impact of the conflict and resistance on the villagers.

[1] *Adat* can be translated as "customs." "*Hukum adat*" means "customary law." "*Masyarakat adat*" in Indonesia is used to mean "Indigenous peoples" and can literally be translated as "people who adhere to customary ways" (Li, 2001, p. 645).
[2] I use *masyarakat adat, masyarakat hukum adat*, and MHA interchangeably.

3. What are the gendered challenges of resistance? What are the gendered visions of peaceful transformation of these conflicts? In what ways, if any, do the local and national social movements use a gendered analysis of these conflicts?

Since the research was ethnographic, it was difficult to limit my focus to my key questions. Despite this, my collected data correspond with the research questions I initially asked, although the field research added more specificity to my initial research questions. For example, I did not intend to focus on women activists' experiences. However, as soon as I stepped into KSPPM's office I noticed that the space itself was gendered and I needed to explore the experiences of these activist women.

I suggest the focus on men and women, and the gendered dynamics of these struggles, may help to move forward the policy and academic discussions on the question of *masyarakat adat* not only in Indonesia, but also in South-east Asia. This is why the discussion on *masyarakat adat* and the role of the Toba Batak *adat* in the daily lives of the villagers is important to consider. I hope that this study can be useful for local NGOs and activists who work towards the recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples contributing to a more peaceful and just world for the men and women in these villages, a socially just peace that is inclusive of gender justice. I believe that the encouragement of the critical inclusion of women's perspectives within social movements is a contribution of this work that can eventually be of benefit to my research participants, both men and women.

Background

My research participants find themselves within the general context of Indonesia and its policies that relate to natural resources. Indonesia covers approximately 190 million ha of the landmass. This land is regulated by three laws, the Basic Agrarian Law 1960 (BAL), the Forestry

Law No. 41 1999 (formerly the Basic Forestry Law 1967 (BFL)) and the Basic Mining Law 1967 (BML). These laws divide all landmass in Indonesia into forest and agricultural land. Forestry laws regulate 67% of the total landmass of Indonesia classified as "*kawasan hutan*" or forest estate, while BAL regulates 33% of the land (Bachriadi & Sardjono, 2006, p. 3 in Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2013, p. 3).

Legally, these policies (BAL, BFL, BML) that were important to people who today refer to themselves as *masyarakat adat* (MHA)[2] left the customary land under the strict jurisdiction of the state. Numerous articles in BAL emphasize the primacy of the national interest above all rights, including *adat* land rights referred to as *hak ulayat*, therefore, creating tenurial insecurity for those who claim rights to land based on *adat* (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Harwell & Lynch, 2002; Lucas & Warren 2013; McCarthy & Robinson 2016). BFL announced all forest to be state forest. The only right given to MHA was that of compensation and all MHA whose land fell under the jurisdiction of the MoEF could not farm the land and were only allowed to collect forest products (Bedner & Van Hius, 2008). BML allowed mining anywhere except for "holy sites, public facilities, key infrastructures, buildings, houses only with the permission of the owners" (Bedner & Van Hius, 2008, p. 183). Compensation should be given for crops and not the land, excluding the generations that could have farmed and lived on the land (Bedner & Van Hius, 2008). BFL 1967 and BML 1967 gave the government the authority to issue forestry and mining concessions under HPH (right to log), HPHTI (industrial tree plantation rights) for timber extraction, KKP (contract of work for mining), and, KP (mining authority) (Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2011, p. 3). In addition to these key laws, there were others, such as the Regional Government Law no. 5/1974 and the Village Law no. 5/1979, that established a uniform system of village

[2] I use *masyarakat adat, masyarakat hukum adat*, and MHA interchangeably.

governance, thus, eliminating *adat* governance structures (Acciaoili, 2007; Bedner & Van Huis, 2008).

Most of the villagers I worked with lost their land during the New Order regime when Suharto was the President of Indonesia. The New Order laws facilitated aggressive land grabbing that led to the dispossession of local communities. By 1992 each of the 1, 206 foreign and domestic companies held about 3,000 ha of land totalling 3.8 million ha of plantation land (Lucas & Warren, 2013, p. 12-13). While the various companies given the concession permits had access to vast tracts of land, families of local farmers held only about 0.5 hectares of agricultural land on average (1993 Agricultural Census in Lucas & Warren, 2013, p. 12), while the population of farming families grew from 21.6 million to 37.7 million (Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2011, p. 16). A high level of inequality connected to "asset inequality and industrial concentration" nationally led to numerous land conflicts. Thus, for example, Dayaks in Kalimantan and other such groups in the Outer Islands were much poorer in the 1990s compared to the 1960s because they had access to their forests till 1967 when the BFL 1967 was accepted (Tadjoeddin, 2007, pp. 15-16).

Today, within the context of oligarchy-controlled economy both forest and mining concessions control more or less 68% of the country with 262 corporations managing 9.39 million ha of the forest estate (*kawasan hutan*) and with 303 corporations exploiting 21.49 million ha of land under HGU (Fogarty, 2014 and Toha & Collier, 2015 in McCarthy & Robinson, 2016, p. 5; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). More than half of the 105 million farmers in Indonesia today are landless or near landless living below the poverty line (Sirait, 2015, p. 3). The whole territory of Indonesia is still essentially controlled by two government agencies, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), which controls almost 70 percent of the land

classified as “state forest” and the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN), which controls the rest.

The villages I worked with claim the identity of Indigenous, or *masyarakat adat*. There are 18,000 to 30,000 villages and *adat* communities (or 50 million rural people) who live on the territory that is being contested by the two agencies and the territories these communities reside in is classified as “state forest,” “cultivat[ing] land under conditions of unclear and insecure land tenure” (Sirait, 2015, p. 1-2). Their lands are classified either as “production forests” (and, in this case, they are in conflict with private companies that have “leasing rights”) or “protected forests,” in which case they are in conflict with state institutions or conservation organizations (Fauzi, 1997 in Sirait, 2015, pp. 1-2). The two organizations I worked with are a part of the Indigenous peoples’ movement in Indonesia.

Despite the fact that the Indigenous peoples’ movement started to emerge as a global movement in the 1960-70s, the question of Indigenousness that is based on the concept of *adat* in Indonesia is not a new story. *Adat* started to become a political force during the colonial era when it was used to justify the legal pluralist system created to support colonialism and the ideas of racial superiority. By the time, Indonesians started to fight for independence, *adat* was a unifying idea on which Indonesian nationalism could be based, taking into consideration, the archipelagic nature of Indonesia’s geography and its cultural diversity (Reeve 1985 in Bourchier, 2007; Bourchier, 2007, p. 117; Burns, 2007; Burns, 1989; Fasseur, 2007). Thus, the leaders of Indonesia with dictatorial tendencies (Sukarno and Suharto) used *adat* to justify their rule (Bourchier, 2007). Towards the end of the New Order regime and with the start of *Reformasi*, *adat* has turned into a strategy that could be used to oppose the state-led land grabbing by

numerous communities who resided within the areas that state claimed as forest zone. They started to refer to themselves as *masyarakat adat.*

The resistance of rural farming communities throughout the Archipelago was widespread. One of the most well-known cases, for example, was the case of Sugapa villagers where ten women led the resistance of the whole village to resist the appropriation of their communal land by TPL (Moniaga, 2007). These protests and conflicts led local activists and Indigenous peoples to organize a meeting in Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi that was facilitated by WALHI (Indonesian Forum for the Environment) at a house of a well-known local leader Sombolinggi and JAPHAMA (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Advocacy Network) was created. Later, at a Congress after the fall of Suharto in 1999, JAPHAMA changed its name to AMAN (Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) (Moniaga, 2007; Simbolon, 1998). KSPPM was one of the organizations represented at these early meetings. AMAN TB (Tano Batak branch of AMAN) is the organization that directly reports to AMAN HQ, which was established with the help of KSPPM.

With the era of *Reformasi* and the pressure from social movements, there have been several changes to the policies that relate to natural resources. Various new schemes have been developed as a result of resistance. The state forest zone is divided into production forests (*hutan produksi*), protection forests (*hutan lindung*), and conservation forests (*hutan konservasi*) (Myers et al., 2017). The government offers several Social Forestry schemes, such as HkM (community forest); *Hutan Desa* (village forest); HTR (community-based timber plantation); and, *kemitraan* (partnership scheme). These work as permits and are given for a limited amount of time (mostly for 35 years) (Siscawati et al, 2017). KSPPM and, therefore, all the communities at the time of the field research preferred the option of *hutan adat*, because it allows the villagers to take their

customary territory out of the state forest zone, turning it into a titled forest (*hutan hak*). However, obtaining a *hutan adat* is a complicated process. MHA has to be recognized with *Perda* (*peraturan daerah*/district regulation) under the Law on Regional Autonomy no. 22/1999 and no. 32/2004, the customary territory has to be a forest or a forested area, and there should be a letter that acknowledges that MHA agrees to turn their forest into *hutan adat* (Malik, Arizona & Mihajir, 2015; Malik, Martika & Chaakimah, 2015; Myers et al., 2017; Sirait, 2015). Currently, this is the route that KSPPM advocates for the villages it accompanies.

One of the objectives at the moment for the Indigenous Peoples' movement in Indonesia is the Bill on Indigenous Peoples' Rights. AMAN has been pushing for the Bill to be discussed at the National Parliament (DPR RI) since 2012 (Arizona & Cahyadi, 2013). It is not clear what the practical implications are of the Bill for the villages in the Toba area. Despite the hopes and arguments that the Bill and all these legal decisions and regulations may bring the recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights, there is no guarantee that the conflicts and land issues facing the communities will be resolved. Fitzpatrick (2007), for instance, argues that despite the fact that *adat* has become a powerful term within the Indonesian political discourse and it seems the government is indeed moving towards its recognition, this focus on *adat* seems "to obscure a lack of real progress on land law reform" (p. 142). A lot of the practical questions in terms of what *adat* means for land reform do not seem to be tackled by the Indonesian government and rather the focus is on the general concept and not on the practicalities that come with it in relation to land-related conflicts throughout Indonesia that may or may not include the Indigenous communities. The recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights may not bring the social justice that the activists hope for (McCarthy & Robinson, 2016). There is also persistent inequality within these communities in relation to land allocation due to various historical,

cultural, and current economic reasons (Li, 2014; Henley, 2007). There are numerous migrant communities living in the ancestral lands of these communities, whether due to natural migration or transmigration who then could be threatened one way or another by this "revival of tradition" and may lead to horizontal conflicts (Davidson & Henley, 2007). The effect of the recognition of the Indigenous peoples' rights nationally can also have a dire effect on territories where the traditional elites, such as Sultans or *Raja*s (kings) claim rights to a certain territory, thus, limiting the legal possibilities to win over for other marginalized urban or rural communities (Thufail, 2013). There can also be conflicts with already set institutions of the village (*desa*), for example, and the traditional elites depending on the part of Indonesia (Arizona & Cahyadi, 2013). Last but not least, it is not clear what the implications of the "*adat* revival" are for women's rights and gender equality at large in Indonesia (Bourchier, 2007).

In relation to women's rights, the Indonesian women have their own stance that developed through decades of activism from the beginning of the 20th century. Indonesian women's activism emerged in opposition to the power of *adat* and religion that denied women's access to education, right to divorce, allowed child marriage, and polygamy (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960/2008). Later other rights became pertinent, such as labour rights, political participation, parenthood, and violence against women. However, the issue of *adat* as a source of violence against women remains pertinent. Thus, Komnas Perempuan published a report titled "*Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Berbasis Budaya*" (Violence towards Women on the Basis of Culture) (2017). This report lays out the role of *adat* in violence against women. The research was based on the study of various Indigenous communities' *adat* law in several areas of Indonesia. The report identifies nine major issues in relation to *adat* and violence against women: forced marriage, discrimination on the basis of mixed marriage, polygamy and

infidelity, violence within the context of a traditional marriage ritual, violence in the family, dowry as a form of violence, violence within child-rearing, violence in the case of divorce and death of one of the spouses, and female genital mutilation (FGM).

The Indonesian women's movement presents diverse standpoints of mostly middle-class Muslim and educated urban women, and the wives of civil servants, who were active somewhat during the Old Order and especially active during the New Order regime under "state *ibu*ism."[3] Rural, peasant and women from the Outer islands have been underrepresented in this national women's movement. The organizations that reached rural women were PKK (Family Welfare Group),[4] *Gerwani* (Indonesian Women's Movement)[5] and the Muslim organizations, *Muslimat NU* and *Aysiyah*. Despite the access of the Muslim women's organizations to rural areas through their networks, their work tends to be based in urban settings (Blackburn, 2010; Martyn, 2005; Robinson, 2009; Wieringa, 1993). PKK is still active today, however, most of their activities remain irrelevant for the majority of rural women. For example, in my research site, women did

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[3] The New Order focused on *kodrat* in order to domesticate and depoliticize women. They built an ideology around this, which Suryakusuma (1997) called "state ibuism." The New Order was built ideologically on the concepts of *dwifungsi* (the military had a dual role of protecting the state and ensuring people's welfare, therefore, allowing the military to be involved in all spheres of social and political life) and *Pancasila*. The family principle within *Pancasila* allowed to see and present the state as a family with *Bapak* (father) as its leader. All state institutions and all civil society organizations, then, were built on the basis of this model of patriarchal family hierarchy with the father as its leader. Then, this hierarchy was replicated within all institutions making the state itself acquire a pyramidal hierarchical structure with the father as its head. Women's roles then were, according to *Panca Dharma Wanita* (Five Duties of Women),"appendages and companions to their husbands, as procreators of the nation, as mothers and educators of children, as housekeepers, and as members of Indonesian society - in that order." The organization that reflected these values was Dharma Wanita (Suryakusuma, 1997, p. 101; Wieringa, 1989, p. 26).

[4] Two organizations *Dharma Wanita* and PKK *(*Family Welfare Group) were established during Suharto's dictatorship. *Dharma Wanita* is the organization that represents wives of civil servants. PKK organizes women in rural areas and urban neighbourhoods (*kampung*). Therefore, the head of PKK at the village level would automatically be the village head's wife. PKK was supposed to mobilize rural families to support national development (Wieringa, 1993, p. 25).

[5] It was the only organization that had the rural women as well as the urban working women as its members. The most prominent members of this organization were Umi Sarjono who was a Parliamentarian and S.K. Trimurti who was the Minister of Labour in the 1950s. *Gerwani*, however, was destroyed due to its affiliation with PKI in 1965 and has not been replaced by any other organization. This created a vacuum within the women's movement (Blackburn, 2010).

not see PKK as an important organization due to its lack of relevance to their everyday lived experiences.

Most recently, in 2012, the Indigenous women affiliated with AMAN established their own women's wing called *Perempuan AMAN* (AMAN Women). Women have played a key role in the establishment of AMAN. Nai Sinta was one of the few women present at the first meeting held in Tana Toraja in 1993. *Ibu*[6] Den Upa is another key persons since she was the village head at the time (Kardashevskaya, 2019; Siscawati, 2014). Due to women's felt presence, the first Congress made sure to include a statement on Indigenous women as one of the parties that suffer the most from land loss and social conflict (Siscawati, 2014, p. 187). Following this, during the first Congress of AMAN in 1999, a workshop was held on women and *masyarakat adat* with women from 11 provinces. The workshop identified several issues: (1) environmental problems and their impact on women; (2) human rights violations and violence against women within the implementation of the family planning program; (3) the spread of alcohol, rape, and harassment; (4) the issue of land access and agrarian conflict and their impact on Indigenous women; (5) women's economic and political discrimination and, (6) finally, the issue of *adat* law and its discrimination towards women (Siringoringo, 2019).

There were several other attempts made by Indigenous women to gain representation at AMAN. In 2001, at a meeting held in Bali, the Indigenous women decided to organize themselves under an organization called APAN (Alliance of Indigenous Women of the Archipelago, *Aliansi Perempuan Adat Nusantara*). In 2007, the 3rd AMAN Congress in Pontianak agreed to create a Directorate on Indigenous Women's Empowerment (DPPD, *Direktorat Pemberdayaan Perempuan Adat*). And, in 2012 at the 4th Congress of AMAN in Tobelo, *Perempuan AMAN* (AMAN Women) was established (Handayani, 2013). *Perempuan*

[6] From Indonesian means "Mother."

AMAN aims to mobilize Indigenous women, raise their awareness of self and increase their ability to participate actively within public and political life. At this moment, to achieve this, *Perempuan AMAN* mainly conducts trainings for Indigenous women. One of the ways that *Perempuan AMAN* trains women is through a tool of gendered mapping. In one of the workshops I attended, held in August 2018, for example, women were invited to reflect and map their communities, territories and personal experiences. According to the facilitators of the training of trainers (ToT), the realization by women of their own positions within their communities encouraged women to think about the importance of their territories for them as women, understand and learn to express this both visually, emotionally, and verbally.

However, the focus on collective rights of women raises questions among the women's rights activists in Indonesia, whereby they argue that the focus on collective rights may hamper the agenda of gender equality within the women's movement due to the structural challenges that exist within the patriarchal structures of *adat*, modern social organizations, social movements, and, the state. Thus, Saras Dewi of Universitas Indonesia at an event on women and natural resources raised a discussion point for Indigenous women's movement. She looked at the land conflict in Tanjung Benoa in Bali and the use of *adat* as a strategy for advocacy on behalf of the local population who are in conflict with a tourist spot developer. Here, women claimed cultural rights to the place based on *adat,* however, women here did not have access to such basic things as education due to their gender. Saras Dewi posed a question of whether this movement could incorporate a feminist perspective in their organizing and aspire to improve the positions of women as well, not just use women as a strategic tool within resistance (Gina, 2017).

The above discussion then speaks to the need to have an in-depth discussion of *adat* and gender justice. Unfortunately, Indigenous women may lack representation and acceptance within

AMAN and other organizations that work for Indigenous peoples' rights and agrarian reform. This then becomes even more important within the context of *Perda*s (regional regulations under the policy of decentralization). With the Regional Autonomy Law (2004), many of the regional regulations (*Perda*) emerged that aimed to control women's behaviour. Suryakusuma (2007) states that these *Perda* allow the local government to introduce "conservative interpretations of *adat*" and "*syariah"* law. As mentioned by one of the prominent women's activists from the Toba area, *adat* does not have to go against gender justice per se. However, this means that there is a need to explore the positions of rural women who claim Indigeneiety or *adat*-ness as central to their own understanding of themselves and their communities. I look at this through the prism of resource-based conflicts the communities experience and the grassroots resistance campaigns they have developed with the help of local organisations. Due to the importance of *adat* itself in these struggles, I also pay attention to the role of *adat* in daily lives of the villagers and their understanding of themselves as well as explore the use of *adat* as an organising strategy used by the social movements.

Positioning myself

My research passion developed as part of my own attempt to understand questions of identity: How is identity constructed? Why is it important? Who constructs an identity? What are the implications of this kind of construction? I grew up in post-90s Siberia whereby my own ethnic group of Sakha was allowed to learn about its traditions and customs for the first time within the context of a formal secondary education as a result of the Perestroika. At the same time, due to the sudden end of Russification and freedom to choose one's identity, Pan-Turkicness came to a rise. I grew up in this process of identity construction when people started to try to make sense of themselves and their stories.

I became interested in the question of gender equality and gender justice as I joined an international peace organization and worked for one year in a small town of Wamena, Papua. At this time, one of my colleagues introduced me to feminism. This was also the first time being exposed to Indigenous women's activism through our "client" Mama Salo, a founder of the local women's rights NGO and a parliamentarian. As I continued working in the country, I met and worked with many more rural women from various areas of Indonesia, including North Sumatra, West Timor, and East Java. I also met female staff from the NGOs who advocated for rights-based approaches, including the recognition of the indigenous peoples' rights. And, as a young foreign woman, I faced gender-based discrimination within this movement. All of this strengthened my interest in exploring the situation of women in the "communities" on whose behalf various NGOs advocated as well as the situation of women activists themselves.

The feminist and decolonizing approaches allowed me to juggle the gender justice stance that I took in a respectful manner towards both men and women. They also allowed me to be aware of power dynamics in the field, romanticizing and Orientalist tendencies of outsiders (including researchers and social movements) and gendered violence. My skin tone, my Asian appearance, my previous trip to the area and my association with Java through my husband made it easier for my research participants to place me in the world. I positioned myself as a respectful outsider vis-a-vis my research participants and this positioning allowed me to remain reflexive and aware of power dynamics that may have been present in my relationships. I shared my reflections and analyses with some key informants, especially from KSPPM and several of the villages to test my interpretation.

Overall, I spent close to eight months conducting the active field research. This included about six months spent in North Sumatra, with two months divided between Jakarta, Bogor, and

Yogyakarta. The field part of the research was also divided into several pieces starting from October, 2017 and ending in September 2018. Throughout the transcription, coding, analysis, and writing period I was based in Yogyakarta, Indonesia from September 2018 to June, 2020. This allowed me to be updated about the situation in the villages through several key informants who visited Yogyakarta regularly several times a year.

In writing about this research, I tried to relay the complexity of the situation, the characters, and the conversations that I had with the villagers as well as the observations I made as a participant in the daily lives of my research participants in order to ensure the "analytical accountability" (Stanley, 1996 in Finlay, 2001). Several key interviews were analyzed at the end of the day and then I re-checked the facts with some of the key informants to ensure I understood what was being said. The analytical accountability was also ensured through my de-briefing with KSPPM staff members during my village fieldwork rest in their office and I had a long informal de-brief with the KSPPM director at the end of my fieldwork before leaving for Yogyakarta.

The dissertation consists of eight chapters, including introduction and conclusions. Chapter 2 introduces the local context in North Sumatra, the villages, and also places the cases within the national context. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on conflict transformation, resistance and peace and gendered perspectives on these. Chapter 4 explains my approach, methods, special considerations and the process of analysis. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the start of the resistance, the history of resistance, the role of NGOs, and the methods of resistance. Chapter 6 presents the analysis of women's and men's participation in the resistance and their motivations. Chapter 7 presents the internal and external challenges of the resistance and the ideas about peace. Chapter 8 concludes and gives ideas for future research.

Chapter 2: Situating the field: districts of North Tapanuli, Toba Samosir, and Humbang Hasundutan in the province of North Sumatra, Indonesia

In this chapter, I first introduce the province of North Sumatra, the three districts where I conducted my research, and the villages/communities where I stayed throughout my field research. I review the basic characteristics of the region, such as geography, population, and economy. Then, I discuss briefly the history of Toba Bataks and the basic characteristics of Toba Batak *adat* along with the position of women within the Toba Batak *adat* from the secondary and primary data. Further, I introduce the main actors, such as PT. TPL, KSPPM, AMAN TB, and the villages. Finally, to contextualize the case study further, I look at the situation of resource-based conflicts in Indonesia at large and the options available within the current political context.

2.1 Situating North Sumatra

The communities I worked with reside in the province of North Sumatra and identify as Toba Batak. North Sumatra province is situated on the northern tip of Sumatra island bordering Aceh, West Sumatra, Riau. Its capital city is Medan. The province covers an area of around 7.2 million ha. There are twenty-five districts (*kabupaten*), eight major cities with 440 sub-districts (*kecamatan*) with a total of 5,419 villages (*desa*) and 693 urban villages (*kelurahan*) (BPS Sumut, 2019).

Map 1: Map of Indonesia (Australian National University, 2019)
Map reproduced with the permission of CartoGIS Services, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

Villages where I collected my data are situated in three districts of North Tapanuli (*Taput*) with a capital city of Tarutung; of Humbang Hasundutan (*Humbahas*) with the capital city of Dolok Sanggul; and of Toba Samosir (*Tobasa*) with the capital city in Balige. *Taput* covers the area of 379,100 ha with a population of around 297,806 persons, *Humbahas* has an area of 233,500ha with a population of 186,694 and *Tobasa* covers the area of 232,800oo ha with a population of 181,790 people (BPS Sumut, 2019).

North Sumatra is the fourth largest province in Indonesia with over 14 million people residing on its territory (BPS Sumut, 2017). It is a home for various ethnic groups, including the indigenous Melayu, Karo Batak, Simalungun, Fak-fak, Toba Batak, Mandailing, and Nias and the migrant ethnic groups from other islands, such as the Javanese, Sundanese, Balinese, Ambonese, Minahasans, and others (BPKP, 2019). All the communities I stayed with identify themselves as Toba Batak. These were majority Christian with some Muslim minority members.

Half of North Sumatra's population resides in urban and half in rural areas with 41.3 % working as farmers, 44.49 in the service sector, and 14.22 in industry. In the provinces where I conducted my field research, most work as farmers: in *Taput*, 76.71 %; in *Tobasa* 61.05 %; and in *Humbahas* 77.87 %. In *Taput*, there are 15 sub-districts with 238 villages. In *Tobasa*, there are 16 sub-districts with 214 villages. In *Humbahas,* there are 10 sub-districts with 145 villages (BPS Sumut, 2017). The poverty level at the provincial level (8,94%) is lower than the national average which is at 9,66% for 2018. Of all the districts I visited, the highest poverty level is found in Taput where it equals 9,75%, in *Humbahas* it equals 9%, and in Tobasa, 8.67% for the year 2018 (BPS, 2019).

In Indonesia, on average, men study in school for about 9 years and women for 8 years. In North Sumatra, men study about 10 years and women for 9 years (BPS, 2019). In North

Sumatra, from 9-13 years; 99,48% of boys and 99,51% of girls go to primary school. From 13-15, 96,26% of boys and 97,27% of girls go to middle school; and from 16 to 19 years, 73,88 % and 80,92% of girls go to school (BPS Sumut, 2019). Rural areas usually have primary schools but for middle and high school, some villagers either have to commute or look for a homestay. Villagers who live close to the district capital, such as Pandumaan and Sipituhuta provide a daily shuttle bus for children from their village to go to their schools in Dolok Sanggul. Generally, BPS data shows that as children graduate from primary school, they are less likely to continue into middle and high school. However, Toba Bataks value education and try by all means to educate their children, both boys and girls, so that they become civil servants in the future.

Despite Indonesia passing legislation that obliged a 30 percent quota for women's representation in party leadership and as legislative candidates (Law No. 10/2008), in many provinces and districts, it is far from reality (Rhoads, 2012). North Sumatra is not an exception. In the province, out of 1,197 members of local parliaments, 1,055 are male with 142 females. In *Taput*, out of 35 MPs, 32 are men with 3 women. In *Tobasa*, there are 30 MPs with 28 men and 2 women. In *Humbahas*, out of 25 MPs, 24 men and 1 woman (BPS Sumut, 2017). So, women remain underrepresented in politics.

The major sources of the provincial economy (based on gross regional domestic product (GRDP) equalling 628,39 trillion rupiah for 2016) are the agricultural sector with fishery and forestry (contributing the total of 21.65%), manufacturing (19.98%), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (17.89%), and construction (13.40%) (BPS Sumut, 2017). In *Taput*, 44.23% of its income comes from the agricultural sector, including fisheries and forestry. In *Humbahas* and *Tobasa*, 32% of their income is from the agricultural sector, including fisheries and forestry.

The major agricultural products in the province are:

Product	Province	North Tapanuli	Toba Samosir	Humbang Hasundutan
Paddy fields (wet and dry)	885, 575 ha	36,481 ha	23,494 ha	19,892 ha
Corn	252,729 ha	7,036 hectares	3,673 ha	1,096 ha
Soybeans	3,955 ha	0	0	0
Peanuts	4,091 ha	943 ha	59.8 ha	385 ha
Mung bean	1,928 ha	0	0	0
Cassava	34, 852 ha	123 ha	898 ha	390 ha
Sweet potato	6,378 ha	579 ha	37 ha	452.1 ha

Table 1: Agricultural products

The table above shows that the major source of economy for the three districts of my research are paddy fields. However, it is important to point out that most of the villages where I conducted research planted paddy (rice) for their own consumption, except for the district of *Tobasa*, where paddy is one of the main sources of income for the villagers. Recently, they started to plant corn for sale with the support of the local district head in Humbang Hasundutan.

In terms of smallholder estates,

Product	Province	North Tapanuli	Toba Samosir	Humbang Hasundutan
Rubber	394,519 hectares	9,189 ha	470 ha	4,259 ha
Palm oil	417,809 hectares	32 ha	670 ha	296 ha
Robusta coffee	21,266 hectares	1,459 ha	0	0
Arabica coffee	63,339 hectares	13,939 ha	3,180 ha	11,107 ha
Coconut	110,626 hectares	371 ha	54 ha	322 ha

Chocolate	64,437 hectares	3,031 ha	134 ha	1,649 ha
Clover	3.329 hectares	138 ha	25 ha	o
Incense/kemenyan	22,902 hectares	16,140 ha	390 ha	4,924 ha
Cinnamon	5,819 hectares	479 ha	21 ha	749 ha
Aromatic oil (nil)	727 hectares	0	52 ha	22 ha
Candlenut	11,104 hectares	472 ha	198 ha	522 ha
Palm sugar	6,101 hectares	564	282	246

Table 2: Smallholder estates

As can be seen from the table above, the main sources of income from the smallholder estates are arabica coffee, rubber and incense/kemenyan for both Taput and Humbahas and Arabica coffee for Tobasa (BPS Sumut, 2017). The communities where I conducted my research are the incense/*kemenyan* and arabica coffee farmers. The only community that produces neither *kemenyan* nor Arabica coffee is the village of Lumban Sitorus, where the major source of income is their rice fields.

The forest is divided into production, protection, conservation, and converted production forest as follows:

Production forest	1,346,221 ha
Protection forest	1,206,881 ha
Conservation forest	427,007 ha
Converted production forest	75,684 ha

Table 3: Forest in North Sumatra

The production forest produces jungle logs, pinewood logs, sawn wood, plywood, pulp, moulding and tusam sap. The production forest produced 59,583 tons of pulp in the year 2016,

which is a lot smaller than the amount they produced in the years before equalling 182,436 tons in the year 2013, for example (BPS Sumut, 2017). The production forest is where the TPL's concession is likely to be counted. It is also where the customary land in conflict that is owned by the villagers is situated.

2.2 Situating the Toba Batak as an ethnic group

In this section, I center the Toba Bataks as an ethnic group with their distinct history and cultural identity. First, I discuss the history of the Toba Bataks. Then, I dwell upon the Toba Batak *adat* and the key concepts within the Taba Batak *adat* based on my field work. I also discuss the positions of women within the Toba Batak communities.

2.2.1 The Toba Bataks in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras

The pre-colonial history of Bataks was defined by their resistance to Islamic expansionism from Aceh and West Sumatra (the *padri*). This advance of Islam resulted in the conversion of some Bataks (Angkola and Mandailing Bataks) to Islam in the Southern areas bordering with West Sumatra, where the *padri* movement originated (Reid, 2010). The conversion led to the continuation of raids from Muslim groups (*Bonjol* groups) in the 1820s (Simbolon, 1998). Resistance to Islam was personified by the king-priest Sisingamangaraja (Reid, 2010). King Sisingamangaraj remains to be the inspiration of many Toba Bataks today. For example, part of the history of the village, Nagasaribu, is that the Batak king Sisingamangaraja established their village and the market that they are known by where the traditional mats the women made were sold. They also own *pustaka* (heritage items) from Sisingamangaraja that is kept secretly by several families. In another village of Pandumaan, one of the leaders of resistance took pride in his descendance from Sisingamangaraja and suggested

that he was inspired by Sisingamangaraja's resistance to the Dutch colonial power in his own struggle to protect the forest.

Despite the fact that East Sumatra area[7] was colonized starting from Jacobus Nienhuys's tobacco plantation in 1863 with the help of local sultans, the North Tapanuli area where most Toba Bataks resided was not colonized by the Dutch until 1878. Toba Bataks refused outsiders. The first Westerner to gain access and stay alive was the German missionary, Ludwig Nommensen, of the Rhenish Mission. He landed on the west coast of Sumatra and was successful in converting the Toba Batak kings into Christianity. Nommensen managed to buy a plot of land and become a king in *Huta Dame* in *Silindung*. He first baptized ordinary families, who then moved in with him into his *huta* (village). But later after realizing the importance of *adat* leaders, he began to baptize local kings. The first king he baptized was Pontas Lumbantobing in 1867 who then persuaded other kings. This was the beginning of the spread of Christianity, which also eventually facilitated colonial access. There was resistance to the colonial power led by Sisingamngaraja XII. He was killed by the Dutch in 1907 (Simbolon, 1998).

Therewere two factors that contributed to the spread of Christianity among the Toba Bataks. First, the Dutch colonizers favoured Christian kings. And, second, Toba Bataks started to out-migrate due to overpopulation, lack of land, and better work opportunities in the East Sumatra plantations (Pelzer, 1978). The out-migration was easier if people identified as Christian because this enabled them to find a community outside of their *bona pasogit*. Today, the Toba Batak church is called HKBP (*Huria Kristen Batak Protestan,* Batak Christian Protestant

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[7] This area during the colonial time was known as the "plantation belt" or in Dutch "*cultuurgebied.*" This area, unlike the area of Toba Bataks, has an exceptionally fertile soil. This is why it was used as a plantation area for palm oil, tobacco, rubber, and other raw materials that then accounted for over 30% of Dutch East Indies "export earnings." Some Batak groups and other ethnic groups, such as the Malays inhabit this location (Pelzer, 1978; Stoler, 1995, p. 15).

Church) (Simbolon, 1998). There are other churches in the villages, some are organized in resistance to or denial of *adat* (field notes, 2018).

Later on, out-migration became such a common practice that most Bataks believe that the male youth should have the experience of out-migration and parents whose children out-migrate seem to be proud of this. If the child stays in out-migration for a long time, this means that the child is successful enough to not come back to his or her homeland. Many villages that Reid (2010) visited during his research only counted a few youths remaining in villages with the majority being in *perantauan*. This trend also eventually led to the formation of a strong Batak diaspora outside the ancestral territory (Reid, 2010). In my research sites, there are few young people residing. Many have recently returned. Resistance is led by those men and women who have returned from *perantauan* and have decided to remain in the villages as farmers only to realize that they did not have enough land to farm.

As soon as the area was regarded as part of the Dutch colony, colonial rulers started to apply to it their laws, such as the Agrarian Law of 1870 (*domeinverklaring)*.[8] In 1883, the administrative changes were implemented by setting up *kampung*s (villages) and *negeri* (state) based on the population numbers and not on *marga* as villages or *bius* territories had usually been organized here. In 1924, the regulations *Bijblad11372* and *Bijblad 12746* gave the government the right to buy peoples' lands for state needs. At the same time, the Dutch were also concerned about the water levels in the Lake Toba. This led to the appropriation of lands for reforestation programs (Simbolon, 1998). Toba Batak communities resisted this because they were afraid that their land would be taken over by plantations (Pelzer, 1978; Simbolon, 1998).

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[8] The Agrarian Law of 1870 declared all land as state land unless villagers could prove their ownership. The ownership could be recognized if the land was "under tillage" for the past three years; if more than that, the land belonged to the state (Peluso, 1992, p. 64).

The post-colonial state continued the process of land appropriation. There were several major laws and regulations that contributed to this, such as BAL, Investment Law of 1967 (UUPMA no. 1/1967) and others which simplified the land allocation process to the various corporations as long as they invested into the failing Indonesian economy at the time (Simbolon, 1998). The Village Law no. 5/1979 made the village head responsible to the central government rather than to the people who resided in the village. Several regulations (*Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri, the Internal Affairs Minister Directive* (PMDN) no. 15/1975 followed by PMDN no. 2/1976 and PMDN no. 2 1985) defined a development project as a "public need;" therefore, land could be appropriated by the state with "proper compensation" (Simbolon, 1998, p. 109). The land right holders did not have the possibility to refuse the development project and were obliged to agree to the compensation. This policy "facilite[d] the taking over of people's land by both the state and private investors for development projects and the public interest" leading to the rise of inequalities and landlessness, further, leading to the rise of poverty in the region (Simbolon, 1998, p. 111). North Tapanuli was known as one of the poorest areas in Indonesia (Simbolon, 1998; Manalu, 2009).

Along with these policies, there were several projects that started to be implemented in the region. One of them was the Asahan Hydro Electric Project. Another was the reforestation program, which started during Sukarno's presidency in various areas of Tapanuli. This led to the loss of communal lands. Some of the communities I visited lost their access to their lands during this time. Finally, in 1984 the government also gave a major permit to a pulp and paper company called *PT. IIU* to log in the area of Tapanuli under a HPH/HTI permit. During this time, there were also some initiatives to develop tourism in this area (Simbolon, 1998).

Within the context of *Reformasi* today, these same problems remain relevant. The kind of conflicts experienced are related to the pulp and paper company TPL, the development of tourism, power plants and an aqua farm. PT. IIU was closed down due to protests, including the protests led by women in Sugapa, however, soon after, the permit was renewed for TPL. Toba Lake area is being developed as the tourist spot currently with the World Bank-funded project of "ten new Balis" (Ariyanti, 2019). There are several hydro-electric power plant projects being worked on at the moment within the context of infrastructure development. The government claims that North Sumatra faces a shortage of electricity and two more hydro plants, Asahan IV in Asahan district and Asahan III in Toba Samosir district, along the major Asahan river ("PLTA Asahan IV," 2015) are being built. Finally, an aqua farm was established in 1998 owned by the Swiss company PT Aquafarm Nusantara that exports the tilapia raised here to the European, American, Canadian and other markets under the brand name of "Regal Spring Tilapia" (Aquafarm, 2019). Communities are concerned with the level of pollution produced by this aquafarm and have been protesting against it since its establishment ("Desakan Tutup," 2019).

2.2.2 The ground-setting concepts of Toba Batak *adat*

Simbolon(1998) explains Toba Batak *adat* by identifying religious, genealogical, and territorial aspects, which provide a basic understanding of the Toba Batak *adat.* Toba Bataks believe that they originate from one person who resided in *Sianjur Mula-Mula* on the Samosir island. This person then had children, who were given different names who eventually founded the contemporary *marga* system. The *marga* is said to have originated about 400 to 600 years ago. All the *marga* have one ancestral home, which is on the island of Samosir but since they spread out and cleared forests where they became a *raja* (king), they founded new ancestral homes, which are referred to as *bona pasogit* (ancestral homeland). New *marga*s can emerge

with time as new villages, *mamungka huta*, are established. In the 19th century, there were 325 *marga*s, according to Situmorang (1993) (in Simbolon, 1998, p. 38). This corresponds with the stories of the villagers I worked with. Most of the villagers tell stories of forest clearance some 200-300 years ago.

Adat is the practice that organizes these communities' cultural and social life. From my experience in Toba Batak villages, *adat* organizes social life by defining social relationships amongst individuals, the surrounding villages, the other districts, the greater geographical region of the Toba lake, and outsiders. A Toba Batak is at all times part of something greater than his/her individual self. In this section, I outline major ground-setting concepts of Toba Batak *adat* that remain relevant today from my observations: *marga* and *dalihan natolu*, *bius* and *raja bius*, and *bona pasogit*. This data is important, first, because it can explain why these communities decided to claim the status of *masyarakat adat* in their struggle because all of these concepts play a key role within the organizing of KSPPM. As mentioned in Chapter 7, KSPPM uses story-telling as one of their ways to mobilize the villagers and these concepts then become key in these stories.

Marga* and *dalihan na tolu

When asked whether *adat* is institutionally organized or not, villagers respond that there is no clear institution (*lembaga*) that organizes it hierarchically, however, relationships between in-laws, sons, daughters, mothers, fathers, grandparents and the land are organized through two major institutions, *marga* (clan), and *dalihan na tolu*. The concept of *marga* organizes social relationships among people and also connects them to the land of origin. It is assumed that all Toba Batak *marga*s genealogically originate from one person, *Siraja Batak*. Two major lines formed subsequently, *Lontung* and *Sumba* moieties, each of these having *marga*s/clans that fall

under them. The rule that everyone follows is that the *Lontung* moiety clan can marry only the person from the *Sumba* moiety, and vice versa. Each of these clans is associated with a certain area of land in the region, often referred to as *bona pasogit* (ancestral area) (Simbolon, 1998, p. 38).

Dalihan na tolu is a structure that explains both communal and individual relationships. Communally, this is a triadic institution that consists of *hula-hula*, *dongan sabutuha*, and *boru*. The daughter in the family is *boru*. The in-laws through the mother's line are *hula-hula*. In relation to *hula-hula* the clan who married their daughter becomes *boru*. And the clan that resides on their own ancestral territory is referred to as *dongan sabutuha*. When *hula-hula*'s daughter (*boru*) marries *dongan sabutuha* and moves to the husband's land, she is a *boru*. Despite the translation of *boru* as "daughter," *boru* is not always gender-specific. The term can refer to a clan that resides in the village, as in *marga boru*. It can refer to men and women of the family of the married daughter (or people of the same *marga* as their daughters' husband).

At an individual level, roles are not static and change as persons interact with each other. *Dalihan natolu* defines these relationships between even seemingly unrelated persons who have never met each other before. When Toba Bataks meet each other for the first time, they introduce themselves with their *marga* to define where they stand in relation to each other within *dalihan natolu*.

Bius* and *Raja bius

Bius is a territory where several *marga*s reside, including *marga raja* (the lineage king clan) and *marga boru* (the in-dwelling clan). The position of *marga raja* is always higher than that of *marga boru*, however, as the *marga boru* resides longer in the territory its status also rises. *Marga raja* has a higher social status, especially within *adat*.

Raja bius are the descendants of the founding clans (*marga raja*) who have the position of elders in the village. They gain this position due to lineage, knowledge of *adat*, respect of the people, life experiences and wisdom. For example, Pandumaan and Sipituhuta are situated in the traditional *bius* Marbun. Marbun includes such clans as Lumban Batu, Lumban Gaol, and Banjar Nahor, but in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, there is no Banjar Nahor.

In the past, *marga boru* tended to have a weaker position than *marga raja*. However, this was changing in some places and *marga boru* were not always willing to take upon a subordinate position, especially when it came to land affairs. For example, in Pandumaan, when villagers and KSPPM were looking at the draft of the district regulation on MHA Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, one of the statements in the first draft was the sentence that said that the land belonged to *raja bius* Marbun. This sentence led to a heated discussion due to the omission of *marga boru* as the owner of the land. *Marga boru,* here, owns huge land and monopolizes coffee and benzoin trade as *tengkulak*. Therefore, a non-inclusion of *marga boru* would have changed the currently existing social structure and put *marga raja* as the ultimate kings of the *bius* as it used to be in the past. Villagers protested and asked the government to revise the document taking into consideration the social change that took place in the villages. Due to this, the document announced the community of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta as an Indigenous community without a reference to *bius* Marbun. *Perda* was approved in the beginning of 2019 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Raja bius institution is not uniform for all Toba Batak people. For example, in another village of Nagasaribu there is a different structure of *raja bius* where *bius* structure is organized as a parliamentary system under the power of *Patik* (law). Under this *Patik*, each major *marga* fills the positions of *raja bius* and *raja patik* depending on the size of the *marga.* The Nagasaribu

residents have a governing document (*undang-undang*) that lays out the principles and rules that *raja patik* and *raja bius* have to follow. A major principle of this governing document is *Dosni Roha* meaning "one/same heart," indicating equality and community. As explained by Ompung Greta, one of the *Patik* kings, "*duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi*" (if one person sits, we all sit; if one person stands, we all stand).

Bona pasogit

Bona pasogit means "ancestral land" (Vergouwen, 1964, p. 162). There is a romanticisation of *bona pasogit* among the Toba Bataks because the origins of their *marga* is inseparable from this land that they call *bona pasogit* (Simbolon, 1998, p. 32). Due to its romanticisation, *bona pasogit* carries an enormous argumentative power that can easily be used for a mobilization.

One of the ways through which the meaning of this concept is strengthened in daily life, for example, is through burials. A person born on the land must be returned to the land where s/he originates from. If cost prevents the person's body being returned to *bona pasogit* the body will be buried where the person resides and, when enough funds are available, the bones will be returned to the ancestral home. According to villagers, this is done even if the person resided abroad, as long as the family has funds to bring back the corpse or the remnants.

Traditionally, *bona pasogit* land could not be sold. Many of my research participants claimed that, even though they and their parents lived in cities all their lives, they still owned their ancestral land and, therefore, they were counted within *adat*. Despite this, when I was in the villages, many middle-aged out-migrants who established themselves in out-migration visited the ancestral land so that they could sell a portion of their land. These trips, however, created friction and fear in the villages and often led to family conflicts. Villagers also resisted this trend by

establishing their own community rules. For example, in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, the mobilized hamlets agreed that they would not sell their land to outsiders. If they urgently needed funds, people were required to seek a buyer within the village. The only hamlet that did not follow this rule was the first hamlet in Marade.

To conclude this section, *adat* plays a crucial role in structuring social relationships, especially within a family and a community. Despite this, it also tends to change and differ from village to village. I outlined in this section key concepts that I learned through my fieldwork. I do not claim these concepts to represent Toba Batak *adat* in general. Other concepts may have been omitted because they did not emerge in my field notes or the interviews.

2.2.3 Women within *adat*

Women play one of the key roles within resistance, this is why it was imperative for me to observe their status within *adat.* Understanding women's status and experience within *adat* can help understand, on the one hand, why women are willing to sacrifice their limited time and energy to resistance, and, on the other, it also raises questions as to why the accompanying organizations such as KSPPM with a human rights perspective do not question *adat* itself from a gender justice perspective and prefer to use it for their organizing as a strategy.

Toba Bataks are patrilineal and patrilocal. Patrilinearity is expressed in the system of *marga*. *Marga* is passed from father to son. The absence of a son means the *marga* line is cut off and, therefore, it is recommended that those men who fail to have a son from their wife re-marry. Women cannot exist outside *marga*. They are a man's daughter (Simbolon, 1998). Patrilocal means that women are more likely to move to the husband's ancestral area, however, there are rare situations when men move to the wife's area (in this case, they have limited rights to land) (Simbolon, 1998).

Strong and hard-working women: gendered roles and division of labour

When I first came into the villages with a concern for women, the first thing I noticed was strong women who are comfortable expressing their opinions when talking tête-à-tête with me. However, as soon as the women gathered in a larger group or when a man was present, women became silent and preferred to give space to their men or to other women to speak. This was especially challenging when I went to villages where KSPPM did not conscientiously and purposefully organize women. The contrast between the villages where KSPPM worked most closely and intensively with women for years and did not was immense.

I also noticed that women were tremendously hard-working: the whole village economy ran on women. The women opened shops, planted coffee plantations, harvested coffee, dried coffee, cleaned coffee, sold it, worked in the rice fields, tilled the land, planted and harveste rice, cleaned *kemenyan*, did the laundry, looked after children, fed the family, prepared coffee or tea for husbands and guests, went shopping to the market, opened and managed *kedai*s, brought the fire-wood, and completed other tasks. As most of the men and women expressed to me, women were the backbone of the Toba Batak society because the whole village and its economy was on their shoulders.

Man's job in the *kemenyan* areas was to go and work in the forest from Monday to Friday intensively from September till February (due to the distance of the forest from the village, men built small huts in the forest and slept there in Pandumaan and Spituhuta), sun-dried, cleaned, and stored rice in the storage (in some places this is a joint work for men and women), and spent time at *kedai*s. In the villages I visited, there was only one woman who joined her husband into the *kemenyan* forest. Some men became involved in farming with the introduction of technology. For example, the current district head started to rent tractors for tilling the land for a cheap daily

rate, and the village men started to also be involved in tilling the land and planting. But this involvement of men was also starting to be seen as a necessity due to the lower yield of the benzoin.

Gendered family budget

Men's expenses were much higher, especially on cigarettes and coffee or tea at *kedai*s. An average man smoked at least two packs of cigarettes a day. The cheapest cigarettes per pack were a little over 15,000 rupiah (1 dollar and 50 cents). However, as one of the women noticed, men usually tried not to smoke the cheapest brand of cigarettes because of their pride (*gengsi*), thus, the price per pack could be more expensive. A cup of coffee at a local *kedai* cost about 2,000 rupiah (20 cents). This made the daily minimum budget of an average man in the village with one cup of coffee at the local *kedai* equal 32,000 rupiah (3 dollars). If we added *tuak* (local alcoholic drink) into the budget, this budget would equal some 40-50,000 rupiah per day (4-5 dollars). The minimum monthly budget of men, thus, equalled 1, 200.000 rupiah (120 dollars).

Men's jobs brought more funds into the family income because the price of *kemenyan* was higher than that of coffee. For example, Ompung Delima in Pandumaan explained that in the past they used to get 200 kilograms per family on average. The price per kilogram depended on the quality but ranged from 200,000 to 300,000 rupiah. This meant they used to get about 40 to 60 million rupiah per year ($4,000 to $6,000). Now, he claimed, they got only about 30 kilograms of benzoin. Ompung Greta in Nagasaribu shared that at a maximum one tree could give 2 kilograms of benzoin and if a family had 700 well-cared for trees, it could produce 1,400 kilograms per year.

The family budget was managed by women. Men were expected to bring *kemenyan* income into the family budget. However, it was usually men who sold *kemenyan* either after they

had cleaned *kemenyan* at home or, sometimes, on the way back home from the forest after having harvested it. The men might keep 50% of the income (or sometimes even more) and gave the rest to the family. Despite taking half of the *kemenyan* income as their pocket money, they might still ask for extra pocket money from their wives for cigarettes and drinks after they run out of their share. Some older women were highly aware of this and protested it, whereas younger ones seemed to be less aware (or, chose to disregard it).

The income from coffee was crucial for women because it became purely their family's income. Coffee sells at 25-35,000 rupiah per litre. However, there were situations in these villages before the coffee and rice harvesting (February, March, and April) that could be called the most difficult time for the villagers when they may not have enough funds to buy themselves even a kilogram of rice. At this time especially, a regular diet could be a plate of rice with a handful of sun-dried bait fish with *sambal* (chili pepper sauce).

Widowed and divorced women

Widowed or divorced women were structurally in the most difficult situation because the house and the children depended on them. These women usually did bead work or opened up small shops to earn additional cash. Their husbands' *kemenyan* forest would usually be worked on by others who would then (or were supposed to) share some income (for widows). The divorcees generally did not have access to a *kemenyan* forest. One such person was Mama Teresa. She was a young woman with a college education (D3). She had three daughters. Her husband married a younger woman who bore him a son. They moved out of the village as out-migrants. She did not want to marry again because in this case, she would lose her three daughters. She had a smartphone, which enabled her to learn new things by watching YouTube or other online platforms. This was how she learned to do beadwork on the church dresses

(*kebaya*) of local women. During one of my visits, she used her smartphone to order things needed by the local women online while getting some small commission for this. She lived in a small hut, which, during my first visit, she turned into a small shop with essentials. By the time I was about to leave the village, she saved up some money from her new coffee business and turned her small shop into a *kedai*.

Domestic violence

In relation to domestic violence, most women preferred to deny the presence of it and often referred to *adat* explaining that this was shameful within *adat*. However, several women confirmed that there was domestic violence in the villages but that it remained concealed due to the shame women felt. They could not share this information because *adat* prohibited domestic violence, and therefore, men felt ashamed if this became known to fellow villagers. Mama Teresa told me that several women shared their stories with her, but they would not do this with people whom they did not trust.

One KSPPM activist explained that within *adat* there was a road map for women who experienced domestic violence. If a woman experiences domestic violence, first, she was supposed to go to the *marga* of her husband (any clan family but within her husband's family line) and seek refuge there. If the needed protection was provided by the husband's family, the man's family needed to ask for forgiveness, invite the woman's family and organize a ritual after which she could go back to her husband. If the husband's lineage did not provide resolution, the woman went back to her own family With this, the husband's risks were higher because he needed to ask for forgiveness from her and her family. She returned to her husband after a ritual.

Equal or unequal?

Most of my women informants pointed out that within *adat*'s *dalihan natolu*, women and men's positions were equal if they were already married. When one was not married, one was a *boru* within one's family. However, after getting married, it was also a husband who became *boru* in the woman's family. And, while the daughter is still a *boru* in her own family but in her husband's family, she is respected as part of *dongan sabutuha*. According to Ester, "There is a moment when I am in the front, and, there is a moment when I am a labourer, a helper, a maid, *parhobas*. There is a moment. I think there is justice in it" (interview with Ester, 2018). When discussing inheritance, She further connected gender inequality within a Batak family to the general structure of patriarchy because inequality is "not only in the Batak family."

Inheritance

There are also various ways that one can gain access to land within a customary territory but these depend on one's gender. Men get *waris* (inheritance) from their fathers. It is assumed that men's' tenurial security provides tenurial security to women. When there is no son in the family, the land is passed on to the closest male relative. If there is a widow or daughters left by the man who dies, they become the responsibility of men who then inherit the land. In the case of the mother, it is the sons who take care of their mother. If the woman does not have sons, then, she obtains her tenurial security through the male relative of the husband. This is when women may be forced to marry their husband's relatives. Women get *pauseang* (often, a rice field) but this depends on their marriage status, availability of land in the family, whether the daughter asked for this or not at the marriage ceremony, and a special ritual (Simbolon, 1998).

