

**Emergency Social Services:
Building A Coordinated Interorganizational Approach**

By

W. Francis Caldwell

**A Practicum presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Social Work

**University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba**

(c) August, 2000



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-53132-5

**THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE**

Emergency Social Services: Building A Coordinated Interorganizational Approach

BY

W. Francis Caldwell

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree**

of

Master of Social Work

W. FRANCIS CALDWELL

Permission has been granted to the Library of The University of Manitoba to lend or sell copies of this thesis/practicum, to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis/practicum and to lend or sell copies of the film, and to Dissertations Abstracts International to publish an abstract of this thesis/practicum.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither this thesis/practicum nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my appreciation to persons who lent invaluable support and assistance through the practicum process.

To my advisor Dr. Neil Tudiver for his devotion to ensuring that my experience would be one that I would both learn from and take pride in.

To my committee members, Professor Pete Hudson and City Councillor, Dan Vandal for taking the time to help shape the practicum and see it through to conclusion.

To my four truly great daughters. I am as proud to share my accomplishments with them as they do their many ones with me. For Trysha, Lana, Suzanne and Taylor.

Finally, to my wife Catherine, whose gentle support, encouragement and love was always behind all of my efforts.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments.....	i
Table of Contents	ii
Abstract.....	v
CHAPTER ONE Introduction	1
Premise for the Practicum.....	1
Professional Learning Objectives	4
Skill Objectives.....	4
Service Objectives	5
Research Objectives.....	5
Organization of the Practicum Report	6
 CHAPTER TWO Literature Review	 7
Disaster Management.....	7
Disaster Defined	7
Cornerstones of Disaster Management	9
Theme – Coordinated, Multi-Organizational Response	9
Theme – Essential Elements of Coordination.....	11
• Mission Coordination.....	11
• Mutual Agreements.....	12
• Inter-Organizational Communication	12
• Trust.....	12
Theme –Altered Organizational Patterns.....	13
Disaster Management in Canada	14
Canadian Legislation	15
Emergency Social Services.....	16
 Political Economy Perspective on Social Service Organizations	 17
Environmental Influences	19
Bargaining for Resources.....	21
Contracting.....	21
Requirements for Successful Negotiating.....	23
Performance Expectations	24

CHAPTER THREE	Practicum Setting and Student Role	27
	The Practicum Site	27
	Catalysts for Change in Winnipeg's ESS Structure.....	27
	1997 Flood Reports.....	28
	Subsequent Exploration and Findings	30
	ESS Flood Problems	32
	The Practicum	32
	Workplace Practicum Considerations.....	34
	Participant Observer.....	35
	Evaluation Methods	37
CHAPTER FOUR	The Practicum Process	39
	Setting the Stage	41
	First Negotiation Meetings	43
	Building The Working Agreements.....	46
	Analyzing Flood Problems	48
	Winnipeg Emergency Social Services and the Canadian Red Cross.....	50
	Winnipeg Emergency Social Services and The Salvation Army.....	54
	Objective Achieved.....	56
	Stumbling Blocks.....	57
	The Salvation Army.....	57
	The Canadian Red Cross.....	60
	Drafting the Working Agreements.....	62
	Definitions.....	63
	Mission Statements	63
	Performance Expectations	64
	Summary	65
CHAPTER FIVE	Outcomes and Evaluations.....	67
	Working Agreements	
	Exhibit A City of Winnipeg / Salvation Army	68
	Exhibit B City of Winnipeg / Red Cross	73
	Evaluative Measures	79
	Evaluation of Professional Learning.....	80
	Skill Objectives.....	80
	Service Objectives	83
	Research Objectives.....	86

CHAPTER SIX	Critique of the Practicum Experience	91
	Implications of the Practicum	93
BIBLIOGRAPHY		95
APPENDIXES		
	Appendix A: Community Services Steering Committee Project.....	101
	Appendix B: Questionnaire.....	103
	Appendix B1: Questionnaire Consent Form.....	104
	Appendix C: Interview Questions.....	105
	Appendix C1: Interview Consent Form.....	106
	Appendix D: Meeting Notes: ESS and Salvation Army.....	107
	Appendix E: Meeting Notes: ESS and Red Cross	109
TABLES		
	Table 1: Questionnaire Responses	112
	Table 2: Interview Responses	120

ABSTRACT

Emergency Social Services (ESS) provides basic services such as food, lodging, and clothing necessary to meet urgent physical and individual needs of persons affected by disaster. Post-disaster critiques of the City of Winnipeg's response to the 1997 "Flood of the Century" pointed to interorganizational deficiencies in the ESS response.

Considering the inter-organizational coordination requirements of effective emergency response systems, and the disparate connections of the social service delivery system, the practicum used an exchange framework – political economy theory – to determine methods for coordinating social service organizations.

Two contracts were negotiated between a municipal government ESS organization and non-profit community organizations. The contracts specify organizational roles, responsibilities, and expectations, accompanied by a Communication Plan for maintaining the integrity of plans during all phases of a disaster. Parties concluded that the process used to develop the agreements was critical to achieving the mutually satisfactory contract. Moreover, the working relationships and terms developed, corrected noted deficiencies in Emergency Social Services Plans.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Premise for the Practicum

Disasters happen. People are killed, homes are lost, and property is destroyed. Despite tremendous advances in science and technology, we live, and die, in a fragile relationship with an environment that produces hurricanes, floods, chemical explosions and massive snowstorms. On a daily basis, somewhere in the world, communities are being threatened, families are imperiled, lives disrupted and social and government organizations challenged to meet the demands created by the unexpected and generally harmful consequences of disaster. And we are not immune in Manitoba.

The 1950 flooding of the Red River Valley resulted in the largest evacuation in the history of Canada, almost one-third the population of Winnipeg. Forest fires raging across Northern Manitoba in 1989 forced the evacuation of thousands from their homes, displacing and separating families, and traumatizing whole communities. The “Flood of the Century” in 1997 created the need for 28,000 Manitobans to leave their homes in the face of a virtual sea rolling across the prairie, creating millions of dollars worth of damage and untold misery that many are still recovering from more than three years later.

Rather than being helpless victims to these events, we learn from them. We learn to prevent further disasters (i.e. legislating industrial safety standards for the transportation and handling of dangerous goods), and to mitigate the effects of disasters when they do occur, (i.e. requiring that new homes be built at sufficiently high elevation levels in our flood-prone valleys). We study our emergency response efforts – police, fire, ambulance and myriad public works such as dike construction, engineering and

heavy equipment provision – to improve them. We also study our Emergency Social Services response, the component that provides goods and services to persons affected by a disaster. Here too, we seek to correct deficiencies in our plans and improve upon our response capacity to succeeding events. The 1997 “Flood of the Century” provided an excellent opportunity for a critical study of this sort.

In Canada, municipal government is responsible for readying plans and responses to disasters. Locally, the City’s **Community Services Department** is responsible for the Emergency Social Services (ESS) component of the City of Winnipeg’s “Emergency Plan”. As a member of Community Services’ Steering Committee on Emergency Health and Social Services, I studied the functioning and response of ESS to the 1997 Red River flooding. Despite what was described overall as an excellent emergency response, some problems were evident. Most notably, were issues of limited coordination and communication, hence, effectiveness between the City and several of the City’s partners with whom it jointly delivered Emergency Social Services to flood victims. I considered these as issues worthy of further attention, particularly as they spoke to an opportunity to improve upon our local emergency plans and preparedness.

My practicum involved the development of contractual “working agreements” between the City ESS authority and two of its closest partners. These working agreements were intended to correct deficiencies noted in ESS work during the 1997 flood and to improve the state of readiness and emergency response of Winnipeg’s Emergency Social Services sector. In preparation for this work, I reviewed literature on comprehensive disaster management and on the political economy view of how human

service organizations operate. My objective was to apply learning from both fields to the contracts we were creating and to the process we used to develop them.

The literature suggests that there is a poor fit between the demands of disaster response work and typical, day-to-day operations of social service organizations. Emergencies create a multitude of needs at once. Responders require a clear understanding and agreement on priorities, tasks need to be coordinated, and resources quickly freed from the day-to-day constraints of procedures, multiple levels of approval and tight budgets. The flow of information between response units must be effective, immediate and ongoing. Players must understand and accept one another's roles, responsibilities, areas of jurisdiction and authority, and work in a coordinated fashion and within a spirit of trust.

These operating conditions are in stark contrast to everyday operations of social service organizations. Agencies and departments rarely make joint plans or set common objectives or priorities to achieve them. Communication between agencies is limited, sporadic and oftentimes, superficial. Agencies protect their respective turfs and rarely seek ways to work closely together. Under these conditions, multi-organizational emergency response work would be grossly ineffective.

However, at least on some level, routine coordination and cooperation does take place between social agencies. Those routines suggest an opportunity to improve, or at least address, a way and means of improving coordination and cooperation. The literature on human service organizations suggests that cooperation can be enhanced through negotiated, mutually satisfactory working agreements. By following the cooperative principles and negotiating methods detailed in the literature, I proposed to

develop agreements that were satisfactory both to the City of Winnipeg and to two of its' partners in the delivery of Emergency Social Services: the Canadian Red Cross, Winnipeg and North/East Regions; and The Salvation Army, Manitoba and North West Ontario Division. These agreements were intended to spell out agreed-upon relationships for sharing of critical resources during all phases of disaster management.

Professional Learning Objectives

My previous social work experience had been in a clinical, supervisory and management capacity. My work in these roles brought me into regular contact with other human services professionals, frequently to exchange information, occasionally to consider ways to better serve a client population, rarely to consider how we might do so by fundamentally examining who was doing what and how. This practicum allowed me to move in a new direction. I established objectives with the intent of achieving measurable outcomes in three areas:

Skill Objectives (personal skills and abilities developed through this work / study);

Service Objectives (contribution of the applied work to my practicum work place); and,

Research Objectives (test through application of theoretical postulates).

Skill Objectives:

- Develop an ability to negotiate mutually satisfactory, inter-agency agreements;
- Demonstrate an ability to apply a strategy of open communication, cooperation, and respect to develop a sense of trust between negotiating parties;
- Apply the theoretical concepts of the political economy model to the pragmatic task of coordinating organizational efforts for emergency social services.

Service Objectives:

- Develop draft written agreements between the City of Winnipeg ESS and two partner organizations, outlining: i) the authority to act under the City of Winnipeg Emergency Plan; ii) emergency roles and responsibilities; iii) expectations; and iv) terms and duration of the agreements;
- Make improvements to Emergency Social Services capacity and response ability in the City of Winnipeg, by correcting ESS interorganizational deficiencies evident in 1997 flood response operations;
- Implement KPMG recommendations to develop a community approach to emergency management by involving ESS partners in various aspects of emergency planning and preparedness.

Research Objectives:

- Determine whether our work in creating agreements supports the disaster management literature. That literature reports that an improved state of emergency preparedness results in an improved emergency response, serving to reduce community disruption and lower disaster costs.
- Determine whether political economy theory is supported or not, with regard to organizational resistance to coordination and how that may be reduced. Political economy theory postulates that to preserve organizational autonomy, agencies develop countervailing powers and adopt strategies of cooperation. These strategies would seem to mask resistance to coordination, if indeed it exists.

(I hypothesized that resistance to a closer working arrangement with ESS will be either minimal or non-existent, because both the Salvation Army and the Red Cross will benefit by securing their role in the City's Emergency Plan).

Organization of the Practicum Report

The practicum report is comprised of six chapters. Chapter One focuses on the premise of the practicum and my professional learning objectives. Chapter Two contains a review of prevalent literature in disaster management and in the political economy theory of human service organizations. The disaster management literature focuses upon the key elements required for a coordinated emergency response and how those elements may be sustained over time. Political economy literature is focused upon understanding how organizations operate within a complex community system, by securing resources necessary for carrying out its' work. Emphasis is placed upon successful strategies for cooperation and negotiating contractual arrangements. Chapter Three details the practicum setting, context and background for change in Emergency Social Services and the student role in the change process. Methods of assessing student progress are also described. Chapter Four describes and analyses the practicum process, detailing issues that were anticipated as well as those that emerged and how they were resolved. Chapter Five contains exhibits of the outcome – the Working Agreements – and evaluative comments on the process and product made by participants who were active in the agreement negotiation process. Chapter Six concludes with a critique of the overall practicum experience and a look at implications of the practicum for future work.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

Disaster Management

Disaster management is the discipline and profession of applying science, technology, planning, and management to deal with extreme events that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive damage to property, and disrupt community life. From sociological studies of the effects of disaster on its victims, to seismological studies of earthquake prediction, to mitigation measures for protecting the City of Winnipeg from the “Flood of the Millennium”, the literature field is vast, and growing. This review focuses on the role of Emergency Social Services in a Canadian context and how emergency response organizations can effectively manage their response efforts to produce a rapid, effective, and coordinated approach to the threat of disaster.

Disaster Defined

Disaster “means a calamity, however caused, which has resulted in or may result in: 1) the loss of life; or 2) serious harm or damage to the safety, health or welfare of people; or 3) wide-spread damage to property or the environment” (Canada, 1991, p.1-2). Understanding disaster requires comprehension of at least two factors: the impact an event has on a community; and the resources available to respond to that event. The relative frequency of hazardous events, the level of preparedness, infrastructure and capacity of the affected community to respond, determines whether a severe event rates as a disaster (Kuban, 1998).

The impact of a hazardous event on a community is partially determined by the mechanisms and adaptations that the population has developed to deal with the effects of potentially damaging events (Auf der Heide, 1989). In Winnipeg, large snowstorms – a natural hazard – occur with such regularity that we have developed effective methods to cope with them. One of those same snowstorms in Vancouver would create a very different scenario. The city of Cincinnati in the flood-prone Ohio River Valley has developed such sophisticated mechanisms for flood response, that this near annual event hardly disrupts their community. Elsewhere, in a populated area not accustomed to massive overland flooding, those same rising waters would be catastrophic.

Disaster depends largely on the community itself, its experience with a particular hazard as noted above, the jurisdiction's size, and its resource base (Hoetmer, 1991). Large, resource rich, urban centres routinely and capably respond to local emergencies that elsewhere, would be considered disasters. A multiple vehicle accident may overwhelm rural community resources and be considered a disaster in that place, but not cause undue problems within the city of Winnipeg. When an event overwhelms the capacities of local emergency services and major segments of the community are left without emergency services, an emergency escalates to a disaster (Hightower and Coutu, 1996).

Disaster is therefore, determined locally, based upon the occurrence and the level of preparedness and capacity of local resources to respond to the emergency conditions created. A key component of effective disaster management is to understand local response capacity and have established, planned mechanisms for responding to disruptive and destructive occurrences beyond that local capacity.

Cornerstones of Disaster Management

Disaster managers and emergency responders have developed – through trial and error, and usually through post disaster reviews – modes of response that are repeated frequently enough to be considered cornerstones of good disaster management. Although not organized or identified as such in the literature, I have listed these cornerstones under separate “themes” which together comprise principles of comprehensive disaster management.

Theme – Coordinated, Multi-Organizational Response

Disasters cross jurisdictional boundaries, involve large segments of the population and require cooperation by a multitude of agencies from all sectors of the community, including many participants that do not normally respond to emergency incidents. They include independent organizations from the private sector, independent and volunteer groups and agencies of city, provincial and federal governments. Oftentimes, such organizations plan for emergencies independent of one another and end up responding that way, with little grasp of how each fits into the overall response (Auf der Heide, 1989).

A Canadian earthquake scenario designed to improve emergency planning and management in Coquitlam, British Columbia defined thirteen critical functions in their modeled disaster. Functions included emergency social services for shelter, food and clothing, public health and coroner functions, public information, debris clearance, transportation, inspection, and demolition, in addition to law and order and first responder functions. To perform these critical functions, no less than forty-two separate

agencies were identified as primary agencies, in addition to the many federal agencies and resources that would become involved in the event of such an occurrence.

(Hightower and Coutu, 1996).

Emergency responders agree that coordination is essential, however, just what that means is a matter of debate. Some groups view coordination merely as a matter of informing others what they will be doing. Other groups view it as the centralization of decision-making within a particular agency or among a few key officials. However, control is not coordination; studies have shown that command and control models wherein one official or agency is in charge are both impossible to impose and of limited effectiveness where no single agency can legitimately control what all other public and private organizations do and don't do in a peacetime disaster (Quarantelli, 1997; Drabek, 1986; Auf der Heide, 1989). Effective coordination in disaster response requires independent actors to work with a common purpose, based on negotiated cooperation over responsibilities. (Gillespie, 1991; Quarantelli, 1997; Drabek, 1986; Auf der Heide, 1989).

Disasters create chaos and the need for extraordinary agency interdependence (Streeter, 1989). Cooperative, organizational working relationships must be in place well in advance of disaster response. Under normal circumstances of daily operations, these can be gradually developed between two groups working with a common goal. This level of preparation results in a more effective disaster response, faster recovery, reduced community disruption and lower disaster related costs (Drabek, 1986).

Theme – Essential Elements of Coordination

Four elements sustaining coordination and cooperative relationships are prevalent in the literature. Each of these is built over time, in the disaster preparation stage. (Kuban, 1993; Drabek, 1986; Hightower and Coutu, 1996; Kreps, 1991; Streeter, 1989; Auf der Heide, 1989).

Mission coordination refers to pre-disaster planning with mutually agreed upon emergency functions and responsibilities of assigned agencies. Good disaster management requires rapid and effective mobilization and response, meaning that a desired and intended result has been produced as opposed to a result obtained in the best possible way (Quarantelli, 1997). Although such effectiveness can only truly be measured during the response phase of an emergency, lessons learned from various disasters support the interpretation that emergency preparedness results in a more effective response (Drabek, 1986). Emergency preparedness and planning done in advance and on an inter-organizational basis, is more likely to result in a coordinated response.

Mission coordination requires that agencies that do not ordinarily work together or even communicate with one another, come together and develop a common understanding, of their own role, the roles of others and how each fits into an overall emergency plan. Disaster plans must be developed jointly, be subject to planned review and be accepted by participants. In order to be functional, plans also need to be tied to practical training programs and plan exercises that test effectiveness of personnel, equipment, assumptions, and operational procedures.

Mutual agreements include informal, verbal agreements of cooperation, mutual aid statements for reciprocal assistance, common data banks, joint Board Memberships, and written contracts that spell out roles and responsibilities during all phases of an emergency. Agreements should go beyond simply designating agency roles. They need to anticipate tasks and how they will be performed, identify personnel and resource requirements (Kreps, 1991).

Inter-organizational communication refers to communication systems such as a common radio frequency band as well as the sharing of information crucial to disaster response (i.e. ongoing assessment of the disaster situation; a determination of what resources for countering the effects of the disaster are required). Communication problems occur because of poorly understood information needs, or because persons possessing information do not realize who may need it. Communication may be blocked due to lack of trust or familiarity, or due to political or jurisdictional disputes. Pre-arranged agreements rarely exist for collection, ownership, and disbursement of necessary information. Factors such as informal contacts and joint planning and training promote familiarity between organizations, and thereby foster inter-organizational communication (Auf der Heide, 1989).

Trust, a key principle of inter-organizational coordination is built through direct and informal contacts, through networking and through activities that demonstrate confidence in others. The element of trust refers to perceptions of reliability and confidence between two organizations. Studies consistently show that when organizations have interacted and coordinated with one another before hand, they have had fewer problems doing so in a disaster (Kuban, 1993; Drabek, 1986). Pre-impact communication, informal contacts,

familiarity across organizations and joint planning and training assist to establish patterns and mechanisms that increase the likelihood of effective communication during disaster response and promote trust between organizations (Auf der Heide 1986).

Theme – Altered Organizational Patterns

Disasters transform the social structure of a community, requiring organizations to work cohesively with other groups, to share information and to undertake unfamiliar tasks and procedures. Normal systems of coordination no longer work; individual organizations have to adapt themselves to a radically changed environment (Dynes, 1978). Disasters require things be done in non-routine ways, under conditions of extreme urgency and often by improvising responses. Disasters create response situations in which many people are trying to do quickly what they do not ordinarily do, in an environment with which they are not familiar (Drabek, 1986; Banerjee and Gillespie, 1994; Auf der Heide, 1989).

Routine operating procedures and management control cannot work (Kartez and Lindell, 1987). The number of persons making decisions of an operational nature increases and the decision-making tends to occur at lower levels in the organization than in normal times. (Mileti, Drabek and Haas, 1975). During disasters, people demand action and leadership of officials. Decisions have to be made urgently or lives and property are lost (Auf der Heide, 1989).

The climate for disaster decision-making has four characteristics: 1) pressure to take action – to prevent or alleviate suffering; 2) limited and uncertain information – little time to gather information and what there is, is often partial; 3) shifting priorities as the

disaster unfolds, demands change, for example, from emergency evacuation to shelter and food, to re-uniting separated families, to preparing for re-entry; and 4) stress that arises from overlapping lines of authority and responsibility resultant from the situation of numerous organizations working in concert (Perry, 1991).

Organizations must prepare for these altered states. Staff must be trained and competent in their emergency roles, be aware of how and where they and their agency fit into the overall plan and be familiar with others' roles. Emergency responders require a level of autonomy in decision-making and know where and when to seek assistance for decisions beyond their authority.

