"Unity in Diversity?":
Examining Winnipeg and Mississauga's Second-Generation Pakistani-Canadians' Perceptions and Experiences of Radicalization

By

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ABSTRACT

Canada is a country where people from across the globe have found a place to call home. Immigrants have added to the rich tapestry of cultural diversity and cross-community ties in this country and have raised families here to give their children a secure future. Similar to other communities, immigrants from Pakistan have raised their children in Canada so that they can excel in a society which offers equal opportunities to all. This research examines the perceptions of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians and the role they play in in the context of domestic and national security policy. The study contributes to a better understanding of the role of second-generation immigrants of Pakistani descent in adding to the rich multi-cultural legacy of Canada. Data from this research helps to further build the evidence base regarding Canada's "national security" interests in this age of homegrown terrorism. The key findings that emerge from this research include that the participants had a fragmented identity and were confused whether their core identity is Canadian or revolves around their Muslim-Pakistani background. They felt strongly that structures favoring the dominant majority have relegated them to second-graded citizens and that white privilege is also a trigger towards radicalization to violence. Participants also perceived that radicalization was a multi-faceted phenomenon that transcends the socioeconomic divide and is exacerbated by the role of the media as well as exogenous factors including the Saudi policy of exporting its version of Salafi Islam to Canada. Finally, the interviewees were apprehensive that Canada would experience the rise of white nationalism and neoliberal capitalism. They were also hopeful that if Canadians did not judge each other on the basis of religion and ethnicity, a positive future awaits this country.

This study highlights the crucial role of second-generation young Pakistanis in radicalization and informing policymakers about the necessity to incorporate the views of second-

generation Pakistani-Canadian in order to frame holistic counter radicalization programs based on the voices of the grassroots within Muslim communities so that at-risk youth are saved from radicalization and those having fallen prey to radicalization may be successfully re-integrated into the Canadian polity

INTRODUCTION: THE "SPECTRE" OF RADICALIZATION

1.1 Introduction

A new specter is haunting Canada—the specter of radicalization. All of Canada's law enforcement powers and departments have entered into an alliance to defeat this new challenge and yet the threat continues to exist. Where are the tools and means, which can exorcise this demon? Can this demon ever be exorcised?

This exploratory case study examines the views of second-generation young Pakistani-Canadians as they relate to their identity, their perceptions about their place within the Canadian polity and race relations within Canada, as well as their views about the reasons why certain individuals tend to gravitate towards radicalization to violence. This study contributes to Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) by examining the perceptions and experiences of individuals belonging to the affected community, second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, by including their voices in the academic discourse. In addition, it provides suggestions to lawmakers so that holistic and nuanced policies may be adopted that are based on the suggestions as well as aspirations of parties to a conflict.

Radicalization to violence and domestic terrorism is not a modern phenomenon, as many individuals believe it to be. From the *Assassins* during the early eleventh century to the assassination of President William McKinley by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz (Chaliand & Blin, 2016), acts of violence to terrorize the local populace in order to affect politics by other means

continue to be used. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, domestic terrorism took on a new twist and the world saw the entrance of a new actor in the global milieu, the homegrown terrorist.

The Criminal Code of Canada, as with the legal codes of other countries, does not differentiate between terrorism committed by an international actor and terrorism committed by a first-generation immigrant (an individual resettled by their own volition in the country of their choice) and terrorism committed by a second-generation immigrant (an individual who was born to immigrants). For example, s.83.01 of the Criminal Code of Canada defines terrorism as:

> an act committed "in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause" with the intention of intimidating the public "with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act." [s.83.01, Criminal Code of Canada, 2019 (as amended)]

Undoubtedly the definition is comprehensive in that it addresses acts and omissions both inside and outside of Canada by people who are both inside or outside of Canada, hence, covering an individual who was born in Canada. However, there is one vital difference which is overlooked whenever the actors responsible for terrorism are addressed: A landed immigrant can be stripped of her or his citizenship and deported back to their home-country if convicted of a crime, including terrorism. An individual born in Canada cannot be meted out the same treatment. It is imperative to mention this fact at the very outset since, as it shall be observed later in the study, individuals born here are more confident than their parents, yet they are also more alienated and disillusioned with what Canada has offered them. This study argues that disillusionment amongst some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, fuels rage, which consequently strikes at the very heart of achieving sustainable peace within the Canadian polity. It it raises the question, why are other disillusioned or disenfranchised groups/people not experiencing or expressing rage in the same way, or even among that group?

This study is critical for PACS as well as National Security Studies. While substantial research exists on the role of second-generation immigrants in terms of identity construction (Abad & Sheldon, 2008; Algan, Dustmann & Glitz, 2010; Giguere, Lalonde & Lou, 2010; Jurva & Jaya, 2008; Lundy, 2011; Rumbaut, 2008; Rothe, Pumariega & Sabagh, 2011; Sabatier, 2008; Sabatier & Berry, 2008; Schneider & Lang, 2014; Stroink & Lalonde, 2009) and while literature exists on racial discrimination faced by second-generation immigrant on various levels (Bersani, 2014; Bleakely & Chinn, 2008; Dustmann, Frattini & Lanzara, 2012), there is next to no literature that examines the role of second-generation Pakistani immigrants in nurturing cross-cultural community ties within the Canadian context. Moreover, while literature examining the role of second-generation immigrants in committing terrorism in the land of their birth exists (Brandon, 2009; Brooks, 2011; Chuang & Roemer, 2013; Crone & Harrow, 2011; Crone & Harrow, 2010; Haque, 2010; King & Taylor, 2011; Kleinmann, 2012; Leikin, 2011; Roy, 2008; Stroink, 2007; Vidino, 2009), there is no prevalent literature that examines the role of second-generation Canadian Pakistani youth in the context of radicalization to violence. In addition, while there is research that addresses immigrants and peacebuilding issues in Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) (Parker, 2016; Parker, 2013; Parker, 2012; Tabar, 2010), there is no existing literature on the unique challenges faced by second-generation Pakistani immigrants. Hence, this study aims to fill the critical gap in the PACS discipline in relation to second-generation male and female Pakistani-Canadians, their relationship with the Canadian polity and radicalization within Canada.

To grasp the nuances of radicalization and its causes amongst some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, this thesis is divided into the following eight interrelated and interdependent chapters.

1.2 Overview of the Study

Chapter 2 provides a historical context through which the phenomenon of radicalization can be examined. The chapter provides a historical overview of Canada's immigration policy during the twentieth century and shows that until the 1970s, Canada was a society that actively refrained from allowing non-white immigrants inside the country. Hence, the argument offered by the advocates of structural violence or social injustice is that the dominant white majority created structures to benefit themselves, that privilege is transgenerational and exists to this day alienating individuals belonging to the non-dominant group (Johnson, 2008; Saenz & Morales, 2005; Wildman & Davis, 1994). Chapter 2 also examines acts of home-grown terrorism that were carried out in Canada as well as in the United States and Western Europe, and it provides the framework within which Canada's anti-terrorism policy operates in relation to home-grown terrorism in order for readers to comprehend that the threat is a serious one and policymakers are taking it as such. This issue is addressed in the last chapter as well.

Chapter 3 reviews salient literature that parallels the three empirical chapters. First, the discussion focuses on second-generation immigrants, the construction of their identities, the factors, which explain how those identities are constructed and how in the context of radicalization, these different factors interplay. The identity section examines and analyzes the construction and intersection of identity with radicalization to violence as well as positing that if young people's basic needs remain unfulfilled, violent conflict is unavoidable. Second, a discussion of radicalization argues that systemic discrimination and unjust structures are an indirect form violence, which ultimately leads to actual, direct, physical violence. Moreover, factors that cause individuals to join gangs are compared and contrasted with the factors that cause people to be radicalized/joining radicalized outfits. Third, the literature around the Hadley Cantril Self-

Anchoring Striving Scale and pertinent literature on futurism is discussed in terms of the best and worst possible outcomes for the respondents and their country (Cantril, 1965).

Chapter 4 examines the qualitative research methods adopted to conduct the field research for this study. The chapter explains the utility of using semi-structured interviews to conduct research with second-generation immigrants. The chapter also examines the utilization of snowball sampling which was the primary method employed to identify research subjects for this study. Finally, the chapter provides an explanation of data collection, transcription, codification and analysis. The chapter also discusses the steps taken to preserve and protect the security of the participants.

Chapter 5 narrates the views of the participants in terms of how their own identities were shaped in Canada, their perceptions about the dominant white majority and the confusion they feel about the interplay between their national identity and their cultural-religious identity.

Chapter 6 illustrates the participant's stories as they relate to the causes and triggers of radicalization. The themes which inductively emerge in this chapter include a deep-rooted alienation from Canadian society, a confused identity, demonization of Muslims at the hands of the media, lack of proper parenting and the role of external actor's such as Saudi Arabia, as well as factors that can contribute to radicalizing vulnerable second-generation Pakistani-Canadians.

Chapter 7 which is the final data analysis chapter explores the hopes and dreams that the participants harbor about themselves, their families, Pakistani-Canadians, Muslims in Canada and the Federation of Canada itself. The findings from this chapter indicate a mix of both hopes and fears, which are felt deeply by the participants.

Chapter 8 offers recommendations to policymakers about the steps that can be taken to ensure that vulnerable second-generation Pakistani-Canadians do not fall prey to radicalization

and develop a strong bond with the polity of Canada. The chapter also concludes this study by pointing out the shortcomings of this study as well as areas of future research.

1.3 Conclusion

This chapter presented the basic theme and structure of this study. In order to understand why some Canadian born individuals of Pakistani descent end up trying to commit acts of violence against innocent fellow Canadians on the very soil on which they are born and raised, it is imperative to look at the historical context of Canadian immigration, recent attacks, foiled or otherwise, on Canadian soil as well as in other "Western countries" and to examine the framework within which Canada's anti-terrorism policy operates. Chapter 2 examines the aforementioned points.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

Canada claims to be a multicultural society (Charter of Rights and Freedoms) where people from all across the globe have found a place to call home. Immigrants in Canada have added to the rich tapestry of cultural diversity and cross-community ties in this country, which has enriched Canadian heritage. Immigrants have raised families in Canada in order to give their children a secure future similar to other communities. Immigrants from Pakistan have raised their children in Canada so that they can excel in a society that allegedly offers opportunities to all (s.15, Charter of Rights and Freedoms).

However, evidence suggests that while first-generation immigrants are generally satisfied with the life they have in their adopted country, some second-generation immigrants of non-Caucasian origins feel as if they are treated as second class citizens due to their ethnic and religious background, which makes them feel "less" Canadian (Solyom, 2016). Evidence also suggests that second-generation individuals are discriminated against in the land of their birth or at least that is their perception (Bersani, 2014). Second-generation immigrants in Canada perceive themselves to be second-class citizens as a result of discrimination by law enforcement agencies (Bersani, 2014), discrimination in employment due to various factors such as language capital (Bleakley & Chin, 2008), and in education (Dustmann, Frattini, & Lanzara, 2012), as well as suffering social isolation (Thomson & Crul, 2007). Further, it has also been found that that prejudice directed towards people belonging to ethnic minority groups exists and influences the legal process (Maeder & Pfeifer, 2014).

Some second-generation Pakistani Canadians perceive that they are treated adversely because of their ethno-religious background coupled with the current geopolitical scenario.[1] This feeling reinforces a core individual identity of being a Muslim first and a Canadian second as these experiences indicate to second-generation immigrant youth that they are treated differently because of their faith and who they are (Solyom, 2016). In order to comprehend, the sense of alienation that is felt by some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, it is imperative that utilizing the lens of history contextualizes the phenomenon of identity, which may lead to radicalization of some Pakistani-Canadian.

This chapter briefly examines the history of immigration in Canada and posits that until the 1970s, immigration to Canada was a privilege afforded to those who are perceived as being "White." Placing the history of Canadian immigration in a historical context can enable us to understand why second-generation immigrants perceive that they are deemed to be second-class citizens in Canada. Following a brief historical context, incidents of terrorist attacks, executed as well as foiled, in Canada as well as in the United States and Europe, will be examined to posit that alienation amongst second-generation immigrants is so deep-rooted that some are willing to commit horrific acts of violence against innocent individuals to exact revenge for the injustices they perceive have been meted out to them. Finally, to frame the issue of radicalization in a public policy context, key documents issued by the Department of Public Safety will be examined and it will be argued that Canada needs a more robust counter-radicalization policy in order to pre-empt and defeat radicalization.

[1] Currently, ethnically Muslim groups such as the Kashmiris in India, the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Uighurs in Sinkiang are facing repression at the hands of India, Myanmar and China, respectively. This repression fuels the narrative that Muslims as a supranational group are being targeted globally. (Author's note)

2.2 History Revisited

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
—GEORGE SANTANAYA

The fact that Canada has given preferential treatment to people perceived as belonging to a Caucasian background is well documented (Kelly & Triebelcock, 2008). Canada's immigration policy until the end of World War II was a policy of discrimination against people belonging to non-white[2] backgrounds and this discriminatory policy was not just implemented by the executive branch but was also adhered to by the judiciary. For example, in the Munshi Singh case (Canada v. Singh) commonly referred to as the Koma Gata Maru case, in 1914 the Supreme Court of British Colombia upheld the government's decision to refuse a group of immigrants from India to disembark on the shores of Vancouver.

It is worth quoting the Court's judgment at length. Among other things, it held that:

> It is plain that upon the study of the question, the Hindu race, as well as the Asiatic race in general is, in their conception of life and ideas of society, fundamentally different to the Anglo-Saxon Celtic races, and European races in general. Further acquaintance with the subject shows that the better classes of the Asiatic race are not given to leave their own countries—they are non-immigrant classes greatly attached to their homes—and those who become immigrants are, without disparagement to them, undesirables in Canada, where a very different civilization exists. The laws of this country are unsuited to them and their ways and ideas may very well be a menace to the wellbeing of the Canadian people…
>
> > The Parliament of Canada—the nation's Parliament—may be well said to be safeguarding the people of Canada from an influx, which it is no chimera to conjure up might annihilate the nation and change its whole potential complexity, introduce Oriental ways as against European ways, eastern civilization for western civilization and all the dire consequences that would eventually flow there from […].

[2] The concept of a "white/Caucasian" race is not a simple one but has intricate complexities. The White race, similar to other races, is a social construction which is based on multiple factors such as class, gender, geography, among others. In the present study, whenever, the term White/Caucasian race is used, it is based on a holistic view of race as stated above. The importance of the term at this point is to demonstrate racism.
For a deeper understanding of the deeper nuances of what constitutes the "White race" please refer to Frankenburg, R (1993). *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness.* London: Routledge.

> In that our fellow British subjects of the Asiatic race are of different racial instincts to those of the European race—and consistent therewith, their family life, rules of society and laws are of a very different character—in their own interests their proper place of residence is within the confines of their respective countries in the continent of Asia, not in Canada, where there customs are not in vogue and their adhesion to their customs her only give rise to disturbances destructive to the well-being of society and against the maintenance of peace, order and good government […].
>
> It is apparent that it will not conform with national ideals in Canada to introduce any such [Hindu or Mohammedan] laws into Canada, or give them the effect of laws to people domiciled in Canada. This probably would be the germ of discontent that would be brought to this country with any considerable influx of people so different in ideas of family life and social organization. Better that people of non-assimilative and by nature properly non-assimilative race should not come to Canada, but rather they should remain in their country of origin and there do their share, as they have in the past, in the preservation and development of the Empire (Canada v. Singh, 1914, Paragraphs 100-102, 104).

"Conformity" with the "national ideals" of Canada, at that point in Canada's history was according to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the forte of the white race.

The Munshi Singh judgment is a clear depiction of the racist and discriminatory practices adopted by all branches of the Canadian government just over a century ago. However, after the end of the Second World War, Canada gradually started to open its borders to people from a non-Caucasian background and there was a gradual increase in the number of immigrants from Asia and Africa (Kelly & Tribelcock, 2008). Moreover, during the 1970s, Canada also opened its gates to people seeking asylum from persecution and established itself as one of the leading refugee-receiving countries (Kelly & Triebelcock, 2010; Beiser, 1999).

Those individuals who voted with their feet to come to Canada also started to raise families. These individuals, who numbered 6,775,800 in the last census, make up 20.6 percent of the total population (Department of Citizenship & Immigration, 2011), a remarkable departure from the days of the *Munshi Singh* case (supra). Evidence suggests that while first-generation immigrants are generally satisfied with Canada and the life it offers them, their progeny feel as if Canada never

accepted them at all, and that their "Canadianness" is always being tested and challenged (Solyom, 2016).

A recent survey conducted in Montreal argues that relative deprivation (a concept which is examined below) does not have a major impact on identity formation and radicalization of youth; 1,894 full time university students in Montreal were asked a number of different questions about radicalization, an overwhelming majority of the sample were middle class (Solyom, 2016). According to the survey those individuals who had either experienced discrimination or were *perceived to have been discriminated against*, were more likely to be radicalized since they would become more insular and their individual identity would merge with the group's collective identity (Solyom, 2016). The survey also suggests that a strong identification with one's own group is a powerful factor towards radicalization if the individual feels that her/his group has been discriminated against (Solyom, 2016). Moreover,

The survey's indicated that individuals who perceived that they had been discriminated against are more likely to be radicalized and discrimination is the key word. Black's Law Dictionary defines discrimination as:

> In constitutional law, the effect of a statute or established practice which confers particular privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privilege granted and between whom and those not favored no reasonable distinction can be found. Unfair treatment or denial of normal privileges to persons because of their race, age, nationality or religion. A failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored (Black's Law Dictionary, 2009, 420).

> Legally then, discrimination only exists if a lawmaking body through the letter of the law gives preference to one group over others. In this light then, are Muslim youth discriminated against in Canada?

In a strict legal sense, (Geraptritis, 2015; George, 2014; McFerran et.al, 2014), Muslim youth are not discriminated against when it comes to employment and getting admissions to

universities. If anything, Muslim youth are in a stronger position than their White counterparts since the former are members of "a visible minority" and are given preference over the latter. If such is the case legally, why then do second-generation immigrants commit or try to commit acts of terror on the very soil they were born on, examples of which we will see below. Is it a validation of what was observed by arguably the greatest of all American jurists, Learned Hand in a speech he delivered at Central Park, New York in 1944:

> Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it… What is this liberty that must lie in the hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not the freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty and leads straight to its overthrow […].
>
> What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias; the spirit of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit of Him who, near two thousand years ago, taught mankind that lesson it has never learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there may be a kingdom where the least shall be heard and considered side by side with the greatest (Learned Hand, 1944).

If the spirit of liberty as elucidated by Learned Hand (supra) is the spirit of being considerate to one and all, what is the opposite of this spirit in the context of the radicalization of second-generation youth? It may be many things but for our purposes, the tyranny of liberty is to be born in a democratic society, take advantage of its laws and processes and then try to destroy that society from within. Some examples from Canada, Europe and the United States will provide readers with an idea of the extent and how deep-rooted this problem is, even though in Canada not much is thought of or about it even at the level of policymaking, a point which shall be elaborated upon below.

2.2.1- The (Not So) Strange Case of the Toronto 18

While Canada has been by and large immune thus far to the menace of acts of homegrown terrorist attacks being executed on Canadian soil, there have been a few instances of second-generation immigrants trying to carry out such an attack(s). The most notorious and well-known example was by a group who were later labeled the Toronto 18. In 2006, the Toronto police conducted security operations, which resulted in the arrest of 17 individuals in Southern Ontario. Their plan was to carry out acts of terrorism in Canada in two different separate locations (CBC, 2008).

The first leg of the plan included bombing the Toronto Stock Exchange and other landmark buildings— in a sense reminiscent of what the FLQ did in the late 1960s. The plan also included beheading the then Prime Minister of Canada and attacking the Parliament building in Ottawa (CBC News, 2011). The second leg of the plan included the creation of a "formal" terrorist cell in Canada's largest city, Toronto, to collect a cache of weapons, terrorize the public through acts of violence and ultimately force the public through terror to push the Government of Canada to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. (CBC News, 2011). Three of the attackers were born and raised in Canada, and contrary to public perceptions about a terrorist's profile, these individuals belonged to affluent families.

Saad Gaya was born in Mississauga to parents of Pakistani descent (CBC, 2018). Steven Chand was born and raised in Mississauga to parents who emigrated from Fiji (CTV News, 2006). Ahmed Mustafa Ghany was a graduate of McMaster university, and the son of a urologist who had emigrated from Trinidad and Tobago (CTV News 2006). Other plotters came to Canada at a very young age and belonged to affluent families. For example, Saad Khalid who arrived in

Canada at the tender age of 7 and was at the time enrolled in a business program at the University of Toronto- Mississauga (CTV News, 2006).

Due to excellent intelligence work by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Toronto Police Department, the attack was foiled, and the suspects arrested. This was especially due to Mubin Sheikh, a second-generation Pakistani immigrant who was at risk of radicalization himself post-9/11 when he went to Syria where he met an Imam who told him that committing acts of violence against innocent human beings was un-Islamic. When Mr. Sheikh arrived back to Canada, he infiltrated the Toronto 18 successfully, kept law enforcement abreast of the plans of the group, which ultimately resulted in members of the group being arrested (NATO Association, 2018). The example of Mubin Sheikh shows how critical it is to engage with Muslims and second-generation Muslim-Canadians if attacks are to be foiled.

2.2.2- Homegrown Terrorism in the United States and Western Europe

Unlike Canada, however, other Western countries have not fared well in the face of domestic terrorism, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent individuals. Malik Nadal Hasan, a major in the U.S. Army, who was born to Palestinian immigrants in the United States, opened fired on an army base in Fort Hood, Texas in 2009 and killed 13 people and injured over 30 (Tarabay, 2013). Omar Mateen, born in the United States to Afghan immigrants opened fire at a gay night club in Orlando, Florida. which resulted in the deaths of 49 innocent individuals and injured 53 others (Handerson, Alexander & Sherlock, 2016). Rizwan Farouk is another example of a so-called homegrown who was able to successfully carry out an attack on the soil on which he was born. Farouk was born in Chicago, Illinois. to parents who had emigrated from Pakistan and he had an undergraduate degree in environmental health from California State University. In

December 2015, Farouk opened fire at an office Christmas party resulting in fourteen innocent souls losing their lives *(LA Times,* 2015).

It may be argued that the problem in the United States (U.S.) when it comes to acts of terrorism committed by second-generation immigrants primarily stems from the fact that gun laws in the United States are quite lax. While this may be true, even countries with strict gun laws have suffered at the hands of second-generation immigrants. Perhaps the best (worst) example is of the 2005 attacks in the United Kingdom.

On July 7, 2005 (7/7), four individuals carried out a series of coordinated suicide bombings targeting London's public transport system. The ensuing tragedy resulted in fifty-two innocent civilians losing their lives, thirty-two of whom were citizens of the UK, while the rest belonged to countries as far ranging as Vietnam to Israel *(The Independent,* 2015). British law enforcement and policymakers, as well British society, were further shocked when they learned the identities of the suicide bombers. Mohammad Siddique Khan was a teaching assistant, born and raised in Leeds to Pakistani immigrants; Shehzad Tanveer was a computer science graduate, born in Bradford to Pakistani immigrants, but spent most of his life in Leeds; and Haseeb Mir Hussain, was an 18-year-old child of Pakistani immigrants born in Leeds (BBC News, 2005). There were two common threads between these three out of the four 7/7 bombers; they were born in England and their parents were Pakistani immigrants.

Another example of the so-called homegrowns' carrying out mass attacks against innocent civilians is the attack on the Paris office of Charlie Hebdo in December 2015. The attack, which was carried out under the pretense of the assailants being offended by the satirical magazine publishing mocking images of Mohammad, resulted in the deaths of twelve innocent civilians and eleven others injured *(The Guardian,* 2015). Shocking as the attacks were, it was even more

shocking to learn that the individuals involved were two brothers, Said and Cherif Kouachi, French citizens, born on French soil to parents who were Algerian immigrants *(New York Times,* 2015).

While acts of violence committed by homegrowns are the best indicator of the deep rage felt by some second-generation immigrants, nonviolent acts can also provide an insight into the sense of resentment carried by these individuals. One final example, even though there are countless others which can be cited, is of the former Turkish star soccer Mesut Ozil. Ozil is a third generation Turkish-German, who was a star midfielder for the German national soccer team. After a photo of Ozil and Turkish President Erdogan was published in German newspapers and the media criticized him, Ozil announced his retirement from international soccer and claimed that he had been a victim of racism at the hands of the German people (Haaretz, 2018). If even a star athlete such as Ozil, whose three generations have lived in Germany can feel as if his country of birth is a racist country, and that this may indicate a deep-rooted malaise in society.

The aforementioned examples clearly indicate that societies which claim to be multi-cultural have at times been unable and/or unwilling to provide a sense of belonging to second-generation immigrants. While countries such as the UK adopted robust policies to tackle this issue, it was not until 2013 that Canada publicly acknowledged that a problem existed. What has Canada done in terms of policy to address this simmering radicalization threat is a question that is explored in detail in the final chapter.

2.3 Conclusions

This chapter commenced by tracing the history of immigration to Canada during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. A country, which initially considered immigrants of color as

undesirables and inferior, eventually became a mosaic, which is multi-colored. The chapter also explored instances of acts of terrorism committed by second-generation immigrants in Canada, the United States and Western Europe to stress the point that home-grown terrorism is a different threat, a much more potent threat than conventional warfare and even terrorism which is committed by first generation immigrants, which is a rarity.

What are the theoretical streams, which may illustrate the phenomenon of second-generation immigrants? What are the different dynamics, which can drive a vulnerable individual into the hateful arms of an extremist recruiter? These and other questions are examined in the next hapter by outlining some relevant theoretical perspectives.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

The primary purpose of this study is to explore the perceptions and experiences of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians and their relationship with the Canadian polity, which may help explain the cause and triggers that may lead some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians to walk the path towards radicalization to violence. To comprehend the intricate nuances, which underlie the relationship of a minority group within a multicultural state, and with the state as well as with the dominant majority, and to understand the triggers that may result in the radicalization of "homegrowns," three interdependent and inter-related theoretical ideas are reviewed to provide the foundation for this study: Identity and Basic Human Needs Theor, Theories of Radicalization, Structural Violence and Gangs, and the Hadley Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale related to individuals' hopes and dreams.

These three theoretical streams can broadly be sheltered under the umbrella of critical and emancipatory peacebuilding. Stemming from the dissatisfaction scholars and grassroots activists have felt with the neoliberal peacebuilding model,[3] critical and emancipatory peacebuilding endeavors to work with local and grassroots activists to achieve justice for both people as well as non-state actors (Thiessen, 2011). Emancipatory peacebuilding also implies that local ideas and

[3] The neoliberal peacebuilding model can be broadly defined as a peacebuilding plan in post-violent conflict societies which usually commences with the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), followed by establishment of political and socio-economic foundations of sustainable peace and a process of reconciliation. (Author's Note)

views are reflected in the peacebuilding processes (Richmond, 2007). A major emphasis of critical and emancipatory peacebuilding is to work with local populations to address conflict by transforming unjust structures that have historically formed the basis of conflict to find long-term sustainable solutions (for example, see Berents & McEvoy-Levy, 2015; Brett & Malagon, 2013; De Greiff, 2006; Goetze & Guevarra, 2014; Gill & Niens, 2014; Gready & Robbins, 2014; Lambounr & Gitau, 2013; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Randazzo, 2016; Richmond, 2012; Stewart, 2011; Tadjbakhsh, 2010). In the context of the radicalization of second-generation immigrants, critical and emancipatory peacebuilding is an optimal broader framework of analysis to explore the experiences and perceptions of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians because it can empower law enforcement to work with people from within at-risk communities, and it can also target unjust structures that have led to the alienation of second-generation Pakistani youth to provide a broader and more inclusive long-term intervention strategy.

The reason these three theoretical streams are chosen to frame this study under the umbrella of critical and emancipatory peacebuilding is that they target the individual, the at-risk person, as well as law enforcement and policymakers and these three models are interconnected when examined in the context of the respondent's ideas about the radicalization of second-generation immigrants. For instance, it is only by studying issues of identity through identity theories that the causes of ethnopolitical violence due to structural issues and the non-satisfaction of people's basic human needs can be discovered (Bose 2010). Moreover, through such an endeavor, the individual and group psychology at the grassroots level can be fully grasped in the context of radicalization to violence (Lederach 2005).

At the macro level, it is imperative to analyze the stages of radicalization, or the evolution of the radicalized youth to design an appropriate intervention mechanism in collaboration with

members of at-risk communities so that an individual's grievances may be addressed before s/he is radicalized to violence. Moreover, these models are interconnected since identity is a common theme that is found in all the models, and it is also a key driver in the context of youth radicalization. For instance, the formation of a core, singular identity amongst radicalized individuals can be traced to the fact that unjust structures push these individuals towards embracing a core religious identity, and the youth's actual or perceived lack of power, autonomy and respect also crystallizes into a radical core group identity (Özerdem & Lee, 2016). Hence, these three models are interrelated and the reason that these five theoretical frameworks have been chosen for this study is that they apply directly to the research question and will be critical in addressing it.

3.2 Identity

Theorists from the social sciences have grappled with the issue of identity and conflict for a long time. Identity is not a basic human need as was claimed by John Burton, rather identity is a separate unit of analysis, which underlies and forms the basis of all conflict (Rothman & Alberstein, 2013). For Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, an individual's identity comprises many different facets such as one's taste in music, one's inclination towards particular literature, one's religion, so on and so forth. The problem begins when one facet of an individual's identity becomes the core, central and sole identity (Sen, 2007). Sen's understanding of identity may illustrate why educated young people turn towards violence and the examples of acts of violence committed by homegrowns, provide some credence to Sen's theory of identity.

The radicalization of second-generation Pakistan-Canadians can also be analyzed through Peter's Black view of identity. "Of course, all identities, all selves, are multifaceted-being

constituted of the mix of various attributes…these attributes are drawn on both by the individual and by others to understand just who she or he is" (Black, 2008, p.148).

The problematic aspect of identity is when individual identity morphs into a larger social identity and this social identity become so strong that it becomes all-embracing and all powerful (Black, 2008). History shows how this phenomenon has lived out in reality. For example, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda are a few gory examples of the violent power identity holds. Black's fear about a larger, holistic group identity taking over individual identity can be seen in the stories of the participants in this study. Every interviewee offered the view that one core reason as to why some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians are vulnerable to radicalization is because they find their identity not in the holistic Canadian polity, but in an overarching extremist Islamist ideology.

3.2.1 What Makes Them "Tick?"

Identity is not a holistic entity, but it can be observed through three different lenses, individual identity, group identity and intergroup identity (Rothman & Alberstein, 2013). To understand conflict and its relation to identity and vice versa these three levels needs to be looked at.

3.2.1.1 The Individual Level

At the individual level, the construction of identity is dependent upon a number of variables which include but are not restricted to interactions within the familial unit, interactions in society and interactions with the state (Byrne & Senehi, 2012). If the individual perceives the interactions with any of these units negatively, it will have an adverse impact on that individual's identity in

relation to the state especially, if the individual perceives that s/he is being discriminated against by society.

There is substantial literature, which indicates that second-generation individuals are discriminated against in the land of their birth or at least that is their perception. From discrimination by law enforcement agencies (Bersani, 2014), in employment due to various factors such as language capital (Bleakly & Chin, 2008), in education (Dusttmann, Frattini & Lanzara, 2012) to social isolation (Thomson & Crul, 2007), second-generation immigrants perceive themselves to be second-grade citizens. Evidence also suggests that prejudice towards people belonging to ethnic minority groups also exists that often results in influencing the legal process (Maeder & Pfeifer, 2014). For example, in the case of R v. NS (2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726), a Muslim Canadian woman who had alleged sexual assault at the hands of her uncle and cousin was ordered to take off her niqab (face veil) in order to be cross-examined in court. The witness refused to do so and later on after an unsuccessful challenge before the Supreme Court of Canada, the witness instead of opting to taking off her niqab, opted to take back her complaint. While the Western system of criminal justice is based on the premise that every accused person has the right to confront her or his accuser, some Muslim women consider the *hejab* as well as the *niqab* to be a primary religious obligation and cases such as R v. N.S., provide fodder for terrorist recruiters to use and spread the propaganda that Muslims are being discriminated against.

This is especially true in the case of second-generation Pakistani immigrants for these experiences, coupled with the current geo-political scenario reinforce a core individual identity, i.e., being a Muslim first and a Canadian later as these experiences indicate to second-generation immigrant youth that they are treated differently because of their faith.

3.2.1.2 The Group Level

At the group level, identity can be divided into two categories: the collectivist level and the relational level. The collectivist level refers to a situation where the individual's identity in a sense merges into the group's identity and the group's benefit is seen as the individual's benefit (Rothman & Alberstein, 2013). Such a situation is usually found in highly motivated ideological and nationalist movements where the group becomes the "supreme leader." As Harry Anastasiou (2009) points out group identity is a dangerous force and is usually used to justify violence against other groups, usually minorities. In terms of second-generation immigrants, group identity grows stronger once they start to perceive that not only are their rights being violated, but also the state as well as society at large is discriminating against them.

The relational level "is more modernist and the individual prioritizes at least significant aspects of his life and choices with reference to relationships, membership in and loyalty to a specific group (or range of groups)" (Rothman & Alberstein, 2013, p.634). At the relational level then, the individual tends to prioritize their needs and as such opts to further the cause of a group that will further their individual goals.

At this stage it is imperative to examine the concepts of chosen glories and chosen traumas (Volkan, 1998) to achieve a better understanding of various dynamics which are at play when it comes to the issue of identity and second-generation immigrant radicalization in Canada.

3.2.2 Chosen Glories and Chosen Traumas

Chosen glories are usually fables of the history of a particular group, which narrate the greatness and splendor of that group's glorious past (Volkan, 1998). These stories infuse not only pride into groups but also rumination about how great the past was and how it was all lost. The

difference, however, between intergenerational chosen glories and second-generational chosen glories is that instead of what Jessica Senehi terms as "destructive storytelling" (Senehi, 2009) being intergenerational, as narratives being passed down from one generation to the next, the narration of chosen glories through destructive stories is in the present; people of the same age/generation narrate these stories to each other.

Compared to chosen glories, chosen traumas are fables of the past, which look at the injustices, perceived or otherwise, that have been meted out to the victim group (Volkan, 1998). Volkan applied chosen traumas to intergeneration's or what he labels the "transgenerational transmission of trauma" (Volkan, 1998), in terms of second-generation immigrants. This transmission of trauma is usually in the present and is deposited in the youth by the previous generation. These chosen traumas imbue into the group anger, resentment and a primal desire to exact revenge, in any way possible.

For second-generation immigrants who have been radicalized or at risk of being radicalized, chosen glories include the supremacy of Islam compared to all other religions and ideologies. While chosen glories are usually embellished, they are also partly based on history. This rumination about the past, and days gone by, results in reinforcing the notion that Islam is by far the best religion and its previous glory needs to be restored. Radicalized youth's chosen traumas consist of stories about how the Muslim world was destroyed by imperial Christian powers as well as conspiracy theories such as 9/11 that was concocted as a plan against Muslims to take over their lands (this "fact" was alluded to by one of my participant's). At this stage it is imperative to posit the question: how does all of this relate to the radicalization of Canadians of Pakistani descent? In the words of Pascal Bruckner, "Erected into an instrument of politics, memory is always threatened by resentment. As in the former Yugoslavia, when Serbian nationalists referred to past sacrifices

to justify their exactions, we are awakening the dead, the tortured, throwing them in the faces of the living and shouting: you don't have the right to remain calm....Given that logic, there are only rats and saints" (Bruckner, 2010, p.159).

This politicized memory is a powerful tool in the hands of those who harbor nefarious designs towards Canada. They use the fall of the Islamic empire, the occupation of Palestine and the presence of American troops in the Muslim world to instill into these disillusioned youths a feeling of resentment, as well as a feeling of belonging to a group by virtue of having an overarching Islamic identity (Abbas, 2012; Choudhory, 2007; Lynch, 2013; Solke & Dienel, 2010). Moreover, for most second-generation immigrants, being the citizen of a country, say Canada, "being Canadian," can be analyzed from the following criteria: nationality, ethnic origin, and descent (Schenieder et al., 2012).

Studies indicate that across Europe, the criterion which matters the most to second-generation individuals professing the Islamic faith, in terms of their identity, is their ethnic background (Schenieder et al., 2012; Van Bergen et al., 2015). The reason is pretty clear as second-generation individuals of a non-Caucasian, Islamic background feel as if they are being discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity and religion. For example, Schneider et al. (2012) conducted a multi-country, multi-ethnic survey amongst second-generation immigrants of Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslavian backgrounds in different European countries. While they discovered that there was a general feeling of discontent amongst these individuals and while they did identify with their ethnic background, the researchers concluded that,

> the second-generation strongly identifies with the *local* place where they grew up and live- be it their city or neighborhood […]. Some factors are conducive to their sense of belonging to the society. Others may hinder it. The most relevant factors seem to be the sense of discrimination, citizenship, religiosity, and- though to different degrees and intertwined with other variables- education and labor market participation (Schneider et al., 2012, 332).

The participants in this study also confirmed the importance of identity in certain ways. For example, one participant noted that the memory of 9/11, or rather the "allegation" that 9/11 was carried out by Muslims, was a conspiracy hatched by the Global North to malign Islam. This conspiratorial mindset feeds into the narrative that Muslims all over the globe are being victimized by the imperial "West," a narrative that recruiters use to target vulnerable second-generation individuals (BBC News, 2007). Moreover, many participants in this study claimed that they were proud to be Canadian, yet at the same time they also narrated a severe dissonance between their two core identities; their Canadian identity in contrast to their ethnoreligious identity. The void that this dissonance created was a critical element in vulnerable second-generation Pakistani-Canadians being metaphorical putty in the hands of terrorist recruiters.

3.2.3 Social Identity Approach

Another way to understand the mind of the homegrown terrorist is the Social Identity Approach. The Social Identity Approach is an amalgamation of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory (Jackson & Sherriff, 2013). Social Identity Theory basically posits that the group to which individuals belong (in this case religious groups) provides human beings with a sense of their own identity. It is logical then that individuals perceive their own groups in a positive light compared to other groups, which may be seen negatively (Jackson & Sherriff, 2013).

In terms of second-generation immigrants, considering that they feel as if the dominant groups have discriminated against them as individuals as well as members of a group on the basis of their religion, Social Identity Theory would argue that these individuals identify very strongly with their Islamic identity and think of their group in a very positive light. Moreover, these

individuals also indulge in the "othering" of the dominant group and perhaps hold them responsible for their problems.

This "othering" was quite evident in the stories offered by the research participants. When participants were asked about their views on white privilege, every participant offered the view that white privilege existed, albeit the degrees of how much privilege was held by the dominant group in Canada varied from participant to participant. For some white privilege did exist, at times it did exist in the eye of the beholder, and in certain cases it was a sense of perpetual victimhood, which did more harm than good.

What exactly is white privilege, a term which is lobbed around a lot, especially in the social sciences? What constitutes white privilege and do studies indicate that it is as pervasive as many participants in this study claimed? The next section examines this question.

3.2.4 White Privilege

> A hierarchical racial order continues to shape all aspects of American life.
> —EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA & KAREN S. GLOVER
>
> (2004, 28)

For the past many decades, white privilege has been used by some academics and social scientists to explain discrimination against minorities in the corridors of powers and the benefits conferred on the dominant white group due to a systemically unjust structure, which is embedded in society and politics (Bhopal, 2018; Foster, 2013; Kendall, 2012). Privilege has also been explained as a minority person being unable to attain something (a job or any other opportunity), not because of one's shortcomings in a meritorious system, but because the individual does not belong to a certain group (Johnson, 2006). Moreover, the prejudicial presumption that members of

certain minority groups such as African-Americans are more prone to commit crimes compared to their white counterparts is rooted in the concept of white privilege (Johnson, 2008).

Furthermore, researchers have also argued that immigrants that resettle in a new country, including Canada, also face structural barriers while trying to integrate themselves in the society, as a result of white privilege (Kong, 2010). White privilege, according to many social scientists, is pervasive and has a negative influence on every facet of life. For example, children belonging to minority groups are often treated more harshly than their white counterparts in the educational system (Books, 2015; Fine et al., 2012;). Minorities may also be disadvantaged in terms of employment opportunities (Saenz & Morales, 2005), to a disproportionately high level of incarceration for African-Americans (Bell & Adams, 2016; Kitchen & Burris, 2011; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996; Wallis, 2016), to discrimination in low-cost public housing (The Housing Research & Advocacy Centre, 2009). Minorities have also faced discrimination in social uplift and economic programs such as the so-called President Bush "no-child left behind" policy (Malyeko & Gawlick, 2011; Paul, 2004) and vulnerable Black communities have been targeted for the so-called sub-prime mortgage fiasco/fraud (Phillips, 2010). Moreover, the presence of white privilege has been responsible in skewing social relations (Abrams & Gibson, 2007; Bonilla-Silva, 2002; Coleman, 2006; Feagin, 2001; Ferber, 2012, Glover, 2007; Inwood & Martin 2008; Lund & Carr, 2010; Solomona et al., 2005). It seems as if no facet of existence in Western countries is free from the scourge of white privilege. Even in multicultural Canada, it has been argued that First-Nations are victims of white privilege ranging from issues as diverse as the environment (Mascarenhas, 2012) to discrimination in the provision of service deliveries (Peters, 2011) to a "free-market" racism.[4]

[4] Free market racism has been defined as "Laissez-faire racism involves persistent negative stereotyping of African Americans, a tendency to blame blacks themselves for the black-white gap in socioeconomic standing, and resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate U.S. racist social conditions and institutions." (Bobo, Kluegel & Smith, 1997, p. 16).

However, is white privilege in the 21st century as pervasive as scholars have pointed out? Moreover, if white privilege exists, is there an inter-minority hierarchy of privilege where certain minorities are more equal than others? Specifically, are second-generation immigrants of South Asian decent including Muslims, more successful in the economic market compared to other minorities, even with the existence of white privilege?

In a ground-breaking quantitative study of South Asians in the US conducted by Woo, Sakamoto and Takei (2012), using regression analysis, the authors argued that South-Asian men aged 25-40, are more likely to possess a college or graduate degree and to be employed in the "highest professional category" compared to their white counterparts. (p.26). In terms of "occupational attainment," second-generation South-Asian immigrants have a net advantage of 77 percent over their white counterparts. (p.26). Second-generation South Asian women in the 25-40 age range have a net occupational advantage over their white counterparts of 24 percent (p.26).

After providing their findings, the authors concluded that, "Our findings do not appear to support the generalization that second-generation South Asians currently encounter a systematic socioeconomic disadvantage due to the fact that they were a minority group with darker skin tones…second-generation South Asians are actually advantaged over whites in regard to wage and occupational attainment (p.30.).

While this study examined the "privilege" of South Asians in the US, the alleged privilege also extends to Canada. For example, the current Minister of Defense is a first generation Sikh Canadian, the leader of the NDP is a second-generation Sikh Canadian, apart from many MPs and MPPs who are of South Asian descent.

Why did the respondents in my study believe that they were at a severe disadvantage in every facet of their existence because of white privilege and the dominant white majority? One argument is that second-generation immigrants are not really at any disadvantage, nor are they discriminated against, but rather it is the perception of discrimination, which is at play. What is a "perception of discrimination?" The next section examines this issue.

3.2.5 Psychological Self Deprivation

Self-deprivation is a common theme in radicalization. It is not a holistic concept, but it has two different meanings. The first is personal relative deprivation where an individual has usually got low self-esteem, is depressed, and has become an introvert (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005). On the other hand, collective self-deprivation result in group mobilization against the "enemy group" since individuals come together to fight against what they perceive to be injustice against themselves and other members of their community (King & Taylor, 2011). So, can relative economic deprivation be a core explanation of creating an individual identity, which coalesces into a group identity, and ultimately leads towards radicalizing young individuals in Canada?

A recent survey conducted in Montreal suggests that relative deprivation does not have a major impact on identity formation and the radicalization of youth. 1,894 full time university students in Montreal were asked a number of different questions about radicalization, an overwhelming majority of whom were economically well off (Solyom, 2016). The results suggest that a strong identification with one's own group is a powerful factor towards radicalization if the individual feels that their group has been discriminated against (Solyom, 2016). Moreover, those individuals who had either experienced discrimination or *perceived that they were discriminated*

against were more likely to be radicalized since they became more insular and their individual identity merged with the group's collective identity (Solyom, 2016).

The results indicated that individuals that perceived that they were discriminated against were more likely to be radicalized. This is a key point and discrimination is the key word. Black's Law Dictionary defines discrimination as:

> In constitutional law, the effect of a statute or established practice which confers particular privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privilege granted and between whom and those not favored no reasonable distinction can be found. Unfair treatment or denial of normal privileges to persons because of their race, age, nationality or religion. A failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored (Black's Law Dictionary, 2010, 420).

In a strict legal sense then, Muslim youth are not discriminated against when it comes to employment and getting admissions into universities. If anything, Muslim youth are in a stronger position than their Caucasian counterparts since the former are members of "a visible minority" and are given preference over the latter. Studies from the field of psychology also indicate that even though individuals may be provided with more than a level playing field, if they perceive that they are being discriminated against, it imbues a cynicism and negativity amongst individuals (Awad, 2010; Dion, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2014). Hence, this is an area, which requires further research; what does discrimination mean to at-risk youth? This study examines that very question in Chapter 4.

So, considering that under Canadian law non-White, second-generation immigrants are in a stronger position compared to their White counterparts, what is the reason for the solidification of a core group based Islamic identity among these young people? One explanation is that relative deprivation is not just economic. It can also be perception based, or what can be termed as *psychological relative deprivation*. In contrast to economic relative deprivation, psychological

relative deprivation does not necessarily have to be based on "real" instances of discrimination. For example, Volkan's (1998) chosen traumas are usually myths of past injustices that are embellished to increase the feeling of persecution. These injustices may not have any legal basis, as is the case in Canada, but the law does not matter; it is the perception, the feeling that they are being persecuted and discriminated against on the basis of their Muslim identity, which drives these youth towards radicalization (Solyom, 2016).

While scholars have pointed out that much work needs to be done on group relative deprivation when researching radicalization amongst homegrowns (King & Taylor, 2011), one missing research component is psychological relative deprivation. When does individual psychological relative deprivation coalesce into psychological group relative deprivation? Moreover, is individual psychological relative deprivation less powerful a tool towards the formation of a radicalized identity than psychological group relative deprivation? These are areas where future research would be quite fruitful.

At this stage it is productive to examine radicalization of second-generation immigrants through the lens of different PACS theories and the social sciences to achieve a deeper understanding of the dynamics of radicalization and the role identity plays.