When discussing inheritance, Ester argued, that when women marry they can ask their family for a little inheritance referred to as "*ulos na sora buruk*" ("*ulos* that never goes bad"); and, more importantly, they also receive inheritance through their husbands. She argued that this

was just in favour of women because, first, women who do not get married do not bear children that they need to take care of; and, second, daughters do not have to take care of their parents. The daughter-in-law has to take care of the in-laws and organize their burial; therefore, it is reasonable that the husband receives a share of the inheritance. Thus, Ester did not see gender injustice in the way inheritance was distributed, according to *adat*.

Ester's views above are representative of married women's opinion both among the activists and the villagers. Most women who were divorced or widowed expressed that they would have liked to own a forest garden (*tombak*). For example, Mama Teresa expressed that she would have wanted to have some *kemenyan* forest, despite the fact that she was given some rice fields and coffee plantations by her family following the divorce to make a living. An older woman activist who chose not to get married said that marriage should not be the way a woman gained access to land because what was the difference whether it was the man or the woman who brought the land into the family. Both could bring the land into the family.This practice has been changing for the last few years, giving more single women access to land. Families find various ways to do this.

Some women also managed to use national law to navigate the inheritance issue and resisted *adat*. For example, women from Humbang Hasundutan and Tarutung area who currently reside in the city of Medan whom I met owned land in Medan and chose to put their girl children's names on their land certificate to protect the land from the claims of the male relatives. According to *adat*, they could claim these lands if the women did not bear a male child.

Centrality of children

Another important aspect of the Toba Batak *adat* is the centrality of all children (*keturunan*). As one of the women respondents said, "all the children within the Batak family are

the children of a king. Boys are children of the king (*anak raja*) and girls are daughters of the king (*boru raja*). *Boru raja* is supposed to serve the family whereas *anak raja* is to be served."

However, in accordance with the patrilineality of the Toba Batak geneology, male children are more central than girl children. In many of our conversations, my respondents, both male and female, refer to male children as a child (*anak*) and tend not to count in the girl children. When they include girl children, they refer to them as girls (*perempuan*). For example, one of the women introduced herself in the following manner: "I have three children (*anak*) and four girls (*perempuan*)." This can be a reflection of patrilineality and the importance that one puts on male children.

One's inability to bear children and especially male children can result in the marginalization and stigmatization of women. If a woman cannot bear a male child, her husband has a right to divorce her. In this case, there is some cultural ambiguity. If asked whether there was polygamy among Toba Bataks, all the women and men argued that this was prohibited in their religion, however, in reality, the man who separated from his wife who did not bear boys married the second time, but within *adat*, it was the first wife who was acknowledged, as long as she did not re-marry. In my eyes as an outsider, this meant the man had two wives.

Adat prohibits women to remarry. If they do, they lose rights to their children and are taken out of *adat* as not belonging to this family anymore. Children are counted as their father's children, but if the mother remarries, she is considered as belonging to a different *marga*. By remarrying she loses custody over her children. At the same time, as told by one of my informants, widows or divorcees rarely remarried because, first, re-marrying meant spending more funds to go through the marriage ceremony. Second, having a husband was seen as an extra

expense. Women's major complaints were that family budgets suffered from the lifestyles of husbands.

Motherhood

Toba Batak women in these locations were also under scrutiny as mothers. It was to the father's merit if the child succeeded, but if a child failed, it was the mother's fault. Women were put in a lower position than both husband and children. After coming back from the fields, women cooked and served dinner. Before eating themselves, they served their husbands, and then their children. The last ones to eat were the mothers. When younger wives first joined the family of their husband they were under heavy scrutiny. Two of the families I stayed with who had their son's family living with them tended to complain about their daughters-in-law saying they were lazy. Being lazy might have been their daughter-in-law's way of protesting the subordinate position they found themselves in when they joined their husband's family vis-à-vis their mother-in-law, especially. This weakness of younger women's position made younger wives less confident to speak. Older women generally tended to be more outspoken.

Women and adat

When I asked women about their attitude towards *adat*, women defended *adat* arguing that *adat* played a crucial role in their unity and helped them maintain their familial relationships. As expressed by women in the village of Nagasaribu during a FGD,

> *Adat* teaches us mutual help, sharing, loving others. So that we do not take things for granted. If there is no *adat*, there could be cheating and violence. But even now we have cases of cheating. But if people know this, the person will be banished from *adat* and religion.

This statement to me reflects the controversy of *adat* itself in relation to gender inequality. In the above statement, we can see that people generally would like to believe that *adat* propagates justice for all people in principle but in reality, it does not regulate inequalities that exist. It may provide a level of unity through its underlying principles, but it also seems to be largely discriminatory towards women and girl children leading to marginalization of certain groups of women, especially.

As an outsider, I see *adat* as it is practiced in relation to women and girl children to be discriminatory. Some Toba Batak women (in especially weak positions within the communities) expressed that *adat* was quite unfair towards women (especially when men or other women were not around). Other women pointed out the Church and its teachings were more discriminatory towards women. Mama Patrisia, for example, argued that the role of the Church was greater in putting women down and justifying women's inferiority to men. She said she wanted to start conversations with other women but she was afraid that others would not understand her intentions because resistance to gender equality came not from men but from women themselves.

I discussed these questions with rural and urban men, too. Urban men were offended by my observations when I shared with them but rural men engaged with me in respectful conversations about the status of women. Often, however, they responded with jokes about women's subordinate position to men and referred to the Bible to prove their points. So, in this case, *adat* and religion supported each other. At the same time, there were rural men who agreed and questioned the gendered division of roles. Amang Trisna, for example, said that he washed his own clothes but he did this in stealth because he was afraid that his friends and neighbours would make fun of him when they saw it. A neighbour of Mama Patrisia, Mama Delima,

complained how hard she worked every day, then, she continued to talk about a neighbour's husband in Lumban Nainggolan (the village of Nainggolan *marga*) who helped his wife.

Thus, there are varying opinions about *adat* among rural women, urban women, urban women activists, rural and urban men. Rural women tend to have a more nuanced view of *adat.* Regular urban women who originate from rural areas tend to be highly critical of *adat* and its discrimination against women and openly resist using existing legal tools, for example. Middle class, activist women who are married tend not to see (or choose not to see) the discriminatory elements of *adat* towards women. Rural men are also more critical of *adat* and its gender ideology as opposed to urban men.

In villages where KSPPM worked intensively, women tended to be more critical of gender injustice compared with other villages with less KSPPM involvement. In these villages, almost no woman questioned *adat*. Overall, few women questioned the unfair distribution of inheritance and general gender inequality. This is understandable due to the power and the potential that *adat* carries as a unifying force. *Adat* is seen as beneficial despite its discriminatory practices. As women and men live this *adat*, they do not want to dismiss it as irrelevant or discriminatory.

In relation to how to tackle this issue, one of the Toba Batak women activists argued that one needed to question *adat* by using *adat* and for this one needed a deep understanding of *adat*. Another woman in the village said that the Church needed to play a role and it was men who needed to be informed about laws against domestic violence or about gender equality. The easiest way to do this was through Church because the Church was respected and it was also Church that also seemed to justify the ideas of gender inequality found within *adat*. In one of our conversations discussing Batak women's lot, one of the women said, she was invited to training

for women about gender equality but she said that the problem was not in women, it was in men; therefore, men were the ones who were supposed to receive training, not women.

2.3 Situating the research site

In this section, I describe the main actors in the conflict that I interacted with in the field. TPL is the company that claims the customary land of the villagers as part of its concession under its permit. KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak are two organizations that I was assisted by during my time in North Sumatra. And, finally, I also explain the situation of the villages, which I visited/stayed with.

2.3.1 Toba Pulp Lestari (TPL)

On the island of Sumatra, there are 4.8 million ha of pulpwood concessions controlled by Sinar Mas Group/Asia Pulp and Paper, Royal Golden Eagle/Asia Pacific Resources International (RGE/APRIL), and Marubeni Corporation. RGE/APRIL manages over 1.2 million ha accounting for 26% of all pulpwood concessions on Sumatra. TPL's concession equals 185,016 ha (Eyes on the Forest, 2019; TPL, 2017).

Global paper and viscose consumption are predicted to continue growing (Berg & Lingqvist, 2017; Obidzinski & Dermawan, 2012, p. 961). Viscose is mostly used in the fashion industry (Changing Markets, 2017, p. 12). Wood trade is an important part of Indonesia's GDP and Indonesia aims to grow this industry in the coming decades (Indonesia 2030 National Forestry Master Plan in Obidzinski & Darmawan, 2012, p. 962). According to Basyuni et al. (2018), between 1990 and 2015 North Sumatra lost more than 595, 220 ha of primary and secondary forest. Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) reports that in North Sumatra, out of over 7 million ha of land, over 1 million ha is under a concession permit (Barri et al., 2018).



Map 2: RGE's concession on Sumatra (in purple). Source: maps.eyesontheforest.or.id

The map above shows the concession area of RGE group on the island of Sumatra. As can be seen from the map, most of the concession area of RGE group is found in North Sumatra and Riau with two major pulp mills, in Porsea, North Sumatra and Pangkalan Kerinci, Riau.

TPL's pulp mill, after being closed down due to grassroots resistance based out of Porsea, reopened in 2003 with a new permit, a new name and a 'new paradigm' under the name of TPL (Toba Sustainable Pulp). This meant that the company offered more community development programs and hired more Toba Bataks (Haboddin, 2008; Manalu, 2009; Nomura, 2009). Today, resistance is not based in Porsea, rather it moved into forest concessions. Those who resist work with KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak. There are other communities who may not be affiliated with these two organizations. At the time of the research, KSPPM worked with eleven forest-based conflicts and one conflict that was not forest-based (Lumban Sitorus' land is categorized as APL) covering four districts: Toba Samosir, Simalungun, Humbang Hasundutan, and North Tapanuli.

2.3.2 Grassroots organizations working on rights of *masyarakat adat*: KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak

KSPPM was established on 4th February 1984 as KSPH (Kelompok Studi Penyadaran Hukum, Study Group for Legal Awareness). A year after, they changed their name to KSPPM

(*Kelompok Studi dan Pengembangan Prakarsa Masyarakat*, Community Initiative Study and Development Group). It works to address poverty, human rights violations, environmental issues and to promote democracy. It emerged within the context of the Suharto regime's developmentalist policies by young church activists and other educated professionals. KSPPM is inspired by Christian theology of helping farmers through research, organizing, popular education, and advocacy. Initially, the organization was based in the small town of Siborong-borong in North Tapanuli district, and in 1993, it moved its office to Parapat in Simalungun district. Its office is based in the scenic small valley towards the end of the village in Girsang on the outskirts of Parapat town (KSPPM, 2018).

KSPPM has three major divisions: community organizing, research and advocacy, and management. The community organizing division facilitates the formation of farmer's groups and works to develop an understanding of citizenship rights. Farmers are encouraged to engage with the local government to demand the realisation of their rights. The division of research and advocacy conducts studies on policies and advocates on behalf of the "structural" cases. As a result of these studies, they identify issues to advocate on and work together with the communities to advocate on their own behalf with the local and national government in coordination with the other NGOs that work on these issues at the regional and national levels. The management division supports the work of these two divisions and takes care of funding, programmatic and financial reporting. Their major funding comes from a German organization called Bread for the World (BfdW), members, and smaller organizations that work together with KSPPM on a common objective, such as the Rainforest Action Network (RAN). Today, KSPPM works together with forty-four farmer's groups, three farmers' unions in three regencies, and nineteen "structural" conflict cases (KSPPM, 2018).

In North Sumatra, there are three chapters of AMAN, AMAN Sumut (based in Medan), AMAN Pak Pak (based in the district of Dairi), and AMAN Tano Batak (AMAN TB, based in the district of Toba Samosir). AMAN TB was established in 2011. KSPPM initially facilitated the establishment of AMAN TB, allocating one of their staff members who then left KSPPM and became employed by AMAN TB. AMAN TB at the time of my research had 36 communities in the districts of Toba Samosir, North Tapanuli, South Tapanuli, and Simalungun. It is not clear how many of these communities are de facto working with AMAN TB due to the shortage of staff they have. When I visited their office, they had three permanent staffs and one intern. Their office is in the town of Balige, the capital of the district of Toba Samosir. I interviewed several current and former AMAN TB staff members and also visited one of their communities of Ompu Ronggur in *Taput*. However, I spent most of my time with KSPPM and the communities they accompany.

There are several differences between KSPPM and AMAN TB. The first major difference is the positioning: KSPPM positions itself as a non-governmental organization that has regional, national and international networks, whereas AMAN TB positions itself as the people's organization. For example, staff of AMAN TB present themselves to be *masyarakat adat* while the KSPPM staff position themselves as educated, middle-class activists who care for human rights.

Secondly, KSPPM has its own separate and independent funding, whereas AMAN TB mostly gets its funding from AMAN Secretariat (*pengurus besar*, PB). Third, KSPPM has a larger presence on the ground due to various programmatic activities and many staff members. At the time when I was at KSPPM, they had three satellite offices in Samosir, Toba Samosir, and North Tapanuli districts with three to four staff members in each of these offices. The satellite

offices mainly work with farmer's groups. The advocacy group is based in Parapat HQ office and counts about five staff members. These staff members at KSPPM are salaried workers, whereas AMAN TB's staff are considered as volunteers who get "a thank you payment" ("*ucapan terima kasih*").

2.3.3 My research sites: "structural" conflict cases

In my research, I looked at the so-called "structural" conflict cases that KSPPM and AMAN TB work on. I visited five communities that work with KSPPM and one community that works with AMAN TB.

1. Lumban Sitorus community	Parmaksian sub-district, Toba Samosir district	KSPPM
2. Ompu Bolus community	Sipahutar sub-district, North Tapanuli district	KSPPM
3. Ompu Ronggur community	Sipahutar sub-district, North Tapanuli district	AMAN TB
4. Onan Harbangan Nagasaribu community	Siborong-borong sub-district, North Tapanuli district	KSPPM
5. Ama Raja Medang Simamora community	Dolok Sanggul sub-district, Humbang Hasundutan district	KSPPM
6. Pandumaan-Sipituhuta community	Pollung sub-district, Humbang Hasundutan district	KSPPM
7. Sugapa	Silaen sub-district, Toba Samosir district	KSPPM

Table 4: List of Communities

The following descriptions of the communities are compiled based on the data in the KSPPM archives, *Prakarsa* magazine published by KSPPM, and my interviews:

1. Lumban Sitorus community

This community represents the descendants of Guru Datu Sumalanggak Sitorus (Guru Datu). His wife was Nan Tinggi Malela who was the daughter of *Raja* (king) Margambat Manurung in Lumban Manurung. Guru Datu helped this king to win a war and married his daughter. When he asked to marry one of the king's daughters, the king hid the blind one because he was embarrassed. But Datu asked to marry the one that the king hid from him. The king never thought that his blind daughter would marry and, therefore, out of happiness, he also gave land. This land became known as the land of Lumban Sitorus. The community of Lumban Sitorus represents the fifteen generations of Datu Sumalanggak and Nan Tinggi Malela's descendants. The *boru* family lines here are Sibuea, Simatupang, Simangusnong, Tapitupulu, and Manurung. 177 families (692 persons) live on 208 ha of land with 100 ha of rice fields (not counting out-migrants).

Two pieces of ancestral land are under contestation, *Jior Sisada-sada* and *Silosung*. *Silosung* was for the Muslim families of the family line and *Jior Sisada-sada* was for the Christian families. This division was needed due to the fact that Christian families grew pigs. Silosung was rented to a Japanese company, *Inalum*, as a storage place in 1978. These lands were traditionally used to graze water buffaloes and also for gardening. They planted clove trees, cassava, sweet potatoes, and other crops. These lands, which are the only communally owned lands in the village (*tanah harajaon*) are situated two kilometres away from the village itself. Paddy fields are closer to the village, often situated only a few meters away from the residential area. The majority of this community is Christian with some Muslim minority.

PT. IIU entrance into the area was allegedly facilitated by local family member, Turman Sitorus, in 1984. He visited village leaders and told them that there was a company interested in developing the village. This allowed the government to come and measure the land. The

measured land was the size of 113 ha, which was then to be given to PT. IIU. Out of this land, 6 hectares are part of *Silosung* l and 36 hectares are *Jior Sisada-sada*. There are four other villages as well who agreed to sell their land to PT. IIU. They were paid compensation, however, Lumban Sitorus did not receive compensation, promised a better deal which has not been actualised, according to villagers. When PT. IIU built a road in 1986, villagers of Lumban Sitorus protested, however, they were threatened to be labeled as development enemies/resistors and PKI. Their land is under HGU permit and is classified as APL, thus, the resolution of this conflict does not deal with MoEF, but with ATR/BPN.

The latest development at the time of my research was that the community was approached by a Sumatran NGO and an independent mediator to facilitate a discussion between them and TPL upon the request of the company. I observed parts of this process. The section on mediation and its challenges is based on my experiences observing, partially participating, interviewing villagers and the lead mediator.

2. Pandumaan-Sipituhuta community

This community is represented by two villages, Pandumaan and Sipituhuta. These nieghbouring villages are related. The major *marga*s here are Lumban Batu and Lumban Gaol. These are *raja bius* family lines. This means that the elders of the two, family lines are respected and revered. There are other family lines that are also central in the struggle, such as Nainggolan, Sinambela, and Sihite. Overall, these villages represent 700 families. The total area of this territory is 6001,153 hectares of which the community claims 5,172 hectares that are part of the state forest zone as *hutan adat* (customary forest) (Silalahi & Wicaksono, 2018).

The conflict started in 2007 when there was a sub-district-wide resistance by twelve villages. At this time villagers organized under the name of "*petani kemenyan*" (incense

farmers); KSPPM did not accompany them then. Later, the resistance subsided in all the other villages and the company developed partnership programs with the other villages. However, in 2009 the conflict erupted anew when the villagers of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta saw that the company was cutting down their productive *haminjon* (benzoine/incense) trees. Villagers started organizing and became connected to KSPPM as a result of their radicalization and since then, KSPPM has advised them on their resistance and helped to advocate on their behalf at the national level. In my account, there were several families who did not have *kemenyan* gardens because they were waiting for their turn, were migrants, or single mothers whose husbands passed away or whose husbands left them due to a second marriage in search of a boy child.

In 2016, the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, issued a Decision Letter (SK) recommending the allocation of a customary forest (*hutan adat*) to this community. However, in order to obtain approval of a *hutan adat*, one needs to have a *Perda* (*Peraturan Daerah*/regional regulation) acknowledging *masyarakat adat* and their rights to land. This *Perda* was passed in February 2019 by the current district head (*bupati*). After *Perda* is approved by the Parliament, it must be verified and signed by the Minister of Internal Affairs. *Perda* was passed by the local Parliament in early 2019. Currently, villagers are waiting for the final decision letter, which then will give *hutan adat* rights to them, thus, taking the *kemenyan* forest out of the state forest zone. Therefore, the forest is a de facto territory of a stalemate and de jure it is still under the concession permit of PT. TPL. One can say that the conflict is close to being transformed.

3. Ama Raja Medang Simamora community

This community represents 40 families who are the descendants of *Ama Raja Medang Simamora*. Their *marga* is Simamora. They also have their *boru* under the clan names of Simanullang, Samosir, and Purba. This community resides in the village of Aek Lung in the sub-

district of Dolok Sanggul in *Humbahas*. The land they claim to be theirs is called *Sitakkubak* with a size of 153 ha, which is administratively part of other neighbouring villages but these villages acknowledge the land to be the land of the Simamora clan, which was confirmed through the mapping process. The villages administratively situated on the land of *Sitakkubak* are Lumban Purba, Batu Najagar, and Sosor Tolong. The North side of this land was used for paddy fields and *bayun*[9] (a hard grass used for making local handicrafts). The middle area was for grazing horses and water buffaloes. The south side was used to grow orange and *kemenyan* trees, coffee and tobacco (during Dutch colonization), and also as paddy fields.

In 1975, the land was asked by the government for greening (*penghijauan/reboisasi*) purposes to ensure the water supply of the area. In the beginning the community did not agree to this, but they were forced to allocate their ancestral land to the pine tree plantation for thirty years with the agreement that the land will be returned to them afterwards. In 1994, the pine trees were logged and the land was passed onto PT. IIU in 1996 without a consent from the descendants of *Ama Raja Medang Simamora*. The company already had a license issued by the government at this time. Protests followed this, however, at the time the government heavily relied on security approaches to the conflict and the resistance was quickly minimized through the use of violence. Following this, the company planted the eucalyptus trees that were harvested in 2006. The community started to reclaim the land in 2005. To resolve their case, they were offered a *HTR* scheme, which the community refused and instead demanded the recognition of their Indigenous rights over this territory because (1) they cleared it and (2) inhabited for more than 250 years (see Gurusinga, 2010).

4. Ompu Bolus community and Ompu Ronggur community

[9] Screw palm, a palm-like shrubs that grow in wet fields. The villagers use harvest these, dry, and make carpets.

These two communities are related. The land was cleared by Ompu Bolus, but then his relative, Ompu Ronggur, was allowed to reside and become the rightful owner of a certain part of this territory. Both of these communities have the same *marga* name of Simanjuntak. The area they reclaim is called *Aek Napa* and constitutes an area of 2,608 ha. The ancestral land is situated in the village of *Sigala-gala* or *Sabungan Ni Huta IV*, Sipahutar sub-district, North Tapanuli. The community itself had moved, similar to *Ama Raja Medang Simamora* community, and now resides in *Sabungan Ni Huta V* village. Both family lines have lived in this area for eight generations (one generation's age is 25-30 years). PT. IIU came into the area in 1987 because this area was part of the concession permit issued by the government.

Both of these men, Op. Bolus and Op. Ronggur trace their ancestry to *Raja Simanjuntak* of Balige area. One of the descendants of this *Raja* migrated towards the area of North Tapanuli. His name was *Tuan Sibadogil*, who at the time moved to the *Siborong-borong* area. Op. Bolus decided to migrate again from this land and opened an area called *Aeknapa*. He had three wives, Boru Limbong, Boru Simatupang, and Boru Ritonga and six children. Op. Bolus was known to have special powers. One of his contributions was the establishment of the market (*Onan*). He was buried in *Aeknapa*.

Op. Bolus had a favourite child among his six children, Op. Latong, who did not treat his siblings well and, therefore, some siblings migrated to South Tapanuli and others established a new village, where they currently reside, five kilometers away from *Aeknapa*. Despite this, villagers claim that they regularly visit the land and feel connected to their ancestral land. They still have the memory of tilling the land. The cemetery of Op. Bolus is also still in Aeknapa, which they regularly visit. Other cemeteries have been destroyed when CV. Poltak Motor was turning the land into a coffee estate. CV. Poltak Motor managed the land from 1967 to 1971

without the agreement of Op. Bolus and Op. Ronggur descendants. However, later the company went bankrupt and left the area.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Op. Ronggur came to visit Op. Bolus to ask for land. He was in hiding at this time. Op. Bolus and Op. Ronggur were close and Op. Ronggur was allowed to live in the area. Op. Ronggur was also buried in *Aeknapa*. Five generations of Op. Ronggur's descendants lived in Aeknapa and managed the land but then after this, the descendants moved to Siparendean village. They also moved Op. Ronggur's cemetery to this village. The descendants of both Op. Ronggur and Op. Bolus moved closer to the urban area. However, both of the descendants managed the land for paddy fields, incense trees, and other purposes at a distance for several decades before PT. IIU came to plant Eucalyptus trees in 1987. Due to the plantation, the villagers claim to have lost several important sources of livelihood, such as rattan, *bayun*, and *kemenyan*. The community has some *kemenyan* forest left at the moment, which PT. IIU could not log due to the trees being down the hill.

Today, the descendants of Op. Ronggur and Op. Bolus do not reside permanently in Aeknapa; Op. Ronggur reclaimed the land and planted it. There is one village of about eleven households residing on this land, families which moved into this area three generations ago. Four descendants of Op. Guru Tahuak came to ask for land from Op. Bolus and were given paddy fields and garden lands, however, they are not the rightful owners of this land because their residence in this area depends on the agreement of Op. Bolus and Op. Ronggur. They are considered to be migrants (*pendatang*).

6. Onan Harbangan Nagasaribu Community

This community resided in *Nagasaribu* village situated in the sub-district of Siborongborong, North Tapanuli. In order to get to this village, one need to be accompanied

because there was no proper road. The two major family lines (*marga*) here were *Simanjuntak* and *Sianipar*. KSPPM called this community the *Onan Harbangan Nagasaribu* community. The community had around 80 families. There were several empty houses in the village due to out-migration. Many villagers who now resided in the village were out-migrants themselves but returned due to various reasons.

The community claimed the land area of 1,085 ha. The main *marga* here was Simanjuntak drawing their line from *Datu Pijor* and *Datu Dolok*. Further other *marga* joined in, such as *marga* Siregar, Simanjuntak Hutabulu, Simanjuntak Mardaup, Napitupulu, Sianipar, and Panjaitan. The village, called *Onan Harbangan* in the past because *Sisingamangaraja XII* came to this village and established a market here houses families who have lived in the village for nearly fifteen generations. Their major income was from *kemenyan,* coffee and paddy fields. When *PT. IIU* arrived in 1991 based on the permit they hav, it was difficult for communities to resist the land occupation. However, they started to resist again recently with the help of KSPPM.

Overview of the villages

The majority of the villagers in these areas depended on benzoin, paddy fields, and coffee. In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta villages, the main source of income was *kemenyan*. The second major source of income was Arabica coffee known under the market name of *Lintong* coffee. Rice (the villagers mainly consume red rice) was planted for personal consumption. In Nagasaribu, the major source of cash income was also *kemenyan* and coffee. Their coffee was bought by a local coffee businessman who seemed to cooperate with Starbucks because the only source of clean water in the village was built with the funding provided by Starbucks. In *Aek Lung*, the major source of income was vegetables. The villagers here were mostly landless and

the ancestral land was the land they worked on to get cash income. Historically, they also had *kemenyan* here. However, their knowledge of how to grow *kemenyan* forest and how to take care of it was lost. In Lumban Sitorus, the villagers planted rice for cash income. The land size here for most community members was less than half a hectare of land and some were landless. In Toba Samosir district, villagers could plant rice two-three times a year, however, due to the lack of an irrigation system in Lumban Sitorus, this was not possible. Some here were employed outside but, more often, unemployed. Some were employed by TPL, then left the company. In the two villages of the Sipahutar district, villagers plant coffee, *kemenyan*, and pine trees as the main source of income.

In Lumban Sitorus, women seemed to be self-employed by opening a small stall, selling fried bananas, and other types of jobs. Older women farmed the paddy fields. There was also some level of prostitution here, however, villagers said that there was no one from their village employed in *lokalisasi*. Most prostituted women were migrants from other areas. In villages where the major source of income was *kemenya*n, women were the rice and coffee bean farmers. Women are not involved in managing the *kemenyan* forest. In Aek Lung, women and men worked together to plant vegetables. Farmers also kept pigs and some villagers kept water buffaloes although the number of water buffaloes had been decreasing in the past several decades. In Lumban Sitorus, pig-breeding was also not always possible due to a shortage of land.

The benzoin tree is an endemic tree in this area and locally is known as *haminjon* (in Batak) or *kemenyan* (in Indonesian). Its resin can be used for incense, perfume, and medicine (Garcia Fernandez, 2004). Traded internationally, Sumatran benzoin can be traced to 9th-century medicinal uses in China (Katz et al. in Garcia Fernandez, 2004). It is mostly used in incense

production globally and cigarette production in Indonesia. The demand both in Indonesia and globally has been subsiding with prices being low in the post-1970s to early 2000s, which also led to farmers changing their trees to more profitable ones (Katz et al., 2002 in Garcia Fernandez, 2004). In the past years, according to farmers, the price was better, selling at $10-$20 per kg depending on the resin quality.

There are three categories of the resin depending on the size, colour, and cleanliness. The price of *kemenyan* fluctuates according to the season and year. The annual income of the villagers ranges from the size of their plot, how much time they spend in the forest taking care of the trees (*manige*), and other external factors (such as, climate, forest coverage in the nearby areas, the level of water retention in the soil, etc.).

Coffee that is planted in these villages are of two types, arabica and robusta. Both of these types provide considerable cash support to families. The price is counted per litre and fluctuates between 25,000 and 35,000 rupiah depending on the season, quality of the beans, and the buyer. Usually, in the villages, there are brokers who can be big (*tengkulak*) or small (*touke*). The bigger ones are usually those who can lend funds to villagers if they are in need of a large amount of cash, and farmers pay them back with their harvest. The *tengkulak* can trade both coffee and benzoin. However, from my observations, *touke* tends to specialize in one type of product. For example, a family I stayed with traded in small amounts of coffee beans. The mother of the family would collect all the coffee beans from neighbours and go to the market on Fridays to sell the coffee there. Another friend in the village collected coffee from villagers to sell to her acquaintance, a big coffee exporter in Marade.

Villages in forest areas tend to still have land available to them. Most families had about 0.25 or 0.5 ha of paddy fields and 3-4 ha of forest garden. One family had about 10 ha of the

forest garden, out of which 5 ha were productive and 5 were not productive due to the presence of TPL. Out of 700-800 families, only a few families did not have *tombak* (forest garden) or paddy fields. In case, they did not have paddy fields, they either bought their rice or share-cropped the rice field with the owner. Villagers of Aek Lung and Lumban Sitorus were mostly landless or owned only one or two *rantai* of land, which equals about 0,04/0,08 ha. The Aek Lung farmers have reclaimed their ancestral land and make their cash from the vegetables they sell while the Lumban Sitorus' farmers lack a stable and reliable source of livelihood.

To conclude, while all of these communities are defending or reclaiming their customary territory, the type of lands they are claiming can be differentiated on the basis of the state-based classification. Thus, the lands of Pandumaan, Sipituhuta, Nagasaribu, Op. Bolus and Op. Ronggur are within the forest zone, while Lumban Sitorus' ancestral lands are in the land that is classified as APL. They all seem to have long histories of dispossession that started in the 1970s. Some stories, such as that of Op. Ronggur and Op. Bolus seems to have some inconsistencies in relation to the chronology, such as villagers seem to not mention CV. Poltak that came to their land before TPL.

2.4 Situated within the national context: resource-based conflicts in Indonesia and their resolution

In this section, I aim to situate the communities studied within the national context. I contextualize why the communities have chosen to struggle for land in the manner they did and why the focus fell on Indigeneity as a strategy. I divide the available options into social forestry, agrarian reform and conflict resolution.

Komnas HAM (National Commission on Human Rights) (2018) differentiates resource-based conflicts or agrarian conflicts[10] in Indonesia as related to: 1) palm oil; 2) forestry; 3) infrastructure; and 4) mining (Laila et al., 2018). In my research site, almost all of the conflicts are forestry conflicts with one conflict being an infrastructure conflict. As mentioned before, the landmass in Indonesia is under the jurisdiction of two major ministries, KLHK (MoEF) and ATR/BPN. Infrastructure conflicts are usually under the jurisdiction of ATR/BPN. They are also harder to resolve due to the lack of schemes that allow for this as well as the nature of permits themselves that are usually given for a building. Thus, in the case of one of the villages (Lumban Sitorus), a pulp mill was built on the land claimed to be their communal land.

There is no unified system that documents resource-related conflicts. This is why there is diverging information on the number of these conflicts. For example, Komnas HAM reports that from 2018 to 2019, they received 196 cases to resolve. Most of these cases concern vertical/"structural" conflicts (Komnas HAM, 2019). The head of BPN (National Land Agency) recently reported that there were more than 8,000 unresolved cases of land conflict (Prabowo, 2018). The national NGO KPA (Committee for Agrarian Reform) reports that between 2015 and 2018 there were 1,769 new conflicts (KPA, 2018). According to KPA's report (2018), due to these conflicts, since 2015, 41 persons died, 546 were tortured, 51 persons were shot, and 940 farmers have been criminalized with 95% of the victims being male and 5 per cent being women. The security forces, including the police, the military and the Satpol PP[11] (Municipal Police, Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja), have been involved in these conflicts, often leading to the

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[10] KOMNAS HAM prefers to use the term agrarian conflict (konflik agraria) because this fits with the BAL 1960 definition of the term "agraria," which includes "land air, and atmosphere, including the natural resources underneath the land within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia" (UUPA, pasal 1 angka 2) (see in Laila et al., 2018).

[11] Their job is to administer peace, public order, and enforce the regional regulations (Perda) and governor regulations.

intimidation of the people. In some cases, the company hired both state and private security forces to intimidate protesters. Most violence towards farmers was committed by the police and the private security firms (*preman*) (pp. 41-43). In my research sites, several villagers were charged and arrested. *Preman* were not involved; however, the company involved the Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob)[12] to protect their concession.

In resolving these conflicts, the approach of social movements and resisting communities was to push towards the release of state hegemony over forests. I see this process, however, as a ball-throwing game, whereby the civil society organizations and communities suggest a structural change, while the government pushes other schemes that could allow it to have more control over the territory. Thus, two opposing schemes developed, one of social/community forestry and the other of agrarian reform. The third approach is in the initial stages of development, that is, a conflict resolution approach.

2.4.1 Social forestry

Within the *Reformasi* context, the security approach of the New Order regime was not any longer possible. Thus, the government developed a social forestry approach. The seeds of this approach were sown towards the end of Suharto's regime due to numerous conflicts. To address the rising number of social conflicts, the Suharto regime designed a program called social forestry with the support of the Ford Foundation (Peluso, 1992; Lindayati, 2002; Siscawati, 2012). The regime launched a program called Forest Village Community Development (PMDH, Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa Hutan) (Lindayati, 2002; Peluso, 1992).

Despite the introduction of the social forestry scheme during Suharto's regime, the real changes started to come forward with Reformasi (Lindayati, 2002). In 1998, a special-purpose zone was established with a Ministerial Decree in Krui. The then Minister of Forestry,

[12]The National Police special forces.

Suryohadikusumo, before stepping down, gave the Krui people stewardship rights over their customary forest where there have not been any major economic interests at stake related to Suharto and his affiliates (Lindayati, 2002). At the time the communities were facing a palm oil plantation and a logging company, however, with this special permit called "'Zone with Distinct Purpose-Krui'" (Kawasan dengan Tujuan Istimewa-Krui/KdTI-Krui), their agroforest of damar (a high-quality resin-producing tree, Shorea javanica) was secured, although the legal insecurities remain till today (Kusters et al., 2007). This is considered to be a "historic" case of agroforestry rights recognition because it influenced the subsequent policy-making on social forestry (Lindayati, 2002, p. 51, Siscawati et al., 2017, p. 7).

Further, during this stage key NGOs organized themselves under the umbrella of KpSHK (Supporting Consortium of Community Based Forestry System, Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan). The objective of the activists at this point was to prove that various alternative and indigenous forms of forest management already existed throughout Indonesia (Siscawati, 2012, p. 177). This process also coincided with other transnational processes, the development of community-based forest management (CBFM) and the community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) approaches as well as the international Indigenous peoples' movement (Siscawati, 2012).

In 1993, WALHI and the local underground activists with some local leverage organized a meeting in Toraja in South Sulawesi. The meeting brought together Indigenous leaders and environmental and human rights activists. The village chief at the time, Sombolinggi, led the meeting, resulting in the establishment of the JAPHAMA. This was a meeting where the activists also contemplated over the term they would use to refer to the customary communities and dwelled upon the term "*Masyarakat adat*." This term was chosen in opposition to all the other

terms that were used to refer to the customary communities. In 1999, the First Congress of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) was held and AMAN was established (Moniaga, 2007). This organization today represents nearly 60 million Indigenous peoples of Indonesia (Simarmata, 2019). While today this network includes various rural communities, in the beginning, most communities supported were facing some form of land and forest-related conflicts and were described as having the environmentally sustainable practices of forest management (Peluso et al., 2008). In 1996, another organization that today closely works with AMAN and other such organizations was established called JKPP (Network of Participatory Mapping Work). This organization supports community mapping throughout Indonesia together with major environmental and Indigenous peoples' organizations (Siscawati, 2012). KSPPM sees itself as part of this greater movement not only for Indigenous peoples' rights, but also of human rights, in general. It works under the same general framework with AMAN and JKPP, despite minor disagreements that will be discussed in the chapter on challenges and opportunities.

As part of this scheme, with the advocacy of AMAN and its allied organizations, the seemingly most viable option for those communities who claim Indigeneiety is *Hutan Adat. Hutan adat,* as mentioned before, is the latest legal development whereby MHA can claim customary forest and take it out of the state forest zone turning their forest into a titled forest (hutan hak).[13] However, obtaining a *hutan adat* is a complicated process. MHA must be recognized with *Perda* (*peraturan daerah*/district regulation) under the Law on Regional Autonomy no. 22/1999 and no. 32/2004, the customary territory must be a forest or a forested area. There should also be a letter that acknowledges that MHA agrees to turn their forest into

[13] In 2011 and 2012, there were a series of decisions by the Constitutional Court (MK 34 (MK34/PUU-IX/2011) and MK 35 (MK35/PUU-X/2012) that challenged the new BFL and resulted in the possibility of *hutan adat* (Myers et al., 2017).

hutan adat (Malik, Arizona & Mihajir, 2015; Malik, Martika & Chaakimah, 2015; Myers et al., 2017; Sirait, 2015).

MK 34 and MK 35 were perceived as a major victory by AMAN and others working on rights and forests. However, it is not clear what will be the exact impact of these decisions. According to Myers et al. (2017), first, those whose land is outside the forest zone today will not be able to claim customary forest, and the community whose land was converted to agricultural land for agricultural plantations, such as palm oil, will not be able to claim their land back. Conservation forests are regulated by two laws: the new BFL and Law no. 5/1990 on the Conservation of Biodiversity and Ecosystems. It is confusing how the lands that fall under a conservation forest will be dealt with under MK 35. Further, claims that have been made on the production forest may not be easily retrieved. These comprise 56.5 million ha of land in Indonesia. In addition, those communities who have claimed other rights under the social forestry schemes, such as HTR, HD or HkM might have challenges in getting the recognition of *hutan adat*. And, finally, the migrant communities who have been forcefully moved and lived on these territories and have developed their livelihood around the forests may not be able to benefit from this legal opportunity (Myers et al., 2017, pp. 209-211).

2.4.2 Agrarian reform movement

Reformasi and specifically TAP MPR[14] legitimized the Agrarian Reform agenda allowing for more in-depth and open discussions on Agrarian Reform (Peluso et al., 2008). The two major farmer's organizations, SPI (Indonesian Farmer's Union) and KPA represent farmers

[14] With the fall of Suharto, under the extraordinary work of Dr. Maria Sumardjono and the working group for the Management of Natural Resources (POKJA PSDA), MPR passed a TAP MPR Nomor IX/MPR/2001 *tentang Pembaruan Agrarian dan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam (*Decree on Agrarian Reforms and Natural Resource Management), which gave a mandate to the President and the parliament to work on land reform (Rachman, 2017).

throughout Indonesia. These organizations were formed from the mid to late 1990s (Peluso et al., 2008). Another important organization is Serikat Petani Pasundan (SPP) representing about 30,000 farmers in West Java. KPA and SPP worked with major environmental organizations, WALHI and LATIN and in 2001 they set up a Working Group on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management (Pokja PSDA). AMAN also joined these efforts. Through the collaboration of agrarian, Indigenous peoples' and environmental organizations an agenda was created that shaped the land reform campaign of the late 90s and early 2000s eventually leading towards the initial legal reforms that further legitimized the land reform campaign at the national level (Peluso et al., 2008; Rachman, 2017).

The agrarian reform aims to resolve agrarian conflicts and achieve a social transformation that would result in the prosperity of farmers, poor people, landless and the Indigenous peoples (Wiradi, n.d., Nurdin, 2014). For example, Wiradi (who represents KPA's views), envisions the establishment of BORA (Agency on Agrarian Reform, *Badan Otorita Reforma Agraria*) accountable to the President, as part of the agrarian reform. This body would oversee the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform, which would redistribute the agricultural, forest, plantation, mining, water, sea, and other areas and also provide the community development tools needed for communities to manage themselves and their economies, such as the technology of production, credit-making, marketing, etc. (Wiradi, n.d.).

Following this and the hard work of social movements for agrarian reform, then President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) developed a National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN); however, this plan was implemented only in part through the program of BPN from 2009-2011 in the Southern part of Java. Some land was redistributed here, somewhat successfully meeting the demands of the farmers, especially when these demands had been well-

formulated by the farmer's organizations. In the case where the organizing was lacking, the redistribution failed to meet the farmers' needs (Nurdin, 2014). The incumbent President's Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) *Nawa Cita* campaign program also included Agrarian Reform as one of its objectives; he aimed to redistribute 9 million ha of land after identifying TORA (*Tanah Obyek Reforma Agraria*, Land as Object of Agrarian Reform). TAP MPR remains to be an effective tool to push forward the agenda of Agrarian Reform today in Indonesia because it provides a strong legal ground for an agrarian reform, which many activists still see as a viable tool to address tenurial conflicts (Laila et al., 2018; Nurdin, 2014; Peluso et al, 2008).

2.4.3 Conflict resolution

Alternative mechanisms for dealing with conflict have been developed and sometimes abandoned since the fall of the New Order regime. One of the first initiatives to emerge was again out of TAP MPR, which inspired activists to not only work together with Komnas HAM but also to work towards the establishment of the National Commission for the Agrarian Conflict Resolution (*Komisi Nasional untuk Penyelesaian Konflik Agrarian* (KNuPKA). Since its establishment, Komnas HAM itself worked towards dealing with past abuses and violations of human rights, including those related to land grabbing. This work was done under the umbrella of its approach which was then called "transitional justice" (*keadilan transisional*). The aim of this approach was based on truth-telling, reparation, punishment of the violators, and organizational reform. This idea was inspired by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) and the Land Claims Court in South Africa. However, this idea was refused by the then President Megawati who argued that the creation of a new institution would further burden the state budget. The same idea was suggested to SBY, however, he also refused and instead

suggested creating a new position within BPN called Deputy for the Resolution of Conflicts (Deputi Penanganan Konflik, Sengketa, dan Perkara) (Rachman, 2017).

Komnas HAM focuses on two major issues. The first one is the past violations of human rights. This includes the cases of human rights violations in Aceh, Papua and other cases from the past. The second priority area is the protection of marginal and vulnerable groups. This second strategy thus covers the ongoing issues of human rights violations. This may include the issue of agrarian reform and land rights. Komnas HAM under this line of work receives reports related to agrarian conflicts through the Team for the Management of Resource-Based Conflicts (*Tim Penanganan Konflik Sumber Daya Alam Komnas HAM RI*). The team's work is to mediate, monitor, study agrarian conflicts to identify whether there is a violation of human rights involved in the conflict or not; whether certain policy changes are queried or not in relation to these conflicts; and to encourage parties to mediate and resolve conflicts (Laila et al., 2018). For example, one of the cases where Komnas HAM acted as the mediator was the conflict between the Kulon Progo farmers and the government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) in the construction of the New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA); however, the Commission was not successful in resolving the conflict between the families who refused to leave their land and the government of DIY (Irawan, 2019).

A ground-breaking initiative of Komnas HAM in 2014 was the organization of the National Inquiry into Indigenous Peoples' Rights on their territories in the Forest Zone following the court ruling MK 35 (inspired and led by Sandra Moniaga, the Komnas HAM Commissioner). This inquiry looked at human rights violations present within the state forest zone (Rachman &Masalam, 2017). Villagers, supported by expert testimonies, were able to tell their stories of land grabbing. The case studies were published as one document that represents a major study of

the dire impacts of various forest-related human rights violations experienced by Indigenous communities throughout Indonesia. Pandumaan-Sipituhuta was one of the Indigenous communities present at this Inquiry.

The Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) is headed by a Minister/Head. At ATR/BPN, there is a Directorate-General Office on Handling Agrarian Problems and Spatial Land Use (*Direktorat Jenderal Penanganan Masalah Agraria, Pemanfaatan Ruang dan Tanah*) (ATR/BPN, 2019). With the Presidential Regulation No. 10/2006 about BPN, there is a position of a Deputy 5 on Assessment and Management of Land Disputes and Conflicts that is drawn from a BPN regulation no. 3/2011 on Management of Assessment and Management of Land Cases (*Peraturan Kepala BPN RI no. 3 2011 tentang Pengelolaan Pengkajian dan Penanganan Kasus Pertanahan*). The deputy does not deal with all land cases but only cases that are caused by the regulations and policies of BPN (therefore, land without certificates, land without clear boundaries, permits not issued by BPN cannot be handled through this deputy). All other conflicts should be handled by the local governments. In handling these cases, ATR/BPN uses mediation involving other government agencies, experts, and academics (Busroh, 2015). In the case of Lumban Sitorus their land is classified as APL (*area penggunaan lain*, land for other uses) and, therefore, it falls under the jurisdiction of ATR/BPN, not MoEF. As will be explained later, other tools, such as the local district-level Parliament have been tried; however, this was not successful due to the lack of a legislation that actually supports the claims of Indigeneity.

The National Forestry Council (*Dewan Kehutanan Nasional*/DKN) was established as a result of the 3rd Indonesia Forestry Congress (KKI III) in 2006. This Congress brought together government officials, business persons, and the civil society. They agreed to establish DKN to

enable a multi-party discussion and monitor the conditions of forests in Indonesia. DKN had four commissions and two desks. One of the commission's tasks was conflict mediation and social forestry (DKN, 2019). This commission was dealing with forest conflicts ad hoc without an official mandate (Safitri et al, 2011). This was done, for example, in the case of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta. DKN representatives visited the villages and issued recommendations to MoF (DKN, 2019). One successful case of mediation led by DKN was a conflict in Kampar Peninsula over 4,500 ha of land between a community and a pulp and paper company in 2015 (Dhiaulhaq et al., 2018).

The House of Representatives also deals with agrarian conflicts. This is the job of the Land Standing Committee within Commission II. The members of this committee analyze and study these conflicts and conduct field visits, and then make recommendations to the relevant government agencies. Often, however, their recommendations are ignored; therefore, the Committee is not seen as an effective conflict resolution tool by the activists (Nurdin, 2014).

MoEF itself has a forest-focused perspective on conflict and conflict resolution. Thus, community rights become important for MoEF in relation to deforestation and forest degradation. Since 2015, MoEF has followed economic equity/equality policy (*Kebijakan Ekonomi Pemerataan*). This means giving communities an opportunity to manage forests. This policy consists of three major pillars: land, business opportunity, and human resources development. MoEF's policy that supports this identifies the agrarian reform objects (TORA) and promotes social forestry (MoEF, 2018, p. 34). Thus, MoEF aims to redistribute 4.1 million ha of land from the forest zone (out of 9 million hectares that Jokowi announced as part of Nawa Cita) (MoEF, 2018).

The conflict resolution process at MoEF is regulated by Ministerial Regulation No. 84/2015 on Tenure Conflict Management within the Forest Zone (Permen LHK no. 84/2015 tentang Penanganan Konflik Tenurial Kawasaki Hutan). This regulation created a Directorate of Tenurial Conflict Management (Direktorat PKTHA). From 2016 to 2018 they have dealt with 288 cases of conflicts and resolved 90 of them while 171 cases are still under process. They also have returned 27 cases due either to the lack of documents (13 cases), or because the conflict reported occurred outside of the Forest Zone (within APL, 14 cases). The conflict resolution process involves various actors including NGOs, mediators, experts, etc. MoEF sends out assessors to the field who conduct the conflict analysis in the field and report to the Conflict Management Team. Further, there are three options available to the team (tim IPKTKH): mediation, legal action (for example, the parties breaking the law could be punished), or social forestry (MoEF, 2018, p. 45).

One of the major causes of conflicts is believed to be the lack of a unified tenurial map that often leads to conflicting concessions on the same piece of land by various government agencies. MoEF and other government actors committed themselves to developing a unified map, formulated into a One Map policy that attempts to bring together 19 ministries and 34 provinces. The initiative is led by the Team of Acceleration of One Map Policy (*Tim percepatan kebijakan satu peta*/PKSP) (PKSP, 2019; Siscawati et al, 2016).

Despite all these initiatives and bodies that may carry a minor role as a mediator, no body exists to manage these conflicts independently and comprehensively while also addressing the root causes of these conflicts (Mulyani, 2014). There is also a lack of unified data on all the agrarian conflicts in Indonesia. The attempts of the state agencies to deal with conflicts have been largely unsuccessful due not only to the complexities involved but also to the interests of

these very institutions in having the control over the spaces they are legally entitled to control. Further, the court system that is sometimes suggested as an option is also not effective and is avoided by the communities. Therefore, the National Committee for Agrarian Reform (KNPA, *Komite Nasional Pembaruan Agraria*) that consists of various civil society organizations such as Walhi, AMAN, KPA, SPI, and others suggested creating a Special Working Presidential Unit for the Resolution of Agrarian Conflicts (*Unit Kerja Presiden untuk Penyelesaian Konflik Agraria*). In its position paper on agrarian conflicts, Komnas HAM also argued for the creation of KNUPKA (Laila et al., 2018).

The communities I worked with preferred the scheme of *hutan adat* on the basis of their claims to Indigeneiety. Most of the conflict resolution initiatives both from the government, Komnas HAM, and other institutions helped to formulate the cause, however, did not provide realistic opportunities to transform the conflicts. The government presents other social forestry schemes as easy options that do not require the same "hassle" as *hutan adat*, but the social movements that advocate for the Indigenous peoples' rights do not trust that the government will keep renewing the permits without the special status of being Indigenous. The communities can get special rights if they are recognized as Indigenous/*masyarakat adat*. Many claim that without the legal change and the recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights, the communities who claim Indigeneity do not have enough legal grounding to exert pressure on the government and, therefore, *hutan adat* is the only possible resolution for these cases at the moment. This, however, leaves out other such communities as Lumban Sitorus whose communal lands are not in the state forest zone. The agrarian reform movement seems to offer a more universal solution to the problems of tenurial insecurity for these communities who claim Indigeneity and millions of farmers who do not claim Indigeneiety and yet, are landless.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

This chapter clarifies key concepts and theories that shape my thinking about social conflict, the role of identity, resources, and gender in social conflicts. I review theories of peace, peacebuilding, nonviolent resistance and the role of women. I separately look at indigeneity, the global Indigenous peoples' movement, politics of recognition, and discussions in relation to women and indigeneity.

3.1 Defining social conflict, conflict transformation, and resistance

Following Kriesberg & Dayton (2012), I define social conflict as "aris[ing] when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives." This involves status, power, and resources as long as they manifest themselves to the adversaries as "incompatible objectives" (p. 2). This definition, however, does not take into consideration the cultural aspect of social conflicts. Lederach (1995) brings the importance of culture (constructions) into the definition of social conflict by paying attention to meanings that parties to a conflict may put into the "incompatible objectives." Merry (1986) argues that "disputes" are "social construct[s]," meanings of which change over time within a given society. Any conflict or dispute, continues Merry, is a

> cultural behavior, informed by participants' moral views about how to fight, the meaning participants attach to going to court, social practices that indicate when and how to escalate disputes to a public forum, and participants' notions of rights and entitlement. Parties to a dispute operate within systems of meaning; they seek ways of doing things that seem right, normal, or fair, often acting out of habit or moral conviction (p. 2063).

Social conflicts involve social groups, such as ethnic groups, governments, social classes, religious groups, racial groups, and also rebellions, riots, revolutions, nonviolent direct action,

strikes, demonstrations, and other aspects of contentious politics (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012; Obershcall, 1967). According to Kriesberg & Dayton (2012), groups in conflict are usually in some kind of relationship and aim to change something in this relationship or situation. The nature of these relationships is tainted with power dynamics, which may be expressed in some form of violence: direct, cultural or structural. Direct violence may be physical or psychological (e.g., war, genocide). Structural violence is embedded in structures, such as, racism, poverty, sexism, and other forms of structural inequalities. And, cultural violence is the legitimation of direct or structural violence through laws, ideologies, arts, norms, and customs (Galtung, 1996). Violence is a social construct that is justified through laws, customs, religious beliefs, or ethics, which are shaped by those who hold power (Whitmer, 1997). Freire (1970/2005) identifies tools used by oppressors, such as rule and divide, manipulation, conquest and cultural invasion. Rule and divide promote conflict; manipulation can be done through myths and treaties; conquest creates the situation of oppression and destroys critical thinking; and, cultural invasion imposes the oppressor's worldview on the oppressed.