Disaster Management in Canada

Local government, which best knows community needs, must be ultimately responsible for disaster preparation and response (Waugh, 1996). Like post-disaster evaluations in other industrialized countries, a recent Canadian evaluation agreed that "The major response issues are: effective coordination at all levels, good relationships established in advance through training, and communication links." (Hightower and Coutu, p. 78. 1996). Multi-level and multi-organizational coordination begins with legislated responsibilities in which each successive level of government relates to the one senior in a specified and regulated manner.

Canadian Legislation

Canada's *Emergencies Act* passed by Parliament in 1988 to replace the *War Measures Act* provides the federal government with the means to respond to national

emergencies, subject to the review of Parliament and in consultation with the provinces. Declaration of a “Public Welfare Emergency” (one of four identified types) following a natural disaster does not alter the division of authorities under the Constitution. Provincial governments remain in control of their own affairs while the federal role provides a coordinated, support mechanism for emergency response requirements. (Canada, 1993).

Related legislation, Canada’s *Emergency Preparedness Act* provides for federal support to the provinces in their discharge of emergency responsibilities. Support includes providing leadership toward improved emergency planning at all levels, training, delineation of roles and responsibilities of each government and cost sharing programs for both preparedness and disaster response measures. (Canada, 1993).

Manitoba’s *Emergency Measures Act* delegates responsibility for emergency planning, preparedness and first line of response to the local, municipal level of government. This legislation requires municipalities to prepare emergency plans, authorizes mayors or reeves to declare a state of local emergency and specifies emergency powers available under such a declaration as may be necessary to prevent or limit loss of life and property damage (Manitoba, 1987). Through its Emergency Measures Organization, Manitoba provides training, support, information, and a single window of access to senior government resources.

The City of Winnipeg’s *Emergency Plan* delineates roles and responsibilities of elected officials, civic departments, mutual aid partners, utilities, and private sector interests in the event of disaster (City of Winnipeg Emergency Plan, May 1999). Official departments that typically act as first responders – police, fire and ambulance personnel –

routinely make initial response. When an event overwhelms the response capacities of these agencies, part or all of the Emergency Plan may be activated. (Emergency Social Services has more frequently been activated on its own than as part of the larger City Plan. When required to “host” large numbers of forest fire evacuees from outside Winnipeg, all the resources of ESS have been required, while other emergency response sectors of the City were largely unaffected.)

Winnipeg’s Emergency Plan adopts a multi-hazard approach; it is generic rather than agent specific. Separate, unique plans are not required for floods, another for explosions, or airplane crashes, and another for tornados. Instead, the Plan recognizes that although specific needs may be different in every case, certain response patterns or functions will need to be carried out in every situation. Generic functions are actions or activities that are useful in various disaster events and include evacuating and sheltering affected persons, assessing damage, coordinating emergency management activities and restoring essential public services (Quarantelli, 1997). Across Canada, the activities prescribed under the function of Emergency Social Services, are generic functions.

Emergency Social Services

In a disaster, the volume, urgency, and intensity of human needs and the degree of social disorganization are such that regular community social service resources are unable to cope. Emergency social services response systems meet urgent physical and personal needs until regular social services or special recovery programs are effectively in operation. “Emergency Social Services (ESS) is a planned emergency response organization designed to provide those basic services considered essential for the

immediate and continuing well-being of persons affected by a disaster.” (Health Canada, 1994, p.7).

Across Canada, ESS is comprised of five essential services: clothing; lodging for homeless or evacuated persons; food services for evacuees, emergency workers and disaster volunteers; registration and inquiry services to reunite separated families and answers queries about missing persons; and personal services for immediate and long term emotional support to disaster victims and temporary care to unattended children and dependent adults (Manitoba Interagency Steering Committee on Emergency Social Services, 1994). Winnipeg’s ESS plan has additional planned functions that work in support of the five basic services. These include activities such as media relations/public information, volunteer coordination, environmental health services, and recreation services for emergency evacuees (City of Winnipeg, Community Services, Skeleton EHSS Plan, July 1999).

Political Economy Perspective on Social Service Organizations

Social service administrators can make their own organizations more responsive when they understand the variables that facilitate and hinder the delivery system. What compels agencies to work in unison and share their authority? What are the potential costs and benefits of working agreements for roles, responsibilities, and requirements? I concentrated my literature review on these areas in my examination of the organization of human services as it may apply in Winnipeg to Emergency Social Services.

The current body of literature on this perspective is limited. To Yeheskel Hasenfeld’s (1983) seminal treatise on the subject, Burton Gummer (1990) added an

insightful book instructive for social work administration managing in today's political arena of tight money and competition for resources. Unless indicated otherwise, notes below are referenced to Hasenfeld.

Political economy theory provides a framework for understanding how organizations operate, compete, and survive in a complex community system. The theory focuses on organizations as a whole, relations between the organization and its environment, and internal relations. Political economy uses an exchange framework to explain relations between different interest groups, both internal and external to the organization, and the power each exercises in controlling and influencing relations. This perspective on exchange is essential to anticipating, understanding, and negotiating on real and perceived costs and benefits of organizational arrangements to work together.

Political economy theory spells out processes involved in negotiating for and allocating resources, those elements required to carry out organizational work. The theoretical model focuses on the interplay of power, the goals of those who wield power (control resources and their allocation) and the interactions between the demand and supply of those organizational resources. It is precisely these interactions – between those who control resources and therefore wield power (we in the position of legislated and administrative control over Emergency Social Services) and those who seek to receive those resources (ESS partners) while accruing only minimal costs in terms of organizational autonomy – that are the focus of attention in efforts to develop agreements for a coordinated emergency social service response.

The “political” within political economy theory refers to the processes through which power and legitimation are acquired by an organization. It focuses on the web of

groups and individuals that possess resources and the ability to sanction decisions. The “economic” piece focuses upon processes by which resources such as clients, manpower, and finances are acquired and distributed within the organization. (P.44).

Environmental Influences

Organizations do not and cannot exist as closed entities. They are influenced by and respond to the environment they exist within, key of which is other organizations. In order to achieve their goals, they must to some degree, depend on their environment for a variety of resources such as information, funding, physical resources and clients (Meyer and Scott, 1983). As a result, they are vulnerable to external influences from forces outside their own boundaries. So, social service organizations typically resist close links with one another. Coordinating efforts would require greater openness, potentially exposing individual agencies to increasing influence and a reduced ability to control their own direction. Instead, organizations fiercely defend their domain, show indifference to true cooperation, and engage in symbolic, rather than substantive coordination (Hasenfeld, 1983).

However, routine patterns of interaction do occur between organizations as they carry out established tasks and activities. As these patterns are repeated, they create an interorganizational network, suggesting that at least on some level, coordination can be achieved. This level of coordination, and the possibility for higher levels is determined by an organization’s need to seek and obtain resources from its environment.

As the local authority in charge of social service disaster response, ESS controls valuable, one-of-a-kind resources: 1) access to the disaster client population; 2) authority

to work with them; and 3) the legitimation of being a government recognized and sanctioned response agent. Emergency Social Services, therefore, wields power. It controls something that other organizations need as they look to carve out a niche for themselves. Access to these resources can only be gained by those organizations through transactions and exchanges with the external groups that control them. If it chooses, ESS may delegate some of its vested authority to a local agency, thereby legitimizing and authorizing them to undertake such activities.

Agencies such as the Red Cross and The Salvation Army are motivated to become one of those authorized agencies. Our communities consider emergency response work to be necessary, benevolent and as serving those deemed in need due to no fault of their own (with occasional, minimal exception). The work has been legitimized; organizations that perform it are conferred with that same status, essential to social service organizations for community support. Moreover, disaster work is highly visible. It provides an opportunity for national and sometimes international exposure. For agencies dependent upon the funding goodwill of the community, this exposure is necessary to organizational survival. It brings them the community support and resources they require in order to carry on their work. Therefore, obtaining the resources controlled by ESS, which are required to act in emergency response, becomes essential.

Bargaining for Resources

Political economy theory shows how organizations that lack resources, bargain for them. Coming from a position of limited power – seeking resources – organizations attempt to develop countervailing powers in order to reduce their dependence and preserve as much organizational autonomy as may be possible. Maintaining high

community visibility as experts in a particular field, devoting internal resources to building this expertise and reputation and making oneself indispensable are means of developing countervailing powers to those who control resources. Possessing only minimal countervailing powers – limited ability to dictate terms of an exchange – results in uncertainty and vulnerability to external pressure, jeopardizing internal integrity and organizational survival. In response to this threat and in addition to maximizing their countervailing powers, human service organizations generally adopt a strategy of *cooperation*. Three forms of cooperation are available to human service organizations: contracting, coalition, and cooptation. This discussion focuses on contracting, the option most frequently used by organizations, and the one available to ESS partners.

Contracting

Contracting involves a formal or informal agreement between two organizations for the exchange of resources or services. As such, it is a key mechanism for coordinating and integrating the social service network, relieving the client of the burden of connecting disparate components of the social service delivery system (P.75). Organizations that are looking to secure resources necessary for them to carry on their work, will generally consider contracting as an acceptable method when they are in a position of sufficient power such that the benefits gained will not be severely outweighed by the costs incurred.

ESS needs to contract with other agencies in order that it may concentrate its own activities and specialize its own resources strategically. By and large, ESS controls the legitimation, authority, and clients required by agencies wishing to become involved in

local, human service, disaster relief work. The payoff to agencies for contracting with ESS is a security to them of a flow of resources, public exposure, and the subsequent benefits that accrue from undertaking work that is highly valued within the community. ESS gets its work done while expending its minimal resources strategically and efficiently, and partner agencies gain legitimation and access to disaster work.

The cost to such agencies however, in accepting terms of an agreement, may be a reduction in flexibility and autonomy. Terms of agreements may commit an organization to activities not consonant with its primary interests; or, typically, in the case of arrangements with government agencies, commit the organization to complex regulations, reporting procedures and service constraints (P. 75). In an agreement between ESS and a social service agency, this potential or perceived threat to organizational autonomy could be characterized in stipulations of a working agreement in which ESS will specify agency activities, roles, expectations, conditions of work and measures of performance.

Ironically, as those partner agencies carve out those roles, become expert within them and develop community expectations that they deliver those services, ESS becomes increasingly dependent upon them. Moreover, ESS loses its own ability and capacity to undertake those functions on its own. The organizational countervailing powers of partner agencies increase, placing them in a position to negotiate and act more autonomously.

Requirements for Successful Negotiating

Political acumen is considered as necessary to building effective organizations as are good human relations and sound administrative practices (Patti, 1990). Such acumen is required to steer through the intricacies and requirements of negotiations and bargaining needed to develop mutually satisfactory and effective working agreements, particularly given that parties may consider contracting an attempt to control or reduce their authority. For successful negotiating, and in order to mitigate inherent mistrust in bargaining processes, open lines of communications between parties are essential in order to examine, debate, discuss and make proposals regarding issues under negotiation. Norms of mutual respect, listening, understanding, and demonstrating an ability to see both parties' perspectives are essential to the process. (Gummer, 1990).

Adopting a cooperative, friendly and mutual stance assists to develop a sense of trust between parties (an ingredient repeatedly noted in the disaster literature as an essential requirement in effective interorganizational work). Building a working relationship – meeting informally, knowing the other side personally – before formal negotiations begin is key to creating a foundation of trust upon which to build during difficult negotiations. Trust itself, is developed over time through repeated interaction, predictable behaviour and regular communication (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996).

Techniques of *principled negotiation* developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project emphasize both the interpersonal methods discussed above, as well as a focus on common interests, and development of mutual gains instead of gains at one another's expense (Fisher and Ury, 1991). Although costly in terms of time and energy, agreements that can be worked out through such a negotiating process are beneficial in

their clarity and the stability they offer parties, reducing uncertainty and vulnerability. Moreover, negotiated, formal agreements provide enforceable conditions and activities not available through less formal strategies (Gummer, 1990).

Performance Expectations

Performance expectations and measurements, like agency roles and responsibilities are the substance of formal agreements. Determining expectations and measurements of effectiveness however, is a difficult endeavor. Political economy theory views organizational performance effectiveness as an ability to score well on the evaluation criteria set by those who control the resources. The greater the capacity of the agency to meet the criteria of the resource provider, the greater its degree of effectiveness. A criterion therefore becomes a politically determined issue subject to power imbalance and negotiations between partners. (Hasenfeld, 1983). Moreover, quality control, that “thing” we might measure or use to determine whether an activity or intervention was successful in doing just what it was supposed to do, is particularly problematic for social service organizations. Hasenfeld points out that human service work – working on people – requires a knowledge that is inherently complex, incomplete, ever changing and often inconsistent and contradictory. Because change in the client state relies so heavily upon the relationship between staff and client, it remains near impossible to determine what factors contribute to that change, particularly since the confidentiality requirements of that relationship means it is hidden from view in a one-on-one interaction. As such, establishing legitimate, measurable indicators of successful interventions and setting those into a negotiated agreement would be unlikely.

However, the kind of tasks ESS will be asking of its partners may be more amenable to measurement than the above reference suggests. Other than the Personal Services component of ESS, its services may be classified as people-processing technologies. One of three categories of Hasenfeld's institutionalized procedures, people processing technologies have one central purpose: to classify and confer upon clients, a status. No attempt is made to alter the state of the client himself (people-changing technology) or to simply maintain clients whom it has been determined have little capacity for improvement (people-sustaining). Once a status has been determined, that status will confer some eligibility for other goods and services. For example, once a "registration" by the Canadian Red Cross is complete, the status of disaster victim is conferred upon an emergency social services client. In turn, that client will receive goods and services for which he has been deemed eligible by virtue of that determination.

Duration of staff-client relations in these transactions is brief. Effectiveness of the work (whether a correct determination of status was made) is determined by the receiving unit of the client (in our case, by other ESS service areas). (Hasenfeld, 1974) In these cases, where clients are assumed non-variable, and tasks are routine, predictable, and standardized, explicit evaluations and monitoring mechanisms are possible (Hasenfeld, 1983).

Establishing performance criteria with ESS partners is therefore anticipated to be straightforward, avoiding the difficulty associated with measuring criteria established with little or no reference to success in intervention. Instead, performance criteria may be established on more visible grounds, ones I expect, that will be considered more acceptable and meaningful to partner agencies. Maintaining the emergency response

theme, performance criteria related to organizational response times and volumes of clients served can be established and subsequently negotiated on.

CHAPTER THREE

Practicum Setting and Student Role

The Practicum Site

The practicum was done in the student's workplace, the Community Services Department of the City of Winnipeg. A large municipal government department, Community Services provides Winnipeg residents with recreation, leisure and library services, as well as protective services including insect control, trades licensing and environmental health inspections. In April 1998, responsibility for the City's Emergency Social Services program was transferred to the Community Services Department from the former Social Services Department, (whose functions were being transferred to the provincial level of government). During my practicum, I was (and still am) part of a departmental Steering Committee assigned responsibility for integrating the ESS function into its new home in the Community Services Department.

Catalysts for Change in Winnipeg's ESS Structure

As a member of the departmental *Steering Committee on Emergency Health and Social Services*, I began our task by studying the functioning and capacity of ESS during Manitoba's 1997 "Flood of the Century". A key component of emergency work is a post-event examination and critique in an effort to learn from noted deficiencies and problems and subsequently improve plans and disaster response capacities. Previous experience in disaster response can contribute to an organization's ability to more effectively respond to subsequent disasters as long as the knowledge gained is incorporated into subsequent planning and training activities (Streeter, 1989).

Manitoba's 1997 flood garnered national and international attention. The "Flood of the Century" transformed the Red River Valley into a lake covering 640,000 acres, virtually a thousand square miles. At its widest point south of Winnipeg, the flooded area was more than twenty-five miles (forty kilometers) wide. Costs associated with flood fighting, damages and associated expenditures ranged in the area of nearly one-half billion dollars (Manitoba Water Commission, 1998). Approximately 28,000 Manitobans were evacuated from flood-stricken and flood risk areas. Although unknown to residents, at one point in late April, an assortment of senior civic, provincial, federal and military experts were planning for the possible evacuation of up to half a million people from Manitoba's capital city, Winnipeg (Bennett, December 1998). By any definition, the event was indeed, a disaster.

1997 Flood Reports

The City of Winnipeg undertook some post-disaster studies (City of Winnipeg, 1998; Angus Reid Group, 1997; KPMG, 1998) and was involved in others (Manitoba Water Commission, 1998) examining the 1997 flood response. Although given very high marks overall in terms of protecting individuals and public and private property, problems were noted in some aspects of Winnipeg's Emergency Plan and operations. Initiated by the City of Winnipeg, a KPMG Consulting report undertook a documentation review and series of 51 interviews with civic and other officials associated with the 1997 flood. The intent of the review was to: evaluate the emergency decision-making process; assess intergovernmental coordination; and, identify lessons learned and recommend

improvements (KPMG, 1998). Several key findings were identified from the review.

Most pertinent to Emergency Social Services and this practicum, the study found that:

- city employees including social workers in ESS demonstrated expertise in their respective roles and knowledge of the City's emergency operations;
- bureaucracy in problem-solving was diminished during the emergency; departmental boundaries blurred as staff worked cross-functionally and virtually all other priorities were set aside;
- external agencies such as the Salvation Army and the Red Cross were not familiar with the City's emergency response structure and therefore could not always effectively contribute to the emergency response.

Two of the recommendations made in the KPMG report were pertinent to Emergency Social Services, namely:

1) Consider developing a community approach to emergency management by involving the various partners in the planning and feedback components of the comprehensive plan. KPMG went on to note that, Trusting relationships are forged prior to an emergency facilitating the effectiveness and speed of decision making, as well as the compliance of citizens.

2) Consider clarifying the roles and responsibilities of all emergency organization partners by involving them in reviewing emergency plans. Authority and accountability for actions will flow from these understandings (KPMG, 1998. p.34).

The KPMG Consulting report was far from exhaustive. In the end, it consisted of a presentation to senior civic officials, supported by limited written analysis and material. The report did not define terms such as “community approach to emergency management” or identify who should be considered as “partners” in emergency planning or what factors might be considered in making this determination. Nor was the report specific or comprehensive enough to provide clear rationale to all of its findings and recommendations. The report was enough however, to clarify that the City’s Emergency Plan and state of preparedness required further review and improvements in order to ready the City for the next, inevitable disaster. The report was also enough to prompt the Steering Committee on Emergency Health and Social Services to widen the scope of our task beyond simply integrating plans into the Department. We included in our objectives, the KPMG recommendation of building a “community approach to emergency management” by developing cooperative, coordinated working agreements with our external partners with whom we deliver emergency social services.

Subsequent Exploration and Findings

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the issues that gave rise to KPMG findings and recommendations, I gathered additional, pertinent information from several sources:

- flood operation debriefing notes of the ESS Public Aid Coordinator (the position responsible for ESS planning and coordination) (Egan, 1997);
- an interview with the ESS Public Aid Coordinator regarding ESS flood operations and specifically, work with partner organizations (Egan, 1999);

- discussions regarding Winnipeg's emergency response with the City's Emergency Program Coordinator (Bennett, 1998);
- speaking notes of the Social Services Department Head for a presentation on the Department's emergency response operations and lessons learned (King, 1997).

All these sources indicated that city staff were knowledgeable of their emergency roles, which they performed in a manner that was both professional and responsive to the needs of flood victims. High credit was also given to partner agencies which, it was noted, also worked in a professional manner during many long hours under demanding conditions. Notable among all the credit however, were "problems" in the working relationships between the City's ESS staff and structure and its closest partners, the Red Cross and Salvation Army.

ESS Flood Problems

These issues summarized below, set the context for my Practicum Proposal and subsequent work. The list is incomplete; it does not include problems identified by The Salvation Army or the Canadian Red Cross. Those were added in the practicum work itself and are discussed in Chapter Four.

- Understanding between ESS and its partners rests on historical, verbal arrangements between agency personnel who are long gone. Roles, responsibilities, expectations, and communication systems and practices are not shared;

- Personnel from the Red Cross national headquarters took over local Red Cross operations. Their lack of familiarity with Winnipeg procedures created additional requirements for clarification, communication and discussions during a chaotic period;
- In the Flood preparation stage, Red Cross personnel announced they intended to do more than the Registration and Inquiry function of emergency response. They held a news conference in front of the evacuation centre that City ESS was about to open, announcing that would be the location they (Red Cross) would receive and assist flood victims, effectively usurping the City's ESS role and function.
- Several days into flood reception duties, Red Cross advised that their volunteer staff were overwhelmed with the work, had become stressed and required Critical Incident Stress Debriefing;
- ESS did not notify the Red Cross when Winnipeg Police Services "registered" St. Norbert evacuees, usurping the Red Cross role and making their registration information incomplete;
- Communications systems and procedures between ESS and its partner agencies were poor:
 - Communication between ESS and the Salvation Army was unplanned, infrequent, and sporadic. Many days went by without contact;
 - At one point in the midst of flood operations, the Red Cross failed to return ESS phone calls for several days;

- ESS held daily briefings to keep staff abreast of developments and to engage in collective problem solving. Neither the Red Cross nor Salvation Army was invited to attend.
- Following flood operations, the Red Cross expressed their displeasure in a media article (Winnipeg Sun, July 21, 1997) noting the working relationship with the City was ineffective.