3.3- Radicalization

Apart from identity theories and PACS theories, scholars and law enforcement personnel have designed models, which explain the process and the steps, which individuals take towards the path of radicalization. For the purposes of this study, it is constructive to examine some of these theories because of the framework they provide, and whether these theoretical perspectives about some of the triggers and processes of radicalization mesh with the views of this study' participants.

The "othering" of non-Caucasian individuals, especially Muslims, is a key factor in radicalization, which is just not restricted to second-generation immigrants, but it may also be a problem for first-generation immigrants as has been pointed out in some recent studies (Chuang & Roemer 2013). Theorists in the field of radicalization studies posit that radicalization of second-generation immigrants is dependent on four factors namely (1) personal and collective grievances, (2) network and interpersonal ties, (3) political and religious ideologies, and (4) support structures (Hafez & Mullens, 2015, 961-970). Hafez and Mullins propose that to counter the radicalization of second-generation immigrants, steps such as global intelligence sharing and the collection of descriptive data by academics as it relates to radicalization should be undertaken.

Randy Borum (2003) is a specialist in analyzing domestic terrorism. He contends that radicalization follows four different stages. At the first stage an individual may feel deprived and detects that her/his position in life is unacceptable. During the second stage the individual discerns that her/his position is below that of other members of society, especially members of the dominant group. At the third stage the individual starts to blame other groups for the challenges and real or perceived discrimination felt by the individual and her/his group. And finally, at the fourth stage the "enemy" group is demonized and violence against it is deemed to be a legitimate response. The radicalization of a second-generation individual usually follows a certain, unique pattern as a triggering event leads a person to believe that s/he is a victim of discrimination so that the person seeks solace in religion that may lead the person to agree with extremist ideologies, and formally declare allegiance to an extremist organization (Wicktorowicz, 2005).

Fatahli Moghaddam (2005) goes into more detail about the process and stages of radicalization comparing the four-step process to climbing a staircase. At the bottom level, perceived or real discrimination and deprivation instill in an individual anger and resentment

towards the society s/he inhabits. Once this anger is instilled in the individual, the person climbs to the first flight of the staircase to fight against injustice. If there is due process and if individuals feel empowered and sense they belong, the chances of radicalization are slim. However, without due process and a feeling of belonging and upward social mobility, individuals are likely to radicalize and climb the second flight where instead of addressing the root causes of discrimination these individuals focus on one meta-narrative; blaming the West. Once they have climbed the second flight, like-minded individuals come together and find moral justification for acts of violence. Finally, after they have climbed the third flight of stairs to reach the fourth floor, they officially join a terrorist outfit, which leads them to the fifth and sixth floors where they commit acts of terrorism (Mogahddam, 2005).

Silber and Bhatt (2007)[5] developed another interesting model for the New York Police Department (NYPD) that includes four stages. The first stage they label as pre-radicalization where the individual in question has not commenced the journey towards radicalization. There are some common traits including gender (they are usually males). They are economically stable belonging to the middle class, they are not devoutly religious, and they usually lack a criminal background. During the second stage that is labeled as self-identification, at-risk individuals look towards Islam for solace after a trigger event or after having continuously felt discriminated against. At this point the individual feels attracted to extremist interpretations of the faith and during this extremist identity formation, the individuals reaches out to people with similar beliefs.

During the third stage, labeled as indoctrination the at-risk individual moves from his or her individual identity and grievances to a more collective identity and collective grievances. At this stage, for the individual in question, anything that is considered to be against the tenets of

[5] The model was taken off of the NYPDs website because it was perceived as too "inflammatory." (Author's Note)

Islam needs to be dealt with violently (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Finally, the last stage is called *jihadization*, where individuals declare *jihad* and either form their own radical outfits to combat injustice at the hands of infidels or they may join an existing "franchise." The latter has usually been the choice made by second-generation radicalized youth as it is easier in terms of resources, training, and logistics.

The last model[6] that merits some discussion is the one offered by Marc Sageman's (2004) non-linear and non-sequential model. The radicalization of an individual, whether it is first or second-generation, depends upon the relationship/interaction between four factors (Sageman, 2004). The first includes a sense of moral outrage when acts by the West, especially the US are seen as violations of morality; an example of this are the predator drone strikes carried out by the US in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. The second factor is the meta-narrative or the dominant worldview, which reinforces moral outrage. Here the US and its allies are seen as enemies of Islam, not a specific Muslim country, but enemies of the religion as a whole. The third prong depends on personal experiences of real or perceived discriminatory acts. This leads to moral outrage (the first prong) and the individual's outrage would multiply if s/he sees other Muslims with similar experiences, which reinforce the second and the third prongs. Finally, for the radicalization process to be complete, Sageman (2004) posits that there should be interactions between these individuals which results in an affirmation of the already pre-existing bias.

These theoretical radicalization models appear to be supported by the study participant's views. Almost every respondent pointed out that radicalization triggers commence with the youth's feeling of being discriminated against by the dominant majority combined with the loss of individual identity both at home and in society. This in turn leads to the youth to find an identity

[6] While there are many other models in the context of radicalization to violence, these models seem to be the most descriptive and relate to the data findings (Author's note).

in an extreme interpretation of Islam because of the narrative of collective grievances propagated by recruiters as well as filling the identity void using a collective Islamist identity. At the very extreme level, these radicalized youth might commit an act of violence against innocent Canadians. One factor, however, that these theories/models of radicalization do not address much are the pre-existing mental health issues amongst at risk individuals. This is a factor that every participant held was critical in the youth radicalization process.

3.3.1 Structural Violence

Structural violence and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969; Price, 2012) implies that discriminatory practices and laws in society create an imbalance in power, which ultimately leads to alienation, exploitation and hostility. For example, the Rwandan genocide shows that overt and covert discrimination was a form of violence that ultimately resulted in mass atrocities (Urwin, 1999). Another way to understand structural violence is through the concept of negative and positive peace (Diehl, 2016; Galtung, 1996; Shields & Grant, 2017; Shields & Soeters, 2017), with the former being an absence of physical violence and the latter being sustainable peace through the abolishment of unjust structures.

Structural violence also exists when oppressive conditions subsist within societies that result in a low quality of life and lack of decisionmaking, power and autonomy for marginalized groups (Jeong, 2000). Moreover, the theory of structural violence holds that the ruling elite imposes discriminatory laws to consolidate power and marginalize the vulnerable. This unjust structure does not provide opportunities to the oppressed to empower themselves and become an active part of society (Jeong, 2000). Johan Galtung also differentiates between actor conflict and structural conflict. In actor conflict, the individual recognizes that discriminatory and unjust structures exist in society and the actor is willing to bring about a change using different means

(Galtung, 1996). Moreover, in a structure based approach "no clear subject-object relationship" is required and instead reliance is placed on a "diffuse subject-object relationship" (Galtung, 1996, pp. 74-75) with the former implying a direct act of violence by an individual/state against an individual/group and the latter implying systematic economic and political oppression through the law and socioeconomic institutions and policies.

Seen from the lens of structural violence, second-generation immigrants feel that their rights have been violated because of what they perceive to be unjust structures embedded within institutions in Canada. Real or perceived discrimination within state and private institutions imbue in these individuals a feeling of alienation and being violated (Awad, 2010; Dion, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2014). This structural violence ultimately leads them towards radicalization at the hands of Islamist extremists that finally results in their endeavor to carry out actual physical violence against Canada.

3.3.2 Basic Human Needs Theory

According to John Burton (1990), the primary source of conflict is the non-satisfaction of people's basic human needs such as power, autonomy, respect, identity, and security. These needs are not negotiable and the needs of all groups in a given society can and must be satisfied at the same time (Burton, 1990). Conflicts arise when basic needs are left unattended, which results in resentment, frustration and finally violence towards the oppressor (Griffiths, 2013). "Poverty, economic inequity and social injustice need to be reduced to overcome obstacles to basic needs" (Burton, 1990, 71).

A basic human needs approach can also explain how at-risk second-generation youth are in danger of radicalization. For instance, because of real or perceived discrimination, second-generation immigrants feel that they do not have as much power and autonomy compared to

individuals from the dominant group (Sageman, 2003). This sense of disempowerment coupled with their fusion with a central identity in religion and religious indoctrination may lead them to find the satisfaction of those needs with groups such as ISIS. The feeling of being weaker than their white counterparts, of having less autonomy and respect in Canada compared to "old stock Canadians" was depicted throughout the research participant's stories from their childhood onwards. They noted that one triggering factor for second-generation Pakistani-Canadians towards being radicalized were the non-satisfaction of their basic human needs.

Apart from identity, white privilege, structural violence and basic human needs theory, are there other theoretical models, which may explain the process of radicalization? Some of these theoretical models are presented below.

3.3.3 Islam's Hells Angels? The Gang Analogy and Radicalization

The final theoretical stream in the radicalization section relates to why young people join gangs? Many participants in this study offered the opinion that radicalized second-generation Pakistani-Canadians are akin to individuals who join gangs during their teens. What explanation does the salient literature on individuals joining gangs offer about the causes and reasons of gang recruitment? And can a parallel be drawn between gang members and radicalized second-generation Pakistani Canadians?

One reason that individuals join gangs is that they perceive that the government and society in general have failed them and in order to have a support system that caters for their needs, these individuals turn towards gangs (Lane & Meeker, 2004; Papachristos & Kirk, 2006). Another reason why young people join gangs is that they feel alienated and are unable to fully integrate into society and feel left out (Fast, 2017). Moreover, and this can be construed as a reflection of Burton's Human Needs Theory, youth turn towards gangs because they find that not only are they

"respected" once they join gangs (Anderson, 1999) but they also find their lost identity and a sense of camaraderie with their fellow gang members (Ngo et al., 2017; Rafanell, McLean & Poole, 2017; Woo et al., 2015; Klein, 1995). Individuals join gangs to find a sense of belonging, to have peers who are gang members, to feel accepted, make friends, and because they feel that their families do not care about them (Grant & Feimer, 2007). Relying on the study made by Roelofs et al., (2006), Taylor (2013) argues that individuals join gangs because of psychopathological issues that may result from individual makeup as well as having undergone traumatic experiences during childhood and adolescence.

Other studies on gang membership posit that those who join gangs belong to crime-infested neighborhoods (Howell, Eagley & Gleason, 2002), or are part of the lowest rung of the socioeconomic order (Chettleburgh, 2007), have prior criminal records (Eitle, Gunkel & van Gundy, 2004) and have family members who are already gang members (Prothrow-Stith & Spivak, 2005; Spergel, 1995). Finally, in relation to why Canadian Aboriginal youth join gangs, it has been posited that the primary factors include oppression stemming from systemic discrimination because of colonization (Sinclair & Grekul, 2012), neglect at the hands of parents (Goodwill, 2009), and poverty (Totten, 2008). Thus, there are multiple and different perspectives about why individuals join gangs. Can it be argued then that the parallel drawn by this study's participants between radicalization and joining gangs is significant? The answer is somewhat mixed and lies in the murky, grey area of the complexity of life.

It is without doubt that individuals who are most vulnerable to being radicalized are those who perceive that the system has failed them; they feel alienated from society, suffer neglect (perceived or otherwise) at the hands of their parents, and feel pain from psychopathological issues stemming from past traumas. However, second-generation immigrants who commit acts of

terrorism do not belong to impoverished backgrounds. They are educated, live in upscale neighborhoods, have no prior criminal records, and have family members who are law-abiding citizens (Solyom, 2016). Moreover, while individuals join gangs to find material gains, those radicalized individuals who end up committing an act of terrorism do not care about material benefits (Chapter 5 examines this issue exploring the example of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh). Hence, while it may be alluring to draw parallels between gangs and radicalized youth and while certain similarities do exist, there are vast differences between the dynamics which fuel the two and it is critically important not to treat the two issues as being completely similar.

However, considering some of the similarities between the two issues, it may be fruitful to see whether some measures, which have been taken to counter gang activity may be used to counter radicalization.

3.4 The Self-Anchoring Cantril Model: Hopes and Dreams, Fears and Worries

> *The past and future are not seen as dualistic, polar opposites. They are connected, like the ends of a circle that meet and become seamless*
>
> — *JOHN PAUL LEDERACH*, 2005, p. 136

For the past sixty years, researchers have been interested in how research participants think about their present, and also what hopes and fears they may harbor about their future. This interest is rational since the imagery of the future and what it entails for participants, can equip researchers and policymakers with information to tailor public policy as best as possible in order to assuage the apprehensions of the general populace as well as to makes their greatest hopes and dreams come true. While much of the work on imagining a future on the basis of hopes and fears revolve around children and young adults as they are the builders of the future, some research both from

the initial era (1960s) and from the recent past (post-2010) has focused on adults and those involved in conflict and what they perceive or imagine their futures to be with consideration to their hopes and fears (Byrne, McLeod & Polkinghorn, 2004; Braungart & Braungart, 1996).

The Institute of Social Relations was arguably the first organization, which looked at the concerns of individuals and groups not according to any pre-existing model but by empowering individuals to narrate in their words what they thought would be an optimal future and following it up with asking what those individuals would consider their worst fears to be (Cantril & Free, 1962). No matter how perfect a system is, for it to be successful, it needs to be perceived to be fair, just, and one which satisfies the desires of individuals and groups living within that system (Cantril & Free 1962). The study respondents bar one live and were raised in Canada, a country, which is generally perceived to be fair and just. However, their feelings and perceptions about the system are less than optimal. The interviewees were raised within a multicultural Canada where everyone is equal under the law and in society, these assumptions were modified by their frustrations, anxiety and anger, which stemmed from their lived experiences (see Cantril & Free, 1962).

The Self-Anchoring model endeavors to empower individuals to define "on the basis of his own assumptions, perceptions, goals and values, the two extremes or anchoring points, of the spectrum on which scale measurement is desired…and then to employ this self-defined continuum as a measuring device" (Cantril & Free, 1962, p.8). The model deconstructed basically inquiries from individuals where they think of themselves on the ladder today and where they consider themselves to be in the future, both in terms of greatest hopes and greatest fears (Cantril & Free, 1962, pp. 8-9). While the present study did not employ the ladder, it did inquire in a very broad-based and open-ended manner from the participants what their greatest hopes and fears for

themselves as well as for their community and their country were; and the responses to those questions were quite deep and introspective.

3.4.1 Hopes and Dreams: Individual's Imagining the Future

The research inquiries into how individuals view the future are significant (Braungart & Braungart, 1996; Byrne, McLeod & Polkinghorn, 2004). The interest which has developed in this line of questioning is essential as well as necessary since aspirations and fears for the future can define and shape a person's present and vice versa. Moreover, imagining the future has an essential role when it comes to social development since it is a key theme in how society may progress (Boulding, 1988) or demise. In essence then, for a robust public policy to pre-empt radicalization, researchers and policymakers need to know what apprehensions individuals have about the future and what aspirations they harbor for the same. Such a holistic, future-oriented comprehension can better enable policymakers and peacebuilders to deal with radicalization, based on pre-existing theoretical models and those that are buttressed with the views of those who could have been or are at-risk for radicalization.

Usually, *futuristic* studies are based on conducting a comparative analysis about images of the future as perceived by participants from different countries (Cantril & Free, 1962; Danzinger, 1963; Oranuer et. al, 2000). However, in recent years, scholars have also focused within a country and a particular segment of the general populace (Braungart & Braungart, 1996; Byrne, McLeod & Polkinghorn, 2004; Henley Centre, 1991; Hick & Holden, 1995). For example, Hutchinson examined the views of over 600 teenagers in Australia and found that an overwhelming majority not only harbor negative views about the future, but they also felt an extreme sense of hopelessness (Hutchinson, 1992). Negativity about the future may be based on personal proclivities, yet usually it stems from and reflects sociopolitical currents of the present milieu (Hicks, 1996). In this present

study the participant's hopes were deeply centered on all segments of Canadian society providing the reader with a better understanding of different perspectives while the respondents greatly feared that Canada may also experience the rise of the far-right, which would result in discrimination against minorities.

3.4.1.1 Conflict Transformation and the Future

Envisioning the future and consequently imagining hopes and fears for the future has also found an important place for itself in PACS. John Paul Lederach, for example, suggests an integrated framework, a combination of the vertical axis of different levels of conflict (system, sub-system, relationship, issue) with a horizontal time axis (immediate to desired future generations) (Lederach, 2005). One way of transforming conflicts is to consider that there is a "seamless connection" (Lederach, 2005, p.148) between the past and the future which entails that the past is alive and an essential part of an individual's and a community's future, and in order to transform a conflict, we have to morally imagine what the future can be by creating a narrative by using our creative voices (Lederach, 2005). It is worth quoting Lederach directly on this point:

> To *restory* is not to repeat the past, attempt to recreate it exactly as it was, nor act as if it did not exist. It does not ignore the generational future nor does it position itself to control it. Embracing the paradox of relationship in the present, the capacity to *restory* imagines both the past and the future and provides space for the narrative voice to create…such a space, however, is the womb of constructive change, the continuous birthplace of the past that lies before us (Lederach, 2005, 149).

As Lederach so eloquently posits, to transform a conflict, one needs to let those affected by it express their greatest hopes and their fears, which are deeply rooted in the lived experiences of the past and the present. These lived experiences not only shape the perceptions and biases of individuals about the world and about others, but they are also instrumental in empowering us to imagine a better future. As such, when the participants in this study were asked about their greatest

hopes they harbored for the future, their responses were clearly embedded in their experiences and perceptions of discrimination; the same was true when they were solicited about their greatest qualms for the future. Hope is a counter to the negative impact that fears have on imagining the future (Cohen et al., 2014). Scholars have argued that by envisioning a future based on hope, individuals involved in a conflict can address the root issues in a more nuanced way (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006) curtailing the desire to lash out and retaliate against the "enemy" (Moeschberger et al., 2005).

The polar opposite impact of asking participants about their greatest hope for the future compared to their greatest fear for the future was also quite informative. When participants imagined their future based on what they hoped it to be, the negativity they had about the dominant majority in earlier responses was almost non-existent, they had a deeper desire for safety not only for themselves but also for all fellow Canadians. They also wished that vulnerable second-generation Pakistani-Canadians would not be lured into the trap of radicalization in the future. Such opposite conceptions of the future can be understood if the dualistic nature of people's hopes and fear in a conflict can be examined. As Cohen et al., (2014) posit, "While hope promotes an orientation towards peace by inducing thought about a better future and various paths to reach it, fear inhibits hope and conflict resolution by highlighting threatening information "(p.15).

While examining the futures envisioned by the respondents was a part of this study, it would be interesting to further examine how, if any, critical a role their hopes for the future play in pushing at-risk individuals away from radicalization to violence, and the role fear plays in pulling at-risk individuals towards violence.

3.4.1.2 Hope Lies Eternal

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines hope as, "Expectation and desire combined, e.g., for a certain event to occur; a person, thing or circumstance, which gives cause for hope" (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1991). While a dictionary definition of hope is available, in the social sciences what exactly is hope, remains contested. For some scholars, hope is a term, which is used "interchangeably with other words such as expectations, images, attitudes, forethought, ambitions, goals and dreams" (Bishop & Willis, 2014, 781) and thus lacks a proper conceptualization.

Scholars also posit that in countries based on the capitalist model, hope is muddled with a person acquiring a better education, which can lead to a better income for an individual, rather than society at large (Bishop & Willis, 2014; Raco, 2009). Such an individualistic lens precludes a holistic understanding of hope and hence, is at best a weak unifying factor amongst different segments of society. A broader definition and underrating of hope is the "ability to perceive positive futures" (Bishop & Willis, 2014, 781). This broader sense of what constitutes hope involved both the personal/individual dimension as well as a broader communal one. These two dimensions are quite interrelated as without the personal the communal cannot exist, and vice versa. For example, every participant in this study hoped for a better future for their children that were inextricably tied to the hope of a peaceful and more accepting Canadian polity in the future. Figure 3.1 below displays this model of the link between individual and communal hope that can also be seen on a spectrum.

Individual Communal

←----------→

Figure 3.1- Individuality and Communality of Hope

Fig 3.1 illustrates the functioning of hope on a continuum. If individuals feel hopeful about themselves, they also feel hopeful about the future for their communities. Consequently, if the future of the community seems hopeful, then it fuels hope as well as resilience at the individual level (Bishop & Willis, 2014).

3.4.2 Fears for the Future

Corresponding to hopes for the future are worries for the future, the greatest apprehensions and fears which individuals harbor. In a study conducted by Braungart and Braungart (1996) which focused on university students in South Africa, the findings indicated that similar to future hopes, individuals' fears can also be broken down into different levels and include:

1. Fears for the self (individual),
2. Fears for one' country (national), and

Fears for other countries (international) (pp. 286-288).

Fears for the self primarily relate to one's economic future and the future of one's family while fears for one's country include the country's economy, relationship between different ethnic groups within the country and the standing of one's country in the comity of nations. Finally, fears for the global nation include the apprehension whether sustainable and long-term peace is achievable (Braungart & Braungart, 1996). Somewhat similar to the model cited above, the fears of the participants in my study also revolved around their families, the toxic relationship between different ethnic communities in Canada as well as the fear of rising xenophobia in the US seeping into Canada. One major difference in relation to future fears as laid out by Braungart and Braungart (1996) in South Africa and Byrne et al. (2004) in Bosnia, Israel and Palestine, Northern Ireland,

South Africa, and Sri Lanka, and between the participants in this study was that the participants did not harbor any deep-rooted fears for themselves.

Other studies have focused on a single variable of fear; fear for the self. For example, the Performance Failure Appraisal Inventory, which was developed by Conroy et al., (2002), examines fear for the self on the following different levels; shame and embarrassment, self-esteem, uncertainty of the future, and relationship with others. Usually, however, studies focus on examining multiple levels of fears, especially when youth are the focus so that a holistic picture of what the imagery of the future is, may emerge. Hicks (1996) examined among other things, fears about the future amongst 7-18-year-old individuals. These levels of fears were similar to those found by Braungart and Braungart (1996) and include:

1. The personal level (educations, work, relationships etc.),
2. Immediate futures i.e. relating to one's neighborhood, and
3. Global Future (Hicks, 1996, pp. 6-8).

At this point a pertinent question is why should the fears of participants be researched at all? Giddens (1991) argued that in a postmodernist world, individuals have a lack of trust in society and people in general, and in order to understand and gauge their perceptions their political images must be examined. Bishop and Willis (2014), relying upon studies conducted by Beck (1992) and Bauman (1998), posit that even though a number of studies concentrate upon young people's hopes about the future, there "is an overall positioning of young people as increasingly worried and pessimistic about social, political and global issues, about war, poverty, the growing number of immigrant sand refugees and in, particular environmental risk and destruction" (p.781).

Scholars have also emphasized the role of fear in exacerbating conflicts. Fears can make individuals more aggressive (Lazarus, 1991), causing people to insulate themselves within their

communities or groups (Neuwirth, Frederick & Mayo, 2007) and blow out of proportion the real threats they face (Cohen at.al, 2013). The participants in my study at times did seem to overblow the "threat" they thought they were facing not only from the dominant majority but also from the state. While such "fears" were related to the present, they also had a negative influence on how the participants viewed the future. Moreover, since present-day fears can and do affect second-generation Pakistanis perceptions of the future, it increases the risk of second-generation Muslim youth radicalization as perceptions of the "other" become more powerful than the truth.

Hence, in order to achieve a well-rounded and holistic understanding of the participants' perceptions of the future, ideally, a study should include the images of the future based both on hopes and fears and the present study endeavored to do the same.

3.4.3 - Deconstructing the Levels of Hope and Fears

Existing futuristic literature breaks down hopes and fears into different levels. For example, Bishop and Willis (2014) deem hopes related to the individual as being multifarious and including simultaneous hopes in relation to material goods, and relationships. They also argue that even at a personal level, individuals have hopes, which transcend their personal benefits; hopes for their family, friends and community constitute such a dimension (Bishop & Willis, 2014).

Compared to the above argument, hopes and fears have also been seen as multidimensional and encompassing the individuals, communal, national and international spheres (Cantril & Free, 1962). For example, Cantril and Free (1962) consider hope to have the following dimensions:

1. Personal (the self and family; community),
2. Political (national unity),
3. Economic (improved standard of living),

4. Social (eliminating discrimination), and
5. International (Cantril & Free, 1962, 10).

Scholars have also examined the different levels of hopes from an "emotional" as well as a "social" aspect. For example, Shoyer and Lashern (2016) consider the emotional component to include hopes and fears for one's self and friends and family while the social aspect includes hopes and fear for society in general, including one's community as well as one's country of birth.

As broad and encompassing the aforementioned frameworks are, for the purposes of the present study, a modified form of the framework was constructed to give a more nuanced structure to the participants' concept of the future. This framework includes the following:

- Personal Hopes and Fears
    - Better future for self and children, and
    - Fear of discrimination being leveled against children
- Political and Social Realms
    - Hope that the dominant majority can understand challenged faced by the second-generations,
    - Hope for a more harmonious and peaceful Canada,
    - Hope that discrimination will end,
    - Fear that the rise of the far-right will afflict Canada, and
    - Fear that discrimination will continue to increase.

Thus, the participants exhibited personal hopes in relation to their children and concurrently their greatest reservations for the future also revolved around their children. Moreover, the interviewees greatest hopes at a communal level was that there would be acceptance of everyone by everyone without any relevance given to one's faith or skin color. The respondents'

greatest fears for the futures, ironically, revolved around apprehensions they felt that discrimination would continue to rise against members of the non-dominant majority, specifically, Muslims.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter provided a theoretical framework to analyze and understand the phenomenon of radicalization amongst second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. The issue is deeply rooted in a dichotomous and dissonant way as these young people's shattered identity results in a void, which individuals' try to fill through an extremist interpretation of the faith of Islam. Alienation from mainstream society, a feeling of victimhood stemming from the perception that the dominant white majority is privileged and the first amongst equals fuels anger, which, is manipulated by recruiters. Moreover, radicalization is not a zero-sum game and neither does it happen in one day. As theories of radicalization show, radicalization is a multi-step process and is dependent upon multiple factors that stem from discrimination, or a feeling thereof. Finally, while a parallel may be drawn between individuals who join gangs and second-generation Pakistani-Canadians who are at a risk for being radicalized, there are certain marked differences between the two and it is imperative that both issues are treated and addressed separately by law enforcement as well as by scholars and academics.

The main purpose of this study is to inquire from second-generation Pakistani-Canadians about what they perceive to be the causes and triggers of radicalization. In order to achieve this purpose, the stories of participants were heard. What were the research methods utilized to collect, codify and analyze data for this study, and who were the storytellers in this study? These are the questions, which are addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

To achieve an understanding of how second-generation Pakistani-Canadians perceive their relationship with the Canadian state and what they believe to be the primary triggers for radicalization, this study specifically utilized a qualitative research design, and semi-structured interviews were used as the primary research tool to interact with the participants. This chapter outlines the study's research locations, the research design chosen and semi-structured interviews for the study, the role of the researcher, data gathering technique and ethics, data analysis, and the study participants.

This chapter outlines:

1. The study's research locations,
2. The research design and semi-structured interviews used in the study,
3. The role of the researcher,
4. The significance of the study, and
5. Data gathering technique and ethics, data analysis, and the study participants.

4.2 Research Locations

This research was unique in the sense that it had three different research locations, based in two different countries. Canada is home to people from over 50 different countries. The first interviews were conducted in Winnipeg, as one purpose of the study was to compare and contrast the views of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians settled in different parts of Canada. The second research location was the city of Mississauga, which is home to 721,600 people (World

Population Review, 2018) while the province of Ontario itself has the highest number of Pakistani-Canadians, numbering at 109,205 (Stats Canada, 2011). These two cities were chosen as the primary research locations as they are major urban centers, multicultural and multi-ethnic and house a number of Pakistani-Canadians. The final research location for this study was Pakistan, since one of the participants in this study has resided in Pakistan for over a decade. He was included in the sample as he was born and raised in Canada.

4.3 Rationale for Choosing a Qualitative Research Design

Identity is a social process involving perception and differentiation. Since identity is based on perceptions and since perceptions are bound to change over a course of time so it would be useful to see identity as a fluid rather than being monolithic and static (Sherry, 2012). For qualitative researchers, ideally there can be no one size fit all approach to research identity-based issues.

4.3.1 "Identity Matters"

Why is a qualitative research design the best way of conducting research on identity is based issues? Researchers over the decades have provided arguments in favor of qualitative research being employed when issues of identity are to be looked at. For instance, in identity-based research, structure is preferred over process, which Hauber found to be problematic (Hauber, 2007). He found that a troublesome aspect of identity research is the usage of narrowly tailored research instruments, which ignore the subjectivity of experience (Hauber, 2007). Kraus et. al (2000) favored using a qualitative approach in order to research identity based issues since through a qualitative approach the researcher can gain an understanding into "the process of individualization and disembedding, the de-standardization of adolescence, the growth of self-

reflexive identity concepts and the qualitative change in the meaning of work for the identity development of young adults" (Krauss, 2000, p.2.).

Jessica Senehi (2009) aptly points out that one way of building a harmonious and multi-cultural society is to include different groups in what she labels "cultural production." This process is important since by listening to the subjects' stories, the researcher has to walk in their shoes as stories cross cultural barriers and promote understanding (Senehi, 2009). In the context of identity related research, semi-structured interviews empower the participants to narrate in their own words what they perceive to be their core identity, and which groups they identify more closely with. Semi-structured interviews are the optimal tool since they enable the researcher to delve more deeply into the perceptions and experiences of the participants (Schmidt, 2004) and allow the participants to open up about their experiences by providing them a forum to tell their stories, to narrate their experiences and to give a voice to their experiences (Bogdan & Biklin, 2007). However, there can be no one size fit all approach for qualitative researchers, especially when the issue to be examined is identity.

Scholars who are examining identity formation, its development and change over a period of time may adopt a longitudinal or also a life course approach to study the change in, and impact of identity over a period of time (Balmer & Richard, 2017; Hong, Greene & Lowery, 2017; Lewis, 2016; Pullen & Crete, 2016). Scholars who are interested in examining multiple identities through the lenses of gender, class, race, and ethnicity can adopt an intersectional approach and endeavor to look at the interaction of all these dynamics (Denzin, 2017). Another approach towards researching identity is related to psychoanalysis which examines fantasies, attraction, fears and other responses in relation to both individual as well as group identities (Denzin, 2017). Semi-structured interviews are an important methodological instrument used by scholars to research on

identity-based issues especially those researching second-generation youth who are risk of being radicalized.

4.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews: A Deeper Insight

At this stage it is imperative to state that quantitative methods are not being rejected as a methodological tool. As Jackson and Sherrif (2013) eloquently argue, "quantitative approaches have much to offer for certain research questions; for example, they can facilitate careful measurement of operationally defined concepts and variables and suggest frameworks of causality. However, we suggest that such methods are limited in their ability to ascertain deeper meanings and explanations of 'messy' and complex real-world group processes" (261). A qualitative research design, specifically the utilization of semi-structured interviews, is the optimal tool to discover the "messy" situation as to what makes second-generation Canadian immigrants join terrorist outfits or become at risk of being radicalized, the identity issues they face, how their identities are constructed, deconstructed, and evolve, and change.

In qualitative research, interviews are used either as the instrument through which data is collected or they may be used to buttress other research strategies such as document analysis, participant observation and/or narrative analysis, amongst others (Bogdan & Biklin, 2007). When interviews are the predominant strategy in research, the subject is usually a stranger and a fundamental part of the process is to put the subject at ease (Bogdan and Biklin, 2007). In a research project, semi-structured interviews can be utilized to apply theory to empirical evidence (Hopf, 2000). Semi-structured interviews are also a form of storytelling through which the subject's story can give the researcher a deeper grasp of not only the subject's experiences, but

also their hopes and fears for the future (Druckman, 2005) allowing for a deeper, more nuanced and richer data.

The utility of semi-structured interviews over structured interviews is that the former provides space to the subjects to tell their stories in the fullest and richest form. Semi-structured interviews are also a powerful tool when the research is on identity that is at the core of radicalizing individuals to commit acts of terrorism. Through semi-structured interviews the researcher can explore the "lived" experiences of the research participants; youth at risk of being radicalized, and thereby gain a deeper insight into the myriad of dynamics that are at play in the context of identity construction and devolution (Clements et al., 2016; Curtin, Kende & Jende, 2016). By listening to the research participants' stories and their experiences, the process enables the researcher to attain a fuller understanding of not only why certain dynamics are at play when it comes to identity issues, but it also provides an insight into *what can be done* to resolve the issue by empowering individuals since "when only those in power have access to producing knowledge, authoritative discourses may serve the interests of power rather than the truth" (Senehi, 2009, 203-204).

Hence, it is imperative to let individuals tell their stories, so that they may be heard not only by the powers that be, but also by common individuals so that a harmonious relationship may be created in society between different groups. Specifically, in projects where identity is a key theme and dynamic and where individuals feel that their identities are the root cause of discrimination, perceived or otherwise, semi-structured interviews are perhaps the optimal option for the researcher to fully discover the hopes, dreams, and fears of participants.

4.4 Role of the Researcher

Since the aim of using a qualitative study design and specifically semi-structured interviews was to allow the participants to express themselves freely in order to collect rich data, the primary investigator conducted all the interviews himself, without the need for any interpreter since the primary investigator is fluent in both English and Urdu, and as such faced no linguistic barriers in the field. The importance of the role of the researcher in a qualitative study is critical. Qualitative methodology elicits a deep explanation, understanding as well as personal and impersonal role for the researcher (Stake, 2010). The qualitative researcher is an "instrument himself, observing action and contexts, often intentionally playing a subjective role in the study, using her or her own personal experience in making interpretations" (Stake, 2010, 21).

In this context then, by employing semi-structured interviews as the primary tool of research, the researcher's aim was to allow as much as possible, by keeping in mind the context as well as actions and words of the participants, the process of storytelling to flow. As Jessica Senehi (2009) posits storytellers bring up the past at times in order to examine the present so as to change the future. The deep reflection by participants in this study, was sometimes a painful introspection as to how their present and perhaps their futures have been shaped by their past. Yet, it also provided the principal investigator with a deeper understanding of how the identities and worldview of the participants were shaped but also why someone who is born in Canada could end up as a tool in the hands of radical recruiters.

4.4.1- Limitations

However, this research project had some limitations, both in a practical as well as an ethical sense. First, the sample size of 15 was too narrow and does not reflect the lived experiences of all second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. Second, while radicalization of second-generation

immigrants usually takes place amongst the urban-educated middle class, and while the interviewees in this study belonged to a similar socio-economic background, it would perhaps have been fruitful to interview subjects from across the socio-economic divide to gain a broader perspective about the research area. Third, while the PI did not personally know any of the interview subjects, perhaps because of his Pakistani background, the interview subjects did not feel confident to open up as much as they would have had with a PI from a different culture. Fourth, no human being (at least an adult) can claim to be a *tabula rasa*, and the same is the case with the PI. Perhaps, my subjective bias played a role in interpreting he data even though I tried my level best to avoid doing so.

4.5 Data Gathering Techniques and Ethics

Semi-structured interviews were used as the primary method of data collection. I conducted 15 semi-structured interviews, 5 were face-to-face one-on-one interactions, 2 were conducted over skype, and 8 were completed over the phone. The interview questions were quite open ended and probes were utilized in order to attain a richer and deeper understanding of the issues. Participants were initially recruited using local community leaders in Winnipeg and Mississauga and later on subjects were identified through a snowball sampling framework, which is "getting referrals from subjects to other people that might be included in the study" (Bogdan & Biklin, 2007, 275).

Even before commencing the interview process, certain ethical considerations had to be kept in mind and addressed. These included informed consent, privacy and protection from harm (Khan, 2015). Moreover, the principal investigator ensured that the identity of the participants was shrouded in complete secrecy by the usage of pseudonyms and by redacting any possible markers in the interview transcripts that could compromise their identities, since the issues broached during the interview process were of a sensitive nature in terms of national security. To further ensure the

privacy of the participants, data was saved on an online storage facility with the principal investigator solely having access to the data, all of the interview recordings were deleted after transcription. Before the fieldwork commenced, approval was sought and granted from the Joint Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB) at the University Manitoba.

After receiving the consent of the participants, both for the interview to take place as well as for recording the interaction, approximately 60-90 minute interviews took place either electronically or in person for 6 weeks during the summer of 2018. When the interviews were conducted in person, coffee and/or tea were offered to the participants to make the experience more comfortable as well keeping it traditional. Making the participants feel comfortable is a critical part of qualitative research and to achieve that aim, the Principal Investigator indulged in a brief and casual conversation with the participants before the "formal" part commenced. The subjects were told before the commencement of the formal part of the interview that they could terminate it at any time and the interview could be continued later or if they felt uncomfortable or traumatized they could opt out completely. None of the participants opted for either choice.

During the interview process, probing questions were employed, and I also ensured that the participants felt free to express as much as they wanted to without being goaded into saying something that they did not feel was important or relevant. Hence, to avoid tainting the data, direct questions and argumentative, compound and leading questions were avoided. Moreover, the inflections in the voices of the participants and their body language (when possible) were also observed and recorded in the field notes. This process was quite important, especially, when the participants discussed their childhood and the experiences of discrimination they faced, their voice tones would either drop or rise up a lot and their bodies would stiffen. In order to protect the emotional safety of the participants they were explained before the interviews and it was also

mentioned in the recruitment scripts that if they felt traumatized, free counseling would be provided at Klinic Community Health Centre in Winnipeg and Mississauga Counseling Centre. None of the participant felt the need to reach out to the above noted services. Before the interviews commenced, participants were advised that they could withdraw from the study during and after the interviews if they so desired, and that any data collected from them would be destroyed.

4.6 Data Analysis

Once the fieldwork was completed the Principal Investigator used Inq. Scribe and Ms. Word 2007 to transcribe all of the interviews. It was clearly important to personally transcribe the data because some participants spoke in both English and Urdu, and it would be quite difficult as well as costly to find a bilingual transcriber. Moreover, I endeavored to be as literal as possible during translations, but where a literal translation did not make sense, I used my discretion and judgment to translate as accurately as I could.

I used grounded theory to analyze the data. Grounded theory is a technique where the analysis commences with engaging with the data and ends up with the emergence of a theory (Hesse-Bieber & Leavey, 2006). Moreover, in grounded theory, analysis commences as soon as one starts to collect the data (Charmaz, 2004). Hence, in this study, codes and categories were developed during the process of data collection as well as during the transcription process.

4.7 Securing the Data

Data was saved on the Principal Investigator's personal computer, a removable USB drive and an email account. All three storage locations were password protected and accessible only to the Principal Investigator.

4.8 The Participants

This study had a total of 15 participants. Table 4.1 breaks down the information using gender, level of education and professions as identifying markers.

Table 4.1 Demographic Information

Pseudonym	Gender	Education	Profession/Class	Place of Interview
Farheen	Female	Undergraduate	Self-employed aesthetician	Winnipeg
Saima	Female	Undergraduate	Senior Manager in a private LLC.	Mississauga
Khaleeq	Male	Undergraduate	Unemployed	Mississauga
Faiza	Female	Undergraduate	Counselor	Mississauga
Javeria	Female	Undergraduate/Post-diploma specialization	Therapist	Mississauga
Maria	Female	Graduate	Home-maker	Mississauga
Zain	Male	Currently an undergraduate	Student	Mississauga
Hina	Female	Some university education	Home-maker	Mississauga
Natasha	Female	Undergraduate/post-graduate diploma	Accountant	Mississauga
Ehtesham	Male	Graduate Degree	Senior Manager at an LLC	Mississauga
Zameer	Male	Undergraduate degree	Chief of Staff to a Member of a provincial parliament (MPP)	Mississauga
Babar	Male	Post-Doc	Professor and former Head of Department	Lahore-Karachi
Merjan	Female	Graduate Student	Instructor	Winnipeg
Aamir	Male	Undergraduate Degree	Accountant in a Crown Corporation	Winnipeg
Zainab	Female	Graduate (PhD)	Assistant Professor/Psychologist	Winnipeg

As can be seen from Table 4.1 above, 10 of the participants were female while 5 were male. Out of the 15 participants in this study, one was a post-doctoral fellow, two had graduate degrees (one person had earned an MA and the other a PhD) eight had undergraduate degrees, while one participant was still attending university.

In terms of employment one participant was a former head of a university department and is currently a full professor. One respondent is an assistant professor, one interviewee is an instructor and a PhD student, one participant serves as chief-of-staff to a current MP, two are accountants, two are involved in counseling and therapeutic services, two are senior executives in limited liability companies, two are homemakers, and one was unemployed at the time of the interview. The participant's diverse educational and professional backgrounds ensured that the data I collected was quite rich. In the original proposal, the proposed sample size was 30-35. However, as the interviews progressed it became evident that the stage of data saturation had been reached. Data saturation is "a state in which the researcher makes the subjective determination that new data will not provide any new information or insights for developing categories" (Creswell, 2012, 433).

As we shall see in the next three chapters, after conducting multiple interviews it was evident to the principal investigator that new categories and themes would not emerge since the participants' views reflected pretty much the same patterns.

4.9 Significance of Study

This research is significant since the perceptions and experiences of second-generation Pakistani immigrants in Canada in relation to discrimination and radicalization have not been fully

examined. Moreover, this study may be critical in our understanding of the need to reintegrate those second-generation Pakistanis into mainstream Canadian society because they feel alienated from the Canadian polity, since the study examines the causes of, and potential intervention and prevention approaches to radicalization through the voices of the key stakeholders themselves; second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. Finally, this study might provide policymakers with an insight to secure Canada's national security interests by examining the perceptions and experiences of second-generation Pakistani immigrants with regards to their identity, Canadian nationalism, and homegrown radicalization.

4.10 Conclusions

Employing a semi-structured interview approach allowed the participants to narrate their experiences and tell their stories freely was the optimal research approach for this study. The Principal Investigator who was trained as an attorney-at-law realized that structured interviews with direct questioning would result in dry and in a sense "fake" data lacking in richness and depth because the interviewees would see the questions as a test or as an intelligence gathering technique and conceal their ideas. For a project that investigates an issue as critical as identity and its role in youth radicalization to violence, affording the participants the chance to narrate as much as they felt was needed was imperative.

While the major objective of this study is to provide policymakers with recommendations to approach counter-radicalization in a more nuanced way, another aim of the research was to empower the participants to give voice to their experiences. Listening to stories is an extremely important way to bring about a sense of closure as well as peace to participants by affording them, among other things, respect. What did the principal investigator listen to? What did the participants

have to say about the issues raised in the research questions? What were their lives like as children, adolescents and adults? Why do some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians get radicalized to violence? The participants in the next three chapters address these and other questions.

CHAPTER 5

IDENTITY: WHAT'S IN A RACE?

5.1 Introduction

The findings that emerged from the interviews were deeply introspective and revealing in many ways. While I had and still do harbor strong views about many of the perspectives that were revealed by the participants, they were continuously challenged as I conducted, transcribed, codified and analyzed the interviews. The themes that emerged from these interviews revealed that even though the participants in this study were raised in Canada and were *jus soli* Canadians, they felt alienated from the mainstream Canadian polity. The participants revealed that they felt as if they could never be "Canadian enough," or "old stock Canadians." In the participant's opinions, Canadian people from a Caucasian background were more than equal to them, and that they felt like outsiders, like the "other" growing up in Canadian society. A possible explanation for such views is that given Canada's history, a particular racial stock was historically preferred, which gave rise to the emergence of structures that favored a particular race and while seemingly dynamics have changed over the decades, for some participants though much is still taken for granted. Discrimination on the basis of race still exists in Canadian society.

This chapter discusses four broad themes, which emerged inductively from the interviews and that were arrived at after analyzing the data. These four themes include:

1. Childhood experiences and the construction of an identity based on "othering."
2. Perceived or actual discrimination stemming from immigrants lived experiences in Canada.
3. White privilege.

4. The use of pejoratives against the participants, which cemented they're feeling of being *othered*.

These themes are critical to consider in the context of possible triggers to youth radicalization because if individuals feel as if they are discriminated against on the basis of their ethnoreligious background and that they are not part of the mainstream society, radical recruiters have a fertile ground to attract individuals to the "dark side."

5.2- Childhood Experiences and the Construction of Identity

Almost every individual in this study revealed that growing up in Canada, as a child of Pakistani-immigrants was a tough experience, which was a defining factor in shaping their identity. For example, Farheen, an aesthetician grew up in a small town in Manitoba, alluded that growing up in Canada was confusing for her:

> FARHEEN: [It] was a good experience I would say. At first—. It's hard to explain. Growing up, it was a little bit confusing.
> One role was going to school while the second role was at home. Once I hit high school, the questions and concerns arose then *[pause]*whether I would get into trouble (at home) without knowing I did anything wrong. So it's difficult in that my identity was lost for a while.
> I grew up an athlete, so that was my label at that time, and I didn't know what I was outside of that. A big issue for me—well not for me but for my parents—was if I had a coach who was male, or, um, if I was around guys.
> So this probably was the most confusing part because I am going to school with them, I am going to trips to town and stuff in the same bus, but at the end of the day I would get in trouble for it. So I was very confused to say the least, if that makes sense.

In contrast, Saima, who is a former senior manager at a major waste management company in Ontario, reported that childhood was an overall pleasant experience:

> SAIMA: So basically I grew up here. I was born here. Then I completed my high school and university here (in Ontario).
> I would say that overall in high school and university I had positive experiences. I never faced any—you know. Now racism is coming a lot into media, and I don't

> think I ever encountered any racism. Reason could be that—because I lived in quite a multicultural neighborhood.
> So far, I would say, it has been positive. And I don't think me being from a different race or having been born somewhere else would have made a huge impact on me. Or that being born here as a Pakistani-Canadian made a difference.

For Khaleeq is a recent graduate who majored in criminal justice and is hopeful that he will work with Canadian law enforcement in countering radicalization amongst second-generation Canadian youth. Khaleeq found that his childhood was a mixed bag:

> KHALEEQ: Growing up here, most of us, we lived in a multicultural city. Most of our lives have been primarily—. It was not a pure sense of isolation in the sense that you are surrounded by other children who are in the same situation—i.e., having parents who were first generation Canadians. Aside from that, I didn't felt like that growing up in Canada it was a problem.
> In grade 1 and 2 there was a notion that maybe that your language, your culture is different. I can recall a time when I was the only student who was selected to be tested for ESL even though English was my first language not my second language. But just based on the fact that my parents were immigrants had to learn English as a second language. Um, that was something, which, was well an issue about who I was.
> Other than that there are like a lot of times, family and other support groups who were around made growing up and balancing the two identities easier.

Javeria is a university graduate in her mid-20s and currently works as a therapist. She reported that childhood in Canada did not pose much of an issue for her specifically in terms that she was a Pakistani-Canadian:

> JAVERIA: Childhood was fine. I mean there weren't any Muslims when I was growing up here, in general. However, I didn't have any problems. I went to school here, mostly Canadian kids, but it wasn't really a problem. Like we weren't outcasts because of whom we were, nothing like that.