Some structures allow responding to the challenge of social conflict in a constructive manner, others do not (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012; Coser, 1956). Conflict can be transformed either from inside the conflicting parties through such means as negotiation and dialogue or with the help of outside involvement through mediation, for example (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012). In other situations, when the root cause of the conflict is embedded in the structure, conflict can be resolved by changing the structure, benefitting both parties because being an oppressor is oppressive, as argued by feminists (Galtung, 1996; hooks, 2000). For this, social movements and grassroots resistance are crucial.

Gramsci (1971/1992) says that the exercise of power needs the consent of the oppressed. The consent of the oppressed is gained through a mechanism of hegemony and it is the intellectuals who play a major role in ensuring it (Gramsci, 1971/1992, p. 12; Crehan, 2002). Schools, courts, and various "private initiatives and activities tend to the same end" – "the political and cultural hegemony" (Gramsci, 1971/1992, p. 258). For Foucault (1978), power is exercised through the "state apparatus," "law," and "various [other] social hegemonies" (p.92). People may not necessarily be the ones to resist this all-encompassing power because they internalize the norms and therefore, monitor themselves, thus, enabling the reproduction of control and subordination (Foucault in Gutting, 2005). Power can also be "from below," seen and found at play in "families, limited groups, and institutions" (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). Sharp (2005) identifies sources of power, such as authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, material resources and sanctions. It is habit, fear, moral obligation, self-interest, indifference, or lack of self-confidence that compel people to obey their rulers.

Taylor and Beinstein Miller (1994) contend that power can be understood not only in a negative sense as domination and oppression ("power-over"), but also in a positive sense as "power to" and "power with." Power carries a potential for social change by rejecting domination and hierarchy. For Gramsci, counter-hegemony is possible from a critical understanding of a subordinated position and of the "common sense" of the subaltern. The agents of change among the subaltern are the organic intellectuals who emerge from a class-consciousness of the subaltern. The task of new social classes is to create their own intellectuals and attract traditional intellectuals to their side (Crehan, 2002). Freire (1970/2005) says that it is crucial to help the oppressed to unveil and critically assess the world of oppression (both direct and internalized). In this process of conscientization, the oppressed expels the myths created by

the oppressors by creating cooperation, unity, organization, and cultural synthesis. Foucault (1978) says that "where there is power, there is resistance," and this resistance is in an entangled relationship with the power. Resistances can be various; they can be "necessary," "spontaneous,""violent," "sacrificial," compromising (p. 95). Sharp (2005) posits that if people realize the meaning of consent in the exercise of power and develop knowledge and motivation to resist, they can transform an oppressive system through the use of nonviolent tactics and strategies, such as protest and persuasion (demonstration, symbolic public acts, procession), noncooperation (boycotts, ostracism, civil disobedience), intervention (sit-in, occupation, the fast). Gandhi (1957) developed *Satyagraha*, a nonviolent civil resistance, in his fight against the colonial rule in India. The major component of this practice is the spiritual transformation of the Self, the use of civil disobedience, noncooperation, and *Swadeshi* (economic self-reliance).

Lahiri-Dutt (2003) argues that resistance "must negate … the basis of domination" (in Selbin, 2010, p. 10). Freire's resistance is done through consciousness-raising and organizing. Gramsci discusses the role of organic intellectuals and of class-consciousness. Sharp and Gandhi mention the importance of awareness and organized action. However, resistance can also be hidden, unorganized, and unaware. It can go unnoticed by those who hold the power and not be fully realized by those who are oppressed. Scott (1990) termed this phenomenon "everyday forms of resistance" or "weapons of the weak." The resistance that he observed in the village of Sedaka in rural Malaysia was in the form of gossip, nicknames, character assassination, feast boycotting, etc. (Scott, 1985). The everyday forms of resistance suggest the invisible agency of the subaltern. In addition, these are the types of acts that may sustain resistance, small acts or "counterdiscourses" that may eventually lead to larger social movements (Mittleman & Chin, 2000, p. 176). For Foucault, power can be seen in our discourse and it can also resisted in our

discourse: “discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (p. 101). This, of course, does not mean that peasants and other subalterns lack organized forms of resistance. There are numerous social movements (local, nation-wide or global) that represent these groups and address the issues facing them (McMichael, 2010/2015).

Following O’Brien & Li (2006) and Schock (2015), I see resistance as a continuum from the everyday forms of resistance to a full-blown civil resistance campaign. From “everyday forms of resistance” or “weapons of the weak” to “rightful resistance” and, then, to “rightful radical resistance” (Scott, 1990; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Schock, 2015). Rightful resistance is “episodic,” “within-system,” works within an institutional framework of the state, “local” or “regional,” and not “national” or “transnational” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 4). Shock (2015) applied this framework to resistance movements in the Global South and termed what he saw “rightful radical resistance.” He called it “radical” because the nonviolent resistance in his case studies were “sustained”, “counter-hegemonic,” employed “nonviolent direct action,” and the framing involved claims to “democratic citizenship.”

Nonviolent resistance is often referred to as “people power,” “satyagraha,” “unarmed resurrection” (Nepstad, 2013, p. 590). Adam Roberts (2009) defines civil resistance as:

> “[A] type of political action that relies on the use of non-violent methods… It involves a range of widespread and sustained activities that challenge a particular power, force, policy, or regime – hence the term ‘resistance.’ The adjective ‘civil’ in this context denotes that which pertains to a citizen or society, implying that a movement’s goals are ‘civil’ in the sense of being widely shared in a society; and it denotes that the action concerned is non-military or non-violent in character” (in Nepstad, 2013, p. 590).

Nepstad (2013) clarifies that nonviolence is seen by social movement theorists as a tactic while civil resistance researchers study nonviolence as “a theory of political power, a moral ideology, a strategy, and a technique for turning state repression to a movement’s advantage” (p. 590).

There are two major understandings of nonviolence, one is strategic and the other is principled. One proponent of the first is Gene Sharp while a proponent of the second is Mahatma Gandhi who is best known for developing the philosophy of nonviolence based on *satyagraha* (sat=truth, agraha=firmness) (Nepstad, 2013). This latter philosophy propagates the active practice of nonviolence on oneself and others, including discriminatory structures through nonviolent means (Gandhi, 1957). Sharp’s nonviolent civil resistance is strategic because he argues that nonviolent resisters do not have to practice *satyagraha* or undergo some form of spiritual transformation. Instead, he sees nonviolence as strategically more advantageous than violence, especially when one is a people who may not have a military power but who can effectively use the strategy of “political jiu-jitsu” to turn the power pyramid around and undermine the power bases of the ruling classes/elites/government (Sharp, 2005). Gandhi principally denies violence, whereas Sharp strategically denies it. KSPPM, for example, understands non-violence in a Sharpian way.

Stephan & Chenoweth (2008) differentiate between “nonviolent political processes,” including lobbying, electioneering, and legislating, and nonviolent resistance strategies, which can be “symbolic protest, economic boycott, labour strikes, political and social non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention aiming at the adversaries' sources of power” (p. 10). They define a nonviolent campaign as:

> A series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible leadership and often

> have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. Usually campaigns have recognizable beginning and end points, as well as distinct events throughout their history (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 16).

Often nonviolent activists may not be fully aware that their action is nonviolent, and they may not be familiar with the theory and practice of nonviolence (Schock, 2003). This is true for the participants of my research. They did not define their resistance as nonviolent.

Nepstad (2013) observes that nonviolent resistance researchers normally study what makes nonviolent resistance work, why certain movements choose nonviolent or violent methods, how do we know that nonviolent resistance is successful, and how nonviolent resistance works in different contexts. For future research, she suggests more research on hybrid regimes and nonviolence, honing the definitions of success of a nonviolent campaign, whether nonviolence can be used against non-state actors, such as rebel groups, patriarchal practices, religious hierarchies, or corporations, among others.

Chabot & Vinthagen (2015) argue that the study of civil resistance so far has been Eurocentric and there is a need for its decolonization. They question the single story of nonviolence that has been developed so far by civil resistance researchers and call for a more open conceptualization of civil resistance. Scholars of nonviolent resistance have also been supportive of liberal democratic ideas of nonviolent resisters and did not look at anti-systemic struggles that oppose the neoliberal world order. This decolonization of research on nonviolent resistance can include such groups as the Zapatista as nonviolent resisters, and other such groups in the Global South. Finally, to add to these points, research on nonviolent resistance largely focussed on macro movements, not so much on micro or meso-level resistances.

Dominique Caouette and Sarah Turner's (2009) edited book brings forward a number of

case studies about rural resistance. They call for the recognition of "numerous" resistances because "resistance is [...] context-dependent [...]" (p. 9). Fabiana Li's (2014) research in Peru, for example, reveals an unexpected side of grassroots resistance, where the "nonhuman" actors shape and re-shape the discourse and the dynamics of a social conflict. Thus, the lagoon and the water contained in it in her specific field site takes on a central role in framing the conflict and influences how the human actors involved in it come to see the resolution of the conflict.

In this section, I defined social conflict, conflict transformation, and resistance. Social conflicts emerge due to direct, cultural or structural violence. Resistance often emerges to address the protracted manifestation of violence towards certain groups of people. The study of nonviolent resistance has been Eurocentric, focusing on democratic macro movements, while resistances of Indigenous peoples have been understudied. In my case study, I see villagers resisting the land appropriation or reclaiming their ancestral territory due to the structural injustice they experience and/or experienced in the past, which then affects their livelihoods in the present.

3.2 Critical approaches to peace and peacebuilding

Conflict and its study as an academic discipline were born in the West. And, the field drew most of its empirical data from the "context of White, male, middle-class North America" (Avruch, 1998, p. 345). Vayrynen (2001) explains that the rationalist tradition within the social sciences tended to suggest that the practice of conflict resolution is value-free. Brigg & Bleiker (2011) suggest that this centrality of reason prevails in Western approaches to conflict and goes back to the Englightenment period whereby reason came to be seen as superior to "other human abilities" (p. 28). For example, Fisher and Ury's work on conflict stated that we needed to look at issues from a distance in order to be able to address conflicts rationally, without emotions (in

Avruch, 1998; in Brigg & Bleiker, 2011). This is problematic, because emotions constitute an important part of a conflict, "conflict is very often shaped by emotional dynamics," and they are also a reflection of important structural issues that we need to look at in our conflict analysis (Brigg & Bleiker, 2011, p. 29; Avruch, 1998). Second, the very separation of reason and emotion can be challenged because recent research shows that in some cultures, if not all, emotion and reason are intertwined, not separated and reason itself can be emotional and emotions can be a certain way of reasoning (Brigg & Bleiker, 2011).

Colonialism played a role in the disregard of culture in peace and conflict studies (Brigg & Bleiker, 2011; Tuso, 2011). The rationale of colonialism was based on the dichotomous civilized-savage classifications, whereby it was assumed that the colonizers were superior to the colonized (LaRocque, 2010; Blaut,1993; Memmi, 1974/2003). This view led to assuming that the Indigenous peoples did not have the same structures as the civilized colonizers and "blinded colonizers to the possibilities of other ways of organizing political life and dealing with difficulties among people." This can be illustrated by the images of the "natives" as being disorganized and chaotic or being in the state of nature, just because they lacked the "command-obedience power relationships" in their social organization (Brigg & Bleiker, 2011, p. 19). The colonization explains both the lack of study of conflict and ways of dealing with conflict in indigenous societies and also explains why the Western science assumed a universalist definition of these concepts (Tuso, 2011). Eurocentrism assumes Europe's (West's) superiority; Orientalizes the rest of the world as lacking history and underdeveloped by silencing or objectifying; Western social theories are based on this assumption; and, they also assume these theories to be universal (Sabaratnam, 2013; Blaut, 1993).

Peacebuilding approaches that developed within the historical context of neoliberal

globalization[15] did not take into account local processes of conflict resolution or the local values of peace. The theory and practice of conflict resolution that developed against the historical background of neoliberalism contributed to the peacebuilding project becoming a project of conversion to liberal values and disrespect of local ways of dealing with conflict because funding for peace projects often comes from liberal states, international organizations and international financial institutions (IFIs) (Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011). Within the liberal peacebuilding project, local culture is seen as inferior – "corrupt," "primitive," "undeveloped," while the internationals are seen as having "superior knowledge" (Richmond, 2011, p.65). These opposing depictions of the locals and the internationals remind the colonial "civ/sav" categorization and lead to the promotion of Western ways of dealing with conflict rather than looking at indigenous ways (LaRocque, 2010, p. 15).

Within the Western social science, conflict has been viewed as "disruptive" (Parsons in Coser, 1958, p. 23). There is a persistent belief or assumption even within the current discussion in PACS field that violence is negative and that peace and nonviolence is to be valued at all times (Sharp, 2013; Burrowes, 1996; Galtung, 1996). Brigg & Bleiker (2011) question this conceptualization of violence because how we define non-violent or violent, conflict or peace is culturally constructed, as is our judgment about these social phenomena. We may perceive drinking another person's blood as unacceptable and violent, while the in Ambon (Maluku, Indonesia) use this practice in their peace and reconciliation ritual *Pela Gandong* (de Jalong & Sugiono, 2011). Mac Ginty (2006) points out that there are cultural contexts whereby war is

[15] Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989) argues that the world then was split into core, periphery, and semi-periphery regions. The core region had power to invest, expected a large return on the investment, and exploited periphery's resources. The periphery depended on the core because its resources and its labour supply were controlled by either its own elites or that of the core (or both) (in Hobden, 2011). Harvey (2005) argues that the neoliberal policies were developed in the 1970s within the context of the financial crisis of the time when the asset values (stock, property, savings) collapsed. The economic elites had to restore their power and started with the neoliberalization of the Latin American states eventually moving onto other parts of the world.

accepted as a way of dealing with conflict. For example, within the Maori culture it is acceptable to wage a war if the honour (*utu*) needs to be restored. Rehman (2011) writes that while the Western model views conflict as negative and attempts to resolve conflicts, the Islamic model views conflict as "…natural and potentially positive" (p. 59).

Similarly, our ideas of peace may vary. Within peace and conflict studies two types of peace, negative and positive, are identified (Boulding, 1978, Galtung, 1996, Mac Ginty, 2006, Richmond, 2010, 2008). Negative peace is the absence of direct violence, such as the cessation of war, tension, turmoil, whereas positive peace would be the proliferation of love, harmony and kindness, freedom and equity, dialogue, the building of peace culture addressing cultural and structural violence (Galtung, 1996; Mac Ginty, 2006; Boulding, 1978; Matsuo, 2007). The concept of positive peace was spurred by the studies by Dasgupta who used the term "peacelessness" to refer to human suffering not caused by wars, and Galtung developed a theoretical conceptualization of violence (cultural, direct and structural) that gave an impetus to include issues of well-being, happiness and sustainability in our conceptualization of peace (Dasgupta, 1968 and Galtung, 1969 in Matsuo, 2007, p. 17). There is an assumption within PACS that peace is something universally desirable. Dietrich & Sutzl (1997) argue that the Western conceptualization of peace as connected to development and unity (as in everyone being the same or else…) and assuming this understanding being universal is connected to colonization and Christian thought of the 19th century. They argue that peace, in fact, is understood variably in different cultures and, therefore, we need to embrace the idea of many peaces. Similarly, Richmond (2008) advocates for many peaces, saying that "single form of peace will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive" and that having only one dominant version of peace "reflects the intellectual limitations … of the discipline" (p. 15). Mac Ginty (2006) brings

an example of how Israelis and Palestinians understood peace; Israelis associated peace with "security," while Palestinians associated it with "dignity and the territorial and repatriation rights" (p. 12-13). Thus, our idea of peace can also depend on our politico-historical contexts. Nader (2001) says that peace can be a cultural value that is also used for political purposes. She says that within the "harmony ideology," peace is always positioned as a positive value and this can lead towards the depoliticization of conflict. Actors use peace to legitimize their own arguments or to challenge the existing power structures. Harmony can also be used to suppress resistance, criticism and conflicts by putting more focus on harmony vis-à-vis justice and confrontation.

Tuso (2011) argues that numerous indigenous models have been developed "for centuries by indigenous communities around the world", ignored by the "Eurocentric model" (p. 246). Fry and Bjorkqvist (2009) document and present numerous peace cultures present and practiced around the world. Without studying different ways of dealing with conflict in various cultural contexts we would not know what are the varieties and variations that exist in ways we define, face and resolve conflicts. Avruch and Black (1991) promote the development of ethnoconflict theory and ethnopraxes. They argue that because "humans use locally received or constructed common sense to perceive, interpret, evaluate, and act on and in both external and internal reality," in order to understand conflict, we need to understand "the local 'common sense' about conflict" (p. 31). This would involve understanding the local meaning and definitions of conflict, indicators of conflict, expectations about conflict behaviors, and conflict variations. Oftentimes, the answers to these questions would be "unconscious" or "taken for granted" (p. 32). Leeuwen (2009) documents that indigenous peacemaking tends to be more effective than state-based court processes due to the price and accessibility despite the challenges that it faces. Duncan's (2009)

research in North Maluku documents how *adat* (customs) contributed to peacebuilding and prevented inter-communal conflict in many parts of North Maluku. In Tobelo area of North Maluku, however, *adat* did not succeed in preventing conflict. This made people believe that *adat* failed because it was not strong enough, thus, they decided to strengthen it in the hope to reconcile the two communities (Muslim and Christian).

At the same time, one needs to be aware that within societies there are multiple divisions, across class, gender, ethnicity, etc. A type of peacebuilding may be defined by local elites who may not necessarily represent the will of the majority of the people. This can be illustrated by the use of an Acehnese ritual *peusijuek* in the aftermath of the Helsinki peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). *Peusujuek* is a ritual that is practiced to show the return of harmony into the community. In this particular usage of the ritual, however, the Acehnese people were not satisfied because it was used in relation to the human rights abuses and killings by the Indonesian security forces and it was the elites that decided to use it, not the common people (Brauchler, 2015, p. 19). Gadlin (1994) looks critically at dispute resolution processes in the United States in relation to race and ethnic conflicts. He observes that often the institutions that request mediation services use mediators to "cover up deep-seated structural problems they are not prepared to address, let alone rectify" (p. 45). Gadlin argues that without taking into consideration the culture that underlies the race or ethnicity-based conflicts, conflict resolution may be a way "to control or deny" conflict, rather than resolve it (p. 45).

Critiques of liberal peace can be understood under the general framework of the "local turn," "cultural turn," or "emancipatory" peacebuilding (Brauchler, 2015; Brigg, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Richmond, 2014). Within the practice of

peacebuilding, the local turn enables local civil societies to be included into the peacebuilding process, providing them access both to the international and national elites. It advocates for local governance. The advocates of "hybrid" approaches base their arguments on possible violences that may exist in certain cultural contexts. Thus, for example, Boege and Garasu (2011), while emphasizing the crucial role that indigenous ways of peacemaking played in the peace process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, propose that there are limitations in the indigenous model in connection to the inclusion and treatment of women and youths. Roger Mac Ginty (2011) argues that indigenous peacemaking may not be able to transform conflicts in ways that enable socio-cultural and economic justice taking into consideration such phenomena as migration, urbanization, environmental and economic changes.

Sabaratnam (2013) criticizes the division between local and liberal as Orientalist because the focus still remains on the international actors; the local is still represented as customary, traditional and just different without recognizing "the historically blurred, intertwined and mutually constituted character of global historical space and 'culture'" (Bhabha, 2004; Bhambra, 2010 in Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 268). Brigg (2008) calls for relationality, ways of working where we remain open to different ways of doing things and being. He argues to de-center Eurocentrism in thinking and doing and take difference seriously. Other researchers ask for mixed approaches to peace because the exchange across cultures enables creativity. Abu-Nimer (1996) and Rehman (2011), for example, call for learning from each other and the exchange to happen equally because both Western and Indigenous ways of resolving conflicts have a wealth of knowledge to further a culture of peace. Western conflict resolution should not be seen as the dominant or the only acceptable way of resolving conflict, rather as one of the many diverse approaches. In order for an exchange to be equal, we need deeper knowledge about indigenous

peacemaking. Thus, both Abu-Nimer and Rehman call for some form of critical relational-hybrid approach. Similarly, de Coning (2018) conceptualizes “adaptive peace” inspired by the concept of sustaining peace, shifting the attention from the liberal peace and placing the attention on the processes of how to achieve a peace that will sustain. This approach does not only allow for local actors to be more heavily involved but also sees conflict transformation as a dialogic process which can potentially address the structural and instrumentalist causes of social conflicts.

I place my research within these discussions of critical relational-hybrid approaches and hope to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of conflict and peace dynamics in order to expand discussions that relate to critical and hybrid peaces. These discussions enable me to be aware of my own cultural assumptions as a PACS student as well as to be sensitive to power dynamics that co-exist intersectionally within cultural contexts.

3.3 The role of identity and resources in the emergence of social conflicts

Identity, in general, is formed through a process of interaction between two types of identities: personal and social. Personal identity can be fixed and is usually related to one’s name, family history, gender, and even genetics. Social identity, on the other hand, is constructed; it is a “label[s] that people assign to themselves” (Laitin, 1998, p. 168). Personal identity gives people a feeling that they know who they are and social identity gives people an opportunity to explore themselves in comparison with the outside world and define themselves anew. Identity change is mostly an exogenous process that is triggered by external motivators. Social identity can be national, racial, religious, and others (Laitin, 1998).

Identity, according to Kriesberg & Dayton (2012), fosters a level of solidarity, ease of communication, based on proximity, language and other factors; clear and unchanging boundaries; and it has an organizational potential to mobilize, and an ability to instigate

adversarial relations (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012, pp. 51-59). Identity is also positioned in a society in a way that it can grant certain privileges to its holder that can be used to discriminate against others who ascribe to a differing identity (Sloan et al., 2018). Identity can be a cause, a resource, and a consequence of collective action (Wright & Marti i Puig, 2012). It can be a cause when identity groups feel threatened or newly identify themselves. It can be a resource when identities are activated based on the structural opportunities, certain "cultural shocks" and "political calculations" of elites (pp. 250-251). Finally, identity can be a consequence due to the dynamics of the collective action itself.

In this section, following Olzak (2006), I see ethnicity as constructed through a process of mobilization. Eriksen (2010) defines ethnicity as a social identity that is born out of a relationship between two or more groups that consider themselves distinctive or have become culturally distinct based on the myth of common origin and other aspects. Racial, religious, regional autonomy, and other movements are seen as ethnic movements (Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 2006). The Indigenous peoples' movement can be seen as an ethnic movement (Eriksen, 2010).

3.3.1 Ethnic mobilization

Ethnic mobilization is "collective action in pursuit of collective ends by groups organized around some ethnic or racial marker that distinguishes members from nonmembers" (p. 36). These movements can be regional (separatist, nationalist, and autonomy movements); "civil rights movements" (for civil and political rights of an ethnic group); antagonist movements (against ethnic, religious and other groups resulting in genocide or ethnic riots); and, state-strengthening nationalism (aims to unify groups: state-building/unification nationalism or a diaspora group) (p. 42). Ethnic mobilization can be violent or non-violent (Olzak, 2006).

There are several major theoretical streams that explain ethnic mobilization emergence:

primordialism, modernism, grievance, and relative deprivation, and theories of contentious politics, including globalization. Primordialists argue that ethnicity is based on a kin-based relationship. This theory was criticized because it does not account for how the ethnic groups/nations become such and how they come to cause ethnic conflicts (Anderson, 2006; Varshney, 2003). Recent data also shows that more ethnic diversity does not correspond with a higher number of ethnic conflicts (Olzak, 2006). Modernists are divided into constructivists and instrumentalists. Instrumentalists argue that ethnicity is a tool that is created to achieve certain objectives (A. Cohen, 1974 in Eriksen, 2010, p. 63). The criticism of instrumentalists, however, is that they do not account for how come people would not just take upon *any* identity if this was the case? (Eriksen, 2010). Along the same lines, Varshney (2003) asks why the leaders decide to organize around ethnic identity, and not around economic problems instead? Constructivists argue that ethnic groups are constructed. Anderson (2006) provides numerous examples of this process of construction of an "imagined community" - all modern nations, such as the French, Italians, the English, Indonesians, and others were constructed. There is usually a social rationale and some benefits that contribute to the construction of an ethnic identity. The grievance and the relative deprivation theory looks at the structural inequalities that exist between or amongst various ethnic groups and explains ethnic mobilization by the relative deprivation of one of the groups. However, many have since argued that grievances cannot solely account for ethnic mobilization because they are a constant (always present) and it is not the most disadvantaged groups that mobilize. And, in fact, ethnic groups in order to mobilize need access to resources as argued by resource mobilization theorists.

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) looks at the role of resources in social mobilization. Movements have adherents and constituents. Adherents are those who believe in the goals of a

movement, whereas constituents are those who provide "major sources of support, [such as] "money, facilities, and even labor" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217). Resources that may be crucial are also the organizers' access to media, institutions, and networks. As argued by McAdam (1982), however, "the model grants too much importance to elite institutions, [and] too little to the aggrieved population" (p. 31).

McAdam (1982) developed a political opportunity model, which subsequently was revised into Political Opportunity Structures (POS) model. POS argues that there are three factors that contribute to the emergence and success of social movements: (1) political opportunities or constraints; (2) formal/informal mobilizing structures (these can be organizations, grassroots and informal networks, associations, and others); and (3) framing processes that make the mobilized feel "aggrieved" and "optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem" (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996/2008, p. 5).

Despite POS providing a comprehensive ground to study the key aspects of ethnic mobilization, Vermeersch (2011) argues that the focus on "institutionalized" opportunity structures may miss out the internal dynamics of ethnic mobilization. In addition, opportunities are assumed to be as "given," whereas often these are perceived as such by agents (Jenson, 1998 in Vermeersch, 2011, p. 10). Further, drawing from Benford & Snow (2000), he argues that framing should be seen as a negotiated product that is generated in a certain context that "is affected by the cultural and political environment," "framings/counterframings of the elites in power" (p. 10). This conceptualization, according to Vermeersch, shows that the process of ethnic mobilization is a product of a dialogue between the intentional construction and adjustment based on the context.

Framing seems to respond to the question: why are some persons ready to die for an

ethnic cause? Varshney (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the micro-processes involved in the construction of ethnic identity in his theory of micro foundations that expands our understanding of the processes of framing involved in ethnic mobilization. Varshney argues that there are two types of rationality, "instrumental rationality" and "value rationality." Instrumental rationality involves the cost-benefit analysis suggested by the instrumentalist theorists of ethnic mobilization, whereas "value rationality" is reflected in people's beliefs about pride, dignity, and other such values. Ethnicity is seen as "a valued good" and this gives it enough power to be used instrumentally by elites (p. 86). Thus, such values as dignity and self-respect are the micro-foundations of nationalism of resistance explaining the power of framing that may lead to self-sacrifice or martyrdom for an ethnic cause.

Framing then responds to the criticisms of instrumentalism, especially in regard to indigeneity. For example, Miller (2003) looks at Indigenous struggles and argues that identities have emotional components that may have been passed onto the younger generations through stories (also see, the social cubism model). He looks at the Snohomish, Samish and Gay Head Wampanoag people in the United States who have kept their identities and the narratives of their identities in relation to the "present-day loss, exclusion, and oppression." He sees their narratives as "responses, counter narratives, to the imposed category […] as official non-Indians" and, therefore, "experientially meaningful" to these groups (p. 6).

Finally, globalization and transnational advocacy networks (TANs) can play a role in the emergence of ethnic conflicts. TANs are networks among individuals, foundations, NGOs, INGOs, media, government actors, churches, etc. that become connected "to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and often involve individuals advocating policy changes" (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 91-92). TANs emerged because of connections created by globalization. First,

it directly made activists more connected due to such factors as economic interdependence, ease of travel, etc. And, second, “cultural globalization” made democratic values have a worldwide appeal (Brysk, 2000). Globalization led to the rise of Indigenous mobilization globally (Brysk, 2000). The Indigenous, environmental, and various human rights movements organize using TANs. TANs put pressure upon nation-states having a “boomerang effect,” whereby domestic issues are taken onto the global stage to then influence the domestic arena (Keck & Sikkink, 1999).

Byrne & Nadan (2011) propose a social cubism model to analyze ethno-territorial conflicts. The model suggests analyzing these conflicts by looking at six forces. Historical force encourages researchers to pay attention to the history and dynamics of boundary-making as well as the processes of exclusion and inclusion, which can be found in folklore and stories. This may include the exclusion of women and other marginalized groups. There could also be a transgenerational transmission of trauma through stories to youth. Religious force angle allows tracing how religion is used to divide people. Political force draws our attention to the existing political exclusion of minority politicians, ethnic favouritism and scapegoating of ethnic minorities, and structural violence. Psychocultural force encourages us to look at the way people see themselves, their stereotypes/prejudices about themselves and others. Demographic force enables us to look at the position of an ethnic group, their numbers, and characteristics (majority/minority, migration, composition, events that may have affected their demographics). And, finally, the economic force encourages exploring the relationship between ethnicity and class by identifying discriminatory policies or practices that affect the economic status of a group, the level of poverty, the power relationship between groups, and the role of diaspora.

Thus, ethnic identities are constructed, but they may carry an element of emotional

importance for the actors involved due to the microfoundational bases and the dialogic nature of ethnic mobilization processes that are facilitated through framing. Indigenous is a recently constructed identity that was created as a result of the collective mobilization of aggrieved groups of people. TANs and other resources play an important role in the construction and the establishment of this identity (Brysk, 2000).

3.3.2 The role of resources in the emergence of social conflicts and resistance

Gleditsch (1998) provides a list of resources that humans see as "worth fighting for:" territory (land), economic zone (islands, sea borders, etc.), strategic raw materials (rubber, e.g.), sources of energy (oil), water and access to it (e.g., for dams), and food (grains, fisheries) (pp. 381-383). The central focus of this section is to consider the theoretical discussions about the relationship between natural resources and conflicts. The review of the literature identifies several theoretical approaches in relation to the issue of social conflicts and natural resources. Most of these theories focus on civil wars and not necessarily on non-violent forms of contentious politics; however, they still remain relevant in understanding the dynamics of nonviolent ethnic mobilization. I review several major theoretical discussions: scarcity of resources, resource abundance which intertwines with theoretical discussions on greed and grievance, and the political-ecological analysis of resource-based conflicts.

The theory of resource scarcity or depletion is associated with Homer-Dixon (1999). He argues that scarcities are caused by depletion and degradation of resources, increasing consumption, rising population, and unequal distribution of wealth (structural scarcity) (p. 15). This scarcity then leads to harsher conditions where people compete and eventually, fight with each other for resources (Gleditsch, 1998; Hartmann, 2001). On the contrary, the so-called "resource abundance," "resource curse" or "greed" theory argues that natural resource wealth

leads to civil conflict. For example, Collier (2000) argues that for a civil war to erupt there should be “opportunities,” not grievances: rebel groups rely on natural resources to fund their rebellion, or they hope to control the primary commodities that are available in a country.

Most PACS research today looks at resource-based conflicts from a greed or grievance perspective and has developed nuanced variations of these theories. For example, Ross (2004) argues that oil and minerals may directly cause civil conflict but not agricultural commodities, suggesting that some resources may be more “lootable” than others. Basedau & Lay (2009) argue that there needs to be a differentiation between oil wealth and oil dependence because oil wealth is likely to secure “rentier peace” while oil dependence may result in “resource curse” and lead to civil conflicts due to inability of the state “to distribute rent” and, by doing so, control the discontented.

Grievance theory takes root in Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation. Since Gurr’s research, there have been more studies to test the hypothesis. One of the recent ones is Cederman, Wimmer and Min’s (2010) research that indicated that exclusion from the state power of large ethnic groups leads to the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict. Lewis (2017) along similar lines argues that more research needs to be conducted on the “micro foundations” of ethnic conflict at the very initiation of the rebellion. Ostby (2008) suggested that social/ethnic polarization and horizontal social inequalities (educational opportunities) may be the cause of ethnic conflicts. Aspinall (2007) analyzes the Aceh conflict in Indonesia and argues that grievances here were constructed in relation to natural resources and appealed to ethnic identity. Bertrand (2004/2012) looking at the Dayak-Madura conflict in West and Central Kalimantan in Indonesia argues that the state excluded the Indigenous Dayak from the political and salient urban power, introduced discriminatory discourse and practices, and encroached on the Indigenous land and forest rights.

All of this then led to the eruption of violent communal conflict.

Others have moved beyond greed/grievance discussion. Thus, Fearon & Laitin (2003) argue that "weak states" with high poverty levels (income of less than $1000 per capita), a large population, and instability (newly formed or decolonized states) account for ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts occur because the population does not have enough income. This makes it attractive for them to join insurgent groups. New states do not have administrative resources to "control the peripheries" (p. 88). The prevention of these ethnic conflicts involves a "well-financed and administratively competent government" with "legal accountability" (pp. 88-89). Assal (2006) argues that the war in Sudan is a conflict over natural resources that turned into an ethnic conflict. The differences between nomadic and pastoralist livelihoods were exacerbated by state economic policies that favoured modern agriculture and privatization.

However, the theoretical perspective that seems to be useful for me is political ecological perspective. Political ecologists are critical of both resource abundance and scarcity arguments because these do not take into consideration major structural causes that relate to the analysis of poverty or gender, economic and political decisions that lead to environmental problems, and the economic and political power disparity between the Global South and the Global North (Hartmann, 2001). They argue that resource-based struggles are connected to local and global power-related issues. They see "violence as a site-specific phenomenon deeply rooted in local histories and social relations but also connected to transitional processes of material change, political power relations, and historical conjuncture" (Peluso & Watts, 2001, p. 30).

Political ecologists look at how conflicts connect to the natural environment as well as the politics of access that surrounds the various resources available in a locality. They look at the power relations, the transformation of these in a specific locality, and how these relations affect

one's access to resources further analyzing the processes of how these are then "distributed, reproduced, and fought over in the course of shaping, and being shaped by, patterns of accumulation" (Peluso & Watts, 2001, p. 2). The environment in this theoretical perspective becomes the background that helps to explain human economic and political behaviour (in the form of organizations, communities, governments, corporations, etc.).

Peluso & Harwell (2001), for example, analyze the Dayak-Madurese ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. They trace the causes of the conflict to the history of the region, ethnic relations and how they have been built through history, land-use changes that occurred under the development policy of Suharto, as well as the process of identity construction of the Dayaknese within the context of the nation-state building the identity of an 'Indonesian'. This theoretical perspective also developed its own strong incorporation of women's voices under the framework of Feminist Political Ecology (FPE) to be covered in the next section.

The social cubism model discussed by Byrne & Nadan (2011) discussed earlier presents a useful tool for understanding ethnic and resource-based conflicts, however, the model lacks a focus on natural resources, gendered nature of conflicts as well as a discussion of the dynamics of contentious politics. Resource politics can be included in each of the forces as an element for serious consideration. The social movements and mobilization theories also need to be added to the model to help understand the way mobilization happens to eventually lead to the emergence of a social conflict. Finally, gender needs to be taken seriously throughout. In the model, gender is important only when looking at the historical forces.

3.4 Engendering conflict, resistance, mobilization, and peace

In this section, I aim to define key terms, such as sex, gender, intersectionality, and feminism. I look at the discussions on the relationship between gender and conflict. I elaborate

on theories that connect natural resources, gender, and social conflict. Finally, I introduce the need for a gendered perspective on resistance and mobilization.

3.4.1 Gendered conflict

Sex is limited to male and female, based on our genitalia, while gender is constructed socially "by social and cultural contexts and related to the roles, behaviours, and attitudes we expect from people based on their categorization as female or male" (Sloan et al., 2018, p. 66). Gender identity is socially constructed and relates to what the person feels to be on a continuum of masculinity-femininity (Sloan et al., 2018). Gender socialization is a process where we learn to be of certain gender based on the pre-existing social and cultural assumptions. Oftentimes, when our gender roles do not coincide with the social and cultural expectations, we may be marginalized, oppressed, discriminated against. Masculinity is generally given preference over femininity in a patriarchal structure. This bias towards gender conformity and masculinity leads to several oppressions of women (and men), and non-conforming people are subjected to oppression and discrimination (Sloan et al., 2018).

Women experience political, social and economic marginalization. Culture and socialization play an important role in women's subordination leading to such social problems as domestic violence, sexual violence in peace and war times, feminized poverty, and others (Sloan et al., 2018). Economic globalization affected women in various ways; on the one hand, connecting them trans-nationally through TANs, on the other, making them more vulnerable by threatening their livelihoods and food security (Desai, 2002; Naples, 2002; Sassen, 2007/2015; Sloan et al., 2018). These experiences differ for women and men, however, depending on race, social class, and ethnic group – "intersectionality" (Collins & Bilge, 2016; Sloan et al., 2018).

hooks (2000) defines feminism as "a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and

oppression" (p.1). She also argues that feminism is not only for women, but it is for everybody because both men and women are victims of sexism and patriarchy. The global popularity of feminism led to several policy-level opportunities to effect positive change. One of these is the policy of gender mainstreaming. Its objectives are: (1) promoting gender equality into analyses and policies; and (2) encouraging women's and men's participation in decision-making (Mukhopadhyay, 2004, p. 95). However, according to Mukhopadhyay (2004), gender mainstreaming has not always met its objectives of changing gendered power relations due to a lack of political and ideological will and commitment of policy-makers.

Zarkov (2018) argues that within the context of war, women have generally been represented as victims. Women as victims of rape is one of the most popular images. These types of portrayals of women were numerous during the Balkan war. This, however, according to Zarkov (2018), is problematic on two accounts: first, it portrays women as passive and denies their roles as agents of war. Women can be actively involved as combatants or their imagery can be used to instigate violence. Second, these portrayals of women as victims were accompanied by the local "savage" men as the perpetrators. These types of simplified portrayals of gender dynamics of conflicts do not always lead to the inclusion of women into the major political processes. Instead, they often contribute to the one-sided portrayals of women's experiences of war as victims, rather than as agents of violence (*Inong Balee*) or peace (*Flower Aceh*), and may even lead to wars (e.g. Afghanistan war) (Zarkov, 2018; Lee-Koo, 2012).

Definitions of conflict did not traditionally include gender. Women, men, and other identity groups have varying experiences of social conflicts. These groups may become participants or instigators of a conflict. They can also contribute to conflict transformation. Conflict can also change gender relations (Zarkov, 2018; El-Bushra, 2018).

Feminist accounts of conflict complicate stories and analyses of social conflicts. They can provide "a complex map of gendered social relations that incorporates the violent oppression of women but also presents a counter-narrative of resistance to, and resilience and independence from, dominant gendered politics" (Lee Koo, 2012, p. 64). This then can result in a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics as well as of constructive conflict transformation.

3.4.2 Women, natural resources, and conflict

There are two major theoretical perspectives that study the relationship between natural resources and gender: ecofeminism and feminist political ecology. Shiva (1988) is the most well-known ecofeminist. The Chipko movement is an example upon which the ecofeminist perspective became well-known globally. The ecofeminist perspective argues that women have a special relationship with natural resources due to the role they play in their communities that enable them to be more aware of environmental problems. Ecofeminism brings together the critique of capitalism and neoliberalism, violence against women and violence against nature and suggests a connection between these, while giving a special place to women's spirituality, especially of those women in the Global South because "they regard the earth as a living being which guarantees their own and all their fellow creatures survival (Mies & Shiva, 2014, p. 19).

Feminist political ecologists (FPE), however, criticize this view because (1) it portrays women as a homogenous group of people without internal differences; (2) makes essentialist assumptions about the nurturing nature of women; (3) fails to mention men who also have a connection to environment in numerous and fundamental ways; (4) represents farming as subsistence. This view, according to FPE, can result in policies that are not beneficial to women by adding more tasks to the already numerous caring responsibilities women have and ignoring intersectional power imbalances that exist by supporting ones with access to power while

ignoring others with less social capital. The idealized portrayal of women as “saviours” fails to address structural issues of “property and power” (Leach, 2017, p. 36-37).

FPE focuses on “gendered knowledge, question of resource access and control, and the engagement between local struggles and more global issues” (Leach, 2017, p. 37). If women seem to be engaged in a certain type of subsistence farming, then, the question asked is why and how this is related to gendered relationships in a community. Further, FPE looks at the intersectionality of gendered relationships, existing differences within a certain community based on indigenous categories of hierarchy, such as kin, social class, property relations, etc. FPE also explores women’s vulnerabilities due to their gendered positions in relation to global economic processes, such as neoliberal globalization.

For example, Julia & White’s (2012) research uses FPE to analyze gender dynamics among the Ibun Dayak in Sanggau District of West Kalimantan where palm oil plantation development is leading towards greater patriarchisation. Traditionally, land inheritance among the Hibun Dayak was not defined by one’s gender. However, palm oil plantations register the smallholder plots to men as heads of households. This then formally transfers the land ownership to men. Second, where traditionally men and women shared agricultural work, both for subsistence and for cash, with palm oil economy, any activity that does not generate cash is seen as women’s work. Further, women are likely to be employed as daily labour by the palm oil plantations to clean, spray and fertilize the seedlings. There are new structures of women’s oppression within the community, such as cafés where men are likely to spend their income, including for sexual services. Women face a risk of criminalization within the plantation work due to scavenging the fallen palm oil fruits, an additional possibility to get cash. Finally, women are less likely to find food, such as vegetables, in the forest; get access to clean water (because

the water in the river is not clean anymore); or, get an additional income through rattan handicrafts. Basics that used to be available widely before for free, now require cash whether it is buying vegetables or making a well in one's yard (Julia & White, 2012).

Thus, conflicts are gendered, women and men experience social conflict differently, whether as combatants, perpetrators, agents of peace, and everyday actors. Women can contribute to violence or peace. The social changes that take place, such as land-use change, affect gendered relationships. Gender analysis of conflicts also needs to incorporate the intersectional nature of gendered relationships to understand the nuanced dynamics of conflicts.

The study of gendered experiences of social conflicts is limited and most of the research within the field of PACS focused on women within war or formal peace processes/grassroots peacebuilding. Most research that focuses on the experience of natural resources within the field of PACS was gender-blind and focused mainly on the question of greed or grievance. Research on women, conflict and natural resources was conducted through the lens of FPE.

3.4.3 A gendered perspective on mobilization and resistance

Despite not being provided enough political space (Principe, 2017), many women have played a crucial role within many of the major civil resistance movements, such as, the American Civil Rights Movement or the Polish Solidarnosc and the many anti-colonial nationalist struggles (Codur & King, 2013). The example of Rosa Parks, who was trained to be a nonviolent activist and whose non-cooperation had sparked the major protests throughout the United States, remains to be more widely recognized (Codur & King, 2013; McAllister, 1999). Women's leadership in civil resistance is often unrecognized, unnoticed and forgotten and despite the data that exists, these are often omitted within the public discourse, and, therefore, there is an urge to bring these stories forward (McAllister, 1999). And, often, it is women on the margins (ethnic minorities,

lower social class, “Third”/”Fourth World”) who are left out from the public as well as the academic conversations on civil resistance.

Faver (2001) argues that women become involved actively in social movements because they want to ensure rights of individuals and groups, to fulfill responsibilities, and to restore relationships and build communities. Jordan (2003) states that women become involved because of the experience of violence as well as due to pragmatic reasons, such as becoming aware and, thus, spiritually motivated to be involved in civil resistance. McAllister (1999) argues that women are likely to choose nonviolent methods of civil resistance. Boulding (2001) and Richter-Devroe (2012) write that women tend to use more informal resistance strategies because they tend to organize loosely and informally, using networks, and often within the realm of their private lives (e.g. within homes). Often tactics they use are aimed at caring for others (such as prison visits, setting up clandestine education systems) within their communities (Richter-Devroe, 2012). Women also tend to use creative and symbolic protest techniques, such as singing, story-telling, etc. (Abu-Lughod, 1990; Richter-Devroe, 2012; Senehi, 2009;). Cockburn (2007) refers to women’s methods of struggle as “responsible process, minimal structure” with the emphasis put on relationships (p. 157). She argues that women are often highly principled in their methods of struggle because they often choose to practice how they want to be treated within their tactics and strategies of civil resistance. Women also often employ their identity (as mothers, for example) as a strategy of resistance (Richter-Devroe, 2012; Cockburn, 2007).

Senehi (2009) posits that even though subversive methods can be used by both men and women, women tend to be more likely to use these methods, possibly due to having had the experience of oppression within patriarchal structures they get to be born in (also see Abu-Lughod, 1990) and they are more likely to survive the political violence because “women are

less scrutinized by the authorities" (Senehi, 2009, p. ivii). Oppressive patriarchal structures are more likely to see men as a threat, than women, granting women more space (Agosin, 1996). Thus, women's power within civil resistance is exercised differently than men's power. This is also confirmed by a recent research report by Principe (2017) where she elaborates on the various roles that women take upon within civil resistance, whether it is by exploiting gender-specific stereotypes for the benefit of social movements they support or embracing their gender roles within a society as a strategic tool for their cause.

Both Cockburn and Richter-Devroe write that a mother figure is often used by women in their resistance work. "Mother politics" is when "women politicize the domestic sphere by presenting their domestic duties and reproductive roles as a form of political activism, and domesticate the public sphere by basing their political activities and entry into the public sphere on their domestic role as mothers" (Peteet, 1991 in Richter-Devroe, 2012, p. 192-193). Representing themselves as mothers gives them a legitimacy to protest. When women's movements employ "specific notions of gender, motherhood, sexuality, and national identity" to achieve their goals, it is referred to as "strategic essentialism" (Lind, 2005, p. 10). This can be dangerous as demonstrated by the experience of Indonesian women's struggle for gender equality.

Within theories of contentious politics, researchers look into structures, opportunities, ways of organizing, resources, tactics, and frames. However, gendered aspects of these movements are often disregarded despite the fact that gender affects all of these aspects of contentious politics (Ferree & Mueller, 2004; Taylor, 1999). For example, in Pinochet's Chile or in Argentina's *junta* political opportunities open were gendered as described by Agosin (1996). Women are "likely to organize outside the formal polity, in those community and grass-roots contexts that are

gendered female" because women are familiar with these grassroots structures due to the gendered nature of our society (Ferree & Mueller, 2004, p. 589).

Social movements can be shaped by gendered mobilizing structures or gendered views by defining the choice of repertoires of contention, and ways movements construct collective identity. For example, women's movements may have non-linear structures that prioritize networking and face-to-face interactions, personal approach and displays of emotion compared to more masculine types of social movements (Taylor, 1999).

Emotions and frames are gendered. When we pay attention to the gendered nature of emotions and frames, this can strengthen our understanding of the use of emotion in social movements and their effect and efficiency. Analyzing frames can open up new ways of understanding how gender is used by social movements (Taylor, 1999). This awareness can help us understand "why social movements mobilize around particular sets of ideas and identities and not others" (Taylor, 1999, p. 25).

Why do women become involved in a mobilization? Codur & King (2015) bring our attention to the concept of "underlying values." They argue that women may be likely to participate in nonviolent resistance because they care as opposed to men who may be involved in resistance to obtain personal gains. Beckwith (2002) argues that due to socialization (women learn violence is bad), political learning (women are often victims of violence themselves), and historical factors (in the context of the US - women's rights movement has pacifist roots), women may tend to prefer nonviolent methods of resistance. This means that motivations or what Varshney (2003) calls "micro foundations" are gendered.

Gilligan (2003) differentiates between "ethics of justice" and "ethics of care." "Ethics of justice" as a concept is based on a premise that "everyone should be treated the same" while

“ethics of care” is based on the premise that “no one should be hurt” (p. 174). The hypothesis is that women act out of “ethics of care,” rather than “ethics of justice.” This is in line with Faver’s (2001) research who argues that women’s main objective when they join a certain type of mobilization is the fulfillment of rights, responsibilities, or the restoration of relationships and communities. This reflects their gendered roles in families and communities. Jordan’s (2003) research showed that women in her pool were involved in social activism due to “prior experience” with violence, “pragmatism”/awareness, “emotional/spiritual motivation,” and “compelling need”/drive (p. 242). Women have historically managed to resist domination in their own ways while working within the gendered frames offered by their lived realities. Sometimes, against the stakes, they have led nonviolent resistance. Women hold a special space and have an important role to play in most social movements, even though most of the time those critical roles are hidden, unnoticed or unrecognized. There is a need to recognize these roles.

3.4.4 Gendered peace

Neither of the approaches to peace and peacebuilding take gender “seriously” except for liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding (Enloe, 2004, p. 3; Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2016). I am interested in the agenda of decolonization and recognition of difference, but I am also supportive of the concept of gender justice cross-culturally. Thus, the bigger theoretical question for me is to how ensure respect for difference and also, gender justice. The research on peace and gender draws our attention to the fact that women and men experience conflicts differently (as victims, agents of peace, etc.), despite this; women are often portrayed mainly as victims. This can deny women’s agency and exclude them from peace processes, despite their active involvement in grassroots peacebuilding. In this work they also face barriers, structural, social, economic, and cultural (Lee Koo, 2012; Justino et al., 2018). For example, Lee Koo

(2012) reports that such important women-led organizations as Flower Aceh have been excluded from a peace process in Aceh and argues this was a missed opportunity. Exclusion of women from peace processes makes reconciliation incomplete and any peace agreement should include women if the objective is to achieve positive peace (Galtung, 1996). There are examples of ways these inclusive processes can be facilitated through visioning exercises (Flaherty, 2012). The cooperation of local and international actors can play a facilitative role in these processes, and, the inclusion of women in institutional peace processes can have profound implications for gender justice.

Many of the new approaches in the *local turn* only touch upon one aspect of the question of "Whose peace?" and they fail to ask "How do men and women experience war and peace differently? What is a gender-informed definition of peace?" (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2016, p. 181). The idea of positive peace covers gender justice as an important component of it. The local approach as mentioned above is seen by many researchers as hostile to gender equality due to varying local culture that may be rooted in patriarchy. This is often the case because most cultures marginalize femininity over masculinity. This is one of the reasons why *hybrid* forms of peace may be more appropriate if they can be implemented in a relational or adaptive manner.

Women and men are affected by social conflicts differently. As noted above, both women and men may become victims, agents of war or peace, however, the dominant portrayal of women in conflict is as victims. This can deny their agency and does not necessarily lead to the tackling of the question of gendered violence in the long-run or the inclusion of women in peace processes (Lee Koo, 2012). It is also important to note that women have consistently been left out of institutional peacebuilding work despite the fact that they have been extensively involved in informal peace work (Justino et al., 2018).

Women are often informal peacebuilding leaders. In their work, they face numerous structural, social, cultural and other barriers. They may be seen as "difficult" or "dangerous." Women also do not always feel secure or safe to be socially active. Their husbands or family members may intimidate them and be suspicious of their work and character. Further, women often face economic repercussions for their activism. A day of lost work may mean a loss of day's earnings. They may be limited in their geographical reach. Many women who would like to be socially active also lack education making them feel unconfident. (Justino et al., 2018).

Lee Koo (2012) posits that the inclusion of women in institutional peace processes can have profound implications for gender justice. Including women in peace agreements, however, is not the only response. One needs to facilitate these processes in order to make sure that women and other marginalized groups are involved throughout the peacebuilding process. This then requires that those who are involved in the process of *adaptive* peacebuilding are trained in gender-sensitive peacebuilding facilitation skills (see Flaherty, 2012 on how to facilitate a peacebuilding visioning process). Gender-based discrimination is a form of structural violence that can be found in all contexts. Incorporating gender perspective into peacebuilding processes means that women need to be involved in a peacebuidling process. In case they are already involved, this needs to be acknowledged and further encouraged through the development of skills.

3.5 Indigeneity, Indigenous people's movement, politics of recognition and Indigenous women

The villagers focused on in this research base their resistance on the identity of the Indigenous or *masyarakat adat***.** In this section, I look at the various definitions of the "indigenous". I briefly review the history of Indigenous peoples' movement. I also discuss

gender justice in relation to indigeneity.

3.5.1 Who are Indigenous?

The demand of most Indigenous movements is recognition. Recognition allows gaining rights to land, identity, and cultural difference. There are several definitions of the Indigenous, among them *relational*, *substantial* (with an emphasis on cultural differences), *historical, and* a *prototype* approach (Miller, 2003). The relational definition focuses on being a minority, having a subsistence-based economy, having experienced colonization and discrimination, without an ambition to establish own nation-state (see Eriksen, 2010, pp. 152-153; Miller, 2003). The *substantial* (*the Fourth World*) definition was developed by Manuel & Poslun (1974) who defined Indigenous peoples as people who have "special, non-technical, non-modern exploitative relations to the lands" and "who are disenfranchised by the nations within which they live" (in Miller, 2003, p. 61). Cobo's definition is *historical* because it focuses on "historical continuity." The p*rototype* approach suggests that the Indigenous are those who may possess the following features: particular spiritual concepts, and practices, language, adverse relations with the state, ways of defining and defending their own boundary as a group, descent from earlier non-state peoples, or particular historical individuals, a history that emphasizes distinctiveness, and so on (MIller, 2003, pp. 66-67).