The Practicum

The development of working agreements (contracts) with ESS partners is part of the larger project of the Departmental Steering Committee on Emergency Health and Social Services. That committee originated an overall goal, “To develop and implement an integrated Emergency Health and Social Services plan for the City of Winnipeg Community Services Department”. (This Project Statement and Project Objectives are attached as Appendix A.)

My Practicum is derived from Project Objective 6: *Cooperative Coordinated Working Agreements With Collateral Agencies*. That objective requires that we clarify the work we will request of collateral agencies and then create mutually satisfactory working agreements with a goal of coordinating emergency response work by including other agencies in ESS plan preparation, training, exercising and response.

Of four primary partners that Emergency Social Services needs to develop closer ties and working relationships with, this Practicum focuses on two: the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army. Those two social service organizations are an integral and essential part of the City’s Emergency Social Services Plan (Canadian Red Cross for

Registration and Inquiry functions and The Salvation Army for the Emergency Feeding component). Moreover, these two agencies were cited in post-flood reports as being unaware of how they fit into the City's overall emergency plan. Additionally, both organizations have a long and distinguished history with disaster response. The Salvation Army has been recognized internationally for its ability to mobilize quickly to disaster requirements and for the public image it has generated because of its humanitarian effort (Mileti, Drabek and Haas, 1975). The Canadian Red Cross is a leader in disaster response and well known for its efforts abroad and in Winnipeg. It was the primary agency involved in coordinating the massive evacuation of thousands of Winnipeg residents during the 1950 flood (Zelinsky and Kosinski, 1991). Both gained renown for their massive efforts in the Red River Valley during the 1997 flood and both agencies indicated in 1999 that they were interested in formalizing their working relationship with Winnipeg Emergency Social Services.

Workplace Practicum Considerations

In the City's Emergency Social Services Plan, my role is (Alternate) Public Aid Coordinator; alternate to the primary Coordinator who held the position when the program was transferred from Social Services Department. The Public Aid Coordinator is responsible for the overall management, planning, and coordination of Emergency Social Services and acts a primary member of the Emergency Preparedness Coordination Committee responsible for the City of Winnipeg's disaster plans and response. In a previous social work management position with Social Services, I held the role of Public

Aid Coordinator and acted in numerous capacities to both small and large-scale emergencies over a period of approximately fifteen years.

My immediate manager, Department Head, and ESS Steering Committee colleagues approved my request to develop ESS working agreements as part of the work required toward completion of my Master of Social Work degree. None of the persons I worked with in the development of these agreements report to or are answerable to me in the department's administrative framework. I worked on the project with colleagues; other management staff involved in the development of the ESS plans in the Community Services Department. From the onset of the project, I advised all of these colleagues and Red Cross and Salvation Army personnel that I was combining my MSW Practicum with this task and that following completion, I would ask for their feedback on a strictly voluntary basis.

In our current Emergency Social Services plan, each major function has a Community Services Department "Chief", responsible for plans, preparedness, and operations of his or her respective area. Both the Chief of Emergency Feeding and the Chief of Registration and Inquiry were requested to accompany me to meetings with agencies they were being asked to form closer ties to, and to work collectively to develop working agreements that ultimately, they would be responsible for working within. The Public Aid Coordinator, Mr. Joe Egan, also agreed to attend and participate in the process with both The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross.

I was responsible for developing written working agreements between the City of Winnipeg and its ESS partner organizations. For the purposes of this student practicum, I worked with colleagues and partner agency personnel over a period of approximately five

months. During that time, we met, negotiated, and developed contractual agreements intended to be acceptable to all involved. The agreements we developed are considered “drafts”, subject to review, revision, and approval of our respective organizations at administrative, legal, and political levels. During the course of our work, I assumed the lead role for ESS in meetings and negotiations with partner agencies. My role falls into the (social scientific) category of participant observer (albeit at the “active” end of the observation scale).

Participant Observer

Participant observation is a process in which an observer’s presence in a social situation is maintained for the purpose of social investigation. By participating with the observed, the investigator is afforded the opportunity to gather data, typically through interviews, observations, and analysis. The strength of the participant observer method are its non-standardized manner of data collection, and the effective use made of the relationship the researcher establishes with informants for eliciting data (Dean, Eichorn and Dean, 1969). Participant observation employs an open-ended approach. Interviews, observations, and inquiries are flexible and frequently redirected to illuminate fruitful areas of data constantly coming in. Respondents need not be treated uniformly, but are interviewed about the things they can illuminate most. This open-ended approach was necessary to the give and take of my practicum, allowing me to revise meeting styles, topics for inquiry, meeting agenda sequences, as appropriate.

By establishing himself as a friend, the participant observer is able to create trust, to create a degree of comfort so that sensitive issues may be discussed with the researcher. This ingredient was central to the negotiation process leading to the

development of our contractual agreements. For us to have candid discussions about issues between organizations evidenced during the 1997 flood, and to speak frankly about organizational limitations, a basis of trust was required.

Ironically, the strengths of the participant observer method, key to my work / study are also its weaknesses. Because data are not collected in a standardized way, it is not considered useful for statistical treatment, effectively limiting the kinds of conclusions that may be drawn from a study. Second, because the researcher establishes relationships with subjects, he is subject to bias in guiding the inquiry in accord with preconceived impressions or personal characteristics (Dean, Eichorn and Dean, 1969).

To reduce the possibility and effects of bias flowing from relationships established in the process, I systematically and routinely checked my perceptions, findings and intended direction with my colleagues, in particular, the Public Aid Coordinator who was present at all meetings with partner agencies. To ensure that conclusions I drew about meeting events were correct, I made meeting notes that I shared with all participants, requesting that they check them for accuracy. I also maintained an informal log of my own, recording personal notes, observations, areas for me to inquire on, and personal insights on the process. Finally, I checked my own perceptions on the process, my input into it and the outcomes we achieved, through evaluative feedback methods.

Evaluation Methods

Noted in Chapter 1, I established objectives in three areas. To assess my progress toward those objectives, I devised two simple feedback mechanisms, a five item, written

questionnaire (Appendix B) and a brief six-question interview (Appendix C). The questionnaire was designed to provide feedback essential to determine the extent I had achieved my skill objectives. Questions pertain to the process I used and the interpersonal and negotiation skills I attempted to demonstrate. The interview questions were intended to provide feedback necessary to gauge organizational satisfaction with the agreements concluded and organizational resistance to developing close interorganizational working relationships. The interview was intended to provide information necessary for answering questions related to my service and research objectives.

Following completion of Draft Agreements between ESS and partner agencies, I requested that all personnel involved in the negotiations meetings complete the Questionnaire. Before distributing it, a Questionnaire Consent Form (Appendix B1) was presented, explained, and collected. For the interview, I asked the most senior administrative personnel from ESS, The Salvation Army, and the Canadian Red Cross to participate. Prior to engaging in interviews, respondents signed an Interview Consent Form (Appendix C 1).

CHAPTER FOUR

The Practicum Process: Applying A Political Economy Perspective to the Development of a Coordinated Emergency Social Service Response System

The Practicum process involved working with senior, administrative staff of two not-for-profit organizations and with City of Winnipeg personnel who were assigned roles and corresponding responsibilities in the Community Services Department's Emergency Social Services Plan. The primary method of work was scheduled, in-person meetings between two teams of personnel: one representing the City's ESS function and the other representing either the Canadian Red Cross, or The Salvation Army. In addition to meeting together, information was exchanged through written communication (generally e-mailed) and telephone conversations.

The purpose of meeting and exchanging information was to develop an agreement, essentially a contract, between the City of Winnipeg and The Salvation Army, Manitoba and North West Ontario Division and another between the City of Winnipeg and the Canadian Red Cross, Winnipeg and North/East Regions. From the outset, all parties agreed that the agreements were intended to improve the way the City and its partner ESS agencies worked together in all phases of disaster response. (Disasters are considered to have four time-related phases; mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, each of which requires different activities. [National Governor's Association, 1979]) The agreements would officially include the agencies as part of the City's Emergency Social Services Plan, define their organizational roles and responsibilities within the Plan, and the City's operational expectations of them.

To achieve this objective, my practicum considered:

- a) Organizational and incidental problems that arose between ESS and the partner agencies during the recent, 1997 flood response;
- b) How to define disaster and response requirements based upon ESS capacity and the conditions the disaster occurrence creates;
- c) The cornerstones of effective disaster management;
- d) Tendency of human service organizations to resist close working relationships;
- e) The position of power that ESS holds in terms of controlling a valuable resource that organizations must bargain for;
- f) Organizations' countervailing powers inherent in ESS dependence upon them to perform functions beyond ESS capacity;
- g) How to maximize payoff of a contractual arrangement to all parties by avoiding terms that reduce organizational autonomy, that introduce activities that are out of sync with organizational values or that require compliance to complex or constraining regulations and performance standards; and
- h) The interpersonal and principled negotiation skills required for successful negotiating.

Setting the Stage

In November 1999, two ESS colleagues and I met at Salvation Army's Divisional Headquarters with the Divisional Commander and the Director of Program. We met at our request to clarify our interest in entering into a joint negotiations / planning process to develop a written, contractual agreement for the coordinated delivery of emergency social services, with the Salvation Army providing the full range of emergency feeding functions. Because neither the Lieutenant Colonel nor the Major were posted to Winnipeg during the 1997 flood, we provided background information from the City's ESS perspective. Most notably, we stressed issues related to the historical, verbal agreement that existed between our respective organizations, the genesis and full objectives of which had been lost in time and personnel changes.

The Salvation Army Administrators agreed that a joint planning process could benefit both organizations by formalizing roles, and by considering the range of duties and responsibilities that Salvation Army personnel might be of assistance with. Stressing that we were interested in developing a mutually satisfactory arrangement, I proposed that a first meeting of administrative personnel with emergency response duties be used to "brainstorm" the issues to examine during the agreement development process.

We held a similar meeting in December 1999 with the Regional Director and the Coordinator, Disaster Services of the Canadian Red Cross. Under a former Regional Director, both these administrators had been fully involved in 1997 flood operations in concert with City of Winnipeg Emergency Social Services. They agreed it was both timely and important to develop a more formal working relationship and that part of that building process would require an examination of issues that arose between organizations

during the emergency flood response. We agreed to begin meeting the following month and that I would forward a proposed agenda.

Prior to commencing negotiations with the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army, I met with a solicitor from the City's Legal Services Branch. Familiar with the City's Emergency Plan and responsibilities, this lawyer answered questions and gave direction respecting the terms and conditions of a contract between the City of Winnipeg and another organization. There were few, if any, restrictions on what might be included in an agreement for emergency social services. I could include what I felt was important, and that upon conclusion, he would re-draft the document in the required legal form. I was advised to keep the document brief and to allow flexibility by speaking more of general concepts and principles than of strict requirements. Since the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army have expertise in disaster work, I should attempt to minimize restricting their functions.

The solicitor also advised that it would not require strict enforcement clauses because the general purpose of the proposed agreement was to tie organizations together by stating roles, responsibilities, and service delivery functions. Moreover, it did not involve financial commitments. The City of Winnipeg would not be taking costly legal action against the Canadian Red Cross or The Salvation Army, or in all likelihood, vice versa, should a party fail to live up to the agreement. Instead, I should attempt to build in joint reviews of organizational performance, a termination clause, and a mechanism for dispute resolution in event of disagreement (Buhr, 1999).

First Negotiation Meetings

Kochan and Verma point out that negotiation is a unique form of social interaction, involving more than one party, holding potentially conflicting interests, as well as sufficient common interests to motivate the party to remain in the bargaining relationship. Additionally, negotiation involves reciprocity whereby positions that are initially divergent, become identical (Kochan and Verma, 1983). My goal for the first meeting with The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross was to find enough common interests to motivate administrative personnel from those organizations to return to subsequent meetings with us.

Within that goal, I had two objectives:

- 1) To establish working relationships conducive to candour, respect and trust;
- 2) To jointly identify as many areas as we (initially) felt it important to review, explore, and examine in the process of getting to an agreement satisfactory to both parties.

Gummer notes the importance of the choice of sites for the negotiating session. Meeting at the other party's offices can be seen as an initial, albeit minor, concession (Gummer, 1990). The first meeting with both organizations was at their head offices. (We began rotating venues on the third meeting.) Our first meetings began very informally, with introductions, light conversation, and humour.

I presented for the group's approval, an agenda and process for our initial meeting. This was comprised of background information on "catalysts for change" in our

existing relationship (several of the participants around the table were not fully familiar with historical roles, or how our respective organizations had traditionally worked together). These catalysts included personnel and structural changes within the City's ESS organization, personnel changes at Red Cross and Salvation Army, a recognition that our joint flood response included some inter-organizational deficiencies which could be improved upon, and finally, the City appointed KPMG Report (1998) which pointed out areas for improvement in ESS functioning. A brief presentation, review and discussion on these topics allowed an opportunity for participants around the table (eleven of us in total at the Red Cross meeting, eight at The Salvation Army) to "get on the same page", share stories – mostly humorous – of flood memories, and remind us of the importance of learning from past disasters by incorporating experiences into subsequent preparedness plans.

We then engaged in an exercise to "brainstorm" all the topics that might be beneficial for us to explore for an agreement on coordinated emergency services. For this exercise, I used the "ToP Workshop Method" developed by the Institute of Cultural Affairs. This process involves a participative approach that taps into people's diverse perspectives and allows participants to build plans from the bottom up, fostering a sense of ownership and partnership borne out of the activity of co-creation (Spence, 1989).

I asked meeting members to take a few minutes on their own and individually write down all the issues, ideas, and concerns they felt may be of use for us to explore and potentially include in a working agreement. In a small group of a few persons, (mixed with some members from ESS and others from the partner agency), participants then shared their written responses. I asked that group members explore and expand one

another's ideas, eliminate duplication and write the diverse ideas up on large recipe cards that I taped on the wall for all to see and share. As I placed them on the wall, we briefly clarified the meaning and intent of each card. We then grouped alike cards together, in columns of similar issues. Finally, we "named the columns", identifying the themes or objectives the individual cards were collectively addressing.

Themes identified by ESS and the Canadian Red Cross included:

- communication and media relations – with tasks such as developing inter-agency plans for communication at each stage of a disaster; and plans for jointly dealing with media inquiries and releases;
- training – including developing joint exercises, educating one another on respective systems and operational procedures;
- developing an inter-agency partnership – creating opportunities for relationship building, regular meeting times.

Themes developed by ESS and Salvation Army included:

- scales of response – understanding response capacities and roles from small, single person events, to large-scale disasters of long-term duration;
- knowledge of organizations – City ESS will have developed an understanding of The Salvation Army, its mission and values and incorporate these into an agreement;
- roles and responsibilities are clear – we have agreed upon expectations, and who does what and how.

These would become the substance of our joint explorations and negotiations.

We agreed the list could be expanded, that we may discover we had missed some

essential points, or that our deliberations may take us into areas we had not initially foreseen; but that together we had developed our agenda direction for future meetings.

These first meetings achieved my initial objective. I also had a commitment from participants to subsequent meeting dates and initial agreement on how to proceed. We would determine which of the identified themes were critical for developing our agreement and which ones might become part of continuing post-agreement discussions. Additionally, we would determine the process to explore the issues generated.

Following each of the initial meetings, I began a practice that I maintained throughout our negotiations. I discussed perceptions, process, outcomes, and direction with my colleague, the Public Aid Coordinator. I maintained an informal log of my own insights and perceptions on each meeting. I typed up meeting notes, reflecting our decisions, areas for intended follow-up, and information we had agreed upon for our next meeting. I emailed copies to all participants with a request that they review the notes for accuracy and advise me of any errors or misunderstandings so that I may correct them. A sample of meeting notes is attached as Appendix D (Salvation Army – Meeting Number 3) and Appendix E (Red Cross – Meeting Number 3).

Building The Working Agreement

When looking to develop integrative agreements that maximize benefits to both parties, a negotiator should view the relationship between the parties as the most process important variable in the negotiating procedure (Rubin and Brown, 1975). I conducted meetings between our Emergency Social Services component and the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army with this principle in mind. A contract between our

organizations was not the end product, but rather a step along the way to an integrated and coordinated emergency response system. The agreement would hold little meaning without personal and organizational relationships of trust to be counted upon in a disaster response.

Chairing each meeting allowed me the opportunity to sequence agenda items. Instead of beginning with inter-organizational problems that arose during the flood, a potentially conflictual issue, we first moved into an exploration of “peacetime” roles of the agencies and then on to their emergency response capacities and procedures. This allowed both organizations to “showcase” their areas of expertise and instruct ESS personnel in areas we were looking to officially partner on, but upon which, we had minimal detailed knowledge. More importantly, it provided the opportunity to demonstrate those ingredients of respect, active listening, an ability to see the others’ perspective, adopting a cooperative and mutual stance, listed by Gummer (1990) as essential for successful negotiating and upon which to develop that sense of familiarity, friendliness and trust.

Also in the interest of building relationships, I did not consult administrative superiors on the agreement as it was being developed, or import suggestions, clauses, and direction from an outside body. This procedure allowed the negotiating body to be in full control of process discussions, deliberations, contents, and decisions. We could get to know one another, share our thoughts and opinions without having them mistaken as someone else’s agenda or direction. It was simply more personal than may have been the case had we been forced to change directions on the basis of an outside body’s input into deliberations.

At our second meeting with each organization, we imposed a timeline for a “Draft Agreement” of late April 2000, ensuring we proceed in a timely fashion and providing us with opportunity to develop a good working understanding of respective roles and emergency procedures by the time we entered traditional flood and forest fire season. We agreed the “draft” would capture the contents that we agreed upon, however, would not yet have received administrative, legal and or political review that it would eventually become subject to. Following those reviews, we will again meet to consider any recommendations and ensure that changes do not alter our original intent and plans.

Analyzing Flood Problems

Banerjee and Gillespie correctly observe that disaster preparedness has been neglected in social work literature, and assert that social service administrators should learn how to plan and prepare interorganizational responses for coordinated services in the event of disaster (Banerjee and Gillespie, 1994). Streeter (1989) notes that planning and preparing includes learning from previous experiences and incorporating those experiences and the lessons learned from them, into subsequent plans and activities. Although as individual organizations, the City of Winnipeg, Emergency Social Services organization, the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army had all done post-flood reviews of their own respective operations, interorganizational problems identified in those reviews had not been addressed. It was time to do so.

Both parties could point to specific incidents during flood operations that caused friction between organizations. Some of the personnel involved at the time, now sat at the negotiating table. I wanted to avoid the possibility that individuals might feel they

were being targeted with blame, or needing to become defensive about decisions made three years previous. I also wished to ensure that we not simply address only the incidents themselves, but instead, that we would come to an understanding of what the incident characterized, and then find solutions to prevent conditions that gave rise to the incidents from recurring. To this end, we classified problems using a frame of reference we were familiar with, disaster management.

Through discussions that began with descriptions of incidents and the impact they had, we jointly explored what was going on within the organization at the time, gathering context and understanding of how and why incidents occurred and issues arose. We classified the issues characterized by incidents, according to a disaster management requirement, i.e. prepare for altered organizational patterns; create pre-arranged, interorganizational communication plans. Classifying interorganizational issues along these themes (reviewed in Chapter 2) avoided incidents becoming personalized and provided us with the clarity we needed to prevent similar issues from recurring in future. We would correct deficiencies noted from 1997 operations and improve our interorganizational emergency plan by building into our agreement, the procedures and processes necessary to sustain a coordinated and cooperative approach, including processes for resolving disputes during disaster response.

We addressed “flood problems” on our fourth meeting with both the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army. By that time, we had developed casual and friendly working relationships that allowed us to examine the issues in a relaxed and non-threatening manner. We reviewed and explored all of the incidents and issues that had been identified. The most substantive issues are listed below.

Winnipeg Emergency Social Services and the Canadian Red Cross

Incident

- Personnel from the Red Cross national headquarters took over local Red Cross operations. Their lack of familiarity with Winnipeg procedures created additional requirements for clarification, communication, and discussions during a chaotic period.

Corresponding Disaster Management Theme – Altered Organizational Patterns

Red Cross indicates that they did experience significant struggle with senior levels of their organization attempting to control Flood operations. Auf der Heide points out various ways that emergency organizations are forced to undergo internal changes when in disaster response mode. Personnel become re-assigned to unfamiliar duties, priorities and procedures are changed, and auxiliary staff employed (Auf der Heide, 1989). These changes require that organizations plan for altered states, know who is going to be required to do what, and ensure that, those most knowledgeable and familiar with local conditions, remain in charge.

Solution

This issue formed a primary “Lesson Learned” for the Canadian Red Cross, Winnipeg and North/East Regions. It resulted in a change of organizational policy: the local area of operations will now maintain charge and control of emergency response; guest delegations will perform supportive roles or other approved and assigned tasks.