Javeria also stated that she did not face any challenges, which stemmed from her ethnoreligious background:

> JAVERIA: Just like I said, wherever we went they treated us with respect. We weren't treated differently. It wasn't like they mistreated us.

Maria, who is a counselor by profession, however, felt differently. When I asked Maria how it was growing up in a major metropolis in Ontario, she offered a story, which reflected the angst of feeling left out as a child:

> MARIA: I was born in Mississauga. We have lived here all our life. Recently moved to Nova Scotia, and, um, I think when thinking of challenges, you know, in a public school, things that we celebrated [as Muslims] weren't celebrated. Christmas, Easter were celebrated, which made it feel like as if say Eid wasn't as important as Christmas. So we would always have that clash of whether we wanted to fit in and, you know, celebrate Christmas or if we want to go against the grain and follow our own traditions and culture.
> Eid didn't seem as nearly important to us because it wasn't celebrated and no one else knew about it. It was more difficult [pause] you felt like you are kind of an outsider because nobody understands why you fast and all.
> Growing up you know, these things seemed big.

Perhaps because of the generational context, Zain who is currently an undergraduate student living in Brampton ON felt connected to his community, a multi-ethnic community. He felt, "It has been a good time. I haven't felt too much like a minority. It's a pretty multicultural community, and, uh, I really like Canada, nice place." In addition, Natasha, who is an accountant, partly echoed Zain's views: "Canada is all I have known growing up. I only went to Pakistan when I was 5-6. Childhood was comfortable happy, *alhamdolillah."*

Perhaps it was because of his lived experience living in the era that preceded multiculturalism, Babar, who has a PhD in mathematics from Canada and is a former dean of sciences at a university in Pakistan, shared his story, which was different from the stories shared by other participants:

> BABAR: So Ottawa, as far as *desis* went, was a very isolated place. Um, in fact, so when we were first there—. Okay, so we moved in 1967. We were in Toronto for 6 months, and I don't remember that at all. We were in Hamilton, I just have a few very vague memories of that. First in Ottawa, uh, as far as Pakistanis and Indians went, um, when people would go to Toronto, we would ask them to bring back red peppers for us, in Ottawa *main nahin milta tha* [red chili peppers were not available in Ottawa back then].
> So, when I was growing up, at least up until middle school, I didn't really have any sense of belonging to some community, which was somehow separate from the

mainstream. And that maybe is different for people who are living in areas, which were already *desified* [substantially populated by the South Asian diaspora].

For Babar, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, discrimination and "othering" in public schools were not on the basis of one's skin color but rather focused on one's ethnopolitical background:

BABAR: I was horrified the way some of my friends would talk about the Québécois or Franco-Ontarians. I remember once it was like in grade 4 or grade 5 that they were setting up this thing where people, school children, could exchange letters from different provinces. And actually this was some province in America, they thought was Québec. And one of the kids yells, "Not Quebec, they are French." And, you know, the teacher is horrified, and told him what a bigot he was and so on and so forth.

The difference wasn't in terms of skin color. That wasn't the case then.

However, Babar also mentioned that the lack of multiculturalism did result in ignorance on the part of the mainstream community in relation to minority communities:

BABAR: I just remember that there was no sense in the part of the mainstream community either. So, you know, in the nursery school they happily served bologna sandwiches[7] to everyone. It was just never a thing that it wouldn't be eaten by some children.

Zainab holds a PhD in psychology and is currently engaged in academia. She also noted that ignorance on the part of schools in the context of dietary restrictions was a major issue for her:

ZAINAB: I wanted to eat hot dogs so I would take my beef hot dogs. There were hot dogs like every once a month, and so initially we would just go home on those days, but then I wanted to stay too. So, I would take hot dogs from home because all hot dogs there were pork. So, I would just take my beef ones from home.

And I remember feeling really angry about it. Why isn't the school providing beef hot dogs? Why do I have to bring them from home? There was that anger about just not being accommodated in any way.

[7] In Islam, eating pork is prohibited. 2:173of the Quran provides: "He has only forbidden to you dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine, and that which has been dedicated to other than God. But whoever is forced [by necessity], neither desiring [it] nor transgressing [its limit], there is no sin upon him. Indeed, God is Forgiving and Merciful."

Merjan, who is currently pursuing a PhD degree was born in a small Canadian town, indicated that experiences stemming from childhood confused her in terms of who she is. She noted:

> MERJAN: Growing up in Canada, it was challenging. It was quite challenging growing up here. Some struggles around identity, race, um, being comfortable within my faith. And I think those have been consistent struggles even today.

When I asked Merjan if she could elaborate on what she meant about continuing to have struggles around her identity, she provided a heart-wrenching answer that was rooted in the discrimination she had faced as a child:

> MERJAN: Being born a Canadian yet not knowing you are Canadian because every time you are questioned where you are from.
>
> There were certain experiences indicating wearing traditional outfits was not okay. My mom, if she was wearing her outfits to school, I would be made fun of for the entire day. So that was like an aspect that was very difficult to figure out, okay how do I belong, where do I belong?
>
> Uh, then in terms of also language. Having a second language meant that others would hear it, and then they would kind of make a face, and say you aren't speaking English and make a face. And that at a very young age, I am speaking about like elementary school.
>
> Then of course culture. I wasn't allowed to play with boys. Uh, so that also… that's combined genders and then school that also affected some pieces. But overall in terms of identity, what is normal, what is not, has always been confusing.

Merjan elaborated upon the gender challenges she faced as well as trying to live up to the expectations that have been constructed by the mainstream media in the context of what constitutes "beauty." These gendered challenges combined with the shame she felt because of her darker skin and her unique and different heritage were faced by Merjan while growing up in Canada and how those challenges made her feel:

> MERJAN: Just feeling like you belong within Canadian society and that's been a consistent challenge. Um, and then being reminded of, let's say for me, as a woman, I was told I was ugly all the time. Umm, ugly, ugly, ugly, the media tells you. Turn on the TV today, same problem. While it's an aesthetic piece, it's an important piece to identity. You know, let's say in terms of feeling like you are unequal that has been a challenge, still is.

And, um, how much you share of yourself as yourself is also a challenge so those are real challenges that any human in any society would feel like they are feeling, like they are somewhat oppressed. Because they can't be who they are because of the shame involved. I was ashamed of my heritage for a long time.

I asked Merjan what she meant by that she was made to constantly feel ugly. The response reminded me of a few lines from William Butler Yeats' "The Stolen Child":[8]

MERJAN: When someone tells you literally that you are ugly, you know, that you are brown, you are not pretty—and the big one was that you are brown.

At one point in my life in grade 9, two guys came to me and they like they spit chocolate from their mouths they were chewing onto me, and said, "Now you are dark enough." So that is traumatic on a level that cannot be explained.

And, of course, I couldn't speak to my parents about it, and no one knows that on my way to school I had to go through that.

I had to compose myself and learn how to compartmentalize psychologically that I will be dealing with this. At that time I felt like I would be dealing with this for the rest of my life.

That fact that Merjan could not even confide in her parents, who are supposed to be metaphorical rocks on which a child's life and their future is built upon indicates her struggle with a lost identity, a confused identity that may lead to anger and disillusionment.

Aamir, who is currently employed by a Crown Corporation, was born and raised in a semi-rural town in Canada. Aamir felt that his childhood was a less than optimal experience, which he described in detail below:

AAMIR: Uh, so growing up in [place] was interesting since it was like a smaller town. And when you are growing up you don't really feel it's small. You don't know any better than your surroundings there.

Just growing up was different for us, because we had a Pakistani background, and the majority during that time was like white. So like going to school it was fine. Starting Kindergarten was fine. I didn't really notice.

When I got to grade 1 for the first time that's when I heard the word, you are a *Paki*. Like this was in grade 1. I had no idea what it meant, what this word was. I had no idea what racism was or anything at that time. I was being called like a *Paki*.

I'm like, "Okay, whatever."

[8] Come away o human child to the waters and the wild with a faery hand in hand; for the world is more full of weeping than you can understand.

> It wasn't like that all the time, but there would be these older guys. There was this older guy when I was in grade 1, I was getting bullied by him, just because I was brown. From there, you kind of like get into just the groove of everything.
> Overall, it wasn't too bad. It was just pockets of, umm, situations like that. Especially when you are young, you don't really understand what that is. It didn't really affect me at that time. I was just a kid playing around, whatever.
> One thing (which stands out now), just going through the school system early on, was the lack of diversity.
> Like you wouldn't understand why people wouldn't involve you in things. I couldn't get it. Racism was just a foreign thing to me. I had no idea of this. Just because I am brown, I'll be treated different?
> As you got older you kinda notice like the split in the school. Like if you are colored, you are going to be, like, separate. It wasn't everyone. It wasn't all the time either. **b**ut certain situations, you would know it is. This is because of this [meaning, race].
> Overall, I guess it wasn't too bad. People were generally nice. But it was, uh, yeah, it was, uh, happy overall, I guess. Uh, things just, you know, happened.
> It would have been nice to have more diversity to be sure, but I guess I couldn't expect that in a small city.

"Separate but equal" (Plessey v. Fergusson, 1899) was a concept that was used for a long time in the United States to justify segregation of African-Americans from the Caucasian majority and give African-Americans the illusion that they had equal rights, but they were different from white folks. For Aamir and many other second-generation Canadians, the feeling imparted to them was, "separate and unequal." which may have resulted in alienation from mainstream society. While Aamir talks about a lack of diversity, that was not really the problem. It was racism. For Aamir, "diversity" is code for "racism." The respondents do not come right out and critique the situation, they kind of equivocate. Why is that? Is that internalized oppression, for example., the internalization of "you should be lucky to be Canadian"? That is not provable, though, because we can never know one's unconscious thinking processes.

The responses of the majority of participants indicate that they were ostracized during their childhood on the basis of their ethnoreligious background. Their peers, and the school system that failed to accommodate their dietary needs, which were an integral part of their religious beliefs did this ostracization. Some of the participants were made to feel inferior and lesser human beings because of their different looks, their cuisine, and their dietary restrictions. This discriminated directed against them at such a tender age, scarred some of the participants for a long time and continues to do so even today.

5.3 What's in a Word?

Aamir indicated that he was called a *Paki* during his school years, and he found being labeled as such racist and humiliating. When I asked Aamir why he felt being labeled a *Paki* was racist since it is a just a word, he had the following to offer:

> AAMIR: Like generally the word Paki—. Now if someone says it to me, I'm like, whatever, it's nothing.
>
> Back then growing up the word Paki was equivalent to the N word for black people, that's what it was used for. People use Paki as a derogatory term that you are less, "you don't belong here"–type attitude. So like you were referred to as Paki, "go back home." So it had a negative connotation to it.
>
> But like growing up, when one got to high school, my Pakistani friends called each other Paki. And it's like a whatever term we own it. It's our word basically.
>
> I wouldn't expect someone other than Pakistanis or someone that you are really close to use it towards you. Because it does have that connotation of a racist slur.

Aamir also indicated that he had lost all patience for those directing racist slurs against him and would respond accordingly if someone referred to him in a racist, and demeaning manner:

> AAMIR: Like, generally, it seems like people like to back off or something. Having grown up being called a Paki and such I have lost the tolerance for it. I can't handle it anymore. I do have to speak up. I do have to defend myself whoever is being calling these names and being ignorant. It's so ignorant to me. You are so like not making any sense first of all.
>
> And, yeah, like I am at a point now where I can't stand that type of behavior anymore, and I do speak up anytime someone makes a racist slur. I do speak up. I

> say who are they to throw out such stupid language at anybody. Like generally when I do see it in the news and such, if someone's making racist comments, the person who is getting the comments thrown at them, they aren't saying anything. They try to just like back off. And they are, like, "I feel sorry for you. I'll pray for you" and such. I guess it works in some cases.
>
> If you remember that Jagmeet Singh, a woman stood up and started calling him names and stuff, like he adopted an approach of this like understanding and just tolerating it. But, honestly, I don't have the patience[pause]he showed a good face and you can't put up and such, out in the public say if I am on the street or in the mall, I am going to get in your face. Like I can't handle that stuff anymore. It's just that there's only so much you can take, it's enough. When's it going to end you know.

Aamir was adopting the same approach as African Americans in the United States who have adopted and owned the N-word using it as a term of endearment among African Americans. It is interesting to note that a word which in the past was used by the dominant majority to demean, degrade, and dehumanize a minority, that word itself has become a form of empowerment, as a way of saying "it is our word now, we have taken it back from you."

Faiza reported that the usage of the term Paki is not just unique to people belonging to the dominant majority, but it's also used as a racial slur by some brown people who consider themselves to be more Canadian then their ethnic comrades:

> FAIZA: I have been called a Paki as well. And the sad part is that even Indians have been called Pakis. So it's not because you are Pakistani, it's because you are brown. I guess I know the reason why it's used here.
>
> Before I go on, I do want to mention the desi kids who were born here, they also call other desi kids Paki.
>
> So, it's not just the white people or any other colored people who are calling brown people Paki. It's people who were, basically who think they fit in and who think they have the upper hand here in Canada because they've been here longer or been here for generations or what not, whatever reason they may have in their head, they think they are superior, and they call the other who has immigrated or you know or has a refugee status. You are a Paki to them.

As Faiza noted above the use of the word Paki by Pakistani individuals themselves indicates that they feel superior to other fellow newcomer Pakistanis. They perceive themselves to

be part of mainstream Canadian society. In a sense Faiza's viewpoint indicates that Pakistanis who use the word Paki for other people of Pakistani descent are "internally colonized."

Natasha opined that the word itself perhaps sounded innocuous, but it was the deep-rooted meaning behind it, which was an issue:

> NATASHA: I don't think it's a word, its' what it means to them [to the individual being addressed]. Well I am called a Paki I don't mind, to be honest. And I have been called that by someone who is white, and I am like okay. I just don't feel offended because they want to offend me.
>
> But it's more about the word or how you feel about it when you are—, when you don't have a solid root identity. Maybe they are Pakistani, but they themselves are confused, don't follow or know the customs, or the language and ask themselves, "Who am I?"

Natasha also felt that the word Paki hits at the core of one's identity as Pakistani-Canadian. This is what she had to say on the issue:

> NATASHA: You know just because we don't connect as much with Pakistan and then we are more, feel more Canadian than [being of] Pakistani [descent], completely isolated from where you are born and raised, you feel like that. I am not less neither more. You are then pushed to a side to think that you aren't all there all that connected after all. For me *alhamdolillah,* I am very cemented to my roots. I know and speak Urdu properly. I do understand that at least some people do have that cultural part or lack it. They feel like who am I?

Natasha recognized that the usage of the word Paki was somewhat of a mixed bag. On the one hand, Natasha argued that the word really did not affect her at all since it depended on how sensitively and personally one took it when the word was leveled at an individual. On the other hand, Natasha also said that the use of the word also in a sense questioned her grounding, her roots, and her so called "Canadianness." This is a recurring theme throughout this study; individuals such as Natasha who consider themselves to be Canadians yet feel as if their fidelity is being questioned all of the time. It is small wonder then that radicalized outfits can manipulate these alienated second-generation individuals.

Zainab is a scholar conducting behavioral research. She considered *Paki* to be a term that dehumanizes individuals and makes it easier to discriminate against them:

> ZAINAB: I think it's what behind it, what's the sense in it. Its exclusionary, to dehumanize. Umm, the history of that word is that it's a racist word and when its addressed to someone its basically saying you are not really human. And that's why people get offended. When someone says to you that you aren't really human you are just a stereotype, just a derogatory stereotype I think that's offensive.

When Zainab used the word dehumanized, it reminded me, even though it does sound extreme, that amongst the ten stages of genocide which start with symbolization and end with denial the fourth stage is "dehumanization" in which labels are attached by the dominant majority to the "other" (Neilsen, 2015; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990). History is replete with such examples, the most notorious was the label "cockroach" used by Hutus to classify the Tutsis.

If I am labeled a Paki it is neither important nor does it enrage me. This is perhaps because of my own upbringing in Pakistan and having the security that I felt confident with my national identity. However, labels do matter, especially when one's identity is challenged on an almost daily basis. Pejoratives become a weapon for oppressors and ironically a shield as well a medium of empowerment for the oppressed (Amer, 2012; Gaucher, Hunt & Sinclair, 2015; Khan, 2015). The participants in this study indicated that their childhood experiences framed how they saw themselves. They intimated that the word *Paki* was a dehumanizing taunt leveled at them not only by the dominant majority, but also by individuals from their own ethnic group, a fact which is mind-boggling, to say the least.

5.4 Pakistani-Canadian: The "Great Chasm"

As a country, which prides itself on being multi-cultural, Canada claims to be proud to be a tapestry that has been woven by individuals from various cultural backgrounds. However, when

a person has a mixed identity, it can result in a dynamic, which causes questions and confusion about what one's true/central identity is. On the one hand an individual feel's (as the stories in the study indicate) that s/he is Canadian, yet if the person experiences racism and discrimination, perceived or actual, an otherwise national identity gets mixed with ethnicity and religion and ultimately becomes an ethno-cultural/national identity conflict.

When I asked Farheen what it meant to have a Pakistani identity she responded in the following manner:

> FARHEEN: I didn't know what it meant to be Pakistani. I never identified as Pakistani for a long because I didn't feel as if I was Pakistani because I wasn't cultural. I never wore the outfits. I hardly even spoke the language (Urdu). Now I speak a little bit more. But growing up I would say that I didn't speak Urdu at all. I mean the only aspect I knew that I was a Pakistani was the food and that on *Eid,* wearing the *shalwar kamiz* – I can't even say that I had any outfits. So, I can't say that I felt as if I was Pakistani.

In her early years Farheen's Pakistani heritage was of little or no importance to her because she did not understand or practice the culture or Islam:

> FARHEEN: I didn't identify as a Pakistani. I was a Muslim by name. At that point whatever my parents told me to do, I did. But I didn't understand certain things. For me it was the *Deen* [faith], and practicing these things was just robotic. Like a puppet basically. It wasn't so difficult I guess because that's all I knew. But then it changes more so when I was more aware of the world when leaving X place and interacting with other people and other Muslims as well. And it just like really umm giving more experience, identity crisis. and all that stuff happens, yeah.

Perhaps because of maturity, personal growth, and new experiences, Farheen now feels that she should be able to express the Pakistani part of her identity and enjoy its richness without fear:

> FARHEEN: I think [being Pakistani-Canadian] means having the liberty to be comfortable in your culture, being able to vocalize the differences that may be in Pakistani culture as compared to Canadian [culture] and not having the fear of being judged. Ummm, yeh, that's what I would say when you think about the culture. It's so flavorful.

Over the years, perhaps because of her childhood experiences that shaped her identity or because of society's relative acceptance of people of other backgrounds, Farheen now feels proud of her Pakistani heritage. While this may come off as strange to some that a person who is born in Canada, identifies with the culture of her parents, Farheen makes no bones about it and when I asked her whether she felt proud of her Pakistani heritage, she responded as follows:

> FARHEEN: Definitely. Because embracing it took myself time but also being proud of it makes it a lot easier at well. Being part of the mainstream as well as being different too. It wasn't like a lot easy initially, but because there was more awareness growing and experiencing different things, I guess I became socially aware and stopped caring about being different.

Khaleeq grew up in a multi-cultural city in Canada. He did not feel that having a cultural background that is not part of the dominant majority's culture to be a critical issue. This is what Khaleeq had to say on the issue:

> KHALEEQ: A disconnect between the two cultures. It was kind of a mix if you can say that. Other than the workplace and public places in general, you have one set of rules to follow, and another when you were at home with your family.
>
> Just take the example of language. Outside in public it was almost embarrassing to speak in your mother language while inside the home my parents had a rule, no English, you can speak English outside. At home you have to speak Urdu.
>
> Other than that, when it came to the balancing act, what made it a lot easier was that diversity was something that was celebrated. So, schools would hold monthly events, which would highlight different cultures, or you had students or people in the neighborhood that belonged to minority families, immigrants, those who had moved here.
>
> There were other people in the same situation. So, you had people around you, multiple people around you, who were in the same exact situation. My understanding is that it would be different if you grow up in a more Caucasian neighborhood and try to balance the two.

Khaleeq's parents enforced the rule that he would only talk in his "native" language while he was at home. This behavior can be seen in two ways. First, it is always a positive tool to have an additional language as it broadens one's horizons in many ways, including having the ability to read literature in different languages. Yet on the other hand, it may also be argued that by enforcing

a "no English at home" rule in Canada, his parents were effectively driving a spear into their child's identity, bifurcating it into a complex ethno-cultural religious identity that may cause complications in terms of an individual trying to determine an answer to the question, "What is my culture?"

Faiza highlighted that one way of tackling the "cultural divide" is to be open minded and cognizant of differences that may exist between dominant and minority cultures:

> FAIZA: I think I had a strong base, so to speak. I still know my roots, but it's just that I know them in a different perspective. I can see them in a different perspective. Being brought up over here gives you a different mindset, a different way of looking at things. So, umm, you can say I'm open-minded as well and that helped.

Maria saw things a little bit differently. She recognized that having a hyphenated Pakistani-Canadian identity means to hold onto one's traditions, yet at the same time being respectful of differences. She commented on this issue in the following way:

> MARIA: To be very honest, the Pakistani part of that for me, is, umm, only what we could really retain from the culture as like my parents had it, right? So, something very Pakistani is the way you invite someone for dinner and you know you kind of force feed them right? You know, "keep on eating, take more," right? But, for me, like I always had such a hard time with that one but now I have my own house and my own family and having people over for dinner, I have more of a Canadian philosophy where when you say, "You are done, you are done."
>
> Maybe I'll offer [food] again but I can't continuously you know push that on you. But like on the contrary we are very family-oriented people. Pakistanis usually are. So that is something I find as in I have very deep roots there. Where, you know, my sisters and everyone we try to get together, we are always involved in anything going on but giving room to everyone too.

The "balancing act" that Maria found is a difficult one. On the one hand Maria follows the Pakistani mantra of "love through food," yet on the other she draws a line when it comes to forcing people to eat more than they can consume. Such simple balancing acts can go a long way in providing a coherent identity even if it is dual in terms of nationalism.

However, Maria's identity was not ethnonational. Rather, she considered her identity to be more along religio-national lines. She explained this point as follows:

> MARIA: Overall if you were to ask if I have a static Pakistani identity, I would say that I don't think I do mainly because I am not sure what that means. Is it the culture my parents taught me, and what I retained?
>
> Even from what they taught us and how they lived, we are very different. Umm, things my parents thought were very culturally and traditionally significant, you know, you marry someone else who is Pakistani, [I don't find them to be that way]. When my proposal for my husband came, he was Afghani. That seemed very outlandish to them whereas for me it's like why does it matter? He is Muslim, you know, why does it matter. Where his parents were born does not make any difference? So, I have a more of a Muslim-Canadian identity rather than a Pakistani-Canadian one.

Maria perceived that her biggest challenge in walking the tight rope of having two different cultures was learning her religion outside of her culture:

> MARIA: I think the biggest for me is in terms of dressing, the way I dress. You see in the summers, you want to fit in you know. I have two kids, and now I am not worried about fitting in anymore. But when I was a lot younger, 16-17, it is a big deal. You don't want to look like, you know, "Why you are wearing full sleeves in 36° C?" You know, "Why you don't have a tank top on?" I think that was the biggest challenge for me. That was learning my religion outside of culture. So what is my religion identity say about this, and how much do I agree with this?
>
> So, when I started wearing a hejab, which was around the age of 18, it was difficult because you still want to fit in at university. You want to have fun or the most fun you can but at that point I knew why I was doing what I was doing.
>
> What the bigger purpose of that was—and for me, it was so challenging—but it helps you grow up as a person and channels your energies. So those two identities. Like I said, I have no fear of wearing a hejab you know, even a niqab if I wanted to, if I wanted to cover my face. I have no fear of that. Because I was born and raised here, I know what my rights are, and I can articulate them well enough so that people are not going to have much more to say.

Natasha, who started to wear the hejab in grade 9, also felt that the *hejab* was an integral part of her identity. She explains it in the following way:

> NATASHA: So I started when I was in grade 9. So, it was the middle of the week, and I hadn't thought that being Muslim you have to adhere to the rules. So, I have always had in my mind that I want to wear the hejab, and I was in those conversations with my brother. And then he was talking to me. We were just talking late at night and we… I think I said to him or he said to me that, "Do you want to wear the hejab?"

You know what, I said, "I will i*nshallah* when I am in university."
And he looks at me and says, "How do you know? When you will go to university, [who knows] what life will be like. Why would your waste time [by not wearing it]?"
And I was speaking to myself, and said, "Yeah, I am just making excuses to wear the hejab or not wear the hejab, you know, like I'll do it later not now. I said, later is not good enough.
So, then I just, the middle of the week, the next day of school I wore the hejab and I haven't taken it off ever since.

Echoing Maria's sentiments, Natasha also felt the hejab was a symbol of empowerment for her:

NATASHA: I feel like I rely a lot less on what I look like and more on my personality. I feel like when you are navigating through high school you have a lot of pressure, looks wise and all, especially if you are a girl. So, when I started to wear the hejab, I felt very free of those standards. I didn't feel like pressure, my looks, when people looked at me, and all. I cared about the content of my character rather than what I looked like. I didn't care to impress anyone. I studied more. I was more involved with community stuff and things. I wasn't so, umm, taken by the brands I wear or how you know whom I look like, what I look like, and what people think about me. I didn't have that issue anymore. I thought, you know, that I already wear the hijab, and I don't care what anyone thinks about me and what I look like because I am more than what I look like.

Zainab does not wear the hejab. She felt that wearing the hejab or the niqab is a decision that should solely be made by a woman as it relates to her identity, amongst other things:

ZAINAB: Muslim women, I think, if they choose to wear it, their choice should be respected, it should be seen as an individual choice. And so, but I think that if a woman is being denied that choice—yes it's an issue because it's about choice—about her autonomy, her bodily autonomy, and if anyone were telling me what to wear and what not to wear, I would be quite upset too. I think being upset about someone telling me about the niqab or hejab or whether to wear it or not, it's not fair. It shouldn't be made a big deal. If the government tells that it can tell you when and where to wear the niqab, what's next? That's infringing on a woman's right to choose her own clothing, which is really ridiculous.

The issue of wearing the hejab[9] has become more than the fact that it is a piece of clothing. Zainab, Natasha, and Maria reported that it is a religious symbol and it is a political symbol for

[9] A hejab is not to be confused with a niqab. While both are religious clothing for Muslim women, the former is a head scarf while the latter is a head scarf as well as a face veil with only the eyes being visible. (Author's note)

some Muslim women. Moreover, on the "other side" of the so-called divide its detractors and critics of Islam perceive it as a symbol of oppression. What these critics should bear in mind is that it is an individual's choice to wear or not wear what she wants or what she feels comfortable with. While it may be argued in a Focaultian sense that essentially human beings do not really have a choice and these women have been conditioned to think that the *hejab* is a symbol of empowerment, the same may also be said about women who wear bikinis in that they have been socially conditioned to wear that particular piece of clothing. Perhaps when it comes to Muslim women wearing the hejab it is best is to respect the choice of those who wear it, without labeling them as slaves and chattels (Hassan, 2017).

Some participants indicated that the issue of traversing two different identities was not complex. For instance, Zain argued that being Pakistani-Canadian was in fact a celebration of diversity:

> ZAIN: [Being Pakistani-Canadian] makes me feel like a bit more diverse. Like, different cultures, it brings me closer to other people of South Asian descent. We are different but similar. We have certain clothes on Eid, on celebrations, its different family customs and stuff like that. I guess it makes my life a little more interesting. Connects me to my culture. But at the same time like being here I guess it's not as, I am not as much into my culture as I would've been in Pakistan… makes me feel like a bit more diverse.
>
> Like, different cultures bring me closer to other people of South Asian descent. We are different, but similar. We have certain clothes on Eid, on celebrations, it's different family customs and stuff like that. I guess it makes my life a little more interesting. Connects me to my culture. But at the same time, like, being here, I guess it's not as clear. I am not as much into my culture as I would've been in Pakistan...I guess the more Pakistani I am, it's because of my family. I never have to juggle between the two to be honest.

While a hybrid identity may seem to be a seemingly trivial issue, for many respondents in this study, their cultural heritage and their Canadian upbringing resulted in the development of their unique personality. Hence, Merjan contended that it was important for her to have a Pakistani-Canadian identity. This is what she had to say on the matter:

MERJAN: Because it distinguishes us from other groups that are being harassed. So, I remember, umm, and this has to do with religion more than anything else. So, people like used to come and say, "Where is your Hindu dot? I want to blow you up."

And then I would say, "No I am Pakistani." Because the assumption was that, you know, Indians are mostly Hindus and Canadians are Pakistanis. The distinction was important amongst South Asians, but it was also important to explain that I am not that.

Even if I was that, it was wrong, but then you go into protectionist mode, right? So, yeah, that's what ends up happening. So in that, umm, identity-wise that's important and also this distinction is important now to me because that's where my parents originated from, came from. And now I feel a bit more aligned to being Pakistani, before it didn't matter as much.

Merjan makes a critical point here. Even though she is a Muslim, and a Canadian whose parents were from Pakistan, ignorance on the part of the dominant majority lumped all South Asians into one group denigrating them without bothering to understand that there were key distinctions and major differences between ethnocultural groups from South Asia. One of the most horrible examples of the tragedies that can result from ignorance was the recent shooting in Kansas of an Indian immigrant who had nothing to do with radical Islam. He was shot dead by a white supremacist on the presumption that he was a Muslim and by default a terrorist (New York Times, 2018).

Childhood experiences, as has been indicated above, were an immensely critical part of how participants perceived their dual identities to be. For many participants, having that "other" side to their persona was a source of shame instead of a source of pride. For Aamir, having two different identities while growing up was difficult and made him hide his Pakistani side:

AAMIR: For me, to be honest, like when I was going through school and stuff, like, I didn't really portray my Pakistani-side. I was a little shy about how people would react because there were times on Eid and stuff when we wore traditional clothes and we would be laughed at like, "Look at what they are wearing?"

One time there was this Punjabi guy wearing a turban walking down the street, and the kids were laughing at him, "Look at him." Growing up, I was guarded on that side of myself because I knew I would get ridiculed for it.

So, I didn't really put it out there that I am Pakistani, I am Muslim, whatever. Because it wasn't an area where I was comfortable of being that way.

> Like looking back, it sucks that we had to like hide that part, I guess. It would have been nice to just be able to be like open, just me, that I am Muslim, that I am from a Pakistani background without getting the whole mocked/ridiculed remarks towards you and stuff. So, yeah, I just tried to assimilate to the Canadian style.

Perhaps it was because Aamir was taunted about his cultural heritage as a child that he now makes it a point to reveal it in public and to wear it as a badge of identity:

> AAMIR: But like now I am now more like I am Pakistani, I am Muslim. I have no worries about saying that now, and like that part of me, I am not embarrassed by it. I am not hiding it anymore. That's who I am. It's a part of me, I'm proud to be Pakistani. I am also Canadian. I do have a mix, and I am not going to hide it any more.

Aamir raises an extremely important point above. Reactance is a well-researched documented and accepted psychological phenomenon, which implies that the more one pushes a person against a metaphorical wall, the harder that person will react in an oppositional way after a while (Brehm & Brehm, 2013; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Kray, Thompson & Galinsky, 2001). Reactance is how one can describe Aamir's "pushback." After being told for years that he was less than others, Aamir not only accepted his Pakistani heritage but he is also very proud of it. Reactance may also explain why certain individuals get radicalized, since after being discriminated against or perceiving that they have been discriminated against, they may react and exact revenge by joining extremist outfits.

Zainab went deeper into deconstructing what a Pakistani-Canadian identity entailed. This is what she had to say on the issue:

> ZAINAB: To me I think [Pakistani-Canadian] means to be a little bit of both. Umm, I think we aren't fully Pakistani, we aren't fully Canadian.
>
> Canadian is a difficult identity too. When you think about Canadian people you think white. But when you think about Canada being a stolen land, and Indigenous communities, and that's a complicated relationship. What is Canada? What is it really? Because white people are from Europe really. It's European culture.
>
> But still its where you live here. I lived here. And I think of myself as someone who lives as a settler on Indigenous land, but with Pakistani heritage. So, I am a combination. I'm not fully anything, I'm not Pakistani, I am not fully Canadian definitely since I am not Indigenous. So, you know, and so it's kind of [pause]. It's an identity of its own, its own identity, that's what it is.

The fact that Zainab felt that she wasn't "fully Canadian" was not surprising considering the experiences she and other participants had growing up in this country. When I asked her what she meant by not being fully Canadian she elaborated upon it by dissecting two her two identities as follows:

> ZAINAB: Well to me Pakistani, to be Pakistani you had to have experience living there, at least some experience living there, and understand the realities. I do keep up-to-date in many ways with what's happening there, and my parents also keep up to date with Pakistani politics. So, growing up, I heard a lot about Pakistan. My family—and I think it's most Pakistani families—they are quite passionate about politics. Because of that, I keep in touch, but I haven't actually lived there. So, I feel I can't have the right to speak about life in Pakistan because I have never actually experienced it.
>
> So, there is that. So, I don't feel 100% Pakistani. And there are cultural differences as well. So, when I try to, for example, talk to or hangout with, or whatever, with people who have grown up in Pakistan, it's not easy. There are challenges.
>
> Even when I talk to my cousins in Pakistan, which doesn't happen often enough. But when I do talk to them, it's difficult. When I was in grad school, trying to explain to them the whole process, they were like, "Why are you still in school? It doesn't make sense." So, it's just things like that taught me about—. I never knew what to talk about with them. So that was one thing where I never felt fully Pakistani.

Zainab also did not feel fully Canadian. She described it in the following way:

> ZAINAB: As far as feeling Canadian, I think it has a lot to do with just whites being seen as Canadians. The idea of white supremacy and all and that. Canadians are white and even the Canadian narrative is very much about Canadian as being a white person. So, you can never be that. You can never be white. Umm, so we can never be fully Canadian in that sense.
>
> But that's complicated, again, going back to the whole issue of Indigenous peoples on this land. It's their land, and white people are really European. A lot of their culture is informed by European cultures.
>
> So, its complicated. I think not feeling Canadian is also about people not allowing you to feel Canadian. In some ways some Pakistanis also don't allow you to feel Pakistani you know. Pakistanis in Pakistan, they don't allow me to feel Pakistani. If you say anything about Pakistan they say, "What do you know? You live in Canada?" Some of that is about other people trying to gate keep it and not letting you in, not allowing you to fully identify in anyway with those particular identities.

When I asked Zainab what she meant by "you can never be white," she offered an interesting perspective:

ZAINAB: Well it means we can't be white physically, obviously, but we aren't going to be part of that power structure. I mean it's white people who have power in this country. They are the ones who determine who defines cultures, who defines pretty much everything. So, we are never going to be a part of that structure, that power structure. And as far as defining what is Canadian, we are not allowed to define what is Canadian. It's like white people are the only ones who define that.

Um, regardless of the fact that there are so many of us now, so many non-white people and, of course, there is an Indigenous population, which was here first, and it's their land, even they don't get to decide what is Canadian. Though again I know their relationship with the Canadian state is complicated.

But it seems like only white people are the ones who define Canadian. That's problematic. I don't think there's a definition of Canadian. In actuality it's [about who has] access to power structures.

Zainab's view about not feeling Canadian enough is not a view, which is restricted to Pakistani-Canadians or even to minorities living in Canada. Usually, any society in which there is a dominant majority discriminates legally and socially against minorities who feel as if they belong in a void, a limbo from which there is no escape. In a qualitative study conducted on an ethnic minority in Pakistan, one common, recurring theme was that the participants neither felt Pakistani "enough" nor did they feel as if they were completely a part of their ethnic group either (Khan, 2015). Such a confusion and relative deprivation in the sense of identity can ultimately lead to the construction of a new radicalized identity that is singular, an identity, which in a sense wears blinkers.'

The views offered by the participants in this study in terms of their dual identities are illuminating in many ways. For many participants, their Pakistani heritage was unimportant but because of childhood experiences where they were denigrated for being "different," their culture ultimately became a source of pride for them and in some instances became more important than their Canadian identity. For some, the ethnic part of identity was not as important as the religious part, especially in terms of religious symbolism such as wearing the *hejab*. Finally, the participants also felt that the dominant majority's behavior towards their ethnoreligious background was a huge

contributor towards cementing their identity. This behavior, which has been labeled as white-privilege, figured largely in the stories of the participants, stories that we now examine.

5.5 White Privilege: What's in a Color?

As was seen in Chapter 2, the term white privilege has been employed by social scientists and laypersons to denote the view that if one is born to Caucasian parents, one has an edge over non-white counterparts. White privilege has now come to encompass disadvantages people of color face in sectors ranging from discrimination at the hands of law enforcement, to discrimination in employment, education, and upward social mobility in general.

In the context of possible triggers to radicalization, the concept of white privilege, which may be termed as racial relative deprivation, psychological or otherwise, can enable scholars and policymakers to analyze the root of the issue, which is alienation from mainstream society. Hence, for this study it was critical that the views of participants about what they perceive white privilege to be were examined. However, since the concept of white privilege is inextricably intertwined with discrimination, it would be fruitful to first examine what participants perceived discrimination to be.

Farheen felt that discrimination was a lack of acceptance of minority ethnic groups by the dominant majority. When I asked her whether she could give an example of discrimination against her, she laughed wryly and pointed out the following:

> FARHEEN: Its an endless list [pause]. One of them that stood out for me was when I was in the basketball team and we had a game. I was fully covered, and wearing shorts, and I was wearing tracks as part of my uniform whereas the uniform was to wear shorts. So I was on the court, and it was more common for people wearing half shorts. And me I just run along with my tracks, and the referee says that you have to take those off.
>
> And I am like, "This is my uniform." And at first it was okay. Then the coach on the other team pointed it out and said she can't be on the court. I was one of the top players. I was booted off and wasn't able to play for the rest of the tournament because according to the regulations you need to have the same clothing as the

> entire team. Then I had to write a letter to sports Manitoba that this is my religion, I have to be this way.
> That's one of the things that stood out and I was actually pissed off later in life, but I understood what had happened because I was like, you are an adult *[referring to the opposing team's coach]*. How low do you have to stoop to get what you want right?
> There are many other examples. We had our window broken at home. I think at one point I had to remember, actually, yeah, I kind of like remembered it the other day, that our garbage was burned on our lawn, our house was egged, our cars were egged. We were called certain names. Someone would call our landline and say horrible things. So, there was like a lot of racism and hatred.

Farheen grew up in an era when the idea of "accommodation" was somewhat of an alien concept in Canadian society even though Canada had federal as well as provincial human rights commissions. If Farheen had grown up during this day and age her uniform issue would not have been an issue at all since the courts have rendered decisions from allowing a Sikh teenager to carry a *kirpan* (dagger) to school (Multani *v.* Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006) to a Muslim woman being allowed to take the oath of citizenship while wearing a *niqab* (Ishaq v. Canada, 2015) in the name of religious accommodation.

After Farheen related to me the discriminatory incident that she remembered the most, I asked her about what privilege she had alluded to in her story about the opposition coach who was white. However, Farheen replied that she did not have a concrete view of what constituted white privilege because of her childhood experiences:

> FARHEEN: I didn't see any difference with the people I grew up with. I was raised with those people. For me there was no difference, just what I know. So, privilege and all that stuff was never in question. I didn't even know privilege even existed at that point. It was just living, you don't know any better and you don't question.

Opposed to Farheen, Saima reflected upon her life experiences and shared that she did not feel as if she had been discriminated against by mainstream society:

> SAIMA: I had good mentors and teachers who were primarily Caucasian. I didn't face any discrimination then. I didn't even feel if it was an issue. The same in university where I graduated with distinction. Same thing, great mentorship. I had a lot of

opportunities—it seemed as if there was no discrimination. I didn't feel that I was behind because of my race.

> Even now being a Mom, I feel like my neighbors are very friendly. They are actually quite friendly, more friendly then I would presume what the media is showing us these days, about all these racism attacks and all these things. But nothing like that all, all very positive experiences. I don't think I have even had one racist or any kind of experience like that thus far.

Unlike many of the other participants in this study, Saima had positive experiences when it came to white people or the dominant majority. She indicated in her story that her school and university mentors and teachers were people of a Caucasian descent and they helped her grow and evolve, personally, intellectually and professionally. One lesson that society at large may learn from Saima's story is that to generalize and stereotype an entire race of people is unjust. Saima felt no discrimination at the hands of white people, if anything she talked about them with affection.

So how did Saima did understand discrimination? She noted that discrimination was the lack of opportunities and disadvantages a person had stemming from one's background. This is what she had to say on the issue:

> SAIMA: Discrimination I feel would mean to me would be, umm, like a lack of opportunities or taking away something that everybody has the opportunity to experience or to do based on whether it be religion, gender, age, or you know anything that makes one person different from another. Anything based on that would be discrimination.

Saima felt that while white privilege was a problem, which needed to be tackled, she also had a question for policymakers:

> SAIMA: I feel like on the opposite end a lot of jobs are being outsourced to minority countries which means that it just makes you think why something, like, exists if people are outsourcing these jobs overseas anyway. Why they discriminate against it if the job is here. It's a double standard. I am certain [white privilege] exists though.

Saima used to be a senior executive at a major business organization. Her observation was somewhat surprising. Perhaps she saw the angst amongst native born Canadians and landed

immigrants who cannot find employment partly because of the outsourcing of jobs, especially IT related jobs to other countries, or it was because of her view of economics that led her to hold that opinion?

Khaleeq, who is from a younger generation (generation Z) and who desires to work with Canadian security agencies to counter radicalization, had a comprehensive explanation for what in his opinion constituted discrimination:

> KHALEEQ: I would say that discrimination is being given an inherent disadvantage for something, which is beyond your control. So, the easiest example for discrimination would be not having opportunities for certain jobs or not being considered for certain jobs not based on your skills but based on your background or culture. For me I think that the definition of discrimination is being given an inherent disadvantage or inopportunity based on something you don't have control over.

Khaleeq also felt that discrimination was in a sense, rampant in Canadian society even in 2018, and that structures especially in the employment sector were meant to benefit people belonging to the Caucasian race:

> KHALEEQ: I can see discrimination which kind of goes beyond "in your face" or what one is accustomed to for belonging to a different religion or a different creed. In fact, from my experience, if you have an advantage because you speak another language or relate to another community, that's discrimination. Discrimination is not getting into certain places or to go to a certain work place. It's not a matter of getting your foot through your door or getting hired onto a company or accepted to a certain school, but it's a matter of being promoted.
>
> In comparison to somebody of another color, within workplaces in Canada, they want people who can speak the same languages or have the same background, leave their career on the frontline. Behind the scenes, decisionmakers predominantly want somebody whom they prefer, which is usually the tall Caucasian person. Discrimination exists in the sense of growth but not in the sense of hiring.

This is a point of view that policymakers and academics need to consider seriously. Khaleeq grew up in an era when Canada, had become a society which was and is accommodating the needs of minorities and where the dominant majority, at least in a legal sense have lesser rights than minorities residing in Canada. This being the case, then why do young people such as Khaleeq

feel that discrimination is so rampant? This and other related questions are examined in the last section of this chapter.

However, Khaleeq felt that middle class white people perceived that white privilege was working against them or what is called "reverse racism." He felt that the legitimate demands of Caucasians had to be taken into consideration:

> KHALEEQ: On an anecdotal level I can very clearly see that just speaking with co-workers or speaking with people around that there is this idea that reverse racism now exists. We celebrated diversity to the point where being a Caucasian is no longer an attractive quality. A lot of the times I will hear from co-workers saying that you have an advantage because you can speak a second language, or you know you look a certain way, and that's why the companies will want you to hire you to show how diverse they are.
>
> So, umm, I feel like it's the same principle at work where there is alternative social media aspect that pushes this narrative that you know being white and being male is no longer an attractive feature or an attractive quality or a desirable thing. So there is a need to protect white culture, if you will.

Echoing the sentiments of Khaleeq, in a sense, Faiza also felt that discrimination had many layered complexities. Perhaps it was because of one's socioeconomic background that there was intra-racial discrimination within the white community itself:

> FAIZA: Even in the white community, there is discrimination itself. So, you know there is judging, if you dress a certain way—doesn't matter if you are white. Doesn't matter if one is white if one is dressed in a sort of street wear. Then you presume automatically that you know this person is from a gang or from a lower stratum of society or, you know, up to no good. So, I think it's done everywhere [that is, judging]. maybe people don't like to agree with it, or they don't like to voice it, or they don't want to. As you said it would open a can of worms. Yes, it's there, one way or another.

These observations made by Khaleeq and Faiza are reflected in the rise of far-right populism and strongmen throughout the globe. In the United States the rhetoric of hate spread by President Donald Trump and his henchmen has been propagated using social media and "fake news." This rhetoric of hate, which is based on some genuine grievances of working middle class white people who feel as if minorities have taken their jobs and that they are outsiders in their "own" country has been stoked by the far-right. This rhetoric has resulted in pitting community

against community and the victims of this racial division have been, as always, innocent people. It is heartening to see young people like Khaleeq recognizing the grievances of the other side and desiring to mend the torn fabric of society.

In comparison to Khaleeq's point of view, Farheen had a simpler, yet comprehensive definition of discrimination. She noted that, "Discrimination means to me that group of people or certain group of people or individuals are not feeling comfy or not feeling I guess, cannot adjust to society because of their norms. And they feel like an outsider."

Javeria recognized that in its simplest form, discrimination was the lack of opportunities one could not access based on one's ethnic, religious, and cultural background:

> JAVERIA: [Discrimination] is not being given like an equal opportunity or a chance to do something because of your nationality, race color, religion, and you are treated differently because of it. If there is an opportunity for a job or for something in school that you are competing for and they don't give you a chance because you aren't Canadian, or you like a minority than that would be discrimination. Where you aren't given an opportunity to do something or to compete in something or to attain something just because you are of a different race or nationality.

I asked Javeria based on her definition of what constitutes discrimination whether the provision of quotas in employment and education to visible minorities can be construed as a form of discrimination against white people. She strongly disagreed in the following way:

> JAVERIA: I don't think that's discrimination if minorities are given more of an opportunity. It hasn't to do with race or religion. It has to do with the fact they are smart. They are educated. The countries they come from, sometimes I find, Asian kids they are much smarter because their ancestors are disciplining them from a young age. Here in the public school system they are very brilliant. They don't give you a lot of homework, its more about fun and play.
>
> In other countries such as India and Pakistan they find that at a very young age, they start to make kids work hard. I think if they do that you know those kids are at an advantage because they get to…there is an emphasis on education. So if they excel in education even when they come here or they get better opportunities when they graduate, it's because they are smart kids and they have a dedication to hard work. To me that's not discrimination, if they get more of a chance compared to actual Canadians.

While this study is not an analysis of jobs quotas for minorities the fact is that if an individual has a particular skin pigmentation then the employment opportunity goes in that person's favor, meets the definition of what Javeria described as discrimination, i.e., a person is given a job preference based on the color of that person's skin and the racism is institutionalized as a form of structural violence.