South-east Asian nations signed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). They signed it on the assumption that there were no Indigenous peoples in their territories assuming that Indigeneity is relevant only o those countries where there are White European settlers (who crossed oceans in the past, salt-water theory). However, this has been changing on the basis of organizing by those who claim Indigeneity in South-East Asian nations. For example, the Philippines and Cambodia legally recognized the indigenous

peoples in the past several decades (Baird, 2018). In Indonesia, the Indigenous peoples' movement emerged with *Reformasi* (Moniaga, 2007; Baird, 2019).

The draft law on the recognition and protection of the Indigenous peoples' rights (*RUPPMHA*) defines *masyarakat adat* as:

> A group of people who have been living in a certain geographical area for generations in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia because of the ancestral connection and a special relationship with the land, territory and natural resources, who own a customary governance system and an adat law order on their territory (Arizona & Cahyadi, 2013, p. 54).

This definition has elements from Cobo's historical definition with its focus on ancestral connection to the land and resources with a prototype approach where the focus is on the *adat* law.

3.5.2 The Indigenous peoples' movement

The International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the revised ILO Convention 169 in 1989. It aims to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples. Until today, it is the only legally binding document that was ratified only by 18 UN member-states (Sawyer & Gomez, 2008, p. 9). Another important document, without legal powers, is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) that was approved on September 13, 2007 (Feldman, 2002). It is a general framework that can be used to recognize Indigenous peoples' rights. One significant right elaborated in this Declaration is that states and other parties need to gain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) from the Indigenous peoples before "extract[ing] and develop[ing] mineral resources from or on Indigenous lands" (Sawyer & Gomez, 2008, p. 10).

In relation to the origins of the movement, there are several theories. The first theory is that of marginalization. Thus, Niezen (2003) and Wilmer (1993) argue that the movement grew out of the experience of marginalization due to colonization, state oppression, assimilationist policies of the state, resource extraction, neoliberal globalization, networks of indigenous activists, and "the United Nations and its satellite agencies" (Niezen, 2003, p. 9). Kay Warren (1998), writing about the pan-Maya activism in Guatemala, argues that the revitalization of Indigenous identity within the context of Guatemala at the time of her research was an attempt of these intellectuals to seek solutions to exclusion and marginalization that the Mayans faced in their own country.

Natural resource-based conflict plays a role in the activation and articulation of Indigenous identity. Oftentimes, Indigenous identities become operational when there is a resource competition involved with other external actors, such as the state or multinational corporations (MNCs). For example, Mahler & Pierskalla (2015) look at the connection between indigeneity and resources in Bolivia, especially, in the areas with gas reserves. They argue that the presence of "high-value resources" contributed to the mobilization of ethnic identity. Yashar (2005), studying Indigenous movements comparatively in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru argues that the strong Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador emerged due to the institutional changes as well as the political opportunities that were created by "existing transcommunity networks" and "political associational space" (p. 85). There were conditions that enabled Indigenous communities to maintain their structural distinctiveness and when new opportunities were created institutionally by state policies and non-state networks and organizations, the Indigenous peoples took the opportunity. In the case of several Latin American states, a transition to democracy was decisive because it enabled Indigenous people to advocate for multicultural politics by recognizing the existing cultural diversity. A similar line of argument is made by

Stahler-Sholk (2010) who looks at the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) as an anti-systemic movement that is responding to various forms of global oppressions, including neoliberalism (also see Harvey, 2003). The Zapatista is a movement who is aiming to build a new type of identity based on indigeneity. It aims to transform social, cultural and economic relations in radical ways to seek autonomy and radical democracy (also, see Nash (2007) who writes about water and its privatization in Chiapas). Miller (2003) points out that most Indigenous peoples have been put on the outskirts of modern "civilizations" by appropriating their natural resources, such as land. And, therefore, today most Indigenous peoples reside in the remotest areas of the world, including tropical rainforests. Brysk (2000) argues that oppression, urbanized "Indian" intellectuals, a celebration of culture, and presence of outsiders (issue advocates or knowledge processors: anthropologists, missionaries, journalists, environmentalists, and aid workers) have led to the rise of Indigenous mobilization.

Yet, other researchers have looked at the constructed nature of indigeneity to pursue certain interests that are based on 'positioning' and 'articulation' that is dependent on relations of power, opportunity structures and frames available (Li, 2000, p. 151). Tania Li (2000) elaborates on the process whereby the rural dwellers come to articulate an Indigenous identity. When the dam was about to be developed in Lindu, the villagers have mobilized around the identity of "*masyarakat adat*" due to the historically available frames of a*dat* and also due to the fact that the Lindu were in the position of power to activate and articulate it as an identity that could help them to win the fight by harnessing support from non-state parties, such as the non-governmental organizations. This was not available to the Lauje. Thus, a resource-based "structural" conflict gave the Lindu a ground to activate, articulate and position themselves as Indigenous.

Similarly, Lynch (2011), based on her review of Indigenous identity construction in Kenya,

looks at several groups who have claimed Indigenous identity in recent years. She argues that the main reason Indigenous peoples have emerged in Kenya is due to lack of access to land and of democratic governance. It is an identity that is organized around grievances. However, it is not the most marginalized and vulnerable who claim indigeneity, rather groups such as the Maasai who are relatively prosperous and who experience a greater level of political inclusion at the national level. Thus, similar to Li, Lynch questions the marginalization and vulnerability argument that is used to prove one's indigeneity.

Kuper (2003) argues that the Indigenous peoples' movement is similar to the right-wing, anti-immigrant movements in Europe in claiming a right to land, based on ethnic origins and original occupation without recognizing the fact that the history of humanity is the history of migrations. It also assumes a static idea of culture when it claims that when "a people … loses its culture," they are "robbed of [their] identity" (p. 390). The movement has the potential to create inter-ethnic conflicts, whether based on constructed, territorialised identities or on differing economic and environmental interests. This nativist/indigenist identities do not take into account the colonial histories of the very construction of ethnic identities, histories of migrations, inter-ethnic marriages that resulted from this as well as various economic changes that may not necessarily meet the image of an "ecological noble savage" (see Ellingson, 2001; Li, 2007, 2014). The Indigenous peoples' movement is "constructed today to suit the Greens and the anti-globalization movement," continues Kuper (p. 395). Davidson (2007), for example, along similar lines posits that the Indigenous mobilization of the Dayak ethnic group in West Kalimantan in 1997 in Indonesia did not contribute to the betterment of inter-religious, and inter-ethnic relations, rather may have exacerbated the destructive powers of the bloody communal violence that resulted in many deaths and displacement of the migrant Madurese.

These arguments then raise a fundamental question about the role of power in the articulation of indigeneity. Due to the lack of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu in Calhoun, 1993), some communities, such as the Lauje, may not activate and articulate this identity. This implies that the identity of Indigenous is a class-based concept. Only those who have the ability to formulate and express themselves are able to benefit from it. The Indigenous identity gives those who claim this identity frames that can be utilized to gain greater access to resources, such as land. Thus, the concept can be utilized by the elites to gain power, rallying people around this identity. It also assumes a special right that is based on the assumption of a special connection the Indigenous peoples have with the land. This may then lead to *the museumisation* of culture, which is impossible and also harmful to social peace. It may also lead to the politics of exclusion, whereby ethnic minorities within Indigenous territories are discriminated against due to their migrant status. All of these risks may mean that the recognition of an Indigenous status does not offer solutions to resource-based conflicts per se.

I position my research in-between these discussions. I see the villagers I work with as both marginalized in global terms and privileged in local terms. They are marginalized because they find themselves surviving within the unfair economic and political structures created by the nation-state and the global capital. Women are especially marginalized because they experience these same structural injustices but in addition they also face discrimination within the socio-cultural structures of *adat*. However, the villagers in this study are also privileged because they have access to social and economic capital in order to resist due to having access to education, markets, due to being Christian, for example, as opposed to Parmalim Toba Bataks, who are Indigenous also, but they lack access to KSPPM, due to KSPPM's Christian-based ethics. I realize that *adat* as an organizing strategy to address root causes of the landlessness may not be

the most powerful strategy due to its potential for class-based, origin-based and gender-based discrimination. Indigenism as a movement may not necessarily contribute to social justice, conflict transformation, or peace within the context of Toba Batak socio-economic and political organizations. I also realize, however, that local organizations make choices based on their strategic goals within a complex environment that entails time and resource constraints (also see the discussion of Afiff & Lowe, 2007).

Fundamentally, this research sees the Toba Batak communities as subjects of neoliberal "re/colonization," which created not only global inequalities, but also inequalities within rural communities themselves (Caouette& Kapoor, 2016, p. 6; Olzak, 2011; Turner & Caouette, 2009;). Economic globalization led to land dispossession globally (Sawyer & Gomez, 2008; Harvey, 2003; Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 65). David Harvey called this process "accumulation by disposession" because the process "involves the forceful and violent reorganization of people's lives as they are subordinated to the whims of capital" (Gordon & Webber, 2008, p. 65). The international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank play a central role in this process of dispossession through debt systems and structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that push policy changes in the countries of the Global South to enable this process (Sawyer & Gomez, 2008, Gordon & Webber, 2008). Araghi (2009) documents the role of colonial powers and, most recently, of neoliberal globalisation that caused the "depeasantization" of the Global South. The various forms of dispossession stimulate rural out-migration, which then, according to Li (2009), leads to what she terms as "surplus population." The influence of neoliberal globalization was significant in South-East Asia, however, it took other forms in the context of Indonesia generating a form of "state-market hybrid" with a group of oligarchs controlling the national economy (Harvey, 2003; Robison, 2006, p. 53; Hadiz & Robison, 2005). Due to the

KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism), it was Suharto's friends who benefited the most from these processes. One of the friends who benefited greatly was, for example, a businessman Bob Hasan who was considered to be the "timber king" of Indonesia (Robertson-Snape, 1999; Siscawati, 2012). Thus, since the New Order regime Indonesia's policy-making in relation to land does not side with the farmers, rather with the capital. This historical land dispossession from the colonial to post-colonial eras under the umbrella of the policy of development and oligarchic self-enrichment led to mass land dispossession of rural populations leading to social conflicts and also the rise of resistance (Aspinall, 2013; Tsing, 2005; Turner & Caouette, 2009). Resistance is an important part of the story because it enables me to see the Toba Batak communities I worked with not only as subjects of global processes, but also agents of their own making.

3.5.3 Recognition as an Objective of Indigenous Peoples' Movement

Within the context of state policy-making options, there are two possible solutions to the problem of diversity: assimilation and multiculturalism. Assimilation aims to overcome cultural differences through policies that create an "overarching identity to bring out-groups in" (Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014, p. 476). There are two types of policies, here, one is melting pot assimilation, which suggests that all groups come together and become one. The second one is minority-assimilation, which hopes that minorities will assimilate into the majority identity. The Indigenous peoples' movement emerged in opposition to the assimilationist policies of the states (Miller, 2003, Niezen, 2003).

Multiculturalism, on the other hand, is seen as a possible way to respond to the needs of the Indigenous peoples. As a policy it was favoured within the liberal democratic ideology from the 1970s to early 2000s (Kymlicka, 2001; Novoa & Moghaddam, 2013). It assumes that: (1) no

culture is favoured and the government does not interfere in regulating identities; (2) individuals will be willing to retain their distinct cultural identities if they are motivated to do so by the structures and systems through policies; (3) "multicultural hypothesis" states that if one is comfortable with one's identity, one will be more likely to respect others (Trudeau's statement in Novoa & Moghaddam, 2013). The main idea is the acknowledgement of difference and based on this, a policy of recognition (Kymlicka, 2001).

Multiculturalism claims that misrecognition or nonrecognition "can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor, 1996, p. 25). This misrecognition/nonrecognition is experienced by women, Blacks, and the Indigenous peoples. Recognition is seen as "a vital human need" (ibid., p. 26).

Taylor (1996) argues that the politics of recognition is a result of two modern concepts that emerged with the rise of democratic and liberal ideas, that of dignity (in opposition to honour) and authenticity to one's own "individualized identity" (p. 26). Dignity brings with it the politics of universalism whereas authenticity brings with it the politics of difference. This politics have two opposing arguments that may potentially be hard to reconcile. The first one argues that everyone should be treated the same (politics of universalism), while the second one argues that "*everyone* should be recognized for his or her unique identity" (politics of difference) (p. 38). The policies of reverse discrimination are favoured under the politics of difference. Also, the politics of difference may be in conflict with the concept of equal respect when we introduce respect for collective rights.

For example, Povinelli (2002), based on her research with the Aboriginal people in Australia, argues that liberalism is a two-edged sword; on the one hand, there is a desire to acknowledge the special rights given to Indigenous peoples due to their past dispossession. On

the other, there are legal requirements as to how Indigenous peoples are recognized and are given their land rights by the liberal state. The interpretation of cultural difference is challenging due to the cultural barriers between the liberal state and the Indigenous values (customs may be considered as criminal acts within the context of the liberal state's common law in Australia) and also hybrid cultures of the Indigenous peoples may not be enough ground to assert one's difference legally. In the politics of recognition, it is proof of difference or alterity that gives the Indigenous the recognition.

Baird (2018) observes that in Cambodia where the recognition of Indigeneity not only creates standards of how Indigenous peoples are supposed to be, which language they are supposed to speak, which historical memories and cultural practices they are supposed to have, but it also creates exclusions whereby the marginalized and the dispossessed are often also denied indigeneity due to the lack of the characteristics required by the law. Securing land titles is so expensive that major funders have refused to support the search for these titles opening up new avenues for corruption for the local government officials. The government approves much smaller territories under these titles than claimed by the Indigenous communities. Finally, there are policies that aim to promote individual land titles and some Indigenous members go with these options, which are much easier to obtain than communal ones, sabotaging efforts to obtain communal land titles.

Yet, Theriault (2019) drawing from his fieldwork in Palawan of the Philippines, argues that while recognition is, indeed, complicated this does not mean that the Indigenous people are the "passive" recipients of this bureaucratic recognition (p. 120). In the specific example of the Indigenous Palawan, they were able to take advantage of the state recognition in order to support their resistance to mining. In one case, they have taken advantage of their ability to choose their

leaders by drawing up the criteria for those who claim to represent them. In another example, Theriault tells how one Palawan community leader uses government conservation initiatives to resolve internal conflicts in the community over land. He calls this ability of the recognized Indigenous people to engage in infrapolitics strategically for their own benefit as “the cunning of the recognized” (p. 119).

In the context of South-East Asia, the recognition of Indigenous peoples is seen by the Indigenous peoples’ movements as a way to resolve land and other resource-related conflicts. Countries such as the Philippines and Cambodia have recognized indigenous peoples’ rights to land (Baird, 2018). In the Philippines, in an attempt to pursue a multicultural state, the government recognized Indigenous peoples in its 1987 Constitution. Ten years after, in 1997, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), a law that protects Indigenous peoples’ rights and gives them the right to obtain a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), was passed by Congress. IPRA’s implementation is overseen by the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) (Theriault, 2019). In Cambodia, Land Law of Cambodia, NS/RKM/0801/14, August 30, 2001, allows for communal land titles for the Indigenous peoples who constitute about two percent of the whole population of Cambodia. The Sub-decree on Procedures of Registration of Land of Indigenous Communities 2009 explains how a community can register for an Indigenous status. This registration allows for the community to apply for a land title (Baird, 2018). In Indonesia, AMAN also attempts to advocate for a Bill that recognises the special rights of Indigenous peoples.

3.5.4 Women and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

Indigenous rights are gendered (Kuokkanen, 2012) and Indigenous peoples’ rights bring up several issues in relation to women’s rights. The first issue is related to the discussion on

individual and collective rights. Kymlicka (2001) suggests that "some kind of minority rights would undermine, rather than support, individual autonomy." This is why he suggests differentiating "bad" and "good" minority rights within multiculturalism. This can help control destructive power dynamics in the name of tradition (p. 21). Something similar is suggested by Johnston who, within the context of the Maori in New Zealand, distinguishes internal and external discrimination. Internal discrimination is the discrimination experienced within the context of the Maori customary law, whereas external discrimination refers to the outside laws (in Kuokkanen, 2012). Thus, Johnston suggests using "the marae" (the Maori meeting place) and not the international framework of human rights to deal with these "internal" issues because, despite the possibility that women could be silenced within the framework of customary court, this method can lead to long-term sustainable solutions. Kuokkanen (2012), however, views this as problematic because, first, short term solutions are not always bad and may be necessary to transform relations more quickly; and, second, customary institutions and practices are gendered and this may not give enough space or ground for women to contest the gendered power relations.

Kuokkanen (2012) following Iris Marion Young, suggests seeing the major objective of Indigenous rights, self-determination, as both collective and individual or relational. The fact is that Indigenous peoples, due to the effect of colonization or due to their own 'original' cultural patterns, do not have gender equality (also see Green, 2007; LaRocque, 2007). Violence against women is not only an Indigenous issue, it is an issue within mainstream society as well. This means that violence against women is not an issue of individual or collective rights, it is a gender justice issue. In order to address this reality, the issue of gender justice should be incorporated into the conceptualization of Indigenous self-determination and not side-lined as it has been by

some indigenous activists. This side-lining, in the end, hurts everyone involved in the fight for Indigenous rights, because women end up "marginalized and excluded" and are prone to become victims of numerous other forms of violence (p. 249). Indigenous self-determination is fundamentally dependent upon gender justice because "societies and communities afflicted by endemic levels of poverty, violence, and ill-health are not in a position to take control of their own affairs" (p. 250). Emphasis on cultural differences diverts attention from "gender-specific" violence.

Green (2007) observes that women who fight for gender justice are criticized as being "un- or anti-traditional." This argument is embedded in the assumption that traditions are good because they "represent pre-colonial time when Indigenous peoples exercised self-determination" (p. 26). Despite this, traditions are neither good nor bad, but they can be employed by the elites, men or others who are in a position of power to justify certain oppressive traditions that serve their interests. Therefore, it is imperative to converse about "what traditions are, how they affect men and women in their gendered roles and what the implications of this are" (p. 27). Green further points out that: "Rejecting the rhetoric and institutions of the colonizer by embracing the symbols of one's culture and traditions is a strategy for reclaiming the primacy of one's own context in the world, against the imposition of colonialism. But, in the absence of an analysis of the power relations embedded in tradition, it is not necessarily a liberatory strategy" (p. 27). We need to analyze traditions: who decided this is a tradition and why.

The second important point to make is how Indigenous women's issues have been conceptualized so far. The International Indigenous Women's Forum (FIMI), for example, identifies six major manifestations of violence against Indigenous women, including

neoliberalism, violence in the name of tradition, state and domestic violence, etc. However, Kuokkanen (2012) points out that in this discussion they have listed "gendered effects of violence," not "gender-specific forms of violence against indigenous women" (p. 240). Suggesting that women's issues need to be dealt with internally is misleading because it diverts attention from the structural violence against women and puts women's rights as "private, cultural, domestic affairs" (Mullally, 2007 in Kuokkanen, 2012, p. 240).

These discussions are highly relevant in most Indigenous contexts, especially within the context of Australia, New Zealand, and North America. As explained in the discussion on Perempuan AMAN in Chapter 2, these conversations can enrich the emerging discussions in the context of South-East Asia as well. These issues are also highly relevant to my own fieldwork site of KSPPM and North Sumatra.

I place my research in-between these theoretical discussions on nonviolent resistance, critical hybrid peace and conflict studies, and gender. Theories reviewed in this chapter are helpful in looking at the case of the Toba Batak resistance in North Sumatra from a gendered perspective. These theories place my research in the ongoing discussions in relation to Indigeneity and gendered experiences of conflict and resistance.

Chapter 4: Methodology and methods

This chapter explains the methodology of this study, the process of obtaining access and consent, and data collection methods. I also touch upon the special consideration or reflection points I have had during my fieldwork. And, finally, I talk about my data analysis process.

4.1 Feminist and decolonizing ethnography as a methodology

For this research project, I combined ideas of both feminist and decolonising research to balance the power of a researcher within ethnographic research. The research project was planned as a feminist and decolonizing ethnography of peace and conflict. This is in line with a major theoretical discussion in PACS that criticizes the lack of local agency in the theory and praxis of peace and conflict. I agree with the calls for an emic understanding of peace and conflict (Avruch & Black, 1991; Fry et al., 2016; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Tuso, 2011;). Feminist and decolonizing approaches call for the empathic understanding of differences and respecting these differences (Smith, 1999; Abu-Lughod, 1991; Wilson, 2008).

Ethnographic research requires a substantial field presence using the methods of participant observation and interviewing, which can lead to a greater understanding of the cultural context and of the conflict dynamics (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983/2007). Ethnography can help us learn about the conflict context, conflict behaviours, how people define and live peace as well as how they resolve conflicts. Participant observation, informal daily conversations, and semi-structured interviews were useful methods throughout my field research.

I chose a feminist approach to the work because my research centred on the experiences of women and the relationships between gender and power. This, however, did not exclude men. It was important for me to be aware of my own power as an outsider vis-à-vis my research participants. I was conscious of various layers of difference and differentiation that exist in the

community and myself and the research participants. The idea of intersectionality, positionality, standpoint and cultural awareness of one's position of an outsider were important (Abu-Lughod, 1991; Haraway, 2016; Harding, 2008; Hekman, 2007; Ramazanaglu & Holland, 2002; Smith, 1999). These principles helped me to be aware of differences in terms of power and capital (economic, cultural, social) among the male and female research participants as well as between myself and the research participants (both male and female).

While feminist research focuses on women's experiences, it does not exclude men to understand gender dynamics (Buch & Staller, 2007). This is why I interviewed and interacted with both men and women. It was a lot easier to talk with men than it was with women due to the language fluency of the men and their ability to articulate their ideas to the outside audience. The women often lacked this skill and, therefore, more time was needed to adjust to their style of thinking and expressing themselves. I conducted research mostly in Indonesian, sometimes in Batak Toba (in this case, I resorted to translation help from the community members who were fluent in Indonesian). Despite the fact that it was easier for younger women to speak Indonesian and express their ideas more clearly, they also often lacked community-given confidence to speak even on behalf of themselves due to their subordinate positions within *adat*.

In addition to a feminist approach, I have also designed to employ a decolonizing approach. Decolonizing methodologies critically approach the process of production of knowledge in the Western sciences. They call for critical sensitivity in questions of representation, being open to and respectful of indigenous worldviews, analysis and understanding of power and its hegemonic workings, thinking of ways to give voice to the Indigenous peoples themselves, accurately representing the voices of the Indigenous peoples both in the design and the reporting of the research, and aiming for a transformation or some

kind of contribution to the Indigenous peoples' agenda of self-determination (Kovach, 2009; Laenui, 2000; Smith, 1999; Wilson, 2008). Relational accountability in indigenous research means that the research is accountable to all the relations that the researcher develops (Wilson, 2008, p. 59). The research needs to focus on asking constructive questions and finding constructive answers (Wilson, 2008).

The research design process involved a consultation with the KSPPM staff members. The first consultation was over email with the Director of KSPPM, and the second consultation was in the very beginning of my research journey when I sat down with KSPPM staff members and we discussed my questions and my research design. KSPPM provided much needed input during this meeting. The next step of consultation was when I was in the villages of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta. The consultation was asking for consent and the explanation of my research questions and of the research process. Those researchers who did not undergo this process and seemed to have a non-supportive agenda were refused entry into the communities.

Nevetheless, not all community members were informed of my research objectives. During my first week in the village of Sipituhuta, as I walked from the house of the family who hosted me to the neighbouring villabe of Pandumaan, I met a woman I found to be a wife of one of the criminalized formal leaders. This woman called me over and offered me coffee and a fried banana. I agreed. She then inquired of me where I was from and what I was doing in their village. I told her about myself, my connection to the village, how I gained access, and my research project. When she learnt that I was a researcher, she became angry with me saying that researchers keep coming to her village without any benefit for her and the kind of problems her community faces in relation to infertile soil, for example. I took her anger to indicate the fatigue that the villagers felt due to the interest of outsiders to their village. Of course, I asked her what

kind of research would be useful for them. So, this way, we were able to discuss about her life and the kind of challenges she was facing in her family. As we discussed her problems, she opened up a little bit more. But this conversation also made me think further about what might be the benefit of my research to the villagers. And, sometimes this question came up as I continued to work with people. I raised this question as well with several of my key informants in the villages and received various responses. Some thought it was supportive of their struggles, others wanted to see more practical research projects, such as exploring the quality of the soil and teaching them how to make the soil more fertile.

My main objective was and remains to that this research contribute to the critical analysis of the grassroots resistance. I have kept this objective as central throughout my analysis and writing process. As part of my decolonizing methodology, I had a long de-briefing meeting with the then Director of KSPPM about my view of the situation on the ground. I have also tested my ideas with the key informants regularly throughout my analysis and writing process to ensure relational accountability and to constructively contribute to the struggles of my research participants.

Smith (1999) and Kovach (2009) stress the importance of reporting back and sharing the knowledge gained with the communities and the movement. I am hoping to develop a strategy of knowledge dissemination. My design involved a trip to the communities upon the submission of my dissertation. However, COVID-19 interfered and changed my plans. I plan to meet with key activist informants over zoom to help them strategize in a new way. More recently, there was an internal conflict and many of the experienced staff of KSPPM left the organization and they plan to set up a new organization. I also would like to go back to the communities and KSPPM to report the findings of my research.

I spent about six months in the province of North Sumatra and two months in total between Jakarta (the capital city of Indonesia) and Bogor in West Java province (the base of many environmental and Indigenous peoples' NGOs) meeting with various actors to learn about the national context. While transcribing and writing, I was based in the city of Yogyakarta in the Special Region of Yogyakarta from September to December 2018, and throughout the year 2019 and 2020. This stay allowed me to remain in the loop of the discussions that take place and able to meet my informants when they visited the city for various events. I have also kept in touch with some of the key informants from the three villages of Pandumaan, Sipituhuta, and Lumban Sitorus over WhatsApp, phone, and Facebook. Other villages do not have strong network coverage. During this time, I have continued journaling and taking notes as needed.

4.2 Gaining access and informed consent

I have come to know Indigenous and human rights organizations in Indonesia through my work with a number of international NGOs. The first NGO I was associated with in Indonesia was working on peace and human rights issues in the province of Papua. I was based in Wamena in the Palim (Baliem) Valley. Experience in this area allowed me to become familiar with the social, political, and economic issues that the Outer islands' provinces faced. Following, I went to other countries in the region working with international and regional NGOs and came back to Indonesia as a consultant with a local NGO through a small but well-connected NGO working on the production and distribution of films focusing on Indigenous land rights. It is through this NGO that I became connected to the North Sumatran NGO, KSPPM headquartered in Parapat, Simalungun district. I developed relationships with this NGO after the work we did in 2011 advocating for the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta following the major confrontation between

the company and the community members, which resulted in the criminalisation of some male community members.

I arrived in Parapat in December 2017 to present my research proposal. At this time, I visited several nearby villages, started to learn about Batak Toba *adat* and had numerous conversations with activists. I also participated in a workshop on budget advocacy. In my proposal presentation, the staff from the advocacy division were present. I told them that I planned to visit three communities, Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, Nagasaribu, and Parlilitan as suggested by KSPPM at the time of my proposal development. However, at this meeting, participants suggested dropping Parlilitan in Humbang Hasundutan district from my list because people there were not resisting anymore and it was difficult to gain access to this community. Therefore, I changed the communities to Nagasaribu and Pandumaan-Sipituhuta. However, as I spent more time with KSPPM learning about the various cases, I became interested in their overall approach and wanted to explore this a bit more going to several other communities on whose behalf they advocate. Thus, overall, I visited seven communities for the purposes of getting to know the larger field, the similarities, and differences between the cases as well as the level of organization they have experienced. This contributed to my understanding of the larger historical, cultural and political context that relates specifically to the Toba Bataks and their connection to the land. It also helped me understand the dynamics of the local struggles. I also connected with AMAN Tano Batak, interviewed some of their staff and visited one of their communities, which is trying to reclaim the same piece of land as one of the KSPPM communities. All of these cases appeared to be part of one story. The work would not have been possible without the help of KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak for me to be accepted and admitted

into these communities. Several researchers before me were denied access, one being a young forestry researcher from a Japanese university whom I met in December 2017.

In each village, it was my responsibility to meet with the leader of the resistance, introduce myself and ask for consent. During some trips I was first introduced by KSPPM staff members. Before each interview or conversation, I advised that I was a researcher and explained the topic of my research. Luckily, this part was not difficult because, in general, people were not shy to speak with me except for one village of Nagasaribu where I needed the help of the resistance leaders to explain more about me to the others. Some villagers, such as Aek Lung, Pandumaan and Sipituhuta remembered me from my film-making time with them in 2011.

My association with KSPPM and AMAN Tano Batak probably skews my findings and the types of people I was able to interview or not interview. For example, in the village of Lumban Sitorus, the street I lived on was the street of the community members who were supportive of the resistance. It was very hard for me to move around, strike a conversation and even sit without causing some type of suspicion on the other streets of the village. Therefore, I preferred to stay on this one street and interact with people there due to the possibility of having problems with the village officials who were not supportive of resistance. In Sipituhuta, similarly, it was hard for me to gain access to the first *dusun* (hamlet) that was pro-TPL. I was able to interview a few people, mostly migrants, who seemed to be open to having a foreign guest in their house. Therefore, I know of the dynamics in this hamlet only from the migrant's stories, not from the Indigenous inhabitants.

4.3 Data collection methods

Several data collection methods were used, including participant observation, focus group discussions (FGDs), semi-structured interviews, as well as use of the archives. As a result

of participant observation, I produced extensive field data, although, as I became more familiar with the context and more comfortable with my methods, I tended to write less. I have had over 70 semi-structured interviews, and around ten FGDs. I was not initially prepared for FGDs and had to adjust to this need of my research participants on the ground. The articles that were useful in this are Soderstrom's (2011) and Bangura et al.'s (2007). In this section, I explain my data collection methods and any specific difficulties I have had.

Participant observation

I spent overall close to eight months conducting the active field research. This included six months spent in North Sumatra, with two months divided between Jakarta, Bogor, and Yogyakarta. In 2017, I spent the months of October and November attending events at UGM connected to tenure as well as the Indonesian National Tenure Conference held from 25-27 October at Hotel JS Luwansa in Jakarta. At this time, I did not have my research permit. After receiving notification about my research permit, I went to Parapat to introduce my research and spent a week and a half before going to Malaysia to arrange my research permit at the Indonesian Consulate. I spent the month of January working on my research permit in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. I started my stay in the villages from February till June and spent the months of July and August between Jakarta, Bogor, and Yogyakarta. I started transcribing my interviews in September 2018; analysis in January 2019; and, writing in April 2019.

I did my participant observation notes daily mostly in the evenings. If I took notes while talking to people or sitting at the café it made people uncomfortable. My participant observations included a variety of notes which were maps that seemed to be incomprehensible months after, descriptive analysis, and reflective notes. However, as I spent more time in the villages and it seemed to me that I understood the cultural context better, I started to rely on my memory and

not write notes. I also started to feel exhausted, possibly due to poor nutrition and bouts of diarrhea that I experienced each time I went to the fields. I was shy to take bottled water with me while everyone else drank from the water boiled in the field. I went to the markets on *onan* days with women and sometimes, by myself. I went to church and changed my church every weekend upon the suggestion of my host family. I also just spent time at local shops and *kedai*s/*lapo* (coffee shops) observing and talking with women or men.

Time with KSPPM was important for me to learn about the cases, ask follow-up questions, work in the archives, and interview staff. This also allowed me to go with them to other villages that I did not spend significant time in but still informed me about the general dynamics and the way KSPPM works with the communities. KSPPM had regular trainings and workshops. This allowed me to observe and learn about the methodology they use in facilitating community discussions and advocating. For example, one of the meetings I attended was a meeting with the Director-General of the Customary Forest Conflict Resolution unit from the MoEF. Another was gender training with women villagers. I introduced myself here officially and told women about my research. This workshop allowed me to hear and learn about women and their experiences in a safe environment.

I was able to participate and observe the preparation for the mediation. One of the communities that KSPPM advocates for, Lumban Sitorus, had a mediation organized by a former activist (now a lawyer) and a local NGO based in Riau. I was able to facilitate a preparatory session based on KSPPM's request together with one other staff member. I also spent time in this village to learn about their struggle and to follow their experience of a mediation with TPL.

In Bogor, I attended a Perempuan AMAN workshop with about twenty women. This workshop allowed me to learn about the work of Perempuan AMAN. I also observed their Training of Trainers for Indigenous women.

There were several difficulties in the field, some alluded to earlier. The first was sleeping on a bare floor when it was +15 outside with the lights on. For someone who does not even use a night lamp, this turned out to be a real challenge. The second challenge was drinking water. When I went to the field with women we would boil water from the water source they had and often the water was rather dirty. Even though the water was boiled, it still gave me bouts of diarrhea (I also have a sensitive stomach). The third challenge was sleeping in the KSPPM office because I started to be afraid of ghosts in the KSPPM office. The staff told me ghost stories and I started to sleep badly in the guest rooms. I preferred to sleep with the girls in the dorm. Often, I hurried to go back to the villages because we would either sleep on the floor with the whole family, and this meant I did not have to be alone, or, with dim lights on, in cases where host families provided me with a separate room. Finally, it was also quite difficult to be far away from my family and my small daughter who was adjusting to Indonesia.

Focus Group Discussions (FGD)

In most villages, I was able to interview women individually in their homes, gardens, or at *kedai*. However, in some cases, women preferred to have FGDs though I had not planned to conduct FGDs. I had my first FGD in the very first week that I was in Pandumaan. I was not ready and it was not as successful. And, I did not quite realize that what we had was called FGD. Later I learned FGDs were a safe space for women, and also probably the easiest way for them to get rid of me. I had one unplanned FGD with men from Op. Ronggur in Aek Napa. Thus, I conducted 8 FGDs in total, three were recorded upon the agreement of the participants and the

rest were not due to the lack of agreement. One of my FGDs got hijacked by the internal conflict in a village.

Semi-structured interviews

I conducted semi-structured interviews with both men and women. Most interviewed men were the leaders of the resistance. At times, it was difficult to meet women only because men would still be there, either as interpreters or, even, as informants. Women were not used to speaking, especially, in Indonesian, and this made them also resort to men's help to explain their ideas. For example, one woman told me there was no need to interview her and her husband separately because she said they think alike and whatever the husband said was true for her as well. However, there were cases when I managed to get women's perspectives alone. This was easier when we had focus group discussions in the villages because then women did not feel alone and there could always be someone to speak on their behalf if they could not formulate their ideas. In some cases, I approached women when they were at home, at *kedai* (coffee shop/cafe), in the field, or, drying their rice paddies/coffee beans.

Going with women to coffee gardens or rice fields gave some time to interact and listen to their stories. This was harder to achieve, however, than I imagined due to me being an outsider, a foreigner, and a guest. Women did not want me to go with them because they thought it was dirty work they were doing. Me joining also entailed them having to take care of me, worry about me being bored or tired, and bringing extra food for me. They saw me as a burden whereas I wanted to position myself as someone who could give a hand. In one of the villages, for example, we had to walk about five kilometres in order to get to the rice field to work on it. In another village, the rice field was situated about two kilometres away with 200 meters of it going down a steep hill. Going down, however, was a lot easier than going up.

I interviewed men as well as women in order to understand the gendered dynamics of conflicts. It was easier to access men because they were everywhere. The months I was in the villages were the months when men mostly stayed in the village. In the *kemenyan* villages, the men go into the forest starting from September or October till January/February. The length of time men spend in the forest depends on the harvest. Men usually spend the whole week in the forest because forest gardens are far from the village, especially in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta. Therefore, in these months it would be only women in the villages. Men could speak much better Indonesian due to conversing in it every day in their interactions with officials or outside of the village. Women go outside the village mostly on the *onan* (market) days. *Onan* days are different in every district: in *Toba Samosir* district - on Wednesdays; in *Tapanuli Utara* district - on Tuesdays; and, in *Humbang Hasundutan* district - on Fridays.

I selected key informants in the villages based on their ability to speak Bahasa, their availability, and their willingness to talk to me. Most women and men were reluctant to talk with me but I developed a habit of walking up and down the streets of the village and meeting random villagers. They would often ask me to stop by and have tea/coffee. I would do this and have a conversation with them about daily activities, family, and my research. The next day I would come again to talk with them and have tea with them. And, then later on, if I thought the person was comfortable enough, I would ask to sit down with me for a longer, more focused time for an interview. It helped to use the term *bercerita* (telling stories) instead of *wawancara* (interview), especially with women.

I planned to interview ten to sixteen persons from each community but in the end, this depended on my time in each village and the availability of the informants and their willingness to be interviewed. Also, due to the homogeneity of the community, the information became

repetitive with time – “data saturation.” In some villages where I spent little time, I conducted FGDs and a few individual interviews with leaders who were often male. In each village, I also made a trip to the fields or the forest. The trips to the field were with women whereas to the forest with both men and women (in the case of Nagasaribu).

Following is a list of interviews and FGDs:

Pandumaan and Sipituhuta	20 persons (10 women and 10 men)	1 FGD with seven women, unrecorded
Aek Lung	1 interview with 1 male leader, unrecorded	1 FGD with 8 women leaders and one male leader, recorded
Sipahutar area (including Op. Ronggur, Op. Bolus and Onan Harbangan (Nagasaribu)	10 persons (2 individual women, 1 interview with 2 women, and 6 individual men)	2 FGDs with women in Nagasaribu (total of 7 women), unrecorded 1 FGD with men in Op. Ronggur (three men), recorded
Lumban Sitorus	10 persons (5 men and 5 women)	No FGDs
Sugapa	2 interviews with women leaders, one recorded, one unrecorded	1 FGD with 8 women, recorded
Balige	3 interviews with current and former AMAN Tano Batak staff	1 FGD with 3 male journalists and 1 female activist
Medan	1 interview (1 male activist)	1 FGD with 2 rural women who moved to city and one male academic
Parapat	5 interviews (3 women staff of KSPPM, 1 male staff of KSPPM and one international activist)	NO FGDs
Jakarta	3 interviews with officials from Komnas HAM and Komnas Perempuan and a	1 spontaneous FGD with HuMA staff (3 men and 1 woman)

	former female KSPPM staff	
Bogor	3 interviews with 1 AMAN staff and 2 Perempuan AMAN staff	No FGDs
Yogyakarta	3 interviews (1 with a government official, 1 with TPL staff, and 1 with a mediator)	No FGDs
TOTAL	71 interviews	9 FGDs

Table 5: List of interviews and FGDs

Interviews were semi-structured, not always recorded, but noted (handwritten notes during the interview which were then transferred to the laptop). With some key informants, I had two or three interviews at different points of my stay to clarify certain statements or stories. I counted these as one interview. Not all KSPPM staff were willing to be interviewed. Those who were willing to be interviewed were the older staff members with longer experience, whereas the younger staff were uninterested or less confident to be interviewed. I requested an interview to which they would agree but then avoided me for the rest of the stay. I eventually learned to take these as a "no." Thus, I interviewed five staff members of KSPPM and had numerous informal chats and participant observation throughout my stay.

The archives

KSPPM was kind to share with me their archives. As mentioned above, the time in-between the villages I used to work in the KSPPM archives while interviewing the available KSPPM staff. The archives consisted of the *Prakarsa* newsletter (KSPPM's newsletter that informs about cases, consolidates farmers and educates). The writers were mainly KSPPM staff describing their experiences and writing about the issues that concerned them individually (such as domestic violence, violence against LGBT, the critique of neoliberalism, etc.). In some cases,

there were letters written by community members to government officials and scans of court decisions. The archives also included background papers written by KSPPM staff. I have used these documents as a source of background information.

4.4 Special considerations and reflective notes

In my research proposal, I outlined several special considerations. I added some more into this list as I reviewed my reflective notes and left some minor ones out. This section presents the most important considerations for me personally. These are safety and security, being an outsider and a researcher, being seen as an expert and the question of payment. I explain how I have dealt with the issues as they came up following the principles outlined in what I understand of feminist and decolonizing methodologies. A key reflection for me is the fact that I had my statistical data unorganized and it took me some time to re-organize these (numbers of interviews, FGDs, etc.) and most importantly, some data on land size to gauge the mean land size of the villagers as well as the extent of landlessness in Lumban Sitorus.

Safety and security

In North Sumatra, my base was in Parapat where I would leave my belongings. KSPPM has a beautiful office building with a guesthouse. I took the local buses, such as Tao Toba, to go to the local villages. In some cases, the driving was risky but I could ask the driver to slow down. Overall, I enjoyed these trips because I was able to meet new people and listen to the local pop music. The hardest part for me taking local buses was the smoking of passengers and drivers. This was also quite challenging with staying in the villages because everyone smoked.

One incident where I felt extremely unsafe was when the villagers asked me to travel with them on a motorbike without a helmet across the pulp and paper plantation into Parapat for a meeting. I did not know how to refuse. We were rained upon on the way and had to stop at a

local café to wait out the rain. On the one hand, the ride was very risky; on the other, I was able to see the extent of the plantation. Afterwards, I discussed this experience with KSPPM, and they said that in the future I had to remember that it was acceptable to refuse and find a safer mode of transport and not worry about hurting the villagers' feelings.

Some villages were three to four hours' drive away and others were an hour's drive away from the Parapat base. The Sipahutar villages were especially far. One village, in particular, Nagasaribu, did not have a proper road. The road was a winding mountain trail covered in stone and mud. KSPPM staff joked about the road being commented on by an American intern who stayed there for a few months. I asked them what our strategy was in case the vehicle fell over. I was told to jump out of the window.

Outsiders as researchers

When I first arrived in the village and people heard that I was a researcher, the villagers were cautious. They complained that there were too many researchers coming to the village (especially true for Pandumaan and Sipituhuta) without benefiting villagers directly. People asked me about the benefits of the research to them. When I explained how the research could help develop general knowledge about their case, they said that they need research about how to increase *kemenyan* yield, for instance, or how to make sure that the yield of the chili peppers was increased or how to get rid of pests in the rice fields, and, not about something that may or may not be practically useful. Some women said resistance is of no use because husbands become criminalized and women are the ones who suffer. The majority of the women, however, were welcoming and curious. But it is important to point out that women had differing reactions to researchers.

Men also had reservations but less than women. One of the men, for example, said that there are numerous pictures of him with all the visitors that ever came to visit his village, but there was no use for these pictures. None of them even shared the printed pictures with him. At the same time, however, the villagers were also proud that their villages are well-known across the world and some saw these visits as an opportunity to learn about other countries and cultures. I heard this opinion also in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta and less in other villages who had fewer foreign visitors. In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, villagers asked me to speak about my own village and my country. We had a few dinners and night-outs at the local *kedai* sharing stories about my home country, the food, and the types of houses. These stories, I found out later, were then a bit exaggerated and shared amongst the villagers.

At another point, when there was a high-level government official visiting KSPPM, one of the KSPPM staff members encouraged me to find time to interview this official. She said this was my opportunity to interview a government official who was involved in resolving "their" cases. But the Director-General was there only for a half day and I did not want to take away KSPPM staff time talking with him and chose to stay in the background.

Being seen as an expert

Hammersley & Atkinson (1995) point out that sometimes researchers can be seen as experts. With Lumban Sitorus, KSPPM asked me to help them to facilitate a pre-negotiation preparation meeting with Lumban Sitorus. I decided that I would write a document to help them prepare since they were confused as to what to do. They had never participated in a mediation before. Since this is my formal education, I was asked to help them out. I co-facilitated (rather badly) the preparatory workshop and the role-play of the mediation.

I was present at several preparatory meetings of Lumban Sitorus in their village. They asked for feedback on ways they have meetings and the way they facilitate meetings and I was able to comply. When asked to provide input, in general, I did not hold back but I tried not to express opinions that might interfere with their decisions. For example, women or men asked what I would do if I were them, and I preferred not to respond to this question directly by explaining that I may not fully understand where they come from in making their decisions. This community was the hardest hit by the conflict and the farmers were near-landless or landless, jobless, unskilled, and without a source of income living in a highly polluted area, only two kilometres away from the pulp mill. The community was also conflicted. They did not see a way out. This made me cautious, sad, and at the same time also concerned for my own health (I have a sensitive stomach). This was the most difficult community to stay with due to the precariousness of their lives in their transition from the rural to the urban society.

Paying for a stay

Before I went into the villages to live, I consulted with KSPPM staff and asked whether I should pay the villagers for hosting me in their house. To this KSPPM said that their policy is that no funds should be given to the hosts. One can bring coffee, sugar, and other foods from the market but cannot give cash because in the long term this will not work for KSPPM. The villagers will have a material interest in hosting the KSPPM staff or anyone to whom KSPPM provides access. They also explained that this was also an approach in order to keep the aspects of the Toba Batak culture that generally honours guests with good intentions.

On market days, I went with the villagers to the market and bought food for the house. I generally bought foods they would not buy, such as vegetables, as well as the local staple *lauk* (source of protein) – dried salty baitfish. Once one of the community members took me to the

bus station and I wanted to reimburse his gasoline, and he refused saying that "We Bataks do not accept money from guests" confirming the explanation given by KSPPM.

However, there was one community where the hosts, through the local translator, specifically asked me what I was going to pay them. This was not a KSPPM-accompanied community. They'd had several international NGOs go there to hold events that paid the villagers to hold these events. From then on, the villagers expected every person coming and staying with them to pay them money. This case took me by surprise and I suggested to the people that I could buy a big meal as recommended by KSPPM. The next day was the market day and I bought food for the whole family to cook *arsik* (fish stew) and bought fruits for the children. I also did not stay in the village for long. Until now, I am not sure whether I dealt with this issue well enough but at the time, this seemed to be the best response.

Importance of statistical data

As I was starting to write, I realized that my statistical data or demographics specific to my participants was scattered and since I had not identified this data as valuable I had not spent enough time organizing it after each interview. Following, to address this, I contacted my informants and asked them the exact statistical data on the number of children and grandchildren as well as the size of the land they owned. The villagers did not mind sharing this information.

4.5 Data analysis

Transcribing

I was hoping to start transcribing the interviews right after I conducted them, however, by the end of each day in the field I was exhausted and did not have time to transcribe, only to note-take or to write reflection notes. I transcribed the majority of the interviews after I finished collecting the data starting from September 2018 till January 2019. I transcribed the work myself

because it helped me to hear the intonation and the way the informants relayed the stories, though at times it was difficult to understand some 90-120 minute FGDs, in particular. Most of the interviews were 90 minutes long. This was a learning experience as I became accustomed to hearing myself, realizing that I became a better interviewer/participant as I gained more experience. There is still some learning to do.

Coding and developing themes

I employed all the data I collected in my analysis. My major focus was on the interviews with some focus on the field notes and the KSPPM archive materials. I conducted data analysis in several stages. The first stage was memo-ing as I was transcribing the interviews. Further, I re-read the interviews and made codes identifying the themes that emerged out of the interviews. Finally, out of these codes, I developed a general thematic framework for the thesis.

The initial coding determined the structure of the dissertation. As I read and memo-ed the first time around I made general notes on the logic of the story. Further, as I coded and analyzed more I started to see patterns. They reminded me of the pieces of a puzzle. Further, to organize these pieces I used *Scrivener* to group them. This grouping allowed me to see the larger picture. Then, I looked at my research questions again and organized my data according to my research questions. Thus, it was quite a circular process of writing and re-writing again. It was useful that I had *Scrivener*. It allowed me to put all my data into one document and group the data into themes and sub-themes.

As mentioned before, I consider villages I visited as one case representing the Indigenous communities of the Toba Batak area resisting the pulp and paper corporation TPL. I saw all the actors, villagers (men and women), KSPPM, other activists, government and company officials as part of one ecosystem. I saw these various data as representing one large case study. The

reason behind this is that as I spent more time in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, it became clearer to me that in order to understand their case better I also had to get to know other places. This variety of experiences also allowed me to understand Batak Toba *adat* and its diversity. I also could see KSPPM's approach in comparison to each of the cases under consideration.

To conclude, this section elaborated on the ins and outs of me turning into an ethnographic researcher. I enjoyed the process and learned a lot through this process. I highly appreciated both of my methodological approaches. Decolonizing and feminist methodology allowed me to be aware of cultural differences and accept them as they are, to remain aware of power relations between myself and research participants, de-centre myself as a researcher and centre my research participants' perspectives (both male and female), and to be aware of general gendered power dynamics within the community as well as myself and the research participants.

4.5 Limitations

There are several limitations with my research. The first major limitation is the number of sites that I have included in my study. I believe that my study would have gained more if I had concentrated only on two communities. I stayed in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta for about three months in total; however, in all the other villages I stayed less than a month with maximum of two weeks' time. In each of the communities of Op. Ronggur, Aek Lung, and Sugapa I stayed for a week, and, in Op. Bolus, Lumban Sitorus and Nagasaribu for about two weeks each. There are several reasons as to why I did not stay longer in these communities. The first reason is some communities limited my stay themselves and there were various reasons for this, including the past unconstructive relationships with outsiders. The second reason is time and funding limitations. I had generous funding through scholarships but limited funding for a long-term research project.

Further, there were also challenges with recruiting female informants in several of the villages, especially in the community of Op Ronggur and Nagasaribu. In Op. Ronggur it was difficult to recruit women informants because the communtiy seemed to be divided and fatigued. When I was there, a horizontal conflict between the community of Op. Ronggur and the migrant community of Aek Napa that lived on the land of the community of Op. Ronggur was about to erupt. In the community of Nagasaribu, KSPPM did not have an intensive presence and this also affected my relationship with the community members. Women here also were not involved in the resistance as heavily as in other places and they did not fully understand the resistance, its strategies and methods.

I must mention that I had the best access to those communities that were working closely with KSPPM and AMAN TB. In these areas, the community members were mostly Christian and contra-TPL. I was able to gain access to the pro-TPL hamlet in Sipituhuta through a migrant family; however, my interaction with the community members in this hamlet was limited due to the divided reality of this community (with elites supporting TPL and non-elites supporting resistance). There was a high level of mistrust of community members towards anyone who asked them about the resistance against TPL.

Some research in relation to the decolonizing research now moves towards the incorporation of participatory approaches, which suggests active involvement of Indigenous actors as co-researchers (for example, see Vasquez-Fernandez et al, 2018). Despite the minor involvement of the local actors in defining some of my research direction, my research was largely designed within the Canadian academic environment and was defined by the theoretical discussions within the study of resistance, nonviolence, and gender within the Western academy.

Finally, the above-mentioned limitations also affected the depth of the intersectional analysis I could present in my research that touched more heavily upon the differentiation of women and men based on their respective social backgrounds, such as age, social class, marriage status, land ownership, and the political leadership position within *adat*. For example, if I had spent six months in Siputuhuta and Pandumaan (while gaining communities' permission to stay for two months in hamlet 1), I would have gained more in-depth understanding of the intersectional dynamics between the pro and contra-TPL groups in Sipituhuta. And, this would have greatly contributed to the "thickness" of my analysis.

Chapter 5: Losing, resisting, and reclaiming the land

In this chapter, I look at the story of land dispossession, struggle for land and various strategies villagers used in their struggle. I also explore the role of NGOs in the resistance. Finally, I analyze the case of mediation and its outcome.

5.1 Losing access to land

My data analysis shows that there were several historical, social and economic reasons as to why the villagers lost access to land initially. These are the state reforestation program (historical force), urbanization (demographic force), landlessness (demographic force), development (historical, political, and psychocultural force), the fall of *kemenyan* price (economic force), and out-migration (historical and demographic force). These coincide with the five out of six forces mentioned in Byrne & Nadan's (2011) model of social cubism.

State reforestation program

Historically, most of the communities in this research lost their ancestral lands starting from the 1970s-1980s. This was ten to fifteen years after Suharto took over the government, introduced an ideology of development, simplified investment and resource management laws, and issued numerous resource exploration permits to numerous corporations, including forestry ones. The first big forest fire took place in Indonesia due to the *el nino* in 1982-83 as a result of widespread logging. This triggered ideas about reforestation within the context of the rise of environmental concerns globally (Nawir et al, 2008; Peluso & Rachman, 2008).

Several communities in my research site said that the first time they lost their access to land was when the government told them that their ancestral land would be used for pine tree planting (the tree often used for reforestation[16] purposes in Indonesia). At this time, some communities doubted but were forced to agree to lend their land to the government because they

[16] Referred to as "reboisasi" by the villagers.

were told the land would be given back to them and they would be able to harvest the pine trees afterwards. Following the agreement of the male village elites, led by the village head, several small companies (CV) logged the gardens of the villagers and planted the pine trees. However, the territory was passed onto TPL instead in the 1990s.