We addressed this issue in our Working Agreement by naming the (local) positions responsible for working and liaising with ESS personnel during disaster response. This will avoid problems associated by personnel being parachuted into unfamiliar roles and

positions of authority associated with local emergency social services response.

Incident

- In the Flood preparation stage, Red Cross personnel announced they intended to do more than the Registration and Inquiry function of emergency response. They held a news conference in front of the evacuation centre that City ESS was about to open, announcing that would be the location they (Red Cross) would receive and assist flood victims, effectively usurping the City's ESS role and function.

Corresponding Disaster Management Theme – Elements of Coordination

This was identified as a coordination issue; Canadian Red Cross had crossed its own jurisdiction into an area it did not control. The Red Cross Regional Director at the time was interested in doing more than the Registration and Inquiry function, having recently come from a city where the Red Cross role was more expansive. Without consulting with local ESS authorities, and without reference to other organizations' roles, the Red Cross Regional Director sought additional roles to take on as "good PR" for her own agency. By doing so, she placed significant strain on Red Cross resources and capacities to conduct their traditional Registration and Inquiry functions and strained working relationships between Red Cross and Winnipeg ESS.

Mission coordination requires that agencies develop a common understanding of their own and others' roles. It requires that organizations agree upon who is doing what, and how their own function fits into the overall emergency plan. Mission coordination requires that emergency plans be developed jointly in the pre-disaster phase, which is not subject to unilateral changes at response time.

Solution

Red Cross, Winnipeg & North/East Regions has since confirmed their primary functions of Registration and Inquiry. Their personnel and physical resources are devoted to, and trained for this function. In future, alternate areas of disaster relief will only be assumed if it does not conflict with Registration and Inquiry functions required in the Working Agreement. In addition, a decision to assume an additional function will only occur in concert with partner organizations (such as ESS) to ensure jurisdictions are not being encroached, and overall emergency plans are not adversely impacted.

It was also agreed that the City's Reception Centre, which had not yet been opened for business, was not an appropriate place for the Red Cross news conference. In both Working Agreements, we have built in a *Communication Plan*. As part of those plans we will have our respective organizational media/communication personnel work jointly and in concert, be thoroughly knowledgeable of emergency plans, roles, and organizational responsibilities so that they may speak to their own areas of control while being sensitive to jurisdictional issues outside their organizational domain.

Incident

- ESS did not notify the Red Cross when Winnipeg Police Services "registered" St. Norbert evacuees, usurping the Red Cross role and making their registration information incomplete.

Corresponding Disaster Theme – Coordinated, Multi-Organizational Response

Organizations typically plan for their disaster response independent of other responders. Coordination will not occur if key responders do not know who is doing what, under which authority and for what purpose. ESS had not educated Winnipeg

Police colleagues on ESS functions, including Registration of evacuees. Winnipeg Police conducted security actions to ensure endangered areas were being evacuated. They recorded names and addresses of evacuees leaving a City neighbourhood with no knowledge that this information was critical to another organization and with no knowledge of the impact their work had upon the Red Cross or the many evacuees who were told they had to “register” again with the Red Cross.

Solution

Police security functions cannot be confused with Registration activities, designed to reunite separated families and answer inquiries on the location of evacuated persons. ESS has since educated the Police Coordinator on all ESS functions (including the mobile capacity of Registration and Inquiry, which could be set up at police check-points and more efficiently gather information necessary to fulfill the needs of all parties). To ensure other key City emergency coordinators also share this information, senior Red Cross and Salvation Army personnel will be invited to attend the City’s emergency coordination meetings from time to time. There they will meet, learn, and inform key emergency coordinators on their role and functions. Additionally, Salvation Army and Red Cross personnel will meet with ESS administrators on a daily basis during disaster response phase, to keep abreast and involved in all aspects pertaining to joint operations. Similarly, the ESS Public Aid Coordinator meets daily with all other City emergency coordinators to maintain a coordinated approach, informing the overall planning and coordinating body of daily plans and events.

Winnipeg Emergency Social Services and The Salvation Army

Incident

- Communication between ESS and the Salvation Army was unplanned, infrequent, and sporadic. Many days went by without contact. Although ESS held daily briefings to keep personnel abreast of developments and to engage in collective problem solving, The Salvation Army was not invited to attend (nor was the Canadian Red Cross). A sample of problems created by this failure to share essential information includes:
 - The Salvation Army had difficulty determining where to deliver food to volunteer sandbagging crews. This information was obtained only through informal channels, despite the fact that the City knew precisely where sandbagging was scheduled to occur.
 - The Salvation Army spent valuable time and resources locating and securing volunteered space sufficient for setting up a warehouse for donated goods. City ESS has knowledge of, and access to such resources.

Corresponding Disaster Management Theme – Elements of Coordination

(Inter-Organizational Communication)

Inter-organizational communication lies at the heart of an effective coordinated disaster response. Noted problems between ESS and The Salvation Army were not evidenced by incidents of friction so much as by the very limited contact and communication between organizations. Problems that each organization faced and that may have been alleviated by sharing information and resources with one another

remained largely unknown until we reviewed respective flood operations during our deliberations.

Solution

Through our discussions and our Working Agreement we have developed an understanding of one another's informational needs relevant to their emergency functions. We have instituted a plan for exchanging information in pre-disaster, disaster response, and post-disaster phases (Appendix to the Working Agreement). Moreover, we have identified the persons (positions) responsible for ensuring that this informational exchange occurs, we have identified how it will occur and when it will occur. We will continue to refine our communication plan as we redefine needs and objectives through joint training, exercises and ongoing formal and informal interorganizational meetings.

Incident

- ESS initially contacted The Salvation Army and indicated they would not be required as part of the City's plan. When an alternate ESS person later called to request emergency feeding services at the reception centre, it placed a strain on Salvation Army resources already committed elsewhere.
- Salvation Army independently assumed the role of feeding volunteer sandbaggers (to the relief of ESS personnel who neither arranged or prepared for the task).

Corresponding Disaster Management Theme – Elements of Coordination

(Mission Coordination; Mutual Agreements)

Emergency Social Services had not been clear on the role and functions it either expected or anticipated that Salvation Army might fulfill. Understanding between ESS and The Salvation Army (and the Red Cross) rested on historical, verbal arrangements

between agency personnel who had left the organizations years ago. Roles, responsibilities, expectations, communication systems, and practices had not been reviewed or shared for a long time.

Mutual agreements are a key element of interorganizational coordination. Hightower and Coutu (1996) point out that informal, verbal agreements of cooperation represent only the starting point to stronger contractual arrangements and joint planning and programming. Miscommunication, misunderstanding, and poor coordination in earlier disaster response form the basis for developing our joint plans and Working Agreement.

Solution

Through joint discussions, exploration and the give and take of negotiations, we have developed a contractual agreement for a coordinated emergency social service response. Our agreement reflects a mutual understanding of who will perform what functions, under what circumstances and with what kind of resources. We have been careful to build into our framework, the supports identified in the literature as necessary to sustain a coordinated effort. Those include joint reviews of emergency plans, shared training and exercise events, and comprehensive interorganizational communication plans.

Objective Achieved

All of the interorganizational problems noted in the flood response problems were explored and resolved. Our plan was to learn from the issues suggested by the incidents and to incorporate that learning into an improved interorganizational plan and operations. By relating problems to the cornerstone “themes” of effective disaster management, we

were provided with a guideline to both understanding the problem and how they may be prevented in future. By doing so, we not only laid to rest, some old, outstanding interorganizational issues, but also achieved several very specific plans and ideas that would become incorporated into our agreement, most notably, key components of our communication plan. Moreover, by correcting these problems, we achieved the objective of improving the City's Emergency Social Services plan by correcting interorganizational deficiencies evident in the 1997 flood.

Stumbling Blocks

Two unanticipated issues arose early in the negotiations process; one was resolved, another is still outstanding. The Salvation Army is interested in expanding its emergency social services role beyond the Emergency Feeding capacity; The Canadian Red Cross intends on being paid for Registration and Inquiry work, something the City of Winnipeg has not done in past.

The Salvation Army

The Salvation Army did not want the agreement to restrict them to an emergency feeding function alone. At the initial, pre-meeting to negotiations, The Salvation Army's Divisional Commander and the Director of Program indicated they were interested in exploring other ESS functions that their organization could undertake. During negotiation meetings, we learned that their interests extended to the areas of emergency clothing provision, staff for the personal services component to provide interpersonal and crisis counseling services, and volunteer coordination services. We also learned that The Salvation Army has not only the interest, but also the capacity, experience and resources

to undertake more than the emergency feeding function we were prepared to delegate to them.

Emergency Social Services was primarily interested in securing an agreement for The Salvation Army to provide the emergency feeding function. However, we also displayed an interest in hearing and learning more about what The Salvation Army wanted to do as part of the overall ESS plan. Our Chief of Personal Services attended negotiation meetings and expressed his genuine interest to tie the personal and grief counseling resources of The Salvation Army into his Personal Services component of the ESS plan. Responding to the Army's demonstration of their capacity in volunteer management, the Public Aid Coordinator arranged a meeting between the ESS Volunteer Coordinator and The Salvation Army Volunteer Coordinator to share information and explore opportunities for working together in this area.

We continued to say that for now, we were interested only in securing an agreement for the emergency feeding function. However, our actions and stated interest implied otherwise, and Salvation Army administrators were not appeased by our interest alone. The issue of which roles the City was going to confer upon The Salvation Army, needed to be openly addressed.

In their oft-quoted work on principled negotiating, Fisher and Ury indicate that the basic problem in negotiation doesn't lie in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires and fears. Positions are something one has decided upon; interests are what made them decide. Exploring and reconciling interests rather than compromising between positions is a more effective strategy. Behind opposed

positions often lie shared and compatible interests (Fisher and Ury, 1991). We discovered this when we took the time to examine interests in our sixth meeting.

Emergency Social Services was interested in securing an agreement for the emergency feeding function, needing to feel assured that the function could and would be given the resources and attention it required, particularly in a large-scale disaster. ESS feared it was not at a preparedness level in other parts of its Emergency Plan to well enough identify and assess its new department capacities. It could not state with enough certainty, what it did and did not require in areas The Salvation Army was offering.

The Salvation Army was interested in better preparing itself for roles it performed during the 1997 flood, but for which the organization was not fully satisfied with its performance. Being named in an agreement with the civic government as having responsibility for a particular service would provide the leverage needed internally and externally (i.e. with the faith community) to prepare appropriate plans, secure requirements necessary to fulfill the function and improve their state of readiness. On the other hand, administrative personnel feared that although it was offering services such as volunteer coordination, the organization was not in a position to provide them. They had neither the expertise nor the available personnel without borrowing from ranks of persons who may be required for other essential duties.

Once interests were identified, an acceptable resolution came quickly. The agreement would be written up to secure the emergency feeding function. A clause would be included to indicate that The Salvation Army could also be in a position to assist the City in areas of emergency clothing, personal services, and volunteer coordination. No obligation would be inferred. The City may or may not call upon The

Salvation Army to perform these additional functions (but will likely do so because the functions will enhance and complement the overall ESS plan). The Salvation Army can now devote resources to improving their ability and capacity in these roles while ensuring that the primary emergency feeding function will not be diminished. The solution provided the breakthrough necessary to move on to the next stage, drafting the agreement.

The Canadian Red Cross

Finances were discussed at the first meeting's "brainstorming exercise". Because the City (and no other Manitoba municipal government) has paid for Red Cross Registration and Inquiry functions performed during any past emergency, I was initially ill prepared for such discussions. Moreover, I was surprised with this issue given the conclusions I had drawn from political economy literature, namely that agencies would willingly choose to engage in this type of work for the exposure it provided them in the community. Exposure would then translate into income through donations. The issue was not formally addressed on our agenda until our fifth meeting.

Canadian Red Cross and Winnipeg Emergency Social Services interests – that we not incur expenses for which we are not eligible to receive reimbursement – are identical. Reimbursement for emergency service costs is typically available through one of two mechanisms. The Province of Manitoba's Disaster Financial Assistance (DFA) Board, a branch of the Manitoba Emergency Management Organization, generally covers "incremental" costs, those above and beyond organizations' normal operating expenses. Private insurers or corporations are billed when that corporation is responsible for the

emergency incident. An example of the latter is gasoline spills creating the need for neighbourhood evacuations. The fuel company responsible for the spilled substance has paid emergency response costs.

Although these mechanisms will potentially cover most foreseeable ESS responses, there are exceptions. When no state of local emergency is declared (i.e. a large apartment block fire forcing tenant evacuation and relocation), and no private insurer is available, response organizations will incur expenses for which they will not be reimbursed. For the Canadian Red Cross, the incremental expenses associated with their Registration and Inquiry function includes staff overtime salaries and installation and use costs of additional telephone lines.

The Canadian Red Cross enjoys the exposure that disaster response work provides. The agency receives public donations because of that exposure; however, strict agency guidelines ensure that those donations are given in full to the victims of disaster, the intent considered to have been foremost in the minds of the donor. Donations cannot be used for agency operating expenses (Weaver Wright, June 2000). Moreover, the Canadian Red Cross, Winnipeg and North/East Regions is a United Way agency, its public fundraising is restricted by this status.

We continue to seek financing solutions with the Canadian Red Cross. The draft Working Agreement includes a commitment by the City of Winnipeg to submit invoices on behalf of the Red Cross for eligible expenses when a DFA program may apply or when a private insurer may cover costs. I have met and explored options with Province of Manitoba personnel in Manitoba Emergency Management and in Family Services, which holds a contract with the Red Cross to provide Registration and Inquiry functions.

Additional meetings are scheduled to explore payment options. Red Cross personnel and I are confident we can find an acceptable solution.

This issue has not curtailed the drafting of the Working Agreement. However, that draft will require change to accommodate financial requirements before being considered fully and mutually satisfactory.

Drafting the Working Agreements

ESS negotiating teams held six meetings of two to three hours duration with each organization. This was sufficient to cover all the areas we considered necessary for building an agreement. In preparation of drafting the agreement, we agreed once again, that the agreement was to be mutually satisfactory to the interests of both parties; it would define roles and responsibilities and capture the agreements we had concluded over the course of our meetings. Finally, it would tie us to continuing, good, effective and coordinated working relationships.

To draft the agreement, I met individually with a representative from The Salvation Army and another from the Canadian Red Cross to consider aspects such as preamble, contract duration, and overall form. I then drafted the document, circulated it for input, suggestions, and revisions from all participants, and subsequently re-drafted it to incorporate agreed-upon changes.

The agreement was enhanced through the drafting process, first through the suggestions made to the initial draft by staff from both organizations; and second, through the requirement that we cover some issues in detail that we had only spoken of in

general terms up to that point. For illustrative purposes, and to detail process and results, a few of the detail improvements we made in the drafting stage are highlighted below.

Definitions

Definitions set the stage for an understanding of the agreement, specifying the conditions that constitute a disaster and therefore, the conditions under which parties to the agreement will fulfill their specified roles. We initially assumed the definitions of disaster and emergency that are standard in Canadian literature and in Manitoba legislation. In legislation and in our document they were used interchangeably; however, they really didn't specify the conditions under which the City would call upon a partner agency. We deferred to the disaster management literature. It is the community that determines disaster and its impact, based upon previous experience, its infrastructure and resources base (Hoetmer, 1991). Reflecting this in our Agreement, we indicated that the City of Winnipeg would determine when an emergency or other such condition exists such that an emergency social service response may be required. Eliminating interchangeable terms, we dropped the term disaster and used "emergency" alone, to indicate the kinds of conditions necessary to enact the ESS plan.

Mission Statements

Each agreement has a Mission Statement that reflects the purpose and principles of The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross. Although the Canadian Red Cross expected to have this clause included in the agreement, The Salvation Army did not think that this (preferable) option was possible. Believing that city government would not wish to subject itself to potential criticism of favouring a religion, Salvation Army

administrators looked for subtle ways of inserting language reflecting their beliefs into the content of the Agreement. Believing that the Mission Statement simply reflects the renowned organization the City is working with, and not a political choice of religious beliefs, I included the entire Mission Statement.

Including the statements does not change the essence of the contract; it does show respect for the City's ESS partners and provides a simple way of enhancing the benefits of the contract for them. Hasenfeld observes that costs are incurred through contractual arrangements by committing an organization to terms not consonant with its principles (Hasenfeld, 1983). This does quite the opposite, by providing assurance and a demonstration of acceptance of those organizational values and principles.

Performance Expectations

According to Hasenfeld, (1983) the kind of routine, predictable tasks we are asking of our partners should be amenable to measurement. Our primary task in this regard was to determine what best reflected successful completion of these tasks. In our negotiation discussions, we spoke in terms of how the required work was to occur. We explored organizational capacity to respond to large-scale disasters, the frequency and volume of staff training and preparedness exercises, and we determined from where and how The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross would secure and employ additional staff when the volume of work outstripped local, organizational resources as it did during the 1997 flood. Jointly, we agreed that a good measure of successful work – registering and feeding disaster evacuees – would be reflected in how quickly the organization would respond to a disaster with sufficient capacity to handle initial evacuee

requirements. We were confident that as volumes rose, plans and capacity to match the volume were in place.

In the Agreement, we included requirements that the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army respond to an ESS call within a particular time frame, with an immediate capacity to serve a high number of evacuees. Expectations were jointly set and confirmed during the drafting stage. They reflect response times and volumes of evacuees we may expect when faced with a disaster that occurs without warning. Moreover, these performance expectations have been backed up by organizational demonstrations of readiness kits, stored preparations and facilities ready to handle volumes required. Our Communication Plans, practice exercises and training programs will provide periodic, ongoing mechanisms to ensure performance standards are maintained.

ESS has every reason to be impressed with the ability of its partners to quickly and efficiently respond to its call. The Salvation Army is in a position to respond with food and refreshments for 200 persons within one hour of a call. Similarly, the Canadian Red Cross will respond to an ESS call for assistance within one-half hour, with staff and supplies sufficient for 500 registrants. Armed with these standards, ESS also has every reason to expect that we will also impress our senior administrative, legal and political personnel as we move these Working Agreements through our civic government system that will authorize, legitimize and put into action, all the preparatory work that has created them

Summary

In January 2000, I began meeting with Salvation Army and Red Cross administrators to develop a more closely coordinated emergency social services system. In June 2000, we concluded draft agreements, which are designed to do just that. Along the way, we engaged in a process of exploration, discussion, and negotiation. Jointly, we were guided by consideration of effective disaster management practices, both from our own individual, collective, and organizational experience in emergency response and from the principles of effective disaster management evidenced in the literature.

Individually, I was guided by knowledge of political economy theory of organizational behaviour. I planned and prepared for the possibility that The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross might resist working closely with ESS through contractual arrangements. From the outset, I ensured that we would engage in a process that would motivate ongoing explorations, and that we would discuss all issues and topics that administrators felt important to the negotiation process. By anticipating issues that could potentially have become impediments to the agreement (i.e. restrictive control over partner agency's work), I avoided them. Through an understanding of how organizations adopt a strategy of cooperation to secure essential resources and the key elements to successful negotiating, I was able to fashion contracts with both organizations that satisfied their organizational interests while tying together, the primary players in the City of Winnipeg's Emergency Social Services Plan. Chapter Five examines the degree to which I achieved the success I was looking for.

CHAPTER FIVE

Outcomes And Evaluations

Compton and Galaway (1994) stress the importance of clearly specifying goals as a prerequisite to evaluation. Without clarity regarding what you are attempting to achieve, the evaluation of progress toward the accomplishment of goals is impossible. This practicum sought to develop contractual agreements for a more effective emergency social services system. The practicum was based on principles from the field of disaster management and the theoretical framework of political economy regarding how organizations work together.

The most tangible outcomes of the practicum – the Working Agreements – are reproduced as Exhibits 1 and 2, below. To evaluate whether organization members think that these contracts will improve coordination of emergency social services in Winnipeg, I administered a questionnaire (Appendix B) and engaged five administrators in separate interviews (Appendix C). These instruments were designed to provide feedback regarding progress toward my professional learning objectives. Each of the objectives is reviewed below, using the feedback obtained from the questionnaire and interviews as well as my own insights and observations on the practicum process and outcomes.

The full results (raw data) of the questionnaire are attached as **Table 1** on Page 112. Interview results are attached as **Table 2** on Page 120.

Exhibit A**WORKING AGREEMENT****For Coordinated Emergency Social Services**

BETWEEN:

The City of Winnipeg and

The Salvation Army, Manitoba and North West Ontario Division

1. Introduction

The purpose of this Working Agreement is to define the role and responsibilities, which The Salvation Army will undertake at the request of the City of Winnipeg, during an emergency. Additionally, the Agreement spells out the actions to be taken by the City of Winnipeg and The Salvation Army to support and sustain coordination and cooperative working relationships for effective emergency response. As such, this Working Agreement constitutes a statement of intention and does not include the making of any financial commitments by either party.

2. Background

Whereas by legislation of Manitoba's *Emergency Measures Act* and the *City of Winnipeg Act*, the City of Winnipeg is responsible for planning, organizing and providing prompt and effective response and evacuation services to reduce the consequences of an emergency to persons and property;

And whereas the Mission Statement of The Salvation Army is:

The Salvation Army, an international movement, is an evangelical part of the Universal Christian Church. Its message is based on the Bible. Its ministry is motivated by the love of God. Its mission is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and to meet human needs in His name without discrimination.