Similar to some of the other respondents, Maria also had a rather broad and comprehensive definition of what constitutes discrimination. She articulated that discrimination is rampant and is on the rise in the workplace in Canada:

> MARIA: I feel like discrimination is in the simplest of terms when you are deserving of something and you don't get it based on something that is unrelated to you, i.e., the position you are going for. The easiest form of discrimination is in the workplace. If I apply for a job that is at the higher (managerial) end and I have all the experience and knowledge but they don't hire me based on the fact that wearing the hejab is not an attractive trait, for me that's a form of discrimination. If they don't hire me because they are looking for a male, you know a certain type of person, that's also a form of discrimination. It comes in so many forms of micro- aggressions during the course of our life, and it's hard to tie it all into one answer.

Maria also had an interesting view about what constitutes white privilege. She argued that white privilege exists even if an individual who is Caucasian belongs to a challenged socioeconomic background. This is what she had to say on the issue:

> MARIA: I think basically for me it would be when a person who is white doesn't realize the fact that they aren't treated the same for the same issues. For example, just because a white person lived in poverty, that doesn't mean that they know what it means to be black in a community. White privilege is I feel like a term that is just coined in terms of people being allowed certain things simply based on the color of their skin, right.
>
> If a white person is pulled over and they find a small stash of marijuana, he is most likely not to be arrested whereas a black person would be, which is why jails are filled with colored people for offenses which are you know minor offense for someone who is white [pause]I don't think they face any of the same challenges and for them to say they do, is just wrong on so many levels.

Maria's comment alludes to a major issue in the criminal justice system, not only in Canada but throughout North America, namely that people of color are unfairly targeted because of the

color of their skin and their ethnic background. A number of studies found that the reason why people of color overpopulate the prison system is because of a lack of opportunities stemming from their socioeconomic status which leaves them with little or no option other than to join gangs (Cheng, Zheng & Ding, 2015; Cook et al., 2009; Fergusson, Campbell & Horwood, 2004). However, radicalization to violence is a different social dynamic altogether as the majority of individuals who have been radicalized to violence and have committed violent acts, usually face little or no economic challenges.

Maria also considered it to be demeaning and patronizing when white fellow Canadians treated her as a foreigner. Perhaps that was an extended meaning of white privilege for Maria:

> MARIA: I have been living in X place and we have a town of 7000 people and… they haven't seen many *foreigners* here. Yeah people feel like they need to teach me to use a debit card and things like that. And once I start talking they are like "oh wait, okay, no never mind. You are okay." It's like, that's the biggest, something that everyone struggles with and will continue to struggle with when you are in a country, which openly upholds the same value. I have been also told that my English is so good. I have people tell me what Halloween is. And when I am buying costumes for my kids I am told, "oh these are for Halloween" and I am like "yeah I know what Halloween is you know". And their response to that is "oh I didn't know that there is Halloween in Syria." And I respond that, "I am not Syrian."
>
> Or when people ask me "where are you from" and I say "Toronto" and they say not Toronto before that. At that point my response is "there is nothing before Toronto." I feel like that's something I will always have; my kids will have. My kids can't even speak Urdu, but I am sure that once they are older because of the way they look, they will do certain things. And I am sure that will cause a completely different generational or identity crisis.

Maria's complaint is one that I have heard a number of times, not only from Pakistani-Canadians who were born here, but also from second-generation Pakistani-Americans and second-generation British-Pakistanis. The complaint and the frustration are legitimate. The assumption is that one is not a "native" Canadian merely based on the color of one's skin, which is humiliating and irksome for individuals.

Zain is the son of two medical doctors. He stated that he had never experienced discrimination and felt that the majority community was quite accepting of different cultures:

> ZAIN: Personally, I don't think I have experienced discrimination, not that I have noticed. I feel like, I have met genuinely nice people who are intrigued by people of different cultures. For example, right now in my city this international thing is going on where everyone is participating from different culture. Discrimination, I haven't personally experienced.

Zain's views might be explained in part by his socioeconomic status. Both of his parents are doctors, so Zain belongs to the upper/upper-middle class. He has never had to worry about tuition and working odd jobs while attending school. Hence, Zain did not face discrimination as compared to other respondents whose accident of birth was not so fortuitous.

Natasha considered that discrimination exists when a person is judged on the basis of her/his characteristics. This is to a large extent important or critical to individuals that are unwilling or unable to change them or should not be forced to change them.[10] She articulated that, "I think discrimination means umm when you are judged on something you can't change about yourself. So, I feel like if the color of your skin, religion, which you can I guess change, but to judge someone just because of that is also discrimination."

Natasha recognized that the existence of white privilege was reflected in the existence of additional opportunities in employment for white people. Similar to Maria's observations about the differential treatment meted out to individuals by law enforcement Natasha reported that people who commit crimes are treated differently due to systemic racism and the othering of people of color:

[10] The explanation of these terms is found in the matter of Re: Acosta [Interim decision 2986, 1985 WL 56042 (B.I.A)] when the Board elaborated upon the concept of a particular social group as provided for in Article 1 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951. In defining a particular social group, the Board stated, "the common characteristic which defines a group…must be something which is beyond the power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed" (pp. 37-39).

NATASHA: Yes, I do really think white privilege exists. I think it's just the fact that people who are native to this country, not actually native, but white people, they get a lot more opportunities because they don't have much of a serious issue with culture and religion, with the baggage that our culture, our religion and our skin color comes with. They have their own kind of stereotypes but because they are a majority in the country, so I feel like yeah they get a lot more leeway.

If you look at America because its less here in a sense, police brutality for example, like how people are treated when they commit crimes when they are white and how they are treated when they commit crimes when they are black or brown or anything like that. Even just see that there is this systemic racism, or even discrimination, or just like how they treat people of color differently.

Natasha also felt that white people used English as a tool to discriminate and exclude those who cannot speak English fluently:

NATASHA: Yeah, they *[those who used language to look down upon people who weren't fluent in English]* were white, only white. We had a lot of different races, blacks, browns, Pakistanis, Chinese—we would never be rude. Minorities understand what it feels like, what it is to learn a language. White people don't, may be if they are Polish they would. But generally, the population in my area was just Canadian. They maybe had European descent very long ago but generally they only knew their one language. They don't understand what it feels like to learn a second language and to be able to understand this. My parents know other languages, and these white people they don't understand the struggle to learn English and to be in a completely different area, and to make someone feel like an outsider, yeah.

Natasha was echoing a well-established well-researched fact that language is used, as a means to discriminate against people whose first language is not English, consciously or otherwise. A number of studies over the years have shown that people whose first language is English and who speak English with a "proper" accent are at an advantage in societies where English is an official language (Chakraborty, Schwarz & Chakraborty, 2017; Fang, 2017; Pronskikh, 2018)

When I asked Natasha what her thoughts were around the idea of "reverse racism," she had a detailed yet somewhat confused and contradictory response that was perhaps based on her experiences growing up in Canada and feeling alienated from the mainstream because of the behavior of the dominant majority:

NATASHA: Back in the day I remember when I was in high school one of my teachers she taught a subject she had literally no knowledge about. She said jokingly that they (school administration) had to hit the quota of having a brown teacher. So, I think that back maybe when our parents were getting jobs they had the issue where they were discriminated against because they weren't white. I don't know whether its reverse discrimination or trying to let people into the field and letting them feel that while once their color wasn't allowed, its different now. So, I don't know if its reverse discrimination because I don't know if it is due to white privilege.

There are (white) people who aren't qualified who are in a position (they don't deserve). So, if someone is qualified why not? But they are so used to seeing whites being hired, now that they are pushed to hiring colored people, it worries them. I don't know. I feel like it should be based on your qualification. But then again, I haven't had that problem where I wasn't hired just because of what I looked like. I don't know too much about the topic, but that's what I would say. If there is a place where systematically white people are being hired they should be told, "No you have to hire brown people also." But it should also be based on qualifications. If a brown person is more qualified, you should hire that person.

Zameer is a senior executive in a telecommunications firm and is currently serving as the chief of staff to a Member of a Provincial Parliament (MPP). He considered white privilege to be covert. However, he also felt that things had changed for the better in Canada:

ZAMEER: I don't think white privilege directly exists in Canada or we would never be here. But you know it may exist south of the border more than it does in the north. And it may not be a phenomenon here. Umm, we have to understand that Canada's make up is changing year by year. The demographics are changing, the way our forefathers and the history here of being of a British background, it's now being diluted. So maybe there were sometimes in the old days when it did exist. The older generations are used to a certain way, a certain culture and stuff like that. That's breaking down.

And even 50 years from now, it will be a different way of life here. So white privilege and so forth, we have yet to encounter it. And umm, and but I think it's more of south of the border and restricted to a particular demographic...I wouldn't discount that white privilege may exist in Canada right now. It is not something that's been completely eliminated. Its just that I have not personally experienced it.

Zameer argued that while white privilege was a reality, a key factor was one's perception about it. He pointed out that, "What is white privilege? What does it mean? I hear that term, but I don't know what it means. What I think it means and what that gentleman thinks are two different things and we may perceive it differently."

One explanation of Zameer's views on the existence and his questioning of white privilege could be because of Zameer's background. He is a high-powered executive in a major Canadian corporation, and a lead advisor to an MPP. In a sense then, Zameer "made it." Zameer's views on radicalization and what causes second-generation Pakistani-Canadians to radicalize as well as what may be the possible solutions towards saving second-generation Pakistani-Canadians from being radicalized were quite different compared to many of the other individuals in this study.

Babar who grew up in Ottawa in the late 1960s and 1970s and served in the Canadian armed forces for a short period of time illustrated that language was the key to understanding why terms like white privilege are used today:

> BABAR: I think we didn't have that option (to speak up) right? For one, this vocabulary has come in later right? So, we didn't see it that way. Now you have the vocabulary say white privilege and so on and so forth. I am not saying that there is anything wrong with that, but we just didn't have that idea in my day; It wasn't part of the mindset. So, for us it was like "okay there is a problem how do I work around it." Maybe, I can't be successful because of these barriers so I have to do something else right? Umm, we didn't... I don't think we really saw a problem, an issue that if I complain about this loudly enough, use this terminology, somehow life will get better.

Babar belongs to a generation, which was told that if you work hard enough you will succeed. Barriers can be shattered through sheer perseverance and hard work. Moreover, Babar did raise a valid point about new vocabulary that has in a sense infiltrated society. Buzzwords are used not only in the developmental sector but also in the social sciences as well as human rights discourse so that they have lost all their meaning and the positive intent that was behind them when they became part of the lexicon many decades ago.

Babar, however, also felt that the change in language and how pop-culture characters that were meant to humiliate people of color once and are now being challenged was a positive change:

> BABAR: For the kid on the school ground Apu (the character from Simpsons) was an insult that was used to de-humanize him. Right? So, they experienced that in a different way. Umm, so, we knew a lot of people and Ottawa might have the most educated taxi

> drivers in the world, right? So, the stereotypes were there. In academia they weren't thought about at that point in time. In the end they (immigrants and people of color) started small business and so on and so forth and you know for us it was like, "yeah you know this guy, he is a very smart probably doesn't have any other opportunity, works 16 hours a day, I know this guy is hard working." As opposed to the 7-year old who is on the school ground (being mocked for being dark skinned by a white kid). For him Apu is an insult, you are different, you are stupid, you are an object of mockery.

Zainab also considered Apu to be a racist stereotype that was an overt form of discrimination against people of color, specifically, people of a South Asian descent:

> ZAINAB: He is an offensive character, that accent is stupid; it's the most ridiculous accent ever. Its only there for laughs, was there for laughs. What kind of impact that has on people who actually have that kind of accent is that they become a joke and that impacts them. When you have a character like that, it has an impact. I am not really sure, I haven't watched the Simpsons in years, but I think characters like that are problematic and outdated. We have so many South Asians now in the media, so what do we need Apu for really? It's a dated sort of character. So yeah Apu is offensive I think.

Both Babar and Zainab harbored strong feelings against the Simpsons character Apu who was depicted as an Indian grocery store owner, speaking in a stereotypical Indian accent and portrayed as a stereotype of a stingy brown person. Moreover, Apu perpetuates the stereotype about brown people that they can only own grocery stores or work at a 7/11. However, as the creator of Apu, Matt Groening after facing a lot backlash for creating Apu, retorted:

> I love Apu. I love the character, and it makes me feel bad that it makes other people feel bad. But … its tainted now — the conversation, there's no nuance to the conversation now…There is the outrage of the week and it comes and goes.…I think particularly right now, people feel so aggrieved and crazed and powerless that they're picking the wrong battles…. I go, maybe he's a problem, but who's better? Who's a better Indian animated character in the last 30 years?" Groening said. "I've been to India twice and talked about 'The Simpsons' in front of audiences. That's why this took me by surprise" (New York Times, 2018, paragraphs 2 & 6).

While it is perfectly understandable, as Babar pointed out, that a character like Apu reaffirms the stereotype that all people of South Asian descent are part of one profession, yet at the same time perhaps some attention should be paid to the words of Matt Groening that battles

need to be fought in a prioritized order. Apu perhaps belongs on the lower end of that racial battle list and *prima facie* Apu does not seem to reflect white privilege.

Merjan, who had experienced overt acts of racism as a child, while admitting that perhaps white people had legitimate grievances against how they were facing challenges, they also needed to understand why it was happening:

> MERJAN: I can't deny if they are feeling that, if they are feeling like they are being pushed aside. Okay. Now how do we discuss that? Because it's not being pushed aside its being called out. So, let's say you have a relationship with somebody we are all interconnected, we want a relationship. But when you are in a relationship and growing up and one side keeps telling you are not a part of this marriage, and finally the other part says, "okay listen, hear my voice and then they feel like they are being attacked," just like you know human reaction. Then there needs to be therapy but at the end of the day one cannot say, I cannot say that's not legit feelings on their parts, but one also needs to recognize why is the other side so upset?
>
> And why are they saying what they are saying, listen, and somehow form a conclusion that first of all the narrative of fear that immigrants take up your jobs, the narrative of whatever's going on, needs to also stop. I grew up with the same narrative that I am still hearing today. So, this is where we need to have a communication that doesn't mean that we should turn the tide as to what happened to me should happen to them, absolutely not. You want to move forward with proper healthy communication that you would in any kind of marriage.

I pointed out to Merjan that technically she was not an immigrant as she was born in Canada. So how did the so-called narrative of fear of immigrants relate to her? She offered an interesting insight in the following description:

> MERJAN: That's a good one because usually they say immigrants are taking over their jobs. I say I am Canadian but then the next question is where are you from? I say I was born in X place (The response is) no, where are your parents from? Like where are you from? That question, I still get that question actually. Unless they think I am Indigenous that also happens.

An overwhelming majority of the study participants had experienced discrimination and racism at the hands of the dominant majority. However, discrimination and racism had also been inflicted upon Aamir by the most oppressed of all Canadians, Indigenous people in a form of what Frantz Fanon called" lateral violence." This is what he had to say on the issue:

> AAMIR: The racism wasn't only from white people per se- like native people were very racist as well. Like they were worse than white people. The word Paki would just slide off their tongue, like it's a correct term. And like you could be at the mall and they'd say, "hey Paki." What do you say to that? What do you say when you hear "That Paki is this and that?" And like that's a weird thing. The most racism came from the Aboriginal population than it did from white people.

I asked Aamir about his thoughts about why Aboriginal people would be racist towards a minority group and he opined the following in his narrative:

> AAMIR: Yeah, uh [pause]it's a good question. I don't know. It's almost like I almost want to say like lack of education. But also, I would say like, since they are feeling oppressed they need someone else to oppress, kind of push it that way, so they have some sort of leverage I guess. Like, ultimately it is their land for sure. But that doesn't give them the right to be racist, like there is never a right to be racist or being racist towards any group. It's like they didn't have a filter for their own words. It just comes out, it's like it's okay. It's weird.

Aamir raised a rather interesting point about the oppressed becoming oppressors when they get the chance to do so a point made by both Frantz Fanon and by Paulo Friere in his seminal work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Friere, 1972). There is a body of literature indicating the psychology of why a group that has been oppressed and marginalized tends to become an oppressor against a weaker minority group when it gets the opportunity (Cho & Lewis, 2005; Friere, 1968; Heaggans, 2003). History is replete with such examples from the Indian sub-continent, to post-colonial Africa to leftist movements in Europe, especially the Red Brigade in Italy and the Baaader-Meinhoff in Germany. Formerly oppressed groups once they got hold of the reins of power started to oppress those who are weaker than them. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, we become the worst devils of our nature.

Apart from social and racial discrimination, as a second-generation Pakistan-Canadian, Aamir also faced work place discrimination that was scarring and frustrating. Working for a crown corporation had not ended Aamir's experience with discrimination as he noted that racism is a key issue in employment:

AAMIR: In all the major companies, if you look at upper management generally it's all white. So, there is still that inherent racism. Like I saw a lot of that in Winnipeg, you see all crown corps. If you look into it, the management on top is all white still. They are at the top. It would be nice to have a lot more diversity knowing that you can proceed or progress to that level regardless of what your color of skin it. Working in the X industry in Winnipeg was an eye opener too. Again, every person who had an upper position was white. And if you try to look at your position coming in, where do you belong? You have no chance of progressing.

Aamir felt that white privilege was deeply structural and embedded in almost every facet of Canadian society, especially, in employment:

AAMIR: White privilege is also them having the upper hand. It's always that they don't have to struggle to get anything basically. Like if you are in the system where like the upper echelon is already all white, its more than likely that the white people are going to be favored. Again, like working for a crown corporation, that's exactly what was happening there. Even the group I started in, there were three colored people, the rest were white. The people, the managers and the team leaders totally had their favorites because like we were all open with each other. All of us who came in together, we were open about what we were getting and how much we were getting (salaries). We noticed right away, the white girls they are getting all the better files, they are getting the bigger files, the bigger the file the easier to get production. And they knew it too, and they were like, "I think we are getting favored, we are getting all the big files."

And there is that thing too, some of them really didn't like that, one girl literally she quit. She said, "I can't handle the pressure because like I am getting favored and you guys are getting screwed, I don't want to be part of this shit." She quit, and she left. But it's like, if you look at all the team leaders and managers, they are all white women and that's the system they have in there. That's what the system is: white women, then they favor white women. If you are a white woman coming in, you are favored right away. Clearly, it was clear as day, like it's ridiculous. That's just white privilege which exists, and which needs to go, which needs to stop.

The perception that the dominant majority in Canada consists of white people whose ancestors put into place structures that to this day favor white people ran deep amongst the study participants. In fact, some participant felt that not only did structures benefit white people, yet that the meta-narrative in an "Althusserian" sense was constructed and continues to be defined by white people.

For example, Zainab reported that the "setup" as she labeled it, reeks of white supremacy and continues to work in favor of white people:

ZAINAB: White Privilege is when white people benefit from the white supremacist system, this system that we have in this country which is setup to benefit white people. So white people whether they want to or not benefit from that and that's white privilege when a European sounding name gets favored over a non-European sounding name for a job, or a job interview. And when systems are set up to help sort of white people do better in life and non-white people don't do as well. White people face less barriers based on race as compared to non-white people.

While Zainab believed that power structures were still controlled by the dominant majority, she also felt that historically marginalized groups were challenging those structures. Zainab contended that this was a positive change in contemporary society:

ZAINAB: I think overall, it's still controlled by the white majority, but I mean there have been some really interesting changes, nonetheless. I think if you look at for e.g. Ottawa, I mean the liberal party is diverse. They have women and men, and they also have lots of people of color. Indigenous people are now getting into positions of power. The media, we are now everywhere in it, especially South Asians are everywhere in the media. I think things are changing because you still have main power is still in the hands of white people. But in some ways, I think, things are shifting right now, where you are starting to see people of color, black people, Indigenous people making gains, especially, people of color who aren't black or Indigenous. Unfortunately, black and Indigenous communities feel more oppression. Certain oppressions that we as non- black non-Indigenous people don't necessarily face.

Nonetheless we are becoming a lot more part of the discourse. You listen to CBC radio, you listen to stuff about Indigenous people all the time and you have marginalized communities being able to (make their voices heard) through social media, which is huge and has helped a lot. You have a lot of these marginalized communities, who are able to get their voices out there, much more than they used to before and I think they are starting to challenge those power structures a lot more. And I think that's pretty key in the last 10 years really that we are seeing a lot more challenges to that power structure and those challenges are becoming louder, and stronger and I think that's where the changes are occurring.

Zainab is an academic. She believed that discrimination was in its most blatant form, oppression that existed at a mass level. Discrimination in her view was rampant, not only in society at large, but also in academia:

ZAINAB: Well discrimination is a form of oppression. Discrimination at a mass level is oppression. And its systemic, we are talking about racism or homophobia or transphobia. Whatever it is we are talking about its due to systems put in place against marginalized communities. Regardless of [pause]the reason why people are worried now and that there is discrimination against white people is that people who have been

marginalized are starting to fight back. That's the only reason that people think that white people are the target. No. They are just being asked to move over. Make room for the rest of us. That's what being asked. But discrimination is a systemic barrier. Its thinking put in place that you know, for e.g., GREs right?

> The GRE has been shown again and again to favor rich white men. Its shown that people of color, people whose first language is not English, who come from poor backgrounds, they do worse on the GRE than white men of privilege. Yet our university programs still use it. That is discrimination, right? Why are you using the GRE when you know that white men are going to do better on it than anybody else? That is an example of discrimination and then to use that part of the application for evaluation. So, things like that are discrimination. They are systemic. They are in place for mainly rich white men but also for rich white women. And those who are able-bodied, straight, cisgender, those are the people who benefit from the systems that we have in place right now.

Natasha had a matter of fact response to the question of whether one's identity as a Muslim Pakistan results in discrimination. Natasha noted that it was all about binaries:

> NATASHA: I think it's just this them and us thing. Because after Pearl Harbor when they had an issue with the Japanese they also lumped Asians together at that time, "go back home chink" or whatever, they would do that. They would do that to Koreans too. This I think is just our time. In history this is our time where it's just us and them. So we are them, if you are darker, you have the same features, you are them. It's a very big fear tactic. Even in the White House, they say people from the Middle East and what not. Just stoking that fear as to who are these people. People don't know where others are from, they make it into a single continent. Pakistan is right next to Syria, that kind of idiocy. It just becomes one. Honestly, we don't look like Syrians, we have distinct features.

However, Natasha did add that "othering," the us versus them binary was not to be blamed entirely on white people as minority communities had their own fair share of blame and responsibility for it:

> NATASHA: When we were younger we were not really exposed or supposed to hang out with white people. You hang out with your own kind, it's a big issue. They don't know you then, and you are creating a more of us versus them. When I grew up it was hard to stay friends with them because of differing goals, and values and I can't be friends with people who are drinking and all. I don't have that same lifestyle. I don't want to be around those kind of people. But I think we create that us/them binary since we are young because we are scared that we won't be accepted by them, so we isolate ourselves from the beginning. We create that us versus them with white people. White people are also Europeans. They are more than just white people you know.

The views of the participants clearly indicate that because of the legacy of colonialism in Canada, the dominant majority, which consists of white people, continues to benefit from systems that were put into place at the expense of historically oppressed minorities. Many participants also went beyond a Marxist class-based analysis and considered discrimination and white privilege to be based more on the color of one's skin rather than on the class that one belongs to- somewhat of an intersectional approach. However, did the participants feel that discrimination and racism, to use those terms interchangeably, were only a "forte" of white people? For some, the answer was in the negative.

Natasha, for instance, felt that racism was rampant amongst people of Pakistani descent in the context of the views held by Pakistani's for black people.

> NATASHA: When I was growing up I was told that, "all black people are thieves". That is terrible, why are you teaching your kid that? When people are being racist towards brown people that pisses you off. Why complain then if you yourself are a racist. Even that nursery rhyme in Urdu "*kala chor*" (black thief)[11] or something. Do you know what I am saying? Teaching kids that is wrong. There are good people and bad people everywhere. You should make sure that you have good friends. You shouldn't limit them to having specific type of friends, you know like just Pakistanis or Muslims. Even Pakistanis we are very racist towards others. It's very hard for Pakistanis to marry outside of their race. We have to get out of that mindset that we are better than everyone else and you know understand that not everyone is the same in Canada. If you are Pakistani, Indian or whatever, you are all immigrants no one is better than another.
>
> There is this last name or that, don't marry those people, maybe in Pakistan that works, over here it shouldn't. There is no us and them, they can be friends with people who are Pakistanis and all. People I grew up with who are friends with me, I see them on Facebook with racist statuses. They were friends with Muslims only, so they know who Muslims are, that's it. The key I think are interactions. When I was in university, I did some community outreach because it's easy to hate someone or a group of people you don't know. If I re-humanize us all, we can see that other people are also struggling with going to school, hating waking up early. If we do that, then people can be themselves and see us as we are (and we can see them as who they are).

[11] A possible reference to an Urdu children's song *"Nanee teri mornee ko moar lay gaey, baaqee jo bacha tha kalay chor lay gaey."* (Grandma, your female peacock was taken away by male peacocks; what was left was taken away by black thieves). (Author's note)

Natasha also believed that people belonging to a Pakistani cultural and religious background did not have much of a right to criticize the dominant majority, if the dominant majority did not accept them since Pakistanis do not accept people of other races either and, do not have much of a justification to be critical:

> NATASHA: You have to be a specific type of Pakistani, even amongst Pakistanis, to be accepted. How do you want to be accepted by white people as you are from a completely different country and culture- everything? And you are upset that white people have a hard time accepting you? But you don't even accept people who are from your country. You know what I am saying? This is a double standard, why do you expect to be treated differently then? Same thing when it comes to us, and black people. We only want to be accepted by white people, we feel that black people are inferior to us.

Zainab alleged that inter-ethnic racism was rampant amongst individuals with a Pakistani background. When I asked Zainab if such ethnic creases could affect solidarity and social justice, she responded as follows:

> ZAINAB: Umm yeah you know those of us South Asians and Asians we are the worst, I think. This is a generalization of course. But I feel like people in our communities try to be white. We try to associate ourselves with the white power structures and then umm basically crap on Indigenous and black people. I mean there are obviously Indigenous and black people who do that. But as a community we tend to bring anti-blackness with us from Pakistan and India and all these countries and we have our own derogatory terms, Arabs have their own derogatory terms. Every group does. Like our parents or those who come from Pakistan, India whatever, like they are the ones who bring these ideas. "All black people are dangerous or Indigenous people are wild and you know, barbaric." I have seen that.
>
> I have seen this happen in the US when I was in ISNA (Islamic Society of North America) many years ago in Chicago, and there were second-generation Pakistanis who were talking in derogatory ways about black people. Not first gens, but second gens. My generation who were saying derogatory things about black people, black Muslims you know. We can't assume solidarity. Even if I meet someone who is Hindu for e.g. they might hate me because I am Muslim. So umm we can't assume what we think about each other. That's one of the things that I have been thinking of.

Zainab's criticism that racism against black people by individuals of Pakistani descent went further than "exogenous racism." She also claimed that some individuals who follow the Hindu religion are problematic because of their belief in the caste-system. Hence, inter-ethnic racism is

not just restricted to people outside of the South Asian community as the racism is also intra-ethnic, i.e., within the community itself against some of its own members:

> ZAINAB: I have friends who talk about the caste system, it's something I never thought about growing up, it was never front and center. Now I have some friends who are social justice warriors and they talk a lot about that. I am just seeing that there are so many, so much division and oppression within our own communities, so how do we deal with that. Plus, the anti-blackness in our communities, the anti-Indigenous sentiment within our communities. That's definitely there, and we have to figure out ways to deal with it. Just like for me I expect woke white people to educate other white people. For me I feel like I have a responsibility to educate other South Asians you know.

Khaleeq had a positive outlook about individuals who have multi-ethnic/multi-racial backgrounds. He articulated that the key was to claim one's culture proudly and to find comfort in how one balances those different identities:

> KHALEEQ: I think that when it comes to a balance between different identities, between different cultures, backgrounds, different hats we wear, it can be seen as something positive, something, which adds to society. All that matters is how that individual navigates it. If for example, when it comes to languages, being able to speak in our mother language is empowering and hopefully it can be used on our resumes. When it comes towards how to move forward it will be interesting how Canadians find themselves in this society, seeing our identity as being something which is...something we can use towards our advantage instead of struggling with it.
>
> Where it comes from is finding comfort in your own skin. This is who I am, this is where I came from, this is the culture I live with. This is the religion I follow, or this is whatever I follow. But just being confident in your ability to follow those different values, those different cultures, and those different identities. So rather seeing it as something that is you know an issue, they need to be looked at in a positive way and being able to find a comfortable balance between things.

Faiza added a word of caution to the discussion on racism. She articulated that rarely are issues, especially issues pertaining to cultural dynamics, black and white. Hence, understanding and openness were essential to ensuring social harmony and peace:

> FAIZA: I know that it's hard for people to not judge other people. Umm, and a lot has to do with umm I guess your culture. Because sometimes it's the culture that puts things in your mind and you just know it that way. So, it's hard but I think everyone should be able to at least [pause]step back and try to see the other side of the coin you know. Because there always, I wouldn't say a 100 percent, but 99 percent there is always a different side

of the story. So, if you are able to do that, then I guess you accomplish a big thing in your life.

What do the stories of the participants indicate? First, these stories show a deep level of frustration, if not resentment, against the dominant majority, which according to most of the interviewees consists of white people. Moreover, some respondents noted that there was a hierarchy of racism, which culminates with white people being at the top of the metaphorical food chain and Black and Indigenous people being on the lowest rung. Some participants made the point that Pakistani-Canadians are quite racist themselves when it comes to Indigenous people, and black people.

So, what can we extract and learn from the narratives offered by the participants to this study? Some of the key findings now follow.

5.6 Key Findings

There were six significant findings that emerged from the respondent's stories in this chapter. First, it came as little or no surprise that the identity of participants was affected and that they were formed partly at least due to their childhood experiences of growing up in multicultural Canada to parents who were immigrants from Pakistan. The participants as children had a constant struggle around the issue of their identity or in the words of one of the participants: "Who am I?" These questions at such a tender age no doubt affected the perceptions of participants as they pertain to Canada and the people they grew up with.

First, childhood experiences at school were critical in shaping the personality and the worldview of the interviewees. Feeling like an outsider when pork was offered in school, which the participants could not eat because of religious prohibitions can affect a child for the rest of her or his life. It impacted the participants because they felt that not only was there a severe lack of

accommodation by the school system when they were children but. They opined that the lack of accommodation for minorities (racial and otherwise) continues to this day.

Some of the views offered by the participants also indicate that their personalities were shaped in a conflicting and confusing manner because of the disconnection between mainstream culture and the culture and/or environment within the home. This disconnect perhaps resulted in a lack of belonging fully to either their ethno-religious side or their nationalist side and as was pointed out by some participants, they managed their identities to try and garner a sense of belonging. For example, the respondents would assume the persona of a culturally Pakistani child within the house and the persona of a "Canadian" when interacting with peers and society at large. Such a dual balancing act resulted in the participants becoming insular about who they really were which resulted in an identity that was perhaps fragmented as well as a personality, which felt a deep angst, specifically against the dominant majority. They felt that it was because of the dominant majority's rejection of the participants' values and culture that they were isolated and abandoned from social affairs. In a sense, the identity of many participants was swaying uncomfortably like a pendulum.

Childhood experiences also resulted in the cementing of a core Pakistani/ethnic identity as they reached the age of maturity and that identity is reinforced even to this day. It would be interesting to see that with all things being equal while one is growing up, would ethnic identity matter at all during adulthood? The participants answered the question in the affirmative. If anything, the more the years passed the more they identified with their unique Pakistani cultural background, even though apart from two participants, none have ever lived in Pakistan for a prolonged period of time (six months or more). Perhaps they have a fantasized imagery of Pakistan

and they are not cognizant of the sociocultural nuances in Pakistan? The grass is always greener on the other side.

Second, for some participants, ethnic identity was inextricably linked with one's identity as a Muslim and the latter was perhaps more important in defining one's personality as well as to how one interacts and behaves in society at large. This dynamic is not unique to the participants in this study. It was discovered in a previous study that Islamic identity was indelibly tied to national identity and at times the former was far more potent than the latter (Khan, 2015). The same was the case for some of the participants in this study. Their Islamic identity outweighed their Canadian as well as Pakistani identity. Perhaps this dynamic can explain why some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians cross over to the metaphorical dark side.

The importance of religious identity perhaps exacerbated due to the "Trump factor" in the U.S., was of vital importance to participants. This religious identity that was symbolized through the wearing of the hejab formed a core part of the lives of at least some of the participants. These respondents felt that religion and religious symbols are badges of pride and identity and should be worn as such. The wearing of religious symbols is not unique to the participants in this study, nor to Muslims. Observant Jewish men wear the yarmulke, and even non-observant Christians wear the crucifix as a symbol. The example of Madonna in 2016, covered in crosses comes to mind (Alexis, 2016).

Stemming from the hejab having symbolic value for participants, some respondents also felt that wearing the hejab also served an important feminist function in de-objectifying women, and de-mystifying the alleged mystique of the female body. The day the participants who wear the hejab in public started to wear it was the day when they stopped caring what people said about them in terms of their looks. For individuals who decry the donning of the hejab and the niqab as

being symbols of female oppression, perhaps the views of these participants can be an eye-opener. This sentiment amongst Muslim women about religious headwear and face wear has also gained critical importance in the light of the passage of Bill-62 in Quebec. While the Quebec Superior Court has suspended the Bill because provisions of it were deemed to infringe on Charter rights (CBC News), it would be instructive for the Quebec government to perhaps take into consideration the sentiment of Muslims in the context of the *hejab* if the government invokes the notwithstanding clause[12] of the Charter to nullify the court's ruling. (s.33). Moreover, even if Quebec is justified in banning face coverings, then to make the law and subsequent actions neutral, perhaps the Quebec legislature should vote to take down the cross that adorns their parliament building. However, wearing the hejab may also result in preserving the patriarchy. As one respondent pointed out that a key reason why she started to wear the hejab was because of her brother questioning her about not wearing it.

Third, another interesting fact which emerged from the stories of the participants was that while all except one felt that they had been discriminated against at some point in their lives, those who were the most vocal about discrimination were from areas that did not have much racial/religious diversity. For example, those who resided in pre-dominantly Caucasian areas such as some parts of Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and PEI had strong and occasionally extreme views when it came to discrimination and the dominant majority compared to their counterparts in metropolitan areas in Ontario. This is indicative of the fact that one feels empowered if one's own "tribe" surrounds one. However, the flipside to this tribal argument and mentality is that in a multicultural and multiethnic society, tribalism is akin to the sword of Damocles because it can provide people with ease and comfort while being surrounded by their own, yet at the same time it can have

[12] S.33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms empowers the federal and provincial governments to nullify a court's ruling for 5 years.

extremely negative consequences for the ultimate glue or citizenship based on at least some shared and common values, which binds a nation state together. The latest and perhaps a sad example of the lack of shared values for the common good of all, especially the most vulnerable segment of society, children, was the opposition by some members of the Muslim community to the sex-education curriculum introduced in Ontario a few years back (Selley, 2015).

The generational divide is also related to the geographical divide resulting in a diversity of opinions amongst the participants. For participants who grew up in the 1960s to the 1990s period, a common complaint was the lack of accommodation for ethnic minorities when they were going to schools. This lack of accommodation ranged from what kind of food was served, to the lack of diversity in peers, and to the lack of diversity in celebration of religious holidays. All of the participants who grew up during this time period also noted that things had changed for the better over the years. In contrast, participants who went to school during the late 1990s and the early 21st century did not allude to a lack of diversity and accommodation, yet they felt quite strongly about discrimination and white privilege, even though accommodation has almost now crossed into the realm of the surreal. Moreover, the generational divide also shows a shift in the changing dynamic in Canada. For example, as Babar pointed out, when he was going to school in the early 1970s, the common enemy were Francophones and Quebecois- illogically logical since the memories of the October crisis were still fresh in people's mind. Further, Babar also pointed out that he did not feel discriminated against since Ottawa at that point in time did not have many Pakistani-Canadians, and, therefore, there were not many people to be discriminated against, perhaps.

Fourth, by and large all the participants in this study, with there being little difference on the basis of geography or generation, had similar views in the terms of what constituted discrimination. They noted that discrimination meant being treated differently on the basis of one's

religious, cultural, ethnic, national, and religious background. While this is the standard definition of what constitutes racism, some participants believed that an edge or additional advantage to minorities at the expense of the dominant majority was needed to level the playing field. While some participants did say that white people's anger is partly justified because they feel that they are being discriminated against because of quotas, they (white people) should understand that this is needed to rectify centuries of oppression. Perhaps all those who call for "equity" and not "equality" need to explain whether past injustices or the effects of past injustices will ever be ameliorated? If so, what is the yardstick for measuring these changes? Moreover, in strict terms, is "the only way to stop discrimination on the basis of race, is to stop discriminating on the basis of race?" (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District).

Another point that may be extracted from the views of participants is that some perceived that black people face more discrimination than Pakistanis and Indians (South Asians). One participant also added the LGBTQI2* community to the list. Oppression Olympics is the term that comes to mind (Yuval-Davis, 2012). To put it simply, the term oppression Olympics implies that as an epistemological starting point, the ethno-socio-political positioning of women of color should be the starting point (Yuval-Davis, 2012). The problem with such an approach is that initially it started out as a feminist idea that gender should be the starting point; then race was added, after that came sexual orientation, then came disability, then gender identity was added. It is a dangerous path that has may have created a mockery of intersectionality and what intersectionality stood for. It is also condescending and demeaning to people who are lumped together and seen as victims by otherwise well-meaning individuals.

Fifth, participants also felt that white privilege was rampant in society. The participants noted that the existence of white privilege was evident when observing factors ranging from

uneven structures defined by those in power to favor their race, to white people being unable to recognize their own privilege. The latter point may strike some as problematic as it assumes no agency on the part of individuals, takes away their judgment as being able to see "discrimination," and is a blanketed statement that uses the yardstick of skin color to judge individuals without consideration of their socioeconomic background while those who blare the bullhorn of white privilege may claim to be intersectional, a class based Marxist analyst escapes them. In an era with heightened racial tensions, with demagogues from Indonesia to Brazil who have successfully tapped into the resentment and anger felt by the majority in their countries to be victorious in democratically held elections, it would probably be fruitful for social scientists, academics and those engaged in bringing about constructive social change to refrain from using blanketed terms and concepts. Twenty-one years ago, the late American philosopher Richard Rorty in a series of (prophetic) lectures warned about the usage of such broad terms and concepts; a prediction which came to fruition not only in the United States but throughout the globe, and which merits to be quoted in detail:

> Labor unions and unskilled workers will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported and they will further realize that suburban white-collar workers, themselves desperately afraid of being downsized, are not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else. At this point something will crack. The non-suburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking for a strongman to vote for—someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots.
>
> The gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will very likely be wiped out, jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words 'nigger' and 'kike' will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism, which the academic Left, has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet (Rorty, 1998, p. 69)

And an outlet it did find. The hatred, a strong term, yet it does depict the state of the union throughout the world has become toxic. Discrimination on the basis of race certainly does exist and perhaps in the lifetime of the author it will not end, but individuals of color, including the participants in this study need to take allegations of racial discrimination with a grain of salt. The recent case of Jesse Smollett who became the poster child for activists fighting for the cause of social justice is an example of how an allegation should be treated as an allegation and not as the gospel truth.

White privilege was something that almost all participants felt quite strongly about and narrated that it was pervasive, and that white people did not even know that it existed. There are a few problems with such a broad-based, wide ranging presumptions and statements. White privilege may not be as pervasive as the common perception is amongst social justice activists as well as the participants in this study. One common theme that the participants raised when it came to white privilege was that people of color are shot indiscriminately by law enforcement a fact, which certainly is true. However, data strongly suggests that the highest number of people who were shot dead by the police in 2018 were Caucasians. In the United States, for example, out of the 998 victims of fatal shootings by the police, 456 (45.69 percent) victims were white, 229 (22.94 percent) victims were black and 165 (16.53 percent) were Hispanic (Washington Post, 2018). Since 2000, compared to the United States, Canada has had 461 police shootings. Data indicates that almost half of the victims were Caucasians, followed by Black-Canadians who constituted almost 37 percent of the fatalities (Marcoux & Nicholson, 2018). Perhaps in our zeal to bring about equality and rectify the past we should not forget that injustice anywhere is injustice everywhere.

Moreover, the blanketed term “white” is also problematic. Minorities take offense when they are lumped together with Asians, Africans, East Indians and so on, yet there is no problem

with lumping fair skinned individuals together as “white” even though they come from diverse and different backgrounds. A principle is only legitimate and worth something if it is applied equally and across the board. In terms of race relations and identification, it unfortunately is not.

Six, the alleged existence of racism within minority groups was another significant finding to emerge from the participants’ stories. One participant had experienced discrimination, while growing up, at the hands of Aboriginal people while some participants believed that people of Pakistani descent or from Pakistani backgrounds had racist attitudes in relation to Indigenous and black people. Such views indicate and support the conjecture that racism is not just the “privilege” of white people but is also a malaise, which afflicts racial “minorities” in multicultural, and multiethnic countries. Minorities who are oppressed and marginalized in the past and continue to be marginalized and oppressed take out their anger, their frustration and their ire on another minority that is comparatively smaller in size and weaker in at least physical numbers. Many scholars have documented such a lateral violence mindset and while it is beyond the scope of this study to propose solutions to this issue, it is worth nothing (Clark 2004; Krishnamurthy, 2013; Monnat, 2010; Phoniex & Tizzard, 2005).

5.7 Conclusions

This chapter examined the participants’ views in relation to identity and how they perceived their dual Pakistani-Canadian identity to be, how were their identities shaped through the experiences they faced growing up, and whether after reaching the age of maturity their experiences still continue to shape their identities. The chapter also explored the participants’ views about what they believe constituted discrimination and there was a uniform consensus amongst participants that discrimination existed when one is judged on the basis of religion, race

and color. The Charter also guarantees that, “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability” (Part I- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.15).

The participants also harbored a strong resentment against the Caucasian majority and an overwhelming majority believed that white privilege was a malaise that was pervasive in Canadian society, structures exist which give white people dominance over people of color and that even well-meaning white people are not cognizant of their privilege. Finally, participants also felt that there was interethnic and well as intra-ethnic racism shaping relationships in society. The former implying that people of Pakistani descent considered black people to be inferior and even within the Pakistani diaspora in Canada, both first and second-generations, considered themselves to be more equal than other Pakistanis.

What do these occasionally uniform and differing views of the participants on discrimination tell us about them? What role have the experiences that the participants faced throughout their lives and continue to encounter play in shaping their identities in terms of their fidelity and love for the land of their birth? What dynamic does the angst that participants felt for the dominant majority play in shaping their views on radicalization to violence, and acts of violence committed by Pakistani-Canadians who were born in Canada? What do the participants think are the triggers that can push an individual so far that s/he is willing not only to give up her/his life but also to take the life of innocent Canadians? These questions and other similar questions are addressed in the next chapter through the participant’s stories.

CHAPTER 6

RADICALIZATION

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the participant's views about the root causes and triggers that might push a second-generation Pakistani immigrant towards radicalization. As was seen in Chapter 2, numerous theories endeavor to explain the process and the causes, which lead to radicalization. We will explore whether some of those theories can be connected to the viewpoints of the participants or whether the participant's opinions and stories challenge these prevalent theories about radicalization, and whether a new-grounded theory based on the experiences and perceptions of at risk individuals can be arrived at.

Theories of radicalization to violence in the context of terrorism associated with Islam generally hold that the process of radicalization commences with a feeling of alienation and isolation that may stem from factors such as experiencing racism and discrimination at the hands of society leading to a conflicted and weak identity (Borum, 2003; Hafez & Mullens, 2015; Wicktorowicz, 2005). This is followed by an individual finding solace with a narrative that provides her/him with the missing pieces of their identity, i.e., an ideology to live (and die) for. Finally, once an individual is deeply entrenched into their new-found ideology, the ultimate step is to execute an act that would further the cause of the ideology (see Chapter 2). The nuances depicted in the participant's viewpoints are examined in this chapter.

This chapter outlines themes that emerged inductively from the interviews. The participants' stories are presented, followed by an analysis of the data as well as a presentation of the key findings. The following broad themes were revealed:

1. Deep-rooted, underlying psychological issues lead an individual towards radicalization to violence and ultimately to committing an act of violence.
2. Root causes of an individual's journey towards radicalization can be found in a confused and conflicted identity that is partly a result of the "public/private divide" a second-generation Pakistani-Canadian faces living in Canada.
3. The reasons individuals become radicalized and join extremist terror outfits are analogous to the reasons and dynamics as to why certain individuals join criminal gangs.
4. The media labels Muslims as terrorists when they commit an act of violence that results in de-humanizing and collectively blaming the entire Muslim-Canadian population for the terror act. However, when an individual belonging to the dominant majority commits an act of violence, the media searches for justifications to downplay the violent act usually noting that the perpetrator had mental health issues.
5. Radicalization is also caused by exogenous factors. The Muslim community in Canada is influenced by the role of Saudi Arabia in funding and spreading an extreme version of Islam through providing financial resources to mosques and Imams in Canada.

These themes broadly summarize the participants' views about what would cause an otherwise "normal" Canadian to become so angry that s/he would be willing to murder innocent fellow Canadians in the name of religion, ethnonationalist identity, and ideology.

6.2 The "Triggers"

What are the triggering events, which cause an individual to make the proverbial leap of faith and join an extremist organization or advocate its ideology? According to the participants in this study, events and dynamics, which can trigger the journey towards radicalization to violence include:

1. Mental Health Issues
2. Identity (lack thereof)
3. Role of the Media
4. Role of the Muslim Community/failure of the Muslim Community
5. External Factors

6.2.1 Mental Health Issues

For almost every participant, radicalization was a result of mental health issues faced by individuals. Farheen framed it as follows:

> FARHEEN: Maybe it's individual to be honest. I don't think it has anything to do with faith. The more experiences I have attained in life, I have started to believe that it's a given choice. I don't think those people are right to do that, I don't agree with it at all, but to take anything to that extent to kill someone, I think it has to do with some mental issue, it's not normal. To take the extremes because you are angry, acting on anger we know it's not normal, not the right thing to do. Yeah, so I don't think if all of Pakistanis that were born and raised here were feeling the same anger, feeling a lot of [pause]
>
> I don't think it's its normal to feel what these people are feeling because they may look a lot like they are taking a different route. How is that different that anyone else who has been given different challenges in life? Why is it okay for some people to act out that way and not for certain people who were raised in a different way?