Urbanization

The administrative system of Indonesia was re-organized with the establishment of villages, sub-districts, districts, and provinces with such laws as the Village Law 1979. The processes associated with this re-organisation seem to have encouraged rural communities to move closer to urban areas (major towns of sub-districts). From stories of villagers, they chose to move closer to towns away from their ancestral territories because there was land that they could expand to, and they wanted to be closer to schools for their children and also to the markets, which were now centred in the sub-district towns.

In the past, markets were organized in the villages assigned this role (see, for example, the story of Onan Harbangan Nagasaribu) but with the administrative changes, the market days started to be held in urban areas. For example, in Humbang Hasundutan district, the market day is on Fridays in the town of Dolok Sanggul; in North Tapanuli, it is in the town of Sipahutar, on Tuesdays; and, in Toba Samosir it is on Wednesdays in the town of Porsea. These are the days when all the villagers from the whole district go shopping in the local market. These are also often days off for male farmers as they come back from the forest and hang out at local *kedai*s. Women go shopping, cook for the family and, if they find the time, meet with their neighbours.

Most of the villages I visited have primary schools today. However, the middle school and high school are still situated in the sub-district towns, which are several kilometres away. Children either walk, take a bus (if provided by the village administration), ride a motorbike, or

stay in a dorm in these towns to be able to go to school.

Land shortage or landlessness

Toba Bataks expanded their land by clearing the tropical forest centuries ago. All of the villagers who struggle for land have been on the land for at least ten generations or 250-300 years.[17] For example, in the case of Op. Bolus community, their ancestor, Op. Bolus, centuries ago, looked for a good piece of land that suited for establishing a village and developing a rice field. He found this land, made sure it did not belong to anyone else, cleared the forest, and established his village, which subsequently became *bona pasogit* of his *paparan* (descendants). Later, they moved closer to the town leaving their ancestral territory. Now they lack enough land to farm and expand their village further. In the nearby community of Op. Ronggur, villagers told me that there was no more available land in the village where they lived now to build houses and they would like to have young families build their houses in their ancestral land. Despite the fact that the villagers lacked farming land for several decades now, it seemed to be a relatively new development that they lacked land to build their own houses.

Sometimes, when communities agree to sell their land when approached by external actors they do not realize that they will not be able to open forest as they have in the past. For example, once, a group of male and female villagers from South Tapanuli came to consult with KSPPM. They explained that they were approached by the hydroelectric company to sell their land, and that the village was divided over this. Those who wanted to sell hoped to clear the forest in another area like their ancestors did in the past. To this, KSPPM explained that there is no more forest available to clear anywhere possibly in the whole of Indonesia because everything was mapped and if they cleared a forest without occupants, it was likely to be a conservation forest – something punishable under law and trackable through a satellite mapping.

[17] They count one generation to be 25-30 years.

Company tactics, hopes for "development" and promises of a special consideration

TPL claims that Lumban Sitorus sold their land to them as all the surrounding villages did at the time when the pulp mill was built in the 1980s. The pulp mill was built on the land of five villages. All the other villages owned land individually and sold it to PT. IIU. Lumban Sitorus, however, had the communal land (*tanah harajaon*) on it that was used for buffalo grazing and gardens, and they wanted a special deal. Some villagers attended a meeting with the company and signed an attendance sheet that might have been used as proof that they sold the land. Villagers claim they did not sell the land and did not receive compensation (*ganti rugi*).

This happened in the context of Suharto's development policy. Indonesia had recently become independent and had a strong president whose major attraction for Indonesians was his promise of development. Villagers remember the excitement of this era. Within this context, one of the villagers, Turman Sitorus, who was working in Batam (a city in another province that neighbours Singapore) met with a person looking for land to build a pulp mill. One of the areas under consideration at this time was the Pahae area in North Tapanuli; however, Turman (who now resides in Jakarta), suggested his own ancestral land. From the stories of the villagers, it seems as if the man hoped building the pulp mill in this area would bring development to his village. Villagers hoped for a special deal with the company. As time passed by, villagers realized that they would not get the compensation they were promised, the company did not bring the development they hoped for, and they started to organize themselves to resist and reclaim their land. Most of the villagers are now landless farmers who generally own less than 0.25 ha of land, and the younger generation tends not to have access to land at all. One of the organizers of this resistance, for example, was a landless and unemployed but educated (BA degree from public university) young married man.

Migrating out and back into the ancestral area

Following the establishment of the East Sumatra estate by the Dutch, Toba Bataks started to migrate out of their ancestral territory, looking for work in the estates (Reid, 2010). They were largely Christian and educated by the German missionaries in schools established by them in the late 1800s. After the independence of Indonesia, for which the Toba Bataks also fought, they started to out-migrate for purposes of education and also, for work (Reid, 2010).

Education is regarded highly among the Toba Bataks. For example, each of the families I talked to had at least one child who graduated with a Bachelor's degree (S1). It was not only male children who were given preference for higher education. At the women's workshop at KSPPM in 2017, for example, women expressed that today gender is not a consideration when educating one's children. The most respected families were those who managed to finance the higher education of all of their children. Children's out-migration is regarded as success of the parents because this means that their children found a good occupation and are able to sustain themselves. Out-migrants are expected to come back to their villages as successful people.

However, there are also situations when children do not succeed, and come back. For example, when children face hardships, such as a sudden illness, they may be forced to come back to their ancestral land to heal and then subsequently, settle down. Many middle-aged men and some women came back to their village due to health issues, financial issues, sudden job loss, or family-related problems. The elderly also came back to their *bona pasogit* to live off their land and die. For example, one of the men in his late 50s who was leading the resistance in one of the villages of *Humbahas* did not grow up in his ancestral village but rather in a town six-hour drive away where his parents settled down. He was not able to establish himself in this town as the second-generation migrant (despite growing up in it) and, therefore, returned to his

ancestral village to become a farmer. But soon he found out that he did not have access to land. He became landless in a rural area with only one *rantai* of rice field for his family of three children. The territory under conflict, then, was the only land he could access to sustain his family. Another younger person moved back to his ancestral village with his wife and two children after having lived in the Bekasi area of Jakarta. Both worked at a textile factory owned by a Korean national. The father became sick and the family had to move back to the ancestral village, recovering eventually due to the herbal medicine found in the forest. He explained that in Jakarta it was hot and stuffy and he was under a lot of stress. The native land and air helped him to recover from his sickness and so they decided to stay with family and harvest *kemenyan*. He needed more land to support his family.

The low price of kemenyan in the 1980s

According to Garcia Fernandez (2004), the price of *kemenyan* fell in the 1980s. This coincides with the start of the reforestation program from the government and the establishment of the pulp mill, which might then have been seen as a good opportunity for villagers. This might have led to the abandonment of the *kemenyan* forest, especially for those villages who could afford to switch to other cash crops, such as coffee, pineapple or orange trees. The more remote villagers might have continued to harvest *kemenyan* due to a lack of access to information or other cash crops. In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, for example, villagers claimed that the soil there was not fertile (with stones) making it difficult for villagers to grow other cash crops. Today villagers here, however, also grow an arabica coffee known by the market name of *Lintong* although they do not grow vegetables even for their own consumption.

As demonstrated in this section, a combination of factors led to the loss of lands for these communities in the 1970s-1980s. These are larger historical and political reasons that related to

government policies and the hype that was created at the time, such as the agenda of development that Suharto pushed for throughout his presidency and the aftersound of this in rural areas. Economic reasons, such as a drop of prices of certain agricultural products that prompted villagers to seek other cash crops leading to land-use changes were contributing factors. Additionally, political and social changes with hierarchical administrative structures that occurred in Indonesia at this time led to greater urbanization and centralization. There were also psychocultural reasons, tied to beliefs and ideas of the Toba Batak families that relate to such concepts as development, education, out-migration, and *bona pasogit*.

5.2 The start of resistance

Toba Bataks have a long history of resistance to Islamization, colonization, and also Christianization. It is only with the strategy of Nommensen that they were Christianized (Reid, 2010; Pelzer 1961). Some of the elders in Sipituhuta and Pandumaan, for example, mentioned their resistance to the Dutch announcement of *Register 41* (which seems to have mapped their *kemenyan* forest as part of the state forest zone).[18]

In Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, resistance against the PT TPL's presence started in the sub-district of Pollung in 2007. This was the time when all the affected villages, twelve villages of the sub-district, protested. These protests, however, soon subsided because the leaders of the resistance were bought off and, therefore, silenced. The initial protests were mostly led by the elites with minimal involvement of female members of the communities, both elite and non-elite. However, elite women tend to be more informed about issues, problems, and plans because they are the ones who host the meetings. The initial protests did not include the two villages of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, and they continued to monitor their border with the plantation.

When conflict erupted anew circa 2009, there was no coordinated cooperation between

[18] I did not find historical or archival records of this in the literature I reviewed.

the two neighbouring villages. One of the villagers went to check which trees the company was felling to find out that the company was felling the trees that belonged to them. At this time, he also met with the villagers from Pandumaan who were also checking on the forest. The Pandumaan villagers suspected that the villagers from Sipituhuta sold their forest to the company. The male villagers from Pandumaan and Sipituhuta then conversed, first, in the forest, later, in the village, and found out that they had the same goal: to stop the company from felling the trees in the benzoin forest. This realization of a common goal led to the announcement of a united struggle of the *kemenyan* farmers (*petani kemenyan*) of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta.

They confronted the company in the forest and organized protests at government buildings. At this stage it was mostly men who were involved in the resistance. At one of these demonstrations, a person named Guntur approached and informed about an organization called KSPPM. By this time, villagers had been approached by various NGOs ("fake ones," according to villagers) and lawyers. In the end, villagers decided to invite several of these NGOs and lawyers, including KSPPM, to lay out their plans for helping them. Each of the "helpers" relayed their plans about how they could work together, and based on the explanations, villagers picked KSPPM.

In the case of one of the villages in the Sipahutar area, villagers were watching the news at the central *kedai* where men gathered to drink *tuak*, smoke and share news. They discussed village and district politics at these *kedai*s, including the issue of land access. There were increasing reports about land conflicts throughout Indonesia as well as AMAN. This made them interested in the work of AMAN and they started to draw parallels between their ancestral land appropriation by the company and these communities who appeared in the news. They started to express an overall interest in organizing around their land as well. At the same time, after

hearing about the *kemenyan* forest struggle of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, one of the priests who worked in this village in the 1980s visited them to find out about their *kemenyan* forest. He heard their story and connected them to KSPPM.

A third village got to know about KSPPM through a *kedai*. One of the community members used to spend time at *kedai*s on market days in the small sub-district capital town of Sipahutar. Here, he first heard about how farmers could be organized to advocate on their own behalf, the work of KSPPM, and he became interested in bringing KSPPM into his village. They invited KSPPM as farmers. With the help of KSPPM, the community organized a farmer's group (*kelompok tani*). As a KSPPM farmer's group, they received training in advocacy, legal awareness, and other more practical farming-related skills (such as compost-making, organic farming (*selaras alam*), and gender equality). They also started to learn about human rights and Indigenous peoples' rights through workshops conducted by KSPPM. They interacted with other communities that fought to reclaim their land. These interactions led them to realize that they also could resist and fight to reclaim their ancestral land.

The fourth village had resisted on and off for the previous three decades before they started to resist again in 2015. Their organization emerged out of the *kedai* discussions also. This was the time when the village head did not have a contract with the company. All the families in the village were involved in resistance, but by the time I arrived at the village in 2018, only 50% of the community was still actively trying to influence TPL. The village head by this time had obtained a contract from the company and was no longer supportive of the resistance. He was, in fact, in clear opposition to the resisting families and punished those who supported the resistance. Thus, for example, families who were dependent on the local government for the

reception of *raskin*[19] (*beras miskin*) could not oppose the village head's position.

The resisting villagers became connected to KSPPM a few months after they started their struggle through one of KSPPM board members with family connection to this community. KSPPM, however, was not willing to take them on due to the history of unstable and uncommitted struggle and the difficulty of organizing them despite the physical proximity of this community to their branch office. Only after many visits from community members, did KSPPM decide to take on their case. This was the only community that decided to later choose mediation due to the specifics of their case. The ancestral land that they fight for is where the pulp mill is built under the permit of HGU. This is not a state forest zone.

In another case, I went with KSPPM to one of the villages that was told that their territory was part of a marble mining concession and they had to sell their land to the company because the company had a mining license. These villagers asked KSPPM to help them strategize. I went to their first meeting. At this meeting, KSPPM learnt about the chronology of events in the village and explained about their rights as well as the rights and responsibilities of the government, including the police forces. Villagers expressed fear of the military that could be involved as it used to be during the Suharto dictatorship. KSPPM responded that under the law today, the military could not become involved in civil affairs. KSPPM also explained to them that resistance was a long-term commitment: it would be hard and might take years of struggle but it could be successful if villagers were united and stood their ground. Villagers thanked KSPPM and asked them to come and witness the meeting with the government and the company officials the next day. They also said they were meeting with all the villagers in the evening to plan for a meeting. I did not join the next day because my presence could have been a security risk for myself, villagers, and KSPPM. However, I saw a KSPPM video footage of the event.

[19] Subsidized rice.

Villagers prepared a demonstration against mining expressing their refusal. Women carried their placards and organized awareness-raising conversations on the spot about other sub-districts where communities agreed to a mining and later found their village polluted and threatened. The men relayed their disagreement in official clothing in an official manner while women were outside protesting.

These stories of the start of resistance struggles prove that villagers organize themselves, first, as an immediate response to an external threat. The exposure to similar stories, access to information or to respected and known people within communities who have access to relevant information are key in the emergence of resistance. It is important that villagers have access to public places, such as *kedai*s because these are places where discussions take place. The *kedai*s are a male space, a place dominated by men. The start of the resistance, therefore, is not a decision that involves women. Decisions to invite external actors, such as KSPPM, are decisions reached mainly by men. Women rarely go to *kedai*s to have drinks, unless they work at this *kedai*. Later, villagers find an association with an NGO if they have this access to information (social capital).

There is a widespread public opinion that NGOs are the instigators of these resistance struggles or that NGOs are somehow behind these struggles in the Global South. However, the evidence in my field site shows that this is not the case. Threatened or aggrieved populations are exposed to various pieces of information both from their immediate networks, *kedai*s and the media, drawing parallels to their own situation, and, then, if they find it useful for themselves, they cooperate with an NGO. Communities are also critical of which NGOs or parties they choose to cooperate within their struggle.

Byrne & Nadan's (2011) model does not cover the above-mentioned elements of

organising or contentious politics. In the case of Toba Bataks mobilization, I can see the significant role that the informal mobilizing structures, such as *kedai*s have played, as well as access to "constituents" (in this case, KSPPM), apart from the immediate political opportunities, such as the felling of the trees, the closer encroachment of the company towards the benzoin forest, etc. The organising is also largely gendered due to the gendered space division that then encourages gendered role division in the resistance.

5.3 The role of NGOs in resistance

NGOs play various roles in strengthening resistance by villagers. Without this collaboration with an NGO, resistance in North Sumatra would not have been possible. This points to the importance of the role of "constituents" in a mobilisation. Collaboration with NGOs provides communities with key strategic tools. In this section, based on my analysis of the data, I outline the following roles of NGOs: legal accompaniment and education, political accompaniment, the employment of cultural symbols in organizing, conflict resolution at the level of community, promotion of nonviolence, and gender mainstreaming.

Legal accompaniment and education

As the communities and NGOs develop a relationship, they start to strategize together. NGOs play a key role in organizing these communities and strengthening their spirit. This is done in several ways by the supporting NGO. The first aspect of NGO contribution to resistance is legal knowledge. Today, the staff of KSPPM is diverse. There are those who studied sociology, geography, and other social sciences; however, some of the key organizers, especially the older generation and those who advocate on behalf of the communities were educated in law and work closely with an organization that understands law. This is crucial because KSPPM can receive legal consultation from practicing lawyers who work at a partner NGO based in Medan

called Bakumsu (*Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Advokasi Rakyat Sumatra Utara, North Sumatra People's Legal Aid and Advocacy Association*). Lawyers from this organization help assess district regulations that are currently under consideration, advocate on behalf of criminalized farmers, and provide other legal assistance. They also educate villagers about their rights as citizens of the country and Indigenous peoples.

Most of the villagers expressed that their cooperation with KSPPM allowed them to gain legal knowledge about their rights. This made them feel secure and helped realise that it is their right to protect their land. With this knowledge, they could also engage government officials and security forces in a persuasive dialogue resulting in the development of a tactic that can be called "*discursive or dialogic resistance*."

Political accompaniment of villagers

NGOs may accompany villagers to have an audience with government officials both at the district or national level. At the district level, villagers often try to meet with the district head. While mostly men, women are also encouraged to join; however, women often remain silent in these meetings. The audience can be sought as part of a protest campaign or as part of legal advocacy towards the recognition of the Indigenous people's rights in the district (for a *Perda*). Within the context of a protest campaign, the district head might try to avoid KSPPM accompanying the villagers. Villagers can be differentiated from KSPPM staff based on how they are dressed. However, villagers usually bring with them a younger KSPPM staff providing them with a sense of security and helping them grasp the gist of the conversation. When villagers go to Jakarta to meet the Minister or the President, the KSPPM director or the advocacy division coordinator usually accompanies them. They gain access to these officials through KSPPM which has a number of allies within the government and the national NGOs who share these

networks with them.

Using cultural concepts in organizing

KSPPM uses a tool called, in Batak, *marturi-turian,* in organizing the communities and strengthening their belief in their own righteousness. In the beginning, villagers sometimes lack confidence in the claims they make and, as one of the organizers explained to me, it takes a process of historical story-telling, *marturi-turian*, to confirm to the villagers the righteousness of their claims. While the NGO activists talked about *marturi-turian*, villagers also often mentioned *tarombo* (knowing one's ancestors or the stories about the ancestral tree). *Marturi-turian* means telling the history of the people, the family. As explained by one of the activists: "For example, my grandma used to tell me our history. She told me stories about Lake Toba, villages there, forest, and the spirits. Why did she tell me that? So that forest is taken care of because it is our source of life."

Marturi-turian is experienced by Toba Batak children. KSPPM also employs it in its organizing by eliciting the memory of the villagers and encouraging them to share their ancestors' knowledge. Writing these stories and then, telling them back contributes to villagers' understanding of their own history. Then, together with the villagers, KSPPM activists "make sense of their own histories." This process helps villagers to connect the past with the present, how they came to be Christian, how they became the citizens of this country, their connection to land, and what is their future.

The activist further explains that this work with communities aims to "to restructure *adat."* They differentiate between the revitalization of *adat* and its restructuring. As explained by one of the activists:

> Restructuring means putting together the remnants that are still there. … Revitalization

means that there is something lost and we build it again. For me personally, I do not like revitalization but I prefer restructuring. And what we mean by that is strengthening. … If we revitalize that means we play a greater role, we tell the people it is supposed to be like this. But when we restructure we take what is there in the village and what is hidden in their lives (meaning we make them aware of the hidden structures in their daily lives). That is what we do and even restructuring is quite difficult in the villages because of many factors, such as religion, education, governance structure. In 1979 it all became a village (*desa*). This had a tremendous influence on all the social changes. And, culture left history...

Another organizer shared how they use Batak philosophy in their accompaniment:

> We always use local values, local terms. [...] so that they believe in their own law of *adat (hukum adat*), in comparison to all the other laws, even the law of the state (*hukum negara*). For example, in the Batak *adat* law, we have a philosophical statement that says "*Sidapot solub do na ro*." This means that there is *adat* law in this village, so, anyone who comes to their village has to follow this law. Not them following the laws of other people who come to their land but these other people following their law. This means they have the strength to keep their *adat* law and their *adat* law is strong and anyone who comes to them has to follow it. [...] Another example is that the farmers believe they do not need to study because they are in the forest, in the field and they do not have a high level of education and they assume that learning is for school children, not for farmers. To rebut this assumption … we say to them "*Nabisuk nampuna hata, naoto tu panggadisan*" meaning "usually the smart one will decide and the fool will become an object and will be sold."

Activists find these proverbs and use them to help people think more critically about their own assumptions.

Resolution of minor non-adat related horizontal conflicts

Another key role of NGOs is uniting the villagers and resolving horizontal conflicts that may be key in terms of unity and strength of the local resistance. For example, at the beginning of the movement in the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, KSPPM helped to work out a strategy for uniting the villagers. At the time, some community members were paid off by the company to oppose the resistance movement. The community, in consultation with KSPPM, agreed that this was a "divide and rule" tactic of the company and the community would not give in to this disruption of unity. Instead, they spoke individually with the people who took money from the company and forgave them, choosing not to exclude them while organizing a traditional ritual to keep them all united in their struggle. It is important to note, however, that the community members who were corrupted were not *adat* leaders. This made a difference to this resolution of the internal conflict.

If the *adat* leaders had been corrupted in the case of the two villages, it would have been almost impossible to resolve this issue. This could be demonstrated by the case of *Dusun 1* (Hamlet 1) of Sipituhuta whose *adat* leader was supportive of TPL due to the contract he received from it. In this hamlet, lower-class villagers who did not benefit in a major way from the company were stealthily supportive of the resistance and the *adat* leader and his family cooperated with the company. KSPPM did not think this was an important *dusun* in relation to the resistance and, therefore, did not try to organize this *dusun.* When an *adat* leader is not in agreement with one's agenda, this can be seen as a lost deal within the context of Toba Batak *paradaton* (*adat* structure). One of the migrants in this *dusun* described *adat* as a "small

kingdom system." Due to this structure of the kingdom, *adat* is also vulnerable to various internal and external manipulations.

The resistance continued without the support of *Dusun 1*. However, this dynamic also points to an existing weakness of these communities; *adat* can not only be the strength and strategy of the struggle, but it can also be the weakness and the tool to weaken it. Not only does *adat* give hope to these communities but it can also become a tool that then forces them into the loss of access and control of the land. In this same *dusun 1* in Marade, the poorer villagers (of which there is a majority) are supportive of resistance, however, they cannot join in resistance due to the *raja bius* in their *dusun* supporting the company.

Nonviolence and its promotion as a strategy of resistance

KSPPM plays a key role in promoting nonviolence as a strategy of resistance. KSPPM itself was established with nonviolence as its founding principle which seems to have its roots in the Christian-inspired ethics of KSPPM. For example, Priest Nelson Siregar associated with KSPPM, in his reflection on KSPPM's spirituality points to the Book of Revelations of the New Testament, Chapter 13, where the article is interpreted as explaining power and how KSPPM is to resist this power, and he points at nonviolence as key to the achievement of success (Siregar, 2015).

There is also a strategic reason as to why KSPPM chooses to ensure the nonviolence of resistance. Here, Novita explained:

> Actually, we at KSPPM have a principle that the struggle should always be nonviolent. This is what we tell the communities. We fight and have to avoid what is called violence. Now, that means that apart from supporting nonviolence, we also explain that everything that is violent has its consequences. For example, for Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, from the

> beginning, we explained that and we told them that from our experience in other places if violence takes place people will be criminalized and this will, in fact, steal our concentration on our struggle because we will need to deal then with our friends who are criminalized. And this will finally lead to the loss of focus on the land. We also explain that it will be their families who will be victims if they commit violence due to criminalization. We also explain that everyone should follow this principle.

Villagers explain that KSPPM encourages them to remain non-violent, trains them in nonviolence, and teaches them nonviolent discipline. As *Ompung Doli* Dewi (the grandfather) said:

> Actually, we already wanted to commit violence, women already wanted to commit violence against men who were working there. All the women wanted to go to the forest and do things they wanted, bringing sticks, beat, strip naked… We already agreed we would do this but KSPPM then came and said: "Do not do that because there will be victims from people if people commit violence. We can accompany you." If they hadn't told us that, we would surely have committed violence.

Therefore, KSPPM's commitment to nonviolence was key in ensuring the nonviolence of the resistance. Their commitment to nonviolence is more strategic than principled in the current context. Neither the villagers nor the activists employed nonviolence in a Gandhian way by analysing the structures of injustice (Gandhi, 1957). Instead, they saw it as a strategy to protect themselves from the company or state violence (Sharp, 2005).

This nonviolence also brought greater support from allied government officials. As explained by *Opung* Delima, one of the government officials said to him: "Keep fighting, Mister. And in your fight for your rights, please, do not break offices or anything else." To this *Opung*

Delima responded:

> Be calm, *Bapak* [Sir, lit. father], as long as we fight we won't destroy even one piece of paper because we know that people inside the government and those who sit in it change. Who knows maybe one day our children will work here. This is the office of all Indonesian people. This made *Kapolda* [head of the regional police office] cry.

Gender mainstreaming and the importance of this in organizing communities

Gender mainstreaming promotes gender equality through a set of policies or programming that facilitate this. There are several prominent women's rights activists in the Board of Directors of KSPPM who are employed by Komnas Perempuan. Many of the KSPPM staff are articulate women with clear and strong leadership skills. Many community members, especially within the *pengorganisasian* (organizing) group were women. For example, I attended several of the *Tobasa* farmer's groups' meetings and there, despite the official leader being a man, it was more women who attended these meetings. KSPPM also provided workshops and training to women on gender equality, domestic violence, and other issues that concerned villagers.

In relation to the organizing of resistance, KSPPM plays a crucial role in bringing women into direct action. They do this using various strategies. For example, Novita of KSPPM said that she often joked that as a woman she did not feel comfortable being the only one at the meeting, and, therefore, it was important to bring in more women so that she had friends of the same gender. KSPPM asked them to bring these women to meetings with the district head or meetings with the officials in Jakarta at MoEF and the Presidential Palace. This forced villagers to look for women leaders. Many of the women were not confident and lacked public speaking skills. Eventually, one woman became a women's representative because she had some level of

confidence in speaking at church meetings and had knowledge of *adat*. The woman's husband was also supportive of her taking up a leadership role. Several other women were also encouraged to join meetings, but these rotated.

This section explained the role NGOs play in this type of nonviolent resistance. Their work is crucial in ensuring that the communities feel they have a right to resist injustices, that their resistance is rightful. This process requires a cultural process that is based on the concept of Toba Batak traditional story-telling, *marturi-turian* and *tarombo*. Thus, the process of framing by the constituents that is based on the knowledge of local cultural values and practices becomes key for the emergence of ethnic mobilisation. Byrne & Nadan (2011) mention that storytelling can be a process through which the stories of exclusion are shared, however, in the context of those who claim a right to land on the basis of ancestral connection, story-telling carries an affirmative element that then transpires into a social action. This can be part of forming the "value rationality" in the framing process that is crucial for ethnic mobilisation, according to Varshney (2003).

NGOs also play a crucial role in rationalizing nonviolence as a strategy to the communities who may not always be aware of its strategic importance. The resistance of the villagers in North Sumatra employs nonviolence in a Sharpian way, rather than Gandhian. Nonviolence is crucial in avoiding repression and winning over the authorities.

Finally, gender mainstreaming also leads to greater inclusion of women into resistance, although often fails to raise more structural discussions about gender justice as argued by Mukhopadhyay (2004). Due to gender mainstreaming policies and attempts of KSPPM, women are drawn into a space that may not traditionally be theirs, such as a meeting hall where the adherents together with the constituents strategise. The constituents' gender plays an important

role in this inclusion of women in the planning process.

5.4 Resisting and reclaiming the ancestral land

The communities under consideration have sporadically campaigned to protect their territory from the company acquisition in the 1980s and the 1990s depending on when their lands were taken from them. However, in the 1980s not everyone had enough strength or access to information to strategise resistance, even though then and today communities resisted nonviolently. In this section, I review the main tactics and methods used by the villagers in their resistance and touch upon the general dynamics of resistance.

5.4.1 History of resistance in the area

One example of resistance often mentioned in my interviews with people who remember the initial resistance to the company is the case of the village of “Siriaria.” Siriaria is a village in the sub-district of Pollung, in the district of Humbang Hasundutan. Women of this village marched onto Dolok Sanggul, the capital city of the district, standing up against the land appropriation for the reforestation program in the 1970s-1980s. I did not find any references to this case in the KSPPM archives, however, the case was mentioned by a number of informants both in the villages of the sub-district of Pollung and also the local activists. Resistance of these women in Siriaria was successful because they managed to get acknowledgement of their ancestral land by the Suharto regime (personal communication with Sinurat, 2020).[20] Another well-known case of nonviolent direct action is the women of the village of Sugapa who managed to reclaim their land de facto (not de jure until now) by pressuring the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Rudini, through a nonviolent direct action in Jakarta with the support of KSPPM and WALHI.

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[20] Lasron Sinurat is a historian who is currently conducting archival research about this case. I met him in January, 2020 in Yogyakarta.

Despite this nonviolent direct action employed by some communities in their resistance, the majority of the villages in my study (those reclaiming their land today) mentioned that they allowed the company to fell their older *kemenyan* trees and plant eucalyptus trees in their place because of the violence they faced at the time from the "apparatus." There might have been other reasons, too, however, such as those listed in the previous section on the history of the land. But it is not surprising that resistance was prone to be the weakest in the remote areas of *Taput*. In addition, during this time, the company worked with the security forces, and, villagers, afraid to dare to protest in their presence, did not resist openly.

5.4.2 Targets of resistance

When I asked villagers about the source of the conflict, I received conflicting responses from both men and women. Some claimed that it was a company that was the root cause of the conflict and others claimed that it was the government. The men tended to focus on the government and its policies as the source of the conflict, while women tended to focus on the company. However, some men also pointed out the role of both the government and the company. The resistance, however, aims to pressure both government and company to acknowledge their land rights.

The company is pressured on the ground by communities and NGOs, and at the international level by two major international organizations: Canopy, based in Vancouver, Canada, and Rainforest Action Network (RAN) based in San Francisco, USA. In a rare case, one community chose to mediate its conflict with the company due to the pressure from these INGOs. The conflict was mediated by an Indonesian independent mediator.

The pressure on the government is exerted by various means. One way is through nonviolent direct action. Nonviolent direct action helps villagers to draw the attention of officials

to their case, protect themselves from state violence, and gain political access to the higher levels of government. In the next section, I will elaborate on the example of nonviolent direct action by the villagers of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta.

5.4.3 *Protective* nonviolent direct action by villagers of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta

I define the nonviolent resistance of villagers of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta as "protective" based on the analysis of the locations and the various roles women and men played in resistance. There were five locations and, in each location, women and men played varying roles. The five locations are: the border between their garden forest and the company's concession area with the Eucalyptus plantation and felled trees; their village; the district capital city; the Police headquarters in Medan, the provincial capital city; and, the national capital city of Jakarta and MoEF. In this section, I present the overview of the resistance in these locations and argue that both men and women in this community played a gendered *protective* role: men protected the forest and women protected the village and the men (or, their family).

The forest is where men had a direct confrontation with the company workers or the security forces. In one example, the Pandumaan-Sipituhuta villagers set the excavator on fire and physically blocked the access of loggers into the forest in order to blockade the felling of the trees and to protect the ancestral gardens. The Police Brigade (Brimob) was often called by the company to protect its employees and confront the villagers. One confrontation with the Mobile Brigade led to the arrest of their weaponry by the villagers. Villagers then were reported and this led to the criminalization of the leaders of the resistance. The forest is also a place where men seek protection from criminalization. Thus, the criminalized male leaders of the movement hid in the forest during the time when they were listed as *DPO* (*daftar pencarian orang,* police search list).

The village is the second location of the resistance, where women played an active role. The village of Sipituhuta is closer to the highway, whereas Pandumaan is about two or three kilometres in. Sipituhuta is divided into three hamlets. The first one is supportive of TPL and is known as Marade (a spot where people wait for inter-village busses). The second hamlet is 500 meters into the village road and resistance started here. Women played two crucial roles here. The first was to protect men from being arrested and criminalized. To do this, for example, they blocked the highway on Marade to search the passing-by cars and ensure their husbands were not being moved. The second role was to protect the village from the police entering their territory. For example, at one point the road from Marade to Amang Siska's house was covered in bush trees to block access into the village. Women cooked their meals in front of Amang Siska's house in the second hamlet, ready to strip their breasts naked to protect the village and make the police retreat.

The third location is in the capital of the district. Three major buildings were key: the local government office, the police headquarters, and the district parliament building. When sixteen male leaders of the resistance from Pandumaan-Sipituhuta were arrested, all the villagers went to the police headquarters and organized an overnight sit-in. They camped on the police headquarter grounds with their children. Some put their newborn children in front of the police during a demonstration and asked the police to take the children (*makan anak*) because taking away the forest and putting husbands in jail meant the same as killing the future of their children. At the government building (*kantor bupati*), they organized demonstrations to meet with the *bupati*, to pressure the government to release their ancestral territory of over 5,000 hectares of land from the TPL concession permit area and issue a *Perda* (regional regulation) to recognize their rights as Indigenous peoples (*masyarakat adat*). Following the height of the conflict and

when the conflict moved towards resolution following the Presidential Decision letter, the demonstrations at the Bupati's office were replaced by demonstrations and visits to the Parliament because its role was paramount in the issuance of the District Regulation to recognize the villages of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta as the Indigenous people.

The fourth location of protests was the Police Headquarters in Medan in the capital city of the province of North Sumatra. This protest was organized when the arrested male leaders were moved to this police office. Women paid prison visits to their husbands and protested in front of the Police Headquarters. The women reminisced that this was one of the most challenging times of their lives, especially for those women whose husbands were jailed.

The fifth location was the capital city and MoEF. Here, KSPPM ensured that there would be women's representation but it was mostly men who went to meet with the officials. Villagers had advocacy meetings with the representative of MoEF to explain their case. This is more a case of rightful resistance where more men were involved. In conceptualising rightful resistance neither O'Brien & Li (2006) nor Schock (2015) discuss the gendered dynamics of this type of resistance.

Women played a key role in demanding justice and were in the frontline of the direct-action campaigns at the village, district, and provincial levels, whereas men played a crucial role in the forest resistance, the direct confrontation with the TPL employees, security, and the Mobile Brigade as well as in the capital city of the nation, in Jakarta. Men and women employed what can be called a *protective* resistance. In this *protective* resistance, women tended to employ a *defensive* method without the use of violence, whereas men combined both defensive and offensive methods, which often bordered on violence. This goes along with the observations of several researchers that women tend to prefer nonviolent methods of resistance (for example, see

Codur & King (2015) and Beckwith (2002)). Men tended to either capture/destroy the property of the state or of the company that was directly involved in the felling of the trees. The felling of the trees was violence against them, thus, the destruction of property was in self-defense. However, the men restrained from destroying the property of the state or of the company when it was not in self-defense. Considering this dynamic, I define villagers' resistance overall as nonviolent, however, the employment of violence in the forest, especially in the beginning of the resistance before villagers started to be trained in nonviolent discipline (see Nepstad, 2008 for some discussion of the importance of discipline), I see as *defensive violence* that then brought strategic benefits. As mentioned by one of the male leaders of the resistance, without the criminalization that resulted from the three acts of the property destruction (putting the excavator on fire, capturing of the chainsaws and of the weaponry), there would not have been the national and international exposure of their case.

The sites also reflected the roles of men and women in the communities. Men protected the forest, their main job site, whereas women protected the village. Men tended to go out of their region, whereas women stayed close to home. When women went to the capital city of Jakarta, it was upon the encouragement of KSPPM. Another dimension of the gendered nature of resistance was the fact that women not only protected their village, but also their husbands, fathers, and brothers from the power of the state and the capital. All this indicates that the "ethics of care" is at work within the context of Toba Batak women's resistance as well (Gilligan, 2003; Faver, 2001; Jordan, 2003). At the same time, this also indicates that women generally have a higher structure of patriarchy to resist as well.

5.4.4 Locally-developed methods of *proactive* nonviolent resistance

Villagers employed more traditional "repertoires of contention," such as protest

demonstrations, blockades, sit-ins, prison visits, and others, as mentioned in the previous section (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2004). As argued before, these carried the intention of protection. However, villagers also resisted *proactively* using methods developed with the help of KSPPM (and wider national and international networks). Some of these methods are: farming, symbolic resistance (*plangisasi)*, mapping, NGO-supported advocacy, *adat*, discursive and dialogic resistance, using elective power, prayers, songs and church, discipline to maintain their righteousness, body as a resistance tool, the spiritual strength and solidarity they drew from *kemenyan* itself, and the specific use of the word "struggle." I suggest that these methods of proactive nonviolent resistance are locally developed and are most likely to be found within land conflicts worldwide in the Global South. I will elaborate on each of these.

"Farming as resistance"

Farmers reclaimed land by planting it. This strategy was used mostly by those villagers who were landless. Since farming is women's occupation in these villages, it was women who played a crucial role in developing this strategy. And, the strategy was used in the areas where women lack land for farming, such as in the villages of Aek Lung and Op. Ronggur. In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta most villagers have enough access to land with some having 0.25 hectares of rice fields at a minimum and most having 1 and more hectares of forest. Land ownership is defined by one's *marga* and how much land was passed onto the children by their ancestors. However, other villagers in *Humbahas* or *Taput* do not have access to land, holding one *rantai* of rice fields on average. The only way these villagers can access extra land for their livelihood is through farming the lands under the TPL license that they claim to be their ancestral land. Thus, for example, Aek Lung villagers planted the land they reclaimed with vegetables turning it into their main source of income. Villagers in several *Taput* villages also planted the

reclaimed land with pineapples managing to sell these as a source of extra cash. Some villagers (such as Op. Ronggur) built wooden huts on the reclaimed land and planned to relocate their houses there. Villagers here argue that tilling the land was the most successful strategy that, in fact, made them feel that the land belonged to them.

In the beginning of the reclamation, villagers had some confrontations with the company. Unknown people burnt down their huts. But for the last few years, there have been no confrontations and the company let them peacefully plant and harvest the crops. This could be the result of the advocacy work done by such international organizations as Canopy and RAN which lobby, among others, the pulp and paper companies to introduce a sustainability policy which includes human rights-based approaches into their business. Thus, TPL started a sustainability policy in 2015 (TPL, 2018). Since the start of this sustainability policy, villagers who reclaim their land from the company have not experienced disturbances.

Symbolic resistance

Plangisasi is a strategy that has been written about previously by other researchers. The lands under TPL concession are usually given a signpost that reads that the land is subject to a concession permit given to TPL by the government. Male villagers of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta started to put up signposts following MK 35. One of the signposts, for example, read: "Information: Customary forest of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta is not State Forest Anymore according to the MK decision No. 35/PUU-X/2012." These signposts are one way villagers show the company that the territory is under a "*stanvas*" or temporary stoppage due to a conflict. These signposts mimic the TPL signposts put up in the areas under their concession permit. In my interviews, the respondents did not mention this as a significant strategy. One of the organizers described this strategy as "*ikut-ikutan*" or "just following others." But as Rachman

(2016) argues this strategy can be seen as a symbolic strategy because it sends a message to the company and the government that the land is a customary territory.

Mapping of one's territory

This is an NGO-led strategy because it is the NGO staff who has the skills to conduct mapping with special GIS equipment. It is also an NGO that then draws these maps together with the male community members to pass these onto BRWA (*Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat,* Body for Registering Customary Territory) administered by JKPP. Mapping allows villagers to understand the size of their land, agree on the borders of their territory together with the other bordering communities, and present this map to the government so that the government understands the size of the land that is being claimed by the communities. The government does not always trust these maps. For example, in one of my interviews, a legal expert explained that according to the government and the company, some of the claims were suspicious because the border of the territory was sometimes where the company road was. He thought that this was good grounds to doubt the validity of the communities' claims that they knew where their original border was. I raised this issue with one of the activists who explained the villagers knew the border of their territory based on hills and other natural signs. Company's activities changed the territorial landscape making it hard to recollect the exact borders.

Negotiations and lobbying the government - "advocacy"

There are two different levels of urgency felt by the communities. The first is when livelihood is threatened directly. In this case, nonviolent direct action goes hand in hand or is followed by advocacy (method of pressuring the local and the central government). The second case is when communities lost access to their ancestral land for several decades already and had enough land. In this case, nonviolent resistance is the second choice because it is seen as too

radical (even violent). These villagers prefer advocacy.

KSPPM connects villagers to Jakarta-based networks and movements. This way, villagers get a hearing inside the government, meeting with officials and presenting their case. KSPPM also invites officials to their office in Parapat to organize hearings on whose behalf they advocate, and sometimes government officials try to mediate between the company and the villagers. Through this kind of advocacy and the support of Dr. Noer Fauzi Rachman who was then a member of the Presidential cabinet, Pandumaan-Sipituhuta obtained a Presidential decision letter.

The objectives of the villagers in lobbying the local and the national government are two-fold. The first objective, especially, in relation to the local government is to get a *Perda* recognizing the rights of the Indigenous peoples, which will automatically give them a strong legal ground to get a recognition of their customary forest. The second major objective is to get a resolution or support from the central government in relation to this *Perda* by either issuing a Decision Letter or pressuring the local government. Despite the fact that the legal work can be more powerful at the district level in today's Indonesia, KSPPM finds it harder to access the district government compared to the national government. In the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, for example, the local district-level parliament, as claimed by villagers, was controlled by parliamentarians who had a conflict of interest concerning the presence of TPL in the district and the province because 27 (out of 28) parliamentarians had contracts with TPL. Villagers saw the central government as key to the resolution of their conflicts. There is also a stronger civil society support at the national level as opposed to the district level. Civil society at the district level is weak also due to a lack of independent, well-funded media.

Adat as resistance

Adat is used strategically by KSPPM and villagers to unite people. For example, one of the leaders of the village resistance committee, Amang Polly made an *adat* ceremony called "*ate-ate na dirusuk*" ("*pakai lidih*") in 2010/2011. At this ceremony, he cut a pig and fed the villagers. Thus, everyone present made a promise, by eating the pig's liver, that they will not give up and betray the other villagers. He said "I invited people from both villages. If they eat the pork at that festival that means they have promised. They are all me, I say. I am not one person but all of them. One for all, all for one is the principle." Soon after this, leaders were sought after by the police. And, if the police asked villagers where the leader was, villagers responded that they were all that person. He clarified, "I know that law is for an individual but it is not for a community. Community cannot be put in prison."

Discursive and dialogic resistance

Several members of the male leadership at the community level are able to express their ideas in a critical manner. Their critical understanding of their situation was extended by the additional legal training they received from KSPPM giving them more confidence in their analysis. This skill became useful when villagers met with security forces and engaged in a dialogue with them during face to face meetings. For example, one of the prominent villagers, Ompung Delima, told me how he engaged a Police Head at the provincial level in a discussion about history. Villagers' claim that they were in that land before the Dutch occupation was questioned by the regional Police Head (Kapolda) and to this Ompung Delima responded:

> You say this as a *Kapolda* [Head of the Regional Police]… Even though you yourself do not know when Indonesia was established, you were not even in the womb of your mother, but, still, you are brave enough to tell this to your subordinates, the history of Indonesia, right? Because you have read this in a book, you have not seen it with your own eyes, and

> now you are questioning me about this… We are also just like you, we learnt this from our ancestors' stories… It's true that I was not a witness to this myself but history is there… The only difference between you and us is that you have *SK* [a decision letter] and we do not. But there is no government without those whom it governs because it is us who provide you with food. If we, people, are silent, do not work, how will you get your food, Mister? So, do not side with the company, Mister. The company has enough, wealth, and more… We, small people, are not counted in but our taxes are collected little by little and that is what helps the government meet its needs. The businessmen will not be businessmen for the rest of their lives. If God does not allow them, they will go bankrupt. But small people, whatever happens, will always be there. The company can end. So, do not look down on us, Mister. Maybe, your father who had given birth to you was just like us, a farmer, maybe, a small person, like us, we are not rebels, we are not squatters on other peoples' lands, what was inherited to us by our ancestors that is what we hold onto…

Another conversation told to me was by Amang Jenny. He also had a conversation with the Police Head who showed the Constitution and showed article 33 which said that "water, land and everything underneath belongs to the State/Country (*Negara*)…" To this Amang Jenny showed his identification card (*KTP*) and said,

> Mister, I know and that is why I am saying that the land is ours, not the government's. Right? The article says those belong to the country, not to the government. I am *WNI* (citizen of Indonesia) and here is my identity card that confirms that this means that I have a right to own my land as a citizen of this country? Our land is not the land of the government (*pemerintah*) but of the country (*Negara*) and we are the owners as citizens of this country (*warga Negara*).

Amang Jenny further explained that it seemed that the Police Head wanted to silence him by showing UUD's article but he said "I was not silenced." This conversation aims to stand the ground and assert that the villagers have a rightful claim to the land.

We can see in these conversations how villagers skillfully and respectfully appeal to their common humanity while legitimizing themselves as humans, citizens and taxpayers often making the officials cry and support their cause. I define this as *discursive* and *dialogic* resistance. This method often transformed government officials into allies of resistors, even leading to the transfer of one district-level police head. These conversations would not have been possible if villagers were not aware of their rights as citizens and have not been involved in legal awareness training to be able to raise these points.

Using one's body

Women did not engage in discursive/dialogic resistance using words with the government officials possibly because they are not as eloquent in Indonesian as men tend to be and also because they are not used to speaking publicly. There are emerging seeds of this, however, among women. For example, one of the women community leaders in Sipituhuta, as we sat discussing these events, took out several books she has read and explained to me that due to the conflict they now know have access to books that explain their Constitutional rights.

One method that is characteristic of only women's active resistance in these villages, however, is the use of their own body to speak in a manner that shames the officials. For example, one of the women bared her breasts in a meeting with the district-level officials and shamed them for treating them as less than human while it is them who gave them life as mothers. This is similar to other land rights conflicts in such countries as Uganda that Ebila and Tripp (2017) describe where women used their bodies and their role as mothers politically to

shame the oppressors.

Within the context of Indonesia as observed by Suryakusuma (1997) motherhood has a special role and it was often employed by the state to essentialize women's roles not only within a family but also within a society at large. Despite this, women also organised to resist political violence and gender-based oppression using the politics of motherhood. One well-known case is the case of women in Sugapa (Moniaga, 2007). Another lesser known case is the case of Siriaria that villagers often referred to during my fieldwork. The more recent case that was discussed widely in North Sumatra is the case of women in the village of Sigapiton who stripped their clothes off to oppose the development of a tourist spot on their ancestral land.

Using elective power to one's benefit

As I came into the village, Ompung Viktor sat with me for a conversation, and one of the first things he told me about was the relationship with the current district head. At the time of the elections, the candidates came to visit their village as part of the election campaign. Resistance leaders sat down with each of them and asked them to present their programs. After they presented their programs, village leaders asked each of the candidates whether they were supportive of their cause. One of the best responses was given by the incumbent district head. This history of the villagers with the *bupati* allows them to have a personal relationship with him. They are also able to advocate on their own behalf. For example, when villagers were waiting for *Perda*, knowing the *bupati* gave them access to more detailed information.

Supportive elements of resistance: prayers, the act of singing, and church facilities

Emotional and spiritual strength for resistance was drawn from religious practice: songs and prayers. The role of both songs and prayers was crucial not only in the process of preparation for resistance campaigns but also in the process. As one of the women informants,

Mama Yanci, said, "we sang these church songs because we hoped that God then would hear our plea." Before a major demonstration, villagers of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta would gather in front of the primary school and organize a mass prayer.

There are roughly four religious groups present in the villages: Roman Catholic, Batak Christian Protestant (HKBP), Charismatics and Pentecostal, with a minority Muslim population in the villages of Sipituhuta and Lumban Sitorus. In the other villages, all were Christian. Major churches in Batak land officially stay neutral in these conflicts between the villagers, the government and the company. This upsets some villagers, while others do not see the need to involve the church. Among the protesting villagers, there were priests of several smaller churches, such as Charismatic, who were protest leaders. These priests supported the villagers spiritually by praying at the site of protests expressing the desire of the villagers and calling for the police to listen to the villagers' plea. This type of praying was seen as important in relation to the humanization of the villagers and their cause because the majority of the local police were also Christian. The prayer was, for example, used during the demonstration of the villages in front of the District Head (*bupati*) office.

In the village of Nagasaribu, I was often awakened by Toba Batak songs that my hosts listened to. From my observations, Toba Bataks love music and generally sing very well. Each church that I attended had a separate choir of women and men. And, villagers made sure they went to church on Saturdays to prepare their songs for the Sunday mass. Thus, Toba Batak women and men know many religious songs. For protests, they changed the lyrics of these songs slightly to correspond to the situation they faced. There were also several folk songs that villagers knew and sang, such as *O Tano Batak* about Batak land.[21] In addition, villagers themselves also composed songs and everyone learned these to sing at demonstrations. Singing

[21] The song expresses one's love for the Batak land and one's yearning to see it.

songs gave villagers strength to persevere when times were especially challenging.

Despite the fact that churches remained neutral, villagers made use of their facilities. One way was to use the church as a gathering spot. The second way was as an information-sharing spot. For example, in Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, at the end of the Sunday mass, villagers communicated with each other about demonstrations or protests planned. Sometimes, this time was used to share information about advocacy trips to Medan, or Jakarta. The church was also used as an emergency alarm with bells rung to alert villagers of danger. Hearing church bells outside of the usual mass time made villagers run from their fields into the village to gather at the Church bringing their sticks. Even though one of the bell ringers was intimidated by police, bells rung on a day other than Sunday were a sign of an emergency gathering. Bells usually ring on Sunday morning two times, first at 6 am for Sunday school, and second at 8 am for Sunday mass.

Discipline to maintain one's righteousness

Villagers use various ways to remain united. Some of the examples have already been demonstrated previously, such as the use of rituals like "*lidih*." One more method of ensuring this unity was the complete refusal of TPL and agreeing consensually not to be employed by TPL. Opung Viktor explained:

> In the past when we fought, so that we are not divided (*pecah-belah*) […] because if there is someone who works at TPL, we realize that the person will side with TPL. So, we agreed to prohibit work for TPL to people from Pandumaan and Sipituhuta. No need to work there, take other jobs. If they go there, they become against us.

This may have been the spiritual aspect of resistance. The principle of nonviolent discipline was an important aspect of Gandhi's principled nonviolence (1957). This commitment

to not associate oneself with the company ensured the internal unity and helped villagers to retain their righteous integrity as a group. It helped them to maintain their inner discipline for the sake of a righteous cause. It also ensured trust.

The kemenyan tree providing spiritual strength

Resistance itself revolves around the *kemenyan* tree. The tree is the center of the struggle. There are economic reasons for this because the price of *kemenyan* is at the moment good. If the price falls maybe it will not be as important. However, to reflect this importance the male villagers also tell the story about the tree itself. The story is about a poor Batak family. A beautiful girl was born into this family. This family had to pay its debts to a local king; however, they could not pay their debt on their own because they were very poor. So, the family decided that they would marry their daughter to the king so that their debts could be forgiven. The daughter did not agree with this and, in protest, she went into the forest. In her sorrow, she grew to become a tree, her cries turned into a benzoin resin enabling her parents to pay back their debts and live in affluence by selling the resin. Further, the forest expanded and today it provides livelihood to many Batak families. When a benzoin farmer (usually male) taps the tree, he often imagines he was courting a woman. After telling this story the villagers usually start referring to the *kemenyan* that used to be exported from this area many centuries ago. They would point out that *kemenyan* was so ancient that it was even mentioned in the Bible. That the *kemenyan* mentioned in the Bible was taken from Tapanuli, their homeland.

This way, all of a sudden a "small" plot of land with trees growing on it through these stories turns into a critique of class relations, women's lot within a Batak society, and suggests a gendered landscape. The *kemenyan* forest is seen as female by the villagers. The forest takes care of the Tapanuli *kemenyan* farming families, in the same way the women here take care of their

families. Women in the villages of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta are forbidden to step into the forest. When asked why the male villagers explain that women could be attacked by the wild monkeys. The forest here is big with wild animals, such as bears, monkeys, and possibly tigers. On the other hand, in a smaller forest of Nagasaribu that is surrounded by the plantation some women are also resin tappers.

Within the struggle *kemenyan* is at the centre acquiring its own spatial significance in the same way this happened with water-centeredness of the Peruvian environmental movements that discusses Li (2012). The government official seemed to be fascinated by the story of *kemenyan* as an endemic tree. The Human Rights commissioner I visited had the dried piece of *kemenyan* on her desk. All the other villagers also focused on *kemenyan*, even though they did not seem to be fully convinced they would plant *kemenyan* on their plot of land they aimed to reclaim. Others who did not have *kemenyan* and did not plan to plant *kemenyan* seemed to look down and feel uncomfortable when I asked questions about *kemenyan*.

Struggle, not resistance

One final aspect of resistance that needs to be mentioned is the usage of the word "*perjuangan*" or struggle. Both male and female villagers use the word "*perjuangan*" instead of "*perlawanan*" in Indonesian, a term which also carries a gendered aspect as discussed in Chapter 6. In the beginning I used the literal translation of the word resistance as "*perlawanan*," however, as I started to talk more with the villagers, I realised this was not an accurate term to use. The first realisation of this came from several interviews with villagers and NGO activists, who explained that "resistance" suggests that one resists the government and this is not the case with their resistance, instead this is a righteous "struggle" to gain one's rights. I started using the word "struggle," which then led to another important inference that I mention in Chapter 6.