And whereas the parties agree that joint emergency planning, training, familiarity across organizations and communication systems for sharing information crucial to emergency response, promote ongoing cooperation and coordination;

Have created this Working Agreement believing that a coordinated emergency response promotes faster recovery, reduced personal suffering and community disruption, and lower emergency costs.

3. Definitions

In this Working Agreement:

“emergency” means a present or imminent situation or condition that requires prompt action to prevent or limit

- a) the loss of life; or
- b) harm or damage to the safety, health or welfare of people; or
- c) damage to the property or environment.

“emergency social services” means a planned emergency response organization designed to provide those basic services considered essential for the immediate and continuing well-being of persons affected by an emergency and comprised of clothing, lodging for homeless or evacuated persons, food services for evacuees, emergency workers and emergency volunteers, registration and inquiry services and personal services for emotional support to emergency victims.

“emergency food services” means a component of emergency social services designed to provide food for those who cannot feed themselves, or those without food or food preparation facilities; and emergency response workers and volunteers.

4. The Role of The Salvation Army

The Salvation Army serves those in need during times of emergency and provides services without discrimination, in the name of Jesus Christ.

When the City of Winnipeg determines that an emergency or other such conditions exist such that an emergency social services response may be required, the City of Winnipeg will decide when to call upon The Salvation Army, which will:

- a) provide emergency food services to emergency victims until they are lodged in alternate, temporary housing with access to regular food services (cooking facilities, local restaurants or congregate feeding facilities);
- b) provide emergency food services to emergency workers and emergency volunteers during the emergency response phase and at locations specified by the City of Winnipeg Chief of Emergency Feeding or his or her alternate;
- c) provide sufficient amounts of food to maintain a feeling of well-being; provide appropriate, safe food service; and seek to meet the special requirements of culturally diverse and high-risk groups, including infants, children, pregnant and nursing women, the elderly, diabetics, and emergency workers;
- d) maintain or improve their current capacity to provide food and refreshments for 200 persons within one hour of a request for emergency service;
- e) provide the required numbers of trained personnel and volunteers to prepare, deliver and serve food and refreshments;
- f) maintain an internal call-out system for Salvation Army officers, lay and volunteer personnel.

5. Additional Assistance

Salvation Army personnel may also be called upon to assist the City of Winnipeg in the following areas of the City’s Emergency Social Services Plan:

- emergency clothing services
- personal services to provide care and comfort
- volunteer coordination

6. **The City of Winnipeg Will:**

- a) appoint a Chief of Emergency Feeding within the Emergency Social Services Plan with responsibility for liaising with, and maintaining effective, cooperative working relationships with Salvation Army personnel responsible for Emergency Food services;
- b) include The Salvation Army in regular reviews of the Emergency Social Services Plan;
- c) provide access to the City's *Emergency Health and Social Services Training Program* for Salvation Army personnel;
- d) invite The Salvation Army to participate in the *Emergency Health and Social Services Training Program* by providing a segment of instruction to program participants on the emergency feeding component;
- e) include The Salvation Army in Emergency Social Services training exercises and practice call-outs;
- f) support the development and maintenance of a pre-planned, coordinated emergency response by providing personnel and appropriate resources necessary to undertake the actions delineated in the *Communication Plan* attached as Appendix 1 to this Working Agreement.
- g) submit on behalf of The Salvation Army, invoices for emergency feeding costs in cases of coverage by a private insurer or corporation or for which an Emergency Financial Assistance Program may apply, unless the program or insurer allows The Salvation Army to submit invoices directly.

7. **Term**

This Working Agreement comes into effect on _____, 2000 and shall continue unless terminated in accordance with Paragraph 8. Both parties agree to jointly review the Working Agreement at least once every two years, the first review due by December 31, 2002. The Public Aid Coordinator will be responsible for calling the review of the Working Agreement. Following the review, the parties will affix an appendix indicating the review and any necessary minor revisions and updates, which are not inconsistent with clauses of the Agreement and signed by the Public Aid Coordinator for the City of Winnipeg and the Divisional Commander for The Salvation Army.

8. **Termination**

Either party may, for any reason, terminate this Working Agreement, in a time of "non-emergency", by giving sixty days' notice in writing to the other party. When an "emergency" as defined in "The Emergency Measures Act" arises prior to and continues beyond the term of notification to terminate, the parties shall continue to be bound by this Agreement until emergency conditions have ceased.

9. **Dispute Mechanism**

During an emergency, should disagreement arise on terms of this Agreement that cannot be quickly resolved between the Chief of Emergency Feeding and the Divisional Commander or his designate, the City of Winnipeg, Public Aid Coordinator shall have final authority to interpret and decide upon a course of action favourable to the needs of emergency victims and applicable to both parties.

Mayor Glen Murray
City of Winnipeg

Colonel Ray Moulton
Divisional Commander
Salvation Army, Manitoba and
North West Ontario Division

Appendix 1

Believing that inter-organizational communication is key to developing and maintaining an effective, coordinated emergency services response, the City of Winnipeg and The Salvation Army have developed and agree to abide by the provisions made within this

COMMUNICATION PLAN**Pre-Emergency Phase**

1. The City of Winnipeg represented by the Public Aid Coordinator will meet at least twice annually with The Salvation Army represented by the Coordinator of Emergency Services. Along with their team members and invited personnel appropriate to the planned agenda, meeting members will review and update emergency plans and prepare exercises and training events to enhance the state of emergency preparedness. At least once annually, the agenda will include a review of plans for the media relations component of emergency response with a view to coordinating emergency public information efforts associated with an emergency.
2. The City of Winnipeg and The Salvation Army will distribute copies of their respective emergency plans and call-out lists to one another and promptly notify alternate parties of updates and changes as they occur.
3. In the event of sufficient forewarning of a pending emergency, the Public Aid Coordinator will convene a meeting with The Salvation Army to prepare action plans.
4. When the Public Aid Coordinator convenes an inter-agency meeting of Emergency Social Services agencies, The Salvation Army will be invited to attend and participate on sub-committee(s) appropriate to their emergency services role.

Emergency Response Phase

1. The Chief of Emergency Feeding and the Coordinator of Emergency Services will ensure daily communication between parties for coordinating the emergency response.
2. A dedicated, non-public phone line will be established between Emergency Command Centres established by Emergency Social Services and The Salvation Army.
3. The Salvation Army and City of Winnipeg Emergency Social Services will attend one another's Emergency Command Centre meetings as required.
4. The Salvation Army will attend the City of Winnipeg Emergency Operations Centre at the invitation of the Public Aid Coordinator.
5. The Salvation Army will be copied on all Emergency Social Services correspondence related to their emergency response role.
6. Regular and frequent communication will occur through the emergency recovery stage.

Post-Emergency Phase

1. The Public Aid Coordinator will convene a meeting(s) with The Salvation Army to debrief emergency response efforts and jointly identify lessons learned and areas of strength and deficiency.
2. Both parties agree to resolve any issues of disagreement that may have arisen during the response phase and to work toward strengthening emergency plans and activities that were deemed as deficient in response.
3. Parties will share public reports related to the emergency social services response with one another.

Exhibit B

WORKING AGREEMENT
For Coordinated Emergency Social Services

BETWEEN:

The City of Winnipeg

and

The Canadian Red Cross, Winnipeg and North/East Regions

1. Introduction

The purpose of this Working Agreement is to define the role and responsibilities, which the Canadian Red Cross will undertake at the request of the City of Winnipeg, during an emergency. Additionally, the Agreement spells out the actions to be taken by the City of Winnipeg and the Canadian Red Cross to support and sustain coordination and cooperative working relationships for effective emergency response. As such, this Working Agreement constitutes a statement of intention and does not include the making of any financial commitments by either party.

2. Background

Whereas by legislation of Manitoba's *Emergency Measures Act* and the *City of Winnipeg Act*, the City of Winnipeg is responsible for planning, organizing and providing prompt and effective response and evacuation services to reduce the consequences of emergency to persons and property;

And whereas the Mission Statement of The Canadian Red Cross Society is:

The Canadian Red Cross Society is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and, together with over 175 national societies, we are focused on one strategic goal: to improve the situation of the most vulnerable. We help people deal with situations that threaten their survival and safety, their security and well-being, their human dignity, in Canada and around the world. In common with Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around the world, the Canadian Red Cross is committed to upholding and advocating the Seven Fundamental Principles (Appendix 1).

And whereas the parties agree that joint emergency planning, training, familiarity across organizations and communication systems for sharing information crucial to emergency response, promote ongoing cooperation and coordination;

Have created this Working Agreement believing that a coordinated emergency response promotes faster recovery, reduced personal suffering and community disruption, and lower emergency costs.

3. Definitions

In this Working Agreement:

“emergency” means a present or imminent situation or condition that requires prompt action to prevent or limit

- a) the loss of life; or
- b) harm or damage to the safety, health or welfare of people; or
- c) damage to the property or environment.

“emergency social services” means a planned emergency response organization designed to provide those basic services considered essential for the immediate and continuing well-being of persons affected by an emergency, and comprised of clothing, lodging for homeless or evacuated persons, food services for evacuees, emergency workers and volunteers, registration and inquiry services and personal services for emotional support to emergency victims.

“registration and inquiry” (R + I) means pre-planned, organized services for the purposes of registering people who have been evacuated as a result of an emergency. Registration and Inquiry has two primary objectives: 1) to collect accurate and reliable information and answer inquiries regarding the location of emergency victims; and 2) to assist in reuniting separated families as quickly as conditions permit.

4. The Canadian Red Cross Will:

When the City of Winnipeg determines that an emergency or other such conditions exist such that an emergency social services response may be required, the City of Winnipeg will decide when to call upon the Canadian Red Cross, which will:

- a) organize and direct the Registration and Inquiry services during an emergency;
- b) provide, when required, Central Registry / Inquiry Services;
- c) respond with an R + I contingent within one-half hour of an emergency call-out and respond with a “Ready Kit” stocked with supplies sufficient for 500 registrants;
- d) provide trained personnel and volunteers to conduct Registration and Inquiry services;
- e) provide additional Canadian Red Cross personnel and appropriate volunteers to assist with the Registration and Inquiry response to the emergency as required;
- f) maintain an internal call-out system for Canadian Red Cross personnel and volunteers;

During non-emergency conditions, the Canadian Red Cross will:

- aa) provide access of appropriate City of Winnipeg personnel to Registration and Inquiry training programs;
- bb) invite the City of Winnipeg to participate in Canadian Red Cross simulated emergency training exercises.

5. **The City of Winnipeg Will:**

- a) appoint a Chief of Registration and Inquiry within the Emergency Social Services Plan with responsibility for liaising with, and maintaining effective, cooperative working relationships with Canadian Red Cross personnel responsible for Registration and Inquiry services;
- b) include the Canadian Red Cross in regular reviews of the Emergency Social Services Plan;
- c) provide access to the City's *Emergency Health and Social Services Training Program* for Canadian Red Cross personnel;
- d) invite the Canadian Red Cross to participate in the *Emergency Health and Social Services Training Program* by providing a segment of instruction to program participants on the Registration and Inquiry component;
- e) include the Canadian Red Cross in Emergency Social Services training exercises and practice call-outs;
- f) support the development and maintenance of a pre-planned, coordinated emergency response by providing personnel and appropriate resources necessary to undertake the actions delineated in the *Communication Plan* attached as Appendix 2 to this Working Agreement.
- g) submit on behalf of the Canadian Red Cross, invoices for emergency Registration and Inquiry costs in cases of coverage by a private insurer or corporation or for which a Disaster Financial Assistance Program may apply, unless the program or insurer allows the Canadian Red Cross to submit invoices directly.

6. **Confidentiality and Ownership of Information**

While this Working Agreement is in effect, and at all times thereafter, the Canadian Red Cross and any officers, employees or agents of the Canadian Red Cross:

- a) shall treat as confidential all information, data, reports, documents and materials acquired or to which access has been given in the course of, or incidental to, the performance of this Agreement;
- b) shall not disclose, or permit to be disclosed to any person, corporation or organization such information, data, reports, documents or materials except in the performance of meeting the primary objectives of Registration and Inquiry services;
- c) shall enjoy joint ownership with the City of Winnipeg of all reports, information, data, research, documents, photographs and materials discovered or produced by the Canadian Red Cross in the performance of this Agreement, the use of which is solely restricted to meeting the two primary objectives of Registration and Inquiry unless the joint owners agree in writing to some other purpose that would be favourable to the interests of emergency victims;
- d) shall store and safeguard the confidentiality of such information, data, reports, documents or materials.

7. **Term**

This Working Agreement comes into effect on _____, 2000 and shall continue unless terminated in accordance with Paragraph 8. Both parties agree to jointly review the Working Agreement at least once every two years, the first review due by December 31, 2002. The Public Aid Coordinator will be responsible for calling the review of the Working Agreement. Following the review, the parties will affix an appendix indicating the review and any necessary, minor revisions and updates which are not inconsistent with clauses of the Agreement and signed by the Public Aid Coordinator for the City of Winnipeg and the Regional Director for the Canadian Red Cross.

8. **Termination**

Either party may, for any reason, terminate this Working Agreement, in a time of "non-emergency", by giving sixty days' notice in writing to the other party. When an "emergency" as defined in "The Emergency Measures Act" arises prior to and continues beyond the term of notification to terminate, the parties shall continue to be bound by this Agreement until emergency conditions have ceased.

9. **Dispute Mechanism**

During an emergency, should disagreement arise on terms of this Agreement that cannot be quickly resolved between the Chief of Registration and Inquiry and the Coordinator of Disaster Services, the Public Aid Coordinator and the Regional Director shall attempt to resolve the dispute; if this is not possible in a timely fashion, the Public Aid Coordinator shall have final authority to interpret and decide upon a course of action favourable to the needs of emergency victims and applicable to both parties.

Mayor Glen Murray
City of Winnipeg

Judith Weaver Wright
Regional Director
Canadian Red Cross
Winnipeg and North/East Regions

Appendix 1

**The Fundamental Principles
of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement**

humanity	The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.
impartiality	It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
neutrality	In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
independence	The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.
voluntary service	It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.
unity	There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
universality	The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.

The Fundamental Principles were proclaimed by the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna, 1965. This is the revised text contained in the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted by the XXVth International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1986.

Appendix 2

Believing that inter-organizational communication is key to developing and maintaining an effective, coordinated emergency services response, the City of Winnipeg and the Canadian Red Cross have developed and agree to abide by the provisions made within this

COMMUNICATION PLAN**Pre-Emergency Phase**

1. The City of Winnipeg represented by the Public Aid Coordinator will meet at least three times annually with the Canadian Red Cross represented by the Coordinator of Emergency Services. Along with their team members and invited personnel appropriate to the planned agenda, meeting members will review and update emergency plans and prepare exercises and training events to enhance the state of emergency preparedness. At least once annually, the agenda will include a review of plans for the media relations component of emergency response with a view to coordinating emergency public information efforts associated with a emergency.
2. The City of Winnipeg and the Canadian Red Cross will distribute copies of their respective emergency plans and call-out lists to one another and promptly notify alternate parties of updates and changes as they occur.
3. In the event of sufficient forewarning of a pending emergency, the Public Aid Coordinator will convene a meeting with the Canadian Red Cross to prepare action plans.
4. When the Public Aid Coordinator convenes an inter-agency meeting of Emergency Social Services agencies, the Canadian Red Cross will be invited to attend and participate on sub-committee(s) appropriate to their emergency services role.

Emergency Response Phase

1. The Chief of Registration and Inquiry and the Coordinator of Emergency Services will ensure daily communication between parties for coordinating the emergency response.
2. A dedicated, non-public phone line will be established between Emergency Command Centres established by Emergency Social Services and the Canadian Red Cross.
3. The Canadian Red Cross and City of Winnipeg Emergency Social Services will attend one another's Emergency Command Centre meetings as required.
4. The Canadian Red Cross will attend the City of Winnipeg Emergency Operations Centre at the invitation of the Public Aid Coordinator.
5. The Canadian Red Cross will be copied on all Emergency Social Services correspondence related to their emergency response role.

Post-Emergency Phase

1. The Public Aid Coordinator will convene a meeting(s) with the Canadian Red Cross to debrief emergency response efforts and jointly identify lessons learned and areas of strength and deficiency.
2. Both parties agree to resolve any issues of disagreement that may have arisen during the response phase and to work toward strengthening emergency plans and activities that were deemed as deficient in response.
3. Parties will share public reports related to the emergency social services response with one another.

Evaluative Measures

After the Working Agreements were concluded, I administered questionnaires to twelve administrators involved in the negotiations process. The nine returned are shown in **Table 1**. Administrators returned two each from The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross. Two were returned by ESS staff involved in negotiation meetings with the Red Cross and another two by ESS staff involved in negotiations with The Salvation Army. The Public Aid Coordinator who attended and participated in all negotiations returned the ninth questionnaire.

Overall, the questionnaire gauged participants' satisfaction with the agreement, whether the negotiations helped to improve working relationships between ESS and partner agencies, and the facilitator's use of open communication, cooperation, and respect during negotiations. These themes are related to my skill and service objectives, which are explored below.

I also conducted interviews with five key administrators who were involved in negotiating the Working Agreements, namely the ESS Public Aid Coordinator, and two administrators each from the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army. Raw data from the interviews is shown in **Table 2**. Interview questions were designed to gauge whether participants considered whether we had corrected emergency plan deficiencies and improved our state of preparedness. A second set of questions explored whether administrators considered their organizational autonomy to be threatened by a contractual relationship with the City of Winnipeg. These themes are related to my service and research objectives; interview responses are analyzed below, in relation to each of those.

Evaluation of Professional Learning

Each of the objectives I established at the outset of my practicum are examined using the feedback obtained from questionnaires and interviews as well as from my own insights and observations on the process and outcomes.

Skill Objectives

I achieved all three of my skill objectives:

- 1. Develop an ability to negotiate mutually satisfactory, inter-agency agreements.*

All nine questionnaire respondents consider the Agreement to be satisfactory and all nine identify the variety of interpersonal and knowledge-based skills I used to arrive at the end product. Satisfaction with the Agreement is expressed in terms of having met agency objectives, being consistent with organizational missions, providing a sound framework for a coordinated emergency response and as spelling out processes we will now employ to further our joint plans and goals. Despite the fact that we have an outstanding (financial) issue with the Red Cross, the Regional Director considers the Agreement satisfactory, reflecting confidence that we will resolve the issue.

One Salvation Army response credited me with providing “excellent leadership to the project”. This was reflected in other comments through recognition of the work I did to facilitate consensus, to ensure all members had ample opportunity to contribute and participate and to keep everyone informed with accurate and timely meeting notes.

2. *Demonstrate an ability to apply a strategy of open communication, cooperation, and respect to develop a sense of trust between negotiating parties.*

Prior to each negotiation meeting with The Salvation Army and the Red Cross, I prepared an informal meeting agenda for the approval of participants (it was always approved).

Additionally, I set personal objectives for the meeting. Those personal objectives required that I pay conscious attention to process, to ensure that I was using those interpersonal and knowledge-based skills suggested in the literature as essential to successful negotiations. I routinely sought to identify common interests, constructively confront issues that blocked our progress, and to engage all the participants in our discussions. Questionnaire responses indicate that the attributes and skills I was trying to demonstrate, were both recognized and viewed as being beneficial to the process. Taking examples from ESS, Salvation Army, and Red Cross questionnaire responses, the key process skills I used during the negotiation process included:

- Preparing and proposing agenda items and processes for group consideration;
- Ensuring everyone's ideas get identified (brainstorming exercise) and subsequently fully explored;
- Record and distribute meeting notes and draft agreements for input, correction and feedback;
- Routinely use phrases such as, How does that affect your ability to... What impact would that have on... Would that cause any problem...

- Devoted time to gaining an understanding and knowledge of organizations, their work and purpose, leading to a sense of trust in relationships;
- Maintained a “problem-solving” rather than “blaming” approach to past interorganizational problems.

3. *Apply the theoretical concepts of the political economy model to the pragmatic task of coordinating organizational efforts for emergency social services.*

Political economy theory points out how organizations bargain for resources they require. Coming from a position of limited power, they “contract” for those resources while attempting to limit their organizational vulnerability. The objectives I set for myself prior to each negotiation meeting always included the need to remain sensitive to the organizational needs of agencies having to “bargain” with the City for access to disaster clients and for the legitimation authority we controlled. I attempted to ensure that what we (ESS) were seeking in an agreement did not threaten their organizational flexibility; either by becoming overly restrictive with performance requirements, or attempting to control the way they conducted their work.

Hasenfeld notes that a key component of maintaining the autonomous nature of organizations involved in contracting is to offer services that are consistent with their primary interests. Questionnaire responses from administrators of both social agencies note that the Agreement we developed is in fact, consistent with their organizational mandates and mission. Salvation Army’s Director of Residential Services specifically notes that the agreement is clear on the City’s expectations but is flexible enough not to

place City controls or restrictions that disallow other emergency response roles as dictated by circumstances. Overall, the Agreements reached and the feedback received, both indicate that the process used, guided by political economy concepts, was successfully applied.