A person is vulnerable to be radicalized to violence not because of that person's faith or where s/he was born and raised but because of their lived experiences. An individual's personal and psychological make-up causes some second-generation Pakistanis to be radicalized. Saima elaborated on this point using the nature versus nurture argument:

> SAIMA: I feel like it probably is more of a personality trait than more nature-versus-nurture. That would be more nature rather than nurture. It might make you more like radicalized. It could happen anywhere. There is no correlation, I think, between growing up here and becoming radicalized. If somebody already has those preconceived notions of culture, religion, like what a religious person should look like and then they bring it here or bring it anywhere for any matter, it would probably –not because they were born here but because they want to show everybody something that they feel is more innate.

Saima's argument about an individual's personal make-up being the cause of radicalization can be partly accepted as valid. However, while the "demons" may be inside an individual, the triggers to radicalization can both be micro as well as macro- in the case of Islamist radicalization macro triggers usually are at play; an example, the most notorious amongst many others is the story of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh.

Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh was born in the UK to Pakistani immigrants. A gifted individual, Sheikh was at one time the London junior chess champion as well as a karate black belt. Later on Sheikh would graduate from the London School of Economics (The Guardian, 2005). Sheikh's life took a change for the evil when he went to Bosnia during the war in the Balkans as part of the Convoy of Mercy and saw the genocide, which had been perpetrated against Muslims. After what he saw, Sheikh became radicalized to the extent that he planned and executed the Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002 and is now on death row in Pakistan (The Guardian, 2005). The example of Sheikh, while not a Canadian one, is instructive for policy makers and law enforcement: global events which affect Muslims, currently the genocide (or what the United Nations has labeled as ethnic cleansing, even though the actions of the Myanmar state meets the criteria of a genocide set out in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention)[13] against the

[13] In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

Rohingyas can be a ripe tool for recruiting at risk second-generation Canadian youth, just as Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh was back in the 1990s.

Merjan also considered the lack of analyzing mental health issues amongst youth who are at risk of radicalization or who have been radicalized to violence as a missing piece of the puzzle. When I asked her that according to her if things had changed for the better in Canada in terms of interracial relations, what then explained the behavior of the members of the Toronto 17 and other second-generation Pakistan-Canadians who felt completely alienated from main stream Canadian society, Merjan explained:

> MERJAN: So, I can only speak from my perspective that things have changed in my realm. Again, I am what? Two decades older than these kids, so I can't speak on their behalf. I can only say that I know I had it rough and I know I could've been one of these kids. If this is still happening, then we have a problem. A couple of things we also need to ascertain, not everyone is sane, there are mental health issues, their family has been destructive, they are foster kids, they are abused- no one seems to investigate these pieces in those children. So, I think that too needs to be considered as to numbers, radicalization and who is radicalizing.

The views of the respondents clearly indicate that in their opinion second-generation Pakistani Canadians who have been radicalized or are at risk of being radicalized have underlying mental health issues which need to be analyzed. Moreover, according to participants unless mental health issues are addressed, radicalization will never be completely defeated.

(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

6.2.2 Sense of Belonging (Lack Thereof)

Farheen felt that a major reason that people get involved in radical/extremist activities is because they feel shunned by and isolated from mainstream Canadian society and that the trigger is not anger, per se, as is commonly presumed. The primary trigger, which pushed a second-generation Pakistani-Canadian towards radicalization, according to Farheen is a sense of isolation and loneliness:

> FARHEEN: So, it could be that they were actually wanting to feel- oh my gosh- included in something, like by joining something, because they were feeling so isolated maybe this was an open door for them to be part of the community but obviously not the right choice but that was their purpose. They felt that, "oh, my gosh. I am part of something." So, I don't think its anger either. Anger has nothing to do with it. It's a mentality [pause] perception is huge I think. So, if one's perception is that um you know someone could be included into something, they are part of society, have friends and all but if their perception is they are alone, and they are feeling lonely, that's their perception, their going act on it. I don't think it has anything to do with it. It's about perceptions.

Farheen argued that why should Muslims as a collective whole feel embarrassed about a terrorist attack carried out by someone who is a fringe element? Why should 1.5 billion Muslims feel embarrassed and ashamed and accept blame for the acts of a handful of individuals who identify with the Islamic faith?

When I asked her what her reaction is when she sees the news about a terrorist attack, which has been executed by a second-generation Muslim, she responded in the following way:

> FARHEEN: When I don't know the name I'm just like it's not a Muslim person. But um, now I have kind of come to terms with that because a lot of people are becoming more educated, the more terrorism happens, the more they are reading up on Islam that's why you have so many converts to Islam right. The negative always has positive as well. Kind of like balances out. While it is unfortunate that these events happen, there is also hope that comes with them. Whenever I hear something like that on the news, it doesn't shock me because it has happened so often. Umm and it's just part of the world we live in. I am at a point where I don't get embarrassed, we are not one- we may be following the same faith but we clearly aren't, do you understand what I am saying? It's an individual thing.

However, Farheen also felt that there was a conspiracy at play to indict and convict Muslims, in the court of public opinion, at least. She considered that 9/11 was an event, which was not carried out by Muslims. According to Farheen, the complexity of 9/11 was such that it was clear that the tragedy was in fact a conspiracy to malign Muslims:

> FARHEEN: Yeah, because if you think of it, these people are coming from the third world, how did they figure out where to put bombs in the twin towers beforehand? Sorry, not bombs. How did they know how to navigate the planes, to pass through the security? It didn't make any sense. Was there a living a person to see this? It could be anybody, but of course they had to attack Islam, and say Muslims were there. All of a suddenly Bin Laden came up. Was it legit? I don't think so. I think it was just a way to enter into the country…the States is behind a lot of stuff, it's a cover. They put a face on it, like Bin Laden, Islam. All of these suicide bombers and stuff, it's a cover.

While Farheen herself is quite a peaceful individual, the fact that she firmly believes that 9/11 was a conspiracy to malign Muslims and Islam and that suicide bombers are part of a conspiracy hatched by the United States to wage a war against Islam is somewhat disturbing. However, Farheen is not the only Muslim who believes that 9/11 was a so-called inside job or that it never happened. For example, in a recent survey conducted in the UK with a sample of 3,000 respondents indicated that 52 percent of the respondents believed that 9/11 was carried out by Jews, 31 percent believed that the American government was behind it while only 4 percent believed that Al-Qaeda was the brains behind the attack (Business Insider, 2016). However, the survey also points out an interesting dynamic; out of the 3,000 respondents, 93 percent felt a strong allegiance to the United Kingdom and 78 percent supported government regulations to ensure that extremists do not teach in *madressahs* (Islamic religious seminaries) in the UK (Business Insider, 2016). So, while at one point some Muslims have deep-rooted skepticism about 9/11, they also are faithful and patriotic to the country of their birth and desire that violent extremists who use Islam as a weapon should be neutralized.

Saima noted that radicalization was in partly a result of a loss of identity and an individual's endeavor to regain that lost identity:

> SAIMA: It might be that maybe people here feel like they have to assimilate too much, too soon, or they feel like that there is no balance, either you can be one or the other. I don't think that's true. I think there is always moderation. Somebody who becomes radicalized or feels like they have to lean more towards one side, feels like there is no in-between, like you can either be Canadian or you can be Pakistani, and in Canada they don't want to kind of lose too much of their identity. So maybe because for that reason, they feel like they have to show others that they are who they are without compromising.
>
> I feel like there could be more on the personal, as opposed to say growing up in Canada or living here since a young age. Because all of my friends are like myself, and we don't hold any radical sort of views. We are very happy that we live here and all those things.

Saima raises a point about identity, which many participants also raised in the previous chapter. It is an either/or situation for many second-generation Pakistani-Canadians when it comes to issues of identity. Are they Canadian? Are they Pakistani? Are they stuck somewhere in the middle? If they accept the so-called Canadian values, will they lose their "core" identity? And as will be seen in the stories of participants in subsequent paragraphs, this confused identity (which was elaborated upon in the previous chapter) has a direct, causal relationship with an individual commencing their journey towards radicalization to violence.

Khaleeq, who is passionate about pre-empting and countering radicalization amongst second-generation Pakistani immigrants and de-radicalizing those who have already fallen into the abyss, had a detailed and multi-layered response about why an individual falls prey to radicalization; a response which needs to be read in detail to grasp the complexity of it. Khaleeq indicated that radicalization and joining a gang stem from the same reasons:

> KHALEEQ: One thing I can say is and draw a parallel between is that it's sort of the same thing between youth that were born and raised in Canada to the dominant majority, the Caucasians, they ask the same question, why their youth go into gang violence?
>
> For me I always think of those as common parallels, it's a sense of a loss of identity, it's a need to rebel, it's a need to belong, but not having a cause to rebel. A

> disconnect from the majority kind of middle ground opinions or thought processes. So when it comes to let's say a Caucasian family and their son is now getting involved with gang violence where does that come from? It comes from the fact that you know that he perceived that he was not being included in society, not being given the same opportunities. Was it factual or not?
> And then there is this need to rebel, this need to develop an identity and these groups that are you know, radical groups, they talk a lot about gangs here. They feed off of that where you have the young impressionable mind and then cay that we can give you protection or give you money or give you whatever you want, we will give you an identity, we will give you friends, but you have to spread our views. It's somewhat similar to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, right? When a child feels their needs aren't being fulfilled, they then have a sense of poor self-esteem and they gravitate towards whatever fulfills that need for them.

Since Khaleeq had raised an interesting analogy about gangs and violent extremist organizations manipulating the same vulnerabilities of youth who have conflicted identities and lack a sense of belonging, I asked him to explain further:

> KHALEEQ: We can see it like how gangs operate when it comes to criminal organizations, which operate the same way for me when it comes to radical groups. So, you have a youth who is given this narrative of being different from everybody else, you aren't ever going to fit in and that need for him to develop, how I am going to make money, survive how I am going to have an identity and then these groups would use that vulnerability to use that kid. So, all of those needs are there, and these groups take advantage.

As was seen in Chapter 2, Khaleeq's gang analogy is pretty much spot on. The same dynamics are usually at play when gangs as well as terrorist organizations recruit individuals. The major difference between the two is that gangs usually have a local or at best a national network, while terrorist cells have an international network, which does the planning and provides them with logistical and financial support.

Khaleeq also felt that the issue of radicalization was mistakenly considered as a zero-sum-game- the so called us v/s them binary, with the "them" being evil, period. Radicalization according to Khaleeq is a layered problem with underlying complexities; in a sense it is highly

intersectional. Khaleeq pointed out that Muslims similar to other groups, belong to different ethnic backgrounds, different genders and class. Religion is used as a primary identifying factor for Muslims because it is perhaps stronger than other markers of identity amongst some Muslims:

> KHALEEQ: I think one of the things, which come to saying that Muslims are singled out, one thing we miss out is which Muslims are we speaking about? We can talk about a South Asian Muslim, or we could be talking about an African American Muslim, or we could be talking about someone who is Caucasian, John something, who converted to Islam later on in life. There is a lot of intersectionality when it comes to using religion as a means of discrimination because religion is not something, which can inherently be seen as something written on your face. Somebody could look at me and say that I might be Indian, you know might be whatever. Umm what I think is that the issue does arise when it comes to more things that you know are based more on physical issues about the religion of Islam. For example, Muslims are singled out because if somebody sees them going to a mosque, or a woman wearing a hijab, that is where the focus is. Or it could also go down to issue that being singled out because of their race.
>
> An African American Christian they would have had the same discrimination leveled on them as an African American Muslim; it's just that (for some) individuals their Islamic identity is a lot stronger. The media then says "because I am Muslim" they don't always identify as African American, but they identify regularly as Muslims. If somebody asks me what are you? I may start off with the answer that I am Muslim rather than saying I am you know Pakistani-Canadian or so forth. So, I think that because religion is such a strong thing, and there are so many other identities and whether it's cultural background, your race or your gender because of which Muslims face discrimination, it is difficult to say.

Since Khaleeq had mentioned intersectionality in his earlier response yet at the same time he had also said that a Black Christian would face the same level of discrimination as a Black Muslim, I asked him to elaborate further. Specifically, when I asked Khaleeq whether the experiences of an aboriginal person who converted to Islam would be different than those of a white person who had converted to Islam, he offered:

> KHALEEQ: Yes. Because that person, one of them walking down the street, he who is aboriginal would be easily identifiable as an aboriginal male and then issues of prejudices would arise since they are aboriginal. Whereas, people that are Caucasian and tilt towards Islam, immediately that same shock factor is not there when they are walking down the street or go to a job interview or the name that pops up on the resume, they look to be the average male you know, John Doe.
>
> I think those experiences differ when it comes to all the other identities that will leak into religion itself. So, a female Muslim might have a very different experience

than male Muslims, even though they are from the same background, they are from the same culture, they grew up in the same area, their experiences would be very different. It wouldn't be based on their religion because they share that, or their culture because they share that. It would be based on the fact that one is a female, and one is a male.

When I asked Khaleeq whether identity amongst Muslims, or a loss of it may be a contributing factor towards radicalization, he disagreed:

KHALEEQ: I think it is an issue where that identity is coming from. So, somebody could face a loss of identity, which for that person could be changing their name from Mohammad to Mo. And you know to speak in a different way. People, even from the same culture, from the same background may have a different accent. So, if they are speaking to an interviewer for a job, they will make it sound whiter than it is. That's a loss of identity, loss of culture, something, which is changed in you. It maybe not the most beneficial ideal thing to have that personality but its not necessarily harmful. If identity, however, is found within a radicalized group, that could be a problem. So, I think a lot of it is a loss of identity, which may be a trigger.

A person who is fourth generation Canadian, whose great-great grandparents were from Pakistan, and his parents named him whatever, and who was born and raised and bred Canadian; they have lost their identity where they came from or where their roots were, but its nor something that's harmful. But if you found somebody who goes through the same thing, loss of identity, who loses those values, find their identity is not there, and tries to find it with a group offering it, that's where the issue is (of radicalization).

The "loss" of identity dynamic as elaborated upon by Khaleeq is a crucial element in understanding the process of radicalization. As a respondent posited earlier, some second-generation Pakistani Canadians try to be whiter than white, i.e., they forego a part of their identity to try and become a part of the mainstream majority. For some the journey is successful, but for others, as was elaborated upon in Chapter 2, the metaphorical melting pot leads to angst, anxiety, anger and ultimately radicalization to violence. The example of Omar Mateen (the Orlando shooter), an otherwise "westernized" individual who detested his ethno-religious identity, forego it completely to adopt what he considered to be the dominant identity, ultimately resulted in horrific and tragic violence.

Similar to some of the other participants, Zainab also conceived that radicalization and radicalized individuals as being gang members since both have the same triggers and elements such as identity or a lack thereof, as well as past traumas, which have been left unaddressed and adversely affect an individual's mental health:

> ZAINAB: If it's Muslim specifically, I think there is a lot of anger in some parts of the community. But mostly, the vast majority that I have seen, use that anger constructively. They will do social work, they will help their communities, they will do research. They express it in ways that are helpful, that are fruitful in most ways, and maybe again, ones who—. I don't know. I haven't read much on this specific issue, so I don't really know, but I think there is some sense of—, I think whatever we see in men who join gangs or other forms of groups would be relevant.
>
> If you are looking at white guys who join white supremacist groups, I think that there can be parallels between them and being radicalized. I think that there are parallels between them and Muslim radicals. Certain identification, desire of identification, belonging, looking for something that's missing. In their history there is trauma in their lives they are unable to deal with and not causing certain problems, so I think that it's a combination of things. Outside of being Muslims, it's about mental health, identification, masculinity, those types of things.

However, the loss of identity, consciously or otherwise, is not the only element in the process of radicalization. According to Faiza, the dynamics of having parents who came from a different background and the nuances, dynamics and cultural beliefs associated with those backgrounds (a theme which is explored later on) could also be one of the first steps towards radicalization. Faiza believed that radicalization in part could stem from both familial (home) as well as external (school, society in general) dynamics:

> FAIZA: I definitely think the environment that you are in, I guess the school environment, right, it makes a difference. How your peers—there is a huge peer pressure—so you don't fit in or if you don't want to be a part of things, then of course that can trigger a lot- that can lead to a lot of things. Umm, so yeah, peer pressure is definitely a major one. Besides that, other triggers I would say could be family. When I was growing up, I wasn't allowed to do a lot of things that my friends were allowed to do. It depended on how I chose that.
>
> So, if I was not capable of handling it or if I wasn't capable to understand then maybe I would have gone on the wrong side. Got involved in wrong crowds, wrong things or you know just the extremes of whatever. Umm, so I guess it all depends

on the person's mentality/personality as well of how they can manipulate (adjust) the situation for their own good.

Javeria argued that one's home environment and the way one is raised makes a difference between an individual living a peaceful life or crossing over to the dark side:

> JAVERIA: A lot of it has to do with the home environment. Depends on the type of the home environment that a child is coming from depending on the values the parents are teaching kids, if they are teaching kids that you know what we follow whatever we believe, our background, that's fine. However, if you are crossing the limits, then you know what we don't care about the laws and regulations here and do what we want. That's a problem. A lot of it comes from the home, how parents raise their kids you know, the values that are instilled.
>
> If the parents don't have time for the kids because of work and so they are not paying attention with whom their child is being involved with, if they are getting into trouble, making wrong friends, it can go the wrong way, to the other extreme. Whether you are radicalized, whatever. So that shouldn't have to do anything with the culture you live in, it depends on your own values, your parents what they gave you, your upbringing.

Javeria's view indicates that one major reason for radicalization is the broken connection between parents and their children. Moreover, Javeria makes an interesting point about immigrant parents crossing a line when they tell their children that the laws of Canada are in contradiction with the cultural and religious values the parents brought over from their home countries. For example, barring daughters, at times forcefully, from not dating, is illegal under Canadian law once the daughter has reached the age of majority. Moreover, when children see their Caucasian counterparts intermingling freely, it creates a sense of insecurity amongst some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, which could be one element of the radicalization process, as Javeria so eloquently pointed out.

Zain, the youngest of all the respondents was of the opinion that if a young second-generation Pakistani-Canadian feels left out from mainstream, that is a potential trigger for radicalization:

ZAIN: I think people resort to that because of how people perceive them. You know it also depends on mental and physical abuse and the only way to deal with it is to take it out on others I guess. I mean again I am really not sure about this because I haven't experienced discrimination but that's how I will describe it. So maybe if someone is a Muslim and is ostracized for being Muslim and getting ignored, you know, makes them feel like they are entitled to do these terrible things.

Zain seemed to contend that radicalization to violence had two separate yet intertwined and interrelated components: first being abused either physically, psychologically or both over the years. Second, feeling left out, feeling shunned because of one's religious identity, in this case the religious identity of being a Muslim. When individuals, especially younger individuals feel humiliated and discriminated again, they desire empowerment and revenge. And that is exactly what groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have to offer to these vulnerable individuals.

Natasha felt that the feeling of isolation amongst some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians coupled up with a flawed interpretation of Islam was a major cause that young, impressionable minds could end up accepting the message of hate being spread around by recruiters of violence:

NATASHA: I think a lot of it is to do with isolation. A really big problem is when youth are not exposed to what true Islam is they turn towards the internet, that's how we know right. Older generations had the advantage of tradition; I feel like our generation is based on googling and on the internet. That can be a very big problem. If you stumble upon a website or a wrong person and you talk to them, it's dangerous. You know what I am not very learned about Islam, I know what I know, so if someone is talking to me with fancy word, holy words, I won't know where I would go. So, these kids you know they are lost, they are influenced by someone who is very learned, someone who is more radical, and then they will just think that it's true.

Especially at an impressionable age if you find someone who is a role model, it's very hard for you to see the wrong in them, you become like you idolize them, you look up to them and they can't do any wrong…I live amongst Pakistanis who are Muslims, my age, you know like it's a sense of belonging. It's really hard to make friends if you are in an area which is more white, you feel isolated, you can feel like the other, you know you can really sympathize with people who feel like the other, and the whole mentality and that's maybe how they get radicalized, when

> they look at other people feel left out. I understand what they are saying, I belong somewhere, they are right. That could be a huge reason (for radicalization).

The feeling of isolation while living in neighborhood, which is predominantly white, was a recurring theme throughout the interviews. Isolation leads to youth alienation, which ultimately may lead to their radicalization towards violence. Moreover, as Natasha said, the internet for all its advantages has become quite a useful tool to recruit at-risk individuals. The recommendations chapter of this study will outline some steps the Government may take to balance two competing rights: the right to access to information v/s the right of the public to be free from future violent attacks.

Natasha also suggested that it was not just the internet and access to it which was the main contributing factor towards radicalization; it was one of the factors. She believed that a key element, which could be instrumental in saving young people from being radicalizing was the Muslim community itself:

> NATASHA: The biggest issue is I think isolating children, kids are different now, you can't expect them to have the same views as our parents or grandparents had. I feel like they need to be accommodated and more programs should be held by the community to show what Islam really is to these children so that may make a difference in countering radicalization. The biggest thing is isolation and Muslims who are practicing Islam, can make a difference (in this context).

Similar to Khaleeq, the radicalization "game" was not a zero-sum for Natasha. In fact, intersectionality was an explanation and the way that the media constructed a narrative in the wake of a terrorist attack, which was committed by a person who identified as a Muslim was not only simplistic but deeply flawed:

> NATASHA: I feel like even when its not Muslims, there is always this Middle Eastern thing before an identity has been established. "Oh, this is a man of Middle Eastern descent." Until they find out who the actual person is, they think it's a Middle Eastern person, the whole continent is Muslim, whoever, whatever, no Christians, just Muslims. Its very irresponsible for news outlets to propagate such information; if a person …I listen to the news so until I know the identity of the person how can I judge? But people they just

presume it's a Muslim and that creates so much unnecessary issue for people whore are Muslims and look Middle Eastern. I wear the hejab, the very symbol of the Muslim woman. Men can get away, but Muslim women they look Muslim, that's why there were so many issues when I was in high school, something if I remember correctly, about Muslim women being attacked on buses. My parents were so scared that they didn't want me to use the bus, and I told them I need to bus, how will I get to school otherwise? A friend of mine who was reading a newspaper in the subway coming to school, an elderly white gentleman yanked it out of her hand and said, "you aren't allowed to read the news if you are the one making it." And the things that are said about us, and going anywhere, walking anywhere, it's so unfair.

Natasha's story indicates, amongst many other things, a key factor, which pushes vulnerable second-generation Pakistanis to join radical groups: the feeling of being humiliated, and being powerless, especially in the public sphere. The fact that an individual snatched the newspaper that Natasha's teenaged friend was reading on a bus and was told in not so many words that because of her looks she was probably a terrorist, could have possibly left her scarred for a long time; scarred and angry. And humiliation when it leads to anger is a potent recipe for individuals to resort to violence. This dynamic is not just restricted to second-generation Pakistani-Canadians; it is perhaps a human condition found globally. In a study conducted by British sociologist Nicola Khan (Khan, 2010) in which she conducted interviews with hitmen for an ethno-nationalist organization, one theme, which emerged was that the hitmen resorted to violence because they felt humiliated as a minority group at the hands of the state. Whether it is the state, which is the cause of humiliation or whether it be society at large, humiliation may lead to radicalization towards violence.

While Natasha did not directly say that racial profiling could push someone into the ever-hating arms of extremist groups, her experiences, and the passion in her voice as she narrated them indicated the intensity she felt about the issue:

NATASHA: People who are white they also commit a crime, black people have it worse anyway, always seen as criminals, even if they are like 15 or so. All I can say is that they have that issue anyways. It's mostly just white people who are immune; they can do

> crimes, but they don't fear, people who look like them are safe. No person should be that. If someone who even looks similar to me commits a crime, I am paying for it. I didn't do it; why do I have to pay for it? People have jeered at me from their cars, in public. I am just going to school, I am not doing anything, I am not a terrorist.

Natasha also felt that the perception amongst Pakistani-Canadians, especially second-generation Pakistani-Canadians that they were not accepted by the dominant majority, i.e., white people, resulted in one feeling as a misfit in Canada. Such a feeling of being ostracized (perceived or real) could be a possible trigger to an individual's journey down the road of radicalization:

> NATASHA: We will never be white. You know we are who we are; we have to be okay with that. I think that because you have this issue you will never be them, no matter how much you become them. Doesn't matter if you completely abandon your own values and everything, your own identity, you will never still be them. It could drive someone crazy. I have tried my hardest and it's also subconscious. Who you hang out with, where you live and stuff, you really need that value, you know.
>
> When you don't have it you kind of feel like I want to be like them white people. When that doesn't happen, you turn to religion and to radicals because you feel that they are preaching what you are feeling. It's this subconscious thing, and you relate to them not because you want to be with them, but you feel as if its right, it's relatable. You think that this is Islam, this is what I have been taught you know.

"You will never still be them." When Natasha said these words, the author was in a sense shocked, but more than shocked it was depressing. To hear, a competent individual, who has worked hard throughout her life to reach the level where she is at now, say that we can never be "them" is problematic on multiple fronts. First, the beauty of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society, which Canada prides itself to be lies in the different races, religions and value sets which make up this country. Second, if non-white individuals, as Natasha alluded, try to be white, it is deeply problematic that an individual wants to abandon their cultural unique cultural values just to "fit in." Third, the blanketed statement "to be white," just like the term "Canadian values" is quite vague. What exactly does it mean to be "white?" No respondent had an answer to that question.

Zameer (chief of staff to a Member of a Provincial Parliament) articulated that the issue of radicalization is not confined to those who belong to a challenged socio-economic background. Even otherwise seemingly "normal" Canadians belonging to the middle-class could be lured into it:

> ZAMEER: You see you can have umm when I read the/those stories about the Toronto 18, they were no different than X (referring to the MPP he serves) and I. And their parents were here in Canada. They were of South Asian heritage etc. But somewhere along the line they took it upon themselves that the system, they were probably led to believe, failed them, I can only speculate. And its definitely (an issue). I remember there was a case in Ottawa where there were three individuals, one of whom was a pathologist, I think. They were earning like a high amount of money.
>
> It can't be about education, they had that. It could be that they were missing something in their lives. And that void they had was then filled with propaganda and hate and took the interpretation of the narrative they wanted to hear and decided to act upon that. They are no different than many other Canadians who have a beef with the system, yet we just label it differently.

Zameer's views transcend a class-based Marxist analysis. As he mentioned, radicalized second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, usually belong to families who are economically strong. For Zameer, similar to other individuals, individuals at risk of being radicalized are usually those who have some sort of void in their lives: perhaps its spiritual, perhaps its professional, perhaps it is intellectual. But the void exists according to almost every participant in this study and eventually the individual finds solace in radicalized views, and radicalized outfits.

Merjan, who is a PhD student and is interested in researching on violence amongst youth in Canada, believed that individuals who were attracted to radicalization were basically trying to fill an emptiness in their lives. Because of a feeling of being alienated from mainstream society, young people tried to find their "core" identity elsewhere; and occasionally, this quest results in recruiters manipulating these alienated, lost souls;

> MERJAN: I am going to be honest. I understand it. It's coming from a lot of extreme that people need to recognize. We are saying that e.g. Trump's America- if you look at them, they are radicalizing as well and showing it. So, since a minority can't radicalize

politically on a larger scale, they are now radicalizing based on where they are being recruited by some groups. So, radicalization needs to be investigated a little bit further. When I was a teenager if someone came and recruited me, I would have gone. So, the question is why? Because of the abuse, the racism, the lack of integration within the school system for people like myself who are Canadian but can't follow along the main let's say European construct and that's okay. You don't have, to but inclusion and you know working on it is very important. I'm not asking for you to change. I think all information is important, but the inclusion part is the key here.

That being said there is also a problem as to what is being infiltrated to the youth they are trying to look for identity and that's the danger of the people who are recruiting them. So, if I am confused about my identity, which I was, where do I belong right? And I go to Pakistan for one year, against my parent's wishes, if I had not gone, I am not sure how I would be today. They need for belonging [pause] the question is who does it and how is it done?

Merjan also did not believe that merely applying a Marxist class-based analysis to the issue of radicalization could explain the problem and its dynamics in its entirety. For her, if someone from a strong socio-economic background fell prey to recruiters, one needed to go beyond a class-based analysis, adopt a more intersectional approach and examine and analyze the issue from various different angles:

MERJAN: I think it's a combination of things not a black and white, 1+1=2 answer. I think again it's a whole person; its family dynamic, its cultural pressures, it could be a few bad experiences and also who they are hanging out with? So, there is a responsibility as to where they are getting information from. So, if they are also now radicalized within their faith that too is a problematic factor, but who becomes radicalized in the faith is of interest. I know some people say they are coming from a wealthy background. But what's the family life like? No one talks about sexual abuse; no one talks about other things that are going on. So, this is a deeper issue because I know I would have turned, and I'll tell you why I would've turned. I could not speak to my parents; they had no idea I was bullied every single day in high school. So, if I am lonely and have no one to talk to, there is a generational gap that is there. Neglect could be a lot of thing, which affects this radicalization process.

Neglect at the hands of parents, abuse, psychological as well as physical, and alienation from society are some of the core elements that may lead second-generation Pakistani youth towards radicalization. Moreover, the fact that these second-generation individuals felt a severe disconnect between themselves and their parents, also made them feel as if they were lost; as if no

one understood them. Such vulnerability is ripe to be manipulated by preachers in the name of Islam.

A parallel between Aboriginal youth who had committed suicide and Muslim youth who were at risk of being radicalized could also be drawn. Merjan outlined that the key issue, the primary commonality, between the two analogies was a lack of belonging as well as the stigma associated with belonging to communities, which are looked down upon by mainstream Canadian society:

> MERJAN: I have started streamlining indigenous suicides with radicalization and I will explain why. So, suicide faith wise is a sin, right? So, they (Muslim youth) can't take that route so they go on a different route. So, the main issue is belonging. And parents of Muslim youth and indigenous communities should have counselors or safe spaces, within today's terminology, where people can communicate openly and freely, shamelessly. There are sexuality issues within Muslim communities as in indigenous communities, there are issues around let's say just feeling connected, there is demonizing of being a Muslim today.
>
> > I can't even imagine growing up and looking at the TV and it's like you are a terrorist, you are a Muslim, you are a terrorist. That's psychologically harmful. I can't be mad at a kid who wants to freak out at the world because in a 17-year old's mind, everyone is watching them, they are the center of attention and then leaving the house and going out thinking, does this guy think I am a suicide bomber? I'd be freaked out, I don't know. So, this has to be considered, and with Indigenous youth, the same thing.

This was a very interesting parallel that Merjan drew, if not a distinction with a difference. I asked Merjan that how could one consider suicide committed by a youth which takes their own life and a suicide bombing which not only kills the bomber himself but also results in the deaths of multiple innocent people who had no link or relationship to either bomber or his perceived enemies? Merjan's response went into the deeper contextual aspect about the analogy she had offered:

> MERJAN: First part is different context. So, if Indigenous youth had, I mean that being said, look at the statistics in gang activities, Indigenous youth are high in there. We

have to look at radicalization as gangs. So, you have taken some body and the gangs also kill a number of people. Access to weapons is very different for each group. But the baseline, the similarities both are dealing with: most hated groups, indigenous groups are well more hated to be more honest; they are seen as of less value, Muslims are seen as a threat.

So, if I take both the youth, they will have a lot of similarities in the conversation I'm supposing, this is theoretical so I'm presuming. But I have seen similarities in what is occurring here. Also, too we have to remember that it's a sin to commit suicide. That being said gang activity is quite high with the Indigenous population.

For Aamir, radicalization was not a simple, one-tiered problem, which could be blamed either on mainstream society or on the individual himself. Radicalization in part stemmed from one shunning mainstream society and its norms as those norms were not allowed to be adopted because of religious issues:

AAMIR: Basically I would say like there is lack of understanding, there, like I honestly want to say that they were brought up in such a like I don't know what their background is or anything, I am thinking maybe they were so sheltered, so just like being put into under control of somebody telling them this is how it is, and they have been so enamored and closed off, that they don't realize like people are normal, people are okay, sure they might not be, not doing the same thing as you, they are drinking, dating etc.

I think from that they became angry almost to the sense that maybe it was a battle for them not to do it maybe. Maybe they felt like they should have something too. But like they can't have it because of their religion so they use their religion as a way to, to try to take out what they have, like the people (white people) have and they can't have. I don't actually understand how you could go down that route anyhow.

The respondents also noted that a major cause of radicalization of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians was due to alienation and such alienation was a result of underlying identity issues. These identity issues revolved around childhood experiences, being insecure about a unique yet dual ethnonational identity and the perception that people of lighter skin pigmentation were preferred. Finally, because of the emptiness individuals feel because of an insecure identity, much like people who join gangs, radicalized individuals seek belonging with extremist outfits and

ideologies which can ultimately lead to them committing acts of violence against fellow Canadians.

6.2.3 "Fake" News and Its Role

Almost every respondent alluded to the negative role of the media in covering acts of violence. In a nutshell, the respondents asserted that when a white male carries out violence, the media always digs deeper and tries to uncover that person's individual as well as social background. However, if an act of violence is committed by a Muslim, the media immediately uses the term "terrorist" to label the alleged perpetrator, thereby, demonizing him.

Information or rather misinformation is a major factor in radicalizing young and impressionable minds, and a huge factor is not the mainstream media, but social media websites which feed the narrative of an anti-minority Leviathan and law enforcement. Khaleeq framed it in the following way:

> KHALEEQ: I think a lot of it just comes from the media, but it depends on what kind of media outlets are being utilized by the youth. A lot of youngsters my age or younger wouldn't consider watching CNN or Fox or any of those channels. What they will watch are YouTube videos e.g. where someone films an interaction between the cops and minority groups and says this is how the government will always treat minorities and hyper-sensationalizes that story.
>
> So, I think that for our generation the issue is not the mainstream media and the portraying of narratives. People who are adults don't sit around watching mainstream media anyway. It comes from alternative media where everyone has a cell-phone and a camera, everyone has a Facebook page where they can read an article and form their own opinions.
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> So, it's this alternative social media which kind of feeds into that narrative of social justice warriors. That it's this horrible issue going around and the only way you can solve it is through radical means. Instead of that the only way you can solve it is through raising your voice. You can stop this by being a functional member of society, by being a proactive member of society.

Similar to other respondents, Zameer considered the role of the media and labeling an entire group (Pakistani/Muslim-Canadians) due to the actions of a perpetrator/perpetrator to be unfair

and unjust. Labeling, according to Zameer, was a major issue in alienating some Pakistani-Canadians from the body politic of Canada. As a result, some individuals could feel so isolated, lose any sense of belonging they had to their country of birth, that they would be easy prey for recruiters. Zameer argued that a crime was a crime and it was problematic that identity politics is used to mould the truth in order for it to fit a particular narrative:

> ZAMEER: That's the only issue I have is that you change the language for a different demographic that has a beef with the system, is aggressive to the system and they commit crimes, yet they are labeled differently from someone with a different background. That aspect, the aspect, which I dislike is what I call identity politics. And that's my biggest issue here and that plays into all factors etc. Overall, they (radicalized individuals) are a fringe group and they don't represent the mainstream.

The media's lack of responsibility and its routine indulgence in hyperbole, a common theme which was alluded to by several participants, also played a role in pushing some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians to the fringes. The difference in the terminology used for the dominant majority, white people, when they committed a crime and for Muslims when they committed an act of violence was unfair, biased and something which needed to be changed since it transmitted the message that Muslims were the others; an inferior, inherently violent group whose fidelities were with their faith and not with their country of birth:

> MERJAN: When something happens, a lot of times psychological evaluation is never looked into. There is this lack of sensitivity; humanizing the brown person is never done. Immediately if there is someone who is white, they are humanized immediately, like what was going on, a whole background check about their life experiences. I rarely hear about that with those kids who would do anything, what was going on in their house? Investigating their psychological state etc. etc. and how did they get involved? Like an actual caring lens, not a blaming lens. Because they are young, this is not something in here is a disease. Let's fix it.

It should not in principle make a difference whether an act of violence committed by a Pakistan-Canadian had international roots and was labeled terrorism, while an act of violence committed by a white person was not. Merjan articulated that it was flawed labeling:

> MERJAN: I'll say why is it that I am linked to a Pakistani thing, if anyone did anything, a crazy group? Why would I be linked there? Oh, I wonder why, because I have been labeled that already, of course I'm going to go where I am connected to. You have made me Pakistani from day one. I am Canadian born so yeah this is not about choosing your group and the group comes to you. Society has also continuously told me that I don't belong, so I am going to go where I belong, that makes sense to me. It's not shocking, it's pretty basic. Where are you gonna go? Where society told you to go.

Merjan, similar to other respondents felt that labels matter; creating a distinction with a difference when it comes to acts of mass violence committed by a Muslim and act of mass violence committed by a person belonging to the dominant majority, is a major factor in imparting a discriminatory message to Muslims; some of whom may then lash out in the most violent of ways imaginable.

The role of the media in "othering" Muslims, was unfair, unjust and ultimately a dangerously potent weapon for recruiters belonging to extremist organizations. Aamir felt that the media painted Muslims as violent demons who were labeled as terrorists because of the faith they followed:

> AAMIR: Just because like someone is Muslim and commits a crime, they call it terrorism just because he is supposedly Muslim. But it's been so like ingrained in everybody now like ever since like 9/11, like the word Muslim and terrorism go hand in hand for a lot of people, which is completely stupid. But all the media and stuff that's what they want everyone to believe so that's the way of putting the same story on it. How many times do you hear Muslim and terrorist? What other religion do you hear that word terrorist being combined with?
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> Its only Muslim and Islam and like, when a white person does it, he gets off (mental health being a mitigating factor in indicting and sentencing) and it's like he has mental issues. That's again like it's the whole white privilege thing where you, because the religion part isn't there. If he is not Muslim, he is not going to be a terrorist because that's not what the media wants to believe. But they want you to believe like you are a terrorist if you are Muslim.

The media's role was also a problematic when it came to labeling Muslims and a critical element in giving radical preachers a tool to recruit vulnerable second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. Similar to other participants, Zainab also pointed out that by labeling a Muslim assailant as a terrorist, the media de-humanized not only the perpetrator, but also the entire Muslim community:

> ZAINAB: Even if you look at Muslims who engage in that kind of violence, when the Toronto shooting happened, there was a young man who shot people last summer and you know I mean the media necessarily did not label terrorism, but people did because he was Muslim. But when the story started out of coming out it was clear that he had serious mental health issues, he has a lot of problems in his family, like just trauma. And to me that was highlighted (bias against Muslims).
>
> When Muslims commit these types of attacks what happens when we label them as terrorists, we dehumanize them. We forget that they too might have mental health issues, they too might have some trauma, and why is it that he did this? What was the reason? We dehumanize people. And I am not saying that we need to humanize them and excuse this, but we need to look at that person individually.

Since Zainab had used the word "dehumanize" a number of times, I asked her how did attaching the label of terrorism dehumanize a Muslim assailant. This is what she had to say on the issue:

> ZAINAB: Like there is- it dehumanizes him, dehumanizes the whole community as if we are some sort of mindless drones and prone to commit violent acts somehow. That's what that labeling does. But when they look at a white person who has done the same thing, a non-Muslim white person, and they say that there must be something in his history etc [pause] that keeps him human, that discourse keeps him human at the same time. It doesn't de-humanize them. It recognizes humanity while holding him accountable for what he did. For Muslims, when you label it terrorism, it doesn't recognize humanity. They look at him like he is a mindless drone following order of some sorts. It dehumanizes us, and our whole community. So yeah absolutely it's something we need to keep on challenging.

As was seen above, respondents harbored strong feelings towards the role of the media when it came to covering acts of violence committed by individuals who belong to the Islamic faith. According to the respondents, the way Muslim perpetrators are labeled as "terrorists" when they commit an act of violence as compared to a person belonging to the dominant majority, not

only dehumanizes the former, but also alienates peace loving Muslims from the rest of society by painting every Muslim by using the paintbrush of "terrorism."

6.2.4 The Muslim Community's Failure

Apart from the media's so-called biased reporting when it came to Muslims, what else could be done to prevent and pre-empt second-generation Pakistanis from being radicalized? Who else could be held responsible in failing and disappointing at-risk individuals?

According to Merjan, the Muslim community itself needs to introspect and correct that flaw within its community if vulnerable individuals are to be saved from being radicalized. She acknowledged a lack of recognition on the part of the community as well as parents about how deep-rooted and wide spread the sense of alienation and resentment amongst second-generations Pakistani youth, if a critical factor in tipping the scales in favor of a sustained peace within Canada:

> MERJAN: They need to stop denying their community is in denial about a lot of things. Uhm, so there is this idea that "oh god will take care of it". There is this kind of attitude that things will fix themselves, okay. So, the community within their sphere is in denial about the threat. They are also in denial about their own responsibility. The parents think that educating somebody with the Quran and showing them how to pray is enough to ward them off from all evil. So, there is this kind of thing of like well they are human, having a human experience. I think there need to be workshops for immigrants to be honest.
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> > I wish my parents had workshops or community members who assisted them to say that your child is going through this because it was the most painful thing to be slammed by your own parents and because they were doing it innocently, you are just kind of thrown to the sides. We need to be realistic that there needs to be education for the adults who have good intentions but don't realize that there are threats even to their children when they go out every day. So that's the thing, don't make it about heaven or hell or faith, but make it about mental health for your youth by you as a family, and as a community. Yeah, they can do a lot, to be honest.

Merjan also felt that the onus was not that much on the government to counter radicalization amongst Muslim youth. She believed that there were only a few things the government could do to counter the threat from becoming a threat (pre-emptive measures):

> MERJAN: I think the government in this part, I am not really asking the government for anything. Its more that we have the policies in place for equality in this country. The problem is that people aren't implementing it. What the government can do is that perhaps we have an educational system, which is more inclusive and representative and broad-based. For example, there is a class in English having this literature perhaps for a person with a different background, ask them to research their ethnic kind of literature because I was thinking about this, I was like inclusion does takes one step. That's enough to show that we are you know far more inclusive than you know other nations per se, but it's a very small step. Isn't that interesting? If I am from China, I could read a literature piece in English of course written by a Chinese author. That alone says wow I can connect to my own even. That's enough.
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> Its not asking for much at the end of the day too, because hell I am also a settler here, I come from a perspective, I'm watching indigenous people who don't even have their history shared in class, I can't ask for much. The government- I also need to know my positions within Canada, as does everybody else does, and I know I'm privileged over indigenous people, for example. I need to know that I can't ask for much, we need to do this in-house, but also too there are very limited things that we really should be asking from the government around this, at this point in time.

Maria believed that radicalization of second-generation Pakistan-Canadians is a result of the family and the community not being caring and supportive about their unique needs. Moreover, a surprising view that was offered by Maria was that immigrant parents did not impose religion upon their children. If anything, they were skeptical and apprehensive when their child became "more" religious and would advise their child to stay away from wearing overtly religious symbols and being "in your face" about the religion they are following faithfully:

> MARIA: I wish I knew [pause] how to save my kids from it (radicalization). It's hard to say. For me it's when I became more practicing (Muslim) it was like my parents didn't understand it because my biggest support has come from my family. (They couldn't understand) that I couldn't get a job, I wouldn't you know marry, like you know things like that. It felt like I needed to dig my head in deeper. You don't know exactly who you are as a person and when you are not getting the guidance from your roots, your people, your parents, when you are not getting that support and that guidance from people close to you in your immediate circle, your family, it's a problem.

> Because I find that for Pakistani people, they fear their children becoming religious. They tell their children don't wear the *hejab*, don't wear the *abaya*, you know- for them, Pakistanis, *abaya* and so on, is not a part of the culture. For me an *abaya* resembles something, which is a symbol. When your parents can't eschew the difference between the radicalized version of Islam and the actual version of Islam, they're scared of you becoming more practicing, it makes you feel like this is you know, I am on the right path now because I am following the path of the prophet who said "You cannot be a true Muslim until you love me more than you love your parents." You feel like you are doing the right thing because your parents become upset when you become religious. You are going on the right path because you know this is Islam and this is what you have to do no matter whether anybody understands or not- I think that may be a big step for people to umm not become that radicalized. Parents, community, they are a reason… we don't have an overly strong community, everyone goes prays and leaves- how many times do you know which people come to the masjid, because nobody overly cares.

Maria's view clearly indicates a number of things. First, that losing support from one's roots i.e. one's family can shake an individual's foundations to the core and shatter one's identity, which creates a void; a void which is manipulated and filled by radical clerics. Second, from what Maria narrated it is quite evident that for some second-generation Pakistan-Canadians, becoming more religious, being "in your face" about Islam is also a way to rebel. Finally, another theme which emerges from Maria's view is that religion has supremacy over every other facet of life- it transcends the spatio-temporal and national divide. However, Muslims in Canada have made religion into a mere ritual, something which goes against the tenets of Islam, according to Maria.

Hina, echoed the sentiments of other participants in this study that radicalization of young people stemmed in part due to a lack of understanding on the part of parents who had a different cultural backgrounds and cultural baggage as compared to their children. She noted that, "Our parents don't understand that its different cultures here, so the whole mentality of keeping inwards. Our parents don't get it."

By using Islam as an ideological framework and distorting the faith's true picture and essence, recruiters are able to draw naïve, impressionable youth into their folds. For Aamir, as a

Muslim, one should be introspective and question an interpretation of Islam, which seems to contradict the basic tenets of the faith:

> AAMIR: Like Islam is supposed to be all peaceful, you are not supposed to kill anybody. Unless like for revenge, if someone killed someone you love. Ultimately you aren't supposed to kill anyone, here you are trying to kill somebody, it makes no sense that they are killing people, committing suicide bombings and all, makes no sense at all., completely opposite of what the Quran says. These guys are being brainwashed by somebody who completely like lied to them. You must be – I don't know what their situation was at home or how they were brought up, but you got to like when someone says something like go kill somebody, and the Quran says you shouldn't kill anybody, you should question that person like this isn't right. So, like I don't know how much understanding they had of the faith, or who was brainwashing them, but they were completely wrong.

Similar to Merjan and other participants, Aamir's aforementioned response is also grounded in an intersectional framework, with familial dynamics being a key element in one's journey towards the dark path of radicalization to violence.

However, radicalization is never a one-way street. To blame the dominant society/majority for discrimination alleged or otherwise, maybe a part of the puzzle but it is missing multiple parts to complete that puzzle of radicalization. The missing pieces include cultural dissonance and the taboo surrounding sexuality within Muslim communities, which confuses young Muslims, especially men. According to Aamir, it was high time that the Muslim community be more introspective towards this particular issue:

> AAMIR: So, the Muslim community I would say like have more like, more I guess [pause] some more westernized activities (in Canada). Sports are always good since they bring everyone together, play whatever sport everyone is having fun and enjoying themselves. Bring people in from the outside, open it up so you have different backgrounds and perspectives are coming in. Even like just having like a seminar or something, just to open people's eyes to what's more out there and people, people who do drink and stuff they aren't bad people- that's their lifestyle, that's their choice. You can't just say, expect everyone to make the same decisions as you do. Being more [pause] be more open for it, have more conversations. Like one thing usually is the whole guy-girl relationship, dating and such.
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> Like, I am like I'm not sure what they need to do, there needs to be something in place there to get some sort of interaction or some sort of uh like I guess skills to

> deal with that. Because like when you are growing up in Canada and you are Pakistani and Muslim like you have the same feelings as everyone else does. You want to date and stuff. But there is nothing ever in place for you to just to help you get along that part of it you know. There is a big gap there. Like I feel like a lot of programs and stuff that happens in the mosque they are geared towards little kids. So when you get into your teens and your hormones are raging, there is nothing there to like, I guess divert that. You are struggling.