As I finalized the transcriptions, started to analyse and write, I attended my daughter's celebration of 17th August, Indonesia's Independence Day at her school. The primary school children performed a play incinerating the struggle for independence against the Dutch. This performance touched me deeply because it made me realize a different layer of the connotative meaning of the word "*perjuangan*:" within an Indonesian consciousness it may carry a fundamentally positive connotation because it is also a term that is used to describe the victorious anti-colonial struggle. Thus, when villagers use the word "*perjuangan*," on the one hand, they seem to suggest that the land appropriation is similar to how the VOC occupied the land of Indonesians, and, on the other, they also aim to seek for allyship from the government officials and the wider public because within the national consciousness, "*perjuangan*" implies a just and rightful struggle.

This section explored several methods of resistance which I classified as *protective* and *proactive* resistance. *Protective* resistance was a response to a threat; sometimes it was defensive and sometimes offensive, and it was gendered. In contrast, *proactive* resistance was a set of carefully developed resistance strategies in cooperation with KSPPM. It was also gendered. I look at the gendered dynamics of some of the proactive methods in later chapters.

5.5 Conflict resolution as an advocacy strategy?

The community of Lumban Sitorus chose conflict resolution as a way to gain recognition of their rights to land. The land under conflict for Lumban Sitorus, unlike all the other cases that KSPPM handles currently, is classified as the land of APL (*area penggunaan lain*) under the HGU (*hak guna usaha*) permit. This means that it is not under the jurisdiction of MoEF and is not classified as a state forest. While MoEF has several options for the resolution, ATR/BPN jurisdiction gives them next to none.

As mentioned before, this community resisted on and off since the establishment of the pulp mill. Towards the end of 2017, they started to consider mediation. This idea first emerged with the meetings at the provincial Parliament in 2015 where all the cases under conflict were heard by the Commission A of the provincial parliament. The meeting here included not only representatives of the local government, including the district head, but also the representatives of the company. At this event, they looked at all the documents of the case and recommended a mediation. The mediation at the local level between the two parties (the community and the company) was organized by the district head, which failed due to a number of factors: the lack of trust towards the district head; the major negotiator from the company was a lower-rank official, and the demand of the villagers was the return of the land and TPL pushed for compensation. The district secretary (*sekda*) then suggested going through a legal process in the court. This was the end of the mediation.

After this failed attempt, the local parliament wanted to mediate between the villagers and the company, however, the villagers were frustrated with the process and refused. Then, in 2017, an independent mediator who had links to the local NGO that focuses on conflict resolution, Scale-Up was approached by the top management of TPL. Both the freelance mediator and a staff of Scale-Up planned the mediation process together with TPL and the villagers. They recruited a higher level official within the company and also, with the help of KSPPM, trained the villagers on mediation and its principles. After the initial preparatory sessions, the mediation started with a pre-negotiation meeting between the community members and the company representative. Then it lasted for several months and ended with a stalemate.

5.5.1 Why mediation?

Community perspectives

Women and men in Lumban Sitorus saw mediation as a last resort because no other strategy worked for them. They wanted mediation to lead to a short-term solution but they believed that this would assist them in regaining their land security. Long-term, they aimed to return their land so their children could build houses or farms on this land. The short-term solution was to ask for annual rent payment for the land. This annual rent payment would enable them to cover their costs, unite them with the other fifty percent, and, most importantly, this would represent an indirect acknowledgement that the land belonged to them and it could become a solid foundation to return the land back after the company left the area.

KSPPM

There are a few activists within the Indigenous peoples' rights and agrarian reform movement who are educated in conflict resolution and are proponents of this approach. At the same time, there is also mistrust among the NGO activists towards this new approach. As one of the NGO HuMA staff members said, "conflict resolution can become a strategy for greenwashing" because it is seeking a win-win solution which may not always be possible to achieve. The same criticism of the approach was also raised in my discussions with KSPPM expressing a concern that conflict resolution can be a tool for weakening the support for the case of the communities who would like to return their land back or protect their land rather than become involved in a working relationship with a company.

One of the staff of KSPPM, Novita, explained,

> Actually, we at KSPPM know that conflict resolution (*resolusi konflik*) is an advocacy strategy that can be used, however, we do not use this strategy because what we advocate is a right to ancestral land. So, it is difficult when this strategy is used in resolving a conflict (*penyelesaian konflik*). Its concept is a win-win solution, and it is impossible that

> with a win-win solution the rights of the people to land would be given to the communities fully if we use this strategy.

However, they eventually agreed to this strategy of mediation as a last resort because they see several characteristics of the resistance in Lumban Sitorus: the community is divided; there is fatigue in the community; it is older generations who resist (and mostly women); it has almost turned into an urban village, affecting the level of emotional commitment to the struggle; lack of confidence in winning due to the status of their land - the pulp mill stands on their land; heavy reliance on KSPPM to lead the resistance; lack of support from the nearby villages; and, finally, to move forward the discussion from resistance to environmental demands related to the pollution from the pulp mill. This analysis led KSPPM to agree to accompany villagers in the mediation process as external observers who then helped villagers to debrief and prepare for the next round of negotiations.

Other regional activists' reactions

This decision of Lumban Sitorus to agree to mediation started off a heated discussion in the province among the activists of the various NGOs. Individual activists protested decisions to support conflict resolution arguing that this weakened the movement against TPL. One activist, Darmin, suggested that KSPPM needed to help communities think through alternative ways to "find food" instead of "facilitating a conflict resolution process" with the company. He criticized KSPPM for bringing the idea of conflict resolution into the communities because the communities accepted anything that the "*pendamping*" (accompanying NGOs) brought to them and conflict resolution could weaken the movement. Communities might also lose trust in NGOs, thinking they are "corporate spies."

Company perspectives on mediation

The company initiated mediation because of pressure from the international market. As mentioned before, there are two major organizations that pressure the sustainability of the pulp and paper mills: RAN and Canopy. The two organizations work by pressuring the market. As explained by one of the international activists:

> [We use] market-based campaigning to leverage chain for forests and communities [...] because of the speed at which the forests are being lost and because this is just a critical ecosystem and also because we have leverage. The way they do this is by looking at which companies buy from the TPL and explaining to them that they are at risk of contributing to forest destruction because they might be sourcing from TPL. This is why TPL was pressured to introduce a sustainability policy, which it then is supposed to abide by.

These groups produce reports and have regular meetings with TPL and other companies. They also meet with the buyers of the viscose, such as PepsiCo or H & M and pressure them to introduce sustainability policies. This sustainability policy pressured the company to negotiate. At the same time, the company representative I interviewed also expressed some resistance to this pressure by arguing that the pressure from INGOs is also within the framework of trade competition between the Global North and the Global South.

5.5.2 *The mediation process*

I started to observe the process of mediation between the company and the community of Lumban Sitorus from the beginning. When I arrived in Parapat in December 2017, the organization was only starting a conversation with the mediator about the possibility of mediation. I started to observe the process not as a direct participant in the mediation process itself, rather at a distance.

The first stage of the mediation helped the community members to understand the

concepts of mediation and negotiation. In the second stage, male and female villagers were trained to formulate their demands. The outcome of these training sessions was that the actors who were in conflict "should be able to negotiate on their own behalf," as explained by one of the mediators. This process then was facilitated by the mediators whose job was to prevent deadlocks. Between meetings, the mediator also visited each of the parties to debrief and to discuss the next steps in the process.

In March 2018, both male and female community members and KSPPM started to plan for the mediation scheduled for May 2018. KSPPM asked me to co-facilitate a pre-negotiation workshop with the villagers, held in the Porsea office of KSPPM. Here, we had a mock facilitation of the mediation process to help villagers understand the process of mediation itself. At this point, women and men were equally represented; however, the vocal ones were the male members, while women remained silent.

Throughout 2018, the community and the company had several mediation meetings. The company suggested discussing community losses, such as environmental, social and economic ones. It wanted to address these grievances. One of the suggestions from the company was to buy the same size land as their land that is now occupied by the pulp mill for the community so that they could use this land for farming or building houses. The community did not agree. According to one of the male leaders, "*adat* land needs to be recognized and the compensation for it is a bouquet from the *sirih* leaves as a form of this recognition is enough because the bouquet from the *sirih* leaves is a symbol of peace for the Bataks." Another male leader of the movement said that this land is proof of their identity. The mediation preparation meetings in the community were mainly led by male villagers, while the majority of those present were women. Women, both young and elderly, remained mostly silent and did not take the space for

themsleves to develop their own claims in a more pronounced manner.

Approximately a year after the parties started the process, the mediation was stopped due to the failure to achieve an agreement. The company suggested CSR funds and compensation of land of a similar size in a different location. The community refused because the land that mattered to them was that specific piece of land which carried symbolic significance to them based on their *sil-silah* (family history/tree).

5.5.3 The outcome of the mediation

The mediation between Lumban Sitorus and TPL did not succeed because TPL refused to recognize the *adat* claims to the land by the community on the basis that they did not have the power to recognize it legally. The state has this power. The company also refused the rental agreement because the company said it had previously paid compensation; what they could provide was CSR funds based on proposals received from the community.

The community focused on their *sil-silah* and the symbolic significance of the communal land for their identity as the Sitorus *marga*; the company focused on grievances (environmental, social and economic) they wanted to address. For the community, the symbolic significance of the land was greater than their environmental, social, and economic grievances. Villagers argued that this land is a proof of their identity.

When I asked one of the activists based out of Balige (and not associated with KSPPM) why land is considered to be a basis for the Batak identity, she explained that the first question every Batak asks of another Batak is their *marga (clan)*. When they know the *marga*, then next question they ask “Do you still have your *ompung*’s land there?” *Ompung*’s land indicates the existence of a *marga*. “Without the ancestral land, *marga* becomes only a *marga*,” she said. Thus, the communal land indicates the existence of a *marga*. *Marga* is not respected if the

communal land was sold or lost. The communal land ownership then is a question of Toba Batak's ethnic "pride and identity." Thus, there was a cultural deadlock whereby neither the mediator nor the company were able to understand the community's rationale.

In addition, the mediator did not realize the depth of mistrust that exists between the community and the company. Trust-building was not very successful as each of the parties were not able to overcome this in the process of mediation. This, according to the mediator, was due to the fact that there was some level of interference from KSPPM. The mediator felt that KSPPM's position on the mediation demands supported the recognition of the *adat* land rights and this made the community focus on this aspect of the demands more.

At the mediation table, the state was absent as a party to a conflict. The mediator pointed out that the state should be seen as one of the parties since it was their non-recognition of Indigenous rights that caused these conflicts. He continued, "[if] we touch upon something that relates to their responsibilities [of the state] we cannot have an agreement, only a proposition, right? On the contrary, they see themselves as a neutral party and even a mediator."

Finally, villagers did not trust the independent mediator and the mediator also did not fully trust the community. Villagers felt that the mediator sided with the company. The mediator denied any type of financial relationship with TPL. He received financial support for the process from the Forest Peoples' Programme (FPP) through an NGO called Bahtera Alam, where one of the mediators worked.

Funding added to the challenges. It was difficult for mediators to find funders for these types of activities. Due to a lack of funding, the mediator was also unwilling to persevere towards the end of the mediation. The mediator later found out that the community was divided into pro and contra and was uncomfortable with this as well.

From the example of the mediation between Lumban Sitorus and TPL, one can see that NGOs in Indonesia seem to be perplexed by the "conflict resolution" or mediation approach. Mediators have a traditional understanding of conflict resolution and are not informed about the conflict transformation approach. The stalemate was mainly caused by the lack of understanding of the local cultural context among other things, such as distrust between the community and the company/the mediator and the community, the interference of KSPPM into the mediation process, and the lack of state actors' involvement.

The discussion on mediation and conflict resolution as an approach and the nervousness that exists around this in my case study seems to reflect and coincide with the discussions about this within social movement, anthropological, and more recently PACS literature as well. For example, Nader (2001) raised questions about "peace" being an ideology of harmony that pacifies people and discourages social movements and resistance. Roy et al (2010) argued that PACS field prefers cooperation over confrontation. Brigg (2008) argued that peacebuilding as a discipline has a bias towards "peaceful" resolution. This nervousness also exists on the ground and social movements are not always welcoming of conflict resolution approaches because of the distrust that it can lead to something that cannot address the structural inequality that exists a priori in a "structural" conflict.

Chapter 6: Engendering resistance

In this chapter, I look at the gendered dynamics of resistance. First, I review the gendered impact of the conflict and the company's operation in them. Further, I look at women's and men's roles as well as their motivations for resistance. NGOs play an important role in the resistance; therefore, I also looked at the gendered experiences of these activist women. Finally, I introduce a discussion on the social transformation that may have occurred as a result of resistance that relates both to the socio-cultural life of the villages and gendered lives of women and men in the villages.

It is important to note that the intersectional view of men and women as a group in the context of Toba Bataks could differentiate men from each other: those who come from *marga raja* and *marga boru*. The men coming from *marga boru* are also classified according to how recently they have migrated into the village after the *marga raja* had settled. Thus, for example, in Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, some *marga boru* have a position as strong as *marga raja*, while others do not. However, most men interviewed were coming both from *marga raja* and *marga boru*. The junior *marga boru*, however, in Nagasaribu and other villages tended to agree with the *raja adat*. In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta the male leaders of *marga raja* and *marga boru* had disagreements at the community level due to both *marga*s strong standing socially and their equal claims to political leadership within the democratic village system; however, when it came to resistance they agreed with each other for the sake of their cause that required communal unity. Thus, in the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, the male leader of the resistance was from *marga boru*, not from *marga raja.* In all the other villages, the male leaders were from *marga raja*.

Women are differentiated according to their affiliation to these clans as well as their marriage status (widow, divorcee), number of children, whether they have a male child or not, their age, and how long they have lived in the area. Thus, one of the prominent women leaders of the resistance was married into *marga boru*. She herself was a daughter (*boru*) of *marga raja* but was not a well-off landowner in the village. Despite this, due to her leadership and speaking abilities she was chosen as the women's leader. I suggest that the relatively insignificant *adat* status of the husband enabled him to give the required space to his wife and step in as the primary caretaker of the children during times when the woman leader had to leave the village.

6.1 Gendered impact of the conflict

In this section, I review the impact of the company and the conflict on men and women. Overall, there are similarities between men's and women's perspectives, but also differences that reflect gendered realities of their lives, such as division of labour in villages. However, the impacts are also often interrelated.

6.1.1 Impact on women

There are several differences between men and women in how they understand the impact of the conflict. Women focused more heavily on: the flooding of rice fields; pesticide use and its impact on their gardens and on their health; pollution and its impact on gardens and spiritual well-being; shortage of *bayun* and rattan; lack of unity and horizontal conflicts; economic difficulties that affect family peace; the general lack of "development." These seem to reflect the gendered division of labour, gendered roles in the families and the community, and gendered roles of women within the resistance.

Impact on women's work

As mentioned before, in all of these villages, women are farmers. They work in the rice fields and coffee gardens. In addition to taking care of rice fields and coffee gardens, women also used to make mats from *bayun* or cleaned/made things from rattan. This is why the impact mentioned by women relates to problems they faced in relation to rice fields and gardens as well as the loss of rattan and *bayun*.

In *Humbahas*, women plant and harvest indigenous red rice once a year. In relation to the impact of the struggle, one of the women said that before when they did not have the eucalyptus plantation their river did not flood their rice fields. Now, that is no longer the case. She said

> This year I planted my paddy field five times but it keeps flooding, so I re-plant. I hope it will be better now. Many people complain now that our paddy fields do not give a good yield. Who knows, maybe God will make it better, but at the moment our prediction is that it [the yield] will not be good because of flooding. [...] How come we would not be angry with that?"

In *Tobasa*, Mama Toga, said that their rice harvest often failed. In *Tobasa*, farmers generally harvested rice more than once a year, however, in the village of Lumban Sitorus, villagers argued that due to the pollution and shortage of water, they harvested only once a year, despite the fact that this was the major source of income for them apart from a contract work the men might get outside of their village. Mama Toga then showed the irrigation system without water in it. At that moment, the only water source for the villagers' rice fields was rain water. They were asking the government to bring water into their rice fields. Despite this becoming the regular promise of the election campaigns of the local district heads, after being elected officials tended to ignore the problem.

Villagers in Lumban Sitorus own on average one or two *rantai* of rice field and many are landless. Farming families sell 100 *kaleng*[22] of rice per year. This means that villagers get about 1,500 kg of rice yearly. They keep half for their own consumption and they sell the other half. This makes their annual income equal about 6-7.5 million rupiah depending on the price of rice at the time they harvest it. If men get jobs outside of the village, they bring 1-2 million rupiah per month.

In these districts, women also mentioned that their rice fields and coffee trees had more pests. They connected this to the pesticide usage of the company to protect the Eucalyptus trees because the aggressive pesticide spraying of the Eucalyptus plantation made pests move to farmers' fields. Some women also mentioned lower yields of corn since the establishment of the plantation. For example, Mama Putri said "after TPL's presence we have less water. Our chilli peppers rot because there is a lack of water in the soil, our soil is so much dryer now. Maybe water is eaten up by Eucalyptus trees. Our fields now are dry (*girsang*). The corn leaves are empty. Our skin is itchy." Women explained that the farming fields that are away from the river used to have small ponds with enough water in it throughout the year. Usually, women took water from these ponds to spray their plants, and these ponds were drying out.

In *Tobasa*, Ompung Luhut told me that

> The impact of TPL is that our fruit trees do not produce enough fruits anymore. In the past we had a lot - we would get millions [of rupiah] from one tree. But now everything falls. Mango tree leaves are not good anymore, and, rarely bear fruits. See those mango leaves? Maybe it is because of their chemicals. And, even fruits are not tasty anymore. Look at this avocado tree, we would normally get from this tree 2 million rupiah. Now, this is

[22] A *kaleng* equals 15 kilograms.

> impossible. From one tree we get two million three years ago, now there are no more fruits. Can't hold on, fall, fruits are quite big but still fall.

In the village of Nagasaribu there used to be a local market that was set up by the Batak king, Sisingamangaraja. This market was known for the hand-made mats that were sold there. People from around the area came to look for these hand-made mats, made from a plant called *bayun*, which grew close to wet rice fields in the river bank. Women mentioned that this was their work before the company came into their area. In the evening, after a day's work in the fields, women made these mats while taking a rest. With the loss of land and land-use changes, this plant disappeared and, therefore, women could not make these mats anymore.

In two villages, two older women villagers mentioned the importance of rattan as an additional source of income. However, I did not see furniture or accessories made of *rattan* and so I am not sure how villagers harvested and traded this commodity. In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, villagers mention that they did not harvest rattan despite having it in large quantities in the forest due to it being time-consuming and economically disadvantageous. In addition, no male villagers mentioned the loss of access to rattan as a major impact of the company's presence.

Women were also more likely to seek employment from their fellow villagers. For example, my host family was a relatively well-off family who hired neighbouring women from poorer families to work in their fields. Sometimes these women worked to pay off debt they had incurred and sometimes for a wage. Women were paid 50 or 60,000 rupiah. Men also sometimes worked as daily labour but I did not see any man work as a daily labour for women farmers. For their work, the men were paid 70,000 rupiah per day's work.

Impact on health and well-being

Ompung Lisken said that food was not as tasty now as it used to be. "In the past, we could enjoy our food, now we can't really enjoy our food because of the smell from the mill…" Every morning around 10 a.m. and in the afternoon around 4 p.m., the pulp mill's smell spreads throughout the whole area reaching even the town of Porsea, which is situated 3 kilometres away. Lumban Sitorus is about a kilometre away from the mill.

During FGD in Pandumaan, women argued that the company not only took the forest and caused flooding, pest infestation, and lower coffee yield, but also the women themselves experienced itchy skin after bathing or washing their clothes in the local river. They connected this to the heavy use of pesticides in the plantation that was washed into the river water. All the houses I visited in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta used groundwater from their wells to drink.

Women in Lumban Sitorus said that there was more access to medicine, with headache medicine being sold in every little shop on the main road, however, people seemed to be dying young from heart attack or stroke. "Men often sit around in *kedai*s and all of a sudden they fall to die afterwards." Women were curious about the cause, suggesting it may be diet, the impact of the pollution, or higher levels of stress.

Impact on families and communities: lack of unity, family conflict, and lack of development

Ompung Dewi in Sipituhuta said that in the past when people were united and made a ritual called *marhottas*[23], *kemenyan* yield was higher. Now they did not organize this type of ritual anymore because their community was divided into pro- and contra-TPL. Ompung continued that family members now did not talk to each other and avoided going to the pro-TPL family members' parties. She was careful when she spoke with the villagers from the first hamlet. "We do not trust them anymore," continued Ompung Dewi. She felt sad about this because this also meant that now they lacked unity under *adat*, therefore, threatening *dalihan na*

[23] The ritual of giving offerings to the spirits of nature to pray for the yield of *kemenyan* to be higher.

tolu. Similar concerns were raised in almost all the villages I visited. And, it was mostly women who raised concerns about this. This can be explained by the fact that it is often women who attend *adat* rituals or Sunday mass at Church where the whole community gathers.

In Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, women observed that with the fall of *kemenyan* production, they started having financial problems. This meant poorer diet and a lack of funds to support children's schooling also leading to conflicts between husbands and wives. When there is no food in the kitchen, it is women who are blamed.

One woman who was open about domestic violence in the village, Mama Teresa, explained that the main cause of domestic violence in families in her village was often economic. Men gave some of the income from *kemenyan* to their wives. Then, after they used up all the money they had kept for themselves, they asked for more money from their wife. The wives, attempted to withhold the money from their husbands arguing that this was the money for food and children's schooling and this made husbands angry.

Another woman told me that children had less pocket money and this made them steal from their parents. She was upset that her child did something like this. But she also felt sorry for her child because she realized that this was an impact of their financial difficulties.

In case of cash shortage, women are the ones who borrow money from neighbours and the wider family. The women told me that it was a women's job because men were not supposed to ask for help in this way, as it is seen as degrading.

In the village of Lumban Sitorus, villagers explained that at the beginning of the establishment of the pulp mill, there was some hope that the pulp mill would bring development into their village. "Development" was an ideology of the New Order era that seemed to excite people at the time until they realised that it meant land dispossession, environmental destruction,

and the rise of oligarchy (Tsing, 2005; Robinson & Hadiz, 2004). With time, villagers realized that "development" was not what they imagined. Ompung Lisken, for example, showed me her old, shabby house and said "If you see our people here, from our houses, from since before [TPL], we live like this. Before TPL, after TPL, same old, same old. That means there has been no change for us."

Despite the village's proximity to the pulp mill, there was only a small proportion of villagers employed at the company. Most of these employees were not on permanent contracts, rather as daily labourers or contractors. Several villagers also expressed that they wanted to work for the company but also were divided internally. From the history of their previous employment with the company, I concluded that they were not happy with the type of work they performed for the company and the conditions of work. Or, possibly, they felt ashamed "to be a slave on their own land."

6.1.2 Impact on men

Men had similar but a slightly different perspective on the impact of the company and the conflict. Men's perspectives on impact can be grouped into the following groups: *kemenyan*'s lower yield, and the impact of this on their lives and forest animals' well-being, loss of alternative sources of income, and concerns over the well-being of the community.

Lower yield of kemenyan and its impact

The reason behind the fall of *kemenyan* yield, the villagers argue, are two-fold, first, the kemenyan forest needs a natural forest to be protected from the heat and, second, the forest animals now do not have the forest coverage that they so rely on for food or protection. So, they go up the *kemenyan* trees of the farmers. This results in the resin being damaged and falling off or not fully coming out due to monkeys climbing it up all the time. The men also mention the

rivers drying out in the forest leading to less leaves on the *kemenyan* trees. And, the leaves are often an indicator of a good yield.

The destruction of the benzoin forest also leads to the loss of the natural habitat for other animals, such as bears, tigers, boars, and others. Thus, male farmers were concerned about bears entering their small forest huts (*pondok*) making a mess inside. Amang Siska said that maybe the bears were angry at humans or maybe they thought it was the farmers who destroyed the forest. So, every time they came back from the weekend in the village they had to fix their *pondok* and rearrange it again. Amang Saur from Nagasaribu mentioned that before the 2000s they could spot Sumatran tigers and deer in the forest, but not today.

In the *kemenyan* areas, men also mentioned the rising level of theft in the forest due to lower yield. As Sitor mentioned:

> Because there is less *kemenyan*, the cost of living is even higher, and, *kemenyan* does not yield as we hope, it is funny - people here often take their friend's *kemenyan*. Actually, they do not steal that much but, because in their house they need money, [...] they have to take their friends', even though this means they are stealing.

Women also told me that men started to be not as enthusiastic as before about going into the forest due to the drop in the family income from the forest. Men tended to farm in the fields today compared to when the yield was higher from *kemenyan.* Sitor observed, "it seems now people here farm in the village more. That is the solution to deal with the lower yield of *kemenyan*." However, this was also more possible now due to the possibility to rent a tractor. As one of the women noticed men were more willing to help out in the farms if there was technology involved. Without this, according to women, men were too lazy to work in the fields.

Men also sought paid employment inside or outside of the village in construction, road-building, irrigation building, and other such government-funded projects. Sitor further explained:

> Usually for projects (*proyek*), it is men who work. Women often work for other people. Farming needs funds. To feed the family and also to buy fertilizer, she does not have cash. She borrows this money but then works for the lender to pay the money back. Like us, my mom has a paddy field but she does not have enough energy. So people come here to lend money from my mother and they say we want to work for you to cover our debt. So, like this, they work in the gardens.

Nevertheless, when men work in the fields, they get paid more, 70,000 rupiah per day because they are "stronger." Men also can sell their labour to work in the *kemenyan* forest and, in this case, they get paid 400,000 rupiah for one week's work in the forest. Sometimes men barter their labour.

Amang Siska told that they would like research about *kemenyan:* how to increase its yield. This research would be useful for them because now the yield was lower than before. The yield was at its best ten to fifteen years ago before TPL came into the area. This enabled them to cover their daily costs and have savings. Now, this was harder, even with coffee as an additional source of income.

Loss of water buffaloes and fish as alternative sources of income and of protein

Ompung David (man) and Ompung Lisken (woman) in Lumban Sitorus reminisced that in the past they used to raise water buffaloes and vegetables in addition to rice. They could not do this with the loss of land. Their economy is narrower now with the loss of the communal land. At the same time, there are more needs created:

> Because the forest is already cut down up there, there is climate change…. In the past, we used to plant vegetables, some people kept water buffaloes there, now we can't [the occupied land used to be for both farming and cattle-grazing]. This lowers our income… In the past, we used to have up to twenty water buffaloes, but now we do not have the land for raising buffaloes. Now there are only two persons who raise buffaloes. In the past after harvesting, we used to take a rest. Now we can't, we have to force ourselves to work in order to cover our expenses… In the past our target was to only have enough to eat, we did not have to school our children, we had fewer needs before. Our economy now is narrower. We have to force ourselves to fulfill our needs. Look for daily paid work. In the past, we did not have a place to look for work. Now there is a lot. Daily labour work in order to meet our needs.

One of the impacts that the villagers noticed at the very beginning of their resistance in Nagasaribu was the death of their water buffaloes where the Eucalyptus plantation was. They concluded that it was due to the herbicide used by the company. Many male villagers connected their loss of water buffaloes to the presence of the company. However, this may not be the case. Thus, in the village of Sugapa, the communal land that was used for cattle-grazing was reclaimed from the company. Despite this, when I was in this village, this land was not used for cattle-grazing rather for personal farms with several families monopolizing the land. Despite this, it is crucial to note that two major resources needed for water buffaloes are land with grass and water. Both of these are in shortage in most of the villages I visited except for Pandumaan and Sipituhuta.

Most men in the villages mentioned that they used to go fishing to provide their family with protein (*lauk*) and since TPL started to operate in the area, they noticed a lack of fish in the

rivers. They used to fish for several hours to be able to catch a meal for the whole family and now they could sit there trying to catch fish for the whole day and not get anything at all. In Lumban Sitorus, men and women mentioned that they used to catch fish from the rice fields' irrigation water in the past and this was important for children's nutrition, however, today they did not get this. It was especially saddening for Lumban Sitorus to not have this option because their lives were almost fully dependent on the availability of cash. Other villages had forest where they could go and hunt for warthogs but villagers in Lumban Sitorus depended on rice as their source of cash to buy *lauk* for the family, office or wage jobs, which they also could not get.

Impact on the well-being of the community

There are several impacts to consider in relation to the well-being of the community that were mentioned by men. For instance, Amang Sahat explained that with the establishment of the pulp mill and the barracks of the employees of the company who were hired from outside, there was a prostitution (*lokalisasi)* spot. Many of the local men went to these cafes. According to Amang Sahat, one family contracted HIV here.

There is also the problem of children starting to sniff glue, from middle school age. They get together while their parents are away to smell glue. This is why Amang Sahat tried to engage youth in discussions about values, morality, and other things, but young people, he argued, were more interested in instant things, such as branded clothes, shoes, and smartphones. This also indicates the fact that there is a *neoliberalisation* of needs in these relatively remote villages. These new needs created a cycle of negative impacts that then affected families. Thus, the lack of enough income to support the family made some men escape this reality and spend even more time at *kedai*s smoking, drinking and playing dominoes. When I asked men why they spent so

much time outside of their homes, they explained that this was one of the ways for them to forget about the problems they faced each day and relax.

As demonstrated in this section, the impact is different for men and women. Men focus on lower yields of *kemenyan*, forest animals with whom they share the forest, loss of alternative sources of income, food security, and specific gendered concerns about the community's well-being as an impact of the company's presence. Women, on the other hand, tend to focus on aspects of their lives, including paddy fields, coffee gardens, fruits, corns, family diet/food security, children's well-being, communal and familial peace, and others. Both men and women try to find ways to adapt and resolve the challenges they face: men try new things; women work harder.

6.2 Men's and women's participation and roles in resistance

Both men and women participated in the resistance campaigns and they had different roles. In this chapter, I look at the nature of men and women's participation in the resistance. And, I also review the different roles they played.

In regular life, women are less likely to be organized at a large-scale, because they do not have enough time. They get together on market days and church days. Outside of this, they prefer to organize themselves into groups for a certain purpose. For example, they organize *arisan* among themselves if someone has a wedding coming up. Men, on the other hand, get together on a regular basis to discuss politics at *kedai*s. This is in accordance with Boulding's (2001) and Cockburn's (2007) observations that women tend to organise as needed and with "minimal structure) (p. 157).

Women's and men's participation and their intensity in resistance differs from village to village. In all the villages, men are active as formal leaders of the resistance. In some villages,

women are more active than men, especially when it comes to direct action. In all cases, women's participation is at its highest if the community is (or, had been) involved in some form of direct action, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades, land reclaiming, and others. When the intensity of the resistance subsides, so does the participation of women. In all of these cases, there were women and men who did not participate, too. Cockburn (2007), for example, writes that women in her research tended to be involved in direct action more.

In this section, first, I look at what kind of roles men and women played in the resistance. I argue that men were formal leaders, while women were the actual grassroots resisters who led the direct nonviolent campaign. Then, I review some of the specific gendered strategies women have employed in their struggle. And, finally, I explain which women and men did not participate in resistance campaigns.

Men as formal leaders

Most men, both elderly and younger, played an important role in the struggle. Men who represented key *marga bius* and *marga boru* were the leaders of the movement. These were some three to ten men in each of the villages depending on the size of the village. However, most resisters during campaigns were female.

For example, I went to the "struggle" meeting of Lumban Sitorus that they hold weekly on Sundays and it was majority middle-aged and older women (about twenty women present at the meeting) with three or four men who all held leadership positions within the struggle. When I asked the men why they were in a leadership position, they explained that this was because women had too much work to do inside the village and men were more likely to be free to go outside of the village. Ompung Greta from Nagasaribu explained that "leaders are all men. We never have women leaders because women have a lot of work, they do not have time to go here

and there because they also have children here." Another male leader from Aek Lung also argued that it was harder for women to leave the village, and it was easier for men to travel outside of their residential area. In addition, women at the FGD in Nagasaribu said that wives generally were supportive of husbands' decisions. Thus, it was men who represented them at official meetings outside of the village.

The exception to the scenario described above was the village of Sugapa that organized itself in resistance to the land appropriation in the 1980s under the leadership of Nai Sinta, a woman who was married to a local land-owner of the *marga raja* of Barimbing. She was an elite woman of extraordinary creativity, wisdom, and leadership skills who led a group of nine other women to resist the company tactics, the government, and the male leaders who agreed to give up their land rights.

Due to the leadership position they hold, men are likely to be bribed. Thus, the company approached several leaders in all of the villages with various offers of money, positions, jobs, land, and contracts. Men are also more likely to hold *adat* or government positions, such as the position of a village head. The position of a village head is held by men who built a coalition of supporters during the election period based on *marga*. Women, on the other hand, are less likely to be approached by the company, because they do not hold key positions within neither an *adat* nor a village structure.

There were a few exceptions to this, such as in the village of Aek Lung, where one woman was considered to be the leader of the movement together with a man. Due to the gender mainstreaming policy of KSPPM, villagers were encouraged to seek a woman spokesperson for the movement. This gave space for some women to develop their public leadership skills. The most intensive work was done by KSPPM in the villages of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta and Aek

Lung in the district of Humbang Hasundutan in applying gender mainstreaming as a strategy. This yielded a greater awareness and a greater number of discussions about women's positions within the community. Women were less likely to be left out of public discussions in the communities where intensive gender mainstreaming work had been done.

Women as major resistors and leaders of direct action

During the direct action, especially when it is a demonstration, men's participation is not as pronounced as that of women despite the fact that it is their discussions at *kedai*s that initially led to the emergence of the community mobilization. In Pandumaan-Sipituhuta, for example, women pointed out the crucial role women played arguing that

> If women did not participate, the movement would not have been strong. Here, women are victims. The world would not exist if not for women. Ask men, can this world exist without women? Men can't raise children, they can't even find their own lighter.

In Lumban Sitorus, Ompung Luhut similarly explained:

> How can I say? Men are… they are quite weak. Not that they do not care about the land, when they see that other men do not go, they lose their enthusiasm. They are easy to be disappointed. If we are not united, they are upset and can't let it [their feelings of disappointment] go. But if we are united - they are enthusiastic… [...] They are weak. Usually, it is women who go. They say we won't get the land back. So, but how do we know for sure if we don't fight? Only asking for 100,000, 200,000 rupiah? Or what?

Here, Ompung Luhut suggested that men were less enthusiastic to join direct action if they saw there were divisions in the village. Men tended to be affected by a lack of unity, whereas women whatever the general mood among the villagers tended to join direct action. Women were committed to resistance from the very beginning and remained committed throughout. Men often

changed their minds. In the case of Lumban Sitorus, thus, there was only one man in the current resistance campaign who resisted throughout his life since the beginning of the conflict.

Women led the land reclamation campaigns. For example, in the community of Ompung Ronggur, villagers tried to reclaim the land that they call *Napa* land. This land is claimed by both Ompung Ronggur and Ompung Bolus and there is a third community who lives on that land, a village now called Aek Napa. The two communities (Op. Ronggur and Op. Bolus) claim to be the original owners and acknowledge each other as the co-owners of the territory. The villagers of Aek Napa moved into the area later than the previous two. They had verbal permission to reside and farm on a certain part of the territory with the usage, not ownership rights. They were considered by the two other communities to be migrants. They had a partnership scheme together with the company.

The reclaiming of this land started a few years ago. The key role in this reclaiming belongs to women. As told by Ompung Katarina:

> Actually, we did it all together but in the year of 2004, right, it was still the men going there. They went there, planted sweet potato, and the plants, but, yeah, they are *bapak-bapak* [men], they come there, plant a little bit, then, smoke, they do not work seriously there. And then, us, in the year 2000 or something. We, women, made groups, group A and then group B. We formed these groups and tilled the land. We started planting it collectively, first, but then we decided to divide the land up into plots per person. But it all started with these groups. Right now, these plots belong to individual families because groups take a lot of time organizing. So, these groups worked from 2014 till 2016. But in 2017 we said let's make this individual because one group consisted of thirteen to fifteen people so we could not continue together. So, we thought if A is not going on that day, are

we supposed to work her share also? So, there was some jealousy if someone did not join these groups regularly, so we made it per person… But this was organized only by women.

Women, first, waited to see what men could do, however, not seeing results, they decided to form groups to work the land and re-occupy it. Most of the women who talked with me argued they owned the land because they worked it and sold pineapples they harvested from the land. They also posited that without women forming these three groups, they would not have been able to reclaim the land.

Stripping oneself was one of the ways that women expressed their emotions. The stripping act was done numerous times by the women of Toba Batak in the history of civil resistance here. When a police officer went to the house of Nai Sinta of Sugapa with a gun, upon seeing the gun, she stripped herself naked in protest. In a meeting with a government official, a woman from Sipituhuta took one of her breasts out to shame government officials, saying that they drunk from that breast and now they violated their rights stripping them off the land. When I asked women why they did this, some found it hard to explain, others felt embarrassed, and, yet, a few explained that this was their way to shame the security forces to realize that what they did was not acceptable. Sometimes in response to my questions, women also laughed me off explaining that stripping was not done by young women but older ones. They said, "if young ones do it, it is too much happiness for the security forces. But if older women strip, the security forces feel ashamed."

One of the men in Nagasaribu explained:

MK: Stripping oneself … Hmmm, I am interested where does this come from, in your opinion?

> OG: That is really, it is a noble thought for Batak people because Bataks know what it means to be ashamed ["*tahu malu*"]. If they strip themselves that means they do not feel ashamed anymore because of what was done to them, they do not feel shame anymore. [...] They strip themselves of clothes because that person does not know shame, therefore, we also do not feel ashamed. [...] This way we all show that we do not feel ashamed with the people who do not know shame. [...] And Batak's principle is to make the person who behaves shamefully to the point of no shame because we also then choose to not know shame.

Other roles that women played within resistance were as cooks. Women talked about how they prepared their meals for demonstrations. They usually prepared rice and salty sun-dried baitfish as a meal during demonstrations or overnight sit-ins they organized when the men were arrested. Women also cooked for coordination meetings and hosted guests in the villages.

Since women were seen as less frightening, women were also more likely to shout during the demonstrations. All the men I interviewed expressed that women shouted very loudly and usually it was embarrassing to them to hear their yell-yells. Some women read the demands of the demonstrators.

Usually, there are only about ten people who go to meet with the government officials. KSPPM often recommends that there be five men and five women in order to have equal representation. It is men who speak with the officials because women are less likely to understand and speak Bahasa Indonesia and also they are less likely to speak within an office setting in a "polite manner." When women joined the official meetings with the government representatives, however, they were the ones who appealed emotionally to the representatives expressing their needs. For example, Ompung Dewi said to the police "is there really something

wrong that we do, something violent? If that is the case, arrest me, show me what is wrong about our struggle?" This is in contrast to how the men engage the officials, whereby they appeal to the Constitution, colonial history, and their citizenship.

It was usually the women who visited the prisoners when the criminalized men were both at Pollung police office and Medan police headquarters. When some of the criminalized men were in hiding, it was also the trusted women relatives who kept the knowledge of where the men were hiding and they were the ones who delivered food. When the men were at the location confronting the company and blocking the felling of the trees, it was the women who prepared the food and brought drinks to the men. One woman whose husband was imprisoned gave birth to their child and they named the child Pertiwi (Earth). The boy was to be named Perjuangan (Struggle). This woman could not visit her husband in prison; however, when other women visited their husbands with newborns, the police cried seeing them.

Not all women supported their husband's activism. Those who supported their husband's leadership positions within resistance acknowledged that this was their contribution to resistance as well. One of the wives of the resistance leaders, for example, said "I did not complain. This is why *Bapak* was able to fight for *haminjon* for this long time." This support was crucial for men leaders because it was the wives who allocated funds for those who made trips to Jakarta or Medan for their struggle. One of the leaders in Lumban Sitorus, for example, did not have the support of his wife because she thought that activism was only causing trouble, leading to criminalization and he was not bringing the money into the family and so the couple argued.

Women expressed that they made sure they understood the issue before they started participating in the struggle. In the areas of less radicalization and in the absence of conflict escalation, women tended not to be informed about the struggle for the forest. Thus, in the

village of Nagasaribu, all the women I talked to tended to be uninformed about the land struggle and its importance. They considered their farms, lack of road, shortage of water, and other issues more pressing than the conflict with TPL. This may mean that radical resistance to the immediate threat of villagers' livelihood tends to involve more women. It may also indicate that land struggles are critical only where there is a heavier involvement of women.

Sometimes, NGOs managed to train women to be the spokespersons for the movement. This often gives these women prominence and media coverage. However, this may not lead to gender justice for women and social justice for communities, in general. Having one strong female leader may not always have a liberating effect on all women. For example, in the village of Sugapa, women played a central role in the struggle for land as described by Simbolon (1998). Nai Sinta was considered to be the leader of the struggle (Moniaga, 2007). However, she led a group of nine other women and was supported by all the women in the village. When I visited the village, these women wanted to raise the issue of the communal land that they fought for, which was now being privatized by a certain number of families from the village (the families who belong to *marga raja* of Barimbing). This made a portion of women disappointed. The women felt that action was needed, however, none of them had enough authority to speak out, so, everyone relied on Nai Sinta (who is married into *marga raja* Barimbing) to speak who in turn preferred to stay away from the matter.

The roles that women played in the resistance are reminiscent of some of the roles mentioned in the literature, such as women visiting prisons, use of body, more heavy involvement of women in direct action, camping/occupying space, etc. (Cockburn, 2007; Richter-Devroe, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 1990). However, within the context of land conflicts women also employed some more radical methods of resistance and were more successful at this

compared with men, such as land reclamation, despite men having legal rights to land within *adat.* This can be connected to the ethics of care and the gendered role and responsibilities of women in ensuring the future of their children.

Why do women play the roles they play?

In all the villages except for Nagasaribu and the community of Ompung Bolus, the women were in the frontlines of numerous peaceful demonstrations (*aksi damai*) that the villagers held in front of the police headquarters, district head headquarters, and other places. They give the following reasons as to why women are in the front: 1) "police would not be brave enough to be rude to women" and they can be "aggressive towards men;" 2) "men can be treated violently more easily;" 3) "there are no women police;" 4) "men generally are rarely rude towards women;" 4) "men are afraid to face the police;" 5) "police are afraid of women"; 6) "women care more;" 7) "women only talk rude, but they can't be violent and do not pull ("*tarik-tarikan*");" 8) "men will be looking for an article;" 9) "women are respected." When I ask the men as to why women are in the front, they explain that "women cannot be beaten;" "women are brave, they pull the gate;" "men would be looking for an article" if they are in the front. Thus, the reasons given by women heavily rely on the gendered nature of politics, in general. Men are assumed to be the challengers, thus, women are less scrutinised by the state and the company who are mostly represented by men (police officers and the company field employees tend to be men). Protesters capitalise on the essentialist, gendered assumptions about the "weak" women as well as the respect that the status of motherhood provides them with (Lind, 2005; Richter-Devroe, 2012). This way, the system of patriarchy they find themselves in provides them with gendered opportunities to express their agency in a way this was possible for the women in Chile that Agosin (1996) describes. And, finally, the ethics of care is also at play whereby women

seem to care more to protest, therefore, they organise themselves in a more responsible manner, too (Gilligan, 2003; Cockburn, 2007).

Women in Op. Ronggur explained men's failure to reclaim the land by the fact that men worked in the forest. However, in another village of Aek Lung, the re-occupation of the land was also led by women and there was no forest work for men there. When I ask the villagers in Aek Lung why this was the case, women responded that women were hard-working, in general, and were not afraid to till the land. The second reason they mentioned was that women were less likely to be scrutinized and were let be by the company employees who came to check on the reclaiming done by the villagers. As told by one of the women leaders in Aek Lung, Mama Zivanna:

> Our struggle started [...] in the year 2005 and our involvement, women's involvement is very strong because in addition to preventing physical violence with the other side, PT TPL, we also limit freedom of movement of our men because we feel afraid that there could be a direct confrontation in the field that could lead to something we do not want to see, such as physical violence or clash that may lead to losses from both sides that can lead to someone's imprisonment, and so we limit their involvement, this is why it is us, women, who are in the field facing PT TPL because we feel that the fight for land should be led by women … Actually, they also can intimidate women but their movement is limited because they may be afraid to face women, right? Maybe they think we are the weak ones (lit. weak creatures/*makhluk lemah*). They think it is impossible. Even though they bring weaponry, bring *Brimob*, bring police, we are not afraid because we feel we have to fight for our *adat* land…

If the company tried to talk with men, these women forced their husbands to move back and not talk. Women conversed with the company representatives to prevent violence. When I asked why they were afraid of women, women explained that even when they started shouting, men were usually afraid and did not want to come closer. "We usually shout at them that the land is ours, nothing out of the ordinary" ("*hal yang wajar*").

In this section, I reviewed several characteristics of men and women's involvement in resistance. Men tended to be in leadership positions of this rural resistance, whereas women tended to be in the front lines of direct action. There are gendered reasons as to why this was the case, such as, the less likelihood of women to experience violence and criminalisation from the state apparatus, such as police. Women, in addition, also played other gendered roles in the resistance, as cooks, visitors, supporters, and carers. KSPPM played a role of a facilitator sometimes pushing its gender mainstreaming policy onto the villagers. This encouraged women villagers to be informed about the conflict and the resistance campaigns as well as to be included into meetings with state officials. Sometimes, putting one woman as a leader, however, does not lead to positive social change for women or communities, in general, as demonstrated by the case of Sugapa.

6.3 Motivations of men and women

In this section, I explore motivations for men and women's participation in resistance. The section consists of two parts: the first explores motivations of women and the second focuses on men's motivations. These are often interrelated and when they do, I make this clear. I conclude with a reflection on the gendered nature of these motivations.

6.3.1 Women's motivations

I classify women's motivations into land as security, landlessness and land infertility, forest as a source of livelihood and a guarantee of child's future, realization of economic interdependence and solidarity, and women's care-taking responsibilities.

Land as security

Both men and women talked about land being a motivation for resistance. Women and men in the interviews focused on land in relation to their livelihoods: that it could provide for the family. Both men and women saw land as key to their economic well-being. However, there were also several differences in women's and men's responses. Thus, men tended to focus on land as *warisan* (inheritance), whereas women tended to focus on land as belonging to future generations. For example, in my FGD in Aek Lung, one of the women said:

> We are essentially farmers. We do not have a monthly wage like the civil servants do. That [land] is our main source of income. So, if that land does not come back to us, our children will become illiterate all the way till our grandchildren.

Having land and passing it onto one's children and grandchildren gave women a sense of pride and a a sense of security. As another woman said during the same FGD:

> We are not afraid anymore that our children will not have land in the future, that they will not have a livelihood. We feel that we can say to our children that if you have your own family you, can work on that land.

In a similar light, another woman in Lumban Sitorus said: "Yeah, it is important so that we have rights, right? So that we have land rights to own it so that we can pass the land onto our grandchildren, right?"

Women also mentioned that land was important for them to build new houses for young families. Many villages seemed to have a lack of land to expand the residential areas, and, therefore, they saw land reclamation as crucial. In the *kemenyan* areas, women mentioned that kemenyan gave them financial security because the land in their village was not fertile enough for other cash crops.

Forest as a source of livelihood and a guarantee of child's future

Women's responses also focused on the importance of the forest as a source of livelihood. They also could get wood for building houses in the forest, including rattan. Despite this, however, rattan is not harvested by women as this is done in some parts of this area (one of my key informants told me that in Hutagalung women used to harvest rattan, but not anymore). The wood from the forest was especially important for young families. Finally, women focused on *kemenyan* as a source of cash and security for future generations.

For example, during the FGD, women in Pandumaan mentioned that *kemenyan* gave harvest almost every week, little by little, with a big harvest once a year. Despite the fact that men usually take almost half of the income (sometimes more) they get from *kemenyan*, the income the families receive from *kemenyan* is significant throughout the year. When I was in the villages from February to June, most villages had some amount of *kemenyan* in their houses. They also had some amount of coffee at all times. Thus, they had some amount of cash from *kemenyan* and coffee at least for eight to nine months a year. However, it is important to point out that the income from coffee is insignificant for villagers compared to *kemenyan*. *Kemenyan* covers costs related to *adat*, children (such as, schooling), house, clothing for church, fertilizers for rice fields, and also can be used as savings. Coffee, on the other hand, is mainly used to buy

daily *lauk* (source of protein), vegetables, and rice (for those who run out of rice or have small land).

One of the main motivations mentioned by women in relation to *kemenyan* was that it could provide for future generations. *Kemenyan* allowed "to send children to school." From long before schooling became free in Indonesia, the income from *kemenyan* was used to educate children. Villagers from these villages as well as out-migrants I met in Pematang Siantar often associated *kemenyan* with "Generals whom it produced." Toba Bataks take great pride in the achievements of their children and would like to see their children acquire *sarjana* (undergraduate degree) by all means and work as a civil servant (PNS, *pegawai negeri sipil*), be it a teacher, a nurse, or a government official. Here is an excerpt from my conversation with Mama Trisna:

> Me personally, me who slept in front of the police office, who fought, shouted, brought my small children, who were not going to school yet, bringing our blankets while carrying my children, what am I fighting for? What I am fighting for is I do not want our *kemenyan* to belong to other people. It's not me who will enjoy it, but my children, my grandchildren, when they grow up, maybe they will come back to their original village. Even though right now they are out-migrants, I am sure they will come back home, it is proven that many people come back from cities to their villages, they come back, already many people did. This means that in the coming years in the future they will come back for sure, what are they going to work on if our *tombak* [garden forest] falls into other people's hands? We fight for *haminjon* not only for ourselves, but also for our children, grandchildren, so that they can enjoy it later.

At the same time, one needs to specify that the fight is for boy children's future because it is boys who will inherit the forest garden, not girl children. Mama Trisna further added that it was a fight for boy children's future because "girl children will be sold off to other people." Girl children's future becomes relevant when mothers think about their possible marriage. As Mama Trisna further explained "[the girls of other families] can marry my child who has a *tombak*. Their daughter marries my son, so she will have a *tombak*, too, then." This was why, according to Mama Trisna, it made sense that all the women were involved in resistance.

Apart from seeing *kemenyan* as a source of their income, however, villagers, both men and women, took pride in their *kemenyan* jobs due to its mention in the Bible. Men and women mentioned that *kemenyan* was an endemic plant because it only grew in North Sumatra: "*Kemenyan* does not grow in every place. This is our blessing from this village. The thing is, for example, when God Jesus was born, this was brought there, *kemenyan*, there. There is a history of *kemenyan*, it cannot grow anywhere. So, this is our blessing from God."

Realization of one's economic interdependence and solidarity

As part of my respondent recruitment I walked across the village and most often I met small shop owners on my way from the house where I lived to the north end of the village. These shop owners often were either women from well-off families with significant amounts of land who were able to open shops of their own or single mothers who were divorced and, sometimes, widows. For single mothers, their shops were a major source of income. When I asked them why it was important for them to resist, they expressed that they realized that their village economy was interdependent. If the villagers did not have enough buying power, nobody would come to buy from their shops. Some women also mentioned that even if they did not have sons, their daughters one day might marry a fellow villager. In this case, it would be better if the husband

had a *tombak*. Therefore, it was in their interest as well to resist and maintain their ownership of the forest garden (*tombak*).

Women also mentioned that solidarity was an important factor for their participation. As Mama Hotman said:

> We have a *tombak* but it is not threatened by TPL. It is quite far from TPL's position right now. But, we also fight, because we support our fellow villagers. Because we all understand that's our main source of income, so women have to push, so that men work in the forest because our income is from *tombak*.

Women's care-taking responsibilities

Another set of responses from women was related to their responsibilities and their dependence on the income from *tombak*. Here, women's responses touched upon their care-taking responsibilities in relation to their families, including husbands and their desire to minimize risks for themselves. Women manage family finances and most of the family income comes from *kemenyan* in Pandumaan, Sipituhuta, and Nagasaribu. They can school, feed, and marry their children because of *kemenyan*. They also have high *adat* expenses for various rituals, including death and marriage rituals. These expenses can be covered from *kemenyan*. As Mama Hotman said:

> Because women suffer. If men do not work in the *kemenyan* forest anymore, how are we going to pay for children's school? The thing is women's hearts are hotter when it comes to money issues because the kitchen needs to be kept alive. If we can't give food to our children, then, how to say? Killings will happen. Right? So, this is why we say even though the knife in the kitchen can be sharp, sharper is what the stomach says. The shouting of the stomach is even sharper.