Service Objectives

The first two service objectives were met. The third was achieved in part

- 1. Develop draft written agreements between the City of Winnipeg ESS and two partner organizations, outlining: i) the authority to act under the City of Winnipeg Emergency Plan; ii) emergency roles and responsibilities; iii) expectations; and iv) terms and duration of the agreements.*

The draft Working Agreements have been concluded in a manner consistent with this service objective, and as indicated above, in a manner satisfactory to all parties. As indicated by questionnaire respondents, roles and responsibilities have been formalized, commitments and expectations of both the City and its partners are clear, and formal procedures have been instituted for ongoing communication and coordination. Red Cross' Coordinator of Disaster Services notes that the Agreement gives both the City and the Red Cross "a solid framework for disaster response in the City of Winnipeg." Terms are clearly stated and agreed to by all parties, a mechanism to resolve dispute during disaster response phase has been agreed to, providing the City's Public Aid Coordinator with final authority, and terms have been established for regular joint reviews of the Working Agreements.

2. *Make improvements to Emergency Social Services capacity and response ability in the City of Winnipeg, by correcting ESS interorganizational deficiencies evident in 1997 flood response operations.*

Interorganizational deficiencies evidenced in the 1997 flood response were characterized by a lack of clarity and agreement respecting agency roles and responsibilities, areas of jurisdiction, internal agency procedures that were inconsistent with emergency response requirements for local administrators to remain in charge of emergency response work, and a critical lack of mechanisms for recognizing and sharing information essential to disaster response efforts. While developing the Working Agreements, administrative staff of the City's Emergency Social Services component held candid discussions with administrators of the Canadian Red Cross and of The Salvation Army regarding all of the interorganizational deficiencies of the 1997 flood response. Reviewing and correcting "flood problems" (as detailed in Chapter Four) was an integral part of building our Working Agreements. We jointly discussed and explored each of the interorganizational issues that arose during flood response, determined the appropriate corrective action suggested by disaster management literature, and built those new procedures into our Agreement and work processes.

All five of the administrators I interviewed indicated that their organization was in an improved state of emergency preparedness because of the Agreements and the work that went into their creation. They point to a better understanding of the City's expectations, improvements made to their own emergency preparedness plans, and a much sharper clarity regarding who will do what and how. Moreover, as one interviewee pointed out,

“we have significantly enhanced communications with them – the key to a more coordinated response – and have plans for maintaining those improved systems.”

3. Implement KPMG recommendations to develop a community approach to emergency management by involving ESS partners in various aspects of emergency planning and preparedness.

In post-Agreement interviews, (Table 2) I asked five administrators whether they considered we had achieved this KPMG recommendation. I concur with their unanimous responses: we are on our way to reaching a community approach. We have developed coordination mechanisms between some agencies. We have laid the groundwork for sharing resources, coordinating plans, and developing joint training and plan exercise opportunities. However, to fully create a “community approach” we need to extend that groundwork beyond the dyads created between ESS and The Salvation Army / the Canadian Red Cross.

During negotiation discussions, administrators from both The Salvation Army and Canadian Red Cross suggested the next step in the development of a wider community approach to emergency management in the area of Emergency Social Services. That approach involves the creation of a network of local agencies and government departments involved in emergency social services response. In response to the recommendations made, the Public Aid Coordinator has already taken the first step in this direction. He has invited numerous local agencies, departments, and organizations that have been involved in some measure of emergency social services, to attend a June 2000 meeting to explore the benefits and perceived need for coordinating ESS efforts through

an inter-agency committee. More importantly, this idea, borne out of our discussions is only one of many that ESS and its partners are currently and actively working on.

Research Objectives

The literature tested in both research (study) areas is supported by my findings.

- 1) *Determine whether our work in creating agreements supports the disaster management literature. That literature reports that, an improved state of emergency preparedness results in an improved emergency response, serving to reduce community disruption and lower disaster costs.*

Whether or not our Emergency Social Services response activities will be faster, better coordinated, and more effective, may only be determined with some certainty the next time we are faced with a disaster. Disaster management literature however, does tell us that we can indirectly assess our level of preparedness, through the existence of disaster plans (Drabek, 1986), emergency preparedness training and exercises (Gillespie and Streeter, 1987) and mechanisms for coordinating interorganizational responses (Hightower and Coutu, 1996). In turn, better levels of preparedness reduce the disruption of disaster to the community (Banerjee and Gillespie, 1994).

Through our work over the past several months, we have created a plan and mechanisms to sustain a coordinated, interorganizational response for emergency social services. As noted above, this is the beginning of a community approach; we are proceeding with plans to expand the level of coordination to include organizations that have in past, only come together in response to a disaster. We have begun to include our partners, the Canadian Red Cross and The Salvation Army in our Emergency Health and

Social Services training program in which they will soon become program instructors for segments on their role and function. We have initial plans in place for a joint disaster exercise as well as numerous other tasks identified during our discussions that we are jointly working on.

ESS, Red Cross and Salvation Army administrators each feel that their own organization is in an improved state of readiness. Jointly, we are assured by the work we have undertaken, that we are at a more advanced level of emergency preparedness than before we began the task of meeting to negotiate agreements. On the next occasion we react to a disaster, together we will take less time to respond, we will know better what to expect and be prepared for, we will operate more cohesively, and we will share resources and information more effectively. Based upon the literature noted above, these improvements suggest that we can say with anecdotal certainty, that we will reduce the costs associated with our response and we will reduce the disruptive effects of disaster upon those we serve.

- 2) *Determine whether political economy theory is supported or not, with regard to organizational resistance to coordination and how that may be reduced. Political economy theory postulates that to preserve organizational autonomy, agencies develop countervailing powers and adopt strategies of cooperation. These strategies would seem to mask resistance to coordination, if indeed it exists.*

I had hypothesized that resistance to a closer working relationship predicted by political economy theory would be minimal or non-existent in my work / study. I based that hypothesis on the assumption that both the Red Cross and Salvation Army would not

resist entering into a closer working relationship that benefited them by securing their role in the City's Emergency plan, providing them with an organizational resource unavailable elsewhere. I was correct in the prediction, partially correct in the reason.

In mid-April 2000 I attended a luncheon at the Winnipeg Convention Centre hosted by The Salvation Army and intended to honour some of their many volunteers. Manitoba's Lieutenant-Governor, the provincial Minister of Family Services and Winnipeg's Deputy Mayor sat at the head table among the most senior officers of The Salvation Army. Among those in attendance, were hundreds of the City's business elite, government administrators, and senior police officials. My observations confirmed what I had been begun to feel at that initial meeting with the Army's Divisional Commander, that The Salvation Army was a very powerful organization, with a community reputation that commanded the respect and admiration of Manitobans and their leaders.

Their countervailing powers, Hasenfeld's term for an organization's ability to control exchange relations, are greater than Emergency Social Services' organizational powers assumed through its legislative authority to deliver services to disaster victims. Unlike my earlier assertion (page 20), Emergency Social Services would not be able to control or curtail access to disaster victims to the exclusion of The Salvation Army. If it chose to do so, that organization could provide services without the "legitimation" conferred by the City's ESS authority. They are not dependent upon the City of Winnipeg to act. Given their community standing and reputation, their authority and legitimacy to act in an emergency response would not be questioned by community or government authorities. (For the most part, they operated quite independent of ESS in the 1997 flood.)

In my interview with the Salvation Army's Coordinator of Disaster Services, he confirmed that the organization would continue to serve disaster victims even if we had been unable to reach an agreement with them. (He noted however, that their level of preparedness has been improved through our work and that our joint emergency services are enhanced by the coordination our Agreement provides.) Although there were no signs of resistance to organizational coordination demonstrated by Salvation Army administrators throughout our series of meetings / negotiations, the Coordinator indicated that he was unsure whether we might have concluded our agreement had ESS not allowed the clause respecting the Army's offer of "Additional Services". Had we not taken the time to explore that issue and find our common interests and an acceptable resolution, I may have witnessed some display of organizational resistance. Perhaps too, I may have seen some demonstration of how countervailing muscle powers might be flexed, as Salvation Army personnel were as aware as us, that ESS has few, if any, strong alternatives to having them deliver our emergency feeding services.

Like The Salvation Army, the Canadian Red Cross also chose to adopt a strategy of cooperation, willingly and enthusiastically entering into negotiations to reach agreement on roles, responsibilities, and working relationships. Unlike The Salvation Army, ESS is not as dependent upon the Red Cross; alternatives to having that organization conduct Registration and Inquiry functions could be more easily found. Their countervailing powers are not as evident as are those of The Salvation Army. That may be in part due to a sense that the Canadian Red Cross has lost some degree of community support through the process of public inquiries and the subsequent loss of Canada's blood distribution system. Although not identified as such in discussions with

Red Cross administrators, this may have played some part in motivating the organization to secure arrangements to maintain a traditional area of their work.

During interviews, both the Salvation Army's Executive Director of Residential and Community Services and the Regional Director of the Canadian Red Cross made comments in support of political economy's theory of organizational resistance to coordination (Table 2). They indicated that for reasons such as loss of identity, a mismatch of organizational beliefs, or a threat to financial security, agencies would choose not to enter into a partnership considered potentially detrimental to organizational well being. Because no such threats applied to the working relationships ESS proposed and subsequently worked out with the Red Cross and Salvation Army, these were not impediments. In fact, our Agreements are fully in sync with our partners' organizational missions, enhancing rather than threatening agency goals and objectives.

Political economy theory is supported. Social service agencies will resist close working ties when those threaten organizational autonomy. Adopting a strategy of cooperation, of linking services with other providers is acceptable when it achieves organizational benefits and resources that cannot be obtained by the organization working on its own. Both The Salvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross determined that the benefits they gained through our arrangement to coordinate emergency social services outweighed the minimal, potential organizational costs they might accrue. Hence, we reached an agreement, which satisfies the interests of all parties and acts in just the manner Hasenfeld suggests it should, to coordinate and integrate the social service network for the benefit of clients.

CHAPTER SIX

Critique of the Practicum Experience

I am pleased with the overall process and outcomes of the practicum. Theory has guided my practice through a study of disaster management literature and the political economy of human service organizations. The guide helped to clarify the requirements of coordinated emergency response efforts, through a contractual agreement negotiated in the pre-disaster phase that articulates who will do what and how, as well as how crucial information will be shared with those who require it. Understanding why and how human service organizations typically resist working closely together, allowed me to predict and avoid barriers to our progress. Finally, the process suggested for successful negotiating was key to achieving what we did.

The occasion to work on a concerted basis and to a defined end with administrators from other organizations provided the opportunity to test and apply theory, learn from other professionals' perspectives, and to develop working relationships and understandings critical to the effectiveness of our emergency social services plan. In one of my post-agreement interviews, one respondent reflecting on the work we did stated that, "the whole process we went through, was an investment." (Timmerman, June 2000) All parties expect that investment will pay off big dividends; we also recognize we must nurture and manage the investment on an ongoing basis.

Selecting a participant observer study approach was critical to the work I undertook; it allowed me to establish the personal relationships necessary to successful negotiating and to begin to forge the key ingredient of trust between emergency partners. The approach also shaped the kind of data I could collect regarding the study's processes

and outcomes. The use of a questionnaire and informal interviews as evaluative feedback measures was consistent with a participant observer approach. They allowed for candid perceptions from experienced, expert administrators respecting their views of the process we engaged in, the products we developed and how their own, and others' organizations work together.

With respect to what I learned about the political economy perspective, prior to beginning work on the practicum, I had a theoretical understanding of how organizations operate and secure the organizational resources and elements they require. The practicum experience provided the opportunity to operationalize political economy concepts of coordinating social services through a strategy of contracting. I worked with purpose to avoid contractual terms that might limit organizational autonomy or diminish satisfaction with the agreement by expecting commitment to terms not consonant with organizations' missions. Interview and questionnaire responses indicate that I did avoid those pitfalls, and that doing so was instrumental in reaching consensus on two agreements that satisfy all parties.

Over the past twenty years of my career I have fulfilled an Emergency Social Services role on numerous occasions. Routinely, I debriefed with colleagues on a departmental and inter-departmental level on what went well and what needed improvements following an emergency response. Almost as routinely, we noted with exasperation that other agencies and organizations were out-of-sync with our efforts. Little was done, or even suggested, regarding the need to coordinate efforts across organizations. Disaster management literature states emphatically that we were not alone in this regard.

My practicum experience provided me with some indication why this may be so. Simply put, coordinating organizational efforts takes a great deal of time, effort and commitment. And although we have achieved a great deal, we will only be successful at maintaining our current high level of emergency preparedness, by continuing to devote the necessary time, commitment, and effort to our working relationships and our familiarity with, and trust in organizational capacities. Emergency preparedness is an ongoing process.

Implications of the Practicum

Learning from the process and outcomes can be applied to other, similar situations. Winnipeg Emergency Social Services can develop working agreements with two other partner organizations: the Province of Manitoba, Department of Family Services, and the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority. Each organization has staff resources that are critical to the personal services component of an effective ESS response.

I anticipate that in both these cases, organizational issues will be different from those encountered with the non-profit sector organizations worked with to date. I expect that finding motivating factors that will bring them to the bargaining table may be more difficult. They are not dependent upon the City of Winnipeg to act in the event of disaster; their own power, organizational legitimacy and resource base is greater than that of the City's ESS component. From the onset, we will need to convince them of the need for a coordinated emergency response and of the worthy nature of devoting energies to this endeavor. Although these initial efforts will differ from what was done in this

practicum, the process of meeting, defining objectives, issues for exploration, and barriers to be overcome, will be as similar and as critical to success in those forums as it was in the ones written of here.

Through the work undertaken during this Practicum, Emergency Social Services has led the way in implementing the KPMG Consulting Report (1998) recommendations for clarifying roles and responsibilities of emergency organization partners, and developing a community approach to emergency management in the city. Those recommendations were made to the City of Winnipeg, not to be confined to only one sector of the City's Emergency Plan.

The City of Winnipeg Emergency Program Coordinator has reviewed the Working Agreements created by Emergency Social Services. He noted that through balanced, flexible agreements with defined avenues for communication, we have effectively eliminated the organizational confusion and duplication of efforts, seen so frequently in the early stages of disaster response (Hull, June 2000). These agreements and how they were reached will be shared with the entire City of Winnipeg Emergency Preparedness Coordinating Committee. Our Agreements will be presented with a promotion message regarding the need for these kinds of coordination efforts to be expanded into all of our emergency sectors.

In the end, our negotiation process and the Working Agreements we produced were successful as measured in terms of participant perceptions. City of Winnipeg, Salvation Army, and Red Cross administrators are unanimous in our confidence that we are better prepared for the eventual day when disaster again strikes our community. The real test of our efforts will occur at that time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Angus Reid Group, 1997. Survey For Residents Of Flood-Affected Households & Businesses. Final Report. Submitted to: City of Winnipeg.
- Auf Der Heide, Erik, 1989. Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination. St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Company.
- Banerjee, Mahasweta M. and David F. Gillespie, 1994. "Linking Disaster Preparedness and Organizational Response Effectiveness." Journal of Community Practice. 1 (3) 1994.
- Bennett, Mark, December 1998. Personal Communication with the City of Winnipeg Emergency Program Coordinator.
- Buhr, Doug, November 1999. Personal Communication with City of Winnipeg Solicitor.
- Canada, 1991. The Brandon Plan: A Model For Comprehensive Emergency Management. Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada, 1993. Report To Parliament on the Operation of the Emergency Preparedness Act. April 1, 1992 - March 31, 1993.
- Compton, Beulah R. and Burt Galaway, 1994. Social Work Processes. (5th ed.) Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.
- Dean, John, Robert L. Eichorn and Lois R. Dean, "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods", in McCall, George J. and J.L. Simmons (Eds.), 1969. Issues In Participant Observation: A Text and Reader. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

- Drabek, Thomas E., 1986. Human System Responses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Dynes, Russell R., "Interorganizational Relations in Communities Under Stress" in Quarantelli, E.L. (Ed.) 1978. Disasters: Theory and Research. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Fisher, Roger and William Ury, 1991. Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. New York: Penguin Books.
- Egan, Joe, 1997. "Public Aid Response". Unpublished Debriefing Notes of the Emergency Social Services Public Aid Coordinator. City of Winnipeg.
- Egan, Joe, April 1999. Personal Communication with the City of Winnipeg Public Aid Coordinator.
- Gillespie, David F. "Coordinating Community Resources" in Drabek, Thomas E. and Gerard Hoetmer (Eds.), 1991. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government. Washington: International City Management Association.
- Gillespie, D.F. and C.L. Streeter, 1987. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Disaster Preparedness", in International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 5 (2) 1987.
- Gummer, Burton, 1990. The Politics of Social Administration: Managing Organizational Politics in Social Agencies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Hasenfeld, Yeheskel and Richard A. English, 1974. Human Service Organizations: A Book of Readings. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, 1983. Human Service Organizations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Health Canada, 1994. Emergency Clothing. Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

Hightower, Henry C. And Michel Coutu, "Coordinating Emergency Management: A Canadian Example" in Sylves, Richard T. and William L. Waugh, 1996. Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

Hoetmer, Gerard J. "Introduction" in Drabek, Thomas E. and Gerard J. Hoetmer, (Eds.) 1991. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government. Washington: International City Management Association.

Hull, Randy, June 2000. Personal Communication City of Winnipeg Emergency Program Coordinator.

Kartez, Jack D. and Michael K. Lindell, "Planning for Uncertainty", Journal of the American Planning Association. Autumn, 1987.

King, Leslie. "Flood '97". City of Winnipeg, Social Services Department Head Presentation: Speaking Notes. 1997.

KPMG Consulting, "Final Report - 1997 Flood Lessons Learned Surrounding the Emergency Response Decision Making Processes, City of Winnipeg". May, 1998.

Kochan, Thomas A. and Anil Verma, "Negotiations in Organizations: Blending Industrial Relations and Organizational Behavior Approaches" in Negotiations in Organizations, Max H. Bazerman and Roy J. Lewicki (Eds.) 1983. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

- Kreps, Gary A. "Organizing for Emergency Management" in Drabek, Thomas E. and Gerard Hoetmer, (Eds.) 1991. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government. Washington: International City Management Association.
- Kuban, Ron, 1998. "The Emergency Site Management System: A Doctrine Paper" Unpublished Insert in Course Training Material: "Emergency Site Management". Emergency Preparedness Canada.
- Kuban, Ron, 1993. "Crisis Management: Analysis of the Management of Communal Catastrophes". Edmonton: University of Alberta. PhD Thesis.
- Lewicki, Roy J. And Barbara B. Bunker, "Developing and Maintaining Trust in Working Relationships" in Kramer, Roderick M. And Tom R. Tyler (Eds.) 1996, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing.
- Manitoba. "The Emergency Measures Act". 1987. Queen's Printer.
- Manitoba Interagency Steering Committee on Emergency Social Services, December 1994. Emergency Social Services: Distance Education Guide.
- Manitoba Water Commission, March 1998. An Independent Review of the 1997 Red River Flood. Interim Report
- Meyer, John W. and W. Richard Scott, 1983. Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality. Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing.
- Mileti, Dennis, Thomas E. Drabek and J.Eugene Haas, 1975. Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective. University of Colorado.

- National Governor's Association, (1979). Comprehensive Emergency Management: A Governor's Guide. Washington D.C. Centre for Policy Research.
- Patti, Rino, "Forward" to Gummer, Burton, 1990. The Politics of Social Administration: Managing Organizational Politics in Social Agencies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Perry, Ronald.W. "Managing Disaster Response Operations" in Drabek, Thomas E. and Gerard J. Hoetmer, (Eds.) 1991. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government. Washington: International City Management Association.
- Quarantelli, E.L. "Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community Disasters", Journal of Disasters. 1997, 21 (1).
- Rubin, Jeffrey Z. and Bert R. Brown, 1975. The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation. New York: Academic Press, 1975.
- Spencer, Laura, 1989. Winning Through Participation: Meeting the Challenge of Corporate Change with the Technology of Participation. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall / Hunt Publishing Co.
- Streeter, Calvin L. "Interorganizational Relations and Organizational Effectiveness in Emergency Social Service Networks". Saint Louis: Washington University. PhD Dissertation. 1989.
- Timmerman, Don, June 2000. Interview with The Salvation Army Coordinator, Disaster Services.
- Waugh, William L. Jr. "Disaster Management for the New Millennium", in Sylves, Richard T. and William L. Waugh Jr. (Eds.) 1996. Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

Weaver Wright, Judith, June 2000. Interview with the Regional Director, Canadian Red Cross.

City of Winnipeg. "Emergency Plan". May 1999.

City of Winnipeg. "Community Services Skeleton Emergency Health and Social Services Plan". July 1999.

City of Winnipeg, 1998. "Flood of the Century: Report on the City of Winnipeg Response to the 1997 Flood."

Winnipeg Sun. July 21, 1997.

Zelinsky, Wilbur and Lesek A. Kosinski, 1991. The Emergency Evacuation of Cities. Savage, Maryland: Rowmand and Littlefield.