Aamir also mentioned the guilt young Muslims feel about having emotional and sexual feeling as they grow up because of the taboo surrounding sexuality in the Muslim community. Perhaps that is a key to understanding why young people find allure and comfort in joining a radicalized group; it provides an escape:

> AAMIR: And that's part of the anger of kids who are Muslim and stuff because they don't have that interaction and it's natural too, like it's something they shouldn't be surprised about. I mean you don't want to go out and sleep with just whomever but there should be something in place there to deal with that part of life. Especially, here in the West. Because, everyone's, it's like they say you shouldn't [pause] it almost feels like when you are growing up, going through that it's like you are being *haram* (prohibited) just thinking that way.
>
> You are haram just feeling those feelings. But they are natural feelings, like you are supposed to have those feelings. It's already hard you know. Especially like you can't get married because you don't have a job or education, whatever. And going through that time it's tough, it's hard to deal with this. But yeah, it's just, they definitely need (program/structures) in place to deal with that part of life here in the West.

Zainab researches sexuality amongst Muslims. She believes that Canadian-Muslims lack experience and knowledge of being in relationships because of the unique cultural nuances that many grow up with. This could perhaps explain why some individuals find solace in radicalization. When I asked Zainab about the challenges she faced during her life she had the following point to offer:

> ZAINAB: One of the bigger challenges had to do with relationships. When it's time to get married, like I am married, 8 years now, but before that it's like you are brought up with "don't date" and all that kind of stuff and then you have to get married, go find yourself a husband and then you don't know anything, you haven't really learned how to engage in a healthy relationship. You know getting to know people and all. That probably has been one of my biggest challenges that's why I do the research I do which I am

interested in its because that's been one of my biggest challenges, trying to negotiate it, learning as I go along. And learn by fire. I wish I didn't have to go through that. And it's one of the biggest challenges, trying to- then I look at my parents, and I think how else could they have done things?

I can understand where they are coming from too you know. It's those situations, could it have happened different? I don't know. But something had to be different, I don't exactly know what. Something could have been different, should have been, but what? So that would probably be my biggest challenge, try and negotiate between culture and religion and then what the mainstream culture is when it comes to relationships and all of that. Try to balance, figure out, what is it? What the right thing to do? Also making mistakes, and I wish I had known better. My friends probably knew better but I didn't because I didn't have the experience or education or the guidance for it.

Aamir also felt that even today, the mosque as a community center and a place for interactions was segregated which caused a problem for some in the Muslim community, especially young men, as they felt as if they were being left out and isolated within their own community. Aamir believed that it would be a prudent idea for the community to open up a little bit and be slightly more liberal when it came to interactions between the two sexes. Such an interaction could be critical in diverting the attention of young Pakistani-Canadians from radicalized ideologies and organizations.

AAMIR: In the mosque its usually quite segregated still. Like every time you know. Like even stuff does happen there is a lot more mixing I guess and in Winnipeg I know it is. When events are happening there everyone is working together, guy girl whatever. No one says anything so that's good. But yeah like if they can just, because like, from a Muslim perspective they expect you to get married young, get your life going and such but within the mosque they make it so difficult to just meet anybody. You can't even go up to and say, you see a girl and you can't even go up to say salam (greetings) or whatever.

Their parents peering on you, like what's this guy doing. So, it's not open in that sense. Uh, like they do have in the bigger cities mixers and stuff once in a while, to get it rolling. But like from my experience in Winnipeg there weren't very many opportunities of mixers or any sort of thing to meet someone for marriage purposes. It would definitely be good if they opened up on that end of it.

Acceptance by everyone for everyone is the key towards sustainable peace in Canada, according to Aamir. He posited that the primary element, which mattered, was the character of the individual and not his or her ethnoreligious background if we had to judge someone. Such a view

on life and human beings may result in harmony in society could go a long way in building the peace in Canada:

> AAMIR: Be more open minded uh you see the stuff in the news and it's… you shouldn't believe it right away; do your own research on it because a lot of that stuff is just propaganda. They want you to think a certain way. Make sure you- be more accepting of all other cultures, be more accepting of different backgrounds and skin colors, they had nothing to do, skin color, background, religion has nothing to do with anything. The character of the person is what should be judged, if anything. The rest of the stuff it's like let people be who they are as long as they are not hurting you or harming you or your family or anything. Let them be.

Zainab highlighted that attitudes within the Muslim community are challenging, specifically, attitudes as they pertain to sexuality and sexual awareness. Some individuals within the community spread misinformation about issues, which may misguide impressionable individuals and provide recruiters with a fertile breeding ground. Zainab gave the example of the sex-ed curriculum introduced in Ontario by Kathleen Wynn's government (an example which was cited earlier to depict the orthodox views amongst the Pakistani community in Ontario) and the reaction to it by certain members of the Muslim community as an example:

> ZAINAB: I heard stories about how they had been spreading misinformation about the curriculum and such. I think the community leaders need to be held accountable for- need to be educated well and need to be held accountable for spreading misinformation. So yeah, I don't know, there were groups out there who were trying to educate and there are still parents to this day. I see it on Facebook, the generation we are talking about, that yeah, Wynn had a lesbian agenda, wants to turn everyone gay. All those sorts of things, it's just ridiculous.
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> I don't know, that's a tough, that's a tough one because I personally identify as Muslim, also as progressive and inclusive, so to me like you know, I have friends who are queer Muslims and so when I you know see them and how devout they are to their faith, it's like how is it that we can spread this kind of hate you know? Why? We need to figure out something out in our community, I don't know what it is exactly but we need to figure something out. To educate our communities umm, and just start challenging.

Radicalization, according to Zainab, was a direct result of "toxic masculinity." While analysts in the field of radicalization studies have applied different frameworks to examine the

issue of radicalization, Zainab believed that masculinity as a framework of analysis was the critical missing piece. Zainab was the only respondent in this study who included the concept of toxic masculinity in her framework of analysis of radicalization. For Zainab, if a man could not be "macho" enough, that created a void in his identity, which he would then try to fill with committing acts of violence:

> ZAINAB: You know what I think part of the issue I think honestly has to do with masculinity too. I think sometimes that seems to be missing from the conversation, everything's about Islam. I think, even in the US, with shootings and all, and mass violence you look at the shooters, regardless of the background there is always some sort of toxic masculinity. There is always a history of abusing women, a history of hating women. I don't know about these guys and that there was a history of hating women amongst them, but I am saying that there is this idea, that being masculine, its very toxic. I would want people to look into it. I don't know much about those guys particularly, and I don't know anything about people who have been radicalized, but I would suspect that part of it is that there is a certain way to be a man and if you aren't fulfilling that then you get alienated that I can't be this, which leads to some sense of loss of identity, because you can't be this very macho guy who provides for his family whatever it is.
>
> This particular image of being a man I think that's problematic, it's that we allow, as a society, not just Muslims, general society expects men to masculine in many variety of ways. I think this is part of the equation and I hope people are looking at it more. Not just Muslims who are radicalized, but also white people who are radicalized and others who are radicalized in other ways. It usually is men, right?

Zainab also believed that one way of countering radicalization specifically and misogyny generally was to address toxic masculinity, or the media, popular culture and social norms, from a very young age, have constructed the way masculinity. Schools in particular could make a key difference:

> ZAINAB: I think it starts in school. Here in my city there is actually a new program they are trying in some schools to teach young boys about toxic masculinity and what it is and how can it be avoided. So, I think that starts in school, teaching young children, young boys that it's okay to express yourself in many different ways. You don't have to hold in your tears and all. And I think it starts from there and I think what we are seeing in many schools now is good, but we need to go further. You know the idea of inclusion and caring for each other like there is a lot more focus should be on that and we need to take this further and start talking about to young children that gender is a social construct. Talking to children about its okay to be, like you don't have to be, there is no one way to be a girl or to be a boy, there are different ways.

> I think that that's where we can start to chip away at toxic masculinity because I mean its harmful for boys and men. I mean its ultimately harming them, I think that's where we start, including in the Muslim community we have to do it. How willing are we to do it though? In the Muslim community we need to start in the mosques with children, stop this whole that women have to be this way, men have to be that way. We are often some of the worse when it comes to maintaining gender roles. So, we need to start challenging those gender roles as well.

The Muslim community's role, which is critical in pre-empting and defeating radicalization, has been less than optimal, according to the respondents. The fact that the community is led by first generation Pakistani-Canadians who are neither well-versed with the norms and mores of Canada nor with the lived experiences of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, is a major reason, according to the respondents as to why individuals turn to radical ideologies to find a feeling belonging which they could never find within their own community.

6.2.5 The Enemy from "the Outside"

Radicalization of Pakistani-Canadians was a recent phenomenon, according to Babar who grew up in Ottawa during the 1970s. However, the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the Saudi response to the revolution was a trigger towards a worldview amongst common Muslims that the *Ummah* was greater than the nation state:[14]

> BABAR: My friend, he was Sunni, but at that time Sunni-Shia conflict wasn't as it is today. At the very least I didn't have that idea or consciousness. I was too young to sort of get a good picture about what's happening. So, he was like I don't agree with this or that but he is bringing an Islamic revolution (Khomeini i.e.). And that struck me as thinking in terms of slogans, the meaning of the so-called revolution. Is it authoritarian top-down? Restrictions on things? Then the revolution itself, there was no logic.
>
> And then you know, the Shah was a cruel person without a doubt. But this concept of Islamic camaraderie was that the right thing to counter him with? And the response that it's your western press, which is maligning the revolution. Then my

[14] The concept of the Ummah is a supra-national concept in orthodox Islam which espouses the belief that nation-states and boundaries are inherently anti-Islam; Islam knows no geographical boundaries. The Pakistani theologian, Syed Abul Ala Mawdoodi and the Egyptian Islamic scholar, Syed Qutb, who has been labeled as the ideologue behind Islamist extremism, initially popularized the concept in the 13th century by Ibn-e-Taimiyyah and later on in the 20th century. (Author's note)

question used to be why the hell you are in Canada if you think there is a conspiracy against you being hatched all the time.

However, Babar also felt that the narrative that was pushed by governments and the media during and after the Camp David accords and the 1st Afghan Jihad[15] created confusion amongst Muslim youth and resulted in a new-found importance for clerics and recruiters:

BABAR: The people that I knew, I never had the sense that they were going to grow up and commit acts of violence. But there was this perception that the West was against them and was not presenting things properly and so and so forth. And there was also you know *uss waqt* Western press main Saadat (at that time Anwar Saadat was given a favorable view in the Western press) was given a favorable view, for making up with Israel and all. And I used to think this is kind of a one-sided sort of thing and you know you would talk to people they would sort of tell you about this very authoritarian, quite often a very brutal regime.

But at the same time, they were conflicted because of the Afghan jihad, so at that time I realized that even if clerics say something utterly stupid, people will follow it even if the cleric doesn't follow it himself. If the cleric says something completely opposite, let's say a blue sock being nicer than a red sock and will take you to paradise, people would perhaps believe that too. It was sort of brainless but whatever you could dress up as Islamic, then they would kind of portray it in whatever they thought was a practical way. I never saw any of them walking off to jihad or something. Jihad is a good thing, but I won't do it- that's what the clerics were all about.

While the red sock/blue sock analogy may seem jocular, Babar makes a very interesting point. Recruiters weave up stories of what is right and what is wrong, the virtues of paradise and what bounties one shall be blessed with in paradise as well as emotionally manipulating vulnerable individuals into committing acts of violence. Anwar Al-Awlaki, a US based cleric was who killed in a drone stroke in Yemen, is a good example of how these clerics can twist the narrative and the truth to enrage vulnerable individuals.

[15] It is now well-documented that the Central Intelligence Agency funneled arms and money to the so called *mujahideen* (holy warriors) to bleed out the Soviet Union through a thousand cuts. These *mujahideen* and the way they were popularized by the Western media (Rambo III e.g.) spread a feeling of superiority amongst some Muslims that Islam was the solution to all evil. (Author's note)

Perhaps because of his experiences in life, both as an academic as well as someone who had served briefly in the Canadian Armed Forces, Babar believed that radicalization to violence, even from a completely tactical point of view serves no great purpose:

> BABAR: Maybe I am too old to understand what makes them tick, but I mean from the point of logic or reason, if you leave aside morality, ethics and all of that, you just ask that where has your tactic led to some permanent success? Right? I mean, you are saying that we have done this and that; the thing is that did your political objective advance? It didn't. That effort is a failure. So, in the same vein, you go blow up a Starbucks or something, did you succeed at all? And how has your case been advanced? You aren't any further ahead than you were before. Osama I can understand, there the effort is to hijack grand strategy
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> > What he is saying is that the state has failed to deal with legitimate grievances. They propagate taking over the functions of the state and force a confrontation. A confrontation which the state is unwilling to face. Because I can't fight them over there, so I will fight them over here (Canada or another western state being labeled as a warzone). So, they try finding recruits here who will fight for them. He makes more sense than some idiot who just wants to blow up.

Babar also felt that the demonization of an entire group of people created a fertile ground for radicalizing individuals towards violence in the name of an ideology:

> BABAR: You know one term I like is stochastic terror. You know, he (Trump) doesn't say that that Mr. Sanchez is a bad man, go and kill Mr. Sanchez and 14-15 other people. What he says is rapists, murderers, this and that, someone, in his audience there is a wingnut who is going to go and beat up a Hispanic person. And it's perfect because than he (Trump) can say that I didn't tell them to do that. But the effect is essentially an incitement to violence.
>
> > So, uh, because you have this narrative of jihad, *aap uss say baaz nahin aa saktay* (In a same vein now that you have this narrative of jihad, it is difficult to defeat it). Islamic state, the whole idea of it, that "Islam is politics and politics is Islam, and that Islam is the state, if you are a real Muslim, you can't deny that." Even if they don't really mean it or even if the preacher isn't going to do that, when he keeps saying this in the mosque, then sooner or later there will be a wingnut available who will do something, somehow to act on this.

The duplicitous attitude of some preachers in Canada was a major factor towards radicalizing young people. Babar narrated an incident during a talk organized by a minority sect

of Islam in Ottawa. The speakers included individuals from the major sects of Islam, including Sunni and Shia scholars:

> BABAR: A discussion was going on and someone asked the minority representative that you have this verse *La ikra ha fil deen* (there is no compulsion in faith), so how can you punish a *murtid* (apostate)? And he said well according to the context of the verse that is not allowed. As soon as he released his mic, the Sunni preacher said that this is fine, yes, it's there in the Quran, but the Islamic state has the right to defend itself. Didn't say anything else. Later on, my father met someone who had been at the session and he said that do you understand that what he was saying? And she said that, "yeah his meaning was that you give them three days and if they don't repent after three days, you kill them."

However, according to Babar, CSIS was aware of the duplicity of some of these clerics. This is what he had to say on the issue:

> BABAR: So, one thing is that they are saying things and not saying things at the same time. And again, if you get a few wingnuts, one of them is going to act violently after hearing such rhetoric. So, my father met someone from CSIS and the guy said that "your sect whether you agree with them or not, they are saying the same thing in English and Urdu when they talk to us and when they talk amongst themselves. He said these other people they are saying one thing to us in English and state something else in Arabic and Urdu to their own congregations. And these idiots think that we don't know what they are up to? They think they are being clever with this duplicity, but we know what they are up to." So, yeah, this is a huge problem I must say. This narrative they can't get rid of. It's difficult for at least some of these people to say that it would be wrong to kill an apostate and unless they cut down on their rhetoric this issue (of radicalization) will continue.

That the intelligence and law enforcement communities in Canada are well aware of the duplicitous attitude of some Muslims, especially come clerics, explains why Canada has thus far been by and large immune to acts of terrorism carried about radicalized second-generation Pakistanis. This duplicitous attitude of saying one thing in public and another behind closed doors is a major element in radicalizing second-generation youth towards radicalization to violence. Behind closed doors, vulnerable youth to be radicalized, are given conflicting messages and when they ask the Imam about those conflicting messages, these young people are told that in order to be successful there has to be a public/private divide when it comes to the "narrative." One

exception to this "rule" is Anjum Chaudhry, a second-generation British-Pakistani who is a lawyer by profession and is publicly vocal about carrying out acts of violence against those who satirize the prophet of Islam. When Chaudhry was asked about these views and how can he justify such views while living in a secular society, his response which was mired in hypocrisy was that a democratic society gives him the right to express his views publicly. (Abdullah Majid, 2016). The hypocrisy truly is mind-boggling.

Babar also mentioned the narrative, which has been espoused by some clerics in Canada, hence, it seemed only logical to ask him about the "narrative" and what it entailed. Who was responsible for defeating this narrative, which may lead to radicalization in Canada. Was it the state's responsibility or would a counter-narrative, which won the day in the marketplace of ideas come from within the Muslim community?

> BABAR: It's on both. The first thing is that you know, a secular state has to say that there are laws against murder and we won't accept this as a defense. In Pakistan e.g., there was this concept of honor killings. I killed my girlfriend because I found out she was going out with somebody else and my honor was outraged. So eventually they enacted a law that your outrage and honor no longer can be used as a legal principle for defending a murder. So, I think at least Western states are not giving any concessions to Muslims.

The other thing is that I hope that the third-generation would produce its own religious leadership, which says that fine and tows its own line. Hopefully the third generation will produce its own religious leadership. I think the new generations' religious leadership has this duty that it states that there are somethings, which are cultural, leave them to culture don't call them religious. Don't give religion an ethnic tinge. It's not necessary that we in fight amongst ourselves, make petty difference, big ones in front of white people- all that will do is to harm our faith.

> For Babar as noted above, the third-generation which is perhaps untainted by the views of the first-generation was the key difference maker in the game of radicalization.

Babar also saw the influence of Pakistan's state policy towards minorities as having an effect on Pakistani- Canadians for decades. He noted that Pakistani-Canadians started to be influenced by their parent country's internal policies and this influence had prepared the ground

for extremism in Canada over the years for generations to come that were born to Pakistani-immigrants:

> BABAR: In 1974, I remember that in Ottawa, Muslim Student Associations in universities were quite happy about the 2nd amendment being passed in Pakistan.[16] So I mean, people kinda get tired of when I bring everything back to the 2nd amendment they think that I am playing the same tune again, uh, but, at times I tell my Shia friends, it was at that time that you should have spoken up. And at that point in Canada these people used to lump up their standard with whatever the official line was coming out of Pakistan.
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> So yeah, I would say that at least for Pakistanis it explains a lot- perhaps even for Arabs it's the same trajectory. For Pakistanis it was one of the things, which was driving them. The second thing is that now these clerics have minted a lot money. At that point in time they used to come and stay at people's homes. So, on one occasion and this is during the 70s, that Dr. Israr Ahmed came to Ottawa. I think I he was staying with one of our family friends. So anyway, he started going off on a tangent, he got more and more heated and it ended with him saying that people should pledge allegiance to me. So, our family friend said that I don't consider you that worthy at all.

Babar also alluded to the influence of Saudi funded mosques in Canada as being a reason why the extreme strain of Islam continues to be popular amongst some Muslims, a fringe of whom end up being radicalized:

> BABAR: So perhaps some of the ground work was being laid at that time in two ways: one was that these clerics would continue to come here, and the other thing is that e.g. the Ottawa Muslim Association's mosque, the Imam of that mosque he was from Al-Azhar. So, they were bringing the imams of mosques and also bringing over these Pakistani Mullahs quite regularly. And the other thing is that there was a lot of funding from the Saudi government for these sorts of things, right? Typically, neither the Pakistani community nor other Muslims, quite often they didn't have enough money to be able to build the mosque by themselves.
>
> So at least some of the funding quite often was coming from the Saudis. And at the same time, a Saudi or another Arab government provides you the chief cleric of a mosque, then you know it makes a difference if you are bringing your kids regularly to Sunday school or to a mosque or something, then maybe that's where also some of this comes from. To my knowledge those people never openly encouraged violence or anything, but maybe they were laying the groundwork for the future.

[16] The 2nd Amendment to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan constitutionally labelled a minority sect of Islam, the Ahmedis as being non-Muslims, stripping them of the right to run for important public offices. Resultantly, Ahmedis over the years have been disempowered and have been a target of horrendous violence at the hand of society at large. (Author's Note)

Saudi Arabia's role in fostering radical views by patronizing and sponsoring mosques, religious seminaries and clerics is well documented now (PBS, 2014). While in Canada the role has been quite covert, in other countries such as Pakistan, the Saudi strain of Islam, supplemented by funding through the Saudi state has resulted in radicalizing generations of youth since the late 1970s (Ward, 2018). Some of those who buy into the Saudi narrative come to Canada, bringing along with them the baggage of Salafism/Wahabism, have children in this country and transmit to them the same message of intolerance. To paraphrase Vamik Volkan (1996), it is a trans-generational transmission of intolerance.

However, according to Babar, Canada was still far better off as compared to some countries in Western Europe in terms of youth being radicalized towards violence. A part of the reason of Canada being relatively immune to radicalization is that Canada and Canadians, i.e., the dominant white majority have by and large been accepting towards Muslims and other minorities:

> BABAR: In Belgium they have become alarmed. Seeds of radicalization were planted there 20-30 years go, and now you can see the results. In Europe, with the integration thing, it didn't go so well. Because I mean main stream society never accepted these people. I mean Germany, third generation and all, and they are still guest workers. Perhaps it would've been worse had the same was done by Canada. They would have never have fit in had we adopted the same policies. In Europe they would stick to themselves and not even bothered interacting with the dominant society. At least in Ottawa growing up there was no option to hang out with Pakistanis, because there weren't any there.

While *ghettoization* is not completely absent in Canada (Dib, Donaldson, & Turcotte, 2008; Hiebert, Schurrman & Smith, 2007; Zine, 2007), it is not even close to the ghettoization one can see in certain countries in Western Europe such as France and Belgium (Albrecht, 2002; Karic, 2002; Savage, 2004) where the Muslim community, including the Pakistani community mingle with their own, hence, making integration a futile exercise.

Zainab also believed, and this is in a way reflective of what Babar also said, that clerics who are "imported" from abroad by the Pakistan community and the Muslim community have no

clue about how Canada works or what the social dynamics of this country are. This disconnection between those clerics and the young people they have as audience can be a critical contributing factor towards radicalization. When I asked Zainab if the Muslim community at large an impediment towards young people had been trying to make sense of their identity, their lives and their existence in Canada, she responded as follows:

> ZAINAB: I don't know about impediment, but they haven't helped either. I think they have just kind of what's the word, abandoned their responsibilities to their people I think that's the issue. Um they have, made them feel, I think the community, Imams and leaders, I think they have made themselves irrelevant to young people. Not so much that they are an impediment, they haven't helped. They aren't really, I hear about this all across Canada, I mean they bring in Imams and stuff who really have no connection with the youth. Umm you know, like they have grown up in different countries, come here fresh. Fine they might have Islamic knowledge, but they don't have social knowledge. They don't have the knowledge needed for here. A lot of Muslim communities have abandoned their youth really.

It is not just Imams (male Imams) who have been a problem in imparting ultra-orthodox views amongst Pakistani-Canadians, both men and women. In a ground-breaking study conducted by anthropologist Sadaf Ahmed, an Islamic organization known as Al-Huda, founded by a Pakistani woman, Farhat Hashmi, has found popularity amongst Muslim women in Canada, even though its message includes rejection of the concept of marital rape, natural disasters are a result of sinful activities and considering photography as a sin (Ahmed, 2008). The fact that the message of intolerance and stupidity has resonated amongst Pakistani-Canadian women and the fact that government of Canada has not thus far determined Hashmi's words to be hateful, goes on to show that either the government of Canada is afraid of the consequences if it determines Hashmi to be a hate preacher or it does not fully comprehend the destructive narrative being espoused. Either way, as Zainab and Babar pointed out, these imported preachers, have zero idea about the openness and multi-cultural aspects of Canadian society and they end up corrupting vulnerable individuals with

a message which may be valid in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but surely not in a country such as Canada.

As is evident from the responses from the views narrated by the participants, radicalization of Muslim Canadians, specifically Pakistani-Canadians can be analyzed through personal as well as collective factors. Personal factors include one's psychological makeup, experiences and traumas, while collective factors include perceived discrimination at the hands of society, lopsided role of the media, failure of the Muslim community to keep up with the times which results in spreading confusion amongst Pakistani-Canadian youth by their community in relation to their sexuality and personal, non-platonic relationships.

Can macro-factors, which lead Muslim youth towards radicalization also find their roots in the comfort of one's home, i.e., are there domestic micro-factors, which are play an integral role in radicalization of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians? The participants address this question in the next section.

6.3- "The Great Divide:" First and Second-Generation Pakistani-Canadians

The stories shared by the participants in this study clearly indicate a marked difference in their and their parents' perceptions about acts and views, which are deemed acceptable and otherwise in Canada. Many participants differed from their parents in relation to views relating to intermingling of the sexes, outlook on religion and views about life in general and that was a major issue in creating confusion and cultural dissonance.

Farheen, who is now in her thirties, shared her experiences as an adolescent child of Pakistani immigrants. Her story provides an example of the confusion that conflicting majoritarian and domestic values can have on a child of immigrants:

FARHEEN: I think the older as a I got as a female, my parents recognizing that and them being older and understanding that's when hormones kick in and all that, I think they were afraid what route I'd take. But it wasn't just for myself it was for my siblings as well. So, I feel I got the most freedom out of everybody because I am the youngest. So, my oldest sibling paved the way so for me like I was like allowed to do a lot more. But because I had such a consistent schedule it wasn't really a bother for my parents. Then things started heating up because, for e.g., there was a photo in a yearbook of me standing beside a guy who was in the track team there.

The photo the way it was taken was that everyone was rushed inside because it was so cold that we ran inside and stood anywhere and took the photo. My mother sees the photo and says "*yeh kia hai*" (what is this?) everyone is going to see this she says- and I am confused; I'm like what? So, I didn't understand where she was coming from because this was normal for me, being around guys was not a big deal for me. It was I feel like that that was when changes started happening. Also, when I entered high school my parents didn't want me to pursue athletics and they actually disallowed me to do so. And then my gym teacher in elementary school found and called them and that's the only reason I pursued- I have no idea how she got the news. It was pretty crazy.

Farheen also explained how difficult it is to grow up as a child of immigrants who have resettled into a new country, yet expect their children to follow the traditional ways, or the cultural baggage they brought with themselves to the land they opted to come to out of their own free will and volition. Such a duality of cultural nuances that clashes with majority values in a new society can push children towards the edge. Farheen explained this issue in the following manner:

FARHEEN: None of my siblings or I were allowed to go to the high school prom, but I was lucky because I had the provincials the same day. So, it wasn't a question for me. It could be anything, going to a friend's birthday party, sleepovers were never allowed. We hardly had friends over, it was challenging for sure because like you are thrown in a society, your parents came here, and they expect you not to do anything that you peers are doing. But like the challenges and asking your parents the question of why not. And not being given an answer, just being told "because I said so." They (parents) are not understanding so you are like just lost.

So, there is that sense of control where I felt that I couldn't really evolve as an individual because my lack of experience it was almost like you get so closed off from the world and experience, then you get thrown out into it as if it were a well and they expect you to flourish. But how? I am scared to talk to people. How am I supposed to go about it right? So, I think one of the biggest challenges was that. The other was moving from a small town to an urban center. Not having socialized with people and then going to university. That's like a huge university compared to what we were used to. So that was a huge challenge umm severe anxiety all the

> time you know what I mean, you don't know what and how to function in an environment in a given society right because you've been closed off from so much.

Farheen's narrative when it comes to competing values that children of immigrants are exposed to shows that cultural dissonance and instilling "traditional" values in children which are unacceptable or at least considered to be archaic in the country of resettlement can scar a child for life. Moreover, these conflicting values may also create the feeling of "I am neither a Canadian nor a Pakistani." Not only is this perhaps one of the greatest injustices that parents can mete out to their children, but from a law enforcement point of view as well, it is dangerous since it creates that personal conflict within a child of immigrants, a conflict, which is occasionally resolved through radicalization

Khaleeq also mentioned that difference between first and second-generation immigrants as to how they perceive Canada and as to what they consider to be important in the hierarchy of life. He noted that first generation immigrants are more concerned with achieving and then providing the basics of life to their children, while second-generation immigrants believe that they have to, and that they can change the structure. This desire to change what second-gens consider to be unequal structures could in part explain radicalization. Khaleeq depicted this difference amongst the two generations in quite an interesting manner:

> KHALEEQ: I think for my parents' generation, the goal was to do well, the goal was to survive. So, it was never to rock the boat, never to establish systems within the society that they came to; it was all about survival. The goal was to find a 9-5 job, provide for their children, their schools, get them into a good neighborhood- it was always this survival mentality. Being a first generation Canadian for my children and their children, I need to survive.
>
> For me as a second gen, the need to survive is no more since it has been provided already; the need now is to be, to be myself within society. So now no longer just finding that simple 9-5 job and just getting a paycheck and living paycheck to paycheck, that no longer is the goal. The goal should be to become decisionmakers. Or becoming people who are influential within society. So, I think moving up from that basic need of we need food, clothing water, shelter or those things that our parents struggled with, had on their minds, wanted to give them to us, the aspiration

> I have myself is not just of survival but being influential, being decisionmakers in this society.

The differences in outlooks of life between the immigrants and their children are an anecdotally well known; yet under researched area, especially in Canada. However, a groundbreaking study by Abougendia and Noels (2001) argued that the acculturation experiences of both first and second-generation immigrants of South Asian immigrants in Canada are different, with the latter experiencing more stress in relation to being acculturated. True as that may be, differences in perceptions as to what is important in life is quite a marked one amongst the two generations. Moreover, first generation immigrants are prone not to "rock the boat" as Khaleeq mentioned even if they do face injustice, it is likely that first generation immigrants will not fight that injustice. In contrast, second-generation immigrants not only take injustice personally, even if it is perceived, but they also tend to be more aggressive in fighting it.

Maria felt that parents who are first generation immigrants in Canada do not understand their children. First-generation immigrants tend to believe whatever they see on the TV as the truth (especially when it comes sexuality and sexual relationships as are portrayed in popular culture), try to restrain their children from indulging in mainstream values, which results in confusion and resentment on the part of their children. Such a confusion results in the children feeling left out that builds up resentment and may lead to a second-generation Pakistani-Canadian being vulnerable to recruiters belonging to extremist organizations. Maria also felt that because of a lack of cultural understanding on the part of immigrant parents, much, which could have been gained and understood in dialogue was never discovered:

> MARIA: You know a lot of times you lie to your parents because they don't understand. They don't get it why prom is so important, and they also don't understand that, "no it's not what you see on TV, it's not some crazy party, it's a landmark." Some may make it a party wherever they go. Prom is more like an end of year graduating kind of thing. So, I think a big part is your parents don't fully understand because they didn't grow

up here. What exactly goes on in high school and all, things like that they fully aren't aware of, and what they need to be talking to their kids about. Like prom isn't an issue, there are different expectations and values. If you look at values, prom is just a party. Its more about your child, what's your child like. If your child is the type of person to act in a promiscuous manner they will do it, whatever, they don't need to go to prom for that, right.

Babar, the oldest of all the participants in this study, also felt that the difference in perceptions amongst first and second-generation Pakistani-Canadians was significant. First generation immigrants were of the opinion that prima facie discriminatory acts committed against them were not important enough to make a fuss about or to challenge, while second-generation immigrants believed that transgressions, even minor ones (micro-aggressions) were seen as a major issue. Babar narrated a story about an exchange between his father (a first- generation immigrant) and his sister (a second-generation immigrant):

BABAR: My father did his master's in criminology. So, when these arguments would be advanced that you know society failed this boy and this and that and so on and so forth, his response and I think its standard with first-gens is that, "yeah life is unfair, some people will have to work harder, there is no getting around that, stop complaining and get on with it. Right"? I mean there were times when, for e.g., my sister complained to my father that she was taking some course and in that course for some assignment she quoted a saying of the Prophet Mohammad, the teacher became angry and said that this is not a historical source it has no historical foundation. She complained to my father, and my father said that, "you know when I was doing my MA, I had a Polish rector. You should have seen what he had to say about people like us. You just buck up and deal with it."

Merjan referred to the relationship between first and second-generation Pakistani-Canadians as fractured. She reported that this fractured relationship, which stems from a lack of understanding on the part of one's parents results in an identity crisis that in turn can make an individual vulnerable to being radicalized. Merjan articulated that she construed the experiences of first and second-generation immigrants differently:

MERJAN: Being the first generation raised and born in Canada, there is that challenge because you are now fractured, you have a fractured relationship with your family for the rest of your life. My parents will never understand either their children, uh from all lenses because they weren't born and raised here. They didn't experience the

> racism that we did and the same identity crisis. They have more confidence in who they are because they are adults. So that's one part.

Merjan's claim about her parents not facing the racism that she did as a second-generation Pakistani is both valid as well as invalid. Instances of first-generation immigrants who moved to Canada, especially to small towns in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s are well documented. They were physically abused at work, emotionally abused in society, their properties were vandalized, and they were overworked and underpaid. Consequently, first-generation immigrants, especially during the early days of Canadian multi-culturalism paid a heavy price (Kelly & Triebelcock, 2009), and many perhaps still suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) to this day.

Moreover, Merjan was also of the opinion that such differences in intergenerational perceptions, and the lack of understanding on the part of parents combined with a severe culture dissonance within second-generation Pakistani-Canadians pushes an individual towards the comfort of their religion. When an individual becomes very religious, some extremists may get hold of the susceptible individual that may lead to the eventual radicalization of that person. Merjan explained the issue in the following way:

> MERJAN: I can only speak about my family, that there is a disconnect because the parents are in the trauma of coming here. They want to keep the culture, and now we are stuck between two cultures and we are not sure what to do. So that there is that kind of disconnect. Uhm, so someone and to be honest, I became very religious also to have a relationship with something. Because you feel misunderstood a lot. Society misunderstands you, mislabels you, and then your parents don't fully understand you. Your siblings don't fully understand you because all of us are privately going through our own pains. So, you become religious. Now If I was taken to some extremist who knows where I would be to be honest. When you are young, 17, you are so impressionable it's ridiculous. And you just wanna have the parental figure.

The participants' views do indicate a deep chasm between the views of their parents (first-generation immigrants) and themselves. The chasm is a result of being born and raised in different

cultures with different values; for first-generation immigrants, cultural dissonance was never a part of their childhood. For many second-generation immigrants of Pakistani descent, cultural dissonance is all they knew growing up. Consequently, they did not feel comfortable sharing their angst with their parents. They felt isolated because in their minds no one, not even their parents understood them. The participants' stories also indicate that because of this disconnection between parents and child, second-generation Pakistani-Canadians are more exposed to becoming radicalized as they seek refuge, "love" and a sense of belonging with recruiters and in radicalization.

Key points can be gleaned from listening to the participants' stories in the context of what can be some underlying reasons that can explain the radicalization of second-generation Pakistani-immigrants. Ten key findings from the stories provided in this chapter are now presented in the next section.

6.4 `Key Findings

Ten key findings emerged from the participants' stories that are outlined below.

First, every individual in this study firmly believed that an act of terrorism committed by an individual in the name of Islam is wrong. The participants also believed that no matter what the triggers, no individual has the right to take the life of another person, as human life is sacred. One participant made a single exception to this rule using the biblical "an eye for an eye" philosophy. He argued that the only justification for taking another human being's life is if that individual has taken the life of someone a person love.

Second, the participants believed that mental health was the greatest factor in making certain that an individual becomes radicalized. Mental health issues, which include trauma could result in a person's low self-esteem and increase that individual's vulnerability, which could lead

her or him towards an extremist interpretation of the faith. The fact that trauma results in a person's low self-esteem is well documented by mental health scholars (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Fennell, 2005; Kuo et al., 2011; Salami, 2010; Yumbul, Cavusoglu & Geyimci, 2010). Individuals are more vulnerable to be manipulated by radicals because of their low self-esteem stemming from childhood trauma so that one way to counter radicalization is to increase individual self-esteem. Mental health is also correlated with being alienated. The more alienated an individual feels the more negative impact it has on their mental health. This estrangement, which stems from feelings of isolation amongst vulnerable individuals, may result in their endeavor to become part of an extremist group to feel a sense of belonging, and to find an identity. When an individual feels contempt and hatred for the society s/he lives in, and for the majority that populates that society either one of two things usually occur. The individual inflicts harm upon her or himself or the person inflicts harm upon others as a means to exact revenge. While many support systems exist for individuals who want to inflict harm upon themselves in the UK and Germany, in contrast Canada greatly lacks the services and support systems for those who are radicalized or are on the verge of being radicalized.

Third, some individuals who feel disaffected and lonely are angry because they are left out. The person's anger is perhaps based on jealousy about the relationship advantages the dominant majority have over second-generation immigrants. Some Muslim youth shy away from their non-Muslim peers who imbibe alcohol and have sexual relationships outside of marriage because these behaviors are frowned upon in a traditional interpretation of Islam, by their families and by the Muslim community at large. The interviewees also pointed out that if someone drinks or is in a relationship outside of marriage, it does not imply that that person is a lesser human being and that judgments should be reserved for those who harm others and not for those who have a different

lifestyle compared to Pakistani-Canadians. These two conflicting views undoubtedly create a sense of resentment and perhaps a victimhood complex amongst second-generation Pakistani immigrants. A logical offshoot of alienation and susceptibility because of the same, is the severe sense of being an underdog that young second-generation Pakistani immigrants carry with them, as was seen in the stories of the participants. One striking feature of this sense of "martyrdom" was a perception among some respondents that second-generation immigrants hold was that events such as 9/11 were a conspiracy to malign Muslims and Islam because it was either an inside job or it never happened. This viewpoint indicates a deeper malaise and a deep-rooted sense of resentment that some Pakistani-Canadians feel, and which should be countered. These acts of terrorism are framed as a conspiracy hatched by Zionists and imperialists because they want to take over and invade Muslim majority populated countries. However, this conspiratorial mindset is not unique to Muslims. Some so-called "truthers" who belong on the "left of the left" politically also argue that 9/11 was a so-called inside job (Moore, Parent & Uscinski, 2014).

Fourth, participants also believed that there was a correlation between growing up in Canada and being at risk to being radicalized. One factor for the presence of this vulnerability was growing up with conflicting values because of the dissonance between the society's values and norms compared to those of the parents. The participants elaborated that conflicting values at home and the uncaring and non-chalant attitudes of an individual's family and the diaspora with regards to the needs and views of second- generation Canadians exacerbated an individual's desire to reach out to radicalized outfits since emptiness exists in such situations. A number of studies depict the permanent damage that can be inflicted upon a child when the parents are not fully involved in their child's life so that they are unable to understand or ignore their child's pain, and basically expect the child to sort out their issues by themselves (Shern, Blanch & Stevernman, 2016; O'

Connell, Davis & Bauer, 2015; Berlin et. al, 2011; Garner et. al, 2012; Forward, 2009). Toxic parenting may be unintentional; however, the child may not construe it as such and instead processes the behavior as the parents abandoning him or her. Adolescents look for parental figures, and recruiters can at times play that role and manipulate these at-risk individuals.

Fifth, and related to the above is the confusion that participants had about relationships, dating and sexuality growing up in Canada. This confusion lead to difficulties in romantic relationships that made many of the participants' feel that they were left out from the mainstream. They pointed out that if teenagers feel left out, and they cannot find a positive outlet for their hormones and primal urges, and emotions, then recruiters can easily divert those hormones towards a darker, more nefarious and violent trajectory. Hence, the sense of having an incomplete and fragmented identity, a confused persona in a dichotomous world combined with having a fractured relationship with parents and feeling alienation from society is similar to the issues young people face that lead them to join gangs. Radicalization is also the result of a deep-rooted sense of animosity resulting from young second-generation immigrants broken identities and isolation from mainstream society. Just as gangs fulfill an individual's need to belong, radicalized outfits placate the loneliness one feels in a society in which one is born into, and which seems alien to those individuals. Radicalized outfits similar to gangs also give individuals a reason to exist that is greater than them. While many individuals join gangs as well as radicalized outfits for the material advantages offered by gangs, many people primarily join gangs to belong (Prothrow-Stith & Spivak, 2004). While some may join extremist outfits because they promise to look after the suicide bomber's family, for many others the reason is simple personal as they rebel against what they perceive to be an unjust world (Araj, 2008; Hafez, 2008; Kruglanski, Chen & Golec, 2008).

Sixth, endogenous factors are critical in providing the foundation on which the edifice of radicalization can be constructed, and the initial part of this process stems from the home. The early childhood Canadian born Pakistanis have had inside their homes suggests that their traditional families cannot fully understand their anger and confusion that provides that initial alienated space that is later on filled by hate-preachers with extreme interpretations of religion. For example, many participants pointed out that their parents did not understand Canadian norms, stuck by the culture they brought over from Pakistan and expected their Canadian born children to live by their Pakistani cultural limitations that became a tight rope for these young people to walk as values within the home would clash with the values of mainstream society. For an individual who is misunderstood by society at large, perhaps the greatest element that shatters her/his already fragmented being is not being fully understood at home by their parents so that they then privatize their pain (Hardy & Lazloffy, 2005). The young people's pain is then taken advantage of by recruiters. In addition, the role played by the Muslim community in Canada alienates young second-generation Pakistanis. Many participants pointed out that leaders of the community usually were first-generation immigrants who could not comprehend the unique psychology of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. Moreover, the lack of understanding on part of the Pakistani community, leads to second-generation youth's confusion about their sexuality and relationships, which in turn makes these young people feel as if they are lost. They have peers from other ethnic groups who are in relationships, yet they are made to feel as if dating someone especially from outside the Muslim community is unacceptable. This conflict between the youth and their elders gives recruiters the opportunity to harness the hormones of these young people down a more dangerous and extremist path.

The disconnection between the first and second-generations and the first-generation's insistence on sticking to its "cultural and social" mores can have disastrous consequences in more ways than one. For example, one major issue faced by the previous government in Ontario was the introduction of sex-education curriculum in the schools. The consequence of the Muslim community's misperceptions about the curriculum was a key factor in the victory of the Conservative party in Ontario (Yakabuski, 2018). At the micro level, this cultural baggage of first-generation Pakistani-Canadians often leads to the second-generation's feelings of anger, resentment, lost identity, alienation, and their increased vulnerability to being radicalized.

Seventh, radicalized outfits also fulfill the human desire to be tribal by identifying as part of a larger group, which is different from the body collective. One possible way of looking at tribalism and radicalization is to observe the rise of white nationalism in Western democracies. Those who voted for demagogues in those democracies crossed the barriers of class and ethno-nationalism and arguably the only unifying or common factor amongst those alt right voters was their race/ethnic group because they felt discriminated against and left out of the hands of the government and the "deep state" (Lilla, 2017). Similarly, individuals who are radicalized and identify with their "tribe" transcend the boundaries of class and social status (Osama Bin Laden was a multi-millionaire); gender (Jihadi Jane); race (ISIS and Al-Qaeda have individuals belonging to multi-ethnic backgrounds from individuals of Uzbek descent to those of Caucasian descent). The single, unifying factor in these radicalized outfits is religion so that it is critical to analyze the issue of radicalization using a holistic framework, which incorporates the intersection of race, class, religion, gender and ethnicity into the analytical framework. That the phenomenon of radicalization transcends socioeconomic boundaries was also evident in the case of the Toronto 18. If individuals perceive that they are marginalized by mainstream society due to their

ethnoreligious backgrounds, they may become vulnerable to being radicalized. The planners and the ideologues of terror are individuals coming from a strong economic as well as educational background. The example of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is quite illustrative in this regard.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the mastermind of 9/11 has a master's in civil engineering from the University of Southern California; Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the murderer of Daniel Pearl was an LSE graduate; Syed Qutb who has been labeled as the founder of modern Islamic terrorism was a former Minister of Education in Egypt; and Aiman Al-Zawahiri was trained as a doctor. A number of studies show that those who commit acts of terrorism as well as those who plan these acts are economically strong and well educated and are in a position to know the system and have the confidence to challenge it as was narrated by the participants, especially Khaleeq and Maria. This "fact" is universal in a sense as for example; Sahar Pirzada (2018) notes that the urban-educated middle class in Pakistan is more supportive of terrorist groups compared to the poor and the wretched of the earth. Hence, many interviewees felt that one key element missing from analyzing the radicalization of Muslim youth was intersectionality. Participants were quite confident that the experiences of an Aboriginal Muslim would be vastly different compared to the experiences of a Caucasian Muslim. Similarly, the experiences of Muslim women, especially those who wear the *hejab* are markedly different compared to the experience of a Muslim man. Hence, a holistic analysis of radicalization should entail examining the experiences of individuals from across the gender and class divide. While it is beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to research whether Muslim women are more marginalized than Muslim men, and if so, why are an overwhelming of individuals who have been radicalized to violence Muslim males rather than females?

Eighth, another key finding to emerge from this study was that the media, both mainstream and social has also played quite a negative role in attracting individuals towards radical organizations. Social media websites provide a free and open space for advocating an extremist, *salafist* interpretation of Islam, which can attract young, lost individuals. Social media forums also perpetuate martyrdom complex as recruiters and even otherwise normal individuals post stories that paint a picture of a perpetual war against Islam being waged by the dominant white majority and their puppet governments who are "Islamophobic." These stories reinforce the narrative of Muslims as victims. A recent example of the dangers of social media in exacerbating already existing chasms in society and reinforcing a sense of victimhood amongst Muslims is the case of Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN). Omar tweeted and equated that Jewish-American support for the state of Israel is unpatriotic to the US. Friends and foes alike criticized her tweets. However, on the social media, many individuals who identified as Muslims (both on the left and the right) claimed that Omar was being unfairly targeted because she was a Muslim with the hashtag #StandwithIlhan. Social media has turned into a poisoned chalice and is a key in driving individuals towards radicalization.

Alongside social media, mainstream media has also resulted in pushing some Muslims to the brink of radicalization, and other Muslims to question the validity of news outlets when they are reporting on Muslims especially in the wake of an act of mass violence. The use of the word terrorist for a Muslim who commits or attempts to commit a large-scale atrocity in contrast to the absence of applying this term in the case of a Caucasian committing an act of violence is problematic for many Muslims, including those who participated in this study. However, it must be borne in mind that the definition of terrorism as per the Criminal Code of Canada usually does not cover acts of violence when they do not have the "terror" factor behind them. This excludes

random criminal acts committed by white people, such as the attack in Toronto in 2018 by an "incel" that resulted in the deaths of multiple innocent individuals.