Many women did not see their resistance against forest appropriation as different from their daily struggle of taking care of their families. Mama Trisna said,

> I say that women play a big role in a household unless our husband is a civil servant or works at a company. Now, here most people are farmers, women usually provide for the family, manage the economy, children, *adat*, they are the ones who make sure we go to *adat*. We don't have anything in our house.... we can work outside for others.... women do everything. The struggle of women is so that their family survives.

Stories of resistance often switched to stories of everyday struggles of women. Women work in the fields all day long. They wake up at 5 a.m., prepare breakfast and coffee for their children and husband. In the evening they come back home from the field and cook dinner for the family. Once a week, they go to the market to sell their goods or to shop for the week. They go to church on Sundays, *adat* festivals during the week, and, even, manage to make money on days off by setting up stalls, selling *mie gomak* (local noodles), or small traditional snacks. They even manage to hire other women or lend money to them.

Without *tombak*, their husbands would ask from their wives for their daily expenses and it would be much harder to fulfill these needs for a woman if she only had an income from coffee. Children tend to ask for pocket money from their mothers, not their fathers, as explained by women. Children are usually afraid to ask for pocket money from their fathers.

In resisting, women also protected and cared for their men. Women expressed fear that their men would lose their jobs. Men do not know how to till the land, but they know how to clean and harvest the resin from *kemenyan* trees. "If there is no *tombak*, where would men go? They do not know how to work in the paddy fields, what are they going to do, the only thing they know is how to climb up trees, *manige*, and clean the trees," says Mama Trisna.

Caretaking responsibilities of women are one of the important motivational factors as pointed out by Gilligan (2003) and also Faver (2001). However, a specific dynamic in the case of Toba Batak women is that women often drew parallels between their daily struggles and the struggle for land. They see that the appropriation of their forest will make them fight harder for their families and communities, and, therefore, to save themselves from more burden, they choose to fight and see these struggles against land appropriation as part of their everyday struggles as mothers, wives, and community members.

6.3.2 Men's motivations

Men's motivations for resistance are: land as inheritance and heritage, *kemenyan* as a source of income, a job and a potential, and their land rights.

Land as warisan (inheritance) *and heritage*

Men talked about the importance of passing the land onto their children and grandchildren, but they came to this idea from the angle of inheritance. For example, Amang Bernard told me that they have taken care of the land for fourteen generations and they feel this gives them a right to claim the land as theirs. Another man, Amang Patrisia, told me that he lived and worked outside of his own *bona pasogit*, and he had seen that the original owners of the land, such as the Betawi in Jakarta, have lost their rights to their ancestral land and their land now is taken over by other ethnic groups, and he does not want this to happen on his land. He said, "It's quite unimaginable that I would live on someone's land but I can't sustain and fight for the land of my own ancestors? This is a bit strange to me." He added,

> We have been here for 14 generations. My family has been here for that long. My grandparents gave it to me. It has a clear history, the land and the forest. We can also give this to our children and grandchildren. Where would they go if we move? How can we live

> at a place owned by other people, on the land whose history we do not understand and know? Here, we also have a cemetery of our ancestors. If people move from here, then, what is going to happen with the cemetery of our *nenek moyang* [ancestors]?

In this statement, we can see that he focuses on the history of his family, his genealogy, the history of the land. He also points at the fact of ownership of the land due to the historical connections they have to the land. Finally, he also connects himself to his ancestors. His role then also is to take care of his ancestors on his land.

Kemenyan as a source of income, a job, and a potential

Men, when talking about *kemenyan,* mostly focused on the income they receive from *kemenyan*, restoration, and the environmental impact of forest destruction. In relation to the environmental impact, men mentioned that if the forest is destroyed the forest animals might come into the village and destroy their farms. They also mentioned the flooding because natural forest keeps the rainwater away from the farms. If they do not protect the land, they are likely to be drawn into becoming the daily labour of TPL, and they do not want to become “slaves on their own land.” Becoming “a *buruh* on one’s own land” is something that the male villagers fear because the land ownership itself is connected with the male pride and the continuity of the clan.

Other villages who did not have *kemenyan* or have lost part of their *kemenyan* forest expressed their desire to re-plant and renew their *kemenyan* forest as a motivation to reclaim their land. Here is Ompung Greta speaking from Nagasaribu:

> Our demand is that the land is returned to us, so that we can manage that land, we can give one hectare to each family for farming and the rest, we can plant pine, macadamia, and *kemenyan* trees. Because *kemenyan* cannot grow in dry place, it has to have protection from other trees, so we have to plant pine trees and macadamia so that our kemenyan has

> enough humidity. The soil has to be humid. *Kemenyan* cannot grow well if it is dry, it has to be humid, so this is why we fight.

This was often mentioned by men and could have been influenced by KSPPM or the government officials they have been in touch with because both government and KSPPM are interested in an environmental aspect of reforestation.

Thus, while women tended to put heavier focus on *kemenyan* as a source of cash income and its importance for education and as inheritance for their children, men tended to focus on the difficulties they face, threats to *kemenyan*, and their hopes for reforestation. These differences in men's and women's views of the forest and its meaning is gendered. Women tend to see forest from the perspective of their care taking responsibilities, whereas men tend to focus on the outside factors. Women's jobs are to take care of their husbands, children, community, gardens, whereas men's responsibilities are to maintain external relationships.

Rightful and righteous claims

Men were more likely to explain their rationale through a rights-based discourse. In this respect, they focus on *masyarakat adat*, rights of *masyarakat adat* and on farmer's rights. They also tend to criticize the government and its policies. Amang Siska from the community of Ompung Bolus, for example, explains that everyone in *Taput* should be considered *masyarakat adat* and the land should be returned to *masyarakat adat* because the government works to make people prosperous. He further argued:

> The farming land is less and less and the government's responsibility is to develop farming. The development should start from the village but what the government does is that it dispossesses the villages of their land and gives it to the company. The government is supposed to make people prosperous. From the data of the government, they

> acknowledged that a farmer in order to live well should have access to two hectares of land but in Ompung Bolus there is no one who has that amount of land, not even two hectares, we do not have anyone who has even one hectare of land. We are not even talking about two hectares here. But then there is a lot of land, but we do not even have 0.5 hectares of land to manage. So, if the government promises to develop and expand farming, then the land has to be returned to people so that every frame has two hectares of land.

Men also based their claims on the original occupation of the land. They said that their ancestors were the first to occupy the land. They knew this through the personal memories, tombs (*tugu*), or the story-telling of their parents (*marturi-turian*). Due to the moves, the territories that the majority of the communities claim today to be their ancestral territory are situated five or more kilometres away from their current residential area. The move did not mean that they abandoned their ancestral territory because they regularly checked on the land and the villagers keep vivid memories of working the land in the area either when they were younger or when they were children. Some villagers remembered the stories of their parents about the land. A physical proof of this previous occupation of the land is their ancestral cemetery or the house and plant remnants from their ancestors. For example, one of the communities of Op. Bolus did not move their ancestral cemetery, despite the fact that the villagers moved closer to the city.

Men explained that they knew about the rights of *masyarakat adat* from KSPPM and AMAN, and this made them sure of their claims. Before the fight, they did not know that they had special rights. Their knowledge of these rights made them feel confident that they had a righteous cause to reclaim the land of their ancestors or to retain the forest of their ancestors. These arguments were also seen in the discussions between male villagers and public officials, where men confronted the same constitutional articles used by the public officials to claim the

land to be the state land and reversing it to claim back the land as citizens of Indonesia with special rights to land. Thus, among the articles mentioned from the constitution are Article 33 of the Constitution, which was used to justify state ownership but this same article was used by the villagers to claim rights to land as citizens. Further, the villagers also used their rights to *hutan adat* (customary forest) and the decision MK35, which recognized *hutan adat* to be outside the state forest zone.

Finally, men also often mentioned that there was greater political space now to allow for resistance. During the time when they lost the right to land and their land was occupied by TPL many men mentioned the company used the military at the time. However, now they knew their rights and there was no military involvement anymore. This allowed them to resist the company. In addition, the company also introduced new policies that provided a space for resistance. Thus, some villagers expressed that now the company allowed them to re-occupy the land and did not disturb the land as long as it was not idling. In two communities, villagers took advantage of this new sustainability policy of the company and reaped benefits by reclaiming the land. This can be seen as a window of opportunity that is essential for the emergence and success of social movements within the POS model (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996/2008).

Despite the fact that generally the motivations of men and women correlated, there are also gendered differences. For example, the focus of men on land as inheritance and of women as a livelihood is a reflection of a culturally embedded gendered difference between a Batak man and a woman. A woman has the utmost responsibility to take care of her family: her children and a husband, whereas men see land as their right. This is why men tend to have adopted rights-based arguments more willingly and naturally than women. Thus, in their arguments with the state officials, men tend to be more confident operating with various articles of the Constitution

and relevant laws and decisions. For men, it is, in general, also easier to absorb these because they have more access to information than women. Another important gendered dynamic here is the fact that women connected their resistance not only to land, in general, but also to their gendered oppression. Thus, for example, the word "struggle" in the beginning meant "resistance" in the local language for me as a researcher. As I interacted with more women, however, I used the word "struggle" both to refer to the struggle for *kemenyan* and also to the daily struggles of women. Women saw the struggle for *kemenyan* through their own struggles and the struggle for *kemenyan* was seen as a way to respond to all these other struggles they waged daily.

6.4 Activist women's experiences

Women activists are usually middle-class, highly educated, and strong-willed. They are also diverse in relation to age, origin, and civil status. I talked with women, senior and junior activists, about their experiences of dealing with gendered discrimination within the movement or an organization. In this section, I will elaborate on key themes that emerged out of these conversations with women. I initially did not plan to draw data in relation to this, however, this came up as soon as I started to converse with women and I felt responsible to analyze the data that I collected, as a result of the need for some of these women to share their experiences.

Working hours and family time

Activists both at KSPPM and AMAN TB have hectic hours. For example, at KSPPM, workdays are from Monday to Saturday with the only day off being Sundays. Activists generally tend to stay in their offices overnight to not have to commute from their homes. Organizing division staff work from satellite offices and others from headquarters. Some staff are permanently based in these satellite offices and reside nearby with their families. Staff who work from the HQ office usually go back to their families on a weekend (Sunday), however, this

depends on the activities of KSPPM. If they have activities (e.g., a training), they do not go back to their families even on Sundays. Some of these women and men occasionally complained about not spending enough time with their families. However, they also presented this as a choice inspired by their activism and, also, Christian spirituality. They said that their children do not seem to get into trouble and this is thanks to all the prayers from the villagers. Indeed, during every KSPPM visit, villagers made sure to pray for KSPPM staff and their children.

Combining child-care and work.

Some staff pointed out that being allowed to bring one's child into an office was a factor that enabled them to continue working at KSPPM. As one of the staff said:

> The advantage here is that the organization is more sensitive towards women. I bring my child, and as long as I do my tasks, bringing a child is not seen as a problem. The proof is that I do the same work as other women here. The only problem I have is that I rest less than them.

In the past, when the organization was led by a man it was not allowed to bring children into the office but with a woman director now this was looser and it was allowed to bring children. This enabled Ester to feel comfortable working at KSPPM. She continued:

> The most important is that I do not leave behind my responsibilities. I write my reports on time. I help clean up and I work no less than others. [...] Everything is taken care of even though I bring my child with me. I see that our director only cares for the work to be completed on time.

Impolite jokes in the community towards younger single women.

Younger and single women often faced impolite jokes in the communities that one of the activists described as "jokes that put women down." She felt uncomfortable about these, and she

learned to respond to these as well with the help of her colleagues. So, if there is a sexist joke in her presence, she called out the joker without directly attacking him as a person. She said something along the lines of “we are already old, so we also have to speak according to our age” or “we have to speak wisely according to our seniority.” She said these in a relaxed and respectful manner in a Bataknese.

Being single

Toba Bataks regard marriage highly. Single women working within communities are often asked why they are not married and sometimes community members try to set them up with their sons. For example, one young woman over 25 chose not to marry, however, this was difficult to explain to the villagers. She understood that villagers genuinely worried about her. So, she learned not to take these comments personally and often responded politely by pointing out that even her father was fine with her not being married. She found having to explain herself constantly challenging.

Verbal and sexual violence

Single women are more likely to face violence, both sexual and verbal. As one of the younger female activists explained, she experienced verbal and psychological violence from male activists before she was married. Marriage protected her in some ways from these types of abuses, and she experienced less of these, post-marriage. Another younger activist was physically harassed sometimes but these attacks were addressed in a timely manner by the organization. A third single woman activist faced sexual assault, which remained unresolved. It is important to note this was not at KSPPM, but at another organization. The woman shared a house with the perpetrator. She felt she could not report the assault to the police because, on the one hand, she was afraid of the reputational damage to the organization and, on the other, she

also was afraid of the gossip that would be spread about her as a result of her reporting. But she remained within the organization for another year after the assault, moving to a different branch in another city. She was told that the case will be dealt with at the institutional level, however, the perpetrator remained employed at the time I was there. The woman kept in touch with me throughout and faced health challenges due to the experience, and, eventually decided to leave the organization.

Women celebrate their mobility but feel unsafe to travel at night. Some women expressed that mobility that was given to them by their activism was a positive aspect of their work. Other women, however, expressed that having to travel at night on scooters or motorbikes was also a security risk for them. Sometimes these women faced harassment from the people they met on their way to the communities or back from the communities during their nighttime travels. This suggests that the organizations often lack security protocols that are oriented towards gender-specific risks that female staff face. In addition, women also faced some scrutiny from neighbours. Coming back home late at night is not acceptable for Toba Batak women. If neighbours notice this, this can cause reputational damage to these women and their parents.

Sometimes women activists also face harassment from government officials due to their gender. Here is an excerpt from my interview with Sari:

> The government officials asked me: "Why does your husband not think of you? Is your family not capable economically?" That is annoying, right? Several government officials in *Humbahas* told me: "You are beautiful, still young, do you have a good relationship with your husband?" So, I asked him right away why he thinks this way. He responded that if I were his wife, he won't let me work like this… I have to face many men. Sometimes I am the only woman accompanying the villagers, almost always like that… "And you have to

argue with the police and others, is your husband not embarrassed?" Like that…. Then I ask why should he be embarrassed? "On the contrary, he is proud of me," I say. "In fact, I would be embarrassed if my husband were like Mister *(Bapak*)." [...] They often try to put us down like that… For example, we meet in Medan at an even, and they ask "What are you doing? Your husbands are nice, eh, they allow you to sleep in hotels by yourselves. If I... I don't allow my wife…"

Lack of gender training for activists.

KSPPM has regular gender training for community members, especially women. However, they have never conducted gender training for men or among their own staff. During the training I attended, all the trainees were female villagers. Most of the facilitators were male activists who sometimes did not listen to women's inputs carefully. Some male facilitators seemed to lack a nuanced understanding of women's experiences.

Women activists explained that the male staff needed to practice what they preach to the communities as well. For example, some women explained that during community meetings women staff were often expected to make tea or coffee, whereas male staff usually chose to rely on women staff to prepare drinks and food. As Ester explained:

> What I feel is this, when there is a meeting in *Sopo.* In Porsea or Samosir, or… Every time there is a discussion, men from KSPPM do not take the initiative of making tea. That's important, right? Because it's a small detail. When leading a discussion, I am not involved, but, why do I have to be in the kitchen, not him? In the end, it is me who takes this job. That's what's visible.

Discrimination against women and how this affects partnerships and alliances

Women activists face organizational difficulties to challenge the male-dominated structures, even when they seemingly have enough level of publicity and acknowledgement as activists. For example, an Indigenous woman activist, Mama Aleta had one Goldman Environmental Award in 2013. Apart from her there are other Indigenous women activists who are considered leaders of AMAN. However, even after this acknowledgement of women's leadership, their inputs for the Draft Law on the Protection and Recognition of the Indigenous Peoples were excluded. All the seven regional inputs were counted, but women's consultations that they had since 2009 were not included as official input. One of the *Permepuan AMAN* activists concluded that "even within their own organization [AMAN], [women] are refused and all the inputs they have given did not become part of the proposed Draft Law." It is notable that the youth branch was created even before the women's branch was created. The establishment of *Perempuan AMAN* aims to ease women's participation within AMAN. However, as explained by the *Perempuan AMAN* activist, this did not make involvement easier for women. On the contrary, new challenges arose whereby women's activism now was seen as a disturbance and *Perempuan AMAN* was intimidated through jokes and inappropriate comments.

The international activists who work with the local ones were affected by these male-dominated dynamics and if they had a choice, they chose to work with organizations that had less discrimination against women with greater women's representation. For example, one international organization's female representative had chosen to work with KSPPM due to the strong positions of women here. She felt not respected and listened to by other organizations in other areas and this made partnership harder for her to manage. However, she liked working in North Sumatra because there were strong women here. She explained:

> A lot of those partnerships exist because of that differential relationship to older white men. [Those] are not partnerships I am gonna be able to continue because they don't necessarily respect me as much. So that sort of defines the direction that we take. I have focussed on whom I partner with, for sure. [...] I am not gonna be the guy who sits around and smokes with the guy until all hours... So, you know… They are all very nice. We still work with them. But we had to decide who is the lead. [At some point] there will be a real conversation about what we do with those partnerships. My experience, it's a lot harder to work with them as a woman.

The experiences outlined in this section demonstrate that activist women have their own gendered experiences of activism. The majority of research on women's role within resistance centred on women's contributions, gendered motivations, and roles (Agosin, 1996; Beckwith, 2002; Boulding, 2001; Cockburn (2007); Codur & King, 2015; Ferree & Mueller, 2004; Jordan, 2003; Justino et al, 2018; Richter-Devroe, 2012; Taylor, 1999). Jordan (2003) in her research argued that women activists were involved in social activism due to past experience of violence. The data presented in this section suggests that women have experiences of sexual violence, verbal abuse and harassment both from within movements and from outside, including communities and government officials. The movements also tend to be male-led and male-dominated, which may hurt movements in the long run, their networking abilities nationally and internationally. Therefore, there is a need to assess how well social movements are mainstreaming gender justice, not only in their grassroots programmatic activities, but also organizationally. Individual women activists are affected by this structural gender injustice.

6.5 Resistance leading to social transformation

Initially, I did not plan to explore changes that occurred in the communities as a result of resistance. However, as I talked with the villagers some of them mentioned the relationship between the youths of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta and how they had previously disliked each other. These conversations led me to explore this question more in my conversations with the villagers and also in my interviews. The data analysis below reflects the findings I classified into three major themes: changes of gendered roles, inter-village peace, and awareness of one's rights.

Changes of gendered roles as a result of resistance

As we were talking with Ompung Viktor of my host family, he told me over one of the many dinners we had how first they were surprised to see that KSPPM's staff were mostly women. These women were not only young and energetic, but they smoked, left their families behind and slept in the villager's houses. The male leaders of the resistance started to think that these women's families were broken families. But on their many visits to the activists' houses, then, they noticed that these women's children were well taken care of, their houses were clean and they had a good relationship with their husbands who then served coffee to these male villagers. This surprised the villagers because these observations challenged their ideas about how family relationships are supposed to be built. These men then started to question themselves and start helping around the house as well. They also started to reflect about the situation of their own mothers and wives.

Ompung Dewi was one of the women leaders of the movement, and she pointed out that she, as a woman, now could sit among men at *kedai*s and take pictures with men. Before women who sit at *kedai*s were looked down upon. Also, if one took a photograph with another man who

was not one's husband, villagers spread gossips about them because this was equalled to cheating. But since resistance, this changed for her. It needs to be pointed out, however, that this change is probably relevant only for this specific woman leader, not other women who are not seen as such.

At the same time, however, I observed that women in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta were more aware of their burdens compared to women in other areas. Women here complained about the amount of work they carry more than women in the Sipahutar area where they have not had the experience of radical resistance. In the Sipahutar area, when I asked them about the struggle of women, they seemed to be less aware of their daily struggles. Men also seemed to be less aware in other villages compared to Pandumaan and Sipituhuta. Thus, when I asked men in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta what they thought of their women, men here mostly pointed out that their women are so hardworking that they give birth and the next day go to work in the fields. Some of these men seemed to enjoy the privilege they had, while others seemed to feel sorry. Women sometimes gave examples of some village men who do household work and said that they thought these men were wise because they helped their wives to do household chores. The local church also had a woman priest for the past few years and the women saw this as a good sign, but they also felt that church played a role in justifying women's subordination. Women who felt critical of their gendered positions also thought they could not do much to change this because there would be condemnation from other women leading to loss of friends and good relationships with the other women and villagers, at large, therefore, they preferred to keep silent.

Women and men in the *kemenyan* areas had their own difficulties in relation to changing their gender relations because of the division of work. The forest is for men bringing more cash

into the household whereas rice fields and coffee plantations are in the village. Rice is usually for one's own consumption whereas coffee does not bring in as much as *kemenyan* does. Women generally do not go into the forest unless forced to; for example, to help find wood for building a house. In Pandumaan, for example, there was a prohibition for women to go into the forest due to them potentially being attacked by monkeys. In other situations where communities reclaimed land, normally, these lands were situated farther away from their villages, leading to the need for more cooperation between husbands and wives. This also led to men working the fields as well. But even in these situations if men had jobs outside, they had the job of transporting the women back and forth rather than tilling the land. In the case of Ompung Ronggur, it was women who managed to reclaim the land and this led to a greater recognition of women's roles in the community at least for women themselves because it was through their work that the land was de facto returned to the community. The realization of this fact made women proud of themselves.

KSPPM activists claimed that there was more participation of women, especially in the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta. In the beginning it was KSPPM who encouraged and insisted on the presence of women, however, with time villagers themselves took the initiative to involve women in the decision-making. Thus, Martua, a long-term staff of KSPPM, explained that

> If there is a huge economic impact [from the conflict], there will be greater involvement of women… First, they are counted in decision-making. And second, within resistance the voice of women becomes something they cannot leave behind. If they go to Jakarta, they already have an agreement that women have to speak, and they are given space to speak. The change is just giving space, [so that women can express their] viewpoint on the struggle. Like in the household, I think there are also many changes. For example, without us knowing actually many men now make tea, want to make tea, in the past they did not

> even step into the kitchen, in the past they did not want to take care of children, and now they take care of their children. So, there are changes like that, too.

Inter-village relationship-building

Before resistance, villagers of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta did not talk with each other. Usually the youth from the two villages fought each other. They thought of each other as aggressive, *nakal* (naughty) and arrogant. However, as they fought for the land, they realized that those stereotypes of each other were not true. As Mama Patrisia explained:

> We are better friends now with each other. In the past we did not know the people from Sipituhuta but now we know each other well. We are invited to parties, so we are more united now compared to before. This unity can also be seen in our everyday life now. In the past, for example, I did not know what Ompung Dewi was, but now we help each other. If I don't have enough child pepper, then I go to her and ask for these. And She shares hers with me. My child was sick before and Siska's father came to visit us in the hospital, that means that we care for each other more now. We did not know each other before but we are close friends. Their *touke* also contribute cars, gasoline, also coffee *touke*s. They can't join us 100 percent but they contribute their cars. If they have five cars, these five cars are given to us for our resistance.

Ompung Dewi similarly explained that before resistance sitting in the same bus, they did not talk with each other:

> But now we talk, we exchange ideas, and we know each other. [...] Before we used to think that people in Pandumaan are cruel and not friendly but now we know that we are friends and people there are nice. Their children are our children now.

Awareness of one's rights, becoming critical and brave

Women expressed that before resistance, they were afraid of the police but as a result of resistance they now developed an understanding that there was no need to be afraid of the police. As Ompung Dewi said,

> I was afraid of the police but now, whenever I see police I ask for help because now I know that there are good cops and bad cops [...] In the past I was also afraid of the government. Now I am not afraid anymore because I have read many books about the way the government is organized, *masyarakat adat*, laws, history of Indonesia.

Another woman, Mama Sitor, said that "a lot of knowledge was given to us about our rights, we can hold the government responsible for these rights. [...] If we are occupied by TPL that means we lose our rights right? So, we started to understand that we have rights." Mama Patrisia expressed that villagers were now better informed about the various governance mechanisms, such as laws, district head and parliament:

> We understand more laws and ministries… We also better understand the political situation in our country. The police and the local government seek for safety - they only want us to be peaceful, but they seek their own interests, not our interests, their interest is not to let people prosper, so, we become more critical towards them. So, we know how to resist, they seek for security - so anything they talk about we have to question it. We also have to listen with our hearts because they can say sweet words but those words may not be what they really mean, so, we have to pay attention to how they say what they say. So, we have to be careful with everyone.

The many women I talked with also pointed out that the representatives of 27 countries had visited their village. They were proud of this but many of them also wondered what this had given them. Regarding this, Mama Patrisia pointed out that these guests contributed to their

worldview. She said "we know more, our worldview is wider now because guests here came not only from one country but many countries. Because of this our thinking is also wider for the future of our children. We imagine more."

Pride of one's village and the respect of others

Finally, many of the women mentioned that they started to be respected by other villages in the area. Mama Patrisia explained that

> Our neighbours in Aek Nauli, Dolok Sanggul, they respect us. The myth spread a different image about our village - that we are fighters and that we are united, compact, so, we are also proud of our region and even though there are problems internally, we hope these problems do not go out and do not become big.

Indeed, the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta seems to have influenced other villages as well because in other villages I visited, including Lumban Sitorus, there were several villagers who mentioned these two villages and their resistance as a source of inspiration.

Resistance seems to have led to certain unexpected outcomes. Resistance itself can be transformative. Gender mainstreaming approach from KSPPM seems to have been more transformative in the case of Pandumaan-Sipituhuta (where they also have most intensively incorporated this strategy). This gender mainstreaming resulted in more women understanding the issue and also finding their own ways of approaching the issue from their unique women's perspective, thus, leading to the connection of struggle (*perjuangan*) for forest to women's daily struggles. Further, it is important to note that the views of men in this section are mainly those of the male leaders of *marga raja* and of the well-off *marga boru*. This is due partly to the fact that the men coming from *marga boru*, especially if they did not hold a socially, economically, or politically significant position in the community, often did not feel confident to express their

own opinions and referred to their status as *marga boru*, and therefore, lacked the decision-making power in the communities. This then evetnually led them to express opinions in line with the popular concensus in the community. For women, it was less risky to express an opinion different than the official position of the elite men. However, women, regardless of their social standing, often found ways to interpret the objectives of resistance and its vision as being in line with their own visioning, whether it was interdependence of the community, economic well-being of the community members, or the expression of solidarity with the majority who were the landowners/forest-owners . It might also be possible this is how the forest-less women preferred to frame the communal pressure from the other community members to support the village cause.

Chapter 7: Looking Back and Moving Forward: Addressing Challenges and Envisioning Peace

This chapter consists of two major sections. The first section focuses on the internal and external challenges of nonviolent resistance, and the second elaborates on the diverse visions of peace that relevant actors have in conjunction with conflicts presented in the previous chapters.

7.1 Looking Back: Internal and External Challenges

In this section, I look back at the internal and external challenges of the resistance. The internal challenges are related to the challenges at the level of NGOs and communities. The external challenges focus on the district, provincial, and national level challenges covering the various aspects that hamper government's efficiency in responding to the demands of the communities who struggle for tenurial security.

7.1.1 Internal challenges

In this section, I present my analysis of the internal challenges of resistance. This includes challenges faced by the accompanying NGOs and challenges faced by the communities. In relation to organizational challenges**,** I identify several challenges that relate to lack of funding and dependence on it, internal conflicts, a lack of post-conflict planning and of conflict resolution strategy.

NGOs' lack of resources and dependence on external funding

The two organizations I interacted with had differing financial situations. KSPPM was more secure compared to AMAN Tano Batak. KSPPM has been funded for the past thirty years by BfdW (Brot fur die Wielt, Bread for the World), a "development and relief agency of the Protestant Churches in Germany" which focuses on the issues of food security, health, human rights, democracy, and peace (BfdW, 2019). The funders' policies change as the concerns of

focus change. At the time when I was with KSPPM, one of the meetings organized by the funder stressed that the funder would be focusing on emergency situations and conflict regions, such as Papua, and leave the region of Sumatra. This made the staff at KSPPM start strategizing about the kind of jobs they would pursue if this were to happen. The issue was resolved and they remained funded by BfDW. Nevertheless, a dependence on external funding remains a challenge, especially when an organization does not have diverse sources of funding and relies on one major funder for almost all of its activities.

This situation of KSPPM was, however, better than that of AMAN Tano Batak. At the time when I visited AMAN TB, some employees of AMAN TB worked for an honorarium as an "expression of thanks" rather than a secure, monthly salary. The AMAN TB staff explained that this was not a problem because they were a part of a movement, the Indigenous people themselves who worked on indigenous issues and, therefore, there was no salary for the work they do. This arrangement also expected communities to pay for the expenses when going to meetings and also to contribute finances to the common pool of resources. The communities complained about this internally and those who did not work closely with AMAN TB explained that they did not have an interest in this cooperation also due to the additional payments they had to make to be involved with AMAN TB. They preferred to work with KSPPM because they did not have to contribute funds to KSPPM and KSPPM, if needed, also helped them to pay for advocacy trip tickets to Jakarta and back.

Internal conflicts within the movement (conflict between AMAN TB and KSPPM)

Out of the two organizations working closely with the communities in Toba area, KSPPM is an older organization. KSPPM was one of the founding organizations of AMAN. AMAN TB was set up by KSPPM as well. One staff member of KSPPM was given

responsibility to manage AMAN and its establishment in the region. To support AMAN TB, KSPPM also enlisted all of their farming groups as part of AMAN TB. However, as AMAN TB became more established in the region, the KSPPM staff was recruited by AMAN HQ and AMAN TB sought its independence from KSPPM. This process led to several conflicts between AMAN HQ, AMAN TB, and KSPPM.

There were other sources of conflict between the two organizations. For example, a few years ago they organized a joint mass action to push for a *Perda* (regional regulation) in the district of Toba Samosir. AMAN TB promised to bring about 300 people, however, brought only 50-80 persons with KSPPM bringing 1,250 persons to the demonstration. Then, while KSPPM and *masyarakat adat* were demonstrating, AMAN TB and AMAN HQ organized a press conference claiming that the action was organized by them. There were several occasions like this which involved other external actors, such as government bodies (Komnas HAM), the international media (the Guardian, BBC), and international NGOs. These then led to some form of competition between the two organizations mainly over human resources and access to communities.

From the explanations given, there seemed to be several causes of these conflicts. First, the differences in their profile: AMAN prefers high-profile, KSPPM prefers low-profile. As one of the respondents expressed "AMAN is in the sky without having its feet firmly on the ground" ("Aman di langit padahal di bumi pun dia ga bisa berdiri") referring to the international travels of AMAN advocating on behalf of the global indigenous peoples' movement but their lack of organizing on the ground. KSPPM, on the other hand, prided itself with not even having a signpost with its name on it in front of the office because people should know about them through their work rather than through a signpost.

Second, lack of coordination between the two organizations. AMAN TB went to communities to whom they developed access through KSPPM, organized meetings and consultations without coordinating together with KSPPM, while KSPPM still considered these cases to be the cases they advocated for. AMAN TB eventually started replicating the work of KSPPM and KSPPM saw this lack of coordination on AMAN TB's side as a threat to the social cohesion they built in these communities and the advocacy strategy they developed.

Third, there is a strategic difference between the two organizations. KSPPM is a people's (*rakyat*) organization that chose *masyarakat adat* as an advocacy strategy, while AMAN TB represents itself as the *masyarakat adat*. KSPPM does not necessarily deny the Christian ethics it is built on and builds their relationship of trust with the communities on the basis of Christian spirituality, while several AMAN TB staff denounced their Christianity and chose to follow *Parmalim or Siradja Batak* (the traditional religion of the Toba Bataks, some of which also seem to have revivalist undertones). KSPPM saw their communities as victims of development, whereas AMAN TB saw themselves as people who were reclaiming their own identity that they lost due to Christianization, nationalization, and development.

Finally, there are generational differences between the two organizations. KSPPM's activists are more seasoned activists who started organizing communities in the 1980s and were part of the 1998 *Reformasi* movement, whereas the AMAN TB activists were younger that may have not been part of the *Reformasi* movement. Older activists might consider younger activists as inexperienced making the younger activists of AMAN TB feel challenged.

The impact of this conflict can be felt on the advocacy efforts and their relationships with the communities. The two organizations did not have free exchange of information on the developments in the districts and the province. They met the government separately. For

example, when the national-level government official visited KSPPM in Parapat. Communities advocated by AMAN TB would have wanted to join the meeting but were not invited. The communities they accompanied did not always feel comfortable with the differentiation that came with their association with one or the other organization. Some communities wanted to make use of both organizations in their struggle but felt afraid to consider other options. All of this indicates the type of power these grassroots organizations have over the villagers' choices and decisions.

Post-conflict planning

According to KSPPM, post-conflict planning starts with the state recognition of the customary forest or some kind of resolution that satisfies the villagers. I noticed the lack of post-conflict planning with the case of Sugapa. I visited the village and had my own romantic vision of strong women here, however, I saw one woman (Nai Sinta) who was highly respected with all the other women remaining marginalized. KSPPM acknowledged that it lacked a post-conflict organizing strategy. They were in the process of developing a tool that allowed them to organize the villagers, especially in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, for a post-conflict life. The tool they were trying to adopt, *Plan de Vida,* was developed by the Guambiano in Cauca region of Colombia (Bastian, 1999). The approach was introduced in Indonesia by a Scotland-based organisation called LifeMosaic[24] in the early 2010s. In 2014, LifeMosaic invited Misak community leaders to Indonesia (LifeMosaic, 2020). When I asked the elders in Sipituhuta, they were sceptical that initiatives that did not involve a village government could be successful when it came to uniting villagers. They said that it was easier for Bataks to be united when there was an external threat but a lot harder to deal with the internal problems. Despite KSPPM's reputation, in the long run they might need the involvement of the village, sub-district and district government.

[24] I worked with LifeMosaic from 2011-2013.

Lack of a movement strategy on conflict resolution

The NGOs working on land issues today are more likely to come across the approach of conflict resolution. However, these organizations also are less likely to have a clear strategy of how to respond to this approach as part of the agrarian reform movement. There is a clear understanding by the agrarian reform movement that land-based conflicts are "structural" conflicts that require structural resolution through agrarian reform. Part of this agrarian reform is the recognition of indigenous peoples' land rights. However, there is a growth of new NGOs that see conflict resolution as a possible approach to dealing with land-based conflicts. There have also been several cases of successful mediation in Jambi, Kalimantan, and other places (see Dhiaulhaq et al, 2018).

KSPPM does not have a strategy in regards to this new tool. One of the reasons for the failure of the Lumban Sitorus mediation is the lack of a well-thought-out organizational and movement[25] strategy in relation to conflict resolution. Other national organizations in Jakarta also were confused to understand this new tool. Thus, there is a necessity to understand "conflict resolution" and develop a strategy around it.

There are several challenges at the community level as well. These are: the toll of resistance, criminalisation, lack of knowledge about *kemenyan* and its market, *adat* and horizontal conflicts, mistrust towards TPL and the government, lack of security, exclusion of women, and change of values in the communities.

Protest and its toll on villagers and their families

The respondents in my research, especially the women, expressed difficulties due to their own or their husband's activism. Women found it difficult to leave their work at home to be able to protest together with all the other villagers. This led to poorer yields in the year when they

[25] I refer to the movement of the indigenous people.

intensively participated in the resistance. One of the women activists, for example, had to go to Jakarta for workshops and meetings and this made her lose out on her harvest in that year. Luckily, she received a per diem for the workshops and meetings, which then helped her to cover her expenses, expenses she would ideally have earned from selling the coffee beans.

Families financed some of their own expenses when they went to advocacy meetings outside the village and the district, leading to financial challenges for their families. This had a toll on women because it was the wives then who had to be more creative in relation to the income generation for family expenses or borrow funds from fellow villagers in order to cover the expenses related to these advocacy trips, most often to Jakarta and Medan. This aspect was especially difficult for men who did not have the support of their wives. Wives who refused to support their husband's activism tended to be the ones who did not attend meetings and did not participate in discussions. In some cases, wives had their own government jobs and did not wish to be involved due to the pressure felt in these instances by civil servants.

Men in the semi-urban areas, such as Lumban Sitorus, had difficulties finding work inside or in the nearby towns. The main employers of educated men are the government or the company. For men with minimum schooling education it is often easier to find random jobs. The inability to find an acceptable job created conflicts within the family between the spouses because the husband was not bringing wages home.

Criminalization

Both men and women mentioned criminalisation as one of the challenges. Due to imprisonment, some men lost their contract jobs. Some criminalized men expressed that this was a life-changing experience for them, one that proved they have a righteous cause. Others found it hard to understand the intimidation they faced at the police office. Some villagers fled and were

in hiding for months to avoid criminalisation. This made it harder for women, because then the wives and women had to take upon extra care-taking responsibilities that included delivering food to men in the forest.

As a result of this, villagers also developed certain strategies, such as refusing photographs with strangers. For example, in the past one of the men from the community of Op. Bolus was photographed by an unknown man to then later find out that the photograph was delivered to the police office. The police tried to accuse him of setting up a fire in the Napa land.

Lack of knowledge about kemenyan and the nature of its market

Some men and women want to know more about *kemenyan*, the market and the price abroad. They were interested to find out how trade is managed between the farmers and exporters from Sumatra or Java. I tried to help the villagers to find information online, however, information online is also limited. I asked a government official whether they understood the way the market is organized. This is a product that seems to be controlled by a cartel. Better state regulation of marketing and the pricing systems would help the farmers to know better how to argue in favour of keeping the resource. Government could also provide access to data as to how this resource can contribute to the local economy and what is its value.

Adat, horizontal conflicts, money and marga politics

Adat can be used not only as a strategy to unite communities, it is also used as (1) a tool of divide and rule; and as (2) a tool of sabotage. For example, in the hamlet of Marade (Hamlet 1) the company approached *raja bius* and offered a job contract. The *raja bius* accepted the offer; his family is supportive of his decision because they also benefit from the partnership with TPL financially. Despite the fact that the lower-class families with less *adat* power oppose the company, they cannot express this because of the power of *adat* hierarchy. In another instance,

the male leaders of resistance were approached by the company with a sack of money telling them that other leaders had received the payment, thus, putting pressure on these men.

In the same way, *adat* can be used as a tool to sabotage resistance. For example, once Amang Siska was approached by the company public relations department employee who was his *hula-hula*, or his wife's male relative. According to *adat*, he was supposed to give the utmost respect to his brother-in-law. The company took advantage of this relationship to pressure him into accepting assistance from the company to build his church in exchange for refusal to lead resistance. Other villagers got visits from women employed by TPL. Women were sent because they were less likely than men to experience a violent response. Sometimes children of villagers were approached with offers of jobs. Sometimes men were fed *tuak* (local alcohol) and asked to sign papers.

Adat hierarchy can also be a source of frustration for families from other non-r*aja bius* families. For example, during my time there, the village of Pandumaan was supposed to have village head elections. Villagers from the smaller *marga*s expressed their frustration with the process of these elections because it was usually the person with the biggest family gathering who won. The village head candidates were picked from the influential families who then organized an *adat* ritual, to which they invited their family and their *boru* and at this ritual everyone present was asked to support a candidate from a clan. If they ate the meat served at this ritual, they could not not follow the advice because by being present and eating the meat they made a commitment.

In other communities where *adat* is not as strong anymore, such as Lumban Sitorus, they are given 50,000 rupiah. If it became known that people did not fulfill the promise made, there were sanctions according to *adat*. In these village head elections, then, the decisive vote usually

belonged to a *boru* clan, however, *boru* clan, if its size was insignificant, would not be able to be elected into a political position. There were also others who were against this type of *marga*-based system of elections because this system "destroyed peace" in the villages due to the consolidation that took place based on the *marga* system. Villagers complained that they could not become united within their own village in their everyday lives. They became united if there was an outside power involved, such as TPL.

Another source of horizontal conflicts was *perkara tanah* or land conflicts between or within families. These conflicts usually happened due to the mobility of the families who moved out of the commuity and back in. Thus, in the case of the *perkara* that the villagers were trying to resolve when I was there was the case of two families. The first family resided in the village, and the second family was away. The deal was between the two brothers. The brother who was away said the remaining family could use his land while he was away. Then the child of this brother came back to the village and said he wanted to use his father's land now that he was back in the village. Now, the child of the other brother had utilized the land upon the agreement of the brother and so argued that the land belonged to him to which the other one agreed that they had lent it to him while they were away but now that they were back, they wanted the land back. However, the family already planted coffee trees on the land under contestation, which meant they had spent a significant amount of funds and would be yielding fruits of this work in the coming years. The other family did not want to come to an agreement over these coffee trees. The mediators, *penetua adat* (*adat* elders), tried to resolve this conflict, but they did not manage. At the time when I was there, the case was to go to the court due to the inability of the family and the community to resolve this conflict. The court, however, was also seen as useless because they could not resolve a conflict. When one chose the court as a conflict resolution tool, the

conflict was considered resolved when one of the parties ran out of funds to appeal the court's decision.

Mistrust towards TPL

The various rapprochements of TPL are seen as a nuisance by the villagers and eventually lead to a mistrust towards the company. This mistrust becomes a challenge if the company shows later an interest in mediation as a way to resolve the conflict. One of the reasons the mediation mentioned earlier failed, according to the mediator, was that the community did not trust the company fully. They trusted KSPPM more and, therefore, chose to continue to consult with KSPPM throughout the process of mediation and kept on pushing for the solution they agreed to pursue in consultation with KSPPM. They did not trust that if they agreed to other possibilities, TPL was able to pursue and fulfill what it promised. They were afraid that if they agreed to less than what they decided to demand initially, this agreement would be used by TPL to rid them of their claim to be *masyarakat adat*.

Lack of self-confidence and women's exclusion

One of the organizers expressed that it takes time to make communities aware and confident of their claim to indigeneity and the associated claim of the special rights to land. Thus, for example, the leader of the community of Ompung Bolus repeated the words of the organizers explaining that the land was their identity using the word "identitas" in Bahasa Indonesia. It was not very clear what he meant by this, but he repeatedly used the word. Later, one of the KSPPM organizers explained that this community needed to reclaim the land but that they seemed to lack confidence in their own claim and delayed this process of reclaiming despite the fact that they had a legitimate physical proof of their previous ownership of the territory (*Tugu* of the founder of the village is still situated on this land). It seemed they hoped and relied

too much on the legal processes and wanted to make sure they had a written recognition of their rights before starting to reclaim by planting their gardens. At the same time, this community was also the one where I could not reach women except for one who was the wife of one of the leaders. The rest seemed to be excluded from the resistance and when asked were not able to explain the reasons why they had rights to the land. On the other hand, in the communities of Op. Ronggur and Ama Raja Medang Simamora, women's involvement was higher leading to their reclamation of the land. Thus, women's exclusion from the organizing process can be seen as a weakness or a challenge because it means that these resistance movements lack the zeal and decisiveness that women brought into the reclamation of both Op. Ronggur and Ama Raja Medang communities.

Insecurity and mistrust towards the government

The villagers are not sure whether the government is supportive of them or not. They think that TPL can influence the government's decisions and, therefore, they can win. The villagers are not sure whether the government sides with the company or the people because, on the one hand, there is a lack of tenurial security that should be given by the government to them, and, on the other, the government provides support to farmers through the village administration. This support to the village administration is seen as proof that the government cares for the people. At the same time, resisting communities face criminalisation and intimidation.

Change of values and of relationships in the community

Another challenge villagers saw was related to the change of values. This change of values then affected the nature of relationships in the community. Many women referred to this concern in personal conversations expressing that people were becoming more selfish and individualistic as expressed in a saying in Jakartanese: "*siapa loh, siapa gue*" (who are you and

who am i?). Thus, in many villages they used to harvest paddy at an agreed time and day altogether, however, this has changed and now each family harvested individually. The only village where this practice remained was Nagasaribu and to some degree, Aek Lung.

Lack of youth's participation

Finally, the last aspect connected to the previous challenge is the lack of youth participation in the community life. This is connected to the fact that most young people, especially males, are expected to leave the villages to out-migrate. Young people are also more likely to be educated as lawyers or economists and less interested in farming as a profession. Many parents discourage their children from work as farmers because farmers lives are hard. In more semi-urban areas, such as Lumban Sitorus, youth are more interested in "instant gratification," "brands," and new technologies, rather than hard work. Drug use (in conjunction with online gaming) and glue-smelling also appeared as an issue in these semi-urban areas.

7.1.2 External challenges

The provincial and national challenges are: lack of media coverage and public discussions, lack of advocacy strategy oriented at the local politicians and parliamentarians, the non-involvement of church, lack of clarity as to who are *masyarakat adat* and a mistrust of the government towards claims of indigeneity, and the investment policies. In this section, I explain each of these points.

Lack of media coverage limits public discussions.

KSPPM explained that they have difficulty getting local newspapers to cover their stories. This is why they use social media, mainly Facebook, to inform the public and their followers about the news related to the communities they accompany. In the town of Balige I met several young journalists who all work for local newspapers. They explained that the articles

they write are usually ordered. They do not get a salary from the newspaper and this means that they expect people who ask them to cover events or issues to pay them directly, at least, to cover their transportation and consumption. In addition to this, there are risks associated with reporting on conflict cases because reporters can be threatened. In Indonesia, there were 64 reported cases of violence against journalists in 2018, and 73 cases against activists between 2014 and 2019 (Duillah, 2018; Nugraheny, 2019). There is a lack of security and protection for both journalists and activists. This means that local communities at district and sub-district level lack a source of objective news coverage about local politics and activists lack a resource to educate, discuss, and pressure the local government.

Lack of advocacy strategy aiming at the local politicians

Allies within the local government must be identified and approached to push towards the recognition of the rights of *masyarakat adat* at the district levels. KSPPM and AMAN TB already work in this direction. But, the national government official suggested that the regional regulation (*perda*) could have moved faster for Pandumaan-Sipituhuta if the KSPPM worked better with the local government.

Members of parliament, their business connections, and the creation of a masyarakat adat community

There have been several obstacles with the process of *Perda* (district regulation) at the national and local levels. First, at the national level, the decision letter (SK) that was signed by the President had in its attachment the map of the territory. The map on the version signed by the President was replaced to include the territory of other villages. It was not the map that KSPPM and villagers attached. Second, *perda* acknowledges "*Masyarakat Adat* Pandumaan-Sipituhuta," which, according to a government official, was not an act of recognition but an act of creation of

a new type of indigenous community. A legal expert I conversed with suggested that this means that anyone could proclaim themselves to be *masyarakat adat*. A KSPPM staff suggested that it might have been better to name this community as "the descendants of bius Marbun in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta," rather than "Masyarakat adat Pandumaan and Sipituhuta." At the local level, the local Parliament had twenty-eight parliamentarians, 27 of whom had a contractual relationship with TPL. This made it a difficult process and the villagers received the approval of their *Perda* only after three years of regular consultations with the local parliament. The *Perda* was eventually signed in 2019 and was awaiting a final decision letter from MoEF at the time of writing.

Church non-involvement

Neither the Protestant nor the Roman Catholic Church seem to have a clear position on the company and its presence. In the case of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta, the church was forced to side with the people due to the push from the villagers, whereas in the case of Lumban Sitorus and other communities, the church preferred to stay aside and sometimes received donations from the company. In close-knit and homogenous communities, it is easier than in more diverse communities to control the church. For example, the church did not support villagers in Lumban Sitorus because a membership of the church also included company employees, and, therefore, the church here remained neutral and received CSR funds from the company.

At the same time, when I was at the Parapat office, the church organized a workshop on the approaches in relation to *masyarakat adat* to which one prominent indigenous peoples' rights activist was invited, Abdon Nababan, who used to be the secretary-general of AMAN. Thus, the church is trying to develop a new strategy. Meanwhile, for the lack of a strategy from the

churches, the priests and pastors who support *masyarakat adat* seem to seek involvement in organizations such as KSPPM.

Mistrust of the government towards community claims, NGOs who support them, and a romanticized view of masyarakat adat

In a few cases, the government official interviewed used the term “land grabbing” in relation to the communities that claimed indigeneity, suggesting that he believed some of these communities were claiming land that did not originally belong to them. He explained that many government officials also argued that some of these Toba Batak communities were grabbing the lands that never belonged to them. The fact that even allies within the government did not fully believe the claims of the communities might pose a great challenge for these communities. In addition to the mistrust towards the community claims, there was also a fear of the government as to where the recognition of *masyarakat adat* might lead in the future. How much autonomy and self-governance could they ask for and could the Indonesian state provide the level of autonomy that *masyarakat adat* asked for? The MoEF would also lose jurisdiction over a significant amount of forest/land if the government were to recognize the rights of *masyarakat adat*. In the case of “small peoples” and small territories this is less risky but if the claims are over a big territory, these claims will be seen as a threat to the state. This is why the recognition of Pandumaan and Sipituhuta who claims a territory of over 5,000 hectares is quite unprecedented (and is considered a mistake by the government official I interviewed). Most of the recognized customary forests seemed to be significantly smaller than the size of this forest territory.

The mistrust towards the NGOs also came up as an issue. The government official mentioned that he trusted KSPPM but at the same time he did not see the complete ethnographic

data on Pandumaan and Sipituhuta and other KSPPM cases. He feared that they did not objectively explain the dynamics in the communities. He seemed to have been affected by the fact that the man who led the resistance in Pandumaan and Sipituhuta expressed that he did not own *kemenyan* forest. The official felt sorry for the man who fought hard and personally lost much (his contract at the oil company he worked for and his pension) when he did not have access to forest himself.[26] He liked the *masyarakat adat* more where he saw the principle of "from everyone according to their capacity and to everyone according to their needs." *Kajang Boti* is, according to him, a socially just and peaceful community whose *adat* elder's principle is not to be richer than the poorest person in the community. This type of idyllic equality would also guarantee to some extent that the claims of the indigenous people were not the local elite's means of grabbing more lands. This means that the allies within the government have a romanticized view of the Indigenous peoples and also indirectly then force this view not only on NGOs but also on the rural people who claim special rights to land.

In this case, many of the people who claim *adat*-ness in Toba Batak area may not be recognized as such. The communities I visited have different structures of *adat* and are all Christian with some minority Muslim populations with some number of both internal and external migrants residing together with them. So, these are diverse villages and the romanticized definition of *masyarakat adat* may not accommodate this diversity. Most communities find themselves in the process of transitioning into new types of "neoliberal" relationships. They also actively use social media, such as WhatsApp and Facebook. They are integrated into the global matrix as much as they are integrated into the global economy. They are not "noble savages."

[26] It is not clear where this government official learned this. The leader he is talking about has a *kemenyan* forest, but he lent it to his brother. This is a common practice among those who choose not to work in the forest.

At the same time the romanticisation itself could be a way for the government to attempt to filter all the land claims that various ethnic groups may have. It is more advantageous for the government to give out customary forest *Perda* to smaller land claims than to larger ones, such as the various Dayak groups, the Toraja, or the Toba Bataks. One of the young activists, for example, suggested that Toba Bataks are not *masyarakat adat* because they are modern. And, there are traditional communities among Toba Bataks as well, such as the followers of the pagan *Parmalim* religion. They are discriminated against and do not belong to mainstream society. All other Toba Bataks belong to the mainstream Christian society in Indonesia.[27]

Investments and their significance to a state economy.

According to a legal expert I interviewed, one of the reasons the government does not want to give away these lands as easily as it could is that this type of act would impact the investment climate of Indonesia. If TPL's concession were to shrink due to a government decision to resolve all the land claims of the *masyarakat adat*, this would send a message to foreign investors suggesting that even if they receive a permit, their occupation of the land would not be guaranteed. This makes the likelihood of the resolution of these conflicts a difficult task unless the investment policies change at the international level.

7.2 Moving Forward: Peace as a discourse and a vision

Following the proposition that social movements and peacebuilding aim to achieve social justice and the agenda of peace is to resist structural and cultural violence and inspired by the critiques of liberal peace, I explored the question of peace (Galtung, 1996: Lederach, 1997/1999; Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Asking a question about peace was not an easy process because it is rare for villagers to engage in these types of discussions outside of

[27] This definition of *masyarakat adat* is similar to Cobo's definition. See the theoretical discussion on the definition of indigeneity.

church. I realized this quickly and later learned to ask introductory questions around peace and conflict in relation to the situation of the villagers rather than just start asking about their general ideas about peace. My initial interviews, however, turned out to be as revealing as my adjusted questions. Both of them revealed dimensions of peace that one needs to understand. The first dimension was that of peace as a manipulation tool in the spirit of Laura Nader's (2001) theory of peace as harmony and the second was a visioning of peace that was conceptualized to address political experiences and that enabled imagining what it means to be peaceful. I asked these questions not only of the villagers but also the activists and the government official. My analysis of the government perspective on peace is also based on the observations of the meeting with the communities. My section on the company's peace is also based on observations as well as an interview with a TPL employee.