Community Services Departmental Steering Committee on Emergency Health and Social Services Department

PROJECT STATEMENT

To develop and implement an integrated Emergency Health and Social Services plan for the City of Winnipeg Community Services Department.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

1. **A working, skeleton plan in place by March 31, 1999**
 - After hours on-call system documented and operational including a rotating schedule and fan out system.
 - People in key positions understanding their roles and what to do in an emergency response.
 - Develop a plan of how to access key partners and specific individuals necessary to manage a response such as WCA, Manitoba Family Services, Salvation Army, etc.

2. **An expanded and revised document for Emergency Health and Social Services operations in coordination with overall City of Winnipeg Emergency Plans**
 - Develop components and framework for the document.
 - Review, revise, and expand existing written plan into coordinated, cohesive and comprehensive manual.
 - Review literature; research models and plans used by other large municipalities.

3. **Identified staff in key roles**
 - Develop description of key responsibility areas necessary for the operation of the emergency response plan and draft staff into positions for approval of Department Head.
 - Orient key personnel to their roles, provide training and written information on their responsibilities and tasks.
 - Have Chiefs of area operations select staff teams to work on the development of their respective areas of responsibility, complete written plans, ensure coordination with all other areas and an ability to respond accordingly to emergencies.

4. **Community Service staff trained in Emergency Health and Social Service operations**
 - Develop training / education strategy.
 - Identify existing training opportunities in emergency management and schedule appropriate personnel in.
 - Create and deliver training programs and training exercises for large numbers of department staff.

5. **Neighbourhood evacuation plans for the City of Winnipeg**
 - Updated maps and 1996 neighbourhood population statistics as part of Emergency Plan Manual.
 - Determine process and time frames for regularly updating and adding to this information as neighbourhood profiles are completed.
 - Identify care facilities, hospitals, senior's residences, schools, etc as part of neighbourhood maps.

6. **Cooperative coordinated working agreements with collateral agencies**
 - Clarify objectives, scope, and tasks of work requested of collateral agents.
 - Meet with agency personnel to determine their objectives, desires, and capacity and work out mutually satisfactory working agreements for emergency response.
 - Include agency in planning, training, exercising, revising their operational piece(s) of the plan in coordination with overall EHSS Plan.
7. **Working agreements for staff assistance from senior governments**
 - Clarify objectives, scope, parameters, and tasks of work requested of public sector agency staff.
 - Meet with government agency personnel to determine capacity, objectives, and willingness to work within the EHSS Plan.
 - Develop working agreements, specify conditions for call-out of staff from alternate public sector agencies, contact persons, etc., and operational plans for coordinated efforts.
8. **An established protocol with collateral agencies for small-scale emergency response**
 - Review and analyze existing contract with Salvation Army and determine if we should negotiate a renewal of the current contract that expires December 1999.
 - Review alternative organizations or agencies that could deliver the same, e.g. Red Cross - Calgary Model.
 - Develop, negotiate, and sign mutually satisfactory service contract.
9. **A working budget in support of EHSS operations**
 - Determine reasonable budget requirements for emergency response operations and secure same.
 - Develop vendor payment methods, materials, and procedures.
 - Develop expenditure recovery procedures. I.E. From senior governments, private businesses, etc.
10. **A working plan for hosting evacuees from outside Winnipeg**
 - Confirm Council's direction respecting the delivery of EHSS to evacuees from outside Winnipeg.
 - Review alternative means for the delivery of EHSS to emergency victims evacuated to Winnipeg.
 - Determine methods for complete documentation of all associated costs, revenue losses, etc to the Department while engaged in hosting activities.
11. **Operational plans for routine testing and continual improvement of emergency plans**
 - Develop and run emergency exercises to test the EHSS plan, document results and update and improve plans accordingly.
 - Engage in coordinated exercises with other City of Winnipeg Emergency Coordinators and their respective departments and roles. i.e. Police, Fire, Ambulance, Public Works.
 - Ensure that all operational groups routinely meet, review, update and revise their plans.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE for Purposes of Frank Caldwell's University of Manitoba Master of Social Work Degree Practicum Report

Please use a separate sheet to answer the questions listed below.

A Practicum Objective was to develop an ability to negotiate mutually satisfactory, inter-agency agreements.

1. Can you describe / list ways Frank attempted to make the agreement satisfactory to both parties. i.e. solicited input from both parties, sought clarification of issues.
2. Is the Agreement satisfactory to you? How:
 - Does it achieve objectives you established for an inter-agency agreement?
 - Is it consistent with your organization's mandate / mission?
 - Does it further the work of your organization? Etc.

Another Objective was to demonstrate an ability to apply a strategy of open communication, cooperation, and respect leading to the development of a sense of trust between negotiating parties.

3. How has this Agreement and the work done between organizations to achieve it, improved working relations between members of City of Winnipeg, Emergency Health and Social Services and Red Cross / Salvation Army? Describe how you think it may improve the way you work together in future.
4. Can you describe / provide examples of how Frank demonstrated open communication, cooperation, and respect?
5. Please make any additional comments related to the above referenced Practicum Objectives and Frank's contribution to achieving them. Feel free to describe any problems that arose.

Name (Optional)

APPENDIX B 1

QUESTIONNAIRE CONSENT FORM

I voluntarily consent to complete a questionnaire for Frank Caldwell with respect to the work he is doing to establish Working Agreements between City of Winnipeg Emergency Social Services and its partners, the Canadian Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

I understand this questionnaire is for his studies as part of his Practicum requirement for his Master of Social Work degree at the University of Manitoba. My agreement to complete this questionnaire is entirely voluntary. I understand that I am free to withhold my identity on the questionnaire or not to. I am also free to answer the questionnaire only partially, or to choose not to submit it. If I choose to submit it, I will forward it to a third party with whom I am confident, will forward the document to Mr. Caldwell without disclosing the identity of the originator.

Both the third party and Mr. Caldwell will maintain the confidentiality of the document by keeping it in a closed envelope and in a secure place in their respective offices.

I understand that Mr. Caldwell may use material from this questionnaire in his Practicum report and that I may be identified in that report if I identify myself on the questionnaire form. This Consent Form grants Mr. Caldwell that authorization.

I have been assured by Mr. Caldwell that I may receive a full copy or an executive summary (depending on my desire) of his Practicum report following its' completion.

My decision to complete this questionnaire is not influenced by my working relationship with Mr. Caldwell.

If I have any concerns about this questionnaire or about Mr. Caldwell's conduct, I am free to contact his University Advisor, Professor Pete Hudson, University of Manitoba Faculty of Social Work at phone number 474-9648.

Signed

Witness

Frank Caldwell (phone 986-2676)

Date

Appendix C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**Emergency Management**

The Post-Flood KPMG study (shared earlier) made two recommendations pertinent to Emergency Social Services:

- Consider clarifying the roles and responsibilities of all emergency organization partners by involving them in reviewing emergency plans (on an ongoing basis). Both authority and accountability for actions will flow from improved understanding in this regard. (From consensus within our group and from questionnaire responses, I'm confident we can say we achieved that between ESS and Salvation Army / Red Cross.)
- Consider developing a community approach to emergency management by involving the various partners in the planning and feedback components of the comprehensive plan. KPMG went on to note that the effectiveness and speed of decision-making are facilitated through relationships of trust, which are forged prior to an emergency.

1. *Would you consider we have achieved this objective? How / Why?*
2. *How do you think the issue of "trust" plays into decision-making in emergency preparedness and response?*
3. *Is your organization in an improved state of emergency preparedness? What indicators would you point to, to show that is the case?*

Inter-Organizational Coordination

Political Economy Theory provides a perspective on how human services organizations operate, compete and survive in a complex community system.

One thing the theory suggests is that organizations typically resist establishing close links with one another, because depending upon others for resources - information, funding, client base - exposes them to unwanted influences. So, instead of making themselves vulnerable and risk losing flexibility, organizations resist efforts at substantive coordination.

1. *Was there any point prior to or during our meetings/negotiations, that you felt your organization (or ours) was hesitant or resistant to entering into a formal, contractual relationship wherein the City of Winnipeg would be to some extent, in charge of how you conduct operations? Please expand – when did it occur? how was it characterized?*
2. *How was it reduced or eliminated (if it was)?*
3. *If there never were a perceived threat to organizational autonomy, how would you explain that?*

Appendix C 1**INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM**

I voluntarily consent to being interviewed by Frank Caldwell with respect to the work he is doing to establish Working Agreements between City of Winnipeg Emergency Social Services and its partners, the Canadian Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

I understand this interview is for his studies as part of his Practicum requirement for his Master of Social Work degree at the University of Manitoba. My participation in this interview is entirely voluntary. I understand that I am free to terminate the interview at any time. I also understand that Mr. Caldwell may use excerpts from this interview in his Practicum report and that I may be identified in that report. He has my permission to do so. I have been assured that I may receive a full copy or an executive summary of that report from Mr. Caldwell following its' completion.

My decision to participate in the interview is not influenced by my working relationship with Mr. Caldwell.

If I have any concerns about this interview or about Mr. Caldwell's conduct, I am free to contact his University Advisor, Professor Pete Hudson, University of Manitoba Faculty of Social Work at phone number 474-9648.

Signed

Witness

Frank Caldwell (phone 986-2676)

Date

Appendix D**February 23, 2000****Meeting Number 3**

Salvation Army: Captain Heather Darrach, Captain David Oldford, and Don Timmerman

EHSS: Frank Caldwell, Joe Egan, Bob Ashuk, and Jeff Minuk

We met at the City's Emergency Operations Centre; Emergency Coordinator Randy Hull provided a brief review of the EOC's features and function.

Our meeting was devoted to discussions / explanation of Salvation Army procedures and resources related to emergency management. Heather provided copies of Salvation Army's December 1999 Emergency Services Operations Manual which details organizational charts, key personnel and position descriptions for a Winnipeg area emergency response. The manual also lists Salvation Army's congregate facilities with a capacity to feed approximately 2600 persons and provide short-term accommodations for around 1,000.

As Heather, David and Don explained their fan-out and response procedures to small scale emergencies, a number of points were raised that speak to their capacity and resources, as well as issues that require further follow-up. Some of these points are listed below:

- Salvation Army responds regularly to calls from Emergency Response Services (Fire and ambulance) and/or Police requests.
- Their Mobile Emergency Vehicle (positioned at a local fire station) is staffed by retired firefighters. The vehicle carries about 10 blankets (access to 500 blankets can be had on a moment's notice), emergency mats for sleeping (access to 200) and food and refreshments for up to 200 persons within one half-hour.
- Another Service Vehicle is used daily for mobile feeding programs and could be made available in the event of a larger scale disaster.
- Family Services has not replaced the \$20,000.00 grant the City provided for after-hours services (an issue Salvation Army hopes to address), however, has been re-imbursing for the costs of goods and services provided when an Income Security application is taken. This includes recent provision of food and accommodations to persons displaced over night because of a police standoff.
- Salvation Army's after-hours capacity to provide services extends to about 20 "cases" from a single event, after which their "regular social services" system may become overwhelmed, requiring an emergency social service response.
- City of Winnipeg needs to clarify and confirm with Manitoba Family Services that direct goods / service costs to small-scale emergency victims are solely the responsibility of Manitoba under their Income

Security program. Apart from staffing costs that are incurred by assisting in emergency response, City costs for goods and services provided to disaster victims would be incurred when a state of local emergency exists.

- Between their clergy, laypersons, employees and volunteers, Salvation Army has a large pool of human resources from which to draw upon. They anticipate that within a couple days, they can have in the vicinity of 500 persons responding to a local disaster.
- Similar to the manner in which the City relies upon the provincial and then the federal government for resources, the Salvation Army's first response is made within their local plan and resources. If the event overwhelms those, resources may quickly be moved to Winnipeg from the Division (Manitoba and North West Ontario) and then from the Territorial level (Canada and Bermuda).
- We agreed that operationally it is important that despite senior personnel from Divisional or Territorial levels taking charge of overall Winnipeg response plans in the event of a large-scale disaster, we need to maintain communication and working level relationships during an emergency response at the same position level as in the pre-disaster phase. Our plans are being built upon the familiarity and trust of working relationships - those cannot be supplanted during the chaotic response phase.
- Salvation Army has a small pool of volunteer coordinators working at various sites that would be called in to coordinate the volunteer effort in the event of a disaster. Coordinating those efforts with those of the EHSS volunteer coordinator is an area for future exploration.
- Approximately 25 clergy – officers – are available for personal / counseling services. EHSS is interested in such resources so that they may be coordinated (not controlled or limited) with other personal services resources e.g. social workers may be more suited to providing short-term crisis counseling, and leaving grief counseling to clergy. This is an area Jeff will continue to explore.

At our next meeting scheduled for March 9 at 1:15 pm in the EOC, we will continue to get at resources and response capacity by walking through various scenarios. We hope to also begin to address communication issues and needs as well as Salvation Army "philosophy / values". Our meeting of March 21 will be held at Booth Centre so that EHSS personnel can get a first hand look at Salvation Army facilities.

Appendix E

March 6, 2000 Meeting - Red Cross and City EHSS Meeting 3

Red Cross: Judith Weaver Wright, Angela Sawh, Shelley Malyk

Community Services: Frank Caldwell, Joe Egan, Gail Doherty, Damon Johnston

Angela led a presentation on Registration and Inquiry services, addressing purpose, objectives, roles, disaster response and volunteer recruitment. We used the material to explore areas of joint interest and deepen understanding of respective service systems. Major points that were derived from the presentation and discussion were:

- The purpose and objectives for R+I are at odds with using the service as a means of eligibility for disaster financial assistance. Although done in the past (97 Flood), Red Cross does not intend to see this practice repeated.
- Release of information to police, utility agencies and government services is also out of sync with R+I objectives (other perhaps than to release info re: numbers and demographic breakdowns). To release names and personal information breaks the implied state of trust inherent in the relationship between disaster victim and the Red Cross. EHSS fully supports this position. (The issue of who “owns” the data, is resolved – R+I data gathered to meet the 2 objectives of Registration and Inquiry is owned by the collector – Red Cross, for the sole purpose of meeting those objectives. Any decisions re: using it for other purposes would need to be closely weighed / scrutinized by Red Cross and EHSS.)
- As a later follow-up, we’ll explore the idea of a revised form that would be initially used for R+I, duplicating what is already on that card, the same size, colour, etc. If the registered disaster victim requires other ESS services, the R+I data would then be torn off leaving a copy to be passed on to the next service stop i.e. lodging. That way, the same info is not being requested twice within a matter of minutes and we can create efficiencies in systems. Angela is going to see if she can track down a copy of the form used in B.C. that she and Gail might be able to review.
- Registration is done manually; a computerized system is maintained within the CRIB, responsible for research and response to inquiries (number of inquiries in Manitoba relocations has not been very high). In '97, the CRIB / call centre received many calls for information of all sorts. Attempts were made to answer them, however, they overwhelmed the system, which was not really set up or staffed to handle these calls. We think that with improved communications between our organizations, these problems will get aired and potential solutions generated – for example, refer some types of calls to another source.
- Red Cross will explore ESS (and others’) system of having a trained “scribe” assist administrators too busy to “log” all the essential detail that they face during a disaster response.

- Similar to the manner in which the City relies upon the provincial and then the federal government for resources, the Red Cross' first response is made within their local plan and resources. If the event overwhelms those, resources are called upon from Western Zone (headquartered in Calgary) and then National (Ottawa). When that occurs, the Regional Director maintains overall responsibility, remaining in charge of the response. Despite occasional attempts to do otherwise, other (even senior) bodies arrive as "delegations" to assist, not take over operations.
- We agreed that operationally it is important that despite senior personnel from senior organizational levels arriving, we need to maintain communication and working level relationships during an emergency response at the same position level as in the pre-disaster phase. Our plans are being built upon the familiarity and trust of working relationships - those cannot be supplanted during the chaotic response phase.
- We are building in flexibility and redundancy of personnel in our joint plans, recognizing that because of limited resources, particularly during an emergency response, it isn't always possible for one individual to attend all meetings, address all issues. Therefore, we have several people "at the table" right now building that level of familiarity and trust so that during response, we can freely attend one another's meetings / control centers, etc.
- Red Cross currently has approximately 300 volunteers in their database that have received some training in R+I. Volunteer training occurs about every 10 months and runs 3 day-long sessions for a dozen participants. A short, 30 minute instructional session on how to complete a Registration card can be rolled out in the event more volunteers are required for the function on an immediate basis. (It would be beneficial for EHSS for Gail, Brian, and Damon to attend the day training when available.)
- It is unclear as to why and what area of operations called for Critical Incident Stress Debriefing during the '97 flood. This is an area EHSS is building resources for and needs to ensure that staff and volunteers working in disaster relief have as an available resource.

At our next meeting (March 16th 1:15 pm in the EOC), we'll look at the issue of "Flood Problems". I've attached a copy of those that I know of from the ESS perspective (taken out of my Practicum Proposal) and hope that Red Cross can recall others – our objective is to improve our joint operations.

ESS Flood Problems

These issues set the context for my Practicum and are therefore, summarized below. It is not my intent to explore or analyze them at this point; that will become part of the joint process of building effective working relationships and agreements. Additionally, the list is incomplete. It only includes problems identified by ESS, not by the Red Cross and Salvation Army.

- Understanding between ESS and its partners rests on historical, verbal arrangements between agency personnel long gone. Roles, responsibilities, expectations, and communication systems and practices are not shared;
- Personnel from the Red Cross national headquarters took over local Red Cross operations. They were unfamiliar with Winnipeg procedures creating additional requirements for clarification, communication and discussions during a chaotic period;
- In the Flood preparation stage, Red Cross personnel announced they intended to do more than the Registration and Inquiry function of emergency response; they held a news conference in front of the City's Evacuation Centre announcing that would be the location they (Red Cross) would receive and assist flood victims;
- Several days into flood reception duties, Red Cross advised that their volunteer staff were overwhelmed with the work, had become stressed and required Critical Incident Stress Debriefing;
- ESS did not notify the Red Cross when Winnipeg Police Services "registered" St. Norbert evacuees, usurping the Red Cross role and making their registration information incomplete;
- Communications systems and procedures between ESS and its partner agencies was poor:
 - Communication between ESS and the Salvation Army was unplanned, infrequent and sporadic. Many days went by without contact;
 - At one point in the midst of flood operations, the Red Cross failed to return ESS phone calls for several days;
 - ESS held daily briefings to keep staff abreast of developments and to engage in collective problem solving. Neither the Red Cross nor Salvation Army was invited to attend.
- Following flood operations, the Red Cross expressed their displeasure in a media article (Winnipeg Sun, July 21, 1997) noting the working relationship with the City was ineffective.

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

Table 1

Question 1 Can you describe / list ways Frank attempted to make the agreement satisfactory to both parties?

<p>Salvation Army <i>Director of Residential Services</i></p>	<p>Salvation Army <i>Coordinator of Disaster Services</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - involved key players from City & Army in all preliminary meetings; - held meetings at various key sites for each organization so they could see what each had to work with; - spent a lot of time getting to know mandates and response capacities of each organization - meeting notes were circulated well in advance of the next meeting so they could be adequately reviewed; - ran through various scenarios to see how each organization would respond; - spent some time sharing flood reports of each organization and attempting to address some of the areas for recommended change; - brainstorming exercise at one of the first meetings and keeping track of our progress on issues raised by this exercise. 	<p>Frank attempted to make the agreement satisfactory to both parties by trying to establish open communication at the very first meeting. The brainstorming exercise allowed all participants to have their voice be heard. At the meeting that followed, Frank ensured that all issues were addressed and that any time an issue was raised that it was dealt with to the satisfaction of the person who raised the concern. This approach was taken through to the conclusion of the agreement being finalized.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Emergency Feeding / Clothing</i></p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Personal Services</i></p>
<p>Frank was able to develop and maintain an open and mature relationship with the Salvation Army. He provides honesty and good communication process and showed a willingness to explore other points of view, an ability to confront issues in a positive and constructive manner.</p>	<p>There was a very successful exercise used to both brainstorm ideas, which served to identify members' views and bring common themes together for further exploration. Each participant was asked to identify what would be important to an agreement and write down their ideas. A range of ideas were placed on a board and where clarification was required the individual who forwarded the idea spoke to it in further detail. Common ideas/themes were placed together for the purposes of subsequent discussion and this helped to move forward the process of identifying key issues to be addressed in the agreement.</p> <p>Each meeting was followed by recorded notes and summary.</p> <p>The start of every meeting had an agenda and clarification of any outstanding issues arising from the previous meeting was sought.</p>

Canadian Red Cross Regional Director	Canadian Red Cross Coordinator, Disaster Services
<p>Frank used several different methods to ensure the agreement was satisfactory to both parties.</p> <p>During our "large group discussions" when an issue was presented by one party he always asked the other party if they felt it was an issue for them. He would then ensure that the issue was recorded as well as what action was required and by whom. Also in these discussions Frank would often repeat back to the group what he was hearing as well as telling us how he was recording the discussion</p> <p>While the primary goal of these discussions was to have a written agreement between the City of Winnipeg and Red Cross, Frank was well aware that this could not happen without some relationship repairs. He remained very flexible during these conversations, allowing individuals to speak about personal feelings on past issues yet moved us along through the process in a gentle manner.</p> <p>When we came to a road block (financial implications) Frank was able to achieve consensus on leaving this issue out of the agreement through lots of listening, behind the scenes research and consultation with all individuals.</p> <p>In short - Frank created an atmosphere of trust with his diligence to the project and his non-aggressive, tactful manner.</p>	<p>Frank was able to ensure satisfaction of both parties through the following activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - brainstorming sessions; - group discussions; - ensuring consensus; - ensuring opportunities throughout each meeting for sharing of ideas and/or thoughts. <p>These kinds of activities lead to mutual understanding and agreement by all parties involved.</p>

Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Registration and Inquiry</i>	Emergency Social Services <i>R and I Team Member</i>
<p>From the first meeting with the Red Cross and throughout the process and subsequent meetings, Frank acted as a facilitator:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To foster team building - To identify lessons learned from previous experiences and potential for improvement - Identify areas of mutual interest or concern - Define roles and responsibilities - Work toward an agreement. 	<p>Frank kept the discussion open and encouraged everyone's participation. In our early sessions, he led us in flipchart and clustering exercises that helped us to identify concerns, but also broke the ice, since not all of us had worked together before. He would re-frame questions or topics for additional clarity and check back with a speaker to make sure that he had "heard" their message. Documentation from all of our sessions followed promptly upon them, while the information was fresh in our minds. We were encouraged to send him comments or corrections as required or necessary.</p>
Emergency Social Services <i>Public Aid Coordinator</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - solicited input from both parties; - sought clarification of issues; - everyone's opinion or thoughts counted; - ensured that all participants were given the opportunity to share their ideas and thoughts; - listened and responded; - sought out "experts" i.e. Law Department; - heavy research; - used email and other communication means effectively. 	