Ninth, many respondents also mentioned the difference in treatment that is meted out to black people compared to white people or even Muslims. This is an interesting fact and it would be interesting to examine the proportion of minority individuals joining gangs and Muslims who are radicalized as it may point us towards a key element that leads individuals to join anti-social groups.

Tenth, another key finding to emerge was the role of radical clerics in radicalization. On the one hand, some governments have planted clerics to keep an eye on Muslim youth that are vulnerable to radicalization; how wise that decision can be in the long run, is open to debate (Sherwell, 2014). On the other hand, there are many radical clerics and preachers that have found fertile ground in western democracies to recruit individuals. For example, Anjum Chaudhry, a cleric of Pakistani descent based in Britain, has called for waging war against Charlie Hebdo in the wake of attacks on this French satirical weekly magazine as punishment for publishing the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad (The Independent, 2015). While the UK is rife with example of similar clerics, (for e.g., Omar Bakri, Abu Qatada), even Canada has been infiltrated by radical Imams though not to the same degree. For example, a mosque in Calgary that became the hub of recruitment for international jihadists was investigated by the RCMP, and recently shut down (CBC, 2017). This infiltration of radical clerics in Canada has been going on for decades and sky rocketed after December 25, 1979, the day when the former USSR invaded Afghanistan- a fact which was alluded to by Babar. Related to the role of Imams in allegedly radicalizing Pakistani-Canadians, is a larger geo-political/geo-religious factor, primarily advocated by Saudi Arabia. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia has used it petro-dollars to fund religious seminaries in countries

such as Pakistan (Ward, 2018) and has also been instrumental in bringing about arguably the worst humanitarian disaster in recent history in trying to strengthen its foothold in the Middle East through the civil war in Yemen. While the role of Saudi funded clerics in Canada has not been researched much, in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the first Afghan war, clerics trained by the Salafi school of thought were exported to Canada and that is when the seeds of radicalization were primarily sown there. One example, of radicalized individuals finding a home in Canada is *Al-Huda*. This is a group that was founded by Farhat Hashmi to attract Muslim women to her version of Islam, and which now has branches in North America. Sadaf Ahmed's (2008) study points out the success of Al-Huda in converting seemingly "normal" Muslim women to radical extremism.

Finally, a lot also depends on second-generation Pakistani-Canadians willingness at some point in trying to integrate into Canadian society and trying to find common grounds for solidarity with Canadian society at large, especially those second-generation Pakistani-Canadians that were born and/or have grown up in an era where their rights are constitutionally as well as socially secure. These individuals should also be careful of the trap of believing everything that is posted on social media, especially "news" and "information" which is inflammatory. A more nuanced approach to using social media would be to fact check any information which comes across as inflammatory and even as slightly suspect. This constructive approach may result in the reduction of the sense of alienation found amongst some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians.

6.5 Conclusions

This chapter presented ten key findings as they relate to the causes of radicalization, both endogenous as well as exogenous. These findings include the fact that second-generation Pakistani Canadians can have shattered and fragmented identities because of divergent values at home and

mainstream society. They can often feel abandoned at the hands of immigrant parents and they lack trust in their parents because of the cultural baggage they carry so that they cannot understand the challenges their sons and daughters born and raised in Canada face as people of color/non-white persons. All of these endogenous factors result in the enhanced vulnerability of individuals with broken identities who often fall prey to extremist organizations and their recruiters that is somewhat analogous to young people who join gangs. Another critical factor that may result in second-generation youth becoming vulnerable to violence and radicalization are mental health issues resulting from unresolved traumas that individuals were subject to as children. Their untreated Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome could be a critical element amongst those individuals who are at risk of being radicalized.

Exogenous factors that are significant in the radicalization process of second-generation youth include the role of the media in demonizing and dehumanizing Muslims in the wake of terror attacks, the unchecked and free use of social media by radical recruiters to spread their message of hate, the failure of the Muslim community to "be with the times," the cultural dissonance between first and second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, and the role of external actors such as Saudi Arabia in funding and spreading an extreme strain of Islam in Canada.

The religious leadership of Muslim communities in Canada should be handed over to individuals who were born in this society to prevent radical Imams from firing up second-generation youth with hate. Some of the participants noted that those Imams who come over to Canada from other countries cannot and will not understand the social and cultural dynamics within Canada. Only those who are born and raised in Canada can understand those cultural nuances and save individuals from falling prey to recruiters. Thus, second-generation immigrants need to take over the reins of religious leadership because they will be able to understand the

apprehension and distress of a vulnerable individual and will be in an important leadership position to successfully address that person's unease and malaise.

All of these aforementioned factors need to be analyzed, examined together, and countered if Canada is to save its young second-generation citizens from being radicalized toward violence. Unless Canadian policymakers and security organizations address both individual and collective factors that lead to radicalization, pre-empting and preventing Muslim youth radicalization will be an exercise in futility. Considering the wide and varied factors that lead to youth radicalization can this process be countered and defeated in Canada? Did the interviewees harbor any hopes for themselves, their families, the Muslim community, and Canada's future in general? What were their worst fears and apprehensions in relation to their futures, Pakistani-Canadians, the Muslim community in Canada and the Federation of Canada itself? These questions about hopes, fears and dreams are now examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

TOWARDS THAT LIGHT: HOPE (AND FEAR) LIE ETERNAL

7.1 Introduction

The preceding two chapters aimed at examining the participants' views as they pertained to their dual identity as Canadians and as Pakistanis, discrimination they have experienced based on that identity, and the causes of radicalization both at the personal and communal levels. This chapter provides a further examination of the steps that can be taken to pre-empt and counter radicalization in order to save young Muslim Canadians, especially Pakistani-Canadians from being lured into the trap of the *jihadi* narrative. This chapter also provides an overview of the respondent's hopes and dreams as well as their fears and worries in relation to themselves, Muslims living in Canada, and the country to which they express their allegiance, i.e., the country of their birth, the Federation of Canada.

The eight findings in this chapter indicate that:

1. Participants believed that if certain steps are taken both by the Muslim community and by society at large, radicalization can be countered and subsequently defeated in Canada.
2. The participants harbor hopes for:
    a. A better future for themselves at the personal level.
    b. A better future for their children and their families in relation to their faith and ethnic background.
    c. Envisioning a Canada, where historically suppressed minorities find their voice, and the hope that those voices become louder and stronger.
3. The fears held amongst the participants were primarily in relation to:

a. Continued discrimination leveled against them because of their unique dual ethnocultural background.
b. Future discrimination aimed against their families and their children on the basis of their ethnoreligious background.
c. An increase in xenophobia, racism and discrimination similar to what Muslims are experiencing in the United States; and,
d. The introduction of an American model of capitalism where Canadians are told that "it's a strictly fend for yourself process."

7.2 Best Hopes and Dreams for the Future

The respondents' hopes for the future did not center around themselves and their families, but for some, a hopeful future was one where radicalization could be eventually defeated. Radicalization according to the respondents is not a monolithic entity as it is a rather layered and complex system with many different nuances. Farheen deemed that it is critical that Muslim youth saw challenges as opportunities rather than obstacles in life in order that they can live a holistic and peaceful life:

> FARHEEN: You should cherish what your life has been given to you. Troubles do not mean that only you are facing them as an individual and they are there to hold you back. People really need to see the light in it and see the challenges as a stepping-stone. Where you can walk forward and understand others and help others better.

Multiculturalism and adherence to its principles provided a hope to participants that it could be a long-term solution to radicalization. Khaleeq believed that multiculturalism was needed, and everyone had to take a step back and hear out each other in order for it to survive in Canada:

> KHALEEQ: I feel like multiculturalism is a possibility. For example, someone growing up here in Canada can have multiculturalism in that your food, your clothing, your language is still yours. But when it comes towards values, we share some basic ones.

> Somebody from Africa, from Pakistan, from Bangladesh, from China, if they all came here, what they eat, what they wear, it doesn't matter if they come (to Canada) for values, for something. For shared values we need to have a conversation with each other.
>
> > So, I think when we are scared of multiculturalism or there is this notion that multiculturalism is dangerous, it depends on the values of the culture. Whatever is common amongst culture, shared values etc. when it comes to certain values, certain principles, which don't resonate amongst the larger multicultural society, you may have to let go off those values, principle and notions- that's where this fear of multiculturalism comes from.

While Khaleeq raised a legitimate point about immigrants sharing common values when they resettle in Canada, the same point was raised by former PM Stephen Harper before the 2015 Federal elections when he alluded to "old stock" Canadian values. Consequently, Harper was labeled as a racist and a xenophobe who wanted to continue with the traditional "white" ways of running Canada. For the de-radicalization process to be successful, Canadian society as a whole has to agree on some shared, common values so that a healthy, multi-cultural society can function properly.

Farheen noted that one way of arriving at social solidarity, a condition which is critical in defeating radicalization, is for all Canadians to take a step back and try to chase away the pre-existing perceptions they may have about each other. If Canadians can do that it can go a long way into placating the anguished souls of those second-generation youth who feel conflicted about their identities.

> FARHEEN: I know that its hard for people to not judge other people. Umm, and a lot has to do with umm I guess your culture. Because sometimes it's the culture that puts things in your mind and you just know it that way. So, its hard but I think everyone should be able to at least [pause] step back and try to see the other side of the coin you know. Umm, because there is always, I wouldn't say a 100% but 99% there is always a different side of the story. So, if you are able to do that, then I guess you accomplish a big thing in your life.

Javeria believed that it fell upon society at large to save at risk Pakistani-Canadian young people from being radicalized. She reported that structures were already in place to help out at-

risk individuals and hoped that these structures would be tapped into. This is what she had to say on the issue:

> JAVERIA: I think my message is for leaders. You have to bring people to work together as a team; anyone can stand up and say, "I disagree." A good leader is someone who works and builds society, doesn't give directions, offers support to pull people together, to work together. The other thing is schools. In classrooms we need to teach kids that character building its essential. Doesn't matter if you are non-Muslim or Muslim. All those qualities, sharing caring etc., basic qualities, help build character, it's important for society.

Maria harbored hopes for the future not for herself or for society at large, but for her children. This is what she had to say:

> MARIA: I think of my kids [pause] umm [pause] it would actually be they can succeed [pause] They can be more firm than anything else [pause] so they know their religion and they can work in the community without isolating themselves. So, I don't want my daughter to think that because she is a girl, she can't be a doctor, because Islam says you can't work with people who are *non-mehram*[17]. Because they know, the difference between all of these things and navigating them, they become contributing members of whatever society they belong to. They can navigate their religion and all. Also, that they realize that religion doesn't have to be a barrier, that they can be contributing (to society).

Zain, perhaps because of his age (he is an undergraduate student) had simple hopes, neither for himself nor Canada, but for the entire world. He believed that countering radicalization was the responsibility of society and it depended largely upon the way it treated individuals who looked "different":

> ZAIN: I guess (my hope) would be uh the world just becomes better, like everyone respects each other views and nobody is treated different because of it. And its a peaceful place. That's what I think…. Be kind to everyone, respect everyone's views, religion, obviously because that's important to them, they grew up with that around. Everyone's views are based on how they grow up in their setting, so be respectful of that.

Zameer is the chief of staff for an MPP. He had a different perspective about the future that Canada may have to face. Perhaps it was due to his politics background that Zameer argued that

[17] A term used in Islam to refer to individuals who are neither a woman's spouse, nor are they related to her by blood, i.e., father, brothers and grandfathers.

macro-factors were an impediment towards forging a prosperous Canada. However, Zameer is an optimist and he was hopeful about Canada's future:

> ZAMEER: I only see the glass half full not half empty, that's me. But are there challenges? For sure. You know it depends what kind of challenges. From a macro perspective we have challenges with the economy that Mr. X is working on. Our books need to be balanced; healthcare needs to be worked on. There is a term called "hallway medicine" that needs to stop. The list goes on. Those are challenges that the state is encountering that they need to deal with and these are things that we know. Negativity wise, do we see a bleak future? I don't see it that way. Hard work needs to prevail, but the scope is basically, if you don't know how to run you need to learn, so we all learn to tackle challenges.

Finally, Zameer considered it imperative that radicalization could be defeated or at least countered if more second-generation Pakistanis had to enter the political arena so that their "own" community could deal with young people's feeling of alienation:

> ZAMEER: What I would like to see that the fact that we need to see more second gens as MPPs and in politics. We are under no illusion that life is utopian. We know the challenges are there and people like Mr. X are there to fight for injustice that occurs. I would acknowledge it happens, injustice. But he (the MPP) is one voice and we need more, many more voices. Hopefully the younger generation, and younger kids in their 20s can see this guy as a role model and as an inspiration, that he put in the effort and he was so successful, I can be successful as well. And so, it takes the second-generation even third generations to learn from the mistakes from the previous generations and then you pass those lessons on to subsequent generations till you get to a stage where you are at a maximum peak.
>
> Politics is a very new industry as I call it for second-generation Canadians of Pakistani background and heritage. We were not subjected to, talked to, at least I wasn't by my parents about being involved politically other than do your civic duty right. So now we see the potential of what we can do as a broader extent as a community and we see people who want to be part of the process and we need to also give back to the community to educate them. We only have a certain life-time on the shelf, right? After that we expire you know. We will get to an age we want to retire. Somebody has to take the baton, so we have a duty to make sure that the next generation is ready and learning from us.

Merjan's hopes were also multi-layered and multi-faceted. Her hopes were for herself, her family, and for the country she proudly calls home, Canada:

> MERJAN: The greatest aspiration for myself is, for me personally, I just want to be. I want to see a point in time where there is some sort of semblance of you know I guess

somewhat of a peaceful nature within the Canadian dynamic around umm race relations. Uhm I think we are okay, but I just hope that, that part improves. Uhm for my family I worry about my nieces and nephews, so I don't know how and where they will land in this whole dynamic. But overall even to be honest I am quite optimistic, even with everything that's going on I am actually quite optimistic because change takes time and I can't complain, and I go back to the past and say okay again…if Indigenous people are still coming through we are doing great, comparatively.

In an interesting way, stemming from his greatest fear about racism spreading in Canada, Aamir's greatest hopes were also centered around race, ethnicity and belonging; the dream of a true multicultural Canada where no matter what one's caste, color or creed is one's ideas would be accepted equally with one's peers and Canadian citizens:

AAMIR: just being able to be accepted for who you really are basically, just not have any fears of speaking out about what you believe in as long as you aren't causing problems or issues. Umm, I guess the whole, if everyone could just open their minds and accept people for who they are uh and look past what your religion is, what the color of your skin is.

Minorities of Canada, unite! Or at least Zainab articulated that minorities that were marginalized in this country on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity, were now speaking out loud, using their voices to shatter the structures that had victimized them for decades. Zainab noted that this was the greatest hope she harbored for a strong prosperous Canada, where minority voices were reverberating in the hallways of power and throughout society:

ZAINAB: Seeing all these marginalized communities rising up. Indigenous communities are right now, their voices, they are there, and they are making themselves heard. They are fighting for their rights and saying we are not backing down. Black communities as well, BLM Toronto is just like happening, they have so much courage, fighting for their rights. So, I mean just the collaborative work, #MeToo and all these marginalized communities, not just racialized but also trans communities and so on, so people are coming together and saying we aren't going to back down anymore.

We are not going to be silenced. We are not going to accept oppression. We are going to challenge. And I think people are challenging it, and those voices are becoming a little bit louder, more powerful. That's my hope, that they are- they we do have that, we have that umm those communities and who are going to fight for

> social justice, humanity you know. To me, I am very hopeful about that. I don't see people backing down now. I see people, new kids, getting stronger and stronger.

With their varied backgrounds and life experiences, the hopes that the respondents expressed about the future were also varied, ranging from general hopes for global peace to more specific ones for Pakistani-Canadians including the hope that more second-generation Pakistani-Canadians will enter into the public fray in order to make a difference. Moreover, some participant also hoped that passing judgment on other due to the color of their skin and/or their religious background would end so that harmonious cross-cultural ties can be cultivated.

7.3 Worst Fears and Worries for the Future

As is the purpose of a futuristic inquiry, the participants were also asked about their greatest fears, so that a holistic picture about the future they envision could be painted. For Javeria, as a parent, it imperative that children should be observed closely, and it should be ensured that they were being kept away from negative influences in society that may direct them towards radicalization:

> JAVERIA: Generally, I mean the greatest fear that parents have is that just you know not getting involved with the wrong type of people because there are a lot of kids out there who are rebelling, and they go to the extremes. Religious or other extremes and there has to be a balance. My greatest concern would be to associate with people who are abusing and following the wrong path and there is no balance. So, you want to protect your family your children from the extremes.

Mainstream society needs to accept individuals for who they are, not what they look like or believe in, and this is the key to counter radicalization. If an individual believes that s/he is intrinsically part of society, and society considers that person to be an equal citizen then radicalization may be defeated. Maria is a therapist, and she framed this idea in the following manner:

MARIA: My kids, they only have a really Canadian identity. They don't have a Pakistani identity. They definitely don't have an Afghani identity. For them, I fear that they would feel that to be Canadian you have to look a certain way, you have to act a certain way. You can be both; both of their parents are that. And a big help is with my husband being a police officer that you know at least for me in smaller towns, they respect cops a lot as compared to bigger cities.

So umm, hopefully that would be something that combats out things, and people see we are contributing members of society. People just assume that if you are an immigrant you live off the system, whereas in reality immigrants are the hardest workers in the country. That's my big fear for my children, fitting in and how that works for them and not having an identity outside of being Canadian.

Merjan's fears were not centered around herself or her family; her fears were more for the Muslim community, especially, Muslim women, and the alleged xenophobia which is on the rise in Canada:

MERJAN: My greatest fear for myself [pause] uhm in relation to this whole scenario [pause]uhm [pause]so, uhm, I don't have any fears to myself in regards to this anymore. It could be because I have acculturated to society in a way that I am not a threat. I would be fearful if I suddenly wore a hejab and went to work. My fear would be that I would be treated differently by my colleagues. Just live a life underneath the radar so that I am not a target, aside from myself it's more a fear for my family.

However, Merjan also added that within the Pakistani community itself, evolution was an issue. By evolution, Merjan was alluding to the fact that the Pakistani-Canadian community has not kept up with the times. The old guard who are the community's gatekeepers still espouse to the "traditional" values they brought over with them from Pakistan and this has resulted in the community's lack of integration and voluntary segregation or "ghettoization." The newer generations that were born in Canada cannot relate to these old values. Merjan feared that subsequent generations would lose their identity, language, and heritage. If such a situation arose, then subsequent generations of Pakistani-Canadians would feel left out of the mainstream Canadian polity and from their own communities that could ultimately lead to the radicalization of some second-generation Pakistani youth towards violence:

MERJAN: I think they need to, the greatest fear is that they are not evolving at a pace that they should be evolving at umm and as a Pakistani, for the community, for me its cultural loss, language loss because that is occurring because society make's you not want to retain it, depending on where you live in the country. Within my sphere it's kind of like on the sides, it's not considered important. I have friends who refused to speak the language from day one. I can only imagine future generations. The other fear is that radicalization will occur more with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th generations because they are going to be lost in the culture, just like Indigenous. I'm tying it together because cultural loss leads to belonging loss. So, the generation now, I am not surprised they are radicalizing because they need belonging. So, this is all tied, there is research on this too.

"When America sneezes, the world catches a cold." Or so goes the saying. The election of Donald John Trump as President of the United States not only spread fear amongst centrists in the United States, but Canadians were also not immune to its fallout. It was in this vein that Aamir's greatest fear for Canada and Canadians was if an individual like Trump was elected to the helm of affairs in Ottawa. In fact, he specifically mentioned Maxine Bernier as an example of what Canada had come to in terms of the rise of authoritarian populism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). (This interview was conducted prior to Andrew Scheer's nomination as the head of the Conservative Party of Canada):

AAMIR: I would say that if we got a leader like Donald Trump who makes [you believe] that racism is okay, backs up racist ideologies of people, um, because more people are becoming more comfortable just going out and having their little marches and stuff against like diversity and all that stuff. Even like just in Canada, Maxine Bernier was comfortable in saying there is too much diversity in Canada, too much multiculturalism in Canada. I mean he said it couple of years back, but I am pretty sure he feels comfortable right now that Trump is in power in the US and Canada kind of just follows the US. Yeah if there was just more racist ideology that became stronger that would really suck for the future generations. Hopefully we can get to a point where everyone just accepts everyone. You have different backgrounds, that's your belief; believe what you want as long as you aren't hurting anybody.

Zainab is an academic who teaches psychology. She was also fearful that if Canada became more like the United States, things would take a turn for the worse. However, she also believed that it was not just about race-relations being skewed further; blatant, American-esque capitalism, if it ever took hold in Canada, would adversely affect the most marginalized of all Canadians:

ZAINAB: I think one of my worst fears would be that we become more like the US. Like where you know like the rhetoric, the anti-Muslim rhetoric becomes acceptable. Umm, not just that, but a bit more capitalist kind of mentality, greed, everyone is for themselves. I mean I think right now what I appreciate about Canada, we still value taking care of each other and my worst fear is that it will change and impact not just the poor and people with disabilities and people who need that collective care, but it's going to impact marginalized racially even if we have certain types of economic privilege.

I grew up with economic privilege. My father's a professor. We were lucky. I was privileged that way. But even then like if this becomes a much more harshly capitalistic type of culture, a lot of us will suffer and that will include racialized minorities as well. And the anti-Muslim rhetoric, the hatred of the other, more nationalist, that's my worst fear I think in Canada. That we become more like the US. Even as it is, we are still being impacted by the US. But at least we aren't that way completely yet.

The participants in this study harbored some deeply rooted fears for themselves, and their families and communities and Canada. Yet, as is the human condition perhaps, they also saw hope for the country in which they were born, hope for the Muslim community, and hope that someday, young, impressionable minds would be immune from being radicalized by recruiters. The following key findings elaborate on what the interviewees' reflections on their hopes and fears really indicate.

7.4 Key Findings

Hope is the thing with feathers
That perches in the soul
And sings the tune without the words
And never stops at all
—*EMILY DICKINSON*

To think about one's hopes, and worst fears is to think about and imagine the future. And to think about the future necessarily entails having some sort of a blue print to imagine that future (Boulding, 1990). There is a loss not only at the personal level but also at the generational level if an individual does not paint a portrait of what life may still have to offer (Seginer & Lens, 2015). Moreover, an individual's past experiences have serious implications not only for the present but

also in how and what the person perceive their hopes and fears for the future to be (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). In this vein, by examining the experiences of the participants, it was discovered that their hopes, dreams and fears for the future were in a sense built on the sub-structure of their pasts.

The themes that inductively emerged from the participants' hopes and fears were then quite closely intertwined with what they experienced during their childhood as well as during their adult lives. The hopes and fears narrated by the respondents' can be categorized into emotional and social. The emotional aspect refers to hopes and fears the participants had about themselves and their loved ones, while the social aspect refers to the hopes and fears participants harbored about society at large (Shoyer & Leshern, 2016). Using the emotional and social paradigm as a framework of analysis, the 9 key findings to emerge from the stories of the participants are as follows.

First, in the future, if radicalization is to be defeated, the responsibility falls on the Canadian government, the dominant majority, and the Muslim community itself. Only if the three units work in tandem with each other without passing judgment, can the scourge of future Pakistani youth falling prey to radical Islamist violent sects be countered. A first step in this regard is for mainstream society to accept them for who they are as Muslims, and Canadians. Perhaps the greatest hope expressed by participants was that no matter what one's religious background was, someday "with glowing hearts they would see thee rise."

Connected to the aforementioned is the fact that the participants hoped that radicalization could be countered if Pakistani-Canadian parents took more responsibility to become more involved in the lives of their children to ensure that they did not mix with the "wrong" kind of people. Young adolescents look towards their parents as ideals and as symbols of hope, and it was of little surprise that the interviewees had high hopes for their parents showing more responsibility

toward their children. Perhaps this hope stemmed from the fact that the respondents opined that their own parents had abandoned them emotionally during their childhood.

Second, Muslims in Canada may feel that they are marginalized yet they should realize that they live in a country where they are free to practice their faith and dress as they chose to (save for Quebec) and to speak as they desire even if it is a prima facie violation of the criminal code's provisions against hate speech. For example, a complaint was filed against Abou Hammaad Sulaiman Dameus Al-Hayiti who is an Imam in Montreal for contravening the provisions of s.13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.[18] The Imam had published a pamphlet that included, *inter alia*, the following:

> Homosexuals and lesbians should be "exterminated in this life; Homosexuals caught performing sodomy are beheaded; men are superior to women and better than them". In general, "men have a more complete intellect and memory than women; She (Muslim woman) brings the liberating message of "*LA ILAHA ILLALLAH*" to the poor western woman who has lost her femininity, her dignity and her honor and who is now crying for her savior; Jews "spread corruption and chaos on earth" (Investigativeproject.org, 2018, paragraph 2).

For inexplicable reasons, the Human Rights Commission of Canada refused to investigate the complaint against the Imam. While the merits and demerits of anti-hate speech laws may be argued, this case clearly fell under hate speech provisions and the fact that the Imam was not even given a slap on the wrist is baffling. Yet at the same time Muslim-Canadians should accept that Canada has accommodated them more than it has accommodated certain other groups. For example, Ernst Christof Friedrich Zündel lived in Canada for decades as a permanent resident, yet

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[18] It is a discriminatory practice to publish or display before the public or to cause to be published or displayed before the public any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that

> (a) expresses or implies discrimination or an intention to discriminate, or (b) incites or is calculated to incite others to discriminate

he was deported because of the anti-Semitic speech he spread (Thomson, 2017). The playing field has not only been levelled in favor of Muslims in certain cases, it has become uneven for other groups.

Third, the participants' hopes at the personal and social level were depicted in their stories. All of the participants envisioned a better future at the personal level. This is only natural because if hope did not lie eternal in the human heart, then we as a species, both at the individual and collective level would have nothing to live for. The failure and ultimate dismemberment of the former Soviet Union is testament to the fact that the killing of hope is the killing of the future for the individual as well as the body politic a theme brilliantly captured in George Orwell's magnum opus, *1984*.

Related to the above is the fact that an overwhelming majority of participants harbored immense hopes and aspirational dreams for their families, especially for their children. Their greatest hope was that they would see the day in Canada where their children would not be judged by the color of their skin but rather by the virtue of their Canadian-ness, and the strength of their character. Some participants also reflected on what they termed a "gendered" hope in relation to their children. This hope was also layered both in terms of the Muslim community itself as well as for Canadian society in general. The respondents hoped that the day would come when some members of the Muslim community would be able to accept that their daughters had to intermingle with men who were not their relatives, and that would be the key to their success. Female interviewees specifically hoped that their daughters would be perceived more than just daughters, wives, or mothers. Rather they would be seen as individuals who can achieve their educational and professional goals without regard to their gender.

Some of the participants were optimistic of changes at the macro-level/social level. Canada's success and its vibrant economy bring together Canadians of all stripes at the national level, as citizens of Canada, rather than as atomized individuals. Ever since the election of Donald Trump, scholars have argued that the only way to mend the torn fabric of North American society is through finding solidarity using citizenship as a common unifying theme (Lilla, 2017). In a similar vein, the interviewees also hoped that at some point Canadians could come together as one so that they could defend Canada from both foreign and domestic enemies.

Fourth, the respondents were also expectant that the previous generations of Pakistani-Canadians learned from the mistakes they made in the past. For example, they pointed out that first-generation Pakistanis were *only* interested in paying taxes, buying homes, and living the all-Canadian lifestyle to attain the "basic" necessities of life. The participants who were born here hoped that subsequent generations, not just theirs, would actively engage in politics, be elected to parliament, and make a change for the better, for their communities, and for all Canadians in general. A long-term and sustainable peace can only be achieved if members of minority communities are active participants in the elected political arena. For example, a number of individuals of Pakistani descent are members of the federal and provincial parliaments in Ontario (some doing more harm than good, as is the case with Iqra Khalid who introduced M-104). More Pakistani-Canadians are needed in the political sphere to spread the message that Canada provides equal opportunities to those who want to avail of those opportunities. This in turn may go a long was in countering the alienation that afflicts many second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, which could be a precursor to radicalization.

Fifth, the resurgence and activism of Indigenous communities in Canada in a way also gave faith to participants. New immigrants faced challenges yet their lives while not perfect had grown

better over the years and would continue to get better. They hoped that the lives of Indigenous peoples would take a positive turn in the years and decades to come. The participants' hopes extended not just to the Pakistani community or the Muslim community. Their hope for a better future applied to all Canadians who had been historically marginalized. They saw it as very positive that Indigenous people, ethnic minorities, and LGBTQI2* communities were finally making their voices heard. For example, the RCMP finally eased the roadblock that it had set up a few hundred kilometers from Prince George during the recent Wet'suwet'en Nation crisis after days of protests and support by people from across the board (CBC, 2019).

However, as positive and as varied the hopes of the participants were, they also harbored deep fears and perhaps hopes, and fears combined go hand in hand because they assist people in envisioning a holistic future. First, a principal apprehension that interviewees' expressed in this study was that Canada might follow the path of the United States where xenophobia has become blatant especially after the election of Donald Trump. The fear while seemingly unfounded is rational and logical. From the Philippines, to the world's largest democracy, India, to the fourth largest economy in the world Brazil, to the rise of so-called strong-men in some Eastern European countries, the far-right has seen a strong resurgence (see Norris & Inglehart, 2019). While Canada has been by and large immune to its stirrings, the fact that candidates such as Kelly Leitch and Maxine Bernier, even though they were eventually defeated, found a national platform to showcase their xenophobic politics illustrates that there is a deep-rooted malaise in Canadian society amongst the dominant majority as well that needs to be addressed both by policymakers as well as by society at large.

One of the greatest worries expressed by almost every participant was that subsequent generations might end up losing their unique cultural identity. Some respondents offered the

example of the early 1960s migration of Pakistanis to the UK and Western Europe, where 4-5 generations later the unique "Pakistani-ness" of their ancestors had all but disappeared. While this may be a genuine fear and apprehension, examples also show that if anything, cultural nostalgia has become stronger over the years with the third and fourth generations, at least in Western Europe. For example, the Turkish-German soccer player, Mesut Ozil is a third generation German of Turkish decent. Ozil was a constant starter for the German national soccer team. Ozil recently announced his retirement from international soccer for alleged racism and discrimination levelled against him because of a picture he had taken with the President of Turkey, Recip Erdogan (Haaretz, 2018). Whether the same fate befalls a majority of Pakistani generations of the future or whether they will feel like "true Canadians" remains to be seen.

The participants expressed dread for their children because in the future children may be blamed or fall prey to racism, racist taunts and slurs, and instead of realizing that the one levelling the slur was in the wrong, the children might blame themselves. This fear was directly related to the hope that the Pakistani-Canadians of the future would blame racists for being wrong rather than blaming themselves for something that was a part of their identity make-up, i.e., their culture, their skin tone, their ethno-cultural roots. Related to the loss of cultural identity was the respondent's anxiety that their culture, and religion might also be lost to them. Some participants bifurcated their identity in terms of culture and religion and considered the latter to be superior and more critical than the former. They feared that as generations passed, the Islamic faith and practices, as a part of young people's identity would be lost. While this may be a legitimate fear, individuals do have the right to carve their own unique niche and interpret what faith means to them, and which faith practices they may or may not wish to follow. Irshad Manji is a LGBTQI2* feminist activist. She is for example, heavily criticized for her "reformist" views towards Islam

that have been labelled as confrontational and insensitive (Whitaker, 2006). Traditional views of what constitutes Islam will have to undergo a transformation if radicalization in Canada is to be countered in the future.

Some participants were fearful that the loss of culture amongst Indigenous peoples in Canada was also connected to the loss of culture amongst subsequent generations of Pakistani-Canadians. They felt that just as Indigenous peoples had lost their languages and their cultures, the same fate would befall Pakistani-Canadians. This is a fallacious analogy and an unfounded fear since Indigenous Canadians were brutally assimilated by the colonists, their languages decimated, potlatches banned, and their children taken away forcibly by the RCMP. In other words, the atrocities committed against Indigenous Canadians fits the definition of what constitutes genocide under International Law.[19] While there is no doubt that Canada's policy towards immigrants of color was historically based on racial prejudice and white supremacy (Kelly & Tribelcock, 2009), legally, it cannot in any way be construed as genocide and thus the fear that a similar loss of culture may occur with subsequent generations of Pakistani-Canadians is at best, unfounded, facetious, and based on hyperbole.

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[19] In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and,

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Genocide Convention, Article 2).

Many participants feared that their children and subsequent generations would lose their "unique" culture and would fall prey to extremist Islamist groups. This fear was based on a number of factors the most common was the reality that social media is used as a breeding ground for recruitment by extremist groups. How exactly can social media be "controlled" without infringing on the right for one to express oneself freely, no matter how vile the expressed idea is?

Second, the participants also apprehended that their children and subsequent generations of Pakistani-Canadians would continue to face barriers in terms of employment because of their names, their faith, and their skin color. Participants felt strongly about discrimination directed against Pakistani Canadians in employment. The participants lashed out at the level of discrimination in employment probably based on their experience even though they were all gainfully employed on a par with their skills compared to first generation immigrants that are more often than not underemployed.[20]

The participants expressed anxiety for the welfare of their parents as life became more difficult for them in terms of access to social services and being treated with respect by the dominant majority. They did accept that their parents had more experience in life compared to them in terms of navigating the icy, sometimes frozen waters of Canada. They also felt that society at large discriminates and will continue to discriminate against these first-generation Pakistani Canadians for not speaking "proper" English. Perhaps this apprehension and anger is what drives some second-generation Pakistanis towards radicalized violence.

Third, the respondents feared that unbridled capitalism would become an integral part of the Canadian economy, as Canada would assume the economic model of the United States. While their concern may have nothing to do with radicalization, it must be borne in mind that orthodox

[20] Jo Volpe, the then Minister of Immigration remarked in 2004 "We have the most educated limo drivers in the world." (Kelly and Tribelcock, 2009).

Islamic theologians such as Maudoodi and Qutb and then later on Bin Laden declared the West to be decadent and its political and economic system an evil because of capitalism. The bogeyman of capitalism was used both by both communists and Islamists alike to attract young people into their folds. Perhaps in order to defeat the threat of radicalization in the long run, a nuanced public conversation about what exactly constitutes capitalism in Canada needs to take place.

In contemporary society people have opted to wear blinkers and refuse to give credit where credit is due, no matter which side of the political divide they fall on. It was under John Diefenabaker's leadership, that Canada introduced its first federal human rights act, a precursor to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Richard Nixon was indicted for Watergate, yet he ensured the passage of environmental regulations in the US. George H W. Bush introduced the American with Disabilities Act. There are countless other examples of people from both sides of the isle introducing legislation that ultimately benefits all of society. Unless society as a whole can accept the positive steps that their political opponents have taken and give credit to them for their efforts, polarization will continue, and the fragile tapestry of citizenship might ultimately be torn apart.

7.5 Conclusions

This chapter narrated the interviewees' worst fears and worries, and best hopes and wishes for the future for themselves, their community, and for their country of birth and origin. The participant's hopes and fears were broadly categorized as personal and social. At the social level, many participants articulated that their greatest hope was that Canada would someday become a truly multi-cultural country where everyone irrespective of their background would have an equal voice and equal rights. They also hoped to see a prosperous, healthier Canada comes into existence where marginalized communities would continue to rise and go from strength to strength.

At the personal level, the worst fears and apprehensions narrated by the participants included a loss of their unique Pakistani culture for future generations, and an erosion of the community's Islamic faith and religious identity. In addition, they feared that their children and subsequent generations might fall prey to radicalized groups while they faced continued discrimination in society, especially in terms of employment. They also felt anxiety about the rise of a populist leader like a Donald Trump that would bring out the ugly side of Canada and Canadians.

The participants' stories in the previous three chapters discussed issues of identity stemming from childhood experiences based on their ethnoreligious background, economic discrimination at the hands of the dominant majority, and a deep-seated feeling of resentment at feeling Canadian while not being treated as Canadian. These mixed feelings are some key reasons why some second-generation Pakistani-Canadians might find a loving embrace in the arms of extremist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al- Qaeda. Finally, one key theme that resonated with the interviewees was a yearning, and a desire to be heard and listened to by mainstream society. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, arguably one of the greatest poets of the Urdu language once wrote, and his words reflect every story shared by the participants in this study:

> My heart is torn, hear the wounds of my heart,
> Listen to the hope of a new dawn.
> I am grief stricken, hear my being soaked with tears,
> Listen to the hope of a new dawn.
> My tongue is dry, unable to speak, console my gaping wounds
> Listen to the hope of a new dawn.
> My feet are blistered, listen to the sorrows of my journey,
> Listen to the hope of a new dawn.
> From the one who travels through the dark desert of tyranny,
> Hear him speak of the beauty of dawn.

The respondent's stories about the possible triggers and reasons that second-generation Pakistani-Canadians are radicalized, and their hopes and fears are fruitful in empowering

policymakers to arrive at possible prevention and intervention measures to pre-empt and counter the possibility of future generations being radicalized. The next chapter highlights the overall key findings from the study and outlines some avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

The study participants raised in Canada by Pakistani immigrant parents offered many deep insights about the unique issues centered on identity, which are faced by second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. They indicated that a dual identity, and at times a fragmented identity, could lead to a vacant feeling in an individual's personality that leaves them vulnerable to be radicalized.

None of the study participants were ever part of an extremist Islamist organization or any other illegal outfit. However, they had strong views about race-relations in Canada, the role that the media plays in demonizing Muslim-Canadians, and problems that exist within the Islamic community as well as having a feeling of alienation from mainstream society and from their own parents. All of the dynamics aforementioned are key elements in the radicalization process.

While all of the elements mentioned above are inextricably linked to the radicalization process, they can broadly be divided into the following four categories: (1) The Individual, (2) The Family, (3) The Society, and (4) The State. All four segments have a critical role to play in order to pre-empt and prevent second-generation Pakistani-Canadians from radicalization to violence. How exactly can these different actors make a difference and contribute to sustainable peace in Canada? What are some of the recommendations that can be offered in light of the respondent's viewpoints? These questions are examined in the next sections.

8.2 The Levels

8.2.1 The Individual

An overwhelming majority of participants in this study narrated their experiences of discrimination that they were subjected to as children as well as during their adult life. For example, Aamir noted that discrimination at the hands of the dominant majority continued in the work place every day. Others did not face overt acts of racism, yet they firmly believed that covert racism and discrimination was deeply embedded and hidden in Canadian institutions.

There is no doubt that "racism" exists in society. Relative deprivation can also explain the sense of victimhood experienced amongst the participants in this study as well as Muslims living in "Western" societies. For example, it has been pointed out that Muslims, even those who have not been subjected to covert or overt racism, construct a victimhood mentality (Meer, & Modood, 2012; Meer & Modood, 2009), which instead of helping them progress further in society, stunts their growth. It is also important to note that the interviewees were very resilient in dealing with day-to-day discrimination.

This was a point raised by Sadiq Khan, a former Liberal MP in the UK and who is currently serving as the Mayor of London. Khan is the son of Pakistani-immigrants. He argued that Muslims residing in the UK need to take more responsibility for the actions of their families and their community and more importantly shun the perpetual sense of victimhood that they feel (BBC News, 2008). Khan recognized that the way forward for Muslims was to pay more attention to day-to-day issues such as unemployment instead of focusing their attention on the persecution of Muslims in foreign lands (BBC News, 2008). Consequently, it would benefit second-generation Pakistani-Canadians to desist and oppose openly racist ideologies, yet at the same time to not

construe every negative action as racism; a malaise that has alienated Muslim-Canadians from the rest of society and their fellow Canadians.

8.2.2. The Family

There is a vast body of literature that argues that parents have a major influence on whether or not a child is radicalized (Bakker 2006; Duriez & Soenens, 2009; Sageman, 2004). The influence parents have on their children and the radicalization process can be due to genetic makeup (pre-disposition) or it may be contextual (Bornstein, 2002; Duriez & Soenens, 2009; Sikkens et.al, 2017). Further, multiple scholars in the field of de-radicalization studies posit that if the interaction between parents and children is developed and nurtured, individuals who were radicalized may be able to reintegrate back into society (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Gielen, 2014; Sikkens et. al, 2017; Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015). Moreover, a number of scholars have pointed out that conflicts between parents and children and instability within families can exacerbate the process of radicalization (Bigo et al., 2014; Bornstein, 2002; Cowan & Cowan, 1992; Sikkens et al., 2017; Spalek, 2016; Subedi, 2017). If an individual's family plays a positive role in that person's life, it can preempt and prevent radicalization, and also be a key factor in the de-radicalization of youth who have fallen prey to violent and extremist ideologies (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan, 2014; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Reinares, 2011).

These theoretical perspectives are supported by the views of the participants in this study. Many respondents noted that they could not narrate the traumas that they suffered as children and the isolation they felt in society at large and within their own home to their own parents and that the lack of intimacy and connection with their parents was a key factor in shattering their personalities and exacerbating their sense of isolation. Many participants revealed that the loss of family, not in a physical sense but rather in an emotional sense is a key element and a primary

trigger in fostering vulnerabilities in youth that result in radicalization. The question then is what role, if any, can the family play in preventing second-generation Pakistani-Canadians from radicalization?

It is beyond doubt that immigrants resettling in Canada face major challenges, ranging from linguistic barriers, to penetrating the employment market as well as trying to create social networks so that a better tomorrow is possible for themselves and their children. However, the flipside to these challenges is that when parents are consumed with trying to make ends meet, their children feel ignored. Moreover, with the cultural baggage that some Pakistani-Canadian immigrants bring to Canada, their children often feel uncomfortable sharing their struggles with their metaphorical rocks.

While this may seem like a very idealistic problem to the "family dynamic" of radicalization, immigrant Pakistani-Canadian parents need to as best they can, leave behind the cultural values they bring to Canada if these values collide with the norms in the country of resettlement. For example, a study participant pointed out that going to the prom was considered a sin by her parents. What immigrant parents need to realize is that when they try to impose Pakistan's values on their children who are born and raised in Canada, they are guaranteeing the children's construction of an identity that is confused and which can be manipulated by radical recruiters.

Moreover, conflict exists between the beliefs imparted in the home and the realities that exist in school and in society in general so that children might feel that they do not have a mentor and guiding influence primarily, the parents to look up to (Sikkens, 2017) and that absence of a parental figure is filled by extremist recruiters and ideologues. In order for second-generation children and adolescents to be protected from radicalization, parents need to accept that their

worldview is different from that of their children, and that these two worldviews occasionally collide. Parents who might still hold onto whatever cultural baggage they may have brought with them to Canada should not try to enforce their beliefs on their children in order to protect them from "moral corruption." The imposition of the parent's cultural values has disastrous consequences for the child and her or his future.

8.2.3 The Society

For the purposes of this study, society can be divided into two different segments: (1) The Muslim community itself, and (2) society at large. In order to preempt, prevent and de-radicalize second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, recommendations are provided below.

8.2.3.1-The Muslim Community

A number of participants in this study complained that the Muslim community itself was a key issue in being a push factor towards the radicalization of young Pakistani-Canadians. They felt that the Muslim community in Canada was isolationist and fragmented within itself. Leaders in the community did not understand the unique sociocultural dynamics of Canada, and as a result there was a severe disconnection between young second-generation members of the Muslim community and its leadership.

The participants noted that there were a number of reasons for the Muslim community failing to save its at-risk youth. In particular, the participants held the view similar to their parents that "imported clerics" did not understand the unique issues faced by second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, and as such young people had no connection with them or with the elders of the Muslim community.

In accordance with the solution proposed by the respondents to the imported cleric problem, it would be highly advisable for the Muslim community to find religious leadership from within, from those who were either born or raised in Canada, or those who came to Canada at a young age, while their cognitive abilities were still forming. These clerics would be cognizant of the realities faced by second-generation Pakistani-Canadians, as well as other Muslim Canadians. They could be instrumental in providing a much-needed outlet for young Muslims to vent out their frustrations in a constructive way. Moreover, it is time for the old guard to pass the baton onto the younger generation, since the older generation has caused confusion amongst the younger people that has had disastrous personal as well as socio-political results. Finally, Muslim communities also need to be somewhat open when it comes to interactions between both genders. An individual young person has to function in a healthy way, especially when her or his hormones are raging and one of the most dangerous things that families as well as communities can do is to deny the existence of the young people's sexual awakening instead of directing it in a more positive way. The key to achieving this aim is for young men and women from the Pakistani-Canadian community to interact somewhat freely, to find that refuge, which the poets and sages have "only dreamt about" (Russell, 2000).

8.2.3.2- Society at Large

A universal malaise is rotting democratic societies from the inside out; the scourge of absolutism and contempt for opposing views. While it is easy to accuse the extreme right of spreading and preaching a message of hate, the extreme left is also to be blamed for the mess that has been created globally. The clash of both of these two extreme world-views has led to what Yeats (1916) once described in Ireland as:

Things fall apart, the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.

While Alt right speakers such as Richard Spencer and Jordan Peterson have attacked identity politics, Liberal centrist philosophers ranging from Richard Rorty (1998) to Mark Lilla (2017) have argued that the left needs to give up its extreme version of identity politics, which demonizes the other instead of unifying individuals under the banner of citizenship (Ham & Benson, 2015). The segregation of individuals under the categories of race, class, gender, and anti-ableism etc., has resulted in a shattered and divided civic polity. Every segment of society including the dominant white majority feels like a victim, hate an opposing point of view, and think of the other side as an enemy. This view is argued by liberal centrists, and also by Centre-right individuals such as Mary Katherine Ham (2015), and Noah Rothman (2019) who consider the destruction of the fabric of society as a result of extremist ideologies. So, in the context of the present study, as was seen in the views of the participants, their identity is rooted in a sense of victimhood based on their religion and as such the key identification factor was religion and not citizenship. If solidarity within Canada has to be achieved, a common identity based on the shared good of all (citizens) instead of one tribe will have to be forged.

The respondents in this study were quite skeptical of their white counterparts, which was evident in their narratives. While many of the points of view shared in the context of race-relations could be deemed as just and valid, the persistent belief that minorities are perpetually oppressed, structures benefit the dominant white majority all the time, privilege is inherent, and the white majority benefits at the expense of non-white minorities, may sound attractive to some members that belong to minority communities, yet such a view also alienates almost half of society, creating fissures. While discrimination when it exists needs to be acknowledged by society as a whole, as was the case during the civil rights movement in Canada and the US during the 1960s, and the post

Toronto bathhouse raids in this country, creating incidents of discrimination and disseminating hate against fellow citizens will only further resentment within both minorities and the dominant majority.

The way for discourse to become more civil and to move forward is for people from every segment of society to accept that the basis of a healthy and functioning body politic is to accept the fact that differences will always exist, and differences may not be respected but to hold a different opinion on any issue is the right of all citizens. If all communities, the Muslim community included, impart this positive message to its followers, then society may have a better chance in defeating extremist thoughts and consequently extremist actions, on both sides of the political spectrum.