7.2.1 Peace as a discourse

The communities used several words to respond to questions, such as "*kedamaian*," "*berdamai*," and "*perdamaian*." All of these words have one root word of *damai* but the way the villagers used these words indicated the connotative differences between these words. I tended to use the word "*perdamaian*" initially. The male respondents tended to respond more aggressively to this word compared to women, but both men (especially men in leadership positions) and women tended to view "*perdamaian*" as a complex concept that did not always indicate something positive for them. Thus, when I asked questions about "*perdamaian*," this was interpreted by the villagers as if I was asking whether they were willing to give up their rights to their land and work in partnership together with the company and stop resisting. They also then mentioned the social forestry schemes that the government offered them and saw these schemes

as a form of peace that they were not interested in. Here is an excerpt of my interview with Amang Siska in Pandumaan-Sipituhuta:

> MK: According to you, what is peace? (*perdamaian*)
>
> AR: There is no concept of peace if our land is not returned. Even the land size of a piece of our hair cannot be owned by TPL. There is no concept of peace. If TPL leaves we can be at peace (*berdamai*). Even the Ministry offers us partnership, but we say we will die till we achieve our peace, which is the recognition of our adat territory, it has to return. The Decision Letter (SK) should proclaim a customary forest, not partnership (*kemitraan*), not peoples' forest (*hutan kemasyarakatan*), but the decision letter should say that the forest belongs to *masyarakat adat*. It is already two times that KLHK offered this. Their peace is peoples' forest (*hutan rakyat*) or social forestry, I responded right away at that time, if we partner with TPL, we can be twisted by the snake *(delimit seperti ular*), if you offer partnership with TPL, better MoEF partners, we do not want to partner with TPL.

From this statement we can see that Amang Siska refused the conflict resolution schemes that the government offered to them, that is, a social forestry scheme, because it did not recognize their rights over their ancestral forest.

"Making peace" indicated attempts of TPL to sabotage their resistance. For example, in another conversation with Op. Viktor, he explained that making peace in the context of resistance often equaled what he referred to as "living a life of *sitongge-tongge*."[28] A promise of a sweet life just like in Sitongge-tongge was a way to silence the villagers and demand them to stop resistance. In this particular case, the younger people were given cash. The elders such as

[28] Sitongge-tongge as explained by one of my respondents is the name of the village. And, according to the stories people in this village are well-off. Therefore, here Op. Viktor refers to "a sweet life," the promise of "sweet life" was used as bribery.

Op. Viktor understood that this was a tactic of creating a horizontal conflict through sowing mistrust in the community. The villagers resisted this by organizing a meeting at which they agreed that they would not make this issue go public and would instead include the people who agreed to *sitongge-tongge* into the resistance. Elders analyzed that the company expected these people to be excluded from resistance. To counter, villagers decided to include them even more on the condition that they agreed to fully support the resistance from then on.

Similarly, another man from the village of Nagasaribu argued that the form of peace matters, also indicating the awareness of the complexity of this concept. He said that everyone's peace was different. The villagers' peace was the recognition of their land rights, whereas the company's peace was continuing business as usual and the government was pushing their agenda of social forestry as a conflict resolution tool. Thus, the communities developed a complex understanding of peace as a discourse. They understood peace equal such concepts as "lies," "commotion," "destruction," "working at TPL," "betrayal," and other such negative concepts that indicated the lack of support for the resistance.

7.2.2 Peace as a vision

In this section, I focus on the various conceptualizations of peace that emerged in my interviews but that differed with peace as a discourse. I call these peace-as-a-vision. I present the various actors' peace-s, then, compare and contrast. When I look at a community's peace, I divide these into men's and women's peace-s.

Government's peace

The government's ideas of peace for communities are reflected in the idea of social forestry. The government official who came to meet with the communities at KSPPM's office

described these as simple and fast ways to resolve the land and forest-related issues. Communities did not agree with this and expressed their refusal of this proposition.

The interviewed government official MoEF expressed several ideas. Some of these are relevant for the national context: the importance of Bahasa Indonesia as a lingua franca that can unite the people and the danger of religious fundamentalism. In relation to *masyarakat adat*, he gave an example of the *Kajang* community as the peaceful ideal of the indigenous community because in this community the leader was not allowed to be richer than the poorest person in the community. Then, he also spoke about a community in Bali that may not be socially just, but they had their unique culture and were isolated from the rest of the world. They were so isolated that even the specialist on Balinese *adat* did not know about this community. Thus, a "traditional" community could claim indigeneity. True indigeneity equalled a peaceful community. He said, "we have to protect them so that they are peaceful, Baduy people. Kajang people, they look like small communities, isolated communities, but they are rich…" These communities are peaceful because they do not complain as much as the "modern people." He continued, "we all know that in Bali they are all *masyarakat adat*… But there is true *masyarakat adat*. They are very different. And I am so grateful that I discovered this and I have learnt a lot. Peace is there."

Further, he connected the definition of peace with gender justice and pointed out the lack of gender justice in *masyarakat adat*. Finally, he raised the concept of anti-trust and how indigeneity along with religious fundamentalism could hurt the general peace within the context of a diverse population in Indonesia.

Thus, on the one hand, based on the various government initiatives that relate to social forestry we can see that the government provides practical resolution of these conflicts, which

can help these communities achieve “negative” peace, or lack of violent conflict (Galtung, 1996). At the same time, the government allies, similar to the one I interviewed, may have a romanticized view of *masyarakat adat*, and are ready to make exceptions for these communities that are exceptionally peaceful in their opinions, but also vulnerable due to their “innocence.” There are other government officials who deny the existence of *masyarakat adat* in Indonesia arguing that everyone is native to Indonesia (Redd-Monitor, 2010?). Finally, despite the concerns expressed by the particular government official interviewed in relation to gender justice and indigeneity, policy-making discussions at the moment do not seem to reflect this, for example, in relation to decentralisation that Suryakusuma (2007) and other gender researchers raise.

Company’s peace

The company’s stance is that they have the responsibility to manage what the government allocated to them under their concession permit. The company does not have a right to release a territory. It is the state's jurisdiction. There is a clear understanding of this. The company hires 1,200 persons and sees this as an input into the local and national economy because they can eventually lead to greater industrialization of Indonesia. Therefore, the question is not of being closed or changing the policy, but the peace thought about by the company is how to work together with the communities they are in conflict with.

One of the ways through which they can resolve a conflict is through a partnership scheme (*kemitraan*) where the company and the community work together and mutually benefit from a relationship. One of the communities in the Simalungun district during my stay decided to opt for this option and stop resisting.

The company is doing several other initiatives to resolve these conflicts under the umbrella of the sustainability policy. Under this policy the company hired a sustainability manager. The job of the person was to provide training to the management and the employees of the company on conflict resolution and Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). He also developed a grievance mechanism. This approach then helped to improve the relationship with the communities whereby the changed attitude of the TPL employees made villagers not dislike the TPL employees. Further, they also distributed CSR funds following the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Under the CSR program, the company had a commitment to allocate 1 percent of sales to the communities. With the sustainability policy, the company changed their previous strategy of CSR funds' allocation. Before they used to distribute funds through the local foundation (*yayasan*) picked by the local government. Since 2017, this changed and the company developed its own programs.

NGOs' peace

The agrarian NGOs tend not to use the concept of peace in their work despite KSPPM having peace-building work as one of the bases of their organizational mandate. Much of the work KSPPM does also can be referred to as peace-building work because they address horizontal conflicts, prevent them using such tools as mapping or discussions at the village level, and raise awareness of villagers in relation to various social justice issues, including gender justice. They also have a complex analysis of conflict and at the community level they bridge conversations between neighbouring villages, the villagers and the government, the villagers and the village head, the *adat* leaders, etc. At the same time, the heavier focus on "structural" conflict leads to the fact that the post-conflict work remains ignored. The village of Sugapa is used as an example of one of the most successful cases of resistance in Indonesia whereby women

succeeded in defending their land rights and de facto managed to return their communal land. The communal land they fought for, however, is currently occupied by the *marga raja*, Barimbing. It is under threat of being privatized. The younger women tried to raise this issue, however, the older, more respected women, such as Nai Sinta, refused to address the issue. KSPPM realizes this drawback as well and is now planning to introduce a post-conflict strategy in Pandumaan-Sipituhuta.

Activists, in their responses, associated the ideas of peace with tenurial security and the recognition of the indigenous peoples' rights. This, they imagined, would result in a certain level of autonomy for these communities, which then would enable them to plan their lives and envision their ideas of how they would like to be developed. One of the KSPPM activists said:

> Peace will be created on its own when rights are protected and recognized. Peace will be taken care of if the customary territory becomes the course of prosperity for the communities. Peace will come if the political elites and the government officials become aware of the origins and the relationships of the people's identity with the land, and they do not prioritize greed for money as a tool to fulfill their thirst for their needs.

This is similar to what an activist of AMAN Tano Batak expressed saying that peace would come to these areas with the recognition of the indigenous peoples' rights because the non-recognition led to horizontal conflicts whereby the communities became divided into pro-company and contra. Perempuan AMAN argued that peace came also with the recognition of the indigenous peoples' rights because then the collective rights of women would be recognized. NGO respondents also argued that peace was a process that resulted from a long process of advocating and raising awareness of the government officials and other key implementers of the law even after the RUUPPMHA was passed.

Community's peace

The realization of the complexity of peace led me to other Indonesian words of *damai, berdamai, hidup yang damai*. My adjustment of my vocabulary in my questions then led to other responses of the type of peace the villagers wanted for themselves. Here, I present themes that emerged out of these for men and women. This analysis reveals that peace is a localized and gendered concept.

Men's peace

Men tended to equate peace with the resolution of the current conflict through a district regulation, recognition of their land rights, and tenurial security. For example, Amang Rina said that "peace (*perdamaian*) meant there had to be recognition. The people have to become independent, not pressured. To reach freedom it is hard. How can we become free if this is what our situation is?" Without the recognition through a *Perda*, the men felt that they did not have enough freedom and security. They indicated that tenurial security could bring peace and freedom to their lives because this meant that they would had rights to their land. Otherwise, they lived in fear:

> If they let the land go, they recognize our land rights, so, we all can work freely. If we are willing to work we can eat for sure, make a living because there is a lot of resource in the forest, rattan, that can be sold for household needs, we can cut trees, make our medicine, sell this for our livelihood. So, if we get our rights, we will have our livelihood, and we can have our prosperity. We won't have nightmares about our land being taken away, about demonstrations, they will already focus on working. That means that they won't have doubts to plant *kemenyan* because they will know this is their right, their customary land. But now we are afraid that we would be disturbed…

In relation to the company's presence, there were some who suggested that maybe it was possible to work with TPL and rent some land to them for a certain fee but this had to be an honest deal with the government accompanying the process and remaining neutral and maximally honest with the villagers. However, this decision had to be agreed upon by all the elders in the village and if the villagers refused, the decision could not be forced. If they wanted to grow forest on the land that did not have any use for the villagers, this could be allowed. The majority of the villagers, however, opposed this view and wanted to see TPL leave the area. They argued that the company had an impact on the ecosystem in the forest disturbing the animals, destroying the soil and the trees. Therefore, peace for them was associated with the refusal of TPL's presence and the restoration of the endemic *kemenyan* forest on the whole territory that was logged by the company. They also wanted to see more *kemenyan* protection and development by the government so that the villagers could improve their knowledge of how to manage these forest gardens. Some even expressed that they would like to learn to process *kemenyan* so that it was not only the raw *kemenyan* that was sold abroad but the ready product. The men expressed that the people developed a level of mistrust towards the government but if the government did not lie and supported them, then they would start trusting the government again. Other male villagers saw peace as the company working on its land, people on their own land and the government making sure things were run according to regulations. The company did not have a right to work on their land and the government should not defend the company.

For men, tenurial security was tied not only with the ecological balance but also with the general prosperity and welfare of the villages. In order to achieve this, men wanted to continue planting *kemenyan* as well as receive a more intensive support for farmer's groups. They appreciated the provision of fertilizers, technology, such as a tractor for tilling the land, and the

road-building. All of these were seen as factors that could improve their lives and bring peace into their communities. They felt supported by these facilities that they were given by the local government and wanted to see more of this type of support.

Men also realized the challenge presented by the change of values in their communities. One of the men explained his idea of peace in relation to this challenge of the zeitgeist:

> We are farmers so we plant our own food. I tell my children and grandchildren, do not talk badly about other people. We have to own peace. Without peace, we won't be honest and won't be able to love. If you want your friend to be honest with you, you have to be honest. I watch TV and there are so many problems of young people today. I think that we have to own the time, not the time own us (*saya harus menguasai jaman tapi jangan jaman magnuasai kita*). I am sure God will help you so that your road is straight, God will show, you will get food and drinks, do not lie to people. If we lie to people, we will also be lied to. When I die, I will leave a water spring, not tears (*saya tinggalkan mata air bukan air mata*). Even though I am poor, that is ok because children are our wealth, that is the philosophy of the Bataks. Because of this philosophy, we, Bataks, have many children.

The final aspect connected with peace for men was *adat*. In communities that were divided due to the conflict into pro and contra (company), such as Lumban Sitorus, *adat* was seen as one of the ways through which they could assess whether they were still peaceful as a community or not. Peace here was associated with unity as a community, as descendants of one line who were united within the institution of *dalihan na tolu*. In Lumban Sitorus, women were concerned that the *adat* rituals showed the lack of this peace and the divisions within the community. At the same time, men hoped that *adat* would play a role and guarantee their unity.

In another village of Nagasaribu, where *adat* was the strongest in terms of guaranteeing and keeping this unity, the male villagers felt this was the most important aspect that guaranteed their peace because it was according to *adat* that they lived their life. It was *adat* that regulated their seasonal life, when to plant rice, when to harvest it, when to go to the forest for *kemenyan* and when to harvest the sap, and other things. Therefore, *adat* guaranteed unity, which then equalled the ideas of peace.

Women's peace

Women similarly also talked about the importance of *adat*, tenurial security and of legal arrangements that could clarify the legal status of the land. One of the women said, for example: "Peace (*damai*) for us is when we work freely in the gardens, and we have enough capital. […] Here, coffee and paddy are for women and the men go to the forest. We still want to continue living like that." Another woman suggested that "*Perda* can be an eraser and bring peace." At the same time, however, women touched upon a slightly different implication of this recognition of land rights, communal peace. They seemed to focus more on the horizontal conflicts that emerged in the villages due to the conflict with PT. TPL. In the village of Sipituhuta, for example, it was the women who let me know about the conflict between Marade and the rest of the village. They shared how this affected their lives making them be suspicious of their own family members. Ompung Dewi, for example, shared:

> Peace (*perdamaian*) in general… If I only have peace (*perdamaian*), but I am not peaceful (*berdamai*) with myself it is not enough, because when I am peaceful (*berdamai*) with myself then I can be peaceful (*berdamai*) with my friend. Not only peace (*perdamaian*), but have to be peaceful (*damai*). Peace (*perdamaian*) is like us with Dusun 1 (Marade), we can talk, can hold hands but inside our hearts we still have

> sickness, that is only peace (*perdamaian*). We do not fight but if they give me food I receive it but I do not eat it. I think to myself what kind of food this person is giving me. That's only peace (*perdamaian*)… So, if I feel safe and there is no struggle I can be peaceful, peaceful with myself, I forget all the bad thoughts about my friends, that means I am truly peaceful. Many here only have peace (*perdamaian*), to avoid arguments, but inside do we feel peaceful? Even to a party I can go all by myself even though I have many friends, and then, when I get to the party place, my friends laugh, talk and I remain silent because I am sick inside my heart because I have not let the sickness go and I my heart is not pure yet.

This feeling of being peaceful inside was also shared by women who talked about gossip in the community and how this disturbed their peace. Women usually gossiped about their female neighbours discussing whether the woman went to the field or not, how the woman took care of her children, whether the woman made tea or not for her husband and guests, and other issues that related to gendered roles and responsibilities of women within a family. Women considered these to be private affairs and felt these were not important enough for others to discuss. They felt burdened by gossip.

Peace was understood as a community peace that could unite all the villagers. They hoped to understand each other better and to respect each other. "Peace is when in the village I do not have rice and I ask from my friend, and she gives me rice. So, we help each other out and understand each other's situation." Some women also connected peace with *adat* explaining that *adat* is the guarantor of peace because nobody came to a party organized by someone who disturbed peace in the village and this interdependence guaranteed peace in the community.

Another woman explained that peace for her was when people were able to forgive each other for the wrongdoings and be kind to each other and this could be facilitated by church. This definition of peace was connected to her own story of forgiving her parents in-law for the treatment she received from them. Women in the FGD in Pandumaan defined peace as needs being met, a nice husband, a good relationship between wife and husband, and a working husband pointing out that life could still be difficult, yet peaceful. Thus, women also seemed to focus on peace in the family.

More women connected the economic situation in the family to their conceptualization of peace saying that if the income lowered then there were more fights in the family. For example, some women asked what was peace right away responded with "*kemenyan*, because its price is high" (meaning that *kemenyan* brought a high income into the family budget). Some women, however, divided the concept of peace from the concept of prosperity saying that prosperous life was when one's costs of *adat,* rituals, children's schooling, and other basic costs were all covered without having to go into debt, while peaceful life was when there were no fights, no domestic violence, everyone was religious (attends church, prays to God, etc.), could visit sick people, family, and could celebrate together. At the same time, women also connected emotions to financial stability and ability to cover basic expenses. And, if this was challenging then there was more domestic violence and less peace in the family.

The final aspect of women's peace was help from husbands. For example, Mama Yanci said: "Peaceful life for me is a harmonious family, praying, God giving us peace, because we pray, mutual understanding of husband and wife, if the wife works and the husband is in *kedai* that means no peace here." Women in FGD in Pandumaan said that women had to work in gardens even if they were about to give birth. They had to till the land. Right after giving birth

they also went to work in the field. They brought their child carriers (*ayunan*) so that the child could sleep while the mother was working. Even if it was raining, women had to still work the land. Other women in the FGD in Nagasaribu explained that men here hunted, harvested *kemenyan* and took care of water buffaloes (even though most often it was male children who took care of water buffaloes from my observations). But women were more tired because they "feed pigs, cook for the family, farm, and men focus only on one task at a time. Mothers focus on children, husband, family, pigs and gardens." Mama Teresa said that men needed to become aware that "women are to be protected… Yes, and appreciated. I hear that there is domestic violence… Psychological violence also hurts." Thus, in order to have peace, they needed healthy communities, healthy economies, and gender justice.

For men, peace was more closely related to the land conflict they experienced and it was assumed that the tenurial security would bring more peace to the community. Women also agreed with this and expected tenurial security to bring some level of peace. Despite this, however, men and women were also aware of other greater challenges they faced that were related to the sociocultural changes that they were undergoing. The connected these challenges to the inter-generational conflicts as well as the impact of the divisionary politics of pro and contra (company) that threatened their unity within *adat*. Women also centred their ideas of peace onto their gendered positions within the communities and connected the burdens they carry to their tasks and responsibilities as mothers, wives and community members.

To conclude, in this section I discussed that there is a mutual mistrust that is revealed by discussing the various conceptualizations of peace with the community members and the government official. The company employed the concept of peace to divide the communities but also to try to approach them to work on a partnership scheme. The government approached them

similarly with a social forestry scheme to try to resolve the conflict. From the government side, there is a romanticisation of *masyarakat adat,* which is then also linked to their general distrust of the arguments of both social movements and the communities. Men in the communities focused on tenurial security, social changes in relationships and values, and the importance of *adat* for communal peace, while women focused on these aspects as well as on relationships within a family and a village and wanted to see less violence in their families and communities. Despite the fact that KSPPM started to think about post-conflict planning, neither KSPPM nor AMAN activists mentioned the question of gender justice that women in the villages raised, for example. Even Perempuan AMAN's conceptualization of peace did not reflect the ideas of women about their visions of peace that have come up in my interviews.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

In my conclusions, I reflect back on the process of this research, challenges I faced as well as my contributions to both Indonesia-specific and theoretical discussions on ethnic mobilization, resistance, and women's roles in this. As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, this research was inspired by my experiences before I started a PhD process. I was intrigued by the Indigenous peoples' movement, challenges and opportunities present in this movement. It is a movement that seems to suggest a solution to problems of capitalism, and at the same time, it is a movement that may suggest a return to the idealized or romantic past that in reality did not exist but remained in human nostalgic pre-capitalistic imagination of the past. A look at gendered experiences of the villagers who claim indigeneity demonstrates this very well.

My process

I conceptualized this research project as a feminist and decolonizing ethnography. A feminist approach allowed me to explore the subject beyond the obvious. The obvious in this context is the movement as it is presented in the media, by the activists, and by non-feminist academics. A decolonizing approach was most helpful as I interacted with various actors, including women, men, children, youths, academics, and activists. As I analyzed and wrote, it also helped me to keep in mind the structural nature of conflicts allowing me to constantly reflect on my own analysis and understanding of the dynamics on the ground. This approach allowed me to challenge and question myself as I struggled to understand *adat*, *dalihan na tolu*, and other such concepts and their importance for the Toba Batak people. The combination of the approaches also allowed me to bridge women's voices and their experiences of gendered injustice and the structural injustices that both men and women resist.

Initially, I planned to spend four to nine months in North Sumatra. The time I spent is within this timeline; however, I wish I had spent more time, especially now that I am at the end of my writing. At the time of analysis and writing, I wanted to gain distance from the people so that I could position myself in a more neutral way, however, as I spent more time away from North Sumatra, the more I realized the strength of connection, compassion, and love I developed towards my research participants and the Toba Batak people, in general.

My research struggled to find a niche of its own in the process of analysis and writing. Everything seemed interesting and related. At some point, I had to stop and limit myself to my research questions. In the end, however, my analysis includes various aspects of ethnic mobilization, resource conflicts, and ideas about peace from both men's and women's perspectives that I tried to make sense of. Its main contribution is the analysis of the grassroots resistance of rural populations and the gendered dynamics of this in the context of resource-based conflicts that are based on an identity, in my case, the identity of Indigenous or *masyarakat adat.*

Actuality and contributions of my research

My research draws its inspiration from several theoretical discussions that relate to ethnic mobilization, resistance, and women. I look at an ethnic conflict or an identity-based mobilization as a process that involves a construction that is based on grievances that then help generate "microfoundations," which can be framed then for the purposes of a mobilization (Gurr, 1971, Varshney, 2003, Vermeesch, 2011). I argue that grievances and "microfoundations" are gendered because the impact in my case study that served as a catalyst for the resistance is different for men and women. The rationale and motivations of men and women for actively participating within resistance are also gendered. While I appreciate Byrne & Nadan's (2011)

model of social cubism for the alternative framework it provides by looking at various forces that affect the strength of the "microfoundations" and the type of impact these may have on the mobilizing population, the model lacks a focus on gendered dynamics of mobilizations.

This dissertation responds to calls for decolonization of peace and conflict studies, nonviolent resistance studies as well as the lack of research about women and their roles within grassroots nonviolent resistance (Avruch & Black, 1991; Chabot & Vinthagen, 2015; Codur & King, 2013; Fry et al., 2016; Mac Ginty, 2011; Martin, Varney & Vickers, 2001; McAllister, 1999; Principe, 2017; Richmond, 2011; Tuso, 2011). I was also inspired by the works of O'Brien & Li (2006), and Schock (2015) on nonviolent resistance within the rural context and resource-based conflicts. This research, built on the ethnographic fieldwork in the villages of North Sumatra, argues that women and men play culturally embedded gendered roles within resistance. The women and men in my case study have developed their own methods of nonviolent resistance, which I define as protective and proactive nonviolent resistance. The methods they developed are culturally gendered, for example, farming as resistance is led by women, whereas discursive/dialogic resistance is employed more widely by men. The current empirical contribution to the discussion on the dynamics of low-level rural nonviolent resistance in the Global South suggests that "rightful resistance" may not only be "rightful," but it also focuses on responsibilities and brings the focus on ethics of care if we take gender seriously.

Based on my data, I also argue that women, despite their disproportionately dominant roles within grassroots nonviolent resistance, are still facing gender-based discrimination and violence, and the identity-based organizing does not provide enough space to address the question of gender justice within its current framing, especially if we take into consideration the intersectional dynamics that are present within Indigenous communities. In the case of Toba

Bataks the analysis of intersectionality draws on community-level distinctions between *marga raja* and *marga boru* within the institution of *dalihan natolu*. This calls for a critical exploration of organizing and analysis of these gendered dynamics of resistance to critically assess these campaigns for local NGOs, so that they are more inclusive of women and women's issues and are inclusive of intersectional analysis of local actors.

Further, I was also informed by the discussions on Indigeneity and gender justice, mostly within the context of North America and Europe (Green, 2007; Kuokkanen, 2012; LaRocque, 2007). And, in the context of Indonesia, there have been several works most recently that discuss the role of women within rural contentious politics in Indonesia, such as Julia's (n.d.), Julia & White's (2012), and Morgan's (2017) research on women and resource-based conflicts in West Kalimantan, and Siscawati's (2012, 2014) research about indigenous women in West Java and, more generally, in Indonesia. My research also adds its own empirical contribution to these discussions on women and conflicts in Indonesia.

My findings are that women live, practice, and respect *adat*, however, they are also willing to challenge the gender-based discrimination that exists within *adat*. Despite this willingness, however, women lack a safe space within their own communities, supportive discussions and structures to explore the challenges they face. NGOs that work with these communities are able to change certain gendered discrimination that exists in these communities, however, gender equality and gender justice is not taken seriously by these organizations despite the fact that there is a need amongst rural Indigenous women to raise some serious questions in relation to their lived experiences of gendered oppression. For post-conflict programming to be successful and to be able to amplify the decolonizing effect of anti-systemic movements, there is a need to not only bring in gender mainstreaming, but also a need to understand the intersectional

dynamics and implications of gendered relationships in the communities. This can strategically contribute to sustaining peace for men and women of all social groups. This point also argues for a critical relational or relational hybrid approach within peacebuilding.

Within the context of rural resistance, NGOs do not start these nonviolent actions, but they are strategically important, especially to villagers' strategic employment of nonviolence. Women's roles are significant in nonviolent resistance. Despite this significance, it is hard for women to be in leadership positions due to the various caretaking responsibilities they have as well as gendered limitations (such as inability to speak publicly). Women tend to be in the forefront of radical resistance when there is direct action on the "streets," such as a sit-ins, road blockades, demonstrations at the government offices, and when there is a confrontation with the security forces on the reclaimed territory. This reflects the gendered nature of this type of resistance: male security forces see women as less threatening than men; because men are seen as a threat, they are likely to be criminalized. Women also tend to be *protective* resistors reflecting the gendered positions of women in the village: they stay close to the village, take care of the fields, villages, communities, and families. While women tend to be the *radical* resistors, men tend to be *rightful* resistors who engage in *discursive* resistance with politicians. Men are also likely to be criminalized and are also more likely to employ *offensive* methods of resistance, such as setting fire to excavator or captivating weaponry of security forces. Motivations expressed by women and men also indicate the gendered nature of motivations, whereby women and men tend to have motives that resonate with their gendered status in their communities and within *adat* as care-takers of families and communities.

Despite the lack of specific focus on gender justice within the mainstream social movements that employ the strategy of *masyarakat adat*, women within social movements

themselves experience gender-based violence. Neither funders nor organizations seem to initiate gender training for the staff members of NGOs. The type of gendered discrimination and the lack of awareness about this affects partnerships and possibly, opportunities to expand networks.

Conflict resolution is a new strategy that is being developed right now in Indonesia. Social movements, however, do not have a mature strategy about this. In view of the fact that there could be more developments like this within the framework of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is a need to develop a deeper and more alternative understanding of this concept, including spreading theoretical foundations of conflict transformation that can be helpful in the context of "structural" or vertical conflicts.

Finally, our ideas about peace are multi-layered depending on our positions, based on our profession, gender, social status, and context. This means peace is *positional* and *contextual*. Each of the actors involved seemed to have their own ideas about peace. The government's peace revealed the romanticized view of *masyarakat adat*; the company's peace was led by the international developments in relation to CSR and sustainability based on the external market pressures; the NGO's peace corresponds with their diagnosis of the problem and their advocacy for tenurial security. NGO's peace coincides with men's peace. Women's peace, however, has strong elements of gender justice. This means that NGOs in their attempts to seek tenurial security and recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights do not necessarily include women's concerns about gender justice. It would be fair to conclude, then, that campaigns for forest and *kemenyan* within the context of advocacy for the rights of MHA are gendered and often do not take women's positions seriously.

Suggestions for future research

I do not claim that my research represents the truth. It is the truth I gained from my individual experience in North Sumatra. Unfortunately, there is very little research about not only Toba Batak women, but also rural women, in general. I would encourage more research about rural women to understand the situation of these women within the context of cultural, social, and economic changes today. It would also be interesting to see migrations between the rural and urban areas in Indonesia and how this affects rural villages. Many of my research participants were former out-migrants. It would also be interesting to explore other cultural contexts to understand the mechanisms of *adat* and its implications to gender justice. Further, research on prominent women leaders and the impact of this on the villages of their origin. For me, the case of Sugapa and its powerless women seemed to be a tragic representation of how women became exploited by social movements without effecting any real change neither for the communities nor for women because the resolution they achieved turned out to be the resolution for the rights of the elites. Often, women who come to represent strong grassroots movements may also come from the major *raja* (royal) families (as is the case with Nai Sinta). Thus, intersectional aspects of gendered realities also need to be taken into consideration. Finally, I would also suggest looking at conflict resolution and its dynamic development within the context of agrarian conflicts in Indonesia. There is a possibility that conflict resolution can become a tool that promotes greenwashing (as argued by one of the Jakarta-based activists) within the frameworks of corporate sustainability and social responsibility policies that are being developed and implemented at the moment by corporations. At the same time, conflict resolution/mediation can bring forward hope and some form of peace towards communities that are in difficult situations, such as Lumban Sitorus. However, to develop a substantial

approach/recommendation, one needs more empirical research that looks at numerous case studies, those, which have succeeded, and those who have been more challenged.

Appendices

Consent form for research participant (English)

LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT FORM
RESEARCH PROJECT TITLE: Peace and Indigenous Women: Gendered Conceptualizations of Peace in Indonesia

RESEARCHER
MARIA KARDASHEVSKAYA, PhD Candidate
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ADVISOR
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This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.

Purpose of Study
This study aims to explore the indigenous gendered ideas about peace and the resolution of a resource-based conflict in the three villages of North Sumatra. Also, as part of the research project, I explore the interactions between the local, regional, and national movements in support of various resistance movements that exist in this specific part of Indonesia. For this purpose, I would like to meet with my informants face-to-face for an interview, which will last approximately one to two hours.

Procedure of Study
I would like to interview 20 villagers from each of the villages selected and suggested by KSPPM and I will interview approximately 10-15 indigenous activists, women's activists,

government officials, and possibly, and company officials. If you agree to participate in this project, we can set up a meeting at your preferred location and time. The interview will be guided by a few questions prepared ahead of time and will last approximately 1-2 hours depending on availability and comfort of both the interviewee and the interviewer.
I will also conduct the participant observation throughout my stay here at your village. This means that I will take note of my daily observations about the villagers' activities, their relationships, and their interactions. And, these observations might be used in future publications.

Recording
If possible, I would like to record the interview. The recordings will be saved in a password-protected laptop and encrypted. I will transcribe this interview at a later stage of my research. You are free to refuse to answer any of my questions during the interview without penalty or prejudice. You are also free to refuse the recording if you have initially agreed and realized that you are not comfortable about being recorded.

Potential Risks
The interviews will not seek information that may harm the informants physically or emotionally. However, there is a potential risk of an infringement on confidentiality. This can affect you in ways that you may not want to be affected (your reputation, employment, political standing, etc.). I will take all precautions to make sure this does not happen: my laptop will be password-protected and the data will be stored in a secure location for five years and destroyed afterwards (06/2025); all interviews will be transferred immediately to my laptop and then, encrypted. No data will be accessed by anyone except for me. You personal name and any other identifying details will never be revealed in any publication of the results of this study unless the informant requests the researcher to do so.

Costs and Benefits
You will not incur any costs for participating in this research project. No direct benefit will be gained by you or anyone else participating in this research project. However, your participation will result in a greater understanding of the local, regional, and national gendered dynamics of seeking resolution to the resource-based conflicts in Indonesia. I am hoping the research results can strengthen the indigenous peoples' movement and critically assess its successes and challenges from a gendered perspective.

Withdrawal
You can withdraw your data from the research at ANY time and at ANY stage of the research until it becomes impossible to do so (around 05/2019) without penalty or prejudice. This includes both the observations and the interviews. Your participation in the project is voluntary. If you decide to withdraw from the research project after the researcher leaves the site, you can let the researcher know through the contact information provided above. If I am still in the village, you can tell me in-person or text me

Further Questions and Follow-Up
Feel free to ask questions from the researcher during, prior, or after to the interview. When I complete the transcriptions of the interviews (06/2018), I will ask you to participate in member-checking process via email. This will give you an opportunity to review, correct errors, challenge what might be perceived as wrong interpretations, determine if a transcription or interpretation of data is adequate and matches what you intended to share and mean. This is voluntary and depends on your interest and/or availability.

Dissemination
Research results will be available through the commonly accessible link to a University of Manitoba library website. I will try to share the results of my research in a public forum or, if needed, I can present in relevant meetings or workshops upon your or your organization's request. I will also share the result of the research with the wider academic community through various academic conferences and publications.

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and/or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

The University of Manitoba may look at your research records to see that the research is being done in a safe and proper way.

This research has been approved by the Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Coordinator at +1 204-474-7122 or humanethics@umanitoba.ca. The office can only speak English. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Participant signature__________________________Date ____________________
(day/month/year)
Participant printed name: ____

Consent form for research participants (in Indonesian)

SURAT PERNYATAAN PERSETUJUAN UNTUK IKUTSERTA DALAM PENELITIAN (INFORMED CONSENT)

JUDUL PROYEK PENELITIAN: Perdamaian dan Perempuan Adat: Gender dan Konseptualisasi Perdamaian di Indonesia

PENELITI
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Formulir persetujuan ini, yang salinannya akan diserahkan kepada Anda untuk catatan dan rujukan, hanyalah bagian dari proses *informed consent (persetujuan dengan informasi yang benar)*. Surat ini akan memberikan Anda gagasan dasar tentang apa tujuan penelitian ini dan apa yang dimaksud dengan partisipasi Anda. Jika Anda ingin detil lebih lanjut tentang apa yang disebutkan di sini, atau informasi yang lebih, silahkan, bertanya kepada peneliti ataupun pembimbing. Mohon luangkan waktu untuk membaca ini dengan saksama supaya memahami informasi yang menyertainya.

Tujuan Belajar
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengeksplorasi gagasan gender tentang perdamaian dan resolusi konflik berbasis sumber daya alam di tiga desa di Sumatera Utara. Juga, sebagai bagian dari proyek penelitian, saya mengeksplorasi interaksi antara gerakan lokal, regional, dan nasional untuk mendukung berbagai gerakan perlawanan yang ada di sini. Untuk tujuan ini, saya ingin bertemu dengan informan saya secara langsung untuk wawancara, yang akan berlangsung sekitar satu sampai dua jam. Selain wawancara, saya juga akan melakukan observasi di desa Anda.

Prosedur Studi
Saya ingin mewawancarai 20 penduduk desa dari masing-masing desa dan saya akan mewawancarai sekitar 10-15 aktivis gerakan adat, perempuan, pejabat pemerintah, dan mungkin, pejabat perusahaan. Jika Anda setuju untuk berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini, kita dapat mengatur pertemuan di lokasi dan waktu pilihan Anda. Wawancara akan dipandu oleh beberapa pertanyaan yang disiapkan sebelumnya dan akan berlangsung sekitar 1-2 jam tergantung pada ketersediaan dan kenyamanan baik orang yang diwawancarai dan juga pewawancara. Saya juga

akan melakukan pengamatan partisipan selama saya tinggal di desa Anda. Ini berarti bahwa saya akan mencatat pengamatan harian saya tentang aktivitas penduduk desa, hubungan mereka, dan interaksinya. Dan, pengamatan ini bisa digunakan di publikasi di masa depan.

Rekaman

Jika memungkinkan, saya ingin merekam wawancara. Rekaman akan disimpan di laptop yang dilindungi dengan kata sandi dan dienkripsi. Saya akan membuat transkripsi wawancara ini pada tahap selanjutnya dari penelitian saya. Anda bebas menolak menjawab pertanyaan saya selama wawancara tanpa penalti atau prasangka. Anda juga bebas menolak rekaman jika Anda pada awalnya setuju dan menyadari bahwa Anda merasa tidak nyaman untuk direkam.

Risiko-risiko potensial

Wawancara tidak akan mencari informasi yang dapat membahayakan informan secara fisik maupun emosional. Namun, ada kemungkinan risiko pelanggaran terhadap kerahasiaan. Hal ini dapat mempengaruhi Anda dengan cara yang mungkin tidak Anda inginkan terpengaruh (reputasi, pekerjaan, kedudukan politik, dll.). Saya akan mengambil semua tindakan pencegahan untuk memastikan hal ini tidak terjadi: laptop saya akan dilindungi kata sandi dan data akan disimpan di lokasi yang aman selama lima tahun dan kemudian dihancurkan (06/2025); semua wawancara akan segera ditransfer ke laptop saya dan kemudian, dienkripsi. Tidak ada data yang bisa diakses oleh siapapun kecuali saya. Nama pribadi Anda dan rincian identifikasi lainnya tidak akan pernah terungkap dalam publikasi hasil penelitian ini kecuali atas permintaan informan.

Biaya dan Manfaat

Anda tidak akan dikenakan biaya apapun untuk berpartisipasi dalam proyek penelitian ini. Tidak ada keuntungan langsung yang bisa Anda dapatkan. Namun, partisipasi Anda akan menghasilkan pemahaman yang lebih baik tentang dinamika gender lokal, regional, dan nasional untuk mencari penyelesaian konflik berbasis sumber daya alam di Indonesia. Saya berharap hasil penelitian dapat memperkuat gerakan masyarakat adat dan menilai secara kritis keberhasilan dan tantangannya dari perspektif gender.

Penarikan

Anda dapat menarik data Anda dari penelitian KAPAN saja dan pada tahap APAPUN penelitian sampai menjadi tidak mungkin melakukannya (sekitar 05/2019) tanpa hukuman atau prasangka. Ini termasuk observasi dan wawancara. Partisipasi Anda dalam proyek bersifat sukarela. Jika Anda memutuskan untuk menarik diri dari proyek penelitian setelah peneliti meninggalkan tempat, Anda dapat memberi tahu peneliti melalui informasi kontak yang diberikan di atas. Jika saya masih di desa, Anda bisa memberi tahu saya secara langsung atau memberi tahu saya.

Pertanyaan Lebih Lanjut dan Tindak Lanjut

Jangan ragu untuk mengajukan pertanyaan dari peneliti selama, sebelum, atau setelah wawancara. Ketika saya menyelesaikan transkripsi wawancara (06/2018), saya akan meminta Anda untuk berpartisipasi dalam proses pemeriksaan melalui email. Ini akan memberi Anda

kesempatan untuk meninjau, memperbaiki kesalahan, menantang apa yang mungkin dianggap sebagai interpretasi yang salah, menentukan apakah transkripsi atau interpretasi data memadai dan sesuai dengan apa yang ingin Anda bagikan dan maksudkan. Ini sukarela dan tergantung pada minat dan/atau ketersediaan Anda.

Penyebaran
Hasil penelitian akan tersedia melalui tautan yang mudah diakses ke situs web perpustakaan University of Manitoba. Saya akan mencoba membagikan hasil penelitian saya di forum publik atau, jika perlu, saya dapat hadir dalam pertemuan atau lokakarya yang relevan atas permintaan Anda atau organisasi Anda. Saya juga akan berbagi hasil penelitian dengan komunitas akademis yang lebih luas melalui berbagai konferensi dan publikasi akademis.

Tanda tangan Anda pada formulir ini menunjukkan bahwa Anda telah memahami informasi mengenai partisipasi Anda dalam penelitian ini dan telah menyetujui untuk berpartisipasi sebagai informan. Namun, persetujuan ini tidak mengesampingkan hak Anda sebagai individu ataupun membebaskan para periset, sponsor, atau institusi yang terlibat dari tanggung jawab hukum dan juga profesi. Anda bebas untuk menarik diri dari studi kapan saja, dan/atau menahan diri untuk tidak menjawab pertanyaan yang ingin Anda abaikan, tanpa prasangka atau konsekuensi. Partisipasi Anda harus berdasarkan informasi yang benar dan sang peneliti bertanggung jawab untuk memberikan informasi yang benar, jadi, Anda jangan ragu untuk meminta klarifikasi atau informasi baru selama partisipasi Anda dalam riset ini.

University of Manitoba dapat melihat catatan penelitian untuk mengetahui bahwa penelitian dilakukan dengan cara yang aman dan tepat.

Penelitian ini telah disetujui oleh Dewan Etika Penelitian. Jika Anda memiliki masalah atau keluhan tentang proyek ini, Anda dapat menghubungi salah satu dari orang yang disebutkan di atas atau Koordinator Etika Manusia di +1 204-474-7122 atau humanethics @ umanitoba .ca. Kantor ini hanya bisa berbahasa Inggris. Salinan formulir persetujuan ini telah diberikan kepada Anda untuk menyimpan buat catatan dan referensi Anda.

Tanda tangan:________________________ Tanggal:___________________________

Nama: ____

Introductory meeting prompt to seek for consent

Dear Friends,

My name is Maria Kardashevskaya. I am a PhD student at the University of Manitoba, Canada. My area of study is related to peace and conflict studies. I am here as part of my PhD to conduct research about the role of men and women in the resolution of the conflict you experience, community understandings of peace and conflict resolution within the context of a resource-based conflict, and the dynamics of the conflict communities experience within the context of Toba area. I have selected your area because I have been here before and I have had special experiences here that I hold dear and that contributed to my personal development. I also would like the analysis that I develop to be useful for KSPPM and the greater indigenous peoples' movement. I am thankful to KSPPM for providing me with this opportunity to come back here and I would like to ask for your permission to live here amongst you and be part of my research. I hope that my research can contribute to the greater understanding of the conflict and its resolution. The length of my stay here will depend on how comfortable the villagers are with me being around as well as my own timeline since I have responsibilities towards my university and my supervisors to finish my study. Apart from your village, I also would like to spend time in two other villages … (name of the second village) and …. (name of the third village). At this point I would like to spend approximately two months here. At any time during my study you are welcome to make suggestions to further improve this study.

Do you have questions to me about myself or my research?

Selamat ....,

Terima kasih atas kesempatan yang diberikan. Nama saya Maria Kardashevskaya. Saya adalah seorang mahasiswa S3 di University of Manitoba, Kanada. Bidang studi saya terkait dengan studi perdamaian dan konflik. Saya berada di sini sebagai bagian dari studi saya untuk melakukan penelitian tentang peran pria dan wanita dalam penyelesaian konflik SDA yang Anda alami, pemahaman masyarakat tentang perdamaian dan resolusi konflik dalam konteks konflik berbasis sumber daya alam, dan dinamika konflik dan pengalaman masyarakat di daerah Toba. Saya telah memilih daerah Anda karena saya pernah berada di sini sebelumnya dan saya memiliki pengalaman khusus di sini yang saya sayangi dan yang berkontribusi pada pengembangan pribadi saya. Saya juga ingin analisis yang saya kembangkan bermanfaat bagi KSPPM dan gerakan masyarakat adat yang lebih besar. Saya bersyukur kepada KSPPM karena telah memberi saya kesempatan untuk kembali ke sini dan saya ingin meminta izin Anda untuk tinggal di sini di antara Anda dan menjadi bagian dari penelitian saya. Saya berharap penelitian saya dapat berkontribusi pada pemahaman konflik dan resolusinya. Berapa lama saya tinggal di sini akan tergantung pada seberapa nyaman penduduk desa bersama saya dan juga garis waktu saya sendiri karena saya memiliki tanggung jawab terhadap universitas saya dan atasan saya untuk menyelesaikan studi saya. Terlepas dari desa Anda, saya juga ingin menghabiskan waktu di dua desa lain ... (nama desa kedua) dan .... (nama desa ketiga). Pada titik ini saya ingin menghabiskan sekitar dua bulan di sini. Setiap saat selama studi saya, Anda dipersilahkan untuk membuat saran untuk lebih meningkatkan dan memperbaiki penelitian ini.

Apakah Anda memiliki pertanyaan tentang diri saya atau penelitian saya?

Semi-structured interview prompt (1st version, proposal version and used in the field as a second go-to prompt)

1. What do you think is the source of the conflict?
2. Do you think this conflict is a different kind of experience for men and women? How so?
3. Who are the major actors (local, regional and national actors involved in the conflict? (continued under point 2)
4. How do you see men and women respond differently to the conflict?
5. Who are the actors whose role is crucial for the emergence of the conflict?
6. What is the role of local governments and police within these conflicts?
7. What is the role of the national government?
8. Who are the actors that can play a role in its resolution?
9. Do you feel included in the discussions on organizing?
10. What is your role?
11. What are the various strategies that men and women (members of indigenous communities) use in their resistance against a land grab by a company and why? Who influences these decisions? How do they organize?
12. What kind of roles do they take upon and why?
13. How do you decide as a community what to do?
14. What is the role of KSPPM in this process?
15. Have you heard of AMAN? What is the role of AMAN here? Have you been to any of their events?
16. Do you think of yourself as *masyarakat adat*? Why? (What role does the conceptualization of indigeneity by national social movements play here? What kind of relationship there is between the local activists and national activists?)
17. What tactics do companies use in order to weaken the local resistance and are they successful?
18. In what situation are they successful and in what situations do they fail?
19. Are there any disagreements in the community in relation to the nature of the conflict? Why do you think there are disagreements in the community?
20. Do you think that women's voices and concerns are heard within the social movements? Why?
21. How do you think this conflict can be resolved?
22. How do you think the obstacles could be overcome?
23. What does peace mean to you in general and, also, within the context of this conflict?
24. How do you think considering yourself as *masyarakat adat* contributes to the resolution of the conflict?
25. Are there any strengths in your community that may contribute to the resolution of this conflict?
26. What do you think is the contribution of KSPPM and AMAN?
27. Is there a role for the government? What do you think should be the role of the government?
28. What do you think the company should do?
29. Do you think the recognition of customary forests by President Jokowi will mean that the conflict is resolved for you? (for those communities that have received the recognition of their customary forest).

Semi-structured interview prompt for communities (2nd version, developed in the field)

Nature of conflict

1. What is the story of your family and your village?
2. What do you think is the source of conflict?
3. What is the impact of the conflict on your life?
4. Who do you think can resolve the conflict and why?

Dynamics of resistance

5. Why do you resist? How do you resist?
6. Why is this resistance important to you?
7. How do you communicate with the leaders of resistance?
8. Do you follow what the leadership tells you and why?
9. How and why do you work with KSPPM and AMAN?
10. Do you think people here are masyarakat adat? Why?
11. How do you know about masyarakat adat?
12. Why is it important to be masyarakat adat for you?
13. What has been the relationship with TPL?
14. Do women also participate in resistance?
15. How do women participate? Or Why?
16. Have you ever used violence (kekerasan atau tindakan anarkis) in your resistance?
17. Can you give me examples of the violence?
18. Have you experienced violence in the resistance?
19. How did you react to this violence?
20. What has been the role of church?

Daily life and peace

21. What kind of other challenges women and men face in your opinion in your village?
22. What is peace for you?
23. What is peaceful life for you and your village, in your opinion?

General semi-structured interview prompt for activists (developed in the field)

1. What is your role within the organization?
2. What kind of work does your organization do?
3. Do you consider it to be a part of a social movement?
4. What are the types of conflicts do you deal with?
5. Why is this important to you personally?
6. What is your strategy?
7. Any horizontal conflicts they are concerned about?
8. What are the gendered dynamics of these conflicts according to them? Do they see any gendered dynamics that are out of the ordinary?
9. What has been your personal experience as an activist? As a woman activist?
10. What are the major actors in these conflicts? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
11. What is the role of your organization in these conflicts?
12. What is the role of national/Jakarta-based and local social movements? Any differences?
13. What is your main strategy in resolving these conflicts?
14. How do you interact with the government and the company?
15. Why is masyarakat adat a strategy?
16. What is being done right now to resolve these conflicts?
17. Do you think these efforts will lead to positive change?
18. What do you think is peace within this context for you as a rep of a social movement and for communities?
19. Do you think it is attainable? Do you envisage any problems with this? What could be the obstacles?

Interview questions prompt for KSPPM staff (for in-depth interviews)

Personal information:
- How long have you worked for KSPPM now?
- What was the reason you became involved with KSPPM?

Cases under consideration: organizing from a gendered perspective:
- Would you describe the situation in these villages in short?
- Who are the major actors involved in the conflict?
- Do you think the experience for men and women of these conflicts is different? How so?
- What is the role of KSPPM? What kind of strategies does KSPPM use in its work? How do you organize communities?
- Are these organizing strategies that you use are different for men and women and why?
- What kind of tactics do the women prefer as opposed to men? Are there any specific discussions around tactics and strategies in the communities and if yes, are there differences of opinion between men and women?
- Do the communities use femininity in specific ways in their struggle? (for example, when facing the security forces?) In what situation are they successful and in what situation are they not?
- Do you have a special concern for gender? How and why?
- What are the women-specific problems in the villages, according to you?
- Is it more difficult to organize men or women? Why do you think that is the case?
- Do you see any transformation or change happening in the communities that go through direct action versus those that do not?
- Why is it much easier to organize communities when there is an external actor as opposed to livelihood-related issues? Does KSPPM approach these two organizing issues differently?
- Bagaimana KSPPM mengatasi konflik horizontal yang ada di desa yang meminta menemani mereka?
- What is difficult in your advocacy and organizing?
- What are difficulties in working with the government or pushing corporations to be accountable? (does it make any difference whether a corporation is big or small?)
- How do the communities define their leaders? Based on adat?

Violence and nonviolence:
- Can strategies that communities and KSPPM use be described as nonviolent or violent? Why?
- Have there been cases of violence in any of the struggles that KSPPM worked on?
- Do you spend time working with communities on figuring out how to define violence / nonviolence? Nagasaribu, for example….
- What does peace mean to you personally and what kind of peace do you imagine in these communities?
- Lifeplan for organizing?

Masyarakat adat:

- How do you think the identity of masyarakat adat contribute to the resolution of the conflict or hampers its resolution?
- In what case do you define a community to be masyarakat adat and in what cases they are likely not to be considered masyarakat adat?
- Why is it important to be masyarakat adat?
- Does KSPPM work within the greater framework of gerakan masyarakat adat, AMAN? Or not and why?

KSPPM and structures:

- What kind of international networks KSPPM cooperates with? And what kind of inputs/benefits these partnerships bring into KSPPM? Are these important?
- Who funds KSPPM? Why do they fund KSPPM? Any challenges there?
- Do you work together with a church or church network?
- What is the role of churches within these movements?

Success:

- When would you consider these cases to be successful? What is the ultimate goal of KSPPM in relation to these movements?

Challenges of the organization:

- What kind of general challenges does KSPPM face as an organization?
- Have you had challenges based on your gender?

Photographs

 Photo 1: Marade, entrance into the villages of Sipituhuta and Pandumaan from the highway, children walking back home from school in the town of Dolok Sanggul	 Photo 2: Mostly women shopping on market day
 Photo 3: Busses lined up on the market day	 Photo 4: Photographs on the wall of one of the villagers, on the bottom left is when the villagers went to Jakartato meet the President of Indonesia

 Photo 5: A decorated table of one of my key informants	 Photo 6: Children going to school
 Photo 7: Beadwork of one of the key	 Photo 8: *Kemenyan* resin
 Photo 9: *Adat* ritual	 Photo 10: Harvesting paddy

 Photo 11: Meeting with village heads	 Photo 12: The concession "*plang*" (signpost)
 Photo 13: Seats at the church are divided between men's and children's side and women's side	 Photo 14: Burjer" ("*buruk-buruk Jerman,*" lit. the bad of Germans); second-hand clothes where villagers buy their clothes.
 Photo 15: Rice fields in the Sipahutar areas of Taput	 Photo 16: Women going to farm

<table>
<tr><td>
Photo 17: Women farming, while I was assigned to look after the baby.</td><td>
Photo 18: Traditional Batak sopo.</td></tr>
<tr><td>
Photo 19: The plantation and kemenyan forest border Rice field in Sipahutar area</td><td>
Photo 20: Reclaimed land and border</td></tr>
<tr><td>
Photo 21: Weaving as a source of income</td><td>
Photo 22: Sorting kemenyan</td></tr>
</table>

Photo 23: Coffee beans dried by the big exporter of Lintong coffee in Sipituhuta	Photo 24: Cleaning the tree

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