Question 2 Is the Agreement satisfactory to you? How?

Salvation Army <i>Director of Residential Services</i>	Salvation Army <i>Coordinator of Disaster Services</i>
<p>Yes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A lot of time was spent in understanding our mission and being sensitive to this in the agreement and I feel this is one of the real strengths of the agreement. - It deals specifically with feeding but also acknowledges the possibility of other types of responses and has established a mechanism so that discussions and preparations can continue in this area. - Clearly states what the city expects of us but is open ended enough to allow us to develop other responses as circumstances develop and not be restricted or controlled by the City. 	<p>Yes.</p> <p>Our objectives were realized in that The Salvation Army is very positive in that we have a role to play that has been formalized and with which we are very comfortable.</p> <p>The agreement is consistent with the mission of The Salvation Army and Frank was very anxious that this be addressed throughout the development of the agreement.</p> <p>It does further the work of the Salvation army, in that it defines our role and the continued working relationship that will be an outcome of the agreement.</p>

<p>Emergency Social Services Chief of Emergency Feeding / Clothing</p> <p>The agreement is very satisfactory both to myself and the Department at large. The agreement is a breakthrough, as the City never had any type of an agreement of this kind. The agreement will help establish a strong link between Salvation Army, the City, and its other partners. The agreement will fulfill a strong partnership that will result in a well-coordinated response to a disaster.</p>	<p>Emergency Social Services Chief of Personal Services</p> <p>The agreement is satisfactory and achieves the objective of providing a sound framework for the two organizations to respond to emergency situations. Clarity was brought forward both in the understanding of the capacities of the organizations to deal with emergency situations as well as further understanding mandates, identifying weaknesses and areas which require further address outside the agreement. As the City of Winnipeg has undergone significant changes in structure over the past 12 months, the agreement provides a strong anchor for the mandated level of government along with its most important partner.</p>
<p>Canadian Red Cross Regional Director</p> <p>While the agreement does not address an area of concern for Red Cross (financial) I would still consider it successful. I believe that all the participants at the table are aware of the importance of this issue and I expect it to be resolved satisfactorily.</p>	<p>Canadian Red Cross Coordinator, Disaster Services</p> <p>The agreement is satisfactory to us because it addresses the main concerns that were identified in the first meeting held between Red Cross and the City of Winnipeg.</p> <p>The sessions held to form the agreement have created an understanding and trust between Red Cross and the City of Winnipeg. The fact that the agreement was completed, ensures continuation of achieving identified goals because it names the processes and systems to achieve them. In that respect, the agreement achieves the objective identified. It is consistent with our organization's mandate and mission.</p> <p>The agreement will, once implemented, further the work of the Rd Cross because it enables the Red Cross to continue to play a role in the community during times of disaster, and it's existence makes the Red Cross position to work with the City of Winnipeg a real, tangible thing.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services Chief of Registration and Inquiry</p> <p>I believe the draft agreement we currently have which was compiled by Frank forms the foundation of what was required from this endeavor. I believe the agreement clearly reflects the commitment and expectations of the City and the Red Cross with regard to emergency response.</p>	<p>Emergency Social Services R and I Team Member</p> <p>The agreement is satisfactory to me. It clarifies responsibilities, and is consistent with goals. The clarification should make it possible to work together more effectively in times of emergency. The agreement also outlines steps that can be taken to build bridges before an emergency takes place and sets out some formal mechanisms to ensure communication occurs regularly.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services Public Aid Coordinator</p> <p>Yes. Achieved objectives. Consistent with our mandate/mission. Increases both organizations' profile. The citizens of Winnipeg will be better served in the next emergency. Our Emergency Plan is stronger and more effective.</p>	

Question 3 How has this agreement and the work done between organizations to achieve it, improved working relations between members of City of Winnipeg, Emergency Health and Social Services and Red Cross / Salvation Army? Describe how you think it may improve the way you work together in the future.

<p>Salvation Army <i>Director of Residential Services</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It clearly defines what the City expects from us (feeding) and doesn't leave us trying to find our role in this but at the same times leaves us free to make other responses as we feel circumstances dictate. - Interagency meeting will hopefully improve communications between all agencies. - To date has just improved communication between City and Army; hopefully interagency meeting will improve communications with other organizations. - We have a name, face and have met the key people and similarly they have met and know the key people in our organization. We know who to call. - Formal procedures have been set in place to involve key people in the necessary communication. - This agreement has forced the Army to better define its role and the role of key personnel within our organization. 	<p>Salvation Army <i>Coordinator of Disaster Services</i></p> <p>The agreement and the work done in its development between the City and The Salvation Army will help to ensure a good working relationship in the long term in that the modeling of this relationship took place during the development of the agreement. The improvement of the working relationship in the future is evident in that the trust has been developed and the mechanism is in place for ongoing meetings to maintain the excellent level of communication that was a product of the agreement exercise.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Emergency Feeding / Clothing</i></p> <p>This agreement has created partnerships among groups that previously worked independent of one another. Today, we will have a good working relationship, which will respond in a coordinated manner. The agreement has helped establish a more comfortable and stronger working relationship between the Salvation Army and my connection with them in my role as Chief of Feeding and Clothing.</p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Personal Services</i></p> <p>The process of formulating the agreement in examining structures and philosophy provided a much better understanding of The Salvation Army organization and should greatly further the ability of our organization to work in conjunction with this partner agency. Prior to this process, I had only a limited and quite narrow view of the Army. I now have a much better appreciation of its internal structure, its ability to respond and its strong commitment as a partner in emergency response. This appreciation was only gained after several exploratory meetings, which while serving the function of formulating the agreement also provided important review of their organization. As the individual responsible for Personal Services I now have several contacts which are essential for any future activities. This includes preplanning which is essential for effective response.</p>

<p>Canadian Red Cross <i>Regional Director</i></p>	<p>Canadian Red Cross <i>Coordinator, Disaster Services</i></p>
<p>Having frequent meetings with the same individuals usually allows opportunities for relationship building. What I liked about this process was that we met in different locations and were able to see everyone in their work environment. It was helpful to personalize the process.</p> <p>After completing this contract, I feel very comfortable in speaking to any member of our working group on an issue that may arise. This was not the case before the process. We have discovered that we often "travel in the same circles" and have already had opportunities to say hello in casual settings. It all helps to keep the communication lines open.</p>	<p>By establishing the agreement, both the City and The Red Cross have a solid framework for disaster response in the City of Winnipeg. This ensures for future disaster responses that both parties have an understanding of what they can expect from each other. This point enables Red Cross to assign anybody to the position, while the understanding remains. It also enables the City to enjoy consistency from the Red Cross in delivering it's service.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Registration and Inquiry</i></p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>R and I Team Member</i></p>
<p>These exercises have fostered great communication between the parties and give the feeling of a joint effort, common goal and a cohesive unit.</p>	<p>The process that led to writing the Agreement ensured that we would have a better understanding of requirements and roles. We got to know each other as we listened to ideas and opinions. We developed respect for each other as a group of colleagues working towards a common goal. I think I would be much more comfortable now in calling up one of the Red Cross people, or following up on a concern with them. The Agreement itself also provides clarity about who is responsible for what services. Clarity "greases the wheels" in time of emergency.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Public Aid Coordinator</i></p>	
<p>The Working Agreement process served as a catalyst for the organizations to meet on a regular basis. There is no doubt that the organizations and the City of Winnipeg have closer working relationships, are more knowledgeable of each others' capabilities and are more prepared to meet the needs of the citizens of Winnipeg.</p> <p>In the next disaster there is no doubt we will see better communication, improved delivery of service and overall coordination that will make everyone's roles and responsibility easier to handle.</p> <p>During this process numerous other issues and ideas arose e.g. financial issues, marketing ideas that will also make our program more effective.</p>	

Question 4 Can you describe / provide examples of how Frank demonstrated open communication, cooperation and respect?

<p>Salvation Army <i>Director of Residential Services</i></p> <p>- very patient in getting to know and understand our organization even when from time to time we had to go back and get ourselves organized or gave conflicting messages at different meetings; - very open to exploring other partnerships we could be involved in - found Frank to be always tactful and trying to understand where we were coming from while at the same time maintaining the leadership position that the City has to take in this agreement. Frank took the time to understand us and us understand them and build the necessary trust relationships before we began to try and put in writing our intentions; Frank didn't assume anything; if he didn't understand something, he asked for clarification; - in the first meeting, Frank explained his dual role, which included his University project; - Frank went over every point of the agreement so that we all understood how each other saw it and was always very open to suggested changes.</p>	<p>Salvation Army <i>Coordinator of Disaster Services</i></p> <p>Frank demonstrated open communication, cooperation and respect throughout the development of the agreement (as discussed in question #1). Frank was very patient with all members of the development team no matter whether they were from the City or The S.A.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Emergency Feeding / Clothing</i></p> <p>Frank's communication, cooperation, and respect for the project were excellent. His skill as a facilitator was put to good use in all of our meetings. His ability to write the agreement and minutes of meetings, which were done succinctly and quickly, was very good. Frank showed a great ability to listen and hear what others were saying. He was able to clarify content and innuendo by asking questions and paraphrasing the person's words. Everyone was satisfied with their input.</p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Personal Services</i></p> <p>I felt the Salvation Army's input into the agreement was successfully included by the request for input, clarification and the exploration of issues. As mentioned the brainstorming exercise allowed input for all members and no opinions were dismissed but rather embodied into common themes. The meeting were conducted in a casual yet purposeful fashion where open communication was encouraged with the posing of questions and requests for feedback on the formulation of ideas and clarification of roles.</p>
<p>Canadian Red Cross <i>Coordinator, Disaster Services</i></p> <p>At each meeting held regarding the development of the agreement, Frank consistently reviewed the previous meeting's notes and asked if there were any points missing or misrepresented. He then proceeded to outline what he thought might be a good way to proceed, always asking the group for approval of the process. I think this initial style developed trust amongst the group members with Frank leading the process. As the discussion took place, Frank listened to each person and clarified points to ensure what he heard</p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Registration and Inquiry</i></p> <p>The thing that struck me most was the commitment to open communication. Frank would frequently use the following types of phrases to encourage further dialogue or to probe further into a particular topic: - What do you think about that..... - How does that affect your ability to... - What impact would that have on..... - Would that cause any problem.... Etc.</p>

<p>was what was meant. He drew out from the discussion what he determined as key points and verified this with the group. This aspect was a successful process for clear communication of ideas or points, cooperation for all to listen, which led to respect amongst the members themselves.</p>	
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>R and I Team Member</i></p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Public Aid Coordinator</i></p>
<p>Frank was especially good when we had to define areas of concern, where cooperation had failed or communication did not occur as it should. Because his manner was "problem-solving" rather than "blaming", people were able to speak honestly. His ability to rephrase commentary to ensure that he (and we) understood the idea or concern clearly also helped us.</p>	<p>Similar to Number 1. The document was always open for changes. Very patient in ensuring the wording was acceptable.</p>

Question 5. Please make any additional comments related to referenced Practicum Objectives and Frank's contribution to achieving them. Feel free to describe any problems that arose.

<p>Salvation Army <i>Coordinator of Disaster Services</i></p>	<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Chief of Personal Services</i></p>
<p>I was very pleased with the method used, and the resulting agreement. Frank gave excellent leadership to this project</p>	<p>I think Frank did an excellent job of facilitating a consensus on what members felt would be important to include in the agreement. In some cases this involved taking philosophical and/or abstract views and translating them into tangible, concrete points which were included in the final agreement.</p>
<p>Emergency Social Services <i>Public Aid Coordinator</i></p>	
<p>I was impressed and felt I learned much from observing the process Frank used to achieve what would be described as a very thorough and progressive document. Three organizations made the time to ensure that a sound product was created. To close, I feel extremely comfortable in stating that The Salvation Army, the Red Cross and the City of Winnipeg have begun a process to clearly demonstrate the true meaning of the word partnership.</p>	

Interview Responses**Table 2**

Interview questions (attached as Appendix C) were forwarded to respondents prior to the interview. Responses have been edited for brevity and clarity. All substantive information has been retained.

Authors and their responses are identified as noted below.

RC1	Ms. Judith Weaver Wright Regional Director Canadian Red Cross	RC2	Ms. Angela Sawh Coordinator Disaster Services Canadian Red Cross
SA1	Captain David Oldford Executive Director Community and Residential Services The Salvation Army	SA2	Mr. Don Timmerman Coordinator Disaster Services The Salvation Army
ESS1	Mr. Joe Egan Public Aid Coordinator Community Services Department City of Winnipeg		

Emergency Management

Question 1 Would you consider we have achieved the objective recommended by KPMG to develop a community approach to emergency management? How / Why?

- RC1 We are on our way to achieving that objective. A community approach is an evolving one, part of a process of building with multiple organizations.
- RC2 We have achieved a much better understanding between our two areas. We need to continue the inter-agency process we have spoken of in order to clarify and understand the roles and responsibilities of all the local players.
Part of a community approach is knowing your partners and we have developed that part well between the City and Red Cross.
- SA1 Yes, for the most part.
We have made inroads between Salvation Army and the City. Now, we need to make connections between other agencies, such as the Red Cross. Then we'll be able to say we're on our way to a community approach.
- SA2 Yes. We have come a long way toward developing better communication and operating mechanisms between our organizations.
- ESS1 Yes, we have come a long way from where we used to be in this area. In the past, we have not attempted to create such close ties with our partners. This is a beginning. We need to continue, to build a volunteer base, to build an inter-agency base, leading to less reliance on us and more of a community effort.

Question 2. How do you think the issue of "trust" plays into decision-making in emergency preparedness and response?

- RC1 We talk in terms of organizational decisions, but it is people making those decisions, and when people make decisions, we tend to second-guess them. With our enhanced level of familiarity, perhaps we won't be so quick to second-guess decisions in a negative sense. We'll act more quickly in support of decisions.
- RC2 Joe (Public Aid Coordinator) knows we're not going to run out and cross jurisdictions in a media interview again. We can feel more confident in one another's areas of expertise.
- SA1 Trust plays a big part in decisions and organizational relations. Knowing persons as individuals and professionals means we have been able to share sensitive information, creating stronger bonds. As a result, we feel that our working relationship improves our organizational efforts. We have contracts with other organizations that are 20 pages in length; in them, we give lip service to "partnership" and then spend pages spelling out how we are expected to do our work. That's not trust, or a particularly effective relationship.
- SA2 Communication is the key to trust. Kind of a chicken-egg thing, one engenders the other. Without a level of trust, our organizations just don't speak, we don't prepare plans together and hence, we don't have a coordinated effort.
- ESS1 As we have gotten to know personnel in partner agencies, we have become better acquainted with respective roles, tasks and challenges. When they're faced with a challenge from their national

headquarters on something being done here, they'll be more confident in advising that they have trust in the direction chosen by their partner.

Question 3. Is your organization in an improved state of emergency preparedness? What indicators would you point to, to show that is the case?

- RC1 Yes, we now have a much better understanding of the City's expectations and we're prepared to meet them.
- RC2 We were ready all along. Our discussions and agreement means that we now better understand how we fit into the City's plan and what their requirements / expectations will be of us.
- SA1 No question. This recent work has forced us to have a look at our preparedness levels in different areas of our operation. We haven't really done that since the flood; we needed the time to separate from the emotional baggage of that event. Now, we have refocused our efforts on getting better prepared for the next one. A big improvement we've made is in our ability to meet the needs of our own staff, the caregivers whom we didn't look after well enough in past.
- SA2 Yes, we have gained a much greater appreciation of overall emergency requirements, and in part, that has prompted us to develop our own plans further than they have been to date. For example, reviewing and updating our manuals because we're sharing them with you, developing new training opportunities and emergency job descriptions.
- ESS1 Absolutely. Roles, who is doing what is much sharper. We have much stronger R+I and feeding programs. We know our partners; we have significantly enhanced communications with them – the key to a more coordinated response – and have plans for maintaining those improved systems. I think problem solving will be improved as we have access to more information as well as more resources.

Inter-Organizational Coordination

Question 1 Was there any point in our meetings/negotiations, that you felt your organization (or ours) was hesitant or resistant to entering into a formal, contractual relationship wherein the City of Winnipeg might be in charge of how you conduct operations. Please expand – when did it occur? How was it characterized?

- RC1 We are guided in our daily work by the Fundamental Principles of our organization, which include concepts of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. These principles occasionally prevent us from working in concert with some others, whose mission may be at odds, for example, groups who want to change the beliefs of persons. Occasionally, we're asked to consider resource sharing with other non-profits; we don't get into arrangements that might compromise us, that might threaten the security of our financial base. Entering into any kind of partnership is difficult, but less so with the City; you represent the total citizenry and have their overall good in mind. We were hesitant in the beginning, until we learned more about what was being asked and considered.
- RC2 Our initial hesitation was grounded in the unknown. We weren't sure what was going to be asked of us. More importantly, we were not sure we could negotiate; what if we said we didn't like something, was the City simply going to walk away and decide not to work with us.
- SA1 Resistance to linking with other groups is usually bound in a fear of the loss of image, of position and person, what I call loss of "edifice". You don't want to get swallowed up in a grey mass of social services and lose your identity. In the business of social services, we're also in competition

for funds. Some partnerships may threaten our position, our funding sources. Neither of these were issues with the City.

SA2 We went into negotiations with an open mind. We put some issues on the table in the brainstorming session, such as fund-raising and volunteer recruitment. These were explored, the City wasn't interested and that wasn't a problem, wasn't a threat to us.

ESS1 No. The Red Cross still has an outstanding financial issue, but that has been an organizational need more than a point of hesitating about an agreement.

Question 2. How was the resistance reduced or eliminated (if it was)?

RC1 Our first meeting set the stage for what was / could be discussed. Our fears of being requested to act as "host" to outside community evacuees was eliminated. We needed the opportunity to discuss our principles as they applied to R+I and its two primary purposes. We got that and full support for them from the City. That went a long way to eliminate any hesitancy.

RC2 As we worked together through the meetings, we did develop a sense of knowing one another much better, a sense of trust. That reduced any hesitancy Red Cross had. We also have in our Act, the statement that we will act "as an auxiliary to government". So, in terms of a contract with government, it's really just in keeping with our mission.

Question 3. If there never were any perceived threat to organizational autonomy, how would you account for that?

SA1 There's no doubt The Salvation Army has not always worked closely with other organizations, thinking that we can do it all on our own. It really is up to the head person, the Commander to set the organizational tone and direction. Currently, that direction means we are looking for mutual ground with other human service organizations, looking to support one another's ministries. We see partnerships at our core, working as equals with other groups to the common good. As a large organization, we are aware of the inequality of power among organizations; we are neither interested in taking over or overshadowing smaller agencies, nor worried that will happen to us.

SA2 We didn't feel that we had a lot to lose if things didn't work out. The Salvation Army isn't dependent upon the City for a role to play in an emergency. If we didn't communicate in the first place, or eventually reach an agreement, the Army would be out there anyway in the next big event. We would be less coordinated in our efforts, and hence, less effective in terms of an overall response, but we'd be there. If the City had chosen to leave out the clause on "additional services", the agreement wouldn't have been as comfortable for us – I'm not sure where that would have left us.

ESS1 We found ways to get around potential issues, to satisfy partners needs so they didn't need to feel hesitant or threatened. Frank explored underlying causes, interests, and brought out workable alternatives. We have managed to define the term partnership, working as equals rather than one organization controlling another.