8.2. The State

The final actor in the struggle to counter radicalization is the state (Szamania, 2016). What can the Canadian State do to pre-empt, counter, and defeat the radicalization of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians? In order to address this question comprehensively, it is important to first examine counter radicalization programs from at least two Western European countries that have been battling the radicalization of the homegrowns for a while now. This exploration is useful in offering suggestions to Canadian policymakers and security analysts so that a more robust counter-radicalization program may be constructed.

Canada has been fortunate in terms of foiling the number of planned and executed terrorist attacks. The UK, France, and Germany have been victims of deadly terrorist attacks carried out by homegrown radicalized jihadists. It would be fruitful at this stage to examine Canada's public policy documents as they relate to homegrown radicalization and then view the policies adopted

by European countries to see how those countries have dealt with the scourge of homegrown terrorism and what are the lessons Canada's national security policymakers and PACS scholars can learn from them.

8.3.1. Public Policy and Homegrowns (2007-2012)

Until the arrest of the Toronto18, Canada's security related documents paid little or no attention to the issue of radicalization. Hence, this study examines policy documents from 2006 onwards when radicalization was finally deemed to be a critical issue by the government, in the wake of the Toronto18 foiled attacks. The documents are examined in a chronological order to evaluate whether over the years Canadian policy in the context of radicalization has developed robustly or not.

In the initial period following the arrest of the Toronto 18 members, not much detail was paid as to how the threat to radicalization would be countered. For example, in the 2006-2007, Public Report issued by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS), radicalization was deemed worth the following mention:

> During the year, a main focus of CSIS was terrorism inspired by the ide-ology of al-Qaeda, and the issue of radicalization of citizens or residents of Western countries. (Public Report 2007, 11.*)*

While the expectation was that after the arrest of the Toronto18, a somewhat detailed response to the threat of radicalization would be issued by policy-makers, surprisingly that was not the case, at least initially. However, in its public report for the year 2007-2008, CSIS went into a bit of detail about the threat which was posed by the homegrowns*:*

> Like many other Western democracies, Canada has individuals within its borders who support the use of violence to achieve their political goals. Their activities are often linked to conflicts around the globe and typically include: planning or helping to plan terrorist

> attacks in Canada or abroad; providing a Canadian base for terrorist supporters; fundraising; lobbying through front organizations; obtaining weapons and materials; and coercing and interfering with immigrant communities (Public Report 2008, pp.10-11).

After providing the reader with an idea as to how radicalized individuals pose a threat to Canada, the state's premier intelligence agency also claims that homegrowns belong to varied ethnic and socio-economic background and cannot be fit into one demographic stratum (Public Report 2008). As was seen in Chapter I, however, this is a flawed assumption since homegrowns usually belong to economically well-off families, have strong socio-economic backgrounds and are educated. Having laid the groundwork about the extent of the threat, the report warns Canadians that even smaller towns vulnerable to being targeted by the homegrowns and that it is "impossible to separate the two (global and homegrown extremism) when considering the implications for Canadian national security interests" (Public Report 2008, p.14). At this stage, it could be expected that to counter such a wide-ranging threat, a plan of action would be offered. That is not the case as the report mentions just two mechanism to counter the security threat in general: intelligence activities and security screening (Public Report 2008, p. 18-22).

Similar to the 2007-2008 report, the report for 2008-2009 also claims that homegrown extremism is a threat to Canadian national security and "while demographically small, Canada remains home to certain individuals and groups that support the use of violence to achieve political or ideological goals." (Public Report 2009, p.11). Unlike former reports though, the above cited report does mention collaboration with other countries who face the threat of homegrown terrorism, in order to counter the threat (Public Report 2009, p.11). However, the report remains silent as to the steps that may be taken to achieve this goal. The 2009-2010 report claims that CSIS

is fully cognizant of the threat posed by homegrown extremism. However, unlike the preceding reports, the 2009-2010 report gives the reader a profile of a homegrown terrorist and claims that:

- Radicalization is impossible to profile with any accuracy. However, it has several drivers which include grievances against the West and its way of life and the misperception that
- Islam is under attack by the West.
- Radicalized individuals believe that they are the only true followers of the faith.
- Low socio-economic status, educational achievement, personal experience of oppression and mental illness are not always the reasons why an individual becomes radicalized.
- Violent radicals come from all social and age levels and are spread across the education spectrum making detection and intervention more difficult. (Public Report 2009, pp.10-11-Italics added).

Similar to its previous reports CSIS does not provide the reader with any plan of action that has been undertaken in order to counter radicalization in Canada. Moreover, it is empirically incorrect to suggest that violent radicals are spread across the demographic and economic divide. As has been argued in this study, homegrowns are usually middle to upper middle-class individuals who belong to educated families. Poverty plays little or no role in radicalizing homegrown terrorists.

In the 2010-2011 report, as was the case in previous reports, it is argued that countering homegrown radicalization is of supreme importance to the Canadian polity. In this context then, CSIS undertook an extensive project the findings of which were titled. “"A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamist Extremists in Canada Today." Unfortunately, the report

was classified and not released to the public. However, the Globe and Mail did receive a copy of the report and summarizes it findings as under:

- Homegrowns are well-integrated into the mainstream polity
- Immigrants and refugees do not pose a critical risk in terms of radicalization as compared to the homegrowns. (Globe and Mail, 2013)

While the policy documents do raise an alarm about the threat of homegrown extremism, they are silent as to how the threat can be countered. Even when studies were undertaken to examine radicalization and the ways to counter it, documents remained classified. However, this was not always the case as certain documents did go into detail not only about homegrown radicalization but also as to the threat posed by Islamic inspired terrorism. The 2013 report issued by the Department of Public Safety is one such document.

8.3.2. The 2013 Report

A document which comprehensively address the issue of youth radicalization in Canada is the 2013 report issued by the Department of Public Safety titled "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Addressing the issue of homegrowns, the report quite explicitly notes:

- To succeed the government's counter-terrorism efforts cannot be limited to operations directed at groups or individuals already involved in terrorist activities. They must also be reinforced by preventive measures, aimed at keeping vulnerable individuals from being drawn into terrorism. These measures call for a focus on individual motivation, and other factors contributing to recruitment into terrorist activities (Department of Public Safety, 2013, 5).
- While the report does not deny that the threat from the outside by Islamist militant groups is real, it emphasizes on how lethal the threat from within is:

> While Al-Qaeda affiliates may pose a threat of terrorist attacks from abroad, violent "homegrown" Sunni Islamist extremists are posing a threat of violence within Canada. Homegrown extremists are those individuals who have become radicalized by extremist ideology and who support the use of violence against their countries of residence, and sometimes birth, in order to further their goals. A number of individual extremists from western countries have attempted terrorist attacks, inspired by but not directly connected to Sunni Islamist extremists abroad. Canadians and other individuals suspected of a variety of activities related to Islamist extremism remain active across the country. Some of these individuals are spreading violent propaganda, raising money to support terrorism, helping individuals travel to foreign zones, and establishing connections with like-minded extremists in Canada and abroad […] *homegrown extremists will a pose a terrorist threat within Canada for the foreseeable future* (Emphasis Added) (Department of Public Safety, 2013, 7).

Finally, considering radicalization of youth in Canada, the report strikes a sober tone:

> Radicalization, which is the precursor to violent extremism, is a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate mainstream beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives" (Department of Public Safety, 2013, 15).

8.3.2.1 The Strategy

The strategy adopted by the then government to counter terrorism was markedly different from the present government's initiatives, both in terms of strategy as well as content. The aim of the government at that point in time was to:

- Enable the Canadian security apparatus to focus on a coherent objective;
- Develop a basis through which Canada's approach towards addressing terrorism could be discussed;
- Constructing counter-terrorism policies for the future; and,
- Enabling a periodic review through which the terrorist threat and Canada's counter to it can be addressed (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Moreover, these aims are based on certain principles, which affirm Canada's democratic norms, and in protecting its citizens from direct violence. These "fundamental principles" include:

- Building Resilience (Strategic),
- Treating terrorism as a crime and prosecuting people involved in it (Legal),
- Adherence to the rule of law (Legal/Constitutional),
- Cooperation and partnerships (Strategic),
- Proportionate and measured response (Strategic), and,
- A flexible and forward-looking approach (Strategic).

These principles are part of the state's neoliberal characteristics that are there to protect the individual and the state's structure. To design a strategy based upon the aforementioned cardinal principals, the strategy proposed by the then government was dependent on four interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing elements, namely Prevention, Detection, Denial, and Response.

All four of these elements need to be examined so that it can be determined whether the new policy is better than the older one or vice versa.

Prevention. The purpose of "prevention" is obviously to thwart any future attacks on Canadian soil. At the level of prevention, the focus is primarily on those people who have either engaged in terrorist activity or are at risk of committing terrorism acts both on Canadian and international soil (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

At the prevent stage the desire is to increase communal resilience to extremism and radicalization. To do so, developing and propagating a counter-narrative counter violent extremist ideology. It is at this stage that preventing individuals from being radicalized is the aim. In addition, de-radicalizing those who were fallen prey to extremist ideology and narratives is also

desired. Moreover, by endeavoring to nip the evil in the bud and by pre-empting the radicalization of homegrowns, the chances of individuals being impressed by violent Islamist extremist ideology is also reduced (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Working with Communities. To achieve success at the prevention stage, the Conservative government proposed a partnership with individuals and communities so that the number of individuals who get radicalized is reduced. As the report points out since violent extremist terrorism does not emanate from a single source but is quite often a hydra headed monster. Therefore, the key is to build strategic partnerships with individuals and groups in Canada that can bolster trust and confidence between the government and at-risk communities. The building of strategic partnerships can also enable the government to prevent future acts of terrorism, and to better understand the finer nuances and reasons behind radicalization of youth so that steps can be taken to rectify the issues that drive young people towards violent extremism.

One successful program that aims to prevent radicalization of youth is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) National Security Community Outreach program. The aim of the program is to "Ensure capacity and capability to achieve a multifaceted approach including outreach/awareness at all levels of policing with communities and partners, prevention, strategic analysis, information/intelligence sharing, and enforcement" (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2013). In this sense, the program is not "pure" law enforcement or coercive enforcement. It is an approach that is based on reciprocity, trust and mutual respect between communities and the government, which represents them.

Alternative Narratives. One major reason that young people are radicalized is the "us v/s them" narrative propagated by ISIS and other like-minded groups. In this narrative, disaffected

Muslim youth are told that the "West" is waging a war against Islam and it is Muslims responsibility (the youth) to protect the Ummah. Moreover, since these young people already feel left out of the main Canadian polity and feel discriminated against, they find a sense of belonging and comfort within radical outfits. According to the 2013 report, at the stage of prevent positive, alternative narratives which emphasize the plurality, openness, diversity and inclusive nature of Canada need to constructed which can result in at risk youth finding their core Canadian identity (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Detection

The second prong of the former model was detection, i.e., observing those individuals who could eventually pose a threat to Canada's national security. A successful detection program would be dependent upon thorough investigations, sound intelligence and eventual prosecutions. At the detection level the aims are to identity the threats in a timely manner, uncovering terrorist activity by embedding early warning systems and the sharing of information within Canada with allies and non-traditional partners (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Tools utilized:

Canada's capability to collect analyze and disseminate intelligence should be strong in order to have a successful terrorism detection system. These three points are addressed briefly below (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Collection: The optimal way to pre-empt an act of terrorism is through the collection of on the ground intelligence. In Canada the three outfits that are responsible for collecting intelligence are the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), the RCMP, and the

Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSES). Other organizations, which collect relevant intelligence include the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). Following the money trail is crucial in not only tracing the source of funds to be used in a terrorist attack but also in getting a broader picture of the terrorist network.

Analysis: For intelligence to be an effective tool, it needs to be analyzed in an optimal manner. For example, one major reason for the successful US raid that killed Osama Bin Laden was good analysis of field data by Langley. While for obvious reasons the tools and methods used by Canadian law enforcement to analyze intelligence are classified, there are certain units that are involved in intelligence analysis.

The Privy Council Office International Assessment Staff (PCO IAS) provides policy-neutral assessments of foreign developments and trends that may affect Canadian interests. CSIS sifts through all the collected information and offers the government an assessment about the level of terror threat. Finally, the RCMP also drafts strategic and tactical assessments of the terrorist threat to Canada.

Dissemination: Finally, in order for the information to be useful it must be shared with those who require it. In Canada critical and relevant information, which has been collected is shared within the government of Canada, between the federal government and provinces and territories, as well as between the government and owners of critical infrastructure and with international partners

.

Denial. The third prong or tier is the denial strategy, which as the name suggests is meant to deny terrorists the opportunity as well as the means that can enable them to carry out acts of terrorism. At the denial stage, the aim is to be able to counter violent extremist activities both locally and internationally, launching strong and effective prosecutions, destroying or rendering terrorist support networks ineffective and maintaining cooperation with allies and members of at-risk communities. Moreover, at this stage the aim is to stabilize international hot spots, disrupting the movement of resources and individuals and reduction of security vulnerabilities, amongst other issues (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Tools Utilized. Denial is the most comprehensive part of the former program with wide ranging activities and tools. These include among others working with international partners to prevent and pre-empt possible terrorist attacks; ensuring the safety of chemical, biological and nuclear materials so that a large-scale tragedy can be prevented; effective and conclusive prosecutions which can be used a deterrence tool, especially in relation to homegrowns; and denying access to financial resources which could be used to plan and execute terrorist attacks (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

Response. While the aforementioned activities and prongs were aimed to prevent an act of terrorism being carried out, the final stage of the model is ex post facto i.e. how to respond if a terrorist attack is carried out. The aim of the "response program" is to develop capabilities to address issues that arise in the wake of a terrorist attack. Moreover, the aim is to rebuild critical infrastructure as soon as possible, continue government services and lead the people through a time of crisis (Department of Public Safety, 2013).

8.3.4. The 2016 Public Report

Another critical document to frame and place counter-radicalization efforts into context is the 2016 public report on the terrorist threat to Canada, issued by the Department of Public Safety. The report first assesses what it calls the threat environment, and then it looks at the national terrorism threat level, the global environment, emerging issues in terrorism and finally how to respond to the threat (Department of Public Safety, 2016). Moving onto current threats, the report claims that the main threat to Canada is by those extremists who can carry out attacks on Canadian soil (Department of Public Safety, 2016). The Government also posits that in order to counter violent extremism in country terrorist attacks can be divided into two sub-groups:

1. *Inspired Attack*: The report defines an inspired attack as "a self-initiated attack by a lone-actor or small group undertaken in support of a terrorist group or extremist ideology, without the inspiring group's prior specific direction, financing or knowledge."
2. *Directed Attack*: Directed attacks are defined as "an attack planned and undertaken on the instructions or with the guidance of a terrorist group. The direction can involve some or all details of the target, financing and methodology" (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 6).

With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, terrorist attacks worldwide are inspiring attacks (inspired attacks) in the Global North. Inspired by Islamist militant ideology, terrorists including the homegrowns, use simple methods to carry out large-scale violence, usually with little

planning. For instance, a person who used a truck to run over innocent civilians killed over 80 people in a terrorist attack in Nice.

The report also claims that a real threat to Canada comes from what the government calls "extremist travelers" (Department of Public Safety, 2016). It further claims that over 36,500 individuals including at least 6,600 from "western" countries have travelled to Syria since 2011 to join the conflict (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 3). The report reaffirms Canada's commitment to the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 2178, which legally binds Canada to "preventing the recruitment, organization, transport and equipping of foreign terrorist fighters who seek to support foreign insurgencies and violent extremist groups" (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 3). The report claims that the number of people with a Canadian passport who have been abroad and are suspected of furthering the cause of militancy was about 180 in 2015, a number which is not that large (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 3).

However, the report does caution that the number of extremist travelers is not an indicator of the level of threat to Canada. The statistics do not indicate how many aspiring terrorists are in Canada, how many are planning to travel, how many have travelled and how many are there who do not want to travel to the Middle East but aspire to carry out attacks on Canadian soil (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 3). Moreover, a significant threat to Canada is the so called "returning extremist travelers" who have come back to Canadian soil after being equipped with the knowledge, skills, experience, and relationships needed to commit an act of terrorism in Canada. The number of such people by the end of 2015 was 60 (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 3), a number which could very well be low since the government may not know about many others who have become radicalized by their trip abroad.

8.5.1. Extent of the Threat

The 2016 report also provides a threat assessment framework, which is followed to this day by the Canadian government. To assess the level of threat to Canada, the government uses a tool that it labels as the National Terrorism Threat Level. The levels vary from very low (highly unlikely) to critical (highly likely). Currently Canada's terrorism threat level is at medium (could occur) (Haris, 2017).

Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels and the security response

Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Critical
A violent act of terrorism	A violent act of terrorism	A violent act of terrorism	A violent act of terrorism	A violent act of terrorism
is highly unlikely	is possible but unlikely	could occur	is likely	is highly likely and could occur imminently
Measures are in place to keep Canadians safe.	Measures are in place to keep Canadians safe.	Additional measures are in place to keep Canadians safe.	Heightened measures are in place to keep Canadians safe. Canadians are informed what action to take.	Exceptional measures are in place to keep Canadians safe. Canadians are informed what action to take.

At all times, Canadians will be informed if they need to take actions to stay safe.

Source: https://www.canada.ca/en/services/defence/nationalsecurity/terrorism-threat-level.html

8.3.4.2. Understanding the Model

To determine the level of threat Canada faces, the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) uses information from Canadian intelligence as well as international intelligence agencies.

It uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the threat and does not depend on specific feedback from the public, but rather relies upon government agencies and private outfits to identity risks and outline responses (Department of Public Safety, 2016). The government uses a three-tiered model to assess the threat to Canada (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 9):

1. *Intention:* Intention is defined as "whether a terrorist entity has a specific intention to target Canada, Canadians, or Canadian interests. Some entities may have no specific interest in Canada, while others may aspire to attack, and still others may have a specific intention to attack" (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 9).
2. *Capability:* Capability includes variables used to "assess capability (and) include an entity's known abilities and its access to training or weapons. Some entities may aspire to attack Canadians but have no capability to do so, while others have the capability but no intention to attack" (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 9).
3. *Opportunity:* The third level of analysis in assessing the terrorism threat level in Canada is opportunity, which is defined, as "a terrorist entity with the intention and capability to attack Canada still requires the opportunity to do so Geography, logistical hurdles or counter-terrorism efforts may limit opportunities. Some entities may have the opportunity to attack but lack the intention and capability" (Department of Public Safety, 2016, 9).

8.3.4.3. Counter Terrorism/Response to Threats

To respond to the threats posed by terrorism, both at home and abroad, the Government of Canada uses a four-pronged approach that include the following:

1. Arrests and convictions
2. Terrorist Listings

3. Global Coalition to Counter Daesh, and
4. Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program.

Since all of these approaches are interlinked and interdependent when it comes to the radicalization of youth in Canada, it would be fruitful to examine them briefly.

Arrests and Convictions

Since 2001, fifty-five individuals have been charged under terrorism provisions of the criminal code, and 12 have been charged with the specific crime of traveling abroad to commit acts of terrorism (Department of Public Safety, 2018). The Criminal Code dedicates 34 sections to the problem of terrorism and is one of the most exhaustive and detailed legal documents in the world. Having a robust criminal code and implementation it is a vital requirement as arrests and convictions not only foil terrorist attacks but also acts as deterrents to future would be terrorists.

Terrorist Listings

The primary document lists terrorists outfit in the Criminal Code, which lists 54 entities as terrorist outfits, an overwhelming majority of which are Islamic entities. (Criminal Code of Canada, 2019, as amended).

Global Coalition to Counter Daesh

Recognizing that the threat from within is dependent upon and exacerbated by entities such as ISIS, Canada is a part of the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh. The coalition not only focuses on countering ISIS through the use of force, but also endeavors to address the structural issue

which plague Iraq's stability. Canada has pledged to invest CDN $1.6 billion in Iraq over the course of three years. Such a broad based and multi-faceted approach can ensure that countries afflicted by the menace of ISIS are secured and through ensuring their security then Canada's security can also be safeguarded.

Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program

An integral part of Canada's national security program is the counter terrorism capacity building program that provides training, equipment, facilities and expertise to vulnerable nations. By providing funding and resources for de-radicalization programs abroad, Canada strengthens its own security since by lessening extremist messages from other nations attempting to disseminate them in Canada protecting its own youth.

While the 2016 report provides a robust threat assessment and counter-radicalization model, a major difference between the 2016 and the 2013 reports can be observed in how they are worded. For instance, the 2016 report does not use the term Islamic extremism while the 2013 report states that, "violent Islamist extremism is the biggest threat to Canada" (Ministry of Public Safety, 2013, 2). The report goes on to state that, "several Islamist extremist groups have identified Canada as a legitimate target or have directly threatened our interests. In addition, violent "homegrown "Sunni Islamist extremists are posing a threat of violence. (Ministry of Public Safety, 2013, 2) Unlike the 2016 report, the 2013 report quite lucidly raises and defines the issue of radicalization of youth in Canada, which is a first step towards constructing a de-radicalization strategy.

8.3.5. Recent Policy Documents

A critical document in the context of counter radicalization is the recently released report by the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence titled, National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence (2018). While the report states that "the Government of Canada is concerned with all forms of violent extremism, not associating this phenomenon with any particular religious, political, national, ethnic or cultural group" (Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, 2018, 1), the report does stress that the "main terrorist threat to Canada continues to be violent extremists inspired by terrorist groups such as Daesh and al-Qaeda" (Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, 2018). According to the report the national strategy to counter radicalization in Canada has three primary purposes:

1. Understanding and explaining radicalization to violence and its associated behaviors as well as its impacts on Canadian society;
2. Providing a framework for the Government of Canada towards countering radicalization; and
3. Supplying material and other support towards intervention mechanisms.

While the report provides a promising framework, as in the past, it muddles up the issues to make it more acceptable and "politically correct." For example, in the section "Why and How People Radicalize to Violence in Canada" the report states:

> Radicalization to violence is not a phenomenon that uniquely affects individuals of any particular background, culture or religion. The *socio-economic circumstances, levels of education*, experiences of marginalization and religious affiliations of individuals who

> have radicalized to violence in Canada are extremely diverse (Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, 2018. 8). [Italics added]

A number of studies and surveys (see Chapter 5) clearly indicate that the socioeconomic background and educational level of a radicalized individual or one who is vulnerable to be radicalized is an important factor, but not in the way it is usually perceived to be (Mink, 2015; Solyom, 2016). The usual misconception is that those who have been radicalized belong to impoverished backgrounds with little or no education. This is a fallacious contention. In Canada as well as in other countries, research has repeatedly shown that an overwhelming majority of radicalized individuals are highly educated and belong to affluent backgrounds (Cragin et al., 2015; Mink, 2015; Solyom, 2016). Perhaps the Government should be clearer and more direct in its contention in order to be successful in its mission to counter radicalization.

Another key document in relation to public safety and the terrorist threat faced by Canada is the 2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada issued by the Department of Public Safety (2018). The report highlights what it labels as the current terrorist threat environment and claims that Sunni Islamist extremism inspired by groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda is the primary threat faced by Canada (Department of Public Safety, 2018). However, the report mentions "all forms of violent ideologies" (Department of Public Safety, 2018, 28) in its countering radicalization section, hence, mixing up different types of threats. The issue of radicalization in the name of Islam is vastly different from the issue of white nationalist radicalization in at least two ways: first, the former is generally a collaborative exercise that is planned and funded by international non-state actors as well as state actors, while the latter is usually confined within the boundaries of Canada. Second, the former uses suicide bombings as a means to inflict maximum damage while the latter relies upon assault rifles, which while being deadly are not as lethal as

someone who blows him or her up. It is a distinction with a difference and time and time again, the Canadian government has tried to sugarcoat the issue.

Similar to the 2018 report on terrorist threats to Canada, the 2016 report also mentioned violent extremism inspired by ISIS and Al-Qaeda as the greatest threat faced by the country (Department of Public Safety, 2017). However, the 2017 report addressed de-radicalization efforts and plans in a very brief manner. Under the heading of community engagement, the report claims that, "the Government of Canada would rather see individuals prevented from radicalizing to violence than having to cope with the aftermath" (Department of Public Safety, 2017, 16).

The report identifies terrorism as a worldwide threat with Canada not immune to the menace. Addressing the issue of terrorism affecting Canadians, the report states that Canadians are a threat both at home and abroad. For instance, it cites the case of two Canadians who were abducted and killed by Islamist militants in the Philippines. It also points out that six Canadians were killed in an attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso. For the government, the threat is to Canadians within Canada as well Canadians who are located outside of the country. The report claims that one way to counter and pre-empt radicalization of Canadians is to monitor and address extremism which stems from and is influenced from cyberspace. Moreover, the report also argues persuasively for collaboration between multiple actors to ensure successful interventions. These actors involve social and health services, law enforcement, education, and grassroots organizations (Department of Public Safety 2017).

While the report provides somewhat of a blue print in the context of countering radicalization and homegrown extremism, it does not provide much detail as to how the same can

be achieved. A better way to counter radicalization would be to build up on best practices from the past and to learn from them as was claimed by CSIS in its 2008-2009 report:

"CSIS has been working closely with partners around the world and across Canada to identify and adopt best practices used in various counter-radicalization programs implemented in recent years. In some countries such as the United Kingdom, the counter-radicalization strategy includes a broad cross-government strategy designed to identify and address relevant concerns within all communities in the interest of national security." (CSIS Public Report 2009, p.11)

The assertion that a broad cross-government strategy is needed to robustly counter radicalization is a critical and some countries which have faced homegrown terrorism and counter-terrorism policies countries such as the UK are a good model to examine in this context. Canada has been fortunate in terms of the number of planned and executed terrorist attacks. The UK, France, and Germany have been victims of deadly terrorist attacks carried out by homegrown radicalized jihadists.

What can the Canadian State do to pre-empt, counter, and defeat the radicalization of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians? In order to address this question comprehensively, it is important to first examine counter radicalization programs from at least two Western European countries that have been battling the radicalization of the homegrowns for a while now. This exploration is useful in offering suggestions to Canadian policymakers and security analysts so that a more robust counter-radicalization program may be constructed.

8.3.6. "Contest" in the United Kingdom

The principal document in the UK that deals with anti-terrorism policy is CONTEST: The UK's Strategy for Countering Terrorism (UK Home Department, 2011). The counter-terrorism

approach in the UK involves four strategies: (1) Pursue, (2) Prevent, (3) Protect, and (4) Prepare. Since counter-radicalization falls under the "prevent" part of the strategy, the other three strategies discussed briefly while the prevent program is examined in detail. The report argues that the "purpose of pursue is to prevent terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible" (UK Home Department, 2011, 12-13).

Protect is defined as, "the purpose of protect is to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas and so reduce our vulnerability" (UK Home Department, 2011, 12-13). The report defines prepare as "the purpose of our prepare work is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end and to increase our resilience, so we can recover from its aftermath. An effective and efficient response will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery" (UK Home Department, 2011, 13).

8.7.1. Prevent

The key part of the UK's counter-terrorism policy as it relates to the radicalization of youth is "prevent." Prevent is defined as "the aim of prevent is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism" (UK Home Department, 2011, 60). The objectives of the prevent strategy are:

- First of all, to respond to the ideological basis of terrorism and the threat faced by its promotion.

- Restrain people from being radicalized by violent Islamist extremism, and the provision of necessary services to save high risk people; and,
- Adopting a multifarious and multifaceted approach by collaborating with stakeholders in education, criminal justice, religion, charities, the internet and health, to prevent at risk youth from being radicalized (UK Home Department, 2011).

The report is very clear about the purpose of prevent, i.e., reaching out to the smaller segment of the population that is an easy target for radicalization. Moreover, at risk communities are by and large convinced that terrorism is wrong, so the UK government would need to adopt an approach that would empower and mobilize these communities, instead of giving the impression that the government is trying to convince them terrorism is wrong (UK Home Department, 2011). This modus operandi is critically important because an overwhelming majority of Muslims are against terrorism and to label their religion as "the mother lode of all evil" (Beinart, 2014), only results in alienating those who would want to coordinate and cooperate with security agencies to make the country safe. It also pushes those people into the embrace of groups like ISIS and these young people are at risk of buying into the "the west is at war with Islam" narrative.

8.7.2. Causes of Radicalization and Prevent Programs

The report briefly touches upon the causes that lead to the radicalization of youth. For instance, radicalizers spread ideologies that portray Islam and Muslims as targets of the nefarious designs of the infidel West, and the homegrowns are also socialized with the impression that they too are victims in their own homelands (UK Home Department, 2011). The report claims that prevent have developed some successful intervention mechanisms with over 1000 at-risk individuals having been saved from falling victim to violent Islamist ideology (UK Home Department, 2011).

The interventions mechanisms included universities collaborating with the police and developing support systems for at-risk students, using the internet referral unit to empower the public to identify extremist material online and developing counter-radicalization programs in prison. An important part of the UK's counter-radicalization strategy is the cross-departmental Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU), which is involved in developing counter ideological and counter-narrative work. (UK Home Department, 2011). The report is quite critical of ICRU as it counter-narrative work has not always been productive, lacked substance and failed to counter the complex theological narratives that justify violent jihad.

8.7.3. The Way Forward

The UK redefined its prevent strategy after evaluating results from previous years. The objectives as set out in its new prevent policy are:

- Responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism, and the threat faced from its promoters.
- Preventing at risk people from radicalization and providing them with the necessary support systems; and
- Adopting a multi-modal approach to counter youth radicalization (UK Home Department, 2011).

To achieve these objectives, the prevent strategy seeks to counter terrorist ideology as it is the basis of terrorism and a critical factor in the radicalization of young people. Without challenging this toxic ideology, a preventive counter terrorism policy would have no teeth. One part of this strategy is to empower theologians, academic and vulnerable communities to delve into and deconstruct complex theological narratives, and then disseminate their research to far ranging

audiences (UK Home Department, 2011). Moreover, a critical step in countering radical Islamist ideology is to work with Imams (Muslim Clerics) so that the pulpit can be used to disseminate a message of peace and tolerance, and not hate.

The second step in the prevent strategy is to support vulnerable and at-risk communities. This is done through the police engaging and collaborating with people from at-risk groups to assist the police to identify individuals that might be heading towards a radicalized future so that they can engage with them in a violence intervention and prevention strategy. Policing and intelligence gathering becomes more effective and consequently countries become safer when the police engage with communities. For example, in 2008 Scotland Yard arrested Andre Ibrahim after members of the Muslim community alerted them. Inside his apartment the police discovered suicide vests, explosives and ball bearings (Graham, 2009).

Finally, those youths who are identified as being at-risk are admitted to a mentoring program called "Channel" where the aim is to de-radicalize them and eventually re-integrate them back into mainstream society (UK Home Department, 2011).

8.8. Other Examples

Some other examples of counter-radicalization programs from around the world include Germany's *Hayat* program that can be viewed at as a blueprint. For instance, *Hayat* (life) was initially concerned with right-wing extremist neo-Nazis who wanted to leave their movements. Hayat assisted those individuals in starting a new life (Hayat, 2011; Pisoiu, 2015). Currently, Hayat is open to referrals from parents, siblings, friends, teachers, employers, and anyone else who has a relationship with a person potentially on the path to (violent) radicalization. During the first contact, Hayat experts conduct an analysis and risk assessment of the respective situation to answer

the most critical question, is the individual in danger of becoming (violently) radicalized or is it a harmless case of conversion to Islam? (if the individual is a convert) (Hayat, 2011).

Once the counselor gains a clear picture of the concrete situation, an individual counseling process and a step-by-step plan is designed that is unique for every individual, including various measures to prevent further radicalization or to stop and reverse the process (Hayat, 2011).

8.4. Critical Analysis of and Recommendations to Canada's Anti-Radicalization Policies

When it comes to acts of terrorism in general, and attacks by homegrown radicalized individuals in particular, Canada has been fortunate because there have been no attacks that have caused a mass scale loss of life. However, as the events in Saint-Jean-sur-Richeliu, Ottawa and Strathroy have indicated, Canada is not immune to violent Islamist extremism. While Canada does have a policy in relation to radicalized individuals, the policy falls shorts on many fronts that are similar to its overall national security policy. Some of the shortcomings include:

1- First, the 2018 threat assessment report unlike its 2016 counterpart which stated "the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)…this group is neither Islamic nor a state, and will be referred to as Daesh (its Arabic acronym) in this report" (Department of Public Safety, 2016) takes a direct view and provides, "The principal threat to Canada continues to stem from individuals or groups who are inspired by violent Sunni Islamist ideology and terrorist groups, such as Daesh or Al-Qaeda" (Department of Public Safety, 2018, 3). However, in the very next line perhaps for the purposes of optics the report claims, "…extremists' views are not linked to any religious, political or cultural ideology" (Department of Public Safety, 2018, 3). While it is true that extremist views can be found

in any ideology, the problem here is that the report jumps from terrorism in one line to extremism in another. The Canadian Criminal Code's own definition of terrorism includes the attainment of political gains as an integral part of the *mens rea* (intent).

The criminal act that was committed in Toronto 2017, where a misogynist killed a number of innocent bystanders because he could not get a date, did not have a particular aim of furthering of any political ideology. Terrorism on the other committed by those who are radicalized to Islamist extremism (and in some cases far-right, white supremacists) is an inherently political act and should be analyzed and dealt with as such. It is a distinction without a difference. Moreover, while no individual would ever argue that all Muslims are terrorists or that Islam is a complete disaster, one should also not argue that groups such as ISIS and others find theological and ideological support from the texts of the Islamic faith.[21] They interpret these texts to suit their own purpose. To muddle up a horrible yet random act of violence with acts of terrorism committed in the name of a religion and/or ideology is essentially problematic and counter-productive.

2- Second, another problem with Canada's current counter radicalization policy is that while it has developed over the years, it in no way is even remotely close to the UK's counter-radicalization program (supra). For instance, the key government document in this context, the national strategy for countering radicalization to violence (2018) while providing a blueprint to address the issue, is scant on details. For example, when the document lays out the strategy to counter radicalization, it lists three priorities: (1) Building, sharing and using knowledge; (2) Addressing radicalization to violence in the online space; and, (3) Supporting interventions.

[21] For a very detailed piece on ISIS and its "Islamic" roots please see, Graeme Wood. (2015). "What ISIS really Wants." *The Atlantic*, March.

To achieve the first priority (hereinafter referred to as "goal"), the government aims to build a database using evidence of best practices. However, the plan admits that it does not have much to rely upon in terms of indicators of radicalization, which is surprising (National Strategy for Countering Radicalization to Violence, 2018). There are a number of studies and models of radicalization that provide a step-by-step deconstruction of the process of radicalization. Why the government of Canada would fail to rely on such models in its key counter-radicalization document is mind-boggling.

The second goal of the current government's counter-radicalization policy is to address the online recruitment threat. To achieve this goal, the government of Canada commits to "the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom of expression and privacy rights…and to provide safe spaces for Canadians so they can fully participate in the online space" National Strategy for Countering Radicalization to Violence, 2018, 25).

There are a few problems with this aim: (1) The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), under s.1 provides that all rights are subject to reasonable limitations. While at the personal level there has to be absolute free speech, unless a direct and causal link may be shown between the words spoken and written, and an act of violence which has occurred or is likely occur, the Canadian polity has been quite strict in enforcing its anti-hate speech laws and the courts have upheld those charges [See for example, Taylor (1990, 3 SCR 892); R v. Keegstra (1990, 3 SCR 697); Sasketchwan v Whatcott (2013 1 S.C.R. 467)]. The point here is not to make the government of Canada turn into big brother, rather, there should be a uniformity in policy when the issue is the preaching of hate, without any pandering to race or religion.

3- For any country to have a successful counter-radicalization policy it needs to have counter-radicalization centers and programs that can empower individuals to revert to a normal lifestyle and be rehabilitated so that s/he can become productive members of society. These programs form the backbone for both Germany's and the UK's counter radicalization program. Unfortunately, in Canada it was not until 2017 that the office of Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization was established. The budget provided to the office is not enough to successfully develop a robust counter-terrorism program. For instance, while the program has been allowed CDN 35 million over a span of 5 years, in contrast, the UK's prevent program was allocated £80 million over a span of six years that resulted in 1000 schemes (Graham, 2017). Moreover, there is only one physical counter-terrorism center in Canada that is situated in Montreal. Recently it was suggested that another center be established in Quebec City to counter white supremacy, a proposal that was ultimately rejected by the mayor of Quebec City.

4- Another issue with Canada's counter-radicalization policy is that it apparently does not distinguish between radicalization of any kind. On paper at the very least all forms of radicalization or any form of violence is seen as a problem. As Ontario Liberal MP Arif Virani stated, "When we look at what's happening across the country, radicalization is not endemic to any one group, institution, race or religion," he said. "It doesn't have particular boundaries that are tied to a religion or an ideology. That's very important to keep in mind because that's a situation we need be upfront about in terms of where the threats are coming from and not focusing on any one particular community" (Haris, 2017, paragraph 6). While the sentiment is understandable and appreciated, the issue is that first of all, violent Islamist

extremism and its appeal to individuals is more dangerous than the appeal white supremacist groups have; the number of victims speak for themselves, from their graves.

5- A crucial element missing from Canada's de-radicalization policy is the role of mosques as breeding grounds for violent views. For instance, a number of individuals who used to be regular visitors to a mosque in Calgary left for the Middle East to join radical militant groups (Heroux, 2017). While the Imam of that particular mosque was not involved in radicalizing those individuals, in some cases Imams do fan the flames. It is imperative that the words and activities of Imams be closely followed.

6- Over the past many decades Saudi Arabia has funded Imams and mosques all over the world, including in Canada. These Imams use their pulpits to propagate a message of hate and intolerance, and that message resonates with some vulnerable individuals who are then targeted for radicalization. While the interaction between Canadian security agencies and the Muslim community leadership is of course classified information, it would be advisable (if this is not being done already) for the RCMP to reach out the local leadership in order to keep an eye on Imams who preach hate as well as young individuals who seem vulnerable to be taken advantage of by extremist religious leaders.

7- For the longest time, Canada, in the name of multiculturalism has allowed extreme settlers to espouse their message of hate and intolerance. Al-Huda is one such organization that has arguably "corrupted" a number of otherwise decent Pakistani-Canadians. The message of the founder of Al- Huda continues to reside in Canada, spreading her message of intolerance, and the government of Canada continues to allow her to do that.

8- One of the most important components of ISIS' (and similar terror groups) strategy is the narrative it espouses, a narrative, which basically posits that the West is at a war with Islam, Muslims are being killed throughout the world, and that Islam will once again rule the world. Unfortunately, not much has been done in Canada to counter this narrative. Rarely is there a public debate, which is open, and intellectually honest about Islamic extremism. On rare occasions when there is a debate the individuals putting forward an objective view are labeled "Islamophobes."

9- Canada lacks robust research on its de-radicalization policy. While excellent work was done by the Kanishka project and later by TSAS, the key question "why are individuals radicalized" in many ways remains unanswered. The Canadian government needs to sponsor more qualitative research on individuals within at-risk communities to determine what is the appeal these individuals find in radical Islamist ideology. Is there a sense of alienation, which leads them towards extremism? If so, what triggers that alienation? Unless policymakers have empirical evidence, which indicates why these individuals are at-risk, they cannot properly formulate a de-radicalization policy. This study was intended to be one such effort in this regard.

10- A welcome addition to Canada's de-radicalization policy could be a program where at-risk individuals are partnered with mentors who were formerly radicalized. If young people are shown a different path by an individual with a similar background and a similar past, it could confirm for at-risk individuals that there is hope in life. Majid Nawaz, a former member of the Hizb-ul-Tahrir and who was later jailed in Egypt, runs the Quilliam Foundation in the UK, which focuses on mentorship programs for young Muslims. Canada

could also adopt that approach in order to counter the allure of radicalization for young at-risk Muslims.

11- Finally, banning "radical" views under the guise of hate speech is not a long-term, sustainable solution. Banning people's thoughts from being spoken out loud is an idea that has been historically unsuccessful, for the idea always festers even if it is banned, and it will ultimately explode. A better way would be to allow these notions to enter the marketplace of ideas, fight those ideas robustly so that terrorism and subsequently radicalization can be de-glorified.

8.10. The "Compulsive Choice:" A New Theory of Radicalization

In light of the data collected for this study, a new theory of radicalization "The Compulsive Choice" emerged, which is depicted in Figure 8.1, after which a brief explanation of the theory is offered.



Figure 8.1 The "Compulsive Choice:" A New Theory of Radicalization

The "Compulsive Choice" is a liner/sequential theory of the "process" of radicalization. While this theory emerged from the data collected from second-generation Pakistani-Canadians

and is primarily tailored towards explaining and countering radicalization amongst homegrowns, the theory can also be applied to radicalized individuals in other settings. The process of radicalization commences with psychological dynamics. While pre-existing dynamics are usually diagnosed and treated at a tender age, issues which arise from traumatic experiences remained undiagnosed and untreated. If radicalization is to be nipped in the bud, the vulnerable individual should find strong emotional support within the family, especially with their parents. If such support is lacking, the role of the Muslim community in providing a sense of identity and belonging becomes critical. If the Muslim community is led by individuals who are well-versed in and cognizant of the norms of a given society, at-risk individuals can identify with and confide in these leaders. If, however, community leaders are "imports" from Muslim-majority countries and are clueless about the norms and mores of a society, radicalization can occur if there is easy access to radicalized groups and ideologies as at-risk individuals can find an identity and a sense of belonging within such groups.

The existence of these groups is dependent upon external as well as internal variables. External variables include foreign support and funding of extremist organizations and ideologies while internal variables include discrimination or the perception of discrimination by at-risk individuals in a given society. Finally, in order to counter radicalization, a country must address both external as well as internal factors. The former can be achieved through diplomatic measures ranging from off-the record talks to the severing of ties. The latter can be achieved through collaboration with the Muslim community and acting, when required, without concern to whether it would constitute a politically incorrect act in the eyes of the public.

8.11. Future Research

This study was an endeavor to determine the relationship perceived by second-generation Pakistani-Canadians between themselves and the Canadian state, using the stories and views of the participants to determine the best practices needed to counter radicalization. The study also was an effort to give a voice to the myriad experiences faced by second-generation Pakistani-Canadian's as their voices usually have not made their way into academic discourse.

While this study may be one the first of its kind in Canada in narrating the ideas and opinions of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians in relation to their identity, society, faith, and radicalization to violence, it falls short in many ways. First, the sample size of 15 respondents is not representative of all second-generation Pakistani-Canadians and does not reflect the lived experiences of the whole segment of Pakistani-Canadians. Second, this study involved only those individuals who had some sort of a university education, since second-generation radicalized youth are usually educated. However, it would be worthwhile to investigate the views of second-generation Pakistani Canadians who do not have a university degree and determine whether the apprehensions reflected in the respondents' stories is also found amongst their less educated counterparts. Third, this study was restricted to second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. For future research it is advisable that second-generation youth from all over the ethnic divide be looked at in order to achieve a more holistic picture of the dynamics, which determine identity and fuel radicalization issues in Canada. Fourth, this study was also restrictive in the sense that it examines the experiences and perceptions of second-generation Pakistanis in Canada only. A huge diaspora of second-generation Pakistanis lives in the US as well as in the EU.

Future research could examine the perceptions and experiences of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians compared with their American and European counterparts to determine

whether a common dread transcends borders. Fifth, a conflict intervention and prevention project that involves both second-generation and third-generation immigrants could be constructive in countering radicalization especially in exploring people's resiliency. This type of project would look at the perceptions and experiences of two different generations and would compare and contrast whether their views are different, similar or the same. This type of research could further our understanding of radicalization and could also result in gauging whether radicalization intensifies or otherwise operates trans-generationally. Finally, a longitudinal qualitative and quantitative study, which examines whether the views and perceptions of second-generation immigrants in Canada, as well as those in the US and the EU have changed over the years, would be an interesting study to conduct. The longitudinal research could explore what are the dynamics that have fueled that change, for better or for worse? The research could better inform policy and security, and PACS analysts about the root causes and triggers of radicalization as well as why people remain resilient in the face of great challenges.

8.12. Final Remarks

This qualitative study explored the experiences and perceptions of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians in relation to their identity who were born or residing in the prairies and Mississauga, and what they perceived their relationship to be with the Federation of Canada as well as their views about the root causes of radicalization as well as their proposed solutions to counter the radicalization of second-generation Pakistani-Canadians.

The study provided a historical and contemporary context for immigration and Canada's history of discrimination against non-white immigrants to frame the present disillusionment felt by second-generation Pakistani-Canadians in a historical context. The chapter also provided

examples of acts of terrorism, failed or otherwise, carried out by second-generation immigrants in Canada, the US, the UK and France. The next chapter provided the theoretical framework within which this study was situated. The theoretical streams elaborated upon included identity, radicalization, and Hopes and Fears for the future, including the Cantril self-anchoring scale. The third chapter elaborated upon the qualitative methodology employed to conduct this study, while the next three chapters gave voice to the participants' views on identity including white privilege, why individuals get radicalized, and the participants' greatest hopes, dreams and fears in relation to themselves, their families, Muslims living in Canada and the Federation of Canada. Finally, this study provided recommendations to policymakers, security analysts, and PACS scholars to counter radicalization.

I am a first-generation Pakistani immigrant and I am the first to admit that I cannot know or perhaps even understand the unique experiences and struggles faced by second-generation Pakistani-Canadians. This study was an effort to give voice to the experiences of second-generation Pakistanis and to incorporate their input into the causes of radicalization and the best way to defeat radicalization. This study has multiple shortcomings and is just one small step towards adding to a multicultural Canada and in achieving a safer and healthier Canadian polity.

The American reformer and abolitionist, Theodore Parker once said:

> I do not pretend to understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways; I cannot calculate the curve and complete the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by conscience. And from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice (Parker, 1852, pp.84-85).

I hope for Canada and for the world that the moral arc of the universe bends toward justice, harmony, and prosperity so that future generations may live in that elusive yet achievable state of sustainable peace.

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Annexure A- Interview Guide

Do you have any questions about the consent form? If not, can I please have one copy, the other one is for your records. Do I have your permission to record the interview and please do know that you are free to answer any/none/all of the questions as you may wish. You may withdraw from the study at any time. Are you ready to commence with the interview?

1- Tell me about yourself and what it was like growing up in Canada?
2- What does it mean to be a Pakistani-Canadian?
3- How do you see the problem of radicalization and the conversation revolving around it?
4- Can you share a story about how you responded to challenges personally, in your family or outside your home in your community?
5- What are greatest hopes, dreams and aspirations for Canadians, Pakistan-Canadians, and yourself for the future?
6- What are your worst fears and worries for your future, and for Pakistan-Canadians?
7- Anything else you would like to add?